A D V A N C E D

P H I L O S O P H I C A L

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J.N. CHUBB.

LIBERATION ACCORDING TO SANKARA.

The Advaitism of Sankara holds a unique place in Indian Philosophy. For sheer dialectical skill it is unparalleled, while as a vision of life it comes as the culmination of centuries of experiments and struggles in the domain of Spirit. Though in characterising this world as a shadow it is anticipated by SunyaVada school of Buddhism, it corrects the purely negative attitude of the latter by affirming that a Reality lies concealed in the shadows, that beyond the darkness of the world shines the incorruptible and self-effulgent Brahman. Sankara lays his whole emphasis on the transcendence of Brahman which he regards as the sole reality constituting the inward self of all. This spiritual principle which is formless and characterless (Nirguna), and free from all taint of finiteness permeates the entire universe. For Sankara the Nirguna Brahman is not a mere hypothesis, a pious belief, based on the authority of a revelation (Sruti). It is a logical necessity and its existence is postulated by every atom of one's experience. As Bradley, Sankara indulges in a negative dialectic against all forms of concrete and relational experience and branding these as ultimately unintelligible (anirvaciniya) and therefore illusory (mithya), he gradually works his way up to an abstract non-relation Absolute. Sankara, however, appears to be more consistent than Bradley in denying that the contradictions of experience are somehow resolved in the Absolute and that therefore every item of experience enters as an element in a self-consistent whole. For Sankara the presence of contradiction in experience means that the experience transcends itself that that as such, i.e. as concrete and relational, it has to be negated as an illusion,

Thus, while for Bradley the finite as such is taken up and transformed in the Absolute, for Sankara the finite essence of the infinite itself, its distinction from the latter being ultimately false.

The identification of the finite self with the Absolute distinguishes Sankara's system from other forms of Absolutism. The goal of the finite, as Sankara defines it, is liberation (moksha) which consists in attaining identity with the Infinite through the negation of its finite. Strictly speaking, there is no attachment in liberation. The self's identity with the Absolute is the ultimate fact, only the ignorance (avidya) which conceals it from us has to be removed. For Sankara the root of ignorance is that which creates the dream of finiteness, and hence liberation from ignorance consists in passing beyond the concrete expressions of life into a Transcendence where all the conditions of relative existence disappear.

The philosophy of Sankara has been criticised from many points of view. I shall not consider here the objections that attempt to show his theory to be logically indefensible. The main reason it can never become acceptable to the mass of mankind is that it seems to cause not merely a logical but a general dissatisfaction. Even if its logic is irresistible it carries no conviction to the heart. It is believed that in renouncing our familiar world in which we live and have our being, together with our felt individuality, we are forsaking that which to a great extent is intelligible to us and which ministers to our needs, for the doubtful pleasure of merging our individuality in a vast void, a transcendent emptiness, in which all that we know, feel and under-

stand is blotted out of existence.

Sankara, however, recognizes stages of spiritual realization. The experience of complete non-dualism comes, not as a bolt from the blue, but at the end of the spiritual quest. It is only when the soul, passing through the various phases of religious experience, dares to take the final step, that it enters into the Peace of Silence. Sankara, therefore, does not deny the validity of any mystic experience that falls short of the ecstatic intuition of the Pure Self, but declares that there is a stage beyond in which the last vestige of finiteness is effaced. We have no means of judging at this level of our spiritual consciousness whether that exalted intuition is worth having or not. "The heresy of individuality" consists in the belief that this individual complex we call the self constitutes our true Being. Sankara declares individuality to be a "fiction of neiscience" in transcending which alone the Self in its purity and unlimited freedom is cognized.

Liberation (Moksha) is thus the disintegration of personality, the loss of the empirical self with its finite interests in a world of finite things. It is entering the vast desert of Silence, above the noise of words and beyond the disturbance of thought. To the flesh-bound vision of the ignorant, the pure Self is but an unfilled void, a fathomless depth of Nothingness. Indeed, so it must necessarily appear until the soul renounces its individuality and enters into that tabernacle of "Nothingness". It may then find that it is a void only in relation to the empirical determinations and that it is filled with its own Light and Glory, in comparison with which the light of

this world is but darkness. The Absolute repels us because it does not respond to our purely finite needs, and remains supremely indifferent to our hopes and aspirations. But once we realize that our true being is rooted, not in the concrete expressions of life but in transcendence, above joy and sorrow, achievement and failure, our cravings and limited desires drop off from us and we seek peace and rest in the Absolute. We relinquish our hold on things finite, and place the supreme value of the soul, not in the chance of life but in the silence of transcendence. We cannot say with James, "I am finite once and for all, and all the categories of my sympathy are knit up with the finite world as such and with things that have a history." The Self is not in its essence finite and immersed in the string of time. Its history through time it understands as a limitation which it has to overcome and not its essential nature. While, therefore, the Self seems to move about in the world of changing things, it has its being rooted in Eternity.

The finite, as such, is a dynamic existence. Its dynamism is the expression of a restlessness or discontent that pervades its being. The finite seeks satisfaction and peace. It finds itself hemmed in by limitations but it feels also the urge for freedom. It seeks to rise to a point of view from which the conflicts of existence disappear, and this means that it attempts to pass beyond its finitude. Nothing save the Infinite or unlimited can satisfy the finite. "The Infinite is bliss, there is no bliss in things finite." The evanscent expressions of life enthral us for a time, but they cannot

have a permanent hold on the seeking soul which does not stop its upward flight until the last barrier in the way of its complete transcendence is overcome. Thus the Aitareya Upanishad declares: "Whatever he reaches he wishes to go beyond." The fruits of realisation drop one after another from the tree of life, but the soul is satisfied only when it has tasted the bliss of Transcendence. It continues to soar upward until the finite world drops from its vision and it finds itself breathing in the Expanse! The joys and sorrows of life are then blotted out in this expanse of Ananda and all differences are replaced by the vision of Identity.

This, according to Sankara, is the final destiny of the human Soul. Not an immortal life after death in some region of happiness, not even a sharing in the eternal life of God, but a transcendent aloofness and isolation. The Self stands as a witness of, and not a participant in, the cosmic drama, and it has nothing to gain nor to lose by the changing fortunes of the world. So long, however, as the Self is under the sway of ignorance it has to stir itself into a life of activity to break through its initial limitations. Within the real of illusion Sankara does not deny the dynamism of life and the need for a constant vigil against the temptations of the world. He does not upset the existing moral order or undermine our ethical values, but only seeks to bo beyond them in the final realisation.

Indeed, as I have pointed out, Sankara does not deny the varieties of religious experience in the proper place. He does not overlook the finer urges, the music and rhythm of life. There are in this universe hidden springs of

harmony and joy which enthral and captivate the soul in its onward march. It hears the Divine Symphony and attunes itself with the moving spirit of the universe. These rich spiritual experiences are perfectly valid so long as the soul does not awaken from the dream of finiteness. But Sankara points out that beyond the music of life there is the Silence of Ananda.

Sankara thus in the last resort denies the values of relative existence. He exhorts us to keep the Ideal of Transcendence constantly in the foreground, even while living the life of fellowship and service or testing the bliss of communion with God. To him the final awakening is the opening of a new dimension of being, beyond the touch of relativity. When the truth dawns, society with its institutions is swept away, nay this entire world. Name and Form with all that there is in it vanishes and leaves not a track behind. Even those few illumined souls who have gained an access into it are not able to void its Glory. Speech fails completely, and the staggers and reels and the easy articulate words that the sage on the brink of realizing truth utters, is that it is Neti, Neti,--not this, not this.

C. MAHADEVIAH.(in Vedanta Kesari)

IS OUR LIFE A DREAM?

Poets and philosophers, mystics and metaphysicians have, with one voice, declared that this life is a mere dream; and people who pride themselves in their sound commonsense have always treated the statement with contemptuous indifference. Even some poets like Longfellow have said: "Tell me not in mournful numbers, Life is but an empty dream." So, it seems worthwhile to go a bit deeply into this question

and find out exactly how much of truth it contains or whether it is at all true in any sense.

The first step is to note the similarities and the differences between waking and dream. It is not possible to say that there is absolutely no difference between the two, for, in that case, they would become identical and the two words, "waking" and "dream" would become unnecessary to denote them. But the similarities between the two are so numerous that it is better to exhaust them before going into the difference between them. In dream we have a complete universe as we have in waking. We have our sun and moon, stars and planets, land and sea, mountains and rivers, forest and meadows, beasts and birds, towns and villages, trains and cars. We have human denizens inhabiting our world. We have our wives and children, our land and king, our friends and foes, our joys and sorrows. We weep and laugh. We sleep and dream, just as we do in waking. We have memory of a long past and expectation of a distinct future. If it is said that some things in dream are incongruous like a man seeing his own back and so forth, the reply is that they are not incongruities so far as the dream universe is concerned, that they appear to be so when contrasted with the standards of waking and that those of waking would appear as much incongruous when contrasted with the standards of dream.

Though there are so many similarities between waking and dream, the difference between them is not far to seek. Generally it is said that dream is stultified whereas waking is not. Though there is some truth in this statement, it is not correctly expressed. The first point

to remember is that what we now call dream was as real as waking, was, in fact, waking while it lasted. Now that it is past and has become stultified, we call it a dream. Even as the state before us is waking, dream was also waking while it was before us. Hence, it is more correct to define waking as a present state and dream as a past state. It may be said that yesterday's waking is a past state, but it is not dream. But what is called yesterday's state is no state at all but only a memory which persists in the present waking. It belongs to what is called to-day's waking as memory of past events. Moreover, I know that I am living in the same universe as I did yesterday, whereas the dream universe is distinct from the waking universe, since it cannot be located anywhere in the latter. Besides, we have to remember that dream has also its yesterday and yesterday's waking state. So, instead of saying that we pass from dream to waking it would be more correct to say that we pass from waking to another and declare the previous waking to be dream. Beyond this difference of present and past, waking and dream cannot be shown to differ on any point.

Now it is clear that it is meaningless to say waking is a state which is not stultified. Waking is always a present state and it is not possible for a state to be both present and be stultified at the same time. The moment it is stultified it is past and so long as it is present it cannot be stultified. So, the argument that the present state is waking because it is not stultified, cannot hold good. If it does, it applies with equal force to dream, for we could assert, while dream lasted, that it

was waking because it was not stultified.

What is it that is meant when life is called unreal like dream. Longfellow quoted above further says, "Life is real, life is earnest." Now why do we say that dream is unreal? It is because the world observed in a dream vanishes into nother. It cannot be imagined to exist anywhere. It cannot be located anywhere in the waking world. It has simply dwindled into nothing. In other words, we call dream unreal because it is stultified. If so, then it is clear that waking cannot be unreal in the same sense. For we have already shown that waking being always a present state, it is not possible to speak of its stultification.

Let us go a little deeper into the question. Sleep overcomes us. Soon we feel we are awake. We have a world before us. We are subjected to great suffering. Perhaps, we lose our dear ones. We seep bitterly. We beat our breast. We tear our hair.. But soon we awake. We come to know it was all a dream. Then our tears give place to irrepressible laughter. We laugh at the whole show, in fact, we enjoy it. We relate it to our friends and enjoy it still more. Now, who is it that wept in dream and laughs when awake? The two cannot be identical, for if I wept because I was lost, then I must laugh because I gain. But here I have gained nothing. I have simply come to know that it was all a dream and I laugh; what is more, I enjoy my previous weeping. Surely the one that laughs now cannot be the same that wept a moment ago. But can I say that it was not I who dreamt but some one else? Certainly not. How then is this dilemma to be solved?

Let us think of an actor on the stage. Suppose he is acting the part of a king. In the

he loses his wife and he weeps bitterly. Suppose at the moment he forgets that he is so-and-so and imagines that he is that king in the story. Then he really weeps and is unhappy. But the moment he goes to the green-room he remembers who really he is and begins to enjoy his weeping on the stage. He feels elated that he acted so well. Our waking from a dream is like going to the green-room from the state. We remember that our real nature is that of the witness of the dream state. For though the dream has vanished along with the ego who suffered and wept, we survive. We now realise that we, the witness, forgot our real nature while we dreamt wrongly identified ourselves with the dream ego. Hence our enjoyment of the whole show.

Now think of an actor who, even while on the stage, does not forget that he is really so and so, and that he is only acting the part of a king. He still weeps--as he has to do it--but he enjoys it even while he weeps. It is not necessary for him that the scene should end if has to enjoy his acting. Even so the wise man does not forget his real nature as witness even while he is awake, that is when the state is present; whereas the ordinary man, like the other actor is ignorant of his real nature as witness while the state is present but comes to know of it only when the state is past. But the wise man knows that even while he is awake he is really witnessing the ego which suffers and enjoys, weeps and laughs as he did when he was awake in dream.

Now, let us place ourselves in the position of the witness which we really are, and view the dream and waking states. The dream state

has vanished into nothing. But the witness is still here. It is now witnessing the waking state even as it was witnessing the dream state while the dream lasted. If we consider the matter well, we shall find that it is not possible to say that the witness did not exist at any time for to note its non-existence at the time another witness would be required and so on ad infinitum. If we call that real whose non-existence cannot even be imagined, then the witness is supremely real. And compared with the witness the dream state as well as the waking state cannot be real. For we know that the dream world cannot be located anywhere in the waking world and even so the waking world cannot be located anywhere in the dream world. They are mutually exclusive. One does not and cannot exist while the other is present. So we can speak, nay, we know of, of a time when either of them did not exist. So they cannot be real as the witness whose non-existence cannot even be imagined. Anything less than real must be unreal. We cannot speak of a thing as half real or three-fourths real. In this sense, compared with the witness, waking is as unreal as dream.

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BENJAMIN GINBURG.

CAN PHILOSOPHY COME BACK.^

Our age has not been an age of philosophy and in fact the very idea of philosophy as an intellectual discipline is held in disrepute in may countries, particularly in The United States. One has only to compare the amount of newspaper interest devoted to a congress of philosophers and that devoted to a congress of scientists.

Were philosophy a specialised art or a specialised science, one might accept its present low status as one of the vicissitudes of time and wait for a turn of the wheel. Thus at certain periods of particular science such as physics has been in the ascendent among the whole group of sciences; at other times biology has been in the ascendant and physics has been in the backward. This does not raise a problem, any more than the fact that one age has specially cultivated music while another age has cultivated the plastic arts.

But philosophy cannot be regarded in that light. It is not a specialised discipline, but a general approach to human experience. For this reason its present backwardness must mean either one of two things. Either the philosophical approach is thoroughly and radically bankrupt, and humanity should actively abandon philosophy as a useless and mischievous dissipation of energy; or else it is not the philosophical approach that is bankrupt, but social and cultural conditions, in which case it becomes our duty to sound an intellectual call to arms.

Nearly a hundred years ago, Auguste Comte formulated a law of history which in effect doomed philosophy as an obselete method of thinking. First, he said, there came the theological stage of thought, then the metaphysical, and finally, in modern times, the scientific stage. The implication of this law is that philosophy has now to give way to scientific specialisation and this has indeed been the feeling of modern times, although few have attempted to express this feeling in in a reasoned intellectual form, in the manner

of Comte. Only recently H.G.Wells gave public expression to this belief when he said that the value of science lay in the fact that it offered us an escape from philosophy and religion, both of which will eventually have to be abandoned as unsuitable for our essentially practical minds.

Wide-spread at this point of view, is, it does not stand up under any sort of critical examination. In fact it is self-refuting as soon as it is recognised that knowledge and thoughts require not only analytic specialisation but also synthesis and critical reflection on fundamental principles. It does not matter by whom this work of synthesis and reflection is carried on; the point is that it is essential part--if not the most important part--of the intellectual process, and that this phase of the process has a different look and different characteristics from those suggested at the commencement of specialisation and quest for facts. Critical reflection cannot of necessity possess the same character of fixity and positiveness as scientific fact-finding in which no questions of principles are involved.

It may be said that the whole idea of regarding the knowledge process as the dividing up of a field into so many specialised scientific homesteads grew up at a time when the fundamental principles of science were for the moment so stable that they did not need to be discussed or cirticised. But in a period of accelerated scientific progress, like the present, it becomes apparent that there are no fixed fundamental principles and that the scientific process taken as a whole involves philosophical reflection on fundamental cate-

gories concurrently with the quest for specific facts. Einstein confesses that he derived the idea of applying a new geometry in physics from reading the philosophic writing of Henri Poincare, who in turn followed out a line of critical enquiry begum by Kant. Similarly the German physicist, Max Planck, concludes a survey of the new Quantum physics with the advice that physicists consult the views and ideas of the great philosoohers on the problems connected with the determinism and causality. Obviously, the advice was not offered on the cry that philosophers possess some power of mystical illumination not given to experimental scientists. Rather it was given with the realisation that the experimental facts involve fundamental categories whose relationship had been the subject of reflective study by the great thinkers.

Once it is recognised that even natural science involves philosophic criticism, the whole perspective with regard to the social sciences must undergo radical change. A great part of the energy of social scientists has been spent not in collecting facts or in systematising principles, but in a sort of attempt to run away from philosophical ideas in order better to live up to the stage conception of science. A recent historian of experimental psychology publicly admits that experimental psychologists have sought to run away from philosophy and have in consequence merely passed off bad philosophy under the lable of scientific psychology. But instead of asking psychologists to master the philosophic problems involved in their science the same historian wants psychologists in the future to leave philosophy completely and severely alone.

If physicists have been able to get along without worrying about what the philosopher says, why should not psychologists? The answer is, in the first place, that physicists have not been able to keep entirely away from philosophy, and in the second place, that in psychology there happens to be less natural leeway for routine specialisation without philosophical reflection, than in the physical or biological sciences. What is true of psychology is true of all the social sciences, as a class.

In addition to the value of philosophical criticism in connection with both the natural and social sciences, there is the far more important value of philosophy in crystalising the spirit of social disinterestedness and idealism, on which all ethics, all orderly life in society must depend. Thought, consciousness, is not merely a tool for achieving greater knowledge of the external world and for helping us to manipulate external objects more successfully; it is also the source of that movement of unification between man and man which tempers our biological selfishness to fit a framework of ideal interests and social sympathies. In the past this function of unifying idealism was filled by religion, which is after all a rough and rather naive philosophy of human experiences. To-day religion has broken down, largely because its institutional commitments prevent it from modernising its ideas in line with the progress of scientific knowledge. But while religion has brken down, it does not follow that the need of crystallising a moral and social consciousness has disappeared. Quite on the contrary, the need is greater than ever

because we can no longer count upon the passive inertia of habit and custom, or upon the instinctive fear of the supernatural to instil a semblance or order in human affairs. To-day men need to be convinced by reason, and the only tupe of reason which is here convincing is to show, both by logic and by example, that man as a conscious being has interests far transcending his biological apetites. And who can undertake such a demonstration and its practical application in concrete problems except the philosopher who is interested in studying the total place of reason in human experience and who has no commitments except to seek the truth.

No, it is not because the philosophic approach is bankrupt or because philosophy has no longer any functions to fulfil, that philosophy does not flourish to-day. The reason is in part the intellectual confusion that has developed around the success of science, but in greater part it is the mechanisation of social life which has intensified the practical struggle for existence and has left less and less place for disinterested thought and disinterested leadership. Human nature is about the same as it was always been: there there are the same idealistic instincts as in the past. But the important fact is that it is harder to philosophise to-day because of the increase of man's knowledge and perspective, but even before the state of thought is reached it has become tremendously more difficult to put oneself physically in a position to think honestly and disinterestedly. And in this problem of making a living, disinterested thinking is quite useless--useless to the individual as an economic weapon for gaining a living and meaningless to

to a public that is exhausted with economic cares. Science, to be sure, constitutes an exception to the rule but it is only by accident that disinterestedness and scientific thinking has been fitted into the machine.

In the case of philosophy it is idle to suggest as an economic calling and endow more philosophical chairs in the universities. For a while science can flourish as an endowed speciality, philosophy is too closely connected with the social consciousness to be able to exist as a specialised calling unsupported by direct public participation. The condition of philosophy in the universities to-day is a mute testimonial to this truth. Philosophy has become a museum speciality, a life-less play of systems and concepts to which the public can point in derision to justify its comtempt for it. Philosophy will not flower until our present high strung economic life gives way to a regime in which it will be possible to cultivate the love of wisdom.

Fortunately, there are signs that our economic Frankenstein is to break down from its own internal weakness. The fate of philosophy is thus tied up with the fate of social reform. And it becomes more than ever the duty of those who can muster disinterested thought at a time when such thought is at a premium, to work for a new society, a society in which there will be room for reason and in which the administration will be in the hands of reason.

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PHILOSOPHICAL SANSKRIT WORDS & MEANINGS.

(BY. P.N.SRINIVASACHARI.)

ABHEDA: Non-difference.
ABHINNA: Undifferentiated.
ABHIVYAKTA: Manifested.
ABHYASA: Practice (of Yoga or meditation.
ACETANA: Non-sentient.
ACINTYA: Inconceivable.
ADESA: (object of) instruction.
ADHARA: Ground; support.
ADHIKARANA: A set of Sutras dealing with a single topic.
ADHIKARIBHEDA: Diversity of qualification.
ADHYASA: Super-imposition.
ADVAITA: Oneness, identity between the self & Brahman.
AGNANA: Nescience.
AGNANA: Ignorance.
AHAM: I.
AHAMKARA: The egoistic principle.
AIKYA: Oneness, identity.
AHAM BRAHMA ASMI: I am Brahman.
AJA: Unborn.
AKSARA: Imperishable; primordial matter.
ALAYAVIGNANA; Consciousness apparently static.
AMRTA: Immortality.
AMSA: Part or element.
AMURTA: Formless; subtle.
ANABHIVYAKTA: Potential, not manifest.
ANADI; Beginningless.
ANANTAM: Infinite.
ANANYA: Not different.
APAPEKSA: Independent.
ANAVASTHA: Infinite regress.
ANIRVACANIYATVA: Indefinability.
ANITYA: Non-eternal.
ANNAMAYA: (The body) composed of food; Material body.
ANTARYAMIN: Indwelling Self.

ANUMANA: Inference.
ANUSMRTI: Remembrance.
ANUVADA: Mere repetition.
APARAMARTHIKA: Unreal.
APARA VIDYA: Lower knowledge.
APAROKSA: Immediate; direct
APAURUSEYA: Impersonal
APAVARGA: Release from Samsara.
APREKRTA: Not material.
APUNARAVRTTI: Non-return.
ARCIRADIMARGA: The path to Moksha.
ARJAVA: Straight-forwardness.
AROHA: Ascent.
ARTHAVADA: Glorificatory or condemnatory passage not to be taken literally.
ASADBHAVA: Non-being.
ASAMAVAYIKARANA: Non-inherent cause.
ASAT: The changeable, i.e. matter.
ASATYA: Unreal.
ASIDDHA: Unestablished.
ASRAMAS: Stages in the life of a twice born.
ASRAYA; Locus.
ASTHULA: Not gross.
ATMAGNANA: Knowledge of self.
ATMANUBHAVA: Experience of the self.
AVARANASAKTI: Capacity to conceal.
AVAROHA: Descent.
AVASTHABHEDA: Difference in condition.
AVASTU: Non-substantial.
AVAYAVA: Part.
AVIBHAGA: Inseparability.
AVIDVAN' One who has no Brahma Vidya.
AVIDYA; Nescience.
AVYAKTA: Unmanifest.

BANDHA: Bondage.
BHASYA: Commentary, generally on the basic Sutras.

MANANA: Thinking over.
MANTAVYAH: Sould be reflected on.
MANTRADRASTARAH: Seers of the Vedic hymns intuiting the Vedic truths.
MAUNI: One who silently meditates on self.
MAYA: Cosmic illusion.
MITHYA: False.
MITHYOPADHI: False limitation.
MOHA: Confusion.
MOKSA: Release from the cycle of births and deaths.
MULAVIDYA: Primordial nescience.
MUMUKSU: One who longs for Moksa.
MURTA: Having form, evolved.
NAISTHIKA-BRAHMACARIN: One vowed to celibacy.
NAMARUPA: Name and form.
NANAJIVA-VADA: Theory of plurality of selves.
NETI: Not so.
NIDIDHYASITAVYAH: Sould be meditated on.
NIRAKARA: Without form.
NIRANJANA: Without blemish.
NIRAVADHIKAISVARYA: Infinite glory.
NIRAVADYA: Faultless.
NIRGUNA-BRAHMAN: Attributeless Absolute or the Indeterminate Being.
NIRVANA: Buddhistic idea of release; a state relationless thought.
NIRVISESA: Attributeless.
NISCAYA-GNANA: Determinate knowledge.
NISKAMA-KARMA: Disinterested action.
NISSAMBODHA: Indeterminate consciousness.
NITYA: Eternal.
NITYAKARMA: Obligatory duty.
NYASA: Renunciation.
NYAYA: Reasoning.
PARA: The infinite.
PARAMANU: Irreducible atom.
PARAMARTHIKA: Transcendental; as absolutely real.

PARAMATMAN: ◊
PARAMESWARA: ◊ The Supreme Self.
of Brahman.
PARAM-JOTIS: Supreme Light.
PARATANTRA: Dependent.
PARAVIDYA: The higher knowledge.
PARINAMAVADA: The theory that the Absolute transforms itself into the world.
PARIVRAJAKA: A Sannyasin: one who has renounced the world.
PAROKSA: Mediate.
PRADHANA: Primordial Matter.
PRAKARA: The relation of the finite self to the supreme Self according to Ramanuja.
PRAKARANA: Context.
PRALAYA: Dissolution of the world.
PRANA: Life, the vital principle.
PRAPAKA: One who attains an end.
PRAPANCA-NASANA: Annihilation of the world.
PRAPANNA: A person who has absolutely surrendered himself to divine grace.
PRAPTI: Attainment.
PRAPYA: That which is to be attained.
PRARABDHA KARMA: Karma that has begun to bear fruit.
PRATIGNA: A thesis to be proved.
PRATYAKSA: Sense perception.
PRAYATNA: Effort.
PRAYOJANA: End in view.
PRATYAKTVA: Self-awareness.
RAGA: Desire.
RAJAS: One of the three constituents of prakrt indicating energy and activity, the other two being satva and tamas.
SADHANA-CATUSTAYA: Four-fold qualifications according to Sankara for knowing Brahman.
SADYO-MUKTI: Immediate release.
SAGUNA-BRAHMAN: Brahman with attributes.
SAJATIYA: Of the same kind.

SADVIDYA: Meditation on Brahman as the Sat without a second as described in the Chhandogyopanisad.

SAKARA: With form.

SAKSIN: Witness.

SAKTI: Potency.

SAMATVA: Equality.

SAMUDAYA-SATYA: The apparent reality of the aggregate the Phenomenalistic theory of the Buddhists.

SAMYA: Similarity.

SANKHYA: One of the six systems of the Indian Philosophy traced to Kapila; a follower of this school.

SAMSARA: The world of empirical experience.

SANDHYOPASANA: The daily worship of God at Sun-rise and sunset prescribed for the dvijas.

SANMATRAVADIN: One who holds the theory of the Absolute as mere Being.

SAPTABHANGI: The Jaina theory of seven kind of relative predication.

SARVAGATA: All-pervading.

SARVAGNA: Omnisient.

SARVAKARMATYAGA: Renunciation of all actions.

SASAMBODHA: Determinate consciousness.

SATTVA: One of the three constituents of prakriti, indicating goodness or harmony.

SATYA: Real.

SATYAKAMAH: One who loves the good; the Being with eternal perfections.

SATYASANKALPAH: One who wills the true: One whose will is always realised.

SATYASYA SATYA: The true of the true, Real Reality.

SATYOPADHI: True limitation as opposed to mithyopadhi or false limiting adjuncts.

KARIKA- Concise statement in verse of (especially philosophical and grammatical) doctrines.

MANDUKYA--Probably from Manduka i.e. derived from the Mandukas--a Vedic school.

SAMHITA--A text treated according to euphonic rules (especially the real continuous text of the Vedas as formed out of the padas or separate words by proper phonetic changes.)

(translated by Swami Isvarananda)

AVIDYA: Nescience, ignorance.
VIDYA: Knowledge of the Truth.
MOKSHA: Freedom of the self or liberation.
SUSHUPTI: Deep sleep, dreamless sleep.
PARAMATMA: The Supreme Self, the Absolute, free from all limiting adjuncts of the individual self.
JEEVATMA: The individual self.
BRAHMAJNANI: Knower of Brahman.
SUSHKA TARKA,: dry logic(i.e. based on
KEVALA TARKA,:mere logic(mere assumptions.
ANUBHAIGATVENA TARKA: Logic based on the evidence of experience.
ATMALABHA: Realisation of the Self.
VRITTIVISMARANAM: Non-cognition of the modifications of mind or mental states.
SAMADHI: Trance.
SARVATMATVAM: The state or fact of being all.

JNANI: the Knower of the Self.

UPADHIS: Limiting adjuncts.
AGRAHANA: Non-perception.
GRAHANA: Perception.
VISESHA VIJNANA: Particular perception, particular consciousness.
ADWAITANUBHAVA: experience of nonduality
AVISESHA VIJNANA: Consciousness without perception of particulars; objectless consciousness; unmodified consciousness.
SARVA AGRAHANAM: Total or entire non-cognition.
SARVATMABHAVA: The fact or state of being all; the knowledge of being all.
TATTVAGRAHANAM. The knowledge or apprehension of the Truth.
ANYATHA GRAHANAM: Misapprehension or false knowledge or wrong knowledge of the Reality.
Tattva; Reality, the thing as it is, Truth.
JNANADWAYAM: Nonduality of Consciousness.
ADWAITA JNANA: Knowledge of nonduality.
ANIRVACHANIYA: inexplicable.
SRUTI: The scripture; the Upanishads.
BRAHMA LOKA: The plane of the Absolute, the Absolute itself.
JIVA: individual self; the creature.
TATTVAMASI: Thou art That.
TATVABODHA: Knowledge of the Truth or Reality.
VICHARA: Reason; enquiry.
ANUBHAVA: experience.
SAMYAG JNANA: Scientific knowledge.
BRAHMANUBHAVA: Experience of Brahman or the absolute.

SAVADHIKA: Limited.
SIDDHANTA: The establishment of a theory by dialectic refutation of rival theories.
SIDDHAPARAVAKYA: An assertive proposition, conveying something that is already established.
SIVA-SAKTI: The twin truths of Saktaism affirming the static and dynamic aspect of Reality.
SRAVANA: Hearing the spoken word of Sastra through a Guru.
SRSTI: Creation.
SRUTI: Divine revelation, ie. the Vedas; a Vedic text.
STRUTAHANI: Distortion of the text, giving up what is actually stated.
SRUTISSAPEKSA: Dependant on Sruti for authoritativeness.
STHULA-SARIRA: Gross Body.
SUDDHADVAITA: Non-duality of pure Brahman: name given to Vallabha's school of Vedanta.
SUKSMA-SARIRA: Subtle body.
SVANUBHAVA: Self-realisation.
SVAPRAKASA: Self-luminous.
SVARGA: The celestial region of the Devas.
Svarupa: Essential nature.
SVASIDDHA: Self-established.
SVATAH NIRAKARA: Formless in itself.
SVAYAM-JYOTIS: Self-effulgent.
SVAMIN: Master.
TAMAS: One of the three constituents of Prąkrti which indicates ignorance or inertia.
TATVAVABODHA: Apprehension of reality or truth.
TRIPUTI: The triadic or subject-object relation.

UPADHI: Limiting adjunct.
UPASAKA: One who meditates on the Supreme.
UPASAMHARA: The conclusion of a topic.
UPASANA: Meditation.
UTTAMADHIKARIN: One who has the highest qualification for Vedic knowledge.
UTTAMASRAMIN: Sannyasi, a member of the highest Asrama.
VAIRAGYA: Freedom from the desires of sensibility.
VAIRAGYA: Abandonment of worldly desires.
VAISAMYA: Partiality.
VAISESIKA: One of the six schools of Indian philosophy.
VASANA: The tendencies of previous karma retained in the psycho-physical complex of the jiva.
VASTU: Substance.
VIDEHAMUKTI: Release only after death.
VIDHI: A vedic imperative.
VIDYA: Knowledge, various meditations described in the Upanisads.
VIGNANAVADA: An Idealistic school of Buddhism.
VIKARA: Modification.
VIKSEPA SAKTI: Power of Maya by which the manifold of experience is projected.
VISISTADVAITA: Ramanuja's school of Vedanta.
VISPHULINGA NYAYA: The analogy of fire and its sparks.
VIVARTAVADA: The theory that the world is an illusory appearance of the Absolute.
VYVAHARIKA: Pertaining to phenomenal reality.
NIRVANA: Ni= not, Vana= Weaving. Desire acts like a cord woven to connect one life with another: Nirvana is its negation.

P.N. SRINIVASACHARI. M.A.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHEDABHEDA.

1. Such a theory is to some a direct violation of the law of contradiction and is to be rejected as a fallcy. In their opinion, it only restates the problem to be solved, and, by a certain verbal adroitness, makes it appear as the solution.
2. Vada is merely a battle of words that leaves us ultimately broken and barren. Heaps of syllogisms can never help us in inferring the infinite; they only make spiritual life sterile.
3. Yadava is more idealistic and he does not recognise any fundamental distinction between cit and acit; acit is only cit in an unmanifested state. What is latent in the former becomes patent in the latter, and the unconscious is but a phase of the conscious.
4. The Vedantic method employed by the Sutras consists in choosing a relevant Upanisadic topic and establishing its true import by the refutation of all possible and plausible rival theories. Truth is determined by the elimination of false theories and partial truths.
5. The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman. Brahman are these gamblers; men and women are Brahman, (Brahma Sukta of Samhitopanisad.)
6. There is incompatibility between the supreme self and the world of experience (paramatman and prapanca), between the transcendental and the empirical, but a real transition and passage from the one to the other.
7. The Mayavadin regards the effect as a figment of reality which somehow comes into being and ascribes the character of dreams to the whole phenomenal process.
8. Causality is a magical show and has no lo-

gical constraint. Our whole experience is a false reading of the absolute based on the perception of mere appearances and is as conventional as the letters of the alphabet and as unreal as the imaginings of an infatuated lover. They exist but have no reality.

9. Idea of negation does not arise at the empirical level, and it is only when the true nature of reality is intuited in the paramarthika state that the world dream vanishes of its own accord. The phenomenal process then ceases to be, and the absolute alone is.

10. If causality is a bare identity, it is self-explanatory but such a relation is no explanation. It illusion is an experience, reason demands its causal explanation, and indefinability is no explanation at all. If causality is an illusion, the knowledge, which removes this illusion, is itself an experience and therefore an illusion.

11. Illusion, as an experience, is an real as normal experience, and, while the object perceived may be false, the subject that experiences the illusion is not itself an illusion. Illusion is due to the operation of real causes like physical and mental disorders.

12. Idealism in all its forms, starts with the subject and finally lapses into subjectivism.

13. To the Buddhist, reality which is both physical and psychical is only a phenomenal series, and a fleeting flux. It is a mere complex or aggregate of the skandhas. Reality is neither an identity nor a difference nor both, but a ceaseless becoming. But becoming without being is unthinkable, and if it is traced to avidya, this avidya itself has to be accounted for. The idea of physical order

and personal identity is rooted in our normal experience and avidya fails to explain this fact of persistence.

14. The Buddhistic idea of abhava is equally untenable and idle, as bare negation without a positive affirmation is inconceivable. How can abhava or bare negation produce bhava or positive affirmation? If all things pass away, why is akasa regarded as an eternal and all-pervading substance? A belief in the theory of karma and vasana without positing a persistent personality meets neither the demands of logical stability nor the claims of moral responsibility.

15. The Yogacara Buddhist is a subjective idealist to whom reality is only a complex of mental states.

16. Solipsism arises when the object is resolved into the subject. Every judgment is a single ideal content and, like dreams, has no reference to external things. Vignana is, like the dream state, without any objective basis and the difference between the waking state and dreams is only a difference in degree and not in kind. But this reasoning is a case of unsound analogy and involves the fallacy of Petitio Principii, or arguing in a circle. It may be stated as follows: All dream cognitions are false because they are contradicted by cognitions in the waking state, but the cognitions in the waking state are false as they are momentary. If externality is an illusion, how is the illusion accounted for? Every perceptive judgment pre-supposes the reality of external things and is therefore objective and is not subjective and private like desire and aversion. If the world of space-time were dissolved into a mere mental series,

then there would be no knowledge or theory of knowledge at all. Sublation pre-supposes two contradictory propositions and no proposition can contradict itself.

17. The doctrine of Alayavignana is built on perishing psychical material and is therefore a baseless fabric without any adhara or substratum. In the history of Buddhism, realism leads to subjectivism and scepticism is the logical conclusion of both.

18. The Jaina theory of predication known as saptabhangi affirms nothing and denies nothing. It may be maintained the the predications refer to the relativity of knowledge and the different view-points as they are said to inhere in the nature of the thing itself (svarupa). If the svarupa or essential nature cannot be defined, then there is no niscaya gnana or determinate knowledge at all.

19. Relativity ends in subjectivity, just as the absolute as absolute becomes a mere abstraction.

20. The eternal enters into the empirical and becomes the empirical. The two are correlative and not contradictory. While Brahman limits itself into the names and forms of the world, the world does not exhaust the whole, even as the waters of the ocean constitute the waves while the waves do not constitute the ocean.

21. To the Mayavadin, causality implies infinite regress and is therefore a contradiction. The idea of God as causa sui or the first cause is unthinkable, and causality does not bring out the unity of reality and its self-identity. William James thinks that causality is an altar to an unknown God.

22. How can the fleeting flux become a permanent sanghata? A series can never become a

self. The idea of antecedent and consequent has no place in a theory of momentariness.
23. Buddhism cannot also account for the persistence of memory and personality. The Yogacara or Vignanavadin asserts the reality of vignana as a mere mental complex and a single psychical content without any substantiality or objective reference.
24. The Vignanavadin fails to recognise the objectivity of knowledge and explains away externality as a mere illusion.
25. The creational view, the root error of all false metaphysics and dogmatics.
26. Mayavada is a philosophic deduction or descent from the monistic experience of Advaita. The Mayavadin who, styles himself a specialist in Vedantic thought opposed to its theology employs the logical idea of contradiction of truth, and confirms his conclusion by the analogy drawn from the universal experience of illusions and sleep. Brahman is, to him, the transcendental Sat without a second and the empirical world is an illusion super-imposed on reality and therefore sublated by it. Even Isvara is only an appearance of the absolute who has no doubt maximum validity and value, but He is caught in the contradictions of relativity. The negative judgments employed by the Upanisads deny the reality of phenomena and affirm the absolute. The judgments relating to divine causality apply only to apparent reality and not to real reality. Brahman is mere being and thought, and becoming is but an illusory projection conjured up by the maya-made mind, and mukti consists in denying the negation and affirming the absolute. The Mayavadin says that Maya is anirvacaniya, indefinable; and is a confession of the self-contradictions of life.

Self-discrepancy or the impasse of illusoriness is finally dissolved in the immediacy of self-identity. The givenness of maya and avidya is first explained in terms of causality and contradiction, or relational thought and inexplicability respectively and then dissolved in mystic gnana. When the non-self is stultified the self shines forth.

27. Causality, according to Sankara, is ultimately based on contradiction and illusion. Brahman is the absolute, devoid of all determination, and the empirical world is enveloped in cosmic illusion, which claims to be true, but is not really true. The manifold is only the making of Maya. But this does not involve the absolute denial of the reality of sense-experience, or moral and spiritual aspirations. At the empirical level there is no contradiction or negation, and causality is a real process of effectuation involving immanence and continuity and is phenomenally true. Negativity at this stage imples the relativity of knowledge; at a higher stage it becomes a riddle of life (a vivarta and not vikara). But, when the identity of the absolute dawns in one's consciousness, all this finiteness becomes a fiction and vanishes for ever. The term sadeva emphatically declares the reality of the cause and the unreality of the effect. Clay, for example, is one homogeous stuff; but its varied names and forms are modifications which have only a relative and verbal value. Maya is a falsity, but yet it may appear to be a fact satisfying certain practical needs. The unreal world may appear to be real and have a pragmatic value for empirical needs, like the prophetic character of certain dreams, the confentions of the alphabet, the fancies of

infatuated love and a false statement producing fatal consequences. But this claim to truth is only an appearance and the world becomes absolutely false like a flower in the sky and the horn of a hare when it refers to the self-evidencing absolute. Then reality merely is and no ism or logical account of it is possible or adequate.

28. Avidya gnaws at the very root of reality and would infect the whole range of experience, spiritual as well secular. Since causality is a condition of maya, the attempt to destroy it is itself an illusion. All congnition is a determination and a denial.

29. It is the end of philosophy to eliminate all false theories.

30. The visaya or the object presented in a dream may be unreal, but the visaya-gnana or the knowledge of the object is real.

31. Avidya is said by the Mayavadin to be sublated and dissolved by knowledge. It is, according to him, a logical defect residing in buddhi and obscuring reality, and gnana is defined as the immediate and non-relational knowledge of the absolute.

32. The law of contradiction pervades all knowledge and perverts its very foundations.

33. In his rejection of theism and thought, the idealist goes to the other extreme, adopts the dialectics of Madhyamika Buddhism, dethrones Isvara from his cosmic lordship and rulership and defines atman subjectively as drk in relation to drsya. I alone exist and the cosmos is the objectified form of my mind for sankalpa, which is sublated in sleep and is therefore non-existent. The inevitable theory of eka-jivavada commits him to the perils of subjectivism, selfism and sopoforific quietism.

34. The jiva, as a thinker, is both self-conscious and conscious of external objects. Just as fire cannot burn itself, no idea can be its own illumination without presupposing the subject-object consciousness. Bhaskara distinguished between the unconditioned 'I' and the conditioned 'I'.

35. Dreams are subjective experiences arising from the memory of the past stored up in the psychic apparatus,and therefore devoid of subjective reality. They belong to the world of the subconscious, in which suppressed desires seek satisfaction in wild and fantastic ways.

36. While the objects presented in dreams are false, the dream experience itself is real and is continuous with the other states of consciousness. But the Mayavadin says that they are false (aparamarthika) as they are sublated by the reality given in the waking consciousness. He distinguishes between existence and reality and rejects the reality of dreams though they are existent.

37. Sleep is not cosmic nescience in its causal state nor discontinuity of personality. The three states of the mind, the conscious, the sub-conscious and the unconscious form a totality and the gap or disruption is more apparent than real. Personal identity is proved by the continuity of consciousness and the moral order which provides for the unity of the doer, the deed and the consequences. In the state of swooning there is life, but no consciousness. It is different from the states of waking, dream and sleep and is midway betwen life and death. In all these psychic levels which are the crests and depths of consciousness, the self abides in its being but in different degrees of conditionateness.

38. The Mayavadin insists on the immediate knowledge of Brahman here and now, in which the dualism between the jiva and Brahman is dissolved. Whatever is made or modified is false and fictitious and therefore mukti is an intuition and not a consummation.

39. The sastra does not favour the ideal of Santi without service. Meditation on Brahman does not require the abandonment of all activity. The quest for inner quiet should not end in quietism.

40. Consciousness without any content commits us to mere subjectivism and abstractionism. Indeterminate intuition involves the dissolution of the cosmos and lapses into the "unconscious." But the Advaitin evades this logical conclusion and explains away the difficulty by various analogies and other devices. One ingenious solution is that illusoriness vanishes, but that the illusion remains. It is only the finitude that is shaken off and not the finite.

41. The alogical exceeds the logical categories but does not exclude them and the polarities of dust and deity are essentially Brahman.

42. Deussen does not agree with the view that the absolute as the basis of being is the seer of seeing or the subject of experience beyond the subject-object relation.

43. Adhikarana brings out the antithesis between the absolute of metaphysics and the personal god of popular theology. The gnani or the metaphysician seeks the one by sublating the many; but the upusaka, who is on the empirical or lower level, personifies and phenomenalises the absolute, and worships the persentational forms.

44. Idealism explains reality in terms of consciousness and its contents, and conscious-

ness contains in itself the meaning of all things. Consistent idealism presses towards monism which is affirmed to be the fundamental need of thought and the general drift of Indian Philosophy. The extreme monism of Advaita is said to have its echo in Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradley. But if the dominant tendency of monistic idealism is its subjective interest which starts with the thinking self as contrasted with the objects of thought, the trend of Vedanta is not subjectivistic, as it is interested in the 'that'as well as in the 'thou!

45. Hegel is said to have often remarked that if a man has no Spinozism, he has no standing in philosophy. Sir Frederick Pollock in his Life and Philosophy of Spinoza asserts that his theory of the eternity of the mind is one of the most brilliant endeavours of speculative philosophy.

46. In Spinoza the finite self strives to persist in its own being and conation refers to this inherent divine impulse of self-maintenance or self-realization. In the first stage, man is a passive part of nature yoked to passions and lives in isolation. A passion is a confused idea, a passiveness of the soul which makes us mere playthings of the external world. and it is the practical aspect of imagination. But ethics is based on metaphysics and evil is used in the Neo-Platonic sense of privation. In the higher life of reason, the passions are subdued by thinking them clearly orrby a strongerrcontrary emotion and the self of individualistic ethic is now extinguished and replaced by the joys of disinterested love and social solidarity. In this stage, we rise from servitude to sovereignty. The passions are subdued

and not swept away. Only the sense of imagination is annulled and not the modal being. But even this stoic life of reason is only a golden link and a half-way house to the supreme Good. In the last stage of the intuition of divine determinism, there is the consummation of all endeavour owing to the absence of compulsion and contingency. The finite sheds its finitude and is taken up into the infinite and is transfigured and the infinite realises itself through the self-maintaining impulse of the finite. The contemplative life and the life of activity are now reconciled in the intellectual love of God, which is at once the culmination of thought and the consummation of morality.

47. Intellect is puzzled by the problem of the one and the many and its endless process or infinite fission and yet the two are reconciled in the absolute.

48. Bradley is not clear in expounding the relation between reality and appearance. In his negative dialectic, the appearances are stripped of reality and abolished. The final destiny of all finite things is their absorption in the absolute. The finite centres as such disappear or lose their distinctive being in the timeless and changeless absolute; they are dissolved and transcended.

49. Royce in his criticism of Bradley proceeds on the principle that the life of thought belongs to the realm of reality.

50. Fichte assumes the possibility of the metaphysical knowledge of reality as a unitary principle underlying the duality of our experience. It is not blank identity, but a unity of form and content discovered by the idealistic analysis of experience. All experience is only for

a subject. It is essentially an activity; it is more an act than a fact. The ego posits itself by oppositing the non-ego, its other, and is thus conscious of its own limitations. It posits itself as determined by the non-ego. This is not an opposition to consciousness, but is an opposition within consciousness. Both the ego and the non-ego are given indissolubly in every act of consciousness. The infinite outgoing activity of the ego receives a check and is driven back on itself. Being is absolute and it has existence as self-existent Being.

51. Science supersedes faith and changes it into sight. When man rises to the religious point of view and abolishes himself, the subject-object opposition disappears and he passes into God. It is the paradox of personality that man loses himself to gain himself and the self dies to an isolated and insular life.

52. Every school of Vedanta knows the limits of logic and ethics and also the Kantian principle that one should not make a transcendental use of an empirical category. It insists on the integral experience of Brahman which is alogical and amoral and is at the same time the fulfilment of logical thinking and moral endeavour. Buddhistic dialectic brought out the self-contradictions of religion and prepared the way for Advaitic philosophy.

53. The theory of creation <u>exnihilo</u> is unknown to Vedantic cosmogony. The idea of creation at a certain time is the "root-error of all false metaphysics."

54. A confession of the failure of thought to explain the contradictions of life as the causal category is itself self-discrepant.

55. "What makes the difference between plura-

lity and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, and this truth is distinctly declared in the text, "Now all this was undifferentiated. It became by form and name.

56 The world of space-time is the objectification of avidya. It is mind-born, mind-made and dissolved in the mind. Eka-jiva-vada, which denies the many-soul theory, belongs to this type. An extrme form of the idealism of Advaita is in the formula 'drsti is srsti' (esse is percipi). The universe is a here-now and exists only as my idea. Mukti is the arresting of the externalising tendency of the avidya-ridden mind and it may be defined as the cessation of all sankalpa which occurs apparently in sleep and rally in samadhi. The method may be the abolition of the "me" by analysing it away or by the dissociation of the saksin from its semblances or by the withdrawal of consciousness from its three-fold states. But the logic of mere self-analysis in practice lands us in the egocentric fallacy and lapses into the subjectivism of vignanavada, selfism in morals and quietism in spiritual life. The second theory is a metaphysical exposition of the inner contradictions of relational thought and the reality of the indeterminate absolute. The world-order is false like the perception of the snake in the rope. Relatins, as Bradley says, separate terms, enter into them and have neither reality nor non-existence. Somehow, falsity is super-imposed on reality and Maya is merely the statement of the contradictions of life and is ultimately indefinable. Maya exhibits itself in or as avidya and it is explained in terms of the illusion theory or the limitation theory. Space-time is merely an apparition; jiva is the hypostatisation of

avidya and Isvara is the sum of all semblances. The second view regards the finite as an appearance of reality and in Mukti the finite is only transcended but not negated.

57. God is neither an evolving entity, nor a future emergence, neither a monad among monads.

58. The transcendental cannot be explained by means of empirical categories and Vedanta therefore resorts to analogies and pictorial representations of what is beyond thought and speech. But the anthropomorphic mind distorts the Vedantic view and gives a physical and psychical interpretation of the metaphysical and the metapsychical. It is God that moulds the soul in His own image. But this is misunderstood as man making God in his own image. God is portrayed as possessing a bodily form and invested with human attributes like thought, feeling and will. The tendency to personify objects and project the self into them is clearly discernible in many popular forms of worship. The materialistic consciousness which arises from mistaking the perishing body for the eternal self ascribes human passions and actions to the absolute and imposes its own imperfections on it.

59. Is Vedanta to be studied as a deductive development of the scriptural authority or as an inductive verification? (b) Are its truths personal intuitions or principles embodied in one uniform institutional creed or sampradaya? (c) Does the validity of each system depend upon the historic method of justifying each system as a fulfilment of the needs of the age and the time spirit or by the method of absolutism which turns our thought as mumuksus from the particulars of sense to the uni-

versal and eternal truths of spirit? (d) How far can the pragmatic method which relies on the workability of truth be applied to reconciling conflicting Vedantic experiences? Is a siddhanta acceptable if it satisfies the tests of truth, goodness and beauty? (e) What are the advantages of estimating the worth of Vedantic systems by the psychological theory that the Advaita philosophy emphasises thought, the Visistadvaita feeling and the Dvaita, will? (f) Is the application of the evolutionary method like the theory that Advaita is the fulfilment of Dvaita and Visistadvaita an adequate test of Vedantic synthesis?

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SRI SANKARACHARYA: HIS PHILOSOPHY.
BY PANDIT SITANATH TATTVABUSHAN.

1. It is said that Govinda desired Sankara to go to Benares first, and afterwards became one of the peripatetic teachers of religion who abounded so largely in pre-Buddhistic as well post-Buddhist India. To this day his name is invoked by his affectionate disciples as "the best of peripatetic Teachers."
2. One day Sankara was going along the street with his pupils to have his mid-day bath in the Ganges. A Chandala with his dogs was passing by him, when the pupils shouted to ask him to clear the road, as Brahmins do in Malabar even to this day. The man, however, turned about and asked the Guru how he might consistently teach Advaitism and practice such differentiating observances. The Guru was struck by the answer, and its pertinency to the occasion called forth the five beautiful slokas forming the Manáshika Panchaka, every one of which ends thus:-

"He who has learned to look on the phenomena in this (monistic) light is my true guru, be he a Chandala or a twice-born. This is my conviction."

3. Ratan Singh as the then chief of Benares, who, on this occasion, pressed Sankara to stay with him. The Guru excused himself by saying that he had been asked by his master to be a peripatetic teacher, and that, therefore, his mission was to teach and preach all over India.

4. Sankara while emphasising Jnana or knowledge of the Supreme Spirit as the chief object of man's endeavours, here on earth did not go the length of rejecting all the other means of attaining the summum bonum, as Bhatta and other controversialists had egotistically done before. This spirit of compromise, in all likelihood, made his word easier; for there was but little revolutionary in his contentions. The lovers of ceremonialism were allowed to go on with their Karmas--only the spirit which underlay the doing of them had to become different.

5. To the temple he attached a Mutt and placed the most learned of his disciples, Mandana, at its head, with the name of Sureswara Acharya, by which name is is still known in the records of that Mutt. The institution is "the Sringeri Mutt" of to-day, the most richly endowed and the most widely honoured of the South Indian Religious institutions.

6. The end of a man being the realisation of the identity of his own spirit with the Supreme Spirit, and the study of Vedanta and the contemplation of the teachings being the best means of attaining it, Sankara also recommended less difficult paths of salvation for such

people as are not fitted for that kind of self-realisation. The practice of self-denial and of other moral virtues, devotion to God and the careful discharge of each man's duties, as ordained by the scriptures are declared by him to be preliminaries to acquiring in due course the needed moral competency for the study of the Vedanta and the realisation of its ideals.

7. He was forced by lay unusual stress in Jnana or the true realisation of the God, and like Socrates of old, sought "to rationalise the whole Universe" to counteract the extravagances of Bhatta. Now this kind of wisdom is clearly not within the reach of common men, to whom Sankara's teaching is accordingly a sealed book.

8. If it seems to the reader that while reading this book with deep attention he really forgets himself, he will find, on actual examination, that the proposition is really unthinkable and even absurd. He will see that if such a thing were possible, if he could really forget himself in reading this book, if he could, in others, know it out of conscious relation to himself it would not be possible afterwards to bring the object in relation to his consciousness, as he will actually do. Perhaps he will say that at one moment he actually knows the book, that is, sees or reads it, without knowing himself as the seer or reader, that is, without knowing that it is he who sees or reads it, but that another moment he remembers that it was really he who read the book. But how is it possible for anyone to remember anything without actually knowing it? Remembering is recognition--

knowing again--and there can be no recognition without cognition. To say, therefore, that one remembers anything without knowing it, is to say that one knows it without knowing it, which is absurd. If, in the present case, the reader says that he reads this book or any part of it without knowing his self as its reader, and then, at another time he remembers himself as its reader, he is really guilty of self-contradiction. Sankara's contention, therefore, that the knowledge of self is the constant basis of all other knowledge, is quite evident.

9. The ordinary unreflective reader has no suspicion of this relativity. To him the world exists whether anyone knows it or not. He constantly thinks and speaks of visible objects as existing unseen, audible objects as unheard, tangible things an untouched, and intelligible facts as unrelated to any understanding. He never suspects that such conceptions are self-contradictory and that the existence of an object necessarily implies the existence of a subject or knowing self in relation to whose knowledge it exists. If, as we have seen, we cannot know objects without knowing the self as its knower, it follows that we cannot think of any object without thinking of the same self as its knower; and if we must believe objects to exist exactly as they are known and thought of--and we cannot do otherwise--we must believe them existing as known--as the objects of the knowing self. In other words, since we know objects as seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched, or understood--as in some way or other related to the knowing self--and can think of them only as so related--therefore, to believe them as existing out of this relation is really to believe that things seen exist unseen, things h

heard exist unheard and so on, which is believing in contradictions as palpable as any can be.
10. The fact is that in thinking of objects, all, whether they are reflective or unreflective, do think of a knowing self, but that unreflective people, because of their inability to analyse their thoughts, are not distinctly aware of this fundamental condition of all thought.
11. If then, every object is found to be pervaded by knowledge the very essence of the self, no object can be distinct from the self, but is really comprehended by it. As a pleasure or a pain, though verbally distinguishable from the self which feels it, is really one with it, so are colours, tastes, smells, sounds, and touch as one with the self that perceives them, though they are verbally distinguishable from it. In knowing the world, therefore, we know nothing but the self. The distinction of subject and object is only conventional--vyavaharika, as Sankara calls it--and the result of ignorance--avidya--ignorance which is removed by true knowledge. In every act of knowledge as we know one, undivided entity--the self which is both subject and object, because it knows only itself and nothing else, or,--as the distinction subject and object is only conventional--which is neither subject nore object, but transcends the distinction.
12. But our notion of the duality of subject and object, of the self and the world, is not likely to be given up unless the source of this notion is traced and shown to be unreliable. Its source, then, is time and space, the idea of which regulates all our sensuous perceptions. We shall consider space first and see how it breaks up, or rather seems to break up, the fundamental unity of consciousness. Space not

only brings in the distinction of one object from another, but also that of the self from the world. The self seems to be here, in the body or in some particular object in the world, there, out of the self. But this distinction in and out, here and there, as between the self and the world, is the result of identifying the self with the body or some part of the body, and of forgetting that its essence is knowledge. As knowledge, the self is not only here, in a particular object, but everywhere, in all objects, for, as has already been seen, it pervades or illumines everything it knows.

13. The fact is that space, as an object of knowledge, is comprehended in the knowing self and cannot be out of it. The distinction of here and there, in and our, therefore cannot exist as between the self and its objects. For the self, there cannot be in the proper sense of the term, any external object or world. The notion of an external or material world, therefore is purely conventional--vyavaharika--and is rejected by true knowledge. Space, which seems to make the Universe dual or plural does not really do so. On the contrary, as a type of unity, it supplies Sankara with an illustration of the perfect oneness and indivisibility of the self. The distinction of here and there, of this and that, as between objects, does not, it will be seen, divide up space itself into parts. The space inside a pot may seem to be different from that outside of it, but there is no partition between the two. The walls or sides of the pot, which seems to part the inside space from the outside, are themselves in space. Similarly the body, which seems to separate the self from the world, does not really do so, for both the body and the world outside of it are illumined by the self--are objects

of the same knowing self--and are thus comprehended in its essence. The notion of duality, therefore, as furnished by space, may be rejected as groundless. Objects, which seem to come to us as aliens, and as from a foreign source, are really one with what we call our self.

14. The constant change apparent in our perceptions does not really imply any change in the knowledge of the self, in which all things exist eternally--not, indeed, as objects distinguished from a subject, for the self transcends this distinction--but in perfect unity with it. Our perceptions seem to result from the contact of our organs of knowledge with objects external to them. But real knowledge, as it is in the self, is not such a resultatnt. It is an eternal attribute of the self. In reality it neither arises from action of external objects upon the senses nor is destroyed in the baseness of such action. If it were so, says Sankara, there would not be such things as visions and sounds in the dreaming state, when the organs af perception are inactive. "Thus, he says "there are two kinds of visions that of the eye which is transient, and that of the self, which is eternal. Similarly also two kinds of hearing, that of the ear, which is transient and that of the self which is eternal. Similarly two kinds of thought and knowledge, external and internal. That knowledge, though seeming to be in a flux is really not so, but a permanent property of the self, receives a striking illustration from the familiar but none the less wonderful fact of remembrance. The fact that things disappearing from the stream of changes that constitutes our sensuous life do yet reappear and are recognised as identical with things known before, proves

that knowledge is non-sensuous and does not depend for its existence on the changing and flowing form which it assumes in our perspective life. Thus, if the knowledge of the book before me were a mere event, a change, a perceptive act, as it is called, it would vanish for ever on the cessarion of the other actions internal and external, on which it seems to depend,-- my attention and action of light on the eye, and the like. We should know nothing about it, at any rate, after a period of sound sleep, when all receptive action ceases. But we know, as a fact, that it will re-appear to-morrow-- re-appear in relation with the self that now forms its ground and cause, and thereby prove itself as a permanent property of the self-- as belonging to its very essence. It will prove that it was never absent from the knowledge of the self,--knowledge which, though different from sensuous knowledge, is none the less real than it, but rather infinitely more so.

15. In the very act of knowledge we know only on Reality--that which we call our self--and that the objective world, the world of time and space, has no independent existence, but is comprehended in the self. The self alone has paramarthika or real existence, whereas the existence of the world is only Vyvaharika, practical and phenomenal. The belief in its independent or real existence is the result of avidya, ignorance,--ignorance which is removed or destroyed by a true knowledge of reality. From the paramarthika standpoint there is no object as distinguished from the subject, no world, no space, no time, no action--therefore and no agent, for action and agency depend on time. The argument for the unreality of space and time which we have already given

at some length, may be briefly summarised as follows: space is the distinction of here and there. The distinction obtains only as long as the principle that relates or unifies here and there is not seen, or, in other words, as long as object in space are believed to be realities independent of the self. When, however, here and there are both seen, to be comprehended in the self--in that indivisible unity of consciousness, in which there is no distinction of here and there,--the distinction itself ceases to be real and with that ceases the reality of space. Similarly, time which the distinction of now and then, ceases to be real when it is seen in relation to the self, for which the distinction has no existence; for while present, past and future events go and come, the self persists and knows all. Even this going and coming of the objects, is, as we have already seen, only apparent, and seems to be real only so long as objects are believed to be independent of the self. When they are seen to be identical with the self, it is found that they can neither go nor come, and we find, by actual experience, that facts disappearing from our perceptive life and apparently destroyed, reappear in that life and prove their permanent, timeless existence in the self in its non-perceptive aspect. Now, as to the unreality of action and agency, they follow from what has been said as regards the unreality of space and time. Sankara indeed speaks, now and again, of knowledge as an action as we too have done in expounding his doctrine. But according to him its character as an action, as a change or event, is only vyvaharika. As we have already said, it is only when you look upon objects or facts, as different from the self

that they seem to come and go, and the self seems to be an agent in the act of knowing. When this distinction is seen to be unreal, knowledge appears in its true character, namely as the permanent essence of the self, and not a passing act or quality. Then again, as to the perfect unity of the self, notwithstanding the fact that it appears different in different persons, the fact is evident from what we have already said. It is time and space and their various modifications that seem to break up the Universe into various parts, various spheres of knowledge and activity, and thus into different selves to which they are related. With the merging of time and space in the self, the idea of a plurality of selves is seen to be groundless. When the agencies that introduce finitude into reality as seen to be unreal, finitude itself disappears and the Infinite alone remains. Thus is our own self, the self in each of us, which we ignorantly imagine to be finite, seem to be really nothing but Brahman, satyamjnanamanatanam--truth, knowledge and infinitude, or the True, the Knowing and the Infinite, if by these adjectivies we understand a Reality of which truth, knowledge and infinitude are non-separable attributes, but form its very essence.

16. HE cannot be described, as description implies distinction.

17. Anandam, bliss, not in the sense of the happiness experienced in obtaining a pleasurable object external to one's own self, but such happiness as a non-dual, secondless Reality can feel in the plenitude of its own nature.

18. Even liberated--absolutely liberated--souls may reincarnate themselves, not indeed under the influence of desires and fruits of action,

for all desires and fruits of actions are dead in their case, but for the object of doing good to the world,--liberating those who are still in bondage.

19. We come, therefore, to a consideration of Sankara's view of Karma. According to him there are four stages of spiritual progress, and accordingly, as one occupies one or another of these stages at the time of one's death, he obtains one or another of four corresponding gatis, fates or conditions, in the period following his departure from the world, In his commentary on the Chandogya Up. V.10, Brih. VI, 2, and elsewhere he speaks of these four stages and the fates to which they lead. The lowest is that in which man--and what is said of man applies to other orders of beings also--does not subject himself to any Vedic discipline but lives a life of pure impulse unchecked by any higher law. Such men, when they dies, are reborn in the form of some lower animal such as a fly or an insect. The next higher stage is that in which man perfoms the duties prescribed in the Srutis and Smritis, but acquires no knowledge regarding the gods he worships. The highest reward allotted to this stage is the attainment of the lunar regions through the way called the Pitriyana--the path of the manes--and the enjoyment, for a time, of the joys provided there. When these are over, with exhaustion of the enjoyer's punya or merit,--which, however, great is nevertheless a perishable thing,--he comes down and is reborn.

20. Sankara admits that the performance of the duties prescribed in the Scriptures is necessary for purifying the heart, and that, unless the heart is purified, the highest knowledge cannot be attained. But he thinks that when the

necessary purification of the heart has taken place, and the highest knowledge has arisen, ceremonial and domestic duties, that is Karma in the proper sense become unnecessary, and the only duties that remain then are those that ripen and strengthen the knowledge of Brahman. 21. From the foregoing exposition of Sankara's view, that bhakti in the popular sense, as a feeling of reverence for a being conceived as higher than the soul of the devotee, can be regarded only as a help, a stepping-stone, to liberation in a system of Absolute Monism like Sankara's. And this is exactly the light in which Sankara regards it; it is a means, not the end,--lower and not the final stage in the soul's progress.

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senses, of the mind and of their inherent forms. In this respect, Vedanta holds a unique position among the philosophies of the world. The self or Atman, the true nature of the ego or Jivatma is one with the essence of Divinity (Brahman) which is absolutely pure perfect, immortal, unchangeable and one. No philosopher, not even Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel or Schopenhauer has reached that height of philosophic thought.

2. Vedanta philosophy guides us above all knowable objects of perception and directs our soul toward the Eternal absolute Being, where we find the solution of all problems and the answer to all questions. Its attempt is to trace the origin of all phenomena objective and subjective, physical and mental, not by any unscientific method, but by the most rigorous processes of logic and reason.

3. A Gnana Yogi, in his search after the Absolute Truth, should reject all names and forms by saying "Not this", "not this" (neti, neti) until he realises the one nameless, formless and absolute Being of the universe, where the subject and the object, the knower knowledge and its object losing their relativity merge into the ocean of the absolute Brahman.

4.@ G.C. CHATTERJI : Common sense empiricism. If this be accepted, it follows that Philosophy cannot divorce itself from life, without risk of becoming a series of sterile formalisms, the indulgence in which becomes mere mental gymnastics. The most fruitful periods of philosophic thought have been those in which Philosophy has remained in intimate contact with life, as witness the great days of Greek Philosophy, whereas

@: Please read para 5 before para 4.

philosophy has always fallen into disrepute wherever it has divorced itself from the real problems of life and devoted itself to artificial subtilities of the intellect, as in the scholasticism of Mediaeval Europe. Much of modern philosophic thought seems to me to be a species of barren formalism, which has no bearing whatsoever on the essential task of Philosophy, which is to reflect upon life and seek to guide and illumine it.

5. Philosophy, I believe, springs from some abiding human need or purpose. There is some deep-laid desire, need or craving in man to reflect upon the world and his experience, and to form some sort of a general intelligible plan or explanation of it. By this I do not mean to posit any so-called philosophical instinct in man, nor do I suggest that all men need to be or even attempt to be philosophers. The prime need or function of life is living itself. At first man is so occupied with the mere maintenance and continuance of life, that he cannot be supposed to squander any of his fitful intelligence on solving the problem of the Universe or on his place and destiny in its midst. But as he advances and does not need to spend all his waking hours in the search for food, or sexual satisfaction, or clothing and warmth, he has periods in which his mind is no longer occupied with practical concerns, and he turns his intellectual powers to two main pursuits, Art and Philosophy.

6. Philosophy beings in concrete experience, and must return to concrete experience in the character of guide or mentor, but in the actual solution of its problems it must remain unbiased by considerations of utility or subjective satisfaction. I believe that experience

is not only the starting-point of Philosophy, but in a certain sense it is also the criterion and touchstone of every philosophy.

7. I do not for a moment believe that my experience is itself the sole Reality, or even that Reality itself can consist of nothing but experiences or psychical matters of fact. In other words, I am neither a subjective nor an objective idealist. I believe that Reality does not consist solely of my own experience because my experience itself is sufficient warrant for the belief that there are other realities besides itself. Every experience that I have is related to some object other than itself, and in the absence of such another could not be what it is. If I am perceiving, or remembering, or desiring, or having an emotion, there is always something that I perceive, or remember, or desire, or have an emotion towards. My experiences are not self-contained or self-generated, but directed towards some object other than themselves, with which they are related by the subject-object relation. I believe that such a theory as that of Hume, which resolves all reality into a flux of immediate experiences, is totally false to experience itself, for every immediate experience contains a reference to something outside itself, in the absence of which the experience itself could not be what it is. What exactly that object or entity is with which each concrete experience of mine brings me in contact, varies with the nature of each individuals experience, and it is the business of Philosophy and scientific enquiry to examine and explore the nature of those varied realities. But that such extra immediate realities do exist is warranted by each and every experience. The objects that I

cognise, which stir me emotionally or towards which I strive or aspire, are not constituted by the acts of my cognising, feeling or striving. For if this be denied, then I can neither cognise nor feel, nor strive after, and my experience cannot possess the character which it does, as a matter of fact, actually possess. If I am perceiving a blue patch of colour, then the analysis of my perceptual experience cannot merely consist of the actual content of my act of awareness, for in that case I would not be perceiving a blue patch of colour, but my awareness of it, which is a totally different thing. Further, I can never express the difference between my perception of a blue patch of colour and a red patch of colour merely in terms of awareness. The difference between those two acts lies, not in the nature or character of the acts themselves but in the objects to which each is directed. If there are no patches of blue and red colours, but merely my awareness of them, then I can never have an experience of now perceiving blue, now red, and now some other colour. What distinguishes one act of perception from the other is not the mental processes involved but the variety of objects to which they are directed. Perception thus itself implies the existence of extra-immediate entities or objects.

8. The emotions I experience are very varied in range, extending from the primitive instinctive emotions of fear, anger, disgust and so on, to highly complex and derivative emotions such as those which are generally described as aesthetic moral and religious emotions. In every case, whether the feeling be primitive or derived, there is always some object in relation to which I have that emotion, and in the absence of which

I could not continue to have that emotion. If I am angry, it is always someone or something which has made me angry, and if you could only convince me that such a person or thing does not exist, my anger must of necessity evaporate. If I could only believe that no person or circumstance is obstructing the gratification of my wishes, the consummation of my ambitions, anger would be a passion wholly unknown to me. Similarly, if there was nothing besides my own immediate consciousness, I could experience neither love nor hate, nor aesthetic appreciation, nor moral indignation or fervour, nor religious ecstasy and devotion. Such a consciousness would indeed be an evaporation of experience itself, an absence of consciousness, a state of nothingness, "a dreamless sleep and a forgetting," which indeed I am told is the goal and ambition of many a mystic especially in the East, but which at any rate I have never experienced, and which if it does exist, must indeed by mute, unutterable, unponderable, and that of which Philosophy can have no cognisance. It is not for me to deny the existence of such obscure and abnormal experiences, whether generated artificially by the administration of certain drugs, or the practice of certain religious exercises and rites, or occurring spontaneously without external aid, but I would urge that unless such experiences can be brought under the scope of scientific psychology for investigation and explanation they cannot be cited as evidence in support of any particular theory of the general nature of reality. Philosophy at the present moment can only take into account such experiences as are the common possession of ordinary humanity, and it is on the basis

of such experience alone that any rational or scientific theory of the world can be constructed. Experience then gives us sufficient warrant to escape from the coils of solipsism, or subjective idealism. On the basis of my experience I am entitled to believe that a world extraneous to my own consciousness exists, for at each point of my consciousness this larger world of external reality breaks in upon the chamber of my inner consciousness, disturbs and determines its flow, and it is towards this that my own emotions and strivings are constantly directed. What is the nature of this trans-subjective world, and in what manner the world of my own subjective experience is related to it, is the essential problem of philosophy.

9. No theory has been so generally held in philosophy as the theory of Idealism, which holds that Reality is essentially spiritual in character, and that nothing but spirits and their experiences exist. Such Idealistic theories have been either singularistic, like those of Hegel, Bradley and others, or Pluralistic, such as that of Leibniz, while others seem to have adopted a midway position difficult to define, such as Lotze and Ward, who have attempted to build a bridge between Singularism and Pulralism. Into the various controversies between the different schools of Idealism I do not propose to enter since what I am concerned to deny is the assumption which all schools of Idealism make in common, namely, that reality is mental, or psychical matter of fact and nothing which is not mental can ever be real. Arguments urged in support of this view in the past were generally directed against the doctrine of materialism as held by the 18th century mechanical science. These may be called negative arguments

for Idealism. There are also certain positive arguments for Idealism which do not merely rely upon the alleged non-existence of matter but also bring forward certain positive considerations in favour of the belief that nothing but mind can exist. Most Idealists, however, make no hard-and-fast distinction between them. We may take the arguments used by Berkeley as typical of one school of Idealists. He urges that what I directly know in perception are merely sensations, and sensations being mental I have no direct knowledge of any supposed physical reality which may be accepted as their cause. He admits that sensations are not spontaneous or self-caused, but holds that their cause cannot be a non-mental material substance which Locke had described as a "we know not what" but must also be mental viz. ideas in the mind of God. He does not deny an objective world order but holds that this order and arrangement is nothing, but the ideas which God is presenting to finite minds. But Berkeley's argument if strictly enforced leads to Hume's Phenomenalism and not to his own panpsychism. It starts with a fundamentally wrong analysis of perception, namely that any act of perception is to be simply analysed into a mental and implies no reference to an object external to itself. It is true that Berkeley contradicts himself when he proceeds to posit an external cause or source of sensations, even though he regards this cause to be mental. Against this view I can only urge that when I perceive a blue patch of colour, what I am perceiving is a patch of blue colour, and this is quite different from my act of perceiving, and so totally different from any act of perception on the part of any other being. I do not perceive, as Berkeley seems to imply, an

an idea of a blue patch of colour in the mind of God. I have ideas myself, and I am sometimes aware that other people also have certain ideas. But neither my own ideas nor those of other people when known to me appear as "this patch of colour" which I am now seeing, "this hard surface" I am now touching and so on. It is conceivable that a Being such as God exists, it is conceivable, further, that God has experiences similar to my own, but if God perceives the world, I would contend, as I did in the case of my own experiences, that God could only do so if the world as a fact extraneous to his act of awareness of it actually existed. If the world of nature is identified with God's act of perceiving it, then it follows that there is no world which he can perceive, and consequently there cannot even be the act of perceiving it, and so God's mind is empty, which contradicts the assumption from which we began. Berkeley's argument, therefore, fails to prove that the world of nature which I perceive is really mental. Certain other philosophers, such as Hegel and, following him, Bradley, Taylor and others, have urged that Reality must be mental or spiritual, because the very concept of matter, space, time and other categories in terms of which we try to interpret an extra-mental reality are self-contradictory. These contentions seem to me unconvincing, because not only are the contradictions pointed out by these philosophers largely of their own invention, but what is more, they condemn with equal emphasis the categories in terms of which we try to interpret mental and spiritual phenomena in so far as they come within the range of our own experience. Bradley, for example, by pointing out contradictions in our concept of time, of discursive reasoning, of self and not-self,

good and evil, and so on, arrives at the conclusion that finite experience and the finite self also are mere appearances. I consider, therefore, that in his Philosophy Matter and Mind are really on a par, and the Absolute which he posits is no more a spiritual or psychical Being than he is a chunk of boundless space. I have already urged that I am not prepared to accept any such hypothesis which constrains me to regard my own experience as an illusion and to substitute in its place some supposed reality for which I can find no warrant in my experience.

10. The knowledge of other minds has involved Philosophy in difficulties even greater than those connected with external nature. It has been urged that if I know nature at best at second-hand, my knowledge of other minds is still more remote, for I know them only through their bodies, which are part of the already doubtful world of external reality. The problem has become still more complicated by difficulties with regard to the relation of body and mind, for it has been urged that since body and mind are totally divergent from each other, and interaction between them inconceivable, it is still more impossible that the knowledge of my neighbour's body could convey to me any knowledge with regard to his mind.

I will begin by admitting that so far as my experience goes, my knowledge of other minds is dependent upon knowledge of their bodies. Your bodies are the media through which I know that you are here, that you are listening to me, approving or disapproving of what I say. It is true that if there was a remitting apparatus here, others whose bodies I cannot see could be "listening in" to what I am saying. But in this case also the communication of one

mind with another is through some bodily organ or other, and through the aid of some external agents. It is my lips which utter my thoughts, the air waves which communicate the movement to the transmitting and receiving apparatus, and the listener's ears which in the last resort convey my thoughts to his mind.
11. At all grades of its manifestation, mind so far as it comes within human ken, be it the mind of a frog or that of a philosopher, seems to be embodies, and it is only through the medium of its body that it can communicate with other minds or receive communications from them.
12. Such a view of nature is fully in harmony with the teachings of modern Physics, which no longer conceives of matter as inert homogeneous stuff distributed at various points in space, possessing indestructible properties, to which time can bring neither dissolution nor change. In place of this static world, modern science conceives of nature as a realm of ceaseless activity, with no passive substratum, composed of self-identical bits of matter. Instead of space which is empty, and time which is irrelevant, it regards nature as a progression of events in space-time, which may be isolated for the pruposes of observation and abstraction, but which are woven together in an indissoluble stream pressing forward to eternity. Science merely takes cross senctions of this eternal stream of moving events, isolating a set of agitations which betray a superficial stability.
13. Such a conclusion seems to me very inadequately grounded on the extremely narrow range of phenomena actually observed, and further to gloss over fundamental difficulties inherent in the very conception of a timeless reality, which is yet indissolubly bound up with the spatio-

temporal order. Given the Deity eternal and immutable, there seems no reason why the world of finite experience should exist at all. The inevitable consequence of such an assumption is the rejection of my own immediate expe-rience as illusory, thus destroying the very foundation on which all philosophical construc-tion must necessarily rest.

14. I turn now to a third aspect of the world of my experience the aspect of value. My expe-rience not only convnices me that there is an external nature which I contemplate and other selves with with whom I communicate, but I also approve or disapprove of things which I expe-rience, persons whom I know, acts which I per-form, or observe others performing. This atti-tude of appraisement is quite distinct from the attitude of contemplation or cognitive aware-ness.

15. Many philosophers have committed an oppo-site fallacy, which is to infer existence from goodness. That is, they have tried to show that such and such a conclusion about reality is very good if true, and have proceeded to assume that therefore reality must actually be so, or that such and such a conclusion about reality is extremely bad, and must therefore be false. Thus it has been urged that if human life does not survive after death, the world would be a very bad place, and therefore we are entitled to believe that human life does survive after death. The attempt to ground existential con-clusions in value premises is parallel with the Naturalistic Fallcy and might be called the Ethical Fallacy.

16. Many philosophers have held that value is subjective, in the mind of the person who makes the judgment and not in the things which he values. Many kinds of arguments have been

have been uses by philosophers in support of this view, but they have chiefly relied upon the variability of Ethical and Aesthetic standards. That a Zulu's idea of what ought to be done or not done, that ought to be admired or not admired, is very different from that of a civilised man, is too obvious to be denied. But even in the same age and clime, and what is more, very often with the same individual, judgments of taste and approval show considerable variations.

17. It is admitted that man's Ethical and Aesthetic consciousness undergoes a process of evolution, just as his sensory consciousness has been gradually evolved through his prehuman ancestors. But just as the colours I see, the sounds I hear, are not merely mental contents, but objects apprehended by me, so also the goodness I approve of, or the beauty I admire, are not mere subjective feelings, but objective realites.

18. There are many who believe that religion can provide a short cut to reality which enables us to dispense with the devious and uphill path to which Philosophy points. In religion, it is claimed, we have an intuitive and immediate knowledge of that ultimate reality which Philosophy seeks. Such a claim may rest either on a direct experience of the protagonist of this view, or a claim on behalf of a religious leader or founder, to whom such truths are said to be revealed. I do not myself believe in the validity of such claims.

19. That there are specifically religious experiences which are genuine, must be admitted by all unbiassed observers, but that the interpretation placed upon those experiences by the person experiencing them is necessarily valid is an extravagant claim which every adherent of any particular religion himself denies to all his

rivals. I place religious experience on a par with the other aspects of human experience.
20. Religious experience, according to my view, is thus a fit subject for psychological study and investigation, after which the findings of the psychology of religion must be fitted into our synthetic view of reality as a whole, as in the case of the other sciences.
21. Our knowledge is everywhere incomplete, and both the world of inner experience, as well as the world of external nature, are like great books, of which humanity has as yet only scanned a few scattered pages somewhere in the middle.
22. Ours is but a little day, for out of the great unknown we come and into a still vaster unknown we pass away. But in our little fitful day the gods have given us the gift of laughter, of human friendship, and the vision of beauty in Nature and in Art. What if we ourselves are mortal, our laughter but the prelude of tears, love's brief transport the herald of approaching doom, and beauty but the echo of a dying song? Shall we refuse the gifts which the gods bring us, for brief must be the time in which we can enjoy them and mortality the fate of all we prize! Shall not our own mortality teach us to treasure all the more the good things that life brings us, and the very niggardliness of fortune enhance the value of its gifts? And if sorrow, or grief, or loss be our portion, these also we shall bear with what of fortitude we can summon, for these also are but transitory, and in any case rebellion and false expectation will but enhance our own afflictions. And if we have wooed with any ardour that coy maid, Philosophy, she also will come to our aid, and by teaching us to lose the personal in the imper-

sonal pursuit of remoter ends, help us to preserve that sanity and forbearance, in the face of good fortune or ill fortune alike which has been from times immorial her reward to her devotees.

23. A.K. COOMARASWAMY"ON THE PERTINENCE OF PHILOSOPHY". Now knowledge as such is not the mere report of the senses (the reflection of anything in the retinal mirror may be perfect, in an animal or idiot, and yet is not knowledge), nor the mere act of recognition (names being merely a means of alluding to the aforesaid reports), but is an abstraction from these reports, in which abstraction the names of the things are used as convenient substitutes of the things themselves.

24. When a cause is discovered, this is called an explanation. But each cause was once an effect, and so on indefinitely, so that our picture of reality takes the form of a series of causes extending backward into the past, and of effects expected in the future, but we have no empirical experience of a now, nor can we explain empirically how causes produce effects, the assumption post hoc propter hoc being always an act of faith.

25. By what should one know the Knower of the knowing" (Brihad.Up. iv.5.15.)

26. Only possible ground upon which an effective entente of East and West can be accomplished is that of the purely intellectual wisdom that is one and the same at all times and for all men, and is independent of all environmental idosyncrasy.

27. "Unconscious" presents an analogy with "Deep-sleep" (susupti= samadhi= excessus or raptus); on the other hand, the use of the word "collective" betrays a purely scientific, and not a metaphysical conception.

28.BHAGAVAN DAS. The disadvantage of two unfamiliar languages (English and Sanskrit) ultimately proved an advantage, for the times required that the invaluable ideas enshrined in the old Sankskrit medium should be interpreted in the new counters of thought. Only so could they help towards a rapprochement between Eastern and Western, ancient and modern, thought and life.

29. The metaphysical theory of causation, that the world is an unreal dream-idea (maya-vada abhasa-vada), is the ideation, the willed-imagination of My-Self (Param-Atma, Brahma), the Infinite Universal Self, comes nearer home.

But some difficulties remain. Why should the Self dream at all? And such a very painful dream! Why any change--which means desire, incompleteness, imperfection? And what after all is change? Every change means the passing of something, some being, into nothing and of non-being into some being, some-thing; this violates the very fundamentals of ordinary logic. How can we reconcile Change with the Changeless, Brahma with Maya, and Joy of Self-dependence with Misery of Life--this is the ultimate trouble with this last theory of causation. "I am" is the most questionable eternal fact. "Cogito ergo" is superfluous. "Sum" is enough. But "This" the world of objects, the opposite of "I" (vivarta), this "Other-than-I", this "Not-I", this "Else-than-Subject", all the mass of objects which consciousness looks at as "This"--this is also an indubitable though utterly changeful, ever passing, fact. If we succeed in reconciling the two in such a way that the not-I shall be at the will of the I and not the other way round; such a way that the I, while doing what it pleases with the not-I, shall still

not lose its eternal fulness and completeness; such a way that disorder, arbitrariness, shall go hand in hand with law and order; then we shall have found the consolation and the peace that we are seeking. The insistent question, why this process, why this posing and opposing, this mutual limitation, remains the crux.

30. We must try again. The secret lies hidden somewhere between "I" and "This." If we can discover the precise nature of the relation between these two, which are the only things that interest us, which fill our whole life and make up and exhaust the whole universe, we will surely have discovered the secret.

Instead of saying "Being is Nothing," (as Hegel said), it seems more readily intelligible to say, "Being is Not Non-Being, Not Nothing, or rather Not-any-particular-thing"; better than that, "Ego is not non-Ego"; better than that "I is not Not-I"; better than that " (am) Not Not-I"; and finally, better than all else "I (am) not-This" or in the Sanskrit order. "I-(am)-This-Not" (Aham-Etat-Na).

In this sentence we gain the reconciliation we sought, the all-comprehensive synthesis which includes both thesis and antithesis within itself. The contrast between "I" and "not I" is so utterly complete that any thought of mutual identification (anyonya-dhyasa), complete or partial (in the way of mutual limitation), is not possible. But if we use the word "This", the impossibility disappears. Our body is clearly "This" to us. We say: "This body is mine," as we say, "This coat is mine"; "mine", not "me" but different, only belonging to me. And we obviously feel identified also with our body when we say "I am coming" "I am going", "Here am I." Yet it is an extension of "I" a part of "I".

In the awareness "I (am) NotbThis," or "I-This-Not" the whole of all possible not-Is is affirmed, is present here, now, all at once, and, at the same time, the being, the existence, the reality, the truth of them all is denied. Affirmation and negation, supposition and opposition, are simultaneous in it.

31. Such is the transcendental view (paramartha-drishti), the view from the standpoint of the Infinite, the Whole, the Unmanifest yet Ever manifest, the Unlimited and Unconditioned I.

32. If we get firm hold of and are satisfied with the distinction between the transcendental standpoint of the Infinite and the experiental standpoint of the Finite, we still realise that to the former view there is no change, that "all is every-where and every-when and all-ways" (sarvam sarvatra sarvada sarvatha); and where there is no change there can be no questioning of why and how. If we are convinced that the five senses which "prove" the existence of material objects do not cognise and prove themselves, that the eye which sees sights does not see itself, the ear which hears sounds does not hear itself, nor the skin, tongue, nose, touch, taste smell themselves, but that they are all cognised and "proved" by the I, that "I" feel, am aware, am conscious, that they exist and see and hear, that the I-Consciousness is the Ultimate Fact which proves all other-facts, and is not proved by any other-fact, that is the locus of all experiences, good and evil, pleasurable and painful, that it is also Universal and the Same wherever there is an I-Consciousness, that "there is another" is also "my-consciousness" and the "other" is within "my-consciousness," that "within" and "without" are both "within",

"thing", and "thought" both "thought" "subjective" and "objective" both "subjective", then too, we would see that our curses and sorrows, as much as our blessings and joys, are all within us.
33. But the final answer to all possible questioning, the abrogation of all enquiry, complete satisfaction and peace, seems possible only by means of the transcendental standpoint of the Logion and the negation and abolition of change itself.
34. In the light of these principles, we may find the means of reconciling different views if we only substitute for their "only"--"this view only is the true view."--the word "also" and explain in what sense and with what qualifications and reservations each and every view is true.
35. The word-sound made of three letters A,U,M, may be regarded as the elemental sound-continuum which can yield all the sounds of animate and inanimate nature. This sound-word reverberating through space is the prime manifestation of the Unmanifest.
36 SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA. That reason is unable to discover the truth--a creed which is almost suicidal to any philosophy in the modern sense of the term. According to this view, reason is only useful for biological or sociological purposes, but is impotent to give us any glimpse of the nature of truth. Reason must always be a hand-maid to scriptural testimony and must always, therefore, be used for discovering the import of such testimony and for persuading us to believe it. A student of Indian philosophy knows well how reason entered into the Vedic circle like the camel in the fable and ultimately practically dislodged the Vedic dogma professing only a lip-loyalty to it. Different interpreters of the Upanisads have always treated

the Vedic texts like noses of wax and twisted them differently to suit the convenience of each type of reasoning. If reason is the interpreter, the infallibility of the Vedic wisdom becomes only nominal.

An ineffable super-conscious state is often described in the Upanisads, and in some passages there is a tendency to regard it as an unchangeable condition or state from which there is no fall. This has often been interpreted as the doctrine of emancipation. It has been argued that, if there be an unconditional state, that must be no state but the pure self as pure consciousness. If that is the only reality, its associations with appearances of diverse contents must be in some sense false or illusory. Relation of identity, or rather the identity itself, is the only reality. The act of relationing implied in identity which is responsible for the notion of difference, is the nescience (avidya) somehow subsistent in the identity. So long as the identity remains in the ineffable state, there is no relationing; but as soon as it descends into the knowable, it can only do so through the extraneous association of a relationing implied in its very nature. Relying on the unrelational ineffable state as the ultimate reality, the relationing factor implied in it is regarded as false.

37. Philosophy, if it is to grow, has to be founded on experience, either direct or indirect. The word experience is very difficult to define. Definition implies that the term to to defined has to be explained by a reference to the underlying relations subsisting between simpler but yet constitutive notions. I do not mean that the constitutive notions are in

themselves sufficient for the purposes of definition. But at least the relations subsisting between the constitutive notions should be sufficient to indicate the nature of the emergent idea to be defined. The word experience covers for us all possible mental facts. Facts, again, are not necessarily expressible in propositions. They are the possession of one or more qualities or relations by an appearance or by an existent. By a mental fact, again, I do not mean the mere inward occurrence in the mind, but I mean by it anything that is revealed in the mind either through the inward workings of the mind or by the outward relationing that it may have with the objective world or the minds of others. All sens-occurrences, feelings, desires, willing, the logical and the reflective phenomena, images or the imaginings, a priori faiths, all stock of ideas derived from social intercourse, all promptings of value, hopes and aspirations of men (civilised or uncivilised) psychological experiences of all descriptions, the inheritance of knowledge that we have through the works of other people, are all included within expeprience. Experience also includes the mystical experiences of religious men, the aesthetic experiences of the artists, the emotional experiences of the devotees and the supernormal trance experiences of the Yogins. Science, in the ordinary acceptance of the word, restricts itself to the study of facts in an inter-related system in special departments of the workings of Nature. As soon as discoveries are made or anticipations achieved, they become part of the human experience. When the poet the dreamer or the lover fills his mind with his mental creations, throbbing and pulsating with emotions, with the vague and indefinite

wanderings of his mind and with conflicting oscillations of pangs and happiness, we have a field of human experience which has its law and order as much as the experience of an insane person. The fanatic, the contemplating Yogin on the banks of the Ganges at Hardwar, the ecstatic devotee forgetting himself in the divine communion, have all their experiences; and the non-relational or the supra-relational state into which a man slowly passes inward far beyond the threshold of consciousness--a state which is inexpressible by any logical propositions, but can be felt in its uniqueness--is also experience. But all these experiences are concrete occurrences in the human mind, howsoever they may or may not be related with the objective world.
38. It is unfortunate that language should practically be the only mode by which we can express our experiences to others or in a very large measure deal with them ourselves. Experiences are dynamic, concrete and showing themselves in different shades of tone and colour in association with other experiences, whereas language is static, abstract, definite and lacking in the wealth of reality. The growth of language has hardly been able to keep pace with the ever-growing experiences. In the very structure of language there is a false logic which has to be wedded to experiences of all descriptions, in order to keep going their currency either with us or with others. Even the Mathematicians, who deal with merely abstract ideas, had to invent a language of their own for giving precision and perspicuity to their investigations. If this is so in the case of Mathematics, how much more should the difficulty be felt in giving expression to experiences or in pinning them

them down in our minds with a few inadequate terms. Joy, bliss, happiness, gladness, pleasure are some of the terms to denote the mental sense of elation which occurs in myriads of forms, each one of which has its own specific uniqueness. This difficulty of expression reserves for us to a very great extent the privacy of our individual experiences. It limits the sphere of general communicability to such an extent that in a large measure communication in a proper sense is only possible between individuals having similar kinds of experiences. This makes possible the formation of such new relational groups among like minds, that what is real to them may be false to others.

39.The aim and purpose of philosophy is to give a connected and systematic explanation of all our experiences in their mutual connection and relatedness and, through them, of the phenomena which they denote. Philosophers must, therefore, gather all possible facts in different departments of nature and also the various kinds of relevant human experiences. New facts are being discovered every day, and the discovery of one little fact which may not fit in with a particular philosophical scheme may upset it or endanger its existence. A philosophy which starts from certain a priori notions and seeks to deduce or distort all phenomena according to them, or which merely occupies itself with dealing with one or a few special kinds of experience, does not deserve the name of philosophy in our sense of the word.

40. A dream, a mirage, a hallucination are also reality so far as they are experienced. A dream may be called unreal in the sense that it has no connected relation with other dreams of other

days or with the experiences of the waking life. It is this break of connection, the impossibility of relating it with other experiences at other times, that makes us call it unreal. So far as it is an occureence as an experience at a particular time, it has a definite aetiology and is in that way connectible with other facts and experiences, and is thus within the scope of philosophical investigation. Freudian attempts in this direction are an illustration to the point.

41. Wise instructions or scientific truths may be rejected by a wrongly-bent or prejudiced mind.

42. The concept of mind and of the ego or the perceiver is indeed a difficult one. Idealists in India and in the West have sometimes maintained that the object of awareness, being given in awareness, is nothing but awareness, and, therefore, that there cannot be an object unless there is the awareness of it. The fallacy of this position was shown by Moore in a brilliant paper in which he showed that awareness and its object are two different things. The Buddhists argued that the two are one since they are given simultaneously. They regarded it as a deduction from a supposed general truth that things realised at the same instant of time are identical in nature. The fallacy is obvious. The image of orange is co-present with the word "orange", and no one would think for a moment that the word "orange" is identical with the round yellow object. Again, it has been held that the subject and the object are given in and through knowledge. The term in-and-through is ambiguous; for if it means a relation, two terms S and O must be present before the relation can occur; and if it means knowledge alone exists and the subject and object are both its modes and a sort of extraneous imposition on it, then also the reality of

knowledge as such, independent of such bi-polar modification, must be demonstrable to us in experience in experience, and some justification should occur. It is a peculiar situation that nothing can be denoted or referred to except through knowledge, but yet it is unfortunate that the situation be so exploited that knowledge should be regarded as the only reality. The word "knowledge" is used in a variety of senses. The knowledge of a blue patch of colour in front of me is very different from the knowledge that I have of the n-dimensions of space, or the knowledge that I may have of a tense pain, or an ecstatic state which is more or less unrelational. The use of the word "I" is also very ambiguous when used as a subject of the verb "to know." Had it not been for the crude conditions of grammar, the situation might just as well have been described as "there is a knowledge of such and such at such a centre at such an instant." The spatio-temporal limits are just as much necessary for knowledge as for any other event in the world, though on account of the peculiarity of the pehnomenon of knowledge its spatial location is not possible. Again, it is said that both the subject and object are revealed in knowledge, is as much an object of knowledge as any other object. Unless the existence of pure objectless knowledge is demonstrable, it seems irresistible that there is only knowledge, and object or objects are denoted by it. The existence of subjects as such cannot be proved. The existence of knowledge as such cannot also be proved. Furthermore, there is no characteristic appearance of the subject with which I can directly be acquainted. The knowledge of the subject, if we have it at all, is only a knowledge by description or a fiction

of linguistic construction. It is difficult to discover if there is a special content of "I", the knower as a mere perceiver, what the Vedantists would call the "Saksi." If there were such an unchangeable perceiver, this entity would have a character and would be perceived as such. On the other hand, we know that in the consciousness of a new-born babe, who is unaware of a linguistic construction, there is hardly any apperception of "I", and it is extremely doubtful whether his knowledge ever takes the subject-object form.

43. HIRALAD DALDAR. REALISTIC IDEALISM.: I have seen myself described as a Hegelian. The basis of my thought is undoubtedly Hegelian, but in the course of years, as this sketch may show, I have been led to modify in many ways what I have learned from Hegel. No man, however poor a thinker he may be, can exactly reproduce the views of another. The very essence of individuality in its uniqueness and therefore the angle of vision of one man is bound to be somewhat different from that of another. In the process of making my own the ideas acquired from Hegel and others, I have inevitably transformed them more or less.

Alexander Bain was perfectly right when he said that the ingenuity of a century and half had failed to see a way out of the contradiction exposed by Berkeley. The contradiction is that of supposing that the objects all around us, the things which we see, smell, taste, hear and touch exist on their own account independently of their being perceived. Take away from things the relations in which they stand to the perceiving mind and they lose all meaning, simply cease to be. The objective world can no more exist apart from mind than can the outside of a thing exist in isolation from its inside. The

self is the very centre of being of whatever can be called real, the life and soul of all that it. The experienced world has its support in mind. This argument is by no means of modern origin and Berkeley was not the first to use it. It was well known to the sages of the Upanishads nearly three thousand years ago. In the Brih. Up., for example, probably the oldest of the Upanisads, Yajnavalkya tells his wife Maitreyi that all things forsake him who suppose that they are separate from mind. As the sound of a musical instrument cannot be taken hold of apart from that of the instrument, as the sound of a conch-shell cannot be apprehended separately from the conch-shell, but if the musical instrument and the conch-shell are cognised the sounds emanating from them are necessarily cognised along with them, so none of these things issuing forth fromthe self can be known independently of the self. It may be said that the plausibility of the idealistic argument is due to a confusion between a thing and the thing as known. A man with whom I am shaking hands is necessarily related to the act of handshaking but this does not mean that his very existence depends on it. The food I am eating implies the act of eating, but eating is not the necessary condition of the existence of the food. So a thing as perceived is dependent upon perceiving, but the thing as perceived is not identical with the thing. The latter has no necessary relation to knowledge. The contention of the idealist is that no such distinction can be made between object and object of knowledge. The very essence of an object is its being known. As Yajnavalkya says all things flee from him who attempts to separate them from the self. Food which is not eaten is possible, a man with

whom no one is shaking hands is possible, but a thing which no mind knows is impossible. It is the outcome of false abstraction.

But however sound and unassailable Berkeley's fundamental principle, in its essence, may be, the conclusions he draws from it are not all tenable. In the first place, he gives a too restricted meaning it it. Perception is not the only mode of knowledge and is therefore not possible to say that what is perceived is alone real. It would have been better if he had said that the esse of a thing is its intelligi. In his earlier writings he ignores almost completely the universal forms of knowledge and takes cognisance of its contents only consisting of a particular sensations and ideas. In the Siris this view is to some extent corrected and the importance of universality in knowledge realised. Even in the Principles he admits that the self is an object of thought, not of perception. In the second place, from the right premiss that nothing is real apart from the mind the wrong conclusion is drawn that everything is reducible to ideas of the mind. So far from its being true that things are only ideas, ideas have no meaning, as Reid urged, without their reference to things. The opposition of mind to its object is the very basis of knowledge and without this duality no sort of cognition can take place. If to be is to be perceived it is equally true that to be perceived is to be. In all knowledge the distinguishable but inseparable factors opposed and irreducible to each other are the mind that knows, the object that is known and the act or process of knowing. Imagination also has this three-fold character. The imagined world is as much opposed to the imagining mind and its activity as the solid world of perception in time and space. This being so it is the images of the

mind, the ideas that are to be brought into line with things and not the latter with the former. The imagined world is quite as objective as the physical world of perception to which we belong. Things, therefore are not mental ideas, they are objects of mind. Instead of things being ideas, it is ideas which have the status of things. This truth is clearly realised by the idealist philosophers of India. Sankara, for example, who is commonly but wrongly supposed to be an illusionist, a thinker who denies the reality of the world, lays the utmost stress on the opposition of what is known to the mind that knows. In the absence of something distinguished from mind and opposed to it knowledge is no more possible than it is possible for a dancer to dance on his own shoulders. Epistemologically, Sankara is a thorough-ging realist. He does not say that the empirical world is in any way dependent for its being on the finite mind. All that he maintains is that ultimately, from the highest point of view, it has no independent existence apart from Brahman. Both Sankara and Ramanuja maintain that even illusions are not unreal and merely subjective. They are as objective as the things of ordinary perception, the only difference being that they are not common to all, but individual and last only as long as they are experienced.
44. Stress has been laid on the opposition of the experienced world in the mind that knows it. It stands over against the subject on its own legs and is in no way reducible to it. Its existence is not dependent upon the finite minds which are included within it except those portions of it that are the products of their imaginative activities. On the opposition of subject and object all knowledge is founded. There is no such thing as an insulated mind contem-

plating only its own internal states. The whole content of mind, percepts as well as ideas, belongs to objective experience. What are specifically mental are its own activities of knowing and willing. But the opposition of subject and object does not mean that they are separable from each other. The error of realism is to make this opposition absolute, just as the error of subjective idealism is to ignore or minimise it. There the opposition is undeniably, fundamentally and glaringly, but is presupposes an ultimate unity from which it arises and of which it is the other side. In the realisation of this truth consists the strenth of the idealism. Berkeley's doctrine is an inadequate and misleading expression of it. The South Pole is not the North Pole, or a locality within it; it is diametrically opposite to it. Nevertheless the being of the one pole is implicated with that of the other and they exist only as two necessarily connected sides of the earth. Similarly the front and back of my body do not look at each other. They are not on speaking terms with each other, but in spite of this they are the inseparable parts of my entire organism. Just in the same way mind and its object are the two opposed aspects of the one all-embracing unity which also is mind. The term "mind" has two meanings. It is the knower opposed to the object of which it is conscious. Further, it is the unity presupposed in the distinction of subject and object and manifested in that distinction. This all-inclusive spirit within which distinctions of every kind arise, which is bifurcated into subject and object is the ultimate reality--the universe in its last interpretation. It is not mere mind nor abstract matter but the source and presupposition the truth of both.'

45. It is ideal unity, the unity of a principle

common to them, realised completely and indivisibly in each of them but limited to none of them. It is the universal mind at the root of things manifested in them and their mutual relations.
46. The mind in which the universe finds its truth and explanation is not foreign to it. It is the mind of the universe itself, its own highest form. What at a lower level of interpretation is a system of mutually determining things in space and time is at a higher level of interpretation mind---mind that does not exclude the physical world but takes it up into itself. The material world is inwardised in mind and mind is externalised in matter. They are the correlated phases of the one all-inclusive spirit. In preaching this truth idealism is in no way inconsistent with realism. It does not make it its business to deny the reality of the world. On the contrary, it strongly affirms it.
47. Kant's great achievement was to show that experience is richer than what the empiricists lake it to be and involves both the categories of thought and the particulars of sense. But solid result of his philosophical thinking was to demonstrate that apart from the principles of the understanding experience is not possible. In the actual knowledge the universal and the particular are never found cut loose from each other.
48. Kant regards the categories only as instruments used by the self for the purpose of producing knowledge out of the data of sense. In themselves they are but empty forms not essentially related to one another and to the self. Hegel, on the contrary, views them as at once forms of thought and modes of being, subjective as well as objective. They form a graded system and the business of philosophy is to show how thought necessarily passes from the lowest of

them step by step through the intermediate stages to the highest. Each category incorporates the immediately fower one into itself and it taken up into the immediately higher, and the highest, the Absolute Idea, therefore contains them all as necessary elements of itself. It is to them that the living body is to its members. For Hegel this view implies that the Absolute Idea is a completed and closed system and that human knowledge is co-extensive with reality. There cannot in his view be anything in thought or reality which has not a definitely ascertainable place in the system of the Absolute Idea.

Now it is not easy to avoid being overpowered by the persuasiveness of Hegel's argument. The methodical procession of the categories produces an immense effect on the reader's mind. But in the end few are able to accept the view that the Logic exhaustively disclosed the contents of reality. The really valuable work which Hegel does is to demonstrate that the universe is an orderly and intelligible system with mind at its centre, but this does not mean that we know in detail what its constitution and contents are. If the categories specified by him were the only elements of this system, if human intelligence penetrated reality to the very core, omniscience would be the necessary consequence and there would be no room for doubt and hesitation of any kind. It sometimes looks as though Hegel actually claimed omniscience. But the revisions to which he himself subjected the arrangement of his categories, the alterations he made in their list from time to time, show that he by no means knew all that there is to be known and that reality after all very largely eluded the grasp of his intellect. The truth, of course, is that human knowledge is not co-existensive with reality and the categories of Hegel's Lo-

gic do not furnish a complete exposition of it. They are only a section of the contents of Absolute thought detached from the whole. The fragmentary character of our knowledge is obvious.

49. Whatever is, is the expression of the mind. There is nothing which is out of relation to intelligence. As Bradley says, "Outside of spirit there is not and there cannot be any reality." All the worlds, the visible material world and the invisible immaterial but objective worlds, are parts of one stupendous whole and in this whole the Absolute mind is completely embodied. A purely spiritual or psychical world is as much a fiction as a purely material world. What is real is also ideal.

50. The universal mind is immanent in all things. This means that it is present in each of them undivided and as a whole, which cannot be unless it is in it as its inner soul. To be a self-complete whole, to be in all parts of it equally and yet to remain aswhole in each part is prerogative of the universal. The mind for which the universe is, is not apart from it; it is its own central principle. Its relation to this, therefore, is not an external relation like that of the thing to another. It is the ideality of each of the things themselves, the very core of its being.

51. Their world-pictures are different. The universe presents itself in different perspectives to them, but they are all fused into a composite whole. Different views of things obtained from different standpoints become complementary to one another in the final synthesis. What is seen with the right eye is also seen with the left eye in a slightly different way but the two visions are merged in one and do not remain apart from each other. See a word

consisting, say, of five letters with attention mainly fucused on each of the five letters successively and you will get five somewhat different appearances, but they are all amalgamated with each other in the ordinary appearance of the word. Nothing is as simple as it seems to be. A lump of sugar is no doubt sweet, but who will undertake to prove that it is sweet to me in precisely the same way as it is to you? Its real sweetness may be the synopsis of the sweetnesses felt by all those who taste it. As no two faces are alike, so it may be that no two perceptions, no two ideas of the same thing are alike. The vulture finds enjoyable repast in a rotten carcass, but to men it is noxious. This ought to give us food for reflection. The truth is that relatively things are different from different standpoints, but absolutely they combine in them all these variations. There is no contradiction in this, for the essence of contradiction is the confusion of standpoints.

49. M. HIRIYANNA: The Problem of Truth. Let us begin by analysing an act of perception. When a person opens his eyes (say) and sees a table before him, there are, as ordinarily supposed, three elements that can be distinguished in the situation. First, the percipient who sees; secondly the object, viz. the table; and lastly the sense-data or sensa, as they are described--a certain shape, colour, etc., which he associates with the table and regards as its actual characteristics.

50. We shall, in what follows, overlook the distinction between errors of perception and illusions, as the only difference between them is that while the judgment is explicit in the former, it is implicit in the latter. Illusions have been described as "errors in the germ."

51. S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Man tears himself from the religious centre, discovers his own powers and possibilities and through their impetuous play tries to create a new society. The modern intelectual whose mind has been moulded to a degree seldom recognised by the method and concepts of modern science, has great faith in verifiable facts and tangible results.
52. Since men began to think, there have always been sceptics. "The wise man," said Arcesilaus, "should withold his assent from all opinions and should suspend his judgment."
53. Human life is an infinitesimal speck on a tiny planet, in a system of planets revolving round an insignificant star, itself lost in a wilderness of other stars.
54 Religion, as a matter of history, has crippled the free flight of intelligence and stifled glad devotion to human values. It has forstered superstition and prescribed crime. It has comforted millions of suffering humanity with illusions of extra-terrestrial solace to compensate for the barrenness of their earthly lives. Religion is only a species of poetry (Santayana) mythology (Croce), sociological phenomenon (Durkheim), or a narcotic for a decadent society (Lenin). Spiritual life is a deception and a dream. At best we can use religion as a code of ethics. It can be reduced to a few rules of morality.
55. "This may well be called the age of criticism" said Kant, "a criticism from which nothing need hope to escape. When religion seeks to shelter itself behind its sanctity, and law behind its majesty, they justly awaken suspicion against themselves and lose all claim to the sincere respect which reason yields only to that which has been able to bear the test of its free and open scrutity." But what has criticism achieved?

It has banished absolute truth from thought and life. In aesthetics, beauty is treated as subjective. In jurisprudence, law is declared to be an expression of social convention, not of justice. In morality a full and varied life is said to be inconsistent with a rigid moral code. Even theologians have dropped the Absolute and taken to finite, "self-educating" gods.

56 The world is passing through a period of uncertainty, of wordless longing. It wants to get out of its present mood of spiritual chaos, moral aimlessness and intellectual vagrancy. Burdened and tired to death by his loneliness, man is ready to lean on any kind of authority, if it only saves him from hopeless isolation and the wild search for peace. The perils of spiritual questioning are taking us to the opposite extreme of revivals and fundamentalism in religion. These are only half-way houses to a radical reconstruction of the mind. The uncertainty between dogmatic faith and blatant unbelief is due to the non-existence of a philosophic tradition or habit of mind. The mental suffering of the thinking, when the great inheritance of mankind is concealed by the first views of science, the suffering which is due to the conflict between the old and the new values, which are both accepted, though without reconciliation, is the sign that no upheaval, no crude passion can put out the light of spirit in man. However dense the surrounding darkness may be, the light will shine though that darkness may not comprehend it. Only when the life of spirit transfigures and irradiates the life of man from within will it be possible for him to renew the face of the earth. The need of the world to-day is for a religion of the spirit, which will give a purpose to life, which will not demand any evasion or ambiguity, which will reconcile the ideal and the real, the

poetry and the prose of life, which will speak to the profound realities of our nature and satisfy the whole of our being, our critical intelligence and our active desire.

57. Hindu systems of thought believe in the power of the human mind to lead us to all truth. It can rise to a level almost inconceivable to us. Each system prescribes a discipline or a practical way or reaching the higher consciousness.

58. It is the result of a long and arduous process of study and analysis and is therefore higher than the discursive process from which it issues and on which it supervenes.

59. Simply because the deliverances of intuition appear incontestable to the seer or happen to be shared by many, it does not follow that they are true. Subjective certitude, whose validity consists in mere inability to doubt, is different from logical certainty. The sense of assurance is present, even when the object is imaginary and even such objects, so long as they are believed to be actual, evoke feelings and attitudes quite as intense and effective as those excited by real ones. While religion may be satisfied with the sense of convincedness, which is enough to foster spiritual life, philosophy is interested in finding out whether the object believed is well grounded or not.

Intuition requires cultivation quite as much as the powers of observation and thought. We can realise the potentialities of spirit only by a process of moral ascesis which gradually shapes the soul into harmony with the invisible realities. Plotinus tells us that the path to the goal is long and arduous, traversing first the field of civic virtues, then the discipline of purification and then the contemplation which leads to illumination. Indian thought requires

us to abstract from sense life and discursive thinking in order to surrender to the deepest self where we get into immediate contact with reality. To know better, we must become different, out thoughts and feelings must be deeply harmonised. Intuition is not only perfect knowledge but also perfect living. The consecration of the self and the knowledge of reality grow together. The fully real can be known only by one who is himself fully real.

60. Life, that sphinx with a human face and the body of a brute, asks us new questions every hour. The backward or those who are still children in the game of life allow their activities to be governed by automatic attractions and repulsions but their activities are by no means free. To hold the balance between instinctive desires and cravings and social obligations is the task of the moral life. Only when man attains unity, when he has discovered his whole nature and ordered it, has he the right to say, "I will." His free decisions seem then to come of themselves and develop of their oaccord, though they may be contrary to his interests and inclinations. They infringe on the ordinary routine of life and bring into it a new type of power. These creative decisions cannot be foreseen, though they may be accounted for in retrospect.

61. R.D. RANADE. It was inevitable for me, however to start with a Pluralistic conception of Spiritual Reality, because that was the conception which was likely to give satisfaction to the enquiring mind in its earlier stages.

62. I advocated a definite correlative study of Indianand European Philosophy. The Absolutism of Bradley has numerous points of contact with the Advaitism of Sankaracharya. Both suppose that the Absolute is the only ultimate real.

With both, God is different from the Absolute. With both, God is unreal as compared tothe Absolute. Both consider that our souls, our bodies, the worldly objects that we see, are ultimately appearances. And both hold that Space and Time are only phenomenal, and are transcended in the Absolute.

63. It is usual to sepak of Sankara's Absolute as being of the nature of the unconscious. Bradley talks of a personal Basolute as being an intellectually dishonest conception. The great difference between Royce and Sankara is that while the former says that the soul comes into existence in time, Sankara says that, seen from one point of view it is eternal, while seen from another and higher, it is merely an appearance as compared with the absoluteness of the Absolute, which is Bradley's position.

64. Ramanuja's system, which is a numerically pluralistic but a qualitatively monistic system, has its best parallel in the theism of Professor James Ward,and in Personal Idealism generally, represented by such writers as Rashdall.

65. We find a great resemblance between the plural souls of the Samkhya without a ruling God, and the "system of selves, or spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a unity but not a conscious unity" of the non-theistic Idealist, McTaggart.

66. One of the great Greek Philosophers who was the first to catch my attention was Herakleitos. It was well known how he propounded the law of Relativism. He said there was no absolute distinction between night and day, between life and death, between good and bad.

67. The nemisis of the Herakleitean doctrine of flux was reached in the extreme doctrine of Cratylus, who did not think it right to say anything

but only moved his finger, and who rebuked his master for having said that it was impossible to step twice into the same river, for he thought that this could not be done even once, for, he said, "in the very process of your stepping into the river, the waters have run off."

68 I was once greatly astonished to see how Parmenides, the great Greek Ontological Philosopher, and Sankaracharya, the great Indian Vedantist, had made exactly similar attacks on the conception of the Idea or the Universal. The question, which both had raised, was--Is the Idea or the Universal fully immanent in the Particulars, or not? If it is fully immanent, it is distributed in so many Particulars. If it is partly present in the Particulars, then it is divisible. It is, therefore, either many or divisible, and hence is not entitled to the name of "Universal." This was the criticism which Parmenides and Sankaracharya alike passed on the conception of the Universal; and this led me on to the closer study of Parmenides himself. His identification of Thought and Being seemed to me to be quite analogous to the Indian identification of "Sat" and "Chit." Zeller and Burnet had interpreted Parmenides in a materialistic fashion, and I could not sympathise with their interpretation. I went, therefore, to study Parmenides from the Sources and I found there was a fallacy lurking in the materialistic interpretation.

69. As we have a rehabilitation of Herakleitos in Bergson, so we have a rehabilitation of Zeno in Mr. Bertrand Russell. He preaches a philosophy of what he is pleased to call "static Change" (Principles of Mathematics p.350). With an eloquence which comes out of intense appreciation, he expatiates on the capriciousness of posthu-

mus fame: "One of the most notable victims of posterity's lack of judgment is the Eleatic Zeno. Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle and profound, the grossness of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one and all sophisms. After two thousand years of continual refutation, these sophisms were reinstated, and made the foundation of a mathematical renaissance, by a German professor, who probably never dreamed of any connection between himself and Zeno. Weierstrass, by strictly banishing all infinitesimals, has at last shown that we live in an unchanging world, and that the arrow at every moment of its flight, is truly at rest." At rest, indeed, and with a vengeance! For does not Mr. Russell say that all such conceptions as velocity, acceleration and force, which may to the slightest extent imply the existence of a changing, moving world, are mere fruitful fictions of the scientific imagination?

70. A.R. WADIA. Bradley's greatest service to philosophy was that he provoked thoughtful reactions and facilitated by contrast the vogue of new philosophers: Bergson and William James, Croce and Gentile, and even the Realists. If they have done any service to philosophy in our own times it is that they have raised a note of warning against a metaphysics too much in the sky and too little on terra firma.

71. My agreement with Indian thought ceases as soon as the question has to be faced: how is this evil in us to be overcome so as to attain nirvana or moksa? The orthodox Indian answer to this question invariably takes the form of some type of ascetic ethics. It aims at an increasing simplicity of life so that the man who has neared or attained the goal should have nothing to call

his own. That is why the extreme Jaina Digambar rejects even clothing and the Jain muni insists on moving about naked, unmindful of the presence of men and women alike. This extreme attitude is not taken up by all the sadhus in India, but they all aim at having nothing of their own so that ultimately they have to be dependent on public charity even for their barest needs of life. The notorious beggar problem in India has its roots in this application of Indian thought and making allowance for a few genuinely advanced souls, the majority cannot escape the charge of being social parasites on one of the poorest communities on earth. Sometimes this asceticism even takes the form of a claim that a liberated soul rises above all social ties. He is said to have no moral duties--a doctrine extremely dangerous in itself. Sometimes it is even claimed that such a sould can do no wrong and that is made an excuse for doing every wrong. Luckily such cases are exceptions, but they essentially point to the perversions that are likely to arise when any school of thought imagines that a man under any circumstances can possibly be above morality.

As I have noted previously, I have never felt it necessary to give up my ethical Zoroastrian inheritance. The spirit of Zoroaster's teaching is anything but ascetic. It has been noted even by non-Zoroastrian students of the old Persian faith that it is the only religion which eschews asceticism in every form. It does not advocate fasts or celebacy. It does not look upon life with sickly eyes. It has faith in a righteous God and believes that in order to succeed man has but to try courageously to rise above all evil temptations. From my own metaphysical standpoint too I see no justification for asceticism. Like the ancient Greek and the Persian, I believe that man

is most natural when he is most developed and he is most developed in the life of civilisation where arts and literature, science and industry flourish. If the Absolute Spirit lives in all its parts there is nothing which it need repudiate as alien to itself except the evil which hinders its life of harmony. What is needed is the recognition of the oneness of Spirit and therefore the real life of the Spirit is to be found in the interplay of individuals rather than in a studied exclusion from the life around us. Such exclusiveness is justifiable only as a stage of preparation for a fuller manifestation of the life of the Spirit, never as an end in itself.

72. Nirguna literally means without qualities. If taken literally, it would amount to Hegel's pure being, which is as good as nothing. I find it difficult to believe that such a meaning could have been intended by so keen a thinker as Sankara. The single legitimate meaning of nirguna can only be that no quality we human beings can possibly conceive of can be an adequate description of Brahman, which in its infinity must necessarily transcend all human categories. I am also driven to agree with him as with European Absolutism that the highest category cannot be a person without sharing in all the limitations of personality. Saguna Brahman is Isvara or God, who has qualities, but even he is a part of the world of Maya, which is usually translated as illusion, but may more appropriately be translated as appearance. So Isvara is not ultimately real. He may be worshipped by the masses, but for the Jnani--the sage--he does not exist in the sense in which the highest religious consciousness conceived him. No wonder if the orthodox Brahmin of the rival schools looks upon an Advaitin as a nastika, an atheist.

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One cannot be blind to the fact that the trances and other paraphernalia of mysticism are found as much in the lowest types of shamanism as in the highest monotheisms. Even in the highest religions mystic experience would have an ultimate value if it not merely speaks of the ONE, but conceives the ONE in an identical manner. In actual fact we find that Christian mysticism centres round Christ, Vaishnavite mysticism round Vishnu, Saivite round Siva and Kali. This clearly shows the purely personal origin of many of these mystic experiences. Faith is strong indeed, but its strength is the strength of the human will behing it, as shown abundantly by Coueism and other similar phenomena. No wonder if a real devotee who has the name of Christ or Ram continually on his lips sometimes sees visions. As psychical phenomena they have worth, but whether they have any ontological value is certainly open to question. Mysticism at its highest can lay claim only to one great uniformity: the sense of oneness that the mystic feels with the whole universe and this is philosophy consistent with pantheism as much as with theism. There is a type of mysticism, not perhaps logically deduced, but intuitively felt and intellectually understandable which we find in the Upanisads and in Sufism, in the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists, in Spinoza and in Kabir. Leuba's crusade, so thorough in its onslaught on theistic mysticism, does not touch the deeper form of intellectual mysticism.

73. A God that could respond to the innermost wishes of my heart is indeed a God that my heart, anybody's heart, can eagerly yearn for. But Kant was devastating when he said that the idea of a hundred dollars is not the same as a hundred dollars actually jingling in one's pocket, and that the idea of God does not necessarily imply the reality of God. A wish in my heart, however in-

tense, cannot be mistaken for an objective reality. Is religion then nothing but an idea, an emotional craving of a lonely and oppressed heart?

74. Religion involves a way of living, essentially practical, but if it is not to dissolve into waves of mere emotions, it must be based on truth, which is fundamentally an intellectual or philosophical category. Religion must in the last resort be Applied Philosophy. Even a fetichist has a philosophy, but a philosophy so crude as to be mere mythology.

75. I often think that if metaphysics is merely a matter of intellectual jugglery and religious pride, as it has come to be in India, it would be good for India to take a metaphysical holiday. But it would be far better for India if her sons did not take their social institutions as divinely ordained, which no man dare touch.

76. If philosophy is not to end merely in talk and endless bandying about of quotations from the Upanisads and the Gita, and still more endless quotations from the numerous commentaries on them, we in India must break loose from the shackles of the past, retain all the good that we can and mercilessly discard the rest.

VIJNANA BHIKSHU'S YOGASARA-SANGRAHA. The partial suppression of mental functions consequent upon the waking state (which include the conditions of Agitation and Ignorance) does not lead to liberation of the form of absolute abidance in one's real nature; because such partial suppression does not finally uproot the seeds of rebirth in the form of the troubles of life, and further because it does not put a final stop to the impressions (Samskara) produced by all the functions of the mind; consequently the aforesaid definition does not extend to this partial suppression

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE.

IDEALISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE.

1. I have often felt the need of a book which, like a map, would help a beginner to thread his way through the tangled mazes of idealistic theory. Such a book I have here tried to write. A student, whilst having much to add and amplify, should have little to unlearn. I have tried to lay foundations on which he can securely build, whatever direction his interest in idealism may take. I have tried, above all, to give him the right approach to the subject, to put into his hands the clues by the intelligent use of which he can unravel the rest for himself through first-hand study of the writings of the great idealists.

2. My chief fear, to confess it frankly, was that I might imbue the reader with a false sense of finality and encourage them to think that this book tells him all he needs to know about idealism.

3. For the sake of freshness of vision, I have avoided, or made but casual mention of, many of the well-worn stock-phrases of idealistic writers.

4. My treatment of Berkeley is, I believe, relatively unorthodox in emphasis and interpretation.

5. My distinction of two types of idealism-- one interpreting reality as a society of spirits ("spiritual pluralism"), the other interpreting it as appearances of the Absolute ("Absolutism") --will supply the student with that map of the idealistic maze of which I spoke above.

6. The Romans had taken over the term "idea" from the Greeks into their own philosophical vocabulary. The original root of "idea", and therefore, of "ideal" is id (Latin vid-ere), which has yielded verbs and substantives to express the act of seeing and the objects of sight.

7. An "idealist" especially as contrasted with a "realist" may be a man who is blind to facts

who is blind to facts as they are and invests them in his imagination with a perfection which is not theirs.

8. To turn from these popular meanings of "idealism" to the philosophic meaning is to turn from "ideal" to "idea." Literally, "idealism," as the name for a philosophical doctrine, means a theory of reality in terms of "ideas."

9. In the course of centuries of philosophical discussion, "idea" has acquired even more meanings than "ideal." Indeed, it has become a term so ambiduous and tricky that some modern writers avoid the use of it altogether.

10. The term "idea" belongs to the vocabulary (a) of popular speech, (b) of psychology, (c) of Philosophy.

(a) In popular speech the phrase, "to have an idea of" an object, is nothing but a circumlocution for thinking, believing, knowing imagining, intending, etc., of something. Thus "I have an idea that it will rain to-day" is equivalent to "I believe (expect) that it will rain to-day." "My idea is to build a house of my own, rather than buy or rent one," means that I intend (prefer) to build rathen than buy or rent. When I cannot answer a question, I may reply that "I have no idea," meaning that I know nothing of the subject. This popular use of "idea" has, as we shall see below (c), filtered down into current speech from the technical language of modern philosophy. But the term, in this process, has lost all precision. "Having an idea" is now nothing more than a loose way of expressing any kind of thought or imagination--a recollection of past experience, a plan for future action, a daydream, the framing of a scientific hypothesis. In all these cases we could express our meaning

just as well, without any mention of "ideas" by using one of the verbs for mental activity (judging, conceiving, remembering etc.) and naming the object with which the activity is concerned.

(b) Many psychologists have tried to rescue the term "idea" from this loose, popular use, and to re-invest it with a precise technical meaning. They distinguish three levels or stages in the development of our knowledge, viz. sensation, perception, ideation (or conception). They take the third stage to be characterised, as its name indicates, by the emergence of "ideas." It is in this sense that we find psychologists discussing whether animals are capable of "forming ideas" or are limited to sensing and perceiving. It is easiest to make the point clear to oneself by reflecting on the obvious difference between, e.g. seeing a colour or hearing a sound, and remembering or thinking of that colour or sound when they are no longer seen or heard. We commonly say that an object is "present" when we perceive it, "absent" when we imagine it or think of it. Now, it is to the technical description of this difference that many psychologists restrict the term "idea." Thus, Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology defines an "idea" as "the reproduction, with a more or less adequate image of an object not actually present to the senses." As this is not a book of psychology, it is not our business here to examine or criticize this definition. We will notice only that, if the definition is taken strictly, we can have no "idea" of any object which, like the relation of identity, or virtue, or God, cannot from its very nature be "present to the senses." Yet we can obviously <u>think</u> of these things, and know various propositions about them;

and we can also think about images. Hence, it would seem that, even for psychology, any account of thinking or knowing which restricts these activities to the use of "ideas", as here defined, must be inadequate.

All occasions on which we talk of "having ideas" can be dealt with according to the maxim: "There are no ideas, there is only thinking." It is good discipline to make clear to oneself that "to have an idea of--" or "to have an idea that--" are simply metaphorical expressions for "thinking of--" or "thinking that..."

(c) And so we pass, thirdly, to the philosophical meaning of "idea." Or, rather, we ought to say "meanings" for the fact is that in the course of more than 2,000 years of philosophical discussion the meaning of "idea" has undergone changes so profound. (1) For Plato, "ideas" are "real natures" or "essences". (2) for St. Augustine and the mediaeval thinkers, "ideas" are patterns in God's mind of all created things. (3) For Descartes, Locke, and their followers, "ideas" are all objects of whatever sort which human minds in any way apprehend. The subsequent history of the term "idea", in Kant Hegel and the idealists of the 19th century down to Mr. F.H.Bradley in our own day, is not, for our purposes, of the same importance. For, of these later thinkers, it is true that their idealisms can be stated without using the term "idea.".

11. The original, non-technical, sense of "idea" among the ancient Greeks was, probably, "look," "appearance", "form." So far as sight is concerned, it is obviously by their characteristic look, appearance, form that we identify, or recognize, things for what they are. Now, <u>what a thing is</u> has been technically called its "nature" or its"essence." There is no reason why the

essential nature of a thing should be restricted to what can be apprehended of it by sight. On the contrary, the essential natures of things might be such as to be incapable of being apprehended by any sense-organ whatever: they might be discernible only by intellect or reason. This is,in fact, the development which the meaning of "idea" has undergone in becoming a technical term in Plato's philosophy.

12. "Essence" via Latin essentia, translates Aristotle's term "ousia," the "being" or the "what-it-is," of a thing.

13. The term "idea" came to be cut loose from all restrictions to visible appearance or geometrical figure, and to be used quite generally for the real or essential nature of anything.

14. Socrates, too, urged the importance of gaining of these moral ideas, or principles, the kind of knowledge which enables us to define them, and thus to distinguish, e.g.,acts which are really just from those which merely appear to be so. Thus, "ideas" enable us to escape from the vagaries of "opinion" into the security of stable "knowledge".

14. Science, as we say nowadays, is interested in universals, principles, laws. It is not interested in particulars as such. It studies particulars in order to discover the principles or laws of which the particulars are "instances" or "cases." A law, once discovered and formulated will apply to, and "explain" all particulars of the same sort or kind. In other words, every law is a "universal" exemplified in a range of "particular cases."

15. Particulars, Plato tells us, may be perceived by the senses: ideas (or universals) can be apprehended only by thought or reason. In modern language they can be only conceived, not perceived. Now, an object conceived is commonly called a

concept, and hence Plato's ideas, like modern universals, are often, and correctly enough, called "concepts." But "concept" is a dangerous word to use. For it has acquired associations for us which are quite alien to Plato's "ideas." We tend to think of a concept as peculiarly a creature, or product, of mental activity.

16. Concept is something of our own making which exists only in our own minds.

17. Without thinking of reasoning, i.e. without the mental activity of observing what is irrelevant, connecting what is relevant, we should never discover any universal or law at all.

18. This is a misinterpretation of Plato's meaning. His "ideas" are not products of any mind, not even of the mind of God. They are objects apprehended by mind, not states of apprehending mind. They are not formed, but discovered, by thinking.

19. The second chief meaning of "idea" has its roots in the philosophies of Philo, surnamed the "Jew" and Plotinus, the founder of the so-called "New-Platonist" school. But it has become important for us mainly through its adoption by St. Augustine, and its consequent influence upon the philosophy of the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages. The difference between the Platonic and the Augustinian theory of ideas is best understood by considering the relation of ideas to God. In Ploto's philosophy God may fairly be said to occupy a relatively subordinate position. In the imaginative account of creation, in the Timaeus, God is represented as making the world to the pattern of the "ideas," but the ideas are certainly not represented as being themselves created by God. For Plato the ideas, not God, are the supreme realities. On the other hand, when the Theism of Jewish and Christian thought came into contact with

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Greek philosophy, in the resulting give-and-take the balance was shifted in favour of God. In this theory the status of the "ideas" is subtly changed, and the change proves to be of far-reaching importance. They are still, in a sense, "objects"--they are what God thinks. But they are also the products, or creations, of His thinking. Their existence and nature now depends on the existence and nature of the Divine Thinker.

20. The third theory, which meets us at the threshold of modern philosophy, on the one hand extends the dependence of "ideas" on mind to human minds, and, on the other hand, drops the restriction of the term to universals and ideals, so that it now covers any and every object of which any human mind is at any time aware. Indeed, among "ideas" in this modern sense there bulk most largely precisely those particular objects of sense-perception which Plato had so sharply distinguished from "ideas" in his sense. It is thus forcibly brought home to us how, in spite of a recognizable connection from step to step, the meaning of the term "idea" nonetheless, undergoes profound alterations. The stages, briefly, are: universal--product of God's creative thought--object of human perception and thought.

21. Locke's further description of ideas as "the immediate objects of the understanding in the widest sense". This "widest sense" covers perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving--in short, to use the terminology of present-day psychologists, all <u>cognitive</u> activities, all modes of being conscious of objects.

22. "ideas" are "representatives" sometimes even described as "copies" in the mind of objects <u>outside</u>. The external world is known to us by

being, as it were, mirrored in our ideas. This is the so-called theory of representative perception--a theory according to which we perceive the external world by means of its mental representation in "ideas."

This theory is the result of two distinct lines of thought. (1) One of these is scientific, and deals with the causes of perception. (2) The other is philosophical, and deals with the truth of what we perceive.

(i) Attempts at a causal theory of perception, i.e. at a theory explaining how perception comes about, go back, like so much else in philosophy to the Greeks. Their common scheme is that the objects somehow through the sense-organs affect, or stimulate the mind and produce in the mind an effect by means of which the mind perceives the object. This theory received a considerable impetus at the threshold of the modern era thro' the development, on the one hand, of the transmission theories of light and sound, and, on the other hand, of the physiology of the senses. Physics and Physiology thus combined to explain perception as caused by a stimulus (e.g. a ray of light) proceeding from an object to a sense-organ, and thence conveyed by the nerves to the brain.

23. Most thinkers, accepting the existence of minds as well as of bodies, went on, like Descartes and Locke, to a theory of the interaction of body and mind, according to which the effect produced by the external stimulus in the brain produces in turn, in the mind a "sensation" or "idea of sense." Thus, when we perceive an object, e.g. a tree, what we are immediately aware of are various sensations of colour, smell, touch, etc. in our minds, which we interpret as the effects caused in the minds by the external

object, i.e. by the tree as a physical thing. Thus the ideas in the mind "represent" the object of which they are the effects. Directly we perceive only the ideas which the object itself causes to appear in our mind. The object itself is not perceived at all, but known only indirectly by inference from effect to cause.

Plausible as this theory is at first sight, especially because of the apparent scientific warrant for it, yet it has been riddled by criticism and shown to be utterly incoherent and self-contradictory. For, if the theory is true, we are confined to our "ideas" and of the external objects which are supposed to be their causes we can know neither that they exist nor what they are like. Consequently, we cannot know whether our ideas are true or false. The very theory that our ideas "represent" objects which are not ideas will be but another, more complex "idea" or "object of thought" and thus there is no escape from the circle of ideas. On the rock of this fatal flaw the theory suffers shipwreck and in anything like its original form it no longer finds support among competent philosophers.

(ii) The other line of thought which has led to the theory of representative ideas does not, like the previous one, attempt to account for the origin and cause of ideas, but seeks rather to explain what is meant by the truth of an idea. A "true" idea, we are apt to say, is one to which there "corresponds" an object in the "real" world; a "false" idea is a mere figment of our minds, to which, as to a dream or a fancy, nothing corresponds in the real world at all. Thus, a true idea has a representative function: a false idea represents nothing. I has, as some moderns put it, no "objective reference". To use

one of Descartes' examples, the scenes and events which we witness in dreams are "objects" presented to our minds as surely as are similar scenes and events witnessed in waking life. In both cases we have "ideas"--objects of which we are immediately aware. Yet in the one case we treat these objects as mere figments, in the other we treat them as representing "real" events in the physical world. Clearly, according to this line of thought, the theory of representation is a device for bridging the gap between the realm of mental ideas and the real of physical realities. It presupposes a sharp distinction between these two realms, and is thus, in technical language, "dualistic." It suffers from substantially the same defects as the causal theory, viz. it confines us to the circle of our ideas and shuts us off from physical things in such a way that the relation of representation betwwen idea and thing, supposing it to exist, can never dome directly to our knowledge.

At this point we may conveniently note the ambiguity of the metaphor by which ideas are said to be "in" the mind. The supposed contrast between ideas"in" the mind and the objects "outside" the mind which cause ideas or correspond to them, has led to more loose thinking than any other phrase in the vocabulary of philosophers. "In" and "out" are, literally, metaphors taken from space, and, therefore, imapplicable to a mind. For a mind is not like a box in which, or outside of which, ideas can be supposed to be. "Being in a mind" then, can be only a metaphor for "being an object to a mind" or "being thought of"; and if the phrase is taken in this sense, we cannot infer from it, as has often been done, that ideas are "mental" i.e. that they are, not merely objects apprehended by the mind, but actually mental states or processes--bits of mind,

as it were. Correspondingly, an object "outside" the mind ought to mean simply an object which is not being apprehended, as in the phrase "out of sight, out of mind." But, instead, being "outside" has often been identified with being "physical," with the result that physical objects have been regarded as incapable of being directly apprehended by mind at all. Their being physical has been held to place them by definition "outside" mind, i.e. beyond the reach of direct apprehension, which is limited to the effects "in" the mind produced by the "external" thing. Thus, for the legitimate distinction between objects apprehended and objects not apprehended by a mind, there has been substituted the illegitimate distinction between objects apprehended and objects not apprehended by a mind, there has been substituted the illegitimate distinction between ideas "in" the mind and the "external" world which the ideas "represent". But, when we brush aside the cobwebs of this theory, we can see that, though we may express the fact of a physical thing, e.g., a tree, being perceived by saying that it is "in" the mind which perceives it, yet the tree does not thereby cease to be physical. Nor is there any good reason for treating the perceived tree as a mental idea representing another tree itself unperceived.

If then, we reject these confusions, and with them the whole theory of "ideas" as mental representatives of physical things, does anything of value remain in the "new way of ideas" to which Locke attached so much importance?

The answer is "Yes." But, if we are to appreciate this value, we must abandon, once and for all, the false lead of the notion of representation with all its presuppositions and consequences.

24. In business, or politics, or science, our work lies in the "real" world, but when, in leisure hours, we take up a novel or go to a play, we pass into the world of imagination, whilst during sleep we may visit the world of dreams. In ordinary life we take these, and similar, distinctions for granted, and our practical, even more than our theoretical, interests lead us to occupy ourselves chiefly with the "real" world and to rank it as superior in status and importance to the others. But all these worlds are equally open to, and enter into, our experience. What we perceive, think, imagine, feel, may belong to any one of these worlds.
25. When we perceive, no doubt we are active--we attend, select, engage our interest. But what we perceives comes to us; it is not mainly, and originally never, of our choosing, still less of our making. Some object stimulates us and we "respond". It attracts and holds our attention.
26. The original meaning of "idea" we found, was probably "visible form" or "appearance." This became generalized into "universal" or "essence." Next, because universals are apprehended by thought, idea came to mean "object of thought," and, thence, "object dependent on, and even produced by, thought." Lastly, developing along this tract, idea ended by meaning, quite generally, any "object of which a mind is in any way aware." At this point, we further found, the interest shifts from "idea" to "mind."
27. Where Wallace (Hegel's philosophy of Mind) declares briefly that idealism is "the doctrine that all reality is mental reality," Bosanquet (Mind) expounds "the old lesson of Hegel and his sympathizers" as being "that the Universe is a single spirit, of whom or of which all appearaces are manifestations.

28. Muirhead when he writes (Encyclopaedia Britannica,) : "Idealism as a philosophical doctrine conceives of knowledge or experience as a process in which the two factors of subject and object stand in a relation of entire interdependence on each other as warp and woof. Apart from the activity of the self or subject in sensory reaction, memory and association, imagination, judgment and inference, there can be no world of objects. A thing-in-itself which is not a thing to some consciousness is an entirely unrealizable, because self-contradictory, conception. But this is only one side of the truth. It is equally true that a subject apart from an object is unintelligible.

29. Berkeley is, historically, the founder of modern idealism. Secondly, his denial of the existence of "matter" has become a byword and a popular gibe against idealists, as though Berkeley were compelled by his theory to believe that his own body did not exist. Did not Dr. Johnson, posing as the sturdy champion of commonsense, think to refute Berkeley by kicking a stone and succeed only in showing that he had not understood the theory which he was holding up to contempt?

30. Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge is to devise a theory of the Universe which shall retain all that is empirically well-founded in physical science, whilst substituting "God" for "matter" as the principle of explanation even for the physical world. It is too often overlooked that Berkeley's idealism is hardly less a philosophy of science than it is a philosophical defence of speculative theology. If he claims to have found a new, simple and convincing proof of the existence of God, he is no less entitled to claim that he is offering a new and illuminating view of Nature. Indeed, the value and

originality of Berkeley's theory of Nature are being revealed to us in a fresh light at the present day by such work on the foundations of natural science as A.N.Whitehead's analysis of Nature as "what we perceive by the senses." It is well to bear this in mind as a corrective of the oft-repeated criticism that Berkeley's idealism is inimical to, and oncompatible with, physical science. It is well, too, not to forget that Berkeley was sufficiently abreast of the mathematics of his day for his criticisms of the theory of fluxions, as the Calculus was then called, to arouse a controversy among mathematicians which lasted for more than a quarter of a century, and helped to clear up the theoretical foundations on which the Calculus rests.

If Berkeley is called an "idealist" it is generally for one, or all, of three reasons, viz. (1) because he affirms that the objects which we perceive by the senses exist only when and so long as a mind perceives them--this is his famous esse est percipi principle; (2) because he denies the existence of "matter"; (3) because he regards the Universe as a society of spirits dependent upon the Supreme Spirit, God.

31. We shall get a step nearer to his philosophical importance if we leave aside, for a moment, the religious associations of the term "God" and ask ourselves simply: What sort of picture of the Universe does Berkeley put before us?

32. Orthodox theism, when transposed from the terms of theology into the terms of metaphysics, always reduces to the general type of spiritual pluralism.

33. The term "activity" derives for Berkeley its whole meaning from our experience of our own

mental operations. Willing, imagining, remembering, and, above all, perceiving--these give us our experience of what it is to be active.

34. All activity is mental activity. That Berkeley should have singled out perceiving as the chief type of mental activity gives a certain one-sided narrowness to his theory. For even if, somewhat doubtfully, we stretch the meaning of perceiving so as to include thinking, inferring, reasoning, the neglect of feeling and willing shuts out whole provinces of the life of mind from receiving adequate philosophical analysis at Berkeley's hands.

On the other hand, the emphasis on spirit as perceiving involves two consequences of the utmost importance for the development of Berkeley's thought. One of the consequences is his sharp distinction between the act of perceiving and the object of perception. The other is his preoccupation which Nature as the totality of objects which we perceive by our senses.

35. Berkeley, trying to make the distinction between idea and act as sharp as possible, emphatically denies that we can have an "idea" of mind or spirit. If he merely meant that one's own mind and its acts cannot be objects of sense-perception, we might readily accept his view. But, apparently, he meant, at any rate at first, that a mind cannot become an object at all. Taken literally, this would amount to a denial of all self-observation and self-knowledge, and might well provoke the rejoinder: "If mind and its acts can never be objects, how is it that we can think and talk of them, as Berkeley does himself? That Berkeley did not intend to maintain the extreme view which would invite this criticism, is evidenced by the fact that, in the second edition of his Principles he admits, not indeed an "idea" but at least a "notion" of mind. "I have" he writes

"some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words." Of course, the introduction of the word "notion" for the word "idea" hardly solves the problem. It is merely a verbal invitation to attend to the difference between knowledge of objects and knowledge of acts, without telling us what the difference is. But with his curious modernity, Berkeley has here touched on a point which is still an open problem to present-day psychologists and philosophers.

From acts we must pass on to objects (or "ideas"), and thereby to Berkeley's most famous and most paradoxical, doctrine, viz. the doctrine that the objects which we perceive exist only when, and so long as, a mind perceives them: to be is to be perceived. It follows that, if an object which I am now perceiving is to be thought of by me as still existing when I no longer perceive it, I must suppose some other mind (or minds) to be perceiving the object at all times when I do not perceive it. Now, obviously, no single human mind, nor even all human minds together, perceive the whole of Nature at any time. Hence, Nature as a whole must exist as the object of perception for the eternal, all-inclusive mind which is God.

36. Everyday speech permits us to say equally that we see a table and that we see a brown patch of colour; that we hear a bell and that we hear a sound; that we smell a rose and that we smell an odour. In general, the "objects" which we perceive are named either as concrete, physical things, like tables, bells, roses, or they are named as colours, sounds, tastes, smells, temperatures, etc.

Further, these latter objects--"sense-data" as they are commonly called by present-day writers--are, in ordinary speech and thought,

treated as <u>qualities</u> of the concrete things. We say the table is brown, the bell is loud, the rose has a sweet smell etc. Thus, the grammar of our language implies a metaphysical theory, viz. that the world consists of individual "things" each of which possesses "Qualities". In technical terms, the world is composed of "substances" in which "qualities" are said to "inhere."

We have, then, two sorts of "objects" of perception--sense-data and concrete things. We interpret the former as qualities of the latter, and say that we perceive the latter by perceiving the former; we perceive things by perceiving their qualities. For no quality, so it is thought, can exist by itself: it requires a thing "of" which it is the quality--a substance in which it inheres.

With the help of these reflections, we are in a position to appreciate just what Berkeley means by his <u>esse percipi</u> principle, and just what is the effect of it.

The colours, sounds, and other qualities of things Berkeley sums up in the general term "ideas of sense." "Idea" is here used exactly as, in the last chapter, we had found Locke use it, viz. as a technical term for any <u>object</u> apprehended by a mind. Hence, to call colours and other sense-date "ideas of sense" is for Berkeley, the same as to call them "objects perceived by a mind."

Now, it is to <u>these</u> objects primarily that Berkeley applies the <u>esse est principi</u> principle, and we shall all realise at once that it is not nearly as paradoxical to say of colours, sounds, odours, etc., that they exist only when they are seen, heard, smelt etc., as it is to say this of tables, mountains, plants, animals , and their concrete bodies! In fact,

there is a variety of more or less plausible and familiar arguments for the view that sense-data are in their nature and existence, more or less mind-dependent.

But what, then, becomes of concrete things, or "bodies" if their supposed qualities exist only when perceived? It is here that we come upon what is really revolutionary in Berkeley's thought. He treats a thing as nothing but a "collection" of ideas of sense, which collection is marked off from other collections of ideas by a distinctive name. In other words, he challenges and denies the concepts of substance, quality, inherence. A "thing" for him is not more substantial somewhat which owns qualities. It is merely a recurrent group of certain colours, tastes, smells, etc. This is truly startling doctrine. It sweeps aside the familiar metaphysics of everyday speech and thought, and substitutes an altogether strange and novel interpretation of the objects of perception. There are colours, but no coloured things. There are temperatures, but nothing of which we can strictly say that it "is" hot or cold. If Berkeley is right, our ordinary language about things is utterly misleading.

37. Considering how subversive this new doctrine is, it is remarkable that Berkeley should not have emphasized it more. It is hardly mentioned again, after having been introduced, almost casually, in the very first paragraph of his Principles. "As several of these (ideas of sense) are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence, having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things."

that we have two quite distinct applications of the esse est percipi principle to deal with. The first application is to "ideas of sense" i.e. to colours, tastes, smells, etc. The second is to the ordinary "things" on the ground that they are nothing but collections of ideas of sense. Clearly, whether the first application is right or wrong, the second raises an altogether fresh issue. Is a "thing" to be conceived as a substance with qualities? or is it a mere collection of sense-data? Few critics of the principle have been careful enough to observe that two distinct theories have to be examined. But it is worth remarking, as illustrating the modernity of Berkeley's thought, that his treatment of "things" has been revived in our own day in the more refined form of Bertrand Russell's theory of a thing as a "class", or "logical constructs" of sense-data. At any rate, the effect of Berkeley's theory is to eliminate from our thinking, if not from our grammar, the concept of substance and quality. And if it be objected that colours, smells, etc., surely cannot exist by themselves, but must belong to something as its qualities, Berkeley's reply is that they exist, not by inhering in a substance, but by being objects for a perceiving mind.

38. This change, no doubt, makes a profound difference in the way we think about what we perceive, but it makes none in what we actually perceive. To this extent Berkeley is undeniably right in his reiterated contention that his theory does not deny the existence of anything which we actually observe by our senses to exist. It only explains what that existence consists in, viz., in being perceived by a mind, and, in doing so, it substitutes a relationship which is intelligible, and which we can verify in every

moment of experience, for one which is both unverifiable and unintelligible. For how can, e.g. a colour exist by inhering in an unthinking substance? Or who, if qualities are all that we perceive, has ever perceived a substance or the relation of inherence? In short, nothing which we actually perceive to exist is by Berkeley's theory declared to be non-existent. Only a new interpretation of the manner of its existence is substituted for the traditional one. To say that colours and sounds, and even houses and mountains, exist only as "ideas" or objects of perception is strange, and may be untrue, but it is certainly not the same thing as to say that they do not exist at all--which is what Berkeley is commonly accused of saying. It is not even true that on Berkeley's theory it is impossible to distinguish between objects which are "real" and objects which are "imaginary." He has definite tests for discriminating between the real and the unreal--real objects, are not dependent on my will; they are more vivid than those of dream and imagination; they exhibit a superior coherence and order, permitting us to formulate "laws of Nature." These tests are, no doubt, purely pragmatic. That is to say, they work well on the whole, but they are neither infallible in practice nor demonstrable beyond all theoretical doubt. But then no other theory is in any better case.

One more point requires to be emphasized in the face of traditiona misunderstandings. An "idea" for Berkeley is an <u>object</u> of the perceiving mind: it is not a <u>state</u> or <u>process</u> of that mind. It is, therefore, not true that Berkeley's theory is "subjective idealism", at least if by that term is meant the theory that each mind perceives nothing but its own mental states. True, Berkeley's language is

is occasionally careless. He uses "sensation" at times, as a synonym for "idea of sense," and this is misleading for us who are accustomed by psychology to use both "sensation" and "idea" for states of mind. And he speaks of an idea being "in" the mind when all he means is that an object is being perceived. But when he actually faces the question whether ideas are states of mind, his answer is emphatically in the negative: "those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it; that is, not by way of mode or attribute (Berkeley's terms for "state"), but only by way of idea (i.e. object)."

39. What, then, does Berkeley deny when he denies the existence of "matter"? He denies the truth of a familiar theory concerning the causes of the objects (ideas) we perceive. This is the theory, already mentioned in the previous chapter, according to which what we perceive are impressions or sensations produced in our minds by the action upon them of material objects. We perceive the effect, viz., sensations (which are, therefore, truly mental states); we infer the cause, viz. matter. It is this theory and nothing else, that Berkeley is denying. And his denial here, as always, is based on an appeal to experience. If the effects produced in our minds are all we ever do, or can, perceive, then the supposed cause in an imperceptible, unknowable Somewhat. All attempts to determine its nature are otiose guess-work. Moreover, "how Matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy."

40. To deny the existence of matter is, for

Berkeley, to deny the <u>theory</u> that the colours, sounds, etc., which we perceive, are mental states, and that these states are the effects produced in our minds by mateiral objects, themselves unperceived and imperceptible. For him, what we perceive are real objects.

41. His one aim is to hold natural science to its proper business of dealing with the actual data of perception. He is relentless in urging upon science to remember its empirical foundations, and to avoid theories which substitute speculations about imperceptible entities for the study of the laws of perceptible events.

42. As Berkeley rejects the theory that colours sounds, etc. do not belong to "Nature", but are merely impressions in our minds, he renders an inestimable service to science by ridding it of an error which would condemn all its work to futility. For, if the data of perception which are, after all, the scientist's sole evidence, are nothing but mental impressions, then science is inevitably cut off from the real world. Berkeley, by boldly identifying Nature with the totality of what we perceive by the senses, restores colours, sounds, and all other sense-data to the context of Nature as <u>bona fide</u> natural phenomena, subject to natural laws. He restores to science its true object--the real world which we perceive. In this he has the support of the best present-day work on the scientific theory of Nature, e.g. in A.N. Whitehead's writings.

Science, however, is not philosophy, for science deals only with objects (ideas) and their relations, in abstraction from minds and their acts of perceiving, thinking, willing. As soon as by reflection we undo this abstraction, some physical objects, viz. human bodies are seen to manifest minds or spirits like our own.

43. Elements of idealistic doctrine which Berkeley has here launched upon the world: 1. The esse est percipi principle, as applied to sense-data and to things as collections of sense-data. 2. The concept of mind (or spirit) as act in distinction from object.

44. Let us begin with Berkeley's distinction between mental acts and with objects ("ideas") upon which they are directed. Just as for an object to be is to be perceived, so for a mind to be is to perceive; or, generally, to be active. And, certainly, it would seem that no mind can perceive, or be active in any other way, without objects. Every act of apprehension or will implies something which is apprehended or willed.

Nothing, on the face of it, could be simpler or more obvious than this distinction. Yet it raises many curious and difficult problems, and some of the various solutions propounded for these problems lead far away from Berkeley's position.

45. One of these problems, as we saw above, was noted by Berkeley himself, though he did no more than touch the fringe of it. This is the problem how we are aware of our acts as distinct from their objects. We are aware of objects in virtue of our acts of apprehension. But how are we aware of the acts themselves? Yet, surely we must experience them in some way, for how, else, could we talk of them and distinguish them from their objects? We say, e.g. I see a colour, I hear a sound, I think something. Here we are sure of the colour, the sound, the object of thought--they loom large before our minds, filling the field of consciousness. Where, over and above them, are the acts? How are we aware of them? And, if to be aware of an object requires an appropriate mental act, must we not postulate correspondingly

a second act for becoming aware of the first act, third act for the second, and so on in infinitum?

46. Consider such a familiar experience as listening to a sound. "I hear a sound," he will say. Now, the constituent of his experience to which the words "a sound" refer is easily identified. The question is, what in his experience is expressed by the words "I hear" and, in general, by the personal pronoun and the verb? The appeal is to "introspection" : is there any factor in the total experience of hearing-a-sound which can be identified as "hearing" (let alone as "I"), over and above the sound? Sometimes at night we wake up thinking we have heard a sound. We lie in bed in the darkness and the silence, listening intently--"straining our ears"--for the sound. What is this listening? How do we experience this mental act? Quite truly we are sensible of a "strain". The eyes stare fixedly; the body is kept rigidly still. If we could prick our ears we would do so. Even as it is, we experience sense-data which seem to come from the muscles of the ears. Does this feel of our bodily adjustments constitute the act, or is there some purely mental listening over and above all these sense-data?

If there is such an act--and the argument applies quite generally to all kinds of experience in which minds apprehend objects--should we, perhaps, credit it with a peculiar quality of transparency? We owe this suggestion to a "realist," Dr.G.E. Moore, who, like many realists, agrees with Berkeley on the distinction of act and object. On this view, then, the act is hard to observe because it is, as it were, diaphanous, its sole fuction being to present the object to us. This transparency of the act would be what Berkeley means when he

says that the act cannot become an "idea", ie. that it cannot be objectified.
47. In the same sense, some thinkers speak of "immediate experience" where "immediate" means the non-objectified part, or factor, in experience.
48. Hume's analysis of experience rejects the distinction of acts and ideas, and, cancelling out the acts, leaves only a tissue, or flux, of ideas. Even so great a psychologist as William James may be quoted on this side. For in his Essays in Radical Empiricism, he declares that in trying to discover what thinking is, ie. to identify what features in our experience the term "thinking" means, we can find nothing, over and above the objects of thought, but a mass of sense-data, due more especially to breathing. To think=to breathe!
49. Thinkers, again, have given to the argument a "monistic" turn, by regarding the activity of our own minds as, so to speak, a pulse of a single cosmic activity which manifests itself in all that exists. The existence of a multiplicity of individuals is only an appearance: at botton, the same cosmic activity or energy expresses itself in all. Many are the theories of this type, from Schopenhauer's Will to Bergson's Elan Vital.
50. There is no experience in which act and object are not found in closest correlation. From such considerations as these spring all those forms of idealism for which the subject-object relation, the "duality of subject and object in experience" is the fundamental fact. Subject and object are, as it were, the two poles of all spiritual activity.
51. The great advance which Kant makes on Berkeley, is that he does not simply accept mental activity as a fact, but seeks to analyse the universal principles inherent in it. It is Kant who

first identified mental activity, in its cognitive aspect, with judgment, recognized judgment as synthetic, and attempted to distinguish the principles of synthesis ("categories") inherent in judgment.

52. Berkeley, fully alive to the paradox which the esse est percipi principle presents to unsophisticated commonsense, exerts all his ingenuity and argumentative skill to make the principle plausible. He offers, in consequence, a great variety of arguments in support of it, and many of these are stated in several different ways. Thus, e.g., like a good debater, he tries to catch his opponents by their own arguments. Are they not saying that colours, sounds, and sense-data in general, are nothing but "impressions" in our minds, caused by external objects? If so, this is to admit the principle for sense-data. For impressions can exist only when perceived. If the opponent replies, "But there is the external object which causes the impression," and goes on to ascribe to that object shape, solidity, weight, etc., Berkeley counters by pointing out that these qualities, too, are but objects of perception and, as such, fall under his principle. And the replies, further, by reminding his oppenent that a mind restricted to impressions can never directly perceive either the alleged external object or the way in which impressions are caused. Hence, the whole causal theory of perception is an unverifiable and unnecessary hypothesis.

53. Berkeley's most important arguments are two, each of which requires us to make an experiment in thinking, an "easy trial". First, he asks us to "attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things." Secondly, he asks us to try whether we can, without contradiction, suppose a sensible thing to exist un-

perceived. It is important to observe how explicitly Berkeley limits his arguments to "sensible things", i.e. to what we have agreed to call "sense-data," and to those "collections" of sense-data which are ordinarily called "things."

54. "To exist" and "to be perceived" are synonymous. They mean the same fact. Is this convincing? True, if for simplicity's sake we leave the hallucinations and dreams out of account, we shall all agree that what we perceive exists as we perceive it. The sounds we hear are existing sounds; to see a colour is to see an existing colour, and similarly for other sense-data. But when we say that the sounds we hear exist, we mean, surely, something more than the idle tautology that the sounds we hear are sounds we hear. Perceiving, in short, gives us evidence that what we perceive exists. But does it prove that to exist is the same as to be perceived?

55. In theory and in practice our concern is with the world which reveals itself to our minds. Any other is literally nothing to us. It is only within the experienced world that the terms "existence" and "reality" have any applicability. Carried beyond that world they are empty sound. Thus, each of us makes his contact with the Universe through his acts of perceiving, thinking, etc. His acts of apprehension define "his" world: he cannot even think of anything as not belonging to that world, for, in so thinking of it, he is making it <u>ipso facto</u> part of his world.

In short, our position is incurabley "egocentric." We cannot eliminate ourselves and then try to think of reality apart from ourselves. We cannot compare an object as it is when perceived with itself as it is when not perceived. We cannot escape from ourselves.

Now, admitting all this as true, does it justify Berkeley's <u>esse est percipi</u> principle?

G

Granted that whatever we find to exist is an object which we perceive or think, does it follow that these objects cannot exist except in relation to perceiving or thinking--if not ours, then God's?

56. Can we without contradiction conceive the existence of sense-data unperceived? Now, this raises a fresh point. The question now is not whether we can mean by "to exist" anything but "to be perceived," nor again whether every object we perceive or think stands <u>ipso facto</u> in relation to our minds. The question now is whether, from the very nature of the object, it is inconceivable that it should exist except in this relation to a mind. In other words, if we attempt to conceive the object as having, in Berkeley's words, an "absolute existence, without any relation to being perceived," do we find ourselves contradicting the very nature of the object? Can the object be seen to be such that it cannot exist apart from an apprehending mind? If so, the relation of objects to minds is not merely, as the ego-centric predicament had shown it to be, universal <u>in fact</u> over the whole field of our experience, but it is <u>necessarily</u> implied in the very nature of the objects themselves. As we might put it: once an idea, always an idea: once object-for-a-mind, always object-for-a-mind. Here is a characteristic passage illustrating the nature of Berkeley's reasoning. "What are houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?"

Now this latter argument is, certainly,

highly questionable. Professor R.B. Perry, with his genius for inventing technical labels, calls it the "fallacy of initial predication." We begin by perceiving, say, a colour and call it an "idea" (i.e. an "object which we perceive"). And then, having so labelled it, we go on to say that it would be a contradiction for an object of perception ever to exist unperceived. But, really, this is arguing from the fact that we have called the colour an object of perception to the conclusion that the colour can never exist unperceived. The illegitimacy of the inference is disguised by Berkeley's introduction of an intermediate step in the term "idea." The net result would seem to be that Berkeley's esse est percipi principle may be true, but has not been proved to be true.

57. Present-day thinkers have tried to turn the flank of the esse est percipi principle by an analysis of the nature of relations. The principle asserts that there is a relation between object and perceiving mind, and that the object cannot exist except in that relation. In general, all knowledge is analyzed as a specific "cognitive relation" between subject and object. This being granted, the question has been raised whether relations are "external" or "internal." By calling a relation "internal" is meant the terms which are found standing in that relation cannot exist apart from that relation. By calling a relation "external" is meant that the terms found in that relation can also exist apart from it--they may enter and leave the relation without prejudice to their existence.

58. There are many movements in present-day thought which converge upon such a dethronement of mind. Chief among them is the biological theory of evolution, according to which the emergence of minds belongs to the latest

stage in the evolution of the world, and presupposes, not only a pre-existing bodily organization, but the whole physical environment. Clearly the conditions out of which mind has emerged cannot, in this view, depend for their existence on being objects of mind. The function of mind is to apprehend the environment, and thereby to enable organisms to live more successfully.

59. To be a spirit is to be constantly active in perceiving and thinking. But perceiving implies "ideas" i.e. objects, and each spirit thus has its "world" of objects.

60. Let anyone look at a table from different successive points of view, and he will find that the colour and shape which he perceives from one point of view will differ, in varying degrees, from the colour and shape perceived by him from any other point of view. Thus, even the "same" single observer will perceive the "same" table differently from different points of view. It is easy to see that two, or more, observers looking at the same table from different angles, and each with his own quality of vision, will differ even more in what they perceive.

61. This view presupposes that one spirit cannot perceive other spirits directly, but only by inference from the sense-data through which each spirit manifests himself. Directly each spirit knows only itself in its activities of perceiving, etc. That there are other spirits in the world like itself is an inference.

62. We know other minds by inference from the resemblance between their bodies and behaviour and ours.

63. This problem of our knowledge of other minds, so far from being settled, is one of the most keenly discussed. (continued on p136)

C.E.M. JOAD.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE.

Modern approach to Philosophy. What is philosophy, what are the subjects with which it deals and why, in spite of the conquest of the material world by science, the pursuit of the intangible values of philosophy still constitutes a living and fruitful study--these are the questions which the author sets out to answer in this introductory study.

Philosophy is nothing more or less than an attempt to understand the universe as a whole. Thus from the nature of its undertaking it is forbidden to set any bounds to the sphere of its interest.

The scientist working in a water-tight compartment, devotes his attention to a particular section of the universe. c.f. physicist proposes to enquire into the nature of matter, the biologist, again investigates the nature of living things; the geologist is concerned with rocks, the botanist with plant. Each special science is like a compartment in a box, and the box is science as a whole.

Enclosed within his special compartment the scientist arrives at more or less definite conclusions without stopping to think what relation they bear to the conclusions reached by other scientists, working in their water-tight compartments e.g. some of the results of modern physics are for example at the moment incompatible with the finding of a well known school of psychologists

The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the expression of the necessary (perfect?) mode of working of the human mind. It is simply the mode at which all phenomena are reasoned about, rendered precise and exact.

Hence there arises the need of a clearing house in which the results arrived at by the various sciences can be pooled and collated, in order that we may be able to infer what kind of universe it is that we inhabit, and hazard a guess at the destiny of human life within it. Philosophy is the Clearing House of Science.

Philosophy is just as interested in the experiences of the ordinary man. For example the ordinary man undergoes moral conflict. Even in this sceptical, irreligious, easy-going age when the Victorian conscience is at a discount and psychologists tell us to get rid of our repressions by indulging our desires, he still feels that there are some things, which he ought not to do. Now what is the basis of this feeling of "ought"? It is exceedingly difficult to say.

Does not the fact of moral experience mean that in some sense we do what we do not want to do, and refrain from doing what we want to do? A curious phenomena which the philosopher inquires into. The branch of philosophy which concerns with the origin of moral experience is known as ethics.

Analysing Beauty. As with ethical experience, so with aesthetic.--What is the meaning of beauty? What are the sources of the alleged value of the works of Art? Why should these simple objects so move you? You experience a strange pleasure as you look at them of pleasure grows as you return to look again and yet again.(The machine-made things--look how totally dull and trite and common place). And you fall to wondering how it is.

Music.Noises may be analysed into waves in the atomosphere which when they reach the place where my ear-drums are, set up a series of vibrations which are conveyed along chords, nerves to my brain. Now all these processes taken together constitute, I suppose, what I call noise, and

when the processes take place I shall have the sensation of hearing a noise. I put it in this pedantic way because I want to bring out the point that all that happens when noises are heard as a result of notes being struck at random on the piano is completely describable by the Science of physics, physiology and psychology.

Aesthetic appreciation. In addition to the physical, there is also the aesthetic effect. The statement of the theme of the fugue (fig. Polyphonic composition contra-mutually harmonised) can thrill you to ecstasy or at least it can thrill me. Of this added effect Science can give absolutely no account. It can only register the fact that it occurs. The attempted explanation falls within the province of philosophy--the philosophy of aesthetics--that seeks to give an account of what we mean by beauty and why it moves us.

In addition to moral experience and aesthetic experience, the philosopher must take into consideration religious experience. Does the religious man make contact with a spiritual reality existing independently of him, or is what is called religious religious experience a process whereby we project for our comfort and assurance the whimsies of our own imagination upon the empty canvass of a fundamentally mindedness and alien universe? Do we, in fact, in religion, find God, or merely create God in our own image?

Thus we have committed the philosopher to an examination of the whole mass of data to which the moral institutions of the ordinary man, the aesthetic enjoyment of the artist, and the religious consciousness of the saint, no less than the discoveries of the physicist and the biologist contribute. But there is yet another item which is apt to prove the most troublesome of all.

Examining the instrument of knowledge. This is the human mind itself, or rather the knowledge which the human mind believes itself to obtain. Philosophy in common with every branch of study, aims at achieving knowledge, but it alone takes the trouble to enquire whether such knowledge is in fact possible. It was hinted above that in religious experience we may be making contact only with the objects of our own creation. The doubt once raised, is capable of indefinite application. For do we, it may be asked, ever make contact with anything else? Does the mind, in fact, ever know any thing except its own ideas? Subjective Idealists have maintained that it does not, and absurd as their doctrine may at first appear, it is exceedingly difficult to refute.

I say that I perceive the fire, and that the fire is warm. But if I approach closely enough my feeling of warmth is gradually intensified until it becomes a feeling of pain. Now, the pain is in me. Yet the pain is only a more intense degree of warmth. Therefore the warmth was also in me. Therefore in feeling the warmth of the fire, I am making acquaintence not with the property of the fire but with an even in my own psycholoty. Similarly the redness and the shape of the fire are also ideas in my mind. And the conclusion? That what I am experiencing when as I say, "I know nothing from the outside world" is nothing but the flow of my experience. Beyond these I can never penetrate. Thus I pass my life completely enclosed within the prison-house of my own ideas and feelings.

Mind and Reality. In spite of the view of the subjective idealists we may still venture to doubt whether the mind is an instrument fitted to give us knowledge of a reality outside of

ourselves--a doubt which modern physics has done much to endorse. Can the mind, in fact, deal with anything in its raw state? Or must it not "cook" the world before it consents to know it? This scepticism with regard to the instrument of knowledge was the theme of the philosophy of Kant, who broadly concluded that we can never know in the world anything except what our minds have first put there. These questions belong to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge.

Philosophy may be described as the effort to understand the universe as a whole. To this general understanding, the various branches--ethics and aesthetics and theory of knowledge--all contribute. The general understanding itself, or rather the effort to achieve it--for the nature of the universe belongs to the realm of conjecture rather than to that of knowledge--is called metaphysics, or the study of reality. In the light of the results achieved by science, in the light of the conclusions of ethics and aesthetics and of the intimations of consciousness (religious) metaphysics proceeds to a consideration of the nature of the Universe as a whole.

What is the nature of the Universe? It is a fortituous collection of material atoms, or the embodiment of purposes and design? Is life an incidental product or a mere eddy in the primeval time slime, or is it fundamental in the scheme of things? Is the process which we know as evolution haphazard and accidental, or purposive and progressive? Are our wills free, or are they determined by the movements of bodies which they animate. Is the human mind something which is unique and fundamental in the universe, or is it an accidental by-product of bodily processes, Or is matter itself as the subjective idealists hold, an illusion, creation, or projection of the mind?

Criticism. Philosophy is a barren pursuit, achieves no agreed results. The philosopher is a man drunk with the exuberance of his own intelligence--he is a man who lights a torch to see the sunrise. If we reckon the whole part of life upon the earth as 100 years, the whole part of human life is reduced to one month, and of human civilization to just over two hours.

Difference in evaluation. The philosopher is concerned less with facts than with their meaning. He will have to evaluate the facts selecting some as relevant to his interpretation and dismissing others as trivial or meaningless. This searching for meaning and significance, this task of assessment and valuation, involves considerations of a highly personal character--one man will detect common elements where another observes only a chaos of difference; some will recognise the hand of God in what others insist to be a haphazard collection of fortuitous events. Thus while the facts are the same for all, the conclusions which are based upon themwwill be different. Thus while the devout Weseleyan will deduce from the surpassing beauty of a still summer's evening evidence pointing to the goodness of God who created it, Thomas Hardy is primarily attracted by the "cry of some small bird that was being killed by an owl in the adjoining wood, from which the reader is intended to draw Hardy's own inference that if there is a spirit behind Nature it is at worst cruel, at best indifferent. It is easy to see then, that our attitude to facts and our estimate of their significance are in part determined by our temperaments, our experience, our wishes and our hopes; so much so that it often seems as if our reasons were given to us only in order that we may invent arguments for what we emotionally wish to believe.

I do not deplore these differences, the world would surely be duller if we all took the same view about it, and thoughts too would be scarcely be worth thinking if all thoughts were the same. Just as it takes all sorts to make a world so does it take all sorts of minds to make the truth about the world. Our age, however, is a matter-of-fact and utilitarian age; governed by the stomach and pocket view of life. It demands of everything that is proffered for its approval that it shall achieve concrete results, that "it shall deliver the goods". The "goods" that philosophy has to offer are of a rather peculiar kind, they suffer from a lack of concreteness.

The impulse of wonder, and the instinct of curiosity form a part of the fundamental psychological make up of every man, but for this impulse and for this instinct the modern world affords few outlets. The removal of mystery from the world is one of the great achievements of the 20th century. We have abolished distance, conquered the forces of Nature, penetrated into the inmost recesses of matter, mapped the surface of the planet, tamed its animals, and catalogued its plants. Looking back upon the achievements of past fifty years, we may well be tempted to ask whether there is anything that Science does not know or can't, if it takes the trouble, find out.

Unromantic Modern World. And modern man, flushed with the mechanical progress of his generation, confident of his control over nature habituated to the continual unlocking of fresh secrets, the continual outpouring of fresh treasures of knowledge, is inclined to answer that there is nothing. Modern man is indeed on the surface of a very confident creature. Nevertheless he is assailed by doubts. He cannot command his own soul and no longer supported by a living religious

faith he fares forth on his little barque upon the troubled waters of the post war world without either the compass of a faith or the rudder of a creed. He can control his communities no better than he can control himself, and civilization trembles on the verge of destruction in the next war. The world lacks the element of wonder, it is singularly devoid of romance.

Philosophy restores this sense of wonder. We all in fact want to know. But no less we want to be able to produce reasons for what we know, c.f. Bradley: "Philosophy may be the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct. Philosophy will make a common everyday object and show us that we know much less about it than we expected. A chair for example which appears to common sense to be four wooden legs surmounted by a wooden seat and back, can be shown by philosophical reflection to be an idea in the mind of God, a colony of souls, a collection of sensations, a piece of our own psychology, or a modification of the Absolute--the man who has no acquaintance with philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices, the preferences, and the habitual beliefs derived from the society in which he happens to have been born and the period in which he lives. If he is born in a Mohamedan land he thinks it right to have four wives, if in England, only one. If 400 B.C. he thinks the sun goes round the earch, if in 1900 he takes the contrary view.

None of the view which he holds is the result of the independent, all are the product of the conventions and prejudices of his age--To such alone the world tends to become dull and obvious ---common objects provoke no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously re-

jected. Philosophy which raises doubts about what has hitherto been taken for granted, keeps alive the sense of wonder and restores mystery to the world. By diminishing our certainty as to what is, it enormously increases the possibility of what may be. Thus it makes life more interesting, not because the answers it provides to the questions it raises, but because, by raising such questions, it liberates us from the religion of emancipating thought.

Here is the widening effect of philosophy. Thirty years ago "Scientific Materialism" was dominant, and the contemporary educated man regarded the universe after the model of the works of a gigantic machine. To be real he held, was to possess the same kind of being as that of a piece of matter. Now matter was composed of little hard bullets called atoms; it was also something which one could not see and touch. Hence to enquire into the nature of the things we saw and touched, to analyse them into their elements and atoms, was to deal directly with reality to apprehend "values" or to enjoy "religious experience" was to wander in a world of shadows.

Relief in obvious. Common sense under the influence of science took the same view. To use the eye of the body to view the physical world was to acquaint oneself with what was real, to use that of the soul to see visions was to become a victim of illusion. And the views of the universe to which the visions led had, it was urged, no objective reality.

Parallel with this belief that the real must be a substance tangible and visible was the belief that it must be subject to the laws which were observed to operate in the physical world; that it must work, in short, like a machine. The implication was that whatever did not show

itself amenable to mechanistic causation--value, for example, or the feeling of moral obligation, or the sense of deity--was not quite real.

But modern matter is something infinitely alternated and elusive; it is a lump of space-time, a "mush" of electricity, a wave of probability undulating into nothingness. In consequence, it is increasingly coming to be regarded not as something which is real in its own right independently of the mind but as a projection of the consciousness of its perceiver.

Kant's view of the world. We have already referred to the possibility that our minds may not be fitted to deal with the stuff of reality in its raw state,--that they must so to speek "cook" the world before they can assimilate it. That is, not only the things we perceive, we shall say, but also those about which we think, have been tampered with by the mind, in the process of becoming the objects of its knowledge. We do not perceive things, do not think about things, as they are, we perceive and think about them only in so far as our minds have first so prepared them that they are rendered fit for our consumption.

C.F. My seeing with blue spectacles: all will appear to me to be blue, not because it is blue but because seeing it there is a condition of my seeing it at all. These mental spectacles (without which we can't perceive) Kant called "categories". Quantities, Qualities and causalities are examples of the Kantian categories. Thus every thing we know has to be of a certain quantity, has to have quality, and has to be the cause of one thing and the effect of another, not because it is really like that, but because its being like that is a condition of our being able to know it.

Being in space, and being in time are further

characteristics of things that our minds have imposed upon them. Thus the world that we know is in a very real sense the product of our minds.

The fact about modern physicist's world is that it is divested of most of the qualities that we believed ourselves to perceive by means of our senses. It is without colour, temperature, sound or smell. A modern mathematician physicist would describe his world as consisting of point events.

Scientific research in physics and chemistry is not a process whereby the mind explores a world of matter existing independently of itself. The mind of the scientist substantially affects the nature of that which he studies by determining the patterns from which it will be built up. Science is not a process of discovery, or rather it is discovery only in the sense that the mind of the scientist rediscovers in the world the qualities which his mind first put there. Thus the modern physicist might be described as one who fares through the uttermost confines of the Universe to find himself, c.f. Arthur Eddington "The footprint on the sands of time is our own."

These latest views of the physicists are only a corroboration and endorsement of Kant. It is the function of philosophy to erect signposts pointing out to the scientists the road along which they can most fruitfully travel.

That whole rather limited conception of reality as being of the same sort as the things we can see and touch and which materialist science sponsored, has lost its justification. If matter is not the only kind of reality, if matter itself as the physicists seem to be increasingly inclined to concede, is in part a product of our minds--many other sorts of things which the

materialists were apt to dismiss may turn out after all to be real. Value for example may be real, and may the objects of the ethical and religious consciousness. Hence there is now no need for those who accept the results of physical sciences to write off, as they were once disposed to write off, as subjective illusions the promptings of moral and the aesthetic sides of their natures, and the 19th century gulf between science and religion is in a fair way to being bridged. Reality, in fact, may be much more various than we had supposed and morel experience, aesthetic appreciation and religious ecstasy no less than scientific research may all be avenues opening before us for its exploration.

One of the main tasks of modern philosophy, is, then so to conceive of the universe that it can make provision for all the immense richness and variety of the intimations of our consciousness, for art and ethics no less than science, for the teaching of religion no less than for the dictates of commonsense--Prof. Whitehead's philosophy seeks to perform this task.

R.F. ALFRED HOERNLE "IDEALISM" (cont.from p.124)

64. The difficulty is partly one of bulk. Berkeley's expositions of idealism, more especially the Principles of Human Knowledge and The Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, are brief and could be read through, without undue effort, in a day. Kant's three chief works, on the other hand, viz. The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment, would take some weeks, and the major works of Hegel some months, to study. But, chiefly, the difficulty is intrinsic. There is never much doubt what Berkeley means.

There is often great and insoluble doubt concerning the precise meaning of what Kant and Hegel say.
65. Kant filled the gap by being the first modern thinker to realize that to know is to judge. An act of knowledge is an act of judgment. An act of judgment is an act of synthesis. An act of synthesis implies a principle of synthesis. If what we said just now is true, viz., that even for ordinary commonsense, let alone for science, Nature is not a mere stream of sense-data, but a world, a system, a whole ordered according to laws, it is not in virtue of mere seeing or hearing or touching that we thus know Nature, but in virtue of acts of judgment affirming the universal relations in which sense-data stand to each other. Let, e.g. the sense-datum which I see be a brown, oval patch. I may say, "This is a table" or I may, without any words, put a book upon it. The latter action, no less eloquently than speech, reveals that I recognize the brown oval patch for what it is; that I know (judge) it to be a table.
66. Berkeley wholly ignores the intellectual labour of discrimination or analysis, of combination or synthesis, of distinguishing the sense-data which go uniformly together from those which, though they may be perceived together at the same moment, have nothing to do with each other--a labour of thinking, or judging, without which not one of his "collections" would be known by us for what it is.
67. There is another type of relation, or order, which illustrates Kant's theory of judgment as synthesis even more clearly, and which is of fundamental importance alike for knowledge and for practical conduct. Sense-data are related to each other not merely as qualities of things (in Berkeley's language, members of collections), but as causes and effects. All "laws of nature" are causal laws; all are of the general form; given an event, or events, of the kind a, an event, or

events, of the kind b will invariably follow. Now, laws are not simply perceived by the senses: they can only be discovered by thought. But such discovery is, once again, synthesis--a discriminative, selective thinking-together of what is thereby judged to belong together. Thus, the principle of causality is another principle of synthesis, or category, furnishing a rule for discovering order in what, as simply given, is a confused stream of sense-data passing before us.

68. Locke was haunted, by the devastating doubt how we can know whether our ideas agree with facts, and whether there are any facts at all for our ideas to agree with. Berkeley certainly made a great step in advance when he dropped this dualism of ideas and facts, and thereby made it clear, once and for all, that we must seek for reality and truth within the world of our "ideas". For this apparent limitation to ideas, i.e. to all we perceive and think, is really a charter of emancipation from the fiction of a world of transcendent andinaccessible facts. It does not impose a handicap: it opens up an opportunity for boundless advance in knowledge. For, instead of distinguishing the world of facts in principle from the world of ideas, it bids us realize that every distinction between what is real and what is unreal, what is true and what is false, must be a distinction within the total field of what we perceive and think. In other words, facts do reveal themselves to us. We are not restricted to conjecturing that they agree with what we perceive and think: we can recognize that they are what we perceive and think. In short, truth is not the correspondence, or agreement, of "ideas" or objects-for-a-mind, with "facts" or objects-in-themselves.

69. We thus learn that what is true and what is false fall alike within the realm of "ideas", or objects-apprehended-by-minds. How, then, do we

distinguish the genuine fact from the spurious? Only by the test of consistency or non-contradiction.

70. Would it be a grave mistake, therefore, to think of these universal principles as arbitrary patterns imposed by human minds on sense-data? If we regard every even in Nature as having a cause, are we not merely indulging a curious mental habit of the biological species, homo sapiens? Is Nature really pervaded by causal law, as implicitly or explicitly, we follow this principle, both in judging that a is the cause of b, and in enquiring what the cause, or effect, of b may be?

71. So far as Kant has any single term for what we have just called "spiritual life", it is reason. Kant's three Critiques are concerned, the first with reason in knowledge (science), the second with reason in conduct (morality), the third with two heterogeneous topics, viz. reason in aesthetic enjoyment (appreciation of beauty). He offers us thus, as it were, a survey of the life of reason-- of four great departments of experience and thought, four channels of man's interest in himself and in the world of which he is part.

72. Hegel lived in a singularly stirring age. From all sides tremendous experiences were crowding in upon men, challenging their accepted beliefs, enlarging their view of the world, shaking them out of their habitual grooves of feeling, thought, and action.

73. In spite of the excesses of the revolution, minds all over Europe awoke to dreams of a better order of society, and were taught that even the most old-established institutions are, after all, perishable and can be remoulded.

74. These eminent individuals were vividly conscious of a destiny not of their own making or choosing, of being the tools of spiritual forces

working through them, of which they could not grasp the full nature nor foresee the ultimate effects. The were great because possessed by something greater than themselves.

75. At the present day, the number and variety of the influences, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, religious, which converge from all sides upon open-minded men, and demand to be mastered by an effort of thinking, at once sympathetic and synthetic, are greater, not less, than they were in Hegel's time.

76 The philosopher must throw his mind wide open to the whole realm of human experience. He must discern the spiritual forces underlying historical events. He must focus in himself the universal principles of Nature as revealed by science.

77. What single mind could still dare to focus in itself the results of scientific researches, infinitely specialized and subdivided as they have become, or to keep contact with all the countless interactions and cross-fertilizations which result from the interchanges of culture between nations, between continents, between East and West?

78 A difficulty arises from the fact that an object, though it must always present itself in some character, does not always present itself in its <u>true</u> character or as it <u>really is</u>. In other words, the terms "reality" or "real" refer, not only to the existence of objects, but also to their nature, as when we speak of the "real nature" of a thing. "Real", in this second sense, is a synonym, not of "existent", but of "true." Even philosophers have sometimes been misled by forgetting, not only that "real" has these two senses, but also that, though we can distinguish them, we cannot divorce them one from the other. Some philosophers, for example, speak of "degrees of reality or truth," whereas others insist that

an object is either real or unreal, but that it cannot be, as it were, partially real. The former are taking "reality" chiefly in the sense of real nature; the latter are thinking chiefly of existence.

79. Our two types of idealism, then, may be contrasted by saying that the type which follows Berkeley throws the emphasis on the problem of Existence, whereas the type which follows Kant and Hegel throws the emphasis on the real nature of that which exists.

80. Absolutists hold that, from this point of view, the formal distinctness of minds, if it does not exactly vanish, becomes subordinate and instrumental to pervading identities. It is a single reality which appears in the different worlds of different minds.

81. When we speak of the "world as we perceive and think it to be", and, again, the "world as it reveals, or discloses, itself to us in our experience" we intend both phrases to mean strictly one and the same thing. For the important principle is that our "ideas" are "facts", i.e. that what we perceive and think is not different from, but identical with, the real world.

82. The Universe is always with us, in us, around us. Every moment of experience attests its presence, is evidence for the affirmation that something exists. What exists? What is this something? To these questions all perception, all thought, all feeling, supply an answer, or, at least, the materials for an answer. Philosophy is the endeavour to elicit from these materials a revelation of the whole nature of the Universe.

83. The demand for system is a demand for the elimination of contradictions, for thinking the Universe as a <u>self-consistent</u> whole.

Are these demands for inclusiveness and consistency merely arbitrary human ideals which our

minds impose upon a world whose real nature is alien to them? Are we mearely weaving the manifold data of our experience into all sorts of elaborate patterns because it is the nature of our minds to to think? Are the cadres de l'intelligence, as Bergson calls them, like distorting glasses through which we see the real, not as it is, but as the structure of our minds makes it appear? In other words, is it conceivable that "really" the Universe is an unintelligible chaos, but that our intelligence, swayed, as Bergson would have it, by practical interests, or, as others say, by our emotions, by the desire for a kindly, protective Universe, picture to us an illusory phantom of order and harmony? Kant's treatment of the categories as the principles of the mind's own synthetic activity is, as we have seen, a standing temptation to contrast our "subjective" ways of thinking with the "objective" nature of the real. If we yield to this temptation, there can be only one conclusion, viz. not as it really is, but only as distorted by the nature of our own minds.

84. This intolerance of contradiction plays an extraordinarily important part in philosophical thinking. The experience of contradiction is the ever-recurrent stimulus to philosophical reflection and gives rise to a method which Plato, who first employed it on a large scale as the distinctive method of philosophy, called "dialectic." This term is nowadays often used in a debased sense as if it meant nothing more than "logic-chopping", "hair-splitting" and, generally, idle argument about words. Even philosophers in their revulsion from Hegel's "dialectical method" look askance at the term. Hegel over-systematized the method by trying to ascend through a series of triads of concepts, from the concept of bare Being to the concept of the Absolute. If we

ask ourselves, What is living and what is dead in Hegel's philosophy we must answer that what is dead in his ladder of triads. If we abandon Hegel's particular system, we cannot abandon the method of dialectic in general. We may avoid the term: we cannot avoid the procedure. A philosopher cannot but be a dialectician, for dialectic is the effort of thought to overcome the contradictions which arise in the very process of thinking together all aspects of the Universe. These contradictions have their root in the fact that the Universe reveals itself to us piecemeal.

85, There is much greater occasion for dialectic when, e.g. science and religion conflict, i.e. when the nature of reality as affirmed by scientific thought clashes with the nature of reality as affirmed by religious thought. The sting of the problem lies just in this, that we cannot say that all the truth is on one side and all the error on the other, though this way out has often been tried. There is truth on both sides.

86. Examples of such contradictions between organized systems of thought--"antinomies" as they are technically called--could be multiplied indefinitely. They occur within the realm of science, as when the mechanical theory of Nature tries, and fails, to include satisfactorily the phenomena of life and consciousness. They occur between science and morality, as when the determinism of science clashes with the moral postulate of the freedom of the will. They occur within morality as when law confronts liberty, or when self-discipline and self-denial point one way, self-realisation and self-assertion another. Duty v. inclination, egoism v. altruism, asceticism v. self-indulgence--everywhere we meet with these antithetic ideals which carry perplexity no less into our conduct than into our thought.

87. They brought the whole realm of human experience within the focus of philosophical reflection, and thus made us acutely and abidingly aware of the antinomies which run throught it all. There is truth of some degree everywhere, but how to hold fast these divergent, and often, conflicting, bits of truth in a single, comprehensive, coherent view of the All--that is the problem.
88. These contradictions, are "antinomies", are the results of partial efforts at synthesis, and, in turn, provoke further synthetic thinking. Clearly, the hope here is that further thinking will resolve the difficulties which thinking itself has created.
89. If we do not merely accept the results of thinking, but reflect, in turn, on the methods by which thinking has achieved these results, we find these methods to be inherently unintelligible, because self-contradictory. In other words, contradiction is inherent in the very nature of thought. It is the symptom through which thought betrays to itself its radical vice--divorce from the immediacy of feeling. Hence, no thinking can, as such, reveal the nature of the real as it actually is. That nature can be found only in a higher form of experience, not given to us humans, in which the work of thought is preserved but re-united with the immediacy of feeling which thought had lost. This higher, and to us unattainable, experience in which idea and existence are restored to union with each other, is for Bradley the Absolute, or the Absolute Experience.
90. For practical purposes this does not matter. The thinking on which we rely in every-day life, and even more the systematic thinking in science, in moral and social theory, in theology, are good enough to live by. But philosophy cannot be

content with these practical makeshifts. For philosophy is nothing but the attempt to carry through the demand for consistency to the bitter end.
91. It takes different feelings, perceptions, volitions, and declares that in all of them it is the "same" self which feels, perceives, wills, and so on. The result, once more, is practically satisfactory: it <u>works</u>. But theoretically it is indefensible and unintelligible.

All this fine-spun argument is, no doubt, far removed from ordinary, practical life, with its loves and hates, its struggle for existence, its games and enjoyments, its politics, its wars. It is nearer to, and yet still far removed from, the work of the sciences, applied or pure. If any reader thinks it idle quibbling, and makes up his mind not to apply the test of absolute consistency to the results of thought so long as they "work" he may even elevate this preference to the dignity of a philosophical principle by calling himself a "pragmatist." For "pragmatism" is the theory that "the true is the useful," i.e. that any way of thinking which leads to successful action, which yields predictions that we can verify, which enables us to control our environment and ourselves, or even which merely effects for us a better emotional adjustment to the world, is true.
92. To appreciate the force of Bradley's argument, it is necessary to repeat his intellectual experiment--for that is what it is; an experiment in rethinking the results of ordinary thought by the standard of consistency.
93. Bradley's distinctive originality among defenders of the Absolute lies in the single-mindedness with which he holds fast to two positions. One is that reality does, indeed, reveal itself in what we think it to be. But the

other is that the revelation ("appearance") of reality in thought is inadequate, as is brought home to us by the inherent inconsistencies of thought, on the one hand, and by the contrast between it and the various forms of immediate experience (also "appearance" of the real), on the other. The "Absolute" thus, means for Bradley the solution of this fundamental antinomy. It is that superhuman form of experience in which the order and articulation of the world as we think it to be is reunited with the vividness and thrull of the world as revealed through sense and feeling.

94. To understand what Bosanquet means by the Absolute all we need--though, in truth, even this demands a sustained effort of philosophical insight--is to learn to discern the Absolute as it reveals itself in the facing and solving of problems, the tensions and harmonies, the struggles and victories, of daily experience. "Dialectic" for Bosanquet, is not merely an abstruse game that a philosopher plays in his study with thoughts as counters. On the contrary, "the transmutation of experience, in accordance with the law of non-contradiction, is the principle of daily life." Here are some examples of what Bosanquet means by this "transmutation of experience." "From finding our way among mountains to moulding our daily business with a self-consistent purpose, or solving an economic problem, or discerning the reality of beauty through the appearance of ugliness, or a lovable through the apparent failings of character, we find from day to day how contradictory aspects blend into harmony as linking and distinguishing contents (= facts, or aspects of facts) come into view....So far as the finite being lives a life at all, it affirms in its whole existence the principle of the Absolute."

95. The Absolute, clearly, must be the most

familiar fact of all, present throughout the whole of our experience, and hard to discern, not because it is remote and abstruse, but only because it is so near, so all-pervading that, as it were, we cannot see the wood for the trees. It is the business of philosophy to make of this familiar fact an explicit object of attention, by crystallizing it into language which will point it out to us, direct us to discern it.

96. We have learnt, partly from Kant, and more comprehensively from Hegel, that to this thinking-together the whole of our experience must contribute, and that, in truth, without the modes of experience in which we affirm, enjoy, and strive to realize spiritual values, the nature of the real is shrunk to a poor abstraction.

97. The mind which awakens to this view of its place and function is led, from a fresh angle, to think of itself as an appearance of the Absolute.

98. These illustrations must suffice to show by what sort of contradictions theism is beset. And no doctrine which contains inherent contradictions can pass in philosophy either as a statement of simple fact or as one of ultimate truth.

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HASTINGS' ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION:
ON I L L U S I O N.

By the common usuage of psychology the name 'illusion' is now reserved for certain special anomalies of sense, which do not necessarily involve any process of cognition in the strict sense of the term.

$ Many theories of this and other similar illusions have been given, but most of these--especially such as involve a reference to the physiology of the retina or of the optical muscles--have been shown to be untenable.

$ Thus arises a primitive kind of error which has much interest for epistemology, just because it is so primitive. It provides a case of natural or unavoidable error, which is, none the less, erroneous and misleading. This peculiarity gives special importance to the study of illusions, and raises them far above the triviality which any practical considerations would attach to their study.

$ Thus in the case of retinal irradiation where-by a bright surface looks larger than a dark surface of the same real size, the untutored mind will act and think as if the bright surface were really larger. Such a mind is guided by the habitual integration of distance from the eye and the apparent size of surface, according to which two surfaces of the same apparent size and at the same apparent distance should be of the same real size i.e., should give the same results by the method of visual superposition through the medium of, say, a foot rule. The hidden cause of this illusion on the retina, where its presence is hardly verifiable, because there is psychical difference between the two cases which might accout for the effect. Similarly the red letters of a coloured lamp sign appear farther away than

the green or blue ones, because the cause--a mere matter of difference of refraction of coloured lights, and hence of retinal 'disparity'--is hidden (cf. the red and blue patterns on many rugs). We soon discover the illusion in this case when we see that the frame of a sign or the glass upon which the letters stand is flat. Still it is to be noted that we discover this only in virtue of the co-relations of sense with which it disagrees.

$ In the illusions of reversible perspective there is no retinal distortion. The cube that appears solid, though merely drawn on flat surface, makes identical impressions upon both eyes. This is proved by the fact that the paper upon which the cube is drawn still appears flat that the illusion holds also for uni-ocular observation and that the illusory solid changes its aspect from moment to moment, all the then far points now appearing to be near and vice versa. If there is thus no change in the outer or in the retinal impression to account for the apparent solidity and its reversal, the cause of these will lie in some more central physiological factor or in a purely psychical determinations given by change of fixation and by thinking of one or other form of the solid. have been excluded. Under certain circumstances, e.g. momentary exposure, supporting indices, suppression of background, etc., the illusion can be greatly increased. The cube will appear 'really' solid. Here, of course, we have succeeded in excluding only the interrogations of sense which in ordinary circumstances make the illusion obvious, viz. that we see the object looked at--paper and drawing of cube upon it--as if it were at once flat and solid. The hidden cause of this illusion probably lies in the nature of stereoscopy as a purely psychical process. Possibly a

primitive form of integrative recall operates here. It is not surprising that the cause of the illusions of reversible perspective, whether it be found in the process of redintegrative memory or not, should be hidden; for the fusion that characterizes sterescopy almost entirely obscures any psychical integrative factors it may contain. We are not usually aware of the double images that all vision involves, but only of their integrative result.

$ The other illusions of sense still await definite classification. Much research has been done on them, but the discovery of their cause is perplexingly difficult. A familiar example and one of the most pronounced is Muller-Lyer illusion in which the length of two equal horizontal lines, pointing, in the one outwards (⟨---⟩) in the other inwards (⟩----⟨). The former line seems much longer. The amount of the illusion has been measured under various circumstances. Anything that tends to let the compared horizontal lines become prominent reduces, or destroyes the illusion; their synthetic visual capacity is probably low. If an analytic habit of vision is practised, the illusion can likewise be suppressed. But the synthetic attitude is the usual one in ourselves; for the illusion appears even when the exposure is momentary. If a regular series of Muller-Lyer figures is prepared in which the arrow-head lines revolve harmoniously about two end points of the horizontal line, and if this series is shown in the stroboscope (projection by cinemotography would be the equivalent of this), the illusion will show its presence most emphatically, for the horizontal line will appear to shorten and lengthen, and the end points will appear to move up and down.

$ The final explanation, however, is not even yet quite clear. Though we are told to compare the lengths of the horizontal lines, we seem to be compelled by the hidden cause of the illusion to compare the spaces enclosed by the two figures instead and to refer the result of this comparison to the comparison which we were instructed and endeavoured to make. Of course, it is easy to learn that it is the end lines which are ultimately responsible for the illusion; but it requires very little insight into psychological science to discern that this most patent factor is insufficient to account for the illusion. There is nothing in the side lines which should alter lengths of spaces. The cause must lie hidden in psychical processes, built upon the skeleton of lines given in the figure, but not patent in it; for the illusion just consists in the difference between the size of the line as a mere line and the size of the line as an element in a complex of lines and spaces.

$ Thus a shadowy form seen at a roadside on a dark night might be the outline of a bush, a brigand or a beast. One would suffer from the illusion if one took it for anything but the harmless shrub. But the mistakes one makes have clear though hidden motives. What is seen and heard and felt and known all suggest the ordinary wayside objects, but the fears that more or less assail us all in the dark help us to see what we dread. To children who instinctively dread the darkness, the terrors of the way to bed up the dark stairs through the unlit halls is very real indeed.

$ True illusions are therefore all of psychical origin. There is no sense or purpose in speaking of the desparity between the psychical and the material as being illusory. For the same reason

illusions caused by the anomalous distortion of impressions, by the sense-organ hardly deserve the name. They enjoy it only in virtue of the fact that the anamoly which they represent exists both on the material and on the psychicl side.

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HASTINGS' ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION.
ON IDEALISM, TRANSCENDENTALISM, THEOSOPHY & CHINESE PHILOSOPHY:

Ambiguity of the world 'Idea': Some of the ambiguities which have beset the word 'idea' are merely verbal, and may be removed by careful definition.

$ The separation of the merely subjective element from elements of the merely objective & super-subjective and universally valid, is a problem which has been touched upon by the Greek sophists and sceptics, by Augustine and the Mediavel Nominalists, and this became the real crux of Descartes and Malebranche, of Locke and Berkeley, and it is impressively expounded by Fichte in his Bestimmung des Menschen.

$ Idealism implies that the relation of subject and object is one of the essential starting points of philosophy, and in its view of that relation it lays down the decisive principle that objects can exist only for a subject, and that the subject which carries the objects within itself is the higher category, and as such must determine the process of philosophical thought.

$ These rather general applications of the words have no place in scientific terminology, and have not much significance even in the inexact speech of everyday life as everything turns upon the particular ethical, religious and aesthetic sense in which the nature of the ideal and its authority over personality are conceived. As a technical term, idealism concerns us only as denoting a distinct type of metaphysical

and in that sense alone it will be dealt with here.

$ It denotes the metaphysical theory which, as regards the primary and most certain datum of experience, takes its stand upon consciousness and its contents. In its most uncompromising form idealism is solipsism, and finds its initial and most difficult problem in the question regarding the trans-subjective reality of knowledge.

$ Idealism is of immense significance for religion. It invalidates all materialism and semi-materialism. It maintains that consciousness cannot be derived from matter, but that, on the contrary, matter exists only for consciousness--that its esse is percipi. Nor does this imply that matter is simply given in consciousness, for in that case it would be of no consequence whether we started from the one or from the other. But in the fundamental relation between the two, according to idealism, consciousness is the formative and regulative principle--that which contains in itself meaning and life, and is, therefore, pre-eminent and intelligible to itself. Idealism asserts the mind's supremacy over the real. But the conviction that the mind cannot be explained by matter and that it is the formative principle of the real, is a fundamental scientific postulate of religious life and thought and is recognised as such wherever religious thought is consciously directed upon its possibility and its rights. It is true that the idealistic theory cannot in itself determine the direction in which the mind's supremacy will assert itself, of the ends and values which that supremacy involves. Idealism regards the mind as a formal principle, the materials of which are given, and the ends of which are revealed

to the will in the process of spiritual development. What particular ends the mind will choose are determined in part by the solutions of the other two groups of philosophical problems, and above all, are drawn from the supreme conviction of the mind itself. No more than any other form of philosophy can idealism by itself develop into religion; it must ever be supplemented by independent elements of religious life and from these receive a concrete determination. But in so far as mind and the supremacy of mind form the metaphysical precondition of religious belief, idealism is to that extent of the utmost significance for religious life and thought.

$ But if the mind is calm, if the heart is pure, then one contemplates the invisible Brahman. One cannot know him except in the heart.

$ To know Brahman it is not enough to open the eyes and the ears and search for Being in the world which surrounds us. Between the Ego and non-Ego there is an irreducible opposition. The senses and the understanding ~~which~~ receive and appreciate the non-ego and transfer either to the object the qualities of the subject or to the subject that which they believe they know of the object. In either case external cognation is vitiated by the error; the true name of this pretended knowledge is 'nescience' (avidya). Outside of us, the senses and the understanding give us only the cognition of the phenomena of 'becoming'. Now Being, in reality, does not 'become'; it is; If it were 'becoming', it would not 'be'; for it is impossible to see how that which is not could come to be. All becoming is only an appearance, an illusion.

This 'being; the only reality, retains in the Vedanta the name of Brahman. This is the absolute Brahman, without determination, or, as the

Vedantins say, without quality; beyond time and space and causation, for time, space and causation belong to the world of appearance of avidya."

$ He attains this life by a process of abscission of motives, by which he arrives at a childlike state of spontaneity and tenderness, in which there is also exemplified the paradoxical possession of security and strength.

$ To be in a position to enjoy what the world regards as honour is to be exposed to what world regards as calamity. That which makes me a possible subject of either is just that I am an object to myself. The sage therefore treats his person as if it were alien to him. He never identifies his happiness with this or that, so never loses his happiness. Having no private ends, his private ends are realised.

$ Specially is illustration to be found in vegetable life which in obedience to an inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth culminating and again subsiding. The Taostic life is therefore a life of equiable indifference, outwardly of non-action, devoid, i.e. of action for chosen ends, moved in obedience to an inward sponteneity rather than motived by outward inducement; a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-spontaneous.

$ As transcendent existence Tao is something quite indefinite, which Lao-tse struggles to express by negatives; (2) from this standpoint of indefinite ground the universe of things issues by a process which is emanation from the Tao as mother and not creation by Tao as agent; (3) Tao is immanent in the world working in an unobtrusive way, producing and bringing to perfection individual existences. On the whole, we come perhaps to the nearest to the meaning of Tao, when we say that it is pure Being,

(most abstract of categories) endowed with spontaneity, the ultimate essence and impulse of all definite things.
$ The ground of existence being a perfectly indefinite spontaneity, a dark abysmal one from which, for no reason assigned, the multiplicity of the world emanates, by the immanence of which the world is and is moved--all this agrees with the ethical doctrine of abstention from self-determination and of sinking back on the inner ground of our being that we may be as this spontaneity in us causes us to become.
$ It is hinted that the influence of a sage becomes effective only when he has the advantage of a high place. Here Lao Tse is in line with Confucius, who asserted that his principle would transform, the world if only he could a ruler wise enough to give him office.
$ As we think back and back, we come to something which we cannot see or hear or touch, an obscure something from which all things come. It is in all things, which could not be apart from it. Yet it never parades itself. It simply is a mysterious, ever-during, all-working existence. Let us conform ourselves to this; let us become one with it. For it is in us as in all else--essence which would visualize itself if it were not hindered by our self will and self-seeking. If we put away these, then we know it and are and become what it tends to be. It is Tao, unqualified being, origin of things, and in them as essence and spontaneity.
$ The general ethical temper is quietists, based now on ignorance, now on fatalism. Another root for it is found in the subjectivity of knowledge, and the absence of any criterion of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, though this is hinted at rather than developed. Along with this may

be noted a disclaiming of any discrimination in worth between waking and dreaming experience.

$ A similar strain of thought appears in Yang-tse, the heresiarch whom Mencius criticized, and is there regarded as congruent with the teaching of Lao Tan.

$ The secret of it is such selfless identification with the life of nature as brings the Taoist into harmony with all its forces, animate and inanimate. The alleged immunity of a drunken man from injury by accident is used to illustrate the still higher immunity which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the heavenly (i.e. natural as opposed to 'self-determined') element of his constitution.

$ Chwang-Tse: The most brilliant of the Taoist writers is Chwang-tse. In him as little as in the Tao-Teh King is there any systematic exposition of Taoism. In the development of his views, he uses various literary devices--anecdote, allegory and imaginary conversation; in some places he handles somewhat freely not only Confucius, but even more ancient worthies, such as Yao and Shun. How little historical accuracy or consistence is regarded is shown by the fact that Confucius is also introduced speaking in quite a Taoist vein. It is not easy to see the drift and relevance of all Chwang-Tse's chapters, but the reader cannot fail to find a characteristic attitude towards reality. As in the Tao-Teh King, the metaphysical basis of everything is Tao, which as the explanation of all things is not itself a thing. It is more abstract than even non-existence, which is made definite by its opposition to existence, and so it may be called non-existing. To call it Tao is only a metaphor, .xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. From this absolute indifference all existences, including spirits and God have come. No explanation is given of this coming into existence of

definite things, though, to be consistent with the general scheme, the evolution must be unmotived and spontaneous. The process from unxonscious inddiference to the world of consciousness and of differentiated things is described in the allegory 'Heedless' and 'Hasty' pitying insensible chaos, and digging in him orifices, of perception with the result that he died. Tao is in things, their reality and the regulator of their processes. In accordance with this view Tao and things are the hints of illusory nature of all knowledge coming through the senses. The truth of things is perceived by the spirit, and Taoist adepts, when most in touch with reality are in a trance, their bodies like rotten tree-stumps and their minds like slaked lime. One may notice also the incipient scepticism based on the relativity of knowledge and the phenomenon of dreaming. A paragraph more quoted perhaps than any other from Chwang-tse , though by no means the most central to his position, is that in which he hesitates to decide whether he is Chwang-tse dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butter-fly dreaming that it is Chwang-tse. Since Tao alone really is, the truth of life is to be found in the above-mentioned trance when self-consciousness and self-determination are completely lost. But, as in the Tao-Teh King, so here, things are taken for granted, with Tao as their spontaneously operating essence; and in accordance with this assumption the ethical ideal is with Chwang as with Lao a life of spontaneity. There is inculcated an abscission of all definite volition and an indifferent yielding of one-self to the course of nature. Hence follows a characteristic attitude towards death, which is regarded as natural as little to be feared as birth. The Taoist is independent of all accidents, which are of no importance in comparison with the independent worth of self as an

expression of Tao. It is only false opinion which differentiates between this and that outward state. If all self-determined effort is a departure from the truth of life, it follows that the devotee of virtue and the worker of inuqity fall under the same self-condemnation. Hence results a paradoxical levelling down of moral distinction.

$ He can sink in consciousness to the depths of his own being, beyond the body, the passions, the emotions, the mind, the reason; these are all his, but they are not he; he can pass beyond them all, but they are himself as separate from them, the pure 'I', pure being.

$ Coming forth from the depths of the One Existence, from the one beyond all thought and all speech, a Logos, by imposing on himself a limit, circumscribing voluntarily the range of His own being, becomes the Manifested God, and tracing the limiting sphere of His activity, thus outlines the area of His universe. Within that area the universe is born, is evolved and dies; it lives, it moves, it has its being in Him; its matter is His breath; it forces and energies are currents of His life; all-evolving; He is its source and its end, its cause and its object, its centre and circumference; it is built on him as its sure foundation, it breathes in Him as its encircle space; He is in everything and everything is in Him. Thus have sages of the Ancient wisdom taught us of the beginning of the manifested worlds."

$ <u>Philosophical teachings</u>: Philosophically, theosophy is idealistic; consciousness is primary, the one indubitabie fact, which can neither be strengthened nor weakened by argument. 'I am' is the testimony of consciousness to itself, and nothing can disprove its witness, since every disproof, every argument must be addressed to that same consciousness, and imply its existence.

$$ He returns to earth life, bringing with him these capacities wrung out of experiences, into new bodies built to express and utilize them. In these he goes through a similar cycle, gathering suffering, transmitting, and so on and on; each birth brings the fruitage of the preceding lives to start the new pilgrimage, and this is the inborn character, temperament, mental, moral physical. Step by step he climbs the ladder, working under inflexible and inviolable laws, until he reaches the stature of the perfect man; he passes through all the classes of the school of life until he has mastered all that the world has to teach, is then a man, beyond birth and death, 'fitted for immortality,' ready for work in the larger life.

$ Let one worship Brahman, knowing that he is the reality. Let one worship the Atman. The Atman has for body the life; for form, the light; for essence space. It can take all forms according to its incination...It permeates all the world. It is the essence of life; it is the essence of myself."--Satapatha Brahmana.

$ From the point of view of true knowledge, there is neither cause nor effect; neither Isvara nor world; neither agent nor act; but only Being unchangeable, indeterminate.

$ For practical purposes and provisionally, both the world and individual exist. To both of them even Sankara pays considerable attention. Both are subjects and objects of action. Their destiny is determined by Karma. "An act cannot be annulled except through working out the result." Action produces life, and life produces action."The self which acts will be re-born for action and again for re-birth."

$ The Sankhya posits the absolute reality of the empirical world. If it is said that the world of

things is the theatre of a perpetual becoming and that it is impossible to predicate being of that which is impermanent, its answer in that a thing is not real only at the moment when it manifests itself; it has also a subtle state, in which it exists potentially, in its cause.

$ The change which emerges in the physical and psychical universe is a regular evolution taking the form of a determination, a growing complexity, an increasing materiality. In its creative aspect evolution brings the gross out of the subtle. The Sankhya which has ultimately described the minute phases of the evolutionary processes, posits 24 principles (tattvas) which are arranged in order, from Prakrti, the common foundation of all phenomenal existence, to the gross elements and their combinations.

$ The linga sarira is subtle and is to the gross body as the cause is to the effect; it explains the differences, both physical and psychical, which distinguish individuals from one another. Whilst the gross body is destroyed by death, the linga sarira passes from birth to birth and constitutes the identity of the individual in the series of its existences. In every life it becomes richer or poorer according to all that man thinks, does or resolves. It is like capital which bears as interest the quality of succeeding existence.

$ By menas of study, self-contemplation, and meditation, we may arrive at an assertion of the truth: "I am not"; nothing is mine; this is not me". One thus gets a direct perception of the distinction between the ego and the Prakrti. To establish this distinction is to destroy the bond and to see the purusa in its absolute purity.

$ Does not the yogi, to obtain salvation, surrender himself to the God with that feeling of

complete abandonment which is called pranidhana? Finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place?

$ The role attributed to Isvara in the scheme of salvation is really secondary. After the preliminary process is gone through, there is no further intervention of divine assistance to second the efforts of the yogi, and everything happens, as if he had only his own powers to rely upon.

$ Isware was no more an inconvenient intrusion in the Brahmanical Yoga than in the monistic Vedanta.

$ The yogi pupil has different conditions to fulfil. A long and painful process of preparation is imposed on him, so that he may triumph over all the obstacles, inherent in the feebleness of man. It is in the first phase of this that devotion and the practice of mortification have their parts to play. Whenever this propaedeutic has fulfilled its functions, the adept may proceed to exercises, which lead to the suppression of the intellectual functions and the detachment of the soul.

$ There is special insistence upon the regulation of thebreath, on the ground that individual life and thought are bound with respiration, and that to control the one is to dominate the other.

$ Sometimes also the strain of so much effort ends in madness. The texts expatiate at great length the manifold advantage which yoga brings to its disciples.

$ Karma may be defined as the reaction of the act upon the subject. The reaction takes place generally at the dissolution of the body, after death, in such a way that the binding force of one individual life reappears in another individual life. As Buddhism has discarded every hypothesis, not connected with the visible forms

of existence, it does not posit the subtle as the vehicle of karma or an Isvara as the controller of resultants. Even at a distance, Karma is a force which works mechanically. Moreover it fulfils in Buddhism the function of explaining the congenital differences which are found among men, and of awakening in the hearts of the faithful adherents the feeling of the ir moral responsibility.

$ The exclusive interests of personal salvation are then so far from its thought that the virtue which it enjoins have a social and human life value--compassion, charity, humility. Similarly there is an expansion of doctrine. Questions kept in reserve at the beginning soon had to be investigated, and the reason for this was that facility might be obtained for discussing them with rival schools. Ontological and epistemological topics soon became the order of the day.

$ Theosophy is thus definitely committed to the doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration, with, on the one hand, its plausible explanation of the inequalities of human life, its stern insistence on moral consequences, its distant prospect of negative salvation, and, on the other hand, its ethical weakness arising out of its tendency to fatalism and encouragement of procrastination, and its lonely outlook as it traces the suceeding phases of individual development.

$ It is at least doubtful whether modern theosophy in India distinguishes sufficiently between the subjective imagination and the controlling power of objective facts, and this considerably reduces the force of the rebuke which it administers to our materialism.

$ The truth is not arrived at slowly and patiently by study and reflection; it is grasped by sudden internal vision. Once the premises have been given by intuition, a rigorous dialectic can construct a system whose scientific appearance has an

element of attractiveness for persistently intellectualist minds eager to 'know.'

$ Its followers have searched for the absolute and whole, when life can give only the relative and the partial. They have thought it possible to arrive by a leap at truth, when in fact nothing has really been secured by this intuitive method and everything has to be begun over again.

$ This work....is a system of the higher or transcendental idealism--an idealism which embraces both mind and matter, transforms the world and ourselves into ideas and represents the objective world as derived from appearances which the understanding combines in the interdependent whole of experience...The cause of these ideas is to us unknown and unknowable.

$ The distinction between the 'reason' and the 'understanding' became familiar and 'transcendental philosophy' acclamatized in English speech. The reason could overcome the impotence of the understanding and get hold of unseen realities.

$ Carlyle, who in spite of his sympathy with Emerson, saw in this movement an extravagant disregard of facts and an enthusiastic electicism, warned Emerson against the dangers ahead. "You seem to be in danger of dividing yourselves from the Fact of the Universe, in which alone ugly as it is can I find any anchorage."

$ Carlyle, in his paper on Novalis, points out that German transcendentalism denies the absolute existence of matter, that it makes space and time forms of the understanding; Therefore to God "Time and Space are not laws of His being but only of ours" and so He is omnipresent and eternal; and "the black Spectre, Atheism...melts into nothingness." Again transcendentalists recognize a higher faculty than understanding, viz. reason.

$ Dor sometime this mode of thinking through its novelty and obscurity, was inintelligible and ab-

curity, was unintelligible and abnoxious to English thinkers, but, when it did take a hold in Britain, it was with such force that it conquered the philosophical chairs in our universities with few exceptions, and exercised an orthodox tyranny against which it was difficult to contend. To Hamilton, who viewed with extreme repugnance the philosophy of the Absolute, must be attributed the revival of philosophical speculation in Britain, and his pupils were able to understand the German philosophy which then was an enigma and a puzzle to others who in Britain interested themselves in speculation.

$ In English speaking countries, it is within the narrow circle of professed philosophers, perhaps the dominant mood of thought; while without that circle it is not so much objected to as totally ignored.

$ It is wisely felt that transcendentalism speaks too confidently of its own power to present a perfectly explicable view of the world--to exhibit all reality in thought categories.

$ Its manner is apt to strike the observer as being haughty and supercilious, and its language would lead one to think that a claim to something like omniscience is arrogated--a claim so contrary to our broken experience as human beings and so opposed to that humility which serious thinkers have always regarded as the fitting attitude for all searchers of truth.

$ To it the external world is only an object for a subject, and the tendency of all idealistic schemes is to lapse into solipsism. This solipsism may be of the individual or of the One Supreme Subject, but in essence it is the same.

$ It is impossible what the future may have in store for philosophy. The best we can wish for is that it free itself from the tyranny of phrases and become intelligent and interesting; that it may have the humility to attempt to solve

real problems that perplex men; that it be freed from its disdain regarding man's abiding convictions; that it abstain from any language which would throw doubt on the great ideals and values of life.

$ Wang Yang-ming (A.D.1472-1529), known also as Wang Shouien, Wang-shen, Wang- eh-an and Wang -ch'eng, was a Chinese statesman, strategist, reformer, and scholar of note during the Ming dynasty.

$ In view of his own precarious position, he had a sareaphegus made for himsèlf. In the midst of these advertisities the chief object of his medi dation was the conduct of a sage under similar circumstances. One night at midnight the great enlightenment came, and suddenly he realised that what the sage meant 'by investigating things for the sake of extending knowledge to the utmost.' Overjoyed he unconsciously called out, and arising from his couch, paced the floor. "I am wrong" he said "in looking for fundamental principles in things and affairs. My nature is sufficient to solve all the problems of existence. From that time onwards he was a faithful defender of idealism in opposition to the realism.

$ At the age of 39 Wang was restored to honour and promoted to the magistracy of Lulinghsien in Shansi. As time passed he held numerous positions of trust and honour in the Government.

$ His great military campaign was undoubtedly conducted while he was military Governor of Kiangsi, against the rebellious Prince Ch'en Hao (Prince Ning), who, it was feared, might utilize the down-river current and invade the capital. Wang first sent up several memorials advising the emperor of the rebellion; then by a series of subterfuges he misled the rebellious prince, finally engaging him in battle near Poyang Lake at Haungchitu and Patzunao, and taking him prisoner of war. His success aroused the jealousy

of several officials.
$ When at the time of enlightenment, he gave utterance to the dictum, "My nature is sufficient," he laid the foundation upon which the entire structure of his philosophy and ethics rests; man's mind holds the key to all problems of the universe.
$ Pointing to the flowers and trees on a cliff, a friend one day said to him: "You hold that there is nothing under heaven outside the mind. What relation exists between my mind, and these flowers and trees on the high mountain?" Wang replied: "When you cease regarding these flowers they become quite with your mind, and when you see them, their colours at once become clear. From this you may know that these flowers are not external to your mind." This is undisguised idealism in which the microcosm creates as truly as the macrocosm.

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THE TIBETAN BUDDHA SAMANTA BHADRA.

THE PATH OF GOOD WISHES.

(A short summary of the general principles of Buddhist doctrine as given in the Path of Good wishes of the Samanta Badra called Thogmahi Sans-rGyas Kunto-bZangpo or SMon Lam-stops-po-che translated by Kazi Dawa-Samdup.)

"Then the all-good Buddha, Kunto-bZangpo, uttered these good wishes whereby the sentient beings of the Sangsara cannot but be saved).
1. Ho!(Listen) All which is visible and invisible, whether Sangsara or Nirvana, is at base One, with two paths(avidya and Vidya) and two ends (sangsara and nirvana. This ultimate base is in advaita Brahmanism the Parabrahman, also called Shunya. By its Shaktis vidya and avidya, liberation (Moksha) and bondage (world) is attained). These (paths & ends) are the wondrous play of ignorance (avidya) and knowledge (vidya)

By the pow

By the power of these good wishes of Kunto-bZang-pǫ may all attain Buddhahood in the Dharma-Dhtu. (that is the ultimate Dharma-kaya in nirvana which is sunyata or void. All have an inherent right and capacity to Enlightenment. But all beings do not attain it simultaneously. Therefor Sangsara is Eternal).

2. The foundation of all is uncreated and independent uncompounded and beyond mind and speech. Of it neither the word nirvana nor sangsara may be said. (These are the terms of the dualistic world, Nirvana being contrasted with snngsara. They are both ideas formed by the mind of certain of certain states. But Shunyata, the Void, is beyond the with all its imaginings. The state of Shunyata is free of all defined notions which have no meaning in this absolute state. Similarly whilst in Advaita Bhrahminism the Parabrahman is, relative to the Sangsara, Being-Consciousness-Bliss or Sachchidananda, what It is in Itself is unknowable except by and to Itself.) To realise it is to be a Buddha and not to realise it is to stray into sangsaric being. May all sentient beings in the three regions realise this indescribable basis of all.

3. I, Kunto-Zang-po knowing the basis which is without cause to be self-produced did not sully it by the thought that it was without or within. It is not obscured by the darkness of unconsciousness. No faulty notion of Self darkens it. (That is the notion of the self. The apparent self is the cause of all error)

4. For those who are in the state of true knowledge (that is knowledge that the sense of self is unreal and phenomenal only, and that the ultimate is Shunyata) there is no fear were even all the three religions to be destroyed. They are not attached to the objects of sense enjoyment. To the self-subsisting experience beyond ideas (beyond all limited knowing for ideas are limitations) there is no material form (that is form in the

there is no material form (that is form is the work of the finitizing principle of Maya) or the five poisons (lust, anger, infatuation, pride & jealousy). Them from clear unobstructed mind come five wisdoms though they are in essence one from which are produced the five Buddhas. From the going forth of the wisdom of the five Buddhas the forty peaceful Buddhas are produced. (the term "Buddha" is here used to describe the whole class).

5. From the shining forth of the power of the five Buddhas come the sixty blood-drinking (that is wrathful) Devatas. In me there has been no error in straying away from knowledge of the foundation. As I am the Buddha may all sentient beings in the three regions by the power of this my good wish gain the great wisdom through the self-produced mind.

6. There will be no end of my Avataras who will appear in inconceivable millions of numbers and shapes and who will adopt various methods suitable for the control of every kind of being. By the power of my grace and good wishes may all beings of the three regions escape from the six sangsaric worlds.

7. Beings who aforetime erred, did so because they knew not the foundation. They were overpowered by the unconscious dark state. This was the cause of ignorance and error. Immerced in ignorance and obscured by delusion (which produces the Maya of selfness. From the notion of 'I' comes that of 'other' then, mine and thine and all errors and sins) the knower was afeared and confused. Then came the idea 'I' and "other" and hatred. As these gained force a continuous chain of sangsaric evolution was produced. Through that the five poisons of the obscuring passions of lust anger covetuousness d elusion jealousy increased and an endless

of evil Karma issued forth. Therefore as the root source of error in sentient beings is unconscious ignorance may all by the power of the good wishes of me the Buddha attain the clear pure mind, (the undisturbed true level of mind which is that of Dhyana. When this is had enlightenment comes)inherent in every being. (Pure mind is inherent in all and may be attained by all. It is said that the essence of the Buddhas pervades all beings, as butter in milk. As milk when churned, yields up butter so each mind being developed, Nirvana arises.
8. The root ignorance is the abyssal ground of the knower's unconsciousness. The other ignorance is that which regards self and others to be different and separate. These two forms of ignorance are the root cause of error in all sentient beings. By the power of these good wishes of me the Buddha may the gloom of unconsciousness which obscures all beings in the Sangsara be dispelled. May they be cleared of their error which regards Beings as separate from one another and may their inherent pure mind be realised. (That is, may vidya arise. May it come to know itself. The phenomenal or Vyavaharic self is admitted, but it is the product of Maya. This is the doctrine of Anatma, for it has no independent permanent being for the attainment of the true or essential state shows this).
9. The thought which regards beings as separate begets a hesitating doubting state. A subtle feeling of attachment arises which on being allowed to gain force gradually resolves itself into strong attachment and a craving for food, clothing dwellings wealth and friends, the five objects of enjoyment, lovers wives and husbands. These are the chief errors of worldly people. There is no end to the action flowing from the ideas of dualism. (which regards things as exter-

nal reality, and the Mind which perceived them as inner reality. If Sangsara be left to itself it goes on producing Sangsara for ever. To attain release therefrom, effort guided by wisdom is necessary. This release is the Buddhist Shunyata and the Brahmanic Moksha). The fruit of these cravings is birth as a preta (what English orientalists call "Tantalized Ghosts") who is tormented by pangs of hunger and thirst (that is, the ordinary normal being gives way to desires and covetousness, the punishment whereof in is Preta Loka. If karmic act be influenced by Anger, then Hell (Naraka) is man's portion. Acts done under the influence of stupidity, such as killing for sport or for the fun of it, in ignornace of the Karmic results, procures for the actor birth in the brute world). By these, my good wishes may all those beings who suffer from their desires strive not to studiously avoid them nor to give way to them but to let the knower take its own course and attain its own position. (That is, detaching the knowing mind from its objects, thus letting it attain its own level free of them. This is a profound counsel. Merely to run away will effect no cure. The same temptation will recur. To surrender is to lose the fight for the supreme end. Let the mind take up a position of detachment from the objects which attrack, and let it detachedly examine them, and the cause of their power over it and so attain dominence. May it realise the discriminating wisdom.
10. From the idea of something external there arises a subtle feeling of dread (as Brahminism says, fear arises from duality. He who becomes Brahman by realising unity is fearless) moves the knower at first faintly. As this feeling gains strength it resolves itself into a vague sense of enmity and the thought "it will kill me" arises. When this hatred produces its evil

Karma burning in hell becomes intense. By the power of the wishes of me the Buddha may all the sentient beings of the six lokas when they feel great anger arising in their minds learn neither to avoid it studiously nor to give way to it, but to leave it to itself and let the mind attain its own (exalted) position. May it attain the clear wisdom.

11. From pride which puffs up the mind is produced a feeling of contempt for others together with overweening self conceit. This leads to disputes and quarrels. When these have karmic fruit their is birth in the Deva world.(the state of a Deva though higher than that of a man is not the highest. The cause of birth in Devalöka is pride combined with good action, which, without pride would have produced better results, yet with pride confers only the lesser boon of Deva-life. A deva has a long life of pleasure, but, like human beings, is liable to death and fall when his stock of merit is exhausted. Towards the term of a Deva's life his beauty fades, his gardens wither, his fountains dry. Upon his wish-granting Kalpataru a blight falls. His companions and the Devis cannot approach him because of the stench his body commences to emit. Being endowed with Deva eye-sight, he sees where he will be reborn in a lower world. He is conscious that his stock of merits is spent, and no fresh stock acquired. He is conscious of the evil result of the life of thoughtless pleasure heaped over against him, leading him to rebirth on a less happy plane. He is weighed down with remorse. He foretastes the miseries of his fate in the comparison he makes of the pleasures of the Deva-life he is leaving behind and the miseries of the life to come. This is the fate and misery which prevails in Devaloka. Pride has taken them there, because

the Devas think themselves the highest and best. Pride is their obscuring passion. As like seeks the like, pride seeks a plane where pride prevails, that is Devaloka). From there they fall suffering hell after death. By the power of these my good wishes may all such as are given to pride know how to detach themselves from the knower. Thus letting the feeling alone and the mind attain its highest position. May it realize the truth that all is one that each is alike. (just as in Brahminism Brahman is the all-pervader. Here the real realisation is that of one of the five wisdoms)

12. From the propensity to regard oneself and others as different arises the desire to praise oneself and depreciate others, an act which leads to suffering. When the wish to vie and fight with others is strengthened there is birth in the Asura loka wherein beings are ever engaged in wounding and killing each other. This hurls them into hell. By the power of these good whishes of me the Buddha may all such beings cease to look upon each other as enemies. Let the feelings of enmity alone by itself and let the knower attain its own position. May it realise the unobstructed power of divine service (When a samsari becomes, by virtue of his merits, a saint, then he devotes himself to the service of sentient beings. Bodhisattvas and Buddhas are ever thus engaged. The acts they perform for the benefit of others are of four kinds, the peaceful, the nourishing, the overpowering or destructive.) Lack of intelligence and memory, indifference, distraction, being overpowered by sleep and forgetfulness, swoon and sloth are all forms of stupidity leading to birth in the brute world.. By the power of these good wishes of me the Buddha may the over-

-powering gloom of stupidity be dispelled and lit up by the rays of clear consciousness. May such attain the pure wisdom.(unrestricted by the finite forms of thought) All sentient beings of the three worlds are in their essence alike to me the Buddha. Unconsciousness (want of true knowledge or Avidya) is the cause of these errors. At present they are engaged in useless actions (such actions as do not tend to self development and emancipation). These six acts aforesaid are but dreams and delusions. I am the most ancient Buddha@ That my incarnations may control the beings of the six regions. By the power of the good wishes of me Samanta Bhadra may all sentient beings without exception attain Buddhahood in the Dharma Kaya.

@ (that is of the most remote past known to man; not the first in status or time. Both Nirvana and Sangsara being eternal there is no first Buddha in point of time).

M.M. MANGASARIAN.

WHAT IS CHRISTIAN SCIENCE?

1. If the teachings of Christian science prevail, there will come into prominence the type of mentality which will dispense with all forms of inquiry, and accept for authority the "say-so" of a book, a man, or a woman as all-sufficient and final. The passive mind easily becomes the plaything or instrument of every kind of imposture--political, economic or religious. Non-resistance will prove the death of free institutions. I am opposed to Christian Science because I am opposed to the least departure from sanity.

2. To work requires concentration and effort in a definite direction, and submission to rules

and regulations; while in play one is at liberty to follow one's own fancy, moving in any direction and at any speed one pleases.

3. Science and Health is a book consisting largely of extra-ordinary claims put forth with the most proving indifference to universally accepted rules of evidence, and with an abandon suggesting that of the steed who has thrown his rider. If her reader hask for proofs, she points to the authority of her name. Has she not received a revelation?

4. Writing was like play to her, and sentences and phrases flow copiously and swell into veritable flood in her pages, because what satisfied her was that she could say so much and not whether what she said had any basis in fact.

5. I am not accusing Mrs. Eddy of insincerity, but of mental indolence. Nothing, for example, but a distaste for work could account for her failure to verify her references in the following instances, or to supply to her readers the means of verifying them for themselves. She had to choose between making assertions and offering proofs, and she chose the easier of the two.

'I have healed Infidels" What were the names? Where did they live?

6. All these stories and illustrations fail completely to impress the inquiring reader, for the simple reason that Mrs. Eddy did not take the trouble to furnish the details to render her testimony admissible. In no court would such statements as "I heard a man say" or "It has been said by so and so" be accepted as evidence. Very likely the parients and the naturalists she writes about,(2) but she was too indolent to reach for her note-book, if she kept one. Again, only mental fatigue or sheer indolence can explain a statement like the following, from which all

important items which alone could give it force and effectiveness are left out.
7. The more Mrs. Eddy explained, the more she had to explain.
8. In comparison with such sophistry or make-believe, how refreshing is the intellectual honesty which sees true aims straight.
9. In a universe where mind is the sole reality and "Nothing is matter" our experience and our senses may testify to the contrary.
10. All metaphysicians before her have failed, to account for the origin of evil or mortal mind in a universe created and governed by the Infinite Goodness.
11. Men of science never try to suppress inquiry, because inquiry only helps to advance their cause which can advance in no other way. Science is investigation. Eddyism, on the other hand is dogma. Science is knowledge, verified, classified, and placed within the reach of all.
12. Is such a statement investigable? And what is not investigable lies outside the province of science. Neither Mrs. Eddy nor Joseph Smith can be put into the same class with Charles Darwin, who advances no propositions which forbids verification.
13. There are many people who reason correctly enough on some subject, but no other subjects they manifest a credulity beyond belief. The Moslem, for instance, uses his reason against the claims of every religion but his own. The Christian scientist argues like a trained logician against all alien cults, but when it is a question of his own faith he bids his reason to hush.
14. But the Christian Scientists who keep their eyes open to the evidences of the mind controlling the body, and know very well how to use these as arguments, shut their eyes completely to the

to the equally convincing proofs of the power of the body over the mind. Hunger or insomnia, if prolonged, will put the mind out of commission. Destroy the optic nerve, and all mentality in the world cannot make the eyes see. Stop the full flow of blood into the brain and every one of our mental faculties,--memory, perception, judgment, as well as the power of speech--becomes crippled, if not totally destroyed. Will any sensible person dispute these statements? The Christian scientists, who sees how many things the mind can do deliberately ignores the things it cannot do. Can mind, as Herbert Spencer asks, change a field sown in wheat into a cotton field? Can it make a horse into a cow? Can it transform an African into an Anglo-Saxon? Can it convert copper or brass into gold? Can we, by thinking, make the sun go round the earth?

15. Despite the frequent use of the word "mind" there are perhaps few people who use their minds less than Mrs. Eddy's disciples. Mental development is possible only where there is freedom to think, to experiment, to differ, and to originate. Are Christian Scientists permitted to think for themselves? Are they at liberty to differ or to express original views? To repeat or imitate another, very little mind is required.

16. In their Sunday meetings no original or even individual word is allowed. Of what use, then, is mentality to a consistent Christian Scientist?

17. And can a woman, claiming to be one with God, "unborn and undying" afford to confess that she has neither the time nor the ability to do all that is required of her?

18. She surrenders everything, and her metaphysices collapses like a bubble. It goes to prove that, despite her many bizaarred somersaults

in the air, she cannot avoid landing on matter. When Christian Science fails, there is still the surgeon with his "hypodermic injection" What an anti-climax! Like all metaphysicians, Mrs. Eddy emerges from the same door wherein she entered.
19. But a hope is not a proof, nor is assertion an argument. The only way to demonstrate a power is to submit to all the tests.
20. Was it not Horace Walpole who said, "The greater the imposition the greater the crowd?" What Mathew Arnold said of the multitude in England is true also of the American multitude: "Probably in no country is the multitude more unintelligent, more narrow-minded, and more passionate than in this. In no country is so much nonsense so firmly believed."
21. The faith habit is an older heredity, exerting upon us the accumulated force of thousands of years while the inquiry habit is too recent an acquisition to have much force upon the generality of peoples. That is another explanation of the greater popularity of dogma, which requires only belief, and the comparative unpopularity of a movement which demands individual thinking. "Superstition" as Goethe says, "is so intimately and anciently associated with man that it is one of the hardest things to get rid of." The only progress most people are capable of is to part with one superstition for another. The Pope is given up for Mrs. Eddy but the idea of an infallible teacher to tell us what to believe is not outgrown.
22. "I do not know what kind of reasoning led her to say: "To abolish marriage and maintain generation is possible in Christian Science" Are not such foolish asdwell as mischievous doctrines a menace to the community? Can a man, can a woman, believe in such absurdities without becoming unbalanced mentally sooner or later?

23. Another resemblance between Luther and Mrs. Eddy is to be found in their common contempt for human science. To Luther the intellect was the devil's bride. When he used stronger language he denounced reason as a whore. He had no use for the universities, and prayed to see them pulvarised. More than once he boasted openly that there was not a dogma of Christianity that did not offend human reason.
24. Darkness cannot be overcome with jargon. To conquer we need the weapons of Prometheus--knowledge and courage!

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PAUL YEVTIC.

"KARMA AND REINCARNATION"

1. To know the ultimate ground of the universe and man was the task of the Indian sage. The eternal question was: Why, by what means, from what substance, has all this world originated. And in one of the Puranas Bhagavati answers shortly: I am alone, this Eternal All, and there is none other. Empirical truth, differing from ontological does not mean a fixed standard of thinking, but a continual growth and change of human reasoning.
2. For may Christians of to-day the universe is a pitch of architectural work which was done once for ever. But the recurring wheel of life always tends to correct our mistaken views on life, giving us a warning as to what is reality. Indian thought was always inclined to conceive the universe as an organic whole, stretching into infinity. In its metaphysics the word beginning and end rarely occur.
3. For according to Sankara, if one recognized the identity of one's own soul with Brahman, considering the manifested world as maya, there was no need for developing doctrines of either samsara or karma, or of any kind of future exist-

ence; because all these problems have value for this world of existence; because all these problems have value for this world of phenomena, whereas to those who have overcome maya, there was no need for any discussion and logical discourse.

4. The Buddhists, by resolving living beings into into a number of elements called Dhamma, which possessed no permanent existence, destroyed individuality as a conscious factor, which the sum total of these elements. Buddha knew perfectly well, that the root of karma lies in our Egoic consciousness which is based on craving.

5. Good and bad actions yield fruits, not at the moment when they are done, but at some future time (yipakaphala.) Our present life is the reflection of past actions. In this manner, past experience is actually possessed, whereas future experience is virtually in the present time.

6. How does karma operate in a conscious agent, if conceived, in the sense of cause consequence? Buddha answers: I say bhikkus, that volition (cetana) is karma; when we have willed, then we make Karma by deed, word or thought.

7. Karma, as a cosmical law rules supreme, both gods and men, and there is no means of escaping it its consequences. The law of karma is applied to universal activity, including purely physical agencies up till the minutest details.

8. In Suttanipata, one of the oldest Buddhist writings, we are told: For one's deeds are not lost, they will surely come back to you,, their master will meet them, the fool who commits sin will feel the pain himself.

9. According to Abhidhamattha Sangaha (compendium of Philosophy) there are four classes of karma, each class being divided into four groups. From the aspect of phala, there are four kinds of of action: (a) that which is dark with dark re-

sults; (b) that which is bright with bright results; (c) that which is mixed with mexed results; and (d) with neither kind of result and which conduces to the destruction of karma, which refers to the fourfold Path-knowledge.

According to the functioning, Karma is threefold: karma affecting body, speech and mind. The root of all three is volition. Mental karma is the germ of all three.

10. God's grace, combined with bhakti on the part of the devotee, does not annul the fundamental teaching of the Gita concerning karma, as Hopkins asserts, since grace implies the opportunity offered to the human being in the present moment, of which man is the master and may choose, without abregating the theory of karma in its completeness.

11. Every calamity is the direct result of some evil acting in former life.

12. One important idea creeps continually into the Epic, i.e., that his world is the realm of the experiencing of karma, and is the central conception underlying the whole karma doctrine.

13. The world appearance is simply a phenomenon of the mind, for it is never experienced apart from the mind when the mind is naught i.e, in the state of samadhi.

14. In the fourth chapter Gaudapada emphasises, the identity of cause and effect . Those who regard the cause as the effect in potential form admit the transformation of the cause into effect, consequently the cause itself cannot be considered as unproduced. How can it be eternal and yet changing? If is be said that the effect is inseparable from the cause, the effect ought to be unproduced as the cause, or vice versa; if we assume that the cause is inseparable from the effect, then the cause is not permanent. Nor can we say that effect is cause of the cause, because that would imply a

beginning and this would lead us to the regressus ad infinitum of cause and effect. The cause being produced, the effect will not be definite; and an indefinite cause cannot produce any effect. Therefore the reply must be in the theory of non-evolution and consequently non-existence of causality.

16. So long as one thinks of cause and effect, one has to suffer the wheel of existence, samsara, but when the notion ceases, one is liberated from illusion. All things are regarded as existing relatively, because nothing endures. Since nothing whatever is produced originally, there cannot be any destruction. Whether things exist or do not exist, whether they are existent and non-existent at the same time, or neither existent nor non-existent, these are thought meant for fools. Such is the final answer of Gaudapada to all those who are deluded by the phenomenal.

16. Viewed from this angle, the effect pre-exists in the cause, though undeveloped, since all production is merely the development of the latent possibilities contained in the agent. The cause must virtually exist in the very moment of the production of an effect, otherwise a thing could not be produced. At the same time, this production, or manifestation of latent qualities does not affect the cause in any way because that effect does not form part of the nature of the cause, the latter being all the time identical with itself. For Vedanta the causation implies simultaneity of happening, rather than succession. The same must logically apply to individuals. All modifications of an individual soul are co-existent in a transcendental time, as well as in ordinary time, which is a succession of innumerable moments, which determine each other in a certain logical causal sequence, since time represents a special modality of succession.

17. It is not Atman which passes from one state to another in successive planes of existence, but elements which make up personality. From the metaphysical standpoint there is simultaneity of all states of existence.
18. Shankara admits both transmigration of souls into lower animals and reincarnation in its general sense, the former being due to sinful deeds which wipe out consciousness of any previous life as a human being. In proportion to the faults, transmigration may ensue from the highest state downwards to the lowest state of inanimate matter.
19. The karmic effects cannot be exhausted in the course of a single life; the works whose maturing is effected build up the present state of existence; others wait for opportunity, place, time and operative causes in order to be effected. The causes in a new embodied existence are not absent even in the case of one who has been performing good deeds, since there is always a remainder of works, due to the unextinguished desire, which potentially exist and at a given moment, under coordinated causal influences, will inevitably produce the actual effects.
20. Karma is efficient cause for the origination of a new body, since there is always a remainder of works, serving as a driving force for reincarnation. The soul devoid of true knowledge, having taken its abodė in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and being impelled by the works, migrates into a new body.
21. The Sun is spoken of as being the place which is reached by a man going to final release.
22. All animals follow their previous karma; in this world, through the influence of evil deeds, although formerly men, they become degraded and

are born as animals. When the evil karma becomes exhausted by suffering they reach the human state, and if they violate the moral law, they are reborn as animals. Thus, over and over again, whirled through repeated births and deaths, they wander about like a piece of wood upon the waves of the ocean.

23. While there exist higher and lower births owing to desire the effectiveness of the Mosa-sastra depends upon arising of desirelessness. When one arrives at disgust (for the world) the world through the enjoyment of pleasure and pain he attains desirelessness accompanied with discernment of his own self. Then, after a certain number of births, he obtains jnanayoga; through efforts in listening and the like, liberation is the established state in his soul.

24. Complete liberation which is achieved by an intense self-realisation is that he is non-different from paramatman.

25. The Surya Gita proceeds to describe the four-fold birth to which all living creatures are subject, i.e. jivaja, birth in the womb as men and mammàls, andaja birth from the egg, birds and reptiles, fishes and insects and which comprises two classing of being, (a) lower animals which are chiefly in the waters, and (b) plants, which are born chiefly by germination in the earth. Having created the universe he himself entered into it. The creation of the universe is the result of prarabdhakarma, that is to say of causes created in previous cycles of existence. The (Isa) Lord is only the highest of all individuals; he was previously in the state of jiva, and he became Lord only through knowledge, worship and works. The god who was placed in charge over a previous kalpa, rejected his own maya and reached the highest state, after his commenced karma had been exhausted.

Though the creator is involved in activity through the three-fold karma (creation, preservation and dissolution of the universe), he is not subject to the law of karma, since it is understood that he is equal to the Jivanmuktas (those who are free, but still retain a physical body).
26. To such a Creator the act of dissolution is like a state of deep sleep.
27. Though formerly he was an individual soul because of his knowledge of Brahman and Atman and because of his omniscience, he is different from Jiva. Isvara has not three karmas, for Karma and he hold a special cosmic function. On the conclusion of his function as Isa, he will become Brahma. How can there be an error in this meaning established in Vedanta?
28. Even if Isa has karma, he is able to get rid of it, since he is not subject to accumulated and future karma and is omniscient.
29. At the time of pralaya, though inactive like one who sleeps he possesses the germ of adhyasa (ascription of phenomenal body) in himself, by which he becomes again active in creation.
30. Just a man who in the darkness mistakes a pillar for a thief, so the man deluded by nescience mistakes Isvara for Parabrahma. Iswara is not real in the sight of him who is a seeker for liberation.
31. Release is achieved by way of evolution as the grub develops into a bee.
32. Brahma, Isa, and Jiva, who are said to be subjects of action are involved in karma through knowledge maya, and ignorance respectively.
33. If a yogin is indifferent towards all things,

and has pleasance in his own soul, what profits it him whether thousands of acts of worship are paid to him or not? Having left aside all personal interest and right of ownership in the body and other like evolutes, by constant states of evolution he becomes radiant purely composed of soul.
34. Primordial karma is said to be the cause of the stage. The existence of the cosmos is conceived in the sense of apakatastasis, or recurrence of an identical state of things.
35. Parabrahma is beyond karma of any kind, whereas Isvara or the creator is bound by the karma of creation.
36. We often put problems in a wrong way, that is, instead of looking to ourselves, to our own self, to find an answer and satisfaction regarding existence, we are advised and taught to look into some distant and indeterminate Being, who assumes at times national characteristics. Whether we conceive God in a patheistic deistic or monistic way, is less important than doing things in a right way. For a Hindu transmigration and karma means that a common bond embraces all humanity from the beginning, that reincarnation is countless repetition of our egoic consciousness, which always strives through much suffering and pain to achieve finally that primeval unity of Being. A living ego is connected directly with all past and future generations, with all lives in the past and in the future. A man does not belong to himself, but to the whole and cannot be imagined apart from the whole. There is no chance in Indian conception. The undeserved, the absurd happens to no human beings. To every one happens with mathematical precision what is due to him, down to the most insignificant occurrence of daily life. Each one incurs only danger that is specifically for him. Everything that happens to him, is, as it were, a messenger of the divine.

PROF. SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA.

'INDIAN IDEALISM'.

1.By spirit we ordinarily mean "self". Do mind and self refer to the same identical (conceptually and numerically) entity? Or is the mind some other entity which stands in some separable or inseparable relation to itself? The same question might be asked with regard to the relation between mind and the states, by which term I include the sense perceptions, images, thought, willing and feelings. Until it is proved that the self or the spirit has the same constituents as the mind or the states, anything which may have the latter for its constituents could not be called spiritual, if the word spiritual means "composed of spirit or spirits." This remark would also apply to any supposition which may regard the spirits as simple entities having no constituent parts. Could we, again, call reality spiritual in a theory which did not believe in the ultimate reality of spirits or self, mind or any of the states? Could we call any reality which is supposed to transcend the spirits (selves or minds whatever they mean) spiritual? Thus Dr.McTaggart believes that the universe is composed only of spirits or selves and these have perceptions as their parts; but Mr. Bradley thinks that the selves are not ultimately real but the reality is the whole which contains along with other things the selves as elements. The nature of this whole is that it is Experience, but this experience is very different from all that we ordinarily mean by experience. It does not belong to any person and is neither perception, feeling nor thought merged and become transfused. Whatever this may be, this is neither spirit nor mind nor anything mental.

2. Thus Kant in distinguishing other forms of idealism (mainly Berkelean) from his own, says in his Prolegomena: Idealism consists in the asser-

tion that there exist none but the thinking entities; the other things we think we perceive in intuition being only presentations of the thinking entity to which no object outside the latter can be found to correspond. I say, on the contrary things are given as object discoverable by our senses external to us but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing, we know only their phenomena, i.e., the presentations they produce in us as they affect our senses. I therefore certainly admit that there are objects outside us, that is, things, which although they are wholly unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we cognize through presentations, obtained by means of t their influence on our sensibility.

3. For the existence of a thing which appears is not thereby abolished as with real idealims, but it is only shown that we cannot recognize it as it is in itself through the senses. What is by me termed idealism does not touch the existence of things (the double of the same being what properly constitutes idealism in the opposite sense) for to doubt them has never entered my head.

4. Our perceptions of the external world cannot give us the assurance that its nature is ultimately such as are revealed by them, i.e. our perceptions are in some sense illusory. This "same sense" is of course somewhat different with different idealists.

5. The reality is neither subjective nor objective, but is such that both the subject and object derive their very existence from it.

6. Just as one element of light manifests itself in diverse colours in this world, so does this one being who abides as an inner essence of all manifests itself in all outward forms; just as the one sun remains untouched by all the defects of the eyes of those who perceive it, so it is also remaining untouched by the sorrows and afflictions

of all beings. It remains in itself as one self-controlled, self-centred entity, and yet it manifests itself in diverse forms as the universal principle of all beings, and those only that can perceive it within their own selves can attain the real bliss. It is the one eternal among all transient things, one conscious principle amongst all living beings. It is undefinable, for there is no way of cognising it through ordinary means. No sun sheds its light on it, no moon, no stars; the lightning and the fire lose all their shiny character before it, because it is through the light of this great illumination that everything else derives its light.

7. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist and the Buddha is represented as saying: "When one says 'I' what he does is that he refers either to all the elements combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I' just as one could not say the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the colour so one could not say that the sense-data was 'I' or that the feeling was 'I' or that any of the other elements composing an individual "I am." What people perceived in themselves when they said that they perceived their selves was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The Upanishads reveal through them the dawn of an experience of an immutable reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes, but Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and false knowledge.

8. Nagarjuna tried to prove the unsubstantiality and essencelessness of all concepts and of all appearances.

9. We shall also see how this doctrine of the unsubstantiality of all elements and their reduction to mere phenomenal appearances made it easy for many thinkers who probably had a Brahmanic training or grounding in the Upanisads, to

reduce these elements into mere mental ideas and to supplement them with permanent nucleus as pure consciousness.

9. The Madhyamika system of Nagarjuna holds that there is nothing which has an essence or nature of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and the fire are the results of combination of many conditions; what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the single nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be discovered which stands independently by itself we cannot saythat it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own we cannot affirm the essence of other things of it. If we cannot affirm anything positive of anything we cannot consequently assert anything negative of anything. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he may be said to have faith in negation, but in reality since we cannot speak of anything as positive we cannot speak of anything as negative either. It may be objected that we nevertheless perceive things and processes going on. To this the Madhyamika reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywere nor goes anywhere and that which appears as destroyed alsodoes not come from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and so the process of change can be affirmed of beings either in their originations or in their destruction. It cannot be that when the second moment

arose the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it is not the same as the second, and there was no so-called cause-effect relation. In fact, there being no relation between the two the temporal determination as prior and posterior is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is invalid, for there is neither self nor the so-called psychological elements. If the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process, for that would suppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment, which is inconceivable. But then the question may arise that if there is no process and no cycle of worldly existence, what is then the nirvana? Nirvana, according to the Madhyamika theory, is the absence of the essence of all phenomena which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced. In Nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirvana, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed. Nirvana is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow. It cannot therefore, be designated either as positive or as negative, for these conceptions only belong to the phenomena. In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge of the phenomena having ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings.

The Madhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real views apart. If from the phenomenal view things are admitted to be as they are perceived, all the relations are also to be conceived as they are perceived. Thus while Dinnaga urges that a thing is what it is itself, Dhandrakirti, a follower of Nagarjuna, holds that since relations are also perceived to be true, the real nature of things need not be svalakshana, the relational aspect of things are as much true as the

unrelational as well. Phenomenal substances exist as well as their qualities. "The thing in itself" says Nagarjuna "is as much a relative concept at all relational things that are popularly perceived to be true;" that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing-in-itself. Chandrakirti thus does not thing that any good can be done by criticising the realistic logic of the Naiyayikas. So far as the popular perceptions or conceptions go the Nyaya logic is quite competent to deal with them and to give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality or order which is true for the man in the street and on which all o linguistic and other usages are based. It is, therefore, useless to define valid perception as being only the unique thing-in-itself and to discard all associations of quality or relations as being extraneous and invalid. Such a definition is also relative and therefore false. Aryavada, another follower of Nagarjuna says, that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, for it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality or unreality. Thus there is no ultimate thesis in Nagarjuna. It is, therefore, neither idealism nor realism nor absolutism, but blank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenal world as it is but which would not, for a moment, tolerate any kind of essence, ground or reality behind it.

10. The soul as bhutatatha means the oneness of the totality of things, i.e. that in which all appearances ultimately merge and from which they have all come into the so-called being. Its essential nature is uncreative and eternal. All things, simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives, appear in their objective and individuated forms.

If we could overcome this, our integrated history of past experiences, otherwise called vasana or smriti, the essence of all individuation and plurality, would disappear and there would be no trace of the world of objects.

11. The "thatness" of reality has not attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in silence as the mere "that". Since you understand that the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, you have the stage of 'thatness'. This bhutatatha is neither that which is existent nor that which is non-existent, not that which is not at once existent and non-existent.

12. All things in the phenomenal world are but reflections in the true light, so that they neither pass out of it nor enter into it and they neither disappear nor destroyed. It is, however, dissociated from the mind which associates itself with birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal calm and immutable. This truth again is such that it transforms itself, wherever conditions are favourable, in the form of tathagata or in some other forms, in order that all beings may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

13. The nirvana philosophy is not nothingness, but tathata or "thatness" in its purity, unassociated with any kind of disturbance which produces all the diversities of experience. The main idea of this tathata philosophy seems to be that this transcendent thatness is at once a quitessence of all thought and activity; as avidya veils it or perfumes it in the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure thatness also perfumes avidya there is a striving for the good as well.

14. But he forgets that as a Buddhist he exposes himself to the ultimate truth. We have seen that in the Upanishads the word Avidya is used merely in the sense of ignorance of the superior philosophy. But the Buddha uses the term as the primary notion in the twelvefold link of causation. But here also avidya is only a term in a evolving series, such that when there is the avidya there are the Samharas which represent the past deeds; and there being avidya and Samharas in the past life.

15. I may now turn to the idealism of the Lankavatarasutra. According to this book, the author of which is unknown to usm all the dharmas or phenomenal entities are but imaginary constructions of the human mind. There is no motion in the so-called external world as we suppose, for no such world exists. We construct it ourselves and then we ourselves are deluded that it exists by itself. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, that which holds the perceptions, and that which orders them by imaginary construction. The two functions, however, mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished. These functions are said to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them in relation to the world of appearances. All sense-knowledge can be stopped when the diverse unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth as is but a creation of maya, a miragem or a dream.

16. All phenomena, both being and non-being, are illusory. When we look deeply into them we find that there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even all negations for they are also appearances. This would make the ultimate truth positive; but this is not so, for it is that in which the positive and the negative are

are one and the same. Such a state, which is complete in itself and has no name and no substance, is described in the Lankavatarasutra as "thatness". This state is also described in another place in the Lankatarasutra as voidness, which is one and has no origination and no essence.

17. The things in their ultimate nature possess no signs of distinction and as such there is no transformation, destruction or distinction of any kind; all things in their essence are but the one soul for which the name tathata or "thatness" is a convenient symbol. All words and expressions are nothing but representations projected froward by our subjective self and are not therefore realities. It is in this sense that the ultimate reality is to beregarded as unspeakable.

18. When this ultimate reality is described as negation, what is meant is that it is free from all signs of distinction existing among phenomenal objects. So in one sense this ultimate reality may be called that which is neither existent (in the popular sense in which all the diverse phenomenal appearances are existent) nor that which is non-existent (because it is the ground, the being and the essense of all things and in its own nature as such all things are identical with it as this alone forms their reality).

19. In refuting the false interpretations of the Mahayana doctrine Asvaghosha says that hearing from the Mahayana-Sutra that the Tathagatagarbha is described as perfectly transquil, there are ignorant people who think that the nature of the tathagatagarbha is eternal and omnipresent in the same sense as space is regarded as eternal and omnipresent. But this cannot be, for, where there is the perception of space there is side by side a perception of a variety of things in contrdistinction to which space is spoken of as if

existing independently, for space exists only in relation to our particularising consciousness. Again, he points out that hearing from the Mahayana-Sutras that all things in the world are perfect emtiness (atyanta sunyata), that even Nirvana or suchness is also perfect emptiness and is devoid of all contents. But this cannot be for the ultimate reality is not a nothing, but holds within itself all infinite qualities which make up its true nature. He again points out that hearing from the sutras that the tathagatagarbha holds with it all the qualities which do not suffer any increase or dimunition in it, it is held by ignorant people that in the tathagatagarbha, there is an inherent and fundamental distinction such as is found between object and subject or matter and mind. But this cannot be, for the ultimate reality is devoid of all distinctions. Then again, he points out that hearing from the sutras that even all impure and undefiled and defiled things in the world are produced from the tathagatagarbha, and that the things of the world are not different from it, it is held by ignorant people that this ultimate reality contains within it all objects of the world in their varied and pluralistic nature. But this cannot be, for the so-called pluralities of the world have no self-existence and are simply illusory, and therefore in a way the ultimate reality is wholly untouched by them. He therefore points out that there are many Buddhists who think that the Buddha taught the doctrine of a non-personal atman as separate from the psychological clusters or skandhas which are momentary, but the true point of view is that all these psychological clusters are neither created nor annihilated. They are in their ultimate reality the essence, the nirvana, and there is no impersonal atman outside them which has to be achieved by our efforts. As seen

as we free ourselves from our particularising tendencies we find that matter, mind, intelligence, consciousness, being and non-being, are all but relative terms, which in their apparent nature are inexplicable and which in their inner essence are identical with the ultimate reality, the "thatness". The "thatness" alone, therefore, is the ultimate reality (tattva) and this reality is absolutely beyond the realm of relations. All so-called illusory phenomena are in truth from the beginning whatthey were, and their essence is nothing but the one soul, the ultimate reality; and though ordinary people may regard this world of plurality to be true and real, wise persons always consider it to have an appearance only originating from the particularising consciousness of our minds, whereas in their ultimate essence they have but one reality, the "thatness." We now see that the doctrine of Asvaghosha admits one reality as ultimate, absolute and true; all the rest are mere phenomena, which though false in all their appearances as many are yet identical in their ultimate essence with this absolute, which for want of specification is signified by the term thatness. 20. All that can be said of the phenomena is that there is nothing behind them and that all doctrines of causation and all existence are meaningless and inexplicable. All things are neither nonexistent or existent, neither created nor destructible, neither positive nor negative. There is no movement anywhere. No one hears anything nor is anything heard, no one sees anything nor is anything seen. Just as an image in the mirror can neither be said to have been originated nor destroyed neither existent nor non-existent, but is merely illusory perseption, so is this entire world. Thus in one passage it is said that a Brahmin spoke to a Buddha that everything was produced, and the Buddha replied that this was a popular view. The Brahmin

then said that nothing is produced, and the Buddha replied that this is the second popular view. Then when the Brahmin said that everything is non-eternal or everything is eternal or everything can be produced or nothing can be produced, the Buddha replied that these are all popular views. The Buddha further said that the notion of oneness, otherness, togetherness and the notion of neither the one nor the other, the notion that everything is a modification, that there is something which is not a modification, that there is self or that there is not a self, that there is this world or there is not this outer world, that there is emancipation or that there is no emancipation, that everything is momentary, all these are mere popular views. The Buddha said that he did not believe in the doctrine of causes nor in the doctrine that there are no causes. He could not grasp these views because they are obsessed with the notion of reality, the notion of a self and its object and the notion of diverse relations.

21. One of the fundamental tenets of idealism is the denial of relations. Thus Bradley, in arguing that if there are relations there must be qualities between which they are held, says that the situation of relations with regard to qualities is incomprehensible. If the relation is, and if so, they cease to be qualities and their relation is non-entity. But if it is something to them, then clearly that would require a new communication relation. The relation cannot be an adjective to one or both of the terms, being something itself, if it does not bear a relation to the terms, how can it at all be anything to them? The introduction of a separate relation to relate the relations would land us in the infinite regress. In this way it is difficult to determine how relations can stand towards the qualities which they are supposed to relate. Bradley's logic ultimately

ends in the denial of all relations and in the affirmation of the one single, indivisible, timeless, real absolute: and thr philosophy of Asvaghosha reminds us of such an absolute wherein all distinctions have vanished which does not consist of soul or thought or will but which at the same time forms the internal essence of them all in their non-distinctive and identical character. What this absolute is would always remain absolutely unpredicable, and this it true both in Asvaghosha and in Bradley.

22. Just as in dreams on experiences different objects in different places and times without there being any real existence of them in those forms, places or times, or as in dreams many people are dreamt of as coming together and performing various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as creations of the principle of intelligence. All that we know as subjective or objective are mere transformations of knowledge, and their essential reality is to be sought in their intrinsic nature as pure knowledge. All the diversity and the multiplicity of the world, having no substantial nature or reality in their apparent aspects as materiality, should be regarded as false. They are all but transformations of pure knowledge in their essential nature, and reality is that in which they are all true and real. The perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world of matter cannot be trusted.

23. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are perceived as if existing outside, but all of them are but illusory creations. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only. External objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (viz. before they were perceived, and when they begin to

to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That ehich is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association of a perceiver or soul-faculties.

24. The "Yogavasishta" holds that the world as such never existed in the pastm nor exists now nor will exist hereafter, so it has no production or destruction in any real sense. But there is the appearance and its genesis has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is indefinite and indescribable, pure extinction or pure intelligence, and remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformation. Out of the first moment of this entity arises ego, which in spite of its appearance is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements like waves on the air there springs forth the entire world-appearance. That which appears before us is due to the imagination of the mind, like dreams in a fairy-land. There is nothing else except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all.-- they are all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless, mental creations of the ultimate entity. The mind again, by those creations everything springs forth in appearance has no proper form, and it is merely a name, nothingless.

25. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas, thought, this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting point having no actual reality . For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them just as one cannot separate liquidity from water. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance are produced though these

dreams and manas are but the same and it is impossible to distinguish between them. It is the perceiver which appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions which appear as the perceiver and the perceived.

26. Though during the continuance of the dreams, they appear to be real they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conceptions is such that though it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as its other and as diversified by space, time, action and substance. The difference between the ordinary wakeful state and the dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as being associated with permanent convictions, where as the latter is generally thought of as having no permanent basis. Any experience, which is consistent and coherent, comes to be regarded as permanent, whereas if even our waking conceptions come to be regarded as incoherent they lose their validity as representing permanent objects, and our faith in them is shaken.

27.As dreams are nothing but mere awareness without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of waking consciousness. The world has thus no independent substance but is mere cognition and mere awareness.

28. All beings are pure consciousness and all appearances are imposed on it, as entities which are expressed by references to it, and apart from which they have no conceivable status or meaning. This is so, not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object-forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable forms of maya, which is not "being" but dependent on "being"; but they can only be

expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world-objects with dream-objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of maya popularly intelligible; and this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position. In the accounts of the Vedantic theory of perception, according to the Vivarana school, we find that the mind (antahkarana) has different functions (vritti) and according to them it has different names, such as Citta (as the basis of memory), buddhi (as synthetical understanding), samsaya (doubt), manas (attention) and ahankara (ego. The antahkarana, thus is considered as a unity of these and other functions.

VIJNANA BHIKSHU'S YOGASARA-SANGRAHA: The fifth embellishment (Parikarma) is the Contemplation of the cognition either of dream or of deep sleep. When the Agent thinks of his waking cognitions as those of a dream,--both being equally hiders of he real form (of Self) and both equally having impermanent (transitory) objects for their subjects,--then the Mind gains its true character and becomes dispassioned and (hence) tranquil. It is for this reason that all worldly phenomena (prapancha) is compared to a dream in all Srutis and Smritis--by such passages as--"know this (world) to be a lengthy dream". Similarly when the Agent looks upon waking persons as on those in deep sleep--because both of them equally have (the true character of the Spirit) hidden from them, and because the waking person has only interrupted glimpses of the world just as one in deep sleep has dreams at intervals also--then the mind loses all attachment to the operations of both these states, thus regaining its true character and hence becoming tranquil. Says the Smriti

ON GAUDAPADA AND GOVINDA.

(Extract from "THE AGE OF SHANKARA" a book in English, published in Madras by an Indian author: now out of print).

The next great teacher in regular succession after Suka Munindra in the school of Vedanta Philosophy founded by Badarayana was the great scholar Gaudapadacharya spoken of above. He is said to have originally belonged to the Dravidian country (Southern India) and to have learnt the Mahabhashya the great commentary on Panini's Ashtadhyayi by Patanjali from the lips of the great sage himself, at Pundarikapura along with 999 other pupils who had come down to that sacred city from different parts of India to learn that Great Commentary on Sanskrit Grammar.

Gaudapada went forth in search of a guru to secure spiritual happiness. He wended his way into the extreme north of India among the Himalayas, and became a disciple of Suka Yogindra, son of Badarayana at Badarikasrama. There he learnt the Vedanta Sutras from his Guru and Paramaguru, with whom he spent the remaining portion of his life-time as a Sannyasin of the order of Paramahamsa Parivrajakacharya, refuting with the Buddhists and Jains and teaching his Advaita interpretations of the Vedanta to his numerous disciples who resorted to him for instruction. As he came from the Dravida country, he was generally known in the North under the name of Dravidacharya. He is said to have written commentaries on several important works relating to Hindu Philosophy, especially on the Vedanta wherein he was considered the greatest authority by all his contemporaries. Even in Sankhya Philosophy Gaudapada was considered such a great authority by his contemporaries like Prasastapadacharya and Udotakaracharya that his commentary on Isvarakrishna's Sankhyakarika was selected and trans-

lated into Chinese so early as the reign of the Chang Dynasty.

The chief among the disciples of, and one in regular succession of Vedantic teachers from Gaudapadacharya was Govinda Yogin. This Govinda Yogin or Govinda Bhagavatpada as Sankara uniformly calles him in his works was no other person that Chandra Sarman or Chandracharya, the renowned grammarian who is said to have had the special fortune of preserving to the world Patanjali's Mahabhashya on Panini's Ashtadhyayi, as amplified by Katyayana's Vartika, as we possess it at present. The traditions current in different parts of India as well as the written account that are recorded in Patanjali-Vijaya Gaudapadollasa, and Harimisriya, inform us that he was a learned Brahmana of Prachyadesa, that he was well-versed in the Vaidika and Laukika literatures of his day, that he had the special fortune of learning the Mahabhashya from Gaudapadacharya, one of the direct disciples of the great sage Patanjali, that he settled at Ujjain and married four wives, one from each of the four castes, and became the father of four sons who all became renowned in Indian Literature under the names of Bhartrihari, Vikramaditya, Batti, and Vararuchi, that he taught the Mahabhashya as we have it at present to his numerous disciples who propagated the same in the world, that he was afterwards initiated into the mysteries of the Vedanta Philosophy by that very great scholar Sri Gaudapadacharya, who had become the disciple of Sri Suka Yogindra, son of Sri Badarayana, the founder of the Vedanta school of Philosophy, that he thereupon renounced the world and became a Sannyasin of the order of Paramahamsa Parivrajakacharya initiated by his Paramaguru under the name of Govinda

Muni and that he lived partly at Badarikasrama on the Himalayas, where his teacher, great teacher and great-great teached lived, learning the Vedanta from their lips, and partly at Amarakanta on the bank of the Narmada near Ujjain teaching the Vedanta to his disciples in turn.

It was to this great teacher Sri Govinda Yogin that Sankara was ordained to go to get himself formally initiated in Sannyasa which he had already practically assumed at Kalati when he emerged from the river Churni with his famous Nirvana-Panchaka. Though not such a great scholar and writer as his Guru (Sri Gaudapadacharya), Govinda Bhagavatpada was like his Paramaguru (Sri Suka Yogindra) a born Siddha and a great Yogin. Besides the Mahabhashya which is is said to have reproduced in its present shape, only three other works--Yoga-Taravali, Advaitanubhuti and Brahmamrita-Varshini--are ascribed to him, but even these three works are sometimes ascribed to Sankara himself. Ordained by Lord Narayana, the chief Deity at Badarikasrama, who is likewise said to have appeared to Govinda Bhagavatpada in one of his yogic visions and ordered by Gaudapada, his own Guru, he went out in search of Sankara and was waiting for his arrival in his own hermitage on the bank of the Narmada. Sankara after wandering for nearly a year in search of his appointed Guru, arrived with his co-student and disciple Vishnu Sarman on the bank of Narmada, and met Sri Govinda Yogin, by a happy coincidence, in his own hermitage, surrounded by his illustrious son Bhartihari and his disciples. Both the teacher and the pupil had their eyes filled with tears of joy at this unlooked-for meeting; and they rejoiced at the respective commands that thus brought them together. Sankara gladly chose Govinda Yogin as his holy teacher, and the latter was most happy to accept the former as his worthy pupil. Though the teacher felt himself inferior to the people,

yet Govinda Bhagavatpada obeyed the Lord's command by making Sankara go through the formalities needed for becoming a full ascetic (krama-sanyassin). In this way, we are told by Chitsukhacharya, Sankara sat at the feet of his holy master for nearly two years and learnt from him almost all the important works on the Vedanta and other philosophies current in his days. It was at this period that Sankara composed his Narmadashtaka and many of his minor poems and Prakaranas such as Pratas-Smarana, Sadhana-Panchaka, Yati-ny Panchaka, Vakya-Vritti, Viveka-Chudamani, Dasa-Sloki, Atmanata Viveka, Maya-Vivarana, Ekadasottara-sata-Vakya-Grantha, Panchikarana (Pranava-Bhashya) Bala-Bodhini, and Raja-Yoga-Bhashya.

Among the various works taught to Sankara by his Guru, none impressed him so much as the Karikas of Sri Gaudapadacharya; he found in them, in a nut-shell as it were, the principles of Vedanta Philosophy which he afterwards so ably and elaborately worked out into his own Advaita Darsana and he at once expressed his desire to see his Paramaguru and to request his permission to write an elaborate commentary on the same. Govinda Bhagavatpada was so much pleased with the suggestion that he at once took his worthy disciple to his Guru, Sri Gaudapadacharya at Badarikasrama on the Himalayas. Sankara was extremely delighted to see his Paramaguru who was then said to have been 120 years old, engaged in Brahmanishta and simply waiting for the arrival of his young Prasishya who was to establish the Advaita Philosophy started by him and by his guru. On being introduced by Govinda Bhagavatpada, Sankara went and prostrated himself before the feet of his Paramaguru and Gaudapada was most happy to welcome him as one of his own disciples in future and offered to teach him all he knew. Sankara studied directly

under Gaudapada for four years, composing many of his most important minor works on the Vedanta such as Shatpadi, Hari-stuti, Sata-sloki (Vedanta-Kesari), Svatma-Nirupana, Paramatha-Sara-Sangraha, and Praudhanubhuti Prakarana. On one of these days Sankara obtained the desired permission to write a commentary on his Paramaguru's Mandukyopanishad-Karikas, and accordingly wrote his famous Bhashya on the same as if preparatory to his Bhashyas on the Prasthanatraya which he was soon ordained to write. Gaudapada was so much pleased with his Mandukyopanishad-Karika-Bhashya that he requested him to write similar commentaries on the Vedanta-Prasthana-Traya and thereby establish the supremacy of the Advaita school of Vedanta Philosophy in the world for all time to come.

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(art.) PAUL POPENOE. (in Scient. American)
YOUR INFERIORITY COMPLEX. Mag)

1. Everyone starts life with feelings both of inferiority and superiority.
2. During the process of development, these strong but contradictory feelings are gradually modified, tempered and fused into a normal outlook on the world in which the individual recognizes both his own capacities and his own limitations, profits by both, and reaches a balance which represents emotional maturity, good mental hygiene--in a word sanity.
3. Many however never attain this balance. They are overweighted in one direction, or the other. They become the victims of complexes.
4. A complex is merely a group of related ideas strongly coloured by emotion, because of this emotional tone, it has the tendency to attract to itself and incorporate in itself all sorts of other and unrelated ideas.
5. The greater a man is, the more likely is he to be modest and genuinely humble, as seen almost universally among the great men of science.

6. The man with a superiority complex is therefore really a bright boy who retains the infant's egocentricity, has not grown up enough to recognize his own limitations, and will never be, emotionally, anything more than a precocious and somewhat spoiled dhild.

7. The inferiority complex has a perfectly natural basis in the experience of childhood, and everyone carried through life what might be called a normal inferiority complex, which is largely responsible for his achievements. He works to accomplish something.

8. The name (inferiority complex) is usually reserved for an abnormal or pathological state which (due to the tendency of the complex to draw unrelated ideas into itself) leads the individual to depreciate himself, to become unduly sensitive, to be too eager for praise and flattery, to adopt a detogatory attitude towards others.

All this again, is largely a survival of infantile attitudes which, facing adult difficulties, build up for their possessor a more or less organized system of ideas concerning his own place in the world. Such an inferiority complex may have grown out of some personal handicap, some physical deformity; or it may be an environmental handicap; or both.

9. There is almost no limit to the possible points of origin of an inferiority complex. Once it becomes established, of course, it makes its possessor very uncomfortable. He reacts biologically by trying to get rid of this feeling--by trying to make himself more comfortable.

10. If he cannot do this in conscious and useful ways, he will find some unconscious method of easing the situation. He may <u>repress</u> the whole thing in his mind, so that it no longer obtrudes itself on his attention. He may <u>regress</u>

that is, drop back to more childish ways of behaving, and try to get the consideration from others, that he was an infant and was not expected to accomplish much. He may day-dream, creating for himself an imaginary world in which he can rule as he likes.

11. Characteristically, however, the victim of an inferiority complex attempts to escape from his discomfort by compensation--that is, by some sort of mental activity which will bring him feelings of personal worth not attainable in the usual way, and which will thereby enable him to "forget" his feelings of inferiority. These "attempts" to compensate for an inferiority complex have become traditional; they are innumerable and extraordinarily diverse in form; which one of them an individual unconsciously selects will depend on his own background and personality. Among the best-recognized of then are the following:-

(a) Bluffing: The boaster and the bully alike are open to suspicion of trying to cover up their own feelings of inferiority. The test is to challenge them in the very field in which they profess particularly to excel.

(b) Posing : This is a little more subtle than the bluffing just described. It affords whide scope for the subject's imagination and his ability to dramatize himself. Mr. W., for example is a prophet. He is always predicting what will happen and he insists that you attach great imporance to his telling you so "Mark my words" is an injunction even dearer to him that "I told you so"--and used much more frequently. By dealing only in future events, he can avoid having to face realities. He can attract enough attention for his purpose by assuring the bystanders in the most solemn manner --and adjuring them particularly to remember that he warned them--that America will have its first

communist president in 1948. He knows that in the intervening ten years everyone will have forgotten him; but for the present he gets a minute's immersion in the grateful warmth of the limelight.

(c) Passing it on to others. If one feels inferior he can always find someone else whom he considers even more inferior and by comparison, make himself feel quite a personage. Much race prejudice stems from this source. The "high" yellow Negro looks down on the ordinary mulatto who in turn considers himself superior to the black. Among Jews in America those of Mediterranean ancestry consider themselves socially superior to the German Jew who in turn does not like to accept the Russion Jew as an equal.

(d) Reforming others. One who is trying to redeem people from their vices or sins can scarcely help feeling superior to the unfortunates whom he is uplifting. As he looks at the drunkard, the virtuous man may say, "There, but for the grace of God, go I"; but unconsciously he can scarcely help reflecting, "At any rate, I don't go there"; moreover psychologists generally agree that when a man shows a particularly strong emotional aversion to some human frailty, it is likely to mean that he himself has a strong unconscious tendency toward that frailty. Zeal in reforming others may help to distract his attention from his own shortcomings, and thereby enable him to live more at peace with himself.

(e) Rationalization. This is a process of dressing up an unpalatable fact so that it becomes attractive. It is a common component of mental life. As the late old J. Pierponto Morgan once remarked: "A man always has two reasons for doing anything--a good reason, and the real reason." Rationalization, or the process of finding "a good reason", is particularly employed to compensate for an inferiority complex. The "sour grapes" attitude is proverbial. The "sweet lemons" attitude is another manifestation of it, exemplified by Pollyanna and more pretentiously by the old philosophy that "Whatever is, is right."

(f) Humility. A common and tiresome device of people with an inferiority complex is to disparage themselves. Dicken's famous character, Uriah Heep, was continually announcing that she was the most humble person that ever lived. Of course, all of them merely want to be contradicted. The bait is annoyingly obvious. They would be considerably disconcerted if you merely agreed with them!

(g) This pressure of deceptive activity, which throws up a cloud of dust in which no one can see just what the thrower is accomplishing, is a common way of covering up a feeling of inefficiency inadequacy and inferiority.

(h) Hitching your wagon to a star. One of the most "high-toned" ways to avoid competition and to escape the possibility of defeat is to adopt some lofty and unattainable goal. Prof. M. has been working for 20 years on some sort of chemical process. No one except himself knows quite what it is, but everyone knows that it is very important--definitely fundamental, in fact he has actually done an immense amount of routine work. He assures you that he isn't the man to "rush to print" with a half-baked announcement; he is going to publish as soon as he has really completed the job. Since it is humanly impossible to complete such a job, he will die unpublished; meanwhile he has more of a reputation than he deserves;people take his hints seriously and don't know that this pose of profundity serves as a cover for aimlessness and futility.

This device of setting up a fictitious and unattainable goal is a particularly good one because it seems to denote a lofty spirit, and because of course there is much truth in the idea that "Not failure, but low aim, is crime" and so on, as poets and philosophers have remarked at great length. But the goal should be at least reasonably realistic. While one man is standing by, waiting for

a chance to get a hitch on to a star, another has hitched his wagon to a tractor and accomplished a good day's work.

All these compensatory mecanisms, and others that will occur to the reader's mind, help to make life interesting. Few of us can pretend to have avoided them altogether. But when they lead toward false goals, when they prevent worth-while achievement, when they merely reflect inadequate personalities, they need attention.

12. The practical question, then, is: What can be done with an inferiority complex?

1. Recognize your disabilities. Don't try to fool yourself. Unfortunately, it is much easier to fool yourself than to fool others. They can see you plainly because they do not look at you through an emotional fog as you look at yourself.

It is just a great mistake to exaggerate your disabilities as to depreciate them. Expert appraisal by a disinterested person will often help you to correct the professional aptitudes, the use of some of the modern batteries of tests may be a great help. No one pretends that they are micrometrically accurate, but they are good rough-and-ready measurements in the hands of one who has the training and experience to interpret them. Measurements of this sort should be given to every young person, as a routine procedure, somewhere in the high school period. They would help boys and girls to their places in the world without too great a tendency either to over-value or to undervalue themselves. They would keep square pegs out of round holes.

2. Overcome your disabilities if possible. The process of doing is often the road to achievement. The elder Theodore Roosevelt was a puny boy: by determination he overcame this handicap and developed into the exponent of "the strenuous life." Ted Shawn determined to outgrow the effects of

infantile paralysis and became an outstanding dancer. The story of Demosthenes overcoming speech impediment by talking with pebbles in his mouth, and developing into the greatest orator of his time, may not have much historical basis but it is at least symbolic of what many another has accomplished under the stimulus of a will to overcome.
3. If you cannot overcome a handicap, act as if you did't have it. As Beethoven became deaf, he worked with more and more industry as his musical composition, turning out better and better work.
4. Finally, develop your strong points. Find out what you <u>can</u> do successfully, and <u>do</u> it.

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that of the patients kept in all other hospitals. Like insanity, nervous disorders and intellectual weakness seem to have become more frequent. They are the most active factors of individual misery and of the destruction of families. Mental deterioration is more dangerous for civilization than the infectious diseases to which hygienists and physicians have so far exclusively devoted their attention.

5. The great cities have been built with no regard for us. The shape and dimensions of the skyscrapers depend entirely on the necessity of obtaining the maximum income per square foot of ground, and of offering to the tenants offices and appartments that please them. This caused the construction of gigantic buildings where too large masses of human beings are crowded together. Civilized men like such a way of living. While they enjoy the comfort and banal luxury of their dwelling, they do not realise that they are deprived of the necessities of life. The modern city consists of monstrous edifices and of dark, narrow streets full of gasolene fumes, coal dust, toxic gases, torn by the noise of the taxicabs, trucks and trolleys, and thronged ceaselessly by great crowds. Obviously, it has not been planned for the good of its inhabitants.

6. Although physicians, educators, and hygienists most generously lavish their efforts for the benefit of mankind, they do not attain their goal. For they deal with schemata containing only a part of the reality. The same may be said of all those who substitute their desires, their dreams, or their doctrines for the concrete human being. These theorists build up civilisations which although designed by them for man, fit only an imcomplete or monstrous image of man. The systems of government, entirely constructed in the minds of doctrinaires, are valueless. The

principles of the French Revolution, the visions of Marx and Lenin, apply only to abstract men. It must be clearly realised that the laws of human relations are still unknown. Sociology and economics are conjectural sciences--that is, pseudo-sciences.

7. Among the numerous concepts relating to the human being, some are mere logical constructs of our mind. We do not find in the outer world any being to whom they apply. The others are purely and simply the result of experience. They have been called by Bridgman operational concepts. An operational concept is equivalent to the operation or to the set of operations involved in its acquisition. Indeed, all positive knowledge demands the use of a certain technique, of certain physical or mental operations. When we say that an object is one metre long, we mean that it has the same length of a rod of wood or of metal, whose dimensionsis, in its turn equal to that of the standard metre kept at the International Bureau of Weights and Measures in Paris. It is quite evident that the things we can observe are the only ones we really know. In the foregoing example, the concept of length is synonymous with the measurement of such length. According to Bridgman, concepts dealing with things situated outside the experimental field are meaningless. Thus, a question has no signification if it is not possible to discover the operations permitting us to answer it.

The precision of any concept whatsoever depends upon that of the operations by which it is acquired. If man is defined as a being composed of matter and consciousness, such a proposition is meaningless. For the relations between consciousness and bodily matter have not, so far, been brought into the experimental field. But an operational definition is given of man when we

consider him as an organism capable of manifesting physicochemical, physiological activities. In biology, as in physics, the concepts which will always remain real, and must be the basis of science, are linked to certain methods of observation. For example, our present idea of the cells of the cerebral cortex, their pyramidal body, their dendritic processes, and their smooth axon, results from the techniques invented by Ramon yCajal. This is an operational concept. Such a concept with change only when new and more perfect techniques will be discovered. But to say that cerebral cells are the seat of mental processes is a worthless affirmation, for there is no possibility of observing the presence of mental processes in the body of cerebral cells. Operational concepts are the only solid foundation upon which we can build. From the immense fund of knowledge we possess about ourselves, we must select the data corresponding to what exists not only in our mind, but also in nature.

8. The confusion in our knowledge of ourselves comes chiefly from the presence, among the positive facts, of the remains of scientific, philosophic and religious systems. If our mind adheres to any system whatsoever, the aspect and the significance of concrete phenomena are changed. At all times, humanity has contemplated itself through glasses coloured by doctrines, beliefs, and illusions. These false or inexact ideas must be discarded. Long ago, Claude Bernard in his writings mentioned the necessity of getting rid of philosophical and scientific systems as one would break the chains of intellectual slavery. But such freedom has not yet been attained. Biologists, and above all, educators economists, and sociologists, when facing extremely complex problems, have often yielded to the temptation to

build up theories and afterwards to turn them into articles of faith. And their sciences have crystallised in formulas as rigid as the dogmas of religion.

We meet with troublesome reminders of such mistakes in all the departments of knowledge. The quarrel of the vitalists and the mechanists, the futility of which astounds us to-day, arose from one of the most famous of these errors. The vitalists thought that the organism was a machine whose parts were integrated with one another by a factor that was not physicochemical. According to them, the processes responsible for the unity of the living being were governed by an independent spiritual principle, an entelechy, an idea analogous to that of an engineer who designs a machine. This autonomous factor was not a form of energy and did not produce energy. It was only concerned with the management of the organism. Evidently, entelecy is not an operational concept..It is purely a mental construct. In short, the vitalists considered the body as a machine, guided by an engineer, whom they called entelechy. And they did not realise that this engineer was nothing but the intelligence of the observer.
As for the mechanists, they believed that all physiolo physiological and psychological activities could be explained by the laws of physics, chemistry, and mechanics. They thus built a machine, and, like the vitalists, they were the engineer of this machine. Then, as Woodger pointed out, they forgot the existence of that engineer. Such a concept is not operational. It is evident that mechanism and vitalism should be rejected for the same reason as all other systems. At the same time, we must free ourselves from the mass of illusions, errors, and badly observed facts, from the false problems investigated by the weak-minded of the realm of science, and from the pseudo-discoveries

of charlatans and scientists extolled by the daily press. Also from the sadly useless investigations the long studies of meaningless things, the inextricable jumble that has been standing mountain high ever since biological research became a profession like those of the school-teacher, the clergyman, and the bank clerk. This elimination completed, the results of the patient labour of all sciences concerning themselves with man, the accumulated wealth of their experience, will remain as the unshakable basis of our knowledge.

9. There is no privileged territory. In the abysses of our inner world everything has a meaning. We cannot choose only those things that please us, according to the dictates of our feelings, our imagination, the scientific and philosophical form of our mind. A difficult or obscure subject must not be neglected just because it is difficult and obscure. All methods should be employed. The qualitative is as true as the quantitative. The relations can be expressed in mathematical terms do not possess greater reality than those that cannot be so expressed. Darwin, Claude Bernard, and Pasteur, whose discoveries could not be described in algebraic formulas, were as great scientists as Newton and Einstein. Reality is not necessarily clear and simple. It is not even sure that we are always able to understand it. In addition, it assumes infinitely varied aspects. A state of consciousness, the humeral bone, a wound, are equally real things. A phenomenon does not owe its importance to the facility with which scientific techniques can be applied to its study. It must be conceived in function, not of the observer and his method, but of the subject, the human being. The grief of the mother who has lost her child, the distress of the mystical soul plunged in the "dark night", the suffering of the patient tortured by cancer, are evident realities,

although they are not measurable. The study of phenomena of clairvoyance should not be neglected any more than that of the chronaxy of nerves, though clairvoyance can neither be produced at will nor measured, while it is possible to measure chronaxy exactly by a simple method. In making this inventory, we should utilise all possible means and be content with observering the phenomena that cannot be measured.

It often happens that undue importance is given to some part at the expense of the others. We are obliged to consider all the different aspects of man, physicochemical, anatomical, physiological, metapsychical, intellectual, moral, artistic, religious, economic and social. Every specialist owing to a well-known professional bias, believes that he understands the entire human being, while in reality he grasps a tiny part of him. Fragmentary aspects are considered as representing the whole. And these aspects are taken at random, following the fashion of the moment, which in turn give more importance to the individual or to society, to physiological appetites or to spiritual activities, to muscular development or to brain power, to beauty or to utility, etc. Man, therefore, appears, with many different visages. We arbitrarily choose among them the one that pleases us, and forget the others.

Another mistake consists in suppressing a part of reality from the inventory. There are many reasons accounting for this. We prefer to stuty systems that can easily be isolated and approached by simple methods. We generally neglect the more complex. Our mind has a partiality for precise and definitive solutions and for the resulting intellectual security. We have an almost irresistible tendency to select the subjects of our investigations for their techinical facility and cleverness rather than for their importance.

On account of techinical difficulties, certain matters are banished from the field of scientific research, and refused the right of making themselves known.

Important facts may be completely ignored. Our mind has a natural tendency to reject the things that do not fit into the frame of scientific or philosophical beliefs of our time. After all, scientists are only men. They are saturated with the prejudices of their environment and of their eopch. They willingly believe that facts that cannot be explained by current theories do not exist. During the period when physiology was identified with physical chemistry, the period of Jacques Loeb and of Bayliss, the study of mental functions was neglected. No one was interested in psychology and in mind disorders. At the present time, scientists who are concerned solely in the physical, chemical, and physicochemical aspects of physiological processes still look upon telepathy and other metapsychical phenomena as illusions. Evident facts having an unorthodox appearance are suppressed. By reason of these difficulties, the inventory of things which could lead us to a better understanding of the humen being, has been left incomplete. We must, then, go back to a naive observation of ourselves in all our aspects, reject nothing, and describe simply what se see.

At first glance, the scientific method seems not to be applicable to the analysis of all our activities. It is obvious that we, the observers, are unable to follow human personality into every region where it extends. Our techniques do not grasp things having neither dimensions nor weight. They only reach those situated in time and space.

10. It is impossible for a specialist, actively engaged in the pursuit of his own task, to under-

the human being as a whole. Instead, such a state of affairs is rendered necessary by the vast extent of the field of each science. But it presents a certain danger. For example, Calmette, who had specialised in bacteriology, wished to prevent the spread of tuberclosis among the French population. He, naturally, prescribed the use of the vaccine he had invented. If, in addition to being a bacteriologist, he had possessed a more general knowledge of hygiene and medicine, he would have advised also the adoption of methods with regard to dwellings, food, working conditions and the way of the people. A similar occurrence took place in the United States of America in the organization of elementary schools. John Dewey, who is a philosopher, undertook to improve the education of American children. But his methods were suited to the schema, the abstraction, which his professional bias made him take for the concrete child.

Still more harm is caused by the extreme specialization of the physicians. Medicine has separated the sick human being into small fragments, and each fragment has its specialist. When a specialist from the beginning of his career, confines himself to a minute part of the body, his knowledge of the rest is so rudimentary that he is incapable of thoroughly understanding even that part in which he specialises. A similar thing happens to educators, clergymen, economists, and sociologists who, before limiting themselves entirely to their particular domain, have not taken the trouble to acquire a general knowledge of man. The more eminent the specialist, the more dangerous he is. Scientists who have strikingly distinguished themselves by great discoveries or useful inventions often come to believe that their knowledge of one subject extends to all others. Edison for example, did not hesitate to impart to the public his views on philosophy and religion. And the public listen-

-en to his words with respect, imagining them to carry as much weight on these new subjects as on the former ones. Thus, great men, in speaking about things they do not thoroughly understand, hinder human progress in one of its fields, while having contributed to its advancement in another. The daily press often gives us the dubious benefit of the sociological, economic, and scientific opinions of manufacturers, bankers, lawyers, professors, physicians, whose highly specialised minds are incapable of apprehending in their breadth the momentous problems of our time. However, modern civilisation absolutely needs specialists. Without them, science could not progress. But, before the result of their researches is applied to man, the scattered data of their analyses must be integrated in an intelligible synthesis.

Such a synthesis cannot be obtained by a simple round-table conference of the specialists. It requires the efforts of one man, not merely those of a group. A work of art has never been produced by a committee of artists, nor a great discovery been made by a committee of scholars. The synthesis needed for the progress of our knowledge of man should be elaborated in a single brain. It is impossible to make use of the mass of information accumulated by the specialists. For no one has undertaken to co-ordinate the data already obtained and to consider the human being in his entirety. To-day there are many scientific workers, but very few real scientists. This peculiar situation is not due to lack of individuals capable of high intellectual achievements. Indeed, syntheses, as well as discoveries, demand exceptional mental power and physiological endurance. Broad and strong minds are rarer than precise and narrow ones. It is easy to become a good chemist, a good physicist, a good physiologist, a good psychologist, or a good sociologist. On

the contrary, very few individuals are capable of acquiring and using knowledge of several different sciences.

11. The few individuals endowed with this exceptional power live under conditions precluding intellectual creation. Neither laboratories, nor apparatus, nor organisation can give to scientists the surroundings indispensable to their success. Modern life is opposed to the life of the mind. However, men of science have to be mere units of a herd whose appetites are purely material and whose habits are entirely different from theirs. They vainly exhaust their strength and spend their time in the pursuit of the conditions demanded by the elaboration of thought. No one of them is wealthy enough to procure the isolation of the silence which in former times everybody could have for nothing even in the largest cities. No attempt has so far been made to create, in the midst of the agitation of the new city, islands of solitude where meditation would be possible. Such an innovation, however, is an obvious necessity. The construction of vast syntheses is beyond the reach of minds unceasingly dispersed in the confusion of our present modes of existence. The development of the science of man, even more than that of the other sciences, depends on immense intellectual effort. The need of such an effort demands a revision, not only of our conception of the scientist, but also of the conditions under which scientific research is carried on.

12. The observer must be endowed with sound judgment in order not to lose his way in the complexity of the facts. The difficulties become almost insurmountable in retrospective investigations. Such studies require a very experienced mind. Of course, we should as rarely as possible utilise the conjectural science which is called history.

13. Even if we penetrate the inextricable maze of

the brain and the nervous functions, nowhere do we meet with consciousness. Soul and body are creations of our methods of observation. They are carved by those methods from an indivisible whole.

This whole consists of tissues, organic fluids, and consciousness. It extends simultaneously in space and in time. It fills the three dimensions of space, and that of time with its heterogeneous mass. However, it is not comprised fully within these four dimensions. For consciousness is located both within the cerebral matter and outside the physical continuum.

13. Eddington and Jeans, in their books of popular books of popular astronomy, always succeed in impressing their readers with the complete insignificance of man in the universe. In reality, our spatial greatness or smallness is without importance. For what is specific or man has no physical dimensions. The meaning of our presence in this world assuredly does not depend upon our size.

14/ The antithesis of matter and mind represents merely the opposition of two kinds of techniques. The error of Descartes was to believe in the reality of these abstractions and to consider the material and mental as heterogeneous, as two different things. This dualism has weighed heavily upon the entire history of our knowledge of man. For it has engendered the false problem of the relations of the soul and the body.

There are no such relations. Neither the soul nor the body can be investigated separately. We observe merely a complex being, whose activities have been arbitrarily divided into physiological and mental.

15. The existence of intelligence is a primary datum of observation. This power of discerning the relations between things assumes a certain

form in each individual.
16. Intellectual power is augmented by the habit of precise reasoning, the study of logic, the use of mathematical language, mental discipline, and complete and deep observation of things. On the contrary, incomplete and superficial observations, a rapid succession of impressions, multiplicity of images, and lack of intellectual discipline hinder the development of mind.
17. The discoveries of intuition have always to be developed by logic. In ordinary life, as in science, intuition is a powerful but dangerous means of acquiring knowledge. Sometimes it can hardly be distinguished from illusion. Those who rely upon it entirely are liable to mistakes. It is far from being always trustworthy.
18. The existence of telepathic phenomena, as well as other metaphysic phenomena, is not accepted by most biologists and physicians. The attitude of these scientists should not be blamed. For these pphenomena are exceptional and elusive. They cannot be produced at will. Besides, they are hidden in the enormous mass of the superstitions, lies, and illusions accumulated for centuries by mankind. Although they have been mentioned in every country and at every epoch they have not been investigated scientifically. It is, nevertheless, a fact that they are a normal, although rate, activity of the human being.
19. There are, writes Gallavardin, the pure egoists, completely indifferent to the happiness or misery of their fellow men. There are the malicious, who take pleasure in witnessing the misfortunes or sufferings of others, and even in causing them. There are those who suffer themselves from the sufferings of any human being. This power of sympathy engenders kindness and charity, and the acts inspired by those virtues. The capacity of feeling the pain of others is

the essential characteristic of the human being who endeavours to alleviate, among his brothers, the burden and the misery of existence.

20. Those who want to conquer real knowledge have to endure a long and hard preparation. They submit themselves to a kind of asceticism. In the absence of concentration, intelligence is unproductive. Once disciplined, it becomes capable of pursuing truth. But to reach its goal it requires the help of moral sense. Great scientists always have profound intellectual honesty. They follow reality wherever led by it. They never seek to substitute their own desires for facts, or to hide these facts when they become troublesome. The man who longs for the contemplation of truth has to establish peace within him. His mind should be like the still water of a lake.

21. The fall of blood pressure due to a haemorrhage suppresses all manifestations of consciousness. In short, mental life is observed to depend on the state of the cerebrum.

22. When our activity is set toward a precise end, our mental and organic functions become completely harmonized. The unification of the desires, the application of the mind to a single purpose produces a sort of inner peace. Man integrates himself by meditation, just as by action.

23. The modest, the ignorant, and the poor are more capable of this self-denial than the rich and the intellectual.

24. Man is powerless against such psychological attacks. He necessarily yields to the influence of his group. If one lives in the company of criminals or fools, one becomes a criminal or a fool. Isolation is the only hope of salvation. But where will the inhabitants of the new city find solitude? "Thou canst retire within thyself when thou wouldst"said Marcul Aurelius. "No retreat is more peaceful or less troubled than that encountered by

by man in his own soul." But we are not capable of such an effort. We cannot fight our social surroundings victoriously.

25. The individuals who are mentally deranged are far more numerous. It is estimated that several hundred thousand persons, not mentioned in any statistics, are affected with psychoneuroses. These figures show how great is the fragility of the consciousness of civilised men, and how important for modern society is the problem of mental health. The diseases of the mind are a serious menace.

26. The frequency of neurosis and psychosis is doubtless the expression of a very grave defect of modern civilization. The new habits of existence have certainly not improved our mental health.

27. There are no techniques permitting the exploration of the unknown world of the nervous cells, of their association and projection fibres, and of the cerebral and mental processes.

It has not been possible to bring to light any precise relations between shizophrenic manifestations, for example, and structural altera-tions of the cerebral cortex. The hopes of Kroepelin, the famous pioneer in the maladies of the mind, have not materialised. The anatomical study of these diseases has not thrown much light on their nature. Mental disorders are perhaps not localised in space.

28. Feeblemindedness and insanity are perhaps the price of industrial civilisation, and of the resulting changes in our ways of life. However, these affections are often part of the inheritance received from his parents by each individual. They manifest themselves among people whose nervous system is already unbalanced. In the families which have already produced neurotic, queer, oversensitive individuals, the insane and the feeble-minded suddenly appear. However they also spring up

from lineages which have so far been free from mental disorders. There are certainly other causes of insanity than hereditary factors.
29. In nature, time is always found united to space. It is a necessary aspect of material beings. No concrete thing has only three spatial dimensions. A rock, a tree, an animal cannot be instantaneous. Indeed we are capable of building up in our minds beings entirely described within three dimensions. But all concrete objects have four. And man extends both in time and in space. To an observer living far more slowly than we do he would appear as something narrow, and elongated, analogous to the incandescent trail of a meteor. Besides, he possesses another aspect, impossible to define clearly. For he is not wholly comprised within the physical continuum. Thought is not confined within time and space.
30. The nature of time varies according to the objects considered by our mind. The time that we observe in nature has no separate existence. It is only a mode of being of concrete objects. We ourselves create mathematical time. It is a mental construct, an abstraction indispensable to the building up of science. We conveniently compare it to a straight line, each successive instant being represented by a point. Since Galileo's day this abstraction has been substituted for the concrete data resulting from the direct observation of things. The philosoohers of the Middle Ages considered time as an agent concretising abstractions. Such a conception resembled more closely that of Minkowski than that of Galileo. To them, as to Minkowski, to Einstein, and to modern physicists, time, in nature, appeared as completely inseparable from space. In reducing objects to their primary qualities--that is, to what can be measured and is susceptible of mathematical treatment--Galileo deprived them of their

secondary qualities, and of duration. This arbitrary simplification made possible the development of physics. At the same time, it led to an unwarrantably schemati conception of the world, especially of the biological world.

31. The rotation of the earth, or the number of hours ticked off by a clock, is the standard to which we refer our temporal dimensions or the flow of time. It is natural for human beings to use the intervals separating the rising of the sun from its setting as the means to measure their duration and organise their lives.

32. Consciousness, under the influence of the stimuli coming from the outside world, records its own motion, the series of its states. Time, according to Bergson, is the very stuff of psychological life.

33. Man is constituted, in his fourth dimension, by a series of forms following, and blending into each other. He is egg, embryo, infant, adolescent, adult, mature and old man. These morphological aspects are the expression of chemical, organic and psychological events. Most of these variations cannot be measured.

34. Physiological time is quite different from physical time. If all the clocks accelerated or retarded their motion, and if the earth correspondingly modified the rhythm of its rotation, our duration would remain unchanged. But it would seem to decrease or to increase. In this manner, the alteration undergone by solar time would become apparent. While we are swept onward upon the stream of physical time, we move at the rhythm of the inner process constituting physiological duration. Indeed, we are not mere grains of dust floating on a river. But also drops of oil spreading out over the surface of the water with a motion of their own, while being borne along by the current.

Physical time is foreign to us, whereas inner time is ourself.

35. The valueof the days of early childhood is very great. Every moment should be utilised for education. The waste of this period of life can never be compensated. Instead of being allowed to grow likfe plants or little animals, children should be the object of the most enlightened training.

36. The second mode of adaptation is flight. Some abandon the struggle and descend to a social level where competition is no longer necessary. They become factory workers, proletarians. Others take refuge within their own self. At the same time they can adapt themselves, in some measure to the social group and even conquer it through the superiority of their intelligence. But they do not fight. They are members of the community only in appearancc. In fact, they live in an inner world of their own.

37. Certain individuals spend their lives in dreaming, in hoping for fortune, health, and happiness. Illusions and hope are also a powerful means of adaptation. Hope generates action. It is rightly looked upon by Christian morals as a great virtue. It contributes in a powerful manner to the adjustment of the individual to unfavourable circumstances.

38. Certain forms of modern life lead directly to degeneration. There are social conditions as fatal to white men as are warm and humid conditions. We react to poverty, anxities, and sorrows by working and struggling. We can stand tyranny, revolution, and war. But we are not able to fight successfully against misery and prosperity. The individual and the race are weakened by extreme poverty. Wealth is just as dangerous.

39. These relations are described by the science of genetics as the laws of heredity. They merely

express the origin of the inherent characteristics of each human being. But these characteristics are nothing but tendencies or potentialities. According to the circumstances enountered by the embryo, the foetus, the child, and the adolescent during their development, these tendencies become actual or remain virtual. And each man's history is as unique as were the nature and the arrangement of his constitutive genes when he was an ovum. Thus, the originality of the human being depends both on heredity and on development.

We know that individuality springs from these two sources. But not what part each of them plays in our formation. Is heredity more important than development, or vice versa? Watson and the behaviourists proclaim that education and environment are capable of giving human beings any desired form. Education would be everything, and heredity nothing. Geneticists believe, on the contrary, that heredity imposes itself on man like ancient fate, and that the salvation of the race lies, not in education, but in eugenics. Both schools forget that such a problem cannot be solved by arguments, but only by observations and experiments.

Observations and experiments teach us that the parts of heredity and of development vary in each individual, and that generally their respective values cannot be determined. However, in children conceived by the same parents, brought up together and in the same manner, there are striking differences in form, stature, nervous constitution, intellectual aptitudes, and moral qualities.

40. Man diffuses through space in a still more positive way. In telepathic phenomena, he instantaneously sends out a part of himself, a sort of emanation, which joins a far-away relative or friend. He thus expands to great distances. He may cross oceans and continents in a time too short to be estimated. He is capable of finding in the

the midst of a crowd the person whom he must meet. Then he communicates to this person certain knowledge. He can also discover in the immensity and confusion of a modern city the house, the room of the individual whom he seeks, although acquainted neither with him nor with his surroundings. Those endowed with this form of activity behave like extensible beings, amoebas of a strange kind, capable of sending pseudopods to prodigious distances. The hypnotist and his subject are sometimes observed to be linked together by an invisible bond. This bond seems to emanate from the subject. While communication is established between the hypnotist and his subject, the former can, by suggestion from a distance, command the latter to perform certain acts. At this moment, a telepathic relation is established between them. In such an instance, two distant individuals are in contact with each other, although both appear to be confined within their respective anatomical limits. Thought seems to be transmitted, like electromagnetic waves, from one region of space to another.

41. Psychical researches must not be undertaken by amateurs, even when those amateurs are great physicists, great philosophers, or great mathematicians. To go beyond one's own field and to dabble in theology or spiritism is dangerous, even for men as illustrious as Isaac Newton, William Crookes, or Oliver Lodge. Experimenters trained in clinical medicine, having a profound knowledge of the human being, of his physiology and psychology, of his predigitation, neuroses, of his aptitude to lie, of his susceptibility to sugsestion, of his skill at predigitation, are alone qualified to investigate this subject.

42. But it is not sure that telepathic pehnomena are due to the transmission of a physical agent. Possibly there is no spatial contact between individuals who are in communication. In fact, we

know that mind is not entirely described within the four dimensions of the physical continuum. It is situated simultaneously within the material universe and elsewhere. We are totally ignorant of the realities that lie outside space and time. We may suppose that a telepathic communication is an encounter, beyond the four dimensions of our universe, between the immaterial parts of two minds. But it is more convenient to consider these phenomena as being brought about by the expansion of the individual into space. The spatial extensibility of personality is an exceptional fact.

43. In time, as in space, the individual stretches out beyond the frontiers of his body. His temporal frontiers are neither more precise nor more fixed than his spatial ones. He is linked to the past and to the future, although his self does not extend outside the present. Our individuality, as we know, comes into being when the spermatozoon enters the egg. But before this moment, the elements of the self are already in existence, scattered in the tissues of our parents, of our parents' parents, and of our most remote ancestors. We are made of the cellular substances of our father and our mother. We depend on the past in an organic and indisoluble manner. We bear within ourselves countless fragments of our ancestor's bodies. Our qualities and defects proceeds from theirs. In men, as in race-horses, strength and courage are hereditary qualities. History cannot be set aside. We must, on the contrary, make use of the past to foresee the future and to prepare our destiny.

44. After their death their personality goes on living through their scientific discoveries, their artistic production, the political, economic or social institutions they have founded, or more simply through the house which they have built, and the fields which they have cultivated with their own hands. It is by such people that our civilisation has been created.

The influence of the individual upon the future is not equivalent to an extension of the self in time. It takes place by means of the fragments of cell substance directly transmitted by him to his children, or of his creations in the domains of art, religion, science, philosophy, etc.

45. Indeed, human beings are equal. But individuals are not. The equality of their rights is an illusion. The feeble-minded and the man of genius should not be equal before the law. The stupid, the unintelligent, those who are dispersed, incapable of attention, of effort, have no right to a higher education. It is absurd to give them the same electoral power as the fully developed individual. Sexes are not equal. To disregard all these inequalities is very dangerous. The democratic principle has contributed to the collapse of civilisation in opposing the development of an elite.

46. Biological sciences have revealed to us the most precious of all secrets--the laws of the development of our body and of our consciousness. This knowledge has brought to humanity the means of renovating itself.

47. To progress again, man must remake himself. And he cannot remake himself without suffering. For he is both the marble and the sculptor. In order to uncover his true visage he must shatter his own substance with heavy blows of his hammer. He will not submit to such treatment unless driven by necessity. While surrounded by the comfort, the beauty, and the mechanical marvels engendered by technology, he does not understand how urgent is this operation. He fails to realise that he is degenerating. Why should he strive to modify his ways of being, living, and thinking? Fortunately an event unforeseen by engineers, economists, and politicians took place. The superb edifice of American finance and economics suddenly collapsed.

48. Why are there so many feeble-minded and insane

among civilized people? Does not the world crisis depend on individual and social factors that are more important than the economic ones? It is to be hoped that the spectacle of civilisation at this beginning of its decline will compel us to ascertain whether the causes of the catastrophe do not lie within ourselves, as well as in our institutions. And that we will fully realise the imperativeness of our renovation. Then, we will be faced by a single obstacle, our inertia. And not by the incapacity of our race to rise again.
49. The evil is not irraparable. But the remaking of the individual demands the transformation of modern life. It cannot take place without a material and mental revolution. To understand the necessity of a change, and to possess the scientific means of realising this change, are not sufficient. The spontaneous crash of technological civilisation may help to release the impulses required for the destruction of our present habits and the creation of new modes of life. Do we still have enough energy and perspicacity for such a gigantic effort?
50. Science was cultivated by those men of the occident for itself, for its truth and its beauty, with complete disin erestedness. Instead of stagnating in individual egoism, as it did in the Orient and especially in China, this science, in 400 years has transformed the world.
51. What we accomplished once we are capable of accomplishing again. Should our civilisation collapse, we would build up another one. But is it indispensable to suffer the agony of chaos before reaching order and peace? Can we not rise again, without undergoing the bloody regeneration of total overthrow? Are we capable of renovating ourselves, of avoiding the cataclysms which are imminent, and of continuing our ascension?

52. We cannot undertake the restoration of ourselves and of our environment before having transformed our habits of thought. Modern society has suffered, ever since its origin, from an intellectual fault--a fault which has been constantly repeated since the Renaissance. Technology has constructed man, not according to the spirit of science, but according to erroneous metaphysical conceptions. The time has come to abandon these doctrines. We should break down the fences which have been erected between the properties of concrete objects, and between the different aspects of ourselves. The error responsible for our sufferings comes from a wrong interpretation of a genial idea of Galileo. Galileo, as is well known, distinguished the primary qualities of things, dimensions and weight, which are easily measurable from their secondary qualities, form, colour, odour, which cannot be measured. The quantitative expressed in mathematical language, brought science to humanity. The qualitative was neglected. The abstraction of the primary qualities of objects was legitimate. But the overlooking of the secondary qualities was not. This mistake had momentous consequences. In man, the things which are not measurable are more important than those which are measurable. The existence of thought is as fundamental as, for instance, the physicochemical equilibria of blood serum. The separation of the qualitative from the quantitative grew still wider when Descartes created the dualism of the body and the soul. Then, the manifestations of the mind became inexplicable. The material was definitely isolated from the spiritual. Organic structures and physiological mechanisms assumed a far greater reality than thought, pleasure, sorrow, and beauty. This error switched civilisation to the road which led science to triumph and man to degradation.

In order to find again the right direction we must turn in thought to the men of the Renaissance, imbue ourselves with their spirit, their passion for empiric observation, and their contempt for philosophical systems. As they did, we have to distinguish the primary and secondary qualities of things. But we must radically differ from them and attribute to secondary qualities the same importance as to primary qualities. We should also reject the dualism of Descartes. Mind will be replaced by matter. The soul will no longer be distinct from the body. Mental manifestations, as well as physiological processes, will be within our reach.

53. It is indispensable that our thought embraces all aspects of reality. Instead of discarding the residues of scientific abstractions we will utilise those residues as fully as the abstractions. We will not accept the tyranny of the quantitative, the superiority of mechanics, physics, or chemistry. We will renounce the intellectual attitude generated by the Renaissance, and its artibrary definition of the real. But we must retain all the conquests made since Galileo's day. The spirit and the techniques of science are our most precious possessions.

54. There have been, in the past, industrial organisations which enabled the workmen to own a house and land, to work at home when and as they willed, to use their intelligence, to manufacture entire objects, to have the joy of creation. At the present time this form of industry could be resumed. Electrical power and modern machinery make it possible for the light industries to free themselves from the curse of the factory. Could not the heavy industries also be decentralised? Or would it not be possible to use all the young men of the country in the factories for a short period, just as for military service? In this or

another way the proletariat could be progressively abolished. Men would live in small communities instead of in immense droves. Each would preserve his human value within his group. Instead of being merely a piece of machinery, he would become a person. To-day, the position of the proletarian is as low as was that of the feudal serf. Like the serf, he has no hope of excapting from his bondage, of being independent, of holding authority over others. The artisan, on the contrary, has the legitimate hope that some day he may become the head of his shop. Likewise, the peasant owning his land, the fisherman owning his boat, although obliged to work hard, are, nevertheless, masters of themselves and of their time. Most industrial workers could enjoy similar independence and dignity. The white-collar people lose their personality just as factory hands to. In fact, they become proletarians. It seems that modern business organisation and mass production are incompatible with the full development of the human self. If such is the case, then industrial civilisation, and not civilised man, must go.

55. Gigantic sums are now required to maintain prisons and insane asylums and protect the public against gangsters and lunatics. Why do we preserve these useless and harmful beings? The abnormal prevent the development of the normal. This fact must be squarely faced. Why should society not dispose of the criminals and the insane in a more economical manner?

56. Criminals have to be dealt with effectively Perhaps prisons should be abolished. They could be replaced by smaller and less expensive institutions. The conditioning of the petty criminals with the whip, or some more scientific procedure, followed by a short stay in hospital, would probably suffice to insure order.

Those who have murdered, robbed while armed with automatic pistol or machine gun, kidnapped children, despoiled the poor of their savings, misled the public in important matters, should be humanely and economically disposed of in small euthanasic institutions supplied with proper gases. A similar treatment could be advantageously applied to the insane, guilty of criminal acts. Modern society should not hesitate to organise itself with reference to the normal individual. Philosophical systems and sentimental prejudices must give way before such a necessity.

57. We know that we are not altogether comprised within its dimensions, that we extend somewhere else, outside the physical continuum. Man is simultaneously a material object, a living being, a focus of mental activities. His presence in the prodigious void of the interside-real spaces is totally negligible. But he is not a stranger in the realm of inanimate matter. With the aid of mathematical abstractions his mind apprehends the electrons as well as the stars.

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PROF. A.R. WADIA.

IS CHANGE ULTIMATE?

1. There is no concept of greater importance in Contemporary Philosophy than the concept of change. Philosophy is generally regarded as a dull subject, which admits of no change, no variation in its assumptions or its aims. Yet after the scientific vogue of evolution, Philosophy seems to have put on a new garb, and breaking away from the static concepts of old philosophy, has become more and more dynamic in character. From the days of Plato onwards in Europe, and the Upanishadic seers in India there have been a definite assumption in the mind of most philosophers, colouring all their thought, that what changes cannot be real. Hence the real was conceived as something that is changeless, something that is perfect. And the phenomenal world of change received the stamp of inferiority by being called maya or the world of mere appearance. Even the Hegelian conception of the Absolute has been interpreted by the most orthodox Idealists as being static, admitting of an infinite number of permutations and combinations among its parts, so long as these leave unaffected the Absolute itself in its immaculate perfection. Bergson's banner of revolt and his planting it at the very heart of reality has given rise to a new outlook on life and to new problems. Italian Idealism, rising as an offshoot of Hegelianism, has joined hands with Bergsonism, and the question is whether this new philosophy helps to solve old problems, and can thus establish its claims to man's allegiance.

Approaching our subject from a definitely Idealistic standpoint we may take it as generally admitted that our experience is finite and relational, and hence incomplete. Nothing in our finite experience can be self-complete, as it is depen-

dent in all directions and is seen to form a part of larger and larger systems, till it is recognised to be a fragment in the ultimate unity of the absolute. The Absolute is self-complete and self-contained in the sense there is nothing outside it to be related to. The fragments within the Absolute continue in ther eternal dance of change and restlessness according to some law of ordered change, which we may speak of as evolution.

The Absolute, which is nothing if not the unity of its parts, has this evolutionary process going on and gives rise to two possible views. (1) Things evolve, but not the Absolute itself.(2) The Absolute itself evolves.

The second view is not popular with the orthodox Idealists of the type of Bradley and Bosanquet. To them a chaning absolute is a contradiction in terms. Yet if we ask why it should be a contradiction in terms, we only come across an old philosophic prejudice that what changes cannot be real. The difficulty is apparently heightened, when it is asserted that the Absolute is perfect; and if it is so, to say that it evolves or admits of progress is to deny its perfection. Here again it is the ghost of the old theistic ideas, that is haunting the vestibules of philosophy. After centuries of superstition and groping for light, men had come to a monotheism of an exalted type, conceiving an all-perfect God, a God above all change. The difficulties of the theistic position have been the common-places of philosophy since the days of Kant. But it seems to have passed on its notions of perfection and changelessness to its philosophical successor: the Absolute. It is hardly necessary for us, however, at this stage of our philosophical development to repeat the Cartesian fallacy of deducing the existence of perfection from the idea of perfection.

It would be merely a Cartesian dogma to believe that the idea of perfection suggests itself to us all by itself, for human experience clearly shows that it is our consciousness that things are not as they might be or as they ought to be, that gives rise to our consciousness of imperfection, and it is this in its turn, which generates in us the idea of perfection. This could be easily illustrated by the progressive evolution of the idea of God or the most perfect Being in the different religions, but it would take us too far afield to adduce these illustrations on the present occasion. It is certainly instructive that the idea of perfection has itself evolved, and that at every stage it stood for something static, and yet in the face of prejudices it has insisted on moving. It is palpably a vicious circle to argue that something is perfect, because it does not change; and that it cannot change, because it is perfect.

2. We may refer here to the problem of evil. Nothing is of more practical importance to us than this, and it seems to us to constitute the very crux of a philosophical theory. Monism, whether of the Spinozistic or the Hegelian type, has again and again to meet the charge that it does not explain evil, and only succeeds in making out that it does not really exist. But nothing is more acutely than suffering the most concrete form of evil. It is possible to show that it is merely a stage in the development of the good, that it is necessary for our spiritual development, and in this sense at least it would be real. That it has at least a phenomenal reality as great as or as little as our physical body, a tree or a river, can hardly be denied without being guilty of a meaningless paradox.

3. If the Absolute is the whole system of the universe, and if the phenomena are part and parcel of

that whole, it follows that the changes in the parts cannot but affect the whole. To say that the parts may change without affecting the whole is to say something that is impossible to conceive except in one sense, and that sense is irrevelant to the question in hand. E.G. it is true that all particular mango trees are undergoing a continuous change, and yet it is true that the mango tree as such--as a Platonic Idea--does not change. So too it may be argued that the Absolute cannot change. But this argument can refer only to the idea of the Absolute; something that is conceived in se per se, something that is self-complete, something that has nothing outside it. In this sense the Absolute never changes; in fact it cannot change. But this is only the Absolute that is conceived in abstraction. The Absolute we are concerned with is the concrete living system of things, and such an Absolute cannot but partake in the movement of its phenomenal parts. Phenomena are appearances of the Absolute, and unless they have an ultimate meaning, i.e. share in the ultimate significance of the Absolute itself, they may as well have not happened at all.

Against this position it may be argued that etymologically and historically the word "Absolute" has been always used in opposition to the relative, the changing. Perhaps it is so; we are not concerned to deny it.

4. We do not see any logical absurdity in the conception of a changing Absolute. The genuine essence of the Absolute is that there is nothing outside it, and that at any moment it is complete within itself and yet continually transcending itself. Our conception of the Absolute fulfils this essential meaning, for if it changes, the change does not come from without. It rather springs from within the depths of its own being. A child is not apart from its parests, it is the manifestation of them. In the last resort everything that

happens come from the Absolute and is within it, and in its own humble way manifests the rich concreteness of the Absolute itself. In a profound sense it is true that everything has its being in the Absolute, and that the Absolute lives in its parts, eternally partaking of their life and their freshness.

5. While the Absolute of European Philosophy is a system of things, i.e. of relations, the Advaitic Brahman is essentially unrelational. The Absolute revels in its infinite number of concrete manifestations, the Brahman revels in its pure simplicity. A stock argument to prove the oneness and the onliness of Brahman is the analogy of things made out of gold or clay. Gold continues the same in all its forms, whether of bangles or buttons or plates. So too does clay in all the various forms it is given. Similarly Brahman is the same in all its forms, which are but its accidents, and the essence of knowledge is to see Brahman in everything and everything in Brahman. Everywere and always Brahman continues the same. Change belongs to the world of maya. The relation of Brahman and maya is the most fruitful topic of discussion all over India.

6. The world of Maya is always changing, but it is argued that this change cannot affect Brahman. The Brahman is conceived as being nirguna (qualityless). If it means that it has a nature indescribable and unknowable so far as our finite intellect is concerned, we have a position, which is intelligible, though it has got its own difficulties. It it means, however, that it has got no nature, i.e. no qualities at all, we have a position, which from a mtaphysical point of view is nothing better than the abstract Unknown of Herbert Spencer. It it exists at all, it must have got some nature, or else how can we even say it appears as maya at all? Of course, it may be at once conceded that

this nature, conceived by itself, ie. apart from its concrete manifestations, cannot change any more than the Idea of a mango tree can change. But to conceive the Brahman thus in its abstraction--and it is so conceived by the Advaitins of the orthodox type at least--is to conceive it in its utter simplicity, as a sort of compulsory, but an entirely uninterested, substratum for the world of maya; as devoid of all the rich and concrete significance of Maya. The question resolves itself to this: has the world of maya any significance, any purpose, or is it a mere blind play of forces? If philosophy is a search for significance,--what else can it be?--it is clear that it cannot accept the second alternative without committing suicide. If then the first alternative comes to be accepted, that significance cannot belong merely to phenomena, it must belong to the core of reality; Brehman itself. Brahman may not be conceived as a system of relations or related things. Let the things be ever so different from one another, they will all find their unity in Brahman, the fountain-head of their being and their activity. Its supreme purpose may be beond human ken, but how can the reality of this purpose be totally denied without denying the reality--or the phenomenality, if you like,--of everything else? This supreme purpose, unknowable as a whole, yet works itself out in time as evolution. Let us illustrate this from history. The grand panorama of human history discloses the "vanished" glories of old civilisations, and it is pathetically asked: where are the glories of Egypt and Babylon, Greece and Rome? But let us not be deluded by rhetoric. Have these great civilisations really disappeared? Apart from ignorance, is it open to any serious student of history to believe so? In fact these great civilisations spread their culture. The old Babylonian and Persian religion left its indelible stamp on

Judaism and through it on Christianity and Mahomedanism. Nor was Greece left untouched by influences so catching as those of Egypt and Persia. And who but a tryo will say that Greece and Rome are dead when more than half the structure of European civilisation to-day rests broad-based on Greek art and Greek philosophy, on Roman Law and Roman administration?

The whole universe too moves on in its great course of evolution "ohne hast, ohnerast", as great Goethe put it. If all this be a mere pageat, which leaves Brahman untouched, surely we may say that not reason, but mockery stands enthroned in the universe, and we may ask why worry about life itself? The prize that is held out to the jnani: moksha itself, is not a prize that falls into the lap of every fool. It is a prize attained through a strenuous preparation extending over a series of births and deaths, through suffering and travail. Of what worth is all this, if change is of no ultimate worth, and time could be annihilated? If the aim of all human existence is absorption in Brahman, and if this aim is unattainable except through the portals of the world of maya, we submit that the end and the means cannot be divorced, and the reality of the end involves the reality of the means, though of course in a lesser degree.

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PROF. A.R. WADIA.

ODD EXTRACTS

1. Plato thought that a man can find supreme joy in philosophy alone, yet he taught that even these philosophers should be forced to sacrifice their personal predilections, and take their hand at guiding the destinies of their society, or else be condemned to the humiliation of being ruled by inferior men.

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2. Spinoza's philosophy is very pertinent in this connection. He regarded good and evil as only our human ways of looking at things, but from the standpoint of substance, as he conceived God, i.e. sub specie aeternitatis, there is nothing evil, for everything is as it ought to be.
3. A single deviation from the path of rectitude may involve a shattered life or create confusion in a thousand innocent people. It is not easy, because there is no clear cut demarcation between what is good and what is evil. Each concrete situation carries with it its own moral tone, and therefore each person must shoulder the responsibility of solving each moral problem as it arises.
4. What is so intellecutally intellectually satisfactory of karma is the intelligible account it gives of the inequalities of life and of the contents of that life. It portrays a soul perfecting itself in a series of births, till it reaps the reward of its perfection in attaining mukti or freedom from the cycle of births and deaths. This reward comes as the culminating point in the history of a soul extending over centuries, not as the end of a hectic adventure completed in a few decades.
So far, so good. But these ideas have had the fatal effect of forstering fatalism in the masses, which, however, is not inherent in it, for karma is both causative and effectual; man is expected not merely to be the passive sufferer of his past karma, but he can modify it and thus build up his future karma.
5. If this is taken literally, we cannot escape the conclusion that philosophy in India must at bottom be theology. This is a criticism which has been freely advanced against it by European scholars, who argue, moreover, that Indian philosophy has not advanced and cannot advance because it has no independence: it can only be a theology. The validity of this criticism, however, is challenged by Indian

scholars like Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer. As an Advaitin he is not concerned to repudiate the correctness of this criticism so far as the other schools are concerned. So far as the Advaita is concerned, he maintains that Sankara is not a theologian; his arguments are all logical and philosophical, and the references to the Vedas are only meant to support the conclusions of his independent thought. If this claim could be substantiated, the conflict between philosophy and religion would be automatically solved. Has it been substantiated?

6. This is the God that may be worshipped, and rituals and ceremonies and the caste organisation and a hundred other things find their justification with reference to it. But Saguna Brahman is not the reality, it is itself in the world of maya. To a Jnani, to one who has mastered the reality of Nirguna Brahman, the Saguna Brahman has no worth. Religion with its restrictions is not binding on him, it has no joys or terrors for him. It is meant only for the masses, the ordinary struggling weak humanity, the ignorant. To them alone is the worship of Iswara real, not to the Jnani.

It is clear that the worship of an unreal Iswara is radically opposed to the deepest convictions of the truly religious. For them God represents the highest reality, and the innermost desire of their hearts is to walk in the path of righteousness as chalked out for them by His chosen Prophet, and to be at one with Him in a thorough communion of spirit. To them Sankara's Iswara is nothing but the merest mockery of God.

7. The main difficulties involved in Theism are first of all, the attributes of omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence are not reconcilable with one another. Omniscience involves a knowledge of the future and this gives rise to the dilemna:

either this foreknowledge must come true, which means a palpable limit to omnipotence, or omnipotence must involve the possibility of doing anything at any time, in which case foreknowledge loses its edge. It is possible to argue that God cannot be conceived as an irresponsible despot, but that He is Himself bound by the laws of His own devising; that even He is bound by His own laws of righteousness and justice. This is an eminently sensible position to maintain, but it reduces the compatibility of omnipotence and omniscience to mere verbosity. Further, personality implies finiteness. The very rise of this conception has been due to the necessity of expressing the play of a finite human self on the stage of life. There has been an inveterate tendency on the part of human beings to be anthropomorphic and to conceive God in the image of man, a procedure which can hardly be countenanced by sober reason. To conceive Him as a personality is to make Him finite, when the essence of God is His infinitude in all directions. The conception of personality may be the highest possible to bring out the superiority of man on earth. Whether it is so high as to be applicable even to the Highest is certainly open to question. The general prejudice against describing God or the Ultimate Reality as impersonal is for the most part due to the mistaken idea that impersonality implies lifelessness, rigidly, inertia.

8. Philosophy that has to supply an adequate criticism of religious practice has failed in its mission, and the dualism of the paramarthika and the vyavaharika reigns supreme.

9. Philosophy in its self-satisfaction has patronisingly tolerated religion with all its crudeness as a matter of only relative importance, while it has missed its true mission of keeping

religion at a high level by a continuous criticism of its practices and its dogmas. Hence too the variety of religious practices in the whole of India, not all of which could be endorsed by the truly moral.

10. It is a fact indeed that the average Advaitin manages to harbour in his mind the conception of a Nirguna Brahman while devoutly performing the worship of Saguna Brahman and fulfilling a hundred duties connected with the observance of caste regulations. He fails to find any inconsistency between his religious worship and his philosophical convictions. In fact he feels it to be his duty to carry on his usual worship, not because he believes in its efficacy or in its truth, but as an example to the younger members of his family, as a concession to the frailty of ordinary humanity.

11. When they understood the mystery of life and death, they did not keep their knowledge as a cherished secret, but came out into the open arena, and did not rest till they had enlightened their fellow-beings. They may have spent several years of their lives in ascetic solitude, but it was to prepare themselves for their mission in life; not because they thought such an ascetic life to be superior to the claims of this workaday world, but as a necessary strenuous discipline fitting them all the better for the conquest of ignorance and evil in their fellow-beings. Buddha and Mahavir, Sankara, and Ramanujacharya, Kabir, and Nanak Dayanand Sarawati and Sri Ramakrishna were all men of austere but noble and generous character, who in the quest of their own moksha did not forget the needs of humanity, and were ever ready to spend the rich treasures of their spiritual experience for the elevation of mankind. I feel convinced that on the basis of their teaching the Mutts they established were not meant to be rich

and merely feeding the pious pilgrim or the stray visitor. They were essentially meant not to be the habitations of recluses intent on their personal salvation, but of men who had conquered their passions and were prepared to give up the ordinary pleasures of life for the supreme pleasure of helping other struggling souls in their upward march.

12. He has risen above morality--not in the sense that he cannot be tainted by immorality, a preposterous claim advanced in fact by charlatans trading on human credulity, but in the sense that he has risen above the necessity of observing Dharma of the ordinary man.

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VIJNANA BHIKSHU'S YOGASARA-SANGRAHA: Says the Sruti: "As a person in deep sleep perceives the whole universe in himself, and on waking finds himself occupying only a portion thereof,--similarly, having come to conceive of the various states of life--the waking etc. -- as mere illusion, one ought to contemplate on the Supreme Spectator of all this (phenomenal existence)."

$$ Says the Smriti: "Then (in the state of meditation) (the Aspirant) having his mind fixed on Spirit, knows nothing either external or internal,--just as the arrow-maker, having his mind engrossed in the arrow, knew not the king passing by his side."

$$ We however cannot allow the assumption of the so-called Neo-Vedantis, that final emancipation consists in the attainment of Eternal Bliss; because we can find no aphorism in support of this in any recognized system of philosophy; and because it is contradictory to all Sruti, Smriti as well as reasoning. As instances of Srutis precluding pleasure from the state of emancipation, we have the following:-(1) "One who has attained Knowledge re-

renounces Pleasure and pain" (Kathopanishad) and (2) "Pleasure and pain do not touch one (who has attained to Knowledge) without physical body" (Chhandogya-upanishad). As Smritis we have the following: "The agent will cross over the illimitable and turbulent ocean of metempsychosis, when he thinks all that is (called) pleasure to be (really) pain. A man resolved into the Supreme Self by means of knowledge and action, is never touched either by pleasure or by pain." The reasoning (overthrowing the Neo-Vedantic theory may be thus summed up): If Emancipation were an effect (produced), it would be impermanent: and if (to avoid this you assert it to be) permanent, then it would ever continue in its accomplished form, and as such could not be the object of the soul (being within his reach; and as such the laying down of the means to Moksha--Sravana, Manana and Nididhyasana--would be purposeless). Again, you cannot assert that Emancipation consists in the attainment of eternal pleasure; because this attainment too cannot free you from the two horns of the dilemma based on the fact of the pleasure being either permanent or transient. Further, you cannot assert that the purpose of the Soul is the destruction of ignorance and the like covering of everlasting pleasure;--because we all know the purpose of the Soul to consist in the experience of pleasure; and no 'covering' (avarana) is possible, because intelligence is permanent (and as such will lighten up everything). (The Neo-Vedanti objects): "If it is so, how do you explain the Sruti and Smriti passages which mention supreme bliss (as constituting Emancipation)?" We reply: Your objection does not hold; because very good explanations of such passages are afforded

(continued on page 352)

F.H. BRADLEY.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY.

1. The writer on metaphysics has a great deal against him. Engaged on a subject which more than others demands peace of spirit, even before he enters on the controversies of his field, he finds himself involved in a sort of warfare.
2. He is confronted by prejudices hostile to his study, and he is tempted to lean upon those prejudices, within him and around him, which seem contrary to the first. It is on the preconceptions adverse to metaphysics in general that I am going to make some remarks by way of introduction. We may agree, perhaps to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against appearance, or the study of the first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Any such pursuit will encounted a number of objections. It will have to hear that the knowledge which it desires to obtain is impossible altogether; or, if possible in some degree, is yet practically useless; or that, at all events, we can want nothing beyond the old philosophies.
3. To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it is a claim to know reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal.
4. A class of objections which are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical views, and which a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel.
5. Is it possible to abstain from thought about the universe? I do not mean merely that to every

one whole body of things must come in the gross, whether consciousnly or unconsciously in a certain way. I mean that, by various causes, even the average man is compelled to wonder and to reflect. To him the world, and his share in it, is a natural object of thought, and seems likely to remain one.
6.-It protests, that if we are to think, we should sometimes try to think properly. And the opponent of metaphysics, it appears to me, is driven to a dilemma. He must either condemn all reflection on the essence of things--and, if so, he breaks, or, rather tries to break, with part of the highest side of human nature--or else he allows us to think, but not to think strictly. He permits, that is to say, the exercise of thought so long as it is entangled with other functions of our being; but as soon as it attempts a pure development of its own guided by the principles of its own distinctive working, he prohibits it forthwith. And this appears to be a paradox, since it seems equivalent to saying, "You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, so long as you do it in a way which is unsatisfactory." If your character is such that in you thought is satisfied by what does not, and cannot, pretend to be thought proper, and if in you a more strict thinking is want of your nature, that is by all means to be crushed out. And, speaking for myself, I must regard this as dogmatic and absurd.
7. There is, so far as I can see, no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic superstition. Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our commonplace materialism on the other side, (it is natural to take these as prominent instances) vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical inquiry. I do not mean, of course, to condemn wholly either of these beliefs; but I am sure that either, when taken seriously, is the mutilation of our nature. Neither, as experience has amply shown, can survive in the mind which

has thought sincerely on first principles; and it seems desirable that there should be such a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently and yet is too good to become a slave, either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry. That is one reason why I think that metaphysics even if it end in total scepticism should be studied by a certain number of persons.

8. Existing philosophies cannot answer the purpose. For whether there is progress or not, at all events there is change; and in the changed minds of each generation will require a difference in what has to satisfy their intellect. Hence there seems as much reason for new philosophy as there is for new poetry.

9. And that is why, so long as we alter, we shall always want, and shall always have, new metaphysics.

10. Nothing is actually removed from existence by being labelled 'appearance'. What appears is there, and must be dealt with; but materialism has no rational way of dealing with appearance.

11. It is the violent abstraction of one aspect from the rest, and the mere confinement of our attention to a single side of things a fiction which forgetting itself, takes a ghost for solid reality. And I will say a few words on this obvious answer to materialism. That doctrine, of course, holds that the extended can be actual, entirely apart from every other quality. But extension is never so given. If it is visual, it must be coloured; and if it is actual or acquired in the various other ways which may fall under the head of the 'muscular sense'--then it is never free from sensations, coming from the skin, or the joints, or the muscles, or, as some would like to add, from a central source. And a man may say what he likes, but he cannot think of extension without thinking at the same time of 'what' is extended.

and not only is this so, but particular differences, such as 'up and down' 'right and left' are necessary to the terms of the spatial relation. But these differences clearly are not merely spatial. Like the general 'what' they will consist in all cases of secondary quality from a sensation of the kinds I have mentioned above. Some psychologits, indeed, could go further, and could urge that the secondary qualities are original and the primary derivative; since extension (in their view) is a construction or growth from the wholly non-extended. I could not endorse that, but I can appeal to what is indisputable. Extionsion cannot be presented, or thought of, except as one with quality that is secondary.

13. It is by itself a mere abstraction, for some purposes necessary, but ridiculous when taken as an existing thing. Yet the materialist, from defect of nature or of education, or probably both, worships without justification, this thin product of his untutored fancy.

14. Our intellect, then, has been condemned to confusion and bankruptcy, and the reality has been left outside uncomprehended.

15. Space is endless, while an end is essential to its being. Space cannot come to a final limit, either within itself or on the outside. And yet, so long as it remains something always passing away, internally or beyond itself, it is not space at all. This dilemma has been met often by the ignoring of one aspect, but it has never been, and will never be, confronted and resolved. And naturally, while it stands, it is the condemnation of space.

16. For take space as large as complete as you can. Still, if it has not definite boundaries, it is not space; and to make it end in a cloud, or in nothing, is mere blindness and our mere failure to perceive. A space limited, and yet without

side, unfortunately, is compelled likewise to pass beyond itself; and the end cannot be reached. And it is not merely that we fail to perceive, or fail to understand that it cannot be otherwise, at least if space is to be space. We either do not know what space means; and, if so, certainly we cannot say that it is more than appearance. Or else, knowing what we mean by it, we see inherent in that meaning the puzzle we are describing. Space, to be space, must have space outside itself. It for ever disappear into a whole, which proves never to be more than one side of a relation to something beyond.

17. As it stands it is not <u>space</u>.

18. If you take time as a relation between units without duration, then the whole time has no duration, and is not time at all. But, if you give duration to the whole time, then at once the units themselves are found to possess it; and they thus cease to be units. Time in fact is 'before' and 'after' in one; and without this diversity it is not time. But these differences cannot be asserted of the unity; and, on the other hand, and failing that, time is helplessly dissolved. Hence they are asserted under a relation. 'Before its relation to after' is the character of time; and here the old difficulties about relation and quality recommence. The relation is not a unity, and yet the terms are non-entities, if left apart. Again, to import an independent character into the terms is to make each somehow in itself both before and after. But this brings on a process which dissipates the terms into relations, which, in the end, end in nothing. And to make the relation of time a unit is first of all, to make it stationary, by destroying within it the diversity of before and after. And, in the second place, this solid unit, existing only by virtue of external relations, is forced to expand. It perishes in ceaseless oscillation, between an

empty solidity and an transition beyond itself towards illusory completeness.

19. If we were to keep to time as it comes, and are to abstain it first from inference and construction, we must confine ourselves, I presume, to time as presented. But presented time must be in time present, and we must agree, at least provisionally, not to go beyond the 'now'. And the question at once before us will be as to the 'nows' temporal contents. First let us ask if they exist. Is the 'now' simple and indivisible? We can at once reply in the negative. For time implies before and after, and by consequence diversity; and hence the simple is not time. We are compelled then, so far, to take the present as comprehending diverse aspects.

20. For any precess admitted destroys the 'now' from within. Before and after are diverse, and their incompatibility compels us to use a relation between them. Then at once the old wearisome game is played again. The aspects become parts, the 'now' consists of 'nows', and in the end these 'nows' prove undiscoverable. For, as the solid part of time, and 'now' does not exist. Pieces of duration may to us appear not to be composite; but a very little reflection lays bare their inherent fraudulence. If they are not duration, they do not contain an after and before, and they have, by themselves, no beginning or end, and are by themselves outside of time. But, if so, time becomes merely the relation between them; and duration is a number of relations of the timeless; themselves also, I suppose, related somehow so as to make one duration. But how a relation is to be a unity, of which these difference are predicable, we have seen is incomprehensible. And, if it fails to be a unity, of which these differences are predicable, we have seen it incomprehensible. And if it fails to be a unity, time is forwith dissolved.

21. This whole question is less a matter for detailed argument than for understanding in its principle. I doubt if there is any one who has ever grasped this, and then has failed to reach one main result. But there are too many respectable writers whom here one can hardly criticize. They have simply never got to understand.

22. Time perishes in the endless process beyond itself. The end it will be for ever its own relation to something beyond, something in the end not discoverable. And this process is forced on it, both by its temporal form, and again by the continuity of its content, which transcends what is given. Time like space, has most evidently proved not to be real, but to be a contradictory appearance.

23. The problem of change underlies that of motion, but the former itself is not fundamental. It points back to the dilemma of the one and the many, the differences and the identity, the adjectives and the thing, the qualities and the relations. How anything can possibly be anything else was a question which defied out efforts. Change is little beyond an instance of thid dilemma in principle.

24. Change, it is evident must be change of something, and it is obvious, further, that it contains diversity. Hence it asserts two of one, and so falls at once under the condemnation of our previous chapters. But it tries to defend itself by this distinction: "Yes, both are asserted, but not itself by this distinction: but not both in one; there is a relation, and so the unity and plurality are combined.' But our criticism of relations has destroyed this subterfuge beforehand. We have seen that, when a whole has been thus broken up into relations and terms, it has become utterly self-discrepant. You can truly predicate neither one part or the other part, nor any, nor all, or the whole. And, in its attempt to contain

these elements, the whole commits suicide, and destroys them in its death. It would serve no purpose to repeat these inexorable laws.

25. Change, upon any hypothesis, is impossible. It can be no more than appearance. And we may perceive its main character. It contains both the necessity and the impossibility of uniting diverse aspects. These differences have broken out in the whole which at first was immediate. But, if they entirely break out of it, they are dissipated and destroyed; and yet, by their presence within the whole, that already is broken, and they are scattered into nothings.

26. Thus it is required that A chould change and for this, two characters, not compatible, must be present at once. There must be a successive diversity, and yet the time must be one. The succession, in other words, is not really successive unless it is present. And our compromise consists in regarding the process mainly from whichever of its aspects answers to our need, and in ignoring--that is, in failing or in refusing to perceive--the hostility of the other side. If you want to take a piece of duration as present and as one, you shut your eyes, or in some way are blind to the discretion, and, attending merely to the content, take that as a unity. And, on the other hand, it is as easy to forget every aspect but that of the discreetness. But change, as a whole, consists in the union of these two aspects. It is the holding both at once, while laying stress upon the one which for the time is prominent, and while the difficulties are kept out of sight by rapid shuffling.

27. The single fact is viewed alternately from either side, but the sides are not combined into an intelligible whole. And I trust the reader may agree that their consistent union is impossible. The problem of the change defies solution, so long as change is not degraded to the rank of mere appearance.

28. The problem calls upon us to answer how these

aspects and respects are consistently united in the one thing, either outside of our minds or inside--that makes no difference. And if we fail, as we shall, to bring these features together, we have left the problem unsolved. And, if it is unsolved, the change and motion are incompatible internally, and are set down to be appearance.

29. We may regard cause as an attempt to account rationally for change. A becomes B, and this alteration is felt to be not compatible with A. Mere A would still be mere A and, if it turns to something different, then something else is concerned. There must, in other words, be a reason for the change. But the endeavour to find a satisfaction reason is fruitless.

30. It would be a thankless task to work these out into detail, for the root of the matter may be stated at once. If the sequence of the effect is different from the cause, how is the ascription of this difference to be rationally defended? If, on the other hand, it is not different, then causation does not exist, and its assertion is a farce. There is no escape from this fundamental dilemma.

31. The dilemma, I think, can now be made plain. (a) Causation must be continuous. For suppose that it is not so. You would then be able to take a solid section from the flow of events, solid in the sense of containing no change. I do not merely mean that you could draw a line without breadth across the flow, and could find that this abstraction cut no alteration. I mean that you could take a slice off, and that this slince would have no change in it. But any such slice, being divisible, must have duration. If so, however, you would have your cause, enduring unchanged through a certain number of moments, and then suddenly changing. And this is clearly impossible, for what could have altered it? Not any other thing, for you have taken the whole course of events. And, again, not itself, for you have got itself already without any change.

In short, if the cause can endure unchanged for any the very smallest piece of duration, then it must endure for ever. It cannot pass into the effect, and if therefore is not a cause at all. On the other hand, (b) Causation cannot be continuous. For this would mean that the cause was entirely without duration. If would never be itself except in the time occupied by a line drawn across the succession. And since this time is not a time, but a mere abstraction, the cause itself will be no better. It is unreal, a non-entity, and the whole succession of the world will consist of these non-entities. But this is much the same as to suppose that solid things are made of points and lines and surfaces. These may be functions useful for some purposes, but still fictions they remain. The cause must be a real event, and yet there is fragment of time in which it can be real. Causation is therefore not continuous; and so un-fortunately, it is not causation, but mere appearance.

The reader will understand at once that we have repaated here the old puzzle about time. Time, as we saw, must be made, and yet cannot be made, of pieces. And he perhaps will not be sorry to have reached an end of these pages through which I have been forced to weary him with continuity and discreteness.

31. If the forms of space and of time have turned out to be full of contradictions, if, lastly, causation and activity have succeeded merely in aiding inconsistency to inconsistency--if, in a word, nothing ofall this can, as such, be predicated of reality--what is it that is left? If things are to exist, then where and how? But if these two questions are unanswerable, then we are driven to the conclusion that things are but appearances.

32. For a thing to exist it must possess iden-

tity; and identity seems a possession with a character at best doubtful. If it is merely ideal, the thing itself can hardly be real.

The continuity, which is necessary to a thing seems to depend on its keeping as identity of character. A thing is a thing, in short, by being what it was.

33. Our facts, up to the present, have proved to be illusory. We have seen our things go to pieces crumbled away into relations that can find no terms.

34. So far is the self from being clearer than things outside us that, to speak generally, we never know what we mean when we talk of it. But the meaning and the sense is surely for metaphysics the vital point. For, if none defensible can be found, such a failure, I must insist, thought to end the question. Anything the meaning of which is inconsistent and unintelligible is appearance and not reality.

35. Take a section through the man at any given moment. You will then find a mass of feelings, and thoughts, and sensations, which come to him as the world of things and other persons, and again as himself ; and this contains, of course, his views and his wishes about everything. Everything, self, and not-self, wishes about everything. Everything and what is not distinguished either, in short, the total filling of the man's soul at this or that moment--we may understand this when we ask what is the individual at a given time.

36. When we look at the facts and survey the man's self from the cradle to the coffin, we may be able to find no one average. The usual self of one period is not the usual self of another, and it is impossible to unite in one mass these conflicting psychical contents. Either then we accept the man's mere history as his self, and if so, why call it one? or we confine ourselves to periods, and there is no long any single. Or, finally, we must distinguish the self from the usual constituents of the man's psychical being. We must

try to reach the self which is individual by finding the self which is <u>essential</u>.

Let us then take, as before, a man's mind, and inspect its future and contents. We must try to find that part of them in which the self really consists, and which makes it one, not another.

37. Where the essential self is not enclosed by a wall, where the essential self is to end, and the accidental self is to begin, seems a riddle without an answer.

For an attempt to answer it is baffled by a fatal dilemma. If you take an essence which can change, it is not an essence at all; while, if you stand on anything more narrow, the self has disappeared. What is this essence of the self which never is altered? Infancy and old age, disease and madness, bring new features, while others are borne away. It is hard indeed to fix any limit to the self's mutability.

38. The true cause of failure lies in this--that we all persist in asking question when we do not know what they mean, and when their meaning perhaps presupposes what is false.

39. Hence in personal identity the main point is to fix the meaning of person; and it is chiefly because our ideas as to this are confused, that we are unable to come to a further result.

40. We may make memory the criterion. The self, we may hold, which remembers itself is so far one; and in this lies personal identity. We perhaps may wish also to strengthen our case by regarding memory as something entirely by itself and as, so to speak, capable of anything whatever. But this is, of course, quite erroneous.

41. This one memory of which we talk is very weak for many aspects of our varied life, and is again disproportionately strong for other aspects. Hence it seems more like a bundle of memories running side by side and in part unconnected. It is certain that at any one time what we can recall is most fragmentary. There are

whole sides of our life which may be wanting altogether, and others which will come up only in various degrees of feebleness.
42. You are driving towards this dilemma. If the monad owns the whole diversity, or any selected part of the diversity, which we find in the individual, then, even if you had found in this the identity of the self, you would have reconcile it all with the simplicity of the monad. But if the monad stands aloof, either with no character at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine thing in itself, but it is mere mockery to call it the self of a man.
43. Well might everything contained in the psychical individual may be at one time part of self and at another time part of not-self.
44. Self has turned out to mean so many things, to mean them so ambiguously, and to be so wavering in its applications, that we do not feel encouraged. We found, first, that a man's self might be his total present contents, discoverable on making an imaginary cross-section. Or it might be average contents we should presume ourselves likely to find, together with something else which we call dispositions. From this we drifted into a search for the self covered that we really did not know what it was. Then we went on to perceive that, under personal identity, we entertained a confused bundle of conflicting ideas. Again the self, as merely that which for the time being interests, proved not satisfactory; and from this we passed to the distinction and the division of self as against the not-self. Here in both the theoretical and again in the practical relation, we found that the self had no contents that were fixed; or it had, at least, none sufficient to make it a self.
45. You will find a man who has not ever made a a serious attempt to decompose it, or ever resolutely faced the question as to what it contains.

And in the second place, taken metaphysically, these tidings, given from whatever source, are either meaningless or false. And here once again we have the all-important point. I do not care what your oracle is, and your preposterous psychology may here gospel if you place; the real question is whether your response (so far as it means nothing) is not appeance and illusion.

46. And you drage it out into the light, and expose it to the criticism of our foregoing discussions, it will exhibit its helplessness. It will be proved to contain mere unsolved discrepancies, and will give us there, not truth, but in the end appearance.

47. Are they permanent real essences, visible from time to time in their fleeing illustrations? If so, once more Phenomenalism had adored blindly what it rejected.

48. We have found, so far, that we have not been able to arrive at reality. The various ways, in which things have been taken up, have all failed to give more than mere appearance. Whatever we have tried has turned out something which, on investigation, has been proved to contradict itself.

49. And the whole result of this Book may be summed up in a few words. Everything so far, which we have seen, has turned out to be appearance. It is that which, taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be true of the real. But to deny its existence or to divorce it from reality is out of question. For it has a positive character which is induibatable fact, and, however, much this fact may pronounce appearace, it can have no place in which to live except reality. And reality, set on the one side and apart from all appearance, would assuredly be nothing. Hence what is certain is that, in some way, these inseparables are

joined. This is the positive result which has merged from our discussion. Our failure so far lies in this, that we have not found the way in which appearance can belong to reality.

49. We certainly ended with a reflection which promised something positive. Whatever is rejected as appearance is, for that very reason, no mere nonentity. It cannot bodily be shelved and merely got rid of, and, therefore, since it must fall somewhere, it must belong to reality.

50. Hence to think is to judge, and to judge is to criticize, and to criticize is to use a criterion of reality. And surely to doubt this would be merely blindness or confused self-deception. But if so, it is clear that, in rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimately reality is such that it does not deny it, or even in attempt to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity.

51. If we think, then certainly we are not allowed to be inconsistent, and it is admitted that this test is unconditional and absolute.

52. We know that the real is one.

53. We have to ask, is short, if a plurality of reals is possible and if these can merely co-exist so as not to be discrepant? Such a plurality would mean a number of beings not dependent on each other. On the one hand they would possess somehow the phenomenal diversity, for that possession, we have seen, is essential. And, on the other hand, they would be free from external disturbance and from inner discrepancy. After the enquiry of our First Book the possibility of such reals hardly calls for discussion. For the internal states of each give rise to hopeless difficulties. And, in the second place, the plurality of reals cannot be reconciled with their independence.

54. Everything phenomenal is somehow real; and the absolute must at least be as rich as the re-

lative. And, further, the Absolute is not many. There are no independent reals. The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within the whole beyond which there is nothing

55. The Absolute does not want, I presume, to make eyes at itself in a mirror, or, like a squirrel in a cage, to revolve the circle of its perfections. Such processes must be dissolved in something not poorer but richer than themselves. And feeling and will must also be transmuted in this whole, into which thought has entered. Such a whole state would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in this whole all diversions would be healed up. It would be experienced entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss. We cannot imagine, I admit, how in detail this can be. But if truth and fact are to be one, then in some such way thought must reach its consummation. But in that way consummation thought has certainly been so transformed that to go on calling it thought seems indefensible.

56. Thought ends in a reality which swallows up its character.

57. In thinking the subject which thinks is more than thought. And that is why we can imagine that in thinking we find all reality.

58. Quite apart from the difficulty of finding anything merely given, and the impossibility of always using actual present sensation as a test of truth--without noticing the strange prejudice

that outward sensations are never false, and the dull blindness which fails to realize that the 'inward' is a fact just as solid as the 'outward' --we may dismiss the whole objection.

59. Both time and space have been shown to be unreal as such. We found in both such contradictions that to predicate either of the reality was out of the question. Time and space are mere appearance, and that result is quite certain.

60. It is mere supersitition to suppose that an appeal to experience can prove reality. That I find something in existence in the world or in myself, shows that this something exists, and it cannot show more. Any deliverance of consciousness--whether original or acquired--is but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we have to accept. It is in in fact, like other facts, to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any fact is better than appearance. The 'given' of course is given; it must be recognized, and it cannot be ignored. But between recognizing a datum and receiving blindly its content as reality is a very wide interval. We may put it thus once for all--there is nothing given which is sacred. Metaphysics can respect no element of experience except on compulsion. It can reverence nothing but what by criticism and denial the more unmistakably asserts itself. Time is so far from enduring the test of criticism, that at a touch it falls apart and proclaims itself illusory.

61. By its inconsistency time directs us beyond itself. It points to something higher in which it is included and transcended.

In the first place change, as we saw must be relative to a permanent. Doubtless here was a contradiction which we found was not soluble. But, for that, the fact remains that change demands some permanence within which succession happens. 1

I do not say that this demand is consistent, and, on the contrary, I wish to emphasize the point that it is not so. It is inconsistent, and change desires to pass beyond simple change. It seeks to become a change which is somehow consistent with permanence. Thus, in asserting itself, time tries to commit suicide as itself, to transcend its own character and to be taken up in what is higher.

62. Time's inherent tendency is to pass beyond itself. Time is an appearance which contradicts itself and endeavours vainly to appear as an attribute of the timeless.

63. Time is not real as such, and it proclaims its unreality by its inconsistent attempt to be an adjective of the timeless. It is an appearance which belongs to a higher character in which its special quality is merged. Its own temporal nature does not there cease wholly to exist but is thoroughly transmuted. It is conterbalanced and, as such, lost within an all-inclusive harmony. The Absolute is timeless, but it possesses time as an isolated, loses its special character.

64. It may be well at this point perhaps to look bak on the ground which we have traversed. In our First Book we examined some ways of regarding reality, and we found that each of them contained fatal inconsistency. Upon this we forthwith denied that, as such, they could be real. But upon reflection we perceived that our denial must rest upon positive knowledge. It can only be because we know, that we venture to condemn. Reality, therefore, we are sure, has a positive character, which rejects mere appearance and is incompatible with discord. On the other hand it cannot be something apart, a position qualified in no way save as negative phenomena. For that leaves essence phenomena still contradictory, while it contains in its essence the contradiction of a something which actually is

excluding diversity, but is somehow including it in such a way as to transform its character. There is plainly not anything which can fall outside of the Real. That must be qualified by every part of every predicate which it rejects; but it has such qualities as counterbalance one another's failings. It has a super-abundance in which all partial discrepancies are resolved and remain as higher concord.

And we found that this Absolute is experience, because that is really what we mean when we predicate or speak of anything. It is not one-sided expepience, as mere volition or thought, but it is a whole superior to and embracing all incomplete forms of life. This whole must be immediate like feeling, but not, like feeling, immediate at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is immediate as holding and transcending these differences. And because it cannot contradict itself, and does not suffer a division of idea from existence it has therefore a balance of pleasure over pain. In every sense it is perfect.

Then we went on to inquire if various forms of the finite would take place within this Absolute. We insisted that nothing can be lost, and yet that everything must be made good, so as to minister to harmony. And we laid stress on the fact that the HOW was inexplicable. To perceive the solution in detail it is not possible for our knowledge. But, on the other hand, we urged that such an explanation is not necessary. We have a general principle which seems certain. The only question is whether any form of the finite is a negative instance which serves to overthrow this principle. Is there any thing which tends to show that our Absolute is not possible? And so far as we have gone, we have discovered as yet nothing. We have at present

not any right to doubt about the Absolute. We have no shred of reason for denying that it is possible. But, if it is possible that is all we need seek for. For already we have a principle upon which it is necessary; and there it is certain.

65. Have we any reason to believe in the existence of anything beyond our private selves? Have we the smallest right to such a belief, and is it more than literally a self-delusion? We, I think, may fairly say that some metaphysicians have shown unwillingness to look this problem in the fact. And yet it cannot be avoided. Since we all believe in a world beyond us, and are not prepared to give this up, it would be a scandal if that were something which upon our theory was illusive. Any view which will not explain, and also justify any attitude essential to human nature, must surely be condemned. But we shall soon see, upon the other hand, how the supposed difficulties of nature, must surely be condemned. But we shall soon see, upon the other hand how the supposed difficulties of the question have been created by false doctrine. Upon our general theory they lose their foundation and vanish.

The argument in favour of Solipsism, put most simply, is as follows: "I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be MY experience. From this it follows that nothing is beyond myself exists; for what is experience is its states."

The argument derives its strength, in part, from false theory, but to a greater extent perhaps from thoughtless obscurity. I will begin by pointing out the ambiguity which lends some colour to this appeal to experience. Experience may mean experience only direct, or indirect also. Direct experience I understand to be confined to the given, to the merely felt or presented. But indirect experience includes all

fact that is constructed from the basis of the 'this' and the 'mine'. It is all that is taken to exist beyond the felt moment. This is a distinction the fatal result of which Solipsism has hardly its argument be defended.

66. My self, as an existence to which phenomena belong as its adjectives is supposed to be given by a direct experience. But this gift plainly is an illusion. Such an experience can supply us with no reality beyond that of the moment. There is no faculty which can deliver the immediate revelation of a self beyond the present. And so, if Solipsism finds its one real thing in experience, that thing is confined to the limits of mere 'this'. But with such a reflection we have already, so far, destroyed Solipsism as positive, and as anything more than a sufficient reason for total scepticism.

67. We sometimes forget that this world, in the mental history of each of us, once had no existence Whatever view we take with regard to the psychological origin of extension, the result will be the same. There was a time when the separation of the outer world as a thing real, apart from our feelings, had not even begun. The physical world, whether it exists independently or not, is, for each of us, an abstraction from the entire reality.

68. That the outer world is only for my organs appears inevitable. But what is an organ except so far as it is known? And how can it be known but as itself the state of an organ? If then you are asked to find an organ which is a physical object, you can no more find it than a body which itself IS a body. Each is a state of something else, which is never more than a state--and the SOMETHING escapes us. The same consequence, again, is palpable if we take refuge in the brain. That is nothing but the state of some brain, I need not

proceed to ask whose. It is, in any case, not real as a physical thing. And this illusive quest goes on for ever. It can never lead you to what is more than either an adjective of, or a relation between what you cannot find.

69. Nature is but an appearance within the reality; it is a partial but imperfect manifestation of the Absolute. The physical world is an abstraction, which, for certain purposes is properly considered by itself, but which, if taken as standing in its own right, becomes at once self-contradictory.

70. The difficulties, which have arisen, are due mainly to one cause. Body and soul have been set up as independent realities. They have been taken to be things, whose kinds are different, and which have existence each by itself, and each in its own right. And then, of course, their connection becomes incomprehensible, and we strive in vain to see how one can influence the other. And at last, disgusted by our failure, we perhaps resolve to deny wholly the existence of this influence. We may take refuge in two series of indifferent events, which seem to affect one another. while in fact, merely running side by side. And, because their conjunction can scarcely be a bare coincidence, we are driven, after all to admit some kind of connection. The connection is now reviewed as indirect, and as independent on something else to which both series belong. But, while each side retains its reality and self-subsistence, they, of course cannot come together; and, on the other hand, if they come together, it is because they have been transformed and are not things, but appearances. Still this last is a conclusion for which many of us are not prepared. If soul and body are not two 'things', the mistake, we fancy has lain wholly on the side of the soul. For

the body at all events seems a thing, while the soul is unsubstantial. And so, dropping influence altogether, we make the soul a kind of adjective supported by the body. Or, since, after all, adjectives must qualify their substantives, we turn the soul into a kind of immaterial secretation, ejected and, because 'out', making no difference to the organ. Nor do we always desert this view when 'matter' has itself been discovered to be merely phenomenal. It is common first to admit that body is mere sensation and idea, and still to treat it as wholly independent of the soul, while the soul remains its non-physical and irrelevant secretion.

71. What is a body? In our last chapter we have anticipated the answer. A body is a part of the physical world, and we have seen that Nature by itself is wholly unreal. It was an aspect of the Whole, set apart by abstraction, and, for some purposes, taken as independent reality. So that, in saying that a body is one piece of Nature, we have at once pointed out that it is no more than appearance.

72. And the soul is clearly no more self-subsistent than the body. It is, on its side also, a purely phenomenal existence, an appearance incomplete and inconsistent, and with no power to maintain itself as an independent 'thing'.

73. The body and soul are, in brief, phenomenal arrangements, which take their proper place in the constructed series of events; and, in that character, they are both alike defensible and necessary. But neither is real in the end, each is merely phenomenal and one has no title to fact which is not owned by the other.

74. The existence by itself of either body or soul is illusory. Their separation may be used for particular purposes, but it is, in the end, an untrue or a provisional abstraction.

75. This mistaken opposition is based upon a truth, a truth that has been misapprehended and perverted into error. What has been perceived, or dimly felt, is in fact a principle that, throughout this work, has so often come before us. The real in the end is self-subsistent, and contained wholly in itself; and its being is therefore not relative, nor does it admit a division of content from existence. In short, relativity and self-transcendence, or, as we may call it, ideality, cannot as such be the character of ultimate reality.

76. We have seen that body and soul are phenomenal constructions. They are each inconsistent abstractions, held apart for the sake of theoretical convenience. And the superior reality of the body we found was a superstition. Passing thence to the relations which seems to couple these two makeshifts, we endeavoured to define it. We rejected both the idea of mere concomitance, and of the one-sided dependence of the soul; and we urged that an adjective which makes no difference to anything, is nonsense. We then discussed briefly the possibilities of bare soul and bare body, and we went from this to the relations which actually exist between souls. We concluded that souls affect each other, a fact, only through their bodies, but we insisted that, none the less ideal identity between souls is a genuine fact. We found, last of all, that, in the psychical life of the individual, we had to recognize the active working of sameness.

77. The Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection. Such predicates belong to, and have a meaning only in the world of appearance.

78. Our judgments, in a word, can never reach as far as perfect truth, and must be content merely

to enjoy more or less of validity.

79. We may put it otherwise, by saying that truths are true, according as it would take less or more to convert them to reality.

80. Perfection of truth and of reality has in the end the same character. It consists in positive self substiting individuality.

81. Truth must exhibit the mark of internal harmony or, again, the mark of expansion and all-inclusiveness. And these two characteristics are diverse aspects of a single principle. That which contradicts itself, in the first place, jars, because, the whole immanent within it, drives its parts into collision. And the way to find harmony, as we have seen, is to redistribute, these discrepancie in a wider arrangement.

82. Hence to be more or less true, and to be more or less real, is to be separated by an interval, smaller or greater, from all-inclusiveness or self-consistency.

83. But to hold a thought, so to speak, in the air, without a relation of any kind to the Real, in any of its aspects or spheres, we should find in the end to be impossible. This statement, I am aware, may seem largely paradoxial. The merely imaginary, I may be told, is not referred to reality. It may, on the contrary, be even with consciousness held apart. But, on further reflection, we should find that our general account will hold good. The imaginary always is regarded as an adjective of the real. But in referring it, (a) we distinguish, with more or less consciousness, the regions to which it is, and to which it is not, applicable. And (b) we are aware, in different degrees, of the amount of supplementation and rearrangement, which our idea would require before it reached truth.

84. And this leads us to the second point. We have seen that every idea, however imaginary, is, in a sense referred to reality.

85. You may measure the reality of anything by the realitive amount of transformation, which would follow if its defects were made good. The more an appearance, in being corrected, is transmuted and destroyed, the less reality can such appearance contain; or to put it otherwise, the less genuinely does it represent the real.
86. In the end each would force us to embrace as complete reality a meagre and mutilated fraction, which is therefore, also, and in consequence, internally discrepant. And each is based upon one and the same error about the nature of things. We have seen that the separation of the real into the idea and existence is a division admissible only within the world of appearance. In the Absolute every such distinction must be merged and disappears. But the disappearance of each aspect, we insisted also, meant the satisfaction of its claims in full. And hence, though how in detail we were unable to point out, either side must come together with its opposite in the Whole. There thought and sense alike find each its complement in the other. The principle that reality can wholly consist in one of these two sides of appearance, we therefore reject as a fundamental error.
87. Existence is not reality, and reality must must exist. Each of these truths is essential to an understanding of the whole, and each of them, necessarily in the end, is implied in the other. Existence is, in other words, a form of appearance of the Real.
88. It is confused attempt to seize and hold in religion that Absolute, which, if it really were attained, would destroy religion. And this attempt by its own inconsistency, and its own failure and unrest, reveals to us once more that religion is not final ultimate. But, if so, what, I may be asked, is the result in practice. That, I reply

at once, is not my business; and insistence on such a question would rest on hurtful prejudice. The task of the metaphysician is to enquire into ultimate truth, and he cannot be called on to consider anything else, however important it may be. We have but little notion in England of freedom either in art of in science. Irrelevant appeals to practical results are allowed to make themselves heard. And in certain religions of art and science this sin brings its own punishment; for we fail through timidity and through a want of singleness and sincerity. That a man should treat of God and relition in order merely to understand them, and apart from the influence of some other consideration and inducement, is to many of us in part unintelligible, and in part also shocking. And hence English thought on these subjects, where it is not studied in foreign school, is theoretically worthless. On my own mind the effect of this prejudice is personally detterent. If to show theoretical interest in morality and relition is taken as the setting oneself up as a teacher or preacher, I would rather leave these subjects to whoever feels that such a character suits him. And, if I have touched on them here, it was because I could not help it.

89. And, baffled by its failure to find its dogmas realized in the universe, this way of thinking at last may threaten us with total scepticism. But here, once more, it is but speaking of that of which it knows really nothing; for an honest scepticism is a thing outside its comprehension. An honest and truth-seeking scepticism pushes questions to the end, and knows that the end lies hid in that which is assumed at the beginning. But the scepticism (so called) of Common Sense from first to last is dogmatic. It takes for granted, first, without examination that certain doctrines are true; it then demands that this collection of dogmas should come to an arrangement; and, when its demand is rejected by the universe,it none the

less persists in reiterating its old assumptions. And this dogmatism, simply because it is baffled and perplexed, gets the name of scepticism. But a sincere scepticism attacking without fear each particular prejudice finds that every finite view, when taken by itself, becomes inconsistence. And borne on this inconsistency, which in each case means a self-transcendence, such a scepticism is lifted to see a whole in which all finites blend and are resolved. But when each fact and end has forgone its claim, as such, to be ultimate or reasonable then reason and harmony in the highest sense have begun to appear. And scepticism in the end survives as a mere aspect of constructive metaphysics. With this we may leave the irrational dogmas of popular Ethics.

90. But to be in earnest with metaphysics is not the affair of perhaps one or two years; nor did any one ever do anything with such a subject without giving himself up to it.

91. We have found that no one aspect of experience as such, is real. None is primary, or can serve to explain the others or the whole. They are all alike appearances, all one-sided, and passing away beyond themselves.

92. This one Reality of existence can, as such, nowhere exist among phenomena. And it enters into but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress. It may repay us to discuss the truth of this last statement. Is there, in the end on the whole any progress in the universe? Is the Absolute better or worse at one time than at another? It is clear that we must answer in the negative, since progress and decay are alike incompatible with perfection. There is of course progress in the world, and there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that one Whole either moves on or backwards. The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number. These, with their tale of progress or decline, are

constructions starting from and based on some one given piece of finitude. They are but partial aspects in the region of temporal appearance. Their truth and reality may vary much in extent and in importance, but in the end it can never be more than reality. And the question whether the history of a man or a world is going forwards or backwards, does not belong to metaphysics. For nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real, can move. The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and it never has summer and winter. Such a point of view, if it disheartened us, has been misunderstood. It is only by our mistake that it collides with practical belief. If into the world of goodness, possessing its own relative truth, you will directly thrust in ideas which apply only to the Whole, the fault surely is yours. The Absolute's character, as such, cannot hold of the relative, but the relative unshaken for all that, holds its place in the Absolute. Dr again, shutting yourself up in the region of practice, will you insist upon applying its standards to the universe?

93. This is a topic on which for several reasons, I would rather keep silence, but I think that silence ~~is~~ here ~~mi~~ might fairly be misunderstood. It is not easy, in the first place, to say exactly what a future life means. The period of personal continuance obviously need not be taken as endless. And again precisely in what sense, and how far, the survival must be personal is not easy to lay down. I shall assume here that what is meant is an existence after dath which is conscious of its identity with our life here and now. And the duration of this must be taken as sufficient to remove any idea of unwilling extinction or of premature decease.

93. Future life is a subject on which I had no desire to speak. I have kept silence until the subject seemed forced before me, and until in a

manner I had dealt with the main problems involved in it. The conclusion arrived at seems the result to which the educated world, on the whole, is making its way. A personal continuance is possible, and it is but little more. Still, if any one can believe it, and finds himself sustained by that belief--after all it is possible. On the other hand it is better to be quit of both hope and fear, than to lapse back into any form of degraded superstition. And surely there are few greater responsibilites which a man can take on himself, than to have proclaimed, or even hinted, that without immortality all religion is a cheat and all morality a self-deception.

94. With regard to the main character of that Absolute our position is briefly this. We hold that our conclusion is certain, and that to doubt it logically is impossible. There is no other view, there is no other idea beyond the view here put forward. It is impossible rationally even to entertain the question of another possibility. Ourside our main result there is nothing except the wholly unmeaning, or else something which on scrutiny is seen really not to fall outside. Thus the supposed Other will, is short, turn out to be actually the same; or it will contain elements dislocated and so distorted into erroneous appearance. And the dislocation itself will find a place within the limits of our system. Our result, in brief, cannot be douted, since it contains all possibilities. Show us an idea, we can proclaim, which seems hostile to our scheme, and we will show you an element which really is contained within it. And we will demonstrate your idea to be a self-contradictory piece to our system, an internal fragment which only through sheer blindness can fancy itself outside. We will prove that its independence and isolation are nothing

in the world but a failure to perceive more than one aspect of its own nature.

And the shocked appeal to our modesty and our weakness will not trouble us. It is on this very weakness that, in a sense, we have taken our stand. We are impotent to divide the universe into the universe and something outside. We are incapable of finding another field in which to place out inability and give play to our modesty. This other area for us is mere pretentious nonsense; and on the ground of our weakness we do not feel strong enough to assume that nonsense is fact. We, in other words, protest against the senseless attempt to transcend experience. We urge that a mere doubt entertained may involve that attempt, and that in the case of our main conclusion it certainly does so. Hence in its outline that conclusion for us is certain; and let us endeavour to see how far the certainty goes.

Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity. To suppose the universe plural is therefore to contradict oneself, and, after all, to suppose that it is one. Add one world to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each the finite appearance of a higher and single Reality. And plurality as apperance (we have seen) must fall within, must belong to, and must qualify the unity.

95. Beyond all doubt then it is clear that Reality is one. It has unity, but we must go on to ask, a unity of what? And we have already found that all we know consists wholly of experience. Reality must be, therefore, One Experience, and to doubt this conclusion is impossible.

We can discover nothing that is not either feeling or thought or will or emotion or some-

thing else of the kind. We can find nothing but this, and to have an idea of anything else is plainly impossible. For such a supposed idea, is either meaningless, and so is not an idea, or else, its meaning will be found tacitly to consist in experience. The Other, which it asserts, is found on inquiry to be really no Other. It implies, against its will and unconsciously, some mode of experience.

96. For me a prson is finite or is meaningless. But the question raised as to the Absolute may, I think, be more beiefly disposed of. If by calling it personal you mean only that it is nothing but experience, that it contains all the highest that we possibly can know and feel, and is a unity in which the details are utterly pervaded and embraced--then in this conclusion I am with you. But your employment of the term personal I very much regret. I regret this use mainly not because I consider it incorrect--that between us would matter little--but because it is misleading and directly serves the cause of dishonesty.

For most of those who insist on what they call 'the personality of God', and intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and, to reach, it, they argue for another. But the second, if proved, is quite different, and serves their purpose only because they obscure it and confound it with the first. And it is by their practical purpose that the result may here be judged. The Deity, which they want, is of course, finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time. They desire a person in the sense of a self, amongst and over against other selves, moved by personal relations and feelings towards these others--feelings and relations which are altered by the conduct of others. And, for their purpose, what is not this, is really nothing. Now with

this desire in itself I am not here concerned. Of course, for us to ask seriously if the Absolute can be personal in such a way, would be quite absurd. And my business for the moment is not with truth but intellectual honesty.

It would be honest first of all to state openly the conclusion aimed at, and then to inquire if this conclusion can be mainteained. But what is not honest is to suppress the point really at issue, to desire the personality of the Deity in one sense, and then to contend for it in another, and to do one's best to ignore the chasm which separates the two. Once give up your finite and mutable person, and you have parted with everyting which, for you, makes personality important. Nor will your bridge the chasm by the sliding extension of a word. You will only make a fog, where you can cry out that you are on both sides at once. And towards increasing this fog I decline to contribute. It would be useless in such company and in such an atmosphere, to discuss the meaning of personality--if indeed the word actually has any one meaning. For me it is sufficient to know, on one side, that the Absolute is not a finite person. Whether, on the other side, personality in some eviscerated remnant of sense can be applied to it, is a question intellectually unimportant and practically trifling.

With regard to the personality of the Absolute we must guard against two one-sided errors. The Absolute is not personal, or is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true. And yet in these denials we may be falling into worse mistakes. For it would be far more incorrect to assert that the Absolute is either false, or ugly, or bad, or is something even beneath the application of predicates such as these. And it is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. But neither mistake should be necessary. The Absolute stands

above, and not below, its internal distinctions. It does not eject them, but in includes them as elements in its fullness. To speak in other language, it is not the indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes. But it is better in this connexion to call it superpersonal.

97. The conclusion which we have reached, I trust, the outcome of no mere compromise, makes a claim to reconcile extremes. Whether it is to be called Realism or Idealism I do not know, and I have not cared to enquire. It neither puts ideas and thought first, nor again does it permit us to assert that anything else by itself is more real. Truth is the whole world in one aspect, an aspect supreme in philosophy, and yet even in philosophy conscious of its own incompleteness. So far again our conclusion has claimed infallibility, it has come, I think, into no collision with the better part of common sense. That metaphysics should approve itself to common sense is indeed out of the question. For neither in its processes nor in its results can it expect, or even hope, to be generally intelligible. But it is no light thing, except for the thoughtless, to advocate metaphysical results which, if they were understood by common sense, would at once be rejected.

98. Reality must keep a certain character. The whole of its contents must be experience, they must come together into one system, and this unity itself must be experience. It must include and must harmonize every possible fragment of appearance. Anything which in any sense can be more than and beyond what we possess, must still inevitably be more of the self-same kind.

99. Everything is error, but everything is not illusion. It is error where, and in so far as, our ideas are notcthe same as reality. It is illusion where, and in so far as, this difference turns to a conflict in our nature. Where experience,

inward or outward, clashes with our views, where there arises this disorcer confusion and pain, we may speak of illusion. It is the course of events in the collision with the set of our ideas. Now error, in the sense of one sided and partial truth, is necessary to our being.

100. It costs little to find that in the end Reality is inscrutable. It is easy to perceive that any appearance, not being the Reality, in a sense is fallacious. These truths, such as they are, are within the reach of any and every man. It is a simple matter to conclude further, perhaps, that the Real sits apart, that it keeps state by itself and does not descend into phenomena. Or it is as cheap, again, to take up another side of the same error. The Reality is viewed perhaps as immanent in all its appearances, in such a way that it is, alike and equally, present in all. Everything is so worthless on one hand, so divine on the other, that nothing can be viler or can be more sublime than anything else. It is against both sides of this mistake, it is against this empty transcendence and this shallow Pantheism, that our pages may be called one sustained polemic. The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality, and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values--this double truth we have found to be the centre of philosophy. It is because the Absolute is no sundered abstraction but has a positive character, it is because Absolute itself is positively present in all appearance, that appearances themselves can possess true differences of value. And, apart fro from this foundation, in the end we are left without a solid criterion of worth or of truth or reality. This conclusion--the necessity on one side for a standard, and the impossibility

of reaching it without a positive knowledge of the Absolute--I would venture to press upon any intelligent worshipper of the Unknown.

101. Reality is about thought and above every partial aspect of being, but it includes them all. Each of these completes itself by uniting with the rest, and so makes the perfection of the whole. And this whole is experience, for anything other than experience is meaningless. Now anything that in any sense 'is', qualifies the absolute reality and so is real. But on the other hand, because everything, to complete itself and to satisfy its own claims, must pass beyond itself, nothing in the end is real except the Absolute. And viewed intellectually appearance is error. But the remedy lies in supplementation by inclusion of that which is both outside and yet essential, and in the Absolute this remedy is perfected.

102. To question or xx doubt intelligently you must first understand. If I, for instance, who know no mathematics, were to reiterate about some treatise on the calculus, "But what does it mean?" I should hardly in this way have become a sceptic mathematically. Scepticism of this kind is but a malady of childhood, and is known as one symptom of imbecility, and is surely has no claim to appear as a philosophical attitude. If about any theory you desire to ask intelligently the question "What does it mean?" you must be prepared, I should have thought, to enter into that theory. And attempting to enter into it you are very liable, in raising your doubts, to base yourself tacitly on some dogma which the theory in question has given its reason for rejecting. And to avoid such crude dogmatism is not given to every man who likes to call himself a sceptic. And it is given to no man, I would repeat, without labour and education. But in the article

which I have cited there is, apart from this absurd idea about sceptisism, nothing we need notice. There are some mistakes and failures to comprehend of an ordinary type, coupled with some mere dogmatism of an uninteresting kind.

MEHER BABA. *

1. Though it is normally an undeniable piece of service to give food to those who are needy, there may be some qualifying circumstances which, in a particular situation, require that the person who comes for food should not be given food for his own good. The tendency to beg for food as charity creates undesirable sanskaras, and in feeding a person who comes to you with this tendency you may help him to increase the burden of such sanskaras. So, though you may appear to do him good by offering food, you may in reality be successful only in binding him further. And, though it may not have been your motive to crush him under your obligations, you may in actuality be doing him nothing else, when you are charitable not through understanding but through habit.
2. Service which is based upon comprehensive understanding is not only selfless and adjusted to the spiritual needs of the recipient, but is rendered with complete detachment; and it is such service which takes the aspirant to the goal most rapidly.
3. External renunciation; for the west particularly is impracticable and inadvisable. "Renunciation" should be mental. One should live in the world, perform all legitimate duties, and yet feel mentally detached from everything.

* "Meher Journal" 1939

4. He who has the clearest perception of final good will be in a position to render the most important and valuable type of service.
5. There can be no realisation of infinity through the pursuit of a never-ending series of consequences.
6. The human mind can at best make brilliant conjectures about the past and the future of the universe, because it is bound by the spell of Maya. It can neither arrive at final knowledge on these points, nor can it remain content with ignorance about them.
7. The human mind cannot reconcile itself with infinite regress in its search for the origin of the world, nor can it reconcile itself with endless change without a goal. Evolution is unintelligible if it has no initial cause, and it is deprived of all direction and meaning if it all does not lead to a terminus.
8. Mahapralaya or the final annihilation of the world, when the world becomes what it was in the beginning, namely nothing. The Mahapralaya of the world may be compared with the sleep of a man. Just as the varied world of experience completely disappears in the case of the man who is in deep sleep, the entire objective cosmos which is the creation of Maya vanishes into nothingness at the time of the Mahapralaya. It is as if the universe had never existed at all.
9. From the point of view of this timeless Reality the whole time-process is purely imaginary, and billions of years which have passed and billions of years which are to pass do not have even the value of a second. They are like not having existed at all.

So the manifold and evolving universe cannot be said to be a real outcome of this one Reality. If it were an outcome of this one Reality,

Reality would be either a relative term or a composite being, which it is not. The one Reality is absolute.

The one Reality includes in itself all existence. It is everything, but it has nothing as its shadow. The idea of all-inclusive existence implies that it leaves nothing outside its being. When you analyse the idea of Being, you arrive by implication at the idea of that which does not exist. This idea of non-existence or 'nothing' helps you to define clearly our notion of Being. The complementary aspect of Being is thus Non-being or Nothing. But "Nothing" cannot be looked upon as having its own separate and independent existence. It is nothing in itself. Nor can it, in itself, be a cause of anything. The manifold and evolving universe cannot be the outcome of "Nothing" taken by itself. And you have seen that it cannot also be the outcome of the one Reality. How then does the manifold and evolving universe arise?

The manifolding and evolving universe arises owing to the mixing up of the one Reality and "Nothing". It springs out of 'nothing' when this 'nothing' is taken against the background of the one Reality. But this should not be taken to mean that the universe is partly the outcome of the one Reality, or that it has an element of Reality. It is an outcome of 'nothing' and is nothing. It only seems to have existence. And its apparent existence is due to the one Reality which is, as it were, behind "Nothing". When nothing gets added to the one Reality, you get the manifold and evolving universe.

10. Absolute as such entirely unaffected by any addition or substraction. The one Reality remains what it was, complete and absolute in itself and unconcerned and unconnected with the panorama of creation, springing out of "Nothing".

11. The whole evolutionary process is within the

domain of imagination.When in imagination the one ocean of Reality gets apparently disturbed, there arises the manifold world of separate centres of consciousness. This involves the basic division of life into the self and not-self or the 'I' and its environment. And owing to the falseness and the incompleteness of this limited self (which is only an imagined part of a really indivisible totality), consciousness cannot remain content with eternal identification with it.

12. As long as consciousness is subject to the working of vitiating imagination, it cannot successfully put an end to this duality, and all the varied attempts which it makes for the assimilation of the not-self (or the environment) result merely in the replacement of the initial duality by other innumerable novel forms of the same duality.

13. When Sanskaras, thus accumulated, begin to express themselves (instead of merely lying latent in the mental body), they are experienced as desires, i.e. they are apprehended as being subjective. The subjective and the objective are the two aspects of the sanskaras; the former is the passive state of latency, and the latter is the active state of manifestation.

Through the active phase the accumulated sanskaras determine each experience and action of the limited self. Just as in the cinema several feet of film have to pass for exhibiting a small action on the screen, many Sanskaras are often involved in determining a single action of the limited self. And through such expression and fulfilment in experience the sanskaras get spent up, The weak Sanskaras get themselves spent up mentally; the stronger ones get themselves spent up subtly in the form of desires and imaginative experience; and those Sanskaras which are powerful get themselves spent up by physically by expressing themselves through bodily action.

14. After a certain point is reached, this tendency is checked and counteracted by a natural reaction consisting in a complete change over to its direct opposite, making room for the operation of opposite sanskaras.

Vry often the two opposites form parts of one and the same chain of imagination. For example, a person might first experience that he is a famous writer, with wealth, fame, wife and all the agreeable things of life, and may, later in the same life, experience that he had lost his wealth, fame, wife and all the agreeable things of life. Sometimes it seems that a chain of imagination does not contain both the opposites. For example, a person might experience throughout his life that he is a powerful king always victorious in battles. In this case he has to balance this experience by the experience of defeats or the like in the next life, taking one more life to complete his chain of imagination. The purely psychological compulsion of the Sanskaras is thus subject to the deeper teleological need of the soul.

15. The progess through the six planes is a progress in imagination. But the realization of the seventh plane is the cessation of imagination, and, therefore, the awakening of the individual into Truth-consciousness.

The illusory progress through the six planes cannot, however, be altogether avoided. Imagination has to be completely exhausted before a person can realize the Truth.

16. Longing is preliminary to the realization of the Infinite. It has at this stage been the instrument of annihilating all other desires, and is itself ready to be quenched by the unfathomable stillness of the Infinite.

17. It has to pass from duality to non-duality. Instead of wandering in imagination it has to

arrive at the ending of imagination. The Master understands the one Reality as being the only Reality and the 'Nothing' as being merely its shadow.
18. He comprehends within his being all existence, and looks upon the entire play of manifestations as merely a game.
19. We want the evidence of knowledge put into practice.
20. Knowledge of that ultimate reality. In that knowledge everything else is contained. If we had it, our lives would be lifted to their highest level.
21. The age is charactised by extreme frankness.
22. The teacher we desire must have achieved complete self-mastery, and have reconciled and transcended the opposites that divide the life of man. He will seek nothing for himself, and will be unaffected by sex, money or fame.
23. In psychological terms, a teacher is one who throws light upon the unconscious--he is a mediator between the conscious and the unconscious mind.
24. There are imperfect teachers who know a little, we meet them often; but the perfect teacher is met with rearely. It is the turning point in one's life when such a meeting takes place, and it does not happen to everyone. We can meet teachers in books; but it is better to meet them in flesh.
25. He does not invite people to leave the world, but to make use of it, to raise it to spiritual values. We should live in the world, he says, and yet be not of it, attend to all worldly duties and yet be completely detached from their results.
26. It should not be understood that I discard and hate materialism. I mean that materialism should not be considered an end in itself but a means to the end.

T. SUBBA RAO.

"ESOTERIC WRITINGS" (Continued)

Admitting Mill's reasoning, Advaita concludes that the various conditions of Ego and Non-ego are but appearances of one and the same entity --entity is neither matter nor spirit, neither ego nor non-ego--the one existence which remains eternal. This grand universe is not reality but a huge aggregation of various states of consciousness, the ultimate is Parabrahman. The Aryans have traced this current of mental states to its source.

$$ The adept points out to the disciple the real basis and nature of his own personality. He reveals to him the mystery of his own logos, gives him a portion of his own spiritual strength and energy.

$$ The Monad, Logos, Soul, is the neutral point of consciousness. When completely isolated no consciousness is experienced by it.

$$ What we call 'I' is a fiction created by our ignorance which dissolves away when we analyse the idea of self.

$$ The three States classification is purposely obscure:to make it perfect each of these states must be further divided into three: Thus:

THE OBJECTIVE STATE.=

Waking:	(1) Waking	WAKING=	Ordinary consciousness.
	2 dream	,,	dream ,, ,,
	3. dreamless	,,	deep sleep ,, ,,

THE CLAIRVOYANT STATE.=

Dream	(1) Waking Dream	=	Waking clairvoyance.
	(2) dreaming	,,	somnambolic ,,
	(3) dreamless	,,	Kama loka (death world)

THE ECSTATIC STATE=

Dreamless-ness:	(7) Waking deep sleep	=	Devachan.
	8 dream	,, ,	Consciousness with interval between 2 planets.
	9. Dreamless	,,	Arupa- formless state between planetary rounds.

These different states mean simply that the one observer, the Self, observes 9 classes of objects.

Atma is the inmost principle in Man. Krishna says Ahamatma, or "I am atma"= I am that I AM of Bible, "I am who I am" or Mazdao" of Zend Avesta

Gautama, after his initiation into the Mysteries, renounced every form of theism, recognised no deity outside of oneself, and became Buddha.

$$ Parabrahm is unconscious NOT in the sense that it is the negation of all consciousness, which is a great fallacy. Conscious existence involves three elements--the Knower, the Knowledge and the Known. Parabrahm is the One without a Second, or the unification of the three elements--the break-up of the three receptacles. Therefore there can be no conscious existence in Parabrahm. On the other hand, to derive consciousness from that which is the negation of every form of consciousness--Unconsciousness--is to establish an impossible relation. There if Parabrahm is not Unconsciousness, it is only not conscious in the sense that the word must be always be used. We can only conclude it is Absolute Consciousness.

$$ The Personality no more feels of <u>itself</u>,, I AM, than does the suit of clothes in which it is arrayed.

$$ Western readers should examine John Stuart Mill's Cosmological Theory as explained in his examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy before attempting to understand Advaita. Mill holds that the ideas of mind and matter, ego and external world are really evolved from the aggregation of our mental state which are the only realities so far as we are concerned. The chain of our mental states: Mill confessed

that the mysterious link which connected together the train of our states and gives rise to our egohood is a mystery. (Answer by P.B. It is 4th state substratum). (CONTINUED FROM page 418.
~~(reading unfinished; reached up to page 470)~~

THE SIDDHA-YOGA OR MAHA-YOGA.

(This is the same system as Barisal but with a different Guru.)

Both Hinduism and Sufi philosophy recognise that the Guru can transfer power to his disciple and thereby cause psychological changes in him. Each disciple reacts differently to such a favour of his Guru. Mr. Tryambak Bhasker Shastri Khare writes thus on this subject in the Ygank of Kalyan (X--P. 395):-

"Gurus of the Tantra Discipline transmit power into their disciples by touching the plexus at the throat (Remember Deep Narain Singh) and between the eye-brows, and thereby make them undergo experiences. What is gained in the Hatha Yoga with difficulty and trouble is experienced here only through the favour of the Guru. Now-a-days Gurus who awaken the Kundalini by the transfer of power are rare. I saw only one such Guru in the last twenty-five years. He is a Bengali Sannyasi. His name is Nityanand Maharaj. This Bengali Sannyasi awakened the Kundalini of Mr. Gulavani and what is wonderful the latter himself could then transmit power to others and awaken Kundalini in them as he did awaken it in an aspirant. Such Great Beings raise one to their level in no time. It is not known where he is now."

The Sufi teachers are more lavish but it is not always an advantage to get Kundalini awakened before one is mentally and morally ready for it. We understand that Gurus of this Discipline are not so rare and that, after initiation the disciple must practise strenuously for some years to gain even tolerable perfection.

Another writer, Swami Shri Shri-Shankar Purushottam Tirtha of Goverdhan Math, Puri, in the same magazine (p.172) describes a Yoga-system called The Siddha-yoga or Maha-yoga which apparently is the same as the one above. The Yoga-shikhopanishat mentions a Siddhi-marga which, in this writer's opinion, is the same as the one he describes. He proceeds as follows:--

"Kaivalya-Mukti can be easily obtained by the Siddhi-marga (Path of Attainment). In the beginning the Guru sends into the disciple some of his power which awakens the Kundalini, and then gradually success in Yoga is attained. Just as a guest has not to collect cooking pots, food provisions, firewood etc. but through the favour of the host he satisfies his hunger with the food cooked in the host's house, in the same way the disciple has not to go through the various stages of yoga like Asan, Pranayama, Mudras etc. but gets success in yoga through the power sent into him by his Guru. This is the easy and natural process. In the other process of going through all the stages difficulties and dangers are met. Just as you sleep or eat when you feel sleepy or hungry, in the same way when you feel an inner urge to do the Asan, Pranayama and Mudra you follow it and by practising according to it you get peace. In fact to resist that urge then is harmful. Just as in great grief weeping is a relief....so on the Guru's sending in his power in the disciple he will feel an urge to practise an Asan, Mudra, Pranayam or other movements of the body and following that urge will give the disciple a sort of satisfaction, and resistance to that urge will create mental and physical discomfort. Just as a physician's medicine restores bodily harmony in the same

way on entering the Siddhi-marga through the force-transmission (Shakti-sanchar) by the Guru and by the practice of mantra repetition or Dhyan (meditation), he points out, all the various stages of yoga are attained easily and naturally. It is then not necessary to take separate lessons on Asans, Mudras and Pranayams from the Guru or to make any other special efforts.

By gradual progress along this line the disciple attains to success until he experiences the oneness of his Self and the Universal Self or the unbroken higher consciousness.

This is the Siddhi-marga or the Siddhi-yoga but it depends on the favour of a duly qualified Guru."

This writer has described his system in a small Bengalee book called "Yoga-banee" or "Siddha-yogopadesha," obtainable from Shree Ganesh Chandra Dutta, M.A.B.L., 3 Kirti Mitter Lane, P.o. Shyambazar, Calcutta, or from the Manager, Shree Goverdhan Math, Puri. The system is brief in this. The Guru puts the force into the disciple who must be of good health pure conduct, and gives him a mantra to recite. He puts him into touch with the Power behind the mantra. The disciple, he may be of any age or sex, leads a pure life, is extremely devoted to the Guru otherwise he cannot draw his power, and in the beginning does the repetition for about eight hours a day divided into four periods of morning, noon, evening and night. His food is Satvic by nature, and life controlled. As he progresses he feels inclination to do, and does such Pranayama, asans, mudras and bandhas as are necessary in his case. He later practices as long as he feels inclined. He leaves

himself to Mother Nature and follows his inclinations. He passes through wonderful experiences including one-ness of consciousness which is the true test of spiritual evolution.

The transmission of power may take place by touch, sight, word, or by mental thought. This power and the mantra recitation eventually lead to the awakening of the Kundalini, to the prana flowing through the Sushumna which now is felt as a hollow lightning rod from the muladhar to the head. The Kundalini passes through the various Chakras to the head.

Throbbing, shaking, rising from the seat, swimming round of the head and swooning are some of the signs that, singly or in company, may manifest themselves on this awakening. Other signs that may manifest on this awakening are sweating, rhythic movements of the body, a desire to sing, dance, laugh or weep, a feeling of intoxication, standing of the hair on the body, paleness, depression and so on. One might feel that ants were creeping in one's spine. The Kundalini may move as an ant does, or as a serpent, or a frog, or a bird moves. One understands these things on experience and not from mere description.

The time required for full success in this discipline may vary from nine to twelve years if the effort is determined and persevering. In rare cases the period may be shortened to six or to even three years in vary rare cases. The ordinary yoga practices are called unnatural and difficult while here the practices come to one unasked and naturally. This mantra-yoga leads through Hatha and Laya to Jnana-yoga. The food of the disciple is of the Satvic nature and acids, wines, pungent and some other articles are avoided. Sometimes some minor ailments or suppressed diseases

make their appearances or the body gets thinned. One should not mind these. All these come to the surface to pass out for ever. But one should not give up one's daily practices on their account.

Experiences may come to one just in the beginning or may take time to come. It all depends upon one's progress in past lives and present efforts. People may lose interest and may even fall away. But they alone are responsible for that misfortune.

It appears that Chaitanya Maha Prabhu and Bijoy Krishna Gowswami had followed this discipline, which is very old.

Now we shall describe some of the experiences of a student on this Path which will show us what value to attach to this system.

On one occasion during his practice he saw himself reflected in a big unreal mirror, on another occasion this student saw his reflection without any image of a mirror. (P.B. sees his too).

Some Great Being appeared to him in a dream and blessed him and gave him a mantra. It seemed to his as if a flame of the size of a thumb rose up in him, passed through the Sahasrar and out of the head. He felt he was that flame and had then no idea of the body. Then he passed up, up, up beyond the Sun and the Moon, to a place where there was neither light or darkness. He felt if he proceeded further his I-ness or Ego-ism would disappear, and he was afraid he would not be able to return, so he awoke but a feeling continued for sometime in him that he was not his body.

On another occasion it was a summer day and after taking his meals he had laid himself down in Shavasan and was doing his mantra

recitation. He slept and in a dream he saw that a great Being came to him and repeated some mantra in his right ear. The disciple felt great bliss but he also felt that if more power were forced into him his body would break and he would not be able to bear it. So he awoke.

One morning in the Brahma-muhurta (4 a.m.) he was meditating and in course of meditation he felt that he was like a great morning Sun with His Rays spreading all around Him. He had nothing to do with his body. When the mind was diverted outward he felt that he was this Sun or Parmatma (Universal Soul) and that the human ego or Jiva was only a Ray of that Sun, and that there was no difference between the sun and the ray.-

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FATHER R. ZIMMERMAN. S.J.

ANUBHAVA, THE CRITERION OF TRUTH IN SANKARA.

There must have been many readers of the 'Indian Philosophical Review, who with great interest went over 'Anubhava: The Criterion of Truth in Sankara' by V. Subrahmanya Iyer meant to be a reply to, and criticism of "Truth and its Criterion in Sankara's Vedanta" by R. Zimmerman, S.J. And there was at least one who enjoyed the perusal of Mr. Iyer's article thoroughly. That happy man was the writer of the article criticised. The reasons for his "delectation" are more than one. First, 'Anubhava' (which may stand for Mr. Iyer's reply, 'criterion' signifying my essay) is a proof that my humble enquiry has not entirely fallen flat. Fear had already crept over the writer, 'Criterion' might simply have been trushed aside as coming from a homo novus, and a mlecchа to boot. Now no less a thinker and writer than my esteemed antagonist has thought his worth his while to take up the cudgels and come forth a veritable Goliath against poor little David. Secondly, a reply brings the antagonists to closer quarters. When meeting for the first time, two opponents suffer from the disadvantage of not knowing one another intellectually, and especially, philosophically: both may use the same language and the same terms; yet owing to their different views, conditions and suppositions, these terms may not denote the same mental concepts. Thus a reply, the first stage in a fray, is apt to become a step towards mutual understanding. Third, I must feel very grateful for having got an opportunity to dispel certain prejudices that seem to obsess my honoured opponent as regards the motives for writing 'Criterion' and my general attitude towards an opinion that happens to differ from my own.

The present writer could not help coming to the conclusion that 'Anubhava' represents 'Criterion' not from the right angle of vision. For instance, 'Anubhava' imputes to the author of 'Criterion' that he looks down upon the Vedantin's God (Brahman) "which he deliberately spells with a small b, while he honours the Christian God with a big G." The explanation for that small b is much simpler. Like every Sanskritist, being very fond of the handsome Devanagari characters, I see and read even transliterated Sanskrit words in that script where there are neither small b's nor big G's. There is as little difficulty for me in writing Brahman with a big B as there is in spelling Leibniz's Monad with M or Uttanapad, the mysterious cosmic principle in the Rgveda with U. To respect my zealous antagonist's susceptibilities I shall indeed now consistently spell Brahman. An emphatic protest, however, must here on my part be lodged against my being brought into connection with the nefarious crime of beating Mr. Iyer's mother or my own. That I could appear to my critic armed with a poniard, and that he heard me crow victory testifies to a remarkably fertile imagination owned by the writer of "Anubhava."

Again, it would be very interesting to know what unlucky specimen of theologian has crossed Mr. Iyer's way. To that ill-starred individual every possible light (and honesty) seems to be barred. It is certainly a great condescension on the part of my honoured and learned opponent to devote twelve closely printed pages of criticism to the production of such mental miscreant as a theologian seems to be before his philosophical eye. It may also happen that that individual whom Mr. Iyer revels in daubing a theologian in "the coils of an octopus"--horrible dictu--has spent the best part of his life on philosophy and philology. I must not omit to ,

thank my formidable opponent for the compliment he has paid to the originality of "Criterion." The writer of that essay approached the question of Truth in Sankara's system "not without diffidence" but with the "ardent desire to find out and tell the truth", certainly without prejudices of any kind, unless it be prejudice to be loyal to truth and to that system of philosophy one has found a sure guide in all scientific pursuits. In return it is only fair to pay my critic the tribute of acknowledging that, he has in "Anubhava" at least tried to follow the line of argument in "Criterion" and that, he has realised the main issue. Whether he has, or has not, fallen into the fault which he lays at my door, that I have directed my attacks against a creation of my dry fancy instead of against the "accredited expounder of Vedanta" this is a question which will be answered by the appropriateness of the following remarks. Let it, however, not be forgotten, either, that it would not be the first time in the history of polemics that an attacked position has been defended with the taunt:- "What you attack is undoubtedly false, but that is not my position." As Mr. Iyer, has chosen to give his reply a personal tone one may be justified in assuming that he will like, certainly not resent it, if now and then the same is done in the course of these remarks.

As the esteemed opponent has been kind enough to follow the thread of my reasoning, I shall take up his line as well and examine his enquiry into I the soundness of my general principles, II the correctness of the premises with which I started; and III the correctness with which I apply to them the laws of reasoning.

After deducting what belongs to more rhetoric and exhibition of style it will be found that the adversary declares my general principles

unreliable, that he denies the correctness of the principles on which the argumentation of 'Criterion' is based, and that, finally he exhibits a good deal of apparently well meant sympathy with they way in which I apply to the 'premises' the laws of reasoning, or as he, more in a Kavya style, puts, with the way in which I institute the search after a mare's nest and attempt the building of "castles-in-the-air."

General principles. Mr. Iyer contests my statement that "different canons of Truth leading to contradictory results cannot be applied in one and the same system." (2) He kindly takes us to 'the province of Mathematics," where "we employ different standards of truth in ascertaining the measure of the circumference of a circle in terms of the diameter. At one stage" we are informed "we proceed upon the formula that the circumference is 3 1/7 times the diameter. At another stage, we employ the measure 3.14159. And at a further stage we find that they are incommensurable." In the interest of mathematics, as well as that of my opponent, and not less in that of the cause he represents, one could wish he had hit upon a better proof for the falsity of my statement. Neither 3 1/7, nor 3.14156 are standards or canons of Truth at all, but they are approximations to the incommensurable ratio between circumference and diameter of a circle. That mathematician has yet to be born who says that either 3 1/7 or 3.14159 or anything but incommensurability represents the true relation between circumference and diameter. Incommensurability is the standard (prameyam in the etymological sense), by which the correctness of all the other formulas is measured (prameyam). Incommensurability gives the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; all

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other formulas are found to give not the truth, but something near it. It seems that Mr. Iyer, here has dished up a bad pie.

May I suggest another example more apt to illustrate the point in question. So far the amount of 43 seconds per 100 years in the motion of Mercury's perihelion was in Newton's theory of gravitation inexplicable. Newton's theory, them, contained a standard of truth that was insufficient in the case mentioned, it is, therefore, being given up by experts for the canon of truth implied in Einstein's theory of gravitation which actually explains the hitherto inexplicable amount of the motion of Mercury's perihelion@ But none of these experts would be prepared to admit both Newton's and Einstein's theories of gravitation on this point, either simultaneously or successively. My opponent is generous enough to concede "that different canons of truth leading to contradictory results cannot be applied at the same stage of thought, i.e. when things are viewed from one and the same standpoint." I agree, Hari stands before me, his face towards me: I get a view of Hari from the front. Then he turns around. I get a view of Hari from the back. But he may turn round and round till he gets giddy, Hari will never beome not-Hari, can never be said to be Hara. A traveller may see Mysore from the City View on Chamundi Hill, or from an aeroplane: it will always be Mysore. What changes is the aspect, the position and relation to the observer, not the object itself. Vyasti, once recognized as true can never become Samasti, as long as our intellect and the principles of cognition remain what

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@ See "The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation" by E. Freundlich. Cambridge Uni.Press.

they are. ".....; a rational system demands that everything be viewed from as many standpoints as are current in the world or as are possible. For its worth as a system depends upon the way in which it co-ordinates or reconciles the difference in views." Following the light of my poor wits, I have applied the Aristotelean canon of Truth to Sankara's Vedanta. That cannot be gainsaid to be a standpoint current in the world. Why then does my logical opponent get so nervo nervous? And I have been waiting to see how he co-ordinates or reconciles Sankara's and Aristotle's difference in views. So far, at any rate, we have been favoured only with the reiteration of shibboleths.

That the present writer's theory of Truth 'has been, with no little force, repudiated by competent philosophical authorities in Europe; not to say by the Advaitins also in India ('Anubhava'), moves an Aristotelian very little. For he sticks to the maxim in Logic that one valid syllogism is worth more than a whole library of sayings that go against the Advaitin, in particular, in the present circumstances amounts to a fault in Logic which nobody of the dialectic powers of Mr. Iyer should become guilty of. Great may in the eyes of my opponent be Schopenhauer, greater Kant; great Plotin, greater still Sankaracharya: but greatest of all is Truth, whatever and wherever that may be. The galaxy of theories on Truth my learned adversary is prepared to recognize for the Vyvaharika, is rather heterogeneous. Utility for one, will by most people be ranked among questions and theories on Ethics. My honoured antagonist makes me say, "Truth to consist in the correct mental representation of the

of the outside world, so that it could lead to an understanding of how the world of thought corresponds to the world of Reality." This, possibly, is meant to be a quotation of the passage in "Criterion":- What is truth? Supposing truth consists in the correct mental representation of the outside world, what measure are we to apply to find out whether our world of thought corresponds to the world of Reality?" There are, of course, degrees of accuracy, and the reader may judge about that of my philosophical opponent. Let that pass, however. But if Mr. Iyer replies to this question:- "But Sankara holds that Reality is never an object of thought and there is no possibility of a correspondence or representation in regard to reality" then we accept this a a devout repetition of a hallowed formula from his own dogma. Why not 'roam' a little outside that dogma? If my opponent were no so nervous about theology--natural and super-natural--I could take him to some of the greatest geniuses the world has even seen who showed that and how the simplest is possible Being philosophy has conceived yet perceives itself and that as reality. Nor should my learned opponent have experienced any difficulty in catching what in "Criterion" is meant by reality.

The very pertinent question has been put to be by the writer of "Anubhava". "May we know which of these principles (put forth by me as coinciding with the notion of Truth) are universally acknowledged?" (Anubhava). Answer:- These principles which the most thorough-going sceptic affirms implicitly; those principles which we use both in our everyday Vyavahara and in most subtle speculations; the same principles my opponent was relying upon when he set pen to paper to

write "Anubhava"; those principles--to cut a long tale short--one of which is essentially the same in Para and Apara Vidya and is the basis even in the realization of the Brahman (as Mr. Iyer has been kind enough to admit in 'Anubhava') That European Idealists do not accept my criterion of Truth is very sad indeed, but I may console myself with Mr. Iyer's own words:- "But with that school we have nothing to do". To show how far even the European Idealists coincide with my ideas of Truth and Criterion, I crave the permission of referring to 'Criterion', Again, how far every Idealist 'stultifies' his own theory is a matter of experience and history and need not detain us here. If Mr. Iyer finds that my general principles do not furnish a common ground for discussion, the onus falls now on him to point out such a common ground. In "Criterion" the attempt was made to furnish that common ground, starting from common sense and everyday experience. The common ground pointed out there has been acknowledged and cultivated by learning and science these 3000 years. My opponent's concession:- "It is not contended here that Father Zimmerman's views are erroneous," is either a conumdrum in this connection or a counsel of despair. Either they are erroneous or they are not. If they are erroneous why not correct them and furnish the common ground? If they are not erroneous, why not accept them as the common ground? As earnest as I am in the search for Truth, so ready am I to accept it; why then leave me so wretchedly in the lurch?

As a matter of fact, there is hardly any use of going on, if the common ground is really wanting. In token, however, of gratitude for the statement that my principles are "not erroneous", I proceed to Mr. Iyer's criticism o

of my Premises.
Premises. In the way of a prelude I readily agree with my learned antagonist that Pare and Apara Vidya are in-adequately translated by Esoteric and Exoteric Knowledge. The terms, coming from Greek philosophy, neither in their meaning in Aristotle, nor in their present denotation, can well render accurately technical expressions of a totally different system. The words Esoteric and Exoteric were used in deference to previous writers--and such writers as my opponent esteems highly, for the want of something better, and finally, because the writer of "Criterion" has more important things to do than to nag as the rendering of terms the original meaning of which is perfectly clear to every student of Vedanta. How difficult it is to find congruent English idioms for Para and Apara Vidya the critical writer of "Anubhava" has proved. For "Empirical" and "Rational" knowledge do not coincide with what Vedanta means by Apara and Para Vidya either, if they are not more inaccurate that Exoteric and Esoteric knowledge. Vide Oxford Dictionary and Eisler, Woerterbuch Der Philosophischen Begriffe,

Now the eight false stones have to be examined which in Mr. Iyer's eyes, form the weak foundation of the tottering structure of "Criterion." It would be ungrateful not to thank him for the fatherly anxiety which my kind opponent exhibits in offering his 'disillusionments.' I also would emphatically ask him to exchange the 'if' for 'as' in the clause 'if he cares for truth.' The first false stone is my wrong notion and definition of Anubhava. It would then be not only interesting, but for the sake of Truth necessary to learn what definition Mr. Iyer has to offer in its place.

This, however, my acute philosopher disdains to do. The inaccurate way of quoting and treating other peoples' words noticeable here again may be passed over. Nor need I mention that it should not have been above perceptive powers of a renowned Vedantist to grasp what in 'Criterion' was meant by samyagdarsanam, consciousness, self-realisation, etc.: viz., exactly that which constitutes the essence of Vedanta, or elements of it. Even Sankaracharya could not help using terms like Saksatkara, though he must have felt that words were poor vehicles for his lofty ideas. May be Sankara himself was a trifle wrong, as my dear friend Dr. Pandit Mahabhagwat of Kurtkoti, sometime occupant of a Sankaracarya Pitha must himself find to be often reading "Anubhava."

But this is not to be passed over that my opponent instead of giving the sorely needed, clean-cut, real definition means to pound the poor false first stone with the statement ex-cathedra:- "In that anubhava, there do not exist the three factors, Jivatma, Paramatma and knowledge of identity, as well as perhaps a fourth, the consciousness which is said to be aware of these three factors." Has Mr.Iyer really misunderstood the situation to that extent that he does not think it worth his while to make clear the very cardinal point in dispute? Or is he prepared to waive the hotly defended claim of Vedanta to be philosophy by not explaining the logical, i.e., philosophical basis of the new system, appealing to authority, as he does instead, without any further proof for his or others' statement? In the best of cases, Mr. Iyer has put forth here a delightful Autos epha, that may crush a pious

Vedantin, but leave an impartial outsider perfectly cool. Of the same argumentative force are the two quotations from the Upanishads. They are wonderful in their brevity and force of formulas. But as proofs they weightvery little. It may be painful for a staunch Vedantin, but instructive for everybody else, that the same texts that have been adduced by Sankara and repeated ad nauseam by his followers for the establishment of their tenets have been used by Ramanujacharya and others as foundations for their rival systems, or have at least been explained in their sense or have simply been discarded. To adduce Sruti texts--of which I have read a good deal--is as futile as it would be to bring in proofs from the Christian Bible. I have spared Mr. Iyer that.

What my most honoured opponent has to say about the second false stone is really refreshing. Because in the first place, he does there excellent Don Quixote work and, in the second, he makes valuable concessions. In "Criterion" it was said that Sankara puts "Anubhava not only above, but against the other sources of knowledge." In the context this can only mean:- Sankara puts the Anubhava of the Para Vidya not only above but, if need be, against other sources of knowledge of the Apara Vidya. Mr. Iyer makes it to imply that according to my (wrong) opinion in Sankara's system Anubhava is a valid Pramana, (means of knowledge) only in Para, but not in Apara Vidya. This is the second stumbling block for my opponent--was never said, which, however does not prevent my astute opponent from fighting against it. Everyone is free to choose his own pastime, though that may be a mere fight against windmills.

The next paragraph contains a concession, viz. that also the poor Dvaitin may have a reliable Anubhava. That, is worth something. So the Dvaitin's opinion may be admitted among the "twenty thousand conflicting experiences" But if the Advaitin has to examine 19999 others first, he may get tired or too old to go through the Dvaitin's view, if that should happen to be the last of the 20,000. That, after all, does not matter so very much, since Mr. Iyer's Advaiting has no more right to his Anubhava than the Dvaitin has to his.

My vigilant opponent makes me declare that 'the Advaitin's world of Anubhava does discard mystic experiences and intuitional knowledge." What Mr. Iyer's Advaitin does or does not discard, I cannot be expeçted to know. But that Sankaracharya has not, in his system, explicitly admitted any other Pramana besides Anubhava others will have found besides me. Perhaps my kind critic will be good enough to show where it comes in implicitly. My opponent's horror of theology would also suggest that the genuine Advaita eschews mysticism. But things seem to change. That I have made any Vedantin discard intuitional knowledge must have been discovered by my wary opponent at a rather late hour of the day. I tried to protect Sankaracharya from the aspersion of uncontrollable, merely chimerical, arbitrary intuition, by implicitly and, if I am not mistaken, explicitly ascribing to him the intuition of a genius. And now Mr. Iyer finds fault with this!

How is it that my antagonist says:-"(The Advaitin) tests all (the data of human experiences, consequently also the "Advaitin's world of Anubhava) by means of reason and

holds fast to that which he considers absolutely true." And we are informed, "commonsense tells the Advaitin that the meaning of the Sruti and especially where there are conflicting interpretations is made out by means of reasoning based upon the authority of anubhava, the supreme court." The most benevolent interpretation cannot help finding here a slight muddle in the rank of the courts of judicature in questions of cognition and Truth.

Next we have to deal with the third false stone, viz., "the argument that the Sruti is Pramana (means of knowledge) for Nirguna Brahman." To this assertion I reply as follows:-

(1) That the Sruti is pramana for Nirguna Brahman has not been given in the way that conclusions were deducted from it essential to the whole thesis. It is therefore a mere statement, not an argument affecting the main thesis.

(2) In making the statement, I find myself in respectable company, which my adversary might be not unwilling to join if he knew who they are.

(3) In mykopinion the role of Sruti in Sankara's system is, as far as the Nirguna Brahman is concerned, that of Prasthana rather than Pramana. Though Sankaracharya freely uses Sruti as a proof, yet it is certainly in the individual Samyagdarsanam only in the relation of Angatva to Anubhava.

(4) If Sankara is made to say (ubi?):-"The knowledge of Brahman depends altogether upon the thing, i.e. Brahman itself," then is this nothing else but the view which with great labour and moderate success the writer of "Criterion" has tried to prove that knowledge depends upon the object and not vice versa, after all a fairly old truth. If Mr. Iyer will

be so kind as to turn this false stone once more over he may perchance find that it comes from his own quarry. The lesson on the Sruti authority "for other purposes" is something to be grateful for, in particular the short homily on the scriptural proof "for the tenet of the causal relation or creator-ship (Sic!) of Brahma, ie.e of Saguna or apara Brahma." My preaching friend proclaims:- 'It need hardly be said that it is only he who has actually seen and caught God in the very act of forging the world that can with absolute certainty and honesty say that God did create." I agree after having substituted 'ought' for 'need' the second word of my quotation. Has my learned tutor, so well acquainted with Eastern and Western philosophy never noticed that the creation of the world is a philosophical question, before, for a rational mind and methodical enquiry, it can be a theological one. Is it possible under the sun that Mr.Iyer should not know the philosophers of first rank who asserted the creation of the world by God in the very act of forging the world', nor turned to 'Scriptural Revelations' for proof of their tenet. What follows on the theologians is best passed over in tactful "absolute silence."

The fourth false stone. It is the assertion "that Nirguna Brahma is attained by Brahma Jignasa." Some thing like this was said in a relative clause, if I remember well; my opponent again makes a main link in the proof of the thesis out of it. That may pass, however. But if Mr. Iyer thinks--as he seems to do that by 'attained' 'produced' is meant, then he has not understood a very common English word. To array the Bhavopanisad in proof of

his view is futile, as has been shown above. Any piece from the Oupneck'hat, say the Mrat Lankoul, would have the same argumentative force. The classical text Taitt. Up.2.4.1: Yato Vaca Nivartante aprapya manasa saha, is 'translated' with:- From which all speech, with the mind turns away unable to reach it." Apparently Mr.Iyer had a recension before him that slightly differs from the common one.

My valiant opponent aims the Brahmasutras themselves at me. He says:- "No one has to go beyond the first Sutra to understand that "the object of the Sastra (Jignasa) is only to discard the distinctions fictituiously created by nescience. It has nothing whatever to do with Brahman which is ever existing, which has never been subject to ignorance. The Brahman proved by such Jignasa is the Saguna Brahman, the hypothetical author of the word: the theological Brahma, but not the philosophical." As "noone has to go beyond the first Sutra" to find what Mr. Iyer avers that the Brahma-Sutrabhasya says on the point, this must be found in the first Sutra:- Athato Brahma jijnasa. The quotation of my accurate friend seems to refer to : "Jnatumiccha Jijnasa. Avagatiparyantam jnanam sanvacyaya iccayah karma phalavisayatvadicchayah. Jnanaesa hi pramanenavagantumistam Brahma. Brahmavagatirhi purusarthah, nihsesasamasara-bijavidyadanarthanibarhanat."--"Brahmasutra-Sankara." Here in his classically clear and forcible way Sankara says that Jijnasa means the desire to know. The desired (object) is to grasp Brahman by means of knowledge...For Brahman-knowledge is the aim of man, since (by that) all the evil, like nescience, etc., being the germ of rebirth, is rooted out. Whether Saguna orrNirguna Brahman is meant the text says a

few lines later - "Asti tavad Brahma nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhavam, sarvanjam, sarvasakti samanvitam,....Sarvasyatmatvacca Brahmastityaprasiddhih. Sarvo hyatmastityampratyeti, na nahamasmiti. Yadi hi hatmastitvaprasiddhih syat sarvo loko nahamasmiti pratiyat. "Atma ca Brahma". It would be an insult to a scholar of the calibre of Mr.Iyer to translate the passage. The Sanskrit is perfectly clear, as clear as that Nirguna Brahman is the object of Brahmajijnasa in Sankara's view. If, in spite of all, any doubt should be left on this point, my antagonist is referred to the commentaries of Srigovindananda, And that Nirguna Brahman is the final object of Sankara in the first Adhyaya of his commentary on the Brahmasutras, has been stated with all possible clearness by Madhusudana-Saraswati- who may stand for many--in his Prasthanabheda. How Jijnasa can ever mean Sastra as my friend is pleased to render it, passes my simplicity.

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth stones, which my learned adversary has discovered, come all from the same layer. I wonder why he has not found more of them. They all rest on the foundation that in a controversy we are bound to admit at once what first has to be proved, in our case that a non-Advaitin is bound to accept the doctrine of the Advaitin if only he speak solemnly enough. I shall content myself with not wasting any space of the Review, and precious printer's ink on a matter that should be clear beyond hesitation to any one who enters on polemics. Nor am I in fairness bount to examine Mr.Iyer's quotation from the Sankarabhasya furnished here, before correct quoting is ascertained.

Process of reasoning.Having thus obtained an

idea of the criticism of the learned writer, we shall now consider the few samples of reasoning adducing which he evidently thinks to deal the final blow to poor me. All these samples are meant to illustrate the elementary Vedanta dogma that the Nirguna Brahman does not know a Dvitiya. The chief if not the only merit of these "samples" is that they are logically fairly well connected and that they are supposed to follow as a matter of course from the primitive Vedanta tenet just mentioned. That elementary doctrine is illustrated with an enviable amount of rhetoric. But all this was never denied by "Criterion" for a single moment. But "Criterion" enquired into the method of proving the Nirguna Brahman; since Vedanta has in unmistakable terms been called a philosophical system, Philosophy is a science that has to prove its tenets and cannot simply demand adherance to them. And we are told by no less an authoritiy than that of Mr. Iyer that "it is...perfectly logical to ask... whether the Absolute exists?"

"What has been said above will show that one of the most fruitful sources of confusion" in polemics about Vedanta may be "the failure to draw the line clearly between the facts given and the facts assumed. Nowhere in polemics does the opponent admit at the outset 'the facts assumed," the postulates of the other party. My honoured antagonist could have saved a good deal of valuable energy if he had remembered that in controversy he has before him an opponent to, not an exponent of, his system. The exponent admits "facts given and assumed"; the opponent admits "facts given" and opposes "facts assumed" without consequent proof. Mere repetition of formulas and dogmas from a philo-

sophical system cannot increase their logical strength.

When Mr. Iyer wrote the last but one paragraph of "Anubhava" he must have had before him a very abridged history of European philosophy. What he says about the study in the West of dream and sleep, about the quest of universally common and uniform experiences, the primitive knowledge of logical inconsistencies as those underlying the use of terms like unity, causality and truth, shows a blissful ingorance. In the end "Anubhava" holds out a glorious Sravanphala:- "this anubhava, the Advaitin says, is ever within the reach of every man, woman and child. Only they all know not it is so." Someone of the present writer's acquaintance, whether man, woman or child, according to Mr. Iyer, it does not matter, has tried for upwards of ten years to grasp the Vedanta doctrine, has studied the Upanishads and writeen about them, has devoured Sankaracarya's works, has even become a Sannyasin, has read Mr.Iyer's works "Anubhava"--a more 'orthodox' treatise than which you cannot find - has even seen his statement about Anubhava; and yet that someone has not reached Anubhava. So there must be something wrong somewhere.

When I first saw "Anubhava" I hoped to get a good deal of enlightenment on Sankara's Vedanta. Unfortunately that hope has been frustrated. It may interest my opponent, for whose earnestness and zeal nobody can have but the greatest respect, to know that my Indian friends with whom I have spoken, share my humble opinion. So we have to plod on again without ire and party spirit.

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THE LATE JAGADGURU SRI SATCHIDANANDA NRI-SIMHA BHARATI SWAMI: HEAD OF SRINGERI MUTT & GURU OF V.S.I. (by "Anynymous")

1. A true saint may therefore,--even if he happens to stand at the head of Brahmin orthodoxy, with all its superstition, its ritual, its dogma and its mysticism,--be deemed a gift from the Heaven to our entire race; and his personality deserves the respectful study even of those who, being sincere, have till now been unable to see any hope of emancipation in the system which produced him. One such saint and helper of humanity,--at any rate in the eyes of the masses of Hindu population, particularly in South India,--was to be found in the person of the subject of this brief sketch. Great in several respects and from several points of view, His Holiness the late Jagadguru of Sringeri had never a superior in that piety, that purity, that sanctity, that humility, that tranquillity, that gentleness, that sweetness, that unfailing cheerfulness and that universal brotherliness.

2. What can afford poorer material to deal with than the career of the Head of a Hindu Mutt? His days are cast in paths mostly of silence and of solitude; and it is not given to him to make himself conspicuous by startling speech or novel activities. . Zeal towards temporal concerns is looked upon as a weakness rather than as a virtue in him; while tradition and atmosphere alike place him in a region removed far, though not inaccessibly, from that in which the common crowd lives and moves and has its being.

3. His Holiness Sri Satchidananda Sivabhinava Narasimha Bharati Swamigalu--or Sivaswami as he was originally named,--was born in

1858 at Mysore of a highly respected Mulakinadu Brahmin family which had produced a long line of Pundits. His father Kunigalu Ramasastrigalu was a literary luminary of the first magnitude at the court of His late Highness Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar Bahadur III. Sastrigalu had studied under the best known Pundits of that age,-- when it was not easy to pass for a Pundit, and his profound erudition had been supplemented by that general knowledge which is gained by means of long and distant travel.
4. But when Sivaswami was an infant of just two years, the fates deprived him for ever of paternal solicitude. Thence-forward, the high-destined child grew under the care of the mother and the two elder brothers, and was in due time invested with the Brahminical sacrament. Stories are still extant of the remarkable enthusiasm and assiduity which characterised the young Brahmachari in the performance of his duties such as Agnikarya and Adhyayana.

His Holiness Sri Nrisimha Bharati Swami, the then head of the Sringeri Mutt (the guru of our hero) paid a visit to H.H. the late Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III at Mysore in 1867. The Swamigalu was a person of great learning and uncommon asceticism, and was held in unbounded reverence by the Maharaja. In the course of their conversation, the Swamigalu gave expression to his intention of taking under his care a Brahmachari tender enough to be trained, and moulding his mind and character with the object of ultimately installing him on his own pontifical throne at Sringeri when the time came for it. Both of them had of course known intimately the celebrated Vidwan (physician) of Kunigal

settled in Mysore, and naturally their thoughts turned to his third son Sivaswami. Another boy with that pedigree behind him,--distinguished alike by intellectual eminence and Godly fervour--it was impossible to think of. Every possible consideration warranted the hope that Sivaswami would, in the fulness of time, make an ideal successor to the exalted office of Jagad Guru.

5. The young Brahmachari might be handed over to the absolute care and guardianship of His Holiness the Swami.

6. So in his ninth year Sivaswami was ordained as a Sannyasi by Sri Narasimha Bharati Swami and given the titular name of Satchidananda Siva Abhinava Nrisimha Bharati. Lakshminarasimha Sastrigalu who was a Pandit of no small distinction especially in logic and metaphysics, was asked to continue as tutor to the consecrated young man in literature and the shastras, the Swami himself undertaking to initiate him into the theory and practice of Advaita. The discipleship which thus commenced went on in the celebrated fashion in which disciples have lived and learned in India for thousands of years. The juvenile ascetic was taken through an arduous process of intellectual and bodily discipline, and habituated to the holy acts of prayer, meditation and worship. The Veda, its six auxiliaries, general literature, philosophy and ethics were all studied in succession.

7. Sri Nrisimha Bharati Swami left earthly tabernacle in 1880, i.e. some months previous to the Rendition of Mysore; and Sri Satchidananda Siva Abhinava Narasimha Bharati Swami, (a lad of 22 summers) had to enter upon the onerous duties of Jagad Guru.

We may note here, for the sake of those not acquainted with the history of our ecclesiastical institutions, that the Jagadguru (preceptor of the World) of Sringeri is the highest authority for all Smarthas in matters pertaining to faith, creed, ritual and religious conduct. The Mutt or convent over which he presides is the chief of the four similar institutions founded by the Great Sri Sankaracharya, the exponent of Advaita or the monistic philosophy of the Vedanta, who lived before the last century (?) B.C. The Adwaitis, known also as Smarthas, form the largest sect among Brahmins, and they are regarded as gurus or preceptors by most non-Brahmin classes. Consequently, of all the religious heads of the Hindus, the Jagadguru of Sringeri has the largest following, and his Mutt is the wealthiest and most influential.

8. It maintains a large establishment of officials and servants to attend to the proper conduct of service in the several shrines attached to it and to carry on its educational and charitable work. The Jagadguru has therefore to be a man of considerable administrative capacity and tact.

9. Our Jagadguru spared for the secular affairs of the Mutt only as much,--and not more--of his attention as was unavoidably necessitated by his position as the trustee of public properties, and that the Mutt nevertheless prospered in his time are matters of common knowledge.

10. The most notable event in his pontific career was his extensive tour in Southern India commenced in 1907 and brought to a close four years later. Thrice before the Swami had travelled abroad,--once in company with his own Guru (1868) and another time in 1897. The

tour,--rather the pilgrimage of 1907-11 was undertaken mainly with the object of visiting Kalati, (in Travancore) the birthplace of Sri Sankara Bhagavatpada, the world-renowned Adwaitacharya and founder of the Sringeri monastery.

11. Our Swami decided to construct a shrine on that memorable spot and instal therein an image of Sri Sankara. The long journey from Sringeri to Kalati and back was indeed one continuous procession,--unrivalled in its magnificence,--thanks to the yet lingering spark of the old celestial fire enshrined in every Hindu bosom. Immense multitudes, vying with one another in their enthusiasm to render homage to the Swami, met His Holiness at every step; and offered their very best for His Holiness' acceptance.

12. When the Swami reached Sringeri, a cruel malady had already laid its hands upon him. Even when starting from Sringeri he had pleaded: "O, Sarada, tell me why Thou shouldst send me far away,--weak as I am to undertake a pilgrimage, with a worn-out body, seized by a disease and fit to receive They unconditional mercy."

13. Our Swami had been by no means lenient towards his body; and the consequences of his self-sacrificing rigour became painfully evident to all who were near him when he was returning after the four years' pilgrimage. But he bore them all with the utmost gladness; and according to thoroughly creditable reports he would not omit any religious ceremony--big or small, and whatever the labour it required,--even when the disease was doing its worst. If an imperturbable serenity in extreme suffering be a sign of saintly self-discipline, any one who saw the Swami in March

1912, would not have hesitated to declare that he was of that stuff of which saints and heroes are made. In spite of the best medical help and attendance which the personal anxiety of H.H. The Maharaja could make available, the adorable Swami merged himself in the infinite in which he had revelled so long, on 20th March of March, 1912, to the unspeakable grief of all that had known or even seen him.

14. His hours were divided between the care of a Guru for his Sishyas and the unconditioned beatitudes of a Brahmanishta. Of both these phases of his life, we have fortunately a vivid and impressive record in his own literary legacy.

15. His writings are either hymns addressed to the Deities of the Vedic Pantheon or essays designed to populalise the Advaitic doctrine. The style adopted is therefore remarkably simple and may sometimes seem even commonplace.

16. That our author had also an abundance of chaste and delicate humour is evident from several of his interrogatory stotras. Here is an example: "O Lord of the Day, in vain dost thou pride over having removed the darkness without; if thou hast really any prowess, remove immediately the darkness within me."

The reader who would have some taste of our author's playful fancy may turn to his verses entitled Shrikhanda Khanda Shatpadi. They were composed on a sandalwood souvenir presented to His Holiness. In it were carved the likeness of binds and monkeys lodged in trees and amidst creepers, and on seeing it the author is reminded of Kishkindha of Lanka, and lastly of the Advaitic principle that behind the apparent is the Real,--behind the shape is the substance.

17. In a hymn to Sri Sankara he says: "The Gem of spirituality which could be had only as the result of the accumulated worth of good deeds, is now fallen in the ocean of materialism. O, thou adorable one, take it out and utilize it for the world's welfare."
18. He implores Sarada: "For the good of the world, establish the religion of Truth in the land between the Himalayas and Sri Rama's Bridge." "These people have given up praying and meditating; their one concern day and night is to satisfy their bodily cravings; they have lost all fear of sin; O Thou mother of wisdom, make them good and truthful and save them."
19. He calls Sankara: "O thou that hast taken a vow to save all humanity, and who wert, in thy infancy, animated by the idea of doing good to the world."

Of his own beloved Guru he says: "My obeisance to the feet of Narasimha Bharati who is a repository of the worth of the virtuous deeds performed by the people of India."
20. Allusion has been made at the very outset to his innate and unaffected humility. This trait of character is nowhere more strikingly expressed than in the terms in which he speaks of his own fitness to do justice to the mission which lay before him as Jagadguru,--terms which, be it remembered were not meant for the public ear and were communicated to the public only after he passed into realms invisible. Addressing Parvati, he cries:- "I am a Paramahamsa (Sannyasi) only in form." "With my ochre-coloured cloth, and with the sacred staff (danda), the water pot and the rosary of beads in my hands, I have been misleading hosts of householders." The whole world is censuring me saying,--"Whence comes to this hermit his love of body, and fame and wealth?" O, Daughter of the king of Mountains, come and protect me."

In the same pensive, self-introspective strain, the Swami frequently addressed Sri Sankara and invoked his help, once having went so far as to say with a feeling of utter diffidence and consequent resignation:- "O Thou greatest of Preceptors, come and occupy thyself the place which thou created." This shows what a lofty conception he had of the duties of Matadipathies. That he never intended the Mutt to be an asylum for the indolent and unprincipled is clear also from the speech printed elsewhere.

21. The late Swami has thus described the true Guru:- "He is the birth-place (as it were) of unconditional kindness. He has forsaken sensuous desires. He has eliminated from himself the sense of distinction between "mine" and "not mine." His countenance is always bright with smiles. He has carefully studied the Upanishads. He has cultivated friendliness and other good qualities. He is ever engaged in imparting a knowledge of the Truth to those who come to sit at his feet. He makes the angry give up their anger, and the passionate give up their passions. He warns them against carnal pleasures. He performs the deeds pertaining to his (Ashrama) place in society, just for the sake of the world; and when he is not in Samadhi, he elucidates the aphorisms of Krishna Dwaipayana (i.e. the Brahma Sutras of Vyasa or Vedanta). To his disciples he teaches the different Yogas according to their qualifications and has always a heart filled with intense joy." Many among the disciples of the Swami will probably say that the above is only a chapter of unconscious autobiography.

22. The welfare of the Sovereign and the citizens of Mysore was a subject of his daily thoughts. H.H. The late Maharaja had Upadesha from him, and used to seek his guidance and inspiration in moment of perplexity.

23. On many occasions and on many subjects His Highness had the benefit of the Guru's sage counsel. The depth of affectionate reverence which the H.H. the Maharaja cherished for the Guru could be easily imagined by any one who was at Sringeri during the latter's last days. Telegraphic enquiries were being made about the Guru's health every day, and His Highness deputed both the Palace Surgeon and the Senior Surgeon to be in attendance upon the Guru.

That the late Swami had no horror or contempt for politics or for any other department of the life of his Sishyas is further made clear by the references he makes to the work of his great predecessor, Madhava-Vidyaranya of Vijayanagar fame. In his prayer to Sri Sankara from which we have already quoted the Swami asks for the help of good kings such as those whom the Acharya himself had secured for his own work.

24. Here is a cutting from a newspaper, and the writer may add that it is from the pen of a Mohomedan correspondent:-

"There can be no doubt that the Swami's visit to Kolar has given universal satisfaction to all classes of the people, and to none so much as to the Mahomedans. On the day (March,1911) the Swami arrived at Kolar, they waited at the Durgah and greeted his holiness. The swami was highly pleased with the address and conversed with the members for nearly half an hour, in the course of which His Holiness impressed them all with his broad and cosmopolitan views of religion. He explained to them that the several religions were so many ways to attain salvation and the best thing that any person could do was to faithfully follow the principles of his own religion.

25. Above all, the Swami was, as much by temperament as by conviction, a great yogi. Bound as

he was to the cares and conventions of a huge Samasthana, his soud was, yearning for that perfect freedom from shackles of every kind which was the special fascination of the life of Sadasiva. This saint of the 18th century had been held up as an ideal to our Swamis love for the ideal may be gathered from the Sada-sivendra Stuti composed when he visited Nerur where lies the samadhi of Sadasiva. The little Atmavidya Vilasa (The ecstasy of Self-knowledge) of Sadasiva was the most favourite poem of the late Swami, and he has spoken of its greatness in his own verses and explained it to scores of devotees.

26. Once He seems to have even thought of entrusting the daily Pooja and other routine, so far as possible, to the agent of the Mutt, Vedamurti Srikanta Sastrigalu, so that he could devote himself entirely to Dhyana (Contemplation of the Supreme). He asks: "What is there (to be achieved) for those who revel in the Atman which is infinite and pervades the entire universe, and which is sung about by the Upanishads?"

27. One who regarded the privilege of sitting at his feet as the highest blessing and benediction may be even now seen to be daily addressing him in the language of Hogg's "Ode to the Skylark"; and we may close this hasty and imperfect sketch with those pregnant lines:-

"Soul of the Wilderness, Blithesome and cumberless, Sweet be thy presence, so stainless and free! Emblem of happiness, Blest is thy dwelling place, OH! to abide in the desert with thee!

Sweet is thy voice and strong, Powerful to right the wrong. Love gives it energy, love gave it birth. How pure thy inmost heart! How great thy noble part! Thy soul lives in heaven, thy body on Earth.

28. Tradition has it that it was in this place that Rishya-Shringa, the celebrated sage mentioned in Ramayana was born. Rishyasringa grew up to a man's estate without even having seen a woman. When once there was famine in Anga-desha Lomapada, King of Anga, was advised that if the youthful Rishyashringa was brought into his city the drought then prevailing in the kingdom would vanish. Lomapada despatched a bevy of fair damsels on this mission and to entice Rishyashringa. The sage fell an easy victim to the charms of the bewitching damsels and was conveyed to the King. Rishyashringa afterwards married the Princess, Shanta, later became the priest of Dasaratha and performed the Puthra Kameshti yaga after which Rama was born. As Rishyashringa had performed penance in this place it came to be known as "Sringagiri" or Sringeri.

29. Vidyasankara, considered as the greatest in the list of Swamis who occupied the spiritual throne at Sringeri, this great scholar had two eminent disciples Madhavacharya and Krishnathirtha by name. Madhava who subsequently became a minister under the "Vijayanagar empire and installing Veeraharihararaya on the throne. Krishnathirtha on the other hand, remained at Sringeri ardently serving his Guru. In 1255 A.D.Vidyasankara installed Krishnathirtha on the apostolic throne and expressed his wish to retire for twelve years to perform a kind of penance known as "Lambika yoga Siddhi". Intimating that he should not be disturbed Vidyasankara retired into a cave.

30. Some years later, Madhava under the name of Vidyaranya, became the Jagad Guru of Sringeri. In gratitude for Vidyaranya's past services as Minister, the Vijayanagar king Harihararaya richly endowed the Matha. He found the Agraharam and Vidyaranyapura at Sringeri.

31. The town itself is very small, consisting of a long street with a loop on one side encircling a small hill, known as "Sringa-giri" on which is located the sacred temple of Mallikarjuna. At the head of the main street there is matha, the Sarada temple and lastly the beautiful Vidyasankara temple overlooking the river Tunga.

"A CALANDER ON PILLARS": The Vidyasankara temple is a remarkable work of art, built in A.D. 1338 according to tradition. This sculptural marvel in Dravida-Hoysala style is very unique in design and execution. The temple is a veritable museum of sculptures representing the past scenes of Siva Puranas. Inside the temple there is a grand hall supported by twelve pillars. Each of these pillars has a lion with a rider sculptured on it. Many of the lions have a ball of stone in their mouth which can be rolled within but cannot be taken out of the mouth. Each pillar has sculptured on it a particular sign of the Zodiac, and the pillars are so arranged that the rays of the sun entering the temple from the entrance in the east fall on the various pillas in the order of the solar months. This calendar on pillars, an astronomical cum sculptural feat, speaks eloquently of the ingenuity of the architect who designed the temple. In the Sanctum Sanctorum of this temple there is a ling set up in memory of the great Guru, Vidyasankara, who departed this life by entering a cave at this spot.

The newly restored Sarada temple, which adjoins the temple of Vidyasankara is a fine structure in the Dravidian style. The image in this temple is made of pure god whose Dharshan is coveted by the devotees of the Goddess.

The Jagad-guru mostly stays in a building in Narasimha-Vana on the other side of the river. In this spot ideally suited for meditation, the Swami spends most of his time in contemplation.

"SRI SANKARA AND HIS MUTT."

The following is the substance of a speech delivered by His Holiness the Jagad Guru of Sringeri on the occasion of the opening of "The Indian Sanskrit Institute" in Bangalore on the 3rd February, 1911, in the presence of H.H. Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar Bahadur, G.C.S.I Maharaja of Mysore, the principal officers of State and citizens of all denominations.

He brought into existence at the creation Sanaka and other Kumaras and taught them respectively the two paths of Dharma described in the Vedas, the Pravritti Marga and Nivritti Marga (the path of action and the path of knowledge). As time went on, these two paths of Dharma, which were being trodden for ages, came gradually to be neglected as men became more and more engrossed in their temporal concerns and thought less and less of their spiritual welfare, so that the real sense of the Vedas was lost and unrighteousness prevailed over the land...As the age of Kali advanced, virtue once more began to wane, and vice in all its hideous forms began to spread all over the land entailing untold miseries upon man. It was at such a time that the divine Sri Sankara Bhagavat Padacharya made his appearance on earth.

While quite a lad of nine years, he entered the holy order of Sanyasis, and by means of his profound learning, self-abnegation and remarkable spiritual force, he secured the help and co-operation of almost all the rulers of the land in overcoming the myriad obstacles that came in the way of his establishing the Dharma..

He vanquished in public discussions all those that pursued unrighteous faiths and won them over to paths of righteousness. It was in this way that he established the religion of Vedic Dharma once again in this land. And with the

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object of making adequate provision against similar lapses from the paths of Pravritti and Nivritt in the succeeding ages and facilitating the work of setting man on the right track whenever the need for it arose, he founded, in the North, East, South and West of India, four monastic institutions, four mighty seats of learning, each, under one of his four leading disciples,-- admapada, Hastamalaka, Throtaka and Suresvara, enjoining on them the sacred duty of upholding the Dharma..The continued inroads of the formidable enemy, Kali, resulted in the capture of every one of our redoubts of virtue. And, some seven hundred years ago, while our country was threatened with a terrible calamity, there appeared on the scene Sri Vidyaranya Swami, one of the apostelic successors of Sri Sankara Bhagavatpadacharya in the monastic seat at Sringeri. Though he was as brilliant in learning and as remarkable in piety, renunciation and spiritual power as the great Sankara himself, yet he felt that the times were such as rquired the help of the ruling sovereigns of the land to enable him to resuscitate the withering Arya Dharma-----After thus making an organised effort for re-establishing the Vedic Dharma on a sure and substantial foundation, he gave to the world a series of the most authoritative works, from his own pen on the Vedit Dharma leading to prosperity in this world as well as to bliss eternal in the world to come. Nor was this all: he set himself to adjudicate upon all questions relating to Varna and Ashrama, and, where ever he found a falling off from the paths of virtue, he had the delinquents punished by the King; and, wherever, he saw unswerving adherence to Dharma, he had the righteous rewarded...The incident in regard to Tippu Sultan above referred is quite

enough to show with what amount of consideration kindness and generosity even the Muhamedan rulers were treating the Sringeri Gurus. Out personal observations and experience in the various parts of the country have led us to think that Dharma could not havefallen lower amongst the people than it has done now, and that as a consequence our people have been subjected to dire ills and misfortunes. It further became clear to us that, if these troubles were to be removed, they could be removed only by the re-establishment of the Dharmas which as you know, can be done only by the spread of spiritual knowledge. Before undertaking such an important and difficult task, we felt it our duty to invoke the blessings of our great Guru Sri Sankara Bhagavat Padacharya at Kaladi where the Lord incarnated as Sri Sankara. Fortified by the conviction that the work we have undertaken has his blessings, we started on our mission without delay. We resolved to start work in this centre and erected the spacious building in which we have assembled today. We propose to establish here a college under the name of "The Indian College of Advanced Sanskrit Learning" with a maximum of 50 scholars who have already had a general grounding in logic and grammar.

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11. Bhikshu Jnanapriya. The basis and principal teaching of Buddha's Noble Path is that all definitive things, phenomena and ideas are subjective and unreal, being infinitely varied manifestations and appearances of one's own mind. Even the highest conceptions are wholly mind-made and 'void'. They are terms of relation, not of Reality. For a concept (even the concept of Karma or Anatta), is a form and a part of Samsara, and as such is subject to the same conditions as all other forms having no self-nature of their own. People, grasping their own shadows without discrimination, become attached to them; and clinging to dualism, they never attain tranquillity.

The sole reality, we can conceive is an ultimate Essence of Mind or the one undivided Existence, free from all change and all duality. Universal Mind, in its essential nature all-pervading and immaculate as a deep mountain lake, pure and unruffled, is intrinsically clear; its face is eternally unclouded by Karmic defilements. That is, it is not directly the source of things and phenomena, and is free from all individuation; it is for ever serene and eternal; yet it is working in all things to uplift and lead them to the peaceful Bliss and exalted state of Buddhahood and Nirvana, and thereby causing the process of evolution from behind the scene. Universal or Divine Mind and Nirvana are One, and this life-and-death world and Nirvana are not to be separated. Worlds and oceans evaporate in Eternity! And this world of entrancing sound and colour, of dance and vibration, is a tiny bubble in the Eternal Silence of the Infinite; it rises out of the darkness, laughs in the

glimmering light, and disappears. It is like seeing phantoms coming and going, as it were, upon the surface of a mirror or like hearing an echo in the valley. When the unenlightened mind of sentient beings, which in its inmost, essential nature is absolutely pure and clear, is stirred and defiled by the winds of delusion --Maya or relativity--the dancing of the waves and bubbles of mentation and discriminative disturbances make their appearance. Any form regarded as in itself superior to, or existing independently of, its parent Mind as "Atta", is a menace to that mind's enlightenment. When vain ignorance and self-illusion are removed, and the mind is for ever quieted, the multiplicities of separate things disappear. The higher Mind, restored to its original brightness (prajna), ralises its identity with Noble Wisdom and purest Mind-essence, which is the seed or kernel of enlightenment.

2. As Bergson pointed out to the people of the West last century, the power of the discursive understanding is strictly limited and only relational. It has been evolved by life for practical purposes.

3. Hard and sharp like diamond it will cut away all arbitrary conceptions and bring one to the other shore of enlightenment. When this principally spiritual faculty begins to blossom and to radiate in the bliss of Samadhi, Sunyata or the Void of things (nothing), equivalent to the One without a second, is understood; and from that understanding rises Karuna, all-embracing living kindness and compassion in the supreme Unity of Buddhahood. Prajna, marking the crowning height of the spritual practice and discipline, is the Ultimate Principle of unified Wisdom and Love overflowing the whole creation; it gives self-realisation through identification.

4. Such an ideal of perfection will not at all produce lazy, dreamy souls and overwise quietists who are out of touch with life, and who shrink from life's responsibilities. The Blessed One Himself was indeed the most energetic person imaginable.
5.(Review of book) One must always be aware of the dangers lurking behind such a pursuit namely, that of dissipating one's intellectual life in a maze of credulity and idle curiosity on the one hand, and on the other of being side-tracked from attempts to build character, to purify the mind and cultivate true longing for God. Generally works on Theosophy are such that they more than justify this apprehension.
6. Mahabharata, Santi Parva, It is perfectly intelligible why a wise man gets over difficulties and not one without wisdom. The wise man discerns everywhere right and wrong from a distance. How can the fickle, insensible, unintelligent one full of hankerings do so, harassed as he is by doubts and uncertainties? He who sits never travels. Without a barge the deluded person cannot traverse the vastness of evil. And even knowledge is no barge for one possessed by the evil spirit of lusts. So the discerning person should seek a barge. What is the barge that will save him from sinking?---To be a Brahmana. Being refined, self-controlled, regulated, serene and wise, he will accomplish his ends here and hereafter. He should live by following the path of the good and do his work as becomes an educated man. He should earn his living by respectable methods without exploiting others. By charity, study, sacrifice, concentration, modesty, straightforwardness and self-mastery his prowess will be enhanced and sins effaced.

7. Swami Satswarupananda.: There is something somewhere which has veiled Brahman or God from us, that we are in our present state under a sort of hypnotic spell due to which we are wandering away from the Eternal Source of Bliss.

8. (book review) One of the common dangers in the spiritual path consists in a too easy assumption on the part of the aspirants that the stage they have reached is final; they mistake the intermediate stations for the terminus. They thus get stuck up, and fall easily into comfortable intellectual convictions. An understanding, therefore, of the various stages of liberation and the attendant characteristics of each stage and the disciplines that appertain to each, is indispensable to seekers, the more so for those who have gone far along the path than to beginners, for whom, perhaps, a rough outline may not be quite insufficient.

9. Gaston De Mengel. For one Frenchman who takes an interest in metaphysics, you will find fifteen Germans; the trouble is that the German mind is blurred by a mist of sentiment, and is too apt to bring everything down to a psychology more or less vague and fanciful.

10. Dr.Nalini Kanta Brahma. The distinction between fire and water is not a bit less pronounced to the Vedantist than to the commonsense man. The Jivanjukta or the Tattvajnanin i.e. one who has attained perfect knowledge, does not swallow fire to quench his thirst or apply water for heating things.

10. Gaston De Mengel. As M.Rene Guenon says: "There are now in the West, a greater number of men than we think, who are beginning to be conscious of what their civilization lacks; if they are reduced to undefined aspirations

and too often fruitless researches, if even they happen to go entirely astray, that is because they are deprived of real data which cannot be replaced, and because there is no organisation that could given them the necessary doctrinal direction.." ("La Crise du Monde Moderne.")

11. Thelogical matters, when they occur, are expounded on the basis of the declaration of the Church, with next to no attempt to explain them metaphysically. Only those who work for degrees are taught what true metaphysics there is in the scholastic philosophy, viz. ontology and theodicy. What wonder that so many of the best men who wish to understand, who have a leaning for real knowledge, and who more or less vaguely perceive that no true work, whatsoever be its nature, can be carried on and no solid and lasting results achieved without the guiding light of spiritual principles, turn away from the Catholic Church?

12. "Where are, even in Catholicism, the men who know the inner sense of the doctrine which externally they profess, who are not content with believing more or less superficially, and more through sentiment than intelligence, but who ~~xxexnextxenxtenxtxwixthxhexiexingxmexexexexkess~~ "know" really the truth of the religious tradition they regard as theirs?

13. ((Editor)). A man who is following the path of Gnana is not much affected by food; but a Bhakta has to discriminate in this matter and should eat only such food as he can freely offer to his Lord.

14. S.R.Sarma: Modern Western psychology, particularly Freudian, takes into consideration these potentialities. Freud postulates three 'areas', or states of mind; the unconscious, the pre-conscious, and the conscious. The un-

conscious is the receptacle of such of our past experiences as have been definitely forgotten and cannot be recalled by the ordinary method of recollection. The pre-conscious is that part of the mind in which are stored experiences which, though apparently forgotten, can be recalled by an effort of the will. Modern Western psychologists differ in their explanation of the unconscious mind, some holding that it is the receptacle of our individual past experiences, and of these alone, while others would include also the common experience of the race.

Yoga psychology agrees with the Western view that the unconscious is a depository of certain individual past experiences, but it differs radically as to the interpretation of those experiences. To Patanjali our individual past is not limited to the present life, as all Western Psychologists would assume, but extends indefinitely backward through a succession of incarnations. According to the law of Karma, our birth is the result of our past lives, in each of which, and in the present one, we possess the same Chitta. In the "unconscious mind" if we may adopt the Freudian term, are stored the impressions and the tendencies which have been formed in our previous existences, and which, taken together, have made us what we are.

The Samskaras or potentialities represent therefore the root impressions received from all our past experiences, including those of our former lives; and they have moulded our character so that, even though largely forgotten, they still control or influence our every act and thought. They may also take on fresh life and potency without our conscious effort or will.

15. (Editor).'What is Maya?': They think that real and unreal are not contradictory terms, but only contraries with a middle ground between them. At one end stands the absolutely unreal or fictious entities like 'horn of a hare' and 'barren woman's son.' These are mere words the contents of which can never possibly fall within any one's experience. At the other end stands Brahman, the absolutely real, which can never be negated by anything. Between these two extremes, there are two levels, forming a middle ground, as it were, which thought cannot exclusively classify with either of them.

The first of these categories is experiences of the dream, and those caused by errors of perception like a rope mistaken for a snake, or a sandy desert for a watery espanse in the phenomena called mirage. At the time of perception these phenomena appear absolutely real, and as far as the perceiver is concerned, for the moment they are <u>there</u>. But when the error is dispelled by right knowledge, the illusion disappears totally, or even if the appearance of it persists owing to the combination of circumstances, it no longer deceives the perceiver--i.e. the rope-snake does not frighten him, nor does the water of the mirage delude him with the thought of quenching his thirst with it. In either case ie. whether he continues to see false presentation or whether even the very appearance of it disappears, he feels convinced that the basis of the illusions had <u>not changed</u> into the illusory perceptions, or had not in any other way been affected by the latter.

16. There have been men who have experienced an <u>awakening</u> corresponding to the disillusionment from illusory perceptions. It is an awaken-

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ing into a wider consciousness, on gaining which--and it is then alone --the phenomenal world is recognised to be on a par with experiences of illusory perception, i.e. it either disappears completely, or if it continues to be perceived, it is no longer felt to be, in itself, of any reality or value. In other words whatever element of reality and value were felt with regard to the world, is now transferred to its underlying basis on which it is found to appear. The world no longer binds, frightens, attracts, repels or deludes a person who has thus been awakened; and he distinctly perceives that that wider consciousness (Brahman) into which he has awakened--which is also the basis of the world and of his own perceiving ego forming a part of it--is not in the least affected by the unimaginably stupendous world-phenomenon appearing on it.

17. The philosopher's work is to synthesise all aspects of experience, into a coherent whole. Hence they speak of two levels of experience, the second having in itself two layers. The first level is the experience of Brahman. Becaust it is unchangeable, it is the ultimate basis of every other form of experience. The second level is the experience of changeful phenomena, having within itself tow internal divisions: (1) the common illusions and false perceptions of life, which come and go within the limits of our life itself, and (2) our experience of life as a whole, which constitutes a series of changes as far as its inner structure is concerned, and which, on the awakening into Brahman-consciousness, either disappears completely or proves to be unsubstantial. It must be carefully noted that these two aspects of the second level of

experience

experience are grouped together and studied by a comparative analysis of them, not because this school fails to understand the distinction between illusion and life, but because from a higher point of view they observe striking similarities between them, namely, (a) they both come and go, (b) they are actually experienced by the perceiver at the time of perception, and (c) in spite of this sense of reality for the time being, the dawn of knowledge reveals their unsubstantiality in so far as they have not in the last transformed or affected the substratum on which they are found to appear.

18. The first of these four significances of the concept of Maya, namely, that relating to the transiency and triviality of the world and its values, is what comes naturally to every sincere spiritual aspirant on examining the nature of the world.

19. The world as "false" (Mithya), the second significance of the concept of Maya, is essentially a logical formulation of the doctrine. It implies that it belongs neither to the category of Absolute existence like Brahman, nor of total non-existence like barren woman's son. It is on the side of "existence" in so far as spiritual awakening reveals it to be a mere appearance of a real basis as in the case of the mirage, experienced no doubt but clearly felt as not in the least affecting or limiting the substratum, i.e. the Deity or Brahman.

20. Even one without illumination can have a vivid consciousness of the fleeting nature of worldly experiences and the triviality of the values they bring.

21. But even the most vivid consciousness of the changeability and triviality of the world is not equal to the recognition of it as Mithya

or 'false'. For the former implies revulsion and rejection, which are in themselves passionate and born of a vivid sense of the reality of the world, just as in the case of a man attached to it, whereas the latter gives a passionless detachment,--a state devoid of either infatuation or revulsion, but views the whole world including one's own life as a big joke, however serious it might be within its own system. This state is called Jnana, and according to the Master, it never comes without Samadhi, or illumination in perfect abstraction, in which the consciousness is absorbed in the Spirit, and no question even of the origin of the world-spell arises.

22. While this searching analysis of the aspirant may be directed towards the whole of the experienced world, its chief point of attack is one's own ego.

23. As you peel off the skin of an onion, you find it consists only of skin; you cannot find any kernel in it. So on analysing the ego, it will be found that there is no real entity you can call 'I'. Such an analysis of the ego convinces one that the ultimate substance is God alone.

24. To show the world as unreal by devices of logic may be comparatively easy; but a spiritual aspirant is more than a logician, and his problem is to feel in his pulse the truth of what is demonstrated by his reason. If one is full of worldly attachments, any amount of logical demonstration of the world's unreality would not help one convert one's whole being to the conviction dictated by the intellect. For when we attach the highest value to the world, it will only be the summit of hypocrisy to speak of that thing as unreal. And in the case of such a one "the moment sense

objects like colours, tastes and the rest appear before him, he takes them to be real in spite of his intellectual convictions to the contrary, and gets entangled in them just like a man who verbally denies the existence of thorns, but bursts out screaming as soon as his hand is lacerated by one."

Men ordinarily lack in this quality of dispassion, because the body-consciousness is very strongly established in them. It is the needs of the body that make us cling to worldy objects and make it so impossible for us to experience their unreality.

25. P.T. Raju Sastri. With Descartes began the opposition, in European philosophy, between the subject and the object. He conceived them as different and disparate entities, the one as pure thought without extension, and the other as pure extension. And the problem as to how the subject could know the object which is so different from it, became acute. For, the subject, in order to know the object, had to come into contact with it, but it was inconceivable how two absolutely different entities which had nothing at all in common could come into contact with each other. In Berkeley's philosophy this difficulty seems to have been overcome. For he denied the independent reality of the object from the subject, and said that the former is only an idea of the latter. The subject can know only its ideas. So far he appears to be a thorough-going subjectivist. But yet he could not stop with subjectivism. There are other aspects of our experience which he could not deny and had to explain. If the object is the idea of the subject, how is it that no sane man believes that he can create objects out of his mind, though he believes that he can create ideas out of it? Berkeley,

then, had to draw a distinction between ideas of imagination and ideas which are objective. The latter cannot be produced at our will and pleasure, they occur in an order. But then how can they be called ideas? They are not the ideas of any human being: otherwise, they would be private to him. If they are not ideas, they must be objects existing independently of every human mind. But then Berkeley was loth to give up his subjectivism. But subjectivism, in the sense that the world is an idea of any finite subject did not adequately explain the situation. He had therefore to sublimate that form of subjectivism by identifying the subject which are objects with God. The objects of the world are God's ideas, not the ideas of merely the finite minds. Berkeley felt that the objects must somehow be the ideas of a mind; otherwise, the mind cannot know them. And if they are not the ideas of a finite mind, they must be the ideas of an infinite mind, which is God.

26. But how we partake of the nature of God, and how we know the objects through Him remain ultimate doubts or problems in Berkeley's philosophy. Call the objects the ideas of God, they still are not <u>our</u> ideas. And the original problem, how we can know objects which are different from our minds, is only pushed back, not solved. The objects finally remain objects, lose nothing of their objectivity, for they are not this or that mind's ideas. For this reason Berkeley's idealism is called objective idealism. This line of thought influenced a large number of British idealists like Ferrier. This objective idealism, we can easily see, is subjective idealism sublimated that is, subjective idealism transcends itself. Thus though Berkeley was obliged to give up the independent existence of object at

the beginning in order to solve the epistemo-
logical problem, in the end he found the
problem raising its head again. But meanwhile
he reached a conception akin to that of the
Absolute in later idealism, in which the dis-
parity between the natures of the idea and
the object disappeared.

27. Berkeley started with pure subjectivism,
and within subjectivism itself he wanted to
preserve the objectivity of the objects. That
ideas and objects have a common nature is not
the result of his philosophy, but is asserted
at the very beginning by denying the existence
of objects outside the knowing minds. But Kant
started with the opposition between the subject
and the object as handed down to him and as
commonly experienced in ordinary consciousness,
and pointed out that no experience is possible
in which the subject does not contribute some-
thing out of itself to the object. This contri-
bution, Kant says, consists of the Categories
of the understanding like Substance, Casuality,
etc. He further postulates three Ideas of Rea-
son, viz. the self, the World as a Whole and
God, the sum-total of all existence, as regu-
lative ideas, that is, as norms according to
which we should organise our experience. Thus
these enter into the understanding of our ex-
perience, though not into the constitution of
our experience.

28. God, therefore, is a transcendental ideal
just as much in Berkeley as in Kant. In Him
the opposition between the subject and the ob-
ject loses its significance. We may call Him
the Object, the sole reality that exists, or
the Subject whose ideas constitute the world.
But in any way the subject or object in the
ordinary sense in which the aspect of opposi-
tion is essential, is sublimated, so that it
is indifferent whether we call it subject or
object. Yet it is continuous with both and

and includes both. When the continuity with the self is emphasized it is called Self-consciousness. Otherwise, it may be called the Absolute, as it is called by the post-Kantian idealists.

29. Some like Prakasananda appear to be pure subjectivists, because they start with Sankara's theory that the self and the Absolute are identical. Even then it is not the problem, "How can the subject know the object which is different from it" that led them to the postulation of the Absolute. What led them to its postulation is the criterion of truth. Truth is what is traikalikabadhya, that is, what is uncontradicted in the past, present, and the future, and such a truth can be the Absolute only. But where can it be found? Only in the knower. Otherwise, as it cannot be found outside him, how could he have come to apply it as a standard of truth? If the Absolute shines through our self, can it shine as its object? Certainly not. For then it would be imperfect as any other object. Then it must shine as somehow identical with our self. It is the light by virtue of which everything is known, and to know which no other light is necessary. But then can it be different from the knower? No. Somehow therefore the finite self and the Absolute must be identical. That is, they are the same in essence.

Such is the gist of the progress of the argument of Advaita, if we ignore the frequent references to scriptures. But now can this self, which is the Absolute, be opposed to an object which is a not-self? Can there be a second to this self? If the object is independent of the Absolute, then the latter cannot be a standard for the object's truth or falsity. Everything must depend upon the Absolute, owe

its existence to the Absolute. Then only can the Absolute be the ultimate truth in the light of which every thing is known and judged. If so, the distinction between the subject and the object should be meaningless in the Absolute. Some who are mere students of the Sanskrit works on Advaita may wonder whether this is its line of argument.

30. The alayavijnana or the "storehouse of consciousness" of the Yogachara school is not the same as the epistemological subject. Only in essence are the two identical, as the Jiva and the Brahman are identical in Advaita. "This", says Sir Charles Eliot, "so far as it is super-individual, is an aspect of suchness, but when it affirms and praticularises itself, it become Citta, that is the human mind." Hence in many respects alayavijnana occupies the same position in the Vijnanavada as that which the Brahman occupies in Advaita.

31. "Many eminent Buddhists began by being Sarvastitvavadins and became Mahayanists, their earlier belief being being regarded as preliminary rather than erroneous." The philosopher who boldly follows the lead of his logic cannot but end in some form of monism, and in the result reached, the opposites that hold true at the starting point, lose their meaning and significance.

32. We have thus seen that, whether the philosopher starts from the object of the subject or from both, he is led by his logic to Absolutism, if his position is to be comprehensive and consistent. In discussing this topic we included Sankara's idealism, though he does not start with the opposition between the subject and the object. He indeed starts with their dualism, though not with their opposition, reaches the conceptions of the Absolute

as the ideal truth, points out that it shines through the subject, and concludes that the Absolute is the sole reality, and the subject and the object and everything in the universe owe their existence to it. Sankara reached the Absolute, not in order to reconcile the rival claims of the subject and the object, but as the ideal truth. But when once the Absolute is postulated, Sankara too is obliged to transcend the distinction between the subject and the object.

33. Even in Sankara's idealism the Absolute is postulated as what is implied or involved in our finite experience. Our experience is relative and imperfect: it is vitiated by contradictions. But what is relative and imperfect and vitiated by contradictions must be based upon, and presupposes, what is absolute, perfect and uncontradicted. Thus though the Absolute is the ideal truth, it is implied by the actual, and so cannot be opposed to the actual.

34. There can be no pure actualism; for no actual can be understood unless with reference to the ideal, and any attempt to separate the ideal from the actual must therefore end in failure. But when once the presence of the ideal in the actual is admitted, the question cannot be avoided, "What is the highest ideal?" Naturally one will be led to the Absolute.

35. R. Shama Sastri. This definition implies that Prarabdha is solely responsible for the success or failure of man in this life and that no attempt on his part can possibly end or mend the effects of his Prarabha-karma. If this is the meaning of Prarabdha and if there is no limitation to the effects of Prarabdha, it follows that there is no difference between Prarabdha and Fatalism. This form of

fatalistic interpretation has been given to Prarabdha-karma in most of the Puranas of the Brahmins and the Jataka stories of Buddhists and Jainas. But this fatalistic interpretation of Prarabdha-karma is unknown to the Upanishads and the Vedanta philosophers, particularly the Advaitins.

36. The ritualists following the teachings of the Vedas proper, attach importance to Karma or action, while the Vedantists following the Upanishads, give importance to desire (Vasana) in the matter of bringing about rebirth.

37. In the fifth chapter of the Yogavasishtha present good knowledge and good actions are said to counteract the results of past knowledge and past actions, just as the bad effects of yesterday's bad work are counteracted by to-day's good work.

In the eighth chapter the same idea is more clearly stated, as follows:- "The store of impressions is of two kinds: good or bad. The store of impressions of the previous birth is one or the other of these two kinds. If you are carried on by the store of good impressions, you will gradually attain the happy end. If the store of bad impressions involves you in a calamity, then attempt should be made by you to overcome it by force. The store of good and bad impressions usually flows by straight and narrow courses. Accordingly attempt should be made to direct it in a good and agreeable channel.

In conclusion it may be stated that the charge of fatalistic view levelled against the Hindu on account of the misinterpretation of the theory of Prarabdha-karma by the uninformed among them has no foundation and that the theory of Prarabhda-karma as explained above, is sure to render them more ethical & progressive.

38. (Editor). In spite of all this, man has everywhere sought for some definite description of the ultimate Reality, some concrete formulation of it to which his thought may hold on in his spiritual struggles. Destructive criticism can easily point out internal contradictions in these theories; it can demonstrate their futility in giving man any conviction regarding the Ultimate.

39. The individual does not cognise the Absolute in the sense he cognises the discrete objects of the relative world. For the Absolute is not something separate from the real self of the individual. What we ordinarily call ourself or individuality is only a phantasm of the Absolute, Who is the real self. This phantasm, encrused with the accretions of evolution --the agelong pursuit of "woman and gold"--is what call our ego with its functions of knowing feeling and willing in ference to the external world. As long as we mistake our real self to be this ego, the Absolute is beyond the ken of our understanding. The ego-centred mind has to be purified by spiritual disciplines. When perfectly purified, the ego dies, i.e. recognises its phantom nature and sinks, as it were, into its sustaining consciousness, the real self or the Absolute.

40. A more satisfactory solution has been attempted in the theory that in regard to the non-dual Absolute the differentiated phenomena is only an apparent manifestation, real in as far as it concerns the consciousness experiencing it, but unreal in as far as it concerns the Absolute. It being unaffected by the phenomena. This may be satisfactory as an analysis of facts, but the questions referred to demand not only an <u>analysis</u> but an <u>explanation</u>

as well. Even if differentiation be only apparent, what exactly is it in the Absolute that gives rise to this appearance?

41 (Reviews) Every metaphysical system would be found to be refuting every other system because of the logical fallacies inherent in all of them.

42. It is better to be an inveterate agnostic than to be an adherent of any logically defective doctrine.

VIJNANA BHIKSHU (contd.from page 252)

by the definitions given in the treatises on Liberation: "(In this world) all is pain, there is no pleasure,--and this (liberation), being the means of the alleviation of pain for the pain--stricken, is called 'pleasure.' The desire for pleasure is pain; and real pleasure lies in the cessation of both pleasure and pain," --such passages having explained pleasure as consisting in pain, give it the name of pain; and give the name of pleasure to the cessation of such pain (i.e. both pain and pleasure); because this (cessation) has the property of being acceptable (to the Spirit). Hence we have the Sankhya-Sutra: "(The name bliss is given) to the cessation of pain, only in its secondary application" and "(The cessation of pain is called bliss only) as eulogising Liberation for the sake of the dull-headed (people)". The attainment of pleasure is only a secondary emancipation, realised in the regions of Brahma.

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA. Vol.XLIV

1. (Review). The Yogachara position is perhaps the most thoroughly subjectivistic that the world has even seen. Though it presents certain similarities with the idealism of Berkeley and the sensationism of Hume, it goes further afield than either of them and differs from them on important points. It rejects all external reality which is held by realists and representationists as the object of our perception or the cause of our sensations and ideas, and reduces all appearances to mere transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement. If our cognitions have no extraneous reference, how then differences in them arise? It replies that individual cognitions of objects are mutually different and that the reason for this diversity is not to be sought in external objects but in the beginningless diversity of instinctive subconscious roots (bheda-vasana). To establish its position it employes two kinds of arguments, epistemological and ontological.

The epistemological arguments are directed to establish that cognitions are self-aware (svasamvedana), that no cognition, whether it be alike or dissimilar in form, can apprehend an object, that the apprehending cognition and the cognized object being one (saho-palambhaniya) are identical with each other, and that an external object can neither be perceived nor inferred, these being the only kinds of evidence admitted by the Buddhists. The metaphysical arguments point to the fact that the external object is an unreal appearance (samvrita satya) and that cognition is the only ontological reality.

In spite of its mentalistic character Yogachara subjectivism differs profoundly from Berkeley in denying God whom the latter substi-

tuted in place of an external, material reality as the source of our true ideas, and in rejecting soul. And though it reduces soul to a cluster of cognitions as Hume converts it to a bundle of sensations, it goes further than Hume in tracing the differences in our ideas to subconscious instinctive roots (bheda-vasana) existing from a beginningless past.

2. M. Hiriyanna: Moksha being the realisation of one's self in its true nature according to all schools, it is not to be effected in the former sense as dharma is. Its achievement can only be indirect, and we find that both the possible views here are held by Indian philosophers. While the generality of them maintain that moksha involves an actual change in the condition of the self, some hold that it means merely a change in the point of view towards it. It is this latter way that Sankara, for instance, understands it. In his view, the self has been and will ever be what it always is, viz. Brahman. This truth, however, is lost sight of by man during samsara, owing to congenital ignorance. It thus lacks realisation though eternally achieved. Moksha consists merely in getting rid of this ignorance; and, simultaneously with its riddance, the self reveals itself in all its spiritual splendour. Hence Jnana is regarded as the sole and sufficient means to moksha in Advaita, while in other doctrines, generally speaking, it is taken to stand in need of being associated with karma to serve that purpose.

In conclusion we may just refer to one more point. Is the highest value realisable by man or is it merely an idea? All Indian thinkers agree that it can be realised, some maintaining that the realisation may take place even within the span of the present life. Nature, including

the physical frame with which it has invested man, is not finally either hostile or indifferent to his spiritual aspirations; and he is bound to succeed in attaining them in the end, if not at once, provided only that his efforts in that direction are serious and sincere. One system, viz. the Sankhya goes so far as to maintain that the kingdom of Nature is not merely favourable to man's realisation of the highest ideal, but that it is designed precisely to bring about that consummation.

3. Swami Vimuktananda.: By anityam is meant the fact that in this world there is only becoming and no being at all. The state of an individual or a thing is unstable and temporary, a mere bubble in the ocean of time. Things (dharmas) may come together and combine for a moment, but as soon as there is a beginning, that very moment there begins also an ending. Impermanence is in the very core of nature everywhere. This leads as a corollary to the idea of anatman or non-existence of the soul. A person or a thing or a god appears as a composite whole for a time, but in truth not a shred of individuality can be ascribed to it, inasmuch as decomposition starts instantly. The river of life is constantly flowing, and perhaps, here and there, there is a whirlpool which is mistaken as an entity separated from the current; but in point of fact, everything is moving and changing every moment. Because of ignorance and attachment people cannot shake off the incubus of this individuality and as a result comes under the sway of endless sufferings.

These three categories form the very basis of Buddhistic thought and are the avenues of approach to a proper understanding of the full implications of its philosophy and ethics.

4. If great stress is laid on the sufferings of the world, its evanescent nature and its utter unsubstantiality, it is only to make people dispassionate towards its vanishing beauties and the fleeting objects of the senses, and thus give a right turn to their mind to realize the summum bonum.
5. Vulgar minds think that there is a soul or individuality (pudgala), to which they desperately cling and thus create innumerable miseries. One attained the final release by eschewing the very idea of a permanent atman or soul and merging all mental modifications in the original source from which they have sprung.
6. Karma, therefore, means a succession of causes and effects, which involves time with its three divisions as its corollary. Without the past there cannot be any cause, and without the present or future there can be no effect. So Karma and its concomitant time play an outstanding role in the evolution of the universe and have considerable philosophical importance. Nagarjuna, in his Madhyamika-Shastra, has devoted two separate chapters to these two points and tried to bring out their full implications as philosophical doctrines.
7. He maintained that the skandhas or the ultimate constituents can be subjected to further analysis, and it will be found at the end that they have dwindled into insignificance,--vanished into absolute non-existence.
8. (Editor). The three states of consciousness, viz. the waking (jagrat), dream (swapna) and deep sleep (sushupti), which comprise in fact the entire gamut of human experience. The Sruti furnishes the method of arriving at the nature of truth by examining these three states of waking, dreaming and dream-

less sleep. The Vedantist holds that these states are unreal appearances that manifest themselves having the Self as their locus.
9. The transcendent Consciousness supports and is ever equally present in the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. If we think that rising to the transcendent Consciousness (turiya) would involve a cessation of the waking and dreaming states, we would be confusing the state of dreamless sleep (sushupti) with the transcendental Consciousness (turiya). While the former, viz. dreamless sleep, is conflicting with the states of waking and dreaming, the latter, viz. turiya, does not conflict with any state at all. Nothing can disturb the transcendent serenity of the turiya Consciousness, and its seeming compresence with the unreal (mithya) states belonging to the lower order of reality can neither touch its sublime heights nor soil its eternal purity.
10. There are some scholars in India whose interpretation of avasthatraya (the three states of of human consciousness) fundamentally differs from that of the orthodox school of thought. In the opinion of these modern thinkers the state of deep sleep (sushupti) is not a state at all but is identical with Pure Consciousness.
ll. But such an assumption which stands contradicted even by subsequent Sruti passages cuts not only at the very root of all spiritual discipline so strongly inculcated in the Sruti but also runs counter to the bold and rational utterances of the great Acharyas such as Sankara. Acharya Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras pertinently observes that on such a hypothesis (as stated above) "it would follow that a person might get final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all works which bear fruit at a later period, and and of knowledge?" "Nor is it difficult to

refute the analogical reasoning", he further argues, "that the soul, if once united with Brahman (in sleep) can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction viz. the work and knowledge (of each individual). Hence the two cases are not analogous ...Brahman itself on account of its seeming connection with limiting adjuncts is metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts so long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. East set of adjuncts continues through the states of deep sleep as well as of waking; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter it is like the fully developed plant."

11. In reply to the argument of the opponent that even one who does not know this does get at the Brahman in the heart during deep sleep, as it has been declared that 'during deep sleep one is endowed with Pure Being, the Acharya emphatically declares, "Yes, it is so; still there is a difference. Just as all living creatures--knowing or ignorant--are real Brahman, yet it is the knowing one alone who is cognisant of the fact "That Thou art" and so knows himself to be Pure Being, that becomes Pure Being Itself; in the same manner, though both the knowing and the ignorant reach Pure Being during deep sleep, yet it is one who knows this that is said to reach the

world of Heaven.

12. It is now distinctly clear that in deep sleep the mental stuff of an ignorant soul, while containing within it germs (of infinite differentiation) of the waking and dreaming states, assumes an undifferentiated existence. In this state Atman or Pure Consciousness dwells in the anandamaya Kosha, identifying itself, as it were, with the karanasarira (causal body), and the bliss which is felt in that deep sleep is not the transcendental joy of liberation.

13. Christ admonished his followers to be dissatisfied with themselves whereas the Communist leaders ask their devotees to be dissatisfied with their neighbours.

If Communism aims at giving people, especially the neglected masses, food, clothing and other amenities of life which are theirs by birth-right and at the same time allow them the completest self-unfoldment which is their divine heritage, then we approve of it. But if it promotes class hatred, if it resorts to violence and oppression in order to silence those who honestly differ with its method, if it destroys one class in order to further the interests of another, if it aims at creating a dead uniformity in society on the basis of materialism alone, and if it interferes with man's legitimate freedom in thought, speech and action, then I submit in all humility that it will not help.

14. Comminism as practised in Europe to-day is a bad way of doing a good thing.

15. Swami Vimuktananda. The task before the Madhyamikas was to state the nature of the ultimate reality, whereas the Yogacharas, tacitly accepting the conclusion of their predecessors, busied themselves in explaining

the phenomena of consciousness or how events and things appeared in and through vijnana or mind, which was the repositary of all knowledge (alaya-vijnana).

16.(reviews) That the existence of God cannot be logically proved or demonstrated, Kant showed long ago in a manner which it is difficult for anyone to surpass. Modern philosophical thought (about religion) has, however, switched off from this logistical railroad and come to a study of the actual deliverances of the religious consciousness. Present day religious philosophy concerns itself about God as the factual content of living experience. It no longer thinks that the proof of God's existence consists in "a process of building a precarious speculative bridge from the world we see to its unseen author."

17. "Another thought does not arise there", true; but a kind of knowledge higher than the ordinary conceptual or relational knowledge which is designated gnosis does arise here. This gnosis is not a lapse into a negative blank, but a truth-revealing consciousness.

18. (Editor). In the sense of passivity certainly cannot be the goal. Were it so, then the walls around us would be the most intelligent; they are inactive. Clods of earth, stumps of trees would be the greatest sages in the world; they are inactive. Real activity, which is the goal of Vedanta, is combined with eternal calmness, the calmness which cannot be ruffled, the balance of mind which is never disturbed, whatever happens. The doctrine that stands out luminously in every page of the Gita is 'intense activity but in the midst of it, eternal calmness.

19. There were also those two disturbing factors, life and mind. The transition from

crystal to protoplasm and from protoplasm to consciousness was not easy to describe; it is difficult to understand how extra-mental vibrations transform themselves into thoughts and feelings which, notwithstanding all that the advocates of behaviourism have been telling us, cannot be completely explained away.
19. This self-complacency has now vanished. Science is no longer sure of its foundations. The Quantum hypothesis and its logical implications seem to indicate the existence of something which is allied almost to free will in the behaviours of atomic constituents and, consequently, defies prediction. Euclidean geometry cannot explain objective reality, Newtonian physics seems to have abdicated in favour of Relativity; the ether has been reduced to a myth and we are assured that we are the denizens of an expanding universe which is at once limitless and finite. It was difficult, added the speaker, to call all this, and Space and Time, a Doctrine, or anything like it.
20. In its own way science has come to the conclusion that the world of nature from the mightiest sun to electron, from man to amoeba, is subjective in a very real sense.
21. Swami Vimuktananda An enquiry is now being made into the definition of pratyaya, (cause).

Those facts depending on which an effect originates are verily called causes. But so long as no effect is produced why should they not be non-causes? An antecedent contingent depending on which an effect is produced is called a cause or pratyaya, so a cause is inseparably connected with the effect. But when the effect is not yet produced no one can consistently think of a cause at all. It is

opined that while we have seen some similar causes producing some effect at some other time, why should we not call a particular thing a cause assuming that it will also produce some result in the future? This is not acceptable, for, it is taken for granted that something in the past was really the cause of some effect, which is not a fact, as the same difficulty will present itself when we shall make an enquiry into the causal relation between the past cause and effect. So causality is an impossibility.

22. It is not proper either a non-existent or an existent thing should have a cause. If it is non-existent, then whose is the cause? If existent, what for the cause? A cause is redundant in the case of an existent entity as its production a second time is superfluous. But in the case of a would-be effect one can speak of a thing as its cause if the latter has the potentiality (shakti) to produce the result. A lump of clay that has the potentiality to produce a pot may be called a cause with reference to a future pot. But this is untenable. It is the invariable condition of a cause to have its effect co-existing with it, and what now exists is not the effect but only the potentiality to produce it. The particular cause in question is never the cause of the co-existing potentiality but it is desired to be the cause of the result. So in the absence of the result a cause is no cause.

Thus causality in general is refuted; now the refutation of particular causes is attempted.

23. While there never originates an existent or a non-existent entity nor one which is both existent and non-existent, then how can there be any generating cause at all?

It is already seen that an existent entity has no necessity to be produced again, and a non-existent one cannot be produced at all, and a third entity that is at once existent and non-existent is an impossibility, and so there is no production for it. As there is nothing to be produced there is hardly any need of a generating cause.

24. Although Dharma or mental phenomenon has no supporting cause, yet it is instructed (as having one). When such phenomenon has no cause (and is, therefore, non-existent), how could then a supporting cause at all exist?

Alambana or the supporting cause serves as a base for all mental modifications. But such a cause cannot be maintained in view of the fact that it cannot be the cause of either the existent, non-existent or existent-non-existent mental phenomena for the reason already shown.

25. Cessation (of the cause) never becomes possible before the origination of things (i.e. effects); and if the cause ceases to exist (even before the effect coming into existence) what would be the cause (of the effect)? So anantara or the immediately contiguous (as a condition for production of things) is not permissible.

The destruction of the cause at a moment immediately preceding the origination of an effect is a necessary condition of causality. This is what is signified by the anantara (or Samanantara) pratyaya. But here is a difficulty. It is seen that so long as there is the cause there is no effect, and as soon as the effect has sprung into existence the cause has been destroyed, and thus the two can never meet. So no relation of cause and effect can be established between the two, for

such relation always implies that the relata must be co-existing. Thus there is no cause, neither any effect, and the cessation of the cause and the origination of the effect have therefore no meaning at all, and so anantara pratyaya cannot stand.

This verse can also be explained by following the principle enunciated in the first verse of this chapter. While there is no origination there is no cessation as well, and origination and cessation being absent there is no scope for anantara-pratyaya. And if there is cessation of the cause (to produce the effect) there is nothing that can be called a cause.

26. Inasmuch as the entities are devoid of essence and, therefore, without any real existence, the assertion "This being that appears" has no validity; (so there is no room for an additional cause or adhipati-pratyaya).

An additional cause or adhipati-pratyaya is described as "this being that is" or on whose existence depends an effect. Here the reality of both the cause and effect is taken as an a priori truth, whereas in point of fact everything is of dependent origination and therefore devoid of any reality. So how can it be declared that "this being that is" when both "this" and "that" possess no reality? Adhipati-pratyaya is therefore impossible. It is proved that the four causes are inadequate to produce any effect separately. Can they do so corporately?

27. The effect neither exists in the individual causes nor in their aggregate; how can an effect which is not contained in the causes come out of them?

The causes cannot produce either individually or corporately an effect which is not in them.

A piece of cloth cannot be in reality produced by the thread or the weaving implements separately nor by their assemblage. Even if an effect can come out of such causes it will not be free from defects.

28. If the effect being non-existent (in the causes) can come out of those causes, why should it not proceed even from non-causes?

If it is not a necessary condition for an effect to inhere in the cause, it can originate equally from a cause and from a non-cause, and it will naturally lead to the absurd position that everything can come out of everything. This will cut at the root of all causality, as causality always presupposes some definite and invariable law to guide all happenings and admits no caprices in nature. Even if the result is directly derivable from the cause, one cannot consistently explain causality.

29. The effect is derived from the cause; but the cause in its turn is not derived from any other cause. How can an effect that is produced from an uncaused (i.e. neither caused by itself nor by any other cause and therefore non-existent) cause be said to be derived from a (really existent) cause?

An effect may be said to have the nature of the cause if it can be proved that the cause has any intrinsic nature of its own. A cause cannot be self-existent, and if it is derived from another cause it will lead to regressus ad infinitum and we shall never come to a point when we can declare with certainty that we have truly found out the nature of the cause. Thus the cause which is devoid of any innate nature of its own cannot bring forth any real effect.

Since there is no effect there is no cause or non-cause.

30. So an effect is neither derived from a cuase

nor from a non-cause (and therefore it is non-existent). The effect thus being non-existent, now could there be any cause or non-cause?

Cause and effect are two correlatives and one cannot survive the other. When it is proved that an effect cannot be derived either from a cause or a non-cause, and therefore it is non-existent, the question of cause and non-cause cannot have any meaning at all. In the ultimate analysis all idea about causality comes to naught, and only the uncaused and therefore unsubstantial nature of the phenomena becomes more vivid.

But granting that there is no causality how can one account for the various things and events that are happening everyday before one's eyes? To all unsophisticated minds that take only a commonsense view of the world, causality is an unassailable fact which explains the world phenomena. But to those who are capable of looking at things from a philosophical view-point everything appears to have no finality in them and therefore possesses no reality except in sunya wherein cease all differences, and which is ever unborn and beyond all causality.

31. Dr.Stanislaw Schayer. The experiences of others are never given directly--that we do not have an immediate perception of the joys and sorrows of our fellow-beings, but only that of the outward, material expressions of them such as mimicry and gestures--that we only hear the sound of words and see the shapes of letters, but neither hear nor see the thought expressed by those words or letters. To say in brief, the whole of our knowledge of the mental states of others, of what other "selves" experience, is entirely different from the

from the direct consciousness of our own experiences. It is a mediate consciousness, based on the relation between material, outward signs and non-material, psychological contents. An analysis of acts in which we apperceive this relation is a very important and difficult problem, which interests epistemology as well as psychology.

32. Even in our intercourse with people nearest to us, we may find ourselves in situations when we "cease to understand." That "not understanding" may be of the most various kinds. For states of feelings, moods, etc., which are very complicated and subtle, neither language nor mimicry possesses any means of expression having a common significance.

33. The word "nirvana" is translated as "extinction". As a matter of fact we often come across in Buddhistic texts the comparison that a personality liberated from painful Existence, goes out like fire. European scholars however understood it an an indirect corroboration of the supposition that for Buddhism, salvation is synonymous with annihilation--the fire being extinguished ceased to exist. On a closer and more accurate acquaintance with Buddhistic literature, however, it appeared that such an interpretation arose out of a misunderstanding or rather simply out of not understanding the meaning. According to Indian ideas fire is an invisible substance contained in water, plants, trees, etc. Under certain circumstances it manifests itself as a flame, and when it goes out it does not cease to exist, but simply becomes invisible, it hides itself. The same happens to the personality of the liberated one, it is not annihilated but ceases to manifest itself empirically. For the Buddhists the state of nirvana is not a nothingness, and the nihi-

listic interpretation of the Buddhistic teaching came out to be false. We have thus made a step further in our understanding of Buddhism, but let us not delude ourselves with the thought that we understand it at last. What a number of such misconceptions await us on our way to explanations and interpretations!

34 Prof.Henri-L Mieville. Whenever we formulate a truth, of whatever kind, we always introduce subjective elements, i.e. a certain logical structure which cannot strictly be attributed to the object as such and which must be considered as the work of the seer. It means that the act of knowing implies a certain amount of creation, and that the mind cannot be compared to a mere object-meter, that the mind plays an active part in the act of knowing. It would therefore be a mistake to imagine the act of knowing as purely receptive, as a kind of vision in which the eye would play no real part, and haveno influence, because the presence of the object would be everything.

But we should not be duped by the spatial illusion created by words. We should not think that by adding together all "partial truths" by sticking them together like pieces of mosaic, we shall ever reach total or absolute truth.

35. It would be improper to speak of "partial" truths, the grouping of which would make up a "total" truth. There is a further reason why the phrase "relative truths" should be preferred to that of "partial truths": those "fragmentary" truths always and of necessity embody a certain amount of error, so that they have to be abandoned--in the form we have given them--when our view becomes fuller and more precise.

36. Philosophical relativism, far from des-

troying the opposition between the true and the false, far from being tantamount to scepticism, as might be wrongly surmised, rather enables us to give greater precision to those notions.
37 Our moral position towards the man who does not believe like us suddenly becomes quite different. This of course does not imply that we should or could adopt his views. The dictates of logic will not be suspended, and we shall still have to make a choice, we shall still think that such and such a view is wrong and incompatible with such and such other view. But we shall proceed with much greater care.
38. This change of attitude is so deep that the very word tolerance becomes intolerable: ein hassliches, intolerates Wort, as Goethe called it. The word implies in fact a feeling which is now rejected, i.e., a secret desire that all divergences should cease, and the idea that all would become perfect if everybody thought as we do, as our party does, as our church does.
39. We are not expected to approve what we cannot approve, nor to make up a kind of Arlequin's dress with all the contradictory opinions which we meet; that would be grotesque.
40. I do not think that such a conception--which might contain the seed of a theodicaea--relieves us from the duty of fighting error and evil when we see them clearly. But there are many possible ways of carrying on that fight. In his famous treaty of "Perpetual Peace" Kant stated that war should only be made with a view with a view to reaching peace, and that everything should be carefully avoided which might make peace morally impossible. That also applies to the war against error; such a war will only be efficient and fruitful if it is waged in a spirit of tolerance--however paradoxical that may seem.

41. It is rash--I was going to say it is criminal--to launch a brutal attack on beliefs which may be naive and absurd, but which in the consciousness of the man who holds them may be inextricably bound up with vitally important convictions which they translate on the intellectual plane.
42. The essential thing as I said is that intellects should be made to think and not that all intellects should reach unanimity.
43(Editor) The philosophical system, on the other hand, is the outcome of an interpretative reflection on the whole data of our experience. Philosophy begins where the experimental and observational sciences leave off, but it does not follow that philosophy in its edifice must use the building-stones just as science hands them over. And rightly has Prof. Radhakrishnan also remarked that it cannot be said that philosophy is only an aggregate of the conclusions of sciences. As philosophy goes to the root of the matter and thinks to the bitter end, it is more thbrough-going than science in the intellectual spirit of enquiry. It is one with science in that it is not satisfied with the first appearances of things, but transcends the view of things as they immediately present themselves to us in perception and seeks to arrive at a deeper view of them through objective laws and principles. Philosophy assumes a scientific attitude towards the whole of human experience, and not merely to positive facts extracted from mechanical science.
44. By whatever name the primordial stuff of the world is designated--be it 'mind-stuff', 'world-stuff' or 'neutral stuff'--the conclusion arrived at by the modern scientific geniuses lends countenance to the fact that mind is fundamental and matter derivative from it--an assumption that

makes the nearest approach to the Vedantic conception of Maya--the unsubstantiability and illusoriness of this visible world.
45. It is said of Christ that he was a man of suffering. Lord Buddha said, "One thing I teach, suffering and the destruction of suffering." This teaching we need to hear again today.

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1. Editor. The aspirant receives therein a warning against the all too frequent misconception that the essence of all spiritual life consists in working up the emotions to a high pitch, in experiencing visions and voices, or in entering into trances that make one oblivious of things eternal. For the first thing needed in spiritual life is a firm Adhara, a secure foundation.
2. In the calm mind, it is the substance of the mental being that is still,so still that nothing disturbs it. If thoughts or activities come, they do not rise at all out of the mind, but they come from outside and croos the mind as a flight of birds crosses the sky in a windless air. It passes, disturbing nothing, leaving no trace. Even if a thousand images or the most violent events pass across it, the calm stillness remains as if the very texture of the mind were a substance of eternal and inscrutable peace. A mind that has achieved this calmness can begin to act, even intensely and powerfully, but it will keep its fundamental stillness.
3. Complete surrender is not possible in a short time. For to do this the ego has to be cut. Hence personal effort cannot be given up at once--nor is it desirable as it may

lead to stagnation and inertia. It becomes possible only in the ultimate stages of Yoga.
4. Thus until the transfer is complete, there must be a personal contribution, a constant consent to the true Force, a constant rejection of any lower mixture.
5. Usually there cannot but be a mixture of these two ways until consciousness is ready to be entirely open, entirely submitted to the Divine's origination of all action.
6. Three methods are suggested to overcome the difficulty of a wandering mind commonly experienced at the time of meditation. One is to observe the thoughts as they come in, without giving any sanction, until they run down and come to a standstill. Another is to stand back from thoughts as not one's own but things coming from outside, and they must be felt as if they were passers-by crossing the mind-space, with whom one has no connection and in whom one takes no interest. By following this method the mind divides into two--a part which is the mental witness, watching and perfectly undisturbed and quiet, and a part which is the object of observation. There is a third, an active method, by which one looks to see where the thoughts come from, and finds they come not from oneself, but from outside the head as it were; if one can detect their coming, then, before they enter, they have to be thrown away altogether.
7. Illusion does not mean nullity or Sunya. The nature of the world, as that of Maya, its parent, is indeterminable. It is not unreal because it appears; It is not real because it is sublated; and it cannot be both real and unreal because of contradiction.
8. P.T. Raju. Advaita does not teach the shadowy nature of this world, nor that we shoul be sorry for our birth here. It teaches renunciation not to the brute who has no experience

of the values which this world has to offer, but to one who has already the experience of them. Renunciation is preached to the latter just to remind him that the values of the world are not the highest, that there is something higher. The higher can be realised only when the mind is detached from the lower.
9. A change in the outlook of the agent, a change of standpoint which gives an altered picture of the universe. After this change, the agent cannot but wonder why he had been regarding the universe differently. He feels like one who has newly learnt the appreciation of music, who begins to see some positive quality in what once used to be a mere combination of notes. The agent then cannot say that his old experience was unreal, for it was actually left by him; yet he cannot say that it was real, for the real is the new experience . The only concept that is adequate to this fact is that of Maya.
10.So long as an illusion lasts, it is seen as an objective fact, a fact which exists in front of us.
11. Ajnana is 'I do not know', it is best experienced in sleep. This Ajnana which is treated as the world cause from the subjective side is ignorance in general. In our conscious moments the ignorance of a particular thing, say say of a pen, implies the knowledge of some other particular thing. That is, a particular cognition, for instance of a pencil, must be at the basis of particular absence of cognition, say, of a pen. But ignorance that is universal cannot be treated as the absence of particular cognitions. For if it were so, universal ignorance must be the absence of every cognition, but after deep sleep we say that we are sure of having no cognition, which surety is impossible without some form of

of knowledge. Hence, Ajnana is not mere absence of cognition and it is the same as Maya only considered from the subjective side.

12. The author of Nyayamrta questions the Advaitin how a thing which is not real can fail to be unreal. The word unreal is of course ambiguous. It is commonly used to denote both the imaginary and the illusory. But there is difference between the two. In spite of the common usage, which is often loose and ambiguous, philosophy which has to be logical should distinguish between the two. The unreal is that which is experienced as non-existent. But the critic of Advaita overlooks the fact that the object of illusion is an object of perception, and so existent though only for the time being. We are never afraid of the imaginary snake however poisonous. But the illosory snake terrifies us. So our experience of illusion is of a different kind from that of the unreal. The impact of a world not ourselves, with the implied hopes and fears, joys and anxieties, are absent in the merely imaginary, but present in the illusory. Again, this concept is not to be confused with the view mostly found in Western idealisms that error is and is not truth; that is, error is truth in its element, but is not truth when taken in isolation. For Maya is neither real nor unreal. It is a unique fact which has to be recognised as such, though as distinct from, and as having its basis in, the real. The concept of maya applies only to the forms of existence; for the whole phenomenal world, according to Advaita, consists of forms and names. And these forms, because they are actually perceived, are not unreal; yet, as they are different from their truth which is the Absolute

and

and on which they depend for their existence, they are not real. The temporal world of forms presupposes the Absolute as its eternal basis.

13. R. Ramakrishnan: It was the sight of human misery that drove the Buddha to seek for light, and the tenets of Buddhism centre round the fact of earthly life being a misery. The Gita declares that this worldly existence is evanscent and unhappy. It is a common experience to find even in those who are blessed with all the so-called good things of life--money, honour, success--a deep undercurrent of melancholy.

14. It is the feeling of want, the sense of our lacking something that is vital, the consciousness of our being imperfect in some measure, that goads us on along the path of progress.

15. When we feel that things are all right with us, when we feel supremely happy in the midst of the (perishable) things of the universe, we give ourselves up to a feeling of self-satisfaction and false contentment. Such a feeling is pernicious to the development of the higher life. It is to awaken us from such a feeling of self-sufficiency that the Lord sends us now and then reminders in the form of misery. Our wealth and our relatives and all the things which we consider as particularly and solely ours, and on which our happiness is based, are removed from us with startling suddenness, and we are made to stand friendless, forlorn, poor.

16. Sri Ramakrishna used to say that so long as we inhabit the body we must pay 'taxes' in the form of disease and suffering. The body is composed of the elements, and being gross, it must inevitably be subject to the law of growth and decay

17. It is this attitude of regarding misery also as a proof of divine grace that has to be cultivated by us. Such an attitude takes away from misery its sharp tooth. So long as we are in the conditioned world we cannot hope to experience unalloyed happiness. Joy and sorrow are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, and both have their uses for us.
18. Vasista is neither an ordinary thinker nor philosopher. He combines in himself all the acumen of an astute philosopher and all the subtle experiences of a mystic Yogin, with all the sympathetic love of a tender mother.
19. He would take his students step by step through rational grounds to the dizzy heights of the monistic conception of Consciousness (Samvid, as he would term it) pure and simple where there is neither the notion of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer, nor the conception of the knower and the known.
20. But must men be religious in order to be moral? The lessons of evolution have thrown doubt on, if not totally discredited, the revelation of a complete ethical code to the first race of men to make them moral.
21 The fact is that the existence of the Atman is self-evident, since it is the "eternal witness, eternal subject, un-changeable reality" in man. There is indeed a logical proof involved in the utterances of these seers, which has been brought to light by later philosophers. It is very simple. To know motion or change, one must know it in relation to something that is less in motion. That less motion, in turn must be known in relation to lesser motion, ad infinitum, until one arrives at something which is not motion, which is unchangeable. Body, mind, everything we know, is a series of changes. There

must be, therefore, something beyond them which does not change. Moreover, the subject the witness, cannot be the object seen or cognised; and our minds, egos, senses, bodies etc. as the instruments of knowledge are the objects cognized. They cannot, therefore, be the subject, the witness. So there must be a separate something, the Atman, which is the eternal witness, the eternal subject.

22. Self-sacrifice would not be ruled out, for very often the individual would see that ultimately such abnegation of the self brings in a greater good to himself, or to those in whom he is interested than a direct self-seeking; but all such acts would be dictated by cool calculating reason, and not by the impetuosities of an emotional life whose roots are in the region of the unconscious.

23. It has been the dream of all secularistic movements that a day would arrive when men would be moral without being religious, that men would preserve the social relations of life without supporting them on transcendental assumptions. Freud in The Future of an Illusion describes religion as an obsessional neurosis of humanity, which, like most neuroses, is removable by proper treatment.

24. This raises the question whether religion is a superfluous luxury of the human imagination, whether individuals and races people the unseen with mysterious powers just as they write novels and compose poems.

25. He is not over-anxious to determine correctly whether what we actually see of a physical object is really identical with or only similar to the physical object itself.

26. Advaita dialecticians have examined with surpassing subtlety the definitions of the

different categories of thought enunciated by the different systems of Indian philosophy. They have declared that the categories of thought and the rational way of knowing things are ridden with contradictions. Thus they have pointed out the necessity for the assumption of the sole Reality uncharacterised by any attribute. The world of facts is neither real like Brahman nor unreal like the horns of a hare; because it is sublatable on one hand, and is perceived on the other.

27. The theory of Maya declares that in the created world there is no absolute reality, no absolute existence, all existence is relative. Objects exist and are known only in relation to other objects; and this knowledge is necessarily impermanent, because each object varies according to the object to which it is related. It is small in relation to a larger object, large in relation to a smaller one, blue in relation to one colour, purple in relation to another. Thus all knowledge of material things must be shifting.

28. When Thomas Edison was at work of a new problem, he spent long hours in deep reflection,--so deep that his meal would be brought, left and carried away again and he would know nothing of it.

29. The Advaita dialecticians have followed a very critical method. They have taken sufficient care and necessary pains to examine the categories of human knowledge, such as cause, quality, generality, etc. They have found all of them contradiction-ridden. They have laid down the satisfaction of two criteria as characterising the Ultimate Reality. They are: (1) it should not be sublated and (2) it should not be uncognisable like the horns of a hare

or the barren woman's son. The world of knowledge--multiplicity is neither Real nor Unreal nor Real-unreal. It is not real because it is sublated in dreams and deep sleep. It is neither Unreal because it is cognised. So the world is Real as well as Unreal. It is this mysterious perplexity that is explained by the notoriously misunderstood term Maya. We cannot commit ourselvesas to the real nature of the phenomena. The doctrine of Maya asks us to wisely suspend and not recklessly repudiate the affirmations about Reality. The academic Advaitin is interested in pointing out that every other position held by the opponent is untenable. The unity of knowledge in Advaita is derived from the unity of experience.

On the dialectic side, the Advaitins strongly oppose the doctrine of difference.

30. Advaita advocates adventure. The adventurer feels giddy as he mounts the last steps of a swaying spire of an ancient Gothic Cathedral..

31. Many of them are mere specks of light to us. But that is no indication of their size or power; for astronomers tell us that some of the stars that appear dimmest to us are many thousands of times bigger than the sun. Yet the sun is the nearest fixed star to us and he counts to us far more than all the fixed stars in the heavens.

32. Akshoy Kumar Banerjea: The objective world also cannot be conceived as having any character of its own apart from relation to the knowing, feeling, acting subject. Extension and duration, co-existence and succession, motion, and rest, unity and plurality, heat and light, sound and touch, weight and density, attraction and repulsion,--in short, all the so-called primary and secondary qualities, all the qualitative and quantitative relations, which constitute

the nature of the objective realities--are mental concepts and represent the diverse ways in which the human spirit receives, conceives and is affected by them. Apart from these, the objective world cannot be conceived as having any character, or even any existence. To give it any such name as matter of thing-in-itself or pure being or indeterminate substance to indicate what it is apart from, and independently of, the relation to the knowing, feeling and acting subject, does not in the least improve the situation, because either such a name should convey some definite meaning to the human understanding, in which case it must be the expression of a mental concept, and hence the relativity remains unavoidable, or it should be a meaningless word, which cannot represent the character of any reality.

33. There could be no conception of space and time, and the world could not be experienced as consisting of phenomena with spatial and temporal properties, if the experiencing subject had not been finite and limited and had not been finite and limited and had not been under the necessity to receive its objects in order of succession and simultaneity.

34. Man as the subject and the world as the object are organically united with each other. Each acts as the mirror of the other. Neither can be said to have any separate existence and character independently of the other. If we try to form any conception of either of them as unrelated to the other, each becomes a differenceless attributeless characterless void.

35. Swami Pranaveshananda. The American Philosopher Santayana says: "That matter cannot by transposition of its particles, become

what we call consciousness, is an admitted truth, that mind cannot become its own occasion or determine its own march, though it be a truth not recognised by all philosophers, is in itself no less obvious." To the Western thinkers, the problem of mind is rathe baffling. All that can be known about the nature of mind is dependent on inference and the behaviour of men and animals. The inter-action between mind and body, they say, is beyond dispute but their relation is an unsolved riddle.

36. Max Planck, a prominent German Physicist, says: "Consciousness cannot be explained in terms of matter and its laws. I regard consciousness as fundamental. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.

37. Prof. Lindemann also says "Causal Law fails completely when applied rigidly to the behaviour of the ultimate particles of which reality is composed." Although Prof. Einstein believes with Eddington that in the ultimate analysis of the physical world causal sequence does not hold in the present state of scientific knowledge, and that in quantum phenomena the behaviour of electrons is not determined, he is not, unlike Eddington, of opinion that determinacy has gone for good. He opines that with more knowledge the the time will come when the law of causality will have to be re-introduced in physics. Max Planck, the author of quantum theory, is also of the same opinion.

While thus the Western scientists are divided in their opinion about this law of causality, the Indian thinker Gaudapada had long ago proved to the holt by means of irrefutable arguments in Chapter four of the Mandukya Karika that this law does not at all hold good ultimately; for

he establishes by Ajatavada or the theory of non-creation that the Brahman or Reality has never become this universe. Law of causality plays its part when we believe in creation and its evolution. Gaudapada says that the universe exists only in the imagination of the seer who is ignorant and untutored.

38. Even when they talk of atoms, electrons, etc. they are talking about things that depend upon their minds. All the chain of events and everything that are perceived by the senses are mental. And since they are mental Sir James Jeans postulates the existence of a "Universal Mind" in which all these have their being. So it is mind that has built up this objective universe of matter wandering through space and time.

39. This world of space, matter and apparent movement in time is only an interpretation of one's own mind.

40. If the mind were in itself conscious or self-luminous, as the Western thinkers claim it to be, it should have been able to cognise itself and the external objects at one and the same time, which it cannot. Therefore mind is not in itself conscious or self-luminous. Patanjali says: "The essence of knowledge (God) being unchangeable when the mind takes its form, it becomes conscious."

41. Prof. John Macmurray of the University of London is regarded by some, so I am told, as the hope of idealism in England. Whether idealism as a philosophic theory is going to have a renewed life in that country, and that through the efforts of Professor Macmurray, I cannot really say.

PRABUDDHA BHARATA.1938. (vol ###)

.BRAHMA SUTRA BHASHYA.by SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA.

1. Here the word 'then' refers to the fourfold spiritual requisites which existing, an inquiry into Brahman is possible and without which it would be impossible, and not to an inquiry into work, for it in no way helps one who aspires after knowledge or liberation. The cause of this bondage is the wrong perception of manifoldness.
2. Brahman, the non-differentiated Pure Consciousness, is the only reality, and all this manifoldness is imagined in It alone and is false.
3. Brahman is bereft of all differences arising from unlike and like objects and attributes, that It is not an object of perception, that I cannot be known, but that Its nature is essentially opposite to what we generally experience in this world.
4. Texts deny all manifoldness in It and show that It alone is real and that everything else is false. Falsehood means that kind of knowledge about a thing, which is liable to be sublated later on by true knowledge, i.e. by knowledge of things as they are in reality, the earlier one being due to certain defects in the means of knowledge adopted.
5. This Nescience disappears when the identity of the individual soul and Brahman is realized.
6. Direct perception gives us the impression that the flame of a lamp is identical throughout but inference tells us that it cannot be the same one but different flames produced by different particles of oil and wick, which come in such a rapid succession that the eye is not able to distinguish them, and thus give rise to the idea of an identical flame. Here direct

perception, though a stronger proof, is set aside by inference, for the former was contaminated by some defect (viz., the incapacity of the eyes) and was capable of being otherwise explained while the latter was free from such defects.

7. It may be objected that if Existence alone is experienced by us in all objects and not the difference, then all our cognitions will have one object only and the resulting experience will be one only, i.e. there will be no difference in our knowledge like "this is a pot", "this is a cloth" even as there is no difference in our continuous knowledge of one object like a pot. The objection is not valid, for the nature of an object and its difference from others--these two cannot result from the same perception, either simultaneously or in successive moments. They cannot be perceived simultaneously or in successive moments. They cannot be perceived simultaneously, for while the nature of the object is perceived at once, its difference from other objects cannot be so perceived as it depends on our remembrance of other things from which this object differs. These two, being contradictory--one depending on other objects and the other not so depending--cannot simultaneously experienced. Nor can they be perceived in successive moments as perception lasts only for one moment. So we have to settle which of the two is the object of our perception: It cannot be the "difference", for it presupposes a knowledge of the realnature of the thing and the remembrance of objects opposite to it. Hence 'difference' cannot be the object of direct perception and our knowledge of it is due to a wrong notion--it is illusory ordunreal. Moreover, this 'difference' cannot be defined, for it is

neither the nature of the thing nor its attribute. If it were its nature, then cognition of the thing would also lead to the cognition of the difference and further the object and "difference" would become synonymous. It cannot be an attribute, for in that case this difference will have a difference from the essential nature of the thing and this latter difference would be an attribute of the first which would lead to a third difference as the attribute of the second and so on ad infinitum. Again, it would mean that this 'difference' which is an attribute would be experienced only when the object is experienced as qualified by attributes such as a generic character (jati), and the object as possessing a generic character which is experienced only on the apprehension of the difference--which is an untenable position. Therefore, 'difference' cannot be defined and so it is only Existence (Sat) that is the object of perception and all difference or manifoldness is unreal.

8. Consciousness which persists in all our cognitions is real and therefore identical with existence (Sat). An objection may be raised that since "Existence" is an object of consciousness it is different from it, which fact establishes plurality. But it has clearly been shown that 'difference' does not exist, for it is neither an object of perception nor can it be defined. Hence Existence cannot be proved to be an object of consciousness, i.e, it is not experienced through any means of knowledge. Hence Existence is Consciousness itself.

9. This consciousness is eternal, for it cannot have a beginning or end. A beginning means that it was not existing before that. Consciousness of such previous non-existence of consciousness

pre-supposes the existence of consciousness. Hence non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved through consciousness. Nor can anything else prove it, for that something can prove it only by making consciousness its object and this is not possible, for consciousness has been shown to be self-proved and cannot become such an object. Therefore, its previous non-existence cannot be proved, hence it is beginningless, i.e. not originated, and so it has none of the other changes too like growth, modification, decay, destruction, etc., since these are true only of objects that have an origin. As consciousness has no beginning, there can be no manifoldness in it, for we find that wherever there is manifoldness it has a beginning, for the latter is an invariable concomitant of the former. Nor can difference, origination, etc., which are objects of consciousness be attributes of consciousness, for objects of consciousness are different from consciousness itself. Colour, for example, is an object of consciousness and it is not an attribute of consciousness. Nor can Existence, Knowledge and Bliss be its attributes, for consciousness is essentially consciousness itself.

Therefore, consciousness is devoid of all plurality and as a result it cannot have any 'knower' (self) at its back different from itself. Self-luminous consciousness itself is the Self, for consciousness is intelligent and so is bereft of inertness, which inertness is a quality of everything that is non-Self. Non-self being thus precluded from consciousness, it is nothing but the Self. Neither can it be said that the quality of being a "knower" is an attribute of consciousness as expressions like "I know" seem to suggest for this knower

is an object of consciousness and therefore cannot be its attribute. The same thing cannot be both the subject and the object of its activity at the same time. An object is that on which is concentrated the activity of the agent, and hence it must be different from the agent, and as this 'knower' is an object of consciousness it is different from consciousness. Moreover, this 'knower' which means the agent in the act of knowing is changing, since agency begins and ends with that act of knowing, for this reason also it cannot be an attribute of consciousness which is eternal and changeless. This attribution is due to a misnomer. It is superimposed upon it even as the notion of being a man, being lame or blind, is superimposed on the self in expressions like 'I am a man', 'I am lame', 'I am blind, and is a product of the ego which itself is unreal and ever-changing. The ego or 'I' is not the Self, because it does not exist in deep sleep and in the state of liberation, when the Self alone persists as consciousness. But this ego nevertheless serves to objectify the Self, or Consciousness abiding in it, even as a mirror reflects an object which thus looks as if abiding in it, and this leads to erroneous notions like 'I know' Therefore the 'knower' or 'I' in I know is no attribute of the Self which is Pure Consciousness.

Thus there exists in reality only eternal, non-changing Consciousness which is bereft of all plurality and whose nature is pure non-differentiated Intelligence which, however, due to error appears as manifold. The object of an enquiry into Vedanta-texts is to set right this error through the knowledge of Brahman which is non-dual, eternal, and Pure consciousness.

10. Ashokanath Sastri. Brahman, on the other hand

is regarded as the cause which appears to the ignorant mind as undergoing real modification in course of the evolution of the world-process. It is technically known as the illusory or apparent cause (vivartopadana).

11. The illusory or apparent cause (vivartopadana)--the cause which remains absolutely unmodified while the effect is apparently produced from it. In other words, the cause appears as the effect. As for instance, rope may be called the illusory cause of a snake, as the appearance of the effect (snake) does not affect the nature of the cause (rope) in any way.

12. Between consciousness and the material world there is absolutely no similarity. If we go deeper into the question we must see that similarity is unpredicable of the Absolute Consciousness, which has neither qualities nor parts in it.

13. He does not, like the Italian Pragmatist, Papini, allow theories to spring up, but shuts all doors to "theories."

14. Surendra Nath Bhattacharya: When we hear of a Buddha, a Sankara, a Ramakrishna apparently feeling excruciating pain from a fell disease, or or a Vasishtha mad with sorrow at the death of his sons, we are naturally led to doubt if they at all realized the truth. On the other hand, when we find a yogi apparently undisturbed even when an operation is performed on his body or shuffling off the mortal coil in a particular posture after giving previous warning, we at once believe that he must have attained to the highest stage of realization. But we forget that our standard of judgment is not necessarily a correct one. We forget that we have made an artificial and conventional

distinction between ggod and bad, that there is no permanent universal standard by which one thing can intrinsically be stigmatized as bad, impure or painful, and another extolled as good, pure or pleasurable. When looked at from our angle of vision the sun is seen to rise and set. But from the viewpoint of the sun these would be quite meaningless. We try to avoid certain things, because we have been trained to regard them as bad. Again, we hanker after certain other things, because these have been believed to be good. But for one who has realized the whole truth, who has become Brahman, can such distinction of good and bad exist?

15. It is the mind that makes the distinction between good and bad, purity and impurity, pleasure and pain.

16. It does not stand to reason that an enlightened soul must not feel the pain of a disease. It is the mind that feels. Why should the enlightened soul disturb the natural course of the mind? If you would expect absence of feeling from him, you may as well demand that he should neither eat nor answer the calls of nature. If his gross body, with all its faults, be not detrimental to his enlightenment, why should his mind with all its natural functions? The enlightened soul indeed does feel quite as much as he walks, sleeps, eats and talks. He sees no need of paralyzing his external nature and habits. To him each work is as worthy as any other. He knows that it is the mind and the senses that actually work, he-in-himself is inactive. (Nishkriya) Whatever might be the nature of the work, he is merely a witness and is not the least concerned. To him every work is Brahman. (In this connection a perusal of the Gopalottaratapinyopanishad will

will be most illuminating.)

So when a Ramakrishna is found to feel pain, we must not jump to the conclusion that he has no realization. On the contrary, if he were found to try to ward off that physical suffering by his will-power, we might have reasons to doubt whether he had attained final realization. Neither should it be supposed that simply because a yogi withdraws his senses (including his mind) within himself and dies a painless death, therefore he is above all pairs of opposites and is established in supreme knowledge; this kind of mental abstraction may be due to the force of his mere habit. In fact, the behaviour of a jivanmukta, whether he be a jnani, a yogi or a bhakta, is hardly ever the sole criterion of his realization. It is only his habit, and when he has visualized the whole Truth he does not feel the necessity of disturbing his second nature, not is he-in-himself ever affected by it. To try to measure the deptth of one's spirituality by one's behaviour is a sheer mistake.

Now a question arises: If the Jivanmukta makes no distinction between good and bad, (and Shastras also place him above all injunctions or prohibitions), can he lapse into immorality (although conventional) and do things unapproved by the Shastras? The answer is an emphatic NO. He has neither the training nor adaptibility for such actions, nor does he like to mislead the ignorant and encourage social disruption. Although now he sees no distinction between good and evil, yet he must have begun his career with a scrupulous regard for it. He must have begun his sadhana by a rigorous practice of virtue and avoidance of vice. In fact, discrimination between the permanent and the transient, realizing the evil effects of the objects of the senses and detachment

from sense-objects are the A B C of spiritual life. To grasp the truth in its entirety the mind must be thoroughly purified and cleansed. Then and then alone will it acquire the power of comprehending things-in-themselves. And purification of the mind is practically its returning to itself. Ordinarily the mind is diffused due to its running after the thoughts of the manifold things of the world and cannot be focussed on any particular point. Till this perfect mental equipose is attained, the mind only apprehends partial truths.

17. His behaviour subsequent to his enlightenment is only a continuation of his past habits. Indeed by evil practices no one has ever attained the state of a jivanmukta. Even if he commits a bad act due to the unavoidable momentum of actions that have begun to fructify in this life, he for himself is beyond reproach and others must not emulate this aberration.

18. Bergson shows that the conception of "nothing" as opposed to "Being" is "pseudo-idea" and the problem raised by it is a "pseudo-problem." If we think deeply, we find that there is no such thing as "pure void" or "nothing", for, behind the "void" there is "continuity." It is wrong to think of "nothing" as we can think of the "all" or "Being". The thought of "nothing" is a negative judgment, and has a non-intellectual element in it, whereas the affirmative judgement of "all" is purely intellectual. So the supposition of "nothing" on intellectual grounds is untenable.

19. S. Radhakrishnan: Is there a point to which you may refer and say here and at this particular point we obtain immortality?

20. Some hypothesis like that of rebirth lends itself to us and we know that this is peculiarly

oriental. It is not merely a theory of the Hindus and Buddhists but of others also. It appealed to Plato and others. Spinoza had sympathy with it. Many others wrote about it. Victor writes in the Destiny of Man, "That which mortals call death is nothing but re-appearance of another phase of life." Huxley affirms the doctrine of evolution. Rebirth has its roots in the world of reality. It is not merely the ancient thinkers and philosopers who proclaimed this hypothesis. The other day James accepted the hypothesis. I am talking now about the Christian theologians who are alive. The latest book is by a Christian theologian, Dr. Spencer, under the title Future Life in which he gives a new interpretation of Christian doctrine. The theory of future life, that declares that human beings have numerous lives, is no more contrary to the Christian doctrine than the theories of Darwin and Lyall. Moreover it enables us to relate salvation and spiritual development of humanity with the lives of the individuals of which humanity is composed. He points out that it need not be taken as opposed to the doctrine of Christianity. As a matter of fact it gives us a more satisfactory solution of the Christian problems themselves and there is nothing in that doctrine which may be regarded as inconsistent with the fundamentals of Christian Philosophy. The present attitude of most of the Western thinkers is thus: May regard life after death as certain and as a possibility which deserves discussion.

The explanation is that modern Western thought and its belief in immortality has been of Christian origin. There is nothing in pre-existence theory imcompatible with any of the dogmas which are generally accepted as the fundamentals of Christianity. Whenever Christian

theologians are pressed to conclusion, they always say that the hypothesis of rebirth is something which has had historical support and may be revived. I anticipate a great revival of the pre-existence doctrine.

21. S.K. Maitra. The greatest need of our practical life is the power of making a proper valuation of facts and judgments upon facts. Every experience of ours, every experience of our fellows brings in its train an enormous number of facts and judgments upon facts. We should be completely buried under this gigantic heap, did we not possess the power of discarding the worthless and picking out what is of value. It is here that philosophical training comes to our aid, for it teaches us the fundamental canons of valuation.

22. However great may be the authority that may back up a particular judgment upon a concrete situation, the philosopher cannot abrogate his duty of putting his own value upon it. Philosophers are born rebels in this sense, for it is not possible for them to accept, without examinaton, any judgment, no matter what the source of it may be.

23. Vimuktananda. For, it is said that "whatever his chitta thinks, of that nature a man becomes." and "if his thoughts (chitta) are so fixed on Brahman as they are on the things ofthe world, who would not then be freed from bondage?" (Maitreyi Up.) To achieve this end the Upanishads have laid down the method of Yoga.

24. By Yoga it should not be understood as a mechanical process of stopping the activities of the mind. It is rather a scientific method of effecting an all-round growth of the best mental faculties. The Upanishads are very emphatic on the point that the realization of the Atman cannot be had by stunting the growth of the mind by

of the mind, but by sharpening the intellect, through self control and concentration.

25. For the practice of yoga a congenial place is a paramount need. One is to find a place that will be pure, free from noise and away from human habitations, which will be delightful to the mind and pleasing to the eyes with its beautiful sceneries. Such a lovely place cannot but exert a quieting effect on the mind and thus help its concentration. That is why most of the beauty-spots in India such as the confluence of rivers, snow-capped mountain peaks or expansive sea-shores, are the favourite haunts of the yogis.

To begin with yogic practices one must get into the habit of sitting motionless on a single seat for a pretty long time. For no sustained thought is ever possible unless one has acquired the requisite composure of the body. There is a close inter-relation between the body and the mind and the least disturbance in the former is sure to react upon the latter and thus throw it out of balance.

26. It exhorts everybody to know the Atman as one's own self alone and give up all other vain cogitations about the gods, heaven and the like, which are but our mental projections and therefore devoid of real value.

27. P.S. Naidu: The growth of non-Euclidean geometries of various types, the development of quantum dynamics, the establishment of the principle of relativity, and last but not least the formulation of the law of uncertainty by the brilliant young mathematical physicist, Heisenberg, are so many indications of the fact that the human mind holds within its inscrutable depths mysteries of an unfathomable nature.

28. Voltaire was perhaps right in believing that society is a growth in time, not a syl-

logism in Logic; and "when the past is put out through the door it comes in at the window."

29. Charanjit Singh Bindra. Some four hundred centuries back, before seed time and harvest began, in the days of hunting and wandering, the far off days of which we possess no written record, we have it on the authority of researches of the psycho-analysts that the true man in his primitive stage must have thought much the same way as the child or the ignorant uneducated do even to-day, that is, in a series of imaginative pictures. These observations are based on the study of the egotistic and passionate impulses of the child as restrained, suppressed, modified or overlaid to adopt them to the needs of social life. This view is further fortified by the study of the human interests as indicated by numerous drawings, carvings, statues and symbols that have come down to us from the early dawn of civilization as also by that of the ideas and customs of such contemporary savages as still survive. And finally the record of mental history as fossilized in fold-lore and the deep-rooted irrational superstitions of the civilised people of to-day also suggests the same postulate. Systematic thinking is comparatively a late development, and even to-day the number of such men as control and order their thoughts in but a small fraction of the total population of the world. As H.G.Wells has it, most of the men still live by imagination and passion. They act in accordance with the emotions that are aroused in them by the images they conjure up, or the images that present themselves to their minds. This is most applicable in the domain of religion, where presumption and speculation are the rule rather than the exception.

INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY BY C.E.M.JOAD.

1. The attitude of the ordinary man in the street to the Universe is that of an uncompromising Realist. He conceives of himself as existing in a world of objects which exist together with him, yet independently of him, and he regards his consciousness as a sort of searchlight which illuminates this world of objects and enables him to ascertain their number and nature. This theory, in so far as it can be called a theory at all, makes no difference between seeming and being: things in fact are what they seem. Reflection, however, shows that there is much in our experience which it seems difficult to conceive of as being 'out there in the world.' Such phenomena as dreams, hallucinations, reveries, and the experience of seeing double which attends intoxication, suggest that it is not everything in our experience that comes from outside. Where, then, are we to locate the objects of our dreams? Obviously in the mind of the dreamer. It seems possible, then, that we can experience ideas of our own which have no necessary counterpart in the world of outside objects: at any rate, the fact that we can perceive what is not there, that in short there is such a thing as error, means that the common-sense realism of the man in the street must, in certain respects at least, be abandoned. Idealism grasps at this possibility and develops it into a complete denial of the existence of the plain man's world.

The first step in the departure from the common-sense view is taken in the so-called Representationalism of Descartes and Locke. These philosophers conceived of consciousness not as a beam of light illuminating the outside world, but as a photographic plate upon which objects

are represented. The representations of the objects on the plate are the ideas which appear in consciousness. Mind, therefore, perceives its own ideas, but does not perceive the external objects which stimulate consciousness and cause the ideas to arise. It is believed that a world of external objects exists, but it is denied that it can ever be directly known.

But Idealism could not remain long in this position. If we can never know the world of external objects, we cannot know that it possesses the property of causing our ideas, not can we even know that it exists. The next stage, then, is to eliminate this world of external objects, and to rest content with a Universe containing mind which knows, and its mental states which are what it knows, and we have the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley and Hume. Berkeley indeed stopped short of the full logical development of his position and admitted the existence of other minds and of the self, though in point of fact we have ideas of neither. Hume, however, ruthlessly pushed to its conclusion Berkeley's argument that a thing's existence consists of its being known, and came to rest in the position which is called Solipsism, a position which asserts that mental states are the only things that can be known to exist in the Universe.

Kant's philosophy is an attempt to escape from the subjectivist Solipsism to which Hume's arguments were logically reducible. He not only formulates a "Thing in itself" which, like the external object of Locke and Descartes, is never known and never can be known, but endeavours to endow the world of what is known, that is to say, the world which enters experience, with objectivity by attributing to mind

the power of prescribing to this world its laws, so far at least as these are based upon the forms of time and space, and upon the categories.

Kant also introduced a new element in the shape of a distinction between the self as knower that owns as its states the objects that it experiences, and the self as known which is just one among a world of different objects. Hegel eliminated the 'Thing in Itself' extended the notion of the mind as the prescriber of laws to the Universe until consciousness came to be regarded as the source of all laws and all relations, and unified in one absolute soul the plurality of knowing minds or souls left by Kant, with the result that the various souls or selves as known, which are mere items in a world of other objects, came to be thought of together with their objects are mere fragmentary manifestations of the Absolute, and not to be regarded as completely real except in so far as they are or can be merged therein. Thus the Absolute is the only real thing that is left in the Universe, the apparent multiplicity of objects that we know being only partial aspect of the Absolute.

In this way the whole Idealist movement in philosophy may be regarded as a development and an elaboration of the doubt that first assailed the common-sense Realist when he found that certain of his perceptions were erroneous, or had at any rate no counterpart in the outside world. And it is in precisely the same way that the Realist movement may be regarded as an attempt to save the common-sense view of the world by accounting both for the fact of perception and for so-called erroneous perception without reducing the wole physical Universe to modifications of mental states.

2. The ordinary Realist method of disposing of the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley and Hume is to accuse it of basing a false conclusion on a true proposition. The true proposition is, 'It is impossible to discover anything that is not known', because it becomes known by the mere process of being discovered. From this proposition it follows that it is impossible to discover with certainty what characteristics things possess when they are not known. The Idealist then proceeds falsely to conclude, "Things have no characteristics when they are not known; therefore the characteristic of being known is that which constitutes their existence: therefore things only exist when they are known.'

But the Idealist conclusion does not in fact follow. The only conclusion which can validly be based upon the proposition quoted above is that "All known things are known." This is a truism, and in so far as the Idealist argument asserts more than this, in so far, in fact, as it draws the conclusion which it does draw, it achieves this result by tacking on to this truism a falsity, this falsity being "All things are known." But from the fact that we do not know what characteristics things possess when they are not known it does not follow that all things are therefore always known. Nor is it really a fact that we can never tell what characteristics things possess when they are not known. We can assert, for example, of a number that is so large that it has never been thought of the following characteristic--"The number in question possesses the characteristic of being half of an even number."

A similar fallcy underlies the Idealist's use of the word 'idea'. The argument that we can only know our own ideas can be expressed in the form of what is called a Syllogism:
(1) Ideas are incapable of existing apart from

a mind. (2) Physical objects, in so far as they are perceived or know at all, are certainly ideas. Therefore (3) All physical objects are incapable of existing apart from a mind.

This Syllogism, which is formally valid, shrouds an ambiguity in the use of the word 'idea.' In the major prèmise (1) the word 'idea' is used to denote the act of perceiving: in the minor premise (2) the object of the act that is to say, the thing or content that is perceived. But the object of an act of thought can never be the same as the act of thought of which it is an object. Hence we shall find that most Realists begin by adopting an attitude towards mind which conceives of it as that which has the power of knowing things which are other than itself.

But a refutation of the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley and Hume does not necessarily carry with it a disproof of the more elaborate Idealism of Hegel. Hegel's philosophy is one which, whatever other claims it may make, takes its stand upon the existence of something other than states of the knowing mind, and, even if this something is 'Thought' taken as a whole, it is contended that the Absolute does at least rescue Idealism from the reproach of being a Solipsistic philosophy.

But does this contention stand the test of analysis? The Realist claims that it does not. The Absolute, he says, is either knowable or not knowable. If the Absolute is knowable, it must form part of the experience of the individual minds which are its own fragments; that is to say, its being, falling as it does within individual experience, affords no evidence for the existence of anything outside individual experience, and we revert to the Solipsist position again. If, on the other hand, the Absolute

is unknowable, then it reduces itself to the status of the physical object of Descartes and Locke; that is to say, of something behind experience, the existence of which, from the very fact that it cannot enter into experience, must remain an unverified hypothesis, a mere guess.

The above dilemma is one which, according to the Realist, besets any philosophy which makes knowledge in any way constitutive of its objects, or, in other words, any form of Idealism.

3. An object cannot be in two consciousness at once. If, therefore, it is in A's experience, taking 'in' literally to mean 'a part of; it cannot at the same time be in B's.

Science teaches that physical objects are never themselves the data of perception, but that these data are the messages which the physical objects send out. Thus the appearance of a star which is now seen directly overhead is really a message sent by a star which may have gone out of existence thousands of years ago. Thus it cannot be said that we actually experience the star. Thus all cases of perception register data which are at a different moment in time (especially, e.g. in the case of hearing), and at a different point in space, as compared with the object which is supposed to have caused the data. Thus the datum of perception is a message which is other than the physical object which may be supposed to have dispatched it.

If the object gets into the experience of A, who has normal vision, as something blue, and of B, who is colour-blind, as something green, we are required to suppose that the object is both blue and green at the same time. Hence erroneous perceptions would be impossible.

But the Idealist view of perception is equally unsatisfactory. Idealists in general contend that the data of perception are psychological existents, ideas or mental states of the perceiver, which may or may not be copies of an outside object whose existence must at best remain an assumption. But our data cannot, it is urged, be our own mental states. For suppose that the datum perceived is, in the words of one of the Critical Realists, 'a round wheel about three feet in diameter moving away from us and now between this house and the next'; it is clear that my mental state is neither round, nor three feet in diameter nor between this house and the next. The mental state must then be other than the datum perceived. Further, it is contended that though A and B may perceive an identical datum, as, for instance, an identical shade of red, A's mental state, from the very fact that it is A's, must be qualitatively different from B's.

4. If it once be admitted that we cannot know reality directly, it follows that we cannot know reality at all, and we fall back logically either into Kantian Idealism, or into the subjective Idealism of Berkeley which asserts that we know only our own ideas.

Mr. Russell's philosophy may be studied in three successive phases, which synchronize with the publication of three of his books entitled, The Problem of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External world, and the Analysis of Mind. The development of his philosophy, which can be traced in these three books, may be described as a continuous application of Occam's razor, an application which grows progressively more drastic, to the constituents of the Universe. In the Middle Ages the monk Occam enunciated a famous axiom to the effoect that "Entities are not to

be multiplied without necessity."; and the changes which have taken place in Mr.Russell's philosophy consist of a continuous paring away of unessential elements, and the reduction of the Universe to an ever-diminishing number of fundamental constituents. (1) The Problems of Philosophy. The view advocated in Mr. Russell's later works is commonly known as Neo-Realism. The Problems of Philosophy, however, published in 1911, presents us with a philosophy which has little in common with these later developments. While it possesses certain features which point the way to Neo-Realism, it is more akin in spirit, in its attitude to Idealism, and in its treatment of the problems of perception, to the theories at which we have already glanced in the previous chapter, and a brief account of it will help to fill in the outline of our sketch of this earlier type of Realism.

5. The philosophy of Berkeley, which, as we have seen, asserts, so far as it is consistent with itself, that the only entities of which we can have knowledge are ideas in our minds. Hence, since all that we can know of a tree is a series of impressions or ideas which the so-called tree imprints upon our senses, the tree does in fact consist of these ideas which are entirely in our minds.

The plausibility of this theory, according to Mr. Russell, rests upon an ambiguity in the use of the word 'in'. When we speak of having a person in mind, we mean not that the person is in our mind but that a thought of him is in our mind; but the thought is different from the person, and we can, in fact, only think about the person because he is something other than our thought about him. This distinction between an act of thought and the object of the act is

of fundamental importance; if it is overlooked or obscured, as Berkeley is held to have obscured it, we arrive at the position that we cannow know that anything exists except our own ideas. This position, known as Solipsism, is, according to Mr. Russell, logically irrefutable, but there is, on the other hand, no need to suppose that it is true.

6. He points out how most philosophers in their accounts of sense perception have first implicitly assumed the existence of other people's minds, and have then found difficulty in accounting for the fact that the same physical object presents difference appearances to two minds at the same time or to one person at two times between which it cannot be supposed to have changed. As a result of these difficulties they have either come to doubt whether an external reality, other than mind, can exist at all (the position of most Idealists), or have been led to believe that if such a reality does exist, it can never be known (the position of Kant).

7. Scientists on the whole have endeavoured to eliminate mind; they have denied its efficacy and restricted its scope, while extreme views have regarded it as a highly attenuated form of matter, convicting it on Idealist grounds of being a fictitious abstraction from an experience whose nature in mental through and through.

8. Philosophers have held that it was their business to take all knowledge for their province and, by synthesizing the results obtained by the special sciences, to endeavour to obtain a view of the Universe as a whole, which was more comprehensive than that to which any single science could aspire. Philosophers,

therefore, while accepting without question the results which the various sciences have reached each within its special sphere, have proceeded to deduce therefrom by purely rational processes certain considerations tending to show what must be the character of the Universe as a whole. The philosopher is concerned, accordingly, not with science itself, but with the nature of the Universe which the existence of science implies; not with experience itself, but with the question of the conditions or presuppositions necessarily involved in the fact that experience is what it is.

9. Hegel may be said to have bequeathed to the world of philosophy two distinct doctrines which are ~~(1)~~ That thought is a living concrete reality and that, since thought, our thought in point of fact, is the only type of existent of whose reality we are definitely assured, thought must be regarded as that in terms of which we are to interpret the whole of reality.

10. By making the Absolute the immanent spring from which all thought rises as well as the all-embracing sea into which all thought merges, the universal presupposition of experience as well as the final synthesis of experience, it renders progress non-existent and change unreal.

11. If the only thing that exists in the Universe is mind, History will be the History of mind; it will record not the occurrence of events, but the development of mind. So far the Neo-Idealist is at one with the Hegelian.

12. Philosophy studies the nature or being of reality; that is to say, it studies the nature or being of mind, But according to the Neo-Idealists, it is the nature or being of mind to be self-creative: mind creates therefore what it interprets, and it interprets what it creates. A creative, mind is History; it is making reality, and History therefore is present reality: as

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interpretative, mind is Philosophy: Philosophy therefore is nothing but the continuance of the activity which it interprets. We may go one step farther and say that it is that activity: for, since mind is what it makes itself, it is the process of its own self-realization: therefore the reflection by mind on mind's nature and being is itself mind's nature and being. Hence the Philosophy of History is the same as the History of Philosophy.

13 Experience appears at first sight inalienably to involve the conception of that which is experienced: it seems to suggest an object which stands as it were face to face with the experiencer, and in so doing stiumulates the experience and determines its character. But this suggestion is a delusion. The distinction between experience and the object of experience is a distinction made within experience itself, the experience, namely, with which we start. This experience with which we start as a whole, a unity, mental through and through, and the distinction made within it between an experiencer and an object of an experience is a distinction which is itself a product of the experiencing mind: we experience , not the object, but our experience of the supposed object. Hence, since our experience is the only thing of which we are directly aware, there is no need to suppose that the object, or indeed the whole world of external matter believed to be independent of mind, is anything more than a mental construction, a species of abstraction made by mind for its own purposes from the concrete whole of experience. But if there is no external object it is clear that mind must create its own objects, and we are accordingly forced to the view that experience is a self-determining and self-creating activity, which is both self-begetting and self-

begotten. And, since whatever is real must be of this type, it follows that reality is a universal Mind.

14. For Croce there is no problem of sense perception, that bugbear of the Realists. There are no objects of sense and no independent sense data; and, since there are no objects or data given to experience, there can be no passive element in experience consisting of the mere acceptance or awareness of these data. Perception therefore is not, as many previous philosophers have thought, a process in which a mind A becomes aware of something outside it.

15. In that given account of the machinery of perception on Croce's lines we find that we are in fact describing the behaviour of the artist and the poet. We have said above that the aesthetic activity produces its data for itself; descriving this process more precisely we shall say that mind has intuitions and expresses these intuitions in the form of images. This does not mean that the intuition and the image are distinct, or that an unexpressed intuition can exist in its own right. The intuition and the image are only spoken of as two owing to the exigencies of language; and the fact that subsequent reflection can distinguish them as two distinct phases in the aesthetic activity does not mean that they possess a separate existence or can function separately.

16. "If", says Croce, "we think of man at the first" (imaginary) "moment of his unfolding theoretic life, his mind as yet unencumbered by any abstraction or any reflection, in that first moment, purely intuitive, he can be but a poet. Art, which creates the first presentations and inaugurates the life of knowledge, also conti-

nually keeps fresh in our mind the aspects of things which thought has submitted to reflection and the intellect to abstraction, and so for ever is making us become poets again.

17. It is the quality of concreteness which serves most of all to distinguish the concept from the pseudo concept. The pseudo concept, is a class name for a number of existent entities or, in Croce's language, presentations which possess a common property. Examples of the the pseudo concept are 'house', 'triangle', 'water', 'man.' Much philosophy has been concerned with the attempt to establish the status of these pseudo concepts, and in particular to determine the question whether they possess an existence which is independent of the classes of objects for which they stand. Croce answers this question in the negative. The pseudo concept 'house' has no existence in its own right apart from the sum total of all the individual houses which it represents; it is simply a class name, the product of a piece of mental shorthand.

18. While admitting the utility of the sciences and the importance of the results which they have achieved, Idealists deny that there objects are entirely real: they are rather abstractions from reality made for a special purpose. The conclusions of the sciences therefore, though possessing validity, possess validity of a very special order which holds within certain limits, these limits being not the indefinite limits of reality as a whole, but those which have been arbitrarily constituted by the scientist's special selection from reality of his subject-matter. What is the basis of this contention?

For the Neo-Idealist, as we have seen, only mind is real. Experience is the insertion of

mind in reality, and there is no reality apart from the experience of mind: there is therefore no 'that' which the mind experiences, in the sense of a 'that' which comehow subsists apart from the experience of it. Now it is precisely with such a 'that' that science deals. Science carves out from the concrete whole objects which it treats as real. It is assumed that these objects of scientific inquiry are real facts of everyday life, and that, for their study and comprehension, a consideration of the act of knowing , of which they really form part, is irrelevant: and the pseudo concepts triangle flesh, and bone, matter, electrons, etc. are formed for the express purpose of enabling them to be so studied and understood.

But a study of entities formed by abstraction from concrete reality must yield a type of truth which is only true within the limits, and subject to the conditions, which the initial abstraction from the real involves. The only study which can yield results which are entirely true is the study of that which is wholly and entirely real, namely, concrete mind. And just as philosophy is more real than science, so the pure concept studied by philosophy, being an actual moment in the life of mind and not an unreal abstraction from mind, possesses a reality which is greater.

19. The argument for the existence of Mind as a whole outside the individual experience with which we have been hitherto concerned is not easy to follow, and has seemed to many unconvincing. Croce's philosophy has often been charged not only with providing no escape from the position of Subjective Idealism, which asserts that the only things we can know are our own ideas, but even with a logical reduction of itself to Solipsism, the doctrine that

our own mental states are the only things that exist in the Universe.

20. He does hold that the experience which philosophy studies is not in the long run individual experience, or at any rate not only such experience, but the universalized experience of mind as a whole, with which the individual's experience is continuous and of which is forms part. "The consciousness which forms the object of philosophical inquiry is not that of the individual in so far as he is an individual, but the universal consciousness which is in any individual, the basis alike of his individuality and of that of others."

21. This mind or experience, as it is called, is for Gentile literally the only thing in the Universe: in fact the Universe is mind or spirit. It is clear that the difficulty of such a position will lie in the attempt to account for apparent multiplicity. We start with a reality which is one spirit or mind; this spirit cancels and supersedes all oppositions and distinctions; it makes and unmakes everything that there is, including itself; and from this startingpoint Gentile has by some means to show how the whole wealth of concrete detail which constitutes our everyday world, with its various degrees and stages of being, is developed.

How is this development effected? We are precluded in the first place from regarding the content of our knowledge, the actual things we know, either as a collection of objects set over against mind and existing independently of it, or as a composite something which, though it determines and is determined by mind, being indeed a necessary condition of the mind's knowing at all, is, nevertheless, something other than the mind which moulds or fashions it.

Knowledge, that is to say, is not on this view an external relationship between mind and a world which is unaffected by being known, nor a relationship in which mind forms for itself the objects of its knowledge from material which is essentially unknowable.

22. In self-consciousness mind is both knowing subject and known object; it can and must postulate itself as acting under each of these two phases while still remaining one with itself. In self-consciousness it is the same mind which is at the same time both knower and known. Nor is it true to say that the subject is a piece of mind, such that there is another piece of mind left over which has no part in the subject and is, for example, object. On the contrary, mind throws itself wholly into each phase, so that the subject is just as much and just as completely mind as the object. Thus mind separates within itself these two phases or stages of its being, and permits them, as it were, to develop along their own lines, while remaining itself whooly present in each phase. Self-conscicusness is therefore a synthesis or uniting of two distinguishable moments or phases, in one of which mind appears as subject, in the other as object.

The fact that the experience of which we are most fully and clearly aware, the experience which is most indubitably real, is a unity containing within itself distinguishable aspects, is of the utmost importance when we endeavour to develop the apparent multiplicity of the Universe out of Gentile's all-pervasive mind or spirit.

For Gentile's main thesis is that the relationship of which we are most indubitably aware in self-consciousness is that in terms of which we must interpret reality as a whole.

Mind, being the only thing in the Universe, must of necessity beget its own objects, and all consciousness, that is to say, all reality, is therefore of the type of self-consciousness.
23. Philosophy, as we have seen, is the study of reality, that is, the study of concrete mind: it is the process by which mind makes itself know itself.
24. The reality of our self-consciousness, then, is that in the light of which we must interpret everything that is.

And, in truth, this position is not as paradoxical as it may at first sight appear. It may be readily admitted that experience is that of whose existence we are most indubitably certain, and that self-consciousness is that type of experience which is at once most constant and most palpable. Is it not reasonable , then, that when Mind comes to consider the nature of the Universe, it should liken it to itself, and in particular to its own highest and clearest activity? We can never light upon anything which is such that our knowledge of its contradicts the view that it is but another aspect of consciousness itself. Whatever enters into knowledge must, according to Gentile's view, form part of the knowledge into which it enters; and, as we are never aware of any external source of that knowledge--of a source, that is to say, which does not itself enter into knowledge and form part of it--it follows naturally enough that the so-called object of knowledge is begotten by the mind which knows it.
25. Croce's doctrine of moments and distincts is, to put the matter bluntly, little more than an elaborate attempt to have it both ways. He asserts that experience is a unity, yet he requires it to develop a multiplicity. But, as Gentile points out, if the experience develops

the distinctions between the forms of experience cannot be assumed to be there to begin with. If however, they are there to begin with, if in fact the determinations of the forms of the spirit are static and not developed, then the whole doctrine of the unity of mind must be abandoned.

26. Criticism which falls wholly within the frame-work of the idealist assumptions. For those who do not share these assumptions, for those who do not believe that experience, thought, spirit, call it what you will, is theonly form of reality, the approach to Philosophy is so radically different, that it is difficult to bring to the consideration of the Neo-Idealist position the intelligent comprehension which fruitful criticism requires.

27. Personal considerations affect all knowing, and that logic, and even metaphysics, are therefore dependent upon psychology. The view that allowances must always be made for the personal factor in any account of knowledge is maintained in opposition to the traditional theory of knowledge which holds that the cognitive faculty can be studied in isolation and that a man's view of the Universe, even if it is to some extent coloured by the desires he entertains and the purposes he wishes to fulfil, does not necessarily depend upon such considerations.

28. The atomistic psychology, which was common to the English philosophers Locke and Berkeley, seeks to give an account of exactly what it is that happens when we perceive things. According to this psychology, the objects of perception consist of a number of distinct and separate sensations or impressions. When we are brought into contact with what is called a physical object, a table for instance, the produces certain sensations upon our sense organs. These sensations

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are conveyed by the nerves to the brain, where w we become conscious of them as ideas, and it is these sensations, or rather these ideas, each of which is a distinct and separate entity, which are known by the mind and which form the subject matter of all our knowledge. Thus, when we think we perceive the table, what we in fact experience is a series of isolated sensations, such as hard-ness, smoothness, coolness, square-ness, brownness, and so forth; we never perceive the table itself.

The implications of this psychology, when logically developed, speedily lead, as we have already seen, to the position of Solipsism. In the first place, if it be insisted that we never do know the table and never can know the table , but only know the impressions produced by the table, we cannot know any of the qualities or properties which the table possesses. Thus we cannot know that it has the property of causing our sensations; nor can we know that the table exists. Secondly, if, in Hume's words, "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, among which the mind never perceives any real connexion," the construct-ional work performed by mind when it informs us that the sensation of hardness and the sensa-tion of brownness both spring from and are caused by the same table is sheer guess-work, for which reality, as we know it, provides no justi-fication.

Kant endeavoured to solve these difficulties by endowing the mind with an apparatus of facul-ties, which performed the function of welding together the chaotic material presented to us by our senses into a coherent and intelligible whole. He arranged our sensations according to categories by means of his famous Principles of Understanding, and endeavoured to show that mind was acting legitimately in constructing its experience in this way. But what right had Kant,

asks the Pragmatist, to legitimize the mind's impudence in tampering with its sensations? Why should the sensations conform to the categories, and why should the constructional process, by means of which connexions are interposed between the originally unconnected, result in anything but a complete falsification of reality? Rightly or wrongly, then, the Pragmatist refuses to take shelter in the elaborate structure erected by Kant, and insists that, if we accept the premises from which Hume starts there is no way of escape from the scepticism in which he finishes.

But, we may put the question, is it after all necessary to accept these premises? And the first characteristic of the Pragmatist position consists in the assertion that it is not. So far in fact from the atomistic psychology being true, it is, according to the Pragmatist, the exact reverse of the truth. Locke had said that experience is composed of distinct sensations between which the mind interposes connexions. William James retorted by asserting that experience is a continuous whole in which the mind interposes distinctions. "Consciousness", in Jame's words, "does not appear to itself chopped up in bits." On the contrary, it is a continuum in which the relations between the different sensations are experienced just as truly and just as directly as the sensations related.

Whereas Locke's analysis of the proposition "the egg is on the table" asserts an isolated sensation of an egg, an isolated sensation of a table, and a piece of mental jugglery which invated the relation '<u>on</u>' between them, William James's analysis asserts first a continuous stream of flux in which the egg, the on, and the table are all alike experienced as an indistinguishable

whole, and secondly a piece of mental activity which subsequently separates the egg from the table, and then postulates a distinct relation of on-ness which subsists between them. Thus, according to the Pragmatist view of perception, the essence of mental activity is to break up and separate that which is originally a continuous whole. This separation is effected by means of what are called mental concepts, such as the concept of 'on-ness' and it is effected for the purposes of action. A world of experience which was a vast indeterminate flow would prove difficult, if not impossible, to live in, and it is necessary therefore, in order that we may act, that we should separate the flow of experience into eggs and tables. Hence all our mental processes bears a definite relation to action.

29. We are now in sight of the fully developed Pragmatist theory of truth. Starting from the proposition, 'people hold beliefs to be true which are emotionally satisfying,' we have only to take the further step which consists in asserting "a true belief is one which is emotionally satisfying" or as it is usually put, "a true belief is one which works" and we have arrived at the pragmatist doctrine of the meaning of truth.

30. Since all experience is finite, no belief can be said to be absolutely true; but this fact need not disturb us. Absolute truth is a figment of the logicians: it is of no importance in practice. Every belief, then, is a truth claim. By acting upon the belief we test it.

31. It is clearly the intention of every belief, says the Pragmatist, to correspond with reality: no belief would in fact ever be entertained

unless it were thought to be true of reality. But, unless we can prove that a belief does so correspond, we must hold that all beliefs are equally true. Can we, then, prove the fact of correspondence between a belief and reality? In order that the proof may be effected the reality must somehow be known independently of the belief, so that the two may be compared and found to agree. But if we do know the reality directly, what is the point of asserting a belief about it and claiming truth for the belief? If we do not know the reality directly, and, as a matter of fact, we do not, how can we know that the belief corresponds with it? Hence the correspondence cannot be made out. A true thought and a false thought then, on this view, are each equally true, since each claims to correspond with reality, and in neither case can the claim be made good.

Another time-honoured philosophical theory as to the nature of truth, the coherence theory, fares little better at the hands of the Pragmatist. The coherence theory asserts that a belief is true if it coheres or is consistent with the general structure of our beliefs. Upholders of this theory are usually Idealist philosophers, who regard the distinction between individual minds as one which cannot in the long run be maintained. For coherence with our own beliefs, then, we may substitute, in our definition of the meaning of truth, coherence with the structure of mind as a whole, or, in the language adopted by Idealists, with the experience of the Absolute.

32. This criterion Pragmatism claims to supply when it asserts that the truth of every belief must be tested by the practical consequences which follow if we adopt it.

33. Scientific laws are not in reality laws at all. A scientific law prima facie claims to embrace not only all the phenomena that have occurred in the past, but all the phenomena of the same type which can possibly occur in the future. But since the future is unknown, we cannot tell that a scientific law, however well it has worked in the past, will necessarily hold good in the future: hence the so-called laws of science are properly to be regarded as hypotheses or postulates. Its truth, which is continually subject to review, is tested by the consequences which attend its application to reality, and progressively validated or invalidated by the results of the test.

34. Intellectualist logic, it is alleged, is based upon the premise that thought can be disinterested: that is to say, it involves the assumption that our reason can function independently of our will, our purposes and our desires. It is held that when reason functions in this way, and only when it functions in this way, it can give us correct information about reality and arrives at results which must necessarily and always be true of reality. The operation of disinterested reason proceeds according to certain formulae. Of these the best known formula of the syllogism, since it is chiefly by means of the syllogism that we arrive at new truth. The syllogismsconsists of a major premise in the form of a general statement, such as "all men are mortal", a minor premise consisting of a particular statement such as "Socrates is a man" and a conclusion "therefore Socrates is mortal" which is said to follow from the two premises and to constitute a statement which is both new and true.

The Pragmatist'sscriticism of the syllogism, which is typical of his general attitude to

to Intellectualist logic, consists simply in pointing out that if the conclusion follows it is not new, and that if it is new it does not follow. Thus, if the major premise "All men are mortal" is formulated after a consideration of all known instanced of men in the Universe, it is false, since it excludes men like Elijah and the Struldbrugs.

35. If, then, we insist, as the Intellectualists do, that our conclusion must be both logically determined and absolutely true, it follows that our conclusion cannot be new; whereupon the Pragmatist appropriately retorts, "Then why bother to reach it?" He then proceeds to point out that thought only occurs in practice when the thinker believes that by reasoning he <u>can</u> arrive at something new. Hence practical thought is purposive: it is conditioned by the necessity of arriving at a conclusion, and this conclusion must possess two characteristics; it must be new and it must apply to reality. In practice, then, it appears that just in so far as a conclusion is new, it is not logically determined. A new conclusion involves a definite mental jump: it is a risk, a piece of guess-work on the part of the mind, of which the only justification is that the conclusion works.

36. Substance of reality is unknown and remote, while the facts which are known are, so to speak, dressed up and 'faked' for our delectation by the mere circumstance of our perceiving them. Thus the act of perception, which alters the fact perceived, in a very real sense creates it.

37. Pragmatism has ever become a widely held and has been popular rather with the scientist and the plain matter-of-fact man, to whose instinctive methods of thought it extends a

semi-philosophic sanction, than with the professional philosopher whose speculations it is apt to dismiss as barren and academic.

38. It has been suggested by critics of Pragmatism, notably by Mr. Bertrand Russell, that the definition of the meaning of truth as 'that which gives emotional satisfaction' springs from an ambiguity in the use of the word 'means.' Let us first of all consider two propositions in which the word 'means' is used in the two different senses which it is capable of bearing. We can either say (i) that 'cloud means rain' or (ii) that '<u>pluie</u> means rain'. Now the sense in which 'cloud means rain' is different from that in which '<u>pluie</u> means rain'. We say that a 'cloud means rain' because it possesses the causal properties and characteristics of being liable to produce rain; we say that '<u>pluie</u> means rain' because the words 'pluie' and 'rain', both of which are symbols for communicating what is in our thoughts, happen to be symbols for communicating the same thought in the minds of two different people. Now the sense normally given to the word 'means' in this latter sense, and the question, "What is the meaning of truth?" can therefore be paraphrased, "What is it that we have in our minds when we say that a belief is true?"

39. Whatever happens in the mind is the result of something that has first happened in the brain, and the material always and in all respects determines and conditions the mental.

Bergson brings against this conception a further series of facts with which it is incompatible. Experiments have shown that the excision of large portions of the brain, and of those very portions which were considered essential for the causation of mental activity, have

been succeeded by no psychological disturbance: whereas, if mental is the result of cerebral activity, modifications in psychology should inevitably have followed. The phenomena of abnormal psychology, and especially of dual personality, are independent of any corresponding physiological change. Subconscious mental activity is also inexplicable on the parallelist hypothesis. Bergson infers that mental activity conditions cerebral activity and overflows it. The brain is not consciousness, nor does it contain the cause of conscious processes: it is simply the organ of consciousness, the point at which consciousness enters into matter.

40. Bergson then asks us to examine the nature of consciousness. What is the precise meaning of the word 'exist' when, for instance, we say we exist?

At first sight consciousness appears to consist of a succession of psychic states, each of which is a single and independent entity, these states being strung together along something which is called the 'ego', like beads on a necklace. But reflection soon shows this conception to be erroneous; and the error consists more particularly in the fact that, when we admit that one state changes and gives way to another, we overlook the fact that it changes even while it persists. Take, says Bergson, "the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless, the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had, even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration

it accumulates.' If this is the case with regard to our perception of external objects, it is even more true as a description of our internal states, our desires, our emotions, our willings, and so forth. The conclusion is, in Bergson's words, that "we change without ceasing, and the state itself is nothing but change." "There is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change at every moment: if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow."

It follows that there is no real difference between passing from one state to another and continuing in what is called the same state. We imagine such a difference because it is only when the continual change in any one state has become sufficiently marked to arrest our attention that we do in fact notice it, with the result that we assert that one state has given to another. Thus, we postulate a series of successive mental states, because our attention is forced upon them in a series of successive mental acts. It is for the same reason that we tend to regard ourselves a beings who endure continually in spite of change. Just as we say there exist separate states which change, so we speak of a self which experiences changing psychic states, and this self, we say, endures. But we have no more experience of an unchanging ego than we have of an unchanging psychic state: however far we push our analysis, we never reach such an unchanging ego. There is in fact nothing which endures through change because there is nothing which does not change.

Hence Bergson arrives at the truth that we ourselves are beings who endure not through change but by change. Our life, as actually experienced, as the inmost reality of which we are sure, is change itself. 'If', says Bergson, "our existence were composed of

separate states with an impassive ego to unite them, for us there would be no duration. For an ego which does not change does not endure, and a psychic state which remains the same so long as it is not replaced by the following state, does not endure either."

There is thus no self which changes: there is indeed nothing which changes--for in asserting the existence of that which changes, we are asserting the existence of something which, from the mere fact that it is subject to change, is not itself change--there is simply change.

The truth that we are beings whose reality is change supplies the clue with which we can now proceed to consider and to understand the constitution of the Universe. For the Universe is that same stream of continual change or 'becoming' as Bergson calls it, that we experience in ourselves. Try as we will to penetrate through the changing appearances presented by material things to something behind them which is stable and unchanging, we never reach it. Just as in our examination of human consciousness we found that what appeared at first sight to be a series of motionless states, each of which persisted until replaced by another, was in fact a continuous process of change, so the view of reality which represents it as a series of bodies possessing qualities which similarly persist until they are replaced, is found to be equally misleading. Everybody, every quality even, resolves itself, on scientific analysis, into an enormous quantity of elementary movements. Whether we represent them as vibrations, or as ether waves, or as negative electrons, or as event particles, it is equally impossible to arrive at something which is sufficiently stable to be spoken of as that in which the changes, or movements take place. For if at any stage such an apparent something

is reached, and you affirm of it that this is the '<u>thing</u>' that changes or in which the changes take place, further examination will always be found to show that the thing itself is composed of changes, which are other than and additional to the changes which we predicated of it when we said, "Here is something that changes, which is itself other than change." Hence there is nothing in the self which changes, for the very reason that a something which changes would be something other than change, and such a something can never be discerned. The Universe is conceived, then, as one continuous flow or surge.

41. In order that we may understand what is meant by the word 'participation', it is necessary that we should pay attention to an aspect of the <u>elan vital</u> which has not yet been stressed, the aspect of it which Bergson calls '<u>duration</u>.'

The history of philosophy bears record to a long and heated controversy as to the nature of time. Some philosophers have held that time is real; others that it is merely a form which is imposed upon reality by the nature and limitations of our understanding, reality itself being timeless.

Bergson's contribution to this problem consists of drawing an important distinction between two different conceptions which are included in the meaning of the word <u>time</u>. In the first place there is what is called mathematical or scientific time. This time does not form part of the reality of the so-called external world of material things; it is simply a relation between material things. If we consider any material thing which passes through two successive states, and then double the rapidity of succession bet-

ween the two states, the operation of doubling the rapidity of succession will in no way affect the reality of the nature of the states, nor of the material thing which passes through the states. If, further, we imagine the rapidity of the succession of states infinitely increased, so that the whole of existence were presented instantaneously to the contemplation of an omnipotent being, the relations between the objects presented would remain constant, and the reality of the objects would therefore remain unaffected. Time, then, as science conceives it, is not part of the material world. Time is thought to exist as a relation between things, because our intellect requires us to conceive things as succeeding one another in time for purposes of its own: it is, therefore, a form which appears to be necessary for the understanding of reality by the intellect.

There is, however, another kind of time which Bergson calls '<u>duration</u>'; and <u>Duration</u> is nothing but the <u>elan vital</u> itself. As we have seen, change is the reality of the existence of a living being; our actual experience, the one thing of which we are completely sure, is a constant flow, and it is this flow which Bergson calls <u>Duration</u>.

42. The distinct outlines we see in an object are not really there in the flux of reality. They are only the design that we have imposed on reality. This representation which emanates from ourselves, is reflected back upon ourselves by reality as by a mirror, so that we falsely believe reality to possess in its own right the modifications and features that proceed from us.

43. Philosophy is full of the contradictions to which the conception of motion which has been evolved by the intellect gives rise. "Let us consider an arrow in its flight" said the old Greek philosopher Zeno: "It is easy to show that the

motion of the arrow is an illusion. For, consider the position of the arrow at any one point or moment of its flight: either it is where it is, or it is where it isn't; if it is where it is, it cannot be moving, otherwise it would not be there; and it cannot be where it isn't. Therefore the arrow does not move at that moment; similarly the arrow does not move at any other moment. Therefore the arrow does not move at all."

William James applied a similar analysis to the lapse of time. It is easy, he said, to show that a period of time, say an hour, can never elapse; for half of that period must elapse before the whole of it; but half of the remaining half-hour must also elapse before the whole of it, and half of the remaining quarter of an hour before the whole of that quarter of an hour. Thus, some portion of time, however short, must always elapse before the whole can elapse: therefore the whole can never elapse.

These results have led many philosophers to believe that motion, change, and time are unreal.

44. The cinematograph takes snapshot views of something which is moving, say a regiment of soldiers, each of which represents the regiment in a fixed and stable attitude. You may lay these snapshots photographs side by side and multiply them indefinitely, but you will not have re-created the movement of the original; you will be presented only with a infinite number of static pictures. In order, then, that your pictures may be animated, you must introduce movement somewhere; and it is not until you unroll your film on the operator's apparatus that, for a series of static pictures, you substitute a moving representation of the moving original.

The pictures of reality presented to us by the intellect are precisely similar to the series

of static snapshots before they are placed upon the apparatus, and they substitute, in a precisely similar way, a succession of objects extended in space for the ceaseless flow and change of the original. Thus the intellect presents us with a false view of reality.

45. Whence does this flow arise? What was there before it to bring it into being? How in fact can the Universe have sprung from nothingness? According to Bergson this is a question which should not be put, and the fact that it has been so frequently put in the past has had consequences of enormous importance in philosophy. The question arises from an illusion of the intellect which opposes the idea of nothingness to the idea of something, the idea of a void to the idea of the All, and assumes therefore that the absence of the something would be equivalent to the presence of nothing. But this idea of nothingness is a false idea: nothingness is necessarily unthinkable, since to think even of nothing is to think in some way: to imagine even one's own annihilation is to be conscious of oneself using one's imagination to abolish oneself.

When I say, "There is nothing", it is not that I perceive "a nothing"; I can only perceive what is: but I have not perceived that which I sought for and expected, and I express my regret in the language of my desire. And just as the so-called perception of nothing is the missing what is sought, so the thought of nothing is the thought of the absence of the order of reality, which is the <u>elan vital</u>, would not be equivalent to mere chaos or disorder, but would inevitably involve the presence of some other order.

The question therefore, "What is the origin or source of the <u>elan vital</u> itself?" should

not be asked, since it posits the existence of a nothing prior to the elan vital from which the elan vital may be supposed to have evolved, and, in so doing, posits a logical fiction. It is because philosophers have insisted on asking this question that they have been wrongly led to suppose that reality is one and permanent, and that change is an illusion. The belief that the absence of the order of reality with which they were acquainted would involve mere nothing, combined with the inability to conceive how something could ever have been generated out of such a nothing, has led them to suppose that the order of reality with which they were acquainted must have always existed, eternally the same. Change, then, was written off as illusory appearance, and the intellect was invoked to penetrate through to an alleged immutable reality subsisting behind the changing and unreal appearances of matter. Once, however, the illusory character of the idea of nothing is grasped, it becomes superfluous to ask whence did reality arise, and the conception of reality as change becomes possible. The above constitutes a brief outline of Bergson's philosophy.

46. Bergson holds that in the last resort intuition by itself is not sufficient to give us metaphysical truth, but that it must first absorb intelligence. Intellect enriched and revivified by intuition, intuition which employs reason to take account of and to control its deliverances, constitute together the searchlight which reveals to us the nature of reality.

47. It is not by means of the intuition which animals possess, but through a glorified intuition which has absorbed intelligence, that metaphysical truth is known.

48. The intellect being relative to practical convenience, we are explicitly warned against

supposing that it can give us metaphysical truth.
49. But a philosophy which begins to look askance at intellect soon finds itself on dangerous ground: for the despised intellect is the tool with which the philosophy is constructed, the weapon with which it asserts its claims. The Greeks pointed out long ago that you cannot know that intellectual knowledge in unattainable for your knowledge that intellectual knowledge is unattainable is itself a piece of intellectual knowledge. If, then, intellectual knowledge is really unattainable, then the intellectual knowledge which asserts its unattainability is itself unattainable; so that we cannot know that intellectual knowledge is necessarily untsainable. The existence of knowledge is in fact affirmed in the very act of its denial.

It has been frequently urged against Bergson that his philosophy, in denying that the intellect can give us truth about the Universe, exposes itself to the danger which the Greeks sought to avoid. For his denial that intellect can give us truth about the nature of the Universe is in itself an intellectual affirmation about the Universe, an affirmation to the effect that the Universe is such that the intellect does not give us truth about it. And if we examine the structure of Bergson's philosophy, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is an intellectual achievement of the very highest order. It employs the most subtle dialectic, the most ingenious similes, the most persuasive arguments, all of which proceed from Bergson's intellect and are addressed to ours, to prove that the view which the intellect takes of reality is a false one. But if this is so, then Bergson's philosophy, which is assuredly an intellectual view of reality, is a false philosophy; so that it turns

out not to be true that the intellectual view of reality is false. In proportion therefore as Bergson discredits intellect, he discredits his own arguments: in proportion as he proves his point, he disproves his philosophy.

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Editorial: Till recently these teachings of the Pali books were supposed to embody the genuine gospel of the Buddha, although many non-Buddhists and non-specialists in Pali did doubt their genuineness and see a positive content even behind these negative teachings. The researches of Mrs. Rhys Davids have, however, confirmed the doubts of non-Buddhist admirers of Buddhism. She has shown that the Pali Canon is not so immaculate a piece of work, that it has undergone a good deal of additions and emendations at the hand of monastic editors and that the original teachings of the Buddha are far different from the generally accepted principles of Theravada. She has pointed out that the message of the Buddha is not a pessimistic gospel of riddance, but a dynamic teaching of hope and cheer for Everyman. He taught the Middle Way, the Bhavamagga or the Way of Becoming which consists in man "becoming ever better, ever less imperfect, ever narrowing that gap between man as he is and Man-in-the-Highest. Desire to become, Will to become, using body, sense and mind in the quest, is necessary; necessary, too, the guiding rein, the curb, the whip of rule and discipline and training. Following neither 'end' alone, nor to excess, by this midway of becoming shall the pilgrim to the topmost height fare on." He disputed neither the existence of the soul nor of the Deity. Anatta is not soulless but

not-the-self, and it is spoken only of sense experience and not of the essence of personality. There is a More in man and his goal in life is to develop that to its fullest possibilities. "You are not just being," he taught, "You are becoming; your becoming is that growing within you; your becoming is a matter, not a ritual of just knowing; it is your very living. In the other man that too is becoming. You are each and all in the long way of becoming toward That Who you are."

2. In this unification of the dual ideals of the Arhat and the Bodhisattva in the conception of the Buddha is the universal message of Sakya-muni to himanity at all times. In this combination the Buddha has given an example as well as warning to all spiritual aspirants, whatever might be their religion or creed. Man's quest after salvation and spiritual perfection has run in two directions that look apparently opposed. There has always been one party that looks upon spiritual life as a purely subjective or internal process. They think of it in terms of a dive within, as an effort to reach at the inner essence of man through a process of meditation and mental analysis. The dynamic virtues of life are discouraged, and emphasis is laid more on the process of elimination rather than of enrichment. A withdrawal from life rather than an advance becomes the motto of the spiritual pilgrim. In staticity they see the ideal of perfection, and in movement nothing but the shadow of it--an erroneous perception that hides the face of Reality and has therefore to be negated by realising its illusory nature. Through withdrawal from all activities of life and practice of the perfect quietism of introspection they seek to achieve this goal. Among those who seek perfection through introversion, a very large

number relapse into dullness and inertia and a good many become self-centred egoists while a small minority develops into a type of static saintliness, full of peace within and capable of carrying peace to the few who may fall in with them in their line of thought. These perfected introverts are the Arhats, good in their own way, but not good enough for the world at large since they lack the dynamic spiritual energy of a Buddha which alone can make the saintly life significant and substantially contributive in the history of societies and nations. Their perfection is not all-sided. Much that is valuable in their personality is shrunken and undeveloped.

3. The pure introvert generally ends by becoming a pure egotist due to the unhealthy 'self-fixation' involved in his discipline.

4. The true Bodhisattva is not like our amateur world-saviours of to-day who seek development in external life but suffer from atrophy within. He is a man of deep contemplative life, one who is on the way to be an Arhat, but yet spurns the bliss of individual salvation, overcome by a sense of utter dedication to the welfare of fellow-beings. The knowledge of Sunya, by which the Buddhists meant ultimate Reality, is at his command; but he gives up absorption in it because that knowledge is in itself imperfect and ineffective unless it is enlivened by Maha-Karuna (Great Pity) which establishes one in identification with the interests of all life.

5. Spiritual life is not merely working out of a programme of social upliftment, as many modern minds think. Nor is it pure self-absorption and a quest after self-salvation. Like a tree it has got its root in the mind and mire of society, but its branches and leaves are spread in the transcendence and illumination of God. To dis-

connect it with its social environment is as disastrous as it is to shut it off from illumination born of insight. Only when both these conditions are fulfilled does it produce a luxuriant foliage and plentiful fruitage of ideal characters.

6. Jagadiswarananda. To Chuang-tzu the highest form of virtue does not mean the mortification of physical nature or living the life of a hermit, but consists in the contemplation of Tao which can alone destroy attachment to existence and loosen the soul from the transmigratory shackles. He condemns both ritualism and asceticism, and recommends "the fasting of the heart" as conducive to illumination.

7. Chuang-tzu expands this doctrine and insists on the ultimate relativity of all human perceptions. Not only space and time, he asserts, are relative but also every form of sense knowledge that is gained by looking at things only from one point of view. The doctrine of illusion as advocated by Chuang-tzu fulfils his doctrine of relativity. He says that life is a delusion after all. "While they dream", remarks Chuang-tzu "they do not know that they are dreaming."

8. Editorial: With the growth of experimental sciences, the pure seeker after truth has begun to place more reliance on them than on philosophy for the understanding of life and nature. With the advent of industrialism, training in technology is found to be more advantageous than knowledge of humanities by those who want to prepare themselves for a career with good prospects. Philosophy has therefore lost the allegiance of talented men, as they have turned their attention to subjects of more practical utility.

This state of affairs is bound to continue and philosophy remain a 'depressed subject' in

the educational curriculum until it becomes really useful for men in modern life.

9. Philosophy, at least as understood in India, has a much wider scope and a deeper significance. It is a Darsana, a method of gaining insight into the nature of man and his place in the scheme of existence taken not simply in its sensuous meaning but in its transcendental significance as well. There is the field for philosophy in the future. In spite of exact sciences, industrialism, and improved standard of living, there is a lot of discontent and disharmony that make life unbearable for the modern mind. For one thing, cases of neurosis, domestic unhappiness and suicides are becoming commoner with the spread of modernism in all its virulence. Exact sciences and technology are of no use here. They cannot cure men of these soul-distracting maladies; they can only contribute to them and make the matter more complicated. If philosophy can do something for relieving the ills of life in this respect, it may hope to regain its lost ground. For this it has however to develop from a purely academic subject into a true Darsana. The philosopher in his turn while retaining his intellectuality and erudition has to become a mystic, and training in philosophy, besides developing the power of thought, has also to aim at culturing the intuitive power of man.

10. If philosophical academies can produce sages, not of the world-shunning but of the world-elevating type, the blight of philosophy will automatically disappear. No more will there then be talk of academic philsophy but only of applied philosophy.

11. Ernest Champness: Why do people believe in reason up to a certain point and beyond that profess to be irrationalists?

12. The new Psychology has shown that actions which profess to spring from reason are often dictated by supressed instincts seeking expression in action.

13. SWAMI SARADANANDA: Swami Vivekananda was essentially a man of meditation. At all times and in the midst of all forms of activity he would keep his mind partially indrawn and engaged in meditation upon God. As the Master used to say, he had reached perfection in meditation. One day in the course of meditation he there suddenly appeared in him the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience. Thenceforth whenever he would sit for meditation, a little concentration would bring his mind to a plane from where he could see persons at places beyond the range of vision and distinctly hear their voices too. Immediately after an experience of this kind he would feel the desire to verify the truth of it. Accordingly he would stop meditation and go to the persons and places he had seen in the state of meditation. In every case he found his experience true, no part of it failing to correspond with facts. When this state continued for some days the Swami informed the Master about it, whereupon came his immediate warning. "These are obstacles in the path of God-realisation. Do not meditate for some days."

14. P. Nagaraja Rao: The genius of Sankarite Advaitism lies in its critical examination of the categories of knowledge. They have scrupulously examined the telescope before turning it on the sky. The "Dialectic literature" in Advaita has proved to the hilt the unintelligibility of most categories of knowledge such as substance, quality, action, relation, causation, time and space. We should not forget to note that the Advaitin only denies ultimate reality

to them. He grants their relative reality. Thus through his sheer logical acumen he arrives at a "secondless reality" (Advitiya) and at the indeterminable nature (anirvachaniya) of the phenomenal world.

His Brahman is the sole reality. It is Knowledge, Bliss and Existence. If it becomes an object of knowledge it loses its selfhood. It is self-manifest (Svaprakasa). But for its luminosity the whole world would be blind. It is non-relational. All relational knowledge is finite and it is only an appearance of the real. Thought can only point to this Brahman, it cannot have a grasp of it. The function of reason here is negative. Thought and reason tell us what the Brahman is not. It is a mistake that most upholders of the "coherence theory" in the West should think that "reason is constitutive of Truth." The invincible metaphysician, Sankara, recognises that he has no right to vary the game and he plays it according to the rules of logic. As a strict metaphysician he is pledged to truth and seeks it at all cost. His mind is not encumbered with religious prejudices or moral vagaries. He makes reason test everything, though he knows that it cannot build. "We discover by intuition but we prove by logic. Explanation is only an adventure of the mind." The vociferations of a hundred Srutis cannot establish what is opposed to reason. Through the negative aid of logic and the positive flame of intuition Sankara arrives at the "Chidrupa Brahman." Logic after all proves its own imperfections and ineffectiveness.

15. Ed. Misery dogs the heels of happiness and happiness follows a spell of misery. Man's happiness and misery ever turns like a wheel. From a happy state you have fallen to a miserable one; once

again happiness shall be yours; neither happiness nor misery is eternal.--Mahabharata-Santi Parva, Ch.173 verse 14-16, 20-21.

16. Jadunath Sinha: It enquires into the validity of the ultimate values of life, viz. the true, the good, and the beautiful. Are they relative or absolute? Do they exist in themselves unrelated to any definite mind? Or do they depend on the individual tastes and subjective feelings?

17. Prabhavananda: Suka, a spiritual aspirant approached the royal sage Janaka to learn of God. Janaka said, "My boy, before I give you the knowledge of God you must give me my fee." "Revered Sir, how is that?" Said Suka, "why do you want the fee to be offered beforehand?" Janaka replied, "When I give you the Light of knowledge, there will be no longer any teacher or disciple. You will realise the One Existence beyond all relativity."

18. Deva Mata: The Egyptian pyramids have taught us that the most enduring structure is one broad at the base, narrowing toward the sky. In such manner should man construct his life,--at the foundation line, wide enough to include all humanity; at the apex, God alone.

No man can afford to live wholly to himself. If he close his door on mankind, he will find that he has shut himself out and stands a beggar at his own threshold. We exile ourselves, when we withdraw from the human family and lead our life as isolated units. We are like soldiers marching alone, without the dignity and protection of an army.

19. How may we gain this sense of universal kinship? We cannot hope to contact all the peoples of the earth or acquaint ourselves concerning them. Confucius may say, "The men of the four seas are our brothers," or St. Paul that we are

all children of one God, but how are we to apprehend and feel it? By expanding our consciousness. We must move gradually up the scale of thinking and feeling--from self-consciousness to group-consciousness, from group-consciousness to universal conciousness, and from an all-inclusive consciousness of the universe to a consciousness of the Infinite or God. Thus we reach the apex of the pyramid.

It is not a new course that we follow. Nature marked it out for man at the outset of his evolution. She has led him from individual to family from family to tribe, from tribe to nation, from nation to internationalism, and to-day she is calling to him to break down the last barrier and pass on to an all-concompassing world-vision. Consciousness has no limit of distance or area. It can circle the earth as swiftly and easily as it can travel to a neighbour's door.

20 Thyagisananda: In Vedic symbology fire stands for intellectual knowledge in the form of ideas couched in language. This knowledge is churned out as a result of study and reflection and philosophical enquiry under the guidance of a competent teacher. Of the two pieces of wood used for producing fire in sacrifices, the upper one stands for the teacher (guru) and the lower one for the disciple (Shisya).

21. Saradananda. Sri Ramakrishna smilingly remarked: "But there powers did not last long. When they began to stay here (in his company), all those powers gradually disappeared." Being asked about the cause of the disappearance, the Master replied, "The Divine Mother withdrew their powers into this (showing his own body) for their own good. Thereafter their minds were free of these things and began to advance again Godwards." Spernatural powers are obstacles in the path of God-realisation--the example of

a sannyasin. The master would thus proceed with further denunciation of supernatural powers: "What is there in them? They will only entice the mind away from the one Divine Reality that is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss.

22. Editorial: From the Unconscious to the Self-Conscious. The line of distinction we have drawn between the ego and the cell is tentative, and its full implication cannot be developed until we have considered the relation between living and non-living matter. It is generally presumed that living matter which forms the bodies of of creatures is entirely discontinuous with non-living or brute matter that forms the world we around us. Although science has not yet been able to give convincing proof against this belief, enough has been done to give substantial ground for holding that living matter is after all only the same brute matter in a higher state of organisation, and that structurally there is very great resemblance between them. For example at least four of the fundamental characteristics of living matter are shared by the supposedly inanimate atoms also. Each atom has a definite structure and unity of behaviour, all the parts within it acting not as a kind of loose aggregate but as subject to the configuration of the whole. One order of atoms is distinct from another and each maintains its distinction. Thus self-maintenance and structural organisation, the first law of life is present in them. In the next place the atom is not passive, but like life is a centre of seething, palpitating energies and activities. The difference is only in the character of the activities. And lastly certain atoms have been seen to change their order by internal transformations, and when helium changes into radium and lead. The origin of atomic species may become

an interesting branch of study in the future. General Smuts in his book on Holism suggests and elaborately argues that colloid matter, which forms so important a subject of study in modern science, may in all probability be the missing link between the living and the non-living. These facts show that the dintinction between brute and matter and living matter is not one over which a bridge cannot be thrown. Science is on the way of showing that brute matter is not as deas as it is supposed to be and that living matter is nothing other than the same brute matter at a higher state of evolution and a more complex state of organisation.

It must not be supposed that we are hereby reducing life into inorganic matter in the approved fashion of the mechanistic view of Reality. On the other hand our attempt is to show that life is the first manifestation of the spiritual potentialities of matter. According to no less an authority than Eddington, the advances made in the study of physics in modern times tend to show that the stuff of reality is more akin to consciousness than to our popular conceptions of matter, and that the latter can at best be conceived only as the crust of Reality. This is in agreement with the Indian idea that matter is nothing but a degradation or gross manifestation of Spirit, and that it is a state in which the Spirit remains veiled or hidden. Evolution in that case is the gradual manifestation of Spirit, that is involved in gross matter, and its culmination must be supposed to be reached when Spirit recognises itself as such. In the scale of evolution gross matter occupies the lowest place, but a higher stage is reached

when the living protoplasm makes its appearance. The evolution of living matter from inorganic matter need not be taken as spontaneous generation, in the first place because the contrast between the living and the non-living is not as absolute as is commonly supposed, and in the next place because evolution conveyes the idea of a gradual development according to some law unlike spontaneous generation which signifies a break of continuity. The former is the sudden outburst into the manifested condition, of an involved purpose that has long been in the process of incubation.

Now life in its early stages need not be conceived as endowed with a mind or ego,--a psychical history, if we may use our descriptive phrase, just as matter in its primeval condition need not be thought of as possessing life, although from the spiritual point of view the possibility or potentiality of such development must be conceded in both the cases. The living cell in the early stages of development has only a physical history like that of the atom, its only difference from the latter being in some of its workings. It is however in the process of developing the ego as the atom is in the process of evolving life. At what stage of the development of life the ego first makes its appearance is a question that cannot be settled. It can be said that self-consciousness is the sign of the birth of the ego; but it is difficult to determine at what point of evolution this faculty comes into existence. To credit rudimentary forms of life like a reproductive cell or a single celled organism with self-consciousness is to draw too freely on the bank of guess-work. At least we have absolutely no evidence in support of such a conclusion. In fact it is only in the case of man that we can say with certainty that there is self-

consciousness and that anego is consequently present. The progress of the study of animal psych psychology may perhaps show in future that even many of the higher varieties of sub-human species are endowed with this faculty.

The three points which we wish to emphasise as the result of this discussion are (1) that a living cell or organism at a low state of development need not be credited with an ego, (2) that the ego comes into being only in the higher stages of life's evolution and (3) that hence we need not always associate life with the presence of an ego. If we are prepared to grant this, we can get over the incompatibility that our contributor poihts out between the theory of the transmigration of the ego and the law of biogenesis. For the chief difficulty here is that we know a reproductive cell to be endowed with life even before it starts on its career as a ndw organism, or in other words life is not a property that it comes to possess by virtue of a transmigrating ego gaining entrace into it but a faculty which it had at its very inception as a new cell by virtue of its unbroken continuity from the original protoplasm. If we grant that there is no invariable relation between life and ego, that the ego is only a later manifestation in the evolution of life, the difficulty pointed out above is automatically overcome. But when we have to b give up one of our pet notions that wherever there is life there is an ego, a jiva. With that we shall also have to abandon our habitof thought attributing a soul, a transmigrating psyche, to a vast body of living organisms, on the ground that there is in them no evidence of self-consciousness that warrants a background of psychical history.

Having arrived at some definite idea regarding the rela tion between life and ego, we may now

consider further as to what is meant by the transmigration of the ego. We said before that in matter the spirit is latent but unconscious; in life, at least in its higher stages, it gradually comes to consciousness; in the ego, however, it becomes self-conscious. Self-consciousness may be described as the capacity to introspect and feel the distinctness of self-hood and its continuity. It is accompanied by consciousness of free will, and is the basis of rationality and moral experience. We can infer the presence of self-consciousness only in those forms of life where there is an indication of some of the above mentioned features, in however imperfect a form they might be. In man it is distinctively present, but whether any of the sub-human species possess it or not, we cannot say with certainty owing to our lack of insight into animal psychology.

23. The ego makes its appearance only when the biological organism has become perfectly developed so as to be a suitable instrument for its manifestation and workings, even as the protoplasm of life emerges only after the material environment in the earth becomes adapted for its origin and growth. The function of organisms below the stage of self-consciousness is just to lead to that state in which the ego first emerges. Once the ego comes into being, it does not perish with the decay of the biological organism but migrates from body to body gathering experience and facilitating more and more the self-revelation of the Spirit. In this process the ego, no doubt, changes, but change does not mean death or destruction, even as in the case of changes in the living body. The thread of continuity is kept on, each stage impressing itself upon, and gliding into, the succeeding stage.

24. In our conception of the transmigrating process also, we shall have to abandon our crudely materialistic symbols of thought. As we have seen before, the mere phenomenon of life need not in any way be associated with the presence of an ego or Jiva, and accordingly even in those species of beings endowed with self-consciousness, the cells that go to originate a new organism are living entities even prior to their association with an ego. In other words the ego or Jiva is not to be conceived as a hard substance which penetrates into some non-living stuff and brings it into life. It is on the other hand an organisation of mind with a definite psychic history; and it is more appropriate to speak of the ego identifying itself with, than entering into, an already living and developing organism of the suitable type, at some stage of its growth which we cannot definitely ascertain. For, the conception of 'identification' is peculiarly mental unlike that of 'entering' which is essentially a material symbol. Identification conveys the sense of unity of experience without any implication of mergence of entity or of a merely mechanical type of connection. In the higher organisms, in man for example, the vital or merely biological phenomena do not originate from the ego, although it may control them. But all the higher powers of man, self-consciousness, personality, free will, rationality, moral experience and aesthetic appreciation, are directly connected with the presence of the ego.

25. As long as the biological properties of a body remain intact and suited to the habitation and development of the ego, the ego continues to identify itself with that body. But with the death of the body, it is forced to abandon it its connection with it and identify itself with a fresh body.

26. Thus the path of evolution is from unconsciousness to life, from life to consciousness, from consciousness to self-consciousness, and from self-consciousness to super-consciousness. And when superconsciousness is reached, there is no more transmigration.

27. Bhagavati Das: It is one of the fundamental beliefs of all these schools of thought that the soul must undergo numerous births, gathering experience in different grades of existence beginning with lowliest vegatable life. It has got to pass through the stages of germs, insects and animals, and come finally to be embodied as human being.

28. These data which present such a formidable front to the theory of individuality are chiefly those discovered with regard to the process of reproduction by which new living beings take birth in this world. While it must be admitted that the whole mystery behind the birth of a new organism has not been unravelled by science, still there is a body of facts connected with it, well-attested by all eminent biologists and the knowledge of which has passed into the common possession of all students of biology and which leaves no room for doubt as to the nature of the process itself.

What, then, are these facts? It is now well-established by biology that all organisms are either single corpuscles, known as cells. Every organism, reproduced in the ordinary way, begins its life as a single cell. The simplest organisms rarely get beyond this stage; almost all of them remain strictly unicellular. But in all other cases the original single cell in which the individual life beings, the fertilised ovum, divides itself into two, each of these again into two and so on. Thus through the

process of division they multiply into a coherent mass of cells, and gradually give rise to a more or less complex body, a multicellular organism. The cells represent elementary organisms that are not composed of lower units capable of life. Among the vital phenomena which cells are seen to exhibit before microscopic examination none is so strikingly distinctive of living matter as in this process of cell division. By the continued division of an original germ-cell or egg-cell all the tissue cells of a multicellular animal arise and the germ-cell or egg-cell itself arises in the parent body from other cells by cell division. The rapid advance of biological research is continually adding weight to the conclusion reached years ago that every cell originates by division of some pre-existing cell (omnis cellula e cellelae). This is now regarded as one of the fundamental laws of biology; and obviously it is corrollary of the biogenetic law which states that all living matter, known to exist only in cells, orginates from pre-existing living matter. No spontaneous generation of cells occur either in plants or in animals. The many millions of cells of which, for instance, the body of a vertebrate animal is composed, have been produced by repeated division of one cell, the fertilised ovum, in which the life of every animal commences.

29. Thus there is a continuity of protoplasm, and any living being of to-day has within it protoplasm derived from its earliest ancestor.

What do these facts signify? Here is an amoeba, the simplest known living creature. Let us look at it through the microscope; we find it dividing itself into two individuals, each of these again dividing itself into two new individuals giving rise to four germs, these

again into eight and so on, until a host of them are reproduced in a few minutes under our eyes. Let us cut a star-fish into two halves. Each half, we notice, sprouts now arms and becomes a whole star-fish. What meaning has this for us?

30. Equally wonderful to contemplate is the mystery that attends the phenomenon of two germs coming together and fusing into a single cell, which can be seen under a microscope. And this exactly is the process by which all the higher order of living creatures have started life. Two living germ-cells, having entirely different individualities, unite together to form a single tiny cell which grows in course of time into a fully developed organism. We find here that in spite of the difference in their individualities before their union they develop into a single individual after that. Our ideas of individualities or personalities or Jivahood has certainly to be rivesed in the light of these facts.

What is the bearing of these facts on the doctrine of individuality? First of all there is no persistence of the same individual after a cell division or cell fusion. The greater is this mutation in the case of the higher species where both these processes are required for the birth of an individual. The three ideas viz. the indivisible unity, persisting identity, and separate existence at all times of every Jiva from all other Jivas, so essential for the doctrine of individuality, are directly contradicted by the facts of biogenesis.

Secondly, biogenesis shows that leaving off one body by complete severence from it is unnecessary for the Jiva's birth in another. On the other hand, it shows conclusively, to quote

Caroline E. Stackpole, "an unbroken material (protoplasmic) continuity from one generation to another that forms the physical basis of inheritance and upon which the integrity of the species depends. As far as known, living things never arise save through this process. In other words every mass of existing protoplasm is the last link in an unbroken chain that extends backwards in the past to the first origin of life."

31. Those who wish to maintain that the individual repeatedly dies at every occurrence of division may use the word "death", seeing that the parent cell does not continue any more as such, but then it will be a case of quibbling and we are not concerned with verbal controversies. The word 'dead' applied in this context cannot have more than a figurative meaning, for the so-called 'dead' individual continues to live in the two individuals into which it has divided itself and there has been no corpse. The conclusion is inevitable that no Jiva existing in a present body has ever died before, it has never been without its physical abode, it never left one to seek another. Nor is it possible to claim the privilege of individuality for human beings alone exempting them from the application of biogenetic objections to the doctrine on the ground of their being better organised and evolved individualities, and contending that the objections are valid only in regard to the lower creatures; for we have seen that the process of reproduction, viz. cell division and cell fusion, is essentially the same for all organisms not excluding man. Therefore the implications of the foregoing biogenitic law must apply as much to the human species as to the sub-human species. Biogenesis thus excludes

the need as well as the possibility of an individuality.

32. Editorial: Buddha was an "out and out rationalist." The following direction of Buddha regarding the enquiry into Truth is worth reproduction: "As the wise take gold by cutting, burning and rubbing it (on a piece of loadstone) so, O Bhikkus, you are to accept my words, having examined them and not merely out of your regard for me." "A Bhodhisatva rests on reason (Yuktisarana) and not on a person (Pudgalasarana), though things might be explained by an Elder (Sthavira) or an experienced man, or Tathagatha, or the Order (Sangha). Thus resting on reason and not on a person, he does not move away from the truth, nor does he follow the path of others." Buddha was silent regarding the nature of the Ultimate Truth.

33. Prof. Bhattacharya, in summarising the Madhyamika position, says, "The teaching of the Master that the world of everyday experience exists is meant only for those foolish and childlike persons who are strongly attached to the existence of the world and are frightened even to hear of the profound and subtle truth. But those who have a better intellect, but are yet ill-witted, are taught that all this is only pure consciousness (Vijana), there being neither the perceiver nor the perceptible.

34. The concept of matter presupposes a principle of awareness--the spirit or intelligence for which it exists. As the first step of the argument these two may be taken as separate, showing the independence of the spirit. But if the spirit and matter were entirely different and therefore unlike, how is it that there is interaction between the two as it obviously is the case in all perception and in the very fact of the presence of consciousness in living matter?

For interaction or contact is possible only between entities that have a fundamental similarity. Hence spirit spirit and matter must be at bottom be the same. Spirit then is the substratum and matter its appearance or changing aspect. In fact the whole universe which is a perpetual flux constitutes the changing mode of the spirit. Change, however, is not real; for the real cannot come and pass away, as it obviously is the case with all changeful modes. Hence change is only an appearance, an illusion, a mere figment of the imagination; it has as a matter of fact no foundation in the spirit. The familiar example of the serpent on the rope illustrates the point. The rope in twilight looks like a snake, and even though this phenomenon may frighten thousands of people, it still remains a rope all the while, and the snake is nowhere except in the imagination of the frightened men. In the same way the changeful world is only an appearance, and consequently unreal. To describe change as an appearance, as an unreality and as unrelated to the substratum is as good as denying it altogether. In the final step of the argument, therefore, the spirit alone is, the world never has been.

35. To posit a changeless substratum behind changing modes or attributes is a pure assumption unwarranted by experience, however necessary it may be for thought. For no one has experienced substance or substratum and attributes or modes separately. When the world is regarded as illusory or non-existent, its values, both bood and bad, also follow the same fate. The problem of evil is not so much explained as denied; for it the world is not, evil too is not.

36. The discoveries of modern astronomy deposed

man from his proud position as the central figure and end of the universe, and made him an infinitesimal speck on a third-rate planet revolving about a tenth-rate sun drifting in an endless cosmic ocean--the limitless expanse of interstellar space. The scientist's capacity to explore the secrets of the countless celestial bodies.

37. Haridas Banerjee: The ultimate test of philosophy is our common experience. Truth of philosophy may be realised in a possible experience but the experience in which it is realised is possible only on the ground of actual experience. Though ultimate truth is not realised in our ordinary experience, yet we must have at least the faint glimmerings of it in our experience before we accept it as truth.

Appealing to experience of love Hegelians wish that others would accept their philosophy. A man feels himself one and the same with another man whom he deeply loves. In sincere love two persons, though different in form and independent of each other, become one. Kantians justify their theory that understanding makes nature on the ground of actual imagination. Golden mountain as a content is not given as such. Gol and mountain are there. In imagination, the mind passes from gold to mountain, and connects them. As the mind connects them, golden mountain as a content appears before it. The Empiricists contend that the truth of their philosophy can be realised if a man looks to his mind when it is passive. In a vacant mind ideas come and go and sometimes group themselves according to their own way. In this way every philosopher tries to justify his theory by appealing to the facts of experience. If a Vedantist claims

to be a philosopher and entertains the hope that his philosophy would be accepted by others, then he, too, must justify his theory that 'self is and the world is not' by appealing to experience.

Some students of Vedanta point out in defence of their theory that when a man shuts his eyes and closes his ears and mostrils, he is not conscious of the world of colour, sound and smell but only of his own self. On the strength of this fact of experience these Vedanti Vedantists conclude that if all the sense-organs are absent there will be, then, no consciousness of the world but simply consciousness of one's own self. Here our aim is neither to state nor to criticise the logical significance of any argument but simply to take notice of the facts of experience. Vedanta admits that pure self-consciousness is the only reality. Our task here is to see whether at any moment of our life we come across such a state of pure objectless self-consciousness. What Vedantists of this school say is certainly not a fact of experience. A man who is born blind and deaf has certainly no consciousness of colour and sound, but he cannot on that ground be said to have pure self-consciousness. He is conscious of his body at least. What happens to his consciousness when a man is dead or when all his sense organs are absent, we cannot ascertain. To assert that there is self-consciousness or to deny that there is any, is equally absurd.

Some Vedantists try to justify the Vedantic doctrine on the strength of the experience of a man waking up from sound sleep that he has only consciousness of his own self and not of anything else. It is, however,

very difficult to deal with this fact of experience, for it does not allow of any reflection. I can reflect on the object of my seeing, for in reflection I recognise it. But difficulty arises when I am to reflect on a content, of which I am only indefinitely conscious. Then again, what exactly is the state of consciousness at the time of waking up cannot be demonstrated. At that time, though there is no consciousness of a definite content, yet there is consciousness of an indefinite content. Thus there is no pure objectless self-consciousness in that experience. Looking at it from the point of view of one's own experience there is no explicit self-consciousness in this state. Those who hold that there is explicit self-consciousness cannot prove their statement and we, too, cannot disprove their statement, for consciousness here never becomes a content to be reflected on. It does not allow any prediction. So, what at best we can do is to look to our own experience only. Thus according to our own experience we find that these Vedantists fail to vindicate their theory.

Now to turn to what most of the Vedantists say in defence of their doctrine. Most of the Vedantic doctrine in what they call the three states of self--waking, dreaming and sleeping. In waking state the world is taken as real. In this state the world appears to be very solid and stable. In waking state the self seems to be very intimately connected with the objects. In dreaming state the actual world is lost. In this state there is, no doubt, a world--a world which is generally called as dream-world, but this world appears to be very unstable. It seems to be very loose and floating. In dream state the self is not so much attached to the object. It is a mere onlooker. Dream objects

come and go and sometimes combine themselves into a definite whole according to their own way. The most striking difference between the dreaming state and the waking state is that in the waking state the self appears to be in the very object itself, but in the dreaming state, though the object is there, it is not felt as identified with the self. It floats before the self, or the self as separated from the object sees before itself the loose object. While in dreaming state there is still a loose object, in dreamless sleep there is no object at all. In this state though there is no object, there is yet the self. We believe so because if there were no self in sleep, we could not have made such a statement as, "I enjoyed very sound sleep." Thus we believe that in the waking state the self feels itself intimately attached to the object, in dream state the self feels itself as standing apart from the object and in sleep state there is the self alone and no object. Can there be any justification for this belief?

That in the first state we feel ourselves identified with the objects, there is no doubt. All of us say "This, is my body," "This is my table" "This is the world in which I live." Difficulty arises with regard to the other two states. When a man dreams, he is not conscious that he is dreaming, then he is not at all dreaming but waking. But that he can remember and reflect on what he dreams, cannot be denied. We can remember only what we self-consciously experienced before. Here though there is no self-consciousness in experience of a dream content, yet there is a memory of the same. How is this possible? Dream state thus gives rise to a problem for the psychologists to solve. In sleeping state there is neither any consciousness of the object nor is there any explicit self-consciousness.

We cannot make any statement whatsoever with regard to the sleeping state. That there is no explicit self-consciousness, cannot be asserted, for assertion implies it. Whether there is any self-consciousness or not in sleep is also thus a problem for thepsychologits. But we simply believe that in sleep the self alone remains and not any object-consciousness. The Vedantists cannot claim to have the glimpse of Ultimate Truth of Vedanta in sleep state.

Dream and sleep states, therefore, cannot be taken as clear and distinct facts of experience. They give rise to problems. However, these states as we uncritically take them to be, may be well accepted as facts of experience to serve as illustrations to bring home the different stages of Vedanta philosophy. These states, as understood and accepted by commonsense, well represent the different stages of development of Vedanta philosophy. The significance of these states in Vedanta lies in showing the philosophic development. How they do so, we shall presently see.

I am surrounded by the countless things of the world. These things act upon me and I too, at once react upon them. This action and reaction go in such a way that I seem to be an object among other objects. All my activities bodily and mental, are determined by the things of the world. The world is so vast, and so great and powerful are the activities of its forces, that it is quite natural to suppose with the materialists that I am a manufactured product of this gigantic workshop of the world. Instead of taking the world as an object before me, I take myself as an object in the world. No doubt, my desires, thoughts and feelings do not allow me to be reduced to a product of the world, but they are so determined by the things that I find myself quite lost or

entangled in them. In no way can I make myself identified with the body, and the body is undoubtedly an object among other objects.

Philosophy begins with this ordinary waking state experience and rises to a higher state, i.e. the state in which the self and the world are not found as closely connected with, but as separated from each other. When I try to know the world in which I live, I then begin to feel myself detached from the object. Trying to know an object means striving or struggling to know it. In this struggle to know the world, I do not feel myself in the world but as being as powerful as the world is. In this struggle the self and the world stand opposed to each other, and the mighty world which seems in the former state to be so powerful as to swallow every appears now to be an object before the self. In the former state the world is all in all and the self is, as it were, a part of it, but in this state the self and the world stand on equally solid basis. One cannot absorb the other. In this state the self and the world meet face to face with each other, no doubt, but the self is not yet totally detached from the world. The self is attached to it, for the self tries to know it. The world is still there, though it now stands before the self.

In its attempt to know the object, the self is baffled. All its attempts end in utter failure. It cannot know the object. The object becomes a riddle to it. All the concepts by which the self tries to grasp the object give rise to insoluble antinomies. Nothing can be asserted, for the opposite of every statement is equally assertable. That 'the object is' cannot be asserted, for that 'the object is not' can also be asserted at the same time. The statement that 'the object is and is not at the same time' is

is self-contradictory. Whatever is self contradictory cannot be known. There is no higher concept in which all these contradictions can be resolved. Every concept, according to Vedanta, is antinomous. According to Hegelians the self at first in immediacy is quite at home with the object. When it rises from immediacy to know the object, it meets with oppositions and contradictions everywhere. But to Hegelians, the self again feels at home with the object by overcoming all oppositions and contradictions in a higher concept. Thus when the object is ultimately known, there is no hostility between the self and not-self. To know an object is to be intimately connected with it. According to Vedanta, in the first state, the self is, no doubt, very intimate with the object but when it tries to know the object, it cannot know it, for the concept of the object, gives rise to antinomies. The self cannot solve these antinomies, so the object remains for ever to the self as something Anirvachya or riddled with contradictions. Whether Vedanta is right in maintaining that all concepts give rise to antinomies, we are not to discuss here. We are only stating how the Vedanta treats the concepts of thought. According to Vedanta nothing can be said of this world. It is unspeakable. It is unknown and unknowable.

The statement that the world is Anirvachya and unknowable is not a statement of thought. It simply expressed the self's feeling of failure in knowing the world. The world does not cease to exist because it is Anivachya (unspeakable). The self feels the world, though it cannot know it. But the self in this stage does not feel a solid and stable world of waking state but something shadowy and inexpressible. To feel a content as antinomous

is to feel oneself as completely detached from it. To feel a doubtful content is to feel it as separated from oneself. The world now hangs loose or merely floats before the self. The self is quite passive and sees this floating world as something vabue and indefinite. It has now no interest in this world. In its failure to know the world it has now got all its connections with the world severed. This is a fact of experience. When a man tries to know reflectively the table which he sees before him and finds that he cannot know it because every concept with which he tries to know it gives rise to antinomies, he in his failure to know the table feels it as something Anirvachya, floating before him. Afterwards when he ceases to reflect on the nature of the table, he again feels at home with it and says in wonder, "This is the solid table which I have tried so much to know."

It is however, difficult to feel oneself detached from one's body, The self is in immediate relation with the body. It is very difficult even to make the body a content of reflective thought. A man always feels his body from within. In trying to know the body a man, no doubt, tries to see his body before him as a content of thought separated from himself, but he fails to present his body before him, for his feeling of body never ceases. Body is always immediate to the self. Whatever else is first presented to the self is also, no doubt, a mass of feelings in immediate relation with the self, but when the self tries to know that presented mass, it can feel itself detached from that. But they body, whether it is known or not, remains for ever as a mass of feelings in the experience of the self. It is true in case of thinking, desiring, etc. the self feels itself

distinct from body but it never feels itself as separated from it. Can any man feel as if he is attending to his body before him? However, if body be an object like other objects and if the self in its attempt to know finds it as antinomous, then the self must feel itself detached from it, for it is a fact that to feel a content as antinomous is to feel oneself detached from it. It is also difficult to feel oneself separated from the world as a whole, for the world as a whole is not certainly a content of experience to any finite individual. When we feel ourselves detached from certain objects, we are explicitly or implicitly attached to some other objects. However, this does not bar out the possibility of making the world as a whole the content of thought and feeling it as antinomous. The complete realisation of the Vedantic truth is possible only for the person who feels the world with his body as Anirvachya (riddled with contradictions). We do not dispute the possibility of the realisation of Vedantic truth here, for we find sometimes in our experience the complete detachment from particular objects. This Anirvachya state of our experience can be to some extent compared with the dream state in which the self, remaining passive and unconcerned, sees the floating content before it.

Now to come to the third of deep sleep. In the second state the object is reduced to a shadowy antinomous content and self is passive and unconcerned with regard to that content. The self, though passive, sees that content before it. In the third state the self is concerned only with itself and does not take notice of the content. Whether the content exists or not, it is not at all interested to

know. Knowledge is truth. It is self-evident and self-shining. The self first tries to know the object but all concepts regarding the object are not found to be self-evident but self-contradicting.

When the self withdraws its attention from the object and turns to itself, it finds itself as self-evident. The self cannot be doubted. To doubt the self is to assert it. It justifies itself and cannot be justified by any other thing. To know a thing is to enjoy it. When the self knows itself, it enjoys or loves itself. In self-enjoyment, the self loses sight of the shadowy object. In self-love the self is lost in itself and knows only itself. It does not know whether the object is there or not. It is a fact of common experience that in case of extreme love and enjoyment, a person is not conscious of any other thing except the object of love and enjoyment. So, in case of self-love or self-enjoyment the self is only conscious of itself and is not aware of the existence of any other thing. This state is generally compared to the sleeping state in which, as it is believed, the self only enjoys itself and is not conscious of any object.

It is only in this state of self-absorption in which a man, after feeling his body with surrounding objects as something vague and inexplicable, turn to his own self and finds it quite secure and self-evident that he gets the glimmerings of Vedantic truth.

38 Editor. With the dawn of conscious thought and ethical sensibility, the simple and naive attitude of looking at life as a matter of the moment gives place to a philosophic outlook that comprehends life in relation to its past and its future, suggests now difficulties and conflicts, and seeks new ways of overcoming the same.

39.Iswaranandа: That Nalanda and its Pandits were held in great esteem at the time is evidenced from the following letter of King Harsha to Silabhadra. "Now I know that in your convent there are eminent priests and exceedingly gifted, of different schools of learning, who will undoubtedly be able to overthrow them--so now in answer to their challenge, I beg you to send four men of eminent ability, well acquainted with one and the other school, and also with esoteric and exoteric doctrine, to the country of Orissa." Silabhadra divided the prevalent doctrines of the times into three categories, and with the help of these, refuted the Hinayana and extolled Mahayana.

40 Editorial "By means of the simile of sleep and dreams, recognize all phenomena to be mind. By means of the similė of water and ice, recognize noumena and phenomena to be a unity. By means of the similė of water and waves transmute all things to the one common state of at-one-ment."---"Yoga of Great Symbol" (Tibetan).

41. Significant is the saying of Saraha; "Since all things are born of the mind, therefore is the mind itself the Guru."

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Edl. It is a wrong approach to an understanding of his life through a particular set of books alone. Ramakrishna faced a motely crowd of listeners. But unlike a common teacher he did not harp on the same string always. He suited his teachings to the needs, tendencies and intelligences of his hearers. He happened to stress special view-points on special occasions. Fron this it is dangerous

to fly to conclusions to our liking as some have done. His method was never to decry or declaim any one. He believed in helping one rise from a lower rung to a higher one. In an unparalleled degree he was a teacher of all. 2. Their often needlessly metaphysical character and abstruse terminology have presented a forbidding appearance to the general reader, One has slowly and patiently to acclamatize oneself in the atmosphere of Aurobindo's writings before any contact can be established between the author and the reader. The book under review, however, being a compilation of extracts from letters written by Aurobinda to his disciples in answer to their queries, is one of his most easily undertood works. To the uninitiated it will afford a clue to the understanding of Aurobindo's Yoga: and though, as we are afraid, dark patches may endure to the end, the general trend and significance of it will be readily understood.

3. This is not exactly a proper place to enter into a discussion about the precise ontological position of Aurobindo. There are jagged ends and sharp corners in his writings, and he himself has not tried to round off a consistent and complete system. One thing, however is quite clear. The genius of Aurobindo has been deeply influenced by both Eastern lore and Western learning. And apart from the fact that some of his intellectual and imaginative constructions and aspirations are strongly reminiscent.

4. K.S.Ramaswami Sastri. In the West the absence of a belief in the doctrine of Karma has made philosophy irreligious and religion unphilosophical. It is easy to cry down the doctrine of Karma as fatalism. But how can doing be fatalism? Fatalism is non-doing. The doctrine

ofsKarma has at least as much reference to the present and the future Karma as to the past Karma. If we have been floating down the current, we can swim up the current.

5 Wolfram H, Koch. True collectedness is something positive, not as is sometimes brought forward, the stopping of all and every thought by the process of trying to think nothing at all, allowing the mind to fall to a lower level of consciousness. If this were the case, he says, those who are in deep dreamless sleep or in a swoon would be the most perfect of collected souls. No doubt, for beginners he finds it necessary to still their minds and rid them, as far as possible, of all distracting thoughts and worldly images, so that they may come to God devoid of all idle imaginations and without those vain distractions and pictures that usually find a dominant place in the thoughts of the worldly-minded. And this banishing of all disturbint thoughts is necessary for perfecting true collectedness, but this does not mean becoming inert or lifeless like stocks or stones or dulled.

6. S.N. Battacharya: To a man who is most attentively looking at a picture all other objects of the world may be non-existent for the time being; in other words, all other objects are steeped in ignorance. In order to have a cognizance of them he must direct his senses to them.

7. Ignorance has two functions--one is to keep back a thing from our view and the other is to represent it as what it really is not.

8. We might analyse a bit further the nature of ignorance itself. It cannot be a reality by itself. There is no doubt that it exists for the time being, that it produces something perceptible by the senses, yet it is not a reality,

for, what is real must be real for all times and be not susceptible to destruction by true knowledge. Nor again, it is an absolute unreality, in that case no illusion would have been possible, and there is no denying that illusion takes place. So ignorance is neither real nor totally unreal. But for the matter of that it is not absolutely non-existent, for in that case knowledge would not have the necessity of destroying it. But in fact knowledge does destroy it.

Hence, if one would try to establish ignorance by reasoning he must fail, for no one can establish a thing which has no reason to exist: nevertheless no body can deny its existence, although temporarily.

9. Jyotish Ch.Banerjee: "Philosophical Implication of Einstein's Relativity: In one word the Einstein Theory proves the relativity of all phenomena of the world in relation to the observer. In other words, apart from its abstruse mathematical formulae to put it in a philosophical way--it means to say that what we see of things, i.e., things as they appear are not true to the things-in-themselves. It is simply from the individual standpoint that they look so. From different perspectives the same thing looks differently. They are all relative and not absolute and how relative Einstein proves. We shall restrict ourselves more to his logical arguments than to his mathematical deductions.

According to Einstein, what we call straight lines are really curved lines. According to his assumption we live in a space which is curved by its nature. We know that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points and that two such straight lines cannot enclose a space. This Euclid's geometry is quite valid in

so far as we think ourselves on a flat surface or space having two dimensions only. But the result will be different, if a man joins two points on the surface of a sphere instead of that on a white sheet of paper on his table. He will observe in that case that he shall be able to draw through these two points an infinite number of lines with are not straight lines, rather each of which is an arc of a circle and that no parallel straight lines can be drawn on the sphere. If, for instance, we drawn a straight line on the surface of the earth--say from Calcutta to London--and if an intelligent creature being seated on the sun --if possible observes our straight line, surely he will observe it as a curve and not as straight though all men on the surface of the earth shall take it to be straight. What of that creature in the Sun?--even an aviator at a considerable height will perceive it to be curved. A more common illustration we may give here as its proof. When a man walks on the railway line which is curved, say almost semi-circular, he realizes that some distance at least--say 50 feet onward from him is quite straight after which the line gets curved. He cannot realize that the very place he is passing over is also curved; and this curvedness is realized by another man who is 50 feet at his back. Another peculiar result of Einstein's theory in this connection can hardly escape our notice here--and that is about the finitude of space. For Einstein space is curved and hence finite and not infinite as we think. If a blind man is allowed to traverse over the straight path (of course straight in our sense) of a spherical body, the man shall undoubtedly come back to his

original starting point since the curvature of the surface shall bend him round; but owing to his blindness if he cannot recognize the starting point, what result can we expect.? Certainly the man shall move on and on, for ever, under the idea that his journay is not yet over. To him the space is infinite. But really speaking his space is finite, but unbounded inasmuch as this motion is not impeded by any obstacle. Einstein makes us think of the space of the universe in a similar fashion. The ray of a star, for instance, shall go on round the universe till it comes back to its starting point. For him, our space is also unbounded in the sense that we can move on for ever in it. We cannot arrive at a place where we can say "thus far and no further." This is how Einstein gets rid of the infinity of space, one of the fundamental notions of human thought.

Thn let us turn our attention to motion and direction. Motion and direction are also relative. They depend on the observer. Motion of a body means that 'it is getting nearer to or further from some other point.' Einstein explains this by illustrating a railway journey. If we are sitting in a railway compartment with the window blinds drawn and if the train goes smoothly on a straight tract with uniform velocity, it is impossible for us to ascertain by any mechanical means whether the train is moving or not. Whenever motion is to be perceived it is always to be perceived in relation to some other object. So if we look outside through the windows we see the train moving but the realisation of this motion is also difficult. Looking at the distant trees it seems to us that rather the trees are going whereas the train is fixed. But we are disillusioned not by perceiving its opposite afterwards but by the fact of our know-

ledge that we have boarded the train at such and such a station at such and such a time and that we are going to such and such a place, etc. We infer that we are in motion and this act of inference is so sharp that we mistake it to be a simple case of perception. This may be proved in many cases of perception of the external object, in our daily life; nay even if we go deep into the critical investigation of logic and epistemology, we are not very unjustified to remark that the whole of our perception may be a case of wrong perception or mal-perception, a case of wrong judgment--the whole of the perceptual knowledge may be an illusion, or error. However, this case of inference of motion is not to be found in a child and it is therefore that a child is ignorance of such a motion of the train. He does not know know that he is going somewhere and therefore he has no perception of the motion of the train; but what he perceives is the trees running to his opposite direction. Further, when our train passes by the side of another standing train it is difficult to say unless we look at a third object, whether it is our train that moves or that the other one goes in the opposite side. From all these facts it is proved that all motion is relative. Dr. Thirring puts it: "It is evident that we can only speak of the mutual relative motion of bodies,--we cannot attach any meaning to absolute motion because it cannot be verified. Given any number of observations or measurement made within a close system (i.e. without reference to the surroundings) we are unable to ascertain whether or not the system is in motion." (The Ideas of Einstein's Theory.)

So space is also relative. A vacuum or empty space is an absurdity. We cannot think of

space out of which everything is taken. There is no such thing as absolute space. It is our measuring rod that creates space for us. By measures only we determine the position of material bodies in space and measures are only relative.

What is true of space is true of time. It has no reality of its own. According to Einstein's view "What would become of time if nothing ever happened?" "Time is merely a local affair; as measuring rods create space for us so clocks create time for us." Einstein's theory accordingly gave up the notion of the objectivity and the absoluteness of space and time and supposed the law of nature as "such that it is impossible to determine absolute motion by any experiment whatever." This was the first formulation of the principle of relativity, the starting hypothesis of Einstein's theory.

10 Then what Einstein really means by Space-Time? Unlike his predecessors Einstein not only repudiates the absolute reality of space and time but also disproves their individual separate existences. It means that according to him time and space are to be regarded as mere. properties which we ascribe to objects. From the viewpoint of science, he maintains that there is no essential distinction between time and the three dimensions (length, breadth and thickness) of space. "There is no difference between time and any of the three dimensions of space except that our consciousness moves along with it." "Science is not concerned with our feelings but about the difference. Before and after appears to us as a much more fundamental difference than before or behind, above or below. Einstein has proved that we cannot meansure time itself--we can only measure it by the motion of something over a space, "as a clock-hand or a

planet.' According to him time enters into physical phenomena in the same way as directions in space. In other words Einstein means to say that the world is four-dimensional. Whatever happens, happens at a particular time and at a place. Two events are not only separated by their positions in space and by their positions in time also. So time is equally relative.

11. From the Einsteinian point of view it may be said that though the reality of the external world is an 'inextricable blend of Time and Space', yet "We sort this blend out into Time and Space to suit ourselves." And the opinions differ owing to the differences of experiences. Thus we cannot say that "everybody sorts it out in the same way."

12. This sort of scientific research at once gives a shock to our deeply rooted notions. We know 'second is a second', ' a foot is a foot' and it is absolute, i.e., true in all ages, in all places, at any circumstances. But what philosophy says--that your knowledge of this world is nothing but a belief which serves your purpose for the time being, is proved by Relativity.

13. The term relativity is nothing new in the world of philosophy--though it is a novel idea to the scientific world. Every great system of philosophy says, e.g. those of Kant and Sir Hamilton, that our direct knowledge is not of things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear in relation to our mind and thus what we conceive as reality is nothing but relative and phenomenal. Not only so, but some philosophies like those of Vedanta and Bradley go a step further. They may be said to hold that "however much we exclude speculation about the metaphysical character of reality and however earnestly we refuse to go behind actual

experience, that experience is dependent on conditions inasmuch as the observer employs, and is compelled by the constitution of his mind to employ, standard conceptions which exclude from him all but certain aspects of what appears." This is perhaps the truth that Einstein proves. This is the philosophy that is not only implicit but also explicit in his Relativity. What philosophy has propounded has been done by Einstein's science.

14. Einstein has propounded the relativity of the physical world; Vedanta propounds relativity in the thought world as well. According to Vedanta human knowledge is imperfect in the sense that it is not absolute--it cannot transcend its limitation. Rational logic either static or dynamic is after all enveloped by the deep darkness of ignorance. It cannot shake itself off from its body, it cannot get rid of it and hence whatever comes to our knowledge--through this channel of knowledge--either sensory or discursive, is not absolute but relative. It is real in the sense of its temporary utility. It is real in the sense that it is a fact, i.e. its truth lies in the act of happening only but not as happened. What is true, good, and beautiful is but relatively so; and hence Vedanta groups them into 'Not-Reality' (In the sense of relatively real), and "Appearance" a mere illusion. And both logically and psychologically and it has sufficient ground and proof for thinking so, and one of the proofs is attained by Einstein. Thus we see that Relativity rather indirectly supports the Vedantic theory of Anirvachaniyavada, a theory which shows the inexplicability of the world, or in other words, it proves the negative aspect of the Vedanta.

Russell has warned us against the misinter-

pretation of Einstein's view of Time and Space as just that of Kant. And to some extent the warning, we must admit, is not without foundation inasmuch as Kant like the Cartesians could not think of objects without space. For Einstein "the primary ingredients of nature are not objects existing in space and time, but events in the contimuum." We, thereby, find the polar distinction between them in so far as their philosophic conclusions are concerned. According to Kant's view time and space are 'subjective': they are the 'forms of intuition.' But what we have seen above in regard to Einstein's conception of time and space, we do not know how logically we can interpret it otherwise. The whole of the objective world of the Realists is based upon this time and space; but if it is proved that this substance itself is not real that it is something imaginary or a creation of the mind then the whole of the structure of Realism falls shattered to the ground. To speak in Sir James's language "when we question nature through our experiments, we find she knows nothing of either a space or of a time which is common to all men." (The New Background of Science,) Further he added, "When we interpret these experiments in the new light of the theory of relativity, we find that space means nothing apart from our experience of events. Space begins to appear merely as a fiction created by our own minds, an illegitimate extension to nature of a subjective concept which helps us to understand and describe the arrangement of objects as seen by us, while time appears as a second fiction serving a similar purpose for the arrangement of events which happen to us." Prof. Wildon Carr has also nicely remarked in the conclusion of his

book--The General Principle of Relativity (in its philosophical and historical aspect)--"concrete four-dimensional Space-time becomes a system of world-lines, infinitely deformable---(and these) world-lines are not things-in-themselves, they are only an expression for what is or may become common to different observers in the relations between their standpoints. Carried to its logical conclusion the principle of relativity leaves us without the image or the concept of a pure objectivity. The ultimate reality of the universe, as philosophy apprehends it, is the activity which is manifested in life and mind, and the objectivity of the universe is not a dead core serving as the substratum of this activity but the perceptions-actions of infinite individual creative centres in mutual relation."

Thus, to conclude, the more the science develops the more the purpose of Philosophy is realised. Science might affect the theologians but surely not the philosophers. To a philosopher science, religion, morality all are but the staircases to reach the terrace of the ultimate Truth which being beyond our finite knowledge is inexplicable in terms of our intelligible expressions. Truth is one and the same whether it is attained by science, or philosophy or literature or whatever it may be. The realization of such a truth is the end of philosophy and Einstein has unveiled one of the aspects of this philosophy before the world of Science by his wonderful discovery of "Relativity". Prof. J. Arthus Thomson's edition of the Outlines of Science suggested, "Einstein's theory shows us that there is something in the nature of an ultimate entity in the universe, but it is impossible to say

anything very intelligible about it. But a certain aspect of this entity has been picked out by the mind as being what we call matter. The mind having done this, also partitions out a space and time in which this matter exists. It is not too much to say that the whole material universe has, in this sense, been created by the mind itself." We are not hereby committing ourselves to the hopeless extremity of subjectivism by the expression "created by the mind itself," but what we want to stress here is they dynamic creativity of the mind on the one hand, and on the other the futility of its attempt in its dynamic process to comprehend the reality as it is or in totality. Of course the opponents might put forth their objection against this to the effect that--why do we go so far as to presume the existence of any other transcendental reality which reaches beyond all our comprehension?--why do we not accept the relativity as the ultimate reality of the universe? This gives rise to the question of the nature of reality which needs an elaborate discussion in so far as its logical and psychological aspects.

15. The march of science is a march towards the horizon of the glowing East and its foot-prints have indicated the marks of revolution against the rationalistic tenets of many schools of realism. The concept of matter has vanished from science and its place 'emanation' of energy has occupied. Time, space, and motion have become relative. "The uncertainty Principle" of Heisenberg has shaken the deeply rooted notion of the concept of causality and determinacy. Undoubtedly, the modern science is not realistic; rather in the words of Sir. J. Jean's "subject to the reservations.....we may say that present-

day science is favourable to idealism."(The New Background of Science). And not only this but also we can go a step further and posit it unhesitatingly that the new conclusions of science give us a clue to the illusoriness of the world if considered philosophically. We may quote here the version of Mr. G.M. Acklom while reviewing A. Korzybski's marvellous book Science and Sanity in the New York Times, February,11, 34. "Most of our basic ideas, such as identity, causality and simultaneity, are illusions due to ignorance and faulty mental processes; all knowledge is (in the ultimate) verbal, and its only possible content is structure. Our language...is positively injurious and increasingly destructive to our mental health and our social progress."

16. Mohan Singh: I have come across only two replies to the question, What is truth? The one is ascribed to Matsyendra, the teacher who replies to his disciple, Gorakha. They thrived in the 9th and 10th centuries. The other is attributed to Charpat, who was the Royal teacher of the Chamba State in the Punjab, alive about 946 A.D. Here are the texts:

(1) What is Truth? Progression from seeing (Drishti) to divine vision (Dibya Dṙishti), from knowledge (Jnana) to realization (Vignana). The teacher and the disciple have the same body; if realization comes, there shall be no straying, no separation, no return.

(2) The expansion of knowledge to realization (Jnana, Vignana) is the eternal essense of Truth.

I believe, here we have definitions which come as near to an absolute reply as possible. Every word in them is important, significant.

17. Each of the six systems or seven, including the Buddhists, is relatively right, the

full truth and the implications of the relative can be brought out only if the relative is for the time being given absolute value, absolutized as I would put it. Complete growth from Drishti to Dibya-Drishti involves the passage through all the systems one after the other, Sankhya at one end and Vedanta at the other. Thadani (Mahabharata) is perfectly justified in maintaining that there is no absolute contradiction involved in the many religions or philosophies that the ancient Indians elaborated. Each took one aspect, threshed it out and passed on its truth for the consumption of the next. Vedanta is the crown of all.

17. C.T. Srinivasan: "Some modern views on Sankara.": Sankara as a historical phenomenon is all that we are taught and expected to teach in our Indian Universities. The result is that regarding the exact view-point of Sankara there exist today a hundred and one opinions causing unnecessary differences. No two Advaitins agree about the meaning of Maya, nor do the different types of Advaita-Vadins meet without a clash! Yet one and all of them adore the Teacher as the world's greatest one. Differences somehow crop up when they try to interpret the basis of their essential agreement.

Long before the appearance of Hegel we have ample evidence of Western thought being familiar with the general principles of Sankara's philosophy. Owing to the honest efforts of Max Muller, Deussen, Thibaut and others, Sankara's system has found a permanent place in the thought of Europe. In spite of their denials we can easily detect the influence of Sankara on the development of modern thought of Europe. In spite of the denials we can easily detect the influence of Sankara on the development of modern thought in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. The rational Monism

of Sankara appears time and again under different names, but under queer conditions of approach. Their scientific speculations based upon an imperfect knowledge of Sankara's philosophy, as merely different aspects of Faith in the intellect or in the will or in both as one. Hegel's Absolute Idea, Schopenhauer's Will, Bergson's Life, Gentile's Mind, Bradley's reality, etc., are only some new names for Sankara's Brahman--unsuccessful attempts to go higher that Sankara, futile intellectual struggles to get rid of sopipsism with a view to giving scientific meaning for the merely phenomenal within the Reality. They share the same fate as that of other speculations. Each new system of thought seems to destroy the existing one. The book of the hour has a short span of life before it inevitably passes into the debris of thought. There seems to be no end to this so-called speculative thought, and consequently no philosopher seems to be secure of his ground. The History of Philosophy occupies a greater position of importance today than the actual science. And the term, 'somehow', creeps in at some stage or other; and dogmatism resumes its proud position, i.e. the sphere of Avidya seems to continue with a vengeance!

We are not concerned with the Western intellectual stunts, but with its views and criticisms of Sankara. When the European philosophers criticize the Upanishads, they attack also Sankara's position which by some unaccountable intuition they identify with the former. Their colour and race prejudices blind their vision. A few rare souls like Deussen and Rene Guenon ask us to keep to Vedanta, the highest possible achievement by human thought. Rene Guenon, in his book, Man and his becoming according to Vedanta (which

deals entirely with Avasthatraya) answers the usual charges levelled against Vedanta thus: "The doctrines are not to be degraded to the scope of the limited and vulgar understanding; they are for those who can raise themselves to the comprehension of them in their integral purity; and it is only in this way that a genuine intellectual elite can be formed." But it is to be regretted that even the most unprejudiced minds of the West are not able to appreciate the full implications of Sankara's philosophy because of their lack of insight into his metaphysical methods. And "the clue to a philosophy lies in the method pursued." It requires the keenest insight and the greatest self-sacrifice, the sacrifice of age-old prejudices, to get into the spirit of Sankara to understand him. Mere intellectual appreciations leave their ignorance of Sankara's system untouched. Hence with with regard to their views on Sankara, each new book on the subject differs from the previous one. Perpetual doubts are arising about the only possible solution of the world problem which Sankara offers, or as to its final disposal. Most of the criticisms levelled against Sankara by the ancient and modern thinkers are concerned only with his "Maya" doctrine so-called. But have they succeeded in attacking his unassailable metaphysical position? Does Sankara really postulate a central cosmic principle independent of Reality, which gives rise to this world of name and form? It is this so-called independent cosmic principle attributed to Sankara, that is attacked with varying degrees of success by the different schools of thought, both ancient and modern.

What does Sankara really state in his Bhashyas? From certain undeniable facts of

experience he establishes that Prajnanam is Brahman or the Reality which is proved to be identical with our Self. Here we get a definite criterion of Reality: Reality is that which transcends time and yet is the sole entity that endures for ever from the time-view, i.e. from the empirical standpoint. Even an ordinary thinker would never then believe in an extra-cosmic force or entity that can give rise to consciousness of a world--the world that consists of individuals and exists in their consciousness. The only possible way in which we can understand him when we take into consideration his sound metaphysical position, is that he points out "Adhyasa" or Mistaken-transference as cause of bondage and misery, which we can easily note in all beings--an individual's illusion or a natural prejudice that veils the truth. The word "illusion" need not give rise to unnecessary fears in the minds of the so-called realists who have clearly no idea of what an illusion is and therefore much less of what Reality means. Life consists of a series of memories; the event of the present becomes only a memory of the past. The elusive handful of the "present" is as unsubstantial as the achievements of a dream. Does any-one realise the illusory aspect of experience within dream? As there is nothing else but reality under any circumstances, even a dream or an illusion has a meaning only within itself. The substance of this world consists only of a bundle of sensations arranged in order by the presence of Reason which is identical with our Real Self. The order and consistency that are instanced to prove the reality of an external world, are entirely due to the presence of the Real Self, and the former are the evidences of the permanent and unchanging nature of the Self

which appears as the consistent whole in any state or in any conceivable situation. It is the invariable presence of Self that gives the appearance of reality to every situation. But there is the same order and consistency within a dream as well; and hence these are no real marks, to prove the reality of an external world.

A born Hindu familiar with Sankara's teachings will be surprised at the different views held by the modern thinkers. He is called a Nihilist, a Mystic, a Tantric, and so forth. These are the opinions of the Westerners who have a fascination for his bold conclusions but have no idea of their grounds. In our country it is a fashion to quote Sankara as an authority even for obscure and irrational beliefs. There are any number of such theories about Sankara which I need not consider now at length. I am dealing only with the views of the intellectuals not only of the West but also of the present Indian interpreters of Sankara. When so many of our own Acharyas and philosophers, not understanding the methods of Sankara, have attached only his so-called theories, how can we expect the philosophers of the West, who have not the least idea about the peculiar Vedic methods, to understand and give the legitimate value to the most rational outlook of the great philosopher?

In trying to give a wider meaning to the term Maya than what Sankara gave it, we move on to slippery ground. Maya is the cause of all the existing disputes! Even in our country there are several possible explanations--theories on the meaning of Maya. One will get really confused by hearing all the different Vadas about it. Therefore the safest course is to read his Adhyasa Bhashya a number of times and form our own independent conclusions based upon his metaphysical position. To treat it as

a real cause of an unreal world or as an unreal cause of an unreal world would lead us on to an endless array of speculative efforts. The cause ceases to be a cause if there is no effect apart from it. The unreal cause of an unreal effect ceases to be with the unreal. What does not really exist, needs neither an explanation nor an accounting for; and the attempt would be impossible because the real position does not allow it. Facts are superior to mere theories and the problem does not exist in the final comprehension of the Fact or in the Fact itself.

What is the cause or purpose of this world? That is all the question which worries the philosophers. They do not pause to consider whether this problem arises at all in an enlightened enquiry. "What world?" we ask. Is it an independent entity? If it is only the consciousness of a world we have to deal with, causality is included within it and can never be traced beyond consciousness. Sankara never troubled himself seriously about this illusory problem. For, the problem of the cause of the world, the crux of all philosophy, is an intellectual illusion by its very nature in an enlightened enquiry. There is no occasion for such a problem if only we analyse our experience and get rid of our ignorance. When one great American philosopher asked Swami Vivekananda how he could explain the creation of the relative universe out of an Absolute Reality, the Swamiji said that he would give the same answer that Sankara had given us long ago, viz. to request the questioner to put his question in a syllogistic form. The questioner of course thought and thought for a long time but had to confess in the end that he could not find the middle term!

We generally mistake one thing for another, to wit, the unreal for the real. Knowledge re-

moves this ignorance. What, then, is the problem that would still exist in the sphere of knowledge? To establish or even to think of a relationship between the absolute and the relative is illogical from the very start. The worrying problem of the origin of world is grounded only in such an ignorant and illogical outlook. Hence Sankara analyses first our ordinary experience and arrives at the permanent and undeniable aspect of it. I need not deal in detail the methods of Avasthatraya and Panchakosha, both of which prove beyond doubt that the Self of the enquirer is the permanent reality--the Self that merely witnesses its percepts in two of its states, waking and dream, and reveals its true nature in what is known as Sushupti; the Self that appears as one perfect whole in each and every Kosha (the universe of discourse) and on serious enquiry is proved to be none of these manifested spheres. The Panchakosha method proves that this 'I', the self of the enquirer, is not anything that it comprehends nor anything that it witnesses but is that which remains unaffected after the most rational process of elimination of the phenomenal. To deny this 'I' is at least to exist in order to deny or to doubt. Now the Avasthatraya and the Panchakosha are viewed together as a whole. There are all the five Koshas even in a dream as per our experience. But after waking we find that the individual of the dream and all his five Koshas and all activities connected with them are unreal. So too in the sheath of Reason or Vijnanamaya-kosha we arrive at the conclusion that the three states or Avasthas are unreal and the Self is free from its temporary attachments created with each state. Thus the five Koshas and the three Avasthas are found to be mere passing appearances and situations, and this Self is actually free from them.

Self's nature as pure or perfect consciousness is proved by the method of Avasthatraya which disposes of all the existing problems of causality, world, etc. Cause demands time, and time has meaning only within the waking or the dream. The sense of time snaps in our deep sleep. Therefore the problem of the cause of the three states on which hangs the consciousness of the world, does not arise, and if it arises at all, it can only arise in those who are ignorant of the nature of cause. About this question of causality, Mr. K.A.Krishnaswami Iyer of Bangalore has dealt with at length in his valuable book "Vedanta as a Science of Reality." The knowledge of reality arrived at by an enquiry into the nature of our experience makes the problem of the cause of the world meaningless and illogical. If there still remains a craving for the cause of the world, Vidyaranya humourously asks those that want to find it out--all within the waking state. Few are aware that the greatest scientists of to-day have arrived at the same conclusion about the cause as that of Sankara.

Here I have to say a few words on a most controversial point. It is not a small family quarrel among ourselves, for it affects seriously our notions of freedom and bondage and release, etc., It think that most of the criticisms levelled against Sankara would appear very reasonable if it is proved that he believed in the existence of Avidya as cause in any form in Sushupti. It is left for great scholars to decide the issue textually. But one familiar with the canons of pure philosophy and modern science, cannot think of a cause in a timeless sphere. As Vasana-matra or as Bija-rupa or in any conceivable form, the presence of Avidya as the cause in Sushupti, would make time greater than the Self.

Fortunately our self is free from such an imaginary curse! Sushupti is the one occasion, so to speak, when we can realize Self's absolute purity and freedom. The waking intellect that demands a cause in its time-bound form, must imagine its cause in Sushupti which is then viewed by it as its previous state from the same time-bound view. It thus includes the timeless sphere within its time sphere and imagines an 'ought-to-be' something in Sushupti to account for the subsequent rise of a world in consciousness. The power of ignorance is so great that such unconscious slips in logic become possible even in very great thinkers. Such an irrational position is mistakenly transferred to Sankara himself, the world's greatest thinker, who never uses such a term as Mulavidya anywhere, according to Mr. Y. Subba Rao of Bangalore, in his scholarly work in Sanskrit, Mulavidya Nrasa. Even if the interpreters and scholars prove by texts that Sankara says that, we know for certain that the greatest philosopher must have meant it only for those who are still in the sphere of ignorance and who will get confused or even get mad if the unreality of cause is proved to them. In his Bhasya on Gaudapada's Karikas and also in several places in Sutra Bhashya, he has clearly pointed out the errors of all such unphilosophical positions. To the Poorvapakshin who asks the question: "Whose is this Avidya?" Sankara replies in his Gita Bhashya: "To you, the individual, who asks this question." One may ask here, "If the individual's ignorance is removed by the individual's knowledge, what have you to say about other individuals? There ought to be a universal force or something, whatever we might call it, that should account for the Avidyas of the other individuals." We say that the idea of a universal force and the other individuals are all included within the individual's

Avidya and ceases to be with it when knowledge arises. Where individuality is absent as in Susupti, it will be a futile attempt to seek for the trace of Avidya there in any form. Avidya in Sushupti, i.e. I did not know anything then, is not a conscious experience but is only a created memory of the waking intellect. He ho establishes the unreality of an external world by Avasthatraya would never undo himself by postulating a central cause for such an unreality outside the actual sphere of ignorance, and much less within the sphere of Absolute Reality. The cause is not available there or then for this or now.

I will also refer to another existing fashion of some of the modern Indian thinkers. A few of the exuberant Advaitins, in their zest for reconciliation and moderation, say that Ramanuja is the best commentator for Sankara. Can ignorance of Sankara's position go further? It arises out of a confusion of religion with philosophy, faith with science. The one is a mere poetical description of the Lord according to the Srutis and Smritis, while the other is the proof for such a Reality. Both talk no doubt about Vasudeva, but Sankara's Vasudeva is a rationally proved entity stripped of all our illusions about it. To Sankara the Srutis that declare the truths about Reality are sacred because of their rational outlook. They can be proved by reason--reason reaching its logical limit in experience and revealing intuition by which the nature of Reality is comprehended. Here, in this position, there is greater room for Bhakti, for it is in perfect accordance with knowledge. Mere faith in the Lord has its own uses of course. But faith based upon certainty means eternal release from doubt, despair, and unnecessary hopes. To think of a

unity in philosophy in the type referred to, is only a compromise with ignorance. Ramanuja's Vasudeva, in spite of all the glorious attributes that we can imagine, is outside the sphere of both reason and experience, the only reliable instruments of knowledge. Knowledge does not arise merely by a denominational allegiance to a particular creed or sect or by accidents or birth, time, and place. Ramañuja's system is a leap in the dark with the talisman of individual consolation or satisfaction for one's own safety. It is an interesting speculation based upon religious instincts without entering into the meaning of their deep basis. Moreover his idea of Reality, "as a whole composed of parts" reifies the essential distinctions, and God as the ultimate unity becomes then a mere illusion--one among several wholes.

God, religious experience, the urge of Truth the sacredness of the Srutis, all these get their deep meaning and glory only in Sankara's system of thought where God is proved to be the very urge and the ideal of all conscious existence and therefore to be the only Reality identified with our Self. Any other view can only be an illusion based upon mere ignorance of the situation. God alone is: there is nothing else but God. We can get at Him intellectually and intuitively. This is the glorious position of Sankara. This high rational outlook is bound to endure for millions of these illusory years, whose value and meaning he so boldly pointed out that even a thoughtful child can try and understand.

Thibaut tries to prove that Ramanuja's commentary on the Vedanta Sutras is more in accordance with the spirit than Sankara's while he also admits that Sankara's is more in line with the philosophy of the Upanishads.

This is entirely a wrong view when we know that the Vedanta Sutras are meant only for revealing the consistent doctrines of the Upanishads. What concerns the modern thinker is not the faithfulness of the interpretations or even consistency with the Srutis. Which is the rational view? The greatness of Sankara consists in taking a most rational outlook while agreeing with the Srutis, thereby showing the rational basis of the Mahavakyas themselves. He does not give up either textual authority or reason based upon actual experience, because his metaphysical position is entirely in agreement with that of the Srutis, as he proves at every step. An appeal to reason alone will hold good for all time to come but an appeal merely to the religious instincts of a particular set of human beings cannot stand the ultimate tests of reason. Sankara yields to none in his reverence for the Srutis. But in his view knowledge demands the fullest use of reason necessary for the discrimination of the Real from the unreal in experience. A Vichara-Buddhi is first absolutely necessary before trying to understand the deep meaning of the Srutis. What appears as reason under the first limited view becomes exalted as intuition; and what is intuitively grasped as Truth is what is revealed in the Srutis. And hence their sacredness. Mere quotations without taking into consideration their full implications do not take us even one step higher. That is where Sankara scores a victory over every other philosopher! Sankara's victory is virtually a victory to Truth! He alone has a right to talk about the limitations of reason, for he alone has reasoned it out and found its meaning in the reality. The legitimate purpose of intellect, the instrument of reason, seems to be to

know its own limitations and obtain the satisfaction that the very limitation is thoroughly rational from the point of view of ultimate reason. What are the proofs for the existence of God? All speculative efforts to answer this question have failed. And Ramanuja's is one of them. The splendid superstructure of his theological speculation is built upon the genuine but uncertain foundations of human beliefs, hopes, and fears! But Sankara's system is based upon the solid ground of reason and undeniable experience. If Self is proved to be the Reality, what seems to hide this glaring fact is only one's own ignorance and nothing else. If that is seen to be the only obstacle, then we can truly say with Sankara that God's mercy is infinite! A little serious thought in the right direction, and we find that we are actually free from all bondage. The greatness and genuine goodness of the Lord is once for all vindicated in Sankara's great system of thought and not in any theological or other speculations.

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18. Sugata: In the appreciation of an object of beauty we can disentangle two elements: a sensuous content and a peculiar emotion. This experience of a peculiar emotion is the starting point of all artistic experience. This peculiarity of emotion has certain characteristic features which distinguish it from other pleasant feelings.

19. Artistic emotion, however, is completely dissociated from our animal needs. Artistic joy is disinterested joy. The idea is also conveyed by saying that detachment characterizes the perceiver of an object of beauty. Biologically we have been made to see things, not to look at them. This feature serves to distinguish

other kinds of pleasurable emotion associated with animal needs from artistic enjoyment proper.

20 With the predominance of the emotion they often appear to stop wholly. On such occasions we appear to look vacant and become rigid, and the visual or audible sensations which were before impressing themselves on the consciousness fail to command any more notice. We momentarily escape, as it were, from the stream of life and come to rest on its banks.

Along with the reduction of our vital activities to a minimal conscious level, there is another aspect of the artistic emotion which has to be clearly marked out. It is that the object of beauty induces in us a sense of mystery. The sense of mystery is there because we momentarily become aware of a deeper reality which escapes our ordinary perception.

21. We may notice the sun shining over a landscape every morning. We just see it and then get absorbed in our daily trivialities. But one morning suddenly we become aware that the landscape is beautiful, we cannot turn our gaze away for some time, and our being becomes immersed in an unutterable joy. In such moments we touch the fringe of the real.

22. A misgiving that may lurk in many minds. It may strike many of us as very strange that anything like mystic consciousness which is attained after years of strenuous effort and rigorous self-control should come to artists who cannot lay claimuto any such discipline? Here it can be pointed out that much of the discipline in religious practice goes towards refining the coarseness of our personality. Artists are naturally endowed with a higher degree of refinement than ordinary men. There

is besides such a thing as the play of the Divine. "The wind bloweth where it listeth." Swami Vivekananda has somewhere said that some persons often stumble upon Yogic realisations. Varying the metaphor we can say that the spirit often stumbles upon certain men.

23. The artist's vision is not only hazy, it is also impermanent. No sooner he seems to feel a thrill than it departs and leaves behind a aching void.

24. Sheo Narayan Lal Shrivastava: The inadequacy of thought to come to ultimate truth of things is vindicated in its two-fold incapacity. On the one hand, it cannot grasp the subject of all experience, the subject for which the movement of thought itself is an objective content; and on the other, owing to its inherent ideality, it cannot grasp the external object to which it refers, the existent per se. That the ultimate subject, the condition and presupposition of all knowledge and experience, cannot itself be objectively presented, is a difficulty realized as old as the Upanishadic period; for the sage Yajnavalkya said: "By whom all this is known, who shall know him; who shall know the knower?" "What I must presuppose in order to know an object" says Kant, "I can never know as an object." In Schopenhauer's words, "That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject." The subject eludes the grasp of thought. "This I or he or it" to quote Kant again "this something that thinks, is nothing but the idea of a transcendental subject of thought--X, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and which, apart from them, cannot be conceived at all. We turn round and round it in a perpetual circle, for we can make no judgment about it, without making use of it in our judgement. (Philosophy of Kant).

As the subject eludes the grasp of thought so does also the external object to which it refers. Thought is an ideal qualification of a real existent which goes beyond it.

25. The ideal of understanding is to grasp in immediacy the whole comphrehending both the subject and the object. To the Upanishadic thinkers it was fully evident that this ideal cannot be realized by thought, which is discursive and relational. They knew full well that thought is not fundamental and foundational in reality, for they asked for something deeper "By whom desired and set forth does the mind start its activity?"

The basis and presupposition of thought is the principle of consciousness which lights up the th thoughtforms or states of thought. It is the subject which comprehends thought itself. The entire life of thought forms the content of an ultimate consciousness which sustains and illumines it. This ultimate principhe of consciousness, the bed-rock of all experience is Atman, the inmost self of man. It is when the rays of this ultimate consciousness fall on the states or modifications of thought, that they are quickened to life. It is the root reality on which rests the entire structure of the intelligible universe. It is the ultimate condition of the possibility of all thinking. By this consciousness is not meant the fragmentary and individual states of consciousness, which are in incessant flux and which appear and disappear, but the principle back of them all, the inextinguishable light of consciousness which illumines them all. It is what the Vedantins call Chit. The entire objective universe, comprising both the physical and the psychical,must, epistemologically speaking, rest on, or be the content of, an ultimate consciousness beyond which there is nothing.

A reality outside consciousness is simply inconceivable. As the entire objective universe rests on consciousness, in virtue of which the objective universe is Objective, the Upanishads speak of it as the light of all lights. Consciousness is the basis and support of all that is.

26. This ultimate consciousness is the fontal reality; but for it knowledge and experience would be impossible.

27. The light of consciousness is prior to all lights, for it apprehends them all. It is the light of consciousness that apprehends the light of the sun, the light of the moon, the light of the stars and all other lights. It is the presupposition of reason, of knowledge and of experience; it is the sustaining source of all these.

28. Sridhar Majumdar: The phenomenal world, again, is perceived through the organs of our senses; but these organs, such as the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin, in their turn, do not function unless the mind be after them. As for instance, we do not see a thing, though our eyes may be quite open and fixed on it, if our mind is engaged in some other thought; similar is the case with the other organs--the ear, the nose the tongue, and the skin. Besides following the sense-objects through the senses, the mind may remain agitated by recapitulating the past reminiscences as well as by pondering over the future expected events.

29. The embodied self is just like a wave dancing on the bosom of the ocean. Behind the wave is the grandest support, the ocean. So behind the embodied self is its grandest support, the Supreme Self. It is the desire or the consequent consciousness of the ego,

that keeps the wave dancing. When the desire ceases, and consequently the ego-consciousness disappears, the wave merges, and takes its repose, in the calm bosom of the ocean, that is, the embodied self is embraced in, or becomes one with, the Supreme Self.

30. "O, You, Padmasambhaba, the supreme status is attainable by devotion, by means of inward dissolution of the ego-consciousness. Constant thought is undoubtedly the means of this end." (Advice of Mahesware to Brahma, Yogasikhopanishad.).

31. "The state in which the attenuated mind rests being free from all objectivity is described as the state of sound sleep even in wide wakefulness. The state when nature is called by the knowers of truth, O, you, Nidagha, as the fourth state--the state of Samadhi." (Instruction of Saint Riva to his disciple Nidagha; Annapurnopanishad).

32. It is as easy to destroy as it is difficult to build up, and in many countries morality of the traditional character has been desperately shaken. Something, however, may be gained from philosophy whether Eastern or Western, and a useful field lies open for the dissemination of philosophical doctrines. There are two main lines of thought in India as in Europe whence help may be derived. We may disregard the ascetic ideal which has so fascinated many minds in the East and West alike. It is ultimately essentially a self-seeking ideal, however it may be philosophically grounded, and it cannot work for the good of mankind as a whole, for it regards men as distinct atoms, without any real links of union one to another. But we have a very different ideal, prominent in Mahayana Buddhism and in Hinduism in the Avatara and Bhakti doctrines

and founded on a philosophy which recognizes not the separateness of individuals but their essential unity. The many Indian sages who have inculcated this doctrine include Sri Ramakrishna; in various forms it is an essential strand of Indian thought and, firmly grasped, it is utterly ireconcilable with those hatreds and that self-seeking which dominate society in so many regions of the world to-day. The belief in unity and differences of appearance is a completely rational belief, which can be taught as pure philosophy or as associated with many systems of religion. Fearlessly posed it offers a real antidote to the particularism and negativism of the practical thought of the day.

From another point of view philosophy, both Eastern and Western, affords for certain classes of intellect conclusive motives for abating the feverish rivalries of the moment. Philosophers teach us to regard things subspecie aeternitatis, and to minimize the time element, the here and now considerations which dictate our actions in far too great a decree. Doubtless this point of view may be carried to excess. It is so carried when we are asked to believe in the unreality of the time process, or to accept human misery as a necessary foil to the perfection of enlightened spirits. But within bounds it is well to be reminded of the comparative insignificance of the events of the moment, and to be warned not to mistake the part for the whole.

Were it only possible to apply these doctrines to the present civil strife in Spain, how great an amelioration of the situation would result.

33. Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler owe their phenomenal success to the decline of the operation of reason in human affairs and the substitution therefore of irrational passions, against whose

domination all thinkers must steadily and persistently strive in the assurance magna est veritas et prevalebit.

34. Editor: The belief that man's existence on this planet is but one stage of his eternal destiny, that his good and evil have a superhuman meaning, and that his whole life on earth is to be seen in relation to a God-created scheme, is still a persistent and a widely disseminated belief. The doubts that now exist regarding the old theological conception of man's place in the physical universe owe their origin to the revelations made by modern science.

35. The position of space and time in modern science is still obscure. Certain developments of Relativity Theory, the latest theories of a finite and expanding space have not yet been able to explain clearly the position of time and space. The Quantum theory is introducing yet stronger modifications into our space-and-time concepts. Mr. Sullivan observes in this connection: "No one can say what theories of space and time will finally emerge from the present scientific reconstruction, but it is certain that they will differ very greatly from what we have hitherto believed. And since there are no ideas more fundamental than our ideas of space and time, a great many other things will alter when they alter. The ideas we have been discussing, our ideas both of man and of the universe, acquire entirely new aspects when placed in this new setting. If it be true, for instance, that man has created time and space, then we must revise our conception of man as a being subject to space and time--to the space and time, that is to say, that have hitherto been assumed in our thinking about these matters."

36. We shall now consider what a Vedantist has to

to say about the modern speculations on time, space, and man's place in the universe. He affirms that every attempt to solve the laws of time and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of the two. The human mind is limited and so cannot go beyond the limits of time and space. As no man can jump out of his own self, so no man can get beyond the limits imposed by the laws of time and space.

With a Vedantist time and space are dependent existences, they change with every change of the human mind. The ideas of time and space sometimes vanish altogether. This universe of time and space has no absolute existence. It exists only in relation to our minds. Man sees the universe with his five senses, but if he had another sense, he would see in it something more. The Universe has no real existence in the sense that it has no unchangeable existence. Nor can a Vedantist say that it is a non-existence, inasmuch as our mind has to work in and through it. So the universe is a sort of something in which there is a mixture of existence and non-existence. In the superconscious state alone a man can get beyond the limits of time and space and the state can be attained by him through intuition. When a man reaches the state, he gets the vision of the soul which is beyond all time and space. Then he finds that time and space are in the soul and not the soul in time and space, and that the sould alone has the absolute existence and is therefore omnipresent. A Vedantist says further that no amount of knowledge of the physical universe can ever solve the riddles of time and space. Science must, according to him, have the necessity of recognizing metaphysics. The hypotheses that are necessary in all physical sciences are apt to meet with contra-

dictions in terms. Because they are nothing but metaphysical conceptions and therefore a scien-
tist has to come to metaphysics in his ultimate conclusions.

37. Saguta: Modern physics has played havoc with the old ideas about matter which actually 'occupies' less than a billionth part of the space it appears to occupy. It is moreover doubtful if it 'occupies' any space at all.

38. Science knows no finality; it is always tentative and hypothetical.

39. Science can only be conscious of its limitations and cease to speak from the heights of Olympus.

40. Editor.: It is said that Sankaracharya had a disciple who served him for a long time, but he did not give him any instruction. Once when he was seated alone, he heard the foot-steps of someone coming behind. He called out, "Who is there?" The disciple answered, "It is I." Then Sankara said, "If the word "I" is so dear to you, either expand it indefinitely or renounce it altogether."

41. Swami Premananda: He would not allow devotees to take such food as would intensify desires or make for dulness. But he would add, "It would, however, not affect the Jnanis; still the novice in spiritual practices must be very particular about it."

42. Epictetus, the stoic, remarked that everything has two handles by which it can be taken hold of.

43. Prof. Sheo Narayana Lal Shrivastava:"WHAT VEDANTISM IS." "Vedanta" literally means the 'terminus ad quem of all knowledge.' The Vedantic lore is claimed to be the Supreme Wisdom which gives the parama purusartha or the Highest Goal of man's life. As a system of philosophy, it claims to give an explanation

of reality which, so far as possible by the human intellect, should be treated as final. Vedanta however is not merely a system of intellectual philosophy but also a disciplinary and spiritual culture. Reflective philosophical analysis can give us an idea of what the ultimate truth of reality is, but the living experience of truth is an acquisition of the Illumined.

44. For yet another reason is the Vedantic metaphysics valued by the teachers of Vedanta viz. for vindicating the untenability of other rival philosophical theories. A firm grasp of the fundamentals of Vedanta is deemed necessary to keep the mind steadfast on the realization of the Goal and not be distracted by theories which may be only seemingly plausible. Intellectual confusion which constantly begets doubts and perplexities is a serious stumbling block in the path of the aspirant. To many it may not appear commendable that there should be such a rigid insistence on accepting a particular metaphysics as the only right one, but Vedanta emphatically insists on our having the correct Weltanschauung (world-view). A fumbling man without an inkling of the Goal can be anything but a steadfast man.

45. They have employed the subtlest of dialectics in combating rival systems.

46. The Vedanta is not merely a philosophy but also a "way of life."

47. Philosophical reflection, unless it stirs one's being spiritually, is from the Hindu point of view, a barren waste of logic.

48. Criterion of ultimate reality in the Vedanta philosophy is abadhitavishayatvam or non-sublatable fact-hood. The real, the absolutely real, (satyasya-satyam) must in the

very nature of it, be self-same everlastingly. The Ultimate Real is characterised by non-negativity: what can be negated or sublated is but appearance. The dictum that the real is non-negative or immutably persistent requires no proof, for it is one which we are constantly employing in appraising truth in every sphere of our life. We are wont to pronounce dreams unreal, for they do not endure; they are sublated in the waking experience. A fancy or hallucination is dismissed as unreal, for it ceases to be in an after-experience. The principle, therefore, that the real is abiding, is an unquestionable deliverance of our deepest rational nature.

49. Every finite item of experience, argues Bosanquet, points to a "system" "a whole of parts", "a world" or "a cosmos" ("Individuality" is his central name for all this) in which it is implicated and from which it derives its meaning and significance and apart from which it is unintelligible. Thought, in its attempt to understand, exhibits an inherent nisus towards wholeness. The implication of a whole is visible in every sphere of our experience. "You cannot anywhere" says Bosanquet, "whether in life or in logic, find rest and salvation by withdrawing from the intercourse and implications of life; no more in the world of individual property and self-maintenance than in the world of international politics and economics; no more in the world of logical apprehension than in that of moral service and religious devotion. "

50. The affirmation of any one thing in the world, implies at the same time the affirmation of the entire world known to me; so that, as Bosanquet says, in affirming the reality of the room I am sitting in, I am also affirming the reality of the Antipodes, for "they are an element, necessary to educated thought, in the

same system with which I am in contact at this moment by sight, touch, and hearing, the system of reality.

51. That the experiential character of reality requires as its prime presupposition an experiencing consciousness is a truism which admits of no doubting or denial were it not for such an ultimate unwitting consciousness, all experience would be blind which is the same thing as saying that there would be no experience. So the most indubitable fact, the initial reality, is the ultimate Witness Consciousness which being there, every thing is. But for an abiding intelligent percipere, all experience would be dark. This ultimate perceiving consciousness is the inexpugnable postulate of experience.

52. The reality of this Consciousness is not merely a matter of inference or deduction from experience, or of a postulate demanded by experience; but a self-manifest and self-revealed (swaprakasha, swatahasidhha) verity of Direct experience. Herein is a great strength of Vedanta as a system of philosophy. What is taken as the first and foundational principle in Vedantism is not a problematical something, an inaccessible noumenon, but the deepest and most undeniable verity of our experience. Consciousness, which is the stay and foundation of all reality, has not to be established by theoretical reasoning, but is self-established. It is self-luminous and self-evidencing as well as it illumines all objects in the universe.

53. "Mind" says Arthur Stanley Eddington, "is the first and most direct thing in our experience; all else is remote inference."

54. What are the differentiae of "self" that distinguish it from everything that could be called the 'not-self'. The Vedantins go into

a searching analysis of experience to differentiate the 'self' from the entire region of the 'not-self' (Drg-drsya-viveka), and their analysis on this point, I venture to say, is the most remarkable achievement in the sphere of reflective enquiry. The theory of "self" is the central pivot round which turn all the sp special epistemological, psychological, cosmological and even ethical theories of Vedantism.

What then, is the self? Vedantism answers this question, not by what has been called the a priori method of logical deduction, but by an appeal to the patent experience of self-awareness. Herein is a clear parting of ways with the Kantian approach to the problem. To Kant, the self is merely a necessary logical postulate of experience, an Idea of Reason, a focus imaginarius, an object of moral faith, ánd not a determinate fact. Now, Vedantism fully fully conceding that the self is a principle to which none of the logical categories of thought are applicable, yet holds that we have a direct awareness of the self, though an awareness of a kind radically distinct from our awareness of objective facts.

To every loving being, who as such is the percipient of a known or experienced objective world, is indubitably given the fact-hood of his own self as a percipere distinguishable from the entire totality of known and comprehended things of the world. Such distinguishing awareness of the self is the patent experience not only of human beings, but as Vachaspati Misra says, of all livings including worms and moths, etc. That such inferior creatures as the worms and moths should have so much discrimination as Vachaspati credits them with, is, it appears to me, disputable. To distinguish the self as the pure subject, transcending everything objective

--even the mind and the body--is, I think, an achievement possible only for man who has the capacity for philosophical reflection. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, any sentient creature if it had the reflective capacity of man, would be aware of 'itself' as the principle of consciousness, transcending all that is objective, its own body and mind included so, over awareness of our "self" is a veridical awareness of it as an extra-objective, perceiving-something the denial of which would mean the cancellation of all experience itself. Consequently, the question: Is there a self? is as meaningless as it is superfluous. Sankara points out that the existence of the self cannot be refuted; for, that which refutes is itself the essence of the self. No one can doubt, says Vachaspati, "Do I exist?" or "Do I not?" Even Mr. Bradley, for whom the concept of the self "is too full of contradiction to be genuine fact" is constrained to concede that "the fact of one's own existence, in some sense, is quite beyond doubt...We are all sure that we exist, but in what sense and what character--as to that we are most of us in helpless uncertainty and in blind confusion." Philosophies which have attempted a theoretic denial of the self, like those, for example, of David Hume and William James in the West and those of the Baudhhas in the East, have really been speculating in abstraction from facts.

We have, therefore, a direct, intuitive, veridical self-awareness and in this living awareness we can get hold of the criteria of real self-hood which will enable us to distinguish philosophically the self from everything that is not-self. This is the clue which Vedantism has taken up in its approach to the problem of self.

Now, then, what are the criteria of the self? The self is, firstly, a percipere per sang. It is a perceiving, comprehending, witnessing, conscious principle, and never a perceived or comprehended content. All that can be characterized as a presented 'this (idamtaya) is for that reason only a not-self, an object, and not the self or the subject. The only consistent view of the self can be to take it as the ultimate subject which for the very reason of its subject-hood is incapable of being presented as an object. A second criterion of self-hood which follows as a necessary corollary from the first is its 'immutable and self-identical persistence.' The self qua percipere is and must be ever-the-same witness of all this rolling and changeful pageant of experience. Experience of change pre-supposes as its inexpugnable basis an experiencer which itself is not subject to change. This is the point where any out and out philosophy of change must come to a sure shipwreck.

Our deepest veridical self-awareness also, which persists identically through all the changes of body and mind in the successive stages of childhood, youth and old age, is expressible in some such form as "I am the same Ithat I ever was"; and there is a further ineradicable FAITH that "I shall be the same I for all time I exist." Immutable self-sameness and unobjectifiable subject-hood, are, then, the ultimate criteria of self.

Applying these criteria, we can easily see that the body or the mind, each of which is an ever-changing mass and a comprehended content, cannot be the real self. Of course, taking the body as the self is too crude a view to be acceptable to men who have even so much as begun to think philosophically, but viewing the self as a physical mass or entity is a snare which has

caught even the philosophers. The Indian view of construing the self as Atman or the pure foundational consciousness presents a conspicuous contrast to the views of many accredited thinkers in the West, who are all in some way or other, inclined to take the self as some central nucleus or part of the psychical stream. 53. Attempts have been made in the history of European thought to show that the psychical series at any moment is itself the self and is aware of itself as such. Hume, for example, resolves the 'I' into a bundle of conscious happenings and sees no reason to believe in the self as an enduring entity distinct from them. Little did Hume realize the difficulty of such a view! We cannot understand how there can be unity in experience or how the discrete and successive impressions and mental states could be linked together in the unity of the same man's experience, unless there were behind them a unifying subject. Similarly William James sought to explain the phenomenon of self-consciousness by making each passing thought the subject of experience. Each thought as it emerges in the mind gathers into itself the whole past experience and passes on or integrates into the next succeeding thought. Thus, says James, the thought is the thinker. James is evidently confusing the process with the subject of the process. The consciousness of the process as such, indispensably presupposes the existence of a subject which itself is not an item in the process but transcends and comprehends it. The subject of successive conscious states cannot itself be a link in the successive series. Further, it is not in the least intelligible how one thought can be the subject of another thought. Every attempt, therefore, to reduce the self to a momentary bundle of psychical contents,

must end in a disaster.

Prof. S. Alexander who occupies an eminent position amongst the realist philosophers of to-day, holds a view of the mind somewhat similar to that of William James. The mind according to him is "a continuum of mental acts." 54. The untenability of such a view must be clear from what we have said before. Alexander resolves the mind into a running stream of mental events, without accounting for how the awareness of this stream as such is possible without an underlying unifying consciousness.

Bradley also failed to make out the real nature of the self, because he was labouring all the while under the delusion that the self could only be conceived as some cross-section or part or central nucleus of the psychical stream, and failed to hit at the transcendental or GROUND-CONSCIOUSNESS. He very tellingly argues that the notions of the self as (i) the momentary psychical contents in the individual's mind or (ii) as "the constant average mass" of psychical contents or (iii) as an "inner core of feeling" resting on what is called coenesthesia or (iv) "some kind of monad or supposed simple being" or (v) as the "simply subjective" meaning thereby that residual portion of the psychical stream which may be thought to stand in the relation of the subject to the rest of it considered as the object. And lastly, Bradley also rejects the notion of the self as the subject--and here Bradley is in hopeless confusion and error, for he gives to the concept of subject a meaning which it never can have.

Bradley grossly misconstrues the nature of the subject in so far as he locates it within the orbit of psychical contents. This fatal mistake is palpably evident from his statement that "both subject and object and their relation" are

"inside a man's mind." If the subject could be comprehended as given inside a man's mind, it would be but the object, a psychical content. We should not say that the subject is inside the subject. The subject construed as the ultimate comprehending consciousness cannot be inside anything, everything being inside it or within its comprehension. The subject, as Bradley understands it, is only a concrete psychical content and the "Ego that pretends to be anything either before or beyond its concrete psychical filling, is a gross fiction and mere monster." It may be pointed out that a concrete psychical content presupposes the subject as the transcendental precondition of its apprehension and therefore the former cannot be equated with the latter. To bring down the subject to the level of a psychical content, is to assent that it is only a content, and not the subject of a content. The subject is ipso facto un-objectifiable, though in all the experience we have, it is necessarily correlated to an objective. To call an empirically observed psychical content the subject is a manifest contradiction. Bradley's empirical bias prevents him from recognizing a transcendental consciousness, without which no knowledge or observation could ever be possible.

55. Consider the case of a man who has followed different callings in different periods of his life and has in these different periods pursued widely differing ends and interests. Even such a man, in spite of the discontinuity and utter discreteness of his interests and ends, is aware of himself as the same man. The identity of the self, therefore, cannot be accounted for by the continuity of any interest or attitude or sentiment, but only by positing a deeper unity of consciousness which comprehends the different organizations of the

mind as so many moments of its experience. The self as the abiding subject of experience is distinguishable from the growing, developing structure of the psychic make-up of man. The latter by reason of its objectivity and mutability, does not possess the criteria of self-hood, which we have set up.

What, then, is the real self? It is not the body which is objective and ceaselessly changing, passing from one mode of existence to another, different in childhood, youth, and old age; nor is it the mind or any part or cross-section of the mental or psychical stream which is equally objective and changeful. But deeper down, it is the GROUND-CONSCIOUSNESS, THE ATMAN, the immutably persisting percipere of the entire changeful objective order including the body, the mind and the whole world of inorganic objects. In the psychical sphere, we cannot find the marks of genuine self-hood viz. unobjectifiable subjectivity and immutable self-sameness. A psychical phenomenon or any aggregation or organization of the psychical phenomena is always, as a matter of fact, a comprehended content, and as such, leaves behind the subject as the condition of its comprehensibility. A procession of discrete ideas, images and thoughts in the mind obtains a unity of experience simply because there is a transcendental bond of unifying consciousness which itself is not dragged into the procession. The self, then, in the last analysis, is the trans-objective, trans-psychical SUBJECT CONSCIOUSNESS. The Subject and the Objective, are, then, spheres so radically divergent from each other that we cannot speak, as Bradley does, of their mutual inter-changeability. If the subject were to degenerate from its subject-hood and become the object, we would have the manifest contradiction of an experience without the experiencer.

56. It is the CENTRE of reference of all objective reality from which at the same time it stands eternally self-distinguished. It is not in space, but it is the condition of comprehending all objects as spatially related; it is not in time, but it is the condition of there being an order in time. We cannot carry the concept of causation which is preperly applicable to the objective order to what is wholly beyond it. The modern realistic philosophers in the West who attempt to bring down the self or the subject to the status of other objects, are simply blind to the incontrovertible fact that there must of necessity be a foundational consciousness for which the entire cosmos of objective reality. The subject for which the entire cosmos of relations exist, cannot itself be determinable by those relations; in fact, it cannot be a 'relatum' at all, being that which renders all relations possible. Consequently, the subject-object relationship the relationship that obtains the subject and the objective, is the most generaic and unique relationship which is presupposed by and is the pre-condition of every other specific inter-objective relationship.

57. Construing the self, then, as the percipere or the ultimate subject of experience, we cannot equate it with anything short of the Basic Consciousness which is the prius of the entire objective universe and therefore has a position which is foundational in reality. The trans-objectivity of the subject also makes it indeterminable by any of the categories of thought, which necessarily have an objective reference. Thus, in Vedantism, the 'self' does not mean a finite something encased in or attached to the finite body, but the primal Being, the Infinite itself.

58. A distinction is usually made between the

self as the individual knower or finite centre of consciousness and the Absolute as the All-knower, the Eternal Mind or God. The All-knower doctrine figures very prominently in the philosophy of T.H.Green. Green construes the individual self as a finite centre of consciousness whose growing knowledge is a gradual "reproduction" in the human mind of the Eternal Mind or God. This distinction involves the assumption that the subject of our experience is not the ultimate and originative source of our knowledge, but merely a conduct or a passive receptacle of knowledge, whose real source is the Absolute behind it. The self, we may say on this view, does not itself know, but receives knowledge. Thus another entity at the back of the so-called finite knowing consciousness is posited to explain the possibility of knowledge.

Now, the knowing consciousness qud knowing, must needs exceed and transcend all that is known or capable of being known which is the same thing as saying that it transcends and comprehends all that is, and therefore, cannot but be the foundational principle in reality. The knowing consciousness, by virtue of its being the all-comprehending principle, cannot be equated with anything short of the First Principle. There is an obvious inconsistency in saying that the all-comprehending consciousness is not ultimate. To posit another entity in the form of the Absolute behind the knowing subject is to hypostatize an abstraction. There is and can be but one knowing intelligence behind the entire intelligible objective reality. The assumption of an All-knower distinct from and other than the knower, is unwarrantable and self-contradictary. The knowing subject is the Absolute, if that be our term to designate the fundamental principle in reality.

The oneness of the knowing intelligence also rules out the notion of a plurality of selves.

Construing the self as consciousness, the question whether there is a plurality of selves resolves itself into a further question as to whether consciousness is divisible into a multiplicity of consciousness? And the answer obviously is in the negative. We cannot conceive of a division or limitation of consciousness, all division and limitation being within consciousness. Consciousness is ipso facto one and infinite. It is important to remember that consciousness of finitude is not finitude of consciousness. It is this confusion that we fall into when we construe the conscious subject as a finite centre. It is forgotten that it is precisely because of its infinity or illimitability that consciousness can apprehend anything as finite or limited.

59. If the self is nothing but the Universal Consciousness, how am I to explain what in my everyday existence I refer to as my "individual" personality or as myself? The answer of Vedanta is that this individual personality is but an appearance, being the result of a false appropriation of or identity with the objective on the part of consciousness. This is what Samkara calls adhyasa. If we look closely into the phenomena of self-awareness as we experience it, two facts become palpably evident. One, that I am directly aware of myself as the conscious percipere of the entire objective reality around me from which I stand consciously self-distinguished; and secondly, that I am aware of myself as an unchangingly self-same entity which, as pointed out before, is expressible in the formula "I am the same I that I ever was." Conscious self-distinction from all objects and unchanging identity are the two directly veridical characteristics of self as found in our patent experience of self-awareness, and therefore, these should be the criteria for determining philosophically what the self ultimately must be. Now, applying these

criteria to what is usually understood as the individual personality, it becomes clear that it is only a section of the objective, and not the subject that stands in conscious self-distinction to it. What is usually known as the individual personality is the psycho-physical organism of man constituted by his body and his pscho-physical organism of man constituted by his body and his psyche comprising his permanent dispositions, emotional interests and his purposive attitudes towards the various elements of his surrounding; in a word, all that go to make up the identity of his character. Such a psycho-physical system, changing continually and characterised by objectivity, cannot pass for the self in the real sense. But the body-mind complex which a man calls 'himself' has meaning for his ordinary experience and in social life is the basis of differentiating one individual from another. A distinction, therefore, between the apparent and the real self becomes significant; and though in our ordinary experience we are aware only of the former we can arise to a reflective awareness of the latter. To transform this reflective understanding into what may be called in the phrase of Kant a "perceptive understanding" is the object of all spiritual endeavour.

It is this taking the apparent as the real, the objective as the subject, something as other than what it is (atasmintabuddhih), which Sankara designates adhyasa. It consists in translocating the properties of one entity to another radically opposed in nature to it. Bondage in Vedanta means just this distemper, this association of the Real with the Apparent; and emancipation is the riddance therefrom, the realization by the subject of its transcendental freedom. So Vedantism denies any cleavage

between the Self and the Absolute.
60. We are not here concerned with specific details about the objective (that is a consideration for science), but for purposes of metaphysical construction, with what is implied in the notion of objectivity as such. And one thing is evident at the very outset that the objective as such has no self-subsistent existence, but is there for consciousness. The comprehending consciousness is logically prior to the comprehended objective. Consciousness being there, the objective is; and this is a relation which from the very nature of the case is irreversible. So, the very first thing that is evident about the objective is that it has a dependent existence, and has no being in its own right. As it is, it exists in relation to something else, viz. consciousness which is the ratio cognoscendi of its existence.

Secondly, consciousness alone is the abiding and unsublatable reality, while the objective is not only changeful in waking experience but exhibits wholly changed characters in the other conscious states of dreaming and dreamless sleep. The consideration of the difference avasthas or states of experience has a profound significance for the Vedantic metaphysics. We should first make it clear to our minds that the most generic feature of reality (meaning by reality all that exists) is that reality is subject-objective. Next, we have to understand ---and this is a principle of paramount importance--that the correlation of the subject and the objective obtains not only in the waking experience but also in the dream and deep sleep states. The Vedanta stands alone amongst all the philosophical systems of the world in reckoning the dream and the deep sleep states as full-fledged states of conscious experience

on a co-ordinate footing with the waking state. Those systems of philosophy which are confined to a consideration of the waking experience alone assume covertly that the dream and deep sleep states are lapses into unconsciousness or semi-consciousness and are as such subjective states; while the waking alone is the fully conscious state of experience wedded to a permanent objective. This assumption must be critically examined if the Vedantic view-point is to be properly appreciated.

First, as to the alleged unconsciousness or semi-consciousness of the sleep states. What, we may ask, is implied in a state of experience being unconscious? But, is there not a ring of absurdity in the very raising of such a question? Is not a state of experience eo ipso conscious experience? An unconscious experience is a pure myth. Is deep dreamless sleep a lapse into unconsciousness? Certainly not. If it were so, no recollection of it would ever be possible. The man, waking from a deep sleep, recollects it and says, "What a happy and blissful sleep I had!" There can be no recollection of a void.

What is true of dreamless deep sleep state is also true mutatis mutandis of the dreaming state. So, consciousness never lapses or never passes into 'unconsciousness.' The notion of semi-conscious state of experience is an equally ill-conceived one. Consciousness as such is never less nor more nor half nor three-fourths. Dream and deep sleep-states, are then, full-fledged states of positive conscious experience, and the correlativity of consciousness and the objective which obtains in the waking experience is euqlly present in them. Consciousness is always there and the objective also is there as the content of consciousness. But the nature of the objective is not

the same in all the states of conscious experience. A consideration of the conditions that make the difference throws a rich flood of light on the status of the objective. The Mandukya Upanishad gives us an admirable analysis of the operative conditions underlying the different states of conscious experience. I give below a brief sketch of that analysis.

In the waking state, the objective for us is the gross physical world of common experience which the Mandukya metaphorically calls the seven-limbed. (The heavens as its forehead, the sun as its eye, the air as its breath, matter and water its belly and the sky and the earch as its feet). In this state, the experience of the objective is conditioned by the functioning of the psyche and the sensorial apparatus; hence it is spoken of as nineteen-mouthed, the nineteen mouths or channels of receptivity being the five organs of sense-perception, the five organs of motor activity, the five vital forces and the psyche with its four-fold functioning as Manas, Buddhi, Ahamkara and Chitta. Experiencing through the instrumentality of these, we have in the waking state, the objective as a "world" of gross physical objects. The dream also is like the waking and we again have the objective as a world of differentiated physical objects, but of a subtler nature.

In the dreamless sleep state, the psyche and the sensorial apparatus completely suspend their functioning, and the bbjective is there not as a differentiated world but as an undifferentiated continuum--a seamless totum objectivum. This state of experience is described as one where we apprehend by consciousness itself unmediated by the mind and the senses.

One important fact of far-reaching consequence is brought out by the deep sleep state of experience; and, it is this, that the manifoldness or differentiation which obtains in the waking and the dream states is entirely contigent and conditional upon our apprehending the objective through the psycho-sensorial mechanism. That ceasing to function, there is no manifoldness. The differentiated world, in its ultimate nature, is purely phenomenal. The perception of the spatial, temporal, and causal relations are all contigent upon he functioning of the psycho-sensorial mechanism. Our 'time-sense' itself becomes different in the dream and the waking states. Events that would require a considerably long time in the waking world would be done in an inconceivably short time in dreams.

The phenomenality of the world obtaining in three states cannot entitle it to be called "absolutely real" which should only be sought for in a noumenal state of experience. Vedanta admits of a Fourth (Thuriya) state of noumenal experience where the objective is entirely sublated and consciousness is left as the sole Real. This is the ne plus ultra state of experience where reality is appraised in its ultimate truth, primal homogeneity and undivided wholeness. The world or the objective, then, according to the Vedantic standpoint is phenomenally real and transcendentally ideal.

It should be remembered in this connection that when the world is pronounced 'ideal' in Vedantism, it means nothing like what is known in European thought as mentalism or subjective idealism or solipsism. Subjective idealism equates the world of outer reality with the procession of momentary psychical states in the individual mind, thus nullifying the distinction between the act or process of knowledge and the 'objects' of knowledge

existing independently of the knowing process. The entire objective order is identified with the pulse of discursive thinking. This is emphatically not the Vedantic position. Vedantism fully retains, for our waking experience, the distinction between the passing course of ideas in our minds and the world of outer reality. It is only in the higher wakefulness that the objective world is sublated. The subjective idealism of European thought corresponds to the Vijnanavada of the Bouddhas, of which, as is well known, Sankara was a relentless critic. Epistemological realism has not been ruled out in Vedantic thought.

What Vedantism insists upon is the fact of the "dependent-being" of the world order. It is in its conception of 'real being' that Vedanta parts company with naive realism. The world has no being in itself or apart from its transcendental ground which is Brahman. Being of a real nature is grasped and realized by me in my own immediate and veridical experience of "I am". It is only in the experience of my self as the subject that I become aware of being at first hand, being which is indubitable (asamdigdham) and immutable or which is and never becomes. Objectivity and becomingness to together; true being is the sphere of the Subject alone. The non-becoming-ness of the Subject places it beyond all doubt.: the becomingness of the world makes it subject to doubt. It is possible to raise the question: "Does the world really exist or not?" But the question "Do I exist or do I not?" is ruled out ab initio by the immediate certainty of "I am". Objectivity does not carry with it immediate certainty of being. How could we make objectivity the guarantee of reality, for, are not our dreams and even our ordinary illusions and hallucinations objectively realized? The

Vedantic argument on the question of "being" may thus be summarized: What is objective is becoming; what becomes, negates itself; what negates itself can have no 'real' being. Vedantism, therefore, does not accord the same kind of reality or being (Satta) to the objective order as to the Supreme Consciousness or Brahman. Brahman has unconditioned and non-negatable reality or paramarthic Satta; the objective order has conditioned and negatable reality or vyavaharika satta. The concepts that are applicable to the objective and the negatable can never be applicable to the non-negatable Being-Consciousness. To seek to apply the concepts that have reference to the order of 'becoming' to the order of 'being' would be what Kant called a "transcendental illusion." Consequently it is impossible to express in any synthetic logical formula or proposition the relation between Being and Becoming, Brahman and jagat. All the categories of our thinking such as 'causation' 'creation', 'transformation' etc. have reference only to the objective order and cannot legitimately be used in reference to Brahman. To say that "Brahman is the cause of the world" or that "Brahman creates the world" or that "the world is a transformation of Brahman" is to forget the utter incompatibility between the spheres of Being and Becoming, the Subject and the objective, the non-negatable and the negatable. A philosophy that seeks logically to harmonize or synthesize Brahman and jagat, is from the Vedantic point of view only a pseudo-philosophy. That the world is, in some way, an expression of Brahman may be conceded; but to specify the nature of this expression in terms of categories that have reference to the world alone would be illegitimate. To be more correct, we should say, the world is an inscrutable (anirvachaniya) expression of

Brahman. By the inscrutable power of Brahman (Maya) we see this prodigious paradox in experience--the union of Being and Becoming, the Subject and the objective, the non-negatable and the negatable.

The objective order has not the same kind of indubitable and self-subsistent being which the Self or Brahman has; they are not samasattaka. If "absolute being" be the criterion of our judgment, we cannot say the world has being. It is an objective fact of experience; but 'objective facthood' and 'being' are not convertible terms.

The objective facthood (vyavaharika Satta) of the world is distinguished in Vedanta, on the one hand, from the unsublatable and primal fact-hood (parmarthika satta) of Brahman; and on the other, from the more ephemeral grades of objectivity characterizing the merely illusory (pratibhasika) and the dream contents (Swapnika). Sankara's distinction of pratibhasika satta or the category of the "merely illusory" from the vyavaharika satta or the standing objectivity of the world of our waking experience, is a clear vindication of the fact that he did not mean to place both on the same level. The world is not an illusion or hallucination in the ordinary sense. This is what the adverse critics of Sankara with their half-digested understanding of Vedanta have never clearly realized. When the world is said to be 'unreal' in Vedanta, it is always said so in a relative sense, that is, judged by the criterion of Absolute Reality. Vedanta refuses to ascribe as much reality to the world as to the Absolute. The world is less real than the Absolute, but not on that account on a par with illusions and hallucinations. The greatest injustice that has been done to Acharya Sri Sankara is that he

has been called an illusionist.
61. Nothing on earth satisfies us because we are dislodged from our real nature. There is a divine discontent in us because we are not of the earth alone.
62. The Vedanta conceives the End not as the acquisition in the literal sense of something extraneous, but simply the removal of the ignorance about it. An extraneous something which is merely acquired would stand every danger of being lost again, and Emancipation would be a thing of perpetual insecurity.
63. But why should I love and serve others? Because, says Vedanta, we are all in reality one, though seemingly or through ignorance we appear to be different.

<u>VEDANTA KESARI:</u> "Answer to Criticisms of 'Is our Life a Dream'".(See page 6) by Mr.C.Mahadeviah.

1. At the very outset I have made it clear that there is, and must be, some difference between waking and dream; for otherwise the two words would unnecessary to denote them. I have further explained the difference by stating that waking is a present state and hence unstultifiable, whereas dream is a past state already stultified. This difference does not, however, guarantee any 'reality' to waking. For on further examination both the states are found to possess the common characteristic of transiency as contrasted with the witness which is permanent (See Sankara's commentary on Brahma Sutras 2,1,9.).
2. Visishtavaitins may say that dream is as real as waking. But this is clearly contrary to universal experience; and as Shankara says, "Even if a hundred Shrutis were to say that fire is cold and dark, they cannot be considered to be authoritative" (Commentary on the Gita

18,66.) Also it must be pointed out that Longfellow is not a Vishishtadvaitin in this sense. For he emphatically protests against calling life which is "real" an "empty dream". The implication is clear, viz. that dream is unreal.
3. I have pointed out that there is in dream, as in waking, a complete universe. Is this not enough to show that the seer sees a second object in both?
4. It is a mistake to identify Thuriya and Samadhi. Samadhi, whatever else it may be, is a state which is experienced, whereas Thuriya is the Atman itself, the experiencer, the witness and the substratum of all states. Whatever may be the differences between Sushupti and Samadhi, they are one in that the mind is quelled in both. Hence for purposes of Vedantic enquiry they stand on a par with each other. In Sushupti, Samadhi, etc. is a common phrase in Shankara's writings.
5. The critic has missed the important point that the dream body is independent of the waking body even as the dream world is independent of the waking world. Even as one sees objects outside his (dream) body in dream.
6. In speaking of reality as 'speculated upon' the critic has missed the essential characteristics of the three-states method of enquiry which distinguishes it from all speculative methods. The reality which is grasped by a rigorous enquiry into our experience of the three states, is a reality which is intimately experienced. It is our own self which is revealed as the ever-present witness on which, as substratum or Adhistana, the states of waking, dream, and sleep, appear and disappear one after another. It is exactly what the critic calls 'primeval ignorance' that prevents men from grasping this reality which is their own Self, although they are constantly experiencing the three states. And let the critic note that it is only for "us who are dogged by

this primeval ignorance" that this understanding is necessary, and not for men who are free from its sway.

7. The idea seems to be that the "full reality" cannot be conceived by the mind which can indulge only in "mere logomachy." It must, here, be pointed out that mere experience of a state where the mind is quelled but consciousness is still aglow, is not enough to produce the knowledge of the Self as the witness and substratum of the appearance of worlds. This knowledge can arise only as the result of an enquiry into the nature of the different states. It is clear that such an enquiry is possible only when the mind is working. But when once such knowledge arises as the result of such enquiries, it (knowledge) is realised to be of the nature of intimate experience and not of external speculation and logomachy. If one should still call this a knowledge of "fractional reality" he shall have to show how he got the idea of "full reality" for without an idea of a 'full' no idea of a 'fraction' can arise.

8. No one need be anxious that 'we have to hold fast to the view that life is not a dream but is real.' For that is the view of the common man to which he sticks like a leech. As for positing Isvara and serving him, let those who can take such things on trust do it. But, if we believe that such a position is not ultimately true and that truth is something different from it, it is our duty to exhort men to leave their false positions and rise to Truth, the attainment of which is alone the supreme end and aim of life.

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ANNIE BESANT.

THE PATH OF DISCIPLESHIP.

1. Karma yoga was taught to the people--yoga or union, by action. That is the form of yoga which is fitted for the men of the world, beset with life's activities; it is by these very activities, by the training afforded by them, that the first steps towards union must be taken.

2. Can humanity in its unevolved and in its imperfect state accomplish perfection of Yoga? Nay, it is not even wise that man should try; for if the child be put to the work of the full-grown man, he will not only fail to accomplish it, but he will overstrain his powers in the attempt, and the result will be not only failure in the present, but also failure in the future. For the task too great for his powers will thwart and distort them. They must be trained to strength before they can accomplish, and the child must grow to manhood before manhood's work should be his.

3. Thus in a well-regulated nation there would be always teachers to instruct, able to guide and advise unselfishly and without a selfish object; thus nothing would be gained by him for himself, but everything would be gained by him for the people.

4. For in the midst of this world of struggle, in the midst of this world of anger and strife, in the midst of this world where men are seeking to gratify the spirit of self instead of the common good, they have to be taught that justice must be done, that if the strong man abuses his strength the just ruler will restrain that unfair exercise of strength, that the weaker shall not be trampled upon, that the weaker shall not be oppressed.

5. Therefore the household life was ordained;

for men were not fit far the hard road of celibacy, save here and there a few. Brahmacharya was not for all. By household life were men taught to control and moderate their sexual passions, not by crushing them out--which is for the mass of men impossible, and if attempted with unwise energy often results in a reaction that throws the unwise person into the worst profigacy of life--not by a single effort which tries to kill and to uproot in a moment, but by gradual training in moderation, and by practising the self-denial of the home, where the lower nature should be slowly trained to temperance and be accustomed to be controlled by the higher, trained out of its over-activity and made utterly subordinate to the One. There is where this Karma Yoga comes in. The householder has gradually to learn self-control, moderation--i.e. making the lower nature yield to the higher, training it day by day until it is absolutely subject to the will.

6. We read of these Initiations in the past; we know them to exist in the present. All history bears testimony to their reality. There are temples in India beneath which are the places of the ancient Initiations, places which now are unknown to the people, places which now are hidden from the eyes of men, but which none the less are there, which none the less are accessible to those who prove themselves worthy to attain them. And not in India alone are such places to be found. Ancient Egypt had also her crypts of Initiation, and mighty pyramids in one or two cases stand over the ancient places, that now are hidden from the eyes of men. The later Initiations that took place in Egypt, those of of which you may read in the history of

of Greece and the history of Egypt itself, those of which you may have heard that one or another of the great philosophers was there initiated-- those took place in the outer buildings known to the people, which covered the real Temples of Initiation. Into these entrace was not gained by outer knowledge but under conditions that have existed from the furthest antiquity and that exist to-day as really as they existed then.

7. That is what he means by the "I", for the most part. Certainly those who have studied carefully know that such an "I" is illusory; but while they know it as an intellectual proposition, they do not realise it as a practical matter in life. They may admit it as philosophers, they do not live it as men in the world.

8. Thoughts come unbidden, and spring up as it were without choice of his own; when he begins to study the workings of the mind he finds thoughts come rushing into it without his asking them to come; he finds himself possessed of ideas which he would wish very different. All kinds of fancies come into his mind which he wants to expel; he finds himself helpless, he cannot get rid of them. He finds himself compelled to grind on at thoughts that dominate the mind, and which are by no means at his bidding nor under his authority. And he begins to observe these thoughts; he begins to ask: Whence come they? How do they work? How may they be controlled? and he gradually learns that many thoughts that come to his mind have their origin in the minds of other men.

9. Modern science in many of its experiments has learned that thought may be sent from brain to brain without the spoken word or without the written message, and there there is something in thought which is palpable, which is observable, which is like a vibration that sets other things

vibrating, although no word be formulated, no articulate speech be uttered. Science has discovered that in silence thought may be sent from man to man, that without any outer communication.

10. Out of the Invisible which is the One from which all proceeds, appears as it were a faint cloud becoming visible, a faint mist condensing, which separates itself from the invisible vapour around it, and gradually condenses more and more till it becomes the individual drop, that we recognise as a unit; out of that which is All comes the separated and distinct; one indeed in its nature with the All, the same in its essence but separated by its conditions,and so individualised out of the whole.

11. In your daily life as you have it, in the busy life of men, you are to begin to train this restless mind of yours and make it subject to your will. Try for a moment to think steadily. You will find your thoughts fly away. What shall you do? Bring them back again to the point on which you desire to fix them. Choose a subject and then think definitely and consecutively upon it.

12. In order that you may fight against this modern tendency of scattering thought, you should make it a daily habit to think consecutively and to concentrate your attention for some time on one subject; make it a serious practice in the training of your mind to read every day some part of a book that deals with the graver matters of life, with the eternal rather than with the transitory; fix the mind upon it while you are reading;do not allow it to wander, do not allow it to scatter.

13. You will never leave the inner sanctuary, however much the outer life is busy in the world of men.

14. He knows that whatever men may do to him they are only the unconscious agents of the Law. He knows that whatever comes to him in life is of his own creating in the past. And so his attitude is the attitude of absence of resentment. He realises justice, therefore he cannot be angry with anything, for nothing can touch him which he has not deserved; nothing can come in his way which he has not put there in his former lives.

15. The first great Initiation makes the man what is called by Shri Shankaracharya the Parivrajaka--what is called by the Buddha the Srotapatti. The Buddhist word, generally given in its Pali form, means "he who has entered the stream" which separates him from this world. He no longer belongs to this world, though he may live in it; he has here no place, nothing can hold him. Exactly the same idea is conveyed by the word Parivrajaka, a man who wanders about, that is, who has no settled home; not necessarily wandering about in the body, not necessarily in the exoteric sense--but the man who in his inner life is separated from the world, who has in this transitory world no fixed place of abode, to whom in this transitory world one place is not different from any other. He can go here, there and anywhere, where his Master may send him. No place has power to hold him, no place has power to bind him; he has shaken off the fetters of place. And so he is called "the wanderer." I know of course, as you know, that this stage is taken in quite an exoteric sense to-day; but I am taking it in the inner sense, in the meaning of the Great Ones who gave it. We know, alas! how much things have changed from the older days; how that which was then a reality in life has now become a matter of words and of outer appearance.

16. He has to get rid of doubt in a very definite way--he is to get rid of doubt by knowledge.
17. Superstition means this, in the technical sense (in which I am, of course, now using the word): it means the reliance on external, sectarial rites and ceremonies for spiritual help. But you are familiar with this idea in your everyday life. The Sannyasi is supposed to be a man who has risen about these things, and from whom they are no longer demanded. And why not? Because he is supposed to have touched Reality, because he is supposed ~~to~~ no longer to have any need of these things which are the rungs of the ladder by which men must climb; they are necessary in the earlier stages--do not forget that fact--this is a case of growth.
18. They are trying to make up for the loss of these divine Kings by having a many-headed King that is called the People: instead of the divine Kingship of mighty Initiates they have what is called self-government and the methods of democracy--as though by multiplying ignorance by a sufficiently big multiplier, you might be able to multiply it into knowledge.

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THE VEDANTA KESARI: VOL.XXII (1935-'36).

1. Editor: Science whichihas hitherto supposed to be the stronghold of materialism is to-day declining to accept the overtures of that philosophy. The billiard-ball conception of matter, as something characterised by inertia or resistance and diffused in space in the form of irreducible particles, has now been abandoned by science. It has declared its incapacity to say what that familiar object of experience is. Matter has been dematerialsed, and all the commonsense notion of it as a hard or soft something 'spread out there,'

is demonstrated as having no foundation in fact. Eminent scientists have begun to doubt whether mind after all is not the back-ground of matter too.

2. While all manifestations of consciousness in a person are only vague matters of inference to others, they form the most immediate and unquestionable facts of experience to the person concerned. A person experiences his tooth-ache in a way quite different from the dentist's knowledge of it. This important difference suggests that consciousness is not a mere property of the body.

3. Swami Devatmananda: The New Deal in the Kingdom of God. Our modern days are witnessing an acute state of new deals in everything. The time-forces are mercilessly pulverising all old things giving birth to new ones. The most important change has been in the field of human outlook on life. It is not that a rebellious spirit is smashing all doctrines and ideas into pieces, but in response to the need of changed circumstances a new spirit has been born which wants a higher, greater and dynamic understanding.

4. The popular mind has always been fed with superstitious stories. Truly, the masses can be taught only through parables, in figurative terms. But sooner or letter they are reduced to superstitions devoid of their essential part.

5. The questioning mind completely throws it overborad: it will rather go without any God or Heaven than submit to a superstition that is outworn and which is much more dreaded than loved. Secondly, time-forces demand a new deal in the Kingdom of God that will work, that will revitalise life in the broadest and most universal sense of the term.

The human mind can think only in terms of relation. It is much more so with the mass mind.

As regards the conception of God or Heaven, the first stage of our understanding is dualism. It is the most popular form with all religions of all countries. In this stage the imagination finds an abundant scope for exercise, which furnishes the occasion for differences of views. In this dualistic stage God is always conceived of as an extra-cosmic Being separate and distinct from Nature and the individual souls, and controlling the destinies of all. How often people look up in search of God who is supposed to be far away beyond the clouds, and eagerly wait to see some kind of sign in the skies as a proof of His Existence! It is a deep psychological fact, however, that the idea of separateness born of the conception of duality, gives birth to fear, which always colours the religious attitude of the votary towards his God. Under such circumstances religion becomes a matter of fear, and the long-drawn process of religious life develops into a means of escape from punishment and attainment of heavenly rewards. Such a life of groanings may be anything else, but it can never be considered as the kingdom of Heaven which is supposed to bring unto man peace and happiness, a reign of beatific felicity on earth.
6. To-day, however, in the inscrutable melting-pot of time all the tribal, sectarian and even national Gods are fast disappearing, and in spire of the feverish efforts on the part of the votaries to retian their Gods, they are merging themselves into one Supreme Godhead.
7. The popular belief is that Everlasting Life is post-mortem. They seem to think that eternity is dissociated from time; so, they look forward for the Eternal Life after their death. The Kingdom of God, however, is right here, on earth, nay, it is within us.
8 Surendranath Mitra: I recognise perception

and reason as the only two valid means of proof, all other means of proof, in so far as they are valid, being included in these two. I also hold that the evidence of perception can be relied upon as true, only so long as it does not contradict that of reason. Otherwise, it must be considered as an illusion, however universal or persistent it may be; as, for example in the case of the appearance of the oval shape of the rising or of the setting sun, or in the case of the appearance of the smallness in size of the earthshine in comparison with the illuminated phase ofthe moon.

9. In the traditional discussions of religious philosophies in our country the evidence of the greatness of a personality by virtue of his mystic experiences of long-standing reputation was hardly ever regarded as of any validity at all. As a typical example, Shankara's refutation of such an appeal to the evidence of personalities of the great ancient sages, like Kapila, is noteworthy in this connection (c.f. The Bhashya of Shankara on the Vedanta Sutras).

10. Advaitism, however, asserts that existence alone exhausts the whole of Reality. Reality is nothing but existence. Except the relation of identity, there is no other kind of relation, however intimate, within Reality.

11. Let us take the judgment, "The book exists". The judgment clearly means that there is a relation between two terms of thought, one of which is the attribute, existence, and the other the thing, book, in which existence inheres. Now, if the analysis be complete, as every genuine analysis should be, then these two terms must be mutually exclusive (in thought, of course). Hence the thing, book, must necessarily be thought of as different from the attribute, existence. And, a thing different from existence

can be nothing but non-existence, or unreal. This argument, applied to every judgment, perceptual or conceptual, involving the category of existence--such as, "I exist" "this man exists", "gold exists" "matter exists", "sweetness exists" "spirit exists", "soul exists", "God exists" etc--will inevitably lead us to one single reality, viz. existence. Nor can we say that reality consists of more existences than one. For, this will be tantamount to saying that one existence is different from another; and that which differentiates one existence from another is bound to be different from existence, i.e. non-existent. Thus, reality cannot be necessarily conceived of as consisting but the single principle of existence, devoid of any diversity or difference within the whole. The metaphysical position of Advaitism is just this.

12. Analysing the judgment implied in each term of the relation-- "Sweetness exists" or "the thing, sugar exists"--we get only one reality, viz. existence; for the other term of the relation, being, in each case different from existence, reduces to something non-existent, i.e. to nothing. Proceeding in this way, the whole world of relations, i.e. of all our percepts or thoughts, ultimately reduces to one single principle, existence, without a second. As there is nothing else besides existence--not even time or space--there can be nothing to limit it; and hence, it is bound to be infinite, too. As existence must necessarily exist by virtue of its own essence as existence, it cannot depend on anything else; that is, existence must also be absolute. "Existence", "Infinite" and "Absolute" are thus synonymous.

Now, in our experience, we never know this existence as it exists absolutely. We know, and can know, existence only phenomenally; and,

then, existence is nowhere found to have a separate and independent existence, but enters into an intimate relation with various things as an attribute. An attribute can have no separate existence outside our mind. It can have a separate existence only in our mind, when abstracted out of its concrete setting, and is, therefore, dependent for its existence on the mind, in which it again implies some other concept or concepts, too, however less we may attend to these. But existence cannot be thought of, without contradiction, as depending for its being on something else, i.e., on non-existence. Hence, to avoid contradiction, existence, in the true sense of the word, i.e. as Absolute Reality, must necessarily be different from existence as an attribute, consisting of "the last abstraction of thought."

13. Maya or illusion must be extremely unique, since it is incomprehensible how that which is nothing can pesent that which really is everything as to altered in its nature. All the examples--such as a mirage, or a rope appearing as a snake--that may be used to explain this Maya, are to be understood as metaphors and should not be carried too far. All these metaphors are taken from the world of phenomena, and hence, none of them would apply in every respect to the Absolute which transcends the world. The illusion of a mirage, e.g. is possible, because the refracted rays of the sun which produce the virtual image do exist, as well as the objects (too remote to be visible), from which the rays are proceeding to meet the eyes. The mistaking of a rope for a snake, too, implies an experience of some snake or snakes which had or have an actual experience. Thus, none of the metaphors can carry us beyond duality, if their appropriate significance is missed. The relevance of such metaphors

consists only in their suggestiveness--in the suggestiveness, viz. that the Absolute Existence alone real and everything else is really non est, in spite of the contrary evidence of perception. According to the evidence of perception alone, the earth is at rest to all of us, whether we are astronomers or laymen. But neither the astronomers, nor the laymen who trust the validity of the science of Astronomy, can ever believe in the stationariness of the earth, just because the evidence of perception is contradicted by that of valid reasoning. Similarly, the evidence of perception should, in all cases, be subjected to the test of valid reason carried to its ultimate conclusion, in order to arrive at the truth.

14. The vital and fundamental proposition of Advaitism, however, is the assertion that Reality is non-dual and also identical with the very self of existence. It is this proposition, to lead to which all its arguments are devised only provisionally, that will always remain most invulnerably and unalterably true; for it is concluded from an ontological argument about the very essence of existence itself by applying the most fundamental of logical axioms.

15. Swami Thyagisananda:Time must exist before precedence can be thought of. We also see by actual observation that everything that we see is born in time, continues to exist in time, and in its own time dies away. It takes time for the seed to sprout. We cannot also know anything without being conscious of the time of its existence. Time therefore may at first sight seem to afford an explanation, but on further scrutiny, what do we find? Time is but a part of the framework of thought itself and without thought it cannot exist. Thought itself is a part of the universe whose explanation we

seek. Therefore time as an explanation of the universe will amount to reducing the former into an explanation of itself. It would be the same thing as to say that the cause of time is time itself, which is no explanation. Again time, though it appears to be eternal, always changes from the past through the present to the future, and it would seem to consist of innumerable moments which come into existence and die away just as any other object we can conceive of. It will again be seen on self-analysis that the cognising self always precedes with cognition of time. So time cannot be considered as the first cause which brought the universe into existence.

16. The universe is not a chaos but a cosmos. Everything seems to be related to everything else, and the whole seems to be well arranged , co-ordinated and organised into a system, each being subject to a particular kind of behaviour. Law is nothing but an intellectual formulation of this uniformity of behaviour of objects under particular circumstances. This uniformity may be supposed to be due to some controlling force from outside which must necessarily exist beforehand. It is on this supposition that law is brought in as a plausible cause. But really law being only an expression of the behaviour of objects, it cannot exist apart from the universe and independent of the cognising mind.

17. Along with time and space, causation forms a framework of thought itself. To deny it will therefore be tantamount to denial of thought. Intellectually therefore it is impossible to conceive of anything as due to chance.

18. The cognising intelligence must be present in every thought, although the objective world may or may not be cognised. In the act of introspection the cognising subject does not feel or

know the existence of anything external to itself. It converts itself, as it were, into an object for the purpose of observing itself. The cognising subject is also present in sleep when the whole of the objective universe seems to have vanished. This perceiving intelligence therefore has better claims to be considered as the cause of the universe. But on closer scrutiny we find the perceiving subject as much part of the universe as the perceived object, as both cannot exist apart from each other. We thus see the necessity for the self itself to take the form of an object of observation in introspection. As part of the universe this perceiving subject also, like the perceived object, vanishes in deep sleep and Samadhi, and only pure consciousness remains. Thus intelligence cannot be the first cause.

Next, as regards the self, The self must remain in Samadhi as well as in deep sleep, although even intelligence vanishes. The consciousness of having enjoyed sound sleep, and of the non-awareness of the existence of world at the time of deep sleep bear evidence to this fact. The self must have existed in deep sleep, as could not otherwise be conscious of these after awakening. We could not also be sure otherwise whether the awakened self is the same as the one that had gone to sleep. This individual self which must thus be presumed to exist in all the three states of Jagrath.

19. Editor: While India has fairly manintained this spiritual tradition, whe has miserably failed in another equally important aspect of life. That is the improvement and enrichment of the life of the average man--a work in which the West has specialised and wonderfully succeeded. The whole structure of life in the West is arranged in such a way as to improve the common

man's standard of living. There, in America, not to speak of the ordinary labourer, even the unemployed who subsist on dole, take better food than a rich man in India does. Public conscience in the West cannot bear the sight of poverty and destitution. If people come to know of cases of misery and starvation in their neighbourhood, they voluntarily go to help them and relieve their sufferings.

"But what is the condition of the masses in India? It is simply deplorable. And who so? It is because our knowledge of Vedanta is only on our lips and very little in practice. Not only are we indifferent to the welfare of the masses, but we have also created certain social conventions which stand against the interests of the average man in society. Above all we are woefully backward in the knowledge and application of the modern methods of production of wealth. This grinding poverty prevents us even from growing to our full spiritual stature. For "Thyaga" or renunciation can come only after a certain amount of "Bhoga" or enjoyment of the good things of life.

20.RAMENDRA SUNDAR TRIVEDI "The Five Bhutas--What are they?" There is no conflict between science and philosophy, but the methods and the points of view are different. Both try to analyse the world and find out its constituent elements. But the scientist does not alayse the world in the same way and with the same means as the philosopher does. One we may call 'psychological' analysis, and the other 'chemical' analysis. If we ask a scientist to analyse an object he will pound it, power it, heat it, burn it, dissolve it, and see what it contains and what it does not. But a psychologist will not at all proceed along that line. In analysing an object a psychologist will simply ascertain

its form, taste, smell, touch, and sound--i.e. those qualities which make objects perceptible to our senses. It is not that the scientist does not concern himself with the form, taste, smell, touch, and sound of the objects he has to analyse. But he looks upon them as mere aids to his analysis,--as the means for the determination of the elements of the substance. On the other hand, the psychologist takes them to be the very elements (Bhutas) which constitute sense-objects.

Who is right? The scientist or the psychologist? Both are correct; but their method is different, process is different, and language is different. There is no real conflict between them and consequently no need for any compromise or reconciliation. Both are analysts. One analises sugar, and says that it contains so much carbon, so much hydrogen, and so much oxygen. The other analyses the same object and says its form is white and crystalline, its taste is sweet, its touch is neither very hard nor very soft, and so on. The method of the one is called psychology, the method of the other is called material science. The scientist works with his hand and apparatus--he calls fire, water the test-tube, the microscope, the chemical balance, etc., to his aid;--he proudly mentions the exact quantities of carbon and hydrogen in a given quantity of sugar. The psychologist has no such external instruments; his only apparatus is his own mind or intelligence;--he is unable to make any quantitative analysis of form, taste, touch, etc. But he does not mean that his method of analysis is wrong even though it does not yield any quantitative results.

What we call matter (e.g. gold silver, glass, coal, the sun the moon, the human body etc), is in this view merely a combination of form, taste, smell etc.

21. To the philosopher the objects of the physical world are nothing but the combination of form, taste, etc. Nothing remains of those objects if we exclude their form, taste, etc. There are some who say that even if we eliminate form, taste, etc., from objects--something is even then left over--which is the real matter of physics. That "real matter" may not be the object of our senses; but we cannot deny its existence. To them the philosopher will reply that he is not in the least concerned with such 'real' physical matter which can never come within the realm of his perception, and about which he can never know anything.

22. When the philosopher analyses the same object, he says that to him its form is like this, its taste is like this, its smell is like this, its sound is life this, its touch is like this. The object is merely a combination of particular varieties of form, taste, etc. I know only the form, taste, etc., and admit them alone.

To pacify those critics who regard Indian philosophical doctrines as nothing but the fabrications of opium-eaters or ganja-smokers, I would mention here that, just like the philosophers of our country, the English philosophers also admit nothing but the five sense-percepts on an analysis of material objects. All the philosophers from Berkely and Hume down to Bain and Mill are agreed on this point. To them who regard all philosophers, whether eastern or western, as disguised opium-eaters, I would say that even the bona fide European scientists do not quarrel with the philosophers on this point. As soon as they lay down the test-tube and try to comprehend the essence of physical matter, with the mind's eye, they find nothing but form, taste, smell, sound, and touch. There is no need to produce a long list of scientists who hold this view. It will be enough to mention the names of Huxley and Clifford from

the worlds of zoology and mathematics, and the name of James Clerk Maxwell from the world of physics.

23. The five Bhutas are not material objects They are mere concepts not percepts. They are products of the imagination, and have no objective reality. Both the scientists and the philosophers have to deal with such concepts; because without their help it is possible neither to describe nor to explain the material world. One may think that the Physicist, who studies only the objective world, has nothing to do with these mental concepts. But it is not so; he cannot move a step without these 'concepts'. He is always talking of the 'perfect solid','perfect fluid' 'frictionless surface', 'perfectly rigid', 'inextensible string' etc--i.e. of things which are conspicuous by their absence in the material world.

24. The material world is simply the combination ofform, taste, smell, touch, and sound. There is nothing else in it than these five Tanmatras. Even if there be something else, that 'something' cannot be the object of our knowledge. What cannot be the object of knowledge is as good as non-existent.

25. One may ask--"What is the use after all of the philosopher's abstractions?" The truthds discovered by the scientist are easily intelligible and of practical utility. The wonderful mansion of chemistry built up by Lovoisier and his successors fills one with awe and respect. Its solid foundation inspires a sense of security. How many useful things man is making with the help of chemistry! He is making sweets for the glutton, wine for the drunkard;--and what wonderful colours he is extracting out of black coal tar! He is easily finding out the elements in the sun and the distant stars. But what is the of the philosopher's abstractions? What will he do by ploughing the sands? Whom will he

invite to dwell in the castles built by him in the air?

26 @@. Paul Robeson writing on this subject in the WORLD says: "No matter in what part of the world you find him, the Negro has retained his direct emotional response to outside stimuli; he is constantly aware of an external power that guides his destiny. The white man has made a fetish of intellect and worships the God of thought; the Negro feels rather than thinks, experiences emotions directly rather than interpret them by round-about and devious abstractions, and apprehends the outside world by means of intuitive perceptions instead of through a carefully built-up system of logical analysis. No doubt that the Negro is an intensely religious creature, and that his artistic and cultural capacities find expression in the florification of some deity in song."

The writer seems to draw a distinction between intellectualism and emotionalism, the white man specialising in the former and the Negro in the latter. The Negro's emotional predilection to the exclusion of intellectualism is perhaps responsible for his being a down-trodden creature in the history of humanity.

27 "Dishonourable men should always be kept at a distance." - Santi Parva.

28.Editor: The doctrine of Karma is only meant for the satisfaction of the individuals when they see that no visible action of theirs is responsible for their particular fate in life or when they find that matters go beyond their control in spite of their best efforts to prevent it. It is also its purpose to invest men with a sense of moral responsibility for their actions, to warn them that as they sow, so they reap. Man, however, makes an illegi-

timate use of the doctrine when he speculates about other people's Karma and seeks justification for his callousness to other people's suffering on the ground that they have merited it due to their Karma.

29. Swami Prabhavananda: What in Western psychology is included in the one word MIND is, in Hindu psychology, divided into the mind, which received the impressions from the senses, the intelligence, which distinguishes between these impressions, and the ego, which experiences the consciousness of them.

30. The fourth centre of consciousness is in the region of the heart. When the mind rises to this centre, spiritual awakening comes. The Yogi sees a divine light within the heart and is wonderstruck by its beauty and glory. His mind no longer runs after worldly pleasures.

31. In the West one finds this "indigestion of Vedanta" in another form. They say, "I am divine. Hence I have every right to health, happiness, and prosperity." They want to demonstrate the principle of divinity by getting the evanescent things of life. And instead of realising the Self which is beyond all relativity, they become bound to the relative experiences of life. Instead of rising above the ego, they become egoists by their repeated self-assertions. Instead of finding the spirit, they become matter bound. Indeed, it is difficult to get rid of the ego.

32. P.T.Raju Sastry. What should be the nature of religion, then, that would meet the demands of the present day? It must dispense with the personal God, who interferes with everyday affairs, and dictates in conventional matters. Thus we shall not only be not obliged to write a theodicy, but also shall not give an oppor-

tunity to those that seek self-aggrandisement by taking His Name. The supernatural dread that by disobeying His so-called we invite his wrath upon us will be known to be a fiction, by the spell of which we have been so long blinded to truth. That man is the maker of his own destiny will be realised to be truer than it was when God was taken to be the disposer of every thing. That the forms of moral and political institutions have only a relative worth, and have been set up by man in his attempt to obtain the highest value of his existence will be brought home to us more convincingly than ever.

33. Neither matter nor space-time is the truth of what we see. The world as we see it is the manifestation of spirit that extends far away beyond the present world.

34. It is not necessary for individuals to wait hoping for universal salvation, because the spirit is his who knows it at any time. Its eternal presence precludes the miserable prospect of utter annihilation and unrealised value, which the evolutionists hold before us.

Now remains the question of the continuation of one conscious identity and the conservation of value realised here. The continuation of our identity can be assured only if the beyond is in some way identical with our self. And the conservation of value can be secured if there is something in the beyond that is identical with the value realised here. And the value must be something which is capable of being carried over. If this value is a material good, it cannot be so carried. So what is of value must be a state of man's self which as having realised that value must be more valuable than it was when it did not realise it. It must, again, guarantee the realisation of value unrealised in this world in spite of man's efforts. Such a beyond can be

no other than the Universal Self of which the Upanishads speak. Its eternal presence vouchsafes the individual perfection and salvation at any time without the necessity of waiting for the future consummation of human existence. Only, one has to try and know the way to perfection. It can be experienced here as well there, because it is continuous and identical with our selves.

35. As expounded in times far remote from ours, it overemphasised renunciation in its crudest sense, as if it forgot that the world is the manifestation of the spirit, and that it is in and through this world that the spirit has to be realised.

36. Swami Vivekananda. I fully believe that there are periodic ferments of religion in human society, and that such a period is now sweeping over the educated world.

37. On planes physical, ethical, and spiritual, an ever-broadening generalisation, leading up to a concept of Unity Eternal--is in the air; and this being so, all the movements of the time may be taken to represent, knowingly or unknowingly, the noblest philosophy of unity that man ever had--the Advaita Vedanta.

38. In India, dualistic formulae are already on the wane, the Advaitists alone hold the field in force. In America, many movements are struggling for the mastery. All these represent Advaita thought more or less, and that series which is spreading most rapidly approaches nearer to it than any of the others.

39. Advaita will be the future religion of thinking humanity. No doubt of that. And of all the sects, they alone shall gain the day, that are able to show highest character in their lives.

40. @@ The Italian renaissance was transformed

into the Reformation as soon as it reached the Teutonic world.

41. D.M. Datta: It is scarcely realised that when we ask an apparently simple question like "What is the colour of milk?" there are so many other things presupposed and understood without which no reply would be possible. A simple question conceals many other questions and an apparently simple reply would be true only subject to so many different conditions which are tacitly understood from the universe of discourse. To answer the above question one should understand from what point of view it has been asked. The colour of milk would appear to be of one shade during sunlight, of another during moonlight, it would be appear to be yellow to the jaundiced and something else to the unjaundiced, it would appear to be something to a man with coloured spectacles, something else to others. In a word, distance, medium, nature of the organs, quantity of the milk consistency of the milk, composition of it and many other facts, too many to mention, will determine the nature of the reply to an apparently simple but really vague question like "What is the colour of milk?" Similarly the reply to the question, "What is the ~~REXDNRXN~~ shape of a pice?" will depend upon the angle of vision from which it is observed. It may appear round, eliptical, etc., from different points of view. To say, then, that there must be only one truth i.e. true proposition regarding any matter is to ignore these logical difficulties.. Almost every simple question turns out to be vague and indeterminate and calls for further and further qualification and determination, before any definite reply can be given.

42. In whatever sense the word truth is taken the dictum, "Truth is one" cannot affect the

possibility of different views about the same truth or reality. If we take into consideration, the divergent physical and mental compositions of men, their different traditions, cultures, education, etc., it is only natural to expect that they will come to look at spiritual problems from different angles of vision. Differences, would therefore, exist very naturally among their views.

43. Ernest P. Horrwitz. Vedanta is vast as the boundless ocean, and immeasurable as the infinite skies. Vivekananda dreaded organisation. Limited societies, religious sects, admirably suit the lower middle classes which never experience personal salvation, yet fondly imagine that they alone possess the faith.

44. Vivekananda was indifferent to Christian Science, but approved of Mrs. Eddy's statement that "our Master lost no time in organisation; if his disciples founded a Church, they erred." Suchlike words occur in the first edition of "Science and Health" but were carefully erased and deleted from all successive reprints. Vivekananda reluctantly lent his name to the new Vedanta Society which he regarded as a form of faith, reflecting rather than embodying life and truth... Lest the statement should be misunderstood, we have to remark that what the Swami warned against is the tendency of the organisation to swallow the individual and his freedom. It is good to be born in a church but not to die in it--this was one of his favourite sayings. He recognised, however, that organisation is absolutely necessary to achieve anything in this world. Refer to his letter. - "Organisation has its faults, no doubt, but without that nothing can be done." It was in this conviction that he founded the organisation that bears his Master's name. To help an indivi-

dual and not to crush or enslave him is the object of a truly spiritual organisation.

44. Swami Ramakrishnananda. Sometimes a man would come from a distant place with his heart panting for God, but seeing the room full of people he would shrink back and hide himself in a dim corner. Without a word Ramakrishna would walk to him and touch him and in a moment he was illumined. "By that touch, Ramakrishna really swallowed ninety-nine percent of the man's Karma. Taking other's Karma was the reason he had his last long illness. He used to tell us: "The people whose Karma I have taken think that they are attaining salvation through their own strength. They do not understand that it is because I have taken I have taken their Karma on to me."

45. N. Kasturi. That the heart of the Buddha and the intellect of Sankara form the highest peaks of human possibility was the conviction of the Swamiji. The Buddha said, "As the mother protects her only son at the sacrifice of her life, let the monk cultivate an infinitely kind mind towards all beings. Standing, walking, sitting or lying down, so far as he is awake, let him abide in this mental mood.

46. Editor. For Sankara reality is in essence subject-objectless, and the polarity of subject and object can at best be described only as an appearance which is negated on the dawn of illumination. What obstructs the cognition of the subject-objectless nature of Reality is ignorance (Avidya), a form of metaphysical error which is at the root of our illusory perception of duality. Error can be overcome only by its opposite, right knowledge, which consists in the recognition of the identity of the individual self with the Universal self. This is purely a matter of cognition or Gnana, and work has no direct function in it. The trend of this know-

ledge is to obliterate the distinction between the triad of the knower, knowledge and the object known or between the actor, action and the object acted upon. On the other hand all action done either with desire or without desire, emphasises these distinctions. Hence according to Shankara there is an inherent oppostion between action and the discipline of knowledge which reveals the changeless and subject-objectless nature of Reality. At one stage of his development, the spiritual aspirant is therefore required to give up all action and engage himself exclusively in hearing of, thinking about and meditating on the unity of the individual self with the universal self. Without this, nescience is never overcome. Action, however, plays no direct part in overcoming nescience. At bst it endows the mind with the necessary purity required for the successful practice of the discipline of knowledge. Once this purity is gained action is to be renounced, especially seeing that there is an opposition between it and the higher stages of spiritual development. According to Sankara therefore the varicus stages of spiritual awakening consist in: (1) the purification of mind by disinterested action, (2) the first dawn of knowledge, (3) the renunciation of all actions, and (4) the state of being established in Brahman.

47. In the case of such perfectly illumined sages, it is improper to say they must act or must not act. It can only be said that they may or may not act guided by their Prarabdha; but such work is mere mechanical action, and being devoid of the sense of ego and agency, it is not to be called action at all. Such is the main trend of Sankara's interpretation of the Gita.

48. Tilak has no quarrel with the fourth Ash-

rama, if it means wearing the ochre robe, leading a celebate life, or living outside towns. He admits that such a mode of life is often more favourable for practising the ethical ideal of service to society which the Gita upholds. His antagonism is really towards that outlook on life which says that man, whether it be in the state of a Sadhaka (aspirant) or in that of a Siddha (perfected one), should sit quiet, giving up worldly activities of every kind, including unselfish service of society. He does not, however, deny that the Gita admits the existence of even such a mode of spiritual life. In the Upanishads this ideal of actionlessness looms large while that of Energims or disinterested action, which is also recognised as an independent path, is given a less important position. The Gita, however, reverses the position, and while admitting the existence of the path of worklessness, concentrates its attention mainly on the ethics of Energism.

49. It is Gnanam or knowledge alone that gives illumination; but Karma or action is in no way incompatible with it. The real incompatibility is between Gnana and works done with desire, not between Gnana and desireless action. Not only does the Gita find no opposition between knowledge and desireless action, but on the other hand looks upon the harmonious combination of both, as the better and the more desirable of these two independent paths--that of Actionlessness and that of Energism.

50. Arjuna's doubt in the beginning is whether the life of Actionlessness or of Energism is preferable, and after hearing the whole discourse and getting himself disillusioned, he declares triumphantly--I shall do according to your words. And it is in recognition of its

specialization in the doctrine of Energism that the Gita styles itself as Yoga-Sastra, the word Yoga signifying according to the Gita, 'equanimity' and 'skill in action.'

51. The discipline prescribed for this realisation is described as the 'Neti', 'Neti' method, which consists in denying all manifestations as illusory or non-existent until the consciousness reaches a subject-objectless state which though indescribable is yet blissful.

52. Sankara's interpretation is one of the most brilliant, and has been one of the most influential too in Indian philosophic thought. The purpose of his commentaries has been to assert uncompromisingly the supremacy of the Attributeless Absolute, granting at the same time the theistic implications of the Saguna passages. This he has achieved by the clever device of admitting a God and Universe as long as the state of ignorance persists, but which, being only an illusion and a super-imposition on the Absolute, disappear on the dawn of knowledge. Devotion to God and service of the world are good as far as they go, i.e. help the purification of the mind, but after that they are of no use and have to be discarded as illusions, since the process of Gnana lays the axe at the root of even these conceptions.

53. This capacity of the wise man to be aloof even while acting is interpreted by Tilak as the absence of opposition between Karma and Gnana. But on the premises of the Mayavada School of Advaita, such action can only be mechanical, springing as it does, from the momentum of past deeds.

54. If we look upon the world-views and codes of conduct presented by scriptures not as so many infallible dogmas but as theological and ethical constructions suited to the needs of aspirants treading different types of spiritual discipline.

55.K.S. Ghosh. History perhaps will never completely disclose how far the ancient mystery-cults in the Egyptian and Greek soils and their cognate speculations were influenced by the visions of the Upanishadic Rishis.
56 The doctrine of the Koshas or sheaths in the Upanishads is to all students of Vedanta well-known, Some Indian commentators of the Vedanta rightly interpret the doctrine in the language of modern science. The Annamaya, the Pranamaya, and the Anandamaya Koshas may be said to represent the different layers of self and, for the matter of that, of Reality. The Vedantic method of realisation of Truth is one of progressive transcendence. When we leave behind the Annamaya Kosha, we reach the Manomaya Kosha, on leaving this behind, we come in touch with the Pranamaya Kosha, and so on. Interpreted in the language of modern science, it may be said that when the Reality is conceived as material, it is studied by the physical group of sciences. But this is the lowest vision that we can have of Reality which next reveals itself as Life; it is then treated of by the biological group of sciences. At the next higher level Reality appears as mind; it is then the turn of the psychological group of sciences to study it. But when we rise higher up still in the scale of vision, the universe appears to us as the field for the realisation of Vignana or self-consciousness or Spirit. It is then the turn of the metaphysical group of sciences to come to grip with it. Here the tether of science comes to an end. Reality from this point. Reality from this point seems to be beyond the sounding line of the sciences and philosophy. In order to reach the Anandamaya Kosha, ie. the heart of Reality, we are required to leave behind us sciences and philosophy and take to the method of spiritual realisation.

56. Swami Avyaktananda. Science has knit together all races of mankind. Railway, steamship, aeroplane, radio, etc. have become the mediums for rapid interchange of ideas, manners and customs. It is amazing to find how universal standards, as regards morality, customs and manners are in a process of growth. No nation is now able to live in a water-tight compartment. The logic of history is compelling every nation to come out and compare notes with other nations. We are painfully conscious that modern political and economic nationalism is not allowing this universalising process to reach its culmination. But modern politico-economic problems, especially the economic depression, show that no national problem can be handled, far less solved, if only the case of a particular nation is taken into consideration. Public finance, credit system, and export-import trade of one country have become inseparably connected with those of other countries. This economic internationalism has a direct bearing upon the political life of every nation. Politics and economics are now intertwined. If the economic self-determination of one country is now impossible without the due consideration of that of another country, how can the political self-determination of one country be possible without the due consideration of that of another country?

57. K.S.Ramaswami Sastry: Modern thought has been aiming at seeing Truth as it is, free from intrusive and obtrusive humanisation and divinisation. It is bold, iconoclastic, naturalistic, even agnostic. When Bacon vindicated induction and the Renaissance substituted the classical literature for Christian theology, a new spirit entered the West. Erdmann said well, "Modern philosophy is Protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit." Philosophy has in modern times refused to be the handmaid of theology.

58. It does not seek to fly away from life but yearns to be a vital factor in general culture and to influence life.
59. The West is yet to know that science is not the entirety of truth and that physical nature is not the entirety of being.
60. Editor: The old Roman historians ignored Jesus entirely; he left no impress on the historical records of his time.
61. He is not free from that mentality of which Spengler accuses Western historians in general--the obsession that human history is the same as European history.
62. Teachings- Quoted from Buddha:
"There is no ascent to or descent from that place. It has no origin, no motion and no rest. That abode does not rest on or hand from anything. But all miseries end there."
"When the mind is ridden by any hankering, it becomes restless. The mind rid of desires and wrong visions never loses its balance. Freedom from fickleness makes the mind collected and calm. Stillness eliminates the roots of lust and attachment, desirelessness burns the seeks of Samsar, or transmigration. "
"All woe and wailing, all sorrow and suffering, of this world spring from fondness of men and things. Those who have no objects of attachment are really happy and peaceful. Undiluted and ineffable peace and blessedness belong to them who do not fall in love with anything of this transitory world."
"The wise associate with the sinners but never contact their sins. As the swan drinks the milk and leaves the water, so the wise always learn the good qualities of others and safeguard themselves against the contagion of evils and impurities."
2"Not even Brahma or any other immortal, not to speak of mortals, can know the man whose mind does not rest in the phenomenon, and breaking the

chain of bondage has scaled the steep wall of Avidya."

PRABUDDHA BHARATA. Vol.XL.

1. Frederic A. Wilmot. Even religion is a form of insanity. Very few persons realize that they are insane. It is the colour through which they contemplate the world. It seems to me that one of the greatest advancements of this age is the study of psychology. We are beginning to understand the human mind, its complexes, its fixed ideas. Religion is one of the most stubborn of the fixed ideas. When you want to know something about the normal mind you study the abnormal. In almost all asylums one finds that in progressive insanity about the last thing to go is the religious concept. This is natural too, because religion forms the psychological basis of our thought. The sub-structure of our subconscious mind is composed of our attitude towards the universe in which we live. Religion is infinitely more than a rational or intellectual matter. It is often a subliminal and involuntary basis of life--in some of its elements it seems to be positively an innate instinct toward a form of thought. It is a group or a race attitude. The last thing ~~is~~ to quit us in life.

2. Buddha was supposed to have been born of a virgin much the same as Christ. In fact it was a common custom in the ancient world of trying to explain a man of unusual spiritual insight. When his spiritual genius could not be explained by the usual means, it was customary to ascribe to him supernatural birth.

3. Editor: The author cavils at Aurobindo's distinction between reason and intuition, his depreciation of the former and extolling of the latter; and pertinently asks, "If they (i.e. the Rishis of the Upanishads) compare their experiences and

reject one and accept the other, by what means are the rejection and acceptance effected?" Similarly pronounced is his criticism of what he thinks to be Aurobindo's pan-psychism. The author also finds it "difficult" to follow the drift of Aurobindo when he insists on the whole-sale uplift of the human race." He says, "The ideal Aurobindo adumbrates is in a sense ethe-real and abstract."

4. What is the attitude of the modern man to-wards God? Mr. Walter Lippmann voices the view of the educated layman of today: "I do not mean that modern men have ceased to believe in God. I do mean that they no longer believe in Him simply and literally. I mean that they have defined and refined their ideas of Him until they can no longer honestly say that He exists, as they would say that their neighbour exists." The modern man seeks to establish God from the results of science.

5. Abinash Chandra Bose: The most ordinary man of mental compensation is the dream, the uncons-cious realisation of unfulfilled desires. A man wishes to visit America and cannot; but how often does his mind take him there through dreams! We meet in our dreams those whom world-ly circumstances make it difficult to meet on the plane of reality--even those whom death has removed from the world. Dream is a miracle-maker. The dream evolves into the semi-cons-cious day-dream.

6. Brij Lal Sharma. The problem of reality or unreality of the world depends upon what we mean by the world. Is it a system of ideas construc-ted by reason, or is it the world out there which is the object of sense perception? In other words, our world is either subjective or ob-jective.

7. When therefore, modern science tells us that

the ultimate reality is electrical energy, the implication being that the wealth of qualities which we perceive in the world, i.e. shapes, colours, smells, tastes, sounds and touches, is unreal; when Russell holds up neutral particulars as the foundation of the universe, when Eddington comes out with his mind-stuff and Jeans with his mental relations, when Alexander declares space-time as the truth and Bergson discovers in duration his absolute, we must reserve our judgment.

8. We thus come to the second alternative. If interpretation is false that which is interpreted cannot be so. The given is given and is an object of perception. By the world then we understand a reality which comes to us through the avenues of senses and provides a theatre for our activities. Is this world real?

9. Reality whose nature is thought brings us back to the first alternative which we discarded above. It is as true to say that the concept of the world is false though the world is real as that the world is false though its concept is real. The unreality of the world, therefore, cannot be judged simply by reference to a set of ideas with which it happens to be discrepant.

10. What we perceive is a simple thing, but the manner in which it is perceived is so complicated, both physically and psychologically, that it is by no means easy to judge how far what we perceive is an object of sense. True, it is sometimes maintained that what is given is merely a succession or co-existence of sensations or sense-data, but what do we mean when we make such a statement? Does this sensation or sense-datum possess a character or not? Unless it does, we can know neither succession nor co-existence, for these two relations demand terms, which must be distinct and differ-

ent; if it does, our sensation or sense-datum has slipped through our hands, for only thought characterizes things. The controversy between Empiricists and Rationalists in Western philosophy arose out of this contradictory nature of sense-experience. Each party attempted to seize the fundamental thing in perception, and each party failed. Those who maintained that the knowledge could be acquired in the absence of categories, like substance and attribute, time, space and cause, which mind seemed to be already furnished with by its own nature, while those who insisted on the reality of a priori ideas be provoked without a specific instance apprehended through a sense-organ? That it is hard to define the meaning of the world will now be evident. We cannot take an object of sense for pure thought or sensation, for not only they are not discoverable in experience, but even if they were they would fall under the first alternative which we have rejected above. The only course left to us is to take the world as a product of subject and object, thought and things. Is this product real?

The 'world' is a complex of facts and fancies, it is, as Sankara says, an object of Adhyasa. Neither the subject nor the object in it is clearly outlined, yet they are not altogether confounded with each other, for they can to some degree be distinguished. If we distinguish them they are divided, if we identify them they are confused. In Brahmavidya, which is an intuitive apprehension, this division and discrepancy are transcended.

ll. The real difficulty is how far the "world" is unreal? Can we distinguish the true and false elements in existence? Sankara emphatically replies that we can. The reality we perceive, urge the Buddhists and modern science,

is a universal flux in which things take shape and dissolve again in an endless process. An object is not a solid enduring stuff, but a type or a direction of movement. All things come and pass away. This is a great truth, though a partial one. The Vedanta and the Bhagavad Gita, both emphasise the unbroken continuity of creation and dissolution of the world process. What they do not emphasise, however, is that the entire reality, immediate and ultimate, immanent and transcendent, is nothing but change. In our 'world' change is a fact among facts. There is something in it which does not change, namely Sat or existence. Even change to be known, must exist. It is beside the point to argue, as the opponents of the philosophy of change do, that if there is change there must be something which changes, for that is reasoning in a circle. There is no difference between a something that changes and change. Indeed to contend that there must be something that changes is to imply that this something cannot change, since if this something itself is a change what is the good of positing it? Whatever be the nature of the "world" that nature, to be true, must exist. The "world" is thus grounded in existence, which is Brahman. It shares being with the Absolute.

We said above that the "world" is a mixture of subject and object. Have we grasped the implications of what this means? If the "world" is a complex of soul and Nature, then we have in it, not only the wealth and movement of what we see, hear, touch and so on, but also the whole colour and quality of the percipient's psychic nature, his thought, actions and feelings, his ideals and achievements. However far we may carry our analysis of the "world" whether in the direction of

subject or object, the perceived or the perceiver, we discover that the two factors, the knower and the known, are inextricably intertwined. Thus all our thoughts, actions and feelings are about some object and are inconceivable without it. In the same manner the object, as we found above, does not stand by itself, but is grounded in consciousness, for nothing can exist in independence of knowledge. If this is the case, what is the real element in our life? Jnanam, Anandam, Anantam, Brahma. Brahman is knowledge, joy and freedom.

12. Sheo Narayana Lal Shrivastaya. The way to 'Freedom' or 'Blessedness' lies according to Spinoza in the control of emotions by reason. Reason expresses the deepest nature of man; to live freely is to live rationally; it is slavery to live in submission to passions. By virtue of reason, man is the highest in the order of creation and is nearest to God, for in thinking man realizes ~~im~~ himself in God, whose essential nature in Spinoza's view is thought or intelligence.

Intelligence is the main characteristic of man, distinguishing him from all other creations of Nature; and the highest ethical end of man, according to Spinoza, is realized, when his intelligence or Understanding attains its fullest defelopment, that is, when man becomes conscious of himself and of all things in union with God. To live in union with God, the soul must free itself from the thraldom of passions and attain perfect equipoise.

What gives the soul spiritual equipose and rest in Freedom or Blessedness is, according to Spinoza, the improvement of the Understanding. The Understanding must gain an insight into the eternal nature.

13. Why does Spinoza insist on the culture of the understanding as a means for the control

of our bodily passions? The answer of Spinoza is that the mind can control the body, for all our bodily modifications have invariably mental modifications as their correlates, and a change in the latter is bound to affect the former.

14. The cardinal process which Spinoza suggests for improving the Understanding is that all our mental modifications, our ideas, feelings and emotions, should be dissociated from external objects as their causes.

15. Another principle which Spinoza lays stress upon is that in order to bring a disturbing emotion under control, we must have adequate knowledge of it. Knowledge is power; the full comprehension of a thing places in our hands the means to control it. To quote Spinoza himself: "An emotion which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof."

16. "We must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces; and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, etc., will be destroyed, but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive."

It is due only to our clogged vision, our imperfect knowledge, that we are under the thraldom of morbid emotions.

17. C.C.Chatterji: (The Concept OM) The first letter indicates the first stage of wide wakefulness of the senses, when the mind is absorbed in sensuous enjoyment of objects of sight, touch

taste, smell and sound. The second letter stands for the next stage of a dream-like condition of the mind. It is not a lower, but a higher condition than the first one; for in it the outward-directed senses are turned inward, and the mind finds its joy in the objects of an inner world and in the ideas and desires aroused by sense-perceptions in the waking stage. The third plane, represented by the third letter, is that of deep sleep where the sense-organs cease to function and desires lose their existence. There the consciousness of the mind is neither objective nor subjective.

18. Editor. The Eternal Existence-knowledge-bliss appears to be involved in its own ignorance and not that It is actually involved in ignorance. We say appears to be involved because what veils It is ignorance which is not a reality. Vedanta says that this ignorance or Avidya is Anivachaniya, unspeakable. We can neither say it is a reality or that it is not a reality. It is something indescribable. This ignorance or Maya is identical with Brahman. When the Supreme Being is thought of as inactive He is styled God the Absolute and when He is thought of as active--creating, sustaining and destroying--He is styled Sakti. It is Maya Sakti that is responsible for the creation of this diversity where there is only One.

19. Buddha and, in fact, all great prophets tried their best to win over extremists to the golden mean. But have they succeeded? It is easier for man to go from one extreme to another than to follow the middle course.

20. R. Das. Since I cannot take myself to be unreal, and none but Brahman is real, I must therefore be in essence identical with the Absolute.

21. Common sense has no misgiving about the reality of the things given in our normal experience.

22. Logic deals with the object, and it is powerless to demonstrate that the object is not, and so logic cannot lead us beyond the object, unless at least the unobjective truth is pointed out by some non-logical means.

23. There appears to be a conflict between Vedanta and common sense, because the same predicate (real) is used by them in their respective denial and affirmation. But the conflict disappears as soon as we realize that the predicate has different meanings in different contexts. When Vedanta says that the things of the world are not real, it merely denies of the things the sort of reality that belongs to the Absolute. And when common sense says that the things are of the world are real, it affirms only the sort of reality that can be given in sense-experience and is needed for the practical purposes of life. Common sense does not and should not, assert that the things of the world have a super-sensible reality, over and above their sensible appearance. When it says that a chair is real, all that it legitimately means is that we can see and touch it, and can sit upon it. Common sense does not know of any other reality. And when Vedanta says that the chair is not real, it can never mean that we do not see the chair or that the chair cannot be used for any of our practical purposes. If it were to say so, all our experience would directly give the lie to it. In fact Vedanta, properly speaking, has nothing to say in the matter of empirical knowledge. And if still it says that an empirical object is not real, its assertion is based on a non-empirical notion of reality which is not satisfied by any empirical object. When common sense, or science, which is common sense made systematic, asserts anything to be real, it merely asserts some actual or possible fact which can be veri-

fied in perceptual experience. Thus the reality of a chair, which we see, is, for common sense nothing but the fact-hood of our present perception and the possibility of some other definite experiences which can be verified. Common sense has only an empirical notion of reality and this is satisfied by all empirical objects. On the other hand, when Vedanta denies the reality of the chair, it does not contemplate to deny the actual or possible facts which the common-sense ascription of reality to the chair assumes.

24. It says no doubt that the world is illusory, but the illusoriness of the world does not consist for a beginner at least, in its utter non-being, which would be offensive to common sense, but in its spiritual insignificance, which even common sense may well understand.

25. Most of our difficulties in understanding Vedanta spring from the fact that we are not properly qualified for it, and are apt to misunderstand many of its statements. When we are intensely interested in the things of the world, we cannot be expected to realize their essential hollowness.

26. Teja Singh: This transformation comes not only through close association with the Guru, which is found in many other religions, but through the belief that the Sikh incorporates the Guru. He fills himself with the Guru, and then feels himself linked up with an inexhaustible source of power. A single Sikh, a mere believer is only one; but the equation changes when he takes Guru Gobind Singh into his embrace. He becomes equal to "one lakh and a quarter", in the Sikh parlance. This change occurs not only in his physical fitness, but also in his mental and spiritual outlook. His nature is so reinforced in every way that, although hundreds may fall round him, he will resist to the last and

give way. Wherever he stands, he will stand as "a garrison of the Lord of Hosts," a host in himself--a host of one lakh and a quarter. He will keep the Guru's flag always flying. Whenever tempted, he will ask himself, "Can I lower the flag of Guru Gobind Singh? Can I desert it? I, as Budh Singh or Kahan Singh, can fall; but can Guru Gobind Singh in me fall? No, Never." This feeling of incorporation with the Guru makes the Sikh strong beyond his ordinary powers, and in times of emergency comes to his rescue.

27. The Sikh idea of religion, as we have seen, was something more practical than merely mystic. The idea of service is that it should be not only liberal, but also efficient and economical; that is, it should do the greatest good with the least possible means. It should not be wasteful. We do not set up a sledge-hammer to crack a nut, or send a whole army to collect revenue. We have to be economical in our efforts, however charitable they may be. For this purpose we have to organize our means. In every work of practical nature, in which more than one person is engaged, it is necessary to resort to organisation. As religion too--especially a religion like Sikhism, whose aim is to serve mankind--belongs to the same category, it requires organisation of its followers as an essential condition of its success. It may not be necessary in the case of an individualistic religion, wherein the highest aim is to vacate the mind of all desires, or to dream away the whole life in jungles or mountains; but where religion consists in realizing God mainly thro' service done within the world, where men have constantly to deal with men to promote each other's good, it is impossible to do without organisation.

28. M.S.Srinivasa Sarma Dr. Bridgman examined 104 girls who were committed to the Illinois

Reformatory and found 97% of them to be feeble-minded. This huge figure gives us some idea of the prevalence of feeblemindedness among prostitutes.

29. Mr. K. Natarajan, the enlightened editor of the Bombay Indian Social Reformer who was the Secretary of an official commission that investigated into the Bombay brothels a few years back is of the opinion that more than 80% of the prostitutes are feebleminded. Studies in the psychological conditions of these girls reveal the fact that they have recourse to this low type of life as a means of livelihood because of their low mentality. The report of the Massachusetts commission for investigation says that of 300 prostitutes 154 or 51% were feeble-minded and the 135 women designated as normal were of distinctly inferior intelligence.

30. The Royal College of Physicians defines the feeble-minded person as one "incapable from mental defect existing from birth of competing on equal terms with his normal fellows or of managing himself and is affairs with ordinary prudence." The mentally defectives are grouped under three heads: idiots, inbeciles and morons or feebleminded. The American Psychological Association has settled that the idiots have the mental age of 2, the imbeciles from 3 to 7, and the feeble minded from 7 to 12; thus the last are the least defective. By reason of such defectiveness, appear to be permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary schools.

31. Feeblemindedness is a native trait and a matter of heredity. The individual differences among human beings are nothing but differences in intelligence.

32. It is true that education is a panacea for most ills; but we must at the same time recog-

nize its inherent limitations. It is wrong to think that education is a levelling process. As McDougall points out, it is more a differentiating process. "The more opportunities for education are multiplied and freely offered to all, the more surely will the better endowed increase the intervals between themselves and their less gifted fellows." After all there is great truth in the Christian dictum that to him that hath much more will be added. He who is given much by heredity in the shape of intelligence and special aptitudes certainly profits tremendously by education, and acquires an infinite stock of abilities. It is sometime believed that all men could be made equal to the best if only the educational process could be sufficiently improved. This enthusiastic wish, however laudable, is blind to the fact that the success of the educational process is entirely due to the kind of mind which receives the instruction and the sort of ability that reacts on it and integrates it into a coherent system of knowledge. The educator is no creator, nor could he obliterate the native differences and inborn defects by any magic wand.

33. Dr. McDougall exhorts the young men in his Character and Conduct of Life thus: "Remember that in choosing your wife, you are choosing also your children; and that their degrees of intelligence, their dispositions, their temperaments and tempers very largely depend on what she brings to the common stock. And it is well to know that, in this respect, the qualities of her near relatives are as important as, if nor more than, her own.

34. Swami Turiyananda. Strictly speaking the Jnanis alone can perform work without attachment. For due to to Knowledge all desires are burnt down. Except the Jnanis none else has the power to do work without attachment.

35. N. Kasturi. Basava never attached much importance to the torture of the senses or the escape into asceticism. He said that the senses are apt to become more insistent and tyrannical through unreasoned repression. "The world is the Lord's mint. If you have currency value here, if you are a good coin here, you can circulate here. Otherwise, you will be thrown back to be recast," he said. He strove to make men active and industrious, and to take up any one occupation, all of which he declared were equally dignified and praiseworthy.
36. Everyone who was initiated had to discard his blind faith in greedy godlings. "To all the wicked spirits that hide in tree tops, caves, bushes, wells and glens, in the village square, and on the banyan tree--and each buffaloes, cows, calves, children and pregnant women--to smash every one of these earthen pots, one stick is enough, the name of the Lord. Can the death of a fowl save the soul of a man? Can a sheep stave off the wrath of the Lord?"
37. The Virasaivites had to bear up with persecution and ridicule. Their enemies said, "Add up the worst Acharyas of every sect and you get the Sivacharya of Basava!" But, Basava exclaimed, "What harm can the dogs in the street do to the man proudly riding on the elephant?"
38. His merciless attacks on the insincerity and the superficial rituals of Jainism and Brahminism touched them to the quick. When he laughed "On seeing water, they plunge! On seeing a tree they circumambulate! Alas! How can the Lord bless these fools who put their trust in tanks that dry up and trees that rot. They carry gross in their hands, for they do not know the Lord. They carry ropes round their necks, for they do not know the Lord. They worship Fire but when their houses are blessed by Fire catching them, they raise a hullabaloo!"

39. SHEO NARAYANA LAL SHRIVASTAYA: "AVASTHATRAYA"; THE TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH IN VEDANTISM: ITS VALIDITY; The present-day philosophical thinkers have become, at any rate, appear to have become apologetic of their mission. They seem to be fighting shy of facing the adverse criticisms of the multitude and betray an anxiety to bring their philosophical formulations more and more in a line with common-sense and the naive beliefs of the generality of mankind. Our age has witnessed the successful spread of pragmatic, humanistic, positivistic and naively realistic philosophical theories, which are to my mind symptomatic of its utter metaphysical incapacity. The accentuation by some of the contemporary philosophers of common-sense and naively realistic theories, reflects more an attitude of mind that hazards to take bold steps in metaphysical enquiry, than one of sober philosophical reflection.

Be it remembered that the philosopher who means fair play in his game, should not turn his back against conclusions that appear to be subversive of everyday unreflecting experience. The philosopher who shuts his eyes before the sun of Truth for fear of being dazzled is a disgrace to his mission. Every serious thinker, on the other hand, has been driven to recognize the unreality and illusoriness of everyday experience. "In philosophy", says Bosanquet, "we turn our usual ideas upside down." "The fact of illusion and error" writes Mr. Bradley, "is in various ways forced early upon the mind.

40. The question of the validity of method is one of paramount importance in any system of philosophical thought. The validity of what we conclude depends mainly on the validity of how we arrive that those conclusions. It is the procedure, the methodology, that ultimately shapes the edifice of any philosophical system.

41. When Descartes had to pull down the edifice of Empiricism and raise in its place the superstructure of rationalistic system, he had to vindicate, before anything else, the essential validity of the rationalistic method of approach. This he did by showing the inherent defectiveness of the empirical method. The empirical method of approach, he pointed out, ignores or leaves behind the Self, <u>for</u> which all things are real, and <u>from</u> which they all derive their validity. What Descartes contended was that any philosophy which ignored the essential correlativity of the objects to the Self, would be suicidal; for the Self is the primal fact of indubitable certainty. Similarly, when Kant sought to make way for his Critical Philosophy, he felt it of primary importance to establish the validity of his now method--the critical method. The first task to which he addressed himself was to show that all previous philosophies were doomed, for their methods were dogmatic and uncritical, inasmuch as they made assertions without first examining the powers and the validity of the mind which made those assertions. The right procedure, he showed, was the critical procedure which started with a criticism of the very faculty of reason and discovering its a priori presuppositions. So also when Hegel sought to give a new orientation to philosophical thinking and direct its course towards an intellectualistic view of the world--a view which dominates idealistic thought down to our own day, he had to vindicate the validity of the intellectualistic approach by showing the essential identity of thought and reality and making metaphysics "the <u>thinking</u> study of things."

Thus a new turn has always been given to philosophical thinking by an innovation in the way of approach. And at each turn, the particular

way of approach resorted to, was believed to be the only secure way; while its inadequacy was only exposed by a subsequent thinker. Even to-day in the sphere of speculative thought, there is hardly visible anything like an established method of philosophical investigation, a method which may be universally assented to and relied upon. Instead, we find a congeries of rival philosophical schools, growing daily like mush-rooms; while none succeeds in taking us near the all-important problem of Ultimate Reality. If we choose to adhere to any of the so-called accredited systems of modern philosophical thinking, we are either left unprofitably pre-occupied with such minor issues as whether in knowledge we know the object per se or a complex of characters belonging to it, and so on; or, we are driven to some hazy and pseudo-philoso-phical generalizations about the Absolute, as in the philosophy of Bradley. Bradley tells us in so many fine words that the Absolute is a supra-relational harmonious blend of all appear-ances, where the appreances are so transmuted and transfused as to end in a final harmony. But asked as to what are the principles of such transmutaiation and transfusion, he has only to give us like the Indian of Locke, a disap-pointing negative--"I do not know." It passes my comprehension how a conglomeration of appear-ances, each unreal and each retaining its unique individuality, results in the fullness of reality which is the Absolute. The Vedantic position, according to which the Absolute is not a summation or interfusion of appearances, but a Reality transcending the region of appearances, seems to me much more acceptable.

42. A centrality of method, as that witnessed in Science, is not visible in the sphere of reflective enquiry. At any rate, this is true

of present-day philosophical tendencies in the West.

43. The ruling conception of Indian thought, the central peg round which is hung the entire fabric of Indian Vedantism, is Atman which reason connot comprehend, but which is the presupposition of all rational experience. The self that reasons is the principle at the back of reasoning and is presupposed by it. Rationality or the reasoning-process would by itself remain blind, were it not lit up by consciousness. All reasoning is conscious reasoning or reasoning in the medium of consciousness. Consciousness is the precondition and prius of intelligibility and the intelligible universe. It is not thought which is the prius of reality, but consciousness which comprehends thought itself. What sustains and makes possible the thinkability of the thinkable universe is consciousness. Thought is for consciousness. Brahman or the first Principle is not thought, but the prius of thought. This prius of thought is the pure principle of consciousness, ultimate and underived, the primal fact. In a metaphysical system much depends, I believe, on what we take to be foundational in the scheme of reality. The West, taking thought to be the prius of reality, could not hit upon the possibility of an understanding of reality other than in terms of the categories of thought.

44. They fail to perceive--and this is their besetting sin--that rational or conceptional knowledge itself presupposes and rests upon a basic intelligence which lends it life and sustenance. The necessity of positing a deeper and more basic intelligence than reason can well be understood if we examine carefully the discursive and relational character of conceptual knowledge. The various concepts that enter into and combine in every single act of judgment or

unit of knowledge, are all isolated, distinct from one another, and appear successively. This process of synthesising the several distinct concepts, and welding them together into a single act of judgment, presupposes a medium of intelligence which retains each preceding concept and gives birth to the one succeeding it.

45. The entire objective universe rightly viewed is, then, in the last analysis, a stupendous manifestation of consciousness, the pure ultimate principle of consciousness or the Atman. Consciousness being the prius of all objective reality, the clue to the ultimate nature of reality was to be found in a thorough-going analysis of the ultimate states of consciousness--the Avasthas of Atman, as they are known. The objective that is spread out on a rational plan, that is intelligible and interprtable in terms of the categories of thought or reason, obtains only in one of the ultimate states of consciousness--the Jagrat or the waking state. The objective of waking experience, is altered in the two ultimate states of Swapnavastha or the state of deep sleep and Susupti or the state of dreamless sleep, and negated altogether in the fourth state known as Turiya. Hence, the Vedantins insist that the universe which is revealed to rational experience during the waking state, cannot claim absolute and metaphysical reality. Its reality is relative to that particular state of consciousness, the Jagravastha only. It is belied and negated in the other Avasthas. The Real is ipso facto immutable and unsublatable. It is manifestly absurd to call that which is negatable real in an absolute sense.

The objective universe which empirically we find to be spread out on a rational plan and explicable in terms of the categories of thought, is transcendentally, that is, from a deeper

base (the Atman), a state of consciousness. Thus Vedantism, I am persuaded to believe, approaches the problem of ultimate Reality from a deeper base than the intellectualistic idealism of the West. This is a fact of cardinal significance, and we shall attempt to show that this method of approach to Reality is philosophic <u>per sang.</u>

Western philosophical thinkers rather find it difficult to grasp the significance of regarding the Dreaming and the Dreamless Sleep states as on a par with the Waking State. To them it has been the darkest mystery of Indian thought that the Dreaming and the Dreamless Sleep States should be held to be of co-ordiate validity with the waking State. To clear up this point we shall go a little into details.

All that is objective, all that is comphrehensible or intelligible at all, all this cosmos which spreads out before us on a rational plan, is ultimately for consciousness and derives its reality therefrom. Consciousness itself cannot be transcended. We cannot think of a transcendental condition of consciousness Itself. The clue to the ultimate nature of reality can therefore only be found in an analysis of the ultimate States of Consciousness--this is the cardinal principle of Vedantic transcendental metaphysics. The first formulations of this transcendental approach to Reality are to be found in the Mandukya Upanishad and these were subsequently elucidated and developed in their writings, by Gaudapada and Samkara, notably among others.

Taking Consciousness as the inexpugnable and most ultimate foundation of all reality, the Mandukya Upanishad analyses the entire range of Conscious experience into four ultimate States or Avasthas. These are the Waking State, the Dream State, the Dreamless Sleep State and or the fourth state. Reality which is conscious

experience, must at any level of experience, be manifest in One of these States. Of these four States, the Vedantins maintain that the fourth or the Turiya is the ne plus ultra State of Consciousness, and therefore Reality as manifest therein the Highest and the Ultimate. The reasons for this, we shall see as we proceed.

Let us now consider these states one by one, and see what light they throw on the nature of ultimate Reality. In the Waking State, the objective appears as the gross material universe of common perception, metaphysically called in the Mandukya the seven-limbed. (The heavens as its forehead, the sun as its eye, the air as its breath, matter and water its belly and the sky and the earth its feet.) This state of consciousness is further spoken of as nineteen-mouthed, because here the objective is apprehended through nineteen channels--the five organs of knowledge), the five organs of action, the five Prana's and the internal organ consisting of Manas, Buddhi, Ahamkara and Chitta. This state of conscious experience is technically known as the Vaisvanara. Its main characteristic is expressed by saying that it is Stulabhuj, or comprehends objects in their gross forms.

The dream state which is technically known as the Thaijasa is also like the Jagrat state Ekonavisathimukh, that is, in it also the objective is comprehended through the above-named nineteen channels; but unlike the first, it has as the objective of its comprehension an innder and a subtler world--a more attenuated objective.

One remarkable difference between the Waking consciousness and the Dream Consciousness is that the rigorous temporal, spatial, and causal uniformities that obtain in the former are almost lost entirely in the latter. Events that would take a considerably long time in our waking

world are done within an inconceivably short time in dreams. Distance also has not that uniformity in dreams which it has in the waking world; similarly causality. Anything may cause anything.

The third ultimate state of consciousness is the Dreamless Sleep State or the Deep Sleep State. It is different from Jagrat and Svapna in two ways: first, with regard to the nature of its objective, and secondly, with regard to the instrument or faculty of apprehending the objective. Unlike the Waking and Dream States, the objective in Sushupti is not the world of manifoldness, either gross (sthula) as in Vaishanara or subtle as in Thaijasa but Ekobhuta or unified. The objective here is an undifferentiated unified whole--a seamless totum objectivum. The plurality of objects being absent here, the knowledge of the objective is also unitary. Then again, with regard to the faculty of apprehension, while the first two states are Ekonivimsathimukha, this is Chethomukha, that is, here Chethas or intelligence or consciousness itself, unmediated by the instrumentality of the mind and the senses, is the faculty of apprehension. Here there is no sensing and no discursive thinking, but simple apprehending, the pure activity of Consciousness, untramelled by the mind and the senses. This is a very significant state of consciousness, for herein it is clearly suggested that the many-ness of experience, the splitting up of the unitary objective into a plurality of discrete objects, is the result of apprehension through the instrumentality of the mind and the senses.

Now, three facts emerge out of a consideration of these three ultimate states of consciousness--The Jagrat, Svapna and Sushupti. First, the objective as such has no constant character, but

is changed and modified in the different states. The differentiation, the many-ness that we find in waking experience are not the permanent and unchanging marks or attributes of the objective. They are, to use a metaphor, the refractions of the rays of consciousness falling on the intellectual prism. Secondly, consciousness is the unchanging and the inexpugnable ground or witness of all the changing pageant of the objective in all its different forms. Consciousness is therefore the absolute reality. Thirdly the objective has no independent status. It has a tendency to merge into the subject. In the Sushupti state, what opposes consciousness is a thin attenuated veil of the objective. The objective is almost wholly merged in the subjective, there being a very feeble sense of the subject-object differentiation, thus pointing to the possibility of the complete mergence of the objective into the subject. This state of the complete obliteration of the subject-object distinction is known as the fourth state or the Thuriya. From the Jagrat, through svapna to the sushupti, there is a progressive attenuation of the grossness of the objective, an increasing in-gathering of consciousness to itself. The end of this progressive withdrawal of in-gathering of consciousness can only be a return to itself. In all the three states of consciousness--waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep, we are aware of the objective in different modified forms, but never of their subjective substratum--the comprehending self or the principle of consciousness.

In the fourth or Thuriya, consciousness returns to itself, the veil of the objective falls. It comprehends itself by itself. There is no trace of the operation of the mind and the senses--no objective--no manifold. The objective merges

completely in the subject. All that remains is One Unitary conscious principle, the Unsublatable Substratum of all sublatable forms of the objective. Herein is Absolute Truth, the Undivided and Indivisible All-whole Spirit.

Some Western thinkers (like Prof. J.S.Mackenzie) have serious misgivings with regard to the philosophical value of the Vedantic system which rests upon a consideration of dream and deep sleep states. These thinkers seem reluctant to recognize the validity of a metaphysical system that is built upon data which fall outside the sphere of waking experience. The view that the data of metaphysics should be strictly confined to the waking experience, is based on the assumption that the waking is the only real and positive state of experience. The dream world, it is argued, is unreal being a subjective creation, and the deep sleep state is held to be a contentless void rather than a positive state of experience. These are however assumptions which can hardly stand criticism. First, as to the reality of dream and deep sleep states. What is real? The real, we are obliged to say, is what exists for consciousness, the content of consciousness. When we construe reality as the content of consciousness, the distinction between subjective and objective reality becomes meaningless. The dream world, as the content of consciousness, is as much an objective fore consciousness as the world of waking experience. The dream world and the waking world can therefore claim objectivity with equal force. Objective reality is as much the prerogative of the dream world as of the waking world; metaphysically they are equally real or unreal. We pronounce the dream world less real than the waking world, taking arbitrarily the latter as the standard. Perceivability, argues Gaudapada, as

much characterizes the objects of the dream world as those of the waking world; it is therefore futile to argue that the latter are more real than the former because they are perceived. moreover, for purposes of metaphysical analysis, we are not concerned so much with the specific contents of the dream state, as with the dream state as such--the epistemological implicates of the dreaming state of experience. In a metaphysical consideration of the ultimate states of experience, the nature of the specific contents of each state is not germane.

Another serious misunderstanding is to take the deep sleep state as a state of contentless void, a lapse of consciousness, rather than a full-fledged conscious state. Now, it can easily be shown that this is but an error. That a recollection of the deep sleep state is possible shows clearly that it is a positive state of experience, and not a lapse into unconsciousness. The man, waking from a deep sleep, recollects it and states "What a happy and blissful sleep I have had!" There can be no recollection of a void. If the man in sleep were really unconscious, he would not be able to recollect it. Consciousness never lapses; it being there everything is. There is no break in the continuity of consciousness. It is the abiding witness of all this rolling pageant of heaven and earth. Asleep or awake, consciousness always is and never ceases to be. Consciousness being always there, there is always the objective of which there is consciousness. The objective is there in dreaming and in deep sleep, though it appears in modified forms. This modification, as our foregoing analysis will show, depends upon or is the result of the instruments through which consciousness appre-

hends. When the apprehension is through the instrumentality of the mind and the senses, the objective is a world of plurality as in the waking and dreaming states; but when the instrumentality of the mind and the senses is removed or is inoperative as in the Dreamless Sleep State, the objective is a unitary or undifferentiated continuum. We cannot assign any unchanging character to the objective as such. We, with our five senses, see the world in the way we see it; but if we had five more senses we dould see it quite differently. Then again, the objective is there at all, only so long as consciousness is extroverted; it is non-existent or no more appears to exist when consciousness is introverted or in-drawn to itself. When consciousness is extroverted, there is an objective as in the three states--waking, dreaming and deep sleep; but when consciousness is completely introverted or indrawn to itself as in Turiya, there is no objective. From our analysis of the Avasthas, we find that the progressive attenuation of the objective is parallel and proportional to the increasing introversion of consciousness. Waking state when consciousness is extrovert to the fullest degree is the dreaming state when consciousness is more introvert is and the dreamless slepp state when consciousness is still more introvert is an undifferentiated continuum. The progressive attenuation of the objective as consciousness tends to be more and more introvert, indicates that the objective is only a projection of consciousness and points to the possibility of complete mergence of the objective into conscicousness, when consciousness is completely introvert or in-drawn to itself. This is the state of Turiya, where consciousness alone is the sole reality. It is the return of consciousness to itself, the state of Self-realisation, Svarupavasthiti or Svanubhuti.

We are now in a position to adjudicate upon the

merits of the transcendental approach in Vedantism as briefly sketched above. The most outstanding merit of this way of philosophical approach is that it goes down to the deepest base of reality, the most ultimate and primal fact of existence, the stay and foundation of all objective reality, Consciousness or Atman. Consciousness is the prius of all reality, of reason itself. Rational activity is not coeval with the entire range of consciousexperience; it is confined to the Waking State only; hence the rationally comprehensible universe is only an impermanent and sublatable phase of reality. A rational account of reality therefore, metaphysically speaking, is provisional and relative to the waking experience only. The criterion of truth, adopted in Vedantism, is non-contradiction or non-sublation through the entire range of concious experience. It should further be noted that this principle of consciousness which is taken to be the ultimate principle in reality, is not a mere postulate, a mere problematical conception like Kant's Idea of Reason, but a veritable fact of experience. Consciousness is self-manifest, self-revealed to all living beings, to all experiments, as this very self. Consciousness is the very essence and not an attr attribute of the subject. My awareness of myself as the subject, is an immediate and veridical awareness of myself as the all-comprehending consciousness. Self-awareness, properly interpreted, means the awareness of self as the pure comprehending consciousness, distinguished from all that is comprehensible as an "object" as a "this", including in the region of the objective the body, mind, senses, etc. Such self-awareness according to Vachaspati Misra, is the patent experience, not only of human beings, but of all living beings, including worms and moths etc. Consciousness is aparokshanubhava-siddha, that

is, given in an immediate and veridical experience. That such inferior creatures as the worms and moths should have so much discrimination as Vachaspati credits them with, is, I think, disreputable. To distinguish the self as the pure subject, transcending everything objective, even the mind and the body--is, I think, an achievement possible only for man who has the capacity for philosophical reflection. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, any sentient creature, if it had the reflective capacity of man, would be aware of itself as the principle of consciousness, transcending all that is objective, its own body and mind included. The Vedantic approach, then, adopting the well-known, phraseology of Kant, is 'transcendental' but not 'transcendent. Herein lies the chief merit of Vedantic methodology. A system of metaphysics, that does not take its stand upon the direct verities of experience, stands self-condemned. Vedanta takes its stand upon the deepest, the most veridical, as well as the most ultimate FACT of experience. It is the vilest travesty of Vedanta to call it a system of abstract metaphysics. Vedanta does not emply any abstraction; it is the science of reality par excellence, revealing the only Undeniable Supreme fact, eternally enduring and eternally manifest (Svatah-Shddha).

Another noteworthy and unique feature of Vedantic methodology is its inclusion of Dream and Deep Sleep states within its purview. The Vedanta is the only philosophical system in the world that has grasped the metaphysical significance of the Dream and Deep Sleep States, and given them a co-ordinate footing with the waking state. Of course, for all practical purposes, the Waking state is regarded as more real

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than the Dream state because of its greater durability and greater uniformity. Sankara also distinguished Vyavaharika Jagat from Svapnic Jagat, and suggested that the former is in some sense more real than the latter. This however is true only comparatively speaking, that is, when we compare dreaming with waking. But from the ultimate or Paramarthic standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of Turiya, the Waking is as unreal as the Dreaming state; the former is on a coordinate footing with the latter. The idea that the waking experience, may, after all, be on a par with the dreaming, no doubt suggested itself to the minds of some Western thinkers also, but they did not try to develop a systematic metaphysics of these various states. Bradley, for example, has written "the contention that our waking world is the one real order of things will not stand against criticism. Quit the position of an onlooker on yourself and imagine your own self in dream, and that while you dream, you can recall but little of your waking state. But suppose also that from what you recall, you judge that your own waking state was more distracted and more narrow, would you not be right if you set down your waking state as less rational and less real?" Similarly Descartes writes in his Meditations: "When I consider the matter carefully, I do not find a single characteristic by means of which I can carefully determine whether I am awake or whether I dream. The visions of a dream and the experiences of my waking state are so much alike that I am completely puzzled and I do not really know that I am not dreaming at this moment."

So also Pascal contends that if the same dreams were to come to us uniformly every night, they would have as rigid a hold upon our jinds as the things of our daily waking experience. To quote his own words: "If an artisan were certain that

he would dream every night for fully twelve hours that he was a king, I believe the he would be just as happy as a king who dreams every night for twelve hours that he is an artisan." However, it is in Vedantism alone that we find that these states have been systematically considered to yield an ultimate theory of existence.

The uniqueness of Vedantism, as happily styled by a recent writer, lies in its tri-basic approach to the problem of Ultimate Reality, and on this account constitutes its superiority over other systems which are only mono-basic in their approaches (confined to the waking state only). A metaphysic of reality, worth the name, ought to take within its purview the entire stretch of conscious experience. Waking experience is only an interlude within the complete dramaaof conscious experience; hence, no metaphysics which is confined to waking experience alone, can legitimately claim to be a metaphysics of the whole of reality.

The object of this article has been to vindicate the validity and significance of the Vedantic transcendental metaphysics based on a consideration of the ultimate Avasthas of experience--experience taken in its entire compass.

46. Taking the primacy of consciousness over all that is comprehended as its content, the Hindu thinkers posit consciousness in its primordial and absolute form as the First Principle or Brahman--"That perceiving everything exists." Primordial Being is identical with Primordial consciousness. It is this primordial consciousness, the root principle in reality, that is designated as the Atman. It is the ultimate comprehending consciousness in man, his inmost Self for which all objects exist, the Unchanging Witness of all this rolling pageant of the ever-changing universe. Being the constant wit-

ness of all change, it itself is never subject to change; and being the ultimate subject of all that is objective, it itself is never presented as an object. It is ever distinguishable from an "object" or anything that is comprehensible or meanable by it as "this". Thus construed, the true self of man is different from his body or his mind or his sense-organs, which all fall into the sphere of the objective. The self construed as the subject of experience is simply identical with the foundational principle of consciousness, the ground of the entire objective universe. Herein comes a crucial point, one on which Eastern and Western philosophies in general largely differ: Is the self finite or infinite? Both construe the self as the subject of experience; but while the former equates the subject with the ultimate consciousness or Brahman, the stay and foundation of all; the latter takes the self to be essentially a finite centre of consciousness rooted in Infinite consciousness or the Absolute or God as it is called in theistic systems. Now, Vedantins maintain that the self qua consciousness is by its very nature infinite; for all limitation being within consciousness, consciousness itself cannot be limited. The perdeiver of all limitation must surely transcend limitation. Consciousness of finitude is not finitude of consciousness. The I-consciousness, egoity or Ahamkara is not the transcendental self which is consciousness, but a modification of the Antahkarana the internal mental being which has simply received the reflection of consciousness. When the Antahkarana ceases functioning as in deep dreamless sleep, there is no I-Consciousness, though there <u>is</u> consciousness. The I-consciousness in Indian thought, is only a mode of consciousness, a modification of the Antahkarana, a psychosis, and not the <u>self</u>

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beyond all psychoses. The 'I' as we know it has only an empirical status and can lay no claim to metaphysical reality. If we really carry the subject-idea of the self to its logical terminus then we have to go beyond all that is physical or psychical. It is easy enough to go beyond the physical, but there is a sinister temptation to posit the self somewhere in the psychical sphere, taking it either to be a collection of certain psychoses or some central core of the psychic being. Bradley, in his Appearance and Reality, has well exposed the hollowness of any such idea of the self. So we see that in Indian thought, the self of man is nothing short of the Infinite consciousness, the Primal Existence. That is the Atman.

47. The ideality of the world allows it only an empirical reality and leaves the spirit as the sole Real in the absolute sense. But how do we know that the world is only an ideal affirmation? The nature of experience indicates it. The entire objective universe, as we said before, exists in the medium of knowledge, spreads out in knowledge; and all that we could call real in any way communicates its reality to us through knowledge. So all that we call real is there in knowledge; and as we shall see presently as knowledge.

Having conceded (as Western idealistic thought also does) that reality communicates itself to us and can communicate itself to us only thro' knowledge, it follows but as a necessary corollary that such a reality must itself partake of the nature of knowledge. No reality which has not knowledge as its essential nature could ever be comprehended through the medium of knowledge. There cannot be utter disparity or radical antagonism between knowledge and the 'known.' A community and continuity of nature between know-

ledge and the known is an indispensable presupposition of the very possibility of knowledge. The possibility of knowledge is in itself a refutation of dualism between knowledge and the known. The 'object' or what is known, reduces itself in the last analysis to a congeries of ideas. Nature or the sum-total of our objects of knowledge, is not a self-closed system of physical or material objects, but a continuum of knowledge.

It is a happy augury for philosophic idealism that modern science is also coming to this very conclusion. The eminent scientist Sir James Jeans, as President of the British Association for the Advancement of science for the year 1934, said in his presidential address: "The old physics imagined it was studying an objective nature which has its own existence independently of the mind which perceived it--which indeed had existed from all eternity, whether it was perceived or not. It would have gone on imagining this to this day, had the electron observed by the physicists behaved as on this supposition it ought to have done. But it did not so behave, and this led to the birth of the new physics, with its general thesis that the nature we study does not consist so much of something we perceive as of our perceptions; it is not the object of the subject-object relation but the relation itself. There is, in fact, no clear-cut division between the subject and the object; they form an indivisible whole which now becomes nature. This thesis finds its final expression in the wave-parable, which tells us that nature consists of waves and that th these are of the general quality of waves of knowledge or of absence of knowledge in our own minds." The entire reality, then, is of the nature of knowledge or ideal.

48. In all rapturous experiences, as in those of aesthetic delight, the self is put aside as it

were; and this as Duessen argues, is a warrant that beyond individuality, there is not a negative blank, but a positive delight, the exuberance of which cannot be described in words.
49. Do we seek happiness or bliss primarily for its own sake, or, secondarily as negation of pain? Are our undertakings for our happiness or for the avoidance of misery? Schopenhauer, the pessimist adheres to the latter view. Pain, he says, is positive and pleasure negative. "Whatever is opposed to our will", says he, "thwarting and resisting it, that is, whatever is displeasing and painful--of all this, we are directly sensitive, at once and very distinctly: (On the other hand) we do not feel the healthfulness of our whole body, but only the One spot 'where the shoe pinches'; so also we do not think about the state of our affairs in general, so long as all goes perfectly well, but only about some insignificant trifle or other that annoys us. On this ground is based the negativity of well-being and happiness in contrast to the positivity of pain, upon which I have so often insisted."
Pain, then, being the positive fact of life, pleasure is sought only as an escape from pain. Pain becomes the primary fact and pleasure secondary; pain the ratio essendi of pleasure.
49. Rhys Davids: I have seen that, if I wish to disclaim, from my earlier legacy to literature on Buddhism, all that follows teachings I now hold to be erroneous or at best misleading, it were well I should rewrite this Manual.
50. If I have altered much in what I now write about Buddhism, it is because I know it better, it is because I see it in better perspective. It is not because I am reading purely subjective experience into it, or finding just what I want to find, as is the opinion of some. I write of fresh discoveries I make as the days pass, things

that make certain conclusions of past and of present writers on Buddhism untenable.

51. Editor: The Rishis of ancient India used to take great precaution when they imparted philsophical training to their disciples. They tested the individual tastes and parts at first, before they imparted any philosophical training. Besides, they laid stress on the practical problems of individuals side by side with their intellectual education. Hence, philosophy could not bring any conflict in the midst of practical life.

52. Madeline R. Hardinge: Such minds as these have all to be taken into account when we in the West talk so glibly of a universal religion, when what is really meant is the impossible task of an attempted amalgamation of human beliefs and ideas and forms and ceremonies. We realize with thankfulness how far away such a day must be.

53. Drupad S. Desai: Sankara has spun out a system of philosophy, peculiarly his own, out of a really weltering mass of confused and unsystematized ideas lurking in the Prasthanatraya.

54. The fact that man, be he a philosopher or any other sort of "er", cannot cut himself aloof from the moorings on which his ship is fixed fast. The past is a precious possession with him, the present has its roots seated deep in that past, and has its growth helped by getting them watered and nurtured by the environments that actually surround it now. Sankara's stand on, and his constant appeal to, Sruti, I believe, is really to be taken as an acknowledgment, on his part, of the debt he owed to his illustrious predecessors who gave him a clue, it may be said, to the philosophy of which he afterwards became a champion.

55. The Srutikaras could not present their thoughts to the world in an orderly systematized manner, that there was a defect somewhere in the manner of the treatment they bestowed upon the various

thoughts and ideas.
56. He has made it his mission, it seems, to show that the Srutis are infallible, not because they are a sort of revelation, but because they contain truth which cannot be contradicted, truth which reasoning may accept without involving itself in self-contradiction. This mission of his, however, has suffered the lot of being misconstfued, and the result is that he is looked down upon as a commentator only. However that be, his services in bringing about a happy blending of Yukti with Sruti, and thus showing that it was not all a matter of the blind following the blind, can never be under-rated. Again, his refutation of the different systems of philosophy then in vogue is a standing testimony to his claims as a supreme dialectician.
57. In order to establish the truth of Advaitic position, Sruti need not be introduced as a valid Pramana at all, we say we are at one here. Even Sankara himself grants this when he says in the very famous introduction with which he begins his Bhashya: Advaitism is a system which establishes the non-existence of duality. Like Descartes, the father of modern European Philosophy, but in a manner quite different from his, Sankara arrived at the doctrine that the Self, the Knower, is the only true existence. It does not and cannot admit of any doubt. Having arrived at this, the entire purpose of Sankara's philosophy consists in proving the unreality of what is perceived or known, and also of its relation to the knower or consciousness. And this he achieves without appealing to the scriptures. Thus the kernel of his philosophy does not require to be substantiated by the Srutis. It is based completely on Experience with reason applied to it.
58. The Vedanta Sutras, e.g. start with the

dogma that God is the cause of this world. Now, the question is: How is this dogma to be justified? Can any amount of reasoning do it? Sankara says, "No reasoning can prove the causal relation between God and the world."

59. The world that appears to us changes from moment to moment, whereas that to which it appears is ever the same. We can doubt away anything and everything in this world, but that we doubt we can never doubt away.

60. "What is the meaning of explaining experience?" Will experience be said to be explained if we simply take stock of each and every phase of our experience and declare it to be real? Or, does explanation consist in tracing it to its proper ultimate ground, and then declaring from there what we find to be its true nature? I believe that the latter is the only real sort of explanation. The former, we do not hesitate to say, is not explanation at all.

61. Suppose I were to refer to one who has studied physical science well for the explanation of my experience of the blueness of the sky. How will he explain it to me? Surely, he will say "It is a big illusion, my friend. There is nothing like sky, a limitless sheet of something spread overhead, as you see. The colour that you ascribe to it is a bigger illusion still." Is not this explanation the only real explanation that can be given of the experience in question? Can I, then, in the face of it still maintain and say that physical science does not explain the experience of the blueness of the sky?

62. Experiences that we have have not a jot of reality, that they appear as real only on the background of that which is eternally and essentially real, the Self, the Atman, Brahman.

63. To know the true nature of a thing does not, and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be believed to mean that we cease to experience that

thing as it is ordinarily experienced, from that very moment. Even though the scientist knows too well that the experience of the blueness of the sky is an illusion, his knowledge of the true nature of that experience will not reduce him to a blank and vacant state in connection with that experience. That is to say, whenever he turns his eyes up, it will not be that he will not see anything there, or will only stare and gaze at it like a mad man. No. This can never be the case. He will see the sky, as long as he lives and looks up, as blue and blue only. He will not see it as white, or he will not be able to say that he sees nothing there up at all. Only the existential value of that experience has been transformed in his case, and transformed so completely as never to mislead him again. Similarly in the case of the Vedantin, the true nature of the world appearance, he knows, is not as and what it appears to us. Now, how will this knowledge react in his case? It cannot be maintained that with the rise of this knowledge he will cease to experience the world-appearance as he actually experiences it in his ordinary every-day life. For he has not ceased to be a man, just as we are--with eyes to to see, ears to hear, and so on. Only the existential value, the real import of this world-appearance, will have been transformed.

64. If the scientists were not Mayavadins, to start with, their very activity would have been impossible. If, that is to say, they had taken things to be just what they appear to us, no science about them would have been possible at all. It is only because they can doubt, and do doubt, that what appears to us is not what is ultimately real, that they can embark upon their journey at all. And, in the end--what does Science prove? Just this that what appears to us cannot be taken to be what really exists, it is not the ultimate reality. A stone as it really is is not what it appears to us; a plant as it really is is

not what it appears to us. This is what Science shows to us so conclusively. I believe a study of Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Biology, and all these sciences may go only to confirm the above view. Just take a very commonplace truth taught by Astronomy: "The Earth revolves round the Sun." Can one imagine that the astronomers would have arrived at this truth if, to start with, they had not doubted the stability of the earth, the immovability of the earth, as it, in ordinary every-day experience, appears to us? Indeed, nothing can be more contradictory to our ordinary every-day experience, and yet nothing more true than this Scientifically. The room in which I live and move; the earth on which I tread, run, and jump; the tennis-court on which I can perform all the skills; and I myself walking so straight and erect, clad up in the best of suits, and what not? --xx all, all are revolving!

65. The Sciences disillusion us practically with regard to the true nature of actual particular experiences. And Vedanta, as philosophy, only continues this work of science further on in a wider field on a wider expanse. It only wants to disillusion us practically with regard to the true nature of the whole of experience. That is what Mayavada really stands for. It is difficult to understand why this Vada then should be regarded as giving a setback to the scientific activity of man.

66. Stealing is bad, stealing is wrong, stealing is immoral, because we believe that man who steals is a man quite distinct from us and that he has no right to our possessions. Thus, its wrongness is based upon a dualistic, or a pluralistic view of the universe.

67, In those days moral acquisitions were preliminary requisites to the study of philosophy. A student who had first to deserve himself for the study of the Vedanta by passing through the

solid test of acquiring those fourfold qualifications, xix. It is plain perversity of view that at the end of his study, he will be behaving in the manner in which he is supposed he will do. In one word, he will have acquired a habit, so to say, to be moral and nothing but moral in whatever he thinks, feels, and wills.
68. Editor: Why is the time of an eclipse considered auspicious for the practice of Japa?
Answer: Man becomes thoughtful when such a natural phenomenon takes place. Eclipse brings a great change in the sphere of nature. At such a juncture when nature passes from one condition to another, the mind becomes calm and so the time is favourable for the practice of Japa and meditation.
69 Prof.B.N.Ghosh: The most modern researches in science conducted by J.J. Thomson, Rutherford, and Bohr, have shown that atoms of all elements are made up of electrons which revolve round the protons life planets. Thus science teaches that all matter in this world is made up of essentially the same thing, namely, the proton and the electron, and thus teaches to cease discrimination.
70. Editor: Buddhism and Jainism made the ascetic order too prominent and admitted men of all classes and conditions in the fold of anchorites. This unnecessary and, at the same time, unnatural step degenerated the Indian masses not only in secular but also in religious aspects of life.
71. The Nyaya helps us in making our faculty of reason sharp and critical--which is so essential for the attainment of correct knowledge.
72. Haridas Chaudhuri: Berkeley lays his finger on a very important truth when he declares that the essence of things consists in being perceived --esse est percepi. When I think of a flower smiling in joy and emitting its sweet fragrance in a dense forest, unseen and unknown, what is it,

he asks, that really happens? The matter is very simple. I construct in my imagination the 'idea' of a flower, and I neglect at the same time to count the agency which effects this construction. It is indeed absurd to think of anything apart from thought; it is impossible to posit anything apart from spiritual activity. The very act of positing anything is the affirmation of the immanence of the object in the activity of the subject.

73. Does then Gentile deny the plurality of things and beings? Does he mean to explain away the unlimited expanse of this universe with its infinite wealth of forms and endless variety of irreducible types? That would indeed be a rash attempt. With a long history of futile attempts to annul variety and diversity in favour of blank identity Gentile cannot betake himself ttot that desperate course. It is completely unavailing to contend that the world is a mere illusion, because even illusion which is a stubborn fact of our experience requires to be explained, and reality must be made to account for it. So Gentile admits the reality of plurality; but plurality is real, he tells us, not apart from but as inextricably bound up with the living activity of the mind. Plurality is plural only in so far as it is unified as an ideal moment in the concrete unity of the transcendental 'I'. Unity and plurality are two inseparable moments of mind conceived as creative process or development; they have their meaning only as they are unified in the transcendental 'I'. This transcendental 'I' should be carefully distinguished from the empirical ego. The empirical ego as a member of plurality is an ideal moment of the concrete activity of the mind. The transcendental 'I' comprises in its bosom the whole field of plurality, i.e. the plurality of the empirical selves and objects, and lives in the process of transcending the positive with ever fresh creations.

74. It is no use only reiterating that Absolute Idea is not self-complete but stands in need of manifestation. Be it noted here that in his criticism of Hegel, Gentile joins hands with the great Eastern thinker Sri Sankaracharya. For, Sankara also maintains that Brahman does not require any world for self-realization; there is no necessary symmetrical relation between the two. Jagat presupposes Brahman but Brahman does not presuppose Jagat--the relation is strictly asymmetrical. Bradley also maintains that the world of appearance cannot be logically derived from Reality. Appearance must be accepted, he contends, as an ultimate fact of existence which should not be further subjected to the enquiries like Why and How.

Having thus shown that though Hegel postulates the need of viindicating the rights of the individual, he cannot properly do so, Gentile now offers to solve the problem in his own unique way. Individual and universal are not, he repeatedly tells us, a couple of static and fixed concepts. They are what they are only in the content of the living activity of thought. Whatever is made the object of thought is individual. The universal is the act of thinking which penetrates the object of thought with light and significance. Let us illustrate the point by considering the notion of 'being' which is commonly accepted to be a universal. Gentile holds that whether 'being' is universal or particular depends on the capacity in which it figures in the activity of thought. If I turn my eyes to the moon in the sky and declare "The moon is", 'being' is then identified with the mind's act of affirmation and is without doubt a category. But when I make this notion of 'being' itself an object of my reflection, it at once becomes pearticularized and distinguished from the other notions. "A Universal becomes a particular the moment it is stared straight in the

in the face." So Logos and Nature are not two self-identical static concepts; they are two ideal moments of the activity of thought. Hegel's whole difficulty arises from his conceiving of didlectic, in consonance with all ancient philosophers, as thing thought and not as thought thinking.

75. Kant has the credit of discovering for the first time in the history of philosophy that space and time are functions of the spirit and not rigid structures outside or inside the mind, existing prior to mind's activity. But Kant could not work out this conception to the full,--he could not realize the full significance of his discovery. He still supposed space and time to be forms of representing a pre-existing manifold. Gentile points out that Kant courts an evident absurdity when he conceives of a non-spatial and non-temporal manifold confronting the spirit. To posit a manifold is at the same time to posit it in space and time. So mind can have nothing confronting it, no pre-existing limitation except what it itself creates. From this it follows that mind is absolutely free and in infinite and immortal. Far from constituting limits to the mind, space and time are only aspects of spiritual activity.

Space in so far as it is an object of thought is a limited datum. But we cannot conceive of a limit to space without at the same time positing a wider space transcending the limit. This shows that space is not infinite but indefinite, i.e. we cannot assign any definite limit to space. The indefiniteness of space points to the infinity of mind, i.e. the mind's unlimited power of eternally overcoming that which is posited. Being infinite with regard to space, mind is also infinite with regard to time. For, time also is a kind of spatialization, and all spatialization receives its significance from mind's act of self-externalization.

76. Nature as nature, as pure objectivity, is mortal because it is unreal and unthinkable. Nature as real and thinkable lives with the living activity of the mind. This means that the objective world (and that includes the plurality of empirical selves), the reality of which lies in the objectification of mind, must lose its abstract objectivity before participating in mind's immortality.

77. Idealism takes its stand upon the most legitimate conviction when it asserts that transcendence of experience as a whole is meaningless and barbarous.

THE VEDANTA KESARI, VOL.XXI.

1. AKSHAYA KUMAR BANERJEA: We do not care to turn inward and examine how far our own outlook, the characters and limitations of our sense-organs, the principles assumed, and the mode of reasoning adopted become the constituent factors of the objects as known by us. In this way, in every plane the knowing subject, with its characteristic limitations, finite powers of observation and special modes of looking upon objects and reasoning about them, imposes itself upon the objects and modifies their nature; but it accepts this modified nature of the objects as their true essential character. In truth, the objects as they really are in themselves remain unknown to the subject. The knowledge attained and accepted as true in these lower planes is necessarily relative. It is not the knowledge of the objects as they are in themselves, but that of the objects as appearing to and reconstructed by the subject. The character of the objects of knowledge, therefore, changes with the change of character and outlook of the subject in the different planes of its development. The methods and instruments of knowledge themselves stand as

insurmountable barriers between the truth-seeking subject and the true nature of the objective Reality.
2. The necessity for such an enquiry is not felt, until and unless the knowing subject is convinced that the phenomenal beings, whether animate or inanimate, are not self-existent.
3. Mind could not have been evolved out of it, if Mind had not existed in an unmanifested form in the essential nature of Life itself. Hence, Life which develops itself into Mind must have been a mental reality in its inner character. As Life as an inherent ideal determines the course of development of apparently inorganic matter, so Mind as an inherent ideal determines the course of development of Life. Thus, Mind is the essence of life, and so of matter.

It also becomes obvious in this plane of thought that all objects of experience--animate and inanimate, sentient and insentient,--become intelligible only in terms of Mental categories. If the characteristics which the Mind contributes or attributes to those objects be withdrawn, they become characterless entities or non-entities. The objective world therefore appears as a Mental system (Manomaya), existing for, by and to the Mind.
4. SHEO NARAIN LAL SHRIVASTAVA. If we examine carefully the discursive and relational character of conceptual knowledge, the various concepts that enter into and combine in every single act of judgment or unit of knowledge, are all isolated, distinct from one another, and appear successively. This process of synthesising the several distinct concepts and welding them together into a single act of judgment presupposes a medium of intelligence which retains each preceding concept and gives birth to the one succeeding it.

5. But how to know the Atman, the Eternal Knower which is the presupposition and condition of all knowledge? As Yajnavalkya exclaims "The problem of turning back upon the subject or making the subject itself an object of knowledge, has been a vertigo, both to the eastern and western philosophers". Apropos of this difficulty Kant wrote "This I or he or it, this something that thinks, is nothing but the idea of a transcendental subject of thought= x, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and which apart from them, cannot be conceived at all. We turn round and round it in a perpetual circle, for we can make no judgment about it, without making use of it in our judgment."

6. SWAMI SARADANANDA. The master would say repeatedly: Discrimination between the real and the unreal is an essential necessity. One should always discriminate and suggest to the mind, "Well, my mind, you are hankering so much after this food, that dress and so on. But don't you see that all kinds of food, quite ordinary courses as well as the finest delicacies, are made of the same constituents--the five elements? Similarly the same component parts of blood and flesh, of bone and marrow, which are themselves but compounds of the five elements, build the forms of beautiful women as well as any other creature. Why should there be then such intense longing particularly for these objects?

7. Therefore these desires have to be rooted out from the mind only through discrimination, by considering the defect inhering in them.

8. ANAGARICA GOVINDA. If logic had really been what it was expected to be, all the thinkers, at least those who started from universally acknowledged facts, would ultimately have reached the same result. There would no longer have been any doubt about what is right and what is

wrong. In short, truth would have been established at last. But just the contrary happened. Even where thinkers started from the same presuppositions and proceeded with the same kind of ligic, results differed. The problems, instead of being simplified became more and more complicated. Yet there is no reason to blame logic for this failure. That would be just as foolish as blaming a knife for not being able to cut water into pieces. Every instrument has its limitation and is useful only for those things or conditions for which it is planned.

Logic is of great help in all practical questions in the realm of solid things and that type of thinking derived from them; and if we examine it critically, all thinking is a mental process of handling "things." Thinking means to divide the floor of reality into things. In the interest of experience, and in order to grasp perceptions, the intellect breaks up experience which is in reality a continuous stream and incessant process of change and response with no separate parts, into purely conventional "moments", "periods", or psychic "states." It picks out from the floor of reality these bits which are significant for human life, which "interest" it, catch its attention. From these it makes up a mechanical world in which it dwells, and which seems quite real until it is subjected to criticism. It does, says Bergson, in an apt and already celebrated simile, the work of a cinemotograph, takes snapshots of some thing which is always moving, and by means of these successive static representations--none of which are real, because life, the object photographed, never was at rest--it recreates a picture of life, of motion.

9. SWAMI BHUTESANANDA. But we fail to see why this practical necessity should be equated with

with theoretical certainty. We know fully well, and modern science too has proved beyond doubt, that our senses do not give us correct readings of things. What right have we then to take them as they are? But the illusory nature of the phenomena we have to deal with constantly in our every-life does not very much interfere with our practical adjustment to them. Even the distinction of reality and appearance among phenomena themselves is maintained intact for all practical purposes. But nontheless they are all reduced to the level of unreality from a higher standpoint--the standpoint of the illumined soul.

10. As for the author's contention that personal God is a fact of experience and that the burden of proof to the contrary lies on those who object to it, we wonder how he fails to notice that a similar appeal to experience is made by the mystics too. How can he solve this conflict between the two types of experience? It is futile to attempt, as the author has done, to explain away the undesirable type of experience of the mystics as due to 'auto-suggestion'. For, the same theory of "auto-suggestion" has been applied to all religious events, including the theistic experiences, by the majority of psychologists. Therefore theists have to maintain their ground either by theoretical proof or by pragmatic argument either of which does not give theism any covetable advantage over its rival theories.

11. The entire history of religion all over the world, however, tells us that this withdrawal from the society is prescribed only as a temporary measure, necessary at the stage of preparation. That is why we find Buddha resorting to solitude, Jesus retiring into the wilderness, and almost all prophets and saints spending at least a period of their life in strict seclusion.

12. ERNEST P. HORRWITZ. One day he went with Padmapada from Tanjore and other disciples to have the usual midday dip in the Ganges. In t the narrow main street of Benares, a Chandala with a lousy dog passed them. Padmapada who was of a vain and jealous disposition, but had unbounded faith in his Shanka-shattering, doubt-destroying Guru, shouted: "Clear the road, quick!" as Brahmins do to this day in Malabar. The untouchable, ignoring the disciple, turned to the master and said: "You teach Advaita and are a Prabhakara or bearer of light. Yet your followers distinguish between high-brow and low-brow, noble-bred and mean-born, and order me to get out of your way! Is your Jnana logical and consistent?" And the strange being (was he a messenger of Shiva) vanished. Shankara, struct by the pertinent retort, was entranced in Samadhi. Coming back from Nirvikalpa to normal-cy the master chanted the five-fold panegyric (Panchaka-Manisha). Each of the five inspired slokas ends: "He who has learned to look on appearances in the Advaita spirit, is my Guru, be he Dwija or Chandala! Such is my inmost conviction.!"

13. He was now more than 25 years old, and made ready to leave Benares with a large number of followers. The Raja urged him to stay, but the Acharya excused himself: "My Guru meant me to be a peripatetic teacher; my mission is to travel and teach all over India." Ratan Singh the then dismissed Shankara with rich gifts.

14. He retired to Badarikashrama. Here Sankara organised another Math, and raised a temple to Narayana (the Artic God in the year-ring: "deus in rota") on the site of an ancient sun-shrine and observatory. A.D.828 the master died forty years old in a hill resort in the Himalayas.

15. Santi Parva of Mahabharata: "What need has a man of self-control for a forest? Similarly,

O Bharata, of what use is the forest to him that has no self-control? That is a forest where the man of self-control lives, and that is even a sacred asylum."

16. K.D. CHOKSY. The lowliest follower of Zoroaster knew even then, as he knows to-day, that the sun is but a symbol of God and Fire is the Sun's representative on earth. Thus though the Parsi may turn Sun-wards or to the Fire upon the altar in contemplative worship, it is only that he may by these pure symbols be enabled to understand, to some slight extent, the glory lying far beyond them. They who saw in the Fire, and the Sun the ministers of God's good will made no images of the Imageless. Zoroaster, their great teacher directed them to turn towards the Sun or the Fire when they prayed, but the prayers which they recite in this position are addressed solely to the Sovereign Being and not to the symbols of Him.

17. Editor. A philosophy that comprehends the totality of life, scientific in its outlook, that would, irrespective of private opinions and intuitions, probe into the mysteries of life and satisfy a well-guided, universal and critical research into the realm of Reality? All religions are only Matams: The Matam of a person is the individual's reaction to his environment under the charge of a conscientious belief or faith. But Tattva, Truth, the terra incognita of the true Religion, is beyond all brain-wave-understanding, as that alone is Satyasya-satyam. In this state where there is no ego to re-act, religion becomes Realisation; and that Religion has a capital 'R' to emphasise that it does not stand for any "conceptual understanding" of life.

18. Mrs. C.A.F.Rhys Davids, This was monastic

Buddhism; it was not early, I mean, original Buddhism taught by the missioners known as Sakyans.
19. It is as a positive conception, not final, not ultimate. Man had, man has as yet, no means of conceiving, much less imagining or wording the ultimate. Every so-called conception of "Deity" or of final consummation of life is frustrated and falls short, because for him this conceiving is as yet not possible.
20. I have used the old word 'goal', a word derived from the round pole (gaule, waule, walus) set up at the terminus of a race, but the terminus may be only a 'lap', a state in a bigger competition.
21."In my Father's house are many mansions..."
22. Here was no finality taught. As with the wine at the cana feast, "the best was yet to come." The Best was, the Best is, and will be; for all Betters, Mores, Highers have their logically ideal point in consummation. Man can never rest in a Better with any sense of finality, of real uttermost achievement.
23. R. Ramakrishnan. As regards Vivekananda he himself has anwered in a most eloquent and moving manner the criticism that because he was a Sudra he had no right to become a Sannyasin. (Vide Swami Vivekananda's lectures at Madras).
24. We realise now that the greatest service of Vivekananda to modern and future India was his harnessing the vast resources of the monks and turning them into socially beneficial channels. In thus combining the spirit of renunciation with that of service he really made history, and in making the monks come away from the caves and cloisters into the midst of the common multitude he immensely enlarged the boundaries of what people had come to understand by spiritual life. But yet even to-day,--to mention

another small fact--we find men who will not readily accept that the members of the order of Ramakrishna, and of similar other groups are monks at all, because they happen to travel in buses and trams and live in huge buildings and carry umbrellas! So strong is the hold of a rigid formalism on human minds that in them externals assume a vital importance while the inner significance is scarce cared for.

25. Swami Ranganathananda. It is a fact of great significance that if there is any scripture in the world which has not lost it appeal to modern minds, it is the Bhagavad Gita. The modern mind, let us note, distrusts all scriptures and has lost that abiding faith in the values which traditional religion offers. The full fire of modern scientific criticism has been directed to all the scriptures of all the religions of the world, and the results have been disastrous to both of them. It is becoming increasingly difficult to live on mere faith especially when such faith does not accord with verified truth. There is no doubt and questioning prevalent everywhere.

26. Knowledge is the only permanent cure for all the ills of life, and it is only when we are torn as it were with doubts and conflicts, that we are fit to enquire into and receive knowledge of truth or philosophy. Since Arjuna is in such a condition and since he craves Krishna to enlighten him with the truth, it is only proper on the part of Krishna to impart to him a philosophy of life which keeps one's mind steady and feet firm in the midst of one's preoccupations with life's ceaseless activities. "Tie the knowledge of Truth in the folds of your cloth and do whatever you please"--Sri Ramakrishna used to say. Sri Krishna does precisely the same. Life at every step raises problems and it is the business of philosophy to find solutions to them.

To this end philosophy seeks a knowledge of the highest truth which alone can give lasting solutions to all the problems of life. Philosophical solutions are not in the nature of promises to be realised when life itself has ebbed away. Truth is of no consequence to us if it cannot be realised in this life. A solution is no solution in the absence of the problem itself. Truth, as the Kenopanishad says, is to be realised here and now. If one knows It here, that is Truth; if one knows It not here, then great is his loss). And truth is simple enough and can enter life silently without elbowing out any of its other contents, and transform it imperceptibly. This, and not a baggage of outworn and meaningless creeds and dogmas, is what Sri Krishna offers us when we are at our wit's end.

27. Editor: But the statement, "Its end is not different from philosophy and its method of approach may not be the same" raises the question whether there can be more than one method of testing truth, whether there is any other approach to truth than that of philosophy. One may readily agree with the author that mysticism gives "peace" and "bliss" but then the quest of philosophy is different, though these may be bye-products of the philosophical attainment of truth. Nor do we think that he need have been so grudging in his admission that "the Upanishads have not forsaken the path of rational realisation of the ultimate truth."

28. A distinction has been drawn between empiric and transcendental intuitions. Exalted and sublime religious feelings are not to be confused with the intuition of Reality.

29. The subject-matter of philosophy is the True, and the philosopher is one who seeks to give a logically consistent description of experience. The nature of the subject renders his

his approach towards it essentially intellectual. His success in the pursuit is to be measured by the degree of disinterestedness with which he proceeds on the analysis of experience. Complete disinterestedness, however, is a quality that is impossible of attainment in this world; yet the orthodox philosopher is expected to perform this impossible feat and study his subject matter without any intrusion of feelings or consideration of its consequences on the world at large. He is to segregate his personality from the subject of his study and treat the structure of Reality as if it existed quite independently of the perceiving mind with no vital relation to the Truth of man. He is to ignore completely that just as in the case of our so-called true intellectual perceptions, the refined or purified feelings of man have also something corresponding to their contents in Reality. His conclusions too are not to be judged by their effects on his character and personality or from their repurcussions on the life of men in general; the cold categories of the intellect under whose inspiration they have sprung are also to be their sole judge. Their validity lies in their logical consistency, not in their human worth.

30. Nor does it end consist in arriving at a theory of the universe but in an entire transformation of one's personality and one's outlook on life and its values.

31. In maintaining experience (Anubhuti) to be the final test of spiritual facts, and in offering the highest generalisation of the universe that the human mind can conceive of, Vedanta embodies in itself some of the most admirable features of modern science.

32. Swami Ranganathananda: The ego in man is the cause of all errors and the origin of all false values. It is that to which we refer all our judgments regarding everything in our experience,

and being itself limited and circumscribed, it is not able to confer infallibility to its judgments. Hence the errors. Hence also doubts, which demand further enquiry. Deeper enquiry reveals the totally unreal character of the ego, thus shifting the self to a deeper reality. Here we come to the great conception of the Sakshi (Witness), which no philosophy in the West has yet arrived at, but towards which Western thought is steadily and unmistakably proceeding through its application of scientific methods to the problems of psychology. That the ego is unreal, that man's individuality does not consist in the ego, is what modern biology and psychology also teach.

33. Modern biological and psychological analysis must go deeper in the search for man's sense of individuality in order to avert the conclusion of Nihilism. We in India see behind the ego, which is part of the ceaseless flow of Nature, the entity called Sakshi, who witnesses all this flow and change and whose philosophical significance has yet to be fully grasped. Yet, all true knowledge, all valid judgments in logic or science imply unmistakably a shifting of the subject from the ego to the Sakshi. When science insists on studying things from the point of view of the objects themselves by eliminating the personal equation, it is, in effect, emphasising only the Sakshibhava. For, the limited vision of the ego gives place to the unlimited and universal vision of the Sakshi by the practice of scientific or intellectual detachment. In ordinary life also, when we insist on what is called impartial judgment, what is achieved is this same ego-elimination. The two important characteristics of the Sakshi are its detachment and universality. It marks the highest point of perfection in the process of depersonalisation.

34. Sri Krishna recognised long ago that a ra-

tional ethics must be based on the highest metaphysics. Mankind has been searching for a sanction for ethical discipline.

35. But the demand for a rational ethics is still there, and Kant's Categorical Imperative is nothing better, if not worse in its application, than ethics based on revelation.

36. Ethics have to solve the conflicts between the rival demands of self and society, selfishness and altruism. When ethics teach the suppression of self as the essence of moral life, it asks us merely to transcend the unreal and find our being in the real--the Sakshi. "Why should I be unselfish?" asks the rationalist of to-day, expecting a rational answer. Because "The self is a fever; the self is a delusion," as Buddha says. And since realisation of Truth requires the attainment of the detached view-point of the Sakshi, ethical discipline must be combined with scientific and intellectual discipline for its fullest realization. To the discipline of the intellect which science insists in its pursuit of Truth must be added a discipline of the whole life covering every moment of one's existence. Life is a continuous struggle characterised by ceaseless activity. How to order life and its activities so that it may yield its fruit in the knowledge of Truth--is the great problem which faces all mankind.

37. Before enquiry, man takes his ego or self as real, and all actions are judged from that standpoint. At this stage man works with various motives.

38. The two characteristics of the real Self or Sakshi are, (1) Its detachment and (2) Its freedom from limited or circumscribed vision. We have also seen how scientific enquiry helps in a measure to attain this exalted view-point. We shall now proceed to enquire how ethical endeavour also finds its meaning and completion in this

consummation. A deliberate conquest of the false self or ego is the sine qua non for the attainment of the true Self.

39. Work by itself is neither good nor bad, neither high nor low, but the preferences of the ego evaluate all work according to its whims. Through the sense of duty we disregard the false values which the ego has attached to work and thus transcend the ego itself. This helps us to realize the second characteristic of the Sakshi, viz. freedom from limited vision, or, what amounts to the same thing, getting universality of outlook. (2) by not caring for the fruits of our actions or by being unattached to them, we are asked to realise the first characteristic of the Sakshi--detachment.

40. Duty is the hard school where man learns to crucify his ego. This phase is characterised by ceaseless struggle and tension. But when the centre has been shifted from the ego to the Sakshi, duty fulfils itself and the invididual works from the highest standpoint. The urge to break all bondages and fly into freedom compels one to criticise at a higher stage the concept of duty itself. Duty is certainly high; but there is an element of compulsion in it. We may call it inner compulsion (Categorical Imperative), or external compulsion, but compulsion it is. Hence it must be transcended. The man of duty is at best a disciplined slave. Hence the Gita teaches man to rise above even his duty and work as a free being. When one has disciplined oneself in the rigorous school of duty, one becomes fit to work as a master.

41. All his actions seek the welfare of mankind as a whole. They are as Sri Krishna says, "Sarvabhutahiteratah" (ever interested in the good of all beings), and their works have always only one reference, "Lokasamgrahartham", "(the welfare of mindkind.)

SHEONARAYAN LAL SHRIVASTAVA:
DISCIPLINARY PRELUDE TO THE STUDY OF VEDANTA.
(In Vedanta Kesari. Vol.XXI)

Vedanta is a unique system of thought, unique in the boldness of its conclusions, in the subtlety of its dialectic, and in its freedom from all shades of dogmatism. Its approach is philosophic per sang, keeping at a safe distance all the deep-rooted theological pre-possessions of man. No wonder then, that Max Muller should have said of it that it is "a system in which human speculation seems to have reached its very acme." Its appeal to the children of the soil is palpable from their according it the first place amongst their systems of philosophies.

Discipline for Even Intellectual Comprehension: Vedanta however, is not a system of philosophy which is so easily comprehensible. It requires the persistent efforts of a sharp intellect to grasp its fundamentals. The Vedantins maintain that the understanding of the deep truths of Vedanta is facilitated by the student's disciplinary equipment, which is an indispensable pre-requisite to Vedantic studies. Not only is moral discipline a practical means to the intuitional realisation of Brahman, but it is even helpful in the intellectual comprehension of Vedantic truths. It is a trite saying of the Vedantins that Sadhana-chatushtaya or the Four-fold Discipline must precede Brahma-Jijnasa or the enquiry after Brahman. The Hindu thinkers believe in the increased intellectual efficiency of a morally disciplined mind. What physical hygiene is to the health of the body, ethical hygiene is to the health of the mind.

All students of the Upanishads must be familiar with the fact that the ancient Upanishadic teachers used to prescribe longer or shorter periods of Tapas to seekers of Brahma-jnana, according as they were lower or higher in the

scale of ethical evolution. The aspirant was taken by and by from lower to higher truths; and his intellectual advance was always found to run parallel and proportional to his ethical advance, to the cumulative effect of his ever-growing Tapas. To most modern minds all this is likely to appear a meaningless joke. What on earth, they may ask, has intellectual clarity to do with Tapas? An answer to this question is here attempted in the lines that follow.

Need for Reflective Turn of mind.: It is well known that every branch of knowledge requires of its student, for the adequate comprehension of its advanced principles, a disposition of mind suited to it. We would not expect a man without a scientific disposition of mind, without scientific insight, to understand higher scientific truths, though he may be a great poet or a great artist. Every study to be thorough, requires an insight in that particular direction. Philosophy is no exception to this general rule. It also invites to its sanctuary men with a steady and reflective vein of mind.

But, egranting that for any particular study there must be a disposition of mind suited to it together with an aptitude for it, it may yet be that moral equipment has nothing whatsoever to do with it. This, we concede, is a truism in so far as other branches of study are concerned; but the case of Vedanta is different. A man may be a physicist or a chemist or a historian or even a philosopher without any moral stamina in him; but he cannot be a Vedantin. The possibility of adequately comprehending the fundamentals of Vedanta shall ever remain closed to him. Vedanta insists on disciplinary equipment, not only as a means to realisation or the intuitional experience of Truth, but even for the intellectual comprehension of its cardianal tenets.

Capacity for Subtle Introspection: Every serious student of Vedanta knows full well that its car-

dinal principles are arrived at by deep and subtle introspective analysis of experience and are not likely to be grasped by those who have no facility in such methods. The Vedanta philosophers were fortunate in realising that theorising on the surface facts of experience was but a very ineffectual way of coming to ultimate truths. They chose, by introspection, to penetrate to the deeper and basic facts of existence--the true data for metaphysical construction. Introspection helped them to penetrate to those deeper recesses of existence which are hidden to our naive sense experience.

Intellectual construction always proceeded in closest collaboration with the introspective observation of basic facts. The psychological ever went hand in hand with the logical; hence the giddy heights reached by Vedanta. For instance it is the introspective genius of our Vedantic thinkers which discerned that the entire range of experience could be classified into four primary and basic states--Jagrat (waking), Swapna (dream), Sushupti, (deep sleep) and Turiya (Transcendent)--a classification which is of immense value in the system of Vedanta.

Calmness and Inwardness: Now, the aptitude for subtle introspective observation can only belong to a mind which is calm, collected, and composed, more inward than outward. To bring about steadiness and tranquillity of mind, such as is well fitted for introspection, a Fourfold Sadhana is insisted upon.

Fourfold discipline and Personality: The cardinal disciplinary principles of Vedanta, as put forth by Sri Sankaracharya, are 1. Samadamadisadana sampat, 2. Nityanitya vastu viveka 3, Ihamuthrapalabhogaviraga and 4 Mumukshatva. We shall confine ourselves here to throwing some light on their significance as aids to the

intellectual comprehension of Vedanta. The intellectual predilections of any one depend very much on the tupe of person that he is. Fichte has rightly observed that "what kind of philosophy a man chooses, depends ultimately upon what kind of man he is." The system of Vedantic culture therefore aims at inculcating those principles in a man which deepen his philosophic insight and make the Vedantic truths easily acceptable to him. The true Vedantin, as the Hindu thinkers have always visualised him, is not merely a theorist with a certain set of notions about the ultimate Reality, but also a type of personality.

Considering the Sadhanas, we find that they all aim at engendering in man the right attitude of philosophic search. To begin with, the Shama-Damadi-Damadi-Sadhana-Sampat includes six disciplinary principles, viz. Shama, Dama, Uparati, Titiksha, Samadhana and Shraddha. Now, what is Shama? Govindananda defines it: It is taking a dispassionate or detached view of the affairs of life. We do not often notice how imperceptibly and silently our affections for the objects of life create in the mind an unduly strong bias for them and disable it from discerning higher values and higher realities. To see things from a proper perspective, it is necessary to take a dispassionate stand.

What is Dama? It is gloating over sense enjoyment that curbs and cripples the vigour of thought. Hence the necessity for one who would choose to be a thinker.

Then comes Uparati which is defined.xx Its purpose is to emancipate the mind from an inflexible routine of duties which have not for their end the supremest goal of life--the realisation of the highest Truth. When thus emancipated it can go on a free and unchequered pursuit of Truth.

In addition to these, has been included Titi-

ksha or an ungrudging endurance of the dual cor-
relatives of pleasure and pain, heat and cold,
etc. Samadhana means keeping the mind steady,
not allowing it to lapse into sleepiness, lazi-
ness and inattention. Shraddha is a respectful
trust for all higher things.

A second cardinal principle of discipline is
the constant habit of discrimination between the
Eternal and the transient. Truth is, ex hypothe-
si, eternally immutable and abiding. All that
passes away, is negated or sublated in any state,
of experience, cannot claim to be real from an
ultimate or metaphysical standpoint. This habit
of discrimination cannot too strongly be empha-
sised for a seeker of Truth. The soul of man is
stirred from its very depths to seek the eternal
only when it has perceived the extreme evanes-
cence of all earthly objects.

A third principle of discipline is relinquish-
ing the desire for the enjoyment of the fruits of
actions here or hereafter. To the genuine seeker
nothing is higher and more desirable than the
attainment of the highest Truth. Enjoyment, earth-
ly or heavenly, is but a trifle as compared to
it. His one supreme desire is illumination.

Lastly, we have what is known as Mumukshutva
or the desire of emancipation from the all-en-
veloping Nescience, a consuming passion for the
living presence of Truth where every trace of ig-
norance has disappeared.

It is this fourfold discipline which is veri-
ly the prelude to the study of Vedanta. With
a proper training in these qualities, obstacles
to the perception of Truth, like restlessness,
hankering after pleasures and the consequent ra-
ging of the passions of love and hatred, are
rooted out from the mind, which acquires in
addition the positive virtues of steadiness and
subtlety in the very process of purification.
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One's penetration into, or assimilation of, the Vedanta Truths is thus directly proportionate to one's mastery of these items of discipline.

C. MAHADEVIAH.

SHANKARA--A PHILOSOPHER. (Vedanta Kesari XXI).

Apparently a Theologian: There are many scholars both in India and Europe who regard Shankara as a scholastic and theologian. A scholastic is one who tries to establish religious dogma with the help of logic. It is well known that theology assumes the existence of God, generally on the authority of scripture, and then begins to expound His relations to man and the universe; whereas the philosopher starts with experience and, with the help of reason, arrives at Truth--truth about the universe and man's relation to it. The works of Shankara, those which are accepted on all hands as his, are his commentaries on the Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and the Gita. It is no wonder therefore, that to a superficial observer Shankara is a mere commentator, a scholastic defending by means of logic the dogma of the Upanishads, a theologian basing his ideas of God and His relation to man and the universe on the authority of scripture.

But this notion is erroneous. It is true that Shankara has not left any work--accepted as his by scholars--in which he has built up his system on the basis of experience and independently of scripture. This is mere accident and the result of the exigencies of the situation in which he was placed. A careful study of his commentaries will however, show beyond doubt that, far from being a scholastic and theologian, Shankara is pre-eminently a philosopher.

Rock-bed of Experience and Reasoning. The first

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point that has to be made clear is his attitude towards the authority of scriptures. In his commentary on the Second Sutra he remarks:

"Whereas in matters of Vedic Karma (like the Yajna whose fruit is said to be the attainment of heaven after death) scripture is the only authority, in matters concerning Brahman not only scripture but experience also is authority; since the knowledge of Brahman can be actually experienced and Brahman is a thing already existing." It must be noted that here Shankara places the authority of experience on a par with that of the scripture. In fact the implication is that scripture derives its authority only by conforming itself to experience. For in the beginning of his commentary on II.1,4, in answer to the question why scriptural testimony should not be sufficient in matters relating to Brahman, just as in matters relating to Vedic Karma, Shankara replies: "It would have been sufficient if, like Karma, Brahman had to be known only by means of scripture, not being knowable by any other means of knowledge. But unlike Karma whose fruit comes into existence only after its performance, Brahman is a thing which is already existing. And with regard to the existent things there is room for other means of knowledge (than scripture) just as in the case of Prithivi, etc." And then follows the significant remark: "Just as when Srutis differ from one another, they are all made to conform to one of them, so when the Sruti is in conflict with (what is ascertained from) another means of knowledge, it must be made to conform to the latter." And again in his introduction to the Advaita Prakarana of Gaudapada's Karikas he says: "If it is asked, "Is Advaita to be known only from scripture of from reasoning also?"-- the reply is that it can be known even from reasoning. To show how it is possible, the Ad-

vaita Prakarana is commenced." It must now be clear that Shankara builds up his system not on the rock-bed of experience and with the only reliable instrument reasoning.

But if we wish to see Shankara the philosopher at his best, we have only to turn to his famous introduction to the commentary on the Brahma Sutras. Here we find a most startling yet true analysis of human experience, and the Truth is deduced by sheer reasoning. No authority of any kind is quoted nor referred to. Starting from the analysis of the totality of experience into the now well-known divisions of subject and object, Shankara shows, by referring to universal experience, how the object is mistaken for the subject and vice versa, and how this mistaking is at the root of all the ills of life, and how when it disappears at the dawn of knowledge, a man will realise the oneness of the Atman and attain to the consequent bliss. Having thus put the whole system in a nutshell, Shankara remarks, "How such is the meaning of all the Vedanta texts we shall presently show in these Shariraka Mimama Sutras."

Love of Truth above everything else: We have referred only to the most obvious passages to show that Shankara is nothing if not a philosopher. But a close study of his commentaries will reveal, almost at every step, his extraordinary metaphysical acumen, his wonderful power of reasoning and above all, his genuine thirst for Truth. If love of Truth, irrespective of all other considerations, be the mark of a philosopher, then Sankara is a philosopher par excellence. In commenting on the first Sutra, to the question why, if Brahman be known as one's own self, there should be any enquiry at all about it, he replies, "But no one is agreed as to which is this self in man." Then after enumerating the various differing

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schools of thought including his own, he remarks, "Such being the case, if one were to believe in any one of these doctrines without enquiry, he would miss his salvation and come to ruin." Thus quite unlike the scholastic whose business is merely to prop up religious dogma on logical support, and unlike the theologian who starts with assuming his God and propounds His relations to man and the universe as satisfactorily as he can, Shankara, with a burning love for Truth, tries to solve the mystery of life by starting with human experience and, by a rigorously logical enquiry, arrives at conclusions which are even today the admiration of the world.

THE VEDANTA KESARI. VOL. XVIII.

1. R. Shamasastry: The forms in which things appear are not real; for they can have neither one nor many forms. Hence there can be neither external nor internal object or form. For a thing cannot be both big and atomic. Everything is merely illusory. Illusion is of three kinds: (1) World-illusion, (2) Truth-illusion (Tatva-samvriti) (3) Faith-illusion (Abhisamaya-Samvriti). The first is like that of mistaking mirage for water; the second is the usual notions of external objects; the third is religious belief.

2. If then there are no objects corresponding to the notions of a pot, a bull of various colours, and the like, it will reduce itself to non-dualistic knowledge or sentiency (Gnana-dvaita) but not Sunyata or emptiness. In reply to this objection the Buddhist says, "We do not say that cessation of appearance is Sunyata or emptiness. All that we say is that forms are all appearances. All attributes are appearances.

The sensation of middle moment (Madhyamasamvid) free from all attributes is truth.
3. Knowledge or impression of middle moment is the very entity free from all attributes; the limit of creatures or elements is the same, it is the reality and it is Sunyata. That notion or knowledge of the middle moment is indivisible; yet owing to Avidya it appears as split into many.
4. Intelligence, though indivisible appears as the knower and the knowable in virtue of erroneous seeing. When all Avidya or erreous notion has melted away, pure knowledge alone remains.
5. There is no other thing to be experienced by the mind; nor is there another experience beyond it; free from the distinction of the knowable and the knower it alone shines in itself.
6. The Vignanavadi school of the Buddhists regard the world as a phenomenon of Gnana or thought itself.
7. Against this argument the Buddhist says as floows:--"Is it the world that we see or the external appearance of our Gnana, thought itself? It is a law of thought that the thought and the thing thought of appear together simultaneously. Without thought there can be nothing thought of. But without a thing thought can exist, as Madhyama-samvit or thought in the middle moment of its rise and disappearance.
8. There is no other thing experienced by the mind or intelligence. Its experience is not distinct from itself. Devoid of all distinction between the knower and the knowable it alone shines of itself.
9. Consciousness itself appears here as both knower and the known. So in our experience of every-day world, too, it can be very well said

that the knower itself appears as the known.
10. In the theory of idealism ideas take the place of objects and serve the purpose of objects as in dream. Some are apt to say that things experienced in the waking state are perceived in dream and that dream-experience goes to prove the existence of things rather than their non-existence. We reply that here is no rule that only experienced things are perceived in dream. For men are found to have dreamt of their own head being cut off and lying on the ground before them.
11. Vasana (memory) called Avidya is the cause of all mental passions. That beginningless Avidya disappears when it is realised that there is only one thing, Prabodha (Advaya-Tatva). For what is unreal is got rid of through Gnana, knowledge of reality, just as the false perception of silver is got rid off through the knowledge of shell. (The above article (items 1 to 11) is based upon Haribhadrasuri's "Sastra-Varta-Samuchchaya.").
12. Girindra Narayan Mallik. Two phases of Buddhi::
Vasana or desire being an attribute of Manas, it is not proper to ascribe it to Buddhi. But popularly the word Buddhi is used in two senses, viz. (1) the judge of rightness or wrongness, (2) the Vasana arising in the Manas. Buddhi being the highest official of the Kshetrajna, it is not altogether improper to describe it in terms of Vasana. To avoid such confusion, however, Buddhi has been described in the Gita as of two phases--(1) Vyavasayatmika, (2) Vasanatmika. In the first phase, Buddhi determines that such and such acts are right and worth doing, while such and such acts are wrong and to be avoided. This is followed by a desire in the Manas to do the right acts. If, therefore, the Buddhi is pure, it will be followed only by right desires and right acts. These two phases of Buddhi are similar to what Kant describes as Pure Reason and

Practical Reason. Hence the rightness of act is always to be determined from the standard of Pure Buddhi or what is called the Sattviki-Buddhi of the Gita. It is to be noted here that this doctrine of the Gita finds its analogue in the theory which Kant develops from the metaphysical and ethical points of view in his Metaphysic or Morals, and is subsequently developed further in Green's Ethical theory of Self-realisation.

13. M.A. Venkata Rao. Thanks to Bergson and Einstein time has become the central problem of philosophy. The crux of the question is presented by the antithesis between time as felt and time as thought. Perceptual time is agreed to be a continuous whole, whereas conceptual time is supposed to be mathematical-discrete and infinitely divisible in character. Confronted by this problem philosophy has so far taken the usual methods of suppressing one or other of the aspects of the problem. The first to take time seriously was Bergson. He dismissed conceptual time as empty, spurious and 'spatial', and upheld perceptual time as the only concrete reality. Time becomes the very stuff of reality. But Bertrand Russell has a great suspicion of this easy solution. For him, analysis is the road to reality, and the world can be analysed into a number of series of discrete moments. The mind is a succession of sensations and images, and the world a succession of 'particulars' (a term which Russell adopts for his neutral entities in the Analysis of Matter). These present day discussions on time display opposite abstractions. As usual extremes meet, and both views commit the same fallacy--that of denying unity.

14. As usual, the truth consists in the synthesis of opposites. Reality is both duration and succession. If we interpret time as the aspect of succession, we have to supplement it with

the aspect of ground or essence to render it adequate to reality in its fullness. This aspect is that of eternity. Reality displays both the aspects of time and eternity. This view renders Bergson's duration concrete as the creative self-expression of reality. It renders Russell's atomicity intelligible as referring to the successive stages of its growth.

15. Contemporary thought on time is involved in blind alleys. It is caught between the Scylla of mere duration and the Charybdis of a mathematical infinity of pure instants,-- between an abstract interpretation of perceptual and conceptual time.

A true view of time is impossible without an adequate conception of eternity. A more concrete interpretation of duration will give a clue to a more adequate solution of the problem of time. Time is to be thought of against an eternal background. Of course discussion is bound to suffer from the necessary employment of metaphors. We must first get rid of the spatial conception of eternity as an endless line. The precept, "Take time seriously" has resulted in a one-sided emphasis on mere successiveness. Duration is a flow certainly; but it cannot be a mere flow. There is something that flows.

16. Eddington points out that interspace is as essential as the centre; that the electron cannot be located definitely and that the same electron may never appear twice.

17. Prof. Kokileswar Sastry. The false error of 'independent being' of the world, what may be called the 'fundamental Adhyasa'--this alone disappears in the Mukti and not the world itself.

18. Swami Iswarananda: H_2O remains H_2O (Brahman, the thing-in itself, remains itself throughout all changes) even though it may

change from gaseous vapour to liquid water and again to solid ice, become hot or cold, take the forms of the wave, bubble, or whirl-pool. Throughout all these changes H_2O never changed, it had no form and remained as it was. Throughout it was static from one standpoint and dynamic from another standpoint, both aspects harmoniously existing in the one. None of the changes changed H_2O, yet these changes were all of H_2O. Staticism of the Supreme in this case is not the staticism of the water at standstill as opposed to water lashed into waves but of H_2O as opposed to the dynamism of standing as well as moving water, of H_2O transcending (yet containing) both motion as well as motionlessness.

19. Brahman exists apart from relationships as well as in and through relation. It transcends the universe of Maya but in its transcendence it does not cast aside Maya but contains it, Maya being Brahman itself hiding and revealing itself. In the same way, water when it appears as water is nothing but H_2O, yet it hides its nature as H_2O.

20. MAHENDRANATH SARKAR. Every philosophy has its theory and discipline. It is true of all systems of thought in India, for in India philosophy as a definite promise in the ideal it offers, and this definite promise is realised by the discipline it enforces. Life and philosophy have never been separated in India, for philosophy is thinking about life.

21. As an intellectual discipline it has its logic which denies the relative and establishes the great truth of Tattwamasi (That Thou art) by denying the restrictions of space and time in the life transcendental.

But this truth does not shed its lustre all at once upon the inituate and the seeker. The seeker has to rear in himself a particular attitude before he can even dream of realising the

great truth of Advaita. This particular attitude enables us to view the whole life in all its aspects from the Advaita standpoint. This particular attitude cannot be established at once. It takes at times the discipline and the effort of a whole life.

Advaita is not, therefore, a mere philosophy; it is also the art of realising truth.

22. This discriminative talent does not come at once, as it is not merely the surface discrimination of the true from the false. Real discrimination attends the finest development of life and consciousness, for it is not merely differentiating thinking but differentiating perception. The finest intuition in transcendence presupposes a penetrating intelligence. The trained Buddhi (intelligence) can see and feel directly the illusoriness of the given and the reality of the transcendent. Transcendent intuition presupposes such discriminative perception. It cannot be vouchsafed unto the seeker unless he possesses such a penetrating intelligence. The adept in the logic and philosophy of Vedanta may not possess this fineness of intelligence, for he may not rear up the right attitude in the discriminative meditation about the reality of Atman and the ideality of the empirical life.

23. The seeker must seek through his entire being, and this means something more than acquaintance with the theory of Advaita. Truth-perception is the highest awakening which means that the inertia of our being and thinking must be set aside. Where the soul is not attuned to the universal life it cannot attain at once the Advaitic transcendance. Thinking can indicate the end of the search but it cannot help us in the realisation unless the fibres of our being are pure and free from all forms of intertia and obstructive thought and activity.

24. The theoretical training seeks to give a direct lead across the ocean of darkness, the realm of Maya, by generating true understanding But it should not be lost upon us that understanding helps life and life helps understanding. And in fact where there is not this mutuality, there must be the dismal failure in the life of realisation. The illusion produces stiffness in the heart and creates an intellectual blindness. The removal of the latter cannot leave us untouched and unaffected. Spiritual illumination when it comes cannot leave us cold in any part of our existence. The intellectual appreciation of the Advaita has an effect upon the heart. The heart can no longer beat with its ego-centric impulses.

25 The egoistic self creates the jarring note, and civilisation suffers from the tension of its being and cannot perceive the harmony and rhythm in the delight of the expansive vision of the self. The future of civilisation will be sure and secure if humanity is inspired by the truth of identity. It chastens our being, it raises our outlook from the instinctive sympathy to the conscious feeling of the widest commonalty of existence and utmost expansion of our being.

26. An observer. Karma is usually held by the evangelist to be identical with fatalism. But nothing can be further from the truth. Karma means both work and its fruit. When rightly understood, the doctrine signifies that each work done must bear its fruit, good or bad, according to its nature. Believing in this cosmic law, the Hindu holds that his present is the result of the past, just as his future is going to be moulded by his present strivings. As such, the law of Karma is the greatest incentive, not to morbid inactivity as is wrongly supposed, but to intense self-effort.

27. Karma includes both destiny and self-

effort of which the latter is more important. Says the Hindu scripture, "Know that destiny is the result of one's own action performed in another bodily existence. Hence the wise call man, i.e. his efforts, superior. For even an adverse destiny is vanquished by manly efforts of people, engaged in auspicious acts and constantly exerting themselves." The doctrine of re-incarnaton proceeds directly from the law of Karma.
28. The Christian theologian does not recognise as was pointed out by Fichte, "that the claimed post-existence of the soul necessarily implies its pre-existence." Nor does he understand why Lessing asks with a deep feeling--"Is this hypothesis so laughable because it is the oldest?--Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring fresh knowledge, fresh experience? Do I bring away so much from once that there is nothing to repay the trouble of coming back?"
29. Professor Huxley speaking of the doctrine said, "None but hasty thinkers will reject it on the ground of inherent absurdity. Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its roots in the world of reality."
30. Many of the early Christian sects also held these doctrines which were suppressed by the Christian Church by passing in the Council of Constantinople in 538 (?) A.D. a law that anathematised those who believed in "the mythical presentation of the pre-existence of the soul, and the consequently wonderful opinion of its return."
31. While the foundation of religion--viz. the mystical consciousness, or the experience of the immanent and transcendent Being--will remain intact, the superstructure of forms and dogmas need a thorough overhauling. Some of the old materials are to be rejected altogether, while others freed from incrustations and excrescenses, may be used in the reconstruction. But as these

will prove insufficient, new materials are to be found. In this age of mutual exchange and assimilation of ideas, no religion should hesitate to take this bold step.

32. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri. He calls his teacher's teacher Gaudapada as Vedantarthasampradayavid (a knower of traditional meaning of Vedanta). He says in his Gita Bhashya: One who, though he knows all the scriptures, is not aware of their traditional import, should be rejected as a fool. In his Taittriya Bhasya he bows to the line of his Gurus. In his Bhashya on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad he says: Anukampaneeya Agamarthavichchinnasampradaya Budyavahah. It is hence not right to say as Dr. Radhakrishnan does, "Sankara's modesty makes him say that the doctrine expounded by him is nothing more than what is contained in the Vedas. He thinks that he is voicing an old and weighty tradition which has been handed down to us by an unbroken series of teachers." The integration of thought in the Upanishads had a reintegration in the Gita, and later in the Vedanta Sutras and in Shankara's system of philosophy. It is further important to note that Kumarila criticises the Adwaita doctrine. He was anterior to Sri Sankara. This shows that the Advaita doctrine is older than Sri Sankara. Bhartrihari, who was anterior to Kumarila, expounds the doctrine in his Vakyapadiya. The author of Vyasa-Tatparya-Nirnaya points out that when contemporary sages criticise Vyasa they describe his doctrine in terms of Adwaita. This also shows that the Advaitic doctrine has not been read into the Brahma Sutras by Sri Sankara. In fact if we study the Upanishads with care and minuteness, we come across many places therein where the Advaita doctrine is formulated with uncompromising precision and thoroughness. The eternally famous declarations Tat Twam Asi, Aham Brahmasmi, Ayam-Atma Brahma, etc. are some of those final and

consummate utterances which sum up the supremest realisations of the human spirit.

33. His strength lay in the fact that he began from the Atman. The Atman (Self) is the deepest reality in all of us. Even if we doubt the self, the doubter is the self. The self is the knower and not the object of knowledge. The Upanishad had declared (who can know the knower?). His famous Bhashya on the Brahma Sutras begins with the declaration that subject (self) and object are as diverse and disparate as light and darkness: The self is identical and immutable in all the three states of waking and dream and deep sleep. In the words of Vidyaranya's Panchadasi "the self-awareness is self-luminous and does not rise or set and is of the nature of oneness.).

Sankara then proceeds to point out that by Adhyasa (super-imposition) we are ignorant and unaware of the true nature of the self and identify it with the non-self in various ways. Some import the characteristics of the body, others of the senses, and others of the mind, in their conception of the Atman. He says that to remove such error (Avidya) and to attain a realisation of the Atman as one, the Vedanta has to be studied and meditated upon and experienced, in full measure.

34. The doubt or denial of the soul is absurd as either the doubter or the denier himself is the self. The flux of mental states implies a permanent background with reference to which alone flux could exist and would have a meaning. If we peel layer after layer of empirical consciousness what is left is nothing but pure consciousness.

35. He says that reality is of three kinds, ie. (1)Prathibhasika (apparent or illusory) like the world of dreams (2) Vyavaharika (phenomenal or

relative or practical) like the world in the waking state and (3) Paramarthika (noumenal or absolute). The first has the transsiency of an illusion or of a mirage; the second has the transiency of the ever-changing finite; but the third has the permanence of a changeless and eternal infinite.

36. Dean Inge says in his Outspoken Essays: "Complete knowledge is the complete unity of the knower and known, for we can in the last resort only know ourselves."

37. Green says in his Prolegomena to Ethics: "The old question why God made the world, has never been answered nor will be. We know not why the world should be; we only know that there it is." All this round-about statement is expressed by the short word Maya which is used by the Advaitins.

38 Mahendranath Sarkar. Vedanta is neither passivism nor activism and therefore there can be no forecasting how the adept will behave. He no doubt will follow the bent of his being.

39 C.T.Srinivasan. Advaita is based upon reason and could be supported by independent enquiry. Duality is a fact of ordinary experience; and reason and common sense are there not to dispute about this fact of common experience. But dualism is different from duality. Dualism refers to the question, "Is the ultimate basis of this universe dual in character?" And duality refers to our ordinary experience characterised by a division as subject and object etc. We should not confuse one with the other. If it is only duality that the so-called Dvaitins want to establish, we have no quarrel with them. But its metaphysical value and meaning in the light of rational enquiry is the question for real thinkers. Every great scientist admits that this whole universe is under the control of one single supreme principle, the basis of

all laws. If there is God, and if there is man, and if there is a world, all these three ought to obey a single system or principle which then must necessarily transcend these three separate units. There should be a common back-ground; otherwise number itself is meaningless. The whole of this universe which is identical with what is known as our experience, is God. The whole is Brahman. That is Advaita.

40. Dualism as the principle that is at the basis of experience is a wrong inference based upon duality which is the illusive nature of experience. The consciousness of that duality is ever the non-dual basis. Our simple sleep shows the non-dual basis of our experience in waking or dream.

41. A.H. Jaisinghani. Sufism, let me say in the beginning, is not an 'ism'; it is in fact, a battle against all 'isms', which are essentially, products of an 'I'sm' or egoism. There is such a thing as Sufi-path.

42. According to the Sufis this life is a search for the knowledge of Truth (Haq); Sufism is concerned, primarily, in the words of Al-Hujwiri, with "the unveiling of the Veiled."

43. Sufi Murshids like the teachers of Vedanta regard the heart as the seat of true purification and knowledge.

44. Editor: On a broad analysis of the question, the decline that has apparently set in with regard to the fortunes of religion at the present day may be ascribed to the new intellectual forces that have enabled man to explore the history of his own racial past as well as the secrets of nature, that were regarded hitherto as inaccessible to the human mind. These forces are represented by the modern scientific spirit and historical criticism. These have opened the eyes of man to an intimate knowledge of the many aspects of nature's working and of human history that were hitherto interpreted and understood solely

in the light shed on them by religion. Abandoning the tutelage of churches and of priests, they have gathered through independent methods a vast body of new data on which has been built up a philosophy of life opposed to religious view that reigned supreme till the modern era. To begin with, the revolt started with astronomy, a science that was strangely enough a handmaid to religion in the past. The discoveries of Copernicus and of Galileo showed the absurdity of the Ptolemaic system of astronomy which regarded the earth as the centre of the universe and the rest of the heavenly bodies as subservient to it.

45. Kokileswar Sastri. Sankara elsewhere argues that all these states, viz. pleasure, pain etc. etc. are felt by the Subject to be its objects; and being its objects how can they constitute the nature of the Subject?

46. It is therefore the construction of our intellect due to deep-rooted habit it has inherited. This is due to Avidya. This Vedantic false knowledge is known as Anirvachaniya Kyati. It superimposes the states of Consciousness upon the unity of the Subject, ignoring or forgetting the fact that the Subject is a unity which it maintains in and through its successive states, which cannot be its component parts i.e. cannot be identified or confounded with the real nature of the subject.

47. Even when we are confined to this Samsara, to the world, we are to take it as Atma, not as something other than Atman. Nothing ought to appear to him as other than Brahma; but all differences of Nama-rupa should now appear as manifestations of the underlying unity.

48. Jiva and 'supreme soul' are synonymous terms designating one and the same entity that is incapable of being limited by space and time. The aspirant therefore should never entertain any notion of their being separate.

49. Editor. Drig-Drsya-Viveka, as the name itself shows, is an enquiry into the distinction between the "seer" and the "seen". Starting from the ordinary conception of "forms" as the "seen" and the "eye" as the "seer" it steps successively behind the senses and the mind and after revealing how from the relative standpoint they too constitute the "seen" comes to a decisive stop with "Consciousness", the eternal witness of all internal changes. The experiences of the waking and dream states are treated as mere modifications of the mind and the idea of the embodied self is declared as falsely superimposed upon the witness.
50. Kokileswar Sastri. The determination of the non-existence of the effect otherwise than as identical with (non-different from its cause."
You will see then that wa re not to look upon the effects, ie. the objects of the world or the states etc. of the finite Self, as so many self-subsisting and independent entities, but as having no separate being from the underlying cause or the self. Sankara regards this view as the means for self-realisation which will remove the idea of separateness.
51. We must rise above the sway of affection and aversion and restrain these impulses under the law of rational reflection.
52. T.J. Desai. Swami Vivekananda said that some people had crude notions that the Vedanta could be learnt in a few days! The Swami further said that he had to devote about twelve long years of his life to the study of Vedanta.
53. The Swami used to smoke cigars. The Owens were greatly pleased by Swami Vivekananda's visit.
54. He told me that when he had to speak before the Chicago Parliament of Religions for the first time, he felt a little nervous in the beginning, but the Mahavakaya--Aham Brahmasmi--at once flashed through his brain, and such a tremendous

power entered his frame that he outdid himself. He electrified the American audience by his subsequent speeches, and the fact, no doubt, is testified by the reports of the American papers. He, therefore, advised all men not to belittle themselves, but to realise their Brahma-hood, their Divinity.

55. SHEONARAIN LAL SRIVASTAVA. "THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ADVAITISM". The most general statement with regard to Reality is that Reality is subject-object, that is, the conscious subject on the one hand, and the entire objective universe on the other, are held together in epistemological co-ordination. Of two things we are indubitably certain: the conscious self as the unmoving witness of this rolling pageant of the universe, and the entire objective universe as an inseparable content of consciousness. Object is, because it forms the content of consciousness.

The spangled heavens, the suns and moons, the stars and planets, rivers and mountains, houses, persons and things, in fact, all that exist derive their reality from, and are dependent for their validity upon, consciousness. Nothing exists except as the content of our consciousness. "The world exists in the medium of our knowledge," as Bosanquet has put it.

Whatever be the Ultimate Reality, one thing is certain above all others that it will have to derive its reality and validity from our consciousness. Anything beyond the range of consciousness is simply inconceivable.

If Ultimate Reality were to fall outside the range of consciousness, there would be nothing to certify its reality. This truth was firmly impressed upon the minds of the Upanishadic th thinkers and they began their search of the Ultimate by a psychological analysis of the states of consciousness. They traversed through

all the states of consciousness--the waking consciousness, the dream consciousness, the dreamless sleep--and came at last to Turiya, which we may call the super-conscious state. Turiya, they found to be the ne plus ultra state of consciousness and the reality here revealed, therefore, the Highest and the Ultimate.

56. The Mandukya Upanishad describes four states of consciousness, waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and Thuriya. In the first three states the objective is modified and in the last negated.

57. One remarkable difference between the waking consciousness and the dream consciousness is that in the waking consciousness there is a rigorous uniformity in the world of time, space and causality, while in dream this uniformity is almost entirely lost. Events that would take a considerably long time in our waking world are done within an inconceivably short time in dreams. Distance also has not that uniformity in dreams which it has in the waking world; similarly causality. Anything may cause anything.

The third, dreamless sleep or Sushupti is technically called Prajna. It is different from the first two in two ways; first, with regard to the nature of its objective and secondly with regard to the instrument or faculty of apprehending the objective. The first two states are Ekonivimsatimukha while this is Chethomukha, that is, here chetas, intelligence or consciousness itself, unmediated by the mind and the senses, is the faculty or apprehension. The operation of the mind and the senses ceases and the objective becomes unified. This is a very significant fact, for it makes us understand that the manifold in the objective is the creation of the mind and the senses.

The fourth or Turiya is quite unlike the preceding three. The objective and the faculty of apprehension are both negated and consciousness is left to itself in its entirety and pristine

luminosity. In the preceding three states of consciousness, we noted a progressive withdrawal of consciousness from the objective, which is completed in this fourth by the return of consciousness to itself.

In all the three states of consciousness--waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep, we are aware of the objective in different modified forms, but never of their subjective substratum--the comprehending self, or the principle of consciousness.

58. Ed. The Seers of the Truth have all concluded that the entity designated by the term 'I' is not (as conceived by the ignorant man) one with the Buddhi, the vital forces, mind, body and egoism, but is on the other hand, of the nature of Knowledge itself.

59. When as a result of faithfully practising the instructions of the scripture, as communicated by the spiritual preceptor , the oneness of Jivatman and Paramatman is realised in the superconscious state, the root cause of all ignorance, along with causes and effects, gets dissolved in the Paramatman. It is this dissolution of ignorance that is spoken of as liberation. As a matter of fact, bondage and liberation are both merely superimpositions on the Atman.

60. The Vivekachudamani gives a consice description of the person who is fit to be accepted as a teacher.

61. This is one of the most advanced ideas of Adwaitic thought. Its significance is that since the idea of bondage is only a superimposition, the idea of liberation from this unreal state should also be considered unreal.

62. (A Review of "Sankara-Vedanta)• Ed.: The book under review comprises the Srigopal Basu Mallick Fellowship Lectures for 1930-31, delivered by Prof. Kokileswar Sastri Vidyaratna M.A. the distinguished Sanskrit Scholar of the Calcutta University.

63. If the world of names and forms is present in Brahman, sometimes in the seed and sometimes in the manifested state, it may naturally be asked what becomes of non-duality, which forms the fundamental tenet of Sankara-Vedanta. For, if it is admitted that in addition to Brahman there exist the differences of name and form, does not duality step in? Prof. Sastri, however overcomes this difficulty with the help of the Vedantic theory of non-difference of the effect from the cause. In fact, the main thesis of Prof. Sastri's lectures consists in elucidating the implications of this doctrine. An effect is only a manifestation of the cause, it has no existence apart from the cause. If it is removed from the underlying causes it ceased to exist. Thus a pot, which is a modification of the substance clay, exists only through the existence of clay; apart from from it it is a nonentity. Even in such a case as of a seed, which gets destroyed and decomposed before it grows into a sprout, the Vedantin contends that only those indestructivle parts of the seed which grow into the sprout, and not the whole antecedent condition of seed, can be regarded as the cause. Hence the world which is an effect of Brahman does not conflict with the unity of Brahman; for an effect can never be regarded as separate from the cuse. Says Prof. Sastri, "whenever the effects are produced, they are produced from their causes; they never appear divided--separated--from their cause. Can you separate the pot from its cause--the clay? Can you separate the waves from their cause--the water? Can you, placing the waves outdide the water, regard them as something self-existent--as something Anya? The effects are in reality, the manifestations of their causes--the stages through which the causal reality expresses its nature. It is the cause which, without forfeiting its identity, differentiates itself in these forms. It is the cause

which holds these forms, sustains them. It is like the identity of the thread which holds the manifold flowers together, and forms a piece off garland. Then how is it possible to abolish these successive changes, to separate them from their cause which holds them?"

64. That there is a real element of diversity within unity is one of the features of pantheism, and if, as Prof. Sastri puts it, Vedanta holds the chaning world of Nama-rupa to be real, we do not understand how it can be free from the pantheistic element. But Vedanta as traditionally interpreted, however, overcomes this difficulty by its distinction between the higher and the lower Brahman. Lower Brahman means Brahman associated with an element of manifoldness, who is the intelligent principle that forms the material and efficient cause of the changing world of Nama-rupa. This, however, is the view of the ignorant man, and is assumed for his benefit, since he perceives the world as real and seeks to find a cause underlying it. But the world and its evolution are unreal, are mere phantoms having no real existence, from the standpoint of Brahman in its higher aspect as Kutastha or unchanging reality.

65. From the standpoint of higher Brahman, Sankara not only refuses to accept the independent existence of the many, but considers it as illusory as the idea of the snake on a rope. The idea of the snake has not only no independent existence from the rope, but is also unreal in the sense that it disappears when the knowledge of the rope dawns on the mind. In fact, he does not state his views on the higher Brahman with as much emphasis in the Sutra Bhashya as in his commentaries on the Mandukya Upanishad and Gaudapada's Karika thereon. In the commentary on a work like the Brahma Sutras, which beings with the aphorism--Brahman is that from which origin

etc. of this world proceeds--it is not perhaps proper to emphasise the world-transcending nature of Advaita. The Karika of Goudapada holds decidedly more advanced views and in the commentaries thereon Sankara propounds the theory of non-evolution and emphatically denies the reality of the world and the relation of cause and effect. Prof. Sastri maintains that Advaitavada rests on a particular theory of relation between cause and effect. This is true with regard to the Advaitic theory in its lower forms whereas in its highest aspect it transcends the relation of cause and effect. The theory of non-difference of cause and effect, on which emphasis is laid in the Sutra Bhashya, is meant not so much for establishing that there is in Brahman an element of real diversity non-separate from it in essence as to pave the way for the Paramarthic view of non-evolution and absence of cause and effect relation, developed in the commentary on the Karika, by establishing as the first step for it that the distinction between cause and effect is a distinction without a difference. If the effect is not different from the cause, the former cannot have any real existence; for a distinction without a difference is only an imaginary and not an objective fact.

66. The particular view of causality given by the Vedantin only aims ultimately at the theory of non-evolution. This state which language fails to describe and which is logically put sometimes as one of non-difference between cause and effect, does not imply that the effects really persist in the cause. The ideas of creation, causation, etc. which Vedanta gives, are only means for ultimately propounding the theory of non-evolution. In this highest state of knowledge, which the Vedantin is to aspire after, there is no idea of causation or of the world in a manifested or unmanifested form.

67. What we consider the real Paramarthic view in Sankara-Vedanta does, now however, stand in conflict with the professedly realistic interpretation of Advaita that Prof. Sastri has given in his lectures. Our object is to point out that a purely realistic interpretation can include only the Vyavaharic standpoint of Sankara which still holds on to the reality of the world and attempts to correlate the same to the absolute. In such a view, an element of multiplicity may be assumed as existing in Brahman in a relation of non-difference with it. This is the view that Sankara assumes while controverting the system of rival philosophers who hold to the reality of change and of objective phenomena. But on deeper analysis, Vedanta denies the reality of this element of multiplicity with the help of the real-unreal and indescribable Maya--an entity which is assumed only for the explanation of the world of phenomena. Going still higher, in the all-embracing sweep of absolute thought, Vedanta denies the very possibility of causality, and there even the question of the world or of its creation and dissolution does not arise. In fact Prof. Sastrichimself is aware of these different strata of Advaitic thought, for he says in his Preface that what he refuses to accept is the view that exalts the idealistic and ascetic interpretation of Advaita Vedanta to the entire neglect of its realistic side. But we have in spite of this found it necessary to present the highest standpoint of Advaita, because Prof. Sastri has characterised his interpretation as "the correct" or "the True" view of Sankara-Vedanta in the main body of his book. Of course, it is correct, but it is in our opinion partial. It is therefore with a view to show the true place of the realistic view in Sankara's system that we have presented the Paramar-

thic view in such detail.

68. A philosophy which denies the world will have little charms for ordinary man, in whose eyes the very basis of thought and life are centred in the world. The realistic interpretation advocated by Prof. Sastri, however, converts Advaita into a more familiar philosophy to the common man and provides him with a sound intellectual basis for zealously following the usual avocations of life without at the same time losing sight of the Supreme and the Transcendental. The Paramarthic view of Advaita, when preached to persons who are incompetent to understand it, has often the effect of paralysing the springs of activity in them and of turning them into dull and impractical pseudo-philosophers. Prof. Sastri's realistic interpretation is free from this danger as it is not inconsistent with the aims, aspirations and tendencies of common men. But competent students endowed with the transcendental and impersonal outlook coupled with the required philosophic and discriminative bent, will, however, like to go beyond this realistic view and can find satisfaction only in the highest note of Advaitic thought that culminates in the theory of non-evolution.

Prof. Sastri has, therefore, done a great service in expounding such a useful aspect of Advaita Vedanta, which has hitherto remained unexplored. Undoubtedly his lectures form a piece of original research in Advaita philosophy --perhaps a unique book of its type written in recent times.

69. Editor. If we now proceed to consider some of their practical implications, we shall see that the supposed antagonism between Indian spiritual ideals and the practical life of the world is more imaginary than real. It is true that the highest conception of Brahman in Vedanta

transcends the world of limitations and leaves no room for questions regarding life and its concerns. A man who is established in this conception may or may not devote himself to an active life in society; for his individual ego has realised its identity with the life of the cosmos, and his movement and behaviour are all entirely dictated by the cosmical forces working within his environment.

70. Vedanta emphatically teaches that the goal of life is to attain Jnana or right knowledge which enables the individual to overcome the limitations of ignorance and realise the Atman as the one undivided existence, free from all change and all duality. But before one is established in this attitude one has to pass through the stage in which the world seems separate from the self. The problem at this stage is how to bridge over this gulf of difference, and one of the methods that Vedanta prescribes lies through spiritualising our outlook on the world of differences. This is done through the help of sublime symbolisms which interpret the world in its relation to its substratum, Brahman. For according to Vedanta, the effect is non-different from the cause--a truth which we fail to perceive owing to our ignorance, and as a first step towards realising this identity, it asks the aspirant to look upon the world as a manifestation of Brahman which is its cause. By cultivating such an attitude the aspirant is helped to visualise the spiritual background of the world process and his identity in the last resort with the Supreme Brahman.

71. Coming now to the psychological aspect of the question, since the Vedantic doctrine of Atman points out that the human spirit is in reality identical with the Supreme Being, it opens an effective way for developing the personality of man towards its maximum possibilities.

Vedanta points out in no uncertain terms that the human being is not really the weak and grovelling creature that he seems to be. The world of matter which appears so vast and overpowering is only a misreading of the nature of the Supreme Atman. The consciousness of bondage, of weakness and of impurity is present because we have forgotten our identity, and the moment we assert our divinity again that inalienable nature of ours, which no amount of self-hypnotism can really change, will manifest itself. Like a lion of the fable that forgot its lionhood on account of the close association with sheep but regained its real nature on being reminded of it, man too can realise his divinity if he will but reflect on what he really is. Vedanta therefore teaches self-reliance as the basis of all virtue and exhorts all men to believe in their own perfection.
72, Mrs.C.A.F.Rhys Davids. At present we read of this and that tidily worded dogma as being "the kernel of Buddha's doctrine," but not of any sifting of the setting of such a dogma in a mass of monastic values, which were conceived and worded by monks for monks.
73. To one who spoke of him as omniscient, he is recorded as using it: "They wo say the samana Gotama is omniscient...not of me are they sayers-of-the-said; they misrepresent me, they do, by the not-real, the not-fact." The later editors of the Sayings, who thought of him as sabbannu, omniscient, will never have invented such a disclaimer as said by him.
74. Sheonarayan Lal Srivastava. People were in a desperate search after a system of philosophy that would remain faithful to the findings of science as well as quench the spiritual thirst of man. The system of Hegel, first made intelligible to the British thinkers by James Hutchinson Stirling by the publication of his epoch-making book "The Secret of Hegel" promised the ful-

filment of this demand.

The understanding of Hegel brought into being a new school of thinkers, known by the name of the 'Neo-Hegelian School' whose idealism was a strong reaction against the godless naturalism of science. Thomas Hill, Green, Edward Caird John Watson, Bernard Bosanquet, P.H. Bradley and others did much in creating an idealistic atmosphere by giving a spiritual interpretation of the universe.

75 The cardinal tenet of these idealists was to assert the existence of mind or spirit as indispensably necessary for explaining the natural phenomena. Nature is inexplicable without mind. Nature being an inclusive system of related objects necessarily presupposes the relationing and unifying agency of mind or consciousness, for a system of relations can only be apprehended by a mind; and an object could not be referred to as belonging to a systematic world, if there were no unifying consciousness. The phenomenon of knowledge reveals the same unifying character of consciousness. Take the simplest case of perception. What is perception of an object but an aggregate of sensations referred to a unity of consciousness, a synthesis of the various sensible qualities of the object? Knowledge, to borrow Kant's phrase, is "The synthetic unity of appreception."

Now, the finite human mind, they say, is subject to growth and development, gradually increasing in knowledge and understanding more and more of Reality. Human knowledge of Reality is incomplete and subject to a process of growth and development. It therefore presupposes an eternal mind or consciousness of God, whose knowledge of Reality is complete, to whose mind, knowledge in its infinity is manifest, and whose reproductions the finite human minds are. This Infinite Consciousness is the background and support of the finite centres of consciousness.

In short,apart from the unity of consciousness, to which the cosmos of inter-related objects can be referred to, the universe is inexplicable. Reality is subject- object. This is the truth which modern idealism has brought into boldest relief. It is a re-action, on the one hand, against materialism, which asserted the existence of the material world, independently of mind; and on the other, against the extremism of subjective idealism, which sought to explain Reality merely by the subjective process of the mind, divorcing them from their objective contents without which they are meaningless. Subject and object do not exclude each other, but imply each other and are mutually correlated and complimentary. Intelligence, apart from the intelligible world which it comprehends, is a mere abstraction of thought, and the intelligible world, apart from the principle of intelligence which comprehends it, is a baseless chimera.

Modern Idealism does not stop here. It goes a step further. The duality of subject and object, the dual distinction of the knower and the known, are made to rest or inhere in a higher unity of consciousness, which comprehends and transcends them both. Let me quote a passage of Lord Haldane, which makes this abundantly clear. "Reality" he says, "lies in the foundational character of knowledge and in the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived, knower and the known, as being distinctions, falling inside the entirety of that foundational character, inasmuch as they are made by and within knowledge itself."

Here we note an important characteristic feature of modern philosophy, and that is to regard the entire universe of objects, the cosmic manifold, together with the fundamental distinctions of subject and objects, as resting on the ultimate ground of consciousness or Chit as our Vedantic philosophers call it.

76. Man is spiritual no doubt, but finite. Here, the modern idealistic philosophers have failed to probe deep enough into the problem. Their study of the phenomenon of consciousness did not penetrate deeper. How can consciousness be finite? Can we put any limit to consciousness? No, for the consciousness of that limitation would necessarily exceed it. All limitation is within consciousness. Consciousness in its very nature is infinite. The Vedantic philosophers never failed to realise this. They characterised consciousness as infinite.

Vedanta holds that man is infinite. His finitude is only a covering Avarana of his infinite nature, a veiling of his ultimate reality. If man were merely finite, he would never be conscious of his finitude, for to be able to perceive the boundaries of a thing it is necessary to rise to a higher level from which one could look beyond them. Man is the Infinite Consciousness--"Tat Twam Asi."

The obvious reason for holding man to be a finite centre of consciousness seems to be that every man is conscious of his finitude. This is evidently a confusion of thought. "The consciousness of finitude" is not the 'finitude of consciousness.' Consciousness in itself is transcendent to all 'states of consciousness' which are merely its empirical contents, and which it illumines. It is the ultimate source of light on which all empirical states depend for the illumination, as the Upanishad says.

According to Vedanta, then, my consciousness of myself as a finite being is only the consciousness of my empiritical individuality, and not of the transcendental principle of consciousness, which I truly am. Man is finite empirically, and infinite transcendentally. Man's realisation of his transcendental self is the realisation of himself as Infinite Consciousness, and the neces-

sary accompaniment of these, Infinite Bliss. This is the promise that Vedanta holds for man. The uniqueness of Vedanta lies in declaring with utmost certitude that man can transcend his finitude and embrace Infinity. And herein alone lies the possibility of knowing the truth of the entire infinite universe, which is the quest of philosophy; for, a merely finite being cannot know the truth of Infinity, unless he becomes one with the Infinite, and is able to comprehend the Whole in himself. Then alone can ignorance vanish.

77. Editor. When post-mortem states are described and the period between two incarnations is, for instance, declared to be about ten to fifteen centuries, Theosoohy too is stepping into uncertain ground and presenting to us statements and theories which we are unable normally to verify subjectively, much less demonstrate objectively.

78. Surendranath Mitra: Life minus reason is the life of the lower animals, the insects and the plants--it is the life of blind impulses, where no religion is possible. Reason is the touchstone by which alone we can distinguish true intuition. Schopenhauer was only partially right when he said that religion is the metaphysics of the people.

79. Earnest P. Horrwitz. In the 8th century, a fearless Gauda theologian composed a metrical exposition of non-dualism (Advaita). A firebrand being swung round and round, the poet-sage explains, resembles a flaming wheel. Even so are physical phenomena but swift vibrations of consciousness. As the apparent wheel on fire is really one light, so the ever-turning wheel of mundane existence is one life, though being set in motion, it appears manifold. As soon as mortal mind is sufficiently concentrated to withdraw from the objective world, and the thought waves in the mind-lake are stilled, the unity of all life reveals itself to the amazed contemplation.

PROF. M.A. SHUSTERY.

MITHRAISM.(In Vedanta Kesari Vol.18.)

80. Mithra was a popular Iranian God. According to Plutarch, Artaxerxes II and Darius III assumed the title of "the Light of Mithra."

81. In Syria and Asia Minor, he had eclipsed the great Ahura, because Iranian princes, following their Achaemenian masters, regarded him as the special deity of the court. Zoroastrianism in the West took the form of Mithraism, as Judaism did that of Christianity. Both were thoroughly westernisted and lost their original eastern features.

82. Mithra, the god of light, the protector of the Achaemenian crown, is praised in the Avesta and the Rigveda.

83. In the Veda, Mithra is a popular deity addressed together with Varuna, and sometimes identified with Surya. The most sacred verse "Gayatri" in in praise of the giver of light and fertility.

84. Mitra's worship appears to be of a very early date, earlier than Zoroaster. Names compounded with the word Mithra are found in Iran as early as 7th century B.C. such as Mithradata, Mithrabazu and so forth. Most of these names are Median.

85. After Pompey, Crassus, Antonius, Julius Caesarand other great generals invaded Asia Minor and thus Roman soldiers and officers had intercourse with the East. Under the Flavians Mithraism began to spread rapidly in the Roman Empire and under the Antonines it became a permanent European cult. Orthodox Zoroastrianism was well known to the Romans since their relation with Pont and Armenia, but its mystic side now attracted their attention. The Iranian princes, whowere in occupation of central and Eastern Asia Minor, were proud of their Iranian descent. They used to trace their origin to Darius the Great or one of his seven assistants. They professed Zoroastrianism as influenced by the native

tive cults and Greek philosophy. A large number of fire temples were founded all over Asia Minor and Zoroastrianism along with its mystic form, Mithraism, retained their hold on that part of Asia till about 5th century A.D. Besides fire temples consecrated to Mithra, there were other temples also consecrated to Him.

86. What is Mithraism? It may be called the mystic form of Zoroastrianism. It was a blending of Semitic and Aryan ideals with a coating of Greek philosophy. Its original home was Iran, and in its essence it remained Iranian, but its development took place in Syria and Asia Minor and its final settlement in Europe.

87. It was imported into Europe under the name of the Mysteries of Mithra. It underwent minor changes, and adjusting itself to the new environment prevailed through the length and breadth of Roman Empire for about three hundred years. Fire was personified as the lion.

88. According to the Avesta, Mithra rises from the summit of the mountain Hera Barazaiti, hence in Mithraism he is supposed to be born of a rock.

89 His first combat takes place with the Sun, who is overpowered, and submitting himself to the victor, becomes Mithra's closem friend and alley. His greatest achievement is the chase, the subdual, and the sacrifice of the bull.

90. Mithra is the defender of truth, justice and purity; he is always young, virogous, self-sacrificing, victorious, awake, active and ready to help his devotees. According to Ahuramazda's wish he is engaged in helping the world. Ahriman (the devil) brings obstacle to his work by sending the ant, the scorpion and the serpent which try to suck the blood and genitals of the bull, thus making the great sacrifice fruitless. But they do not succeed in their attempt.

91. Ahriman is ever active in destroying Mithra's construction.

92. At last Mithra, thinking that he has accomplished his great task, takes his last supper with his devotees and accompanying the Sun, crosses the vast heavenly ocean, ascends to the abode of the Yazatas (gods) and joins them. Such is the myth about the life and ascension of Mithra.

From heaven he watches his devotees. He is not the God of Gods but Ahuramazda's chief assistant, one with him in maintaining law and order in nature. He is the maker of all things. He is distinct from the Sun, yet in many aspects one with him. He is born on the 25th December, of Virgin Mother Rock. He has travelled far and wide and has seen all places. Festivals in his honour were celebrated at the winter solstice and the spring equinox with great pomp and ceremony.

93. According to Mithraic belief, fire was the first cause and Mithra its manifestation. Everything on earth was divine.

94. There were seven grades of initiation. The number seven was adopted in consideration of the number of the planets. Eadh grade has a particular name, form and training. An oach of allegiance was taken from the devotee that he would be active in the sacred struggle and remain faithful to Mithra, after which is forehead was sealed and branded as the memorial of his vow. The first and the lowest grade was called Raven. Its holder had to represent himself in the form of that bird and imitate its cry. In the second grade the devotee had to remain invisible to others at the time of religious performances. The third was called Soldier. His duty was to fight with his animal soul and bring his passions under control. The fourth was named Persian. This grade was distinguished from others by wearing a Phrygian cap. Higher were grades of Lion, Eagle and Father, who presided over the reli-

gious ceremonies. The highest grade was the chief Bishop called Pater patrum (father of fathers). The devotees were promoted to higher grades by the father, corresponding to Zarathustrotema of Persia or Pope among Christians.
95. This was a distinction to the grade of Lion and higher grades. Like the custom of the Zoroastrians fire was burnt in their temples. The sun was worshipped, the worshippers facing the east at dawn the south at noon and the west in the evening.
96. Caves were preferred as the places of worship. Where they could not find natural caves, artificial ones were made.
97. In the grade of the Soldier the devotee was offered a crown, which honour he had to decline and say, "Mithra is my Crown." Caves or underground places of worship were well illumined and adorned with symbolic figures.
98. Mithraic Doctrine. The soul is the divine spark of light. It descends from its original place, heaven, and is entangled in matter. This worldly life is a struggle to regain freedom and return to its original condition. A man can achieve this object by siding with Mithra, who is Mediator between light (Ahura) and darkness (Ahriman).
99. As all human beings have the same origin and the same goal in view, a sense of fraternity should prevail among them.
100. Mithraism was an offshoot and the esoteric form of Zoroastrianism. Zoroaster had affirmed the existence of this world, and sought his ideal in union with Ahuramazda through practical and active but virtuous life. But the human mind is never satisfied with simplicity and is inclined towards something mysterious and complex. In Zoroastrianism there was no renunciation, no unnecessary penance, fast and hardship. These were added by Mithra's devotees.
101. Originally Mithraist moral training was very

high, even sublime, but gradually it reached such a low level that it became unbearable. Virtue had to be proved not in theory but in practice.
102. Mithra would help those who would help themselves. A spirit of fraternity prevailed. The Mithraist had to be obedient and submissive to his spiritual master. They were exposed to scorching heat, biting cold, hunger, thirst, submersion and other torments in order to bring passion, in other words the Ahrimanic aspect of the soul under the control of the Ahuraic.
103. Mithraic asceticism consisted in subdual of passions, and in fortitude.
104. After being successful in all other performances, the devotees had to die a mystical death. This symbolic murder was performed by the Pater Patrum, the high priest. By suffering such death the devotee passed into a true spiritual existence and in his new birth he was fully admitted to Mithraic Communion.
105. Monuments and Inscriptions: These are the only sources of correct information about Mithraism. They are found in large numbers all over Europe and a few of them are seen in Asia Minor, (for details see Texts et Momunents, Figures Relatifs and Mysteries de Mithre, by Franz Cumont)
106. In some monuments a lion is added. The sun is placed on the right side of the moon. Kronos (Zarvan Akerena) or infinite time is shown in the figure as a man with lion's head, holding the two keys of heaven, and sometimes in human form by the side of a lion. He is encircled by a serpent.
107. There is such close resembrance between Mithraism and Christianity that many have believed the latter to be only a new form of the former, Christ being Mithra, and the twelve apostles the twelve signs of the Zodiac. No doubt the resemblance is very close. They are different only in language and names.

103. Christianity adopted from Mithraism all that it found agreeable to itself, and became the great rival of Mithraic faith. The following are parallels between Christianity and Mithraism:
1. The followers of both formed secret assemblies for worship. (2) Both seek purification by baptism. (3) Sunday, a clear compound showing the day sacred to the sun, which was held sacred by Mithraists, was adopted by the Christians.(4) The 25th December, a great Mithraic feast, was made a Christian festival about the 4th century A.D. (5) Both regarded asceticism as meritorious. (6) Both believed in renunciation of the world and self-control. (7) Both had the same conception of the world and the destiny of man. (8) Both similarly believed in hell and heaven. (9) Both Mithra and Christ were believed to be the judges of the dead. (10) Both believed in a world deluge.(11) Both believed in the immortality of the soul. (12) Mithra was born of a virgin mother rock and Christ of the Virgin Mary. (13) Mithra carried the lamb on his shoulder and so did Christ. (14) Both were believed by their followers to be mediators, but the Christians try to distinguish the position of Christ as such from the position of the other. (15) In both religions men and women often took the vow of celebacy. (16) Both had high moral codes but the Mitraic was much more severe and more difficult to obey. (17) Charity was encouraged by Christians but there was no alms giving among Mithraists. They hated beggary, but approved help and cooperation. (18) both employed libation, music bells and candles in the service, and chanted hymns in praise of their respective deities. (19) Christ bears the cross, but Mithra bears a sword (of the Zodiac sign arms) resembling a cross. (20) Both Christ and Mithra have the last supper, communion of water, bread and wine, redemption,

sacramentary grace, salvation, resurrection and everlasting life. (21) Like Christ, Mithra is buried and comes to life again and ascends to heaven. (22) Life the Christians the Mithraists performed the ceremony of the infant Mithra. The sun-worshippers of Egypt and Syria used to retire on the night of the 25th December into inner shrines, from which at midnight they used to come out and cry "The Virgin has given birth to the sun," which then was represented by an image of an infant. (23) The Mithraists celebrated a feast, with lights, on the night of the 25th Decemver, and in this Mithraist feast Christians also took part. Afterwards they adopted it for themselves.

109. For both, caves were the favourite places of refuge. A Sufist ascetic (see Nizamī's 'Shirin-Khusroe') was called a "Kohbud" which word was a corrupted form of the old Persian, "Kaufa Paiti" or master of the mountain.

110. Mithra was worshipped by the ancient Aryans, and his name is mentioned in the "Bughaz Koi" inscription dated about 1400 B.C.

111. Its rise in Europe began about 70 B.C. Its triumph was during the period of the Antonines. It lasted till 400 A.D. Owing to the conversion of strong Roman Emperors who, together with the Christian clergy, persecuted it, Mithraism lost its hold in Europe. It gradually disappeared in Asia Minor, and even in Persia.

112. Mithraism was an essentially esoteric cult, and hence could not continue for long as a universal creed. But its doctrine of sacrifice will remain for all time the highest human ideal and the most sublime truth. It is by sacrifice that the spiritual as well as the material world exists. If man neglects to sacrifice himself or in other words to live for others, nature forces him to do so.

1. Swami Jagadiswarananda: Singon, one of the eight great Buddhist sects prevailing in Japan, which is based on Mahavairochan Sutra and Vajrasekhara Sutra and founded by Kobo, Daishi, teaches the doctrine of Funishen, that is, not two, all is not two but one. As is said in the Rigveda, Ekam Sat Vipra Bahutha Vadanti, the Supreme Being is one, sages call it variously. This Singon doctrine is just like Vedantic Advaita-Vada. It teaches that Buddhahood is latent within us and all things, animals and plants, that each soul is a potential Buddha, and that when man attains Nirvana, he becomes one with the Supreme Buddha, which is joy Supreme. The Tendai sect introduced into Japan by priest Saicho and which is based on Satdharma Pundarika teaches the absolute oneness of all things, and Nirvana is the realisation of that Oneness with the Absolute One, Mind, the Buddha.

2. Govinda Chandra Dev. But even if it be taken for granted that pessimism is bad philosophy since it produces an enervating effect upon the mind, still it can with ample justice be shown that the type of pessimism which Indian philosophy advocates cannot be accused of such a charge. Indian philosophy does not maintain that because of the fact that this world is a vale of sorrow, therefore there is no way out of it. Rather, it upholds the message of Moksha, Nirvana, Kaivalya--all of which point to a state beyond sorrow. Thus Indian philosophy is not a charter for suicide, but it is a message of hope. Such pessimism leaves ample scope for the highest development of the individual.

Further, philosophy must be loyal to facts. It cannot explain away facts simply because they do not suit its temper. If this world, as we find it, be a vale of sorrow, philosophy has no

has no right to deny this fact. In the words of Russell "reason is a harmonising rather than a controlling force." The fact indeed is to-day evident before all philosophers that this world is not the best of all possible worlds. So in modern times we hear of meliorism, instead of clear-cut optimism. Modern man says that this world, as he finds it, is a vale of sorrow, but he will make it a paradise.

Optimism which denies sorrow or evil is pulpy. But pessimism, which shows a way out of evil, is real optimism. It does not deny facts of the ordinary world but goes a step beyond it. Says Bosanquet,--"I believe in optimism, but no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it." In this sense Indian philosophy upholds optimism of a deeper order.

But the thesis, namely, that philosophy must have a bearing on life indicates philosophic timidity. Every sort of philosophy, as a matter of fact, has some bearing on life. But this bearing is not a connotation, but is properly speaking an "accident" of philosophy. As philosophers, we should not anticipate pessimism, meliorism, or optimism but should proceed very logically in our explanation of the world. The theory of life which follows as a sequel of our speculation should without hesitation be received by us. Philosophy is, in the words of Socrates, 'love for wisdom'; knowledge for knowledge's sake is its watchword, and consequently a commercial procedure in philosophical speculation is highly defective. Well has it been said by Russell, "The conscious purpose of philosophy, therefore, ought to be solely to understand the world as well as possible, not to establish this or that position which is morally desirable."

3. C.V.Srinivasa Murthy. It is one of the virtues of philosophy that it takes nothing for

granted. Everything must be tested by logic and life before it can be accepted as true. Though philosophy is not science, it is scientific in its attitude in so far as it attempts to view things with freedom from prepossessions and prejudices. But the scope and function of the two are different. The interest of science is mainly cognitive; that of philosophy is the whole of experience, the cognitive, the emotional and the volitional, as well as the conditions that make possible such experiences.

4. Even Kant's critical method is not critical enough. While recognising the claims of reason and sense it failed to achieve a proper co-ordination of the two with the result a false theory of knowledge and a dualistic metaphysics came into being. Starting from a discord between reason and sense Kant could not harmonise the two. Hegel cuts at the root of the dualism of the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds, by employing the famous dialectic method. He examines one category after another with a view to discovering a concept which is self-consistent, which does not contradict itself. He arrives at the category of the absolute, a category which does not contradict itself but explains the whole of experience. The phenomenal and the noumenal worlds are not separate and independent but are the expressions of a single spirit. The same method is employed in the great work of F.H. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality." But the dialectic method appears to be purely intellectualistic in character.

5. One cannot speak of an universe which one has not realised in one's own experience. It is this attitude that is characteristic of Indian philosophy. In India nobody has a right to philosophise unless he qualifies himself for such a task. A certain duty is enjoined on him, failing to perform which incapacitates him from

pursuing the quest of reality; the successful performance of the same announces his fitness for it. The duty that is demanded by a philosophic life is marked by a largeness of experience and breadth of outlook. We may b- briefly describe the preparation necessary to acquire the right to philosophise:-
Adhikara (Fitness for Philosophizing: The most outstanding of the Indian systems of metaphysics is Vedanta and the qualifications required for a Vedantic student are described by Sankara. The description is marked by a brilliant psychological analysis of a soul marching steadily towards the realisation of the universal life. The method aims not merely at moral discipline but intellectual conviction as well. The acquisition of the following four qualities makes one aifit disciple of the Goddess of Wisdom.
i. "Discrimination between things eternal and non-eternal." This statement must be interpreted with caution. It should not be understood to mean that 'discriminative knowledge' should be possessed whole and entire by a student who is still on the threshold of philosophic life. It only means that the student must have the power of thought to know that there are things of intrinsic value as distinguished from those of instrumental value and that the former alone ought to be steadily realised. What is required is only a certain capacity and a certain tendency which actualise themselves as life proceeds.
ii, "Renunciation of the enjoyment of the rewards here and in the other world." An action must be done, a rule must be followed, not because it brings reward of some kind or other but because it aids in the realisation of the Goal of existence. If the student of philosophy concerns himself with relative goods and temporary satisfaction he loses the wood for

the trees. Nothing in the empirical world can give final satisfaction. A certain detachment is essential to concentrate one's whole self on the ideal to be realised.

iii. "The possession of a group of six qualities" The first two of these Sama and Dama respectively represent the control of the mind and the senses. Uparati denotes abstention from things which lack philosophic interest; Titiksha means the possession of fortitude and courage to 'bear the pairs of opposites like heat and cold.,' pain and pleasure. Samadhana is the power of concentration on the ideal to be realised. Sraddha is faith in the idea. "It is respect for truth, which means readiness to work for its achievement and is a great help in securing stability of effort. It is a form of reverence and need not necessarily be opposed to reason. It only excludes vacillation of mind that leads to constant shifting of ideals."

iv. "The desire for self-realisation." The possession of other qualities is useless without an intense desire for self-realisation. It is this desire that acts as an effective spur to effort and activity.

The acquisition of the qualities so far described fits one for the task of philosophizing. In insisting on the preparation for philosophic life we are simply following the example set by science. Nobody can be a scientist unless he cultivates the spirit of impartial judgment and trains his powers of observation and interpretation. The scientist creates for himself the factors of his observation. So also the philosopher must equip himself by means of an efficient system of training, a system which enables him to live a dedicated life, which leads him to create an experience in which the contradictions of life find a fruitful source of explanation. The success in philosophic explanation depends

very greatly on facts supplied by the richest experience possible, just as the success of scientific explanation depends on the exactness and precision of the facts supplied by experiments. In our philosophic endeavour it is to be successful, we must bring to bear the western intellectualistic method to work on the experience which is as intense as it is comprehensive, an experience which is supplied by a disciplined life. The western methods have failed for want of a rich experience.

6. Editor. His quarrel is really with those who associate Karma with his ideal of knowledge--the knowledge of the non-dual Self,--and contend that through Karma one can gain liberation which consists in a state of awareness where there is neither subject nor object. Sankara would say t that from Karma no such result can arise. The very basis of Karma lies in the notion of duality relating to the difference of action, agent and result. Unless one is prompted by the egoistic feeling that one is the actor working for the attainment of something that is for the present different from oneself, and that there are means outside oneself for accomplishing the purpose in view, no Karma, however exalted, is possible. Moreover, the performance of Karma, also requires that one should be imbued with the consciousness of one's own qualifications or fitness for the same--a consciousness which involves the superimposition on the Atman of the idea of body, capacity, needs and other egoistic notions. How can actions whose foundations lie rooted in the consciousness of duality be a direct aid in rising to that level of non-dual consciousness which negates the very primary requirements of Karma? In the words of Sankara, "the knowledge of the Self, this Atman of all, which abhors all perception of difference, cannot possibly co-exist with Karma whose basis is the perception of the differ-

ence of agent, result etc."
7. With regard to the Jnani: His being has been liberated from the shackles of egoism and has come to recognise its identity with the Supreme Changeless, non-dual Reality, free from the relation of cause and effect. The apparent spontaneity of life is manifest in him in its unmodified form. All that can be said of him is that he may act or he may not; but neither alternative can be regarded as a test of his knowledge. He may not act, because in the absence of the ego and desires he has no motive to act or any purpose to strive after. He may act, too, because he being beyond the domain of law, no one can lay down a hard and fast rule with regard to him, that he should not work. If he acts, he does so seeing inaction in action, as the Gita itself has put it. Being identical with the changeless and non-dual Witness of the fleeting phenomena of name and form, the Self can never be said to be involved in action which means change. What acts is the psycho-physical organism, and its action is attributed to the Self by an ignorant man, because he identifies the ego with it and looks upon it as the Self. But in the cause of the knowing one, the ego having disassociated itself from the psycho-physical organism and disappeared in the Self, any action that the body and the mind may do can in no sense be attributed to him, except it be from the standpoint of ourselves, ignorant men, who still continue to identify his body and mind with the Self.
8. We find that Sankara has to speak with a double voice, as the theologian and social leader on the one hand, who had to defend and justify the scripture of his faith and the institution supported by them, and on the other as a philosopher and spiritual genius whose mission

it was to expound and uphold the principles of universal reason and the basic principles of spiritual life common to all mankind. This too has to be borne in mind if we want to reconcile Sankara's teachings.

9. Editor: We admit Prof. Mitra's contention that all operations, even mental, which involve the use of the will are in a sense actions.

10. Sravana, Manana and Nidhidhyasana do not form the privilege of Sannyasins or any other blessed group of people. Even in the restricted sense we give to it, it is not excluded from the reach of men who have not taken to a formal life of Sannyasa. But the point is that even in their case it is not their actions but reflection and reflection alone that is responsible for their knowledge, and it is only by devoting themselves exclusively to it at a certain stage of life that they can hope to gain pre-eminence in Gnana.

11. This recognition of two levels is made only to meet the requirements of dull-witted individuals whose growth is obstructed by innumerable obstacles born of ignorance. In reality difference in level seems to be spoken of only with regard to knowledge understood in the sense of removal of ignorance, and not in the sense of revelation of the nature of the Self, in which no difference of degree can be admitted. In the case of a competent aspirant in whom the veil of ignorance is very thin, there is no such distinction between the rise of knowledge and the maturing of the same. In his commentary on Brahma Sutra, Sankara remarks in the course of a discussion on the question of repetition: "Those quick-witted persons on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt and misconception, are able to intuit the sense of the sentence, "Thou art that" on its first enunciation even, and for

them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the self having once sprung up discards all ignorance, so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged." It is evident from this that the progressive stages are not so much in knowledge proper, i.e. in the intuition of the Self as in the removal of ignorance. Of course these are not two processes; when ignorance is completely removed, knowledge which consists in the cognition of one's own nature springs up automatically without any new effort. In a thoroughly prepared mind, therefore, it undergoes no progressive stages of origination, growth and perfection.

12. A karma yogi is only a Sadhaka, one who is still labouring under the difficulty of Dehatma-Buddhi (looking on the body as the Self), and it is out of the question for him to be fully established in the consciousness that the Self is the unconcerned witness of all forms of activity that may flow through the body and the mind. If a person has reached this level of thought, he is neither a Karma Yogi nor a Gnana Yogi--he is no Yogi at all but a Gnani or a Jivanmukta who has been liberated in life. No one can reach this state except through the subtle process of mental discipline known as Vichara.

13. Surendranath Mitra. It is perfected souls (Siddhas or adepts) that alone are the fittest persons to do good to the world (Lokasamgraha). Other souls are fit enough to do it only in proportion to their nearness to perfection.

14. The recognition of one's own self as the self of others is the only true basis and the only intelligible explanation of morality, as recognised by Schopenhauer and Deussen too. It is not the only logical conclusion from this that where this recognition is clearest, as in the life of the Jivanmukta, the morality, too, must necessarily be the most unselfish and the most vigorous?

According to Advaitism, Brahman or self is not only absolute knowledge but also absolute love. (Panchadashi, I,8,9,11: VIII,56-57; XII 69, etc). The knowledge aspect expresses itself in the life of the Jivanmukta (the liberated soul in embodied existence) as a never-failing recognition of the identity of his self with the selves of others, in spite of the apparent duality of experience, just as an astronomer never fails to recognise the rotation and revolution of the earth in spite of its apparent stationariness. So, too, the love-aspect is bound to express itself in the life of a man who is fully Jivanmukta in serving the genuine interests of other selves, since his own self with its interests is dissolved in other selves with their interests.

15. R. MARRS. "The Distinction between Waking, and Dreaming." The subject of this essay relates to a point subsidiary to the doctrine of Maya, the theory which maintains the illusoriness or unreality of the world of our cognition as we perceive or know it. Modern scholars have, we understand, established that this conception is as old as the later books of the RGVEDA. The word Maya is of later origin or use; it covers, we have read, for the first time in the Svetasvatara Upanishad. But it has been amply demonstrated that the theory is a growth out of one of the prominent tenets of the Advaita Vedanta, it receives one of its first clear expositions in the Karikas on the Mandukya Upanishad of Gaudapada, who is reputed to have been the teacher of Sankara's teacher, Govinda, and may be regarded as the Berkeley of ancient India. Gaudapada's treatise is in four parts. The first treats of the syllable "OM", the second comments on the characteristic of duality shown by our world, the third meets arguments

against the Advaita system, the fourth aims at establishing the unique reality of the Atman and the illusoriness of everything else. This part is called Alata-Santa, or the putting out of the fire-brand. A burning stick waved round and round in the air seems to create a circle of fire (Alata-chakra). This circle of fire does not really exist, only the point of the brand exists though we cannot help seeing it as a circle of fire. It is not easy to see the exact significance of the simile. At any rate the multiplicity of our world, for Gaudapada, is appearance only and not reality. In demonstrating the unreality of multiplicity (the many) Gaudapada argues that our waking world, which we think real, has not more reality than our world of dreams. From the point of view of reality both are unreal though it is possible to view the waking world as external and the dreaming world as internal. For the same self share the same unreality.

16. In short, both classes of objects display the same falsity of presentment. The waking experience is as illusory as our dreams.

17. Sankara develops similar lines of thought, employing his famous similes of the rope and the snake, the magician and his tricks, the desert and the mirage, the dreamer and the dream. His object is to show that the Atman is not affected by the world's illusory appearance of existence. On the point of dreams we observe: (1) That the dream state is as real as the waking state so long as the dream lasts- i.e. so long as we are not by consciousness able to distinguish the dream, as such, from the waking state: (2) As we only make out the illusory character of our dreams on waking, so we only awake from the sleep of ignorance when we reach a knowledge of Atman and recognise then that the world is unreal. (3) We can only call dreams unreal and the waking

world real in a relative sense. The difference between the two is not a difference in the nature of things.

It appears that Gaudapada and Sankara condemn both the waking and the dreaming worlds as illusions from the point of view of reality. But Sankara is not prepared to accept a position in which presentations are the same whether we wake or sleep.

18. Sankara is not denying that the world is illusory; he is maintaining that, within the sphere of what is all ultimately unreal, external things are as real as the minds that perceive them. To this extent they have a degree of reality not present in dreams.

19. I invite the particular attention of the readers oto Sankara's general theory of the relative or conventional existence of our world, which seems to mark him off from the more emphatic subjectivism of Gaudapada. His view has parallels in Buddhist philosophy e.g. in Bhavaviveka's, modifications of the Nagarjuna's rejection of the phenomenal validity of our empirical world.

20. These preliminary reference to certain Hindu philosophers have, I trust, served to introduce to the reader in a familiar shape the particular problem which I have selected for discussion, that is the distinction between waking and dreaming. Gaudapada could find no satisfactory principle of distinction: Sankara claims to distinguish between them on the ground of a theory of greater and less degrees of reality. The problem is, of course, not peculiar to Indian philosophy, though it has particular importance in the effort to differentiate Gaudapada's from Sankara's attitude towards our common world. My personal interest in it was aroused by my philosophical tutor at

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Oxford who saw in it an occasion for bringing out an essential feature of ordinary cognition, and of the standpoint of Kant, with certain features of whose doctrine Sankara's philosophy has often been compared.

21. Kant added a consideration to the problem which was not brought out by Sankara, a consideration which vitally affects our general view of the nature of elementary cognition. The manner of distinguishing dreaming from waking, implicit, if not expressed, in Kant's standpoint, may perhaps have been adumbrated by Sankara. But a caution is necessary against what is called the Vitium subreptionis, the tendency to read into an ancient philosopher theories or attitudes or forms of argument which are the product of a later stage of philosophical development. This is a vice to which scholars are peculiarly susceptible both in the East and in the West. It is noticeable in our present day historians of Indian philosophy, and may perhaps have with them in part a political origin, though they are justified in protesting against the ignorance of Indian philosophy shown by earlier Western scholars. It is equally noticeable in some of our English interpreters of Plato or Aristotle, for whom Plato or Aristotle is the greater brain according to the number of texts we can find in one or the other which can be made to support some preconception of modern philosophy. After all it is an article of faith with all who are not pessimists or misologists that the world drifts towards intelligibility and that thought did not stop with Sankara or Plato; and I believe that whatever may be the general affinities of Kant with certain ancient philosophers Kant is responsible for a remarkable advance in metaphysical speculation.

22. Though Plato the dreamer mythologises to

his and our hearts content, Plato, the philoso-
pher pulls himself up to inquire whether it is
really possible to draw a clear line of demar-
cation between the two states of waking and
dreaming. Sphinx-like he propounds a riddle and
Sphinx-like reserves the answer. "How can you d
determine", asks Socrates in the Theaetetus,
"whether at this moment we are sleeping and all
our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are
awake and talking to one another in the waking
state?" Theaet:--"Indeed, Socrates, I do not
precisely know how to prove the one any more
that the other, for in both cases the facts pre-
cisely correspond: and there is no difficulty
in supposing that during all this discussion we
have been talking to one another in a dream;
and when in a dream we seem to be narrating
dreams, the resemblance is quite astonishing."
Socrates: "You see then that a doubt about the
reality of sense is easily raised, since there
may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in
a dream. And as our time is equally divided bet-
ween sleeping and waking, in either sphere of
existence the soul contends that the thoughts
which are present to our minds at the time are
true; and during one half of our lives we af-
firm the truth of the one and during the other
half, of the other; and are equally confident
of both."

So Plato. And here is a point we must empha-
sise. While we are dreaming in sleep we are not
conscious that we are dreaming. As Plato puts
it, "The soul contends that the thoughts which
are present in our minds are true." As an error
is no longer an error if you know that you are
in error, so a dream exists no longer as a dream
when you reflect upon it in the waking state.
We might pursue the analogy further and say that
as you cannot be in error (as opposed to doubt,
be it

be it understood), without feeling that you are right, so you cannot be actually dreaming without feeling that you are moving and acting in an actual world. You live, move and have your being in a dream, or appear to, just as you live, and move and have your being while awake, or appear to. I dream that I am walking in London, and my dream has all the vividness of the actual experience. A dream to be a dream must seem an actual experience. You cannot distinguish between them on the score of vividness, as some do who assert the waking state to be the more vivid of the two. That will not do. "I rather suppose," with Kant (in the Dreams of a Ghost seer), "that ideas in sleep may be clearer and broader than were the clearest in the waking state." We do the same when we dream as when we wake. "Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit." Often our only excitement is a nightmare which may be vivid enough to agitate us for days and days of waking life. You can feel the extremes of terror in sleep; and though when you experience the singularly dreadful feeling that you are falling into a bottomless abyss your fear may be traced to its waking origin in the anthropoid ape who fears the falling tree, the dream is intense and vivid enough to induce a cold sweat. And as my Kantian tutor said, "If the waking consciousness is to be the more vivid, we shall--with Hume--have to explain rather urgently that "the force of our mental actions....is not to be measured by the apparent agitations of the mind."

While we reject the distinction between waking and dreaming on the score of vividness, there are two further facts which we must take into consideration before we can fully realise the problem. Again I quote from my mentor:

"In waking we take dreams to be hallucinatory, but in dreaming we do not take waking to be hallucinatory." Secondly, "We are sharply aware of a contrast when we wake up, but not necessarily of a change when we go to sleep." That is to say, you know you have been dreaming when you wake up: you do not know you have been awake when you begin dreaming. Oddly enough we never remember the immediate beginning of a dream. But then do we ever remember the immediate beginning of conscious waking life? We slip into dreams as we seem in childhood to have slipped into consciousness; so like a dream is life, the poet dreamer might urge. But here I would add another fact with reference to the extended problem with regard to life as a whole. We have no other state to contrast with our conscious life; whereas we have a set of experiences to contrast with our dreams. A dream implies a contrast to another state of consciousness. Can we say the same of life? And if we cannot in the end know that life is not a dream, "a great connected and consistent dream," we at least know that we cannot contrast it with a previous conscious state as we ought to be able to contrast a dream with a previous conscious state. But here I might be interrupted with the plea that the very quality of a dream is that you should not be conscious of a previous waking state or a contrast. All the more, therefore, you may say, is life a dream. Yet it remains evident that the dream of a night (as opposed to life) implies previous conscious states out of which we seem to have fallen into a different type of conscious state.

Here a solution of our riddle suggests itself. The states previous to all our dreams connect together into a coherent whole, while our dreams remain what my tutor called "lonely incoherencies:

so that the waking state is coherent in a way, while our dreams are utterly incoherent." Dreams are inconsistent: waking states are consistent. So Descartes would distinguish between the two states. For by this distinction he exemplifies the truth that all things are connected in a system and the particular acquires reality thro' being related with everything else in the system. "I can unite the experiences of waking life..." he says, "with all my other experiences and recollections, but not the experiences of my dreaming life." Reality can only be tested, from this point of view, by connection with other perceptions. Reality of course cannot be distinguished from mere dreaming in itself. Adam dreaming on his first night in the Garden of Eden has an experience as real as that of his first waking moment on the previous day. But his waking experience of the second morning accords, not with the dream of the first night but with the experience of the first day. If his experience of the second night accords with that of the first night, then from the point of view of reality, one cannot distinguish the two appearances. "I distinguish the two," Descartes would say, "only by comparing the incoherence of dreams with the coherence of waking experience," implying, of course, what can scarcely be admitted, that two dreams of the same person are never consistent. But here is no real distinction. Forwithout pressing the point that it is not possible to explain the gaps formed by dreams in any attempt to give an intelligible schemes of life, we are still brought up against the possibility of not only of a dreaming state being consistent with a waking state and a waking state with a dream, but of one dream being consistent with another dream. So that there are not two definitely distinguishable worlds--one the waking world which

presents an orderly series of connected events, the other the dreaming world which is simply a heap, and not a system, of isolated events (not to insist, I repeat, on the impossibility of reconciling the two worlds in a single whole which we call life). Once admit the possibility of one night's dream being connected with the previous night's (which you must admit) and the proposed distinction vanishes. What have been called "serial hallucinations" overthrow the distinction.

The consistency criterion can however be applied in a broader way. The eminent psychologist, Hoffding, suggests that in dreams there arrives a point where they cease to be systematic. "Even the most systematic of dreams" he says "is but a fragment as compared with the totality into which progressive experience conducts us." But as he himself proceeds to point out, if we accept the reductio ad absurdum of our experience achieved by the Gaudapadas and Berkeley's of the philosophical world, we are left with more than a bias in favour of regarding our whole waking experience as a dream, if even a connected and consistent dream. The waking world if consistent may yet in the end be as much a dream as the most inconsistent dream. We may not, in fact, have any ground to believe in either, though we may distinguish them by their respective degrees of consistency. I say "degrees of consistency" because neither state is completely consistent, as Sankara showed. On this point let me quote again the same writer: "If ultimate consistency is intended, then all experience seems inconsistent; any spaced object, any timed happening, is still a fresh-springing comedy of contradition",-- which, of course, is what Sankara meant in denying reality to them from the standpoint of metaphysical truth, and what every philosopher

worthy of the name has admitted. Even granted then a greater degree of inconsistency in dreams, we are yet at a loss from some principle on which to believe in one state rather than the other. But the question of belief is not our immediate point. This distinction on the ground of consistency is overthrown if it is even found that a dream is consistent with the waking state. Consider the dream of our Kantian. "Let me this time" he says, "have a simpler dream: one night it seems to me that I lie in bed, and reflect on the difference between thinking and picturing: suddenly I do not remember what Kant says about Schematism; I must get up and go into the next room where there is a Kritik der reinen Vernunft lying open on the table. I read a passage, and then, happy and mystified, I go back to bed; when I am in bed I hear the leaves of the book being turned by the breeze. Upon what principle do I later judge this to be a dream? "Why", says the opponent, 'the electric light would show you if the measurements were exact enough.' Then let the occasion have been very early in the morning at midsummer, when daylight should not be denied even to a believer in Kant."

Before coming to what appears to be a more adequate explanation of the distinction we are considering, reference has to be made to another attempt to solve the riddle, which will be found in a brief essay by Leibnitz, "On the Method of distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena." He puts forward two proofs of the reality of a phenomenon,--the one that it is true if "it is in agreement with the whole course of life, especially if very many others affirm that the same agrees with their own phenomena also; for that other substances similar to us exist, is not only

probable, but indeed, certain, as I shall soon say." The other, he expresses as follows: "But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena, which indeed alone suffices, is the success in predicting future phenomena from the past and present, whether that prediction is founded in reason, or in the hypothesis thus far succeeding, or in the usage thus far observed."Nay", he adds, "although this entire life were said to be nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough, if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it." On both proofs Leibnitz himself throws doubt. He denies them to be demonstrative because they prove not metaphysical but only a moral certainty; and continues: "and thus, by no argument can it be absolutely demonstrated that there are bodies, nor anything keep certain well ordered dreams from being objects to our mind, which are considered by us as true, and on account of the agreement among themselves with respect to use are equivalent to truths." And, he suggests, "what if our nature were perchance not capable of real phenomena,....What indeed, if this whole short life were nothing but a certain long dream, and we should awake only in death?--a conception such as the Platonists seemed to have. For since we are destined for eternity, and this whole life, although it should continue many thousands of years, has in respect of eternity the value of a point, how small will be the interposition of such a little dream in the full truth, the ratio of which is much less than that of the dream to life?"

With reference to Leibnitz's first proof, it is to be noticed that everything we have urged against the distinction on the ground of consistency would apply here, were it not

for this very interesting reservation that the proof is strongest, if very many others affirm that the same agrees with their own phenomena also. Leibnitz was clever enough to see all along that you cannot resolve philosophical problems if you start from the isolated individual consciousness. The central idea or motive of his system is the conviction that many minds exist besides ours. He saw what my philosopher insists on, that "from the isolated individual mind there may perhaps be elicited various sorts of subjectivism but no kind of cognition." Few but Leibnitz (and Heraclitus too, as we may judge from his saying:--"the waking have one and the same world but the sleeping turn each into a world of his own," which Kant misquotes in "The dreams of a Ghost seer" as Aristotle's) have realised what the same writer calls, "the grand central truism that 'objective' means 'shared' and that it is therefore a far cry to objectivity when we set out from the unsharable." It was perhaps something of this nature that Sankara had in mind when he spoke of a kind of conventional reality for the many. Hence for a discernment of dreams the criterion is now indicated; I must appeal to more than one consciousness. "What is dreamed by several is a cognition." If then I cannot help seeing pink rats I must appeal to those present for a verification of my cognition. Now this seems common sense but it is also sheer Kantism as you will agree if you care to refer to Kant's Kritik of judgment. But the best metaphysics is always consonant with common sense. "Cognition and judgments" says Kant, "along with the conviction that accompanies them admit of universal communicability (or shareability); for otherwise there would be no harmony between them and the object

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and they would be collectively a mere subjective play of the representative powers, exactly as scepticism desires." Shareability, or an appeal to the common sense of many individuals, is the test of the objective. No cognition which is not shareable is valid. There is another passage which indicates that Kant realised the true significance of a principle which few philosophers have noted in his works. It is this: "And this common sense is assumed without relying on psychological observations, but simply as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical." Applying this principle to our difficulty, we decide that what is shared by all is a real phenomenon, what remains the thought or image of one only is not a real phenomenon. Dreams are clearly not shareable and thus are not true phenomena. There are however different kinds of sharing:-- e.g. (1) I dream I meet a friend in Colombo: that is a kind of sharing. (2) You and I have the same dream that we meet: that also is a kind of sharing. (3) After our coincident dream we actually meet and what we dreamt as happening really happens. How can these different kinds of sharing be distinguished? Again, you may say if cognition is merely sharing, did not the sun once go round the earth, since everybody used to think so? And if we all went mad, would not two plus two really equal five? And nothing is true to philosophers for they all disagree! An ingenious answer that drives us to the heart of the problem; for it is as deceptive as it is ingenious. It purposely ignores a very real difference between two aspects of thought, between what used to be called we may now call-borrowing from the prince ofoKantians--on the one side primaryçonstructive and automatic, on the other

secondary critical and reflective thought (Kant's "constitutive" and "regulative" aspects of consciousness). Now primary or constructive thought (which may never seem like thought to be ordinary consciousness) builds up the world we call objective and which we are coerced by its common possession to see alike: secondary thought reflects upon the construction and reveals it, but charges it with inconsistency in the philosophical sense of the term. That does not matter. Primary thought may be inconsistent in the end but its constructions are nevertheless such that we are bound to agree upon them. Let reflexion find what difficulty it may in these constructions, it cannot alter them. It is just such constructions, (the tables, chairs, men, buildings, animals and men of our experience the posts and walls and pots and pans of Sankara) which compose our realities. And it is experiences which are not common to many or shareable that are pronounced subjective. Such are dreams, and at last we seem to have solved the riddle. Subjects dreams where they disagree: they wake or cognise where they agree. Now put me to sleep under observation. If I dream that I am discussing a very difficult problem most inadequately before the Vivekananda Society, the observers must decide. If the Secretary is put to sleep and dreams that he is listening to the same discussion and is very bored with it, the same observers must decide. Somebody must have been dreaming. How are we to decide? Only by reference to the opinion of more consciousness, and not their agreement but their coerced agreement. If you are coerced to agree that I am floundering about this subject and that the Secretary is very really bored, then I am not dreaming but really reading this paper and the Secretary is really bored. Waking cognition then is an actual or virtual agreement of the automatic

unreflective subjects of consciousness: dreaming is their virtual disagreement. Reflective thought may prove inconsistency of the products of unreflective thought, but it cannot alter them. The philosopher may convict our meeting of all kinds of unrealities and metaphysical inconsistencies of space, time and causality. Here we are and meet and we cannot help agreeing that we meet. We at least agree in our philosophical inconsistency, though we rarely agree in our dreams.

Let us now see where we are in relation to the distinction between waking and dreaming. The distinction between primary and constitutive or constructive and automatic thought on the one side, and secondary reflective thought on the other, is offered as a ground of differentiation of cognition or knowledge of objects (objectivity) from the purely subjective and unshareable. We have first of all our ordinary cognition, e.g. tables, chairs and other animal beings everything which is an object or possilbe object of actual experience, which we see alike and which is in a sense shared by many subjects of cognition. Our objective world is a product of primary automatic functions, such as substance, cause and the like. Whatever contradictions reflection may see in the heart of such functions,--consider, e.g. the irrationality of time and space and the causal concept--however inconsistent the result may be, we agree in our inconsistency. What is more, primary functions are not self-conscious in their operation. In that sense they are automatic. Without any deliberate exercise of self-consciousness, we objectify our experience as a world of this building, these chairs and tables, and those human beings. Open your eyes, and by unconscious inference you have constructed your shareable world. What now happens to dreaming? We call our waking experience cognition,

cognition, the cognition of objects; and regard cognition as the agreement or virtual agreement of subjects of cognition, you and them and me. Dreaming is their virtual disagreement. The cognition of waking experience is a kind of consistency and shareability--agreement in an illusion, if you like, but a coerced agreement which we cannot help. Dreaming on the other hand, be it never so consistent so far as concerns serial connectedness, from night to night, lacks the feature of shareability. Čognise and the world cognises with you, dream and you dream alone. That which we cannot help picturing communally is cognition. What we cannot picture communally is a dream. And the test is a case of doubt is an appeal to more subjects of cognition and their forced agreement. All this seems to be the implication of Sankara's distinction between what can and what cannot be negatived and what is and what is not part of every day experience.

But have we here an unfailing principle of distinction? "Suppose," my tutor asked, "that when I am asleep in bed I dream that I am asleep in bed; for when asleep we often say "I am dreaming and shall wake by-and-by." Or suppose that I always sleep with my eyes open, and at day-break, while I am sleeping with my eyes on the window, I dream that dawn is lighting the window. "I do not yet follow how your principle"--"Neither do I" our Kantian interrupts hurriedly--"and I am now racked by the riddle whether to be cheated is to be cheated when the cheat is the same as truth." that is, whether to dream is to dream when the dream is the same as waking experience. There seems to be no principle or criterion of distinction in such a case. Not to be baffled, however, he makes one more suggestion. Thus our whole experience covers both waking and sleeping. In this whole, waking seems to include dreaming but dreaming cannot include waking. In

In my waking state I know that I dream: this follows from the proposition that I must wake-fully know that I wake. But I am not awake when I only dream that I am dreaming. Does this really help? Consider the following devilish puzzle which occurs to him in answer: "Godfather," said his godchind, "is it wrong to dream that you steal?" "Well", he answered, "it might mean that you would steal, or had stolen." "You see", said the god-child, "I dreamt that I had had a dream that I took an apple and wasn't sorry; and I dreamt that I hated having had the dream. Ought I to be glad?"

It seems then that we have not really in any absolute sense, settled the problem that Neitzche was perhaps right when he accused Kant of explaining his empirical reality (Appearance) by means of a means (Vermoge eines Vermogens). It is a case of appearance to appearance to appearance and so on ad infinitum. Sankara replied to the argument that if the world is a fiction, then the teaching of the Upanishads, as part of it, is a fiction, that if a man dreams he is bitten by a snake, the bite is unreal but not the dream, But the dream, we may still say, appears to be a dream. Our waking experience is appearance only, not Reality. From the standpoint of Reality there is really no distinction between the two. So Schopenhauer, whose spiritual affinity with the Indian outlook you all know, wrote: "Although individual dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that they do not fit into that continuity which runs through the whole of experience, and the act of awakening brings this into consciousness, yet that very continuity of experience belongs to axxifs real life as its form,and the dream on its part can point to a similar continuity in itself. If, therefore,we consider the question from a point of view external

to both, there is no distinct difference in their nature, and we are forced to concede to the poets that life is a long dream." It is simply that within the limitations of appearance there is a sort of principle of distinction, on the basis whether of container and contained, or of a communal thought reference implying other subjects of cognition for whom,--whatever may be the differences in the individual pictures of each subject,--the object is "a picture of coincidence." Are these subjects of cognition really constructing a common shareable world? It is the first condition of normal activity to believe so. However absurd the forms of objectivity may prove to be of reflective reason, they are the root of the only inevitable world we have. "To dispute about its reality," says Schopenhauer, "can only occur to a mind perverted by over-subtlety." Error belongs to the province of the abstract, of reflective reason, and it is on this plane, not on that of practical unreflective naive experience of the outer world, that cases can come under consideration in respect of which it must for ever remain uncertain whether they were dreams or reality. It is on this plane too that life may appear to be a dream, a "great connected and consistent dream" as our Kantian phrased it, or, in Stout's phrase "a collective hallucination", but still a dream. Within the dream for the individual, there remains the distinction between the long dream of the whole and the short dream of the disconnected parts (in sleep), the anomaly of a dream within a dream. It would seem absurd, however, to call one more real than another merely because it was longer, if both, apart from their duration, exhibit in other respects the samefeatures, since the duration of a life-time as Leibnitz pointed out, is the tiniest fraction of a pin-point compared with eternity. What more can we now say than that you ca

can know that you are wrong? Which is, in the last resort, equivalent to the Kantian position that you can have conditioned knowledge that you have not unconditioned knowledge.

21. It is true there is both moral and physical evil in my world. But had there been no pain, happiness would have been unintelligible to men them. And had there been no error, it would never have occurred to them that they were right. And if I had not made them radically wicked, they would never have conceived those fine moral ideals which even you must admire. 'If nobody falls into temptation, the thing becomes absurd' --(here he was quoting from an exceedingly minor story of modern times.) I defy you to create a being who will comprehend good and yet not know the bad.

22. Miss. Violet Paranjoti. We have failed to understand the self and its identity. Our attempts to conceive of them have turned out to be full of contradictions. Our failure to conceive of the self and its identity makes us womder whether we should not retrace our steps and instead of regarding the self as an independent and self-substing factor, as we have done so far, we should rather consider it as a part of a bigger whole, which therefore should not be looked upon as independent and self-subsisting. Our attempt thus far to understand the self may be compared to the effort to understand the root of a plant without any relation whatever to the whole of the plant. The certainty as to the thinker may be based not on an atomic self but on an Infinite Consciousness of which thinker, thought and thinking are appearances. Our mistake thus far has been in attempting to conceive of the self as an independent factor out of all relation to the Infinite Consciousness of which it is an aspect. Hence our conceptions of the self have resulted in contradictions.

23. We do not think of a man as made up of a

number of momentary selves but as one individual that remains the same through all the varying experiences of his lifetime. "A" who is born now will be the same individual ten years hence, or even in his old age. What we mean is that through the varying stages of life, we have one individual. When recollecting experiences of years ago, a man says "I did this." On close examination, do we find that such personal identity is real? If so, in what does it consist? We may speedily dismiss the idea that personal identity consists in having the same body, for apart from the objection that the body changes as time goes on, it is a very crude conception, Neither can memory serve as a satisfactory basis of personal identity. The events relating to long periods of our life are forgotten, so that memory being full of limitations as its best, fails to serve the purpose. Continuity of psychical experiences cannot serve the purpose, for the reason that in sleep this continuity is snapped. Moreover, besides continuity, there is need of qualitative sameness, and this too is not to be had in the stream of physical experiences, each of which is different from the other. We may make another attempt and say that the various interests of a person go to build up his personal identity. It is very obvious that this suggestion must be rejected as our interests are never the same all through life. The suggestion that perhaps the self is encased in a monad rouses our hope, but there is only disappointment here as in the above instances. Granting that the self is a monad, then, this factor either changes or does not change. If it changes, then where is the permanence that is essential for personal identity?

EDUCATION AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER. by Swami RANGANATHANANDA. (discipleof V.S.I.) in"THE CRY"

"There is no problem in Modern India that cannot be solved by that magic word "Education"..Swami Vivekananda.

The subject of education is of interest to one and all. Popular interest in this subject is increasing day by day. There was a time more than two centuries ago when education was considered to be the prerogative of a privileged class. This idea dies only very slowly. From 'Education to a chosen few' to 'Education for all' is a revolutionary change; and in this is contained much of the history of modern development.

The prejudice was so strong that many thinkers even advanced pseudo-scientific reasons against the spread of education among the massesx. Aristotle remarks in his 'Politics': "It is the intention of nature to make bodies of slaves and freemen different from each other...And this is true with respect to the body, it is still more just to determine in the same manner, when we consider the soul." He further addes that "a slave can have no deliberative faculty."

This spirit of narrowness and exclusion has persisted for centuries. An Eighteenth Century writer says, "To make the society happy and people easy under the meanest circumstances, it is requisite that great numbers of them should be ignorant as well as poor...The welfare and felicity therefore of every State and Kingdom require that knowledge of the working poor should be confined withing the verge of their occupations and never extended (as to things visible) beyond what relates to their calling. The more a Shepherd a Plowman, or any other Peasant knows of the world, and the things that are foreign to his labour or employment, the less fit he will

be to go through the fatigues and hardships of it with cheerfulness and content. Reading, writing and arithmetic...are very pernicious to the poor, who are forced to get their daily bread by their daily labour."

The extension of education to the masses was opposed by the ruling classes purely on grounds of self-interest. The well-known writer, Viscount Bryce says, "All the despotic Governments of sixty years ago, and some of them down to our own day, were either indifferent or hostile to the spread of education among their subjects, because they feared that knowledge and intelligence would create a wish for freedom.

But to-day, the principle of education of all has been recognised by one and all. In a modern state, education is not the monopoly of a chosen few but is the prerogative and privilege of one and all of its citizens; nay, the state would compel all its citizens to resort to education. The Nineteenth century witnessed the spread of education on a vast scale among the masses of Europe and America and Japan. The Eastern countries have been slow to appreciate and extend this principle not out of prejudice as in Europe but out of lethargy and other extraneous factors. But the past few years have been a change especially in India and Burma where the newly established popular Governments are exerting themselves to 'liquidate illiteracy' and spread education and enlightenment among the masses.

Along with the spread of education came the triumph of the spirit and ideal of democracy. The worst fears of the ruling classes were realised in that the spread of knowledge led to the demand for personal and political liberty by the masses of the people. The Nineteenth Century saw the spread of democracy in most of the European countries. In England, the Parliamentary Reforms were the direct result of the awakened self-

consciousness of the people which was sponsored by a wide-spread system of education. On the Continent things were not so smooth, and democracy emerged only after a series of revolutions and popular upheavals.

It is no doubt true that the Post-war world has seen an eclipse of the spirit of democracy.

We are learning to understand slowly and after repeated painful experiences--that democracy cannot thrive in an atmosphere of passion, violence and hate. From the time of the renaissance to this day we have witnessed the steady advance and triumph of the scientific spirit and outlook which has resulted in a total transformation of the lives of individuals and communities. The scientific outlook is the objective outlook and int the sphere of the management of the affairs of a community, which is government this outlook expresses itself as the democratic ideal and method. The democratic ideal evokes, and is sustained by, the idealism of the peoples.

But, in spite of its being the natural issue of the scientific advancement of the past three centuries, democracy has suffered a serious set-back in recent times. The most unnatural inter-statal relationships that obtained in the Post-war era has resulted in the rise of dictatorships in some of the most powerful countries of Europe. The states of Germany and Italy are openly anti-democratic. The heads of these powerful states have poured scorn on the democratic ideal as being fit only for decadent peoples. Democracy is being fought with its own weapons. Education, which, as we have seen previously, was the tool, as well as the determining factor of decocracy, is being used extensively to-day not to help the growth of the individual but to the suppression of the individual and his freedom. The dictators have found in education the best weapon for realising their

dreams. The state has control over the bodies and a carefully controlled system of education has the minds of the peoples under its charge. A dwarfed humanity is the result.

Twenty years after the last War, we are again in the midst of another war. The world is in a melting pot. Even shrewd thinkers desist from prophesying about the future. All are agreeed that the end of the present war will see the world metamorphosed. A larger hope envisages the triumph of true democracy also. In the reconstruction of the new world education is bound to play the most important part.

Countries like India and Burma can take a lesson from the experiences of Europe. Democracy has come to stay in our midst; but in order to sustain it and make it genuine we have to depend mainly upon a proper educational programme.

Education has to usher in a new social order. It has to help to produce a new generation of men and women nurtured in freedom and imbued with the details of truth and justice. This is a stupendous task and our whole educational system requires revision and reorganisation.

The two important aspects of an educational programme are--purpose and method. The first defines the aims and scope while the second defines the technique of education. If the purpose is high and the method efficient, the result will surely be the advancement of the nation along the desired line. The system of education obtaining in India and Burma today has got this virtue in it--it has a method consistent with its purpose. But unfortunately, its purpose is not of that high order which alone can result in national advancement. And as to method, it is entirely foreign to the genius of the people. In spite of occasional improvements and interpretations, its original purpose remains unchanged. The well-known intention of Lord Macaulay and other spon-

sors of English education in India was the production of English educated Indians in sufficient numbers who will help the administration of the country. It is sad to contemplate that for a full hundred years this conception dominated our educational policy. Indian Leaders, without a single exception, have spoken disparagingly about an educational system whose direct aim was the production of clerks. That a love of liberty and a spirit of nationalism have been awakened in the country as a result of this education is not denied--but it is plain that these results have been produced in spite of and not as a result of the original purpose.

What shall be the purpose and method of the new educational programme? Education has been defined by Swami Vivekananda as the manifestation of the perfection already in man. Education seeks to bring out the powers and potentialities of the individual. The full and unfettered development of the human character and personality is to be realized through a proper assimilation of ideas and ideals. There is something noble in this conception of the aim of education. It was a national calamity that for long the purpose of education was taken to be equipment for Government service. With the increase in the turnover of University graduates and the consequent increase in the educated unemployed this position has become increasingly untenable. The situation had become so acute that a thorough reorganisation of the entire educational system in India was felt to be urgent. The rapidly changing political, economic and social situation also demanded an adjustment in the educational sphere. In short, what was needed was a thoroughly national approach to the problem.

Under the inspiring guidance of Mahatma Gandhi such an approach has been made in what has now become famous as the "Wardha Scheme." This is the product of the co-operative efforts of a large number of patriots and educationists of them

country. This is the first systematic approach to a national solution of the educational problem. As such, it approaches the problem from the side of the masses--the millions of agriculturists and artisans of the land. Whereas the old system of education was conceived in terms of, and in the interests of, a small percentage of India's population--the upper middle class--the new system seeks to serve the cause of the vast masses of the rural population. The Wardha Scheme is revolutionary in this sense. It is revolutionary in its purpose and in its method. It is revolutionary because it is national which the old system was not. Whereas the old system began from the top and never succeeded in reaching the bottom, the new system begins right from the bottom-- the toiling masses and through a graduated scheme of Elementary, Secondary, and University Courses, it seeks to build up a complete educational edifice on national lines.

The Wardha Scheme has had many critics. Its most critics have been those who represent the University interests. These critics have directed their attacks on the revolutionary character of the scheme. These criticisms mostly reveal one singular fact--the presence of 'vested interests' even in the field of education. There have been others --less virulent--who have criticised the details of the scheme as well as its method of approach. These latter criticisms have been helpful in modifying and correcting the scheme, and the Wardha Scheme in its final shape is quite different from the original. But in its method of approach and in its broad outlines, it correctly expresses the national aspirations. A high degree of patriotism, a spirit of detachment, a great sense of national responsibility and, above all, much educational experience--all these have come into play in the framing of the Scheme. And it stands as a monument

to the constructive genius of the Indian Nation.

There is a vast amount of idealism in India to-day. Much of this is being employed in the creation of a New Social Order in India based on Freedom, Justice, and Peace. Leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru are the symbols of this larger hope and aspiration. They speak not in narrow, parochial terms but in terms of the welfare of humanity itself. The words nation and nationalism are used entirely with a diffeent connotation. India is but a symbol. Indian Nationalism aims at preparing India for the larger service of the world.

The thoughts and outlook of a community are moulded by its best philosophers and thinkers. The Germany of to-day is not mainly the creation of Hitler. He is only the able organiser of the national thought forces in a mental atmosphere provided by philosophers and thinkers like Hegel and Nietzsche.

Says Hegel, "The state is the divine idea as it exists on earth....it is the absolute power on earth, it is its own end and object. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual."

Nietzsche represents best the Germany of Hitler. He says, "What have we to do with the herd morality which expresses itself in modern democracy? ...it is good for cows, women and Englishmen...A new tabernacle, I set over you, oh my brethren, become hard, for the best things belong to us, the best food, the purest sky, fairest women, and if men do not give us these things we take them... What has he to do with contracts who can command, who is master by nature, who comes on the scene with violence of deed and demeanour?"

The Italian Philosopher, Gentile, who is also the Minister of Education in Italy, speaks in a similar vein. "Every force is moral force in so

far as capable of influencing the will, whatever be the argument applied, the sermon or the cudgel."

Mussolini in one of his recent speeches thundered sarcastically, "Events are moving, and we desire that nothing more shall be heard of brotherhood, sisterhood, cousinhood of other bastard parenthoods, because relations between states are relations of force, and these relations of force are the determining elements of our Policy....

The order of the day is more guns, more ships, more aeroplanes, at whatever cost and by whatever means,--even if we have to wipe out completely what is called civilian life."

Europe has been nurtured in these thoughts for over a century. And the result is the production of an atmosphere charged with the arrogance. Democracy is sick in Europe. Even in England and France there is less of true democracy and more of its outer trappings. The democracy of Greece was based on the labour of vast numbers of slaves; there is much kinship between modern democracies and the democracy of ancient Greece. The National Anthemns of most European countries do not certainly breathe the spirit of democracy. The fact is, true democracy is yet to be. The true foundations are yet wanting. Neither a widespread literacy nor the elective party system of government can constitute the essence of democracy. The essential question is what are the lights that guide the collective aspirations of the community. As Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "The destity of the human race, as of the individual, depends on the direction of its life forces, the lights which guide it, and the laws that mould it." Neither the desire for expansion nor a philosophy of racial superiority can inspire the best in humanity. They are no high ideals but temporary aberrations. If selfishness and self-interest are no high ideas for individuals, neither are they for nations. The twentieth Century demdnds that the welfare of

humanity as a whole be placed above everything else. Democracy of the nation must reach out and grow into a democracy of humanity itself.

If there is any country in the world where poets, philosophers and thinkers have alike dreamt of and striven for peace and brotherhood it is India. Indian culture is permeated by a universal and broad outlook. India's philosophy places moral excellence above physical might. In accordance with the teaching of Lord Buddha--hatred cannot be conqured by hatred, it can be conqured only through love--the Great Asoka established, a kingdom based on love and service. The Great Emperor, who H.G.Wells calls the greatest among crowned heads, stamped the future course of Indian History with his genius by directing the energies of the nation to the great work of propagating the Dharma--Righteousness. From his time, the extra energies of the nation have been spent in his noble task instead of in devastating adjoining lands and peoples. In his wake India built up an enduring empire of the spirit in the hearts of millions and to-day half the world is grateful to India for this.

National awakening in India is an awakening to the realisation of this responsibility. India desires freedom, economic improvement and Social solidarity in order to fully prepare herself for the service of the world. India has to teach the world her high philosophy and culture. Many a leader in India have felt this to be the special mission of India. Swami Vivekananda calls it his foreign policy for India. In a recent speech at Colombo, Jawaharlal is reported to have said that "India was to-day on the threshhold of a new age. Considering the past, present and the future, he had no doubt that India, with her superior natural resources and man-power had a great future, not great in the sense of superior position in relation to other countries, or domination over

others, but better and nobler in the sense of friendliness and co-operation with others, with a message for other peoples of the world.

The great Leaders of Modern India--Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal, to name only a few--have been philosophers and thinkers, not like Hegel or Nietzsche, but like their own predecessors--Krishna, Buddha or Sankara. They are all men of broad outlook and vast sympathies, men whom any nation would be proud to own as citizens. Modern India is nurtured in the thoughts of these leaders. Their hold on the national mind is great. This fact alone holds great hopes for the future.

Against this cultural background stands all our activities--educational, social, economic, and political. Education has to instil into the minds of the young the great ideals for which the nation has existed for centuries. A national scheme of education will aim at economic improvement by means of a wide-spread system of technical education; it will help to produce social solidarity by instilling the correct historical sense and a liberal interpretation of religion and morality; above all, it will produce a sense of world kinship and world loyalty through a sympathetic study of world history.

In his address to the students of the "Nava Bharat Vidyalays" Wardha, last November, Pandit Jawaharlal stressed on the need for developing this larger outlook: "You should certainly love, admire and serve your country. But this does not mean that you should hate other nations. To think that your country isthe best is a foolish idea because it betrays the narrowness of your mind. Of course, some countries are more progressive than other countries at a particulartime. But a country that is regarded as progressive today may become dust after

sosometime. However, each nation has its own good points and you should try to understand them. It is only then that you will be able to develop a broad-mindedness which is so essential for all of us. Try to picture in your mind the students all over the world going to their respective schools and learning various arts and crafts together with their studies, as you do here. You should try to understand other nations and thus ~~xryxtm~~ develop a sense of international fellowship. Our nation is a part of the world and whatever happens outside affects us as well. No country can live alone. Therefore, if you wish to keep pace with the world, you must try to broaden your vision. The evils of narrow-minded nationalism can be easily seen by you if you turn your eyes to Europe."

Sentiments such as these are moulding the minds of Indian youth. What a contrast this is to the lead that the youth of Europe is receiving. It is well for us to learn to choose our leaders. India has set up a new pattern for leadership which other nations will do well to copy. It is a painful fact that politician have brought the world to its present chaos. Goldsmith's famous lines, slightly altered, express this truth well:-

"Ill fares the land to hastening ills a prey
Where Politicians abound and Statesmen are few."

The Old world is collapsing before our eyes. The new world on a miniature scale is being created in India thanks to the activities of her outstanding leaders. In her success in this lies much of the hopes for the future. The immense idealism of India is the guarantee that the world may still bee the light in the midst of the encircling gloom.

An optimistic note is struck by Dr. Radhakrishnan in his "World's unborn Soul.": "The collapse of a civilization built on the auda-

cities of speculative doubt, moral impression-
ism and the fierce and confused enthusiasms of
races and nations need not dishearten us, for
it has in it elements of an anti-social and
anti-moral character, which deserve to perish..
...In spite of all appearances to the contrary
we discern in the present unrest the gradual
dawning of a great light, a converging life
endeavour, a growing realization that there is
a secret Spirit in which we are all one, and of
which humanity is the highest vehicle on earth,
and an increasing desire to live out this know-
ledge and establish a kingdom of spirit on earth.
.....Humanity's ultimate realization of itself and
of the world can be attained only by an ever-in-
creasing liberation of the values that are uni-
versal and human...What we require is not profes-
sions and programmes but the power of spirit in
the hearts of men, a power which will help us to
discipline our passions of greed and selfishness
and organize the world which is at one with us in
desire."

Many a thinker in the West believe that India will show the way. This hankering is reflected in the world tribute paid to Mahatma Gandhi on his seventieth birthday. Will India respond? If she does not, who else can?

ROBERT R. RUSK.:THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF EDUCATION.

1. Fichte in his Addresses to the German People: "the art of education," he said, "will never attain complete clearness in itself without philosophy. Hence, there is an interaction between the two, and either without the other is incomplete and unserviceable." Dewey has even gone so far as to maintain that the most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is that it is the theory of education in its most general phases.

2. Gentile in The Reform of Education has warned us that the belief that men may continue to educate without concerning themselves with the subtle problems of philosophy, means a failure to understand the precise nature of education.
3. The answer to every educational question is ultimately influenced by our philosophy of life. Although few formulate it, every system of education must have an aim, and the aim of education is relative to the aim of life. Philosophy formulates what is conceives to be the end of life; education offers suggestions how this end is to be achieved.
4. There is no escape from a philosophy of life and of education. Those who pride themselves on their neglect of philosophy, have their own philosophy,-usually a quite inadequate one; every man, as Schopenhauer says, is a born metaphysician. "There are some people--and I am one of them--", says Chesterton, "who think that the most practical and important thing about a man still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy."
5. Idealism agrees with Pragmatism in seeking an escape from "the paralysing horror of the naturalistic view of life, the nightmare of an indifferent universe," but it adopts a different course. It accepts without question the validity of the methods and conclusions of science, but points to the incompleteness of the scientific sphere.
6. Feeling and emotion cannot account for science, a whole technique having been devised to eliminate just this personal equation and

render the results of scientific investigation universal and objective. As little can it construct or criticise a metaphysic.

7. Aspect of pragmatic philosophy which makes the emotions directive as well as dynamic, and which leads people, as he said, to mistake the beating of their hearts for the working of their brains.

8. Man himself has set the problem which he is called upon to solve, and his attitude to this environment is something far removed from the animal's attitude of adaptation to its natural but alien environment. He cannot be said to be the creature of his environment in the sense in which that term is applied to any other animal. "This is why human life has a value, why education is a mission." When man emerges in the course of evolution, instead of being content like the animals to take things as he finds them, he sets about to question, to inquire their origin, to embellish what he finds or produces, to strive after something better than the given--in a word, to progress, since "progress is man's distinctive mark alone."

9. In our ordinary thinking we conclude from this to that. Kant formulated his problem in the well-known question--How are synthetic a priori propositions possible? In seeking an answer to this question he was forced to recognise that such synthetic activity of mind was involved not merely in judgments characteristic of the scientific world but even in all knowledge and experience; thus his problem assumed the more general form--how to account for experience in general. It was this problem which Locke had earlier set himself, although by his assumption that the mind is but the passive recipient of impressions received from the outside world he prejudiced his procedure, thereby drawing upon himself the

condemnation of Fichte, who characterised Locke's doctrine as "the worst of all philosophical systems." It is to Kant's credit that he anticipated this development, and that he sought by a complete inversion of the empiricist position, by investigating the activities of the knowing mind, to account for human experience.

p.9. The child, in fact, only wins his freedom gradually; he grows in freedom, and is successful only in so far as he is capable of subordinating his present impulses to the attainment of more complete and higher purposes. Only when the individual has attained the philosophic insight of Plato's rulers, has become "the spectator of all time and of all existence," or when he can orient all things (in Spinoza's phrase) "sub specie aeternitatis," can he be regarded as free in the fullest sense.

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1. According to Sri Sankaracharya the world of phenomena, or the Universe is something which cannot be defined exactly, since it is constantly changing. It has some sort of existence, which cannot be called existent or non-existent; for if it has any real existence it can never become non-existent, as in that case something will have to be nothing, which is absurd. But, as a matter of fact, every moment it is dying and giving birth to a new state of affairs; so it cannot be called existent or non-existent. It cannot be both simultaneously; how can a thing be permanent and impermanent at the same time? This state of affairs goes by the name of Maya. So much regarding the known. Coming back to the knower the Self, the first personal pronoun, if I put such a question as "Who am I?", the answer at once comes that I am a man of many wants. This is because I wrongly identify myself with the ever-changing body, born of earth equally fluctuating. Sankara has proved in several ways the perfect nature of the soul analytically. I am not my body. It is mine. I am not identical with it. This individual is made up of three factors--the body, the mind, and the self or ego behind the other two. The first two are changeable; the third is changeless, for there has been no break in the self-identity from babyhood to the present time. Now change means death of one and birth of another, exist of one and entrance of another, end of one and beginning of another. Hence changeless means beginningless and endless, or, in other words, eternal. So the "I" behind body and mind is eternal. Sankara shows again that that which is eternal must also be infinite, and he thus proves the infinite and eternal nature of the soul. He also proves the unity of the soul

There cannot be two infinities. Myself means the real self behind the body and the mind. This is true with regard to every other creature. Behind the body and behind the mind of everyone the Self is one. This is Advaita Vada, or the Monistic system. "O beloved, when there was no creation, there was only one soul existing, one alone without a second." These individual souls are the shadows of that one eternal Soul. The Self is not outside me, it is inside." "That Which words cannot describe, Where the mind cannot reach, that is the all-blissful Self."

It may be noted here that the individual soul has been regarded by other philosophies as smaller than the smallest, whereas Sankara has proved it to be bigger than the biggest. Two extremes meet. Now it is a fact that whatever is smaller than the smallest is the same as bigger than the biggest. So the Upanishads teach us. If we dive a little deep we find no difference. Sri Madhavacharya and Sri Ramanujacharya can be understood by all. Sankara can be understood only by thoughtful people.

2. It has been proved beyond all doubts the indestructibily of matter. It has analysed the human mind and believes in its unextended immaterial nature.

3. Perceptions and sensations, these are called phenomena. The universe is nothing but a collection of countless phenomena. Therefore it is not a simple and self-existent entity. It is a compound. The moment it is split up into its factors it vanishes.

4. Where does the universe exist? It is localised in space and time. Are they self-existent or themselves localised somewhere? It is an undeniable fact that they exist only in your wakeful condition, and not when you sleep soundly. When a man like Rip Van Vinkle, in

the story sleeps even for several months, he does not know where he has been lying or how long. So space and time exist in your wakeful condition, i.e. they exist when you are conscious, or, in other words, in your consciousness. Now your consciousness is confined inside your body; for outside it, in the table or the chair, it does not exist. Hence the Universe is inside your body which is pervaded by your mind, which in its turn is pervaded by yourself. So, the whole cosmos is in yourself. Emmanual Kant has also pointed out that space and time are the two forms of the senses and the mind; they do not exist apart from them.

There is another way of arriving at the same conclusion. Suppose a big cannon is fired two miles away from you, nothing intervening between it and yourself. You see the flash and you know that almost simultaneously with the flash, the roaring sound is there. But you do not hear it. There is no sould for you. A few seconds after the actual occurrence you hear it. Now where does the sound take place? In the cannon or in the ears? The auditory nerves within the ears carry the vibration to the brain centre, which carries it to the mind, and that to yourself; and then you know it. So, the sound exists inside yourself, and not in the cannon outside. Similarly, forms, touches, tastes, smells exist inside your senses or in yourself. And so the Universe, which is but an aggregate of innumerable sensations of forms, tastes, smells, exist inside your body, in your mind, or in your own consciousness, not outside. There is no such thing as space or time outside you.

Yet another method of arriving at this conclusion is this. You know that every object of inference really exists in the mind. There are two ways of looking at the universe--pratyaksha and anumana--by direct perception and inference.

You see the smoke on yonder hill; you directly see the smoke only, and you infer that there must be fire. This knowledge of the fire is not based upon your direct perception through your eyes. The fire exists only in your mind. So is every matter of inference. How far does your direct perception extend? We see the beautiful birds winging their way through the air in all directions, we see the sun, the lord of the day, and the shining starry world in the night. Even beyond these there must be space, that is what we infer. The space beyond is conceived as made up of various concentric spheres one surrounding the other, which go by the names of Janah, Mahas, Tapas, and Satya. Of these, we are able to see directly only this side of Swarga or heaven, while the other side and the other outer spheres we are not able to see; we simply infer their existence. Now, whatever is inferred is in the mind. So, all the outer spheres are in the mind. But all the inner spheres, which make up the visible Universe, are inside the outer. So the visible Universe must be inside the mind or in yourself.

Again, who illumines all these? The sun. What illumines the sun? The eyes; for an eyeless man has no sun. What illumines the eyes? The mind. What illumines the mind? The self. So the whole Universe is illumined by yourself. But for you there can be no universe. Thus you see that you cannot localise it outside yourselves; the whole of it exists in your own minds, in your own selves.

5. Suppose a man looks through the wrong end of an opera-glass at the men and women passing along the street opposite to his room. How very much smaller they will appear! Then what is space? We have seen that it has only a relative existence, and this relativity of its

existence is altogether deceiving. Duality is the beginning of relativity. The moment two things or two ideas start up, relativity begins. Then we commence to differentiate one thing or idea from the other. Here is the beginning of knowledge and elementary reasoning. From this we proceed to more complex reasoning by coming across a variety of things or ideas, till for the sake of convenience we name them differently by looking at their differences; and we retain these various ideas and names in our mind by the relative faculty called memory, the storehouse of our knowledge. So we see that relativity is the cause of our knowledge, and that space is nothing but an idea of relation.
6. When a yogi tries to concentrate his mind, he sits in a cross-legged posture, holds his body erect--upon a level spot neither too high nor too low--shuts his eyes and tries to separate his mind from all his senses. So far it is easy. For a time he can baffle the delusion of space. But he finds a great deal of difficulty to struggle with time; for a long succession of random mental phenomena intrude on his mental field. The cause of this disturbance is the ever active habit of his mind acquired by long association with the senses. Even after the carriage has been cut away from the running train it moves a good distance by its own inertia. It requires an opposing force to check its course and it cannot be stopped all at once; if we attempt to do it, there will be a great shock which may lead to the injury of the carriage. The best way is to allow it to move along only trying at the same time to retard its motion gently as much as we can. So in this case, Allow the mind to oscillate between one idea and another for a time, then try to retard the oscillation by compelling it to oscillate in relation to

one and the same idea. This can be done by the mental repetition of a single word, called mantra in Sanskrit, and the best mantra in this case of mental concentration is the Pranava (AUM) of the Vedas. The meaning of the Pranava is Sachchidananda Brahma where all struggles end; and hence the repetition of that mantra inclines the mind to, and prepares it for that blessed state. Any other mantra than the Pranava does not so well serve the purpose, for it requires the help either of the throat, palate, teeth, or lips, for its articulation; whereas Pranava requires the least physical exertion for its utterance and therefore is more suited for mental repetition. Hence it has been pronounced to be the best of all the mantras; and because it helps the attainment of eternal peace in Brahma, it has been highly extolled in the Vedas.

Now when after several mental repetitions of the Pranava the oscillation of the mind becomes less and less, it will grow more and more tranquil, till at length, if the process is steadily pursued, it reaches the blessed state. This can not be done in a day. It requires a hard struggle of many days to end all struggles.

7. In the state of reerie or dream, when we are the creators of our own world, we can imagine or dream of extended bodies and surfaces, such as, the the sun, the moon, the mountain, the river, the sky, the ocean. But we can imagine only what we have perceived before, and although we may combine anew the elements of the things previously perceived, we cannot create anything which we have not experienced in some shape or other beforehand. This shows that our mind of itself has a faculty of conceiving space, although the conception has been derived from something independent of our mind, namely, the objects of our perception. Those objects are the cuase of

rousing the slumbering faculty of special conception inherent in our mind. In the case of reverie or dream space is a purely mental form, and hence must be without any extension. Now let us concider it as perceived in our waking state. I have just tried to prove the relative nature of space, and the non-existence of any permanent and definite form of extension. As in our reverie or dream space is purely of a mental nature and has its place only in our mind, similarly may it not be concluded that the infinite space outside and independent of us has its place in the infinite and independent mind of a Being whom we call God? "We are such stuff as dreams are moade of." This conclusion is the only one which can reconcile the universally accepted belief that in the beginning there was only One, Omnipresent, Omniscient, Eternal, Pure, Independent, Absolute Being, named God.

8. In this process of philosophical self examination, he at once perceives that his physical and mental states have been changing from moment to moment in the course of his life, and that nevertheless he has been feeling himself to be the same man unaffected by the variations in his mental and moral conditions. In doing so he marks his own plastic nature. When his body was that of a child, he thought himself to be a child; when his body was weak, he thought himself weak; when his body was strong, he thought himself strong; when his body was that of a youth, he felt himself to be young and so on. But all these different circumstances have not the least affected his self-identity. He feels himself to be merely a spectator of the long-winding panorama of the outer life. He finds that what may be called his self, has the peculiar power of adapting itself to the conditions of the body. In a weak body it is weak, in a strong

one it is strong, in a feverish one it is feverish, in a dyspeptic one it is dyspeptic, and so on. But of itself it is neither weak nor strong nor feverish nor dyspeptic; it is pure identity, the witness of all these, and other states. He also finds that this self is neither a male nor a female, neither a Brahman nor a Sudra, neither a Hindu nor a Mussalman, neither a Christian, nor a Buddhist, and that it is neither of this nor of that class or nation or sect, because all these distinctions savour of externality, and so belong to the external world. But this self is something internal which is unchangeable. He finds too that although his childhood, youth and manhood are no more, his self survives them all; so he finds his self to be the one unchanging entity in a changeful world, without any name or form or caste or creed, without fear or hope, pleasure or pain, free from all physical bondages. When it comes in contact with bodily frames it acquires all the aforesaid and many other attributes, although essentially and by nature it has none, as a pure crystal, without any colour of its own, takes on the colours of the things that come in contact with it. Ultimately he finds the self to be beyond the domain of space and time, absolute and so indivisible, (for if he thinks of dividing the absolute, then it is no more absolute but relative, and also he cannot even imagine dividing what is beyond space and time. So he realizes his self to be Akhanda, that is, without any part, undivided), full in itself, pure consciousness. Then he concludes that since this is true of his self, it must also be true of the selves of all other individuals like himself, for "no one examines all the grains of rice that boil in a pot to see whether they are well cooked or not," says

Bhagavan Sri Ramakrishna, "since the examination of a single grain is a sufficient guarantee for all the others." Therefore he finds that his self is the self universal, one and absolute. The selves of the highest and the lowest beings are one and the same essentially.

9. What are the arguments to prove that there is such a thing as the soul, the soul existing before and after this life and eternal in its nature? The first answer is that we must realise it; then there will be no need of questioning. There are also many rational proofs; one of them is the following. Try to imagine your own destruction. In order to do so, there must be one who imagines. Try to imagine his destruction; in order to do so another person is necessary. Thus we cannot imagine our own destruction, cannot completely annihilate ourselves. So it is impossible for us to be destroyed. "That 'I' exists, as to this, what man can entertain any doubt? Even if there be any doubt, he who doubts is the self." This is what Sankaracharya wrote. Later on, Cartesian philosophy taught the same to the West. Descartes began to doubt everything; at last he found it impossible to doubt the doubter; hence his momorable saying "I think; therefore I am." Thinking and doubting are synonymous; for when you arrive at a conclusion after doubting, you know clearly about the subject and then you cease to think. So he established that 'I' exists. Whatever exists is something. Whatever does not exist is nothing. Something can never become nothing. I was never nothing and can never become nothing. Being can never come out of non-being.

10. Every material form is liable to change. Heat expands and cold contracts it. It admits of any number of divisions. The big ones become smaller, the smaller, still smaller, and so on. So it is constantly changing. Now let us analyse

the phenomenon of change.. Whenever any form changes into another, the old form exists no more or dies, and a new form comes to exist or is born. So the words "birth" and "death" may be substituted for the word "change". Thus we see that every material form has to change or die unceasingly, on a background which is change-less or birth-and-deathless. On account of this birth-and-deathless or eternal background, the ever-dying material form is saved from destruc-tion, as it is inseparably united with it amidst all its vicissitudes.

Now let us see what sort of a thing this eter-nal background is. Is it formful? No, as in that case it would also have to die like that which rests upon it. Hence it must for formless; and as every form is limited, that which is formless must be limitless or infinite. The finite form exists on this infinite background, but where dues this latter exist? Does it exist in space and time? It cannot, since space whose existence depends upon the co-existence of things, and time whose existence depends upon succession of events, are not independent, hence have beginnings and ends,or in other words, are finite. How can the infinite one live in the finite? Space begins to exist after the co-existence of things and cease to exist, when that co-existence ceases. Time beings to exist when two events occur one after another, and ceases to exist when no such succession takes place. Again, when two things co-exist, they must be known to exist together and so one of them must be the knower, and the other can be known, and knowledge takes place only in mind. So space conception must be in the mind. Succession of events, bringing along with it two or more different ideas, also pre-supposes the existence of the mind, for how can there be an idea without a mind to give birth

to it? Hence also time conception exists in mind. Therefore, both space and time exists in mind. But is mind limited or limitless? That it is limited requires no proof, and as such you cannot localise the limitless one in it. Now, what else is there besides the mind, the space, the time, and the universe existing in them? It is the self that only remains.

11. But you may say that although we may thus seem as one, still we keep up our two separate individualities, and thus if we eliminate space away from A and B, they may appear as one, but they are really two entities. To this we say, as far as space is concerned, you are perfectly right, but by hypothesis, we must have to eliminate time, another separating principle, like space, from between A and B. In that case there should not be two distinct or mutually exclusive ideas conveyed by A and B, as two ideas coming one after another will keep up the idea of time, which we want to eliminate. Hence A and B must be absolutely one, or infinity must be absolutely one; and being conscious of this oneness or changelessness or birth-and-death-lessness, it is infinitely and eternally blissful. It is the one Soul both of mind and matter, of the internal and the external universe. There is not a single material particle, however minute it may be, more minute than an electron, more minute than an etherial particle even, which is not ensouled by it. That is why our forefathers used to find God everywhere throughout the whole universe. Although it is the one formless background of the whole universe, in different forms it appears deifferently.

12. The phenomenal nature of the universe was known to our ancient seers. By studying and

analysing some of these phenomena they arrived at the knowledge of one Supreme Being pervading the whole universe. Let us see how it was possible for them to do so. What is a phenomenon? Is it simple or elementary in its nature or a compound? Because it is a mere appearance, it cannot exist independently of a knower to whom it must appear, and there must be something to appear and then, out of their union, an appearance or a phenomena becomes possible. Hence it is a compound and is made up of three factors, the seer, the object, and that which brings about their union, or as they are called in Sanskrit, Adhyatma, Adhibhuta and Adhidaiva. We now see that no phenomenon can exist without a seer or soul, hence, no phenomenon is soulless, or in other words, every phenomenon is infilled with a soul, and hence is alive. The universe is made up of innumerable forms, touches, tastes, smells and sounds, which go by the name of phe - nomena; and you are the one soul of all these which begain to exist with your birth and which will cease to exist with your death, and so, along with you your world rose and along with you it will set. But you know that the world existed before your birth and it will exist after your death. Indeed you know it to be beginningless and endless.

13. That this Ego is not one with my body or mind can be easily understood by studying the phenomenon of sleep. When I am awake I am in every portion of my body. But when I fall asleep I am not in any one of my external organs either of sense or of activity. This requires no proof. Now if I were one and the same as my body, separation in that case would be impossible. How can I separate me from myself? I can always separate or distinguish me from that which is not myself. Hence the organs of

of sense and those of activity which make up the exterior portion of my whole living organism are distinct and separate from me. But this does not prove that I am distinct from my mind. The same mind is to be found when I dream in the course of my sleep. So mind is there even in the condition of my sleep. But I do not always dream when I sleep. There is dreamless sleep called sound sleep. I, at that time, do not think, feel and will; not only that, I do not remember anything at all. Not only the world, including my own body, as well as the charming forms of my wife and children, but even the very memory of it has left me. Both of them have slipped off from me. So the mind is not there. But where am I at the time? Have I left the body? If that were the case, the body would be dead. You may call the dead body of a man ever so loudly, the body is never going to be alive and conscious. But that is not the case with a sleeping man. He is somewhere in the remote corner of this body taking rest, just as a man desiring to take rest wants to avoid all sorts of disturbances and so leaves the street-side rooms of his house and goes to a solitary corner remote from the bustle of crowds that pass by in the street. If at that time a friend comes to see, having an urgent news to communicate to him, he must have to give loud calls, before he can make him aware of his presence. But any amount of loud call or ringing the call-bell would never bring the man if he were not at home. In the same manner, you must have to give loud calls, nay, sometimes you must push and shake him in order to wake him up, or bring him back to his mind and his senses. Hence when I sleep I simply take rest in a solitary place in some corner of my body. Let me try to find out that corner. It is a fact, that I

do not stay in any one of the ten external organs which make up the exterior portion of my body. It is also a fact, that I do not live in my brain which is the instrument of mind, as I do not think, feel, will, and remember anything. So I do not stay in the head, the hands and the legs. Then I must be living somewhere inside the trunk as I do not live in any of my sense organs. Even in my wakeful condition I do not live in the alimentary canal as I have nothing to do with the digestion of my food. I know to cook all sorts of savoury dishes, I know how to put them into the cavity of my mouth, I know how to relish and swallow them. But afterwards, how out of the food-stuff, living blood is manufactured, I know nothing about, not even the greatest scientist of our time. No man, however clever he may be in many respects, has the power to produce one drop of living blood out of the most nourishing food. That power belongs to the Creator who in that capacity goes by the name of Vaisvanara (Gita XV, 14). What is my relationship with Him? Just as a cooly's relationship is with the master-builder. The cooly is ordered to bring bricks, mortar, lime, water, etc. and is paid by him for his services. The Master-builder of this body is inside me and His orders come in the form of hunger and thirst and I must have to obey Him, and He pays my daily wages in the form of gustatory enjoyments. Hence the whole of the alimentary canal, and the various supplementary organs such as salivary glands, peptic glands, the liver, the pancreas, the spleen, the villi, the lymphatic glands, the excretory organs, etc. are presided over by God even in my wakeful condition, much more they should be so when I sleep soundly. Thus in sleep, my search after me confines me to the thoracic, as I have

no place in the abdominal region. Again the organ of respiration mostly acts independently of my will even when I am awake. So, in sleep it certainly acts independently of me, and hence my search ultimately confines me to the Heart, as I have no place in the lungs. So, when I sleep I am made to hide myself in the recess of my heart for rest, away from all the workshops of my body which in my absence remain closed.

14. Now we have found out the real home of Ego to be the heart. The other portions of the body are merely its workshops. We have also seen that it is independent of body and mind as it can live without them in sleep, a condition in which it is absolutely helpless.

15. Thus tied to his false home, the earth, he has no power to come back to his true home voluntarily. Only by the irresistible power of sleep which makes him perfectly helpless, and mostly unconscious, he is forced to go there every day for some hours. Of his own accord, he never cares to go, and even if he cares, he finds that he has no power to go. Thus caught in the net-work of earthly attachments he can never go out of the world, and even after his death, he eagerly takes his birth in it, not for once, but for several times, for although he may imagine himself to be mortal, thereby his immortal and eternal nature can never suffer. With whatever intensity I may imagine a rope to be a snake, the rope is never going to be a snake on account of my imagination. So man can never perish after death. He only follows the bend of his mind after he casts off his body, and as his mind is a lover of the world, to world he must have to come again and again as long as he will have a love for it.

16. The Ego has no control over the heart which works perfectly well even when it sleeps soundly.

Who does at that time direct the movement of the heart, and through its ceaseless contractions and expansions preside over the circulation of the blood all over the body? It is God. "When all the inner and outer organs of the body are sleeping, He who keeps awake and goes on producing the things that they desire most, is the Pure One. He is Brahma. He is described in all the Scriptures as the one deathless Being. All the spheres exist in Him. He is beyond all, none can go beyond Him. This is what is He." (Katha V,8.).

17. So the Lord sits in the middle, neither in the right nor in the left, neither in front nor behind, neither above nor below. He occupies that central point in the heart from which He directs the centripetal and centrifugal forces that keep up the continuous on-flow of life.

18. The phenomenon of sleep will prove this very easily. So long as the eyes can see, forms will exist for you; so long as the nose can smell, odours will exist for you; so long as the ears can hear, sounds will exist for you; and so with every other sense. Now what is the wakeful condition, when you are in your eyes, your ears and all your senses? Then there is a thoughtful condition when you are in your mind. But there is a condition when you go away from your senses, when you go away from your mind, and that condition is known as sound sleep. Then a friend may come and sing a sweet tune beside you, but you do not hear him, because you are not in your ears. You are in your body, no doubt, but you are not in your ears or any of your senses. Yet although you are away from you mind and senses, you are still in your body; for if I give you a good push, you wake up. And what does this waking mean? You come back to your mind, you came back to your senses.

W. NICOL REID.

"I KNOW" in "THE LITERARY GUIDE"

"The fool" says one reputed wise above his fellows, "is wiser in his own concept than seven men that can render a reason." "Our first carnal inclination" said M.M. Robertson "is always to think we are right to begin with." To be exempt from either weakness is to be more than human.

The trouble with us all is that we find it infinitely easier to assume we are right than to examine the grounds on which our opinions should rest. So strange a potency has the mere feeling of certainty that it seems--to ourselves --to guarantee the truth of whatever it may be that we feel carries with it an unreasoned and unreasoning conviction of personal infallibility. It will ever masquerade as "knowledge" thus reinforcing a "carnal" disposition to impose one's will on others. "I know" I am right; do be guided by me." Hence the world is full of dogmatists who know, "intuitively" of course, that they are right, while as the situation is, the thoughtful Rationalist is not amused. Rather he is put on his mettle to seek to qualify, as far as in him lies, for a place among the seven men who "can render a reason." His reading of the facts of experience has made it plain to him that the tendency of unreasoning belief has always been to divert a wealth of human emotion into channels where it will lose itself in the sands of futility, or be dissipated in a vapour of other-worldly aspiration. Moreover, he reads in holy writ that "there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave" whither he goeth. If, therefore, he is ever to be good for anything, he must be so here and now, and with humanly realizable ends in view. And in order that his activities may not be mischie-

vous, he must by clear thinking, earn the right to put his conceptions of duty into practice with reasonable confidence. Nor can he earn that right once for all. The task of self-orientation is a life long one, involving increasing vigilance and the maintenance of many contacts with the realities of life.

The extra-ordinary plausibility of the mere feeling of certainty seems to be due to the fact that it satisfied a somewhat imperious need. In this it counterfeits and takes the place of the satisfaction which the disinterested thinker derives from reaching sounder conclusions by more legitimate means. The difference is that in the case of the free or straight thinker the dominant factor in the whole emotional complex is the desire to know what the truth of the matter is, and to accept it for no other reason than that it is the truth. For this emotion the thinker finds its rightful satisfaction, not by "shooing away" but by weighing one consideration with another, and either drawing the conclusion to which the facts point or suspending judgment for lack of available evidence. This is the only course worthy of the dignity of a being endowed with reason.

When, however, the desire to feel certain is strong enough to expel the love of truth, and remains in undisputed possession, it pats itself on the back with the complacency of one who is getting everything his own way. One unfortunate result is that the wish-thinker tends to harbour an implacable hostility to every kind of inquiry or discussion which threatens to disturb that complacency. That, indeed, is the characteristic mark, brand, or stigma of the wish-thinker in all ages and climes. And we are all wish-thinkers more or less. Hence to quote a well-known passage in Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd" when we

find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one." Frequently as this passage has been quoted, I do not think we can say that it has been quoted often enough. I say this because it seems to me that if we were all to take its lesson to heart the shutters of obscurantism would everywhere go down with a crash. Right Reason would come into its own, and a flood of new light would be thrown upon our path, showing us in what direction our duty lies and revealing a maginficent panorama of wider aims and undreamt-of possibilities. I must, nevertheless, in honesty warn the Christian reader against being led away by any such precepts. Were he to adopt and practise them he would be, if not transformed ipso facto into a rationalist, at least in imminent danger of becoming one. I can well imagine the Devil taking him away into a quiet corner and tempting him with one of our membership application forms! Those however, who think meanly of that Reason which they themselves describe as "God-given" and those who think they "know" Rationalism to be "Pernicious" have an obvious alternative to making an honest use of the divine gift. I only hint at it. I hesitate to name it. I cannot commend it.

What is this Rationalism which they so confidently assume to be pernicious? Even people who are under a moral obligation to be accurate allow themselves to harbour curious misconceptions on the subject. In an excellent popular dictionary which I sometimes consult I find the Rationalist described as "one who

believes himself guided in his opinions solely by reason." I am willing to assume--though with a little difficulty--that the reverend compiler believed this to be a fair definition. My comment is that it would be just as fair were I to describe the Christian as "one who believes himself to be already in the full use and enjoyment of the celestial robe, harp, and crown." The most we Rationalists presume to say for ourselves is that, in so far as we are consistent, we aim at being as reasonable as we can. That aim determines our attitude to the sources amd materials of knowledge. I have often thought that the Latin Motto In Luce Spes ---" "Our hope is in the light"--might well be adopted by the R.P.A. as symbolical of that attitude. It avoids the very appearance of claiming to have attained the utmost available "knowingness." Whatever else the Rationalist may or may not be, he is to that extent agnostic. And in this respect his position is impregnable. He does not lay claim to some ineffable wisdom, and then have to confess himself in the presence of a Great Mystery.

We Rationalists justly esteem it a blessing to have discovered that we are under no moral obligation to believe the incredible. We cheerfully disown all pretence of having succeeded in picking the pocket of the Absolute. Realizing our limits as finite beings and that we can know things and people only in their relations to us and to each other, we cease to propound sham solutions of the Riddle of existence. Our aim is to learn to distinguish between paths that lead nowhere and those which may reasonably be expected to lead to some good end. It is sadly careless or biassed thinking that allows outsiders--bishops, deans, and the like--to picture the agnostic as an invertebrate

sort of person, irresolute alike in thought and in action. It is the merest caricature to portray us as displaying a paralysing uncertainty about the things that matter. It is precisely in dealing with the things that matter to humanity in the only world we can truthfully profess to know, that men of our way of thinking have always been conspicuously in advance of public opinion and of the reformatory march of their Christian contemporaries. In our country's written histories especially those for the use of schools the work done by those men has been systematically minimized while that of a handful of Christian reformers--pitifully small as representing an enormously larger community--has been lauded to the skies. We deem it no stretch of candour or generosity to acknowledge our debt to the latter. Will our Christian friends prove themselves equally broad-minded? Never, I am afraid so long as they continue to know where they have not seriously enquired.

Quotations from Swami Vivekananda. (extracts from Prabuddha Bharata). 1. "Come to the Himalayas," he would say every now and then, "Realise yourself without feeling, and when you have known that, you can fall upon the world like a bolt from the blue. I have no faith in those who ask, "Will any listen to my preaching?" Never yet could the world refuse to hear the preaching of him who had anything to say. Stand up with your own might."

2. "As you passed to the problems of the Sudra, which would be first worked out here, his face took a new light, as if he were actually seeing into the future, and he told of the mixture of races, and of the great tumults, the terrible tumults, through which the next state of things must be reached.

3. He talked of Vairagya, how much grander to give one's youth, how miserable to have only age to offer. Those who come to it old, attain their own salvation, but they cannot be Gurus, they cannot show mercy. Those who come young shall carry many across without any benefit to themselves.
4. We were all watching the making of men, and that alone. Sri Ramakrishna was always weeding out and rejecting the old, he always chose the young for his disciples."
5. The love on which he could not most surely count, if he became a drunkard tomorrow, was not that of his disciples, they would kick him out in horror, but that of a few (not all) of his Gurubhais. To them he would be still the same. "And mind this, Margot", he said, "It is when half-a-dozen people learn to love like this that a new religion beings. Not till then.
6. There was an implication throughout the talk by the Swami himself that Christ and Buddha were inferior to Krishna--in the grasp of problems--inasmuch as they preached the highest ethics as a world-path, whereas Krishna saw the right of the whole--in all its parts--to its own differing ideals. But perhaps no one not familiar with his thought, would have realised that this lay behind his exclamation. "The Sermon on the Mount has only become another bondage for the soul of man!" All through his lectures now, he shows this desire to understand life as it is, and to sympathise with it.
7. He told me how, as a child, he hardly ever was conscious of going to sleep. A ball of coloured light came towards him and he seemed to play with it all night. Sometimes it touched him and burst into a blaze of light, and he passed off. One of the first questions Sri Ramakrishna put to him was about this: "Do you see a light when you sleep?" "Yes" he replied, "does not everyone

sleep so?"
One of the Swamis says this was a psychic something which showed that concentration was a gift with which he started this life, not to be earned during its course.
8. I sit and listen to him now, and all appears to the intellect so obvious, to the will so unattainable; and I say to myself, "What were the clouds of darkness that covered me in the old days? Surely no one was ever so blind or so ignorant!" You must have been right when you thought me hard and cold. I must have been so, and it must have been the result of the long effort to see things by the mind alone, without the feelings.
Swami is all against Bhakti and Emotion now--determined to banish it, he says.

K.A. KRISHNASWAMY AIYAR. (In Ved. Kesari).

WAS SANKARA A CRYPTO-BUDDHIST?

Some critics who ought to know better look upon Sankara's system as Buddhism in disguise. This is due to an inaccurate appreciation of facts. The two schools are as opposed to each other as the poles. A mere surface-dip may give rise to a belief in their fancied identity. But, in the first place, like all Non-Sankara speculations the Buddhistic view is closely restricted to the Waking experience. In the next it affords no explanation of Time which is a logical implication of the doctrine of momentariness and cannot be absorbed by the latter. It is a Philistine notion that since Buddha declares that the world, a depending on consciousness, is unreal, his teaching is identical with Sankara's. We shall show briefly wherein the two systems seem to agree and wherein they differ.

Buddha's Position: (1) The world is unreal. For it is only a concept. A concept can create its own object, and the object is unreal as in Dream.
(2) Consciousness which produces concepts is itself momentary, arising and disappearing every moment. Nothing persists through any two moments.
(3) The Ego is a momentary notion or concept and has no existence apart from the momentary consciousness.
(4) To believe in any permanent entity or essence like the Atman or the world, is Avidya from which springs up desire, the mother of all ills including Rebirth.
(5) The removal of Avidya roots out desire and leads to the end of suffering,--to Nirvana, whatever that may mean.

Sankara's Position. (1) "The world is unreal." Yes, says Sankara, but with a caveat. It is so because it is bound up with the state in which it appears and which it cannot transcend. But within the state both the subject and the object

are real and are the inevitable correlates and counterparts of each other. The world with all its manifold elements, is, however, only a manifestation of Pure Consciousness which it presupposes. Life is not a sum of concepts merely, for a concept without content commits suicide, and contradicts the practical distinction between a dog that can bark and the idea of a dog that cannot. A concept cannot do duty for a feeling or a volition. An actual feeling can by no means be reduced to a concept of the feeling.
(2) Mental life unfolded in the Waking state is no doubt a stream of ideation. Consciousness does change every moment and the current of ideas ever flows. But this consciousness is only empirical, and, like the external world which is its invariable concomitant, is but a manifestation of Pure Consciousness. To talk of a current without a spring-head is devoid of meaning, and the source must be an abiding one, a changeless Witness, without which our memory of past states or our cognition of Change would be impossible. Memory connects the present with the past, and Change involves the experience of two moments. Buddha's denial of the witnessing consciousness causes his system to collapse like a house of cards.

Besides, Buddha's idea of momentariness presupposes Time as its eternal background. His "Consciousness" originating and dying each moment must emerge from Time and be swallowed up by Time, and it would be preposterous to extend this momentariness to Time itself. The doctrine of the momentariness of all things thus knocks its head against Time and breaks to pieces. It cannot explain Duration which has both a subjective and an objective phase and is fundamental to Life and Action. We are not ordinarily conscious of fugitive moments which are an intellectual division of Time, but of the duration of successive single states.

Further, Waking, Dream, and Sleep are not

events occurring in one time-series. For, then they would be experienced as parts of one continuous state. The idea of momentariness cannot be applied to them.

(3) The Ego is not simply a notion. To think so is to be untrue to Life. It is far rather, as the rock-basis of Life, an immediacy; and though as a notion it may ever vary in content, it transcends Time, Change, and even the empirical consciousness, when it (the ego) objectifies the three states intuitively and enables one to say "I slept, I dreamt, I am awake." The Ego in this instance stands for the Witness beyond all time and causation. It is Pure Consciousness or Brahman. When this is realised, to what low depths of unreality is the Waking consciousness, upon which Buddha builds with such confidence, hurled down! And to what sublime heights is the Ego elevated!

(4) Avidya is indeed the cause of all ills. But its activity consists pre-eminently in this, that it causes the unreal like the world to be taken for reality and the real like the Atman, which transcends the three states, to escape our notice. Buddha himself has come under its power in this latter respect.

(5) The removal of Avidya leads not to Nirvana synonymous with annihilation, but to Vidya or the Knowledge of truth, nay to The Truth, viz. Reality. For, at this stage Truth and Reality become inseparably one. Vidya reveals that the Ego at the highest level is no other than Brahman, the highest all-inclusive Reality, of which empirical life is but an expression.

Buddha's position involves him, besides, in a dilemma. Does he stand for the momentariness of all things or for their nature as concepts or for both? On the first supposition, Time is left to domineer over all else and remains an insoluble surd. On the second supposition, a concept presupposes consciousness which there is no means of vanquishing and must be admitted to have eternal life. For

Consciousness whose offspring Concept is--with its adjutant Memory, cannot be included in its own effect. Consciousness is not a concept, for a concept cannot be conscious. Lastly, as to the combination, namely, a momentary concept, both universal time and consciousness are two entities instead of one claiming eternality and immortality, resulting in an inevitable annihilation of his theory of Annihilation.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how the knowledge of the momentariness of all things can include the witnessing consciousness, unless this is also regarded as an object,--an idea revolting to its nature as the eternal Subject. If knowledge is the final issue of Buddhistic speculation, how can it also be momentary? We may pass over his idea of Nirvana, firstly, it is but an idea and as such momentary, and secondly, since he has taken no pains to describe its nature and has left it in inpenetrable mystery.

It may be claimed on behalf of Buddha that he arrived at his conclusion of the unreality of Life and all things, after a careful analysis of the three states, and that Sankara can score no point against him. The objective part of waking is known to be unreal by reference to dream-experience, and the subjective vanishes in Deep Sleep. Hence the whole is illusion. But this claim is invalid. Analysis implies consciousness to which objects are presented. The three states can be compered only by an indwelling, immanent and witnessing consciousness which must persist throughout their sequence. Otherwise the sequence cannot be cognised. Hence a logical analysis discloses not the unreality of all things, but the undeniable Witness as the Basic Reality.

Thus when one, who professes to know anything of philosophy, with an intellectual supineness altogether inexcusable, supports the unenlightened

view that Sankara's system is Crypto-Buddhism, he illustrates in his own case the double effect of Adhyasa. One need not rise above common-sense to distinguish between a system that denies essence to things including the Soul (Niratmaka) and that which affirms Brahman as the immortal essence of each and all (Sadatmaka), between undiluted Nihilism and Absolute Monism, between the universal Nay and the universal Yea.

K.A. KRISHNASWAMY AIYAR. (in Ved. Kesari).

THE SYSTEM OF SANKHYA.

The Sankhya School of Thought leaves us helplessly in the conception of two equally abiding entities; the Soul and Matter. It is not intelligible why Matter should spontaneously work only in the best interests of the soul as if by an original contract, or why there should be Matter at all, an embodiment of the soul. Even if these entities are admitted to be beginningless and causeless, there must be some law by which the relation between the soul and matter and the behaviour of each can be defined and determined; and that that relation is one of ultimate benefit to the soul seems to be more a pious hope than a rational necessity. Besides, the theory cannot satisfy the philosophical instinct in man which seeks a single principle that can explain all life.

When we dive into details, there are many important points craving an explanation. How is the equillibrium of the Gunas disturbed? Is the first shock communicated from without or from within? It cannot emanate from the soul which is pure consciousness not yet embodied, or from another source besides, as none other is admitted. Nor can the motion proceed from an impulse within the Gunas without a special change in them which pre-supposes a stimulus extraneous. If activity is an inherent tendency in the Gunas, then they must be eternally active

tive

and a state of rest or equilibrium with which we start is inconceivable. Moreover, a permanent activity would obviate all chances of Release. Thus the initial activity becomes inexplicable, and without it the evolution of the world process is impossible.

While Causality is assumed, it is singular that Time is never taken into account or even recognised, which makes the system less precise than it could have been Space likewise remains a grim uninvited guest demanding an adequate treatment. The original Avidya or Aviveka (want of discrimination) which is an inevitable death's head at the banquet of all systems of thought, Eastern or Western, is of course, left unaccounted for.

To make the first activity possible, which we found an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the Sankhyas who denied a transcendent Being, such as a God, another School arose known as the Sesvara Sankhyas who posited a Supreme Being in addition to the individual soul and primordial Matter. God as a conscious being was supposed to effect movement in the Gunas and release their tendencies to combine and evolve. This strategic position, however, brought no advantage and failed to heal the defect in the original conception. In the first place, the first School proceeded strictly on the basis of positive knowledge and the introduction of the transcendent entity ran counter to its spirit. In the next place, according to their theory, there cannot be a conscious being which is not embodied, and embodiment pre-supposes the activity of the Gunas to create the intellect or the physical body. For both the latter are products of evolution. Thus nothing is gained by positing a supreme conscious being or God beyond human experience. The first school, therefore, rejected the new idea altogether.

Although the system fails to be completely intelligible, it discloses many remarkable features. It is the first attempt made by the Hindus to

steer clear of all allegiance to scriptural au-
thority. It is the forerunner of the modern scien-
tific desire to give the fullest scope for un-
aided effort towards grasping the first principle
of life and piercing the veil of mystery surround-
ing it, armed only with reason, proceeding alone
on the basis of experience, and carefully avoid-
ing the pitfalls of sentiment and tradition. As
the origination of life from matter was felt to
be unimaginable, they rejected Monism with its
time-honoured credentials, and boldly formulated
two independent principles, the Soul and Matter,
Still they could not get over the ancient idea
that Life is a stage of suffering and they adopted
the doctrines of Karma and rebirth which they ad-
mitted because the soul is eternal and the in-
equalities patent in life demanded a belief in
them. Similarly they accepted the notion that Re-
lease was possible and desirable and they agreed
with the Vedic dictum that it can be obtained by
true knowledge, or discrimination between the
nature of the soul and that of the Pradhana. They
have wisely abstained from painting the joys of
Release in flaunting colours of fancy, by the sim-
ple statement that the soul's final destiny is to
enjoy its own pure and unalloyed bliss which it
can claim by its very nature.

We should be unfair to the Sankhyas if we failed
to say a few words on the perfection of its ethics.
Since the soul is of a blissful nature, and its
temporary joys and sorrows arise from a wrong at-
tachment to the body and the senses, a wise man,
realising the purity of his nature, must overcome
the attachment and the resultant selfishness. He
must subdue his passions and live a life of self-
denial, for he has a goal to attain to, viz. com-
plete detachment from everything which is a crea-
ture of the Gunas. With this self-discipline, evil
ceases to be evil; and when life ends, he departs
with gratitude for the kindly services of Matter,

hurrying to taste the bliss of his disembodied nature. In this respect, one must observe that to the Sankhyas--the ancient scientific thinkers of India--Life presented an aim and a purpose. While the reality of Matter was unquestionable, its existence was regarded as something to be thanked for, not regretted. In the specularions of the modern scientist, we miss altogether the formulation of a similar aim.

Sankara seems to have been indebted to the Sankhyas for his idea of Adhyasa or superimposition. But to suit his undiluted Monism, he has improved upon it. To the Sankhya superimposition begins with the embodied soul, and the really preexistent Gunas are fully active in the anterior stage. This would not do for Sankara who admitted no reality besides the Soul or Atman. Hence he lifted superimposition bodily and placed it over the heads of the Gunas themselves or the Pradhana. He alleged that the Pradhana itself was an unproven hypothesis, simply superimposed on the Atman. This speculative feat set a new line and direction to Indian Thought.

H.F. OXBURY.

"H A L D A N E." (In "The Cry")

The following conversation takes place in a story by Mr. Somerset Maughan in which a certain minor official is explaining to higher authority why his actions in a particular matter had met with criticism from public opinion:- "Your excellency does not read Schiller, I suppose. You are probably not acquainted with his celebrated line "Mit der Dummheit Kamfem die Gotter Selbst vergebens." "What does it mean?" "Roughly, against stupidity the Gods themselves battle in vain."

Lord Haldane might have been forgiven had he made some similar reply to the attacks made upon him in the early years of the Great War such as

that of the Duke of Buccleuch in the House of Lords in July 1916. Haldane had risen to move a motion, when the Duke rose up from his seat and cried, "Before the Noble Lord directs your Lordships attention to foreign policy, I suggest that he should explain his past conduct in misleading Great Britain upon the German danger and in misleading Germany upon British policy." It was never, however, the habit of Haldane to reply with bitterness to the attacks of his opponents. He simply expressed the hope that soon the stream of misrepresentations, untruths and inaccuracies that were ruining his reputation would be stemmed by the publication of the true facts, and then continued his original speech.

What those facts were is made clear in the judgment of Dr. Fisher in his "History of Europe." In describing the conditions in England in August '14 he writes, "The country had never been better equipped for war. Haldane, a lawyer and a philosopher, who had studied in Gottingen and translated Schopenhauer, had recognised the army on principles which, while they owed much to German example, were yet adapted to an insular power which might be obliged to take part in continental warfare. To his administrative genius Britain owed the creation of a General Staff, of an Expeditionary Force complete in all its details, of a Territorial Army and of an Officers' Training Corps."

It is impossible in a short article to give any satisfactory account of the invaluable work done by Haldane before 1914 whilst he was Secretary of State for War in the Liberal Government or after 1924 when he became Lord Chancellor in the Labour Government. All that can be attempted is to give some indication from his own words of his attitude to problems of statecraft and of the principles which guided him in his own approach to the problems with which he had to deal. The view which he constantly emphasised in his letters and speeches was the necessity for organised thinking

regarding political problems. In a letter to Lord Knutsford in 1915 he wrote, "We as a people have the gift to a greater extent than other peoples of dealing practically with problems as they arise, but we fail lamentably in thinking ahead, in being ready for the problems before they arise. Indeed, we have a natural distrust of plans prepared for hypothetical cases. We say, "That's all very well in theory, but it won't work in practice." Yet any scientist will tell you that nothing is well in theory which will not work in practice. Plans which won't work in practice are due to slovenly thinking. Germany has been able to do what she has done against what on a paper are overwhelming odds, because she has applied General Staff principles not only to her military but to her national organization. If we are to get the best out of ourselves, both in war and in peace, we must do the same. It is evident from what has happened and is happening that our public will need a good deal of persuading that organised thinking pays, but I mean to do my best in persuasion.

Mr. Winston Churchill in his book "Thoughts and Adventures" wrote "It has been accepted generally until quite recent times that the best way of governing states is by talking." It is a criticism frequently levelled at the Democracies by the leaders of Totalitarian States that in countries in which free expression is permitted to public opinion there is too much fruitless talk and insufficient organised planning. It is to the great credit of Haldane that he strove tirelessly to urge upon his contemporaries the necessity in the sphere of Government for organised forethought.

In his inaugural address as President of the Institute of Public Administration, he said in 1922, "In all organisation, whether it be of bare scientific knowledge or of that knowledge embodied in the practical direction of business, there is a cardinal phase which is indispensable if a maxi-

mum standard of efficiency is to be attained. What is done, be it purely theoretical or be it the realisation of plans in the direction of everyday affairs, must be based on clear thinking. Such thinking must take the form of objects and principles lying at their foundation. It is by taking thought and by that alone that we can accomplish what the unreflecting mind cannot accomplish, add cubits to our mental stature."

Sir Frederick Maurice concluded his biography of Haldane, from which these extracts have been taken, with the words, "He made it as reasonably certain as anything in human affairs can be certain that, if we went to war again, we should do so with naval, military and air plans scientifically co-ordinated, and that, if there were alternative plans, these should be presented in such a away that the Government could make its choice with full knowledge of the technical issues involved." Britain is now engaged in another great war; she entered it considerably better equipped and prepared than in 1914; to Haldane she owes a great debt for the selfless persistence with which he stressed the need for organised thinking and for the co-ordination of effort the high degree of preparedness that will ensure ultimate victory.

"One may do a great deal of good in this world if one does not care who gets the credit for it."

HIRALAL HALDAR.

"AN IDEALIST'S CONFESSION OF FAITH" (in Calcutta Review). It was in 1885 that I first became acquainted with the principles of idealism. Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous opened the gates of a new world of thought to me. In those days the study of Indian philosophy was taboo in our universities. I saw that what seems so obvious to the unreflecting mind, the view that matter exists independently of mind and may be the stuff out of which mind itself is developed is the very reverse of the truth and that the world is essentially spiritual in its nature. But I was fortunate in being able to avoid the subjectivism of Berkeley, because, almost simultaneiously with Berkeley, I began the study of Kant and Hegel also. From these great thinkers and also from T.H. Green, Edward Caird, F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet and others I learned the lesson that Idealism need not necessarily be what has recently been called mentalism.

It is undeniable that the theory which is suggested by the first look of things is entirely opposed to idealism. In the vast world of matter, the position of mind does not at all seem to be well assured. It is not certain that it exists anywhere but on this tiny planet and appears to be wholly dependent on the brain. Even on this planet, it is apparently a late product of evolution. How then can such a thing be regarded as the pre-supposition of matter? But although such considerations seem to be obvious, it is impossible for one who has grasped Berkeley's doctrine, the esse of a thing in its percipi to withhold assent from it. Berkeley indeed unduly narrows his principle. Instead of saying that the esse of a thing is its percipi he should have said, the esse of a thing is its

intelligi, for there are modes of knowledge other and higher than perception. However that may be, Berkeley is irrefutable when he argues that an object unrelated to the mind that perceives it, or, as we should say, knows it, it is an abstraction. Bain is quite right in saying that all the ingenuity of a century and a half has failed to see a way out of the contradiction exposed by Berkeley. Unfortunately, Berkeley converts a valuable truth into a serious error when he concludes that because a thing cannot exist independently of mind, it is nothing more than ideas of the mind. From the premiss, nothing is real which is not in essential relationship with mind, the conclusion certainly does not follow that all that is is reducible to ideas of the mind. The source of Berkeley's fallacy is probably what Stillingfleet calls Locke's new way of ideas. From the truism, whatever men know, if they know anything, must be related to their conscious life, Locke infers that we know things by means of their ideas. Are ideas separable from things or are they the mental process of knowing them inseparable from and presupposing them? Locke unwarrantably chooses the former alternative and the result is that between the mind and the objects that it knows there get interposed a *tertium quid*, the ideas of things. But if things are other than ideas, how can we ever be assured of their existence? Ideas, argues Berkeley, are either unlike the things or like them. If the former, how can we know things by means of them? If the latter, things must be ideas, for only ideas can be like ideas and what do we gain by unnecessarily duplicating ideas? He, therefore, arrives at the conclusion that things *are* ideas and not, as Locke supposes, different from them and known through the medium of them.

The objective world thus gets reduced into ideas of the mind. If this be the necessary consequence of idealism, it must be admitted that idealism stands condemned. But, as I have already said, between the view that nothing is real apart from knowledge and the view that objects are only ideas of the mind there is no necessary connection whatever. Ideas have no meaning apart from the things which they signify and to which they must be referred. To point this out and thus to expose the error of Locke's new way of ideas is the merit of Reid. He truly urges that sensations are real only as signs of things and do not exist independently of them. The reduction of things to ideas is therefore impossible, for the latter presuppose the former. From this truth, however, Reid draws the wrong conclusion that things are self-subsistent and independent of mind. The fact that ideas mean objects and are abstractions apart from them no more proves the independent existence of bbjects than does the dependence of them on the knowing mind prove that they are only ideas. Subject and object are inseparably related to each other. Mind apart from the objective world is as much a fiction as an objective world apart from mind. Each implies the other as its necessary correlative.

It is in Kant's theory of knowledge that this great truth was first unambiguously expressed in modern times, although Kant himself did not realise the full significance of it. It is curious that while holding, like Reid, that sensations are meaningless without reference to things, he yet labours to prove that the objective world of cognition is the outcome of the data of sense, being subsumed under the forms of thought supplied by the mind. He does not see that the one doctrine is utterly incompatible with the other. The truth seems to be that he failed to realise that the view expressed in the section on the

on the refutation of idealism inserted in the second edition of the Critique, to which he was led by his anxiety to disown subjective idealism attributed to him by his critics, necessitates a radical modification of his whole theory of knowledge. It is impossible to convert merely subjective feelings into objects of knowledge by any such precess as is described so elaborately in the Critique of Pure Reason. Transformation of feelings into felt things is an impossibility. We have to deal from the very first with things opposed to the mind and sensations are only signs of things. To say this is not to deny the truth of what really matters in Kant's doctrine. His great achievement is not to show that understanding makes nature, but to demonstrate that the principles of the understanding constitute the framework of nature.

This idealistic truth finds adequate expression in the writings of Hegel. Lord Haldane justly speaks of Hegel as the most rewarding of modern philosophers. Hegel takes the world as it is and only seeks to interpret its nature adequately. He points out that the various aspects of it are inseparably connected and cannot be sundered from one another. Together, they constitute the one reality which at the highest level of interpretation is mind. To pick out one aspect of the real and to attempt to subordinate all the rest to it is what he calls abstract thinking and to abstract thinking he attributes all the woes of philosophy. When he says that the real is mind or spirit, he does not mean that matter does not exist. By 'mind' he understands the spiritual principle of unity which overreaches the distinction that arises within itself of the subject that knows and the object that is known. Kant lays stress on the correlativity in knowledge of the self and the world. Hegel points out that such correlativity pre-supposes a unity that finds expression in the

distinction and opposition of the correlated elements. Mind is the inclusive unity, the entirety within which all distinctions, including the distinction of the knower and the known, falls. There is therefore no question of denying the reality of matter. All that is insisted upon is that what seems to be only material is, in its last interpretation, spiritual without ceasing to be material. The materialist mistakes what is only one aspect of reality for reality itself. The universe is neither mere subject nor mere object but subject-object--a spiritual whole self-distinguished into mind and the world.

In the eye of the plain man objects merely coexist in space. The world is to him only a vast aggregate of these objects. Science first opens our eyes to the truth that objects are essentially related to one another as elements of a single system. To be, in the words of Lotze, is to stand in relations. But if it is so, if the world is not an aggregate but an organic whole, it must be the objective expression of mind. Things which are real only as mutually related to one another are ultimately one and this unity can only be conceived not as a numerical unity exclusive of other unities but as an ideal unity manifested in the differences of things. The world which, viewed from the outside as science views it, is a totality of things standing in relations of various kinds to one another is, viewed from within, the self-expression of mind.

The difficulty of thinking of kind as that for which the object-world is, arises mainly from the fact that mind itself seems to be a limited object included within that world. But such mind is not mind in its proper nature, but what it is in its imperfect form as conditioned by an animal organism. It, however, bears a character which indicates that, freed from its limitations, it is the very centre of the universe, the presupposition of

all that is real. If, in one aspect, it is one among other objects in nature, in another aspect, it is the subject to which the object-world presents itself and also the unity presupposed in the distinction of subject and object.

Of the truth of the type of idealism which I have sketched so barely, I became convinced in early life. The acute criticisms to which the idealistic theory has in recent years been subjected have not led me to modify my views in any way. Indeed in what is called new realism, I fail to find anything that is really very new. Its main arguments are old and familiar and the idealists, so it seems to me, have fully met them. This is not the fitting occasion for eterning into a discussion of new realism, but, with your permission, I wish to say a word or two on some of its contentions. The idealist, we are told, wrongly supposes that the object and the object of knowledge are one and the same. It is no doubt contradictory to say that the object of knowledge exists independently of knowledge, but from this it does not follow that the object itself in in any way dependent for its existence on knowledge. But from Berkeley downwards, it has been pointed out by all idealists that the distinction between object <u>per se</u> and object of knowledge is impossible. It is of the very essence of the object to be <u>for</u> knowledge. To be known is not an accidental property that it sometimes acquires but its fundamental characteristic, a characteristic without which it is nothing . An unknown object, unknown not by this or that mind but by mind, is a chimera. As F.H. Bradley puts it, "Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have a being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience."

Another charge laid at the door of the idealist is that he fails to distinguish the object from

the process of knowing it and improperly identifies them. The idealist, however, does nothing of the kind. So far from ignoring this distinction he insists upon it, only that he points out that the distinction is relative and not absolute and arises within knowledge itself. The object can neither be reduced to the process of knowing it nor can it be divorced from it. They mutually imply each other as the correlated aspects of the one whole of experience. The fallacy which the realist commits is to suppose that because the object of cognition is other than and distinguishable from the cognitive proceds, it is not essentially related to that process.

In proclaiming the reality of the external world, idealism is whole-heartedly in agreement with realism. As I have observed elsewhere, it "can have nothing to say against the main contention of realism. Instead of reducing things to states of consciousness, it allies itself with realism in seeking to destroy the root from which this sort of speculation grows. What are called secondary quqlities, it urges, belong to things quite as much as the primary qualities. To separate them from each other and to refer the former to the perceiving mind and the latter to external objects was the cardinal error of Descartes, Locke and others. Berkeley went further along this path of error by reducing primary qualities also to ideas of the mind. As against these xixxx, views, realism rightly urges that objects must be credited with the primary as well as the secondary qualities. Nay, we must go further still and perceive that bes des the primary and secondary qualities, things also have what have been called tertiary qualities, viz., the aesthetic qualities revealed to the poet and the artist. But if realism is so bountiful and lavishes on things qualities of different sorts in such an ungrudging spirit, why should it not be more

generous still and give to them minds in order to make it possible for them to enjoy their wealth of qualities? Idealism does not see why the fountain of realism's charity should suddenly run dry as soon as things are vested with diverse qualities. Surely it is intolerable that they should be supposed to have everything except that which alone can make all else worth having, viz. mind. So far from reducing existing entities to ideas in the mind, idealism of the right kind does the very opposite: it carries mind over to things. It is so greatly in earnest with the doctrine that things are real that it has no patience with the futility of realism when it fails to see that things must have mind to understand that they are real. It, therefore, is in no way hostile to realism, but incorporates the truth of it into itself."

In recent years, I have felt the need of broadening the basis of idealism in at least two respects. It is not possible to explain my meaning clearly in a short address like this. I have stated my views, I am sorry to say rather meagrely, elsewhere and can only give here a bare indication of what I have in mind. In my view, the Absolute self, the self of which the universe is the expression, cannot be regarded as a single undifferentiated self. It is true that it is a cardinal principle of idealism that the Absolute self is realised in the differences of the world, but it is not perceived that the things in which the Absolute mind is revealed cannot be things merely but must be minds as well, minds not on their own account but through inseparable connection with each other as component factors of the Absolute mind. The differentiation of the universal self into objects, that is to say, must be a corresponding differentiation into the selves of these objects. This means that what viewed from the outside is a mere thing, is, inwardly, mind--mind that excludes nothing, for it is the nature

of mind to be all-inclusive, but embraces the entire circle of reality within its consciousness. Ideally, therefore, every object is a unique centre of the universe, a view-point from which the whole world is contemplated. The Absolute is the unified system of these selves--a self of selves.

The next suggestion which I venture to offer is that it is a mistake to think that the Absolute is fully revealed in the natural world. Idealism rightly denies the medieval distinction between the natural world and the spiritual world. There is no spiritual world somewhere beyond this world. The spiritual world is this very world adequately interpreted as the manifestation of mind. But this does not justify the conclusion that the Absolute is completely revealed in the material universe. There may be objective worlds other than the physical world in which we happen to be at the present moment. There is no reason to suppose that matter alone constitutes the object. It may also consist of stuff of another sort than matter. Nothing is more obvious to the discerning eye than the fragmentary character of the world in which we live. It looks more like a piece of composition separated from its context than a complete book. The truth seems to be that it is only a very insignificant part of a much larger world in which alone the Absolute is completely revealed. I agree with Hegel in thinking that a God who is not revealed is no God, but that does not mean that He is revealed only in the world of our knowledge and nowhere else. The visible world and all possible invisible worlds, however, must be conceived as component factors of the one objective world which alone can be regarded as the full manifestation of the Absolute.

I will conclude with one word more in explanation of the position of idealism. People have very strange notions about it. It is sometimes supposed to be concerned only with what is

unearthly and transcendental and to have nothing to do with plain matters of fact. Whatever may be the case with dreamy speculations which sometimes pass for idealism, the supreme merit of philosophical idealism is that its feet are all along planted on the solid ground of experience. It denies nothing. It does not make the absurd attempt to prove that the material world does not exist. It only seeks to rightly understand the nature of what indubitably is, to interpret the world we live in not from any circumscribed point of view but comprehensively and adequately. Its main conclusion, in Bradley's words, is that "outside of spirit there is not and cannot be any reality." This, at all events, is what idealism has always meant for me. I have no hesitation in ending to-day by repeating what I wrote in one of my youthful essays nearly forty years ago. The idealist "does not want anybody to attempt the extravagant task of going beyond knowledge and experience. He takes his stand upon positive and verified facts, steadily refuses to believe in anything but what is known in experience and sets his face resolutely against mysticism. But at the same time he challenges the right of easy-going philosophers to talk glibly about matter and mind without making any critical inquiry into their nature and meaning. What Absolute Idealism says is this,--"Do not indulge in mysticism and transcendentalism. Adhere to positive facts alone. Carefully inquire into the import and meaning of the external and the internal world. The external world is a mass of dead matter to your unreflecting mind. Look at it with penetrating and searching eyes and you will find that it is not composed of inert lifeless matter but is the living thought of a living God. The whole scene will be transformed in a moment. Where you found death before you will now find life: where you found strife and sorrow, you will now find harmony and joy."

"THE VEDEANTIC CONCEPTION OF GOD". (In Calcutta Review)
MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR.

Sankara's philosophy may accept the theistic implications as implications of relativistic consciousness. The duality of subject and object is the datum of empiric intuitions and pragmatic revelations. The realistic consciousness is the implication of will and it lends a touch of reality unto that which is ideal. Sankara does not deny the immediacy of perception and the reality of the object. What he does deny is the metaphysical reality of the object.

Here is exactly the point of difference between Sankara and the realistic philosophers. Both accept the immediacy of perception and the revelation of the object. While the theistic teachers accept the materiality of the object, Sankara can only accept its ideality. For to him self-consciousness and its implications are after all psychological and not metaphysical. The distinction of self and not-self is, according to Sankara, the distinction which emerges out of a relativistic consciousness and does not obtain in the Absolute. Sankara accepts relativity in a psychological sense but denies its metaphysical import. The fundamental difference between Sankara and the theistic Vedanta lies in the consciousness of relativity. Theistic teachers consider relativity to be a law so deep in consciousness that at any stage it cannot deny the law. But relativity does not necessarily mean, according to them, a divided consciousness, on the other hand, it has a demand for a unitive consciousness and that unitive consciousness is the highest synthesis of Absolute being. Sankara on the other hand, is anxious to emphasise that a relative or divided consciousness cannot give rise to a synthesis. It is more a figure of speech than a reality, for the difference continues to be a difference and goes on multiplying and defies

assimilation. The difference posits two terms and a relation which again imply a stream of relations. A differential consciousness, therefore, cannot be synthesised in a unity, a relative consciousness is, therefore, a divided consciousness. Such a relativistic consciousness cannot give us the absolute truth regarding facts of existence. A fact is true in reference to a universe of thought, and apart from such a universe the fact can never be seen and realised. The fact stands in reference to a system of relations and a system of relations has meaning only to the subject-consciousness. The empiric fact then has always a reference to the subject and the order of relation. The absolute fact is then no fact for the relative consciousness.

Sankara has drawn a distinction between the epistemological and metaphysical tests of truth. An appearance is truth, because it is a fact to consciousness, but false because it is denied. Being is truth, because is cannot be denied. Sankara insists upon undeniability as the test of truth. The evidence of self-consciousness, no doubt, holds in empiric intuitions, but in transcendent realities it holds not. Self-consciousness is a divided consciousness and as such precluded from knowing what transcends its limitation. Such a conclusion, no doubt, bars the possibility of knowing the absolute fact. Sankara agrees that it is so. The Absolute can never be known. It is intuition, which does not intuite.

The appearance reports a fact, the meaning makes it real for pragmatic consciousness. The truth of a fact is then determined by an appearance and a subsequent construction of a meaning. Even illusory perceptions, so long as they are not known to be illusory, satisfy the above definition. A true presentation in empiric sense implies (1) a presentation, (2) in reference to the subject, (3) having a meaning for it. A false pres entation also implies (1) a presentation,

(2) in reference to the subject, (3) having an apparent meaning for it. A false appearance is also an appearance, and so long as it continues to be an appearance in reference to a particular universe of thought, it is truth in as much as it still has a meaning which is denied later on. So long as it not denied, it continues to be true and has a hold upon will-consciousness.

An appearance in empiric sense is false when it has an appearance but no meaning. But this distinction cannot dispense with the main character of an appearance as an apperance. Meaning or no meaning, an appearance is true in a particular state of consciousness, and apart from a reference to particular state of consciousness it has no truth. The consciousness of a meaning only proves that the fact is no creation of our divided consciousness and is not subject toour will and is, therefore, called truth. Apart from such reference to will-self, a fact, either true or false, makes no difference so far as its appearance is concerned.

From this arises in Sankara the classification of the grades of being. Sankara makes a searching analysis of the facts of existence,and besides the main analysis of transcendental and empirical facts, he has the analysis of the different grades of empirical facts. Facts are classified into four groups: (1) fact transcendental, (2) fact empirically real, (3) fact empirically illusory, (4) names with no corresponding facts.

Being illustrates the first, objects of perception, the second, rope-snake illustrate the third, sky-flower the fourth. Such an elaborate analysis has enabled Sankara to drawa a distinction between the second and the third. As facts, they have no difference, for they have both the same kind of existence, empirical, the difference lying in their sublation. And this at once marks them off respectively as an objective reality and a subjective construction. Sankarites agree that the subjective constructions belong to the same category

of facts as the objective realities, for both of them are real in a certain sense and non-real in another sense; real because they appear, non-real because they do not long persist. In other words an illusory empirical existence is illusory when the particular reference in relative consciousness is displaced by another reference in the same kind of consciousness, whereas a real empirical existence becomes illusory when the relative consciousness is denied by the Absolute, and not till then. Apart from this, these two forms of empirical facts have no difference between them. They belong to the same category of existence, real and non-real. Though to the liberated consciousness the appearance lingers on for sometime as the effect of past habits and accommodation, yet, the meaning construed to it by realistic consciousness vanishes. Sankarites have gone so far as to say that the problem of the origin of the world can be a problem for the realistic consciousness, but is no problem for the transcendent consciousness of the emancipated souls, for such a problem strictly has a meaning for the divided consciousness and not for the Absolute. And so long as the consummation of identity consciousness is not within our reach, the relativistic consciousness must necessarily be anxious for a solution of the cosmic drama.

The elaborate analysis of the degrees of Being makes synthesis of them impossible and naturally, therefore, Sankara has to call them real in different senses, empirical and transcendental and as, the reality of them is not equal, Sankara has to deny the lower category of existences in the higher and in this way proceeds until all existences are not only transcended but denied in the identity-consciousness.

In the history of thought, two conceptions are found regarding the relation of the Absolute and the relative: (1) the Absolute transcends the relative, though the relative is assimilated in the

Absolute. (2) The Absolute denies the relative.
Sankarites are anxious to indicate the truth of the second alternative by denying the truth of the first. The assimilation of the relative in the Absolute has been attempted, but has completely failed. Kasmere Saivism has gone away with the distinction of the Absolute and the relative and has tried to retain the identity of existences of the relative and the Absolute and at the same time has drawn the relative out of the Absolute. Concentration and diffusion are the two contrary processes by which the indeterminate gets into the determinate and the determinate breaks its limitation and passes into the indeterminate. The whole conception has been wrought upon the indeterminate being which is the only category of existence. The relative grows out of the absolute and ultimately dwindles into it. But such is not the conception of the Absolute of Sankara. The Absolute denies and not simply transcends the relative. Mere transcendence means that Brahman stands above the relative order and maya has got no control over Brahman. Similarly maya cannot influence Isvara. But Isvara certainly is not the Absolute, To insist upon the complete transcendence of the Absolute, Sankara and the Sankarites have had to accept two kinds of categories, transcendental and empirical. The empirical categories are the categories of the relativistic consciousness and each of these categories has been denied an absolute character. A gap exists between the Absolute and the relative, and to do away with this gap, the Sankarites have conceived the origin of the relative out of the Absolute in the empirical sense and itd denial in the Absolute in the transcendent sense. Brahman is the background on which the relative appears and in which it disappears again. The realistic consciousness demands an origin of the world

system and that is satisfied by calling Brahman the cause of the universe, but in denying it again in Brahman, the world is reduced to an illusion. Apart from the demand of the realistic consciousness of the origin of the universe, the philosophic thinking really cannot conceive Brahman to be the cause of the relativistic order. Goudapada has elaborately shown the fallacies of thinking thiswise. The causal category has no clear definite sense when it is sought to be applied to the transcendent and the Absolute. The causal category, Goudapada points out, can be applied to the phenomenon, but never to the noumenon. Even when it is applied to the phenomenon, it leads us to an endless regress and commits us to the mutuality of cause and effect. Such a mutuality has to be established. The concrete instances do not establish it. They also require to be established.

The mutuality of cause and effect makes the causal chain eternal. The effect as well as the cause are eternal. But such a conclusion is certainly self-contradictory. Anyhow the thinking of the causal category in the realistic sense commits us to fallacies. Thought, this way, is involved in antinomies when it begins to think of the origin of the world-process. Vedanta has, therefore, eventually to adopt the idealistic attitude and to deny the reality of becoming and to attribute it to ignorance. With this attitude the world-process is reduced to an illusion not in any way differentiated from the illusion of rope-snake, the only point of difference is that the cosmic illusion is more durable and requires a subtle training in transcendent philosophy before it can be fully denied.

To indicate the Absolute as the denial of the world-illusion may be supposed to determine the indeterminate. There are some who are given to thinking that the end of the world-drama in the

Absolute also limits the being, and, therefore, Being is to be conceived as no doubt, transcending the becoming and not necessarily denying it. Really speaking, the denial of the becoming is no limitation to being, for becoming is not a reality. The only way of apprehending the Absolute lies in the negative method, and so far as reason is concerned, the Absolute must be understood as the denial of the determinate. More than this, reason cannot think of. The position of the many and the negation of the many are certainly concepts of the reason. But negation has a locus, and reason indirectly conceives that locus to be the Absolute, though it cannot directly apprehend it; and as such the question of determining the Absolute by the negative concepts cannot arise. So far as thought-category can best describe it, it can only indicate that the Absolute does not come within the range of anything thought of, rather it negates all concepts of positive thinking and enies them. This is at best the highest effort that thought can reach in description of the Absolute, but it certainly does not thiswise, determine it. Negation has a greater import as a thought-category than position, and in this sense alone identity is sought to be described in terms of negation of the empirical concepts.

Vedanta, no doubt, offers a theory of the origin of the cosmic system out of Brahman, but that is only by way of a concession to realistic consciousness. Even there it has refuted all the theories which ascribe a purpose immediate or remote to the creator, and lends its support to the theory of spontaneity. It does not even support the theory of sportful activity (Goudapada Karika I,9). In accepting the spontaneous origin of the cosmic system according to its own inherent forces Advaitism has ascribed a detachment to the

Absolute from the world-process, and this detachment is consistent with the impersonality of the Absolute.

When all purposeful and wilful activity in creation is denied and a complete detachment of the Absolute and the spontaneity of the origin of the world-process are maintained Vedantism really affirms that the origin of the many out of the one is a hopeless task for the human intellect. All the possibilities, motives and theories of creation have been exhausted and none can fall in with the Absolute; and, therefore creation has been a mystery and defies all conceptual thinking. Maya has this import of mysteriousness, anirvachaniya, and in ascribing the spontaneity of the world-origin to Maya, Vedanta has really emphasised not only the human ignorance, but also the human incapability of solving such a problem. So long as thought works on realistic basis, it can have that conclusion and that conclusion only. An activity, purposeful and spontaneous cannot be conceived of the Absolute, for that would mean a personality of the Absolute, which Vedanta emphatically denies. Consistent thinking demands, therefore, that concentration of the Absolute in the form of the cosmic-subject is also a creation of relativistic consciousness and not inherent in it. In fact the Absolute is made completely absolute by denying and transcending the implications of relativistic consciousness and not inherent in it. In fact the Absolute is made completely absolute by denying and transcending the implications of relativistic consciousness.

"Thou art that." Thus assertion is an identical proposition. In this affirmation, Vedanta completely transcends the realistic outlook and therefore, the implications of realistic consciousness and propounds the clear transcendence of identity. But such transcendence cannot be established unless the implications of realistic consciousness can

be proved false, and therefore, the Vedantin seems anxious to do away with the theory of causation as held by Sankhya and other realistic metaphysicians and to propound in its place the doctrine of Vivartha. Vivartha is the direct denial of the reality of the world as an effect and the indirect vindication of the truth of the identity. In this place, the epistemological realism of Vedanta changes into epistemological idealism inasmuch as the reality of the given is transformed into idee-forces and all distinctions of realistic consciousness are reduced to psychological illusions. This conclusion becomes irresistible as a necessary consequence of the axiom of identity. Whether the given in knowledge is to be construed as real or ideal, it is no doubt true that the identity-axiom in insisting upon the undivided being behind nature and finite selves takes away the touch of absolute realism from Vedantic metaphysics. There are some teachers in Vedanta, e.g. the Ekajivavadis who do not go so far as to maintain the whole world as a subjective construction and a subjective illusion. But there are other teachers who cannot draw a distinction between illusion as subjective or objective and consider the whole show as an illusion, because in illusion as such the line of truth and falsity cannot be clearly indicated. Such a conclusion is necessarily forced upon us, inasmuch as the reality of the self as well as of the object is denied and both of them are reduced to psychological realities. The object is no longer the given but an appearance, and appearance is more to be thought of as a projection of the self than as a reality. For, without reference to the self the appearance has no reality. The ideality of the appearance is more clearly manifested in dream-consciousness than in waking and in Sankara Vedantism, dream-consciousness has a greater value than waking-consciousness in-

asmuch as it shows the creativeness of the idee-forces without any reference to an object. This spontaneity of creation is also evident there. Dream-consciousness establishes then the spontaneous creation of the idee-forces and in the waking-consciousness, the limitation of the sense-activity interprets that to be real which is only ideal. The realistic bent of the objective-consciousness is a bar to the clear understanding of the spontaneous creativeness of the idee-forces. Even this idealistic construction does not dispense with the cosmic or the individual subject, though it can dispense with the reality of the object. But how the subjective centres are formed in the conscious exapnse is a problem that passes human comprehension.

Vedanta has, therefore, had to hold in momentary abeyance the psychological self in susupti where the drama of the spontaneious creation is replaced by a negation of the subject and the object-consciousness, though the native transcendence of saksi-consciousness still reveals the negation of susupti. Here, the continuity of concrete experiences is suspended. Such a consciousness of saksi and a primal ignorance is within the normal experience of every self. What is more important here is that there is a state in our normal experience where the psychological continuity for the moment does not obtain. In this way Vedanta has a tendency to pass away from the concrete hold of life and experience and to accept the transcendence of consciousness. And Vedanta holds that metaphysically the absolute intuition is more real than the concrete intuition of empiric consciousness, for intuition is here undivided and transcends all distinctions of relative consciousness. No philosophy can explain how the indeterminate passes into the determinate. This gap still continues, Vedanta says that the in-

determinate never passes into the determinate. To think in this way is a fallacy. The indeterminate is the metaphysical Absolute and the psychological minimum. The determinate consciousness is construction of thought but the indeterminate passes the comprehension of thought and is the undivided consciousness. Psychologically even the indeterminate and the determinate are opposed to each other and cannot be synthesised.

Vedanta is given to thinking that the determinate is more or less the necessary construction of the divided life and unless it can be transcended, the indeterminate cannot be apprehended, far less realised.

Sankara Vedanta is essentially a search for the indeterminate believing, as it does, in the absolute truth of the indeterminate and the falsity of the determinate. As consciousness frees itself from the limitations of the practical life it breaks the chord of humanistic joys and delights and gets over the inherent limitations of thinking by categories, it feels unfailingly its absolute integrity and enjoys the unspeakable delight of identity. The glory of Vedanta lies in bestowing upon the seeker its inestimable wisdom and the crown of all human efforts and philosophical achievements, Liberation.

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