

Book Notes 06

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Editor's Note: This volume consists entirely of extracts (or full articles) from the Philosophy East And West Journal. This notebook has material from Volumes 1 – 5, 7, 8, 15 – 17, 19, and 20; these were published between 1952 and 1970. Book Notes 08 is also exclusively extracts from the same journal, Volumes 6, 9, 10, 12, 21, 22 and 23 – which obviously are interleaved with the selections found in this volume. These files were compiled by members of Wisdom's Goldenrod – Ed McKeown, Timothy Smith, Paul Cash, and Robert Geyer, between 1979 and 1981. It is my recollection that this work was done at Wisdom's Goldenrod Center in Valois New York and then sent to PB.

For more information about the people and texts PB quotes or references here, please see the file titled "Wiki Standard Info for Comments." For more information about the editorial standards, spelling changes, and formatting that we have implemented – including page and

para numbering – please see the file titled “Introductory Readers’ Guide.” We have introduced minimal changes to the text; our changes deal with inconsistencies of spelling, educated guesses at illegible words, and the rare modification of grammar for clarity’s sake. Whenever there is any question as to whether what is typed is what PB wrote, please consult the associated scan of the original pages, currently to be found in a PDF of the same name. – Timothy Smith (TJS), 2020

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(8-1)⁹ point-instant in space-time perception where {??}¹⁰ mystical experience such a point *first* felt to exist within the heart.¹¹ But the World-Mind cannot be confined within such a limited perception. And later mystical experience always transcends this centre within the heart and largely detaches the consciousness from the body altogether.¹² Yet the finite self can never bring the World-Mind in its fullness within this experience

⁶ The original typist inserted "2B 9840" and "1957, 61" by hand.

⁷ There is an unnumbered para at the top of the page. The remaining paras are numbered 1 through 4; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

⁸ The original editor inserted "9" by hand.

⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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¹¹ The original editor underlined this by hand

¹² The original editor underlined this by hand

simply because finitude would itself merge and vanish while trying to do so. This mystical meeting-point, the Overself, represents the utmost extent to which the finite self can consciously share in the ultimate existence. It is that fragment of God which dwells in and yet environs man, a fragment which has all the quality and grandeur of God but not all the amplitude and power of God. The difference between the World-Mind and Overself is only one of scope and degree, not one of kind, for they are both essentially the same "stuff." [We]¹³ may climb as high as his highest self but not beyond it. Thus our personal life is a [phase]¹⁴ of the Overself's life. The latter's existence in its turn is a phase of the World-Mind's existence. Through his chain of relations the little self has an everlasting kinship with the cosmic one. It can become aware though philosophy of this kinship but it cannot transcend the relation itself.

(8-2) The World-Mind apparently breaks itself up into an endless multitude of such higher selves but after it has done so it paradoxically remains as unlimited and as ultimate as undiminished in its own being as ever. The notion that the Infinite Existence has divided itself up into such units is correct only if we understand first, that this division has not meant any reduction in its essence, and second, that it has not meant any real parting of them from this essence. We can best understand this by remembering what happens in our own mental activity. Our innumerable ideas are a kind of division of the mind but do not really involve its exhaustion for the ideas not only arise but must vanish back into it. Although the mind perpetually empties itself into thoughts, it is never less itself, never less its own single presence. Nor are these thoughts separate at any moment from the mind. In the same way, except that it is not affected by the transiency which affects all thoughts, the Overself is not separate from the World-Mind. Every Overself exists in the World-Mind just as different thoughts exist in one and same human mind. The World-Mind's consciousness may multiply or divide itself a million times but its stuff is not really divisible; it only appears so.

(8-3) "It may be noticed that the term Overself has here been used only in the singular number. Yet if it is not the world-mind itself but only a refracted fragment of it a spark from its flame, should it not be right to use this term in the plural number also? The answer is that this would tend to give a wrong

(9-1)¹⁵ Check Vols 1, 2 for

¹³ The original editor deleted "1st ed" after "We" by hand

¹⁴ "The original editor deleted "this" after "phase" by hand

¹⁵ There is an unnumbered para at the top of the page. The remaining paras are numbered 1 through 16; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

- (9-2) Author of Chou Tun-D
- (9-3) Author of Wang Yang -Ming p(4)
- (9-4) Name of article by Paul Masson-oursell
- (9-5) Name of article by J. Kwee Swan Lat}
- (9-6) Author of PLOTINUS fr. p. 9
- (9-7) Author of review on Autobiography of a Yogi (S.K. Saksena)
- (9-8) E.R. Hughes=review on Wilhelm's I Ching
- (9-9) Was Mei article on Hsun Tzu a review? (no translation)
- (9-10) Chatterjee - article or review?
- (9-11) Moore? Author of The Concepts of man East and West. PB wrote in NO
- (9-12) author of Isherwood's Vedanta for Modern Man review? Harold E. McCarthy
- (9-13) author of Eaton, Gai review The Richest Vein S.K. Saksena vol 1
- (9-14) April 52-Jan 53 = what vol? Vol 2, yes was 3 states article written by Nikelananda
- (9-15) PT Raju 'Comp Studies' - article or review?
- (9-16) Das "Brahman" & Maya article Vol 2 ?
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- (10-1)¹⁶ Vol 3
- (10-2) Author of review on Life Divine?
- (10-3) Author of review on Stace's Time and Eternity?

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(10-4) Author of review on Paradox and Nirvana (p.45)

(10-5) Vol 4

(10-6) Idealism: E and W on PT Raju Idealistic thought of India by Herbert. Schneider?
Commentary and discussion by Herbert. W. Schneider?

(10-7) Vol 5

(10-8) P. Damle review article: is title "Phil essays"

(10-9) Review of Pt Raju Idealistic Thought... why?

(10-10) Review of Confucius His life, by LIU? On Who?

(10-11) Who wrote review of Murti's Central Phil? Clarence H. Hamilton

(10-12) Vol 8 to 9

(10-13) Radhakrishna article?

(10-14) Kenneth Ch'en?

(10-15) What is BNP 135 about

(10-16) Vol 16

(10-17) K Narain outline of Madhya, book review by Rao?

(10-18) Vol XX

(10-19) Carus 1st name? Grace E

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(11-1)¹⁷ From "The Development of altruism in Confucianism" vol 1 by Homer H. Dubs

(11-2) Ibid

¹⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 4 and 9 and 10; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

(11-3) "True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy"

(11-4) "Methods of comparative Philosophy"

(11-5) S.K. Chatterjee article "The Needed Reform..."

(11-6) Drawn up by Unesco Secretariat, included in News & Notes, vol 1

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(12-1)¹⁸ ? Author of (vol 1) p14 review of Saksena's Nature of Cons =

(12-2) Vol 5

(12-3) P.R Damle wrote "philosophical Essays!" Hans Staffner reviewed it

(12-4) E.A. Burt

(12-5) Liu, wu-chi wrote Confucius, His Life and Times
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(13-1)¹⁹ Note: Change p.3 to p.16 and adjust accordingly
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¹⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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- (2) Ames, van meter 48, 49
- (3) Aurobindo, review on 34

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- (5) Brooks, R. 327-8

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²⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 3, and 1 through 3; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

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PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 1 (1951)

Van Meter Ames: America, Existentialism, And Zen

31
PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 1
[1]³⁷

(31-1)³⁸ Since it is impossible to grow up in society without developing a somewhat separate self which will think for itself and of itself.

(31-2) We need Zen's affirmation of the actual. Zen may seem naive when it would have us fall in love with ordinary experience and suddenly see the wonder of it.

³³ The paras on this page are numbered 1 and 2; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

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³⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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³⁷ The original editor inserted "1" by hand.

³⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 4; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

Perhaps nothing is harder or more necessary. Santayana has said that men have a prejudice against themselves. They are afraid to trust themselves, their own experience, their attachment to their own life. They would transcend it, escape it, put off mortality, be born again. Yet they do not go far without nostalgia.

(31-3) Suzuki makes wonderfully clear that we are always in “this very moment.” If we see this we are saved, for here we are safe from birth and death and most of our worries. There is not room for them here. And this refuge is not reserved for a few. It is for all to enjoy. Tranquillity and bliss are here for everyone.

(31-4) With a watch on every wrist there is no time to linger in the moment before it is jerked away, unless illness, age, or laziness intervenes.

Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman knew better. The writers of the Bible knew better. The sitting figure of the Buddha appeals now that we are becoming aware of the East and are being flung against it physically as well as imaginatively. We think ourselves practical people, but so do the Chinese. We draw back from the extreme spirituality of India, but along with the Chinese we may be attracted by it, and even more by the blend of the pragmatic and the speculative which gave rise to Zen when Buddhism took hold in China.

The moment need not be otiose. To live in the present does not prevent activity. The joy of Zen is found in doing the dishes and, by the same token, in doing whatever needs to be done. Delight in reality will not exclude participation in art and science or any effort to change, to shape and direct, for effort is a present part of the world as much as trees and mountains, and they are in process too. Even criticism occurs in the midst of what

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AMERICAN, EXISTENTIALISM, AND ZEN

Van Meter

[2]³⁹

(continued from the previous page) is simply there. The mediate is seated in the immediate.

Nothing could be done or enjoyed in the moment if it were the knife-edge of the physical instant. A moment in which we can even begin to do the dishes must be a “specious present,” with enough spread into the before and after to allow a span of attention. Within this span the sense of attending to the immediate may last for an hour or more, though commonly just a few seconds or minutes. The spell must last long enough to permit the sense of doing or feeling or thinking something now, and be short enough to be distinguished from what we would assign to the past or future rather than to the passing moment. A moment can be noted as a moment simply by the awareness

³⁹ The original editor inserted “2” by hand.

that now we are reflecting or acting or acquiescing. It is always now that we remember or anticipate; now that we sink back on the couch of the unconscious, or rise from it.

(32-1)⁴⁰ It is noteworthy that Zen has been followed largely by monks who did some gardening, cooking, sewing, but did not have to worry about getting or keeping a competitive job. Yet it is also significant that a person's stay in a Zen monastery has often been temporary, preparatory to going back into the world with new insight, where it is needed.

(32-2) Americans need more detachment amid their commitments.

Homer H. Dubs: The Development of Altruism in Confucianism

(32-3) Ancient China was a feudal country, and Confucius was a man of his age. Ren denoted benevolence rather than love. It was the attitude of a bountiful lord to his inferiors – the superior manifests a benevolent kindness. For the inferior to be benevolent to his superior would be presumption – the inferior should instead manifest the attitude of loyal obedience. This aristocratic distinction has clung to Confucianism throughout its history and is one reason that Confucianism is so much in disfavour in present-day China.

Confucius was, moreover, a practical man who recognise that people loved most the people closest to them, especially their parents and relatives. So he qualified his teaching of love to others by adding that it is correct to love one's relatives more than others.

(32-4) Benevolent love, then, is graded, greater to those closer to oneself and lesser to more distant persons. The Confucian

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTRUISM IN CONFUCIANISM

Homer H. Dubs

[3]⁴¹

(continued from the previous page) virtues of filial piety (hsiao) and brotherly respectfulness (t'i) – special care for those in one's own family – are consequences of this emphasis upon graded love.

⁴⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 5 through 8, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁴¹ The original editor inserted "3" by hand.

To sum up: Confucius made fundamental to his ethical teaching the conception of love for others. But it was a graded love. His grandson emphasised “the decreasing measures of love to more distant relatives.”

(33-1)⁴² But China was being destroyed by the continual wars between the great noble clans, all of whom were closely related, much as were Europe’s royal families.

(33-2) Mencius (372–298), the doughty champion of Confucius, replied that equal love for all is unnatural. People naturally love their own parents more than those of others. Everyone has certain special duties to his own parents. Anyone who does not recognise his special relationships to his family is less than human – a beast.

(33-3) So Mo-dz’s equal love to all was relegated to the golden age, while Confucius’ graded love was taught as appropriate to the contemporary world. It implies the subsidiary virtue of specially loving or favouring one’s relatives (tsin-tsin).

When, in the last century B.C., China became officially a Confucian state, the emperor was naturally expected to be an example to his people. He accordingly placed his relatives in high positions.

Chou Tun-I

(33-4) Chou Tun-i of Lien-hsi (1017–73), who actually founded the subsequently dominant Neo-Confucian school, repeated Han Yu’s⁴³ statement that love (ai) constitutes benevolence (ren). He stressed one of the virtues subordinate to universal love, namely, public-spiritedness or impartiality (gung). “The way of a sage is to be completely impartial (gung).” “He who is impartial with regard to himself is impartial toward others. I have not heard of anyone who is partial to himself and is able to be impartial toward others.” Here is a complete denial of the ancient Confucian virtue of special love toward one’s relatives (tsin-tsin).

(33-5) “He who enlarges his mind is able to treat equally all living beings in the universe.” This may be called the pantheistic argument for altruism. It became standard in

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Chou Tun-I
[4]⁴⁴

⁴² The paras on this page are numbered 9 through 13, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁴³ “Yü” in the original.

⁴⁴ The original editor inserted “4” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) Neo-Confucianism. "All people are my brothers, all things are my relatives."

(34-1)⁴⁵ Bitter experience of the evils that graded love brought upon the country, together with the prodding of Daoist and Buddhist criticism, led intelligent Confucian leaders to reverse the traditional attitude and teach "universal love" and "impartiality" instead of the earlier virtue of "favouring one's relatives."

But, alas, human nature does not find congenial such a high ideal of universal love. The Neo-Confucians were, moreover, unable to contradict the ancient and lower ideal. For Confucianism is fundamentally an authoritarian philosophy which rests, for its validity, upon the ipse dixit of ancient sages. Neo-Confucianism could only reinterpret ancient terms, declaring that Confucius' word ren actually meant "universal love." It could not, however, deny the plain meaning of various passages in the ancient classics urging that one's relatives should be favoured.

Wang Yang-Ming

(34-2) Wang Shou-ren of Yang-Ming (1472-1529), who was in many respects the greatest of the Neo-Confucians, especially in his character. An objective idealist and a monist, he declared that there is only one true reality, which is Universal Mind.

(34-3) "If he makes a distinction in it between you and me on account of appearance or bone-structure (i.e. wealth or race), he is a small-minded man."

(34-4) When Wang Shou-ren was once exiled from the court and made a minor official among barbarians, an epidemic laid his retinue and people low. He nursed his sick servants, Chinese and barbarians alike, himself chopping wood, carrying water, and cooking for them, regardless of his superior position. No wonder he was loved by all!

But Wang Shou-ren's moral idealism has remained devoid of official support in China. Political considerations had made Ju Hsi's philosophy authoritative, and Wang Shou-ren was declared heterodox. Although that ban later was lifted, yet Ju Hsi continued to dominate official Confucian dogma until the Chinese Revolution freed the Chinese mind.

(34-5) Confucius made central in ethics the high moral concept

⁴⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 14 through 18, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁴⁶ The original editor inserted "5" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) of love for others. But, in an endeavour to make it congenial to human nature, he qualified it by making it a graded love, greater to those closer to oneself. There consequently came to be an emphasis upon filial piety and favouring one's relatives. Mo-dz, however, pointed out the necessity of equal love for all. But human nature does not desire over-high ideals. Mo-dz's ideal made little permanent impression in ancient times. But the Chinese are a practical people, who put their philosophies to the test of practical experience. This test demonstrated that Confucianism, in spite of its great moral eminence, nevertheless contained a vital defect. So, Neo-Confucians were driven to the same conclusion of universal altruism which was also adopted by the best Occidental thought. Yet the Chinese did not remain on these heights. Alongside this new universal altruism there was also perpetuated in Confucian dogma the same graded love that had been so congenial in ancient days. Chinese family loyalties are still the source of much in China's sorrows.

DeLacy O'Leary: Al-Hallaj

(35-1)⁴⁷ He felt a call to religion and sought the company of teachers of Sufi mysticism, first Sahl Ibn 'Abdallah, then 'Umar al-Makki, but was dissatisfied with their teaching and left them without asking their permission.

(35-2) In the end he developed his own ideas.

(35-3) "All his sayings are like the first visions of novices."

Daniel S. Robinson: Vacaspati and British Absolute Idealism

(35-4) Bradley's statement: I may perhaps remind the reader that to speak of a relation between phenomena and Reality is quite incorrect. There are no relations properly except between finite things.

Yu-Lan Fung: A Short History Of Chinese Philosophy

(35-5) Fung's distinction of wu in Kuo-hsiang as "literally nothing" and that in Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu as merely the unnameable is an important contribution. His interpretation of wu-wei (having no action) in Neo-Taoism as following new circumstances naturally and yu-wei (having action) as chauvinistic opposition to new and natural tendencies is

⁴⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 19 through 23, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) original. His correlation of basic Buddhist concepts to Taoist ideas of yu and wu is a masterpiece of scholarship and philosophical acumen. His treatment of the Buddhist Meditation school (Ch'an) is also superb because what is presented is not Indian yoga but a romantic, realistic, and this-worldly sort of transcendentalism produced by the Chinese genius.

(36-1)⁴⁹ Under Taoist influence Fung has over-emphasised the internal, in some cases to the exclusion of the external. He has neglected the Confucian doctrines on human relations and government altogether! This is really amazing, for the sage devoted practically his whole life to just such matters. A whole section is given to Confucius' way of spiritual development, but nothing is said about his teaching on ancestor worship. The familiar Confucian saying, "I follow my heart's desire without overstepping the boundaries," is understood as "no longer needing a conscious guide" and "acting without effort."

(36-2) While Chou Tun-i's Taoistic element is unmistakable, Fung concentrates on his "having no desire," and pays no attention to his equally prominent ideas of "centrality correctness, love, and righteousness."

(36-3) To say that Chu Hsi is more mystical than Plato simply because he conceives the universal principle as immanent in an individual thing is hardly convincing. And to liken Chu Hsi's "complete understanding" to the Taoist and Buddhist sudden enlightenment is certainly to go too far. After all, Chu's procedure is essentially rationalistic whereas sudden enlightenment is entirely intuitive.

(36-4) The intuitive Neo-Confucianism of Ming, are generally regarded as the most important Chinese philosophers in the last three hundred years.

(36-5) Reconstruction of Chinese traditional philosophies, such as New Buddhist Idealism and Hsiung Shih-li's New Neo-Confucian Idealism, are entirely omitted.

⁴⁸ The original editor inserted "6" by hand.

⁴⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 24 through 29, making them consecutive with the previous page.

Alan W. Watts: The Supreme Identity: An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion

(36-6) The Supreme Identity, is regarded as “a necessarily inadequate attempt to describe a most definite and positive experience,” and to indicate the way to its realisation. The experience or realisation is held to be the important thing, to be, in fact, the ultimate source for the

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THE SUPREME IDENTITY

Alan W. Watts

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(continued from the previous page) proper direction of life, society, and religion.

(37-1)⁵¹ This experience occurs when a person discovers that he as Self is not the empirical personality (the body and the mental processes which together constitute a particular individual) but rather the unperceived perceiver of this empirical reality; and then he realises the substantial identity of the Self with the infinite reality of which the finite world is a manifestation.

(37-2) It may perhaps be wondered why the readers of a philosophical journal need be concerned with a book that does not want to be regarded as philosophy. Watts considers modern philosophy to be a “corpus of ingenious but wholly inconclusive speculation, uncertain of the very methods of logic and cognition which it employs.” His complete neglect of current philosophical writings makes clear that he does not expect help from philosophers in the task he has set himself.

(37-3) The interpretation of the claim that intuition provides both a direct experience and a form of non-verbal knowledge has still not been carried out convincingly – as the discussions of the second East-West Philosophers’ Conference attest. Interest in all types of symbolism has become a central preoccupation of contemporary Western philosophy, and this interest is spreading to Japan, China, and India. This rapidly developing theory of signs will inevitably extend its interest to the language of and about mysticism. It is likely that in the process there will arise a better understanding of the nature and functions of the mystical mode of expression, with its characteristic use of negations and contradictions. And since the theory of signs deals with all signs, and not merely with linguistic signs, it may throw light upon the problem of intuition by

⁵⁰ The original editor inserted “7” by hand.

⁵¹ The paras on this page are numbered 30 through 32, making them consecutive with the previous page.

showing how the mystic experience may be what I have called in Signs, Language, and [Behaviour]*⁵² a “post-language sign,” and so a kind of knowledge not adequately translatable into the language signs required in discursive reasoning.

However it is done, in one way or another Western man will find ways to incorporate into his own heritage the wisdoms of other traditions, even though he may talk differently about these matters than has been done traditionally.

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THE SUPREME IDENTITY

Alan W. Watts

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(38-1)⁵⁴ The West is now “open” to Oriental thought and influence,⁵⁵ and it may in time know and become the Orient as thoroughly as the Orient already knows and becomes the West. Then the East will no longer be the East, nor the West the West.

Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: The Philosophy Of Zen

(38-2) It is what makes the existence of anything possible, but it is not to be conceived immanently, as if it lay hidden in or under every existence as an independent entity. The doctrine of sunyata⁵⁶ is neither an immanentism nor a transcendentalism; if we can say so, it is both.

(38-3) When sunyata⁵⁷ is awakened to itself or becomes aware of itself, which is “knowing and seeing” itself, we have another name for it: sunyata⁵⁸ is tathata,⁵⁹ “suchness.”

(38-4) When Hui-neng⁶⁰ is said to have had his insight into the truth of Zen while listening to The Diamond Sutra, we can trace the same idea lurking in the phrase which contributed to his enlightenment, namely, “to awaken the mind while abiding nowhere.”

⁵² The original editor inserted * and inserted foot note “* Charles Morris” at the bottom of the page by hand.

⁵³ The original editor inserted “8” by hand.

⁵⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 33 through 40, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵⁵ The original editor inserted comma by hand

⁵⁶ The original editor changed “sunyata” to “sūnyatā” by hand.

⁵⁷ The original editor changed “sunyata” to “sūnyatā” by hand.

⁵⁸ The original editor changed “sunyata” to “sūnyatā” by hand.

⁵⁹ The original editor changed “tathata” to “tathatā” by hand.

⁶⁰ “Hui-nēng” in the original.

(38-5) All our group activities are the accumulations of individual thought and action, I cannot help being in deep sympathy with the Biblical writer who makes God soliloquize in this wise:

And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth.

Ji-Ming Shien: Being And Nothingness In Greek And Ancient Chinese Philosophy

(38-6) Parmenides tells us: "One path is only left for us to speak of, namely that it is."

Plotinus

(38-7) "No attribute can be affirmed of it; we penetrate to it only by mystic contemplation, the senses sealed. We cannot make any statement about it, since all else we may say of it is said by negation."

(38-8) The source of all things must be self-contained and self-sufficient, in need of nothing other than its own self. Only Being, which transcends space and time, can

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PLOTINUS
[9]⁶¹

(continued from the previous page) be the source of all things.

(39-1)⁶² What can the nature of such existence be? Regarded from the standpoint of its lack of limitation, it is completely independent, that is, absolute. "Absolute" means that it is relative to nothing.

(39-2) Confucius, although not a Taoist, also recognises this principle of nothingness. In his Analects, he says: "I would prefer not speaking. His student Tzu-kung asks, "If you, O master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples, have to record and follow?" The master replied, "Does the universe speak? The four seasons pursue their own course and all things are produced in their order; but does the universe say anything?"

⁶¹ The original editor inserted "9" by hand.

⁶² The paras on this page are numbered 41 through 46, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(39-3) The full development of metaphysics both in ancient Chinese Taoism and in Greek philosophy culminates in nothingness. Nothingness is the nature of Being-in-itself, which is absolutely transcendent and nameless. Only in the namelessness of nothingness is the nature of ultimate reality discerned. If we give it a name and call it Being, then it is limited and loses its nature of absoluteness and self-forgetful unconsciousness. When we reach this step, we have gone as far as metaphysics can go in investigating the ultimate nature of reality. This is the merit of Lao-tzu in the East and of Gorgias and Plotinus in the West.

Hajime Nakamura: The Kinetic Existence of an Individual

(39-4) Heraclitus said, "Neither any god nor any man has created this world which is equal to all beings. On the contrary, it always was, is, and will be eternal living fire, burning according to rules and vanishing according to rules." Heraclitus acknowledged the lawfulness (metra) unity by logos through the vicissitudes of everything.

(39-5) In the dissolution of the phenomenal world into the ultimate principle, everything returns again into being in the reverse order. The order of development and dissolution coincides with that of the downward and upward ways of Heraclitus.

(39-6) In spite of the resemblance of these thoughts there is a conspicuous difference between the Indians and the Greeks. In the philosophy of Heraclitus the "eternal living fire" was called "the One," or "God," and was

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THE KINETIC EXISTENCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Hajime Nakamura

[10]⁶³

(continued from the previous page) identified with "Logos."

(40-1)⁶⁴ Nirvana,⁶⁵ the supreme state, has often been explained as expressing the state of the extinguishing of fire, which was compared to our evil passions.* This difference of opinion makes our attitude toward actual life different, too. According to Heraclitus, war is "the father of everything" and "harmony through conflict" is esteemed. Conflict is a condition essential to the existence of the world. According to Indian philosophers,

⁶³ The original editor inserted "10" by hand. at the top of the page by hand.

⁶⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 47 through 50, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁶⁵ The original editor changed "Nirvana" to "Nirvāṇa" by hand.

however, conflict in human life should be annulled at any cost. Herein is rooted the traditional peaceful attitude of Indians.

On account of this difference of views of life, the Greek thinkers were apt to be this-worldly, while Indian thinkers showed a tendency to transcend the mundane world.

Hsun-Tzu: On Terminology (Translated by Y.P. Mei)

(40-2) And so their people were converted to the Tao as by magic. Why should they use dialectic?

Now the sage-kings are no more; the world is in disorder; wicked doctrines have arisen; the superior man has no longer any authority to compel the people to do right, nor any punishment to prevent them from doing wrong.

(40-3) He has attained the proper measure of modesty, and he is in accord with the principles obtaining between the elder and the younger; he does not speak of what is forbidden or taboo; he does not utter imprecation; he expounds from a benevolent heart, he listens with a receptive mind, and he argues in a fair spirit; he is unmoved by the criticism or praise of the multitude, and he does not court the ears and eyes of the onlookers; he does not have respect for the power of people of rank, and he does not take advantage of the utterances of the depraved; thus he is able to dwell in the Tao and not err.

(40-4) Therefore what is in accordance with the Tao, follow it; how could anybody discourage this except to cause disorder? What is not in accordance with the Tao, desert it; how could anybody encourage this and bring about order? Hence, a wise man is concerned only about the Tao itself. All that the

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ON TERMINOLOGY

Hsun-Tzu (Translated by Y.P. MEI)

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(continued from the previous page) minor schools of philosophy aim at in their heterodox theories will fail.

(41-1)⁶⁷ All whose actions deviate from moral principles are in dangerous circumstances; and without exception, all who are in dangerous circumstances are inwardly fearful.

⁶⁶ The original editor inserted "11" by hand.

⁶⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 51 through 55, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(41-2) The superior man is cautious about untested doctrines, actions which have not been previously seen, and schemes which have been unheard of among the people.

(41-3) Buddhism brought in a flood of new concepts from India. When assimilated into Chinese life these ideas became the fertilizing stimuli to the great philosophers of the Sung dynasty. Chus Hsi integrated the teaching of his masters from Chou Tun-i on. He found new words in which to present a metaphysical defence. Moral values were related to cosmic energies and ultimate principles, li. In the Ming dynasty the emphasis was again shifted as Wang Yang-ming stressed mind and the unity of knowledge and action. The critical scholars of the Ch'ing period felt that these Sung and Ming interpretations were too much influenced by Buddhism. They tried to go back to a simpler earlier truth.

Richard Wilhelm: The I Ching (Review by E.R. Hughes)

(41-4) To the professional philosopher the above critique can hardly appear as encouraging; his training is of course calculated to make him impatient with the logical vagaries of occultism.

(41-5) On the cosmic scale constructive and destructive forces are at work, not in mutually negating processes of antithetical functioning but complementing each other in a self-perpetuating rhythm that produces just that, a working cosmos. Thus in Nature and in man momentum must be followed by rest, rest by momentum, and in the realm of the mind the positive presupposes the negative, the negative the positive, and certainty is followed by uncertainty, uncertainty by certainty. The symbolism of the hexagrams (viewed as consisting of two trigramatic parts) is based on this dualism.

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THE I CHING
Richard Wilhelm
[12]⁶⁸

Paramhansa Yogananda: Autobiography of a Yogi (Review by S.K. Saksena)

(42-1)⁶⁹ This autobiography focuses the attention of the reader on just those aspects of spiritual life and yoga which for ages have been regarded as hindrances in the path of a yogi's realisation of God.

⁶⁸ The original editor inserted "12" by hand.

(42-2) It is surprising to note that almost all the miraculous occurrences take place in India, before the Swami's arrival on American soil.

S.C. Chatterjee: The Needed Reform in Philosophy

(42-3) The Hegelian idea that we can know God or the absolute reality through "the reason of the universal" in us is either wrong or confused. If by the "universal reason" we mean, as Hegel did mean, man's speculative thought, then the reality of God and the self would be only a matter of airy speculation or, at best, of moral faith. If Hegel's "universal reason" stands for this kind of direct experience, it should have been plainly described as supersensuous experience or intuition to leave no room for any confusion or misunderstanding. It is here that Western philosophy may take its cue from the East. If in philosophy we are to deal with supersensible realities like God and the self, then in our epistemology we must admit intuition as a, if not the only, source of our knowledge of them.

Ji-Ming Shien: Nothingness in the Philosophy of Lao-Tzu

(42-4) In Lao-tzu, a negative statement is often an expression of the most positive truth. Nothingness is the way to the very positive truth of spontaneity.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman: Goals of Philosophy and Religion, East and West

(42-5) Hegel was chiefly concerned with Hinduism, Schopenhauer with Buddhism. In mid-century, the St. Louis School passed on to the American public the insights of the German idealists.

(42-6) For Plotinus, Eckhart, and Spinoza, the highest good

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GOALS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, EAST AND WEST

Edgar Sheffield Brightman

[13]⁷⁰

(continued from the previous page) is religious salvation of a mystical sort.

⁶⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 56 through 61, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "13" by hand.

(43-1)⁷¹ The first and primary goal of Eastern philosophy, that of daraana⁷² (intuitive “realisation”), reveals its kinship with religion.

(43-2) Plotinus, Spinoza, and Hegel are at least apparent exceptions to the high estimate place on the individual in the Occident.

(43-3) The influence of Plotinus on Christianity through the Pseudo-Dionysius has been immense; Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, Boehme, Thomas à Kempis, Saint John of the Cross.

Ha Tai Kim: Nishida And Royce

(43-4) The influence of Zen led Nishida to hold the philosophical thesis that experience, or the religious experience, is the highest reality.

F.S.C. Northrop: Concerning Unesco’s Basic Document on World Philosophy

(43-5) The first requirement is that scholars, whether they be philosophers, theologians, or historians, stop using abstract nouns like “theism” and “mysticism” apart from the specific definitions, content, and attendant values which such terms have in specific systems. Identity of words in different systems and cultures cannot be taken for identity of the content of those words or for identity of meaning.

(43-6) The basic values in Buddhist and Hindu systems derive from the nirvana⁷³ or Brahman concept which the Western philosophical systems do not contain.

The Concepts of Man in East and West

(43-7) But Western man, for his part, is prone to see the factors of possible stagnation in the tradition of the East, the sterility of its resignation, the indemonstrability and incommunicability of its metaphysical intuition; Eastern civilization, in his view, is incapable, by itself, of extending the benefits of progress, culture and even spirituality to the race of men as a whole.

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THE CONCEPTS OF MAN IN EAST AND WEST

[14]⁷⁴

⁷¹ The paras on this page are numbered 62 through 68, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁷² The original editor changed “darsana” to “darśana” by hand.

⁷³ The original editor changed “nirvana” to “nirvāṇa” by hand.

Christopher Isherwood: Vedanta For The Modern Man (Review By Harold E. McCarthy)

(44-1)⁷⁵ We are assured too often of the unity of existence and of the unreality of the physical world, /while/ Huxley refuses to ignore all plurality in the interests of unity.

(44-2) Vedanta as presented in this volume may offer consolation and hope to those who feel that most events are beyond their individual control. Others may find the reiterated goal of immortal bliss too luxurious to be seriously tempting.

S.K. Saksena: The Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy (Review)

(44-3) The book points out that the preceding analyses have converged toward the conclusion that we must postulate a “transcendental” unchanging and pure consciousness as underlying all our changing conscious states. The basic evidence for this postulate lies, the author holds, in the fact of our consciousness of change. This fact cannot be explained by changes in consciousness; it implies that the self by which all changing objects, and events are apprehended is not itself divided and changing. “Transcendentally, consciousness is one, eternal, unchanging, and a distinctionless universal which stands constantly as the support and the substrate of its ceaselessly varying manifold of inner and outer fluctuations. It is the presupposition equally of plurality as well as of unity in all knowledge and experience.” The difficulty of explaining the relation between this transcendental unity and the world of our changing experience he believes to be “logically insoluble, and a necessary feature of the limitation and the finitude of our minds.” It is resolved by an intuition which transcends logic – a divine vision, “in which alone the Absolute in its totality is revealed to the pure in heart.”

When we look at the basic presuppositions reflected in this treatment, it is evident that some of them are familiar to Western minds; outstanding among these is the presupposition that consciousness, in virtue of its distinctive nature, could not possibly arise from any unconscious form of reality.

Gai Eaton: The Richest Vein, Eastern Tradition And Modern Thought (Review by S.K. Saksena)

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THE RICHEST VEIN

⁷⁴ The original editor inserted “14” by hand.

⁷⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 69 through 71, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(45-1)⁷⁷ The general Western misunderstanding of nirvana⁷⁸ as total annihilation, and points out that the comparison of enlightenment or liberation to a stroke of lightning is common to Oriental and Occidental doctrines, to St. Augustine in the West, to Sufism in Islam, to Zen Buddhism, and to Hinduism.

(45-2) But Mr Eaton also seems to give an impression that in order to appreciate a tradition fully you must take it in its entirety or not at all.

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THE RICHEST VEIN
Eaton Gai (Review by S.K. Saksena)

Paul Masson-Oursel: True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy

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TRUE PHILOSOPHY IS COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
Paul Masson-Oursel⁸⁰
[16]⁸¹

(47-1)⁸² What changes in the last quarter of a century! I cannot forget that back in 1923 I tried to make the notion of comparative philosophy precise. And not only did no one, in any country, regard it as both humanly significant and important, but the "best" minds regarded it as purely utopian. Idolatrizing analysis, they feared that synthesis involved over-simplification and bias - as if these two methods, analysis and synthesis, were not complementary as well as inverse. Impartial comparison is as much concerned with differences as with resemblances; it is the very contrary of the simplification which was often exhibited by the "theosophists," who were inclined to suppose that all cults were equivalent.

⁷⁶ The original editor inserted "15" by hand.

⁷⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 72 through 73, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁷⁸ The original editor changed "nirvana" to "nirvāṇa" by hand.

⁷⁹ Blank page

⁸⁰ The original editor inserted "True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy" by hand. This page also reads "PHILOSOPHY EAST & WEST, JOURNAL APRIL 1951, U. OF HAWAII" in the original.

⁸¹ The original editor inserted "16" and "(vol. 1)" by hand.

⁸² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

J. Kwee Swan Liat

(47-2) Comparison tends to overstress the analogy and to neglect the essential differences, often resulting in a false conviction that all philosophy or religion is essentially the same.

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J. KWEE SWAN LIAT

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 2 (April 1952 – January 1953)

Wilmon H. Sheldon: What is Intellect?

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PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST VOLUME 2

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(49-1)⁸⁵ Poincaré⁸⁶ wrote of mathematical method: “It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover.”

(49-2) Not that this eminent mathematician fails to emphasise the necessity of logical proof of the inspired intuition; he insists on it. But it must not be taken as the only road to knowledge. Discovery of a fruitful postulate or notion is prerequisite. So Poincaré⁸⁷ declares, “I find nothing in logic for the discoverer but shackles.”

(49-3) Says Einstein in his preface to Planck’s book Where Is Science Going?: “But there is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition.”

(49-4) He (:Beveridge:) goes on to say: “In this book I have tried to show the error of this outlook and have emphasised the limitations of reason as an instrument in making discoveries.”

(49-5) What we call creative imagination, when concerned with the discovery of hypotheses about principles, is but intellect attending expectantly. How, indeed, could

⁸³ Blank page

⁸⁴ The original editor inserted “17” and “Vol 2” by hand.

⁸⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 7; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

⁸⁶ “Poincaré” in the original.

⁸⁷ “Poincaré” in the original.

intellect create a notion which comes unexpectedly? Creation is a word flattering to man's pride — hence its common use.

(49-6) The great stress which has been laid in the past on the activity of intellect is due to the need of severe effort, the difficulty of concentrated attention in the higher forms. The difference between this and the intense concentration of the scientist (or artist, which is usually less strenuous) is one of degree. But neither is in the slightest way originative in respect of the ideal possible with which he works; that is pure gift.

(49-7) Yes, we must repeat: Intellect at its best — so far — is a passive beholding, awareness, contemplation of possibles, their nature and what it involves, possibles realised or not, intellect wholly receptive, never quite certain that it sees correctly. And by one of the dialectical ironies of nature, this passivity is, in its higher stages, attained only after an intense activity of man's

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WHAT IS INTELLECT?

Wilmon H. Sheldon

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(continued from the previous page) unique possession, voluntary attention.

(50-1)⁸⁹ That so much stress has been laid on the mysterious creative power of the artist is probably due to the fact that he is a maker of physical things: he makes statues, designs buildings, paints pictures, writes music, books, etc. But this making is only a physical business. He no more creates his ideal possibles than does the scientist: all is given, just as sense is given. The point, as said, has been made before. Readers of R.L. Stevenson may recall his statement that the writer of a story sees the plot unfolding itself as he goes along, no initiative on his part but in the writing down. That is quite as true of the artist as of the scientist who witnesses the logical consequences of his hypothesis as they unfold themselves before his focused attention. Both contemplate a revelation, a revelation no more mysterious, probably less so, than the revelations of sense data.

(50-2) Concentrated attention and hopeful looking by the mind's eye, followed by a revelation from without: that is the method of the Vedantist, the Buddhist, the Christian mystic, the poet, painter, musician, and scientist alike. The difference between the experiment of the mystic and that of the others is that in the former the revelation, the gift, from a height or a depth transcending the personal self, comes as more than an

⁸⁸ The original editor inserted "18" by hand.

⁸⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 8 through 11, making them consecutive with the previous page.

ideal possible, rather as a reality directly sensed as if by some non-physical sense, a power which lifts him from the fret and turmoil of common life to a higher plane of blissful ecstasy. There is no deduction present; there is a passive beholding.

(50-3) Plotinus called reason the lame mind's crutch; when intuition fails to give its message, man resorts to reasoning as second best. But it is easy to see the source of the exclusion. The mystical deliverance is so overpowering to the devotee that he is at the time absorbed in the object. Self-consciousness is out of the picture.

(50-4) The object itself, he knows, was given as an immediate presence. What the mystic denies is ratio, logical

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WHAT IS INTELLECT?

Wilmon H. Sheldon

[19]⁹⁰

(continued from the previous page) implication; he does not in the least deny intellectus, the penetrating insight into ultimate reality; rather, he affirms it. The mystical experiment is contemplation; activity of attention, so intense in the process of the experiment, practically ceases when the experiment succeeds; the object itself compels attention, the recipient is passive as the eye is passive when it lingers on the beauty of ocean, forest, or mountain.

(51-1)⁹¹ Rosamund Harding (:said:) "The process is not so much an active as a passive one...the thinker dreams over his subject.... The procedure bears an analogy to the mystic way. The sinking of the personality... holding the intellect by the will so that it watches, but does not disturb, the life beyond himself in order that he may become one with it; these are the characteristics alike of mystic, seer, and thinker."

(51-2) The mystic and the thinker, she declares, have no separation; productive thinking is "natural in the same way as the experiences of mystics are natural: so rare in their extreme form as to appear supernatural and so common in their lesser manifestations as to pass almost unnoticed." Non-religious poets, novelists, scientists, "are often surprised to astonishment at the results of their work which seem to have been in some way 'given' to them."

⁹⁰ The original editor inserted "19" by hand.

⁹¹ The paras on this page are numbered 12 through 16, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(51-3) So much for the nature of what has usually been called intellect; it has appeared to be only the faculty of attention directed upon principles, possibilities within or apart from reality, essences existing or not existing.

(51-4) Intellect seeks to know the principles which order the world. It looks for causes.

(51-5) If the mind did not first sense the objective reality of the principle itself, it would not look to see the actual specific causes at work. It would not look for the powers that rule the universe, it would not philosophize. It is a direct revelation to the attentive thinker, and every living man, whatever his words may say, accepts it in order to conduct his life – as the small child asks why, and so on until fatigue intervenes. Let

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WHAT IS INTELLECT?

Wilmon H. Sheldon

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(continued from the previous page) us here use the old name: the principle of sufficient reason, where sufficient reason means cause of existence.

(52-1)⁹³ But man's intellect becomes aware of this very gradually; at first its eye is fixed on the external world, on reality, on the temporal, even on the eternal and ultimate as in the East and in the Christian West.

(52-2) Some cause there must be; intellect knows that. But if this world could be shown to contain everything that is possible without any inconsistencies or self-contradictions, the explanation would be perfect. So thought Hegel, too; he would prove that there is no mystery of being, since nothing and being are not alternative possibilities but are equivalent, and all that is real in our world can be deduced from the nature of being qua being. Thus he showed that he really respected the principle of chance: all that is possible is actual without preference, since whatever is possible was for him necessary from the very essence of being. But, of course, neither he nor anyone else has demonstrated the logical necessity of nature's specific laws. Such necessity can at best be taken only as a postulate, a faith, by the devout rationalist.

(52-3) Sit still and enjoy the vista that opens out before the mind. Calmness, later to be idolised by Stoic and Epicurean alike, was the great moral virtue.

⁹² The original editor inserted "20" by hand.

⁹³ The paras on this page are numbered 16 through 20; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

(52-4) The conflicts of metaphysics, the retreat into epistemology with no less conflict, the further retreat into logic and semantics with no result which bears upon knowledge of reality – if, indeed, there is here any consensus of the experts – these are phenomena obviously due to exclusive intellectualism. Nor is the trouble confined to the theorists of philosophy. Historians, politicians, economists, aestheticians, sociologists – the more they inquire, the more they bicker.

Walter T. Stace: Oriental Conceptions of Detachment and Enlightenment

(52-5) The opposite of attachment is detachment. I think the word “indifference” used by Max Muller⁹⁴ in the above

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ORIENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF DETACHMENT AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Walter T. Stace

[21]⁹⁵

(continued from the previous page) translation, is probably unfortunate. The English word “indifference” cannot, I feel sure, carry the sense of the ideal which Krishna is urging. Indifference means for us carelessness, not caring about anything. To be indifferent as to what the consequences of one’s actions may be is something which cannot be praised. And the Indian ideal of detachment cannot be this.

(53-1)⁹⁶ Stace: Nirvana⁹⁷ is said to be the cessation of all craving. But a man cannot act, cannot even breathe, without desire, so how could Buddha walk, eat, sleep, etc., without desire?

Buddhist: He will have the usual desires, but he is “detached” from them. His desires will not be egoistic.

Stace: Is egoistic the same as selfish, detached the same as unselfish?

Buddhist: No. In detachment the desire is “rootless.” It is not rooted in the self. Action takes place and is motivated by desires, but the inner personality remains withdrawn and not involved in the desires. If the desires of the man who is detached are not fulfilled, he remains serene and unaffected because his personality is not involved, but those who are still attached may become neurotic, as often happens, especially in the West.

⁹⁴ “Müller” in the original.

⁹⁵ The original editor inserted “21” by hand.

⁹⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 21 through 23, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁹⁷ The original editor changed “Nirvana” to “Nirvāṇa” by hand.

Stace: It is difficult to understand how a man can have a desire and not be involved in it. It sounds like having a desire, and yet not having it.

Buddhists: Yes. I think this kind of impersonality has to be experienced before it can be understood. It is part of the “enlightenment” experience.

Swami Nikhilananda: The Three States (Avasthatraya)

(53-2) Since the waking state is only a part of life, the experience gathered in that state is only a part of man’s experience. Hence, knowledge derived from the waking state can lead only to partial truth, not to the whole truth.

(53-3) The Buddhist and some Western idealists have tried, without success, to prove from the study of the waking state alone that the objects of the waking world are mere ideas.

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THE THREE STATES

Swami Nikhilananda

[22]⁹⁸

(54-1)⁹⁹ The objects of the waking state are perceived by the senses and therefore appear to us perfectly real. But what is their true nature? Vedanta,¹⁰⁰ from its detached standpoint, says that they are ideas. Where has one seen an objective reality that does not pass into the region of memory or ideas but always remains real? There is no objective reality that is not found, on inquiry to be an idea. This truth is not easily grasped if one limits one’s inquiry to the waking state alone. To a Vedantist,¹⁰¹ things are thoughts; objects are never known to exist apart from thought. The objects seen, as well as the ideas we have of them, are equally thoughts, as in a dream, though they appear to be different.

(54-2) A man who has acquired enough knowledge and wisdom about the world (which the Vedanta¹⁰² holds may require several lives or generations of experience and observation) attains without much conscious effort the knowledge that the world is an idea. Or, again, one may set about inquiring into the nature of perceived objects, utilise the experience of others, and realise the truth. Such a pursuit of truth is well known to modern thinkers, though they confine themselves to the data of the waking state alone.

⁹⁸ The original editor inserted “22” by hand.

⁹⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 24 through 27, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁰⁰ The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

¹⁰¹ The original editor changed “Vedantist” to “Vedāntist” by hand.

¹⁰² The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

(54-3) Time, space, and causality, which are indissolubly associated with objective reality, both in the waking and in the dream world, are mere ideas which vary with the individual. The standard by which one judges time, space, and causality in one state contradicts that by which one judges them in the other. In other words, they are relative.

(54-4) The “I” is a part of the cognised world; it is the correlative of the “not-I” and cannot create or wipe out the world to which it belongs – a feat, which solipsists have vainly sought to perform. If everything disappears, whence do ideas or the world come when we awake? They must have a basis of existence. They cannot be the effect of non-existence. To postulate non-existence, one must also admit an existence which is

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THE THREE STATES

Swami Nikhilananda

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(continued from the previous page) aware of it. There cannot be any such entity as absolute non-existence, since that implies the non-existence of one’s awareness, which bears witness to everything, including non-existence.

(55-1)¹⁰⁴ Since there exists in deep sleep neither “I” nor “my mind” into which ideas may merge, Vedanta¹⁰⁵ says that what exists in deep sleep is mind, that is to say, pure mind, or spirit, denoted in Vedanta¹⁰⁶ by the word prajna.¹⁰⁷ (As it is sentiency or thought alone that enables the prajna to experience the other two states, it is indeed the vehicle of sentiency in its so-called act of cognizing the different conditions. It is that whose form is all sentiency pure and simple, as distinguished from that of the other two, which admit of variety.) Definition from Sankara’s commentary on the Mandukya

(55-2) An abstraction cannot give rise to anything like the universe, which appears real and substantial. Vedanta¹⁰⁸ says that this awareness is nothing but mind, the reality of which is directly and immediately perceived.

(55-3) Vedanta¹⁰⁹ sometimes designates mind as saksin,¹¹⁰ the witness or onlooker, which is never an object of thought. This saksin¹¹¹ is not the “I,”¹¹² which disappears in

¹⁰³ The original editor inserted “23” by hand.

¹⁰⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 28 through 31, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁰⁵ The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

¹⁰⁶ The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

¹⁰⁷ The original editor changed “prajna” to “prajñā” by hand.

¹⁰⁸ The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

deep sleep, although, when ideas are cognised, saksin,¹¹³ or mind, functions for the time being as the “I,” or subject. Saksin¹¹⁴ is not real in the sense that a sense-perceived object is real; on the other hand, its unreality cannot be conceived. Therefore, it is said to be neither real nor unreal, but supra-real.

(55-4) When one sees the universe of ideas and its appearance and disappearance, then one regards saksin¹¹⁵ as its source. But, since mind is the sole entity that exists in deep sleep, and since there exists in that state no trace of the universe, mind is truly devoid of relationship. All relationships, including the basic relation of cause and effect, have been refuted by Gaudapada¹¹⁶ in the fourth chapter of the Karika.¹¹⁷ The notion of causality is the result of avidya,¹¹⁸ or ignorance. It applies to the phenomenal state, when a multiplicity of objects is perceived and one seeks to establish a relationship between them. That is why, when Vedanta speaks of saksin from the waking standpoint, it uses the language of causality and describes it as the source and final merging place of all ideas.

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(56-1)¹²⁰ Everything seen, felt, or thought of is the one entity, of whose non-existence it is impossible even to conceive. It is the very nature of reality to appear as the phenomenal universe without undergoing any change as regards its non-duality, infinity, and eternity. All that exists is mind, just as all that exists in the ocean is the ocean itself.

(56-2) Only when one imagines the waves to have an independent existence can one think of their source and of their place of final disappearance. This grand truth can be realised through the understanding and co-ordination of the experiences of the three

¹⁰⁹ The original editor changed “Vedanta” to “Vedānta” by hand.

¹¹⁰ The original editor changed “saksin” to “sākṣin” by hand.

¹¹¹ The original editor changed “saksin” to “sākṣin” by hand.

¹¹² The original editor inserted comma by hand

¹¹³ The original editor changed “saksin” to “sākṣin” by hand.

¹¹⁴ The original editor changed “saksin” to “sākṣin” by hand.

¹¹⁵ The original editor changed “saksin” to “sākṣin” by hand.

¹¹⁶ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

¹¹⁷ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

¹¹⁸ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

¹¹⁹ The original editor inserted “24” by hand.

¹²⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 32 through 36, making them consecutive with the previous page.

states. The faculty by which the three states are co-ordinated is called Vedantic¹²¹ reasoning, Intuition and intellectual reasoning, as applied to religion, science, and other human pursuits are the Vedantic¹²² reasoning functioning in the waking state.

Similarly, the personal God and such other spiritual ideals as Krishna, Buddha, and Christ, are only waves in the infinite ocean of mind, or consciousness, immediately and directly felt as "I am."

(56-3) Consciousness, or mind, is directly realised only as it exists in "me," and not as it exists in other creatures. This awareness functions as "I" when the latter distinguishes itself from the rest of the world; and it is the same awareness that is conscious of the empirical ego and the three states, as its objects, when it contemplates their appearance and disappearance.

(56-4) The Godhead regarded as the creator and preserver of the universe becomes identical with Atman¹²³ when the unphilosophical notion of causality is destroyed by means of Vedantic¹²⁴ reasoning. Then one realises the sublime Vedantic¹²⁵ truth that all that exists is Atman.¹²⁶

P.T. Raju: Comparative Studies in Philosophy

(56-5) The spiritual for the East is more profound, more important and more dynamic, creative and powerful, than what the word aesthetic means to either the West or to the East.

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COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

P.T. Raju

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George P. Conger: Did India Influence Early Greek Philosophies?

(57-1)¹²⁸ The "unlimited" – which is not to be thought of as an undifferentiated mass, or as mere emptiness, but as a matrix of everything – is eternal and ageless and

¹²¹ The original editor changed "Vedantic" to "Vedāntic" by hand.

¹²² The original editor changed "Vedantic" to "Vedāntic" by hand.

¹²³ The original editor changed "Atman" to "Ātman" by hand.

¹²⁴ The original editor changed "Vedantic" to "Vedāntic" by hand.

¹²⁵ The original editor changed "Vedantic" to "Vedāntic" by hand.

¹²⁶ The original editor changed "Atman" to "Ātman" by hand.

¹²⁷ The original editor inserted "25" by hand.

encompasses (periechein)¹²⁹ all the worlds. In the Rg Veda, among many other views, we find that Aditi, the unbounded, unlimited, is the matrix from which all the gods and all the world originate.

(57-2) The Pythagoreans had a list of ten pairs of cosmological opposites, but “light and darkness,” which might suggest Zoroastrian influence, is only one of the ten pairs, the eighth on the list. This is a marked reduction in rank, but we must not overlook the fact that here, also, opposition has somehow become important. The Pythagoreans emphasised opposites in their speculations about odd and even numbers, the “limited” and the “unlimited,” and the “indeterminate dyad.”

(57-3) Heraclitus’ emphasis on opposition may have been due to Persian influences. Heraclitus was a younger contemporary of Buddha, who taught that all the constituents of being are transitory. Into the same rivers we step and do not step; in this respect, and in a way, then, we are, and are not. So, any one tendency or property entails its opposite. Opposition is characteristic and essential. But for all the opposition there is a reciprocal change, a harmony, an encompassing unity; the universe always was, and is, and ever shall be, an ever-living fire, in which there are “fixed measures” kindling and dying out.

(57-4) A cosmic principle “willing and unwilling to be called Zeus” – i.e., sometimes interpretable in personal and again in impersonal terms. B 108 indicates that although men do not understand sophon (wisdom) it is a thing apart. At all events, the One Wise cosmic principle could hardly have been an unfamiliar concept in the empire which venerated Ahura Mazda, the “Wise Lord,” and to sophon, (the wisdom) regarded as cosmic and transcendent, now personal and now impersonal.

(57-5) There is one God, but the one God is not like mortals in form (demas)¹³⁰ or thought. God sees as a whole,

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DID INDIA INFLUENCE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHIES?

George P. Conger

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(continued from the previous page) thinks as a whole, hears as a whole.

¹²⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 37 through 41, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹²⁹ “periéchein” in the original.

¹³⁰ “démas” in the original.

¹³¹ The original editor inserted “26” by hand.

(58-1)¹³² Brahman “goes, standing”; it moves and does not move at the same time.

(58-2) The soul knows everything. Where knowledge is not of a dual nature, what is that? It is impossible to say. Monism, when it tries to be explicit or descriptive, always leads to problems and paradoxes; it is not strange that the Greek and the Indian, though coming at monism from different angles, encounter the same difficulties.

(58-3) The major division of the poem into two parts puts into high relief the distinction between true knowledge obtained by reason, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, opinion based on the senses.

(58-4) Fragment B 3, with the disputed translation which has sometimes made it say, “One and the same are thinking and being.” If this translation is to stand, we have what looks like a metaphysical idealism. The two fragments belong together. Apparently they must, if Parmenides is to be made consistent. Simplicius in the sixth century A.D. combines them, but they occur separately in older sources – as Diels indicates, B 2 in Proclus and B 3 in Plotinus.

A.C. Das: Brahman And Maya in Advaita Metaphysics

(58-5) According to the Advaitists (non-dualistic Vedantists),¹³³ particularly according to Sankara,¹³⁴ Brahman is the sole reality. It is pure being, immutable, eternal, and destitute of all attributes. Brahman, being absolute and infinite, must therefore be conceived only as the negation of everything relative and finite. It is true to say that Brahman cannot resemble anything of this world. We cannot liken it to any empirical object, nor can we erect any view of it in the light of anything we can fix upon in our experience. If we are to use anything of this world in our attempt to form a conception of it, we can use only the negation of whatever we may select for the purpose. That is the drift of the Vedantic¹³⁵ method of “not-this, not-this.”

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BRAHMAN AND MAYA IN ADVAITA METAPHYSICS

A.C. Das

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¹³² The paras on this page are numbered 42 through 46, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹³³ The original editor changed “Vedantists” to “Vedāntists” by hand.

¹³⁴ The original editor changed “Sankara” to “Śaṅkara” by hand.

¹³⁵ The original editor changed “Vedantic” to “Vedāntic” by hand.

¹³⁶ The original editor inserted “27” by hand.

(59-1)¹³⁷ Hence, the neti-neti (not-this, not-this) method to which the Advaitists have recourse does not in any way indicate that it is just a void. On the contrary, the method brings out that Brahman, being the ultimate reality, is unique and as such cannot be determined in thought, which involves comparison and analysis.

(59-2) The reference qua reference to Brahman is itself symbolical. In other words, the conception only serves to kindle our imagination and impels us to conjure up a sense of a reality which is the ground of the universe without clearly indicating anything of the determinate nature of that reality. We admit, then, and the Advaitists agree, that the supreme reality or Brahman is incomprehensible and indescribable. But this does not restrain philosophers from speculating upon reality. There is evidently an inherent urge in the human mind to penetrate into the mysteries of the beyond. Meta-physicians are therefore found wrangling over the nature of reality, and that is why metaphysics becomes a very “fruitful field of confusion.”

(59-3) We cannot dismiss it as mere non-being. It thus hovers between the real and the unreal and as such baffles thought. All this is inexpressible in articulate logical terms and remains a mystery.

(59-4) This is no solution to the problem, but only an evasion of it.

(59-5) The world, to be an illusion in relation to Brahman, requires at least some percipient outside Brahman, and entails the conception of Brahman as an object of perception. But all this is absurd.

(59-6) But to say that Brahman creates through maya¹³⁸ is to say that Brahman creates through, or out of, itself. Strictly, then, the world cannot be conceived as a superimposition upon Brahman.

(59-7) We cannot see why there should be a world appearance to be negated by the nature of Brahman. But this leaves the mystery of creation all the more mysterious.

Hugo Rodriguez-Alcala: Francisco Romero On Culture East And West

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FRANCISCO ROMERO ON CULTURE EAST AND WEST

Hugo Rodriguez-Alcala

[28]¹³⁹

¹³⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 47 through 53, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹³⁸ The original editor changed “maya” to “māyā” by hand.

¹³⁹ The original editor inserted “28” by hand.

(60-1)¹⁴⁰ To characterize the advent of the masses as a revolt is to prejudge it as a calamity. The masses are human beings whose slow emancipation has been sped up in our time. The material and social improvement of their situation is an achievement of which the West should be proud. To be sure, the masses pose a tremendous problem to our culture, but the duty of the West is to try to find a solution with serenity and open-mindedness, taking into account the fact that the rise of the masses also implies a flowering of human dignity.

Shoson Miyamoto: Freedom, Independence, and Peace in Buddhism

(60-2) According to Stcherbatsky, such ucchedavada,¹⁴¹ or nihilism, the Buddha emphatically denied.

(60-3) The Suttanipata¹⁴² (says) “The wise expire like this lamp.” “As the flame, blown down by vehemence of the wind, goes out, and can be named no more; even so the sage, liberated from individuality (namakaya),¹⁴³ goes out and can be named no more.”

(60-4) Rhys Davids says: “It is the extinction of the sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence....Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a sinless, calm state of mind; and if translated at all, may best, perhaps, be rendered “holiness” – holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom.”

(60-5) Sir Charles Eliot wrote: “The Buddha did not describe Nirvana as something to be won after death, but as a state of happiness attainable in this life by strenuous endeavour – a state of perfect peace, but compatible with energy, as his own example showed. The original meaning is the state of peace and happiness in which the fire of lust, hatred, and stupidity are extinguished.”

(60-6) W. Stede, co-author of the Pali-English Dictionary,

¹⁴⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 54 through 59, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁴¹ The original editor changed “ucchedavada” to “ucchedavāda” by hand.

¹⁴² The original editor changed “Suttanipata” to “Suttanipāta” by hand.

¹⁴³ The original editor changed “(namakaya)” to “(nāmakāya)” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) writes: “The ethical state called Nibbana¹⁴⁵ can only rise from within. It is therefore in the older texts compared to the fire going out, rather than to the fire being put out. Yet, it is a reality, and its characteristic features may be described, may be grasped in terms of earthly language, in terms of space.... Yet its sentimental value to the (exuberant optimism of the) early Buddhists (Rh. Davids, Early Buddhism) is one of peace and rest, perfect passionlessness. R. Otto (Das Heilige) describes it, “only by its concept of Nirvana is something negative, by its sentiment, however, a positive item in most pronounced form.”

(61-1)¹⁴⁶ E.J. Thomas concludes his chapter “Release and Nirvana”: “On this was based a system of moral and mental training directed to one goal. The teaching about that goal, we also have reason to believe, was due to one mind, the mind that taught the way to it.”

(61-2) This basic nirvana¹⁴⁷ should not be thought of as absolute nothing, or as a substantial existence outside of phenomena. It is an ultimate goal and at the same time the starting point, because of the necessity of truth in which start and goal coincide with each other. According to Japanese tradition, this nirvana¹⁴⁸ is considered the highest form of nirvana,¹⁴⁹ to which Dharmakaya,¹⁵⁰ Prajna,¹⁵¹ and Moksa¹⁵² are attributed, being named “Nirvana’s¹⁵³ three virtues.”

(61-3) Nirvana¹⁵⁴ has become universalised in recent times, being found in the dictionaries of the major languages of the world. But for it to become truly universal, the right understanding of its central concept must accompany the term. Sanskrit santih¹⁵⁵ in the Upanisads is used for moksa,¹⁵⁶ in Buddhism, mainly to express nirvana,¹⁵⁷ to be exact, moksa-nirvana.¹⁵⁸ “The peace which passeth understanding is

¹⁴⁴ The original editor inserted “29” by hand.

¹⁴⁵ The original editor changed “Nibbana: to “Nibbāna” in the original.

¹⁴⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 60 through 62, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁴⁷ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand.

¹⁴⁸ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁴⁹ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵⁰ The original editor inserted an accent mark in “Dharmakāya,” by hand.

¹⁵¹ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵² The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

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¹⁵⁴ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵⁵ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵⁶ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵⁷ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

our equivalent to this word (shanti).” The Japanese say nehan-jakujo¹⁵⁹ or peaceful tranquillity and apply it to the tea ceremony and the miniature garden of Zen atmosphere; it is the wahi, sabi, and yugen^{*160} of Japanese art and literature. The peace of nirvana¹⁶¹ is not simply peace, but is based upon a circular and infinite idea of freedom-peace and peace-freedom; the realm of

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FREEDOM, INDEPENDANCE, AND PEACE IN BUDDHISM

Shoson Miyamoto

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(continued from the previous page) satori and Jodo-faith¹⁶³ expresses this feeling. This is the deepest and highest which man seeks.

C.T.K. Chari: Russian and Indian Mysticism in East-West Synthesis

(62-1)¹⁶⁴ What can the Occidental do in a debatable land where scientific skill and reflective insight count for nothing? Even the sympathetic exponents of Oriental philosophy edge away nervously from the issue. The great systems of Eastern philosophy lose themselves in religion. The quest for philosophic certainty fades away into the quest for salvation.

(62-2) The possibility of such highly dialectical unities must be contemplated, and not dismissed with the cheap sneer that it is “syncretism” or “Theosophy.”

(62-3) Eckhart’s Opus Tripartitum inspired the Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae. Nicolas would like Eckhart’s works to be removed from libraries; they go beyond accepted belief. Yet “they contain subtle and useful things for the intelligent.”

(62-4) Lossky has written: “It is significant that logical thought, when strictly consistent, inevitably leads us beyond itself and compels us, in our survey of the world-system, to recognise a Super-logical, Super-cosmic principle. Philosophy, confined to its specific

¹⁵⁸ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁵⁹ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁶⁰ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁶¹ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁶² The original editor inserted “30” by hand.

¹⁶³ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁶⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 63 through 66, making them consecutive with the previous page.

domain of logical thinking, can tell us very little about that principle. It can only tell us that, being incommensurable with the world, it cannot be expressed or defined.

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RUSSIAN AND INDIAN MYSTICISM IN EAST-WEST SYNTHESIS

C.T.K. Chari

[31]¹⁶⁵

(63-1)¹⁶⁶ Father Nicholai Velimirovic says: "The aged East, tired of individualistic ambitions, tired of great men, flagellated by the phantom of human greatness, was thirsty for something higher and more solid than any human personality. Adoration of great personalities being the very wisdom of the world, the East stretched its hands to a superhuman ideal, to the Holy Wisdom."

(63-2) St. Catherine of Siena was often aware of the thoughts and deeds of her "absent children." The testimony of her aristocratic disciple, the wayward Francesco di Vanni Malavolti, has the ring of truth. St. John of the Cross is also said to have had insight into the unconfessed sins of others and with his advice often saved them from temptation and turned them to the right path. St. Seraphim of Sarov used to receive a number of letters from persons needing spiritual consolation and advice and often answered the letters without reading them or even opening them. The prophetic insight or precognition of mystics demands the most drastic reconstruction of current theories of time.

Nolan Pliny Jacobson: The Predicament of Man in Zen Buddhism and Kierkegaard

(63-3) D.T. Suzuki says: "The individual shell in which ray personality is so solidly encased explodes at the moment of satori. Not, necessarily, that I get unified with a being greater than myself or absorbed in it. The feeling that follows is that of a complete release or a complete rest – the feeling that one has arrived finally at the destination... As far as the psychology of satori is considered, a sense of the Beyond is all we can say about it."

(63-4) It is "a state of mental concentration which is attained when one realises states of emptiness, egolessness, and the truth that is free from passions and is ever serene; when one annihilates notions belonging to the externality of things... and when one has an insight into reality as it is." (Lankavatara Sutra)

¹⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "31" by hand.

¹⁶⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 67 through 70, making them consecutive with the previous page.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 3 (April 1953 - January 1954)

Alan W. Watts: On Philosophical Synthesis

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(65-1)¹⁶⁹ "I" am not this individualised consciousness alone, but the matrix from which it arises. This knowledge consists, not in a verbal proposition, but in a psychological change, similar to that which occurs in the cure of a psychosis. One in whom this change has come to pass does not attempt to control the world, or himself, by the efforts of his own will. He learns the art of "letting things happen," which is no mere passivity but, on the contrary, a creative technique familiar to the activity of many artists, musicians, and inventors in our own culture. However, it will be extraordinarily difficult for a wisdom of this kind to come within the scope of Western philosophy unless the latter can admit that philosophy is more than logic, more than verbalization, to the point where philosophy can include the transformation of the very processes of the mind, and not simply of the words and symbols which the mind employs.

Haridas Chaudhuri: The Integralism of Sri Aurobindo

(65-2) Absolute idealism is the Weltanschauung of a speculative thinker of retiring disposition.

(65-3) The Great Silence (the Upanishads)

(65-4) The universal creative principle has also the power of existing simultaneously, or rather non-temporally, as an infinite number of unique centres of self-expression.

(65-5) Man's deepest wisdom cannot consist in mere self-negation; but, rather, in the reconstruction of one's life by the limitless power of silence.

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¹⁶⁸ The original editor inserted "32" by hand.

¹⁶⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 8; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

(65-6) The highest goal of human life cannot consist in mere emancipation from ignorance and suffering.

(65-7) It implies an integration of the material and the spiritual values of life. The future of humanity lies in such an integration.

(65-8) Reality in its inmost essence is conceived here as beyond the scope of the concepts of unity and plurality.

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THE INTEGRALISM OF SRI AUROBINDO

Haridas Chaudhuri

[33]¹⁷⁰

(continued from the previous page) Reality in its inmost essence is the ineffable infinite and is beyond the scope of the subject-object differentiation.

(66-1)¹⁷¹ It would be erroneous to place them all, like universal parallelism, on an equality of footing; for, even though the creative impetus is equally present in them all, it is manifested in them in varying degrees, with the result that life represents a power superior to matter, and mind represents a power superior to life.

Siao-Fang Sun: Chuang-Tzu's Theory of Truth

(66-2) The escape from falling into universal skepticism in Chuang-tzu¹⁷² lies in two points: (1) the harmony of the universe, and (2) the concept of transcendentalism. There is a harmony of the universe by which things are arranged in an order. The events do not occur in chaos. While the individual things are relative, the totality of all things is itself not a thing. It is, to use a familiar term in Western philosophy, a transcendental concept. It transcends all relativities. It is one and it is absolute.

(66-3) What we mean by the totality here is called Tao in Chuang-tzu.¹⁷³ Tao is the fundamental assumption or the fundamental condition of the existence of the things we see.

¹⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "33" by hand.

¹⁷¹ The paras on this page are numbered 9 through 14, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁷² The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁷³ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

(66-4) For the ultimate change we may imagine that there is something in it which sustains the change. We do not know what this something is, but we imagine that there is something underlying the changes.

(66-5) This is why Chuang-tzu,¹⁷⁴ like Lao-tzu,¹⁷⁵ sometimes considered Tao as the source of the universe, while at other times he considered Tao as the highest principle of the universe.

(66-6) We need not lament over the constant change of everything, for, although we cannot grasp anything in the world with absolute certainty, in compensation we can grasp in our mind the Tao, which is absolute and one. The sage who realises what Tao is participates in the creative process of the universe. He identifies life with death, right with wrong. He transcends all relativities, and assimilates himself with the absolute. It

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CHUANG-TZU'S THEORY OF TRUTH

Siao-Fang Sun

[34]¹⁷⁶

(continued from the previous page) is in this sense that he himself becomes the Tao and is aware of himself as the Tao that is eternal.

(67-1)¹⁷⁷ There is no contradiction between the two statements that we can have no knowledge of Tao and yet that we can have intuitive experience of it. It has absolute certainty, but the validity is limited to the self.

(67-2) In summary, according to Chuang-tzu, there are two kinds of truth, relative truth and absolute truth. These two truths are not on the same level. Relative truth lies within our knowledge, while absolute truth lies in our intuitive experience, which cannot be analysed. From the realm of the relative to the realm of the Absolute, Chuang-tzu did not make a bridge; rather, he jumped.

Sri Aurobindo: The Life Divine (Review)

(67-3) The world process becomes a meaningless dance of the cycles of evolution and dissolution, leading nowhere. Therefore, the only hope that is given to man in most Indian systems is the hope of individual salvation. No matter what the status of the

¹⁷⁴ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁷⁵ The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

¹⁷⁶ The original editor inserted "34" by hand.

¹⁷⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 15 through 19, making them consecutive with the previous page.

world or of the rest of mankind may be, there is always hope for the individual man to win salvation. No hope is held out for any permanent improvement in their condition. They are to remain forever playthings of cyclical changes, one cycle pushing them up and another dashing them to the ground.

(67-4) We talk of peace but we forget the essential condition for it. Without a radical transformation of human consciousness, it is idle to hope for any lasting improvement of human relations.

(67-5) "At present mankind is undergoing an evolutionary crisis in which is concealed a choice of its destiny; for a stage has been reached in which the human mind has achieved in certain directions an enormous development while in others it stands arrested and bewildered and can no longer find its way."

S.K. Maitra: On Philosophical Synthesis

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ON PHILOSOPHICAL SYNTHESIS

S.K. Maitra

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(68-1)¹⁷⁹ The Samkhya,¹⁸⁰ like the rest of the Indian systems of philosophy, believes in the cyclical view of the universe, the view that evolution is always succeeded by dissolution, and vice versa. This takes from evolution all its value, as it reduces the world process to a mechanical oscillation between evolution and dissolution, leading nowhere. Moreover, even during a period of evolution, there is the cycle of the four epochs (yugas), so that even during this period it is not all an upward march, but continuous ups and downs. It goes back to the days of Aristotle, but it was lost through the passage of centuries, till Hegel revived it in a new form, and the scientific thought of the nineteenth century adopted it and handed it back to philosophy ... Western philosophy has stood solidly by the intellect or reason.

(68-2) Once the West gives up its existential bias, its outlook will be spiritual and not merely logical, as it is at present. It will then be in a position to realise the value of intuition as a method of discovering truth. Philosophy will also have a more direct contact with life and cease to be merely an academic pursuit, as, unfortunately, it has tended to become increasingly in recent years.

¹⁷⁸ The original editor inserted "35" by hand.

¹⁷⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 20 through 23, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁸⁰ The original editor inserted an accent mark in "Sāṃkhya" by hand.

(68-3)_Although it is very wrong to characterize all Indian philosophy as world-negating, yet, on account of the great influence of certain schools of thought which have favored this view, the impression has gone abroad that it favors a negative attitude toward the world. It is necessary, therefore, for Indian philosophy to assert very strongly, as Sri Aurobindo has done, a positive attitude toward the world. As I have shown elsewhere, once the idea that the culture of the East is world-renouncing is definitely rejected, the way will be prepared for a reconciliation of the East and the West, since the West undoubtedly stands for the affirmation of the world.

C.T.K. Chari: Dialectical Affinities Between East and West

(68-4)_F.H. Bradley's dialectic, which, according to a commonly accepted version, demands, "Thought must choose between an ultimate failure and a suicidal success."

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DIALECTICAL AFFINITIES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

C.T.K. Chari

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(continued from the previous page) Bradley's own personal religion was of a strongly marked mystical type, in fact of the specific type common to Christian mystics. Religion meant to him, as to Plotinus and Newman, direct personal contact with the Supreme and Ineffable, unmediated through any form of ceremonial prayer or ritual. The Absolute remained for him a "transcendent mystery"; it never became "transparent," as it did for some idealists. The "Cloud of Unknowing" ever stood between It and us. Scepticism is hardly the correct expression for Bradley's point of view. The Highest is present at every step ... Rather he should be called a mystic; and that he certainly is when his thought comes to rest. Bradley's scepticism had its roots in his mysticism.

(69-1)¹⁸² Religion reconciles philosophy to itself – by transmuting philosophy into religion. Philosophy, regarded as discursive analysis, is left limping behind; it has its small uses who would deny that? – but it is not philosophy, which is "seeing God."

(69-2) Spinoza's metaphysic is a beacon of warning. His tragedy was almost like that of Bradley; a mystic by temperament, he was the child of a rationalistic logic and prized it highly. The issue about religion and philosophy is stated in a rather muddled way in popular accounts of their alleged "synthesis" in the East. One gets the impression that the East has found some lapis philosophorum to which the West has had no access. The

¹⁸¹ The original editor inserted "36" by hand.

¹⁸² The paras on this page are numbered 24 through 26, making them consecutive with the previous page.

impression must be discounted. The only way any philosopher, be he Occidental or Oriental, to reconcile his philosophy with religion is to "know religion from within."

(69-3) Nor am I surprised at the disconcerting divergence of opinion about Spinoza's method: its "eclectic patchwork" (Wolf); its "unity" (McKeon); its flawless logical structure (J.A. Froude); its "incoherences" (A.E. Taylor); its geometric form devoid of all literary and philosophic charm (Couchoud); its more geometrica excluding with the "hardness of glass" emotional and other confusions (Zweig); its "ideal of impersonality" embodied in the

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(continued from the previous page) mathematical exposition (Roth.); its "vertical consistency" which prevents its "horizontal consistency" (Falckenberg); its "artistic" and "mystical" conception of intuition (Höfdding); its anti-mystic (anti-Cabalistic) tendency (Erdmann).

(70-1)¹⁸⁴ I am afraid I cannot accept Lossky's estimate of Hegel that he was a "philosopher-mystic" like Plotinus, /or/ Proclus.

(70-2) Hegel would have countered with the remark that metaphysics has the best of reasons: the World-Reason. If our reasons are bad, better ones must be found. The choice of a philosophical career is not a mystical vocation.

(70-3) "That which is known, not by the intellect, but by a presence passing all knowledge ... is absent from none, yet absent from all. Present, it remains absent to all save to those who are skilled to receive it." (Ennead, VI.ix.4)

(70-4) The mystical definition of reality as One, Immediate, and Ineffable is "a psychological report (and a true one)," but taken as "a metaphysical statement" is false or at least one-sided.

(70-5) They would insist that no "plurality of inductions," no "revision" of human knowledge, would bring us nearer to an ultimate rational solution of the problem of the One and the many, that is, an ultimate solution which our reason can formulate and understand. The point may be illustrated with respect to two notorious weaknesses of

¹⁸³ The original editor inserted "37" by hand.

¹⁸⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 27 through 32, making them consecutive with the previous page.

Hegel's idealism. His whole treatment of time, like Bradley's, Bosanquet's and Royce's, has proved inadequate; the protests by Croce, Gentile, Bergson, Alexander, Broad, and Russell should have made this plain to the meanest capacity.

(70-6) Neither Royce nor Hocking neglects personality, but both fail to solve the idealistic riddle about time. The structure of time in human experience and history is that of an open line and militates against "wholeness." We do not dispose of the problem by labelling the numerical infinity the "spurious infinity." Time gives us, in Hocking's own phraseology, a "negative wholeness."

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(71-1)¹⁸⁶ How does all this bear on mystical dialectic? Mysticism should not be confounded with its idealistic trappings. The mystical transcendence of time and personality is not the idealistic negation of them. The mystical transcendence may well signify an inclusion as well; only, it is not propounded as an intelligible solution of the riddle. The Advaita philosophy of India has given a subtle turn to the dialectic of mysticism by its doctrine of anirvacaniya (the "indeterminable" or the "indefinable"). Unfortunately, the language is apt to suggest to outsiders "illusion" in some semi-intelligible sense.

(71-2) To the Russian philosopher S.L. Frank must go the credit for boldly invoking "metalogical identity" and "metalogical difference" in a defense of mystical philosophy. The Unity of unities and of all pluralities is metalogical; it stands above the logic of human reason.

(71-3) Mystical philosophy may be called "syncretistic," if we please; they are symbols for clothing what is and must be for human thought an ineffable mystery.

(71-4) Why must we suppose that reason is the highest organ for apprehending reality and that the destiny of man in this world, as well as in other and unseen worlds, will not involve higher organs of awareness? The mystical philosopher thinks otherwise. No refutation of his claim, so far as I am aware, has ever been forthcoming.

(71-5) L. Shestov says: "Here we must not for a moment forget that ultimate truths have nothing in common with middle truths, the logical construction of which we have so

¹⁸⁵ The original editor inserted "38" by hand.

¹⁸⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 33 through 37, making them consecutive with the previous page.

diligently studied for the last 2,000 years. The fundamental difference is that ultimate truths are absolutely unintelligible. Unintelligible, I repeat, but not inaccessible.... When explanations lose all meaning and are good for nothing any more. It is as though we were led by a rope – the law of sufficient reason – to a certain place and left there: ‘Now go where you like.’ And since we have grown so used to the rope in our life, we long to believe that it is part of the very essence of the world. But if a man cannot distinguish without signs, and moreover does not want to ...

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(continued from the previous page) what is to be done with him? Really, I do not know.

Lossky is not altogether fair to Shestov in saying that his “extreme scepticism” has its source in the “idea of unrealizable super-logical absolute life.” Shestov, in the passage I have quoted, seems to imply that the supra-logical is accessible to our spirit, though not intelligible to thought. That is precisely the dialectic of mysticism. Lossky himself grants that philosophy, confined strictly to its domain of logical thinking, cannot lead us to the “metalogical”; mystical intuition is the only avenue of approach here.

(72-1)¹⁸⁸ Kierkegaard was not against the intellect; he wanted to go beyond it.

(72-2) Classical Advaita philosophy, which is essentially rooted in the claim to mystical experience, recognises something which is neither real nor unreal, nor a combination of real and unreal.

(72-3) The logic of reality is identity-in-difference, as Hegel thought.

(72-4) Poetic intuition involves a finer, a more sustained, application of the laws of thought than our commonplace and shallow thinking.

(72-5) The crude logician has a more comfortable life ... He has his given scheme for all subjects. He has introduction, thesis, and conclusion.”

¹⁸⁷ The original editor inserted “39” by hand.

¹⁸⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 38 through 45, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(72-6) Teresa confessed: "My Lord spoke these words to me: 'Forget yourself utterly, my daughter, leave it to me; now it is not you who are alive, but I; you cannot comprehend what you understand and that is understanding without understanding.'"

(72-7) The incomparable poet-mystic San Juan de la Cruz could speak only in exquisite images of the "holy inactivity and forgetfulness" which he experienced during the "Dark Night of the Soul"

(72-8) Although he profited by his study of Hegel's dialectic and made some notable applications of it, he was no Hegelian. His Absolute had its kinship, not with Hegel's "World-Reason," but rather with the An-Soph of the Cabbala, the Boundless One above Being and Thought of Proclus, the

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(continued from the previous page) the Super-essential, Indeterminable, All-transcending, Super-existent Super-Deity of Dionysius. In his visions of Sophia, Solovyov found common ground with Western Sophiologists, especially with Boehme, who testified, "the soul skippeth in its body for great joy." Solovyov's great dream of the "deification" of all mankind and all creation was not the climax of Hegel's dialectic, but a return to the mystical vision of St. Sergius Radonezh.

(73-1)¹⁹⁰ In the light of Kierkegaard's remarks about the "consolidated believer" who can endure the "double-vision."

(73-2) Here we must remind ourselves of the dictum of Giacomo Leopardi, a poet with some mystical as well as metaphysical pretensions, that a clear expression of the indefinable is not vagueness of expression. The romanticists, Leopardi said, went wrong in their judgement here. Most of our modern difficulties with religion, G.K. Chesterton once observed, arise from "our confusing 'indefinable' with vague – something misty or cloudy." According to Leopardi, the great poet conveys a clear idea of the state of his soul, whether it be one of seeing clearly or seeing obscurely. Mystical intuition is "seeing obscurely" if reason is our only criterion, and "seeing clearly" if the intuition is its own criterion. Mystical poetry is most successful when it produces the "double effect": the baffled reason and the satisfied soul. Leopardi went so far as to say that the mystic cannot communicate his vision to others unless he is also something of a

¹⁸⁹ The original editor inserted "40" by hand.

¹⁹⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 46 through 48, making them consecutive with the previous page.

poet. Short of that, he can only assert that he had his vision and describe it in symbols so obscure that they convey a hint only to the initiated and not always even to them.

J.P. McKinney: Can East Meet West?

(73-3) As the drama develops, twentieth-century man finds himself under the frightening necessity of bringing his highest powers to the service of his lowest instincts with self-destruction as the only outcome of the new knowledge to which he has attained.

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CAN EAST MEET WEST?

J.P. McKinney

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(74-1)¹⁹² Locke had regarded experience as an interaction between a “self” and the external world of things in Newtonian time and space. Berkely reduced these “things” to thought-structures in the mind of the “self,” and Hume finally reduced the “self” to a series of “distinct perceptions.”

(74-2) Hegel reached back to the “absolute substratum” underlying these individual viewpoints and the common world-picture. In keeping with the view which had inspired this development that the “world” was a thought-structure, he regarded this Absolute as Absolute Idea. The result was, to some minds, the most profound and penetrating of human philosophies, and to others of a different intellectual temperament a “senseless and extravagant maze of words.”

(74-3) Western positivistic analysis reduces traditional scientific and philosophical theories and the “something unknown which is doing we know not what,” to which physical analysis reduces the everyday world of substantial things, as the necessary logical counterpart of the negatives and paradoxes to which the Buddhist is reduced in his effort to express the outcome of his analysis. It is clear that man’s basic problems are not of such a nature that they can be solved by a simple application of reason, even if man himself were able to bring reason to bear upon his problems with complete and unwavering integrity. The basic fact is that the thinkers of both cultures have been carrying out the same procedure of analysis.

¹⁹¹ The original editor inserted “41” by hand.

¹⁹² The paras on this page are numbered 49 through 52, making them consecutive with the previous page.

W.T. Stace: Time and Eternity (Review)

(74-4) Stated with inescapable crudity, it is that a distinction must be made between two “orders,” one temporal and natural, the other eternal and the locus of the realities of religion. These two orders are wholly other to one another, but, nevertheless “intersect” at every point, as is manifest in the mystic experience. Every metaphysical problem has, then, two solutions, a naturalistic one and a mystical one, according to the “order” to which it is referred. Each solution is, “in its own right, absolute and final.”

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TIME AND ETERNITY (REVIEW)

W.T. Stace

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(75-1)¹⁹⁴ Of particular interest to the student of Oriental and comparative philosophy is the importance such a view confers on mysticism and a universal mystic “intuition.” If time and eternity are wholly other to each other, “all religious thought and speech are through and through symbolic.” What we say in time can refer to eternity only metaphorically.

(75-2) There is a positive theology which goes beyond “neti, neti”: some metaphors are more appropriate than others. Stace can account for this appropriateness, not on the basis of resemblance, but only on the basis of a “nearness” construed in terms of a vague Panpsychism and an unanalysed metaphysic of “levels of being.”

(75-3) The discussion of these issues has been considerably advance by Stace’s book. In the opinion of this reviewer, the penetration, conciseness, and lucidity of his presentation make the work one of the best on the subject in many, many years.

Daniel H. Ingalls: Samkara’s Arguments Against Buddhists

(75-4) Argument derives from Dharmakīrti’s verse: Sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīla-tad-dhīyah / Bhedaś ca bhrānti-vijñānair disyētendāv ivādvaye.¹⁹⁵ (Blue and the cognition of blue are not different entities, for the one invariable occurs with the other.)

¹⁹³ The original editor inserted “42” by hand.

¹⁹⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 53 through 56, making them consecutive with the previous page.

¹⁹⁵ The original editor inserted diacritical marks across this passage by hand. It originally read: “Dharmakīrti’s verse: Sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīla-tad-dhīyah / Bhedaś ca bhrānti-vijñānair dīśyētendāv ivādvaye.”

The doctrine of the simultaneity of cognition and content gains strength from the phenomenon of apperception, that is, cases of reflective knowledge in such form as “I know that I see the post.” It is said that in apperception the object and the knowledge are never separate. This can be only because they are identical in nature. Samkara’s¹⁹⁶ particular answers to these Buddhist pronouncements are not so important as his general criticism. Finally, Samkara uses the following argument, and this is his heaviest artillery. There must be something beyond the cognition, namely, a cogniser. The Buddhist is then made to object that to allow the cognition to be grasped by something outside itself leads to an infinite regress. Something still further must then grasp the grasper. It is to avoid this that he

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SAMKARA’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST BUDDHISTS

Daniel H. Ingalls

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(continued from the previous page) stops at the cognition, which he regards as self-luminous, like a lamp. But Samkara counters by saying that this cognition could not be reached by any means, nor could it have anyone to understand it. It would be like a thousand lamps set in a wilderness. For illumination the lamp needs an eye. A witness is necessary in order to have a cognition. And there is no logical necessity (akanksa)¹⁹⁸ for something to grasp the grasper. The witness stands self-proved. Buddhist: “But in urging against me the self-validity of the knower you are merely using my theory under a different name.” Samkara: “No, because you claim that cognition is momentary and multiple.”

(76-1)¹⁹⁹ The Buddhist argument runs thus: Just as our ideas of dreams and mirages have the form of perceiver and perceived although they lack external objects, so also do our ideas in the waking state. Or, to put the matter more simply: The ideas we have in dreams are false; therefore, the ideas we have when awake are false, because they are ideas. The answer is based on common sense. Dreaming is different from waking. The ideas we have in dreams are different from those we have when awake. The first are sublated by awakening; the second are not.

(76-2) Mayavadins²⁰⁰ hang on to Buddhist doctrine.

¹⁹⁶ “Śamkara’s” in the original.

¹⁹⁷ The original editor inserted “43” by hand.

¹⁹⁸ The original editor changed “(akanksa)” to “(ākāṅkṣa)” by hand.

¹⁹⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 57 through 60, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁰⁰ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

(76-3) It is Samkara's followers who slip over into the Buddhist position, not Samkara. The author of the *Viveka-cudamani*²⁰¹ uses exactly this Buddhist argument to prove the unreality of the external world.

(76-4) Samkara considers briefly the *alaya-vijnana*²⁰² of the Buddhist idealists. *Alaya-vijnana*²⁰³ or reservoir-consciousness is a concept set up by the *Vijnanavadins*²⁰⁴ to provide something permanent in the constant flux of momentary particles. It is a consciousness or cognition as abstracted from all terms of the relations in which cognition occurs. That is, it is pure consciousness, not consciousness of anything. Metaphysically it is similar to Samkara's *Brahma*, which is knowledge devoid of all the terms in which knowledge occurs, in other words, pure knowledge, not knowledge of anything. But there is a psychological and historical difference between the two terms.

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(continued from the previous page) First, let me paraphrase Samkara's words on II.ii.31. "The reservoir-consciousness that you set up, being momentary, is no better than ordinary consciousness. Or, if you allow the reservoir-consciousness to be lasting, you destroy your theory of momentariness." The reservoir-consciousness appears to Samkara as the last-minute thought of a school which has spent most of its effort in nihilism, a notion pulled in by the hair to save the system from becoming sheer nonsense.

(77-1)²⁰⁶ Integral to Samkara's system of metaphysics, the witness is the centre of all Samkara's philosophy. It is the light by which everything is seen, the light of which the sun and moon are pale reflections. It is not only real but so egregiously real that the workaday world fades into mist beside it. And the only fact that enables us to realise this truth is that it is the witness within us. We realise it by realizing an identity: "tat tvam asi."

(77-2) As Samkara states at the beginning of his *Brahma-sutra* comment: Everyone has the notion "I am"; no one can deny the self, for it is the self even of the denier. Both

²⁰¹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁰² The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁰³ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁰⁴ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁰⁵ The original editor inserted "44" by hand.

²⁰⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 61 through 65, making them consecutive with the previous page.

these arguments, that of the witness and that of identity, are at the very centre of Samkara's system of Vedanta.

(77-3) It may be put most strongly as follows. In arguing against the Vijñānavādins,²⁰⁷ Samkara seems to argue as a realist. Certainly he seems to insist on the reality of the external thing. On the other hand, when developing his own system of philosophy, he claims not once but a hundred times that the world is unreal, as unreal as the foam on water, as the trick of a magician, as a mirage, as a dream.

(77-4) When it comes to logical definition, of course, there is small difference between the Buddhist and the Vedānta concepts, but Samkara admits that Brahma is not logically definable. And then he leaves himself a logical loophole. Remember his words: "Common sense cannot be denied without the discovery of some other truth."

(77-5) I myself would judge the evidence in this way. If we are to adopt a metaphysical and static view

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Daniel H. Ingalls

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(continued from the previous page) of philosophy, there is little difference between Samkara and Vijñānavāda²⁰⁹ Buddhism, so little, in fact, that the whole discussion seems fairly pointless. The central reality of both systems is a qualityless, changeless unity, and from this point of view there is much justice in the Buddhist objection that I have quoted: "But in urging against me the self-luminousness of the knower you are merely using my theory under a different name."

(78-1)²¹⁰ Given the concept of a partless brahma, which is universal, we cannot explain the external world as parts of brahma, nor can we explain changing circumstances as varying states of brahma. The external world must be simply an appearance.

(78-2) A few Buddhist idealists, Samkara realised, had posited an unchanging unit within which all this change could take place and they called this unchanging continuum reservoir-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna)²¹¹ or pure consciousness

²⁰⁷ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁰⁸ The original editor inserted "45" by hand.

²⁰⁹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²¹⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 66 through 70, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²¹¹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

(vijñaptimātrata).²¹² But to Saṃkāra this seemed simply a hypocritical attempt to patch up the picture after it had been torn to shreds. Saṃkāra refused to take the alaya-vijñāna seriously.

(78-3) Saṃkāra came at a point in history when these two traditions, on an intellectual plane at least, had almost coincided. Out of their original pluralism the Buddhists had evolved a unity, while the Vedānta had left its early joyous acceptance of the whole of life. It had so concentrated its effort toward the peak of nirguṇa-brahma (quality-less brahma) that the workaday world had become as sorry a place as it was to the early Buddhists.

Robert L. Slater: Paradox and Nirvana (Review)

(78-4) His conclusion is that the vitality of Buddhism, like that of all other religions, is due to the paradox associated with the ultimate goal, in this case, Nirvana.

(78-5) Slater comes to the recognition that wherever religious faith ventures furthest with bold affirmation it is obliged, in the last resort, to express that affirmation in negative as well as positive terms. "A Yes is uncomfortably joined with a No," or, more simply put,

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PARADOX AND NIRVANA (REVIEW)

Robert L. Slater

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(continued from the previous page) "the imaginative language of analogy is joined with the language of negation." Hence the paradox, which is inevitable, and he agrees with Langmead Casserly (*The Christian in Philosophy*) that "there can be no going behind or pretending to resolve the paradox. To evade the paradox is to lose the truth!"

(79-1)²¹⁴ Nirvana is. Like all such terms which reflect, however dimly, the 'reality of realities' it eludes philosophy while it inspires life.

(79-2) Buddha declared that to describe Nirvana as annihilation is a "wicked heresy," and here we see "immortality" used as a synonym for Nirvana. What then is the solution? There is no solution, for Nirvana is not something to be described; it has to be experienced to be known. It can be known only by insight or, as Slater prefers to call it,

²¹² The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²¹³ The original editor inserted "46" by hand.

²¹⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 71 through 76, making them consecutive with the previous page.

by "Vision." "All power short of this Vision is inadequate. Intellect falls short. It is not despised, but neither is it exalted."

(79-3) The paradox must remain a paradox.

(79-4) But this universality of the religious paradox does not mean that all religions come to the same thing or express the same faith. "The kinship indicated by paradox refers to some basic experience. But does this necessarily mean that the experience is, in every respect, similar?

(79-5) Until man is freed from the fret, not only of the invasive world without, but of the distract world within, he cannot know the answer. The path to be followed is the path of purity which leads to the place of vision where, utterly detached from selfish and shallow interest, man may know the Truth... The calm of silence brings man nearer the Great Peace than any wind of words. The Buddha himself know this only too well; hence his silence – so often misunderstood by Western writers – on questions which were later classed by his followers as the "Great Indeterminates," the ultimate realities, which he left open, answering neither "Yes" nor "No."

(79-6) Like the majority of Buddhist writings, the Prajnaparamita Sutras have, however, a marked preference for negative terms. The positive term "sameness" is used sparingly, and nowhere is it further developed or explained. It is sometimes coupled with another one of

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PARADOX AND NIRVANA (REVIEW)

Robert L. Slater

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(continued from the previous page) there are positive synonyms of emptiness, i.e., with "suchness."

(80-1)²¹⁶ It must be admitted that this kind of philosophy gives little comfort to common sense. As a matter of fact, it must leave the average person in a state of gasping bewilderment. On the other hand, this method of thinking is perfectly consistent with itself, although it does not draw its inspiration from the interests and concerns of the man in the street, but from the religious aspirations of what, by contrast, one might call "the man in the forest." It now remains for me to show briefly how a concern for

²¹⁵ The original editor inserted "47" by hand.

²¹⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 77 through 80, making them consecutive with the previous page.

religious values and for a holy life has shaped the leading tenets of the ontology of the Prajnaparamita.

If selfless renunciation is the essence of the religious life, then these teachings reach the highest summit of unworldliness. If non-attachment is a virtue, then the negation of the multiplicity of all dharmas is the intellectual counterpart to the desire “to abandon all the points to which attachment could fasten itself.” If our basic anxiety is only perpetuated when we rely on something and is rooted out only when we give up this search for a firm support – what could be more conducive to depriving us of any stable support than a perpetual concentration on the self-contradictory nature of all our experience? If a peaceful attitude to others is the test of religious zeal, it can only be furthered by a doctrine which tells us not to insist on anything, not to assert anything. Subhuti, the great expounder of perfect wisdom in these books, is expressly called “a dweller in peace,” one who can abide without fighting.

Where this kind of ontology is actually believed to be true, it must lead to calm and even mindedness. There is no calm like the calm of oneness because it is withdrawn from everything that could disturb it. The teaching of sameness of everything is a somewhat round-about way of describing the attitude, or virtue, of even- mindedness, which is the final crown of the Buddhist endeavour.

(80-2) One who is disinterested expects nothing from the world.

(80-3) Signs of low-spiritedness are permissible on the lower, but not on the highest stages of the path.

(80-4) The ontology of the Prajnaparamita is a description of the world as it appears to those whose self is extinct. That is its justification and the source of its strength [and of its limitation.]²¹⁷

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G.E. Cairns: Intuitive Element in Metaphysics

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PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST VOLUME 4

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(81-1)²¹⁹ There is no way that complete unconsciousness can be experienced. Such a lapse of consciousness, which would be equivalent to temporary death, can be inferred only by memory of experiences before and after the state.

²¹⁷ The original editor inserted “and of its limitation.” by hand.

²¹⁸ The original editor inserted “48” by hand.

Van Meter Ames: Zen and Pragmatism

(81-2) Is it a mysterious truth beyond understanding, about the world and salvation, as Suzuki more and more would have it?

(81-3) Suzuki is quick to add that sunyata is not a negative term but a positive concept, and is not arrived at by abstraction or postulation, for it is "what makes the existence of anything possible."

Since there is no division of subject and object in the experience of sunyata, the plunge into it requires the doffing of all reasoning. The intellectual procedure which works "in dealing with this world of relativities" will not work "when we want to get down into the very bedrock of reality, which is sunyata. With the revival of irrationalism in our time, this advice to stop thinking and plunge should give pause.

(81-4) Zen's paradoxical existentialist-sounding language might be dismissed as mystifying, if not for the age-old and renewed testimony that there is something of great significance here, to be rediscovered and found the one thing worth communicating, though scarcely to be expressed. Suzuki reports the twelfth-century Tai-hui as calling the end of striving a plunge into the unknown with the cry, "Ah, this!" and declaring that all the scriptures are merely commentaries upon that cry.

(81-5) What distinguishes the development of Zen in China and Japan from Indian Buddhism is being "extracted from life itself as it is lived by every one of us, thoroughly democratic in his way of thinking and feeling." Incidentally, this comment stands in unexplained contrast

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ZEN AND PRAGMATISM

Van Meter Ames

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(continued from the previous page) to the statement in an earlier volume that "Zen is by no mean a democratic religion. It is in essence meant for the élite."

(82-1)²²¹ We should cultivate some gaiety and insouciance through faith.

²¹⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 5; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

²²⁰ The original editor inserted "49" by hand.

²²¹ The paras on this page are numbered 6 through 13, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(82-2) Suzuki has said: "Paradoxical statements are... characteristic of prajna-intuition.²²² As it transcends vijnana²²³ or logic it does not mind contradicting itself; it knows that a contradiction is the outcome of differentiation, which is the work of vijnana.²²⁴"

(82-3) If this seems contradictory, the teaching of Zen is "to experience the dissolution of contradictions." We are assured that if we can get back to the pre-analytical suchness of tathata,²²⁵ the difficulties of logical thought vanish. It is helpful here that Suzuki relates tathata²²⁶ to aesthetic appreciation.

(82-4) "The only remedy one can have," Suzuki exclaims, "if it is granted, is the gospel of insensibility!" His anguished conclusion is that this is not inhuman if things are as bad as they seem and out of our control. He suggests that they may, after all, be our fault.

(82-5) Its texts have charm. They can be read for inspiration though rejected as substitutes for the quest that each man must undertake for himself. Suzuki is revered as an authority on the doctrine of no authority.

(82-6) And for the living to ask how to live is to inquire how to live now, in this century and this situation. Resenting the idea that Zen can be confined to its historical setting, Suzuki replies with "the fact that Zen is still fully alive."

(82-7) Then, as Rinzai said, nothing would be needed but to go on with our life as we find it: with "no hankering after Buddhahood, not the remotest thought of it."

A.N. Marlow: Hinduism and Buddhism in the Greeks

(82-8) The Hindu conception of Rta, the law of Nature, or "course of things," has the same scope as the

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HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM IN THE GREEKS

A.N. Marlow

[50]²²⁷

²²² The original editor inserted an accent mark by hand

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²²⁷ The original editor inserted "50" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) Greek dike.

(83-1)²²⁸ The apeiron of Anaximander is almost exactly like the Hindu Nirvikalpa, the nameless and formless, called Aditi, the unlimited, in the Rg²²⁹ Veda.

(83-2) In the more imaginative view of the Upanisads,²³⁰ we find that a personal god, Prajapati²³¹ ("lord of creatures"), draws forth from himself all existing things. One might adduce here the similar Chinese doctrine of yang and yin, the principles of expansion and contraction by which the world is formed from chaos. Empedocles seems to be expressing a similar idea, or, rather, combining it with the equally ancient doctrine of primordial strife, also found in the Upanisads:²³² "I will tell you a twofold truth: at one time it increased so as to be one out of many and at another it parted so as to produce many from one. For twofold is the creation of mortals and twofold their decline."

(83-3) Empedocles is keenly conscious of a sort of "fall of man" and affects to remember past births as plant and animal, boy and girl. The way by which the original bliss may be gained, from which he is now an exile, is by asceticism, the Hindu method. He advises meditation, for by this means all truth shall be revealed and even supernormal powers attained. In the end, the soul of the righteous ascetic regains its divinity.

(83-4) The aim of Orphism, the realisation by man of his identity with God, would have appeared blasphemous insolence to a sixth-century Athenian.ⁱ In the Orphic abstinence from animal sacrifice there seem to be traces of the primitive taboo which, according to the latest evidence, gave rise to the caste system and to the doctrine of ahimsa.²³³

(83-5) It is interesting to find attributed to Pythagoras the doctrine of purification by ascetic practices and by 'theoria' (contemplation). Even the secrecy of the doctrine and the refusal to commit it to writing reminds us of the very meaning of the word "Upanishad,"²³⁴ a "confidential communication."

(83-6) No one can read any of Plato's dialogues without

²²⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 14 through 19, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²²⁹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

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(continued from the previous page) being struck by his frequent stress on the complete independence of soul and body and his equally significant insistence on the fact that the soul does not come into its own until the body is quiescent.

(84-1)²³⁶ The Upanisads²³⁷ refuse to ascribe more than a relative reality even to waking consciousness, for who knows when it may be sublated into something which bears the same relation to it as it does to dreams? Hence, their important doctrine of 'māyā'²³⁸ (illusion). We find this in the Theaetetus: "Nay, I go further, and say that if we are half of our lives asleep, and the other half awake, in each of these periods our minds are convinced that whatever opinions present themselves to us, these are really and certainly true; so we insist on the truth of both alike."

(84-2) As to the problem of the way by which Indian influence reached Greece I have no new solution to offer and fall back with others on Persia as the intermediary.

H. Chaudhuri: Concept of Brahman in Hindu Philosophy

(84-3) It is a religion in so far as it emphasises the necessity of living in harmony with the basic spiritual truths of existence; and yet it is not a religion in so far as it does not set itself in opposition to the other great religions of the world but insists upon the human spirit's going beyond all doctrinal religions.

(84-4) The world is an appearance in the sense that it does not exist by itself, but is a beginningless and endless process of creation and dissolution sustained by the creative power of Brahman called maya or sakti.²³⁹ Whether this process is real or unreal, and, if unreal, in what sense it is unreal, are matters of philosophical controversy.

(84-5) The question may now be raised: What is the highest goal or the summum bonum of the individual? The answer of Hindu philosophy is embodied in its concept of mukti, spiritual freedom. Mukti means freedom

²³⁵ The original editor inserted "51" by hand.

²³⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 20 through 24, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²³⁷ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

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(continued from the previous page) from ignorance and, consequently, the attainment of the directness of truth-vision (jñāna).²⁴¹ It implies transition from all forms of narrowness of outlook and a limitless expansion of consciousness. It implies emancipation from all kinds of emotional attachment and psychic dependence.

(85-1)²⁴² Mukti, spiritual freedom, is essentially a matter of knowledge. It is not mediate knowledge via the senses or the discursive understanding, but an immediate apprehension of reality.

(85-2) Those who attain spiritual fulfillment are integrated with the supreme truth.

(85-3) Since the non-temporal pervades every moment of time, such conscious integration can be achieved at any time in our worldly life as soon as the inner psychic tensions and emotional conflicts are completely liquidated.

(85-4) It is a complete misunderstanding of the true spirit of Hindu philosophy to suppose that it encourages a negative attitude to life. The truth is that Hindu philosophy has always acknowledged negativity as an important factor in the right type of affirmation of life. In order to understand the world from the true perspective, in order to appreciate the proper significance of the temporal order in the context of the eternal, in order to participate in the drama of life in a spirit of detachment, freedom, and mental equilibrium, periodic retirement into the silence of the transcendental has been considered essential.

(85-5) Brahman is the immanent truth of the world of the finite and the relative. And consequently, Brahman is not entirely unknown and unknowable, but is, rather the basic condition of all differentiated knowledge and capable of intuitive realisation.

(85-6) The finite world in its true essence is a form of manifestation of Brahman, and, therefore, is identical therewith.

(85-7) All that can be said is that nirguna and saguna, silence and creativity, are two poises of being or modes

²⁴⁰ The original editor inserted "52" by hand.

²⁴¹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁴² The paras on this page are numbered 25 through 31, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) of existence of the same supreme reality called Brahman. Brahman as the identity of such logical incompatibles is, indeed, the profoundest mystery of existence.

(86-1)²⁴⁴ Brahman is unknowable as an objective content and inaccessible to the mind and the intellect, but it is surely attainable in a supra-intellectual immediacy of experience called turiya²⁴⁵ or samadhi.²⁴⁶ See Swami Nikhilananda, *The Upanishads*, Vol. II, pp 248-249.

(86-2) Samkara²⁴⁷ and his followers have tried to show, for instance, how an analysis of such different phases of human experience as waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and mystic realisation (turiya) constrain us to formulate the notion of pure unobjective consciousness as the one fundamental reality which is called Atman-Brahman.²⁴⁸ Being established on independent logical grounds, the concept of Brahman is thus as much a concept by postulation as a concept by intuition. Reason is not in essence totally opposed to spiritual intuition, but is an inadequate mode of apprehension.

(86-3) It is definitely wrong to identify Brahman with the aesthetic factor in the nature of existence. The aesthetic and the theoretic factors are in truth inseparable aspects of the world of manifestation, which is called "jagat," i.e., the cosmic flux, in Hindu philosophy. Brahman, in its inmost essence, is none of these. Still it may also be said to include them in a sense, in so far as sensuous immediacy and rational mediation are interrelated factors in the creative self-expression of Brahman. The immediacy characteristic of the experience of Brahman is not to be confounded with that of sentient experience; rather, it is akin to (though not quite the same as) what F.H. Bradley in his Appearance and Reality calls "that superior form of immediacy" where "thought must reach its consummation. Northrop has brought out with admirable precision, however, the practical implications of the concept of Brahman. He is perfectly right in assuming that the experience of Brahman entails devotion to the aesthetic and spiritual values of life.

²⁴³ The original editor inserted "53" by hand.

²⁴⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 32 through 34, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁴⁵ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

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(87-1)²⁵⁰ Buddhists call the “bodhi-mandala” – the magic circle of enlightenment, when the meditator feels his essential identity with his object of meditation, Brahman, or Amitabha.

(87-2) Such fundamental philosophical positions as pluralism, monism, and non-dualism are not to be statically viewed as mutually exclusive water-tight logical systems, but should be dynamically conceived as different stages in man’s spiritual unfoldment. The multiple self, the personal God, and the impersonal Absolute, are different moments in the life of the same Brahman.

(87-3) According to the theory of Brahman as interpreted by Sri Aurobindo, the uniqueness of individual self-expression, endless cosmic creativity. It follows from this that the true significance of life lies neither in exclusive glorification of individuality nor in the liquidation of individuality in a supra-cosmic silence. The material world is, in the view of Sri Aurobindo, neither independently real, nor transcendently unreal. It is, rather, the scene of progressive self-manifestation of the superconscient real.

Carsun Chang: Reason and Intuition in Chinese Philosophy

(87-4) I should like to make it clear that before the various schools of philosophy in China²⁵¹ attained to the conception of knowledge they passed through a stage where concern was with meditation, concentration of mind. Preoccupation of this kind has many Chinese names, such as “mind-keeping,” “spiritual nursing,” “silent understanding,” “re-collectedness,” “devotion.” Without such work of meditation one leads merely the daily life of coming in, going out, calling on acquaintances, attending to one’s business, etc. Under the pressure of practical business one’s mind may never have the time to be concerned with Tao, that is, with the way of knowledge and right behavior. But once a person has become interested in aspiring after Tao and devotes himself assiduously to the task, he will find the way.

(87-5) A valid method of knowledge according to Eastern

²⁴⁹ The original editor inserted “54” by hand.

²⁵⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 35 through 39, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁵¹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

(continued from the previous page) thinkers requires preparatory disciplines which are non-intellectual as well as intellectual... The mind must be cleared of obstructions which arise from selfish desire and turbulent emotion. One who aspires to achieve Tao, should strive first to rid himself of the sensuous and licentious, and also of the desire for money, fame and power. Besides self-elimination of desires, other factors were proposed for self-elimination, such as prepossession, bias, departmentalization – all of which infect the mind with partiality, unfairness, one-sidedness, and blindness.

(88-1)²⁵³ When Chou Tun-i faced the question: “How may I attain sagehood?” the following answer occurred to him: “singleness of purpose.”

(88-2) Zen Buddhism is famous for its contemplation; yet, we know that many of its categorical imperatives are based upon the Avatasamka²⁵⁴ school or upon the Madhyamika²⁵⁵ school. The same may be said of the Taoists, who stressed “mind-fasting,” which is identical with Ch’an’s (or Zen’s) contemplation.

(88-3) The three schools: Confucianism, Ch’anism, and Taoism will be considered. These schools have one thing in common, namely, contemplation, “spiritual nursing” or “mind-fasting” as a preparatory step. Their adherents believed that since the activities of ordinary life are in vain and futile they should devote themselves to what is everlasting and unchangeable.

(88-4) After the introduction of Buddhism from India, the road of personal cultivation took a new course: it tended to become quietistic. “Calmness,” said Chou Tun-i, “is the way to set up a human standard.”

(88-5) There is an essay by Ch’eng²⁵⁶ Hao about the tranquillity of human nature or mind. An important document of meditation, it reveals the nature of the “spiritual nursing” which the Neo-Confucianists learned under the influence of Buddhism. As a follower of Confucius, and therefore one who would spend his life in this world, Ch’eng Hao was able nevertheless to attain calmness without sitting for years before a wall like a Ch’an Buddhist. Ch’eng Hao’s advice about how to remain quiet whether in

²⁵² The original editor inserted “55” by hand.

²⁵³ The paras on this page are numbered 40 through 44, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁵⁴ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

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(continued from the previous page) activity or in inactivity was to forget that there is inside or outside to mind; in other words, to become oblivious to the separation of the internal from the external as far as mind is concerned. This is the path to calmness for the Confucianist living in the world. Chêng Hao believed that, if one became unconscious of, or unconcerned about, whether “this” is inside one’s mind or “that” is outside one’s mind, one would respond naturally to what comes. He tells us what a mind ought to be in order to be quiet, impartial, and capable of making right judgements. This kind of mentality enables one to reason and to attain truths by intuition, and it is, in my opinion, the highest stage to which a philosopher can aspire.

(89-1)²⁵⁸ Chu Hsi’s way of approach towards Tao was (1) to investigate reason in order to improve his knowledge; (2) to put his convictions into practice, thus giving them exemplification; (3) to concentrate his mind, which was the Alpha and Omega of the whole process, running through the former two aspects. If the mind were not concentrated when engaged in improvement of knowledge, there would lead to such befuddlement that the mind would be incapable of seeing where the principles of righteousness lie. Again, if the mind were not concentrated while concerned with personal practice, there would ensue relaxation and negligence, and the work of exemplification would be impossible. The way to attain concentration of mind is to devote one’s self to singleness of purpose.

In China, Chu Hsi is considered an adherent of the school of knowledge-seeking. Yet, he never forgot the importance of the rôle of concentration of mind, which, for him, was just as important as knowledge. The great philosopher in the camp opposite Chu Hsi was Wang Yang-ming. As the former was the founder of the school of knowledge-seeking, so the latter was the champion of the school of the supremacy of virtue or mind.

(89-2) Wang Yang-ming pondered the words of Chu Hsi that in everything there is a rational principle which each

²⁵⁷ The original editor inserted “56” by hand.

²⁵⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 45 through 46, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) of us should study. He became convinced that their theories suffered from their tendency to separate mind from the principles of the natural world and the world of moral values. One night he awoke, imagining that somebody had called him, and he perceived suddenly the meaning of the two concepts: “investigation of things” and “realisation of knowledge.” At this moment he became aware of the unity, or integral wholeness, of the physical world and mind.

(90-1)²⁶⁰ Ch’anism, as a forerunner of Neo-Confucianism, was renowned for its contemplative life and its contempt for book-knowledge. To Bodhidharma are attributed the words: “appeal directly to the original mind! When one’s nature is found Buddhahood will be attained!” Great emphasis is placed on the command: “Away with intellect and worldliness!” The Ch’an sect was on the surface very anti-intellectualistic. One day a monk came to Bodhidharma and said, “My mind is not yet pacified. Please, Master, pacify it.” The Master answered: “Bring your mind and I will give peace to it.”

(90-2) As mere viewers-of-the-scene, they practiced “mind-fasting,” and were therefore able to maintain a detached point of view. Their life in the world accorded with the principle: “As a spectator one has a clear view, As one who is in the midst of affairs one is confused.”

A.C. Das: Advaita and Liberation in Bodily Existence

(90-3) Nirvikalpa samadhi is the ultimate state of ecstatic trance, in which Brahman in its true undifferentiated and unconditioned nature is realised. This state is one of absolute identity. The aspirant merges into Brahma; his ego or individuality is eliminated; all differentiation ceases; and he in fact becomes Brahman. But, if that were really the ultimate state, no one could ever return from it to teach illusionism on earth.

(90-4) When the aspirant comes out of nirvikalpa samadhi, he perceives, somewhat in the same way, an existent

²⁵⁹ The original editor inserted “57” by hand.

²⁶⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 47 through 50, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁶¹ The original editor inserted “58” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) world, though he is convinced that it is unreal. Now the question is: How can the Advaitist explain the return from nirvikalpa samadhi of the one who has realised Brahman? Once merged with the indeterminate, how could he ever come out of it again to the world? In nirvikalpa samadhi the individuality of the aspirant is lost in Brahman. So, we cannot put down his return from the ultimate state to any option on his part. On the other hand, since Brahman is absolute and indeterminate, no activity whatsoever can be ascribed to it. We cannot, therefore, conceive that Brahman sends back the blessed one out of the state of identity and projects a world-appearance to be presented to him.

Advaitists are puzzled over this problem. In fact, they fail to solve it, and in their perplexity resort to makeshifts.

(91-1)²⁶² We have in the Katha Upanisad, "The Self cannot be attained by learning, nor can it be attained by the intellect or by means of the scriptures. That is attained only by him whom That chooses; to, him alone the Self reveals its real being." Advaitists are hard put to explain this text, and some of them have tried to explain it away altogether.

(91-2) The philosopher's endeavor is not all useless, however. The conception he reaches through thinking makes the world more intelligible than the popular conception of it does. The position of an idealist thinker is peculiarly important in this context. He, through analysis and reasoning, arrives at the conception of God as absolute spirit manifesting himself or itself in the universe. So, the conception that the world arises from a supreme source is far more adequate than the conception that the world is self-existent, although the former conception is little more than an intellectual construction, an idea built on the basis of ordinary experience.

(91-3) Again, after realisation of Brahman the world admittedly persists, and the sadhaka remains in the body for some time. So, the state of nirvikalpa samadhi cannot involve an absolute cancellation of the

(continued from the previous page) world, and, for that reason, cannot be conceived as a state of getting out of the world illusion. If the sadhaka returns to the world and to bodily existence, he is ever aware that the world is unreal and only Brahman ultimately real. And this awareness he attains through the transformation he undergoes in the

²⁶² The paras on this page are numbered 51 through 53, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁶³ The original editor inserted "59" by hand.

ultimate state of realisation. If we credit him at all with any conception of the world, that conception results from the transformation of his empirical conscious being.

(92-1)²⁶⁴ If the world persists even after the realisation of Brahman, it must have some sort of reality, although it can be only a dependent reality. To say that the world is real in the reality of Brahman is to say that the world is real in the reality of Brahman is to say that the world derives from Brahman, or that Brahman, though in itself undifferentiated, manifests itself in differentiation. The exponents of the “transcendence in conception” theory must obviously end by abandoning the orthodox Advaitist position, which is nothing short of acosmism.

(92-2) When the sadhaka comes out of nirvikalpa samadhi and regains consciousness of the world, he is left with a sort of ego. Advaitists themselves cannot afford to be blind to this fact. But the question is: How is it that some sort of individuality is restored to the sadhaka, though in the state of nirvikalpa samadhi all ego or individuality and all differentiation are annulled? The Vedantists of the “transcendence in conception” school give only dubious recognition to the problem. They do not so much address themselves to it. If they are at all conscious of the problem, they seek to evade it.

(92-3) God is a minor being as compared to unconditioned Brahman. God is indeed the creator and sustainer of the world. Still, he is only a supreme phenomenon among phenomena.

(92-4) The state of liberation in bodily existence after the realisation of the Absolute is an enigma. On realisation, the sadhaka gets immersed in absolute bliss, and it is only we, it may be maintained, who see that

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ADVAITA AND LIBERATION IN BODILY EXISTENCE

A.C. Das

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(continued from the previous page) the sadhaka lives in the body. This is no explanation, but only an attempt to explain away the whole state of liberation in bodily existence. So, the conclusion that follows is that the teaching of the sadhaka as to nirvikalpa samadhi after he has realised Brahman is illusory. Then, how can we know if anybody ever realised Brahman? To attain to nirvikalpa samadhi is to cancel the world as illusory. But this cuts at the very foundation of Advaitism.

²⁶⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 54 through 57, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁶⁵ The original editor inserted “60” by hand.

T.W. Organ: The Silence of the Buddha

(93-1)²⁶⁶ There are other instances in which Gautama corrected a question, so he could answer it. In the parable which forms a part of the Kevaddha Sutta a man asks the gods, "Where do the elements pass away?" But Gautama changed the question to "Where do the elements find no footing?" Then he answered it. He changed the question, so that it became an epistemological rather than a metaphysical question. And in the framework of an idealistic epistemology the answer is obvious: the existence of the elements depends upon intellection; intellection has ceased in the "intellect of arahatship"; therefore, in the mind of the arahat the elements find no footing. Again, in the Mahavagga, when Siha, a disciple of the Nigantha sect, asks the Buddha if he teaches the doctrine of annihilation after death, the Buddha's answer involved a rephrasing of the question, for he answered, "I proclaim, Siha, the annihilation of lust."

(93-2) Mahayanists believe that some of his doctrines would not fit the language patterns of his day. According to the Zen school his doctrine will not fit the language patterns of any day. The Mahayana texts warn over and over again against the dangers that lurk in the use of words. They are fingers which point to the moon. One must beware lest one concentrate on the word and miss the reality to which the word points. "But neither words nor sentences can exactly express meanings, for words are only sweet sounds that are arbitrarily chosen to represent things, they are not

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THE SILENCE OF THE BUDDHA

T.W. Organ

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(continued from the previous page) the things themselves, which in turn are only manifestations of mind." Zen masters, beginning with Bodhidharma, are fully convinced of the insufficiency of human language to express the fundamental nature of reality. Even to say "I do not know" is inadequate, since a confession of not knowing implies a measure of knowledge. Silence is the best expression of reality.

D.T. Suzuki: Zen and Pragmatism

(94-1)²⁶⁸ Zen Masters always try to keep their eyes inwardly on "this side," because it is here that they get into "the moment of living."

²⁶⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 58 through 59, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "61" by hand.

²⁶⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 60 through 64, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(94-2) Where, let me ask, is this clearness and transparency where we can come face to face with reality? It is no other than where absolute emptiness (sunyata) is, which means the limit of objectivity, where “the other side” can go no further: this is where pure subjectivity reigns supreme.

(94-3) The realm of objectivity has its limit, and when you come to it, the only thing you can do is to make a leap over it. As long as conceptualization goes on, there will be no discovery of the real self.

Wing-Tsit Chan: Religious Trends in China

(94-4) Confucius had both: conceiving that in his teaching – the “spreading of right living” – he was carrying out a Mandate of Heaven, the religious element was there. If now we ask how the Heavenly Mandate is to be known, we are referred for an answer to our own moral nature (as the phrases “taking virtue seriously” and “cultivating one’s personal character” suggest).

H.G. Creel: From Confucius To Mao Tse-Tung

(94-5) Much has been written on the question whether Mencius was mystical and relied on introspection as the way to knowledge. Creel notes that Mencius broke with *Confucius*, who had explicitly branded meditation as inadequate.

P.T. Raju: The Spiritual in Indian Thought

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THE SPIRITUAL IN INDIAN THOUGHT

P.T. Raju

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(95-1)²⁷⁰ The Advaitins argue that there is consciousness in deep sleep, because one who wakes up says that he slept well, and, unless one was conscious, one could not have known of one’s sound sleep.

(95-2) In deep sleep, the atman is overwhelmed and stupified by some mysterious dark force, the Unmanifest, and so it does not realise its true nature. Therefore, this shroud has to be removed, and then the fourth state of the pure atman is revealed. This is the

²⁶⁹ The original editor inserted “62” by hand.

²⁷⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 65 through 68, making them consecutive with the previous page.

real spirit within us. If one could enter into deep sleep and at the same time not lose consciousness, one could realise this fourth state; it is true spiritual realisation.

(95-3) Antahkarana literally means “the inner instrument,” and is often translated as the inner sense. It is the instrument that connects spirit (atman) with the external world and is the mediating link between the two. Along with this psychological function, antahkarana performs a metaphysical function also, namely that of evolving or generating the world. With the Mandukya²⁷¹ conception, its significance becomes clear. It is the evolution of the psychophysical personality of the waking state from the unmanifest unconscious of deep sleep. And because Indian philosophy attaches more value to inwardness than to outwardness, the Indian philosophical tradition has to be interpreted as the tradition of inwardness.

(95-4) Even in the intuitive attitudes of the so-called Eastern man, the intellectual element may also be present. If he has not utilised it, the reason may be that he has not disengaged it from the intuitive. But can it be disengaged from the spiritual? It can be and has been disengaged from sense intuition, and so the material sciences have progressed. Thought can think of things and also of thoughts. But the intellectual element cannot be disentangled from the spiritual, because the spiritual, which includes the intellectual and transcends it, would then cease to be spiritual. It is true, we speculate about spiritual life just as we think about material things. Spirit is within

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THE SPIRITUAL IN INDIAN THOUGHT

P.T. Raju

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(continued from the previous page) thought; but material things are outside thought. That is why Indian thought, which is concerned mainly and primarily with the spiritual, does not speak so much of this disentanglement and does not concern itself with this problem so much as does Greek philosophy.

(96-1)²⁷³ Man's being has two dimensions, the inward and the outward. The Katha Upanishad says that the Lord created the senses as outward looking (pranci),²⁷⁴ and so man perceives with the senses only external objects; but one who wants eternal life closes his senses and looks at the inner spirit. But with what can one look at the inner spirit? The instrument here is mind (antahkarana). Without the antahkarana we cannot

²⁷¹ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

²⁷² The original editor inserted “63” by hand.

²⁷³ The paras on this page are numbered 69 through 71, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁷⁴ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

know the objects of the external world, nor can we get at the inner spirit. The two dimensions of man's being are the directions of his activity, the inward and the outward. And every action, excluding the purely spiritual, can be measured or evaluated in both ways. The inward becomes spiritual when it is directed deliberately toward atman, and no inward activity becomes spiritual unless it is so directed.

(96-2) Inner activity is not inward activity. Imagination is inner activity, but not inward activity; it is inner outward activity. Inward activity is activity turned toward the inner. The main interest of all Indian philosophers except the Carvakas is in explaining and upholding the importance of this process of inwardness. Whenever an Indian calls a man spiritual, he means that the man attaches the highest value to the life of inwardness. Ethical and aesthetic activities become phases of the spiritual only when they are deliberately and consciously viewed as activities leading inward toward spirit.

(96-3) Only one man out of a thousand can make up his mind to follow the path of inwardness; and, out of a thousand who make up their minds, only one can accomplish it. Hence, this philosophy, with such great spiritual heights, cannot succeed in becoming the philosophy of the average man, who, nevertheless, regards it as teaching the highest ideal. Spirit and

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THE SPIRITUAL IN INDIAN THOUGHT

P.T. Raju

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(continued from the previous page) matter are two extremes of man's being; they are the limits of his inwardness (antarmukhata) and outwardness (bahirmukhata). He cannot act, therefore, either as pure spirit or as pure matter, for what man, for instance, will consider the death of a loved one as nothing more than the disintegration of material particles? So, neither pure spiritualism nor pure materialism can be an adequate philosophy for man; and yet, neither spirit nor matter can be ignored for directing his actions and life.

(97-1)²⁷⁶ The seeds of such philosophy can be found in the Purva Mimamsa,²⁷⁷ which is essentially a philosophy of action (karma) and which, when properly blended with the Vedantic, the Buddhist, and Jain spiritual truths, can give a well-balanced philosophy of life as a guide to the majority of mankind. Apart from ancient and classical systems, Indian or Western, a true and workable philosophy of life must give equal recognition

²⁷⁵ The original editor inserted "64" by hand.

²⁷⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 72 through 73, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁷⁷ The original editor inserted accent marks by hand

to the two dimensions of man's being, the inward and the outward. Overemphasis on inwardness disables man from being active, and over-emphasis on outwardness disconnects him from his spiritual essence, without which his activity becomes aimless, for one's identity in all acts, ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual, with the spiritual ground of the world has to be recognised, and it cannot be recognised without the necessary orientation to the innermost spirit, whether it is called Atman, Brahman, or God.

J.M. Van der Kroef: Pantjasila

(97-2) Islamic orthodoxy has on more than one occasion expressed its disapproval of seeking a mystic union with Allah, on the grounds that it is blasphemy; yet, in Indonesia it is often in these terms that the position of Allah is understood by indigenous Moslems. Especially in times of adversity and stress, this mystical appeal manifests itself. As a recent report has it: The bureau of religious affairs reveals that in West-Java no less than 29 so-called new religions have come

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(continued from the previous page) into existence. Although their adherents call themselves Muslims their beliefs diverge from the concepts of Islam. The cause of the phenomena is attributed to the adverse economic condition of the population and the insecurity in the desa (village). In their despair many people seek their salvation in the mysticism of a new religion." The orthodox Moslem aversion to mysticism, strongly evident, for example, among Indo-Arabs in the country, is thus at variance with the mystic character of the communal religious life.

(98-1)²⁷⁹ Mystical values, deriving from the ancient Javanese art of life, were held to be fundamental to the child's training. It is not a particular religion Taman Siswa seeks to encourage, but a sense of religiosity, piety, and reverence, especially in terms of humanitarianism; hence, all religions can make use of the Taman Siswa system. In evolving this philosophy, if it can be called such, Dewantara was profoundly influenced by the Hindu-Javanese code of the "good life," with its emphasis on obedience to elders, unswerving compliance with the duties imposed on one by nature and society, semi-asceticism, restraint, manners, and cultural development rather than factual knowledge, etc. Therefore, he represented a unique symbol of continuity from the

²⁷⁸ The original editor inserted "65" by hand.

²⁷⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 74 through 75, making them consecutive with the previous page.

golden past, a past which valued leisure, polish, and inward maturity more than ambition, aggressiveness, or facility in technical performance.

(98-2) Takdir sees cultural life in Indonesia threatened from two sides. On the one hand, there are those who are still tradition-minded, who orient themselves in terms of the old values of the people: "the safe peace and sense of cohesion of the desa, the profound spiritual life of our earliest mystics, the beauty of our old artistic expressions," and so on. On the other hand, there is the younger generation, so deeply impressed with things European and American that "they will accept only European norms and standards as their guides, not only in science and technology, but in daily life, food, manners, and living conditions. All sorts of

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(continued from the previous page) theories are accepted by them without criticism. The fault of the first group is that they look too much to the past, to a lost golden age when the gods still conversed with men, and when the ancient institutions which will always endure were founded by the ancestors. The fault of the second group is more difficult to determine, says Takdir. They hate the conservative, are champions of 'kemajuan', progress, but their error is that they view the present conditions of Europe and America as a static entity, as a "fixed complex of phenomena," without considering the long evolution, historic and cultural, behind these phenomena. They have no "historic sense"; they cannot see that their heroes - Marx, Sartre, Hemingway, and Picasso - are themselves characteristic products of a certain time and set of circumstances, which do not now apply to Indonesia, and probably never will. All this produces a curious artificiality. These people quote Marx, Lenin, and Stalin as absolute truths, which are not subject to any influence of time or place. Artistically they are mere imitators; unlike Western artists they do not react to their own society but to an imaginary society of which they have read in the authors they happen to admire.

(99-1)²⁸¹ There are indeed perennial values in Panjasila, and Indonesian values in particular, but they derive meaning only in their "historic sense," i.e., in the context of the time and place in which the multitude of Indonesian societies, minorities, and groups now exist. To elevate the doctrine to an absolute is to deny precisely that sense of perspective and continuity which Takdir deems essential.

²⁸⁰ The original editor inserted "66" by hand.

²⁸¹ The paras on this page are numbered 76 through 77, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(99-2) Pantjasila may well become that transcendent set of national values which its propagators and implementers so ardently desire that it will be. But only if recognition is given to continuity and diversity, to “commutative justice” and traditional rights, to all which Burke once described as “the unbought grace of life.” Precisely because Pantjasila as yet comprises

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(continued from the previous page) little or none of these, precisely because it does not carry with it the weight of obligation, discipline, and order, it fails to inspire and remains merely a quarrelling-point among intellectuals and a convenient apology for demagogues and would-be war lords (condottieri). It must meet a need that has arisen in the tempest of a revolution of traditional values, a clash of cultures that uproots and discourages. Whether it can meet this need only time can tell.

Paul Weiss: The Gita: East and West

(100-1)²⁸³ Every reading of the Bhagavad-Gita makes it more and more evident that this is a great work, with a message for all mankind. It should be a meeting place for East and West. But this has rarely proved to be the case. While Westerners have again and again criticised the Gita for failing to meet most obvious ethical questions, questions which it itself raises, Easterners have offered ever new and subtle re-interpretations.

(100-2) Metaphysical: Nothing really happens. If the individual neither kills nor is killed, what is Arjuna being asked to do when he is asked to fight? If his kinsmen are already slain, why is he being asked to kill them now? What does it mean for him to fight? Let it be said that in the last analysis nothing happens; still, room must be made for the truth that kindness is better than murder, honesty better than cheating, friendship better than hate. Does the Gita allow room for these? But, then, does it not also allow room for the assertion that non-killing is also better than killing?

Theological: Act as God’s instrument, without attachment to the fruits of your acts, as though what you did were not your primary responsibility, not your doing. We are here asked to imitate God, to look at things sub specie aeternitatis. But does it not make any difference what we do, just so long as we detach ourselves from the fruits? May I steal, lie

²⁸² The original editor inserted “67” by hand.

²⁸³ The paras on this page are numbered 78 through 79, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) murder, providing I do this in cold blood? Do not the fanatics and defenders of religious wars – and other types as well – view themselves as God’s instruments? Is there any wickedness whatsoever that might not be sanctioned in this way?

(101-1)²⁸⁵ But if this is all the Gita says it is a book only for the East, and then for a time happily fading rapidly into the past. It will have no message for those who recognise that man has more than limited duties, that there is good action and bad, that killing, even in a good cause, needs justification, and that an acceptance of inevitability and divine responsibility still leaves the question of the nature and conquest of evil, and the avoidance of evil deeds by men.

It is difficult, I think, to read the Gita with an unprejudiced eye without feeling that it has serious limitations as a work in ethics, nature, value, metaphysics, theology, or religion. But the spirit of the work transcends these limitations. It tells us that we all have onerous work to do in this world, work that entails injury and wrong doing. It is foolish to suppose that anything we do is altogether satisfactory, foolish to try to accept it, with its consequences, as all-sufficient.

H.W. Schneider: Idealism – East and West (by P.T. Raju)

(101-2) P.T. Raju says: “Even in the Advaita, we find different schools; but each school does not rebuke the other as dishonest or as having misinterpreted Sankara. Yet, one peculiar fact to know about Professor Radhakrishnan is that, though he himself is not the founder of a new system, it is he who pleads that philosophical construction should be protected in India. But important attempts can be made only when stock-taking is done with reference to Western philosophy.

(101-3) Raju says: “It is reasonable that we should follow our thought to the greatest height to which it

²⁸⁴ The original editor inserted “68” by hand.

²⁸⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 80 through 82, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) can lead us. It is an illusion to think that this ideal can explain our ordinary experience with all the stubborn facts it contains. If the statement that the Absolute explains our experience by being its fundamental principle means that it is presupposed by our experience, we may accept it. But if it means that the world can be deduced from the Absolute, we have to reject it.

(102-1)²⁸⁷ Can the Absolute, says Raju, whether it is an identity in difference, or only identity, or will, or feeling, or anything else, explain how the world of finite and imperfect things comes out of it? Can the infinite explain the finite?

(102-2) He makes very clear, especially toward the end, that he is using Western absolute idealism to help Indian idealists to a more positive or constructive attitude toward the world: idealism is not world-forsaking, but a world-transforming activity. Raju is trying to help his fellow Indians to get a more critical, as well as a more constructive, conception of their traditional doctrines.

(102-3) Both Eastern and Western traditions are burdened with the attempt to identify truth and reality.

A.R. Wadia: Can Indian and Western Philosophy be Synthesized?

(102-4) It has been claimed that Samkara's Advaita is the only philosophy that can claim to be independent of religion. There is a certain justification for this belief. The only reality for Samkara was Nirguna (qualityless) Brahman whereas god as Ishvara is Saguna Brahman and this is but a part of maya or the general world of phenomena and illusions. This implies that Samkara did not attach any importance to religion, but like a shrewd student of human nature he appreciated the full importance of religion for the masses and he did develop a religious creed too, but this was not so much a

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CAN INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY BE SYNTHESIZED?

A.R. Wadia

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²⁸⁶ The original editor inserted "68" by hand.

²⁸⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 83 through 86, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁸⁸ The original editor changed "69" to "70" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) synthesis as a compromise demanded by the psychology of the masses.

(103-1)²⁸⁹ I for one attach great importance to the Indian doctrine of karma and transmigration of soul and would like to see its importance more fully appreciated by Western thinkers. But as a rule Western thinkers have been averse to accepting it, and it is certainly a concept which is difficult to prove in the ordinary sense of the term. It must remain a dogma as the late Dr Surendra Nath Dasgupta frankly admitted.

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CAN INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY BE SYNTHESIZED?

A.R. Wadia

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Ha Tai Kim: Zen and Hegel

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(105-1)²⁹² Any student who is interested in a synthesis of the philosophies of East and West must be careful to observe disagreements as well as agreements, even in systems which are similar.

(105-2) Tao-sheng said²⁹³ that to achieve Buddhahood means to be one with Wu (non-being). Zen is not satisfied with the idea of God as an ultimate reality, because Zen immediately asks the question "Where is God?" Zen dares not build any philosophical systems, for it defies all concept-making. Realizing the difficulties of the conceptual description in understanding the nature of reality, it resorts largely to the method of poetry and art.

(105-3) This positive aspect of Zen is often ignored by the critics of Zen philosophy. Indeed, the positive side of Zen is the logic of the illogical. It may be added that the logic of Zen is not a-logical but super-logical; it transcends the logical bifurcation of subject and object, mind and matter, being and non-being, which always falls into the realm of relational knowledge, so as to acquire an absolute point of view.

²⁸⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 87, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁹⁰ Blank page

²⁹¹ The original editor changed "70" to "71" by hand.

²⁹² The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 6, making them consecutive with the previous page.

²⁹³ "shêng" in the original.

(105-4) This is to be ‘immediately’ apprehended and not after a tedious and elaborate and complicated process of dialectic.

(105-5) He already found Zen experience in what he calls “pure experience” or “immediate experience.” He postulates “pure experience” as the most concrete reality, in which intellectual activities do not occur. It is an experience in itself, in which subject and object are not separated. For him, the undifferentiated state of pure experience is unquestionably richer and fuller than our ratiocination, which yields intellectual discrimination and analysis.

(105-6) The present moment is not merely a one-directional continuity of different moments, but is the “Eternal Now.”

Y.R. Chao: Chinese Grammar and Logic

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CHINESE GRAMMAR AND LOGIC

Y.R. Chao

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(106-1)²⁹⁵ Western science is only a matter of the last three or four hundred years, which is a very small fraction of recorded history and even a more minute fraction of the history of human culture. Any set of fortuitous circumstances – fortuitous in the sense of being non-racial and non-linguistic – would have been enough to lead to such a relatively small difference in the starting time of the scientific phase of history. It would indeed be of the greatest interest if research should bring out what those fortuitous circumstances were.

P. Munz: Intuitions of East and West

(106-2) Northrop says that Westerners who have performed this experiment correctly have reported that the outcome is exactly what Easterners claim it to be. If one cuts oneself off from all sense impressions and reduces the body’s and the mind’s activities to a bare minimum, one will not be left, as might be expected, if one is a follower of Locke, with a blank, but with an emotionally overwhelming, aesthetically ineffable experience of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, which is called Brahman or Nirvana or Atman. This experience is a positive experience, and there is no speculation or theory involved. The question that arises, however, is whether Northrop is right in contrasting this positive experience of the East with the theism of the West. He argues

²⁹⁴ The original editor inserted “72” by hand.

²⁹⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 7 through 9, making them consecutive with the previous page.

that in the West God is a theistic God, i.e., one whose character can be conveyed positively by a determinate thesis and whose nature can be described in terms of specific attributes. The belief in a theistic God is a mere inference, a speculation, and a theory that is necessitated if one wishes to explain certain facts. But it is necessary to remind ourselves that only one half of the Western tradition is committed to this kind of theism.

L.J. Rosan: Desirelessness and the Good

(106-3) The "Four Noble Truths" may be reduced to the single proposition that the suffering²⁹⁶ of life can be

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DESIRELESSNESS AND THE GOOD

L.J. Rosan

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(continued from the previous page) ended only by halting the process of desiring, which is its cause.

(107-1)²⁹⁸ The Neo-Platonists themselves acknowledged this by saying that the One-Good was absolutely unknown and even in itself unknowable; only from its effects could it be known in any way. For this reason, no positive characteristic can be assigned to the Good.

(107-2) It may seem surprising that a psychological state such as desirelessness has been equated with a metaphysical entity like the Good.

C.T.K. Chari: Note

(107-3) The challenge is not less real for the traditional Oriental philosopher. He must familiarize himself with the new tools by which Occidental science and mathematics have wrought revolutions in their domains.

A. Waley: History and Religion

²⁹⁶ The original editor closeup "suffering" by hand.

²⁹⁷ The original editor changed "71" to "73" by hand.

²⁹⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 10 through 15, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(107-4) It was Hu Shih, after all, who first discovered the T'ang Dynasty Zen writings in the Pelliot collection and who set going the whole train of research which has made clear to us what the early history of the Zen sect in China, long falsified by Zen writers themselves, really was. The influence of these discoveries is apparent in many of Suzuki's later writings, despite the fact that to him "Zen is above space-time relations and naturally above historical facts." If this were really so, the proper course for Suzuki to take would seem to be to avoid history altogether.

(107-5) But is the attitude that Zen is "above historical facts" really a Zen attitude at all and not, rather, a personal prejudice? It seems to me that this separation of the mundane and the transcendental, of the finite from the infinite, comes of an attitude that almost every one of the old Zen writers has warned us against.

(107-6) As for the verses themselves, the one about "the bridge flows, but the water stands still," referred to by Suzuki, seems to me one of those lapses into mechanical

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HISTORY AND RELIGION

A. Waley

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(continued from the previous page) paradox to which in China Taoists and Buddhists alike were rather too prone.

(108-1)³⁰⁰ Where I feel that Hu, in his inveterate love of the reasonable, goes too far is in his contention that Zen sayings in general have a rational meaning. He produces a handful of cases where this is so, but, if one reads through several hundred kung-an (Japanese, koan), questions for meditation, of the tenth century onward, it seems to me it is very seldom true that there is any rational meaning at all. They are in most cases simply verbal devices for breaking down the common-sense everyday view of things, in order to make room for what Suzuki calls "prajna-intuition."

(108-2) After all, every Zen Master who has ever existed lived in time and space, was a man of T'ang or Sung or Ashikaga times, a man of Honan or Kuang-tung or Kyoto, and it was not in some transcendental existence, but in working and sleeping, eating his rice and sipping his tea, that his satori, enlightenment, could be incorporated. And surely the case of the artist is much the same. One cannot communicate Beethoven's musical satori by tracing his movements in time and space. Yet, no one thinks it sinful or even irrelevant to inquire into the history of his life and relate it to what was going on in the

²⁹⁹ The original editor inserted "74" by hand.

³⁰⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 16 through 18, making them consecutive with the previous page.

world around. Some modern Zenists would think this analogy between music and Zen frivolous. But it certainly would not have thought so in ancient China, for example, at Hangchow in the thirteenth century, when art was so often discussed in terms of Zen.

P. Damle: Philosophical Essays (Review by Hans Staffnec)

(108-3) He deals with the strife among various philosophical systems and ends by paying special attention to the characteristic features of Indian philosophy as compared with Western thought. In between, he gives some practical illustrations as to how this method of appreciating and harmonizing aspects of a question can be usefully applied to a better understanding. In his attempt at harmonizing mutually contradictory systems of philosophy, the author is lead by the conviction that

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PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

P. Damle (Review by Hans Staffnec)³⁰¹

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(continued from the previous page) "they all represent aspects of truth and none of them can be considered to be less or more than an aspect."

G.B. Burch: Contemporary Indian Philosophy

(109-1)³⁰³ Our usual logic is based on the conflict of truth and falsehood. Hegelian dialectic is based on the synthesis of opposed alternatives. The former is the basis of dogmatic thought; the latter is the basis of liberal thought. The dogmatist accepts one view as true and rejects the opposite view as false. The liberal believes that opposed views may both be true in so far as they can be harmonised in some larger synthesis. The dogmatist says, "This, not that." The liberal says, "this, and that." But the logic of alternation says, "This or that." The dogmatic logic fails to recognise the equal claim of the alternative. The liberal logic is irrational in uniting incompatible ideas. The logic of alternation avoids both these difficulties in accepting either alternative but not both. Neither alternative can be judged by the other, and for that very reason neither can destroy the other. The logic of alternation teaches that real alternatives can never be synthesized but that both may still be true, not simultaneously, but alternatively.

(109-2) Philosophy is the search for the Absolute. In India it is sought in one place only, namely, in experience.

³⁰¹ The original editor inserted "by Hans Staffnec" by hand.

³⁰² The original editor deleted "72" and inserted "75" by hand.

³⁰³ The paras on this page are numbered 19 through 22, making them consecutive with the previous page.

J.W. Cohen: The Role of Philosophy in Culture

(109-3) Here in the West, intensified stress on Oriental philosophy could only accentuate the atmosphere of defeatism and the tendency, now well advanced, to abandon affirmative faith in reason as intellectuals are cowed by the difficulties of maintaining it before the course of events.

(109-4) Continental thought has become an emotional *Stimmungsphilosophie*, a type of philosophical psychology with a strong flavour of Orientalism despite its Western origin; "mixed with delusions of superior

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THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CULTURE

J.W. Cohen

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(continued from the previous page) wisdom, absolute necessity and mystical 'decision.'"

(110-1)³⁰⁵ Who, then, can take seriously the view that we can reduce existing tensions or win battles of minds by holding conferences for the reconciliation of philosophies East and West?

(110-2) There is no genteel and innocuous alchemy for achieving a united world. There is a problem for philosophers in action in an arena of strident partisanship intimately linked with world affairs and the clash of powers. Those studies and conferences only which will bring to bear upon this situation philosophical insights most relevant to it from the past or present stand any chance of contributing to the role philosophy should and must be playing. We academic philosophers may not be up to the task. If so, other philosophers will be.

S.K. Saksena: Note on Cohen

(110-3) His first observation about Indian philosophy is that "it stills the will." Yes, if properly understood, it is intended to be so, but only at the very final stage of man's search for spiritual perfection.

³⁰⁴ The original editor inserted "76" by hand.

³⁰⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 23 through 28, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(110-4) It is a form of renunciation which comes only after a higher seeking has arisen. The idea is more against the undue halt in life's path than against enjoyment. Not to march on, leaving footprints behind, but to get caught in the mire of chance gratification in life is certainly not the Indian way.

(110-5) It is not contended here, however, that the great truths of tolerance and quietude and renunciation have not been occasionally misused by the idlers and do-nothings. But that has been the fate of great ideas everywhere, and points to no flaw in the ideas themselves.

(110-6) Those who seem to protest any intake of ideas from the East, and think that the West can of itself supply all its needs to put its house in order without going out to an East of dubious worth display an isolationist mentality in the realm of thought.

Y.P. Mei: Note on Cohen

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NOTE ON COHEN
Y.P. Mei
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(111-1)³⁰⁷ The movement of East-West philosophy is spreading, not because of any high-powered lobbying on the part of a few devotees, but because the time has come.

A. Wayman: The Lamp and the Wind

(111-2) In the meditative section of his 'Lam rim chen mo', Tson-kha-pa (A.D. 1357-1419), founder of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, says: "Now, why is it that a cultivation (bhavana)³⁰⁸ of either Calm (samatha)³⁰⁹ or Higher Vision (vipasyana)³¹⁰ does not suffice, and that both must be cultivated? This is to be explained. For example, if, for the purpose of seeing icons in the darkness of night, one lights a lamp, if the lamp is very bright and not disturbed by the wind, the icons are seen very clearly. However, if the lamp is not bright, or, if bright, flickers in the wind, the forms are not clearly seen.

In the same way, for seeing the profound meaning, if one has the conclusive Wisdom (prajna)³¹¹ without distortion of the meaning of reality, and also has the

³⁰⁶ The original editor changed "73" to "77" by hand.

³⁰⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 29 through 31, making them consecutive with the previous page.

³⁰⁸ The original editor inserted accent marks in "(bhāvanā)" by hand

³⁰⁹ The original editor inserted accent marks in "(śamatha)" by hand

³¹⁰ The original editor inserted accent marks in "(vipaśyāna)" by hand

³¹¹ The original editor inserted accent marks in "(prajñā)" by hand

motionless fixation, exactly as wished, on a meditative object (alambana)³¹² of thought (citta), reality (tattva) is seen clearly. However, even if there be the retention without discernment (Nirvikalpa-samadhi)³¹³ having the fixation so that thought does not proceed elsewhere, if the Wisdom with full comprehension of Be-ness (yin lugs) is lacking, then, because there is a lack of the eye which sees reality, no matter how one perseveres in retention (samadhi),³¹⁴ there is no possibility of the full comprehension of Be-ness. Again, even if there be the view with full comprehension of the reality of selflessness (nairatmya),³¹⁵ if there is a lack of the retention (samadhi)³¹⁶ with firm fixation in one-pointed thought, then, because the self, powerless, is agitated by the wind of shifting discernment. (cala-vikalpa), there is not possibility of seeing clearly the meaning of Be-ness.

(111-3) The usual translation of “samadhi” is “concentration.” For “retention,” s.v. Webster’s Dictionary

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THE LAMP AND THE WIND

A. Wayman

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(continued from the previous page) “4. A retaining or holding fixed in some place or position; state of being kept in place.” What is held fixed is thought. (citta)

(112-1)³¹⁸ In my understanding of Tson-kha-pa’s position, he would agree that it is “the ultimate state of ecstatic trance,” but not that it is the highest accomplishment. It represents the “place free from wind” and then a “lamp” must be added. “Kasyapa, (when things are analysed) by right discrimination (samyakpratyaveksana), the faculty of Noble Wisdom (arya-prajna)³¹⁹ is born; and, (that Fire) having been born, it burns up that right discrimination itself.

P.T. Raju: Idealisms: Eastern and Western

³¹² The original editor inserted accent marks in “(ālambana)” by hand

³¹³ The original editor inserted accent marks in “samādhi” by hand

³¹⁴ The original editor inserted accent marks in “(samādhi),” by hand

³¹⁵ The original editor inserted accent marks in “(nairātmya),” by hand

³¹⁶ The original editor inserted accent marks in “(samādhi)” by hand

³¹⁷ The original editor inserted “78” by hand.

³¹⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 32 through 33, making them consecutive with the previous page.

³¹⁹ The original editor inserted accent marks in “(ārya-prajñā)” by hand

(112-2) While Plato's idealism is based on the principle that to be is to be an ideal, Berkely's idealism is based on the principle that to be is to be perceived. While the ideal as the universal is common to all individuals, the idea as perceived is not common to all, but can be the object of the individual perceiver alone. Hence, Berkeley's philosophy, so far, is subjectivistic and is called subjective idealism. Berkely's aim was to disprove the reality of matter, and then to refute all claims of materialism. But, for this purpose, he started epistemologically, denied separate existence to objects apart from their being perceived, and ended in subjectivism. Then he had to meet the objection that, if to be is to be perceived, objects must go out of existence when not perceived, whereas experience shows that the same object may be perceived by us for quite a long time at intervals. So, Berkeley in his later writings introduced what is called theological idealism. The objects, when not perceived by man, must exist as ideas in the mind of God, and thus they acquire continuity of existence. But theological idealism raises another difficulty. If objects exist in the mind of God as his ideas, they are independent of man's mind. When they become ideas of man's mind, what is the relation between man's mind and God's mind? How can man's mind perceive an object which is not its idea? What is the relation between man's mind and God's mind?

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(113-1)³²¹ All the Vedantins followed Samkara in the fashion of explaining the ontological status of the object of illusion. This was motivated by the desire to defend the original metaphysical intuition. If the world has no reality of its own, the illusory object has no reality of its own; yet it has the borrowed reality of the substratum, and so it is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. This is Samkara's view, which is that the metaphysical truth is intuited, and not logically constructed.

(113-2) The attempt to interpret Vedantic idealism as subjective like Berkeleyan idealism is definitely wrong. In epistemology, all the Vedantic schools, except one subschool of the Advaita, are realistic so far as the object of perception is concerned.

(113-3) It is not realised that most of even the great philosophers do not possess the metaphysical intuition, but only accept its truth by tradition, and that, when they actually think, they think as men, not as God or the Brahman.

³²⁰ The original editor changed "74" to "79" by hand.

³²¹ The paras on this page are numbered 34 through 39, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(113-4) The Vijñānavāda and the Mādhyamika, though it has been usual to call only the former idealistic, the latter nihilistic or, at most, absolutistic. If we accept only Berkeleyan subjectivism as idealistic, then Vijñānavāda alone may be called idealistic, for it held that the objects of the world are only forms projected by the mind out of itself. But if we hold that a philosophy which tries to explain the world in terms of an ideal reality that is deep within or inward to man is idealism, the Mādhyamika also is idealistic, because the *śūnya*³²² (void), which is nirvana, is to be realised within man.

(113-5) We may add that the ultimate truth, which is *Ālayavijñāna*,³²³ is to be known not through *pravṛtti*,³²⁴ but through *nivṛtti*,³²⁵ that is, by turning *pravṛttivijñāna*³²⁶ inward. Ultimate truth is eternally accomplished, and can be realised not through action but through cognition only by turning it inward.

(113-6) The Mādhyamikas also, like the Advaitins, pressed their doctrine of the *śūnya* into the service of their

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(continued from the previous page) epistemology and. defined their doctrine of illusion as what is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor both nor neither. Realisation lies in recognizing that the essence of the world is *śūnya*.³²⁸

(114-1)³²⁹ The Absolute of the Vedānta is taken from religious or spiritual experience, which is a metaphysical intuition. The Brahman of the Upaniṣads³³⁰ and the *śūnya*³³¹ and the nirvana of the Buddhists are objects of such experience.

(114-2) One should not conclude, therefore, that the Vedānta depended on intuition as a method for constructing empirical truth. The fact is that it did not care to make the attempt. It was not interested in understanding the structure of the empirical world, for

³²² The original editor inserted accent marks in “*śūnya*” by hand

³²³ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*Ālayavijñāna*,” by hand

³²⁴ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*pravṛtti*,” by hand

³²⁵ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*nivṛtti*,” by hand

³²⁶ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*pravṛttivijñāna*” by hand

³²⁷ The original editor inserted “80” by hand.

³²⁸ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*śūnya*.” by hand

³²⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 40 through 44, making them consecutive with the previous page.

³³⁰ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*Upaniṣads*” by hand

³³¹ The original editor inserted accent marks in “*śūnya*” by hand

the interest of all Vedanta was in salvation or union with God, not in understanding and controlling nature. Here the exception is the idealism of the Vijñanavadins. This school of Buddhism, though not interested in understanding the world, gave a clue to it from their own point of view. According to them, all objectivity is false. Then, why do we draw a distinction between truth and falsity within objectivity? The answer is: Because some objects serve the purpose for which they are meant. Thus doing what they are meant for becomes the criterion of empirically true objects.

(114-3) Every man has his own conscious being, and his experiences are his own, subjective and private. And every man has the two directions of being, inward and outward.

(114-4) Philosophy should not forget man either for God or matter. Both are real because man, who affirms both, is real. If man is forgotten for either matter or God, philosophy not only ends in fallacious conclusions, but also becomes inadequate as a philosophy of life. It is not enough to exhort man to look inward; he has to look outward also; the pull comes from both directions.

V.P. Varma: East and West in Aurobindo

(114-5) Indian spirituality in its later days generated an attitude of renunciation of the world and, by its exaggerated

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EAST AND WEST IN AUROBINDO

V.P. Varma

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(continued from the previous page) emphasis on the evanescent character of cosmic phenomena, led to a weakening of vital force.

(115-1)³³³ Although the idealistic philosophy has its validation in the unimpeachable testimony of mystic experience, still in its historical course the popularization of this philosophy led to a bankruptcy of life.

H. Chaudhuri: The Gita and its Message

³³² The original editor changed "75" to "81" by hand.

³³³ The paras on this page are numbered 45 through 48, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(115-2) The possibility of mistake or error clings to everything human, whether it is human judgment, or human action, or human experience. There are illusions of the senses, errors of judgement, mistakes of intuitive apprehension.

P.T. Raju: Idealistic Thought of India (Review by E.A. Burt)

(115-3) Raju is a confirmed idealist. He is convinced that all philosophy becomes idealistic as it gains fuller and clearer awareness of its subject-matter, its method, and its presuppositions - in fact, that it tends toward an absolute idealism of a certain definite sort. Non-idealistic philosophies, judged in the light of the whole history of the speculative enterprise, are either protesting reactions against philosophic truth, which are justified only when idealism has allowed itself to diverge too far from the facts - this is the case with realistic (and perhaps positivistic) philosophies -or are failures to carry the idealistic elements in their thinking to appropriate completion, exemplified in pragmatism, humanism, personalism, and other quarters. Idealism alone, he is sure, gives a just and adequate interpretation of experience in all its varied aspects; it alone finally achieves what all serious philosophies aim to achieve. But idealism does not exhibit everywhere a common pattern. For example, Indian and Western idealisms show, on careful analysis, important differences.

(115-4) One of the surprising features of the book, in fact, is Raju's neglect of Neo-Platonism, which in my judgement comes nearest of all Western schools to the basic orientation of Indian idealism.

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IDEALISTIC THOUGHT OF INDIA

P.T. Raju (Review by E.A. Burt)³³⁴

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(116-1)³³⁶ Indian idealists typically reject as inappropriate and impossible any attempt to deduce the details of the phenomenal world from the Absolute. That world does arise from the Absolute - for there is no other way in which its presence could be accounted for - but no assumption such as Plato or Hegel made that human reason can explain the process is admissible. To say that the world is the sport of Brahman is to speak in metaphor, not to give a systematic explanation. Another is the fact that the phenomenal world cannot be said, without qualification, to be included in the Absolute. Such reality as it has cannot exist anywhere else, of course, but qualification is needed because,

³³⁴ The original editor inserted "by E. A. Burt" by hand.

³³⁵ The original editor inserted "82" by hand.

³³⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 49 through 50, making them consecutive with the previous page.

when a thinker has achieved ultimate truth and (therefore) become one with the Absolute, the phenomenal world disappears. Or at least it is so drastically transformed in virtue of this experience that its characteristics as phenomenal have been left behind. It is paradoxical in ordinary language to say that one thing is included in another when experience of the latter has as its consequence that the former is no longer felt to exist. A third is the emphatic commitment of Indian idealism in its typical representatives to the complete unity, in the Absolute, of all distinctions. Western idealism, except in its explicitly mystic forms, has shied away from such an unqualified unity.

P. Munz: India and the West: A Synthesis

(116-2) The fundamental experience upon which the religious life is based – ritual and ceremony are attempts to remember it and to induce its recurrence; theology is an effort to explain it more or less rationally – is the experience of redemption. To add that it is the gift of God or the result of spiritual exercises is not to explain it or account for it, but simply to replace one phrase by another. This hope is the sustaining force of every religious tradition. Without it a tradition would never develop and maintain itself for centuries. It disintegrates only when this hope has become too dim to be entertained.

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INDIA AND THE WEST: A SYNTHESIS

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(117-1)³³⁸ The atman is a man's consciousness in itself, that is, consciousness without any mental content. We are quite used to the idea that there are mental events without consciousness. The notion that there is consciousness without mental event is more difficult to grasp, but it is not unintelligible. It is the peculiar contribution of Indian psychology to have discovered that it is possible to reach such a condition of pure consciousness. It is a timeless point, without any extension. And the achievement of silence may well be the only mark of having reached "no-mind."

(117-2) Many centuries ago some Indian sages discovered that in the attainment of such a state redemption was to be found. Hence, they described it as pure bliss. Their mythology and their religious doctrine are an attempt to convey this insight and to enable people to attain this experience for themselves.

(117-3) A Hindu temple, when compared to a Gothic cathedral, strikes one as an almost profane place.

³³⁷ The original editor changed "76" to "83" by hand.

³³⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 51 through 55, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(117-4) Furthermore, if redemption is sought in this way, it becomes clear that it is a form of release (moksa) from the world, for withdrawal and self-restraint must result in the dying away of all impulses and desires. As a result, there arises the notion that the world that can be experienced by the senses – the goods of which are desired by men – is not real but is a kind of mirage.

(117-5) From the law of karma and the notion of creation through God's mere exuberance there emerges the cyclical philosophy of history with which we are superficially acquainted through the ancient Greeks. Even in the form in which we find it in Plato it does not reach the solemn sobriety of the ancient Indian conception. In Plato it is an ingenious theory to account for the fact that political institutions seem to deteriorate. But to the Indians it is the final verdict upon the world which determines much of India's comparative indifference to social amelioration and technical improvement. The life of mankind, according to this view, develops in cycles. It emerges and is absorbed again. And after many aeons it emerges again, and so on. During

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(continued from the previous page) this cyclical movement things are what they are, and, nothing can be gained by man's supreme effort to alter them. They can, in fact, from time to time be improved, but nothing is gained by such improvement, because the final aim of the individual as well as of mankind is to gain release even from the desire for such improvement.

(118-1)³⁴⁰ In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God must remain, ultimately, a mystery. The mind's attention can best be directed to him through the creation of a mysterious atmosphere – in dark cathedrals and temples where the light enters through stained-glass windows, where incense is burned, and where the supernatural is hinted at through an unusual and uncanny presence.

(118-2) The great danger here of occult powers seems to be that such powers can bestow upon the aspirant a semblance of omnipotence and of true redemption and therefore destroy in him the vision which he ought to hold constantly before him, namely, the vision of achieving "no-mind." The natural emergence of these powers cannot even be

³³⁹ The original editor inserted "84" by hand.

³⁴⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 56 through 60, making them consecutive with the previous page.

called a temptation to deviate from the true path, since the true path, according to innumerable testimonies, is quite identical with the emergence of these powers. In treatises on yoga there are severe warnings that no true aspirant must ever exercise any of these powers. But warnings are not enough. It may be completely obliterated by the emergence of demonic powers. The attainment is likely to heighten one's sense of freedom to the point of irresponsibility.

(118-3) Nor do I mean to argue in support of the peculiarly modern, quasi-psychotic desire of so many Westerners to seek both refuge and relief in India.

(118-4) The meeting of East and West has, however, set a new task to them by providing them with new evidence. So far, however, it has been very distressing to find that they have seen in this meeting, not a challenge, but merely the discovery of something new.

D.T. Suzuki: A Reply to Ames

(118-5) The Zen master does not tolerate this roundabout

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A REPLY TO AMES

D.T. Suzuki

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(continued from the previous page) way of handling reality. It is meant to make one feel it as something most intimate, most concrete, and most personal. Touch is the most primary sensation. Hearing comes next, while seeing is the farthest away from actuality itself.

W. Liu: Confucius, His Life and Time (Review by Y.P. Mei)

(119-1)³⁴² References for quotations would always be a help and at times are essential. What is more, a reader who takes the trouble to look up a few references might think of reading the full text for himself, a possibility that could not be considered a misfortune.

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CONFUCIUS, HIS LIFE AND TIME

W. Liu (Review by Y.P. Mei)³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ The original editor inserted "85" by hand.

³⁴² The paras on this page are numbered 61, making them consecutive with the previous page.

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Carsun Chang: Wang Yang-ming's Philosophy

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WANG YANG-MING'S PHILOSOPHY

Carsun Chang³⁴⁵

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(121-1)³⁴⁷ If the question were raised as to who was the most powerful and influential thinker in China, I should answer without hesitation, Wang Yang-ming (or Wang Shou-jen).³⁴⁸ He was a commanding personality who lived 1472-1529 in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). The twenty-six chapters of the *Ming-ju-hsueh-an*³⁴⁹ ("History of the Ming Confucianist Scholars"), which deal with Wang schools, occupy nearly half of the book. This means that he had a great number of followers, who lived in different parts of China. He was daring enough to challenge Chu Hsi (1130-1200), who was the representative of the orthodox school from the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) to the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911). Wang's philosophy is a product of profound thinking and system-building. One is often impressed by his thoroughness and acuteness. In saying this I do not mean either to exaggerate Wang's power or to belittle Chu Hsi's greatness. Both are great thinkers in the history of Chinese philosophy, but there is a difference in their ways of thinking. Though each of them builds a system, the scope of which embraces the physical world and moral values, the individual and the universe, Chu Hsi's system, with all its many-sidedness and universality, is marked by an element of cautiousness and considerateness, while Wang's is characterized by sharpness and penetration.

In order to provide the reader with the background for the discussion which is to follow, I shall first summarize Wang's main themes:

(1) Mind is reason. While mind is free from selfishness, it is intelligence *per se*, and embodies right principles, or categorical imperatives.

(2) The external world, which, according to common sense, consists of things of hard fact, is the object of consciousness. Berkeley's principle, *esse est percipi*, was discovered also by this Chinese thinker.

(3) While according to common sense willing and knowing are separate functions of mind, they are correlated in Wang's system. Mind's working with a directive effort is called willing. Its working in sheer distinctness or clarity is called knowing. For Wang volition is a part of cognition.

³⁴⁴ The original editor inserted "by Y.P. Mei" by hand.

³⁴⁵ The original editor inserted "by CARSUN CHANG" and "PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST: VOL 5" by hand.

³⁴⁶ The original editor changed "96" to "86" by hand.

³⁴⁷ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

³⁴⁸ "Shou-jên" in the original.

³⁴⁹ "Ming-ju-hsueh-an" in the original.

(4) Knowing is the core of reality, that is to say, reality is comprised of consciousness.

* *Ming-ju hsüeh-an*, *Ssü-ch'an hsüeh-an* ed. (Shanghai: World publishing Co., 1936).

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(continued from the previous page) (5) The universe is an integration of which man is the mind or centre. All men constitute a brotherhood. Physical objects have spiritual affinity with mind.

(6) If there were no mind or intuitive knowledge, the universe would not function.

(7) Matter or the world of nature is the material with which mind functions. The following quotation from Wang gives his fundamental concepts and shows how his thought-structure is built. "What is called *li* (reason) is an integrative system. That in which *li* is integrated is called human nature. The master of this integration is mind. When mind works with a directive effort, it is will. When it works in a state of intelligence, distinctness, and clarity, it is cognition. The objects which appear in consciousness are things."¹ This question is only a nuclear part of his thought; it is necessary to study his whole system.

A. Metaphysics: The Integration of the Universe

(123-1)³⁵² Wang Yang-ming's premise is the intelligibility of the world. Intuitive knowledge or knowing is the key, and is not restricted to man, but, in a wider sense, extends to all animate beings and even to physical objects. "Man's intuitive knowledge," says Wang, "is shared by grass and trees, stones and tiles. Grass and trees, stones and tiles could not function if they did not possess the capacity to know. The universe itself would be incapable of running or operating, if it were not for man's intuitive knowledge."²

Elsewhere Wang comments: "Intelligibility fills the universe. Man, imprisoned in his physical body, is sometimes separated from intelligibility. Nonetheless, his intuitive knowledge is the controlling power of the cosmos and of the gods. If there were no intellect in the universe, who would study the profundities of *terra firma*? If the

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³⁵¹ The original editor inserted "87" by hand.

³⁵² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

spirits had no knowledge of mankind, how could they reveal themselves in fortune and misfortune? Heaven, earth, and deities would be non-existent if they were separated from the human intellect. On the other hand, if man's intellect were divorced from heaven, earth, and deities, how could it exercise its functions?"³

I am not prepared to say that Wang believed in hylozoism, the doctrine that all nature is alive. But something of the sort is implicit in his remark

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(continued from the previous page) that because animals and grains are nourishment for men, and because herb and mineral medicines cure disease, there must be a spiritual affinity between the biological and physical worlds, on the one hand, and mankind, on the other hand.

That intelligibility exists at the core of the universe was Wang's prime conviction. At this core is man, intimately related to the supersensible world above and the world of nature below. The universe is a unity with man at the centre.

The following dialogue between Wang and his disciple describes clearly his understanding of the universe as a whole.

"Somebody asked: 'With regard to the unity of the human mind and the manifold of things we have an example in the human body, because it is an organism activated by the circulation of blood and the nervous system. Therefore, it is called a unity. But as one man A is different from another man B and as animals and plants are very different from mankind, how can all of them constitute a unity?'

"Wang answered: 'You must look to the responses in your mind. It is not only that animals and plants constitute a unity with you; the universe forms a unity with you. Even the spirits form a unity with you, too.' "

Wang mentioned a question to his disciple: "What is the mind of the universe?" This disciple answered: "I heard some time ago that man is the mind of the universe."

His disciple asked again: "Why is man called mind?" Wang said: "Mind means nothing but intelligence. What fills the whole world is intelligibility. As a man is built up by his physical body, he is intercepted and isolated from the whole. Intelligence is

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³⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "88" by hand.

the master of the universe and spirits. Without intelligence how can the height of the heavens be surveyed? Without intelligence how can the profundity of the earth be studied? Without intelligence how can fortune and misfortune be revealed by the spirits? If heaven, earth, spirits, and the manifold things were separated from intelligence, all of them would lose their existence. If my intelligence were separated from the universe, spirits, and the manifoldness of things, it would lose its existence, too. This is why I say that they (my intelligence, spirits, and the manifoldness of things) together constitute an integration, from which no one of them can be divorced.”⁴

This dialogue tells how Wang looks at this fundamental problem. He means to say that intelligibility is the essence of reality. Intelligibility has two aspects; on one end, it is mind, which knows, and, on the other end,

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(continued from the previous page) it is the universe, which is known. Neither one, without the other, can mean anything to mankind. Therefore, he said: “The eye of a man has no substantiality by itself (is not sufficient unto itself), but must have colours and shapes of the manifold of things as its objects. The ear has no substantiality by itself, but must have all the kinds of sounds in the universe to listen to. The nose has no substantiality by itself, but must perceive all the smells in the world. The mouth cannot do otherwise than to taste whatever is tasteful. The mind is to know right and wrong concerning challenges and responses which happen between all things and itself.”⁵

Wang Yang-ming means to say that the nature of the world depends on knowing; without intelligibility or mind, it would be a darkness, or the world would be nonsense to us. So, he said: “*Liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge) is the spirituality of the universal creation. This spirituality creates heaven, earth, and the spirits. It is the highest, the absolute. If a man can keep *liang-chih* completely to himself, he feels so happy that he cannot help but dance with his hands and feet.”⁶

Wang Yang-ming considers that *liang-chih* is like the sun, which shines brightly because it knows what is right or wrong, or it embodies the categorical imperatives. But this *liang-chih* (mind) must be kept pure and unselfish, lest it may be beclouded like

³⁵⁵ Blank page

³⁵⁶ The original editor inserted “89” by hand.

the sun, which is sometimes darkened by clouds. Thus, spirituality is reality, but the grasp of reality depends on a pure and unselfish mind.

Wang liked to quote the sentence from the *Chung-yung (Doctrine of the Mean)*: "It is said in the *Shih-ching (Book of Poetry)* that the hawk flies up to heaven, fish leap in the deep sea."⁷ This is an illustration to show how the world is moving and active. What is visible is that birds are flying in the heavens and fish are swimming in the deep sea, but much mystery lies beyond. What is intelligible is that the universe is an integration.

Wang Yang-ming's intuitive knowledge is not mere knowledge, but is the light that makes things visible and understandable. One of the Cambridge Platonists, John Smith, said: "It is but a thin, airy knowledge that is got by mere speculation, which is ushered in by syllogisms and demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true goodness... brings a divine light into the soul, as is more clear and convincing than any demonstration. The reason why, notwithstanding all our acute reasons and subtle disputes, truth prevails no more in the world is that we so often disjoin truth and true goodness, which in themselves can never be disunited."⁸

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(continued from the previous page) This joining together of truth and goodness constitutes a definition of *liang-chih* which Wang Yang-ming would like to have coined himself. The light of truth and goodness is with Wang the reality of the universe.

Such passages, whether from Eastern or Western thinkers, tell us that the universe is a whole with man at the centre. The Chinese philosopher Wang goes further, and tells us not only what man is, but also what he should be. Wang Yang-ming concludes that "The great man is one who has the sense of integration with the universe. The great man thinks that the whole world is one family, or that the whole world is one man. When a man imprisoned in his physical body differentiates between 'thee' and 'me,' his feeling is that of the petty man. The doctrine that human beings have a sense of unity with the universe is not in the least the product of imagination. Rather, it comes from the instinct of *jên* (human-heartedness). Indeed, this nobility is not the characteristic of the great man alone, but is present also to some extent in the

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³⁵⁸ The original editor inserted "90" by hand.

petty man. When one sees a child about to fall into a well, one is aroused by a sense of commiseration. This sense of commiseration makes one feel a unity with the child, who belongs to the same species as oneself.

"This feeling of commiseration goes further. When a man hears or sees an animal or bird crying or frightened, he also feels its misery. His *jên* leads him to a consciousness of the same kind with living beings. Further still, when he beholds a great tree falling, he feels 'what a pity!' His sense of wholeness, thus, extends to plants. Finally, seeing a stone or brick smashed to pieces, a man feels 'what a pity!' – which means that his sense of integration reaches to inanimate objects. This instinct of integration (*jên*) is rooted in man's nature. It is at the same time the intelligence of man and the quality which renders man intelligible; also it is the illustrious virtue of man."⁹

Wang Yang-ming's world is a community of conscious or moral beings living with animals and plants, which possess spiritual kinship with them. This universe is teleological, for in it consciousness rules and moral values dominate.

The sense of *jên* is, in other words, of the same nature as the root from which all beings have sprung. It is spiritual, yet also empirical. It is metaphysical and at the same time physical. This doctrine is an excellent illustration of how deeply embedded the Chinese metaphysical theory of moral value is in the practical life of mankind.

Wang's conception of the universe is nowhere more vividly expressed than in the above passage that mind or reason, or the light of truth, constitutes reality.

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B. Psychology and Epistemology

Carsun Chang

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(131-1)³⁶¹ Wang discusses his theory of mind from two points of view: (1) mind in the naturalistic sense and (2) mind in the normative sense. Often he combines these two views, starting naturalistically and ending normatively.

A disciple, Hsiao Hui, complained: "I have the idea to better myself. Why can I not do it?" The master suggested: "Explain in detail what your idea of bettering yourself is." Hsiao Hui continued: "My idea is to be a good man. Perhaps what I do is

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³⁶⁰ The original editor inserted "91" by hand.

³⁶¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

more for my physical self than my true self.” Wang Yang-ming interposed: “The true self cannot be separated from the physical self. I suppose that what you have done is not even good enough for your physical self. The physical self or body consists of the five senses and four limbs.” Said the disciple: “I agree with what you have said. The eyes are fond of beauty. The ears delight in beautiful voices. The mouth craves delicious tastes. The four limbs take delight in comfort. These pleasures make me unable to control myself.” Wang Yang-ming continued: “Beautiful colours blind the eyes. Beautiful sounds deafen the ears. Delicious tastes fill the mouth with too much flavour. Racing and hunting drive one mad. All these delights are harmful to the eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and four limbs. They do no good to the senses or to the arms or legs. If you care for your senses and limbs, do not give first thought to how your ears should listen, or to how your arms and legs should move. If you can control your senses and bodily parts to conform to the Confucian rule that seeing, hearing, speaking, and motion should abide by the principle of decency, you will understand well enough what is good for your senses and limbs. But to bring your seeing, hearing, speaking, and physical movements into conformity with the principle of decency requires more than merely to leave them to your body. This accomplishment depends completely on mind. Seeing, listening, speaking, and motion are the work of mind. To be sure, your mind-directed vision operates through the organ of your eyes, your mind-directed speech issues from your mouth, your mind-directed movements are put into effect by your four limbs. But each of these functions is mind-directed. Otherwise – that is, if you had no mind – your senses and limbs would be unable to operate. Your mind, moreover, is not a nervous system of flesh and blood. If it were that and nothing more, a man after death, while he still kept his flesh and blood, would continue to see, hear, speak, etc. I say that mind is the organ which directs seeing, listening, speaking, and motion, because mind consists of human nature, i.e., of heavenly reason. Since mind is so constituted, part of its essence is the virtue of *jên*. When the essence of mind – constituted as it is of human nature – works in the eyes, the function of seeing is operative. When it works in the ears, hearing

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³⁶³ The original editor inserted “92” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) takes place. When it works in the mouth, speech occurs. When it works in the limbs, movement ensues. All these are the operations of heavenly reason, which works in mind as master of the physical body. Mind in its essential nature is heavenly reason in the form of decent manners. This is your true self, controller of your physical body. This true self knows self-control even when nobody else is present and knows caution even when eavesdropping is impossible."¹⁰

In this discourse, Wang starts his discussion of mind at (1) the naturalistic level previously mentioned, and ends it at (2) the normative level. He concludes his remarks with suggestions of what mind ought to be, rather than with what mind actually is. Normatively, mind is reason.

To quote a few definitions of mind from Wang Yang-ming's writings:

"The intrinsic quality of mind is nature, which is reason."¹¹ "There is no reason apart from mind."¹² "The highest good is the essence of mind."¹³

Now to quote a few illustrations from Wang about the nature of mind:

"Mind is reason. How can you find reason apart from mind? How can you find so-called things outside of mind? Suppose we talk about service to your parents. How can you find the reason for filial duty in the body of your parents? The reason for filial duty can be found only in your own mind. Suppose we discuss the sense of loyalty. How can you find the reason for loyalty in the body of the king? The reason for loyalty can be found only in your own mind. Or suppose we talk about friendship or the people's ruler. How can you find the principle of honesty in your friend's body, or the principle of benevolence in the people's body? The principles of honesty and benevolence can be found only in mind. When mind is clear, in the right, and unblinded by selfish motives, it acts toward parents in accordance with filial duty, it acts toward the king in accordance with loyalty, and it behaves toward friends and people-at-large in accordance with honesty and benevolence."¹⁴

Such is the meaning of Wang's maxim: "Mind is reason," a maxim, the reader may recall, which originated with the philosopher Lu Chiu-yuan (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193). Wang Yang-ming, thus, followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor, and in doing so, moreover, he deviated from the orthodox tradition of the school of the Ch'eng Brothers (Ch'eng I, 1033-1107, and Ch'eng Hao, 1032-1085) and Chu Hsi. According to this older tradition *hsing* (human nature) is reason. The Ch'eng-Chu school

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(continued from the previous page) held tenaciously to the two-level theory of mind, the upper level, where reason is stored, being *hsing*, and the lower level, occupied with awareness and consciousness, being *hsin* (mind in the naturalistic sense). It would be wrong to assert that Lu Chiu-yuan and Wang Yang-ming abandoned this two-level theory *in toto*, suggesting as interestingly as it does the Kantian doctrine of the forms of thought. Rather, they fused the two levels into a single unity, because reason must be expressed through mind, and, particularly, through the thinking process of the mind.

It is not too far wrong to call Wang Yang-ming a follower of Lu Chiu-yuan. In the doctrine that mind is reason, the theories of the two philosophers are identical. However, it should be emphasised that Wang's system as a whole is more comprehensive and more developed than his predecessor's, and in this sense it is original with him. The theory that mind is reason developed in Wang's system to a richer fullness of meaning than in that of Lu.

The term "intuitive knowledge" has occurred several times in this exposition of Wang Yang-ming's teachings. Perhaps it is appropriate now to explain its meaning. The Chinese words for intuitive knowledge are *liang-chih*, and they signify the innate faculty of knowing. With Wang the terms "knowing," "moral consciousness," and "intuitive knowledge" coincide in meaning. "*Liang-chih*," comments Wang, "whether of an ordinary man or of a sage, is the same."¹⁵ It means conscience or the concomitant knowledge. He says in a letter to Lu Yuan-ching: "*Liang-chih* exists always. If you do not take care to preserve it, you will lose it. In itself it is bright and clear, despite ignorance and blindness. If you do not know enough to keep it clean, it will become beclouded, but though it may remain thus beclouded for a long time, it nonetheless is essentially brilliant, limpid, and distinct."¹⁶

In Wang's view *liang-chih* is part of reason or reality. Knowing is the spiritual part of reason. He says: "*Liang-chih* is what is intelligent, clear, and distinct in the sense of heavenly reason."¹⁷

In the same letter, Wang says: "*Liang-chih* is as bright as a mirror. Nothing that is reflected in it can escape it."¹⁸

Thus far, quotations from Wang Yang-ming on *liang-chih* have shown it functioning as the fundamental category of the pure and practical reason.

And now a word about the origin of the Chinese expression "*liang-chih*," which I have translated "intuitive knowledge." This technical term Wang

³⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "93" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) Yang-ming borrowed from the *Book of Mencius*. Indeed, the passage where it occurs is well worth quoting, for it throws additional light on its meaning. "The ability," says the famed Second Sage, "possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is intuitive ability, and the knowledge possessed by them without the exercise of thought is their intuitive knowledge. Children carried in arms all know to love their parents, and, when they are grown a little, they all know to love their elder brothers. Filial affection is the working of benevolence (*jên*). Respect for elders is the working of righteousness (*i*)."¹⁹

*Liang-neng*³⁶⁸ (intuitive ability) or *liang-chih* (intuitive knowledge) might be interpreted by some modern schools of psychology as instinct. In Wang Yang-ming's system it is a philosophical concept covering the three aspects of conscious life: intellect, will, and emotion.

It is no secret that many a philosopher, such as Locke or Hume, has built up a system out of knowing or understanding or cognition. More rarely has a system been constructed out of the will. Yet Schopenhauer, because he was much influenced by Indian philosophy, did just this. Wang Yang-ming, though he placed much emphasis on intuitive knowledge as is obvious from the passages quoted above, was scarcely less emphatic about the rôle of the will.

This will which he stresses is "true will" or "real will," and by "true will" or "real will" he means much the same as Kant meant by "good will." With his usual clarity, Wang says that whenever there is any movement or prompting in the mind it is will. The way to control will is to entertain virtuous motives and to eliminate wicked ones. This will result in the creation of "true will" or "real will."

As an implication of this theory, the "true will" or "real will," is correlated with knowing. Any prompting of will is known to *liang-chih*. Wang elucidates his position skilfully: "When," he says, "the will is on the move, and when such a motive is bad, most people will not attempt to stop it, because they suppose that since the motive has not yet been put into practice it has no consequence. According to my doctrine of the unity of knowing and doing, even such a prompting of the will is a doing, so it should be stopped at once."²⁰

³⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "94" by hand.

³⁶⁸ "nêng" in the original.

The point Wang is making is that if a vicious motive can be cleared away thoroughly, then the will, while still at the early stage of motive, can be set in the right direction before it has realised itself in action.

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(continued from the previous page) To this subject of the will Wang has more to contribute. In his "Answers to questions concerning the book *Ta-hsüeh* (the *Great Learning*)," he says: "Mind in its original nature is pure and good, but when it is agitated by a motivation it can be either good or bad. So-called 'rectification of mind' entails the idea that when motivation begins to stir, it should be controlled in the interests of steering toward the right track. When motivation is good one should embrace it in the same way that one loves beauty. When motivation is evil one should hate it as one abhors a foul smell. Then motivation will be pure and virtuous, and mind will be rectified."²¹

The difference between the doctrines of Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming should already have become plain from what has been quoted. Chu, the pillar of Confucian orthodoxy, stressed the seeking of knowledge through reason. Only after one has acquired much knowledge does one learn how to distinguish between right and wrong. But Wang Yang-ming followed Mencius' doctrine of *liang-chih* in asserting that when one applies *liang-chih* to one's motives and will one knows the difference between right and wrong, and the mind is *ipso facto* rectified.

In Wang's system emphasis is placed upon the close connection between willing and knowing – a nuance of philosophical doctrine not to be found elsewhere unless in the practical reason of Kant, who as much as said that practical reason is the will. Wang explained: "When motivation is known to *liang-chih* as good, but when nonetheless one cannot embrace it but turns instead to the contrary, this means that one takes the bad as substitute for the good and is deaf in spite of the dictates of *liang-chih*. On the other hand, when motivation is known to *liang-chih* as bad, but when nonetheless one cannot afford to avoid it but on the contrary puts the bad into practice, this again means that one takes the bad as substitute for the good and is deaf in spite of the dictates of *liang-*

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³⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "95" by hand.

chih. *Liang-chih*, of course, knows what is bad and good. In these two cases what is called knowing turns out to be ignorance or deception. The proper way to begin is to make will real or true."²²

Wang's meaning is that if you act in conformity with *liang-chih* your will is true. Otherwise, your will is untrue.

Wang says further: "When *liang-chih*'s dictates are followed, this means that there has been no deceiving of *liang-chih*, and that making will true has been achieved."²³

It will thus be clear to the reader how intimate, for Wang Yang-ming, is the connection between *liang-chih* and volition.

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(continued from the previous page) So much for the theme of the will, to which Wang had so much to contribute; and now to his theory of knowledge. Wang Yang-ming is fully aware of the epistemological problem. The key to his system is the thesis that things are objects of consciousness. As long, he says, as we consider entities to exist outside of ourselves and to occupy positions in space, the physical world and mind are separated, and their unity is inconceivable. When, on that memorable night in Lung-ch'ang, Wang Yang-ming made the discovery that all so-called things are objects of consciousness, he built a bridge between mind and its object, and laid the epistemological foundation for his philosophical system.

Just as Berkeley and Kant inquired, "How is scientific knowledge of the external world possible?" So Wang asked: "How are cognition and moral value possible?" And it happened that this Chinese philosopher discovered that for any knowledge, whether of the external world or of moral values, to be knowledge at all, it must first exist as consciousness in mind and pass through the process of being object of thought.

In order to clarify Wang's theory that things are objects of consciousness, consider the following from a letter he wrote to Ku Tung-ch'iao. "Chu Hsi's exposition of the phrase 'investigation of things' is that principles should be studied in things. If this were so, principles can be found only in things themselves. Then mind would be at

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³⁷² The original editor inserted "13" and "96" by hand.

one end and the principles of things at the other end. There would be a disunity between mind and things. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Chu Hsi's doctrine that principles are to be found only in things is sound, and let us then consider the principle of filial duty. Is the principle of filial duty to be found in the bodies of your parents or is it to be found in your own mind? If the principle of filial duty exists in their bodies, it will disappear after their death. Or let us consider the principle of commiseration. In the case of the child falling into the well, does this principle exist in the child's body or in my mind? Shall I save the child by my hand? Ought I to follow the child to the well? These examples – the principles of filial duty and commiseration – are only two, but any number of other principles may be analysed in the same way. Thus, to take the view that a disunity obtains between mind and things is to err.... According to my teaching, 'realisation of knowledge' and 'investigation of things' mean that I myself apply my own *liang-chih* to different entities. My *liang-chih* knows what reason is, knows what is right and what is wrong. When I apply my *liang-chih* to different entities, they become adjusted in a proper manner. Application of *liang-chih* to different objects means the 'realisation of knowledge.' When different things become adjusted in the

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(continued from the previous page) sense that they function in their proper way, this is the work of the 'investigation of things.' "²⁴

Here is another interestingly relevant comment of Wang Yang-ming in answer to somebody who questioned his doctrine that things are objects of consciousness. Once when the philosopher was on an excursion to Nan-chen, a friend said: "According to your theory existence is impossible outside of mind. But consider a flower which blooms and withers by itself in the valley. What has it to do with mind?" Wang replied: "Before you see the flower, both you and the flower are in a state of isolation. When you see the flower its colour and shape become clearer to you – which means that knowledge of the flower cannot exist apart from mind."²⁵

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³⁷⁴ The original editor inserted "97" by hand.

The reader should remember that for Wang Yang-ming the importance of the knowledge which consciousness or mind provides does not lie in its being subjective, but rather in its having metaphysical significance. This is obvious from the following conversation:

Chu Pen-ssu³⁷⁵ remarked: "Man is intelligent, therefore he has *liang-chih*." But, inquired Chu Pen-ssu,³⁷⁶ "Do plants, stones and bricks have *liang-chih*?" Wang Yang-ming answered: "Man's *liang-chih* is one with the *liang-chih* of plants and stones. Without man's *liang-chih*, plants and stones would not work as plants and stones. Not only is this the case in regard to plants and stones, but the universe itself would not work save for man's *liang-chih*."²⁶

This last remark tells us clearly that our knowledge of the world is an actual construct by our minds, a formation brought into being by our thinking process.

In this connection note the difference in opinion between Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming. Though the older philosopher, being true to Chinese tradition, concerned himself almost exclusively with moral values, he nonetheless took a scientific attitude toward the world, studying nature analytically. Moreover, his approach, like that of Descartes, who dichotomized reality into thought and extension, led him to separate mind from the physical world. Wang Yang-ming, in the first period of his intellectual development, seemed to have followed his predecessor in presupposing this duality between mind and its object, as is evidenced by his contemplation of bamboos. Later he realised that this method could lead nowhere. After much pondering, while in exile in Lung-ch'ang, he reached the conclusion that, since things must come to the mind as objects of consciousness first, it follows that so-called principles lie in our minds, not in the external world. This remarkable conclusion

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(continued from the previous page) Wang called "the unity of mind and the principles of things." It may be considered to be a Chinese version of Berkeley's *esse est percipi*.

³⁷⁵ "Pên-ssü" in the original.

³⁷⁶ "Pên-ssü" in the original.

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³⁷⁸ The original editor inserted "P15" and "98" by hand.

In connection with the meaning of the term “things” as objects of consciousness, I may refer to Henke’s book, *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming*. This was no doubt a difficult task for him as he himself acknowledged. I find that in his translation of the text of a letter from Wang to Lo Cheng-an, something is left out.

Let me give Henke’s text and my own, which will show how much he left out. Henke’s text: “He who investigates things carries on this investigation with reference to the things of his mind, purpose and knowledge.”²⁷

The Chinese text consisting of three sentences, which Henke contracted into one, should be translated as follows:

“The investigation of things means an examination of objects which are in your mind; it is also examination of objects to which the will is directed; it also means examination of things which are thought of in your knowledge.”²⁸

Wang Yang-ming wrote these three sentences in the form of repetition, because he understood that so-called things, whether they are in mind, in will, or in knowledge, are nothing but objects of consciousness. As things are object of consciousness, they exist in mind, in will, and in knowledge. I do not think that Henke’s contracted form gives the full meaning of Wang’s text.

These three sentences are followed by three more sentences by which Wang Yang-ming tried to show that mind, will, and knowledge cannot perform the function of rectification, true-making, and realisation without having things as objects of consciousness.

Henke’s text: “He who rectifies, rectifies the mind manifested in his things; he who makes his purpose sincere, does so with reference to the purpose of his things; and he who develops his knowledge to the utmost does so with reference to the knowledge of his things.”²⁹

Henke’s use of the subject “he who” makes his text redundant; his putting “mind, purpose and knowledge” or the subjective side before “things” is contrary to what Wang Yang-ming meant.

Wang’s text should be translated simply as it was written: “Rectification of the mind means that things as objects of consciousness, which are in the mind, should be put right by rectification; making will true means that things as objects of consciousness, to which will is directed, should be brought in

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(continued from the previous page) line with truthfulness; realisation of knowledge means that things as objects of consciousness, which are in knowledge, should be studied to the utmost."³⁰

The reason Henke translated the first three sentences in a contracted form and the next three sentences in his own way is that he did not grasp the meaning that (1) things are objects of consciousness in Berkeley's sense, and (2) the subjective side (mind, will, and knowledge) and the objective side (things) are interchangeable. It is because of this interchangeability that Wang coined the first three sentences in a form in which the subjective side (mind, will, and knowledge) is emphasised, while in the second three sentences the objective side (things) is stressed. The two sides are interrelated in such a way that they may be interchanged without altering the meaning.

This school of Wang Yang-ming exercised such a great influence in China that it was a rival of the Chu Hsi school in the Ming Dynasty. However, the vastness of the number of Wang's disciples, and the multiplicity of schools claiming allegiance to him in the different provinces, resulted in a variety of interpretations of his doctrine. All kinds of opinions about what he meant grew up among his disciples, and by the close of the Ming Dynasty his popularity was displaced by opposition. There occurred in China, to make the matter short, a decline and fall of the school of Wang Yang-ming.

In spite of his fate in the Middle Kingdom, his influence in the seventeenth century crossed the borderline of China into Japan. The exact date of this transition is a moot question. The Japanologist G.B. Sansom in his *A Short Cultural History of Japan* says: "... we must mention the name of Nakae Toju (1608-1648), who founded the O-Yomei {the Japanese pronunciation of Wang Yang-ming} School in Japan...."³¹ From a Japanese source, however, one gets the report that a monk, Keigo Ryoan, went to China in 1507 and interviewed Wang Yang-ming. At the time of his departure from the Middle Kingdom to return home, many Chinese presented him farewell poems, to which Wang Yang-ming affixed a preface. This report, though extant in a Japanese source, is not found in China.

Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that Nakae Toju was the man who advocated and popularized the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming in Japan. Nakae Toju was at first a follower of Chu Hsi, whose school had been established in Japan ever since the fifteenth century, but in his thirty-seventh year he became converted to the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming. G.B. Sansom explains the reason for the change, "... the O-Yomei philosophy rejected the authority of written works, recommended a practical subjective

³⁸⁰ The original editor inserted "99" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) morality, and insisted upon the intuitive perception of truth to be reached by self-study and self-command. Such doctrines, because they were free from traditionalism and pedantry, had always appealed to the most vigorous and most thoughtful type of Japanese of the upper class...."³² These words make clear the reason for the appreciation of Wang in Japan.

Nakae Toju's starting-point was the "illumination of illustrious virtue" according to the *Ta-hsiieh*. The basis for the obligation to this illumination is that the universe, including man and the manifold of things, is one, and that the duty of each individual is to establish himself and also to establish others, as was expressed by Confucius in the *Analects*. If a person is un-happy, it is because somebody has not done his duty. The work of illumination should begin with oneself, that is, with the effort to purify one's own conscience or intuitive knowledge, and to apply it to human relations: to relations with one's parents, sovereign, brother, friend, etc. Thus far there is no deviation from the sense of Wang's philosophy as the Chinese understood it. But Nakae emphasised the importance of filial duty as the foundation of human relations. Whether in this point he agreed with his master will not be discussed here.

Between the time of Nakae Toju and the revival in Japan of Wang Yang-ming's teaching in the nineteenth century, many incidents occurred, such as a controversy of the Japanese schools over Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming, attempts at their reconciliation, and demands of a return to Shintoism, the indigenous Japanese way of worshipping and thinking. In the first place, two men, Sato Issai (1772-1850) and Oshio Heihachi (1796-1837), prepared the way for the revival of the school of Wang Yang-ming at a time when the influence of the school of Chu Hsi was at a low ebb. Tetsujiro Inouye, a present-day authority on Japanese philosophy and Confucianism, says these two thinkers were followers of Wang. Other scholars held them to have been partisans of Chu Hsi. However that may be, I shall pass on to more modern times and discuss a third-generation disciple of Oshio Heihachi, Yoshida Shōin, who was a pupil of Sakuma Shōzan, who in turn studied under Ōshiō. Yoshida Shōin is important as the moving spirit behind the Meiji Reform. As with Satō and Ōshiō, some scholars have labelled him a follower of Wang; others have classified him with Chu Hsi.

³⁸² The original editor inserted "100" by hand.

Yoshida has bequeathed to us seven principles which he believed to lie at the basis of the Japanese spirit. They are:

(1) The sovereign and subject should live harmoniously as members of a community.

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A NOTE ON LIBERATION IN BODILY EXISTENCE

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(151-1)³⁸⁵ A.C. Das has an article in *Philosophy East and West*, July, 1954, on "Advaita Vedanta and Liberation in Bodily Existence." He concludes the article in the following words:

Liberation in bodily existence is a standing reproach to illusionism.... In the ultimate state, as the *sadhaka* relinquishes³⁸⁶ his individuality, he is not in any way responsible for his return; for the reason of his return we must look to *Brahman* itself. It all suggests that it is *Brahman* that casts the *sadhaka* out³⁸⁷ of *nirvikalpa samadhi*.³⁸⁸ And *Brahman* can send the *sadhaka*³⁸⁹ back to the empirical world only if *Brahman* is not merely indeterminate and impersonal, and if the world is not illusory." (p. 123).

The reasoning behind this conclusion may be briefly stated as follows: To know *Brahman* in *nirvikalpa samadhi*³⁹⁰ is to be one with *Brahman* or to be *Brahman*. *Brahman* is completely free from empirical existence. The liberated soul that is one with *Brahman* cannot therefore function in the body or through the body. But if that is so, there can be no teacher of Vedanta³⁹¹ who has actually known *Brahman*. The guru-disciple relationship not being available, no one can ever know *Brahman*. All that is possible under the circumstances is mere intellectual speculation about the nature of ultimate

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³⁸⁴ The original editor changed "90" to "101" and inserted "PHILOSOPHY EASTWEST, VOL 5" by hand.

³⁸⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

³⁸⁶ "sādhaka" in the original.

³⁸⁷ "sādhaka" in the original.

³⁸⁸ "samādhi" in the original.

³⁸⁹ "sādhaka" in the original.

³⁹⁰ "samādhi" in the original.

³⁹¹ "Vedānta" in the original.

reality, or *Brahman*. The Advaitic ideal of liberation *through knowledge* is thus quite false and impossible.

The argument amounts to saying that there is a contradiction between realisation of identity with *Brahman* and bodily existence. But is there any such contradiction? There is no contradiction between *Brahman* and illusory appearances of various sorts. The world is such an appearance. Embodied existence of the self is another such appearance. Human striving for liberation is also an appearance. The bondage of man and the liberation of man, and the causes of bondage and liberation, namely, ignorance and knowledge, are no less appearances. Only *Brahman* in all its purity is not an appearance. But if that is so, knowledge of *Brahman*, and the consequent liberation, cannot be equated with *Brahman*. Knowledge and liberation belong in the end to the realm of appearance. We think we know, we think

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(continued from the previous page) we are free, we think we have become *Brahman* – all this has no relation to the reality of *Brahman*. Our knowledge, our liberation, our becoming *Brahman*, belong to the realm of *māyā* only. There can be no contradiction between these and *Brahman*.

The very conception of *nirvikalpa samādhi* is expressive of human limitation. It is a state of the mind only. Any such state cannot be eternal. It has seeds of temporality in it. It is bound to pass away. But if such is the value of *nirvikalpa samādhi*, it is a wholly fictitious problem to raise about the return of the liberated soul from that state to bodily existence. Both are mere states, having reference to a certain condition of the mind. Both are illusory in the end, having nothing to do with the nature of pure *Brahman*. Both are natural to the mind, one leading to the other like winding and unwinding. Both are just the states of the soul with a mind, and in that sense of *Brahman* in apparent bondage. Pure *Brahman* does not descend or come back. It has no states of any kind.

The soul in bondage has states. Some of these states come nearer and nearer to *Brahman*, and thus reflect *Brahman* more and more truly. They can, therefore, be spoken of as the means of the soul's freedom. The only thing that is important in this process of gradual freedom is the end of the process. The end must be one in which there is no self-consciousness, no consciousness of a return, and no knowledge of being free. We become free without knowing it. Since there is no consciousness of a return, there is no problem relating to it. All problems are reflective problems based on self-consciousness. With the lapse of this consciousness, all problems have ceased. This is

³⁹² The original editor inserted "102" by hand.

real freedom, to which, however, we can approximate in various degrees in the process of liberation from bondage.

The question, however, may be asked: But is liberation in bodily existence at all possible? Our answer is that it is possible only in the body. Liberation for us is a relative term. It has reference to the state of the mind in its various degrees of enlightenment. *Nirvikalpa samādhi* represents a state where the perception of duality has completely ceased and Truth is directly intuited. Both these elements can be found in various degrees in a person who has returned to bodily existence. He may still see the one Truth in all things, and he may still regard all differences as illusory, and therefore as quite unreal and valueless. One cannot at once forget a great vision or a great revelation. The memory lingers; and with practice the vision itself may linger as a pervading and an abiding perception. In that case, liberation in the body can become the normal condition of a liberated soul, who need not seek the trance of *nirvikalpa samādhi* for the highest satisfaction of his soul. He has now a satisfaction which is more and more

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(continued from the previous page) free from the limitations of time and circumstance, for he can progressively take his highest joy in all his worldly dealings. His *samādhi* or trance becomes unbroken and something quite natural to his empirical existence. In fact, he has, through an enlightened mind, transformed his human life into a divine life. Can we any longer doubt the truth of freedom in the body? It is the highest realisation that is open to us and that is truly called *jīvan-mukti*. The principal thing here is not the logic of *jīvan-mukti*, but the *psychology* of it. So far as the logic is concerned, the expression seems to be self-contradictory. Freedom means freedom from empirical existence and complete identity with *Brahman*, and yet we are talking about freedom in the body. But this logic need not be taken seriously, for an identity that is *yet to be achieved* is, in a logical way, quite fictitious. *One thing cannot become another*. We are *Brahman*, we have not *to be Brahman*. Psychologically, however, liberation is a goal, and it can be realised in the human body only. If I inwardly know the Truth and live the Truth, nobody can logically prove to me that I am not knowing the Truth or living it.

Advaita Vedānta³⁹⁴ has given certain formal answers to the objection that freedom in the body or *jīvan-mukti*³⁹⁵ is not possible.

(a) One such answer is that there is a residuum of ignorance left which accounts for the return to bodily existence from *nirvikalpa samādhi*. This answer does not satisfy

³⁹³ The original editor inserted "103" by hand.

³⁹⁴ "Vedānta" in the original.

³⁹⁵ "jīvan" in the original.

Sri A.C. Das, who argues that the world- illusion should vanish completely as soon as one attains to knowledge of *Brahman*. No residuum of ignorance can then remain.

Our answer is that this residuum of ignorance is immanent in the human situation. When we speak of knowing *Brahman* or becoming *Brahman*, it is clearly a case of mind knowing and mind becoming. The mind cannot really become, it can only figuratively become. It becomes *Brahman* when it assumes the form of *Brahman* in *Brahmakara vitti*.³⁹⁶ The mind continues to be distinct from *Brahman*, but the distinction cannot at the time be known. All distinctions, including this one, have ceased to be a fact for the mind. But if the mind can assume the form of the Absolute and become the Absolute, it can also retreat from it or relax. When it does that, it functions once again through the body. But since it has known directly a greater reality, it cannot be completely oblivious of it. The memory of the Truth is there, and its pervading presence has changed the appearance of all things in a feeling way, if not also in a cognitive way. We see the world; and yet we do not see the world only, but *Brahman* in the world. There are many levels of conscious recognition. This is a character of the mind. It is human to rise and to fall within certain limits in accordance with the maturity

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(continued from the previous page) of the mind. Knowledge of *Brahman* is, after all, a human phenomenon. One does not, therefore, cease to be human the moment one knows *Brahman*. It is wrong, therefore, to say as Shri Das says, "Once the *sadhaka*³⁹⁹ is in the state of *nirvikalpa samadhi*,⁴⁰⁰ he cannot return to bodily existence." The mind, wedded to a body, has other tensions as well, namely, the needs of the body and of the social environment. It can only temporarily dissociate itself from the body and its contacts, and concentrate upon a higher or transcendent reality. It cannot do this *always*. It must relax. It is not in the way of nature to be always in *samadhi*.⁴⁰¹ It is like going up into a rarefied atmosphere, staying there for a while, and then coming back to

³⁹⁶ "Brahmākāra vṛtti" in the original.

³⁹⁷ Blank page

³⁹⁸ The original editor changed "92" to "104" by hand.

³⁹⁹ "sādhaka" in the original.

⁴⁰⁰ "sāmadhi" in the original.

⁴⁰¹ "sāmadhi" in the original.

rest in the natural element of the body. All that we can say is that, while living in the body, life in the spirit may still appear more natural and more congenial than life in a physical sense.

(b) Sometimes the effect continues even if the cause thereof ceases to exist or to operate. Therefore, even when ignorance is gone, its *after*-effects may continue in a diluted form for some time, without affecting the truth of the original enlightenment and the transformation which it brings about in life. We have the case of a person shivering and perspiring for a while even after the illusion of a snake is cancelled. The same is the case of a person who has had a nightmare, or any other significant and powerful dream. The effects lengthen out beyond the cause.

(c) *Prarabdhas*⁴⁰² the set of *karmas* that have borne fruit in the form of the present body. Nothing that we can do can annul *prarabdha*.⁴⁰³ It is like a wagon started or an arrow released. They will come to rest only when the initial force has exhausted itself. Are we then quite helpless in the face of *prarabdha*?⁴⁰⁴ Not necessarily. Our knowledge of *Brahman* does affect *prarabdha*.⁴⁰⁵ Only it affects it in a human way. It mitigates its adverse effects which have reference to our knowledge and our will, or what is called *sofa* and⁴⁰⁶ *moha*. We need not now be deluded, and we need not be unhappy over trifles. For the rest, the body will be governed by its laws. Since all individuality in the grosser sense is annulled, no further chain of *karma* is manufactured by the individual. Once, therefore, *prarabdha* has⁴⁰⁷ worked itself out, no cause is left for further embodied existence.

It is possible to argue that the philosophy of Advaitism is all right, but that, consistently with its views, a knower of *Brahman* is never found, and never can be found, functioning normally in the body. Such a conclusion may not be altogether wrong. It is merely a question of our estimate of what we regard as consummate or complete knowledge. We have no quarrel with this estimate, although it may be unnecessarily extreme and may

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(continued from the previous page) go beyond all legitimate human meanings. We seek to know *Brahman* [in]⁴⁰⁹ present human context and thereby realise the highest

⁴⁰² "Prārabdha" in the original.

⁴⁰³ "prārabdha" in the original.

⁴⁰⁴ "prārabdha" in the original.

⁴⁰⁵ "prārabdha" in the original.

⁴⁰⁶ "śoṇa" in the original.

⁴⁰⁷ "prārabdha" in the original.

⁴⁰⁸ The original editor inserted "73" and "105" by hand.

value that [is]⁴¹⁰ open to us as human beings. We need not take leave of our humanity [in]⁴¹¹ order to realise a transcendent value. But it is certainly arguable that our humanity is, in the end, inconsistent with our divinity, and that therefore our humanity must be progressively shed. The author, Shri Das, however, goes beyond any such estimate of what constitutes perfect knowledge. [He]⁴¹² argues against the very possibility of knowledge of *Brahman*, and therefore argues against Advaitism as a whole, because Advaitism needs teachers, and it cannot explain how teachers are possible. We may well reply, but we cannot dispense with teachers living in the human body, if their existence [is]⁴¹³ inconsistent with the true doctrine? Alternatively, why can we not have teachers who have gone a long way in the knowledge of the Truth, if [not the]⁴¹⁴ right to the end where speech is forever rendered impossible. Such is our modest ideal of a *jivan-mukt*^{415a}.

T.R.V. Murki: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Ma-Dhyamika System

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(157-1)⁴¹⁷ if his ultimate goal is that of gaining some insight (however partial and incomplete) into Zen. Third, Herrigel seems to write with a dedicated seriousness which leaves little place for humour; and where humour is not, Zen is not – for one who has really tasted Baso’s kick cannot help keeping up his laughter.

But let us not take these criticisms too seriously. The task of communicating Zen is not an easy one, and errors of emphasis will inevitably creep in. What is important about the book is that it is sincere and sensitive and will undoubtedly help to spread knowledge about Zen among Western philosophers and religionists. – Harold E. McCarthy, *University of Hawaii*.

THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM: A STUDY OF THE MĀ-DHYAMIKA SYSTEM. By T.R.V. Murti. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955. (U.S. distributors, The Macmillan Co.) Pp. xiii + 372, including glossary of Sanskrit terms and index.

⁴⁰⁹ The original editor inserted “in” by hand.

⁴¹⁰ The original editor inserted “is” by hand.

⁴¹¹ The original editor inserted “in” by hand.

⁴¹² The original editor inserted “He” before “argues” by hand

⁴¹³ The original editor inserted “is” by hand.

⁴¹⁴ The original editor inserted “not the” by hand

⁴¹⁵ “jivan” in the original.

⁴¹⁶ The original editor changed “93” to “106” and inserted “PHIL E+W-V.V” by hand.

⁴¹⁷ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(157-2) For Western students of Buddhist philosophy, the area of greatest obscurity and difficulty is often found in the system of thought known as the Madhyamika or Middle Position philosophy. This is due partly to the fact that its basic literature has not yet been made available in full and adequate translations, and partly to misunderstandings arising from brief general accounts which do not make evident its dimension in depth. It has always been puzzling that a philosophy characterized as a negativism, a nihilism, a doctrine of emptiness, a universally destructive dialectic, should yet have been widely influential and persistent historically, and somehow functioned as a source of inspiration to thinkers in India, Central Asia, and the Far East.

What has been lacking hitherto is a full and systematic study by a scholar thoroughly versed in the Sanskrit sources and at the same time skilled in both Eastern and Western philosophical terminology. The deficiency has now been admirably supplied by Professor Murti, who teaches Indian Civilization and Culture at Hindu University, Banaras, India. An admiring disciple of S. Radhakrishnan, though by no means an uncritical follower, he shares something of his teacher's grasp of the world's philosophical scene and also a like power of effective statement in English. In the original preparation of his book as a doctoral thesis he had the benefit of contacts, conversations, and criticisms in association with other Indian scholars at the University. He also had access to the published writings of such Western specialists as Stcherbatsky, Poussin, Winternitz, A.B. Keith, E.J. Thomas, McGovern, Walleser, Rhys Davids, and others. The final result is a treatment, well organised, thoroughgoing, and illuminating. For the benefit of scholars wishing to check his statements with the Sanskrit sources, Murti furnishes in footnotes a full complement of quotations in romanised form. Readers, both Eastern and Western, may now see with greater clarity the full outlook on Buddhist thought from the standpoint of Nagarjuna's⁴¹⁸ philosophy of The Middle Way.

The fourteen chapters of the book are grouped under three main headings. Part I is devoted to the "Origin and Development of the Madhyamika Philosophy" (Chaps I-IV). Part II, "The Dialectic as System of Philosophy," is the longest, being the essential exposition of the system (Chaps. V-XI). Part III, "The Madhyamika and Allied Systems," contains discriminating comparisons with the dialectical systems of Kant, Hegel, and Bradley. There is also analysis of the Vedanta and Vijnanavadi⁴¹⁹

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⁴¹⁸ "Nāgārjuna's" in the original.

⁴¹⁹ "Vijñānavādi" in the original.

⁴²⁰ Blank page

(continued from the previous page) absolutisms contrasted with that of the Madhyamika.⁴²² Its last chapter presents a cluding estimate, seeking to evaluate the Madhyamikasystem⁴²³ as a possible contribute to world culture (Chaps. XII-XIV). In this third part the Western philosophy student will probably find the most immediate point of contact and may well {r??}⁴²⁴ before entering into the systematic, technical exposition of Part II.

Considering the origin and development of Nagarjuna's⁴²⁵ system of dialecticalism, the author sees it as a pivotal revolution in Buddhistic thought, with; similar to that of Kant's critical philosophy in Western thought. As against Upanishad tradition, which exalts the idea of soul (*atman*)⁴²⁶ as the inner core of things, the Buddha had taught a doctrine of *anatman*,⁴²⁷ meaning that all things lack substance, or permanent identical reality. He did this on the basis of moral consciousness. An unchained eternal soul would imply no advance in spiritual life, but would render effort the law of ethical cause and effect (*karma*) meaningless. Denial of a self in this is the basic tenet of original Buddhism, Murti holds, giving rise to a second tradition in Indian philosophy. The orthodox Upanishadic Vedanta⁴²⁸ tradition under the *atman*⁴²⁹ (soul or self) idea. Buddhistic Madhyamika⁴³⁰ philosophy develops the *anatman*⁴³¹ (no-soul) concept, bringing out the significance of the dialectical clash between the two traditions. The author rejects the contention of some scholars Rhys Davids especially) that the *anatman*⁴³² doctrine did not arise with the Buddha but was the product of later monkish scholasticism. Actually, the Buddha was denying the specific metaphysical soul-substance theory of the *brahmins*.⁴³³ He was making a counter metaphysical claim of his own. This is clear from the fact that when pressed for positive metaphysical pronouncements he declared such questions "unanswerable" and was "silent." "The Tathagata, O Vaccha, is free from all theory. This is not nihilism (as Oldenberg thought), but suspension of judgment reference to what transcends conceptual power.

⁴²¹ The original editor changed "265" to "107" by hand.

⁴²² "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁴²³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁴²⁴ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only "r-" is visible in the original.

⁴²⁵ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

⁴²⁶ "ātman" in the original.

⁴²⁷ "anātman" in the original.

⁴²⁸ "Vedānta" in the original.

⁴²⁹ "ātman" in the original.

⁴³⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁴³¹ "anātman" in the original.

⁴³² "anātman" in the original.

⁴³³ "brāhmins" in the original.

Here is the clue to a method of philosophy which Nagarjuna⁴³⁴ and his followers were to make explicit and extensively to all “views” of what is ultimate, the method of dialectical criticism which was, says Murti, a “Copernican revolution” in Indian thought.

Historically the method proved influential. Later Vedantic⁴³⁵ and Buddhistic scholars used dialectical criticism for destroying arguments of opponents, even when (contrary to Nagarjuna’s⁴³⁶ complete suspension of judgment) they sought to establish positive metaphysical theories of their own. This may be seen in writings of {Sa??}⁴³⁷ and of the Buddhistic idealists, Asanga and Vasubandhu.

In what did the revolution consist? Essentially it was recognition of the inherent conflict of reason, made explicit by Kant for Western philosophy though handled differently. Kant’s critical philosophy emerged from the conflict of two dogmatisms: Rationalism and Empiricism. Nagarjuna’s⁴³⁸ dialectical method emerged from the clash between the *atman*⁴³⁹ and *anatman*⁴⁴⁰ dogmatisms. Both arrived at the conclusion that speculative metaphysics (*drsti*) yields not knowledge but illusion. Nagarjuna’s⁴⁴¹ method of making this explicit, however, is to point out that for every metaphysical proof there are four possible alternative views, none of which on analysis proves valid. The view is either so, or not so, or both so and not so, or neither so nor not so. It exhausts the possibilities. As a dialectician, Nagarjuna⁴⁴² draws out the implications of each alternative to show its contradictory character, thus rejecting each by a *reducto ad absurdum* (*prasanga*). In the end this leaves no positive metaphysical state standing. Thus the so-called “middle position” of Madhyamika⁴⁴³ philosophy,

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⁴³⁴ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴³⁵ “Vedāntic” in the original.

⁴³⁶ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴³⁷ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “Śa-” is visible in the original.

⁴³⁸ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴³⁹ “ātman” in the original.

⁴⁴⁰ “anātman” in the original.

⁴⁴¹ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴⁴² “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴⁴³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

⁴⁴⁴ Blank page

⁴⁴⁵ The original editor changed “94” to “108” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) called a middle view between extremes, is really a no-position, a suspension of judgment with reference to metaphysical matters. In a careful detailed exposition Murti shows how Nagarjuna⁴⁴⁶ applies his dialectic to the concepts of causality in its many forms, of motion and rest, of the elements of existence (*āyatana*s,⁴⁴⁷ *skandhas* and *dhātus*⁴⁴⁸ and *dharma*s), of their changing combinations, of the substance-view of reality (*ātma-drṣṭi*),⁴⁴⁹ and of such conceived entities as space, time, atoms, and souls. The analyses are penetrating and painstaking, given in more completeness, perhaps, than anywhere else in English.

In view of the universal devastation wrought among ideas previously taught as “the truth” in Indian philosophy, it is easy to see why the Madhyamika⁴⁵⁰ has been criticised as logically destructive and metaphysically sterile. Showing the futility of all views, what room does it leave for hope, faith, or devotion? Are not the older characterizations of it as “nihilism” or “negativism” essentially just?

Murti shows, however, that the ultimate purpose is constructive. Dialectical criticism is severe, but it is in the service of a higher end, what the *Ratnakūṭa Sūtra* calls⁴⁵¹ “the vision of the Real in its true form.” (Quoted on p. 210.) All speculative constructs must be cleared away so that direct intuition (*prajñāpāramitā*)⁴⁵² may arise. This intuition is characterized as “non-dual knowledge,” i.e., coincidence of knowledge and the real in such a way that there is negation of all opposites, “abolition of all particular viewpoints which restrict and distort reality” (p. 214). It is supra-rational and contentless, inexpressible, free from all illusion. This is the famous *Sūnyatā*,⁴⁵³ voidness, of the conceptual function of the mind.

Such intuition, however, is far from implying unreality in the Absolute. It simply means that in its ultimate truth (*paramārtha*)⁴⁵⁴ *satya* the Absolute is unconditioned and indeterminate, void only from the standpoint of our conventional determinations of truth which are only “covered, or apparent truth” (*saṃvṛti*)⁴⁵⁵ *satya*. In itself the Absolute is the ultimate truth and reality of the world which we in our ignorance apprehend in terms of appearances only. It is in the interest of this realisation that Nagarjuna⁴⁵⁶ criticizes all supposedly ultimate empirical distinctions. To be bound, attached to the world of phenomena or empirical particulars, is *samsāra*.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁴⁶ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴⁴⁷ “āyatana” in the original.

⁴⁴⁸ “dhātus” in the original.

⁴⁴⁹ “ātma-drṣṭi” in the original.

⁴⁵⁰ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

⁴⁵¹ “Ratnakūṭa Sūtra” in the original.

⁴⁵² “prajñāpāramitā” in the original.

⁴⁵³ “Sūnyatā” in the original.

⁴⁵⁴ “paramārtha” in the original.

⁴⁵⁵ “saṃvṛti” in the original.

⁴⁵⁶ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁴⁵⁷ “samsāra” in the original.

To be released from this bondage is spiritual freedom or *nirvana*.⁴⁵⁸ It is awakening to the truth that the Absolute is the implicate of phenomena, their final reality, even if no affirmation is valid as to its nature in itself.

But if the Absolute is transcendent to thought and phenomenal beings, how can there be communication or relation between them? The author replies. Absolute truth (*Tathata*)⁴⁵⁹ is not constituted by any act of knowing in empirical terms. It does, however, freely manifest itself as a Person through an intermediary, i.e., the *Tathagata*,⁴⁶⁰ one who “knows the truth” as did the Buddha in his enlightenment. Such an intermediary is a “free, phenomenal being,” partaking of both noumenal and phenomenal realms. He is able to teach and lead others to the truth. In spite of some logical difficulties involved here, Murti contends that in the Buddha impersonal truth becomes personalised. This is the Buddhist conception of Godhead, one possessed of omniscience, freedom from all defects (*klesa*),⁴⁶¹ and great compassion (*mahakaruna*),⁴⁶² which is “an active and abiding interest in the welfare not only of suffering humanity but of all beings” (p. 283). What is the evidence? The fact of Gautama’s own great enlightenment (*bodhi*) and his long ministry of teaching out of compassion for all beings. Gautama is not the only Buddha, however, and the author points out that

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(continued from the previous page) in the Mahayana⁴⁶⁵ religion which Madhyamika⁴⁶⁶ philosophy upholds, he is only {??}⁴⁶⁷ “innumerable acts of divine dispensation.” Other Buddhas and Buddha-aspects (*bodhisattvas*) are also manifestations of God as *Tathagata*,⁴⁶⁸ but these must be stood in the context of the religious consciousness. Ultimately, the Absolute transcends all attributes of personality as well as all other

⁴⁵⁸ “*nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁴⁵⁹ “*Tathatā*” in the original.

⁴⁶⁰ “*Tathāgata*” in the original.

⁴⁶¹ “*kleśa*” in the original.

⁴⁶² “*maḥākaruṇā*” in the original.

⁴⁶³ Blank page

⁴⁶⁴ The original editor changed “267” to “109” by hand.

⁴⁶⁵ “*Mahāyāna*” in the original.

⁴⁶⁶ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

⁴⁶⁷ This word is cut off entirely by the right margin.

⁴⁶⁸ “*Tathāgata*” in the original.

phenomenal characterizations. respect the *Tathagata*⁴⁶⁹ as personal stands to the impersonal or super-personal Absolute (*Tathata*)⁴⁷⁰ as does Ishvara⁴⁷¹ to *Brahman* in Vedantic⁴⁷² thought.

In his twelfth chapter, Murti takes note of affinities of thought between Madhyamika⁴⁷³ and certain Western dialectical systems. Kant also denied the competence of reason to reach reality in itself, and exposed the illusory character of speculative metaphysics by the inevitable conflicts in its constructions, but he did not recognise the possibility of non-conceptual intuitional knowledge without mediation of the categories (i.e., the *prajnaparamita*),⁴⁷⁴ although such knowledge is implied in his "transcendental illusion," for how can illusion be recognised without some kind of intuition of the truth with reference to which reason is illusioned.

In the philosophy of Hegel, as in Madhyamika,⁴⁷⁵ dialectic is the consciousness opposition in reason. Concepts in thesis and antithesis negate one another. Hegel works through opposites. For Hegel, however, they are negated only in their {siveness}.⁴⁷⁶ They are affirmed when taken up into the synthesis or inclusive {?}.⁴⁷⁷ Reality is the synthesis of all opposites. "The synthesis," he says, "is a new concept but a higher, richer concept than that which preceded; for it has been enriched by the negation or opposite of that preceding concept, and thus contains it, but contains also more than it, and is the unity of it and its opposite." (Quoted by Murti {on page 302, from Hegel's *Science of Logic*, W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, trans. York: The Macmillan Co., 1929) Vol I, p. 65.) Madhyamika⁴⁷⁸ dialectic, on the hand, is non-affirmative. It rejects all appearances, all views, reaching the real theory of their negation, not by adding them together to make up a wider view which, from this standpoint, would still lie within the realm of relativity and phenomena.

F.H. Bradley, the Neo-Hegelian, presents a dialectical criticism of the catalogue of experience which comes close to the Madhyamika method. Both he and Nagarjuna agree that all phenomena are infected with relativity. Both admit that only in the Absolute can reality be consistent and self-contained. However, Bradley, like Hegel, gives a certain affirmative status to appearances. They are real as appearances of the Absolute. But such a position, according to Murti, "can only result in the Absolute being but the totality of appearances." Nāgārjuna and his followers, he believes are more consistent in holding strictly to the relativity of appearances, denying them in the

⁴⁶⁹ "Tathāgata" in the original.

⁴⁷⁰ "Tathatā" in the original.

⁴⁷¹ "Īśvara" in the original.

⁴⁷² "Vedāntic" in the original.

⁴⁷³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁴⁷⁴ "prajñāpāramitā" in the original.

⁴⁷⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁴⁷⁶ The word is cut off by the right. Only "-siveness" is visible in the original.

⁴⁷⁷ The entire word is cut off by the right margin.

⁴⁷⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

Absolute, though saying that the Absolute is their reality and their truth, at once immanent and transcendent.

Comparisons are made also with other absolutisms in Indian philosophy. Madhyamika absolutism is to be distinguished from that of the Vedanta⁴⁷⁹ system and the rivaling Buddhist idealistic school known as the Vijñānavāda.⁴⁸⁰ Common to all is a recognition of the Absolute as devoid of empirical determination, a distinction between reality and appearance, an ideal of spiritual discipline through knowledge (*prajna*,⁴⁸¹ or *brahmajñāna*),⁴⁸² and a state of deliverance (*mukti, nirvana*)⁴⁸³ in common identity with the Absolute. In the mode of approach, however, there are differences.

Vedanta⁴⁸⁴ absolutism, starting with an analysis of illusion in the empirical realm reasons analogically that the whole world of appearances is a world-illusion

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(continued from the previous page) imposed upon the real. Thus *Brahman* (the Absolute), in contrast to the appearances, is their essence or soul, the ultimate one reality of which they are only modes. In itself, *Brahman* is pure, changeless, undifferentiated, unconditioned, and independent. This, however, tends to be affirmative metaphysical doctrine, a “view” (*drsti*),⁴⁸⁷ precisely the very thing Madhyamika⁴⁸⁸ criticism means to avoid.

In Buddhism, Vijñānavāda idealism is also a “view,” for while it rejects the soul theory (*atma-vāda*)⁴⁸⁹ of Brahmanism and the theory of ultimate elements (*dharmas*) of early Buddhism, it also refuses to follow Madhyamika⁴⁹⁰ philosophy in its negative

⁴⁷⁹ “Vedānta” in the original.

⁴⁸⁰ “Vijñānavāda” in the original.

⁴⁸¹ “*prajñā*” in the original.

⁴⁸² “*brahmajñāna*” in the original.

⁴⁸³ “*nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁴⁸⁴ “Vedānta” in the original.

⁴⁸⁵ Blank page

⁴⁸⁶ The original editor changed “93” to “110” by hand.

⁴⁸⁷ “*drṣṭi*” in the original.

⁴⁸⁸ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

⁴⁸⁹ “*ātma-vāda*” in the original.

⁴⁹⁰ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

naming of the Absolute as the Void (*Sunya* or *Sunyata*).⁴⁹¹ On the contrary, it holds that beneath all appearances of the empirical world is that which undergoes these illusory experiences, namely, consciousness (*vijnana*)⁴⁹² itself. Consciousness can exist by itself without real objects, as it demonstrably does in dream-states and other illusions. It is self-determining, governed by its own laws of development, and, what is most important, creative of its own objects. All objects in the experienced world are its ideations. In and from the dynamic stream of consciousness all phenomena appearing in the subject-object relation are created. Consciousness is thus the sole reality. It is not a changeless, identical soul substance, as in the *atma-vada*⁴⁹³ tradition, but a dynamic stream of creative activity. This view, in the words of Murti, is an "Absolutism of Consciousness as Pure Act." "*Vijnana*⁴⁹⁴ is Cosmic, Impersonal will, realising itself through projection and retraction of the object" (p. 316).

As against both the Vedanta⁴⁹⁵ and Vijnanavada⁴⁹⁶ approaches, the dialectical Madhyamika approach criticizes the above two "views" of the Absolute as antithetical, hence not ultimate. Both are conditioned, conceptual constructions, hence obscurations of the real. The Void (*Sunyata*),⁴⁹⁷ or contentless intuition (*Prajna*),⁴⁹⁸ is a purer designation for the Absolute because no positive affirmation is made as to its nature. Nothing is predicated of it, although through reflective awareness of the dialectical play of reason it is realised in the ultimate non-dual intuition itself. The aim is spiritual, to free the mind of all alternatives, the state of freedom which is *nirvana*⁴⁹⁹ and also Buddhahood. Religious realisation supervenes at last upon the conceptual strivings of philosophy.

In a final estimate of the Madhyamika⁵⁰⁰ system, Murti seeks to defend it from the charge that its dialectic is wholly negative, positivist in its anti-metaphysics, destructive and intolerant of other sincere reflective efforts. Nagarjuna's⁵⁰¹ sharp pointing up of contradictions in every positive metaphysical statement would seem to sustain this. Yet, it should be recognised that the polemic is against dogmatism in metaphysics, not against the reflective use of reason itself. It is sufficient to keep in mind the limitation of reason. Then positions may be chosen and pictures of reality developed accordingly, while retaining humility before the fact that no picture of reality can be taken as ultimate truth. The Real (*Sunya*)⁵⁰² is always transcendent to thought,

⁴⁹¹ "Śūnya or Śūnyatā" in the original.

⁴⁹² "vijñāna" in the original.

⁴⁹³ "ātma-vāda" in the original.

⁴⁹⁴ "vijñāna" in the original.

⁴⁹⁵ "Vedānta" in the original.

⁴⁹⁶ "Vijñānavāda" in the original.

⁴⁹⁷ "Śūnyatā" in the original.

⁴⁹⁸ "Prajñā" in the original.

⁴⁹⁹ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

⁵⁰⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁵⁰¹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

⁵⁰² "Śūnya" in the original.

but for that very reason “one need not restrict oneself to any particular mode of synthesis to serve for all time and all people” (p. 336). By being a “no-position” philosophy the Madhyamika⁵⁰³ “can accommodate and give significance to all systems and shades of views” (p. 337). In this respect Murti concludes that it can stand among competing systems, a necessary sobering recognition for each, but making for good will among them all. So functioning, “it should prove of value by way of preparing the background for the spiritual regeneration of the world” (p. 341).

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THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM

T.R.V. Murki

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(continued from the previous page) There can be no doubt that in this thoroughgoing exposition of Madhyamika⁵⁰⁵ philosophy Murti has made an outstanding contribution to contemporary knowledge of Buddhist thought. He has set in just perspective the total character of influence of the tradition so that Western scholars can understand more adequately its constructive intent on the religious side. Like Kant’s Transcendental Dialogue it humbles the pretensions of speculative reason in order to make room, if not exactly for faith, then for the inward surety of mystical intuition. From the length and sustained character of the study we can see that the author has for value and inspiring significance in his subject.

From the standpoint of history of religions, however, a question arises as to evolution in the title of the book. If the Madhyamika⁵⁰⁶ is the basic and central philosophy of Buddhism, why was it not so recognised by such later acute thinkers as Asanga and Vasubandhu? These idealists of the Vijñānavāda⁵⁰⁷ school by no means regard their system as subsidiary to Nāgārjuna’s ultimate suspension of metaphysical judgement. They contended, rather, (as Murti himself shows on page 319) that the interpretation of *Sūnyata*⁵⁰⁸ is unwarranted and extreme. They interpret the term as meaning absence of the subject-object distinction in consciousness. Denial is not of every possible metaphysical conception, but of the objective reference in all ideations, all of which arise out of consciousness itself. The Absolute is pure consciousness itself, unstained by the distinctions of the subject-object world. Rejection of “ideation-only” (*vijñaptimātrata*)⁵⁰⁹ is the ultimate intuition of the Buddhism. The “silence” of the Buddha did not mean that he denied every conceivable object (as Nāgārjuna⁵¹⁰ held) but

⁵⁰³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

⁵⁰⁴ The original editor changed “269” to “111” by hand.

⁵⁰⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

⁵⁰⁶ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

⁵⁰⁷ “Vijñānavāda” in the original.

⁵⁰⁸ “Sūnyata” in the original.

⁵⁰⁹ “vijñaptimātrata” in the original.

⁵¹⁰ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

only what are taken to be realities apart from consciousness. Consciousness itself is the ultimate, undeniable reality. In this positive meta-physical doctrine the Vijñānavādins⁵¹¹ claimed to be unfolding the true meaning the Buddha.

Historically, we are thus confronted with two systems of Mahayana⁵¹² Buddhist philosophy, each claiming to be the central meaning of Buddhism. Conceivably it might be argued that since Vijñānavāda⁵¹³ arose later and in full cognizance of Mādhyamika it indicates practical dissatisfaction with a complete no-position philosophy and a desire to uphold some doctrine that is positive and constructive. Devout reverence before a completely inexpressible, inconceivable Absolute may not be impossible, but that experience, the idealist can point out, is still within consciousness and implies consciousness itself as the Absolute.

The authorities which Murti cites for the Mādhyamika interpretation of Buddhism are the Tibetan historians, Būston (1290–1364) and Taranātha (1574–1618) and Western scholars who expound them (Obermiller, Stcherbatsky, and Rosenberg). These all regard Mādhyamika⁵¹⁴ philosophy as central and as containing the main meaning of Buddhism. This is done, however, from the standpoint of the philosopher doing the evaluating. We must note that historically the Vijñānavādins⁵¹⁵ interpreted the central meaning of Buddhism differently and held to idealism as the final word.

This observation, of course, in no way detracts from the excellence of Mādhyamika's⁵¹⁶ work. His purpose to furnish an adequate exposition of this one great branch of Buddhist philosophy has been admirably fulfilled. Certainly he has put in his all. Western scholars seeking to penetrate the deeper recesses of Buddhist thought
CLARENCE H. HAMILTON, Professor emeritus, Oberlin College.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 7

Joseph Taubes: Virtue and Faith

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(167-1)⁵¹⁸ Plotinus, the last great philosopher of antiquity, was aware of this contradiction between classic and Christian standards of moral behaviour and

⁵¹¹ "Vijñānavādins" in the original.

⁵¹² "Mahāyāna" in the original.

⁵¹³ "Vijñānavāda" in the original.

⁵¹⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁵¹⁵ "Vijñānavādins" in the original.

⁵¹⁶ "Mādhyānika" in the original.

⁵¹⁷ The original editor changed "78" to "112" by hand.

⁵¹⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 4; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

formulated the question in a superb way in his tractate "Against the Gnostics." Plotinus writes: "This school, in fact, is convicted by its neglect of all mention of virtue: any discussion of such matters is missing utterly: we are not told what virtue is or under what different kinds it appears; there is no word of all the numerous and noble reflections upon it that have come down to us from the ancients; we do not learn what constitutes it or how it is acquired, how the Soul is tended, how it is cleansed. For to say 'Look to God' is not helpful without some instruction as to what this looking imports: it might very well be said that one can 'look' and still sacrifice, still be the slave of impulse, repeating the word God but held in the grip of every passion and making no effort to master any. Virtue, advancing toward the Term and, linked with thought, occupying a Soul makes God Manifest: God on the lips without a good conduct of life, is a word."

(167-2) The Stoics differ in the definition of happiness, but they agree that to attain virtue is a life-long process. The Stoics emphasise the askesis, the "exercise or training," necessary for the achievement of virtue.

(167-3) "It scorns every known law known to us; immemorial virtue and all restraint it makes into a laughing stock...it cuts at the root of all orderly living, and of righteousness which, innate in the moral sense, is made perfect by thought and by self discipline: all that would give us a noble human being is gone..." (Plotinus)

(167-4) Plotinus is conscious of the root of the

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(continued from the previous page) difference between ancient-classic ethics and the Christian-Gnostic denial of virtue that may breed contempt against all ethical norms. "Their error is that they know nothing food here: all they care for is something else to which they will at some future time apply themselves: yet, this world, to those that have known it once, must be the starting point of the pursuit: arrived here from out of the divine nature, they must inaugurate their effort by some earthly correction... and those who have no part in well-doing can make no step towards the Supernal."

J.A.B. Van Buitenen: Dharma and Moksa

(168-1)⁵²⁰ Dharma upholds the established order, while adharma threatens it; adharma is sheer lawlessness. Moksa, however, is the abandonment of the established order, not

⁵¹⁹ The original editor inserted "113" by hand.

in favour of anarchy, but in favour of a self-realisation which is precluded in the realm of dharma. Occasionally, especially in the Bhagavad-Gita, we find sentiments to such extent in favour of the established order that aspirants are discouraged from abandoning it openly, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Fundamental to Indian thought is the idea that the world and phenomena, being transitory, can never be an ultimately valid goal.

(168-2) Moksa, on the contrary, starts with a deliberate rejection of this order, a refusal to submit to its demands, a total severance of all ties with family and society and all laws and customs regulating it, with the universe at large and the rites which contribute to its stability. A brahmin choosing samnyasa renounces cast. What possible relation can there be between dharma and moksa?

This question occupied the best minds in Indian thought. In Vedanta the discussions centre around the meaning of the first words of the Vedanta Sutra: Subsequently,

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DHARMA AND MOKSA

J.A.B. Van Buitenen

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(continued from the previous page) therefore, arises the desire to know Brahman." Can this mean that this desire for moksa through knowledge is conditioned by something that precedes it? The question is hotly disputed. The original Vedanta view was indeed the combination of both knowledge and act; but acts necessarily involve results, and the results bind the performer. Shankaracharya,⁵²² to quote the most explicit rejector, is obliged to state that ultimately there can be no direct relation between any part of samsara and the knowledge of Brahman, which is synonymous with release. "The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to any activity," he states, and in the Upadesasahasri he repeats emphatically the necessity of samnyasa, the absolute relinquishment of all worldly ties.

(169-1)⁵²³ The world must obviously go on, if only because the demands on the capacity and effort of the aspirant to release are too high to be met by the ordinary person. The compromise that is achieved is extremely interesting: continue to perform the necessary acts, but abjure their results. So, by changing one's intention, namely, not to enjoy the

⁵²⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 5 through 6, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵²¹ The original editor changed "79" to "114" by hand.

⁵²² "Sankaracharya," in the original.

⁵²³ The paras on this page are numbered 7 through 8, making them consecutive with the previous page.

good fruits resultant on the performance of good deeds, one can prevent those fruits from being realised. But that means also that the efficacy of an act is no longer automatic, and if thought through consistently this proposed change of doctrine could reform the entire doctrine of karma. But it remains a makeshift solution which the authors are quite hesitant about, sometimes preferring it to jnana yoga, sometimes subordinating it to jnana yoga; only when stated as a part of bhakti yoga does it become meaningful.

Daniel H.H. Ingalls: Dharma and Moksa

(169-2) After glossing each word in order to give the literal meaning, Bhaskara turns to refute the religious enthusiast Samkara: "Here are some

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(continued from the previous page) philosophers who are too lazy to work for liberation"... "One should not cherish a vain hope, nor let one's mind be tempted to forsake one's moral duty (dharma) thinking, 'Let us just sit here comfortably and receive liberation (moksa).' "

(170-1)⁵²⁵ The virtues of firmness, courage, forbearance, discipline grow from within the man himself, they are not given by God. ... Such concern as is shown with a divine principle - with sat (the Existent), vijñanam (wisdom, consciousness), or Brahma, indicates a desire for revelation, for a statement of fact, not for guidance in one's moral life.

(170-2) One disciplines the senses by the mind, the mind by the judgement, judgement by the very self.

(170-3) This association of success with the doctrine of free will or "human effort" was felt so clearly that among the ways of bringing about a king's downfall is given the following simple advice: "Belittle free will to him, and emphasise destiny."

(170-4) First there is the challenge of Nagarjuna. He points out the discrepancies between the world in which we live and the nirvana we wish to attain. The two things are so different that there really can be no relation between them. The area of

⁵²⁴ The original editor inserted "115" by hand.

⁵²⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 9 through 12, making them consecutive with the previous page.

discrepancy to which Nagarjuna most often refers is an intellectual one. The way in which we train ourselves to think within the workaday world simply cannot help us to attain nirvana. There is in Nagarjuna no new, unworldly morality, no fiat from God to supersede the old categories of virtue. In fact, Nagarjuna's school, the Sunyavada, was very wary of applying its dialectic against the virtues. ...Samkara, like Nagarjuna, points out the discrepancy between the world in which we live and moksa which we hope to attain. Incidentally, moksa to Samkara can in no sense be

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(continued from the previous page) called an attitude. He is very specific on this point. Brahma is as unalterable by our way of thinking about it as is a post. It is not a goal, not something which one can do or not do, or about which one might think this way or that way. To return, though: the area of discrepancy which Samkara points out between this world and brahma includes action as well as thought; his emphasis is perhaps even more on the area of action. Everything in worldly life, in vyavahara, as he calls it, implies action and plurality. One object works upon another, changes the other, is changed by the other. Moksa is a state where there can be no change, where there can be no plurality. ...Both Plotinus and Bhaskara object that their opponents have thrown morality overboard. But the opponents have really done two different things. The Gnostics exchanged one set of virtues for another... Samkara has thrown out the virtues without substituting virtues of any sort, and he remains just as anthropocentric as Vedanta was from the beginning.

(171-1)⁵²⁷ The break in the steady path in India has always been made by monks, that is, by members of a religious order who had withdrawn from society, who withheld themselves from marriage, family, and caste duties, and so had already broken with the path of dharma within their own life-experience.

(171-2) Contemporary Indian Philosophy, review article by George B. Burch

The duty of the artist is "to remind the world that with the truth of our expression we grow in truth." (R. Tagore)

(171-3) A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. Ed. S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore. Review by S.K. Maitra.

Here we must plead for a broader outlook

⁵²⁶ The original editor changed "80" to "116" by hand.

⁵²⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 13 through 15, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) which will not hesitate to call a man philosopher simply because he has not written a technical book on philosophy.

Edward Conze: Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (Review by Clarence H. Hamilton)

(172-1)⁵²⁹ The central doctrine of emptiness is not just an absurd negativity but “an attempt to describe the Universe as it appears on the level of complete self extinction, or from the point of view of the Absolute,” an enterprise not unknown to Meister Eckhart and Hegel in the West. Conze finds a striking parallel between the negative method of Madhyamika philosophy and the sceptical method of the Greek Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 330 B.C.) and suggests that the latter could have acquired his views when he visited India...

(172-2) More definitely philosophical is the doctrine of thinkers in the idealistic school whom Conze calls Yogacarins. Here, in an effort to rationalise trance experience, reflection centres about a metaphysical Absolute conceived as “Thought-only.” This is a positive concept as against the older negative term “Emptiness.” The author shows how the idea may be traced through several Sanskrit sutras down to the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu around A.D. 400. It happens, however, that the important and culminating literature of this school is to be found in Chinese and Japanese exposition, rather than Sanskrit.

(172-3) Wei Shih = vijñapti-mātrata = ideation only or mental representation-only. That is, what appears to represent an object is only a phenomenon within consciousness. There is no external object. There is seeming representation only.

(172-4) The last complex of Buddhist thought considered

⁵²⁸ The original editor inserted “117” by hand.

⁵²⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 16 through 19, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵³⁰ The original editor changed “80
81” to “118” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) by the author is the Tantra, or Magical Buddhism, especially influential in Tibet and Mongolia. This phrase often is slighted or ignored in general expositions as being repugnant to the higher teachings of Buddhism. Conze shows, however, that secret magic practices, recitation of spells, performance of ritual gestures and dances go back a long way in Buddhism as well as Hinduism.

(173-1)⁵³¹ The central concept for meditation, Emptiness, is carefully analysed for its significance with the warning reminder that the purpose of its use is not intellectual comprehension but an experience of spiritual revelation.

D.T. Suzuki: Zen Buddhism, Selected Writings (Review by Harold McCarthy)

(173-2) A more rewarding philosophy than what is currently being offered by the language-obsessed positivist or the pessimistic and despairing existentialist, whether theistic or atheistic.

Alan W. Watts: The Way of Zen (Review by Harold E. McCarthy)

(173-3) Watts, accordingly, may find himself regarded by Suzuki as belonging, with Hu Shih, to that type of mentality "which is utterly unable to grasp what Zen is."

(173-4) The concept of maya is now "properly" interpreted to mean simply "that things, facts and events are delineated, not by nature, but by human description, and the way in which we describe (or divide) them is relative to our varying points of view."

(173-5) This is not to say that Watts is dogmatic.

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THE WAY OF ZEN

Alan W. Watts (Review by Harold McCarthy)

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(continued from the previous page) It is only to say that he moves in the direction of over-simplification.

⁵³¹ The paras on this page are numbered 20 through 24, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵³² The original editor inserted "119" by hand.

S.N.L. Shrivastava: Samkara on God, Religion, and Morality

(174-1)⁵³³ Radhakrishnan writes: "The speculations of philosophers, which do not comfort us in our stress and suffering, are mere intellectual diversion and not serious thinking. The Absolute of Sankara, rigid, motionless, and totally lacking in initiative or influence cannot call forth our worship. ...The sense of personal communication with God involves a real fellowship with an 'other,' divine personality. The Nirguna Brahman, which stares at us with frozen eyes regardless of our selfless devotion and silent suffering, is not the god of religious insight.

(174-2) Is this indictment of Samkara really justified? Does Samkara's philosophy really leave no room for God, religion, and morality? ...It is rather disconcerting to hear this said of one who composed numerous devotional hymns and prayers of great lyrical beauty and poetical excellence which thousands of devotees in India sing every day.

(174-3) Samkara's distinction between God and the Absolute, the Saguna Brahman and the Nirguna Brahman, the former having only a phenomenal and lower order of reality than the latter and also negotiable in the higher order. ... The Nirguna Brahman, the highest reality of Samkara's conception, is a blank, featureless abstract and impersonal entity which, from the very nature of the case is unable to become the object of religious devotion.

(174-4) Samkara emphasises jnana or knowledge of the Absolute as salvation, which is the true goal of

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SAMKARA ON GOD, RELIGION, AND MORALITY

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(continued from the previous page) life, and disparages activity (karma) as falling within the sphere of avidya or ignorance. It is in his commentary on the Bhagavad-Gita Samkara has voiced his protest against the possibility of activity's going hand in hand with knowledge.

(175-1)⁵³⁵ It would be well to remember initially that these two are the aspects or facets of the same Brahmin and do not refer to two different entities, as we are wont to think,

⁵³³ The paras on this page are numbered 25 through 28, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵³⁴ The original editor inserted "120" by hand.

the one “higher” and of a superior status and the other “lower” and of an inferior status. Brahman in its aspect as conditioned by its own inscrutable power of maya is designated Saguna Brahman or Ishvara (God), the Lord of the world and the individual souls, and the very same Brahman viewed in its unconditioned aspect is designated the Nirguna Brahman or the Absolute. Samkara makes this perfectly clear in the following passage. “Although the same Atman dwells in the heart of things moveable and immoveable, yet there is in different things a graded revelation of the glory and power of this Immutable Eternal Atman in accordance with the graded levels of chitta (consciousness) which constitute the different limiting adjuncts in the different beings.”

(175-2) Reality, with its differentiation into God, world and individual souls, is a necessary self-expression or self-revelation of Brahman in names-and-forms – I am using the word ‘necessary’ advisedly. It is not often realised that manifestation as the name-and-form world is, according to Samkara, a necessity inherent in the very nature of Brahman. “Where name and form not manifested” writes Samkara, “the Unconditioned form of this Self called the pure unity of knowledge would not be known. It is when there is a name-form manifestation as body and organs that it becomes possible to know its nature. The unconditioned and the conditioned are complementary and necessary to each other. In the conditioned manifestation of the unconditioned there is, according to Samkara, a hierarchical gradation of beings, according as they manifest more

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(continued from the previous page) or less of the power and glory of Brahman.

(176-1)⁵³⁷ This does not mean that the individual souls lack initiative of their own. They act of their own initiative, but God makes them act and reap the consequences of their actions in the same way as rain makes the plants of the different species grow in their own ways and bear fruits and flowers of different kinds.

(176-2) Samkara says that the existence of a God of the above-mentioned nature is also proved by the presence of orderliness in the world, which cannot be explained without there being an intelligent controller and ruler.

⁵³⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 29 through 30, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵³⁶ The original editor inserted “121” by hand.

⁵³⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 31 through 35, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(176-3) Ishvara alone has the power of creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe, finite souls may acquire any amount of occult powers, but not this.

(176-4) In the universe, which is the self-revelation of Brahman, God is Its highest self-revelation. "It is often said to be a blank, featureless, abstract entity, hardly distinguishable from nothing. This is a very great misunderstanding of the meaning of Nirguna Brahman, analogous to the misunderstanding of the Sunya of the Madhyamika Buddhists as "void" or "nothingness." Brahman in its absolute or unconditioned form is said to be nirguna, not because it is devoid of all attributes, but because no attribute can be adequate to it or because no category of thought is applicable to it. Since, as Spinoza said, all determination is negation, it is the indeterminate. The Nirguna of the Advaita, like the Sunya of the Madhyamikas, must be understood in its a logical or mystical signification.

(176-5) God, then, is not a fiction, according to Samkara, nor is devotional life meaningless or insignificant, according to him. In refreshing contrast to the passages quoted above, which give rather an adverse impression, Radhakrishnan elsewhere

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(continued from the previous page) states the true position of Samkara concerning his idea of God and religion when he says that "Worship of God is not a deliberate alliance with falsehood, since God is the form in which alone the Absolute can be pictured by the finite mind....The conception of a personal God is the fusion of the highest logical truth with the deepest religious conviction. This personal God is an object of genuine religious worship and reverence, not a non-ethical deity indifferent to man's needs and fears. He is regarded as creator, governor and judge of the universe, possessing the qualities of power and justice, righteousness and mercy, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. Holiness of character and moral beauty are prominent aspects of Samkaras god.... The severity of metaphysical abstraction relaxes when Samkara dwells on the variety of the divine qualities by which the eternal draws to himself the spirits of the children he has made." ... In the philosophy of Samkara the personal God is not a concession to human weakness; it is Brahman with its maya-sakti.

(177-1)⁵³⁹ We find several passages in Samkara's writings which betray the fact that to Samkara's mind there was no substantial difference between God and the Absolute.

⁵³⁸ The original editor inserted "122" by hand.

"That very Brahman is, in all ways, ruler, highest God even amongst the gods, Lord of all the lords, difficult to be comprehended."..." The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of the dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes."

(177-2) "Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed."

(177-3) The arguments which the Advaitins give for maintaining that the "finite" cannot be ultimately

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(continued from the previous page) real and that the personal form of God cannot be the whole or the highest truth. Why should the ultimate spiritual experience of oneness with the infinite be regarded as the losing of personality? Why not as the expansion of personality into infinity, the breaking of the spell of limited existence?..."To understand the personal we have always to refer to the impersonal, the particular must be referred to the general, and that general, that impersonal is the Truth, the Self of man, but this personalised manifestation is not referred to as that truth.

Wing-Tsit Chan: Transformation of Buddhism in China

(178-1)⁵⁴¹ According to Hiu-Neng (638–713), the central figure in this revolution, there was no need for the Pure Land because it is in one's own mind, and there was no use for sitting in meditation because seeing one's own nature is meditation. According to him, all Dharmas are in one's own nature. When one sees his own nature, Thusness or the True State, the Dharma-body, will be found there. Consequently, studying scriptures, building temples, practicing charity, reciting the name of the Buddha, etc. are all futile. The only way to freedom is to look into one's own mind and see Buddha-nature there. This is what later Buddhists called "directly pointing to the human mind and becoming a Buddha by seeing one's own nature." The total effect of ch'an is to

⁵³⁹ The paras on this page are numbered 36 through 38, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵⁴⁰ The original editor inserted "123" by hand.

⁵⁴¹ The paras on this page are numbered 39 through 40, making them consecutive with the previous page.

abandon the entire Buddhist organization, creed and literature and to reduce Buddhism to concern with man himself. It is to be achieved here and now. What is most interesting, it is to be achieved "in this very body." This is a far cry from the original Indian idea that the body is a hindrance to freedom.

Kenneth Ch'en: Transformations in Buddhism in Tibet

(178-2) In the realm of Buddhist thought, the Tibetans

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(continued from the previous page) have preserved faithfully the Madhyamika system of Nagarjuna and his followers.

(179-1)⁵⁴³ In the Pali scriptures the Buddha discouraged relationships with women. "Ananda asked the Buddha, 'How are we to conduct ourselves, O Lord, with regard to women?' 'As not seeing them, Ananda.' "But if we see them, what are we to do?" 'Do not speak to them.' 'But if they speak to us, then what are we to do?' 'Keep wide awake, Ananda.' "

(179-2) Amidst such widespread decay of the church, a reformer named Tsongkha-pa arose in the 14th century who advocated a return to the traditional Buddhist life, a clearing away of witchcraft and magic, restoration of celibacy, prohibition of meat and alcohol, a severe monastic discipline, and a strict curriculum for all monks. The sect which he organised, the Ge-lug-pa, or the Yellow sect, as it was commonly called, won immediate approval among the populace.

(179-3) Unlike the Buddhist monasteries in India, which kept aloof from temporal involvements, the Tibetan monasteries from the beginning identified themselves with the secular struggle for political paramountcy.

(179-4) About the end of the 7th century, there arose on the borders of India, mainly in Uddiyana, a body of literature called the Tantras, which dealt with such subjects as esoteric yoga exercises, rituals, charms, mystic formulas and diagrams, magic, and even medicine. This Tantric phase is usually looked upon as the last interpretation of Buddhism, with some scholars even going so far as to say that it was a decayed and

⁵⁴² The original editor changed "84" to "124" by hand.

⁵⁴³ The paras on this page are numbered 41 through 44, making them consecutive with the previous page.

corrupt form of Buddhism. Certainly its interpretation of doctrines and its esoteric practices had little in common with the Hinayana or Mahayana traditions. In one Tantric text, for instance, the Manjusrimulatantra, we find the Buddha descending to the level of a witch

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(continued from the previous page) doctor, revealing the formulas to carry out successfully any kind of crime.

(180-1)⁵⁴⁵ This new interpretation was none other than the application of the Madhyamika doctrine of sunyata according to which all appearances vanish and the gods and demons we see before us are mere images created by our own fanciful imagination and therefore have no real existence.

(180-2) In Tantric Buddhism, there is the conception of the five dhyani-buddhas, or Meditation Buddhas, representing the five skandhas or heaps, or the five directions. Once the conception of the 5 dhyani-buddhas has arisen, the search began for a principle transcending the pentad, some unchangeable ideal centre, so to speak. This gave rise to the conception of Adibuddha, the primordial Buddha who preceded all the others. The emanation of these dhyani-buddhas from the Adibuddha did not stop there; each must be accompanied by its female consort....We have another set of 5 dhyani-bodhisattvas, and by a further emanation, their female consorts. At this stage the process of creating gods and their female counterparts began to get out of control.

(180-3) The Vajrayana achieves this (return of the individual to the Absolute) by adopting the homology of the macrocosm and the microcosm. That is to say, when the individual realises within himself the process of cosmic expansion and reabsorption, he is able to attain salvation.

(180-4) In conformity with the doctrine of sunyata, these images are mere artifices, temporary forms with no reality whatever, to be abandoned whenever one becomes aware of his Buddha-essence....Two main arguments are advanced in defence of their position. Tantrism, like the Mahayana Yogacara school, advocated an extreme form of idealism. The external world has no objective basis; all phenomenon are merely illusory appearances

⁵⁴⁴ The original editor inserted "125" by hand.

⁵⁴⁵ The paras on this page are numbered 45 through 48, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) created by the subject. Thus, when the yogin enters the mandala circle for initiation into the secret rites, his mind is already so trained and purified that he realises the sunyata nature of all things. To such a person all the dharmas, or elements of existence, appear to be of the same non-dual nature.

(181-1)⁵⁴⁷ In accordance with the doctrine of sunyata, the yab-yum images are merely temporary forms and have value only in that they are sources of purification for those who gaze upon them. They are to be abandoned as soon as one realises prajna, the awareness of the non-dual nature of the Absolute truth.

Haridas Bhattacharya: The Cultural Heritage of India Vol. III. (Review)

(181-2) Suppose we take the Indian doctrine of the three states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep as sources of knowledge, as defended with dubious dialectic in Krishnaswami Iyer's essay. It is much simpler to think of the waking state and of deep sleep as one of the rhythms which pervade all Nature, and of dreams as a feature of the transition from one phase to the other - let the psychoanalysts make of dreams what they can.

Reiho Masunaga: The Soto Approach to Zen (Review)

(181-3) It is important for his book to come to the notice of Western readers interested in Zen, for purposes of comparison with the books of professor D.T. Suzuki, representing the Rinzai Sect. Soto rejects the use of koan, the baffling kind of problem which cannot be solved intellectually and is intended to promote intuitional awakening. Although there is an intuitional element in Soto

⁵⁴⁶ The original editor changed "85" to "126" by hand.

⁵⁴⁷ The paras on this page are numbered 49 through 51, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) there is no rejection or depreciation of logic and science as in Rinzai; there is a readiness to reason and make sense. Silence is not golden but silver and secondary to the value of the argument. The old Zen saying “No dependence upon words and letters” is not given the anti-scriptural interpretation. It means that “the sutras are not taken as the final authority.” Personal “transmission from mind to mind” does not rule out but vitalises reading. There is no lack of unity between personal teaching and teaching through the scriptures. The object for both is “not to know Buddhism but to become Buddhism.”

Meditation is all important. In the narrow sense it is zazen. But this “cross-legged sitting” is not for the sake of satori enlightenment, since that would entail dualism between means and end. In Soto the practice of meditation is enlightenment, not for it. Otherwise, once having attained satori, one would have no further need for zazen. But satori is not to be attained. Men need only to realise that they have it from the outset. And there is nothing better to do with satori than more zazen. Sakyamuni continued to sit after becoming a Buddha.

Yet he did more than sit, and meditation is not limited to sitting. One may meditate while walking or working or what not. In the larger sense meditation includes all that is worth doing, and especially seeking peace and happiness for all beings. Soto emphasises the close Buddhist relation between wisdom and compassion. It is not enough to be wise for oneself. To cling to that is to be a “personally enlightened corpse.” Helping others seems to count more in Soto than in Rinzai. Suzuki has noted the association of Rinzai with “reigning families” and the avoidance of them by Dogen, who preferred ordinary people, wrote in Japanese to reach them, and honoured their toil by saying “Daily work is itself Buddhism.” The depreciation of ethics, which shocks Americans in Rinzai, is not found in Dogen. He was strenuously ethical. While Dogen

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Reiho Masunaga (Review)

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(continued from the previous page) did not want to set Zen apart within Buddhism, neither, did he think of himself as founding a separate school within Zen. Moreover, the division of Buddhism into Theravada and Mahayana is overcome by Dogen, since for him the Arhat and the Bodhisattva ideals are inseparable.

⁵⁴⁸ The original editor inserted “127” by hand.

⁵⁴⁹ The original editor changed “86” to “128” by hand.

Swami Nikhilananda: Hinduism: Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit (Review)

(183-1)⁵⁵⁰ Whether non-dualism “harmonises conflicting philosophical doctrines” is open to question: certainly as presented by Swami Nikhilananda it seems to embrace points of view which, in their ordinary Western formulations, are contradictory if not mutually exclusive.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 8

K. Bhattacharyya: Classical Philosophies of India and the West

(183-2) The dominant attitude was that of a hearer, a learner, intent on discovering priorities, but not heaving yet discovered them or discovered them fully. This is why Indians relied so much on scriptures. Even to acquire a right to listen to scriptures they had first to undergo a training such that the truths to be discovered would not be distorted, and, also, that one might not submit blindly or be hypnotized. This listening, technically called *sravana*, was understood as already constituting transcendental intuition, though in the making. But even this was not considered enough. The hearer was required to go on continuously substantiating the truths, half realised, by means of arguments pro and con. (This second process was called *manana*.) But this was again to be followed up by a third process, viz., that of deep concentration, called

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(continued from the previous page) *nididhyasana*, which was to serve a double purpose. It was to dissipate the philosopher- hearer’s subconscious doubts, if any were still left, and, second, a sustained deepening of concentration was considered capable of disclosing deeper implications and ultimately the whole system of relevant priorities. This last process, known as *jnana- sadhana*, was a process which Plato hinted at and Kant developed to a degree and which is in modern times treated in all seriousness by phenomenologists.

⁵⁵⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 52, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵⁵¹ The original editor inserted “129” by hand.

(184-1)⁵⁵² Samkara insisted that the supersensuous cannot be proved by ordinary logic, reminding us of Kant and Hegel. But they added that empirical logic, may at least be corroborative (anugrahakatarka) by way of half establishing even supersensuous truths and refuting contrary views.

(184-2) Mencius is the first Confucian follower who built a system based upon the doctrine of ideas. He sees reality in one's own consciousness, not in the phenomenal world. Knowledge, which is necessary for virtue, does not consist in what one sees, hears, tastes, and touches, but in what comes from one's inner mind.

(184-3) Some Chinese present their ideas in aphorisms and not in systematic treatises. Students of Chinese Western Philosophy are accustomed to systematic works like those of Plato, Kant, and Hegel.

(184-4) If one traces the philosophy of Lu Chiu-yuan of the Sung Dynasty and that of Wang Yang-ming of the Ming Dynasty, one cannot but be persuaded that Mencius' emphasis on "thinking" is the pioneering spirit which eventually produced the idealism of China.

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(continued from the previous page) Mencius says: "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by (external) things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets (the right view of things), by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These (the senses and the mind) are what Heaven has given us. Let a man stand first fast in (the supremacy) of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man.

(185-1)⁵⁵⁴ This demarcation between senses and thinking is not a feature peculiar to Mencius. It is a necessary way which leads to philosophy.

(185-2) Animals live, move, and sense, but have no moral knowledge, that men are the only living beings who can distinguish between right and wrong.

⁵⁵² The paras on this page are numbered 2 through 5, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵⁵³ The original editor inserted "130" by hand.

⁵⁵⁴ The paras on this page are numbered 6 through 9, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(185-3) Professor Masutani sees the common man absorbed in the self-centred affairs of daily life, unreflective and ignorant of higher spiritual possibilities. The world's great religious leaders are they who awaken in him a dissatisfaction with self and at the same time awaken a self-examination that brings about conversation to a higher way of life. The Buddha awakens him from his foolish mediocrity to a superlative wisdom.

(185-4) The ability to refrain from meddling in the lives of others by citing the passage "Behave indifferently without trying to impose your own ideas upon the lives of others" which is his rendering, it turns out, of the cryptic Chinese *shih wu shih*, "act by non-acting "or" do by non-doing." Moreover Professor Bahm consistently resists the notion that non-action may be a prescribed technique for achievement and not a glorification of non-achievement. Thus the heavily purposive passage "By non-action gain all under heaven" is inexplicably reversed into the quietistic "Everything gains by non-interference."

Richard H. Robinson: Mysticism and Logic in Seng-Chao's Thought (Vol. 8)

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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC IN SENG-CHAO'S THOUGHT (VOL. 8)

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(186-1)⁵⁵⁶ Seng-Chao's intention is not to elucidate. Buddhist theory, but to force the reader to admit the impossibility of solving the riddle of Existence by rational thinking. The paradox itself, not its rational solution, is the priceless find he is seeking. These do not make a theory, but are meant to lead the reader before the Gate of Mystery, to the borders of Unknown, so that he may gaze into the unfathomable in a moment of ecstasy and share Chao's experience.

(186-2) When the Hinayanists enter the trance of cessation, then their bodies are like dry wood and lack the power of moving and functioning.

(186-3) Seng-Chao: Now in the samadhi of the dharmakaya, a body and spirit have both ceased. The way (bodhi) is cut off from ordinary sense-spheres, and it is something that seeing and hearing cannot reach. How then is it samadhi when one manifests a body in the three planes and cultivates thoughts? Sariputra still had karma and was born in a body. Because worldly retribution is the root of thoughts, he considered human

⁵⁵⁵ The original editor inserted "131" by hand.

⁵⁵⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 4; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

company an annoyance, and “sat still” under a tree. He was not able to make his body and spirit devoid of discursive intellections and so he incurred this criticism.

(186-4) Seng-chao’s earliest essay, *Prajna Has No Knowing* (Because *Prajna* - Wisdom uses no mind to function nor body to act, cannot be named or expressed nor even attained because it is already here - hence it is a revelation - P.B. comment)

(186-5) Vimalakirti criticised Sariputra’s *samadhi* because contemplation that depends on the senses of the imagination is not the *dharmakaya* contemplation. This does not constitute a repudiation of the intellect, though it means that the content of the highest contemplation cannot be learned by inference and transcends the sensible and the imaginable.

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(187-1)⁵⁵⁸ Seng-Chao: Bodhi is true enlightenment, absolute knowledge of the markless. Its Way is void and metaphysical, s sublimely cut off from ordinary sense- spheres. Hearers have nothing to insert their hearing in, and knowers have nothing to exercise their knowledge on. Dialecticians have nothing on which to fasten their words. Symbolisers (i.e. I-ching diviners) have nothing with which to give shape to their primary dichotomy (between *ch’ien*(heaven) and *k’un* (earth)).

(187-2) Borrowed and even trite phraseology often serves to express a very personal and intense psychological event of the inner life.

(187-3) “Mirroring,” in the above passages, designates the cognitive aspect of *prajna*. The mirror occurs commonly in Chuang Tzu and in the Mahayana Sutras as a figure for perfect, effortless, and non dualistic cognition.

(187-4) Seng-chao considered that the recounting of his experiences would have been prideful and immodest. Certainly the Buddhist tradition contains numerous warnings against publicizing one’s attainments, and in this traditions there was no Augustine to show how in writing an autobiography a devotee might humble himself and glorify the Other.

⁵⁵⁷ The original editor inserted “132” by hand.

⁵⁵⁸ The paras on this page are numbered 5 through 11, making them consecutive with the previous page.

(187-5) The study of the Sutras and Sastras and the contemplation of their doctrines were Seng-chao's "concrete empirical method for realizing the Holy Mind." As with the later Chinese San-lun School, he most likely considered that the elimination of wrong views through dialectic was an efficacious method leading to revelation of the truth.

(187-6) Seng-chao frequently discusses the relation of language to fact, and the problem of talking about the unimaginable. The wise do not cling to false designations. He only says that the marks of the dharmas cannot be expressed. He does not fasten words onto the marks of the dharmas. This language is the end-point of language.

(187-7) Bodhi does not know in the mundane sense,

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(continued from the previous page) because mundane knowing is directed towards the sensible and the imaginable. However, bodhi is all-knowledge (sarvajñata) because it knows the own-being of things, namely, their lack of own-being.

(188-1)⁵⁶⁰ As for "everything is both real and unreal" there are three classes of living beings—superior, medium, and inferior. The superior look on the *marks* of the dharmas as "not real and not unreal." The medium look on the marks of the dharmas as "all both real and unreal." The inferior, because their powers of knowledge are shallow, look on the marks of the dharmas as "partly real and partly unreal." Because nirvana and the unconditioned dharmas are imperishable, they look on them as real. Because samsara and the conditioned dharmas are counterfeit, they look on them as unreal. As for "(everything) is not real and not unreal," the Buddha declared 'not real and not unreal' in order to refute "both real and unreal"!

In other places, it was declared in order to demolish the four kinds of attachment. But here there is no discursive fancy (prapañca) towards the tetralemma. When one hears the Buddha's declaration, then one attains bodhi. Therefore he says, "not real and not unreal."

Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapada* gives a somewhat different interpretation of the stanza in question. He considers the tetralemma as an expedient device (upāya) that the Buddha uses in giving progressively higher instruction to the different grades of beings. First, the Buddha speaks of phenomena as if they were real, in order to lead beings to venerate his omniscience. Next, he teaches that phenomena are unreal, because they undergo modifications, and what is real does not undergo modifications.

⁵⁵⁹ The original editor inserted "133" by hand.

⁵⁶⁰ The paras on this page are numbered 12, making them consecutive with the previous page.

Thirdly, he teaches some hearers that phenomena are both real and unreal - real from the point of view of worldlings, but unreal from the viewpoint of the saints.

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(continued from the previous page) To those who are practically free from passions and wrong views, he declares that phenomena are neither real nor unreal, in the same way that one denies that the son of a barren woman is white or that he is black.

(189-1)⁵⁶² These paradoxes themselves, rather than their rational solution, are the goal. These paradoxes, like Nagarjuna's, serve to demonstrate that reality cannot be described by means of the concept of ownbeing (*sva-bhava*) and with terms that exactly match actuals. But if one understands the rational solution to these apparent contradictions, then one is brought face to face with the mystery of the relation between symbols and actuals.

(189-2) The ontological objective of Seng-chao's arguments, as it can be inferred from his writings, is not to establish any "positive"⁵⁶³ entities as existent, but quite simply to demonstrate that existent and inexistent cannot be absolutely and universally predicated of anything. Reality belongs to an order that is fundamentally incommensurable with symbolic systems such as language. Nevertheless, language performs a function in establishing this very truth. Seng-chao was in agreement with Wittgenstein's [Ludwig Wittgenstein "Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus"]⁵⁶⁴ conclusion in the Tractatus: "My propositions are citatory in this way, he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions, then he sees the world right. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

It seems that in fifth-century China, as in the modern world, at least one thinker saw an intimate connection between logical or dialectical forms and the mystery of reality, that he saw the road to bodhi, not in the practice of trances, but as a journey through, on, and over propositions about existence and inexistence.

⁵⁶¹ The original editor inserted "134" by hand.

⁵⁶² The paras on this page are numbered 13 through 14, making them consecutive with the previous page.

⁵⁶³ The original editor inserted quotation marks around "positive" by hand

⁵⁶⁴ "Ludwig Wittgenstein "Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus"" was typed below the line and inserted with an arrow.

Book Notes: Radhakrishna

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BOOK NOTES

Radhakrishna

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(190-1)⁵⁶⁶ Radhakrishna: The mind with its categories on the one side, and the world which it construes through them, on the other, hang together... When the Indian thinkers affirm that the world is maya it is not real, though existent, that we can escape from it, that is possible for us to circumvent the time process, they affirm the reality of spirit which is not objective, which is not (merely) existent.

(190-2) Kenneth Ch'en: Very misleading is the statement on page 90 that the enlightened man dies shortly after attaining arhatship. Just who is the enlightened man? members of the Sangha, like Sariputta, Moggallana Kassapa, etc. lived for many more years after having become arhats. What the Pali texts such as the Milinda Panha say is that if a layman should attain the fruits of arhatship (and there were some 20 such instances mentioned in Anguttara 3.451) then he would die, unless he took steps immediately to join the monastic order.

(190-3) Of more than passing interest to the reviewer was the, emphasis placed by the secret teachings on sudden illumination (pp. 88,90). In the historic debate between the Indian Kamalasila and the Chinese Ch'an monk Mahayana, held in Lhasa in 794, the latter, who was adjudged the loser, was represented by the Tibetans as the leader of the Ston-mun-pa (Tun-men- p'ai, school of sudden enlightenment), while his opponent represented the Rtsen-min-pa (Chien-men-pai, school of gradual enlightenment). Yet, now the Tibetans have come around, to the same viewpoint held by the defeated Mahayana. History has thus vindicated the position taken by the Chinese monk.

(190-4) I speak a mild dissent with the statement on page 56 that the conception of a Buddha as a purely human teacher is a modern Western creation, and that it is an accommodation to present- day rationalist thinking. While it is true that there are some passages in the Pali canon that support the view of the Buddha as a transcendent being, there are

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⁵⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "135" by hand.

⁵⁶⁶ The paras on this page are numbered 1 through 3; they are not consecutive with the previous page.

(continued from the previous page) many others that present to the reader the picture of an intensely strong human personality. To his disciples Ananda, Sariputta, and Kassapa, he appeared as a human teacher, not as a transcendent being. If later Buddhists endowed him with transcendence, it was due to changes that evolved within the religion itself as it developed in India and the border regions in later centuries. In later biographies as the *Lalitavistara* and *Mahavastu* are conspicuous by their absence, they contained a sober, matter-of-fact recital of events as they happened to a human being seeking after understanding and truth, not to a transcendent cosmic entity already in possession of enlightenment, but who descended to earth among human beings merely as a concession to human practices and frailties. It was only with the passage of some time that the docetic conception began to assert itself within Buddhism, which was to culminate in the Mahayana theory of a transcendental Buddha who never appeared in a corporeal form on earth. Yet, even after this doceticism arose, the Theravadins still clung to their concept of a human teacher. The primitive image of the Buddha held by the early community of Buddhists was that of a monk humbly dressed in the accepted garments of that group, and not that of a universal monarch or transcendental Buddha.

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THE PRACTICE OF ZEN

Paul Wienpahl (Review)

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(192-1)⁵⁶⁹ Striving for it is all right, provided that you are not attached to the striving."

Haridas Chaudhuri

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(193-1)⁵⁷¹ integration with pure Being (Sat, Brahman) or with the inmost center of his own existence (*atman*).⁵⁷² Pure Being has been regarded as the source of all values and of the supreme fulfillment of human life.¹

⁵⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "136" by hand.

⁵⁶⁸ The original editor inserted "137" by hand.

⁵⁶⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁵⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "138" by hand.

⁵⁷¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁵⁷² "ātman" in the original.

Now, there are different philosophical schools of Vedanta, such as those of Samkara,⁵⁷³ Ramanuja,⁵⁷⁴ Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabha, Caitanya, and others, which interpret in various ways the original teaching of the Vedas and Upanisads. In modern times, Swami Vivekananda popularized the message of the Vedanta in the West, with special emphasis upon its universality of outlook and its ability to harmonise the different historical religions of the world.² In still more recent times, Sri Aurobindo presented Vedanta as an all-comprehending dynamic outlook on life which is capable of reconciling, not only different metaphysical schools and systems, but also such divergent values of life as the material and the spiritual, the intellectual and the intuitive, the humanistic and the transcendental.³

Turning to existentialism, we find that this also is a very broad philosophical movement covering a wide variety of concepts, insights, and tendencies. There is the Christian existentialism of Soren⁵⁷⁵ Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and others. And there is the non-Christian existentialism of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and others. After one existentialist philosopher has defined existentialism in a particular way, others have felt like denouncing the label and keeping free of all association with it. But underlying its wide divergencies of viewpoint there are some broad tendencies and basic insights which have brought together Christians and non-Christians, theists and atheists, theologians and Godless metaphysicians, novelists and ontologists, within this most vital and thought-provoking existentialist movement of contemporary times.

The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on some significant concepts of existentialism and to consider how they can be related to the corresponding essential concepts of the Vedanta.⁵⁷⁶ While calling attention to noteworthy points of similarity, some essential differences also will be indicated. By the Vedanta,⁵⁷⁷ we mean here the original teaching of the Upanisads⁵⁷⁸ and the *Bhagavad Gita*⁵⁷⁹ as understood by the author.

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(194-1)⁵⁸¹ over the primordial infinite potentiality which has not yet been differentiated into the manifoldness of the world. The cosmic unobjectified subject is the primordial manifestation of Being (Brahman), the Supreme.

⁵⁷³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁵⁷⁴ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁵⁷⁵ "Søren" in the original.

⁵⁷⁶ "Vedānta" in the original.

⁵⁷⁷ "Vedānta" in the original.

⁵⁷⁸ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

⁵⁷⁹ "Gītā" in the original.

⁵⁸⁰ The original editor inserted "139" by hand.

(194-2) Now, waking, dream, and dreamless sleep do not exhaust the possibilities of human experience. Transcending them and yet embracing them all is what is called *turiya*,⁵⁸³ i.e., transcendental consciousness. Testimony has been borne to this consciousness by mystics and sages the world over. It has been the source of the profoundest spiritual intuitions of mankind. It has been enshrined in the great scriptures of the world such as the Upanisads,⁵⁸⁴ *Gīta*,⁵⁸⁵ *Dhammapada*,⁵⁸⁶ Bible, Koran, etc.

According to the Vedanta, the transcendental consciousness transcends the dualism of subject and object, I and Thou, or I and This. It is therefore egoless and impersonal. Husserl maintains that by putting into brackets the natural world the boundless realm of essences is discovered as relative to transcendental consciousness. The empirical ego which feels itself as part of the natural world is also an object to this transcendental consciousness. So, Husserl conceives of the transcendental consciousness as the pure Ego.³¹ But, for the Vedanta,⁵⁸⁷ even the transcendental Ego cannot be accepted as the Absolute, for the transcendental Ego is relative to the realm of transcendent essences as much as the latter is relative to it. Both are interrelated aspects of the world of relativity. Both shine through the light of a common substratum, pure impersonal consciousness (*cit*) beyond all distinctions and relations. In the egoless transcendental consciousness of the Vedanta, the dichotomies of subject and object, ego and non-ego – and consequently all I-sense – are dissolved.³²

Sartre has rendered signal service to modern philosophy by showing that consciousness in its inmost structure is egoless.³³ The ego, the I-sense, belongs to the objective side of consciousness, to *thought thought* and not to *thought thinking*. When I am angry, my mind is merely a wave of anger. It is riveted upon the object of my anger. A strictly phenomenological analysis of my anger reveals that while I am angry there is no I-sense present. When I say,

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⁵⁸¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁵⁸² “Vedānta” in the original.

⁵⁸³ “turiya” in the original.

⁵⁸⁴ “Upaniṣads” in the original.

⁵⁸⁵ “Gītā” in the original.

⁵⁸⁶ “Dhammapāda” in the original.

⁵⁸⁷ “Vedānta” in the original.

⁵⁸⁸ “Vedānta” in the original.

⁵⁸⁹ The original editor inserted “140” “Vol 12, 1962 Haridas chaudhuri” by hand.

(195-1)⁵⁹⁰ “I am angry,” my anger, along with its object, has already been objectified by a transcendental act of consciousness free of any ego-sense. The “I” always refers to a mental state of mind or to my body which is objectively contemplated as engaged in the world and concerned with some objective affair. Since the “I” implies my relationship to the objective world, it is revealed as an objective content of consciousness. Pure consciousness is egoless or void of any I-sense.

But, whereas, according to the Vedānta, consciousness in its inmost structure is of the essence of Being, Sartre affirms consciousness as a Nothingness,³⁴ which is also a revelation of Being. In the Vedānta, consciousness shines out in its complete purity and grandeur on the attainment of *samādhi*, the fundamental ontological dimension (*turiya*) of human experience. It may be called *being-consciousness* (*sat-cit*), which is realised as the sustaining background of all other phases of experience, such as waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep. Being-consciousness is not the monopoly of a privileged few. Every human individual possesses it as the profoundest spiritual potentiality of his existence. He wakes up on the level of being-consciousness on the attainment of the complete integration of personality. It happens when the apparent darkness of the unconscious mind is removed and the bonds of egoism and emotional attachment are cut asunder.

According to the Vedānta,⁵⁹¹ the light of being-consciousness reveals human reality as *being-with-others-in-That*. The integrated individual realises his essential identity with That (Being), his essential togetherness with others, and the rootedness of all in the unity of That.³⁵ Such existential relations as I-That, I-thou, and thou-That are interrelated in the unity of the formula *I-and-Thou-in-That*, which reflects the structure of existence as a multiple relationship. Being is the transcendent and comprehensive unity of this relationship. Human existence is an effort to manifest Being through conscious realisation of this relationship.

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(196-1)⁵⁹³ Buddhist notion of causal efficiency (*artha-kriya-kāritva*).⁵⁹⁴ His reference to the term and its derivatives, however, presupposes its earlier usage, which had been that of the Sautrāntikas, namely, a *causa efficiens* due to the fulfillment of a previously established need, and not its later use as efficacy of producing any action or event, in

⁵⁹⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁵⁹¹ “Vedānta” in the original.

⁵⁹² The original editor inserted “141” by hand.

⁵⁹³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁵⁹⁴ “artha-kriyā-kāritva” in the original.

the manner defined in Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇagarbhasiddhi*,⁵⁹⁵ which had been in the mind of Hindu critics from the tenth century onward.⁹ Nagarjuna's⁵⁹⁶ systematic use of quasicontradictory correlative terms and his conclusion that objects denoted by such terms cannot *really* (*paramārthataḥ*,⁵⁹⁷ *vastutaḥ*)⁵⁹⁸ exist, since their individual existences cancel each other, lead to the Madhyamika⁵⁹⁹ axiom that there can be no cause whatever until an effect is present, and that there cannot be any effect unless a cause is shown. This is considered by Jha⁶⁰⁰ to be totally absurd.

Jha's⁶⁰¹ style and the dialectical tools which he uses are provided by the Navya-nyaya,⁶⁰² in which he had been thoroughly trained in true conformity with the Maithili tradition, in which he had received his education.¹⁰ He uses the Madhyamika's⁶⁰³ own weapon to lead him *ad absurdum* – at least, he thinks he does. However, he does not mention the crux of it, i.e., that Nagarjuna⁶⁰⁴ and his school were emphatic that they did not proffer any proposition of their own, their task being to demolish others' propositions, viz., all propositions.

I shall now proceed to show some of Jha's⁶⁰⁵ main arguments: Are all things, including intellectual notions, subject to immediate decay by the rule of momentariness? If so, then the instrument for stating such a law is invalid, being itself momentary (*traikālika-artha-kriya-karaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ samarthasya kalakṣaye hetvabhāvat*);⁶⁰⁶ ¹¹ if they are not, then this would imply the existence of something durable/ (*sthāyin*);⁶⁰⁷ but, since this is axiomatically impossible with the Buddhists, it would mean that there is an instrument different from the state caused by something preceding it, which, again, cannot be upheld if the notion of *artha-kriyatva* (a purely pragmatist type of causal efficiency) is to be maintained (*na caīśa vartamānārtha-kriya-karaṇa-kāle atitāgate arthakriye karotīti bhūta-bhaviṣyat-kālayor api tad-akaraṇa-prasaṅgaḥ*).⁶⁰⁸

His illustration is: "Just as a pot cannot be black and red all over at the same time" (*na caikasmin ghaṭe parataḥ śyāma-rakta-rūpayor iva*)⁶⁰⁹ – thus somewhat freely

⁵⁹⁵ "Kṣaṇagarbhasiddhi" in the original.

⁵⁹⁶ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

⁵⁹⁷ "pāramārthataḥ" in the original.

⁵⁹⁸ "vastutaḥ" in the original.

⁵⁹⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁶⁰⁰ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶⁰¹ "Jhā'" in the original.

⁶⁰² "nyāya" in the original.

⁶⁰³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁶⁰⁴ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

⁶⁰⁵ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶⁰⁶ "traikālika-artha-kriyā-karaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ samarthasya kālakṣaye hetvabhāvat" in the original.

⁶⁰⁷ "sthāyin" in the original.

⁶⁰⁸ "na caīśa vartamānārtha-kriyā-karaṇa-kāle atitāgate arthakriye karotīti bhūta-bhaviṣyat-kālayor api tad-akaraṇa-prasaṅgaḥ" in the original.

⁶⁰⁹ "na caikasmin ghaṭe parataḥ śyāma-rakta-rūpayor iva" in the original.

rendered it would sound close enough to the standard parlance of contemporary British analytic philosophy.¹²

Agehananda Bharat: Modern Hindu Exegesis Of Mahayana Doctrine

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MODERN HINDU EXEGESIS OF MAHAYANA DOCTRINE

Agehananda Bharat

[142]⁶¹⁰

(197-1)⁶¹¹ *advayam etan na buddhena bhasitam-iti bhasyam*²⁴⁶¹² ("A non-dual absolute essence void of the distinction between knowledge, the known object, and the knower, such is *not* the teaching of the Buddha).⁶¹³ Jha⁶¹³ does not indicate, however, whether he thinks Gaudapada⁶¹⁴ to be a Vedantin⁶¹⁵ or a Buddhist. Less than a generation ago, Hindu scholars would have indignantly rejected the suggestion that Samkara's *paramguru*⁶¹⁶ (one's own *guru's guru*) might have been a Buddhist, but today quite a few pandits are considering the possibility, such change of attitude being a sequel of inter-religious contacts on the scholastic level.

Jha⁶¹⁷ then proceeds, If people think that Sunyavada⁶¹⁸ and Advaitavada⁶¹⁹ are identical, this is not so due to the ascertaining of the respective tenets (*siddhanta-parijnanat*);⁶²⁰ "in Sunyavada⁶²¹ the Void itself is non-existent together with the ten million times fourfold congeries of the universe [i.e., the phenomenal totum]; whereas in Advaitavada,⁶²² although the phenomenal totum is indeed void, its true essence is self-luminous [i.e., existent in the ontic sense]" (*sunyavadinam koti-catustaya-sunyam apy asaty eva paryavasati advaitinam tattvam tu svetara-sattvadi-koticatustaya-sunyam api svaprakasatmakam sadrupam eva*).^{623 25}

⁶¹⁰ The original editor inserted "142

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⁶¹¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁶¹² "bhāṣitam-iti bhāṣyam" in the original.

⁶¹³ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶¹⁴ "Gauḍapāda" in the original.

⁶¹⁵ "Vedāntin" in the original.

⁶¹⁶ "Śamkara's paramguru" in the original.

⁶¹⁷ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶¹⁸ "Śūnyavāda" in the original.

⁶¹⁹ "Advaitavāda" in the original.

⁶²⁰ "siddhānta-parijñānāt" in the original.

⁶²¹ "Śūnyavādaz" in the original.

⁶²² "Advaitavāda" in the original.

⁶²³ "śūnyavādinām koṭi-catustaya-śūnyam apy asaty eva paryavasati advaitinām tattvam tu svetara-sattvādi-koṭicatustaya-śūnyam api svaprakāśātmakam sadrupam eva" in the original.

Jha's⁶²⁴ final criticism is, again, in the classical Vedantic⁶²⁵ tradition in diction and content: "if there is total voidness, then what is the locus of phenomenal existence whereof it is a manifestation? Hence, the doctrine of total voidness conflicts with everything, and, since it denies a foundation for anything, it has to be rejected (*sarvasūnyatve kaḥ samvṛter aśayaḥ yasyaivam avabhāsaḥ; tataḥ sarvasūnyavādaḥ sarvaviruddha eva ity evam adhiṣṭhānābhāvād eva -'pākṛtam*).^{626 26}

I do not know if Jha⁶²⁷ was aware that his final statement is grist on the Madhyamika's⁶²⁸ mill; indeed, Nagarjuna⁶²⁹ and Candrakīrti⁶³⁰ want to be in conflict with every statement, because the denial of any proposition whatsoever by leading it *ad absurdum* is the job of the Madhyamika dialectician. However, if Jha⁶³¹ was aware of this, then "*sarvaviruddha*" (totally contradictory) would simply suggest "not amenable to any accepted way of arguing."

In a marginal remark, Jha⁶³² suggests that, according⁶³³ to the Sunyavadins,⁶³⁴ one should cling neither to *śūnya*⁶³⁵ nor to positive existence of any sort; but, since both of them are imaginary, it is really irrelevant whether one clings to the one or the other. Again, this is precisely the point of view taken by the Vajrayāna⁶³⁶ and Sahajayāna schools of Buddhist Tantrism, which emphasise the notion of *asampratīṣṭhita nirvāṇa*,⁶³⁷ i.e., the *nirvāṇa*⁶³⁸ which is the intuition of the complete oneness of *samsāra*⁶³⁹ and *nirvāṇa*.⁶⁴⁰ With less emphasis, this

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⁶²⁴ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶²⁵ "Vedāntic" in the original.

⁶²⁶ " sarvasūnyatve kaḥ samvṛter aśayaḥ yasyaivam avabhāsaḥ; tataḥ sarvasūnyavādaḥ sarvaviruddha eva ity evam adhiṣṭhānābhāvād eva -'pākṛtam" in the original.

⁶²⁷ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶²⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

⁶²⁹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

⁶³⁰ "Candrakīrti" in the original.

⁶³¹ "Jhā" in the original.

⁶³² "Jhā" in the original.

⁶³³ The original editor given space "according" by hand.

⁶³⁴ "Śūnyavādins" in the original.

⁶³⁵ "śūnya" in the original.

⁶³⁶ "Vajrāyāna" in the original.

⁶³⁷ "asampratīṣṭhita nirvāṇa" in the original.

⁶³⁸ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

⁶³⁹ "samsāra" in the original.

⁶⁴⁰ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

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Norimoto Iino: Dogen's Zen View of Interdependence

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DOGEN'S ZEN VIEW OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Norimoto Iino

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(199-1)⁶⁴³ The concept of interdependence (*parasparapeksa*)⁶⁴⁴ is of Indian origin,¹ and has since been interpreted in various ways. The Japanese Zen^{b2} man Dogen⁶⁴⁵ (1200-1253) gave a many-sided interpretation to it.

Dogen⁶⁴⁶ reminds us of the Buddha. He was born in a distinguished family of political achievements. His father was related to the Imperial Household, and was an influential member of the Cabinet. At the early age of 13, Dogen⁶⁴⁷ decided to become a Buddhist monk, and came to live in the temple of his mother's older brother, who was a learned priest.

Dogen⁶⁴⁸ was noted for brilliance, which is illustrated by a question he asked at the age of 15, "If the *sūtra* is right in that man has *buddhahood*, why it is that he has to go through the ordeal of rigorous Zen practice?"³ No priest in the Kyoto area was able to give a satisfactory answer to this question except Eisai^d (1141-1215), who had studied Zen in China. He said to Dogen:⁶⁴⁹ "The *buddhahood* in man is only potential. Raw human nature is beastly. Hence the necessity of transmuting it by Zen."⁴

Dogen⁶⁵⁰ went to China at the age of 25 and studied Zen with the most famous Zen master of that generation, Nyojo.^{651 e} Dogen⁶⁵² proved himself to be the best student of Nyojo, whose austere Zen practice is said to have radiated such compassion as to include not only mankind but even inserts in the circle of his radiant virtue. Self-denial and enlightenment depend on each other –

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⁶⁴² The original editor inserted "143" and "Vol 12" by hand.

⁶⁴³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁶⁴⁴ "parasparāpekṣā" in the original.

⁶⁴⁵ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁴⁶ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁴⁷ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁴⁸ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁴⁹ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁵⁰ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁵¹ "Nyojō" in the original.

⁶⁵² "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁵³ Blank page

(continued from the previous page) this is what Dogen⁶⁵⁵ learned from his teacher. Upon his return to Japan, good positions were offered him, but he went to a snowy province of Fukui,^f thinking that prestige and Zen would not go together. In the mountain area of Fukui he began his work of teaching.

Dogen's⁶⁵⁶ Zen is thought of by some people as Soto⁶⁵⁷ Zen.^g But he views it in terms of something vaster. With him, Zen is another name for all the values of all the schools of Buddhism. To confine Zen to one segment or sect of the whole historical process of Buddhism at its best is wholly to misrepresent it. He firmly believes in the complete interdependence of all values on one another. They, in turn, are rooted in the one "Crimson Heart of Cosmic Compassion,"ⁱⁱ which is one ethereal ship⁶ aboard which all mankind will be delivered to the Blessed Land of Enlightenment sooner or later. In fact, the whole cosmos is radiant with infinite compassion when we have our inner spiritual eyes opened through the practice of Zen. Zen is concentration on the truth of universal interdependence, which reveals the folly of the narrowness of self-centeredness.

If there is any remainder of selfishness in a man, he is not able to see the pervading presence of the cosmic compassion. His raw human nature must wither away, just as old leaves fall to the ground and decay as the fall season advances. Not only his soul but also his body – in other words, his entire personality – must be transformed into pure compassion itself. The rigor and austerity with which this change is brought about is characteristic of Dogen's⁶⁵⁸ Zen. "*Shinjin-hoge*⁶⁵⁹"^{h7} or "*tōtai-datsuraku*⁶⁶⁰"⁸ is the way he expresses this soul-stirring experience of his. "*Shinjin*" and "*tōtai*" mean one's whole being most emphatically stated. "*Hoge*" and "*datsuraku*" mean the way leaves fall or a kimono is taken off. Here, cosmic compassion takes the initiative in causing men to feel like practicing Zen. Without this initiative, the Buddha would never have left his family to become a wandering truth-seeker. Millions of Buddhists through the ages have followed the Buddha and were enlightened, all because of this initiative. So, Zen is not autonomous in a narrow sense. Dogen⁶⁶¹ uses the term "*hakobarete*,"^{j9} which means to "be carried." This reminds one of the Pauline

⁶⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "144" and "lino vol 12" by hand.

⁶⁵⁵ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁵⁶ "Dōgen's" in the original.

⁶⁵⁷ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁶⁵⁸ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁶⁵⁹ "Shinjin-hōge" in the original.

⁶⁶⁰ "tōtai-datsuraku" in the original.

⁶⁶¹ "Dōgen" in the original.

experience of being transformed (*metamorphoumetha*) as recorded in Second Corinthians 3:18. So, Dōgen's

(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1939), Book 22, Book 37, on *buddhahood*. He compares man's *buddhahood* to a seed which begins to grow as the *Dharma* rain comes. Book 22 in Vol. II, p. 317.

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(continued from the previous page) phrase, a "*hysteron proteron*"; it puts the cart before the horse inasmuch as it recognises the sole authority of our passive, sensuous self and teaches that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."⁸ Kant has the support of common sense when he points out that what distinguishes man from the animal world is not the sensuous self but reason, which by virtue of its own greatness is entitled to the supreme authority of determining "what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." No wonder that Kant discovered in such reasoning the supreme principle of what he called "the autonomy of will." There emerges a new philosophy of life which is radically different from that of hedonism. In this new philosophy, "autonomy of will" comes to acquire the pivotal position – realisation of it as such in all its fullness becomes the supreme end, and the doing of duties the means to the realisation thereof. It is this philosophy of end and means that constitutes the central theme of the practical teachings of Kant and the *Gita*,⁶⁶⁴ and it is with an exposition of the implications of such a philosophy as is common to both that the present article is concerned.

Although, as pointed out before, Kant and the *Gita*⁶⁶⁵ recognise that man's position in this world is *sui generis* insofar as, besides having an empirical nature, he also possesses a rational self, yet they are keenly alive to its limitations; its authority is limited and its autonomy is continually at stake, always in danger of being outraged by irresistible currents of emotions and passions, desires and inclinations. Butler was pointing out this very fact when he said, "Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."⁹ So long as the authority of desires and inclinations reigns supreme over our mind no action can be

⁶⁶² Blank page

⁶⁶³ The original editor inserted "145" and "Vol 12" by hand.

⁶⁶⁴ "Gītā" in the original.

⁶⁶⁵ "Gītā" in the original.

determined by the rational self, and morality must then remain a stranger to us. Naturally, much emphasis comes to be laid by Kant and the *Gita*⁶⁶⁶ on the need of impressing upon us the desirability of conquering desires and inclinations through the discipline of the rational will. It is this conviction which finds its expression when Kant says, "Inclination is blind and slavish whether it be of a good sort or not, and when morality is in question, reason must not play the part merely of guardian to inclination, but disregarding it altogether, must attend simply to its own interest as pure practical reason."¹⁰ If we perform all our actions simply because they are motivated by certain desires or impulses, forgetting that we are hu-

Anima Sen Gupta: The Meanings of "That thou art"

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THE MEANINGS OF "THAT THOU ART"

Anima Sen Gupta

[146]⁶⁶⁷

(204-1)⁶⁶⁸ One of the most important Upanisadic⁶⁶⁹ statements which the Non-dualists (Advaitins) regard as the very foundation of the Advaita theory is the proposition "That thou art" (*Tat tvam asi*), which occurs in the *Chandogya Upanisad*.^{670 1} The followers of the Advaita school attach great importance to this Upanisadic⁶⁷¹ text, because in their opinion this is the text that clearly and emphatically suggests the oneness of ultimate reality. To others, such absolute unity is not intended or implied by this statement. In fact, the interpretation given to this one key passage tends to a considerable degree to determine the character of the various schools of Vedanta⁶⁷² – and there are several significantly differing interpretations within the range of Vedantic⁶⁷³ systems or schools.

For the Advaitins, *Brahman* alone exists as the only reality from all points of view. To teach this central truth (the identity of the soul or self and *Brahman*) is the aim of all the Upanisads.⁶⁷⁴ The text "That thou art" expresses in a nutshell the whole teaching of the Upanisads..⁶⁷⁵ In this statement the sages of the Upanisads⁶⁷⁶ affirm that each one of us is *Brahman* and that there is no other truth or reality besides *Brahman*. The Advaitic interpretation of this important Upanisadic⁶⁷⁷ text has aroused opposition

⁶⁶⁶ "Gītā" in the original.

⁶⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "146" and "Vol. 12" by hand.

⁶⁶⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁶⁶⁹ "Upaniṣadic" in the original.

⁶⁷⁰ "Chāndogya Upaniṣad" in the original.

⁶⁷¹ 'Upaniṣadic' in the original.

⁶⁷² "Vedānta" in the original.

⁶⁷³ "Vedāntic" in the original.

⁶⁷⁴ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

⁶⁷⁵ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

⁶⁷⁶ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

⁶⁷⁷ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

from the non-Advaita quarters, however, and both qualified monists and dualists have interpreted this text differently. The main purpose of this paper is to make a comparative appraisal of the interpretations of "That thou art" given by Samkara⁶⁷⁸ (788–820) and Ramanuja⁶⁷⁹ (11th century).

(204-1)⁶⁸⁰ Meaning of "Tat tvam asi," according to Samkara⁶⁸¹

In the opinion of Samkara,⁶⁸² this statement of the *Chandogya Upanisad*⁶⁸³ asserts the absolute identity between *Brahman* and the individual self. The individual soul, in the opinion of Samkara,⁶⁸⁴ is nothing but the pure consciousness of *Brahman*, which appears not by itself but in association with the

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THE MEANINGS OF "THAT THOU ART"

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(continued from the previous page) Ramanuja⁶⁸⁶ on "Tat tvam asi"

Ramanuja⁶⁸⁷ does not believe that "Tat tvam asi" asserts absolute identity between the individual soul and *Brahman*. In his opinion, there is no such absolute identity between soul and God (or *Saguna*⁶⁸⁸ *Brahman*). It is unthinkable that an individual soul, which lives in God and which derives sustenance from God, can be identical with God in every respect. Were there absolute identity between soul and God, then the *Chandogya Upanisad*⁶⁸⁹ would not have made this assertion, "That thou art." This is because it is meaningless to assert identity between two exactly identical terms. A judgment or a proposition always cites a unity of differentials. An identity judgment such as "This is that Devadatta" implies simply that Devadatta qualified by one set of conditions is identical with Devadatta qualified by a different set of conditions. In "That thou art," the two parts, "That" and "thou," are not unified in the form of a proposition to express simply the absolute oneness of one differenceless substance. No differenceless substance can ever become the object of any form of

⁶⁷⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁶⁷⁹ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁶⁸⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁶⁸¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁶⁸² "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁶⁸³ "Chāndogya Upaniṣad" in the original.

⁶⁸⁴ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁶⁸⁵ The original editor inserted "147" by hand.

⁶⁸⁶ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁶⁸⁷ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁶⁸⁸ "Saguṇa" in the original.

⁶⁸⁹ "Chāndogya Upaniṣad" in the original.

knowledge. All sources of knowledge establish the existence of some qualified substance, and, for that reason, experience, on all its levels, has a qualified substance for its object. The identity proposition “This is that Devadatta” actually refers to one and the same person perceived twice, at different times. Such propositions do not imply the identity of one substance, leaving out the attributes.

The Upanisadic⁶⁹⁰ sentence “That thou art” actually implies “qualified identity,” which means that God as the cause of the universe is identical with God as the inner self of the individual soul (*jīva*).⁶⁹¹ “That” signifies God as the cause of the universe, and “thou” signifies God as the inner controller of the individual soul, and both refer to the same substance. Identity is asserted here between two forms of the same substance (i.e., God). God is self-dependent, and the individual soul is God-dependent. So, to predicate their absolute identity is nothing but a perversion of thought. The individual soul is a mode (*prakāra*)⁶⁹² of God, and, as such, it is neither a distinct reality external to him nor a vanishing being produced by the principle of illusion (*māyā*).⁶⁹³ As a spiritual mode of God, the individual soul derives its being and function from God, with whom it stands in a body-soul relation. So, the judgment “That thou art” implies the personal identity of God under different conditions. *Brahman* as the cause of the world and as the possessor of infinite auspicious qualities is identical with *Brahman* residing in the individual soul in inseparable association with the material body (*acitviśiṣṭajīva*),⁶⁹⁴ since such a soul constitutes the body of God in which he resides as the inner controller.²

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THE MEANINGS OF “THAT THOU ART”

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(continued from the previous page) The central core of the Viśiṣṭadvaita⁶⁹⁶ (qualified non-dualism) system is a form of organic unity brought about by the body-soul relation (*sarīra-sarīri-sambandha*),⁶⁹⁷ in which the soul as the body of *Brahman* remains inseparably related to it, and every movement of the soul is directed by God to the fulfillment of the divine purpose.

(206-1)⁶⁹⁸ Meaning of apposition (*samanādhikaraṇa*)⁶⁹⁹ according to Ramanuja⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁰ “Upaniṣadic” in the original.

⁶⁹¹ “jīva” in the original.

⁶⁹² “prakāra” in the original.

⁶⁹³ “māyā” in the original.

⁶⁹⁴ “acitviśiṣṭajīva” in the original.

⁶⁹⁵ The original editor inserted “148” by hand.

⁶⁹⁶ “Viśiṣṭadvaita” in the original.

⁶⁹⁷ “sarīra-sarīri-sambandha” in the original.

⁶⁹⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁶⁹⁹ “sāmānādhikaraṇa” in the original.

In the opinion of Rāmānuja, apposition really signifies that different attributive words are predicated of one and the same substance.³ In the case of “blue-lotus” (a single compound in Sanskrit), for example, the attributes of blueness and lotusness are applied to one and the same substance. Apposition never means identity of essence only, apart from all differences. According to the rules of grammar, when attributive words formed by *prakṛti*,⁷⁰¹ *pratyaya*, etc., and having different senses, are predicated of one and the same substance, which is their common substratum, it is known as apposition (*samanādhikaraṇa*).⁷⁰²

So, here, also, in the statement “That thou art” different attributes in the forms of causal state and effect state are predicated of one and the same substance, that is, God or *Brahman*. The individual soul, which as a category is inferior to God, or the highest category, can never be absolutely identical with him. There is natural and essential difference between God and the individual soul. It is because the individual soul is the body of God that there is identity between the two from the practical point of view. In practical life, a word connoting the body connotes also the self of which it is the body.⁴ When we say, “This fair person is a learned man,” by using the word “fair” we refer to his body, whereas it is the soul that is really the scholar; but here the soul and the body have been treated as identical. Ramanuja⁷⁰³ asserts, therefore, that all terms like “tree,” “river,” “man,” “God,” etc., must refer ultimately to *Brahman*, of which they are the body. In fact, the relation between the body and the soul resembles the relation that exists between substance and attribute. Just as an attribute refers to the substance of which it is an attribute, so the term that connotes the body also connotes the self. The body of Svetaketu⁷⁰⁴ refers to his self, and the self of Svetaketu⁷⁰⁵ refers to

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(continued from the previous page) God, of whom it is the body. The proposition “That thou art” shows identity between the Cosmic Self and the inner self of the self having a body bearing the name of Śvetaketu (*Svetaketu sariraka*:⁷⁰⁷ The soul of Svetaketu⁷⁰⁸ is the body of the Cosmic Self). Apposition here does not signify bare

⁷⁰⁰ “Rāmānuja” in the original.

⁷⁰¹ “prakṛti” in the original.

⁷⁰² “sāmānādhikaraṇa” in the original.

⁷⁰³ “Rāmānuja” in the original.

⁷⁰⁴ “Śvetaketu” in the original.

⁷⁰⁵ “Śvetaketu” in the original.

⁷⁰⁶ The original editor inserted “149” by hand.

⁷⁰⁷ “Śvetaketu śarīraka” in the original.

⁷⁰⁸ “Śvetaketu” in the original.

unity established by the abandonment of attributes, as was supposed by Samkara.⁷⁰⁹ On the contrary, it shows that adjectives having different senses possess the power of referring to one and the same substance. The word “That” refers to God as the cause of the world, and the word “thou” refers to the same God in a different aspect, as the inner ruler of Svetaketu’s⁷¹⁰ self associated with a body.

(207-1)⁷¹¹ *Ramanuja and the identity-and-difference (bhedabheda) theory of Bhaskara and Yadava Prakasa*⁷¹²

From what has been stated above regarding Ramanuja’s⁷¹³ interpretation of the judgment “That thou art” it is clear that in his opinion the difference between God and the individual soul is natural and real. The individual soul is the body or a mode of God, and, as such, it can never be absolutely identical with God. There is identity only from the practical point of view. Ontologically speaking, God and the individual soul are different, although they always stand in a relation of inseparable union.

Bhaskara⁷¹⁴ (9th or 10th century) holds, however, that identity is final, whereas the difference between God and the soul is caused by limiting adjuncts such as intellect, ego, mind, etc., produced by ignorance. In the state of emancipation, the finite transcends itself and becomes wholly merged in *Brahman*. Hence, the state of liberation is a state of oneness (*ekibhava*).⁷¹⁵ Bhaskara⁷¹⁶ seems to have followed the tradition of Auḍulomi, who expounded the theory of identity and difference between God and the individual soul. In the opinion of Audulomi,⁷¹⁷ *Brahman*, when soiled by the body, sense- organs, mind, intellect, etc., appears as an individual. The individual, again, when purified by knowledge, meditation, etc., becomes dissociated from the body, senses, etc., and regains its pure form as *Brahman*. Absence of the form of individuality (*jivabhava*)⁷¹⁸ is the presence of the form of pure consciousness (*brahmabhava*)⁷¹⁹.⁵ Bhaskara,⁷²⁰ too, asserted that there is both identity and difference between God and the individual soul. Identity, however, is ontological, while difference exists in the empirical life only. In the empirical life (i.e., the condition of bondage), the individual soul is different from *Brahman*, because the purity of the soul is lost in this state due to its association with ignorance, desires, and actions. When, through meditation and

⁷⁰⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

⁷¹⁰ “Śvetaketu” in the original.

⁷¹¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁷¹² “Rāmānuja and the identity-and-difference (bhedābheda) theory of Bhāskara and Yādava Prakāśa” in the original.

⁷¹³ “Rāmānuja” in the original.

⁷¹⁴ “Bhāskara” in the original.

⁷¹⁵ “ekībhāva” in the original.

⁷¹⁶ “Bhāskara” in the original.

⁷¹⁷ “Auḍulomi” in the original.

⁷¹⁸ “jīvābhāva” in the original.

⁷¹⁹ “brahmabhāva” in the original.

⁷²⁰ “Bhāskara” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) knowledge, the soul regains its natural purity on the elimination of all limiting adjuncts, it becomes one with the absolute *Brahman*. Although Bhaskara⁷²² upheld the view of final oneness (*advaita*) between the individual soul and *Brahman*, he rejected the non-dualistic ideas of illusion (*maya*),⁷²³ *maya*-bound⁷²⁴ God, and the illusory nature of the individual soul. The individual soul is finite, but it is not an illusory appearance of the unconditioned *Brahman*. The infinite *Brahman* actually limits itself and makes itself finite in the form of the many. The effect is a real transformation of the cause and not its illusory manifestation (*vivarta*). *Brahman* possesses infinite power of creation and transformation (*parinama-sakti*),⁷²⁵ as a result of which it becomes the manifold of living beings and non-living things according to the moral needs of the world. This process of differentiation, however, does not affect the pure and taintless nature of *Brahman*. It is a kind of sport with *Brahman*, and this ceaseless creative operation simply proves the fullness and richness of the highest reality. Thus, in the opinion of Bhāskara, there is natural identity between the individual soul and *Brahman*. The differences caused by ignorance, desires, actions, etc., in the empirical sphere are practically real but non-eternal. In other words, according to Bhaskara,⁷²⁶ there is identity at the root and difference only in the manifested world. Both are real, however.

Yadava Prakasa⁷²⁷ (11th century), too, declared the relation between *Brahman* and the individual soul to be one of the existence of both identity and difference between *Brahman* and the individual soul (*bhedabheda*);⁷²⁸ but, while Bhaskara⁷²⁹ did not hold to the existence of both identity and difference in the final state, Yādava Prakasa⁷³⁰ did and described *Brahman* as, by nature, both different from and identical with the individual soul. Identity between the individual soul and *Brahman* exists only in the sense of a relation between conditioned factor (*upadeya*)⁷³¹ and conditioning factor (*upadana*),⁷³²

⁷²¹ The original editor inserted "150" by hand.

⁷²² "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷²³ "māyā" in the original.

⁷²⁴ "māyā" in the original.

⁷²⁵ "pariṇāma-śakti" in the original.

⁷²⁶ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷²⁷ "Yādava Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷²⁸ "bhedābheda" in the original.

⁷²⁹ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷³⁰ "Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷³¹ "upādeya" in the original.

⁷³² "upādāna" in the original.

whereas there is a difference of individuality (*vyaktibheda*) between them. Hence, according to Yadava Prakasa,⁷³³ even in the state of liberation the individual soul will stand to *Brahman* in the relation of both identity and difference. It will never become merged in *Brahman*.

Ramanuja's⁷³⁴ theory, however, differs from the theories of both Bhaskara⁷³⁵ and Yadava⁷³⁶ Prakasa,⁷³⁷ who were regarded in that period as the staunch supporters of the theory that posits the existence of both identity and difference (*bhedabheda*)⁷³⁸ between *Brahman* and the individual soul. For Ramanuja,⁷³⁹ identity refers simply to the inseparable relation between *Brahman* and the individual soul. The being of a finite self cannot dissolve itself wholly in the Absolute in any state of its existence. In the opinion of Bhaskara,⁷⁴⁰ difference is inherently of the nature of identity (*abheda-dharmi*).⁷⁴¹ The waves are

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(continued from the previous page) phenomenally different from the sea, but are essentially identical with it. Identity, for Bhaskara,⁷⁴⁴ means absolute identity or total oneness. In the opinion of Ramanuja,⁷⁴⁵ on the other hand, identity does not mean oneness; it refers simply to inseparableness. The self can never be dissolved into God. One substance cannot be totally merged with another substance. An individual may rise very high in purity and knowledge, but still there will always be a God superior to him. The individual is only an adjective (*visesana*)⁷⁴⁶ of God, and, as such, he can never become one with God. An adjective can never be merged with the noun it qualifies.

Bhaskara's⁷⁴⁷ theory that posits the existence of both identity and difference, on the other hand, has a tendency to suggest that identity means essential identity, which

⁷³³ "Yādava Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷³⁴ "Rāmānuja's" in the original.

⁷³⁵ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷³⁶ "Yādava" in the original.

⁷³⁷ "Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷³⁸ "bhedābheda" in the original.

⁷³⁹ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁴⁰ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷⁴¹ "abheda-dharmī"

⁷⁴² The original editor made some corrections its not clear legible by hand

⁷⁴³ The original editor inserted "151" by hand.

⁷⁴⁴ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷⁴⁵ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁴⁶ "viśeṣaṇa" in the original.

⁷⁴⁷ "Bhāskara" in the original.

has been emphatically denied by Ramanuja.⁷⁴⁸ Thus, while, for Bhaskara⁷⁴⁹ identity is essential and difference is practical, for Ramanuja⁷⁵⁰ difference is essential and identity is practical.

Nor has Rāmānuja accepted the theory of Yadava Prakasa,⁷⁵¹ since he has refused to admit that both identity and difference are natural and essential. It is because of the difference between the theory of Ramanuja⁷⁵² and the theory of identity and difference held by Bhaskara⁷⁵³ and Yadava Prakasa⁷⁵⁴ in respect of the relation between the individual soul and *Brahman* that Rāmānuja has not given the name of "*bhedābheda*"⁷⁵⁵ (identity and difference) to his own theory, lest it might be confused with the theories of his predecessors.

To sum up, the Upanisadic⁷⁵⁶ judgment "That thou art" does not convey essential oneness (*svarūpaikya*)⁷⁵⁷ of *Brahman* and the individual soul. It implies simply the oneness of a substance having two different attributes. The non-dualistic claim that this proposition establishes pure identity between the individual soul and *Brahman* by eliminating the attributes is false. There is an eternal distinction between spirit, matter, and God. Matter is the object of experience; spirit is the subject of experience; and God is the ultimate sustaining principle of both spirit and matter. Hence, God can never be totally identified with spirit or matter. Thus, while for Samkara⁷⁵⁸ the difference between the soul and *Brahman* is false, for Ramanuja⁷⁵⁹ it is true and real. Again, Bhaskara⁷⁶⁰ says that the difference is non-eternal, but Yadava Prakasa⁷⁶¹ holds that there is no contradiction in supposing that both identity and difference exist between *Brahman* and the individual soul at the root and also in the final state.

(209-1)⁷⁶² Conclusion

A careful reflection on the two major interpretations of "That thou art" given by Samkara⁷⁶³ and Ramanuja⁷⁶⁴ will reveal that these interpretations are

⁷⁴⁸ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁴⁹ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷⁵⁰ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁵¹ "Yādava Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷⁵² "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁵³ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷⁵⁴ "Yādava Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷⁵⁵ "bhedābheda" in the original.

⁷⁵⁶ "Upaniṣadic" in the original.

⁷⁵⁷ "śvarūpaikya" in the original.

⁷⁵⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁵⁹ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁶⁰ "Bhāskara" in the original.

⁷⁶¹ "Yādava Prakāśa" in the original.

⁷⁶² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁷⁶³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁶⁴ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

(continued from the previous page) not in reality so far apart as not to allow for compromise between them. No doubt, there are important differences, but there is some subtle affinity as well.

The difference that strikes one at a first glance is that, while Samkara⁷⁶⁶ negated individuality totally in the state of liberation by completely identifying "thou" with "That," Ramanuja⁷⁶⁷ retained individuality to the end. According to Rāmānuja, the soul is one with God in a manner in which the body of a man is treated as one with his soul in worldly dealings and worldly affairs. It is this identity from the practical point of view that has been referred to by the Upanisadic⁷⁶⁸ judgment "That thou art." Otherwise, there is natural and essential distinction between the soul and *Brahman*. In fact, the non-dual interpretation of this Upanisadic⁷⁶⁹ judgment is not possible in the well-known expressed sense (*vācyārtha*)⁷⁷⁰ of the words "thou" and "That." A non-dual interpretation is possible only when these two words are taken in their implied sense (*lakṣyārtha*).⁷⁷¹ From the point of view of Qualified Non-dualism, however, both the words ("That" and "thou") can be understood in their usual well-known meaning. The word "thou" stands in the usual manner for the highest reality residing in the soul of Svetaketu,⁷⁷² since, in the opinion of Ramanuja,⁷⁷³ every word refers to God and everything denoted by a word belongs to God as his adjective. Hence, it is not necessary to take the word "thou" in an implied sense. The true expressed sense (*vācyārtha*)⁷⁷⁴ of every word is God. As adjectives are necessarily related to their respective nouns, so, also, all things and beings comprising the world remain inseparably related to God – their only substratum; and, because of this inseparable relation, the substance (God) and the attributes (soul and matter) are treated as one. Otherwise, even in the state of liberation, the duality between God and the soul is not annihilated. For Samkara, however, individuality is a product of illusion, and so, when illusion is destroyed, the individuality of the individual soul is also destroyed. Thus,

⁷⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "152" by hand.

⁷⁶⁶ "Śamkara" in the original.

⁷⁶⁷ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁶⁸ "Upaniṣadic" in the original.

⁷⁶⁹ "Upaniṣadic" in the original.

⁷⁷⁰ "vācyārtha" in the original.

⁷⁷¹ "lakṣyārtha" in the original.

⁷⁷² "Śvetaketu" in the original.

⁷⁷³ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁷⁴ "vācyārtha" in the original.

according to Samkara,⁷⁷⁵ there is singleness in emancipation and not the oneness of a whole, whereas, for Ramanuja,⁷⁷⁶ emancipation is not a state of singleness but a state of oneness of an organic whole.

In spite of such metaphysical differences, we shall be able to find affinity between these two conceptions of liberation from the psychological point of view. The Qualified Non-dualism of Rāmānuja advocates a total identity between the soul and God from the psychological point of view. The liberated soul, through intense devotion, feels that it has become one with God or that its existence is lost in the existence of God, just as a lover experiences a feeling of oneness with his beloved in true love. Felt experience is one, although the experience is true. Therefore according to Ramanuja⁷⁷⁷ as well experience

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(continued from the previous page) is non-dual. For Samkara,⁷⁷⁹ Brahman is nothing but pure experience or knowledge, and for that reason he has stopped by describing this highest state of experience as one of non-dual experience. He does not believe in the reality of any knower or experient besides knowledge. Ramanuja⁷⁸⁰ has advocated the existence of God and of individual souls as knowers, and has for that reason asserted the existence of duality of metaphysical principles even in that state of non-dual experience. That the state of liberation is a state of non-duality from the point of view of felt experience has been accepted by both Samkara⁷⁸¹ and Ramanuja.⁷⁸²

Further, in the opinion of Rāmānuja, the individual soul has no substratum other than God. It remains inseparably united with God, who is its sole refuge. Hence, though in the state of liberation the individual soul retains its individuality, still this individuality remains inseparably united with the deity. Now, the soul, in the opinion of Ramanuja,⁷⁸³ is atomic in nature, while God is all-pervading. Both God and the soul are principles of illumination (consciousness). If a principle of illumination which is atomic in nature remains in close proximity to a principle of illumination which is all-pervading, then the separate existence of the atomic light cannot be distinguished at all. The separate existence of a light of ten-candle power cannot be differentiated if it is

⁷⁷⁵ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁷⁶ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁷⁷ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁷⁸ The original editor inserted "153" by hand.

⁷⁷⁹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁸⁰ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁸¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁸² "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁸³ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

used in a room in which a light of one hundred candle power is in operation. So, the individuality of an individual soul is completely overshadowed by the all-embracing personality of God. It is because of this fact that Ramanuja⁷⁸⁴ has said that the state of liberation is a state of highest affinity (*paramasamyā*)⁷⁸⁵ between God and the individual soul in respect of consciousness. If this is so, then it actually becomes an impossible task to distinguish atomic consciousness from all-pervading consciousness. It is because of this fact that Samkara⁷⁸⁶ has perceived oneness in emancipation, whereas Ramanuja⁷⁸⁷ has maintained psychological oneness but metaphysical duality, which is in tune with his philosophical position. The motive of Samkara⁷⁸⁸ is to teach the identity of Brahman and the individual soul, while the aim of Rāmānuja is to advocate the existence of an all-embracing God with whom the individual remains inseparably related as his body. It is the duty of every soul to discover this divinity in his own soul, and for that reason, in the *Chandogya Upanisad*,⁷⁸⁹ Svetaketu⁷⁹⁰ has been advised to look within his own soul to find out who is the Soul of all souls.

Abraham Kaplan: The New World of Philosophy

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THE NEW WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY

Abraham Kaplan

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(212-1)⁷⁹² temporary Chinese thought. This last part, however, is less well organised than the others, and its long list of names and titles seems rather formidable.

On the whole, Day has brought together much accurate and pertinent information about Chinese philosophy. This is a useful book to dip into whenever one needs references on certain aspects of Chinese philosophy or is looking for some neat and readable quotations from the philosophers. – Liu Wu-chi, *Indiana University*

(212-2) This is a remarkable book. It is based on a series of public lectures given at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1959 and 1960. The chapters deal, in order, with Pragmatism, Analytic Philosophy, Existentialism, Freud, Communism, Buddhism, Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, and Zen.

⁷⁸⁴ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁸⁵ "paramasāmya" in the original.

⁷⁸⁶ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁸⁷ "Rāmānuja" in the original.

⁷⁸⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

⁷⁸⁹ "Chāndogya Upaniṣad" in the original.

⁷⁹⁰ "Śvetaketu" in the original.

⁷⁹¹ The original editor inserted "154" by hand.

⁷⁹² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

The order is significant. Abraham Kaplan's training and earlier commitment was in pragmatism and analytic philosophy, and his chapters on these philosophies are sympathetic and discerning. Partly as a result of his participation in the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference, Professor Kaplan became interested in a wide range of contemporary "living" philosophies which express and influence contemporary cultures. There are very few persons with this initial training who have so extended their range of interest, and who could write such a book.

The topics are old. Why, then, is this a "new world of philosophy?" Because it suggests that the "age of analysis" in contemporary philosophy is now moving in the direction of a new age of synthesis. Not synthesis in the sense of eclecticism – Kaplan is perfectly clear about this. He is not striving toward a world philosophy, but toward philosophizing in the awareness of the various philosophies at work in the world. Only now is it possible to philosophize from a perspective which can be "genuinely world-wide in scope." This is "the new world of philosophy."

The book gives a fair presentation of the nine points of view, and penetrating analyses of the problems they raise. In my opinion, the analyses, criticisms, and cross-comparisons are excellent.

There are no footnotes and there is no bibliography. Based on public lectures, the book is not addressed primarily to scholars. It is a book around which to think. It will be welcomed by many searchers concerned with the problem of philosophical orientation in the contemporary world. (If a paperback edition is not yet planned, it most surely will be.) Nevertheless, the analyses, criticisms, and cross-comparisons are so discerning that professional philosophers will not wish to neglect this book. I have read it carefully twice and with sustained admiration. It is a sound, wise, and unique book. – CHARLES MORRIS, *University of Florida*

Warren W. Smith Jr.: Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History

(212-3) This is essentially a historical study of how Confucianism was adapted to the growing nationalistic and imperialistic ideology in Japan from the

Paul Wienpahl: The Practice of Zen

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THE PRACTICE OF ZEN
Paul Wienpahl (Review)
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(213-1)⁷⁹⁴ Robert Powell, *Zen and Reality*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1962. Pp. 140.

⁷⁹³ The original editor inserted "155" and "Vol. 12" by hand.

Bernard Phillips, ed., with Introduction, *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism: Selected from the Writings of D.T. Suzuki*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962. Pp. 491.

Chisan Koho, *Soto Zen*. Yokohama: Soji-ji Temple, 1960. Pp. 105 + Appendix.

Trevor Leggett, comp. and trans. *A First Zen Reader*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1960. Pp. 236.

Ruth Fuller Sasaki. *Zen, a Religion*. New York: The First Zen Institute of America, Inc., 1958. Pp. 21.

Robert Linssen, *Living Zen*. D. Abrahams-Curiel, trans. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956. Pp. 344.

Nyogen Senzaki and Ruth Stout McCandless. *Buddhism and Zen*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 85.

H. Dumoulin, S.J., *The Development of Chinese Zen*. Translated from the German with Additional Notes and Appendices by Ruth Fuller Sasaki. New York: The First Zen Institute of America, Inc., 1953. Pp. 132.

D.T. Suzuki, *Essais sur le Bouddhisme Zen*, première série, deuxième série, troisième série. Translated from the Japanese under the direction of Jean Herbert. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1954, 1954, 1957.

Westerners who have studied Zen Buddhism in a temple instead of a library find themselves dissatisfied with most of what is said about Zen in the Occident. They see that Zen in the West has been a largely literary event. It is time, therefore, to enter a new phase of understanding of Zen Buddhism. This is necessary whether this form of Buddhism is to have a chance of being transplanted to the West or we are simply to have a clear picture of something concerning which our curiosity has been aroused. We have the word. We should now be more concerned about the thing.

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(continued from the previous page) The remarks in this composite review are, accordingly, centred around a single proposition which provides the main basis for evaluating the books under consideration. The importance of this proposition for beginners, which all Westerners are, in the study of Zen Buddhism cannot be overestimated. It is: at the heart of Zen Buddhism is a practice which the Japanese call *zazen*.

⁷⁹⁴ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁷⁹⁵ Blank page

⁷⁹⁶ The original editor inserted "156" by hand.

This is a form of “meditation” in which the practitioner sits cross-legged concentrating. It is a practice in which the body and the mind are inseparably involved. This will hereafter be referred to mainly as sitting or as zazen (of which the word “meditation” is a misleading translation).

These facts are being ignored in the interpretation of Zen Buddhism to the West. We remain either unaware or only vaguely aware that Zen Buddhism is “meditation” (sitting) Buddhism. This has led to uses of the word “Zen” in which it has virtually no significance and to claims that Zen is ineffable, paradoxical, and beyond understanding. It is no more ineffable than swimming, though its practice is infinitely more difficult and requires far more diligence. Quiet sitting and its extension to quiet, concentrated living take more effort than most of us can muster.

Sitting Buddhism: This phrase suggests quietism and retreat from life. At times, therefore, Zen Buddhists have emphasised *satori* (enlightenment) in order to correct this suggestion. One can, therefore, as a corollary principle of judgment, evaluate a book about Zen Buddhism by the amount of attention paid in it to *satori*. If that word occurs frequently and with a capital S, the chances are that the book is highly misleading.

Zen and Reality is based on a series of lectures given before the Buddhist Society in London. Its subtitle, “An Approach to Sanity and Happiness on a non-Sectarian Basis,” reveals that it is misnamed. *Zen and Reality* is a melange of Krishnamurti, “Zen” sayings, Buddhism, Christianity, and “psychology” for those interested in self-help. It may provide solace or inspiration, but its title must have been designed to market it. Its message is, “Awake and be happy,” but it contains no hint of how this might be accomplished. The book is part of the do-it-yourself movement which might be called Operation Bootstrap.

At the outset we are told that, according to Krishnamurti, “all psychological suffering begins and ends in and through the mind.... Therefore ... liberation from suffering can only be achieved by ending the ceaseless activity of the mind” (p. 11). “This happens – not by discipline, not by repression, not by choice – but spontaneously once the mind has understood the nature of its own activities ... suddenly and without any forewarning or intimation” (p. 12).

Where else would “psychological” suffering occur except in the mind? Yet, this is paraded as a discovery equalling in importance the theory of⁷⁹⁷

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CONFUCIANISM IS MODERN JAPAN

Warren W. Smith Jr. (Review)

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⁷⁹⁷ This para is continued on page 217.

⁷⁹⁸ The original editor inserted “157” and ““Vol 12 Review of “Confucianism is modern Japan” Warren W. Smith Jr.”” at the top of the page by hand

(216-1)⁷⁹⁹ Restoration of 1868 up to World War II. As such, it is a careful study, fully documented and systematically presented. It is not a study of the internal development of Confucianism itself, that is, the evolution of Confucian thought in modern Japan resulting from philosophical deliberations or textual study. Rather, it is a concentrated study of how the Confucian moral values of loyalty, filial piety, and social harmony have been adapted to the Japanese imperial system and how nationalistic elements “would preempt and use the force of Confucian ethical values for their own purposes” (p. 138). As such a concentrated study, it is a very worth-while contribution to the understanding of the intellectual history of Japan.

After giving a clear account of the background of Confucianism, in which the name of the most important Neo-Confucianist, Ch’eng I (1033–1107), is somehow omitted from among those mentioned (p. 1), and the Tokugawa Legacy, the author tells the stories of the fortune of Confucianism in political Japan, its outstanding figures, its organizations and activities, and finally how it has been made use of to support Japanese nationalism at home and imperialism in Korea and Manchuria.

One wishes the author had gone into an analysis of certain fundamental Confucian doctrines and their modification in Japan. For example, the author refers to a Japanese scholar’s observation of the Chinese tendency to cyclical change and revolution and his explanation that these concepts developed because of many invasions, whereas Japan is characterized by an eternal imperial line (p. 142). The author could have pointed out that these Chinese doctrines were taught long before there was any foreign invasion and are based on the fundamental ideas that the people had the right to revolt when the ruler fails to carry out the mandate of Heaven and that history follows the same law of rise and fall as does Nature. In fact, the Confucian doctrine of the mandate of Heaven is not mentioned. It would be extremely revealing to show why Japanese Confucians have avoided it.

However, in the concluding chapter, the author has pointed out certain striking differences between China and Japan so far as Confucianism is concerned. For example, in Confucian China, civil service examination was open to all, but in Japan only to nobles of the fifth rank and above (p. 229), and in Japan the military class, rather than the scholar as in China, was at the apex of society (p. 230). There are other illuminating contrasts.

The bibliography of both Japanese and Western works is comprehensive. Extensive comments follow many entries. “*Tsu-bu-t’ung*” (p. 246) should have been “*ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an*.” – Wing-tsit Chan, *Dartmouth College*

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⁷⁹⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(217-1)⁸⁰¹ relativity. The subtle mistake contained herein is repeated throughout the book. It is exemplified by the report on page 23, and common in books about Zen, of the manner in which so-and-so attained enlightenment. His rake, {one day},⁸⁰² struck a tile and wham! These reports, with one or two exceptions in D.T. Suzuki, invariably neglect to mention that so-and-so had been practicing *zazen* for years and continued to do so after his awakening. Mr Powell's head, in other words, is in the clouds, and his remarks are like a statue without a base. He leaves his reader with naught but high-sounding words. The significance of the legend of Bodhidharma's sitting for nine years before he established Zen Buddhism in China is lost.

The last chapter of *Zen and Reality* is appropriately entitled "There is Nothing in It." This is the only resemblance between the contents of the book and Zen Buddhism. On the other hand, Powell has assembled an interesting array of quotations which show common traits in the *Bhagavad Gita*,⁸⁰³ the Bible, and some Zen literature.

(217-2) Mr Phillips opens his Introduction to *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism* by remarking that never have so many been so interested in anything as little understood as Zen Buddhism. Zen, he says, tantalises us by its inscrutability. Phillips' Introduction has many good qualities, but this sort of remark approaches nonsense. A major reason for the supposed inscrutability of Zen Buddhism is that it is a practice, and not a philosophy which can be understood. This aspect of the matter strikes any beginner who goes to Japan to study Zen, and it is what should be understood first. Whatever may come later is something else, but it will not be appreciated before the practice is undertaken.

On page xviii a practice is mentioned and Zen is referred to as an "ultimate therapy," yet *zazen* is not discussed. Instead, there are misleading references to your True Self and to the fact that each person's truth is different – both of these overlook the egolessness for which the Buddhist strives and the fact that the practice is universal. On page xix Phillips says that you cannot realise your true self by the intellect, and writes sensibly on the failure of the intellect to bring us into contact with reality (though he calls it "your reality"). However, by page xxvii there is still no reference to *zazen*, or to any means other than the intellect; and, indeed, one passes to the end of the Introduction without in any way being illuminated in this regard.

Phillips says some other things to which attention should be called. On page xxiii he misleads us with the claim that Zen formulates no system of ethics. Actually, a Zen Buddhist lives by a strict ethical code quite like the Christian and finds that his

⁸⁰⁰ The original editor inserted "158" by hand.

⁸⁰¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered. They are a continuation of the paras on page 215.

⁸⁰² The word is cut off by a hole-punch. Only "-ay" is visible in the original.

⁸⁰³ "Gītā" in the original.

zazen provides the basis for this code. Possibly Phillips slips here because of our own aversion to the authority and lack of

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(continued from the previous page) creativity in Christianity. On page xxviii it is correctly pointed out that, if Zen is not conformity, it is not non-conformity, either. Life does require discipline.

There is a fine discussion of creative morality (pp. xxviii-xxix) and the transcendence of rules, which can bring out, though Phillips does not, a resemblance between Zen Buddhism and pragmatism. The good is unique, claimed Dewey, and moral rules are only guides to conduct, not its arbiter. Later (pp. xxxi-xxxv) there are some penetrating remarks on the failure of Western religions because of their emphasis on duality (God and the Devil, form and freedom, faith and reason).

Phillips finally warns that his anthology is only a book about Zen and not Zen itself. This is excellent, but where does it leave the reader? For the author then writes of a year in Japan, of having his eyes opened to Zen, and of access to Suzuki's library, but he nowhere mentions the *Zendō* (Meditation Hall) at Engaku-ji, the temple where Suzuki lives.

Looking through the anthology, one finds a single chapter (Part IV, Chapter 1), devoted to the practice of Zen – 36 pages out of 490 – and even there *zazen* is only mentioned. According to the Index, the word occurs but twice in the book; "meditation" has five references, but meditation is never thoroughly discussed. *Satori*, on the other hand, is mentioned six times in the Index and discussed four times at length.

The book includes two hundred pages from the *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, almost seventy pages from *Zen and Japanese Culture*. Only one hundred and three pages come from sources which the average reader might not consult. Furthermore, *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk*, regarded by some as Suzuki's best book, is not quoted at all. Finally, most of the works included were written in the early thirties. Later ones, such as *Living by Zen*, are not used, and the reader gets little idea of the development in Suzuki's interpretation of Zen (his views on the use of the *kōan*, for example, underwent a change).

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⁸⁰⁵ The original editor inserted "159" by hand.

Thus, the book is essentially an anthology to introduce readers to Zen Buddhism. It is well worked-out and more complete than the anthology in Anchor Books.¹ However, one still wonders at the need for it, especially since so much of Suzuki has been reissued by Rider and Company.²

*Soto*⁸⁰⁶ *Zen*. Because of the influence of Suzuki there are still many Westerners interested in Zen Buddhism who are unaware, that there is more than one sect of this form of Buddhism. Chisan Koho,⁸⁰⁷ in a foreword, distinguishes two

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(continued from the previous page) of these sects, the Rinzai and the Soto,⁸¹¹ and defines Zen Buddhism largely in terms of *zazen*. Soto⁸¹² Zen is for the people, continues Koho,⁸¹³ Rinzai for the elite.⁸¹⁴ Both sects employ *zazen*, but the Rinzai stresses also a rigorous use of the *kōan* for achieving penetration and concentration in the exercise.

The distinction between the two sects stems from a teaching of Dogen,⁸¹⁵ a great thirteenth-century master, according to which *zazen* is enlightenment and not in part a means to it. Thus, anyone who simply does *zazen* is regarded as enlightened. This has had the effect of making the goal easier and thus rendering Zen possible for more people. Chisan Koho⁸¹⁶ does not say that reward is proportional to effort and consequently that the rigor demanded by the Rinzai sect should result in greater

⁸⁰⁶ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸⁰⁷ "Kohō" in the original.

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⁸¹⁰ The original editor inserted "160" by hand.

⁸¹¹ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸¹² "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸¹³ "Kohō" in the original.

⁸¹⁴ "élite" in the original.

⁸¹⁵ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁸¹⁶ "Kohō" in the original.

attainment. But, then, Soto⁸¹⁷ Zen is for the average person, and one cannot but admire the Soto⁸¹⁸ sect for making Zen available to more than an elite⁸¹⁹ few.

The author next distinguishes between Eastern and Western culture as being, respectively, religiously and scientifically oriented. Each culture, then, has something for the other.

There follows a good, short discussion of Buddhism. The reality of change and the goal of selflessness are stressed. Buddhism is shown not to be antithetical to science, with the implication that it is the religion of the future. The discussion ends on the point that the Zen Buddhist accepts the principles of Mahayana⁸²⁰ Buddhism but insists that they be experienced *concretely* as well as conceptually (p. 19).

From the principles of Buddhism the author turns to a short history, showing that Zen developed out of a variation of the practice of *zazen* which occurred early in India. The value of this little history lessens toward its end where there occurs a mere recitation of names, but it is important that the story is centered about *zazen*.

On page 57 the principles of Soto⁸²¹ Zen are listed. Mainly, these are: to lead a simple life, to perform *zazen*, and to help others. Then Dogen⁸²² is discussed. He combatted sectarianism and emphasised *zazen*, saying that it *is* enlightenment (to combat intellectualism) and that "attainment of the way can only be achieved with one's body" (p. 63). (Pages 64–65 are also worth looking at.)

Chapter 7 further discusses Dogen's⁸²³ principle that *zazen* is enlightenment. It might be pointed out that awareness of the principle can be of immense help in *zazen* and that Zen Buddhists, whether Rinzai or Soto,⁸²⁴ are deeply impressed with Dogen's⁸²⁵ profundity in this and in other respects.

In Chapter 8 Christianity and Zen are contrasted, in large part by contrasting prayer and *zazen*. "*Zazen* is the basic expression of a religion which emphasises practice" (p. 81).

Chisan Koho⁸²⁶ closes, as one might expect, by recommending Soto⁸²⁷ Zen as

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⁸¹⁷ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸¹⁸ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸¹⁹ "élite" in the original.

⁸²⁰ "Mahāyāna" in the original.

⁸²¹ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸²² "Dōgen" in the original.

⁸²³ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁸²⁴ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸²⁵ "Dōgen" in the original.

⁸²⁶ "Kohō" in the original.

⁸²⁷ "Sōtō" in the original.

(continued from the previous page) the religion of the future. This spirit of sectarianism vitiates an otherwise promising book for interpreting Zen to the West. The book's value is further decreased by a lengthy appendix in which the author repeats what has already been said in an almost frantic effort to recommend Soto⁸²⁹ Zen over Rinzai. Suzuki is enviously criticised for emphasizing Rinzai, though certainly the point should be made to Westerners that Suzuki has emphasised only one aspect of Zen Buddhism.

How can a Zen Buddhist be sectarian? It may help in getting Zen Buddhism down to earth to notice that even Zen masters are people.

A First Zen Reader. Leggett's brief introduction is good. It is simple and stresses the practice on which Zen Buddhism is based. One senses immediately that the author has been closer to Zen than Powell or Phillips. There is less theorizing in his remarks, and, for example, he brings out the fact that the Japanese word for mind is close in meaning to the English word for heart. This helps one to realise the extent to which *zazen* is a physical activity and its outcome physical as well as mental. The Rinzai student, when given a *kōan*, may be told to "solve" it with his guts.

The book, except for a brief final chapter, consists of writings by Zen *roshis*⁸³⁰ (masters). For this reason alone it would be of value. It is of particular value because two of these writings, the "backbone" of the book, are by modern *roshis*⁸³¹ and are for laymen, not Zen students. The book is in this respect almost unique in the literature "about" Zen in English. An important exception is Soen⁸³² Shaku's *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot*, Open Court, 1906, now long out of print.

The first selection, *The Original Face*, by Daitō⁸³³ Kokushi (fourteenth century) is short and to the point. It starts: "All students should devote themselves in the beginning to *zazen*" (p. 21). It continues by saying that wiping the mind clean, getting rid of thoughts, is part of *zazen*. And it indicates that *zazen*, as just being quiet, can pervade all one's activities.

The second selection is by Rōshi⁸³⁴ (Master) Takashina Rosen,⁸³⁵ Primate of the Soto⁸³⁶ Sect. It opens with two sections on *zazen* which include photographs of the position. It continues with simple descriptions of that for which one strives in *zazen*. There is no philosophy, no theory, in these sketches. The religious quest is defined simply as a deep penetration into daily life (p. 41). It is not something esoteric, though it is difficult. For the Zen Buddhist its method is *zazen*.

⁸²⁸ The original editor inserted "161" by hand.

⁸²⁹ "Sōtō" in the original.

⁸³⁰ "rōshis" in the original.

⁸³¹ "rōshis" in the original.

⁸³² "Sōen" in the original.

⁸³³ "Daitō" in the original.

⁸³⁴ "Rōshi" in the original.

⁸³⁵ "Rōsen" in the original.

⁸³⁶ "Sōtō" in the original.

Example after example shows that the practice leads to everyday life. However, this vital point is made: cold water before and after boiling is cold water, but with an enormous difference. So, our ordinary life before and after

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(continued from the previous page) *zazen* is our ordinary life, though in the first we are in chains and in the second free. Westerners who quote Rinzai's "The Zen life is your everyday life" overlook this difference.

The third selection (130 pages) is by a Rinzai *roshi*,⁸⁴⁰ Amakuki Sessan. Interestingly enough, it is a commentary on Hakuin's "Song of Meditation (*zazen*)," at the heart of which are the lines:

The Zen Meditation of the Mahayana
Is beyond all praise.
Giving and morality and the other perfections,
Taking of the name, repentance, discipline,
And the many other right actions,
All come back to the practice of meditation.
By the merit of a single sitting
He destroys innumerable accumulated sins (p. 67).

Roshi⁸⁴¹ Sessan's essay is more difficult than Roshi⁸⁴² Rosen's and shows the intellectual rigor which a Zen Buddhist can attain. However, like Roshi⁸⁴³ Rosen's, it is full of the typically Zen references to concrete cases, in this instance to make Hakuin's song clear. "We should meditate deeply on these words, bringing our mind to stillness, to taste the real meaning. In fact, better than putting legs onto the snake (which does

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⁸³⁸ Blank page

⁸³⁹ The original editor inserted "162" by hand.

⁸⁴⁰ "rōshi" in the original.

⁸⁴¹ "Rōshi" in the original.

⁸⁴² "Rōshi" in the original.

⁸⁴³ "Rōshi" in the original.

not need them) with these foolish comments of mine, is to ... reverently meditate on the Song of Meditation" (p. 80).

Of the three sections dealing with the lines of the song quoted above, sections 5 and 6 are especially important. In section 5 we are told that simple sitting (*zazen*) extends into the rest of a man's life. It grounds his morality, his patience, his endurance, and his understanding. In section 6 *zazen* is described. In both sections there is the taste of the practical advice which comes out of *zazen*; for example, money is the best of slaves, the worst of masters. Certainly, however, this helps one to realise that the main thing that differentiates Zen Buddhism from the life of common sense is a practice which makes such a life more feasible.

Sections 9 and 10 describe the state of enlightenment and put much-vaunted *satori* in its place. "It is not simply a question of having *satori* and waking from a dream. The aim is to wake up and then be active ... return to this world to extend the hand of compassion to all that lives" (p. 164). (I have taken the "Song of Meditation" as praise of simply sitting. It is also praise of the life to which that leads.)

In his concluding "Note on the Ways" (*judo*,⁸⁴⁴ calligraphy, etc.) Leggett starts by emphasizing *zazen*. A saying or a blow may bring the latter to a

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(continued from the previous page) head, but sitting is essential. The ways are then described as means of extending *zazen* into practical daily activities. They are not substitutes for it.

The translations in this book are pleasantly in that vernacular which so often characterizes the discourse of the Zen teacher. The format is commendable, except for the printing, which is too far to the outer edge of the page.

(227-1)⁸⁴⁶ In *Zen, a Religion* Mrs Sasaki makes out a case for regarding Zen Buddhism as a religion. Her point is that the practice of Zen leads step by step to full awakening to the simple life. The latter is the religious life and, therefore, Zen is a religion.

Mrs Sasaki stresses the awakening over the practice but makes it clear that it is the practice which leads to the awakening. Her monograph is of particular value because it brings out the fact that full awakening is a gradual step-like process made up of many small awakenings. *Satori* has been misunderstood as one tremendous and sudden illumination, after which all is light. It is not. Full enlightenment takes years of *zazen*, years of effort, and many realisations. (Hakuin reported that he had innumerable

⁸⁴⁴ "jūdō" in the original.

⁸⁴⁵ The original editor inserted "163" by hand.

⁸⁴⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

small *satoris* and seven great ones. One of the first small steps for a Westerner can be the awakening to the importance of *zazen*.)

(227-2) Attention should be called to Mrs Sasaki's *Zen, a Method for Religious Awakening* (26 pages), also available at the First Zen Institute. It is the best short introduction to Zen in English. The goal is described, no mystery made of it; the method is stressed, and *satori*, as Westerners speak of it, debunked. (Mrs Sasaki reports that after thirty years studying with three Zen *rōshis* she had not heard the word "*satori*.")

The French title of Linssen's *Living Zen* is significant: *Essais sur le Bouddhisme en General*⁸⁴⁷ *et sur le Zen en Particulier*. It is actually an introduction to Buddhism. In it we are removed from Zen to the chamber of the Western scholar.

As you wade into this book you feel that, with qualifications here and there, it is a contribution to the literature on Buddhism. In a short history of Zen no mention is made of Bodhidharma's sitting, but the practical influence of the Chinese on Buddhism is stressed. Then Buddhism is compared to pragmatism, which further counteracts the impression that it is esoteric. However, one's initial feelings turn out to be wrong. Buddhism is said to shun metaphysics, but Linssen goes on to indulge in a prodigious amount of it.

And so it goes. The evident scholarship is subtly misleading. In Chapter 3 there is an interesting comparison of the saint with the sage, but the role

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(continued from the previous page) of ritual is misunderstood. It can become a crutch, but it can also play a vital part in the discipline which the religious life requires. We see

⁸⁴⁷ "Général" in the original.

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⁸⁵⁰ The original editor inserted "164" by hand.

that Linssen is attracted by the naturalism of Buddhism but that he does not appreciate the hard work that goes with a religious practice that is not wholly mental.

By Chapter 7, "On the Nature of Things," the urge to praise *Living Zen* practically disappears. What have all these demonstrations culled from physics to do with Buddhism? That change is real and things substanceless can be seen in everyday experience. They do not require demonstrations from science. The pure stuff in this book is overlaid with a confusing mass of theorizing. If this is an expression of the author's enlightenment, the latter is murky indeed. You have only to compare this writing with that of the *rōshis* in Leggett's book to see where there is more light.

Chapter 22 is particularly misleading, though it is characteristic of the kind of error on which this book is based. Here any sort of regular religious practice is condemned. Meditation, though mentioned, is made a mystery. So is the attainment of enlightenment. It can be seen only as an accident or an act of Grace. Linssen is right, of course, that striving for it makes awakening impossible. But he has not seen the next step, which is: of course, one strives for it. Striving for it is all right provided that you are not attached to the striving.

In Chapter 24 Buddhism and Christianity are interestingly compared, especially at the time of Christ. Nevertheless, one finds that the author is reluctant to abandon the idea of divinity, though he is right in insisting that it is inaccurate to label Buddhism atheistic. (How, where there is no question of God involved, can one speak of atheism? That, however, is not Linssen's argument.) This sort of thing distorts understanding of Buddhism even as a matter of scholarship.

Put the word "Zen" in the title and sell the book. This one also turns out to be more Krishnamurti than Zen Buddhism, though on the former it is better than Powell's book. (Krishnamurti, incidentally, never recommends a practice, but he has his own physical religious exercises.) On page 252 a *koan*⁸⁵¹ is discussed. It is not a complete translation of the *koan*.⁸⁵² *Satori* is played up. Anything like *zazen* is criticised so often that one suspects that Linssen has a block against it. The style is encumbered by scientific jargon and bastard words like "Love-Intelligence." As Linssen himself says: "We remain impenitently cerebral" (p. 286). If you tried to live by this book, you would die.

I dislike being thus critical of a work the author of which is clearly on the side of the angels. However, the realities (as contrasted with the words) of Zen Buddhism must be brought to the fore. It is either a misunderstanding or

⁸⁵¹ "kōan" in the original.

⁸⁵² "kōan" in the original.

⁸⁵³ The original editor inserted "165" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) a disservice to repeat the ringing phrases over and over without referring to the practice of Zen and the long years of hard work which it requires.

Buddhism and Zen is a little book of a different stripe. It has the flavour of Zen Buddhism and is mainly a translation of Zen documents. Mrs McCandless has added a simple and informative introduction to Buddhism and some notes on meditation.

The *Shō-dō-ka* (Song of Realisation), an eighth-century Zen poem, is translated and commented on by Senzaki, a Zen monk who lived in the United States for fifty years. There are also translations of two fragments: "Notes of Bodhidharma's Disciples" and "Suggestions for Zen Students by Zen-Getsu."

On the whole, Mrs McCandless has accomplished her purposes: to provide a brief introduction to Zen Buddhism for beginners, and a manual, in the form of Senzaki's translations, for those who are beyond this stage. Whether it was wise to mix the two purposes is another question. The translations may only confuse the beginner, and the more advanced student needs no introduction.

The *Sho-do-ka*⁸⁵⁴ has already appeared in Suzuki's *Manual of Zen Buddhism*. Nevertheless, it is a service to make any of these materials available, especially with a commentary by a practicing Zen Buddhist. Zen literature, as distinct from books about Zen, is important for the serious Zen student.

Despite the quality of *Buddhism and Zen* and the help it may provide, I could not avoid thinking as I read it that an appreciation of the simplicity and practicality of Zen Buddhism is virtually impossible without an association with Zen Buddhists. Words like "*Dharma*," "*Mind-essence*," "*the Buddha-body*," and so on must either repel the Western reader or throw him into a hysterical state of pseudo-religious ecstasy.

The Development of Chinese Zen is a handsome volume which is neither an interpretation of Zen Buddhism nor an introduction to it. Consequently it should not be assessed strictly on the basis of the criteria employed in this review. It is a book for scholars and will probably play a role in the development of advanced training for Western Zen students.

The book centres about an article of forty pages by H. Dumoulin, S.J., "*The Development of Chinese Zen after Eno, in the Light of the Mumonkan*," which first appeared in *Monumenta Serica*, Vol. VI, 1941. The article is a contribution to history, and Mrs Sasaki's notes and multilingual glossaries will be invaluable for those who eventually pursue the study of Zen Buddhism into its further reaches.

The scholarship in this book may seem far from Zen. However, the advanced

⁸⁵⁴ "*Shō-dō-ka*" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) Zen student supplements his work on *kōans* by finding Chinese poems which illustrate the “point” of each *kōan*. A thorough knowledge of both Japanese and written Chinese is at present necessary for the Zen student who is going beyond the beginnings of, say, three years of Zen study. It will be generations before this can be done in a Western language, if it ever will be. Meanwhile Mrs Sasaki’s efforts to provide translations and the beginnings of dictionaries, not only here but in all her work, together with the rigorous standards she maintains, will be of great service to those who follow in this direction.

In this connection, a point on page xvii should be emphasised. Members of the Zen sect hold that “apart from linguistic qualifications, only one who has studied under a Zen teacher is competent to translate a Zen koan collection, for instance, and then only after his correct understanding of those koans ... has been acknowledged by a Zen master.” Otherwise, the translation may be linguistically accurate but miss the “pivot” of the original, “the subtle point in which its ‘Zen’ meaning is conveyed.”

Father Dumoulin’s article provides a brief history of Chinese Zen Buddhism after the death of the Sixth Patriarch, from roughly 618 to 1279. After saying that little is known of the period from Bodhidharma to the Sixth Patriarch, Dumoulin traces the development of Zen through the “Golden Age” of the great masters of the T’ang Dynasty (618–906), when Zen Buddhism was in its creative stage, into the Sung Dynasty (960–1279), when the *kōan* exercise was developed and left as a legacy to succeeding generations.

A theme of the article is that the T’ang masters employed no one technique for helping their students. Each created his own. As the vitality of this early phase died, Zen Buddhism was in danger of being lost. The gradual development of the *kōan* exercise, a particular technique, prevented this, according to Dumoulin in a quotation from Suzuki (*Essays in Zen Buddhism*, II, p. 66).

Though this account is based on the soundest scholarship, it is misleading. It hides the fact that, regardless of special teaching techniques, Zen Buddhists have throughout their history performed *zazen*. Father Dumoulin’s work even implies that this is not the case, that *zazen* is just a special technique. On page 10, for example, he relates a story about Baso, a T’ang master, who ridiculed *zazen*. Such a trick, of course, is perfectly consistent with *zazen*’s being all-important, for a student can also get attached to *it* and should be warned of this. This example shows, however, the great need for the care which must be taken both in reporting about something like Zen Buddhism and in reading about it.

⁸⁵⁶ The original editor inserted “166” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) The fault is not with Father Dumoulin, for the error has occurred in connection with the work of the man who almost single-handedly has brought the awareness of Zen Buddhism to the West.

This brings us to the French translation of Daisetz T. Suzuki's *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (all three series), which began appearing in England in 1928. Over half of the translation first appeared in France from 1940 to 1943. All of the translation is fluent and accurate.

I shall say little of this book. As the other volumes reviewed give evidence, it is too well known to require extensive description. Virtually all that the West knows of Zen Buddhism has come from the pen of Suzuki and particularly from the *Essays*. Rereading them, I realised what a mine of information they are. Not only are the history of Zen Buddhism, its theory and practice, its relations to other religions and to philosophies discussed, but the book contains translations of dozens of Zen Buddhist anecdotes, records, and poems.

Despite the excellence and comprehensiveness of these and others of Suzuki's writings, however, and admitting his right to be regarded as the interpreter of Zen Buddhism to the West, a re-emphasis (if not a correction) of one portion of this interpretation should now be made. Any Westerner who has studied Zen Buddhism in a temple can do this, which suggests that the need for it may be due to us as much as to Suzuki.

Suzuki has nowhere in his writings, except perhaps in the little-known *Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk*, sufficiently emphasised the role of *zazen* in Zen Buddhism. This has resulted in making far more of a mystery of Zen than it deserves and has turned reports of the results of Zen practice (which many Zen stories and *sūtras* favoured by the Zen Buddhists are) into philosophical theories about no-mind, nothingness, the Void, etc., thereby suggesting that Zen is a philosophy.

Whatever else "Zen" may mean, it means meditation, *zazen*, a particular practice with a classical description that has remained unchanged for centuries. The so-called Zen person is the "meditating" person. The so-called Zen experience is the "meditating" experience. "Zen" may mean more after this aspect of it is grasped, but it

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⁸⁵⁸ The original editor inserted "167" by hand.

means at least that, and the chances of grasping its further significance are nil until *zazen* is being regularly practiced.

There are many reasons for the obscurity into which *zazen* has disappeared in the Western view of Zen. For example, even when it is clearly stated that meditation is at the heart of Zen Buddhism, the matter does not become clear to the Westerner – for the word “meditation” does not mean *zazen*. Thus the

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(continued from the previous page) translation of the word “Zen” is at once a help and a hindrance for furthering the understanding of Zen Buddhism. It calls attention to the essence of the thing only to hide it behind an ambiguity in the word “meditation” which is created by the very act of translation.

Then, too, there is the fact that the practice of *zazen* (or exercises very much like it) is as familiar in the Orient as it is unfamiliar in the Occident. This results in two factors. On the one hand, because he is so familiar with it and because he does not realise that the Westerner is not, the Oriental interpreter does not see the need for stressing *zazen* for his Western audience. On the other hand, precisely because it is quite unfamiliar to him, the Westerner does not realise the importance of *zazen* even when he does hear about it.

Westerners, furthermore, are incurably dualistic. We talk of God and the world, faith and reason, and mind and matter. The notion of a practice in connection with thinking and enlightenment, as the basis and core of it, is consequently hard to grasp. We read of enlightenment in books on Zen and immediately think of an intellectual affair. That it should be an affair of the body is virtually incomprehensible.

Finally, there are the facts that, rightly or wrongly, Zen Buddhism has often been charged with quietism and that it has sometimes resulted in quietism – both during its long history and now. This brings us, last but not least, to another reason why *zazen* has

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⁸⁶¹ The original editor inserted “168” by hand.

been overlooked in the West. Western literature on Zen stems mainly from the writings of Suzuki, of which the *Essays* are the core. And these have obscured the importance of *zazen* because a major thread in them is Suzuki's effort to combat both the charge and the tendency to quietism. For this reason he has stressed those aspects of the history of Zen Buddhism which deal with the efforts and the development of techniques to combat quietism, and he has stressed the aspect of insight or enlightenment in the practice of the Zen Buddhist to show that such practice is anything but mere sitting when it is properly carried out. The stressing of insight, however, has been so great that the pendulum has swung in the other direction for the Western reader, and the importance of sitting has been overlooked.

Thus, if one turns to the indices in the *Essays*, one finds very few references to *zazen* or to meditation. And only some thirty pages out of more than a thousand are devoted to explicit discussions of *zazen*. In the chapter on the *Zendo*⁸⁶² (Meditation Hall) in the first volume there is no mention of that for which the hall is primarily used. Furthermore, there are dozens of the stories, to which allusion has already been made, on the manner in which this or that man became enlightened by something that a master did or said,

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(continued from the previous page) perhaps a single word or blow; and yet there are few references to the facts that all of those who became enlightened were at that time practicing *zazen* and that many achieved further insights.

There is also a long chapter called "Practical Methods of Zen Instruction," in which certain devices are discussed and classified, giving him who is not aware that they presuppose *zazen* the idea that short lectures, pithy remarks, paradoxes, and blows are the only methods of Zen instruction. In fact, these devices, when employed, are preceded by instruction in *zazen* and are accompanied by its constant and unremitting practice.

However, Suzuki has not been guilty of omission. For the Zen student the references in the *Essays* to *zazen* are there, even though most are implicit. *Zazen* forms the background for the three volumes, though it is an obscure background because Suzuki has been so concerned to point out that *zazen* is not mere sitting.

So much for the words. For the rest, religion is the same wherever it occurs. It is garbed differently by time, place, and circumstance. If we are to become acquainted with its Zen Buddhist pontificals we must go, not to books, but to Japan and to *zazen*.

⁸⁶² "Zendō" in the original.

⁸⁶³ The original editor inserted "169" by hand.

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(241-1)⁸⁶⁶ The search for philosophical parallels is fraught with pitfalls. Some parallels are fruitful and significant, others incidental and fortuitous. I now propose to discuss the European parallels to Buddhist thought in two articles, of which the first is devoted to the true, and the second to the spurious, parallels.

As for my interpretation of the basic principles of Buddhism, I have recently given it in some detail in *Buddhist Thought in India*.¹ Since my views differ to some extent from those of my predecessors, I will briefly sum them up so that the reader can see what kind of "Buddhism" I compare with European philosophy.

The basic teaching of the Buddha can be expressed in one sentence: The conditioned world as it appears to us is fundamentally and irreparably undesirable, and salvation can be found only through escape to the Unconditioned, also called "*Nirvāṇa*." Everything else is elaboration.

All conditioned things are marred by having three "marks," i.e., by being impermanent, "ill," and "alien to our true self."² Much thought has gone into determining the full meaning of those marks. "Ill," for instance, comprises not only pain and suffering, but also the unease which is nowadays known as "existential anxiety,"³ and the mark of "not-self" has given rise to interminable discussions.⁴ Human beings fret against a world which is impermanent, ill, and not-self and are not content to live in it, because they believe that in the core of their own being they are eternal, at ease, and in full control of everything.⁵ This alienation of our empirical personality from our true being (i.e., from the "Tathagata" within us)⁶ is brought about by "craving."⁷

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⁸⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "170" and "Vol 13 #1 April 1963" by hand.

⁸⁶⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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(continued from the previous page) If we want to return to our original state of purity, we must first regenerate ourselves by developing five cardinal virtues,⁸ of which wisdom is the last and most important. After these virtues have sufficiently matured, we can slowly attempt a break-through to the Unconditioned,⁹ which, through the three doors of deliverance, i.e., Emptiness, the Signless, and the Wishless,¹⁰ leads to *Nirvāṇa*,¹¹ which is a state in which the self has become extinct, in which none of this world is any longer extant, and which therefore transcends all words and concepts.¹²

This is all quite simple to understand, though at times hard to believe. It is very much complicated, however, by being combined with an ontological theory of “*Dharma*” which requires a tremendous intellectual effort.¹³ This theory distinguishes three levels of reality: (1) the one and single *Dharma*, which is the ultimate and unconditioned reality of *Nirvana*;⁸⁶⁹ (2) a multiplicity of *dharma*s, or momentary and impersonal events, which, though illusory compared with the one single *Dharma*,¹⁴ are more real than the things around us; and (3) the things of the common-sense world, which are mere verbal constructions, in that they are combinations of *dharma*s held together by words.¹⁵ The Buddhist “*dharma*-theory” is unique, and has no exact equivalent anywhere else.¹⁶

So much for the tenets of what I call “archaic” Buddhism. They were probably formulated by the time of Asoka.^{870 16a} Two centuries later the further elaboration of these ideas led to two distinct schools, i.e., the “scholastic Hinayanra”⁸⁷¹ and the “Mahāyāna,” which, contrary to what is often said, did not significantly conflict in their doctrines but merely diverged in their range of interest. The “scholastic Hinayana”⁸⁷² concentrated on the conditioned *dharma*s, systematized their classification, defined more precisely their particular attributes and general marks, and worked out the relations pertaining among them.¹⁸ The creative contributions of the Mahayana,⁸⁷³ on the other hand, almost exclusively concern the Unconditioned. In particular, the notion of “Emptiness,” which in “archaic” Buddhism had been one of the avenues to

⁸⁶⁸ The original editor inserted “171” by hand.

⁸⁶⁹ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁸⁷⁰ “*Aśoka*” in the original.

⁸⁷¹ “*Hinayānra*” in the original.

⁸⁷² “*Hinayānra*” in the original.

⁸⁷³ “*Mahāyāna*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) *Nirvāṇa*, was now immensely enriched.¹⁹ It was also buttressed by a searching analysis of the traditional concept of the “own-being” of *dharmas*²⁰ and by a type of logic which in Europe we would call “dialectical.”²¹ Equally applied to conditioned and unconditioned *dharmas*, “emptiness” led to their identification. The result is a “monistic” ontology which shows many analogies to European metaphysical systems of the same type,²² while the descriptions of the bafflement experienced by the intellect when confronted with this one and unique Absolute resemble the position of the Greek skeptics in many ways.²³

Of special interest for the theme of these articles is the chapter on “Tacit Assumptions,”²⁴ in which I compare Buddhist with contemporary mentality, and try to establish that

Buddhist thinkers made a number of tacit assumptions which are explicitly rejected by modern European philosophers. The first, common to nearly all Indian, as distinct from European, “scientific,” thought treats the experiences of Yoga as the chief raw material for philosophical reflection. Secondly, all “perennial”²⁵ (as against “modern”) philosophers, agree on the hierarchical structure of the universe, as shown in (a) the distinction of a “triple world” and (b) of degrees of “reality,” and (c) in the establishment of a hierarchy of insights dependent on spiritual maturity. Thirdly, all religious (as against a-religious) philosophies (a) use “numinous” as distinct from “profane” terms, and (b) treat revelation as the ultimate source of all valid knowledge.²⁶

This is not how everyone sees it, and the doubting reader must be referred to the arguments of my book.

The cornerstone of my interpretation of Buddhism is the conviction, shared by nearly everyone, that it is essentially a doctrine of salvation, and that all its philosophical statements are subordinate to its soteriological purpose. This implies, not only that many philosophical problems are dismissed as idle speculations,²⁷ but that each and every proposition must be considered in reference to its spiritual²⁸ intention and as a formulation of meditational experiences acquired in the course of the process of winning salvation. While I cannot imagine any scholar wishing to challenge this methodological postulate, I am aware that, next to D.T. Suzuki, I am almost alone in having applied it consistently.

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(continued from the previous page) Finally, any interpretation of Buddhism which goes beyond the indiscriminate accumulation of quotations and attempts actually to understand Buddhist thought involves an element of choice, in that one has to decide which one among the numerous presentations of the Buddha's doctrine should be regarded as the most authentic. Bu-ston favors the Buddhism of the Pāla period, Frauwallner the Yogācārins, Oldenberg the Pāli Canon (minus the Abhidhamma), Stcherbatsky the scholastic Hinayāna and the later logicians, D.T. Suzuki the early Mahāyāna and Zen, some Chinese schools the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, and so on. With Professor Murti, I regard the Mādhyamikas as representing the central tradition of Buddhism, and believe that with them Buddhist theorizing reached its full maturity. This preference colours much of what I have to say.

What, then, is the relation of these Buddhist teachings to European philosophy? From the outset, I must admit that I do not believe in a clear-cut distinction between "Eastern" and "Western" mentality. Until about 1450, as branches of the same "perennial philosophy,"²⁹ Indian and European philosophers disagreed less among themselves than with many of the later developments of European philosophy. The "perennial philosophy" is in this context defined as a doctrine which holds (1) that as far as worth-while knowledge is concerned not all men are equal, but that there is a hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; (2) that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more "real," because more exalted than others; and (3) that the wise men of old have found a "wisdom" which is true, although it has no "empirical" basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that in fact there is a rare and unordinary faculty in some of us by which we can attain direct contact with actual reality – through the *prajna*⁸⁷⁸ (*paramita*)⁸⁷⁹ of the Buddhists, the *logos* of Parmenides,³⁰ the *sophia* of Aristotle³¹ and others, Spinoza's *amor dei intellectualis*, Hegel's *Vernunft*, and so on; and (4) that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents.

⁸⁷⁷ The original editor inserted "173" by hand.

⁸⁷⁸ "prajñā" in the original.

⁸⁷⁹ "pāramitā" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) Within the perennial philosophy Indian thought is marked off by two special features: (1) the reliance on *yoga* as providing the basic raw material of worth-while experience,³² and (2) the implicit belief in *karma* and rebirth. *Yoga*, of course, has its counterpart in the West in the spiritual and ecstatic practices of contemplatives, and belief in reincarnation is nearly world-wide,³³ though rare among philosophers accorded academic recognition.

Then, after 1450, the East fell asleep and lived on its inherited capital, until in the end innate lethargy and aggression from the outside brought it to its present impasse. In the West, a large number of philosophers discarded the basic presuppositions of the "perennial philosophy," and developed by contrast what for want of a better term we may call a "sciential"³⁴ philosophy. That has the following features: (1) Natural science, particularly that dealing with inorganic matter, has a cognitive value, tells us about the actual structure of the universe, and provides the other branches of knowledge with an ideal standard in that they are the more "scientific" the more they are capable of mathematical formulation and the more they rely on repeatable and publicly verified observations. (2) Man is the highest of beings known to science, and his power and convenience should be promoted at all costs. (3) Spiritual and magical forces cannot influence events, and life after death may be disregarded, because unproven by scientific methods. (4) In consequence, "life" means "man's" life in this world, and the task is to ameliorate this life by a social "technique" in harmony with the "welfare" or "will" of "the people." Buddhists must view all these tenets with the utmost distaste.

"Sciential" philosophy is an ideology which corresponds to a technological civilization. It arises in its purity only to the extent that its social substratum has freed itself from all pre-industrial influences, and in the end it must lead to the elimination of even the last traces of what could properly be called

⁸⁸¹ The original editor inserted "174" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) "philosophy" in the original sense of "love of wisdom." For centuries it existed only blended with elements from the traditional "perennial" philosophy. As philosophies, both the "perennial" and the "sciential" systems possess some degree of intellectuality, and up to a point they both use reasoning. But, considered in their purity, as ideal types, they differ in that the first is motivated by man's spiritual³⁵ needs, and aims at his salvation from the world and its ways, whereas the second is motivated by his utilitarian needs, aims at his conquest of the world, and is therefore greatly concerned with the natural and social sciences. Between the two extremes there are, of course, numerous intermediary stages. They depend to some extent on the quality of the spirituality behind them, which is very high, say, in Buddhism, slightly lower in Plato and Aristotle, and still quite marked in such men as Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Goethe, Hegel, and Bergson. The general trend, however, has been a continuous loss of spiritual substance between 1450 and 1960, based on an increasing forgetfulness of age-old traditions, an increasing unawareness of spiritual practices, and an increasing indifference to the spiritual life by the classes which dominate society.

Leaving aside the relative merits of the "perennial" and the "sciential" approaches to philosophy, all I want to establish at present is their mutual incompatibility, which is borne out by their mutual hostility. Our "sciential" philosophers are well aware of this. We need only peruse the writings of empiricists, logical positivists, and linguistic analysts, and it will become obvious that the animosity displayed toward a philosopher is almost a measure of his spirituality.³⁶ And, in a way, the moderns are quite right. For "perennial" and "sciential" philosophies represent two qualitatively different kinds of thinking which have almost nothing in common, except perhaps for a certain degree of respect for rationality. Our contemporaries continually assure us that the spiritual philosophers of the "past are not "philosophers" at all, but dreamers, mystics, poets, and so on. All we can conclude from this is that the word "philosophy" is being used in two quite disparate senses: (1) as the pursuit of "wisdom," and (2) as a "rigorous" academic exercise without

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⁸⁸³ The original editor inserted "175" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) much ostensible purpose. The “wisdom” meant here is compounded of knowledge and a “good life,” and to it apply the words of *Proverbs*: “Blessed is the man who has found wisdom. Her ways are good ways, and all her paths are peaceful. She is a tree of life to all that lay hold upon her.”³⁷ It is not easy to see how such words could be used of “philosophy” in the second sense.

Having stated the general principles on which the comparison of Buddhist and European thought must be based, I now speak of the only three currents of European philosophy which can significantly be compared with Buddhism, i.e., (1) the Greek Skeptics, (2) the wisdom-seeking mystics, and (3) the monists and dialecticians.

(253-1)⁸⁸⁶ The European system nearest to the *Madhyamikas*⁸⁸⁷ is that of the Greek Skeptics. In my *Buddhism*^{37a} I have shown their close similarity, both in intention and structure. They also agree in that the history of skepticism exhibits the same tendency to deviate into a purely theoretical intellectualism which has continually threatened the integrity of Buddhist thought. Greek Skepticism went through four stages, which R.G. Bury³⁸ has called the practical, the critical, the dialectical, and the empirical. The parallel with Buddhism is closest in the first stage, i.e., with Pyrrho (360–275 B.C.). In the last, with Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 160–210), it is barely perceptible. Indeed, taking the later developments as his norm, Bury can affirm that Pyrrho “was probably not at all a full-blown Sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere and ascetic type who cultivated insensibility to externals and superiority to environment.”³⁹ It was only in the New Academy, with Arcesilas (315–241 B.C.), that Skepticism “ceased to be purely practical and became mainly theoretical.”⁴⁰ “Thus, while Pyrrho had renounced and Timon flouted the Dogmatists, Arcesilas started the practice of refuting them scientifically and systematically, and earned thereby the abuse of Timon for his lapse from pure Pyrrhonism.”⁴¹ In fact, when we read Sextus Empiricus, we find that, although some of the original message has remained intact,⁴² it has been overlaid by a vast technical apparatus accumulated over five centuries and by numerous concessions to common sense. The bulk of Sextus’ work is parasitical on the dogmatic philosophers, and seems to be motivated more by disputatiousness and

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⁸⁸⁵ The original editor inserted “176” by hand.

⁸⁸⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁸⁸⁷ “*Mādhyamikas*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) the desire to score debating points than by a positive interest in mental repose. In many ways his attitude resembles that of the later Buddhist logicians.

At the time of Cicero, halfway between Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus, this loss of spiritual earnestness had not gone quite so far. Some of the statements which Cicero makes in his *Academica*,⁴³ on behalf of or in response to the Skeptics, are indeed strikingly similar to the teachings of the Madhyamikas⁸⁹⁰ and other later Buddhists.

The Skeptics were people who "sanctioned nothing as proved" (*qui nihil probarent*)⁴⁴. "All those things you talk about are hidden, closely concealed (*occultata*) and enfolded in thick clouds of darkness, so that no human intellect has sufficiently powerful sight to be able to penetrate to heaven and get inside the earth."⁴⁵ Though "it is possibly the case that when exposed and uncovered they change their character" (*quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutantur*).⁴⁶ The Skeptics "have a habit of concealing (*occultandi*) their opinion, and do not usually disclose it to anyone except those that had lived with them right up to old age."⁴⁷ And the opponent says, "What pray are those holy secrets (*mysteria*) of yours, or why should your school conceal (*celatis*) its doctrine as something disgraceful?"⁴⁸

"It is the wise man (*sapiens*) that we are investigating,"⁴⁹ and it is on him that "all this enquiry turns."⁵⁰ He "avoids being taken in and sees to it that he is not deceived."⁵¹ They hold that "nothing can be perceived,"⁵² or grasped (*comprehendi, anupalabdhī*),⁵³ and the "wise man will restrain all acts of assent" (*adsensus, abhiniveśa*).⁵⁴ There is also a reference to the "perversity" (*pravitas*) of seeing the non-real as real,⁵⁵ and to arguments against the senses, which are said to be "full of darkness,"⁵⁶ and against "everything that is approved in common experience" (*consuetudo = samvṛti*).^{891 57} And, as

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⁸⁸⁹ The original editor inserted "177" by hand.

⁸⁹⁰ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

⁸⁹¹ "samvṛti" in the original.

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⁸⁹³ The original editor inserted "178" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) though he had read the Prajnaparamita,⁸⁹⁴ an opponent points out that “as for wisdom herself, if she does not know whether she is wisdom or not, how in the first place will she make good her claim to the name of wisdom? Next, how will she venture with confidence to plan or execute any undertaking when there will be nothing certain for her to act upon?”⁵⁸

(257-2) Secondly, there is a close similarity with those ascetic, other-worldly, and “mystical” thinkers who assigned a decisive importance to “spiritual experience.” They are represented by four main trends:

(a) First, there are the Wisdom speculations of the Near East between 200 B.C. and A.D. 300. Their conception of *chochma* and *sophia* is closely analogous to that of *prajnaparamita*,⁸⁹⁵ and some of the similarities are really quite startling.⁵⁹

(b) Next, the kindred Gnostic and Neo-Platonic modes of thought, especially the later Neo-Platonists, like Proclus and Damascius,⁶⁰ and also their Christian form in Origenes and in Dionysius Areopagita, who in some passages of his *Mystical Theology*⁶¹ gives what may well be called a Christian version of the *Heart Sutra*.⁸⁹⁶

(c) Thirdly, there are the great mystics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Meister Eckhart,⁶² Ruysbroeck, and Suso. Their kinship with Buddhism has been noted so often that I can be quite brief. Ruysbroeck says of the “God-seeing man” that “his spirit is undifferentiated and without distinction, and therefore feels nothing without the unity.” Among Western contemplatives, *sunyata*⁸⁹⁷ corresponds to the “desert of the Godhead,” to Ruysbroeck’s “idle emptiness,” to Eckhart’s still wilderness where no one is at home, to the “naked prison,” the “naked intent stretching unto God,” which becomes possible with entire self-surrender, and also to the fathomless abyss of Ruysbroeck and Tauler.⁶³ This “abyss” is wholeheartedly welcomed by those steeped in self-negation and self-naughting, but, later on, less selfless people

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⁸⁹⁴ “Prajñāpāramitā” in the original.

⁸⁹⁵ “prajñāpāramitā” in the original.

⁸⁹⁶ “Sūtra” in the original.

⁸⁹⁷ “śūnyatā” in the original.

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⁸⁹⁹ The original editor inserted “179” by hand.

(continued from the previous page) like B. Pascal⁶⁴ and Ch. Baudelaire⁶⁵ felt rather ambivalent when confronted with it, since they were clearly none too enchanted with the implication of being “separated from all created things.” The *Theologia Germanica*⁶⁶ (ca. 1425), as is well known, contains many formulations with a distinctly Buddhist flavour. The most striking similarity lies, of course, in the constant emphasis on “I-hood and selfhood,” on “I, me, and mine” as the source of all alienation from true reality, and on the need to undo that “blindness and folly.”⁶⁷ But this is not all. On re-reading the book I have been astounded to find how close it is in so many ways to Buddhist mentality, in spite of its author’s “cautious limitation of his speculations to what is compatible with the Church,”⁶⁸ and some minor concessions to theism, especially in the later parts. Apart from the subject of *satkāyadrsti*⁹⁰⁰ this is true of what is said about the Godhead (= *Nirvana*),⁹⁰¹ the “deified man” (= the *bodhisattva*), activated by both “cognition” and a “love” wherein “there neither is nor can remain any I, Me, Mine, Thou, Thine, and the like,”⁶⁹ non-attainment,⁷⁰ the perverted views,⁷¹ self-deception (= *avidyā*),^{902 72} Suchness,⁷³ faith,⁷⁴ the One,⁷⁵ emptiness,⁷⁶ desire,⁷⁷ and so on – in fact, quite an impressive list.

(d) Toward the end of the seventeenth century, shortly after Galileo, European mysticism of this type lost its intellectual distinction, and faded away into the “Quietism” of Molinos and Mme Guyon. In the aftermath of the French revolution, many of the basic laws of the spiritual life were re-discovered by great poets who were also fine thinkers, such as Blake, Shelley, Wordsworth, and Coleridge in England. Though often vitiated by a fatal rift between theory and practice, their thought offers many parallels to Buddhist thinking. To this generation of rebels against the Goddess of Reason belonged Arthur Schopenhauer, whose thought, partly under Indian influence, exhibits numerous, and almost miraculous, coincidences with the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy.⁷⁸ The term “parallel” implies that two lines run (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1901), pp. 97–99. Cf. St. John of the Cross, *Noche Oscura*, Vol. I, Book 2, chap. 17.

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⁹⁰⁰ “satkāyadrsti” in the original.

⁹⁰¹ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

⁹⁰² “avidyā” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) parallel at more than one point, and the degree of affinity existing between Schopenhauer and Buddhism will give us a standard by which to judge other alleged “parallels.”

As he himself said, Schopenhauer continued the triple tradition of “quietism, i.e. the giving up of all willing, asceticism, i.e. intentional mortification of one’s own will, and mysticism, i.e. consciousness of the identity of one’s own inner being with that of all beings, or with the kernel of the world.”⁷⁹ He shows that life in the world is meaningless, essentially suffering, and bound to disappoint the hope that our desires might be fulfilled. He attributes this suffering to “the will to live,” which is the equivalent of *trṣṇā*,⁹⁰⁵ and which “involves us in a delusion.” He looks for salvation from this world by way of a “denial of the will to live,” which is a “consequence of the dawning of better knowledge,”⁸⁰ and by an asceticism and self-renunciation exemplified in “the lives of saints, penitents, *samanas*,⁹⁰⁶ *sannyāsins*, and so on.”⁸¹ We may add his atheism, his denial of an immaterial, substantially unchanging, soul, his belief in reincarnation, his stress on compassion as the basis of morality, his indifference to the “achievements” or “rhythm” of human history,⁸² as well as his insight into impermanence⁸³ and into the reasons why *Nirvana*⁹⁰⁷ can be described only negatively, and yet it is not nothing.⁸⁴

It is only on two points that he differs from Buddhism.

(A) He fails to appreciate the importance of disciplined meditation. Educated non-Catholic Germans of the nineteenth century were quite unfamiliar with the tradition of spiritual contemplation. On the other hand, for relaxation they habitually visited art galleries and went for walks in the countryside. It is no wonder, therefore, that Schopenhauer sees the foretaste of “the exalted peace” of *Nirvana*,⁹⁰⁸ not in trances (*dhyāna*),⁹⁰⁹ but in “pure esthetic contemplation.” Although the contemplation of beauty has some analogy to the conditions prevailing in trance, it is on the whole an undisciplined faculty, and its results are rather fleeting and have little power to transmute the personality. In this respect, the German bourgeois town-dweller was a lesser man than the Indian man in the forest.

(B) Secondly, Schopenhauer teaches that the Will is the Thing-in-itself, whereas in Buddhism “craving” operates within the conditioned and phenomenal world, and the unconditioned noumenon lies in *Nirvana*,⁹¹⁰ which is quite calm as the result of the abolition of craving. Unacquainted with the

⁹⁰⁴ The original editor inserted “180” by hand.

⁹⁰⁵ “*trṣṇā*” in the original.

⁹⁰⁶ “*samaṇas*” in the original.

⁹⁰⁷ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁹⁰⁸ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁹⁰⁹ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

⁹¹⁰ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) practice of *yoga*, Schopenhauer did not know that at the bottom of every mind there is a calm quietude which is the prototype of *Nirvana*.⁹¹³ His central metaphysical thesis is, however, incompatible, not only with Buddhism, but also with his own soteriological aspirations. It is, indeed, not only hard to see how any cognitive act can ever reach the Thing-in-itself, but it also remains incomprehensible how thought can ever have the strength to stand up against the Will, and, what is more, how as a part of the purely illusory phenomenal world it can possibly overcome and effectively “deny” it.⁸⁵ This was early recognised by Nietzsche⁸⁶ and J. Bahnsen⁸⁷ (1881), Schopenhauer’s immediate successors, and led them, respectively, into nihilism and a pessimism unrelieved by the hope of escape.

(C) Furthermore, Buddhism has a distinct affinity with the “monistic” traditions of European thought. The Eleatic emphasis on the One⁸⁸ implied devaluation, depreciation, and at times even rejection of the plural and multiple world. However they may phrase it, all monistic systems are in tune with the feeling which Shelley formulated in the famous verse:

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass
Stains the white radiance of eternity
Until death tramples it to fragments.⁸⁹

Parmenides (*ca.* 480 B.C., nearly the Buddha’s contemporary) and his successors assume a radical difference between appearance and reality, between surface and depth, between what we see (*phainomena*) and what we can only think (*noumena*), between opinion and truth. For Parmenides, opinion (*drstii*)⁹¹⁴ is derived from the senses, which are deceptive and the basis of false information. Truth is derived from the *logos*, which has for its object Being (that which is and has no other attributes but to be). Being is, non-being is not; and that which Is can never not be, either now or later (as in change). Nothing that Is can either arise or perish.⁹⁰

All monistic systems are remarkably uniform, and they are all equally

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⁹¹² The original editor inserted “181” by hand.

⁹¹³ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

⁹¹⁴ “*drṣṭi*” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) beset by at least four unavoidable difficulties. They must, first of all, try to guard against the misunderstanding that the One might be a datum within the world, or a part of the conglomeration. Both East and West acutely felt the difficulties of finding an adequate verbal expression for the essentially *transcendent* and elusive reality of the One, and both made many attempts to circumvent them by the use of paradoxes, absurdities, contradictions, tautologies, riddles, negations, and other devices. Secondly, the monists must attempt to maintain the *simplicity* of the One by redefining the meaning of predication in regard to it. In this context, scholastic philosophers explained that God *is* each of his predicates, whereas creatures *have* them, and that the predicates of God are not different from one another, since otherwise he would not be simple. "The absolute essence is not in one respect different from what it is in another; what it is, it is in the totality of its being."⁹¹ Everything plural is itself and in addition something else, and only the completely free can be itself pure and simple.

A third problem concerns the relation between the One and *Being*. The old Eleatic school, which flourished between 540 and 300 B.C.,⁹² identifies the two. One must bear in mind, however, that in doing so it uses a special archaic, pre-Aristotelian type of logic⁹³ which, among other things, employs "the principle of unlimited predication." This means that a predicate is either predicated without limitation of the subject or it is not valid at all. This logic only knows statements of the type "All A are all B," which predicate the entire P of the entire S, without any qualification as to time, part, or respect, without any distinction being made between total and partial identity of S and P, or between their partial and total difference. The Eleatics also "assumed that one speaks only in one sense (*monachōs*) of 'one' and 'being.'" ⁹⁴ The victory of Aristotelian logic changed all that. Plotinus describes the One expressly as "beyond being"; for Meister Eckhart, who said that "in the Kingdom of Heaven all is in all, all is one, and all is ours," Pure Being, as the most general, becomes the richest of all terms;⁹⁵ and Hegel, again, treats "being" as the initial and minimal definition of the Absolute, which is later

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⁹¹⁶ The original editor inserted "182" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) enriched by many further "attributes." The *Theologia Germanica*⁹⁶ says that "he who finds satisfaction in God, his satisfaction is the One, and is all in the One. And he to whom the One is not all and all not the One, and to whom something and nothing are not one and the same, cannot find satisfaction in God." The Buddhist non-dual One was in the same way by many devices transferred beyond all logical categories.

And, fourthly, monists must come to some decision on the *status of appearance*. It may well be that not all of them have, like most Buddhists, regarded appearance as a mere illusion, and it is probably true that "there is never any suggestion in Plotinus that all things except the One are illusions or fleeting appearances."⁹⁷ But this is a distinction without much of a difference, because also in the Plotinian system the sensory and material world has an extremely low degree of reality, and is afflicted by a great loss of the original reality, near its point of extinction. In the same way, in the Hegelian system the natural world is a state of estrangement from the Absolute Spirit. In Eckhart, "all creatures, insofar as they are creatures, as they are in themselves (*quod sunt in et per se*), are not even an illusion, but they are a pure nothing."⁹⁸ And, for Spinoza, "a temporal existence insofar as it is purely temporal is the same as non-existence, and is perishing in proportion to its fragmentariness and exclusiveness; existence in every range insofar as it gains content moves already towards an ideal of perfection which is one with eternity itself."⁹⁹

The background of all "monistic" views¹⁰⁰ is a religious contempt for the world of ordinary experience, for that which is not One or not He who Is. That world is held to be unsatisfactory – partly emotionally as a source of suffering, and partly logically as self-contradictory, and as therefore either simply non-existing¹⁰¹ or unable to abide in the state in which it is. In this way monism is apt to beget the *dialectics* out of itself, as in Zeno, Hegel, and Bradley, to name only a few. In the case of Zeno of Elea (*ca.* 460 B.C.),

⁹¹⁸ The original editor inserted "183" by hand.

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(continued from the previous page) whom Aristotle called the founder of the dialectics, the “paradoxes” (*aporiai*) he devised aimed at defending by indirect proofs the view of Parmenides, which held local movement to be impossible in the ultimate reality of the true world of being. All Zeno did was to show that, on assuming movement, the consequences which follow are contradictory and untenable,¹⁰² and that, therefore, the information derived from sense-data is patently false, since self-contradictions are the marks of false appearance.

Zeno’s dialectics has had many successors. Among them, Bradley seems nearer to the Madhyamikas than either Hegel or Marx. Both Hegel and Marx make two assumptions which must irritate Buddhists. The first is the insistence on human history,¹⁰³ which Buddhists hold to be utterly pointless. The second is the constant introduction of the tripartite scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which postulates a relentless “progress” from one state to the other, culminating in the tyranny of the Prussian state or of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, Bradley is, next to Schopenhauer, the nearest representative in modern Europe of at least one side of Buddhist thought. Even the procedure of *Appearance and Reality* is the same as that of the *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, in that one currently accepted category after the other is taken up and shown to be self-contradictory and untenable. Nor can I agree with Professor Murti’s¹⁰⁴ claim that they differ greatly “in their notion of the Real and its relation to appearance.” In fact, they both treat the Real as ineffable, and “at once transcendent and immanent.”¹⁰⁵ If Bradley takes care not to exclude entirely the appearance from the Real, and seeks somehow to identify the two,¹⁰⁶ then this is not a “rather inconsistent contention,”¹⁰⁷ but the exact equivalent of the Madhyamika position (“Form is emptiness,” etc.). Both these books are essentially polemical treatises and their message seems to be identical.

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⁹²⁰ The original editor inserted “184” by hand.

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(271-1)⁹²³ himself was a monumental example of the fact that in the face of the firmness of a strong will all obstacles vanish. He conquered the numerous allurements and temptations put forward by Mara⁹²⁴ and thus vindicated the superiority of the moral will.

The early Buddhist texts also stress the concept of *upadana*⁹²⁵ (craving) as a propulsive force for *karman*.⁶⁶ The will to be is the real cause of the terrestrial existence of a man. The conjunction of *upadana*⁹²⁶ and *karman* would show that early Buddhism adhered to the organic view of the universe.⁶⁷ The elimination of *upadana*⁶⁸⁹²⁷ is essential for the attainment of *nirvana*.⁹²⁸ The older generation of Pali⁹²⁹ scholars was mistaken in maintaining that the exhaustion of *karman* would produce *nirvana*.⁹³⁰ It may be pointed out that this is interpreting early Buddhism on the lines of Jainism.⁶⁹ According to the Jainas, bondage is regarded as being produced by the influx of subtle material-particles into the soul and consequently the *samvara*⁹³¹ (stopping of influx) and *nirjara* (exhaustion) of *karman* are viewed as leading to the liberation of the soul. But, according to Buddhism, not the mere stoppage of physical action, but the neutralization of the psychological clinging to action is essential for *nirvana*.⁹³² Although the Buddha is a great ethical teacher and inculcates the supremacy of moral living and righteous endeavors, it is incorrect to interpret him as the promulgator of only the sanctity of actions. Beyond actions, he teaches the supremacy of knowledge. Although *karman* has a vital importance in Buddhist ethics and metaphysics, the supreme way to enlightenment is not merely moral action but the knowledge of the four Aryan truths.⁷⁰ Both the Upanisads⁹³³ and Buddhism stress knowledge for the

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⁹²² The original editor inserted "185" and "V.P. VARMA Vol 13 #1 april 63" at the top of the page by hand

⁹²³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁹²⁴ "Māra" in the original.

⁹²⁵ "upādāna" in the original.

⁹²⁶ "upādāna" in the original.

⁹²⁷ "upādāna" in the original.

⁹²⁸ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

⁹²⁹ "Pāli" in the original.

⁹³⁰ "nirāṇa" in the original.

⁹³¹ "saṁvara" in the original.

⁹³² "nirvāṇa" in the original.

⁹³³ "Upaniṣads" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) attainment of the highest goal of man. By knowledge (*vidya*)⁹³⁶ the Upanisads⁹³⁷ mean intuitive supra-rational apprehension of the Absolute and not analytical or dialectical learning. But knowledge, according to the Buddhist, signifies the realisation of the four Aryan truths. The last of the four truths is the *arya astangika marga*⁹³⁸ (noble eightfold path), and the last item in the *marga*⁹³⁹ (path) is *samadhi*⁹⁴⁰ (concentration).

Sociological Implications of Moral Determinism

(273-1)⁹⁴¹ Sometimes it is said that Buddhist philosophy, with its negativistic conceptions of *duhkha*⁹⁴² and *nirvana*,⁹⁴³ is antithetical to any positive approach to life and politics. It is difficult to deny this charge completely. It is true that during the age when Buddhism was culturally ascendant in India great progress was made in the secular aspects of life. But this does not mean that the great examples of art, architecture, political administration, and social organization of that epoch owe their construction to the Buddhist monks, who were attempting to attain *nirvana*⁹⁴⁴ or who were experiencing the bliss of *samadhi*.⁹⁴⁵ (England and the U.S.A. are Christian countries, but that does not mean that the achievements in the mundane domain in these countries are due to the efforts of Christian monks and theological preachers.) The main problem is: Is adherence to the Buddhist ethical and spiritual code repugnant to a rigorous pursuit of political and social objectives? It certainly *is* antithetical. The Buddhist “way” is definitely and dominantly individualistic. On the other hand, the pursuit of social and political objectives is possible only through group co-operation, organization, diplomatic manipulation, and compromise. Politics is a game of give and take. This attitude, highly commendable in the mundane sphere, is not consistent with the austere character of the Buddhist ethical norm. It is true that several prophets and teachers in the world have attempted to combine the techniques of religious liberation with the conquest of social and political power. But the consequence has been that

⁹³⁵ The original editor inserted “186” by hand.

⁹³⁶ “*vidyā*” in the original.

⁹³⁷ “*Upaniṣads*” in the original.

⁹³⁸ “*ārya aṣṭāṅgika mārga*” in the original.

⁹³⁹ “*mārga*” in the original.

⁹⁴⁰ “*samādhi*” in the original.

⁹⁴¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

⁹⁴² “*duḥkha*” in the original.

⁹⁴³ “*nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁹⁴⁴ “*nirvāṇa*” in the original.

⁹⁴⁵ “*samādhi*” in the original.

either they have failed in their endeavors or political considerations have engulfed the religious. The organization of political life assumes a positive insistent approach to the world. This positivism may entail choices and decisions wherein the rigorous and ascetic ideal may have to be sacrificed. Hence, although the ethical and religious man may excel in the acquisition of inner illumination, he may appear to be unsuccessful in terms of purely social and secular considerations. The worldly attitude believes in the quantitative computation of goods. Thus, there may be chances

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G.R. Malkani: On Philosophical Synthesis

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(275-1)⁹⁴⁸ The problem of philosophical synthesis may be considered in a general way or in a specific form. In the former case, one would like to put different philosophical views together and reconstruct a whole view, which would reconcile all partial views. This is a process which is difficult of accomplishment. It is open to question whether there can be any such thing as a whole or complete view which can accommodate all so-called partial views. It is quite possible that no formula or view, however comprehensive, can do justice to reality, and that ultimate metaphysical truth is above all views. A view naturally presupposes a standpoint; and a standpoint naturally excludes some other standpoint or standpoints. How can the process of synthesis be completed? We contend, therefore, that philosophical truth is no view at all. It is not any intellectual formulation. It coincides with reality and is reality. It alone is known; a formula is not literally known. A formula is only formulated. The distinction between the two is the distinction between knowledge and imagination.

We therefore prefer to consider the problem of synthesis in a more specific form. There is such a thing as Western philosophy, and there is such a thing as Eastern, or, more particularly, Indian, philosophy. There are philosophers who are interested in bringing them together or reconciling their divergent standpoints and their divergent tendencies. They hope thereby to achieve a grand synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophies. This is an interesting adventure, even if we are unable to carry it to complete success. There are persons who are strong advocates of the East, and there are

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⁹⁴⁷ The original editor inserted "187" and "Vol 13 #2 July 1963" by hand.

⁹⁴⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

persons who are enamoured of the Western way of doing philosophy. We may not be able to reconcile these opposite viewpoints, but we may at least succeed in better understanding and in appreciating their respective claims and counterclaims; and that will be no small achievement in the world of philosophy.

It is possible to argue that the whole problem as stated above is artificial and uncalled for. Indian philosophy is not a simple thing. It comprises all kinds of methods, attitudes, and views. The same is true about Western philosophy. Western philosophy is a product of several currents of thought, scientific, religious, socio-economic, etc. Different influences shape different systems of thought. How is it possible to make a fruitful comparison

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(continued from the previous page) between so-called Eastern philosophy and Western or to reconcile the two in any significant sense?

There may be some force in this argument. But it is possible so to simplify the problem further that the very useful purposes of mutual understanding and of comparison can be served. Here, indeed, there will be ample room for different interpretations and different methods of reconciling the East and the West.

There will be those who will find everything that is important in the East also present in Western philosophy, and vice versa. For them, there will be no problem of synthesis, but only a problem of emphasis. There will, again, be those who will find the most distinguishing character of Indian philosophy, taken at its supposed best, absent in Western philosophy, also taken at its supposed best, and vice versa. For them, also, there will be no problem of synthesis, but one of evaluation only. But there will be many more between these two extremes who will like to pick the best from each tradition, and bring about a synthesis of the two at its highest possible level. Indeed, here, too, there will be as many forms of synthesis as there are persons with a philosophical mind and a method of evaluation. It is the personal philosophy of the individual that will decide for him how and where the lines are to be drawn and what conclusions are to be arrived at. Naturally, therefore, what is attempted below is only the personal view of the present writer.

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⁹⁵⁰ The original editor inserted "188" by hand.

In our opinion, Western philosophy has mainly a scientific motive, while Indian philosophy has a religious motive. The scientific motive has a practical side, but this practical side is confined mainly to human life on this earth and its needs. The religious motive, too, is eminently practical; but, generally speaking, it has its origin in dissatisfaction with life as it is or as we find it and a yearning for what may be called life eternal – a sort of supra-mundane existence. Philosophy can be undertaken both ways, i.e., in the spirit of science and in the spirit of religion.

The Christian religion fully conforms to the interests of life in this world, and it naturally encourages the scientific attitude and the scientific method. Hindu religion and its various heterodox branches have what may be called a pessimistic attitude toward life in general. It is natural that they should be less interested in the well-being of life here and now, and more interested in a different kind of life altogether or life in the spirit, however that may be understood. It means a kind of withdrawal from this world and all its interests. Our home is not here. It is a different kind of home that bears no comparison with mundane existence. All Hindu philosophy is in this sense inspired by an otherworldly interest. This interest does not find its

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(continued from the previous page) satisfaction in a heavenly abode or some kind of perpetual enjoyment elsewhere! Since life as such is painful, all enjoyments of life are painful, too. They lack, by their very nature, the quality of giving real or permanent satisfaction. They always leave a vacuum behind. The only real joy is the joy of being. It is in the very nature of man as pure spirit. It is designated by terms such as *moksa*⁹⁵³ (emancipation), *kaivalya* (aloneness), *nibsreyas*⁹⁵⁴ (the sublimest), etc. All these terms denote a disembodied condition of the soul in which the soul recovers the joy that is part of its own nature, but which was obscured by ignorance and the resultant distortions.

It appears to us that no form of Western philosophy would accept such a goal. If anything, we find a strong condemnation of this goal and an exaltation in its place of the values of social, ethical, and devotional life. India appreciates these values, too, but

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⁹⁵² The original editor inserted "189" by hand.

⁹⁵³ "*mokṣa*" in the original.

⁹⁵⁴ "*nibśreyas*" in the original.

regards them as largely instrumental. It looks beyond them and is never satisfied except with the Absolute Value. No Western philosopher, who identifies spirit with the mind and its functions, has a clear idea of this. Maybe, divinity stands for the Absolute Value. But can man realise it, without losing his humanity and his finitude and becoming in all respects what Godhead is. Hindu thought goes that far. No Western thinker appears to do so. Western thinkers regard the Hindu ideal as a mirage, or at best a sort of escape from the turmoils of life and not a conquest of the ills of that life. Can the East and the West meet here? Not as far as we can see.

This leads us to the method of philosophy. Philosophy in the West has always been associated with science. It is an extension of science. The different sciences are scrupulously cultivated, and their results utilised for building up a world picture. Maybe philosophy is sometimes critical of the methods of science, and develops a way of its own to achieve a world view which will do justice to all the facts of experience. But, however far philosophy may go and repudiate the methods of science, it retains the spirit of science. The method of science *par excellence* is the hypothetico-deductive-experimental method. This is clearly out of place in philosophy. Philosophical theories can never be tested experimentally. But the hypothetical method is still there. A philosophical theory is nothing but a hypothesis which is imagined. The only restriction upon our imagination is the test of self-consistency and conformity to experience. But many different philosophical theories can satisfy this test. Each system develops a logic of its own – and it is quite right by this logic. The result is that no philosopher can ever succeed in disproving the conclusions of another philosopher. All that he can do, perhaps, is to show the inner contradictions of a system. But that is true of all systems. No system is absolutely

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(continued from the previous page) self-consistent and free from inner pressures and inner contradictions. It is a negative way of disproving a system. So far as positive truth is concerned, different theories are equally possible. Materialism, spiritualism, theism, absolutism – all can thrive in their own way and on the basis of their own assumptions or respective standpoints. Philosophy in the West boasts of being guided

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by reason alone, but it is reason in its negative aspect, not in its positive aspect. The positive content of Western thought derives from imagination or speculative thinking.

Indian thought does not break with reason; but it makes it subsidiary to something else, namely, the revealed word, or *sruti*.⁹⁵⁷ Its argument is simple. Reason is not an independent method of knowledge. It can start with sense-experience and render that experience more intelligible. It makes for unity, self-consistency, and intelligibility. Scientific hypothesis does nothing else. If, now, philosophical criticism can show that science does not give us the truth, where and how shall we find it? Hindu thought here allies itself with the instruments of religion. This is the revealed word, having a supernatural source. It introduces us to a new realm of reality, the supersensible and the metaphysical. Religion utilises the knowledge of *sruti*'s realm for its practical interests – the interests of action and of devotion. philosophy utilises the statements of *śruti* for a different purpose, the theoretical purpose of determining the nature of the absolute truth. We are introduced by *sruti*⁹⁵⁸ to a new form of experience, the experience of the supersensible, such as *Brahman*, *Atman*,⁹⁵⁹ *Ishvara*⁹⁶⁰ (God), etc. Reason then goes to work to interpret and to develop this experience to theoretic perfection. In the end, we attain to a direct intuition of supersensible reality, which is at the same time the absolute truth, not open to doubt or error. The theoretical search for truth finds here its complete fulfillment. This is the higher wisdom that philosophy seeks.

This, then, is the second point of divergence between the East and the West. Western philosophy is wedded to reason and other faculties of the human mind, unaided by any divine instrument. Hindu thought considers this approach inadequate and fruitless. Reason unaided by revelation cannot get at the higher truth. The West will have nothing to do with any divine instruments; India thinks them indispensable for the fulfillment of the philosophical goal of truth. The divergence is once again complete.

The West gives free rein to speculation and unlimited powers of criticism and of construction to reason. It no doubt gives a kind of human joy to exercise those powers in full freedom. That accounts for the growth, the variety, and the movement in Western philosophy so dear to many of its votaries. By comparison, Indian philosophy seems static, immobile, and al-

⁹⁵⁷ “*śruti*” in the original.

⁹⁵⁸ “*śruti*” in the original.

⁹⁵⁹ “*Ātman*” in the original.

⁹⁶⁰ “*Īśvara*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) most stagnant. The man of the East, on his part, feels amused at these epithets. The Western way of philosophizing does not impress him. It may please as any aesthetic creation may please. But it has little theoretic value. Indian philosophy may be only religion, and not philosophy, by Western standards. But it is the religion of Truth. Indians are as emphatic as Western philosophers that philosophy is an essentially theoretic activity aimed at the knowledge of the theoretically perfect form of truth. Feeling, will, and mere dogma play no important part here. Only, philosophy is done differently and with a different goal.

We conclude that a synthesis of Eastern (Indian) philosophy at its best and Western philosophy at its best is not possible. But some interchange is certainly possible. The Indian can learn the method of presentation of the truth in a rational way, and the Westerner can learn the spirit of religious earnestness with which philosophic truth is to be pursued; and that is perhaps all that can be said by us on the subject.

Edward Conze: Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy

(285-1)⁹⁶⁵ After an examination of the genuine parallels between European and Buddhist philosophy,* we shall now consider a few of the more widely advocated spurious parallels. They often originate from a wish to find affinities with philosophers recognised and admired by the exponents of current academic philosophy, and intend to make Buddhist thinkers interesting and respectable by current Western standards. Since this approach is not only objectively unsound,¹ but has also failed in its purpose to interest Western philosophers in the philosophies of the East, the time has now come to abandon it. Modern academic philosophers normally have no interest in what Buddhists care for, and vice versa.

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⁹⁶⁴ The original editor inserted "Vol 13 # 2 1963" and "(192)" by hand.

⁹⁶⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

A philosophical doctrine can be viewed from at least four points of view: (1) as the formulation of certain propositions, (2) in terms of the motivation which induced their author to believe them to be true, his motives being connected with the purpose he had in mind, (3) in terms of the argumentation through which he tries to establish their truth – the reasons which he adduces being rarely those which actually impelled him, and (4) in terms of the context in which the statements are made, a context which is determined by the philosopher's predecessors and contemporaries, and by his social, cultural, and religious background. When we compare Buddhist and European thought, it happens quite often that the formulations agree, whereas considerations of their context, of the motives behind them, and of the conclusions drawn from them suggest wide discrepancies. Verbal coincidences frequently mask fundamental divergences in the concepts underlying them. For pages upon pages Shinran Shonin⁹⁶⁶ and Martin Luther in almost the same words expound the primacy of "faith," and yet

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(continued from the previous page) in fact their two systems disagree in almost every other respect.² Berkeley's denial of matter seems to re-state literally the absolute idealism of the Yogacarins,^{969 3} but, nevertheless, (a) his immaterialism sets out to deny a conception of matter derived from Locke, etc., and unknown in India; (b) his idea of Mind agrees none too well with that of the Vijñānavādins;⁹⁷⁰ (c) his uncritical acceptance of sense-data conflicts with the *dharma*-theory; and (d) his idea of "God" would not commend itself to Buddhists.

Far too often "soteriological" are confused with "philosophical" concepts, and the Buddhist "Void"⁴ is thus regarded as being on the same level with the Aristotelian or Plotinian idea of "matter," or with the "pure potentiality" of the *Timaeus*, which is empty of all distinctions and full of infinite possibilities. Nor must it be forgotten that spiritual sickness is apt to ape or counterfeit (*prativarnika*, *pratirūpaka*) the language of spiritual health. If the words alone are considered, the emptiness doctrine may be mistaken for one of the forms of European post-Nietzschean nihilism,⁵ and the self-

⁹⁶⁶ "Shōnin" in the original.

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⁹⁶⁹ "Yogācārins" in the original.

⁹⁷⁰ "Vijñānavādins" in the original.

naughting of saints is to some extent mimicked by the self-destructive tendencies of German Romantics, like Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis, and so on.⁶ Likewise, we could in recent years observe in the Anglo-Saxon countries certain of D.T. Suzuki's followers using the Master's sayings to justify a way of life diametrically opposed to the one envisaged by him.⁷

These examples might be multiplied almost indefinitely. In this article I will confine myself to three kinds of false parallels. (1) Some, like Kant, are not "Parallel" at all, but tangential. (2) Others, such as Bergson and the existentialists, are preliminary. (3) Others, again, like Hume, are merely deceptive.

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(289-1)⁹⁷³ Professor T.R.V. Murti⁸ has found between Kant and the Madhyamikas close similarities, which Jacques May⁹ has rejected as "*perfidie*," or "treacherous." In judging this issue, we must first of all bear in mind that it is the whole purpose of Kant's philosophy to show that morality and religion, as understood by the German Protestantism of East Prussia, can survive, even though Newtonian physics be true and Hume's skepticism significant. So great had the pressure of natural science become by his time that he is a man divided against himself. On the one hand, he longs to preserve the decencies of the perennial philosophy. It seemed vital to him to confine the intellect, conceived as the progenitor of natural science and therefore the foe of all human values, to the phenomenal world. In consequence, he resembles the perennial philosophers insofar as he maintains that true reality cannot be known through sense-data or concepts, but must be contacted by a pure spiritual intent – in his case, a completely disinterested act of the will. On the other hand, he takes the assertions of natural science very seriously, and is concerned as much to find reasons for their universal validity as to define their limits.¹⁰

Kant's great specific contribution to philosophy stems from his insight into the problems posed by the tension between traditional values and the implications of natural science, and in his having found a solution acceptable to many for a long time. This tension was quite unknown in India. Since he answers a question no pre-Macaulayan Indian could ever ask, his answer can have no real correspondences in

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Indian thought, which never under-went the onslaught of the “mechanical” method. Therefore, all those modern thinkers who either accept the ideal of “mechanical” knowledge or give it great weight cannot have much affinity with Buddhist thought. Kant’s

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(continued from the previous page) position in regard to Buddhist philosophy is the exact reverse of Schopenhauer’s. There the analogies were essential, and the discrepancies fortuitous, whereas here the similarities are incidental and the differences vital.

To begin with, it is wrong to describe Nagarjuna’s⁹⁷⁶ position as episte-mological, since it is clearly ontological.¹¹ For perennial philosophers everywhere, philosophy is a way of life based on an understanding of reality as reality, of being as being. They all agree with Aristotle’s famous remark according to which “The question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us – ‘What is Being?’ – is in other words ‘What is substance?’”¹² The whole theme of Nagarjuna’s⁹⁷⁷ work is the search for the own-being (*svabhava*)⁹⁷⁸ of *dharma*s.¹³ Epistemology, by contrast, is a branch of “sciential” philosophy, and became an object of inquiry only in modern times. Following the hints of the nominalists, Descartes tore apart thought and being, and then decided that we are more immediately aware of our thoughts about things than of the things themselves, that the data of inner experience are more immediate and clear to us than the experience of outward things.¹⁴ Kant succinctly expressed the shift from the ontological to the epistemological approach in his famous remark about the “Copernican Revolution,” which Murti has surely misunderstood.¹⁵ Kant says¹⁶ that “hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects,” whereas he himself prefers “to suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.” This assertion of the primacy of the subjective over the objective assumes a separation between subject and object which is alien to Indian thinking. In the Madhyamika system, on the highest level, i.e., on that of the fully realised perfect

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⁹⁷⁵ The original editor inserted “195” by hand.

⁹⁷⁶ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁹⁷⁷ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

⁹⁷⁸ “svabbāva” in the original.

wisdom, they are one and identical. On the lower levels, they are occasionally distinguished, but never with the rigidity of post-Cartesian philosophy. The division between subjective and objective facts is always incidental and never fundamental. Their basic unity lies in their all being dharmic facts. Just as truth (*sat-ya*) does not describe a particular kind of knowledge, but a state of being, so all cognitive acts are viewed as factors in the interplay of objective facts (*dharma*) which bring

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(continued from the previous page) about, not just a false view of the world, but the origination (*samudaya*) of a false world alienated from true reality. There is no room here to show the existential character of *avidyā* (ignorance), *drṣṭi* (false views), *prapañca* (idle speculations), etc., but the reader should always bear in mind that false views are not merely wrong knowledge, but wrong knowledge on the part of a viewer who is in a false position and surrounded by distorted objects.

All Madhyamika reasoning has the one single purpose of enabling transcendental wisdom to function freely. In his remarks about "intellectual intuition," Kant questions the possibility of such a faculty, and, in addition, he could not possibly formulate a spiritual discipline which could lead to it,¹⁷ because no man can be much wiser than his age. The essence of Buddhism concerns the one true reality (*Dharma*), which can be realised only in the discipline of a traditional system of meditation, of which the Christian counterparts vanished from sight in Northern Europe soon after the Reformation.

There remains the apparent analogy between Kant's antinomies and the Buddhist treatment of speculative questions (*avyākṛtavastūni*). They agree in a few details, i.e., in that they are both concerned with whether the world is finite or infinite, etc., and in that they are both left undecided. The difference, however, is the following: The antinomies are insoluble because one can argue convincingly on both sides, and so no decision is possible. The deadlock of reason indicates that it has overstepped its boundaries. The argument concerning the "indeterminate topics" is totally different. They "are not explained, set aside and ignored," because they are not conducive to salvation. There are answers to them, and the Tathagata knows them, but he does not reveal them because they are of no use to us.¹⁸ In the one case, these questions fall outside the scope

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of scientific, in the other of salutary, experience. The similarity is purely formal, and quite trivial when the formulations are viewed in their respective contexts.

(293-1)⁹⁸¹ We now come to those who go but part of the way. Bergson and the existentialists, among others, agree with the Buddhists in their revulsion from the nightmare of a sinister and useless world, but cannot follow them into the transcendental world, just for lack of expertise and because of their

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(continued from the previous page) unfamiliarity with any definite spiritual tradition – whereas Kant had still stood squarely in the Protestant tradition, however impoverished that may have been by his time.

(295-1)⁹⁸⁴ Bergson, like Kant, strives hard to show that spiritual values can co-exist with the findings of science. He does this by contrasting the largely false world of common sense and science (in which he, nevertheless, takes a keen interest) with the true world of intuition. He is perfectly lucid and even superb so long as he demonstrates that both the intellect and our practical preoccupations manifestly distort the world view both of everyday experience and of mechanical science. But, when he comes to the way out, to his *duree reelle*⁹⁸⁵ and his “intuition,” vagueness envelops all and everything. His positive views have therefore been rightly described as “tantalising,” for “as soon as one reaches out to grasp his body of thought it seems to disappear within a teasing ambiguity.”¹⁹ Mature and accomplished spiritual knowledge can be had only within a living tradition. But how could a Polish Jew, transplanted to Paris, find such a tradition in the corridors of the Collège de France or in the *salons* of the 16th *arrondissement*? It is the tragedy of our time that so many of those who thirst for spiritual wisdom are forced to think it out for themselves – always in vain. There is no such thing as a pure spirituality in the abstract. There are only separate lineages handed down traditionally from the past. If any proof were needed, Bergson, a first-class intellect, would provide

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⁹⁸⁵ “*durée réelle*” in the original.

it. His views on religion are a mixture of vague adumbrations and jumbled reminiscences which catch some of the general principles of spirituality but miss its concrete manifestations. Tradition furnished at least two worlds composed of objects of pure disinterested contemplation – the Buddhist world of *dharma*s and the Platonic ideas in their pagan, Christian, or Jewish form. Here Bergson would have had an opportunity to “go beyond intellectual analysis and to recapture by an act of intuitive sympathy the being and the existence in their original quality.”²⁰ But for various reasons he could not accept either of these traditions. Like Schopenhauer, he regarded art as one of the avenues to the truth,²¹ but, otherwise, his “intuition,” this “ecstatic identification with the object,”²² this spiritual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it, and consequently inexpressible,²³ is never explained as a disciplined faculty.

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(continued from the previous page) Because of this disavowal from a concrete spiritual practice, Bergson has now no disciples, and his work belongs to the past. As Raissa Maritain put it so well, “Bergson travelled *uncertainly* towards God, *still far off*, but the light of whom had already reached him.”²⁴ Unable, like Moses, to reach the promised land, he, nevertheless, cleared the way for the Catholic revival of the twentieth century, which enabled many French intellectuals to regain contact with at least one living spiritual tradition. At the same time, he realised that the inanition of the spiritual impulse slowly deprives life of its savor among the more finely organised minds of Europe, and he wrote in 1932, “Mankind lies groaning, half-crushed beneath the weight of its own progress. Men do not sufficiently realise that their future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first whether they want to go on living or not (!).....”²⁵

(297-1)⁹⁸⁸ It is at this point of despondency that the existentialists had, after World War I, arrived on the scene. By that time the speculative vigor of European philosophers had declined so much that they got the worst of both worlds. As for the world of science, they rejected its pretensions with a lordly disdain. As for the world of the

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⁹⁸⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

spirit, they did not know where to find it.²⁶ Their beliefs reflect to perfection the social position of the post-1918 intelligentsia on the European Continent. In the provincial perspective of England both logical positivism and existentialism are often explained as reactions against German idealism. This is not the case. Logical positivism is descended from the philistinism of the English commercial middle classes,²⁷ and, long before the days of Ayer, Wittgenstein, and Wollheim, the “British school of philosophy” had found its classical and superbly brilliant expression in Macaulay’s essay on Lord Bacon.²⁸ As for existentialism, it is derived from the hopeless anxieties of the more intelligent European intellectuals. Their *Sorge* and *existentielle Angst* spring, not from

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(continued from the previous page) their reading of Pascal and Kierkegaard, but from their own objective social situation. Russell was certainly not under the influence of either Pascal or Kierkegaard when he wrote in 1903 that “only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth[!] be safely built.”²⁹ We naturally ask ourselves what might have happened to “henceforth” necessitate so much despair. By way of reply we are told that “the world which Science presents for our belief” is “purposeless” and “void of meaning.”³⁰ If Russell had realised that the methods of Science, with a capital S, preclude it from ever recognizing any objective purpose or meaning even if there is one, he might have saved himself much unnecessary worry. Millions of people like him take the conventions and hypotheses of mechanical “Science” for “truths,”³¹ and are plunged into deep gloom forever after. Existentialism, like logical positivism, arose primarily from social conditions. Secondly, of course, when these two movements reached the universities, their followers naturally rubbed themselves against the professors who were entrenched there and who were then in the habit of expounding the tenets of German idealism, and they also added a few frills of their own, such as Moore’s characteristically Cambridge “preciousness,” etc.

The existentialist diagnosis of the plight of human existence agrees with that of the Buddhists. “So human life is nothing but a perpetual illusion. Man is nothing but disguise, lie and hypocrisy, with respect to himself and with respect to others.”³² and so on and so on. In terms of the Four Truths, the existentialists have only the first, which

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teaches that everything is ill. Of the second, which assigns the origin of ill to craving, they have only a very imperfect grasp. As for the third and fourth, they are quite unheard of. They just do not believe that "there is, O monks, and Unborn, an Unbecome, an Unmade, an Unconditioned; for if there were not this Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Unconditioned, no escape from this born, become, made and conditioned would be apparent."³³ Knowing no way out, they are

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(continued from the previous page) manufacturers of their own woes. As distinct from their world weariness, that of the Buddhists is cheered by the hope of ultimate release and lightened by multifarious meditational experiences which ease the burden of life. Denied inspiration from the spiritual world, existentialists are apt to seek it from authoritarian social groups (Nazis, Communists, the Roman Catholic hierarchy). They are prone to ascribe their disbelief in a spiritual world to their own "unblinking love of truth." I myself was brought up among them, and they were clearly the bedraggled victims of a society which had become oppressive to them through the triple effect of Science, technology, and social decomposition, and in which no authoritative spiritual teaching could any longer be encountered, except in some obscure nooks and corners inaccessible to the metropolitan intelligentsia.

(301-1)⁹⁹³ By "deceptive" comparisons I mean those which concern statements that are negative in either form or content. A negative proposition derives its true meaning from what it is directed against, and its message entirely depends, therefore, on its context. In different contexts two identical negative statements may, therefore, have nothing in common. One single example must suffice.

Hume's denial of a "self" seems literally to agree with the *anattā* doctrine. Buddhists are certainly at one with him when he rejects the notion of a permanent self-identical substance in favor of a succession of impermanent states and events.³⁴ Furthermore, his assertion that our mind is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions,³⁵ united together by certain relations" would win at least their qualified approval. The unity of the personality is a fairly loose one for Hume, just as

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⁹⁹³ The para on this page is numbered 3 making it consecutive with the previous page.

for Democritus and the Epicureans it was a mere assemblage (*concilium*) of subtle moving atoms, and all that Hume did was to substitute “perceptions” for the “atoms” of the ancient materialists. He understood our personality after the image of inanimate objects,³⁶ which also have no “self,” or true inwardness, of any kind. In addition, those inanimate objects, as well as the human personality, were subjected to the mechanical method, which discarded Aristotle’s “substantial forms” and “intelligible substances,” and which, in accordance with the “law of inertia,” allows for no centre of inward initiative. For Hume, only a stream

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(continued from the previous page) of successive ideas exists, and there is no permanent self within, nor is any subject of experience needed to hold the ideas together, or to guide them. The mind, a mere stage for its contents and for their relations and interactions, is reduced to the drifting passage of an aimless temporality.

All this corresponds well to the picture of Pāli Buddhism which British civil servants gave about eighty years ago. It takes no account, however, of the context of Hume’s statements. When applied to the human personality, the Aristotelian synthesis used the term “substance” to indicate that some features of man are more essential to him than others, closer to his true being.³⁷ For Hume, on the other hand, all mental contents are of equal value, and for him it makes no sense to speak of “surface” or “depth,” of “inwardness” or “alienation.” In consequence, from his point of view, there can be no sense in the spiritual approach of which Augustine has so well said, “*In te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas*.”³⁸ Although Aristotle’s theory of substance may have been a rather clumsy way of providing an ontological basis for the spiritual life, its rejection by Hume meant that he dropped all quest for the transcendental, and, appalled by his own nihilism, turned away from philosophy and occupied himself with re-writing the history of England in the interest of the Tory Party.

Whereas Hume reduced selfhood to the level of the sub-personal, the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* invites us to search for the super-personal. Its whole point lies in that, since everything in this empirical self is impermanent, unsatisfactory, etc., therefore it constitutes a false self, and none of it can be mine, me, or myself. In consequence, I must look beyond the *skandhas* (heaps) to find my true and abiding transcendental self

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(which is the Tathāgata).³⁹ The *Dhammapada* says that, if the egolessness of all *dhammas* is seen with the eye of wisdom, it will then lead to a turning away from all ill.⁴⁰ Suzuki, commenting on this verse, defines the *prajna*-eye⁹⁹⁶ as

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(continued from the previous page) “a special kind of intuition enabling us to penetrate right into the bedrock of Reality itself.”⁴¹ To Hume, such a penetration would not have been a particularly meaningful undertaking, and he would have been still more displeased by Suzuki’s sequel, when he says: “The problem of the ego must be carried on to the field of metaphysics. To really understand what Buddha meant by saying that there is no *ātman*, we must leave psychology behind.” Those who equate Hume and Buddhism on the subject of the “self” overlook the fact that no passage in the Buddhist scriptures teaches that there is no self, although the self is often called “inconceivable” and inaccessible to verbalised knowledge, that the whole subject of the existence and non-existence of a self is relegated to the class of the fruitless “indeterminate topics,”⁴² and that the fixed conviction that “there is not for me a self” is expressly condemned as a false view.^{999 43}

These comparisons with European philosophers could be continued for many more pages, but enough has been said to clarify the general principles which in my view a comparative study of Buddhist and European philosophy must observe.

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⁹⁹⁶ “*prajñā*–” in the original.

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⁹⁹⁸ The original editor inserted “202” by hand.

⁹⁹⁹ The original editor underlined “no passage in the Buddhist scriptures teaches that there is no self, although the self is often called “inconceivable” and inaccessible to verbalised knowledge, that the whole subject of the existence and non-existence of a self is relegated to the class of the fruitless “indeterminate topics,”⁴² and that the fixed conviction that “there is not for me a self” is expressly condemned as a false view.” by hand

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CAUSALITY: ETERNAL OR MOMENTARY?

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(307-1)¹⁰⁰² This paper will concern itself with two variant types of causal theory found in Indian philosophy in the eighth and ninth centuries. One of these is Hindu, that of Saṃkara,¹⁰⁰³ the great commentator of Vedānta. The other is that of two Buddhist dialectical logicians, Śāntaraksita¹⁰⁰⁴ and his disciple-commentator Kamalaśīla,¹⁰⁰⁵ who in their general position are some-where in the “idealist” Yogācāra and “nihilist” Madhyamika vicinity.

One of the interesting features of the two positions is their sharp difference on some points and yet a curious likeness in others. No doubt their common-though-differently-interpreted heritage from Indian philosophical-religious thought – for Buddhism is a Hindu heresy – accounts for this in general. In particular, it is sometimes suggested¹ that Śāntaraksita-Kamalaśīla¹⁰⁰⁶ may well have influenced the method of Saṃkara’s¹⁰⁰⁷ exposition and perhaps his thought. At any rate, he was accused of being a crypto-Buddhist despite his attempts to confute the Buddhist position.²

D.H.H. Ingalls³ has construed this confusing likeness-and-difference relation in the following way: Saṃkara’s¹⁰⁰⁸ version of the Vedānta proceeds from his basic conviction of the sole reality of the Cosmic Self (*Brahman*) toward the unreality of the phenomenal world. The Buddhists, on the other hand, begin with their characteristic emphasis upon the evanescence of the phenomenal world and move on from there toward a denial of all substantiality, both in the phenomenal order and in selfhood. Thus, when Saṃkara¹⁰⁰⁹ “arrives” at his emphasis on the unreality of the phenomenal world, he speaks much as a Buddhist. But obviously the two denials of phenomenal reality are from opposed viewpoints.

The point of the encounter to be taken up here, as noted above, is in respect to causal theory. This is a crucial point, since, so far as the Vedānta

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¹⁰⁰¹ The original editor inserted “203” and “Vol 13 # 2 July 1963” by hand.

¹⁰⁰² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁰⁰³ “Śaṃkara” in the original.

¹⁰⁰⁴ “Śāntaraksita” in the original.

¹⁰⁰⁵ “Kamalaśīla” in the original.

¹⁰⁰⁶ “Śāntaraksita-Kamalaśīla” in the original.

¹⁰⁰⁷ “Śaṃkara” in the original.

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Śaṃkara” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) and Buddhism are concerned, it bears on the basic nature of the world order in which we find ourselves; and, more importantly for both, has to do directly and specifically with the human prospects for salvation, i.e., how one reaches his liberating Absolute, “substantial” *Brahman*, and qualitative, experiential *Nirvana*,¹⁰¹² respectively. For, in the causal process, particularly for the Buddhist, is found the key to liberation.

Roughly and generally, the two positions may be set forth thus. Samkara’s¹⁰¹³ fundamental operational base for all his thought is his conviction that *Brahman*, the Cosmic Self or Supreme Consciousness, is the only true reality. Even the evanescent phenomenal world must be somehow related to *Brahman*, therefore, for only as *Brahman* is somehow “in” it can there be a world, however illusory. Hence his preoccupation with the “non-difference” of cause and effect, with its implications of an unchanging basal “substance.” The Buddhist position is one of emphasis upon the radical discontinuity of phenomena, the insistence upon the non-identity of cause and effect, and is an unremitting war against all substance theory or implication. But in the end there is a curious static quality about both systems. So far as religious implications are concerned, the Vedantist¹⁰¹⁴ finds Buddhist discontinuity a chaos allowing of no definite salvational topography or dependable lines of cause and effect; while the Buddhist is perturbed by the block-universe fixity of Vedāntist substances, including selves, which allows for no saving self-reconstruction. Yet their ultimate liberating Absolutes (*Brahman* and *Nirvana*)¹⁰¹⁵ are in most ways indistinguishable from each other.

The writings used as a basis for this study are as follows: Samkara’s¹⁰¹⁶ commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra*⁴ and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,^{1017 5} and the *Tattvasaṅgraha* Santaraksita,¹⁰¹⁸ combined with Kamalasila’s¹⁰¹⁹ commentary thereon.⁶

¹⁰¹¹ The original editor inserted “204” by hand.

¹⁰¹² “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹⁰¹³ “Śaṃkara” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁴ “Vedāntist” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁵ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁶ “Śaṃkara” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁷ “Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁸ “Tattvasaṅgraha Śantaraksita” in the original.

¹⁰¹⁹ “Kamalaśīla” in the original.

Sometimes the general Samkaran¹⁰²⁰ Vedantist¹⁰²¹ position will be referred to *in toto* as SV¹⁰²² and the Buddhist position of our two authors as SK.¹⁰²³ The method of development will be to set forth descriptively the two causal theories in turn, and then in the third section discuss points at issue between them.

(309-1)¹⁰²⁴ We may begin by nothing again Samkara's¹⁰²⁵ basic conviction of the sole reality of *Brahman*. This must never be forgotten in anything which Sam-¹⁰²⁶

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(continued from the previous page) kara says, for his only concern, whatever he discusses, is to establish the truth of this conviction and chart the way to realise its liberating power. (This is really his only concern with causality at all.) As to the ultimate nature of *Brahman*, nothing descriptive can be said. It is the Absolute; and to attribute qualities to it is to deny its absoluteness. Sometimes it is spoken of as *satcit-ananda*¹⁰²⁹ (Being-Knowledge-Bliss) in one indissoluble distinctionless unity. Yet, even such language is dubious and tends to reduce ultimate *Brahman* to something less.

Nevertheless, there exists in some sense a phenomenal world-order also, one of distinction, of manyness, even though in the final analysis it is an illusory dream-fiction. And, if *Brahman* is truly the only reality it must in some way be related to this phenomenal world-order. For, as noted above, even the phenomenal order possesses its ephemeral illusory being only by sharing somehow in the being of *Brahman*. Hence, the problem of problems for Samkara (and Advaita) is to relate *Brahman* to "its" world, unity to multiplicity, non-acting being to acting being, purity to impurity, bliss to agony, knowledge to ignorance.

¹⁰²⁰ "Śamkaran" in the original.

¹⁰²¹ "Vedāntist" in the original.

¹⁰²² "ŚV" in the original.

¹⁰²³ "ŚK" in the original.

¹⁰²⁴ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁰²⁵ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁰²⁶ "Śaṁ" in the original.

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¹⁰²⁸ The original editor inserted "205" by hand.

¹⁰²⁹ "satcit-ānanda" in the original.

Samkara's¹⁰³⁰ basic device for doing this is the concept of material causality, though, as we shall see, he is somewhat inconsistent and irregular in the use of his analogies. His variability in this respect may be accounted for by the difficulties intrinsic in the concept when applied to the metaphysical situation as he sees it. Yet, his basic conviction of one changeless, distinctionless reality (*Brahman*) drives him inevitably to material-causal imagery, even though he often implies or uses other concepts and observes that none of the ordinary causal concepts which are applicable to the phenomenal world apply to the *Brahman*-world relation.⁷

Let us, then, observe Samkara's¹⁰³¹ conception of material causality. The making of jugs from clay and ornaments from gold ore or the production of curds from milk provide good examples. Thus, clay as material cause underlies, and is more basic than, all of its modifications such as jugs. One effect or modification may take the place of another, but that does not destroy the basic clay-substance present through all of them.⁸ "It is in the presence of the clay only that a pot is seen to exist."⁹ The effects of a material cause, or its modifications, are found "potentially" in the cause - curds in milk, earrings in gold ore, jugs in lumps of clay. Or, in the same way, rice and barley are potentially in the earth as their material cause.¹⁰ And to "know" a material

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(continued from the previous page) cause, such as clay in jugs, is to "know" all things of clayey or earthy substance.¹¹

What, then, of the forces or factors ("accidental causes") that bring potentiality into actuality? With Samkara,¹⁰³⁴ they play a subordinate role. Thus, the curd-potentiality of milk is "merely accelerated by heat, etc."¹² Heat (and other accidental causes) only brings out the true nature of the original substance.¹³ In a manner of speaking, material causes such as clay and gold lie dormantly "expecting" accidental causes to "excite" their activity.¹⁴

¹⁰³⁰ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁰³¹ "Śamkara" in the original.

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¹⁰³³ The original editor inserted "206" by hand.

¹⁰³⁴ "Śamkara" in the original.

With this agrees the generalised SV¹⁰³⁵ language about the relation of cause and effect. The effect “is but only a particular special condition of the cause.”¹⁵ It is held that “cause and its effects are non-different from each other.”¹⁶ Another (and favorite SV)¹⁰³⁶ example of this is the waves and foam which are non-different from their cause, the ocean of water, even though separate as modifications.¹⁷ A man is not different men by virtue of taking different positions from time to time.¹⁸ It may be noted in passing that it is, of course, this substantial and enduring causal concept that SK¹⁰³⁷ most vigorously attack.

Such, then, is the SV¹⁰³⁸ version of material causality. It represents a continuing identity of substance in the “cause” and “effect” conditions of the item in question. The accidental causes work upon or modify this basic material. Now, how does this apply, if it does even by analogy, to *Brahman*’s relation to the phenomenal world? And here we come to the nub of Samkara’s¹⁰³⁹ conceptual difficulties and to instances of inconsistency. For certainly substantial clay is much more recognizably like its “effects” than the distinctionless Absolute is like its supposed modifications in the phenomenal world.

Brahman must indeed be placed beyond all desire to create, for such desire would introduce a “tormentor and tormented” tension into *Brahman*’s distinctionless oneness.¹⁹ Hence, in this context the creative potency, perhaps as both accidental and material causes, is placed outside *Brahman* in *māyā*.¹⁰⁴⁰ *Māyā*,¹⁰⁴¹ of course, is the world-, individual-producing result of nescience

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(continued from the previous page) (*avidyā*). *Brahman* is held to be “always in association with the great *māyā*,”²⁰ and there are those in later Vedānta¹⁰⁴⁴ who

¹⁰³⁵ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰³⁶ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰³⁷ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰³⁸ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰³⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

¹⁰⁴⁰ “māyā” in the original.

¹⁰⁴¹ “Māyā” in the original.

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¹⁰⁴³ The original editor inserted “207” by hand.

¹⁰⁴⁴ “Vedānta” in the original.

attributed to *māyā*¹⁰⁴⁵ the substance of the world, i.e., its material causality.²¹ Yet, the flavour of such passages as the last one seems often to be that of the imposition by *avidyā*¹⁰⁴⁶ of its illusory categories, much in the manner of accidental causes, upon the basic “substance” of *Brahman*, the “material” cause, as false being-concepts parasitically living on true being.

In other passages, Samkara¹⁰⁴⁷ suggests a more active role for *Brahman*. Its “causal” relation to the world is analogous to an inactive magnet, which “induces” activity without itself being active. “So the Self of all, omniscient and omnipotent, may, even though He Himself is without any such tendency, still induce such activity in everything.”²² Later in this passage it is suggested that *Brahman* as intelligence is indeed the prime causal factor. Or, to use a somewhat different vocabulary, *Brahman* is like the sun and moon, which remain themselves unaffected by the reflections which they “cause” in a pool of water,²³ or like a crystal unaffected essentially by a red color reflected into it by a nearby cotton pad.²⁴ Yet, again *Brahman* is said to “participate in limiting adjuncts,” whose source is *avidyā*.^{1048 25} But it must be repeated that *Brahman*, though “participating,” is not thereby changed or affected in its essential nature. It is a kind of “general causality” like the rain which helps “cause” rice and barley growth. But rice and barley (types of sentient individuals) both have “their own different individual actions as the cause” of their diversity, and, of course, of their sins and sufferings.²⁶ Now and again the stock textual answer that puts the creative impulse onto second-level, or conditioned, *Saguna*¹⁰⁴⁹ *Brahman*, in the form of *Ishvara*¹⁰⁵⁰ or God, is accepted. Such creation is that of sportive play.

It must be said that Samkara,¹⁰⁵¹ even when speaking of ultimate *Brahman*, wishes somehow to keep the creative initiative with this “One without a second,” the Real within the real. Negatively, *Brahman* is “eternally free, has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial”²⁷ – which leaves it free from “coercion” by *māyā*.¹⁰⁵² *Brahman* – here called the Lord in somewhat anthropomorphic language – may choose to work or not to work.²⁸ In other words, *māyā*¹⁰⁵³ is not coeval with

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¹⁰⁴⁵ “*māyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁴⁶ “*avidyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁴⁷ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

¹⁰⁴⁸ “*avidyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁴⁹ “*Saguṇa*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵⁰ “*Īśvara*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵¹ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵² “*māyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵³ “*māyā*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) *Brahman* in the ultimate sense; *avidya*¹⁰⁵⁶ cannot force *Brahman* into world-making.

And what of the reality of this phenomenal world? Does the fact that *Brahman* “enters into” (i.e., shares in the increase and decrease of) its own creation,²⁹ participates in it, that the world is pre-existent in the Creative Self,³⁰ render it substantial in any real sense? Not ultimately. Foam and waves upon the ocean are of the ocean, and reflections in pools and color in crystals have a certain reality, but no ultimate being. They may disappear (or be withdrawn, to change the figure) into their source without affecting that source, just as a spider draws its web back into itself,³¹ as metals are reabsorbed into the earth, or as a magician destroys his empty illusionist effects at will and without remainder, and without change in himself.³² The phenomenal world of *Brahman*’s modifications does “not exist in the real sense,” for “if there were genuine otherness [from *Brahman*] it could not be known.”³³ Yet, the world is not pure nothingness, for *Brahman*-with-world seems to be somewhat more than *Brahman*-without-world. *Brahman* may be said to “increase and decrease” with its limiting adjuncts, i.e., as there are and are not worlds. So, also, the world itself does not completely disappear (the eternality of *maya*?):¹⁰⁵⁷

The creation, when it comes to be annihilated or dissolved, still retains that residuary potentiality, and this same potentiality is the root-cause of its regeneration, otherwise there would result the predicament of a result occurring without a cause.³⁴

And on one occasion Samkara suggests that there may be a latent self-quality, or sensibility, i.e., *Brahman*-quality, even in the non-sentient material world itself.³⁵

We may now draw our threads together. The forces at work in Samkara’s¹⁰⁵⁸ philosophy of causation are obvious. Fundamental is the primacy of *Brahman* as the ultimate real, in terms of which Samkara¹⁰⁵⁹ must relate and describe all else – if only to prove that the ultimate real is the only real. His reverence for the scriptures, traditional Hindu that he is, sometimes impedes his philosophical thrust, however. For therein he finds some anthropomorphic language – in speaking of the “cause” of the world in particular. Hence, he is willing to adapt himself to this language on occasion in considering Īśvara to be the creator of the world; this usage serves to maintain *Brahman*, even

¹⁰⁵⁵ The original editor inserted “208” by hand.

¹⁰⁵⁶ “*avidyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵⁷ “*māyā*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵⁸ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

¹⁰⁵⁹ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) in conditioned form, in its supremacy, if not ultimacy.^{35a} Further, he maintains the superiority of *Brahman* to *maya*¹⁰⁶² in a primordial sense, at least implicitly. *Maya*,¹⁰⁶³ as an *avidya*-product¹⁰⁶⁴, logically may seem to be operationally almost as necessary as *Brahman* to world production; but “in the beginning,” or at the highest hierarchical level, *Brahman* is one without a second. Beside it this poor phenomenal world and *maya*¹⁰⁶⁵ itself are merest illusion.

Yet, the only reality possessed by this world (of evanescent foam, waves, and reflections) is that of *Brahman* (ocean and sun), which in some sense “causes” the world. How better express this than by the analogy of material causality? The revered scriptural teachings, despite Upanisadic¹⁰⁶⁶ spiritualizing of their themes, plus Samkara’s¹⁰⁶⁷ own similar efforts, often seem to have an underlying substance-philosophy. And, by analogy at least, substance-philosophy, in the form of material causality, can best serve Samkara’s¹⁰⁶⁸ conviction that *Brahman* is ultimately all the being that is, the transcendental ground of the phenomenal world. For, as noted above, the illusory being of this world rests upon *Brahman*-being for even its capacity to be an illusion. Hence, unlike as the essentiality of clayness to pots may seem to be to *Brahman*’s relation to the phenomenal world, there is a basic fittingness of analogy here that Samkara¹⁰⁶⁹ always reverts to and that accords well with his conviction of the “non-difference” of seemingly diverse causes and effects.

II.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Blank page

¹⁰⁶¹ The original editor inserted “209” by hand.

¹⁰⁶² “māyā” in the original.

¹⁰⁶³ “Māyā” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁴ “avidyā” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “māyā” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁶ “Upanisadic” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁷ “Śamkara” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁸ “Śamkara” in the original.

¹⁰⁶⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

(319-1)¹⁰⁷⁰ The basic unit of phenomenal existence for SK¹⁰⁷¹ is what Stcherbatsky calls the point-instant.^{35b} Existent reality is here-nowness. What is is somewhere perceptible in space, “here” for observation – though SK¹⁰⁷² deny that space is a separate and eternal entity. It is “now” in experience. Point-instantaneousness is the mode of experience of reality, and the point-instant is the bearer (potentially) of all true knowledge of that reality as perceived by the senses. For “*Sense-perception* is free from conceptual content and *not erroneous*.”³⁶ Yet, also, in mystical noumenal manner, SK¹⁰⁷³ note that “... all ‘Specific Peculiarity’ is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression.”³⁷ And it is of the essence of these entities to be “never really cognised.”³⁸

It should be stressed that point-instants are clearly only in the temporal

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(continued from the previous page) now. ŚK hold there are no such things as “permanent,” “enduring,” or “eternal” realities. At least, such cannot enter into the dynamism of the causal order, and consequently are so existentially irrelevant as to be unreal. For to be real in the phenomenal sense is to appear; appearance in time-space contexts is the way in which an entity achieves its self-essence.³⁹ Yet, real appearance is only momentary, and momentary in the strictest sense. The instant at which the reality-point exists, i.e., appears, is knife-edge and needlepoint in its nowness. There are no parts, previous or future, to such an instant.

Now, if points exist only at instants of no “thickness,” we have here a very marked and obvious atomism. And, indeed, SKaccept¹⁰⁷⁶ temporal atomism to the full. Relations, connections, unities are radically denied on every hand.” ... when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form,”⁴⁰ with no hooks, tails, or leftover connections of any sort. “Things of the nature of Individuals cannot become inter-related among themselves” because of differences of time and place and mode of action.⁴¹ Thus, a whirling firebrand gives the impression of a circle of fire, but it is

¹⁰⁷⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁰⁷¹ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁷² “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁷³ “ŚK” in the original.

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¹⁰⁷⁵ The original editor inserted “210” by hand.

¹⁰⁷⁶ “ŚK” in the original.

“really” only a chain of instantaneous particular fire-moments.⁴² “In fact ... there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at all.”⁴³

If all universals and continuities of any sort are non-existent, how can the Buddhist have a theory of causality? The theory can be stated both positively and negatively. Negatively, it may be stated as the flat denial that there can be a permanent or enduring cause, that is, a cause which lasts beyond the knife-edge moment of its appearance and causal efficacy, or one which has existed, even “potentially” or partially, before its moment of appearance-efficacy. To be a cause – indeed to be “existent,” for all existents are causes – consists only in momentary appearance. What, then, of the relation or connection of one causal point-instant to the effected point-instant? Perhaps “contact” is the best word to employ.

Let it be repeated that the SK¹⁰⁷⁷ viewpoint is most insistent that there is absolutely no temporal overflow or splicing of causally connected point-instants. The “cause” is non-existent until it “causes.” Then it turns into its effect. Or, to state it more Buddhistically, the effect is the “destruction” of the cause; the two are mutually exclusive, save that they make temporal (and probably spatial) “contact.” And the essence of the causal relation is precisely

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(continued from the previous page) this self-destroying succession; only if this is the case, says the Buddhist, does the cause-effect terminology have any meaning.

In this situation, the only existent is moment two of any three moments of the causal series, i.e., the present moment. It is caused by moment one, the past moment; and in turn causes moment three, the future moment; but exists in neither of them, in either part or whole. Interestingly enough, this radically atomistic theory, which denies all connections and relationships save that of temporal (and spatial?) contact, thereby becomes almost completely relational. The only reality is the relation of temporal succession; and every point-instant is both cause and effect at the same time, i.e., it is composed of relationships.

But, of course, for SK¹⁰⁸⁰ the seeming duality of being cause and effect at once is only one of viewpoint, not of real relation, which is a one-to-one sequence. And to all

¹⁰⁷⁷ “SK” in the original.

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¹⁰⁷⁹ The original editor inserted “211” by hand.

those who, like SV,¹⁰⁸¹ would strengthen and multiply connective tissues in this area, by terms like “productivity,” “potentiality,” “causal relation,” or “operation,” SK¹⁰⁸² would reply: You have not grasped our point. To exist, i.e., to be present in the causal order, implies in the action of existing, both arising and ceasing. One facet is as essential to existence as the other. Destruction is an integral characteristic of existence; being includes non-being in its essence. Arising, or production, has non-being as a presupposition; and experience teaches that everything which arises likewise passes away. “‘Destruction’ ... is not-different from the Thing itself; as the positive Thing is produced from its own cause.”⁴⁴ SK¹⁰⁸³ go on somewhat ambiguously to warn against the reification of “destruction of things” into an entity, since the term means only “the ‘Dissociation of a particular form’ and not the negation of its existence”⁴⁵ – which sounds suspiciously like the SV¹⁰⁸⁴ interpretation of causality as only the gradual change of qualities or aspects of an underlying substance, so vigorously denied by SK¹⁰⁸⁵ elsewhere.⁴⁶ This points to some final considerations as to the basic dissimilarities of the two views, but here we need only reiterate the radical intention of SK.¹⁰⁸⁶ “it is *efficiency* (for effective action) that constitutes the characteristic of (existing) ‘Things.’”⁴⁷ “All that the expression ‘Being’ (Existence) is meant to convey is only the idea of ‘*capacity for action*.’”⁴⁸ “The momentary existence of a thing consists merely in its being produced from its cause.... If a thing did so exist [beyond its momentariness] *it would never cease to exist*.”⁴⁹

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(continued from the previous page) The italicised phrases mirror the Buddhist fear of Hindu doctrines of permanence, to which we must return later.

In short, SK’s¹⁰⁸⁹ philosophy of causality might be stated simply in terms of invariable temporal succession, nothing more. Thus stated, “causality” means only that

¹⁰⁸⁰ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸¹ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸² “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸³ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸⁴ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸⁵ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁸⁶ “ŚK” in the original.

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¹⁰⁸⁸ The original editor inserted “212” by hand.

A is followed by B is followed by C, *ad infinitum* – which is also the Buddhist description of existence, of course. But what, then, is A, the causal “unit?” Apparently nothing more than a simplistic point-instant. That is, only point-instants can be causal, because they alone are real. Holistic entities are always suspect for SK,¹⁰⁹⁰ because compounded entities are the work of the (false) conceptualizing intelligence, and therefore cannot be causal. Any such entity as “milk-with-tendency-to-produce-curd” – often hidden in the apparently simple concept of “milk” by people like SV¹⁰⁹¹ – has no real nature; for the real “nature of the Thing itself ... is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts.”⁵⁰ (This sounds much like SV’s¹⁰⁹² *Brahman*, but is here used only to simplify false and composite wholes.) Nor can the human body be the cause of consciousness, because it is not a whole of a unitary sort.⁵¹ Apparently for SK,¹⁰⁹³ in the physical area, causality works only at the atomic level, though mental states may offer a different problem.

A second observation and question: SK¹⁰⁹⁴ have no use for “causal potency” or the presence of the effect in the cause, as maintained by SV.¹⁰⁹⁵ Causes must spring fully formed, in all their perfection as causes, into instantaneous existence. Before causes are causing they are non-existence. “When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as *antagonism*.”⁵² Or, otherwise stated, it is a contradiction in terms, and existentially impossible. For a non-acting cause is not a cause at all. “What is capable of effective action is said to be ‘existent,’ – other than that it is said to be ‘non-existent’; *the two cannot exist together in the same substratum....*”⁵³

What, then, do SK¹⁰⁹⁶ mean in speaking of “latent causality” as they do? Presumably this: When a mental impression or physical action occurs, it sets in motion various causal chains of a “similar” sort which scatter in their various causally determined paths, combining with other causal chains (of point-instant simples) to produce new complexes when time and place are right. (For SK¹⁰⁹⁷ suggest that time and place determine causal conjunction, even though they may not be entities in themselves.)⁵⁴ When a cause is said

¹⁰⁸⁹ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹⁰ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹¹ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹² “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹³ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹⁴ “ŚK” in the original.

¹⁰⁹⁵ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰⁹⁶ “ŚV” in the original.

¹⁰⁹⁷ “ŚV” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) to be “latent,” therefore, it is only a way of speaking. It means only the capacity of any given causal unit to join together in a certain way with another unit when time and place make the conjunction possible.

But again we ask: What connective tissue is there between the atomically conceived point-instants of causal reality or existence? To the meaning of “contact” between cause and effect – and SV¹¹⁰⁰ fears that in the Buddhist scheme any cause might produce any effect whatsoever, and hence chaos – we shall turn in the final section. But here we may note some other factors of continuity hinted at by SK.¹¹⁰¹ There is the suggestion at various places that there is an independent real order of events and qualities which produces order in the perceptions of the beholder. For all differentiation there must be something “in the Idea (or Cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it.”⁵⁵ In view of another statement about the “formlessness” of all cognitions as such, the implication is clearly that the external order gives form and order to cognition.⁵⁶

Yet, what is it that the cogniser cognises in the external world? Point-instants – the true reals – or only partially false conceptualised wholes? There is no clear answer in SK;¹¹⁰² the verdict seems mixed. For example: Himalaya¹¹⁰³ does “not differ with time and place” but its atoms “are diverse and momentary.”⁵⁷ Thus, the point-instant atoms composing Himalaya,¹¹⁰⁴ even though obviously non-perceptual, are yet held to be the true reals in theory. But the mass, Himalaya,¹¹⁰⁵ which is what is perceived – though it ought to be a false conceptual whole – continues “permanently.” Is, then, the perception of Himalaya¹¹⁰⁶ false? In any case, we seem to have, contrary to Buddhist principles, perception producing a false conceptual wholeness, an empty eternal form, and conception producing the real, intuitively (?) “perceived” atoms.

Lastly, the question of the relation of the causal and cognitional series must be raised. Are they independently real, or mutually causative or dependent? SK¹¹⁰⁷ seem to consider the mental series independently real – unless we consider mental states to include a bodily factor. After denying that body is the continuing cause of cognitions,

¹⁰⁹⁹ The original editor inserted “213” by hand.

¹¹⁰⁰ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁰¹ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁰² “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁰³ “Himālaya” in the original.

¹¹⁰⁴ “Himālaya” in the original.

¹¹⁰⁵ “Himālaya” in the original.

¹¹⁰⁶ “Himālaya” in the original.

¹¹⁰⁷ “ŚK” in the original.

SK¹¹⁰⁸ assert that one conscious state is the “material cause” of the succeeding one, i.e., there is no outside, other-than-cognitional, factor involved.⁵⁸ And the situation is the same between rebirths as between conscious moments in one life.⁵⁹ So, also, each mental, i.e., personal, series is internal to itself.⁶⁰ Just conceivably the body may be

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(continued from the previous page) considered a point-instant factor in the mental series, or mental states include a bodily factor – though this is by no means clear – so that the personal causal series might be a psychosomatic one. In view of the false wholeness of body, however, body-mind wholeness seems even more questionable. Indeed, the mental series more often seems to be in the observer’s role, apart from the physical series. Yet, again ambiguously, the mind of the saint can transform his bodily particles into any desired shape or form, according to Buddhist orthodoxy.

The temporal relation of cognition and event, referred to in the SV¹¹¹¹ context above, is also of interest. In some places, SK¹¹¹² seem to make a clear statement that the event causes its cognition:

... it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on; all causes must exist before (these effects); hence the object caused cannot exist along with its own cognition.⁶¹

But this then raises the problem for the Buddhist: What is it that is cognised? For, since event-instant does not remain static but immediately changes into its effect, what is known in the resulting cognition is the effect, not the cause. Thus, cognition is always one step behind the causal flow and is false. Indeed, on Buddhist grounds how can it be cognised at all?

Though SK¹¹¹³ never speak to this point, implicit here may be that same perception-*cum*-event, or event-*cum*-perception, assumption often present in Indian philosophy by which subject-object consciousness is one unitary, simultaneous event.

¹¹⁰⁸ “ŚK” in the original.

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¹¹¹⁰ The original editor inserted “214” by hand.

¹¹¹¹ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹¹² “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹¹³ “ŚK” in the original.

Cognition may not require any time; we may have the occurrence only of “cognised-event.” So, also, Stcherbatsky implies with regard to the Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*:

We read in scripture, “Consciousness apprehends.” What is consciousness here meant to do?

Nothing at all. It simply appears *in coordination with* its objective elements, like a result that is homogeneous with its cause.⁶²

One other suggestion is to the point. Contemporary Southern Buddhism speaks of the mental point-instants (mental moments) as much more rapidly pulsed than the material point-instants. If there were several moments of consciousness set over against one moment of material occurrence, this would provide a sense of the continuing similarity of apprehension of “enduring” physical forms. Whether the 17 component elements of the one mental instant represent each in itself a unit of awareness, or must be taken to-

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(continued from the previous page) gether to achieve awareness, is not clear. However, presumably even the 17 taken together are shorter in their totality than one physical-event pulsation.

And which order, mental or physical, is the more real? It may be that there is implied only one order with physical and mental poles, as the perceptual situation seems to suggest. However, one passage speaks in phenomenalist terms in asserting that non-existence means that an event, “(prior to production) ... is not found to fulfill the conditions of *Cognizability*,”⁶³ i.e., things do not exist unless they are cognizable. (Conceivably, a *buddha* could know many things not open to human intelligence, of course, thus opening up the possibility of many humanly unverifiable existences.) And another passage seems to suggest an “*esse est percipi*” doctrine:

(331-1)¹¹¹⁶ ... all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of “*ideas*” bringing the things into existence; like the “burning capacity” of fire; as a matter of fact, they come

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¹¹¹⁵ The original editor inserted “215” by hand.

¹¹¹⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, *through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other*.⁶⁴

(331-2) But what are these “things” thus brought into existence by the power of successive cognitions? Obviously not the truly real point-instants which are beyond ordinary perception – though we do have a rough approximation of their rapid changeability in our conscious awareness of change even in perceptual entities. Perhaps the “things” which are brought into existence are these pseudo-realities, point-instants bound together by false conceptualization into specious wholes such as “burning capacity of fire.” They may be analogous to the “secondary” qualities of Western philosophy, added to the “primary” ones by the form of human awareness. With regard to these “things,” we may have a perceptual realism as suggested in this passage:

(331-3) It is the *form (aspect) of the Thing itself* that is held to be “differentiated”; it is in that same form that it exists, and it is in this form that it is perceived.⁶⁵

(331-4) Or we may wish to go as far as Stcherbatsky does with reference to Vasubandhu:

(331-5) The question of the reality of an outer world is, strictly speaking, obviated. In a system which denies the existence of a personality, splits everything into a plurality of separate elements, and admits of no real interaction between them, there is no possibility of distinguishing between an external and internal world. The latter does not exist, all elements are equally external towards one another.⁶⁶

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(continued from the previous page) In conclusion of this section, it is of interest to note that just as the SV¹¹¹⁹ tradition believes that it saves man by positing an unchangeable order of Selfhood, that of *Brahman- Ātman*, so the SK¹¹²⁰ view holds, in precise opposition, that the doctrine of momentariness presents man’s only hope for

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¹¹¹⁸ The original editor inserted “216” by hand.

¹¹¹⁹ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹²⁰ “ŚK” in the original.

salvation. To the latter, permanent Self (or selves) means that man, even the universe itself, would be a prisoner of its present state, for all change would be unreal. Contrarily, the doctrine that no two moments in the causal series are bridged over by any connective identity, but only held together by “contact,” is a doctrine of hope built into the very nature of things themselves. In fact, it suggests not only a theory of causality, but a methodology of salvation: The insertion of discrimination’s knife edge between two consecutive moments, recognizing their absolute difference from each other, is a means of cutting that causal chain of successive impressions called variously “sameness,” “identity,” “self.” This knife edge of insight may expand its tiny crevice into an eternal boundless here-nowness that dissipates all deterministic succession that binds man to his present unsaved selfhood, and may free him ultimately from existence itself. Or, if the causal series be conceived as a two-dimensional linear progression, a third-dimensional, quite other, direction can be taken. Thus, by the very recognition and appropriation of the inmost atomistic nature of causal relations, their power can be escaped.

III.

(333-1)¹¹²¹ How, then, shall we summarize and characterize the basic conflict of viewpoints between SV¹¹²² and SK?¹¹²³ The SV¹¹²⁴ objection to SK¹¹²⁵ Buddhism can be stated as follows: Momentariness, in which there is only something called “contact” between cause and effect, temporal-spatial contiguity, is insufficient to guarantee the integrity of the cause-effect relation. That is, one could not guarantee that any one result rather than any other would follow from a given cause.

Such a “universe” would be one of intellectual and moral chaos for SV.¹¹²⁶ Indeed, there could not be an organised universe wherein lotuses might indiscriminately produce elephants as well as lotuses, or what have you. And how can man follow any enduring or certain course of action leading to salvation in such chaos? There must be some similarity, permanence, or partial identity which passes on from cause to effect, or is present in both, to provide the necessary continuity.

Not so, say SK.¹¹²⁷ You have misunderstood our argument. You make our causal contact into causal gap, from which anything may come. But we hold

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¹¹²¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹¹²² “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹²³ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹²⁴ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹²⁵ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹²⁶ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹²⁷ “ŚK” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) to the binding character of the contact between causal moments in the causal series. "Contact" is not a thing in itself, to be sure, but it does guarantee the passage of the appropriate cause into the appropriate effect. Lotuses do not produce elephants in our world, either. Location in time and space and perhaps the factor of similarity (see below, p. 133) are of sufficient strength to provide the necessary continuity for a phenomenal world.

SK,¹¹³⁰ in their turn, mercilessly attack the concept of a "permanent," i.e., continuously acting, cause mercilessly. For SK,¹¹³¹ anything that endures beyond one moment, any point that lasts more than an instant, is for all practical purposes eternal. For, if it crosses one temporal divide unchanged, it is no longer part of the temporal series, but, like featureless, ineffective, eternal space, is beyond and above the series. And perhaps we have here a key to understanding the fundamental quality of the SV – SK¹¹³² controversy. ŚV is essentially space-substance oriented, but ŚK are essentially time-succession oriented. Hence, they clash at almost all points. The space-substance orientation of ŚV appears at every turn. Substance, the root of the material-causality concept, is, of course, spatial; certainly it does not belong to the realm of restless temporal succession. Indeed, *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, is often spoken of as manifest in, or like, eternal space. Furthermore, logical relations are always more fundamental to ŚV than temporal ones. Perhaps in some sense ŚK are correct when they accuse ŚV's permanent causality of being productive of a non-temporal synchronous universe in which all change is sheer illusion.

ŚK Buddhism is, of course, precisely the opposite. It feels keenly the existential reality of time and embodies it in its philosophy at every point. ŚK do, indeed, deny the concept of time as a thing – because it would then be a static eternal non-entity – but only the better to embody "real" time integrally in theory and practice:

On account of their [i.e., qualified states] coming into existence in succession ... the whole phenomenon is regulated by *Time*, not by the conditions of any Quality⁶⁷

And, of course, in consonance with time as being of the essence of causal change, ŚK look everywhere for discontinuities, difference within sameness, evanescence, and irregularities. Indeed, the only type of causality which takes any sense to them is precisely the arising-and-perishing, the changing-into-effect, efficient cause.

¹¹²⁹ The original editor inserted "217" by hand.

¹¹³⁰ "ŚK" in the original.

¹¹³¹ "ŚK" in the original.

¹¹³² " ŚK – ŚK" in the original.

For ŚK, whatever has the semblance of eternally unchanging space or substance is also non-existent, or at least does not affect existence in the

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(continued from the previous page) slightest. It is an empty concept having no effective role in the dynamic temporal order of experience and perception. And so, for ŚK, a “permanent cause” is a contradiction in terms:

For us, eternal things cannot produce any effects, because “consecutive” and “concurrent” action are mutually contradictory; and if objects are consecutive, there must be the same consecutiveness in their cognitions also....

...only non-eternal things can be productive causes; as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character – of being *present* now and *past* at the next moment.⁶⁸

Indeed, say SK,¹¹³⁵ if causes were “permanent,” i.e., in continuing or continuous activity, the total universe would be temporally static, produced all at once. For, when a “cause” is present, the “effect” must come at once:

That which is itself devoid of birth [i.e., two-moment eternal things] cannot be the cause of anything.... *Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously.*⁶⁹

Were this the case, all change would be illusory. Man would be already saved, the universe completely perfect, consisting of eternal, “non-existent” *Brahman*.

But is this apparently contradictory opposition as radical as it seems? Some of it appears to be a matter of emphasis, or even of mere semantics, Obviously SV¹¹³⁶ is synthetic, holistic, stability-seeking, afraid of flux. Hence, the regularities and “permanencies” of experience – consciousness and the external world – are insisted upon. They are seen as necessary to any order of thought and life, and as manifestations of an eternal identity. Therefore, SV¹¹³⁷ give to identity and continuity dynamic causal force. Yet SV¹¹³⁸ do not wish entirely to destroy change and difference. Indeed, SV¹¹³⁹ criticised the Samkhya¹¹⁴⁰ for not having sufficient dynamism in its

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¹¹³⁴ The original editor inserted “218” by hand.

¹¹³⁵ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹³⁶ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹³⁷ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹³⁸ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹³⁹ “ŚV” in the original.

ontological scheme to produce the phenomenal world. And all of the SV¹¹⁴¹ language of magicianship, ignorance, *maya*,¹¹⁴² limiting adjuncts of self and Self, indicate an awareness of change and evanescence, paradoxically all the more emphasised because of *Brahman*'s eternal unchangeability.

So, also, there is a desire for sameness-in-difference, some continuity, in SK¹¹⁴³ as well as SV.¹¹⁴⁴ As noted above (p. 127), the physical form (perceptual or conceptual) of Himalaya¹¹⁴⁵ does achieve some sort of permanence, even though its constituent atoms are constantly changing. Point-instants-in-themselves give reality to the phenomenal order and present a basis for the perceived succession and quality of that order. And the category of "simi-

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(continued from the previous page) larity" of successive states slips into the discussion of the mental or cognitional series with regard to memory. Thus:

Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity, – yet, in reality, their nature is entirely different. That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything.⁷⁰

Thus is "similarity" called in to save at least the mental series from that chaos of disconnection feared by SV.¹¹⁴⁸ To be sure, the definition of similarity as "similar in form, through the presence of some similarity," seems quite circular. The intention of SK¹¹⁴⁹ is quite clear, however: each remembrance is the "material cause" of the succeeding one, tied to it by "similarity," which is not a separate entity but a loose and often inaccurate relation which covers "real" diversity with the cloak of pseudo-likeness. Yet, it does cover that atomistic difference in an apparently important, even

¹¹⁴⁰ "Sāmkhya" in the original.

¹¹⁴¹ "ŚV" in the original.

¹¹⁴² "māyā" in the original.

¹¹⁴³ "ŚK" in the original.

¹¹⁴⁴ "ŚV" in the original.

¹¹⁴⁵ "Himālaya" in the original.

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¹¹⁴⁷ The original editor inserted "219" by hand.

¹¹⁴⁸ "ŚV" in the original.

¹¹⁴⁹ "ŚK" in the original.

essential, way, since it is the reason “why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity” in the recognitional series. Indeed, in this personal cognitional chain of causal moments (the “self”), the chain is perpetuated by the “successive production of more and more specialised ‘moments’ by a specially vivid apprehension.”⁷¹ And what can be more tightly linked than the successive stages of one’s own karmic history and identity? And perhaps, if, as Stcherbatsky puts it, the causal series is indistinguishably inner-outer all at once, the series governed by specially vivid apprehensions of similarity (and difference) may be the movement of reality itself.

This should lead us to a somewhat closer inspection of the restless temporal dynamism of SK¹¹⁵⁰ momentariness. Is it as atomistic and as dynamic as it seems? In fact, a considerable static element can be discerned in it. For example, there is no such thing as physical motion in SK dynamism. The circle described by the whirling torch is not motion of anything through space, but a succession of different fire-particles or fire-states at successively different positions. No particle moves from one place to another. SK¹¹⁵¹ are very specific with regard to non-motion:

When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot it cannot subsequently get at any other spot ...; all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence....⁷²

So, also, this implies that there is no movement from one time to another, no passing through successive instants. For point and instant cease together,

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(continued from the previous page) at once in the same place and time. Otherwise, there would be two-moment eternal persistence of substance. Thus:

At the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such is unable to pass over to the other place ... It is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space.⁷³

Thus, the only Buddhist dynamism of which we can speak within the causal order is dynamism in place and stationary time. The point-instant is self-contained, finding its own grave in the place and moment of its first and only existence. So, also,

¹¹⁵⁰ “SK” in the original.

¹¹⁵¹ “SK” in the original.

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¹¹⁵³ The original editor inserted “220” by hand.

“doers” and “actions” are unreal. “Doer” is only a karmic chain, and even thus conceived is only a mere concept.⁷⁴

This raises a final question of evaluation. In the long run, despite all the spirited dispute between the SK¹¹⁵⁴ and SV¹¹⁵⁵ traditions, are not their ultimate universes much alike? For both of them the phenomenal world is unreal, whether as seen by SV¹¹⁵⁶ as mere foam upon the changeless deep of *Brahman*, or by SK¹¹⁵⁷ as an endless series of point-instants firmly anchored in their places and times. Is not the integrity of the causal order as real sabotaged by both, as Nagarjuna¹¹⁵⁸ realised? Indeed, why the strong Buddhist distinction between empty eternal forms and dynamic causal instants? When we remember that “existence” for the Buddhist means only the evanescent causal order, which he seeks to escape with as great ardor as the Hindu Advaitist, has he really insulted the eternal realities by calling them non-existent; or is he giving them a mark of highest esteem? Is not his *Nirvana*¹¹⁵⁹ as empty, as eternal, and as non-active as *Brahman*? In fact, if one should cut *Brahman*’s creative connection with the world, *Brahman and Nirvana*¹¹⁶⁰ would not be far apart conceptually. And perhaps only with difficulty can the outsider distinguish between the experiences of union with *Brahman* and the “going out of self” in *Nirvana*.¹¹⁶¹

Two concluding statements will vividly indicate the measure of SV-SK¹¹⁶² likeness in this context. The first is from SV:¹¹⁶³

The whole universe of action, its factors and results [i.e., cause and effect], beginning with the Undifferentiated, comes within the category of ignorance.⁷⁵

And, of course, for SV,¹¹⁶⁴ ignorance means the unreality of *māyā*.¹¹⁶⁵

From SK,¹¹⁶⁶ the philosophers of dynamic change, comes this:

If it had been held by us that there is really a *Doer* and *Experiencer*, then the doctrine of the “Perpetual Flux” might have involved the anomaly of “the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done;” – as a matter of fact, however,

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¹¹⁵⁴ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁵⁵ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹⁵⁶ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹⁵⁷ “ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁵⁸ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹¹⁵⁹ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹¹⁶⁰ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹¹⁶¹ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹¹⁶² “ŚV-ŚK” in the original.

¹¹⁶³ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹⁶⁴ “ŚV” in the original.

¹¹⁶⁵ “māyā” in the original.

¹¹⁶⁶ “ŚK” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) the view held by us is that the Universe is mere Idea, and that there is nothing done or experienced by anyone.⁷⁶

Now, it is true that the latter comment is primarily spoken against the doctrine of soul. And so one might say that it is only soul whose unreality is here in question, not that of causal sequence. But in the end there is little difference. The mind's cognitional order is not clearly distinguishable from the physical phenomenal order. The whole realm of "existence" in the Buddhist world is but a restless, tormented dream that someone – identity unspecified – is having. But, as soon as the dreamer is released into changeless *Nirvāṇa*, as changelessly undifferentiated as *Brahman*, for him all existence and causal order will disappear.

No doubt, if all dreamers were released, the total order would dissolve into that same *Nirvāṇa*, the only true Real. There remains then only the question as to whether the superior importance given to the ever-changing order of causal succession by the Buddhist, within the realm of ignorance, is a better psychological means of escaping the changefulness of that realm than the Hindu alternative of the realisation of an Eternal Identity amid illusory phenomenal succession.

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A. Grava: Tao: An Age-Old Concept in Its Modern Perspective

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TAO: AN AGE-OLD CONCEPT IN ITS MODERN PERSPECTIVE

A. Grava

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(345-1)¹¹⁷¹ [The state in which] there are no concepts [is the] beginning of heaven and earth; [the state in which] there are concepts [is] mother of all entities. [In the state in which] there is no conceptual longing [directedness] at all one can intuit its [*Tao's*]

¹¹⁶⁸ The original editor inserted "221" by hand.

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¹¹⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "222," "Vol 13 # 3 Oct '63," and "A. GRAVA" by hand.

¹¹⁷¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

backgroundness; [in the state in which] there is true conceptual longing [directedness] one can perceive its [*Tao's*] distinctness [in the appearance constituted within *Tao*]....⁵

After carefully comparing these four translations, it is rather obvious that the last three do away with a certain ambiguity, if not obscurity, which has always arisen whenever the relationship between being and non-being is conceived in their absoluteness, rather than in their relational meanings. Duyvendak follows this ambiguous terminology of "Being" versus "Non-being" which, according to some earlier Neo-Taoists, remains at least ambiguous, and in some later analyses of Neo-Taoist writings logically leads to the doctrine of "self-transformation" (*tu hua*^d), thus discarding the necessity of the original concept of *Tao*. Fung is quite explicit in this respect:

Wang Pi^e ... refers to the Way or *Tao* as "non-being" (*wu*^f), without, however, explaining very clearly what he means by this term. But when we turn to the *Chuangtzu's Commentary* [joint interpretation by Hsiang-Kuo^h], it becomes apparent that "non-being" is there interpreted as actually signifying a state of nothingness. In other words, it is equivalent to what we would today describe as a mathematical zero. Hence *Tao*, since it is "non-being," cannot be regarded as the first cause or prime mover for things in the world of being. On the contrary, we are told that all things are the way they are simply because of an inherent natural tendency which causes them to be thus.⁶

Fung's own conclusion points to the doctrine of "self-transformation" as it appears in the *Chuang Tzu Commentary*, joint work by the later Neo-Taoists Hsiang Hsiu¹ and Kuo Hsiang.¹ "According to these statements, what we call the Way or *Tao* is simply a designation for the principle that everything produces itself and does not issue from anything else.... For in actual fact, 'being' as such eternally exists; ..." ⁷

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(continued from the previous page) That Duyvendak's choice of terms "Being" and "Non-being" is unfortunate, and actually has nothing to do with the original meaning of *Tao*, becomes obvious in a passage from another work by Fung:

The Hsiang-Kuo interpretation made several most important revisions in the original Taoism of Lao Tzu^k and Chuang Tzu. The first is that the *Tao* is really *wu*, i.e., "nothing" or "nothingness." Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu also had maintained that the *Tao*

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¹¹⁷³ The original editor inserted "223" by hand.

is *Wu*, but by *Wu* they meant having no name. That is, according to them, the *Tao* is not a thing; hence it is unnamable. But according to the Hsiang-Kuo interpretation, the *Tao* is really literally nothing.⁸

In their later criticism, it is obvious that Hsiang-Kuo have distorted the very essence of Lao Tzu's original thought: it is not a question of polarity between "absolute being," which "exists eternally" (having a Parmenidean flavour) and "absolute non-being," but rather between "actuality" and "potentiality." One of the greatest dangers that lurk at every corner on the way toward a correct interpretation of the original meaning of *Tao* is the tendency to equate "non-presence" or "not-yet-being" with "absolute non-being," and to commit the fallacy of confusing potentiality of a "field" with empty space or absolute void, or the mathematical zero with nothingness. The original meaning of *Tao* points to an immense reservoir of pure potentialities, out of which things emerge through the process of emanation and not through creation *ex nihilo* (cf. physical particles that "emanate" from a "field of forces").

When Hsiang-Kuo inquire into the possible existence of a Creator by means of the following argument: "If He is not, how can He create things? But if He is, He is simply one of these things, and how can one thing produce another? ... Therefore there is no Creator, and everything produces itself ..." ⁹ they seem to miss the point completely, since the original meaning of *Tao* has never contained any idea of a Creator or even creation, but only that of emanation from an unnameable backgroundness, somewhat similar to the modern views on "ether," or to Eddington's "mind-stuff." "The mind-stuff is the aggregation of relations and relata which form the building material for the physical world.... It is in this background, that our own mental consciousness lies; and here, if anywhere, we may find a Power greater than but akin to consciousness." ¹⁰

From the text under examination, especially the last three translations, it appears that the difference lies between the state of actuality, or the realm

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Harsh Narain: Sunyavada: A Reinterpretation

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SUNYAVADA: A REINTERPRETATION

Harsh Narain

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¹¹⁷⁵ The original editor inserted "224
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(349-1)¹¹⁷⁶ Paradoxically enough, the Madhyamikas,¹¹⁷⁷ who were undoubtedly a most clear-headed group of Indian philosophers, happen to be the most misunderstood of them today. A careful scrutiny of original texts of the Madhyamikas,¹¹⁷⁸ as also of those of their rivals, confirms the opinion that the Madhyamika¹¹⁷⁹ philosophy, Śūnyavāda, is absolute nihilism rather than a form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism, as commonly believed today. The burden of this paper is to reveal and demonstrate the modern mistake of regarding the Sunyavada¹¹⁸⁰ as a form of Absolutism and to throw into relief its real, nihilistic character.*

I

(349-2) In the early days of Buddhist studies, scholars were unanimously of the opinion that Sunyavada¹¹⁸¹ was rank nihilism or negativism, that it countenanced a view of reality as pure void. Thus, according to H. Kern, Sunyavada¹¹⁸² is “complete and pure nihilism,” and, according to M. Walleser, “negativism which radically empties existence up to the last consequences of negation.” H. Jacobi takes it that on the Madhyamika¹¹⁸³ view “all our ideas are based upon a nonentity or upon the Void.” A.B. Keith holds that the Madhyamikas’¹¹⁸⁴ reality

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SUNYAVADA: A REINTERPRETATION

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SUNYAVADA: A REINTERPRETATION

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(continued from the previous page) is “absolute nothingness.” I. Wach characterizes them as the most radical nihilists that ever existed.¹ But, exceptions apart, later scholars, viz., those from Th. Stcherbatsky down to T.R.V. Murti, find in Sunyavada¹¹⁸⁷

¹¹⁷⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹¹⁷⁷ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹¹⁷⁸ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹¹⁷⁹ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹¹⁸⁰ “Śūnyavāda” in the original.

¹¹⁸¹ “Śūnyavāda” in the original.

¹¹⁸² “Śūnyavāda” in the original.

¹¹⁸³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹¹⁸⁴ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

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¹¹⁸⁶ The original editor inserted “(225)” by hand.

¹¹⁸⁷ “Śūnyavāda” in the original.

an Absolutism more or less akin to that of the Vedānta.¹¹⁸⁸ Stcherbatsky translates the term “*śūnyatā*,”¹¹⁸⁹ used by the Madhyamika, as relative or contingent.² He hastens to add, however, that it “means not something void, but something ‘devoid’ of independent reality (*svabhāva-śūnya*)†,¹¹⁹⁰ with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality, and with the further implication that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (*niṣprapañca*)¹¹⁹¹ since they can only bifurcate (*vikalpa*)¹¹⁹² reality and never directly seize it....”³ He sums up the Madhyamika position thus: “The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the Phenomenal.”⁴ Murti has it that the terms “*śūnya*”¹¹⁹³ and “*śūnyatā*”¹¹⁹⁴ are applied to phenomena as well as to the Absolute: to phenomena because, being dependent on and relative to each other, they are devoid of essence; to the Absolute because it is devoid of conceptual distinctions.⁵ According to him, the Madhyamika¹¹⁹⁵ denies, not the real, but doctrines about the real.⁶ Indeed, he regards Sunyavāda¹¹⁹⁶ as “a very consistent form of absolutism.”⁷

Earlier orientalisists find ample support from the Indian tradition, the verdict of which is that Sunyavāda¹¹⁹⁷ is pure nihilism. The consensus of Hindu opinion is in favor of regarding it as nothing but nihilism.⁸ The Hindus also find in it an outright repudiation of all the four conceivable categories of reality – viz., is, is-not, both, and neither – and hold it to be thesisless through and

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(353-1)¹²⁰⁰ Keith, “There is nothing internal nor external for him with true discernment, and a realisation of non-existence is the means to secure a safe crossing of the tumult of life.”¹⁵ The order of planes of existence on which the Buddha dwelt, as set out in the

¹¹⁸⁸ “Vedānta” in the original.

¹¹⁸⁹ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹¹⁹⁰ “*svabhāva-śūnya*” in the original.

¹¹⁹¹ “*niṣprapañca*” in the original.

¹¹⁹² “*vikalpa*” in the original.

¹¹⁹³ “*śūnya*” in the original.

¹¹⁹⁴ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹¹⁹⁵ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

¹¹⁹⁶ “*Śūnyavāda*” in the original.

¹¹⁹⁷ “*Śūnyavāda*” in the original.

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¹¹⁹⁹ The original editor inserted “(226)” and “page missing” by hand.

¹²⁰⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

Culasunnata-sutta¹²⁰¹ of the *Majjhima-nikaya*,¹²⁰² 16 lends support to this view. The planes are:

- (1) Consciousness of humanity (*manussa-sananna*)¹²⁰³
- (2) Consciousness of forest (*aranna-sanna*)¹²⁰⁴
- (3) Consciousness of the earth
- (4) Consciousness of the infinity of space
- (5) Consciousness of the infinity of ideation
- (6) Consciousness of nothingness (*akincannayatana-sanna*)¹²⁰⁵
- (7) Consciousness of neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness
- (8) Objectless cessation of consciousness
- (9) The supreme, ultimate void (*paramanuttara-sunnata*)¹²⁰⁶

As will be developed in the sequel, thesislessness, or repudiation of all views, of all metaphysics, which is so zealously advocated by the Madhyamika,¹²⁰⁷ is nihilism carried to its logical extreme. And it is significant that the Buddha himself preaches such thesislessness to an ascetic, Dighanakha,¹²⁰⁸ in no equivocal terms.¹⁷ There are a good many such suggestions in the *Suttanipata*,¹²⁰⁹ too.¹⁸

That the Buddha analysed the whole of reality into a fivefold scheme of momentary reals called *dhammas* is common knowledge; that he occasionally preached their ultimate unreality, so as to prompt Nagarjuna,¹²¹⁰ and also Gaudapada,¹²¹¹ to claim that he preached no *dhammas* at all,¹⁹ is unknown to many. Of the five *dhammas*, he likens *sensum* (*rūpa*)¹²¹² to dots of foam, feeling (*vedana*)¹²¹³ to bubbles, perception (*sanna*)¹²¹⁴ to a mirage, impression (*sankhara*)¹²¹⁵ to a banana tree, and awareness (*vinñāna*)¹²¹⁶ to illusion (*māyā*).¹²¹⁷ 20 A more clearly nihilistic teaching is: "Depending on the oil and the wick does the light of the lamp burn; it is neither in the one nor in the other, nor is it anything in itself; phenomena are, likewise, nothing in themselves. All things are unreal;

¹²⁰¹ "Cūlasuññata" in the original.

¹²⁰² "nikāya" in the original.

¹²⁰³ "saññā" in the original.

¹²⁰⁴ "arañña-saññā" in the original.

¹²⁰⁵ "ākāṅkhaññāyatana-saññā" in the original.

¹²⁰⁶ "paramānuttarā-suññatā" in the original.

¹²⁰⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁰⁸ "Dīghanakha" in the original.

¹²⁰⁹ "Suttanipāta" in the original.

¹²¹⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²¹¹ "Gaudapāda" in the original.

¹²¹² "rūpa" in the original.

¹²¹³ "vedanā" in the original.

¹²¹⁴ "saññā" in the original.

¹²¹⁵ "saṅkharā" in the original.

¹²¹⁶ "vinñāna" in the original.

¹²¹⁷ "māyā" in the original.

(355-1)¹²²⁰ they are deceptions; *nibbana*¹²²¹ is the only truth.”²¹ His rejection of both the existence view and the non-existence view of reality,²² too, serves to align him with the Sunyavadin,¹²²² broadly speaking.

The Madhyamika seeks to reconcile the Buddha’s realistic, *dharma*-positing, with nihilistic, *dharma*-denying, sermons by declaring the former as of a secondary or empirical import and the latter as of primary or absolute import.²³ Indeed, there are suggestions in the Buddha himself that the latter is a higher teaching than the former.²⁴

III

(355-2)The Madhyamika¹²²³ philosophy is a development of the amorphous ideas of *sunyata*¹²²⁴ contained in the canonical Mahayana¹²²⁵ Sutras,¹²²⁶ especially the Prajnaparamita¹²²⁷ texts, which were systematized and skillfully developed by Nagarjuna¹²²⁸ into a full-fledged doctrine of *sunyata*.¹²²⁹ ²⁵ Let us, therefore, scrutinise these texts to determine what light they can throw on the notion of *sunyata*.¹²³⁰

One of the texts has it that all *dharms*, as well as the soul, are non-existent.²⁶ Elsewhere, all *dharms* are described as illusory and dreamlike. Indeed, the text goes to the length of declaring: “Even the All-Enlightened One (*Samyak-sambuddha*) is illusory and dreamlike; even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusory and dreamlike.”²⁷

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¹²¹⁹ The original editor inserted “(227)” by hand.

¹²²⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹²²¹ “*nibbāna*” in the original.

¹²²² “*Śūnyavādin*” in the original.

¹²²³ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

¹²²⁴ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹²²⁵ “*Māhayanā*” in the original.

¹²²⁶ “*Sūtras*” in the original.

¹²²⁷ “*Prajñā-pāramitā*” in the original.

¹²²⁸ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

¹²²⁹ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹²³⁰ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

This interesting statement, which has been put in the mouth of Subhuti,¹²³¹ who is shown as addressing the sons of gods, takes the latter aback, and they ask Subhuti¹²³² if he really means what he says. Let us quote their own words:

Well, Revered Subhūti, do you say that even the All-Enlightened One is illusory and dreamlike? Do you say that even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusory and dream-like?²⁸

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(357-1)¹²³⁵ absolutely no room for the postulation of an Absolute in the Madhyamika¹²³⁶ system.

To sum up: According to the early formative texts of the Mahayana¹²³⁷ discussed above, all *dharmas* without exception are *sunya*.¹²³⁸ *Sunyata*¹²³⁹ is nothing over and above the *dharmas*, so that one cannot install it as the Absolute over against the *dharmas*. The highest wisdom consists in the non-apprehension of any *dharmas*, of anything whatsoever. Since there is nothing to apprehend, non-apprehension of anything can alone be the highest wisdom. Were there something like the Absolute, the apprehension of it would be said to be the highest wisdom. Hence, the question of there being an Absolute simply does not arise. Accordingly, the philosophy taught by these texts is pure and simple nihilism.

IV

(357-2) Now we come to the Madhyamika¹²⁴⁰ philosophical literature proper. Earlier⁴⁰ we noted that the Madhyamikas¹²⁴¹ themselves refer to the nihilistic interpretations of their philosophy without a word to indicate that they should be interpreted on

¹²³¹ "Subhūti" in the original.

¹²³² "Subhūti" in the original.

¹²³³ Blank page

¹²³⁴ The original editor inserted "(228)" and "several missing pages" at the top of the page by hand

¹²³⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹²³⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²³⁷ "Māhāyana" in the original.

¹²³⁸ "śūnya" in the original.

¹²³⁹ "Śūnyatā" in the original.

¹²⁴⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁴¹ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

Absolutistic lines. Let us enlarge upon this proposition by producing negative evidence for the thesis that the Madhyamika¹²⁴² philosophy is nihilist par excellence.

The whole of Nagarjuna's¹²⁴³ *Vigrahavyāvartanī*¹²⁴⁴ seems to accord tacit approval to the critics' ascription of nihilism to him. The imaginary critic in the work proceeds on the assumption that Sunyavada¹²⁴⁵ is absolute nihilism and raises the objection that, if all is void, the Madhyamika's¹²⁴⁶ proposition that all is void is itself void and hence devoid of validity.⁴¹ This argument of the imaginary critic is developed by Nagarjuna¹²⁴⁷ in 20 stanzas of the 72-stanza work. It is strange that this work, small in size but great in merit, has received little consideration by those favouring an Absolutistic interpretation of Sunyavada.¹²⁴⁸ Even Murti, who is probably the most serious student of the Madhyamika¹²⁴⁹ system today, makes almost negligible use of it. Nagarjuna¹²⁵⁰ nowhere in this work repudiates the ascription of nihilism to him. On the other hand, his reply, that he does not find any reality whatever to postulate or deny,⁴² serves to confirm the truth of the ascription.

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(continued from the previous page) Such implicit confirmations of the ascription of nihilism to the Madhyamika¹²⁵³ way of thinking are not lacking in the later Madhyamika¹²⁵⁴ works as well. Bhāvaviveka's reference to the Yogācāras¹²⁵⁵ ascribing nihilism to the Madhyamika¹²⁵⁶ without the least concern on his part to correct them is a case point.⁴³ He also raises the question, as raised in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*,¹²⁵⁷ that, if all

¹²⁴² "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁴³ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁴⁴ "Vigrahavyāvartanī" in the original.

¹²⁴⁵ "Śūnyavāda" in the original.

¹²⁴⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁴⁷ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁴⁸ "Śūnyavāda" in the original.

¹²⁴⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁵⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁵¹ Blank page

¹²⁵² The original editor inserted "(229)" by hand.

¹²⁵³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁵⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁵⁵ "Yogācāras" in the original.

¹²⁵⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁵⁷ "Vigrahavyāvartanī" in the original.

is void, the very proposition that all is void is itself void and hence devoid of sense.⁴⁴ Chapter X of Aryadeva's¹²⁵⁸ *Sata-sastra*⁴⁵¹²⁵⁹ is devoted entirely to this problem. In his *Catuh-sataka*,¹²⁶⁰ too, the problem is raised at one place.⁴⁶ The *Lankavatara-sutra*¹²⁶¹ contains the remark: "The essence of all entities is unreal, and this proposition, too, is unreal."⁴⁷

Santideva¹²⁶² discusses the question of universal nihility vis-a-vis¹²⁶³ the question of the validity of the means of knowledge (*pramana*)¹²⁶⁴ thus: "If the means of knowledge is false then what is known by it is false, and hence the essential non-being of entities fails to be established."⁴⁸ He purports to say that on the Madhyamika¹²⁶⁵ view the means of knowledge, being *sunya*¹²⁶⁶ (false), no longer remain true means of knowledge, and, in the absence of any valid means of knowledge, the knowledge that all is *sunya*,¹²⁶⁷ or false, is itself false. His reply to this objection is not much to the point, and so we ignore it here. We have adverted to this question, first, to bring home to the reader the significant fact that, in whatever context the imaginary objector raises objections to the doctrine of *sunyata*,¹²⁶⁸ he proceeds on the assumption that *sunyata*¹²⁶⁹ is nothing but pure void, and, second, to note that the Madhyamika¹²⁷⁰ nowhere takes exception to such an assumption.

The Madhyamika¹²⁷¹ invokes his thesis of thesislessness to answer such arguments.⁴⁹ That, however, this thesislessness springs from the consciousness of absolute void or, what is the same thing, the non-apprehension of anything whatsoever, is made abundantly clear by Nagarjuna,¹²⁷² Aryadeva,¹²⁷³ and Candrakirti.¹²⁷⁴ 50 Indeed, the Madhyamika¹²⁷⁵ thesis of thesislessness is nothing but absolute nihilism in disguise.

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¹²⁵⁸ "Āryadeva" in the original.

¹²⁵⁹ "Śata-śāstra" in the original.

¹²⁶⁰ "Catuh-śataka" in the original.

¹²⁶¹ "Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra" in the original.

¹²⁶² "Śāntideva" in the original.

¹²⁶³ "vis-à-vis" in the original.

¹²⁶⁴ "pramāṇa" in the original.

¹²⁶⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁶⁶ "śūnya" in the original.

¹²⁶⁷ "śūnya" in the original.

¹²⁶⁸ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹²⁶⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹²⁷⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁷¹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁷² "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁷³ "Āryadeva" in the original.

¹²⁷⁴ "Candrakīrti" in the original.

¹²⁷⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁷⁶ Blank page

(361-1)¹²⁷⁸ Now about positive evidence of Madhyamika¹²⁷⁹ philosophical literature proper.

Nagarjuna¹²⁸⁰ unequivocally expresses the view that objects, being essenceless, do not exist.⁵¹ He openly declares, "Essencelessness of objects is proved by the phenomenon of change. And there can be no object without essence. Hence the *sunyata*¹²⁸¹ of objects."⁵² According to him, the fact of change presents an insoluble problem, a veritable dilemma, to the realist.

If there be no essence, what would undergo change? If, again, there be an essence, what would undergo change? The same object cannot undergo change (viz., cannot become another object), nor can another object do so; for the youth does not age nor does the aged one age. If the same object becomes another, milk itself would become curd. [If you say that something else becomes curd,] what other than milk can become curd?⁵³

The Madhyamikas¹²⁸² are never tired of describing the world as pure illusion, but in so doing they never suggest that they see anything non-illusory behind it.⁵⁴

Nagajuna's¹²⁸³ method is to consider the various modes of being countenanced by common sense as well as by philosophies in general and to repudiate all of them by showing that they lack law, lack logic, and hence are a chaos rather than a cosmos. This is a chaotic or irrationalistic conception of reality, as it were. Hegel, who is in a way the most thoroughgoing rationalist ever born and whose cosmic or rationalistic conception of reality can perhaps never be surpassed, declares that the real is rational and that the rational is real. The Madhyamika¹²⁸⁴ is prepared to grant this proposition, that only the rational can be real; but his finding is that there is nothing rational, from which premise he concludes that there is nothing real. In sum: Hegel takes it that the real is rational; the Māahyamika¹²⁸⁵ that the apparently real is the irrational, and hence at bottom unreal.

¹²⁷⁷ The original editor inserted "(230)" by hand.

¹²⁷⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹²⁷⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁸⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁸¹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹²⁸² "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹²⁸³ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁸⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁸⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

So, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Madhyamika's¹²⁸⁶ method is that he endeavors to drive at the thought that all is pure void. The modes of being examined by him are: causality, motion, matter, space, existence,

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(continued from the previous page) non-existence, qualificans and qualificand, light and darkness, soul, substance, relativity, time, change, relation, essence, value or morals, etc. What he seems to be concerned to drive at through his examination of such modes or categories of being is to demonstrate that the universe is a chaos and not a cosmos, that nothing can be said to be in any of the states conceivable by man, and that, this being so, nothing whatever exists.

As noted above, according to Buddhism, reality is divisible into the conditioned and the unconditioned. Nagarjuna¹²⁸⁹ argues: "There being no proof of emergence, endurance, and extinction, the conditioned does not exist; and, in default of the establishment of the conditioned, how can there be the unconditioned?"⁵⁵ The logical corollary from this proposition is that, there being neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned, there is no reality whatever.

Nagarjuna¹²⁹⁰ takes enormous pains to demonstrate that nothing possesses absolute being, that all is relative. Reality is characterized by interdependence. Nothing exists in its own right, independently of other things. The existence of each object is borrowed from its relationship to other objects. This is the doctrine of what may be called universal relativity. It rejects all thought of an Absolute as the ground of the realm of relativity. According to it, all is relative (*pratitya-samutpann*^{1291a}). "No Absolute (*apratitya-samutpann*^{1292a}) real whatever exists."⁵⁶ "There is no non-relative subsistence of anything anywhere at any time."⁵⁷

Nagarjuna¹²⁹³ remarks in two of his works that, since this world is non-existent, the other world is non-existent also.⁵⁸ This will also be found significant in this connection.

¹²⁸⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁸⁷ Blank page

¹²⁸⁸ The original editor inserted "(231)" by hand.

¹²⁸⁹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁹⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁹¹ "pratītya" in the original.

¹²⁹² "apratītya" in the original.

¹²⁹³ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

What we wish to drive at vis-a-vis¹²⁹⁴ the position of the Madhyamika¹²⁹⁵ is best illustrated by the very interesting discussion of the relativity of *dharma*s with reference to fire and fuel given in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*¹²⁹⁶ (*Madhyamika-kārikā*).¹²⁹⁷ Nagarjuna¹²⁹⁸ writes:

If the fire is relative to the fuel, or the fuel is relative to the fire, which of the two came first, to which the fire [or] the fuel is relative? If an entity becomes possible in and through its relation to that entity which itself owes its existence to its relationship to the former, which entity can exist on account of which? The entity which owes its existence to another is non-existent; how, then, can it need the latter? If, on the other hand, it so needs when it is existent, the question of needing simply does not arise.⁵⁹

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(continued from the previous page) Nagarjuna's¹³⁰¹ suggestion⁶⁰ that his denial of the world should not be taken to imply belief in another order of reality like the Absolute, immanent in or transcendent to phenomena, is quite in conformity with the spirit of the Prajñāpāramitā¹³⁰² texts, which refuse to set *śūnyatā*¹³⁰³ over against the *dharma*s and to acknowledge the positive knowledge of any such reality in the highest wisdom conceived by them. As already shown, the Madhyamika¹³⁰⁴ holds that *śūnyatā*¹³⁰⁵ is non-different from the *dharma*s and that there is total non-apprehension of any reality whatsoever in the highest wisdom. This is the tone of the whole gamut of Madhyamika¹³⁰⁶ literature. Nagarjuna¹³⁰⁷ goes to the extent of declaring identity of phenomena with the Tathāgata¹³⁰⁸ and *nirvāṇa*,¹³⁰⁹ thereby making it indisputably clear

¹²⁹⁴ "vis-à-vis" in the original.

¹²⁹⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹²⁹⁶ "Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā" in the original.

¹²⁹⁷ "Mādhyamika-kārikā" in the original.

¹²⁹⁸ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹²⁹⁹ Blank page

¹³⁰⁰ The original editor inserted "(232)" by hand.

¹³⁰¹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹³⁰² "Prajñāpāramitā" in the original.

¹³⁰³ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹³⁰⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁰⁵ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹³⁰⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁰⁷ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹³⁰⁸ "Tathāgata" in the original.

that there is nothing like the Absolute over and above the relative. He says, “Where there is no superimposition of *nirvana*,¹³¹⁰ nor elimination of *samsara*¹³¹¹ (phenomena), what can there be conceived like *samsara*¹³¹² and *nirvana*?¹³¹³”⁶¹

Candrakīrti¹³¹⁴ comments that such superimposition and elimination are ruled out on account of the non-being of both *nirvana*¹³¹⁵ and *samsara*.¹³¹⁶ ⁶² Nagarjuna¹³¹⁷ establishes complete equipollency between *samsara*¹³¹⁸ and *nirvana*¹³¹⁹ thus:

This world is of the same essence as the Tathagata,¹³²⁰ and, since the Tathagata¹³²¹ is essenceless, this world, too, is essenceless.⁶³

*Samsara*¹³²² has nothing to distinguish itself from *nirvana*.¹³²³ *Nirvana*¹³²⁴ has nothing to distinguish itself from *samsara*.¹³²⁵ *Samsara*¹³²⁶ belongs to the same category as *nirvana*.¹³²⁷ There is not the minutest difference between the two.⁶⁴

That which constitutes this process of births and deaths due to causes and conditions constitutes *nirvana*¹³²⁸ without causes and conditions.⁶⁵

Elsewhere Nagarjuna¹³²⁹ expresses the view that *śūnyatā*¹³³⁰ is nothing other than existents, nor is there any existent without *śūnyatā*.¹³³¹ ⁶⁶ These words occur in the *Advaya-vajra-saṃgraha*¹³³² as well.⁶⁷

Prajñākaramatī¹³³³ has expressed himself categorically against the attempt to install *śūnyatā* over against the realm of being. His words are: “*Śūnyatā*¹³³⁴ is not

¹³⁰⁹ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³¹⁰ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³¹¹ “saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³¹² “saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³¹³ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³¹⁴ “Candrakīrti” in the original.

¹³¹⁵ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³¹⁶ “saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³¹⁷ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹³¹⁸ “saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³¹⁹ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³²⁰ “Tathāgata” in the original.

¹³²¹ “Tathāgata” in the original.

¹³²² “Saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³²³ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³²⁴ “Nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³²⁵ “saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³²⁶ “Saṃsāra” in the original.

¹³²⁷ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³²⁸ “nirvāṇa” in the original.

¹³²⁹ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹³³⁰ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹³³¹ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹³³² “saṃgraha” in the original.

¹³³³ “Prajñākaramatī” in the original.

¹³³⁴ “Śūnyatā” in the original.

different from being, for being itself is of the nature of that; otherwise, in the event of *sunyata's*¹³³⁵ being different from being, there would be no essencelessness of *dharms*.”⁶⁸

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(continued from the previous page) The doctrine of universal relativity (*pratitya-samutpāda*^{1338a})¹³³⁹ is the stepping stone to the doctrine of *sunyata*.¹³⁴⁰ The knowledge of the former at once leads to the knowledge of the latter. Their relation is so intimate that Nagarjuna¹³⁴¹ does not hesitate in identifying the two. He says, “What is relativity we call *sunyata*.¹³⁴² It (*sunyata*)¹³⁴³ is relative being (*upadaya-prajñapti*).¹³⁴⁴ It is the middle path.”⁶⁹ This proposition is pregnant with implications. The *Madhyamika*¹³⁴⁵ turned *pratitya-samutpada*¹³⁴⁶ (relativity or, literally, dependent origination) into *pratitya-samutpada*¹³⁴⁷ (dependent or relative being).⁷⁰ In this sense, he expressed *pratitya-samutpada*¹³⁴⁸ otherwise as *upadaya-prajñapti*¹³⁴⁹ (relative being). In fact, his *pratitya-samutpada*¹³⁵⁰ is tantamount to a denial of causation altogether. Indeed, in another work, Nagarjuna¹³⁵¹ has remarked that what has come into being through causes and conditions has, in fact, not come into being at all. And, since it has not come into being, it is *sunya*,¹³⁵² or void, pure and simple.⁷¹ It is significant that Candrakīrti interprets *pratitya-samutpada*¹³⁵³ to mean “non-origination by nature” (*svabhavenanutpadaḥ*).^{1354 72}

¹³³⁵ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹³³⁶ Blank page

¹³³⁷ The original editor inserted “(233)” by hand.

¹³³⁸ “pratītya” in the original.

¹³³⁹ “samutpāda” iito

¹³⁴⁰ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹³⁴¹ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹³⁴² “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹³⁴³ “śūnyatā” iito

¹³⁴⁴ “upādāya-prajñapti” in the original.

¹³⁴⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹³⁴⁶ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

¹³⁴⁷ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

¹³⁴⁸ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

¹³⁴⁹ “upādāya-prajñapti” in the original.

¹³⁵⁰ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

¹³⁵¹ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹³⁵² “śūnya” in the original.

¹³⁵³ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

The Madhyamika¹³⁵⁵ system is an extension of the Buddha's theses of soullessness, universal evanescence, and the quietude of *nirvana*.¹³⁵⁶ 73 His doctrine of soullessness and denial of substance or abiding reality led to the denial of a reality subjacent to phenomena. From the position that the changing phenomena have no underlying, changeless reality, it was only a short step to the position that phenomena have no underlying reality at all. The former position made short work of the latter. The Naiyayikas,¹³⁵⁷ Purva¹³⁵⁸ Mimamsakas,¹³⁵⁹ Lokayatas,¹³⁶⁰ and Buddhist realists like the Sarvastivadins¹³⁶¹ and Vaibhasikas¹³⁶² hold that appearances are real. The Advaita Vedanta and the Vijñānavāda¹³⁶³ hold that appearances are unreal, and posit a reality underlying them. Early Buddhism dismissed substance, including the soul (*pudgala-nairātmya* or *pudgala-sūnyatā*),¹³⁶⁴ but postulated two orders of reals called *dharma*s, personal and non-personal, which come out of nothing, endure for just a moment, and then relapse into nothing, thanks to the law of discontinuous continuity (*pratītya-samutpāda*).¹³⁶⁵ The Satyasiddhi and Madhyamika¹³⁶⁶ schools went a step further and dismissed the *dharma*s (*dharma-nairātmya*¹³⁶⁷ or *sarva-dharma*

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(continued from the previous page) *-sūnyatā*),¹³⁷⁰ too. The Madhyamika, in effect, calls appearances unreal without positing a reality behind them. Dasgupta is right when he says:

¹³⁵⁴ "svabhāvenānutpādaḥ" in the original.

¹³⁵⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁵⁶ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹³⁵⁷ "Naiyāyikas" in the original.

¹³⁵⁸ "Pūrva" in the original.

¹³⁵⁹ "Mīmāṃsakas" in the original.

¹³⁶⁰ "Lokāyatas" in the original.

¹³⁶¹ "Sarvāstivādins" in the original.

¹³⁶² "Vaibhāṣikas" in the original.

¹³⁶³ "Vijñānavāda" in the original.

¹³⁶⁴ "pudgala-nairātmya or pudgala-sūnyatā" in the original.

¹³⁶⁵ "pratītya-samutpāda" in the original.

¹³⁶⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁶⁷ "nairātmya" in the original.

¹³⁶⁸ Blank page

¹³⁶⁹ The original editor inserted "(234)" by hand.

¹³⁷⁰ "sūnyatā" in the original.

The Madhyamika¹³⁷¹ view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, for it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality or unreality. Thus there is no ultimate thesis in Nagarjuna.¹³⁷² It is, therefore, neither idealism nor realism nor absolutism, but blank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenal world as it is but which would not, for a moment, tolerate any kind of essence, ground or reality behind it.⁷⁴

It is in this vein of blank phenomenalism that Nagarjuna¹³⁷³ says: "This all is groundless, and groundless has it been called."⁷⁵ "This all is supportless, and supportless has it been called."⁷⁶

Murti is of a different opinion. He observes,

The *Tattva*, however, is accepted by the Madhyamika¹³⁷⁴ as the Reality of all things (*dharmānam dharmatā*),¹³⁷⁵ their essential nature (*prakṛtir dharmānam*).¹³⁷⁶ It is uniform and universal, neither decreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nor decaying. The Absolute alone is in itself (*akṛtrima svabhāva*).¹³⁷⁷ The Absolute is that intrinsic form in which things would appear to the clear vision of an Ārya (realised saint) free from ignorance.⁷⁷

Murti seems to have the following statements of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*¹³⁷⁸ and Candrakīrti's comments thereon in mind: "Self-being is inartificial and nonrelative to other [being]."⁷⁸ "Not realizable through other, calm, inexpressible through words, exempt from conceptualization, of not many meanings - this is the definition of *tattva*."⁷⁹

There is reason to believe that Murti is wrong in taking it for granted that these statements of Nagarjuna¹³⁷⁹ make him an Absolutist. It is true that Nagarjuna¹³⁸⁰ appears to argue as if he believed in so many laws of thought and being, so many truths. He wields logic as skillfully as others, as though he were demonstrating that at least logic contained the whole truth and that it was an exception to the theory of absolute nihility propounded by him. At first sight, it appears that for him the law assumed in his argument is unquestionably real and that it is not a non-entity, not an illusion. But the actual position is that he employs popular notions to refute popular theses, thereby trying to demonstrate that our notions of things are self-contradictory.

¹³⁷¹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁷² "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹³⁷³ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹³⁷⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁷⁵ "dharmāṇām dharmatā" in the original.

¹³⁷⁶ "prakṛtir dharmāṇām" in the original.

¹³⁷⁷ "akṛtrima svabhāva" in the original.

¹³⁷⁸ "Mūlamadhyamakakārikā" in the original.

¹³⁷⁹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹³⁸⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

It is not that he really believes, for example, that what is self-subsistent alone can cause another. He simply means to say that on the realist's own logic what does

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(continued from the previous page) like Samjaya Belatthiputta¹³⁸³ and Pyrrho expressed their inability to say whether the ultimate reality was being, nothing, or both. That it is neither being, nothing, nor both would be the fourth alternative. The Madhyamika¹³⁸⁴ system maintains that the real is devoid of all these four categories. Sriharsa,¹³⁸⁵ taking his cue from the Madhyamika,¹³⁸⁶ regards his *Brahman* as belonging to a fifth category, as shown above.

However, as pointed out earlier, the Madhyamika posits no category of his own. He examines the categories posited by others with a view to showing up their hollowness. Candrakīrti writes, "We do not postulate the non-being of it. What then? We simply repudiate the being conceived by others. Likewise, we do not postulate its being. What then? We simply repudiate the non-being of it as conceived by others."¹³²

Five stages are discernible in the Madhyamika's¹³⁸⁷ treatment of the ultimate truth. First, things are shown to be essentially chaotic and hence non-existent. Then, second, non-existence, too, is demonstrated to be false, together with things. That is to say, both being and non-being are rejected as false. In the first stage, *sunyata*¹³⁸⁸ is presented as non-being. In the second stage, it is said to be beyond both being and non-being. Third, even *sunyata*¹³⁸⁹ is rejected on the ground of there being no non-*sunya*,¹³⁹⁰ and essencelessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*)¹³⁹¹ is established. Fourth, the doctrine of non-apprehension (*anupalambha* or *aprāptatva*)¹³⁹² ¹³³ is set forth. Finally, rejection of all ontology is the result.

¹³⁸¹ Blank page

¹³⁸² The original editor inserted "(235)" by hand.

¹³⁸³ "Samjaya Belatthiputta" in the original.

¹³⁸⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁸⁵ "Śrīharsa" in the original.

¹³⁸⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁸⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹³⁸⁸ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹³⁸⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹³⁹⁰ "śūnya" in the original.

¹³⁹¹ "niḥsvabhāvatā" in the original.

¹³⁹² "aprāptatva" in the original.

As suggested above, one is bound to arrive at the conclusion, after a scrutiny of the hybrid and seemingly conflicting utterances of the Madhyamikas,¹³⁹³ that being and nothing are the only really fundamental positions, the rest enjoying only a derivative status. “Is” and “is-not” are the only positions that one can possibly take with regard to ultimate reality. The other hypotheses are only semantic hypotheses. Strictly speaking, the ontological issue is between the first two hypotheses only. And the Madhyamika¹³⁹⁴ adheres to the hypothesis of non-being to the last. In effect, the Madhyamika’s¹³⁹⁵ seeming objection to non-being is directed, not toward non-being as such, but toward styling it as non-being. Non-being cannot be thought of save as opposed to being, and, he argues, if there is no being, how can there be – or, what is the same thing, how can anything be styled as – non-being? At bottom, both the Satyasiddhi and the Madhyamika¹³⁹⁶ schools hold the same position: blank phenomenalism without a reality subjacent to phenomena.

The Madhyamika’s¹³⁹⁷ method is something like this. He first seeks to show that all is relative, hence chaotic, hence essenceless, and hence void. Lest undiscerning people should erect his void into a positive reality like the

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(continued from the previous page) *Brahman* of the Vedānta¹⁴⁰⁰ or the Absolute of the Western idealists, as has been done by those trying to see The Madhyamika¹⁴⁰¹ through Vedāntic¹⁴⁰² or Absolutistic eyes, he later refuses to admit even the void, saying that the void can be there only when there is a non-void. This leads him to affirm the doctrine of non-apprehension, ending in the repudiation of all metaphysics.

This interpretation of the Madhyamika’s¹⁴⁰³ method may sound novel, but it is based on definite indications in Madhyamika¹⁴⁰⁴ writings. For example, one relevant

¹³⁹³ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹³⁹⁴ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹³⁹⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹³⁹⁶ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹³⁹⁷ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹³⁹⁸ Blank page

¹³⁹⁹ The original editor inserted “(236)” by hand.

¹⁴⁰⁰ “Vedānta” in the original.

¹⁴⁰¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁴⁰² “Vedāntic” in the original.

¹⁴⁰³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁴⁰⁴ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

verse of Nagarjuna¹⁴⁰⁵ suggests that in the first instance all is declared imaginary and that then imagination itself is dismissed as false.¹³⁴ Elsewhere, he contends that even the conception by which *sunyata*¹⁴⁰⁶ is conceived is itself *sunya*.^{1407 135} Santideva¹⁴⁰⁸ writes in the same vein: "By contemplation on *sunyata*,¹⁴⁰⁹ the conception of being vanishes. By contemplation on the idea that there is nothing whatsoever, that, too, vanishes afterwards."¹³⁶

In fact, The Madhyamika¹⁴¹⁰ literature abounds in such suggestions.¹³⁷

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(373-1)¹⁴¹¹ Prajnakaramati¹⁴¹² has discussed an interesting question as to the *raison d'être*¹⁴¹³ of the beneficent *bodhisattvas* involving themselves in such activities as alms-giving, etc., which are, according to the Madhyamika,¹⁴¹⁴ *sunya*,¹⁴¹⁵ or false. His reply is that they do so spontaneously, involuntarily, or unpremeditatedly (*avicarataḥ*).^{1416 138} If he held any other view of *sunyata*¹⁴¹⁷ than as void, his immediate reply would be that, his *sunyata*¹⁴¹⁸ not being identifiable with the void, the objection was pointless.

Some people are inclined to the view that the Madhyamika's¹⁴¹⁹ emphasis on nihilism springs from his extra concern for the attainment of renunciation, and that, otherwise, his thesis of the void need not be taken seriously on ontological grounds. There are those who tend to take even the Samkarite's¹⁴²⁰ world-negating attitude in this light. A casual utterance of a Kumarila¹⁴²¹ (*vis-a-vis*¹⁴²² Buddhist nihilism) or a Viṭthalesa¹⁴²³ (*vis-a-vis*¹⁴²⁴ Advaitism) is their main support.¹³⁹ But their interpretation is demonstrably false and far-fetched. Here we confine ourself to the clarification of the

¹⁴⁰⁵ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁴⁰⁶ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁰⁷ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴⁰⁸ "Śāntideva" in the original.

¹⁴⁰⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁴¹¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁴¹² "Prajñākaramati" in the original.

¹⁴¹³ "d'être" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁵ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁶ "avicārataḥ" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁷ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁸ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴¹⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁴²⁰ "Śaṅkarite" in the original.

¹⁴²¹ "Kumārila" in the original.

¹⁴²² "vis-à-vis" in the original.

¹⁴²³ "Viṭṭhaleśa" in the original.

¹⁴²⁴ "vis-à-vis" in the original.

Madhyamika's¹⁴²⁵ position. Now, it is not difficult to discover the true character of the Madhyamika's¹⁴²⁶ emphasis on nihilism. Aryadeva¹⁴²⁷ has raised the issue and answered it un-

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(continued from the previous page) equivocally. He says, "It is not that the non-*sunya*¹⁴³⁰ is shown to be *sunya*¹⁴³¹ simply by the desire to attain *nirvana*;¹⁴³² for the Buddhas do not describe *nirvana*¹⁴³³ as attainable through false vision."¹⁴⁰ Candrakīrti comments: "Are these objects non-*sunya*,¹⁴³⁴ but shown to be *sunya*¹⁴³⁵ for the attainment of renunciation? Or are they demonstrated to be *sunya*¹⁴³⁶ by nature? It is said in reply [here he quotes the above verse of Aryadeva,¹⁴³⁷ and then says,] ...entities are known to be *sunya*¹⁴³⁸ by nature."¹⁴¹

The Madhyamikas¹⁴³⁹ are serious thinkers and do not believe in make-believes like the ones read into them by the interpreters just criticised. Otherwise, they would have broken down over such a fundamental question.

By the Absolutist interpreter of Sunyavada¹⁴⁴⁰ much is made of Nagarjuna's¹⁴⁴¹ rejoinder to the objection: "If all this is *sunya*,¹⁴⁴² there is neither origination nor decay, and the negation of the four Noble Truths will become chargeable against you."¹⁴² On behalf of the objector, Nagarjuna¹⁴⁴³ refers to the chain of negations which will follow of

¹⁴²⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁴²⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁴²⁷ "Āryadeva" in the original.

¹⁴²⁸ Blank page

¹⁴²⁹ The original editor inserted "(237)" by hand.

¹⁴³⁰ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³¹ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³² "nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁴³³ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁴³⁴ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³⁵ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³⁶ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³⁷ "Āryadeva" in the original.

¹⁴³⁸ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴³⁹ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁰ "Śūnyavāda" in the original.

¹⁴⁴¹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁴⁴² "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴⁴³ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

themselves in the wake of the negation of the four Noble Truths, and concludes that such a state of affairs will lead to chaos. His reply is:

To this we rejoin,

You do not appreciate the purpose of *sunyata*,¹⁴⁴⁴ *sunyata*,¹⁴⁴⁵ and the meaning of *sunyata*,¹⁴⁴⁶ that is why you raise this objection. The Buddhas preach the *dharma* with reference to two truths-the empirical truth and the transcendental truth. Those who do not know the division of the two truths do not know the great essence in the Buddha's teaching. The transcendental is not preached save *vis-a-vis*¹⁴⁴⁷ the empirical, and, without recourse to the transcendental, *nirvana*¹⁴⁴⁸ is not attained. Wrongly apprehended, *sunyata*¹⁴⁴⁹ destroys the unintelligent, even as a wrongly caught serpent or wrongly practiced science... If, then, you criticize *sunyata*,¹⁴⁵⁰ it is not our fault, for the criticism does not apply to the *sunya*.^{1451 143}

What Nagarjuna¹⁴⁵² seems to mean is that there are two truths, one for the higher souls and one for the lower, and that the highest doctrine, that of *sunyata*,¹⁴⁵³ is not meant for the latter, who must be taught to adhere to the four Noble Truths as also to all other canons of righteousness taught by the Buddha. According to Aryadeva,¹⁴⁵⁴ the truth is preached in three steps. In the first step, the seeker is told that there is such a thing as sin which attaches to and pollutes the self and that, therefore, one should beware of sin. In the second step, he is told that not only the sin but the self itself does not exist. In the third and final step, it is revealed to him that all is nothing, void.¹⁴⁴

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¹⁴⁴⁴ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁵ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁶ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁷ "vis-à-vis" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁸ "nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁴⁴⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁵⁰ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁵¹ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁴⁵² "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁴⁵³ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁵⁴ "Āryadeva" in the original.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Blank page

¹⁴⁵⁶ The original editor inserted "(238)" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) Candrakīrti expounds the idea of Nagarjuna¹⁴⁵⁷ thus:

*Sunyata*¹⁴⁵⁸ is preached with a view to putting an end to all speech; therefore, the purpose of *sunyata*¹⁴⁵⁹ is cessation of all speech. You, on the other hand, who construe *sunyata*¹⁴⁶⁰ to mean non-being (*nastitva*)¹⁴⁶¹ and thereby only enlarge the net of speech do not know the purpose of *sunyata*....¹⁴⁶² Hence, how can there be non-being in *sunyata*,¹⁴⁶³ which is of the essence of cessation of all speech? So, you do not know even *sunyata*....¹⁴⁶⁴ What *pratitya-samutpada*¹⁴⁶⁵ means is also meant by *sunyata*,¹⁴⁶⁶ but what non-being (*abhava*)¹⁴⁶⁷ means is not what is meant by *sunyata*.^{1468 145}

We take it that Candrakīrti purports to say that *sunyata*¹⁴⁶⁹ is neither being, nor non-being, nor both, nor neither; that it would therefore be incorrect to identify it with non-being; and that it is only this wrong identification that gives rise to the objection that it will strike at the root of all practice, all righteousness.

In this connection, Nagarjuna¹⁴⁷⁰ makes another observation which deserves notice. He says, "All fares well with him with whom *sunyata*¹⁴⁷¹ fares well; nothing fares well with him with whom *sunyata*¹⁴⁷² does not so fare."¹⁴⁶ Candrakīrti¹⁴⁷³ tries to bring out the idea of this pithy remark thus:

With him with whom this *sunyata*¹⁴⁷⁴ fares well, *pratitya-samutpada*,¹⁴⁷⁵ too, fares well; with him with whom *pratitya-samutpada*¹⁴⁷⁶ fares well, the four Noble Truths fare well. How so? Because suffering is phenomenal (*pratitya-samutpanna*),¹⁴⁷⁷ not non-

¹⁴⁵⁷ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁴⁵⁸ "Śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁵⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁰ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶¹ "nāstitva" in the original.

¹⁴⁶² "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶³ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁴ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁵ "pratītya-samutpāda" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁶ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁷ "abhāva" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁸ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁶⁹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁰ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁴⁷¹ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁷² "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁷³ "Candrakīrti" in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁴ "śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁵ "pratītya-samutpāda" in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁶ "pratītya-samutpāda" in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁷ "pratītya-samutpanna" in the original.

phenomenal. And, being essenceless, it is *sunya*.¹⁴⁷⁸ Suffering being there, its origination, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation fare well with him.¹⁴⁷

Thereafter, Candrakīrti¹⁴⁷⁹ goes on recounting the tenets of Buddhism the uselessness of which was apprehended by the imaginary objector to the *sunyata*¹⁴⁸⁰ doctrine and which would be reinstated by the proper appreciation of *sunyata*.¹⁴⁸¹

Nagarjuna¹⁴⁸² continues:

By seeking to lay your faults at our doors you have forgotten the very horse you are riding. If you regard objects as essentially existent, then, by doing so, you see objects [emerging] without causes and conditions. Thereby you fail to explain effect, cause, doer, means, action, origination, cessation, and consequence. *Pratītya-samutpada*¹⁴⁸³ is called *sunyata*¹⁴⁸⁴ by us. It is relative being, it is the Middle Path. There is no non-relative [or uncaused] *dharma*, and, therefore, there is non-*sunya*¹⁴⁸⁵ *dharma*. If all this is non-*sunya*,¹⁴⁸⁶ there is neither origination nor decay, and denial of the four Noble Truths becomes chargeable against you. How can there be uncaused suffering? For suffering is said to be non-eternal, which would not be possible if it had essence. If it is existent by nature, then what is there to originate? Therefore, there is no origination for one

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(continued from the previous page) who rejects *sunyata*.¹⁴⁸⁹ If suffering exists, it will not cease. By upholding its essence, you speak against its cessation.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷⁸ “*śūnya*” in the original.

¹⁴⁷⁹ “Candrakīrti” in the original.

¹⁴⁸⁰ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸¹ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸² “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁴⁸³ “*Pratītya-samutpāda*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸⁴ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸⁵ “*śūnya*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸⁶ “*śūnya*” in the original.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Blank page

¹⁴⁸⁸ The original editor inserted “(239)” by hand.

¹⁴⁸⁹ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

Thereafter Nagarjuna¹⁴⁹⁰ recounts the theses of Buddhism, which will, in his opinion, lose their significance on the non-*sunyata*¹⁴⁹¹ doctrine, and thus lays the same charges at the doors of the non-*sunyata-vadin*¹⁴⁹² as the latter sought to do at his.

It is obvious that here Nagarjuna¹⁴⁹³ purports to define *sunyata*¹⁴⁹⁴ in its empirical aspect alone. Candrakīrti¹⁴⁹⁵ has it that “*pratitya-samutpada*”¹⁴⁹⁶ as used by Nagarjuna¹⁴⁹⁷ in the present context means emergence of things through causes and conditions (*hetupratyayanapeksya pradurbhavaḥ*)¹⁴⁹⁸ or, conversely, non-emergence of things without causes and conditions, of themselves (*svabhāvenānutpadaḥ*).¹⁴⁹⁹ 149 So, the denial of *sunyata*¹⁵⁰⁰ in its empirical aspect is tantamount to the belief in the immutability of things, which precludes all possibility of origination or elimination of suffering, thereby rendering the doctrine of the four Noble Truths altogether meaningless. Therefore, *sunyata*¹⁵⁰¹ in its empirical sense alone seems to be in question here.

Nagarjuna¹⁵⁰² has elsewhere, too, suggested that belief in the being of things is tantamount to belief in their eternity. He has, accordingly, characterized the realist as an eternalist in these words: “If there were being in the nature of things, it would not be non-existent; for the negation of nature cannot be established.”¹⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, according to him, “To say ‘[it] is’ is eternalism, to say ‘[it] is not’ is the philosophy of cessation. Therefore, the wise should not adhere either to [the doctrine of] ‘it is’ or to [that of] ‘it is not.’ For what is by nature, of that it can never be said that it is not; to say ‘it is not now, it was before’ means [belief in the doctrine of] cessation.”¹⁵¹

Indeed, as suggested above, the Madhyamika¹⁵⁰³ denies not only being but also non-being – in fact, even being-*cum*-non-being and neither-being-nor-non-being.

The last difficulty in giving credence to the nihilistic interpretation of the Madhyamika’s¹⁵⁰⁴ standpoint is the religious fervor shown by him as a Mahayanist.¹⁵⁰⁵ If all is void, how can this fervor be explained? The best course for a nihilist would be to be unruffled by emotions and sentiments, rather than to be so devoted to the Buddha

¹⁴⁹⁰ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁴⁹¹ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁴⁹² “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁴⁹³ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁴ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁵ “Candrakīrti” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁶ “pratītya-samutpāda” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁷ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁸ “hetupratyayanapeksya pradurbhāvaḥ” in the original.

¹⁴⁹⁹ “svabhāvenānutpadaḥ” in the original.

¹⁵⁰⁰ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁵⁰¹ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁵⁰² “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁵⁰³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁵⁰⁴ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁵⁰⁵ “Mahāyānist” in the original.

as to erect him into a veritable Godhead. The reason, though slightly difficult to appreciate, is not far to seek. The

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(continued from the previous page) Madhyamika¹⁵⁰⁸ does not present a much greater problem on this score than the Advaitin, who claims not only consubstantiality but veritable identity with the Absolute and declares the world to be illusory, but, nevertheless, does not lag behind others in his devotion to gods and goddesses. As a matter of fact, they both share the common Indian trait of dichotomizing truth into the transcendental and the empirical, in effect wholly unconnected with each other. While contemplating the transcendental truth, the Madhyamika¹⁵⁰⁹ considers everything as illusory and void and goes to the extent of declaring the Tathagata¹⁵¹⁰ himself, the object of his devotion, to be nothing better than illusory. But, while contemplating the empirical truth, he distinguishes between his gods and their devotees and behaves as if he were as much a realist as others.¹⁵² This is the case with the Advaitin as well. Indeed, the Indians have never been able to reconcile the empirical with the transcendental, and one need not be surprised if the Madhyamika¹⁵¹¹ fares no better.

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(381-1)¹⁵¹² Is the Madhyamika's¹⁵¹³ thesislessness tantamount to an admission of failure on his part to fathom the mystery of the ultimate reality? His tone does not disclose any such defeatist mentality.¹⁵³ He does not seem to regret the fact that he is not in a position to talk about the real. As a matter of fact, he is not at all a skeptic. He does know, but cannot express. He believes in the void, pure and simple. But he is not in a position to explain to others what the state of affairs would be like in the absence of all that we can perceive or conceive as real. Language can operate only in the world of being. Where there is absolutely no being whatsoever, its operation is bound to come to a standstill.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Blank page

¹⁵⁰⁷ The original editor inserted "(240)" by hand.

¹⁵⁰⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁵⁰⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁵¹⁰ "Tathāgata" in the original.

¹⁵¹¹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁵¹² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁵¹³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

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(383-1)¹⁵¹⁶ Such a reality forms the basic core of perception, but cannot be directly apprehended because of its momentary character. Therefore, it can be inferred only from its impact on the mind of the perceiver (efficacy). But its existence cannot be denied because in that case a veridical perception could not be distinguished from illusory perception.^{4a} Veridical perception itself results when various factors, including the object, which is nothing but an appearing momentary reality, co-ordinate. But, as the perception of an evanescent reality is not possible, it is contended that the object of perception is a composite thing which is comparatively permanent and hence not real in itself. What we perceive is therefore not the real-in-itself but the real-in-general (*samānya-laksana*).¹⁵¹⁷ This is really the incapacity of our mind, which is not able to penetrate beneath the hard shell of generality. But this generality itself should not be taken as something entirely non-existent because, after all, it derives its existence from evanescent reality. But it is not located in the real particular; it is a creation of our own mind (*kalpana*),¹⁵¹⁸ through which the real object (*idam*)¹⁵¹⁹ is perceived. When we perceive a jar, e.g., there is a concept of jar (*paratantra*=depending upon the other i.e., other than the real object, viz., mind) which itself refers to the real external object, the object existing independent of any mind perceiving it (*svatantra*). In a judgment like "This is a flower," "this" stands for the real momentary object, but is not known as such; "flower," stands for the concept but depends upon "this" for its reference. All knowledge is therefore ultimately the knowledge of "this," the real momentary element (*idam-pratyayata*),¹⁵²⁰ but apparently it has a tinge of concepts (*savikalpa*). The "this" part

¹⁵¹⁴ Blank page

¹⁵¹⁵ The original editor inserted "(241)" and "R.C. Pandeya THE MĀDHYAMIKA PHILOSOPHY: a New approach Vol 14" by hand., and "Vol 14 # 1 1964" at the bottom of the page by hand.

¹⁵¹⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁵¹⁷ "sāmānya-lakṣaṇa" in the original.

¹⁵¹⁸ "kalpanā" in the original.

¹⁵¹⁹ "idam" in the original.

¹⁵²⁰ "idam-pratyayatā" in the original.

of it is real (*idam-satya*);¹⁵²¹ the conceptual part is make-believe. We have to sift the husk from the grain in order to be emancipated from the powerful impact of concepts.

Thus this theory rules out the possibility of knowing the real but accepts its existence on the strength of its impact on our mind. From our experience, now of a flower, now of a man, a horse, etc., etc., we are compelled to believe in its particularity, but its generic character is relegated to the position of nescience because what we know is necessarily manifold, and efficacy lies in a particular, not in the universal. Thus reality is manifold, free from concepts (*nirvikalpa*), in itself a directly unknowable something (*idam-matra*).¹⁵²² Monism is condemned as a wrong view (*mithya-drsti=kalpana*).¹⁵²³

The Madhyamikas¹⁵²⁴ had to defend their own view against Brahmanical¹⁵²⁵ systems, the Samkhya¹⁵²⁶ and the Nyaya-Vaisesika,¹⁵²⁷ on the one hand, and against

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(continued from the previous page) the Vaibhasikas¹⁵³⁰ and the Sauttrantikas,¹⁵³¹ on the other. They came with a new interpretation of the teachings of the Master which they thought was not properly presented by any Buddhist school of philosophy. In their zeal to preserve the sanctity of the concept of Middle Path (*madhyama*¹⁵³² *pratipad*) of the Buddha, they came forward with a novel interpretation of the theory of causality popularly called the theory of Dependent Origination (*pratitya-samutpada*).¹⁵³³ Their interpretation completely changed the picture of the Buddha's teachings and presented a landmark in the history of Indian philosophy.

¹⁵²¹ "idam-satya" in the original.

¹⁵²² "idam-mātra" in the original.

¹⁵²³ "mithyā-dṛṣṭi=kalpanā" in the original.

¹⁵²⁴ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁵²⁵ "Brāhmaṇical" in the original.

¹⁵²⁶ "Sāṃkhya" in the original.

¹⁵²⁷ "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika" in the original.

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¹⁵²⁹ The original editor inserted "(242)" by hand.

¹⁵³⁰ "Vaibhāṣikas" in the original.

¹⁵³¹ "Sauttrāntikas" in the original.

¹⁵³² "madhyamā" in the original.

¹⁵³³ "pratītya-samutpāda" in the original.

While criticizing the Brahmanical¹⁵³⁴ view of soul as something over and above the five elements (*skandhas*) composing it, Candrakīrti, the illustrious commentator on Nagarjuna,¹⁵³⁵ says that, although the Brahmanas¹⁵³⁶ tell us about something which is supposed to be beyond these composing elements, the description of this entity, called soul, does not depend upon the direct knowledge of the soul. The soul is not directly known, and the Brahmanas¹⁵³⁷ admit its unknowability. This criticism means that what the soul is in-itself is never found, but the Brahmanas¹⁵³⁸ take pleasure in describing it as existent, blissful, etc. This description of soul cannot refer to soul-in-itself; the Brahmanas¹⁵³⁹ would never agree that the description really stands for the conglomeration of five elements, as they are afraid that in that case the cherished soul will be reduced to evanescent reality. Hence, in reality, their soul is nothing but a name (*nama-matraka*).^{1540 5} Thus, in the opinion of the Madhyamikas,¹⁵⁴¹ such a view of soul is even worse than the Sautrāntika view, which presents the description of soul as directly referring to its generic character (*samānya-laksana*),¹⁵⁴² thereby meaning that there is an evanescent reality (*sva-laksana*)¹⁵⁴³ at the root. Therefore, for the Brahmanas,¹⁵⁴⁴ the soul would be a purely imaginary entity having no existence. Thus, the Madhyamikas think that there can be a description in the Russellian sense which need not involve the actuality of referent.⁶ A description without any reference is a fabrication of words

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¹⁵³⁴ "Brāhmaṇical" in the original.

¹⁵³⁵ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁵³⁶ "Brāhmaṇas" in the original.

¹⁵³⁷ "Brāhmaṇas" in the original.

¹⁵³⁸ "Brāhmaṇas" in the original.

¹⁵³⁹ "Brāhmaṇas" in the original.

¹⁵⁴⁰ "nāma-mātraka" in the original.

¹⁵⁴¹ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁵⁴² "sāmānya-lakṣaṇa" in the original.

¹⁵⁴³ "sva-lakṣaṇa" in the original.

¹⁵⁴⁴ "Brāhmaṇas" in the original.

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¹⁵⁴⁶ The original editor inserted "(243)" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) (*prapanca*) .^{1547 7} It is like the expression “a barren woman’s daughter” (*vandhya-duhitṛ*).¹⁵⁴⁸ Such a description of a girl would not attract even highly passionate people.⁸

A second type of description refers to the generic character of an object (*samānya*¹⁵⁴⁹=*vikalpa*=imagined) as belonging to a reality-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*=*idam-pratyay*¹⁵⁵⁰*a*=this). Here a distinction may be made between the case where this generic character actually refers to the reality-in-itself and the case where it merely appears to refer to it. The former may be called the case where description is accompanied by demonstration (*vikalpa*), and the latter is mere description without any real demonstration (*vikalpa-mātra*).¹⁵⁵¹ In both cases reference is involved; whether it is actual or only supposed makes all the difference. Veridical perception differs from illusory perception only on this ground. In Madhyamika¹⁵⁵² terminology, in the former case the “truth of ‘this’” is taken in correlation with the description (*idam-satyābhīniveśa*),¹⁵⁵³ whereas in the latter case there is only the “awareness of ‘this’” (*idam-pratyaya-mātra*)¹⁵⁵⁴ without an actual correlation.⁹ Apart from this metaphysical analysis, the two cases are alike from the point of view of the knowledge situation (*pratīti*¹⁵⁵⁵=*pratyaya*). In knowledge we cannot tell veridical perception from illusory perception. This is the case with the knowledge of ordinary human beings (*prthag-jan*¹⁵⁵⁶*a*). An object is known in co-ordination with the generic concept and evanescent efficacious reality (*upādāya-prajñap-yamāna*),¹⁵⁵⁷ and such knowledge is couched in language (*vikalpa+ prapanca*) .¹⁵⁵⁸

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¹⁵⁴⁷ “*prapāṇca*” in the original.

¹⁵⁴⁸ “*vandhyā-duhitṛ*” in the original.

¹⁵⁴⁹ “*sāmānya*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁰ “*svalakṣaṇa*=*idam*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵¹ “*vikalpa-mātra*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵² “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵³ “*idam-satyābhīniveśa*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁴ “*idam-pratyaya-mātra*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁵ “*pratīti*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁶ “*prthag*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁷ “*upādāya-prajñap-yamāna*” in the original.

¹⁵⁵⁸ “*prapāṇca*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) Thus far the realists, like the Sautrantikas,¹⁵⁶¹ would prefer to be with the Madhyamikas.¹⁵⁶² But the Madhyamikas leave their predecessors behind at the point.

We have seen that for both the Madhyamikas¹⁵⁶³ and the Sautrantikas¹⁵⁶⁴ knowledge refers to something external. In the phenomenological sense all knowledge is intentional.¹¹ This is true of illusory cognition also. But for the Sautrantikas¹⁵⁶⁵ the external is something in co-ordination with which (*pratitya*¹⁵⁶⁶=*pratyaya*) knowledge arises, and this is a necessary presupposition by which they distinguish veridical perception from illusory cognition. There is not only intentionality, there is also a real sense-datum. But the Madhyamikas¹⁵⁶⁷ cast a doubt upon the reality of “this,” i.e., the co-ordinating character (*pratyaya*) of the intended reality. The “this” is said to be the object of knowledge because it is efficacious in the appearance of veridical perception. Hence, in spite of the fact that it is not known in itself, its existence cannot be denied. The Madhyamikas¹⁵⁶⁸ do not subscribe to this view of knowledge. They say that an efficacious reality is not a necessary condition or co-ordinating factor for perception, because perception takes place even when there is admittedly no such reality present, e.g., the perception of a double {moon.}?¹⁵⁶⁹ Perception simply entails a concept referring to something external. The something external need not be actual. Thus, from this point of view we have veridical perception on a par with illusory perception. So far as knowledge is concerned, in both the cases there is an awareness of “this” (*idam pratyaya*),¹⁵⁷⁰ but we cannot at the same time hold the truth of actual existence of “this” (*idam-satya*).¹⁵⁷¹ That is the reason why Candrakīrti¹⁵⁷² condemns the view of “truth of this” as childish.¹²

But, then, how distinguish between a veridical perception and an illusion one? For the Madhyamikas,¹⁵⁷³ this question does not arise. The Sautrantika think that knowledge depends upon things other than the knowledge itself they co-ordinate to make it appear. The so-called real is known as “the other” (*anya*). This otherness is

¹⁵⁶⁰ The original editor inserted “(244)” by hand.

¹⁵⁶¹ “Sautrāntikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶² “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶³ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁴ “Sautrāntikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁵ “Sautrāntikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁶ “pratītya” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁷ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁸ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Indecipherable in the original, it looks like “{moo??}”

¹⁵⁷⁰ “idam pratyaya” in the original.

¹⁵⁷¹ “idam-satya” in the original.

¹⁵⁷² “Candrakīrti” in the original.

¹⁵⁷³ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

either superfluous, if it is supposed to refer¹⁵⁷⁴ to something which is already different from knowledge, or impossible, if actually does not refer to the other. The supposed reality at the root of¹⁵⁷⁵

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(continued from the previous page) veridical perception cannot be proved; hence, knowledge operating only with concepts will have to be explained in terms of concepts.¹³ The supposed reality in itself does not contribute to our knowledge. The concept of it alone will explain knowledge. Thus, illusory cognition is as much conceptual as non-illusory cognition. In the absence of any effective tool at our disposal to institute a distinction, we have to take them as of one kind.¹⁴

Inasmuch as we cannot go beyond the concepts and penetrate into the nature of reality in itself, it would be absurd to assert the existence of reality merely on the strength of our knowledge. That is a mere supposition. But, it may be urged, if reality does not contribute to knowledge, how is it that when an object is placed before us we perceive it; when it is removed we cease to perceive it? Had knowledge been purely conceptual, perception or non-perception would have depended on the will of the perceiver. To explain this phenomenon the famous twelve-linked formula of Dependent Origination is pressed into service, with a different interpretation, of course. We need not say that reality actively co-ordinates, because activity itself is a concept. We can assert only that the concepts *inter se* are relative to each other. Co-ordination is replaced by relativity (*sapeksata*).¹⁵⁷⁸

The metaphysicians are wont to jump from concepts to actual things of which these concepts are supposed to be replicas. If there is a concept of the other, then they think that there must be an actual other. Similarly, if two things are conceived as co-ordinating, a metaphysician would think, without the least hesitation, that there are two such actual things. The Madhyamikas¹⁵⁷⁹ chide such metaphysicians by saying that co-

¹⁵⁷⁴ Indecipherable in the original, it looks like "{refe??}"

¹⁵⁷⁵ Indecipherable in the original, it looks like "{Illegible}"

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¹⁵⁷⁷ The original editor inserted "(245)" by hand.

¹⁵⁷⁸ "sāpekṣatā" in the original.

¹⁵⁷⁹ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

ordination of things is not at all possible and relativity itself leaves an actual reality, if there be any, untouched. Co-ordinating factors must be different from the supposed thing to result from their co-ordination. Co-ordination presupposes difference, on the one hand, among co-ordinating factors, and, on the other hand, between co-ordinating factors and their result. But the fact is that these factors them-selves, being momentary, cannot co-ordinate, and, even if their co-

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(continued from the previous page) ordination is accepted, they cannot be said to be in a relation of causation to something thing which is yet to be produced. Relationship can be assumed to exist {??}¹⁵⁸² between two things existing simultaneously.¹⁵ In knowledge we assume {??}¹⁵⁸³ there is an object (*alambana*)¹⁵⁸⁴ which is responsible for it. But can we see the relationship between an object and its knowledge? The Madhyamikas¹⁵⁸⁵ give a negative answer to this, saying that what we are aware of is only a concept of an object; this concept is based upon another concept of relationship. The concept of relation, in its turn, depends upon two things that are related. In order to prove actual relation between two things we refer to the concept of relation and say that had there been no relation the concept of relation would never have arisen. But the Madhyamikas¹⁵⁸⁶ would pay the realists back in their own coin, because, for them, if there had been no concept of relation actual relation itself would never have been assumed. Therefore, we can say with justification that the concepts are responsible for the notion of actual existing things, but we cannot say the converse because except concepts we have no other means to ascertain the actual state of affairs.¹⁶ Thus, the {not??}¹⁵⁸⁷ of causality for the Madhyamikas¹⁵⁸⁸ is not rooted in actual co-ordination of

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¹⁵⁸¹ The original editor inserted "(246)" by hand.

¹⁵⁸² The word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁸³ The word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁸⁴ "āḷambana" in the original.

¹⁵⁸⁵ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁵⁸⁶ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁵⁸⁷ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only "Not--" is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁸⁸ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

{??tors}.¹⁵⁸⁹ It means only dependence of one concept upon another ({h??pratyayapekṣa}).¹⁵⁹⁰¹⁷

This dependence is not to be conceived in a metaphysical sense. It is purely an epistemic relativity. Having proved the impossibility of actual relationship among things, the Madhyamikas¹⁵⁹¹ propose to show that it is a concept that makes other concepts appear. An example of this type of dependence very often repeated in their texts, is that of big and small (*dirgha*¹⁵⁹² {??hrasva}¹⁵⁹³)¹⁸. It is clear that in itself a thing is neither big nor small; it is when we come to compare two things that in relation to one the other is big or small as the case may be. Thus the concept of bigness arises because there is a concept of smallness and vice versa. Similarly, the entire furniture of our knowledge is nothing but a great fabrication of mutually dependent concepts.

But, in that case, we have to explain the origin of primary concepts. For the realists there is no difficulty: these concepts would arise in co-ordinating with actual realities. But the Madhyamikas,¹⁵⁹⁴ who intend to oust metaphysics from the realm of philosophy, cannot agree to this. They would

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(continued from the previous page) that so-called basic concepts are in no way better than other concepts. Candrakīrti makes a distinction between general relativity (*anāṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa*)¹⁵⁹⁷ and specific relativity (*āṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa*).¹⁵⁹⁸¹⁹ Relativity as a basic tendency of mind may be compared to a field which is given to the mind to play in. Within this relativity-field our mind encounters other things, but, conditioned as it is by the relativity-field, it takes those specific objects in the light of relativity. To say that this relativity is associated with mind without any beginning is to assert indirectly that it cannot go beyond its field. Mind is confined to the field of relativity; only

¹⁵⁸⁹ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “--tors” is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁹⁰ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “h--pratyayāpekṣa” is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁹¹ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁵⁹² “dīrgha” in the original.

¹⁵⁹³ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “--hrasava” is visible in the original.

¹⁵⁹⁴ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

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¹⁵⁹⁶ The original editor inserted “(247)” by hand.

¹⁵⁹⁷ “anāṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa” in the original.

¹⁵⁹⁸ “āṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa” in the original.

concepts and not things can be legitimately relative; hence, mind cannot know the thing-in-itself. The Sautrantikas¹⁵⁹⁹ think that, although the realities cannot be directly known, they are many, momentary, and efficacious. This view is rejected since to say that reality is many involves the concept that relation, momentariness, and efficacy are not possible without the concept of causation. The very logic which rejects oneness of reality (viz., in knowledge only the manifold is given, and thus monism is fictitious) compels us to disown plurality also, since not the manifold real but only the concept of relation is given to play with. Thus reality in-itself is neither one nor many.

Relativity-field is interpreted as the general law of causality, which is expressed in the formula "this being, that arises," which means that given a concept it will lead to another concept. The causal formula of the Master *pratitya - samutpada*¹⁶⁰⁰ - therefore shows that reality is not born, nor does it die. It is neither momentary nor efficacious. Nagarjuna¹⁶⁰¹ discusses this relativity field in the first chapter for his famous book and various particular concepts, such as motion, conjunction, time, space, emancipation, and soul that arise as a result of this relativity, in subsequent chapters.²⁰ He invariably comes to the conclusion that all these are mere concepts rooted in their mutual dependence, and hence they cannot describe the real-in-itself. The task of philosophy is to show that reality conceived within the relativity-field is conceptual, and hence it has no essence of its own, i.e., it is not what it would be in itself (*svabhava-sunya*).¹⁶⁰²

The question as to what is the cause of the relativistic tendency of the mind itself cannot be answered because that involves a state beyond the relativity-field, and our mind cannot venture in that realm. An unanswerable question is no question. Similarly, the question whether this relativity-field

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(continued from the previous page) is relative also cannot be finally answered because any answer to this would presuppose relativity. Thus, the most consistent position of a philosophy should be to take his experience as a play of interdependent concepts which

¹⁵⁹⁹ "Sautrāntikas" in the original.

¹⁶⁰⁰ "pratītya - samutpāda" in the original.

¹⁶⁰¹ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁶⁰² "svabhāva-śūnya" in the original.

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¹⁶⁰⁴ The original editor inserted "(248)" by hand.

having no connection with reality, are empty. Within the field of reality emptiness means devoid of content (*nairatmya*),¹⁶⁰⁵ and not of existence (*abhava*).¹⁶⁰⁶ The concepts prevail powerfully upon and obscure the visit of the mind, and hence they are there but are not to be confused with reality (*samvrti-satya*).¹⁶⁰⁷

But the concepts are pregnant with intentionality. Actually a concept refers to another concept (*pratitya*¹⁶⁰⁸=*samvrti-saty*^{1609a}), but, if a concept is taken referring to reality (as realists in general do), it is delusion. That is called wrong notion (*mithya-drsti*).¹⁶¹⁰ Notion (*drsti*)¹⁶¹¹ and truth (*satya*) should be carefully distinguished. To think that the existence of a concept means the existence of a thing is a notion which is utterly false; to think that a concept exists because there are other concepts is a truth.²¹ The former has its repercussions in the form of bondage; the latter has no repercussions in the sense that bondage, being a relative concept, has a contentless existence.

It is possible to have a wrong notion about truth. If it is propounded that the concepts are empty existences, it may be taken by some deluded person to mean that these concepts exist. For such persons relativity means existence (*bhava*).¹⁶¹² This is a confusion worse confounded. These people first deny what is truth (*samvrti-saty*^{1613a}) and then proceed to accept what is not so. One who says that there are realities first denies that there are relative concepts (of truth) and then forms a notion that these concepts must be real in themselves because they exist. He takes relativity as an indication of the existence of concepts. Nagarjuna¹⁶¹⁴ thinks that those people who reduce the relative truth of concepts to a mere notion are incurable (*tan-asadhyan-babhasire*).¹⁶¹⁵ Hence, relativity should not be made a notion, just as eternalism is a notion.²²

Truth as relativity is accepted by common people, who have no philosophical axe of their own to grind. One concept leads to another concept. Causality presupposes the concept of cause and an effect, motion depends upon a mover, space depends upon the concept of something occupying it, time assumes changing objects, soul depends upon the concept of various mental activities, and even liberation depends upon the concept of prior bondage and subsequent release of a person. We are not justified to go beyond these concepts and assume reality, just as we are asked to avoid the misconception

¹⁶⁰⁵ “*nairātmya*” in the original.

¹⁶⁰⁶ “*abhāva*” in the original.

¹⁶⁰⁷ “*saṃvṛti-satya*” in the original.

¹⁶⁰⁸ “*pratītya*” in the original.

¹⁶⁰⁹ “*saṃvṛti*” in the original.

¹⁶¹⁰ “*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*” in the original.

¹⁶¹¹ “*dṛṣṭi*” in the original.

¹⁶¹² “*bhāva*” in the original.

¹⁶¹³ “*saṃvṛti*” in the original.

¹⁶¹⁴ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

¹⁶¹⁵ “*tān-asādhyan-babhaṣire*” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) about the real existence of concepts. What we know are mere concepts, and they are not realities in the sense in which we talk of such realities. It would be absurd to maintain the existence of realities, but it would be more so to maintain their non-existence. We are conceptually undecided about there being realities, and thus the Madhyamikas¹⁶¹⁸ are exonerated from the charge of agnosticism.²³ Thus, any statement should always be construed in the sense that the meaning of it refers either to concepts or to words or to both together, but never to a state of material reality. In modern philosophical terminology, we should have either conceptual mode or formal mode of speech, but not the material mode of speech. The formal mode of speech differs from the conceptual mode insofar as the first one depends purely upon the habit of speech and does not arouse any concept in its hearer. For example, "A flower in the sky is fragrant" does not give any sense because it is rooted only in the language-habit of a person, i.e., on the model of a significant sentence any other sentence can be framed. This is what is called a "language fabrication" (*prapanca*)¹⁶¹⁹ by the Madhyamikas.^{1620 24} Significant sentences, on the other hand, give us an idea of the state of affairs. These statements are significant on two counts: first, they are framed strictly in accordance with rules of a particular language – in this respect they are analogous to the previous example (*prapanca*);¹⁶²¹ and, second, they are capable of arousing some concept in the minds of hearers and thus can continue the chain of concepts. They are therefore not only the fabrications of language but also of mind (*citta-pracara-kalpana*).^{1622 24a} Unlike the Grammarians, the Madhyamikas¹⁶²³ do not believe in the inseparability of concepts from language.

But the realm of reality is a prohibited area; concepts unable to reach at the realities simply create an illusion of reality in the mind of a person. We have shown in detail that this external reference is due to the intentionality of concepts. If concepts cannot give us a glimpse of realities, how can we expect the language to describe it?

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¹⁶¹⁷ The original editor inserted "(249)" by hand.

¹⁶¹⁸ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁶¹⁹ "prapāṇca" in the original.

¹⁶²⁰ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁶²¹ "prapāṇca" in the original.

¹⁶²² "pracāra-kalpanā" in the original.

¹⁶²³ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

Reality therefore eludes both our concepts and language. It is without the pale of the fabrications of language and concepts (*niṣprapaṅca*¹⁶²⁴ and *nirvikalpa*).²⁵

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(continued from the previous page) Some interpreters of this system have committed the same mistake which is emphatically being avoided by this school.²⁶ They think that, although the Madhyamikas¹⁶²⁷ deny speech and thought to reality, they still maintain from a “higher standpoint” an existent real in the form of the Cosmic form of the Buddha (*dharma-kaya*),¹⁶²⁸ which is described as “without a second {??}”¹⁶²⁹ (*advaya*). In actuality this all seems to be a mere fabrication of mind.

Let us examine here the concept of a “higher standpoint” (*paramar*)¹⁶³⁰ Nagarjuna¹⁶³¹ talks of this standpoint, and his commentator explains it at length.²⁷ The entire empirical life is governed by the concepts of description, the described, knowledge, the known, etc. These are, rightly speaking without any foundation in reality. But they themselves, being relative, sent a phase of truth. We cannot penetrate the sheath of concepts beneath since it is itself smoky in nature, it only causes our fall to fathomless depths. They are relative among themselves but never because of something tional. This is the right view about concepts (*samyak-drsti*).¹⁶³² Similarly, there is nothing higher than these concepts, because, again, the concepts themselves, being relative, cannot lead to the pinnacle of absolute truth. Even if that higher truth be there, it would be relative, since it would be achieved through relative concepts.²⁸ Therefore, it is difficult to agree with that interpretation which ascribes to the Madhyamikas¹⁶³³ an Absolute.

¹⁶²⁴ “*niṣprapaṅca*” in the original.

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¹⁶²⁶ The original editor inserted “250” by hand.

¹⁶²⁷ “*Mādhyamikas*” in the original.

¹⁶²⁸ “*kāya*” in the original.

¹⁶²⁹ The word is entirely cut off by the right margin of the page.

¹⁶³⁰ “*paramār*” in the original.

¹⁶³¹ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

¹⁶³² “*drṣṭi*” in the original.

¹⁶³³ “*Mādhyamikas*” in the original.

But Nagarjuna¹⁶³⁴ says that truth is twofold: the truth about relatives the truth in itself.^{28a} It is absurd to say, as many have, that the phrase “{l??}”¹⁶³⁵ *saṃvṛti-saty*^{1636a} (empirical truth) means relative truth. Truth, rightly speaking, can never be relative. Truth about relatives is not the same thing as relative truth. That concepts are relative is a truth about relatives but it is absolute. Had this not been the case, it would have been impossible to distinguish between the Jaina theory of relative truth (*anekānta-vāda*)¹⁶³⁷ and this concept of the Madhyamikas.¹⁶³⁸ Thus, when truth is conceived in without reference to relative concepts, it is the absolute truth. We have that all concepts are governed by the law of relativity. Wherever that

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(continued from the previous page) is applicable, we find relativity. But, what about this relativity itself? It is well known even to a casual reader of the *Madhyamika Karikas*¹⁶⁴¹ that for this school the law of relativity itself is everything, and Nagarjuna¹⁶⁴² salutes the Master because he proclaimed this as truth.²⁹ Hence, to think that the Madhyamikas¹⁶⁴³ believe in some *Brahman*-like Absolute seems to read too much between the lines.³⁰

If we are to consider a few remarks about such truth in itself found in the works of this school, our misconception would be reduced to a minimum. It is said that those who do not know the distinction between truth in itself and truth about relatives do not know the reality underlying the Buddha’s teachings (*tattva*).³¹ Here the author uses the word “truth” (*satya*) to mean an instrument for the realisation of reality (*tattva*). Reality, on the other hand, is said to be self-realizable, quiescent, not fabricated by the fabrications of speech and mind (*prapañcair-aprapaṇcittam*¹⁶⁴⁴ and *nirvikalpa*), and

¹⁶³⁴ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁶³⁵ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “l--” is visible in the original.

¹⁶³⁶ “saṃvṛti” in the original.

¹⁶³⁷ “anekānta-vāda” in the original.

¹⁶³⁸ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

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¹⁶⁴⁰ The original editor inserted “(251)” by hand.

¹⁶⁴¹ “Mādhyamika Kārikās” in the original.

¹⁶⁴² “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁶⁴³ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁶⁴⁴ “prapañcair-aprapaṇcittam” in the original.

without distinction (*ananārtha*) .^{1645 32} So long as we operate with concepts we are not dealing with reality. But, when concepts cease to appear relatively, speech and mind stop fabricating. As a result, all the inflictions arising out of attachment to these concepts cease to bother a person. This state is not achieved by means of others' preachings. Candrakīrti¹⁶⁴⁶ beautifully illustrates this point by an example. A man with defective eyes perceives queer things like hair floating in the air, etc. If a man with normal eyesight tells him about the unreality of these apparent objects to him, he will refuse to believe him. He may think of these objects as unreal but not as non-existent. But when his eyes are cured he ceases to perceive their existence. Similarly, a person, although convinced about the unreality of concepts, continues to be led away by their intentionality. He has to stop even the flow of relative concepts to get at the real. This he has to do by himself. What he gets when this whirlwind of relative concepts is over is the real, but he will then be incompetent to

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(continued from the previous page) speak about it to the world at large. Truth about the relativity of concepts {??}¹⁶⁴⁹ to be told to the world (*loka-samvṛti-satya*)¹⁶⁵⁰ because the concepts are {??}¹⁶⁵¹ there, but the truth in itself can never be told since concepts do not {co ?? ute}¹⁶⁵² to it.³³ But, as it is entirely against the accepted canon of logic to ascertain a truth and yet refuse to say it, it has been found convenient to {s??}¹⁶⁵³ negatively. Truth is negation of concepts.³⁴

But reality should not be confused with truth. Only a proposition is true or false. Thus truth-value belongs to a statement, not to a fact. {Assertion}¹⁶⁵⁴ or affirmation is only a mode in which propositions are stated; only a proposition can be negative or positive. There is no negative truth as such, because such a thing is not distinct from

¹⁶⁴⁵ "anānārtha" in the original.

¹⁶⁴⁶ "Candrakīrti" in the original.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Blank page

¹⁶⁴⁸ The original editor inserted "(252)" by hand.

¹⁶⁴⁹ The word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁰ "loka-samvṛti-satya" in the original.

¹⁶⁵¹ The word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵² The word is cut off by the original. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵³ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only "s--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "--on" is visible in the original.

falsity. A proposition is positive or negative; it is either true or false. Truth in itself is always positive. Reality is distinct from propositions, because it can neither be affirmed nor denied; it is neither true nor false. It is not the same thing as truth, because it is the view that we take of it. Hence, when we find a distinction inst between two truths, the lower and the higher, it means only a less {c??}¹⁶⁵⁵ and a more correct view of reality. And, of course, the view is not the same thing as the real.

That the concepts are relative is a truth, but a less correct one, v assumes relativity as the standard. A and B are conceived as relatives because of the standard of relativity. But to ask whether relativity is relative is an absurd question because there cannot be another relativity for this {rela??}¹⁶⁵⁶ to be made relative. It is an absolute standard of reference in the case of things, concepts included, other than itself. But it is equally obvious in the absence of anything relative, relativity itself loses its significance. I believe in relativity or in the Absolute. One cannot believe in both together. In the Advaita Vedanta¹⁶⁵⁷ the effort is made to reconcile the difference between the empirically real and the absolutely real by introducing the principle of cosmic illusion (*maya*),¹⁶⁵⁸ but whether that illusion itself is illusory or not, it can never be adequately explained – since, if it is not illusory, then it does in no way differ from the Absolute, but, if it is illusory, we require another {ill??}¹⁶⁵⁹ to make it illusory. In the Madhyamika¹⁶⁶⁰ system such an anomalous {position}¹⁶⁶¹ does not arise because, unlike Advaita Vedanta,¹⁶⁶² it is an out-and-out non metaphysical system. Relativity applied to concepts is an effective too when devoid of concepts it devours itself.^{34a} Thus relativity conceived self would be the end of relativity. Thus, it is said to be the consummation

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¹⁶⁵⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "c--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "rela--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁷ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁸ "māyā" in the original.

¹⁶⁵⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ill--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁶⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁶⁶¹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "po--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁶² "Vedānta" in the original.

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¹⁶⁶⁴ The original editor inserted "(253)" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) of the cessation of all notions, concepts, and ideas. The word “*sunyata*”¹⁶⁶⁵ used by this school is very significant in this connection. It does not mean a vacuous reality but only vacuity of thought.³⁵ But to say that such is the case is a truth – in fact, the truth that the most perfect wisdom can conceive of (*prajna-paramita*).¹⁶⁶⁶

But the question still remains unanswered: Can there be a truth without reality? If there is nothing which this truth-statement purports to assert, it is false. Thus, it may be urged, and in fact has been urged, that since there is a truth asserted therefore there must be a reality.³⁶ But such an interpretation of the Madhyamikas¹⁶⁶⁷ goes entirely against the spirit of the school. Had the Madhyamikas ever maintained that at the empirical level concepts and realities are inextricably mixed up, as the Advaitins assert (*satya-anrte mithuni-kṛtya*),^{1668 37} then it would have been proper to say that, once they have denied reality to concepts, whatever remains undeniable (*pratyak*) is real for them. But the case is just the opposite. Since for them relative concepts are, though existents, devoid of the touch of reality, when their existence disappears nothing remains as their substratum to shine in its own light. For the Advaitins, negation is used with the ultimate aim of implicit affirmation. “Not-A” implies something other than A. But, for the Madhyamikas, negation is used simply to affirm the negation itself: “Not-A” means simply the absence of A. If the absence of a table is a fact and “table is absent” is a truth, it is equally justified to maintain with the Madhyamikas that “the concepts are non-existent” is a truth because of the fact that the concepts are not to be found. This is not only a matter of emphasis on the negative approach (*niśedha-mukha*);¹⁶⁶⁹ this is the very essence of the philosophical vision of the Madhyamikas.³⁸ But, if contrary to all usage, we want to call a negative fact reality or the Absolute, we are free to do so. Words, says Candrakīrti, like a policeman with a chain and a baton in hand, do not compel us to use them in one way and not the other.³⁹ Thus relativity of concepts is a truth about the relative concepts, but cessation of all concepts is a truth about relativity itself. Just as no reality is involved in the relativity of concepts, no reality or Absolute is involved in the cessation of concepts.

This denial of concepts does not amount to denial of reality, nor does it

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¹⁶⁶⁵ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁶⁶⁶ “prajñā-pāramitā” in the original.

¹⁶⁶⁷ “Mādhyamikas” in the original.

¹⁶⁶⁸ “satya-anrte mithunī-kṛtya” in the original.

¹⁶⁶⁹ “niśedha-mukha” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) imply an affirmation of some Absolute. If there were any {ultimate}¹⁶⁷² it could not be touched by our affirmations or denials. *Nirvana*,¹⁶⁷³ the {f??}¹⁶⁷⁴ of a Buddhist, is to be viewed in this light. The soul, being merely {an ??tual}¹⁶⁷⁵ idea, is denied, and hence nothing conceivable can attain this {state. Nor}¹⁶⁷⁶ can this state be described, because, having been discovered after {t?? ??tion}¹⁶⁷⁷ of all concepts, it remains beyond concepts. The truth about {*Nirvana*}¹⁶⁷⁸ be couched in negative language. Even questions like whether {*Nirvana* is}¹⁶⁷⁹ the same as the real can best be answered by comparing two negative concepts and not by identifying them. Nagarjuna¹⁶⁸⁰ says that the nature is like *Nirvana*¹⁶⁸¹ (*Nirvanam iva-dharmata*).¹⁶⁸² 40 Reality is like {*Nirvana in*}¹⁶⁸³ the sense that each of them is conceived by negating all concepts ({*n??samyam*}¹⁶⁸⁴ fabricated by our mind and language. It is like saying {t??}¹⁶⁸⁵ not a, b, c...n, X₂ is also not a, b, c...n, therefore X₁ and X₂ {ar??}¹⁶⁸⁶ But to say that they are identical presupposes some common {positive}¹⁶⁸⁷ the presence of which warrants identity of the two. On the {negative}¹⁶⁸⁸ the world and *Nirvana*¹⁶⁸⁹ are identical because the world in itself is {united}¹⁶⁹⁰ by transitory and relative concepts and so is *Nirvana*,¹⁶⁹¹ 41 but on the side nothing can be stated because *Nirvana*¹⁶⁹² and reality are not {??}¹⁶⁹³ share certain common characteristics.⁴²

¹⁶⁷¹ The original editor inserted "(254)" by hand.

¹⁶⁷² the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ultima--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷³ "Nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "f--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "a --ual" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "s--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "t--" and "--tion" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁸ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "nir--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁷⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "Nir--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁰ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only "--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸¹ "Nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁶⁸² "Nirvāṇam iva-dharmatā" in the original.

¹⁶⁸³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "Nirvan--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "n--samyam" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "t--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ar--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "positi--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁸ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "nega--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁸⁹ "Nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁰ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "u--" is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁹¹ "Nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁶⁹² "Nirvāṇa" in the original.

¹⁶⁹³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

The state of *Nirvana*¹⁶⁹⁴ is not an achievement; it is a revelation. The controversy over the relative worth of action and knowledge in the Vedānta¹⁶⁹⁵ and the final decision that knowledge is not an action but revelation are perhaps a logical corollary of identification of {libera??}¹⁶⁹⁶ the world, and accords well with the ideal of *bodhisattva* and a {jiva}¹⁶⁹⁷. A result to be achieved is contingent upon the act done to achieve thus is relative. *Nirvana*,¹⁶⁹⁸ on the other hand, is simply the {cessation of}¹⁶⁹⁹ relatives and therefore cannot be said to depend upon the act. {When}¹⁷⁰⁰ relatives cease to exist, it is *revealed* and this is not made or unmade or unknown.⁴³

The Madhyamika¹⁷⁰¹ system prefers to use the word “*advaya*” but the Vedānta has a fascination for the word “*advaita*.” These words are only significant insofar as they bring out the essential differences in these {items}.¹⁷⁰² The word “*advaita*” means free from duality ({*avidyāmanam*??})¹⁷⁰³

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(continued from the previous page) *yasmin*) and thus describes indirectly (*tatastha-laksana*)¹⁷⁰⁶ the *Brahman*, to which duality cannot be ascribed. “*Advaya*” does not mean the denial of duality but of *two*, because the Madhyamikas¹⁷⁰⁷ do not make a distinction between a concept and the real object of which it is a concept, but for a Vedāntin¹⁷⁰⁸ there is such a distinction. Thus by denying two objects they even deny one because the concept “one” is dependent upon the concept “two.”⁴⁴ If we are permitted to see in the

¹⁶⁹⁴ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁵ “*Vedānta*” in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “libera--” is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “jiv--” is visible in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁸ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

¹⁶⁹⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “cessa--” is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁰⁰ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “W--” is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁰¹ “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

¹⁷⁰² the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “--ems” is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁰³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only “*avidyāmanam* --” is visible in the original.

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¹⁷⁰⁵ The original editor inserted “(255)” by hand.

¹⁷⁰⁶ “*tatastha-lakṣaṇa*” in the original.

¹⁷⁰⁷ “*Mādhyamikas*” in the original.

¹⁷⁰⁸ “*Vedāntin*” in the original.

Madhyamikas¹⁷⁰⁹ a philosophy of numbers, we can say that they take delight in the concept of zero.⁴⁵ It is against the background of zero that the concept one can arise. To say that a number is not one means it is two or more, but to say that it is not two may mean either that it is one or more than two. In order to avoid this ambiguity they introduce the term "*sunya*,"¹⁷¹⁰ or zero. A number which is not two (*advaya*) and zero (*sunya*)¹⁷¹¹ is obviously zero without any reference to a positive number. The Vedāntins describe the real as one only (*ekam eva*), which means without a second (*advitīyam*).¹⁷¹² Numerically speaking, they do not recognise zero as something significant. Zero itself stands between the absence of numbers and positive numbers from one up to infinity. Thus the word "*advaya*" read with the word "*sunya*"¹⁷¹³ means complete absence of numberable objects or the number concept. But what this *sunya* is¹⁷¹⁴ in itself cannot be answered. Any attempt to answer this question will land us in relativity. One thing is certain,

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(continued from the previous page) that it is not nothing. Had that been the case, the relative {concepts would}¹⁷¹⁷ never have arisen.⁴⁶

The Madhyamika¹⁷¹⁸ system is called dialectical Absolutism by {its}¹⁷¹⁹ interpreters. Dialectic understood in the Hegelian sense is a synthetic process, but the Madhyamika¹⁷²⁰ would be the last person to {subscribe to a}¹⁷²¹ synthetic approach. They are out-and-out analysts; they profess {th??}¹⁷²² of concepts. Adept as they are in

¹⁷⁰⁹ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁷¹⁰ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁷¹¹ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁷¹² "advitīyam" in the original.

¹⁷¹³ "śūnya" in the original.

¹⁷¹⁴ "śūnya" in the original.

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¹⁷¹⁶ The original editor inserted "(256)" by hand.

¹⁷¹⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "conce--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷¹⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷¹⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "i--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷²¹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "subscr--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²² the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "th--" is visible in the original.

bringing out an element of {coherence}¹⁷²³ in every concept, they do not move upward to some synthetic {unity}¹⁷²⁴ in the Kantian or in the Hegelian sense. They operate upon {them}¹⁷²⁵ and leave the wound gaping without making any attempt at {ba??}¹⁷²⁶ embalming it. They simply show that the concepts are self-{contradictory and}¹⁷²⁷ never attempt to remove the contradiction. Contradiction is {the??}¹⁷²⁸ of the truth about relative concepts. If this contradiction is {so??}¹⁷²⁹ moved, even relative concepts cease to be, and that would be a {state of}¹⁷³⁰ nothingness, which is to be avoided. Let there be no illusion about the existence of uncontradictory concepts, because that would be a {me??}¹⁷³¹ The Madhyamikas¹⁷³² show contradiction because they feel that in {th??}¹⁷³³ would accord some reality to concepts. Is it not a fact that what is {??ly}¹⁷³⁴ originated alone is real (*pratitya-samutpann*^{1735a})? This purpose achieved by synthesis. But is it possible to call an analytic system {??}¹⁷³⁶ The Madhyamikas¹⁷³⁷ have no thesis of their own to prove. But every {??}¹⁷³⁸ has to prove a thesis – the summation of thought-process, e.g. (Platonic), the Absolute (Hegelian or Bradleyan).⁴⁷ Samkara¹⁷³⁹ gets

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¹⁷²³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "co--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "u--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "th--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ba--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "contra--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁸ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "the--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷²⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "so--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷³⁰ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "st--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷³¹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "me--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷³² "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁷³³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "th--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷³⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "--ly" is visible in the original.

¹⁷³⁵ "pratītya" in the original.

¹⁷³⁶ the word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁷³⁷ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁷³⁸ the word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁷³⁹ "Śaṅkara" in the original.

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¹⁷⁴¹ The original editor inserted "(257)" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) for evolving a new technique of dialectic insofar as his Absolute is not achieved by means of upward thought-movement, the thesis for him, being indubitable, is not to be proved (*atman*¹⁷⁴² is said to be *pratyak*). Hence, according to him, the only function left for the dialectic is to show a correlation between the accomplished (*siddha-Brahman*) and what is found in itself a baseless appearance. A complete identity between “that” (*tat*) and “thou” (*tvam*) is instituted by the dialectic. “*Tvam*” is not brought up to the level of “*tat*,” nor is “*tat*” forced down to the level of “*tvam*.” They are on the same plane; only, “*tvam*” is shown not to exist as “*tvam*.” His dialectic therefore works for the elimination of relation, internal as well as external. For Hegel and his fellow dialecticians, relation is the very core of the Absolute, as it is for Ramanuja.¹⁷⁴³ For Samkara,¹⁷⁴⁴ this same relation is the root of appearance. For the former, if relation is removed a thing is reduced to naught; for the latter, removal of relation means uncovering the veil of reality. Samkara’s¹⁷⁴⁵ *Brahman* would be a nugatory concept for Hegel, and Hegel’s Absolute would be a mass of appearances for a Samkarite.¹⁷⁴⁶ Thus, dialectic functions for Samkara¹⁷⁴⁷ only on the plane of appearance, clearing undergrowths and overgrowths, and it ultimately results in the purification of thought. So what is achieved is negative; *Brahman* does not depend upon any process of thought.⁴⁸

Nagarjuna’s¹⁷⁴⁸ analysis seems to be the original on which Samkara has

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(continued from the previous page) modelled his dialectic. When the former shows every concept to be contradictory and leaves it there, the latter seeks to synthesize self-contradictory concepts with the Absolute. In Samkara¹⁷⁵¹ we find an unwarranted jump, and it is invariably the trait of all metaphysical systems, from concepts to reality.

¹⁷⁴² “*ātman*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴³ “*Rāmānuja*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴⁴ “*Śaṁkara*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴⁵ “*Śaṁkara*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴⁶ “*Śaṁkarite*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴⁷ “*Śaṁkara*” in the original.

¹⁷⁴⁸ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

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¹⁷⁵⁰ The original editor inserted “(258)” by hand.

¹⁷⁵¹ “*Śaṁkara*” in the original.

In this respect the Yogācāras¹⁷⁵² are more cautious and faithful in their basic standpoint in as far as they deny an external world. {Analysis of}¹⁷⁵³ concepts and their self-contradictory character do not warrant the self-contradictory character of objects as well. The objective reality stands unaffected by the contradiction in concepts. The Mādhyamikas¹⁷⁵⁴ think that concepts are contradictory and say nothing about realities. The Yogācāras,¹⁷⁵⁵ taking clue from the contradiction of concepts exhibited by the Mādhyamika¹⁷⁵⁶ believe in the non-existence of objects. They argue that, if the {concepts are}¹⁷⁵⁷ contradictory and unreal, how can there be real objects corresponding these concepts? Thus, the consciousness which is aware of this contradiction alone is real. There is a real, not that it is warranted by contradictory concepts, but because it is presupposed by contradiction itself.

Samkara's¹⁷⁵⁸ position is different from these two systems. He agreed with Yogācāra idealism so far as the presupposition of contradictions, i.e., Consciousness (*ātman*), is concerned. But he found it difficult to agree with them on the unreality of the objective world. He thought that if concepts are contradictory their contradiction must be judged from the standard of something non-contradictory. How can we brand a concept contradictory unless we have a scale which itself is free from contradiction. This scale should {r??}¹⁷⁵⁹ another concept because it would be *ex hypothesi* contradictory. {He??}¹⁷⁶⁰ must be a unique real. With reference to this real, concepts are contradiction but the real behind them is asserted at every step. On the objective side there is a real which is correlated to the subjective counterpart, the {atma}.¹⁷⁶¹ The *Brahman* is a subject-object correlation. Hence, Samkara's¹⁷⁶² philosophy a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, realism and conceptualism.⁴⁹ Mādhyamikas¹⁷⁶³ refuse to venture into the realm of metaphysics. They that contradiction does not presuppose a consciousness, because such consciousness (*vijnana* or *atman*)¹⁷⁶⁴ would not be separated from the concept of it. Similarly, the standard of contradiction should not be sought some outside the pale of concepts, because we cannot go beyond concepts. {But}¹⁷⁶⁵ contradiction should be taken as a fact about concepts and should not be plained in terms of something non-contradictory. When every

¹⁷⁵² "Yogācāras" in the original.

¹⁷⁵³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "Analy--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁴ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁵ "Yogācāras" in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "concept--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁸ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁷⁵⁹ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only "r--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁶⁰ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "He--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁶¹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ā"--" is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁶² "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁷⁶³ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

¹⁷⁶⁴ "ātman" in the original.

¹⁷⁶⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "B--" is visible in the original.

concept, without exception, is shown to be contradictory, the very concept of contradiction

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(continued from the previous page) itself is contradicted. Thus, ultimately there is no contradiction, because there is nothing to be contradicted (*avivadam-nibodhata*) .¹⁷⁶⁸ 50 There is no Absolute, because negation of contradiction does not mean some affirmative principle. There is no nihilism, because concepts have never been associated with reality, and thus, if they cease to be, reality will continue to exist in its own right.⁵¹ But such a reality, being conceptually zero, will not be one or many. It is neither Absolute nor a jumble of discrete particulars.⁵² Therefore, just as the Madhyamika¹⁷⁶⁹ system is not called pluralism, similarly it should not be designated as Absolutism. Metaphysical epithets like Absolutism, realism, idealism, empiricism, etc., should not be used for this, because it is not a metaphysical system. It would also be wrong to say that the school has any logical view of its own in the form of dialectic – since it has nothing to establish or nothing to achieve. Accepting for argument's sake the logic of the opponent, all that this school does is demonstrate by that very logic that his results are not free from contradiction. Is it, then, justified to say that the Madhyamikas¹⁷⁷⁰ have any form of dialectic of their own? Thus, it is neither Absolutist nor dialectical. It should therefore be called, if a name is necessary, an analytical philosophy, where analysis is confined only to concepts and language. It is not factual analysis. Again, here analysis should not be understood in the sense of exhibiting the components of a whole; rather,

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¹⁷⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "(259)" by hand.

¹⁷⁶⁸ "avivādam-nibodhata" in the original.

¹⁷⁶⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁷⁰ "Mādhyamikas" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) this analysis shows that the so-called whole (concept) is pregnant with contradictions, and this is not a whole at all. It is an analytic system {??}¹⁷⁷³ a negative function. There is no one word to express this idea, {an??}¹⁷⁷⁴ therefore, it should either be called “analytic zeroism” (zero is not the same as void) or, better, be given no name at all.

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Wing-tsit Chan: A Sourcebook In Chinese Philosophy (Review by Vincent Y.C. Shih)

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A SOURCEBOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
Wing-tsit Chan (Review by Vincent Y.C. Shih)

(422-1)¹⁷⁷⁶ Wang lived more than two centuries before Bishop Berkely, and yet he already had the insight to see what Berkely later described as esse est percipi. I have not seen any forceful refutation of such a datum.

Joseph Politella: Meister Eckhart and Eastern Wisdom

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MEISTER ECKHART AND EASTERN WISDOM
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(423-1)¹⁷⁷⁸ The Madhyamika school developed the conception of the dream-like quality of the manifested world in the Sunyata - doctrine that all things are empty and void, and that the underlying idea is the only permanent substance. Suzuki emphasises that we must remember:

¹⁷⁷² The original editor inserted “(260)” by hand.

¹⁷⁷³ The word is cut off by the right margin. Nothing is visible in the original.

¹⁷⁷⁴ The word is cut off by the right margin. Only “an--” is visible in the original.

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¹⁷⁷⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁷⁷⁷ The original editor inserted “262” by hand.

¹⁷⁷⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

The Mahayana has its positive side which always goes along with the doctrine of Emptiness. The positive side is known as the doctrine of Suchness or Thusness (tathata).

(423-2) Quote from Shankara:¹⁷⁷⁹ (Vivekachudamani, verses 60, 61)

Well uttered speech, a waterfall of words, and skill in setting forth words are for the delectation of the learned, but do not bring liberation.

When the supreme reality is not known, the reading of the scriptures is fruitless. Even when the supreme reality is known by the mind only, the reading of the scriptures is fruitless.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 16

Richard P. Benton: Keats and Zen

(423-3) The Zen patriarch Seng Ts'an advised, "Cease to cherish opinions." Robert Linssen contends that "attachment to any ideas is contrary to freedom," for such attachment necessarily "conditions the mind." Indeed, he says, "the simple preference for one idea rather than another, for one value rather than another equally enslaves the mind." Therefore, Zenists look askance at polemicists, who are people who actively defend particular ideas and beliefs. Zenists, on the contrary, avoid

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(continued from the previous page) disputation because they "are not fighting anything." Certainly Keats would have agreed with this attitude.

(424-1)¹⁷⁸² Keats's views here are very much like those of Zen, which also emphasises effortlessness or nonaction (wu wei) in the doing of everything. Its slogan in this respect is "wei wu wei," which means "to do without doing." This means doing things naturally, freely, spontaneously, and with perfect control without consciousness of any control. Wu wei is action that avoids laboriousness, awkwardness, artificiality, and ugliness. It is action that is instinctive, sure, efficient, and beautiful.

¹⁷⁷⁹ "Sankara" in the original.

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¹⁷⁸¹ The original editor inserted "263" by hand.

¹⁷⁸² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(424-2) His particular kind of self-annihilation was not egotistic and solipsistic and an excuse for “the extremest form of romantic self-expansion.” His self-annihilation did not result in the inflation of the personal ego, but in a genuine loss of self-identity and in a discovery of his True Self.

(424-3) She (Ruth Fuller Sasaki) writes, “The aim of Zen is first of all awakening, awakening to our true self. With this awakening to our true self comes emancipation from our small self or personal ego.” This does not mean, however, that our individual ego is completely extinguished. As long as we remain in the flesh we maintain our individual existence; we continue to “exist as one manifested form in the world of forms.” But it means that our personal ego is no longer in control, “with its likes and dislikes, its characteristics and its foibles.”

Raymond Panikkar: The “Crisis” of Madhyamika and Indian Philosophy Today

(424-4) Everything is transitory; all philosophy is only provisional, all constructions relative – and false in consequence the moment they claim some absoluteness. All our being is a shadow, a would-be thing; and yet, though the Madhyamika seems to forget it, this, our “being,” is a will-be thing, a being-to-be, an ex-sistence of the only consistency.

And here lies the “crisis” of Indian philosophy and its challenge to the world today: to turn back, or rather, to turn upward, to dispose ourselves in an expectant mood, not to our reason, or our possible faculties or efforts, but toward the Source, of which reason and our whole self are a humble and weak, but yet somehow a real, spark; because in it we breath, move and are.

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(425-1)¹⁷⁸⁴ Madhyamika¹⁷⁸⁵ and Indian Philosophy Today

Indian philosophy today stands at the crossroads, not only between East and West, but also between past and future. Aware of this problem, the Indian Philosophical Congress recently asked its members (and the philosophers of Indian in general) whether Indian philosophy needs reorientation, and organised a symposium on this subject. But a positive contribution to the philosophy of our times is more

¹⁷⁸³ The original editor inserted “(264)” and “Vol 16.” by hand.

¹⁷⁸⁴ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁷⁸⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

important than a philosophical self examination, than making plans or spinning projects. It is with this aim of dealing with a philosophical problem (and not simply with a historical exposition of an ancient philosophy) that this paper will discuss the role of the Madhyamika in regard to the revision of Indian philosophy today.¹

Two main points will be discussed. One refers to the central doctrine of Madhyamika itself; the other to the crisis it brings in the Greek sense of the word to the whole of Indian philosophy in its place in the philosophy of the world today.

I. Criticism of Madhyamika

(425-2) Regarding the truth-claim of the Madhyamika,¹⁷⁸⁶ nothing can be said before determining the truth-criteria to be applied to that system.

Two questions present themselves. First, how does the Madhyamika¹⁷⁸⁷ prove the truth, not of its contents sometimes it will say that it has no contents –

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(continued from the previous page) but of its claim? Secondly, is its claim at all tenable, i.e., without implying a vicious circle?

*Madhyamika's*¹⁷⁹⁰ *claim*. The Madhyamika's¹⁷⁹¹ claim to be beyond and above all views and system of philosophy relies on a double and very logical step. (1) All “views” are false because they are self-contradictory: here is the realm of the dialectic. (2) The negation of all “views,” in the sense of not being itself a “view,” opens – unveils – the intellectual intuition that transcends all “thought” and unites man with the Real.

All systems are self-contradictory. To prove that all “views” are false, the Madhyamika¹⁷⁹² tries to prove, first, that one view is contradictory with itself, applying none but the very criteria accepted by that view. We may wonder, first of all, if its arguments against a certain system are accepted by that representatives of that system, for we see those philosophies also continue to flourish after the Madhyamika's¹⁷⁹³

¹⁷⁸⁶ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

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¹⁷⁹⁰ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁷⁹¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁷⁹² “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁷⁹³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

criticisms. But we may grant for the time being, and for the sake of argument, that such a refutation has succeeded.

Now, if a particular "view" is false, it would seem that the opposite one is automatically true. The dialectic of the Madhyamika¹⁷⁹⁴ explicitly denies this "consequence," a consequence which it considers false from two different points of view: first, because, according to Murti (pp. 146 ff.) the Madhyamika¹⁷⁹⁵ rejects the "Law of Excluded Middle," on which that "consequence" rests; second, because this opposite system is subjected to criticisms analogous to the first one. Within its own dialectic, this second system is also found guilty of self-contradiction.

To prove that all views are false, it is not enough to prove that one is false, nor even that two are contradictory. It must be proved that any view is self-contradictory. The Madhyamika¹⁷⁹⁶ considers only four possible "views" on any subject, and it rejects all four. But how does the Madhyamika¹⁷⁹⁷ know that among these four "possibilities," i.e., A and non-A, on the one hand, and between A and non-A and non-(A and non-A) on the other, there is not another middle possibility, except by applying the Law of Excluded Middle, which the Madhyamika¹⁷⁹⁸ rejects? On what grounds can it be justified that "the four sets of views serve as schema for classifying *all* systems of philosophy?" (p. 130, italics mine). Not only logically from the Madhyamika's¹⁷⁹⁹ own standpoint is this untenable, but, in fact, there exist middle positions between the logical alternatives granted by the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰⁰ criticism. Moreover, this problem is important, not only because of the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰¹ challenge, but because the issue in itself puts the whole consistency and truthfulness of philosophy at stake. This point will be dealt with along with our second remark.

The first step of the claim is not proved, and the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰² does not

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¹⁷⁹⁴ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁹⁵ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁹⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁹⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁹⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁷⁹⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁰⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁰¹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁰² "Mādhyamika" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) even have the tools to prove it; it does not have and cannot have any criterion to prove that it embraces all systems of philosophy. This criterion transcends dialectics, for “Dialectic is criticism only” (p. 208), and criticism cannot jump over itself or forget the concrete system it criticizes. The best the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰⁵ can do is to criticize the concrete “views” that it has in view.

The rejection of all views does not rely on the quantitative ground that it has exhausted all possible views, but on the qualitative discovery of the falsity of any view, and, in fact, the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰⁶ is more inclined to such an attitude, namely that “the self-conscious awareness of all points of view, or reason as such, cannot itself be a view” (p. 163; cf. also p. 209). But the system can affirm this only under two presuppositions: first, leveling down all philosophies to rationalistic systems, which besides being gratuitous is not true, and secondly, transcending *positively* “all thought categories” (p. 208), i.e., “the competence of reason to apprehend reality” (p. 208), which a pure dialectic cannot do. For this, it should base itself on something outside that is even higher than reason. And, in fact, it does this (cf. p. 163). This is the dogma and the true tenet of the Madhyamika, but as a real dogma it lies beyond the realm of a dialectical process.

*The Madhyamika*¹⁸⁰⁷ *itself is not a system.* This is already the second step alluded to, i.e., an extradialectical jump. It leaps straight from the negation of all “views,” including its own “view,” if it has one, to the discovery, or realisation, or postulation, of the underlying real identical with the intellectual intuition. The Madhyamika¹⁸⁰⁸ says that this intuition emerges, as it were, when all the obstacles set up by reason have been removed. How is this second step dialectically justified, since for the Madhyamika¹⁸⁰⁹ “the Dialectic itself is philosophy?” (p. 209; cf. p. 213, etc.)

The Madhyamika¹⁸¹⁰ affirms again and again that “Criticism of other views is a means, not an end itself” (p. 213; cf. p. 218, etc.), that the rejection of views is “the *only* means open to absolutism, to free the real of the accidental accretions with which the finite mind invests it through ignorance” (p. 234, *italics mine*). One cannot but first ask how the Madhyamika¹⁸¹¹ knows that there is only one means to set the real free, that our mind “falsifies the real” (p. 235), and above all that “there is an underlying reality – the subjacent ground?” (p. 234; cf. p. 237). This is the painful conclusion of many a system of philosophy, and yet, on the positive side, it seems to be the Madhyamika’s¹⁸¹² very point of departure. The reason that Murti suggests – “If there were no

¹⁸⁰⁴ The original editor inserted “(266)” by hand.

¹⁸⁰⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁰⁶ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁰⁷ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁰⁸ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁰⁹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸¹⁰ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸¹¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸¹² “Mādhyamika” in the original.

transcendent ground, how could any view be condemned as false?" (pp. 234–235) first of all takes for granted and assumes the validity of the complete rejection by the Madhyamika¹⁸¹³ of all systems (and we are concerned here precisely with the justification of such rejection). And one must secondly observe

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(continued from the previous page) that the statement that there must be a transcendent ground in order to make possible a false view is either an inference, thus presupposing the very principle of causality which is precisely the first victim of the Madhyamika¹⁸¹⁶ critique (pp. 121, 166 ff.),² or that statement is not an inference, in which case it would be a metaphysical presupposition, a non-dialectical starting point. It starts, namely, from the intuition of the real, from the realisation of the Tathagata.¹⁸¹⁷

Moreover, if the dialectic (or, if we prefer, the rejection of all views) is a means, it implies that it is a means for something, for an end not given in the means. This end is "a spiritual goal" (pp. 331 ff.) of the whole system. The dialectic will occupy an honorific place as philosophy; but, like European scholastic philosophy, will be *ancilla theologiae* at the service of a higher wisdom. Dialectic is the means of uncovering the real; but the real is already there, and we lift the veil and pitilessly criticize all systems because "The possibility of intellectual intuition is not only *accepted* but is taken to be the very heart of reality" (p. 214, italics mine). The means have a consistency in themselves, of course; but they are means, because they are at the service of the end. The "higher level" does not belong to dialectics.

Its weakness. Is the Madhyamika's¹⁸¹⁸ claim tenable at all, i.e., without self-contradiction?

The *sunyata-sunyata*,¹⁸¹⁹ "the Unreality of (the Knowledge of) Unreality" (p. 352), the kind of self-destruction of the Madhyamika¹⁸²⁰ in the realm of "Reason" or of

¹⁸¹³ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

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¹⁸¹⁵ The original editor inserted "(267)" by hand.

¹⁸¹⁶ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸¹⁷ "Tathāgata" in the original.

¹⁸¹⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸¹⁹ "śūnyata-śūnyatā" in the original.

¹⁸²⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

“thought,” will not help in saving the Madhyamika¹⁸²¹ from “dogmatic” assumptions of a much more serious order than any other system.

The Madhyamika¹⁸²² repeats again and again that it is not a “view,” at least on the same level at which it places all other “views.”

The rejection itself is as much relative, unreal, as the rejected; because it is unintelligible without the latter. The fire of criticism which consumes all dogmatic views itself dies down, as there is nothing on which it could thrive; the medicine after curing the disease dissolves itself, and does not itself constitute a fresh disorder.... But the rejection of the dialectical criticism (*sunyata*)¹⁸²³ does not mean that re-instatement of the reality of the phenomenal world; it merely means that in rejecting the unreal we have to resort to means that are themselves of the same order, like the extracting of a thorn by another thorn (p. 353).... The pronouncement that everything is sunya¹⁸²⁴ (relative, unreal) is itself unreal; it is not to be taken for one more entity (p. 356).... avidya¹⁸²⁵ is itself unreal; it is Maya¹⁸²⁶ (p. 241).

Does this mean that we are concerned with a sheer nihilism? It does not seem so, for “the Madhyamika¹⁸²⁷ is spiritual to the core. His absolute is not void,

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(continued from the previous page) but devoid of finitude and imperfection. It is nothing but Spirit” (pp. 332–333). “Sunyata,¹⁸³⁰ as the negation of all particular views and standpoints, is the universal *par excellence*” (p. 333).

Now, how does the Madhyamika account for its position? If it were nihilism, it could be somehow consistent, at least to the extent of pseudo-destroying itself. Since it is not pure nihilism it must transcend dialectic, and with that it must transcend its claim of no presupposition and its “anti-dogmatic” attitude.

¹⁸²¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸²² “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸²³ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁸²⁴ “śūnya” in the original.

¹⁸²⁵ “avidyā” in the original.

¹⁸²⁶ “Māyā” in the original.

¹⁸²⁷ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

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¹⁸²⁹ The original editor inserted “(268)” by hand.

¹⁸³⁰ “Śūnyatā” in the original.

In fact, if a philosophy is characterized not only by its method but also by its implications, its objectives, and its contents, the Madhyamika transcends by far all dialectic; and it is to that extent misleading to present it as pure dialectic when this is only its method.

If the Madhyamika¹⁸³¹ claims to be only dialectic free from all “dogmatic” presuppositions, if it were “the one system that is completely free from every trace of dogmatism” (p. 334), or “the impartial tribunal which alone can assess the true nature of every philosophical system” (p. 334), it should first of all unmistakably show its own credentials in such a way that no doubt could ever arise after due examination. But the history of philosophy proves that, at least *de facto*, it did not succeed in doing so, perhaps because the human race is still deaf and blind; and secondly, if it is to remain only dialectic, it must abolish just that which makes the Madhyamika¹⁸³² valuable, namely, its implications and objectives. Let us mention only some of these non-dialectical elements of the Madhyamika.¹⁸³³

1. It presupposes that there is something higher and more valuable than “reason.” The fact that “reason” leads us nowhere and is full of antinomies does not prove, dialectically, that there is a higher court of appeal, unless we presuppose that somehow all antinomies must be solved (cf. p. 330, etc.).

2. It assumes, again, and in connection with the first presupposition, that beyond “thought” and “negation” there is a “subject ground,” an “underlying reality.” “Reason” cannot discover it, but the failure of “reason” does not justify the assumption that the “transcendental illusion” must be transcended (cf. p. 234).

3. It identifies this “ground” with an “Intellectual Intuition,” and assumes the dichotomy of two “levels,” not only in the epistemological order of “reason” and “intuition,” but also in the ontological one of “reality” and “appearance,” the Absolute and the phenomenon. The dialectic – and Vedanta here is more illuminating cannot – disclose the Absolute (cf. p. 220).

4. It identifies this “ground” with the Tathāgata (God, the Absolute, etc.) (cf. p. 224 ff.).

5. It assumes, further, that this “ground” is uniform, universal, immutable, and the like (cf. p. 235).

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¹⁸³¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸³² “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸³³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) 6. The main assumption of this philosophy regarding its claim to uniqueness comes to this: it assumes that all philosophies are “dogmatic,” or, explaining this taboo-word, it takes for granted that all systems of philosophy are a kind of science (“scientism”) or rationalism, i.e., closed systems aiming at exhausting the real with their lucubrations and in most cases interpreting it as an empirical reality (cf. p. 210 ff.).³ On the other hand, the Madhyamika¹⁸³⁶ presupposes that it, and it alone has access to the true realm of philosophy that lies beyond thought and all its antinomies. It is hardly necessary to say that neither of these assumptions can be substantiated.

To put the matter bluntly: A claim to uniqueness is the most common presumption of all truly “dogmatic” systems. If this uniqueness is bought at the price of condemning *en bloc* all other systems as not up to the mark, the aspiration, to say the least, looks far-fetched. And yet, the powerful *sunyata*¹⁸³⁷ is somehow the climax of Indian philosophy, and the positive clue for its possible intervention in the philosophical crisis of our times.

II. The Crisis of Philosophy

(435-1)¹⁸³⁸ “ ‘That everything exists’ is, Kaccayana,¹⁸³⁹ one extreme; ‘that it does not exist’ is another. Not accepting the two extremes, the Tathagata¹⁸⁴⁰ proclaims the truth (*dhammam*) from the *middle position*. Nagarjuna¹⁸⁴¹ makes pointed reference to this passage in his *Karikas*,¹⁸⁴² declaring that the Lord has rejected both the ‘is’ and ‘not-is’ views – all views” (p. 51).

In fact, Indian philosophy in its entirety rests on the tension and polarity between the *atman*-view¹⁸⁴³ and the *anatman*-vie¹⁸⁴⁴w. The Madhyamika is the ingenious attempt to transcend both views by denial, by *sunya*.¹⁸⁴⁵ Could not Indian philosophy in its present stage, after a full elaboration of its implications and a deeper contact with other philosophical traditions of mankind, be aware of another possible solution by eminence, by transcending both views equally, i.e., not by mere denial, but

¹⁸³⁵ The original editor inserted “(269)” by hand.

¹⁸³⁶ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸³⁷ “śūnyatā” in the original.

¹⁸³⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁸³⁹ “Kaccāyana” in the original.

¹⁸⁴⁰ “Tathāgata” in the original.

¹⁸⁴¹ “Nāgārjuna” in the original.

¹⁸⁴² “Kārikās” in the original.

¹⁸⁴³ “ātman” in the original.

¹⁸⁴⁴ “anātman” in the original.

¹⁸⁴⁵ “śūnya” in the original.

by a positive synthesis, which is not a simple mixture or a syncretistic compromise, but a third and yet qualified affirmation? Is there not that middle way which the Indian mind has always been passionately looking for as the path of salvation, the *via media* of a philosophical path that is aware of the itinerant character of being, the contingent feature of ourselves, including our philosophy? Is there not a middle way between the static being that cannot move and change and become, and the perennial flux that has no consistency, no identity, no being? But it must be a way and not a denial of all ways, because we are still pilgrims here on

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(continued from the previous page) earth and our philosophizing is still itinerant. Could not Indian philosophy become aware of what the metaphysical tradition of the European Middle Ages called the analogy of being? There would be no need for India to copy it or to adopt it uncritically; but could she not discover something of this kind that would enable her to follow her best absolutist trends, without losing the sense of the relative?

Perhaps such questions may sound somewhat naïve in their generality; and perhaps, too, the benevolent answer would be that in India there is already this synthesis, for no serious system is so one-sided as to deny Being to save the beings, or vice versa. And yet a mere glimpse at the philosophical discussions among the different schools in India is enough to make us realise that the antinomy *atman-anatman*¹⁸⁴⁸ has not been overcome in the sober realm of pure metaphysics; or, in other words, that between the Parmenides of India and her Heraclitus no Aristotle has yet emerged to produce a realistic and ultimate insight into that being which moves, changes, is not yet *Brahman*, though, equally, it is not nothing. A study of the deep differences between the Sāmnkhya system and Greek-Scholastic conceptions of act and potency, in spite of external similarities, would throw light on this theme (cf. pp. 168–169). The itinerant being is not "*partly* actual and *partly* potential" (p. 169, italics mine). Needless to say, we are not pleading now for an Aristotelian way, but for a philosophical overcoming of the main Indian antinomy. It is not enough to say that we may choose either way or none. Philosophical inquiry has always been a pioneering

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¹⁸⁴⁷ The original editor inserted "(270)" by hand.

¹⁸⁴⁸ "ātman-ānatman" in the original.

search for a pathway, without neglecting any sign, even if those hints may happen to come from the Stagirite.

Here let us bring out the general tenor of our present remarks with the aid of three concrete examples.

(437-1)¹⁸⁴⁹ *The Problem of change*. Let us take the problem of change, first (and very briefly), regarding the general theme of causality (pp. 74-75, 121, 166, ff.), and secondly (in some more detail), regarding the conception of motion and rest (pp. 178 ff.).

To begin with, if change could not be explained rationally, this would not mean at all that change is unreal, unless we assume that rationality is the criterion of reality. Nor would it prove that reason is unreal, but only that both are incommensurable and heterogeneous, at least so far as no rational explanation can be given. In short, the problem of reality should be carefully distinguished and dealt with on its own merits.

Secondly, rational explanation does not mean full intellectual evidence. The former means to find, to be aware of, the "rational" laws by which the thing in question is governed. The latter means the awareness of the thing itself, transparent, as it were, to our intellect. We can rationally explain quite a

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(continued from the previous page) number of mathematical theorems or physical processes without having the intellectual evidence for them. No rational explanation can stop or satisfy, is it were, all the "whys" we are capable of putting. It must stop somewhere, because its function is not ultimate. So, to criticize a rational explanation because it does not exhaust all the "whys" is out of the question. The contrary would presuppose that the realm of reason is absolute and illimited. The critique then would be very easy; but this assumption is not even rational.

So, the fact of the incapacity of our reason to explain causality would mean only that causality is not a "rational" category; it would not mean anything else.

The Madhyamika¹⁸⁵² is absolutely convinced of this from the very beginning, but it puts it only as a result of its critical analysis.

¹⁸⁴⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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¹⁸⁵¹ The original editor inserted "(271)" by hand.

¹⁸⁵² "Mādhyamika" in the original.

Here we shall only sketch the structure of this critique; for, if we entered into its details, they would overshadow what we intend to bring out, and distract us from our central point. The analysis of this structure shows a certain mental scheme that is repeated in all Madhyamika analysis.

The four possible alternatives already mentioned are here reduced to two. This fact will show how this rational critique cannot comprehend any middle position, paradoxical as this may sound in a system called the Madhyamika.

According to the general scheme, A, in this case the effect, may be considered “as the self-expression of the cause, or as caused by factors other than itself, or both, or neither. The last alternative amounts to giving up the notion of causation The third alternative is really an amalgam of the first two” (p. 168). Now, with the same mental scheme of identity, the second alternative will be reduced to the first one. If the effect were different from the cause, then there would be a lack of relation between the two. Under this circumstance “anything should be capable of being produced from anything” (p. 172), unless some other factor were the real cause, in which case we should have fallen into the first alternative. But the first alternative, the *satkāryavāda*¹⁸⁵³ (the doctrine that the effect exists in the cause), is easily refuted. Causality would mean here merely self-duplication, because the sufficient reason for its own self-reproduction is already present in the effect, which would have to produce a second effect, and so on and on without end. Moreover, “if the cause and effect were identical, how is one to function *as cause* and the other *as effect*” (p. 169). So, there is no explanation possible, as far as the dialectical criticism in its structure is concerned.

Now, the first role of any sound criticism is to understand what the other wants to say. The mental scheme of identity of the Madhyamika¹⁸⁵⁴ reduces the most different conceptions to a logical pattern which other systems do not accept and recognise as their own. In the example we are now considering, the

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(continued from the previous page) dismissal of the third alternative and the mode of dealing with the second one are typical of the Madhyamika¹⁸⁵⁷ procedure.

¹⁸⁵³ “satkāryavāda” in the original.

¹⁸⁵⁴ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

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¹⁸⁵⁶ The original editor inserted “(272)” by hand.

The Madhyamika¹⁸⁵⁸ makes the most strenuous efforts to resolve any position into a relation of absolute identity or absolute non-identity. Either the effect is equal to the cause or it is not. If it is, there are no cause and effect; if it is not, no relation is possible – because it again levels down any relation to identity and non-identity (partly identical, partly non-identical – and thus there is no effect at all). This blindness to relations is the most characteristic feature of the Madhyamika¹⁸⁵⁹ dialectic. But this two-dimensional critique misses the point altogether, because the very object of its attack is a three-dimensional reality. Even mere reason is something more than the power of the yes and no. It is also the passing from one to another, from the yes to the no, or vice versa. Along with the two extreme positions that our reason can think of, and equally immediate and valid as they are, there is their “relation”; that is to say, there is also a “middle.”

If, for instance, the third alternative is significant at all, it is not in any way an “amalgam” of the two extremes, but a real third position that tries to explain as far as possible the peculiar phenomenon under study, causality, which is neither identity nor non-identity.

The same happens with the second case, which is not so naive¹⁸⁶⁰ to pretend that the cause is not the “cause” of the effect. Precisely because they are not the same, there is a special relation that constitutes the very problem of causality.

Up to now we have purposely avoided judging which of the views is consistent. It was our purpose, first, to show the structure of the dialectic.

(441-2) *The Question of movement.* Let us now turn to the criticism of the notions of movement and rest. We know how the Madhyamika¹⁸⁶¹ dialectic works. Besides making a criticism of its critique, we should also be able to answer its charges.

The Madhyamika¹⁸⁶² works here in the following way: the notion of movement is self-contradictory, and that of rest fares no better. Both are equally inexplicable.

What is motion? The Madhyamika¹⁸⁶³ seems blind to the reality of movement, for obviously it is neither identity nor non-identity. In consequence, it analyses, not movement, but only “Three *factors* [that] are [considered] essential for the occurrence of motion” (p. 178, italics mine).

The first observation to make here is that we have lost sight of motion, in order to consider certain factors, conditions, ingredients, and the like which we nevertheless assume to be “essential.” not for the nature of motion, but for its “occurrence.” It is as if we were to examine the two factors 2 and 3

¹⁸⁵⁷ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁵⁸ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁵⁹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁶⁰ “naïve” in the original.

¹⁸⁶¹ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁶² “Mādhyamika” in the original.

¹⁸⁶³ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) that produce the number 6. None of the factors alone will give us the product, and 6 is the very destruction of the 2 and of the 3. The Madhyamika would dismiss the 6, because the 2 is not the 6, but, rather, contradictory to it (the 6 is the non-2); and the same happens with the 3.

Murti gives the example of Zeno. May I remark that Zeno's argument is not valid at all, being a kind of *reversed* "ontological argument." It passes from the rational, logical sphere to a reality, an existence outside it. It only proves that the notion of movement, as conceived by Zeno, is untenable or contradictory. It does not even touch the motion outside his mind (Achilles is the proof), and very few other conceptions of motion either. Besides, we know today that his imagining space to be divided into an indefinite number of parts is not only practically but theoretically impossible. But we are not now concerned with the Eleatic.

Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between Zeno and Nagarjuna,¹⁸⁶⁶ which does not lie in the fact that the former "did not disturb rest" (p. 178) whereas the latter "denies both motion and rest" (p. 178), but in the peculiar significance of negation in the Madhyamika¹⁸⁶⁷ system. Here, "Negative judgement is the *negation of judgement*" (pp. 155, 160). This amounts to saying that the Madhyamika¹⁸⁶⁸ negation of movement is, properly speaking, the negation of the affirmative judgment about movement. But, strikingly enough, the whole criticism of the notion of movement does not deal with the judgment about motion, but about motion taken in the most "realistic way."

The three essential factors for the Madhyamika's¹⁸⁶⁹ critique of motion are: "... the space traversed (moved in), the moving body and the movement itself" (p. 178). Again, at first sight the heterogeneity of these three factors is striking: The simple and naively realistic imagination (of space), the physical entity (of a body), and the abstracted notion (of movement). If they are going to be "factors," it will presumably be on very different levels.

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¹⁸⁶⁵ The original editor inserted "(273)" by hand.

¹⁸⁶⁶ "Nāgārjuna" in the original.

¹⁸⁶⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁶⁸ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁶⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

The first factor puts up but small resistance to criticism. First of all, the implied notion of space is untenable. It makes a substance out of it and manipulates it as if it were a "thing," cutting it down, dividing it, and comparing it with "other spaces." And then, again it applies its identity-scheme: the "space" is either already traversed (*gatam*) or not-traversed (*agatam*). "... there is no third division of space as the 'being traversed' (*gamyamānam*)" (p. 178). And only this one would make motion possible; hence, motion is impossible. The logical argument is clear: any point of that "space," even in the supposed moving thing, has been either traversed or has to be traversed. In short, the body may move, but "space" cannot move – and does not allow movement. Even the "traversed" "space" lies peacefully there. Being blind to movement, the *Madhyamika*¹⁸⁷⁰ leaves everything frozen. Reason

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(continued from the previous page) sees the static picture and from there cannot conceive motion. It would be another picture. And, again, the implied conception of space is untenable. It is an idea, like those of the people who ask what is there after the last star, or whether the antipodeans walk upside down.

The same scheme is applied to the second factor: What is the moving body? No effort is made to grasp the mover as such. It kills the moving body at once to distinguish – and substantialise – a (static) mover and the "motion" inherent in it. "The mover is either motionless by himself apart from the motion, or he has a motion other than the motion which inheres in him" (p. 180). The first alternative is a contradiction, and in the second one there are two motions which oblige us to accept either two movers or a disembodied motion; both possibilities unacceptable. The "reason" for introducing a second motion is clear: if mover and motion were identical, "the mover would always be moving" (p. 180).

We cannot go into details here on this subject (to which we have devoted over two hundred pages elsewhere).⁴ The climax of the Greek mind, represented in Aristotle, consisted precisely in overcoming the static and the purely dynamic conception of beings by a right analysis of moving being. Movement is the

¹⁸⁷⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

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¹⁸⁷² The original editor inserted "(274)" by hand.

characteristic and irreducible aspect of things. Moving being is essentially and existentially becoming.

The motion of the mover is only an abstraction. It is the mover that moves and *anagke stenai*¹⁸⁷³ (it is necessary to stop – somewhere). It is the moving mover we have to consider, and whose condition we have to explain – or reject – without recurring to abstractions which as such are intrinsically incapable of explaining the concrete fact of movement. Even a critique must know its own limits.

The third factor, the movement itself, is also easily dismissed with no attempt to understand the idea, but asking for the where and when of such an idea, again substantialised as a thing.

Similar considerations, which lack of space here compels us to omit, could be applied to the critique of the notion of rest. It is not asked what rest is or might be, but simply who rests? And the baffling answer comes: “Not the mover, nor the static – the non-mover; and there is no third who could rest. The static does not rest, for it is already stationary ...” (p. 182). Nor the mover, for it would be contradiction: it would no longer be mover. Besides philosophical considerations of another kind, even logically speaking the argument is weak. It takes “rest” in a twofold sense: as “stationary” and as “coming to rest.” It applies the second sense to the first part of the dilemma

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(continued from the previous page) and the first sense to the second. The static does not come to rest, because it is already at rest. The mover cannot be stationary for it would no longer be mover. But it already recognises that the static is at rest, and it is not a contradiction that the mover comes to rest.

(447-1)¹⁸⁷⁶ The *atman-anatman*¹⁸⁷⁷ schema. We should like to deal at length with a second example of paramount importance: the *atman-anatman*¹⁸⁷⁸ problem; but we shall have to

¹⁸⁷³ “stēnai” in the original.

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¹⁸⁷⁵ The original editor inserted “(275)” by hand.

¹⁸⁷⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁸⁷⁷ “ātman-anātman” in the original.

¹⁸⁷⁸ “ātman-anātman” in the original.

limit ourselves to the central issue at stake here, overlooking many other points that would make our contention more plausible.

Indian philosophy in its entirety rests on, or rather moves in, the internal tension and polarity of the *atman-anatman*¹⁸⁷⁹ thematic.

Something must undergo change. In the rich variety of this world that changes and moves there must be something that sustains and maintains all this show, this (divine) display. This is the ground, the substance, the *atman*.¹⁸⁸⁰ Now, this *atman*¹⁸⁸¹ cannot change, can neither increase nor decrease. It is Being and, as such, is the ultimate core of everything. *Atman*¹⁸⁸² is the foundation of the world and the substance that “understands” everything.

Now, there are many “possible” ways of interpreting this *atman*:¹⁸⁸³ e.g., in a pluralistic way (there are many *dharmas*, elements, the combination of which produces the world); or in a dualistic manner (only two principles give account for reality, be they on a cosmological (*prakṛti-puruṣa*)¹⁸⁸⁴ or on an ethical (good-evil) or metaphysical (prime Mover-beings) plane); or in a monistic fashion (*Brahman*, pantheism, Absolutism, etc.). The summit of philosophical speculation has found a fourth possibility – the advaitic answer: God and the world, the Absolute and the relative are “not two” (two examples of what? – the what would be higher, more supreme than the Absolute). The effort to solve this dilemma constitutes the metaphysical problem par excellence, not only of the Indian mind, but of philosophy as such. Indian absolutisms have struck at the problem and deepened it in such a way that no philosophical speculation is possible now without taking into account the problems raised by the Indian systems. And yet, owing to the absence of an immediate intuition of the contingent being, Indian advaitisms fall again and again into one form or another of monism.

One thing remains common to all these systems. Being is Being and does not tolerate gaps, becomings, potentialities, imperfections, changes, movements. The “other,” or other “side” (whatever it may “be”), cannot impinge against the unconditioned, for that would amount to saying that it is not more Absolute, if Being could ever be dependent on what is not Being.

The whole criticism of the previous view by the second pole of Indian thought consists in destroying the rational or intellectual presupposition on which the

¹⁸⁷⁹ “*ātman-anātman*” in the original.

¹⁸⁸⁰ “*ātman*” in the original.

¹⁸⁸¹ “*ātman*” in the original.

¹⁸⁸² “*Ātman*” in the original.

¹⁸⁸³ “*ātman*” in the original.

¹⁸⁸⁴ “*prakṛti-puruṣa*” in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) first group relies entirely: There must be a ground, otherwise nothing is understandable. Why this craving to understand, to creep under the only standing of reality; i.e., change, movement? Paradoxically enough, change is also denied, because there is nothing that changes. Being is the great illusion; and, if we speak here of becoming, we must discard the interpretation of a coming to be.

Pure dialectics must needs be inclined toward this second group. Pure metaphysics cannot give up at least some of the requirements of the first systems. The Madhyamika¹⁸⁸⁷ cuts the Gordian knot, but at the same time it throws the baby away with the bath water.

Is there not possible, and perhaps even already existing as a philosophical approach, a *via media*, a positive solution to this *atman-anatman*¹⁸⁸⁸ dilemma? Could not Indian philosophy overcome this impasse positively, and discover that being is certainly one but also that, somehow, precisely because it is the fullness of being, of one, it is life, plenitude, silence, and even word and love? Could not Indian philosophy try to "accept," at least as a working hypothesis, that the Absolute (still a relative concept *solutus ab*, that is, *a nobis*: loosened from us), is rather, an "*In-solute*," a fullness in itself that has somehow life, consciousness, love – of which the little *atmans*¹⁸⁸⁹ of this earth are nothing but shadows, participations, creatures, callings?

This is no plea for the supra-philosophical conception of the Godhead as Trinity. Nor am I saying that the pre-philosophical Indian wisdom, as we find it in the "scriptures," is very much along this line. I want only to state that the recognition of a dynamic fullness of Being, which does not destroy us unity and simplicity, alone can somehow give an answer to the philosophical problem of change.

What is the underlying presupposition common to both the *atman*¹⁸⁹⁰ and the *anatman*¹⁸⁹¹ views? That change is not possible, that becoming is contradictory because Being is immutable. Either what "is" is and then cannot become, come to be, because it already is; or what "is" is not, because we can nowhere find such an "is." The moment that we "imagine" we have caught it, it vanishes away – it "is" no more, there exists no such "is," Ultimately *atman*¹⁸⁹² and *nairatmyavada*¹⁸⁹³ present the same structure: There is only one way of being a "being." No "phenomenon," no "thing" in this world fulfills

¹⁸⁸⁶ The original editor inserted "(276)" by hand.

¹⁸⁸⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

¹⁸⁸⁸ "ātman-anātman" in the original.

¹⁸⁸⁹ "ātmans" in the original.

¹⁸⁹⁰ "ātman" in the original.

¹⁸⁹¹ "anātman" in the original.

¹⁸⁹² "ātman" in the original.

¹⁸⁹³ "nairātmyāvada" in the original.

its requirements. The “is” lies beyond this world, devoid of anything that might contaminate it. It is pure transcendence. And this is the *atman*¹⁸⁹⁴ as well as the *anatman*.¹⁸⁹⁵ It does not matter at all if pure unrelatedness is or is-not. It is not only that we have no way to prove it, or to speak about it, it also makes no difference. The “thing” – i.e., the cow, the house, my soul, my thoughts, this earth – is not. Either it is not, for the *astikas*,¹⁸⁹⁶ because it, the cow, etc., insofar as it *is*, is

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THE “CRISIS” OF MADHYAMIKA AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

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(continued from the previous page) *Brahman*; or for the *nastikasit*¹⁸⁹⁹ is-not, because it, the “thing” is, neither as “thing,” nor as something *else*.

What “is” it, then? It “is” certainly not “being”; but it is not “not-being” either. In the analysis of that “thing” that changes lies the whole business of philosophy; and in finding a balanced answer consists the real “crisis” of Indian wisdom.

*Atman*¹⁹⁰⁰ and *nairatmyavada*¹⁹⁰¹ lie here together on the one side of a higher dilemma for which Indian philosophy has no terminology of its own, and for which it will not find Western concepts adequate. That “pollachos”¹⁹⁰² of Aristotle, that *analogia* of the Scholastics, that *fieri*, the becoming, of some moderns, could well be the provisional tools for overcoming this crisis of Indian philosophy. And it is here that one of the pivots of the whole Indian life should prove its astonishing vitality: the concept of *karman* (and even in a sense of *dharma*), common to both Indian traditions. They would face then a third rising tradition that could solve harmoniously the dilemma and polarity of Indian thought. *Karman* is much more than crystallised action, or stored time. It is something that becomes, comes to be and yet is not *the Being*.

¹⁸⁹⁴ “ātman” in the original.

¹⁸⁹⁵ “anātman” in the original.

¹⁸⁹⁶ “āstikas” in the original.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Blank page

¹⁸⁹⁸ The original editor inserted “(277)” by hand.

¹⁸⁹⁹ “nāstikas” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁰ “Ātman” in the original.

¹⁹⁰¹ “nairātmyavāda” in the original.

¹⁹⁰² “pollachōs” in the original.

The dilemma is not *atman nairatmya*.¹⁹⁰³ but identity and difference: in one word, relation. It is *Brahman-atman*,¹⁹⁰⁴ or *Absolute-relative*, or Being and beings. or in Platonic terms the One and the manifold, or again reality and appearance, or eternity and time.

Quite rightly, the Madhyamika puts all dialectic problems of philosophy on one side; all belong to the relative, to the contingent, to the sphere of reason, it will say. On the other hand, there is intuition, *sunyata*, *nirvana*,¹⁹⁰⁵ the real, Being. It provides us also with the internal dialectics to recognise the inefficiency, the insufficiency of the first side. Moreover, it will never again allow us to “substantialise” the first side, as if it were something of its own. Nagarjuna¹⁹⁰⁶ says quite forcefully that “Nirvana¹⁹⁰⁷ is the reality of samsara,¹⁹⁰⁸ or conversely, samsarais¹⁹⁰⁹ the falsity (samvrti)¹⁹¹⁰ of Nirvana”¹⁹¹¹ (p. 162). Its only internal defect would be that it imagines that we can jump from the first shore to the second, out of the frustrations and contradictions which we find in the realm of the contingent. The jump is certainly possible; but it is, first of all, an existential pass-over, in which we really do not jump, but are taken over, by the other side. The grace of God, the gift of intuition, the higher knowledge of faith, and the like are here more or less adequate terms expressing this existential situation of ours. And this is quite a common opinion among the Indian systems, the Madhyamika¹⁹¹² not excluded. It is not a dialectical maneuver that saves us, or that saves philosophy, but a descending

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(continued from the previous page) redemption, the obedience to a higher “calling,” the realisation of, or, rather, the being “realised” by, the real.

¹⁹⁰³ “*ātman nairātmya*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁴ “*ātman*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁵ “*śūnyatā*, *nirvāṇa*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁶ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁷ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁸ “*samsāra*” in the original.

¹⁹⁰⁹ “*samsāra*” in the original.

¹⁹¹⁰ “*saṃvṛti*” in the original.

¹⁹¹¹ “*Nirvāṇa*” in the original.

¹⁹¹² “*Mādhyamika*” in the original.

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¹⁹¹⁴ The original editor inserted “(278)” by hand.

Everything is transitory; all philosophy is only provisional, all constructions relative – and false in consequence the moment they claim some absoluteness. All our being is a shadow, a would-be thing; and yet, though the Madhyamika¹⁹¹⁵ seems to forget it, this, our “being,” is a will-be being, a being-to-be, an ex-sistence of the only consistency.

And here lies the “crisis” of Indian philosophy and its challenge to the world today: to turn back, or, rather, to turn upward, to dispose ourselves in an expectant mood, not to our reason, or our possible faculties or efforts, but toward the Source, of which reason and our whole self are a humble and weak, but yet somehow a real, spark; because in it we breath, move and are.

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Quinter Lyon: Mystical Realism in Radhakrishnan (Vol. 16)

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MYSTICAL REALISM IN RADHAKRISHNAN

Quinter Lyon

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(455-1)¹⁹¹⁸ There is no justification for the view that mysticism is necessarily a form of monism. It happened to be monistic in the cases of Plotinus, Spinoza, Bradley, and the Hindu Upanisads as interpreted by Samkara and Ramanuja.

But Whitehead, the pluralist, shows unmistakable evidences of mysticism. There appears to be no incompatibility between pluralism and mysticism.

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MYSTICAL REALISM IN RADHAKRISHNAN

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Hwa Yol Jung: Jen: An Existential And Phenomenological Problem Of Intersubjectivity

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¹⁹¹⁵ “Mādhyamika” in the original.

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¹⁹¹⁷ The original editor inserted “279 (a)” by hand.

¹⁹¹⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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JEN: AN EXISTENTIAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF
INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Hwa Yol Jung
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(457-1)¹⁹²¹ However, it was the “pioneer” of Neo-Confucianism, Chou Tun-i, who identified jen with sheng. Later, Wang Yang-ming stated this idea most forcefully when he wrote that jen is “the principle of unceasing production and reproduction.”

**Quinter M. Lyon: Mystical Realism In The Thought Of
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan**

(457-2) The fact is that he has restated his position from time to time without worrying about consistency. For this reason his “Fragments of a Confession” may be regarded as his most mature statement up to 1951, and his most complete brief statement until now. It is characteristic of the man that in his Confession he states, we “are ignorant men thinking aloud.” He was here saying that it is man’s nature to be ignorant concerning ultimates.

(457-3) It is interesting to note that Radhakrishnan rejects Hegel’s philosophy for the same reason that he rejects materialism, namely, because both reduce one thing to another. Matter cannot be reduced to mind, nor mind to matter. To try to do so is to fail to account for either. Both are real but not apart from each other.

(457-4) The fall of man, according to Radhakrishnan, is a truth of experience, not an event of history. Realistic awareness of the human condition and its limitations does and should cause despair and anxiety, but its cure is possible through the achievement of wholeness and the recovery of a sense of destiny. Existentialism properly teaches that man is not an abstract universal but a unique and free individual. “Man’s insecurity stems from his experiences of nothingness ... which is not negative but positive and mysterious.” Man’s anxiety arises from his feeling of destiny accompanied by the fear that he may not realise that destiny. He is free both to sin and to grow. He cannot escape temptation. Life is real.

The world of Buddha and Radhakrishnan is remarkably like the world of Kierkegaard. For the latter, man stands aghast at his ignorance, debased instincts, errors, and disorganised desires. His human self-respect is hurt. He is divided against himself and society with which he wants

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MYSTICAL REALISM IN THE THOUGHT OF SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

¹⁹²⁰ The original editor inserted “279” by hand.

¹⁹²¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(continued from the previous page) peace. Questions and fears fill him. But these very real tensions of good and bad, strength and weakness, ignorance and knowledge, are what make human life worth living, for they lead to religion, to the fulfillment of selfhood, to goodness, knowledge, reality, eternity. Escapism cannot solve the human problem, says Radhakrishnan, either through irrationalism as some existentialism tends to do, or through resignation to the animal estate, as behaviorism teaches, or by resorting to the unconscious, as with Freud. Wisdom must be mastered. We cannot be saved by drugs, nor by fondly cultivated myths, nor by the dogmas of religion or politics.

(459-1)¹⁹²³ Man is alone in his quest for being, in his anguish at not being able to escape his destiny, or death, or the bewildering universe. The anguish of his ignorance, however, prepares him for wisdom, for his discovery of the Absolute Being, the Universal Self, the consciousness of and identity with Spirit. Such a discovery reveals not an object of thought but an inward experience, an intuition, a transcendence of individuality in his apprehension of God as Being and Perfection. The direct experience of Being bypasses reason and empirical data. Yet, all approaches support one another: perceptual, conceptual, and intuitive knowledge or integral insight. The latter is simply the whole person knowing. Conception is knowledge by abstraction.

(459-2) Radhakrishnan's is a modern mysticism based on the premise that the world is real and must be dealt with.

(459-3) The existentialism of Radhakrishnan grows out of his view of maya as positive, as the threat of nothingness which man faces. In overcoming the inertia (objective law) of karma the human spirit, looking inward, can enter into Being and experience the mystic bliss through truth and goodness. Man's spirit belongs to the non-objective order though it needs the objective order and can realise itself only through economic, political, and other human relations. This approaches a humanistic interpretation of the traditional Hindu mysticism. It remains mysticism, however, since the divine in nature and man, while transcending the intellect, is, nevertheless, internal to the spirit of man and responsive to his needs.

K. Narain: An Outline Of Madhva Philosophy (Review by P. Nagaraja Rao)

¹⁹²² The original editor inserted "280" by hand.

¹⁹²³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(459-4) Ramanuja (1017-137) opposed Sankara's (788-820) interpretation of the texts and severely criticised the doctrines of

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(459-1)¹⁹²⁵ it is attained by free spirits (pluralistic, real) living in this world, practicing the life of simple goodness, learning to be meek, patient, kind loving, helpful, unpretentious, contemplative yet also active, creative, willing to suffer vicariously, at the same time affirming the goodness of the (real) world.⁴⁰

Successful mystics are not the monks but men who, like Gandhi, lived with men, women, and children suffering, aspiring, frustrated, needing help and companionship. He finds the highest bliss who helps his fellows to express the divine image in full lives. The true mystic instinctively works for political, economic, and social improvement.⁴¹ Let it be "action without attachment," leaving the results to God.⁴² Only people of integrity need hope for the beatific vision.⁴³ In God's kingdom are free spirits: free from fear, loneliness, and hate. Christ and his followers are sons of God, says Radhakrishnan. The real purpose of all religious discipline is to evolve the divine stature. Worship has no other purpose. Religion that is merely external is not religion at all. Religion is a form of being; it is "not a problem to be solved but a reality to be experienced."⁴⁴ The inwardness of religion makes religion self-knowledge. He who lives an external and superficial life lacks religion and all knowledge of reality. Said Augustine (quoted by Radhakrishnan): "Behold Thou wert within and I abroad and there I searched for Thee." Radhakrishnan points out that Kierkegaard taught that "truth is ... subjectivity." Adds Radhakrishnan, "the divine is more deeply in us than we are in ourselves. We attain to spirit by passing beyond the frontiers of the familiar self."⁴⁵ Yoga, like Plato, calls to inwardness.⁴⁶ This is like Whitehead's concept of religion as "what the individual does with his own solitariness."⁴⁷

A mystic cannot be sectarian or exclusive. The religion of the spirit will be a religion of fellowship of believers, not a fusion of beliefs. The great prophets in all traditions have experienced a universal religion. The determination of all who feel the impulse to cling to inwardness, to reality and spiritual growth, is expressed in the words of Shaw's St. Joan, whom Radhakrishnan quotes: "O God, that madest this beautiful earth, when will it be ready to receive thy saints?"⁴⁸

It may seem more fitting to classify Radhakrishnan as a prophet rather

¹⁹²⁴ The original editor inserted "(281)" and "Vol 16 - mystical Realism in the Thought of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan" by hand.

¹⁹²⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

Ram Pratap Singh: Radhakrishnan's Substantial Reconstruction of The Vedanta of Samkara

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RADHAKRISHNAN'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VEDANTA OF SAMKARA

Ram Pratap Singh

[282]¹⁹²⁷(461-1)¹⁹²⁸ I. Introduction: Radhakrishnan's Reorientation

The Vedanta¹⁹²⁹ in the recent past has seen a reorientation which marks it as a philosophy of culture – a peculiar turn for Samkara Vedanta.¹⁹³⁰ Radhakrishnan has been a major force in giving this new direction to the Vedanta.¹⁹³¹ He is a philosopher of a new East-West cultural synthesis, and the Vedanta¹⁹³² is the soil into which the roots of this synthesis are stuck. The history of this process of reconstruction has been the history of the Neo-Vedantic¹⁹³³ movement in contemporary Indian philosophy which was inaugurated by Vivekananda and which has culminated in Radhakrishnan. The Vedanta¹⁹³⁴ which Radhakrishnan reconstructs and develops into a world culture is, of course, based on the Advaita Vedanta¹⁹³⁵ which Samkara¹⁹³⁶ ex-pounded.

In the history of this reconstruction of the Vedanta,¹⁹³⁷ Radhakrishnan occupies a position similar to the one occupied by Samkara¹⁹³⁸ in medieval times. Both appear at a critical time in the history of human thought and culture, when divergent trends are struggling for supremacy. Both are faced with the stupendous task of resolving the conflicting cultural tendencies and achieving a unified view of life and its meaning. Both overcome the crisis, not so much by driving away the rival tendencies of thought and culture as by achieving an integrated harmony. The method of both is the method of harmony, of texts, views, tendencies, and perspectives. Both present a system which

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¹⁹²⁷ The original editor inserted "(282)" and "Vol. 16" by hand.

¹⁹²⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁹²⁹ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³⁰ "Śamkara Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³¹ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³² "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³³ "Vedāntic" in the original.

¹⁹³⁴ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³⁵ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³⁶ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹³⁷ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹³⁸ "Śamkara" in the original.

is the meeting place of divergent currents of thought. Both develop their system of thought in their commentaries on the Upanisads, the *Brahmasūtra*,

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(continued from the previous page) and the *Bhagavad-Gita*,¹⁹⁴⁰ the triple foundation of the Vedanta,¹⁹⁴¹ and also in independent works. Both regard the *catuḥsūtrī*,¹⁹⁴² the first four *sūtras*, to be "the essence of the teaching of the Brahma-sūtra." While professing to belong to the Vedāntic tradition, both make their teachings universal in character.

But the Neo-Vedāntic movement, of which Radhakrishnan is the leader as well as the product, has been far more pervasive in its influence and much more potent in its working. Radhakrishnan has worked for the emergence of a new civilization and a new culture founded "on the truths of spirit and the unity of mankind." In adopting these truths as basic to the new world-perspective, Radhakrishnan undertakes to fulfill in the modern age the task which Samkara¹⁹⁴³ essayed with the help of his doctrine of the oneness of *Ātman*¹⁹⁴⁴ and the identity with all. "Even as our political problem is to bring East and West together in a common brotherhood which transcends racial differences, so in the world of philosophy we have to bring about a cross-fertilization of ideas."¹ This "free interchange of ideas" will, according to him, prepare for the "world's yet unborn soul."²

His statement of his philosophic position of "the truths of spirit and the unity of mankind," which will prepare for the world's unborn soul, is contained in his commentaries on the classics of the Vedanta¹⁹⁴⁵ and his other independent works, which he intends to provide the basis of a reasoned faith which deals justly with both the old Indian tradition and the demands of modern thought. He has "in mind the problems of our age," while he interprets the past for today. In this respect also he reminds us of Samkara,¹⁹⁴⁶ and, like him, explains the classics and writes independent treatises "in relation to the religious milieu he represents."³

The philosopher and the philosophical commentator are a product of their times. Each has to look at the past from his own point of view and thus recreate it for men of his generation. Both Samkara and Radhakrishnan have done this. Even when they

¹⁹³⁹ The original editor inserted "(283)" by hand.

¹⁹⁴⁰ "gītā" in the original.

¹⁹⁴¹ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹⁴² "catuḥsūtrī" in the original.

¹⁹⁴³ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁴⁴ "Ātman" in the original.

¹⁹⁴⁵ "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹⁴⁶ "Śamkara" in the original.

agree on fundamentals, their reactions to their age and environment and their re-creation of the past are different and bear the stamp of their personality and their age. The physical and social world which constituted the environment of Samkara¹⁹⁴⁷ was of a different make from that of Radhakrishnan. The world of thought and culture to which Samkara's¹⁹⁴⁸ philosophy constituted a reaction was also different. Radhakrishnan's world is truly one world, socially, politically, economically, and culturally. The global¹⁹⁴⁹

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(463)¹⁹⁵¹ insight into the meaning of life defines the religious character of his philosophical speculation and determines the nature of his approach to the philosophical problem, an approach from the angle of religion as distinct from that of science or history.⁷

Though philosophy is a persistent and consistent effort of reflection, it rests, according to Radhakrishnan, on an assumption which is an act of faith, an assumption woven into the very texture of his philosophical theory. It is an act of acknowledgment. The assumption is: "This universe makes sense. The world has a pattern and it is intelligible. The task of philosophy is to seek this pattern."⁸ Radhakrishnan aligns himself with the Great Tradition in philosophy in the East and the West, which is characterized by the notion of a world intelligible in a deep sense beyond the sensible and the phenomenal. Radhakrishnan calls it the world of spirit. Samkara called it the *Ātma-loka* (world of the soul) and distinguished it from other worlds which fall within the pale of *Śamsāra*, the sensible world of man, manes, and gods. Inasmuch as philosophy grows out of life and is a reflection on its meaning, according to Radhakrishnan, "it is not possible with indulgence in ways of life which show lack of restraint. A life dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom must be an ethical life."⁹

Radhakrishnan is traditional to the very core. But he gives a very new turn to the tradition by developing the Vedanta, not only as a philosophy of personal salvation, but also as the foundation for the fellowship of man in a world community, for the solidarity of the human race. This is his great contribution. A liberated life acquires for him a much more enlarged connotation than it had in Samkara. It can be lived at every level of human existence. The rigor of asceticism, which had an otherworldly flavour in

¹⁹⁴⁷ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁴⁸ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁴⁹ The paras on this page continue on page 464.

¹⁹⁵⁰ The original editor inserted "(285)" by hand.

¹⁹⁵¹ The paras on this page follow the paras on page 464.

the Vedanta of Samkara, is replaced by a moral discipline which means restraint. Withdrawal is not the whole of spiritual life, according to Radhakrishnan. It would be doing less than justice to Radhakrishnan to say, as M.N. Roy has said, that his Vedanta "is the pantheistic monism of the scholastic theology of Shankaracharya expounded in the language of modern Academic philosophy" and that philosophy to him is mere theology.¹⁰

II. Prolegomena to Reconstruction

A. The Rational Note in Vedanta¹⁹⁵²

(463-1)¹⁹⁵³ The first thing which strikes a close student of Radhakrishnan's Neo-Vedāntic idealism is the *rational* note which he has struck in his attempt to

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(464-1)¹⁹⁵⁵ changes in our social and political ideals and in the structure of our social, political, and economic institutions which have taken place in the centuries that intervene between Samkara¹⁹⁵⁶ and Radhakrishnan have compelled him to re-think the philosophical problem in a new and wider context. Radhakrishnan is aware of the demand for "the creation of a new awareness of oneself and the world" which will bring in its wake the consciousness of a "world community," of "a community of ideas," and fashion a "new type of man."⁴ He presents this new awareness of oneself and the world which is the nerve of his Neo-Vedantic¹⁹⁵⁷ movement, and turns his Vedāntic idealism into a philosophically cultural idealism which is ready to take the place of a world religion and a world culture. This need has been rendered all the more urgent because the ancient answers are not able to meet the challenge of the present time. Radhakrishnan is sensitively alive to this need of the times and meets the "modern challenge" neither by providing "substitutes" nor asking people "to find precarious refuges in the emergency camps of arts and science, of fascism and nazism, of humanism, and communism." The people he has in mind are the millions of religiously displaced persons⁵ who "are taking to crude and amazing cults."⁶

Philosophy is treated by Radhakrishnan as an organic part of human culture, as at once its condition and its highest sublimation. He reinforces the traditional view,

¹⁹⁵² "Vedānta" in the original.

¹⁹⁵³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁹⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "(284)" by hand.

¹⁹⁵⁵ The paras on this page follow the paras on page 462.

¹⁹⁵⁶ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁵⁷ "Vedāntic" in the original.

which is the view of *philosophia perennis*. Consequently he is not able to confine philosophy to logic and epistemology. Philosophy is called upon to face the problem of what has been described above as “the creation of a new awareness of oneself and the world.” The world which he has in mind is to be “an international community,” a “fellowship of man” sustained by a “community of ideals” and a “new type of man.” The foundations of these are to be laid, not in political and economic arrangements, but in what is the best in man, the spirit in him. The solution involves the resolution of ultimate issues which are spiritual in a very deep sense and highly significant. Spirit, according to Radhakrishnan, is the symbol of the unity of man, both as an individual and as a national and international community. It is in the spirit that the world with all its multiplicity is unified and feels itself as one. Radhakrishnan sets before himself the task of outlining a philosophy which is at once a philosophy of religion and a religious philosophy, a world faith and a world perspective. His insistence on philosophy as an

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(continued from the previous page) reconstruct the Vedanta. Existence, according to Radhakrishnan, has a rational aspect, and the great mystics have always been sensitive to it. He insists on the predominantly rational character of religious insight.¹¹ “As the experience has a cognitive quality about it, the judgments based on it should be subjected to logical scrutiny.”¹² The great mystics rise to mystical elevation, not only through intuition, but through the strictly logical sequence of rational thought.¹³ The result is that the second *sūtra*, *janmady asya yataḥ*¹⁹⁵⁹ (from which the origin, etc. of this [world proceeds]), gives us natural theology, an ascent to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason, and not by revealed theology, as Samkara¹⁹⁶⁰ thinks. It sums up the essence of the cosmological and teleological arguments. Therein Radhakrishnan excludes the appeal to religious experience. The temporal world suggests a cosmic meaning, and he holds that this meaning, this logical movement of the spiritual quest, this logic of religion, is embodied in the texts of the Vedanta¹⁹⁶¹ itself, and anyone who goes behind the words of the scripture can discover this.

Samkara¹⁹⁶² recognised the relative, tentative, preliminary value of reason for the construction of the Vedanta. But, for Samkara,¹⁹⁶³ there could be no such thing as

¹⁹⁵⁸ The original editor inserted “(286)” by hand.

¹⁹⁵⁹ “*sūtra*, *janmādy asya yataḥ*” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁰ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

¹⁹⁶¹ “*Vedānta*” in the original.

¹⁹⁶² “*Śamkara*” in the original.

¹⁹⁶³ “*Śamkara*” in the original.

natural theology, an ascent to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason.¹⁴ *Brahman* cannot be known by means of inference or reasoning alone. Vedantic¹⁹⁶⁴ thought in Samkara had not attained that freedom of movement where it could evolve the conception of “natural theology,” which supplemented revealed theology and which could, as in Radhakrishnan,¹⁵ emphasise the connection and continuity of reason, intuition, and revelation. For Samkara¹⁹⁶⁵ the second *sūtra*, *janmādy asya yatah*, excludes a rational approach to the reality of God, and the foundations of belief are laid, not in reason, but in authority,¹⁶ the authority of the word. While recognizing the value of reasoning for the establishment of the truths of the Advaita system, Samkara¹⁹⁶⁶ does not subscribe to Radhakrishnan’s view that reason, like experience, is a response “of the human soul to God’s self-disclosure, through nature and history and spiritual experience.”¹⁷

The times in which Samkara¹⁹⁶⁷ lived were not ripe for taking the steps which Radhakrishnan took. The age of Samkara¹⁹⁶⁸ was a period of minority for the Vedanta philosophy. Even when he rises above the times he lived in and

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(continued from the previous page) makes the point that the word “upanisad”¹⁹⁷⁰ primarily means knowledge, and that it only secondarily denotes the book (*grantha*),¹⁸ the mere assemblage of words,¹⁹ he does not rise above enough, and ultimately reasoning is said to be auxiliary to scripture²⁰ and has to fall in line with it.²¹ For Radhakrishnan, the life of reason and the life of religion form one life, the life of spirit.

(466-1)¹⁹⁷¹ B. Revised Conception of Scripture

Radhakrishnan introduces a revised conception of scripture. Scripture is not a written text; it is eternal truth. “We do not accept scriptural documents as books apart from other books, unquestionable in their accuracy and advice. The view that they are the inerrant word of God does not carry conviction.”²² Scriptures cannot be accepted on trust. Accordingly, “Faith is not blind acquiescence in external authority. It is the response of the whole man which includes assent of intellect and energy of will.”²³

¹⁹⁶⁴ “Vedāntic” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁵ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁶ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁷ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁸ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁶⁹ The original editor inserted “(287)” by hand.

¹⁹⁷⁰ “upanisad” in the original.

¹⁹⁷¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

Radhakrishnan speaks of this approach to scripture as a “new approach today,” which is in line with his recognition of the predominantly rational character of religious insight and the continuity of reason and intuition. This marks a further development of the view of Samkara,¹⁹⁷² an emancipation from the yoke of authority, and a coming to its own by the spiritual intellect oriented toward the good.

(466-2) C. New Conception of Samanvaya: Knowledge an Ordered Whole

This new conception of scripture and scriptural knowledge, according to Radhakrishnan, gives a new meaning to the ancient concept of *samanvaya* (reconciliation) with which Badarayana¹⁹⁷³ and Samkara¹⁹⁷⁴ worked. For the latter, the concept of *samanvaya* was the basic concept which gave unity to the Vedāntic thought; it embodied the method of reconciliation of the different and divergent texts of the Upanisds,¹⁹⁷⁵ which constituted for them the body of scriptural knowledge. What lent life to this concept was the thought that the scriptural texts were revealed texts, and, being revelations, they could not be at variance. The thought which governed the entire working of the religious mind of the Vedantic *acaryas*¹⁹⁷⁶ was the ultimacy of the fundamental law of non-contradiction. It was the principle that truth is the whole. But it

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(continued from the previous page) was not allowed a fully autonomous play and was hedged in by the limitations imposed by a scholastic theology. In the Vedanta of Radhakrishnan, the principle comes to its own. Knowledge becomes self-conscious; and this self-consciousness of knowledge appears as the logic of his Vedanta. Its ruling thought is: “Even as there are order and harmony in the universe so in knowledge.”²⁴ What was implicit in Badarayana¹⁹⁷⁸ and Samkara¹⁹⁷⁹ becomes explicit in Radhakrishnan, for whom scripture “is eternal truth interpreted with the help of the doctrine of *samanvaya*.”²⁵

Radhakrishnan takes a much bolder step when, in working out this concept of *samanvaya* and drawing out its logical conclusion, he lays down that “today the

¹⁹⁷² “Śamkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁷³ “Bādarāyaṇa” in the original.

¹⁹⁷⁴ “Śamkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁷⁵ “Upaniṣds” in the original.

¹⁹⁷⁶ “Vedāntic ācāryas” in the original.

¹⁹⁷⁷ The original editor inserted “(288)” by hand.

¹⁹⁷⁸ “Bādarāyaṇa” in the original.

¹⁹⁷⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

samanvaya or harmonization has to be extended to the living faiths of mankind.”²⁶ Badarayana¹⁹⁸⁰ and Samkara¹⁹⁸¹ had extended the principle to the living thoughts of the individual sages of the Upanisads¹⁹⁸² only. Radhakrishnan, for whom “religion concerns man as man and not man as Jew or Christian, Hindu or Buddhist, Sikh or Muslim,” extends it universally, for he believes that the “spiritual community of the future needs for its foundation no geographically limited writings.”²⁷ *Samanvaya*, reconciliation, is the need of our age, according to him, as it was the need of the age of Badarayana¹⁹⁸³ and Samkara.¹⁹⁸⁴ But now, because the religious environment has become worldwide and the living faiths are encountering one another, the idea of fellowship among religions is gaining ground and a reconciliation is taking place. The philosopher of religion is called upon to take up this new task of reconciliation and to evolve a coherent picture as did the author of the *Brahma-sutra*.¹⁹⁸⁵ Samkara¹⁹⁸⁶ himself had done the same thing and had announced his Advaita as providing the unity among the living faiths in his time. Through *samanvaya*, Radhakrishnan is in search of a faith which is “the heart of all faith.”²⁸ This faith is what he describes indifferently as the religion of spirit or the philosophy of spirit.

(467-1)¹⁹⁸⁷ III. The Dual Vision of the Supreme

For Radhakrishnan, as for Samkara,¹⁹⁸⁸ spirit is the symbol of unity of all existence. This spirit has been the central theme of philosophy as well as religion. For both, the religious problem has been the fundamental problem of philosophy, with the form of thinking about God being the same as the form of thinking about the ultimate reality. Both stand for an ultimate con-

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(continued from the previous page) nection of value and reality. Spirit is the supreme reality and the supreme value. This is the deliverance of the valuational consciousness of man, of which the religious and the philosophic consciousness are forms. The spirit

¹⁹⁸⁰ “Bādarāyana” in the original.

¹⁹⁸¹ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁸² “Upaniṣads” in the original.

¹⁹⁸³ “Bādarāyana” in the original.

¹⁹⁸⁴ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁸⁵ “Brahma-sūtra” in the original.

¹⁹⁸⁶ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁸⁷ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

¹⁹⁸⁸ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

¹⁹⁸⁹ The original editor inserted “(289)” by hand.

is discovered in the inner depths of man and reveals itself as the true Being, as what exists *a se*, of and by reason of itself, as the most basically real. It is our real self, above the distinction and correlativity of the empirical self and not-self. It is the *Atman*.¹⁹⁹⁰ Both Samkara¹⁹⁹¹ and Radhakrishnan acknowledge the reality of the spiritual intuition of the ultimate fact of spirit, and for both the certainty of the primacy of being, spirit, or self is an intuited certainty. Spirit is all there is, all being and all value. The universe is essentially spirit.

Here arises a problem which is the key problem of philosophy of religion and which is at the centre of the systems of Samkara¹⁹⁹² and Radhakrishnan. The problem concerns the dual vision of the Supreme. The religious experience, in which the validity of divine existence is founded, discloses these two aspects of divine existence, which correspond to the two types of experience in relation to the Supreme. According to Samkara¹⁹⁹³ the dual vision is (1) the vision of the Supreme as transcending all duality and distinction, devoid of any differentiation, owning no differences, nor confronted by any, the vision of oneness of all existence, of a pure *advaita*, and (2) its vision as owning all differences, supporting them and qualified by them, manifesting them and maintaining them by its creative power, which is its eternal and unlimited knowledge and which functions as its *upadhi*,¹⁹⁹⁴ its associative-cumlimitative adjunct. The first is the vision of the Supreme as *nirupadhika*¹⁹⁹⁵ (devoid of all adjuncts and non-dual); the second, its vision as *sopadhika*¹⁹⁹⁶ (associated with adjuncts and cosmic).

The monistic, non-dual vision of the supreme is its vision as it is in itself,²⁹ in dissociation from any adjuncts;³⁰ it is its vision as the very *atman*,¹⁹⁹⁷ the very self, and precludes any relational operation (*vyavahara*).^{1998 31} It is only in the context of that vision of the Supreme, where he is associated with the adjuncts (*upadhis*),¹⁹⁹⁹ that all relational operations and attitudes on the part of the individual are possible, the attitude of the worshipper and the worshipped, the ruler and the ruled, the creator and the created order, the omniscient mind and the intelligible order.³² This monistic vision is the highest truth and the highest experience. The authority for this vision of the Supreme and for its being the supreme vision and the final one is the vision

¹⁹⁹⁰ "Ātman" in the original.

¹⁹⁹¹ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁹² "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁹³ "Śamkara" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁴ "upādhi" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁵ "nirupādhika" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁶ "sopādhika" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁷ "ātman" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁸ "vyavahāra" in the original.

¹⁹⁹⁹ "upādhis" in the original.

(continued from the previous page) itself, which is sufficient unto itself³³ and has a completeness which knows no unreconciled other.

The relational vision of the Supreme, because it is not a vision of reality as it is in itself and comes to us through the molds of associated adjuncts, is incomplete and inadequate and infected with ignorance. It leaves an unsolved problem for the spiritual life of man, namely, the problem of reconciliation, not only of spirit to the objective order, but also of spirit to spirit. The attitude defined by this vision of the Supreme is not one of knowledge, as it does not answer to the fact, of the true nature of Being, of the real which, in itself, is of a non-dual nature, as testified to by the highest spiritual experience of Samkara²⁰⁰¹ and others. As this vision presents the real as something other, not as the very Self, our attitude toward this other, which is but the Supreme appearing as qualified by associated adjuncts, ultimately becomes a pragmatic and practical attitude and not one of pure awareness, involving adjustment on our part. The vision of the Supremes as Ishvara,²⁰⁰² as Creator, as Lord, is such a vision which does not overcome completely the sense of unreconciled otherness, and so it is infected with ignorance of the real as the very *Atman*,²⁰⁰³ to which latter vision all pragmatic activities are external. This dual vision of the Supreme determines the dual religious attitude of man in relation to the Supreme. These, according to Samkara,²⁰⁰⁴ are the attitudes of *jnana*²⁰⁰⁵ and of *upasana*.²⁰⁰⁶ In the context of these two attitudes, the Supreme in its original, non-relational, and non-dual aspect is called the *Jñeya-Brahman*,²⁰⁰⁷ and in its relational, cosmic aspect is called the *Upasya-Brahman*²⁰⁰⁸ (the *Brahman* meditated or worshipped).

The highest spiritual experience, according to Radhakrishnan also, makes us aware of both these aspects of the Supreme, its supracosmic transcendence and its cosmic universality. This is the divine mystery which is inexpressible.³⁴ The first is the experience of rest and fulfillment, which discloses to us the character of the Absolute as pure and passionless being, transcending the restless turmoil of cosmic life. The other is the experience of the Supreme as cosmic power supporting the whole cosmic play and involved in the restless turmoil of that ceaseless activity.

²⁰⁰⁰ The original editor inserted "(290)" by hand.

²⁰⁰¹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰⁰² "Īśvara" in the original.

²⁰⁰³ "Ātman" in the original.

²⁰⁰⁴ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰⁰⁵ "jñāna" in the original.

²⁰⁰⁶ "upāsana" in the original.

²⁰⁰⁷ "Jñeya-Brahman" in the original.

²⁰⁰⁸ "Upāśya-Brahman" in the original.

The Supreme, in its transcendent and non-relational aspect, is called the Absolute by Radhakrishnan, and, in its cosmic aspect, it is God. Samkara²⁰⁰⁹ describes these two aspects as *Brahman* and *Ishvara*²⁰¹⁰ respectively. For neither man are these two realities exclusive of each other. It is one reality, the Absolute-God of Radhakrishnan, the *Paramatmesuara*²⁰¹¹ of Samkara.²⁰¹² The problem which both these thinkers face is the problem of a fundamental synthesis

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(continued from the previous page) – the synthesis of unity and plurality, of the monistic and personalistic concepts of God, of being and becoming, of perfect activity and perfect repose, of the one and the Good, of the *ens realissimum* and the *ens perfectissimum*. Above all, it is the problem, in the words of W.M. Urban, of the fusion of the Good or Value with Being. How do Samkara²⁰¹⁴ and Radhakrishnan solve this problem?

(470-1)²⁰¹⁵ IV. The Dual Vision and the Problem of Synthesis: Samkara²⁰¹⁶

The problem of the dual vision of the Supreme is a religious problem in Samkara, and its solution is likewise a religious solution. The problem is: Does the Supreme take upon itself this second form, which consists in “association with the adjuncts?” Samkara’s answer is “Yes.” The Supreme, while remaining in its transcendent, absolute, pure, and non-dual being, takes upon itself its cosmic aspect by virtue of its own power, called *māyā* by Samkara, and as part of its eternal existence. This *māyā*, in the context of the second of the two visions of the Supreme, is called the *upādhi* of the Supreme, which appears as *Īśvara* with *māyā* as his *śakti*. In the monistic, non-dual vision of the Supreme, *māyā* and the Supreme are one and indistinguishable. In the second, the Supreme exists as Lord, the *Īśvara*, and is distinguished from *māyā*, his *śakti*. This *upādhi* of *māyā* wears two aspects. (1) One consists of “eternal and unlimited knowledge.”³⁵ This “knowledge” is the very essence of the creative power and is the creative power itself. Without this there can be no creative act.³⁶ (2) The other consists of “name and form,” which are of the nature of nescience, the principle of limitation.³⁷

²⁰⁰⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

²⁰¹⁰ “Īśvara” in the original.

²⁰¹¹ “Paramātmeśuara” in the original.

²⁰¹² “Śamkara” in the original.

²⁰¹³ The original editor inserted “(291)” by hand.

²⁰¹⁴ “Śamkara” in the original.

²⁰¹⁵ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²⁰¹⁶ “ŚaMkara” in the original.

The name-and-form constitutes the object of the eternal knowledge of Īśvara before creation takes place.³⁸ It is only in relation to the power of manifesting the seeds which are of the nature of name-and-form and whose essence is ignorance and limited knowledge that the Supreme exists as the All-knowing Ishvara,²⁰¹⁷ the Lord, the Controller, and the Creator. The Supreme in association with the adjunct of eternal and unlimited knowledge, which is its creative power, is the foundation of the manifested order; and in association with that aspect of the same power which is of the nature of name-and-form, whose essence is ignorance and limited knowledge, is the condition of the limited nature of created existence and limited awareness of it.

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(continued from the previous page) The latter aspect of the *upādhi*²⁰¹⁹ of the Supreme embodies a dialectical antinomy in the heart of the creative reality which Samkara²⁰²⁰ calls *anirvacaniyata*²⁰²¹ *Avidya*, which is the original state of name-and-form, exists in the Supreme as the very warp and woof (*ātmabhūtam*).²⁰²² ³⁹ Its being is not that of a non-self,⁴⁰ like the *pradhāna*²⁰²³ of the Samkhya²⁰²⁴ or the atoms of the Vaisesika.²⁰²⁵ Nor is it wholly one with the Supreme since it is the principle which presents the entire realm of non-self and is the *sine qua non* of the consciousness of something alien.⁴¹ Its nature is indescribable in terms of any of the above two, *tattva* and *anyatva*, and is *tattvanyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya*.²⁰²⁶ This *avidya*,²⁰²⁷ however, exists by virtue of the Supreme,⁴² is a moment in the creative life of the Supreme Reality,⁴³ and fulfills a divine purpose. *Māya*,²⁰²⁸ wearing these two forms, is the divine power of Ishvara,²⁰²⁹ the divine associated adjunct of the Supreme. There can be no uncertainty

²⁰¹⁷ "Īśvara" in the original.

²⁰¹⁸ The original editor inserted "(292)" by hand.

²⁰¹⁹ "upādhi" in the original.

²⁰²⁰ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰²¹ "anirvacaniyatā" in the original.

²⁰²² "ātmabhūtam" in the original.

²⁰²³ "pradhāna" in the original.

²⁰²⁴ "Śamkhya" in the original.

²⁰²⁵ "Vaiśeṣika" in the original.

²⁰²⁶ "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīya" in the original.

²⁰²⁷ "avidyā" in the original.

²⁰²⁸ "Māyā" in the original.

²⁰²⁹ "Īśvara" in the original.

that Samkara²⁰³⁰ holds both doctrines – the monistic, non-dual view of the nature of the Real, wherein the Supreme and the cosmos fuse in one, and its cosmic aspect, wherein the Supreme figures as the creative power upholding the whole created order. What Samkara²⁰³¹ calls the transcendental truth about the Supreme (*paramarthavastha*)²⁰³² forms one whole with what he describes as the cosmic truth about the Supreme (*vyavaharavastha*).²⁰³³

What is that realisation which holds both these truths together, according to Samkara?²⁰³⁴ That Ishvara²⁰³⁵ is a valid form of the Real and is the ground of the manifested order of creation – this position is never surrendered by Samkara.²⁰³⁶ 44 But Samkara²⁰³⁷ has a bias for the realisation of the monistic, non-dual form of the Supreme, the realisation of the Supreme as the very self, which realisation, by its very nature, excludes all practical and pragmatic dealings in relation to it and permits only one attitude, namely, that of awareness in which to “know” is at the same time “to be” or in which “knowing” is a way of “being.” This transcendental realisation is the only Supreme Good.⁴⁵ How does Samkara²⁰³⁸ correlate this truth to the cosmic truth about the Supreme? The cosmic truth about *Brahman* is, according to him, auxiliary to the basic transcendental truth about it; it is a means to the latter. It is not an independent truth; nor does it bear an independent fruit.⁴⁶ And it forms one whole with the transcendental truth only as being subsidiary to it⁴⁷ and

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(continued from the previous page) as being but a means to its vindication. They are not opposed truths. Nor are they on a par. According to Samkara,²⁰⁴⁰ *Brahman* manifested itself in different forms “for the sake of making itself known. Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature (*nirupādhika rūpa*)²⁰⁴¹ of this Self as pure intelligence would not be known. When, however, name and form are manifested

²⁰³⁰ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³¹ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³² “paramārthavasthā” in the original.

²⁰³³ “vyavahārāvasthā” in the original.

²⁰³⁴ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³⁵ “Īśvara” in the original.

²⁰³⁶ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³⁷ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³⁸ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰³⁹ The original editor inserted “(293)” by hand.

²⁰⁴⁰ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²⁰⁴¹ “nirupādhika rūpa” in the original.

as body and organs, it is possible to know its nature"⁴⁸ as non-dual and monistic. The experience of this non-dual, *nirupadhika*,²⁰⁴² nature is of the form "I, *Brahman*, am all this."

But the dominant note of Samkara's²⁰⁴³ thought is an indifference to the creative side of the life of the Supreme. "Those whose preoccupation is the reflection on the Supreme Good have no respect for creation."⁴⁹ This explains the ascetic character of his Vedanta, which is meant for those whose central interest is "liberation." This also accounts for his otherworldly conception of spiritual life and liberation. This has prevented him from developing the ideal of "life universal," which is involved in the conception of *sarvatmabhava*²⁰⁴⁴ to which he is committed. He equates the conception of realisation of the Supreme as *nirupadhi*²⁰⁴⁵ and *sarvopadhi*²⁰⁴⁶ which stand for one and the same ideal, but ultimately the former formulation gains the upper hand, and the liberated life turns out to be an abstract universal life. The conception of life universal (*sarvatmabhava*)²⁰⁴⁷ is inextricably bound up with the creative realisation of the cosmic life of the Supreme, and Samkara²⁰⁴⁸ does not take exception to this side of the Supreme life.

(472-1)²⁰⁴⁹ V. The Dual Vision and the Problem of Synthesis: Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan is impressed by the dual vision of the Supreme, but his reaction to the creative side of the Supreme life is very different from that of Samkara.²⁰⁵⁰ The difference is that between the religious romanticist and the religious ascetic.

Samkara²⁰⁵¹ has no interest in what Radhakrishnan describes as the creative outpouring of the conscious delight of Ishvara.²⁰⁵² The picture which Samkara²⁰⁵³ paints of the created world is a horrid picture, a picture of the terrible contingencies of life to which man is exposed at every turn. The world is not a fit place in which to find one's home.

For Radhakrishnan, Pure Being is not locked up in its own transcendence, and God has freely willed to realise this possibility.⁵⁰ What happens is real

²⁰⁴² "nirupādhika" in the original.

²⁰⁴³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁴ "sarvātmabhāva" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁵ "nirupādhī" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁶ "sarvopādhī" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁷ "sarvātmabhāva" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁴⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²⁰⁵⁰ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁵¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁵² "Īśvara" in the original.

²⁰⁵³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) and significant, not only for us, but for the world spirit.⁵¹ God is working in history and reveals himself in it,⁵² which is "neither a chapter of accidents, nor a determined drift," but a pattern of absolute significance.⁵³ Samkara's²⁰⁵⁵ experience of the pure realm of Being, of the timeless calm and peace wherein *Brahman* and the world fuse into one, has generated in him an indifference toward the empirical order of existence, even when he recognises the creative side of the Supreme. The realm of reality disclosed by the creative side of the Supreme and the Good connected with it constitute, according to Samkara,²⁰⁵⁶ the realm of *avidya*,²⁰⁵⁷ nescience. On this is founded his philosophy of life, the dominant note of which is renunciation and through it emancipation from the cycle of worldly existence. Radhakrishnan, while fully alive to the supracosmic transcendence of the Supreme and to the reality of that pure realm of being, takes issue with Samkara.²⁰⁵⁸ He says, "It is not true to contend that the experience of the pure realm of being, timeless and perfect, breeds in us contempt for the more familiar world of existence which is unhappily full of imperfection."⁵⁴ Neither for Radhakrishnan nor for Samkara²⁰⁵⁹ are reality and existence to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries.⁵⁵ Existence is rooted in reality. But for Samkara²⁰⁶⁰ existence is a vicious existence, and one who seeks the Supreme should turn his back on it. According to Radhakrishnan, "for one who has the vision of the Supreme, life, personality and history become important,"⁵⁶ and the full meaning of the divine life is brought out as much by play and its concomitant as by rest and fulfillment. "The one reveals itself in the many."⁵⁷

Radhakrishnan has Samkara²⁰⁶¹ in mind when he speaks of the "common temptation to which Indian thinkers have fallen more than once victims, that spirit is all that counts while life is an indifferent illusion, and all efforts directed to the improvement of man's outer life and society are sheer folly."⁵⁸ "The world-process which has resulted in the formation of human personalities has significance and the structure of things is spiritual."⁵⁹ While the cosmic processes have no interest for Samkara²⁰⁶² except insofar as they mark a passage to the Supreme, Radhakrishnan is

²⁰⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "(294)" by hand.

²⁰⁵⁵ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁵⁶ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁵⁷ "avidyā" in the original.

²⁰⁵⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁵⁹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁶⁰ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁶¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁶² "Śaṁkara" in the original.

deeply impressed by the riches of cosmic evolution and the values achieved in its course. He pleads for an

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(continued from the previous page) organization of human life, for an "interactive union" which is "life more abundant" and which "is possible only with the perfection of the world, its growth into the higher state of being."⁶⁰ We can, he says, rise into the scale of being only by drawing all into ourself.⁶¹ "The world is our garden and we cannot become self-sufficient until the world is so."⁶² Radhakrishnan notes in the world "a compelling drift towards better things" which is making for "a profound and co-operative spiritual commonwealth with freedom and harmony as its marks."⁶³ He discovers a "rationality" in the universe which suggests a spiritual creative power. The temporal world suggests a cosmic meaning⁶⁴ and offers its own suggestions.⁶⁵

In Radhakrishnan's world-view there is a passage from the Supreme to the cosmos and from the cosmos to the Supreme, but in Samkara, while there is one from the Supreme to the cosmos, there is none from the latter to the former. There is no room for natural theology in his thought. While Samkara recognises the element of order and definiteness in the created universe and is impressed by its unfathomable depths,⁶⁶ which defy analysis, it is ultimately "transient, impure, flimsy and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, a dream."⁶⁷ It carries no good with it.⁶⁸

This difference in their attitude toward the world of existence determines the temper of their philosophical outlook. In Samkara, the Vedanta developed more as a philosophy of personal salvation with a dominant ascetic note about it. In Radhakrishnan, it developed into a world culture providing the spiritual foundations of "an international community" and a "fellowship of man."

(474-1)²⁰⁶⁴ VI. The Status of the Empirical World: Samkara²⁰⁶⁵

Neither in Samkara²⁰⁶⁶ nor in Radhakrishnan is the world illusory, though Samkara²⁰⁶⁷ sometimes compares it to illusion and mirage and sometimes to foam and dream in order to emphasise certain truths about the world and the Supreme. The concept of status is an evaluational concept and presupposes a measure in terms of which something is valued. The problem before

²⁰⁶³ The original editor inserted "(295)" by hand.

²⁰⁶⁴ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²⁰⁶⁵ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

²⁰⁶⁶ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

²⁰⁶⁷ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

(continued from the previous page) both Samkara²⁰⁶⁹ and Radhakrishnan is: If the universe is essentially Spirit, how do we account for its appearance as non-Spirit? According to Samkara,²⁰⁷⁰ its appearance as non-spirit⁶⁹ (*abrahmapratiti*)²⁰⁷¹ is false (*mithya*).²⁰⁷² The problem of the status of the world is essentially a religious problem in Samkara²⁰⁷³ and arises in the context of the spiritual experience of the unity of all existence,⁷⁰ about the veracity, validity, and authenticity of which there is no doubt in his mind.⁷¹ The experience of the world is an experience of one aspect of the supreme existence, namely, that supporting the cosmic play. The question of its status is the question whether the cosmic realisation is (1) self-sufficient and (2) durable. The status of the world cannot be determined and defined in abstraction from the spiritual experience of the divine.

According to Samkara,²⁰⁷⁴ in the experience of the cosmic aspect of the Supreme, an element of nescience appears as a constituent factor. This element is a divine element;⁷² it is of the nature of a great sleep,⁷³ in which the worldly souls, caught in the web of transmigratory existence and unaware of their real nature, lie embedded. This divine element of nescience lends intelligibility to the entire practical life of man by determining its individuality and defining that duality which is the lot of finite existence-duality between Self and something-other-than-the-self, between value and being, between spirit and non-spirit, between I and something-other-than-I.⁷⁴ Nescience presents the spirit as non-spirit, the I as not-I, *Brahman* as the universe of name-and-form by its side. The play of this empirical existence is the play of the cosmic principle of nescience, which upholds the empirical order but only as auxiliary to the vindication of the supreme truth of the oneness of spiritual existence. The spirit appears (it makes itself appear) as non-spirit, as empirical existence. That appears and sets itself up as this, as the conditioned world of name-and-form. This appearing of That as this, of spirit as something-other, of Self as not-Self, is the meaning and mystery of creation. In this process, That appearing as this, of the spirit setting itself up as non-spirit, the universe does not give up its nature, infinitude, the state of supreme Self⁷⁵

²⁰⁶⁸ The original editor inserted "(296)" by hand.

²⁰⁶⁹ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

²⁰⁷⁰ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

²⁰⁷¹ "abrahmapratiti" in the original.

²⁰⁷² "mithyā" in the original.

²⁰⁷³ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

²⁰⁷⁴ "ŚaMkara" in the original.

(*yatsvarupam puranatvam paramatmabhavam*).²⁰⁷⁵ It emanates as but the infinite. The otherness of the conditioned universe is an “apparent otherness” created by ignorance. This apparent otherness is overcome, and this overcoming marks the fusion of That and this and the realisation of the unconditioned

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(continued from the previous page) nature of existence as homogeneous, pure intelligence, without exterior or interior, of the universe as spirit.

What, then, is the status of the empirical world, according to Samkara?²⁰⁷⁷

(476-1)²⁰⁷⁸ It is not, to be sure, an empirical status. It would be an empirical status if it existed in its own right and as an object of empirical awareness only. Its otherness, according to Samkara,²⁰⁷⁹ is an “apparent otherness,” and its empirical status is only an apparently empirical status. Its true status is a transcendental one which is functionally transcendental. This transcendental functioning is the true status of the empirical world.⁷⁶ Its status is not an existential but a functional status which marks its character as a process which has its consummation in what Samkara²⁰⁸⁰ calls *Brahma-pratipatti*. The empirical world has an instrumental and subordinate function in the scheme of reality, i.e., to exhibit the non-dual, transcendental nature of the Supreme. There can, therefore, be no question of its being illusory or of its not being at all. To say that it is illusory is not to say anything about its status. It is to avoid the very question. The world is made to serve this function through the intervention of nescience, which is a constituent element in its make-up. Nescience gives rise to multiple existence, and this multiple existence is seen to be nothing other than and apart from the self-conscious spirit which eternally realises its absolute nature as “I am all this.” This is the spiritual purpose which is fulfilled by the creative process of setting up “apparent otherness,” which is finally seen not to be other. Those who attribute to Samkara²⁰⁸¹ an illusionist explanation of the empirical world commit the fallacy of what Whitehead called “misplaced concreteness,” which prepares the ground for the illusionist slip. The empirical world for Samkara²⁰⁸² is not a world of mere objects but of both objects and

²⁰⁷⁵ “*yatsvarūpaṃ pūṇatvaṃ paramātmabhāvaṃ*” in the original.

²⁰⁷⁶ The original editor inserted “(297)” by hand.

²⁰⁷⁷ “*Śaṃkara*” in the original.

²⁰⁷⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²⁰⁷⁹ “*Śaṃkara*” in the original.

²⁰⁸⁰ “*Śaṃkara*” in the original.

²⁰⁸¹ “*Śaṃkara*” in the original.

²⁰⁸² “*Śaṃkara*” in the original.

subjects forming inextricably a network of existence and nourished by nescience and its accompaniments, desire and action. But the illusionist interpreters abstract the object world and the subject from each other, let the subject stand apart, concentrate their attention on the object world, melt it into an illusory perception, make the subject witness this illusory phenomenon, and then they brand his philosophy as mentalism or subjective idealism. But, for Samkara,²⁰⁸³ the awareness of the subject or the self, of the I, as finite, as hedged in by the body, by space and time, by everything which is not-self, is as much erroneous as the awareness of the object world as non-spirit. According to Samkara,²⁰⁸⁴ just as the self is not reducible to the non-self, similarly the not-self, the empirical world, is not to be reduced to the self. Samkara²⁰⁸⁵ rises above one-sided subjective idealism and one-sided materialism, both of which are beliefs in reductionism of some sort. For him, it is all spirit. The universe is essentially spirit.

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(477-1)²⁰⁸⁷ As the empirical world is an element in the realisation of the transcendental nature of the Supreme by the Supreme and its status is a functional status, and this realisation is an eternal realisation, being the basic nature of the Supreme, the empirical world as a moment in this realisation, in the life of the Supreme, is eternal. It has no beginning and no end.

(477-2) As the empirical world fulfills this purpose through the intervention of nescience, which is a constituent element in it, it shares the nature of nescience, and, like it, represents a dialectical antinomy in the heart of reality, being neither wholly one with it (*tattva*) nor wholly different from it (*anyatva*). It is indescribable (*anirvacaniya*)²⁰⁸⁸ in terms of any of these.

(477-3) This dialectical antinomy represented by nescience and the world is eternally resolved in reality by virtue of its nature as Supreme Consciousness, which is eternal awareness of the form "I, *Brahman*, am all this." When the same is resolved in the life of the individual, and nescience is integrated with gnosis (*vidya*),²⁰⁸⁹ *samsāra*²⁰⁹⁰ and

²⁰⁸³ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰⁸⁴ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰⁸⁵ "Śamkara" in the original.

²⁰⁸⁶ The original editor inserted "(298)" by hand.

²⁰⁸⁷ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²⁰⁸⁸ "anirvacaniya" in the original.

²⁰⁸⁹ "vidyā" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁰ "samsāra" in the original.

Brahman, This and that, fuse into one. There is no Creator confronting and confronted by a created order.⁷⁷ It is one existence, which vindicates its oneness⁷⁸ by projecting varied existence through the instrumentality of its creative power, one aspect of which consists of eternal and unlimited knowledge and the other aspect of nescience or name-and-form. Nescience is a religious concept in Samkara's²⁰⁹¹ philosophy; it is the divine power (*daivi sakti*).²⁰⁹²

(477-4) VII. The Status of the Empirical World: Radhakrishnan

The specific problems concerning the empirical world which are uppermost in the minds of Samkara²⁰⁹³ and Radhakrishnan are different. Every line written by Samkara²⁰⁹⁴ reveals his anxiety "to save the Supreme Brahman" from disintegration and loss of its authentic being. The philosophical world of Samkara's²⁰⁹⁵ time caused anxiety to his mind. Unity and plurality were viewed as equally real and equally significant. *Brahman* and the world were assigned equality of status by the *Bhedābheda*vādin²⁰⁹⁶ (one who believes in difference and non-difference at the same time).⁷⁹ In this view, *Brahman* was not saved. Nor was it safe. The task which Samkara²⁰⁹⁷ assigned to himself was the task of saving *Brahman*, saving its integral unity of existence, while recognizing the factual character of the many-sidedness of the cosmic order.⁸⁰ This was the mission of his *māyāvāda*. The world enjoyed an instrumental, not an authen-

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(continued from the previous page) tic, character. The One became many through *maya*.²⁰⁹⁹ The diversity was not a self-subsistent truth.

By the time Radhakrishnan took up the task of reconstruction of the Vedanta, Samkara²¹⁰⁰ had been interpreted as sanctioning the illusory character of the world. This seemed to be a mockery of the oneness and absoluteness of *Brahman*.

²⁰⁹¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁹² "daivī śakti" in the original.

²⁰⁹³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁴ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁵ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁶ "Bhedābhedavādin" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁷ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁰⁹⁸ The original editor inserted "(299)" by hand.

²⁰⁹⁹ "māyā" in the original.

²¹⁰⁰ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

Radhakrishnan's principal problem became the formulation of a conception of *māyā*²¹⁰¹ "so as to save the world and give to it a real meaning."⁸¹ The affirmation of the reality of the empirical world, even when it had a derived being,⁸² became the dominant note of his Vedānta.²¹⁰² The problem as to how it came to be a limited being, how it appeared as non-spirit even when it was essentially spirit,⁸³ which was the principal problem before Saṃkara,²¹⁰³ did not engage Radhakrishnan's attention. Though he raises this question, he does not concentrate on explaining the role of nescience in the scheme of reality as Saṃkara,²¹⁰⁴ does. His reaction to the dominant note of the illusory character of the world of ordinary experience assumes the form of a concerted repudiation of the view that the world is an illusion and an affirmation of a thoroughgoing evolutionary realism to which the creative genius of God is germane, with the three stages of plan, process, and perfection⁸⁴ marking the evolutionary advance.

The reality of the world is grounded, according to Radhakrishnan, in its being willed by God, though it has a dependent created reality.⁸⁵ It is real because it is willed by God. This is the significance of the doctrine of *māyā*.²¹⁰⁵ Radhakrishnan is so anxious to "save the world and give to it a real meaning" that his account of the world "has in it the promise," not of a "spiritual idealism,"⁸⁶ but of a spiritual realism. The world is an act of worship. The spirit has entered into the world of non-spirit to realise one of the infinite possibilities that exist potentially in spirit.⁸⁷ What happens is real and significant, not only for us but also for the World-Spirit, and, therefore, the temporal process is not a tragedy or an aberration.⁸⁸ He offers a conception of history as "a pattern of absolute significance" and not as "a chapter of accidents, nor a determined drift."⁸⁹ It is full of new things because God works in it and reveals himself in it,⁹⁰ and "it is wrong to think that the

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(continued from the previous page) universe exists for us only to escape from it."⁹¹ God is so intensely concerned with this history that he actively intervenes in it.

Saṃkara²¹⁰⁷ does not clothe the cosmic process itself with any other progressively realised meaning except the one which consists in the catastrophic

²¹⁰¹ "māyā" in the original.

²¹⁰² "Vedānta" in the original.

²¹⁰³ "Sāṃkara" in the original.

²¹⁰⁴ "Sāṃkara" in the original.

²¹⁰⁵ "māyā" in the original.

²¹⁰⁶ The original editor inserted "(300)" by hand.

²¹⁰⁷ "Sāṃkara" in the original.

realisation of the oneness of *Brahman* and *Atman*²¹⁰⁸ and of *Brahman* and the world. Radhakrishnan also says, like Samkara,²¹⁰⁹ that “the aim of the cosmic evolution is to reveal the Spirit” which “lives in the world.”⁹² But, unlike Samkara,²¹¹⁰ he holds that the cosmic process progressively reveals the richness of the life of the Supreme, and the passage to the Supreme is not a flight to it but an ascent, for which “life, personality and history become important.”⁹³ Reality gives value to “empirical objects and earthly desires.”⁹⁴ The world is a passage from existence to reality.⁹⁵ Therefore, we are not to neglect worldly welfare or despise body and mind. The body is viewed not so much as a limitation (*upadhi*)²¹¹¹ as a necessity for the soul. We are not to despise bodily life. Nor are we to repress personal life in order to gain the end of religion.⁹⁶

Unlike Samkara,²¹¹² Radhakrishnan is interested in the descending movement of the divine also, and not only in the ascending movement,⁹⁷ in which alone Samkara²¹¹³ discovers the significance of the world process. The descending movement of the divine discloses to him “the central drive of the universe.” “The central drive of the universe” – this brings out the uniqueness of Radhakrishnan’s view about the place of the universe in the scheme of reality. The cosmic process itself is clothed with meaning even when “God’s will is the meaning of the world.”⁹⁸ For him, the world is not a completed act; it is still in the process of completion.⁹⁹ Radhakrishnan here raises a question which is relevant to the philosophy of cosmic history. Cosmic evolution has a cosmic meaning for him. This meaning is embodied and realised in actual entities. “Existent objects exemplify subsistent values.”¹⁰⁰

For Samkara’s²¹¹⁴ conception of the world, there can be no question of its being “in the process of completion.” It is a completed act of Īśvara. That is infinite; This is infinite. This emanates from That as but the infinite, and its finiteness is only an apparent one. Samkara²¹¹⁵ is not aware of that aspect of the

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(continued from the previous page) universe which has been disclosed to moderns by the emergence of the scientific theory of evolution; and, even when he is aware of it as a

²¹⁰⁸ “Ātman” in the original.

²¹⁰⁹ “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹⁰ “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹¹ “upādhi” in the original.

²¹¹² “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹³ “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹⁴ “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹⁵ “Śamkara” in the original.

²¹¹⁶ The original editor inserted “(301)” by hand.

process, he is not aware of it as an evolutionary process with its emergent levels. The universe is present to him as an existent “fact” characterized by differentiations of name, form, and action, all these rooted *ab initio* in nescience. There can be no such thing for the world as a process of completion. But, for Radhakrishnan “the destiny of the world is to be transformed into the perfect state of the Kingdom of God.”¹⁰¹ The realist in him ultimately interprets *maya*²¹¹⁷ “not so much as a veil as the dress of God.” “The process of becoming is not unreal. The human individual is not a false appearance. By means of self-variation the Spirit manifests itself as the universe without at the same time suffering any derogation from its original status. The universe is essentially dynamic and the human individual is the growing point of the future, the agent as well as the offspring of the creative process.”¹⁰²

The values of spirit are surprisingly exemplified, according to Radhakrishnan, in the world of existent fact, and embodiedness has positive value for the evolution of the soul.¹⁰³ Radhakrishnan represents, in the history of Neo-Vedantism,²¹¹⁸ the dominantly realistic trend of thought which is a fusion of the Advaitism of Samkara,²¹¹⁹ modern evolutionist thought, and contemporary value-thinking. He reconstructs reality as one with many planes and does away with the conception of spiritual and material worlds as separate and hostile.¹⁰⁴ One is not to be discarded and the other accepted.¹⁰⁵ “The material looks upward to the spiritual and finds in it its true meaning. Similarly the spiritual leans to the physical in order to find itself.”¹⁰⁶ This vein of thought is foreign to Samkara,²¹²⁰ who would never subscribe to Radhakrishnan’s faith that “the complete self-finding of spirit in the cosmic life is the terminus.”¹⁰⁷ For Samkara,²¹²¹ the cosmic life represents a dialectical antinomy which is finally and fully resolved in the total integration of the transcendent and the cosmic aspect of the supreme life. For the Absolute, taken as pure being, there is no antinomy, according to Samkara,²¹²² because there is no problem of relating the world to the Absolute.

The doctrine of *maya*²¹²³ is utilised by Samkara²¹²⁴ and Radhakrishnan in different ways in connection with the problem of the status of the world in their respective schemes of reality. Samkara²¹²⁵ tries “to save *Brahman*” with the help of the doctrine of *maya*.²¹²⁶ Radhakrishnan tries “to save the world” with

²¹¹⁷ “māyā” in the original.

²¹¹⁸ “Vedāntism” in the original.

²¹¹⁹ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²⁰ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²¹ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²² “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²³ “māyā” in the original.

²¹²⁴ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²⁵ “Śaṁkara” in the original.

²¹²⁶ “māyā” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) its help. In their saving mission, they offer divergent accounts of the dialectical antinomy (*anirvacaniyata*)²¹²⁸ which they discover as embedded in the heart of reality. The inexplicability (*anirvacaniyata*),²¹²⁹ according to Radhakrishnan, is the inexplicability of the logical relation between the Absolute taken as Pure Being and the world. The Absolute in its transcendent being is conceived by Radhakrishnan as devoid of *maya*,^{2130 108} and hence this conception of reality excludes any relational binding of the world to the Absolute. All that can be said is that the Absolute is the ultimate background without which there can be no world. Nothing can be said about the relation between the world and the ultimate non-relational background. Samkara²¹³¹ offers a different account. For Samkara,²¹³² the question of relating the world to the non-relational background, which is the Absolute, or to what Radhakrishnan calls the transcendent side of Ishvara,^{2133 109} has no meaning. The question does not arise in this context because, for this point of view, *Brahman* and the world are one and indistinguishable. According to Samkara,²¹³⁴ the question is relevant to the *Īśvara* side of the Absolute only and arises in the context of the creative action of *mayasabala*²¹³⁵ *Brahman* (*maya*²¹³⁶ variegated *Brahman*). *Maya*²¹³⁷ and name-and-form are neither wholly one with nor wholly different from Ishvara.²¹³⁸ A determination of the nature of *maya*,²¹³⁹ which is the very seed of name-and-form, in terms of "identity" (*tattva*) or "non-identity" (*anyatva*) with the own-nature of Ishvara²¹⁴⁰ is not possible.

(481-1)²¹⁴¹ VIII. The Status of the Individual: Samkara²¹⁴²

²¹²⁷ The original editor inserted "(302)" by hand.

²¹²⁸ "anirvacanīyatā" in the original.

²¹²⁹ "anirvacanīyatā" in the original.

²¹³⁰ "māyā" in the original.

²¹³¹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹³² "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹³³ "Īśvara" in the original.

²¹³⁴ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹³⁵ "māyāśabala" in the original.

²¹³⁶ "māyā" in the original.

²¹³⁷ "Māyā" in the original.

²¹³⁸ "Īśvara" in the original.

²¹³⁹ "māyā" in the original.

²¹⁴⁰ "Īśvara" in the original.

²¹⁴¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²¹⁴² "Śamkara" in the original.

The questions which have been generally raised in the course of critical discussions of Samkara's²¹⁴³ philosophy in modern times in connection with the problem of the status of the finite individual are: (1) Is the *jiva*²¹⁴⁴ real or an appearance? (2) Does it possess a substantial or an adjectival existence? The formulation of these questions has been determined by the issues raised and discussed by Absolutist writers such as Bradley and Bosanquet. The question whether the *jiva*²¹⁴⁵ has an adjectival or a substantial mode of being is not raised at all in this form by Samkara;²¹⁴⁶ and the question concerning the reality or phenomenality of the individual is not properly formulated in the form "Is it real or unreal or an appearance?"

Samkara's²¹⁴⁷ philosophy is an inquiry into the true nature of the "embodied self," a *sarirakamimamsa*.²¹⁴⁸ The individual existence, as we find it (*yathapraptam*),²¹⁴⁹ is an embodied existence, and its present status is the status of *Atman*²¹⁵⁰ in association with and limited by the adjuncts of body, the gross, the subtle, and the seed body, the last of which is constituted by nescience, which

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(continued from the previous page) is the original limiting adjunct. The present existence is "individualised" or "particularized" existence of the *Atman*²¹⁵² (*visesatmabhava* or *saśarīratā*).²¹⁵³ But its true life and its real nature is non-embodied (*asārīratā*)²¹⁵⁴ existence, i.e., existence as pure consciousness, as pure and unbroken "I," not confronted by not-I. The embodied existence of the Self is a twilight existence between being and non-being. It is not the same as, or wholly one with, *Brahman*, in which all duality, of Self and not-Self, of value and existence, is transcended and overcome. Nor is it an entity wholly distinct from *Brahman*, because it is *Brahman* which exists as and receives the designation of "*jiva*"²¹⁵⁵ under special conditions of limiting

²¹⁴³ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁴⁴ "jīva" in the original.

²¹⁴⁵ "jīva" in the original.

²¹⁴⁶ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁴⁷ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁴⁸ "sārīrakamīmamsā" in the original.

²¹⁴⁹ "yathāprāptam" in the original.

²¹⁵⁰ "Ātman" in the original.

²¹⁵¹ The original editor inserted "(303)" by hand.

²¹⁵² "Ātman" in the original.

²¹⁵³ "viśeṣatmabhāva or saśarīratā" in the original.

²¹⁵⁴ "aśarīratā" in the original.

²¹⁵⁵ "jīva" in the original.

adjuncts (*upadhi*).²¹⁵⁶ The embodied existence (*saśarīratva*)²¹⁵⁷ of the *jīva* is adventitious. It has its genesis in *atman*'s²¹⁵⁸ association with the limiting adjuncts.

This "embodied existence" (*jaiva rūpa*)²¹⁵⁹ is terminable. Its termination is liberation. But annihilation of the embodied existence of the individual is not annihilation of the individual, the *atman*.²¹⁶⁰ *Atman*²¹⁶¹ may give up the particularized existence (*viśeṣātmabhāva*),²¹⁶² the embodied existence, and its real nature (*pāramārthika svarūpa*)²¹⁶³ will remain. In this conception of the individual there is no question of its being annihilated or destroyed, or its disappearing in the Absolute, its being, as Bradley says, "merged," "blended," "fused," "absorbed," "run together," "dissolved," "destroyed," or "lost," but only of the *jīva*'s²¹⁶⁴ regaining or existing in its own nature. This is the unconditioned existence (*nirupādhika svarūpa*)²¹⁶⁵ of the liberated self; and, if the liberated self identifies itself with the limiting adjuncts, it identifies itself with all the limiting adjuncts. Every limiting adjunct is its own limiting adjunct (*sarvopādhī*).²¹⁶⁶ This is living a universal life and having a universal existence. In this there can be no question of the annihilation of the individual. Liberation, living an unconditioned existence devoid of all limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhī*),²¹⁶⁷ and living a universal life with all as one's limiting adjuncts (*sarvopādhī*)²¹⁶⁸ all mean the same thing for Samkara.²¹⁶⁹

The question whether the individual self has ultimately an adjectival or a substantival mode of being is not present to Samkara's²¹⁷⁰ mind. He is interested only in the question whether the true life of the *jīva*²¹⁷¹ is life universal and eternal, i.e., life as *Brahman* lives it, or the life of individuated existence, which is not able to overcome completely the discrepancy between self and something other. The true life of the individual is life universal. Individuality (*viśeṣātmabhāva*)²¹⁷² is carved out by the limiting adjuncts and is not native to the *atman*;²¹⁷³ and the annihilation of the limiting adjuncts marks the end of the individuated existence of the self, but not of the self itself,

²¹⁵⁶ "upādhi" in the original.

²¹⁵⁷ "saśarīratva" in the original.

²¹⁵⁸ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁵⁹ "rūpa" in the original.

²¹⁶⁰ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁶¹ "Ātman" in the original.

²¹⁶² "viśeṣātmabhāva" in the original.

²¹⁶³ "pāramārthika svarūpa" in the original.

²¹⁶⁴ "jīva" in the original.

²¹⁶⁵ "nirupādhika svarūpa" in the original.

²¹⁶⁶ "sarvopādhī" in the original.

²¹⁶⁷ "nirupādhī" in the original.

²¹⁶⁸ "sarvopādhī" in the original.

²¹⁶⁹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁷⁰ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁷¹ "jīva" in the original.

²¹⁷² "viśeṣātmabhāva" in the original.

²¹⁷³ "ātman" in the original.

whose very nature it is to have universal being and who merely happened to acquire adventitiously individuated life.

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(continued from the previous page) Samkara's²¹⁷⁵ constructive metaphysics has before it only two problems: (1) the problem of determining the true nature of the Supreme Self and (2) the problem of exhibiting the oneness of the individuated self with the universal Self.¹¹⁰ Individuated existence, according to Samkara,²¹⁷⁶ is existence wherein the self is aware that "he is this much and no more." The universal existence is of the nature of the awareness that "I am all this." This awareness is accompanied by a dissolution of the limiting adjuncts and their transmutation into a means for the exhibition of the universal life of the *Ātman*, the Spirit. Samkara's²¹⁷⁷ main interest is in rejecting the adventitious nature which accrues to the individual due to intervention of the limiting adjunct and establishing certain truths concerning the real nature (*paramarthika rūpa*)²¹⁷⁸ of the individual which are not at all relevant to the question of the adjectival or substantival mode of its being. These truths are:¹¹¹ It is not part and parcel of the world procession. It is not a complex of body, sense-organs, *manas* (mind), and intellect. It transcends bodily existence. It is pure consciousness and untouched by any blemishes. Its embodiedness is forgetfulness of its authentic being. Its non-embodied being is its true being which is coterminous with full self-awareness. The otherness of the individual self from the Supreme Self is not founded in the truths of spirit.¹¹² Its genesis is in nescience, which is terminable. The individualised form of the self (*ātman*)²¹⁷⁹ as distinct from its original character as universal existence is secondary, imposed upon and assumed by it through the force of nescience, and therefore capable of being overcome.

There is nothing in the own constitution or being of the self, the *ātman*,²¹⁸⁰ which is a mass of consciousness, that can turn it into a "particularized consciousness" as a permanent part of its nature. The liberated "I" is not an I which is confronted by other I's or by not-I's. It is an unbroken I, a universal I, which sees in other (unliberated) I's its own I. In the liberated existence there is absence of any constitutive association with name and form, but this absence is not absence of being or annihilation of self or a

²¹⁷⁴ The original editor inserted "(304)" by hand.

²¹⁷⁵ "Śaṅkara" in the original.

²¹⁷⁶ "Śaṅkara" in the original.

²¹⁷⁷ "Śaṅkara" in the original.

²¹⁷⁸ "pāramāthika rūpa" in the original.

²¹⁷⁹ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁸⁰ "ātman" in the original.

merging of the self in the Absolute. It is freedom from particularized existence, from the limited consciousness that "I am this much and no more." In the liberated consciousness, existence and content fuse into one and are not separate, according to Samkara.²¹⁸¹ Those who, like Pringle-Pattison, are not disposed to accept this view and hold that the finite individual retains its separate existence do so on the ground that existence and content always remain distinct

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(continued from the previous page) and separate. That is why they say that finite minds cannot overlap in existence though they may overlap indefinitely in content. The separation, division, or partition of the Supreme Spirit as the individual is at the level of consciousness and has no likeness in any other sphere of reality; and this division is not a division in Spirit but one in and through the limiting adjunct.¹¹³ The body is superimposed on the *atman*²¹⁸³ and thus becomes part and parcel of the life of the *atman*.²¹⁸⁴ This embodiedness is not the own nature of the *atman*;²¹⁸⁵ it is a grafted nature. When the *atman*²¹⁸⁶ returns to its non-embodied existence, its reality is the reality of the Supreme Spirit. This does away with what Pringle-Pattison describes as the "formal distinctness" of the finite individual. Pringle-Pattison affirms their formal distinctness on the basis of experience in different fields, moral causation, social life, etc. The superstructure of these experiences, he says, will be robbed of their very foundation if the existence of the self for the self were not an experienced certainty. The ultimate issue, then, between Samkara²¹⁸⁷ and those who stand for the "formal distinctness" of the finite individual is an issue regarding the validity of what the former calls the spiritual experience of universal selfhood (*sarvatmabhava*),²¹⁸⁸ which puts an end to all egoistic, self-centered, pragmatic behavior. This issue cannot be settled by an appeal to logic, but only by an appeal to spiritual experience. For Samkara,²¹⁸⁹ the experience of *sarvatmabhava*²¹⁹⁰ is the supreme truth of realised spiritual life; but the category of the "formal distinctness" of the finite individual, while it lends plausibility to all thinking

²¹⁸¹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁸² The original editor inserted "305" by hand.

²¹⁸³ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁸⁴ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁸⁵ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁸⁶ "ātman" in the original.

²¹⁸⁷ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁸⁸ "sarvātmabhāva" in the original.

²¹⁸⁹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²¹⁹⁰ "sarvātmabhāva" in the original.

and acting, and to the social structure itself, is not able to bear the weight of that supreme experience which is the supreme reality and the supreme good.

(484-1)²¹⁹¹ IX. The Status of the Individual: Radhakrishnan

(Radhakrishnan asks squarely the question whether the liberated self loses or retains its individuality.¹¹⁴ The liberated state alone can give us the clue to the true nature and status of the self-hence, the appeal to the liberated life in an attempt to determine the true and original status of the individual. What is the nature of the individual as it exists? According to Radhakrishnan, the individual is a composite, a unity in multiplicity,¹¹⁵ is spirit and body,¹¹⁶ even when it is not exhausted by body and mind.¹¹⁷ It is permanently in a process of creative change.¹¹⁸ But it "is not a false appearance."¹¹⁹ It is a self-variation of the Spirit, which manifests itself as the universe by means of

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(continued from the previous page) this variation,¹²⁰ a spark from a great flame.¹²¹ Individual human existence has its limitative conditions of time, birth, and death. Liberation is freedom from these limitative conditions of individual human existence,¹²² and absolute identification of the finite with the infinite.¹²³ But the Divine has two poises of being, the Divine in himself and the divine in all. The liberated individual is one with the "divine in himself" as well as the "divine in all."¹²⁴ The liberated individual continues to have individuality, therefore, so long as there is the "divine in all," i.e., so long as the whole cosmic process continues and is not dissolved, because the liberated individual is one with the divine-in-all also and not only with the Divine-in-himself.

The liberated individuals retain their distinction until the end of the cosmic process, though they possess universality of spirit. But there is loss of individuality when the world is redeemed, when the multiple values figured out in it are achieved.¹²⁵ They retain their individuality because they have work to perform, which is to participate in the cosmic process and to co-operate with the divine purpose with a view to redeeming all. In Radhakrishnan's scheme, the individual is not included in or absorbed by the Divine; God and man remain distinct,¹²⁶ and the individual retains its centre as individual. According to Samkara,²¹⁹³ individuality is a limitation; it is a

²¹⁹¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²¹⁹² The original editor inserted "(306)" by hand.

²¹⁹³ "Śamkara" in the original.

limited consciousness (*viśeṣātmanabhāva*),²¹⁹⁴ and is determined by limiting adjuncts of intellect, etc.¹²⁷ Liberation, the true nature of the individual self, is the getting rid of individuated existence and the attaining of its intrinsically universal nature (*viśeṣātmanabhāva*).^{2195 128} According to Radhakrishnan, the individual, while possessing universality of spirit, retains its distinction, and this distinction is not caused by or does not have its genesis in nescience. Selfhood or individuality can mean only uniqueness or formal distinctness, and, if Radhakrishnan means that this formal distinctness of the liberated individual is not impaired when it attains its intrinsically universal nature, his position is fundamentally divergent from that of Saṃkara.²¹⁹⁶ But Radhakrishnan is not prepared to say that God is mere *primus inter pares*, even when he holds that God and man remain distinct and are bound together in love,¹²⁹ and that we have no right to treat either out of relation to the other.

But the loss of individuality does take place, according to Radhakrishnan.

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(continued from the previous page) It happens only when the world is redeemed and the cosmic consummation is achieved. The line of thought with which Saṃkara makes us familiar is different. In Saṃkara,²¹⁹⁸ "liberated life" and "loss of individuality" are synonymous; and the "individuated" life is the same as the "embodied" life. Accordingly, the "liberated" existence is a "non-embodied" existence (*asārīratva*).²¹⁹⁹ The "embodiedness (*saśārīratva*) and non-embodiedness (*asārīratva*)²²⁰⁰ have their sole constitutive cause in true awareness or otherwise of the real nature of the self."¹³⁰ The liberated self, because it attains a non-embodied state of existence by rising above body consciousness and regaining its real nature, can have no individuated being. Radhakrishnan is at one with Saṃkara²²⁰¹ in thinking that liberation is not a state of existence to follow on physical death but an all-satisfying present experience.¹³¹ But Saṃkara²²⁰² would not subscribe to Radhakrishnan's view that liberation "does not depend on embodiment or non-embodiment."¹³²

²¹⁹⁴ "viśeṣātmanabhāva" in the original.

²¹⁹⁵ "viśeṣātmanabhāva" in the original.

²¹⁹⁶ "Śaṃkara" in the original.

²¹⁹⁷ The original editor inserted "(307)" by hand.

²¹⁹⁸ "Śaṃkara" in the original.

²¹⁹⁹ "aśārīratva" in the original.

²²⁰⁰ "aśārīratva" in the original.

²²⁰¹ "Śaṃkara" in the original.

²²⁰² "Śaṃkara" in the original.

In Samkara's²²⁰³ philosophy, body symbolises in human experience the cosmic principle of nescience, the original divine nescience, and is a concrete representative of it at the empirical level of existence. Nescience gives rise to individuated existence through the concrete mediation of body, which the self owns as part of its being. But Radhakrishnan holds that neither embodiment nor non-embodiment has anything to do with liberation. He does not find any incongruity in the position that the liberated individuals may attain universality of spirit and retain their distinction and their centres as individuals. When Radhakrishnan says that the loss of individuality happens when the world is redeemed, he does not mean that the liberated spirit ceases to be, because, as he says, it is not a false appearance and comes into being through the self-variation of the Spirit,¹³³ because it is part of the divine self-manifestation in the universe.¹³⁴ When Samkara²²⁰⁴ says that one, though still in the body, lives a fully realised life,¹³⁵ he does not mean that liberated life is a particularized or individual life (*visesatmabhava*).²²⁰⁵ The individual lives the life of *sarvatmabhava*,²²⁰⁶ i.e., life universal. The individual is, but it is the universal individual. The philosophical categories which speak of the "formal distinctness of the finite individual," or of "the finite selfhood as a vanishing distinction which disappears in the Absolute," or of the "adjectival or substantival mode of being of the individual" are not adequate to the spiritual experience of the "undivided existence" (*avibhaktena sthitiḥ*)²²⁰⁷ of the

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(continued from the previous page) universal and what was previously the mere individual, an existence in which the individual is no more merely individual and becomes the universal individual. For Radhakrishnan, ultimately, the state of union with the Absolute is indescribable just as the Absolute is indescribable.¹³⁶ Union is the final truth and in this union the two are not two but one. For Samkara, this experienced truth of "undivided existence" is the ultimate paradox of human thought, namely, that what looks like division in the Spirit itself has its rationale in the limiting adjuncts in its own being; the Spirit is one.¹³⁷

(487-1)²²⁰⁹ X. Recapitulation

²²⁰³ "Śamkara" in the original.

²²⁰⁴ "Śamkara" in the original.

²²⁰⁵ "viśeṣātmabhāva" in the original.

²²⁰⁶ "sarvātmabhāva" in the original.

²²⁰⁷ "avibhaktena sthitiḥ" in the original.

²²⁰⁸ The original editor inserted "(308)" by hand.

²²⁰⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

We may bring together the salient features of Radhakrishnan's reconstruction of the Vedanta,²²¹⁰ as described above.

(1) He has introduced a rational note into the Vedanta²²¹¹ by recognizing the rational character of religious intuition and emphasizing the intimate connection and continuity of reason and intuition.

(2) He has discovered the presence of a natural theology in the Vedantic²²¹² tradition.

(3) He has given a revised conception of scripture as eternal truth and not as a written text.

(4) He has evolved a broadened conception of *samanvaya* grounded in the faith that knowledge is one coherent whole. It consists in harmonizing the living faiths of mankind.

(5) He has developed the idea of the "fellowship of faiths" on the basis of this new conception of *samanvaya*.

(6) He has toned down the ascetic note in the traditional Vedanta,²²¹³ and has thus made it a faith for the common man and thus a world faith.

(7) He has effected a closer co-ordination between the two visions of the Supreme as supracosmic transcendence and cosmic activity. Repose and activity bring out the full meaning of the divine life. For Samkara,²²¹⁴ transcendent repose alone brings out this meaning.

(8) His main problem has been "to save the world" and give it a real meaning. Samkara's²²¹⁵ main problem was "to save *Brahman*" which was not saved in the philosophy of the Naturalist and the *Bhedabhedavadin*.²²¹⁶

(9) Hence their emphasis on divergent aspects in their explication of the doctrine of *māyā*.

(10) For neither of them is the world illusory. But Samkara²²¹⁷ views the world as a brute fact which embodies a dialectical antinomy which is re-

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²²¹⁰ "Vedānta" in the original.

²²¹¹ "Vedānta" in the original.

²²¹² "Vedānta" in the original.

²²¹³ "Vedānta" in the original.

²²¹⁴ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²²¹⁵ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²²¹⁶ "Bhedābhedavādin" in the original.

²²¹⁷ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²²¹⁸ The original editor inserted "(309)" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) solved in the transcendent realisation for which *Brahman* and world fuse into one. Radhakrishnan views the world as essentially a dynamic process which aims at the realisation of an ideal. This is the difference between the religious ascetic and the religious romanticist.

(11) For Samkara,²²¹⁹ there is no individuality apart from embodied existence which is bondage for the self. The liberated self has non-embodied being, and this is attaining its original universal nature, which marks the absence of individuated existence. For Radhakrishnan, the liberated individual, while it attains a universal nature, retains its individuality. They have different notions of individuality. In spite of this, they stand for the same truth concerning the reality status of the individual.

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(489-1)²²²¹ D.T. Suzuki has, in his writings, insisted again and again that Zen is not a philosophy and that Zen is not a religion, but that it is essentially different from both philosophy and religion, and yet, relevant to both as a significant alternative. Unless this much is understood one does not even approach Zen on the right foot, let alone in the right direction.

Zen is not, certainly, a system of speculative philosophy. Zen is not concerned with an attempt to formulate, systematically and intellectually, answers to questions concerning the ultimate nature of man, the ultimate nature of the totality of reality in which man is caught up, or the ultimate nature of the good life and the good society for man. Zen gives us no laws, no rules, no principles, no "truths" which could possibly be construed as metaphysical, epistemological, or even moral. Thus it is that Zen cannot properly be spoken of as a form of materialism, idealism, dualism, pantheism, mysticism, or even existentialism. Nor can we say that Zen advocates the elimination of speculative philosophy. Zen *is* the elimination of metaphysics in the sense that Zen is not metaphysical at all. It does not solve or resolve metaphysical questions. Metaphysical questions do not, for Zen, come up from within the Zen orientation. When metaphysical questions are directed to Zen, Zen smiles broadly and marks them, one and all: *Return to Sender*. The understanding is that, if one can speak of *understanding* in this context, they have been sent to the wrong address.

But if Zen is not a system of speculative philosophy, Zen is not a form of critical philosophy either. Zen is not concerned with the intellectual analysis of the meanings

²²¹⁹ "Śamkara" in the original.

²²²⁰ The original editor inserted "(310)" and "Vol. 16" by hand.

²²²¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

of terms and concepts, the rules of logic, or the diverse modes of linguistic functioning. Some who are students of Wittgenstein have been of the opinion that there is Wittgenstein in Zen and Zen in Wittgenstein. Nothing, it seems to me, could be farther from the truth. The writings

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(continued from the previous page) of Suzuki and the writings of Wittgenstein cannot be compared. They move in opposite directions, and if they appear to arrive at times at somewhat similar conclusions, the similarity is appearance only. If Wittgenstein cannot be studied as Wittgenstein, let him be studied not as a student of Zen but as a student of Aristotle who, after all, was very much concerned with the rectification of names, the formulation of what it is to be a science, and the setting forth of rules of formal logic, though without the advantage of truth-table analysis.

Just as Zen is not philosophy, speculative or critical, so Zen, as presented by Suzuki, is not religion either. In Zen there are no rites, no rituals, no dogmas, no doctrines, no sacred scriptures, no theologies, and no formulated "truths," noble or ignoble as the case may be. The religionist who claps his two hands together to summon a servant, natural or divine, is answered by the Zen man who holds one hand aloft and calls attention to the impact of its soundlessness. Even this is something one reads about but does not do. Holding one hand aloft is not Zen. There are too many things to do, quietly, with both hands to spend any time at all holding one hand aloft. A Zen man may meditate, just as the emotionally ill man may seek out an analyst, but meditation is not Zen. At best, meditation in Zen is a means to an end, not an end in itself – though even this dichotomous distinction between *means* and *end* is, at best, a symptom of our fallenness, our departure from and separation from the on-going immediacy that is Zen.

It may be said, of course, from the outside, peering in, that the goal of Zen is the achievement of *satori*. *Satori* may be achieved, we are told, by way of *zazen*, or seated meditation, though enlightenment is not something that can be guaranteed in advance. *Satori* may also be achieved quite apart from *zazen*. If the eye has been opened, it is ridiculous to say that *satori* has not been achieved because *zazen* has not been systematically practiced. If the eye has been opened, if suddenly we find ourselves free

²²²² Blank page

²²²³ The original editor inserted "(311)" by hand.

from names and forms, if – in response to whatever occasion or stimulus – our world shines forth in its original face, no longer sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, this is – if it is – *satori*.

Properly speaking, in Zen there are no sacred scriptures nor expository analyses. The basic “literature” of Zen consists, for the most part, of *mondos* and *koans*. *Mondos* and *koans* are happenings, and there is a difference between a happening and the report of a happening. One may, perhaps, learn from a report just as one may learn from the critical review of a novel; but reading the review of a novel is not undergoing a novel. Reading the reports of *mondos* and *koans* may be a way of “studying” Zen, but it is not a way of

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(continued from the previous page) undergoing Zen nor of achieving *satori*. *Koans* are personal challenges and *mondos* are personal experiences, each one with a unique form of its own.

My first *koan*, which emerged as a genuine happening, was given to me by Suzuki himself at the time of the 1949 East-West Philosophers’ Conference. I was, at that time, young and fresh and full of spit and empirical tough-mindedness. Devoted to logic and philosophy of science, I was – or so I thought – carrying out in my way the program outlined by A.J. Ayer in *Language, Truth and Logic*. Before meeting Suzuki I had never heard of Zen, and what Suzuki had to say during the meetings of the Conference seemed to make no sense to me at all. I decided at first that he must be some kind of odd and offbeat mystic concerned with uttering the unutterable. Later, in contrast to what I was learning about Advaita, it seemed to me that Zen was not mysticism at all but, really, an odd form of pragmatic naturalism that could be improved, or possibly brought up to date, by removing its chosen air of paradox and deliberate mystification. Becoming more and more perplexed and disturbed toward the end of the Conference, I came, as it were, to the end of my rope. Leaning across the conference table in the direction of Suzuki, I asked what I took to be a real payoff of a question. “Sir,” I said, “answer me just one question and I shall be content. Is the empirical world *real* for Zen?” Suzuki, it seemed to me, replied without a moment’s hesitation: “The empirical world is real just as it is.” I felt that I had struck home. This

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²²²⁵ The original editor inserted “(312)” and “93” by hand.

was no mystic but a tough-minded empiricist. I was elated. My elation, however, lasted hardly more than a few seconds. The arrow that had pierced my skin possessed a barb. For suddenly I was face to face with the question: If the empirical world is real just as it is, *how* is it when it is *just as it is*? Philosophers and scientists, East and West, had attempted to describe the empirical world just as it is – the outcome was disagreement, conflict, and the cancelling out of mutually incompatible descriptions. I turned the coin over. There it was, the empirical world, just as it is, beyond all manner of speech; and there, so clear in the morning light, were the traps, the nets, that encircled it on every side, designed to catch what mainly crept away.

I had never done *zazen*. I had never practiced the art of archery. I had, however, surfed. I was once asked by an outsider what I thought about when riding in on the shoulder of a wave. My answer was immediate and direct: "I think about nothing at all. If I were to think I could not keep my balance." No two boards are the same, no two waves are the same, no two winds are the same, no two days are the same. Surfing is not a knowing but a doing. And when one surfs, the empirical world is real just as it is. Only afterwards, over one's shoulder, does not reflect. Although not a saint, it would appear that, face to face with Suzuki, I had kept an appointment.

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ZEN - AND SOME COMMENTS ON A MONDO

Harold E. Mccarthy

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ZEN - AND SOME COMMENTS ON A MONDO

Harold E. Mccarthy

[313]²²²⁷

The *mondos* are many, and many of the classical *mondos* are familiar. {But}²²²⁸ *mondos*, when they happen, are happenings; and there is all the difference in the world between a living *mondo* in which one is caught up and a {dead}²²²⁹ *mondo* which lends itself only to dissection after the fact. During the {1949}²²³⁰ East-West Philosopher's Conference, Suzuki was present again, older, to {be}²²³¹ sure, but with a vigor that defied his years. Sometime during the second week or so of this Conference I learned from Van Meter Ames that Suzuki had arranged, outside the framework of the Conference proper, a {number}²²³² of Zen discussion meetings. Suzuki, Professor Ames indicated, would like

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²²²⁷ The original editor inserted "(313)" and "94" by hand.

²²²⁸ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "B--" is visible in the original.

²²²⁹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "dea--" is visible in the original.

²²³⁰ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "19--" is visible in the original.

²²³¹ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "b--" is visible in the original.

²²³² the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "numb--" is visible in the original.

{me}²²³³ to be present. "Thank you," I replied; and I did not go. My presence {may}²²³⁴ in some manner, have been missed. The following week, possibly as an {envoy}²²³⁵ from Suzuki, Kenneth Inada (a former student of mine, and at that time an advanced student at the University of Tokyo) informed me that there was to be a Zen discussion meeting and that Suzuki would like me to come. "Thank you," I replied; and once more I did not go. The third week Suzuki himself arrived on the scene and informed me that there was to be another Zen discussion meeting to which I was invited. I bowed and smiled. Suzuki bowed and smiled. Then we both laughed. Suzuki went his way and I went mine. I had been invited not once but three times. It was in the end as if the master and I understood on a level beyond analysis and discussion. I had been given my *koan*. Ten years later I had now lived through my *mondo*. It was not *satori*, I had achieved, or so it seems to me, a measure of insight.

(495-1)²²³⁶ Though *mondos* are happenings, meaningful when one is really caught up in them, not analysed but lived through, the reports of *mondos* are not {all}²²³⁷ together beyond analysis, explication, elucidation so long as one remembers that the analysis of a *mondo* is not a *mondo* any more than the analysis of a poem is itself a poem. Poems, if they are to be analysed at all, must be grasped from within in the dimension of sense, feeling, emotion, and imagination; and *mondos*, if they are to be explicated at all, seem to presuppose a unique kind of *Einfühlung*.²²³⁸ The student of Zen may have a favorite *mondo* but one thing is certain – if the student has one favorite *mondo*, he has many favorite *mondos*; and the explication of one *mondo*, however partial and personal, will lead him to the explication of another and another. There is really no termination. Suzuki, it seems to me, is wise. He provides us with *mondos* but resists, on the whole, complicated explication. I am certainly not as wise as Suzuki. I have a favorite *mondo*, presented by Suzuki without comment. Where he maintains a noble silence, I play the game of explication.

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ZEN - AND SOME COMMENTS ON A MONDO
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ZEN - AND SOME COMMENTS ON A MONDO
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[314]²²⁴⁰

²²³³ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "m--" is visible in the original.

²²³⁴ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "ma--" is visible in the original.

²²³⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "envo--" is visible in the original.

²²³⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²²³⁷ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "a--" is visible in the original.

²²³⁸ "Einfühlung" in the original.

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(continued from the previous page) Let me conclude this chapter with the following quotation from one of the earliest Zen writings. Doko (Tao-kwang), a Buddhist philosopher and a student of the Vijnaptimatra (absolute idealism), came to a Zen master and asked:

“With what frame of mind should one discipline oneself in the truth?”

Said the Zen master, “There is no mind to be framed, nor is there any truth in which to be disciplined.”

“If there is no mind to be framed and no truth in which to be disciplined, why do you have a daily gathering of monks who are studying Zen and disciplining themselves in the truth?”

The master replied: “I have not an inch of space to spare, and where could I have a gathering of monks? I have no tongue, and how would it be possible for me to advise others to come to me?”

The philosopher then exclaimed, “How can you tell a lie like that to my face.”

“When I have no tongue to advise others, is it possible for me to tell a lie?”

Said Doko despairingly, “I cannot follow your reasoning.”

“Neither do I understand myself,” concluded the Zen master.¹

Although Suzuki warns us that in Zen “Questions and Answers” there “are no quibblings, no playing at words, no sophistry,”² this little dialogue sparkles with the most serious wit, irony, and directness. Involved is the immediate confrontation of a Buddhist philosopher and a Zen master. The philosopher, being a philosopher, assumes – on the basis of his own ignorance, which he undoubtedly regards as wisdom – that Zen is, indeed, a philosophy, concerned with disclosing a truth to be grasped by the mind or intellect. The reply on the part of the master is completely to the point. The philosopher has come to the wrong place. Zen is not a philosophy; there is no “truth” to be grasped by the “mind,” and one who supposes that there is such a truth has already come in the wrong frame of mind (or the wrong frame of something), exhibiting his ignorance by speaking about a “frame of mind” in the first place.

The master’s reply may be surprising, but Doko is not set back on his heels. Like a chess player determined to win and sure of his rules and his skills, he tries again, pointing out what he takes to be evidence incompatible with the master’s statement: the obvious presence of monks who are, equally obviously, studying Zen and disciplining themselves in the truth. The master’s reply is without hesitation as he sticks to his guns. Men there are, but there are no monks; indeed, in a *zendo* there is no more room for monks of the traditional variety than there is for deaf men at a musical concert – occupying seats, they would deny room to others and yet would hear not a sound. More-

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C. M. Chen: Comment On Samatha, Samapatti, And Dhyana In Ch'an (Zen)

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COMMENT ON SAMATHA, SAMAPATTI, AND DHYANA IN CH'AN (ZEN)

C. M. Chen

[315]²²⁴²

(499-1)²²⁴³ A certain causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) might be there when a hermit sets his pen to paper; otherwise, he should indulge himself in meditation (*samadhi*)²²⁴⁴ only. A few comments on Charles Luk's *Ch'an and Zen Teaching* may be in order. But, before commenting, a few quoted lines will help.¹

"*Samatha*"²²⁴⁵ is stopping or silencing [the active mind]; its characteristic is absolute, and its meditative study is that of all as void.

*Samapatti*²²⁴⁶ is attaining equanimity, evenness, or calmness [of mind]; its characteristic is relative, and its meditative study is that of all as unreal.

*Dhyana*²²⁴⁷ is unperturbed abstraction, which is beyond the absolute and the relative; its characteristic is nirvanic,²²⁴⁸ and its meditative study is that of the mean."

These are the main principles of the commentary on the twenty-five methods of meditative study taught in the *Ta-fang-kuang-yuan-chuch-hsiu-to-lo-liao-i-ching-chih-chieh* (*The Sutra*²²⁴⁹ of Complete Enlightenment.)

Surely, *samatha*²²⁵⁰ is the first stage of meditation, in which the active discriminative mind is stopped. It is neither objectively absolute nor subjectively meditative. As the above *Sutra*²²⁵¹ says, during *samatha*²²⁵² the agitating consciousness is exposed and all thoughts are stopped. How, then, may meditative study of that "all-is-

²²⁴² The original editor inserted "(315)" and "Vol. 17" by hand.

²²⁴³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²²⁴⁴ "samādhi" in the original.

²²⁴⁵ "Śamatha" in the original.

²²⁴⁶ "Samāpatti" in the original.

²²⁴⁷ "Dhyāna" in the original.

²²⁴⁸ "nirvāṇic" in the original.

²²⁴⁹ "Sūtra" in the original.

²²⁵⁰ "śamatha" in the original.

²²⁵¹ "Sūtra" in the original.

²²⁵² "śamatha" in the original.

void” be achieved at this stage, as Han Shan says? He is somehow perplexed himself by the words of the *Sutra*:²²⁵³ “with the appearing wisdom begotten by stillness.” This wisdom is a result to be achieved only after *samatha*²²⁵⁴ is attained and the *samapatti*²²⁵⁵ stage begins to develop, but not in meditation within the stage of *samatha*²²⁵⁶ itself.

*samapatti*²²⁵⁷ has its meditative effects negatively in relative illusions and positively in the nature of enlightenment, though both are attained only after the stillness gained from *samatha*, but we cannot say that *śamatha* alone occupies the absolute and *samapatti*²²⁵⁸ the relative. For this reason, the mind in *samatha* has no function with respect to maintaining the Absolute in in-

500²²⁵⁹

COMMENT ON SAMATHA, SAMAPATTI, AND DHYANA IN CH’AN (ZEN)

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[316]²²⁶⁰

(continued from the previous page) sight, keeping relative illusions away from the Absolute, or causing them to be identified. All these functions, in fact, should be carried out only in the stage of *samapatti*²²⁶¹ and not in *samatha*.²²⁶² These three functions are called meditative study in the above-mentioned *Sutra*;²²⁶³ it is different from “concentrative training” relative to the function of *samatha*.²²⁶⁴ The text, moreover, does not mention “meditative study” with reference to the definition of *samatha*²²⁶⁵ and therefore supports the view expressed here on *samapatti*.²²⁶⁶

Regarding the term “*dhyana*,”²²⁶⁷ it is a common name referring to these three stages. The word “meditation” may be used for consideration in the first stage,

²²⁵³ “Sūtra” in the original.

²²⁵⁴ “śamatha” in the original.

²²⁵⁵ “samāpatti” in the original.

²²⁵⁶ “śamatha” in the original.

²²⁵⁷ “samāpatti” in the original.

²²⁵⁸ “samāpatti” in the original.

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²²⁶⁰ The original editor inserted “(316)” and “85” by hand.

²²⁶¹ “samāpatti” in the original.

²²⁶² “śamatha” in the original.

²²⁶³ “Sūtra” in the original.

²²⁶⁴ “śamatha” in the original.

²²⁶⁵ “śamatha” in the original.

²²⁶⁶ “samāpatti” in the original.

²²⁶⁷ “dhyāna” in the original.

*samatha*²²⁶⁸ for contemplation in the second stage, and *samapatti*²²⁶⁹ for absorption in the identification of these two stages in the third and final stage, *samadhi*.²²⁷⁰ There are many examples of them recorded in the Chinese Tripitaka. The first four meditations of the realm of materiality (*rupadhatu*)²²⁷¹ were called the four *dhyānas*.²²⁷² It was used in the sense of *samatha*.²²⁷³ The next four meditations of *arupadhatu*,²²⁷⁴ which contain four kinds of *samāpatti*, were also called eight *dhyānas*.²²⁷⁵ It was used in the sense of *samapatti*.²²⁷⁶ Modern scholars use the word “*ch’an*,” which is a transliteration of the Sanskrit “*dhyānas*.”²²⁷⁷ It is the sense of *samadhi*,²²⁷⁸ the final stage of truth, that became *ch’an*, or *zen*. As the term “*dhyāna*”²²⁷⁹ was used so widely without an exact definition, the great sage Nagarjuna²²⁸⁰ confined the definition of “*dhyāna*”²²⁸¹ to the first four meditations of *rupadhatu*²²⁸² and referred to the next four as *samādhis*.²²⁸³ This term “*samadhi*”²²⁸⁴ should be used only for the final stage of full enlightenment. Hence, the book on meditation has a chapter called “The Definition of Meditative Terms,” in which “*dhyāna*”²²⁸⁵ is used for “*samadhi*”²²⁸⁶ as used in this *Sutra*.²²⁸⁷ It is ironical, again, that the *Sutra*²²⁸⁸ describes the Buddha’s meditative attitude in the first paragraph with only the term “*samadhi*,”²²⁸⁹ not “*dhyāna*.”²²⁹⁰ Nevertheless, “*dhyāna*”²²⁹¹ as used in the *Sutra*²²⁹² on other occasions is certainly used in the sense of “*samadhi*”²²⁹³ or “*ch’an*.” As Luk’s

²²⁶⁸ “*śamatha*” in the original.

²²⁶⁹ “*samāpatti*” in the original.

²²⁷⁰ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²²⁷¹ “*rūpadhātu*” in the original.

²²⁷² “*dhyānas*” in the original.

²²⁷³ “*śamatha*” in the original.

²²⁷⁴ “*arūpadhātu*” in the original.

²²⁷⁵ “*dhyānas*” in the original.

²²⁷⁶ “*samāpatti*” in the original.

²²⁷⁷ “*dhyānas*” in the original.

²²⁷⁸ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²²⁷⁹ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁸⁰ “*Nāgārjuna*” in the original.

²²⁸¹ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁸² “*rūpadhātu*” in the original.

²²⁸³ “*samādhis*” in the original.

²²⁸⁴ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²²⁸⁵ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁸⁶ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²²⁸⁷ “*Sūtra*” in the original.

²²⁸⁸ “*Sūtra*” in the original.

²²⁸⁹ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²²⁹⁰ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁹¹ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁹² “*Sūtra*” in the original.

²²⁹³ “*samādhi*” in the original.

book is prepared for modern readers, it has left out such terms as “*dhyana*”²²⁹⁴ to avoid confusion.

Han Shan purposely relates the three kinds of *samapatti*²²⁹⁵ to the void (*sunyata*),²²⁹⁶ the unreal (*prapanca*),²²⁹⁷ and the mean (*madhyama pratipad*)²²⁹⁸ of T’ien-t’ai doctrine in harmony with the three processes of meditation – *samatha*, *samapatti*,²²⁹⁹ and *dhyana*²³⁰⁰ – in the *Sutra*.²³⁰¹ At least, he is particular about the fact that the first three belong to *samāpatti*, which is the second of the processes of meditation, but nothing corresponds with the first and third processes. However, they are not in three pairs, as he suggests.

Birds have wings, fishes have fins, bulls have horns – these three ideas

502²³⁰²

COMMENT ON SAMATHA, SAMAPATTI, AND DHYANA IN CH’AN (ZEN)

C. M. Chen

Untitled

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UNTITLED

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(503-1)²³⁰⁴ this system, accusing them of self-contradiction and other logical fallacies. He formulated his system also through commentaries on the Gita and the Vedanta Sutras and in a work on the disputed passages of the Upanisads called the Vedārtha Samgraha. He has three commentaries on the Vedanta Sutras (Sri-bhasya, Vedanta-dīpa, and Vedanta-sara). Ramanuja’s was the first powerful attack on the Advaita metaphysics of Samkara, especially the doctrine of maya, the concept of the indeterminate absolute Nirguna Brahman, and the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

The philosophy of Madhva is, however, a more radical attack on the metaphysics and the ethics of Samkara than that of Ramanuja. It is an uncompromising open confrontation of the defects of Samkara’s interpretation of the three basic texts and of the formulation of his system. Madhva (1238–1317) has formulated the principles of his

²²⁹⁴ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²²⁹⁵ “*samāpatti*” in the original.

²²⁹⁶ “*śūnyatā*” in the original.

²²⁹⁷ “*prapāṇca*” in the original.

²²⁹⁸ “*madhyamā pratipad*” in the original.

²²⁹⁹ “*śamatha, samāpatti*” in the original.

²³⁰⁰ “*dhyāna*” in the original.

²³⁰¹ “*Sūtra*” in the original.

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²³⁰³ The original editor inserted “(317)” by hand.

²³⁰⁴ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

system on the constructive side through a thorough criticism of Samkara, in thirty-seven works, comprising his commentaries, independent tracts, and hymns.

Daniel H.H. Ingalls: Bhaskara The Vedantin

(503-2) Bhaskara cannot understand the view of Samkara, for it there has been in reality no creation of the phenomenal world, what would there be to undo? What occasion would there be for striving or for the religious life?

Hajime Nakamura: Interrelational Existence

(503-3) "When this exists, that exists, when this occurs, that occurs; when this does not exist, that does not exist; when this is destroyed, that is destroyed." (Ref. is to {Se??utta}²³⁰⁵ Nikaya, 12, 19) This truth is also seen through the twofold contemplation which is: If nescience (avijja), the first link, exists, other links exist, and finally suffering (e.g. decay and death) exists; if, on the other hand, nescience does not exist, being destroyed by enlightenment, then other links also do not exist, and finally suffering does not exist, having been destroyed. Such a two-fold contemplation should be practiced.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 18

Siu-Chi Huang Chang: Tsai's Concept Of Ch'I

504

TSAI'S CONCEPT OF CH'I

Siu-Chi Huang Chang

[318]²³⁰⁶

(504-1)²³⁰⁷ Chou Tun-i (1017-1073) and Shao Yung (1011-1077), talked about ch'i in their respective cosmological systems, but neither of them was as outspoken and emphatic as Chang Tsi on the concept.

(504-2) The ch'i or vital force is, according to Chang Tsi, the fundamental substance by which all processes of the universe can be explained. He would probably accept Chou Tun-i's idea of the evolution of the cosmos as expounded in the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (T'ai-chi-t'u), which begins with the invisible realm and proceeds to the more concrete and tangible world of myriad things.

²³⁰⁵ the word is cut off by the right margin. Only "Se--utta" is visible in the original.

²³⁰⁶ The original editor inserted "(318)" by hand.

²³⁰⁷ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(504-3) Hence, he laid emphatic stress on ch'i as the one element which makes the "Great Void" (t'ai hsü, an important term which will be discussed in detail) not a vacuum but the ultimate source of the world of nature. The Great Void (like Chou Tun-i's Supreme Ultimate, a term not used by Chang Tsai), which seems to belong in the realm of the invisible, depends on the activity of ch'i to make its manifestation possible. However, the ch'i, which is the basic stuff of everything, is derived from and has its origin in the Great Void to which everything is destined to return.

(504-4) ftn: See Chou Lien-hsi (Complete Works of Chou Tun-i), 1.1-2 (Kuo-hsueh Chi-pen Ts'ung-shu edition, 1937). For the translation of the Diagram Explained, see J. Percy Bruce, Chu Hsi and His Masters (London: Probsthain & Co., 1923), pp. 128-131; and for an account of the Diagram, see Siu-chi Huang, Lu Hsiang-shan - A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1944) pp. 17-23.

(504-5) ...the term t'ai chi (Supreme Ultimate), which, for Chou, is the origin of the universe and from which all things spring.

Arnold Kunst Somatism: A Basic Concept in India's Philosophical Speculations

(504-6) Paradoxically enough, it was the subject of metaphysics that Buddha refused to discuss because it came within the realm of unutterables.

Joshi: Criticism and Discussion

505

CRITICISM AND DISCUSSION

Joshi

[319]²³⁰⁸

(505-1)²³⁰⁹ fundamental presuppositions of philosophy in India; namely, that the life of an individual in the world is predominantly a matter of misery and sorrow, and further, that the soul, which is the principle of life (*caitanya*), is something that continues to exist even after the death of the body. This view is open to two objections. First, the eschatological element in it makes the state of liberation uninteresting and meaningless so far as the life of an individual in the world is concerned. Second, and this is more serious, it may be argued against this view that if the basic presuppositions regarding the soul are taken strictly and seriously, each soul must be taken to be ever free; it can never really have bondage, and so there cannot really be any question of liberation

²³⁰⁸ The original editor inserted "(319)" and "Vol. 18" by hand.

²³⁰⁹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

either. These difficulties can be overcome by viewing the state of liberation as something that can be achieved by an individual in his very lifetime. This is called liberation in bodily existence (*jīvanmukti*).²³¹⁰

In this discussion we will attempt to analyse the concept of liberation in bodily existence in order to clear some of the confusion which seems to prevail in the minds of many regarding it. A good example of this confusion is provided by A.C. Das in his article, “Advaita Vedānta²³¹¹ and Liberation in Bodily Existence,” published in *Philosophy East and West* (IV, No. 2 [July, 1954], 113–124). Das has tried to cut at the very foundation of Advaitism by arguing that if *nirvikalpa samādhi*²³¹² is, as the Advaitins hold, the ultimate state of ecstatic trance, in which *Brahman* in its true undifferentiated and unconditioned nature is realised, eliminating the ego or individuality of an aspirant, then none could ever return from it to teach illusionism on earth. “The point that concerns us here,” says Das, “is how it is that one sometimes comes out of the state of *nirvikalpa samādhi*.²³¹³”

Das has equated the state of liberation in bodily existence to the state of *nirvikalpa samādhi*,²³¹⁴ and very correctly so. But what he thinks to be of crucial importance is whether the *sādhaka*²³¹⁵ can come out of *nirvikalpa samādhi*²³¹⁶ and back into bodily existence. To put the matter in his own words:

Contemplation in the end culminates in *nirvikalpa samādhi*²³¹⁷ – the superconscious ecstatic state of trance in which the *sādhaka*²³¹⁸ becomes merged with *Brahman*. On the other hand, when the *sādhaka*²³¹⁹ comes out of *nirvikalpa samādhi*²³²⁰ and regains consciousness of the world, he is left with a sort of ego. Advaitists themselves cannot afford to be blind to this fact. But the question is: How is it that some sort of individuality is restored to the *sādhaka*,²³²¹ though in the state of *nirvikalpa samādhi*²³²² all ego or individuality and all differentiation are annulled? (p. 122)

In his acute philosophical analysis, Das seems to assume that when a person experiences the state of *nirvikalpa samādhi*,²³²³ he no more sees the world of variety of objects in the same fashion as the rest of us, and secondly, that

²³¹⁰ “jīvanmukti” in the original.

²³¹¹ “Vedānta” in the original.

²³¹² “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³¹³ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³¹⁴ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³¹⁵ “sādhaka” in the original.

²³¹⁶ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³¹⁷ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³¹⁸ “sādhaka” in the original.

²³¹⁹ “sādhaka” in the original.

²³²⁰ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³²¹ “sādhaka” in the original.

²³²² “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

²³²³ “nirvikalpa samādhi” in the original.

(continued from the previous page) behavior on the usual psycho-biological plane is out of the question, so far as one is in that state of ecstatic trance. Guided by these two assumptions, he concludes: "If the *sadhaka*²³²⁶ comes out of *nirvikalpa samadhi*,²³²⁷ which is the state of identity, he cannot possibly get back to the same plane from which he rose to the realisation of the undifferentiated. On the other hand, in the ultimate state, as the *sadhaka*²³²⁸ relinquishes his individuality, he is not in any way responsible for his return"

Malkani, in his article "A Note on Liberation in Bodily Existence" (*Philosophy East and West*, V, No. 1 [April, 1955], 69-74), has tried to meet the objections raised by A.C. Das. But in trying to do so, what he has actually done is to confuse the matter still further. He argues that "The very conception of *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³²⁹ is expressive of human limitation. It is a state of the mind only. Any such state cannot be eternal. It has seeds of temporality in it. It is bound to pass away." Malkani continues:

The mind, wedded to a body, has other tensions as well, namely, the needs of the body and of the social environment. It can only temporarily dissociate itself from the body and its contacts, and concentrate upon a higher or transcendent reality. It cannot do this *always*. It must relax. It is not in the way of nature to be always in *samadhi*.²³³⁰ It is like going up into a rarefied atmosphere, staying there for a while, and then coming back to rest in the natural element of the body.

It seems here that both Das and Malkani are arguing about a fictitious problem or about a difficulty which really is not there. To speak about the state of *jivanmukti*²³³¹ or *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³³² in terms of "going into" and "coming out of," is, to be sure, a product of a gross confusion. The confusion here has arisen from a failure to distinguish between the state of *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³³³ and the state which is ordinarily

²³²⁴ Blank page

²³²⁵ The original editor inserted "(320)" and "Vol. 18" by hand.

²³²⁶ "sādhaka" in the original.

²³²⁷ "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

²³²⁸ "sādhaka" in the original.

²³²⁹ "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

²³³⁰ "samādhi" in the original.

²³³¹ "jīvanmukti" in the original.

²³³² "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

²³³³ "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

indicated by the word *samadhi*.²³³⁴ What the two authors mentioned above seem to have done in their articles on liberation in bodily existence is to confuse two different states, both of which are described by the word *samadhi*.²³³⁵

Many people who are ignorant of the real meaning of the word *samadhi*²³³⁶ feel that true knowledge, which puts an end to ignorance, vices, and misery, can be obtained through a process of mental concentration. This process involves drawing away the mind from the objects of enjoyment to some objects of concentration, like the idol or image of God, auspicious symbols like “*aum*,” or some points in the body like the tip of the nose, the navel, and so on. There is a widespread belief in India, especially among those who are supposed to know something about *yoga*, spiritual *sadhana*,²³³⁷ mental concentration, and the like, that a state of deep mental absorption or concentration can yield knowledge about anything in the universe, far and wide. Such a state of mental

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(continued from the previous page) concentration, which is usually supposed to be the meaning of the word *samadhi*,²³⁴⁰ obviously cannot last forever, and the person who succeeds in concentrating his mind on any object of concentration, say, even the soul or *atman*,²³⁴¹ or God, finds himself, after some time, to be out of that state, to be caught up once again in the rough and tumble of daily life. A mind that seeks lasting pleasure, eternal happiness, spiritual enlightenment, God realisation, or emancipation, tries to pursue such a state of mental concentration, through regular and increasingly intense practice.

But such a state of *samadhi*²³⁴² comes and goes, because it is a state put together by a mind that wants to run away from some situation in order to escape into a supposedly advanced spiritual state. It differs radically from the state of *nirvikalpa*

²³³⁴ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²³³⁵ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²³³⁶ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²³³⁷ “*sādhana*” in the original.

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²³³⁹ The original editor inserted “(321)”

²³⁴⁰ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁴¹ “*ātman*” in the original.

²³⁴² “*samādhi*” in the original.

samadhi,²³⁴³ which is not a state of concentration, or elimination of thought. The latter cannot be the product of any effort, as we shall presently see, to concentrate the mind on any particular thing or thought to the exclusion of all else. It is not a state in which the mind is *made* silent, through control or discipline. The state of *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³⁴⁴ does not come and go, as is supposed by Das and Malkani; it is once for all. Nor can it be sought after through positive effort; it comes uninvited when all the effort for attainment, fulfillment, or achievement stops completely. The most important point about the state of liberation in bodily existence is that when once it is there, it no more admits of any duality like concentration and lack of it, going into, or coming out of it, and so on. This is, indeed, a striking point which calls for a more elaborate analysis, to which we now turn.

Why does one concentrate at all? Why does one aspire to be absorbed into or to be one with *Brahman*, *Atman*,²³⁴⁵ *aum*, God and so on? It is obviously because one wants to bring about a change either in oneself or in one's surrounding. This idea of change, improvement, enhancement, and achievement is the motivating factor underlying one's effort to make the mind silent in a state of *samadhi*.²³⁴⁶ This effort to concentrate the mind arises from two sorts of formulations, namely, "I am this," and "I want to be that." The "this" is here made by what an individual takes himself to be, which depends on what one has been taught to believe by the sacred books, scriptures, religious authorities, or *gurus*. The "that" indicates the ideal one sets before oneself, arising, once again, from one's belief, learned from the masters of religion or philosophy. One thus aspires to obtain the grace of God, or be one with God, be eternally free from the cycle of rebirths, be absorbed into *Brahman*, and the like. An obvious gap is felt between the "this" and the "that," or the states of *actual* and *ideal*, formulated in this process. To bridge this gap, and to reach from the "this" to the "that," one takes recourse to spiritual *sadhana*,²³⁴⁷ involving concentration of the mind.

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²³⁴³ "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

²³⁴⁴ "nirvikalpa samādhi" in the original.

²³⁴⁵ "Ātman" in the original.

²³⁴⁶ "samādhi" in the original.

²³⁴⁷ "sādhana" in the original.

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²³⁴⁹ The original editor inserted "(322)" and "Vol. 18 Joshi" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) It is supposed by many that if the mind can be made completely steady and concentrates on *Brahman*, or God, abandoning contact with everything else for some time, then one gets absorbed into *Brahman*, or God, as the case may be. One can actually have a feeling of emancipation or God-realisation or whatnot, as long as one is in that state of deep contemplation. But that state, as one experiences, does not last indefinitely; there is inevitably a return from it. This probably has made Das and Malkani feel that the state of *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³⁵⁰ is something that comes and goes. There should be no room for any such confusion, however, if one realises that *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³⁵¹ can never be the “that” of any “this.” It comes into being when one realises the futility of the very idea of an ideal, which is always based on information and belief, and abandons completely the way of concentrating the mind on anything, however sacred, to the exclusion of other thoughts. It implies a complete absence of craving, including a craving for *mukti* or liberation.

As described by the great Jñāneśvara, “Like the moon responding to moonlight or the ocean responding to showers of rain, a *jivanmukta*²³⁵² reacts passively to whatever confronts him. His peace, passivity and choicelessness remain ever undisturbed by whatever he does. He may speak whatever his tongue may happen to utter, but, with all this, his state of silent *samadhi*²³⁵³ remains unshaken.”¹ It is, indeed, a state of culmination of all spiritual *sadhana*,²³⁵⁴ and religious and philosophical effort. As the ocean remains undisturbed even when many rivers constantly pour huge quantities of water into it, so, too, a person liberated in bodily existence behaves in everyday life, without causing his state of silence and peace to be in any way disturbed. There is really no problem of “going into” or “coming out of” it.

Such a state of *nirvikalpa samadhi*²³⁵⁵ is described by words like *sahajavastha*,²³⁵⁶ *turiya*,²³⁵⁷ *unmani*, *nirbija samadhi*,²³⁵⁸ and so on, indicating the fact that it is not a state of the conscious mind inasmuch as it cannot be brought about by any mental effort of concentration, and this being the case, that state cannot be disturbed by any conscious mental activity. A *sadhaka*²³⁵⁹ (or rather *siddha*, one should say), can, therefore, behave like the rest of us on the psycho-biological plane, while remaining unhindered so far as his state of liberation is concerned.²

²³⁵⁰ “*nirvikalpa samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁵¹ “*nirvikalpa samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁵² “*jīvanmukta*” in the original.

²³⁵³ “*samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁵⁴ “*sādhana*” in the original.

²³⁵⁵ “*nirvikalpa samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁵⁶ “*sahajāvasthā*” in the original.

²³⁵⁷ “*tūrīyā*” in the original.

²³⁵⁸ “*nirbīja samādhi*” in the original.

²³⁵⁹ “*sādhaka*” in the original.

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R. K. Tripathi: Comment and Discussion

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(513-1)²³⁶² prior to distinction, synthesis is posterior to it; while the former is a kind of potentiality, the latter is a kind of achievement. If there is no contradiction in the *avaktavya* it is not because the contradictories have been transformed or opposition overcome, but because there is no distinction of the contradictories.¹¹ Therefore *avaktavya* is not a synthesis of contradictories, but their inexpressible non-distinction. The implication is that *only what is expressible can be self-contradictory and not what is inexpressible or indescribable*. It is this view of *avaktavya* alone which can enable us to have the following: (1) the distinction of the *avaktavya* from skepticism or the fourth *koti* of the Madhyamika, (2) the distinction of the *avaktavya* from the Hegelian synthesis. (3) the freedom of the *avaktavya* from self-contradiction, and (4) the preservation of *avaktavya* as a *mūla* or underived *bhaṅga*. The Jaina is not guilty of accepting blatantly the validity of self-contradiction or contradictories. If the *avaktavya* has to be rejected, it must be pointed out that there lurks a kind of inconsistency in accepting this concept even in the sense of non-distinction, just as we have shown that there remains an inconsistency in Hegel even after the synthesis of the contradictories is accepted.

All the systems of Indian philosophy have criticised the concept of *avaktavya* because it is uncomfortable for them. But the concept is especially dangerous for the Madhyamika, because the admission of *avaktavya* threatens the very structure of the dialectic. As is well known, the Madhyamika thinks of four and only four – neither more nor less – alternative standpoints or *dr̥ṣṭis* not reducible to each other.¹² But *avaktavya* opens the possibility of there being more alternatives than four. Probably this is not a very serious difficulty. The more serious point is that it is a concept which is impregnable to dialectical criticism.¹³ The Madhyamika therefore rejects *avaktavya* as a possible *dr̥ṣṭi*, even as the Jaina rejects the fourth *koti* of the Madhyamika as mere skepticism. Now the question is: Is the Madhyamika justified in rejecting *avaktavya*?

The Madhyamika and the Jaina both agree that many views of reality are possible, but the difference between the two is that for the former these views are just views and not truths about reality, while for the latter these views are

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²³⁶¹ The original editor inserted “(323)” and “VOL. 18” by hand.

²³⁶² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

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(continued from the previous page) acceptable truths about reality. For the Jaina, thought represents reality;¹⁴ for the Madhyamika, thought misrepresents reality. But we are not concerned here with the question of whether thought represents or misrepresents reality. Our problem is: in how many possible ways can thought do so? The Madhyamika begins with two *mūladr̥ṣṭis* and comes to have four in all. The Jaina begins with three *mūlabhaṅgas* and comes to have seven types of predication in all. The difference is obviously due to *avaktavya*.

We have drawn some distinctions about *avaktavya* above; additional distinctions must be drawn before the question of the legitimacy of the concept of *avaktavya* is taken up, because some other systems too seem to accept something like *avaktavya* or the inexpressible. On the face of it, the Advaitic conception of *Brahman* and the Madhyamika conception of *śūnya* seem to be *avaktavya* or inexpressible inasmuch as they are beyond all thought and speech. But the *avaktavya* is undoubtedly different from *Brahman* or *śūnya* for the obvious reason that no claim is made for its being transcendent; the Jaina *avaktavya* is not inaccessible to thought but only to speech. If so, can it be compared to the misperception of a rope as a snake or the *prātibhāsika* (empirical illusion) which is said to be *anirvacanīya* or indescribable? The rope-snake is said to be indescribable because though it appears in consciousness, it is not real; it can be characterized neither as *sat* nor as *asat*, nor as both. We have already rejected the view of *avaktavya* as “neither *sat* nor *asat*”; *avaktavya* is both *sat* and *asat*, and so it is clear that it cannot be compared with the rope-snake which is *sad-asat vilakṣaṇa* or neither and hence *anirvacanīya*; it is not only a case of non-distinction, but an admission of another category different from both. Moreover, the rope-snake is cancelled when the error is recognised, but the *avaktavya* is not. Like the *anirvacanīya*, the *avaktavya* is different from both *sat* and *asat*, but unlike that category, it is a copresentation or nondistinction of the two terms. Like the fourth *koṭi*²³⁶⁵ of the Madhyamika, it is different from a synthesis of *sat* and *asat*, but unlike that, it is not a denial of *sat* and *asat*, but mere non-distinction. How is this non-distinction different from the concept of non-distinction (*akhyāti*) of the Prābhākaras? The difference is that in *akhyāti* the terms are distinct, but there is no consciousness of the distinction; but in the *avaktavya* the terms are non-distinct. Again, the terms of *akhyāti* are not necessarily contradictories, as is the case with *avaktavya*.

²³⁶⁴ The original editor inserted “(324)” and “VOL. 18 – Tripathi” by hand.

²³⁶⁵ “koṭi” in the original.

Having made the above distinctions clear, let us now proceed to see whether *avaktavya* can legitimately be accepted in philosophy. We are here reminded of the famous words of Wittgenstein: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof

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(continued from the previous page) one must be silent." To this Gellner retorts, "That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak."¹⁵ The inexpressible has been insinuated both by mystics and critical philosophers, but they have chosen to be silent. Plato held that the highest truth could not be really written, as it is a communion between two souls. Plotinus and Eckhart thought in the same manner. Kant was silent about the thing-in-itself and so was Buddha. The *ṛsis* of the Upaniṣads too advise silence.¹⁶ But it must be clearly noted that the inexpressible in these cases is quite different from the *avaktavya*. The inexpressible in the abovementioned systems is transcendent to thought and not to speech only, and is therefore merely hinted at; the transcendent is not an alternative thought or view, and in this sense the Madhyamika too accepts the inexpressible. But the peculiarity of the Jaina is that he wants to admit the inexpressible even on the empirical level,¹⁷ that is, as a view of reality. The inexpressible of the Jaina is neither transcendent nor a mere postulate, but something thinkable and knowable but not expressible. The transcendentalist's inexpressible is beyond thought and is unthinkable. Can we accept something which is thinkable, but not expressible?

K.C. Bhattacharyya says, "The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is *given* cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept."¹⁸ Now the point is whether the inexpressible is really *given*. Probably Bhattacharyya takes *avaktavya* as a continuum like the *avidyā* of Advaita Vedanta, but for obvious reasons the Jaina cannot take *avaktavya* as a continuum or background, because for him *avaktavya* is a *particular* view or aspect of reality like *asti* and *nāsti*. The Jaina takes *avaktavya* as thinkable, but not expressible. Can thought accept it without making it expressible in the process? Is it merely a handicap of language that the *avaktavya* cannot be expressed?¹⁹ If so, can the inexpressible be at least thought, if not actually expressed? The dilemma is this: if it can be thought it can also be expressed; if it cannot even be thought, it cannot be regarded as a view or aspect of

²³⁶⁶ Blank page

²³⁶⁷ The original editor inserted "(325)" and "Vol. 18" at the top of the page by hand

reality. The Madhyamika rejected the Jaina *avaktavya* as it cannot even be thought. The unthinkable cannot be accepted in philosophy as a viewpoint; it can be accepted only as transcendent. The Jaina does not insinuate it or hint at it; he takes it as a viewpoint and regards it as thinkable but not expressible, and that is the contradiction or impossibility in his posi-

R.K. Tripathi: The Concept of Avaktavya in Jainism

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THE CONCEPT OF AVAKTAVYA IN JAINISM

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(continued from the previous page) tion. The inexpressible or the *avaktavya* cannot be equated with *asti* and *nasti* as a position: thought must be thoughtless here. It may be asked whether this criticism applies to the *anirvacaniya* of the Vedanta. Can anything which is not transcendent be regarded as *anirvacaniya* (inexpressible)? The Vedantin would say that there is no harm in accepting the *anirvacaniya* as a concept describing the unreal because the worst that can be said against it is that it is unreal, and the Vendantin would jump with joy to see that you have caught the point. The difficulty arises only when the *anirvacaniya* or the inexpressible is taken as real: and not only real, but even as *empirically* real. This is what the Jaina does. Hence the *avaktavya* should either be given up by the Jaina, or he should be a transcendentalist.

Clarence Shute: The Comparative Phenomenology of Japanese Painting and Zen Buddhism

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THE COMPARATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF JAPANESE PAINTING AND ZEN
BUDDHISM

Clarence Shute

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(519-1)²³⁷¹ The third canon is *ki in* or "spiritual elevation." It appears that from early centuries the writers on art in China and Japan have believed in an inborn character of nobility which is called "the clear character" in the ancient Confucian classic, *The Great Learning*. In a commentary on this work written by Wang-Yang-ming about 1527, "manifesting the clear character" is explained first of all in terms of the unity of all

²³⁶⁸ "R.K. Tripathi: The Concept of Avaktavya in Jainism conclusion of article, p. 193" in the original.

²³⁶⁹ The original editor inserted "(326)" by hand.

²³⁷⁰ The original editor inserted "(327)" by hand.

²³⁷¹ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

things, which is shown in the feeling of commiseration that a man has for the suffering of a fellow human being, for birds and animals, for plants, and even for tiles and stones. "Such a mind is rooted in his Heaven-endowed nature, and is naturally intelligent, clear, and not beclouded. For this reason it is called the "clear character." "This clear character is recognised in the truly great man, and in the same way ki in or spiritual elevation is recognised as a distinctive characteristic of great art.

(519-2) The artist who is possessed by the spirit of muga ("it is not I that am doing this"), and the Zennist who realises his own nature as the Buddha nature in all things, display quite clearly what seems to be, in phenomenological analysis, an identical phenomenon.

D.W.Y. Kwok: on Scientism in Chinese Thought (review by Shu-Hsien Liu)

(519-3) On the whole, I tend to agree with Kwok's main contention that the function of science was fanatically worshipped rather than truly understood by the Chinese intellectuals in those days.

(519-4) It was a demand for action in those days that turned ideas so easily into ideologies. There was a general impatience on the part of the Chinese intellectuals that drove them to commit themselves too quickly to a superficial concept of science which gave scientism a false appearance of doctrinal finality.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 19

Richard Brooks: The Meaning of 'Real' in Advaita Vedanta

(519-5) But clearly, the world cannot be totally unreal in the sense of being fictitious or nonexistent. We do, after all, perceive it. Falsity, then, although it excludes reality

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THE MEANING OF 'REAL' IN ADVAITA VEDANTA

Richard Brooks

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(continued from the previous page) (sat), does not entail unreality (asat). This is what is meant by calling the world an illusion. Although an illusion has a peculiar ontological

²³⁷² The original editor inserted "(328)" by hand.

status, it is not that of nonbeing or nonexistence. The very word 'mithya' seems to me to bring this out.

(520-1)²³⁷³ Why do Advaitins refuse to acknowledge a thing to be real unless it is eternal, immutable, unlimited, and unchanging?

(520-2) Reality, in Advaita, will be that which is (1) experienceable, (2) nonillusory or nonimaginary, and (3) stable, lasting or permanent.

(520-3) In a loose sense of the term 'real', this will lead to the doctrine of levels or degrees of reality, which I have argued is an indispensable doctrine of Advaita metaphysics. In the strict sense of the term 'real', however, there is only one thing which fulfills all these three criteria, and that is Brahman: this is why Advaitins say that reality is nondual (a-dvaita). This is why Advaitins claim that everything which is pluralistic must be an illusion (maya). These startling claims rest directly upon Advaita's assertion that the knowledge of Brahman (Brahmajnana) is the experience which sublates all other experiences but which is itself unsublatable – a very startling claim itself!

Joseph S. Wu: Chinese Language and Chinese Thought

(520-4) Mahayana Buddhism has had vast metaphysical systems developed in very sophisticated ways. For instance, the Yoga-cara school which was founded by Asanga and Vasabandhu has developed complicated epistemological theories. However, the great Chinese monk Hsuan Chuang has _____²³⁷⁴ simplified and summarized the whole system in his own version. Since the Chinese Buddhists could not stand the unnecessary analyses in Buddhist metaphysics, they formed their own Buddhism, which is less complicated in its theoretical aspect.

PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST JOURNAL VOLUME 20

D.J. Kalupahana: Dinnaga's Theory of Immaterialism

(520-5) ...a twofold development, one, represented by the Madhyamikas, that the nature of the external object is completely unknown and that no predication can be made of it (transcendentalism), and the other represented by the Yoga-carins, who maintained that nothing exists outside thought (idealism).

²³⁷³ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²³⁷⁴ A blank space was left in the original because the original typist couldn't read PB's handwriting, or because PB himself left a blank in the para.

(521-1)²³⁷⁶ The idealism found in the Lankavatara and later systematized by Asanga and Vasabandhu is an "absolute idealism" and does not recognise the validity or even the possibility of mere sense experience. According to Vasabandhu's Vimsatika, even "the knowledge of those who perceive the thought processes of others (paracittavidam jnanam)," in spite of the fact that it has been included under the category of highest knowledge (abhijna) in early Buddhism, is not valid because in it there is a recognition of a discrimination between "one's own mind" (svacitta) and "other's mind" (paracitta). The highest knowledge is nondiscriminative and nondual (advaya) and is developed by the Buddhas in their trances (yoga). Thus this extreme form of idealism came to be designated as Yogacara.

N.K. Devaraja: Contemporary Relevance of Advaita Vedanta

(521-2) The later Vedantins who, in imitation of the Madhyamika, sought to prove the untenability of all definitions and conceptions and the phenomenality of the world through dialectical procedure, were clearly departing from the method of the Master.

(521-3) The Indian thinkers have great distrust of the person swayed by subjective feelings and emotions: such a person is not considered fit to undertake philosophical inquiry. According to Samkara only the person who has control over the mind and the senses and is indifferent to the pleasures of this world and the next is fit to inquire into the nature of Brahman. The ideal investigator, in other words, is one who approximates to the state of the pure spectator or the completely detached observer.

W.T. de Bary: The Buddhist Tradition In India, China, And Japan (review by J.N. Jayatilleke)

(521-4) ...according to the early texts, the Buddha had a different approach (upaya) in teaching the Dhamma to the common man as against the intellectual. To the latter he stressed the importance of mental culture (Sanskrit: dhyana; Pali: jhana; Chinese: ch'an; Japanese: zen) giving them topics of meditation (Japanese: koan; Chinese: kung-an) suited to their temperaments. To the former he spoke of heaven and the necessity for faith.

²³⁷⁵ The original editor inserted "(329)" "to be xc' 2" and "Vol 20" at the top of the page by hand

²³⁷⁶ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

(521-5) Both forms of Buddhism intended to reduce the ignorance, hatred and greed of the individual and bring about an awakening or transformation.

J. Glenn Gray: Splendor of the Simple

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SPLENDOR OF THE SIMPLE

J. Glenn Gray

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(522-1)²³⁷⁸ ...every original thinker thinks behind the beginning in some sense, for that is the meaning of the word origin and its adjective original. He starts without a compass, where as scholars remain within the secure boundaries of learned subject matter. Original thinkers risk living on the boundaries, risk the abyss, as Nietzsche would say, on the frail chance of discovering the radically new. We should recognise that advances in understanding are frequently made by leaps of thought as well as by continuities. I do not know about Kierkegaard's leap of faith, having never made it, but I am persuaded that there are genuinely new possibilities in philosophy as in the sciences. The emphasis on "the leap," grown fashionable since Kierkegaard, is hardly more than our groping awareness that discontinuities are a persisting feature of modern life and thought.

(521-2) ...a philosophy which cherishes practical wisdom must begin with these hard realities and by living close to them strive to make them more comprehensible to a baffled younger generation drifting rapidly into an unfruitful self-alienation.

Elisabeth Feist Hirsch: Martin Heidegger and the East

(521-3) Buddha rejected the Hindu doctrine of salvation which envisioned a return to the source: Brahman. He concentrated his efforts on finding a way to avoid pain and suffering in the world rather than advocating an escape from it like the Hindus. Because Buddha insisted on the afflictions inherent in man's existence, his position is pessimistic but nevertheless less negative than that of the Hindus.

Elisabeth Feist Hirsch: Martin Heidegger and the East (Commentary by Donald W. Mitchell)

(521-4) The Taoists call this process "losing and losing" or "forgetting" (wang), and it is through this process that one is projected into Nothingness when in the depths of

²³⁷⁷ The original editor inserted "(330)" by hand.

²³⁷⁸ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

concentration (samadhi). At this point one's mundane nature has been transformed into its true essence, its "Buddha nature" (buddha-svabhava), and one is thus enabled to "return to the source" ...

(521-5) "he who has experienced the Void or Being has gained insight into the 'isness' or 'suchness' of the world." (Mitchell quoting Hurst). To use Heidegger's terms, one

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE EAST

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(continued from the previous page) – thought extreme intensity and concentration – experiences the Being of beings and then dwells in openness and release, lighted by this experience...

(523-1)²³⁸⁰ Thus we can see that through etymology the meaning of sunyata, especially in the positive sense, is enriched to the point that one cannot make the mistake of translating it as emptiness in the sense of a vacuum, as many Westerners do.

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(526-1)²³⁸² follows from his theory that there is but one eternal, unchanging Self; the world of plurality, of time and change, though merely phenomenal and ultimately unreal, is cast forth by this one reality, Brahman. For this reason it is an intelligible system and follows a definite pattern in which "individuals" may find release through knowledge. The one Self who gives the world its intelligibility has, in his eternal

²³⁷⁹ The original editor inserted "(331)" by hand.

²³⁸⁰ The paras on this page are unnumbered.

²³⁸¹ The original editor inserted "(332)" and "Cairns / Vol. 20" by hand.

²³⁸² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

fullness of Being, no reason to repattern the world of *māyā* differently. It is, therefore, essential that name and form, that is, the pattern of individuals and objects, and of man's social history, should ever be the same.

Yet T.M.P. Mahadevan, a leading exponent of Advaita Vedanta today, has a view of human history that includes an idea of spiral progress in man's social history, even though his general view of time is the same as Samkara's²³⁸³s. Mahadevan says that "Time is by its very nature indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*),²³⁸⁴"⁴ and comments that no thinker of East or West has given a satisfactory solution to the problem of time. The purpose of time, therefore, must be our concern. This purpose, as the Advaita system teaches, is *mokṣa*,²³⁸⁵ the return to the Source, the timeless Brahman.

Mahadevan points out that *mokṣa*²³⁸⁶ is not release *for* the individual, but release *from* individuality. He writes, "Such expressions as 'individual release' and 'collective release' have no meaning. In release, there is neither individuality nor collectivity."⁵ Here we find the holistic view that all are one in the nondual Brahman; it is the purpose of time to have all men realise this identity of the Atman²³⁸⁷ with the Brahman. There is nothing here that is different from Samkara's²³⁸⁸ classical formulation of the general meaning of time and its purpose.

It is in his discussion of time-cycles in relation to the progress of man in this world that Mahadevan departs radically from Samkara's²³⁸⁹ and the traditional Vedantic²³⁹⁰ version of the time-process. Mahadevan describes a spiral progress in man's social history. He says:

The theory of the four ages (*catur-yuga*) does not mean that the time process is cyclical, but rather that it is like a spiral. Nor does it mean that the four *yugas* should necessarily succeed one another. All the ages are all the time there. And the progress of the world implies that *kali*, *dvapara*, and *treta* should, to a greater and greater extent, get sublimated in *kṛta-yuga*.⁶

It is highly significant in this passage that Mahadevan looks for the Golden Age in the future and ignores any in the past; the idea of a spiral progress for man in history is a new injection into the Advaita philosophy of history. Like Toynbee, Mahadevan thinks that the rise or Golden Age and fall

²³⁸³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁸⁴ "anirvacanīya" in the original.

²³⁸⁵ "mokṣa" in the original.

²³⁸⁶ "mokṣa" in the original.

²³⁸⁷ "Ātman" in the original.

²³⁸⁸ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁸⁹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁹⁰ "Vedāntic" in the original.

²³⁹¹ The original editor inserted "(333)" and "Cairns / Vol. 20" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) (*kali yuga*) pattern of human social history is not a mere repetition, but shows an overall progress toward an age of truth, peace, and harmony.

God Himself, Mahadevan believes, aids man to attain this goal. He writes:

The purpose of history is the cosmic realisation of the eternal perfection. The object of the *avatars* is precisely this, that by their advent the world process as a whole is accelerated in its advance towards the goal. God as the Time-Spirit incarnates himself from age to age in order to further the cause of goodness, and to keep disruptive forces in check. With each *avatara* or divine descent, the world is helped to move a stage further in the ascent to God.... Though essentially unborn and immutable and the lord of all beings, though eternal, ever pure and of the nature of consciousness and freedom, God appears as if endowed with body and as if born, in order to save the world by his grace.⁷

In a footnote to this passage Mahadevan refers to a passage in Samkara's²³⁹² *Commentary on the Gītā* which also declares that God in his grace appears as if with a body to save the world when the need is great. But the doctrine of *avatāras* or world-saviors is not related to a spiral progress of total human history in Samkara's²³⁹³ thought as it is in Mahadevan's. Samkara²³⁹⁴ apparently believed that name and form are the same in every cycle, not that history shows a progress pattern, spiral or otherwise. Yet both philosophies are grounded in a typically Indian holistic view of microcosm and macrocosm. Both accept the doctrine of the "sheaths" (*kosas*)²³⁹⁵ of man and the universe.⁸ It is this doctrine that makes plain the meaning of Mahadevan's words, "all the four ages are all the time there." The Brahman and the Atman,²³⁹⁶ the macrocosm and the microcosm, have the same sheaths of *maya*,²³⁹⁷ which may be related thus to corresponding historical epochs (*yugas*).

The outermost sheath (*annamayakosa*),²³⁹⁸ the layer of gross matter, may be equated with the *kali yuga*. The intermediate layers, the sheaths of life and mind (*pranamayakosa*,²³⁹⁹ *manomayakosa*,²⁴⁰⁰ and *vijnamayakosa*),²⁴⁰¹ correspond to the *dvapara*²⁴⁰² and *treta yugas*. The fifth and last sheath, the sheath of bliss (*anandamyakosa*),²⁴⁰³ parallels

²³⁹² "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁹³ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁹⁴ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²³⁹⁵ "kośas" in the original.

²³⁹⁶ "Ātman" in the original.

²³⁹⁷ "māyā" in the original.

²³⁹⁸ "annamayakośa" in the original.

²³⁹⁹ "prāṇamayakośa" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁰ "manomayakośa" in the original.

²⁴⁰¹ "vijñāmayakośa" in the original.

²⁴⁰² "dvāpara" in the original.

²⁴⁰³ "ānandamyakośa" in the original.

the *satya* (or *krta*)²⁴⁰⁴ *yuga*. In the macrocosm this sheath is Brahman-with- *maya*²⁴⁰⁵ or *Isvara*,²⁴⁰⁶ source of all creation. *Isvara*,²⁴⁰⁷ the Lord, is the Whole that includes all the lower evolutionary sheaths or levels, those of mind, life, and matter. As we said above, in the microcosm, the individual, the sheath of Bliss is precisely analgous; it, too, is the unity that includes the lower levels. In Mahadevan's view, the *krta*²⁴⁰⁸ *yuga* plays a similar role; it is the whole-age, he says, which includes the other three ages in a higher synthesis. Exactly as in the human individual, the microcosm, all the sheaths are simultaneously present, so are the corresponding sheaths and analogous *yugas* present in the *maya*²⁴⁰⁹ or time-world of history. If this organic, holistic

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(continued from the previous page) view of man and history is valid, it is indeed possible to make the Golden Age explicit and dominant even in this *kali yuga*. One does not need to accept Samkara's²⁴¹¹ dictum that name and form are the same in each *kalpa*. However, Samkara's²⁴¹² view too has its own logic, as we noted above. The same holistic metaphysics can support either view.

Knowing well the sad plight of the world in our time, Mahadevan's faith in man's better nature is great enough to believe that the era of truth, peace, and harmony will be realised. Mahadevan, like Gandhi, thinks that India will have a leading role in ushering in this new age, an age of complete *ahimsa*²⁴¹³ (nonviolence). Again, like Gandhi, Mahadevan believes that the Golden Age will appear only when a sufficient number of individuals attain the mastery over the passions and sensual desires shown heretofore only by a few saints, most recently by Gandhi. (It is interesting to note that Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan hold similar views of the goal of human history and of the method of its attainment, namely, through the attainment of saintship by a sufficient number of individuals.)

To sum up: The spiritually-oriented holistic philosophy advocated by Mahadevan, in its anticipation of a Golden Age to be realised by mankind in this world, has given a new orientation to the Advaita Vedanta²⁴¹⁴ philosophy. This philosopher,

²⁴⁰⁴ "krta" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁵ "māyā" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁶ "Īśvara" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁷ "Īśvara" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁸ "krta" in the original.

²⁴⁰⁹ "māyā" in the original.

²⁴¹⁰ The original editor inserted "(334)" and "Cairns" by hand.

²⁴¹¹ "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁴¹² "Śaṁkara" in the original.

²⁴¹³ "ahimsā" in the original.

²⁴¹⁴ "Vedānta" in the original.

like his great contemporaries Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo believes that the purpose of history is the return to the spiritual Center, Brahman, a return manifested already in the great saints of the world. Society disintegrates (the *kali yuga* is the symbol of extreme disintegration) when the majority of mankind is alienated from the Center. Then (to borrow the language of Jung) there is activation of the “archetype meaning central” in the collective unconscious of mankind. When this collective unconscious becomes an overt supraconsciousness in humanity in general, Mahadevan (like Aurobindo) believes that a climactic Golden Age will then bloom and flourish. In this era of maximum spiritual integration of men with Brahman and with each other, all social and material problems will find adequate solutions.

This emphasis upon a nonrepetitive Golden Age as a goal to be achieved in this world is the really new thing that Mahadevan has injected into the Advaita system. The nature of the Golden Age, an era when all men will have become saints with full intuitive realisation of the Divine, of Brahman, is typically Indian and as old as the Upanisads. It is an ideal that harmonises with the best in the world’s great religions.

I

The Western student of philosophy of history might be concerned with two problems: (1) Is the particular idealist-holistic metaphysics accepted in

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(continued from the previous page) Mahadevan’s philosophy in relation to historical causation valid? (2) Is there any historical evidence of progress in human history toward a Golden Age when humanity will have attained the level of sainthood?

All metaphysical systems, whether idealist, materialist, dualist or pluralist, are in large measure speculative. Yet all thinking men have some kind of view of the general nature of the universe, either confused or organised into a coherent system. As Goethe says in *Faust I*, metaphysics may not suit the human mind.⁹ Nevertheless man, despite his finitude, chooses, perhaps only tentatively, the point of view that seems most adequate to his knowledge and experience. The above holistic system is one of the leading possibilities and among the great ones in contemporary Indian thought. Westerners are most interested in empirical evidence in support of hypotheses; the empirical evidence for this and similar Indian philosophies is grounded in the direct intuitive experience of the Ultimate Reality. Are the gifted saints who have had these experiences the forerunners of a new breed of humanity, as our philosophers believe? There is evidence to support this view in the phenomenon in twentieth century India of Mahatma Gandhi, a man of merely average endowment who attained to this kind of sainthood. This shows that such a goal is possible for mankind. Those men who have experienced a feeling of divine presence in the world or in themselves will be prone to

²⁴¹⁵ The original editor inserted “(335)” and “Vol xx Cairns” by hand.

accept some kind of idealist or at least theistic metaphysical system. Mahadevan's philosophy should, therefore, have much to offer Western as well as Eastern minds.

The opposing, rival metaphysical system today is Marxian dialectical materialism.¹⁰ In this form of humanism, man, not Brahman or God or the Absolute, is the center of the *mandala*²⁴¹⁶ of reintegration. Since Jung, as we said above, found that some of his patients were able to reintegrate themselves around the ideal of devotion to humanity, perhaps the neuroses of our society can be remedied even by such a man-centered metaphysics. On the other hand, apart from the problem of its truth-content, the danger of humanism is its limitation to the human world. This leaves the door open for encouragement of the less noble human passions and desires, to egoistic greed, the love of power, and the use of violence to satisfy such motivations.

More satisfying from both the spiritual and the practical standpoints is a synthesis of the idealist and humanist philosophies expressed in the Upanisadic²⁴¹⁷ "That art thou." As Mahadevan says, man must realise his divine nature. He must realise that he is not the body, sense organs, or even the intellect; he must realise that he is the divine itself, the timeless Brahman. Gandhi conspicuously carried out this philosophy to its logical, practical consequences

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(continued from the previous page) in his doctrine of *ahimsā* based on this very axiom that every man is a spark of the Divine, of God who is Truth.¹¹ This is the reason why one must never injure another human being, but seek instead to help him realise the divine which is in him, however deeply obscured it may be. When the divine is realised, love becomes the bond between men. This is the practical consequence of idealist religious belief as Gandhi applied it. Another consequence is restraint of the passions and desires. The spirit must control the body to abolish greed, rage, and lust, the basic causes of crime and war.¹² To see the divine in the human glorifies man without setting up the human race as God. God or the Ultimate Reality remains the infinite source of our ever higher spiritual aspirations and yearnings that can guide man to ever greater achievement.

Western professional historians believe that philosophers of history in both East and West are too selective in their attempts to pattern historical events around a certain hypothesis about the structure or direction of history. At the same time every historian is compelled to be selective in writing history because historical events are almost infinite in their variety. The historian must select, on the basis of some hypothesis, the events which he believes are the significant ones – political, cultural, economic, and so

²⁴¹⁶ "maṇḍala" in the original.

²⁴¹⁷ "Upaniṣadic" in the original.

²⁴¹⁸ The original editor inserted "(336)" and "Cairns vol. 20" at the top of the page by hand

on. Though at one time the political events were thought to be the significant ones, now the cultural are perhaps more important. The Marxians began to orient history around the economic order (the means of production which results in social classes and "class struggle"). In the future other kinds of events may be chosen as the most significant in the selection of the more crucial among the billions of past events. This kind of relativism in the writing of history has been emphasised most by Carl Becker, who asserts that the personal back-ground of the individual historian, the epoch in which he lives, and the "climate of opinion" of his cultural environment determine in large measure his manner of writing history.¹³ Even Maurice Mandelbaum, who defends an objective approach to the writing of history, concedes that the selection of

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(continued from the previous page) events as the significant ones changes with the discovery that a certain class previously neglected has also been a causative factor in the movement of history.¹⁴

The most qualified responsible historians and philosophers of method in this area generally agree that there is a plurality of causes operative in history – geography, economics, and great men as inaugurators of political and religious events and institutions are among these.¹⁵ Despite the plurality of causes, one authority in this field writes that

Historical facts are psychological facts. Normally, therefore, they find their antecedents in other psychological facts. To be sure, human destinies are placed in the physical world and suffer the consequence thereof. Even where the intrusion of these external forces seems most brutal, however, their action is weakened or intensified by man and his mind.¹⁶

Such a view harmonises with Arnold Toynbee's "challenge and response" theory of historical causation. Toynbee's *Study of History* attempts to delineate the challenges that inspired the birth and achievements of the great civilizations of East and West, and the causes of their decline when the challenges were no longer met in constructive ways. Despite the rise and fall patterns of particular civilizations, Toynbee concludes that there has been an overall spiral progress pattern in the history of mankind as a whole. Mahadevan agrees with this; and again, as with Mahadevan and other prominent Indian philosophers, the standard by which progress is measured is progress in spiritual values. Toynbee and these Indian philosophers of the twentieth century have been well aware of the sword of Damocles, the imminent threat of total destruction, hovering over our heads. If mankind through sagacious compromises muddles through this epoch, Toynbee, Mahadevan, and other great Indians like Radhakrishnan, Aurobindo, and Gandhi, hope to see the dawn of the spiritual rebirth of

²⁴¹⁹ The original editor inserted "(337)" by hand.

mankind, a new Golden Age founded on the spiritual values of the best in the world's great religious philosophies. Western technology, too, will aid in ushering in the new era and will be used to aid all men to overcome the material obstacles that stand in the way of enjoyment of a full spiritual life. Toynbee concludes from his vast study of history that a materialist philosophy cannot satisfy the highest intuitions and aspirations of the human spirit; also, it is not adequate to bring in an age of world brotherhood and peace.¹⁷

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(continued from the previous page) History is so complex that no one can pattern the past or predict the future with any certainty. We do know that the human race is very young in the vast perspective of geological time. The next stage in human evolution may well be the species of saint already nascent and implicitly here, and waiting only to be realised explicitly, as Mahadevan's philosophy declares. The psycho-logical factors which Marc Bloch thinks are of prime significance in man's historical development are the key also in Mahadevan's system. Mahadevan wants us to realise concretely the spiritual values of our divine innermost nature and thus bring in the Golden Age. We *can* do this if we *will* to do so; Gandhi, an average man, was able to accomplish this. The goal, therefore, is a possible one for mankind; but it may take much time to attain. Mahadevan and other great Indian philosophers of our epoch believe that humanity cannot be satisfied with a lesser goal; we shall be driven by our very nature to strive to attain it. At the moment we can let the psychological factors of our belief in progress and in the great spiritual values influence the history that is now being made, which will in turn shape the world to come. In this way we can help avoid annihilation and eventually perhaps bring in the Golden Age despite the deplorable predicament in which we find ourselves at present.

J. Glenn Gray's: Splendor of the Simple (Commentary by Chung-yuan Chang)

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(533-1)²⁴²² Professor Gray's paper gives us a clear and profound presentation of the essential framework of the most recent thought of Martin Heidegger. The paper is

²⁴²⁰ The original editor inserted "(338)" and "Cairns" by hand.

²⁴²¹ The original editor inserted "(339)" by hand.

²⁴²² The paras on this page are unnumbered.

obviously the result of Gray's spending years absorbing Heidegger's thought and repeatedly consulting with the noted philosopher himself. Since my field is Chinese philosophy, I welcome this opportunity to relate the essential ideas of Heidegger with Taoist and Ch'an Buddhist philosophies. Perhaps through our discussion we will find some basic thoughts which may pave the way toward bringing the philosophies of the East and West together.

In his paper Professor Gray says that "I have no doubt that many of Heidegger's insights ... are profound and enduring, capable of indefinite further development and enrichment in areas of knowledge usually remote from philosophy." To discuss meaningfully Heidegger's way of thinking we have to strip ourselves of our own habitual ways of thinking – that is, if we think conceptually and representationally ourselves, we will never be able to understand Heidegger's strict or meditative thinking. What is this strict thinking? As Professor Gray says, it is to think back to the origin in order to reach behind "usual and traditional conceptions," and to "gain astonishing insights into what has not been thought hitherto." Professor Gray points out that what Heidegger is aiming at in his endeavor to think the simple in its origin, to think behind the beginning, is at once an intensity and equanimity which opens to things as they are and yet is persistently singleminded. What is this singlemindedness? Professor Gray points to the difference between the "I," which is the genuine, original self, and the "me," which is the traditional, acquired, and adapted self. The task of Chinese Taoism and Ch'an Buddhism is to lead man to see his original self, that is, the I, which is nonconceptual, nontraditional, nonrepresentational. This genuine, nonconceptual, nonrepresentational self is reached through releasement. In chapter 48 of the *Tao-te Ching* we have: "the student of knowledge gains day by day; the student of Tao loses day by day." Through the process of losing, or releasement, one will return to the roots, or *kwei ken*, which is the movement of reversion. Thus, we read: "reverse is the movement of Tao." In this connection the question arises: What will be the outcome of the process of losing or releasement? The goal of releasement is to reach *wu*, or Nonbeing, or Nothing. Therefore, according to Taoist philosophy, Nothing is the root of everything. It is in the Nothingness that the Taoist "builds," "dwells," and "thinks."

Perhaps the most fundamental concept found in both Heidegger's philosophy and Chinese Taoism is the concept of Nothing. This Nothing in Heidegger's philosophy may be identified with *wu*, or Nonbeing in Taoism. In his essay "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger says: "Only on the basis of the original manifestness of Nothing can our human *Da-sein* advance towards and enter

(533-2) Chung-yuan Chung is Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii

(continued from the previous page) into what-is."¹ The Nothing Heidegger speaks of is "neither an object nor anything that 'is' at all."² It is in Nothing that we may experience the vastness of Being. Nothing is not just the negation of the totality of what is, but is more original than negation, or we may say, it is the source of negation.

According to Heidegger, we can think the totality of what-is and then negate what we have imagined. "In this way we can arrive at the formal concept of an imaginary Nothing, but never Nothing itself."³ It is only when what-is-in-totality actually falls away from us, and ourselves along with it, that we come face-to-face with Nothing. What-is-in-totality is objectivity and we are subjectivity. The falling away of what-is and ourselves thus frees us from both subjectivity and objectivity. In the Taoist expression this is called *ming*, or light, which is the illuminating aspect of Nonbeing. I wonder if this *ming* is close to Heidegger's idea of *Lichtung*, which Professor Gray has described in the sense of a clearing and lighting. In Ch'an experience one reaches the illumination of *ming* through the experience of "the great death." Similarly, in Heidegger's approach one must experience Nothing through dread before the revelation of what-is is possible. This pure revelation exists nowhere but in the experience of the man who seeks the truth. In fact, the process of seeking is the truth. For Heidegger, it is Nothing. For Taoists, it is Nonbeing. According to both Heidegger and Chinese Taoists, this Nothing, or Nonbeing, must be experienced in the sense of a pure finding. It cannot be reached through any process of rational or objective thought, which would only dichotomize subjectivity and objectivity into polarities.

Rational, objective thought is what Heidegger calls calculative thinking, which differentiates between the observed, or the objectivity of what-is, and man as the observer, or subjectivity. But what Heidegger calls strict or essential thinking is thinking which is free from calculation or observation, and is "determined by what is 'other' than what-is," that is, Nothing.⁴ In Taoism it is called the knowledge of no-knowledge, or Nonbeing. For Ch'an it is the thought of no-thought, or the mind of no-mind, or the Buddha nature. For Heidegger, "This thinking answers to the demands of Being in that man surrenders his historical being to the simple, sole necessity" of preserving the truth of Being.⁵ But Being is not a product of thinking. It is thinking itself. Thus Being and thinking are identified as one. Ch'an Buddhists would say that this is the thought of no-thought in action. In other words, we may say that Being is experienced in Nothing, or Nothing discloses itself in Being. As Heidegger puts it, "Nothing, conceived as the purely Other than what-is, is the

²⁴²³ The original editor inserted "(340)" and "Chang" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) veil of Being. In Being all that comes to pass in what-is is perfected from everlasting."⁶ This everlasting is the Nothing which is the veil of Being, and what-is, or we may say, "ten thousand things," are perfected through Being, which is manifested from Nothing, or Nonbeing. Heidegger clearly points out that instead of "abandoning Nothing in all of its mysterious multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself."⁷

Heidegger's previous approach proceeded from what-is in order to reach Being. As he said, "what-is comes from Being." For the Taoists his approach is based upon the notion that all things are created from Being. But one cannot merely analyse ten thousand things, or what-is, and assemble them into Being. In Heidegger's words, "No matter where and however deeply science investigates what-is it will never find Being."⁸ In his introduction to *Discourse on Thinking* John Anderson states that "it seems impossible to escape from subjective distortions and to learn anything about Being as such by means of the method Heidegger used in *Being and Time*."⁹ But in his later approach Heidegger plunges directly and immediately into the ground of all possibilities, which is what he called Nothing. It is in this Nothingness that he finds Being. In the Taoist expression, Being is created from Nonbeing. Thus, in order to find Being one must first discover Nonbeing. Without the realisation of Non-being there would be no ground for its manifestation, or Being. As Anderson points out, "what seems to be necessary in order to comprehend Being is a method of understanding which can grasp man's nature in terms of its ground, rather than simply in terms of the horizons of experience."¹⁰ To grasp man's nature in terms of its ground is to reveal Being as derived from Nonbeing. In the Taoist expression, ten thousand things are created by Being, and Being is created by Nonbeing. In "What is Metaphysics?" the translator refers to this saying from the *Tao-te Ching* in relation to Heidegger's statement that "only on the basis of the original manifestations of Nothing can our human Dasein advance towards and enter into what-is." This would seem to indicate that the two streams of thought, in Heidegger's new approach and in the Chinese *Tao-te Ching*, flow together in their similarities.

In his book *Identity and Difference* Heidegger compares his own concept of Being with that of Hegel. For Hegel, Being is absolute thought thinking itself, and is conceived in the traditional, logical sense as ground, or Logos.

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²⁴²⁴ The original editor inserted "341" by hand.

²⁴²⁵ The original editor inserted "(342)" and "Chang" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) It is the absolute concept, or the absolute Idea, which moves toward the negation of all individual distinctions and their elevation into the "higher reality of the whole."¹¹

For Heidegger, instead of establishing Being as the ground, Nothing is conceived as the source, and Being is its manifestation. In the work of Chuang Tzu we have: in the very beginning there was *wu*, or Nonbeing, which is Nothing and nameless. It is that from which the One is produced. The One is inherent in it, and yet it is formless. The One that is produced by Nonbeing and is inherent in it is Being. For Heidegger, Being differs ontologically from beings. Heidegger moves from this difference, which is what has not yet been thought, to the oblivion of the difference, which is what is to be thought. What has not yet been thought is Nothing. What is to be thought is Being. This process is a move forward in thought by means of a step back out of the realm of metaphysics into the previously undisclosed realm of truth. Through this step back, Being is thought without being an object of thought. The step back takes us out of metaphysics into its essential origin, which is Nothing, or Non-being. As Professor Gray says, Hegel sought to establish philosophy as wisdom itself, in the form of absolute knowledge. "Heidegger seeks to reverse this overweening claim and to transform philosophy into something much more preliminary and 'poverty-stricken' than even the love of wisdom." Heidegger maintains that "Philosophy is only set in motion by leaping with all its being, as only it can, into the ground-possibilities of being as a whole."¹² The ground-possibilities of being as a whole are Nothing. Thus, Heidegger says that one must let oneself go into Nothing, and ask, "why is there Being at all...?"¹³

For Heidegger the experience of Nothing occurs only in rare moments. In his book *What Is Called Thinking?*, a collection of lectures given at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger tells his students that "we are attempting to learn thinking."¹⁴ The way of thinking is long, he says, and our few steps "will take us to places which we must explore to reach the point where only the leap will help further. The leap alone takes us into the neighborhood where thought resides."¹⁵

The leap in Heidegger's thought is a leap away from the attitude of representative thinking. In Ch'an there is a similar attitude of moving away from our ordinary ways of thinking. In Suzuki's words, *satori* may be defined as "an intuitive looking into the nature of things, in contradistinction to the analytical or logical understanding of it. Practically, it means the unfolding

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[343]²⁴²⁶

²⁴²⁶ The original editor inserted "(343)" and "Chang" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) of a new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically trained mind."¹⁶ To enter into the abyss of this new world and to be free from the dualities of representative thinking is, for Taoists, like leaping across a chasm or a gulf. Either one succeeds in the leap, and attains sudden enlightenment, or remains as one was. Thus, in both Taoism and Ch'an, the leap opens the learner's mind to an entirely new way of thinking. This opening out of the mind through confrontation with the unexpected is like opening a door upon a new world of experience. Similarly, for Heidegger, "the leap takes us abruptly to where everything is different, so different that it strikes us as strange. Abrupt means the sudden sheer descent or rise that marks the chasm's edge."¹⁷ Thus the process of the leap seems to be conceived in the same way in both Heidegger's meditative thinking and Chinese philosophy.

Various explanations may be given for the radical change in Heidegger's thought from extreme rational analysis to the direct, immediate approach of essential thinking. In the field of Chinese philosophy we also find a drastic change in the development of Chinese Buddhist thought from complex meta-physical approaches to the direct, abrupt approach of Ch'an, which might serve as a reference in the study of the change in Heidegger's thought. The Chinese Madhyamika²⁴²⁷ school attempted to obtain *sunyata*²⁴²⁸ through the highly developed and refined dialectical process of the double truth on three levels.¹⁸ Through this process of incessant negation the Chinese Madhyamika²⁴²⁹ Buddhists intended to reach behind traditional, logical thought and thus open man's mind. But they became entangled in the complexity of their own dialectical framework, and could not set themselves free. This led to the discontinuation of the Madhyamika²⁴³⁰ school and the rising of the direct, immediate approach of Ch'an.

Similarly, Hua-yen philosophers sought to grasp the universe dynamically in its unceasing movement through the interrelation among all individualities. Their complicated formulas present a very refined description of the unimpeded mutual solution among all particularities, and their eventual identification.¹⁹ When the metaphysical structure of the Hua-yen school became too

²⁴²⁷ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

²⁴²⁸ "śūnyata" in the original.

²⁴²⁹ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

²⁴³⁰ "Mādhyamika" in the original.

²⁴³¹ The original editor inserted "(344)" and "Chang" by hand.

(continued from the previous page) complex to awaken the minds of its devotees, they converted to the abrupt thinking of Ch'an Buddhism.

The change in the development of Chinese thought from extreme logical and metaphysical complexity to the direct, concrete approach of Ch'an might offer us an insight into the development of Heidegger's philosophy from his earlier analytical approach to the direct, essential approach of his recent thought. Of course, the natural surroundings in which Heidegger spent his lifetime have undoubtedly influenced his thinking. But if this influence of nature were the sole factor in the formulation of his thought, it would have emerged earlier in his study, when he analysed the transcendental structures of man's experience in order to reach an understanding of Being. It was after Heidegger's *Being and Time*, however, that he made a complete change from complexity to simplicity, from an analytical approach to a direct, intuitive one, from highly technical, philosophical expressions to common, simple language, from book-form presentation to plain, simple dialogue, such as in his "Conversation on a Country Path." To what extent this change is similar to the rise of Chinese Ch'an Buddhist thought may be determined through our further study. What may be pointed out at this time is that the essential thinking maintained by Professor Heidegger may be considered one of the basic means for establishing a unity among the philosophies of the world. In fact, in this conference we have seen that a "prerational harmony" among the philosophies of the East and West has already begun.

* This explanation, although most commonly in popular use, is incorrect. The true meaning of "Nirvana" is emancipation, salvation, bliss. (Cf. Thomas William, Rhys Davids, and William Stede: *The Pali-English Dictionary*.)

* These are correlative terms in Hapanese literature, especially found in zuihitsu or fugitive essays on Waka- and Hokku-poetry. Wahi literally means, being disappointed and wretched, live in distress and loneliness; but its literary meaning is solitary quietness, tranquil happiness, refinement. Sahi, literally patina, antique appearance, and desolation; but, in literature, tranquility, simplicity, purity, and humbleness. Yügen means obscurity, profundity, mystery, abstruseness, occultness.

ⁱ The avoidance of flesh and fish is due to the doctrine of transmigration.

¹ Wang Yang-ming: *Ch'üan-hsi-lu* ("Collected Works"), *Ssü-pu pei-yao* ed. (Chung-Hua: Chung-Hua Book Co., n. d.). Book 2, "Letter to Lo Chên-an," p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 26.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 11.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 25.

⁸ Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953), p. 144.

⁹ Wang Yang-ming, *op. cit.*, Bk. 26, "Questions concerning the *Great Learning*," p. 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Bk. I, pp. 26-27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, in the letter to Ku Tung-ch'iao, pp. 11-12.

¹² *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Ch'üan-hsi-lu*, Bk. I. p. I.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. I, p. 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 8, in a letter to Lu Yüan-ching.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 24.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 26.

¹⁹ J. Legge, trans., *The Book of Mencius* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1895), VIIA. 15.

²⁰ Wang Yang-ming, *op. cit.*, Bk. III, p. 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. XXVI, "Questions concerning the Great Learning," p. 4.

²² *Loc. cit.*

²³ *Loc. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 14.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, p. 13.

²⁷ Frederick G. Henke: *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1916), p. 374.

²⁸ Wang Yang-ming, *op. cit.*, Bk. II, p. 27.

²⁹ Henke, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

³⁰ Wang Yang-ming, *op. cit.*, p. 27-28.

³¹ G.B. Sansom: *A Short Cultural History of Japan* (London: The Cresset Press 1936). p. 489

³² *Loc. Cit.*

¹ *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* II.i.1.

² No editor listed, *Letters of Swami Vivekananda* (Mayavati: Advaita Ashram, 1948), pp. 222-223.

³ Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1955), Vol. I, chaps. 2, 3, 4.

See also his *Isha Upaniṣad* (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1945), pp. 67-85.

³¹ Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, pp. 172-173.

³² *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* VIII. See also S. Radhakrishnan, *Principal Upaniṣads* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), pp. 698-699.

³³ Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, trans. (New York: The Noonday Press, 1959), pp. 39-40. Sartre says: "The ego is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness," p. 97.

³⁴ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 78. See also translator's Introduction, p. XXI.

³⁵ Man's essential identity with Being is expressed in such statements as "I am Brahman," and "That art Thou." See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I. iv. 10, and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI. viii. 7. A man's togetherness with other and the rootedness of all in the Supreme are most clearly stated in *Bhagavad Gītā* VI.29 and 30.

⁹ See S. N Dasgupta, *History*, Vol. I, p. 163; also E. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie* (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1953), pp. 386 f.; also, E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958), pp. 79, 118, 391.

¹⁰ I understand Jhā is a linear descendant of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, author of the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam*.

¹¹ Jhā, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹² The token "two colours all over at the same time" is frequently used by H.H. Price,

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹ Hajime Tanabeⁿ thinks that the Vedānta concept of *parasparāpekṣā* is the most appropriate word to describe the structure of reality. It means the uniqueness of each entity and the interdependence of all entities. See his *Tetsugaku Nyūmon*^o ("Introduction to Philosophy") (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1950), Vol. IV, pp. 45-90. Professor Brand Blanshard of Yale, too, for example, is convinced that the world is internally coherent and that each part of it hangs together with all others with a perfect systematic coherence. See his *The Nature of Thought* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939), Vol. I, chap. XXVII.

² D T. Suzuki's^p best book in English is *Zen and Japanese Culture*. Bollingen Series, Vol. 64 (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1959). In summarizing the meaning of Zen, he says that it discovers a meaning hitherto hidden in our daily concrete particular experiences, such as eating, drinking, or business of all

kinds. He does not stress the idea of the sublimation of the lower self to the realisation of the potential buddhahood as Dōgen does. See pp. 16, 17.

³ Hakuju Ui,⁹ Bukkyō-Hanron^r ("Introduction to Buddhism") (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1948), Vol. II, p. 473.

⁴ Dōgen, *Shōbōgenzō* ("The Highest Truth of Buddhist Enlightenment"), Eto Sokuo,{illegible} ed.

ii Dō gen, *op. cit.*, Book 71, in Vol. III, p. 11.

⁶ "kokū isseki,"^t that is, the whole cosmos interpreted as a vehicle of enlightenment.

⁷ "shinjin hōge," that is, the whole person radically transmuted. See Dō gen, *op. cit.*, Book 1, in Vol. I, p. 57. This is needed by science and art and philosophy, too.

⁸ "tōtadatsuraku," that is, the whole body thoroughly renewed. See Norimoto Iino, *Kirisuto to Buddha*^u ("Christ and Buddha") (Tokyo: Risō sha, 1957), pp. 65-93.

⁹ {illegible} *ibid*

⁸ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Bk. II, sec. iii (London: Thomas Longmans, 1740).

⁹ *Sermons*, 2.14.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. ix-xiii, *passim*.

² Rāmānuja, *Vedārtha-Saṁgraha* (2d ed.; Kashi: Jag annath Prasad, 1924), p. 35: *tatpadaṁ jagatkāranabhūtaṁ sakala-kalyāṇaguṇagaṇā-karaṁ niravadyaṁ nirvikāram ācaṣṭe tvam iti ca tad eva brahma jīvāntaryānirūpeṇa svaśarirajīvaprakāraṇiśiṣṭam ācaṣṭe*.

³. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45: *bhinnapravṛttinimittānāṁ śabdānāmekasminn arthe vṛtti-samānādhikaraṇyam ite*.

⁴ *Śrutaprakāśikā Tīkā*, Śribhāṣya I.i.1, Grantha edition, Vol. I: *śarīravācīśabdānāṁ śarīriparyantatā*.

⁵ *Vedānta Sūtra* I. iv. 21, Samkara's Commentary.

¹ W. Barrett, ed., *Zen Buddhism*. Anchor Books A90 (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1956).

² Christmas Humphreys, ed., *The Complete Works of D.T. Suzuki* (London: Rider and Co., 1947).

¹ *Buddhist Thought in India* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962). Hereafter *BThI*.

² *BThI*, pp. 34-43.

³ To be discussed in Section 2b of the second article, "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," to be published in the next issue of this Journal.

⁴ About its relation to Hume's denial of a "self," see Section 3 of the second article.

⁵ *BThI*, pp. 43-46.

⁶ It is "A central peace, subsisting at the heart/Of endless agitation" (W. Wordsworth). See below, p. 18.

⁷ See below, p. 19.

⁸ *BThI*, pp. 47-55.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-69.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-79.

¹² The teachings of European mystics correspond to this doctrine in its general tone (see below, pp. 17-18), but only Schopenhauer matches it in many particulars (see below, pp. 18-20).

¹³ *BThI*, pp. 47-55

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-225 (see below, p. 22).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97n.

¹⁶ See Section 2a of the second article.

^{16a} 274-236 B.C.

¹⁷ *BThI*, pp. 119-191

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-158.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-249.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.239-241 (see Section 1 of second article).

²¹ *BThI*, pp 261-264; also below, pp 22-23

²² See below, pp. 20-22.

²³ See below, pp. 15-17.

²⁴ *BThI*, pp 17-30.

²⁵ For a definition, see below, pp. 12-13.

²⁶ *BThI*, p. 17.

²⁷ Section 1 and 3 of the second article.

²⁸ For a definition, see below, p. 14, note 35.

²⁹ This term was originally invented by Catholics to describe the philosophy of St. Thomas and Aristotle. It was then taken over by Aldous Huxley and others, and my definition is akin to that of Ananda Coomaraswamy. A. Huxley in his famous book of 1946 envisaged only the mystical school, whereas here I include the intellectual and speculative trends, i.e., Plato and Aristotle as well as the German idealists. The only people before 1450 who are excluded are those who, like the Lokayātikas in India, were deliberately antispiritual, but not necessarily the Epicureans who were anticlerical but no foes of a tranquil and serene life.

³⁰ Being for him is “one” *Kata ton logon* (when seen by reason), “many” *kata tēn aisthēsin* (when seen by perception). Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1986^b33-34.

³¹ In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle has taken great pains to describe the subjective counterpart of “being as being” eg., in Book I.981^b-983^a.

³² “Notre philosophie est née de la curiosité et du besoin de savoir, d’expliquer le monde d’une façon cohérente. En Inde la philosophie est l’interprétation rationnelle de l’expérience mystique.” So Constantin Regamey, on page 251 of what is one the most notable contributions so far made to comparative philosophy, i.e., “Tendances et méthodes de la philosophie indienne comparées à celles de la philosophie occidentale,” *Revue de Théologie et de philosophie*, IV (1951), 245-262. Regamey also shows how this difference in the *point de départ* leads to a radical divergence in the criteria of absolute truth.

³³ Joseph Head and S.L. Cranson, eds., *Reincarnation: An East-West Anthology* (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1961).

³⁴ The opponents of the perennial philosophy prefer to describe themselves as “scientific.” There can be nothing more unscientific, however, than the drawing of extravagant and presumptuous conclusions about the mind, soul, and spirit of man, and about his destiny and the purpose of his life, from a few observations about the expansion of gases, the distribution of moths, and the reflections of the celestial bodies in little pieces of glass, If I were reduced to that part of myself which can be seen in bits of glass, I would certainly feel that most of my being was omitted. Why should this not be true also of other things apart from my own dear self?

³⁵ I have defined the word “spiritual” in my *Buddhism* (3rd ed., Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1957) on page 11. The quintessence of the spiritual life, shorn of its usual accretions, was admirably formulated by Petrus Damiani in the eleventh century in two exceedingly fine poems which have recently been reprinted in F.J.E. Raby, ed., *The Oxford Book of Medieval Latin Verse* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 185-189. The second has also been translated into English in Frederick Brittain, ed., *The Penguin Book of Latin Verse* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), pp. 176-180.

³⁶ To mention just two easily accessible sources: In Bertrand Russell’s *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) this attitude is expressed with some urbanity, and in J.O. Urmson, ed., *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy* (London: Hutchinson, 1960) with blunt rudeness (e.g., the article on Schopenhauer is sheer personal abuse).

³⁷ Cf. 111:13-18.

^{37a} *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-142.

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- ³⁸ R.G. Bury, trans., *Sextus Empiricus*, 4 vols. Vol. I, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p. xxx.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxx; Cf. also p. xxxi.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii.
- ⁴² E.g., in what the *skeptikē agōgē* ("sceptical procedure") (Book I. Chap. 4) has to say about *ataraxia* (= *śamatha*) as the end of life (I. 25-30), or about the *svabhāva* (*physis* or *peritōn exōthen hypokeimenōn*) (I. 15, 22, 93, 163), the relativity of everything (I. 135), or on non-assertion (I. 192-193), non-determination (I. 197), and non-apprehension (I. 200).
- ⁴³ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum; Academica*, H. Rackham, ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 488-489; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). vi.17.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 624-625; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxxix.122.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 462-463; *Academica*, fragment No. 21.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 542-543; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xviii.60.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 550-551; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xx.66.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 614-615; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxxvi.115.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 550-551; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xx.66.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 550-551, 554-555, 608-609, 489-490, 542-543. They "do not deny that some truth exists, but deny that it can be perceived" (*qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus*). II. xxiii.73.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 620-621; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxxviii.119.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 554-555; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxi.68.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 566-567; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxv.80.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 559; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxiii.73.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 562-563; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). xxiv.75.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 499; *Academica*, II (Lucullus). viii.24.
- ⁵⁹ For some details, see my review of H. Ringgren, *Word and Wisdom*, in *Oriental Art*, I, No. 4 (Spring, 1949), 196-197.
- ⁶⁰ Some useful material has been collected by R. Gnoli in *La Parola del passato*, I (1961), fasc. LXXVII, 153-159. See also J. Rahder's suggestions on *śūnyatā* in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*). IX, No. 2 (1961), 754. On the other hand, I can see no merit in E. Benz's attempt to establish a direct link by claiming that Plotinus' teacher, Ammonios "Sakkas," was either a member of the Indian dynasty of the "Saki," or a "Sakya" (Sakiya, Sakka), i.e., a Buddhist monk. *Orientalia Romana*, I (1958), 18-20 (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Serie Orientale Roma, XVII).
- ⁶¹ I.e., I.2, II.1, III.1, chaps. 4 and 5. The translations are apt to obscure the parallel, which becomes strikingly obvious as soon as the Greek text is consulted.
- ⁶² Cf. Daisetz T. Suzuki, "Meister Eckhart and Buddhism," in *Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp. 7-35.
- ⁶³ For a good description, see Tauler, "Sermon on St. John the Baptist," in *The Inner Way: 36 Sermons for Festivals*. New translation, edited with Introduction by Arthur Wollaston Hutton
- ⁶⁴ E.g., L. Brunschvicg, ed., *Pensées* (14th ed., Paris: Hachette, 1927), p. 350.
- ⁶⁵ It is quite interesting to note, when reading *Les Fleurs du Mal*, the varying and conflicting connotations of such key terms as *gouffre*, *abîme*, and *vide*.
- ⁶⁶ New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1949. London: Gollancz, 1950. This is the translation of S. Winkworth, revised by W. Trask, on the basis of J. Bernhart's translation into modern German: *Theologia Germanica* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1949).
- ⁶⁷ Chaps. 1-5, 20, 22, 24, 32, 34, 40, 44, 49, 51.
- ⁶⁸ Bernhart, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192, 197.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 167, 180, 183.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 186.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 206, 240.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 197, 204-206, 218-219.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 219-220.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115, *liebhey*t.

⁷⁸ Cf. R. Fussell, *The Nature and Purpose of the Ascetic Ideal* (Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1960). H.v. Glasenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag, 1958), pp. 428-429.

⁷⁹ E.F.J. Payne, trans., *The World as Will and Representation (WWR)*, 2 vols. (Indian Hills, Colorado: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958), p. 613. Vol. II.

⁸⁰ *WWR*, Vol. II, p. 608.

⁸¹ Quoted in Fussell, *op. cit.*, p. 1. *Samaṇas* = recluses; *sannyāsins* = ascetics.

⁸² *WWR*, Vol. II, chap. 38.

⁸³ *WWR*, Bk. I, par. 3; Bk. III, par. 33.

⁸⁴ *WWR*, Vol. II, pp. 608, 612.

⁸⁵ For an exceedingly clear and lucid survey of the many inconsistencies in Schopenhauer's philosophy, I must refer to H.M. Wolf, *Arthur Schopenhauer. Hundert Jahre Später* (Bern and Muenchen: Francke Verlag, 1960).

⁸⁶ H.M. Wolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 70, 106-107.

⁸⁷ About his "miserabilism," see E. Conze, "The Objective Validity of the Principle of Contradiction," *philosophy*, X (1935), 216.

⁸⁸ But the *panta chōrei* of Herakleitos fits none too well, because not everything flows; *Nirvāṇa*, the most important thing of all, being excepted.

⁸⁹ Good parallels can be found in P. Damiani, "The Glories of Paradise," referred to above, note 35.

⁹⁰ "It never was, and it never will be, since it is, all of it together, only present in the Now, one and indivisible" (Diels. Kranz, Fr. 8 [Simpl. Phys. 145. I.3-6].)

⁹¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI. viii. 10.

⁹² Also the Megarics and Antisthenes belonged to it. Pyrrho appears to have started with the Megaric position.

⁹³ S. Ranulf, *Der eleatische Satz vom Widerspruch* (Kopenhagen: Gyldendal, 1924). The archaic character of Parmenides' thinking is also shown in his belief that Being is a mass which, as a well-rounded sphere, fills space. Also the well-known works of Prantl, Apelt, Maier, E. Hoffmann (*Die Sprache und die archaische Logik* [Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1925]), and Cornford are helpful in this connection.

⁹⁴ Aristotle, *Physics*, 185^b33. In many passages (*Metaphysics*, Gamma 2, 4, E 1, Z 1, K 3), Aristotle points out that Being is said *pollachōs* (in many senses).

⁹⁵ See R. Otto, *Mysticism East and West* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1932), pp. 21-26.

⁹⁶ Pp. 204-205. Italics mine.

⁹⁷ A.H. Armstrong, *Plotinus* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), p. 41. For the ambiguities in Plotinus' own thought, compare Armstrong p. 21 with p. 29.

⁹⁸ For useful quotations see R. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-96.

⁹⁹ According to Harold F. Haller, *Aeternitas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 45.

¹⁰⁰ It may be objected that the comparison of all this with Buddhism applies more to the "monistic" Mahāyāna than to the "pluralistic" Hinayāna theories. But the difference should not be overstressed. As the Theravāda had a latent idealism and an implicit bias toward a mentalistic interpretation of physical reality (Étienne Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti*. Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 51 [Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1962], pp. 52-60), so it teaches also the one *Dhamma* side by side with the multiple *dhammas* (see Buddhaghosa on *ekam hi saccam, na duttiyam atthi*, in *Visuddhimagga*

of *Buddhaghosācariya*, H.C. Warren, ed; rev. by Dh. Kosambi, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 422, 421.

¹⁰¹ A purely intellectual contradiction reduces thought to nothing. It results in nonsense. He who thinks a contradiction thinks nothing at all.

¹⁰² Or, in other words, that his Pythagorean opponents cannot assert the reality of movement without coming into conflict with their own premises. These opponents assumed that a line consists of indivisible points in juxtaposition, and the counter-arguments of Hobbes (*Works*, I. 110), Bergson, and Aristotle take no notice of the historical situation. The contradictions involved can be seen succinctly in Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, Haldane, trans., 1892, I. 273–274; cf. *Logic*, I. 191–193, II. 143, sq.; F. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz, 1894), 120; E. Conze, *Philosophy* (see note 87), p. 215.

¹⁰³ Hegel said that “comprehended history forms both the memorial and the calvary of the absolute Spirit—that without which it would be Lifeless (!) Solitude.” He seems to have a strange view of “life,” as composed of a long series of senseless oppressions and massacres perpetrated in the name of some fatuous “ideal” or other.

¹⁰⁴ *The Central philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 308.

¹⁰⁵ Murti, *ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁰⁶ *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical study* (9th impression, corrected, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 404.

¹⁰⁷ Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁶⁶ The Buddhist *upādāna* (clinging) has some resemblance to Pareto’s concept of “residues,” or basic constellations of sentiments, and to the “interests” of the Ratzenhofer-Small theory. For the views of these sociologists, see Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 561–563, 377–379, 782–784.

⁶⁷ The relation of *upādāna* and *karman* has been analysed in the *Tathātā* philosophy of Aśvaghōṣa. See S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 133.

⁶⁸ According to the later Buddhist scholastics, the loss of *upādāna*, along with that of (a) *karman*, (b) *dṛṣṭi* (false views), (c) *śīlavrata* (superstitious usage), and (d) *ātmavāda* (doctrine of self) follows from the loss of egoistic feelings. For the English renderings of the Sanskrit and Pali terms used here, see A.B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, pp. 128, 114.

⁶⁹ James B. Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), p. 73: “It is Tanha, craving, that keeps one on the weary wheel of rebirth and brings one back after the death of the body to birth in a new one. That one’s Karma was the cause of rebirth was a Brahmin and Jaina concept; hence the ideal of worklessness as a means of salvation, referred to so repeatedly in the Bhagavad Gita, and the attempt of the Jainas to extinguish acquired Karma through ascetic practices and avoid the acquisition of new Karma. Against these conceptions the Buddha set up his new psychological theory (if so we may style it) that rebirth was due not to Karma but to craving; and that by rooting out evil desire and the will to live one could escape from rebirth, regardless of the Karma one had brought with one to this life. This, of course, was a much more hopeful and moral doctrine, and one for which a certain amount of empirical evidence based on analogy could be produced.”

⁷⁰ Hence it is incorrect to interpret the Buddha as a mere practical moralist. Since he propounded a concept of emancipation based on knowledge, he may be said to have attained the gnomic stage of moral reflection.

* See “Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels,” *Philosophy East and West*, XIII, No. 1 (April, 1963), pp. 9–23. (Comment and Discussion pieces on Dr Conze’s two articles will be welcome. – Ed.)

¹ As explained in the first article of this two-article series, *ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

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² See H. Butschkus, *Luthers Religion and ihre Entsprechung in japanischen Amida-Buddhismus* (Elmsdetten: Verlags-Anstalt Heinr. & L. Lechte, n.d., probably 1950).

³ See the quotation in my *Buddhism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 168.

⁴ E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 242ff.

⁵ In my *Der Satz vom Widerspruch* (Hamburg: Selbstverlag, 1932), I have, at no. 300, collected a few characteristic statements of Nietzsche, for example, "The only reason why we imagine a world other than this one is that we are motivated by an instinct which makes us calumniate life, belittle and suspect it." "It is not life which has created the other world, but the having become weary of life." "It is of the utmost importance that one should abolish the true world. It is that which has made us doubt the world in which we are, and has made us diminish its value; it has so far been the most dangerous assault on life." Whatever this "life" may be, it is surely not the spiritual life.

⁶ See Fritz Brüggemann, *Die Ironie als entwicklungsgeschichtliches Moment* (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1909). Eckart von Sydow, *Die Kultur der Dekadenz* (Dresden: Sibyllen Verlag, 1921).

⁷ N.M. Jacobs, in *The Times Literary Supplement*, May 3, 1963, p. 325, speaks appositely of "Miller and those Beat writers who abandon practical affairs for the inner life and self-realisation – or destruction – by means of Zen, Sex or Drugs.0022

⁸ *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Hereafter, CPB) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 294–301, though with serious reservations. Stcherbatsky, on the other hand, had seen Kant as closely similar to the later Buddhist logicians, and had likened the Mādhyamika to Hegel and Bradley. See Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 264–269.

⁹ (1) "Kant et les Mādhyamika," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, III (1959), 102–111. (2) "La philosophie bouddhique de la vacuité," *Studia Philosophica*, XVIII (1958), 131–134. Some valuable comments by J.W. de Jong are in *Indo-Iranian Journal*, V (1961), 161–163.

¹⁰ This is one reason why the Kantian "phenomena" cannot be simply equated with the Buddhist "saṃsāra." From the point of view of the Absolute, both Kantian empirical and Buddhist conventional knowledge are non-valid. But Kant never questioned the value of empirical knowledge. In Buddhism, however, the *saṃvṛtisatya* (conventional truth) is a mere error due to nescience (*a-vidyā*, *a-jñāna*), and conventional knowledge represents no more than a deplorable estrangement from our true destiny. In its uncompromising monastic form, Buddhism maintains that the empirical world is not worth exploring, that all one has to know about it is its worthlessness and inanity; its scientific exploration, as irrelevant to the escape from the terrors of *saṃsāra*, is deemed unworthy of attention. A second reason why the Kantian phenomena/noumena cannot be equated with the Mādhyamika *saṃsāra/Nirvāṇa* is that the latter are identical, whereas the first clearly are not. The one dichotomy, in any case, is defined by its relation to science, the other by its relation to salvation.

¹¹ On this subject, see also the excellent remarks of Jacques May (1) 104–108, (2) 135–138 (see note 9).

¹² *Metaphysics*, Z 1, 1028b. H. Tredennick, trans. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p. 313.

¹³ Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 239–241.

¹⁴ This is not a psychological but a philosophical statement, because psychologically it is manifestly untrue. The normal and untutored mind is usually quite at ease among external objects, and, unable to even understand this doctrine of the "primacy of internal experience," is much more immediately aware of a chair than of its awareness of a chair.

¹⁵ CPB, pp. 123–124, 274.

¹⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, N.K. Smith, trans. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 22.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 270–271. Murti, CPB, p. 300. May (1) 108: "La dialectique kantienne est le lieu de l'impuissance de la raison..... Au contraire, la dialectique mādhyamika est véritablement constitutive de la réalité, elle accomplit en abolissant." See note 9.

¹⁸ This is perfectly clear from *Mājjhima Nikaya*, No. 63, and the fuller account of Nāgārjuna, Étienne Lamotté, trans., *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse* (Louvain: Bureau du Muséon, 1944), Vol. I, pp. 154–158.

¹⁹ Th. Hanna, ed., *The Bergsonian Heritage* (Hereafter, BH) (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 1; also pp. 27, 53.

²⁰ BH, p. 40.

²¹ "So art ... has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself." *Le Rire*, quoted in *BH*, p. 88.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 92 (my italics, but not my translation from the French).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99. If this statement, which goes on to speak of the "universe" as "a machine for the making of gods," is collated with that which Italo Svevo (Ettore Schmitz) made in 1924 in his *Confessions of Zeno* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons), pp. 411–412, it must become clear that we do not owe our present plight merely to the brilliant achievements of our able technicians. The progressive decline of spiritual wisdom may well have weakened the will to live and correspondingly strengthened the death wish. On this subject, refer to Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind* (London: Penguin Books, 1961), whose conclusions I take for granted throughout.

²⁶ I speak here only of the "secular" existentialists. The "religious" existentialists would require separate treatment.

²⁷ Matthew Arnold, after dividing the English population of his time into "barbarians, philistines, and populace," well defined the philistine as "a strong, dogged unenlightened opponent of the chosen people, of the children of light," in A.C. Ward, *Illustrated History of English Literature* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), Vol. III, p. 227.

²⁸ July, 1837. Th. B. Macaulay, *Literary Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 364–410.

²⁹ *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Penguin Books, 1951), p. 51. The whole essay (pp. 50–59) is worth re-reading because now, sixty years later, it shows clearly the grotesque irrationalities of a "sciential" philosophy, which in nearly every sentence blandly went beyond all scientific observations made even up to the present day. May I explain that my attitude cannot be called "antiscientific," because nowhere have I said anything about "science" as such, either for or against. My strictures concern only extravagant philosophical conclusions drawn from a few inconclusive scientific data. Sir Isaac Newton, as is well known, said at the close of his life, when all his work was done, that he had only played with pebbles on the sea shore, and that "the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me." This is all I try to say, neither less nor more.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³² Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, no. 100. For a good comparison in some detail see Constantin Regamey, "Tendances et methodes de la philosophie indienne comparées à celles de la philosophie occidentale," *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, IV (1950), 258–259.

³³ *Udāna*, viii, 3: no ... nissaraṇaṃ paññāyetha.

³⁴ So, Murti, *CPB*, p. 130.

³⁵ "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perceptions." David Hume. *A Treatise on Human Nature*, T. H. Green, ed. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874), Vol. I, p. 534. When I first saw this sentence forty years ago, I thought it unanswerable. What now strikes me is the immense vagueness of the word "perception."

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 537–540.

³⁷ For Aristotle, intelligence (*dianoētikon*) was a man's true self (*E.N.*, 1166a8), and, for Porphyry (*de abst.*, I. 29), the *Nous* is his *ontōs auton*. The *Nous* is man's sovereign (*kyriotaton*) and his better part (*ameinon*) (*E.N.*, 1178a2). The connection between man's *ousia* (essence) and his proper objective purpose is made particularly clear in Aristotle's *Protreptikos*. For the quotations, see E. Conze, *Der Satz vom Widerspruch* (Hamburg: Selbstverlag, 1932), no. 141.

³⁸ Approximately: "Enter into yourself, for the truth dwells in the inmost heart of man." Likewise, in the Far East, Ch'an taught that "a man could be a Buddha by immediately taking hold of his inmost nature."

D.T. Suzuki, *The' Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, Bernard Phillips, ed., (London: Rider & Co., 1963), p. 175. Also George Grimm, *The Doctrine of the Buddha* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), p. 175: "We must retire from the world back into ourselves, to the 'centre of our vital birth,' and by persistent introspection seek to find out how we have come into all this Becoming in which we find ourselves enmeshed."

³⁹ This side of the *anattā* doctrine has been explained with great subtlety and acumen by Grimm, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–116, 140, 147, 149, 175, 369–372. For my own views, see *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 36–39, 42, 122–134, 208–209.

⁴⁰ *Dhammapada*, V. 279: *yadā paññāya passati, atha nibbindatī dukkhe*

⁴¹ *Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), p. 39.

⁴² Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 140n.

⁴³ *The Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 8. Edited by V. Trenckner. (London: Pali Text Society, 1888).

¹ Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 172–173.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I (1922), pp. 493–494.

³ "Śaṁkara's Arguments against the Buddhists," *Philosophy East and West*, III, No. 4 (January, 1954), 291–306.

⁴ *Brahma-Sūtra-Shāṅkara-Bhāṣya*, V. M. Apte, trans. (Bombay: G. R. Bhatkal, 1960).

⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, with commentary by Śaṁkaracāraya. Swāmi Mādhavananda, trans. (Almora, Himalya: Advaita Ashrama, 1950).

⁶ *The Tattvasaṁgraha* of Sāntarakṣita, with commentary of Kamalasila. Vols. I, II. Ganganatha Jha, trans. Volumes I, II. Gaekwad Oriental Series, Vols. LXXX and LXXXIII. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1937, 1939).

⁷ *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. iv. 27, com.

⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. i. 4.

⁹ *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. i. 15, com.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 25, com.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 23, com.; II. i. 14, com.

¹² *Ibid.*, II. i. 24, com.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 23. Dr Karl Potter writes that the term "expect" is in his opinion an exaggeration. It should be further noted in this general connection that in I. iv. 23–27 and II. i. 24–25 it is repeatedly asserted that *Brahman* is both material and accidental (efficient) cause of the world., i.e., containing within itself the power to modify itself (accidental causal potency) *as well as* being the material (or substantial?) cause of the world.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II. ii. 17, com.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, II. i. 14.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II. i. 13, com.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II. i. 18, com.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II. ii. 10, com.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II. ii. 4, com.

²¹ Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p.11.

²² *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. ii. 3, com.

²³ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. 4. 13.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 1. 20.

²⁵ *Brahma-Sūtra*, III. ii. 20, 21, com.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II. i. 34.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II. i. 22, com.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, II. ii. 5, com.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, II. i. 13, com.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, II. i. 7, com.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 27, com.

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- ³² *Ibid.*, II. i. 9, com.
- ³³ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. 4. 6.
- ³⁴ *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. iii. 30, com.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, II. i. 4, com.
- ^{35a} “Supremacy” is used here to refer to a qualified or lesser form of ultimacy, suitable for the phenomenal-world context.
- ^{35b} *Buddhist Logic*, Indo-Iranian Reprints (S-Grabenhage: Mouton and Co., 1958), Vol. I, Part II, chap. 1.
- ³⁶ *Tattovasaṅgraha*, Text No. 1214. Italics mine.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 734.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 870 and com.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 32, com.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 441–443, com.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 873–874.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 1254–1256.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 540, com.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 358.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 382.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 31–45, *passim*.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 415–416.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 727–729.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 688.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 1886, com.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 441–443, com.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1675–1677.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 115–116.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1181–1183.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 533–535, com.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 875.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1886–1915, *passim*.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1897.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1893–1896.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 468, com. Cf. *ibid.*, 149–150, 473–474.
- ⁶² Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961), p. 48. Italics mine.
- ⁶³ *Tattovasaṅgraha*, 31, com.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 438, com.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1674.
- ⁶⁶ Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- ⁶⁷ *Tattovasaṅgraha*, 675–676, com.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 76 and com.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 87, com.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 438, com.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 543, com.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 692, com.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 696–697, com.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 504.
- ⁷⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I. iii. 2.
- ⁷⁶ *Tattovasaṅgraha* 538–539. com.
- ⁵ Hummel, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

1. Dau, das man unter den Begriff Dau fassen kann (“Dauen” kann),

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2. ist nicht grenzenloses Dau;
 3. der Begriff, den man als solchen fassen kann,
 4. ist (in seiner Reichweite) *nicht* grenzenloser (absoluter) Begriff.
 5. (Der Zustand, da es) keine Begriffe gibt, (ist der) Anfang Von Himmel und Erde;
 6. (der Zustand, da es) Begriffe gibt, (ist) all Wesenheiten Mutter.
 7. (In dem Zustand, wo es) absolut kein begreifendes Sehnen (Gerichtetheit) gibt, sieht man seine (des Dau) Hintergründigkeit;
 8. (in dem Zustand, wo es) absolut begreifendes Sehnen (Gerichtetheit) gibt, sieht man seine (des Dau) Deutlichkeit (in der in *dau verfassten* verfahren Erscheinung).

⁶ Fung Yu-lan, D. Bodde, trans., *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Vol. II, pp. 207-208. (Hereafter HCP.)

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁸ Fung, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, D. Bodde, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 220-221.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁰ Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 278-282.

* Abbreviations used to refer to frequently cited texts are as follows:

BCA Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, ed., with BCAP, *BI* (Vol. 983, New Series, 1901).

BCAP Prajñākaramati, *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā* (BCA ed.).

BI *Bibliotheca Indica* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, Baptist Mission Press, various dates).

CS *The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva*, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with copious Extracts from the Commentary of Candrakīrti (CSV). Reconstructed and edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. [Santiniketan: Kishorimohan Santra, Visva-Bharati, 1931], Vol. XXXIV, p. 308.

CSV Candrakīrti, *Catuḥśataka-vṛtti* (CS ed.).

CSt Nāgārjuna, *Catuḥśtava*, Prabhubhai Patel, ed., *Indian Historical Quarterly*, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1932), 316-331; No. 4 (December, 1932), 689-705.

MK Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (*Mādhyamika-sūtra*), Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, ed., with MKV, *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, Vol. IV (St. Petersburg: The Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913).

MKV Candrakīrti, *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā-vṛtti* (MK ed.).

VV Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartani*, K.P. Jayaswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, eds., *JBORS*, XXIII (1937), Part IV (n.d.), first appendix, pp. 1-31.

¹ All these references are taken from Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927), p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

† All documentation and hyphenation follow the author's preferred style.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁵ T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 142, n. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁸ See, for example, Gautama, *Nyāya-sūtra*, Ganga Nath Jha, ed. (Poona: Oriental book Agency, 1939), 4.1.37-41, and commentaries, glosses, and scholia thereon; Kumārila, *Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1898), 1.1.5. Nirāmbanavāda, stanza 14; Śāṅkara, *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, Mahādeva Śāstrī Bākre, ed., and Wāsudeva Laxman Śāstrī Panaśīkar, rev. (3rd ed., Bombay: Nirṇaya-Sagar Press, 1934), 2.2.31, pp. 478-479; Śāṅkara, *Bṛhādarāṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya* (2nd impression, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1955), 4.3.7, p. 905; Rāmānuja, *Śrī-bhāṣya* Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyaṅkara, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. LXVIII (Bombay: Nirṇaya-Sāgar Press, 1914), 2.2.30, pp. 495-496; *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra*, Āsubodha Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Nityabodha Vidyāratna, eds. (3rd ed., Calcutta:

Vācaspatya Press, 1936), 1.44-47, and Vijñānabhikṣu, *Sāṃkhyapravacana bhāṣya*, *ad loc.* (in the same publication); Mādhava, *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyāñkara, ed. (2nd ed., Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951), p.29.

¹⁵ See A.B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923), p.47. Quotations from Franke and Kern are taken from this reference.

¹⁶ See *Majjhima-nikāya*, *Pannāsaka* III entitled *Upari-paṇṇāsaka* and constituting Vol. III, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. (Nālandā: Pāli Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958), *sutta* 21 (121 of the whole treatise) entitled “Cūlasuññata-sutta,” pp. 169-173. Cf. *Udāna*, Paul Steinthal, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), VIII. 1, p. 80.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, *Paṇṇāsaka* II entitled *Majjhima-paṇṇāsaka* and constituting Vol. II, *sutta* 24 (74 of the whole treatise) entitled “Dighanakha-sutta,” pp. 193-197.

¹⁸ See, for example, *Sutta-nipāta*, Lord Chalmers, ed., Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 37 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), stanzas 794, 800, 803, 811, 824-834, 839, and 877-914.

¹⁹ MK, 25.24; CSt., 1.4; *Āgama-śāstra*, 4.99.

²⁰ See Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 50, n. 2.

²¹ *Majjhima-nikāya*, III, 40, p. 330. Cp. *Sutta-nipāta*, sts. 757-758; MK, 13.2.

²² *Majjhima-nikāya*, *Paṇṇāsaka* I entitled *Mūlapaṇṇāsaka* and constituting Vol. I, P.V. Bapat, ed. (Nālandā: Pāli Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958), *sutta* 11 entitled “Cūlasīha-danāda-sutta,” p. 92. Also see *Udāna*, *vagga* 3, *sutta* 10, p. 33; *Itivuttaka*, Ernst Windisch, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), *nipāta* 2, *vagga* 2, *sutta* 12, p. 43; *Samādhiraṣa-sūtra*, Nalinaksha Dutt and Shiv Nath Sharma, eds., *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. II (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1941), 9.27; MK, 15.7.

²³ See MKV, 1.1, pp. 40-44; 15.11, p. 276; colophon (p. 594).

²⁴ See *Majjhima-nikāya*, *Paṇṇāsaka* I, *sutta* 22 entitled “Alagaddūpama-sutta,” pp. 179-180, where *dharma*s are likened to a raft to be left off after crossing the stream. Cp. “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (4th impression, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), 6.54.

²⁵ See MKV, p. 3.

²⁶ *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*, Rajendralala Mitra, ed., *BI* (1888), p. 29.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁰ See section II (*supra*).

⁴¹ *VV*, st. 1. The discussion of this issue contained in this small work will be found interesting reading by those having an idea of the examples of *systematic ambiguity* cited and discussed by Bertrand Russell in connection with his theory of logical types developed in his *Logic and Knowledge*, Charles Marsh, ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 59-102. Russell’s thesis is ably discussed in F. Waismann, “Language Strata,” in *Logic and Language*, Second Series, Antony Flew, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 16-18.

⁴² *VV*, st. 30.

⁴³ See, for example, Bhāvaviveka, *Karatalaratna*, restored from Huen Tasang’s Chinese version into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami Śāstrī (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), p. 57.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-63, *passim*.

⁴⁵ Āryadeva, *Śata-śāstra*, English rendering from the Chinese version by G. Tucci, *Pre-Diṃmāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, Vol. XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), pp. 26-89.

⁴⁶ See CS, 8.9, and CSV thereon.

⁴⁷ *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Bunyiu Nanjio, ed., *Bibliotheca Otaniensis*, Vol. I (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), *gāthā* 265, p. 300. Advayavajra, *Advayavajra-saṃgraha*, Haraprasād Śāstrī, ed., Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, Vol. XL (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927), p. 26.

⁴⁸ BCA, 9.139.

⁴⁹ VV, st. 29.

⁵⁰ See note 42 (*supra*); CS, 16.25; MKV, 1.1, pp. 44, 55-58. The following words of Candrakīrti are especially noteworthy: “Sages find nothing which could be false or true.” (*Naiva tvāryāḥ kiñcid upalahante yan mṛṣā amṛṣā vā syād iti.*) MKV, 1.1, p. 44.

⁵¹ MK, 1.10.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 13.3.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 13.4 – 6.

⁵⁴ See *ibid.*, 7.34; 23.8; CSt. 1.14; 2.4, 18, 34; 3.5, 17, 31; *Bhavaśāntikrānti* (first recension of *Bhavaśāntikrānti-śāstra*), st. 6; *Cittaviśuddhi-prakaraṇa*, Prabhubhai Patel, ed. (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), st. 19. Such statements abound in the *Prajñāpāramitā* and other Mādhyamika Sūtras as well. Cp. *Udāna*, VIII. 1, p. 80.

⁵⁵ MK, 7.33.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.19.

⁵⁷ CS, 9.2, with CSV.

⁵⁸ *Bhāvabheda-śāstra* (third recension of *Bhavaśāntikrānti-śāstra*), p. 21; *Bhavaśāntikrānti*, 4. Cp. *Udāna*, VIII. 1, p. 80.

⁵⁹ MK, 10.8, 10 – 11.

⁶⁰ See notes 55 – 58 (*supra*) and 64 – 66 (*infra*).

⁶¹ MK, 16.10. Cp. CSt, 1.5.

⁶² MKV, 16.10, p. 299.

⁶³ MK, 22.16.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.19 – 20. Cp. CSt, 1.5; *Cittaviśuddhi-prakaraṇa*, st. 24.

⁶⁵ MK, 25.9.

⁶⁶ CSt, 3.41.

⁶⁷ *Advayavajra-saṃgraha*, p. 24.

⁶⁸ BCAP, 9.34, p. 416.

⁶⁹ MK, 24.18. Also see CSt, 2.20; 3.38.

⁷⁰ We remember having read it somewhere.

⁷¹ CSt, 3.3. Also, Nāgārjuna, *Yuktiśaṭṭikā*, referred to in Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 89, n. 2. Also, *Advayavajra-saṃgraha*, p. 25.

⁷² MKV, 24.18, p. 503. *Larīkāvatāra-sūtra* (gāthā 582, p. 337), however, says: “All this is uncreated. But it is not that things do not exist. Things do exist, but they do so without sufficient reason, like *fata morgana*, dream, and illusion.”

⁷³ These are said to be scals in Nāgārjuna, *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, cited in Junjiro Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A. Moore, eds. (1st Indian ed., Bombay, etc.: Asia Publishing House, 1956), p. 140.

⁷⁴ S.N. Dasgupta, *Indian Idealism* (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 79.

⁷⁵ *Bhavaśāntikrānti*, st. 10.

⁷⁶ *Bhavaśāntikrānti-parikathā* (2nd recension of *Bhavaśāntikrānti-śāstra*), st. 8.

⁷⁷ Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

⁷⁸ MK, 15.2. Cp. CSt, 3.35 – 39, 42.

⁷⁹ MK, 18.9.

¹³² MKV, 20.3, p. 393. Also see note 80 (*supra*).

¹³³ See Takakusu, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹³⁴ CSt, 3.34.

¹³⁵ See *Bhavaśāntikrānti-parikathā*, st. 12.

¹³⁶ BCA, 9.33.

¹³⁷ Also see note 105 (*supra*).

¹³⁸ BCAP, 9.4, p. 372.

¹³⁹ See N.K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śāṅkara's Theory of Knowledge* (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962), pp. 205-206.

¹⁴⁰ CS, 8.7.

¹⁴¹ CSV, 8.7, p. 7.

¹⁴² MK, 24.1.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 24.7-10, 11, 13.

¹⁴⁴ CS, 8.15.

¹⁴⁵ MKV, 24.7, p. 491.

¹⁴⁶ MK, 24.14.

¹⁴⁷ MKV, 24.14, p. 500.

¹⁴⁸ MK, 24.15-23.

¹⁴⁹ MKV, 24.18, p. 503.

¹⁵⁰ MK, 15.8.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 15.8-11. Also see CSt, 3.21. Elsewhere, however, Nāgārjuna remarks: "Isness without birth and death is simply unthinkable (*prasajyetaṣṭi bhāvo hi na jarāmaraṇaṁ vinā*). MK, 25.4. At a third place, again, he remarks: "Being is either eternal or non-eternal" (... *bhāvo hi nityo'nityo'thavā bhavet*). MK, 21.14. It is difficult to reconcile the three statements.

¹⁵² *Cittavisuddhi-prakaraṇa*, st. 83.

¹⁵³ MKV, 1.1, p. 56.

^{4a} "See note 2, above.

⁵ MV, pp. 344-345.

⁶ A true proposition contains a particular as a constituent. A proposition like "I saw a unicorn," though significant, is false, because unicorn is not a constituent. "I shall say an object is 'known by description' when we know that it is 'the so-and-so,' i.e., when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property: and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance," says Russell in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925), p. 214.

He elucidates this point further by saying, "Suppose we say: 'The round square does not exist.' It seems plain that this is a true proposition, yet we cannot regard it as denying the existence of a certain object called 'the round square' Thus in all such cases, the proposition must be capable of being so analysed that what was the grammatical subject shall have disappeared." Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Introduction (2nd ed., Cambridge: The University Press, 1925), chap. III, p. 66. See also Russell's *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), chap. XVI; B. Russell, "On Denoting," *Mind*, Vol. XIV, No. 56 (October, 1905), 479-483; B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London, New York; Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. V. For philosophical implications of this theory see B. Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, 12th Series (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 323 ff.

⁷ Cp. *śabda-jñānānupati vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ*. Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra* (hereafter YS), I. 9.

⁸ MV, p. 360.

⁹ Candrakīrti seems to make a distinction between *idaṁ-pratyaya* and *idaṁ-pratyaya-matrā*. Some Buddhist opponents of the Mādhyamika system (Sautrāntika?) correlate *idaṁ-pratyaya* with "ultimate truth" — *paramarśigaditam idaṁ-pratyaya-pratītya-samutpāda-lakṣaṇaṁ paramārtha-satyam* (MV, p. 159). But Candrakīrti thinks of all the so-called cases of causation as *idaṁ-pratyaya-matrā* whereby he means something utterly unreal (MV, p. 189). A common man thinks what is *idaṁ-pratyaya-matrā* to be something ultimately real (MV, p. 172). This distinction between *idaṁ-pratyaya* and *idaṁ-pratyaya-matrā* corresponds to that of Russell between "Constituent of a proposition" and "incomplete symbol." See L.S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (New York: Crowell, 1930), pp. 152-158. For the Mādhyamikas, every symbol, including demonstratives, is an incomplete symbol, and we know "by description only."

¹⁰ The word “*prajñāpti*” is explained in *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (hereafter *Abhidh*, k.v.) (236d) as follows: “*prajñāptim anupatita ity yathā samjñā samjñā yathā vyavahāras tathā ‘nugata ity arthaḥ*.” (See MV, p. 137, note 3.) A statement attributed to the Master is quoted by Candrakīrti thus: *bālo bhikṣavo śrutavān pṛthagjanaḥ prajñāptim anupatitaḥ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasya-sthāniyānya-bhiniviśate* (MV, p. 137). In MK, XXIV. 18, Nāgārjuna equates *prajñāpti* with the Middle Path. There, “*upādāya prajñāpti*” means “a description without any constituent,” which does not necessarily entail actual causation. (See MV, p. 504.) But the realists, who interpret causation as an actual production from co-ordinating factors, would interpret it as a description rooted in acquaintance, i.e., as having a real constituent. *Prapañca* for the Mādhyamikas is a verbal description-*prapañco bi vāk prapañicayatīarthān ity kṛtvā* (MV, p. 373); the Sautrāntikas would like to interpret *prapañca* as directly coming from the concepts (*nāma-jāti-kalpanā*), yet rooted in realities (*svalakṣaṇa*). See *Abhidh*, k.v. {*nimi??todgrahaṇātmiketi*} (*samjñā*). *Nimittaṁ vastuno ‘vasthaviśeso nilatvādi tasyodgrabanaṁ* {*paricched??*} (MV, p. 63, note 3.) Candrakīrti says, “*vikalpaḥ cittaprācāraḥ*” (MV, p. 374), whereby he means say that the Sautrāntika conception of *vikalpa*, viz., as associated with *svalakṣaṇa*, is not accepted the Mādhyamika system.

¹¹ *Vijñāpti* (intention) is of two kinds, according to the Sautrāntikas. *Viprayuktā vijñāpti* (MV, 444), i.e. intention without any object, is empty, whereas *aviprayuktā vijñāpti*, or simply *vijñāpti* is an intention with some object – *tad hi parasmād ādīyate* (MV, p. 309, note 3).

¹² MV, p. 173.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

¹⁴ Mind functions and creates concepts—that is what is perhaps meant by Candrakīrti when he says “*vikalpaś cittaprācāraḥ*” (MV, p. 374). It is interesting to note that Candrakīrti criticizes Dīrṇāga’s definition of perception, viz., *kalpanāpoḍham*, by saying “*kalpanāpoḍhasyaiva ca jñānasya pratyakṣatvā bhyupagamāt, tena ca lokasya śāmyavyavabārabhāvāt, laukikasya ca pramāṇa-prameya vyavabārasya vyākhyātum iṣṭvāt, vyartbaiva pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-kalpanā samjāyate* (MV, p. 74). It is implied in this criticism that perception, and for that matter any *pramāṇa*, depends upon *kalpanā* or concept which=*vikalpa*. Therefore, he says that perception is determined with reference to intentional knowledge (*ataḥ pratyakṣaṁ vyavasthāpyate tadviśayeṇa jñāneana saha*) (MV, p. 75). I prefer to read “*tadvisayiṇā*” instead of “*tadviśayeṇa*” as it is found in the Tibetan version, i.e., *de.i.yul.can.gi*. This being the case, it follows that illusory perception of double moon, etc., is also as good a perception as any veridical perception (*dvicandrādinām toatimirika-jñānāpekṣayā apratyakṣatvam, taimirikād yapekṣayā tu pratyakṣatvam eva*) (MV, p. 75).

¹⁵ For a detailed discussion of causality, see MV, pp. 78-85; 250-258.

¹⁶ *anāmbana evāyaṁ san dharma upadiśyate (athānāmbane dharme kuta ālambanam* {*pur??*} (MK, I. 8).

¹⁷ *hetu-pratyayapekṣo bhāvānām utpādaḥ pratītya-samutpādarthaḥ* (MV, p. 5).

¹⁸ *yasmād yatpratītya yad bhavati tasmāt tad anyan na bhavati sāpekṣatvād bijāṅkuravat* {*hra??*} *dīrghavacceti* (MV, p. 252).

¹⁹ *prāptyarthas tvaṇagikṛtārtha-viśeṣe’ pi pratītya-śabde saṁbhavati prāpya sambhavaḥ pratītya samutpāda iti, angikṛtārtha-viśeṣe’ pi saṁbhavati, cakṣuḥ pratītya cakṣuḥ prāpya cakṣuḥ prekṣyeti vyākhyānāt* (MV, pp. 6-7).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²¹ MK, XXVII. 26. This is to be contrasted with MV, p. 591.

²² MK, XIII. 8; MV, p. 247.

²³ *na ca vāyam abhāvārthaṁ śūnyatārthaṁ vyācakṣumahe kin tarhi pratītya-samutpādartham* (MV, p. 499).

²⁴ *te ca vikalpā anādimat-saṁsārābhyastāj jñāna-vācya-vācaka-kartṛ-karma-kāraṇa-kriyā-ghaṭṭapaṭṭa-mukuṭṭa-ratharūpa-vedanā-strī-puruṣa-lābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-nindā-praśaṁsādi-lakṣaṇād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante* (MV, p. 350); also (MV, p. 373).

^{24a} See note 10 above.

²⁵ *apara-pratyayam śāntam prapañcāprapañcitam (nirvikalpam anartham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam)* (MK, XVIII.9). Here “*tattva*” is to be clearly distinguished from “*satya*.”

²⁶ Cp. “In full accordance with the idea of a monistic universe it is now asserted that the not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the phenomenal, between *Nirvāṇa* and {*sar??*} The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the phenomenal.” Stcherbatsky, BN, p. 48. Again, see

“There is no reason to single out the Mādhyamika as spenihilistic. If anything, his is a very consistent form of absolutism.” T.R.V. Murti, *The {C??} Philosophy of Buddhism* (2nd ed., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 234.

²⁷ MK, XXIV. 8, and MV on it.

²⁸ MV, p. 493. It is wrong to translate “Nirvāṇa” by “Absolute” because “*nirvāṇam api māyop svapnopamam vadāmi kiṃ punar anyad dharmam. Yadi nirvāṇād apyanyaḥ kaścid dharmo {viśist??} syāt tam apy ahaṃ māyapamam svapnopamam iti vadeyam.*” This statement of the Aśṭasāh Prajñāpāramitā (Calcutta, 1932), p. 40, clearly states Nirvāṇa also to be a mere concept.

^{28a} See note 27 above.

²⁹ MK, I. 1-2.

³⁰ Our cognition of empirical objects is true when those objects are viewed in the light of relative concepts. It is a truth that every concept is relative; this I call the *loka-samvṛti-satya* of the Mādhyamika. But it is utterly false that the concepts are absolute, unrelated entities; for that matter, our notion of an absolute objective reality is relegated to the position of falsity; it is not even *samvṛti*. In contrast to this is a truth about this truth itself. It is true not only that the *concepts* are relative but also that *relativity*, too, thrives upon these concepts. This second truth about relativity itself is the *paramārtha-satya* of the Mādhyamikas. See MK, XII. 8 and MV on the same. When relativity of concepts is fully realised, is fully realised, the relativity itself ceases to operate because there is nothing to be operated upon. This state would be the ideal state, or Nirvāṇa. Hence, *paramārtha* is cessation of concepts where relativity consumes itself. This is the truth, the real nature of things, *tathatā*, the Supreme Doctrine of the Middle Path proclaimed by the master, the Perfect Wisdom – *prajñā-pāramitā* – and the mother of all the enlightened ones.

³¹ MK, XXIV.9.

³² *Ibid.*, XVIII. 9.

³³ MV, 373.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

^{34a} See note 30 above.

³⁵ MK, XVIII. 7.

³⁶ “Absolutism is committed to the doctrine of two truths; for, it makes the distinction between the thing as it is, unrelatively, absolutely, and how it appears in relation to the percipients who look it through views and standpoints.” Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

³⁷ Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1, Introduction.

³⁸ Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvarttani*, 64 (hereafter VV).

³⁹ MV, p. 24.

⁴⁰ *nivṛttam abhidhātavyam nivṛtte cittagocare (anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam {iv??})* (MK, XVIII. 7).

⁴¹ MK, XXX. 19-20, and MV, p. 536. Also see MK, XXV. 22-23 and MV on it.

⁴² *kathan tarhi saṃsāra iti ced ucyate-ātmātmīyāsadgrāha-grastānām bāla-pṛthag{ja??} svarūpā api bhāvāḥ satyataḥ pratibhāsante* (MV, p. 523). This alone can be said to be aspect of the world. For the positive aspect of Nirvāṇa, see MK, XXV. 4-6.

⁴³ *tadā tat tattoam anadhi-gamana-yogena svayam adhigacchanti* (MV, p. 373).

⁴⁴ *astitva-nāstitva-dvaya-vāda-nirāśena tu vāyam nirvāṇa-pura-gāminam advaya-patham vidyota-yāmahe* (MV, p. 329).

⁴⁵How number has been treated as a motif – for the explanation of cosmic process is evidenced by early Greek philosophy. Parmenides, following Xenophanes, declared Being as one, complete and definitive. The Pythagoreans thought that the permanent Being was to be found in numbers. Plato designated his Idea of the Good as the One and attempted to derive from it the duality of infinite and measure (see A. Trendelenburg, *Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina – ex Aristotele Illustrata* [Lipsiae, 1826]). Plotinus thinks that of the “First,” which is exalted above all finite determinations and oppositions, nothing can be predicated in the strict sense. “It is only in an improper sense, in its relation to the world, that it can be designated as the infinite One, as the Good, as the highest Power or Force.” – Dr W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, J. H. Tufts, trans. (2nd ed. rev. and enl. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 245.

In the philosophy of the Renaissance, numbers played a very important part. "The book of nature is written in numbers; the harmony of things is that of the number-system" (*ibid.*, p. 372). Coming down to modern philosophy, the same problem of reality was viewed in terms of monism, dualism, and pluralism. Descartes' mind and matter, Spinoza's one Substance, Leibniz' plurality of monads, and, finally, Hegel's one Absolute show the way in which numbers play a part in the determination of philosophical concepts. Modern logicians like Frege and Russell give a new orientation to number-concept (see B. Russell, *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*). In India, the controversy about the number of ultimate reality dates back to the *Rgveda*. Reality is one but described as many (*ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti* – I.164.46), the episode of the twin birds (I.164.20), and the Nāsadiya Sūkta (RV, X.129), which perhaps thinks in terms of void or zero, give a glimpse of the numerical thinking of the ancient seers. The Upaniṣads abound in discussions about the one and the many. Has the name "Sāṃkhya" anything to do with numbers? Except the two Mīmāṃsās all other systems of orthodox Indian philosophy proceed with the enumeration of various categories, viz., 24 or 25 categories of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, 16 categories of the Nyāya. The Uttara Mīmāṃsā school discusses the relation between the one (*Brahman*) and the many (*jīva-jagat*). That early Buddhism was fond of categorization and counting is evidenced in the Abhidhamma philosophy. The term "*śūnya*," preferred by the Mādhyamikas to designate their concept of reality, therefore assumes importance.

⁴⁶ Number zero is often used to indicate absence of quantity. "We can define all the {??bers} if we know what we mean by '0' and 'successor'" (Russell, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 20). Thus, number 1 can be defined as the successor of 0. But 0 its successor of any number. All the natural numbers, therefore, proceed from 0 (*ibid.*, p. number is defined as a number of terms in a class; number 0 is the number of {te??} which has no member. Since a class is not identical with its member, "0 is the class {wh??ber} is the null-class" (*ibid.*, p. 23). In this light "*śūnya*" will mean a class having {no??} "*ekam*" will mean a class having one member. "*Ekam*" can be explained in terms of {illegible} thus would be inferior to the latter. "*Śūnyam advayam*" is a higher philosophy than *advaitam*." But we are emphatically asked not to take *śūnya* as a notion or concept {Illegible} that, being a class (*jāti* = *sāmānya* = *kalpanā*), is in no way better than other {class-??}

⁴⁷ Zeno is said to be the father of dialectical method, who thereby sought to defend {t??} Being against change and plurality. The object of the Sophists being transformation of {illegible} traditional art to a science, they made themselves the mouthpiece of all the unbridled {te??} undermined social, ethical, and spiritual ideals of life. Dialectic was, in this case, a {dan??} placed in a wrong hand. Socrates, utilizing the sophistry of the Sophists and {employ??} method skillfully, found the essence of knowledge. For Plato, Ideas and their relations are to be found by means of subordination and co-ordination of concepts, which he Aristotle's dialectic searches out the starting points for deduction and the highest {prince??} {??tion}. Identity, difference, and union of that which has been distinguished are the {thr??} the dialectical process, according to Proclus. For Abelard, dialectic has no longer Anselm, following Augustine, prescribed, viz., making the content of faith {compreh??} intellect; he pressed this into the service of critically deciding doubtful cases.

Kant, in his Transcendental Dialectic, employs this method to find out the unconditioned ideas for the totality of all phenomena of the inner sense (soul), of all data of the outer sense (the world), and of all the conditioned in general (God). Dialectical method, for Hegel, helps "to determine the essential nature of particular phenomena by the significance which they have as members or links in the self-unfolding of spirit" (Windleband, *op. cit.*, p. 611). This review of employment of the dialectical method unmistakably shows that (1) dialectic is a synthetic process and (2) aims at proving a thesis. But the Mādhyamikas think that the synthesis of concepts would result in another concept, which they seek to avoid. In the absence of any synthetic aim, the purpose of dialectic would be merely negative. Hence, Nāgārjuna says, "*yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivā' sti me doṣaḥ*" (VV, p. 29). The distinction between dialectical and analytical methods is rooted in synthesis and analysis, respectively. The Mādhyamikas analyse a concept to determine whether it contains some real element, and ultimately come to conclude that it has none. Thus, instead of going upward to some

synthetic unity or the Infinite, they come down to the root, the *śūnya*. In Kantian terminology, no synthetic judgment a priori is ever possible – for the Mādhyamikas.

⁴⁸ The Vedāntic conception of dialectic is well explained in the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, as follows:

*sa vai na devāsura-martya-tiryakṇ
na strī na śaṇḍho na pumān na jantuḥ
nā' yaṁ guṇaḥ karma na san na cā' san
niṣedha-śeṣo jayatād aśeṣaḥ.* (VIII, iv. 214.)

Dialectic simply helps in eliminating misconceptions; whatever remains thus uneliminated would be the One, i.e., without a second. Thus Śaṁkara's *Brahman* is not achieved by means of a dialectical process; it is simply re-discovered. Hence, dialectic has a value only at the empirical level; transcendently, it is also a science rooted in ignorance or *avidyā* – *tasmād avidyā-vad-viśayāṇi eva pratyakṣāṇi pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca* (SB, I.i.1, Introduction). At another place (SB, II.i.11), Śaṁkara paraphrases Bhartrhari, the Grammarian (cp. *Vākyapadiya*, I.34), to the same effect.

⁴⁹ SB, II.ii.28.

⁵⁰ *Ārya-ratna-kūṭa-sūtra*, quoted in MV, p. 338, reads: *tena hyāyusmantaḥ sangāsyāmo na vivadiṣyāmaḥ avivādapavāmo hi śramaṇadharmāḥ*. The *Samādhirāja* also says, *vivāda-prāptyā na duḥkhaṁ praśāmyate. avivāda-prāptya ca dukham nirudhyate* (MV, p. 136). Gauḍapāda, too, maintains the undisputability of this position (see his *Kārikā*, V. 2). This *avivāda* is due to the fact that there is absolutely nothing contradicted even from the so-called higher standpoint (VV, p. 30).

⁵¹ *yasmād astitvaṁ ca nāstitvaṁ cobhayam tat pratiṣiddham tasmān na yuktam bhāvābhāva-darśanam tattvaṁ ityśāthātum* (MV, p. 270).

⁵² "Zero-conceptuality" should be contrasted with "unitary-conceptuality" of the Advaita Vedānta. In the Advaita, the *ātman* is accepted on the strength of indubitable experience, and everything other than *ātman* is shown to be mere appearance, because every such object conceived by us displays doubt. Thus, we start from the one, *ātman*, proceed to examine the many, and in this process invariably find only the one and never the many. Thus, the one also becomes the Infinite (*ananta*). The Real is the One and therefore the Infinite. We may take any point in this Infinite; it will always point to the Infinite as its substratum. The individual is resolved in the Universal, the Infinite, and the One. Concepts always point to the unitary concept of *ātman*. In contrast to this, the Mādhyamikas think that any point in the infinite series is a determination with reference to its preceding point, which in its turn depends upon its own preceding point, and so on until at last the indubitable ground is achieved. Contrary to the Vedāntins, this indubitable ground is not the One, because the One itself depends upon its predecessor, the zero. Instead of going forward to the Infinite, the Mādhyamikas prefer to come backward to the root. If there is a one, there is the possibility of the Infinite because one is the threshold of infinity. If there is only a zero the possibility of infinite altogether vanishes. If any link in the twelve-linked circle of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*) is broken the entire circle ceases to be operative, because the root of it, the zero, is discovered. This origination is rooted in zero, proceeds from it, ends in it, and itself is nothing but an extension of zero. This zero is not infinite, nor is it finite, whereas the Absolute is always infinite and never finite.

¹ In order not to enter into mere technical details, we shall utilise for the Mādhyamika the excellent work by T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Mādhyamika System* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955). (Pages referred to are placed in parentheses.) This paper is not concerned with the Mādhyamika as mystical or religious experience, but only as philosophy in the technical meaning of the Western world today.

² The "underlying reality" would then be the cause of the illusion of the views. This sounds very Vedāntin, but is inconsistent for the Mādhyamika.

³ It is very easy to draw up caricature of philosophy, and then believe we have accomplished the most stupendous revolution.

⁴ *El concepto de naturaleza* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1951), pp. 95 ff.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69. Cf. RF, p. 107.

⁴⁵ PSR, p. 70.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁷ A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 16. Cf. Radhakrishnan's sympathetic and convincing interpretation and defense of Whitehead's definition of religion, IVL, p. 113.

⁴⁸ PSR, p. 81.

¹ Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, Library of Living Philosophers (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1952), p. 13. (Hereafter PSR.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ BS, p. 235.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

¹⁰ PSR, p. 545.

⁴ *The Brahma Sūtra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life*, translated with an Introduction and Notes by S. Radhakrishnan (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 250. (Hereafter BS.)

⁵ PSR, p. 14.

⁶ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealistic View of Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1947), p. 52. (Hereafter IVL.)

¹¹ BS, p. 246.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, with Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*) (Gorakhpur: Gītā Press, 1933), III.1; p. 108.

¹⁴ *Brahma-Sūtra* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*), Narayana Ram Acharya, ed. (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1948), p. 188. (Hereafter ŚB.)

¹⁵ BS, p. 246.

¹⁶ ŚB, I.i.2; p. 8.

¹⁷ BS, p. 242.

¹⁸ *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*) (Gorakhpur: Gītā Press, 1933), p. 14; Introduction, I.i.5.

¹⁹ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*) (Gorakhpur: Gītā Press, 1957), p. 21.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I.i.2; p. 8.

²¹ *Ibid.*, II.i.11; p. 194.

²² BS, p. 243.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

²⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (*Śaṁkara -bhāṣya*) (Gorakhpur: Gītā Press), III.viii.12; p. 21. (Hereafter *Bṛhad* – ŚB.)

³⁰ ŚB, I.i.12; p. 34.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I.i.27; p. 214.

³² *Ibid.*, II.i.14; p. 201

³³ *Ibid.*, II.i.14; p. 199.

³⁴ PSR, p. 64.

³⁵ *Bṛhad* – ŚB, III.viii.12; p. 199.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I.i.5; p. 27.

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- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, II.i.14, p. 201.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, I.i.5; p. 27.
- ³⁹ *Aitareya Upaniṣad* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*) (Gorakhpur: Gītā Press, 1937), pp. 25-26.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *SB*, II.i.14; p. 201.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, I.iv.3; p. 149.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, I.iv.9; p. 157.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, II.i.14; p. 200. See also II.i.27; p. 213.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, II.i.14; p. 200.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya*), I.7.
- ⁵⁰ *PSR*, p. 39.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- ⁵⁴ S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 31. (Hereafter *ER*.)
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷ *IVL*, p. 110.
- ⁵⁸ S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West in Religion* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933), p. 137. (Hereafter *EWR*.)
- ⁵⁹ *IVL*, p. 71.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶² *Ibid.*
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 313.
- ⁶⁴ *BS*, p. 236.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- ⁶⁶ *SB*, I. i. 2; p. 7.
- ⁶⁷ *Bṛhad-SB*, I. v. 2.
- ⁶⁸ *SB*, I. iv. 14; p. 163; II. i. 14; p. 200.
- ⁶⁹ *IVL*, p. 110.
- ⁷⁰ *ŚB*, II. i. 14; p. 199.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, I. iv. 9; p. 157. *saiva daivī śaktih*.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 3; p. 149.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *Bṛhad-SB*, V. i. 1.
- ⁷⁶ *ŚB*, I. iv. 14.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, II. i. 22.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I. iv. 14.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II. i. 14.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II. i. 28. See also *Bhāmatī*, on II. i. 28.
- ⁸¹ *PSR*, p. 800.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*
- ⁸³ *IVL*, p. 110.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338.
- ⁸⁵ *PSR*, p. 41.

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- ⁸⁶ *IVL*, p. 87.
⁸⁷ *PSR*, p. 40.
⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.
⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.
⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.
⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 44; *ŚB*, I. iv. 14.
⁹³ *EWR*, p. 31.
⁹⁴ *BS*, p. 142.
⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.
⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 157.
⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.
⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.
¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157.
¹⁰² *Ibid.*
¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 189.
¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 140.
¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.
¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 150
¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 141.
¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*
¹¹⁰ *ŚB*, I. iii. 25.
¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, I. iii. 19; pp. 111-115.
¹¹² *Ibid.*, I. iii. 19.
¹¹³ *Ibid.*, II. iii. 17.
¹¹⁴ *IVL*, p. 306.
¹¹⁵ *BS*, p. 145.
¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 148.
¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 144.
¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 149.
¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.
¹²⁰ *Ibid.*
¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 147.
¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 210.
¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 207.
¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.
¹²⁵ *IVL*, p. 306.
¹²⁶ *PSR*, p. 799.
¹²⁷ *BS*, I. i. 31; p. 61.
¹²⁸ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (Śaṁkara-bhāṣya)*, Commentary, III. ii. 8.
¹²⁹ *PSR*, p. 799.
¹³⁰ *ŚB*, I. iii. 19.
¹³¹ *BS*, p. 215.
¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 216.
¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 189.
¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.
¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, IV. 1.15.

¹³⁶ ER, p. 37.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹ D.T. Suzuki, *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

¹ This comment pertains to *Ch'an and Zen Teaching*, edited and translated by Charles Luk, Series Three (London: Rider & Co., 1960-1962). A review of this book appeared in Vol. XIII (2), July, 1963, of this Journal.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹ Jnyāneshwara, *Anubhavāmṛita* (Poona: Chitrashālā Prakāshan, 1956), IX, 19-20.

² I have discussed how this happens in my book *Yoga and Personality* (Allahabad: Udayana Publishers, 1967).

¹¹ The orthodox Jaina view is that there is no contradiction in the *avaktavya* because the contradictories are not absolute but relative to conditions. Cf. *Syādvādamāñjari*, stanza 24, *upādhibhedopahitaṃ viruddham*. But the point is that even if the contradictories are relative, they are simultaneous and hence there will be at least relative contradiction.

¹² T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 129.

¹³ Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), Vol. I, p. 17. "This method looks like an answer to the Mādhyamika method of proving the 'inexpressible' character of absolute reality by reducing its every possible predicate *ad absurdum* and thus reducing empirical reality to a mirage."

¹⁴ Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁵ E. Gellner, *The Words and Things* (London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1959), p. 265.

¹⁶ Cf., *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II. 4: *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*.

¹⁷ The *viśeṣas* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and the *svalakṣaṇas* of the Buddhist are also inexpressible because they are absolutely particular and unique, but they are not empirical entities.

¹⁸ Bhattacharyya, *op. cit.*, p. 341-342.

¹⁹ Dhruva, *op. cit.*, p. 127. *tādṛśāsya śabdasya asambhavāt avaktavyam*.

⁴ T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Time and the Timeless* (Madras: Upanishad Vihar, 1953), p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, preface, p. vi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸ This doctrine is Upaniṣadic; see the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣads*. The above interpretation of these Upaniṣads is the one accepted by Advaita Vedānta.

⁹ *Faust*, Part I, the Study scene. Goethe voices his opinions through Mephistopheles, but they are Goethe's own ironical thoughts on the subject-matter of the university curriculum.

¹⁰ The Communists, of course, believe their system is scientific sociology; only idealism is metaphysical.

¹¹ M. K. Gandhi, "M. K. Gandhi" (description of his own philosophy in his own words), in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J.H. Muirhead (rev. and enl. ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), p.21.

¹² Gandhi memorized and recited daily in his prayers chapter 2 of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. This chapter describes the *sthitaprajña* (the man of steady wisdom). In his autobiography he quotes his favorite passage from this chapter:

For a man who is fasting his senses
Outwardly, the sense-objects disappear,
Leaving the yearning behind; but when
He has seen the highest,
Even the yearning disappears.

See M. K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, trans. Mahadev Desai (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 332.

¹³ Carl Becker, *Everyman His Own Historian* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1935).

¹⁴ Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1938), pp. 298-300.

¹⁵ For a fuller account of critical approaches to philosophy of history see Grace Cairns, *Philosophies of History* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962), pp. 456-476.

¹⁶ Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 194.

¹⁷ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1934-61), VII, 416.

¹ Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?," in *Existence and Being*, trans. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949), p. 339.

² *Ibid.*, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 357

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁸ *Ibid.*,

⁹ John Anderson, introduction to *Discourse on Thinking*, by Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, *I dentity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 16.

¹² Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?," p. 349.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, trans Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁶ Daisetz T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, 1st ser. (New York: Grove Press, 1949), p. 230.

¹⁷ *What Is Called Thinking?*, p. 12.

¹⁸ The double truth consists of a common truth and a higher truth. The higher truth on the first level is negated and becomes the common truth on the second level. The higher truth on the second level is negated and becomes the common truth on the third level. The higher truth on the third level reaches the extreme of logical negation. The complexity of this higher truth may be illustrated in the following formula: The mind is both not-existence and not nonexistence and, simultaneously, it is neither not-existence nor not nonexistence.

¹⁹ The Hua-yen concept of the simultaneous unimpeded mutual solution among particularities may be illustrated as follows: One enters into one by taking-in one; one enters into all by taking-in all. All enters into one by taking-in all all enters into all by taking-in all. Finally, we have not only one is in all, or all is in one, but one is all, all is one.