

This vol. (8) is
also reserved
for 'Philosophy
East and West'
articles



() Philosophy East and West Vol. 10:

The way to proceed is to mention your idea casually to a fellow teacher not in the form of a statement but as a question. If your proposal sounds impracticable he will quietly tell you and you will be spared embarrassment.

()) Even the psychological value of physical adjustment which is attained through Zen meditation practise was recognized by Dewey through Dr. F.M. Alexander who taught him a posture and a way of breathing which enabled Professor Dewey to work at his desk and to carry on his life more comfortably and effectively.

() There is in Zen the full acceptance of this life here and now as all there is, yet filled with all there could be for one who is awakened.

University of California

It is a pleasure to receive your letter of the 15th.

I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time.

I will try to get back to you as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

John F. Kennedy

(The following is a list of the names of the members of the committee.)

John F. Kennedy, Chairman

Robert F. Kennedy, Vice Chairman

Edward Kennedy, Secretary

John F. Kennedy, Treasurer

John F. Kennedy, Member

John F. Kennedy, Member

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John F. Kennedy, Member

From Phil E. S.W.

() I have chosen five passages from the works of Ramana Maharshi, he is so typically Indian in his manner of discourse that these passages will probably provide a fairly rigorous test. The first is, the devotee asks what is moksha? Maharshi replies, "Moksha is to know that you are not born." Then Maharshi quotes, "Be still and know that I am God." To be still is not to think. ✓ Know and not think is the [?]Word. Second test: We learn here something about the relation of moksha to reality. At the same time we are being taught to consider~~r~~ liberation primarily as experience. There is an unquestionable link between the experience of moksha and the metaphysics ^{a?} of Brahmin and Atman. Third test: We note that our understanding of moksha has been furthered by learning that ✓ liberation is not only a state of ^Aabsolute ^BReality but that this state is conscious and blissful even though it is absolute and relationless. Fourth test: Seems to approach the experience in terms of activity which is either observable or at least related to the kind of experience with which we are normally familiar.

1. The first question that arises in the mind of the student is, "What is the purpose of this course?" The answer is, "The purpose of this course is to provide a comprehensive introduction to the study of the history of the United States, from the early colonial period to the present day. The course will cover the major events, figures, and movements that have shaped the nation's development. It will also explore the social, economic, and cultural forces that have influenced the course of American history. The student will gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of the American experience and the role of the individual in the larger context of the nation's history. The course will be taught through a combination of lectures, readings, and discussions, and will culminate in a final examination and a research paper. The student is encouraged to bring to the course a sense of curiosity and a willingness to engage in thoughtful discussion and debate. The course is designed to be both challenging and rewarding, and we hope that it will provide a valuable and enriching experience for all who participate in it.

The Fifth, and final ~~last~~ passage is where Maharshee denies there is any such thing as liberation itself. This means that [†]The Sage is aware of the existence of such usage. They cannot in this instance be taken as the complete truth about moksha. So Maharshee concludes by utterly contradicting his initial negation that there is no liberation and says there is only mukti and nothing else. As a result of these investigations our understanding of the primary importance of experience in this concept of liberation.

Donald W. Mitchell ANALYSIS IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM

(1) The viewing of Theravada analysis within its religious context and as posited for the specific purpose of liberation cannot be stressed enough. An example of this intent can be seen in the following text from the Mahavagga: "Perceiving this, (the nonexistence of the self) O priests, the learned and noble disciple conceives an aversion ... and in conceiving this aversion he becomes divested of passion, and by the absence of passion he becomes free..."

(2)...the "practice-power," that is, the power by which a man performs what is good and attains enlightened understanding, is not simply the power of the individual ego, the sort of thing a man boasts of as his "willpower." It is, rather, the Bodhi-power or Dharma-power, the Absolute itself conceived as power.

W. Scott Morton THE CONFUCIAN CONCEPT OF MAN: THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION

(3) They (Chinese aristocrats) considered demeanor and bearing to be of great importance, but there is no evidence that physical beauty was looked upon as linked with goodness of soul.

Robert K. Sakai book review of DISTINGUISHING THE WAY: AN ANNOTATED ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE BENDO, by Ogyu Sorai/translated by Olof G. Lidin

(4) "The Way is the Way of the Early Kings," he (Sorai) said. The Way was the creation of the ancient sages who received the mandate to establish peace and contentment under heaven. Therefore it should not be subject to the manipulation of would-be sages; instead scholars should endeavor to understand by study of the ancient texts what the Early Kings had to say. It is interesting to note that he (Sorai) himself believed he had received heavenly assistance in attaining understanding of the Way.

D.J. Kalupahana book review of THE DIAMOND SUTRA AND THE SUTRA OF HUI NENG, transl. by A.F. Price and Wong Mou-Lam

(5) Hui Neng goes to the extent of maintaining that "So far as the Dharma is concerned, the distinction of 'Sudden' and 'Gradual' does not exist."

Gerald J. Larson book review of PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF BENGAL VAISNAVISM: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION by S.C. Chakravarti (6)...finally, far too much attention is given to yet another summary of Samkara's Advaita Vedanta. At least a quarter of the book is devoted to Samkara's rope-snake analogy, vivartavada, adhyasa, etc. Would it perhaps be a sin against the Holy Ghost or a violation of one's dharma to suggest a moratorium on summaries of Samkara? Would not the effort to think creatively and imaginatively be greatly strengthened if one could work in the field of Indian thought without having to do obeisance and to perform ritual repetitions before the altar of Sankaracarya?

Erling Skorpen THE PHILOSOPHY OF RENUNCIATION EAST AND WEST (7) We recall Meister Eckhart's claim of belonging to himself, and his fourteenth century disciple and fellow mystic Heinrich Suso concurred in his account of theistic mysticism: "(A man's) self-annihilation and mystical transport into the pure Godhead do not transform his personal nature into the Godhead in such a way that he becomes essentially one with God. Holiness advances side by side with the self-forgetfulness, which naturally results from contemplative absorption in God, and so the ecstatic soul forgets everything created because God has become its all in all. Although this soul sees everything in God, every creature, nevertheless, retains its own individual substance. There are some blind and inexperienced persons who either cannot or will not take note of this apt distinction."

(8) Suso's recent translator reports: "Whereas earlier German mystics and spiritual writers sought God outside of and above themselves, fourteenth-century mystics, following Meister Eckhart's teaching, sought God primarily in their own soul, in the depths of the spirit, in the 'ground of the soul,' in its 'sparkle,' which is, according to Eckhart's final interpretation, an emanation from and essential part of the divine life."

Such insights based on mystical experience prepared the ground for Western Enlightenment and existentialist distinctions between man's limitless and limited selves.

Kenneth J. Inada WHITEHEAD'S 'ACTUAL ENTITY' AND THE BUDDHA'S ANATMAN

(9) Buddhist literature dramatically records that the would-be Buddha set out to find the answers to (cont'd on photocopy, next page)

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Vol. XXI K. J. INADA ON WHITEHEAD
AND BUDDHA

incompatible, but it would be worth our while to examine them closely. I am quite mindful of the fact that the concept of an actual entity is really the alpha and omega of Whiteheadianism, so that to discuss it means at once to implicate the rest of the concepts abounding in this system of thought. Curiously enough, the same is also true of the doctrine of *anātman*. In this respect both systems are on common ground, and both strictly adhere to the naturalistic rule or creed of the self-sufficiency of the nature of things. The two concepts in question will then be treated as a framework within which the relevances of the respective complementary doctrines will be exhibited.

ACTUAL ENTITY

Whitehead was a man of rare vision. He was profoundly religious. In one of his more famous religious statements, he remarked: "I hazard the prophecy that that religion will conquer which can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact."³ He made this remark quite late in his life, but the idea seems to have haunted him for a long time. Perhaps it is not amiss to say that the deep concern for the temporal fact and what it entails had compelled him to reexamine or re-appraise the whole function of philosophy. Whether he succeeded finally in presenting his case to popular understanding remains an open question, although the challenge is constantly present.

We are easily attracted to the rational and abstractive (symbolic) processes, thinking that one could continue the processes without relating the abstracted elements to the immediacy of concrete events. Whitehead was cognizant of the limitations of logic, language, and the whole symbolic process in man. But, in the ultimate sense, he says there is no "mere awareness, mere private sensation, mere emotion, mere purpose, mere appearance, mere causation."⁴

where the so-called self is taken to be something static, structural, and thus is even looked upon as a lifeless entity. This is the realm of pure abstraction or symbolism. On the other side there is the "bifurcating self" which, by virtue of being thought of in its nature of isolation or independence, continues the process of fragmentation or abstractive discrimination of different realms of existence. The status of an I, an ego, a subject aloof from the experiential process in which it is dynamically involved, is thereby advanced. Thus the process only furthers the whole bifurcating series in the continuity of being. The bifurcating self necessarily relies on the bifurcated self and thus keeps going the perpetual quest for discriminative physical and mental realms and their elements. The true self or *anātman* is not grasped or achieved so long as this quest goes on. It will be seen later in the discussion that the Buddha admonished those who indulge in extremes (*antas*) of all kinds, for they are not able to experience the middle path (*madhyamā pratīpad*).

³ A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 41.

⁴ A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Social Science Book Store, 1941), p. 27.

man's ills by taking up traditional yoga, but later experienced its inadequacy; then he took a different meditative tack and was awakened to the truth of things.

The ultimate truth he gained was the middle doctrine (*madhyamā prati-pad*).²³ It is the ontological principle in Buddhism, for it expresses the nature of the supreme moment of experience in the transient nature of things. It is also the abandonment of abstract metaphysical notions unrelated to that moment. Thus the Buddha declares:

This world, Kaccāyana, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence and on non-existence.

Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world. But he, who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world. Grasping after systems, imprisoned by dogmas is this world, Kaccāyana, for the most part. And the man who does not go after that system-grasping, that mental standpoint, that dogmatic bias, who does not grasp at it, does not take up his stand upon it, [does not think]: 'It is my soul! (*ātman*)' . . . who thinks: . . . 'that which arises is just Ill (*dukkha*), that which passes away is Ill.' . . . this man is not in doubt, is not perplexed. Knowledge herein is his that is not merely another's.'

Thus far, Kaccāyana, he has right view.

Everything exists: . . . this is one extreme. Nothing exists: . . . this is the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme the Tathāgata (i.e., the Buddha) teaches you a doctrine by the middle [way].²⁴

The middle doctrine or way is never a rational or a psychological middle. It is not even a balanced middle between any two points or a middle sought in any quantitative or qualitative analysis. The Buddha's message in the passage above is clearly one of seeking the true unclouded nature of one's own being, a being which is what it is, or in technical terms, the thusness of being (*yathābhūtam*). The Buddha's great insight here is to indicate that man is a constantly bifurcating creature, that he bases his whole epistemological viewpoints upon the two extremes (*anta*) of existence (*bhava*) and nonexistence (*vibhava*, *abhava*). Or, in more common terms, man builds up his world of knowledge by implicitly positing the extremes of something and nothing in the world, and continues to function in the fashion of an "either/or" logic, despite the fact that the world of logic, which is the realm of abstraction, is not always in one-to-one correspondence with the world of reality (*yathābhūtam*). Nevertheless, man grasps at a system which is another form of abstraction because he seeks rational clarity and coherency even at the expense of losing the more basic aspects of the nature of total experience. Thus every view,

²³ Proclaimed in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, V. 420; allegedly the first words of the Buddha at Sarnath, near Banaras.

²⁴ *Samyutta Nikāya* II. 15; also, III. 135. The translation is from *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, trans. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Pali Text Society Translation Series, no. 10 (London: Luzac & Co., 1952), pt. II, pp. 12-13.

concept, or dogma, if unwarily maintained, becomes an abstract entity in an already abstracted framework. The meta-metaphysical series or process knows no end since man constantly bifurcates and, what is more, he is unmindful of his own bifurcated state of being. There is thus a dual aspect in man, who suffers (*duḥkha*) by virtue of his bifurcated state (the I, me, ego, etc.) and the bifurcating process he indulges in. It was against this dual aspect underlying the *ātman* concept that the Buddha revolted, and he substituted in its stead the *anātman* theory. Consequently, the right insight into the rise and passing away of one's own experience belongs to the *anātman*, and is never possible with the *ātman* or self-concept. It is the grasp of the ontological coherency in the total experiential process.

The venerable Rāhula once asked the Buddha: "How, lord, should one know, how should one see, so that in this body, together with its consciousness, and likewise in all external objects, he has no more idea of 'I' and 'mine,' no more leanings to conceit?"²⁵ The Buddha replied:

Whatsoever material object, Rāhula, be it past, future or present, inward or outward, subtle or gross, low or high, far or near, one regards thus: . . . "this is not mine; this am not I; this is not the Self of me," . . . that is seeing things by right insight as they really are.

Thus knowing, Rāhula, thus seeing, in this body, together with its consciousness, and likewise in all external objects, one has no idea of "I" and "mine," no more leanings to conceit.²⁶

On another occasion the Buddha referred to the so-called personal identity claimed by some with respect to the three temporal moments as "merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And of these a Tathāgata (one who has won the truth) makes use indeed, but is not led astray by them."²⁷

The Buddha's dying words allegedly were: "All compounded nature of things is impermanent or subject to decay."²⁸ Immediately after the Buddha's demise, one of the disciples clarified the profound statement thus:

They all, all beings that have life, shall lay
Aside their complex form . . . that aggregation
Of mental and material qualities,
That gives them, or in heaven or on earth,
Their fleeting individuality!
E'en as the teacher . . . being such a one,

²⁵ *Ibid.*, III. 136. *The Book of Kindred Sayings* (London: Luzac & Co., 1954), pt. III, p. 115.

²⁶ *Ibid.* Also, the Nakulapitar section of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. 1-5, carries the same discussion on not setting up a self or an I.

²⁷ *Paṭṭhapada Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, Sutta IX. The translation is from *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol. 2 (London: Luzac & Co., 1956), pt. I, p. 263.

²⁸ *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, II. 120, 156.

origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which is commonly called the Wheel of Life or Becoming. No experience or event, according to this concept, happens in isolation. Each arises from and is within a multidimensional background. Thus the Wheel begins (quite arbitrarily, since any element in it could be taken to be the point of inception) in the following manner:

Conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass, conditioned by activities consciousness; thus conditioned [arises] name-and-shape; and sense arises, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, decay-and-death, grief, suffering . . . even such is the uprising of this entire mass of ill. But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance [arises] ceasing of activities, and thus comes ceasing of this entire mass of ill.³¹

Consequently, the Wheel of Life, similar in nature to the five *skandhas*, can be looked upon as the cause of suffering, but it also can be the basis for a way out. The five *skandhas* and the twelve elements of the Wheel express the empirical nature in man and yet the Buddha, paradoxical as it might seem, expounds the middle doctrine within such a context. In short, the *anātman* must be sought within the becomingness of things. This spirit was captured very well by Buddhaghōṣa quite a few centuries later:

There is no doer (*attā, ātman*) who does the deed (*kamma, karma*);
Nor one who reaps the content (*phala*) of the deed as such.
The aggregates of being (*khandhas, skandhas*) continue to become.
This alone is the correct view [of the reality of experience].³²

Again:

There is suffering (*dukkha, duḥkha*) but none who suffers;
Doing exists but none who does (i.e., no doer)
There is cessation (*nirodha*) but none who ceases (i.e., the extinguished person in the *nirvāṇic* realm)
The path (*magga, mārga*) exists but not the goer (i.e., one who experiences empirical or tangible elements)³³

And thus in a very cryptic way the concept of *anātman* has been advanced. Its discovery must be considered one of the greatest insights by an Asian. Many of us are only now feeling its full impact.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the actual entity and *anātman* are dynamic concepts and, consequently, that they do not lend themselves to any static description or analysis. This does not mean, however, that all descriptive or analytic attempts or devices must be ruled out completely. These are vitally important, espe-

³¹ *The Book of Kindred Sayings*, pt. II, p. 13.

³² *Visuddhimagga* XIX. 602.

³³ *Ibid.*, XVI. 513.

(10) The Buddha,
Unequaled among all the men that are,
Successor of the prophets of old time,
Mighty by wisdom, and in insight clear ...
Hath died!

(11)...both men (Buddha and Whitehead) disdained to resort to school metaphysics, since it would lead to more problems and result in inane descriptions.

(12)The Buddha always invoked the principle of indeterminacy or indescribability (avyakrita) when anything definitive or absolute was demanded, because he saw that definitive answers on the abstractive or symbolic level only vitiate the temporal fact in passage.

(13)...the Buddha's middle doctrine includes the notion of mutuality or mutual immanence since it denies the assertion of extremes (antas) of every conceivable type, such as eternalism and nihilism, permanence and impermanence, existence and nonexistence. In the denial there is an affirmation of the 'middle' ground present in all experiential arisings.

Donald W. Mitchell book review of STUDIES IN THE BUDDHISTIC CULTURE OF INDIA by Lalmani Joshi

(14)Kumarila seems to have a more profound and accurate grasp of the Buddhist position than Samkara, as Joshi quickly points out. In fact, Joshi makes a strong case that Samkara was influenced by Madhyamika thought through his teacher, Guadapada (who tried to synthesize Buddhism and Vedanta). He points out that while Samkara claims that Madhyamika was "unworthy of refutation" his concepts of maya and of the "non-dual" come very close to the Madhyamika views.

(15)One of the most outstanding of the factors in the fall of Buddhism was that the Mahayana, in order to make room for the laity, laid emphasis on image worship, prayers, incantations, pompous ceremonies and rituals, blurring the distinctions between Buddhism and popular Hinduism. In the end, Buddhism in India was assimilated into Hinduism.

(10) The Buddha, unanalysed among all the world's great religions, and in insight clear ...

Let's look:

(11) ... both men (Buddha and Mitchell) claimed to report to school metaphysics, since it would lead to more problems and results in some descriptions.

(12) The Buddha always invoked the principle of indeterminacy or indeterminability (svabhava) when making definitive or absolute was demanded, because he saw that definitive statements on the qualitative or symbolic level only violate the temporal fact in language.

(13) ... the Buddha's middle doctrine includes the notion of actuality or natural immutability since it denies the essential of extremes (states) of every conceivable type, such as existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence, and consciousness and non-consciousness. In the final there is an affirmation of the 'middle' ground between all extremes.

David W. Mitchell book review of THE MIDDLE WAY by ...

(14) ... Buddha seems to have a more profound and accurate grasp of the Buddhist position than scholars, as I can quickly point out. In fact, I can make a strong case that ... was influenced by Buddhism's thought through his teaching. ... (who tried to synthesize Buddhism and Vedanta) ... he points out that while scholars claim that Buddhism was "unworthy of attention" his concepts of a ... and of the "non-dual" come very close to the Buddhist view.

(15) One of the most astonishing of the factors in the fall of Buddhism was that the Mahayana, in order to make room for the deity, laid emphasis on image worship, prayers, incense-burns, elaborate ceremonies and rituals, blurring the distinction between Buddhist and popular Hinduism. In the end, ... in India was assimilated into Hinduism.

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The treatment Mādhyamika has received from its ancient opponents and modern discussants is, in one respect, as peculiar as the way in which it handled the views against which its criticisms were directed. Far from admitting that they must either refute the Mādhyamika objections or concede defeat, most classical systems either ignored Nāgārjuna's incisive and forceful attacks, or contented themselves with answering one or two specific objections, or tried rather ineptly to discredit the Mādhyamika method of refutation. Unsympathetic modern writers such as A. B. Keith have remarked briefly and categorically that this method is sophistic, but have not attempted to demonstrate their charge in detail. Sympathetic authorities such as T. R. V. Murti have shown clearly and concretely how this destructive dialectic works, but have not subjected to a searching examination its claim to demolish all constructive philosophical views (*dr̥ṣṭi*). If this claim is sound, it will be in order to examine why those philosophies to which it has been applied have not considered themselves refuted. Even if the Mādhyamika claim is false and its methods sophistic, philosophy stands to gain from discovering precisely how this form of sophistry works, and why it seems so formally convincing even while arousing suspicion in the observer.

In American country fairs there used to be a well-known game played with three walnut half-shells and one pea. The operator first held up all three shells for the audience to see. Then he turned all three upside down, placed the pea under one shell, and proceeded to shuffle the shells. When he stopped, a member of the audience would try to guess which shell the pea was under. Nāgārjuna's system resembles the shell game in several ways. Its elements are few and its operations are simple, though performed at lightning speed and with great dexterity. And the very fact that he cannot quite follow each move reinforces the observer's conviction that there is a trick somewhere. The objective of this article is to identify the trick and to determine on some points whether or not it is legitimate.

Nāgārjuna has a standard mechanism for refutation, the pattern of which may be abstracted as follows: You say that *c* relates *A* and *B*. *A* and *B* must be either completely identical or completely different. If they are completely identical, *c* cannot obtain, because it is transitive and requires two terms. If they are completely different *c* cannot obtain, because two things that are completely different can have no common ground and so cannot be related. Therefore it is false that *c* obtains between *A* and *B*.

Several features of this formula excite immediate suspicion. That it can be applied so readily to almost any thesis suggests affinity with a number of well-known sophistic tricks. That it relies on dichotomy calls for caution, since false dichotomies are so easy to make and are so frequent in philosophizing. And that it seems to contradict common sense ought to arouse distrust, since even in philosophy common sense statements that seem true are not rejected until

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work in the various departments. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done in the different departments during the year. The report then goes on to discuss the financial position of the country and the progress of the work in the different departments. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done in the different departments during the year. The report then goes on to discuss the financial position of the country and the progress of the work in the different departments. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done in the different departments during the year.



disproved. But before we give way to offhand disbelief, it is proper to note the definitions and presuppositions that underlie this formula and render it more plausible.

The first key term is own-being (*svabhāva*), which is defined as unmade and not dependent on another (*Mādhyamika-Kārikās* 15.2); it is that of which otherwise-being (or change) never occurs (*MK* 15.8). It does not have another as its condition, it is calm, is not manifested discursively, is nonconceptual, and has no diversity (*MK* 18.9).

Emptiness (*sūnyatā*) is defined as equivalent to dependent coarising (*MK* 24.18). It equals absence of own-being. All entities (*bhāva*) are dependently coarisen (*MK* 24.19).

Own-being is defined as nondependent, so own-being cannot arise and so does not exist. It follows that all entities are empty and have no own-being. This is the sole thesis that Nāgārjuna wishes to prove. He asserts that when emptiness holds good all the Buddha's teachings hold good, and that when emptiness does not hold good, nothing is valid (*MK* 24.18).

The insistence in the refutation formula that A and B must be completely identical or different, rather than partly identical, follows from the definition of *svabhāva* as not dependent on another. Qualifications such as "some" and "partly" are excluded because the discussion is concerned not with the denial or affirmation of commonsense assertions such as "some fuel is burning and some is not," but with the concepts of own-being and essence. What pertains to part of an essence must pertain to the whole essence. A defining property is either essential or nonessential. If it is nonessential it is not really a defining property of an essence. If it is essential, then the essence can never be devoid of the property.

This set of definitions is clear and consistent. Wherever one of the terms can be applied, the others will follow and refutation occurs. This is not really mysterious, since *svabhāva* is by definition self-contradictory. If it exists, it must belong to an existent entity, that is, it must be conditioned, dependent on other entities, and possessed of causes. But by definition it is free from conditions, nondependent on others, and not caused. Therefore, it is absurd to maintain that a *svabhāva* exists.

The validity of Nāgārjuna's refutations hinges upon whether his opponents really upheld the existence of a *svabhāva* or *svabhāva* as he defines the term. Those who uphold the existence of a *svabhāva* are clearly self-contradictory. The possibility remains, however, that any one of the classical *darśanas* could purge itself of the self-contradictory *svabhāva* concept and become as unobjectionable as the *Buddha-vacana* which Nāgārjuna accepts as legitimate. If, on the other hand, some non-Buddhist theories turn out not to be guilty of holding the *svabhāva* concept in the form Nāgārjuna defines, then his critique will find no mark, and his dialectic will fail to destroy some constructive philosophy.

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Robinson -
Nagarjuna

antagonist. This axiom is enunciated in Chapter 24 of the *Kārikās* where Nāgārjuna is explaining why he cannot be charged with denying all the Buddha's teachings. The opponent here is a Hīnayānist who accepts the authority of the *Āgamas* or *Nikāyas* but certainly would not accept as *Buddhavacana* the *śūnyavādin sūtras* in which Nāgārjuna's doctrine of the two truths is stated. Hence Nāgārjuna departs from his avowed method, makes an existential statement about an exegetical principle, and bases his argument on an axiom not acceptable to his opponent.

The nature of the Mādhyamika trick is now quite clear. It consists of (a) reading into the opponent's views a few terms which one defines for him in a self-contradictory way, and (b) insisting on a small set of axioms which are at variance with common sense and not accepted in their entirety by any known philosophy. It needs no insistence to emphasize that the application of such a critique does not demonstrate the inadequacy of reason and experience to provide intelligible answers to the usual philosophical questions.

This critique of Nāgārjuna's critique does demonstrate, however, that critical self-examination is fruitful for philosophy. A similar examination of the axioms and definitions of the other classical *darśanas* would reveal that each depends on a set of arbitrary axioms and hence does not arrive at any non-experiential propositions which all reasonable men must accept. More cogent than Nāgārjuna's criticism of constructive philosophy is that which T.R.V. Murti makes under Nāgārjuna's banner: "By its defective procedure dogmatic metaphysics wrongly understands the transcendent in terms of the empirical modes; it illegitimately extends, to the unconditioned, the categories of thought that are true within phenomena alone."²

I may add that dogmatic metaphysics, like the Mādhyamika critique, usually fails to do justice to the categories of thought we commonly employ in thinking about the phenomenal realm. This observable fact furnishes some justification for the Savage in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, who extracted from Hamlet's passing remark the definition: "A philosopher is someone who thinks of fewer things than there are in heaven and earth."

² T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 332.

The first part of the report is devoted to a description of the general situation in the country at the beginning of the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the work done during the year, and a summary of the results achieved. The report concludes with a number of suggestions for the future.

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Styan Anacker -

VOL. XXII

Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakarana and
the Problem of the Highest Meditations

- (1) The KSP's main problem is how, in the absence of a fixed entity or self, the self which is denied by almost all Buddhist schools, one can account for the retribution of past acts. For Vasubandhu, this problem reduces itself to the whole question of the continuity of somatic and psychic events within one organism.
- (2) In the case of the experience of the highest meditation, "the attainment of the cessation of feelings and concepts," this schema, as it is stated, runs across some difficulties. For in this state all the normal functions of consciousness are suspended, and yet after some time, to speak conventionally, the practitioner emerges from his trance with memories and retributions which continue exactly where the last moment of full consciousness left off.
- (3) The highest meditation being "the attainment of the cessation of concepts and feelings," Vasamitra is truly in trouble.
- (4) ... Vasubandhu can attack Ghosaka's thesis by demonstrating that it is obviously not the attainment of cessation itself which has this function, but the moment of consciousness directly antecedent to attaining the meditation. It is this consciousness which is endowed with a volition strong enough to reach the trance state where all normal consciousness is suspended. The attainment of cessation is to Vasubandhu no more than the absence of the full functioning consciousness.

5. Cromwell Crawford, book review of The Religion of the Sikhs by Gopal Singh

- (5) The Name is the experience of merging self-consciousness into the state of the Super-conscious. It is imperceptible and effortless, being...
- (6) He (author) raises none of the philosophic ~~the~~ questions connected with such dichotomies as: grace and karman; law and miracle; pacificism and militarism; egalitarianism and Guru-elitism. His use of Scripture is uncritical, finding no need in them for demythologization. He has surrounded Guru Nanak with a haze of myth and fails to distinguish critically between the Guru of faith and the Nanak of history.

Chung-yuan Chang 'THE ESSENTIAL SOURCE OF IDENTITY' IN WANG
LUNG-CH'I'S PHILOSOPHY

(1) Heidegger refers to the foundation of metaphysics as the question of the essence of man. Thus, a fundamental ontology reveals that the understanding is not simply a mode of cognition, but a fundamental moment of existence. This moment of existence is what Heidegger calls the "internal possibility of the comprehension of Being," which may be identified with Lichtung in his later writing.

(2) Our identity with empty illumination and silent radiation cannot take place in literature, according to Wang Lung-ch'i, but does take place within ourselves.

(3) Wang Lung-ch'i once said: "what we should learn today is to lay down our load."

(4) As Wang Lung-ch'i explained: "When the mind is in the absolute present it will be free from the departing of the past and the coming of the future, and will be unified." In other words, when the mind is free from contradiction, it is the absolute present, or absolute mind. When we realize this point, we may be able to appreciate the poem which Wang Lung-ch' wrote on his own portrait.

...My light clearly illuminates a thousand years ago and yet does not even move one foot.

I transcend ten thousand things and yet I am no different than the ordinary.

I remain in concealment as if I were unconcealed. ...

(5) But time itself, in the wholeness of its nature, does not move; it rests in stillness." (says Heidegger) Heidegger further remarks, "We have long known it, only we do not think of it in terms of timing." What Heidegger thinks of in terms of primordial time is the mind of present existence, or chien tsai-hsin, as maintained by Wang Lung-ch'i. This chien-tsai-hsin, or the innermost essence of man, is time itself. The unity of this essence makes human subjectivity possible in its totality. Thus, we have Wang Lung-ch'i's explanation of belonging together, expressed in terms of primordial time. "When the mind is the mind of the absolute present, then thought is the thought of the absolute present, knowledge is the knowledge of the absolute present, and things are the things of the absolute present." May we not say that Wang Lung-ch'i has discovered the origin of the fundamental sour-

ces of man, through primordial time?

Thome H. Fang THE ESSENCE OF WANG YANG-MING'S PHILOSOPHY IN
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(6) Ever since Chou Tun-i (1017-1073) initiated the movement of Neo-Confucianism, the metaphysical drift of thought had been centering around the concept of quiescence, which induced many a philosopher to be intoxicated in the Ch'anist practice of quiescent sitting even if he did not subscribe to the Buddhist faith. In the opinion of Wang Yang-ming, this was a lamentable Neo-Confucian perversion waiting for immediate correction. He explicitly said this: "The principle of creative creativity based upon the Great Ultimate has endless wondrous function and yet there is the perennial substance which never changes itself." By this it is meant that the cosmic Reality cannot be cut in two, namely, the state of rest in contradistinction to the state of motion. As a matter of fact, there is always an aesthetic balance between the dynamic creativity and the static repose, together constitutive of the fundamental cosmic order.

(7) The universal order of Mind is constituted by the exuberance of spiritual light outshining warmth and heat. Those who find it chilly and cold will revolt against it on some other ground.

Wei-ming Tu SUBJECTIVITY AND ONTOLOGICAL REALITY -- AN INTER-
PRETATION OF WANG YANG-MING'S MODE OF THINKING

(8) This gives rise to a crucial question: Why is quiet sitting, a form of inner spiritual self-cultivation, not accepted as a highly desirable method of learning to become a sage? In other words, if the structure of the self is sufficient for the actualization of the inner sage, what else is need to manifest that which is inherent in human nature?

(9) T'ien-li, a term which Wang Yang-ming inherited from Cheng Hao (1032-1085), refers to the ultimate basis upon which man can become what he ought to be. Rendered as heavenly principle or heavenly reason, tien-li conveys the idea that the ontological reality of human nature and the inner sage in the mind is "naturally so."

(10) ...the process of self-realization ultimately leads to the complete manifestation of the heavenly principle.

Antonio T. de Nicolas review of LECTURES ON COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY by P.T. Raju

(11)"...the word self (says Raju) does not convey the exact meaning of the word Atman, it is perhaps better to use the word spirit. But the word spirit may also be misleading, since it has other meanings in English. It is therefore better to use the word Atman itself, provided it is understood that it has something to do with the word 'I' or self, and is something that appears as the 'I' in our experience. But the 'I' does not express the whole nature of that entity ... However, for the word Brahman, one may safely use the word Absolute".

Luis O. Gomez EMPTINESS AND MORAL PERFECTION

(12)...presenting Santideva's own Mahayanist concept of meditation. According to the author, the prime object of meditation is, of course, inner calm (samatha); but this calm is only preparatory to the real object of meditation: namely, the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta).

(13)Thus, Buddhist doctrine is not metaphysical doctrine for the Madhyamika philosopher. What is it then? The immediate purpose of his dialectics is to refute all metaphysical systems, but this is only in order to bring about ...(see photocopy for continuation)

Charles Wei-hsun Fu MORALITY OR BEYOND: THE NEO-CONFUCIAN CONFRONTATION WITH MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

(14)A further Neo-Confucian attack upon Buddhism, Zen in particular, is that its quietist cultivation of the mind lacks dynamic functioning in daily activities, and that the no-mind of Zen is as dead as a withered tree and is therefore useless in everyday moral practice. All great Zen masters since Hui-neng would retort that this criticism is erroneous, for, they would say, in the Zen teaching of mind-cultivation, there is always a strong emphasis on what is called "the great functioning of the great potentiality" (ta-chi ta-yung). If sitting or resting is Zen, walking or acting is equally Zen. Even in the flowering age of Neo-Confucian thought in the Southern Sung dynasty, Ta-hui Tsung-kao was drastically opposed to the quietist approach of "silent illumination" and took a dynamic approach to Zen for the purpose of perfect functioning in everyday affairs.

(15) Regarding the nature of Zen no-mind or mind of non-abiding, Zen Buddhists would reply that the words like "no-mind," "no-thought", "no-form," or "non-abiding" should not create a linguistic barrier to such an extent that the Zen mind is identified with a dead thing.

Kenneth R. Stunkel THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST IN COOMAR-SWAMY AND RADHAKRISHNAN

(16) Coomarswamy ... believes that Radhakrishnan has allowed his Hindu background to deteriorate under the influence of Western habits of historical consciousness and critical intelligence, for "he accepts without hesitation the current academic notion of a human 'progress', with the correlative 'development' of systems of 'religious philosophy', not realizing what India has known so well, that there are things to which the historical method, valid only for the classification of facts and not for the elucidation of principles, does not apply." It seems that Radhakrishnan's alienation from Hindu truth has progressed so far that he would not recognize "the deduction that a single page of a Purana is worth all the writings of Tagore, a fact that would be obvious to any orthodox Hindu. It is clear that Radhakrishnan would reject the whole idea of a superhuman origin of the orthodox tradition..."

(17) Coomarswamy's response ... is ... "Radhakrishnan's is thoroughly un-Indian when he speaks ... in a casual disparagement of dogmas and rites and in enthusiasm for what he calls an 'open religion', as if to imply that the mysteries can be communicated in the same way as a profane science." Coomarswamy takes his stand for "mysteries" against "profane science", and indicates that Radhakrishnan's error lies in placing too much confidence in the latter at the expense of the former. There is no impartial, objective, reliable perspective from which one can undertake a rational assessment of the origin and development of the Hindu tradition. The mystery and truth of Hindu dogma are inaccessible to historical judgement. Hindu tradition is, inscrutably, what it is: "that the Vedic incantations and sacrifices represent a primitive 'worship of the powers of nature' is a favorite dogma of the Orientalist and anthropologist." Evidently Coomarswamy viewed Vedic incantations and sacrifices as authentic deliverances of the supernatural and sacred expressions of divine revelation.

(18) In his (Radhakrishnan's) own writings, the mere act of entertaining alternative religious possibilities, philosophical positions, and sources of cognitive authority is an expression of the scientific spirit, the quality most offensive to Coomarswamy.

(19) ...the instruments of such reconciliation (i.e., of diverse traditions and philosophies) would have to be the very disciplines and attitudes spurned by Coomarswamy: history, philosophy, impartial scholarship, critical judgement, compromise, and willingness to put all traditions at a distance in order to see how they ^{might} fit together. Radhakrishnan believes "our quarrels will cease if we know that the one truth is darkened and diversified in the different religions." On the other hand, Coomarswamy believed that Radhakrishnan's wish to terminate quarrels on such a premise negates his Hindu affiliation and makes of him an Orientalist, thus placing him outside the tradition that can offer spiritual freedom. Cultural synthesis and the ideal of universal religion turn out to be no more than naive capitulations to the Western tradition in lieu of the Hindu tradition.

Patricia Bjaaland and Arthur E. Lederman book review of
INDIAN BUDDHISM by A.K. Warder

(20)...Warder leaves on with the distinct impression that Buddhism is more scientific than religious--a dogmatic stance that is certainly in accordance with what Buddhists, but no scientists, in fact, claim. But this depiction ignores the spiritual dimension of Buddhism or why Buddhism is a religion.

Practically every writer on the subject recognizes that Buddhism must go beyond science, that it must supplement science, even that it must correct or oppose science in its quest for what Buddhism calls the spiritual, which is the real goal of all Buddhist teaching. If the spiritual means anything, it must in some way transcend samsara and the physical, and in this sense Buddhism must go beyond science and reject any attempt to identify the two in method or scope. (says Charles Moore in "Buddhism and Science: Both Sides")

(21) Warder's depiction gives a clearer image than most of the continuity between Theravada and Mahayana and is especially

effective in an area in which others have tended to emphasize the points of variance. Warder performs an exemplary task in presenting Mahayana as a clearly self-contained and later development in Buddhism...

(22) In suggesting that a place for the laity was an inherent aspect of the doctrine, we can only concur with Warder that this provision does not represent a degeneration from the Buddha's original teachings -- the Buddha did, however, teach his doctrine at two levels, one for laypersons and one for monks. In thus taking this interpretive position, Warder has worked out a convenient structure by which apparent inconsistencies in the Buddha's teachings can be resolved; the various teachings need not be mutually exclusive.

(23) For example, achieving rebirth in the heavens (for laypersons) and achieving nirvana (for monks) are not mutually exclusive goals once it is understood that achieving the higher rebirth can be a step toward the achievement of nirvana.

...the ideal of nirvana and the ideal of universal liberation...
...in the line of the Hindu tradition...
...book review of

INDIAN SPIRITUALITY by A.K. Warder

(20)...Warder leaves on with the distinct impression that Buddhism is more scientific than religions -- a dogmatic stance that is certainly in accordance with what Buddhists, but no scientists, in fact, claim. But this depiction ignores the spiritual dimension of Buddhism or why Buddhists is a religion.

Practically every writer on the subject recognizes that Buddhism must go beyond science, that it must supplement science, even that it must correct or oppose science in its quest for what Buddhism calls the spiritual, which is the goal of all Buddhist techniques. If the spirit that means anything, it must in some way transcend science and the physical, and in this sense Buddhism must go beyond science and reject any attempt to identify the two in method or scope. (says Charles Moore in "Buddhism and Science: Both Sides")

(21) Warder's depiction gives a clearer image than most of the continuity between Theravada and Mahayana and is especially

ture and Reason, Nature and Heaven, the mind of men and the Mind of the Tao, Mediety and Harmony,²⁷ with reasons only explicable in the light of his theory of Mind, which is needed before further discussion.

At the age of forty, Wang Yang-ming set forth his theory of Mind, which betrayed the influence of Chang Tsai (1020-1077), Ch'eng Hao, and Lu Hsiang-shan on the one hand and the allurements of Ch'anism on the other. It is a kind of double-aspect theory in that the Mind is a unitive core of substance and function or of human nature and human emotion. As a substance, the Mind is in a state of immobility; but as a function, it is susceptible to giving sympathetic response. It is at the same time statical *and* dynamical in character—statical insofar as it is embedded in the mediety of Heaven and Earth as the perennial Nature, and dynamical inasmuch as it is incited to activity, which gushes forth either as the stream of consciousness (perception or thought) or as the rush of volcanic emotion. The best conceivable state of Mind is when its statical repose always accords well with the mediety of perennial nature while its dynamical activity is forever tuned to the best of comprehensive harmony. Such a state of mind is called the substance and function in perfect union.²⁸

In agreement with the Neo-Confucians in the Sung dynasty, Wang Yang-ming tried to identify the Mind successively with Nature, Reason, Tao, and Heaven without much ado.²⁹ His aim was to make his thought congruent with the heritage of Mencius by asserting that Mind dominates over the body, that (human) Nature abides by the Mind, and that goodness originates in the (human) Nature.³⁰ Consciously or unconsciously, he widened the domain of Confucianism by bordering upon the camp of the Hua-yen Buddhism according to which all *dharma*s have their origination in the Mind only. Wang actually spoke about disposing of objects by Reason, dealing with objects for Righteousness, and treating of (human) Nature as Goodness: what is referred to in each case is actually the product of the Mind, with a difference only in name. "There can be no objects outside of mind, no events beyond the reach of mind, no Reason independent of mind, no righteousness apart from mind, and no goodness in the absence of mind."³¹ In fact anything that is done in connection with the mind or its activities such as intention and cognition is nothing but a mental concernment. "Hence the investigation of things means investigating the objects in the mind, investigating the objects in intention, and investigating the objects in cognition."³² And yet there is no egocentric predicament here.

²⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, I, II, pp. 3, 7, 10, 21-22, 27, 30, 33-34; W:P, vol. 2, *Sayings*, pp. 22.

²⁸ Cf. W:P, vol. 4, *Letter to Wang Shih-t'an*, pp. 3-4.

²⁹ Cf. W:P, vol. 1, pp. 3, 22, 24, 30, 33-34, 38-39, 51-52; vol. 2, pp. 6, 21.

³⁰ Cf. W:P, vol. 4, *Second Letter to Wang Shun-fu*, p. 13.

³¹ W:P, vol. 4, p. 14. Also Cf. vol. 1, p. 8; vol. 2, p. 24; vol. 4, pp. 25-26.

³² W:P, vol. 4, *Letter in reply to Lo Cheng-an*, p. 26.

For "the rectification of mind means rectifying the mind with respect to objects; the truthful intention means the testification of the intended objects; and the realization of knowledge means the verification of the cognitive objects. How can there be the cutting asunder of the interior and the exterior inasmuch as Reason is the all-pervasive unity."³³ All these statements were made by Wang to prove the noetic-noematic unity in the rational order of Mind. There are no events outside of mind. There is no reason outside of mind. Hence there is no learning outside of mind. "And, therefore, the man of virtue only aims at the attainment to the truth of Mind through learning. Even if the achievement is so great as to put the entire range of Heaven and Earth in perfect order wherein all beings come to the complete fulfillment of life, there can be no transcendence of my mind."³⁴ For such a reason as this, Wang was led to the acceptance and appreciation of Lu Hsiang-shan who asserted that the mind of mine (as well as of yours) is constitutive of the rational order of all things, after a systematic criticism of Chu Hsi's attempt to seek the truth of knowledge in and from the external world.³⁵

It was at the same time of his philosophical flourishing that Wang Yang-ming tried to simplify his theory of Mind by likening it to a looking glass. It may be called the mirror-theory of Mind betraying the influence of both Shen-hsiu (606?-706) and Hui-neng (639-713). There are different sorts of looking glasses—the perfectly polished, the partly polished, and the unpolished—with different degrees of reflectiveness. The mind of a sage, as sheer spiritual light befitting any changing situation, mirrors everything as it is essentially, whether beautiful, ugly, or neutral. The mind of the ordinary people may look dusty with defiled elements waiting for wiping off in order to show traces of spiritual light. The mind of a dullard may be like a drab-colored speculum with patches of dirt impairing the reflection. It has to be thoroughly polished before it can be used to throw light upon things.³⁶ The final purpose of mental cultivation and spiritual refinement for everybody is to become a sage whose mind, like a perfectly polished mirror, made purely of the heavenly reason undefiled with evil desires, will cast its spiritual light upon all beings throughout the Universe. Such a spiritual light, by reason of its illumination, will reach the infinite height of Heaven and penetrate into the mysterious depths of the earth, deciphering the significance of all things that have their ways of being in the rational order.³⁷

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Cf. W:P, vol. 4, *Preface to the Collected Essays of Tzu-yang Academy*, p. 94.

³⁵ Cf. W:P, vol. 4, *Preface to the Works of Lu Hsiang-shan*, pp. 96-97.

³⁶ Cf. W:P, vol. 4, *Letter to Huang Tsung-hsien and Ying Yüan-chung*, p. 5; vol. 3, *Letter in Reply to Ou-yang K'iung-i*, pp. 46-47.

³⁷ Cf. W:P, vol. 1, *Record on Teachings*, II:18, 28-29, 33; vol. 2, *Sayings*, pp. 24-25; vol. 3, *Letter to Lu Yüan-ching*, p. 22.

Wang Yang-ming's theory of Mind has an important bearing upon the last phase of his philosophical development, namely, the concept of *liang-chih* and the way of its realization. It is rather difficult to find the exact English equivalent for *liang-chih*. It is knowledge somehow connected with the sense and the intellect, but it is neither sensory perception, which is tied down to the body, nor merely intellectual knowledge. One may be extremely clever, and yet one's cleverness in intellectual knowledge may turn out to be another mode of foolery because of figuring out much too pragmatically. Wang Yang-ming defined it as the clear illumination and spiritual awareness of the Heavenly reason which is the substance of Mind issuing in the spontaneous function of thought generative of wisdom.³⁸ I should like to take it for *conscientious wisdom*. It is metaphysical, intuitive insight intent upon moral vision. It is penetrative insight, like a cat getting at the mouse with the concerted concentration of sight, hearing, muscular alertness, and mental assurance, swiftly combined to form a miraculous conductance of spiritual power that will become affluent in the whole sphere of action. When *liang-chih* displays its wondrous function, we are able to see that the Mind of man will coalesce with Heaven and earth into a substantial unity, with a flux of energy all-pervasive *up and down* in the cosmic sphere of life. And the Sage only goes by the spontaneous functioning of *liang-chih* in order to be aware that the universe, together with all things, will be embraced within the natural process of *liang-chih* with no possibility whatever of having anything lying outside of it to weigh down the freedom of the spirit.³⁹

In the answer to the *Querries Concerning the Great Learning*, Wang identified the conscientious wisdom (*liang-chih*) with the substance of illuminant virtue, which is disclosed to us by the exuberant spiritual light as the Supreme Good embedded in the human Nature as given by the Divine.⁴⁰ It is in this light of the spirit that the Sage has come to the awareness of conscientious wisdom, in the virtue of which, he establishes the substantial unity with the Cosmos as a whole and performs the function of it by affiliating his mind and heart with the affinity of people as well as with the akinness of beings.

Thus it is the Sage who is capable of realizing the ideal of conscientious wisdom by applying the Heavenly reason in his Mind to all varieties of things and events, making them all rational in character. Whenever the ideal of conscientious wisdom is realized, in and by the sagacious mind, then all varieties of events and objects will be in perfect unison with reason, bringing about the final unity in the intelligible order of Mind.⁴¹ The Mind of the Sage, piercing

³⁸ Cf. W:P, vol. 3, *Letter in Reply to Shu Kuo-yung*, p. 25; *Letter in Reply to Ouyang Ch'iung-i*, p. 45.

³⁹ Cf. W:P, vol. 2, *Sayings*, pp. 14-15.

⁴⁰ Cf. W:P, vol. 2, *Sayings*, pp. 27-29, 42.

⁴¹ Cf. W:P, vol. 3, *Letter to Ku Tung-ch'iao*, p. 54.

through the rational order of the Universe as a whole, will look upon all things as being near and dear in the consanguinity of spiritual life and upon all existence as being akin in the magnificence of authentic value. All of this is clearly known for sure by the unerring conscientious wisdom in theory which must be carried out in a perfect scheme of noble action because of their inseparable unity. When this is finally achieved, Wang Yang-ming would sing of Joy as the essence of Mind, for he found the Mind of humanity was the inseparable bond of all things in the Cosmos, which is, as it were, a symphony of harmony gladdening all around.⁴²

Having seen the essence of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy, I shall now try to explain some points in which his philosophy was actually or possibly connected with the previous trends of Chinese thought that have had considerable influence upon him. As a rule, he was considered by many as the greatest Neo-Confucian in the Ming dynasty. Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692), however, charged him to be a terrible heretic who mimicked Ch'anist Buddhism for Confucianism.⁴³ Contrarily, Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) maintained that ever since Wang Yang-ming had pointed out the universal presence of conscientious wisdom in the Mind, the pathway to sagehood was opened up for every man, otherwise the classical Chinese heritage would have been dead long ago.⁴⁴

Wang Yang-ming was neither a precocious child—being unable to speak at the age of five—nor a precocious thinker. In his twenties and even in his early thirties, he was still in the rockaway, loitering on the intellectual prairie—now attracted by scholastic Confucianism, now indulging in Taoism⁴⁵—the self-styled Taoism, and now allured by Ch'anist Buddhism. It was only during the fatal and distressed years, 1508-1510, toward the end of his thirties that he awakened out of a life-and-death struggle into philosophical wisdom, by, first, expounding the theory of the unity of knowledge and action, and then, after a number of years, the monistic philosophy of Mind. And still later he found the sure ways of realizing conscientious wisdom as a proposed road to sagehood. He died at a rather young age, as a great victorious soldier, otherwise his philosophical achievement would have reached a far greater height.

In 1524—four years before his death—he gave a musical dinner party to his disciples at the Heavenly Fountain Bridge; he was reported to express his thought in four aphorisms.⁴⁶ In 1527, the question about these aphorisms was still debated among the disciples in his presence.

⁴² Cf. W:P, vol. 3, *Letter to Huang Mien-chih*, p. 29.

⁴³ Cf. Wang Fu-chih, *Commentary on Chang T'ai's Treatise on Edification*, Introduction, pp. 1-2; vol. 3, p. 6; *Expectation of Proper Understanding*, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁴ Cf. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Doxographies on Philosophers in the Ming Dynasty*, vol. 10, preface to section on Wang Yang-ming.

⁴⁵ I have coined the term Taoism—the self-styled Taoism—to designate a theory of those who are practitioners in the esoteric art of longevity in contradistinction to the philosophical Taoism of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.

⁴⁶ Cf. W:P, vol. 2, *Sayings*, pp. 20-22; *The Sayings of Wang Lung-ch'i*, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

- (1) The substance of Mind is beyond good and evil
- (2) Intention is motivated by the consideration of good or evil.
- (3) Conscientious wisdom consists in the distinctive awareness of what is good from what is evil.
- (4) The investigation of things aims at doing the good by shunning the evil.

These four aphorisms, especially the first one, can be subject to at least three different interpretations: (1a) Being beyond good and evil may mean a sheer neutralism which washes away Value from all forms of existence; (1b) It may mean that there is the absolute Supreme Good surpassing the limitations of all relative values, positive or negative, designated by the good and the evil; (1c) It may mean that in the substance of Mind per se there is no defilement owing to attachment to the exterior idea of what is good and evil, as has been caused or conditioned by the environmental factors.

The possibility (1a) would have the effect of making him either fall into self-contradiction or alienate his philosophy from the classical Confucian heritage as embedded in the *Book of Change* (*Wen-yen Chuan*, *Hsiang Chuan*, and *Hsi-tz'u Ch'uan*), the *Great Learning*, and the *Doctrine of the Mean*, all of which urge us to aspire for the attainment to the Supreme Good in our conduct of life. Moreover, everywhere in his writings, he asserted that the substance of Mind is either in itself the Supreme Good or the locus in which the ideal of the Supreme Good is realized. If (1a) were still maintained in spite of these consequences, then Wang Fu-chih would be justified in accusing him a Confucian heretic.

Such an accusation could be avoided only if he were to change himself into a devotee of one version of Taoism by dint of which Confucius himself, in laying especial importance upon moral values, was ridiculed by many a Taoist.⁴⁷ This transforms the possibility (1a) into that of (1b). In the second chapter of *Lao Tzu*, there is the statement of which my reading is something like this: "People in the world, all claiming to know what is beautiful for the Beauty of it, will lapse into ugliness; all claiming to know what is good for the Goodness of it, they will lapse into evil." By this it is meant that the absolute Value such as the Good or the Beautiful is far above and beyond all relative values. It is beyond good and evil in that it transcends all limitations pertaining to what is good and evil. But this is Taoism rather than Confucianism, the latter emphasizing the continuous qualitative transformation of relative values into the absolute transcendental Value with no need of radical transcendence. If Wang Yang-ming were to hold fast to possibility (1b), he would be a Taoist and certainly not a Confucian.

⁴⁷ Cf. *The Works of Chuang Tzu* (Chinese Text and Collected Commentaries), ed. Kuo Ching-fang, vol. 5, *On the Tao of Heaven*, pp. 11-12, 14-15.

(1) The purpose of this is to provide a...

(2) The purpose of this is to provide a...

(3) The purpose of this is to provide a...

(4) The purpose of this is to provide a...

(5) The purpose of this is to provide a...

The purpose of this is to provide a... (faint text)

The purpose of this is to provide a... (faint text)

The purpose of this is to provide a... (faint text)

a radical transformation of thought.²² Its ontology has been correctly described as an abolitive ontology: its conception of reality only serves the function of abolishing the grasping at conceptions, the settling down (*abhiniveśa*) in imaginings and ideologies. After all, in the opinion of Śāntideva the mystic, thought alone is the source of all evil and thought alone should be controlled and corrected (V.6-14). This is the sole aim of the morality of continence. In this very connection, Śāntideva the philosopher has this to say:

Once you have adopted the notion of emptiness, the notion of existence disappears, yet later, through exercise in the notion of "nothing exists," the notion of emptiness also disappears. Once you do not conceive of any entities which could be assumed not to exist, how could nonexistence stand before the mind, which then will have no support? And when neither existence nor nonexistence stand before the mind, then the mind is at rest, without an object, because it has nowhere else to go (IX.33-35).²³

The *Pañjikā* explains the meaning of these famous stanzas (Śāntideva is supposed to have levitated beyond the sight of his audience as he recited them)²⁴ as the rejection of any possibility of clinging to emptiness, clinging to the idea that ultimate truth has an essence (*paramārthasvabhāva*), or clinging to it as if it had an essence. *Nirvāṇa* is the stopping of this clinging. As expressed in the *Ratnāvalī*: "*Nirvāṇa* is the destruction of all tampering with being and nonbeing."²⁵

Consequently, this being the *bodhisattva's* aim, he should put an end not only to self and the five groups of grasping, but also to emptiness and to selflessness as absolute values.²⁶ Thus, Mādhyamika "ethics" could be said to rest on the principle of the ultimate analysis of emptiness, especially on the analysis of the emptiness of moral values. In this way it claims to have superseded absolutism and its individual psychological manifestations: self-righteousness, self-complacence, and the rest. This is aptly expressed in the words of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*: "by means of wisdom there is no station in becoming, by means of mercy there is no standing in quietism."²⁷

Therefore, the one aim of the application of compassion is the reflexive effect of compassion: the training of the mind in the notion of selflessness. When Śāntideva projects himself into the self of a beggar (VIII.141 ff) he

²² In its moral intent, the meditation on the void is not wholly different from the charnel-ground meditations, which pursue aims similar to those of the Christian *meditatio mortis*. The meditations on the void, however, pretend to uproot not only passion, but also all intellectual clinging. See passages referred to in note 20 herein.

²³ Cf. *Sikṣ.* 257 and references in note 21 herein.

²⁴ Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism*, p. 163 of E. Obermiller's translation (Heidelberg, 1931).

²⁵ *Rat.* I.42.

²⁶ The roots of this radical interpretation of nonself, or, rather, of this attitude of extreme selflessness, can be traced to the *Suttanipāta*, see *Suttanipāta* IV.11 (862-877), IV.12 (878-894), and IV.14 (917).

²⁷ *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* I, stanza 10a: "prajñayā na bhavē sthānaṃ kṛpayā na śame sthitiḥ."

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schauung and *Lebensanschauung*. This criticism again only exposes the Neo-Confucianists' own ignorance of Mahāyāna metaphysics grounded in the Middle Way. The greatest contribution of Mahāyāna philosophers is that they present the ultimate question about the Absolute in terms of things-as-they-really-are (*yathābhūtam*) seen (personally realized) by the historical Buddha and try to solve this question by applying the principle of the Middle Way from beginning to end. They ask: Suppose, hypothetically, we are all enlightened as the Buddha himself *sub specie aeternitatis*, then what sort of transcendental wisdom (*prajñā*) can we share with him? And what is the Absolute or Ultimate Reality "intuited" by a man of perfect wisdom? It is in order to answer this ultimate question that all Mahāyāna philosophers since Nāgārjuna have tried to speculate by exploring all possible points of view, such as Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, the *Tathāgatagarbha* thought, *T'ien-t'ai*st (the Lotus school), Hua-yen, or Zen. They are different Mahāyāna schools to be sure, but all of them subscribe to the same fundamental principle, the Middle Way. They all agree on the real nature of the Absolute, *if it is*, that it is ontologically nondifferentiable (nondualistic) though epistemologically differentiated (through the mental fabrication of the nonenlightened). Epistemologically we dichotomize reality-as-it-is (*tathatā*) into the Absolute and the phenomenal, and this dichotomy presupposes the duality of our (ignorant) mind. Our dual mind establishes two kinds of truth in order to describe the Absolute and the phenomenal respectively; and what is asserted as real from the mundane point of view is to be denied of its reality from the transcendental point of view. If the phenomenal world, *samsāra*, the realm of events (*śih*), form, etc., are taken as real from the standpoint of worldly truth, they are denied of their own-being (*svabhāva*) from that of transcendental truth, which instead establishes suchness, *nirvāna*, the realm of Principle (*li*), *dharmakāya* (the Law-body), etc., as real. In short, the phenomenal mind takes the worldly point of view to establish a conventional truth about the reality of the world of appearance; and the transcendental mind takes the higher point of view to establish a higher truth about the unreality of the phenomenal world and the reality of the noumenal.

But the Mahāyāna analysis of this epistemological duality of the mind, the truth, and the reality is at best the final pedagogical device to lead the Buddhists to the stage of perfect enlightenment, if they are still one removed from it. Once the last *māyā* (illusion) or *avidyā* (ignorance) is removed, the transcendental wisdom of the ontologically nondifferentiable would naturally emerge in the nondualistic mind. The Middle Way now steers between all pairs of "perverted views" (*viparyāsa*): paradoxically, *nirvāna* is now *samsāra* and vice versa, emptiness is now form and *vice versa*, the realm of Principle is now the realm of Events and *vice versa*, the absolute

mind is now the phenomenal mind and *vice versa*, transcendental truth is now mundane truth and *vice versa*, etc.⁵⁴ The absolute mind, the transcendental truth, emptiness, or *nirvāṇa* are all provisional names (*prajñāpti*) based on our thought-constructions; their existence is, so to speak, "parasitic" upon the existence of the phenomenal mind, the mundane truth, form, or *saṃsāra*. In other words, if no mundane truth is constructed, there is no necessity to create an absolute truth to refute it. To say that the world is real is a one-sided view (mundane truth), but to say that the world is unreal is again another one-sided view on a higher level (transcendental truth). If the former view is discarded, the latter view will disappear altogether: herein lies the real Middle Way.⁵⁵ If the principle of the Middle Way in Mahāyāna Buddhism is understood this way, it is senseless to speak of its metaphysical principle as real or "vacuous." Failing to comprehend Mahāyāna metaphysics in terms of the Middle Way through and through, the Neo-Confucianists mistakenly treat, as did many European Buddhist scholars generations ago, Mahāyāna Buddhism as sheer negativism.

Conze once gave us a misleading interpretation of the word "*śūnyatā*" as follows:

Roughly speaking we may say that the word as an adjective (*śūnya*) means 'found wanting' and refers to worldly things, and as a noun (*śūnyatā*) means inward 'freedom' and refers to the negation of this world. . . . When in China Buddhism fused with Neo-Taoism, 'emptiness' became the latent potentiality from which all things come forth, and it became usual to say, in a cosmological sense, that all things go out of emptiness and return to it. None of all this is intended here. . . . As a practical term 'emptiness' means the complete denial or negation of this world by the exercise of wisdom, leading to complete emancipation from it.⁵⁶

It is doubtful that early Indian Buddhists thought of emptiness and *nirvāṇa* in terms of "the complete denial or negation of this world" as Conze interprets here. But even if this were the case, their escapist tendency was corrected first by Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamika followers, then by the life-affirming Chinese Mahāyānists. And it is important to point out that Nāgārjuna's "negativistic" logico-ontological analysis of the epistemological duality of the mind, the truth, and the reality constructed by men as well as of the ontological nondifferentiability of *nirvāṇa/saṃsāra*, absolute/relative, etc., is finally transformed into a direct, positive, and dynamic affirmation of the reality of the phenomenal world and everyday life—an interesting example of

⁵⁴ Nāgārjuna says it well: "*Saṃsāra* is nothing essentially different from *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is nothing essentially different from *saṃsāra*," in Kenneth K. Inada, trans., *Nāgārjuna* (Tokyo: Hokuseidō, 1970), p. 158.

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 148. Here Nāgārjuna declares that "whatever is relational origination is *śūnyatā*. It is a provisional name . . . for the mutuality (of being) and, indeed, it is the middle path."

⁵⁶ Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 60-61.

planation is crucial, because the former permits heart transplants and navigation to the moon, while the latter does not. Science might well be included in Radhakrishnan's remark that "to defend a dogmatic tradition is not to discover philosophic truth."¹⁸

Coomaraswamy, who is by no means a stranger to "profane" sciences, goes so far as to deny Western thought any true metaphysical consciousness. Western scholars, for example, are dismissed as mere fact collectors, ignorant of underlying principles: "tradition is . . . in no way 'opposed' to science, although independent of science, and severely critical of the accumulation of facts without a relation of these facts to any unifying principle."¹⁹ Furthermore:

The essential distinction of the East from the (modern) West, and one that involves all other differences, is that the East referred to in Radhakrishnan's book has still preserved and is still conscious of the metaphysical bases of its life, while the modern West is almost completely ignorant of traditional metaphysics (which it confuses with "philosophy," as does Radhakrishnan himself), and is at the same time actively and consciously anti-traditional.²⁰

Coomaraswamy goes on to say that Eastern societies are organized to facilitate the attainment of "spiritual freedom," whereas Western societies obstruct any serious commitment outside "the 'facts' of science." Clearly he identifies genuine metaphysical concern with religious traditions within which spiritual freedom can be sought. His disagreement with Radhakrishnan on this point is fundamental, for the latter maintains that no religion holds more than a part of the truth, while philosophy rises above all traditions.²¹ For Coomaraswamy, metaphysics is not *inquiry* into the nature of reality, whose meaning has yet to be fully understood; it is the religious, social, and educational means available in the form of a "tradition" through which the individual liberates his spirit. The Hindu tradition exemplifies perfectly what he means, with its sacred Vedas; class system (*varna-vyavasthā*) comprised of Brahmans, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Sūdras; caste system (*jāti-vyavasthā*); four stages of life (*āśrama*); and four ends of man (*puruṣārtha*), all summed up in the phrase *sanātana dharma* (duty, law, the ultimate order of the world, or, even, the nature of things).²² In such a tradition, rational comprehension of nature, self-knowledge through historical perspective, open-ended philosophical inquiry, a tentative, searching orientation would be of little interest, if not wholly

¹⁸ "Reply to Critics," in TPSR, p. 790.

¹⁹ Coomaraswamy, p. 138 n.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

²¹ "Fragments of a Confession," in TPSR, p. 78.

²² Whereas Coomaraswamy implies a supernatural or divine sanction for these elements of the Hindu tradition, Radhakrishnan views them as historical phenomena more or less responsive to real human needs. Hence change is essential and to be expected in the light of altered circumstances. "Reply to Critics," in TPSR, p. 839.

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() There is a mondo quoted by Suzuki which may be of use here. A student, an absolute idealist, came to a Zen master and asked, "With what frame of mind should one discipline one self in the truth?" Said the Zen master, "There is no mind to be trained nor is there any truth in which to be disciplined." The mondo goes on now one meaning is clear, namely, that a mindless or witless question, particularly on the part of an absolute idealist who claims that all is mind, deserves what appears to be an answer in kind. What the master knows and the student does not know is that one who wants directions for a frame of mind in which truth will be disclosed has already exhibited himself as incapable of having the appropriate frame of mind.

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(1) Most of the so-called Chan Schools in the 8th Century emphasized knowledge instead of quiet sitting, and the Chan masters taught and spoke in plain and unmistakable language and did not resort to enigmatic words, gestures, or acts.

(2) Suzuki agrees with Hu that Chinese Zen, (Chan) had almost nothing to do with the Indian practise of Dhyana, meditation, quietude. But he insists that instead of Zen Hui, it was Hui Neng who brought on the revolution and that the revolution aimed at the identification of Prajna and Dhyana. The Zen masters understood Prajana not as rational knowledge but as intuition.

(3) Later developments such as the question and answer method mere intellectual analysis.

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() It must be pointed out that for me there is no such thing as Zen as such but only Zen such as is presented by this or that thinker. It is pointless to keep up the fiction that Suzuki is only a neutral historian or an impersonal mouthpiece.

() We may distinguish broadly and loosely creative thinkers and academicians both of whom work within some tradition. No creative thinker works in a vacuum and there is nothing remotely academic about Suzuki.

() With the intellect and the sensibilities dulled insight may require years in a Zendo or equally long years in a psychoanalysts office. In the end perhaps the goal is the same: to break through the maze of intellectualizations, rationalizations, projections and distortions originally set up by the ego as defense or

operating measures but at the eventual price of being trapped in its own constructions, the burden being psycho-financially too great to bear, and to learn once more what can never really be taught, that life is biological and psychological long before it is rational.

() Even the psychological value of physical adjustment which is attained through Zen meditation practise was recognized by Dewey through Dr. F.M. Alexander, who taught him a posture and a way of breathing which enabled Professor Dewey to work at his desk and to carry on his life more comfortably and effectively.

() There is in Zen, the full acceptance of this life here and now as all there is yet filled with all there could be for one who is awakened.

() The way to proceed is to mention your idea casually to a fellow not in the form of a statement, but as a question. If your proposal sounds impracticable he will quietly tell you and you will be spared embarrassment. (-teacher)

() Mencius theory of intuitive knowledge is the ability possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is the intuitive ability and the knowledge possessed by them without exercise of thought is intuitive knowledge.

() Mencius gives an example showing that a man cannot but choose what is right. Here are a small basket of rice and a platter of soup and the case is one in which the getting of them will preserve life.

() The major Hindu tradition understands the experience as disclosing an actual identity between the individual self and the universal self. The three western theistic religions emphatically reject this view because they hold that there is a great gulf fixed between the Creator-creature and the Creator and that claim of identity with the Creator is presumptuous and heretical.

Mai Sze THE TAO OF PAINTING

() "It is concealed geometry with its dimensional relations and tensions the force of the brush, the life of washes and gradations the dynamic modulation of the line which are now the principle source of the spectator's pleasure." The author introduces her notion of the Tao in this way.

() The same cosmic power alive in a painter's personal conduct as well as in the inspired discipline of his brushwork, the Tao is at the same time the soul of a living tradition. Its appearance not its essence changes with the style of the time and the personality that renders it.

() There are mysteries of the Great Void and the totality of the Tao which contains everything in its encompassing harmony and its hermetic recesses.

() The main thing for a painter was and remains, the aptitude to see.

TRANSLATION AND ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

() If the student turns to Prabavananda-Isherwoods translation of the Gita he will read, "The world is imprisoned in its own activity except when actions are performed as worship of God. Therefore you must perform every action sacramentally and be free from all attachment to results." He may think now that he understands and certainly Isherwoods prose is felicitous, but here the inclusion of the word, "God" may cause him to suspect the injection of a specious familiarity not necessarily justified by the text and he may wonder about the modifying word "every" which did not appear in the editor's translation.


() Heinrich Zimmer states the problem specifically and forcefully: "Actually we have no precise verbal equivalence for translations from the Sanskrit but only misleading approximations resounding with occidental associations that are necessarily very different from those of the Indian world. This fact has led the west to all sorts of false deductions as to the nature and means of oriental thought. Whether or not we have "only misleading approximations", we're all familiar with frequently puzzling translations of such terms as, nirvana, karma, maya.

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David White MOKSA AS VALUE AND EXPERIENCE

() Why is it that Indians value moksa either actively or implicitly? How can they seriously find a place in their view of human life and purposes for a possibility on the one hand so abstract and on the other so specialized and esoteric?

() I have chosen five passages from the works of Ramana Maharshi, he is so typically Indian in his manner of discourse that these passages will probably provide a fairly rigorous test. The first is the devotee asks what is moksa? Maharshi replies, "Moksa is to know that you are not born." Then Maharshi quotes, "Be still and know that I am God." To be still is not to think. Know and not think is the word. Second test: We learn here something about the relation of moksa to reality. At the same time we are being taught to consider liberation primarily as experience. There is an unquestionable link between the experience of moksa and the metaphysics of Brahman and Atman. Third test: We note that our understanding of moksa has been furthered by learning that liberation is not only a state of absolute reality but that this state is conscious and blissful, even though it is absolute and relationless. Fourth test: Seems to approach the experience in terms of activity which is either observable or at least related to the kind of experience with which we are normally familiar. The fifth and final passage is where Maharshee denies there is any such thing as liberation itself. This means that the Sage is aware of the existence of such usage. They cannot in this instance be taken as the complete truth about moksha. So Maharshee concludes by utterly contradicting his initial negation that there is no liberation and says there is only mukti and nothing else. As a result of these investigations our understanding of the primary importance of experience in this concept of liberation.



Wilbur Long, review of Intuition and Science, by Mario Bunge (Vol 12)

But what about "philosophical" intuition? The author's answer is that it is "the chief foe of reason and a variety of quackery" (p. 120). As "anti-analytic and ~~total~~ credulous," as it is "opposed to the scientific spirit, which is essentially analytic and critical." Philosophic intuition an alleged third mode of knowing, other than sense perception and reason, is only a cheap and easy way to avoid the trouble of careful analysis and a trick to escape the possibility of destructive criticism. This kind of intuition can be (is?) conceited, rigid, arrogant, and dogmatic, and an encouragement to Messianism.

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