THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHIC CONGRESS.

C O N T E N T S.

SATISCHANDRA CHATTERJEE:
IS IDEALISM REFUTED? 1
JOSEPH JASTROW: EFFECTIVE THINKING. 8
ERNEST P. HORRWITZ: VEDA & VEDANTA. 38
MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN VEDANTISM. 51
MAX BORN: THE RESTLESS UNIVERSE. 63
SARDAR UMRAO SINGH SHER GIL:
THE YOGA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE & ITS
POSITIVISM. 77
ADHAR CHANDRA DAS:
AUROBINDO & THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. 80
LORD HALDANE: TRAINING OF THE NATION. 82
N. RAMA RAO: THE WORLD IN CONFLICT. 89
J.B. MORGAN: THE WAY TO CLEARER THINKING. 95
A.E. BAKER: HOW TO UNDERSTAND PHILOSOPHY 99
SCIENTIFIC NOTES: SNAKE POISONING: 130
K.A.KRISHNASWAMY IYER:
INTRODUCTION TO YO. SUBBA RAU'S
"MULA VIDYA NIRASA." 131
H.H. MAHARAJA OF MYSORE: 141
S. RADHAKRISHNAN: (& 601) - 143
P.N. SRINIVASACHARI "ON ATMANISM." 605 & 146
S.G. SATHE: THE GROWTH OF ETHICS. 608 & 151
DR. SUHRIT CHANDRA MITRA: "A NEW
THEORY OF EMOTION." 152
G.R. MALKANI: "THE ONE AND THE MANY." 610, 153
D.M. DATTA: "EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEP-
TION." 158
P. NARASIMHAM: "THE SOUL OF KNOWLEDGE. 159, 613
HUMAYUN Z.A.KABIR: THE INDIVIDUAL IN
KANT. 161
R.N. KAUL: BRADLEY'S LOGIC. 163
T.R.V. MURTI "NAGARJUNA'S REFUTATION
OF MOTION & REST." 165
AKSHYA KUMAR BANERJEA: BRAHMASUTRA &
ADHYASA VADA. 174

DHIRENDRALAL DE: THE IDEA OF DUTY" 176
N. VENKATARAMAN: PRACTICAL OUTLOOK
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 177
P.T. RAJU: "KANT & SANKARA." 620 & 180
SUDHIR KUMAR BOSE: THE PROBLEM OF
LANGUAGE. 181
H.N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR:"AN INTRODUCTION
TO VEDANTA SYSTEMS." 182
C.T. SRINIVASAN "CAUSALITY & VEDANTA" 185 ,621
S. RADHAKRISHNAN. "SARVAMUKTI." 623, 187
PROF. TUCCI: THE IDEALISTIC SCHOOL
IN BUDDHISM. 189
ALBAN G. WIDGERY: "MEANING.". 208
ALBAN G. WIDGERY: "REASON & BELIEF." 215
R.G. BHANDARKAR: "IDEALISM." 219
ARTHUR AVALON: "ALLEGED CONFLICT
OF SHASTRAS." 221
R. ZIMMERMANN: "ANUBHAVA AS CRITE-
RION OF TRUTH." 227
COLONEL JACOB: INTRODUCTION TO
SURESVARACHARYA'S NAISKARMYA-SIDDHI. 234
BUECHNER: "ON DEATH". 245
SWAMI JAGADANANDA: TRANSLATION OF
UPADESHASAHASRI. 246
JOHN MACMURRAY: THE BOUNDARIES OF
SCIENCE. 259
D.S. GORDON "ON SNAKES" 272
SWAMI ISWARANANDA: "VEDANTIC VIEW OF
LIFE. 273
D.S. SARMA: "BUDDHI YOGA IN THE GITA. 282

STEPHEN LEACOCK: REVIEW OF BOOK: 286
FROM H.P.B.'S LUCIFER MAGAZINE: 289
V.B. SHRIKHANDE: THE NATURE OF SELF. 290
V.B. SHRIKHANDE: TEST OF REALITY: 307
R.V. DAS: SOLIPSISM. 313
K.C. GUPTA "NECESSITY" 316
N.O. LOSSKY: THE INTUITIVE BASIS OF
KNOWLEDGE. 318

S. VITTALA SASTRY: SANKARA & HIS MODERN INTERPRETERS. 355
Y. SUBBA RAO SARMA "PRIVATE INTERVIEW" 362
H.H. MAHARAJA OF BARODA: Inaugural ad. 366
CHARLES PHILIP BROWN: THE VERSES OF VEMANA (translated). 388-A
R. NAGARAJA SARMA: "UN-HINDU EXPOSITION OF HINDU THOUGHT. 388-B
MAJUMDAR "ANCIENT INDIAN HISTORY." 388-C
M. HIRIANNA: THE PLACE OF FEELING IN CONDUCT. 388-D
NALINIKANTA BRAHMA: SANKARA'S MAYA: 389
HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYA: PHILOSOPHY OF GAUDAPADA 393
B.L. ATREYA: GAUDAPADA & VASISTHA. 403
V.B. SHRIKHANDE: THE SUMMUM BONUM" 418
K.H. KELKAR: PHILOSOPHY OF BRADLEY. 431
R. DAS: BRADLEY & SANKARA. 438
SRI AUROBINDO: THE LIFE DIVINE: Vol.1. 445
H.H. RAJAH SIR RAMA VARMAH: HINDU PHILOSOPHY & LIFE: 474
A.B. DHRUVA: "SENSATION, CONSCIOUSNESS & SOLIPSISM. 475
ADHARCHANDRA DAS. "THE FACT OF KNOWING" 483
V.B. SHRIKHANDE: "NIDDHYASANA MEDITATION.". 485
S.K. MAITRA: CONSUMMATION OF THOUGHT IN BRADLEY. 487
N.K. BRAHMA: REASON INADEQUATE TO THE ABSOLUTE. 489
D.G. LONDHE: "THE REAL SELF IN SANKARA" 493
RASVIHARY DAS. "BRADLEY'S VIEW OF APPEARANCE. 506
BHASKAR S. NAIK: "THE EGO." 509
J.N. CHUBB: APPEARANCE IN BRADLEY & SANKARA. 512
C.T.SRINIVASAN "ON IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING TRUTH" 514
A.C.MUKERJI: SANKARA'S THEORY OF APPEARANCE. 514

BAHADUR MAL. "ONCCONCEPT OF FREEDOM." 527
R.D. DESAI: HOW DO WE KNOW OTHER MINDS.534
N.V. BANERJEE: THEORY OF SENSE-PERCEP-
TION. 535
C.T. SRINIVASAN. "MAYA." 541
D.G. LONDHE: "SANKARA'S CRITERION OF
TRUTH." 548
P.N. MUKHERJI: "THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ISVARAKRSHNA AS EMBODIED IN THE KARIKAS553
V.B. SHRIKHANDO: "MIND & SELF." 557
SRIMATI TATINI DAS. "BRADLEY & SANKARA.561
K.A.HAMID: "GENTILE'S PHILOSOPHY." 567
G.R. MALKANI. "INTELLECT & INTUITION" 571
G.R. MALKANI "PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION579
J.N. CHUBB. "PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE." 586
KALI PRASAD: "THE CONCEPT OF THE UN-
CONSCIOUS."593
N.K. SEN: "THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY" 598
P.P.S. SASTRY: "INDIAN PHILOSOPHY &
PRESENT SITUATION." 607
P.P.S. SASTRI: "GOD IN ADVAITA." 626
A.C. MUKERJI: "THE PLACE OF GOD IN
ADVAITA:" 628
B.N. ROY: THE STATUS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 638
NIKUNJA VIHARI BANERJEE: "MOORES REFU-
TATION OF IDEALISM. 640
H.D. BHATTACHARYA: "IDEALISM & THE
PHYSICAL WORLD." 646
G.R. MALKANI DO DO DO 658
J.K. CHAKRAVARTY DO DO 662
HUMAYUN KABIR: THE CONCEPTION OF
HEAVEN. 671
R. VAIDYANATHASWAMI. "WHAT IS REAL ,, 672
H.H. THE RAJASAHEB OF SANGLI . 676
RASVIHARI DAS. IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE 678
B.S. NAIK. EXPLANATION OF OBJECTIVITY
AS FALSITY. 680
M.V.V.K. RANGACHARI "CAUSALITY." 682
V. PARANJOTI. THE SIDDHANTIN'S CRITI-
CISM OF MAYA. 683

U.C. BHATTACHARJI: THE PROBLEM OF TIME -- IN INDIAN THOUGHT. 688
RAMA KANTA TRIPATHI "THE MADHYAMIKA -- THEORY OF DIALECTIC. 689
S. RADHAKRISHNAN "WELCOME ADDRESS." 693
G.R. MALKANI "NATURE OF PHILOSOPHIC -- TRUTH." 694
T.R.V. MURTHI: ILLUSION AS CONFUSION 697
SATIS CHANDRA CHATTERJI: INDIAN & -- WESTERN THEORIES OF TRUTH. 699
D.M. DATTA: "SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SANKHYA SYSTEM." 700
G. HANUMANTHA RAO: REVIEW OF LEUBA'S STUDIES IN RELIGION AND MYSTICISM. 703
M.S. SRINIVASA SARMA: ETHICAL RELATIVITY & ITS BEARING ON SITTLICHKEIT. 706
S.N.L. SRIVASTAVA: ADVAITISM IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN THOUGHT. 709
....."INTO THE MATRIX OF MEMORY". 714
A.G. HOGG: THE CLAIM OF SOCIETY ON THE METAPHYSICALLY MINDED. 717
N.G. DAMLE: INSUFFICIENCY OF INTELLECT 720
S.N.L. SHRIWASTAVA: "DRG DRSYA VIVEKA & MYSTICISM." 724
RAJ NARAIN:SENSORY PHENOMENA IN MYSTIC LIFE. 735
P.T. RAJU: NATURE OF VITANDA & ITS RELATION TO THE METHODOLOGY OF ADVAITA 737
P.S. NAIDU: "ON INDETERMINABILITY." 742
T.R.V. MURTI: "THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY 746
D.M. DATTA: CAN A QUALITY BE PERCEIVED WITHOUT SUBSTANCE. 755
MAKHANLAL MUKHERJI: "THE FUNCTION OF DIALECTIC." 756
MOHINI M. CHATTERJI. ATMANATMA-VIVEKA OF SANKARA. 757

SATISCHANDRA CHATTEREE. Review).

IS IDEALISM REFUTED? (In Calcutta-

There is now a widely current belief in the philosophical world that Idealism has lost its old prestige. It is no longer given a place in the forefront of philosophical speculation, but is supposed to have exhausted itself and pushed to the background by better equipped competitors. Realism, pragmatism, voluntarism, behaviourism, Bergsonism--ever so many isms recently invented are now in the ascendant. Idealism is look upon as a bankrupt institution, a thing of the past, an exploded theory or a futile and frivolous type of speculation. In words like these or in even stronger and more bitter ones, has the death-knell of Idealism sought to be sounded and its refutation driven home to us.

Reviewing all the varied and strenuous attempts that have been made to disprave and discord Idealism we may notice two forms of opposition to the idealistic creed. The first is a frontal attack directed to the very foundation on which the massive superstructure of Idealism stands. It questions the validity of the basal principles of Idealism. All the main grounds on which Idealism is based are subjected to the most relentless criticism. The attempt is made to demonstrate that Idealism is supported by no solid ground, but is built on quicksand. The second is a sort of side attack which aims at exposing the defects and inconsequence of the Idealist's philosophy. The point pressed here is that Idealism offers no adequate solution for many facts of the real world and certain problems of actual life. It stands condemned by the presence of evil in the world. The questions of individuality and freedom, the reality of time and progress are stumbling-blocks to Idealism of the absolutistic type, if not to all. It is proposed in this short paper to examine the first line of argument which is employed as a basis for the refutation of Idealism.

What is Idealism? Much depends on the answer to this question. What is professed to be the refutation of Idealism does not, I venture to show, touch the essence of genuine Idealism but only certain specious forms of it. Modern Idealism assersts two general principles. According to it, the ultimate reality is mind. Idea, Experience, Reason, Consciousness and Spirit are the various terms used by different idealists to express the mental or spiritual character of ultimate reality. It is the prime source from which all things arise, for which they all exist and by which they are sustained. It follows next that between mind as the ultimate reality, on the one hand, and the finite things and beings , on the other, there subsists a necessary relation of correlativity as between subject and object. The world of things has existence as a system of objects necessarily related to mind. It has no independent being apart from relation to the unity of a living universal experience. On the other hand, the ultimate reality as a mental or spiritual principle is the subject of experience of the world of objects. The unity of its life and experience is meaningless apart from its relation to a variety of contents in other real things and beings. The reality of things, therefore, does not lie in their independence of all minds. It consists in their objectivity in relation to a subject of experience. The reality of the ultimate mind or subject, again, lies in the activity of evolving and experiencing a world of objects. Reality and rationality, the objective existence of things and their subjective reference are reciprocal conceptions.

Now, let us consider the attempts to refute Idealism as sketched above in its bare essence. One such attempt consists in tracing the cardinal doctrines of Indialsim to the Berkeleian principle: esse is percipi, and then showing that

"in all the senses ever given to it, it is false." As Dr. G.E. Moore observes: "That wherever you can truly predicate esse you can truly predicate percipi...is.....a necessary step in all arguments, properly to be called idealistic, and what is more, in all arguments hitherto offered for the idealistic conclusion."

It is here held that the Hegelian principle of the correlativity between subject and object is none other than Berkeley's principle of "esse est percipi" but thinly disguised. The Idealistic view of thèspiritual character of reality resting, as it does on this argument, ends in reducing the objects of experience to aspects of experience or ideas of the mind. Modern idealists do indeed admit a distinction between a sensation or idea and its object. But they "are not thereby absolved from the charge that they deny it." Their view of the inseparable relation between ideas and objects, their conception of the two as forming an 'organic unity' land them logically in the same position as that of Berkeley's subjective idealism. "That Berkeley and Mill committed this error will, perhaps, be granted: that modern Idealists make it will....appear more probable later."

Whatever of truth there may be in the above argument against the Idealistic position, it hardly contains anything to convince us of the truth of its conclusion. What is urged here is that modern idealists commit the same mistake as Berkeley in that "esse is held to be percipi, solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it." But a levelling statement like this cannot be accepted as true in any possible sense. It rests on a radical misunderstanding of the position of modern Idealism. A theory of subjectivism or mentalism of the type worked out by Berkeley is indeed open to this charge. With Berkeley the

principle of "esse is percipi" is a psychological truth. It is the result of an introspective analysis of the conditions that make the world actual to us. And since Berkeley (following the lead of Locke's empiricism) could accept only empirically virifiable conditions, he had to reduce the esse of things to our actual or possible perceptions of it. So far we can understand how esse is equated with perception, how what is experienced is identified with the experience of it or how blue is held to be identical with the sensation of blue. The position of modern idealists, however, is altogether different. I say this through no love of settled opinion or favouritism but in a spirit of fair criticism. That modern idealists admit a distinction between idea and its object, that it is no part of their intention to identify the two and also that they expressly assert the actuality of this distinction is to be admitted by the most perverse of their critics. It remains to be seen whether from any of their assertions the identity between idea and its object, that it is no part of their intention to identify the two and also that they expressly assert the actuality of this distinction is to be admitted by the most perverse of their critics. It remains to be seen whether from any of their assertions the identity between idea and its object follows as a logical consequence. Such an assertion, it has been urged, is contained in the idealistic view of the relation of inseparability or organic unity as subsisting between the idea and its object. To say that two things are inseparably related or that they constitute an organic whole is to deny their distinction. Hence it has been pressed by the critic that the idealists' assertion of inseparable relation or organic unity between idea and object leads logically to their identity. As Dr. Moore says: "When, therefore, we are told that green and the sensation of green

are certainly distinct but yet are not separable, or that it is an illegitimate abstraction to consider the one apart from the other, what these provisos are used to assert is, that though the two things are distinct, yet you not only can but must treat them as if they were not."

But it is too much, I think, for any logic to prove identity from inseparability. The idea of inseparable relation requires (1) two things that are somehow distinct and fifferent from each other. It is meaningless to speak of the same identical thing as inseparably related to itself. (2) It requires also that their relation holds good in all times, places and conditions, and that one cannot be separated from the other without prejudice to the existence and nature of both. This is illustrated in the relation between substance and attribute, cause and effect, genus and species and the like. Nowhere in the conception of inseparable relation do we find anything that forces us to the conclusion of identity and its logical consequence. Far from this, it requires the distinction between two units of existence, howsoever alike they may otherwise be. Nor is it sound reason to say that two things cease to be distinct and become identical because they form an 'organic unity' and because it is an illegitimate abstraction to consider the one apart from the other. An abstraction may become illegitimate when we attempt to assert as a part that which is true only of the whole to which it belongs. But Dr. Moore is not right when he says that this principle is used to assert "that whenever you try to assert anything whatever of that which is part of an organic whole, what you assert can only be true of the whole," and "this can only be because the whole is absolutely identical with the part." What is true of the whole cannot obviously be true of the part. But from this, it follows by no means that what is true of the part of an organic whole is true

of the whole itself and therefore the two are identical. All that can legitimately be said is that what is true of the part is true of it as a member of but not as identical with the whole. Hence even if idea and object be organically related and cannot be considered apart, it does not follow that they cease to be distinct and become identical. What is true of the idea is true of it as a distinct unit that refers always to an object and what is true of the object is true of it as another distinct unit always referred to by idea. It does not, therefore, appear from the above argument that modern idealists make the same mistake as Berkeley and that they deny the distinction between idea or experience and its object in spite of their best intentions to the contrary.

Another formidable attempt to refute Idealism consists in attacking the Idealists' principle of co-relativity between things and mind, or, between object and subject. That all things are necessarily related to mind or that their existence depends on their relation to some mind is an idle and unfounded assumption. Things have an independent existence of their own. True, that they are sometimes known by us thus enter into the cognitive relation. But this is no part of the essential nature of things. It is an accidental and adventitious quality of things. They can and do exist in all their glory even when there is no mind to know them. The last vestige of the cognitive relation may disappear and yet things exist as no whit less real. "Many tulips are 'born to blush unseen' forever." To say that a thing known at certain times must be known always is as foolish as to argue that because the letter 'a' occurs in the third place of words like 'place', 'that' etc., it is to be defined as the letter occurring in the third place of words. "This specious argument" Prof. Perry says, "may be conveiently described as "definition by initial predication." It may be that the knowledge of things is not possible apart

from consciousness, because to conceive is ipso facto to bring within consciousness." But this is a redundant proposition. It means simply that a conceived thing is an idea and an idea cannot exist except in mind. "But what the idealist requires is a proposition to the effect that everything is an idea, or that only ideas exist. And to derive this proposition directly from the redundancy just formulated, is simply to take advantage of the confusion of mind by which a redundancy is commonly attended."

The above anti-idealistic argument has the merit of clearly bringing out the real point at issue. That matter exists as well as spirit, that things are not mere ideas of the mind or that the objects of experience are somehow other than experience will be readily admitted by modern idealists, if not all. But the moot-point to decide is: How do things exist? Do they exist only as related to mind, as present to consciousness? Or do things exist independently of the relation to any mind, the cognitive relation being one of the many contexts into which things may indifferently enter? Idealism, while it grants the distinct existence and objective reality of things, holds that they are necessarily related to and not independent of mind. It is plain that all the things we speak about or anywise refer to are related to our minds. However much we may try to get a thing existing apart from ind, we not only fail but also see how doomed to failure all such attempts must be. No sooner than we get at the thing it becomes relation to our mind. A man cannot leap over his shadow. The bird cannot soar above its wings. There is then no gainsaying the fact that all the things we anyway point to are related to our minds. But the question still remains: Is this relation of things to mind a necessary or an adventitious one? Is it inherent in the very constitution of things? Or, is it only an accident that sometimes befalls them but touches

not their essence? Now so far as the finite mind is concerned, it cannot, I think, be said that all things are necessarily related to it, or, that they do not exist when out of relation to it. At the same time that we cannot point to any thing without bringing it into relation to our minds, we are convinced that the thing existed before and would continue to exist even when my or your consciousness disappears. Who among you would doubt the existence of your pen at the intervals no man takes notice of it? No doubt a thing stands related to our minds as often and as long as we deal with it in any way. Nor can we conceive anything as existing apartfrom relation to our minds.

JOSEPH JASTROW.

"EFFECTIVE THINKING"

1. The air is, literally and figuratively, crowded with new ideas, unproved theories, exciting prhpehcies. It is no longer possible to make up your mind once and leave it undisturbed for the rest of its natural life. To-day the mind, more than ever, is an instrument to be kept bright and keen by continuous, careful usage.

2. On every hand our minds are being gassed by political journalists, system-mongers, nostrum-venders, inspirational "psychologists", and other up to date confidence men. Still more reflecting the menace of weak thinking is the sway of prejudice, the strangle-hold of ignorance, the folly of flabby emotions.

It is hard to get people to think about thinking. They are still affected by the traditional notion that thinking is a ritual of "logic" which along with economics is a dismal science. This idea is a relic from medieval days when the prestige of authority outweighted the appeal to reality. That type of thinking belongs to a dead past. Our 'logic' is alive with the vivid life of crowded enterprise.

Right thinking came not as a new logical dispensation, but in the wake of a change attitude toward nature.

3. The first step is to set forth the actual technique of thinking. That includes some logic, not as baggage but as directions for the journey. It is all in simple, direct statement that carries a meaning here and now. Next, we undertake to discover why thinking goes wrong. It goes wrong, one might say, because it is beset by temptations--by human urges, desires, prejudices, that are strong as they are irrational. We map these temptations, we chart these obstacles. Then we consider the constructive phases by which right thinking is guided and encouraged.

4. Since men feel as well as think these two sides of human nature are closely fused. Feeling may obstruct thinking or give it purpose. How man learned to regulate his feelings as well as his actions, by taking thought of consequences, is likewise part of the story.

Every stage in man's progress has been an advance in the art of thinking. The first chapter takes us to <u>psychology</u>, which is the general study of the human make-up and its mental behavior.

5. The notion that there is no more need to learn to think than there was in your childhood to learn to walk, that nature attends to that as you grow up, is a near-truth that does as much harm as though it were wholly false.

6.Yet psychology is interested in all kinds of thinking, good, bad, and indifferent; while logic offers a guide to useful, profitable thinking. Though for the time concerned with the mind's activity as it gathers material for the logical venture, we shall not forget that sound thinking is our aim, and a knowledge of the psychological structure on which it is based the means to our goal.

The accredited name for the science and art of thinking is logic, the father of all the "'ologies."

But of all subjects that were taught in a formal manner, logic was the most unpopular. It was as dry as sawdust, and, like sawdust, appeared to be what was left when all the useful part of the tree of learning had been disposed of. Yet to regard logic as a useless study is a big mistake.

7. The first rule for effective thinking is to be a good observer. Sharp eyes, quick ears, sensitive fingers, a keen nose and a discriminating taste are among the essentials. Everything that sharpens the powers of observation is an aid to thinking.

Since dull senses make dull thinkers, cultivate the senses. Do not see things generally and vaguely; observe them accurately and in detail. That is the great value of learning to draw. You cannot draw anything without observing it in detail. It is surprising to find how little you know of the common things of life until you try to draw them. You cannot draw a horse in general, for there is no such beast. You can only draw a horse of definite shape and coloring, and it is enlightening to discover how many are the points to be observed about a horse to make even a rough sketch of it.

8. Thinking is a biological function, as much as breathing or walking. It is just as necessary to think as it is to see or hear; the life of the senses supplies the material for thought and for action. The test of good seeing and good thinking lies in the behavior which it directs.

9. The facts or data or results of your observation that you start from are called <u>premises</u>. Thinking proves to be the drawing of a conclusion from the results of observation; and that is all. But the "all" contains enough to make a lifetime study for the best minds of the day; and they would not get very far in the art of thinking if they could not build upon the work of the best minds of previous generations. Some of these had a genius for thinking--a genius that led to discoveries and inventions that moved the world. But in form it is no more than the drawing of inferen-

ces from the results of observation. For fundamentally there are only two sources of knowledge: what the senses report, and what the mind by orderly reflection, which we call thinking, builds upon them. That in a nutshell is the process of thinking. There is another and a special name for this process: reasoning. Reasoning is that last step of drawing a conclusion, right or wrong together with all its supporting processes.

10. The next step is to consider the typical mental processes that support thinking. Observation or perception is one of them already noted. The next is memory. Both of you recalled how a man looks or acts when he is about to turn a corner, and how, when he intends driving straight on. Memory looks backward. Without it you could have no experience; you could never learn. You learn by experience, because experience leaves a registry

It things seen left no impression, you would not be a bit better off the second time than the first. The burnt child dreads the fire because he remembers the unpleasant sensation of the burn. No memory, no thinking.

A good memory is an aid to good thinking. Memory is not photographic, but selective. You could possibly remember everything you saw. If you did, your mind would be so cluttered that you could not think at all..

To remember everything on the front page of the newspaper or the whole contents of a show-window would not help, but hinder your day's work. So you select a little and forget the rest; you concentrate; you organize your memory according to your interests. You select and select and select. But the "right" things leave a very considerable impression; it is on the momory of that impression that you leanr and, by learning, think.

The upshot is that you do not live in the present alone; out of sight is not out of mind. You keep in touch with your past, and through books, with

the past of the race. But equally, in order to think, you must look to the future or anticipate. Eventually you foresee, look ahead; and if you know enough, you predict. That is the very cream of the test of good thinking--the power to foresee. That is taking time by the forelock, acting for the future. The psychologist's name for it is <u>imagination</u>.

While memory is dependent on the past, on what has actually happened, imagination has no such limitations. You can imagine things that never happened and perhaps will never happen. The imagination can be a great aid to thinking; it can also be a hindrance.

11. The Tower of London, the bridge over the Thames--al these are pictures of my imagination, but based on actual impressions. They were once sense-perceptions, retinal images, and now are faded mental images. The power of image-making is the basis of memory and imagination alike, and thus supplies the usable data of inferences.

12. We recognize that there is order, sequence, and linkage in our ideas; they do not come any which way. The steps in the same process must be co-ordinated.

13. The first use of taking thought is to <u>explain</u>. That represents the great <u>why</u> of understanding. After the first few years of infantile examining, exploring, fingering, seeing, listening, tasting and smelling--and all with the increasing purpose of attaining satisfying experiences--the second stage of child curiosity bursts forth with constant inquiry: why?

14. <u>Explaining</u> is one of the great patterns of thinking. It is well worth while to analyse it minutely. Such analysis will be useful also in tracing other logical patterns and thinking needs. Just as there is no horse in general but only specific types and specimens of horses, no emotion in general but only special emotions with sources and objects, so there is no thinking in

general, but only specific patterns of thought, distinctive in end and procedure.

15. By way of summary, we have: Pattern (1): Given result and rule, and infer the case, and you explain; Pattern (2): Given result and case and infer the rule, and you generalize; Pattern (3): Given case and rule, and infer the result, and you apply. And to complete the summary, the logical names for these thought-patterns, are hypothesis for (1), induction for (2) and deduction for (3).

16. Reasoning by analogy may be both suggestive and effective; and it may lead hopelessly astray. There are scientific analogies and popular folklore analogies. There happens to be a strong tendency for the human mind to reason by analogy, and to accept weak and remote analogies in support of conclusions otherwise and not always openly arrived at. Many an ambitious thinker has gotten into trouble by too free indulgence in this questionable procedure. For many errors of thought the uncritical use of analogy is responsible.

17. Thinking takes form and purpose by the same step; its elements are results of observation, rules of uniformity or tendency, and cases or instances. Explaining is determining what kind of a case, an event, a symptom, an appearance really is, to what order of happening it belongs. Generalizing is putting the world in order, finding its governing rules. Applying is employing knowledge to practical ends. There are other varieties of argument, such as analogy; and another is the interpretation of signs. The value of the thought product derives from the quality, the insight of one's explanations, the basis of one's applications. Understanding the logical patterning is an aid to effective thinking. The patterns supply a formula on paper for something real in fact. Excursions into the abstract give returns in dealing with the concrete. A complex world requires adequate instruments of its comprehension.

18. Your career as a thinker begain in your infancy. You then made two great discoveries. You discovered your own body, and you discovered things outside yourself.
19. Right thinking leads to right doing. How we found that out is too long a story; but it was by the method of experiment, making a guess as to the cause and trying it out. That trying-out is called verification--testing the truth of your guess as to the cause of the observed effect.

We arrive at a point of importance. How we handle our causes and effects, how we think of them, depends on our general system of thinking; we may think fairly well by one system in regard to one set of things. You as a business man may t think fairly correctly about business and merchandise and costs and profits, and not so wellin regard to to the subject of disease.
20. Such knowledge, gained largely by doing, by experience of how things happen--with little insight into the why--is called empirical. The word is useful because it sums up a common stage in learning how to think.

Observation of hundreds of cases of cause and effect, collected haphazardly as the opportunity arose, but without much relation to one another, would advance science and the arts about so far, but would stop there. What was needed, and always sought, was a principle, a supremely important product of thought. Nature is orderly; order is heaven's first law. Things do not happen haphazardly, but uniformly, according to principles--if only the mind of man can discover them. The principle binds a mass of observations together, and makes the order of nature intelligible. It explains on a large scale.
21. Aviation began by a study of why birds are able to fly. An aviator flies like a bird as the result of studying the principles of gliding planes in air currents. The power supply of his mechanical wings is derived from half a dozen

principles of combustion, electricity, and engine construction. The principle of the X-ray came out of elaborate study of wave-lengths. The telegraph depends upon one application of the electro-magnetic principle; the telephone of another. Invention is the application of principles.

22. The study of cause and effect extends from infant exploration to elaborate scientific research. It observes the sequences of nature, but penetrates behind the scenes by formulating principles. Much of it remains empirical, partly explained knowledge, but enough to establish control. We may not know just what electricity or life is; but we can devise dynamos and health measures. The hope of application invites investigation. Studying the principles of bird flight led to aviation. Cause and effect extends from atom to universe. Physics and chemistry and biology have a common logic, but each develops a technique of its own. The forces of nature are so complex that they make a life study for layman and dpecialist alike. The intellectual and no less the practical life a constant experience of cause and effect.

23. The mental world includes the set of agencies brought into being by men to run themselves effectively and profitably. But underlying this partly artificial system is a nature-made set of motives and mechanisms that runs largely by laws of its own. These motives it is the business of psychology to study--and of applied psychology, aided by logic, to employ. Mental causes are impulses, instincts, urges, drives, tendencies, traits, wishes, desires, ideas, purposes, yearnings, strivings. They may be generally referred to as motives, the source of the motive power. In operation, they lead to effects, which may be called behavior, actions, conduct, expression, including the attitudes that accompany or induce them.

24. Motivation is nothing less than the logic of human behavior determined by the temperament and training of the individual and the social forces to which he is subject. The Freudian psychology has reinterpreted motives, finding deeper and unconscious sources of action.

25. For practical purposes there is a line of cleavage between the physical and the mental world. In the physical world, the mere thinking things so has no power to make them so. We cannot, merely by wishing, make the sun stand still, nor water run up-hill, nor smoke rise on a damp day, nor the kettle boil faster. But when it comes to aches and pains, body and mind may be hopelessly entangled as to cause and effect. Bodily symptoms may arise through mental causes and be cured by the same means. If you gather mushrooms, prepare them and eat them, and then have some misgivings as to whether they were the edible kind or the harmful kind, you may become uneasy or even quite sick. The cause of your symptoms may be not the mushrooms but your state of mind about them. If an expert tells you positively that what you ate was the wholesome meadow mushroom, agaricus campestris, and most certainly not the deadly amanita muscaria, you are relieved mentally and your symptoms disappear promptly.

26. The principle may be illustrated in a hundred ways. You may call it suggestion. Whether the 'it' comes from the tomb, or from belief of others in its wonder-working powers, or from witnessing the cures, or from seeing the crutches left by recovered cripples, it derives its strength from your belief that it will help you. All suggestion is, in the end, self-suggestion; your attitude acts as a cause to produce your behavior as an effect. When about to jump a ditch, your confidence that you can make it helps you to jump farther. Any serious doubt or hesitation may be conveyed to your muscles and land you in the mud just

short of the bank. In these matters, thinking
things so helps to make them so. However, re-
lations in the mental world are rarely as simple
as this. Mental causes and effects operate far
more subtly. Yet, even when complex and indirect ,
they are of the same order, and involves similar
mechanisms.

27. You have a natural principle of explanation,
which makes any supernatural explanation as need-
less as it is far-fetched and illogical to those
prepared to think in scientific ways. It is an
ironical fact that the very instrument first devi-
sed to prove subconscious movements was converted
into a ouija board (the name combines the French
and German for 'yes') to prove the supernatural.

28. There is first bad observation, such as fail-
ure to note that the subjects in table-turning or
rapping were really exerting their muscles in
the direction of their intentions, when they be-
lieved they were not doing so. It may have been a
pardonable error, since the indications were often
so slight as readily to be overlooked. There is
next the error of selected evidence,--not taking
a fair sample of cases. This occurs in many super-
stitions. You note when your signs or dreams or
premonitions come true, not when they fail.
The failure to make allowance for coincidence is
another order of error.

29.Social and economic causes, like supply and de-
mand, seem as "real" as gravitation, but are hu-
man motives in disguise. The mind as cause will
always remain complex and uncertain. Logic leans
on psychology at every step in which human values
enter.

30 What distinguishes man is that he is a tool-
making, and not merely a tool-using animal. An
elephant may, with a stick held in his trunk, dis-
lodge a leech under his hind leg; he may break off
a palm leaf and fan the flies away, or throw
straw on his back to keep off the sun; but he

does not invent a fork, or a bellows, or an umbrella. Beyond his mere manual skill, the mind of man invents the tools to aid his thinking.

31. The motive for the invention of signs and symbols is the urge to communicate. The social impulse is the great stimulus to thinking, even though each individual does his thinking for himself. As we must live together, so also must we think together and understand one another. Sending and receiving, we acquire a set to aid our thinking in all its phases. Words form a vast collection of symbols of things and ideas, and ideas are relations between things. A vocabulary is a large and efficient kit of tools for the work of the thinker. Once the thinker uses words, he lives in another and a richer mental world.

32. This account of communication and record with other than word-symbols will aid by contrast in showing how enormously superior to any other order of symbol are words. Spoken words use as tools the lips, tongue, teeth, palate, vocal cords, lungs. The actual sounds, the sensations of the percussions of the air (such as the telephone or phonograph disc transmits) are meaningless, arbitrary, not the same in any two languages; but the meaning is in the word thus spoken through its power to call up the thing, the relation, the experience, the idea. That is no longer gesture-language, or picture-writing, but word language; it has gone far ahead as a tool of thinking.

The thinker, equipped with a language that grows as his power of thinking grows, expands with every need, responds to every shade of thought and invention, is launched on the most challenging venture of the mind. Language aids thinking as a tool, but does not supply the ideas. Thinking is an independent art, however dependent for its record and its procedure on words.

How naturally and enormously words and talking aid thinking, appears convincingly in the promptly

formed habit of children to talk at play as soon as they can command words. The parents, who wait eagerly for every evidence of their child's growing intelligence, measure it by the increasing vocabulary.

33. The one great tool of thinking is the symbol, substituting a sign for a thing; the second is the concept, which leads to a general idea, a relation, or a part-quality of a thing, and which proceeds by abstraction.

34. Words do not refer to a single individual object alone; they refer to an object as a specimen of a class, and that makes a concept. You never saw a horse in general, but only this and that horse; but you know what a horse is; and you can at once regard donkeys, mules, and zebras as "horses" in a general sense, but not so when you make finer distinctions.

Words are concepts, so far as they are not just labels or proper names; it is as concepts that they become tools of the mind. We could not think as we do if we were literally limited to thinking of things as pictures or images of actual objects. My desk does not give me the same image when looked at from front or back, from above or below; your photograph is not the same in profile and full-face; but the desk or person is recognised by resemblances--despite differences. This flexibility of concepts is essential to thinking. You call it an idea, and ideas are thoughts.

35. Dominant is the psychological system of human relations which in the concrete appears in family relation, in attitudes to friends and strangers, pals and older persons, men and women. All of them abstract, but embodied in actual human situations. You cannot behave like a human being without them, and by them you direct your thoughtful behavior. Throughout, they are handled by way of words--the rich, flexible vocabulary of relations growing with our needs, and adequate if we can make the translation from fact to expression.

The spoken words, when heard, must in turn be translated back again in the hearer's mind, the ideas conveyed into motives and determinations, before they affect his behavior.

36. So accustomed are we to think in words, and to accept words as the embodiment of thought, that there is great danger of accepting words as the reality. Our ideas may be vague, and not clearly thought out; we acquire a fluency in handling words, without a real grasp of their meaning; we lose the fine distinctions between the boundaries of one concept and another; we just repeat what we hear or have read, with but a partial comprehension. And some minds become so befuddled with words that they mistake a verbal fluency for thinking. Words not only may conceal thought, but may confuse it and become a substitute for its absence.

37. Words have so many and such slippery meanings, and we are so easily biassed in using them, that misunderstandings arise. Language will never be a perfect tool, nor those who handle it perfectly expert in its use; but it is the great reservoir of symbols and concepts by which men do their thinking and make the world of ideas move on.

38. however well endowed, even a genius will have to think in order to meet the situations of life. He cannot meet them by following his natural impulses; his genius consits in his capacity to learn, in which acquired thinking plays the leading part. Genius and average man alike guide behavior by trained reason.

Nature's contribution to the regulation of behavior is instinct. The lowly and the lofty orders of creation including homo sapiens, are equipped with instincts, which give the set to their behavior. If the sum total of the instincts afforded an adequate guide to behavior, reason would indeed by unnecessary. As things are, however, instinct and reason divide the field between them.

38. Man has had to pay heavy penalties for his insufficient protection by instinct in avoiding many varieties of dangers; he has had to learn by sad consequences what to avoid and fear. Being inexpert in the art of thinking his way in the world, man has acquired by the same route of thought a motley collection of unreasonable fears. He fears quite innocent events and signs and conditions which, when outgrown, are called superstitions. But superstitions are not unreasoned; they are only crudely and falsely reasoned; they become fears under the prompting of a native timidity, abetted by a natural credulity.

39. The perspective of human behavior is overwhelmingly that of the issues of learning. Tradition, logic and psychology shape our thinking. Everyone thinks in accord with the intellectual level of his class, day and generation.

40. In vision, you see or infer that an object is solid, not flat, that it has three dimensions and not two, because a solid object forms slightly different pictures on the reninae of our eyes. Knowing that fact will not alter your use of the eyes.

41. The uncertainty and obscurity of the field of operation of intuition have given rise to strange beliefs and intriguing theories.

42. Intuition must be rationally defined. The temptation to make of it a marvel or a mystery is often present; if we yield to it, we do not strengthen but impair our thinking powers. With transcendent sources of knowledge we have no concern. Those who believe in inspired doctrines do so by loyalty to a faith; they may attribute such inspiration to prophets, seers, or saints. Because of the prevalence of that tradition, there has been a wide dissemination of the belief in supernormal knowledge.

43. It is my conviction that, so far as any of these procedures are substantiated, they fall within the rationalistic view of intuition, under the

formula developed--a composite of subconscious, implicit, vaguely impressionistic data. And much of the rest is myth or hearsay or popular belief that will not stand the test of proof.

44. The civilized, educated mind of to-day is not only far more richly informed; it is far more logical than the simpler order of intelligence with which children and men in the childhood of the race set out.

In all the less tutored, less disciplined and logic-trained portions of the community, the patterns of thought follow a simplified and limited reason, with a greater dependence upon the intuitive level of apprehension. The same holds of complex social situations, particularly when strong human emotions are involved, when we tend to <u>feel</u> rather than <u>reason</u> our way to conclusions.

It is desirable that intuition be naturalized in the domain of logic; but it must take out its citizenship papers in the name of reason and avoid claims which science cannot validate.

So far as we can admit intuition as a guide to behavior, it falls under the province of reason. I should prefer to call it <u>insight</u>, to make this point still plainer. We have insight of the human variety only because we have reason. It could never develop from instinct, though the same mechanism and endowment which instinct serves, continues to act when guided by an intuition or a reasonable insight. Both spring from the psychological roots of thinking behavior; both have a place in evolution.

Thinking is necessary because human instinct, except in lowly functions, supplies only the driving power and that vaguely, leaving the pattern of behavior to develop by experience, by trial and error and reflection. Men must learn what to fear and to avoid, and to unlearn their natural trends as well. Superstitions are unreasonable fears. Reason

analyses complex situations and plans the way out. Intuition is an impressionistic judgment. It is not a mystic or third order of knowledge, but proceeds upon sense impressions and implicit judgments. Intuition operates complexly in human relations. Where animals find their way by instinct, man guides his course by a map. Homo sapiens is well named. Reflective intelligence is the human type of guidance of behavior. Effective thinking is an acquired art.

45. The understanding of right thinking may be advanced by analysing how thinking goes wrong. Logic has always included the study of fallacies. A helpful psychological approach is to consider that as there are impediments of speech which prevent the speaker from speaking plainly, so there are also impediments of thought which prevent the thinker from thinking effectively. These defects are in the nature of temptations to use the thinking machine wrongly. Every thinker is tempted by his own psychology to accept and to reach weak, improbable, or false beliefs.

We behave and misbehave like human beings by virtue of the same psychology. We misbehave variously; for sin is versatile. The like holds of our logical sins, when we mis-think. The average citizen is not a uniformly logic-abiding individual. Hence the need in a manual of effective thinking of a fairly comprehensive survey of the impediments of thought.

Correct thinking is a difficult art for many, and especially for two reasons. The first is that many minds are not equal to the task; the average mind easily gets beyond its logical depth. Most of us can think well enough in simple matters; but when the data are complex and the relations involved, we lose our way; we are stuck, and thinking stops, or gets side-tracked. That is an intellectual limitation. We could all think better if we had better thinking machines, trained them better,

kept them in better order.

The second reason is an emotional intrusion. Our feelings get in the way of our reasoning, or throw the thinking machine out of gear. We draw or accept a conclusion under the influence of a wish, a hope, or a fear; our thinking is in so far warped. That is prejudice-- a psychological trait with logical (or rather illogical) issue. We are to consider how thinking goes wrong through an emotional interest in the conclusion.

Prejudice means literally judging in advance. As it operates, it includes ignoring some of the evidence, over-estimating other parts of it, and a strong inclination to a set conclusion to start with. We are biased in many ways by our prepossessions. For we think with our total psychology, in which feeling often plays a more potent part than reasoning. At all stages of cultural development, there has been more false and weak thinking than sound thinking. Prejudiced thinking abounds.

46. Few of us form quite neutral or objective estimates of our fellow men, or hold unbiased opinions on current issues. Racial and class prejudices thrive. We may recognize them as impediments to fair judgment, without supposing that by such confession we shallget rid of them. Love is blind to faults, and keen-eyed to virtues; the eyes of hate see quite oppositely. We are apt to ascribe to beautiful persons other desirable qualities which they do not possess; it is proportionately difficult to detect the good qualities of the unattractive. We are prejudiced for or against people by appearance, or by manner, or by what we have heard in compliment or detraction. Human relations are so strongly emotionalized, that they represent the favourable field for the exercise of prejudice. Yet it is our intention to deal with our fellow men and with our common problems, in a rational, unprejudiced manner. What commonly happens in any matters in which we are honestly

trying to reach a fair conclusion, is that we combine logic with prejudice and prepossessions. We have some sound reasons for our conclusions, supported by a varied medley of emotional tendencies to accept them.

47. When passions are aroused, rationality abdicates. In the World War, all the factors conducive to reason suffered. Even the senses were deluded. There was widespread belief in the appearance of the Angel of Mons, duly attested; there was the accredited myth of the Russian army appearing in England. More characteristically there was a war hysteria, which disturbed judgment, ascribed to the enemy any and every variety of atrocity, and intensifed propaganda and suspicion against loyal pacifists and harmless conscientious objectors. As feeling runs high, reason runs low.

48. Another human habit, that of forming beliefs whether or not we have the competence or the knowledge to do so is that we have inclination to take sides; without that, controversies would not be so sharp nor the exhange of opinion so interesting. It is an inevitable habit, exposed as we are to so many issues and arguments, even if our reading does not go far beyond the daily papers and the popular magazines, and our discussions remain as unauthoritative as those of the rural corner grocery or the city club. It is only when this habit extends beyond its legitimate field--which it does commonly--that it lowers the quality of thinking. By discussion we may both reduce or strengthen our prejudices, learn to recognize or to insist upon our prepossessions. It is better to think and occasionally think wrongly than not to think at all. Effective thinking matures by exercise in the process of argument and evidence; it may lead to a recognition of prejudice and prepossession.

Impediments of thought are not so obvious as impediments of speech. The thinker may be as little aware of them as of color-blindness, which he discovers by learning that others see things differently.

Prejudice need not be crude and coarse and obvious and simple. It may be subtle, delicate, intricate, elusive. It intrudes at all levels, in endless variety. We approach most matters with a somewhat predisposed set of mind, neither quite closed nor quite open. Prepossession divides men sharply into diverse camps, and followings, and presumably plays the largest part in determining what we believe, how we appraise evidence, how we think.
49. This recognition becomes central in the Freudian "wish", indicating that belief, no less than behavior, follows desire, and desire follows the clue of satisfaction. So fundamental is this mental habit, that Freud recognizes two orders of thinking. One follows the pleasure principle; the other proceeds on the reality principle. The conflict between the two is the source of much mental struggle.
50. So long as the nature of romancing is recognized as such, its powers to affect thought are limited; it may be an aid to imaginative thinking as well as a hindranceeto realistic thinking. Indulgence in it is natural to childhood. The real world and the world of fantasy often persist side by side without serious confusion. Gradually, the insistent claims of the world of reality must be recognized, for behavior must be adjusted to them. We cannot afford to live in a fool's paradise. Logic derives from the reality principle; we must thing rationally to live effectively.

It is obvious that we cannot afford to believe whatever strikes our fancy. It is obvious that no normal mind lives by wish thinking alone. Only the deluded, who, through loss of mental balance, have reduced or forsaken contact with the world of reality, are absorbed in their own fantasies. By such "concentration" (which is limitation(, reality is excluded, irrantionality dominates; their logic is not that of the accepted world, adjustment to which is the sign of sanity. Responsible thinking implies a control of fancy by allegiance to reality.

51. Idols are congenial errors of the mind; they are mental tendencies that induce wrong reasoning, and their source lies in the frailties of human character. If we continue to call them fallacies, we do so with a new insight; they are not the cut-and-dried fallacies of the logic books--viclations of the partly natural and partly conventional traffic-regulations of thought--but are psychological in origin. They are psycho-logical.

52. A tribute to Francis Bacon is in place because he so long ago recognized that ways of wrong thinking have a lesson for right thinking. He wished to free the mind of idols, to prepare for the great reform of science by effective thinking, as he called it, the Great Restoration. Whether or not the word is derived from the eidola of Plato, to whom it meant the false appearance of things, since Bacon it means false ways of looking at nature.

In the idol of the tribe (which is the first of Bacon's group of four idols) he included a variety of tendencies common to and inherent in the human race, so that they are not likely to be completely eradicated. He mentions the noting of instances favourable to our beliefs, and the neglect of the unfavourable ones; generalizing from too slight data; regarding as real, figments of the imagination to which we give a name; the will and yielding to the passions; building up a world from our own point of view and thus distorting reality.

His second idol is that of the cave (or den), which was a way of stating that we tend to look at things, each from his own point of view, and tend to overdo and overstate our favorite notions. It is a restriction of outlook. Minds live in caverns, and when they emerge, they wear blinders.

His third idol is that of the forum or market-place, and represents the force of tradition and the loyalty to prevalent doctrines. It includes the following of weak analogies and regarding as alike what are in essence different. The forum represents the social and the popular side of think-

ing and its tendency to develop formulae, slogans, and a "band-wagon" following.

The fourth Baconian idol is that of the theater. We might call it the idol of the platform, of creeds and cults and sects and parties. It refers to the allegiance to the past, and a dogmatic insistence. These impediments of thought tally, in part, with those of our modern insight. But they lack the psychological touch, and are too much influenced by the protest against the scholastic habit of mind, then prevalent, but long since outgrown.

What is still more remarkable is that the thirteenth-century Roger Bacon should also have enumerated four obstacles to, or violations of, good thinking, which he called offendicula. Roger Bacon described these as the overweight authority, the slavery to custom, the dominance of the opinions of the unskilled masses, and the concealment of ignorance by the pretense of knowledge. These impediments, likewise, still survive.

If we live differently to-day, it is only because we have learned to think more effectively, more scientifically. Advance in knowledge proceeds upon a better logic as well as a richer body of facts. The essence of the Baconian "restoration" is that beliefs should be framed not from preconceived notions of what nature should be, but with an open mind to follow the trail of truth wherever it may lead.

53 In the art of persuasion, by orator, politician salesman or friend, the emotional appeal is uppermost, and convictions proceed by sentiment as much as by reason. The facts of history are distorted by the appeal to patriotism, and biography is coloured by hero-worship. Propaganda and partizanship have an emotional as well as an intellectual complexion; rationalization is an added confirmation. Once embraced, openions are held with the fervor of the extension of one's personality. There is rarely a conclusion reached by

the cold light of reason; beliefs persist by their emotional warmth.

54. The emotional inpediments of thought spread over a wide domain. Subjective feeling impedes objuective judgment. The personal equation enters. Prejudices reflect social tradition; as they engage emotional loyalty they lower the quality of thinking. Followed dominantly they form a will-to-believe. More commonly they intrude subtly and compose versatile prepossessions recognized as idols or congenial errors of the mind. The Freudian view finds the origin of prepossessions in the lure of pleasure thinking and the enhancements of personal satisfaction which may be extended to movements and causes, which once embraced retain their hold. The recognition of prejudice serves as a caution in the conduct of the mind's logical pursuits.

55. The ancient saying of Protagoras that man is the measure of the universe, contains both a truth and an idol. That to each man he himself is the centre of his world is the personal fallacy from which we shall never escape. Yet despite it, every normal-minded man can learn to think objectively. Only as the human race learned to think objectively and impersonally did valid science arise. To that end, each in his own thinking must hold in check the idol of the self, the distortion of the thought by the intrusion of the psychology of the thinker.

56. Modern psychology recognizes in hysteria a tendency to over-emotionalism and a too personal reaction to the incidents of human contact. It is not merely our thinking but our general behavior that is distorted by the idol of the self. Near this kin is the Idol of the Thrill--the temptation to believe what is interesting, striking, unusual, dramatic. It is an inclination toward accepting as true what has a "kick" in it, to credit what is emotionally satisfying. The fondness for what makes good story is intelligible.

57 It is the confusion of the interesting with the true that favours an idol. The logical mind is a

critical mind; it is less disposed to accept as true the interesting but improbable. Were it not for the attraction of the thrill, the distinction between truth and error would be more secure; the story of human belief would read quite differently in the tangled tale of the logical pilgrim's progress.

58 The third of the dominantly subjective idols is the idol of the Web, the tendency to spin the truth from an inner conviction as to how things should be. It is a more limited and an intellectual idol, in so far as it involves a devotion to thought, though under the impediment of a confusion between what is contributed from the loom of the innder world and what is found in the world without. The idol of the web makes things so by thinking them so. The devotee of the idol of the web declares and asserts, assumes and denies. His is a creative invention, yet he regards the product as an issue of discovery, possibly, of an inspiration.

59. A mob is made up of a group of persons unable to think straight because they are affected by the consciousness of their own number." It is this "thrilling awareness of number" that distorts the critical appraisal of what the idea or the article or the argument may be worth, and gives it another and false kind of value.

60. Complex is a Freudian term, incicating precisely the moulding of opinion no less than of behavior through a limiting emotional bias; it implies as well the overdoing of a trait natural in ordinary proportion. The affection toward and dependence upon a mother is natural; the intense fixation carried byond the childish years is a complex. A feeling of diffidence in situations trying to our self-assertion is natural; an inferiority feeling may rise to the stature of a complex. A sense of guilt in situations in which we have culpably failed is natural; the inability to surmount it, the

constant brooding upon it, permitting it to warp or stunt the psychic growth is a complex. An ardent religious piety is natural, but the absorption of the total energy in that direction becomes a religious complex, more narrowly, a pietistic or ritualistic complex. One may be by rational judgment a prohibitionist, or a single taxer, or a socialist, or a spiritualist; but one's loyalty to any of these causes may assume the quality of a complex. Complexes form formidable impediments of thought.

61. So tenacious is this idol that such a triumph of science as the radio--which never would have appeared had the frame of mind hospitable to astrology persisted--is actually used to broadcast to modernly thinking minds the discarded debris of a remote and long obsolete state of thought.

62. Doing the right thing for the wrong reason does not destroy the benefit.

63. The study of idols, of logical transfressions through psychic frailties, suggests the vast amount of poor, weak, defective, one-sided false thinking that is going on on all sides, and of which the story of thinking is a continuous panoramic record. We seem to be surrounded by swarming illusions, unconscious assumptions, vagaries, and esoteric heterodoxies, traditional orthodoxies, imported and transported dogmas, private or class prejudices, political and related doctrines, all tinctured by expediency and vested interests--a veribable thicket of entangled undergrowth which must be penetrated or removed before clear vision of the trees and the forest of human problems appears, while the difficulty of seeing the forest for the trees remains.

64. Superstition refers to a survival or hangover of ways of thinking belonging to earlier stages of human development. For thinking has a long history; we have come to our present standing by slow degrees.

Superstitious thinking is contrasted with scientific thinking; each follows a logic of its own. Superstitious thinking is crude, primitive, ignorant, dominated by fear and wish.

65. Many elaborate cults and systems that aimed to set in order and rationalize the world of forces and desires. These may be called the pseudo-sciences, since they attempt to follow the methods of science, but proceed largely in the manner of superstitious thought.

66. A common remark in a "post-mortem" analysis of a situation is: "Why didn't you do thus and so?" and the common reply: "I never thought of it." The logical light failed; your creative intelligence did not work. Psychologically the failure is one of imagination; for it is the imagination that looks ahead, foresees, supplies, completes, plans, invents, solves, advances, originates.

67. Imagination can be fertile or futile. It can help or hinder; it can strengthen or weaken the psychological team-work and the logical resources. Imagination, too, needs direction and discipline. Imagination alone is an uncertain pilot, and may run off the track and wreck the train of thought.

68 How do we see objects as solid? Only an orinal mind would recognize in this familiar experience the data of a fundamental problem. The solution was the stereoscopic principle, which reads that each eye receives a slightly different image of a solid object (a shadow or silhouette would have the same contour however seen); and the mind behind the eyes combines the two views in one perception. The resulting invention was the stereoscope which gave each eye its own appropriate view and by mirrors (Wheatstone) or prisms (Brewster) combined them. Systhesis followed analysis is quite the same manner as if, determining the composition of a diamond or of rubber, we could then proceed to make them artificially. The re-

sult is a synthetic creation of solidity from two flat drawings or photographs.

69. There are mental inventions designed to aid the thinking process. Language is such an invention, both oral speech and written record. Number is such an invention; from counting on one's fingers and measuring by the span of one's hand up to the elaborate calculations on which the constructions of modern science and engineering stand. The origins of language and of number are lost in the obscurities of prehistoric times. That a sound made by the human voice (the X) might be used to indicate an object or relation (the Y), is perhaps of all early inventions the most significant. The elaboration of that idea to indicate the finer distinctions of mood and tense, of plurals, genders, questions, conditions, relations, qualifications, and so make a language by which men could express their meaning accurately, is a supreme example of intelligence created in interests of that intelligience. The greatest instrument of thinking is language.

In recorded language the inventive process is more clearly traceable. Speech and writing are as typically inventions as a plough or a bow or a gun, and in their development show similar stages of perfection. Writing was first picture-writing, which involved a versatile, high-grade invention, uncertain and ineffective as it was. To devise in its stead a system by which the marks as written (letters) became but signs for the sounds made while speaking, was an unparalleled stroke of genius. Without the invention of an alphabet, all other discoveries and inventions might have been lost--except as handed on by tradition. Writing extends the memory of the race and completes the individual memory and grasp; the modern world is built upon the records of the past.

70. The central story of belief is a thinker-pilgrim's progress "from myth to reason." Myth, explanatory in intent, is imaginative in method. It creates gods and heroes and explains the origin of the world (creation myths) as their work, much after the pattern of human labours. Noah's Ark, the labouts of Hercules, the Golden Fleece, Pandora, the Gardens of the Hesperides, satisfy the imaginative cravings for a world of adventure and romance, though incidentally and often primarily it is the purpose of myth to account for facts in nature and events in history. Such are myths of explanation, common among primitive peoples and caught in the modern spirit by Kipling, in his "Just So" stories--a logic-book, fascinating to the child mind. That is their 'plot' the appeal of which is emotional logic parallels the satisfaction of insight into the cause and effect in the logic of the intellect.

71. The intrusions of emotional logic continue to this day. The will to believe is a will affected by the desire for the consoling, the satisfying, the dramatic, the interesting. But with the establishment of the logic of science, these intrusions become more subtle, less crude, except as the older methods of thinking survive. The physical sciences achieve an objective status; the disciplines standing close to human relations continue to be affected by prepossessions, by the acceptability rather than the demonstrability of the conclusions. We give up the belief in the central position of the earth readily, and are not affected by the consideration that we dwell on a minor planet. The resistance to the acceptance of simian relatives for the human race has a stronger emotional basis of the same order. But most of us are prepared to let science settle these matters and to accept the conclusions objectively. We reserve our emotional bias for

beliefs that touch our lives more closely.

72. We begin by assuming that thinkers profess loyalty to the same logic. They start with much the same premises or have access to them; intent upon a common journey they arrive at different destinations, each traveler convinced that his is the right one. Equally honest and it may be equally able thinkers take opposite sides of an issue. Controversies abound; the world of opinion is as beset with warfare as that of politics and economic interests.

73. In problems of mathematics, there will be no difference in conclusion. The premises are definite, the rules of reasoning fixed, the answer follows rigidly. All who understand the problem and the technique of its solution reach the same conclusion. There can be no controversy; we do not call the attitude toward a proposition in geometry a conviction. Is there any hope that all thinking on all subjects will eventually be reducible to that pattern? There is none. For many problems vital to human welfare, it cannot be remotely approached, though we retain the intention to make the data reliable and the interpretation sound. Despite it all, differences of conclusion are inevitable, and doctors and all other experts will disagree.

74. Controversy itself has taken a more scientific turn, and convictions proceed with a greater loyalty to logical principles. That is the essential progress. In that sense we think better, arrive at our conclusions more critically than did our predecessors. As thinking improves we shall reach greater agreement in most issues of importance. The difference in capacity for the thinking process will indefinitely continue to hold convictions by use of such logic as they can command. Those who think most closely to scientific standards are more likely to reach an agreement in conclusion than those who think loosely, and are prone to prejudice and fallacy. Men will continue

to live by convictions and to engage in controversy. The field of controversial issues both contracts and expands; doubt and exploration advance side by side, older controversies are settled; newer ones arise. There is progress through it all, for the urge to rationalism endures.

75. The prevalence of controversy seems to invalidate logic, but finds its natural explanation in the complexity of the issues which reflection raises. History is not logic; by way of and despite controversies knowledge and control have progressed.

76. Man is by nature a thinker in embryo. He is born with the makings of a mind capable of logical thought. But the mind as it is employed today has been long in the making. By cultivating his tendency to think man has risen to his present estate. The power of thought has created civilization. What keeps the world going is not "horse-power", or steam or electricity, but brain-power. Because a few men in each generation carried the art of thinking to a higher stage, have we all come to think more effectively, or can do so if we will. Thinking must be considered as an acquired art, for the most part imperfectly acquired. Under the pressure of necessity, spurred by curiosity, rewarded by benefits, men came to engage in the pursuit of ideas as well as of food and possessions.

77. The lure seems to attract, despite the obvious fact that if these professors had the art they profess, they would not need to peddle it. Any such hope is vain and its promise misleading. Thinking is not that kind of an accomplishment; and the outer semblance of intelligence, like cosmetic applications, deceives only the undiscerning.

78. Much of our thinking is done in terms of words. Speaking and writing crystallise and organize thought. A legal or a scientific argument or a

political appeal translates ideas into words. Training in language is training in thinking, quite differently in different orders of thinking; the language of the Psalms and of Euclid are wholly distinct. Words may impede and endanger thinking because they may so readily be used without definite, well thought out ideas in back of them. Much weak thinking results from the lure of words. To learn to say effectively what you think is a principle of logical hygiene. Thought is matured by expression. In the very process of writing or talking, as of doing, you learn how to think effectively.

79. The primitive mind thinks by other concepts, believes and interprets in quite different fashion than that stage of understanding from which this book is written, to which it is addressed.

There is evolution in human thinking. Logical hygiene arises out of the complexisties of modern life. The range of modern interests and the high-grade concepts of modern science have developed in the service of understanding and control. The lay mind that desires to participate intelligently in the progress resulting from the contributions of the specialized minds, must do some intelligent thinking about thinking itself.

Sound thinking is accordingly the issue of an educational discipline on the basis of psychological equipment. It is not an acrobatic art, nor a bag of tricks, nor a legalistic tripping up of contradictions, nor a dialectical contest nor an oratorical display. It is the consummation of intelligence, rationally directed. It includes the avoidance of thinking that is weak, illogical, prejudiced, haphazard, lacking organization. The traditional logic, however limited its outlook, recognized technique and impediments; it taught rules for correct thinking; it illustrated fallacies. Logical hygiene considers closely the temptations that beset the would-be logical mind. The impediments of thought have been surveyed to

that end. Many a writer on the subject of thinking--which has recently come into popular favour--comments upon the low level of thinking among the people in general, and finds therein a major source of the misery and evils and injustices that oppress a reflectiveworld. Men have ever followed false gods and listened to unwise counsels. The cheap orator and the shrewd advocate, the sophist who could make the worse seem the better cause, the mountebank and the demagogue and the promoter and the hypocrite find their followings. Logical hygiene reduces their appeal; by wise mental sanitation it renders the public mind more immune to popular error. It is not a simple task. Eternal vigilance against fallacy is the price of safety.

ERNEST P. HORRWITZ.

VEDA AND VEDANTA.

1. The so-called realities of life, failure and success, sadness and gladness, April tears and laughter, crabbed old age and sparkling buoyant youth, are but a passing spectacle, a variety show, constantly enacted before the enwrapt and entrapped senses.But higher values abide beneath the crowd of fleeting sensations; permanent substance is hidden behind flitting shadows. As atma spurs the grandiose dreamlife, the roused mind presses on to coherent thought and concerted action. Sakti-flooded and power-driven, the soul rushes in spiritual torrents from theory to practice, and from rhetoric to reality. Fears and fetters fall off before the majesty of Being. Confronting the vagaries of the mobile mind stands as a tranquil witness eternal atmathe glorious self which like brilliant firework breaks forth in myriads of names and forms, even as the mild moon radiates in an infinitude of silver beams which flood with magic light on the transfigured landscape. Moonlight has no existence apart from the lunar orb. Similarly, the whole cosmos and its

greatest achievement, man, moves in atma, its primal source and fountain-head. Atma is our light, breath and soul; in atma we exist and plan and jostle. Being young, we claim liberty of action, but hard experience soon teaches us that we have to follow a higher law than our own sweet will. Character and environment, karma and dharma, shut us in on all sides, curb our desires, thwart our planning and purpose. According to Vedanta, the regimented philosophy of the Upanishads, human nature is not free, however much we may boast of apparent liberty. As soon as we feel our nothingness outside atma, we learn to abase and reject ourselves. Along with self-abandonment comes self-realization which means spiritual liberty. Atma alone is real (sat), while individuality is unreal (asat), shifting and transient, a moving picture, and part of the cosmic veil of nature (maya). Sat means literally "that which is." Reality "is" and abides. Sat is unchangeable, beyond evolution and its laws. Yet Sat is not static; the veil of maya is worn and torn by supple sat. Maya signifies "measurable," and constitutes the tangible, visible, objective world.

2. The law of causation or karma, if carried to an extreme, enervates the mind, and impregnates it with the diseased germs of fatalism. And indeed, causality has spread its sombre shadows for and wide over India. In the vain endeavour to escape from merciless law of endless action and reaction, Indian preachers sometimes command the crushing of desire. Self-repression is the essence of their wisdom. In the case of a few saints and sages, utter detachment is possible and excellent, but psychoanalysts trace many a crime and morbid mental condition to repressed desires. To satisfy legitimate longing is our healthy western ideal; the mystic East swarms with pensive ascetics, often as mad as sad. For most of us it is best to harmonize matter and spirit, to co-ordinate faith and economics sanely. The senses are natives of the earth where soul is a

forlorn pilgrim; our very self or essence is a migrant and alien in the world.

3. Vedantists, just like Uddalaka, always lay stress on the oneness of life, pervading the myriads of nature's fickle forms. They neither deny the existence of matter nor the plurality of manifest life (it would be lunacy to deny such palpable and obvious facts), but what they do deny is independence of the physical universe. Matter, in their opinion, is not in a free state, but objectified by human consciousness as red tints are projected by a ruby. Matter is limitation of mind, and has no intrinsic value, being regulated and determined by the subjective side of life. Vedanta and Sankhya are rival currents of philosophy, both emanating from the Upanishads. Vedanta declares that the material aspect of things shrinks in the same measure as mental vision expands and moral consciousness grows. Entangling matter assumes gigantic proportions before a stunted intellect or narrow sympathies.

4. As a rule, Buddha was reluctant to speak on topics, unprovable and unprofitable, which might engage immature listeners in idle argument. The ever-present Now is more dynamic than the buried Yesterday.

5. Whenever Menander reflected on the possibility of reincarnation, he utterly resented the prospect of having to lose, at the time of rebirth, his individuality which he had cultivated so diligently. The problem puzzled and perplexed his alert mind, since all men crave for individual existence. Does personality persist after death? the illustrious ruler, time and again, would ask himself. In this perturbed frame of mind, the king drove one day to a learned Buddhist monastery just outside the city, and consulted the reverend father Nagasena, superior of the Buddhist order in Bactria (Balkh), on reincarnation and retention of personality. Menander enquired: "When I die, must I lose my individuality? If I am born again, is my person to be radically

different from what it is now?" The priest answered riddling in a parable: "A light, lit from another light, need not quench the original flame."
6. Individuality, said the priest, is but a convenient term to designate perception, reflection, disposition, consciousness, and what else may work silently and subconsciously in our complex minds. Your car is a grouping and make-up of various materials, and your individuality is an aggregate of mental and moral qualities. Car and individuality are both compounds which, sooner or later, must break up into their elements. Sire, let us get out of the rigmarole of words.
7. Buddhist Science: Stratosphere aeronauts are impressed with the unity of the universe, as they gaze from dazzling altitudes at the starry expanse, with a blazing sun overhead. In a flash of realism, the span of space dissipates to a mirage, suspended in the air. The blue vault of heaven is but an optical delusion; the trick is done with myriads of minute mirrors of dust and cloud. The gossamer web of space and the tissues of time are both fancy-woven. As susets are not the sun, but his image and reflection,so time is but imaginary, projected by the magic of the mind. The historic drama, packed with grim actualities and romantic films, is life-like as a vivid dream. Arctic explorers, encased in the perpetual night of a polar winter, live as much today as the dawn of Christianity or in the age of stone. Life is a rapid succession of elusive events. Theyevery skies looked different to soldiers fighting at Waterloo, or Bunker Hill, or Trafalgar. A planetarium actually turns the clock backward, and projects celestial orbits and conjunctions as they appeared to bygone generations. Aswaghosha knew neither stratosphere nor planetarium, but keenly felt the unreality of space and time.

In their eagerness to stem the swelling tide of materialism, the new theologians allowed the doctrinal pendulum to swing to an extreme idealism.

The regarded visible objects as visionary and unreal. Aswaghosha went even further, and declared that individual consciousness, the source of all things, is illusory, null and void. As a crystal catches the reflection of a bluebell or red rose, he argued, so the mind is coloured and overlaid with mental images. All sorts of imaginings cover pure intelligence. This brain-cloud produces the variety of mundane appearances; a whole crowd of ill-assorted phenomena makes up the cosmic cinema or moving panorama of the showy world. Tangible objects can no more be separated from subjective notions than moonbeams from the moon. Objects do not exist by themselves, but only in our busy brains, Aswaghosha pleaded; they are mere phenomena of consciousness. The whole objective world is a castle in the air, a dream devised and staged by the mind, and mortal mind is utter delusion. Christian science has an eastern counterpart in Buddhist science as conceived by Aswaghosha two thousand years ago. Subconscious memory, he tells us, clouds the soul, and results from previous experiences. Pictures, conjured up, hold us spell-bound; we fondly dwell on dim memories of our remembered or forgotten past, our actual and prenatal history. We go on dreaming, and fancy all this optical deceit, the gay and dismal display of life's perpetual motion. Awakened sages who have overcome the force of memory are not at the mercy of their thoughts, but can manipulate and control every subconscious impression; they know the meaning of personality, see humanity in man, conceive the general behind the specific. Sages realize the eternal in the transient, and revere abiding unity in all things. Name and form vanish before the supernormal vision; what remains is the essence of things, the thing itself, the same yesterday, today and tomorrow. In a superconscious state the complex compounds of mind and matter break up in simple elements which again merge in Being. Shadow and semblance turn to substance, are transubstantiated.

There is nothing left of shape and form, either gross or subtle, except its spiritual perfume. According to Aswaghosha's super-idealism, soul alone is real, is THE thing, is THAT thing. Hence Buddnist science which repudiates mortal mind is known as Thatness (tathata).

The new idealism which became characteristic feature of Neo-Buddhism was virtually the old Upanishad teaching that we can only see life through the spectacles of our impressions; what the universe really is nobody knows. Our preconceived notions and sensations need constant correction. The whole creation is a mirage and image, a floating film and flighty vision, a web of sensation or tissue of mortal mind as Aswaghosha expresses it. We rarely give ourselves as we are. We want to make an impression; we act and pose and bluff. But appearance cannot be the real thing. Love and hatred, flattery and abuse, attraction and aversion and another thousand opposites, sway the muddled mind; they blur the cosmic picture in our excited confused distorted brains. Buddha had preached the middle path between extremes: courage instead of rashness or cowardice, generosity between extravagance and meanness, and so forth. The Saka sage was dispassionate, serene and selfless. Aswaghosha too had a keen sense of proportion, and in moments of exaltation was privileged to see things as they are, their inmost self through outer seeming, without the intermediary of sense and reason, though through a glass darkly. Spiritual laggards mistake falsehood's fancy-haze for truth ablaze; to them the real and the true are veiled. The blinded can only contemplate the shadow and semblance of reality; economic pressure and sex-urge weigh them down. We all live in a vague and misty dreamworld of our own; nothing presents itself alike to any two men. There are not two individuals who look at a problem or event from exactly the same angle just as there are not two faces precisely alike.

8. Buddhist Yoga: Many manuals exist on Neo-Buddhist idealism; the tile of the most important text is "Transcendentalism". The foremost exponent of the new theology is the latter part of the second century was Nagarjun. This Brahmin from Dekhan lived in Behar, and in his younger days had been an ardent suttantist. His Sanskrit commentary on Transcendentalism molded Buddha's golden mean to a philosophy of the middle path. We are admonished once more, neither to be prone nor averse to this butterfly existence which proves manity and vexation of spirit. Nothing abides; hard facts and practical acts burst like soap-bubbles, and vanish like a conjurer's trick. Inbred delusion (Nagarjun calls it cosmic nescience) veils and dims the mind which consequently mistakes clouds for crags,,and the seeming for the solid. Visible life-forms are dust and dead, but for their hidden vitality, the life throbbing and pulsating in organic matter, is everlasting. To the visionless the unseen is a non-entity, and appears to be non-existent. But like summer clouds before the golden sun, so is innate ignorance scattered before the golden mean in conduct. "agarjun told nothing new when he sounded a warning neither to renounce the world nor to sink in its slime and mire; to avoid vulgar obtrusion as well as sheepish restraint; not to be hustling and aggressive nor servile and submissive, neither too slick nor too soft; neither abusive nor commendatory; to keep right in the rush and bustle of life, and yet be above it; to enjoy all things, but contemplate them from an eternal angle. He upheld the individuality of immortal soul, just as yoga, the secret of atma-bodhi, affirms the personality of almighty God. Nagarjun knew the lure of a great personality which after all is an expression of the impersonal, and reflects the unmanifest. Another concession he made to the shallow tastes and base instincts of the money-making middle class was the infusion of psychic

practice and occult spell, vibhuti and tantra, into Neo-Buddhism. Medical magnetism and magic were productive of Buddhist yoga.

Yoga teaches that health is harmony, and disease is discord. Violation of nature's laws is fraught with dissonance; non-injury attunes to the infinite, and makes contacts with the heart of humanity. Yoga is a blend of psychology and transcendentalism, Sankhya and Vedanta with a theistic sprinkling. A sane co-ordination of rational thought and soul-vision is not easy, and yoga is not always logical and consistent. But yoga is unique as a practical presentation of the spiritual life. Its teachings are clear, and its methods precise.

9. Interior analysis and self-realization are to break the tyranny of the delusive ego. A clever juggler manipulates phantom-objects; jigging monkeys grip the bending branch of a forest tree, and let it go again. The restless squirrel-mind clutches all sorts of mental pictures. "Yoga practice" (Yogachara) teaches how to throw them overboard and "submerge" them; how to control the mind. Auto-suggestion to the effect that the world is not what it seems is part of medical psychology which Buddhist yogis cultivate eagerly. Nature has hypnotized us into false beliefs, they maintain, and auto-suggestion can de-hypnotize us; it is curative and brings happiness, if only used with wise restraint and modesty. Moreover, when the contemplation of visible forms is turned inward to the subtle workings of the mind, this introspection or survey of the sequence of mental phenomena recalls to memory much of the forgotten past, and allows a firmer grip on current problems. One-pointedness, thinking of one thing at a time, to the exclusion of all other thoughts, grows to visions of immortality; in the crucible of yoga they are transmuted into serive to humanity.

10. Patanjali worked out the science of breath in

every detail. He maintained that it is perfectly feasible to draw vitality straightway from the boundless ocean of harmony and health, in particular from the sun, so that we may be constantly rejuvenated and refreshed, electrified by rhythm as it were. Every public speaker and actor should master rhythmic force, and achieve harmony of soul. Rhythm will strengthen his oratory, and self-expression will help him to self-realization. Rhythmic breath carries force and persuasion; harmonious breathing is curative. Persistent and methodical breathing charges the physical frame with rhythmic motion and dynamic energy. Rhythm is hygienic, and alleviates nervous disorders such as stuttering and stammering, palpitation of the heart and outbursts of temper. Deep and regular breathings from the diaphragm render the voice rich and sonorous; its very tone and inflection will lay subtler shades of meaning into spoken word. The complexion will become clear, the body light, and the appetite healthy. Nausea and indigestion, insomnia and insomnia and bilious headaches, boils, and pimples, will gradually vanish before the magic mastery and mystery of breath. On the slightest provocation, untutored minds flare up in mad excitement, and lose all self-control. Breath experts take annoyances more calmly.

Thythmic breathing like every other art requires hard and steady practice, before complete lung control is attained, and through it self-command which is the gateway to self-knowledge: the mortal becomes conscious that he is immortal and has eternal life.

10. You must learn to stand sentinel over your thoughts; at present they control you, and you are at their mercy. One morning you wake up with a bright and happy mind; next day you have a splitting headache, and feel utterly miserable. You cannot breathe rhythmically when a hundred conflicting mental currents rush headlong through the rest-

less brain, creating discord, and dragging the poor helpless mind in a hundred directions, just when you wish to concentrate. A productive artist simply cannot create unless his soul is one-pointed, enamored of one ideal, not agitated by alien thoughts, but tranquil and serene. Do you imagine that Beethoven could have composed his heavenly symphonies, or Shakespeare his deep-laid plots, if there mental lake, so to speak, had been perturbed by worry, or ruffled by anger and resentment?

11. Rhythmical breathing is the finest tonic for shattered nerves, far better than a dose of medicine or a vacation at the seaside, and certainly less expensive. Continued practice will not only bring signs of nerve purification, but healing gifts, therapeutic power and psychic intuition, superior to learned argument and heated discussion. All this will develop. You will be able to read other minds, their thoughts will come to you in picture form, but yogis generally avoid these tempting bypaths, and go streight ahead for self-realisation. The magnetic rock of magic, more irresistible than the perilous lure of sex, has shipwrecked many a strong-winged soul.

12. Full success in yoga is impossible without chastity in thought, word and deed. Every initiate knows how to transmute the accumulated sex energy into spiritual force. About the method of transmutation yogis are reticent. The little the author has been able to ascertain is that they seem to know of a physiological process by which the retained life-essence can be drawn up through the spinal column to the cerebellum. The periods of transmutation are computed according to the sun's position at the hour of birth. After scoring three years of success in Brahmacharya (chastity), or figuratively speaking, after thrice slaying the twelve beasts of the zodiac, the celibate takes the mystic degree of self-mastery. The aspirant is now an apta or adept, qualified for the higher

life; he is regenerate or twice-born.
13. The two Buddhist converts, and the Gauda adwaitists after them, declared that the visible world is void and vain. To which Badarayan added: our sense impressions, depending on exterior objects, are nil and worthless too, so many empty bubbles.
14. In the eighth century a fearless Gauda theologian composed a metrical exposition of non-dualism (Adwaita). A firebrand, being swung round and round, the poet-sage explains, resembles a flaming wheel. Even so are physical phenomena but swift vibrations of consciousness. As the apparent wheel on fire is really one light, so the ever-turning wheel of mundane existence is one life, though, being set in motion, it appears manifold. As soon as mortal mind is sufficiently concentrated to withdraw from the objective world, and the though-waves in the mind-lake are stilled, the unity of all life reveals itself to the amazed contemplation. The Gauda poem is the earliest Vedantic document extant. Two generations later, a native of Malabar, Sankara (788-828), once more annotated Badarayan's terse aphorisms. The lapse of centuries had rendered their brevity more obscure and unintelligible than ever.
15. Sankara: Names and forms, maya-toys, are passing emotions, a temporary onrush and overflow of accumulated energy; infinitude (brahma) alone abides. Sankara contemplated finite life in its endless moods and possibilities. Once the acharya was asked: Master, you always dwell on brahma and make light of visible things! But can you explain nature's variety show? How is it that the One has beome many? Why did the ever-free allow itself to be caught in the meshes of space, time and causation? Sankara smiled as he replied: last night a mosquito stung me under the bed curtain. Iddid not reflect how the troublesome insect had slipt inside the net, but rather how

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to get the self-invited guest again. Nature's netting has caught us, and keeps us captive in the tenement of flesh. We humans are where free men should not be, in prison! Adwaita points the way out of the bondage of the senses, so that we might rise again above inbred limitations to a higher vantage-ground, to a larger and more universal view of life. The lure of nature, I mean woman and wealth, still beguiles you, young man, or else you would never have idly enquired how it is that the perfect has become personal, and unity divided.

Master, do you believe in reincarnation? Yes and no! it all depends on one's state of consciousness. From a normal and natural standpoint, rebirth and personality, creator and creation, seem real enough. But a more bracing and penetrating vision soon dispels all cherished day-dreams from the be-clouded intellect, and only beholds unity where mortal mind still sees plurality of things and persons. "As soon as consciousness of non-difference arises" runs the classical passage in Sankara's Commentary, "the transmigratory state of the indivisible soul and the creative quality of brahma vanish at once. The entire display of multiplicity springs from misconception and is removed by perfect knowledge which leaves no room for creation and reincranation."

In a superconscious state (nirvikalpa) Sankara felt one with Brahma, but could no longer speak about it. He was profoundly silent, a master-muni, his magnificent logic being at perfect peace and rest. Reasoning only lasts until realization. The mouth that dares utter brahma defiles the sacred sound. But Sankara, the man of realization, was an acharya; from supernormalcy he descended to a lower plane, and talked. Retaining his purified ego, the mahacharya instructed men that the "personal god" whom they ignorantly worshipped is in reality the boundless One without a second!

16.The neglected education of multi-millionaires benefits little from foreign travel. They are generally pampered and self-engrossed; too much money burdens the mind quite as heavily as stark poverty. The best things pertain to heart and soul.
17. Light is complete in itself, and does not depend on darkness; only it is more conspicuous in the dark. But darkness may be changed to light.
18. Sat is the ever-present, but asat is absent from a noble soul. Falsehood and naughtiness are asat. In the beginning arose desire, the primal germ and seed of organic life; sages who diligently search their hearts discover sat hid in asat.

The transient world as it appears to the five senses is asat; changeless reality, the essence of all individuality, is sat. The senses can only cognize asat or outward phenomena which are conditioned by space and time, and have to submit to the law of evolution and causality. What bud, bee, babe really are, the senses can never know. Earth life with its keen joys and sorrows is asat. We are asat, imperfect. The perfect is outside of history and geography, and never changes. We change, and have reached various stages of growth. And it is because we are more or less advanced, none equally gifted, that so different views of life are taken. A painter's eye sees finer shades, a mucician's ear detects subtler tones, a poet's radian fancy is more alert and intuitive, a philosophic mind is clearer about the nature and reason of things than ordinary mortals are.
18. Human progress ultimately rests on pure science (gnana). Disintegrating society pursues follies (maya), without sensing reality (sat) behind the veil of vanity. Organized religion fails; faith wanes. Churches have lost the healing touch which cleanses innate pride and baseness. Should land-hunger and greed of gold launch another world war, many gospelers, despite solemn declarations to

the contrary, will again join the pagan madness of legalized slaughter. Ethical collapse has almost destroyed doctrinal authority. Physical science makes gigantic strides; rationalists have every reason to mock at static Christianity. Whenever modern research conflicts with the Biblical letter, the fundamentalists flare up in defense of time-hallowed, but untenable doctrines. Creeds are not dynamic enough to retard the rapid decline of the tottering west. Neither could Vedic tenets avert the break-down of India. Rajas and nizams, or their divans responsible for government, never had an enlightened public opinion behind them.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR. M.A. Ph.D.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN VEDANTISM.

1. Vedantic teachers have thought in concepts similar to those of Western thinkers, have shown the highest logical acumen and have not been lacking in philosophic boldness in pressing, as they do, their conclusions to a logical end.
2. The complete presentation of the Vedantic system demands a treatment of Vedantism as a discipline in life; for Vedantism, rightly understood, is as much an art of life as a science of thinking, and life ultimately in its fullness of growth embraces Truth and finds its meaning and purpose therein.
3. Sankara distinguishes between consciousness and the self, and thinks that the self, though a native accompaniment of consciousness, is not in it. To mean the one for the other is Avidya.
4. Sankara's conception of Being as homogeneity of consciousness and blissfulness of Existence exclusive of determination offers a bold contrast to the theistic conception of the Absolute as inclusive of infinite determination and endless qualification. To Sankara determination is negation of Being, to determine it is to deny its absoluteness.
5. Consciousness, though it appears as determining

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empirical experience and activity, generates none in dreamless sleep, samadhi and emancipation. It is not expressive consciousness. Expressiveness requires either the self or the not-self as objects of expression. The former makes its self-conscious and takes away its character of impersonality. Brahman is not an object to its own self. The latter makes liberation impossible by the const constant demand of mutuality of subject and object.

6. Prakastma Yati points out that the consciousness of an object presupposes its esse, but the truth of consciousness or percipii itself is not dependent upon the truth of object, the supposed character of percipii to relate itself to object would destroy its character of immediate intuition and lend to it the character of a notion.

7. The subject-object theory of knowledge may have either a psychological or an epistemological implication. The former accepts a psychosis as the object in perception, the latter demands an objective reference. Sankara Vedantism would accept the former and naturally deny the latter, as the objective reference in perception is illusory; the limitation put upon by the senses apparently set up a division of subject-object, but if one can transcend the habitual mode of thinking and observe the spontaneity of creative effort in dream one would feel truly that knowledge does not necessarily suppose the objectivity of the subject-object relation.

Dialectic on "Sakshi" Consciousness--: Witness-intelligence.

The distinction of the static and dynamic character of consciousness is also borne out in the conception of saksi or witness intelligence.

8, Confusion arises from ignorance of the sense in which the term is employed. The word, Saksi, has a transcendent and an empiric meaning. In the former case it is the percipii accomplished. It

has no relation with avidya. It is completely transcendent. It is Suddha Cit. It is not saksi in its usual implication. In its empiric application, it is consciousness not purely transcendent, but felt in isolation from its timeless but accidental qualification.

9. Swarupa is essence which cannot be conceived to be related to itself. Relation and essence cannot be synchronized. The attempt to establish a relation between Being and attributes ends in a logical confusion. Either we must say that there is no relation between substance and attributes, or we must accept an outwardness or mediateness in relational concept. Either the attributes resolve themselves into substance or they are illusory. Anything, besides this, forces us to a dualistic position.

10. The Absolute to the Sankarites has no history of its life and development. To the theists it is the perpetuity of an expression in Bliss and Consciousness: a history which is a self-revelation to itself of its own inner possibilities in a transcendent plane, a revelation to finite existences in experience, either through an inward revelation or through the world of Nature.

11. Though in the ideal of Brahma-Samyapatti, Brahman--likeness, we have the promise of an expansive and unrestrained life in knowledge and delight, still the philosophic doubt about the possibility of such a life lingers. How can a being of atomic magnitude transcend the limitation of knowledge and bliss and acquire a likeness unto Brahman is a question that passes logical comprehension. The I-ness, which is the creation of maya, may be removed, but how, with its removal, the finite being, by acceptance atomic in nature, can transcend its finitude and acquire an expansion in Being, Intelligence and Bliss is what requires an explanation. And this explanation is not logically possible so long as the least difference

between the infinite and the finite is retained.
12. The double aspect of Sankara's philosophy presents us with a two-fold category--transcendental and empirical. Strictly speaking, Sankara's philosophy embraces a single identical category of existence, for, in the height of knowledge every other form of being is an illusory appearance. To the sophisticated mind attracted to the exoteric plane of Existence some modes of existence appears to be gaining a hold upon consciousness as determinants.
13. Here is the problem. Philosophy has either to negate relational consciousness or to posit it in the Absolute. Bradley supposes that in the Absolute the differences, if not completely annulled, are transmuted and fused, but how, he does not know. Hegel and Ramanuja make a unitive synthesis of differences in the Absolute. Bosanquet is no nearer to Ramanuja in assimilating the differences in the Absolute as predicates or adjectives. Bradley does not solve the mystery. Ramanuja and Bosanquet cannot give the unity they desire so much
14. At the basis of immanent experience lies avidya which has the double capacity of concealing the truth of identity and holding a scene of multiple existences. Avidya has an epistemological and a creative function. It screens our consciousness. It has individuating capacity. In Vedantism the epistemological aspect has been more emphasized and the whole order of existence has been supposed to be a psychical illusion and nothing real. The vyavaharika existence and the pragmatic value of the experienced order have been set aside. The pratibhasika existence or psychological ideality of it has been emphasized.

But in any case avidya is the root cause of the cosmic appearance, be that appearance extramental or objective, mental or subjective. But both these forms are prevalent in Advaitism. If

the objective order is guaranteed some constancy and externality, it is supposed to be rooted in maya. The Vedantists use the word in a cosmological or ontological sense. The word avidya is used in the epistemological sense.

But in Sankara's system the epistemological functioning of avidya is more significant than its creative functioning, for no sooner does the epistemological functioning cease than the truth of identity is revealed and the creative functioning gets a rude and a sudden check and in not time dies out. The epistemological functioning has not been accepted with equal emphasis. Those who regard the creative functioning as equally important have to maintain an objective extra-mental world. We notice, therefore, a tendency among a certain section of the followers of Sankara to dispense with the creative order as a subjective illusion acquiring an apparent objectivity through inter-subjective intercourse.

15. Sankara's test of truth is purely metaphysical.. A thing may appear or ~~truth is purely metaphysical~~ may not, but this does not constitute its truth. A positive appearanace which subsequently dies out is no truth. The epistemological or psychological test of truth as appearance to or object of consciousness has been set aside.

16. Vivarthavada is a frank confession of a failure to exactly determine causation. A change supposes a difference, for without difference it is no change. But it is hard to conceive a difference and an identity together. The difference of the effect cannot co-exist with the identity of the cause. Vacaspati thinks synthesis impossible. He inquires, what is this bheda, which is supposed to co-exist with abheda? Are they mutually opposed? If so, cause and effect will be totally different existences, non-compatible in nature. If there is a difference, there is no identity, if identity, none can conceive a difference. So the

attempt to establish difference in identity in causation fails completely.

17. The concept of an 'I' the unity of synthetic apperception, is more or less apparent in conscious life, yet this 'I' is nothing real but a reflection. But, on the other hand, we must not think that the 'I' is the mere sum total of the psychic states. The idea of an integrative and unifying principle subsists through all psychical changes. Sankara avoids two extremes of reality and complete unreality of the ego.. The ego is a scientific and a pragmatic reality. It has a psychological or epistemological ideality, but no transcendent reality.

18. **Empirical existences are facts of finite consciousness. They appear, and appearance lends them a colour of truth. We cannot deny them. But all these appearances have not the same hold upon finite experience and consciousness. And this fact leads us to think of degrees of reality.**

The pratibhasika existence commands the lowest degree, vyavaharika existence, a higher degree. The one is a mere appearance to consciousness and had has no claim upon us, the other has a claim upon our personality, feeling and willing. Not only this, even in the scale of existence the one appears and claims to be more real and durable than the other. In other words durability has varying degrees and intensities. A varying degree naturally suggests a beginning. An inni initiation which may rise and fall in being cannot claim to be the Absolute reality, which, as absolute, must deny variation or degree of reality.

That this variation is a fact to finite consciousness, Sankara does not deny. Its character as real is also accepted. But because it is a degree, it is denied an absolute character. Sankara is frank in his confession that we meet in experience such variations in the degree of being, and so long as experience (finite) persists we cannot avoid them, but on that ground we

cannot accept them as truth. Variation and degree cannot connote the full being and imply necessarily a partial being and a partial non-being. A partial non-being characterizes its illusoriness and unreality.

A partial being is true as being and illusory as partial. Being is a continuum and a plenum. Partiality of being is a creation and a false creation of relative consciousness which, as relative, cannot transcend the division and posits to the unilluminated intellect the degrees of reality. And so long as the intellect works, we cannot but accept this division and grades of being. Partiality then does not posit anything new but presents to finite consciousness the same reality in degrees. And as such this presentation can claim truth relative to that experience and that consciousness. It comes to this, then, partiality is not by itself a character of being, but an acquired appearance of being in relation to consciousness to which it is reflected. In other words, partiality is relative to finite vision and finite experience, and has no place in the Absolute.

19. The immanent and all-inclusive consciousness, though it represents the centre of all centres of experience and is fully aware of the entire experience and presentation still suffers within itself a limitation of the division of subject and object. And so long as it has the consciousness of presentation, it has a sense of an outness, which is a barrier to its absoluteness. And an outness, which is an expression of self to self, though often claimed to be not strictly an outness, cannot be reconciled in the Absolute for an expression has a differentiating implication inasmuch as it is an effort to be away from the centre. Sankara has, therefore, conceived the Absolute to be denying all relational consciousness, it is the centre which has no circumstance, it is the focus which shines by in itself, but

does not throw out its splendour. It is expression. It is real, for it is continuity. It persists. And Sankara claims that we finally get to such an existence, which denies and transcends all relational import.

20. Really there are not two existences, the Absolute is the metaphysical reality and the only reality, the appearance is not the reality, though it has an expression. And in so far as appearance has a reality, it is non-different from Being. And in the extreme section of the Sankarites the order of appearance has been reduced to psychoses, samskaras and ideas projected outward. The world has been reduced to a psychological illusion. Even if we do not go so far, we cannot ascribe to appearance any reality, for Being is the only reality. Spinoza's is a double-faced reality. It appears as thought, just as it appears as extension. Advaita Vedanta cannot accept this. It reduces all existences to consciousness. Nothing inert exists.

21. The illusoriness of existence is still some form of being; it has an appearance. But Vedantism in its highest effort of realization does not hesitate to deny this character of appearance even to the cosmic manifold. It not only denies it, it does not recognize it at all. Denial presupposes a prior acceptance or assertion. It denies denial and assertion both.

22. Next comes the stage of pure percipience which does not attach any objectivity to the manifold. It is a subjective reation. It exists only in the form of dṛṣti. It is an appearance and as appearance it is not independent of percipi or percipience. The notions of practical reason are mere notions or concepts, corresponding to which nothing exists, for nothing has existence beyond consciousness. To think that anything outside exists, or to lend to subjective concepts and notions an objective color, is to invert the true order and is psycho-

logical illusion. Pure percipience in its highest stretch can only see the immanence of certain fundamental concepts in intuition, which as intuition surely transcends them. The intuitions of practical reason have not in this stage pragmatic significance. They have not as yet acquired it. They are there as mere empirical intuitions, fundamental psychological notions of which no mind is free. But they are still notions floating eternally in the ether of consciousness and we must characterize them as <u>notions</u> of empiric consciousness and apart from ap empiric consciousness these have no reality. This pure percipience sometimes feels its transcendence as witness, sometimes feels it not. But in any case it does not see the extramentality and objectivity of the psychic manifold. Hence Prakasananda says, "The wise consider the world as identical with consciousness, the ignorant as something objective." Nothing is objective, nothing is real, save and except pure percipience. Percipi is the being of <u>esse</u>. Drsti is srsti. Confined within empirical intuitions this high intellectual isolation denies will and its activity and does not recognize anything besides these intuitions. The creativeness of will is denied, that of imagination is accepted.

23. Sankara's system is chiefly intelledtual and the philosophical discrimination of the real from the unreal is the immediate cause of realization. With an intellectual discipline in Vedantism, the seeker transcends the impulsive and emotional consciousness and has a soaring in intuitive effort. Here again, the intellectual discipline may have two forms, the one is a dialectic consciousness, the other, a psychological opening. The Samkhya Marga (as the former is called) is exclusively an intellectual insight, reared up by a logicaid discipline, unaccompanied by any form of mystic opening opening. It is prominently the philosophicm method. It requires an opening

open and a free mind to follow the course of rational thinking and when this logical understanding is satisfied, the discriminative reflection begins. As the result be there is of the mental-consciousness soon parts with its concrete modification, for backed up by a logical sense, it no longer attends to the sense-datum. It now is engrossed in meditation upon atman, and an inner indeterminate modification of mental being, a continuous and undivided transformation into the form of atman is soon established. Such a modification is called vrtti in Vedantic terminology.

The process of inversion is started. This is the first stage. Before it can take a firm hold upon mental-consciousness, it must destroy the contrary modification of antahkaranam in the form of the manifold, the samsara. In this stage the mental consciousness has the capacity to get over the habitual accommodation and to go out in search after reality. It soon realizes in the intensity of meditative penetration the delight of self-opening and becomes more engrossed in it. It gains a firm ground in us and soon the absolute consciousness in its integrity reveals itself. This is the third and the last stage which is immediately preceded by the negation of the manifold existence including the vrtti itself. The first stage marks out the origin and the continuity of vrtti, the second, its final disappearance, the third is the stage of illumination and knowledge.

Between the second stage, the denial of the manifold and the atmic-revelation in the third, there is no sequence in time. They are simultaneous. Atman, strictly speaking, cannot be known, for it is neer an object to a subject. It transcends the ordinary operation of thinking. Even if it be not known, its existence and knowledge can be indicated by the last stage of mental transformation. It is known by implication as identical with the denial of illusion. And we have this denial in

the concrete in the last state of vrtti (mental functioning) (i.e. the second stage indicated above) which destroys the conceptual structure and the empirical intuitions of the sense and with it is itself lost or destroyed. The meditative penetration has the effect of opening intuitive consciousness and with it the conceptual thinking and completely disappear. Avidya with its phantoms is totally denied. A training in Vedantism has not the desirable effect of destroying nescience, unless it is followed by direct knowledge. The immediate assertion of truth requires a direct denial in knowledge. The consciousness of division is put off, and the jiva attains the freedom or emancipation. Freedom or emancipation is not of atman, which is eternally free. Nothing can restrict its freedom, for nothing, besides it, exists. We cannot speak of freedom or bondage of Atman, for they are relative concepts. The one implies the other; these concepts can be extended to jiva, the psychological self, but not to atman, the transcendent identity. Here again, the psychological or the empirical self completely vanishes, and psychological ideality consists in limitation or reflection. So with the limitation (put upon by avidya) removed, the transcendent self is what alone is left. Liberation is to cast off this sense of limitation, and to get into expansive consciousness.

24. Such a realization presupposes an adaptation and a fitness chiefly intellectual. This is generally indicated by the three-fold method of sravana, manana and nididhyasana. Sravana introduces the subject with a course of instruction, manana establishes the logical cogency and nididhyasana, the sustained reflection, strikes deep the truth of identity in our heart. Sravana displaces the crudest form of ignorance, viz. Brahman does not exist. Manana refutes the opposite philosophic

conclusion. Nididhyasana is the continuous meditative effort to realize the truth of identity. The discipline is chiefly reflective criticism and psychological analysis. Nididhyasana is the continuous meditative effort to realize the truth of identity. The discipline is chiefly reflective criticism and psychological analysis. Nididhyasana has two forms according as the duality of the witness and the mental modification, the peculiar psychoses set up by the constant thought of the axiom of identity, exists or not.

25. We should not forget, for a moment, that the direct and immediate cause of emancipation is knowledge; ignorance causes bondage, knowledge gives liberation, for knowledge is opposed to and destructive of ignorance. Whatever may be the preliminary discipline, transcendence and emancipation are simultaneous with knowledge destroying ignorance. The chasterning of emotion, the purification of will, the right regulation of conduct, in short, the ethical discipline, have a place in the life of knowledge, but cannot give us knowledge direct.

They prepare us for the final intellectual penetration and insight, but they cannot effect immediate vision and transcendence. Vacaspati holds that they indirectly help our knowledge by creating a desire to know and by purification of the mental and intellectual sheaths. Karma or merely properly regulated life in the light of Sastric injunctions, generally known as dharma, is inherently incapable of removing ignorance; for it is a life in ignorance; a divided life cannot, by a pulse of will or by a move of emotion, deny its own individuality. A course of evolution in accorance with an ideal of perfection is possible, but it is not emancipation. It may be the ethical or the karmic end, but because of its being separated for ever from the truth it cannot be the goal of

the search. Truth is everlasting. Everything is illusory and unreal. Will and its affirmations have a value, but not the permanence; but that which is not abiding cannot demand intrinsic value, sooner or later its truer nature reveals itself to be a hollow show, however attractive it might have appeared a moment before. Truth is reality. And the eternal reality is the fact of consciousness. The real is, therefore, the good. In Sankara Vedantism, therefore, the ethical life gradually transforms itself from active usefulness and regulation of conduct to search after truth, for it soon discovers that truth is our being.

MAX BORN.

THE RESTLESS UNIVERSE.

1. It is odd to think that there is a word for something which, strictly speaking, does not exist, namely, "rest." We distinguish between living and dead matter; between moving bodies and bodies at rest. This is a primitive point of view. What seems dead, a stone or the proverbial "door-nail" say, is actually for ever in motion. We have merely become accustomed to judge by outward appearances; by the deceptive impressions we get through our senses.

2. The physicist takes it for granted that air merely consists of a lot of small particles which he calls molecules. These molecules are flying about all the time and are continually colliding with one another

3. At one time scientists were accustomed to draw a distinction between "permanent" gases, which could not be liquefied, and other gases which were known to be "vapours" of liquid or solid substances, bearing the same relation to them as steam does to water. As lower and lower temperatures were reached, however, one gas after another was liquefied; first carbon dioxide (at -78.5' C),

then air (at -193' C) and other familiar gases. The last gas to resist liquefaction was helium; but at last Kamerlingh-Onnes succeeded in liquefying this gas also, at the extremely low temperature of -269' C. It is clear, then, that there is no real difference between a gas and a vapour. Conversely, every liquid or solid substance can be vapourized, i.e. transformed into a genuine gas, by the application of high temperatures. There is no substance, not even iron or gold or platinum, that will not melt and vaporize if the heat is great enough. One of the most difficult metals to vaporize is tungsten, the boiling point of which is estimated to be 4800' C. Thus the concept of a gas includes every substance whatever--provided the temperature is sufficiently high;

4. The restlessness of the very small parts of the universe then, is a matter of very practical concern.

5. More than a hundred years ago a botanist named Brown, on looking down his microscope, saw that the minute particles which detach themselves from pollen when the latter is thrown into water keep continually moving about like a swarm of bees. But it was only in 1906 that Einstein and Smoluchowski realized that this is a direct proof of the reality of the molecular motions.

6. No one who has ever seen the swarming points of light under the microscope will cast any doubt on the truth of the kinetic theory of gases.

7. By the kinetic theory of gases, we know that the molecules are never at rest.

8. According to Chemistry, the incomprehensibly great number of substances of which dead and living matter is made up are compounds formed from a comparatively small number of elements. There are 92 different kinds of atoms--the elements--and all molecules are combinations of some of these elemental atoms. This analysis is one

of the most wonderful achievements of the human mind.
9. The same spiritual urge has led research still farther--for who is going to believe that there really are as many as 92 ultimate units?
10. The genuine physicist believes obstinately in the simplicity and unity of Nature, despite any appearance to the contrary. Hence, for him, the periodic table was not a tombstone inscription, but a command to renew his inquiries.
11. Light is an electromagnetic process.
12. Suppose next that the earth people make the same observations on the clocks on Mars. They find them showing the same time when, from the standpoint of the observer on the earth, they should not show the same time at all. Who is right? Who is wrong? Einstein's answer is: neither is. They are both right and both wrong. Each planet, more generally each moving body, has its own system of time, and also of space; it can be shown that the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction is closely associated with the "relative" of time. No planet can claim to have the absolute system of time and space.
13. Shells from large guns can already be made to travel faster than sound, so that they arrive before their own sound-waves--the victim is hit before he has time to hear the shot.
14. If we stick to the relativity principle, we must alter ordinary mechanics. But nothing of the many established results of mechanics must be lost.
15. A certain crystal,Zinc sulphide, gives a flash of light when it is struck by a fast particle from a radium preparation (a so-called α-particle, in reality a helium ion. In a darkened room it was possible with a not ver powerful magnifying glass to see the individual hits as little points of light, so-called scintillations, which can easily be counted if the eye is suitably rested. Anyone who has a watch with a luminous dial can verify this; for the figures are painted over with zinc

sulphide powder mixed with traces of radio-active substance. To the naked eye the figures seem to be feebly luminous; but a magnifying glass shows that the light is really intermittent.

16. Light is the most important messenger bringing us news from the outside world. What does it really tell us? We think we actually see things, their outlines and colours. In reality the light merely reports this: "I come from such and such a direction, vibrate with such and such an intensity and such and such a velocity, and I have entirely forgotten what happened to me on the journey on which I set out just after my birth and which ends here on your retina with my death." Everything else, such as our perception of coloured objects is not like a newspaper reporter's "copy", but is an unconscious combination by the editorial department (the brain) of thousands and thousands of these reporter's messages, depending on impressions derived from all the senses taken together.

Most people find this journalistic combination so fascinating that they scarcely pay any attention to the reporter's skill. The physicist, however, finds these very reports particularly attractive. He does not combine them unconsciously, but, on the contrary, deliberately sets out to analyse them, using considerable ingenuity and cunningly devised apparatus. Then they tell him quite a different story, one of a restless universe of atoms, governed by strange laws.

Light itself forms part of the restlessness in the world of the very small. Even where there are no atoms, in empty interstellar space, for example, there are light-rays coming from the stars and moving in all directions. And near the stars, which of course are glowing suns, like our sun, light vies with the atoms, rushing on in a wild dance.

17. The great revolution in physics began with the work of a single man, Max Planck. By extremely

careful experiments he showed that in certain phenomena of heat radiation the observed facts cannot be reconciled with the hitherto accepted laws of mechanics and optical theory. Once he was absolutely convinced of this, he sought to make a very trifling modification in these laws, which would bring them into agreement with the facts. In 1900 he asserted that it is necessary to assume that the emission and the absorption of light take place in quanta--"atoms", we may say--not in arbitrarily small amounts (as was possible according to the wave theory.) Yet this very minute discontinuity of the process, assumed by Planck, had dramatic consequences! Five years later Einstein came forward and declared that Planck had said far too little. According to him, discontinuity does not merely occur in the emission and absorption of light; no, light itself by no means consists of smooth waves, but is quite discontinuous or "quantized": in short, it behaves like a rain of particles: photons or light quanta.

This is Newton's old hypothesis again, but now armed with quite new experimental facts, above all, the observations of the photo-electric effect.

This we have already mentioned. If light of short wave-length falls on matter, it knocks out electrons. The process has been investigated by means of photo-electric cells; these are evacuated glass tubes with a coating of metal (e.g. sodium) on their inner surface, and provided with a quartz window which lets through ultra-violet light. These cells are used for a variety of practical purposes, e.g. in talking films and in television apparatus. There are also photo-electric instruments for measuring the intensity of light, which photographers find useful in estimating exposures.

Physicists have accurately investigated the con-

nection between the number and velocity of the electrons emitted and the properties of the light. If the intensity of the light is increased, the current of electrons emitted by the metal becomes stronger, but not, as one might expect, because the electrons are more accelerated by the stronger vibrations and fly out of the metal more quickly--no, the velocity remains the same so long as the colour, or, more accurately, the wave length of the light remains the same; it is the quantity of electrons emitted that increases. If, however, the wave-length of the light is altered, the velocity of the emitted electrons is altered in accordance with Planck's law.

18. Einstein asserted that this puzzling behaviour would at once become intelligible if light were regarded as a rain of particles (photons), whose energy, following Planck, is $h\nu$. But we see at once that such particles cannot be real in the sense of having mass; for if they had mass and moved with the speed of light, their energy would be infinite, as the theory of relativity tells us. A photon falling on an atom can give up its energy to an electron instantly and knock it out of the atom. The quantity of electrons knocked out by light is accordingly proportional to the quantity of photons, and the energy of the electrons (less the work required to separate them from the atom) is proportional to the frequency.

At first physicists were extremely sceptical about this idea; for the wave theory seemed excellently confirmed by countless experiments and measurement. But gradually there accumulated a host of experimental facts which immediately became intelligible on Einstein's hypothesis, whereas the wave theory could not do anything with them; and these were mostly phenomena in which light was transformed into other forms of energy or conversely.

19. Experiments demonstrate quite clearly that light and matter unite in themselves properties of waves and properties of particles. We therefore cannot say that they are one or the other: they are both, displaying one side of their nature or the other, according to the type of obstruction they meet.

This circumstance raises great difficulties of theoretical interpretation. Bohr has declared outright that there is an incomprehensible irrational factor in physical events. To make the position clear, we need only state bluntly what the quantum postulate of Planck and de Broglie means.

Energy and momentum are properties of minute particles. Frequency and wave-number, on the other hand, are properties of simple harmonic waves, whose definition implies that they extend indefinitely in time and space.

Yet it is asserted that--apart from the factor h, which serves to transform the units of measurement--energy and frequency are to be identified, and also momentum and wave-number.

We see at once that this is not possible unless we sacrifice some fundamental assumption of ordinary thought.

The case is like that of the theory of relativity. Their experiments on the behaviour of light in rapidly moving systems forced us to form a new conception of space and time. Here in the quantum theory it is the principle of causality, or more accurately that of determinism, which must be dropped and replaced by something else.

To be quite clear about what this principle means, we shall return to the illustration of a gun firing, which we used right at the beginning of the book. We then said that a knowledge of the laws of nature is far from being sufficient to enable us to make predictions about future events; we must know the initial conditions as well. In the case of the gun the form of all possible trajectories is

determined by a law of nature, which expresses the effect of gravity (and perhaps also air resistance) on the motion of the shell; but the path actually followed by the shell in a prescribed case depends on the direction in which the gun is trained and the muzzle velocity of the shell.

Now in the older physics it was assumed as obvious that these initial conditions can always be stated with any desired degree of accuracy. Then the course of the subsequent phenomena (the trajectory of the shell, in the case of the gun) can also be calculated with any desired degree of accuracy. The initial state determines the future according to the laws of nature. From a given state onward everything goes on like an automatic machine and, provided we know the laws of nature and the initial state, we can predict the future merely by processes of thought and calculation.

This actually does happen. Astronomers, above all, predict the positions of the moon and the planets, the occurrence of eclipses, and other celestial phenomena, with great accuracy. Engineers, too, rely firmly on their machines and structures doing what they have been calculated to do--and successfully.

Nevertheless, modern physics declares that the matter is not so simple as this, whenever we have to deal with the restless universe of atoms and electrons.

Even in the case of gases we saw that the determination of phenomena from the initial state may be an excellent idea in theory, but is of no practical consequence. For it is quite impossible to determine the positions and velocities of all the particles at one instant. Instead, we have recourse to statistics. We make an assumption about equally probable cases (the hypothesis that the molecules are arranged at random) and deduce results from this. As these agree with experiment, we are led to the belief that statements about probabilities can

be just as good objective laws of nature as the ordinary laws of physics. This kind of statistical argument, however, has only a loose and superficial connection with the rest of physics.

All this is changed by the discovery of the dual entity of wave and particle. Experiments show that the waves have objective realities just as much as the particles--the interference maxima of the waves can be photographed just as well as the cloud-tracks of the particles. There seems to be only one possible way out of the dilemma; a way I have proposed, which is now generally accepted, namely, the statistical interpretation of wave machanics. Briefly it is this: the waves are waves of probability. They determine the "supply" of the particles, that is, their distribution in space and time. It follows that the waves, apart from their objective reality, must have something to do with the subjective act of observation.

Here lies the root of the whole matter.

In the older physics it was assumed that the universe goes on like a machine, independently of whether there is someone observing it or not. For the observer was believed to be capable of making his observations without disturbing the course of events. At all events, an astronomer looking thro' his telescope does not disturb the march of the planets.

But the position of a physicist who wishes to observe an electron in its path is not so simple. He is like a craftsman who is trying to set a valuable diamond with a mason's trowel. He has no apparatus available which is smaller and finer than the electron. He can only use other electrons, or photons; but these have an intense effect on the particles under observation, and spoil the experiment. We see that a necessary consequence of atomic physics is that we must abandon the idea that it is possible to observe the course of events in the universe without disturbing it.

Now if the steps necessary for making an observation had quite complicated effects on the events, mathematical physics could not exist at all. Happily this is not so. The fundamental laws of the quantum theory, with which we are already acquainted, see to it that enough is left to enable us to make predictions. But the predictions are no longer "deterministic," in the sense that "the particle observed here to-day will be at such and such a place to-morrow"; but "statistical": "the probability that the particle will be at such and such a point tomorrow is so and so." In the limiting case of large masses, such as we have in ordinary life, this probability of course becomes practical certainty; here the principle of causality still holds in its old form.

To penetrate more deeply into the meaning of these statements, we go back and consider an electron and its pilot wave. We saw that physically there is no meaning in regarding this wave as a simple harmonic wave of indefinite extent; we must, on the contrary, regard it as a wave-packet consisting of a small group of indefinitely close wave-numbers, that is, of great extent in space. Then the group velocity is identical with the velocity of the particle; the wave-packet moves with the particle. But where-abouts in the packet is the particle?

Clearly it is in accordance with the spirit of the probability idea to say that this question has no answer. We can, however, say that the particle has an equal probability of being anywhere in the wave-packet. The wave is just that part of the description of the phenomenon that depends on the intrusion of an observer; it replaces the initial conditions of classical physics. The difference, however, is this: the assumption that the particle has a definite velocity necessarily means that the position of the particle is and must remain largely indeterminate. For it is only in the case of a group of waves of almost equal

wave-numbers that we can speak of a group velocity. As was stated on p.148, the product
Extension in Space of Wave X Range of Wave-number
is approximately 1; hence if the range of wave-number is small, the extension in space must be great.

This rule can be stated in another way, in which it no longer refers to waves but tells us something about the measurability of the position and velocity of the particle.

As we have seen, the extension of the wave in space corresponds to the uncertainty about the position of the particle. We now recall de Broglie's relation:

Wave-number = Momentum $\div$ h.

A definite range of wave-number therefore corresponds to a definite undertainty about the momentum Thus we obtain the result that the product
Uncertainty of position X Uncertainty of Momentum
is never less than h. This is the celebrated Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg, which interprets the irrationality of the quantum laws as a limitation of the accuracy with which various quantities can be measured. There is another similar relation between time and energy.

20. This interpretation of the periodic system, an interpretation due in essence to Bohr, has given a powerful impetus to chemistry. Indeed, we may say that the distinction between physics and chemistry has disappeared, so far as theory is concerned; the difference is merely one of practical methods and modes of instruction. For even the nature of chemical forces has had light thrown on it by the quantum theory.

21. Yet there is no possible doubt that the quantum theory is capable of explaining all the properties of atoms and molecules accurately, although the working-out of details may still leave very much to be desired. The riddle of matter is not indeed solved, but is reduced to a deeper problem, which, however, is in many ways simpler, namely, what are

atomic nuclei?

Before we attack this problem, however, we shall consider one of the most remarkable consequences of the quantum theory in somewhat greater detail.

We must not forget that in spite of all its successes the quantum theory demands an intellectual sacrifice--renunciation of the complete determinability of position and time for a particle whose momentum and energy are known, and renunciation of the complete prediction of future events. Bounds must be imposed on reason and understanding; because Nature seems to exhibit features which are irrational and unintelligible. Even among concepts which we seem capable of grasping, there are many which are highly paradoxical. One of the most peculiar is quantization of direction.

21. We reach the atoms in their thermal dance. We penetrate into them, and far from finding a state of greater rest, we find still wilder motion. The electrons in the inner shells of a light atom like lithium vibrate about 10^{17} times per second--a colossal number! Let us compare it with long intervals of time and ask ourselves the question, what happened 10^{17} seconds ago? In one year there are 60 X 60 X 24 X 365 = 3×10^{7} seconds so that 10^{17} seconds come to about 3×10^{9} or 3000 million years. This is a longer time that that which has elapsed since the formation of the first solid crust on the earth. With the heavier atoms, the number of times the inner electrons vibrate in a single second is many times greater that the number of seconds since the "creation of the world."

Now we have reached the nucleus and have hopes of greater rest, firmness, and solidity--but we find none. True, the nuclei are much heavier than the electrons, and as a whole they therefore move correspondingly less rapidly. What goes on in their interior, however, does not promise peace or repose.

22. The idea that the atoms of electricity, the electron and the proton, are the ultimate units out of which matter is built up was a simple and beautiful one. But, alas, it is wrong. There are other particles as well which have an equal right to the title of ultimate atoms.

In the first place, it was found that neutrons do actually exist. Their discovery is closely bound up with another discovery, namely, that nuclei can be excited and made to emit light, just as atoms can. This had been suspected for a long time. The rays, of the same nature of light, which are emitted by radioactive substances, can be explained.

23. Even in empty space there is no rest. Everywhere light-waves coming from the luminous stars are in continual oscillation. Here and there an atom is found wandering about by itself; their density in interstellar space is estimated at about 1 atom per cubic centimeter. Further, the sun is continually shooting out very fast electrons; these give rise to the aurora ("northern lights").

24. Matter does not persist from eternity to eternity, but can be created or destroyed. A positive electron and a negative electron may annihilate one another, their energy flying off in the form of light; but they can also be born, with the annihilation of light-energy.

Once the equivalence of mass and energy had been recognized, the possibility that material particles, electrons in particular, can be created or destroyed was often thought of. But now the phenomenon is made visible to our eyes. For in the Wilson chamber we actually see the birth of an electron-pair. The reverse process, the collision and vanishing of a positive electron with a negative electron, has been demonstrated with equal certainty. The state of affairs is therefore as follows: each electron seeks for a partner of the opposite kind and rushes to unite with it. In this wild

wedlock the parents disappear

wedlock the parents disappear and a pair of twin photons are born. But not all electrons find a partner. In our part of the universe there is a superfluity of the negative kind. Why? We have no idea. In other parts of the universe, perhaps, the reverse may be true.

25. The old hypothesis that the nuclei consist of protons and electrons no longer has any justification now that the neutron and the positron have been discovered, and there are a number of facts that directly contradict it.

26. I am convinced that the dual conception of matter, as particles which act on one another by means of the electromagnetic field, cannot be final. Particle and field must form a higher unity; they must be much more intimately related to one another than is assumed in the wave mechanics.

The riddle of matter is still unsolved, but it is reduced to the problem of the ultimate particles. The solution of this problem is the task of the physics of the future.

We have reached the end of our journey into the depths of matter. We have sought for firm ground and found none. The deeper we penetrate the more restless becomes the universe, and the vaguer and cloudier. It is said that Archimedes, full of pride in his machines, cried, "Give me a place to stand, and I will move the world." There is no fixed place in the universe: all is rushing about and vibrating in a wild dance.

27. Truth is what the scientist aims at. He finds nothing at rest, nothing enduring, in the universe. Not everything is knowable, still less is predictable.

SARDAR UMRAO SINGH SHER GIL.

THE YOGA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS POSITIVISM.

Yoga starts with the facts of the existence of subject and object, and holds that their correlation is without beginning. The subject is, and was, never bound by ignorance, and is ever free, while the individual spirits, though free in their essence, are bound by ignorance to Nature. Purusha is called Chtishakti, consciousness as power, not as a process. As long as ignorance persists this relation and the consequent experience will continue, and it can cease for the individual only when knowledge has destroyed this ignorance.

It appears from the study of Patanjali's Yoga aphorisms and the scholium and commentaries thereon that (1) Purusha, the soul or spirit, is merely self-luminous pure consciousness, etc. etc. and may be said to be in a certain sense only the seer or subject and passive witness of the functions of the mind: (2) Chitta or mind is merely the organ of thought, etc. whose very nature is Prakhya i.e. "showing" and "making known" all things including itself and Purusha to Purusha: (3) Mind is unconscious in itself, being a product of insentient nature, but through which the beginningless but close association with Purusha or consciousness and becomes conscious, so to speak, with the result that its activities, which otherwise would be purely mechanical and blind, become intelligent, and we get what we call states of consciousness, functions of the mind, Pratyayas (motions)., etc. It is the medium of knowledge. Buddhi (understanding) or Chitta (mind)--both words used in this system are synonyms which is a product of Sattva plus Rajas and Tamas, is thus the medium of knowledge for Purusha. In it, and through it, will be represented to him every object of knowledge including himself, the mind, and sense objects, gross and subtle.

We see in ordinary life that the person whose mind is less dull and agitated, and consequently more clear and concentrated, has greater power of

knowledge, through the senses by observation, and by thought, reasoning and memory and mental grasp generally, through the mind. In greater mental activity we observe an abstraction from the senses, and men of genius and talent are a proof of that. After a certain stage sense activity gives place to, and is merged in, mental activity.

Modern psychology has shown in the phenomena of hypnotic sleep, which it considers an extension of natural sleep, that a certain exaltation of various mental, moral, and emotional faculties occurs in certain depths of trance. Mandukya Upanishad also speaks of the extention of the range of knowledge in the "dream" phase of consciousness by which, of course, is meant something more than ordinary dream state. In this state of the abstraction of senses into the mind's depths appear phenomena of vision which are veridical and not merely illusory. Some subtler sense opens out the windows of the soul and enlarges its power of perceiving things actually existing, known as clairvoyance, lucidite or telaesthesia, as Myers prefers to call it. Whatever the theories advocated to account for it, the fact remains, and Yoga philosophy understands it to be neither more nor less than the simple act of perception made possible through the reduction of the influence of the Rajasic activities of the senses playing upon the mind stuff and moulding it in various shapes, thus standing in the way of its pure perceptions. Not that every one during sleep or trance can be a clairvoyant. The ordinary man in his average condition would seem to be overcome by Tamas (darkness and dullness), and unless darkness and dulness as well as the agitating Rajasic influences were absent, no exaltation of faculty of what nature would take place. To the agency of the Rajas are also attributed the fancies, theories, and illusions during waking state of sleep or trance, and the Yogi places no trust upon his faculties till he has over come Rajas, i.e. pas-

sion, as well as Tamas, darkness and dullness. When that has happened, then alone he is called Ritambhara-Prajna, "possessed of truth-bearing cognition (or gnosis)." This simply means that the Sattva now is fairly free of these impurities, and is consequently clear. It would not be out of place here to refer to the idea of Mandukya Upanishad that in the phase of consciousness called Sushupti, where no dreams or various other notions arise in the mind has reached the highest state of consciousness and experiences, bliss and unity of consciousness. Yoga also speak of Sananda (blissful) and Sasmita (with I-am-ness) conditions where he feels himself "infinite life an ocean without waves." (See Yoga Bhashya I,36).

It is interesting to compare this with the oversoul of Emerson and the cautious hypothesis put forth by Myers and Sir Oliver Lodge, that the deepest levels of the subliminal self, where a sense of unity exists, may be after all oneness of consciousness. It is here that the Yoga philosophy touches the fringe of Vedanta, but keeping itself to the semi-empirical standpoints which it has to adopt for the sake of the enquirer, it confines itself to dualism or rather the idea of many purushas, but clearly postulates, this Purusha to be the power of consciousness, changeless, immovable, pure, and endless.

For final knowledge it sets it aside completely like the testimony (agama) of others. Preconceived notions and fancies, too, have to be destroyed before the specific knowledge through cognition of Samadhi (samadhi Prajna) is possible.

Patanjali considers fancies (vikalpa) as non-viridical, and condemns illusions and hallucinations as obstacles to Samadhi like other obstacles such as disease, uncertainty, (Or dout), heedlessness, slothfulness, not-detachment, and delusions, not finding the stage, and not remaining established in it (namely falling back from

what has been achieved). Chap. I. Aphorism 30.).

ADHAR CHANDRA DAS.

SRI AUROBINDO AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND.

1. Out of all the confusions of the different schools of current philosophy, the problems emerge with baffling freshness, namely, what is philosophy? What is its starting-point?(S. R'krish.)
2. Without the senses the things are devoid of shape, size and colour; the twinkling stars, the blazing sun, the beautiful landscapes, the pretty flowers, all fade away into the utter blank of infernal darkness. That there is an external world or at least the objective facts of experience, we know, on the evidence of the senses. Seeing that the senses play an important part in the constitution of knowledge, some thinkers regarded them as the only sources of knowledge. Others, on the contrary, extolled reason at the expense of the senses.
3. Philosophy beings in wonder. Wonder is undoubtedly the awakening of human reason from its slumber in material quiescence. Thus pure action of reason lifts us gradually from the hundrum sort of life to the metaphysical standpoint. The interest in philosophy indicates partial awakening of the human spirit.
4. "Dialectic is necessary," says Bergson, "to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts and be propagated to other men."
5. Difference in our world-views will inevitably ensue, for every one approaches the world-riddles from his own standpoint. His personality and his intellectual power have much to do with his conception of the universe.
6. Metaphysics which stands on a presupposition, must fail to attain to the full view of Reality, for at least there is the presupposition which its scrutiny leaves untouched.

7. But this satisfaction is relative. What is the source of satisfaction to one is the beginning of dissatisfaction to another.

8. The path of knowledge also aims at the realization of the supreme state and it relies upon intellectual reflection. This path coincides with philosophic search which begins with the analysis of our experience. It takes one order of being after another and reflects over its reality or otherwise. On a close scrutiny, the empirical reveals its self-contradictory character and the intellect proceeds by nagating the contradictory. In this way, by the method of "neti", "neti" a sort of destructive criticism.

9. In aviation, exploration and in other adventures, the pioneers are the persons who find the path. They bear most of the stress and strife of the struggle. But they turn to account the lesson they learn from their experience. They generalize and formulate principles of procedure which are recorded in the form of a literature which turns out to be a real possession of the ardent aspirants. Now what is true of enterprises in the phenomenal realm is true with a greater force in the spiritual sphere. It is an invisible world that sustains the visible. It is only the seers who therefore can bring message to men. Shastra is the record of their endeavour and experience.

10. For definite guidance and driving force, the aspiring soul demands a human being who in the image of the eternal upon whom the Divine has descended with light.

11. Though spiritual discipline demands a guru or teacher, there is no reason why it should lead to sectarianism or fanaticism. Sectarianism is an offshoot of ignorance. In it the soul is still enmeshed in the ego. A parochial religion is "pooled self-esteem."

12. The sadhaka need not feel troubled with time, for it is a help and no hindrance. It is the condi-

tion of his progress. His ideal attitude then is one of persistence and patience.

The sadhaka should not fly away from the normal surroundings in which his life is found and seek shelter in caves or jungles. Spiritual illumination will ensue not by way of rejection of our normal course, but in virtue of its transformation.

13. The dedication of our all to the Divine depends upon some amount of energizing of our thought. So it presupposes a measure of intellectual culture in the individual, inborn or acquired. As the religion of love without a philosophic background is turned into one of laxity, superstition and obscurantism, so this yogic discipline, lacking a keen intellectual insight and losing the dynamic influence of an illumined soul, will tend to degenerate into a resting place of lethargy and into a life of indifference. There will be retardation and no progress.

LORD HALDANE. (In Mys. Econ.Journal).

TRAINING OF THE NATION.

On Wednesday, July 12, in the House of Lords, Viscount Haldane rose "to call attention to the training of the nation and to the necessity of preparing of the future."

Viscount Haldane turning to the notice on the paper, said the country was engaged in a tremendous struggle in which our life and freedom were at stake. But the war which was going on was not the only struggle in which the country was engaged. There was a larger rivalry, a rivalry more peaceful less obvious less rapid in its progress, but no less decisive, if we were to hold our own and maintain our place. In that rivalry knowledge, skill, and foresight were as much required as they were in the war. We must turn to that task now, because we are not to be caught unprepared. Although the struggle might not in the main rest on the shoulders of those who were growing old,

still they not the less had a tremendous responsibility and a great duty. They had to their utmost to prepare the future generation intellectually, morally, and physically, to endure the strain they would have to face. We had done a great deal in the past, we were doing a great deal in the present but other nations had been coming up and devoting themselves with an assiduity and a science which were in excess in some respect of our own. It was in that excess of assiduity on their part that the danger to us lies. Scientific direction of our energy. He held his countrymen is some respects higher than the people of any nation he knew but where we had been lacking was in the scientific direction of our abundant energy, and in order to obtain that scientific direction, training and education were necessary of a kind which we had not yet known, which other nations were putting in practice, and which if we did not learn and apply we should find ourselves inevitably left behind. The real difficulty that we had to face was that we had never been ready to take up new ideas. A great teacher and preacher to whom this country owed more than to any other man, Mathew Arnold, told us some fifty years ago that our inaptitude for taking up new ideas was a danger which we must train our minds to overcome if we are not to fall behind in the rivalry of nations. For twenty years he had been himself interested in education and had done all he could, both in and out of office to advance that cause, often with very indifferent success. It was a matter of satisfaction to him that so much progress had been made since the beginning of the present century, but if we had been making progress other countries had been making progress also and more rapidly than we had.

He was not talking of any particular nation. It was sufficient for him to take two neutral

nations--Switzerland and the United States of America, Switzerland put us to shame in respect of her national system of education, and in the United States there was a keenness and activity about the whole subject which we would do well to take note of. Our problem was to make education interesting by showing what it meant not only theoretically but practically. It meant not mere examination but the training of the mind in the widest and most comprehensive sense, so that the youth of the country might be able when the time came to turn, it might be to science, it might be to the humanities, or to any of the thousand thousand and one subjects which were covered by the field of knowledge in the twentieth century. Lord Cromer was keenly interested in the preservation of the humanities and he agreed with him about that. But some aptitudes lay in realm of science, and it was necessary to take account of different aptitudes and train men according to their aptitudes.

It Will Cost More.: It would cost a good deal of money, but it was an expenditure on which they dare not economise. It was an appalling fact that in this country 90% of your young persons got no further education after fourteen. What chance had they? Take the most formidable enemy country with which this country would have to enter into acute rivalry after the war was over--Germany. He was not taking Germany because he had any special admiration for the German system. On the contrary it had several great defects, but it had also some great virtues and he did not wonder at the German Government of to-day for keeping up its expenditure on education in view of the tremendous effort she was going to make to wrest the markets of the world from us as soon as the war was over.

Secondary Schools: There was a great difference between this country and Germany in the matter

of the secondary schools. In Germany they were the strongest point in the educational movement. They were thoroughly organized and virtually, though not nominally compulsory. The preliminary studies, which encroached upon the time of our universities, were completed in Germany in the secondary schools. It was, however, a defect in the German system that a hard-and-fast line was drawn between various classes of the nation--the aristocratic class, the middle class and the democracy. We were more fortunate in this country. We did provide means for not merely the small percent getting up the educational ladder, but the children of the working classes, if they had exceptional aptitude, could obtain by bursaries and and scholarships the benefit of secondary education was the strongest point in the German system, it was the weakest point in, the problem of the secondary school was one of the most pressing we had in this country. Our public schools were in some respects remarkable institutions. They had the power to train boys to be rulers on men. But increasingly science and the application of science were becoming a necessity for the training of a very large number of our people. But they were discouraged because nearly all the scholarships in the universities were allocated to the professions. It was not enough to do any thing short of reforms which would improve our training system itself--the quantity and quality of the teachers--and make education more interesting and comprehensive, so that when boys wished to go forward to a particular industry and science they might go with their minds so trained that they might be able to take up and absorb the scientific ideas which they were to put in practice.

Lack of Experts. We suffered in this country from want of experts. It was no use telling manufacturers to employ more chemists. We were not training them. Our taining machine was not ade-

quate to produce the supply we required at this moment. There were only 1,500 trained chemists in this country, although on the other hand, four German chemical firms who simply played havoc with our trade employed 1,000 chemists. To take another instance an expert calculation showed that by proper means we could produce in this country the whole of the motor power which we used from one-third of the coal we actually consumed in doing so. Another calculation was that in the various stages of consumption and of the making of products we wasted as much coal as would pay the interest on 500 millions after the war. It was not that we had not got experts; for it was a great mistake to suppose that we have had that we have had not got men of the highest science and knowledge but we had not enough individuals possessing that science and knowledge to go round. He had spoken apparently somewhat gloomy of the situation and he would turn for a moment to the great progress that had been made. Since the beginning of the century ten new teaching universities had been called into existence. London had become a teaching university, but much remained to be done there though it was not for the want of trying that they had not gone further. The others were Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Bristol the Armstrong College at Durham, and two teaching universities in Ireland. That was a great step forward and given time and above all, some improvement in the system of secondary schools so that they might send up pupils prepared to benefit by university training we should get an immense deal out of it.

Hampered by Religious Controversy: A good deal had been accomplished by the Education Act of 1902 and previous acts, and we should have accomplished more had we not had the religious controversy mixed up with education. He had always felt that if we have been sufficiently keen about education

we should not have had ary religious controversy. In Scotland, where people were keen about education, very little was heard about the religious controversy. He could not help thinking that here there was a load of educational sin on the backs of some right rev. prelates and also a some non-conformists; but the real sin educationally had been the indifference of the average Englishman who did not care much about education and was very much bored with it and left the matter to be turned into a controversy. We had now reached a period when the nation was taking a far larger view of the matter. One striking thing which filled him with hope was that we were now thoroughly awakened to the necessity of action. Everywhere he saw the most magnificent public spirit. People were ready only not to contribute their money and pay taxes, but the sons and daughters of all classes were ready to throw their energies and abilities into the production of things necessary to ensure victory. The spirit was going to stay and was going to influence us profoundly, and we should be influenced still more profoundly by those who came back from the war. If that were national spirit, then he thought it might be possible to do justice to both sides of the education question. The interest in the continuation of the school system was growing, and people were becoming aware of the peril to which we were exposed from the want of a system for training the son of the workman in the expert knowledge he required if he was to attain a high place in his industry.

Applying Figures. Our present position was really appalling in regard to the waste of talent, owing to the denial of the opportunity of development and training. He had got some instructive figures from a high authority. In England out of 2,750,000 boys and girls between the age of 12 and 16 only 1,100,000 got any further education after 13. Of the remaining 1,650,000 the great bulk were edu-

cated only for a very short time, most in elementary schools up to the age of 14, Only 250,000 went to proper secondary schools, and they were only for a short period in most cases. Thus quantity as well as quality was deficient. Between the ages of 16 and 25 there were in England and Wales 5,350,000 who got no education at all. 93,000 only had a full time course for a period which was generally very short and 390,000 had a part time course in evening schools. Those were appalling figures. What chance had we against other nations which go on a different plan and thereby had the power and knowledge to stimulate industiral capacity and activity? In England each year 18,000 and in Scotland which did much better, 7,770 entered university institutions. That was a deplorable state of things. A great responsibility would rest in our rulers if they did not take the lead in availing of that vast reservoir of undiscovered talent, which might contain men and women who would raise the genius of the country in every walk of life.

<u>Physical and Religious training:</u> It was impossible to speculate as to what would be the organization of the future army of this country. But whatever system was adopted whether it was a purely voluntary system or some compulsory form should be much better if we attended to the physical side. It was essential if we were to have a complete system of elementary education, that physical training should be looked to. He should like to see the Boy Scouts made an integral part of the elementary schools. This country owed far more than it knew to Sir R. Baden Powell in his great discovery of the Boy Scout System.(cheers). Then coming to the secondary schools we should like to see cadet corps training made compulsory up to seventeen or eighteen When they came to the University they had the work of the Officers' Training Corps which afforded an opportunity to every man of talent to qualify him-

self to become an officer. He was quite sure also that there could be no comprehensive system of national training which would fall upon them if ethical and religious were left out of the school. (cheers).

In conclusion, he deprecated any dilatory action and said we had to act at once. We in this country disliked thought before action. When we had no competitors we made our position by energy. What was necessary now was energy directed by high science.

Practical suggestions. If we were asked what could be done practically, he would suggest that a Minister should devote his whole attention to certain things. The last year at the elementary school should be improved. Then there was the question of freeing the university from preliminary studies, which ought to be carried out in the secondary schools. Lastly there was physical training in the schools, which he thought might be introduced without delay. If money was spent on these things it would come back a thousandfold. We were face to face with a new order, and our old methods would avail no longer. The sands were sinking in the glass. When the war was over the struggle would be on us almost immediately, and at present we had taken no adequate steps to prepare for it. He recalled to the House the lines of Shakespeare beginning: "There is a tide in the affairs of men" and concluded:-- Let us not lose the tide.

N. RAMA RAO.

THE WORLD IN CONFLICT. (In.Mys.Econ.Jrl)

1. In the series of thought-compelling articles collected under the appropriate title of the World in Conflict, Professor Hobhouse attempts to discover the real underlying springs of the great World Tragedy. If the desolation that has befallen Europe is due to the mistakes of statesmen or the wickedness of rulers, there is a hope that things will resume their normal course after peace

is restored. But if the war indicates that this seemingly solid civilization is but a thin crust which can no longer withstand the disruptive pressure of seething barbarism, the future is full of gloom and menace for mankind.

He sorrowfully observes that to the philosopher who could see below the surface, the war could have come as a surprise. The indifference of Europe about the Armenian massacres was perhaps the earliest indication that faith and honour had come to be regarded as anachronisms, and that there was no longer a common conscience, like that which had prompted the Crusades of an earlier age. A cynical Europe, which could not, for a moment, postpone selfish interests to the clear call of duty, or be withheld from pursuiing schemes of agrandisement by the dictates of honour of humanity, was rushing headlong on disaster.

Political history is merely an outward manifestation of political morality.

2. With the growth of scientific knowledge, men began to question the infallibility of accepted moral notions. Soon this cleavage between science and tradition widened, and the theory of the survival of the fittest led to a feeling that progress was achievable only by strife and self-assertion.

This weakening of the moral sense reacted viciously everywhere, but nowhere so disastrously as in Germany. She was throbbing with new-found national life, and had been nurtured on blood and iron. With the splendid victories of 1870-71 has come a consciousness of strength and an arrogant belief in her own invincibility. With the this consciousness came also a maddening sense of constraint.

3. The loosening of moral bonds had in other nations produced only distortions of literary artistic taste, or at worst a mischievous and rather ridiculous jingoism. But in the peculiar condition of Germany, it resulted in a fatal perversion

of the very concepts of right and wrong, and a total destruction of all restraint. Nietzsche's Pragmatism which recognised no law or restraint on the will of man, Hegel's deification of the State, and Treitschke's gloomy consecration of it as an embodiment of ruthless force which demanded a sacrifice of all that was noblest and best in life, fused together into a creed of merciless and brutal aggressiveness which held nothing sacred, and to which the strongest bonds of honour were mere scraps of paper.

The Triple Entente intensified this feeling, and added the unreasoning impulse of fear to the pugnacity of self-conscious strength.

European polity, which rested on such unstable foundations, was bound to collapse; and the only surprise is that the crash did not come earlier.

Prof. Hobhouse sees in the present was a momentous struggle between two ideals. The one, which we may call democratic and humanitarian, is the goal of what we regard as civilization, and holds truth and honour dearer than material gain and the increase of human happiness the great goal of all endeavour. The other, which may be styled bureaucratic and militarist, is the negation of faith as a principle of conduct, the denial of the rights of the weak, and the deification of brute force. It is a war such as was waged of old between the powers of light and darkness, and it is the future of mankind that is at stake.

The allies have wakened to a full realization of the stupendous issues involved in the conflict; and mankind may look forward with confidence to the result, for in such a struggle, civilization, which believes in itself, has never yet been vanquished; and truth and justice will emerge triumphant now as ever. This war, in passing, will, undoubtedly, have altered the world. Much that reckoned itself real and permanent will have passed away, and much that was believed impossible will

have taken place in the established order of things. False prejudices and unreasoning pride of race based on immaterial differences of creed colour, or circumstance, will have vanished. It will be for the architects of human destiny to clear the ground of the debris of departed solecisms, and construct a new and lasting civilization, with sweeter manners, purer laws, and a nobler aim than a narrow racial aggrandisement.

Prof. Hobhouse discusses the question of what the most lasting and advantageous re-adjustments of international relations would be after the restoration of peace.

The war, he says, was due to the prevalance of immoral political ideals and the lust of power and gain; and argues that the future of civilization must depend on the extent to which these root vices are eradicated.

There is one element of hope--that this calamity will shake the nonsense of unreason and immorality out of the nations, and bring them to the work of reconstruction in chastened mood, free from frantic boast and foolish word.

The moral death of the European Concert sent the nations headlong into the war and the future will necessarily recognise the need for an organized community of nations. There are no doubt formidable difficulties. For one thing, the other nations of the world would find it difficult to co-operate with a beaten and sulky Germany in a spirit of frank trustfulness. Prof. Hobhouse recognises also that the spirit of nationality which is so potent a factor in European politics, and which has wrecked many a well-intentioned scheme in the past, would militate against the permanence of any thing like a federation. Nationality often finds natural expression in aggression, and is, in this aspect, incompatible with public law. History has shown

however, that no adjustment which depends on the suppression of nationality can be stable; and the future organization to be permanent or even practicable, should take full account of "the distinct individuality of the component peoples."

Prof. Hobhouse dismisses the notion that alliance or federation could be the basis of the future organization.

"What is the nature of that bond to be? Is it to be an alliance? But alliances are rarely made except as against a common enemy, and we are hoping to supersede enmities. Is it to be a federation? But a federation involves a considerable sacrifice of internal sovereignty, and is not effective unless the armed force is in the hands of the federal Government. Is it conceivable that the European States would confide to any common centre the control of their military organization?"

Schemes of arbitration presuppose that nations love peace, which is not true; and "no schemes of arbitration unsupported by force, are worth the paper they are writ upon."

4. "It (the alliance) is going to be a part of the most moving historical traditions of these peoples. So far as the three Western States are concerned, it is reinforced by similarity of political development and by geographical conditions and all these forces together have engendered a sense of true solidarity which must not be allowed to perish. Scoffers ask whether we are really fighting for Belgium, France or ourselves. The true answer is that we have been forced by hard facts to regard the cause of all three as one. We are fighting neither selfishly nor unselfishly, but for the whole of which we are members just as the man who works for his family is working neither selfishly nor unselfishly but for the whole of which he is a member. I cannot think that this sense of solidarity once gained will, or ought to, die away. On the contrary, I think that here we may have the

beginning of that true foundation in feeling which may be the basis of an international state. I would look to the union of States in Europe through the existing alliance and not as requiring its dissolution."

The alliance would lose its primary martial character by being converted into "something of the nature of a permanent league or Federation," with a standing council for dealing with matters affecting the league as a whole, and in particular with questions arising between any of its members.

The sentiment of common interest, and we may add, the feeling of camaraderie born of the death struggle in which they fought shoulder to shoulder, would be sufficiently strong to make the members agree to a collective regulation of their affairs. Prof. Hobhouse even thinks the assumption of the League of a certain amount of military authority, including the control over the manufacture of armaments, not impossible. The League would then slowly expand, by the free admission of new members, including every neutral State in Europe and America, till it ultimately approaches the ideal of a world federation. This organization would, no doubt, prima prima facie, appear antagonistic to Germany; but this arises from the necessities of the situation. Germany's inclusion is not to be thought of in a league held together by mutual confidence and goodwill, and the memory of suffering for a common cause. Germany's political creed repudiates civilization, and laughs the laws of God and Humanity to scorn. She is a false friend and a barbarous foe, and must always be reckoned a great power of sixty or seventy millions bent on mischief in the centre of Europe.

5. This we think, would be imbecile charity, and not statesmanship. This is not the spirit in which a sensible penal law deals with truculent disturbers of the peace. To leave Germany, defeated, no doubt, but all the more dangerous on that account, free to nurse her wr

free to nurse her wrath and craving for revenge till she gathers strength for another stipendous onslaught on civilization, would be a sorry result for all the suffering and tribulation, for devasted homes, and fair countries drained of their heart's blood.

We think there should be no patched up peace with Germany which leaves her beaten and baffled, but still able to bide her time. The sword should not be sheathed till militarism is stricken to the earth never to rise again. Germany should be disarmed and held in tutelage till the generation which learnt state-craft and political honesty from Nietzsche and Treitschke has entirely passed away, and yielded place to a new German manhood which believes in reason, honour, and humanity.

J.B. MORGAN.

"THE WAY TO CLEARER THINKING." (approved-
(In "Psychologist" London) by V.S.I.)

Do you believe that two equals four? That two and four are not equal numbers is one of the facts you believe so strongly that no amount of evidence would convince you otherwise. But a mathematical trickery will make you, as a thinker, wonder how often proofs can be trusted, and in what way belief and truth are related.

The fact is that your belief is your feeling about a fact and has little to do with the truth or falsity of the fact. Belief does not make a fact true. Disbelief does not destroy the truth of a fact.

Even large numbers of persons believing a certain thing is no proof or disproof of its truth. At one time men believed the sun moved around the earth; now we are certain that the earth moves around the sun.

You cannot prove the truth of any proposition by gaining supporters for that truth. But our

beliefs are more likely to be sound if we think clearly.

Even when we do learn the rules of clear thinking and apply them rigidly we fall into errors and find ourselves arriving at conclusions which are false as when we prove that 2 is equal to 4. If we can make such mistakes in simple problems of this sort, how much more likely are we to fall into logical errors where the factors are much more complicated.

The difficulties in the way of clear thinking are enhanced by a little trick we play upon ourselves. Instead of waiting until reason brings to light a belief for us to accept, we adopt an attractive belief first and then try to support it by reasons.

BELIEFS ARE OFTEN FALSE: Beware the belief that gives you personal satisfaction. You can hardly imagine a person getting any great personal enjoyment from believing that 2 plus 2 equals 4, but what a thrill he may get by believing "Mary loves me." If he should discover some evidence that two plus two did not equal four he would view it calmly. Let someone prove that Mary loves another, and he will not view the evidence with equanimity..

Beliefs that depict realities are a safe anchor, but beliefs are often false. Because most of us feel the need of security, we are prone to seize the first comforting belief that comes our way. We are not happy to be without an anchor in the seas of thought: doubt is an irritating state of mind.

Because of this, a good way to measure the validity of a belief is to determine how much you wish to believe it. The more you wish to believe, the more you should suspect the idea of being untrue.

Truth is nothing to fight about. If something is true, there is no need for a fight; if it is doubtful, the procedure should be to investigate.

How can we be sure that our investigations will lead us to the truth? There are four main principles which, if observed, will ensure that our emotions do not lead us astray.

CLEARING WAY FOR CLEAR THINKING. It is extremely difficult to be rational about a belief based on emotional preference. Freedom from emotional prejudice is Point No.1 in clearing the way for clear thinking.

A great scientist once said that when he discovered some fact that went against his theories he carefully recorded it and gave it great weight in his thinking because he knew that he was emotionally prejudiced against it. When he found things which favoured his views he knew that he would not forget them, nor would he slight their influence in his thinking. It would pay all of us to follow him.

Willingness to accept any conclusion is Point no.2 in preparing to think clearly. Are you willing to go anywhere your reason takes you? If your rational conclusions contradict your cherished beliefs, which must go, the belief or the results of reason?

In answer to these questions you may counter, "Why should I give up a cherished belief for a rational conclusion when I know that the rational conclusion may be wrong? When you proved to me that two equals four should I throw away the belief that two equals two?"

Answer to this is that the mathematical trick contradicted logical belief, not an emotional one. When logical process brings you to an intellectual contradiction, the next step is to hunt for the error.

Danger comes when you find your faith shaken in some belief when you want to hold, but for which you have little logical evidence. If you can follow your reason when your favourite theories are threatened by it, you are on the road to clear thinking.

BE READY TO CRITICISE YOUR BELIEFS: Point No.3 on the way to clear thinking is that we must be ready to criticise our beliefs.

We are all likely to fall into the silly error of assuming that our acceptance of a theory somehow enhances that theory. Then, we feel we must be loyal to the cause we have espoused. We develop it into a creed or code, devise some slogans to express our position crisply, and force ourselves into a loyalty that will brook no criticism.

This may work well in politics, but it has no place in the realm of thinking. In fact, you should be more critical of a belief you have accepted than one you have rejected--just to counteract the natural tendency to do exactly the opposite.

All great thinkers have had to admit that they were wrong. Willingness to change beliefs is Point 4.

Progress marks the versatile man from the old fogey. If you cannot see where you have changed, you have already stagnated--nc matter what your chronological age may be. Resistance to change is a mortal enemy to clear thinking.

Meantime you have to get on with your daily workand play; you cannot spend all your time investigating every belief you use in your everyday life. What are you to do?

IS THERE A MIDDLE WAY? Some immature individuals realizing the danger of adhering rigidly to a belief, go to the other extreme and hope to escape trouble by saying that nothing is certain, and therefore they will believe nothing. They thi think there is a virtue in denying obvious truths even those derived from pure reason. The same people that told them there was a Santa Claus told them also that two plus two make four. Discovering that Santa Claus is just father's fun they turn bitter and say all the rest is nonsense, too.

To believe nothing at all is just as emotionally unscientific and truth-flouting as to believe everything that comes your way. Is there a middle way which will serve to anchor us in the ocean of thought for the time being while we do the day's work?

A. E. BAKER.

HOW TO UNDERSTAND PHILOSOPHY.

1.These earliest philosophers tackled one problem which has attracted thinkers ever since. Is there any permanent unity behind all the variety and change of the world? The great thinkers are ranged in opposing camps by their answers to that question. Those who said, "Yes, the ultimate reality is one" are called Monists (from the Greek word Monos, which means "alone" or "onely"); those who said, "No, there is no unity behind or within Nature's plurality" are called Pluralists. The Milesian philosophers were monists.

2.Heracleitus, who flourished in Ephesus about 490 B.C. was interested in the actual concrete here and now and this, in all the variety and change of the world of living experience, rather than in any abstract, unchaning unity which might be held in the explanation of them. He found the meaning of the universe in the actual process of experience, in the flow of time and change in which we are all immersed. All things flow. Nothing remains the same. I stand on the river bank dabbling my toes in the stream, but I never put my foot twice into the same river. Difference and Multiplicity are as essential to the universe as are its Oneness and Identity. The One depends on the Many as entirely as do the Many on the One. If the Many disappeared, there would be no One, because the Unity is no more than the activity manifest in the changing variety of the Many. It has been said that for Heracleitus reality was not a noun but a verb.

3. The Eleatics were the extreme monists of the ancient world. Parmenides was carried by the Sun-maidens up to the Gate of Night-and-Day, and there he was instructed in the difference between truth and appearance. Our perception of this changing world is mere delusion. We grasp the real world by our reason. It is unchangeably one and indivisible, with no qualities that can be discerned by the senses; it is all that is, without beginning or growth or decay or end, unmoving and immovable. The indivisibility and unchangeableness of the universe were emphasised in such an extreme way that the system explained away, but did not explain, the difference between one thing and another. No reply to this criticism was, indeed possible, except a counter-attack. Zeno, in his well-known fable of Achilles and the Tortoise showed the absurdities latent in the belief that the Universe is <u>not</u> one and indivisible.

4. His wisdom (and the Oracle at Delphi declared that there was no one wiser than Socrates) was that he knew nothing except that he knew nothing. He questioned everything. His method was characteristic and homely, as it is well-known, and must have been very irritating. During a conversation somebody uses some general term, such as "wisdom" Socrates asks him to define the word. When he offers a definition, Socrates at once names particular examples to which the definition will not apply. Other definitions are offered, which at once suffer the same fate. In the end, the wretched person contradicts himself. It is amusing to notice that those who talk to Socrates rarely take his negative attitude seriously. They always think that he has his own alternative suggession ready to offer. His main concern, however, was to teach people to criticise their own principles. "The unexamined life is not worth living."

5. Greek teaching about sin had been concerned entirely with outward actions, not with motives. Not only so, but Socrates commonly sought his illustrations in the industrial arts. In shoe-making or carpentering, right actions follow from knowledge, wrong actions from ignorance; and so must it be, he argued, with the art of life. He was always mocked at for taking his illustrations from the workshop. He held that artisans knew their business, but that many who professed to teach were ignorant of theirs.

6. The philosopher, therefore, is the only good man, in the fullest and proper sense of the word. Others may have an opinion or belief about the good, by nature or the gift of God. The chief way of developing this is by self-discipline. He who would live the life of virtue or reason must "die daily" to the life of the senses. Plato defined philosophy as "a practice of death," and any idea of his system is incomplete which ignores the ascetic element in it.

7. There is also however, in Plato's system, much emphasis on education, as the positive side of the training for the good life. Not the written word, but the fruitful personal contact of teacher and pupil, is important here. Much of Plato's life was given up in the practical work of education.

8. It is natural, therefore, that Plato had a consistent and complete contempt for science. He tries to deal with its subject-matter deductively, not inductively. He accepts, without trying to cure, the imperfect equipment of his age for any kind of scientific observation. Our acquaintance with the sensible world is mere opinion; knowledge belongs to the unseen.

9. One of the unsolved problems of Plato's system is the connection between appearance and Reality. He found the reality or essence of individual things in the general class to which they

belong. But having reached his world of eternal, unchanging, perfect Ideas, he cannot show how or why they condition a world of imperfection, and change, and concrete individuality.

10. Aristotle's description of Causes is important and well known. There are four kinds of cause in nature. The material cause, as bronze may be called the cause of a statue, since without the bronze that statue could not exist; the formal cause, the form or pattern which the thing has been made to assume (the statue is of the Burghers of Calais, let us say); the efficient cause, the sculptor who made it, Monsieur Rodin; the final cause, the purpose or goal for which the work of art was created (let us suggest to purify the emotional relations between two great peoples). Obviously the last, the final cause, is the most important of the four. It is only when the mind has discovered the purpose of anything that it is satisfied, and ceases to ask questions. This is the real cause.

11. Aristotle's Ethics is the most systematic account of the science of human conduct in pre-Christian times. His doctrine of the ethical "mean" has been especially influential. Virtue, he taught, is in every case the mean, or middle point, between two opposite vices; courage is a virtue; both rashness and cowardice are vices. This doctrine is a protest against the false asceticism which condemns all natural impulse, and also against the "immoralism" which accepts, uncritically, any impulse as the guide to action merely because it is "naturel." It is also noteworthy that Aristotle has seen that in many cases our natural reactions to situations go in pairs.

12. The Cynics sought escape and security in the development of Socrate's criticism of the ideals of the average man. Knowledge and reason are to be followed, and riches, honour, power, and pleasure are to be despised. The founder of the school was Antisthenes (b.440 B.C.), one of

little band who shared Socrates' last day on earth, but the most characteristic and interesting member of the school was Diogenes of Sinope (died 323 B.C.), He expressed to the full the cynic contempt for sentiment, hatred of delusion, and antagonism to the ordinary standards of life: "Remint the coinage" was his famous maxim, an early assertion of the transvaluation of values. He had a gift of scoffing wit, and secured himself against all loss by having nothing to lose. "He had prepared himself for every hazard of fate."
13. Their monism, asserting that all apparent differences represent a reality which is one and undivided, meant that even the distinctions between good and evil and between right and wrong are only appearances.
14. Epictetus teaches that our character, and therefore our happiness, depends on the strength derived from resistance to opposition. The suffering which we call evil is merely the gymnastic exercise by which we attain self-mastery, and, as such, is a blessing in disguise...The solution at which they arrive is that "Good and Evil" is a subjective distinction. All things are good. It is thinking makes some of them appear ill. "My judgment"--my opinion--the way things seem to me--runs through all Epictetus' teaching like a keynote.
15. Certain things are ours, in our power, under our control, matters of our will and choice. Other things are not ours, beyond our power, they force themselves upon us. The impressions of the senses are beyond our control, but the use we make of these impressions, our thoughts about them, our estimate of them and their consequences, these are in our power.

The aim of practical education is to attain what we desire, and to avoid what we dislike. The world, however, has little respect for our desires. We cannot get what we likfe, we have to learn, therefore, to like what we can get. The Stoic will

alter himself and his desires to fit anworld that he finds he can alter only a little. He must limit his desires to the few things that are subject to his control. If he is to avoid disappointment and despair he must school himself to accept whatever is as right, and learn to recognise that what does not exist cannot be desirable. The result of such discipline is tranquillity, fearlessness, apathy (the peculiar Stoic virtue). We must obey the law of fate, we have no option; the wise, therefore, will obey with eager willingness. We may work for health or success, but we must not allow our peace of mind to depend on such things.

16. The Stoic ideal took flesh and came to life in the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius (A.D.180). He is Plato's dream come true, the dream of a philosopher king, of a ruler who would prefer not to govern. "Even in a palace life may be lived well" he says. He turned from comfort and pleasure and sought only virtue. In his days plague and famine and foreign and civil wars made problems enough for a ruler, and trials to test the philosophic calm of one who believed in, and aimed at, self-control, but the Stoic Emperor bore himself nobly and well, and his Meditations show that the bulwarks of his spirit were never overthrown. His life, as well as his writing, broadened and humanised Stoicism. The claims of natural affection occupy a large place in his book. For him the brotherhood of man, the citizenship of the world, were warm realities rather than cold abstractions; the common good, and nothing else, is the private advantage which a man ought to seek, and to pity and forgive one's enemies is a luxury to be prized. "The best way to revenge is not to imitate the injury." He will not expect gratitude, or made any parade of virtue. There is no need to grieve because there is no immortality; let us live this life well, if we have no other. His wisdom has never lost its appeal, and never will, for it has little that is local or passing about it, and it

appeals to men of widely different temperaments.
Scepticism is related to an obvious element in the Socratic philosophy, although it has also its relations with the teaching of Democritus. The founder of ancient Scepticism was Phrrho. His most characteristic saying were, "No more" (i.e. no more this than that); "I decide nothing;" and "Balance" (of evidence and views). He appealed to the consciousness of ignorance which is common to men. He appealed to the consciousness of ignorance which is common to men. He seems to have held that we have no means of knowing whether our sensations and opinions correspond to the nature of things. We can, therefore, do nothing but hold our judgment in suspense. We cannot know what is, and what is not. The result of this conviction is the carefree, indifferent state of mind which some call tranquillity.

17. The aim of the Sceptics was to live in a world of facts,and the only facts beyond dispute are immediate and present sensations, images, and thoughts. Science is possible because simultaneity and succession are matters of immediate experience. Beyond that we cannot go. Everything that men claim to know is either self-evident or leads to an endless succession. Knowledge is impossible, therefore.

18. Plotinus arrives at the thought of God negatively. Every attribute that we apply to God, he holds, is really a limitation of Him, and He is infinite. We cannot say that God is good or just or loving. We must remove all attributes until only God is left. He is beyond thought, therefore He is unknowable. We cannot even say that He is real, since that also would imply a limitation of the Absolute. It is strangely like the Brahmin teaching about God, but it is even more like agnosticism wrapped up in fine words. Looked at as the product of a logical process,

the Neo-platonist thought of God is an empty abstraction; for if we remove all attributes from any being, it is difficult to see how what is left can be distinguished from nothing.

From this unreality, Plotinus himself was saved by his mysticism. God, for him, was not merely the conclusion of an argument, He was chiefly the object of an experience.

18. Every spiritual monism is faced with the problem of explaining how and why the Eternal and Perfect Absolute gives rise to a world of time and change and imperfection and evil.

19. The permanent importance of Plotinus is that he showed once for all the futility of trying to explain the mental or spiritual in terms of the materialistitradition of European philosophy has fed on his teaching.

20. John Scot Eriugena (800-877), who translated the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius into Latin, was an Irishman, himself a philosopher and mystic, a deep thinker and powerful personality, and on of the most striking figures in the thought of the of the early middle ages. He had worked out a complete system. Thereis, he taught, only one Being, God, who is all that is. Other types of being are manifestations of Him. All existences are in God, and are emanations from Him. The Divine Nature "is" in four successive stages. First, the Deity in His original and unknowable being, God the Father, Whom no man can know, who does not even know Himself, Nature uncreated.

21. Evil as such is mere appearance, and the annihilation of evil is the clearing away of intellectual or spiritual obscurity. But Eriugena finds it impossible to deal with sin without assuming its reality. In many ways, as a thinker, he resembles Origen and, like his great predecessor, his treatment of Christian doctrine is sometimes very free indeed. He treats dogma as a smybolic approximation to truth.

22. This raises the whole question of Ideas, as Plato calls them, or Universals, to use Aristotle's description, and it divided the Christian philosophers of Europe into two camps until the fourteenth century. Those who hold that species and genera are only names are called Nominalists, but those who believed that universals have, in some sense, real existence are called Realists.@ Extreme nominalism is the belief that the universal is a mere name and nothing more; it is probable, however, that no mediaeval philosopher accepted this view. Moderate nominalism held that the universal is a concept wherein intelligence grasps the common attributes in different things, and raises them into a true notion. Although it is not easy to relate mediaeval thinking to modern thinking (Father Joseph Rickaby says, "The gauge on which the mediaeval mind ran was not our gauge. Which of the two is broad, and which is narrow, we need not argue; anyhow the gauge is different, and the passage of the train of thought from the one to the other is a troublesome operation."), it seems probable that the moderate nominalism or conceptualism of the schoolmen was in many ways closely similar to modern idealism.

23. The most effective critic of this, as of all the rational arguments for the existence of God was Immanuel Kant.

24. Scholasticism up till the second half of the twelfth century made use of Plato and Aristotle, but knew little of either, and misunderstood both.

25. The Crusades, and the struggle with Muhammedanism in the Near East and in Spain, made European scholars acquainted with the thought of Islam, and, in particular, with the commentaries on Aristotle of the great Arabic scholars, Ibn-

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@ The beginner should be careful not to confuse the mediaeval Realists with a widely different school of modern thinkers who are called by the same name.

Roschd the Moor and Ibn-Sina the Persian (whose names were Latinised as Averroes and Avicenna!). These were very far from being orthodox, from the Catholic point of view. Averroes, for example, denied individual immortality, and both thinkers were inclined to Pantheism.

26 St. Thomas Aquinas (1193 to 1280), the greatest of all Christian theologians, on whose thought the Western Church still lives, and proposes to live, after six centuries. Albert's chief work was to paraphrase the comment on Aristotle; St. Thomas accomplished the tremendous task of a reconciliation and intimate alliance between the received Christian view of life, as i it had been handed down to him, and the recently recovered Aristotelianism.

27. Ockham's razor is very famous as a principle of scientific method; it is that entities must not be multiplied unnecessarily. It means that of two possible explanations of any event we must always, other things being equal, choose the simpler. This is quite sound, as a principle of method; but it is one of the reasons why science is abstract, and possibly untrue; because, for all we know, the reality in any particular case may be complicated, and not simple.

28. The watershed between the Middle ages and the Modern World, is arbitrary as all such distinctions are to some extent, is the great upheaval which in general culture men call the Renaissance, but which appears in religion and theology as the Reformation. The beginners of this movement appear before 1400, and it took nearly three centuries to work itself out.

29. The Renaissance was a definite turning away from Christianity, a reconciliation with the paganism. Its characteristic notes are questioning and speculation, its interests are outside, independent of, the Christian ideal. This world and the glory of it make the other world

grow dim. Life becomes secular. Man and his strength and beauty and self-sufficiency are so fascinatingly interesting that God is forgotten.

30. Even in its greatest and most satisfying personalities, in Leonardo da vinci, for example, the Renaissance expressed a pride of intellect, a self-conscious culture.

31. Authority had so hardened into despotism as to make it almost impossible for freedom to express itself through membership in the Catholic Society.

The logical source of the Reformation is the kind of individualism which implies the right or, rather, the duty of the individual to be the final judge of truth--the infallibility of the man in the street. Individualism for strength and for weakness, for evil and for good, is the mark of change from the middle ages. The growth of commerce meant increasing competition, and the development of individual enterprise. It also meant the growth of rationalism, and the disappearance of the discipline and guidance for the conscience which men had found in the confessional.

32. One obvious difference between mediaeval and modern thought springs from the assertion of the duty of the human spirit to do its work independent of theological dictation. Philosophy science, art, and politics no longer receive their orders from theology.

33. The two great formative thinkers who express the influences that have created the modern world are Bacon and Descartes. To say this implies that the Renaissance was, even more than a return to antiquity, a return to nature. It has the realism, the appeal to experience, which mark the "modern mind" and a boundless curiosity which thinks that nothing can be so surprising but that it may turn out to be true. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) popularised a new logical method. He criticised with damaging thoroughness the mediaeval thinkers, and especially their thought about nature, and he stated

clearly and once for all, the psychological causes of the prejudices and errors which leam men astray in their search for truth. This last, perhaps his chief contribution to the philosophical and scientific progress of the days that were to follow, was his famous doctrine of Idola, or phantoms of the mind. These are the Phantoms of the Tribe which are those common to all men; the Phamtoms of the Cave, which depend on the nature, character, or training of the individual; the phantoms of the Market Place, the false suggestions which arise from intercourse with one's fellow-men, and, specially, from words and the easy mistakes which come from their careless use; the Phantoms of the Theatre, the vainly imagined false philosophies, fantastic, shows, neither realities nor copies of realities, which had tried to forecast what the world must be. In the place of these false methods, he aims at putting the inductive or empirical method; his Novum Organum was to take the place of the Organon of Aristotle, the syllogism was to give pplace to observation and induction. Bacon overestimated the simplicity of Nature, and expected that the whole truth about the universe would be known in a few years. It is not true to say that he did not recognise the function of hypothesis in the progress of science, but it is certain that he had no idea of the great part that imagination, disciplined, of course, by a submissiveness in the presence of facts, was to play in the process of discovery. Although, he did not invent induction or the empirical method, it is largely through his influence that they have been used during the last three centuries. Nature and experiment became the main sources of knowledge.

24. Greater than Bacon, in his influence on modern methods of thought was Descartes (1596-1650). He, and not Comte--not even Kant--is the true Copernicus of modern philosophy. He maintained the right of private judgment to an extent which im-

plied that doubting is a duty. Everything that can be doubted must be doubted. We must free ourselves from all uncertainties. Guesses, prejudices, the things that we believe because we have been told them, must all be given up, not as steps in the way to scepticism, but to leave the foundation free on which true knowledge can be built. When we press this method as far as it will go, we find that there is only one proposition a man cannot doubt, and that is that he himself exists; for he must exist in order that he may be able to doubt his own existence. Descartes puts it in a famous phrase, cogito ergo sum, I think, therefore I am. Whatever else is doubtful, this at least I cannot doubt, that I, as a thinking being, exist.

On this foundation he procees to build his philosophy. The first principle is thinking, cogito ergo sum, is accepted because it is self-evident. It is so clear and distinct that no proof of it need be offered. The mind is being cleared of all doubtful knowledge.

25. If the only proposition which is absolutely indubitable is "I think, therefore I am" then it follows that the only things I know directly are the states of my own mind, and I have no escape, logically, from the sceptical person who reminds me that I know nothing else, or from the idealist who says that everything that exists is mental through and through. Some would press Descartes' doubt further, and claim that "I think, therefore I am" is already the product of inference working on immediate experience. That there is an 'I' at all is an assumption, or at best a construction. Strictly speaking, Descartes' irreducible minimum ought to have been, "There is consciousness." But as there is no meaning in the idea of a conscious state or a sensation which does not belong to a self, that argument is not very impressive. A more damaging criticism of

Descartes, however, is that consciousness is essentially a relation between subject and object. The indubitable minimum is not "I think, therefore I am", but "I am conscious of something, therefore, I and an external world are."

26. He reveals the revolt from the scholasticism which he had been taught in Oxford, in an almost morbid fear of systematising and of the use of technical terms. He did for the philosophy of the period what Mr. Bernard Shaw did for the economics of a generation ago. He made it speak the language of "the man in the street." His philosophical writings were unusually popular because they represent the essence of the "common sense" of the educated classes of the time.

Locke's system is really a criticism of the mind as a knowing instrument. The sort of question that he sets out to answer is, What can the mind know, what are the limitations of knowledge? He holds that knowledge is the perception of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and he defines an idea as "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks" or "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Ideas are the objects of minds, the appearances of things are those appearances are presented to the mind or "in" the mind.

27. Berkeley (1685-1753), Bishop of Cloyne, is the founder of modern idealism. His philosophy seeks to retain the description of the universe offered by common sense or science, with an explanation of it in terms of the will of God instead of matter. He holds the apparently paradoxical theory that the things we perceive exist only so long as a mind perceives them. "To be" means "to be perceived" (esse est percipi). If an object which I am now perceiving still exists when I no longer perceive it, I must suppose some other mind or minds to be perceiving the

object at all times when I do not perceive it. No single human mind, nor all human minds together, perceive the whole of nature at any time. It follows that nature as a whole must exist as an object of perception for the eternal, all-inclusive mind which is God.

28. There is more to be said in favour of Berkeley's idealism, and it is much harder to refute, than seems probable at first sight. If we use "idea" in Locke's sense of the word, the qualities of external objects, of "material things", are ideas; Berkeley calls them "ideas of sense." This is true of the secondary qualities, as they are called (colour, taste, smell, etc) and also of the primary qualities (shape, size, hardness). It is obvious that for these, to be is to be perceived. Common sense, however, thinks of the qualities as inherent in particular things. We say, the head is read, the brow is high, and so on. We think of a substance, an indefinite, imperceptible "somewhat" which in some inconceivable way "possesses" the qualities, or which "causes" the "ideas of sense" in our minds. Berkeley will have none of these "substances". A "thing" for him, is merely a "collection" of ideas of sense, which is marked off from other "collections" or "things" by a distinctive name. A thing is not a substantial "somewhat" which owns qualities; it is a recurrent group of colours, tastes, smells, etc. Berkeley, that is to say, substitutes "object for a mind" for "quality inherent in a substance." His theory makes no difference, of course, to what we perceive, but it makes a great deal of difference to the way we think of what we perceive. We perceive the effect, certain sensations, and we infer the cause, which is matter. But Berkeley cannot understand how matter can act on spirit. He perceives the effect, sensations, and he infers the cause, God.

29. Dr.Johnson, with characteristically English contempt for subtle thinking, thought that he had

disposed of Berkeley's theory by kicking a stone. In fact, he had done nothing but prove that he did not understand the theory, for, as we have seen, it makes no difference at all to what we perceive. Berkeley accepts the facts of perception as whole-heartedly as do the scientist and the artist. Hardness is hardness, roughness is roughness, brown is brown, whether Berkeley's idealism be true or false. It has, however, been objected to Berkeley's system that it does not make it easy to distinguish what is real, in the world of the senses, from what is imaginary. There is a considerable force in this. In reply to it, Berkeley is reduced to saying that the real is more vivid than the imaginary, and it is not dependent on any will. This is far from satisfactory, for it would not show the delusiveness of the pink lizards which a dipsomaniac saw creeping up the wall, and would prove helpless before the commonplaces of the New Psychology. But Berkeley is not by any means the only thinker who has found the problem of error too much for him.

The most obvious criticism of Berkeley is to point out that "to exist" is certainly not the same as to be perceived. Perception may be the ground of my belief that a particular thing exists. But to say that I see a horse is not the same thing as to say that a horse exists. To say that the horse I see exists is more than to say the horse I see is the horse I see, but the two statements would be the same if "to be" means "to be perceived." An object must exist in order to be perceived, but its existence is not simply identical with its being perceived." The other main objection to Berkeley's system is that it shuts me up to direct knowledge only of myself and my own sensations; the universe is a dream which each man dreams in private. God and my fellow-man are alike inferences drawn from my own sensible experiences.

30. Berkeley, as we have seen, eliminated from

the external things. The qualities, primary and secondary, do not subsist in any "thing" they are not held together as Locke supposed, by any material substance, they are held together by the perceiving mind, and the only existence they have is as "objects" for some "subject"; being perceived is the meaning of existence. Hume went further. There is, he held, no more need to assume or infer a thinking or perceiving "substance" than a material substance. If we can do without a "thing" of which the sensations we have are the qualities, we can, equally, do without the assumption of a "self" which holds these perceptions together. All that we have experience of is our perceptions. We cannot discover anywhere a mind distinct from its perceptions. If we take them away, there is nothing left. Perceptions are our only objects, and knowledge is confined to them, and to the relations between them. There are perceptions or, as Hume calls them, impressions (it is noteworthy that his choice of a word assumes that the mind is passive in knowledge), and there are ideas or images, which are copies, more or less vivid, of impressions. This gives us a test by which "ideas" can be judged. "When we entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion." Hume assumes that an idea is invalid if it has no single distinct impression as its source. Actual sense experience is the only source of knowledge. The idea of substance, for example, is asserted to be invalid because it turns out to be "a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection." Similarly, the idea of cause and effect is dismissed

as nothing, but the product of the persistent habit of human nature to expect similar facts to be followed by similar experiences. The mind, that is to say, is shut up to its own perceptions. And as its own existence is not directly perceived, it is not justified in believing in its own existence.

Hume's philosophy, like every thorough-going scepticism, is riddled with contradictions. It could probably be shown that it is all built up on arguments which are not the copies of single distinct impressions. It all assumes the law of contradiction, for example, that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. But not even the ingenuity of a Hume could derive that law from sensible experience. It is also probable that Hume's scepticism falls to the ground if we decline to make with him the initial assumption that experience is merely perceptions, instead of perceptions <u>of something</u>. Hume is an indication that it is possible for men to lose faith in truth. His philosophy is a refusal to ask the meaning of experience.

31. We are conscious of ourselves by inner sense. We know <u>that</u> we are, we do not know <u>what</u> we are.

32. The Ethica, Spinoza's most important book, is presented in geometrical form, that is to say, in axioms, definitions, propositions, and corollaries. It was all assumed, probably, in the definitions. But it is noteworthy that the mathematical method is not so rigid as it looks, for Spinoza is reduced at times to showing different kinds of notes that his doctrine has a basis in experience.

33. Spinoza does not mean, by immortality, duration in time. Eternity is not anything different from the eternity of the multiplication table, (it is an eternal truth that twice two are four), it means rational necessity. But he distinguishes between immortality and eternity.

"If the way which I have pointed out, he says,

as leading to this result (immortality and true acquiescence) seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected. But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."

34. Kant may seem very negative, almost a pure agnostic. He emphasises the fact that all that we can know is the appearance of things and that the realities which morality and religion demand are never more than assumptions. But in relation to Hume's reduction of the individual mind to a mere succession of sensations, and his denial of the validity of the idea of cause and effect (a denial which, if true, makes the sensations useless as material knowledge of the external world), Kant's claim that some knowledge is possible is itself a great advance. Little is infinitely more than none, and the difference between agnosticism and scepticism is just as great.

35. The philosophy of any period is most influenced by the science which is making most progress at the time, not that about which most is known. So the philosophy of the nineteenth century was dmoniated by biology, and that of the twentieth century shows signs of being moulded, and made most amazingly difficult, by mathematics.

36. All philosophy before Kant is ancient; all philosophy since Kant is modern. It is impossible to grasp what is most characteristic in nineteenth-century thought without some understanding of the difference which Kant made.

Kant's first great contribution lies in the realm of the theory of knowledge. He emphasises and re-emphasises the <u>activity</u> of the knowing and perceiving subject in all experience. It is important to remember that experience is always the experience of some individual, and that the indi-

vidual has a large share in making it. The mind is not a tabula rasa, a clean sheet, on which the external world writes what it pleases; rather is it ever active, choosing and arranging what would otherwise be an undifferentiated chaos. Time and space, Kant suggests, are not objective existences, but are the forms in which we perceive things. It would be more true to say that space is in me than that I am in space. They are the contribution which sensation makes to the systematisation of the manifold experience. In the same way, the understanding does its share in this task through the "categories", or "notions of the understanding." These are such exceptions as cause and effect, substance and accident, unity and plurality, purpose, and so on. They are not to be observed, they are not parts of experience, but rather belong to the mind's organisations of its own experience. They are not invalid, but they belong to what the subject brings to his own knowledge. What we know, then, is not the thing as it is in itself, but the thing as it appears to us. We cannot get outside the subject-object relation; knowledge is fundamental.

Two things follow from this. First, since the knowing, perceiving, active subject plays so large a part in the orgination of experience, it is idle to pretend that the subject himself is no more than a product of the object, an epiphenomenon. Kant placed the argument against materialism in a new sphere. The onus of proof now is on the materialist. It is much more likely, since Bishop Berkeley and Immanuel Kant, that matter has no existence apart from, independent of, mind than that mind has no existence independent of matter. Materialism has been put on the defensive.

The second thing that follows from Kant's theory of knowledge, or perhaps it is the same

blow to materialism put in another way, is the assertion that all that we get in the knowledge the senses give us is <u>appearance</u>. The implicit trust in <u>facts</u> which was at the bottom of much dogmatic naturalism (and the dogmatism of scientists is not less obscurantist and one-sided that of theology) will not bear examination in the light of the critical philosophy. Facts are, in part at least, the creations of the mind and senses that perceive them. "Trust your senses" is the postulate of all thinking in the natural sciences; and apart from the curious contradiction that modern physics builds on this trust of the senses, a theory that the physical universe is entirely different from what it seems to the senses, the perceptions of sense are not the reality as it is in itself, but the reality as it appears to us. Phenomena are all that we know; reality is for ever unknown. As Mr. Charles Marriot has said, "what we call facts are, after all, only convenient fancies for dealing with the mystery of life....The facts, even if they exist at all, are doubtful in character, and the only sure thing about the senses is that they are misleading.

37. In the <u>Critique of Judgment</u>, Kant moves a little from his absolute agnosticism as to the "thing in itself" behind the world of phenomena. Even in the Critique of Pure Reason he had hinted that the supersensible mystery which is the unknown reality behind the world of natural phenomena may be not entirely alien from the reality of the ego. "Both kinds of objects differ from each other, not internally, but only so far as the one <u>appears</u> external to the other; possibly what is at the basis of phenomenal matter as a thing in itself may not be so heterogeneous after all as we imagine." This is from the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Critique of Judgment he is more definite. "There must be a ground of the <u>unity</u> of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature,

with that which the concept of freedom practically contains." What this seems to mean is that the reality with which we have intercourse in our natural experience is God. He is the Absolute with which our experience relates us.

Kant's second great contribution to thought was his negative criticism of the scholastic arguments for theism, which were attempts to prove the existence of God by reasoning which would "coerce" the understanding as does mathematical reasoning. Since Kant it has been generally recognised that none of them can be fully reinstated. The Ontological Argument has been already discussed. The argument for a first Cause seems now a poor attempt to demonstrate by reasoning what would be far from satisfying the needs of faith. The argument from Design (what Kant calls the Physico-theological argument) is the most widely popular of the three. But Kant held, and Newman agreed with him, that the natural world, with the signs of purpose and design that it affords, does not shut a man up, without logical possibility of escape, to say, "This cannot be explained without God."

38. Much that has had a great influence on popular thought, for example, Hegel's Philosophy of History and his Philosophy of Religion, is entirely dependent on the Logik, in the sense that they are applications of what is there proved.

39. At the present time, there is widespread distrust of any kind of metaphysics, and the sort of scientific common sense which assumes materialism in a crude or refined form is very common. Hegel lived in an age which had the confidence in human reason. Idealism held the field. The result is that Hegel is not chiefly concerned to prove that materialism is invalid but to show that this form of idealism is more adequate than its rivals and predecessors.

40. Hegel's argument starts from an absolute

basis. He assumes the category of Being, in other words, that there is such a thing as Reality, or that experience really exists, or that something *is*. Consider the proposition, nothing exists. Then if the proposition is true, the proposition itself exists, and proves itself false by its very existence. Every truth can be denied, but the denial of the category of Being contradicts itself. The first step of Hegel's argument resembles, in some ways, Descarte's *Cogito ergo sum*.

If we abstract from any object of thought every category except that of being, if, that is to say, we remove every quality and adjective until we have nothing left but mere existence, so that we can say literally nothing about the object beyond the fact that it exists, we see at once that this thing is indistinguishable from nothing. The category of mere being implies necessarily its opposite---nothing. But these two are in clear opposition to each other. The law of contradiction will not allow us to say of anything that it both *is* and *is not* at the same time, and in the same sense. But we come to see that these two contradictory categories can be taken together, if we consider each as the complement of the other. Both Being and non-being are included in the idea of Becoming. So the first "movement" in Hegel's *Logik* is from the thesis; Being, to the antithesis, Nothing, and then forward to the synthesis, Becoming.

So the whole dialectic process moves forward. Each category, as the mind apprehends it, reveals its inadequacy by showing that it implies its opposite. The contradiction so manifested is reconciled in the less abstract, richer conception of the synthesis. Then the higher category so arrived at becomes the thesis in a new "triad." And the dialectic process moves in this way from the abstract to the concrete. Its

beginning, as we have seen, is the most abstract conception of all, pure, empty being; its goal is the richest, most adequate, fullest, most concrete of all concepts--Absolute Spirit, within which universality and self-differentiation are one, the Concrete Universal, essentially self-conscious, a conscious unity in all its process, consciously the source of endless distinctions within itself, an identity manifesting itself in its differences, and claiming them as its own.

The elements on which the dialectic process is built up, the "triads" as they have been called, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, deserve a little further consideration. The place of the negative--the denial--the antithesis--in the whole process is very significant. When we remember that Hegel's work as "Professor Extraordinary" at Jena began, at the age of 26, in 1805, when the terrific upheaval of the French Revolution had issued in the Caesarism of Napoleon, and when we recall how inescapable has been the effect of that upheeval on all the spiritual life of the nineteenth century, it is impossible not to see that effect in the inevitable place of the "negative" in Hegel's thinking. To those who were born before the Revolution, and had known the condition of things which had produced it, it was impossible not be believe that, in spite of all its excesses, it represented, not mere chaos and destruction, but the spirit of man set free to conquer and organise the realm of matter and force. It set a real problem, therefore, to idealism; and in the dialectic process we see Hegel solving that problem by showing the necessary place of the negative element, in reality and in the mind's apprehension of it. It is significant, however, that the "triad" form,

with its equality of the antithesis and thesis, becomes less marked as the Logik approaches its conclusion. The higher the categories with which the mind is dealing (the less inadequate, in other words, they are to the description of Reality), the smaller the part played by the negative element. The last transitions are the merging of a category into its successor, with little suggestion of the distinction of positive and negative, as between thesis and antithesis.

We are accustomed in ordinary logic, in the syllogism, for example, to discover that there can be no more in the conclusion than there was in the premises. Does not the fact that Hegel's dialectic begins with the empty and abstract and ends with the Concrete Universal prove that the process is essentially illogical, and that by some mental jugglery what is produced at the end has been imported surreptitiously into the argument. The clearest answer to this difficulty is that given by the late F.H. Bradley. He points out that although the mind has before it a single category, which is more or less abstract so long as it is not the final category in which the process ends, the Absolute Idea itself, nevertheless the whole mind engages in the process, and the total reality of the Absolute Idea is implicit in the mind. We do not realise this presence of the mind, because the mind, while it is actually doing the work of thinking, is not an object presented to itself. But it is the fact that the mind, in which the Absolute thinks itself, is apprehending the more or less abstract category, and the tension so set up between the absolute and the concrete, which produces the result. The Absolute Idea in which the dialectic process ends was, indeed, present from the beginning, but it was present, not to the mind, but in the mind.

Hegel's system is an Absolute Idealism. For

him, subject and object, in all experience, are transparent to each other. Thought is the stuff of reality. It follows, then, that this Logik. the dialectic process, is not only on account of how the mind comes to apprehend reality, it is also an account of reality itself. The science of Logic is identical with metaphysics, the science of the Absolute. The reality of the Universe is one with the reality of reason. The rational is the real, and the real is the rational. In the mind's knowledge of the Absolute, the Absolute knows itself, just as in knowing the Absolute, the mind knows itself.

The dialectic method is the essential part of Hegel's philosophy. All the rest is dependent on that, and is secondary to it. What is called the History of Philosophy, for example, is only a demonstration of how the actual systems of philosophy have been related to those which preceded them, and to those which followed them, as, in the dialectic, the antithesis is related to its thesis and to the synthesis. Similarly, the Philosophy of History shows history not merely as one event after another, but as the dialectic expressed in time. (We must remember, however, that although the dialectic process is a valid description of reality, reality itself is not, in its truest nature, a process, but a timeless and therefore static state, completely rational and perfect.)

39. The decay of Hegelianism has been due, in an age interested in natural science, to "its presumptuous attempt to withdraw the hypotheses of metaphysics from the supreme jurisdiction of facts." In part, however, we must admit that the natural materialism of the ordinary man has rejected Hegel's unfaltering trust in reason.

40. The truth is, of course, that pessimism does not rest upon argument, it only defends itself with argument. In itself, it is a matter

of temperament. A recent view is that it is a disease, partly physical, and pathological condition due to the failure of the endocrine glands to function.

41. The foundation of all scientific thinking is the idea of "cause." We say that one event causes another, or, more loosely, that one thing causes another. A match in a powder magazine causes an explosion. The present state of the universe is the cause, that is, the sufficient explanation of the state which immediately follows. There is no doubt, however, that this whole way of talking is so obscure as to have very little meaning. Lotze showed that it is not only difficult to show the connection between an act of will and an outward event, as when I say, "I will to raise my hand," and my hand moves, it is no easier to show why the motion of one billiard ball causes another ball to move. He tries to explain how one event causes another by emphasising the unity of the universe. If the whole of things is eternal, and therefore unchangeable, we can understand that a change in one part of it must be balanced by a corresponding change in some other part, if the whole is to remain the same.

42. The fundamental ideas in his system are the "Law of the three states" and the classification of the sciences which depends on that law. The Law of thethree states is that each branch of knowledge develops from the theological or fictitious state through the metaphysical or abstract state to the scientific or positive state. For example, diseases used to be looked on as divine punishment; later, they were thought of as entities which "attacked" people; now they are seen to be merely a dislocation of the functional harmony in the organism. Similarly, the "divine right of kings."

43. Pleasure in itself is not evil, and asceti-

cism, except as a training for service, is alien to the religion of humanity. This social reference is implicit in all his teaching.

44. The fundamental fault of Compte as a thinker, however, is that he was unaware of the existence of the problem which Kant set out to solve. He has no theory of knowledge. He does not examine what we can know, and what are the necessary limits of human knowledge. This means that he accepted the claims of science at their face value, without criticising them.

45. By a psychological analysis of our perceptions of the primary qualities, such as size and hardness, as well as of the secondary qualities, such as colour and taste, he arrived at an idealistic view of reality.

46. "The Unknowable," of course, is a contradictory conception, for if we know enough about it to know that it is unknowable we already know a good deal about it.

47. The philosophy of Bergson differs from most idealistic systems in its emphasis on the reality of time.

THE MYSORE UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE.

1. A.R.WADIA: It was Locke who remarked in a bantering tone that people used to reason long before Aristotle discovered the syllogism.

2. The question of right and wrong is not the monopoly of this or that individual, but it is one of the same pressing problem for us all. We may despise the study of ethics as idle, as more dazzling than illuminat ng, but ethical problems in their very nature are bound to thrust themselves on our attention and clamour for solution. People may extol practice at the expense of theory. But nothing can be more harmful than a complete divorce between the two. Except perhaps in crude societies, practice is invariably the fruit of some theory, and practical morality

is bound to be affected by the theory of it. i.e ethics.
3 It is on this shoal of neglected psychology that many an imposing ethical system has suffered shipwreck. A too rigid breaking up of man into body and soul has been the source of countless illusions. The thorough-going ascetic sees nothing but evil in the body; he is all for soul. He would starve his body to lift his soul to higher levels of spiritual insight. Wife, children, mother, all the pleasures and joys of an ordinary healthy existence he condemns with cynical austerity. The forest is his home with the blue sky as its roof; there he would sit ash-covered, cross-legged, with uplifted eyes and joined hands, and thus he would dream away his whole existence.
4. M. Seshadri. The application of Kant's critical method consisted in discovering what the nature of our understanding must be, and what the constitution of nature must be, if the pretensions of the sciences of his time, viz. physics and mathematics, were to be justified. But, says Bergson, of these pretensions themselves Kant made no criticism. Bergson himself realises the strict limitations of the physical sciences. While he has the highest admiration for the achievements of physical science, he yet considers that it cannot give the key to the secrets of life. The true function of science is to subdue nature to the purposes of man. The interest of science is practical. It may be theoretical in form, it may be disinterested in its aim, nevertheless its function is to secure "the perfect fitting of our body into our environment."
5. Bergson considers that both mechanism and finalism fail to explain the evolution of life.He protests that life cannot be reduced to a system of physical and mechanical processes. Mechanism cannot explain the continuity of life. The teleological or the finalist conception, which pre-

supposes a pre-established plan containing in advance all that has to appear in the course of evolution, is an untenable as the mechanistic theory.

6. Our intellect has been evolved in the interests of practical action. The function of the human intellect, in the narrow sense of the term, is to bring about our adaptation to our environment. In trying to understand the things around us we use these categories. They are really the several instruments which our thought has invented in order to meet the needs of practical life. How, then, can these be used to understand the secrets of life?

7. Scientific truth has no intrinsic value. No; since intellectual knowledge is subservient to the needs of practical life, out thought really touches the absolute. The absolute knowledge which our thought gives us is, however, only knowledge of inert matter. It is only when our thought attempts to fathom the depths of life that it fails. Fabrication, invention, and not knowledge is the true function of our thought. If, then, the true function of our thought it to invent instruments, if our thought fails to grasp the true meaning of life, must we give up fathoming the secrets of life? Berson answers,No.

8. Bergson lays particular stress upon the utilitarian character of our mental functions. It is here that he comes very close to pragmatism. Berson is a pragmatist, in so far as he asserts that the categories of our thought have been evolved in the interests of practical life. For him, as for the pragmatist, the value of these categories consists in their practical utility. But while the pragmatist stops here, Bergson goes further. Just because the categories of our thought have been evolved under the stress of practical need, Bergson concludes that they cannot give us a knowledge of the real, our thought being orien-

tated in the direction of practical activity fails to comprehend the richness and heterogeneity of life. Bergson therefore considers that we must invoke other mental powers that lie hidden in us. These powers, when amalgamated with our intelligence, will yield a vision as wide as life.
9. Even if intuition were possible, it would have to remain dumb for want of a medium of expression. All language is the work of thought. Since reflective thought is opposed to intuition, it follows either that the contents of intuition cannot be expressed, or we must be ever falling into contradictions.

Bergson tells us that some of the greatest theories of science have been reached not by a loborious process of reasoning, but by a sudden flash of intuition. For the discovery of scientific hypotheses, "scientific imagination" is necessary. But the scientific imagination is distinguished from the artistic by the fact that it is not an absolute conclusion, but only the starting point for further reflections, while artistic imagination has a value and an end in itself. That is why Bergson's intuition belongs to art and not to science. Bergson himself finds an analogy between art and philosophical intuition, and he reverts to it more than once. When we pass to intuition there is no solution of problems. On the other hand, we pass into a state without problems. Hiffding is therefore right when he says, "Bergson rather paves the way towards a sort of artistic perception than towards a higher science."

By reason of the artistic elements which it contains, Bergson's philosophy is, however, interesting as the articulation of a tendency which, in modern times, comes from the dissatisfaction with rational thinking and experimentalism. We may, indeed, be of the opinion that our thought has missed the due need of place and recognition, we

nevertheless cannot help admiring the power with which Bergson has portrayed, to the eyes of his contemporaries, the eternal battle of science and of life.

10. SCIENTIFIC NOTES.(i) Snakes are not all of them poisonous: in fact, the non-poisionous kinds preponderate. Some, such as the python and the rat-snake (Jaripotu, Kerehavu) though large in size are harmless; the latter may even be reared to great advantage, inasmuch as it is an excellet ratter, and can therefore help to check the spread of plague. (ii) Of the poisonous kind, the more common are--the cobra, the krait, (Kattuhavu) the deboia or Russell's viper (Kolakumandala) and the saw-scaled viper (Kalluhavu), the second one being the most deadly. (iii) In a good many cases fear kills more than the poison does. (iv) Snakes generally raise their progeny through eggs, except the vipers, which bring forth young ones alive. (v)The snake, being a cold-blooded animal, is dull in the cold season and very active in the hot season. (vi) The poison of the poisonous snakes is prepared in glands corresponding to our salivary glands, in the mouth. Each of these glands communicates with a canal in the poison fang on that side, the canal opening at the tip of the tooth. (vii) The minimum fatal dose of cobra poison to man is the weight of a mustard seed (about .02 of a grain). (viii) The time that might elapse between the bite of the snake and the death of the victim varies from 2 to 24 hours in the case of the cobra and the viper; but cases are on record of death having occurred within half an hour of the bite; here, fear must have played an important part. (9) Charms and snake-stones have absolutely no effect on snake poison. (10) First aid to a person bitten by a poisonous snake is to apply ligatures between the part bitten and the heart, then to make deep scratches with a knife all round wound to drive out the poisoned blood.

K.A. KRISHNASWAMY IYER.

INTRODUCTION TO Y. SUBBA RAU'S "MULAVIDYA NIRASA" (Sanskrit).

Mr. Subba Rao has written a valuable work. His Mulavidya Nirasa represents, as its other name implies, the Vedantic Truth as taught by Yajnavalkya, Goudapada, Sankara and Suresvara. Later Vedantins came too much under the power of Reason divorced from Intuition, Intellect severed from Life; and hence in their hands the Brahman of the Upanishads, the soul of the Universe, has become a dry abstraction, a concept void of human interest. It marks the decadence of the metaphysical sense, and the triumph of the dead forms of thought to which myriad-sided Life is forced to conform itself. The result is obvious. Vedanta has ceased to be a living force; and notwithstanding the lip-homage paid to the System of Sankara its followers have become either pessimistic anchorites looking with unconcealed pity on the struggles of the ignorant, or selfish seekers of the goods of life, declaring that Truth is beyond the reach of man, and its realization possible only after death. They argue that so long as we identify ourselves with the physical body we are not enlightened; and, as this identfication is inevitable while we live, to aspire to an immediacy of knowledge, with breath in our body, is to attempt the impossible. Thus even without the insidious efforts of adverse critics, Vedanta has long ago come to lose its vitality, and degenerate into a sanctified superstition.

Mr. Subba Rau has set before him elf the task of pointing out the radical errors that have crept into later Vedanta, defacing, disfiguring and very nearly killing out its central Truth. If by his noble endeavour that Truth can be made to emerge from the obscuration that it has so long suffered, he will have laid every lover of Vedanta under a deep debt of gratitude. To an individual or a na-

tion, nothing is more precious than, spiritual truths--truths in which Vedantic Literature is specially rich.

As this work, to be properly understood presupposes the reader's acquaintance with the later form of Vedanta as expounded at present, I will summarize the main doctrines of the latter and show how they fail to establish the Truth, but turn Vedanta into a mere handmaid of mysticism.

The oneness of Reality which from the time of the Upanishads down to the times of Sankara and Suresvara was not a matter of faith but one of intuitive Experience, not a doctrine accepted on authority but a Truth realized in life, has become a cardinal article of belief based on Vedic assertion admittedly unprovable. The Vedantins of the present day take refuge in Degrees of Reality known as the Paramarthic (Transcendental), and Vyavaharic (empirical), and Pratibhasic (Illusory). In their hands the Transcendental has passed into a pure assumption, since all experience has to be included in the Empirical. Vedantic Truth has thus become an unsupported dogma resting on the sanctity of the ancient writings, but neither attainable, nor demonstrable. With a modesty undistinguishable from self-humiliation, the modern exponents confesss that they cannot aspire to the vision of the ancients, and that they must pass through innumerable births before they can become entitled to Release. A great deal of importance is attached to Samadhi, or trance, and only the gifted are supposed to enjoy the bliss of the Mystic Union. Unchecked Intellectualism has punished itself. While the Pandits cannot overcome the fascination of Vedanta, of the doctrine of oneness, they feel their helpnessness as to how it can be attained in life.

The problem of the world, however, has tasked all their energies. If, as they piously believe, Reality is one, whence this multiplicity and difference of Perceptual Experience? It must be real,

and must be traced to a real source. A difficulty soon presents itself; If Brahman be the cause, then the cause and the effect must belong to the same degree of Reality. The scriptures on the contrary insist on the one only being real. The world must therefore be traced to some other Principle which by the side of Brahman must part with its reality, but in reality, but in relation to the world be as real as the world. In this perplexity, the Post-Sankaras transformed Maya into the Prakriti or the Primordial matter of the Sankhyas, and made it as eternal. This certainly rendered the world more intelligible, but at the same time cast an impenetrable veil over Brahman which has lapsed into a holy fetish, unconnected and unconnectible with Life. The grand structure raised by Goudapada and Śankara on the solid foundations laid by the Vedic seers has in the hands of the Pandits vanished like a summer-dream, like Alladin's Palace by the magic of the African sorcerer.

But their difficulties have only increased. The Avidya of the ancients have somehow to be identified with this Prakriti, and Vidya or enlightenment must dissolve it. His is this miracle to be accomplished? Nothing daunted, they proceeded with their bold speculation, and declared that the unconsciousness of the world which we experience in dreamless-sleep is due to the persistence of Prakriti or the world-principle. It is Maya, Mulavidya, or radical nescience. Mere Avidya, or ignorance, they argue, cannot explain the positive appearance of a world with its Time, Space, and Causation. It is too negative being a mere non-existence and therefore uncreative. On the other hand this root-Ignorance is a positive substance, adequate for purposes of an evolutionary process and is experienced by all in dreamless-sleep in the form of total Ignorance, Ignorance of the world and of Brahman. The waking world is a transformation, an organic growth,

like a tree from the seed, of the Positive Ignorance persisting in sleep. Being a positive principle it gives rise to the positive world; but, again, being of the nature of ignorance, of darkness, it disappears with the light of knowledge. Sankara, they admit, did not put it so explicitly, but his system would crumble to atoms without this doctrine. The Post-Sankaras thus claim the credit of having made the system of non-duality complete and invulnerable.

The reader might fear that in making these attempts to provide the world with a rational explanation, the Post-Sankaras have lost sight of Brahman altogether. But he mistakes. For the Root-Ignorance is, according to them, not distinct from Brahman, though not identical with it at the same time. Brahman does not, it is true, admit of a second entity separate from itself, and is an unqualified one. Yet somehow it must find room in itself for Maya, which is inscrutable and indefinable. Here all enquiry and explanation must cease. The source of Maya cannot be traced further.

The system of Sankhya from which so much has been freely borrowed by the later Sankaras, is perhaps the most rational speculative product of ancient India. It is plain unspphisticated Dualism. It posits spirit and matter as two independent realities. By Aviveka, or beginningless Ignorance, the spirit identifies himself with the physical body which is an evolved product of Nature or primordial matter; and, though essentially pure and blissful, he becomes thereby subject to suffering. Nature exists to help him to regain a knowledge of himself through enjoyment or suffering and finally obtain release from the wheel of Samsara. The system recognises the irremovable distinction between the two primary elements of life, and steers clear of the ontological difficulty of Absolute Monism. Vedanta, however, cannot accept this view. If there be an entity second to the self, and the self suf-

fer from its attachment to the non-self, the existence of the latter is a standing menace to the peace of the self. To say that Nature is always mindful of the interests of the soul is a pious fiction, and a solace derived from it is childish. Besides, as a Kantian might urge, two entities must be related to each other by Time, Space, or causation, and to aver that Nature's changes are unregulated by Time or Causation is untrue, and unthinkable. The mind that thirsts for final solution of the mystery of the dualities of Life cannot rest in two ultimates. Also, speculation can never end. As science advances, and as more and more of the external world comes under the dominion of the Intellect, human views must undergo modification; and since the aim of science is the unification of knowledge, Dualism can only be a half-way house on its journey to Truth. Sankara's perspicacity realized the excellence of the Vedantic Method of discovering Truth. Yajnavalkya and Goudapada sought it in the principle. Our self, that persisted in the three states, transcending the dualistic experiences of every single state. Sankara followed in their footsteps and declared that every other view was but a will of the wisp, an intellectual quagmire in which those that were caught could never extricate themselves. At the end of his examination of the Sankhya and Yoga schools he delivered a note of warning to the reader that however ethically perfect they might profess to be, they were not, as unvarnished dualisms, calculated to put him in possession of the only Truth that can lead to bliss, namely, Absolute Monism.

But the assiduity of the Post-Sankaras is incorrigible, incurable, indefatigable. They dread neither disloyalty to Sankara, nor disaster to Truth. Such is their restless zeal that they hunt up every passage in which he refers to Avidya, though in his own sense of mistake of identity, and hasten to add a comment thereon that it is only the effect-

ed, not the causal Avidya that Sankara means there. Yet, one might wonder, where ever he refers to this causal Ignorance which is the idol of the Post-Sankaras? The fact is that Sankara in his search for Truth, is never dominated by a tender consideraion for the authority of scriptures, or of tradition. He proceeds like a Kant or a Spinoza, carefully analysing Life and experience, but reverently acknowledging the help and experience he derives from the guidance of the Vedic Seers. Whoever reads his masterly introduction to his comment on the Sutras must be filled with admiration for the boldness and frankness with which he states his position, characterizing all human activities as based on an innate tendency to mistake one thing for another; and in this he makes no exception in favour of the Vedas and allows no privilege of age, caste, or learning. The subject in man is the root principle of Life, and cannot be turned into an object nore the latter into the former. This is the irreversible judgment of Reason. Yet we see man identifying himself with the body, the mind, and the senses. What can this be due to but to a radical want of discrimination, to Avidya or Ignorance? The world as the manifestation of Atman is Maya, the counterpart of Ignorance and ultimately identical with it. Now, does Atman possess the Power of manifesting itself, this Maya? The answer is both yes and no. It <u>does</u> seem to have the power, for when as in dreamless-sleep we experience all existence absorbed in Pure consciousness--the only Reality-- the Kosmos, can be referred to no second source and must be inferred to be only a an expression of that Reality. Hence Atman has the Power to manifest itself as the world. Nevertheless, Atman as Pure Consciousness, is eve beyond Time and Change, and can be allowed to have Power only anticipatively with reference to the world regarded as the <u>effect</u>. In itself Atman is beyond Change and

Causation, and to invest it with Power is to regard it as a Cause, to convert it into an empirical entity. Atman is neither a Power, nor a Cause. This conclusion drawn from a study of the Avasthas is final, and cannot be twisted to suit the predilections of the waking intellect. Sankara's procedure is strictly scientific, and he never permits his reasoning to be deflected by any extraneous consideration. In undertaking to expound the teaching of the Sutras, he starts with the Premiss that they establish the Truth of the Atman being the only Reality, and that they are only aphoristic collections, strung on the same principle, of the various doctrines of the Upanisads, the parental source of that Truth. He quotes no authority for his postion, showing thereby that he entirely relies on facts of Life and Experience.

It is thus evident that Sankara who never mentions the persistence of Nescience as a substance, even in his examination of the state of dreamless sleep, accepted the age-old Avidya as a convenient theory, borne out by life, to explain its patent contradictions--a theory serviceable so long as Knowledge has not arisen and truth is not comprehended. The realization of Brahman being All and of its being the only Reality, rings the death-knell of Avidya, which is but an intellectual stop-gap, to spur the soul on the upward course.

Unable to perceive the value of Avidya adopted only as a theory, the later Sankaras in their obtuseness, "boldly rush where angels fear to tread," and fancying a serious defect in the system piusly erect a theory into a fact, and insist on seeing the Causal Ignorance, as a lump of matter, entering the mansion of the Lord--dreamless sleep--as his ever threatening rival, and placidly occupying a second throne by his side!

But a Post-Sankara might say, if in dreamless sleep a man finds himself one with Brahman, and there is no second stity, why, he obtains release whenever he sleeps. How then does it happen that

still he wakes into fetters? If Maya does not persist in sleep, what leads to one's entanglement again in the wheel of Samsara as soon as he wakes? Finally, what is the cause of the reimposition of the world? This objection betrays ignorance of the fundamentals of Vedanta. A man whether waking or sleeping never ceases to be Brahman, never can be other than what he is by nature. His bondage results from his ignorance of his true nature. Hence he need not be made Brahman, he is that already, but he must be cured of his ruinous notion that he is any other. Release occurs so soon as he realizes this Truth. He then discovers that, as Brahman, he neither wakes nor sleeps, but is eternal bliss, free from the bondage of the states. As to the world the idea that it is or can be something other than Brahman is the source of all difficulties. The enlightened is troubled with no such abstraction, and his position is free from doubts of every kind. The waking world cannot desiderate a cause beyond the state in which it appears, for all causality binds together phenomena of the same state only. To sow the seed (Maya) in dreamless sleep that it might gorw up into a tree--the world--in the waking state is ludicrous. No common gardener will approve of the suggestion. The seed and the tree must belong to the same order of things, and to the same Time-series.

But this misguided zeal in refining is, alas, suicidal. In their undeft handling of Vedantic problems the Post-Sankaras have caused Truth to evaporate, knowledge to dwindle into a pretence, and Release, a pious hope. According to their presentation, Atman and Maya alike constitute the inseparable and constant elements of each state, so that as Life does not extend beyond the three states, Dualism is left uncontradicted. For whatever Degrees of Reality is conferred on the Atman is equally claimed by Maya, and the pretentions of the latter cannot in fairness be denied or dismissed.

To escape from this predicament, it is urged that there is a fourth state, Samadhi or trance, in which the claims of Atman, as a higher Reality, can be vindicated. This device is equally futile. The argument that dreamless sleep is not a state of oneness because it is followed by waking, and that this demands the persistence in dreamless sleep of a second entity, namely, Causal Ignorance to account for the subsequent projection of an external world, applies pari passu to the state of Samadhi. For Samadhi must likewise contain the germ of a world, since it is succeeded by a world. If still it is contended that the state of Absolute Identity is experienced in the Final Samadhi from which there is no waking, we shall have no evidence left in experience to testify to it, as the only witness who has enjoyed the oneness will never return to life. Baffled in all directions, and hopelessly pinned to a corner, the Post-Sankaras advocates of Vedanta are compelled to confess that, after all, non-duality is only a matter of faith in the scriptural declaration, and that all doors to knowledge of Truth are slammed in the face of the faithless skeptic. But Sankara deals a knock-out blow to the mere worshippers of Texts by meeting them on their own ground. "Tat Twam Asi" (That thou art) he urges cannot by any means be interpreted to mean "that thou wilt become after you art dead." Thus even the holy text for which all reason is sacrificed by the Post-Sankara cannot save him. Truth cannot be proved, knowledge cannot be acquired in life and Release must occur, on his authority, only after death, that is, after all the organs of perception and reflecxion have suffered dissolution. Sweet life and Reason become positive obstacles in the way of realization. Such is the fate of the later Vedic Monism which is ushered with so much clap-trap, pomp, and ceremony.

But in all earnestness, what are Vedic asser-

tions? Sankara treats them as only suggestions of Truth, which must stand or fall, as we find them confirmed or condemned by Life and Experience. As he shrewdly adds, Truth must in the last resort come to be realized in our own experience, and no blind faith in the dicta of the scriptures or the seers, can constitute it as such. The monster of a positive causal Avidya which the Post Sankaras conceived in a fatal hour and have undergone such throes to deliver, is a still-born child. For rather, it is a veritable canker that eats into the vitals of Vedanta. The sooner it is killed, and its elegy is sung, the better for the well-being of True Vedanta.

"Mulavidya Nirasa" is a magnificent reassertion of the impregnable position of Sankara and of the Vedic Truth and I trust that it will effectively break down the idols of unreflecting belief entrenched behind walls of learned superstition, and later tradition. It has not appeared one day too soon. No other contribution made to spiritual knowledge since the time of Suresvara can compare with it, in depth or achievement. It gains in value from the circumstance that Mr. Subba Rau's acquaintance with European speculation, has enabled him to press into his service the Kantian discovery of Time, Space and Causality as the a priori forms of the intellect, which has greatly facilitated the explosion of the dry logic-chopping of the later Sankaras.

Mr. Subba Rau in his inimitable manner which combines vigour with clearness, has bravely set himself against the misinterpretations that have for centuries been in vogue; and the services he has rendered to the cause of the ancient Truth of fadeless lustre, are simply incalculable. In his indomitable fights with superstition and glittering fallacies, he neither asks nor gives quarter. He reasons where plain facts are involved, and

quotes authorities where these are necessitated by the context. He gives short shrift to irrational dogmas which have hitherto ruled opinion with unquestioned sway. But alas, the life of a scholar, as of an independent thinker, is an incessant battle with antagonistic forces--with afflictions, social obligations, philistine opposition, weak health, and what is most inexorable, finance.

Mr. Subba Rau's work consists of two volumes and he has been able to publish the present, through the encourangement given by the Mysore Educational Department in the shape of a prize from the Devaraja Bahadur Charity Funds (Literary Section). I hope that the second volume will meet with even greater encouragement.

The present work being in Sanskrit may not be so widely useful as if the thoughts were presented in English with which nowadays our own countrymen are more familiar. An English rendering is very desirable, and I intend to supply it after my own work on "Vedanta or the Science of Reality" which is now finished has seen the light of day.

8th THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS. 1932

1. H.H. Maharaja of Mysore: It was in Mysore that Sankaracharya founded the premier Institution for the propagation of his philosophy. It was to Mysore that Ramanujacharya fled from the persecution of the Chola kings to preach his doctrines. It was here that Madhvacharya by his teaching gave an impetus to the Dwaita system. In Mysore again Veera-saivism has flourished for several centuries.

Mysore is also a storehouse of ancient philosophies. There are wonderful manuscript libraries in Sringeri and Sravanabelgola. The Oriental Library in this city, has become fa-

mous through the discovery of the manuscript of the great Kautilya's Arthasastra, which has thrown a flood of light on a most important period of Indian History. It is our endeavour in our Sanskrit College, which has already been in existence for over half a century, to keep alive the philosophic heritage of Bharataversha. Perhaps in these libraries there are still important, but undiscovered, gems of historic and philosophic lore, awaiting the labours of scholars like yourselves. While we are thus loyal to the past, we also try to keep ourselves abreat of modern developments. Mysore has, as you are aware, been selected as the headquarters of the greatest scientific institute in India.

2. Religions are apt to be two closely associated with particular territorial boundaries. Philosophy is free from such associations; but by its very nature it is confined to an aristocracy of learned men. But each can help the other. Philosophy can aid religion by inducing the clarity of thought which tends to purify it and to disperse the clouds that obscure the truth. Religion can aid philosophy by spreading abroad to the people at large the truths that philosophy has thus revealed. In the last resort the good and the true will meet in the God of religion, the Absolute of philosophy.

Philosophy has come to be looked upon as an abstruse subject, far removed from the stress and strain of life. But a philosophy that is remore from life forfeits all claim to our homage. It should give us a co-ordinated world-view which comprehends all the aspects of life including religion. Philosophy can justify its existence only by the creation of a broad-based standpoint for the study of arts as well as of sciences: physical, biological and social. The world to-day suffers from excessive specialisation and we are apt to miss the broad vistas of life because

of our circumscribed outlook. It was not so long ago that politics and economics as well as the physical sciences were nourished by philosophy and grew up under its fostering care. They are now grown to manhood, and are apt to be somewhat contemptuous of their philosophic ancestry. None the less they need to-day the guiding counself of philosophy. Our economic and our political difficulties point to the need for comprehensive thought, a need which philosophy alone can hope to meet. And you all know that the highest art and literature of a people are the natural outcome of their philosophy. It evaluates all experience and thought and it is thus co-extensive with life.

Indian philosophic traditions are supremely rich, but they need to be vivified by the breath of life to-day. You gentlemen, by your knowledge of western thought as well as your inborn zest for our own philosophy, are in a position to reconcile the warring claims of narrow specialisation and broad-based culture. I trust that the Indian Philosophical Congress will play its part in the renaissance of philosophy which the highly distracted condition of the world demands today.

3. S. Radhakrishnan: I cannot resist an invitation which brings me to Mysore, a place which is so dear to me in several ways. While philosophical studies are under a cloud in other parts of India and even departments of education are looking askance at them, here at any rate, they are growing strong. It will be impertinent for me to refer to His Highness's great love for it. I consider it a rare good fortune for this Congress to be opened by one, who is so well-known for his philosophical learning, religious earnestness and austere simplicity of life. Such a combination is rare among any but it is unique among the princes of this land. For his presence

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here and his wise words we offer him our most cordial thanks.

I am sorry that one riper and older is not in my place to-day, for philosophy is not a matter of dialectics and intellectual jugglery but a product of life and meditation on it.

4. Philosophical wisdom is possible only for those who have disciplined their whole nature and not merely those who have sharpened their intellectual powers. Wisdom is integral thinking, while knowledge is fractional thinking. While the latter is more in evidence in science and mathematics, which can be understood by all who possess a trained intellect, the exercise of the former is demanded for an understanding of poetry and philosophy.

5. Integral thinking or intuitive understanding is responsible for the great insights of philosophy and it is not without reason that philosophy in India is conveyed by the term "darsana" which literally means 'sight' or 'insight'. Philosophy as a darsana implies that the ultimate reality is something of which we are directly aware and is not a matter of speculative construction or logical syntheses.

6. Bradley correctly represents the teaching of Hegel when he observes: "For thought what is not relative is nothing." The Being of Sankara is one which suffers no second. Human thought is bound up with distinctions while the real is above all distinctions. Our linguistic symbols and logical concepts veil the Real and reduce it to an idol.

7. Simply because we characterise it by negative terms, it does not follow that it is non-being. It is neither being nor non-being as it is above both these. It is sad asat tat param. Sankara recognised the possibility of directly apprehending the ultimate reality in a way which cannot be equated with either ordinary sense-perception or logical inference.

It is what he calls aparoksanubhuti. It is not individual phantasy or illusion. It is unfortunate to characterise this view as mysticism and be done with it. Mysticism is a blanket term, a portmanteau expression which covers a miscellaneous host of ideas, occult visions, apparitions, trance and ecstasy, pious gushing, luminous vacancy, intoxicated erotism, a striving after the bliss of the bridal chamber. While Sankara admits the value of the eightfold yoga, it is only as a means to samyagdarsana, a perfect insight which is far removed from any kind of sentiment or feeling. Nor does he believe that this direct awareness of spiritual reality is a mystical insight or heavenly vision or special revelation. It is the normal experience of all those who get to the depths of the soul. It is the possession of self as such and not of this or that special individual.

8. The last word on the structure of reality cannot be uttered by the epistemologist who leaves us with open alternatives. While it is disloyalty to reason to deny the known character of the world, it is not disloyalty to reason to note that it is something more than what it known of it.

9. From the vividness of the experience arises emotional intensity but these accompaniments are not a guarantee of the truth of the object intuited. These intuitions, are simply because they carry conviction to the seer, are not to be taken as true. Subjective certitude is different from logical certainty. The sense of assurance is present even when the object is imagined and such unreal objects, so long as they are believed to be actual, evoke feelings and attitudes quite as intense and effective as those excited by real ones. The strength of assurance and the intensity of the experience are not a proof of the reality of the object experienced. Intuitions, sensuous as well as spiritual, require to be

tested and criticised before they are accepted as valid. Questions of validity are not answered by the experiences themselves. Certitude is not certainty. Psychological objectivity is not ontological reality. While religion may be satisfied with the sense of convincedness, which is enough to foster spiritual life, philosophy is interested in finding out whether the object believed in is well-grounded or not.

10. Philosophy is dismissed as a narrowly intellectual affair dealing with proofs and evidences with the result that it has become negative and arid.

11. We should recognise that happiness is found in the adequate realisation of all human powers. Physical prowess, mental cunning and spiritual peace are needed. on "ATMANISM"

12. P.N. Srinivasachari*. Metaphysics is the comprehensive intellectual effort to form a theory of reality by the thinking together of all the sides of experience.

13. Naturalism, as a more refined type of materialism explains the self in terms of sensation, sensation in terms of cellular activity and cellular activity in physico-chemical terms and thus traces the wisdom of a Socrates to the whirling of atoms. The tension in matter, according to Smuts, becomes the attention of psychology; the chemical affinities become appetite in life, purposiveness of will, and finally the ideals of life. The holistic activity starts with the dynamic creativity of matter, and ends with the self as the last term in the series. Scientific intellectualism, as a still more refined form of naturalism, seeks to avoid the risks of materialism by allying itself with agnosticism. In Spencer's theory, naturalism ends in agnosticism and its antinomies.

14. In explaining the higher by the lower, the end by the origin, naturalism puts the cart be-

fore the horse. As Smuts himself says, the naturalist wrongly infers the primacy of matter from its priority, and, in the name of simplicity, the concrete becomes shadowy and the abstract becomes real; the physical is the primary and the metaphysical secondary. The scientific understanding in its excessive zeal for objectivity has an aversion for the metaphysical. But, as Ward points out, we can never divest ourselves from our consciousness. In ignoring the work of thought, it presupposes thought.

15. There is a third type of physical philosophy represented by Eddingtom, Einstein and Whitehead. As Muirhead remarks, mathematicians have not been for some time on speaking terms with metaphysicians, but now, there is an attempt at a searching criticism of the scientific presuppositions and the co-ordination of results. The fundamental postulates of science have become the problems of philosophy and the scientist has turned a metaphysician. "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and enter on a thorough criticism of its foundations."--Whitehead. According to Northrop, Greek thought as the pattern of all later thought gave a threefold solution of matter,--the mathematical, the physical and the functional. The mathematical lays stress on rationality, the physical emphasises atomic motion and the functional, teleology. This triple movement is discernible in our own time in the mathematical theory of Eddington, the physical theory of Einstein and the functional theory of Whitehead. Muirhead is glad that the concept of nature is now affliated with the idealistic philosophy. To Eddington, the world of space-time is a system of mathematical or logical relations, but a genuine law is transcendental and there is something in us that has value for the eternal. But as Hoernle says metaphysics cannot be modelled

on mathematics. In the words of C.D.Broad, "It is a bad thing where a science and the philosophy of that science are mixed up."

Einstein's physical theory of space-time or the four dimensional continuum denies the Newtonian view of the homogeneity and absoluteness of space and time, which Kant regarded as final, and insists on the relativity of space-time. The structure of space time varies with its contents. The view of nature as a system of events in space-time related to the mind has changed the orientation, but it is on the borderland of relativism and subjectivism and the Jain philosopher may seek affinities between relativity and his theory of nayas or standpoints of knowledge.

15. There cannot be a self-complete philosophy of nature as perception of things pre-supposes the existence of the percipient.

As Broad points out, science has an aversion for the intrusions of metaphysics, and, we may add, metaphysics has an aversion for the intrusions of science, but it utilises the method of science while rejecting its fractional views. The philosophy of nature, as re-interpreted by Atmanism, insists on the reality of the world of space-time-causality as a fleeting flux of events and its relative externality to the finite self. The self as the subjet of experience and nature as the object of experience are distinguishable, but not divisible. Nature serves as an environment or opportunity for, and not the cause of, the moulding or perfection of the self.

16. Life has no mechanistic origin, but is sui generis and is more comprehensive than matter. Bergson and Driesch bring out the inadequacy of the materialist hypothesis by referring to the phenomena of mutation and metamorphosis.

17. The philosophic agnosticism of Kant which was developed by Hamilton and Mansel, culminated in that of Bradley and the only logical conclusion

of the self-contradiction of relational thought is its abolition and not transcendence.

18. Alexander's theory of the deity of the goal of the evolutionary nisus, in which God as having the quality of deity is yet to be, is simply deification of space-time and making deity spatio-temporal. It is naturalistic fallcy to explain the universe as the hierarchy with space-time event at the bottom and deity at the apex. His theory, as Dr. Radhakrishnan says, suffers from an anti-metaphysical bias. It is a mere tautology and "verbal sedative," as it says that life and mind emerge because they emerge. The emergence of matter, life, mind, etc., is abrupt and unintelligible. Hoernle has no faith in the progression as it may be beyond deity, and Haldane observes that Alexander produces the real world very much as a conjurer produces rabbits from a hat. No one worships space-time as the absolute and finds saving experiences in it; it is an unorthodox messianic hope expressed in modern thought.

19. Monism relie on the self-identity of reality and the absoluteness of the one, and dismisses the world as an illusion.

20. P.P.S. SASTRI.* Philosophy is an expression of wisdom that is not academic but the product of fullness of experience. In the case of Indian philosophy in particular, speculation divorced from life and its needs is peculiarly unreal. And yet, unfortunately we find that the study of Indian philosophy is still largely mechanical, a kind of observation of an archaic specimen, not an introduction to the waters of life-giving spring. That such a state of affairs exists is partly due to the dominance of Western notions of metaphysics as a peculiar intellectual game. That such a game can be interesting, that it may have valuable reserves of its own, that if pursued to its very limits it may fulfil itself in a vision that is more vital--there is no gainsaying. But

*on "INDIAN PHILOSOPHY & PRESENT SITUATION"

such a process is needless waste in the case of us, inheritors of the vastly different Indian tradition. As the Hindu Scholiast would say, it is to infer from the foot-mark the existence of the epephant seen with one's own eyes.

21. What we try to learn is what our ancients said, not why they said it. We treat our seers as intellectual machines grinding out dogmas more or less true and fail to realise that they were human beings re-acting in definite ways to concrete situations, from the study of whose reactions we can derive profitable lessons for our present and future.

22. Every creature is bound in its due station because of its own acts in a previous life, that the inevitable consequences of that life have to be worked out in particular stations in this life have to be worked out in particular stations in this life through duties, obligations, enjoyments and sufferings incidental thereto.

23. It is again an undoubted truth that while truth and goodness are unitary, not all truths are true for all nor all goods good for all. The acquisition of fresh knowledge depends on the previous existence of a suitable apperceptive system.

24. If we would be wise in dealing with both sections of the community, we should devise means which would alienate neither. Would it not be better to create a new cult or to invent a deity than arbitrarily force the one into the society of the other. Such a synthetic reform is not unknown to Hinduism.

25. If humanity has a birth-right and a goal, it cannot be cheated of either. But the attainment of it can be hastened and made less tortuous by efforts inspired with insight. And if philosophy is studied in correlation to practices mentioned above, if fractional thinking is not introduced even into the study that is meant

to correct that mode of thinking, then we may find solutions for our problems by a mode of synthesis which while giving unto each part its due will yet quicken the evolution of the whole.

26.*S.G. SATHE:Socrates was practically the first to deal with ethical problems. He made virtue identical with (in the sense of following from) knowledge. One who knows his interest or good is bound to follow it, he argued. As a corrollary from this tenet, he held that virtue could be taught. If virtue is knowledge, vice must be ignorance. But if vice is ignorance, you cannot blame or censure a bad man. Immorality must accordingly be considered to be, in principle, the same as a physical malady. Punishment with Socrates was only curative or deterrent, not retributive.

27. The inevitable difficulty viz. how did this unending stream of Karma at all start and why should there be different Karmas for different souls? remains unsolved. But probably the impossibility of its solution is due to the difficulty itself being an absurdity, and there cannot be a rational solution for an irrational difficulty. Of this type is the question--how did the stream of Karma start? The question is exactly like the question--when did the time process make its beginning? "When" itself means, "At what time." The question is therefore reduced to--At what time did time start? Time cannot be measured or marked by time just as the eye cannot see or the hand cannot hold itself. Karma is often identified with Maya, and "starting" i.e. "beginning" is a Mayik idea. An attempt to explain Maya in Mayik terms is absurd. Hence the reply to the above difficulty is that the difficulty itself is absurd. The answer that is conventionally given is that Karma or Maya, in common with time, is beginningless. It is therefore that the existence of Karma is recognised as inevitable, without prying further into its secret.

* on "THE GROWTH OF ETHICS"

"A NEW THEORY OF EMOTION" by

28. Dr. SUHRIT CHANDRA MITRA: With refreshing candour Bentley asks whether the subject of emotion is after all still anything more than a mere chapter-heading in the text-books of psychology.

29. Freud took the lid off the mind and all that lay hidden underneath became revealed. The gates were opened and the prisoners at once escaped. The individual became conscious of the powerful emotions that move him and psychologists were compelled to pay attention to them. In other words, the newly released emotions spread over all and everybody had to take serious notice of them. At the same time that Freud was reconstructing theoretically the individual man after ridding him of his repressions, the world was practically carrying out the task of reconstructing itself and removing its own repressions. The war ruthlessly broke down all barriers with the consequence that the elemental passions of mankind and their forceful emotions, repressed so long by the process of civilisation, dashed out of the caves in their undisguised nakedness and throbbing with all their unmitigated virility. A surer test and a better experiment no psychological theory had found before. Freud was fortunate, as no theorist ever was, that just as he was beginning to forecase the inevitable consequences of unnatural repressions the world staged a large-scale experiment, unsurpassed before in its magnitude, to put his bold assrtions to the test and to prove his fundamental assumptions to be valid.

30. That perception is not conditioned by external factors alone is not a novel statement to make. It has been observed that a bush may easily be perceived as a bear under the stress of fear. But there need not be any highly excited state of emotion to transform the object of perception. What happens in an intense form in that exaggerated state of emotion takes place

in normal proportions at the ordinary state of feeling--at the state which Krueger would perhaps describe as the feeling-like state.
31. Consciousness forms only a part of mind, a very small part as is now well-known, and therefore cannot be properly regarded as the essential characteristic of it.
32. Herbart, the great champion of reason, found the task of metaphysics to be freeing the general ideas from the contradictions that they contain. He named his philosophical treatise on education as <u>The Aesthetic Presentation of the Universe</u>. Is not the term "aesthetic" significant? Kant's great mission was to bring back to philosophy that harmony which she had lost by the conflict of the two opposing schools of thought, viz. Rationalism and Empiricism. Hegel's dialectic is the continued attempt to establish a Synthesis between the Thesis and the Antithesis. The view has been expressed that progress always proceeds by way of over-emphasising now one aspect and then another. Without subscribing to the implication of the word 'progress' I readily agree with the view, for that only illustrates my fundamental conception. According to the principle of harmony the disturbed equilibrium caused by the over-emphasis of one aspect must necessarily be sought to be counterbalanced by the subsequent over-emphasis of the previously neglected aspect.
33. <u>G.R. MALKANI</u>:* We must either be able to reconcile the two concepts with each other, or in the alternative decide to reject either the one or the many as unreal.
34. What is one cannot also be many, unless either the or or the many is illusory. In the same way, the one cannot <u>become</u> the many without losing its one-ness, and the many cannot b<u>ecome</u> one without ceasing to be many.
35. It is this thought which inspires the proposition that the truly real must be indivisible; for it if is divisible, its substantiality is

*on "<u>THE ONE AND THE MANY</u>"

not truly in it but in its parts, and we should have to look for our reality in some ultimate indivisible parts and in nothing else.

36. It might now be urged that the last remaining alternative, namely that the one alone is real, is also not tenable; the conception of the one involves the conception of the many. In pure non-difference, there will be nothing to prescribe any boundary, any limit, any distinction to being. How can we then significantly call such being <u>one</u>? When we call anything one, we separate it out from a manifold and constitute it into a unit in itself. The unbounded, the unlimited, and the undifferentiated, if it did exist, would be one in no sense of the term.

We admit that the conception of the one, as it is used in mathematics and in ordinary speech is the conception of what is limited or what is only one among many. Its specific sense is that of a unit that can be repeated in almost identical form and measure.

37. A universe in which nothing was repeatable, and nothing could be got twice over--in other words, in which everything was unique,--would not be amenable to a numerical treatment. How can we get anything that is <u>one</u>, since we can nowhere proceed from a given something to a second? Still we may admit that where a distinction can be made, the idea of number can also be applied. We can thus give meaning to <u>one</u>. But <u>at</u> the same time, this only shows the limitation of the conception of the <u>one</u> in ordinary use. It does not show that the unlimited and the undifferentiated cannot be. That is the only <u>real</u> one, if one we may call it; for it is one without a second.

Whether such an undifferentiated unity exists or not, is a question that can be asked. But one thing that is certain is that if anything exists it must be such a unity; for the notion of this unity involves no self-contradiction, while there is self-

is self-contradiction in the notion of the pure many or the notion of the one-in-many. The one in our sense then alone is a possible existent.

We shall now proceed to give some further indication of this non-dual being. It is evident that what can be objectified can only have a limited being; it will be <u>this something</u> and <u>not that something</u>. It will exclude, and also be excluded. In itself, it will be divisible and it will stand in relations without which it can be nothing. The ultimate unitary being cannot therefore be objective in character. Can we find this being in the subject? But our idea of the subject is of something that is related to the object, the subject is therefore itself known; it cannot be said to be wholly unobjective. Can we suppose that the true being is the unity of both subject and object? But that unity is nowhere realised, and by the very nature of the terms can never be realised; for the object must always be other to the subject. If it ceases to be other to it, it ceases to be object. How can the opposition be overcome?

It might be thought that the unity is realised in all our experience. Experience is a single unitary whole from which the subject and the object are obtained by abstraction. That may be so. Still the distinction of the two terms is either real so far as this experience goes, or it is not. If it is real, the unity is not realised. If it is not real, then there is no reconciliation of any real terms. What is certain is that once the relation of otherness between the object and the subject in experience is recognised, it cannot be supposed to be cancelled without cancelling the fundamental dualism of terms. It will no doubt be said that notwithstanding this dualism, experience is a single whole or a unity. But either it is a unity with an inner contradiction; or it is a unity in which one of the terms, namely the object

is reduced to falsity, being regarded as having no existence apart from the experience of it. In no case is a real dualism of terms overcome, and a real subject and a real object reconciled in being. The so-called unity through otherness is a contradiction in terms. If otherness is conquered, there is no otherness left in the unity, if it is not conquered, there is no unity yet.

Let us suppose that the unity is realised in some kind of experience in which the distinction of the subject and the object and so the relation of otherness between them is completely lost. have we any such experience? It might be said that in feeling there is no dualism of the subject and the object. The felt is not something other to the feeling of it. It has no existence except in feeling. Tooth-ache, for example, and my feeling of it are not two distinct terms such that the former can be said to be other to the latter. Similarly, the feeling of well-being. The same thing is both feeling and the felt looked from different points of view.

Now feeling in this sense is a subjective fact with an objective character. We speak of the perception of the table as a distinct perception from the perception of the wall. Just in the same way we speak of the feeling of well being as a distinct feeling from the feeling of pain. Thus feeling is to be distinguished from the pure subjective function. It is ultimately not wholly unobjective. Although therefore the relation of otherness might not exist between the feeling and the felt, any actual feeling cannot but have this relation to awareness as such or to the pure knowing fuction. Feeling cannot be the ultimate unity we seek.

It might be thought that the unity is realised in some form of mystic experience. That indeed may be so. Still we cannot help asking, how is the miracle to be achieved without annulling the terms?

For the object cannot be the subject, and the subject cannot be the object; they have nothing common between them. Their unity is impossible by the very nature of the terms. We therefore cannot help thinking that if the unity were realised, it would not be found to contain any suggestion of two terms at all, and no suggestion of any reconciliation between them.

We are told that in absolute experience, the distinction of the subject and the object ceases. But if that is so, that experience would have no content. It would be just pure intelligence that is confronted by nothing and knows nothing. This intelligence is the true ultimate subject. The empirical subject or the ego is confronted by objects and is necessarily related to them. It is also impermanent, it comes and goes. But that which reveals this subject, and its coming and its going, is not itself revealed. It is self-revealed if we might say so. It is the eternal light that never comes and never goes. This enduring essence of being which is the ground of the subject-object relation is their only true unity. Distinctions are available within objects, and in the subject-object relation; they cannot be carried further to the ultimate ground of all appearances. What is not a subject, and is not confronted by anything, cannot know any distinctions and cannot stand in any relation of otherness to aught else. It is the true ultimate unity that we have been seeking to know. The many of our ordinary experience are related to it as false and illusory appearances are related to their underlying substratum; for the many can never be truly one except in the sense that the many are not; their appearance is only an illusory appearance.

38, RASVIHARY DAS*. Whenever we think of knowledge we think of it as having an object. To know is to know something. Knowledge thus implies object and goes with it. Since knowledge and object go-to-

*ON "KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECT"

gether, it seems we must suppose that they are related, for relation is nothing but the togetherness of things. Moreover, as knowledge implies object, because one thing cannot imply another without being related with it. The chair on which I am sitting is not related to the coming German Election and cannot by any means imply it. On the other hand the chair as a constructed object implies a maker and is so related to the carpenter who made it. Thus there is a prima facie case in favour of some relation being present between knowledge and its object.

39. Western Idealists try to make our understanding of this relation deeper by suggesting that knowledge and object are not two different things but are only inseparable aspects of one and the same thing, because neither of the terms is available apart from the other.

40. D.M. DATTA. * We do not know the existence of any external object and that immediately; and therefore, the question as to how it is known does not at all arise. It is the answer give, as is well known, either by sceptics who deny the knowledge of external objects or by subjective idealists who altogether deny the existence of the external objects. The chief objection against this answer is that unless we believe in an external object we cannot explain why there should be any sensation, the nature and duration of which are not wholly dependent on our minds. Some idealists have tried to explain this charge away by holding that the reason why there are some perceptions which are not wholly dependent on our wills is not that these are caused by extra-mental objects, but that these are caused by some forces within the mind which are not under the control of the mind as the knower. But this defence only admits in a round-about way the existence of factors other than and therefore external to ourselves as knowers and thus amounts to the confession that

*on "EPISTOMOLOGY OF PERCEPTION"

there are realities external to the knower. There are many other well-known grounds on which subjective idealism is rejected; but as this one is sufficiently conclusive, we need not mention any other here. In fact, so far as the psychological premise in question is concerned, subjective idealism is wholly incompatible with it, because the premise involves the belief in external objects as the sources of the sense-stimuli. The psychological account of sense-perception can stand only if subjective idealism be false and subjective idealism also can stand if the psychological account be false. The attempt to deduce subjective idealism from the psychological view- (as is sometimes done by some who start with the psychological origin of sense-impressions and showing thereby that all that we know about the objects arethe mental changes, conclude that we do not know anything except these changes) involves the contradiction of the premise.

41. In criticising subjective idealism we have already shown the reason why at all we are led to suppose something other than the knowing self as being responsible for a sense-perception. We find that the nature and duration of the sensation are not wholly dependent on ourselves and hence we are not satisfied to think of the sensation as being wholly due to ourselves.

42. P. NARASIHAM.* Science is not self-critical, introspective. It does not analyse its own right of knowledge or our ability to know. Where science is silent, philosophy tries to speak. But yet the philosopher or the metaphysician seems also to fall into the same habitual groove of the so-called "scientific" way of thinking. We are not yet clearly aware that we are using only the external or objective categories of knowing, and that there is besides, or must be, some internal or central view-point which puts us right into the heart of things where knowing and being are not two but one.

*on "THE SOUL OF KNOWLEDGE"

43. There is again the awkward question how we know that we know. Our logics do not help us in this direction, either the quality-judgment logic of Aristotle, or the quantity cum space logic called mathematics, or even the logic of causal thinking of our inductive sciences including the semi-mechanical theories of Evolution. They all express only the onlooker's point of view, getting deluded by the ambiguity of the question "How". The charge of materialism in made against the scientific outlook because it is uncritical and unreflective of its own postulates, and does not admit or is unaware of a different way of knowing. It merely studies objects as only objects. The science that is honestly self-conscious and introspective can never become materialistic, but rather would point out that there must be an as-yet unknown factor within the very heart of nature which evades every objective observation.

44. We may attempt to examine the significance of the idealistic "slogan" Esse is percipi, what is true about it and what false. It is easy to understand that it is only a psychological truism to say that the "being" of a thing for us is and can be only in terms of our experience, and that to speak of an existence in terms beyond such experience is psychologically at least ultra vires. This interpretation, however, does not help us any further as a theory of Reality. Of reality as such, in terms of our ordinary knowing the statement is preposterous. We cannot agree with a Berkeleyan Idealism that shows scant respect to the normal "instinctive" distinction that man (let alone the brute, which is only an 'idea' for Berkeley) makes between his subjective act of knowing and an objective being, that seems to voraciously swallow up all objects by simply knowing them, and that miserably impoverishes all reality by reducing it to

"bare" human souls, a god and the play of "ideas" between them as if by a sort of miraculous wireless. It makes the story of evolution from the lowest to the highest forms a meaningless delusion. We should rather have a Leibnizian view that regards everything as at once both real and living. But from the point of view maintained here regarding real knowledge, the phrase Esse is percipi may be interpreted rather as containing a profound truth, as pointing out towards the very one-ness of knowing and being. While it is not true of the mere "mortal" man, it is utterly true of "divine" man. It is the "saving knowledge" of the Upanishads that the ultimate Subject is only one and the object is also Himself.

45. HUMAYUN Z.A.KABIR* The preponderance of epistemological over ontological interests which characterises modern Philosophy may have begun with Locke, but it is in the Philosophy of Kant that this tendency reached its full development. Locke started with an enquiry into the nature of human understanding, but this enquiry was merely preliminary to an examination of the objects of our awareness in order to determine their ontological nature and status. The recognition of substance as a mystical "I know not what", mysteriously characterised by primary or original qualities, remains as evidence of his inheritance from the ontological metaphysics of his predecessors.

For Kant the problem always was, not what things are, but how is it that knowledge is ultimately at all possible. Human knowledge is a process in time, coming about in a finite individual mind and yet it claims to hold true for all minds at all times. To explain this paradox, it is necessary to examine the judgment and its types, for knowledge exists in the medium of thought and the most fundamental act of thought is the Judgment.

46. The principle of mechanical causation which is exalted in the first critique leads in the end

* on "THE INDIVIDUAL IN KANT"

to its own negation. In causation, we start by premising that we must not regard the nature of things as determined by their spatio-temporal positions, but their time and space relations as determined by their nature. This however cannot be their nature merely as parts of a series, for they could not be even parts of a series unless they were something more than mere parts, for a system of relations without relata is a contradiction in terms. Yet in causation we state relations of things and the more we extend the causal chain, the more do things lose their independent individuality and become merely determined points in a space-time order. The perceptual element seems to become less and less important, till at last, the whole or reality is sought to be represented as the quantitative function of some element whose quality is neutral or indifferent. Change itself becomes impossible as the result of this attempt to reduce everything to a synthesis of the homogeneous. There are no qualitative differences among the elements of reality to allow for change from one quality to another, and quantitatively, its magnitude remains constant, so that the process of explaining change comes in the end to denying change altogether. "In the Absolute there is no change."

47. HANUMANTHA RAO. Mysticism is not what a philosophy starts with or works with; it is something which it has recourse to in the last resort. It cannot be asserted as philosophy though a philosopher may have to assent to it when he is at his wit's end. This is not to disparage mysticism. Myst cism has its own legitimate place--perhaps a place higher than the one assigned to philosophy, but it has no place in philosophy as a philosophic principle. Nor can theism be the cardinal principle of idealism. Theism is more a postulate of religion ra-

ther than of philosophy. To make theism the chief principle of a philosophy is to allow religion to reign supreme in philosophy.

48. The epistemological assumption that the world as an intelligible whole is an idea, has in recent years played so important a role in the history of idealism that it has technically come to be recognised as the cardinal principle of idealism. It was the peculiar epistemological turn that Descartes gave to modern philosophy that is responsible for making much of it.

49. It is the aim of philosophy to evolve a conception of the universe that explains and unifies the manifold forms of experience.

50. R.N. KAUL*: The confusion was worse confounded by the writings of the Empiricists such as J.S. Mill and Prof. Bain, and by "the psychological method" which they had inherited from their brilliant predecessors, Locke, Berkely and Hume. The use of the term "idea" in a rather loose and vague sense was one of the prevailing confusions. Owing to the psychological attitude prevalent, an idea meant a state of consciousness, a subjective entity existing in our heads, and judgment, like Association, meant the linking of these isolated atoms, on the analogy of physical or chemical principles. It is no wonder then that in logical theories of judgment and inference, current at the time, this fictitious atomism of the idea crept in almost as a matter of course and right, and gave rise to disastrous results. Thus Bradley was compelled to start by clearing up this confusion in the use of the term 'idea' and he does so by the statement that for logical purposes we have to take "ideas" in a particular sense viz. Smybols. To explain what he means, he makes a three-fold distinction between (i) existence (ii) content and (iii) meaning. Every idea has the first and the second aspect, but it is with its third aspect viz. its meaning, that the Logician is concerned. For

*on BRADLEY'S LOGIC

logic all ideas are signs used for the sake of their meaning or significance. "The idea, in the sense of mental image, is a sign of the idea in the sense of meaning."

51. Bradley's Principle of Logic which is perhaps the most frequently quoted in modern idealistic literature remains as a striking reminder to us of his empirical and dualistic tendencies. "That the glory of this world in the end is appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstraction, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we cannot embrace them. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that Whole which commands our devotion than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful."

This change of front, this backsliding, as it were, puzzled even the most sympathetic and understanding of his readers. Bosanquet, in his "Knowledge and Reality" a criticism of Mr. F.H.Bradley's "Principles of Logic" which appeared in 1885 writes "If I have read Mr. Bradley right, he joins a thorough understanding of the ideal of knowledge to a peculiar impatience of something, I do not quite know what, in the ordinary doctrine of relativity." It was only natural that a hostile critic should suspect Bradley of playing fast and loose with a double standard--on the one hand, that of a stable intellectual construction; on the other, that of correspondence with sense-given fact. In the words of Bosanquet, Bradley "cherishes a deep discontent with any effort to resolve reality into an intellectual movement."

52. As soon as we move out of this native realism which makes the physical event an independent

happening in the physical world (whether there be any mind to conceive it or not), we find that we have removed the only foundation there could possibly be for creating a new fiction, viz. that of a mental event or a happening in the soul. Just as there is no independent nature in the event called "rising of the sun" apart from the meaning it has for the conceiving mind, similarly there is no independent aspect of my "thinking" a particular thought, apart from the meaning and significance of the thought itself.

53. One of the reasons which consciously or unconsciously influenced Bradley in this matter was his irreconcilable distrust of Hegelianism. Though he never claims to have mastered Hegel's system perfectly, yet so far as he understood it, he could not accept what seemed to him an essential part of that system. "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if "thinking" is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational.. the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism."..Principles of Logic: Preface to first Edition, p.x.

54. T.R.V. MURTI: "NAGARJUNA'S REFUTATION OF MOTION AND REST.

Nagarjuna's refutation of motion and rest presents several interesting features and raises some big issues. Zeno denied motion; he did not disturb rest. Nagarjuna performs the seemingly impossible task of denying both at once. Zeno's argument, repeated in all the famous examples, rests on the infinite divisibility of space without taking into consideration a similar circumstance with regard to time. His arguments do not bring out any epistemological or metaphysical standpoint; Nagarjuna's do. An attempt will be made to elucidate

his general standpoint, after a presentation of his dialectic against motion and rest.

(1). Motion is denied by showing the untenability of the factors indispensable for its generation--viz. the space traversed, the mover and the commencement of motion. To take each in turn:

What is traversed? Not that which has been already traversed; nor even that to be done so; there is no third division of space as "the being traversed." When a foot-step is put forward, it divides the space exactly into two--the one already traversed and the other yet to be done so. so. It will be pointed out that there is some such space that <u>is being</u> traversed; for that is the place where activity is present; and this activity does not pertain to the traversed or that portion yet to come. But as the activity belongs to the moving body and not to the space, this too will not help us to distinguish that space, unless we accepted motion in both--two motions in the space covered and in the moving body. If there were only one motion--namely, that of the moving body--how can the space, though unrelated to motion, be still said to be 'being traversed'? there is nothing to differentiate it from other spaces. With two motions, two moving bodies shall have also to be accepted, unless we hold that motion can exist disembodied, apart from the moving body. We here come to an impasse. There is no space which is being traversed. The divisions in space are relative and unreal; from the standpoint of knowledge no such distinctions are tenable.

Motion is possible, because there is the mover in which it inheres. We must make the distinction between the two. But is the mover intelligible with or without the motion? Can we say that the mover moves? He is either motionless in himself apart from the motion, or has a motion other than

the motion which inheres in him. In the first case, we have the contradiction of a mover without motion; in the second, there are two motions, for it is a mover that moves, not a non-mover as in the first case. But this too is unpalatable; disembodied motion cannot be contemplated.

It may be thought that these difficulties are really about the locus of motion, whether it resides in a body which is itself bereft of motion or not, and have nothing to do with motion at all. When and where does motion begin? Not at the place already traversed, nor even in the space yet to come; and we have seen that there is no such space like "the being traversed", for this would involve two motions and two bodies. When does motion begin? Not when a body is at rest; for at that time, before the commencement of the activity, there is no space that is being traversed or that traversed etc. Can there be motion in the space not yet traversed? This is a veritable contradiction; motion is to commence where it does not exist. Without motion, the divisions of space into the 'traversed' etc. are untenable. It would be seen that on the basis of these distinctions can motion be conceived to arise, and only with its commencement are such distinctions tenable, involving thereby a vicious circle.

(2) Motion does exist, it might be asserted, for, its opposite--rest--does do so; that exists whose opposite exists, as darkness and light, or as this side and the other side. Logically therefore, a denial of motion involves that of rest as well. It is here precisely that Nagarjuna proves himself a truer dialectician than Zeno.

Here too, as in the case of motion, the indispensable factors are denied. Who rests? Not the mover, nor the static--the non-mover; and there is no third who can rest. The static does not rest, for it is already stationary; there are no two rests, as these would involve two stationary

bodies. It is a flat contradiction to say that the mover rests, when a mover is impossible without motion; when any body rests, it is, ipso facto, not a mover. It will be said that rest is possible, as cessation from motion is possible. The mover can stop; stopping is an opposite activity. Not so; for, whence will he stop? Will it be from the space already traversed, yet to be traversed, or that which is being traversed. Now this activity brought in to ensure rest is on a par with motion, and will be assailable on that score. There is no motion in all these three spaces for the said reasons; and hence there can be no cessation of it.

Rest is possible, for it can be begun, it might be said. But is it begun when someone is at rest, or not at rest, or when about to rest? --precisely the very alternatives considered in connection with the commencement of motion.

A general difficulty about motion is that it can be conceived neither as identical with the mover nor different from him--the difficulty of all predication. If identical, the subject and his activity cannot be distinguished; but to assert this identity a distinction is necessary. If activity be different from the subject, the latter can exist without activity and vice versa; motion should be possible without the moving body. Nagarjuna comes to the conclusion that both those things do not exist which can be conceived neither as identical with nor as different from each other. ("Ekibhavena va Siddhir nana bhavena va yayoh; Na vidyate tayoh Siddhih katham nu khalu vidyate." "Madhyamika Karikas." Ch.II. 21.)

(3) What is the general principle involved in this dialectic against motion and rest? It is undertaken from the standpoint of pure immediacy of experience, and is a consistent Solipsism of the 'present moment.' Santayana has very admirably developed this method in his "Scepticism and Animal Faith." Far from being self-contradictory

solipsism of the present moment is the only attitude that demands radical evidence--experience--for any assertion; it is not to be frightened into acquiescence of universally believed notions. Confine yourself at any time rigorously to the immediately given, the distinctions of space into the traversed, yet to be traversed, etc., and of motion as originating, progressing and ceasing cannot arise; for these issue out of relating, out of positing characters that transcend the immediately given. All such relating and positing involve a vicious circle. Distinctions in space are possible on the commencement of motion, which itself cannot be understood without these very distinctions it engenders. The Madhyamika Dialectic is a call to purify the given object of thought of all beliefs in the transcendent, of dogmas. It finds that when such a purification is effected, no assertion--affirmation or negation--is possible. Everything is Sunya. The Madhyamika cannot have any thesis of his own--positive or negative.

(4) This raises two fundamental issues: Is criticism of any thesis poss ble without any counter thesis; and can all the alternatives under any head be rejected, without thereby violating the Excluded middle?

It is commonly held that to criticise a theory, we should have a rival theory or standpoint of our own, or that some tenets should be held in common by the disputants. But the acceptance of a common platform cannot serve to favour any of the rival hypotheses; nor does a special tenet or thesis particular to each party fare any better; for to claim peculiar strength on the basis of a special tenet will cut both ways. How then is any hypothesis to be demolished at all? It is by pointing out that all the consequences of the hypothesis contradict either the hypothesis, or are mutually contradictory. The holding of a rival hypothesis is not o

is not only unnecessary but is clearly irrelevant. Nor is it necessary that the consequences of a hypothesis should be believed in by the party which urges the objections, but merely that the consequences should be shown to be implied in the hypothesis to the satisfaction of the party concerned. This is the only way by which we can confute an opponent. The absurdity of his position must be brought home to him. The Madhyamika claims to do nothing else. He is a Prasngika--having no tenet of his own and not caring to frame a syllogism of his own. "An opponent in putting forward a thesis is expected, as he is a believer in Pramanas, to validate it; he must prove to his oppoment the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusions.. But the case of the Madhyamika is different; he does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples which he believes to be true." Every endeavour of the Madhyamika is, therefore, exhausted in reducing the opponent's position to absurdity on principles and consequences which the opponent himself would accept. So we may answer the first question by forcibly asserting that to criticise a position it is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to advance another position.

It might be urged that criticism is the application of certain logical canons--the valid sources of knowledge etc. These at least shall have to be accepted even by the Madhyamika. But for a critic of Knowledge, for a Transcendentalist, there are no first principles, no inviolate axioms which he should respect, or at which he should arrive at the end of his enquiry. If the first principles and the valid sources of knowledge are themselves under discussion, will it do to start by unquestionably accepting them? Just as this enquiry can proceed without being saddled with the acceptance of any dogma, other enquiries

can fare equally well. Formal Logic may proceed on certain assumptions, but a self-conscious dialectic cannot, without being false to its position, accept them.

(5) Another line of objection may be adopted to confute the Madhyamika. When one alternative is rejected or accepted the other is, eo ipso accepted or rejected, else the Excluded Middle is violated. The Madhyamika flagrantly violates the rule; we find him cutting down all alternatives that are exclusive and exhaustive. For instance, four alternatives are framed by him with regard to causation, but none is accepted:

"Neither out of themselves (Svatah), nor out of others (Paratah) nor from both (Ubhayatah), nor at random (Ahetutah) have entities sprung into being." (Madh.Kar.1.1) Here too both motion and rest have been denied. The Madhyamika alone is not the sinner in rejecting the Excluded Middle. Kant does not accept this when he formulates his antinomies and rejects them both, e.g. "the world has a beginning in space and time," and that "the world has no such beginning" etc. Hegel himself does not recognise it; had he done so, he should have chosen either Being or Non-Being instead of seeking a third.

i. No logical flaw is involved in not observing the Excluded Middle. If any one wants to vindicate this law, he must not only resolve the antinomies which any dialectic presents, but show that in rejecting one alternative we do so by covertly accepting its contradictory or vice versa.

ii. The law of Excluded Middle assumes a sort of omniscience and makes capital out of our ignorance. That any two alternatives together exhaust the realm of discourse and that no third is possible cannot be known from the alternatives themselves. Such is not the case with the law of Contradiction; it derives all its force

from the material in hand, what is actually presented to us. We can, even on the strength of immediate experience, say that both the contradictories cannot be true. Excluded Middle too, it will be urged, does not presume anything more than the particular kind of disjunctives called the Contradictories--as Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. Such contradictory alternatives can easily be recognised by any one. To this our reply is that the doctrine of Contradictories conceived by Formal Logic is defective; for, it is always possible to suggest one other alternative in all cases; besides being and non-being, we can admit the Indefinite; affirmation and negation do not exhaust all attitudes towards an assurtum; we may not assert anything at all, but simply entertain a datum without these two modes. The contention is not merely academical. Consider for instance the two propositions--"An integer between 3 and 4 is prime;" "An integer between 3 and 4 is composite, not prime." Neither of these propositions is true, though they are contradictories in the formal sense. Can the Excluded Middle help us here? For, this is a case where no adjective, no alternative can be predicated without absurdity. The illusory snake is another example; it cannot accept the predicates Sat or Asat, for it is not an existent.

It we want to formulate the contradictory of any proposition "S is P"--, it is not merely "S is not P" but also "S is not"--i.e. the proposition is contradicted if the subject does not exist. It is clear that because there are two contradictories to any position we can never pass from the denial of the position to any one of the contradictories or vice versa. This is tantamount to giving up the Excluded Middle.

A formal objection, pointed out by Johnson, can also be raised against the law. If it were true, the existential import of a proposition and that

of its obverse must be neither less nor more. "S is not P" says nothing about the existence of S or of P; the proposition will be valid even if they had never existed. What is required is that the combination SP should not be found, and this is available with or without the existence of these terms. Now following formal logic, we shall be told that "S is not P" can be positively rendered into "S is non-P". But this is more than a mere verbal change. The new proposition affirms a negative predicate of a subject S. If S were not an existent the proposition would be meaningless, as it would be even if there were no P and non-P. But as we have seen, the original proposition gives no guarantee of the existence of S or P. The obverse imports, tacitly under cover of an indubitable law, existential matter not to be found in the original proposition. The obverse will be valid, only if one implied premise "S is" is supplied. Therefore it is clear that the principle on which obversion is based, namely the Excluded Middle, is not valid. "S is non-P" commits us to the existence of S and possibly of P and non-P. It is apparent that Excluded Middle is not a purely formal principle, but a device to serve a metaphysical doctrine, in which to negate a judgment is taken as affirming a negative predicate. It seems to be a very cheap device for asserting the existence of any subject. As a matter of fact it does not question the existence of the subject; its only trouble seems to be confined to the assignment of a positive or negative predicate; the fundamental question of the existence of the subject of a judgment is left to take care of itself.

The Madhyamika, on the other hand, questions the very existence of the subject of which there may be any dispute about the proper predicate. And as the subject cannot be discussed or known apart from the predicates, he formulates a general rule--that a subject, an entity of which all assignable

positions, predicates, either taken singly or collectively are inadmissible, does not exist. If the existence of the subject is not assumed at the outset, non-existence is also not presumed, but everything is decided on its own merits. The Madhyamika finds that he can formulate at least four theses or alternatives in any case. One can assert existence of a subject, or deny it, or assert both existence and non-existence, or assert neither existence nor non-existence. It will be seen that the first is the Positivist or Realist thesis; the second is purely negative, the third is a synthetic position, say that of Hegel or of the Jaina, the fourth is the purely agnostic thesis. All these, singly and collectively, are wrong and Tattva is that which escapes all these predicates.

55. AKSHYA KUMAR BANERJEA:* Sankara's adhyasa-vada is evidently the corner-stone of the whole edifice of his philosophy.

56. In his introduction to the great commentary, Sankara gives a clear exposition of his theory of adhyasa, and promises to demonstrate by a detailed interpretation of the sutras that this doctrine forms the purport of all the teachings of the Vedanta. The fundamental postulate with which he begins his introduction is that the subject and the object--the self and the not-self--the spirit and matter--are obviously distinct from and opposed to each other in their essential characteristics, and neither can really be in communion with the other, or participate in the nature and the attributes of the other. The only relation that can possibly exist between them is that of adhyasa, i.e. the false attribution of one or of one's characteristics to the other. This adhyasa gives birth to a relative or phenomenal or apparent reality, which may be described as a combination of the real and the unreal, the true and the false, --the real in respect of the adhisthana or the substance to which what is not is attributed and

*on "BRAHMASUTRA AND ADHYASA VADA"

consequently the true character of which remains hidden or unmanifested, and the unreal in respect of that which is attributed to it and which falsely appears as real and pretends to present the real character of the substance.

Acharya Sankara asserts that the phenomenal world with which are are acquainted--the world of subjects and objects, egos and non-egos, in intercourse with one another,--the world of finite spirits and minds and matters--the world of substances and attributes, causes and effects; spatial and temporal externalities--is the product of a general adhyasa, the natural causeless beginningless attribution, to the one timeless, spaceless, differenceless, absolute Spirit or Self, called Brahman or Atman, of a plurality of names and forms, which by themselves possess no reality, and likewise the attribution of the reality and spiritual characteristics of Brahman to these names and forms. All knowledge, emotion and activity,--all consciousness of Me and mine, Thee and Thine, the actual and the ideal happiness and misery, ought and ought-not,--are the creations of this adhyasa.

Adhyasa evidently involves two elements,--the concealment of the true nature of the substratum (adhisthana) and its appearance as what it is not. This again refers to an observer from whom the true character of the substance is hidden and to whom it appears with false names and forms. With reference to such an implied observer, it is to be conceived as due to avidya, or ignorance. This avidya, is destroyed by Vidya or true knowledge. When the observer, by suitable spiritual discipline, attains Vidya, or true knowledge of the real character of the Substance, viz. Brahman, adhyasa vanishes, the world of names and forms falsely attributed to Brahman disappears or no longer appears as real, and Brahman alone shines in His absolute infinite differenceless attribute-

less character. The observer himself also, as a separate entity, vanishes, or rather, having realised his absolute identity with Brahman, is completely merged in His differenceless unity. Acharya concludes his introduction with the assertion that in course of his interpretation of the Sutras he will establish this to be the true significance of all the teachings of the Vedanta.

57. DHIRENDRALAL DE.* The subject is conscious of himself as a being in whom the conflict of desires may take place. The consciousness of desire thus implies that the subject appears to himself as an object capable of experiencing various desires. Now the subject cannot be conscious of himself as capable of having a variety of desires without conceiving of himself as not identical with any of them, or the whole of them taken together. So arises the consciousness of self as a subject that is opposed to the self as an object with its varying desires.

58. He who makes the object of particular desires the end of his life will learn by the stern logic of experience that he has been seeking to allay his hunger for the infinite by feeding himself on the husks of the finite.

59. The real motive operative in the desire is the desire for permanent self-satisfaction. The individual who seeks satisfaction in the attainment of wealth may have no clear consciousness that the motive of his action is not the attainment of wealth but the attainment of self-satisfaction by means of wealth. The question may be asked, why is not self-satisfaction found in this way? This is not found because the individual has wrongly identified his ultimate good with what is not ultimate good.

60. All desires, as the perfectionists point out, are desires for complete self-realisation. So long as we seek for self-satisfaction in a particular object, we are laying up for ourselves natural de-

*on "THE IDEA OF DUTY"

sires, but the difference between willing the object for itself and willing it for a higher end is spiritually an infinite difference. We can attain higher spiritual life only by transforming desires.

61. The perfectionists point out that there is no necessary conflict between appetite and reason. The conflict, according to them, really obtains between a higher and a lower conception of the self. We condemn the action of an individual as irrational only when he is prepared to sacrifice his higher interests to the gratification of his appetites, because he substitutes a particular end for a universal. Duty does not consist in the extirpation of natural impulses, but in subordinating it to the realisation of the complete nature of the self.

62. N. VENKATARAMAN.*The whole of the Bhagavad-Gita is devoted to an exposition of the Vedantic doctrines, as having a bearing on practical life, (hence the context, the beginning of a great-war, and battle scene; the teacher, the most active agent in the drama of the MahaBharata; and the pupil, the greatest of the heroes and fighters of the age). The conclusions reached (and urged repeatedly on the hearer) there are, first, that a knowledge of Reality, of one-self, as well as of the World, is essential to every rational being; second, that this knowledge need not necessarily lead to a cessation of all action and effort (one's karma--duty etc) and third, that what is most important in the life of the enlightened man ('jnani'--the 'philosopher', one who has really benefitted by the teachings of the Vedanta) is, not so much to lead a life of renunciation and inaction (vairagya, sanyasa, nivritti-marge, etc--so incessantly preached by Sankara)--but a life of unattached effort and activity--nishkama-karma, and the disinterested and unfailing performance of all one's duties, and

*on"PRACTICAL OUTLOOK OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

the discharge of all one's obligations. To run away from one's duty, or to forget one's obligations, would be as much opposed to genuine wisdom, and as mischievous, in the case of an enlightened man, inspite of all his philosophy and erudition, as in the case of any boor or ignorant person. The example of Janaka is quoted--the king who continued to attend to his high office, in spite of the great truth and wisdom he learnt from the sage Yajnavalkya.

-- In ch.II (54) Arjuna asks Krishna to tell him the consequences to one of accepting his philosophy of the Self; and the latter goes on to describe the enlightened individual as Sthitha-prajna--"one with a steady mind"; and to enumerate the characteristics that distinguish him--and the whole passage ought to be carefully studied by one who wants to know the bearing of the Vedanta on practical life. It is an equability of temper, perfect control over senses and the passions; an inward peace, contentment and joy; complete unattachment to bodily wants and desires, and freedom from egoism and the self-regarding sentiments, that mark the the life of one who has realised the true Self.

The Vedanta teaches one not to locate all one's experiences in Space-time, but refer them to the Subject within. This leads to a realisation of the Self, which is the same in all. This is the meaning of saying that one's salvation is attained through Jnana, or that knowledge leads to liberation.

63. Liberation is not a state or condition to be reached by any process, mental or physical. Since absolute Idealism is a denial of all causation, there can be no becoming or change for the Self. The Self is always free, and was never under bondage. What appears as bondage, misery, and evil (Samsara), in en-

tirely due to the erroneous tendency to regard mere thought-forms as objective and real (adhyasa). One has only to unlearn this habit of one's mind (due to avidya), in order to gain a true knowledge of one's self. The latter does away with the obstacle (unreal) that stands in the way of one's Freedom. Jnana is a hindrance of hindrances (illusions)--knowledge, in revealing one's true Self, reveals, at the same time, that one is absolutely and eternally free.

64. Besides cultivating mental equanimity, the enlightened individual should try to be an example to the less enlightened by his conduct and expressions. (He must set the standard of virtue and upright behaviour.

65. The acceptance of advaita philosophy leads to abheda--the unity of everything in Brahman. One who has realised this forgets all distinction, and perceives everything as Brahman. The same Self is in all. This truth can be recognised and acted upon even in the midst of active (worldly) experience. Therefore, the enlightened man feels himself one with the whole Universe; (hence humanitarianism, the rising superior to all distinctions of race, nation, colour, caste, etc. Karuna, pity and sympathy for all kinds of suffering and trouble; ahimsa love for all sentient creation).

66. All causation, with its relativities of space, time, motion, etc., are equally phenomenal--mere phantasmagoria that issue out of, and depend entirely on, the one true Reality--the Atman.

67. VIOLET PARANJOTI. There is no dogmatic assertion of the realities which we in all meekness are expected to recognise as true. By the full exercise of our reason, we are led step by step to the facts of the system. And there is an implicit challenge to us to examine the system by the exercise of reason before accepting it.

68. R.A.SANKARA NARAYANA. A short sketch of the commentary of Sankara on Goudapada-Karikas which

are but the exposition of the verses of the Mandukya Upanisad. The Rishi of this Upanishad with the help of the three stages of human consciousness namely, waking, dream and deep sleep, elucidates the nature of the ultimate reality--the Brahman, which is the sustainer of all that exists. In the wakeful stage, man is endowed with sense and intellect, and is fully conscious of a non ego which stands opposed to the ego, the 'I'. This 'I' or the ego can never be doubted, because it is the presupposition of all doubts. The doubter cannot be himself doubted. So the existence of the soul is self-proved. In the dream stage also both the subject and the object exist but the object exists in a different form. It is no longer material but rather a direct respresentation of it, and is supplied by memory. In dreamless sleep both these factors vanish, of course not in nothingness but in a self-luminous, all-embracing pure consciousness--the Brahman.

68. P.T. RAJU:* Although there is no identity between Kant's Ideals of Reason and Sankara's Brahman, it can be shown that had Kant consistently developed his thought on his own principles he would have arrived at an ideal of Reason corresponding to the Brahman of Sankara.

In his treatment of the transcendental ideal Kant asserts that they are required to define the standards to which the activities of the understanding must conform in a perfectly unified experience. The rules of the understanding apply to phenomena and the principles of Reason to the rules of the understanding. Kant does not say as Sankara does, that the phenomenal world has no metaphysical stability. He merely asserts that it points to something higher.

Kant in his Critique, by means of the application of the transcendental method, affirms the noumenon and the three Ideas as the limiting con-

*on "KANT AND SANKARA"

cept of the understanding and the Ideal of Reason. The Ideal of Reason for Kant is the unconditioned or the totality of conditions.

Kant is justified in saying that the unconditioned is only as ideal of Reason. For, thought's object is judgment which is made possible by the distinction between the subject and the predicate. To effect their complete unification thought looks up to the ideal, the unconditioned. If the unconditioned becomes an object of thought, it will cease to be unconditioned. The unconditioned can only yield itself to intellectual intuition. But finite mind is deprived of such integral experience.

Kant's great failure however lies in not being able to arrive at the ultimate unity of the three Ideas. But it must at the same time be admitted that the conception of unity was not totally absent from his mind. In fact, he observes in the Critique that such unity is not unthinkable.

Another defect of Kant is that he has not proved that the Ideal of Reason could be no other than the noumena and that noumena are one. The solution of the problem which he took up in the Critique requires that he should identify them.

There are passages however in the Opus Postumum which show that Kant, in the later period of his life, realised that the noumena would be no other than the self in its transcendental aspect. Had Kant stuck to this truth and worked it out his idealism would not have been difficult to accept. In that case he would have very little differed from Vedanta which makes Universal spirit foundational.

69. SUDHIR KUMAR BOSE. *The proposition of language may be divided into (i) the philosophy of language which is concerned with the relation of language to the question of knowledge and reality, and (ii) the science of language which studies language in its causal and genetic aspects.

Philosophy of language: On the question of ori-

*on "THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE"

gin and status of language the philosophers split into two camps; (i) The naturalistic philosophy of language upheld by Watson, Russell, DeLaguna, Ogden, Richards and all those standing for behaviourism, pragmatism or positivism. (ii) The idealistic philosophy of language advocated by Spranger, Cassirer, Vossler and others affliated to the school of Kultur philosophy. The first group thinks that "language is a purely naturalistic product created by environmental pressure", while the second group ascribes transcendental validity to meanings conveyed by words and sentences.

Is thought possible without language? This question has been answered in the affirmative as well as in the negative. One school thinks that in early days thought used systems other than language. Another school denies the possibility of thought in the absence of language and holds that thought and language have grown together. These two contrary views may be somewhat reconciled by supposing that thinking of the period prior to the growth of verbal activity was chiefly guided by what has been called "organic intelligence" and was of a different kind from our present-day thinking.

70. H.N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR: "AN INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA SYSTEMS."

The term Vedanta means several things. It means first the end of the Veda, secondly the heart or essence of the Vedic teaching and lastly that which decides the true meaning of the Vedic teachings that are apparently contradictory in character.

What is the central teaching for which the whole Veda stands? Such teaching must be extricated from apparent contradictions. To do this a separate system has been evolved to thresh the essential out of the non-essential. Such a system is Vedanta.

Several attempts at such systematisation have

been made. Badarayana's attempt seems to be the very first of them. In his Brahma Sutra he has systematised the thoughts of the Veda. The Sutras consist of pithy statements that are very comprehensive in their outlook. They are called Vedanta Sutra because they embody the systematisation of the Vedic thought.

The Brahma Sutras are 564 in number. They refer to a date later than when Sankhya or Nyaya, Jaina and Buddhistic philosophies came into being. Prof. Keith holds that the date cannot be later than 200 A.D.

The Sutras consist of four chapters. The first explains that the whole Veda deals with Brahman. The second chapter removes the difficulties in viewing Brahman as the ground of all. In this connection rival systems are refuted. The third chapter is devoted to how Brahman is realised and liberation obtained.

The Sutra consists of very brief statements which with their condensation of meanings made it very difficult to arrive at a final teaching. This gave rise to many commentaries.

Among those that appeared as systematisers of Vedic thoughts by way of commenting on the Brahma Sutras, Sankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, and Madhvacharya are the most important. They appeared one after another. Sankaracharya called his system Advita Vedanta, Ramanujacharya Visistadvaita Vedanta and Madhvacarya Dvaita Vedanta.

Generally there is a misconception as to the real significance of the terms Advaita, Visistadvaita and Dvaita. The term Advaita is taken to mean unity in diversity. Visistadvaita of qualified monism and Daita duality. But these terms betray absence of correct understanding. They are not as different from one another as they are taken to be. The three systems start from the same point. Their starting point is Brahman which is the ground of all and which is the reality. As far as this goes

the three systems may be described as Brahmadvaitism.

They differ from one another on the question of the relation between Brahman and the world. According to Sankara the world has no reality of its own. Brahman is the only reality. The world is superimposed upon Brahman just as the silver as appearance is imposed on the shell. Apart from Brahman nothing is real, is the thesis of Sankara and he calls it rightly Advaita.

According to Ramanuja Brahman is to the world what soul is to the body. The world is because Brahman is in it. The world is not a superimposition, an illusion but it has not also any self-sufficient existence beyond Brahman.

Madhvacharya does not agree with either Sankara or Ramanuja. Even if the world is regarded as a superimposition some amount of reality must have to be granted to it. If it is nothing there is no sense in saying that it is a superimposition. To say that the world is the body to Brahman is simply to indulge in metaphor. The world is our starting-point its reality is undeniable. But it has a dependent existence. It is dependent upon Brahman who is causa sui. Brahman is the necessary presupposition of the world.

71. LEKH RAJ PURI. Russell has made a distinction between Physical Object on the one hand and Sensation and sense-data on the other. The physical object is never directly presented and has to be inferred from certain appearances or phenomena which he calls sense-data, while sensation is the experience of being aware of these appearances. It is doubtful if in addition to objective existence and subjective apprehension there is a tertium quid like sense-datum which belongs to neither. The sense-data belong to the self and we can only guess that there is a reality corresponding to the subjective states: but the sense-data do not form an independent realm hovering

between Reality and Subjectivity.

72. C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

Does the cosmos indicate the plan and the method of future development? Does causality really signify anything more than a way of human reckoning in the final? To arrive at the first cause in the sense of its being the prior condition, is as impossible as to arrive at the first hour of existence. The several antecedent conditions are found to be one with the present, and the imaginary breaks in the continuity are only different views of one great event that is beg nningless. The Vedic proof of the unreality of the world does not erase it from existence. The disappearance is therefore purely metaphysical not even mental. We are not concerned with the psychological cases. The world continues (to appear) as long as we are awake. The cause of it must be included within that beginningless continuity. But no cause is got at!

Cause is the sense of motive or purpose constitutes the philosophic field. In this sense it is subjective, for we cannot detect any motive in the object. As motive or purpose is individual, it is reasonable to seek the cause in the subject. It is impossible to think of a cause for this waking world, because the actual motive is absent with the mind in a previous state. No state is previous or subsequent to another state where, as we know per Vedic Method, there is no common time to connect them. It is illogical to think of a cause for subject-object existence. We are driven therefore to the conclusion that cause is only an individual possibility; neither an objective factor nor a transcendental power in any form. But individual existence is not purposeless or aimless.

If cause means the basis of all this show, the question is not illogical, for then every bit of creation can be traced to it. To make it real, we have to posit a Creator! It is in this sense Essence, the Vedanta Sutras speak of Brahman as cause

or the basis of this whole existence, and prove it to be identical with our Real Self. Cause in any other meaning fails in itself. The true nature of cause is clearly dealt with by Sankara in his Adhyasa Bhasya. Adhyasa is not the cause of the appearance of the world but is the cause of mistaking it as the real. Adhyasa helps to continue the mistaken notions of differences and distinctions. But the consc ousness of duality or manifoldness is always one and secondless. In this light only knowledge can be of any use, for individual's knowledge can getrid of all individual illusions.

73. P.K. DAMLE. The object of knowledge is independent of the knower. The difficulty of this view is to establish knowledge at any stage--to bridge the gulf which has been made unbridgeable almost by definition. (All realists)

The object is mental: mind-dependent. The difficulty here is to preserve the necessary distinction between subject and object. How can mind be itself subject and object at the same time? (Kant Hegel, Green.)

The object is a product of the relation of knower to known. Not mind as knower--nor independent, but as knower, knowing etc. (Bradley, Bosanquet).

This merely repeats the problem set, in the terms of the solution.

74. A. MINAKSHISUNDRAM AIYAR. Mental activity is not outside the scope of the law of conservation of energy. Nothing can be destroyed. The mind must continue to exist as Mind. It can grow but cannot be destroyed.

There is evidence that after the death of the body, the mind appears again associated with another body, as capacities and tendencies of an individual. Rebirth is the only explanation for congenital tendencies, thought it is mysterious how the choice of body is made. This is not more mysterious than the relationship of mind and body. Heredity is no rival theory. It is a statement of the facts

of reproduction and conservation. Reproduction of mind is unthinkable.

75.S. RADHAKRISHNAN.* What exactly does moksa or salvation connote? It does not involve the destruction of the world. It implies the disappearance of a false view of the world.

76. Sankara admits that the world appearance persists for the jivanmukta, though he realises moksa or brahmabhava, still lives in the world. The appearance of multiplicity is not suppressed. It is with him as with a patient suffering from timira that, though he knows there is only one moon, he sees two. Only it does not deceive the freed soul even as the mirage does not tempt one who has detached its unreal character. Freedom consists in the attainment of a universality of spirit or sarvatmabhava. Embodiment continues after the rise of the saving knowledge. Though the spirit is released, the body persists. While the individual has attained inner harmony and freedom, the world-appearance still persists and engages his energies.

77. Apantaratamas and others continue as individuals although they possess complete knowledge which is the cause of release and obtain release only when their offices come to an end. So long as their offices last their karmas cannot be said to be exhausted. Sankara here admits that samyagdarsana, though it is the cause of release, does not bring about final release and the liberated individuals are expected to contribute to lokasthiti or world maintenance. Their karma can never be fully exhausted, so long as the world demands their services.

78. Even such released souls, persistence of individuality is held not only as possible by Sankara but as necessary in the interests of what is called lokasthiti. In other words, the world will persist as long as there are souls subject to bondage. It terminates only when all are released, i.e. absolute salvation is possible with world redemption.

*on "SARVAMUKTI"

79. To be saved in the former sense is to see the self all in all, to see all things in the self and to live in the self with all things. To be perfect is to be oneself and all else. It is to be the universe. It is to give oneself so that all might be saved. Commenting on the Mundaka Up. text Sankara says: "He who has reached the all-penetrating Atman enters into the all." Kumarila in his Tantravarttika quotes Buddha as saying "Let all the sins of the world fall on me and let the world be saved."

Is such a world-redemption possible? Is it necessary? That it is possible is undoubted. If one can be saved, there is no reason why every one cannot be saved. Is it necessary? I believe it is. If Brahman dwells in all and constitutes the reality of the world, if he is revealed in each and all of the infinite number of individuals if separate existence is really non-existence, an appearance only, our falling short of our eternal stature is due to aviveka or non-discrimination, then the aim of the world process is the sublation of the non-real. Bondage is real.

80. SAILESWAR SEN. The advaitin's position is that Pure Consciousness is the sole real: that human beings, since they are of the nature of consciousness, are identical with this sole real; that error, imperfection and sin are all appearances due to beginningless but not endless nescience; that nescience is destructible by knowledge, that knowledge is not an adventitious attribute of spirit but is of the very nature of spirit or Consciousness that, though temporarily unattained as it were (like the forgotten ornament round one's own neck) and later attained as it were, it is really eternally attained; and that when the eternally attained knowledge is realised (in the same way as the realisation of the already present ornament) that is release. On this view, then, release is dependent on man's nature as Spirit, not on man's dependence on the love, grace or omnipotence of God.

PROFESSOR TUCCI.

THE IDEALISTIC SCHOOL IN BUDDHISM.©

If we remember what was known about Buddhism when Burnouf and Oldenberg started their masterly researches, and if we consider at the same time the actual present stage of Buddhist studies, we cannot help being proud of the results of about seventy years of deep and patient work. And yet, if we compare what we know with what still remains to be known, we shall realize that it is the duty of any sound scholar to resign into the hands of the so-called "dilettanti" whom the interest and the revival of Cakyamuni's doctrine has called into being in the West as well as in the East, those apparently imposing reconstructions and those summary appreciations of Buddhist lore, which are condemned by their superficiality itself and the lack of any trustworthiness. To the glory of ephemeral synthesis which further studies will change and modify, we shall prefer a more modest piece of work, or rather a programme, and we shall frankly confess that till now we have not been able to represent with absolute certainty the progressive evolution of this religion and of this philosophy in all the often contradictory and divergent shapes and manifestations it assumed in its millennary life. Let us consider, for instance, of the most important systems of later Buddhism: the Yogacara school. What do we know about it? Prof. De. La Vallee Poussin, one of the greatest authorities on Buddhist philosophy we have in the West, as far as this system is concerned seems to be very sceptical when in his last book on Nirvana he asserts that the Vijnana-school is yet almost a mystery to us. Nor shall I claim to have succeeded in solving the problem, although in my History of Indian Buddhism, which is now going through the press in Italy, I have dealt very largely

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with this system; because I am convinced that when we speak of a philosophical school, it is not enough to expound its fundamental tenets, but it is also necessary to try to trace out its slow evolution and its gradual growing up, its relation with other systems, its influences upon other forms of thought; otherwise we run the risk of restraining within a static description what in reality a dynamic thought. But in order to ascertain in precise terms all these questions, many a problem which still now remains without any answer should be first solved; and this will be the task of further researches. Nevertheless, I shall be very glad to expound some of the results of my own studies and some of my particalar views at which I have been able to arrive through a daily perusal, not only of Sanskrit sources, but also of Tibetan and Chinese translations. I must ask you to make allowance for the technical character of the subject I have chosen; but science, true science, is preeminently made up of technicalities and cannot be always amusing. I trust, moreover, to the highly scientific atmosphere in which I have the honour to speak. To less than a University audience I should hardly venture to address myself. If any of the Duddhist doctors can claim to be compared with the master himself, it was Nagarjuna, who is generally, but wrongly, considered as the founder of the Mahayana: wrongly I said, because the universalistic and apostolic character which Buddhism had at its very beginning, will sufficiently explain how, side by side with the monastic and dogmatic tendency, the growth of a popular form of Buddhism was possible; which, emphasizing very soon the living and the spiritual side of the new doctrine, and deeply permeated with that religious and mystic spirit which is inherent in the Indian soul, was the real reason of the vitality of Buddhism and had the privilege of conquering

Asia and imbueing the largest part of eastern civilisation with the highest expressions of Indian thought. But this difference between Hinayana and Mahayana, asserted itself, not only in the practical side of the doctrine, giving birth to two different ideals--that of the 'arhat' and that of the 'Bodhisattva', that of the immediate 'mukti' and that of a 'mukti' put off to a far off future--for the benefit of suffering beings, but also in the theoretical side of the system which more and more assumed an idealistic character. What Hinayana taught was the 'pudgalanairatmya', the non-substantiality of the ego. What Mahayana would assert is the 'pudgala---' as well as the 'dharmanairatmya,' the non-substantiality of the ego and of the Dharmas. Nor will it be difficult to point out the links in this chain of gradual evolution. According to the Sarvastivadins, whose theory represents the basis of all later speculations, as even their opponents could not help starting from their tenets, the seventy-five dharmas under which every individual, every thought, and every form of being can be compromised, 'dravyato santi', as Vasubandhu states in his Abhidharma Koça, exist as a substance, although ever-changing in their ephemeral manifestations, through a continuous series of 'utpada, sthiti, bhanga' birth, duration, and destruction, which will come to an end only when the true knowledge, the "samyagjnana" will put a stop to the restless movement of the samskrta, that is of this contingent world, in the supreme 'çanti' of the ineffable "Nirvana." But far from being generally accepted, the Sarvastivada school roused the criticism of the Sautrantikas, who, trying to show the inner contradiction of their opponents, in subtle discussions summarised by the Abhi-dharma-Koca, asserted the impossibility of perceiving any

any "dharma", the existence of which can only be inferred. But the idealistic tendency which was gradually finding its way through the dialectic of the schools and the endless discussions of the doctors did not stop here. In fact, in the immense and anonymous literature of the Prajnaparamita, full of contradictions and yet containing many a germ of all the abstruse speculations of the later 'Mahayana' we meet with the bold assumption that everything is void, that nothing exists, that everything is 'abhava' from the 'dharmas' down to the 'Tathagatas' themselves. According to it, "sattvadhatu" and "Tathagatadhatu" are mere synonyms for 'abhavadhatu'. The true 'Prajna' is the realisation of nothingness. The largest part of the Prajnaparamita literature is mere gossip and a tiring repetition of stereotyped formulas; the central idea itself of its philosophy, if this can be called philosophy, is not demonstrated, but assumed as it were in a dogmatic form; and yet in the absurd formulation of the 'abhava' there was the germ of a new conception of life and of the reality of things, which was finding its way to expression. Nagarjuna came, and from the gossip of the Prajna he started the organic and wonderful construction of his philosophy. Therefore, even if Mahayana as a religion was anterior to him--and in fact, in his largest work the Prajnaparamitacastra, preserved only in Chinese --he is continually quoting the most important Mahayana Sutras as the 'Saddharmapundarika' or the "Vimalakirtinirdeca"--yet on the other side it cannot be denied that he was the ral father of "Mahayana" systematical philosophy. What he tries to establish with logical coherence, is the truth of the <u>void</u> as it was postulated by the Prajna; and therefore what he is obliged to refute is the dogmatic and realistic conception of the Sarvastivadins. Coming back to the central principle

of ancient Buddhism, he lays a special stress on the double aspect of the law of causality; there is an external (bahya) pratitya-samut-pada and an interior (adhyatmika) one. Thus, as every 'dharma' is 'pratitya-samutpanna' dependent on others, it cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another, or by the two hypotheses together; so that we are obliged to conclude that every notion is antinomic, contradictory and inconsistent and therefore 'cunya'. But I cannot follow modern interpreters when they say that this cunya is the absolute void--the nothingness. We must remember that Buddhism could not give up this general Indian conception that the absolute being is beynd every possible human definition, that according to it this absolute being is the 'avyakrta' the 'cunya' the 'tathata' because it is the contrary of what we can predicate of contingent experience; that it is the 'neti, neti' of the aupanishadic seers; and therefore that the absolute being, the absolute essence is beyond and above the over-becoming of all the 'samskrta'; so that this 'cunya' of Nagarjuna is quite different from the 'abhava' of the 'Prajna'. In fact to assert 'abhava' is an act of thought, 'jnana' the dialectic reason, while the true 'prajna' the ineffable intuition and realisation of truth, is neither affirmation nor negation: 'na kasyacit prahanam, napi kasyacin nirodhah, as Candrakirti asserts; it is only so to say, a result,--the result of this gradual suppression of any possible thought, sakalakalpanaksayarupa,--that is to say, the stopping of all the 'prapanca' the inconsistent and illusory world of contingency; because, according to the tenets of this philosophy, the being of a thing coincides with its being thought. In fact, carrying to its ultimate consequence the system of the Sautrantikas Nagarjuna denies the objective existence of everything, beyond the fact of its being thought. "Cunya" is

therefore "nirvana" the 'nirvana' of the yogin, not the nirvana of the heretics or the nirvana of the Hinayana, because really this latter is nothing else than the Samsara, a mere notion, that is to say 'pratitya-samutpanna' that is to say "prapanca". This is the main characteristic of the system of 'Nagarjuna' as it is expounded by him in the commentary to the Prajnaparamita preserved only in Chinese, and in many other minor works, of which the most important, as also the most known, is the so-called "Mulamadhyamakakarika", although almost certainly its original title was 'Prajnaçastra'. The çastra represented the bible as it were, of the followers of Nagarjuna, who very soon began to comment on it, giving birth by and by to three principal different interpretations, which later on constituted three autonomous schools. In fact, the Prajnaçastra was commented upon, not only by authors who, according to later and usual tradition, are considered as Madhyamika--the mysterious 'T'sing mou' of the Chinese texts, for instance, and Candrakirti--but also by doctors who belong to the Yogacara school, as Asanga did who wrote a Madhyantanugamaçastra wrongly considered by Nanjio as a commentary to the Prajnaparamita; and the same happened to Aryadeva, the famous disciple of Nagarjuna, whose works were commented upon not only by Candrakirti, but by true Yogacara masters like Dharmapala and Vasubandhu. This can be only explained if we assume that Nagarjuna's philosophy was beyond all the differences which later on arose, although it could claim to justify and to include everyone of them. So, gradually, we meet with three different schools which went on discussing and quarrelling. The first, having as its greatest doctor Candrakirti, claimed to be the real and most faithful interpreter and repository of Nagarjuna's thought, and was called Prasangika

because, as the master himself maintained, nothing really can be asserted or denied, so that the only means we can employ for establishing truth is the 'prasanga,-that is the reductio ad absurdum of every notion. The second school was that of the Yogacaras who recognised Asanga as their master, and his forms the special subject of this lecture. The third is that of the Svatantrikas founded by Bhavyaviveka who, contrary to the Prasangikas, taught that in establishing the void we can employ the method of the "Svato" numana,; that is to say of self-inference.

What was the starting point of the Yogacaras? We must remember that Nagarjuna had asserted that the only ultimate truth is the 'Cunya' which, as the ineffable 'quidditas', the 'tathata' is opposed to the ever-changing mirage of contingent phenomena. Satisfied with this assumption, he confines himself to the refutation of all possible dharmas, that is of all notions. His was a gigantic construction of logical subtlety, but at the same time an utter paradox which all his dialectic could not solve. It is the thought itself which creates the phantasms called beings and things, and it is this same thought that can realise the 'çunya' killing as it were and annihilating itself. Side by side with the 'Prasangika' current of thought, the only preoccupation of which was the reductio ad absurdum of all the notions--in dissolving through a process of critical anatomizing all that is thought, felt and experienced,--a new school arose, which tried to establish positively how this phenomenal world can be produced. They did not proceed from the Maya of this world to the essence of the absolute truth, but conversely, from the indiscriminable and absolute entity, they went down to the ephemeral and inconsistent variety of things. They retain all the critical aspect of the system of

Nagarjuna, but they lay more stress on the positive side of the ultimate reality. As has been rightly said, this theory is at the same time 'Niralambanavada' inasmuch as it denies the existence of any external object, apart from our mental constructions: and it is 'Vijnanavada' inasmuch as it has a positive side, as it asserts solely the existence of mere representations. It is but natural that, in so doing, they could not help emphasizing the idealistic tendency already started by the 'Sautrantikas' and echoing as it were an axiom which is to be met with in the canonical literature (Anguttaranikaya,)--"The consciousness, O bhiksu, is shining, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements," they made a cosmical principle of that Vijnana which, according to the ancient dogmatics, was the real basis of any individual series, that is to say of the ever moving santana, the flowing succession of mental states which constitutes what appears an individual. Whatever exists is only mere imagination--'parikalpa' but this contingent imagination is only possible if we admit that there is something which is the eternal repository, the 'alaya' of every possible imagination. This continuous flowing of 'parikalpas' to which the so called individuals as well as the phenomenal world can be entirely reduced like the moving waves eternally arising in order to vanish immediately into the infinity of the ocean, derives from the 'alaya-vijnana' that is to say from the thought in and by itself, without the thing itself, which is thought, and it is therefore, the 'Çunya,' the void, the 'tathata' the Tathagatagarbha, beyond all conceptions and all imaginations, but at the same time the potentiality of every possible thought. This is a very logical and systematic conception, which could be compared with Plato's theory of ideas eternally realizing themselves in the contingency of this world, if the strictly

idealistic and monistic character of the Vijnanavada did not differentiate the tenets of the Indian school from the dualistic conception of the Greek thinker who tries, but in vain, to reconcile in his philosophy the immanent and the transcendent side of being. But it is necessary to remember that this system did not arise from its very beginning in a very organic form. Before the 'Vijnaptimatrasiddhicastra' of Vasubandhu, which can be considered as the textbook of the school and at the same time one of the most gigantic works of Indian thought, we meet only with mere attempts which are far behind the systematic perfection of the later masters.

For the most part these attempts are full of contradictions, although we can already realise in them that philosophical reaction which was preparing the most productive period of Buddhist speculation.

If we take, for instance, a very important work attributed to Asanga, I mean the 'Hien Yang Shang Kiao Lun' the Sanskrit title of which is restored Prakaranaryavacacastra (Nanjios Cat. 1177-1178), we shall find there still surviving the classification of all possible dharmas as it was elaborated by the Sarvastivada school, with the sole difference that the order of the five groups in which the dharmas are divided is slightly changed; instead of the Sarvativada series: "Rupe", "Citta" "Caitasika", "Cittavipryukta" "Asamskrta." This difference is worth remarking as it represents by itself the new standpoint of the school; Citta is no longer a moment of the individual series, but it is a cosmical truth from which through an unending process everything which is believed existent is emanated. This 'citta' or 'manas' or 'vijnana' is of eight kinds: that is, 'alayavijnana,' 'caksurvij,' 'rupavij', 'ghrana-vij' 'jihva-vij; 'kaya-vij', 'manas-vij.' Of this ala-

yavijnana, which is the cause of all the pravrttivijnanas, it is said that it has as "pratyayas" or conditions the klecas of former karman, as 'hetus' the defilements existing ab aeterno (anadikalavasana) and as its essence all the Vijnanas, which constitute the ripening of all the seeds that are produced by itself; then it is added that its action consists in increasing the 'raktapravrittivijnanas' and in stopping the 'cuddha' ones. I cannot help insisting on these assumptions of Asanga, as they show one shape of the doctrine according to which, the Vijnana, although yet conceived as a cosmic principle, was considered as the only factor and the agent of the 'samsara' or of 'pravritti'. This particular Yogacara, school largely borrowing dogmatic elements from the sarvastivadins, had not yet elaborated that mystic conception of the 'alaya' which we shall find very soon asserted from the Lankavatara onwards. Therefore what is predominating in this gradual evolution of the system as we find it in Asaonga's school is only a theoretical preoccupation.

It is for this reason that I cannot admit that the new current of thought was determined by a revival of pure yogic traditions, which, according to some scholars, might have taken hold hold of the Buddhist schools, giving birth to the Yogacara system. Apart from the fact that the Yogacaras are already quoted in the Abhidharmakoca, as a school almost exclusively interested in mere philosophical or theological problems, it is necessary to remark that the Yoga to which the Vijnanavadins owe their names is a pure mental Yoga which has nothing to do with the classical Yoga; It is the Yoga of the Bodhisattvas, that is to say the full realisation of all the truths preached by the new school. "When the Bodhisattvas"--the Lan-

kavatara says--"are possessed of four qualities, then they are practising the great Yoga; what are these four qualities? To realise that everything is only a manifestation of our own spirit to be freed from the false conception that there is a growth, a duration, and a destruction of things, to understand that external objects have only the characteristics of non-existence and to know that the holy knowledge is to be realised in ourselves."

I think it is quite evident why the texts lay a special stress on this mental Yoga, on this fourfold knowledge, without which we must be dragged into the painful whirlpool of an endless samsara; in fact as worlds and individuals are mere thought, prajna alone can tear off the veil of Maya, realising that ineffable Nirvana which is beyond the restless illusion of contingency. Nor will it be possible to annihilate again our conscious personality in the 'Alayavijnanas, till we have traced back, as in a process of 'pralaya' the gradual evolution and the expansion of the 'Pravrttivijnanas, that is of thought in action, continually flowing from the inexhaustible repository of the 'Alaya'. Then the Yogacaras met with one of the most important problems of every philosophy, I mean that of the origin of the world, that is to say, of evil, since the world was considered as a magic appearance, as an illusory unrest. According to the fundamental tenets of the school, the problem was this: how can the 'alaya' be removed from its quietness, which represents its essence and its nature? How can the 'pravrtti the individual consciousness arise? Some texts answer this question by asserting that the universal agent is the 'avidya' or the 'vasanas' which have existed ab aeterno and are defiling as it were the 'Alaya' and are the ultimate cause of its becoming. It is evident that this answer is far from being satisfactory. In

fact in this way the Yogacaras replied with an "avyakrta" to an "avyakrta" as they assumed the existence of two independent forces: the 'alaya' and the 'avidya', both without any beginning or any end, the one passive and the other active, the one eternal movement and unrest, the other motionless in its essence. That is to say, that we meet here with the same relation that already 'Sankhya' had assumed between 'Prakriti' and 'Purusas' without giving a satisfactory explanation of why the purusas, which are mere intelligence, are attracted by Prakrti which is mere matter. The same conception is inherent in the Sarvastivada school when it states that the Samskrta is set in motion by the 'avidya' without telling us from whence this 'avidya' is derived. This is worth remembering, because it shows that not even the Buddhists could always solve that dualism between being and becoming which for the first time appears in the speculations of the Upanishads, but rather that the Buddhist dogmatics, far from representing an absolute reaction from Brahmanical thought, worked very often in the same conceptions and notions which we may call pan-India, as they constitute the fundamental and characteristic basis of the largest part of Indian philosophies. But if the ancient Yogacaras or at least some particular schools of them still retain a dualistic tendency, Asanga and Vasubandhu try to elaborate a monistic system; and, anticipating Bayle, boldly assert that 'alay' is in itself the repository of the bad as well as the good of the 'klecita' as well as of the 'kucala', that it is mere thought which is the potentiality of every individual thought and the unending series of ephemeral thoughts. But as a gem of priceless value hidden in a clod of earth, as soon as it is polished and washed, shines again in all its blazing

splendour, so, as soon as the 'vyavadana' the cleancing away of all infections is realised by the Yogin and the Bodhisattva through the holy 'prajna' the 'alaya' acquires again its motionless purity: it is the tathata, the absolute, beyond every defilement. But defilement is only imagination, that is a series of ideas, the 'bijas' the seeds, which lie in the 'avidya'; and these imaginations represent the other two characters under which the restless unfolding of 'alaya' appears to us, in the phantasms of contingency: that is to say, the 'parikalpita' and the 'paratantra laksana.' Not having been clearly expounded, by the Lankavatara, nor by the Mahayanacraddhotpadacastra, a work, wrongly attributed to Acvaghosa, and known to scholars through a bad translation by Prof. Suzuki, the theory of the three Laksanas is not sufficiently dealt with in modern treatises on Buddhist philosophy. But the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the fundamental texts of the schools such as the Bodhisattva--bhumicastra, attributed to Maitreya, the Mahayanasaparigrahacastra, the Madhyantavibhangacastra and so on, will be of great help to us in getting a clear idea of this important point of Yogacara dogma, and in grasping the real difference between the three Laksanas of reality, according to the various moments of its manifestations. Moreover, I shall draw your attention to a short treatise included in the Chinese Tripitaka; it is perhaps only an abstract of a larger work now definitely lost; and it is exclusively dedicated to the theory of the three Laksanas, as can be inferred from the title itself which can be restored as: "Trilaksanacastra."

According to this treatise, parikalpita laksana is only a synonym for word, because it is not possible to imagine everything without expressing the idea in some words. But as the existence of a thing is only the existence of a particular thought, not the internal reflection of an objective reality

bbetween name and object there is only a supposed and conjectural relation which is the effect of "Avidya"; The word is adventitious in the 'Artha' as well as the 'Artha' is adventitious in the word. But words, that is dharmas, if we speak according to the terminology of the ancient schools, are not alone, but reciprocally combined in the most varied manner, within us, as a series of thoughts, outside of us, as the inconsistent mirage of the so-called objective world. It is worth remarking that--as I hope to have demonstrated in my book--this theory cannot be considered as the real creation of the Yogacaras, as it is already expounded in the Mahaprajna paramitacastra of Nagarjuna, to whom therefore the true credit of its first formulation belongs. But on the other hand, it cannot be denied that it was specially perfected and carried to its ultimate consequences by the Yogacaras, in whose system it tries to usurp the place of the principle of the double truth, the conventional truth, 'lokasamvrtisatya' and the true one 'paramarthasatya', which according to the dogmatics, is inherent in every Buddha's tenet. It is evident that a new conception of Karman was unfolding itself from the tenets of the school. Karman is no longer a mere individual force which, manifesting its power and acting through the urgency of 'avidya' establishes a connection between the numberless links of that chain which has no beginning but can have an end, and which is called a 'Santana' an individual series. Karman now assumes a cosmic aspect; more than action, it becomes an idea; a bija, a seed, is deposited in the 'alaya', and then from the 'alaya' it springs forth again. It is not only the substructure of the so-called individuals, mere phantasms, but also of all things, subjective as well as objective. It is the real factor of all that we experience, see, feel, touch; it is the creator of the world. The syn-

thesis of all 'parikalpitas' and all 'paratantras' unfolding the endless whirlpool of the individual consciousness and mutually arising the one from the other as the grass from the seed, constitutes the variety of this world and of the systems of worlds, which, through the result of myriads of 'bijas' appear to us as being governed by some common principles of general analogy. As there are many lamps, though their light is one, so the multiplicity of the 'Vijnanas' flowing from and returning back into the 'alaya' gives birth to this universal 'maya' which, although manifold in its manifestations, is one in its laws and in its becoming. And yet, as external things do not exist in their objective reality, the world can change according to the beings and to their mental perfections. As a mountain appears to me in a quite different manner when I look at its snowy peaks from afar, when it is reddened by the beams of the new sun, and when I begin to ascend its summit, so everything changes according to our merits, and to our knowledge. A river as Agotra says, in his commentary on Vasubandhu, appears to us as a mass of running water but to infernal beings as melted iron; to 'pretas' it looks like pus and blood, to the gods it appears as a necklace of pearls on the breast of earth. Therefore, all this world that the deceitful magic of 'avidya' makes us think as really existent, is nothing else than the projection of our karman itself; the most eloquent aspects of nature, the dreamy sun and the melancholy sunset, the mystery of the night watching us with its myriads of stars, and the gorgeous glory of the sun, the wind which refreshes and solaces, the storm which ravages and destroys, are mere illusory imaginations determined by the force of karman in that series of interdependent imaginations that is called an individual. Thus all the common notions are refuted by a crushing and pitiless logic. Everything is non-existent; the material

elements, as well as the infernal beings, who, according to the ancient dogmatics and the popular belief, harm and torture the sinners in the dreadful and fierce realms of Mara or Yama. Hell is nothing else than the representation of a hell determined by the inevitable force of our actions, that is to say of what an individualised idea fancies to be objectified. "In Hell" says Vasubandhu in his Vijnaptimatrasiddhisastra, "there are no infernal ministers; but the sinners, owing to their own sins, fancy that they see the infernal ministers, and the thought arises in them: This is the hell, this is the place of hell, this is the time of hell....this is an infernal minister--I am a sinner. And as a consequence of their bad karman, they fancy that they see (and experience) the various infernal tortures..."

The notion that the dogmatics had of the infernal ministers cannot resist a serious critic--the same buddhist doctor says again---and for many reasons; if they were real creatures, they would suffer as creatures do. But this is against your own assumption. If they were creatures, they would harm each other; so that they could not harm the sinners. If they were creatures having bodies and therefore subject to pain and evil, they could not be feared by the sinners. If they were creatures, as the hells are made with melted iron, burnt by fire, how could they do harm to the sinners? But beyond the illusion there is the reality. I said before that there is a supreme reality, 'tathata' which is the basis of everything: the totality of beings is no other than this 'tathata'. The "satvadhatu" is the same thing as the 'tathagata dhatu' or the 'Dharmadhatu, or the 'Dharmakaya.' This supreme reality is in everyone, because nothing exists beyond it, or outside of it; only owing to the kleças and to the infections, the creatures do not realize this oneness

of their own being with that of the Tathagata.

This was a conception which reminds us of he vedantic 'Atman', and in fact we can deduce that this was the main objection raised by the Brahmins from the texts of the Yogacara themselves, which, through a subtle but always convincing dialectic, try to refute the criticism of their opponents. And this was indeed a difficult task, as little by little the system was assuming a mystic and religious character which differentiated it from the ancient doctrines.

Concluding a gradual evolution which had been going on since the latest Vedic times, Buddha, although he did not deny the existence of gods, assumed that they were only one of the various classes of beings, asserting at the same time, the undisputed superiority of man, since only manhood can give birth to a Buddha. It is no more a God who descends from heaven to earth, in order to finght together with humanity against the devil who is trying to do mischief to it, but it is man who, purified by a holy life, breaks once for all the ties of evil and becomes a God. This is a titanic vision of struggle and conquest, which makes out of the Bodhisattva a heroic creation as he, coming out of evil, annihilates it. It is no longer a question of asceticism and renunciation.

Nevertheless it is true that man prefers the security of a dependent to the tragic responsibility of a hero. The nietzschean Zarathustra is suffering from his spiritual wealth; and rather than give, he would have preferred to receive. People rather than take high speculative flights, prefer to adore and to pray. Buddhism could not escape this fate. Little by little, the mystic and religious feeling which permeates Indian civilization took the upper hand; and that transcendentalism which was for a while denied invades again and changes the doctrine of Cakyamuni. Buddha is no more the man, the supe-

rior man, the Ubermensch who, through a 'carya' practised during cycles of time has conquered the truth of universal redemption. But we have once more the hypothesis of the absolute being existing in itself and by itself, and which, as Acvaghosa says, echoing as it were the Bhagavad-gita, manifests itself in this world as soon as dharma is clouded. For the ascension of men to god later Buddhism substitutes the 'avatara' of the the eternal truth; which theory the Yogacara philosophy later on elaborates in the minutest detail through the doctrine of the three bodies of Buddha, which represents the highest attempt by Indian philosophy to reconcile the immanence and the transcendency of God. As soon as the fusion with these theistic and mystic tendencies was realised, the Buddhist philosophy, which, in the Vijnanavada school had expounded principles that blot out all claim of originality advanced by the bold assumption of modern absolute idealism, closes its glorious era of gigantic creations. Its mystic and idealistic character made it easy to Gaudapada to elaborate a vedantic system on the basis of Yogacara philosophy, while the syncretic tendency of the school continually preaching that brahmanic gods are only manifestations or 'avataras' of the 'tathagatadhatu' prepared its fusion with Hinduism which at last absorbed it. Its theoretical elements which still survive in the later and degenerated speculations of the Tantrayana and of the Mantrayana, deteriorated solely into sophistry and into mere dialectic disputes as soon as the epoch of original creation was at an end.

Dignaga and Dharmakirti followed Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu. Mere logic usurped the place of that living harmony of faith and wisdom, of mystic ecstasy and of thirst after knowledge, which was the principal reason of the millenery vitality of Buddhism. Logic can appeal to a well trained philosophic mind, but it cannot say anything to

hearts anxious to communicate with the divine precense of God in the infinity of creation. As Hinduism was absorbing its later religious manifestations, subtler and sharper logicians little by little broke all its dialectic constructions; to the era of Dignaga and Dharmakirti that of Udayanacarya Kumarila and Cankara followed, in which the general defeat of Buddhist thought took place and that light was quenched which had spread for centuries in luminous rays all over Asia. The greatness and importance of Buddhism is not only in the magnificence and in the depth of its theoretical and philosophical conceptions, but specially in its humane and historical purport. It is to Buddhism that India owes the spreading of its culture in Central Asia and in the Far East. It is Buddhism only which, calling Iranian, Chinese and Tibetan pilgrims into the sacred land of Cakyamuni, accomplished the miracle of bringing into contact many cultures and many civilizations. New roads were opened through mountains and wastes, peoples met with, different visions of life blended together: and from the interpenetration of so many ideas and conceptions eastern civilization reached such a high and full blossoming as it never had before or afterwards; assuming little by little, in arts, in literature and in habits of thought a general uniformity of expression which was essentially Buddhist. But it seems as if nature had opposed insurmountable barriers to the intercommunication of peoples. The chain of high mountains, the large wastes, the unlimited plains of Asia, cannot facilitate contact and exchange; as soon as this religious enthusiasm began to wane, the invasion of new tribes changed the history of central Asia, and the sands invaded little by little the Tarim's valley, which Chinese colonization and Iranian immigrations had stolen as it were with a historic struggle from the threatening desert, then the relations

between the Far East and India became rare, so that every nation was obliged to seek for the realisation of its own ideals without those exchanges and those contracts which, in the variety of actions and re-actions that they determine, are the real factors of all progress.

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

1. Alban G. Widgery:*The problem of Philosophy is therefore the knowledge of all the facts, of "all the real", and of the meaning or meanings of what is real. It may be rightly maintained that "meanings" are themselves facts: but usage and philosophical convenience justify the retention of the two terms with a distinct reference.

To the question which may now be raised: What is the meaning of meaning the reply might, indeed, be made, that the putting of the question implies some understanding of meaning on the part of the questioner, since he requires that an explanation of the term "meaning" shall be given, which he shall recognise as meaning. Such an answer could not be accepted as satisfactory. Although many philosophers have regarded Philosophy as a quest for meaning or meanings, their efforts have so far too often been directed to a logically consistent statement of matter of fact and of principles of knowledge, and these without reference to any associated meanings. There has been little discussion of "meaning" exceptiwith reference to the meaning of words. An attempt must be made to suggest what seems to be implied by meaning, though a thorough treatment in this introductory lecture is impossible.

For the tautological character of the question: What is the meaning of meaning it appears that here an ultimate is reached. What is the nature of this ultimate? It is what is usually called "value." That which has meaning is that which has value. A fact is to be explained, if at all, by

*on "MEANING"

reference to its value: the statement of the antecedent conditions is no real explanation. There may be facts without values; what might be called mere "matters of fact." Neither are values to be limited in this connection to what are to men desirable. Facts which are undesirable, i.e. possessing "good" values. Philosophy seeks not merely to know facts, but also whether any facts have meaning or meanings and if so, what facts have what meanings. At the outset it is not to be assumed that all that is real, taken together, has one meaning, or many meanings, or no meaning at all.

2. The meaning which facts have for many men may not be their only meaning; and further, that it does not follow that if men are unable to find meaning in certain facts, those facts have no meaning at all. Facts which have meaning for us may also have other meanings, and facts which have no meanings for us may have meanings nevertheless. But until the facts of human experience are appreciated from the point of view of their value, their meaning is not known, and the task of philosophy not achieved.

3. A careful consideration of these values leads to the recognition of the fact that they are actually experienced only as particulars, even while it becomes equally clear that they are related in various ways. What I enjoy is not a "good meal" in general, but this or that good meal; and so for the other physical values, either good or bad. It is not truth in the abstract (if, indeed, that is at all an intelligible conception) but this truth and that truth, i.e. true propositions, which are the object of intellectual effort and the source of intellectual value. In the realm of the beautiful, the objects of endeavour and of appreciation are particular,--beauties of body, of dress, of music, of poetry, of dwellings, of scenes of nature and so on.

4. Pandit Mahabhagvat of Kurkoti: "This extremely subtle reality, the source of absolutism, may not even be imagined without the help of the Sruti; for, having no form and the like, it cannot be the object of direct perception; nor can it come within the range of inference and other proofs as it has no characteristic mark or anything of the kind." These quotations make it sufficiently clear that Sankara allows perception and inference to hold undisputed sway in their own sphere i.e. in the phenomenal.

5. Sankara employs reasoning for highly intellectual people, reserving the dogmatic method for less gifted aspirants to enlightenment.

6. According to Sankara, the ultimate reality is one and brooks no distinction; while true knowledge is the knowledge of this reality as being such. This "realisation" is therefore, the ultimate criterion of truth.

6. R.D. Ranade: It is no wonder if this intellectualistic psychology makes room for an idealistic metaphysics. The intellectualistic seer of the Aitareya Upanishad is an idealist as well. In the very section that follows the one we have quoted, the author goes on to point out how Intellect is the backbone, not merely of physical functions, but of reality itself: "This god Brahma, and this god Indra,---these five great elements, (earth, air, ether, water, fire,... creatures born from the egg, from the womb, and from perspiration, sprouting plants, horses, cows, men, elephants, and whatsoever is immovable, all this is led by the intellect. The world is led by Intellect. Intellect is the support. Intellect is the final reality." This is as outspoken an idealism as idealism can be. The author says that all the movable and immovable objects in this world, all those creatures which walk or fly, all the elements and gods exist by virtue of intellect and in Treatise, Sction6, "All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth."

Of the very same import is the passage from the Maitri Upanishad which tells us that it is the inner self which governs "external" existence, that, in short, the inner Prana is the pivot of the existence of the Sun. This knowledge, says the passage, is given to only a few.
7. We see here what a great stress is laid on the constructive activity of the soul in the state of dream. Finally, we are told in a passage of the Prasna Upanishad how dreams, even though they are usually a mere replica of actual waking experience, also occasionally involve absolutely novel construction: "there that god experiences greatness in sleep. What is seen over and over again, he sees once more (in the dream); what is heard over and over again, he hears once again (in the dream). . . What is seen and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he experiences all, because he <u>is</u> the all." This must indeed be regarded as a very clever analysis of dream-experience.
8. "If one medicates on Brahman as support, he himself will get support; if as greatness, he himself will become great; if as mind, he himself will receive honour; if as the <u>parimara</u> of Brahman, round about (pari) him shall die (mri) all the enemies who hate him"; and lastly "he who meditates on Brahman as Not-Being, he himself shall cease to exist; he, on the other hand who will meditate on Brahman as Being shall(always) remain. This is what they know." We recomment these passages from the Upanishads to all those who believe in the thaumaturgy of thought.
9. <u>P.A.Wadia</u>: Emphatic reassertion in a generation which, whether in the East or West, is so prone to self-deceit, which salves its conscience by weighing the half truth against the hidden lie.
10. Thus Zarathustra taught how the great unity of life lasts on, how the immortal life knows no break in its continuity.

11. Who has not struggled, and complained in bitterness against the waste and meaningless of human sufferings? To these Zarathustra appealed, and not entirely in vain, with his firm faith in a righteous God. The Greek had no such solace to look to, and the Greek spirit has immortalised in Promestheus the protest of humanity against injustice and wrong, a plea not for pity but for the worth of human nature.

12. Editor: Almost all philosophers admit that philosophical reflection aims at a synthesis of apparent opposites. The tendency of thought is, however to swing from one side to another, and the consequence is that anyone who tries hard to steer clear of over-emphasis of one side and to present a statement which seems to do justice to all sides, is more likely to meet with more opposition than sympathy from all sides.

13. There can be "no doubt that the twentieth century opens a remarkable revival of general interest in philosophy", and that philosophy appears to be girding herself afresh for her synthetic task.

14. The whole treatment suggests that the philosophy here presented--like the Reality it affirms--was (or is eternally) there "from the outset," so to speak. It is not so much the progressive advance to a conclusion, as the criticism of partial views from the stand-point of a position already accepted. It may be said that all philosophical exposition must read like this, and the rejoinder is in large measure just. But the impression of hard struggles to attain the position is not given, and some of the problems seem all too easily passed over.

15. The method adopted by the author is similar to that found in his other books, the constructive presentation of his own position through the critical estimation of other positions.

16. The Critique of the Pure Reason with its

limitation of phenomena, as the only really important work of Kant, and represented morality and religion as subjective and poetical.

17. The ancient Indians did not use the method of experiment. To quote a letter on this point from Mr. B.G.Tilak: "This method was utterly unknown till Bacon and Descartes pointed out its importance; and to my mind, this is the important difference between the ancient and modern scientific thought. Dr. Seal has not quoted a single instance to prove that the method of questining nature by experiment was known to the ancient Hindus. They observed that when a stone was dropped in water, it produced a widening circle of waves, and imagined that the same happened in the atmosphere when a sound was uttered. But not having learnt the art of experimenting, they could not go further. This to my mind is the main difference between the ancient and modern scientific thought.

18. As is usual to represent the philosophy of Sankara, Dr.Macnicol talks of the impossibility of theism finding a "place in a system of such absolute and unflinching monism---which makes self-consciousness an illusion, and to the sole eixtent Being denies all attributes whatever."

19. Rudolph Eucken: How much time was spent in overcoming external hindrances! How difficult travel was! How tiresome the exchange of thoughts by correspondence! In all these matters changes have come about, even the idea of which had never before been approached in the history of of the world. Illuminating ideas, which since the beginning of the seventeenth century had formed part of Natural Science, have in the nineteenth century been more adequately systematised, developed and brought to a position of supremacy.

20. Along with the change in ideas has gone a change in practical life. The relation of man to his environment has completely changed, especially where industry has availed itself of the results of research, and where new combinations

advantageous to our well-being have been made.
21. The achievements of this direction gain distinctly in comprehensively through the influence of the social ideal with its requirement that the results of endeavour be shared not simply by a small circle of chosen individuals but by all who bear human features. Thus, completely new prospects open out, and new tasks are originated.
22. It is common experience in history that when great changes take place and the former balance is disturbed, the power of careful judgment disappears and clearness of vision is lost. Subjective inclinations of men, unguarded against error and passion, are inter-woven with the actual facts. Hence arises the urgent necessity of distinguishing the genuine facts from human interpretations and additions.
23. Goldzieher: The Sufi commentators accordingly have their own allegorical ta'wil, an esoteric exposition which has called forth a great literature, and which runs through all Sufi works. In order to obtain for this esoterism a legitimate traditional connection in Islamic relations, they borrowed from the Shias the doctrine that Muhammed had entrusted to his mandatory "Ali the hidden meaning of the revelations. The Arabic Sufi poet, already mentioned, "Omar b. al-Farid gives expression to this attitude in Sufi circles in the words:

"And with ta'will Ali made clear that which was dark, through knowledge which he received as a testament (from the Prophet)".

Ali is regarded by them as the Patriarch of of Islamic mysticism, a view which has to be rejected absolutely from the standpoint of Sunni orthodoxy: for it, the Prophet could not have withheld anything from the great majority of his people, nor imparted to anyone secret knowledge.

(Vo.2.No.1 of) THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

1. RADHAKRISHNAN: The entrance of democracy into philosophy which made the plain man's belief the touchstone of all philosophic truth helped to vindicate the rights of feeling and will against the claims of intellect. "Theosophy, the speculations of the Kabala, occultism, magic, spiritualism, all the mystic ravings of the Neo-Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans, the most antiquated of theories, debris of every kind, heaped haphazard on the foundation of the speculations of the ages,--all these have returned to favour in defiance of the dictates of logic and commonsense."

2. Dr. Aliotta's chief objection to absolute idealism is that it is difficult to conceive how the consciousness of different minds can be fused into one. But the truth or otherwise of absolute idealism is not to be decided by our capacity to imagine the complete fusion of minds. If the feeling of subjectivity or selfhood is due to the empirical contents which are extraneous or accidental to the true nature of mind, then the incommunicability of egos has no logical necessity about it. The barriers which separate the selves are empirical and they may any day be broken down.

3. Ed: The traditional Formal Logic suggests to us most the utterances of the Kindergarten, and the alleged outpourings of Bedlam. To exaggerate a little: there are times when to raise a better construction we pull down a building and clear the ground thoroughly: perhaps the time is not far distant when we shall burn all the books on the traditional Formal Logic and shoot all Formal Logicians.

4. ALBAN G. WIDGERY:* The distrust of thought and reason, to the extent found amongst most of writers examined, who have directly or indirectly put forward the proposal that beliefs should be justified by the satisfaction chiefly of emotional religious needs, has been shown to be unwarranted, frequently leading to self-contradiction. Reason is not merely

→ *on "REASON AND BELIEF"

relative but has in its own nature something absolute.

5. Though the adoption of propositions as beliefs is influenced by feeling, they are in their own nature essentially expressions of thought: they are cognitive, concerned with ideas. And as soon as anything is expressed in the form of thought and language it ipso facto places itself in a position compelling rational and critical consideration. On this ground alone it might justifiably be maintained that reason is the chief court of appeal as to the validity of religious as of other beliefs. The rock on which all contrary views come to grief is the intolerable inconsistency of appealing to reason and intelligence to deny reason.

6. The problem is in part as to the real nature of reason. In the mind of the person who would minimise the importance of reason this term far too frequently suggests the process of reasoning, as predominantly or solely the passing logically from one or more premisses to a conclusion. But it is evident that for any such process (1) the meaning of each proposition must be grasped sufficiently for the purpose, and (2) "in the last issue" it must be either accepted or rejected. Only so far as the meaning is known can reason accept or reject the proposition. The condition "in the last issue" is necessary because for the sake of argument one may state one's acceptance of a particular proposition or series of propositions, but if it came to the question of ultimate and genuine acceptability, reason might reject the proposition or propositions. The premisses and the conclusion of a process of reasoning must all be grasped individually and in relation to one another immediately by the reason. There is a definite meaning in saying that reason accepts or rejects, and that this acceptance or rejection does not necessarily admit of analysis. In other words, there is no test of reason itself. When we say that "thought has come to rest" we refer to this immediate grasp of the meaning and

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the definite acceptance or rejection of the conclusion both in itself and in relation to the premises.

7. Reason can accept or reject only what is consciously apprehended, that is, it must be acquainted with the relevant facts. The truth with regard to reason itself seems to be, not that it is itself defective, but that it is beset with limitations owing to not yet being supplied with the whole of the necessary subject matter.

8. The fundamental motive underlying all active thought, whether expressed or not, is to view the aspects of experience as rational and intelligible. The implicit faith in all intellectual investigation is that the data with which the investigation deals may be grasped as factors in a scheme more or less rational and systematic. This is so whether the aim is purely intellectual or whether the knowledge is sought as a means to some other kind of satisfaction. Ultimately we have to recognise that reason "accepts itself" and that is no more and no less circular than when, in using the term <u>self-consciousness</u> we mean that the self is aware of itself. The existence of elements of empirical data which do not at once fit into a rational whole is not regarded as a ground for reason to abandon its attitude, but rather as an istigation for more arduous and careful consideration. "What is logical now for A or B is not therefore destined to remain so for all men coming." If a distinction is made between what men really believe and what they may think they believe, it will be found that the former beliefs are always held because the world appears more intelligible with than without them. The test of the acceptibility of a particular proposition, even for common sense, is in most cases the extent of its conformity with the general system (more or less "ragged-edged") already accaccepted. Only occasional extraordinary expe-

riences lead to such radical change in grouping or looking at the facts that one may justifiably talk of the acceptance of a new general system.

One distinct method of reason is its rejection of the contradictory, and its aim at general consistency. This is not disputed by anyone. The great difficulty is that of sufficiently careful analysis as to when propositions are in real contradiction. The fallacy of so many of the earlier Idealists has been to confuse the rational consistency of propositions with an actual metaphysical and ethical harmony of realities.

9. These thought contents or beliefs in the religions have been formed in relation with empirical facts of religious experience. To the particular individuals who experience these facts the presence of "objective" elements is not open to doubt.

10. Treating what may be individually experienced as thought is simply subjective. Nevertheless, it is clear that the beliefs with which philosophy and science generally are concerned are those which become shared by all. In other words, universality is attributed to the truths which the beliefs are supposed to express. The correct representation of the distinction between what is objective for the particular individual and what is objective for all is one of the most difficult problems of philosophy and upon its solution depends also, practically, the increase of telerance amongst persons of diverse religious beliefs. The objective for all has been described as that which " is so far detachable from the series of our private experience that it may be made an object of universal apprehension." But though "detachment" may seem logically conceivable, it may be questioned whether it is psychologically possible.

11. The development of a justifiable and satis-

factory system of beliefs is a social and historical task. The majority of the ideas in the thought of the individual have been passed on to him through his life in the community, and these ideas have grown up in the experience of the race. It is through thought expressed in language that he enters into this inheritance.

12. Reason cannot accept propositions which are contradictory, in conflict with perceived facts.

13. Every philosophy of life, every creed or scheme of beliefs, implicitly or explicityly involves some propositions in themselves ultimate. The critical consideration of these principles is to be regarded as the concern of metaphysics, usually best left to the metaphysician.

14. Reason is called on to understand the positions and in consideration of the empirical data to accept or reject them. In this task it will examine propositions individually in themselves, but even more evidently in relation to other propositions and to the whole nature of human life.

15. R.G. BHANDARKAR:* The position of idealism is this. I know directly what passes in my consciousness. I am conscious of certain sensations of which I believe myself not to be the cause. To account for them, I suppose the existence of an external nature. But this is simply an inference necessitated by the constitution of my mind, i.e. the external world for me exists in consequence of a law of my intellect. Beyond my consciousness and my intellect, there is no warranty for the existence of the external world. Whence arises the necessity of the supposition of its existence? In consciousness, there are feelings and representations i.e. I feel myself tied down to a particular state, my freedom is restrained, my free activity is limited. Who has limited me? Certainly not the external world, for it is my own creation. It is to account for that limitation of my free activity that I posit it. The limita-

*on "IDEALISM"

tation is prior, the supposition of the external world is subsequent. I feel my activity impaired, and so much as I feel is taken away from me, I attribute to something else. I simply objectivise my subjective feeling. We must then look for this limitation of the me in the state of the intellect previous to consciousness; for when the me awoke, it awoke with its limitations, with the not me. These limitations, therefore, point to the nature of the intellect just as the little red green and blue clouds visible to the eye when it is dazzled, indicate the structure of the organ itself and do not exist in themselves. This is the Idealism of Fichte, the German philosopher.

16. The external world is reduced to states of consciousness and, along with our finite thoughts and feelings, is derived from a certain power called vasana which is not of the essence of the me and though it resides in it, is separable from it. Then by a transition not unusual in the history of Philosophy, the Madhyamikas, another sect, deny the existence of both the internal and the external world, and end in nihilism. With them, vasana is the cause of both, and when, by the discipline enjoined by their master, this is rooted out, nothing remains and this is their nirvana. Then again, another school, that of the Sautrantikas, starting from a subjective basis, similarly with these two admits the existence of external objects, but only as the result of an inference that cannot be avoided. They say that if the vasana producing such a representation as that of a blue object for instance, exists in the soul, it must always produce that representation, that is, we must always produce that representation, that is, we must always see a blue object. But we see it only occasionally; therefore, the cause of that representation must exist out of the ego. But the forms of external objects are supplied to them by the intellect; they are the creations of our mind. This external world, and

and the internal one of finite thoughts and feelings, are capable of destruction or separation from the soul, (nirodha), and the way to this, is the discipline spoken of before (marga) When they are thus destroyed, pure intelligence alone remains and the soul attains Moksha. We thus see how closely these schools are connected. The philosophy of the Sautranikas may be compared to that of Kant, that of the Yogacharas to Fitche's, while that of the Madhyamikas is nihilism. But all the schools start from a subjective basis and are idealistic, in which respect they resemble the Sankhya system.) 17. S.RADHARKISHNAN. This objective world is not an object of any individual's experience. It has an existence even though this or that individual is not aware of it. There must be some kind of experiment to which it is an object, for an experiment that is not owned is a contradiction."

18. Ed: Though he is evidently filled with a keen interest in his subject, he is not qualified for the task he undertook. One has but to compare the excellent book of Dr. Dhalla on Zoroastrian Theology with Mr. Tatia's order to see the difference at every point between the work of trained and disciplined, and untrained and undisciplined thought. This much may perhaps be said, that there are in all religious communities persons who think in an unsystematic way about the ideas of God.

19. ARTHUR AVALON: "ALLEGED CONFLICT OF SHASTRAS" A not uncommon modern criticism upon the Indian Shastras is that they mutually conflict. This is due to a lack of knowledge of the doctrine of Adhikara and Bhumika, particularly amongst Western critics, whose general outlook and mode of thought is ordinarily deeply divergent from that which has prevailed in India. The idea that the whole world should follow one path is regarded by the Hindus as absurd, being contrary to Nature and its laws. A man must follow that path for

which he is fit, that is for which he is Adhikari. Adhikara or competency literally means "spreading over" that is "taking possession of." What is to be known (Jnatavya) done (Kartavya) acquired (Praptavya) is determined not once and generally for all, but in each case by the fitness and capacity therefore of the individual. Each man can know, do, and obtain not everything, nor indeed one common thing, but that only of which he is capable (adhikari). What the Jiva can think, do, or obtain, is his competency or Adhikara, a profound and practical doctrine on which all Indian teaching and Sadhana is based. As men are different and therefore the Adhikara is different, so there are different forms of teaching and practice for each Adhikara.

19. The very merciful Bhagavan Parameshvara desirous of aiding men whose mind and disposition (Chitta) differ according to the results produced by their different acts, promulgated different kinds of Vidya which, though appearing to be different as between themselves, yet have, as their common aim, the highest end of all human life (that is Liberation).

20. Such Texts as praise any particular Vidya are addressed to those who are Adhikari therein, and their object is to induce them to follow it. Such texts again as disparage any Vidya are addressed to those who are not Adhikari therein, and their object is to dissuade them from it. Nor again should these words of blame (or praise) be taken in an absolute sense, that is otherwise than relatively to the person to whom they are addressed.

21. The study of the Purvamimanga and the Karmakanda in the Vedas is useful for this purpose. When by this means Dharma, Artha and Kama are attained, there arises a desire for the fourth Purushartha (Liberation or Moksha). And therefore to sever men from the former stage (Purvabhumika) there are texts which deprecate Karma such as (Mund.Up.) "By that which is made cannot be attained that which is not made" (Nastyakritah kritena)

Vashishtha says that these (earlier stages) are seven and that all are stages of ignorance.(Ajnanabhumika). Beyond these are stages of Jnana. For the attainment of the same there are injunctions relating to Brahmajnana which lead on to the next higher stage, such as (Mund.Up.1) "He should go to the Guru alone". "Listen Oh Maitreyi the Atma should be realised." Some say that the Jnana-bhumikas are many and rely on the text. The wise say that the stages of Yoga are many." The holy Vashishtha says that there are seven, namely, Vividisha (desire to know) Vicharana (reflection) Tanumanasa (concentration) Sattvapatti (commencement of realisation) Asamsakti (detachment) Padarthabhavini (realisation of Brahman only) and Turyaga (full illumination in the fourth state.) The meaning of these is given in, and should be learnt from, the Jnanashastra of Vashishtha.

22. Nidhidhyasana when the mind, the natural characteristic of which is to wander, is directed towards its proper Yoga-object only.

23. Brahmajnana again is of two kinds:-- namely Shabha and Aparokshanubhavarupa. Understanding of the meaning of Shastra (Shastradrishti) the word of the Guru (Gurorvakyam) and certainty (Nishchaya) of the unity of the individual self (Sva) and the Atma are powerful to dispel inward darkness, but not the mere knowledge of words (Shabhabodha). (See Yogavashishtha Utpatti). Therefore when the Shabdhabhumika is attained one should not waste one's time further at this stage, and there are texts which prohibit it. Thus "Having become indifferent to learning let him remain simple as in childhood." (Br.Ar.)

24. In Nyaya and other Shastras it is stated that Moksha will be attained by mastery in such particular Shastra, but that is merely a device by which knowledge of the higher stage is not disclosed. This is not blameworthy because its object is to remove the disinclination to study such Shastra by reason of the delay thereby caused in

the attainment of Purushartha (which disinclination would exist if the Sadhaka knew that there was a higher Shastra than that which he was studying).
25. The words do not deny that there is a higher stage.
26. The Adhikara of men varies. Therefore so does the form of the Shastra. There are many stages (Bhumika) on the path of spiritual advance. Man makes his way from a lower to a higher Bhumika. Statements in any Shastra must be interpreted with reference to the Adhikara of the persons to whom they are addressed. Texts laudatory of any Vidya are addressed to the Adhikari therein with the object of inducing him to follow it. Texts in disparagement of any Vidya are addressed to those who are not Adhikari therein, either because he has not attained, or has surpassed, the Bhumika applicable, and their object is to dissuade them from following it. Neither statements are to be taken in an absolute sense, for the truth is in each case given in that form which is suitable for the stage reached. From step to step the Sadhaka rises, until having passed through all presentments of the Vaidik truth which are necessary for him, he attains the Vedasvarupa which is the knowledge of the Self.
27. It principles admit a progressive revelation of the Self to the self, according to varying competencies (Adhikara) and stages (Bhumika) of spiritual advance. Though each doctrine and practice belongs to varying levels, and therefore the journey may be shorter or longer as the case may be, ultimately all lead to the Vedasvarupa or knowledge of the Self, than which there is no other end. That which immediately precedes this complete spiritual experience is the Vedantik doctrine and Sadhana for which all others are the propaideutik. There is no real conflict if we look at the stage at which the particular instructions are given. Thought moves by an immanent logic from a less to a a more complete statement of the true nature of the thinker.

28. Because a seer such as Kapila Adividvan (upon whose Smriti or experience the Sangkhya is assumed to be founded) teaches Dvaitavada, it does not follow that he had not himself reached a higher stage, such as Advaitavada is claimed to be. A Seer may choose to come down to the level of more ordinary people and teach a Dvaitavada suited to their capacity (Adhikara). If all were to teach the highest experience there would be none to look after those who were incapable of it, and who must be led up through the necessary preliminary stages. As pointed out by Professor Pramathanatha Mukhyopadhyaya, Sangkhya is the science of analysis and discrimination, and therefore the preparation for Vedanta which is the science of synthesis and assimilation. Kapila, Gotama and Kanada mainly built on reason deepened and enlarged, it may be, by Smriti or subjective experience. We do not find in them any complete synthesis of Shruti. A general appeal is made to Shutri and a few texts are cited which accord with what (whether it was so in fact to them or not) is in fact a provisionally adopted point of view. They concentrate the thoughts and wills of their disciples on them, withholding (if they themselves have gone further) the rest, as not at present suited to the capacity of the Shishya, thus following what Shangkara calls Arunadhati-darshana-nyaya. Nevertheless the higher truth is immanent in the lower. The Differential and Integral Calculus are involved in elementary Algebra and Geometry because the former generalise what the latter particularize. But the teacher of elementary mathematics in the lower forms of a school would only fonfound his young learners if he were to introduce such a general theorem (as say Taylor's) to them. He must keep back the other until the time is ripe for them. Again the great Teachers teach wholeheartedness and thoroughness in both belief and action, without which the acceptance of a doctrine is useless. Hence a teacher of Dvai-

tavada, though himself Advaita-darshi presents Dvaita to the Adhikari Shishya in such a forcible way that his reason may be convinced and his interest may be fully aroused. It is useless to say to a Sadhaka on the lower plane "Advaita is the whole truth. Dvaita is not; but though it is not, it is suited to your capacity and therefore accept it." He will of course say that he does not then want Dvaita, and, being incapable of understanding Advaita, will lose himself. (This I may observe is one of the causes of Scepticism to-day. In the olden time it was possible to teach a system without anything being known of that which was higher. But with the printing of books some people learn that all is Maya, that Upasana is for the "lower" grades and so forth, and, not understanding what all this means, are disposed to throw Shastric teaching in general over board. This they would not have done if they had been first qualified in the truth of their plane and thus become qualified to understand the truth of that which is more advanced. Until Brahma Sakshatkara, all truth is relative).

29. A Rishi who has realised Advaita may teach Ayurveda or Dhanuveda. He need not be Sthula-darshi because he teaches Sthula-Vishaya, Again Shastras may differ because their standpoints and objectives are different.

30. The difference in interpretation is incidental to difference in standpoint and objective. The same remarks apply to the various forms of Advaita such as Vishishtadvaita, Shuddadvaita; between the Shaktivada of the Shakta Agama and Vivarttavada. In some Shastras stress is laid on Karma, in others on Bhakti, and yet in others on Jnana as in the case of Mayavada. Buth though the emphasis is differently placed, each is involved in the other and ultimately meet and blend. The Mahimnastava says "Though men, according to their natures, follow differing paths, Thou art the end of all, as is the ocean of all the rivers which flow thereto."

Madhusudana Sarasvati commenting on this, has written his Prasthanabheda, the reconciliation of varying doctrines. To-day the greatest need in these matters is (for those who are capable of understanding) the establishment of this intellectual and spiritual whole. The Seers who live in the exalted sphere of Calm understand the worth and significance of each form of spritual culture as also their Synthesis, and, to the degree that lesser minds attain this level to this extent they will also do so. Whilst the lower mind lives in a section of the whole fact and therefore sees difference and conflict the illumined who live in and have in varying degrees experience of the Fact itself see all such as related parts of an Whole.

31. R. ZIMMERMANN.*The reason d'etre of every philosophical system is based on its essential relation to truth. Its notion of truth must coincide with universally acknowledged principles; the criterion of truth, in itself a fit measure of cognition, is to be applied with every possible rigidity to the first principles of the system as well as to the consequences. For, however varied the starting points, the methods and results of the different systems of philosophy may appear, they all profess to give an ultimately valid representation and explanation of reality.

32.It would certainly be wrong to suspect and condemn a system because it is new either in itself or to us. Again, it could hardly be called a sound method to accept a system with all or part of its tenets because it has a long history and a large following. It is the indisputable right of philosophical criticism to examine the most time-hallowed doctrines and systems, either to confirm and accept or to reject them at last.

33. The human mind claims the proud prerogative by following the light of truth to look behind the appearances, to tear away one covering kosa after the other from the true nature of things, to search and go on till the Supreme Principle has been

*on "ANUBHAVA AS CRITERION OF TRUTH."

reached and unveiled beyond which there is no Why? anymore.
34. A good many systems, in theology for instance, owe their origin to the undue emphasis of one particular aspect of truth, or to the incapability of expressing a truth that was recognised and acknowledge by everybody as soon as it was adequately formulated.
35. Supposing truth consists in the correct mental representation of the outside world, what measure are we to apply to find out whether our world of thought corresponds to the world of reality? In technical language, What gives us certainty that our cognition is correct?
36. Truth, then, is the representative equality (produced) between intellect and object.
37. In (one kind of) Idealism not the picture in the mind depends on the exterior thing but rather the "exterior" thing on the mind.
38. Nobody doubts that two plus two equals four in the logical order; nor has it ever been contested that there are actually four horses there, if two and two have been testified to be there by the legitimate sources of knowledge.
39. Either within the individual intellect (subjective Idealism) as Berkeley teaches, or the universal I or consciousness, as Fichte, Shcelling, Hegel maintain (objective Idealism).
40. What is the assurance of this light not turning out finally to be a will-o'the-wisp? As our intellect does not act blindly, there must be a legitimate motive of the adherence to a statement, and in order to be certain, we must be given an infallible sign that the truth is not only in general knowable, but is in present individual judgment actually known. This legitimate motive of assent and sure sign of certitude is the criterion of truth.
41. It should be clear that a philosopher of Sankara's intellectual power will not easily make a mistake in the chain of his reasoning, nor have

we any ground to assume that he was trapped by any unusual bias into illogical conclusions. Yet it will be wise not to forget that both as an ardent follower of his school and a powerful exponent of his doctrine he may have been led to consider certain reasons supporting his views in preference to others that were adverse to his opinion, and that he may have attributed such weight to favourable arguments as an outsider would fail to do.

42. One of the fundamental principles of Sankara's system is the distinction between the para and the apara vidya, the higher, esoteric and the lower, exoteric philosophical view. The apara vidya is the everyday view, the doctrine for the man in the street, expressly declared to be fit for the vyavaharika avastha. The para vidya is the sublime teaching, the secret of the initiated ones, not only producing but constituting the paramarthika avasta. Now the first question is, in what relation do these vidyas stand to one another? Do they condition one another by mutual interdependence, or is one supplementing the other, or are they finally contrary or contradictory to one another? Besides the contents of the two vidyas the origin of the distinction between the para and the apara vidya, as well as the criteria of truth on which they are based, prove that their mutual relation is mainly that of logical contradiction. Sankara's Vedanta professes to be based among other sources chiefly on the "Vedanta" of the Sruti, the Upanishads. The conflicting statements in those texts about God, the world, the problem of universality and individuality etc could not have escaped even a mind of lesser acumen than that of Sankaracharya. And yet the Upanishad doctrine has to be adopted in bulk, if the claim to be the Vedanta par excellence for Sankara's philosophy had to be justified. The expedient resorted to by him and his school was the bold demarcation and frank acknowledgment of the two conflicting views, putting them side by side, but at the same time embodying them into one and

the same system. Where contrary teaching could be brought to coincide it was made to do so, in a few instances of minor importance especially in the apara vidya the contradiction was left where it was; but in all other cases the most glaring inconsistencies were bridged over by the distinction between the para and apara vidya. What appears true in the one may be false in the other; for the tenets of the para and the apara vidya constitue each a separate domain of truth. Naturally the para vidya embodies the final, supreme, unchangeable truth, the apara vidya has, if the two collide, to be corrected by the para vidya. The criteria valid for the apara vidya may have to be mullified by the criteria of the para vidya, even one and the same criterion may lead to different conclusions in the two vidyas respectively.

The criteria valid in the apara vidya are the pratyaksha dini, sense-perception, inference, analogy, (especially sacred) authority.

42. Psychologically the anubhava is a perceptive act of the intellectual faculty the object of which is internal. This internal object must not be a past experience, be it impression or act; thus smriti remembrance, is excluded. The object of the anubhava must moreover be something really existing-not an object to be accomplished as in a vidhi but something in actual existence and now entering into the range of our internal vision. Anubhava is not such a rare psychological fact as might appear, for the internal perception, "Aham Janami" = "aham jnanavan asmi" differs from "Aham Brahmasmi" only on account of the object, not on account of the nature of the act itself.

From the point of logic it will have to be admitted that Sankara, considering anubhava as a criterion of truth, occupies a rather independent position.

43. We may have the finest game in logic, operating to our heart's content with terms, syllogisms and arrive at the most delightful conclusions; yet

at the end we find that we are still on the airy playground of logic alone and have not put our foot on the terra firma of ontology.

44. With such a basis for a system the intellect may go on a holiday for good; and the laws of thinking are but an unfortunate invention, barring us the straight way to happiness. In fact they are little more than an unnecessary burden of life, if Innerlichkeit, which is the last resort is a matter of taste and feeling, is to decide between truth and falsehood. Sankara's Vedanta would have to waive every claim to be considered as a philosophical darsanam.

There is however another kind of intuition that might appeal more to the genuine Vedantin, as it has been recognised and made use of through the whole history of thought.

45. Can intuition alone by itself be a source of truth, a motive and criterion, such as we needs demand for an imposing structure like Sankaracharya's system? Let us for a moment suppose that intuition comprises all the objects of knowledge coming within the range of ideas which form the foundation of Sankara's Vedanta, the nirguna brahma, maya for instance. Now either the intuition contains implicitly the deductive (or inductive) reasoning and consequently "is subject to the laws of logic" or it does not. If it does contain the reasoning, then the rules of logic concerning the criterion of truth must be applicable to it. If on the other hand intuition does not contain at least implicitly the ordinary reasoning, and if it can not be gauged by the rules of logic, then the ordinary standard seems to be wanting by which truth may be distinguished from falsehood assented to by the mind in the intuitive act. A bright boy may have an intuition, seeing in a flash of intellectual light of one moment's duration what his duller neighbours find out in hours by syllogisms of something like a bullock cart's speed. And perhaps the most brilliant discoveries in the history of human

mind have either been made or at least crowned by the intuition of the genius. But in all these cases the result, if not the process, of the intuition was controlled by the rigid laws of slow, laborious reasoning or by experiments. In other words the laws of logic are at least applicable to, if not consciously working in, the intuition. The very word intuition, coming from the Latin verb intueri, to regard, observe, contemplate, seems to point to the fact that this kind of cognition is based on the objective evidence, not less than a judgment in plain terms or a syllogism in barbara. How far the process of intution contains even the formal laws of logic and runs, however so swiftly, along the common grove, would be a matter of psychological enquiry. If then the brightest intuition is subject to the laws of logic, then all that has been said above about the criterion of truth holds good in the end for intuition. Those in particular, who are so very emphatic in preserving for Sankara's Vedanta the character of a pure philosophy, will agree that this system cannot be built on the chances of some subjective assertion thrown out on the strength of an "intuition", which may owe its origin to anything but a philosophical mentality, and must be the more suspicious the more it fights shy of an examination in the search-light of dry logic.

46. The name of mysticism, coming from (myein), implies the closing, viz. of the eyes to the outer world to concentrate oneself entirely on the inner one.

47. Mystical knowledge, at any rate in the first instance, appeals only to the individual mind, consequently it is neither universally known nor binding. The mystic may for instance be fully convinced about the essence and existence either in general or of a particular thing, yet he will always fail to express it adequately by a term or a formula, and he never can claim the assent of

everybody to his mystic vision without further proof for its correctness.

48. If we understand Sankaracharya well, he himself would be the last to acknowledge, and build his system upon, mystic vision as the main source and criterion of truth and motive of certitude.

49. Can it ever be philosophically acceptable that one or more than one acknowledged source of knowledge is nullified by another which is not better but, if anything, worse accredited at the court of truth? Are we under any circumstances justified to use simultaneously or successively a double measure of truth, any more than to apply a double standard of morality? It may be truly said <u>beati possidentes</u> of those who are fortunate enough to enjoy the para vidya, they form an aristocracy of mind in Vedanta. Not only thousands of fathoms below them dwell the plebeians in Sankara's system, those who are and remain enthralled in the apara vidya; they as a matter of fact are doomed to grope in the dark and are, if any mortal sitting in the shadow of ever recurring death. Worse still, they do not only possess the truth, but with an irresistible force, innate and unbending they are driven to hold that to be true which they have to reject and deny as soon as the redeaming light of self-realisation sheds its rays on these regions of Yama on earth.

50. It is the flat contradiction, the splitting of the notion of truth into twain, the yes and no about one and the same thing, that makes the theory of the esoteric and exoteric knowledge philosophically so unpalatable, and its source, the anubhava, so suspicious.

51 <u>R.D. WELLONS</u>: The first article of his faith is Primacy; the mind is supreme, eternal, absolute, one, manifold, subtle, living, permanent, flowing, self-manifesting. The universe is the result of mind, nature is the symbol of mind. There is one mind, with which the

There is one mind, with which the minds of all men are in touch, and which spreads like a sheet over all, and at the same time touching the smaller threads which extend up to it.

52. ED: The relation of philosophy to the social problem is the insistence on the necessity of knowledge and intellectual reflection as fundamental for the adequate solution of social problems.

53. Mr. Durant is not insisting on a platitude when he maintains that what men essentially need for social reconstruction is a knowledge of facts unaffected by prejudiced presentation such as is common through the press and so great a part of the educational channels of to-day.

54. There is a random quotation from the booklet under notice and it shows clearly the enthusiasm with which it is written. It would be vain to look for any close, systematic and disciplined thought about the study of the world forces or a close grasp of the world situation in it.

COLONEL JACOB'S INTRODUCTION TO SURESVARACARYA'S NAISKARMYA-SIDDHI.

1. Comparatively little is known of Suresvara, whose civil name was Mandana Misra, except that from being a bigoted Mimamsaka he became an ardent disciple of Samkaracarya; and he is supposed to have been commissioned by that great philosopher to write treatises elucidating his works. He accordingly prepared a most voluminous Varttika, which at present exists only in manuscript, on the Brhadaranyakopanisadbhasya, and a shorter one on the Taittiriyopanisadbhasya, which was published last year, with the commentary of Anandajnana, at the Anandasrama Press. Besides these, we have his Manasollasa, explanatory of the Acharya's short poem entitled Dakshinamurttistotra--and the Pancikaranavarttika, based on a prose work of Samkara's named Pancikarana.

2. The work now laid before the public, and which is in my judgment the best of the author's productions, is intended to reiterate the views embodied in the Upadesasahasri, another important treatise of Samkara's, and numerous quotations are made from it in the concluding chapter. As its title shows, it consists of an argument in opposition to ritual, and in favour of knowledge, as a means to mukti.

In his opening remarks the author says:--"As there exists in every living thing, from Brahma down to a tuft of grass, a natural desire to be free from every description of pain, a spontaneous effort is made to get rid of it. But as pain owes its existence solely to the body, which again is the result of previously accumulated merit and demerit, it cannot be eradicated. Merit and its opposite too, being the fruit of prescribed and interdicted actions, cannot be averted. Action, too, cannot be avoided because it is the outcome of desire and aversion; nor can these, because they depend upon attractive and repulsive appearances; and this appearance cannot, because it is the effect of an ill-considered belief in the existence of duality; neither can duality be got rid of because, after the manner of nacre taken for silver, it is caused solely by ignorance of the self-existent secondless one. Therefore ignorance of the Self is the sole cause of every ill. And it is ignorance that conceals happiness, which because it is the essence of Self, is unfluctuating and independent. When, therefore, ignorance is completely dispelled, the acme of all human desire is reached. And since the dispersion of ignorance can only be effected by the acquisition of right-knowledge, that is the means to be used. But inasmuch as the subject of the ignorance of Self which is the root of all evil, is outside the range of such popular proof as perception or the like which is non-Vedic, it is clear that right-knowledge can be gained from Vedantic writings only. This treatise therefore, a

compendium of the essence of the entire Vedanta, is now commenced."

3. The main purpose of this work, as indicated by its title, is to discuss the true means to Moksa or self-realisation. The conclusion is that Jnana is the sole means and that karma, however useful or necessary it may be as a preliminary aid, has no direct bearing upon it. In other words the final goal of human existence is not attained, according to the Advaita, until the obligation to perform karma is wholly transcended. In establishing this position of naiskarmya, the main controversy, as may be expected, is with the mimamsaka; but owing to the well-known divergence of view among the teachers of Vedanta, our author has to join issue with more than one of them also. We shall deal with these two phases of the controversy, separately.

Unlike the advaitin, the mimamsaka does not believe in the efficacy of jnana in securing moksa. To understand his exact position in this respect, it is necessary to know what his conception of moksa is. Seeing that the Mimamsa is a direct development of early Vedic teaching, one might expect that the final ideal according to it was the attainment of svarga or supreme happiness hereafter, resulting from the performance of karmas like the jyotistoma. Possibly such an ideal marked a stage in the history of the system, but it seems to be nowhere upheld in the Mimamsa as it has come down to us. The ultimate aim of man according to the latter is not to attain svarga, but to liberate his self from all the accidents of empirical existence so that it may subsist by itself ever afterwards. The means of thus restoring the self to its true nature, the mimamsaka deduces from the general assurance of Indian thinkers that karma is the cause of samsara or bondage. When the cause is removed, the effect must necessarily cease to be; and abstention from karma, the mimamsaka thinks, should therefore

result automatically in securing freedom from bondage for the self. The karmas to be abstained from, however, are not all; but only those of kama and pratisiddha types, which, as accepted by orthodox teachers alike, are respectively the cause of good and bad births. The third or nitya variety of karma, even the seeker after moksa should perform; for otherwise he will be disobeying the Vedic law enjoining them. That would be equivalent to indulging in pratisiddhakarmas, the only difference being that while the one counts as a sin of commission, the other does, as one of ommission. It is to prevent the self from becoming involved once again in the miseries of samsara as a consequence of this sin, that even the seeker after moksa should engage himself in nityakarmas. Thus the course of discipline laid down here is two-fold: abstention from kamya--and pratisiddha-karmas and adherence to nitya-karmas. In either case, it should be added, is there anything positive effected, the conception of moksa in the system being purely negative.

Such is the purva-paksa view that comes in for criticism in the present work. It is not necessary to enter here into the details of this criticism; we shall merely draw attention to the general principle underlying it. The advaitin does not deny that karma is the cause of samsara but he carries the enquiry farther and discovers the cause of karma itself is avidya. Freedom from bondage accordingly will not ensue until the removal of avidya, which is the root-cause of samsara in this view and not karma. This alters the standpoint of the mimamsaka very much and the alteration, as we shall see, proves fatal to his conclusions. The course of training provided in the Mimamsa, as already pointed out, consists of two parts. Of these, the first or withdrawal from all kamya and pratisiddha activity--assuming that such withdrawal is at all practicable--cannot bring

about moksa; for suppressing the effect is not the same as suppressing the cause. Karma may cease; but its cause avidya may persist. In susupti, for instance, every form of conscious activity is absent; but avidya yet endures. Thus inaction in itself cannot lead to final release as the mimamsaka tries to maintain. The second part of the training, viz. adherence to nitya-karmas, is equally ineffectual. These karmas are what are otherwise known as varnasrama-dharmas. As the latter term signifies, they differ in the case of different persons, according to the place which they have in the social order as well as the level of moral culture which they have already reached. The nityakarmas are thus entirely relative in their character and though each be binding in particular cases, none can be regarded as universally so. The very idea of obligation implicit in them, because it has its basis in a belief in duality, renders them discrepant with the ideal of moksa or the realisation of the unity of Being after transcending the notion of duality. So far from being a help to moksa, the nitya-karmas will prove a hindrance to it; for their continued practice is sure to confirm one the more in the belief that diversity is true. Thus action like inaction, is powerless to dispel avidya. If the removal of avidya, the pre-condition of moksa, should be secured, it can be only through the agency of its contrary, vidya or Jnan which accordingly is the only logically tenable means of attaining moksa.

The conception of moksa presupposes a belief in the survival of the self, which being derivable by means of neither Perception nor Inference--to mention only the more important pramanas--has to be acquired only through revelation. The revealed authority to which both the advaitin and the mimamsaka appeal is the same, viz. the Veda; and it may therefore appear somewhat surprising that they

should differ at all in respect of the means to moksa. Of the several reasons that explain this difference, one may be mentioned here, being alluded to in the present work. The revelation which is alike the source of authority for both the disputants comes to us couched in language and the truth which it discloses is therefore such as can be conveyed through the medium of words. What the nature of knowledge which words can convey is, however, not a matter on which thinkers are agreed, variations of view in regard to the import of propositions being well known. Hence arises the divergence of view referred to above. The question thus reduces itself largely to one of Logic--which by the way illustrates how revelation though claiming to be extra-empirical cannot be altogether so, since in the process of interpretation at least it has to be brought under the laws of human reason.

According to one school of Mimamsakas--the Prabhakaras--as significant propositions should refer to some action. This is not, it may be stated, the same as saying that every sentence should have a predicate; that is merely a matter of syntax and the advaitin is quite prepared to grant it. What the mimamsaka means is that the import of a proposition is a command or an injunction directly leading to the accomplishment of something. It is not merely the communication of an idea that it aims at, but rather the translation of that idea into action. This essentially pragmatic view is deduced from observations of how a child learns a language. It gets at the meanings of individual words gradually comparing and contrasting imperative sentences like gam anaya, asvam anaya, gam badhana which are used by the old in their intercourse with one another. A merely assertive sentence, even if it should ever be used in practical life, does not help the child in this respect, for it leads to no

action as its immediate result whereby the connection between sound and significance can be discovered. Since this is the natural process of learning a language, the meaning of every word comes to be associated in the child's mind at first with particualr actions but eventually, through the elimination of all incidental circumstances, with action in general. What is denoted by a word accordingly, if we do not forget the context in life in which it is used, is not the thing standing by itself, as we commonly imagine; it is always the thing as related in some manner to action. Naturally a proposition which consists of such words has action as its ultimate significance. Being verbal in form, the entire Veda must also have action alone as its final import--only in keeping with its nature as revelation, the forms of activity it recommends are such as we have no means of knowing for ourselves. If the Veda is thus precluded from speaking to us about anything but action, it can have little, the mimamsaka thinks, to do with revealing the mere nature of the self, whose knowledge, according to the advaitin, is the means of securing moksa.

The advaitin might acquiece in this view were it recognised as only a partial representation of the fact. He is willing to admit that the meanings of words are usually learnt in the manner described above; but there are other ways of doing so which do not necessitate the association of the meanings with action. When a mother for instance, in teaching her child, points out to an object with her hand uttering its name at the same time, there is no action, he says, as related to which the child apprehends the object. Even supposing that the only mode of learning a language is the one described by the mimamsaka, it does not follow that the meanings of words should include a reference to action. For that represents only the manner of their first acquisition

and they need not remain unmodified ever afterwards. We learn for instance what the word "cow" means with reference to a particular cow at first; but as we come to know of other cows, this meaning undergoes a modification in our mind until it ceases to stand for the particular at all and becomes a symbol for the general. Similarly a word, though its meaning is at first learnt in relation to action, may, as one's acquaintance with the language grows, come to denote the thing by itself unrelated to any action, and there may be nothing logically absurd in assertive propositions signifying an existent entity.

Though this conclusion that a word may signify an object unrelated to action is not acceptable to the Prabhakaras, it is admitted by Kumarila; but even he refuses to recognise that jnana is the means revealed in the sruti for attaining moksa. For he is of opinion that the atman whose nature is set forth in the Veda is not otherwise unknown for its being a fit subject for revelation. Each pramana has its own specific range of subjects (prama-ma-vyavasta); and nothing which is knowable by one pramana needs to be known by another. The self being internally perceived does not require to be revealed at all. Where its nature is set forth in the sruti, the statement should be regarded as merely re-presenting a familiar fact. It is not thus untrue; only its truth is second-hand and is therefore not mentioned for its own sake in the sruti, but in reference to what is newly made known there, viz. sacrifice or meditation. Again to justify the injunction--svadhyayodhyetavyah, all Vedic teaching must be conceived as serving some useful purpose; but no such purpose can be served by a knowledge of the self--an existent entity. If we are taught that it is of a certain nature, we know that it is so; but this knowledge by itself cannot assist us either in avoiding evil or in attaining good. If it should be rendered serviceable at all, it should be understood in reference to what in the

teaching of the sruti has practical utility, viz. sacrifice or meditation. Thus though Kumarila admits assertive propositions as significant, he denies to them what may be described as independent logical status, so that Upanisadic statements like Tat tvam asi do not represent the ultimate aim of the Veda.

The advaitin easily refutes the position thus stated. He also recognises premaya-vyavastha, and the purposive nature of Vedic teaching; but he maintains that these requirements are fully satisfied in the case of the self, rightly conceived. It is true that we commonly think that we no the self; but we certainly do not know it is in its actual nature, as identical with other selves and as the basic fact of the universe, which is what the Upanisads teach. In this, its true form, it is neither known nor knowable through any means except the sruti. It is beyond Perception, being devoid of all sensible qualities, and it is likewise beyond Inference, for it possesses no characteristic mark (linga) to serve as the middle term of a syllogism. Inferential knowledge besides is necessarily mediate, while it is only an immediate knowledge of the self that, according to the Upanisads, secures moksa. As against the contention that knowledge of the self by itself is useless, the Vedantin holds that so far from being useless, it represents the highest conceivable good; for self-realisation is the goal of all human endeavour. There can accordingly be nothing incompatible, he concludes, in atmajnana being the revealed means to moksa. The statements that disclose this means are the maha-vakyas such as Tat tvam asi, and as one that possesses the needed mental and moral equipment,--discussed chiefly in the present work--ponders over their meaning, there dawns upon the mind the unity of spirit which instantly dispels avidya. This is moksa or self-realisation as conceived by the advaitin, secured through jnana as taught in the Upanisads

and not through karma as taught in the purva-kanda.

It is necessary to remember that the advaitin denies the utility of karma only in the final stages of the ideal life and does not discard it altogether. The nitya-karmas, in particular, are assigned a very important place in his scheme of discipline. These karmas, as already stated, are what are incumbent upon man in his relation to society and their chief value consists in the reference they involve to general well-being. As distinguished from kamya-karmas which are primarily intended to secure the good of the individual, these emphasise his dependence upon his environment and point out his obligations to it. They are accordingly very well suited to be the means of rationalising his first impulses and make him altruistic by enlarging his vision. It is true that they cannot help him to overcome selfishness altogether; that help can be rendered only by jnana or spiritual enlightenment. But their value is not the less on that account, for without the preliminary moral training which they alone can afford, there will not be the needed fitness to receive that enlightenment. Their value, as a means of self-realisation, may not be the highest; but it is the next best and that is what is meant when they are described as aradupakaraka or "distantly conducive" to moksa.

4. The ideal is thus neither to perform one's duty blindly, nor to rest in jnana as sufficient in itself, but to do one's duty with a realisation of its full significance. Though karma is a common feature of the mukta and the mumuksu, the motive inspiring it in the two cases is totally different.

Suresvara's refutation of this view again is brief and is based chiefly upon the self-discrepancy of the conception of Brahman as a unity of differences. It would carry us too far to discuss the question on the metaphysical side. We may

merely remark that it is rather significant that this view of the Absolute, which obtains so much currency in the West now, and which was once held in India also, should have been practically superseded by the ideal of Samkara. Sureśvara's argument against it amounts to this--that bheda and abheda, dvaita and advaita are so opposed to their nature that a compromise between them is unthinkable. Even if we grant that there is no self-contradiction in the conception, it will lead us, Sureśvara adds, to chaos in the end. For the seeker after moksa, when he has achieved his purpose and realised his oneness with all, will have to engage himself in all karmas irrespective of the particular circumstances with reference to which they are prescribed. There is also the old difficulty, pointed out in connection with the mimamsaka position, of associating any obligation or endeavour with a person who, by realising the one Absolute, has risen above the notion of the 'other'. Moksa again in such a view would mean participation in all the torments of the world, if also in all its joys.

So far we have treated only of the special theme of the work. Though styled Naiskarmya-siddhi, the work may well be described as a compendium of advaita philosophy, for it touches upon all the salient features of that system. The author himself describes it as such in one place. In this, its general aspect, it may be compared to two other works--one by his teacher and the other by his pupil--the Upadesasahasri of Samkara and the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatman. They all aim at giving a brief and connected account of the Advaita doctrine and, as may be expected, contain many common ideas, arguments and turns of expression. In this trilogy we have altogether a unique means of judging the position of this doctrine at a very important stage of its growth. Of these, the Upadesa-sahasri is perhaps some-

what difficult and the Samksepa-sariraka, somewhat elaborate; but the present work is simple and clear and forms an excellent introduction to Samkara's system.

5. The work corroborates part of the tradition that is current about its author--for example, that he was a disciple of Samkara and that he composed this work in obedience to the wishes of his guru. From the nature of the subject set to him for treatment by the guru, we might also conclude that Suresvara was once a mimamsaka and from certain references in the work which appear to be appeals made to critics, we might also think that some of his contemporaries, as related by tradition, questioned his competence to expound the Advaita doctrine because they doubted the sincerity and the strength of his new convictions.

BUECHNER: (In "MAN IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE)

With regard to death Buechner expresses his views as follows:- "Great philosophers have called death the fundamental cause of all Philosophy. If this be correct, and the empirical or experimental philosophy of the present day has solved the greatest of philosophical enigmas, and shown (both logically and empirically) that there is no death, and that the great mystery of existence consists in perpetual and uninterrupted change. Everything is immortal and indestructible--the smallest worm as well as the most enormous of the celestial bodies, the sandgrain or the waterdrop, as well as the highest being in creation: man and this thoughts. Only the forms in which Being manifests itself are changing; but being itself remains eternally the same and imperishable. When we die we do not lose ourselves but only our personal consciousness or the casual form which our being, in itself eternal and imperishable, had assumed for a short time; we live on in nature, in our race, in our children, in our descendants, in our deeds, in our thoughts--In short, in the entire material and psychical contri-

bution which, during our short personal existence, we have furnished to the subsistence of mankind and of nature in general."

SWAMI JAGADANANDA'S Translation of THE UPADESASAHASRI (In Ved. Kesari).

1. We shall now expound for the benefit of persons who aspire after liberation, who have faith in the doctrine taught here, and who ask for it, a method of teaching the requisite means of liberation. This means of liberation is Jnana--knowledge of Atman--which a guru (preceptor) should explain to a disciple again and again until it is thoroughly grasped by him. The disciple is one who has become indifferent to everything transitory and achievable by the adoption of appropriate means; who has given up the desire for progeny, wealth, and the worlds attainable through them; who has entered the holy order of the Paramahamsa (A Sannyasin of the fourth and the highest order); who is endowed with tranquillity, self-restraint, compassion, and so forth; who possesses the qualities enjoined on the disciple by the Scriptures; who is a pure Brahmana; who has approached the preceptor in the prescribed manner; and sho has been examined in respect of his birth, vocation, conduct, learning, and parentage.

This is confirmed by the Sruti (Revealed Scripture) texts "Having examined the worlds...knowledge of Brahman"--Mundakopanisad, I.II: 12 & 13. For knowledge, when it has been thoroughly grasped, conduces to one's own good and turns out to be a favour done to others, as it gets transmitted from generation to generation, just as a boat available for one who wants to cross a river. The Scripture (Cchandogyopanisad III, II,6) says: "Were one to give this sea-girt earth with all its treasures (in exchange of this knowledge) the latter surely is a greater gift." In default of such transmission, attainment of knowledge would

be impossible. Sruti texts such as "One who has a teacher knows (Brahman)", "For knowledge received from the teacher alone (becomes perfect)", "Here, it is said, the teacher is his pilot and right knowledge is the boat." and passages from Smriti (Traditional Code) like "The wise who have seen the Truth will teach you the knowledge", also declare the same truth.

When the guru has inferred from signs that knowledge has not been received by the disciple, let him remove its causes such as transgression of moral and religious laws in the past, heedless conduct in the present life, failure to learn very well the distinction between what is real and what is not, anxiety for the right and wrong behaviour of other people, and pride of birth and the like, with the help of remedies ordained by Sruti and Smriti texts, namely, the acquisition of moral qualities like freedom from anger, cultivation of non-violence, and so forth, as well as, religious observances that are not inconsistant with knowledge. Let him also inculcate upon the disciple virtues that aid knowledge; for instance, absence of pride and others taught in the Bhagavadgita, XVIII: 8 -11.

And the disciple should approach such an accomplished preceptor alone who can foresee his difficulties (or, convince him by new arguments) who is able to counteract the possible ways of misapprehension (or, is able to refute the views contrary to the doctrine); who is quick in grasping the disciple's objections and remembering them (till they are disposed off with appropriate answers after due discrimination); who is tranquil, self-controlled, compassionate, and prompted by purely humane considerations, and so forth, who has learnt the Scriptures duly (from a teacher) who has no clinging to enjoyments of this world or other unseen worlds; who has renounced all means and conditions of religious ceremonies and temporal works (like wealth, household, sacred

thread and so forth); who is a knower of, and established in Brahman; who never violates the rules of good conduct; who is clean of evils like ostentation, insolence, deception, cruelty, desire to confound others, malice, lying, egotism, selfishness, and the like: who has absolutely no other motive than blessing others; and who seeks to impart to others the Supreme Knowledge (he has attained).

Let the guru, first of all, teach these Sruti texts and similar others bringing out the oneness of the Self.

(2) The preceptor shall ask the disciple who has thus learned from Sruti and Smriti texts the definition of Paramatman, and who is eager to overcome the sea of recurring birth, activities, and death: "My dear, who are you?"
(The sequel is put in the form of a dialogue between the guru and the disciple. In the original it is set forth in the optative form following the ancient method of giving instruction with the force of a command. In the rendering the optative mood is left out to avoid clumsiness. The implication of the commandcan easily be borne in mind).

Disciple: I am a Brahman's son, descended from so and so; I have been a student--or a householder (if that be the case--and at present I am a Paramahamsa Parivrat (a religious mendicant conforming to specific definitions), intent on liberating myself from the ocean of transmigratory existence infested with the collosal sharks of birth and death.

Guru: Since at death your body is pecked by birds or reduced to earth here itself, how it is my dear, that you entertain the wish to go beyond the round of birth and death? Surely when you are burnt to ashes on the hither bank of the river, you will not cross over to the other bank.
Disciple: I am other than the body. Assuredly the body is born and dies; it is consumed by birds and converted to clod; weapons, fire or

other agencies, cause its destruction; it is overtaken by disease, and so forth. As a bird which had been occupying one nest enters another at the destruction of that previous one, so also, I, already occupying one body, like the bird in the nest, pass from that to another, and then to another, and so on, overpowered by the effects of good and evil deeds. In this wise, in the beginningless phenomenal existence I am being whirled in the wheel of continuous birth, activity and death, like a rope-and-bucket machine used for raising water, by force of the effect of my past deeds, taking embodiment as divinity, man, animal, and a denizen of hell, and laying aside previous bodies and taking on other fresh ones in succession; finally in this order I have obtained the present body, and being disgusted with this cyclic course of birth and death, I have betaken myself to your holy presence so that I may put an end to this repeated process of transmigration. Hence I am always other than the body; bodies are taken and relinquished just as a man puts on and puts off garments.

Guru: Well said; you observe rightly. But how is it that you answered wrongly: "I am the son of a Brahmana, I belong to such and such lineage, I had been a student or a householder, and I have now entered the order of the Paramahamsa?"

Disciple: Revered Sir, Have I stated wrongly? How is it?

Guru: Because you have recognised the body, which is associated with different births, families, and sanctifying ceremonies, to be the Atman (Self) devoid of birth, family, or sanctifying ceremonies by the statement "I am the son of a Brahmana and come from such and such a lineage."

Disciple: Please explain how the body is related with different births, lineages, and sanctifying ceremonies, and how I am unconnected with them?

Guru: Listen, my dear, I shall tell you in what way this body, associated with various births, families, and sanctifying rites, is different from you, and how you are entirely bereft of birth

lineage, and sanctifying ceremonies. You should remember, my dear, that Paramatman (the Inmost Self) is the Self or Essence of all that is, as has been defined to you above in the words of Sruti texts beginning with "Being alone this was, my dear", and also in the words of Smriti passages: remember also His definition declared by the Sruti and Smriti texts. Atman, the ~~inmost~~ universal Self of all, (the teacher may continue to instruct the disciple who had been reminded of the definition of the Supreme Self) Who is called ether; Who is an entity other than name and form; Who is characterized as incorporeal, not gross, untouched by sin, and so forth; who is not the least contaminated by any of the attributes of phenomenal existence; Who is Brahman present to intuition, not hidden; who is the Spirit indwelling the entire sentiment and non-sentient world; Who witnesses, hears, reflects and cognizes, but is never the object of sight, hearing, reflection, or cognition; Whose true nature is permanent Consciousness; Who is pure knowledge itself without interior or exterior; Who has filled everywhere like the spacial ether; Whose power is infinite; who is the self of all; who is beyond hunger, thirst, and the rest; and who is ever manifest--He, by His mere existence, by means of His incomprehensible potencies, develops name and form which had been latent in Him; which are altogether different from Himself in their nature; which are the germ of the universe; which have no basis other than Himself, and yet cannot be defined whether they are He himself or different from Him; and which constitute the objects of His cognition. These, name and form (or thoughts and things), which were not manifest before, and which were manifested subsequently, proceeded from the Atman, described above, and became the name and form of spacial ether. And that primordial cosmic constituent (or great element), called ether, rose from the Paramatman in the manner stated just now, as foam, which is an impurity, emerges from pure, limpid water. Foam is not water, nor is it wholly

different from it; for it is not to be found where there is no water. On the other hand, clear water is quite different from foam which is but an impurity. Similarly, the pure, serene, Supreme Self is quite other than name and form which take the place of foam in the illustration. It is the name and form, comparable to foam, which became what is designated as ether and its form, when it developed from a previous unmanifested state to a subsequent manifested one. Name and form evolving into grosser and grosser states in progressive order, the suceeding one springing from the preceding one, became the essential air, fire, water, and earth; and in the same order of succession, by the inter-penetration of the preceding ones into succeeding ones, the five cosmic constituents down to earth were produced; and hence the earth is endowed with the qualities of all the five. Herbs Herbs, such as paddy and barley, are produced from earth compounded of all the five cosmic constituents. From them, eatern by man as food, is generated Lohita (egg) and Sukla (sperm) in the female and male bodies, which, as a result of the instinct of sex, ~~being aroused by Avidya or nescience~~, is brought out, sanctified by sacred utterances, and scattered in the womb, at the time of menstruation. Growing by the ingress of the secretions of the mother's body, what had been an embryo develops into a child, and is delivered in the ninth or tenth month. What is born has now received a name and form, and it is sanctified by means of sacred formulas employed at the performance of the specific rites occasioned by the birth, and so forth. Sanctified, again, by the investure of the Yagnopavita (sacred thread) at the commencement of Studentship, that receives the designation of a Brahmacharin. The same body is called a householder when it undergoes the sanctifying rite concomitant with marriage. That again receives the name of a hermit dwelling in the forest by virtue of the ceremonies attendant upon its entry into

that stage of life. Once more that itself comes to possess the name of a Parivart, wandering Sannyasi, by undergoing ceremonies leading to a cessation from works enjoined by the Scriptures. The body associated with various births, families and sanctifying rites, is thus different from you. That the essential nature of the mind and the senses is also but name and form is known from Sruti texts, ~~such as: "Mind, my dear, is derived from food."~~

And now as to the question: How is that I am different from birth, family, and sanctifying rites? the reply is this: The same One, Who is the cause of the unfoldment of name and form, Whose characteristics are different from that of name and form, and Who is devoid of all connection with sanctifying ceremonies, having evolved name and form, created this body, and Himself entered into it (which is but a name and a form) Himself seeing though unseen by others, Himself hearing without being heard, Himself reflecting without being reflected upon, Himself cognizing without being congnized--as stated in the text, "The Wise One Who having divided all forms and having given all names, remains speaking with those names." There are numerous Sruti texts conveying the same meaning.

(3) Dis: I, a transmigratory soul subjected to ignorance, happiness, and misery, am one, He, the Divinity transcending phenomenal existence and entirely different from me in nature, is quite another; and I am harbouring the eager wish to cross the ocean of birth and death by worshipping and bowing down to Him, by making oblations and offerings to Him, by observing the duties pertaining to my class and stage of life, and by similar other possible means. I am He Himself!--how can that be?

Guru: You ought not, my dear, to regard it so; because a doctrine of difference is forbidden (in the Scriptures). If it is urged why it is so, in answer the following and other Sruti texts

may be cited: "He who worships another god thinking, "He is one and I am another" does not know," "The Brahman ousts one who knows Him as different from the Self." , "He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in It." And these very Srutis show that continuation of transmigratory existence is the result of accepting difference. That, on the other hand, liberation results only by ceasing to perceive difference is borne out by a multitude of Sruti texts; for example, the statements, "That is the Self, Thou art That", A man who has a teacher knows Brahman, and that a knower of Brahman has to wait only so long as he is not merged in Brahman" assert that the individual Self is no other than Brahman. That transmigratory existence comes to an absolute cessation in the case of one who is prompted by the truth that there is no difference, is illustrated by the example of one who was not a thief and who did not get burnt (by grasping a heated hatchet). The person who is prompted by the false notion that difference is true, as he perceives difference, continues to be in mundane condition; this is illustrated by the example of the thief who got burnt. The text commencing with "Whatever these creatures are here, whether a tiger.." after asserting that by perceiving non-difference "he becomes Svarat or Brahman", proceeds to state in the sequel that by the perception of difference, on the contrary, one goes the round of birth, activity, and death, as corroborated by the text "But those who think differently from this live in perishable regions and have other beings for their rulers." Such statements are found in every branch of the Veda. It was therefore certainly wrong on your part to have stated that you are the son of a Brahmana, that you belong to such and such a family, that you are subjected to transmigration, and that you are quite different from the Supreme Self.

That being so, perception of difference is for-

bidden with reason; performance of religious and temporal works have scope only so long as there is the perception of difference; Yajnopavita and the rest are accessories of religious work; it must, therefore, be understood that on the attainment of identity with Paramatman one is debarred from the accessories imposed by religious works; for religious works and their accessories such as Yajnopavita and the rest go counter to the perception of identity with Paramatman. Only those who are still bound to the conditions of earthly life are commanded to perform sacrificial duties and do have Yagnopavita and the rest, and not one who does not behold himself to be other than the Supreme Self; and (even in respect of the former) a distinction from Paramatman (which affords the ground for the performance of religious and temporal works) is true only in as much as he perceives himself to be different from Him.

If religious works were obligatory and if they were not to be discontinued, the Sruti would neither have declared the identity of one's Self with the Supreme Self, unrelatedto the means of religious works and their conditions such as class and stage in social life, in unambiguous sentences such as "That is the Self, thou art That," nor would it have disparaged the perception of difference in clauses such as the following and others: "This is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman" and "..untouched by good work and untouched by evil work," and "Here a thief becomes no thief."

If religious and temporal works and their accessories, Yajnopavita and the like, were not desired to have been renounced, it would not have been statedcthatithe essential nature of the Self is in no way connected with religious works and conditions required by them such as a particular social class and the rest. Hence it follows that religious and temporal works, together with their accessories, must be laid aside by one who is eager for liberation, as they are not in agreement

with the realisation of identity with Paramatman. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the individual Self is none other than the Supreme Self defined in the Sruti in the aforesaid manner.

Dis: Revered Sir, I directly perceive the painful sensation when the body is being burned or wounded; and the misery caused by hunger and the like, too, is directly perceived. It is mentioned in all Srutis and Smritis that this Supreme Self is beyond sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, and without any smell or taste. How can I, so entirely different from the Supreme Self and possessing several phenomenal attributes, possibly accept the Paramatman to be the Atman, and myself, a poor transmigratory being, to be the Paramatman? I may, then, very well admit that fire is cool! Being one in the realm of birth, and death, and consequently entitled to accomplish all prosperity in this world and in the next, as well as the supreme end of life (i.e. liberation) how can I discard sacrificial duties that bring about these result and their requisite conditions such as Yajnopavita and the like?

Guru: You have stated that when the body is subjected to heat, or wounded, you perceive pain directly; that is not true. Why? One perceives the painful sensation, caused by burning or cutting, in the object of perception, namely, the burn or the cut in the body which is quite another like the tree burnt or cut. So burning and the rest and the sensation of paid produced by them have their location in the same place. Only where a burn or cut is made, people point out the paid caused by them, and not in the perceiver of those sensations. To explain: when one is asked where is your pain, one replies: The pain is in my head, or in the chest, or in the stomach. Where is the burning sensation and the rest--to that place alone he points out, and not to the perceiver of those sensations. If either the pain or its causes, such as burn, were in the perceiver

one would have pointed out to him in order to locate them, just as he would point out to the body where the burning was caused.

The Self, i.e. the perceiver, cannot be perceived even as the colour of the eye is not seen by the same eye. Hence, as burn, cut, and the rest, and sensation of pain, are perceived to co-exist at the same place, it follows that the latter also is only an object like the former; and since it is of the nature of an activity, like the cooking of rice, it must have a basis to abide. Reminiscent impressions of pain have the same substratum as that of the sensation of pain for the reason that they are perceived only at a time when memory is possible, i.e. when one is awake and is not in deep sleep. The aversion regarding the sensation of pain and its causes also have the same basis as that of reminiscent impressions. There is an old authority testifying to this fact: "Attachment, aversion, and fear have the same locus as that of reminiscent impression; they are apprehended in the intellect; therefore the cognizing Self is ever pure and fearless." (vide Metrical Part, Topic, 15: verse 13).

The question may arise here: What when is the locus of the reminiscent impressions and so forth, and colour and the rest? To this the reply is given: The same as that of desire and the rest. If it is further enquired where desire and the rest are located, it must be known on the strength of the Sruti text, "Desire, deliberation, doubt.." that they are in the intellect and no-where else. Reminiscent impressions and the rest, as well as colour and the like, also have their bases in that itself, as it is declared in the Sruti,--"On what do colours rest?--On the heart (intellect)" Thus it is evident from a collection of Sruti Texts, such as "...desires that dwell in his heart...", "for he is then beyond all the woes of his heart...", "...(for this Infinite Being) is then unattached." "That is his form

---beyond desires; and Smriti passages like "It is said to be changeless" "..because it is beginningless and without attributes"--which declare that like, dislike, and so forth are the attributes of the embodiment and not of the embodied Self;--that impurity pertains to the object and not to the subjective Self. Because you are not contaminated by colour and so forth, and reminiscent impressions and the rest, and because there is no conflict with the means of valid knowledge such as perception, therefore you are not other than the Supreme Self; and it is also reasonable to acknowledge: I am the Supreme Self and none else.

The following Sruti and Smriti texts establish that you are Atman the one only, to wit, the Supreme Reality entirely free from every phenomenal attribute.

(4) Dis: Revered Sir, if the Atman who is without interior or exterior, who is both within and without, who is unoriginated, who is altogether a mass of pure intelligence like a lump of salt, and who is devoid of all the various forms, is of only one tenor, like the spacial ether, what is it that is observed in ordinary usage and revealed in Scriptures as what is to be accomplished, their appropriate means, and the accomplishers related with the various accomplishments ---for they are thoroughly established by Sruti and Smriti texts as well as by ordinary parlance--, and made, subject-matter of contention among a host of rival disputants holding different views?

Guru: All that we observe or learn from Srutis --ends realized, means of realization and persons who realize--are products of nescience. But in reality, there is only one, the Atman, who untruly appears more than one, just as the moon appears more than one to a person affected by amaurosis.

(5) It is clearly learnt that duality (constituting of the perceiver and the perceived) is the offspring of nescience.

Dis: If that be so, why mention is made in the Sruti texts about diverse ends that are sought to be attained, their means, and so forth, as well as origination and dissolution of the universe?

Guru: One who is still in the sphere of nescience, who accepts the difference of body and the rest, who considers himself destined to be united with what is approved of and what is disliked, who does not possess the knowledge to distinguish the means of securing what he desires and avoiding what he dislikes, merely with the aid of requisite means, and who is at the same time eager to do so--to remove gradually the ignorance of such a person regarding them is the purport of the Scriptures, and not to enunciate the distinction between means, ends, and so forth; for, that difference constitutes phenomenal existence which is held to be totally undesirable. By demonstrating the conclusion that origination and dissolution and the rest are but One, the Scripture eradicates the cyclic round of birth, action, and death--in other words, perception of difference or nescience. And when nescience is rooted out with the aid of Sruti, Smriti, and reasoning, the seer of the Supreme Truth becomes firmly and finally established in the one cognition that he is the Supreme Self and none else, who is without interior or exterior, who is within and without, who is unoriginated, who is pure Consciousness like a lump of salt, and who is all-filling like the spatial ether; and quite reasonably then there is not in Him the least taint associated with the difference between ends, means, origination, dissolution, and the rest.

And now those who wish to realize the Supreme Reality must rise above the desire to have sons, wealth and new worlds, and so forth, which are

described in a fivefold manner and which are the outcome of the conceit of class and stage in the social order and so forth; for such conceit is opposed to true Knowledge. It is therefore quite intelligible why the perception of difference is prohibited in the Sruti texts. For when the conviction is generated by verbal testimony and ~~logic~~ reasoning that the one Atman is ~~beyond~~ phenomenal being, there cannot exist side by side with it a knowledge contrary to it. None can think of chillness in fire, or freedom from old age and immortality in regard to the perishable body. The conclusion is therefore settled that one who is established in the intuition of the Supreme Reality shall give up all temporal and sacrificial duties and their accessories like the Yajnopavita and the rest; for their presence can be accounted for only as an effect of nescience.

JOHN MACMURRAY: THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE.

1. When an eminent scientist, like Professor Eddington, writes a book which attempts to estimate what contribution physical science has made to our knowledge of the real nature of the physical world, he is not writing science, but philosophy. The views which he expresses are not reached by the use of the methods of physical science, in which he is a master, but by some of the methods which philosophers are accustomed to employ.
2. The philosophy of science requires to be based upon considerations of the relation of scientific experience to other aspects of experience. It is probable, here, that a physicist will give too little weight to the conclusions of biological or psychological science, and that the scientist will give too little weight to experience of the physical world which is not the result of scientific investigation.

This may be enough to suggest what the business of a philosophy of science is. It is not a scien-

tific task. The philosophy of science is not concerned at all with the scientific validity of or scientific theories. But it is concerned with the business of relating science as a whole to the other parts and aspects of common human experience. It has to attempt to integrate science with aspects of experience which are not scientific.

3. But such an account would not be complete without a treatment of the inner conditions which must be present before science can arise and develop. As it is this aspect of the question which throws most light upon the philosophy of the psychological sciences we must treat it a little more fully. The attitude of mind which was characteristic of the Middle Ages could not have produced science. It had no interest in doing so. Mediaeval society did not want scientific questions asked and answered because it had no intention of modifying the traditional forms of social life. Its interests were conservative. No society will really be interested in getting certain questions answered unless they have a practical importance of some kind. No doubt natural curiosity at all times makes us ask questions and seek to answer them merely for the sake of doing so. But such a natural curiosity will never give rise to science or indeed to any sustained effort of serious thought that is characteristic of a particular society. Some practical necessity of asking these particular questions in these particular circumstances must provide the incentive. The mediaeval world was a traditional society. It lived by custom and habit. It assumed, therefore, that the right way to do anything was the traditional way, the way it had always done. Its intentional life was conservative. This reference to intention is important, because science is an intentional activity. Scientific knowledge cannot happen to

people. It can only result from a deliberate effort and the deliberate effort must be a social one because science, unlike art, is only possible through a continuity of co-operation. In other words, the inner condition of science is the intention to produce it, and the intention to produce science is a particular aspect of the intention to achieve progress. Sociologically, therefore, the inner condition of the appearance of science as a feature of the life of a particular society is that the society should have formed the intention of progress. In the mediaeval world this intention was absent. The intentional life of society was concerned with the maintenance of custom and authority. Before society can produce science there must be socially effective group of people who have abandoned the outlook that finds its canons of rightness in the wisdom of the past, and replaced it by an attitude which is determined to make the future better than the past. Until people feel that the right way to do things is to do them better than they have ever been done, the idea of progress and the intention to progress are unthinkable. Science is necessarily a function of a progressive society. It is, indeed, the reflective aspect of a progressive intention. It can only occur in a society which feels that it can live its social life better than its predecessors, and is prepared to make the attempt. The sardonic conservative no doubt will ask, "How do you propose to set about it?" To that the primary answer must be: "We don't know, but we are going to find out." The effort to find out is the production of science.

4. People will never set out to discover things unless they have first become convinced of their own ignorance. A doubt of the validity of the old forms of knowledge is a precondition of the effort to produce new ones. This psychological condition we must relate to the external condition by reminding ourselves that people will never

discover that they do not know something until they have discovered that they cannot do something which they desire to do. Equally, they will never discover that they cannot do something unless they want to do something different from what they are accustomed to do. The social condition for the origin of science is that a particular society wants to strike out upon a new path in its social behaviour instead of to maintain its traditional form of behaving.

5. This involved the feeling that their own way of living was not as good as it might be, and that the beliefs which held their minds were not as true as they might be. In this way the ideas of duty and of practical goodness ceased to sustain custom and became associated with experiment. People began increasingly to realize their ignorance and their limitations, and to feel that the proper mode of human life lay in the effort to change their customary habits of life and thought in order to achieve higher and better forms both of life and of knowledge.

6. Science is not a mere account of our observations. It is the result of our efforts to understand. In a word, science is something that we create, deliberately and purposively. It is what we make it. The purpose for which we create it must determine, to an appreciable extent, how we apprehend the facts, what facts our observation selects as important, and how we deal with these selected facts in order to achieve our purpose. There can be no doubt that science is not independent of the human mind and that, therefore, the character of the knowledge which science provides is partly determined by our own psychology.

Of the modern philosophers, the one who above all others realized the problem that this presents was Immanuel Kant.

7. Kant was convinced that knowledge is created by the spontaneity of the mind, by that product-

ive imagination which he described as a blind art hid in the depths of the soul. To use the language of modern psychology, Kant realized that all our knowledge, including especially our scientific knowledge, is the product of fantasy. His greatness consisted in the fact that he realized the problem which this recognition involves. If we invent our knowledge, what right have we to call it knowledge? For knowledge is by definition the receptivity and not the spontaneity of the mind. The pure spontaneity of the mind is art, not science. If science is the creation of the human imagination, how can it be more than a modern mythology?

That science is the product of human imagination is certainly true from the psychological point of view. Consider, for example, the part played by mathematics in the physical sciences. The physicist is not content until his discovery can be expressed in a mathematical formula. Now, scienfitic formulae do not grow on goose-berry bushes. They are not to be discovered in the external world. Mathematics, from beginning to end, is an invention of the human mind. It belongs to the subjective field. In so far as physics consits in a set of mathematical formulae, it is something invented by human minds. When scientists describe a natural object as a collection of electrons moving in a field of electrical energy, they are clearly imagining something that neither they nor any one else has ever seen. If the physicist maintains that the world which we observe is not so solid and massive as we imagine it to be, what he really means is that the world as he imagines it is not so massive and solid as we see it and feel it. He is setting the construction of the scientific imagination against the observed facts. He is holding that the real world cannot be observed but only imagined. This other world that science has created for us, is in fact, much more unlike the

familiar world which we observe than any of the other worlds that the fantasy of the religious mythologists of earlier ages ever produced. This is one thing that Kant realized about science. The scientist sets out with the conviction that there is something in the world that we don't know. He tries to discover it, and so to bring it within the charmed circle of our experience. Yet instead of doing this, he succeeds only in inventing a new mathematical formula. This formula is an invention. Kant's question is, "if we invent our scientific knowledge, what right have we to call it knowledge? How is it distinguished from imaginative fiction?"

This observation, however, only concerns the construction of theories for the understanding of the observed facts. Kant saw that the imagination plays a large part not merely in the construction of theory but in the observation of the fact itself. What we call our experience of facts is much more largely the work of our imagination than we ordinarily suppose. At the very least it depends to a great extent upon memory.

The significance of this can best be revealed by an illustration. Suppose, then, that when I come into a room I see a blue vase standing on the edge of the table. I go up to the table and stand there looking down at the vase. Then I turn away, and in turning round I brush against the vase and knock it off the table. It falls to the ground and it breaks. Suppose that someone hears the crash and calls out to ask what has happened. I shall reply that in turning round I knocked the blue vase off the table and broke it. Now, let us be philosophical and ask how I know that I knocked the vase off the table and broke it. The answer will surely be that I know it as a matter of direct personal observation. It is a part of my own experience. I did it and I know what I did. What if I am pressed to be very exact and give a psychological account of of that experience? I shall find how small a

part direct observation has to do with it. How much of what I express by saying that I knocked the vase off the table and broke it is a matter of direct sensory observation? First I had a visual sensation. I expreas it by saying, "I saw a blue vase on the table." Perhaps it might be questioned whether I have any right to say this instead of saying that I had a visual sensation of a blue shape. But we may ignore these refinements. What is certain is that when I turned round the vase disappeared, I no longer saw in on the table. The next direct sensory experience was a slight sensation of pressure on my elbow. That sensation was quite momentary. A second later, I experienced a sensation of sound. That is sense-datum number three. On hearing the sound I turned round quickly and I saw instead of a blue vase on the table some pieces of blue and white china on the floor. At the most, it would seem, I have four separate and discrete sense intimations about what happened. There are two visual sensations, a sensation of pressure, and a sensation of sound. Three of them have no inherent relation of any kind to one another. What is there that is common to a sound, a colour, and a feeling of pressure? Nothing at all; they are just completely and finally different and unrelated. The only thing that they have in common is that they all happened to me. On this slender basis of four different sensations I have managed to construct a connected little story about a vase on the table which I knocked off the table and broke. This is a simple example of what we call the direct observation of facts. It is easy to see that the greater part of it is the work of our imagination which pieces together a few fragments of direct sensory experience by filling up the gaps between them so as to produce a story that hangs together. That in principle it is the imagination which does it can be easily seen. If I ask myself what I mean when I say that

the vase fell to the floor, when as a matter of fact I did not see it fall, I shall have to answer that I mean that if I had been looking in the right direction midway between the time when I felt the pressure on my elbow and heard the crash I would have seen the vase midway between the top of the table and the floor. In other words, when I say that the vase fell to the floor, I am imagining what I would have seen if I had been looking, in order to link up my two visual sensations of the vase on the table and the fragments of china on the floor, with a series of imagined sensations. If we then generalize this simple case, we can see that the whole of our direct sensory experience is merely a set of more or less discrete and inherently unrelated fragments, out of which by means of imagination we construct what we call the world of observed facts. Indeed, what we usually mean by "the world" is little more than our imagination of what we would see and hear and feel if we were everywhere at once, seeing and hearing and feeling everything all the time.

If this is true, what can I mean by saying that this elaborate construction for which my imagination is responsible is knowledge? Perhaps the simplest answer would be that in calling it knowledge I mean that any one else would see and hear and feel in the same way that I do under the same conditions; that other people can see what I have to imagine and that, where we all are compelled to pass beyond the limits of observation, there is some necessity which compels us to imagine the same things in the same way.

This answer, however, even if it is satisfactory, is highly abstract and general. The question remains how we are to discover whether the imaginary constructions that we make on any particular occasion are true or false. How are we to distinguish between fact and fiction, if both fact and fiction are the products of the same activity of imaginary construction? So long

as we are only worried about theories we can comfort outselves by saying that they can be tested by observation. But when we realize, as Kant did, that the observation itself is largely an imaginary construction we have to go deeper.

8. What is important in Kant's analysis of experience is his realization of the extent to which our knowledge, even when it is based upon direct sensory experience, is a product of the activity of the imagination. When we realize this, we realize that the limits of our control of the constructive activities of the mind must be limits for science. This explains why it is a fundamental principle of scientific method to exclude from consideration whatever cannot be verified by observation and experiment. So soon as our minds pass beyond the limits of what can be verified in this way, we have no longer any means of distinguishing between reality and fiction. The imagination can carry its constructive spontaneity far beyond the bounds of possible experience. The difficulty is not to construct systems of belief. That is all to easy. The difficulty is to find any means of distinguishing between different constructions in a way that will guarantee truth. From a psychological point of view there is no inner distinction between a construction that is true and a construction that is false. All of them are alike fictions in the strict sense of the term. To distinguish those that are merely fictions from those that constitute knowledge there must be an appeal to something other than the reflective activities of the mind. If ideas are to be knowledge there must be a reference from ideas to reality, and this reference as Kant has shown, is not to be found in sense-perception alone. The appeal must be from the field of experience in which we are dealing with ideas to the field in which we are dealing with real things, that is to say the field of action.

Where that appeal is impossible, our systems of belief remain speculative. They are not merely hypotheses but hypotheses which it is impossible to test. Scientific knowledge is necessarily confined within the limits of that which can be verified in the field of practical experience through observation and experiment.

This limitation, however, is one which is shared in some sense by all our knowledge whether it is scientific or not. There is another limitation which we must proceed to notice. If we are to observe and understand anything in a scientific way, it is essential that our activity of observing and understanding should not alter it. Our purpose is to discover what the object is and how it behaves; it is not to make it different or to interfere with its behaviour

9. It is a postulate of scientific knowledge that the activities of knowing should not alter the object which is being known. This postulate cannot be granted if the object is myself, for when I try to know myself my activities of knowing do necessarily alter me. I cannot first achieve an understanding of myself and then use the understanding I have gained to change myself. Because the activities of understanding are themselves changes in me. The very intention to understand is an intention to change my mind. This is true in every field of scientific research. It only becomes a problem for the scientist when his mind is the object or part of the object which he is seeking to understand. Scientific enquiry seems to demand that there shall be a real object quite independent of the investigator and that it must stand in certain relations to other objects independent of him. It assumes that what happens to the object and how it behaves depend upon its properties and its relations to other objects in accordance with objective laws. This puts the scientist in a dilemma when he undertakes the investigation of human behaviour. He is involved

involved in investigating his own behaviour, but his postulates compel him to consider it as something real which is independent of himself. How can his own behaviour be independent of him? If it can be, what can be meant by calling it his behaviour?

10. Scientists, surely, are not trying to satisfy their private curiosity but are following a desire to take part in a human task with ends and effects which pass far beyond their private interests and to which an intelligent man can honourably and serviceably devote his life. The urge which maintains scientific research is surely not to be accounted for by a mere reference to animal instincts. It demands a recognition of rational purpose. To understand science sociologically we must determine the social purpose which is clearly embodied in its development. We must consider the social function of science.

11. The social motive which sustains science must be looked for not in the theoretical field but in the field of practical social needs. It is surely obvious that the purpose which expresses itself in the creation and development of science rises and can only arise from the recognition that science enables us to do things that we want to do and which cannot be done without it. Science serves human society by helping it to live the kind of social life that it wishes for, and which it could not achieve without science.

12. Society has its scientists, encourages and supports them, because it needs them for very sound and urgent practical reasons. Beyond a certain level of civilization science becomes one of the necessities of life.

This is to say that from the point of view of society science is a means to an end.

13. It implies that the social motive which has created and sustained scientific research arises from our need to discover how to use the means at at our disposal in the world to the best possible

advantage. The motivation of science is ultimately concerned with the provision of technique.
13. The kind of questions which science is designed to answer are questions which arise when we are considering the means of doing something, and not the kind of questions which arise when we are considering what is worth doing. Science, in the last analysis, is knowledge of how to use the means at our disposal to achieve our purposes. It is not knowledge of what purposes are good.
14. The question, "whose beliefs are true" has been resolved into the question, "Which of us is physiologically the healthier?"
15. The Freudian theory of religion maintains that it is an illusory form of human behaviour, which provides through the operation of fantasy imaginary satisfaction for repressed tendencies in the human psyche. The beliefs to which this activity of fantasy gives rise are not true beliefs. Their function, indeed, is not to satisfy a desire for knowledge but to provide a substitute in imagination for the satisfaction of impulses which cannot be satisfied objectively and which are accordingly suppressed from consciousness.
16. Cures of neuroses which are the main verification of psycho-analytic theory are to be found in many forms of religion as the result of the acceptance of religious beliefs which are considered by most people nowadays, including religious people, to be illusory. The psychologist may reply that the verifications produced by religious people are as illusory as the beliefs that they verify. Yet this is precisely the kind of argument that the scientific psychoanalysts have had to meet from their opponents. They have pointed to the cures they have effected, as evidence of the truth of their theory, and their opponents have replied that the verification is illusory. Even if it is admitted that the patient now behaves more normally, that only proves that what he now believes produces

results in his behaviour which are more satisfactory to himself and to other people. This does not prove that what he now believes is true, and certainly it does not prove that what the psycho-analyst believes is true. It is always possible to find illusory verifications for illusory beliefs.
17. If all beliefs are illusory, then the belief that all beliefs are illusory must be itself illusory. There is no longer any meaning to be attached to the distinction between true and false. Consequently, it is quite useless to ask questions and try to answer them, because no answer could be of any more value than another.
18. He is compelled to adopt an objective attitude and to arrive at his conclusions by inference from what he can observe and what the patient can tell him. The patient therefore must adopt the same attitude to his own behaviour.
19. This will lead us to look upon the whole of our conscious behavour as a sort of superstructure built up by the unconscious to achieve unconscious ends.
20. There is a discrepancy between a scientist's description of any material object and any ordinary description of it. The common-sense description of a table represents it as a solid, static object. The scientific description represents it as consisting of minute particles at relatively great distances from one another, and all in perpetual and rapid movement. These two descriptions clearly contradictory; so much so that one finds scientists talking as if there were two tables, the scientific table and the perceived table, and one finds philosophers arguing the question which of these two tables is the real table. Yet the presupposition of all this is that both are descriptions of one and the same table and that there are not two tables but one. If, for example, we adopted the conclusion that the scientist's table was the real one, we could not also maintain that the scientist's description was the true

description of the table we see. Yet, the scientist's description of the table claims to be valid because it is based upon observed fact, and in this case the observed fact is what is expressed in the common-sense description.

@@ D.S. GORDON in "The Hindu" of 1/12/40. on SNAKES

1. According to Hindu mythology, the entire globe is supported, not upon the shoulders of the mighty giant Atlas as the Greeks had imagined, but upon the raised head of a huge serpent. In several other Puranic stories, too, the snake is a frequent and an honoured character. Snake-worship has been an ancient cult not only among many other races all the world over.
2. The snake is the most intelligent of reptiles, and some of the species contain the most violent of poisons known to man. Snakes change their coat from time to time, and in this they seem to suggest re-birth, or at least, rejuvenation.
3. One of the most ancient developments in snake-lore is the association of this reptile with matters of sex. In India sculptured figures of twined snakes are a very common phallic symbol to be found on many a road-side shrine. In many other phallic cults too, the snake is given a unique place.

M. HIRIYANNA in INDIAN PHILOS. CONGRESS 1936

1.It is this oneness which the disciple should discover through his own experience,if he is to realise the highest reality;and he cannot obviously do so by neglecting others.This shows that his attitude towards the environment can not be negative.On the other hand it necessitates the cultivation of universal love,not in the sense of love for others as others but as oneself. This conduct becomes spontaneous.The moral striving which marks the lower stages is once for all left behind,but the elimination of strife does not mean the elimination of action. Fruition does not mean rest,although activity is now not directed towards any personal end.

SWAMI ISWARANANDA: "VEDANTIC VIEW OF SLEEP." *

1. Deep sleep is looked upon by most people as of little or no meaning or significance, except it be that it has a biological value as giving rest to the tired out psycho-physical organisms to recuperate itself. Modern psychologists have paid little attention to this every day phenomenon and those among them who have studied it, have tried to understand it only in its physiological aspect. Western thinkers have confined themselves to the data of waking experience for their philosophy. But the thinkers of the Upanishadic period have taken all the three states of waking, dream and sleep for their philosophising and they have read a deep meaning into the state of sushupti or deep sleep which has escaped the attention of many a philosopher.

It is easy to understand dreamless sleep as a state of ignorance. We all describe it in the waking state in the words "I knew nothing in sleep." We conclude it to be a state of darkness or Tamas, in which we are overpowered by Avidya or nescience in its densest form and that is why nothing is known in sushupti. It is further believed to be a state which contains in itself the experiences of the waking and dream states in their seed form, beejavasta.

2. According to Vedanta we are always Brahman, in the waking and dreaming states as much as in the deep sleep state, but the Upanisads have singled out the Sushupti as the state where we are free from Upadhis (limiting adjuncts) set up by Avidya in the waking and dream states, and are said to attain to Brahman. They could as well have told us that we attain to Brahman in the waking and dream states in the sense that we are Brahman even in these states, instead they point only to the Sushupti in which we are said to attain to Brahman. Hence there is a particular significance in the choice of the state to instruct us in Brahmavidya.

* Contributed articles.

That the Upanishadic thinkers considered Sushupti in terms of the highest value can be easily grasped by the fact that in Chhandogya 8.3.2 deep sleep is compared to walking over a treasure of gold over which we pass up and down every day of our life without suspecting that something of inestimable value is there and so we do not get the benefit of it.

3. The students of Philosophy in Europe and America will learn with not a little surprise that the commonest of all experiences common to all mankind, nevertheless neglected as of no consequence in the world of philosophical enquiry, has been the subject of profound thought and keen analysis by the ancient thinkers of India who have produced the Upanishads of the Hindus and has been the basis of the metaphysics of the Vedanta. According to the Vedanta it is this experience viz. deep sleep which leads to the knowledge of reality. It is the contention of this philosophy that the Absolute is not an abstraction of thought but is that which is suggested by this experience. The spiritual nondualism of the Vedanta which has fascinated the intellect of great thinkers in all lands is not a matter of mere speculation but is a fact of demonstrated truth and the evidence for it is supplied by the experience of dreamless sleep.

The Upanishadic lore has it that when this philosophy of deep sleep was first offered as the clue to the knowledge of Brahman, the basic reality of the world of phenomena and which is no other than the Self or Atman of all beings, it was hotly disputed and was admitted only after a good deal of resistance on the part of the students who were puzzled at the extreme simplicity of the procedure. One student is said to have repeatedly protested, "I see no good in this!"

But the teacher was equally obdurate and said "I will explain to you this alone." Indeed, it is the doubtful relevency of this commonplace experience being raised to the status of sufficient

evidence for a grand philosophical conclusion that has baffled the students of this subject. The human mind has a weakness for mystery and involved and complex reasoning. A lurking suspicion haunts the mind of man that truth is to be had in the technicalities of logic and complex system of building. Later philosophers, rather, theologians, in India have succumbed to this unnecessary complexity and have thereby compromised over the bold and straight-forward teachings of the Upanishads and tried to cover up the naked truths therein by sophisticated explanations and thereby had to take refuge in the twilights of mysticism as evidence for their conclusions. However, it was the good fortune of humanity that there was at least one philosopher in India, Sankara the redoubtable champion of non-dualism, who, while occasionally making concessions to the unthinking and half-thinking conservatism of the man in the street and of the theologian, where the context did not demand the conclusion of philosophical thinking, did preserve for posterity the original meaning of the upanishadic thinkers in language indubitable; and without fear or hesitation taught the grandest of all truths in the simplest of language.

There are about half a dozen sections in the Upanishads commented on by Sankara dealing with the topic of dreamless sleep in which uniform conclusions have been pronounced as to the true nature of deep sleep and as to its great importance in the search after the highest metaphysical truth.

4. To get the Vedantic account of sleep we shall survey this time the Brihadaranyaka 4.3.19 to 4 3.32, which is the most brilliant exposition of the subject in the Upanishads. In introducing the 19 Sankara says that the Samprasada, the serene self of deep sleep, is now shown to be completely non-attached (asamya), that this section dealing with deep sleep is intended to show that

the self is externally free, pure and aware.
5. The introduction to the next mantra, 20 tells us that this section is intended to adduce proof that avidya is agantuka, that which comes and departs, foreign to the nature of the self and thereby demonstrates that liberation (Moksha) is possible. The Mantra 20 gives concrete examples of vidya and avidya--"When one feels he is being killed or overpowered or is being pursued by an elephant or is falling into a pit in the dream, and whatever fear there is in the waking state, it is due to avidya and when he thinks "I am all this," that is his highest state,"--the Atman's own natural supreme state (svabhavika), explains Sankara.

What then are vidya and avidya? When prior to this realization of identity with all (sarvatmabhava) he views the latter as other than himself even by a hair's breadth, thinking, 'this is not myself' that is the shape of Avidya. When ignorance is eliminated and knowledge reaches its perfection, the state of identity with all, which is another name for liberation, is attained.
6. Through pure knowledge a man is identified with all, and through ignorance he is identified with finite things or separated from something else. He is in conflict with that from which he is separated, and because of this conflict he is killed, overpowered or pursued. All this takes place because the results of ignorance, being finite things, are separated from him. But if he is all, what is there for him from which he may be separated so as to be in conflict? And in the absence of conflict by whom would he be killed, overpowered, or pursued? Hence the nature of avidya proves to be this, that it represents that which is infinite as finite, presents things other than the self that are now existent and makes the self appear as limited. Thence arises the desire for that

from which he is separated; desire prompts him to action, which produces results. This is the gist of the whole passage.

7. It is possible to suggest that the self had become unconscious in deep slēep and therefore did not know anything in that state. If this hypothesis is not disproved, the Upanishadic explanation cannot stand indisputably proved. True. But the hypothesis cannot stand. For, if unconsciousness is something other than consciousness then it does not belong to consciousness or intelligence which is the very nature of the Self. If, on the other hand it is said that consciousness and unconsciousness are both different attributes of the Self and they manifest themselves alternatively, then there must be an entity different from either of these to be aware of them and that is their self, and it therefore cannot be unconscious. Consciousness and unconsciousness, being negations and contraries of each other, neither can it be said that they both constitute the nature of the Self. If, on the other hand, unconsciousness is its nature, then it could not become aware of anything else, at any time, including the attribute of consciousness. If an unconscious entity is known, then it follows that that entity is different from the knowledge which knows it; the knowledge which knows it does not thereby become unconscious. Unconsciousness of the conscious is therefore an impossibility. It is nonsense, pure and simple as "cold heat" or "dark light"! The non-perception of objects in deep sleep is, therefore, not to be attributed to the loss of consciousness. Then what is the explanation. It is given in texts 23 to 31.

As introductory to these, Sankara raises an objection and says it is answered by the text:-"Now the question is, if this intelligence is the very nature of the self like the heat etc. of fire, how should it, in spite of the unity, give up its nature and fail to know? And, if it does not give

up its nature, how is it that it does not perceive in the state of profound sleep? It is self-contradictory to say that intelligence is the nature of the Self and at the same time it does not know. The answer is, it is not self-contradictory, both these are possible. How?:--Says the Upanishad: "That it does not see in that state is because although seeing them, it does not see; for the vision of the witness can never be lost because it is immortal; but there is not that second thing separate from it which it can see." This explanation is repeated with regard to hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, knowing etc. It is not that the functions of hearing, touching etc. are retained in tact and separate from each other or from the Self as its attributes in dpep sleep. The natural intelligence of the Self manifests itself as these functions when the organs are present, in the waking state, reflecting into different channels of consciousness or knowledge such as tasting, smelling etc. The organs themselves and the reflected modifications disappear in deep sleep, but the original of these reflections, the self-luminous intelligence remains intact just as it remained in tact in the waking state, though it appeared to be modified in the reflections. It is in this sense that the Sruti says that the vision etc. is not lost, for the original is the source of the reflections. That is the substance of Sankara's explanation.

8. Thus it turns out that the supposed unconsciousness or ignorance in sleep is nothing but non-perception or non-cognition due to the absence of anything to be known by the self which remains intact in its own nature--Pure consciousness. This also explains why the self-consciousness which obtains in waking and dreaming do not obtain there, for self-consciousness is Visesha-Vijnana, knowledge involving the cognition of Upadhis and other objects. This latter is possible only when there is duality but not in the ~~Ad-~~

Advaitanubhava which characterises deep sleep. That is why the text said that in this state a father is no father, a son is no son etc. for these are relationships involving the notion of duality. Nor is it contended that there is the knowledge of the Truth of Advaita in deep sleep.

9. Knowledge of the Truth "I am all this; there is nothing other than the Self" involves mentation however subtle it may be and so it can exist only in waking and dream.

10. Vedanta does not say that the world evaporate or melted away, but that the world is and was the Self itself; not being different from it, it was not seen separate, as something other than the Self. Now, if a light whose nature it is to reveal objects is here and no object is revealed in spite of the existence of this light, what other conclusion can be drawn than that the objects were not present? Similarly, knowledge or consciousness being present in deep sleep, if no object is re - vealed in spite of its existence, then the only rational conclusion is that no object existed then which it could have revealed. Therefore it is said, "The Witness alone remains, one without a second like a mass of serene water." But when the sleeper is awake the world is found to remain as it was before sleep; others also testify to the continuance of it. But the sleeping individual, the world and the others who testify to its continuance were also unknown to the Witness in sleep, it alone had existed then. If therefore the world, the individual sleeper and other individuals had existed during sleep, they must have existed as the Self; no other conclusion is possible. Therefore all this was the Self and Self alone.

11. There is no answer to the why of anything whatever, ultimately. Therefore this appearance and disappearance of the states is said to be maya, something like magic. Maya is not a theory but a bare statement of facts of experience as they are,

as Swami Vivekananda has put it. But these false presentations must have a real basis, they must be presentations of something and that something is that which accompanies them and remains behind when they disappear--namely, the Self.

12. As the Chhandogya has it, we are, in the waking state, like a person who has been brought away from his native country with his eyes covered and left in a foreign land, helpless and crying for help; whereupon some kind man unloosens his bondage and shows the direction to go. Similarly we require a teacher who will open our eyes to the truth of our being by being instructed "Thou are That." Then only we know "I am Brahman, the Being of deep sleep." Merely repeating "I am Brahman" without knowing its meaning in terms of our own experience, is as good as repeating " I am abdacadabra." Hence enquiry is necessary.

13. Having heard, we have to analyse the contents of experience, reason and find out their significance and import, and then only we realise the truth. Tattvabodha is not brought about by any other means than vichara, just as an object is nowhere seen without the help of light." Mere anubhava is not samyagjnana; all sentiment, beings are having Brahmanubhava, but they are not Brahmajnanis on that account. Vichara or Reason is that mental process which makes explicit in <u>terms of thought</u> what is implicit in anubhava or experience. But it is not intellectual sport, or a feat of logic, for it is built up of the stuff of experience. Reason is not sushka tarka.

14. The self is ever known to every one as the object of the idea 'I', intuition is the common property of all sentient beings. What is required is the removal of the false ideas of duality.in the Self, such as "I" and "not I." These are due to ignorance of the truth of the nondual Self; and ignorance can be banished only by the aid of enquiry, by the exercise of Reason.

15. Samadhi may be brought about by other means as well, such as the practice of yoga etc. without ever having enquired into or known the truth of all things. Therefore samadhi is not the criterion of the realization of Truth.

16. "Tat Tvam Asi": The well-known Mahavakya "Tat Tvam Asi" occurs in the 6th chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad. It is repeated nine times. Because the subject matter is subtle, the truth is tried to be brought home through numerous analogies and at the end of every explanation "Thou art that" is repeated. The first time it occurs is in 6.8.7. The preceding six mantras of the 8th section expound the nature of the Being to which "Tat" in "Tatvamasi" refers. The usual method adopted by later teachers of Vedanta to elucidate the meaning of this Mahavakya, introduces a number of technical terms such as bhaga lakshana, tatastalakshana, jahati lakshana, vijahati lakshana etc. These might be necessary and good for many. But the upanishad which is the source of the mantra adopts a different method by pointing to an experience common to all in which the "That" is revealed, but the value of which for want of appreciation of its true import, is lost upon the unthinking humanity. The first mantra of this section directly introduces to us that Being which forms the meaning of the "tat" in the 7th Mantra and this Being is no other than the Being revealed in dreamless sleep.

"Uddalaka, the grandson of Aruna, said to his son, Svetaketu: "Learn from me, my dear, the true nature of sleep; when a man is said to sleep then, my dear, is he united with Pure Being and gone to his own."

Sankara's commentary on this text is very valuable as throwing a flood of light on the phenomenon of sleep. According to it the Paradevata or Supreme Deity (mentioned in the 6th Mantra) has entered into the mind in the form of the

jeeva as the face enters the mirror or the sun water, in the form of a reflection.

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D.S. SHARMA, M.A. "BUDDHI-YOGA IN THE GITA."@

Nothing shows the intellectual robustness of the teaching of the Gita as the place that is assigned in it to Buddhi or understanding. It we gather together all the passages in which the word Buddhi and its synonyms (Dhi, Prajna etc.) derivatives and compounds are used, we get a new light on the teaching unperceived before. Let us begin with the psychological analysis given in the third chapter.

"The senses are great, they say; the mind is greater than the senses, greater than the mind is the understanding (Buddhi), but what is greater than the understanding his He (the Atman.)"

The Gita is, of course, following here its great prototype--the Kathopanishad, which in a famous passage compares the soul in the body to a hero in his chariot and Buddhi or understanding to his charioteer. The Upanishad says:-

"Know then that Self is the master of the chariot and the body is the chariot. Know then that the understanding is the charioteer and the mind is the reins. The senses are said to be the horses and the objects of sense are the paths."

This Upanishadic scheme is generally followed in the Gita--namely, the ascending order of the senses, the mind, the understanding and the self--except that sometimes Ahamkara or self-consciousness is interposed between the mind and the understanding as in the Sankhya system. Buddhi is thus next only to Atman in man. The rational element in us is next only to the spiritual element. Therefore it is not by suspending our reason but by fully exercising it that we can rise to the highest level of the spirit. In some schools of Theism, Christianity for example, intellect and reason are almost always suspect. They say that reason is opposed to faith, that intellectual

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enlightenment is generally inimical to love of God and that salvation lies in righteousness and love and not in knowledge or the training of the understanding. Christ is quoted as saying that "whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein." But this only means that we should be as innocent as a child and not as ignorant as a child. For our talents are as much God-given as our emotions. And it should not be forgotten that Christ has also a parable about "the talents" and says that he who does not improve his stock shall be deprived of it. At any rate in the well-balanced philosophy of the Gita intellect is neither neglected nor over-emphasized. Accordingly the discipline of the discipline of man is always the discipline of the whole man--Indriyas, Manas and Buddhi. And enlightened understanding plays as prominent a part in Bhakti-Yoga and Karma-yoga as in Jnana-yoga. The Bhakti that is taught in the Gita is no unbalanced emotion any more than the Karma that is taught there is unenlightened action. This will be clearly seen when we note carefully the implications of what the Gita calls Buddhi-Yoga and the relation of this Yoga to other kinds of Yoga.

Let us take, for instance, the passage in the second chapter in which the expression Buddhi-yoga occurs for the first time.

"Far inferior indeed is mere action, O Arjuna, to equanimity of mind. So take refuge in equanimity. Miserable are they who work for fruit.

"A man of even mind puts away here both good and evil. Therefore strive for Yoga. Yoga is skill in action.

"Sages of even mind, who give up the fruits of their actions, are freed from the bond of birth and go to the place where no ills exist.

"When thy understanding has crossed the slough of delusion, thou wilt become indifferent to what has been learnt and also what is yet to be learnt.

"When thy understanding which is distracted by the Vedic texts rests steadfast and firm in spirit--then wilt thou gain true insight."

In all these verses either Buddhi-yoga or Buddhi-Yukta or simply Buddhi is used. And from them we infer that according to the Gita, Buddhi-yoga implies (1) equanimity or evenness of mind, (2) detachment, (3) freedom from the pairs of opposites, (4) absence of error or delusion and (5) ability to rise above the letter of the law and to rest steadfast in spirit. In short it is the preliminary discipline of the mind which is indispensable to every mode of spiritual life. Buddhi-Yoga is the basis of all types of Yoga--Karma-Yoga, Bhakti-Yoga, Dhyana-Yoga and Jnana-yoga. In fact that is one of the reasons why we find that these are never mutually exlusive. And I think we are justified in saying that Karma-Yoga is only Buddhi-Yoga <u>plus</u> disinterested action, that Bhakti-Yoga is only Buddhi-Yoga <u>plus</u> loving devotion to God, that Dhyana-Yoga is only Buddhi-Yoga <u>plus</u> unwavering contemplation of the spirit, and that Jnana-Yoga is only Buddhi-Yoga <u>plus</u> a vision of the oneness of all things in the Absolute.

It is interesting to notice that in the following verses where worshippers are described, Buddhi-Yoga is mentioned as the means by which they reach God.

"Their minds are fixed on me, their lives rest in me, and of me they ever converse enlightening one another. Thus are they delighted and satisfied.

"On those that are ever devoted to me and worship me in love I bestow the Buddhi-Yoga by which they come to me." X.9,10,

Again in the description of the two paths--the downward path and the upward path in II.62-65--we are taught that the loss of Buddhi (Buddhi-nasha) in the former and the steadfastness of Buddhi in the latter are the last stages.

Further light is thrown on the importance of Buddhi in the Gita by the use of the word Vijnana as distinguished from Jnana. These two words--Jnana and Vijnana, that is, spiritual realization and intellectual enlightenment--are mentioned in conjunction in five different places--III, 41, VI 8, VII 2, IX, i and XVIII, 42. If we examine these verses we realize what great emphasis the Divine Teacher lays on intellectual enlightenment. According to Him intellectual enlightenment is next only to spiritual realization. In fact spiritual realization is never complete without the enlightenment of the understanding. For He says:-

"I will set forth to thee in full both Vijnana and Jnana which when thou hast learnt nothing more remains for thee to know." VII.2.

"As thou dost not cavil, I will expound to thee this profound secret of Jnana along with Vijnana, by understanding which thou wilt be released from evil." IX.1.

The connection of Buddhi with Vijnana is obvious. The awakening of Buddhi results in Vijnana as the awakening of the Atman results in Jnana. The latter is the fulfilment of the former and not its negation.

At the same time the Gita is not unaware of the dangers of the understanding. In its charącteristic way it speaks of three kinds of Buddhi--Sattviki, Rajasi and Tamasi. The last type is described thus:-

"The understanding which being enveloped in darkness regards wrong as right and which reverses all values is Tamasi." XVIII. 32.

And this type is best illustrated in the description of the wicked men in the sixteenth chapter:-

"Men of demoniac nature know neither right action nor right abstention. Nor is purity found in them, nor good conduct nor truth.

"They say, 'The world is false, without a moral

basis and without a God. What is there that does not spring from mutual union? Lust is the cause of all.'

"Holding this view these lost souls of small understanding who commit cruel deeds come forth as enemies for the destruction of the world." XVI.8-10.

Thus, though the Gita is a theistic gospel and ends on the note of self-surrender, its object is not to bring a weak, ignorant, anaemic self to the feet of God, but a strong enlightened and fully developed self. Its view of the intellect of man may be expressed in words similar to those of an English poet who expressed his view of poetry thus:-

"Poetry does not save the soul of man, but it makes it worth saving." (in "PRABUDDHA BHARATA")

REVIEW OF "TOO MUCH COLLEGE" BY STEPHEN LEACOCK.@

He would probably have lived his professional life without the slightest suspicion that there was anything wrong with education. The lack of a sense of humour is entirely responsible for all the efforts that are make to keep not only education, but many other mistaken modern developments, in a state of static and even ecstatic complaisance. When this journal published an article an education it drew a great number of abusive, malicious and "old school tie" letters which convinced us either that we must be entirely wrong, or that we were at least fifty years in advance of the times. Beneath the humour of this incomparable fun-maker there is always a full percentage of truth. As all the world knows, Stephen Leacock was for many years a professor at McGill University, so what he has to say about education is the more authoritative. A different but possibly equally negative response will reward the sound sense and keen insight of Mr.Leacock's book. It will be widely read and--

@ in "TOMORROW" April, 1940

keenly appreciated--for its humour. He tells us in the preface that:

"The opinion I have reached is that education, in the narrow sense of school and college attendance, is taking too heavy a toll of the years of life and that the curriculum should be shortened." Excellent. And again:

"A part of the present difficulty is that our school and college curriculum in its one thousand years of development from the Church Schools of the Middle Ages has taken on a mass of subject-matter beyond the range of any one mind."
This is so obvious that the failure of educationists to perceive it is sufficient evidence of our mental debility. It is to this that we owe the curious cult of specialisation, both fatuous and demented, which enables an admitted master of biology, or mathematics, or astronomy actually to brag about his total ignorance of anything else. That is not education, it is lunacy. Such a man cannot possibly be said to live, and in the event of his obsession taking, say, a political instead of a scholastic form he would be accounted a fanatic, promptly and publicly dissected by the equally obsessed psycho-analysts, and worshipped by the dead-heads.

"Thus, by the time the student has reached middle high school on his way to college, he has already joined a sort of 'convoy' that moves slowly down the widening stream of education, always at the pace of the slowest. It sweeps along majestically, working puzzles, muttering declensions, answering quizzes and translating 'parlez-vous.'"
And in the final sentence of the preface, the matter is clinched:

"We seek to accomplish friendship with a League, Mothers' Day with a statue, welcome with a bye-law and sobriety with a code. Without the spirit, all falls in a littered heap. If education is to change, there must first come the consciousness of the need of change."
Psychology, The Black Art of the College, is both

very funny and very true. About psychology he asks:

"How much does this whole pretentious claim amount to, and what room is there for psychology in sound education? In my opinion, very little. Put back all that is mere common sense, restore to medicine what is medicine, leave business to business men, and psychology will be back again with nothing but its original mystery and its black gown..."

"And salesmanship! Open any of the manuals on it (I admit they are getting fewer: it has been a flop) and you will be introduced to a nut called the Prospect. This doesn't mean a landscape; it means the man to whom you are going to sell something. The nut called the Prospect doesn't want it but you are going to make him take it. You do it partly with your eye (the nut wilts when you look at him), partly by suggestion and partly by "personality." This last attribute will sell anything, but to acquire it you need at least three hours a week for half a year, and must put up about a hundred dollars..."

Teaching the Unteachable is good fun.

"....the creation of courses with made-up names that are a mere burlesque of scholarship such as Kinesiology. Put beside it, as drawing cards, taken from the 1939 calendars of various colleges, the course in Eurambics, in Choric Speaking and Human Ecology! This last sounds like being sick. But apparently there are students today prepared to take a course on anything with anname with a proper sound, such as Rheumatics, Spondulics or Peritonitis...."

Can there possibly be any doubt that more than half of the nonsense stuffed into would be scholars at colleges and universities is utter drivel and absolutely useless in the outside world? Is there any doubt that people are staying at school for far too long a portion of a life that proves to be all too short? Mr.Leacock is not attacking

some freak college with a particularly phoney curriculum, his criticism is based upon personal experience and an examination of the programmes of study issued by some fifty American Universities. And in this connection it may be useful to remember that every year our English colleges and universities are more closely imitating their American counterparts.

In a very amusing chapter which takes a tilt at economics, we have this:

"Here before me on my dest is one of the latest, a book that will be pronounced by the reviewers as one of the really 'big' things--an 'outstanding contribution,' that's the phrase. The ordinary person can no more read it than he can read Chinese. Here is a sample of how this outstanding contribution stands out:

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Education is certainly in a serious state. Our reactions to this book will be determined by our temperament. If we don't give a hoot for education we shall laugh from the first page to the last, but if we believe that the state of education is a fair index to the health of our civilisations, the smiles will probably fade before the indisputable validity of Stephen Leacock's criticism.

FROM H.P.B.'s "LUCIFER MAGAZINE. V,4.1889:

The questions asked and the difficulties propounded in the foregoing letter arise mainly from an imperfect acquaintance with the philosophic teachings of Theosophy. They are a most striking proof of the wisdom of those who have repeatedly urged Theosophists to devote their energies to mastering, at least, the outlines of the metaphysical system upon which our Ethics are based. Now it is a fundamental doctrine of Theosophy that the "separateness" which we feel between ourselves and the world of living beings around us is an illusion, not a reality. In very

deed and truth, all men are one, not in a feeling of sentimental gush and hysterical enthusiasm, but in sober earnest. As all Eastern philosophy teaches, there is but ONE SELF in all the infinite Universe, and what we men call "self" is but the illusory reflection of the ONE SELF in the heaving waters of the earth. True Occultism is the destruction of the false idea of Self, and therefore true spiritual perfection and knowledge are nothing else but the complete identification of our finite "selves" with the Great All.

2. This shows also that no blind submission to the commands of another can be demanded or would be of any use. Each individual must learn for himself, through trial and suffering, to discriminate what is beneficial.

@@ THE NATURE OF THE SELF by V.B.SHRIKHANDE.

(A Study in Sankhya and Vedanta).

The problem of the Self is one of the most persistent as also one of the most difficult problems of philosophy. The permanent interest which attaches to it arises from the fact that there is nothing so dear to a man as the Self. There are, of course, persons in every age and country who willingly die for causes and ideals which they hold dearer than life. An adequate solution of the difficulty presented by the behaviour of these martyrs will appear at the end of our investigation. But the truth of the statement that every person attaches the greatest value to his Self will, for the present, be sufficiently borne out by a psychological analysis of the phenomenon of desire. When a poor man desires to be rich, he does it with the belief that wealth will satisfy his needs and when a rich

man thirsts for honour and fame, he also thinks that these will satisfy him. But there have been poor men like Socrates who made no effort to be rich, thinking that their needs were not fulfilled by wealth. What is an object of desire to one person may be an object of aversion to another and the same persons who when hungry desires food may not even bear to see it when he has had more than enough. These instances make it clear that every object is desires as a means to the fulfilment of the self. In other words we may say that the essence of desire is a sense of incompleteness coupled with the expectation, true or false, that a certain object, if obtained, will make us complete. The Self thus is the ultimate object of all desire and if the martyr desires to hold fast to his cause or ideal even at the cost of his body it must be in the belief that his self will be fulfilled in that way alone. It is because his self is clearer to him than the body that he is prepared to sacrifice the latter. As the Brihadaranyakopanishad puts it "Everything is loved for the sake of Self." The self being thus the standard of all vaue there is a constant reference to it in all our dealings with other persons and things. In social intercourse especially, is it necessary for us to study the nature of others and this we can do only to the extent to which we understand our own Self. In the science of psychology the explanation of most psychical phenomena depends on an adequate idea of the Self while the development of this idea is in itself a subject of absorbing interest. In ethics, the ultimate solution of moral problems is based upon the end of human life but this cannot be discovered before the true nature of the self is determined. In fact, the knowledge of the self may well claim to be the key to the knowledge of

the whole universe and the precept "Know thyself" is perhaps the wisest saying of the wise men of ancient Greece. As the same Upanishad says further "Verily, the Self, Oh Maitreyi, should be realised and for this purpose it should be heard about, thought about and constantly dwelt upon). Thus it is the duty of every man to find out for himself the true nature of the Self with the help of his own experience and of the great thinkers of the past and present.

If we look at the answers given by the various systems of philosophy we find there is a bewildering variety of them. Each answer is founded upon some experiences and hence is not without an element of truth but the neglect to notice other relevant experiences naturally leads to error. For instance, in ordinary thinking the line between the Self and the not-Self is generally drawn at the surface of the body though sometimes we talk and behave as if our property, family, reputation, and other things are parts of ourself. It is through the body that we act upon the external world (including other members of society) and are in turn acted upon. The state of the body accounts for much of the happiness or misery of our lives. This, combined with the impossibility of perceiving through the senses anything else, makes some thinkers believe that the Self is the body and nothing else. A sufficient refutation of this view is that it is false to those very experiences (those states of consciousness) by which the body is known to exist. Others would correct this view by including the mind as well as the body into the Self. It is possible to point against this that we experience the body as the object of knowledge as distinguished from ourselves who are the subjects. Still others would make the self con-

sist of the mind alone but understand by mind only passing states of consciousness so that there is no such thing as an identical self persisting through the life of the individual. This view goes against many facts of mental life notably the facts of memory and recognition which require a co-ordination of processes tak- ing place at different times often separated by very long intervals. Thus we see the danger we have to avoid in our quest of the self. We must put together the various kinds of expe- rience we go through in life without omitting any and form a conception of the self that will be consistent with them all. For this purpose we shall first examine commonsense notions which though often inconsistent with one another are all one-sided views of the truth and will guide us to the desired goal if we make a pro- per use of them.

What do we include in the self in ordinary thinking? The most important constituent is ob- viously the body. The condition of the body in respect of health, strength, beauty, age etc., is taken to be one's own condition (as is evi- dent from forms of speech like "I am ill," "I am old"), so that the identification of the self with the body may be said to be almost complete in most persons. But that there are other things with which men identify themselves is clear from the fact that many men risk their lives in the service of their country, in the pursuit of truth, for maintaining their reputation and even for such a low aim as that of money-making. Whatever a man lays down his life for is obviously to him his true self or at least a more important part of his self than his body. Though these man form a smaall minority while those that would keep body and soul together at any cost are the vast majority yet there is no doubt that the latter also include in their self material possessions, re-

latives, country, reputation and ideals generally to a greater or less extent as determined by their mental and moral development.

In general, everything which we are glad to have and sorry to part with or any cause which we should like to see prospering and should not like to see suffering is so far considered by us to be a portion of our self. A man who loses his money or son feels himself, as it were, mutilated and many times says he is ruined. On the other hand a man whose business is prospering and who is surrounded by a growing and happy family feels that his self is becoming fuller and larger.

Now it is true that along with the sense of unity we are also aware of our distinction from our material possessions, relatives and friends. This awareness is due to their being objects which are known by us or of which we are conscious and it is brought home to us by their frequent absence. Though the body also is as much an object of consciousness as a house, yet as it is always with us and constantly affects us agreeably or disagreeably, its distinction from the self is obscured and is realised only by an effort of reflective analysis. A man certainly speaks as if he is his body when he says "I am ill", but if we ask him how he came to know of his illness he will answer "Why?" Am I not conscious of the body and its conditions?" If we further ask him whether the body is conscious of itself he will say "No; I am conscious of the body which is not conscious of itself." This experience shows the falsity of the belief that he is the same as his body.

Having thus established the distinction of the self from the body, we may proceed further along the same life of reasoning. On the principle that every object of consciousness is distinct from the self, we see how the various

modifications of the mind called in modern psychology "Immediate experiences (and including sensations, images, formless states of mind as also ideas, concepts, beliefs, emotions, desires and volitions), are not parts of the self but only objects of which the self is the conscious subject. Thus consciousness taken apart from all objects is seen to be the essential nature of the self. This experience of the self as the conscious subject or as consciousness is involved in all our conscious life and enables every one to say with Descartes "Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am, i.e. I exist as the thinker or the conscious subject)." Hume, losing sight of this constant experience of the self looked for it among the objects of consciousness and failing to find it there denied its existence apart from perceptions. Thus the one thing which is beyond the possibility of doubt (as doubt itself presupposes the doubter) is to Hume as good as non-existing.

Before we proceed further we have to answer a serious objection which might be raised here. On hearing that consciousness taken apart from all objects is the self, one may naturally ask. "How can consciousness ever be without an object? It must always have some object or another." The objection may be answered in this way. It is true that for want of a better word we use the name consciousness which like all other words is relative. The word subject implies a similar relation. But we guard against this implication by using the expression consciousness without an object or pure consciousness. The self as related to objects is called "consciousness" but it is not necessary that it should be always so related. The very fact that it is not bound up with any particular object but may have one object or another shows that its existence is independent of all objects.

A simple illustration will make this clear. Light, as that which illuminates, requires something or other to be illuminated by it. But as no particular object is required the thing which we call "light" in its relation to visible objects exists apart from them all. Of course the name "light" does not properly apply to it when thus taken apart from things illuminated but for want of a better word we convey our meaning by the apparently self-contradictory expression "Light without things illuminated." After this explanation we can use the name "pure consciousness" without laying ourselves open to the charge of self-contradiction, to denote the essential nature of the self.

Understood thus the self will be readily seen to be constant and to admit of no change. If we take our waking life on any day from the moment of rising to the moment of falling asleep, we find there is no moment at which consciousness is absent. It remains the same though the objects come and go. It will also be agreed that there is uninterrupted consciousness during dreams; but there appears to be no consciousness during deep sleep. The reason why we think we are unconscious during sleep is that on awaking we do not remember to have experienced any object while asleep. Yet we remember that we did not experience anything and this implies that during sleep we were conscious of not experiencing anything. "Though he does not see anything, he sees that he does not see anything," says the Upanishad. We can also describe the state of deep sleep as a state of intense happiness and as such a phase of our conscious life. As we rise from deep sleep we feel that we are emerging from an intensely happy state under the influence of which we remain for sometime before we are reminded of the preceding day's

events and of the occupations of the coming day. Similarly if we observe the process of sinking into deep sleep we feel that we are being merged in a state of bliss. When we feel very sleepy but are prevented from going to sleep by some one talking to us we are vexed and are impatient to enter into the state of bliss which should be ours but for the disturbance. Again if a man is awakened while fast asleep he wishes to do away with the disturbance as soon as possible and to return to the blissful state from which he has been torn away. These experiences are sufficient to prove that deep sleep is not a period of unconsciousnes but one of happiness. The intensity of the happiness is so absorbing that the distinction between subject and object is obscured so that a man is not able to say to himself at the time that he is happy. But this is a characteristic of concentration in general and is no peculiarity of sleep, though such absorption is rare in waking life.

Thus consciousness is one and continuous through waking, dreaming and sleeping. What goes to sleep is not consciousness but the mind which must be distinguished from it as its object. It is the mind that undergoes various modifications during the states of waking and dreaming and remains comparatively unmodified during deep sleep. Mental dispositions or impressions left behind by previous experiences persist during sleep and to a large extent determine the subsequent modification of the mind. Thus all the modifications and changes occur in the mind and body while consciousness (spirit, soul) remains changeless and suffers no breaks. The same result can be reached in another way also. If consciousness undergoes changes, these must be perceived by consciousness itself. Now a change involves a difference between the previous and the subsequent states of a thing. If, therefore, a change in

anything is to be perceived both the states must be perceived by the same unchanging perceiver. It will not do for the previous state to be perceived by one perceiver and the subsequent one by another. Hence these changes must necessarily be in the objects and not in consciousness itself which is required to be their perceiver.

From the point of view at which we have now arrived we can see clearly the mistake made by Hume. While looking for the self he could only observe some perception or other and when there was no perception as in sleep, there was no consciousness of self either. Hence he concluded that the self was nothing but a bundle of perceptions, distinct from one another but giving rise to the illusion of identity by their inconceivably rapid succession. He failed to see that if rapid succession is to give rise to the illusion of identity and continuity (e.g. in the case of a flowing river), the various percepts that succeed one another must be perceived by a really identical perceiver. Apparent identity of the object presupposes real identity of the subject. In fact, Hume's fundamental mistake lay in confining his attention to the objects and in ignoring the subject. Experience has two sides: experience of the object as object and experience of the subject as subject. It was the latter experience that enabled Descartes to say "Cogito, ergo sum." Modern psychology which takes the self to consist mainly of a complex system of mental dispositions is also unable tp explain the sense of unity and identity. It is true that mental dispositions are more lasting than the fleeting states of consciousness (so called) but they are constantly being modified by the latter. Old impressions tend to be effaced and new ones arise so that if we compare the

dispositions of a man at the age of 35 with those at the age of 10 we shall find very little in common; yet he is sure that he is the same man that existed 25 years back. Again, the only explanation of this sense of identity is that the change being gradual gives rise to this illusion. But, as has been already pointed out, all illusion of identity pre-supposes real identity in the perceiver.

For the foregoing reasons the Sankhya philosopher maintains that the true nature of the self is pure, continuous, immutable consciousness. He may of course be called upon to account for the experience of activity and the cases of alterations of personality. His reply would be that it is the false identification of the self with the mind (which is really active and which sometimes undergoes sudden and vast changes) that is responsible for both. This identification cannot be conceived to have a beginning though, as will appear later, in any particular individual it may have an end. This brings us to the question of the origin and the end of the self.

If, as Descartes saw, the existence of the self is beyond the possibility of doubt (as doubting itself requires the self to exist), we cannot escape the conclusion that it has always been existing and will always continue to exist. To say that anything that really exists now did not exist before and will cease to exist in the future is to admit that something comes out of nothing and passes into nothing which is clearly an absurdity. It will not do to point out against this the creation and destruction of things taking place before our eyes every day; for it is only the form of a thing that comes and goes while the stuff of which it is made exists before the form, along with the form and after the form and is therefore, alone

real. As the Chhandogyopanishad says, "The form is only a name and arises from speech. It is the matter of the earthen pot, viz. the earth which alone is real)". The modern physical scientist who believes in the real existence of matter, also, for this reason, believes in its indestructibility. The Bhagavadgita expresses the principle thus, "That which does not already exist can never come into existence, and that which really exists can never pass out of existence)" and in the words of the Mandukyopanishad Karika, "That which did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future does not also exist in the present."). The self, therefore, of whose present existence there can be no doubt, must always have existed and will always exist. Besides, all destruction that we know of is dis-integration or dissolution into parts; but pure consciousness which can have no parts does not admit of being dis-integrated or dissolved. In fact it is the indispensable witness of all birth and death, production and distruction. If anything exists or ceases to exist it can do so only for some consciousness. True that we can very easily imagine the contents of a box existing without being perceived by any one. Still they exist for our consciousness. Existence and, similarly, non-existence have meaning only as objects of consciousness. Bishop Berkeley's attempt to reduce external objects to sensations was un-successful and he himself distinguished the two in his Dialogues by saying that the former were ideas of God, not of any particular individual. But he was not able to establish the true relation between God and men. He thought that God had created individual beings and might, if He chose, put an end to them. But consciousness which is the essence of every soul can never be an object and is therefore without birth

and death even at the hands of God. As Vidyaranyaswami says in the opening passage of his Panchadasi, "Through the endless months, years, ages and cycles, past and to come, this self-luminous consciousness is one and neither begins nor ends."

The Sankhya philosopher has rendered invaluable service to the cause of truth by determining the exact nature of the self but he is afraid to draw all the conclusions that follow from his doscovery. He continues to believe in an endless number of individual selves all existing independently of one another. But if each self is pure consciousness distinguished from all objects, it is impossible to say what can distinguish one self from another. We cannot say that one self occupies this portion of space and another, another portion of space, for consciousness does not occupy space which belongs to the object world. Similarly we cannot distinguish them by temporal relations. The only way that might be supposed to remain is by saying that one self is conscious of one set of objects and another of another. But even this way is not open; for though the self has been said to consist of consciousness, its existence has been seen to be independent of all objects. The Vedanta, therefore, teaches that there is only one universal self in the true sense of the word. The so-called individual selves are only false appearances due to identification with different minds and bodies. Within the false individual self are distinguished various partial selves such as body-self, energy-self, the self as mind (desire and doubt), the self as intellect (determination), and the self as happiness. Beyond all these is the self as pure consciousness or universal subject. The Sankhya objects to this conclusion by saying that if there were only one (universal) self, all

men would be equally happy or equally miserable. But we find that some are happy, others are miserable; some are wise, others are ignorant; some souls are liberated, others are bound. The Vedantin meets this objection effectively by pointing to his distinction between the individual selves and the universal self, the latter alone being ultimately real. Even the Sankhya believes that the real self is the same, unchanging consciousness throughout and that the experiences in the way of pleasure or pain, knowledge or ignorance, which really belong to the mind are falsely ascribed to the self. The self which is always free is never bound and therefore is never liberated. The Sankhya therefore gains nothing by retaining the conception of a plurality of selves. It must be noted here that even in ordinary thought and conduct we are not altogether without experience of the universal self. When a number of persons (relatives or friends) feel that their interests are the same and, as far as possible, ignore the rights which each has against the others, they may be said to be particularly emphasizing the elements which are common to them as distinguished from those which make them separate individuals. All acts of sympathy and sacrifice involve a certain sense of unity based on the belief that it is only the common or universal element that is essential and real, while what distinguishes one man from another is un-essential and un-real. It is true that our sympathies are generally limited to a more or less narrow sphere--our caste, community, country, religious sect and so on--but the principle underlying a narrow and a world-wide sympathy is just the same, viz. the belief that what is common is alone real and essential. The sain succeeds in freeing himself from all exclusive tendencies by means of the conviction that the one eternal

principle which runs through all individuals is alone valuable while the differences are unessential and not worth considering. It thus appears that the same tendency towards universalization which in ordinary persons works occasionally and to a limited extent is always and consistently carried out by the saint.

But how can the differences among individuals be shown to be unreal? We have already seen that pure consciousness is the same everywhere and that it is the objects alone which vary. The differences among individuals are made by the different minds and bodies which in relation to the real self are objects. They are therefore un-real in the sense that they do not really distinguish one self from another. There is also a further sense in which they are un-real to the Vedantin. Every object exists only in some subject and therefore pre-supposes it in the same way. Both subject and object thus presuppose each other and must therefore be abstract and hence un-real aspects of one distinctionless concrete reality. The Vedantin be it noted, does not deny objective reality. On the contrary he adversely criticises those who, like some of the Buddhists, reduce all things to subjective ideas by pointing out that our experience of external objects clearly involves, besides immediate experiences or modifications of the mind, a consciousness of things outside the mind. His only point is that just as the objects of dream consciousness are un-real when compared with the external objects of waking consciousness, similarly, the latter are un-real as compared to the absolute reality which is beyond subject-object relation and therefore also beyond all speech and thought. It is called by the names, Self, Consciousness, Infinite, but it is made clear that these names are to be understood

apart from the relations which they ordinarily imply. As long, of course, as we have not realised the true nature of this concrete reality we must continue to talk and behave as if objects are real and as if individuals are, to a certain extent, different from one another.

What is meant by realising the true nature of the self and what is the way to that realisation? Those who take the self to be a complex thing which gradually evolves throughlife understand by self-realisation the perfect development of the different capacities possessed by ghe self. According to Aristotle the real nature of a thing is the final stage of its development and till this is reached it exists more or less in potentiality. What is only possible at first is afterwards realised. The use of the phrase may also be justified in another way. The different instincts and capacities which constitute our nature give rise to different needs and the complete satisfaction of these needs is an ideal which every person seeks to realise according to his light and means. What exists at first only in idea is afterwards made real. But when the true nature of the self is seen to be constant and to admit of no development we cannot speak of self-realisation in these senses though there is still a legitimate sense in which we may use the expression. Our ordinary thought and action as we saw at the outset, imply false notions of the self due to our identification with things properly belong to the world of objects (the not-self). Hence the process of realising the self consists in ridding ourselves of this false identification and attaining to a view of it as it really exists. Owing to the force of habit which is particularly strong in this case it is not sufficient for our purpose to sit down and reflect on the true nature of the self once for all.

For in the first place, a certain moral and physical discipline is required for loosening the attachment to 'flesh' which is to be found in almost all persons (though in different) degrees) before we can even be inclined to take up the line of reasoning which has been indicated in the foregoing pages. Secondly even if we follow and are convinced for the time being by the reasoning, the mental dispositions left behind by the opposite beliefs which are too deep to be effaced at once will continue to trouble us by raising doubts and difficulties and will many times make us forget the conclusions at which we have already arrived by sound reasoning. To counteract and finally destroy these dispositions what is required is constant thinking and dwelling upon the true nature of the self. When in consequence of this prolonged process the old habit of thinking is destroyed and a new one formed, then we become free from doubts and diffculties and can be said to have 'realised' the self.

The attainment of this self realisation marks the end of all temptation, sin, and misery. Unhappiness arises from the presence of unfulfilled wants and happiness has its source in the sense of freedom from want. A man who is convinced that he is really the One Infinite Being which can neither be added to nor taken away from, must feel that he is above all want, for want implies a sense of incompleteness and the expectation of becoming complete by the acquisition of some object. The person who has realised the self is, therefore, in possession of the source of supreme happiness which is the ultimate aim of all human endeavour though most persons are not clearly aware of this fact. Whatever may be the immediate object of a man's desire, it

is always sought after as a means to the removal of the sense of incompleteness which, as has already been pointed out, is an essential element in all desire. All objects of desire are thus considered to be means to a completer self. Desire therefore will come to a natural end and permanent happiness will be gained when we know the self to be really infinite. In this way every man is seeking to realise his infinity though without a clear consciousness of it.

In the light of these truths we are able to settle many differences in ethical science, notably, the opposition between egoism and utilitarianism and that between self-surrender and self-development. In his "Methods of Ethics," Sidgwick makes the truth of utilitarianism rest upon intuition which means that a man intuitively perceives the ultimate value of general happiness for every person. But if any one says that his intuition declares his own happiness to be ultimately valuable this statement cannot be gainsaid and Sidgwick under these circumstances despairs of reconciling the two standards of value unless the reconciliation takes place in the next world. We now see that the deepest need of every one is to realise his own true nature as being universal and infinite and therefore, regard for one's own happiness and that for universal happiness spring from one and the same source. In the case of the conflict between self-surrender and self-development, we now understand how the individual must abandon false and limited notions of the self if he is to realise his true infinity. The martyr, as has been seen, ceased to identify himself with his body and is therefore prepared to sacrifice it in the interest of what he thinks to be his true self. Even the ordinary suicide

is not thinking of putting an end to his own existence but only wants to be free from the trouble which he hopes to avoid by giving up this body.

Thus this grand conception of the self which is the richest treasure bequeathed to us by the ancient sages of our land satisfies the most rigid claims of logical intelligence while at the same time it possesses the highest pragmatic value.

THE TEST OF REALITY: A STUDY IN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY. by Prof. V.B. SHRIKHANDE, M.A. LL.B.@

1. The distinction between the real and the unreal is drawn by every person since very early in life. When a child doubts the truth of our saying that the toy it is asking for is not with us or when children are, in the course of their play, enacting the drama of afterlife, we see them employing this distinction. When a boy gets astride of a stick and tries to feel as if he is galloping on horseback, he knows full well that it is not really a horse that he is riding but that he is only 'pretending.' Belief is the primitive state of the human mind and at first we take every appearance to be real; yet we are compelled to disbelieve certain appearances even in childhood. For instance, when a looking glass is held before an infant it must at first believe that there is somebody in the mirror but sometime before it is able to speak well it comes to know that it is only an appearance and not a reality. In adult life we have so many occasions for employing this distinction that appearances have come to be proverbially connected with unreality though we should not take the responsibility

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of saying that all appearances are false. We are often deceived by the appearance of water where there is no water, of love where there is really indifference or hate, of good character where there are only good manners. Many of our ordinary beliefs are proved to be delusions by science which shows, for instance, that it is not the sun that moves round the earth as it appears to do, but it is really the earth that goes round the sun. It is only a further stage of the same process when philosophy criticises the presuppositions of science (e.g. the independent reality of matter) and shows that even science is not able to get rid of all illusions.

It need not surprise us that the child, the scientist and the philosopher are all engaged in knowing the real from the unreal in as much as it is the same process of knowledge of which common sense, science and philosophy are the three stages. The objects of knowledge are the same at all the three levels though at the lowest level our aim is to acquire only practical acquaintance with things and their properties while on the higher levels we aim at the satisfaction of our intellectual needs. Throughout it is the demand for consistency in our expe-rience that makes us doubt the appearance and look for the reality. At first we believe everything that we see or hear and to the end we require a reason, not for believing that we perceive, but for not believing it. This means that no question arises till what we see or hear is found to be inconsistent with something else which also is seen or heard. The child who is looking into a mirror finds that the child inside the mirror laughts, moves his limbs and generally undergoes all the changes which he himself goes through. This experience is inconsistent with the first belief that

there is actually some child inside. Putting all his experiences together he thinks that he can unify them only by taking it to be his own image and not something possessing independent reality. Similarly people had believed for centuries that the motions of the heavenly bodies were real before Copernicus showed that there were good reasons for thinking that they were not real. The reasons consisted in the experiences which were inconsistent with the belief in the reality of these motions. He showed that the demand for unity could be satisfied only by believing that the earth was moving and not the sun. So also when the philosopher says that matter has no reality independent of consciousness, he appeals to experience in support of his conclusions.

2. What is it that we take to be real and what unreal? We shall examine the different answers that may be given to this question and see if we can reach a satisfactory explanation: (a) It may be said that we consider as real whatever is perceived through the senses, either our own or of other persons whose testimony is reliable. We may further qualify this statement so as to include things, like other or the motion of the earth, which are not actually perceived by any man but which can be conceived to be perceivable under certain circumstances. Using the word "real" in this sense we call the objects and processes in the external world "real" and whatever exists or passes in our minds 'ideal' (which when contrasted with 'real' means 'unreal'). We may prepare the plan of a journey or some other work in our mind but it is 'ideal' till it is 'realised' by the actual doing of the journey or work. The mental picture of a house is imaginary (and so unreal) as contrasted with the actual house which can affect the senses. Shall we, then, say that the physi-

cal is real and the mental, unreal? A little reflection will show that this is by no means a satisfactory solution. In the first place, we do not take our thoughts and emotions, pleasures and pains to be unreal though they exist only in the mind. A fit of anger, a pleasure enjoyed or a pain suffered is as much an actual event as a battle is, though the one is a part of physical history and the other a part of mental history. Who can deny that the plan of a battle as it is formed in the mind of the general is as real, considered as a part of his inner life-history, as the external battle is, considered as a physical event? Secondly, it seems arbitrary to call an object existing in the mind (e.g. sensation, emotion) and perceived immediately, unreal, and an object existing outside and perceived by the external senses, real. What is perceived by the mind directly has as much claim to reality as anything perceived through the eye or the ear. It appears then that only those ideas which are pictures of external objects are unreal and that too not in themselves but in relation to the external objects of which they are copies. The mental picture of fire though real as a mental fact cannot cook our food or give us warmth and so is contrasted with the external fire. But in the same way we call even a physical picture (a photograph or a statue) unreal in so far as it cannot replace the original though there is no doubt that it is something real in its own right.

(b) Shall we, then, say that whatever is an object of experience, external or internal, possesses reality? Here also difficulties arise. Hallucinations, illusions and dreams are admittedly not real. An hallucination is an object which is perceived outside and so appears to exist, though as we find out afterwards, it does not really exist. Such experiences

are very rare but illusions which differ from hallucinations only in having a real sensational basis are much more common. We enter a room dimly lighted. We seem to see a man standing near the wall though we find afterwards that the appearance was caused by some clothes hanging by the peg. In such cases we perceive things which do not really exist; yet while the experience lasts, it is as if we are perceiving an actually existing thing. We cannot dismiss these experiences by saying that they are simply our own ideas; for when we perceive a hallucination or an illusion we can distinguish between the thing itself and our perception or idea of it just as we do in the case of a real thing. The objects seen in a dream afford a parallel case. While we are experiencing the dream we treat the objects we see as being distinct from our ideas of them and there is nothing to indicate that we are not seeing actually existing objects. It is only when we wake up that they prove to be unreal. This seems to show that they are not simply our ideas. We thus see that not all the objects of perception are considered by us to be real. But immediately the question arises, How to distinguish between those objects of experience which are real and those which are not real? Suppose we see in a dream a house burning in our neighbourhood. When we see next morning the house without any signs of fire we treat the dream experience as false but if the house bore signs of having been burning a few hours back we should say that the experience was real. Similarly if we have been feasting in a dream and after waking up we find out stomachs heavy and we also see the other after effects of a feast we should believe we really had a full meal during the dream. But as a matter of fact the objects in a dream do not

leave behind them any signs of their having existed previously. We count them as unreal because they do not continue to exist either in their own form or in the form of effects. A hallucination or illusion also leaves no part of effect of itself behind and we are led to believe that it did not exist.

(3) Thus the real appears to be that which endures. This implies that in so far as anything ceased to exist it is unreal. There is another implication also, viz. that in so far as a thing comes into being, it is unreal. That which has always been and will always be, that is, exists eternally, is alone real. Are we prepared to accept this as our test of reality? What will becomes of our pots and pans, furniture, houses and even our bodies? Are all these unreal? Our answer is that they are both real and unreal. In so far as these things are distinguished from the materials of which they are composed i.e. in so far as they consist in form, they are unreal. A house 'comes' into being when a certain form is given to certain materials, it continues to exist while that form appears and it ceases to exist when that form disappears. The building materials existed before the house, they existed while the house lasts and they continue to exist after the house is pulled down. The form of the house did not exist at first, seems to exists for a time and then ceases to exist. It comes out of nothing and goes into nothing and is therefore unreal. Thus, the house does not really exist in so far as it exists in the form but as we do not distinguish 'form' from 'matter' in ordinary experience the reality of the matter is transferred to the form and the house as such becomes real to us. The reality of the house is the reality of the stones and bricks of which it is made. In the same way the reality of the stones and bricks is the reality of the mat-

ter of which they are composed. In the famous passage in the Brihadaranyakopanishad, which gives the final word on this as on many other questions, the point is illustrated by the instance of an earthen pot. "The form (of the pot) exists only in name while it is the earth (matter) alone that is real."

The general principle is expressed in another Upanishad in these words: "That which did not exist in the past and will cease to exist in the future does not exist even in the present." We have seen how this principle is applied by us in treating hallucinations, illusions and dreams as unreal and how the apparent exceptions to it are due to a confusion of matter and form.

(d) The real must be unchangeable. Change means something ceasing to exist and something else coming into existence, both of which must be unreal according to the test we have discovered. Hence the underlying reality must be without change. We arrive at the same result from another point of view. In order that the thing should change, it must continue to be the same through all its changes. As the essence of a thing can never change, the changes must affect only the unessential attributes or accidents, which is only another way of saying that the thing itself does not change. This may appear to be a mere play of words but minute reflection will show that there is a real contradiction at the basis of the idea of change.

SOLIPSISM: by Prof. R.V. DAS. M.A. @

1. Solipsism is not a logical fallacy but a metaphysical theory: but it is so disreputable among philosophers that it is treated almost as a fallacy. We should expect therefore that there is, on the very face of solipsism, some unmistakable mark of absurdity which can at once be detected.

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But although its practical absurdity seems patent enough, its theoretical inconsistency is not so easily discoverable. And it is with theory rather than with practice that philosophy is directly concerned. Some writers have even gone so far as to admit that solipsism is irrefutable. Its practical absurdity accounts for the rarity of professed solipsists in the world; but its supposed irrefutability seems to have encouraged amng some philosophers a way of thinking which on close examination reveals its clear affinity with solipsism.

2. Bradley has stated the case of solipsism in the following words: "I cannot transcend experience and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond myself exists; for what is experience is its states;" No solipsist would I think find fault with this statement of his case. It shows him in as favourable a light as he can possibly wish. No one can deny the fact that we cannot transcend experience. No one can also maintain that experience need not be the experience of anybody in particular, or that I can have the experience of someone else. It may be said that in experience we seem to find things which are quite distinct from us in their existence. But solipsism would reply that no such things are ever really given in our experience. What I really experience is certain states of my own being, and this is falsely interpreted as denoting some independent things or as signifying the existence of such things. I cannot experience what is outside myself. So what I can and do experience is only myself affected in various ways; but that beyond this feeling or sense of affectedness, there is something, I do not and cannot know, and have no right to assert. Thus does solipsism seem to demonstrate the inevitability of its conclusion..

Bradley, as we know, does not accept solipsism. He has shown that by direct experience we can never come upon a self. The idea of the self is an intellectual construction which is as realiable as the process by which we arrive at the idea of other selves; so that if we are to believe in the self, we may believe in other selves as well.

3. Now the solipsist may reply that the self which is a construction may be as false as other selves; but the self which is not a construction, which cannot be got at by experience direct or indirect, but which is the presupposition of all experience, may be the true self, the only existent. Then, further, if our experience is once admitted to be confined to our states, it is difficult to understand how we can ever go beyond them. The alleged imports and contents may only be other imagined states called forth by memory. At least at sometime or other they must come to be our states if they are at all to be experienced and made real.

4. When solipsism is taken up as a metaphysical theory it is understood that it is amenable to philosophical consideration. If we are to regard the solipsist not as a maniac who holds fast to a theory without rhyme or reason, but as a philosopher, then it must be understood that he allws the sovereignty of reason, that he is prepared to test the validity of his theory in the light of reason. His theory cannot be true simply because he is pleased to hold it. Now when he has submitted his theory to philosophical consideration, even though the consideration is carried on by the solipsist himself he has surrendered his claim to be the arbiter of metaphysical truth. He has no control over the truth or falsity of his theory. His submission to reason carries with it the tacit admission that he may be constrained to accept a view

which he does not like. Now, for the philosopher reason is the guiding light of reality. Compulsion through reason can come only from reality. At least that is what a philosopher must believe. Philosophy as the search for knowledge of reality is there because there is the faith in the competence of reason to interpret the nature of reality. If there could be a conclusion enforced by reason which might at the same time be at variance with the nature of reality, then faith in reason would be lost and the door of philosophy for ever closed.

NECESSITY: by K.C. GUPTA. M.A. (IND.PHILOS. CONG.PRO.'26)

1. All modern discussions on the nature of necessity must make Hume's treatment of the subject their point of departure. Hume raises the question the conception of necessity has any objective validity and answers in the negative. Hume does not deny the presence of the idea of necessity in our mind. What he is concerned to deny is that there is actually any necessary connection in nature, of which this idea would be an exact copy. When he says, for example, that "we have no idea of connection or power at all," or that "these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life," he obviously means that our idea of necessary connection is not valid so far as its objective reference goes, the objective validity that we are inclined to attach to it is purely illusory. But at the same time he recognises the necessity of accounting for the existence of this idea, illusory as it is; and this he does by attempting to show how it has originated. By necessary connection he understands a tie or nexus that binds two phenomena together. There is no such tie or connection between different things or events in nature; because if there were any, it would have been perceived by us.

We are aware of impressions corresponding to natural phenomena but we are not acquainted with any impression of a tie or nexus in addition to the impressions of the phenomena themselves. Certain phenomena, however, are as a matter of fact observed to be frequently followed by certain other phenomena and this conjunction is falsely interpreted by us as a necessary connection between those phenomena. The idea of necessary connection can therefore be reduced to a mental habit of ours, there is nothing corresponding to it in nature.

2.As the conception of necessity and the conception of laws are closely associated together, it may be expected that an investigation into the real character of "natural laws" will clarify to a great extent our conceptions of necessity, and it is claimed that such an investigation leads to a radical change in our conception of necessity.

3. If a law of nature is thus a mere description of facts, in what sense can it be said to have universal validity? It is evidently not possible to take into account all the facts which a certain law is trying to generalise. No one has ever tried to verify on every occasion whether fire burns or sound travels through air with a particular velocity. A scientific law or formula is, moreover, abstract. When we investigate a very large number of facts we have to ignore the individual peculiarities of each of them and fix our attention only on a few of their characteristics which appear to us to be exactly similar. The law is based on this apparent multiplicity of identicals. This simplification of data is carried out at the expense of the manifold particulars which are completely left out of account. The law thus ceases to be an accurate and complete description of actual concrete things. It may be looked upon as an

approximate generalisation which has to be considerably modified whenever we apply it to any particular instance. It is therefore meaningless to talk of the absolute and universal validity of the laws of nature. Their validity is wholly relative to man and his capacity of observation. So our conception of physical necessity has to be considerably modified or rather abandoned. Nature as conceived apart from man does not reveal any necessary connection between things and events. All natural facts are contingent, they might just as well not be, they might be different. There is no "must" in nature.

4. Conjunctions and disjunctions in nature are to be regarded simply as matters of fact. And if particular conjunctions or disjunctions are found to be variable that would entail no contradiction whatsoever. All the laws of nature are contingent truths and may be altered at any time if the occasion demands. The conception of necessity has its origin solely in our mind and has no validity when referred to the objective world.

5. It is we ourselves who invent these laws of nature and can alter them according to our own requirements. Similarly Huxley contends that "the notion of necessity has a logical, not a physical foundation." That is to say, it is not physically imposed by nature on us, but psychically imposed by us on nature.

N.O. LOSSKY: "THE INTUITIVE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE."
(Preface by G. Dawes Hicks) i. By ordinary common-sense intelligence it is taken for granted that in and through knowledge we become acquainted with the facts and events of the world as they actually are. The tendency of almost all the great historical systems of philosophy has been, however, to cast discredit upon this belief, and to lead, when con-

(Nos. i to vii are from preface)

sistently followed out, to what seems to be a well-founded doubt as to whether our ordinary knowledge can be said to be knowledge of the real world at all.

ii. Even Leibniz, who on metaphysical grounds had discarded the notion of causal interaction between the mind and things, was still compelled to fall back upon the conception of "representation" by which to indicate the relation between the content of knowledge and the real world, without being able in the smallest measure to justify the contention that the former was representative of the latter.

iii. By the very terms in which the problem is stated we are debarred from convincing ourselves that by means of the instrument allotted to us we ever have in the results we reach what is entitled to be called objective truth.

iv. What at first appears as confused, chaotic, formless, gradually assumes, as this process of discriminating proceeds, clearness, distinctness, definiteness; instead of a vague, blurred, amorphous mass the conscious subject comes to be aware of a whole of distinguishable parts and characteristics, resembling and differing from one another, and resembling and differing from the other parts and characteristics of other objects. Generally, then, knowing may be defined as a process of differentiating the elements and features of the real world by means of comparison. I hail with satisfaction the emphasis here laid upon the function of discriminating and comparing. It is a recognition of what seems to me to be fundamental in the development of cognitive apprehension; and for the last twenty years I have been trying, in season and out of season, to make its importance manifest, as also its far-reaching consequences for the theory of knowledge.

v. Not even the crudest, vaguest consciousness of a content can be accounted for, either psychologically or epistemologically, without calling to our aid in the exposition the notion of a discriminative activity which is in essence identical with the more elaborate activity which Professor Lossky describes as "knowing." I should contend that there is no way of explaining the origin of the ideas of relation, which the act of judging, as ordinarily understood, involves, except by viewing them as themselves the outcome of discriminative activity.

vi. Just because the essence of knowing consists in discriminating and comparint, it is inevitable that knowledge should come to expression in the form of the judgment. Following still the same clue, he indicates how, from successive acts of discriminating directed upon one and the same object, notions or concepts come into being.

vii. Many long-standing difficulties cease to appear as such from the vantage ground which is thus attained. For example, the old antithesis between analytic and synthetic judgments can be at once dismissed, for it becomes obvious that every judgment must be from one point of view analytic and from another synthetic.

(1) If we be told that there is not to be found a knowledge which is apprehensive of the real world, that knowledge has merely a symbolic character, and that we do not know the thing itself but only its effect upon us,--if we be told that the world we know is merely the world of our own presentations, of phenomena, which come into play in accordance with the laws of our understanding,--we are utterly dissatisfied with such knowledge.

(2). Most epistemologists are inclined to maintain that immediate experience consists entirely of the individual mental states of the knowing subject. But if in immediate experience we are concerned merely with our own states of consciousness, it follows that in whatever direction we turn we can never be freed from our own self or transcend the limitations of our own personal experience.

(3) To one who is convinced that knowledge does penetrate to the essence of things, the question inevitably presents itself why Philosophy, during the many centuries of its history, has not only failed to find a justification for that belief.

(4) The founders of the different philosophical systems were men of exceptionally logical minds; their keen intellects easily detected the disposed of contradictions in the most complicated of arguments. The fact that even they failed to track the errors which in the last resort lead to subjective idealism is sufficient proof that those errors have been exceptionally well concealed, that they lie not among the explicit assertions, but among the instinctively conceived assumptions, the unconsciously adopted premisses, of philosophy. The best way, therefore, to rid ourselves of them is to analyse carefully the points of departure of the most important systems of thought. We shall, then, discover their unrecognised implications and bring into the light of day the hidden supports of such philosophical reflection.

(5) A theory of knowledge must being with an analysis of the experiences actually taking place at any given moment. A thinker who wishes to perform this analysis without reverting to some ready-made theory has no right in any way even to define knowledge; he has no right, e.g. to approach his enquiry with the idea that "know-

ledge is a reproduction of thought of reality," etc. Still less ought he to start with preconceived notions of the self and the not-self, of the inner and the outer world, of their interreaction, etc.

(6) A critical method of this kind is so difficult and so unique that even its great founder, Kant, was not able to carry it through consistently. In working out his theory of knowledge he did not avoid making dogmatic assumptions for he was building upon the foundation laid by the empiricism and rationalism of the preceding ages. These two systems were full of assumptions that had never been subjected to the thorough-going criticism which the study of history of philosophy has now rendered possible.

A thinker who is to avoid the rocks upon which, aswe shall show later, the philosophy of Kant was wrecked, must start by scrutinising the philosophical systems of the past, and laying bare their presuppositions--i.e. the assumptions on which they are based but which are not explicitly stated as well as those assumptions which, though explicitly stated, have not been compared with other possible and contrary assumptions, and are in this sense dogmatic. Such is the course I propose to follow in this book.

7. Until a theory of knowledge freed from the assumptions of the pre-Kantian philosophy has been formulated, one is compelled to employ such terms as "fact", "experience", "perception" etc. in the indefinite sense in which they were used in all the dogmatic systems of thought. But a loose and inaccurate use of these terms makes a discussion of so complex a system as that of Kant extremely difficult. Before proceeding to deal with the Kantian system, it will, therefore, be desirable to determine more pre-

cisely the significance of the terms by means of which knowledge is to be interpreted.

8. Empiricism seeks to ground the whole of knowledge upon the basis of what is called experience. But in the early stages of philosophical investigation the terms "experience" and "fact" were used with extreme indefiniteness. And the development of the empirical theory consisted largely in introducing changes into the meaning of these terms. The anwer which first suggests itself to the question as to the nature of experience is that it consists of the perceptions mediated by the external organs of sense, i.e. of visual, auditory, and other data. But since these perceptions inform us only of the so-called corporeal world, and since other materials of knowledge are, to begin with, overlooked--for a reason which will be discussed later--it is not difficult to see why, in the early stages of philosophising, all that is thought to be knowable is taken to consist of corporeal things and their reactions. This, for instance, was the view of the founder of English empiricism, Francis Bacon. A conception so one-sided could not long persist in philosophical reflection. The later empiricists were forced to recognise that the actual material of knowledge is not limited to visual, auditory, and other presentations. Some facts can be apprehended without the help of eyes, ears, or touch. If I think of the philosophy of Leibniz and compare it with that of Aristotle, finding points of resemblance between them, I am engaging in various activities, such as remembering, comparing, analysing, observing agreement or contradiction between ideas. Yet to know these states of consciousness there is no need to touch them or to look at them; they are evidently known in some more immediate way. These two kinds of knowledge were already noted

by Locke; the one he called "sensation" and the other "reflection."

9.There is no doubt that things are experienced owing to the fact that they enter into a certain relation to me, the knowing subject. But what is the nature of this relation? The subject's knowledge of an object is a fact that differs profoundly from all other facts--from chemical and physical changes, physiological processes, and so on. It is, therefore, to be expected that it will contain elements and relations which are nowhere to be met with among the other aspects of the world. An accurate description of them will involve new conceptions different from the conceptions of physics, physiology, etc. The naive realist, who believes that things as they are enter into the subject's consciousness, assumes, without being aware of doing so, that a quite peculiar specific relation holds between the subject and object. Yet, when he comes to theorise about knowledge he turns out to be fatally incapable of formulating his conviction in abstract terms, and pursues a course which must lead him in the end to forsake his realism. This is due to the inertness of the human mind, which finds it difficult to grasp what is new, and strives at all costs to satisfy the promptings of curiosity by means of the least possible number of well-worn and familiar conceptions.

When men approach the problem of truth--when they take up the epistemological inquiry--they already possess a number of habitual, deeply rooted ideas about the world, especially ideas about the material world, which subsequently play an important part in natural science. Such, for instance, is the idea of a thing and of properties belonging to it (e.g. the green colour belonging to this birch leaf, hardness to this pience of quartz etc.), and

such also is the idea of the causal action of one thing upon another.

When the naive realist--or indeed anyone untrained in epistemological inquiry--comes to deal with the fundamental problem of epistemology,--namely, with the relation between the knowing subject and the object known,--he usually stumbles hopelessly upon a wrong track. He imagines, that is to say, that empirical knowledge is due to the causal action of the object upon the subject (first on the body and then on the mental life of the subject). Hence, the conclusion is drawn that in experience the knowing subject is dealing not with the external object as it is in itself, but with a more or less exact image of it which is in the subject's mind and is therefore a mental state of the subject. Thus, the point of view of naive realism comes to be relinquished.

Another misconception which proves fatal to naive realism is the wrong use, often made even in epistemology, of the idea of a thing and its properties. The rock I see, the table I touch, etc. are in my consciousness. I am conscious, and these things are what I am conscious of. What, then, is the relation between the conscious subject and that of which he is conscious? At first sight it seems indisputable that the relation is one of belonging to, in the same sense in which a thing's qualities, or the processes taking place in it, belong to that thing--i.e. in the present case, in the sense in which a subject's feelings and desires belong to him. Hence the conviction that the perceived thing is not a part of the external reality as it is itself, but simply a subjective image of it, a presentation consisting entirely of mental states of the knowing individual.

10. Locke beings his Essay concerning the Human Understanding by asking the question as to

the origin of our ideas. As a result of his criticism of the theory of innate ideas he arrives at the conclusion that there is nothing innate in the mind, and that the mental life begins under the influence of experience, by which he understands precisely the action of the external world upon the self.

11. We, at the present day, resting upon the work of philosophers and psychologists both before and after Kant, can, without difficulty lay our finger on the non-sensuous elements of knowledge. Every perception is composed of a number of sensations which form a unity; the consciousness of unity is not itself a sensation and cannot be explained by the activity of any organ of sense simply because unity of sensations are transcended and put into relation with one another.

12. Yet if experience be, as Locke asserts it to be, simply a subjective response of the mind to the influence of an external world that is foreign to it, a perplexing, and indeed an insoluble, problem is presented by the phrases "we consider things to be actually without us."

13. According to Hume, then, substance is simply the habitual coexistence or grouping of certain impressions. He was well aware, that the difference between simple coexistence in time and substantive co-existence must be accounted for, and that it must be explained through the help of some actual experience. The experiences which, according to Hume, must be added to the consciousness of temporal coexistence, in order to transform it into the consciousness of temporal co-existence, in order to transform it into the consciousness of substantive co-existence, are a mode of feeling engendered by custom and the tendency of anticipation arising therefrom.

In a similar way Hume explained the idea of

causality. He supposed the causal connection to be simply a form of the succession of events in time; it is, namely, the succession which, owing to frequent repetition, has become so habitual that the appearance of one member of the succession leads us immediately to expect the other. According to Hume, then, the succession of two such events as a stone striking a glass and the appearance of cracks in the glass does not essentially differ from such a succession of events as my opening a book and a distant peal of thunder which happens to follow my action. The difference between the first and the second pair of events is simply that the first is accompanied by a mode of feeling and a tendency of anticipation, whilst in the second these feelings are absent.

13. The thought that we can only know our own ideas had, however, already been reached by Locke. "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no immediate object before it but its own ideas, which it alone does and can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them," he writes; and in the opinion of Berkeley, the very term existence in reference to the things of the external world means simply "to be perceived."

14. But, surely, the question at once presents itself--How does Locke know that the idea of white or bitter as it is in the mind exactly corresponds to the power of things which produces this idea? If sensations are subjective, and the force which produces them does not enter into consciousness, it must be admitted, if we are to be true to fact, that we have no means of knowing whether these forces correspond to sensations or whether, indeed, such forces exist at all.

Berkeley did not fall into so crude an error. He would not admit any conformity between sensa-

tions, at any rate, and an external world. He says that perceptions of material things cannot be copies of real things, be it only because every percept is a complex of ideas and an idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

Finally,Hume--the most consistent of the empiricists--no longer speaks either of a correspondence or of a want of correspondence between our ideas and the external world; if he does make any conjecture on the subject he is inclined to the second alternative. He thinks the existence of an external world cannot be proved.

@@. Consistently carried out, empiricism was, therefore, compelled in the end to relinquish the discussion of the question as to the relation of knowledge to the external world, and Hume did relinquish that discussion. In defining knowledge, Hume and even his predecessors had in view not the relation of knowledge to objects external to the human mind, but rather the inner peculiarities of the cognitive process which characterise knowledge on its subjective and immanent side.

16. If impressions are merely the subjective reactions of the mind to influences from without, then, however adequately each impression may be known, there can be no knowledge of their causal connection. And yet it is precisely this connection that is of supreme importance to science. When muriatic acid is added to an alkaline solution which is blue from the presence of litmus, and it is observed that the blue liquid turns to a rose colour and begins to react differently, all these changes, we are to suppose, are given as a series of various sensations which are perfectly knowable so far as the resemblance and difference between them are concerned. This, however, is not what is of interest in regard to the chemical reactions. We

study the latter in order to discover the laws of the connection between the phenomena in question, the general rules of the necessary sequence of the events. Now, according to Hume, this aim can never be realised. Contemplate our impressions as carefully as we will, we can never arrive at any trustworthy general rules of their mode of sequence. And in studying chemical reactions we are really concerned with subjective impressions which do not produce one another, and are utterly disconnected except as regards the order of their appearance in time. If any two events have often been experienced together, from force of habit we begin to imagine that there exists a particularly close connection between them, and we lay down a general rule asserting the supposed necessity of a certain kind of sequence of impressions for the future. But obviously our habit carries with it no guarantee of the truth of the belief; the next day may convince us that all the laws of physics, chemistry, etc. are invalid. The complex of impressions designated by the terms oxygen and hydrogen may then be followed by the complex expressions "iron" and not by the complex called "water." What has occurred nine hundred and ninety-nine times in our laboratories may not occur for the thousandth time. If every general statement about facts be merely a belief founded on habit, the theoretical sciences based on facts, such as physics, chemistry, physiology, sociology, etc. are unreliable from the philosophical--though not, of course, from the practical--point of view. Only the concrete sciences such as history and geography, limited to a mere description of individual facts (impressions) as such, can be taken to be perfectly trustworthy from the point of view of philosophy.

17. It has already been pointed out that if we are to remain within the limits of what is ac-

tually experienced and are at the same time to admit that all the materials of knowledge are subjective, we cannot in the end escape from the pitfall of solipsism.

18. When I come across a new event I feel convinced that it must have a cause, and I begin to look for that cause, to make investigations for the purpose of finding it. But the law of causality does not tell me where I must look for it, nor does it tell me that my search must needs be successful. It the material of knowledge consisted entirely of my subjective states I should naturally be compelled to look among those states for the cause of the new event.

19. But if all general statements are mere beliefs, the inferred elements of a description must be beliefs also. Having witnessed a parade I assert that I have seen several thousand soldiers marching past. Yet what I really perceived were simply several thousand spots of colour, which, in a number of other cases, have been connected with tactile sensations of a human skin, auditory sensations of a human voice etc. If by the word "man" in the description of the parade be meant the whole complex of these sensations and not merely the visual spots, the limits of immediate perception have already been transcended, and a number of inferences have been drawn from general statements or beliefs.

20. Thus we arrive at a self-destructive scepticism, according to which everything beyond the range of momentary apprehension must be regarded as mere belief. Such a scepticism must obviously throw doubt on its own truth, because as a theory of knowledge, it purports to consist of general statements, and in this sense must destroy itself.

21. Descartes begins the exposition of his philosophy by showing that every experience,

in so far as it refers to the external world, may turn out to be deceptive. A stick submerged in water appears bent, although in truth it is straight; in a dream I see myself walking in a wood, although in reality I am lying in bed; a wounded soldier feels pain in the toes of his foot although the whole leg has been amputated. But these experiences are absolutely trustworthy when regarded as states of myself. The stick may not be bent, I may not be walking in a wood, the leg may be amputated, but there is no doubt whatever that I perceive a bent stick, that I dream of walking in a wood, that I feel pain. Finding that every experience undoubtedly involves states of the knowing subject, Descartes concluded that it consists entirely of these states. In referring an experience to our own minds we are merely stating a fact and cannot be mistaken, but in referring it to the external world we take for granted the existence of events external to us and yet similar to those which have taken place within our mind. Such a supposition is a conjecture, an inference, and may, therefore be false. In apprehending colours, sounds, etc., we are dealing with states of our own minds which include these qualities, and not with properties of the external world.

22. It may be maintained that since it is impossible to compare the states of the knowing substance with the states of the external world, the question of the adequacy of our knowledge cannot be decided one way or the other. But, once more, this anwer is not free from self-contradiction. If all the states entering into the cognitive process are merely accidents or properties of the knowing subject, there can be no question of an external world at all, nor of the adequacy of our knowledge of it. The very circumstance that we are asking the question

shows either that the assumptions which lead the sceptic to deny the possibility of knowledge are false,,or that his talk about the inadequate character of our knowledge is devoidoof intelligible meaning.

23. The new theory of knowledge must destroy the barriers thus errected between subject and object, recognise their fundamental unity, and in this manner bring about their reconciliation. Beginning with Kant, philosophy has entered upon this new course. Still, there are different ways of recognising the unity of subject and object, and, since there is no reason to suppose that Kant selected the best way, the other ways too must be considered.

The possible modes of conceiving the unity of subject and object may be said to be three in mumber. First, the subject may be resolved into the object. Secondly, the object may be included in the subject. Thirdly, the subject and object may be reconciled not by subordinating one to the other but by co-ordinating them, by maintaining, i.e. that although each retains its independence in respect of the other, they yet form an indissoluble unity. The first alternative evinces itself as impossible for it conceals a self-destructive contradiction: if there is no subject there can be no knowledge. There remain, then, the second and the third possibilities. The second subordinates the object to the subject, or rather to the process of knowing, and regards the object as brought into being by the very process of knowing, and as having no existence apart from that process. This view was worked out by Kant, and various modifications of it introduced by his successors have occupied a foremost place in the philosophy of the nineteenth centurv. Finally, the third possible view, described in the present work as the intuitional theory,

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is being gradually evolved out of the critical philosophy, and has indeed been formulated, though not as yet in a perfectly clear manner, by some philosophers of the Kantian school.

24. A theory of knowledge must be free from assumptions. At any rate it must in our day be free from the assumptions made by the pre-Kantian philosophy. It must start with an analysis of the facts, and it has no right to offer at the outset any definition of knowledge, nor, indeed, to indicate any characteristics of knowledge, nor, indeed, to indicate any characteristics of knowledge, except those which are directly apparent in the actual contents of experience.

25 When I say "it is light," "it is noisy," "I am in pain," these assertions refer to the noise, the light, the pain which unquestionably form part of my knowledge and are not external to it: i.e. I mean <u>the</u> noise, <u>the</u> pain etc. which are actually present within the range of my consciousness.

26. The transparent, tasteless liquid, the burning liquid, the smoking liquid with a pungent smell, the brown, dust-like sediment on the metal, the white flakes of the chlorate of silver, etc. are present in consciousness, and form its contents, to which our acts of affirming or denying refer.

27. If the object of knowledge is immanent in the knowing process, the structure of knowledge may be conceived in one of two ways. On the one hand, it may be maintained that the object apprehended not only enters into the knowing process, but forms the whole of it. On the other hand it may be urged that knowledge is composed of the object apprehended plus some process other than the object; in other words, that knowledge is always more complex than its

object. So soon as an attempt is made to grasp the meaning of the first view, it is seen at once to be untenable. It would imply that light, noise, anger, pain are the same as the knowledge of the light, the noise, the anger, the pain. But that is impossible, simply because knowing is a process that refers to an object, and there could be no such reference if the object known were indentical with the knowledge of it. Such a reference is only possible of the object known is either outside the process of knowing or if it lies within that process as a part of it. The first alternative has already been shown to be untenable; there is left, therefore, only the second.

28. It must be shown in what precisely the greater complexity of knowledge as compared with the object known, consists. To put the matter more concretely: what must be added to such contents of consciousness as light, noise, anger, pain, in order that they may become knowledge? Undoubtedly the knowledge that 'it is light' is only possible when the experience of light has been compared with the experience of darkness and distinguished from it as well as from other contiguous experiences. The same may be said about the experience of pain, anger, inference, etc. The assertion that 'this is a syllogism of the first figure' can only be made if the process of inference in question has been singled out from other experiences,--emotions, organic sensations, etc.--distinguished from inductive reasoning and recognised as similar to deductive inferences of the first figure. The thought that a process of comparing enters into every act of knowledge meets with wide acceptance.

29. They could not fail to see that all these materials of the mental life will not yield knowledge until comparison has been brought to

bear upon them. Locke was well aware of the fact that he maintained that there can be no knowledge without discrimination. The rationalists were primarily concerned to prove that necessary truth cannot be obtained from experience, to establish the existence of innate ideas, and so on. But they, too, did not, by any means, overlook the necessity, for knowledge of discrimination. Leibniz fully agreed with Locke that 'without comparison there is no knowledge'; and he did not dwell on the part played by comparison in the process of knowing simply because he was engrossed with other problems, and was anxious to show that the necessity of comparison for knowledge in no way excludes innate ideas. Finally, the adherents of the critical philosophy have been doing their utmost to construct the known object by means of the forms of sense and the categories of the understanding. Yet they, also, admit that there can be no knowledge unless sensations, forms, and categories are distinguished from one another. Kant was constantly insisting that knowledge is a synthesis of the manifold. In the senction on the "Deduction of the Pure Notions of Understanding," he speaks of the conditions under which the manifold is represented as such. "Every presentation," he writes, "contains something manifold which could not be presented as such unless the mind distinguished the time in the succession of one impression after another; for, as contained in one moment, each presentation can never be anything else than absolute unity. In order, then, that out of this manifold there should be unity of intuition (as, for instance, in the presentation of space), it is necessary first to run through the manifold and then to hold it together. This synthesis of apprehension must also itself be carried out a priori, that is, with reference to presentations which are not empirical." Further on, after the

section on "Reproduction in Imagination," Kant speaks of the necessity of identifying with one another thoughts that occupy different moments in time. "Without our being conscious that what we are now thinking is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be in vain. Each presentation would, in its present state, be a new one, and in no wise belong to the act by which it was to be produced by degrees." Hence it is clear why, at the beginning of the "Deduction," Kant looks upon knowledge as forming a whole of presentations connected and compared with each other.

The contention that knowledge is an experience compared with other experiences would then, be granted by all these schools of thought. A difference would only manifest itself in regard to the question as to the transcendent character of the object apprehended. I contend that the experience which is being compared is the object apprehended, but according to the rationalists this experience is a copy of the object, and according to the empiricists (of the type of Locke) it is a symbol which serves in the mind as a substitute for the object.

It should be noted that, whatever view they may take of the real object, these philosophical thinkers are compelled to admit that the object apprehended, as it is in consciousness, must be an experience compared with other experiences, and must lie within the process of comparing itself.

30. When the assertion is made, "every event has a cause," the object referred to is a relation between events which is represented in consciousness by its symbol, namely, by a habitual sequence of sensations. Yet, for the act of knowing to take place, the symbol must be recognised, or, in other words, distinguished

from other symbols--from the unusual sequence of sensations, from substantiality, etc. Transcendent relations remain, according to this doctrine, for ever unknown, and in reality we know only symbols, only our own ideas. In other words, empiricists would be still more prepared than rationalists to subscribe to the statement that knowledge is an experience compared with other experiences.

31. If knowledge be, then, an experience compared with other experiences, and if the object apprehended be the experience that is being compared, it follows that the object is known as it is in itself. What is present in knowledge is not a copy, symbol, or appearance of the thing that is to be known, but the thing as it really exists.

32. The process of knowing the meaning of these terms must be more exactly determined. No ready-made conceptions of self and not-self ought to be used by a theory of knowledge which is to be free from dogmatic assumptions. Knowledge we have taken to be an experience compared with other experiences; the next thing is to compare the various kinds of processes, events, things etc., with one another, and to discover the fundamental distinction between them on the basis of which the world as a whole is divided into the world of the self and the world of the not-self.

33. Both rationalists and subjective idealists (e.g. Hume and Mill) thought that all experiences present in an individual consciousness belonged entirely to that particular self, the world of the not-self being absolutely cut off from the self. The subjective idealists were not in a position to draw any dividing line between the self and the not-self: all that the subject experiences is his self. Of the not-self he either knows nothing (Hume and Mill) or arrives

at a knowledge of it by means of duplicating certain experiences of the self. For instance, in the opinion of Descartes, when I perceive a ball, there arises in my mind the idea of the ball, while the real ball exists outside of my mind. According to Locke, when I see a red colour, the colour is in my mind, but in the external world there is something which produces this sensation.

34. Cognition of the external world is, then, a process one side of which takes place in the world of the not-self (the material knowledge) and of the other in the world of the self (the activity of attending and comparing.)

35. All the arguments in favour of the subjectivity of sensations amount in short to this--that it is self-contradictory to ascribe contents of sensation to things external to the human body, and that sensations alter in connection with changes in the human body. But these arguments merely prove that the content of sensations is not a process taking place in the object (the smell is not in the lily of the valley). Where, then, does it take place, i.e. in which group of events must it be included? Since they depend upon changes in the group of experiences which is called the body,and since any attempt to conceive of them as external to the body leads to contradiction, the conclusion must be drawn that sensation is a process which takes place within the body of the knowing subject.

36. It was argued that because the external world is known in experience through its effects upon the knowing subject, the subject experiences not the external world but his impressions of it; hence there is no knowledge of the external world, but only of subjective ideas or impressions.

37, Individualistic empiricism was, then,

driven to the conclusion that relations are produced by the knowing subject, and have therefore, no objective value for knowledge. It was compelled to regard as subjective that which is clearly experienced as coming from without.
38. The opposition between non-sensuous and empirical knowledge turns out to be a prejudice.
39. A philosophy which starts with a theory of knowledge must inevitably terminate in idealism, or even in solipsism.
40. It is stated as the conclusion and not as the starting point of the inquiry. In truth, however, it was present from the first in the traditional assumptions which constitute the hidden background of the Critique. These assumptions evince themselves as fatal for the Kantian theory of knowledge. Not merely do they deprive it of its critical character, they make it impossible of proof and even positively false, since they create for it an insoluble problem.
41. Kant maintains that the conditions of the possibility of experience cannot themselves be abstracted from experience--for how can we abstract from experience that which is necessary for any, even the most elementary, experience; the conditions of experience must therefore, be a priori conditions. This argument is decisive against the attempt made by Locke, Hume, Mill and other individualistic empiricists to derive from experience the conditions of experience. Thus, Hume imagined that causal relation substantive unity, and such like elements of scientific experience, are not originally contained in experience, but gradually arise in the human mind as a result of experience. To be more exact, the notion of causality in his view was not even derived from experience , but was for the first time created by it. Yet it is obvious that causal relation, substantive unity, etc. are conditions of the possibility

of all, even the most rudimentary, experience. Hume's position is, then, hopelessly contradictory: he maintains that experience brings about the conditions of its own possibility. It is clear, however, that this argument does not prove what Kant intends it to prove. It merely shows that those elements of knowledge which make experience possible cannot themselves be derived from experience; but it does not show that they spring from the understanding; they may be ultimate data of experience. In other words, this argument is decisive as against individualistic but not as against universalistic empiricism.

42. All Kant's arguments contain an element of truth. Indeed, his system as a whole is permeated with far-reaching reflexions which have become an integral part of many subsequent systems. Almost in every section of his exhaustive work Kant insists on these truths, and at the same time adds to them his ungrounded constructions. A close association is thus formed in the reader's mind between the two, and he gets into the habit of thinking that the acceptance of what is true in the philosophy of Kant involves the acceptance of all the specific peculiarities of the Kantian doctrine. This autosuggestion is not easily dispelled, especially as Kant's involved and sometimes vague arguments are difficult to analyse.

43. Kant's philosophy impoverishes the world; it unconsciously deprives the world of most of its contents. According to Kant, the world we know is appearance.

44. According to Kant, however, a phenomenon is not only a content of knowledge but is itself an intellectual construction, every part of which simply subserves the function of being an element in knowledge, and which is, apart from this function, devoid of all mean-

ing. Indeed, the contents of the world known to us consist, according to Kant, of nothing but sense-data, which would be a meaningless, disorderly, and lifeless mass were they not received into the forms of sense and arranged by the forms of the understanding which transform them into presentations and even into objects of experience. And these forms, in their turn, are lifeless and meaningless apart from their significance for knowledge. Particularly striking in this respect are the categories of substance and of cause. The everyday consciousness understands by them something living and real, something which has in itself no specially intellectual significance. By substance we mean the independent individuality, the ultimate core of being, and by causality we mean activity, expenditure of energy. No trace of this living significance is to be found in Kant's treatment. In his view substance and causality are merely the intellectual rules of a necessary, simultaneous or successive synthesis of sensations--rules by which sensations are built up into presentations with an objective significance. Thus, the syntheses of causality, substance, etc., are purely intellectual constructions and nothing more. The whole world, according to Kant, is a presentation all the elements of which exist merely in order to constitute that presentation. This is an extreme form of intellectualism, according to which the only process we know is the process of knowing.

45. It is no wonder that the followers of Kant do not draw back from the thought that the life of nature in all its richness and fulness is merely our presentation. Unconsciously following the truth, they mean by 'presentation' the world of actual existence. They overlook the fact that consistently with the Kantian doctrine they ought to mean by it something very different.

46. If Kant's view of knowledge be correct, it

would have to be admitted that the existence of other minds than my own cannot be proved; like the existence of God their existence could be, at best, only a matter of faith. Such a conclusion makes a philosophical system appear ridiculous to the 'plain man'; but to those who are familiar with the history of philosophy it will yield a new stimulus for thought and investigation.

47. Suppose, indeed, that Kant is right, suppose that the world I know is 'my' presentation, that it consists of 'given' matter (sensations) and of 'my' syntheses due to the spontaneity of my thought. How can such a world fall into two spheres--the world of self and the world of not-self, the inner and the outer world? All the "given" material, all sensations, taken as such, are, according to Kant, subjective. This constituent of knowledge, then, obviously does not form part of the external world; and the other constituent (the spontaneity of thought) is the very inner core of the conscious subject. It is next to impossible to extract from such constituents the world of the not-self. Kant's creative genius does not shrink even from this task, but his way of handling it involves contradictions and obscurities which escape notice only because of the ambiguity of the terms subject and object which he makes use of at every step. The words 'subject' and 'object' may stand for "the self" and "the external world" in so far as the latter consists of facts standing over against the former to be known. In that case, 'objective' means belonging to the external world, proceeding from it, having cognitive value in relation to it. The same terms may have, however, a different meaning. The word "subject" may denote the self as the bearer of knowledge and the word 'object' may denote the content of knowledge, whether forming part of the outer or of the inner

world (in that sense the object of knowledge may be, for instance, 'some mineral' or 'my emotion of anger'). In this case, 'objective' means belonging to the content of knowledge, proceeding from it, having cognitive value in relation to it, and 'subjective' means proceeding from the self, and from that sphere of it which has not and ought not to have any feature ascribable to the content of knowledge. Obviously the notions of objectivity in the first and second senses are related to one another as species to genus. To distinguish them, I shall refer to the two species of objectivity of inner experience and the objectivity of outer experience.

An examination of the Critique of Pure Reason will show that Kant did not clearly distinguish between these two things, and that instead of investigating the problem of objectivity in general he was mainly concerned with the objectivity of outer experience. Moreover, he was guilty of a further confusion. The fact that the character of objectivity attaches both to inner and to outer experience shows that the problem of objectivity cannot be identified with the problem of the externality of some experiences and of the subjectivity of others--with the question, namely, why we are aware of some elements of experience as forming part of the world of the not-self and of others as belonging to the world of the self.

48. It was a great merit of Kant to have recognised the erroneous character of all theories which take knowledge to consist in a correspondence between presentations and things external to the process of presenting, or, in other words, the erroneousness of all transcendent theories of knowledge. In order to render knowledge explicable, Kant saw that it was necessary to unite subject and object, to reconcile their opposition, and to do away with the

idea of any barrier between them. Nevertheless, his method still bears traces of the older systems of philosophy: he still maintains that real existences, real things, are external to the process of knowing. The barrier is removed only between the knowing subject and the thing as an appearance for the knowing subject. The reconciliation is further incomplete in the sense that to subject and object no equality of status is assigned. In the theories of Kant's predecessors, things were supposed to affect, to force themselves upon, the mind of the knowing subject. In Kant's view, on the contrary, the knowing subject creates objects--and creates them badly, for they prove to be nothing but appearances for the knowing subject, and to be devoid of independent existence.

49. If, however, the new principle be sufficiently far-reaching, it must result in a new system of thought which will include all that is true in the older modes of speculation, and, removing the barriers between them, absorb them into itself and reconcile their differences. In the second Part of the present work an attempt will be made to show that the new principle does not possess this power of reconciliation. But, like every far-reaching principle, it came first to light in a vague and unreflective guise, and was not, therefore, presented with the methodical fulness and clearness that are necessary for a general reconciliation.

50. They wanted to dispense with the minute sifting of facts and to reconstruct the whole system of knowledge at one stroke by means of the speculative method. They put before themselves and they actually solved problems which their predecessors had not dared to formulate; their genius created splendid systems of thought, full of imposing revelations. But their one-sided method and their unrestrained speculative

daring had a bad effect upon their philosophy. They undertook too much, they attempted to decide by pure intellectual intuition alone problems which can only be solved by the help of the telescope, the microscope, and the retort. Thus they discredited their great conceptions in the eyes of a public that could not distinguish between what was permanent therein and what was accidental. Owing to a temporary combination of circumstances they were at first put on a pedestal by the public, that had not as yet grown to their level, but soon they were cast down again, not because the masses of the people had outgrown their teaching, but because they had not yet learnt to understand it. Such a fall cannot be final; the influence of those teachers must be and is, in fact, beginning to be felt again in philosophical research.

51. Mystical Rationalism: Like all the successors of Kant, Fichte opposes the critical method to the method of dogmatism. Dogmatism is invalid because it starts with things in themselves, with things outside any consciousness and tries to effect a transition from these to intelligence,--a transition which is impossible. Critical philosophy disposes of all the insoluble problems that thus arise by putting the question in an entirely different way. It first inquires into the nature of intelligence, and seeks to explain by its structure the whole system of experience. This does not in the least imply that such enquiry will result in a system of presentations only, whilst real life remains in some unknown realm of things-in-themselves.

52. The critical philosophy had made it clear that there is no fundamental difference between inner and outer experience. The assertion, therefore, that there can be immediate knowledge of the life of the self was almost equivalent to the assertion that the world of the not-self can also be immediately known. Yet,

in pre-Kantian philosophy, and in all those systems of thought which preserve its typical characteristics, knowledge of the self was thought without any further discussion to be immediate, while knowledge of the not-self was, no less unreflectively, pronounced to be mediate.

53. There can be no dualism between subject and object, that there can be no reality transcending the processes of knowing--no things that exist somewhere beyond the known things and by affecting us provide the material content of our presentations.

54. Idealism often meets with ironical criticisms, such as the following: "The man whom I have just met thinks that he left his house of his own free will; how, then, is it possible that he should be in the street owing to my necessary constructive activity?" or "What a happy creature the idealist must be who can regard as his own the divine works of Plato, Sophocles and all other great minds."

55. Knowledge of finite things is knowledge of phenomena; but it is a mistake to imagine that phenomena exist for the knowing subject only. "According to Kant," says Hegel, "the things that we know about are to us appearances only, and we can never know their nature behind the phenomena. That nature belongs to another world which we cannot approach. Plain unprejudiced minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows: the things that we immediately know about are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature and without our interference; and these things, finite as they are, are appropriately described when we say that their being is established not on themselves but on the divine and universal Idea. This view of things, it is true,

is as idealist as Kant's; but in contradistinc-
tion to the subjective idealism of the critical
philosophy may be termed absolute idealism."
56. "My true inner essence," Schopenhauer writes,
"exists in every living being as immediately as
it reveals itself to me in my own self-knowledge.
This knowledge which in the Sanskrit is expres-
sed by the formula tat-twam asi, i.e. 'this thou
art' finds its realisation in compassion, which
is the basis of all true, that is, disinterested
virtue, and manifests itself in every good ac-
tion." "This is the reason why in the previous
chapter I called compassion the great mystery of
ethics." "I am well aware how paradoxical the
metaphysical interpretation of the ultimate fact
of ethics must appear to persons brought up upon
Western ideas."
57. Spencer is decidedly opposed to 'idealism,'
meaning thereby theories which reduce the whole
of the perceived external world to presentations
of the knowing subject. In his opinion realists
(philosophers who admit the independent reality
of the objects of perception) base their theory
upon the direct deliverances of consciousness
(upon perception) and idealists upon the in-
direct (upon reasoning). But the direct delive-
rances of consciousness have far more force than
the indirect, and the preference of the idealists
for the latter is a kind of superstition. "We
will assume that Kant's premisses are incontesta-
ble, and his conclusion irresistible. We will
assume that the space-consciousness and the time-
consciousness behave as he alleges, and that
therefore we must agree with him in saying that
they are forms of intuition." "Consider first
the thing affirmed--that Time and Space are
subjective forms, or properties of the ego. Is
it possible to realise the meaning of these words?
or are they simply groups of signs which seem to
contain a notion but really contain none? An

attempt to construct the notion will quickly show that the latter is the fact. Think of Space--of the thing, that is; not the word. Now think of self--of that which is conscious. Having clearly represented them, put the two together, and conceive the one as a property of the other. What results? Nothing but a conflict of two thoughts that cannot be united. It would be as practicable to imagine a round triangle. What then is the worth of the proposition?" "Among the many contradictions which anti-Realistic hypotheses involve, in the contradiction between the assertion that consciousness cannot be transcended and the assertion that there exists nothing beyond consciousness. For if we can in no way be aware of anything beyond consciousness, what can suggest either the affirmation or the denial of it? and how can even denial of it be framed in thought? The very proposition that consciousness cannot be transcended, admits of being put together only by representing a limit, and consequently implies some kind of consciousness of something beyond the limit."

58. Mansel, in whose opinion, "the Absolute and the Infinite are, like the Inconceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible."

59. The whole of Spencer's elaborate argument, starting originally from the fact that in primitive consciousness there is neither subject nor object, amounts in the end to the assertion that we cannot get rid of the thought of the existence of an external reality. In view of this result, it must be said that Spencer neither revolutionased the empirical theory of knowledge, as he had intended, nor did he set it on to the path of a realism that is epistemologically justifiable. If, on the supposition that all

cognitive processes are the individual mental states of the knowing subject, realism is proved to be simpler, clearer, more convincing than and prior to all other theories, this merely establishes its utilitarian and not its epistemological value. All that the proof would amount to is that I cannot help thinking in this way, and that it is the most practical way of thinking; but since these thoughts are merely my mental states, the existence of a reality external to me is never given in perception, i.e. in immediate experience.

60. In the process of making a statement two aspects must be distinguished--namely, the statement of a movement of the organs of speech and all the mechanical consequences of that movement and the content or the meaning of the statement, i.e. that to which the statement refers.

61. If any one were to consider 'the sefl' as a real unity, he could not escape the following dilemma. He would either have to contrast this unity with a world of unknowable entities, which would be absurd, or to regard the whole world, including other selves, simply as contained in his own self, which could hardly be seriously done by anyone." (Mach, Popular Scientific Essays P.131)

62. They insist that individual minds have a part of their contents in common. It is obvious that this "common and identical part of the contents of individual minds is independent of the individuals as such." It must, however, be the object of some mind; and if the individual minds as such are not its bearers, there is nothing left but to suppose that its bearer is a super-individual generic consciousness--"consciousness in general.' The objects of this super-individual ego are immediately given to the individual, because the individual participates in the generic consciousness and is, indeed, only a modification of it." --Schuppe, Grundriss der Erkenntnisstheorie und Logik.

63. They must, therefore, either side with solipsism and co-ordinate all objects with the individual self, or make the metaphysical assumption that there exists a cosmical self as the bearer of the external world.
64. It concludes that things exists only as contents of consciousness, and is thus led to an idealism of the intellectualistic type.
65. The term consciousness frequently bears with them the same significance as the term self. See Schuppe, Gurndriss, etc.
66. This subject "contains in itself nothing peculiar to me as a particular individual, and it is to this impersonal subject alone that the external world can be referred." It is clear, then, that "such consequences as that of solipsism" are utterly invalid, and that it is an error to speak of "the immediately given world as the content of my consciousness." --Rickert, Die Gernzen Der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, p.168.
67. Philosophical enquiry is only possible for those who believe that over and above their individual activity is the norm of what is universally binding, and are convinced that it may be discovered."
68. Regard compassion as a "mysterious phenomenon" which consists in the fact that "I have to a certain extent identified myself with another, and that, therefore, the barrier between the self and the not-self has for once been removed." Notwithstanding this feature, however, Solovyov's ethics differs fundamentally from the ethics of Schopenhauer; it is based not only upon the capacity of apprehending another person's suffering.
69. In Russia there has been hitherto no history of philosophy, no successive series of philosophic systems developing the one from the other, as in ancient Greece or in modern Germany. I am not without hope that mystic idealism (using the term

idealism in Plato's sense), which already has many followers in Russia, will be capable of such organic growth and development.

70. Knowledge is differentiation of the object by means of comparison.

71. I do not dispute the primary importance of the logical laws of thought as a criterion of falsity. But as a criterion of truth they are only applicable in the case of those judgments in which the predicate follows from the subject (or from the premisses) with analytic necessity. This is the reason why Kant confined the significance of the law of contradiction as a positive criterion of truth to the sphere of analytic knowledge.

72. The identity and the absence of contradiction which compel us to accept a given judgment can only be constituted in relation to a truth which has been already firmly established. Hence it is clear that an ultimate truth or ultimate truths cannot be discovered simply by means of perceiving identify or absence of contradiction.

73. It is clear that although the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle compel us to choose between the two assertions, they are unable to indicate which assertion we must adopt. To determine where the truth lies, another and more ultimate criterion is needed.

74. We need now simply recapitulate our results. If truth be neither a copy of the real world, nor a symbolic reproduction of it, nor an appearance of the real world determined by the laws of cognitive activity, if it be the reality itself in so far as it is discriminated, there can be no other criterion of truth than the presence in the act of knowing of the reality to be known.

75. We possess an infallible test of truth, and yet what we call our knowledge is full of errors. The fault is our own. Under the influence of emotions, habits, thoughtlessness, etc. we repeated-

ly accept propositions (or, rather, combinations of ideas) as true which are in obvious conflict with the criterion of truth. Or, at other times, we do not refrain from forming a judgment, although, owing to the content being still undifferentiated, the criterion gives no definite indication as to the truth of such judgment, or at any rate as to the truth of some part of it. If these are the sources of error, it may be said with certainty that honest seeking almost always leads us ultimately to the truth, although it may not be the complete truth. In order to become perfectly true, our judgments usually stand in need of much correction, or, more, frequently, of limitation or expansion. And the history of science entirely confirms these reflexions.

76. When one and the same verbal expression of a complex proposition stands in the mind of one person for some one definite content and in the mind of another for a content somewhat different. In such cases, the one person will often affirm the proposition with a full sense of the objectivity of his affirmation, whilst the other will deny it with an equally clear consciousness of the objectivity of his denial. The possibility of such a conflict in no way detracts from the value of the universal criterion of truth. For the opponents are not talking about one and the same thing, but about two different things. Were they to analyse the complex content of their judgments they would see that they were both right--or that one of them was wrong in the sense of speaking of what was not in any way relevant to the matter under discussion.

This source of error in complex judgments is familiar enough. But as it throws a great deal of light on the nature of axioms and on the process of their evolution, we will linger on the subject a little longer and cite the case

of a conflict which has long ago been settled by science and which has been handled in philosophical literature. In the time of Columbus some persons admitted the existence of the antipodes and others denied their existence. To us the denial is perfectly intelligible. In speaking of the antipodes the opponents of Columbus imagined men subject to the action of a force which pulled them away from the earth's surface and which, therefore, made their remaining on the earth impossible. It is obvious that such antipodes are as unthinkable now as they were then, for the fall of the people from the earth's surface clearly arises before the mind's eye and is an inevitable consequence of the premises assumed at the start. And indeed, strictly speaking, many persons of the present day, who cannot help imagining the people at the antipodes as men who are underneath us, have not really grasped the new conception. If they were true to the content of their ideas, they ought to return to the denial of the antipodes. Only those who clearly realise that the feet of the people at the antipodes cling to the earth, so to speak, with the same force as our feet do, can be said to hold the scientific view and to have banished the idea that the people at the antipodes walk with their heads downward. In this case, again, the representation we form of the antipodes is inevitably present consequence of the premises on which we have been proceeding.

It is, then, clear that when there is a conflict between two complex conceptions, the criterion of truth cannot give us any definite indication so long as each concept is taken as a whole, in a rough and undifferentiated form. But if the concepts in question are analysed into their elements, it will be seen that in the one case the force of gravitation is thought of as directed towards the surface and the cen-

tre of the earth (the vague idea of 'below' being thus differentiated), and in the other as directed outwards from the earth's surface. And it becomes at once apparent that the content of the first idea is objectively present, whilst the content of the second has been arbitrarily brought by us into relation with the given facts. The consequence of this second idea is therefore (to some extent) a result of our own activity and not of the reality itself which is there to be known.

From the same instance it is likewise evident why judgments of direct perception are not alone sufficient for knowledge. In most cases the content of the reality apprehended turns out to be so complex that we cannot clearly discriminate all the elements and relations of it at once, and we run the risk of taking for objective reality the products of our own creative imagination and subjective relating activity. If, then, even judgments of direct perception cannot, without further elaboration, be relied upon, predictions based solely upon them must be still more untrustworthy, although, in the form of an indirect perception which anticipates what lies beyond the directly apprehended reality, they are quite possible. In order, therefore, to discriminate with perfect definteness what elements of the real world are actually before us, and in what relation, it is necessary to analyse reality to its inmost depths, making the differentiation more and more complete, and thus helping to free the objectively given content from subjective additions.

77 It does not take phenomena to be mere presentations, and it refuses to regard the bonds of relation in the phenomenal world as due to the cognitive activity. The last-mentioned contention does not prevent us from describing the world of finite things as phenomenal, but obviously the term must be understood in a sense

quite different from the way in which it was understood in the critical philosophy. The term, in truth, indicates a certain relation of the world of finite things not to the individual knowing subject but to the Absolute.

"SANKARA AND HIS MODERN INTERPRETERS" by S. VITTALA SASTRI. @@

It has been the misfortune of Sankara, like some of the great philosophers of the world, to be misunderstood by his own followers. As interpreted to-day, Sankara is responsible for a peculiar speculative system of which he is perfectly innocent.

Almost all presentations of Sankara's system whether by the commentators or by translators, whether by adverse critics influenced by the later Bhashyakaras or by independent appreciative exponents guided by oriental scholars now speak of the Mayavada as the Central doctrine of Advaita. Advocates of Sri Sankara seem to talk enthusiastically in defence of what is known as the Moolavidya or Maya which they evidently regard as the very corner-stone of the system, while the opponents appear to feel no less nervous at the very mention of the word. It may be said that for some centuries back a fierce fight has been raging around this chimerical principle "Moolavidya" on which apparently Sankara is supposed to have staked his all.

And yet, it would appear, that that great thinker knew nothing whatever of this wonderful Moolavidya. Translations of almost all the genuine works of Sankara are now available, and one searches in vain in his great Bhashyas to find even the faintest trace of such a doctrine. More than ten years ago, Br.Sri.Y. Subrahmanya Sarma threw, in his Sankara Hridaya or Moolavidya-Nira-

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@@ Substance of lecture read before the Indian Philosophical Congress, Madras 1940.

sa, a challenge to Sanskrit scholars to produce a single quotation from Sankara, or at least to adduce cogent reasons, in support of this blessed theory, and that remains unanswered till today. He has very recently brought out a Kannada book discussing this point at length and showing the utter hollowness of the contention that Sankara ever countenanced this ruinous stop-gap devised by later Vedantins.

It would be necessary to examine this Moolavidya doctrine a little in detail in order to distinguish it from the genuine doctrine of Avidya taught by Sankara. Now two teachings could be so dissimilar as the theories of Avidya or Moolavidya. For Sankara, Avidya means no more and no less than the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-self and the mistaken transference of the characteristics of each to the other. This superimposition and transference is, according to him, due to a natural tendency in man which can be rooted out only by the realisation of the Advaita or the one Highest Reality without a second. The philosophic grandeur and significance of this theory cannot be explained, I fear, in the space of a short paper like this. I shall therefore content myself with the remark that Sankara relies entirely on facts of life and experience to show how our real self as witness of the three states: (Avasthas) waking, dream and deep sleep, transcends all limitations and in in fact the metaphysical reality in search of which all philosophy has been at work ever since man began to think.

In perfect contrast with this, is the Moolavidya theory bolstered up by the neo-Vedantins in the name of Sankara. They have quietly assumed the oneness of Reality and to account for the plurality experienced in life, they postulate a primeval nescience, the Moolavidya which is the cause of all phenomena including the superimposition of the self and the not-self referred

to above. This Avidya is Root-ignorance (in that) it is the cause, the material cause, that gives rise to all the various ignorance attaching to individuals in every day life. It is not my ignorance or your ignorance, but the Universal beginningless Ignorance, residing in Brahman or pure consciousness and it is called Avidya, because it is admitted to be sublated by Vidya or the knowledge of Brahman.

One detects here at once the influence of the realistic Sankhya, for the conception of cause so naively introduced militates against the strictly nondualistic teaching of the Upanishads according to Gaudapada and Sankara who have shown the untenability of all causation whatever from the highest standpoint of Vedanta. But our friends have carefully glossed over their theory of causation so that it may not offend against the feelings of any conscientious followers of Sankara. This cause Moolavidya it is averred, is not transcendentally real but only empirically so, and even as such, it neither is nor is not. Again it is not distinct from Brahman in which case it would militate against the oneness of Reality nor is it identical with Brahman seeing that it serves as the cause of the phenomenal world. The causal Avidya being thus indescribable in nature, its effect embracing the stream of superimpositions on the one hand and the objective world on the other, partakes of its nature also and is equally indescribable. Hence, it is claimed, the possibility of the total disappearance of Avidya and all its effects at the dawn of knowledge.

Is there any one thing in the world which we can all recognize as being indescribable effect of indescribable Avidya? For if we do find actual instances of effects of indescribable Avidya sublatable by knowledge, then there may be some justification for a theory which holds

that the whole Universe is the effect of Avidya. Advocates of Moolavidya had to face this question at the very start, and so they set about revising and recasting the problem of Appearance and Reality as well as that of Truth and Error so as to suit their system. The nature of illusion and error in particular has exercised all their imagination and the conclusion they arrived at is certainly as ingenious as the original theory which it was meant to amplify. The question was where have we got any instance of an indescribable thing sublatable by knowledge? And the answer is that both error and illusion, such for instance as we confront in the experience of silver in nacre are of that categories. In the first place they are neither being nor non-beings: for if either the silver or its notion were being, it would not have been sublated, and if it were non-being, it would never appear. It is therefore an indescribable entity and being a temporary effect requires a cause, a material cause of exactly a similar nature. Incidentally the Moolavidyavadin is led to a consideration of the theory of cause and he finally comes to the conclusion that nothing which is not beginningless can be actually a cause, and that therefore only the beginningless indescribable Avidya is the cause of both error and illusion. This is certainly a jump and we are naturally landed in a number of controversies. In the first place, we have to be convinced that illusion is an effect desiderating a material cause, and in the second it has got to be shown how we are compelled to trace it to a beginninless Avidya which no one has ever experienced in life. Moreover, the consideration, that no one feels that a sort of silver was actually born during the time of error and both error and illusion were actually destroy-

ed by the knowledge is alone enough to make this theory bereft of all value. But all grantings allowed, would not this involve the repugnant position that each time we are deluded into the belief that nacre is silver and correct ourselves by subsequent reflection of truth, a particle of Avidya is being destroyed? And considering the countless number of errors and illusions that are destroyed by knowledge every moment in this world, would it not follow that the causal material called Avidya is diminishing minute by minute and so tends to vanish in course of infinite time?

Even supposing for argument's sake that such is not the cause, the doctrine is faced with another insurmountable difficulty of a more serious nature. How are we to be sure, that knowledge will disperse all ignorance of this type? Is there any enlightened soul who has got rid of all avidya and who can point out to us the way of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman? This natural question put to the advocates of Moolavidya makes them very uncomfortable. For, if one has completely annihilated Avidya he cannot perceive our world which is admittedly the effect of Avidya and if there be no enlightened teacher who can prove the truth of Vedanta to us, unity of Brahman would be no more than an undemonstrable dogma. An escape from the horns of this dilemma is impossible, but the followers of Moolavidya were undaunted. They made an immediate alliance with the mystics, the followers of Yoga and boldly affirmed that Avidya is destroyed in Nirvikalpa Samadhi or the highest trance. It will be remembered that this root-Avidya is held to be present in all three States (Avasthas) waking, dream and sleep; only it takes a potential condition in deep sleep and becomes kinetic as soon as we awake. The persistence of Avidya in all the three states, therefore, de-

siderates some other special state in which it may be safely declared to be absent and so these thinkers thought it best to identify the Thuriya of the Upanishads with the Samadhi of the Yogins. Thus all difficulty is solved, Avidya is finally seen to be destroyed by Samadhi and till one attains that condition, it may with impunity, be held responsible for all plurality.

But this is only an escape from the frying pan to the fire. For even so, there is no escape from this dreaded Avidya. If a man who gets this trance awakes from it, he does so along with Moola Avidya which alone can create a world; but if he goes to final Samadhi never to rise again, there is left no one to testify to the truth of Vedanta.

To last link in this chain of the Moolavidya argument, has got to be mentioned now. We have seen that this undesirable Moolavidya haunts man throughout his life and shows it's cloven hoof even subsequent to his mystic trance. So to avoid its reappearance, the doctrine of "Avidya-Lessa" a trace of Avidya, is pressed into service. It is affirmed that although Moolavidya is mostly destroyed by Samadhi, to the teacher who awakes from it is left just such a trace of Moolavidya as would suffice for perception and commerce with the world. From his own view, even this perception is illusory, and when finally he shuffles off the mortal coil he becomes a full-pledged Mukta or released soul never more to return to this transmigratory life. Should it be still objected that traces or parts of such a principle as Moolavidya are inconceivable in as much as it is not material, there is the Anirvachniya-Vada--the doctrine of indescribability ever ready to hand. Parts of Moolavidya are as indescribable as Moolavidya itself and so no logical difficulty need worry us.

This is in brief the Moolavidya theory piously fathered upon the great Sankara. A full account of all the various branches of this scholastic line of thought that are current today, is neither possible nor desirable here. Even a brief account of the historical origin and growth of this doctrine, interesting as it would be, has to be postponed chiefly in consideration of the short time at our disposal. But I hope that sufficient information has been given in this paper to persuade any one that this teaching is as different from Sri Sankara's as tinsel is from gold. At the very commencement, it assumes the unity of non-dualistic Brahman (with individuals) which has got to be proved, and to explain away the plurality universally perceived, it conjures up the ghost of Moolavidya from whose clutches it wriggles and wriggles to extricate itself by various means till at last it is forced to declare that final release is possible only after death.

As I have already stated, it is not altogether hopeless to rescue the genuine doctrine of Advaita taught by Sankara from its obscurity since we have abundant material for this purpose in his great Bhashyas.

My own version of his philosophy as gathered from these sources cannot, as I have already said, be set forth at any great length here. But I have here pointed out the one key which ensures access to Sankara's system which would otherwise be altogether unintelligible. Passages about in Sankara's Bhasyas where he is never tired of repeating that Adhyasa or Mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self is the only Avidya which is in our way of realising the truth. We are all apt to overemphasise that aspect of the Self where it appears to be actually conscious, where one inevitably transfers the characteristics of the mind to oneself. The Self,

however, ever remains in its pristine purity transcending all individuality, personality or plurality in spite of this Avidya, for the simple reason that mistaken notions can never affect facts. Sankara therefore appeals to universal experience and following the great Upanishadic Seers like Yajnavalkya and Uddalaka, shows that an examination of the three states of consciousness discloses the absolute identity of the witnessing consciousness in each one of us with Brahman or Absolute self. For a detailed account of the method of enquiry he proposes, I beg to refer to his Bhashyas on the Vedanta Sutras, the Brihadaranyaka and the Chandogya.

In the meanwhile I earnestly beg of you to consider whether it were not high time that we all ceased to disgrace ourselves by unjustly imputing this unphilosophic teaching to the great Sankara who never dreamt of entertaining it for a moment.

PRIVATE INTERVIEW WITH MR. Y. SUBBA RAO (Y. SUBRAHMANYA SARMA) on 17th February, 1941.

1. Idealism is not taught in Vedanta. In none of the systems of Vedanta is idealism taught, even including non-dualistic advaita. Nor is there any other doctrine in Vedanta similar to Idealism.
2. The whole world as Mind? No such thing in Vedanta! Sankara does not teach this.
3. The analysis of meaning of words: this semantic doctrine of meaning is foreign to us in India. Only whether a word can express reality is taught, but nothing more.
4. Brahman: The best English equivalent to this word is Highest Reality: Infinite or Absolute.
5. Brahman cannot be translated or taken as universal mind.
6. Brahman can be called neither conscious or unconscious. No relation can be established

between conscious and unconscious. Brahman is not conscious, not conscious of anything, not even of itself. There is nothing of which it can be conscious. I am basing my answers on Sankara's works.
7. Brahman is not consciousness, but also it is not unconsciousness. You may more accurately call it non-consciousness.
8. Whenever there is consciousness there must be individuality, ego. The two rise and fall together.
9. The goal and aim of Vedanta is to realise the truth and be free of the sad consequences of ignorance.
10. There is no relation between ego and reality. Ego does not exist in the real sense. Ego does not exist in reality. No relation between individuality and reality exists. If you ask how you perceive the reality, questions can be asked and answered from the relative point only. No purpose will be served since we cannot know what Brahman is. Brahman does not know Brahman as itself. Brahman, we cannot know. But we have to discuss about Brahman. Therefore it is placed somewhere from our standpoint, just as you would be talking about this book or that thing etc. In all questions about Brahman we have taken for granted that there is the world of relation. We may say, we may talk of Brahman, we may be discussing Brahman, knowledge of Brahman etc. All this belongs to discussions of knowing as a process which can be put into language. As such an individual who knows the truth, he has to talk in the world of relation. When I say that I know Brahman I am talking from the relational world.
11. Philosophy is thinking. There are two levels of thinking. The lower and ordinary process is the general method of thinking in

terms of conceptual consciousness. Another is the result of the intuition we have of things, what we directly feel. You may call it inner experience or direct experience--e.g. intuition of sleep--implies intuition. When we are thinking about thinking what is the basis on which we stand? Before we can talk of thinking as such there is already its intuitional basis. Do you make it an object of thought and what is the subject from which we are judging about thought as such? Thinking presupposes a mind. How can we say there is another thinker behind it? What is the basis which enables us to talk of this or that before we are enabled to think. How are these assertions and denials made? Something is there with which we have to observe thinking when we make these assetions about it. With what do we observe? It cannot be thinking itself. That is what I meant by intuition. Intuition is a wider term than mere feeling. It is deeper. It is not special to any individual. Every human being is capable of intuiting. We proceed from intuition. Intuition is basis of all thinking. Intuition is thinking in itself, pure thinking as opposed to conceptual thinking, without reference to thought.

12. Samadhi is a level of the mind, the highest level--but strictly speaking we can't say this is higher, that is higher still etc. Intution realisation is not relational. Samadhi is shutting all thought of relational world from the absolute standpoint. It is just like forgetting or closing the eyes from the external world. In this sense it is akin to and no better than deep sleep.

Vedanta places yoga at the beginning, not at the end. It can be called a preparation because it disciplines the mind--helps to get what is called Satwic mind which can realise or glimpse philosophic truth better than

the ordinary mind. But yoga cannot be said to be essential to philosophy for some men are born with Satwic mind so that they need no yoga. Just as you read prescribed texts for passing examination, but for general reading you need not confine yourself to any text book but read what you like so also yoga, as well as religious rituals and ethics is to get the proper frame of mind. Religion is not Vedanta although no irreligious man can know Vedanta. It is another sort of elementary training of the mind. Afterwards you can have yoga or religion as it will not stand in the way of realisation or of philosophic studies. A philosopher has nothing to gain either by sticking to any practice or has nothing to lose by leaving them.

13. Vedanta gives the highest good in all states of life. It gives the truth and reality of everything in the world. Even when a partial truth is known, e.g. science or things like that, a man acts in a way which is different from one who does not know it, i.e. in a better way. Therefore when the whole truth is known i.e. he gets gnan, he will act so that his actions will be good for all.

14. Truth can be defined as knowledge of highest reality. Reality is that which is un-deniable. The term "uncontradictable" has a limitation; "undeniable" will be a better word.

15. Philosophy is open to all. It is not esoteric, and never has been kept hidden. Those who want it study it; that is all.

16. Commentaries of Sankara contain a mixture of discussions, accounts of rituals upasanas, etc. as philosophy comprehends all. One must pick out the highest philosophy from the treatments of various other things in the Upanishads.

17. Gaudapada's Mandukya Karika is the best book because it alone deals in pure philosophy proper. Even there, there is some relationalism.

For it cannot be helped as long as we have to discuss and talk. No book has ever been written on pure philosophy alone. The Indian mind felt no need for it either.

18. Ashtavakra Samhita has got no special value. It is an ordinary book. We do not find the most important point in it, i.e. about Avasthatraya. The Brihad Upanishad and Gauda-pada's karika do give it.

19. We can only by inference say whether one is a gnani. How to see whether one is a Gnani or not? From his characteristics! In Gita and other books it is stated the Gnani will have certain characteristics, e.g. he has Satvic qualities etc. If you think one has got those characteristics we may infer that he has got gnana, but it will be unproven for only a gnani can know another. It is not necessary to a gnani to be travelling. He may be anywhere, even in caves or ashrams, no restriction what-ever. All that can be said is that all his actions will tend for the general good of the world.

H.H. THE MAHARAJA OF BARODA: @@

I have to thank you for the cordial reception you have given me. When I received the kind invitation of your committee to give me the inaugural address of your Congress, I felt, as I still feel, that this honour and this task should rightly fall upon one one eminent in the world of academic scholarship. But, having throughout my adult life taken such opportu-nities that have offered themselves to me to acquaint myself with the rudiments of philoso-phy, I thought that on this occasion you might be willing to forego a technical discourse, and to consider the philosophical reflections of one

@@ PROCEEDING OF THE 3RD INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 1927: OPENING ADDRESS.

whose duties in life have been closely associated with social administration and social science.

Further reflection made me welcome such an occasion as this to draw your attention, and that of thinking Indians generally, to some urgent demands of the life of our race and of our time. It has all too frequently been said: Philosophy bakes no bread. It has all too frequently been charged against philosophers that their reflections are remote from the facts of ordinary life and have little or no bearing upon it. I wish to challenge the necessity of such a view. I maintain that philosophy, rightly understood, may have very important effects on practical social advance. I maintain that philosophy, rightly understood, is a vital and fundamental factor in social progress. And, Gentlemen, speaking from this chair, I trust that I may be voicing your convictions also concerning the significance of philosophy. Our deliberations should not simply be of value to our fellow men beyond this small circle; they should have genuine practical importance.

This history of philosophy, in the East as in the West, contains many examples of its influence on the development of civilisation. Sometimes it is suggested that that was when philosophy had not the severely technical character which it claims to have to-day. But, surely, the increased care, the greater regard to method, the undogmatic spirit, with which philosophy is now studied, should make it more not less valuable for human life. Many great philosophers in the past did bring philosophical reflection to the solution of practical problems, and thinkers to-day are called upon to consider such problems in the light of philosophy. But before indicating the directions in which, in India, philosophy ought to have an influence on social progress

at the present time, I would ask your attention to some preliminary considerations.

Let us turn our attention to the study of philosophy in Indian Universities as it is, and as it might be. What has been the nature of the requirements during the last forty or fifty years from our students who have wished to qualify for a degree in philosophy? Is it not true that in the past, and even now, more often than not a student might obtain a degree in philosophy without showing any knowledge of the philosophy which has originated and developed in his own country among his own people? Is there any other civilised country with a philosophical heritage in which such a condition exists? We all know the cause of this condition in India. Our Universities were for long dominated by Europeans, who, drawing up courses of study, kept to the philosophy of the West which was the only philosophy most of them knew anything about. We need not suppose that they deliberately aimed at the substitution of Western systems for the systems of India. It is probable that even the idea of Indian philosophy did not occur to most of them when they were occupied in drafting University requirements on lines parallel with those in Britain. Gentlemen, if we are to get a proper understanding of our historical tradition and of the underlying principles of our civilisation this state of affairs must be definitely changed. Some of our Universities are introducing changes in the right direction, and I hope and believe that this Philosophical Congress represents also a movement towards remedying this defect.

Two main reasons have been urged for the limitation of the study for philosophical degrees in India chiefly or entirely to Western philosophy. They merit a brief reference here. It is pointed out that the classical expositions of

Indian philosophical thought, Vedantic, Jaina, and Buddhistic, are in Sanskrit, Pali, or some form of Prakrit. It is then maintained that few students in the Universities have that sound knowledge of these languages necessary for efficient study. The reply to this contention is clear and definite. It is through English that the Indian student is called upon to study philosophical classics originally written in German, French and Greek, of which languages he usually knows nothing. His general intellectual environment and tradition ought to enable the Indian student to acquire, even through English a more intimate understanding and knowledge of Indian thought than that of the West. In view of the linguistic difficulties and the differences among Sanskrit scholars as to the interpretation of Indian philosophical classics, it may be better for most students to use translations by efficient scholars than to trust to the sort of elementary knowledge of Sanskrit they may reasonably acquire. Those who can qualify themselves linguistically should study the original texts and interpret them for their less well equipped fellows.

There is another reason why attention is directed to Western thought and away from that of India. It is claimed that the study of Western systems gives a more thorough philosophical training. Western thought is essentially critical, systematic, logical; marked by the rigour of its method, by its effort for accuracy and clearness. Though it may not always reach the standard demanded by Descartes, the Father of Modern Philosophy in the West; "Define all terms and prove all propositions"--it aims at absolute freedom of though and the utmost clarity of expression. There is no need for me to bring forward evidence of the great achievements of Western thinkers inspired by these aims. Contrasted with them, it is undeniable that the thought of

the East manifests much dogmatism, is very largely lacking in system, and often indefinite in its method. Unfortunately, to the want of sound logical sequence of ideas, must be added all too frequent obscurity of expression. Sometimes it seems as though such obscurity was cultivated in order to produce a greater impression of mystery.

Yet criticisms of this kind by no means justify the neglect of Indian philosophy. They do not involve that the ideas contained in it are of little or no value. There are good grounds for maintaining that both in its ideas and in its methods Indian philosophy contains much that is of importance and genuine worth. These criticisms indicate the need for its study rather than justify its neglect. What is really required, is that Indian students shall train their minds in accordance with the high standard of accuracy and logical precision found in the West, and study and systematise those contents of Indian classical literature which are worth preserving. In short, we should aim at a combination of Western clarity and logic with Eastern comprehensiveness and profundity.

This aim leads to important considerations of detail as to the study of philosophy in India. Here it is possible to indicate only the main directions of these. In the first place in our Universities and among educated people generally there should be definite attention to the history of Indian philosophy. It is a happy sign of the beginning of a movement in this direction that within recent years a few important books on this subject have been published. I need only mention the History of Indian Philosophy by Dr. Das Gupta eminent for its accurate scholarship; that of Professor Radhakrishnan, impressive by its broad sweep, and the systematic study of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy by Dr. Barua.

The history of Indian philosophical thought is not only interesting in itself. The vigour of its best periods in the past should provide us with an inspiring lesson in opposition to the stagnant acquiescence in tradition which has characterised our intellectual life for centuries. The Vedas, though they contain the beginnings of Indian philosophical reflection, were, after all, mainly compilations for use in connection with religious worship. In the Aranyakas there is a slight step forward; in them philosophical reflections are gathered together with some freedom from the symbolism and ritual that dulled thought in the times both of the Vedas and the Brahmanas. This movement towards independence and freedom of thought involves a great and important principle, which has striven for recognition at various times in our history, and is in great need of recognition and expression to-day.

The transition to the Upanishads was a truly remarkable advance in this direction. They reveal an independence in the raising of problems and of freedom in the search for solutions, which can be paralleled only in the early philosophy of Greece. The Upanishads may not have so direct a practical bearing as the writings of Plato and Aristotle, with their interest in the life of man as an individual and a social being; none the less they have more than a theoretical interest. They include a variety of views. With an appreciation of the fundamental problems of existence, they discuss questions concerning the self, the world of nature, and God. What is chiefly important for us to notice here is the fact that dogmatism of a later orthodox type is absent. The appeal is to the intelligence of man, not to the authority of sacred texts. Time is too short for us to linger on the contents of these genuine efforts of our early thinkers. They

have long awaited exposition by an Indian inspired by the Indian spirit, equipped with knowledge of Sanskrit, and a mind disciplined by Western methods of research. I am glad to welcome in Professor Ranade's recent masterly work on the Upanishads what we have so long awaited.

Nevertheless, as Prof. Ranade's work amply reveals, the Upanishadic thinkers had not yet learnt to think very systematically. They jump from facts to symbols, from the rational consideration of ideas to poetic interpretations of religious rites. But more systematic thought, inspired no doubt by the intellectual freedom of the Upanishads, began to spring up in many directions. Some of these movements associated themselves with particular religious cults which may have been of older standing. We see, for example, the rise to greater clearness of view of the more theistic tendencies which may be grouped as Vaishnavism. Then, in quite a different direction, Jainism, whatever its origin may have been, championed a philosophic movement which tended to purify life from much of its brutality, and vigorously opposed the destruction of life too often associated with religious rites, maintaining that by his own inner personal effort the individual must strive for the attainment of the ideal. From its opposition to Brahmanical ceremonialism and social oppression, and from its criticism in general, much may be learnt of the conditions of India at the time of its rise into prominence. Later, Buddhism arose and spread over a great part of India, striving to free the life of men from mistaken endeavours and false hopes. Intellect, which had manifested its freedom in the Upanishads, had tended to become its own idol; it seemed to set up powerless and futile abstractions and to distract attention from the pressing problems of suffering and evil. With much intellectual insight

and psychological knowledge on its own part, Buddhism wished to turn the attention of men from metaphysical abstractions to the ethical. It opposed socially useless ritual, irrational ascetic self-torture, and the cruelty of animal sacrifices. In principle, it virtually undermined the idea of caste. Buddhism not only placed ethics in the forefront as opposed to intellectualism and ceremonialism; it also inspired a great and marvellous artistic activity. Jainism suffered enormously by political opposition and persecution. Buddhism became swamped and in part absorbed by the surrounding cults. Its tendency to promote an excessive number of monks and nuns led to a divorce from ordinary social activities, with the consequence of rapid decay in face of the political disturbances which began through widespread and repeated invasions. The emphasis placed both by Jainism and Buddhism upon the ideas of karma and samsara has given these a decided prominence in later Indian thought.

It is not possible for me here to describe the important intellectual analysis and speculation in the philosophical system of Samkhya. Both it and the practical system of Yoga had marked effects on Jainism and Buddhism, and their influence has continued on Indian life and thought right up to our own times. The yoga system in its essence is a series of practical means to be adopted as a preliminary to the attainment of the highest knowledge. Its later forms have degenerated and become mixed with superstition, associated with claims to supernatural powers, claims usually assumed in order to impress the ignorant. Here there seems a great need of purging, of purification by renewed philosophical criticism. What the yoga system may have to teach us as to the preparation for the attainment of true philosophic

insight needs to be dissociated from the fantastic and the magical.

Advance in intellectual systematisation has led to the compilation of a sort of epitome of Upanishadic teaching in the so-called material, systematic and unsystematic, often as an ethical kind, eventually became grouped together in the epics, especially the Mahabharata. One line of thought reached a definitive statement in the philosophy of Sankaracharya, especially in his commentaries on the Brahma-Sutras and the Bhagavadgita. Other varying expressions took shape in the works of Ramanujacharya and Madhavacharya. I venture to believe that there was much that was reactionary in the works of Sankara. Be that as it may, this at least seems true, that the philosophy associated with his name has become a form of Indian scholasticism which still continues. Since the time of Sankaracharya and that of his great opponents, philosophy in India has rarely been able to free itself from the limitations of a merely deductive method. This characteristic of the Indian mental life of the past--and incidentally of much of our mental life to-day--merits closer consideration and exemplification.

It is not here a question of the methods that were adopted by the great leaders of Indian philosophical and religious thought. They used methods of independent investigation, to a large extent introspective, and always with a large amount of unfettered reflection. Not so their disciples and successors. They have accepted teaching from the guru, and more often than not have treated it dogmatically. Their own reflection has been a form of deductive inference of what they supposed the received teaching to imply. In later times the Indian systems of philosophy have thus been elaborated with an increasing divorce from real problems,

from the world of facts and from the demands of social advance. To express the situation briefly: Indian philosophy is still scholastic; it has not yet had its Descartes or its Bacon.

The movements which have arisen in later centuries have been of various kinds, revolts from mere formalism, intellectual and religious, and from caste prejudices and oppression. They have rarely if ever risen to eminence with regard to their philosophical productivity; they can hardly be said to have directed themselves to philosophical reflection. The vast masses of the population of India, including to a very large extent the so-called educated, have continued and continue in a condition of intellectual inertia. It is this intellectual stagnation which permits them to acquisce in doctrines and practices from which they should be free.

There have been influences at work in later thought in India which it is well we should recognise. For example, the influence of Islam has probably been felt in those movements such as the rise of Sikhism and of the Kabir-panth, in emphasising a monotheistic attitude. On the other hand it is probable that in some directions forms of Hindu thought have tended to strengthen mystic strains in Islam. An actual study of the sources reveals how both Islam and Christianity had a share in leading to the type of thought found in the Brahmo Samaj. These are merely suggestive examples of the different forces at work moulding our intellectual life.

The student of philosophy in India most definitely requires to make an adequate study of the philosophy of the West. While he may not embark upon it with the object of systematic comparison of East and West, as is suggested by M. Masson-Oursel in his Comparative Philosophy, the main steps of the history of philosophy should be compared. If that is done, I think we shall see

ample justification for our view that strictly Indian philosophy still remains somewhat in the same sort of position as Western scholasticism. If that is so, then we have especially to learn from those later stages of Western thought which have enabled it to escape from scholastic formalism and stagnation. We have to learn the nature of its critical, analytical, and inductive methods and train ourselves to apply them.

The study of Western philosophy in these later centuries will reveal to us how great an extent it has used inductive methods. This constitutes a distinct contrast with what has been described as the essentially deductive character of prevailing Indian philosophical thought. As a consequence of this inductive method--according to which facts are studied in search for any principles which may describe them or their relations--philosophy in the West calls for attention to that wide and varied knowledge which is systematised in the sciences. Indian philosophical thinkers, instead of occupying themselves merely with the interpretation of ancient sastras, need to embark upon study of these natural sciences as a part of their instruction and training.

What we have to look for, therefore, in the study of philosophy in India to-day is a broad acquaintance and knowledge of both Indian and Western philosophy, and some understanding of their methods with some ability to apply them. From such two-sided education we should hope for genuine philosophical advance in India. There are different ways in which this may be promoted. On the basis of such training Indian scholars may restate the problems of philosophy and endeavour to solve them in modern terms. This has one disadvantage: apparently it does not preserve a continuity of Indian philosophical thought. It cannot have that close assodiation with life in India which is so much needed.

A more satisfactory way for Indians on Indian soil is to investigate the real meaning and value of those ideas from India's philosophic past which still form the intellectual heritage of Indians in general.

Gentlemen, this is the call I would make today to those assembled in this Congress, and to the great multitude of students scattered among the teeming masses of India: standing in line with Indian tradition, with Indian sentiments in your hearts, with the love of India in the present and an ardent desire for its future, with a knowledge of its past, on this basis with all the acumen and logical precision that you may learn from the West investigate philosophically the problems of your own culture and civilisation, and the problems of wider humanity as related to the conditions in which we in this generation live in India.

Let us turn for a short time to that important side of philosophical reflection which concerns itself with morality. Within recent years several books have been published on Hindu ethics and the ethics of India, mainly historical. A systematic critical and constructive study is still awaited. I shall not occupy your time with detailed replies to the contentions that Indian philosophy gives no bases for ethics, or that Indian ethics logically gives no place for genuine social morality. Every educated Indian knows that there is a moral sense of dharma, that there is a nitisastra. Every educated Indian knows that in traditional Indian systems of thought there are important ideas relating to moral life, such as those of pravrtti and ni-vritti, the asramas, and the various paths to moksha. Every educated Indian knows that the end or ideal of human life, purusartha, includes what is discussed in artha-sastra, in dharma-sastra, and in kamasastra. In artha-sastra

social and political organisation with its rights and duties receives due consideration. Dharma-sastra includes both moral and religious requirements. Kama-sastra is concerned not simply with sex, as is all too often imagined by irresponsible youth, but with the life of desire in a wide sense, especially that which finds satisfaction in the Arts.

In the consideration of the moral life philosophy is concerned with what is intimately related with social advance; here the influence of philosophy on practical life may and should be real. An Indian philosopher should ask: What is the true meaning of these ideas of Indian ethics? Upon what does their authority depend? These questions must inevitably lead to the others: Are these ideas at present misunderstood and misrepresented with bad effects on social life? If so, in what manner ought they to be interpreted and expressed in order to promote social advance? By all means let us learn what earlier philosophical thinkers have said, but before all let us cultivate a genuine philosophic attitude towards these ideas, and not be satisfied with mere dogmatic repetition.

To what conclusions must we come, for example, if with a truly philosophical independence and acumen, if with sound logic, we examine the ideas associated with varnasrama? The ways in which the Indian doctrine of the division of social activities has been and still is interpreted, the prejudices and false sentiments which have gathered around it, have been the greatest obstacle to social advance in India for decades and for centuries. Widespread enlightenment from genuine philosophical reflection on this subject would bring a liberation, a freedom to Indian social life which to-day is in fetters. I ask: Is there a more important task at the present time than to free men's

minds from the false ideas which bind them body and soul? Whose duty is it to guide those striving for liberation, if it is not essentially that of the philosophers of our day and generation? You have here a task which, in my opinion, is of far greater importance, of far greater social significance, than the majority of those upon which I fear most of you are actually engaged.

Gentlemen, let us keep in mind the important practical truth, that mere negation has little force in face of error. A false interpretation is most effectively overcome by the statement and defence of a correct one. Philosophically I think we must admit that it is incredible that the principle of social groups should have been so widely accepted for so long, if there were not something true and valuable in it. The belief that social groups have their source in God contains the truth that some are by nature, that is in part by their original endowments, fit to perform certain functions in society, while others are fit to perform other functions. If one wishes one may call this an aspect of the divine organisation in life. It is an entire misinterpretation and mis-representation of this to maintain that the place a person is to take in society is to be decided once for all by the circumstances of birth. To say that there is a division of labour among the members of a society is a reasonable statement of a fact and a necessity, but to say that this must conform with physiological and ethnological divisions, is to expound a quite unjustifiable dogma. Such an arbitrary and arfiticial method is detrimental to society and a hindrance to social advance, which requires that a man should do that work, perform that function, for which he is most fit. It may be true that owing to conditions of heredity and of environment the members of a family through successive

generations manifest a fitness for the same social function. That, however, is no justification for the establishment of artificial barriers; the fitness of each generation must be tested and proved for itself. I will not attempt to point out here the multifarious ways in which group privileges have been artificially bolstered up. To the critical eye of philosophical reflection all these must eventually reveal their irrationality and their want of any satisfactory basis. In the performance of this task of social liberation, philosophy has the assistance of changing economic conditions. On grounds of philosophical reflection and in view of economic forces artificial communal distinctions ought to be broken down for the general social advantage. Philosophical reflection may lead us to the view that Government might be most efficiently carried on by representation of the various interests and activities of the people, rather than by communal representation.

Even when we pass to some of the wider ethical ideas of Indian thought, we find a great need for independent philosophical consideration. Think, for example, of the various ways in which the doctrines concerning the paths to moksha, redemption or enlightenment, are interpreted. It should be seen that this is not a matter simply of one's own individual development but is also bound up with social advance. There seem to be at least three ways in which the doctrine of karma-marga may be interpreted, with different social effects. It is for philosophy to estimate the rationality of these interpretations and to evaluate their effects. By karma-marga one might understand the way to achievement through the ritual acts of religion. That view has all too often led to mere formal practice of religious rites, to self-satisfaction therein, and a consequent

neglect of an active and intelligent participation in social duties. Again, karma-marga is sometimes represented as adherence to the functions and duties of our particular caste, as prescribed in traditionally accepted sastras. The alliance of this view with one in which karma-marga is also given an implication of political nationalism has become well known through the work of a prominent leader who died only a few years ago. As distinct from these two interpretations philosophy may be able to develop a view according to which activity devoted to each and every good social and individual end is both a part of duty and a means of attainment of equanimity of mind. Such a conception of karma-marga would lead to a strenuous life conforming to social advance in all directions of human culture.

Jnana-marga may be interpreted with an orthodox limitation, as a way by knowledge of the scriptures, or more profoundly as the way of a mystical vision of God. Whatever philosophy may have to say to this--and it will beware of superficial rejection--it must in our day raise the question as to the importance of that form of knowledge which we have come to call "modern science." If we reflect on the alleviation of human misery, on the promotion of human health and joy of living, which we owe already to modern science, we shall see at once how important it is that jnana marga shall include this, that in short it should be so interpreted as to refer to knowledge in its fullest sense.

Even the doctrine of the path of devotion, bhakti-marga, is capable of a narrower and of a wider interpretation. It may be represented as a purely individualistic ecstasy of the soul in relation to God, or it may be made the form of an enthusiasm of universal love, which, adopted as an ideal, may help in overcoming those antagonisms

between different communities which are the greatest hindrance to social progress.

If we think of the root meaning of the term yoga, to join, unite, we may suggest that for complete realisation we must join all the paths. There must be many-sided activity, inspired by love and enthusiasm, and guided by knowledge; activity, devotion, knowledge, are all at all times necessary in their right proportion. So again, the individual should duly perform the requirements of the different asramas. If a man is fully to perform his duty as a householder he must find that he has much to do for the general social welfare. The hermit and the ascetic tend to become merely egoistic, neglecting those social activities essential to social progress. Our existence in this world may be taken to imply that the affairs of this world require and deserve to be adequately attended to.

One aim of philosophy is to seek for comprehensiveness and consistency. An examination of Indian ethical ideas from this point of view should help us to eradicate misconceptions hindering social advance. I think, for example, of the different ways in which, with a modern philosophical attitude, we might work out the implications of the doctrines of the gunas. On the one hand we might treat these as representing moods and dispositions, contrasting the joy of selfless, sattvik, action with the tamasik pain and gloom associated with selfishness. Or we may look at these in another way, and ask: Is not the condition of society, permeated with and moulded on unreasonable ideas of caste, lacking in rational organisation? Is it not essentially chaotic from the point of view of what is required for social advance? In short, is it not fundamentally tamasik? May we not find in a political order imposed upon India--an order which as being order is so far bene-

ficial--something of the rajasik? Can we escape from admission of the amount of selfishness with which it is too often associated? Order, peace, efficient administration, these are all of very great value, and should be fully appreciated. But true social advance is concerned with the ideals which are to be attained, and these should be free from any taint of exploitation whether of individual by individual, caste by caste, or nation by nation. In short, again, may we not find in the idea of the sattvik, philosophically interpreted, a fundamental principle of social advance?

What I have so far said, Gentlemen, is by way of suggestion and illustration. I would show that Indian thought has ideas of its own which have grown up among us and have a living hold upon us. It is through these ideas that one most easily and most intimately comes into touch with Indian social life. It is these ideas, therefore, which call for consideration by Indian thinkers of to-day. You have to train yourselves to disciplined thought with the methods of the East and the West, and you have to interpret these ideas in a truly modern philosophic spirit. I need hardly remind a gathering such as this, that yoga as equanimity of mind is fundamentally different from an attitude of indifference with which it is too often confused. I need hardly remind you that if the doctrine of asramas were fully appreciated and the duties of each social function and period of life sincerely undertaken, the people of India would not suffer that intolerable drag upon its social advance which exists in its vast army of so-called ascetics. I need hardly remind you that if the principle of true charity were carefully and widely expounded that indiscriminate charity--upon which these beggars depend--would largely cease.

In the West in our generation the science of

psychology has made vast strides, and is becoming a subject of study absorbing almost all the attention of those devoted to it. In India I imagine that for long psychology will have to be but one of that group of subjects which our professors of Philosophy are called upon to study and teach. I mention it here, because I believe that in our ancient literature we have a wealth of observation on the springs of conduct. Much of this is spasmodic and disconnected and not apparently arrived at by experimental methods such as are common to-day in the West. But it seems more than probable that they have been arrived at by long-practised methods of concentrated introspection which in this field may be of greater value than the mechanical means the West strives to apply. The field of psychology is already in the West, and for some time has been, a battle ground between introspective and externally experimental methods. The latter tend there to attract the greater support. But do not allow yourselves to be unduly influenced by what is done or thought in the West, just because it is Western. And to others it is also necessary to say: do not cling to anything simply because it is Eastern. In the present connection, however, I do think that it is worth while urging you to study the Indian tradition, which in regard to the psychological is introspective. The Indian mind may be peculiarly adept at this type of investigation, and by it may make genuine contributions to knowledge. I am glad to observe that Mr. S.K. Maitra in his book on the Ethics of the Hindus has given much space to the discussion of the springs of conduct as understood in Hindu thought. Psychological and philosophical discussions of this kind should eventually do much to correct the socially harmful impression which still lingers in some quarters, that the so-called law of karma is a form of fatalism and of pessimism. Social advance depends on the

ever present conviction that man has the capacity to mould social life to greater conformity with our ideals, and upon a rational belief in the triumph of the good.

What, however, is the good? What are or should be our ideals? These are the questions which I know you must at some time have asked yourselves, and which your students time and again ask you. These are questions which also in one form or another present themselves to all. These, indeed, may be said to express the fundamental problem. And at once it may be maintained by some, as it has often been maintained, that the solution proposed and the attitude adopted by the West is quite different from that taught by the East. If we may say so, in general terms, it is suggested that the ideal of the Western philosopher is a luxurious study, a stable income of no mean proportions, and perchance also access to elaborately equipped laboratories for investigations into the constitution and qualities of matter. And the ideal Indian philosopher is by contrast mistakenly conceived as a recluse living in the forest as free as possible from physical distractions and social enjoyments, contemplating the ineffable being of Spirit, with purely individualistic aim. Paying no attention to a due proportion to individual and social claims, such a one asks what philosophy, occupied with this ideal of divine contemplation, has to do with social advance. Here, Gentlemen, is this question as to the nature of the "good" we have the question of questions. What answer or answers can we give, we whose task and privilege it is to find and to teach to others the nature of the ideal at which we should aim?

Let us divest ourselves of the idea, not infrequently spread abroad in India, that Western philosophy is fundamentally materialistic. The reality of the spiritual nature of man is recognised in manifold ways and is constantly assert-

ing itself. The supposed differences between Indian and Western philosophy are ultimately not so great as they at first appear, but they are often misunderstood. It is for you, Gentlemen, many of whom have had the advantages of a study of Western philosophy and combined with this a contact with Indian ideals in this land of ours, it is for you to study this subject and to guide public opinion. The time that is available for me here is too short to enter into detail, but I would like to indicate my own way of meeting this apparent opposition of ideals.

In the end, Gentlemen, this problem resolves itself into a consideration on the one hand of the facts and things of the actual world in which we live and on the other of that world of ideas which consititutes for us a realm of ideals with which we would like this world of things to conform, or in which we feel more satisfied and at peace. Now, I ask: What has Indian philosophy said concerning this world of things? Has it not said that it is maya, illusion? It is a world of appearances, a world of finites as distinguished from the infinity of the ultimately real. Does this involve that there is a short path to the real and the infinite, from jivatman to paramatman, by the negation of this world of appearances? Is that a truly philosophical interpretation of the Indian standpoint? I venture to think that it is not. The ultimate is not described simply by neti, neti, but, in addition, by the two-fold implication of the saying: Tat tvam asi. The ultimately real does not shut out any of its appearances, but it must not be thought of as solely any one of them. And ought we not to seek the philosophical significance of that other term, lila? Ought we not to try to see in the richness of the details of this world varied expressions of the joy of existence? It is thus that I would treat this problem. I would

say that there is no short path to reality by the neglect of the things of this world. But I would say that in intellectual research, in the various forms of art, in the diversity of social relationship, in fact in all that we may call culture and civilisation, man is coming into a wider and more comprehensive contact with reality, with the ideal, through these different forms of expression of itself.

Social advance, in its widest sense, therefore, as I look upon it, is essentially bound up with the broadening and deepening of our spiritual life. Some of the tasks that are involved are irksome tasks of technical knowledge and mechanical labour, which call for great patience and great effort. With these the philosopher does not often concern himself. But the philosopher ought never to forget that upon him rests the task of making men conscious that these things are worth doing for the ideal which thereby may be achieved. The whole development of civilisation and culture is not materialistic, it is an increasing triumph of the spirit of man following the ideal in conquest over the physical and the conditions of nature of primitive man. The philosopher should endeavour so to grasp and to express ever new aspects of the ideal in order that men engaged in the practical affairs of social advance may be rightly guided.

It is true that religion has indeed been and is more constantly present to the Indian mind than to that of the ordinary European. This is in large measure doe to the Indian's neglect of practical affairs, to his want of continued and varied activity. If, however, we have to try to rectify this attitude of the people of India, it does not mean that we should be justified in neglecting to study the religious side of Indian life. Philosophy should have a purifying influence here as in other spheres. Further, if

we may learn from the practical wisdom of the West, we may be able to repay our debt by contributions to the religious advance of mankind. Into the wealth of our religious literature I cannot here attempt to enter, but I would urge you to study that material with the critical philosophical methods of our generation.

In conclusion, while thanking you again for your kind invitation and your patient attention, I would say how inadequate I feel my scattered remarks to be to the vast problems and tasks which the study of philosophy and its relation to social advance opens up to us. I had wished to impress upon you the great need of the freedom of philosophic reflection in the social life of India in our generation. I have wished to impress upon you that your position and duty in society involve something more than to pursue what may appear to you to be simply intellectually interesting. You must be liberators of the minds of this generation. You must be its enlightened guides to prosperity and happiness. Bearing this in mind I cannot leave this subject without reference to the need of original works on philosophical and practical subjects in our Indian vernaculars. The vernacular literature which is being produced is in the main open to the criticism that it does not conform to the best of modern scholarship. Translations of classical Sanskrit works, and popular expositions by insufficiently educated men, are not what we are most in need of. This task of producing original works in the vernacular languages of India is one for genuine scholars, well equipped with knowledge and skill, with an education which combines the best of East and West. Gentlemen, until the fruits of your intellectual efforts are given for the nourishment of the great masses of our fellowmen, until their lives are permeated with the light that you more than others are expected to bring, your philosophy can have little effect upon social advance.

THE VERSES OF VEMANA: (translated by CHARLES PHILIP BROWN: (Vemana wrote in Telegu, 17thCenty)

1. It is fit to perform no act tardily; if thou hurry it, it will itself become evil. It thou take and cast down a raw fruit, will it ripen?

2. They are entangled in their lusts and perish; he who is converted into pure mind is the saint who knows the great secret.

3. He who has attained to the great secret is the teacher of teachers.

4. The teacher (Guru, a teacher, doctor, or preceptor in religion) who is unable to show the path of holiness to his disciples, and plunges them in an evil creed, his wisdom is like that of a bullock entangled in a field of maize (also called cholum the stalk of which is sometimes ten feet high.)

5. In no world is there a blessing greater than wisdom: none possesses wisdom but he who recognizes its value. Knowledge is comparable to itself alone, Wisdom is (tatwa) the chief good.

6. If I say "Let me view the past," it is like a thing seen in a dream; neither can I rely on the time now passing; our attachment to our earthly connections lives but for a moment.

7. Numerous are those who are ignorant of tatwam the truth; and few are those who are aware of it: and it is difficult to perceive who they are that know it.

8. Riches flourish, like the charms of women, for a season, but rapidly fade away; as moonlight dies when a cloud passes over the sky.

9. In its due season food is refreshing as ambrosia, and appears agreeable to the eye; but if eaten out of due time even food turns to poison; if we even see it with the eye we loath it.

10. Religion that consists in contriving various postures and twisting the limbs is just one straw inferior to the exercises of the wrestler.

11. The wretched ascetic pushes out his belly,

winks his eyes, and strains with all his body: He is like a sheep bound for sacrifice, and no better!

12. Be not like those haughty monks who imagine that by the gestures appointed for respiration, inspiration, and retention of the breath, they have attained to wisdom. In the absence of inward vision boast not of mere oral divinity.

13. Excessive study leads only to disputatious talking: a man does not hereby attain divine knowledge: he is entangled therein like a silk worm in its shell.

MEISTER ECKHART. "INSUFFICIENCY OF MYSTICAL TRANCE:" (title by P-B)

"NO PERSON CAN IN THIS LIFE REACH THE POINT AT WHICH HE IS EXCUSED FROM OUTWARD WORKS. WHAT THOUGH ONE LEAD THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, ONE CANNOT KEEP FROM FLOWING OUT AND MINGLING IN THE LIFE OF ACTION. Even as a man without a groat may still be generous in the will to give, whereas a man of means is giving nothing cannot be called generous, so no one can have virtues without exercising virtues at the proper time and place. Hence those who lead the contemplative life and do no outward work, are most mistaken and all on the wrong track. What I say is that he who lives the contemplative life may, nay he must, be absolutely free from outward works what time he is in act of contemplation, but afterwards his duty lies in doing outward works; for NONE CAN LIVE THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE WITHOUT A BREAK, AND ACTIVE LIFE BRIDGES THE GAPS IN THE LIFE OF CONTEMPLATION."

M. HIRIYANNA in INT. PHILOS. CONGRESS 1936:

It is this stable satisfaction or abiding peace that is the ultimate goal of life, and it furnishes the criterion by which all conduct is to be judged. That conduct is moral which prepares the way to such peace, and that which hinders it is the reverse. Moral conduct is then only an aid to the attainment of the end which is beyond good and evil.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "Un-Hindu Exposition of Hindu Thought (a pamphlet).

1. The science elaborated in the relevant literature--notably, the Yoga-sutras (apothegms) and Yoga-Sutra Bhashya, (commentary) thereon. Here is a categorical definition of Yoga. The apothegm containing the definition runs thus: "Yogah chitta-vritti-nirodhah." Every term in the definition is supremely significant. "Chitta" means mind or mental energy. "Vritti" means the natural flow of the said mind or mental energy towards objects of external reality from which different stimuli are impinging on the organism. "Nirodha" means arresting, inhibiting, or withdrawing. Thus yoga means a conscious, calculated control of mind or mental energy so as to arrest its natural flow towards the objects of external reality. Why should it at all be arrested or controlled? The Yoga system gives a ready answer. The control of mind is perfectly pragmatic. There is a definite and clearly-defined end to be achieved by that control. The apothegm runs thus--"Tadadrashtuh-svaroope-avasthanam." When the mind is controlled, the subject finds or enjoys the benefits of equipoised existence, calm and restful in its essential and fundamental nature.The point is this. Indian and European psychologies agree in maintaining that senses are the gateways of knowledge. The sensory structures are designed by Nature to give man adequate knowledge of external reality as it is. The distinction between things as they are and as they appear of the Kantian and other varieties of idealistic metaphysics is ignored by psychology very rightly indeed. Senses are excited by means of adequate stimuli. Thus in virtue of structure and function, the mind and senses naturally flow towards external objects. Yoga advocates something like a Copernican revolution in

general outlook and psycho-physical methodology. There may be two opinions about Kant's claim that he effected such a revolution in metaphysics. (See Prichard on Kant). But, there can be no difference of opinion or adverse critical judgment about the claim of Yoga.

A FALSE BALANCE. The claim made by Yoga is that the essential nature of the self is permanently obscured or obfuscated by the flow of mental energy towards the objects of external reality. Arrest the flow by conscious and deliberate control of the mind and the senses, says yoga, and then you will enjoy unique bliss of equipoised existence in self's essential nature. The hedonisms and sense satisfactions that lure and lead mankind to-day are quite alien to the essential nature of the self. Here I use the term "equiposed-existence" as marking the nearest approach to the language of the text (svaroope-avasthana).

2. In the celebrated section of the Mahabharata Santi Parva, it is said that professional politicians and kings should pursue ethicised ideals and programmes in political transactions (Raja-Dharma). There is another section devoted to an exposition of the programme to be followed in times of exceptional storm and stress, upheavals and dangers (Apaddharma). By far the most important section relates to pursuit of the programme believed to free one from the meshes of transmigration (Moksha-Dharma).

MAJUMDAR: "ANCIENT INDIAN HISTORY."

"The ancient writers on polity also emphasised the heavy responsibility of the king's position. By accepting taxes from the people, the king incurs definite obligations to them and these he must fulfill by the due discharge of his duties. These ideal virtues of an ancient Indian king are embodied, to a considerable extent, in the character of the great

emperor Asoka. "All men are my children," said he, "and just as I desire for my children that they may enjoy every kind of prosperity and happiness, in both this world and in the next, so also I desire the same for all men." Again he wrote in the same strain: "Just as a man, having made over his child to a skilful nurse, feels confident and says to himself, "The skilful nurse is zealous to take care of my child's happiness," even so my officials have been created for the welfare and happiness of the country."

Asoka's zeal for public business, and his sense of responsibility for the sacred trust imposed on him as king, are well exemplified by another record. "For a long time past" runs the royal edict, "it has not happened that business has been despatched and that reports have been received at all hours. Now by me this arrangement has been made that at all hours and in all places--whether I am dining, or in the ladies' apartments, in my bedroom, or in my closet, in my carriage, or in the palace gardens--the official reporters should report to me on the people's business, and I am ready to do the people's business in all places....It have commanded that immediate report must be made to me at any hour and in any place, because I never feel full satisfaction in my efforts and dispatch of business. For the welfare of all folk is what I must work for--and the root of that, again, is in effort and the dispatch of business. And whatsoever exertions I made are for the end that I may discharge my debt to animate beings."

M.HIRIYANNA: IND PHILOS CONGRESS 1936:

The second stage of advaitin's life is when he assumes sannyasa in order that he may better accomplish the end of knowing reality. He already possess viveka but it is mediate and his present purpose is to know immediately.

M.HIRIYANNA:THE PLACE OF FEELING IN CONDUCT

(12th I.P.C.1936)(1) Nearly all the Indian systems teach on their practical side the necessity of cultivating vairagya. The need for it is clear from its inclusion in the fourfold aid to Brahma-knowledge set forth by Sankara in his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutra. Now Vairag means dispassion or etachment from interest;and when we take this along with another of the qualifications laid down as necessary for enter -ing upon the life of a Vedantin,viz, discrimin -ation between the eternal and the transient with its emphasis on reason, it seems that feel -ing has no place in conduct according to the Adavita. The point that we have to consider is whether this conclusion is in consonance with the doctrine taken as a whole;and if it is not to find out what exactly is to be understood from vairagya.

(2) The life of an Advaitin is broadly divisibl into two stages. The chief means recommended in the earlier of the two stages for the cultivati -on of vairagya is the adoption of the life of a householder.The underlying idea here is that the detachment cannot be achieved in the abstra -ct but only living in the midst of others and discharging the manifold duties that devolve upon one by doing so.

(3) It may be said that, though the discipline of the householder's life as described above might not once have excluded feeling from conduct, it does so now, because the conception varnasrama-dharmas has since been totally transformed by the teaching of the Gita that whatever one does should be done without any thought of the result which may follow from it. This teaching may doubt-less be taken to mean that duty should be done for its own sake, and that it should therefore be divorced from all interest. In that case there may be no room for feeling, in our sense of the term,

in conduct. But, according to Sankara with whose doctrine we are now concerned, disinterested activity, in the literal sense of the expression, is a psychological impossibility; and to insist upon it in the name of morality is, as he observes to reduce life to a form of meaningless drudgery. There is accordingly no conflict between duty and interest; and even deeds performed in the spirit of the Gita teaching have in end, viz. sattva-suddhi, the cleansing of the heart or the purifying of the affections. What is meant by the counsel that all thought of fruits should be dismissed from one's mind in the doing of duty is not that it should be emptied of all motive but that the diverse purposes of the deeds that fall to one's lot in life should be replaced by one and the same end, viz. self-conquest or the moral improvement of the agent. There is thus an end here as much as in the previous stage; only it is of a higher type, because it shuts out altogether the desire for inferior values (abhyudaya) and aims solely at subjective purification. Vairagya means here the total abnegation of such inferior interests and not merely restraining one's natural inclinations. It thereby becomes much wider in its scope; but yet, as it does not altogether exclude the ides of an end in which the agent is interested, feeling will continue to have a place in the conduct of this stage also.

(4). It cannot be regarded as divorced from feeling, for it is inspired by his equal love for all, or his interest in the whole. The activity is, in fact, the concrete expression of that love. We may, if we like, suppose that it involves self-interest also; only we should then bear in mind that it is not the egoistic, but the true or universal self that is meant. Vairagya does not accordingly mean the abolition of interests but only the extinction of narrow egoism. Hence the present stage, like the previous one is not bereft

of either activity or feeling. But both of them come to have a new meaning by reason of complete knowledge that has been attained. The one becomes wholly impersonal, and the other is transformed into cosmic love.

SANAKRA'S DOCTRINE OF MAYA BY NALINIKANTA BRAHMA@.

The doctrine of maya, the central and the most important theme of the Advaita philosophy of Sankara, has been misunderstood and misinterpreted in the West and very often been unjustly criticised by western thinkers. The maya-vada, it is true, is really a difficult theory to understand, and it is no wonder that it should present difficulties to all serious students of philosophy. In this country also the adhyasa-bhasya of Sankara and the maya-vada expounded in it, as regarded as the most difficult of all philosophical treatises. But that even eminent western thinkers should without giving such an important philosophical doctrine serious reflection which is undoubtedly deserves, dispense with it as a philosophical trifle, is really regrettable.

The doctrine of maya, as expounded by Sankara, can hardly be traced to the Upanishads, and all such attempts are bound to be more or less futile. The occasional references to such passages fail to give any idea of the doctrine of maya as explained by Sankara. The Karika of Gaudapada, the gift of Sankara's Paramaguru to Sankara, contains the germs of almost all the aspects of Sankara's philosophy, and the doctrine of maya also can undeniably, I believe, be traced to that invaluable work. Sankara's indebtedness to the Karika of Gaudapada can hardly be exaggerated. Even the highest aspect of the doctrine of maya, the ajata-vada which denies the aspect of creation altogether, is explained in the Karika.

The doctrine of maya is understood very often by western thinkers to be an artifice to deny the reality of the universe and to explain the same as merely an illusion. But this is not the truth. The doctrine of maya is an attempt not to explain away the universe, nor to deny it altogether, but rather to explain the reality of

@@3rd INDIAN PHILOS. CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS.1927.

the universe, to show the nature of reality that it possesses and can possess. It is an attempt to explain how the finite universe can out of the Absolute and the Infinite. The difficulty of explaining the fact of Creation is the greatest difficulty which the philosophical mind encounters in the course of explaining the mysteries of the universe. The philosophy of almost all countries has more or less ignored the difficulty of explaining how the finite could ever come out of the Infinite, and almost all religious systems have tacitly assumed the possibility of communion and relation (and even in some cases identity) with the Absolute of the finite individual, without ever seriously stopping to think how this can happen, how the finite can ever reach the Infinite. The Infinite, ex hypothesi, is something which no addition of finites can ever yield. The fine logical mind of Sankara could not ignore this supreme and fundamental difficulty in the way of all religion, and also in the way of an advaita philosophy. The age of the Upanishads was more or less the age of Faith and Authority, and the mere appeal to Srutis stopped all argumentations, and hence in India also the difficulty, the difficulty of connecting the finite with the Infinite, could not show its face uncovered then. But the age of Sankara, the age following the rise of Buddhism, was the age of Reason and Sankara had to win his case more by logic than by an appeal to authority. Hence it was impossible for Sankara to avoid the difficulty, and he faced it boldly. The doctrine of maya is the logical answer which Sankara offered to the difficulty. It was thus an epistemological and a logical necessity on the part of Sankara to formulate the doctrine of maya.

The doctrine of maya does not mean any dif-

ferent ontological position of Sankara from that held by the Upanishads. The reality of Brahman, one without a second, undivided, pure, untouched by any sin, is alone upheld, and the reality of the world is described to be phenomenal and empirical.

The descriptions of maya in various ways leading to altogether different views have created much confusion and been the source of infinite troubles to students of philosophy. This confusion can be avoided to a very great extent, I think, if we try to understand the stage of realisation which a particular description points to. The Upanishads, the source of the Vedanta philosophy, abound with contradictory passages, irrelevant descriptions, etc. We have not to seek for them and find them out. Contradictory epithets are applied to the same subject times without number in the very same sentence. These are all irrelevant and illogical statements to the superficial student of the Vedanta and the Upanisads. But these really contain the essence of the Vedanta and these are the divices which the Vedanta invents to describe the Indescribable, to explain the non-relational Absolute. The contradictions can always be reconciled and explained, if we regard them not as descriptions of the same stage of experience, but as denoting different stages of realisation of the Absolute. The Absolute is the very same unchangeable Reality that ever persists, but our apprehension of the same reveals differently in different stages. We can in this way notice three markedly different stages in the description of maya:-

(1) Maya is regarded as the source of this universe. It is the finitising principle that brings in differences and relations where no differences and relations exist. It is the power of sakti that is, it can do what cannot be done.

It is that which explains the Creation of this universe, the rise of the Finite out of the Infinite. The variety and multiplicity of the universe can all the traced to this sakti: In this sense, it does not differ from Herbert Spencer's Force. It is not only not unreal, in this sense, but it is most real in as much as we have to derive from it the reality of all that we see and touch. It is the karana-vastha or the primal cause of all that exists in subtle and gross conditions. At this stage, the question of reality or unreality of this universe does not at all come in,--only we learn to trace the variety and multiplicity of gross and subtle things to their primal cause.

(2) Maya is described as anirvachaniya, neither real nor unreal. It is not real, because in the ultimate experience of the realisation of Brahman, not only the gross and the subtle universes do disappear, but no trace of the primal cause even can be noticed. The trace of all infinitude and limitation, the least signs of all variety and multiplicity, however diluted they may be, are bound to disappear, when they are merged in and realise the One Infinite. But when we miss that blessed mood of realisation, and so long as we cannot retain the memory of that blessed experience so that it alone always shines before us, we fall back upon the realm of duality and limitation, and then maya as the primal cause of all that shines is regarded as real. This anirvachaniyatva is more a logical category than a stage of realisation. Logically we can neither deny it nor affirm it. It presents itself but it is not. It is like the day-dream the reality of which is denied even when it is presented. We cannot say whether it is or is not. Maya is eternally negated in Brahman. It presents itself through its effects,but it is already

eternally negated in Brahman.

(3) Maya is tuccha, altogether unreal. This is known as the ajatavada, the theory holding that there has never been the creation of this universe. Where the Infinite alone shines, there is no room for the finite to appear. At this stage (i.e. the highest stage of revelation) it is seen that the finite never was, and there can never be any finite. All finitude and limitation with their sources, disappear altogether, never to appear again.

So Sankara declares that there is no reaching of the Infinite by the finite, but the Infinite alone is, and all finite beings are really the One Infinite, only appearing different through an inexplicable riddle not further definable.

Through the doctrine of maya, Sankara gives us the conception of an Absolute, which is really transcendent, which is not merely a relational Absolute like the Absolute of Hegel. The highest stage of intuitional realisation, soaring far above the intellectual reaches of the discursive understanding and the relational reason, reveals an Absolute that is really one without a second. Such an Absolute is really pure and free from all relations, because it is mayatita, above all finitising relations. Without the intervention of maya, the Absolute is bound to be related to the universe in some way or other, and hence becomes a relational, if not also a relative, Absolute.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GAUDAPADA: by HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYA. @@

Of all the systems of Indian thought that of Vedanta has undoubtedly been the greatest living spiritual force which has determined the practical and speculative life of the people. And

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it would not be going too far from the truth to say that of all the different schools of Vedantism, it is the Advaita School that has received the widest acceptance from the Indian mind as it has most strongly appealed to its taste and temperament and has most convincingly satisfied the demands of its keen intellect and lofty imagination. Now, this Advaita School of Vedanta philosophy, which might be traced to the hymns of the Rg Veda, and which has its chequered history through the earlier Upanishads--sometimes looming large as in the pure Idealism of Yajnavalkya-Maitreyi symposium and sometimes obscured by realistic, pluralistic and hihilistic lines of thought, traceable to the co-operative and syncretic work that the Upanishads are--owes its first clearer formulation to the epoch-making genius of Gaudapada; the Advaitism of Sankara being a fuller development of the nucleus of this absolutist thought propounded by Gaudapada, with modifications of his own. Besides the age and atmosphere to which Gaudapada belonged was surcharged with traits of Buddhistic thought and consequently his philosophy is of perennial interest for the historian of Indian Philosophy. The philosophy of Gaudapada thus represents a line of thought which was emerging from the vague glimmerings of the Upanishadic horizon on the one side, and which, while so emerging, was at the same time outshining the opposite horizon of Buddhistic subjectivism and hihilism on the other. My object in this present article is to indicate in general outline how the philosophy of Gaudapada has given to the idealism of the Upanisads a definite monistic direction and mould, avoiding at the same time the Scylla and Charybdis of Vijnanavada and Sunyavada, a more detailed treatment of other aspects of his philosophy being reserved for other occasions.

The central proposition of Gaudapada is

that what is, is one unborn (aja), awake (anidra) dreamless (asvapna) consciousness which is self-illumined (prabhatam bhavati svayam) and which is the only reality, and which is identical with Atman. Hence it follows that reality or existence belongs only to Atman or absolute self-consciousness and all else is unreal. The world of our experience with its diverse contents, physical and mental, is a figment of our imagination. Gaudapada maintains that the reality of a thing consists in "that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is unborn, that which is not accidental or that which does not forego its own character." Thus the test of reality being immutable persistence for all eternity and neither objectivity nor practical efficiency, and such a test being satisfied in quiescent or tranquil self-consciousness which is Atman, it follows that the world of our experience or Jagatprapanca which is the field of change and becoming must be unreality. Now Gaudapada has confirmed this his metaphysical conclusion as to the nullity of the jagatprapanca by a psychological analysis of experience--first of all by pointing out the similarity of the waking world to the world of dream-consciousness, and secondly by showing that the moulds of time, space and causality into which the world of our experience is cast, are themselves meaningless and hence the world of our experience also is a mere unreality.

The most obstrusive reality which enforces itself upon our consciousness is the reality of the waking world whose existence our senses refuse to deny. Gaudapada disillusions us by pointing out in a manner similar to Descartes' that the waking world is no more real than the world of our dream-consciousness. Just as the objects of waking consciousness are nullified

in dreams even so the objects of our dream-consciousness cease to exist with the dawn of our waking life. Experiences in dreams are coherent in their own order as much as experiences in waking life are, but each of the two sets of experience is unreal in an absolute sense. But Gaudapada differs from Descartes in so far as Descartes assigns to the world a second-hand reality derived from the reality of God. Gaudapada also differs in this point from Sankara though they are at one in their ultimate position that Brahman or Atman is real and the phenomenal world is unreal. Thus while Gaudapada argues out the unreality of the world by demonstrating that the waking world is on a par with the dream-world, Sankara keeps up in a pronounced manner a distinction between the dream-world and the waking-world by assigning to them different degrees of reality though however he comes to the conclusion common with Gaudapada that both the worlds melt into the ultimate reality of Brahman. Thus it follows that Gaudapada tends more towards subjectivism than Sankara who retains in his system realistic elements in a relative and not an absolute sense.

Now the subjectivism of Gaudapada received its colouring from the line of the Vijnanavada argument which he appropriates and uses to refute the standpoint of the Realist, without however identifying himself with the Vijnanavadin. The contention of the Realist is that the world of objects exists outside and independently of our mind as the determining cause of the varieties of our cognition (prajnapti) and feeling (klesasyopalabdhisca). But Gaudapada points out that the etramental world is as much unreal as the mental world, that the relation of the percipient and the perceived is only apparent and not real, each of these

two terms of the relation having derived their air of reality from the movement of consciousness (vijnanaspanditam) quite in the same manner as the line of fire of a fire-brand (alata) appears straight or curved according to the different kinds of its movement. And just as on the cessation of all movement of fire-brand all linear differences in the fire disappears, even so on the cessation of chitta which grows and dies and is not a reality, all differences between the mental and the material world disappears. All duality is mental, and whatever is mental is ultimately unreal, and if mentality or understanding could be sublated (amanibhave), there would be no cognition of any duality which is the soul of the empirical existence. Now the very mind or citta or vijnanam is an abhasa or unreality, for mind or citta grows or becomes, and whatever grows or becomes is unreal. Gaudapada thus goes beyond the vijnanavadin is so far as he points out that vijnanam or citta which becomes is not the basic principle but an unreal aberration of one unitary changeless self-consciousness or Atman in relation to which all changes are unmeaning. Hence the world of experience which is mind-begotten (manah-kalpitam) is as unreal as the mind itself from which it is projected.

Then from this negative attitude to the world of experience he proceeds to give us a constructive conception of the ultimate reality by a subtle dialectic which at once reminds one of Nagarjuna. He points out that the unreality of the world of experience suggests the reality of something which transcends experience, something which persists as a transcendent onlooker through the transient modifications of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and it would be complete nihilism to deny all reality as is done in the Madhyamika system of thought; and

this reality is thus identical with pure thought or consciousness. He goes on to say that reality alone is, and never becomes; change, becoming and origination are foreign to the nature of reality. For origination is itself an unreality. Origination to be a reality must be either self-origination or other-origination, but neither is possible. For we cannot imagine the origination of a water-pot from its own nature (svatah), nor can we reconcile ourselves to the belief that a thing can originate out of another thing (paratah) of its kind. And if it be maintained that the earthen pot originates from a source other than itself, viz. from earth, then we must point out that all ideas of existence, origination and decay are forms of speech and not representing anything in reality corresponding to them. Further a thing can either be or not be. Now if a thing is, then no becoming or origination; and if a thing is not, then also no origination, for origination of a non-existent thing is as absurd as the origination of the horns of a hare. And even if a thing is both is and is not, even then also origination is meaningless in respect of either of its aspects. Thus Gaudapada concludes that since origination or change is foreign to reality and all changes belong to the world of experience which is looked down upon, as it were, by a transcendent metempiric consciousness, the ultimate reality is then that absolute consciousness or Atman, 'the ever unborn, awake and dreamless, that illumines itself by itself.' And the finite consciousness or citta whose nature is origination and change is responsible for the world of experience which is the realm of duality. Now when the citta is dissolved, the world of diversity and change is dissolved along with it, and the translucent absolute reality of the Atman shines forth in its own light.

The above may be said to be a synoptic representation of Gaudapada's general philosophical standpoint in relation to the dominant current of Vedantic thought that permeated the Hindu mind of that age and to the Buddhistic lines of thinking which were still ringing in the ears of the generation which had just passed the age of Asanga, Asvaghosa and Nagarjuna.

Now, before I close I deem it worth while to refer to the question whether Gaudapada was a Buddhist or belonged to the orthodox Brahminical School, and, along with it, to the allied question whether Gaudapada was the first inaugurator of Advaita Vedantism. As regards the latter question it may be urged that there seems to be no tangible evidence that between the older Upanisad age and Sankara there appeared any individual philosopher who may be credited with the formulation of Advaitism excepting Gaudapada. As Dr. Dasgupta puts it, "I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gaudapada who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upanisads) either by writing a commentary as did Sankara, or by writing an independent work as did Gaudapada."

There is, however, another hypothesis that the origin of the Advaita school may be pushed beyond Gaudapada to Upavarsa, the reputed Mimamsa philosopher as its real founder. Such a hypothesis is based on the ground that Sankara has referred to him twice in his bhasya and Bhagavan Upavarsa, and that in the earlier part of his commentary on the Mimamsa philosophy (prathame tantre) where he has the occasion to deal with the reality of the soul, Upavarsa makes a promise to take up the problem in detail in the supplementary part of his commentary on the Sariraka or the soul. But in view of the fact that there is really nothing more than mere promise in the shape of an actual commen-

tary on the Sariraka available, it would be a gratuitous assumption to say that Upavarsa was the founder of the Advaita school, of which Gaudapada is consequently a later exponent. In the absence of positive evidence in favour of Upavarsa, and in the face of the fact that Sankara himself distinctly mentions in his commentary on the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the Karikas that Gaudapada is the founder of the Advaita school it is difficult to deny Gaudapada the credit of a founder of Advaitism. And Sankara's recognition of Gaudapada as the founder of Advaita school and as the teacher of his teacher whose tenets he is traditionally said to have been trained by the latter to represent and defend, and Gaudapada's intrinsic doctrinal difference from what either the Vijnanavadin maintained or the Sunyavadin denied, force one to the conclusion that Gaudapada was a Hindu philosopher, and not a Buddhist, and was the first to promulgate the Advaita Vedantism after the earlier Upanisad period.

There are, however, two things which have led some writers to surmise that Gaudapada was a Buddhist and not a Hindu. The one is that there are several instances of similarlity in expressions, such as, prapancopasana, samvrti, jati, in the sense of origination, dharma in the sense of quality or entity, the simile of the alatacakra which are common to Gaudapada and Nagarjuna, and specially the similarity in the following parts of their respective verses sambuddha stamvande dvipadamvaram and sambuddha-stamvande vadatamvaram. And the other reason is that Gaudapada's method of dialectic is leavened with the Vijnanavada and Sunyavada spirit, as we have already hinted at. Dr.Das-gupta has based his conclusion that Gaudapada was himself a Buddhist on these evidences; and

the special point worthy of note in this connection is that the expression, asparsa-yoga, has been interpreted by him as "probably referring to Nirvana."

But we would venture to differ in this point from the learned Doctro, and would like to point out that this similarity in form and matter of Gaudapada's arguments is indeed a similarity, but does not, however, on that account argue him a Buddhist any more than the sophistical expressions and dialectic used by Socrates make him a sophist or Kantian. Besides all the assertions of the learned Doctor with regard to Gaudapada's adherence to Buddhism are scarcely more than problematic. "I believe," he says, "that there is sufficient evidence in his Karikas for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist and considered that the teachings of the Upanisads tallied with those of Buddha." Then he whittles down the force of his problematic remark by further adding that, "it is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings he believed to be his. Certainly to have regard for a particular tenet of philosophy or religion and its founder is not equivalent to identifying oneself with that tenet.

As regards his adoption of the so-called Buddhistic expressions it may be pointed out that the expressions, prapancopasamam, sivam and the like which are said to point to Nagarjuna's terminology, are no less the watch-words of the Upanisadic teachers. In fact they occur within the very Mandukya Upanisad (Slokas 7 & 12), which Gaudapada undertakes to explain. As for the specific expression, asparsa-yoga, which Dr. Dasgupta interprets as "probably referring to Nirvana," it may be urged that in the two places where that expression occurs there is

the unmistakable reference from the context, to the relationless self-consciousness or Atman realizable by Yoga. Nor can we lay Gaudapada down as a Buddhist for the similarity of his dialectic to that of Nagarjuna either. For to think that a full-fledged propounder of the Upanisad doctrine was ignorant of dialectical argument, so much so that he must have imitated Nagarjuna in this matter, is to ignore the entire trend of Upanisad teachings. And apart from this general relation even specific instances of dialectic argument resembling that of Nagarjuna are not infrequent in the Upanisads. The very seventh Sloka of the Mandukya Upanisad which he undertakes to annotate and to elaborate runs as, "nantahprajnam na bahihprajnam nobhayatahprajnam, na prajnanaghanam na prajnam naprajnam," and this is apparently a facsimile of the dialectic which Nagarjuna has employed in his attempt to determine the nature of Nirvana among other things. Moreover, supposing that Gaudapada was a Buddhist there seems to be no ostensible reason why he of all Buddhists has taken care to expound any of the Upanisads, the sacred texts of the anti-Buddhistic cult.

The real situation seems to be this that Gaudapada who was inspired with the subtle monistic idealism of the Upanisads had to meet the arguments of Buddhism which had just established its stronghold upon the Indian mind by the great genius of Asanga, Asvaghosa and Nagarjuna previous to him, and therefore he could not but be largely influenced by the line and spirit of their arguments and also could not possibly establish his own standpoint against Buddhism without meeting its votaries on their own grounds. That he was not a Buddhist and that his doctrine differs fundamentally from that of the Buddhist, has been emphatically pointed out by himself in so many words when he says, "naitad buddhena bhasitam," where he finally distinguishes

his own position from that of the Buddhist of
the Vijnanavada school by insisting that the
one ultimate reality of the Atman which trans-
cends all relation of knowledge, knower and the
known, has never been posited by Buddha. It is
more proper, perhaps been posited by Buddha.
It is more proper, perhaps, to say that Gauda-
pada cast the Buddhist line of thought into
the Vedantic mould than to think that Gaudapada
was a Buddhist, or was at least a crypto-Buddhist.

GAUDAPADA AND VASISTHA: by B.L. ATREYA. @@

Gaudapada, the author of the famous Karikas on
the Mandukyopanisad, is quite well-known to the
world of Indian Philosophy. He is considered by
the oriental scholars to be the first exponent
of the Advaita Vedanta after the Upanishads. This
view stands unchallenged only so long as the
work known as the Yoga-Vasistha has not been
studied, and its date definitely determined. It
is really strange why oriental scholars have not
as yet turned their attention to this important
work which when studied thoroughly will perhaps
be found not to be a post-Sankara work, as it
is generally believed to be. In the Yoga-Vasis-
tha we find almost every view held by Gaudapada,
and there can be found lines in the Yoga-Vasis-
tha parallel to almost every line of the II,
III, and IV chapters of the Karikas which repre-
sent the philosophical position of Gaudapada,
yet it is strange that there is hardly any line,
except one or two borrowed perhaps from some
common source too well-known at that time, which
is literally identical in the two. Leaving the
question which work is the earlier of the two
to the historians, we shall here attempt a brief
survey of the opinions shared equally by both
Gaudapada and Vasistha, the philosopher in the
Yoga-Vasistha, under four main heads, namely,

@@ 3RD INDIAN PHILOS. CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS.1927.

Idealism (Kalpana-vada), Illusionism (Maya-vada) Acosmism (Ajata-Vada), and the Method of Self-realisation (Yoga).

1. IDEALISM, (Kalpana-vada). It has been sometimes maintained by the students of Hindu philosophy that "Hindu thinkers have been and are (in the epistemological sense) not only Realists but Realists of a thorough-going type. There is no trace of Subjectivism which may be found in the Buddhist schools." Now, whatever might be said of other Hindu thinkers including perhaps Sankara also, Gaudapada and Vasistha at any rate were thorough-going Idealists. Both of them hold that the reality of the world-experience consists in its being imagined by mind. Here is what Gaudapada says: "The external as well as the internal objects are all imagined (K.II.14). Those objects that are in the subtle condition within as well as those that are manifest without, are all the work of imagination, the difference between them lying only in the means of their cognition (K.II.15). The whole experience consisting of perceiver and perceived is merely imagination of mind (K.IV.72). The whole duality, of whatever kind, is merely a phenomenon of mind (K.III.31). As movement makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, etc. so activity makes thought appear as perceiver and perceived (K.IV.47). As are dreams, magical creations, and castles-in-the-air, so declare the scholars of the Upanishads, this cosmos to be (K.II.31). All entities are like dream-objects sent forth by the creative power of the Self (K.II.5)."

In the same way declares Vasistha:-- "Everything in the world-experience is the work of imagination only. All this world-experience is a wonderful working out of consciousness in itself like the rising and falling of the city of dream. All the three worlds are the

creation of the activity of mind alone. This universe is considered to be the overflow of mind. Everything is constructed by the imagination of the self as in dream. The world-experience comes out of the heart of consciousness as a tree comes out of a seed. The world-experience is like a castle-in-the-air. And so on.

Do they give reasons like Berkeley for holding this startling position in philosophy? Yes they do give some, though not in a systematic way. Gaudapada is very brief in his statements. His arguments for Idealism may be gathered from the following: (i) A thing is said to be real because it is experienced and on account of its being the cause of an action. But are the objects of our illusory knowledge which are mere ideas of the mind not such? There is no difference between the two in these respects. Therefore the so-called real things are also thought-creations as the illusory ones are (K.IV.44). (ii) We all know that mind assumes a duality of the objects and the subject in dream by its own power, so there is no reason why in the waking experience we should not think that it acts in the same manner through the same cause (K.III.30). (iii) The duality (of the perceiver and the perceived) is a work of the mind because when the mind is annihilated, i.e., expanded into the Infinite Self (as in the case of Samadhi) the duality is not at all experienced (K.III.31)."

The arguments of Vasistha for Idealism may be gathered as the following:--

(i) The phenomenon of knowledge cannot be explained if the subject and object are two things quite different and opposed in their nature, for no relation can exist between two heterogeneous things. That which comes into consciousness cannot but be a mode of consciousness for nothing of a different nature could have entered consciousness. If the object were something of a different

nature from the knowing mind, it will ever remain unknown, and there would then be no proof even of its existence. (ii) The whole world-experience, with its cities and mountains, etc. can be duplicated in dreams. We all know that the dream objects are only modes of consciousness. There is no reason why the objects of the waking experience should not be taken to be so. (iii) The world-experience and its objects do not exist for the consciousness of the Yogi (who has learnt to put a stop to the activity of his mind). When the mind is lost in the Infinite consciousness (as in the case of Nirvana) there is no experience of any duality. All these considerations show that the mind is in the nave of the wheel of the world.

But then, is there any difference between dreams and the waking experience if the latter is just like the former which, of course, we all know to be a play of ideas in our mind? Both Gaudapada and Vasistha think that there is hardly any difference between the contents of the two. Thus says Gaudapada:--"The wise regard the waking and the dream states as one because of the similarity of the objective experiences in them (K.II.5). The mind, though one, appears dual (subject and object) in dream, so also in the waking state, it, though one, appears dual through its creative power (K.III.30), etc." In the same way Vasistha holds that "There is no difference between waking and dreaming experiences except that one is more stable than the other. The contents of both are similar in entirety, always and everywhere. The waking experience is just like that of dream, etc.etc. Dream also appear as waking states so long as they last, and the waking state looks like a dream when the objects of perception are not stable and lasting. From the standpoint of the permanent Self there is absolutely no difference

between the contents of dream and waking state. Although the waking man never apprehends his waking state to be a dream, the dead man rising again to experience a new life thinks his past life to have been a dream-like existence. As a man may recollect the many sleep-dreams he has experienced throughout his life, so the Perfect Sages can remember the waking dreams they have experienced in their long history of transmigration."

Now, if the world-experience is a work of imagination, who is the author of it? Gaudapada raises this question in K.II,11 and answers it thus: "The Atman, all light, imagines these objects so sent forth. This is the last word of the Vedanta on the subject (K.II.3). The first result of ideation is Jiva from which the various entities subjective and objective come forth (K.II.16)." Thus according to Gaudapada, the first product of the Creative imagination in the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, is Jiva (a finite entity) which imagines the objects of its experience. Vasistha calls the Subject of world-experience by many names one of which is also Jiva, but the names most often used are Manas and Brahma. "The world-experience," thus says Vasistha, "is spread out by Brahma manifesting himself in the form of Manas." How Brahma arises in the Absolute Reality is explained thus: "Manas comes out of the Absolute Reality like a sprout. The Creative power of the Absolute Reality (which is always inherent in it as its inseparable nature) by its own free-will, in a mere sportful overflow, comes to self-consciousness at a particular point, which in reality is forgetfulness of its being one with the whole reality, and on account of intensity there, begins to vibrate in the form of imagining activity ("consciring") and assumes a separate and distinct existence for itself apart from the Whole whose one aspect it is in reality."

Thus we see that Gaudapada and Vasistha have the same idealistic standpoint. Gaudapada, however, does not raise the problem, which is very important metaphysically, whether it is the individual or the Cosmic Jiva which imagines the world-experience including that of every individual. On the answer of this question will depend whether he is a Subjective or an Objective Idealist. Vasistha raises the problem and answers it in a satisfactory way reconciling the claims of both Solipsism and Realism, which does not concern us here.

II. ILLUSIONISM (Maya-vada) Having established the ideality or the imaginary nature of the world-experience, both Gaudapada and Vasistha proceed to point out another very important feature of the objects of experience, namely, their temporary appearance in the field of consciousness. We have seen that the objects of the waking life are similar to those of dream-state. But we generally regard the contents of a dream to be unreal because they do not persist for a long time, but come into consciousness for a short while and vanish. Similarly in the waking experience we regard some objects as unreal appearances when they are perceived for a short while but vanish soon from view. But is not the experience of everything in this world of a similar nature for the eternally existent Self, before whose vision numberless objects have come and gone? The Eternal Self has experienced the beginning and end of innumerable objects. Every object of experience has in the consciousness of the Self a beginning and an end before and after which the object was not and will not be. But can that which is real ever cease to be? If it is real it must ever exist. A temporary appearance cannot be said to be real. This is how both Gaudapada and Vasistha argue. The real, according to Vasistha, is "that which never comes to an end, and that which has a beginning

and an end cannot be real in any way, for real is only that which has neither a beginning nor an end." Gaudapada also repeats the same line literally in K.II.6; and in K.IV.31 which has been translated as "That which is naught at the beginning and is so also at the end, does not necessarily not exist in the middle." "On this logic of reality the objects of experience cannot be said to be real at all (K.II.32)." But do they not appear to be so? So do illusions and dream-objects appear, but we all know them to be unreal. "All things seen in dream" says Gaudapada, "are unreal, being seen within the body; for in so small a space how could objects exist and be seen." So on and so forth (K.IV.33,34,35,36,39, II.1,2,3). "Objects therefore are illusory appearances though they appear to be real (K.II.6). That they serve some purpose (and so should be regarded as real in opposition to the illusory appearances which do not serve any purpose) comes to naught in dream, hence (on the previous above-mentioned principle) they are illusory appearances (K.II.7). Even in dream we make the usual distinction of unreal, calling the subjective imagination within the dream unreal and the objectively existent things as real, as we do in the waking experience. Yet in fact both are illusory appearances (K.II.9,10)." So, as Vasistha says, all objects of experience should be viewed as "illusory appearances, visions of ignorance, mere maya (literally that which does not exist), delusions of consciousness and dream-like appearances; like illusory water in a desert; like an unsubstantial rainbow; like the appearance of a snake in a rope; like an unreal city in the sky; like a second moon in the vision of a diseased eye; and like the movement of trees in the vision of an intoxicated fellow;" etc.etc.

In this connection, it will be interesting to note in the Karikas as well as in the Yoga-

Vasistha the connotation of the term Maya which has played a very conspicuous part in the subsequent philosophy of India, and has very often been misunderstood both by the followers of Mayavada and its opponents; specially because Gaudapada is generally believed to be the father of Mayavada in Vedanta. The word Maya occurs in some eight Karikas of Gaudapada: (II 12; III 19, 27, 28; IV.58,59,61 69). A careful consideration of the significance of the word will bring one to the conclusion that by Gaudapada Maya is used in the sense of peculiar power which enables its possessor to create some forms which do not exist in the sense of the really existent, yet give the appearance of their being so, and also enables him to multiply or change himself into any number of forms, without, however, himself undergoing the slightest modification. The products of such power were characterised as Maya-maya and sometimes as maya even. An illustration of such a peculiar capacity was, in old times when people did not know well the secret of the so-called magic, found in the activity of a magician. Sankara very often uses this illustration to make people understand Maya. But a careful study of the stories of Lavana and Gadhi given by Vasistha in illustration of Maya will convince us that maya is not like the power of a magician so much as like that of a Hypnotist, in the best possible sense, who by his thought-power can produce, and was able to produce in ancient India, before the vision of others, or even of himself, things and scenes which do not exist in reality, but appear to exist. Maya is thus, according to Vasistha, a power or capacity of the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, to think out or "concire" forms which come to exist when thus thought out or imagined. "It is the Creative power of the Ultimate Reality and it can imagine the world-appearance as the

thought-power of an ordinary man can build his world of imagination. It is called by the names of Prakrti, Divine Will, Creative Force, and the World-Maya."

So there is nothing very peculiar about the word Maya which has been very much misunderstood in the later philosophy of India. The reason why it has been misunderstood is perhaps the sense of illusoriness accompanying the word. If the conception of the real and the unreal of Gauda-pada and Vasistha stated above that "all that has a beginning and an end is unreal" is accepted, it will be quite clear that except Consciousness which experiences the beginning and end of all objects everything is unreal, however long it may appear in the field of consciousness. In this sense all the products of Maya are unreal, for they have a beginning and end of all objects everything is unreal, however long it may appear in the field of consciousness. In this sense all the products of Maya are unreal, for they have a beginning and an end. The activity of the Di-vine Will itself having a beginning and an end is unreal. And Will has no meaning when not ac-tive; it, being merged in and become one with the Infinite and Absolute Consciousness then, is also called unreal both by Gaudapada and Vasishtha.

III. ACOSMISM. (AJATAVADA) Just as Kalpana-vada paves a way for maya-vada so does the latter do for ajata-vada or acosmism. Acosmism is the doc-trine which denies the existence of the world of plurality and change in and before the truly real. It shuns a compromise between real and unreal, be-ing and non-being, perfection and imperfection, logic and life. It is rigorously logical, and pursues logic to its furthest flight, caring lit-tle for the consequences and ridicule from the man in the street, for the opinion of whom the Pragmatists care much. For it truth is truth and and not stand in need of respecting the so-called

demands of life. Parmenides and Spinoza, Vasistha, Gaudapada and Sankara have been the greatest acosmistic thinkers of the world.

In philosophy even, Acosmism is the least understood doctrine. It is often talked of only to be criticised and ridiculed, and seldom to be sympathetically understood. Yet Gaudapada asserts twice in his Karikas (III, 48; IV, 71) that "It is the highest truth." So also does Vasistha say that "It is the most victorious doctrine of the Spiritual Science that in reality there is neither ignorance nor illusion but only Brahman resting peaceful in its own glory."

We have no time here to go through all the arguments which Gaudapada and Vasistha give in favour of Acosmism. We shall therefore be content only to notice a few points in this connection. It is not difficult to grasp the logic of Acosmism only if we raise our vision a little higher than the usual and be strictly logical apart from the consequences. Gaudapada names his view Ajata-vada (non-production) and argues for it thus: "That which cannot be produced (for it is already there), and that which is not cannot also be produced (for it will be something coming out of nothing which is quite absurd)(K.IV.5)." "It is inconceivable that the unborn and the immortal which ever exists can ever become mortal (VI.6)" for as we have seen beginning and end imply unreality and the real is always real. Moreover, change is an illogical conception for it implies the transformation of a thing into something else. But how can anything change into what it is not? If it is something, it must ever remain what it is. "The real can never become unreal, for the one <u>is</u> and the other is not (K.IV.7-9)."

These statements are not mere quibbles; behind them lies a great truth which must not be ignored. The Principle of Identity in formal

logic requires in the judgment 'S is P' the presence of some identical X which persists unchanged both in S and P, to make the judgment possible. If we look deep into this problem, we shall discover that from the point of view of X there is neither S nor P for X always subsists as X unchanged in spite of its changes of form from another point of view. This is made clear by Vasistha through a number of illustrations. Think of a gold ornament, a bracelet or a ring. From our points of view bracelet and ring are realities, for they, as bracelet and ring, have a peculiar value for us which mere gold has not. But if we look at them from the point of view of gold as such, bracelet and ring have no existence in and for gold. God is gold and nothing other than itself. In the same way Brahman ever remains Brahman in itself and never experiences or undergoes change. Take another illustration. We say that water can be changed into several forms, solid, liquid, and gaseous, etc. But if there is anything like water which can equally stand as the subject of all these forms, does it actually undergo any change in any one of those forms? If it did it will not be water everywhere. Water, therefore, exists as the immutable X behind all these forms quite untouched by the change. So is the Absolute Reality untouched by any change of forms that we perceive, no matter if they appear to be real from our point of view; for our limited point of view itself is non-being from the point of view of the Absolute Reality (K.II.32,).

Both Vasistha and Gaudapada severely examine the category of Causality and the analogy of the seed and tree, and show in the interest of Acosmism that both are fictions in relation

to the Absolute Reality. The conception of cause and effect, says Vasistha, can hold true of the forms where one form precedes the other, but that which underlies all forms and so does not precede or follow anything, for it is present always and everywhere, cannot be related to any form as its cause or effect. Even on the Sankhya conception of causality which means the transformation of something into another, Brahman cannot be said to be the cause of the world-appearance, for, how can that which is transformed into something be real, and how can that which admits even of partial change be called permanent (K.IV.11;)?

As regards the 'Seed-and-tree' analogy, that too cannot be applicable to Brahman and the world. For, Gaudapada says, "the illustration of seed-and-tree being itself a part of what requires to be proved cannot be taken as a proving illustration (K.IV.20). "How can that," argues Vasistha, "which is so subtle in its nature as to be even beyond mind, be the seed of the gross physical objects having visible forms, etc. etc. "A seed, moreover, cannot begin to germinate unless there are some external favourable circumstances to help germination, nothing like which is present in the Absolute Brahman. Again, a seed ceased to be itself and perishes altogether in giving rise to a tree, but Brahman cannot be said to perish like this." The only way therefore, if any, in which we can relate these forms to the reality is the analogy of dream, although in reality they are as unreal as the son of a barren woman (K.III.28). "They, in fact, neither exist apart from the perception of the particular consciousness of the experiencer, nor involve any change in the being

of the reality. Like their production the production of the world is false; like their growth the growth of this world is false; like their enjoyment the enjoyment of this world is false; like their destruction the destruction of this world is false."

Both Gaudapada and Vasistha thus conclude that from the highest point of view, ie. in truth, nothing is ever produced and that the truth of philosophy is Ajati-vada (K.IV.3) or Ajata-vada which Vasistha enunciates thus: "There is nothing like the world in reality, not even in name; Brahman alone is real, and everything is in reality Brahman." This is the boldest truth ever declared by Philosophy, which will ever assert itself in spite of the fact that much has been said against it and much can be said against it.

IV. THE METHOD OF SELF-REALISATION (YOGA).

Philosophy in India has never been merely an intellectual pursuit; and truth was never meant only to be discovered and appreciated. Philosophy was to be lived and truth to be realised. "Having known the truth within and without," urges Gaudapada, "one should become the truth, should ever rest in it, and should be firm in it (K.II.38)." Vasistha divides thinkers into two classes, namely, the wise (jnani) and those to whom knowledge is a helping friend in the world, (jnana-vandhu), and prefers the ignorant to the latter. A wise man according to him is "one who having come to know the truth brings it into practice." This is why almost every system of Indian philosophy devotes a portion of it to Yoga or the method of practical realisation of the truth discovered by the system. Let us now briefly find out the Yoga of Gaudapada and Vasistha.

The truth according to both is the One

Absolute Reality without a second by its side, resting in its own blissful essence without the slightest touch of change or multiplicity in it. It is the essence of myself as well as of the universe. This is the ideal before us as long as it is not a living experience with us. To be anything other than that is the bondage and suffering we are experiencing. But what is that which binds and limits us? Both Gaudapada and Vasistha think that it is the mind which by its consciring activity creates limitation and bonds for us. It has the power to imagine any thing which it creates by its own power (K.II.18-29). It imagines the world of change and multiplicity, and causes its own bondage and freedom. If the consciring activity of the mind be somehow stopped, the whole trouble will be over. "The whole duality, of whatever form, is simply a creation of the mind, and it is never experienced when mind is naught (K.III.31)." In the same way Vasistha says, "Mind is the nave of the wheel of the world-experience, and if it could be stopped from movement the whole trouble would be over. If through intelligent effort the cinsciring activity of the mind is stopped, the world-experience will vanish etc. etc."

Now how to bring the activity of the mind under control and stop it? In answer to this question Gaudapada tells us: "When mind ceases from imagining, by a knowledge of the truth of the Atman, it remains at rest for want of things to cognise (K.III.32)." Vasistha deals with the subject very thoroughly and gives a very detailed scheme of mind-control which we can review here in bare outline only. According to him there are three chief methods of controlling the mind, any one or all of which might be practised. They are Brahma-bhavana, i.e. imagining oneself to

be identical with the Absolute Reality with its negative accompaniment of Abhavabhavana, i.e. imagining the non-existence of finite things; (2) Prana-spandana-nirodha, i.e. the control of the movement of the vital airs, which is said to be very intimately connected with the movement of the mind; (3) Vasanatyaga, i.e. giving up all desires, for desire is said to be the motive power of the mind which comes to naught without desire. There are also other minor methods suggested by Vasistha for the control of mind, a bare mention of which will not be out of place here. They are:--1. Becoming convinced of the unreality of the mind itself, 2.Giving up imagining-activity, i.e. sankalpa; 3. Having a disregard for the objects of enjoyment, 4. control of the senses. 5. Annihilation of the egoistic tendencies; 6. Attempt to realise cosmic consciousness; 7 Practice of disinterestedness. 8. Realisation of equanimity in all states; 9. Giving up the sense of being an agent of actions. 10. Mental renunciation of everything.11. Practice of always being merged in the idea of the Self. etc.

These details need not confuse an aspirant. All these methods ultimately are only the so many optional, but at the root identical, ways of breaking the limitations that we have gathered around us and consequently have surrounded us with a false, yet hard to crack, shell of individuality, which acts as an obstruction to the flood of Divine Light and Bliss which are ever ours, but from which we have disinherited ourselves by being satisfied with the glow of smaller lights; which, however, we now and then discover, are not sufficient for the craving of our heart and for the satisfaction of our intellect both of which ever yearn for the Infinite.

This is in short what Gaudapada and Vasistha

teach us in common. There is no doubt that much can be said against this kind of philosophy, yet before we stand up to criticise them, it is our duty to understand them sympathetically and honestly, so that we may not in the haste of judging them add to the already existing lot of blunders.

THE SUMMUM BONUM (PARAMA PURUSHARTHA) or A STUDY IN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY by V.B. SHRIKHANDE. @@

The question of the Summum Bonum is one of the most important questions that have engaged the thought of philosophers through all the ages. It is the principal question of Ethics, the science of moral judgments. In order to explain these judgments of value it is necessary to discover the standard of value and the only satisfactory standard is to be found in the End towards which all human actions are necessarily directed. Religion, as the art of human conduct, has to prescribe forms of good behaviour for those whose lives it is called upon to guide and organise and in doing this it has to keep clearly before itself the end the achievement of which makes human life a success. The inquiry is very important for philosophy also, considered as the explanation of the universe as a whole, since the search for this explanation is an intellectual activity and hence must be regulated by the end to which all our activities are means. It is true that the process of acquiring knowledge is determined at every step by the ideal of unity of nature (or experience) but the attainment of this ideal gives the satisfaction it does (or has value) only because it con-

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@@ 3RD INDIAN PHILOS.CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS.1927.

tributes to the achievement of the highest purpose of life as a whole. All Indian systems of philosophy make this relation between philosophy and the Summum Bonum clear and avowedly undertake to lead their followers to the final goal of human life. With us, philosophy takes its rise not in wonder in general (as Plato and Aristotle say) but in the uneasiness of mind resulting from the presence of evil in the world. It is this which sets us thinking and allows us no rest till the problem is satisfactorily solved. It is of course possible for a system of philosophy to arrive at the conclusion that, as the universe is constituted, this uneasiness is man's permanent lot but this disappointing result will not mark the end of our thinking and is sure to be followed by renewed efforts till we succeed in convincing ourselves that the attainment of the theoretical ideal coincides with that of the practical. A detailed discussion of this point however is beyond the scope of this paper. It is proposed here only to determine the ultimate aim of all our activities.

First a word or two as to the nature of this inquiry. The highest good or the standard of value is something which is ultimately desirable. There are things like health and wealth which are good or desirable only as means to some higher good. Indeed, our usual way of proving that any thing is desirable by showing that it is a means to something more valuable. But this kind of proof would hold good only if there is something which is intrinsically good or desirable, not as a means to any thing else. This is called the highest good or good-in-itself and as all proof of value depends upon it is also called ultimate standard of value. Our question now is, How can we know what the

ultimate good is and how can we prove its value? It is obviously not a matter of choice; for all choice must be guided by some standard and therefore pre-supposes it. So the ultimate standard must be fixed by our nature. In his proof of the utilitarian principle J.S. Mill says that just as if a thing is seen it must be visible, similarly if a thing is desired it must be desirable. This is clearly a mistake; for there are so many undesirable things which are actually desired by us. But when the question is "What is ultimately desirable?" the correct answer is "That which is ultimately desired." If there is any thing which man desires by his very nature as the final end of all his acts, then this cannot be undesirable for the simple reason that a thing is regarded as undesirable only when it prevents us from obtaining some higher object of desire but there is nothing higher than the ultimate object.

The standard of value or the 'ultimately desirable' being thus necessarily the same as the end of our actions or the 'ultimately desired,' we have now to ask, What is this final aim of our lives? If it is some thing which we actually desire, how is it that there is such a difficulty about knowing it and how is it that different persons give different answers when asked about it? Can we desire anything without being conscious of it? In particular, is it possible that we should be pursuing an object every minute of our lives without knowing what it is? The difficulty will disappear when we bring to our mind the fact that for the occurrence of mental activity a vague awareness of the object to which it is directed is sufficient. A clear consciousness which will enable us to name and define the object is not necessary.

The point may be illustrated by taking the example of the science of logic which is an attempt to make ourselves clearly conscious of those principles of correct thinking which all of us (including even children and savages) are actually employing in our ordinary and scientific thinking. It is only reflection on our thinking activity that leads to a clear knowledge of our own aims. The history of logic shows the difficulty of this reflective process and also how there can be differences of opinion and mistakes about what we are ourselves doing and seeking. There is thus nothing paradoxical in the question about the ultimate object of our desire. It is only by means of careful reflection that we can come to know it. Every person who wishes to regulate his life consciously so as to ensure success must discover the end which is already guiding his own mind and the mind of every one else.

But is it true to say that all men are pursuing the same end? A glance at the various tastes and pursuits of men is sufficient to throw doubt on the statement. "One man's meat is another man's poison" as the proverb says; some men are very fond of music, there are others who find no pleasure in it; some men are deeply interested in philosophy, others hate it. But on closer reflection it will appear that these differences are with regard to the subordinate ends or the means adopted for realising the final end. Every one of us pronounces judgments of right and wrong on the actions of others and we are sure that we are all using the words "right" and "wrong" with the same meaning, which implies that we are all applying the same standard. Even when we differ with regard to the moral quality of any act we do not attribute the difference to the

difference to the existence of our different standards but to the mistaken application by the other party of the same standard. We have already seen that the standard of value is necessarily the same as the end of our lives. Hence in spite of the differences of ways and means there is no doubt that the end is the same for all men. This reminds us of the beautiful words of the well-known hymn "Thou art the one destination of men resorting to different paths, straight or crooked, according to their various tastes, even as the ocean is the destination of all waters."

Before we proceed to discover the end, we have to draw a certain distinction failure to notice which has caused much confusion in the discussion of the present problem. "What do we desire ultimately" is a question distinct from whether it is attainable. It is true that before we can consciously <u>will</u> a course of action as means to any end we must believe that this end is realisable. We never attempt what we know to be impossible. But belief in the possibility of attainment is an indispensable condition of <u>will</u>,not of <u>desire</u>. We first form a desire and then consider the possibility of fulfilling it. If there is another and a conflicting desire in the mind at the same time, there is a struggle and the first desire may remain unfulfilled in case the object of the other appear to be more valuable. If the obstacle is presented not by another desire but by external difficulties (as in the case of a prisoner desiring escape) which are believed to be insurmountable, the result is disappointment which means not that the desire ceases to exist but only that it remains dormant. It forms what is called in modern psychology "a complex" and then it requires much

effort and skill on our part to discover it. Hence while asking ourselves about the object that we desire as the final end of our actions we must keep apart the question whether it is possible to realise it, as this properly arises after the first is answered. If on consideration of the constitution of the universe it appears that what we desire above every thing else is not within our reach we are landed in the pessimistic conclusion that man is doomed to failure. If on the other hand we reach the result that sooner or later, either in this life or another, we are bound to succeed, our entire outlook on life is brightened up and we can work with hope and energy. However that may be, both optimists and pessimists agree on the answer to the first question. This brings us to our main inquiry.

When we ask "What is it that all men are seeking during every hour of their lives?" the answer at first sight is very simple. It is agreed that all of us are in search of Happiness. In one sense this is true. Whenever any desire is fulfilled there is a sense of satisfaction and the object desired (whatever it is) may be said to be a means to this satisfaction. This accounts for the commonsense notion that every person does everything ultimately for the sake of happiness. But a little reflection will show that this is not a satisfactory answer to our question. To desire an object is to expect satisfaction from it. As soon as we are convinced that a certain object is not likely to give us the expected satisfaction we give up the desire for it also. Hence the ultimate object of desire is that the possession of which will give us permanent satisfaction or happiness. Here we see that happiness is the sense of having accomplished the end, i.e. the state which will be ours when

we have realised the end of our lives which (end) must be different from it (happiness). To adopt a distinction made by Prof. G.F.Stout, happiness is the end-state but not the end. Our question therefore really is, "What is that which will give us happiness?" To say that this is happiness is to say that happiness will give us happiness and hence to say nothing.

We shall now consider some answers to the question thus stated that have been given by great thinkers of the past and present times.

The first that naturally suggests itself is "Pleasure." It has been said that success in life consists in enjoying the greatest amount of pleasure including under this term both sensual and mental pleasures. The plausibility of this theory is due to the confusion made by its advocates between pleasure and happiness and it appears in its true colours when we distinguish these. Pleasure is the agreeable feeling that arises when some need, bodily or mental, is being fulfilled and must be distinguished from the state of rest or the feeling of satisfaction which supervenes when the need is completely fulfilled so that it ceases to exist. Bodily, sensual and intellectual pleasures correspond to the needs of the body, the senses and the intellect respectively. These needs arise from capacities, and the corresponding pleasures last till these capacities are exhausted. Happiness, on the other hand, is the sense of the absence of all needs and involves no excitement. Is pleasure understood in this sense the ultimate object of desire the accomplishment of which will give a man supreme satisfaction, that is, will make him feel that his life has been a complete success and that there is nothing further for him to de-

sire? Merely to ask this question is to answer it in the negative. Even taking the extreme case of an old man who has lived a life of continuous pleasure (which means an unbroken succession of pleasures), will such a man feel that he has attained complete success and that he is free from all want now? Our own experience of pleasures enables us to answer emphatically "No." There is really no completion of the process of enjoying pleasures. As Manu says "To fulfill a desire for an object of sense is like adding fuel to fire and enhancing it." Every pleasure is a temporary phenomenon and a past pleasure is no gain to us now. It only whets our appitite for future pleasure. Besides, it is not true to say that every desire is for pleasure inasmuch as pleasure results in the first instance when some desire or want is being fulfilled, which therefore, must be for something else. Moreover, for most pleasures we are dependent upon external objects and this sense of dependence involving an apprehension of their loss leads to an amount of disagreeable feeling which more than counter-balances the pleasure of enjoyment. We may go further and say that the very existence of desire on which pleasure is dependent involves a disagreeable feeling feeling of restlessness.

This has led some others to believe that complete independence of external objects ought to be our ideal in life and for attaining it we have to suppress all our desires for them. This ascetic view of life also involves much confusion of thought. We have seen that success in life depends upon our obtaining what we really and ultimately desire. Can we say that, in every thing we do, independence is our one object of pursuit? When-

ever we desire any object are we thinking of being free from desire for it? When we put the question in the latter form the contradiction becomes apparent. In one sense indeed desire or speaking generally, a conative process is directed towards its own cessation but this is the end-state not the end (or object) of the process. When the one desire of our life is fulfilled, there is necessarily a freedom from all desires but this latter cannot be an object of that desire. The practical difficulties in the way of the ascetic are not mentioned here as they relate to the possibility of attaining the end which, it will be remembered, has been carefully excluded from the present enquiry. It is sufficient to point out here that the exclusion of all desire cannot be the ultimate object of desire though it may be the result of our having accomplished the ultimate object. As has already been seen, desires arise from needs and needs from capacities. The suppression of desires therefore means the suppression of these capacities themselves which is akin to self-annihilation, a wholly negative ideal.

According to many other thinkers led by Aristotle, it is the harmonious development, not the suppression, of all our capacities that is the final aim of our lives. Though at first sight this appears to be the right conception, it is full of difficulties. First, as we find human nature to-day, it involves tendencies towards evil as well as tendencies towards good. Should these also be developed? If it is said that we should take into account only those capacities of man (e.g. reasoning) which distinguish him from the lower animals, we observe that among these distinctive faculties there is the power of regulating the desires connected with our bodily life and we

and we must know how far these should be encouraged or checked. And taking the peculiarly human faculties it is not possible to know what share of development is due to each of them. Harmony itself depends upon each receiving its due share and hence we cannot refer to harmony as determining that share. When the followers of Aristotle are faced by this question they refer back to the recognised forms of good conduct. But this means that the goodness of conduct is explained by the harmonious development of our faculties and this in turn by good conduct as it is known to us from our ordinary moral experience. Those who take the perfection of human nature (understood in the sense of harmonious development) as the end of human life and the standard of value cannot get out of this circle. It was the comparison of human life with a work of art that gave rise to this conception of harmonious development in the minds of the ancient Greeks. Man's natural inclinations and powers were considered to be like some plastic material to which he is called upon to give the best possible form and this was thought to be characterised by the due proportions of the various parts. But we may very well ask whether this harmony carries the evidence of its value with itself. An appeal to experience does not show that all our desires are the expression of the need of harmony carries the evidence of its value with itself. An appeal to experience does not show that all our desires are the expression of the need of harmony.

In fact all theories of the end that are not based upon a proper analysis of desire are bound be be misleading. Whenever we desire anything because there is a sense of incompleteness in ourselves and the belief that the object desired will make us complete. So

when we are hungry it is food that we desire; in sickness, health; in poverty, wealth; when conscious of our ignorance, knowledge. If a poor man like Socrates does not desire wealth it is because he does not believe that he is incomplete without it. This shows that anything becomes an object of desire because of the belief (true or false) that it is a part of our self. As soon as we come to know that it is not a part of the self it ceases to be desired. It was this knowledge that made even our ancient kings renounce wealth, home and kingdom and retire into the forest. We thus see that the Self is our one object of desire. When the great sage Yajnavalkya, according to the story in the Brihadaranyaka, proposed to divide his material estate between his two wives, Maitreyi, the younger of the two, who was a student of philosophy, asked him whether wealth would make her immortal. The sage replied that it would give her all material comforts but never immortality. When his wife implored him to put her on the path to immortality he began by pointing out to her the real object of desire. Every thing (e.g. husband, wife, money, cattle) is loved for the sake of the Self; hence the Self is the only object of immediate interest and the one object of study.

Our analysis of desire shows not merely that the self is always the real object of desire but also that we are longing for its completion. The sense of incompleteness is what makes us uneasy and we are trying to remove it. But what is meant by a complete self? As long as it is limited in any way there is ground for uneasiness and for further desire. We have an illustration of this in the pursuit of wealth which occupies our thoughts for the most part in these days. Even if a man becomes

a multi-millionaire he is not satisfied, for his wealth is still limited and there can be more. For another illustration we may take the desire for long life. Even if the advance of science makes it possible for man to live for one thousand years even this is a limited period and he would like to live longer. This means that man will be satisfied with nothing less than immortality. Even the suicide is no exception to this for his object in putting and end to his life is only to make himself free from the troubles incidental to his association with it. But to become immortal is to be unlimited only in time. There are other limitations which are sure to cause uneasiness. Every finite thing is limited in space and one who believes that he is finite must desire freedom from this limitation also, which means that he is longing to be all-pervading. But supposing a person becomes immortal and all-pervading, he will not be altogether free from the sense of incompleteness as long as there are other persons and things having an existence distinct from and hence limiting his. As the Upanishad says "The existence of another is a source of fear." Hence a complete self must be immortal, all-pervading and one without a second. We may express all this by saying that the one desire of our heart thro' out our lives is to attain Infinity. When Narada approached the sage Sanatkumara with a long list of his achievements in the sphere of learning and complained that though he had mastered every science and art he had not found peace of mind, the great teacher advised him first to discover the ultimate object of his desire by the words "Seek (the conditions of) happiness" and gradually led him up to the answer that the one condition of happiness is Greatness (Infinity), adding that one cannot

be happy with a little i.e. limited.

It is interesting to see how the answer that we have reached comprehends the truth contained in each of the other answers that were examined and found unsatisfactory. The pleasure-theory is on the right track in so far as it insists upon the fulfilment, not suppression, of desire as an indispensable condition of attaining peace. It is wrong in saying that the object is always pleasure in the sense explained. The independence theory is right in so far as it has grasped the fact that the pursuit of objects of sense for fulfilling our desires is bound to fail as the desires are recurring and the objects are perishable and may also be out of our reach. But it errs in advising us to suppress our desires; for this, even if it were possible, would only lead to discontent not to satisfaction. As the Gita (Chap.II) says, "Objects of sense do not lose their attraction by being kept away from a man and do not thereby leave the mind." The perfectionists are under the influence of a true instinct in thinking that man aspires after perfection but it is a mistake to say that this consists in a harmonious development of our nature.

When a man is convinced that his real desire is for a complete self he gives up his attachment to external objects and becomes one who consciously desires the self. When he knows that his self is really infinite, that desire is fulfilled and he becomes one whose desire is fulfilled. Finally when the one desire of his heart is thus satisfied, there being nothing else to be desired, he becomes free from desire.

It has to be admitted that very few, if at all, are aware of this deepest need of every

man but, as was pointed out at an earlier stage of this discussion, though in most persons the consciousness of it is not clear, it is not altogether absent. Psychological self-observation reveals its subconscious influence and serves to bring it into full consciousness. Belief in the possibility of attaining this end is also another important factor for awakening us to a lively consciousness of this need which is only dormant in most of us. So in conclusion we ask Is this end attainable and if so, how? The Advaita philosophy gives the answer.

PHILOSOPHY OF BRADLEY: by K.H. KELKAR. @@

1. When a student of Philosophy thinks of Bradley, he is reminded of his famous metaphysical essay "Appearance and Reality" and there arises immediately in his mind the picture of a dialectician, who by his fascinating yet devastating logic, swept every thing from primary qualities up to the Soul--and from the soul to its ideals of truth, beauty and goodness into the limbo of appearance. In this picture, however, he is not altogether wrong, if we remember that almost all critics, who are opposed to the teaching of Bradley, characterise his philosophy as destructive of all that is valuable in human culture and civilisation. Thus Mr. Caird describes Bradley's intellect as "all blade and no handle," and Mr. Ward calls his dialectic subtle and subversive. It appears that much of the opposition to Bradley rests upon the tendency to judge a system of philosophy, not by its truth, but by its conformity with the prevailing moral and religious views.

2. It is necessary to refer briefly to the new movement of idealism which began in England in

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the sixties and the seventies of the last century. The aim of this movement was to call attention of the English-speaking people to the standpoint of Hegelian Idealism, and in this way to place British thought again in the great line of the continental tradition from Plato to Hegel. The first to arouse interest in this great movement was Thomas Hill Green. Profoundly influenced by Wordsworth and Carlyle, Green developed a peculiar religious idealism, for the philosophical groundwork of which he was indebted to Kant and Hegel. Green exerted an extraordinary influence upon the young students of Oxford through the enthusiasm of his personality. The Prolegomena to Ethics, his monumental work, is based on the conviction that the moral life is a realisation of the Divine purpose and the spirit of God is present in all goodness wherever present. Bradley does not merely continue the work of his illustrious predecessors but has given a new direction to the idealistic movement.

The spirit of Bradley's writings:--In all his writings, whether ethical, logical or philosophical, his interest is purely theoretical. In this Bradley essentially differs from Green whose writings were a source of inspiration to students who seriously thought about moral and religious ideals. On the other hand, Bradley has no intention to set up either as a teacher or a preacher. He has no desire to found a school, but only to stimulate a few persons, with the ability and opportunities for the task, to take metaphysics seriously and to think over its problems. It is true that Bradley's criticism of popular ideas of Ethics and Religion appear lofty and contemptuous.

3. For Bradley, the intellectual effort to

understand reality was the most effective way to experience the Divine. But he is far from the opinion that the metaphysician is a person who is consecrated to "some what" that is too high for the great mass of mankind. Genuine philosophy can never justify spiritual pride, however much the philosopher himself may be prone to it. Thus it is clear that a spirit of modesty pervades all the writings of Bradley.

4. Let us now try to understand how Bradley has applied to various aspects of human experience the fundamental principle which he inherited from Hegel, namely the idea of a whole or organised system as the criterion of what we must hold to be true and good. He starts with the assumption of the reality of the Absolute as a single all-inclusive and perfectly harmonious experience which is victorious over all the difficulties which beset the human understanding and within which all the elements, found more or less in conflict in ordinary experience, so fall as to form a harmonious whole.

5. Bradley starts with the commonly accepted truth that morality--at all its levels, implies the distinction between the self as it happens to exist and finds itself here and there and the ideal self or the good will as the end which is superior to all individuals and which is capable of confronting the wandering desires of the struggling moral agents as a law or an ought. It is true that the ideal of systematic life satisfies the normal, decent and serious man, when he has been long enough in the world to know what he wants. But we cannot ignore the impulse which continually urges us to widen our empire over the sensuous facts not only within us but without us as well. This is so, because we feel somehow that we are not mere finite individuals. Hence the ideal,

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is present at every step, and every step

which will be ultimately satisfactory, cannot be less than the Infinite Whole, harmonious and all-inclusive, which has not only no limit from outside, but outside which nothing really is. But morality is practical activity, and the moral ideal in order to be actually lived has to assume a concrete form. The importance of the chapter "my station and its duties" lies in this that it helps us to develop the abstract conception of the moral law implied by the formula "Duty for duty's sake" into a concrete ethical universal which is not only objective but leaves nothing of the individual outside it. The clue to this development lies in the psychological fact that an individual, though numerically separate, is continually passing beyond this separateness, because of his community with other selves.

6. It marks the end of an old and the beginning of a new period in logical study. It sounded the death-knell of the equational or substitutional logic of the syllogism, by the proof that the ground of inference is not an abstract identity but the relation of elements within a systematic whole. At the close of this book, Bradley's break with the idealistic position of Green and Hegel becomes explicit. He abandons the view, common to his predecessors, that thought and reality are identical. To Bradley the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as being cold and ghost-like.

7. The Hegelian principle so interpreted is the key-note of Appearance and Reality--by far Bradley's most important book.

This remarkable book has probably exerted more influence upon metaphysical thinking than any other book of the last forty years. In it the conceptions of popular thought and

of metaphysics alike are subjected to detailed relentless criticism. The investigation is based on the recognition of reality as opposed to appearance and consists in the examination of the claims of the commonly recognised forms of reality to ultimate self-sustaining being, in the light of the criterion which helps us to distinguish between lower and higher grades of reality. The clue to the nature of the criterion is found in the unity of that immediate experience, sentence or feeling which discursive thought breaks into distinct subjects and objects. This lower or infra-relational unity of feeling suggests dimly to us the nature of the higher or supra-relational unity, in which the differences of the finite or phenomenal world are overcome and fused in a single and all-inclusive harmonious whole. Accordingly the criteria of reality are inclusiveness or expansion and harmony or self-consistency. The result of this investigation is to establish the ultimate inadequacy of all our so-called knowledge. This is inevitable, because every endeavour of thought to characterise reality results in contradictions. It fails to grasp fully the nature of reality as is experienced actually or (potentially). Our thought is always aspiring to something more than personality and our morality to something higher than all morals. Thus Philosophy, according to Bradley, leads to a healthy scepticism. He lays more stress on the impossiblity of a conclusion that on the possible closer determination of Reality. He, therefore, attaches too little positive importance to special or empirical sciences. But as Hoffding remarks, scepticism is hardly the correct expression for Bradley's point of view. He does not rest content with a cleft between Appearance and Reality. The highest is present at every step, and every step

has its truth. There are many grades and stages; but all are indispensable. We can find no province of the world so important that the Absolute does not dwell therein. In the light of these statements, it becomes justifiable to call Bradley a mystic, and that he certainly is when his thought comes to rest.

8. Bradley has once more emphasised in clear terms, and with a dialectic irresistible to those who are willing to repeat Bradley's intellectual experiment with uncompromising thoroughness, the ancient truth that the Absolute or the Brahma--as the all-comprehensive concrete universal--is the presupposition and explanation of all that is and of all that is valuable in life, science, art, morality, religion and philosophy. This truth seems to have been forgotten by the modern ethical culture movement which has for its foundation the belief that man is the centre and the hero of the universe. Hence the first element of value in Bradley's Philosophy is its correction of this tendency. As a matter of fact Bradley never rated the powers of human self very high. Thus to him, "The fact of appearance and the diversity of its particular spheres are inexplicable. Why there are appearances and why appearances of such various kinds are questions not to be answered. The nature of the Absolute whole lies beyond our knowledge. In this respect Bradley appears to differ from his predecessors who believed that thought itself would resolve the difficulties which thought itself had created. But to Bradley contradiction is inherent in the very nature of thought. Hence for him no thinking can, as such, reveal the nature of the real as it actually is. The nature of the Absolute reality can be found only in a higher form of experience called intuition, in which

the work of thought is preserved. "In this experience the knower no longer regards himself a particular, but as the whole including himself." The point to be noted is that Bradley's intuition does not break with our ordinary thought. It is, as the poet Wordsworth says, reason in its most exalted mood. This does not mean, however, that Bradley has abandoned the central principle of the British idealistic movement. Both by reason of his clear conception of this famous principle and by his fruitful application of it to life and its problems, Bradley's place is secure in this great movement. Not only this, but his philosophy marks a step of advance over his predecessors. As Prof. Muirhead says, the progress consists in this that he made the movement free from the last taint of intellectualism by conceiving of the Absolute in a more concrete way as the reality which the human mind, at one level, feels without knowing it, at another pressing on it with the force of the ideals which its own nature pledges it to reach after and so far as may be to realise in the actual world, at another still as that which it may apprehend (if only in rare moments) as an encompassing presence with which it feels itself at one.

9. Throughout his writings, with a rare single-mindedness, Bradley holds fast to two positions--one is that Reality does indeed, reveal itself in all the ideas which we employ in science, art, religion and philosophy--But the other is that these revelations (appearances) are inadequate, although they are real and valuable in their own places. Thus though the Absolute of Bradley reminds us of the absolute of Spinoza, they are not identical. This is so, because, the absolute of Bradley, as the concrete universal, does not destroy differences so as to make the diverse finite

centres illusive.

The third and the last valuable service of his writings is that he has shown that the study of metaphysics is not the sovereign remedy for the ills of the soul. And at the end of "Essays on Truth and Reality," Bradley points out the necessity of a new religion which would justify in due proportion all human interests and at the same time to supply the intellect with that to which it can hold with confidence. Bradley has shown that it is possible to experience the Divine by best logic. He tells us that his metaphysics inspired him with a higher and a wider confidence and a better grounded sympathy with all that is best in life. He, however, hints that this may not be the outcome for all who try to reach the Divine through metaphysics. For such person the way to Divine life is through the gate of the best life. And for such persons a religion, which metaphysics is unable to justify in some sense, is most valuable. In the light of these facts, it becomes sheer misunderstanding of his writings to say that Bradley was opposed to all religion. In these circumstances, it appears reasonable to conclude that the merit of Bradley does not lie merely in the 'disciplinary uplift' which he gives. His writings are full of suggestions to those who would endeavour to solve the deepest problems of the reflective man. The courage and sincerity, with which he faced the ultimate problems of human life, entitle him to be called "a philosopher's philosopher."

BRADLEY AND SANKARA: by R. DAS.@@

1. Those who have gone through the writings of Bradley and Sankara are sure to have

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marked the striking resemblance that exists between the thoughts of these two great philosophers. But their philosophies, although similar in may respects, are not without some very important differences. We propose to study in this short paper some of the salient points of their agreement as well as of their difference. We shall try also to see if Bradley was true to his own principles in deviating from a view which is largely the view of Sankara.

The absolute or Brahma is the pivot of Sankara's philosophy as well as of Bradley's. Both of them may be said to be absolutely real. As regards the nature of the absolute, the agreement between Sankara and Bradley appears also to be striking. The absolute of course, is one and has no second.

2. The absolute sustains no relations, which imply unreality, and consequently there are no differences (Bheda) in the absolute. How is this absolute to be known? Can we know it by intellect or thought? To this question both Sankara and Bradley are very emphatic in giving a negative answer. Bradley thinks that our thought is always relational; it disjoins predicate from subject and although it attempts to synthesise them into a unity, it fails to restore the original unity destroyed by it. "It (thought) has to recognise the division of the "what" from the "that" and it cannot so join these aspects as to get rid of mere ideas and arrive at actual reality." Thought expresses itself in judgments, but in no judgment can we encompass the absolute reality. "If there is no judgment there is no thought, and if there is no difference, there is no judgment nor any self-consciousness. But if, on the other hand, there is a difference, then the subject is beyond the predicted content." When we remember that in Bradley's

theory, reality is the subject of all judg-
ments, we have in these words a demonstra-
tion of the futility of thought to express
adequately the nature of reality. Thought,
it is seen, moves in the sphere of ideal
content and cannot get down to actual reality.
Thought only manipulates ideas, which have
been, in a way, estranged from reality, and
although it refers them back to reality, the
bond of unity, once severed, does not get
completely restored. We see therefore that
thought creates difference where there is
unity, and gives us ideal content when we
seek for actual fact.

Sankara too denies the possibility of
knowing the absolute by our intellect or
Buddhi. It is the essential nature of intel-
lect to make objects of things (as good as
to give only ideal contents for them). If
it knows anything, it knows it only as its
object. But according to Sankara the ulti-
mate reality is the absolute subject which
cannot, therefore, be known by thought or
intellect. For if it were to be known in this
way, it would forthwith become an object of
thought and thus become utterly different
from itself. Moreover, wherever thought has
scope, there is bound to be raised the
characteristic difference of knower and known
and the process of knowing. And when we know
that the absolute of Sankara does not tole-
rate any difference whatever, we at once see
that, for Sankara, the way of thought can
never be the way of knowing reality.
3. To Sankara as well as to Bradley, the
empirical world is a world of appearance
only. It is not ultimately real. The world
we see around us, is a world of space, time
and causality. We understand it in terms
substance and attribute, relation and quali-
ty. But all these categories of thought, by

which we conceive the world of experience, have been found by Bradley to suffer from inner self-contradiction. To his metaphysical scrutiny these ideas have revealed their utter self-discrepancy. So he concludes that the world, conceived through such self-contradictory notions, cannot give us reality but appearance. (non-contradiction is his test of reality). The idea of appearance, as used by Bradley, is essentially akin to the notion of mithya (false) used in Sankara's philosophy. What is mithya is not of course real (sat), but it is not altogether unreal (asat). It is something which is neither real nor unreal. Similarly Bradley says "Whatever is rejected as appearance is, for that very reason, no mere nonentity." So appearance is not altogether unreal, and it is not of course identical with reality, because it is distinguished from the latter. In appearance we do not meet with an emptiness of mere nothing. "What appears, for that sole reason, most indubitably is; and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it. In Sankara's philosophy, too, it is argued that if the world were altogether unreal, it would not have appeared at all. So it appears that in both the systems an identical conclusion is reached almost by the same arguments.

Thus we find that, besides believing in the absolute, on the three major subjects of philosophical enquiry, God, soul, and the world, both Bradley and Sankara are in complete agreement with each other. To make their agreement still more striking, the doctrine of the degrees of reality, upheld by Bradley, appears to bear some resemblance to Sankara's classification of being into three kinds: viz. absolutely real (paramarthika,) empirical or practical (vyavaharika) and illusory (pratibhasika). Just as Bradley thinks that there is being in everything

so does Sankara think that a kind of being is enjoyed by everything in the world. Even an illusory object has its being, although it is a being of the illusory kind (pratibhasika-satta.) The world of every-day experience enjovs only practical reality (vyavaharikasatta); and ultimate reality (paramarthika-satta) belongs to the absolute alone. Besides this difference of kind in reality, there seems to be a difference of degree in reality even according to Sankara. For the world of every-day experience seems to be more real than an illusory object, and the absolute is more real than the world. Now it appears that Sankara should not be averse to admitting degrees of reality in his system.

4. The agreement between Bradley and Sankara on the doctrine of the degrees of reality is rather superficial. In our opinion Sankara cannot really admit degrees in reality. His classification of reality into absolute (paramarthika), practical (vyavaharika) and illusory (pratibhasika) kinds does not really lend countenance to a theory which would find degrees in reality. This becomes clear when we once realise the significance of the words he uses in this connection, and also take into account his view of the nature of the ultimate reality. An illusory object is said to have some being. But what sort of being has it got? It has got the being of the illusory kind. But when we say that a thing has got a being of the illusory kind, we mean that its being is illusory, that is to say, is not real. An illusory object therefore has no real being. Similarly when we speak of practical reality (vyavaharika-satta), we really mean that it is some thing which is taken to be real for practical purposes only but is not really so. The word "practical" shows that it has no

philosophical justification. So from the point of view of truth, it is as unreal as the being of an illusory kind. In Sankara's opinion there cannot be any metaphysical difference between the world of every-day experience and an illusory object. Reality in the true sense (paramarthika) belongs only to the absolute, and of this there cannot be any variety or degree. When one speaks of pratibhasika, vyavaharika and paramarthika satta, we should not understand that three different sorts of reality present themselves to an angelic observer (in Alexander's sense) whose vision is true. They are not simultaneously present nor do they become successively real in the same sense. They represent only three different points of view or experiences which however are not equally valid. The deluded man takes an illusory object to be real when it is really not so. But the object is illusory only from the point of view of the practical man who is not, or is no longer, under any illusion. To the man under illusion the object is as real as anything else. Similarly the world of practical experience is real for us so gong as we have not seen the truth. But to be real for a deluded man or for a practial man, is not to be real in itself. Just as the illosory object is not there from the point of view of the practical man, even though the deluded person may see it to be there, so is the world of practical experience not there, from the point of truth, even though we may see it to be there. If the real state of things, i.e. reality as it is, is to be realised only when one has reached the absolute point of view, then neither the world nor illusory objects can be said to have any reality at all.

Moreover the ultimate reality for Sankara is an undifferentiated unity which cannot suffer

any division in itself. It is not possible, therefore, from his point of view, to speak of reality as being really divided into three kinds or as admitting of any difference in degree. Sankara's speaking of vyavaharika-satta was at best a concession to popular weakness.

Bradley too thinks that ultimate reality belongs to the absolute which is an all-inclusive, self-consistent system. But he also upholds the view that everything in the world is more or less real. There is an actual difference in degree between the realities of different things in the world. So according to Sankara there cannot be any such degrees in reality.

The difference between Sankara and Bradley comes out in bold relief when we turn our attention to their respective views about the nature of the absolute and its relation to the world of appearance.

5. The absolute of Sankara seems to exclude all appearances whereas the absolute of Bradley seems to include them all. The world of appearance, for Sankara, is an illusion and has therefore no metaphysical connection with the absolute reality. But from the point of Bradley we can think of an appearance as a part of the absolute, and of the whole world of appearances as constituting the absolute itself.

6. A thing is called an appearance because it involves self-contradiction and cannot therefore stand the test of non-contradiction, which is the criterion of reality. If we really believe that non-contradiction is the test of reality, and if also we find that something does not satisfy this test, then the obvious conclusion for us to draw is that the thing in question is not real. If it still persists in appearing, then the only

possible way, in which we can think of it, is that it is an illusion. For an illusion is only that which appears without being real.
7. The world of our experience is necessarily grasped in those moulds of thought which have been found by Bradley to be infected with self-discrepancy. If we are to think away the character of substance and attribute, quality and relation, activity and causality, space and time, the world will be reduced to nothing. But conceived in terms of these notions the world is nothing but appearance.

THE LIFE DIVINE by SRI AUROBINDO. (VOL.1 only)
1. Attempts are sometimes made to have done finally with questionings which have so often been declared insoluble by logical thought and to persuade men to limit their mental activities to the practical and immediate problems of their material existence in the universe; but such evasions are never permanent in their effect. Mankind returns from them with a more vehement impulse of inquiry or a more violent hunger for an immediate solution. By that hunger mysticism profits and new religions arise to replace the old that have been destroyed or stripped of significance by a scepticism which itself could not satisfy because, although its business was inquiry it was unwilling sufficiently to inquire. The attempt to deny or stifle a truth because it is yet obscure in its outward workings and too often represented by obscurantist superstition or a crude faith, is itself a kind of obscurantism.
2. Sankara's wordless, inactive Self and his Maya of many names and forms are equally disparate and irreconcilable entities; their rigid antagonism can terminate only by the dissolution of the multitudinous illusion into

AUROBINDO's "SUPERMIND" = ISVARA.

the sole Truth of an eternal Silence. Therefore, in these barren contradictions the human mind cannot rest satisfied. It must seek always a complete affirmation; it can find it only by a luminous reconciliation.

3. Only such a complete and catholic affirmation can all the multiform and apparently contradictory data of existence be harmonised and the manifold conflicting forces which govern our thought and life discover the central Truth which they are here to symbolise and variously fulfil.

4. The intellect is driven, having before it this multiplicity of elemental principles, to seek unity by reducing all ruthlessly to the terms of one. It attempts practically, in order to assert this one, to get rid of the others. To perceive the real source of their identity without this exclusive process, it must either have over-leaped itself or must have completed the circuit only to find that all equally reduce themselves to That which escapes definition or description and is yet not only real but attainable.

5. Therefore the time grows ripe and the tendency of the world moves towards a new and comprehensive affirmation in thought and in inner and outer experience and to its corollary, a new and rich self-fulfilment in an integral human existence for the individual and for the race.

6. But, first it is well that we should recognise the enormous, the indispensable utility of the very brief period of rationalistic Materialism through which humanity has been passing. For that vast field of evidence and experience which now begins to reopen its gates to us, can only be safely entered when the intellect has been severely trained to a clear austerity; seized on by unripe minds, it lends itself to the most

perilous distortions and misleading imaginations and actually in the past encrusted a real nucleus of truth with such an accretion of perverting superstitions and irrationalising dogmas that all advance in true knowledge was rendered impossible. It became necessary for a time to make a clean sweep at once of the truth and its disguise in order that the road might be clear for a new departure and a surer advance. The rationalistic tendency of Materialism has done mankind this great service.

7. In what regions of unsubstantial cloud and semi-brilliant fog or a murk visited by flashes which blind more than they enlighten, do they not lose themselves by that rash and premature adventure? An adventure necessary indeed in the way in which Nature chooses to effect her advance,--for she amuses herself as she works,--but still, for the Reason, rash and premature.

It is necessary, therefore, that advancing Knowledge should base herself on a clear, pure and disciplined intellect. It is necessary, too, that she should correct her errors sometimes by a return to the restraint of sensible fact, the concrete realities of the physical world. The touch of Earth is always reinvigorating to the son of Earth, even when he seeks a suprephysical Knowledge. It may even be said that the supraphysical can only be really mastered in its fullness--to its heights we can always reach,--when we keep our feet firmly on the physical.

8. And it is certainly the fact that the wider we extend and the surer we make our knowledge of the physical world, the wider and surer becomes our foundation for the higher knowledge, even for the highest, even for the Brahmavidya.

In emerging, therefore, out of the material-

istic period of human Knowledge we must be careful that we do not rashly condemn what we are leaving or throw away even one tittle of its gains, before we can summon perceptions and powers that are well grasped and secure, to occupy their place.

9. A certain kind of Agnosticism is the final truth of all knowledge. For when we come to the end of whatever path, the universe appears as only a symbol or an appearance of an unknowable Reality which translates itself here into different systems of values, physical values, vital and sensational values, intellectual, ideal and spiritual values. The more That becomes real to us, the more it is seen to be always beyond defining thought and beyond formulating expression. "Mind attains not there, nor speech." And yet as it is possible to exaggerate, with the Illusionists, the unreality of the appearance, so it is possible to exaggerate the unknowableness of the Unknowable. When we speak of It as unknowable, we mean, really, that It escapes the grasp of our thought and speech, instruments which proceed aways by the sense of difference and express by the way of definition; but if not knowable by thought, It is attainable by a supreme effort of consciousness. There is even a kind of Knowledge which is one with Identity and by which, in a sense, It can be known.

10. If modern Materialism were simply an unintelligent acquiescence in the material life, the advance might be idefinitely delayed. But since its very soul is the search for Knowledge, it will be unable to cry halt; as it reaches the barriers of sense-knowledge and of the reasoning from sense-knowledge, its very rush will carry it beyond and the rapidity and sureness with which it has em-

braced the visible universe is only an earnest of the energy and success which we may hope to see repeated in the conquest of what lies beyond, once the stride is taken that crosses the barrier. We see already that advance in its obscure beginnings. Nothing can be more remarkable and suggestive than the extent to which modern Science confirms in the domain of Matter the conceptions and even the very formulae of language which were arrived at, by a different method, in the Vedanta,--the original Vedanta, not of the schools of metaphysical philosophy, but of the Upanisads. And these, on the other hand, often reveal their full significance, their richer contents only when they are viewed in the new light shed by the discoveries of modern Science,--for instance, that Vedantic expression which describes things in the Cosmos as one seed arranged by the universal Energy in multitudinous forms. Significant, especially, is the drive of Science towards a Monism which is consistent with multiplicity; towards the Vedic idea of the one essence with its many becomings. Even if the dualistic appearance of Matter and Force be insisted on, it does not really stand in the way of this Monism. For it will be evident that essential Matter is a thing non-existent to the senses and only, like the Pradhana of the Sankhyas, a conceptual form of substance; and in fact the point is increasingly reached where only an arbitrary distinction in thought divides form of substance from form of energy.

11. But the worlds are only frames for our experience, the senses only instruments of experience and conveniences. Consciousness is the great underlying fact, the universal

witness for whom the world is a field, the senses instruments. To that witness the worlds and their objects appeal for their reality and for the one world or the many, for the physical equally with the supra-physical we have no other evidence that they exist. It has been argued that this is no relation peculiar to the constitution of humanity and its outlook upon an objective world, but the very nature of existence it-self; all phenomenal existence consists of an observing consciousness and an active objectivity, and the Action cannot proceed without the Witness because the universe exists only in or for the consciousness that observes and has no independent reality. It has been argued in reply that the material universe enjoys an eternal self-existence; it was here before life and mind made their appearance; it will survive after they have disappeared and no longer trouble with their transient strivings and limited thoughts the eternal and inconscient rhythm of the suns. The difference, so metaphysical in appear-ance, is yet of the utmost practical import, for it determines the whole outlook of man upon life, the goal that he shall assign for his efforts and the field in which he shall circumscribe his energies. For it raises the question of the reality of cosmic existence and, more important still, the question of the value of human life.

12. Extinction, not necessarily of all be-ing, but of being as we know it; extinction of ego, desire and egoistic action and men-tality.

13. For an age out of sympathy with the as-cetic spirit--and throughout all the rest of the world the hour of the Anchorite may seem

to have passed or to be passing,--it is easy to attribute this great trend to the failing of vital energy in an ancient race tired out by its burden, its once vast share in the common advance, exhaused by its many-sided contribution to the sum of human effort and human knowledge. But we have seen that it corresponds to a truth of existence, a state of conscious realisation which stands at the very summit of our possibility. In practice also the ascetic spirit is an indispensable element in human perfection and even its separate affirmation cannot be avoided so long as the race has not at the other end liberated its intellect and its vital habits from subjection to an always insistent animalism.

We seek indeed a larger and completer affirmation. We perceive that in the Indian ascetic ideal the great Vedantic formula, "One without a second," has not been read sufficiently in the light of that other formula equally imperative, "All this is the Brahman." The passionate aspiration of man upward to the Divine has not been sufficiently related to the descending movement of the Divine leaning downward to embrance eternally Its manifestation. Its meaning in Matter has not been so well understood as Its truth in the Spirit.

14. As we have seen how greatly Materialism has served the ends of the Divine, so we must acknowledge the still greater service rendered by Asceticism to Life. We shall preserve the truths of material Science and its real utilities in the final harmony, even if many or even if all of its existing forms have to be broken or left aside. An even greater scruple of right preservation must guide us in our dealing with the legacy, however actually diminished or depreciated, of the Aryan Past.

15. The silent and the active Brahman are not different, opposite and irreconcilable entities, the one denying, the other affirming a cosmic illusion; they are one Brahman in two aspects.
16. Man, too, becomes perfect only when he has found within himself that absolute calm and passivity of the Brahman and supports by it with the same divine tolerance and the same divine bliss a free and inexhaustible activity.
17. The Silence does not reject the world; it sustains it. Or rather it supports with an equal impartiality the activity and the withdrawal from the activity and approves also the reconciliation by which the soul remains free and still even while it lends itself to all action.
18. We are being misled by words, deceived by the trenchant oppositions of our limited mentality with its fond reliance on verbal distinctions as if they perfectly represented ultimate truths and its rendering of our supramental experiences in the sense of those intolerant distinctions. Non-Being is only a word. When we examine the fact it represents, we can no longer be sure that absolute non-existence has any better chance than the infinite Self of being more than an ideative formation of the mind. We really mean by this Nothing something beyond the last term to which we can reduce our purest conception and our most abstract or subtle experience of actual being as we know or conceive it while in this universe. This Nothing then is merely a something beyond positive conception. We erect a fiction of nothingness in order to overpass, by the method of total exclusion, all that we can know and consciously are. Actually when we examine closely the Nihil of certain philosophies, we begin to perceive that it is a zero which is All or an indefinable Infinite which appears to the mind a blank, because

mind grasps only finite constructions, but is in fact the only true Existence.

19 Pure Being is the affirmation by the Unknowable of Itself as the free base of all cosmic existence. We give the name of Non-Being to a contrary affirmation of Its freedom from all cosmic existence,--freedom, that is to say, from all positive terms of actual existence which consciousness in the universe can formulate to itself, even from the most abstract, even from the most transcendent. It does not deny them as a real expression of Itself, but It denies Its limitation by all expression or any expression whatsoever. The Non-Being permits the Being, even as the Silence permits the Activity. By this simultaneous negation and affirmation, not mutually destructive, but complementary to each other like all contraries, the simultaneous awareness of conscious Self-being as a reality and the Unknowable beyond as the same Reality becomes realisable to the awakened human soul. Thus was it possible for the Buddha to attain the state of Nirvana and yet act puissantly in the world, impersonal in his inner consciousness, in his action the most powerful personality that we know of as having lived and produced results upon earth.

When we ponder on these things, we begin to perceive how feeble in their self-assertive violence and how confusing in their misleading distinctness are the words that we use. We begin also to perceive that the limitations we impose on the Brahman arise from a narrowness of experience in the individual mind which concentrates itself on one aspect of the Unknowable and proceeds forthwith to deny or disparage all the rest. We tend always to translate too rigidly what we can conceive or know of the Absolute into the terms of our own particular

relativity. We affirm the One and Identical by passionately discriminating and asserting the egoism of our own opinions and partial experiences against the opinions and partial experiences of others. It is wiser to wait, to learn, to grow, and, since we are obliged for the sake of our self-perfection to speak of these things which no human speech can express, to search for the widest, the most flexible, the most catholic affirmation possible and found on it the largest and most comprehensive harmony.

20. The Unknowable is Something to us supreme, wonderful and ineffable which continually formulates Itself to our consciousness and continually escapes from the formulation It has made.

21. If it be true that the Self alone exists, it must be also true that all is the Self.

22. The deepest instinct of humanity seeks always and seeks wisely wisdom as the last word of the universal manifestation, not an eternal mockery and illusion,--a secret and finally triumphant good, not an all-creative and invincible evil,--an ultimate victory and fulfilment, not the disappointed recoil of the soul from its great adventure.

For we cannot suppose that the sole Entity is compelled by something outside or other than Itself, since no such thing exists. Nor can we suppose that It submits unwillingly to something partial within Itself which is hostile to is whole Being, denied by It and yet too strong for It; for this would be only to erect in other language the same contradiction of an All and something other than the All.

23. It is only our relative consciousness, alarmed or baffled by the phenomena of evil, ignorance and pain in the cosmos, that seeks to deliver the Brahman from responsibility

for Itself and its workings by erecting some opposite principle, Maya or Mara, conscious Devil or self-existent principle of evil. If then the world is a dream or an illusion or a mistake, it is a dream originated and willed by the Self in its totality and not only originated and willed, but supported and perpetually entertained. Moreover, it is a dream existing in a Reality and the stuff of which it is made is that Reality, for Brahman must be the material of the world as well as its base and continent. If the gold of which the vessel is made is real, how shall we suppose that the vessel itself is a mirage? We see that these words, dream, illusion, are tricks of speech, habits of our relative consciousness; they represent a certain truth, even a great truth, but they also misrepresent it. Just as Non-Being turns out to be other than mere nullity, so the cosmic Dream turns out to be other than mere phantasm and hallucination of the mind. Phenomenon is not phantasm; phenomenon is the substantial form of a Truth.

We start, then, with the conception of an omnipresent Reality of which neither the Non-Being at the one end nor the universe at the other are negations that annul; they are rather different states of the Reality, obverse and reverse affirmations.

24. While we still labour under the stress of the dualities, this perception must no doubt constantly support itself on an act of faith, but a faith which the highest Reason, the widest and most patient reflection do not deny but rather affirm. This creed is given, indeed, to humanity to support it on its journey, until it arrives at a stage of development when faith will be turned into knowledge.

25. An Unknowable which appears to us in many states and attributes of being, in many forms

of consciousness, in many activities of energy, this is what Mind can ultimately say about the existence which we ourselves are and which we see in all that is presented to our thought and senses. It is in and through those states, those forms, those activities that we have to approach and know the Unknowable. But if in our haste to arrive at a Unity that our mind can seize and hold, if in our insistence to confine the Infinite in our embrance we identify the Reality with any and eternal, with any particular attribute however general and comprehensive, with any fixed formulation of consciousness however vast in its scope, with any energy or activity however boundless its application, and one definable state of being however pure if we exclude all the rest, then our thoughts sin against Its unknowableness and arrive not at a true unity but at a division of the Indivisible.

So strongly was this truth perceived in the ancient times that the Vedantic Seers, even after they had arrived at the crowning idea, the convincing experience of Sachchidananda as the highest positive expression of the Reality to our consciousness, erected in their speculations or went on in their perceptions to an Asat, a Non-Being beyond, which is not the ultimate existence, the pure consciousness, the infinite bliss of which all our experiences are the expression or the deformation. If at all an existence, a consciousness, a bliss, it is beyond the highest and the purest positive form of these things that here we can possess and other therefore than what here we know by these names. Buddhism, somewhat arbitrarily declared by the theologians to be an Un-Vedic doctrine because it rejected the authority

of the scriptures, yet goes back to this essentially Vedantic conception. Only, the positive and synthetic teaching of the Upanishads beheld Sat and Asat not as opposites destructive of each other, but as the last antinomy through which we look up to the Unknowable. And in the transactions of our positive consciousness, even Unity has to make its account with Multiplicity; for the Many also are Brahman.

26. Such is the teaching, calm, wise and clear, of our most ancient sages. They had the patience and the strength to find and to know; they had also the clarity and humanity to admit the limitation of our knowledge. They perceived the borders where it has to pass into something beyond itself. It was a later impatience of heart and mind, vehement attraction to an ultimate bliss or high masterfulness of pure experience and trenchant intelligence which sought the One to deny the Many and because it had received the breath of the heights scorned or recoiled from the secret of the depths.

27. We will guard ourselves also against the excessive importance that the mind attaches to particular points of view at which it arrives in its more powerful expansions and transitions. The perception of the spiritualised mind that the universe is an unreal dream can have no more absolute a value to us than the perception of the materialised mind that God and the Beyond are an illusory idea. In the one case the mind, habituated only to the evidence of the senses and associating reality with corporeal fact, is either unaccustomed to use other means of knowledge or unable to extend the notion of reality to a supra-physical experience. In the other case the same mind, passing beyond to the overwhelming experience of an incorporeal reality, simply transfers the same inability and the

same consequent sense of dream or hallucination to the experience of the senses. But we perceive also the truth that these two conceptions disfigure.

28. In the Monistic view the individual soul is one with the Supreme, its sense of separateness an ignorance, escape from the sense of separateness and identity with the Supreme its salvation. But who then profits by this escape? Not the supreme Self, for it is supposed to be always and inalienably free, still, silent, pure. Not the world, for that remains constantly in the bondage and is not freed by the escape of any individual soul from the universal illusion. It is the individual soul itself which effects it supreme good by escaping from the sorrow and the division into the peace and the bliss. There would seem then to be some kind of reality of the individual soul as distinct from the world and from the Supreme even in the event of freedom and illumination. But for the Illusionist the individual soul is an illusion and non-existent except in the inexplicable mystery of Maya. Therefore we arrive at the escape of an illusory non-existent soul from an illusory non-existent bondage in an illusory non-existent world as the supreme good which that non-existent soul has to pursue! For this is the last word of the Knowledge, "There is none bound, none freed, none seeking to be free." Vidya turns out to be as much a part of the Phenomenal as Avidya; Maya meets us even in our escape and laughs at the triumphant logic which seemed to cut the knot of her mystery.

These things, it is said, cannot be explained; they are the initial and insoluble miracle. They are for us a practical fact and have to be accepted. We have to escape by a

confusion out of a confusion. The individual soul can only cut the knot of ego by a supreme act of egoism, an exclusive attachment to its own individual salvation which amounts to an absolute assertion of its separate existence in the Maya. We are led to regard other souls as if they were figments of our mind and their salvation unimportant, our soul alone as if it were entirely real and its salvation the one thing that matters. I come to regard my personal escape from bondage as real while other souls who are equally myself remain behind in the bondage!

It is only when we put aside all irreconcilable antinomy between Self and the world that things fall into their place by a less paradoxical logic. We must accept the many-sidedness of the manifestation even while we assert the unity of the Manifested. And is not this after all the truth that pursues us wherever we cast our eyes, unless seeing we choose not to see? Is not this after all the perfectly natural and simple mystery of Conscious Being that It is bound neither by its unity, nor by its multiplicity? It is "absolute" in the sense of being entirely free to include and arrange in Its own way all possible terms of Its self-expression.

29. The universe and the individual are the two essential appearances into which the Unknowable descends and through which it has to be approached.

30. Yet how can such contraries pass into each other? By what alchemy shall this lead of mortality be turned into that gold of divine Being? But if they are not in their essence contraries? If they are manifestations of one Reality, identical in substance? Then indeed a divine transmutation becomes conceivable.

31. Human language is a poor help in such a

search, but at least we may find in it some symbols and figures, return with some just expressible hints which will help the light of the soul and throw upon the mind some reflection of the ineffable design.

32. The ancient Vedanta presents us with such a solution in the conception and experience of Brahman as the one universal and essential fact.

33. Into later Vedanta there crept and arrived at fixity the idea that the limited ego is not only the cause of the dualities, but the essential condition for the existence of the universe. By getting rid of the ignorance of the ego and its resultant limitations we do indeed eliminate the dualities, but we eliminate along with them our existence in the cosmic movement. Thus we return to the essentially evil and illusory nature of human existence and the vanity of all effort after perfection in the life of the world. A relative good linked always to its opposite is all that here we can seek. But if we adhere to the larger and profounder idea that the ego is only an intermediate representation of something beyond itself, we escape from this consequence and are able to apply Vedanta to fulfilment of life and not only to the escape from life.

34. The perceptions of the pure reason may also--and this is their more characteristic action--use the experience from which they start as a mere excuse and leave it far behind before they arrive at their result, so far that the result may seem the direct contrary of that which our sensible experience wishes to dictate to us. This movement is legitimate and indispensable, because our normal experience not only covers only a small part of universal fact, but even in the limits of its own field uses instruments that are

defective and gives us false weights and measures. It must be exceeded, put away to a distance and its insistences often denied if we are to arrive at more adequate conceptions of the truth of things. To correct the errors of the sense-mind by the use of reason is one of the most valuable powers developed by man and the chief cause of his superiority among terrestrial beings. The complete use of pure reason brings us finally from physical to metaphysical knowledge.

35. In a sense all our experience is psychological since even what we receive by the senses, has no meaning or value to us till it is translated into the terms of the sense-mind, the Manas of Indian philosophical terminology. Manas, say our philosophers, is the sixth sense. But we may even say that it is the only sense and that the others, vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste are merely specialisations of the sense-mind which, although normally uses the sense-organs for the basis of its experience, yet exceeds them and is capable of a direct experience proper to its own inherent action. As a result psychological experience, like the cognitions of the reason, is capable in man of a double action, mixed or dependent, pure or sovereign. Its mixed action takes place usually when the mind seeks to become aware of itself, the subject. In the former activity, it is dependent on the senses and forms its perceptions in accordance with their evidence; in the latter it acts in itself and is aware of things directly by a sort of identity with them. We are thus aware of our emotions; we are aware of anger, as has been acutely said, become anger. We are thus aware also of our own existence; and here the nature of experience as knowledge by identity becomes apparent. In

reality, all experience is in its secret nature knowledge by identity; but its true character is hidden from us because we have separated ourselves from the rest of the world by exclusion, by the distinction of ourself as subject and everything else as object.

36. This limitation is a fundamental creation of the ego and an instance of the manner in which it has proceeded throughout, starting from an original falsehood and covering over the true truth of things by contingent falsehoods which become for us practical truths of relation.

37. It is possible for the mind--and it would be natural for it, if it could be persuaded to liberate itself from its consent to the domination of matter,--to take direct cognisance of the objects of sense without the aid of the sense-organs. This is what happens in experiments of hypnosis and cognate psychological phenomena. Nor is this extention of faculty really impossible but only more difficult in our waking state,--as is known to all who have been able to go far enough in certain paths of psychological experiment.

38. It is on this possibility that Indian Vedanta has based itself. It has sought through knowledge of the Self the knowledge of the universe. But always mental experience and the concepts of the reason have been held by it to be even at their highest a reflection in mental identifications and not the supreme self-existent identity.

39. Sad Brahman, Existence pure, indefinable, infinite, absolute, is the last concept at which Vedantic analysis arrives in its view of the universe, the fundamental Reality which Vedantic experience discovers behind all the movement and formation which constitute the

apparent reality. It is obvious that when we posit this conception, we go entirely beyond what our ordinary consciousness, our normal experience contains or warrants. The senses and sense-mind know nothing whatever about any pure or absolute existence. All that our sense-experience tells us of, is form and movement. Forms exist, but with an existence that is not pure, rather always mixed, combined, aggregated, relative. When we go within ourselves, we may get rid of precise form, but we cannot get rid of movement, of change.

40. They started from Reason and tested the results it gave them, holding only those conclusions to be valid which were supported by the supreme authority. In this way they avoided to a certain extent the besetting sin of metaphysics, the tendency to battle in the clouds because it deals with words as if they were imperative facts instead of symbols which have always to be carefully scrutinised and brought back constantly to the sense of that which they represent.

41. Those who see only this world-energy can declare indeed that there is no such thing: our idea of an eternal stability, an immutable pure existence is a fiction of our intellectual conceptions starting from a false idea of the stable: for there is nothing that is stable; all is movement and our conception of the stable is only an artifice of our mental consciousness by which we secure a standpoint for dealing practically with the movement. It is easy to show that this is true in the movement itself. There is nothing there that is stable.

42. Neither reason nor experience nor intuition nor imagination bears witness to us of the possibility of a final terminus. All end and beginning presuppose something beyond the end

or beginning. An absolute end, an absolute beginning is not only a contradiction in terms, but a contradiction of the essence of things, a violence, a fiction. Infinity imposes itself upon the appearance of the finite by its ineffugable self-existence.

But this is infinity with regard to Time and Space, an eternal duration, interminable extension. The pure Reason goes farther and looking in its own colourless and austere light at Time and Space points out that these two are categories of our consciousness, conditions under which we arrange our perception of phenomenon. When we look at existence in itself, Time and Space disappear. If there is any extension, it is not spatial but a psychological extension; if there is any duration, it is not a temporal but a psychological duration; and it is then easy to see that this extension and duration are only symbols which represent to the mind something not translatable into intellectual terms, an eternity which seems to us the same all-containing ever-new moment, an infinity which seems to us the same all-containing, all-pervading point without magnitude. And this conflict of terms, so violent, yet accurately expressive of something we do perceive, shows that mind and speech have passed beyond their natural limits and are striving to express a Reality in which their own conventions and necessary oppositions disappear into an ineffable identity.

43. If this indefinable, infinite, timeless, spaceless Existence is, it is necessarily a pure absolute. It cannot be summed up in any quantity or quantities, it cannot be composed of any quality or combinations of qualities. It is not aggregate of forms or

or a formal substratum of forms. If all forms, quantities, qualities were to disappear, this would remain.

44. Necessarily, when we speak of things passing into that from which they have come, we are using the language of our temporal consciousness and must guard ourselves against its illusions. The emergence of the movement from the Immutable is an eternal phenomenon and it is only because we cannot conceive it in that beginningless, endless, ever-new moment which is the eternity of the Timeless that our notions and perceptions are compelled to place it in a temporal eternity of successive duration to which are attached the ideas of an always recurrent beginning, middle and end.

45. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY CONSCIOUSNESS? ORDINARILY WE MEAN BY IT OUR FIRST OBVIOUS IDEA OF A MENTAL WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS SUCH AS IS POSSESSED BY THE HUMAN BEING DURING THE MAJOR PART OF HIS BODILY EXISTENCE, WHEN HE IS NOT ASLEEP, STUNNED OR OTHERWISE DEPRIVED OF HIS PHYSICAL AND SUPERFICIAL METHODS OF SENSATION. IN THIS SENSE IT IS PLAIN ENOUGH THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE EXCEPTION AND NOT THE RULE IN THE ORDER OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE. WE OURSELVES DO NOT ALWAYS POSSESS IT. BUT THIS VULGAR AND SHALLOW IDEA OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, THOUGH IT STILL COLOURS OUR ORDINARY THOUGHT AND ASSOCIATIONS, MUST NOW DEFINITELY DISAPPEAR OUT OF PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING. FOR WE KNOW THAT THERE IS SOMETHING IN US WHICH IS CONSCIOUS WHEN WE SLEEP, WHEN WE ARE STUNNED OR DRUGGED OR IN A SWOON, IN ALL APPARENTLY UNCONSCIOUS STATES OF OUR PHYSICAL BEING. NOT ONLY SO, BUT WE MAY NOW BE SURE THAT THE OLD THINKERS WERE RIGHT WHEN THEY DECLARED THAT EVEN IN OUR WAKING STATE WHAT WE CALL THEN OUR CONSCIOUSNESS IS ONLY A SMALL

SELECTION FROM OUR ENTIRE CONSCIOUS BEING. IT IS A SUPERFICIES, IT IS NOT EVEN THE WHOLE OF OUR MENTALITY. BEHIND IT, MUCH VASTER THAN IT, THERE IS A SUBLIMAL OR SUBCONSCIENT MIND WHICH IS THE GREATER PART OF OURSELVES AND CONTAINS HEIGHTS AND PROFUNDITIES WHICH NO MAN HAS YET MEASURED OR FATHOMED. THIS KNOWLEDGE GIVES US A STARTING-POINT FOR THE TRUE SCIENCE OF MIND AND ITS WORKINGS; IT DELIVERS US DEFINITELY FROM CIRCUMSCRIPTION BY THE MATERIAL AND FROM THE ILLUSION OF THE OBVIOUS.

MATERIALISM INDEED INSISTS THAT, WHATEVER THE EXTENSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, IT IS A MATERIAL PHENOMENON INSEPARABLE FROM OUR PHYSICAL ORGANS AND NOT THEIR UTILISER BUT THEIR RESULT. THIS ORTHODOX CONTENTION, HOWEVER, IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HOLD THE FIELD AGAINST THE TIDE OF INCREASING KNOWLEDGE. ITS EXPLANATIONS ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE INADEQUATE AND STRAINED. IT IS BECOMING ALWAYS CLEARER THAT NOT ONLY DOES THE CAPACITY OF OUR TOTAL CONSCIOUSNESS FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF OUR ORGANS, THE SENSES, THE NERVES, THE BRAIN, BUT THAT EVEN FOR OUR ORDINARY THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS THESE ORGANS ARE ONLY THEIR HABITUAL INSTRUMENTS AND NOT THEIR GENERATORS. CONSCIOUSNESS USES THE BRAIN WHICH ITS UPWARD STRIVINGS HAVE PRODUCED BRAIN HAS NOT PRODUCED NOR DOES IT USE THE CONSCIOUSNESS. THERE ARE EVEN ABNORMAL INSTANCES WHICH GO TO PROVE THAT OUR ORGANS ARE NOT ENTIRELY INDISPENSABLE INSTRUMENTS,--THAT THE HEART-BEATS ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO LIFE, ANY MORE THAN IS BREATHING, NOR THE ORGANISED BRAIN-CELLS TO THOUGHT. OUR PHYSICAL ORGANISM NO MORE CAUSES OR EXPLAINS THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS THAN THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ENGINE CAUSES OR EXPLAINS THE MOTIVE POWER OF STEAM OR ELECTRICITY. THE FORCE IS ANTERIOR, NOT THE PHYSICAL INSTRUMENT. MOMENTOUS LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW. IN

THE FIRST PLACE WE MAY ASK WHETHER, SINCE EVEN MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS EXISTS WHERE WE SEE INANIMATION AND INERTIA, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT EVEN IN MATERIAL OBJECTS A UNIVERSAL SUBCONSCIENT MIND IS PRESENT ALTHOUGH UNABLE TO ACT OR COMMUNICATE ITSELF TO ITS SURFACES FOR WANT OF ORGANS. IS THE MATERIAL STATE AN EMPTINESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, OR IS IT NOT RATHER ONLY A SLEEP OF CONSCIOUSNESS--EVEN THOUGH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EVOLUTION AN ORIGINAL AND NOT AN INTERMEDIATE SLEEP? AND BY SLEEP THE HUMAN EXAMPLE TEACHES US THAT WE MEAN NOT A SUSPENSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT ITS GATHERING INWARD AWAY FROM CONSCIOUS PHYSICAL RESPONSE TO THE IMPACTS OF EXTERNAL THINGS. AND IS NOT THIS WHAT ALL EXISTENCE IS THAT HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED MEANS OF OUTWARD COMMUNICATION WITH THE EXTERNAL PHYSICAL WORLD? IS THERE NOT A CONSCIOUS SOUL?

46. We may go farther. When we speak of subconscious mind, we should mean by the phrase a thing not different from the outer mentality, but only acting below the surface, unknown to the waking man, in the same sense if perhaps with a deeper plunge and a larger scope. But the phenomena of the subliminal self far exceed the limits of any such definition. It includes an action not only immensely superior in capacity, but quite different from what we know as mentality in our waking self. We have therefore a right to suppose that there is a superconscient in us as well as a subconscient, a range of conscious faculties and therefore an organisation of consciousness which rise high above that psychological stratum to which we give the name of mentality. And since the subliminal self in us thus rises in superconscience above mentality, may it not also sink in subconscience below mentality? Are there not in us and in the world forms of consciousness which are sub-

mental, to which we can give the name of vital and physical consciousness? If so, we must suppose in the plant and the metal also a force to which we can give the name of consciousness although it is not the human or animal mentality for which we have hitherto preserved the monopoly of that description.

Not only is this probable but, if we will consider things dispassionately, it is certain. In ourselves there is such a vital consciousness which acts in the cells of the body and the automatic vital functions so that we go through purposeful movements and obey attractions and repulsions to which our mind is a stranger. In animals this vital consciousness is an even more important factor. In plants it is intuitively evident. The seekings and shrinkings of the plant, its pleasure and pain, its sleep and its wakefulness and all that strange life whose truth an Indian scientist has brought to light by rigidly scientific methods, are all movements of consciousness, but, as far as we can see, not of mentality.

47. The development of recent research and thought seems to point to a sort of inert or suppressed consciousness in the metal and in the earth and in other "inanimate" forms, or at least the first stuff of what becomes consciousness in us may be there. Only while in the plant we can dimly recognise and conceive the thing that I have called vital consciousness, the consciousness of Matter, of the inert form, is difficult indeed for us to understand or imagine, and what we find it difficult to understand or imagine we consider it our right to deny. Nevertheless, when one has pursued consciousness so far into the depths, it becomes incredible that there

should be this sudden gulf in Nature. Thought has a right to suppose a unity where that unity is confessed by all other classes of phenomena and in one class only, not denied, but merely more concealed than in others. And if we suppose the unity to be unbroken, we then arrive at the existence of consciousness in all forms.

48. Man's consciousness can be nothing else than a form of Nature's consciousness. It is there in other involved forms below Mind, it emerges in Mind, it shall ascend into yet superior forms beyond Mind.

49. "Why should Brahman, perfect, absolute, infinite, needing nothing, desiring nothing, at all throw out force of consciousness to create in itself these worlds of forms?"

50. To settle upon a fixed Truth or order of truths demands a selective faculty of knowledge commissioned to shape finite appearance out of the infinite Reality. This power was known to the Vedic seers by the name of Maya. Maya meant for them the power of infinite consciousness to comprehend, contain in itself and measure out, that is to say, to form--for form is delimitation--Name and Shape out of the vast illimitable Truth of infinite existence.

51. This distinction between the lower and the higher Maya is the link in thought and in cosmic Fact which the pessimistic and illusionist philosophies miss or neglect. To them the mental Maya, or perhaps an Overmind, is the creatrix of the world and a world created by mental Maya would indeed be an inexplicable paradox and a fixed yet floating nightmare of conscious existence which could neither be classed as an illusion nor as a reality. We have to see that the mind is only an intermediate term between the creative governing

knowledge and the soul imprisoned in its works.

52. The idealistic interpretation supposes a relation between the Truth behind and the conceptive phenomenon in front, a relation which is not merely that of an antinomy and opposition. The view I am presenting goes farther in idealism; it sees the creative Idea as Real-Idea, that is to say, a power of Conscious Force expressive of real being, born out of real being and partaking of its nature and neither a child of the Void nor a weaver of fictions. Mind is not sufficient to explain existence in the universe. Infinite Consciousness must first translate itself into infinite faculty of Knowledge or, as we call it from our point of view, omniscience. But Mind is not a faculty of knowledge nor an instrument of omniscience; it is a faculty for the seeking of knowledge, for expressing as much as it can gain of it in certain forms of a relative thought and for using it towards certain capacities of action. Even when it finds, it does not possess; it only keeps a certain fund of current coin of Truth--not Truth itself--in the bank of Memory to draw upon according to its needs. For Mind is that which does not know, which tries to know and which never knows except as in a glass darkly. It is the power which interprets truth of universal existence for the practical uses of a certain order of things; it is not the power which knows and guides that existence and therefore it cannot be the power which created or manifested it.

But if we suppose an infinite Mind which would be free from our limitations, that at least might well be the creator of the universe? But such a Mind would be something quite different from the definition of mind as we know

it: it would be something beyond mentality; it would be the supra-mental Truth. An infinite Mind constituted in the terms of mentality as we know it could only create an infinite chaos, a vast clash of chance, accident, vicissitude wandering towards an indeterminate end after which it would be always tentatively groping and aspiring. An infinite, omniscient, omnipotent Mind would not be mind at all, but supramental knowledge.

Mind, as we know it, is a reflective mirror which receives presentations or images of a pre-existent Truth or Fact, either external to or at least vaster than itself. It represents to itself from moment to moment the phenomenon that is or has been. It possesses also the faculty of constructing in itself possible images othern than those of the actual fact presented to it; that is to say, it represents to itself not only phenomenon that has been but also phenomenon that may be: it cannot, be it noted, represent to itself phenomenon that assuredly will be, except when it is an assured repetition of what is or has been.

Nihilism or Illusionism or some kindred philosophy is the only logical conclusion of such a pure noumenalism. The cosmos so constructed would be a presentation or reflection of something not itself, but always and to the end a false presentation, a distorted reflection; all cosmic existence would be a Mind struggling to work out fully its imaginations, but not succeeding, because they have no imperative basis of self-truth. That traced to its roots is Nihilism and Illusionism and it is the only wisdom if we suppose that our human mentality or anything at all like it represents the highest cosmic force and the original conception at work in the universe.

But the moment we find in the original power of knowledge a higher force than that which is represented by our human mentality, this conception of the universe becomes insufficient and therefore invalid. It has its truth but it is not the whole truth. It is law of the immediate appearance of the universe, but not of its original truth and ultimate fact.

53. We see too that our reason seeks to emerge out of and dominate the helpless drift of our mentality and we arrive at the perception that Reason is only a messenger, a representative or a shadow of a greater consciousness beyond itself which does not need to reason because it is all and knows all that it is.

54. Time and Space are that one Conscious-Being viewing itself in extension, subjectively as Time, objectively as Space. Our mental view of these two categories is determined by the idea of measure which is inherent in the action of the analytical, dividing movement of Mind.

55. Our mentality makes a distinction between these three because without distinctions it cannot proceed; losing its proper means and fundamental law of action, it becomes motionless and inactive. Therefore, even when I regard myself mentally, I have still to make this distinction. I am, as the knower; what I observe in myself, I regard as the object of my knowledge, myself yet not myself; knowledge is an operation by which I link the knower to the known. But the artificiality, the purely practical and utilitarian character of this operation is evident; it is evident that it does not represent the fundamental truth of things. In reality, I the knower am the consciousness which knows; the know-

ledge is that consciousness, myself, operating; the known is also myself, a form or movement of the same consciousness. The three are clearly one existence, one movement, indivisible though seeming to be divided. This is a knowledge which the mind can arrive at, can reason out, can feel, but cannot readily make the practical basis of intelligent operations. 56. It is indeed only when our human mentality lays an exclusive emphasis on one side of spiritual experience, affirms that to be the sole eternal truth and states it in the terms of our all-dividing mental logic that the necessity for mutually destructive schools of philosophy arises. Thus, emphasising the sole truth of the unitarian consciousness, we admit the play of the divine unity erroneously rendered by our mentality into the terms of real difference, but, not satisfied with correcting this error of the mind by the truth of a higher principle, we assert that the play itself is an illusion. Or, emphasising the play of the One in the Many, we declare a qualified unity and regard the individual soul as a soul-form of the Supreme, but would assert the eternity of this qualified existence and deny altogether the experience of a pure consciousness in an unqualified oneness. Or, again, emphasising the play of difference, we assert that the Supreme and the human soul are eternally different and reject the validity of an experience which exceeds and seems to abolish that difference. But the position that we have now firmly taken absolves us from the necessity of these negations and exclusions: we see that there is a truth behind all these affirmations, but at the same time an excess which leads to an ill-founded negation. Affirming, as we have done, the absolute absoluteness of That, not limited by our ideas of unity, not limited by our

ideas of multiplicity, affirming the unity as a basis for the manifestation of the multiplicity and the multiplicity as the basis for the return to oneness and the enjoyment of unity in the divine manifestation, we need not burden our present statement with these discussions or undertake the vain labour of enslaving to our mental distinctions and definitions the absolute freedom of the Divine Infinite.

57. This presence of the Absolute would not be with it as an experience occasionally glimpsed or finally arrived at and held with difficulty or as an addition, acquisition or culmination superimposed on its ordinary state of being: it would be the very foundation of its being both in the unity and the differentiation; it would be present to it in all its knowing, willing, doing, enjoying. (CONTINUED ON PAGE 635, "INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AUROBINDO RED LEATHER TYPED VOL.)

HINDU PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE. by H.H. RAJAH SIR RAMA VARMAH. @@

1. Colonel Jacob, for instance, in his Preface to his edition of the 'Vedantasara,' observes, "The Vedanta Philosophy, of which this volume is an outline, is supposed to be the finest outcome of Indian thought; yet, it abolishes God, as an unreality, and substitutes an impersonal It with no consciousness, whilst its highest notion of bliss is the annihilation of personality!"

2. If science has done one thing more than another, it is to shake our faith in the finality of solutions invented by human ingenuity; and, we shall be untrue to our light if we fail to re-think for ourselves what has been thought out even by better minds.

3. If such a philosophy does not offer man the strength of spirit which he needs in times

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@@ INDIAN PHILOS. CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS. 1928.

of trial and perplexity, I know not what does. It is for you, gentlemen, to establish on a broader and more popular foundation the convictions which constitute the body of Hindu philosophical teaching, clothe them in modern garb, and place them within the reach of all. The fellowship of learning is the most cosmopolitan bond and it does "made the whole world kin" in a way in which no other institution does or can.

4. A.B. DHRUVA.** The first thing that strikes an observer as he casts his eye upon the philosophy of the new century is the growing share which Science is taking in the problems of philosophy. To understand the full significance of this attitude, we have to trace the path--which we can do here only very briefly--through which the human mind has travelled in the matter of this eternal question. As is well-known, with the ancient Greeks Philosophy was the only science, from which special sciences gradually emerged. Later,

"Away, haunt not thou me
Thou vain Philosophy.
Little hast thou bestead
Save to perplex the head."

--these lines in Milton's Comus express the attitude of the average Christian towards philosophy; and yet to the great glory and benefit both of the Christian religion and Greek philosophy, Pauline Christianity in its beginning as well as further development was philosophy brought to bear upon religion, so that Dean Inge is to-day perfectly justified in speaking of "Platonic tradition in English religous thought." Paradoxical as it may appear, Bacon, the father of English empirical philosophy, was hardly a philosopher himself, and took little interest in what we now understand by Philosophy. However, with the practical

** on "SENSATION, CONSCIOUSNESS & SOLIPSISM"

common sense characteristic of the Englishman, he separated the provinces of Reason and Faith, Science and Religion. In the next two centuries Science was too much absorbed in its own activities to think of its relationship with Philosophy, and the latter went on in its own even tenour of speculation, unaware of the clouds of conflict that were gathering on the horizon. When Science awoke to its own potentialities and became self-conscious, it invaded the domain of Philosophy and snatched the reins of government from its hands, leaving little or nothing for Philosophy, its old master and latterly its neighbour. In the meantime Kant, with a sense of justice unsurpassed in the history of thought vindicated the claim of Philosophy to settle not only its own boundaries but also those of science. But his efforts to establish a perpetual peace between the two warring forces eventually failed, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century we witness a furious battle raging between philosophy and science, in which victory lies with science in the earlier and with philosophy in the latter part.

5. Philosophy and Science are not regarded as water-tight compartments, but are permitted to influence each other as parts of one organic whole of knowledge. Thus among the eminent philosophers, or those who work in the field of philosophy, at the present day--such as Bergson, Alexander, and Russell, to mention only a few prominent names--have used their knowledge of Science for investigating the problems of philosophy.

6. The theory of Relativity, which is the most revolutionary discovery of the present-day science, has played havoc with our common-sense ideals of Space and Time, and has thereby breathed new life into the schools of Idealism.

7. Russell is a neophyte in the temple of philosophy, having wandered into it from his original home of Mathematics and Physics. His adventure, however, has proved a gain to his new subject to which he has contributed much penetrating and scientific thought, though part of it seems to be still in the making. He writes: "all traditional philosophers have to be discarded and we have to start afresh with as little a respect as possible for the systems of the past. Our age has penetrated more deeply into the nature of things than any earlier age, and it would be a false modesty to overestimate what can still be learned from the metaphysicians of the seventeenth eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."

8. "Russell's theory of Perception has passed through several stages in which he has been gradually marching towards Sensationalism. In his latest book he emphasises the subjective element in perception, and declares that "the idea that perception in itself reveals the character of objects is a fond delusion." We have no direct knowledge of the external world what knowledge we have of it being at the most inferential: as Russell puts it in his graphic way, "it is as if we could not see the sea, but could only see the people disembarking at Dover." Eventually he recognizes sensations and sensa as the only reality, the external reality which was at first posited to explain sensa being eliminated altogether. All these points of view might show that he was an idealistic sensationalist, but he endeavours to range himself among materialists. And so he is, considering that the sensa according to him are physical occurrences in the brain without any ulterior principle which would transmute them into consciousness. In fact,

the same neutral particulars, according to Russell, belong to two worlds--the two cross-sections of Reality--the mental and the physical. Since sense-organs play a part in the causation of sensa, and the sensa accordingly are private, it is argued that this position of Bertrand Russell must end in solipsism. But I think Russell would meet the criticism by regarding the sensa as private as viewed from within and public as viewed from without. The significance of this double aspect Russell has not cared to explore. He regards perception as a species of sensitivity. In truth, it involves sensitivity, but it is more than sensitivity. He sees no distinction between the case of a photographic plate sensitive to light and the mind in a living body except this that the living bodies are subject to the law of association or of the "conditional reflex." But is there no difference between mind and was because we speak of impressions in both cases? Similarly, between the sensitivity of a photographic plate and that of the mind in a living body? The confusion arises from failure to distinguish between the literal and the metaphorical use of the word. If the law of association or of the "conditional reflex" were properly analysed it would point to a principle of synthesis and illumination which turns the sense-data into mental life. Thus Russell has prepared the case for Idealism, but has inconsequentially wandered into materialistic Realism. The whole trouble of the scientists arises from the failure to appreciate the true nature of consciousness. No analysis of mind or matter can successfully reduce reality to a series of discrete particulars or dethrone consciousness from its central position.

9. Consciousness has thus a double aspect--the noumenal and the phenomenal. The latter is the legitimate province of scientists, while the former falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of philosophers. If Alexander had analysed and not treated as ultimate the distinction between the 'enjoyed' and the 'contemplated' self, and Russell had explored the full import of the distinction which he has made between 'perception objectively regarded' and 'self-observation,' they would perhaps have arrived at the point of view which makes Idealism inevitable.

10. No one could worship space-time. It may excite speculative or mathematical enthusiasm and fill our minds with intellectual admiration, but it lights no spark of religious emotion. Worship is not the response which Space-Time evokes in us, but intuition. One may be tempted to accept this position on behalf of Sankara Vedanta on the ground that Sankara too makes a distinction between the Brahman of Upasana (worship) and the Brahman of Jnana, (self-realisation).

11. The two principles to which modern scientists and philosophers seem committed are: first, the dynamic conception of Reality; and second, the doctrine of 'emergent evolution.' The Sankara Vedantin considers both as truths, but as half-truths. The first, according to him, fails to do justice to the static element which lies at the heart of the dynamic and makes the latter possible and intelligible. For, change is not mere succession: analysed carefully, it is the unity which discloses itself in succession. The second, namely, 'emergent evolution,' if it is to be adequately interpreted, should be read backwards as well as forwards. For, let us remember that evolution is not the same thing as creation in the sense of absolutely new existence.

"Becoming" as the modern Heracliteans call it, is, in full truth, being as well as becoming.

12. The home of the Philosophy of consciousness as the only Reality is Italy at the present day and the two of its leading lights are Croce and Gentile. By them the scientific approach to philosophy is unhesitatingly, almost unceremoniously, discarded. Croce's philosophy which starts apparently as a criticism of Hegel is really its re-interpretation. The so-called 'bloodless categories' of the old idealism of Kant and Hegel did not satisfy the full-blooded European very long, and complaints soon began to be heard that Hegels philosophy besides being false to facts was too abstract to serve as 'human nature's daily food.' This gave rise to attacks from within as well as from without, creating numerous forms of Idealism and Realism.

13. Let me reproduce from another writer a summary of Gentile's answer to the objection that his theory of the relation of thought to reality ends in solipsism:

"Am I then the creator of the universe? Is each of us the creator not merely of his world but of the universe? To answer this question we must discriminate between the mere subject, the empirical ego or self, which is just the ordinary individual with a body, clothes, names, friends, social relations, the man that is distinct from other men and begins and ends in time, on the one hand, and Spirit or the Subject or the Transcendental Ego on the other. Obviously the mere individual (myself as a mere ego among many others) is just only an object, a part of nature. But in so far as I know myself as an individual among many others, I am already something deeper than the self I know myself to be. My deeper ego is not the one I can describe and define, but it is my very

describing and defining activity, the subject which never can be object just because it is the very condition of my thinking of objects at all; it is just this thinking of objects. I can distinguish myself from others only by trancending myself and others, thus embracing within my unity all the differenciating particularities, which consequently appear to be mere objects like all other things and events. Similarly I can only be aware of changes in myself and in others if I am already something outside such changes, beyond time and space, above all distinctions of here and there, before and after. Our empirical personalities are real only as rooted in and unified by the Transcendental Ego, the Spirit, the Person that knows no plural."

The distinction here drawn between Empirical ego and Transcendental ego has been long known in Europe, but in India it is much older still, being well known in the schools of Sankara Vedanta as a distinction between Atman as Drg and Atman as Drsya, between the parinamin Aham and the Kutastha Atman.

In the light of this distinction, the charge of solipsism which has been laid against Gentile's philosophy seems unjustified. I will quote one more passage even at the risk of wearing you with quotations, to show how Indian Philosophy would feel at home even in other lands. Discussing the problem of Immortality in that remarkable work of Italian Neo-Idealism, "the Theory of Mind as Pure Act," Gentile writes: "The conclusion is that if we think of ourselves empirically as in time, we naturalize ourselves and imprison ourselves within definite limits, birth and death, outside of which our personality cannot but seem annihilated. But this personality through which we enter into the world of the manifold and of natural indivi-

duals, in the Aristotelian meaning, is rooted in a higher personality in which alone it is real. This higher personality contains the lower and all other empirical personalities, and as this higher personality is not unfolded in space and time we cannot say that it is before the birth and after the death of the lower, because 'before' and 'after' applied to it would cause it to fall from the one to the many and by destroying it as the one we should thereby also destroy the manifold. But this personality is outside every 'before and after.' Its being is in the eternal, opposed to time, which it makes to be. This eternity, however, does not transcend time in the meaning that it stands outside time as one reality is outside another. It is not clear, then that the eternity of mind is the mortality of nature, because what is indefinite from the standpoint of the many is infinite from the standpoint of the one. Life, the mind's reality, is in experience (in nature, the experience of which is consciousness). But it lives within nature without being absorbed in it, and without ever itself becoming it; moreover, it always keeps its own infinity or unity, without which even nature with its multiplicity, that is, with space and time, would be dissolved." And his conclusion is "The part of us and of those dearest which dies is a materiality which has never lived."

How much of this is the Bhagavadgita! One word about consciousness as "act." Unless the word "act" is used in a sense which makes it indistinguishable from "being", I wonder if "act" is not the empirical aspect of "being" which is the "transcendental"; or, perhaps, both of them are aspects of the same Reality, empirical and transcendental respectively.

The philosophy of Italy is not all Neo-

Idealism. The human mind instinctively, may be rightly or wrongly or under a misapprehension of what is being done, refuses to be wiped out of reality or be made lonely, or be deprived of its dwelling-house and its furniture. As has been observed, Hegelianism has never lacked strenuous opponents even in the days of its triumph. And we have consequently some exponents and advocates of the claims of science of spiritual Realism, Pluralism and Theism such as Aliotta and Varisco.

14. The scientific approach to philosophy which has been detailed in the preceding paragraphs has received many protests, checks, modifications and even complete reversal in certain other chools. In England is heard the voice of Humanism through such masters as Balfour, Haldane and Schiller in varying degrees and forms. "Behind all philosophy lies human nature, and in every philosopher there lurks a man."--is the keynote of this movement. It rejects the universalism and abstractions of Science whose highest ambition is to "depersonalise and dehumanise itself." It refuses to deify as well as to materialise man.

15. ADHARCHANDRA DAS.* It is not so easy to rule out dispute from the domain of Philosophy. In a sense dispute will cling to us, so long as we cling to philosophical thinking. Philosophy is after all an individual product, and as such is the expression of a personality under the cumulative effect of the cultural atmosphere, he breathes in. As individuals are empirically diverse, their expressions must necessarily diverge. But disputation presupposes one common notion, the notion of self-conviction and the principle of contradiction. Every philosopher is convinced that his system of thought, is entitled to the full claim of truth, and dispure arises, when one system contradicts the

* on "THE FACT OF KNOWING"

other. But as there is dispute, so also there is affinity amongst philosophers; and that affinity depends on the affinity of culture and spirit. So as long as we are in the domain of speculation, we cannot get rid of dispute.

16. Logic must being with something without which it cannot begin at all. But the question is, what is that thing without which it cannot begin? Whatever else may be said of our conscious life, this much we can safely assert that we are essentially knowing beings. Our conscious life begins, with some mode of knowing however inchoate it may be. I do not claim that 'the fact that we know' is beyond dispute. One is at liberty to dispute this principle. A sceptic may argue that the much-vaunted "fact of our knowing" is a chimera. There exists nothing, nor is there the fact of our knowing. But it will sound paradoxical to assert that the dispute of the sceptic merely corroborates my contention. The sceptic disputes the fact of our knowing only by overlooking that he, in his dispute, asserts the very act of his disputation; for if he disputes, he at least, apprehends the fact of his disputation and that he disputes. So the "fact of knowing or knowledge," he may dispute, but he cannot dispense with.

17. "It is impossible" as Aristotle puts it, "that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; there would be infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration." If we are to demonstrate our conscious life and for the matter of that, the "fact of our knowing" we must fall back on something else outside our conscious life in order to demonstrate it. But it is far more difficult to outstep our conscious life than to dispense with one's shadow. One may still contend that we need not go beyond our cons-

ciousness; we must get something within it to demonstrate our starting point. But in that case we must know the demonstrating principle, before we demonstrate the fact of our knowing; and this is really a vicious circle. Thus we find that the fact of our knowing is not capable of demonstration. It rather stands self-demonstrated. The fact that we know is given, and if we deny it we cannot begin at all. We are then led to out-and-out scepticism which stands on a vacuum. Hence the fact of our knowing or knowledge, which I propose as the proper starting-point of Logic, is the most primary, involving the least of presupposition. To deny or doubt it is to deny or doubt our conscious life--a position which we have examined and have found to be self-contradictory and suicidal. There is a peculiarity about the "fact of knowing" namely that it is self-validating. To deny it is to assert it. There is such a fact as knowledge, and the human mind seeks to study it systematically. The systematic study of this fact of knowing or knowledge constitutes the proper scope of the science of Logic. "The fact that we know" is a determinate principle with an intermediate depth, to begin with. But the modes of our knowing are not revealed to us just in the beginning. It is, by a systematic reflection and analysis that they are brought to light. It is incumbent on the science of Logic to dig up the prima facie indeterminate depth of the fact of our knowing, and to discover the treasures, if there be any.

18. V.B. SHRIKHANDE:* The importance of these qualifications naturally increases with the difficulty and complexity of the problem to be solved. It is in the highest degree necessary that a man who sits down to determine the nature of ultimate reality or the destiny of the universe should be gifted with devotion to truth, long

** on "NIDDHYASANA MEDITATION"

and leisured life, subtle and comprehensive observation, and quick perception of unity amidst diversity. Unaided ordinary intellect can never hope to think out the solutions of these problems. But these are so intimately related to our success in life that we cannot shelve them as being beyond our ken. The only course open to us is to take the views of the wisest representatives of the human race and to see how far they agree with our own experience. Even in this process our attitude must be one of great reverence and patience. We must not reject what appears on a hasty view to conflict with our limited experience.

19. This prepares us for the next stage, viz. mananam by which we are asked to get rid of the doubts which arise from these conclusions being in seeming contradiction with our ordinary experience. A patient consideration of experience as a whole including the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states will, we are told, remove all doubts. Still this newly acquired knowledge is not strong enough to withstand the force of the deep impressions left behind by the old beliefs. These impressions, being of a very long standing, persist in producing the corresponding wrong beliefs unless we are on our guard. In order to wipe out these subtle enemies a constant dwelling on the new truths is necessary. This nidhidhyasahah helped by our natural predilection for truth serves to efface the unwanted impressions. When mananam and nidhidhyasaha have done their work then only we reach perfect conviction and are said to have a direct view of Reality.

20. HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA: In Greece, it was implied in the Eleatic theory that Space was no reality. The Protagorean empiric school and the Sceptics also denied the existence of

any real space. In modern times, Berkeley is famous for his theory that Space is no real substance at all. According to him, our conception of Space is due to the peculiar impressions of sight and touch and as such, purely subjective. Kant contends that Space does not inhere in the nature of things per se but is purely a subjective condition of sensibility.

21. In India, the Vedanta school of philosophers stoutly opposed the doctrine of real Space. A real Space, the Vedantin pointed out, must be possessed of both general and special characteristics. But as Akasa is one, it cannot have any general characteristics,--characteristics which are called general, being found to be common to a group of individuals. You cannot define Space as that which gives Space (Avakasa), for such a definition is purely verbal.

22. The Vedantins controvert this position and point out that Space is an object of our visual perception; where the eyes are inoperative, it is the soul which intuits Space. Space, according to the Vedantins, is not eternal and self-existent; it is a Karya or product. In this way, the Vedantists reject the doctrine of real Space. The Vedantins are opposed to any doctrine admitting the reality of anything beside the Brahman.

23. S.K. MAITRA: Hegel believed that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy. This is no doubt a very grand conception. But unfortunately, he weakened the force of this conception very considerably when he asserted that the movements of the history of philosophy are identical with the processes of thought as described in his logic. Just at the moment when we expected from him a vindication of the dynamism of the history of philosophy, we were treated to a narrow, and partly even a static conception of it. For the development of the

** on "CONSUMMATION OF THOUGHT IN BRADLEY"

processes of thought, as described in his logic suffers much from excessive rigidity. The stiff framework of his logic is certainly most inadequate for the vital processes with which the history of philosophy deals. The dance of life, the play of colour, refuses to come into the grooves of a ready-made logic. Indeed, Hegel had to twist the facts of history in order to make them fit into the grooves of his logic.

24. In the West the scope of philosophy was somewhat limited and it did not absorb the whole of life in the manner in which it did in the East. Thus, although warnings were often given and the dangers of one-sidedness in philosophy were frequently pointed out, philosophy was generally confined to abstract thinking. Logic, in fact, has been the guiding principle of philosophy practically throughout the course of its development in the West.

25. The idealistic movement also is at present considerably shorn of its former logicism. Bradley's Absolute is not the logician's Absolute but rather the mystic's Absolute.Bradley, in fact, declares emphatically that logical thought can never take us to the ultimate reality. Thought, he says, is relational and discursive, and if it is so, how can it contain immediate presentation? "To make it include immediate experience its character must be transformed. It must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth. Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you choose to use that word. But if any one else prefers another term, such a feeling or will, he would be equally justified...For when thought begins to be more than relational, it ceases to be mere thinking." In another place

Bradley says that thought consummates itself in something other than thought. He gives as illustrations--the river running into the sea and the self losing itself in love. Thought demands for its completeness an Absolute, where mere thought would certainly perish. The completion of thought is thus always in a reality which remains for ever an "Other" for thought.

For these reasons Bradley seeks his Absoute in an immediate Experience. His philosophy is a curious mixture of rationalism and mysticism. With the rationalists he accepts the ideal of coherence, but with the mystics he believes that this ideal con only be realised in immediate experience. This immediate experience, however, is not feeling, that is to say, subrational consciousness, but supra-rational consciousness. It is immediacy at a level higher than that of thought. It is an immediacy which is above, not below, the level of reflection.

26. To avoid the difficulty of stating what value is, it has been said by Moore and others that value is indefinable. "My point" says Moore, "is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is." "What value in itself is," as Rickert also says, "cannot be defined but this only means that we have to do here with the final and most fundamental concept with which we think the world."

27. N.K. BRAHMA:* The ontological argument is the real basis of all theories of truth. Truth implies perfect correspondence or identity of thought and being, and the ontological argument is an attempt at healing up the inherent and apparent division of idea and existence, thought and being. The defects of the theories

** on "REASON INADEQUATE TO THE ABSOLUTE"

of truth intellectually are insuperable, and the masterly criticism of Kant pointing out the unbridgeable gulf between idea and existence, and hence also the impossibility of attaining truth, can hardly be satisfactorily answered. The correspondence theory is hopelessly inadequate to show us the way to the 'fact' as distinct from the 'idea.' We can never discover extra-mental facts with which we can compare our ideas and find out their correctness. The idealistic theory of coherence also falls short of supplying the adequate criterion of truth. The coherent and the consistent are only 'possible' which may or may not be 'actual.' The 'actual' is no doubt 'possible' but is not merely 'the possible.' There is a gap between possibility and actuality and unless the possible which alone idealistic philosophy can claim to have proved, is also shown to be actual, truth is not attained, and Kant's criticism will remain unanswered. As Prof. Radhakrishnan puts it: "Admitting that the conceptual plan of reality revealed to thought is true, still, it is sometimes urged, thought is not identical with reality. By compressing all concepts into one we do not get beyond concepts."

28. Kant frankly admits that the intellect cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and reality and hence cannot attain truth.

29. To say that Reason is the whole Real is a dogmatic assertion so long as the Absolute Reason is not found to be identical with the Individual Reason. That there is something external to and beyond the scope of individual Reason which comes to it as given is undeniable, and it is this distinction between the presented and the given on the one hand, forming the object, and the subject on the other, as the witnes of the object, and the source

of some other ideas, that is the basis of the bifurcation of subject and object essential to all cognition. So long as the given outside, the jada of the Vedanta, the object, the Drsya, cannot be reduced wholly to the Drasta or to the Atman, the Eternal subject or more correctly, the self-luminous luminosity or chit, there cannot be any idealism in the highest significance of the term. To say that the object appears, though only as the cognised presentation of the cognising subject, and yet to hold that there is identity of thought and being and to deny the gap between idea and existence, is to confuse the real merit of the ontological argument, and Hegel's position is fully open to the criticism of Kant. Mere thought or reason always moves within its own sphere and so long as there is division of subject and object, the necessary bifurcation of intellect, it cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and existence. The appeal to anubhava or experience (not sense-experience according to Sankara-Vedanta, but subtle anubhava of the very fine intuitive reason) can alone transform the possible into the actual, the ideal into the real. Bradley recognises the inadequacy of the intellect to reach truth. The 'that' exceeds the 'what.' For the apprehension of truth, 'another element in addition to thought' seems to be required and "this is suggested by the term 'darsana.'"

30. Brahman or the Absolute is not merely an idea that is supplied by reason, and as such is not merely an idea that is supplied by reason, and as such is not like Hegel's Absolute Idea. It is svayamprakasa and svasamvedya, self-evident and is not revealed or proved by aything else. Here the ontological argument takes a different turn. It is not manana or

reason that reveals the existence of Brahman, --it is hopelessly inadequate for the purpose. It is nididhyasana or dhyana (meditation) that gradually enlivens up the idea. The idea attains reality not as separate from the subject, on the one hand, nor from the object as real, on the other but the idea is transormed into the real through the resolving of the subject and the object into the oneness of an all-inclusive experience.

31. The Vedanta speaks to us of an experience where the not-self, the given is wholly resolved into the self.

. The self or Atman or Brahman of the Vedanta is not to be taken as the subject, but is something which transcends the distinction between the subject and the object, which is beyond all relational consciousness. The internal division between the subject and its ideas forming the object also disappears, and the experience is one of a higher type of immediacy transcending relational thought.

-. It is only when the idea is completely merged in the subject or rather when subject as the knower and the object as known resolve themselves into the non-relational consciousness, then only the 'other-ness' becomes completely extinct. At any stage short of this, knowledge implies the grasping or acquiring by the subject of something which is (at least partially) other than itself, and as such implying a process, a movement depending upon some conditions. The unconditionality of knowledge, which alone can supply its own criterion or more strictly which is above the requirement of any criterion, involves the complete annihilation of this 'otherness' of the object, and as such the very distinction of the subject and the object. This is what Sankara is at great pains to

explain to us as the svayamprakasatva and nityatva of jnana. Knowledge must be at the last step unconditional,--depending upon no conditions and no process, must be eternal and absolute, must depend on nothing else as its further criterion. To ask always for a criterion of knowledge and truth and not to reach the goal is to declare the impossibility of knowledge and the bankruptcy of the human reason. Sankara clearly explains the difference between this jnana where the Atman alone shines unhampered and unresisted by any not-self and all other forms of knowledge implying the not-self as an object. As Sankara puts it "Therefore jnana alone is all that the self acquires. The acquisition of the self is not like the acquisition of the not-self, an acquistion of something new--getting of something which was not--because here there is no distinction between the gainer and the gained."

32. D. G. LONDHE* What is the criterion of the Real? What is precisely the mark which the Real should possess and the Unreal should lack? Sankara's answer to this question would be that the criterion of Reality is permanence. Reality if anything at all, must be permanent. That which exists to-day and ceases to exist to-morrow can hardly deserve the name of reality. It is but a travesty of reality. He tells us in his commentary on the Taittiriya Upanishad: 2.1. "That is real which does not allow its ascertained nature to be contradicted; contrariwise, that is unreal which suffers a change or contradiction in its nature." The nature of a thing may be contradicted by growth or decay, by alteration or destruction.

33. That which is material (jada) depends upon the spiritual (chit) for its being known. Whatever has the character of materiality is an object (drsya). Whatever is an object lacks self-

** on "THE REAL SELF IN SANKARA"

sufficiency of existence and necessarily refers itself to the Subject (drasta). The object is dependent on the Subject. The distinction of the Subject from the object is a point which is central in Sankara's system and the nature of the Subject as such, gives, according to Sankara, a clue to the nature of the Absolute. It is perhaps for this reason that Sankara opens his commentary on the Brahma Sutras with this topic of the contrast between the Subject and the object, Visayi, and Visaya. The states that the "Subject and the object are as much opposed in nature as light and darkness." The Subject is Chit, pure consciousness, and the object is jada. The Subject being chit is self-luminous, known through itself and the object is known as an 'other' by the subject.

34. It is evident from this that Sankara does not use the terms Subject and object in an epistemological sense. The Subject, that is Drasta or Saksi, is different from the knower, Pramata. The knower is only a particular more of Buddhi, a state of consciousness, whereas the Subject is pure, unmodified consciousness. Epistemologically speaking, the knower is as much dependent on the known as the known is on the knower. The relativity between the two is complete and the one is inseparable from the other. Metaphysically speaking, the knower has the character of the object (drsya). According to Sankara, the external things, the body, the sense-organs and the mind together with all its particular modes such as cognitions, feelings, hopes, desires, etc. are objects. Only the innermost self, which never becomes the object but to which all objects are presented is the Subject.

But do we know the innermost self, the Subject that never becomes the object? Sankara

answers this question in the affirmative. He expressly says that the Subject (Visayi) is experienced in the awareness of the self (Asmat-pratyayagochara). The self's awareness of itself is the only clue which is supplied to us towards our understanding of the nature of the Absolute. But we must make sure as regards the precise nature of the awareness of ourselves. It should be clearly recognised that the awareness of the self is quite different from the awareness of objects.

35. The self and awareness are not two things but one; the self is awareness. It is in the self that being and knowledge meet in a manner which is unique being incomparable to any other experience. The self is self-evident, indubitably certain and unassailable by any species of scepticism. It is prior to all proofs; all proofs presuppose but cannot establish the self. The self which is awareness is prior to the distinction between subject and object. It, therefore, follows that the self which is subject cannot be brought before the mind and known as an object in a particular mental mode or a state of consciousness (vrtti). And yet, at no point of time is it found missing. The self or the subject is known but it is not known as an object. We may say that the subject is "experienced" and the object is "known." It might have been noticed that the self-awareness to which Sankara attaches so much importance is different from the notion of self-consciousness with which we are familiar in Western philosophy. Western thinkers regard that the experience in which the self is dichotomised, so that an aspect of the self stands over against itself as not-self, is the highest experience available to us. Sankara holds that it is by no means the highest experience, nor is this state essential or foundational. It is but a passing and momen-

tary manifestation, which is relative to what is external and extraneous. The nature of the self or the subject as such is above all duality, difference or division. The Atman has not the character of identity-in-difference, it is the unity pure and simple, the unity that excludes difference.

36. The Reality cannot be one and many. It is one, only it appears as many.

37. The self is never an object, if the term object is strictly taken to mean as that which 'stands before' the mind, so to say, and is caught in a momentary cognition. But it does not follow from this that the self is altogether unknown and a foreign entity. It is rather with the self that we can be said to be most directly and intimately acquainted. The immediacy of self-knowledge is unique and therefore it is no contradiction but a statement of fact to say that the self is never "known as an object" and yet in a sense it is always "known or rather experienced as subject."

38. The Absolutism of Sankara is mysticism only so far as the question of the "realisation" of the Atman is concerned, but so far as simply the establishment of truth within the domain of a philosophical system goes, Sankara does not seem to go beyond the facts and presuppositions of experience.

39. Sankara's answer to the question of the relation of the Absolute to the world consists in showing that the question itself is illegitimate after the right conception of the nature of the Absolute.

40. Sankara insists on the complete contrariety in the nature of the Real and the Unreal and when that is grasped the Unreal no longer exists apart from, and over against the Real. That the world will ever remain should not be taken to mean that there would be two entities side by

side, the Brahman and the world both being equally real.

41. Sankara's conception of the Absolute is unique in the sense that he neither admits the appearances in the Absolute nor posits any relation between the Absolute and the appearances. The appearances exist only empirically, metaphysically they are non-existent.

42. R.A. SANKARANARAYANA AYYAR. The Realist argues that the Idealist confuses the issue in perception by failing to distinguish between the object of perception and the act of perception. An act of perception takes place when the perceiving mind confronts objects existing outside of us. When facts are present before our sense organs, an act of perception results. Perception is the culmination of the process of discovery. In any act of discovery, the qualities and the characteristics discovered cannot totally exhaust their objects. They are more than their qualities or characteristics. Is an orange more than the sensations of yellowness, roundness, sweetness, etc? What constitutes the object as an object on the other hand, is the unity of the object--the state of togetherness that characterises the thing and its qualities. The Objects of perception are, therefore, that-what complexes. If the 'that' should also be perceived, it will lose its character of the that and become another 'what.' Therefore the 'that' is mental, for what is not perceivable is only mental.

43. RASAVIHARI DAS. If the absolute, which is conceived as pure intelligence or consciousness (Suddha-cit) without subject and object, were alone there, the philosophy of Vedantism itself would not arise. The very fact that we as subjects and the world-appearance as the object are there shows that

there must be something, beside the absolute, at the root of our experience. This something is conceived as ajnana or ignorance (literally, non-knowledge).

44. I am persuaded that illusion is the only meaning that can reasonably be given to the term ajnana in Vedantism. When the ultimate reality is one undifferenced absolute with no distinction of subject and object in it, the only way of accounting for the appearance of the world with its plurality and difference is to suppose that it is entirely due to illusion.

45. Just as the world is only seen to be there without in fact being there, so is God only imagined to be there (kalpita) although in fact there is no such thing as God. This is the meaning and consequence of "the theory of individual creation by perception" (drsti-srstivada) according to which the individual creates the world when he sees it and which is supposed to give us the ultimate teaching of the Vedanta philosophy (Mukhya Vedanta Siddhanta (cf. Madhusudana Sarasvati's Siddhanta Bindu). We therefore come to the conclusion that Vedantism cannot seriously maintain the reality of God which is essential to all forms of theism.

46. R.D. DESAI. The concept of experience resolves itself into the relationship of subject and object. Pure experience without reference to any subject, whose experience it is, is a fictional idea. Experience unqualified is an unmeaning term. It must have an experiencer; it cannot hang in the air. The subject of experience signifies one to whom various objects are consciously present. The subject is not only the knower, but it feels as well as wills. It is believed that the essence of self-hood is subjectivity; and

is subjectivity; and hence attempts are made to conceive it as pure subject without any reference to any object. But such a thing is a logical impossibility. We cannot at any time divorce the subject from the object. We may distinguish them, but cannot separate them completely.

47. B.L. ATREYA. When we cease to be en rapport with the external world with our physical senses, an inner world is opened to us in what we call a dream-experience. A careful study of dream is very necessary for the proper understanding of the personality and the mystery of human life. There is sense-perception in the dream, but the physical senses are closed and are at rest. There is a body active in dream, but the physical body is at rest; it is free from all that the dream-body is busy about. There is a world full of things and persons for the dreamer, but those things and persons are not exactly the same as the contents of the waking world. Does all this not show that the sphere of the existent and being experienced is much wider than that of what is perceived by the physical and external senses. The hypothesis, therefore, that the personality of the dead does not exist anywhere after the dissolution of the physical body is not sound.

48. "The study of dream" says Dr. Du Prel rightly, "frees us much more thoroughly from that physiological prejudice than can the investigation of psychical functions in the waking life." (Du Prel: The Philosophy of Mysticism Vol.1.p.54).

49. Prof. G.C. CHATTERJI: Common sense is neither systematic, nor is it ultimate. Its dogmas about Reality are dictated by practical utility and many of these conflict with each other. Science, on the other hand, is systema-

tic but is not ultimate. Every science in the first place, selects a limited group of facts, as aspect of Reality, and studies the nature of these in isolation from facts of another order, or from other aspects of Reality. Physics selects one group of facts, Chemistry another, Biology still another, and so on. The Physicist examines phenomena from the point of view of their mass, energy, and motion. He neglects and entirely ignores their chemical characteristics. He does not deny that the facts that he is examining have also a chemical nature. But he is not interested in this aspect of those facts, and he leaves the examination of the chemical characteristics of things to the Chemist's care. The Scientist thus abstracts from the concrete manifold of Reality a certain group of things, or a certain aspect of things, and confines his attention to this group or aspect alone. The Philosopher, however, is concerned with Reality as a whole. It is his attempt to take impartial note not only of the facts with which Physics deals, but equally so of the facts with which Chemistry, Biology, Psychology and all the other Sciences deal.

50. Philosophy is concerned with what I may call, on the one hand, the roots of science, and, on the other, with its fruits. It is concerned with the roots of science, for every science builds on the basis of certain postulates which it accepts uncritically. It is the business of philosophy to analyse and critically examine those fundamental postulates of each of the several sciences. It is for Philosophy to examine and analyse the conceptions of cause, motion, evolution and development. I may be asked, why should not the scientist himself examine, analyse, and justify these postulates? My

answer is that there certainly no objection to the individual scientist himself analysing and examining the postulates of his science. But once he begins to do so his activity is no longer scientific but becomes philosophical. The other function of philosophy appears to me to be synthetical. We have seen how each Science is partial, selecting for its study a "special group of facts, or a special aspect of reality." It pursues their study in exclusion from other related groups of facts, or other aspects of reality. As compared with this partiality of Science, Philosophy is the attempt to study the nature of Reality as a whole.

51. Philosophy is, in a certain sense, continuous with and even posterior to science, in that the only Philosophy which in my opinion has a future is a Philosophy not carried on in abstraction from and independently of the sciences, but is a Philosophy of any particular science or group of sciences, or of the whole body of scientific knowledge as such. Its function is two-fold, one, analytic, the other, synthetic.

52. J.K. SARKAR: There is no term so hopelessly misinterpreted, no notion so completely distorted as the Nirvana is. The confused mass of misconceptions and ambiguities arises from various sources, viz. the long litany of synonyms negative, contradictory and apparently inconceivable, indefinite definitions, etc. The confusion between "Nivrti" and "Nirvana," the two-fold meaning of the word "Nirvana, viz. cooling and extinguishing, are but the most prolific source of errors. To us the Nirvana is shrouded in mystery and with regard to its meaning our imagination has its full play, as the reality is unknown.

53. The suppression of the individual exist-

ence and supreme felicity arising out of the appeasement of thirst (corresponding to the two imports of the Nirvana, viz. extinction and cooling down)--the negative and the positive bliss affirmed of the Nirvana--do not exclude each other.

54. The Nirvana is one. It does not admit of degrees. It is, or it is not, just as a flame as much as it burns, is not extinguished. So Nirvana could not be more or less complete. It is without relation to what may be other than itself. It receives nothing from some other cause.

55. The constructions of different heavens (Svarga, Buddha-Kshetras etc) by the Buddhist monks, as rightly pointed out by Poussin, are simply meant to suit various temperaments of the people.

56. "The Bhiksu attaches himself to nothing, as the sensations are perishable. Without having any attachment he fears nothing. Because he fears nothing, he has the nirvana (Majjhima-Nikaya).

57. How can we form an idea of, or define, nirvana, as all ideas and words are related to the distinguishing characters of things of the Samsara? In fact Nirvana has no characters. It is impossible to say what it is. It is a region in which there is neither earth, nor water, nor perception. In it there is neither coming, nor going, neither birth, nor death. It does not grow, has no point of support.

58. But how can it be the supreme felicity when there is no sensation or perception in it? It is precisely the perfect felicity as there is no sensation or perception in it. All sensation supposes duality, implies limitation, and limitation is suffering.

59. S.C. CHATTERJI. Consciousness is awareness of something by some one, i.e. by a self.

Psychology as the study of consciousness is to be treated as the science of the self, because all consciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness.

60. H.P. MAITY. Though the concept of unconscious mental processes is not a new idea in Psychology, it has never been so extensively worked up as recently by Freud of Vienna. He claims that a scientific enquiry into certain mental disorders and, certain states like dream and hypnotism must necessarily lead to the supposition of unconscious mental processes. A belief in the existence of such processes is bound to be of far-reaching significance for Psychology as well as for Philosophy. It would affect not only our general view of life and morals but also the theory of knowledge. To General Psychology it offers a challenge to maintain its standpoint of mere structural analysis and neural explanation. On the other hand, it wants to widen the conception of mind and thereby to enlarge the scope of Psychology. General Psychologits, however, have not yet given that careful consideration to the concept which it seems to deserve.

61. A mind in disorder may be different from the mind in health, but it is mind all the same. And the principles that determine its disordered functions must be intimately related to the principles of the normal mind.

62. The concept of the unconscious coming from an alien source, appears to antagonise many of our long cherished beliefs about mind. Some of these beliefs, e.g., Beliefs in Soul, Freewill, etc., are not only very old but are deep-rooted in the universal and natural egocentricism of the human mind.

63. The first objection against this argument is that unconscious mental processes are inconceivable. The hypothesis involves self-con-

tradic tion. We cannot think of the processes--
mental and unconscious at the same time. Cons-
ciousness, in other words, is the very essence
of mind.

But are mental and conscious really identi-
cal? Can we not give instances of mental pro-
cesses of which we are not conscious? It is a
well-known fact that the phenomenal descrip--
tion of a mental process varies to a great
extent with the direction of attention and
the genearl attitude in which the experimental
situation is experienced.

64. Academic Psychology has not really been
able to completely identify the mental and
the conscious. For, it has felt the need of
recognising a peculiar kind of mental pro-
cesses, known as the subconscious. The subcons-
cious is a quantitative idea and comprises
all sub-threshold degrees of consciousness.
We can think of mental processes ranging from
O degree of excitation to the just sub-thresh-
old degree of it. Now as regards the chance of
recovery in consciousness, the processes with
very low values of excitation are exactly like
unconscious mental processes of the Psycho-
analysts. The question then is, not whether
unconscious mental processes are inadmissible,
but whether there is any necessity of recog-
nising two separate kinds of unconscious pro-
cesses--the subconscious and the unconscious.
The Psycho-analysts claim that their materials
justify this distinction and that phenomena of
post-hypnotic suggestion, analysis of dreams,
hysterical symptoms, etc., warrant the assump-
tion of the unconscious in addition to the sub-
conscious.

PROF. A. R. WADIA:@@ 1.Great metaphysicians like Sankara and Ramanuja were born centuries later, but they too were content to formulate their philosophy only as humble commentators. Their originality, their profoundity were all involved in making the Upanishads and the Gita say what they wanted them to say. While Plato developed his thought in dialogue form and Aristotle, summing up all previous thought, agreed to differ wherever he could not help it, and preferred truth to friendship in building up his own system of thought, Sankara and Ramanuja created systems of thought, far more profound than any the world has ever seen, only as appendages to the revealed Vedas and Upanishads. The difference is striking and instructive, for it epitomises the history of Indian and Western thought. While philosophy in the West forged its independence of dogmas and religious creeds, it was content in the East to play the role of an advocate of revealed truth.
2. A great genius can be an independent thinker, even while ostensibly playing the role of a mere commentator, but for the rank and file such a system of philosophy becomes a creed, too true to be criticised, too sacred to be questioned. In such an atmosphere philosophy cannot but become a creed, and this explains to my mind the curious paradox that in India the metaphysical interest has always been very high, but metaphysical thought has been content to revolve round the old old puzzles of the era of Sankara, of the era of Ramanuja. Philosophy has become a matter of birth; a man is expected to believe in the philosophy accepted by his father and grandfather.
3. S.K. DAS. Hume deduced wrong conclusion from a perfectly veridical testimony. He was

@@ INDIAN PHILOS.CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS. 1930.

looking for the self in the wrong direction --wanting to have the subjects as the object--and hence his inevitable failure in getting at the self.

4. G.R. MALKANI. The idea of a soul has been distinguished from that of a self or a subject. For my present discussion, I do not admit any material difference in the meaning of these terms. I mean by them that unity of consciousness which each individual person calls his self or the 'I'. I shall not raise here any question whether there is any real entity which deserves to be called by that name, nor again whether our meaning of self is perfectly definite and intelligible to us and can be made so to others in terms of reflective thought. I shall take for granted for my present discussion that we all agree what sort of entity we ordinarily call our 'self,' and that therefore that term signifies for us something quite definite. The unity of consciousness which we call our 'self' or the 'I' is not further definable; and if anyone wants to know the exact meaning of these terms, he has simply to appeal to his own experience in the matter and see for himself what he means when he himself uses those terms (as he cannot help doing) in the ordinary converse of daily life. The soul then defined in this way is some sort of entity which any person who intuits his self, or is self-conscious cannot help regarding as real in the ordinary usage of that term.

5. RASVIHARY DAS*. Bradley strikes a middle path. Although he condemns appearance as too full of contradictions to be wholly real, he protests vigorously against the idea that appearances are not real at all. He thinks that appearances, though in themselves falling short of reality, are retained as transformed

** on "BRADLEY'S VIEW OF APPEARANCE"

and harmonised in the absolute. The absolute of Bradley comprehends and retains all appearances whereas the absolute of the Vedanta rejects and negates them all. Unlike however the sensa of the realists, the appearances of Bradley are not real in their own right.

By Bradley and the Vedanta the idea of appearance is applied to that which cannot stand the test of reality. According to Bradley non-contradiction or harmony is the test of reality. But the world as conceived in terms of thought is found to be infected with self-discrepancy. According to the Vedanta ultimate reality belongs to that which does not depend on another for its manifestation. It is the pure subject alone which shines by its own light and is not dependent upon anything else for its manifestation. The world comes to us in the form of an object and as such it lacks the principle of self-manifestation. It is only in the knowing consciousness of the subject that an object as object realises its being. Pure subjectivity or consciousness being the ultimate nature of reality, the world of objects can only have the status of a false appearance.

6. The Vedanta gives us the instance of an illusory object in order to facilitate our understanding of this concept. According to the Vedanta an illusory object is neither nor unreal. It is not real, because it actually disappears when the illusion disappears and is negated in the correcting judgment. It is not also altogether unreal, because if it were completely unreal, it should not se been at all. We cannot see an object which is not there. The illusory object is not even a mental idea, because an idea has never an external appearance. So the Vedanta maintains that there can be a thing which is neither real nor unreal and which may therefore be called indescribable.

Bradley tries to solve this difficulty of conceiving appearance as different from both absolute reality and complete unreality by his doctrine of the degrees of reality. Nothing in the world is, according to him, absolutely real or unreal. There is more or less of reality in everything in the world. An appearance is thus more or less real according to the degree of its freedom from self-contradiction.

But can we really accept either the Vedantic view that there is an indescribable kind of being which is neither real nor unreal or the solution of Bradley that there are only degrees of reality? We find it impossible to conceive of different kinds of being; being as such must be of one sort only. Things differ in their specific characters, but they may never differ, if they are real, in their being. So we cannot think of two kinds of being, one real and the other illusory. Illusory being is no being at all. If it is asked 'if an illusory object is not, how is it that it is seen at all?' We have to say that it is the very characteristic of illusion that in it we seem to see thing which are not there. No further metaphysical account can be given of an illusory object.

7. D.M. DUTT. He utilises the first principle in proving that matter is inconceivable and therefore cannot exist. Matter he holds, is thought of as the general substance which is not identical with any particular substance like, iron, copper or gold but as that which is common to all of these. Though in our ignorance we believe that such a general conception can be formed by the mind, we find, however, on careful and sincere introspection that the mind can think only of a particular thing made of gold, copper or iron, but cannot

form the abstract idea of something which is not any of these particular things, but yet exists in all of them. For the formation of such a general idea, the mind is required to abstract from each of these particular things their particular colour, size, weight etc. and to think of something which has colour but one of the particular colours we perceive, which has size but not any of the particular sizes we can mention and which has weight but not any particular weight. Mind is, therefore, incapable of forming the abstract general idea of matter. Being unthinkable, matter cannot be thought to exist.

8. It is commonly known that Berkeley believes in the existence of the spiritual substances. Berkeley's statements regarding this matter also would seem to support this opinion. But if we look sufficiently deep and try to understand his conception in the light of the two main principles mentioned above, we find that Berkeley would not be consistent to entertain any common conception of a spiritual substance which has to depend upon any idea, for less an abstract idea, of a spirit or of a substance. To be consistent, Berkeley can only feel the existence of other spirits or God as such a proof has to depend upon imagination or inference which again involves ideas. But his own self also is known not as a substance but felt only as a series of changing activities. This would remind one of Berkeley's conception of Reality as change, the existence of which can be known not through concepts, but through direct intuition; but more specially of Gentile's theory of mind as a pure act which is essentially subjective and can never be known as an object.

9. BHASKAR S. NAIK. *In European philosophy no distinction is generally made between the self

** on "THE EGO"

and the ego, the subject and the mind. In the Vedanta each of these terms has a distinct meaning. The purpose of this short paper is to explain and justify these distinctions. The self is spoken of as 'I'. But the application of the term 'I' is possible only where there is knowledge. To an inanimate unconscious thing the term 'I' can never be applied. It is only the knower who can speak of himself as 'I'. Therefore the first definite meaning of self is the subject. The self is the subject that knows.

Since the subject is that which knows, it must be distinct from that which is known. The meanings of knower and known are entirely different. If they were to be identified, all sorts of confusion in thought and speech would inevitably arise. So it should be agreed that the subject in its true character can never become an object and an object can never be treated as the subject.

Another important fact to be noted about the subject is that it is not liable to any change. All change presupposes the unchanging subject which must bear witness to it. If the subject itself were to change, no consciousness of change would be possible.

When we understand the subject in this sense we find we have to admit another entity called 'mind' which is different both from the subject and from the body. There are certain states given in our experience which are not the states of the subject nor of the physical body. Such states are for instance, fear, anger etc. No body can say that there are no such states nor that they are the states of the body. There may be some bodily changes accompanying these states. But anger, fear, etc. are not in their proper character mere bodily states. They are not also the states of the subject.

The subject only knows; consciousness is its only nature or state. There is a consciousness of these states; but these are not states of consciousness. These states cannot belong to consciousness itself to which they are given as objects.

10. Ordinarily the ego is taken to be the self. One of the peculiarities of the Vedanta consists in showing that the self is different from the ego.

11. I feel I am happy or unhappy. It cannot be said that there is no experience of happiness or unhappiness. It must be referred to some mind or ego. It is I or you who can be happy. So happiness or unhappiness can be taken as the characteristic of the ego. The self cannot be either happy or unhappy.

It cannot at least be denied that it is the ego which thinks, when I am perplexed with any problem and I try to find out a solution for it, I cannot suppose either that nobody is thinking at all or somebody else is thinking for me. It is certain, therefore, that thinking is a function of the ego, but the self never thinks because it is not perplexed with any problem.

Waking, dream and sleeping are different states of the ego. We cannot say that there are no such states or that they are the states of physical objects. But the self has no states.

I know one thing at a time. That is not the way of self's knowing. There is no succession in its knowing. In fact it does not know; it is because of it that we know; it is knowledge itself.

12. We can say that the subject may always be there but the ego is not always found to be there. Whenever we like, we may be self-conscious. The sense of the ego is not always present, it comes and goes. It is not reasonable

to suppose that the ego can be present even when there is no sense of it. Vedantism together with all forms of idealism believes that the being of a thing cannot be separated from the sense of it given in knowledge.

13. J.N. CHUBB.* The chief feature of our world is relatedness. Everything stands in relation to everything else. Relations separate terms and give them individuality and independence; at the same time relations penetrate their terms and destroy their self-sufficiency. Relatedness is thus a mark of appearance, since related terms are unintelligible and inconsistent in their meaning. Appearances in short are bundles of discrepancies. Before analysis, they seem to pass off as real. But when closely examined their claim to reality is found to be unsubstantial, and they are, to use Bradley's words "undetermined and ruined."

But are appearances completely lost in the real? Bradley does not think so. He believes that a deeper insight would re-instate what we at first condemn. Appearances are not wholly unreal. They have a positive character and are for that reason not mere nonentities. Whatever appears, is, and as such it cannot be merely shelved and got rid of. Appearances must fall somewhere, and since there is no room outside the real in which they can live, they must somehow fall within and qualify reality, but in such a way as not to be discrepant.

14. Bradley overlooks the fact that self-contradiction is the essence of appearance and is inseparable from it. The ideal character which appearances reveal gives him the clue to his conception of an all-embracing synthesis. Appearances according to him reveal a tendency towards self-estrangement and self-transcendence. They therefore demand the wider whole in which they are taken up and absorbed.

** on "APPEARANCE IN BRADLEY & SANKARA"

But do appearances really call for a synthesis? Their ideality seems to suggest that they do. But it should be noted that ideality is not the last word about appearance. Appearances are ideal no doubt, but their ideality <u>follows from</u>, and is not <u>a condition</u> of their nature as discrepant. Appearances are ideal because they are self-contradictory.

15. Thus Bradley's attempt to link up appearance with reality by calling the former partially real is bound to fail, since the very nature of appearance as inconsistent precludes it from entering as an element in a self-consistent reality. Sankara sees the difficulty of synthesising appearance and reality and he therefore regards appearance as illusion. For Bradley, appearances are ideal, for Sankara they are ideal and illusory. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the nature of illusion as it is expounded in Sankara Vedanta, but it might be mentioned that illusions for Sankara belong to the category of the indefinite. What is illusory is not wholly unreal, nor is it an element in reality. Appearances are positive no doubt, but only in the sense that they are facts presented in our experience--but the presentation is nevertheless illusory. Illusions are objective facts, but they are neither real nor unreal.

16. If Bradley had followed up the hint contained in this remark he would have arrived at the conclusion reached by Sankara, that appearances are illusions, and that an illusion is that which cannot be defined either in terms of reality or unreality. Sankara's analysis reveals that appearances supply us with no clue whatever as to the nature of the real. Reality does not lie in the direction of appearance, it cannot be obtained by widening out and expansion of a finite content. Such a reality would only be absurdities of the appearance writ large.

* on "IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEFINING TRUTH"

Sankara's conclusion is that appearance is mithya (false) and anirvacaniya (inexplicable as either real or unreal). It is that which appears, without being real. More strictly appearances which are true from the finite stand-point are from the infinite stand-point ever non-existent. This is his Maya-vada.

17. C.T. SRINIVASAN.* The objective of truth being truth itself, every attempt at definition is bound to fail. Yet Truth demands a definition. But to define the one with the other is an absurdity. Here, the Upanishads teach us how Truth cannot be defined, how Reality cannot be grasped by showing conclusively that the Eternal Subject of all experience, cannot be defined or grasped as an object. They proclaim "Na Ithi, Not so." We can have an apprehension of it by an intellectual faith and not by speculative reason. Vedanta terms it Aparokshanubhava or Intuition.

What is "conscious experience"? Reality 'Sat' or existence and 'Chith' or consciousness are not two different things; they are two only in an empirical view of the transcendental. We may call consciousness "A pure act," involving individuation and differentiation, both fused into an actuality by a sense of present. Consciousness of a state covers the whole of Reality. But the Reality which is the 'witness,' transcends the sense of present. Consciousness is transcendental, only we do not know it at that time. Hence it is termed by the Upanishadic seers as Maya, the inscrutable. But the Real or God has not got really any Maya or error. The real Knower knows that He is the Absolute and secondless. If nothing else could be thought of as existent, where is the possibility or even the necessity for a definition.?

18. A.C. MUKERJI.+ Nothing is more central

++ on "SANKARA'S THEORY OF APPEARANCE"

in Sankara's philosophy than his theory of appearance; and the problem of right interpretation, therefore, reduces itself to the discovery of the status of appearances in his philosophy. Yet, it is precisely here that the divergence has been the acutest, both among his accredited exponents of the middle ages as well as among his interpreters of a more recent time. The difficulties in the way of a modern interpreter are increased by the fact that he has to reinterpret the vedantic theory of appearance in terms of western thought which is the living thought of the day, and so the very first problem which he has to encounter is whether and how Sankara's doctrine may be presented in a systematic and coherent form. And even here there is anything but unanimity of opinions among contemporary scholars. Some think that Sankara's views have unsolved certain questions which inevitably arise out of his expressed doctrines, and consequently "one could not treat Vedanta as a complete and coherent system of metaphysics" without taking into account "the questions and problems which Sankara did not raise" and which "have been raised and discussed by his followers." (Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy,p.437). There are others who think, on the contrary, that Sankara made a "successful attempt at systematization" and so it is possible to present his philosophy "in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself," (Pandit K. Sastri, Advaita Philosophy p.ix). It is far from our purpose here to estimate the comparative merits of these two methods of interpreting Sankara. Yet, it may perhaps be useful to remember that when an interpretation is avowedly based on the ipsissima verba of the original philosopher, its correctness is

not necessarily proportional to the success with which relevant extracts are quoted in support of that particular interpretation. It is well known that widely divergent interpretations of Kant and Hegel have been sought to justify by profuse extracts from their writings. If then we are to confine ourselves to the pronouncements of the original philosopher, a better insight into his innermost beliefs is likely to be gained by supplementing what he says directly by what he impies indirectly. That is, the possibility of misinterpretation of a complex doctrine is to a great extent diminished when the direct conclusions of a philosophy are read in the light of the doctrines which it seeks to reject as false. The value of this indirect procedure in interpreting Sankara's philosophy, we believe, can hardly be exaggerated. For, as is well known, Sankara, in presenting the fundamental conceptions of the Vedanta, makes use of two entirely different stand-points, and is not always careful to specify the standpoint from which he is arguing in a given context. The consequence is a tissue of contradictions which open up the prospect for conflicting interpretations, equally supported by disconnected passages from his works.

19. No one who attempts to place Sankara's philosophy in its right perspective can afford to forget that through all his arguments, positive as well negative, there runs one unmistakable tendency to translate into the language of rational thought that which is at the same time admitted to be entirely beyond reason. On the one hand, Sankara is never tired of insisting that the mystic vision of the Unity does not admit of a

rational proof, and that thought when left to itself may lead to any conclusion in accordance with the forensic excellence of the thinker. On the other hand, he is equally emphatic on the need of rationalisation as a stage towards the attainment of the intuitional vision. In this respect, Sankara's procedure is analogous to that of Plotinus for whom God is neither to be expressed in speech nor in written discourse, though we have to rationalise on Him "in order to direct the soul to him and to stimulate it to rise from thought to vision." That is, philosophy as the thinking consideration of things, as a rational discourse or 'mananam', is, for Sankara as well as for Plotinus, a discipline or a training for moulding the finite soul and thus helping it to give up its finitude with all the limitations incidental to the finite standpoint.

Except in the light of these observations, Sankara's theory of appearance will ever remain a mystery, an ingenuous makeshift to brush off the contradictions that arise persistently at every step of his exposition. Unfortunately however, the interpreters of his theory, have, as a general rule, underestimated the importance of distinguishing the finite from the infinite stand-point for appreciating his position correctly. And the result is that they have been led to one of two extreme views, and Sankara is either interpreted as a subjectivist or a realist. Those who concentrate on the passages that compare the world of appearance to the apparitions in dream and illusions rush to the conclusion that the world, for Sankara, is but a prolonged dream or a systematic illusion. It then falls to the lot of their critics to point out that analogy should not be pressed too far, and

Sankara has expressly repudiated subjectivism by distinguishing between three classes of objects, namely that which is absolutely false, that which is illusory and that which has phenomenal reality. Both these interpretations, however, we contend, represent extreme views consequent mainly on the failure to distinguish between the finite and the infinite standpoints which, as we have remarked, pervade Sankara's exposition of appearance.

The subjectivistic interpretation which is favoured by a number of passages in Sankara's philosophy is implied in the popular version of his theory of appearance, and this is responsible for the widely current opinion that the world, for Sankara, is nothing better than a huge illusion or is such as dreams are made of. The mistake of this popular version of Vedantism has been successfully exposed by the contemporary scholars who have once for all placed it beyond doubt that Sankara is not a subjectivist in the same sense as Berkeley or Hume. His uncompromising criticism of the Buddhistic subjectivism, and his frequent insistence on the distinction between the phenomenal or vyavaharika, the illusory or pratibhasika and the absolutely false of alika, ought to have exposed the mistake of those who think that the doctrine of Maya classes "the whole known world as illusion." (Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality). So far as reality of the world is concerned, a better insight is likely to be gained if we remember Max Muller's remark that "these Vedanta philosophers have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfill their duties in this phenomenal world." (The Six Systems). And when it is urged that a "pantheistic, or rather acosmic, idea of God such as that of

Brahmanism not only offers no hindrance to idolatry and immorality, but may be said even to lead to them by a logical necessity" (J. Caird, Philosophy of Religion) one may again retort in the language of Max Muller that it is "hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedanta philosophy, even in its popular form, holds out no encouragement to vice. Far from it. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline, whether as a student (Brahmakarin) or as a householder (Grihastha)."

The fact is that the subjectivistic interpretation of Sankara's theory of appearance arises from a misapprehension which essentially consists in confusing the finite with the infinite stand-point as understood by Sankara. The world of appearance, with its ethics and religion, duties and worship, are real in the strictest sense of the term; but, they are so within definite experience alone. If the world is an illusion, it is emphatically not so for the finite ego, for whom an illusion exists only as different from reality. That is, it would be impossible to know an illusory appearance as such if there had been nothing real for us. When therefore Sankara compares the world of appearance with illusions and dreams he never means to reduce the world as it is for the finite ego to the level of what we call an unsubstantial shadow or an unreal apparition. While, however, conceding to the world a full measure of reality, Sankara is equally emphatic on the ultimate nothingness of appearance when regarded from a different standpoint. This leads us to the consideration of the realistic interpretation of his theory, in order to see how far it avoids the confusion of the finite with the infinite

standpoint which vitiates the alternative theory.

The essence of the realistic interpretation consists in pointing out that the world of appearance with its empirical objects and moral order are not false in Sankara's philosophy. From his doctrine of the sole reality of the Absolute Spirit follows, not the unreality of the world, but is relative reality only; Brahman manifests himself through the world, or, stated from the other side, the world is the manifestation of Brahman's nature, the self-expression or the self-realisation of the underlying Reality. All that Sankara means by the non-existence of the world, it is urged, is that the world should not be imagined as a factor separate from the Absolute, for, it has really a conditioned existence dependent on and sustained by the Absolute. To put these contentions into the form of a technical formula of philosophy, the relation between the Absolute and the world of empirical objects is neither one of identity nor one of difference; and Sankara it is contended, does not content himself with exposing the difects of pluralism, but he continues his polemic right into the camp of the patheist as well and thus repudiates mere identity and pure difference as equally inadequate, for representing the relation of the Absolute to the world.

This realistic interpretation, we believe, is valuable as a protest against the subjectivistic tendency which vitiates some of the popular versions of Sankara's philosophy. But an interpretation of Sankara's ultimate position, we submit, it fails to emphasise the deeper aspects of the vedanta system which is not a system of philosophy in the ordinary sense of reasoned knowledge.

Systematised knowledge, for Sankara, is no doubt superior to the unsystematic knowledge of common-sense, and consequently a philosopher cannot dispense with reason. But this is only a stage, a discipline intended to lead the philosopher beyond the domain of reason. Hence Sankara's repeated invectives against those who accept the ultimate and independent truth-value of rational conclusions. It is his considered opinion that reason with its principles of space, time and causality is incompetent for grasping the ultimate truth about the universe, but when conducted under the control, and in the light, of the scripture it may give us the negative assurance that the ultimate truth entirely improbable. That is, reason for Sankara, has the indispensable function of stimulating the finite ego to rise from thought to vision though it can never be an adequate substitute for the intuitional vision as an organ of knowledge. No interpretation of Sankara, we claim, can be accepted as true that ignores the intuitional basis of his philosophy and fails to distinguish between the stand-point of intuition and that of finite knowledge which enter into his exposition, often to the great confusion of the reader.

When judged in the light of these remarks, Sankara's theory of appearance, we believe, should be admitted to have two aspects. From the standpoint of finite knowledge, or yukti dristi, the world is an appearance which, like an illusion, is there, inscrutable and inexplicable or anirvachaniya. This is shown by a criticism of the different theories of error as well as by contrasting his own position with the alternative conceptions of the relation between the finite and the infinite within as well as without the school of Vedantism then known to the world. On the other hand,

the world of appearance, when regarded from the standpoint of the Absolute, or sastra dristi, is absolutely non-existent or tuchha, existing neither in the past nor in the present nor again in the future. From this standpoint, it is urged that there is neither a summum bonum to be attained nor a moral struggle for its attainment, neither a state of bondage nor one of liberation. There is only One without a second, entirely beyond the categories of one and of many, existence and non-existence, cause and effect, and consequently incomprehensible from the standpoint of finite experience. Finite thought which understands through distinction is incapable of comprehending the pure unity of intuition which is different from the category of unity, and which is pure being different from the empirical existence of things in space and time. And it follows from this that all questions of the relation between the pure unity and the world of appearance are irrelevant in as much as they assume the reality of at least two relata in the form of cause and effect, or substance and attribute, or end and means, or again the manifestation and the manifested. Hence again all we can say about the world of appearance is that it exists <u>for us</u>, but to penetrate further into the mystery of the origin of appearances is to go beyond our depths.

This aspect of Sankara's philosophy is thrown overboard if we interpret his theory of appearance either exclusively on the subjectivistic or the realistic lines, even when these interpretations are supported by profuse extracts from his works. Through all his polemics and expositions runs the agnostic conviction that all distinctions are within finite experience that duality

is inseparable from the finite stand-point, and that Reality is consequently beyond the competence of finite thought. Avidya and adhyasa are inseparable from the finite nature, and so our highest category may give us nothing but an appearance of the Reality. In this regard, Sankara's position may be compared with that of Plotinus and the mystics in general, or again with those of Spinoza, Kant, Schelling and Bradley. Spinoza's distinction between the view point of thought and that of a higher faculty, Kant's critical limitation of the categories, Schellings's intuition to which finite thought may lead up, and Bradley's ultra-relational experience are reminiscent of the mistic aspects of Sankara's philosophy which have an important bearing on his theory of appearance. The chief difficulty of the problem of error, it has been pointed out, (F.H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality,186) is this that "we can not on the one hand accept anything between non-existence and reality, while, on the other hand, error obstinately refuses to be either. It persistently attempts to maintain a third position, which appears nowhere to exist, and yet somehow is occupied. In false appearance there is something attributed to the real which does not belong to it. But if the appearance is not real, then it is not false appearance, because it is nothing. On the other hand, if it is false it must therefore be true reality, for it is something, which is. And this dilemma at first sight seems insoluble." Here Bradley raises, almost in the spirit of Sankara, the deepest problem about the world of appearances, and the problem has remained unsolved since the days of Plato and Aristotle. Appearances are still thought to have a quasi-substantive existence; or, as Alexander puts it, they have a twilight exist-

ence between the things they represent and the mind which understands them. According to Sankara, the problem is insoluble from the finite stand-point, they belong and do not belong to the real. We cannot doubt that the appearances appear, they are co-existent with the finite ego. But from the infinite standpoint, they never exist and are as unreal as a castle in the air. But how the absolutely unreal can yet appear is a mystery to us, and it will ever remain as inexplicable as the origin of the finite from the infinite.

20. H.N. RAHGAVENDRACHAR. Among the Western thinkers the problem of illusion has come to receive a separate examination only recently. Yet we can trace some kind of conception of illusion from the very beginning of philosophical thought. When Parmenides taught that only being is and it is one and the senses which show us a multiplicity of things are the sources of error, he implies a kind of the conception of illusion that it is something which presents that which is not. The same idea in some form or other runs throughout the monistic doctrines down to our own time.

21. ASHUTOSH SASTRI. Sankara draws a clear distinction between Reason and Intuition as two different faculties having different scopes and functions--the one dealing with the relative and conditioned, while the other with the Absolute and Unconditioned. Reason therefore is not competent to pronounce any judgment upon the affirmations of intuition.

22. Sankara brings out pointedly that though there is this divergence of function between reason and intuition, the two are not inherently antithetical. Reason by its own

inherent dialectic comes to realise its inadequacy to apprehend Reality. For in trying to apprehend Reality, it involves itself in contradictions and antinomies. This is shown by an analysis of the nature of falsity and empiric illusion from the Adwaitic standpoint. Sankara shows that neither sense-knowledge nor the thought-constructions of reason can give us reality as there are constant changes and denials in the report of the senses, and reality or truth can not consist in such constant change. It is a common experience that perception is denied by perception, perception by inference, inference by authority and so on. Thus empirical knowledge by its own denials establishes its own falsity. The seeming uniformities of experience obtain under some conditions and do not obtain under others. Truth of experience is thus subject to the conditions of space, time and causality. This criticism of sense-experience applies to all finer forms of perception whether of religion, art or of morality. All experience is true in one way and false in another. Thus logical reason ultimately finds its own barrenness and discovers self-contradiction in all products of thought.

Reason ultimately comes to realise that reason is not the final arbiter of truth and that there is a super-logical way of apprehending truth by intuition. Sankara's system brings out the great truth that Reality can be seen or intuited but not understood in the ordinary ratiocinative way. But this intuition of Sankara is not something mysterious but self-luminous and with its emergence all duality and darkness vanishes. Reality or Self shines forth resplendent in its own light.

23. U.C. BHATTACHARJEE: It is a commonplace to say that with the flow of time interest in phi-

losophy has shifted from point to point. The old questions which enthralled the minds of the throng of young listeners of Socrates, hardly create any enthusiasm in the minds of the young men of to-day. There was a time when the prime concern of a thinker was moksa or nirvana or temperance or justice; and the hours and days spent upon questions of this kind were never considered ill-spent. But such speculation would little interest the world of to-day, except as relics of antiquity. It is an inevitable change and the change is not peculiar to philosophy.

Even in the sciences, new questions have come to take the place of the old. In science however, this comes to pass, as we are frequently told, because the old problems happen to have been solved, leading to the vision of new problems in the distant horizon; the boundaries of knowledge being extended, new territories invite the attention of the conqueror. In philosophy, on the contrary, as her accusers would have us believe, old questions are given up not because they are solved once for all, but out of sheer inanition and fruitlessness of the search; and if new problems happen to engage our attention, that again is so because the philosopher must be in eternal search of his stone.

Whether the shifting of interest from question to question is a sign of life in science and of inanition in philosophy, may be left as an open question.

24. A philosopher's prime concern, no doubt, is to remain pure, but it is also his concern to make pure the world he lives in. He must put his shoulder to the wheel and set things right or, else, he is not functioning as a philosopher.

The mistake of allowing international relations to be adjusted by mere diplomacy, will be discovered one day. Failure here will lead men to the means of success. International like individual relations cannot be settled by systematic lying only. If the world is not proceeding more rapidly towards the solution of its problems, it is mainly due, it seems, to the dishonesty involved in dispossessing Ethics of her legitimate say in these matters. No good will come to humanity by stifling Ethics.

25. The philosopher should forget his race and creed; and unmindful of the plaudits of the platform or the pulpit, and absorbed in the meditation of the "essential Form of the Good," he should, as Plato dreamt, point out to erring humanity the path to peace and happiness.

26. BAHADUR MAL.* The mere fact, however, that an action is accompanied by consciousness is in itself not a sufficient evidence, that it is a free action. Impulsive and habitual acts are not the results of free choice. We would not be prepared to apply the category of freedom to such actions. In the case of most actions the real motives remain hidden in the unconscious while the apparent reasons that we ascribe to them, are simply the consequences of the rationalising activity. Mostly our actions are the outcome of a bias or prejudice, which is too subtle to be detected.

27. The question of the freedom of will resolves itself ultimately into the legitimacy or otherwise of the assumption, that the intellectual recognition, that one action is more valuable than the other, is in itself a sufficient motive to its performance.

It is a matter for psychology to decide whe-

we can act merely from the intellectual reali-

** on "THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM"

sation that a certain line of action is reasonable and right, apart from considerations of personal likings and dislikings. I think that the idea, that a certain action is right, can be a sufficient motive for action, even in the absence of an impulsive reinforcement. There is always a motive behind every action.

28. Our so-called knowledge may not be a genuine knowledge. It may only masquerade as such. The real inciting causes may be hidden from our view. All that can be said in this connection is, that we must try to make our knowledge as adequate as possible and to make our judgment of right and wrong as impartial as we can; otherwise the mere consciousness that we are making a free choice, which at bottom, may be determined by hidden impulses or complexes, will be of no avail.

Psycho-analysis has done a great service in drawing attention to the fact, that our actions are, for the most part, determined by motives of which we are unconscious. People, as a rule do not know all the relevant circumstances, which directly and indirectly influence their judgment at the time of making a choice. It is only possible after a careful self-analysis which in itself is not an easy task.

It follows as a corollary, that freedom of choice is a rare phenomenon. It does not occur as often as some of us imagine. The measure of our freedom increases with the growth of knowledge. There are two sides to the question. In the first place, the free action should originate from a pure sense of duty or in other words from the perception that "an action is per se the right and reasonable act to be done." It is the great contribution of Kant to the science of mora-

lity for all time to come. In the second place the act should be backed up by adequate knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. Sometimes we think we are acting from a pure sense of duty while as a matter of fact, there is a hidden impulse working in the unconscious, of which we have no knowledge. At other times our conduct, though actuated by a sense of duty is based upon erroneous beliefs. This defect can only be remedied by means of genuine knowledge of the situation, in which we are acting. In this sense, we can say that our actions are relatively free, that is, relative to the adequacy of our knowledge of all the elements of the situation, subjective as well as objective.

It goes without saying that a sufficient knowledge of the situation is presupposed in all actions. We cannot launch ourselves into any activity, unless we possess some working knowledge of the circumstances in question; and yet for the sake of free choice we may attach a greater importance to the subjective factor of self knowledge than to the knowledge of the objective situation.

29. Let us analyse a free act into its two important ingredients. On the one hand there are the circumstances or the situation, out of which the act develops. It is obvious that the free act cannot transcend the limitations, imposed by the situation. It is the situation, that calls forth the action. The latter cannot ignore the former and has to shape its course according to its requirements. The second important and more complicated factor is the mind of the agent. It is here, that we must search for the source of freedom, if it exists at all. The mind of the agent, theoretically speaking, is what it is, on account of its native equipment and environmental in-

fluences. It therefore has a special point of view or a special character at the time of making a choice. My contention is, that the special point of view, brought to bear upon the choice of an alternative, by the agent, cannot be regarded as a wholly predetermined affair. We are only wise after the event, when we declare that a certain action could only issue from a certain type of character. But we cannot say, before the choice has already been made, what the outcome of the choice will be. It is not because, the mental factor is, in its very nature, unforseeable and in-determinable in all its aspects.

30. From the nature of the case, it is apparent that however far we may go in formulating mental laws, there would always remain the possibility of an irreducible surd, acting as a disturbing factor in our calculations about mental phenomena.

It is this aspect of mind, which provides a content to the concept of freedom. Freedom does not imply, that we can capriciously choose any course of action, towards which, for the time being, our mind is attracted in an incomprehensible manner. Our freedom is limited by the number of alternatives at our disposal. But within those alternatives, our mind may roam freely, provided that its choice is guided and controlled by the impartial judgment of the comparative value of the various goods, from which we have to choose. I believe that the conception of freedom as presented here may possibly undo some of the tangles, involved in this most intricate problem.

31. HARISATYA BHATTACHARYA. "Being an animal yourself, your shall not kill an animal for know for certain, one who kills an animal

is sure to have grief."...(Buddha).

The practice of Ahimsa was thus a great virtue, according to Buddha. But the first principle of his philosophy was "All existence is misery" and he was so much overwhelmed with this sad thought that he hastened to do the little amount of positive good that he could to his fellow-sufferers in the world.

32. RADHA KAMAL MUKHERJEE. In Sufi mysticism earthly love is not disregarded but blossoms forth through the cult of Beauty into Divine love. With the sublimations of the desires and emotions of sex a rich and tender symbolism develops which indicates that the mind has moved far away from the pleasures of the senses. "Wine, the torch and beauty are epiphanies of truth. The wine-house is the fountain of meditation. Wine is the rapture that maketh the Sufi lose himself at the manifestation of the Beloved. By it, that one swalloweth at one draught the cup, the wine-house the saki and the wine-drinker, and yet open remained his mouth."

No such symbolism characterises the strange cult in Bengal known as Sahaja an offshoot of Bajrajan Buddhism, which either came to Eastern India through Nepal or was developed in India by the Buddhist monks and nuns when they lived a freer life in the Sanghas. It disregards altogether idolatry as well as Brahminism and cult of sacrifice, emphasises a course of psycho-physiological discipline of the mind. It recommends worship of man and woman, and frankly recognises the adoration of the opposite sex as the road to mental illumination and ultimately Salvation. Sahaja at its best implies that there is neither desire nor non-desire, neither wish nor repression. Everything is spontaneous in nature, so there should be spontaneity in human relations and

experience. Thus sexual mysticism, outside the marital relation, and accompanied by religious preparation and discipline has given us an inspiring vision of the dignity and majesty of human relations through a realisation of the divine perfection and infinity of the human lover and beloved.

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1. PROF. A.R.WADIA: @@

If the metaphysical concepts require a proof, the only proof can be transcendental. It is one of the puzzles of philosophy as to why so acute a mind as Kant's failed to gauze the significance and the range of his own great discovery. His hesitancy in following his own logic and the pitiful contradictions of his Transcendental Dialectic which pursued him even to the pages of the Critique of Judgment may well cause bewilderment, but do not in the least affect the worth or the cogency of the mighty instrument forged by his titanic genius. What he sowed, Hegel reaped. Here again we may or may not agree with the net conclusions of what has come to be known as Hegelianism with its impossible triads and a stagnant Absolute, but this leaves unaffected the method. For all that it seeks to assert is that if X is given and is explicable only in terms of Y, then Y must be real.

2. Russell as a mathematician has a native predilection for the world of physics and is less than just to the meaning of mind. He does not reduce it to matter, but it exists for him only in introspection and memory.

3. B.L. ATREYA: Nagarjuna begins his famous Madhyamika sutras with a very bold statement: "There is no death, no birth, no destruction, no persistence; no oneness, no manyness, no

coming in, no departing." He holds that "The production, the stay and the destruction are all alike a magic scene, like a dream, and like a Gandharvanagar (city in sky).
4. A study of the same facts differently interpreted in waking and dream-consciousness will probably make the point intelligible. A slight scratch, for example, on the physical body lying in bed may be interpreted as a real cut of sword by the dreaming personality. A very little weight put upon the physical body may be interpreted by the dreaming personality as being pressed heavily by a rock.
5. With a slight change in our senses with regard to their number of constitution, this objective dream of ours would change immensely. It will become quite another to a differently constituted mind. This is not inconceivable. Even here and now there might be experienced several kinds of worlds existing simultaneously and interpenetratingly with one another, and yet quite unreal to the minds differently constituted from those to which they are real. If all of us had X-ray sight, for example, our world would be found inhabited not by bodies of the nature we see, but by skeletons only. How can we then expect that the Absolute consciousness, which is very much different from our present consciousness, would be conscious of things as we are conscious of them, that the world in the Absolute Experience would be as it is in ours, who are limited forms of the Absolute, viewing it in our own way and from our own particular point of view?
6. That the vision of an objective world is relative to the activity of mind, that it is absent when the activity of the mind is absent, as the author of the Yogavasistha points out, is evident from the fact that no objective

world is experienced when the mind comes naturally to rest in deep sleep, and is brought to rest in Samadhi.

7. R.D. DESAI:* Not to talk of the idealists even the English realists--G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and S. Alexander--unanimously hold that experience can be analysed into an act of awareness and an object or a concept of which it is aware. The act of awareness is the peculiarly mental or conscious factor in the cognitive situation. This is taken as quite self-evident on self-observation. To Alexander the mind becomes aware of itself as knowing other objects. This self-awareness is called the enjoying activity of the mind. The mind enjoys itself. It cannot contemplate itself as a presented 'this' as it contemplates a physical object as a given this' in perception. So according to Alexander mind is a unique quality which can be aware of itself in being aware of external objects. Bertrand Russell explicitly recognises the knowing capacity of mind as distinguished from the absence of it in the non-mental objects, "The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of mind." So the differentium that distinguishes a mind from other objects is that mind has the faculty of knowing objects. It also becomes aware of itself in the act of knowing. The non-mental do neither of these things. They are presented in perception. Mind cannot be presented as an external object. The mind cannot know itself nor other minds as a presented 'this' in perception. Then how does one mind know another mind at all? If one mind cannot have a direct access to other minds, as in perception, is there any sufficient reason for holding that there are minds other than

*on "HOW DO WE KNOW OTHER MINDS"

my own? If not, is the belief merely based on instinct as a sort of assurance which cannot stand the analysis of logical criticism?

8. The mind knows itself only. It has no access to any thing non-mental. This is the extreme 'privacy' view of mind's capacity to know. The mind is confined within itself, it cannot even know the material objects given in perception, much less the minds behind the external living bodies. There is no logical ground for the mind to pass from its knowledge to the knowledge of other foreign objects. This is the Cartesian breach between the mental and the non-mental.

9. One mind cannot know another directly as an entity given in perception, nor does it know the other directly as it knows its own acts. The belief in the existence of other minds is reached only by inference based on analogy. I know physical expressions of my mental states. I see other bodies with similar behaviour. I connect this behaviour with a mind behind them as I am already conscious of such a correspondence in my person. We do not directly know other minds as we know our own. Neither do we know them directly in perception, but we know only an inference based on the analogical correspondence of mental states and bodily behaviour familiar to us in our person.

We never see mind as a given entity in perception, nor do we share others' feelings directly. What we see is the bodily expression of the feeling or the mental state. So we cannot be said to have a direct access to the states themselves.

10. N.V. BANERJEE.* The commonsense view is not, as previously pointed out, a definitely formed opinion, consciously maintained by any one. It is what the thinker can elicit from the ordinary individual by questionings.

*on "THEORY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION."

11. In the first place it may be pointed out that it is a fact of common experience that one and the same object may appear differently to one and the same individual under different circumstances, and also to different individuals under the same circumstances. A round object may, for example, appear to one individual as round and to another as oval due to differences of perspective from which it is viewed. What is noticeable about facts of this type is that though our experience in these cases is affected by relativity, it cannot be said to be necessarily erroneous. Seeing a round object as oval or seeing a man as smaller, when looked at from a distance, than what he really is, is not ordinarily regarded as a case of erroneous experience.

12. According to common sense, the subject in knowing transcends itself and directly apprehends an independently existing object, i.e. an object as it is in itself. Now so far as our experience affected by relativity is concerned, how can we be justified in holding that in the cases in which relativity operates, the object as apprehended is the independently existing object? If it is a fact that one and the same object one may apprehend as red under certain circumstances, and as grey under certain others, one cannot be said to have apprehended the independent object in either of these cases, since the object cannot be both red and grey. The difficulty seems to be much greater in the case of dream, etc. In these cases the object apprehended may not at all have an independent existence. But some object is all the same present to consciousness. So the suspicion may naturally arise in the mind of the thinker that there may be some cases of experience to which the commonsense view that in sense-knowledge what is apprehended is the

independently existing object, may not apply. Who knows whereto this suspicion may lead the thinking mind? The importance of the question, arising in the connection of these phenomena to any view of sense-knowledge cannot, therefore, be overestimated.

13. Facts of relativity, dream, etc., tend to throw doubt upon the fundamental theses of the commonsense view--namely the directness of sense-knowledge, and the independent existence of its object. Now if facts of relativity alone are taken into account, it appears at first sight that what is difficult to maintain is the directness of sense-knowledge and not the independent existence of the object. The latter rather seems to be the presupposition of the former. If there be nothing existing independently, the relativity of its appearances cannot be possible. When, for example, I perceive an object as red at one time and as grey at another what I am naturally led to doubt is not that there exists some object in the external world but that what I perceive is the object itself. There may arise, that is to say, the suspicion that what is present to consciousness is probably something other than the real object, though this something is not wholly unrelated to the latter. The implication of this suspicion seems to be that it is not necessary that in every case of sense-knowledge what is present to consciousness should necessarily be an independently existing object. This suspicion againat the validity of the commonsense view may not only gain some confirmation but may actually grow stronger and invade the other thesis of this view when facts of error, etc., are taken into consideration. It has been already observed that in the case of error, etc. what is present to consciousness may not at all exist in the external world. So the second

thesis of the common-sense view, namely, that the object of sense-knowledge exists independently, is also in danger of being rejected. It may be further pointed out that doubt about the second thesis may gather added strength from the consideration of certain experiences, e.g., pleasure, pain, desire, etc., which we have no reason to suspect as necessarily erroneous.

14. The legitimate theory of sense-knowledge should, therefore, be a logical theory of truth and error. It should be noticed, however, that the whole problem of truth and error is far wider than what the theory of sense-knowledge is in a position to deal with. The question of truth and error is co-extensive with the whole field of knowledge. Now sense-knowledge being only of the several types of knowledge, the limitation of the logical theory concerning sense-knowledge is obvious.

15. We see, therefore, that the primary object of a satisfactory theory of sense-knowledge is to solve the problem of truth and error in so far as sense-knowledge alone is concerned. But since it is not easily realised that this problem is the only genuine problem, it should undertake a criticism of current theories of sense-perception in order to show that the problem which they seek to solve is absurd.

16. C. HANUMANTA RAO. In the history of idealistic thought, three lines of arguments have been advanced to prove that the relation between knowing and its object is internal. They are: firstly, the Berkeleyan argument that we know an object only as related to a consciousness and that therefore it is dependent upon consciousness; secondly, the Hegelian argument that the real is the rational

and therefore spiritual and therefore dependent on mind; and thirdly, the Bradleyan argument that all relations are internal and therefore the cognitive relation also.

The Berkeleyan argument only proves that in order to be known an object must enter into relation with a consciousness, it does not prove that it must always be in that relation. The Berkeleyan argument is made much of by the realists, but it is not employed by any contemporary idealist to prove the mind-dependent character of reality. The argument which is more seriously advanced in support of the mind-dependent character of reality is the Hegelian arguemtn which we shall now consider.

When the idealists maintain that the object is mind-dependent, they do not mean that it is dependent upon my consciousness or your consciousness, but that it is ultimately dependent upon a consciousness that is absolutely rational. They argue that in so far as the real is the rational and the rational is of the nature of mind, reality is mind-dependent. The argument of Hegel derives a great deal of its plausibility from the ambiguity lurking under the word "rational." "Rational" could be understood in two senses. We may speak of man as being rational and we may also speak of an argument as being rational, but the argument is not rational in the same sense as man is. "Rational" used in respect of man means, "capable of reasoning," but used in respect of an argument it means "intelligible". Reasoning is not the same as being intelligible. To be able to reason we certainly want a mind, but for a thing to be intelligible it is not necessary that it should have a mind. Reality may be admitted to be rational only in the sense that it is intelligible but not to be intelligible is not to be dependent upon mind. Reality must present a scheme of

relations to a thinking consciousness in order to be known, but it need not reason. That which does not reason has no mind.

Hegel tries to prove that the cognitive relation is internal by showing that reality is ultimately spiritual. But Bradley does not adopt this line of proof; he tries to prove that the cognitive relation is internal because reality is one. He argues that the relation between knowing and its object is internal because all relations are internal.

17. C.S. PAUL: Descartes brought about the Copernican revolution in philosophy by insisting on the subjective starting-point in all philosophical speculations. The ancients unquestioningly acquiesced in an external world regarded as real and independent, waiting to be contemplated by the mind of man. To the extent that they did not realise the importance of the subjective starting-point in all philosophy they may be said to have not appreciated fully the epistemological problem. We must start with the thinking mind and its content if we are at all to successfully face and solve the problem. As Descartes himself maintained, nowhere in the whole world do we get a certain basis for further construction, short of the thinking mind or consciousness. The alternative to this is to take for granted that there is reality independent of the mind, with such and such a nature, and the problem of knowledge will then be in thinking it as such, or using such powers of the mind as will enable us to see reality as such and such, unity or plurality, material or spiritual etc. We protest against the attitudes not because we disbelieve in an independent reality nor even because we doubt its priority as an existent, but because the nature of such reality (not its existence), ought to come as a result

of the investigation conducted into the mind, its contents and prowers. So what we insist on is the starting with the subjective standpoint as the proper procedure in any epistemological enquiry. Let us, therefore, as Descartes did provisionally, set aside all our implicit belief, in the existence of an independent reality of such and such a kind over against the mind, as, as yet, unverified belief, though we may be led to posit all these later on as a result of successive stages of reasoning. In other words, let us refuse to believe in anything till we have seen the intellectual necessity for it. The man in the street may easily acquiesce in so obvious a position as an independent reality, but we can give our consent to it only if reason demands it.

18. C.T. SRINIVASAN: * Where even reason fails to explain certain actual experiences, they finally appeal to our intuition which comes to be the final limit of thought.

Thus the method pursued by Yajnavalkya in the Brhadaranyaka to establish Reality takes at first the form of an appeal to our ordinary experience and then of a judgment on the nature of that Reality which is present to our experience, or consciousness, in one phrase, our sense-of-the-present or the waking. Judged in that way, we can distinguish the Real from what is given and taken to be real in our individual experience. Beyond the conceptual level, transcending the merely perceptual and sensational levels of experience, there are the ethical, aesthetic, the religious and the speculative levels of experience. All these modes of construction adopted and followed by the scientists and the Western philosophers have reference only to our waking mood, or state which is only one aspect of the Reality in Yajnavalkya's system, the other two aspects being

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*on "M A Y A"

the dream and the state of dreamless sleep. That we have a memory or consciousness of these three states could never be doubted. But a consciousness of three states appearing as three and identifying itself with them is itself "Maya" which appears to be but really is not. For we do not find these three states either as successive in one time-series or co-ordinate in space. Therefore, they are not true to the real or intuitional level of experience. Mandukya Upanisad is wholly devoted to an examination of the Reality in its apparent dynamic aspect known as three states.

19. Transcending both the ego and the non-ego as our very consciousness, yet underlying both as pure consciousness, is maya, the entire possibility of experience known as the Universe. It is Gentile's Mind as pure Act, which he considers as the ultimate Reality but is in Yajnavalkya's system, called Brahman by courtesy. Bradley asserts that existence is not the Reality but Reality must exist, i.e., existence is only a form of appearance of the real. This view brings the Reality down to the conceptual level of experience, because existence implies time. But time being an appearance only the Reality Absolute must necessarily be beyond our ideas of existence (sat) or non-existence (asat). Hegel's conception is the best that we can possibly have, although his Absolute Idea does not really transcend the subject-object relativity though he asserts it does.

20. The whole of experience or existence could be viewed as the dynamic or the functional mode of Reality. Consciousness arising from an antithesis between a subject and an object, is the entire empirical Reality. If a complete comprehension is possible of the

actual Reality we have in our experience, that alone must be the ultimate Reality. At best it is only a speculative ideal, for consciousness is not capable of a complete comprehension of itself. What consciousness does is different from what it means. It is able to explain everything else but not itself. In itself it means mere "Knowingness" in the ultimate Reality of God because complete knowledge is the ideal of all thought. What constitutes "Knowingness" is consciousness, the material of which knowledge is made. When both become indistinguishable, it is identical with Reality. Hegel says: "The otherness or error as cancelled is itself a necessary moment of truth, which is only in so far as it makes itself its own result." This aspect of Reality is termed the empirical consciousness or Maya. As such it is not unreal to and in itself, only it is not the Real. Maya thus is (sat) and is not (asat). As an empirical fact it is because we see the extraordinary power of the Universe as a whole persisting in and as our consciousness, which does not desert us even in our dreams. It really is not because it is nowhere in the perfect knowledge which is identical with the Ultimate Reality. The Upanisads point out such a Reality which every one can experience in deep sleep. An actual experience of absolute non-duality in our so-called sleep is the speculative ideal in the conscious states, waking and dream where the apparent duality is trying to abolish itself. As Sankara beautifully puts it, consciousness is itself Maya in its limited scope and in its fullest or true nature Brahman.

21. Consciousness therefore does not get rid of or transcend its own forms of space, time and causation, the limiting factors. A point of view implies a self-limitation with its necessary adjunct of an individualisation.

Individuality as the central point is thus an illusion arising no doubt out of the basic Reality underlying all consciousness yet retaining its original principle of pure self-consciousness, for ever in all its manifestation. This is the active or will aspect of consciousness which is best realised in the individuality.

Reality by itself must be conscious in its true nature, i.e., in its entirety. We have such a Reality in the state of dreamless sleep. It is Reality by Itself Alone without an individual consciousness persisting in it. Because of its own self-limitation consciousness or mind can have only a partial view of Reality. This self-limitation is the very nature of consciousness in its partial aspect only which splits itself as the individual and as the world but hiding at the same time the fictitious nature of this division. Dream-consciousness is a fine example of the enveloping nature of consciousness which by itself acts as the covering sheath or Avarana to what it seems to do.

22. Thus said Yajnavalkya to the bewildered Maitreyi, "Individuality being destroyed after death, no consciousness remains. Thus, O, Maitreyi, I hold (5 Brah.4 ch. 13 ver).

23. Consciousness and the individual both mean the same thing, being the partial aspect of the Reality characterised by the term knowledge. The individual is <u>not</u> there as the individual but God is there. The individual's memory of "I slept" is based upon intuition only and is evidence enough of the fact of God's eternal purity and permanent knowing. Sleep only shows the absence of the self-consciousness as an individual, but does not prove the absence of God's knowing. "There is no loss of knowing to the Real Knower." (Brih.3-4-30).

24. The conception of time, the necessary form which all conceptions take, creates this artificial division into cause and effect. In truth both are identical. There is neither cause nor effect, since complete knowingness is the very nature of Reality and as such includes consciousness and overflows it. The sense of time-space-causation exists, e.g., only in two states, the Waking and the Dream and is entierely absent or lost in the Dreamless sleep. (Brih. 3-4-21,22). As there is no time in the Reality there are no intermediate stages in knowing.

25. Mere consciousness, though it means nothing in that complete knowing, is a power in itself and it includes both the ego and the non-ego, for both are its manifestations. If only one is the fact, all plurality must be an illusion. The plurality of egoes only shows and emphasises this fact. The permanent character of one Universe shows the permanent character of consciousness as a power which retains its true nature of purity and non-duality, in spite of the fictitious centres of consciousness which seem to come and go. These fictitious individuals in order to be, must be born out of it and live cognising the same Universe and again get absorbed into it without causing an addition by their presence or a loss by their absence. The light of the sun is neither increased nor diminished by the reflection being continuously formed and lost on the waves of the ocean. The whole of the Universe exists in fact as a concrete content of that power known as consciousness. The individual self-consciousness completes the process called the Universe. Self-consciousness is the end in view of the experience known as the Universe.

26. Empirical consciousness is a power in and

by itself but is meaningless in the ultimate Reality. It is Maya from the point of view of the Reality, i.e., unreal in its true aspect but power enough in its display to itself.

27. In that ultimate Reality or complete knowledge there cannot be any possibility of any such division or analysis. Even when we take this mere consciousness and follow it up in all its processes as the so-called developments, we end only where we begin, as the divided aspect of the universe collapses into an unity in self-consciousness. And when consciousness is purged of all its illusions of plurality,--time, space and causation,--what we have is only pure consciousness which is a harmless and insignificant fact in the Reality or God, but in itself appearing to be a big power creating a whole universe and becoming conscious of it. The whole affair is called Maya which is thus real only in itself but unreal in the ultimate Reality. As time is only an intellectual form, Maya cannot be even a fact belonging to Reality, for Reality can have no stages or degrees of itself and consequently knows no imperfection nor any need for development. Development and process demand time. And Maya alone can supply such unreal things, because an unreal demand in consciousness by consciousness is supplied by the all-powerful consciousness. Nothing is removed from the actual or supposed existence simply by being called Maya. This vast universe of sentient and non-sentient factors, though really nothing in the Reality, is nevertheless an undying eternal universe. Whatever is, must be supposed to persist. Existence or persistence could only be in and for consciousness. Existence and continuity are only the inherent nature of cons-

ciousness. It is powerful in itself to appear to be a divisible factor in the Reality but is lost beyond recognition in the Absolute Reality. In the dreamless sleep for, e.g, it is Reality as it is, a reality transcending both subject and object. (Brhad, 4-3-21,22). As individuality is absent in such an experience we are able to remember it (i.e. Susupti or the dreamless sleep) only as a past state of non-distinction with the help of intuition which includes memory and overflows it. The true Consciousness of the three states as the Witness of the three states must necessarily transcend them, and in its true nature is the ultimate Reality itself, as everybody's experience in dreamless sleep shows, though very few are conscious of that fact. If all change and manifestation is Maya, the Reality which is intuited by our remembrance of deep sleep, is changeless for it will cease to be a reality if it is not true to itself. Certainly it could not be Unconscious type of Martmann's. If so, how could have consciousness arisen out of the Unconsciousness? For even an illusion must have a Real Basis without which it could not have arisen.

28.BHASKAR S. NAIK. Illusion is not realised as illusion at the time of illusion. We commonly say that we had an illusion, only when the illusion is no more. For instance, when we have the illusion of a snake in the place of a rope, we really feel that we are perceiving a snake, the perception of the snake there is not at all questioned then, and hence it is not an illusion at that moment. Similarly, a dream is not a dream for us when we are actually in the dreaming state. We say, we had a dream only when we are awake. The experience of the snake and that of the dream are both illusory owing to the knowledge of the real rope and the waking

life. The snake and the dream are not illusory in themselves and at the time of the perception. The question we have to ask is, why are not the knowledge of the rope and the waking state illusory? They are not illusory because they do not contradict our general experience. They are believed to be trustworthy with certitude and definiteness.

29. D.G. LONDHE: To ask what is truth is the same as asking "what is reality?" for Sankara does not seem to have made any distinction between truth and reality. Sankara would not have supported the view that truth is what is logical and the reality is ontological, the former being concerned with ideas or representations of the existent and the latter being the existent. The reason perhaps would be that he was opposed to the dualism implied in such a distinction. Another thing that might be mentioned here, by way of clearing the ground, is the doubt concerning the legitimacy of the question of the criterion of truth in the system of Sankara. The objector will point out that the truth, as Sankara understands it, does not admit of any criterion since it is transcendent in character, goes beyond the ken of the logical categories of criterion and the proof and the proved. The pramana-prameya vyavahara itself belongs to the sphere of the phenomenal falls within Avidya. In fact, with Sankara Truth is extra-philosophical. Philosophy ever deals with the fictitious, the creation of the Avidya; philosophy, in other words, is "the philosophy of the 'as if;" of the Truth there can be no philosophy. In a sense we may admit the force of such an extremist view, but it is irrelevant to philosophy, inasmuch as in philosophy we are dealing with the philosophical and not with the extra-philosophical, if there

* on "SANKARA'S CRITERION OF TRUTH"

be any such thing at all. Moreover, is it not by philosophising activity alone that we have understood what is extra-philosophical? Sankara seems to have clearly borne in mind the rules of the game we are playing in philosophy, supposing for a moment that he believed in the extra-philosophical character of Truth. We, therefore, say that the question we raise is a legitimate question.

Coming to the problem proper, common sense takes experience as ordinarily understood, i.e. sense perception, as adequate to give us truth. It would in effect have us believe that truth is not a matter of laborious intellectual search we have simply to open our eyes to see truth laid out before and around us in the manifold of name and form. Perception merely acquaints one with a datum about the truth, or otherwise, of which there is no question on the perceptual level. To the unsophisticated mind, the content of every perception is true as it is not awakened to the sense of the inner contradictions lurking therein. Sankara finds himself faced with the task of correcting this naive belief. A philosopher in the modern sense of the term, when undertaking a similar task would have proceeded to expose the contradictions of experience and would have concluded by arriving at the non-contradictory which, to him would be truth. Sankara, unlike his modern successors, starts by stating the distinction between truth and falsehood, that is, the one between Self and not-Self. It is with this topic of the utter distinction, for which there is no parallel in the domain of thought and existence--inasmuch as of the two terms distinguished the only one, viz., <u>is</u> and the other <u>is not</u> metaphysically speaking--that he opens his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras. His method may be characterised as

deductive, rather than inductive.
30. Sankara, almost in the manner of Descartes, takes the absolute, unimpeachable certitude of the self as a criterion of its truth. But Sankara would not go with Descartes when he proved the existence of the 'I' from 'my thinking'; He would not say, "I think, therefore, I am" but would rather state that "I am, therefore, I think"; what is primary and fundamental is "my being", my thinking is secondary and derived.
31. Is there any certitude of this absolute type about the object that is presented? Obviously not. Whatever is presented is liable to some doubt or other in the last resort. In fact one may say that to be presented is to be haunted by a ghostly possibility of doubt or error of some sort. This liability to error arises in the first place from the inherent imperfection of the senses. In the second, it arises from the possible parallax of judgment. But apart from these considerations, sense-perception cannot guarantee the truth of its datum, because it is so much bound up with its content that by the very nature of the case it does not possess that detachment which is absolutely essential for epistemological introspection, or rather, retrospection into past experience. To take the stock example in the perceptual experience of a snake appearing on a rope, the mental state and its content were inseparably bound together; it was a reality at the time, it is only in the light of further experience that its content is rejected and that which was taken as perception is judged to be illusory appearance.
32. This brings us to the inherent inadequacy of sense-perception as a criterion of truth, as recognised by Sankara. Dream-experiences are negated or contradicted by waking experiences, and some (illusory) waking experiences

are negated by other waking experiences. But what about the majority of waking experiences which are never negated?

33. According to the native belief, concomitant with the first, unreflecting acquaintance with the world, an object is given in sense-perception; hence its perceptibility is regarded as an unmistakable indication of its reality. The object is taken as real because it is perceptible. Sankara completely subverts this notion; he takes perceptibility as the conclusive and irrefutable reason of the unreality of the object, and not of the reality of the object. According to Sankara, the object is unreal for no other reason but that it is capable of being perceived. To be perceived is to be unreal, he would have said in effect. He would not admit that the object exists independently of knowledge, or the Self whose essence is knowledge. "It cannot be said that there exists an object but it cannot be known; it is like saying that a visible object is seen but there is no eye. When there is no knowledge there is no knowable" (Com.Pr.Up.6,2). The object has no being (satta) apart from the object, the self. This amounts to saying that only the self is truth and the object is a mere appearance. This concept was elaborated with great acuteness by his followers. We find, for instance, that Madhusudana in his Advaitasiddhi advances "drsyatva" as the principal reason of the unreality of the world, and maintains it with a subtlety of thinking that is unsurpassable. With him, whatever is a content of a cognitive state must be for that very reason something short of the ultimate reality, the absolute truth.

34. Thus we come to consider the knowledge of Truth compared to which our so-called knowledge

is but ignorance, that is, in other words, we ask What is Anubhava? In what sense is it the highest criterion of truth? Sankara hastens to add that Anubhava is the culmination, end (avasana) of Brahma-jnana, the culmination here means not only the last stage in a chronological sense, but also in a logical sense inasmuch as the Anubhava in it contracts the knowledge of earlier stages but itself is not contradicted by any other experience. In Sankara's opinion Anubhava is supreme, Sruti comes next, and reason the last as it is nothing unless 'patronised,' (anugrhita) by Sruti.

Apart from the relation of Anubhava to other Pramanas, what is Anubhava in itself? Is it a cognitive act or an intuition? Psychologically speaking, it is a mistake to understand Anubhava as one cognition among others, with this speciality perhaps that its object is 'internal,' but essentially similar to others so far as the character of the act is concerned. For a cognitive act, as we know it, presupposes that its object is an 'other' to it, even if it is internal; Sankara, however, as also his followers would not admit otherness in Anubhava, it being the realisation of what the self is in its true nature. What the self was not, but was mistakenly supposed to be, may be removed by the last cognitive state (carana vrtti). In realisation the Self is what it ever was, without a ripple of vrtti arising any longer. Hence it is characterised as "svarupanubhuti." It will be clear from this that it would not be correct to christen Anubhava as intuition. Intuition has got a very vague connotation; the term is useful in its negation of the intellectual knowledge, but what is the non-intellectual experience never unequivocally describes. What is sure,

is that Anubhava is not a mystic intuition. It is philosophic intuition if there be any such thing. Anubhava is not transcendent to experience in the sense of being discontinuous with it. Hence Sankara cannot be justly charged with having an unbridged gulf between what he calls apara vidya and para vidya. He has emphatically stated that what is realised in Brahma vidya, as contrasted with Karma, is not something reached, accomplished, manufactured (apya, sadhya, samskaryya) but it is experiencing what always had and ever will have accomplished facthood (siddha). The accomplished facthood of the Atman, however, differs from the accomplished facthood of finite material things; as with the latter, it is a limitation, bondage in the forms of space and time, whereas with the former, the accomplished facthood does not preclude the possibility of still accomplishing itself, in the sense of experiencing, realising the accomplished facthood. Realisation, Anubhava, may be best described as "the point where the knowledge about the Absolute and the Absolute itself are one and the same". Anubhava is an experience in which the criterion of Truth and Truth itself are one. This is the highest criterion, for there is nothing that contradicts this experience.

34. P.N. MUKHERJI: "THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISVARAKRSNA AS EMBODIED IN THE SAMKHYA KARIKAS."

The object of this paper is to show that the Karikas contain a philosophy fundamentally different from what Vachaspati and a host of other writers on the subject have propounded it to be. They have gone on an absolutely wrong track and have imported into the interpretation of the Karikas quite an amount of myth and superstition to the entire detriment of their great philosophical significance. It may be argued that I have no right to question the validity of Vacas-

pati's interpretation since it has the sanction of tradition behind it. To this it may be replied that there is a clear gap of several centuries between Isvarakrsna and Vacaspati and it is not improbable that he had to depend on his own ingenuity for restoring to light a half-forgotten philosophy.

35. The Karikas contain a theory of knowledge which may be best characterised as the development of meaning. The Meaner with the Meaning and the irreducible Meant form a transcendental unity. They are distinguishable aspects of a unity which by its nature is transcendental, i.e. non-spatial, non-temporal and non-causal. Purusha is inconceivable without Artha. The whole Vyakta world simply symbolises what the Purusha means. Creation has been referred to as Pratyaya Sarga, i.e. intellectual or better logical construction. It is the development of meaning through symbols. Thus it has two aspects the Lingakhya--the symbolic and the Bhavakhya, the aspect of meaning. The term Linga in the Samkhya Philosophy is very important. It means throughout Symbol. The Symbol is pregnant with meaning, "Bhavairadhibasitam Lingam." The Linga Purusa is the Symbolic Man, the empirical Man. The transcendental man is the Purusa. No Longa without Bhava and there is no realisation of Bhava or meaning without Linga or Symbol. All these have been explicitly stated in the different Karikas, only their real meaning has not been properly understood--thanks to the unphilosophic writers of philosophic commentaries. The Bhavas or meaning have been called Samsiddhikah, i.e. as one translator has by chance rightly translated it, transcendental.

36. In the second Karika the author has characterised the Sankhya philosophy as vyaktvyaktajnavijnana. The word Vijnana dis-

tinguishes it at once from Prajnana or Mysticism of the Philosophical and not of the Theological type. For this latter there is no place in the Sankhya Philosophy. The Sankhya has been debarred by its point of view from being theistic. The Sesvara-Samkhya illustrates the acme of misapprehension. The Sankhya Vijnana is the rationalistic knowledge of what knowledge or reality is.

The term Vyaktavyaktajna is usually taken to be a case of simple Dvandva samasa. The grammarian here gets the better of the philosopher and he finds in it the unmistakable evidence of commonsense dualism. The Vykta and Avyakta are taken to mean two forms of Matter or Nature, and jna is taken to mean spirit or Purusa. It betrays a hopeless ignorance of the true meaning of jna, to know. Vyaktavyaktajna is a case of Samahar Dvandva. It means a unity of the knower and the known. Jna is not mere spirit. A mere spirit is hardly distinguishable from a dead atom. It means a spirit who discharges his true function of knowing. Jna is spirit with a function, viz., the function of knowing. To know is to develop meaning. The terms of the compound Vyaktavyaktajna do not fall apart and form a duality but are held together by the transcendental tie of knowledge.

37. Saksi and Drasta signify the unique activity that belongs to Purusa. Meaning is <u>understood</u> as it is said in English. Perceiving is understanding meaning. It is for this reason that in the Sankhya theory of pprception the transcendental <u>reflection</u> of Purusa is said to be absolutely necessary.

38. Avyakta is not formless matter. There is no matter in the Sankhya philosophy. Avyakta is the undifferentiated Experience-complex on which has been reared the whole Vyakta world of ever-changing symbolic forms. It is Expe-

rience characterised by objective reference.
39. JITENDRAKUMAR CHAKRAVARTY. Bradleyan treatment of memory leaves a lesson for us. It shows, if it shows anything, how utterly vicious must be any procedure that aims to settle questions of fact by an appeal to logic.
40. Such a doctrine of memory stands as a corrective to the modern spiritualistic movements. Much has been made of certain phenomena of a pseudo-scientific character to console the tender-minded with the belief that their psychic life as it unrolls in time here on earth goes on accumulating in the form of memories, the varied experiences of love and hate, knowledge and wisdom. And when owing to the dissolution of the associated physical frame, life on earth comes to an end it does not cease for good. The psychic personality with its structure of memories continues to play the game even beyond the grave. It is something enough to listen to the stories of psychic survival. But it ignores the cardinal point that psychic personality is not a matter-of-fact existence. It has to be reared up by steady and strenuous effort of the will. Where no determined effort is made to co-ordinate and organise the moving experiences of the passing hour into a single unified system there we have no evidence of psychic personality with any memories.
41. A.N. MUKHERJEE: Our influence on our pupils is determined by what we really are, and not by what we profess to teach. The teacher may present flawless exterior to his pupils, but should there be any discrepancy between his public and his private life, his pupils are sure to discover it. Our neighbours have some gift of mysterious intuition which enables them to tear off the mask, and expose to view the hypocrisy and hollowness which

lies concealed behind it. Although we may not know it, our actions are constantly observed, scrutinised, criticised, and in some cases, are, I fear, absolutely condemned by our pupils. This criticism and condemnation result in most cases from immaturity of youthful judgments. But where the condemnation is really deserved, there is created a breach, a loss of confidence, between the teacher and his pupils, and this breach may go on widening till the teacher loses all influence by which to mould the character of his pupils. The responsibility for living a pure and clean life, outer and inner, dominated by moral energy and enthusiasm, attaches in a special manner to those who have taken up the teaching of this subject. If we want faithfully to discharge the task voluntarily undertaken by us--the task of shaping and moulding the character of the youths entrusted to our care, it cannot be achieved solely by our success and popularity as teachers or by our reputation as scholars. These may extort from them a certain amount of confidence in our skill as teachers, but nothing more. We should not be content till we have succeeded by our life and character in evoking in them the sentiment of genuine reverence, without which the Guru is a mere high-sounding name and not a real living force.

42. V.B. SHRIKHANDO.*We know the mind through its functions. It is that which knows, feels, and wills. Both knowing and willing consist in determination of something--the former, of the nature of a thing or events, the latter, of the action to be performed by oneself, "What is this?" is the question answered by the former: "What shall I do?" by the latter. In both cases there are certain alternatives and wavering between them is called manas (the function of which is to desire and doubt) and the same

* on "MIND AND SELF."

mind as deciding between the alternatives is called Buddhi. The experience of pleasure and pain, like every other experience is connected with manas or Buddhi according as it is vague and doubtful or definite and certain. Does our experience point to the existence of the soul or spirit apart from the mind? For one thing, I can distinguish myself from the mind just as much as from the body. Though, on many occasions, I think and speak as if I were the same as my body, yet, on reflection, I find that I am conscious of the body as an object of which I am the subject. In the dream state, again, I am not conscious of my body, though I am conscious of myself as the subject of the objects in dreamland. This leads to the conclusion that my real Self or Soul is different from the body. In the same way, it appears that I am conscious of the mind as an object of which I am the subject (as when I think of my desires and decisions). In deep sleep, again, I am not conscious of my mind (doubts and decisions) though I am not without self-consciousness. These experiences show that the self (which is referred to by the pronoun 'I') is different from the mind also. It is the same during the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and is of the nature of pure, unchanging consciousness. Mental processes and their objects come and go; the subject remains constant.

These are the reasons for distinguishing the self, soul or spirit from the mind. But we must note that they point to an unchanging subject or spirit in contrast to the changing mind or other objects.

43. The ignorance of the real self resides in the intellect and therefore the removal of the ignorance must also be an affair of the intellect. As for direct experience of the self,

we are always having it though it is mixed up with certain illusions and only requires to be freed from these before it is clear and distinct. This was recognised by Descartes when he said "Cogito, ergo, sum" for he meant that he always experienced himself as the subject of thinking. The doctrine that the soul is beyond the intellect does not imply that it is not to be known by the latter but that the only way of knowing it is by distinguishing it from the intellect with which it is usually confused. When it is said to be unknowable it is implied that it cannot be known as an object and can only be experienced as the subject. The difference between what is called a mere intellectual understanding and realisation is, in this case, only one of degree and not of kind. The direct experience which is said to be the one means of salvation is here nothing but intellectual knowledge freed from all doubts and illusions. This truth is expressed by texts like "It is to be attained by the mind", "It is seen by the subtle intellect". This blessed vision of the spirit, therefore, is only the crowning achievement of the intellect in its search after truth. It is the last stage of the same mental process which finds expression in the child's wondering questions about the things around him, their relations to one another and to himself. For the whole course of scientific and philosophical thought shows that the intellect is ever pressing forwards towards the principle which will reduce to unity the bewildering variety of subjects and objects in the universe. This process reaches its completion when the intellect perceives that the spirit is the one universal reality, eternal and all-pervading.

44. The important question is how to control one's desires. Suppression by sheer force of

will is, as we have just seen, impossible. The only other course open is to convince the mind of the evil consequences of indulging the desires. If we dwell on these till the thought takes a firm hold of the mind, the objects of sense will lose most of their attraction for us. This is the course recommended in Manusmriti II, 96, where it is pointed out that the senses which are attached to objects cannot be successfully controlled merely by denying them their objects but by constant thinking of the evil consequences of satisfying them.

45. What people so often forget is that realisation does not consist merely in learning (Shravana) certain conclusions from books or persons. Most of those who profess to know the self have only made themselves familiar with certain technical terms by reading and listening. They have not even gone through the next stage of the path of knowledge, viz. Manana which consists in justifying to oneself what one has heard by reconciling it with one's own experience and thus clearing it of doubts and objections. It is at this stage that the two conflicting beliefs came face to face and the fight begins. But even if Manana is successful and the old beliefs seem to be worsted, the fight is not finished. During the period of our study, the false beliefs may appear to have retired from the mind, but they return as soon as our study ends and our dealings with other men and things begin. Then they return perhaps with a vengeance and carry everything before them. This is how the inconsistency between a man's professed beliefs and his behaviour arises and in order to remove it we must go through the third stage of the path of knowledge, viz. nididhyasana or consstant dwelling on the truth.

In the way already explained, this weakens the hold of erroneous beliefs on the mind and finally sets the mind free from them. What is called "realisation" comes only after this most important and difficult stage, i.e, only after the conflict of ideas has altogether ceased. Hence there can be no longer any inconsistency between knowledge and behaviour.

This sweeeping statement requires one slight qualification. Even after full conviction has been attained, emotions and actions inconsistent with it may make their appearance by the sheer force of habit. A man who is of a naturally irritable temperament may show signs of anger on his face and in his behaviour but the emotion is only a rapidly passing wave and disappears soon. No continued fit of anger, fear, grief or jealousy is consistent with the knowledge of the Spirit, as has already been seen. As soon as the emotion comes, it is seen to be out of place and may, therefore, be called, in a sense, unreal. Of course, even this cannot arise except from an erroneous belief but the error is perceived at once and cannot play further mischief. Hence it is often compared to a burnt seed which cannot grow into a plant. We must be careful not to overrate the original and the main source of sin is ignorance. When this is removed, in the way and to the extent above indicated, what remains is only the force of habit which has already lost most of its energy. Whether it is the Prarabdha that is determining the conduct of a particular man or it is his ignorance can be known by the careful observer after some experience of him in different circumstances.

46. Srimati TATINI DAS.* Bradley may be taken to be the most influential representative of the idealistic movement which began in England in the nineteenth century and which proceeded

* on "BRADLEY AND SANKARA"

in the reverse direction to the 'insular' philosophy. The distinguishing characteristic of the 'insular' philosophy had hitherto been its empiricism. In opposition to the atomism of English psychology the English philosopher maintains that consciousness cannot be described as a mere collection of elements, for it would be impossible to understand how such a collection could become aware of itself--and vijnana, urges the Indian philosopher against the Bauddhas, cannot be consciousness or the self, for this Vijnana cannot be aware of itself, for in order to be known, it must be known by something else. The most remarkable of Bradley's works, however, is his Appearance and Reality. His arguments in the book as to the nature of Reality may be summed up in the following words: "Ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself." We find this characterisation of Reality in certain philosophers belonging to the Sankara Vedanta school if not in Sankara himself.

47. Again, by way of giving a concrete determination of Reality, Bradley calls it Experience. By "Experience" in this context Bradley did not mean "consciousness" if the term "consciousness" be taken to signify "awareness" of an object, on the part of an individual subject. Consciousness in this sense is "thought" which implies a severance of the subject and object and always points to something more inclusive than itself in which the distinction of subject and object would be transcended. Rather, he urged, is 'experience' to be identified with 'sentience,' and sentience while including, after a certain stage of development has been reached, thought or consciousness, includes also much besides. "Experience" in Bradley's sense of the term, is more akin to "feeling" than to "thought"

inasmuch as in feeling also there is no such severance of subject and object as in thought. Here, in Bradley's characterissation of Reality as "sentient experience" as disginguished from 'consciousness' in the sense of awareness on the part of an individual subject, we find a strong point of resemblance with Sankara's characterisation of Reality as 'Chaitanya', i.e. an all-pervasive universal Intelligence. Of course in default of a better term we cannot but translate Sankara's 'Chaitanya" as "consciousness" or "self-consciousness" but in its inner significance it is as comprehensive as Bradley's "sentience." Consciousness in Sankara, does not mean awareness on the part of an individual subject but an impersonal universal consciousness which comprehends everything.

48. With an audacious irony Bradley speaks of the perfection which is to be striven after by the individual as "the complete gift and dissipation of his personality in which he as such, must vanish!" But if the person as such has to vanish who will be there to enjoy the perfection?

49. As to the knowability of the absolute the arguments of both Sankara and Bradley are sceptical, so far at least as thought is concerned. The Absolute is a self-consistent and harmonious totality and therefore beyond all relations because relations involve contradiction. But 'thought' works by way of relations --it always involves a separation of the 'that' and the 'what.' Hence thought can never grasp the totality of Reality. Sankara also argues in the same strain. But then what is the conclusion? Do these philosophers conclude that Reality is not knowable at all, in any sense of the term 'knowing.' No. The scepticism of both culminates in mysticism.

Reality is not graspable by discursive thinking, but it is graspable by a higher form of knowledge,--intuition. We cannot know the Absolute by thinking but we can grasp it by identifying ourselves with it. To know the Absolute we must be the Absolute --must lose ourselves in ecstatic intuition in it. (Of course, the terms, ecstasy and intuition are not to be found in Bradley). Sankara's arguments on this point agree, word for word, with Bradley's. Sankara also identifies Brahmavidya with Brahmabhu; to know Brahman is to be Brahman. There is no other way of knowing Brahman.

If we have to know Brahman we must leave our empirical lives behind us, and identify ourselves with the Real. The knowledge of Brahman is termed by Sankara Anubhuti by which he means ecstatic intuition; for Bradley, the term is 'Feeling.' This feeling is something quite different from what we mean by 'feeling' in psychology. It seems to approach Sankara's conception of Anubhuti though it has not for him the further sense of ecstasy.

Nevertheless, though thought by itself cannot get hold of Reality, both Sankara and Bradley recognise the importance of thinking as a preliminary step. The feeling which is identical with absolute experience can come only at the end of a long process of thinking,--only when thought has done all that it could have done. So also with Sankara-- the anubhuti being only the culmination of the labour of thought in knowing Brahman. The feeling which comes before thought is too poor and unstable to be a fit instrument for the knowledge of Reality. It can become fitifor this high vocation, only when it has gone out of itself into the region of thought,

and when after the whole travail of thought, has returned upon itself, enriched and purified.

However, according to both, we can know Reality only as we leave our empirical lives behind. But, is there no aperture through which we can catch even a glimpse of this Reality, even while this empirical life endures? Bradley answers the question in the affirmative. For though he begins with the disheartening lines--"Fully to realise the existence of the absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we should have to be and then we should not exist,"--he adds a few lines below: "what is impossible is to construct absolute life in its detail, to have the specific experience in which it consists. But to gain an idea of its main features--an idea true so far as it goes though abstract and incomplete--is a different endeavour." And this general idea, he thinks can be got through the analysis of feeling. The reasons for this supposition have already been given. And if it is through psychological analysis that Reality can be approached according to Bradley, the same is true of Sankara as well. But according to the latter, it is no longer the psychological analysis of feeling, but that of dream and dreamless sleep that is supposed to give us a general idea of Reality.

Reviewing the systems of Bradley and Sankara as a whole we are now in a position to wind up our comparative survey with a concluding reflection on their respective philosophical methods and conclusions. The method common to both may, in the absence of a better term, be styled the dialectical. Both start from an epistemological analysis of the primitive psychological datum expressed in the form of judgment. Accordingly for both the approach to metaphysics is not so much through Psychology as it is thro'

Epistemology. According to Sankara, all appearance from the epistemological point of view, is a case of adhyasa, proceeding on the conjunction of truth and error. Seized on its positive and metaphysical side Sankara's Maya answers exactly to the Bradleyan construction of 'appearance.' Sankara's Maya imports exactly what Bradley seeks to convey by his phrase, so happily worded "the ideality of the finite." This dynamic nature of appearance has its counterpart in the truly philosophic construction of the term "Samsarah so often emphasised by Sankara. By following up this common approach to the metaphysics of both we arrive at the same metaphysical conclusions with regard to their characterisation of Reality. The indentity-in-difference which underlies every judgment falls far short of the Real which characterised by inner coherence or comprehensiveness is truly represented as an undifferenced identity. Discursive or rational thinking which proceeds by way of judgment, and seeks a completion beyond the sundering of the 'that' and 'what' fails to attain this identity. Thought has ultimately to give away to a higher intuition, which alone can grasp the Real. Intuition or anubhuti is the terminus ad queem, the last word of philosophy for both, inasmuch as it alone can grasp the nature of absolute Reality as a whole, as the goal of all aspirations, intellectual or emotional.

50. M.A. VENKATA RAO Thanks to Bergson and Einstein time has become the central problem of philosophy. The crux of the question is presented by the antithesis between time as felt and time as thought. Perceptual time is agreed to be a continuous whole, whereas Conceptual time is supposed to be mathematical-discrete and infinitely divisible in character.

Confronted by this problem philosophy has so far taken the usual methods of suppressing one or other of the aspects of the problem. The first to take time seriously was Bergson. He dismissed conceptual time as the only concrete reality. Time becomes the very stuff of reality. But Bertrand Russell has a great suspicion of this easy solution. For him, analysis is the road to reality; and the world can be analysed into a number of series of discrete moments. The mind is a succession of sensations and images, and the world is a succession of "particulars" (--a term which Russell adopts for his neutral entities in the Analysis of Matter). Thus present-day discussions on time display opposite abstractions. As usual, extremes meet, and both views commit the same fallacy--that of denying unity. Bergson seems disinclined to admit a unitary ground or essence, revealing itself in duration, and speaks of 'pure Duration.' And Russell is equally emphatic in denying continuity of essence between the succeeding particulars. As usual, the truth consists in the synthesis of opposites. Reality is both duration and succession. If we interpret time as the aspect of succession, we have to supplement it with the aspect of ground or essence to render it adequate to reality in its fulness.

51. K.A. HAMID. *Hegel's point of view is prominently associated with two doctrines which he has bequeathed to Philosophy:--(1) Thought is the only existent of whose reality we are immediately assured. It is a living concrete reality. The whole of reality must be interpreted in its terms. (2) We are immediately aware of our thought and experience, but immanent in it and transcending it--behind it--is a total concrete unity of thought which gives all the reality to individual experience that it possesses.

* on "GENTILE'S PHILOSOPHY"

52. To account for the multiplicity of objects in experience Croce posits two sub-grades of mental activity. Mind being self-begetting and self-begotten, must create its own objects. This is done with the help of the sub-grades. The first is Intuition (with its corresponding science of Aesthetic.) This is the form under which mind supplies the material. The second is Conceptual Thinking (with its Logic) which arranges the material supplied by the first. (This seems to be an echo of Kant's division in his Critique of the Pure Reason). Now, Gentile agrees with Croce in the general doctine of Neo-Idealism but he rejects his sub-grades entirely. These are regarded as no solution of multiplicity but rather a presupposition of that. The unity of mind cannot co-exist with sub-grades. Hence these must go.
53. Gentile defines his Idealism as Absolute. He is a spiritual descendent of Descartes and Berkeley, via Kant and Hegel. "I am conscious, therefore, I exist." When I think of the 'I' I find that it is the sole existent. It absorbs all other so-called existents. It contains everything. The sole all-embracing reality is thus the 'I'!
54. Our conscious life is immediately apprehended by us. We feel the mind as a complete unity. This unity is retained throughout by Gentile and all the multiplicity that there is in actual experience is extracted from it. Mind is experience and it is the only object in the universe. The universe is mind or spirit. How does the unity develop a multiplicity? The latter is not as real as the former. Mind really makes all. It is self-creative. There is no world of objects outside mind. No thing-in-itself as against the mind. Consciousness is the all.
55. What is knowledge? Gentile denies that it

is any external relationship between mind and outside object. Here he agrees with Croce. The object of mind is in mind or experience itself. Only that can be known which is capable of being known. An entity absolutely independent of the mind can never be known. Hence what is capable of being known must be of the nature of mind. The knowing subject and the known object must be facts of the concrete Universal mind. Gentile quotes with approval Berkeley's Doctrine of the ideality of the real.

56. Thus the object of knowledge is in mind or experience itself. To detach the facts of mind from the real life of the mind is to miss their inward nature by looking at them as they are when realised. Now, the spiritual reality which is the object of our knowing, is simply mind as subject. To be known its objectivity should be resolved in the real unity of the subject who knows it. To know is to identify, to overcome otherness as such. Subject must absorb object, it seems. (To understand a cake I must consume it, be one with it?) But who is this subject? It is the transcendental ego, in the Kantian sense. But 'the empirical ego' is not thereby annuled as in Mysticism. (Gentile fights shy of Mysticism). This ego has no 'other' to exist independently of it. It is a constructive process.

We can only comprehend that which we ourselves create. To comprehend spiritual reality we must resolve it our own spiritual activity gradually establishing that self-sameness or unity in which all knowledge consists.

What is the type of such knowledge? Self-consciousness answers Gentile. Herein mind is both knower and known, subject and object, as well as the activity of knowing. As the Persian mystic sings: "Himself the pot, himself the potter and himself the clay of the pot. In

self-consciousness the whole of mind is at one time subject, at another object. It is present as wholly itself in each phase. Here- in also is mind both unity and multiplicity a One in the many, with the emphasis on the for- mer. Self-consciousness is experience in its most intimate form.

57. Mind being both knower and known, is know- ing itself makes itself, adds to itself-- creates itself. (This seems to be an echo of the causa sui?) Thought feeds on itself. Reality is thus thought about thought, i.e. Philosophy. Thus the philosopher creates reality.

58. Again, the unity of mind is real, not apparent. It is unmultipliable and infinite unity. It is unmultipliable because we cannot think of mind as decomposable in parts. Mind at each moment can only be thought of as a whole. (There is a fusion of the distinguish- able parts or elements in one unique whole. There is no mental chemistry). The unity of mind is infinite, 'because the reality of mind cannot be limited by other realities' and still be or keep its own reality. "Its unity im- plies infinity." "The without is always with- in." "There is for us nothing which is not something we perceive." (Berkeley). "Whatever effort we make to think or imagine other things or other consciousness outside our own, they yet remain within the latter." (This is what Titchener describes as one of the characteristics of mental process--it 'em- braces the whole world'.) Even ignorance of so-called external objects is a fact of our own cognition. (We cannot jump out of our own shadow.)

59. God creates what he apprehends and appre- hends what he creates, in a single act. The same is true of Berkeley's God. He is the

ground of reality for the finite percipient.
60. Gentile's metaphysics with its emphasis on immanence and complete denial of all transcendence leads him not only to Solipsism but also to Mysticism. In some passages where he is most eloquent he reads like a Persian Mystic.
61. In their zeal the disciples often far outstrip their master. This is an old failing. Schopenheuer accused Kant of 'timidity'. Croce went 'beyond' Hegel. Gentile goes 'beyond' Croce. He carries Croce's position to its extreme logical limit and thus unconsciously provides its reductio ad absurdum. Gentile's peculiarity lies in his identification of the Spirit with the present act of human thinking. But he fails in stopping here. The Universal may be immanent in each particular mind but it must transcend it, too. As it is, Gentile's absolute mind or spirit is not much else than the individual human mind (with all its infirmities) raised to the infinite degree. And his progress turns out to be 'cricular' motion. His is a strange fix: he cannot allow the ideal to be realised, for then it would be dead. Hence it must always be in the process of 'becoming,' but a becoming which is never 'become' turns out to be a chase of the will-o-the-wisp. The ship of Gentile's metaphysic founders on the same old rocks which have seen the destruction of many previous philosophies i.e. the problems of the finite and infinite mind and of the one and the many.

61. G.R. MALKANI:* We do not indeed commonly have an intuition of ultimate reality; but it is by intuition alone that we can possibly know it. Thought is essentially abstract. It tries to grasp reality which is concrete by a round-about way,--by piling abstractions upon abstractions, so to say. Such an attempt is

* on "INTELLECT AND INTUITION"

doomed to failure. Thought is therefore quite impotent to give us knowledge of reality as it is, and must, therefore, if we are to have this knowledge at all, be transcended in the end.

It is not possible for us to discuss at length the merits and demerits of each side in the controversy. We ourselves recognise that anything that is real must be capable of being intuited. Ultimate reality can be no exception. There must be an intuition appropriate to ultimate reality, if anything is really ultimate. At the same time, no intuition that is intuition of reality can be opposed to thought. In fact, the intuition of ultimate reality can only be reached with the help of thought. If it is reached in any other way which involves the suppression of thought, it ceases to be intuition of reality. It becomes a form of error. All systems of mysticism then which seek to give knowledge of ultimate reality by the suppression of thought, are, in our opinion, misguided attempts at the knowledge of the real.

62. Some one might argue here that the person who has an intuition of the Absolute indeed sees that we ordinary mortals see, but he knows that it is not what is real; it is phenomenal and unreal. But how does he decide between the two kinds of intuition? What is his ground for believing that the one gives him truth and the other less than the truth? Have they not both the form of intuitive perception? If they have, there must be a reason, outside the simple fact of the intuitions themselves, that leads him to the distinction. This reason can only be found in thought, which thus becomes an integral element in the perception of truth. The fact is that any duality found in experience can only be reduced to

unity by the method of analysis and interpretation. We have different experiences. But that there is only one reality that is known in all those experiences, or that there is only one experience that is the experience of reality while other experiences are not,-- these are conclusions that can only be established by a certain interpretation of the facts of experience taken all together. Mere intuition, however convincing, has no truth-value. It is thought that determines this value, and gives us the ultimate conviction as to the nature of reality.

The contention that intuition is an instrument of knowledge superior to the intellect involves a fundamental misunderstanding as to the proper function of the intellect. The intellect by itself cannot know any kind of reality, sensible or super-sensible. All knowledge of reality must originally come by some form of direct experience or intuition. It is the business of the intellect to accept all the intuitions without denying any of them. It is only when doubts occur that its proper work begins; and this simply consists in removing the doubts by an interpretation of experience as a whole. Intuition then is the basis of all intellectual operations, and the intellect cannot question the validity of any intuition unless it conflicts with a more fundamental intuition. In the end, there must be one or more fundamental intuitions beyond which the intellect itself can never go, for without these intuitions the interpretative work of the intellect will not be possible. There is thus no reason to suppose that there is anywhere any antagonism between intellect and intuition.

63. We certainly do not doubt the possibility of an intuition of this sort. But what is important is the recognition <u>by thought</u> of its

fundamental character. Thought is not simply superseded. Its claim to self-satisfaction is not shoved aside. It is rather affirmed in its true rational meaning. The intuitions which thought accepts as fundamental and therefore beyond the possibility of doubt are intuitions rational par excellence; for they constitute the ground of thought's own rationality. It is only intuitions that are more or less hypothetical, or intuitions that cannot stand the criticism of thought but must simply be accepted on their own authority, that are in question.

What we want to emphasise is that thought alone can give objectivity to our experience; and by objectivity we mean "freedom from purely personal and hallucinatory elements." An intuition then is rational when thought recognises that any further doubt would defeat its own end; or in other words, that doubt itself would be irrational. And an intuition is irrational, when thought is not obliged to affirm it and finds reason to doubt its validity.

We have so far seen the limitations of intuition. Intuition cannot criticise itself, and cannot therefore vouch for its own truth. We must now see that similar limitations attach to thought. The proper business of thought, as we have said, is to criticise our intuitions of reality in order to determine valid knowledge. When however it proceeds to construct an experience, it revels in abstractions. It then goes beyond its true office, and ceases to convince. It must deal with experience as we find it, and simply remove those natural doubts that occur in respect of it. The insight of reason consists not in any construction but merely in the interpretation of experience. It does not however require much imagination to see that this interpretation may make all the

difference in our perception of reality.

We may then conclude this part of our reflections by saying that it is not the business of philosophy to lead us to any new intuition of the real or to evolve any new instrument of knowledge in the place of those that we have. If reality is not known here and now, it can never be known. I shall say that it is indeed adequately known. But on the basis of this knowledge, which all but the mystics share with each other, there are various systems of beliefs, all more or less warranted by certain aspects of experience. It is the business of philosophy to systematise experience, lead us to right beliefs and guard us against those that are erroneous. All the revelation of reality that philosophy can ever achieve will merely amount to a perception of the beliefs that are warranted by reason, and of the pitfalls of unreason or inadequate thought. The change will be all in our understanding of things, or our outlook upon them, not in our experience of reality as such.

64. This way of thinking, it will be noticed, is sharply contrasted from that adopted by Bradley. We are all familiar with the main problem which he has set out to solve. According to his analysis, all knowledge implies the distinction of the 'that' from the "what." But this form of knowledge he finds inadequate to reality which is concrete and not abstract. He therefore argues that the knowledge which is adequate to reality must be entirely different in character. It must be of the nature of a sublimated feeling or intuition; for in that form of knowledge the distinction of the 'that' from the 'what' can be supposed gradually to disappear, and we can then have knowledge of reality which can be said to be coincident with reality itself. Whatever now he may mean

by this intuition, one thing is quite certain that this intuition of reality or the absolute experience is not empty and hollow experiencing, or intuiting. It is an experience that achieves the harmony and therefore the true unity of the appearances. It is, in short, an experience with a transcendent content. He explicityly says that it is an experience of which we have just an inkling, or inadequate and transient glimpses. But if that is so, that experience can only be distinct from the experiences which we have by the nature of what is known in it, i.e., by the nature of the content intuited. Experience as such remains quite distinct in each case from what it is the experience of. In the one case, it is the experience that relates to something x, namely in reality; in the other case, it is the experience that relates to something y, namely appearances. That is all the difference. The essential nature of experience and the relations which it implies remains the same. The dualism of experience and its content, or of the subject and the object, is not superseded. The unity which the intuition of the Absolute was to have achieved, it has failed to achieve. Our conclusion is that there can be no intuition of ultimate reality, if it is an intuition that we do not yet have, and which is distinct from the intuitions which we have by its transcendent content.

1. G. H. LANGLEY: @@

It is for this reason that I have used the term "Reason" to describe man's power of apprehending univeral principles rather than the term 'intelligence.' The latter term is commonly applied to the power of analysing precisely observed changes and of making exact statement

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@@ 7th INDIAN PHILOS.CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS: 1931.

of principles found to operate. Such analysis and precision of statement are in a measure possible in regard to the more ultimate constituents of inanimate nature, but they are not always possible in dealing with the behaviour and relations of the higher forms of being.

2. S.K. DAS. Although the main lines, on which Indian thought was destined to develop hereafter, lie prefigured herein, the value of the Rigveda is to be measured by what it aspired to be and was not in actuality. It begins with that infantile wonder, and its native hue of creative phantasy, which is not, as yet "sicklied ov'r with the pale cast of thought." Later, reflective thought supervenes and seeks to introduce system and order into the reign of riotous fancy and lawless myth-making. Once criticism is aroused, the mongrel method of allegorizing is steadily on the wane until the repugnant elements in the patched up unity break asunder and dissipate it altogether. Before the noon-day glory of the achievements of reflective thought, the twilight of mythopoeic activity does admittedly pale away into significance, and thus all its findings are safely relegated to a forgotten chapter in the history of human search after truth. Nevetheless the Rigveda with all its backwardness, may truly be said to have succeeded in what it seems to have failed in: its twilight of god-making and allegorizing eagerly anticipates the dawn of a new intellectual era.

3. We cannot fail to detect in it a morbid passion for passionlessness, a sentimental yearning after martyrdom for its own sake, which has neither sanity nor seemliness about it.

4. This is evident from the frequent insistence on Sankara's part on anubhava or anubhuti that is, experience in its integrity which

personalises the impersonal certitude of Sruti. Nothing short of the certitude of personal experience will meet the requirements of the situation. As it has been rightly observed, "the human mind is so constituted that only intrinsic evidence necessarily compels assert. No matter how great the authority of the witness, assent is impossible unless the truth in question is luminous to us, is felt as such by us."

5. Rooted as he was in inflexible orthodoxy, Sankara had yet the sufficiency to assign to reason its proper rank and function even in the matter of attaining unto the highest bliss of mankind. So runs his verdict that "a man who somehow espouses a creed without prior discussion or critical reflection is dispossessed of beatitude.

6. Thinking always proceeds by questioning experience, and unless there be in evidence this questioning spirit or jijnasa the search after truth becomes an impossibility.

7. P.B. ADHIKARI. We usually make a distinction between fact and fiction. On a closer view the distinction becomes so thin that it is difficult to make out where it exactly lies. For what is called a fact always involves elements of fiction. The term fiction is to be understood here in its original sense as that which is fashioned by the mind--by imagination or conception. Used in this sense, it is to be distinguished from what is fictitious, implying falsehood. The question of truth and falsehood is a larger and different one, as is that of the real and unreal. A fiction need not necessarily be false, if it works successfully, though not exactly in the pragmatist's sense. I adopt here the meaning given to the word by Prof. Vauhinger in his "Philosophy of As If."

The world of Experience, as we take it at any moment, is a world of objects as they have been fashioned by the mind out of their primary stuff--the basic matter or content--into their present forms, so that we fail to make out what that stuff was originally. This is true both of our outer and inner experience.

8. What are meanings but ideas or fictions that we put into our experience of objects. The question is--what was the original stuff before it acquired meaning in our ordinary experience?

9. Various aspects of the world of experience are regarded as real facts without question. But a closer and critical view would disclose that here too there is relativity everywhere. And every phase of relativity is subjective involving a fiction of the mind. Who can say how far this relativity extends, and when to stop it facing absolutely pure facts. The shapes, sizes, etc. and the colours, tastes, smells etc.--the whole lot of the so-called primary and secondary qualities of matter--are supposed to be bare facts. Are they really so? The scientific view of the day, regarding the ultimate nature of matter tells, however, a different story.

10. G.R. MALKANI.** In philosophy, we seek an ultimate explanation of things, and not the provisional explanations with which empirical sciences are concerned. Two different kinds of questions may be distinguished here: (a) What things are in themselves or in their true nature? (b) How things come to be?

The first question implies a distinction between the real thing and the apparent thing. The second, a final cause of things as against the secondary and empirically determinable causes. Let us suppose that the latter question is answerable. In that case, it is evident (1)

** on "PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION"

that the cause will not be homogeneous with the effect; if it were, we should have to ask, what caused it? It must therefore be uncaused. (2) Secondly, it cannot be a cause operating in time. If it is in time, we cannot stop with it; there must be an antecedent cause. (3) Thirdly, the cause must not be distinct from the effect, but identical with it. If the cause is in any way distinct it does not explain the effect. The connection becomes inexplicable and artificial. In actual experience we do find such connection. But there at least there is evidence for it. We have no empirical evidence of any connection between the world course and an ultimate cause. Besides, nobody presumes that the empirical cause really explains the occurrence of the effect.

We may substitute the idea of an ultimate ground for that of the cause. The ground does not bring forth anything in time. It is timeless. The so-called effects are contained in it as certain consequences are contained rationally in their premises. The latter do not bring forth the former in time. The consequences are in fact timelessly contained in their rational ground. We may therefore suppose that there is an absolute idea which is similarly the ground of the actual world-appearances. But while it is possible to evolve certain general conceptions from a more comprehensive concept, it can never be satisfactorily shown that the actual contents of experience--the specific connections between things and the particulars of sense, --can be similarly evolved out of a most comprehensive concept. The exact definition of this concept is a supremely difficult task. It is beyond the power of reason. But even if we somehow got over this difficulty to

our own satisfaction, the farther we went from the concept and descended to particulars, greater will be the uncertainty and the obscurity of the deduction. The world of ideas with their "sequential" clearness may be eternally valid. But nobody can presume that its relation to the realm of chaning relations between endlessly varied elements of the actual world is rationally intelligible, or that the latter is unrelated to the complete self-realisation of the former. We conclude that it is impossible to deduce the world of our actual experience from a general ground.

We now turn to the other question of philosophy, and suppose that the real problem is to get at the true nature of things as opposed to their apparent nature. The problem may be capable of solution. I do not want to enter into the question how it may be solved. I take it for granted that it is somehow soluble. But even though we may know the true nature of things, the question cannot be dismissed as to the relation of that nature to the apparent nature. Two different ways of regarding this relation may be considered.

(a) It may be argued that the appearances are not nothing. Reality without appearances has no content. The appearances alone constitute this content. Only, in the reality, the appearances have lost that self contradictory character which made them less than the real; they have attained that harmony and unity which is the essential nature of reality. The appearances are never wholly divorced from reality. They constitute, in an ascending series, the different degrees of reality.

Now what made the appearances "Appearances" was their self-contradictory character; and as there can be no degrees of self-contradictoriness, there can be no degrees of apperance and

of reality. But even if we admitted these degrees, it is no explanation of the self-contradictory that the self-contradiction is progressly removable. We should have to admit in the end that what is self-contradictory is inexplicable by what is not self-contradictory. The possible existence of the self contradictory has not been explained.

(b) The other view is somewhat more outspoken. The appearance because it is an appearance has no place in reality. It is not something more or less real. Like the illusory snake seen in the place of a rope, it does not exist and cannot be said to be real. No element of it that constitutes it as appearance is retained in the reality. The snake is completely non-existent in the rope.

This view of the relation of reality and appearance can well be taken to be more rational, Let us suppose that it can, in fact, be carried out. The question might still arise But how does the false appearance come to occupy the place of reality? Or in other words, reality being what it is, how does the appearance at all become possible?

It is quite evident now that reality by itself can never explain the possibility of the appearance. The true nature of a thing is in no way rationally connected with the false and therefore non-existent nature. We cannot therefore mean by the above question that the real nature of a thing should be such that it should supply an explanation of what is admittedly unreal and non-existent. The question in order that it should be answerable, should be a rational question. Interpreted in the above way, it is evidently not a rational question.

It will be admitted that whenever we are faced with a situation in which the real

nature of a thing appears different from what it is, we attribute the false appearance not to the thing itself but to the erroneous apprehension of the thing. We may therefore be tempted to account for the false reality. But is this the explanation that we want? Is the appearance at all explained? Does not the question still arise: but what gives rise to the error? It is cldar that we have not explained. This last question must at least be answered if we are to have an ultimate explanation of things; and yet, in order to answer it, we must point to something in the nature of things themselves or in reality. This, we have already seen, would not explain error, but explain it away by dispelling it.

The truth is that the question as to the rational basis of error is itself not a rational question. It would be rational if the nature of error were such that it admitted of some form of explanation. But error does not admit of an explanation. It is, in its essential nature, an irrationality. It is opposed to reason. To give reasons for an error is to dissipate the error. It is to keep error "error" no longer. Error is error because it has no explanation. It is essentially inexplicable. In fact, it does not need an explanation, and cannot consistently with its nature have one. This question then which seeks for an explanation of the possibility of error is once again irrantional.

How shall we then formulate our ultimate question? It is clear that the false appearance is not explained. There appears to be a demand to have it explained. And yet we cannot formulate a rational question with regard to it. Philosophy may be expected to answer all our ultimate questions. But we cannot expect it to answer questions which are seen on ana-

lysis to be spurious in as-much as they have no conceivable answer. That there is no answer for such questions is the best answer that can be given. A philosophical system then is not complete because it can supply a direct answer to all possible questions. No system can ever do that. There will always remain certain questions which can never be answered. But the highest system of thought will meet every question by a concept which either directly resolves it, or renders it ineffective by an analysis of its inherent irrationality. This ultimate unaswerability of the most perfect philosophical system however is not a matter of despair for the human reason. It would indeed be a matter of despair if the ultimate truth of things were incapable of being known. But when by an analysis of our experience we are brought in possession of it, we are no longer shadowed by doubt and can no longer be said to have a real question left. The questions which we have found to be unanswerable are real and insistent oonly to those who have not followed with understanding the original process of discriminating truth from falsehood. Reason can never call halt to itself unless it has first been made the instrument of an insight into the nature of reality that is above reason. The only true ultimate explanation then is this insight and not an abstract process of justification on the plane of static ideas.

11. ASHUTOSH SHASTRI: Vedanta does not doubt the claim of intuition to truth, but when the affirmation of intuition is to be carried to others it seeks the aid of reason and logic, for an undisciplined understanding cannot grasp the philosophic implication and prepare for illuminated vision.

12. Reason with him is a critical weapon

against untested assumptions and a creative principle which selects and emphasises the facts of truth.

13. Anubhava is the vital spirit of experience which can be communicated only through the language of imagination, and Sruti is the written code embodying it. Without the background of experience the statement of Sruti is mere sound without sense."

Vedanta as a theory of knowledge has recognised the services of intellect and intuition and has sought to seek confirmation of the one from the other. Logic and intuition have not been, therefore, contradictory. The highest intuitions are for the intellect the greatest truth and what is for the intellect a logical truth, is for intuition a spiritual reality. Mystic intuition is not a necessity opposed to reason though it flashes out light which intellect takes time to discover. Vedanta approaches truth through intellect as well as through intuition and does not find any conflict between the two, though what intuition presents in immediate consciousness, is seen by intellect in mediate consciousness.

14. Reason occupies the subordinate place inasmuch as it can give mediate knowledge and not immediate knowledge.

15. The relative order is understood by reason and is true to reason. Reason cannot go beyond the relative order and the relative truth. Reason is confirmed to this order, as it works with categories of space, time and causality. "Intellect works with the categories of space time cause and force which involve us in deadlocks and antinomies. Either we must postulate a first cause, in which case, causality ceases to be universal maxim or we have an endless regress. The puzzle cannot be solved by intellect pure and simple. It must confess itself to be

bankrupt when ultimate questions arise."
16. The divergence of reason and intuition is a special feature of Sankara's metaphysics. Therefore, in his philosophy unaided reason has been instrumental to finding out contradictions in relative concepts and antinomies in its own character. Reason, in fact, is inherently incompetent to establish the final truth, for it moves in relational consciousness and cannot transcend the relative. Logical faculty is, therefore, by its own nature precluded from knowing the non-relational being. Sankara has, therefore, finally to break away from the assertions of logic and see the way to intuition.
17. This difference of intuition and intellect has brought to philosophy a momentous conclusion, viz. truth is to be directly felt and apprehended, it can never be thought about.
18. J.N. CHUBB:** The problem of change which is the problem of experience itself is rightly considered as the most fundamental in philosophy. The whole of Kant's endeavour in the Critique of Pure Reason may be regarded as directed towards explaining the experience of change, by bringing change into relation with the unity of thought. Broadly speaking there are three main views concerning change which divide philosophers in the West, the Parmenidian, the Kantian and the Heraclitian. Parmenides simply ignores change and does not explain it. Kant explains change in the first edition of the Critique by bringing forward the principle of the permanent substance and thus passes over to the Heraclitean view by asserting that a 'perpetual change' is all the permanence that we are aware of in time. I have here tried to bring out, in contrast, the Vedantic theory according to which the experience of change is self-contradictory and

**on "PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE"

cannot be logically determined since it gives rise to an insoluble paradox.

I believe the Heraclitean view of the relation between change and permanence is true so far as it goes, that is, so far as it protests against the view that a concrete 'substance' or 'thing' is self-subsistent and can be referred to apart from the changes it is said to undergo, as a unit complete in itself and remaining unchanged in the midst of its changes. And in this Heraclitus has much in common with the Buddhists, the latter assert "Sarvam Anityam," "Sarvam anatman" everything is impermanent and whatever is, is without a self; the Buddhists disbelieve in the soul or self regarded as a permanent substance persisting through time. They talk of the "heresy of individuality" and substitute for soul a group or aggregate of skandhas, (feeling, knowing etc.) a <u>soul-structure</u> instead of a soul-substance. The Vedanta claims, however, that the analysis of change and identity is not complete at this point. It accepts the Buddhistic conclusion as legitimate only as a recoil from the one-sided assertion of a thesis in an antinomy. The Buddhist view represents the antithesis, the second horn of a dilemma (the first being supplied by the Parmenidian notion of permanence) which is equally false if set up as final.

The philosophers of change reject the hypothesis of a permanent substance persisting in the midest of change. The physical object as they understand it is no self-identical substance underlying change; it is simply a '<u>logical construction</u>' from the changing sense data. Heraclitus asserts that all is change and that <u>nothing</u> is permanent except the law of change. There is no substance which persists in the midst of change. The changes form a series and develop according to a certain law or inner

purpose. It is this law immanent in the series and guiding its development that we refer to as something persisting in the midst of changes. It is really unmeaning to say that what persists is permanent. Persistence implies time and what is permanent is not in time. The phrase 'permanent in time' is a contradiction.

The above view, however, overlooks the paradoxical nature of change. Change is logically an impossible and self-contradictory concept, in that it necessarily implies permanence as its basis and yet cannot be reconciled with it. The question may be put thus: if change implies something which is permanent, in what sense can this permanent something be said to change? Change is true of something which changes and if change is continuous it means that which changes must remain identical in spite of the change. But if identical, how is it related to change?

The philosophers of change cut the Gordian knot by saying there is change yet nothing changes, i.e. there is no <u>thing</u> or <u>substance</u> which persists permanently in the midst of change. How can a permanent thing change? Does it in its change become other than itself? If it does it is not permanent, if it does not it has not changed. That there is the fact of change cannot be doubted. Change implies a process, it has several phases in succession. Yet somehow when we come to analyse it we find it hard to discover at any particular phase in the change <u>anything</u> that is actually changing. The 'thing' is a unity of all these successive phases. To consider an example. An object moves from A to B. It has to pass through several stages a,b,c, and so on. Now the object at each stage may be regarded as one phase of the whole object. The question is what changes? It is clear that not one of

the aspects of the object, far less the object as a whole is changing. The object thus has a changing aspect but neither it nor anything in it changes.

My contention is that the above view avoids the paradoxical conclusion that a permanent thing changes only by over-looking the fact that only the permanent can change, that if we experience change at all, we do not experience bare change or change by itself; but change as belonging to and qualifying something which itself is felt to persist unchanged. The expression 'persisting unchanged' may be contradictory but it nevertheless expresses a fact of experience. Change may be analysed into its different phases but the different phases which are successively presented to us are not new or separately given but felt to belong to the same identical object. In our experience of change we experience the same thing re-appearing, as it were, in different forms. This reference to an identical object is indispensable in any experience of change and therefore cannot be regarded as a 'logical construction' out of it. It has to be taken into account and cannot be brushed aside because it gives rise to a paradox.

The Heraclitean argument is an empiricism at the cost of logic. It exploits the dilemma into which change leads us, but does not show a way out.

19. Whatever is in time has a history, and as such it cannot have a momentary existence. We are asked to distinguish between an event and a moment.

20. Change implies causality. I do not see any sense in which, on this view, causal connections can be made intelligible or shown to be more than bare succession. Causality implies identity. To say that any thing has a cause is to assert that the thing in its present aspect

does not explain itself, is not <u>self-subsis-</u>
<u>tent</u>. In order to explain its appearance in
the present we have to carry it back to the
past and show that the present is intelligi-
ble in the light of its past existence i.e. is
consistent with it. The present in explaining
itself, transcends itself as the purely pre-
sent and asserts that it has the roots of its
being contained in the past. If we do not
admit this then in what sense does the past
explain the present? The shifting sense-data
cannot explain each other because they have
nothing in common. Any sense datum can be
brought forward to 'explain' any other. What
is truly explained is shown to be no new
fact--what is wholly new does not admit of
explanation. As Kant asserts, objective time
determination is possible only through the
concept of causality, and causality must mean
<u>Sat Karya Vada</u>. Causality is introduced merely
to give us the assurance that in the two suc-
cessive perceptions that we have the object
remains the same, that there has been change
<u>in</u> the object rather than <u>of</u> the object. No-
thing is not which once was and nothing was
not which once is.

Briefly the Vedantic doctrine of causality
is this. Effect is identical with the cause
and yet somehow it distinguishes itself from
the cause otherwise causation would have no
meaning. As distinguished from the cause, how-
ever it is anirvacaniya. It is in a sense a
new product and yet not new. In short the ef-
fect as such has an inexplicable existence,
it escapes all logical determination. This
is the peculiar standpoint which Vedanta holds
in analysing experience. Experience presents
us with contradictions and according to Vedan-
ta contradictions are facts and exist in <u>rerum</u>
<u>natura</u>. It believes in an objective contradic-

tion (anirvacaniya) even as it believes in an objective falsehood (snake-rope). There is only one such experience which makes us familiar with an objective inexplicability--the experience of illusory objects. And hence the Vedanta asserts that ultimately, i.e. from the standpoint of Brahman, our vyavaharik experience is itself illusory and has not to be 'explained' but negated like the snake on the rope. When we experience an objective contradiction (experience of change) a doubt naturally arises that our experience is not true, that it does not present the reality as it is.

21. Before concluding we must determine the true nature of permanence which is implied in change. We refer to the changing object as 'this' meaning by 'this' the content that is perceived. Now what does 'this' really refer to? As I have contended we can never refer to bare change, i.e. change without a background of identity. All knowledge refers to the permanent element in our changing experience. Does 'this' then refer to the permanent object in so far as it changes? It cannot be because by 'this' we mean something self-subsistent and complete whereas the permanent object which changes is logically indeterminate. It is neither there nor yet not there. If it were there it would be complete and self-contained and then it would be difficult to predicate change of it, as change implies growth and development and hence lack of completeness. If it were not there it would be complete and self-contained and then it would be difficult to predicate change of it, as change implies growth and development and hence lack of completeness. If it were not there then how could it enter into a process of change at all? The changing object thus is not a complete meaning and hence 'this' cannot really refer to it. Our reference seems

to be a time-less object or permanence out of time. Sankara distinguishes between two kinds of permanence; parinaminitya and kutasthanitya, permanence through time and timeless permanence. In the latter we have the true permanence. The 'this' really refers to the kutasthanitya (timeless permanence). As I have said change in the sense of parinama may be predicated of the permanence through time but never of the timeless permanence. Compared with the timeless background, change is vivarta, an appearance like the snake on the rope. Parinaminitya includes and embraces change and hence in its turn is embraced by contradiction. Not that time falls outside eternity, but like the illusory snake it does not demand to be located at all, or if under the pressure of the realistic demand we seek to find a place for it we must say that time falls within eternity not to qualify it but to be negated therein.

It may be said that 'this' cannot refer to the timeless permanence since what we experience is the changing object in time and not the changeless object outside time. It is true that the reference is not immediately to the timeless permanence, but, nevertheless, ultimately such a reference is necessarily implied. "This" refers directly to present changing object, but by implication to the reality which transcends the divisions of past, present and future, to eternity itself. How is such a dual reference possible? The experience of illusion supplies us with an answer. When in illusion I assert, "this is a snake" the 'this' immediately refers to the snake and not the rope. This is a snake means, this snake is here. But 'this' also refers to the rope. By 'this' I mean not merely something which I see but something which you can also see, something which exists there whether you or I see it or

not. In this sense 'this' means this rope. We may say that 'this' refers to the snake, but snake itself refers to the rope because it has no existence apart from the rope. Similarly in all knowledge we ordinarily refer to a finite object, but the finite itself carries us beyond itself to the Infinite which is its essence and in which it is not taken up and transformed as Bradley suggests, but negated as a false appearance, even as the appearance of the snake is negated on the perception of the rope.

To conclude: So far as the 'permanent in time' is concerned it is contradiction and we may characterise it in any way we like, either as a "construction", "a law of change" or as the 'structure' of the changing process. This, however, merely states the paradox of change but does not solve it. The only way to resolve the contradiction is by regarding the changing manifold as the vivarta of the false appearance of the timeless reality (paramarthik sat). Buddhism in common with Vedanta rejects the Bradleyian synthesis. After all Sankara was not unjustly accused of being a 'prachchanna Baudha.' Sarvam anityam, sarvam anatman is not the last word of the Buddhists. It is the last word so far as this anirvacaniya jagat is concerned, but jagat, jiva and Ishvara are not the themes of the Vedanta nor of the Buddhists. The latter assert Nirvanam Santam. Nirvana is the only calm.

21. KALI PROSAD:* In a singularly expressive phrase William James charecterised the psychology of the unconscious as 'tumbling ground for whimsies.' The characterisation does not appear to be wholly unjust, for the amount of loose thinking and confusion that prevail have made it one of the most notoriously baffling subjects in modern psychology. No very successful attempts seem to have been made toward the clarification of the concept of the unconscious.

** on "THE CONCEPT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS"

There is no unanimity about its connotation, as the term continues to be employed by different writers to signify widely different conceptions. Some of the followers of Freud, for instance, look upon it as the dwelling place of all kinds of repressed desires and unfulfilled ambitions that are declared taboo. In this sense the unconscious is a lumber-room or a prison where the condemned ideas and 'rebellious tendencies' are kept when they are not wanted. To Jung it is the inexhaustible reservoir of archaic thought and feeling. It is a huge mass of the collective experiences of humanity with which the individual is endowed at birth. It is a realm of 'shadows, dim lights and confusion.' Others regard the unconscious as a material or immaterial entity (or personality) which exists independently of consciousness and which thinks plans, struggles and achieves. It is co-conscious with the conscious activity of the subject; and goes on concurrently as a subsidiary stream of mental activity. This is the famous hypothesis of Morton Prince. There are others, however, who look upon the unconscious with superstitious awe and reverence and would invoke it whenever there is a failure of scientific explanation. Still others like Schopenhauer and Hartmann have complicated the problem of introducing general metaphysical considerations i.e, by ascribing ultimate reality to the unconscious as a principle of cosmic evolution. Still more recently Samuel Butler and Hering follow the same line of thought though they identify the unconscious with Matter. On the other hand there are those who have suggested that it is nothing but a hypothetical entity necessary for certain purposes of explanation and description. And some (like Munsterberg) have even doubted

if it is necessary to postulate this at all.

The common characteristic of the above views is the tendency to spatialise and individualise the unconscious: to regard it as a structure or stratum. Now to prejudice our enquiry at the outset by accepting implicitly what we might call the 'stratal' view of the unconscious would be quite unwarranted. Prima facie there is no reason why the unconscious should be looked upon as an independent structure or a mechanism made up of diverse elements of thought and feeling. And yet we find that a majority of writers have adopted some such point of view as the basis of their theory. We shall, therefore, avoid both the stratal and the 'personalistic' descriptions of the unconscious as being too mystical or metaphysical for scientific psychology.

It must not, however, be overlooked that the stratal point of view, as for instance, that implied by Freud, has considerable practical utility and methodological convenience. In the analysis and understanding of concrete neurotic phenomena it is always useful to demarcate the normal from the pathological with the utmost sharpness. Thus alone can insight be obtained into the nature of such pathogenic phenomena, as, for example, appear when two or more rival tendencies or systems of ideas develop in a single personality. Psychopathology must, therefore, like the natural sciences, isolate its phenomena with a view to their scientific treatment. But as in the sciences, so too here, we must not forget the more or less hypothetical and abstract nature of the entities that are dealt with by the psycho-analysist or the pathologist.

Freud has, it must be admitted given due regard to this fact. He does not take the three divisions of conscious, fore-conscious and

unconscious as ultimately separate or independent levels at all. On the contrary his fundamental position is that each of these strata determines and is determined by the others. More particularly the unconscious which, according to him, constitutes eitht-ninths of our mental make-up inevitably determines our conscious actions and general behaviour. He proceeds to interpret conscious phenomena in terms of the unconscious; and for purposes of analysis and description this method turns out to be eminently useful. But it is not of much avail for a systematic exposition of mental phenomena which we must attempt in general psychology. Here analysis and description are not an end in themselves; they constitute but a framework for ultimate theoretic construction. This has not been sufficiently realised by Frued and others, or at any rate, such general theoretic considerations stand in the back-ground and supply but a feeble motive in their investigations.

22. Every perception, for instance, is a fusion of what by an introspective abstraction we call sensations and images. My perception of the moon, for instance, is a fusion of the various sensations, memories and images and meanings which rise into my mind as soon as I perceive it. I may try to discriminate and distinguish between these various contents but it is impossible to effect any disjunction between them. They constitute one dynamic configuration, a fusion-whole, like the two notes of an octave.

23. B.L. ATREYA: "Is there any view which is free from error; is there any place where there is no agony of suffering; is there any creation which is not transitory; and is there any transaction which is free from deception?" It is a serious question which was put to Vasistha by Ramachandra. It is sure to occur

in the mind of every human being at some time or other. The answer we get from our experience is in no way optimistic. Buddha, the Enlightened one, with his searching and penetrating eyes, discovered that pain and transitoriness are the characteristics of all beings. "Birth", says he, "is painful, decay is painful, death is painful, union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is the separation from the pleasant, and any craving that is unsatisfied, that too is painful. In brief, the five aggregates (body, feeling, perception, conation and cognition), which spring from attachment are painful." And "There are three things, O King, which you cannot find in the world. That which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death, that you will not find. The quality of anything which is not impermanent, that you will not find. And in the highest sense there is no such thing as being possessed of being." Kant asks: "Would any man of sound understanding who has lived long enough and has meditated on the worth of human existence care to go again through the live's poor play, I do not say on the same conditions, but on any condition whatsoever?" Schopenhauer comes to a similar conclusion: "The nature of life throughout presents itself to us an intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing at all is worth our striving, our efforts and struggles; that all good things are vanity; the world in all its ends bankrupt; and life a business which does not cover expenses." In the Yogavasistha we are told by Vasistha that there cannot be any abiding satisfaction realised by sense-enjoyments for "they please only at the commencement." "All pleasures terminate in pain as all bright flames terminate in the darkness of smoke." "On the head of all beings dances non-being; within all beauty is hid ugliness;

and all pleasures terminate in pain. To which shall we then resort?" "We are disgusted, because we have realised that all beautiful things turn ugly; all stability is unstable; and all our truths are false." "All prosperity briings added misery; all pleasures bring their consequent pains; and life is only for death." "The entire activity of life will be found asara (without any positive gain) on reflection." It is this dark and disappointing aspect of life, which, however undesirable it may be, is a fact to which eyes cannot be shut for all times, that is called <u>evil</u> in religion and philosophy of the West. It is designated ad duhkha in India, and all religion and philosophy have their birth in the consciousness of evil or duhkha and the desire to get rid of it.

24. <u>N.K. SEN</u>:**In the B.A. Pass Course, Philosophy is an elective subject which includes Psychology as part of the studies. The position it occupies in the curricula of the Universities is not commensurate with its importance and the attention it deserves. The teacher is compelled to rush through the work in about 6 to 9 months and does not get a fair chance to evoke a proper interest in the students. Although in most Universities a syllabus is prescribed, teaching is usually confined to one or two set text-books. I do not ignore the value of text-books, and I recognise the help they afford to teachers as well as to students. But suitable text-books are not easy to find. The books that are usually used in our Universities are in most cases elementary works by Western Psychologists. They are not only foreign in language and expression but usually in atmosphere and setting. The illustrations are unfamiliar, the details are sometimes strange

** on "<u>THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY</u>"

and they speak of a life not quite our own. The student is not infrequently puzzled; but he resigns himself to the inevitable. He takes the illustrations and the other details for granted and tries to store them in his mind for the ordeal of the examination. There can hardly be any pleasure in a task like this and he is not entirely to blame if he lacks interest in the subject.

25. History and Economics, particularly the latter, are now attracting an overwhelmingly large number of students and philosophy classes are becoming thinner and thinner every year.

26. We have to take the facts as they are, and examine the situation as we find it. The average student, it is generally admitted, shows a deplorable lack of intelligent interest in his studies. The examinations loom so large in his mind and he is so distressingly influenced by their exaggerated value that he loses both the joy of learning and the spirit of free enquiry. The evils of the present system of examinations are too well known to need any discussion here. But can we as teachers absolve ourselves from all obligations and responsibilities? Have we succeeded in inspiring them with a love of knowledge and a loyalty to truth? These are questions which will disturb the equanimity of every thoughtful person engaged in teaching. Why is philosophy condemned as a futile speculation? Why is the study of psychology abandoned as unprofitable? I think the reason is not far to seek. The false conceptions owe their origin to some perverse methods of study as well as to ignorance and prejudice. The study of psychology, I regret to say, has been dissociated from life--life as we live it and find it around us. The study of the science so far at least as our students are concerned is confined to books and lectures.

27. It is the pursuit of the abstract rather than the concrete and real, devotion to books rather than interest in life, which makes them dull students of psychology. Imagine for a moment a student of astronomy who has never looked at the sky, or a student of botany who has never been in a garden, and you will see my point. A living and fruitful interest in psychology cannot be expected in one who has never learnt to take an interest in the life and doings of his fellowmen as well as his own experiences. The problems of psychology do not appeal to him as living human problems and no wonder that he finds psychology dry and unprofitable. What is to be done then?--One would ask. The reply is simple. Divert at least a part of the energy and attention at the disposal of the student from books and theories to human life in its common and familiar manifestations. Even while teaching a book the teacher can, if he is so inclined, refer frequently to the ordinary incidents of every-day life in illustrating his principles. He can also present to his students human problems to which they can apply their knowledge of psychology.

28. J.B. DAVE. The Upanishads began to discern the underlying unity of the cosmos. The Upanishadic seers approached the problem both from the objective and the subjective point of view. The ultimate reality as viewed from the objective side they called Brahman. Subjectively the ultimate reality discovered is Atman. The finite is contained in the Infinite and the differences in the phenomenal world are due to illusion.

1. SIR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN.@@ Opening Address:

What is rarer is the combination in one individual of knowledge and wisdom. It is only from those of deep thought and large experience that we can get a breadth and depth of understanding, a hold on essentials too often absent from the works of mere intellectuals. In our ancient scriptures it is laid down that philosophy is not a pursuit to which any one can take. It requires not only a sharp intellect but a detached spirit.

2. Wisdom is integral thinking, while knowledge is fractional thinking. While the latter is more in evidence in science and mathematics, which can be understood by all who possess a trained intellect, the exercise of the former is demanded for an understanding of poetry and philosophy, art and literature.

In a recent book I argued that integral thinking or intuitive understanding is responsible for the great insights of philosophy and it is not without reason that philosophy in India is conveyed by the term 'darsana' which literally means 'sight' or 'insight.' Darsana implies that the ultimate reality is something of which we are directly aware and is not a matter of speculative construction or logical syntheses.

While this view is regarded as true of the Indian philosophers who are theological in their outlook, it is said to be inappropriate to a thinker like Sankara, who does not lean on either dogmatic orthodoxy or emotional assurance. Such a contention is hardly fair.

The real is no mere aspiration unrealised and unrealisable but is the ultimate behind all appearances whatsoever. It is not something which has yet to be accomplished like the future deity of Alexander, but what is

@@ 8th INDIAN PHILOS.CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS.'32.

already there, ever present. For Hegel the Absolute is a construction epistemologically analogous to similar constructions in the world of knowledge. It is hypothesis like that of the electron or the neutron. Sankara is definitely opposed to this view. For him the real is genuinely given in knowledge. He distinguishes between purusatantra, that which is constructed by the knower and vastutantra, that which is given to it. Philosophy is knowledge of being, bhutavastuvisaya. It is the apprehension of being, an apprehension which has a distinct flavour of its own. It is more immediate than mediate, more direct than indirect. It has more in common with perception than conception. It is pure immediate self-intuition and it utterly distinct from reflection or mediated thought. Commenting on the phrase pratyaksavagamam, Sankara says--"Pratyaksena sukhader iva avagamo yasya tat pratyaksavagaman." In the view of Hegel, the Absolute is a rational synthesis transparent to the human intellect. There is no mystery in it which thought can disclose. Protests were uttered immediately Schleiermacher and Lotze deny the adequacy of thought to comprehend the whole of reality without remainder and resort to considerations of value. Ritschl, after Kant, affirmed that religious faith is rooted in the practical side of our nature. Systems of voluntarism were the result.

3. Bradley correctly represents the teaching of Hegel when he observes: "For thought what is not relative is nothing." The Being of Sankara is one which suffers no second. Human thought is bound up with distinctions while the real is above all distinctions. Our linguistic symbols and logical concepts veil the Real and reduce it to an idol. The

Katha Upanisad says: "Not by speech, not by thought, not by sight, does one grasp him." Sankara tells us that Brahman cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge." The Absolute is a positive but unnameable being. It negates limitations, privations. The moment we apply logical concepts to it, we reduce it to a non-absolute, the determinate God. The Absolute is the ground of all possibilities including that of God.

4. Sankara recognised the possibility of directly apprehending the ultimate reality in a way which cannot be equated with either ordinary sense-perception or logical inference. It is what he calls aparoksanubhuti. It is not individual phantasy or illusion. It is unfortunate to characterise this view as mysticism and be done with it. Mysticism is a blanket term, a portmanteau expression which covers a miscellaneous host of ideas, occult visions, apparitions, trance and ecstasy, pious gushing, luminous vacancy, intoxicated erotism, a striving after the bliss of the bridal chamber. While Sankara admits the value of the eightfold yoga, it is only as a means to samyagdarsana, a perfect insight which is far removed from any kind of sentiment or feeling.

5. The difference between Sankara and Hegel is just here. Logical reasoning by itself cannot lead to the apprehension of reality. Sankara admits "On account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation.

6. The last word on the structure of reality cannot be uttered by the epistemologist who leaves us with open alternatives. While it is

disloyalty to reason to deny the known character of the world, it is not disloyalty to reason to note that it is something more than what is known of it.

7.He differs from the view which is sometimes adopted by Bergson that intuition is a negation of intellect. For Sankara, it is a fulfilment of it. Intuitive experience is the crown of intellectual knowledge. Anubhavavasanam brahmajnanam, anubhavarudham eva ca vidyaphalam. Intuition is not a substitute for rational knowledge but a supplement to it. It is rational thought matured to inspiration. Intuitive insight while spontaneous does not arise except in the minds of those who are prepared for it by study of scripture and reflection. "Hearing from scriptural texts and reflecting with the help of arguments and meditation are the causes of the insight into Brahman."

8. From the vividness of the experience rises emotional intensity but these accompaniments are not a guarantee of the truth of the object intuited. These intuitions, simply because they carry conviction to the seer, are not to be taken as true. Subjective certitude is different from logical certainty. The sense of assurance is present even when the object is imaginal and such unreal objects, so long as they are believed to be actual, evoke feelings and attitudes quite as intense and effective as those excited by real ones. The strength of assurance and the intensity of the experience are not a proof of the reality of the object experienced. Intuitions, sensuous as well as spiritual, require to be tested and criticised before they are accepted as valid. Questions of validity are not answered by the experiences themselves. Certitude is not certainty. Psychological objectivity is not ontological

reality. While religion may be satisfied with the sense of convincedness, which is enough to foster spiritual life, philosophy is interested in finding out whether the object believed in is well-grounded or not.

9. What reason suggests as the truth, intuition reveals as the reality. The intuited truth that the self of man is eternally one with the supreme is the ultimate fact to which we are led by a rational ontology which establishes the unreality of multiplicity, division, manifoldness and separatedness. The unreality of the world is just its self-contradiction.

10. Reason affirms the complete oneness and simplicity of the real. But reason by itself cannot disclose this truth. When once the beliefs arise through intuition or scripture, then logic can tell us whether they are valid or invalid. Sankara's samyagdarsana does not express itself in song or ritual but in a rational dialectic rather cold and stiff, when we compare it even with the mysteries of the Upanisads. Dialectics help us in proof but not in discovery.

11. It is obvious that Sankara believes in a direct awareness of reality which is neither perceptual not conceptual. Here he differs from Hegel but he also affirms that this direct awareness is through and through rational and in this he differs from Bergson.

To discover thought and intuition is to dismember the real and deny the eternal unity of life. The puzzles and paradoxes of philosophy are due to the fallacy of abstraction and if we are loyal to the great tradition of this land, we shall always use intellect in the interest of intuition.

12. P.N. SRINIVASACHARI*. The self is the prius and pre-supposition of all knowledge and is its own evidence. Its existence is proved not by physical evidence or metaphysical spe-

* on "ATMANISM"

culation but by direct intuitive experience.
13. The philosophy of religion has to mediate between these extremes and bring out the central truths of spiritual experience and it is not a compromise like humanism, positivism and pragmatism. While rejecting the mythological as irrelevant, philosophic criticism accepts the foundational facts of the spiritual life. When Russell traces religion to fear and asks us to abandon its consolations which are ideal and not actual, he fails to reach the heart of religion. Freud's theory that religion is an illusion based on pansexualism is itself an illusion; in the name of culture it glorifies sex. Religion is not a subjective or social need which elevates fancy to the level of objective reality. James, in his immortal work on religious experience, has once for all established the case for a philosophy of religion by refuting the dogmatism of medical materialists who attribute religion to physical and mental diseases.
14. Alexander's theory of the deity as the goal of the evolutionary nisus, in which God as having the quality of deity is yet to be, is simply deification of space-time and making deity spatio-temporal. It is naturalistic fallacy to explain the universe as the hiarchy with space-time event at the bottom and deity at the apex. His theory, as Dr. Radhakrishnan says, suffers from an anti-metaphysical bias. It is a mere tautology and "verbal sedative," as it says that life and mind emerge because they emerge. The emergence of matter, life, mind, etc., is abrupt and unintelligible. Hoernle has no faith in the progression as it may be beyond deity, and Haldane observes that Alexander produces the real world very much as a conjurer produces rabbits from a hat. No one worships

space-time as the absolute and finds saving experiences in it; it is an unorthodox messianic hope expressed in modern thought.

15. Intuition is not an irrational and fugitive feeling or any psychological state, but is the integral experience of reality, and is therefore the fulfilment of reason. Mysticism thus removes the breach between metaphysics and theology.

16. P.P.S. SASTRI.* Philosophy is an expression of wisdom that is not academic but the product of fullness of experience. In the case of Indian philosophy in particular, speculation divorced from life and its needs is peculiarly unreal. And yet unfortunately we find that the study of Indian philosophy is still largely mechanical a kind of observation of an archaic specimen, not an introduction to the waters of life-giving spring. That such a state of affairs exists is partly due to the dominance of Western notions of metaphysics as a peculiar intellectual game.

17. We remember that the Advaitin begins and ends with a colourless Absolute which is beyond good and evil, whose attainment can come by no external activity; we forget that this Brahman which is no other than the soul of the seeker can be realised only by him of purified intellect, the purification involving most rigorous and arduous exercise that can be conceived of in any moral code.

18. Adhikara again is not fixed for all time. It is capable of growth, of education. To purify, sanctify and educate should be our mission, not to dispense spiritual favours after the fashion of granting political franchise. And in this matter of Adhikara we have also to remember that it is not merely the depressed that are defective but also the conservatively orthodox. The former clamour mostly for

*on "INDIAN PHILOSOPHY & PRESENT SITUATION"

they know not why. If we would be wise in dealing with both sections of the community, we should devise means which would alienate neither. Would it not be better to create a new cult or to invent a deity than arbitrarily force the one into the society of the other.
19. What shall it profit our depressed brethren if they enter our temples but depart from our hearts?
20. If humanity has a birth-right and a goal, it cannot be cheated of either. But the attainment of it can be hastened and made less tortuous by efforts inspired with insight. And if philosophy is studied in correlation to practices as mentioned above, if fractional thinking is not introduced even into the study that is meant to correct that mode of thinking, then we may find solutions for our problems by a mode of synthesis which while giving unto each part its due will yet quicken the evolution of the whole.
21. S.G. SATHE:* Socrates was practically the first to deal with ethical problems. He made virtue identical with (in the sense of following from) knowledge. One who knows his interest or good is bound to follow it, he argued. As a corollary from this tenet, he held that virtue could be taught. If virtue is knowledge, vice must be ignorance. But if vice is ignorance, you cannot blame or censure a bad man. Immorality must accordingly be considered to be, in principle, the same as a physical malady. Punishment with Socrates was only curative or deterrent, not retributive.
22. It is true that fatalism is generally considered as a term of abuse. Once it is decided that a doctrine is fatalistic, it is the philosophic fashion to treat it as condemned once and for all. The reason seems to be that it is held to be an axiomatic truth

*on "THE GROWTH OF ETHICS"

that fatalism kills manhood, for, as is alleged, it paralyses all spirit of self-confidence and induces a feeling of helplessness and renders a man indolent. But let us subject the fatalistic theory of Karma to some cool and dispassionate thought and see whether it deserves the slur that is cast on it.

According to the karma doctrine all that happens to a being and all that the being does are determined by the accumulated karma of the being. This statement itself is the result of some thinking on the part of a thinking being or beings, so that, according to the Karma theory, the thought about the karma is itself the fruit of some former karma, so that it is fated that some beings will have power to think and through thought derive knowledge; further that such beings will know that through knowledge of the nature of karma, they might acquire freedom from its shackles, when it is realised that karma that is done without any selfish desire to enjoy the fruit, would render the karma impotent for further mischief and produce that serene state of intelligence which enables the sould to receive the light of the supreme knowledge which consists in seeing that the ignorantly conceived individual self is nothing but the Absolute itself. In this way it may be fated that such a being or beings may attain Moksa--the Summum Bonum. It is difficult to see where, want of self-confidence, helpnessness or indolence comes in. Such a man will be inspired by a kind of spirit which, according to the champions of free will, should animate the ideally virtuous man, viz. that of doing duty for duty's sake and not with an eye to the advantages accruing therefrom. On the other hand, a man who is not gifted with the power of such philosophic reflection, will remain blissfully under the delusion that he has in him the freedom to achieve his own welfare.

Here again there cannot be any question of his being in any way depressed or diffident or lazy. In no case, therefore, will the Karma doctrine, fatalistic as it is, produce the lethargy which it is feared it may produce

23. G.R. MALKANI.*The problem presents itself to thought, how are the two reconcilable? For there appears to be a contradiction in saying that both the one and the many are real. That which is many cannot really be one; and that which is one cannot really be many. We must either be able to reconcile the two concepts with each other, or in the alternative decide to reject either the one or the many as unreal.

24. Pure identity is unthinkable. Space, time, substance and quality, relations, etc. are all principles of the manifold. What does not conform to these principles can never be known, and can never be posited. If the real one is nevertheless known, it would at least be an object to a subject and thus stand in this relation at least. Pure identity then is impossible to find in the realm of being with which alone our experience is concerned. Pure identity is pure nothing.

25. It is this thought which inspires the proposition that the truly real must be indivisible for if it is divisible, its substantiality is not truly in it but in its parts, and we should have to look for our reality in some ultimate indivisible parts and in nothing else.

26. It might be urged that the last remaining alternative, namely that the one alone is real, is also not tenable; the conception of the one involves the conception of the many. In pure non-difference, there will be nothing to prescribe any boundary, any limit, any distinction to being. How can we then significantly call such being one? When we call anything one, we separate it out from a manifold and constitute it into a unit in itself. The unbounded, the

*on "THE ONE AND THE MANY"

unlimited, and the undifferentiated, if it did exist, would be one in no sense of the term.

We admit that the conception of the one, as it is used in mathematics and in ordinary speech, is the conception of what is limited or what is only one among many. Its specific sense is that of a unit that can be repeated in almost identifical form and measure. But in this specific sense it is certainly not true of reality. If we looked at the being of things as such, we should find it throughout continuous; there is no hiatus, no discontinuity, no real separation anywhere to serve as a basis for enumeration. If, on the other hand, we concentrated attention on real differences, then each different element would be simply itself, unique and non-respectable. Such a real manifold would be alien to the idea of number. This idea implies a unity, throughout self-same, the by self-addition of which other numbers are reached. But a universe in which nothing was repeatable, and nothing could be got twice over--in other words, in which everything was unique, --would not be amenable to a numerical treatment. How can we get anything that is <u>one</u>, since we can nowhere proceed from a given something to a second? Still we may admit that where a distinction can be made, the idea of number can also be applied. We can thus give meaning to <u>one</u>. But at the same time, this only shows the limitation of the conception of the <u>one</u> in ordinary use. It does not show that the unlimited and the undifferentiated cannot be. That is the only <u>real</u> one, if one we may call it, for it is one without a second.

Whether such an undifferenced unity exists or not is a question that can be asked. But one thing that is certain is that if anything exists it must be such a unity, for the notion of this unity involves no self-contradiction,

while there is self-contradiction in the notion of the pure many or the notion of the one-in-many. The one in our sense then alone is a possible existent. We shall now proceed to give some further indication of this non-dual being.

27.It might be thought that the unity is realised in some form of mystic experience. That indeed may be so. Still we cannot help asking, how is the miracle to be achieved without annulling the terms? For the object cannot be the subject, and the subject cannot be the object; they have nothing common between them. Their unity is impossible by the very nature of the terms. We therefore cannot help thinking that if the unity were realised, it would not be found to contain any suggestion of two terms at all, and no suggestion of any reconciliation between them.

We are told that in absolute experience, the distinction of the subject and the object ceases. But if that is so, that experience would have no content. It would be just pure intelligence that is confronted by nothing and knows nothing. This intelligence is the true ultimate subject. The empirical subject or the ego is confronted by ojbects and is necessarily related to them. It is also impermanent, it comes and it goes even as the knowledge of objects comes and goes. But that which reveals this subject, and its coming and going, is not itself revealed. It is self-revealed if we might say so. It is the eternal light that never comes and never goes. This enduring essence of being which is the ground of the subject-object relation is their only true unity. Distinctions are available within object, and in the subject-object relation; they cannot be carried further to the ultimate ground of all

appearances. What is not a subject, and is not confronted by anything, cannot know any distinctions and cannot stand in any relation to otherness to aught else. It is the true ultimate unity that we have been seeking to know. The many of our ordinary experience are related to it as false and illusory appearances are related to their underlying substratum; for the many can never be truly one except in the sense that the many are not; their appearance is only an illusory appearance.

Our conclusion is that if anything does exist, it must necessarily be one, without a second, and non-dual. This being we can only find in pure intelligence or the ultimate selfhood. Lastly, since there is nothing other to it, and nothing that can stand in any relation to it, the many of our experience and all the relations which they render possible, are only illusory appearances.

28. P.NARASIMHAM.* Science is not self-critical, introspective. It does not analyse its own right of knowledge or our ability to know. Where science is silent, philosophy strives to speak. But yet the philosopher or the metaphysician seems also to fall into the same habitual groove of the so-called "scientific" way of thinking. We are not yet clearly aware that we are using only the external or objective categories of knowing, and there is besides, or must be, some internal or central viewpoint which puts us right into the heart of things where knowing and being are not two but one. So long as we have that knowledge, even complete knowledge, consists in a thorough understanding of the inter-relations of all the parts which thus constitute a whole, so long we shall be far away from the "Soul" of knowledge. The real whole is not and cannot be made up of parts; it belongs to a different

*on "KNOWLEDGE"

dimention of meaning altogether. The parts are only parts of the whole; the parts, starting as parts, can never create the whole. Philosophy, as a mere unification or synthesis of sciences, building up a system of completely co-ordinated knowledge, can but be a fore-runner of sciences and scientific discovery, belonging to the same category of knowledge as the sciences. It does not touch the soul of knowledge. Philosophy has so far remained "outside" as a theoretic consolation, supplementing the defects of sciences, by its own bold thought-solutions which it one day hopes to "scientifically" prove. It is no doubt a worthy endeavour to so forerun and anticipate the sciences, if philosophy is to be worthy of any scientific respect; but yet it cannot claim to be the ultimate knowledge. We should strive to discover deeper still the very soul of knowledge from which the various other types of knowledge take their source and derive their authority, i.e. that form of knowing which transcends the common judgment type.

What is the psychology of rationale of knowing, what are its postulates,and what do we mean by logic and metaphysics? The psychology of knowing, as we now have it, however deep our analysis of its mechanism, does not reveal to us the source of knowing either internally in the subject or externally in the sense organs and the object. We simply say we know and believe we know. We are like the denizens of Plato's cave, cognisant of the picture-shadows on the tri-dimensional screen of space, but knowing nothing of either their source or the what within us by which we can know. Further, we require to understand how we, as both bodies and minds,are constituted and evolved to know what it is that

knows and what is the known. There is again the awkward question how we know that we know. Our logics do not help us in this direction, either the quality-judgment logic of Aristotle, or the quantity cum space logic called mathematics, or even the logic of causal thinking of our inductive sciences including the semi-mechanical theories of Evolution. They all express only the onlooker's point of view, getting deluded by the ambiguity of the question "How." The charge of materialism is made against the scientific outlook because it is uncritical and unreflective of its own postulates, and does not admit or is unaware of a different way of knowing. It merely studies objects as only objects. The science that is honestly self-conscious and introspective can never become materialistic, but rather would point out that there must be an as-yet unknown factor within the very heart of nature which evades every objective observation. Even our metaphysics, though nominally meta-physics, seems to recede more away from reality as though attempting to draw sciences behind it, rather than introvert in a sort of fourth dimensional direction to look into and touch the very centre of both being and knowing. It unconsciously adopts the same "scientific" out-look of nature; it does not study nature as a "subject", nay, as the one-subject. We seem to require a new and real metaphysical in-look if we want to truly know. But we seem to be baffled at the very outset, since we ourselves to ourselves seem to be hermetically sealed up, as enigmas, dreamily feeling surrounded, as it were, by a cloudy panorama of 'ideas'. Where are we in this field of 'Knowledge?'

29. We have not yet had in our midst any human form as a specimen that could be declared in any definite sense as being conscious of itself as such. On the other hand we find at present

that the higher the genius the greater is its unconsciousness. Even the inspired, the gifted and the so-called mystic are to that very extent, as the names themselves betray, unconscious only. From the high to the low we act more as mediums of the Unseen and the Unknown than as self-conscious and self-directing agents or entities.

30. We may attempt to examine the significance of the idealistic "slogan" Esse is percipi, what is true about it and what false. It is easy to understand that it is only a psychological truism to say that the 'being' of a thing for us is and can be only in terms of our experience, and that to speak of an existence in terms beyond such experience is psychologically at least ultra vires.

31. "That thou art" is the "ultimate" of the Upanisadic thought.

32. The liberation is rather from the present limitations of knowledge, from the illusion of separateness as of a "this" from a "that", or of a "you" from a "me." The difference-seeing mind, the psychological "me" is merely the "negative", dependent and mortal self. It must be transcended; it is not the Atman.

33. HANUMANTA RAO. Mysticism is not what a philosophy starts with or works with; it is something which it has recourse to in the last resort. It cannot be asserted as philosophy though a philosopher may have to assent to it when he is at his wit's end. This is not to disparage mysticism. Mysticism has its own legitimate place--perhaps a place higher than the one assigned to philosophy, but it has no place in philosophy as a philosophic principle.

34. Though I should admit that if a thing is to be known it should be known according to the laws of logic, yet I am not prevented

from giving myself up to feeling when knowing fails to put me in possession of reality.
35. R.N. KAUL. Truth according to Bradley, necessarily implies an aspect of psychical existence,--it must happen and occur in a mind and must exist as a mental event.
36. One of the reasons which consciously or unconsciously influenced Bradley in this matter was his irreconcilable distrust of Hegelianism. Though he never claims to have mastered Hegel's system perfectly, yet so far as he understood it, he could not accept what seemed to him an essential part of that system. "Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if "thinking" is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational...the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism...our principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that whole which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful." --Principles of Logic, Bradley.
37. The part of Hegel's teaching which was most unsatisfactory for Bradley was the place that was claimed for thought as not merely apprehensive but, is some exclusive sense, constitutive of reality.
38. T.R.V.MURTI. What is the general principle involved in this dialectic against motion and rest? It is undertaken from the standpoint of pure immediacy of experience, and is a consistent Solipsism of the 'present moment.'.
39. Far from being self-contradic tory, solipsism of the present moment is the only attitude

that demands radical evidence--experience--for any assertion; it is not to be frightened into acquiescence of universally believed notions. Confine yourself at any time rigorously to the immediately given, the distinctions of space into the traversed, yet to be traversed, etc. and of motion as originating, progressing and ceasing cannot arise; for these issue out of relating, out of positing characters that transcend the immediately given. All such relating and positing involve a vicious circle. Distinctions in space are possible on the commencement of motion, which itself cannot be understood without these very distinctions it engenders. The Madhyamika Dialectic is a call to purify the given object of thought of all beliefs in the transcendent, of dogmas. It finds that when such a purification is effected, no assertion--affirmation or negation--is possible. Everything is Sunya. The Madhyamika cannot have any thesis of his own--positive or negative. This raises two fundamental issues: Is Criticism of any thesis possible without any counter thesis; and can all the alternatives under any head be rejected. 40. This is the only way by which we can confute an opponent. The absurdity of his position must be brought home to him. The Madhyamika claims to do nothing else. He is a Prasngika--having no tenet of his own and not caring to frame a syllogism of his own. "An opponent in putting forward a thesis is expected, as he is a believer in Pramanas, to validate it; he must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusions....But the case of the Madhyamika is different; he does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent, He has no

reasons and examples which he believes to be true." Every endeavour of the Madhyamika is, therefore, exhausted in reducing the opponent's position to absurdity on principles and consequences which the oppoentn himself would accept. So we may answer the first question by forcibly asserting that to criticise a position it is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to advance another position.

41 For a critic of Knowledge, for a Transcendentalist, there are no first principles, no inviolate axioms which he should respect, or at which he should arrive at the end of his enquiry. If the first principles and the valid sources of knowledge are themselves under discussion, will it do to start by unquestionably accepting them? Just as this enquiry can proceed without being saddled with the acceptance of any dogma other enquiries can fare equally well. Formal Logic may proceed on certain assumptions, but a self-conscious dialectic cannot, without being false to its position, accept them.

42. N. VENKATARAMAN Liberation is not a state or condition to be reached by any process, mental or physical. Since absolute Idealism is a denial of all causation, there can be no becoming or change for the Self. The Self is always free, and was never under bondage. What appears as bondage, misery, and evil, (Samsara), is entirely due to the erroneous tendency to regard mere thought-forms as objective and real (adhyasa). One has only to unlearn this habit of one's mind (due to avidya), in order to gain true knowledge of one's Self. The latter does away with the obstacle (unreal) that stands in the way of one's Freedom. Jnana is a hindrance of hindrances (illusions)--knowledge, in revealing one's true Self, reveals, at the same time, that one is absolutely and eternally free. Sankara, in the introduction to his commentary on the Mandukya

Upanishad says "as a sick man recovers his health on the removal of the cause of his illness, so the Self, when freed from the (supposed) cause of his misery--the illusion of duality, realises its unity. The illusion, being due to ignorance, is dispelled by proper knowledge."

43. Vedanta maintains that the only thing about which we can be positive and certain is the Self, with its inner essence of Thought; and all the so-called facts and things of the external world, including the causal formulae of science, the Laws of motion and of Evolution; the perceptions, feelings, and other changes taking place in the mind are all phenomena and appearances only--a huge and variegated show put forth by the inner spirit for its own delectation and edification; and no more real in themselves than dreams and mirages that appear on the mental and material planes. All causation, with its relativities of space, time, motion, etc., are equally phenomenal--mere phantasmagoria that issue out of, and depend entirely on, the one true Reality,--the Atman.

44. P.T. RAJU: *Kant does not say as Sankara does, that the phenomenal world has no metaphysical stability. He merely asserts that it points to something higher.

45. Kant is justified in saying that the unconditioned is only an ideal of Reason. For, thought's object is judgment which is made possible by the distinction between the subject and the predicate. To effect their complete unification thought looks up to the ideal, the unconditioned. If the unconditioned becomes an object of thought, it will cease to be unconditioned. The unconditioned can only yield itself to intellectual intuition. But finite mind is deprived of such integral experience.

on "KANT AND SANKARA"

Kant's great failure however lies in not being to arrive at the ultimate unity of the three Ideas. But it must at the same time be admitted that the conception of unity was not totally absent from his mind. In fact, he observes in the Critique that such unity is not unthinkable.

Another defect of Kant is that he has not proved that the Ideal of Reason could be no other than the noumena and that noumena are one. The solution of the problem which he took up in the Critique requires that he should identify them. There are passages however in the Opus Postunum which show that Kant, in the later period of his life, realised that the noumena would be no other than the self in its transcendental aspect. Had Kant stuck to this truth and worked it out his idealism would not have been difficult to accept. In that case he would have very little differed from Vedanta which makes Universal spirit foundational.

46. H.N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR. What is the central teaching for which the whole Veda stands? Such teaching must be extricated from apparent contradictions. To do this a separate system has been evolved to thresh the essential out of the non-essential. Such a system is Vedanta.

Several attempts at such systematisation have been made. Badarayana's attempt seems to be the very first of them. In his Brahma Sutra he has systematised the thoughts of the Veda. The Sutras consist of pithy statements that are very comprehensive in their outlook. They are called Vedanta Sutras because they embody the systematisation of the Vedic thought.

47. CAUSALITY & VEDANTA by C.T. SRINIVASAN.

Does the cosmos indicate the plan and the method of future development? Does causality really signify anything more than a way of human reckoning in the final? To arrive at the first cause in the sense of its being the prior condition,

is as impossible as to arrive at the first hour of existence. The several antecedent conditions are found to be one with the present, and the imaginary breaks in the continuity are only different views of one great event that is beginningless. The Vedic proof of the unreality of the world does not erase it from existence. The disappearance is therefore purely metaphysical not even mental. We are not concerned with the psychological cases. The world continues (to appear) as long as we are awake. The cause of it must be included within that beginningless continuity. But no cause is got at!

Cause in the sense of motive or purpose constitutes the philosophic field. In this sense it is subjective, for we cannot detect any motive in the object. As motive or purpose is individual, it is reasonable to seek the cause in the subject. It is impossible to think of a cause for this waking world, because the actual motive is absent with the mind in a previous state. No state is previous or subsequent to another state where, as we know per Vedic Method, there is no common time to connect them. It is illogical to think of a cause for subject-object existence. We are driven therefore to the conclusion that cause is only an individual possibility: neither an objective factor nor a transcendental power in any form. But individual existence is not purposeless or aimless.

If cause means the basis of all this show, the question is not illogical, for then every bit of creation can be traced to it. To make it real, we have to posit a Creator! It is in this sense Essence, the Vedanta Sutras speak of Brahman as cause or the basis of this whole existence, and prove it to be identical with our real Self. Cause in any other mean-

ing fails in itself. The true nature of cause is clearly dealt with by Sankara in his Adhyasa Bhasya. Adhyasa is not the cause of the appearance of the world but is the cause of the appearing it as the real. Adhyasa helps to continue the mistaken notions of differneces and distinctions. But the consciousness of duality or manifoldness is always one and secondless. In this light only knowledge can be of any use, for individual's knowledge can get rid of all individual illusions.

48. S. RADHAKRISHNAN* What exactly does moksa or salvation connote? It does not involve the destruction of the world. It implies the disappearance of a false view of the world.

Sankara admits that the world appearance persists for the Jivanmukta or the Sthitaprajna of the Bhagavadgita. The Jivanmukta, though he realises moksa or brahmabhava, still lives in the world. The appearance of multiplicity is not suppressed. It is with him as with a patient suffering from timira, that though he knows there is only one moon, he sees two. Only it does not deceive the freed soul even as the mirage does not tempt one who has detected its unreal character. Freedom consists in the attainment of a universality of spirit or sarvatmabhava. Embodiment continues after the rise of the saving knowledge. Though the spirit is released, the body persists. While the individual has attained inner harmony and freedom, the world-appearance still persists and engages his energies. Full freedom demands the destruction of the world-appearance as well. Sankara's view of the jivanmukta condition makes out that inner perfection and work in the finite universe can go together.

It is usually thought that at death, the soul attains final liberation or videhamukti. It is not easy to reconcile this view with the

*on "SARVAMUKTI"

other statement Sankara makes that Apantaratamas, Bhrgu and Narada even after death work for the saving of the world.

The continuance of Apantaratamas and others depends on the offices which they fill for the sake of the world. As the sun, who after having for thousands of yugas performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, so Apantaratamas and others continue as individuals, although they possess complete knowledge which is the cause of release and obtain release only when their offices come to an end.

So long as their offices last their karmas cannot be said to be exhausted. Sankara here admits that samyagdarsana, though it is the cause of release, does not bring about final release and the liberated individuals are expected to contribute to likasthiti or world maintenance. Their karma can never be fully exhausted, so long as the world demands their services.

This view is not to be confused with kramamukti or gradual release in the traditional sense of the term. Those who are devoted to Karyabrahma or Hiranyagarbha as distinct from Parabrahman attain liberation only when the office of Brahma terminates. Sankara is discussing not gradual release but release consequent on brahmajnana which is attainable here and now; and for even such released souls, persistence of individuality is held not only as possible by Sankara but as necessary in the interests of what is called lokasthiti. In other words, the world will persist as long as there are souls subject to bondage. It terminates only when all are released, i.e., absolute salvation is possible with world redemp-

tion.

Such a view of Sankara's philosophy is by no means new. Appayya Diksita, for example, takes his stand on those passages in Sankara where the jiva is said to be of the nature of Isvara and not Brahman and holds that the liberated individuals attain communion with Isvara and not union with Brahman. He contends that Sankara supports the view of moksa as attaining the nature of Isvara. He also suggests that when all the jivas attain liberation, the world with the liberated souls and Isvara lapse into the Absolute where there is neither subject nor object, neither world nor God. But so long as some souls are unredeemed, even the liberated are in the world which is governed by Isvara, though filled by the spirit of Oneness of all and fulfil their redemptive functions.

That the individual does not become identical with Brahman but only with Isvara comes out from what is called the theory of reflection or the bimbapratibimbavada. When a face is reflected in a number of mirrors, the destruction of a particular mirror means only its lapse into the reflecting face and not the face in itself. It is only when all reflection ceases, ie. when all mirrors are destroyed that the reflecting face disappears and the face in itself appears. The full release or the attainment of Brahman is possible only when all avidyas are destroyed. Until then, release means only identity with Isvara.

If such a view is adopted, two conditions are essential for final salvation (1) inward perfection attained by intuition of self and (2) out perfection possibly only with the liberation of all. The liberated souls which obtain the first condition continue to work for the second and will attain final release when the world as such is redeemed. To be saved in the former sense is to see the self

all in all, to see all things in the self and to live in the self with all things. To be perfect is to be oneself and all else. It is to be the universe. It is to give oneself so that all might be saved. Commenting on the Mundaka Upanishad text Sankara says: "He who has reached the all-penetrating Atman enters into the all." Kumarila in his Tantravarttika quotes Buddha as saying "Let all the sins of the world fall on me and let the world be saved."

Is such a world-redemption possible? Is it necessary? That it is possible is undoubted. If one can be saved, there is no reason why every one cannot be saved. Is it necessary? I believe it is. If Brahman dwells in all and constitutes the reality of the world, if he is revealed in each and all of the infinite number of individuals, if separate existence is really non-existence, an appearance only, our falling short of our eternal stature is due to aviveka or non-discrimination, then the aim of the world process is the sublation of the non-real.

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1. P.P.S. SASTRI: @@ on "GOD IN ADVAITA"

We seem to contradict ourselves. If the real is the undetermined, how can there be a conception thereof? The answer is that the undetermined is conceived of not as a term in a thinking relation, but as the non-relational ground of all thinking and other relations. Conception does not grasp it, but indicates it as its own fulfilment, wherein it, as conception, ceases to be. This we claim, is not intellectually unintelligible, though it cannot be fully comprehended by the intellect because of the very nature of the Absolute as transcending thought.

2. The advaitin finds himself forced to admit a final cognition which is non-relational and

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@@ 10th Indian Philos.Congress Proceedings.'34.

is of the impartite (akhanda). This cognition is not itself the undermined; it thus falls short of the real, and in so far forth may be called false; but none the less it has the capacity to remove all lower grades of false-hood; that the false can destroy the false is not a meaningless paradox, as the water of the dream can quench the thirst of the dream. True, the sublater is also sublated in turn; but this is not unintelligible or in conflict with even ordinary experience. The fire that con-sumes the faggot finally consumes itself.

3. The world, however, cannot be wholly unreal, like the horns of a hare, as then it would not be presented at all. Hence the postulation of its difference from the real as well as the unreal, of its essential indeterminability. Nor may it be urged that to accept the indetermi-nable is to violate a fundamental law of thought. What happens here is not the acceptance of two opposites (which is absolutely unwarranted), but the rejection of two opposites; the latter is not unjustified unless it is shown that the opposites are also contradictories; and despite the apparent contradiction in verbal form bet-ween "sat" and "asat", they should be admitted in the light of experience to be but contraries; for there is a whole world of appearances, which are neither real like Brahman, nor unreal like a barren woman's son.

4. In this scheme, where Brahman is the uncon-ditioned and the Jiva is the avidya-conditioned, where is the room for a God? He cannot be the unconditioned, for that is Brahman. He cannot be conditioned, for that would reduce him to the status of a jiva. He is not the cause of the conditioning, since this is beginningless. This criticism does not affect the advaitin, for, in no case does he seek to identify Isvara with the ultimate. That conception is real in

so far as it works; but in the last resort that too is fictitious. But there are relatively intelligible ways of viewing this. On the principle that the offering is proportionate to the demon, a fictitious Isvara may well fulfil all the demands of a jiva that is itself fictitious.

5. A.C. MUKERJI.* A mass of conflicting opinions defying all attempts at a successful synthesis, a series of ineffectual hair-splittings leading to no definite results, mutual fault-finding, attacks and counter-attacks--these are generally supposed to sum up the nature of philosophy and indicate the function of a philosopher. However unpalatable and provocative such a characterisation may be, there is no denying the fact that the history of philosophy, either in the west or in the east, bears ample testimony to this deplorable state of philosophical thought; and, I believe, even the conception of the history of philosophy as the progressive realisation of the Absolute Truth through the relative truths of the divergent systems of thought or as the passage of the world-spirit through the different spirits of the ages, cannot wholly disarm the critics. What is this apparent fruitlessness due to? I believe there is but one answer to is. A system of philosophy, though professing to give a deeper insight into the nature of the universe by a rational sifting of existing knowledge, is frequently influenced by alogical considerations. And when extra-logical forces are allowed, either consciously or unconsciousnly, to guide and incite a construction, the results are bound to be as various and conflicting as are the human prejudices and predilections. We have in that case travelled beyond the limits of philosophy into the region of the 'Idola.' And as the

*on "THE PLACE OF GOD IN ADVAITA"

voice of the universal, is thus smothered under the weight of the 'idola,' all prospects for the successful termination of an issue through mutual cooperation and understanding are bound to disappear, because the irrational 'idola' are proverbially personal and individual.

The long-drawn-out dispute between the monist and the pluralist is one of the clear cases in which the controversy has been perpetuated by the disputants stepping into the region of the "Idola"; and the inevitable consequence is that Reason degenerated into a handmaid of the irrational, and in place of a dispassionate quest of truth, we get the sophistical pleading for a foregone conclusion. A certain amount of self created delusion is inseparable from such a procedure.

6. If it is assumed for the time being that the function of philosophy is to know the universe as a systematic unity, then, the aim of the advaita speculations may be said to consist essentially in bringing about a spiritual conversion of the finite into the infinite by means of knowledge or jnanam. The finite is here called upon to shake off its limitations and thus realise its own nature through systematic knowledge. But as finite knowledge has its own presuppositions, the method prescribed is that of training the finite faculties of knowledge gradually through a number of definite stages, so that they may be stimulated towards what yet falls outside their scope. The advaita literature, as is well known, abounds in such expressions as the mounting of a staircase, the standpoint of ordinary experience, the viewpoint of ultimate realisation etc. Here lies the source of the difficulties in understanding rightly the advaita position. As the reasoning has necessarily to pass through a series of tentative conclusions, each of which is valid only for a particular stage, they are

sure to come into conflict with each other when the conditions under which alone they are valid are ignored or mis-stated. This I have always taken to be the right explanation of the apparent contradictions that have proved to be a stumbling block to the exponents of the advaita position. They are all due to the omission of the particular standpoints from which alone the statements are meant to be true.

The result that emerges from these considerations is that the terms truth, reality, etc. as used in the advaita philosophy, have always a reference to particular contexts, and consequently are likely to lead to confusion when they are used indiscriminately. Hence, I am inclined to believe, the key to a right estimate of the place of God in the advaita philosophy, as also a number of fundamental problems, lies in its classification of experience into different levels of perfection, the most important of these being the vyavaharika and the paramarthika levels of experience. In view of the importance of this distinction, it will be useful to add here a few words of comments on their difference as well as relation.

The most fundamental characteristic of the paramarthika level of experience is its transcendence of duality in all its forms. It is an experience which is so subversive of all the recognised canons of human knowledge that it has no place for even such a generic relation as that of the experiencing subject to the experienced object. It is, therefore, aptly called an absolutely non-dual and ultra-relational experience. Here alone Reality is supposed to stand self-revealed. As thus stated, its contrast with finite experience is obvious. Finite knowledge is necessarily relational or discursive. It not only involves the subject-

object relation, but also those inter-objective relations that are generally called the basic conceptions of thought or categories. Thus, duality being implicit in the very structure of finite experience and finite faculties of knowledge, that which is ex hypothesi non-dual must be indistinguishable from a pure nothing, a mere naught that cannot stand as the subject of a significant proposition. Thus the non-dual Reality, though it is nothing less than the ens realissimum, is, for us, the ens absolute indeterminatum. How then is it possible to bridge over this great chasm between the fine and the infinite, and thus to bring about that special conversion which, as we have said above, is the final aim of the advaita speculations? The answer is given in the advaita method of gradually training the finite faculties through successive stages of approximation to what is yet beyond their scope. Thus our discursive or vrttyatmaka knowledge suffers a gradual transmutation leading ultimately to the Absolute Experience. Here, the advaita method offers a strong contrast to the mystical method as represented, for instance, by the Yoga philosophy. As we have put the whole position elsewhere, the advaita method is not that of removing the defects of discursive knowledge by a stright leap to the mystic platform; on the contrary, a rigorous intellectual scrutiny is regarded here as an indispensable generative condition of the Absolute Experience where alone Reality stands self-revealed. Like the temporary scaffolding which has an indispensable function while the construction is not completed the discursive knowledge prepares the path to Intuition, and is, therefore, an important propaedeutics to Absolute Experience.

The peculiarity of the advaita method, as explained here, ought to awaken us to the difficulty of a right interpretation of the fundamental

Vedanta tenets. The terms asat, mithya, etc. which are the current coins of the advaita speculations, are sure to propagate confusion when they are simply translated as non-existent or unreal. Even the usual term "phenomenal reality" though used extensively for the vyavaharika satta has always appeared to me to be responsible for not an inconsiderable amount of mischief and misunderstanding. And the reason lies in the fact that the vedanta categories are always relative to definite stages or levels of experience, the most important of which, as suggested above, are the levels of discursive and non-discursive experience. The great chasm existing between these two types of experience ought to indicate clearly the danger of applying to the same sense the categories of reality and unreality, or of existence and non-existence, to the facts of different levels; this would be a serious misapplication of the categories beyond their legitimate sphere. If, for example, the world, in the advaita system, is condemned as mithya or non-existent, this is not equivalent to saying that the world does not exist <u>for us</u>, or that our world is a mere dream or an ordinary illusion. Such an evidently absurd position can have no place in any serious philosophy; and while this misrepresentation of the advaita system persists none can claim to have gone through even the initial baptism for understanding the profound implications of the theory of Maya. The distinctions that we ordinarily make between a real thing and an illusion, or between the world of waking consciousness and that of dream, it is very important to note in this connection, are distinctions <u>within</u> finite experience; and, consequently, when an appearance is condemned as a mere illusion, it is presupposed that we are also aware of real appear-

ances. That is, to put it from the other side, it is only in so far as we know the nature of the real rope, that we can condemn the snake-appearance as an illusion. No philosophical thought can seriously ignore this essential correlativity of the finite categories.

7. God is as real as the individual centres of experience, or, as the world of our common experience, our moral strivings and aspirations, our happiness and misery. Neither He nor these minds and material things are mere illusions. The fact that they are absolutely non-existent from the stand-point of a higher experience does not militate against their genuine reality for our experience as it is now. A fictitious God can as little satisfy a factual religious sentiment as the unreal mirage can quench a real organic want for water. Not only this, but the Vedanta method as a method of spiritual discipline would reduce itself to a sham mockery, not a serious pilgrimage, if reality were denied to those very things which form the background of the successive stages of the process. That is, if the Real is self-revealed at the final stage of Absolute Experience, such a stage cannot by any means be reached through a mere imaginary discipline; hence the reality of the higher experience implies the reality of the lower stages, quite as much as the real completed structure implies the reality of the scaffolding.

8. While the finite remains as finite, knowledge is necessarily discursive; but the fact that there is another type of experience which is not discursive does not prove that the objects of discursive knowledge are non-existent or unreal for the finite intelligence. Similarly, though God and the entire rubric of individual souls and material things, reduce themselves to absolute non-entities which could not exist either in the past or in the present or, again,

in the future, yet, this is not incompatible with their fullest reality at the pre-intuitional stage of existence. It is this which the advaita system seeks to convey by its comparison of the world to a sort of cosmic illusion. The ordinary illusions show clearly how an absolutely non-existent entity can be as clearly perceived as any real thing, and how the non existence of the illusory entity can be realised only when the illusion has disappeared, but not before it. But this analogy is never meant to condemn the world as illusory <u>for us</u>.

I must now turn to what I have called above the self-created delusion born of an initial prejudice which prevents unanimity in philosophical conclusions. It is difficult to imagine from the general trend of Mr. Raghavendrachar's analysis of the advaita position that he might be entirely ignorant of such a fundamental distinction of standpoints from which, as has been emphasised above, the Vedanta thought must be interpreted. When, for instance, it is remarked that the real is necessarily relative, or that the whole universe is real, or, again, that difference is an essential aspect of everything, none but the ill-informed will take these observations to be anti-vedantic. In fact, each of these so-called criticisms, far from exposing the defect of the advaita position, is explanatory of the well-known vedanta contention that finite knowledge is necessarily discursive. So far as the reality of the universe is concerned, this, as I have contended above, is never denied by it. The really important question is, not whether the universe is real, but whether the category of reality can be relative to a particular level of experience.

9. The very fact that such a huge list of controversial topics is lightly dismissed with

a cynical indifference to the arguments on the other side is strongly suggestive of the spirit of the advocate pleading before a court of justice rather than that of a philosopher before the tribunal of reason. While justly complaining that the Absolute should ever have been identified with God, he seems to reduce the advaita conception of God to a mere pragmatic necessity, a mere fiction which may well fulfil all the demands of a fictitious 'Jiva.' Here, again, I am inclined to believe, Mr. Sastri fails like Mr. Raghavendrachar, to see the importance of the theory of different levels of experience which holds the key to the advaita position. A determinate God, as I have tried to emphasise above, is not a mere fiction, much less can the individual centre of experience which is the logical presupposition of every fact and fiction can be itself reduced to a fiction. If it is admitted that "God is an indispensable postulate of the thinking man," and that God and man are "like the prototype and the reflection," what follows from this admission is, not only that both the prototype and the reflection disappear with the disappearance of the reflecting medium, but also that God is real while the medium is there.

10. God, I must say at the risk of repetition, is not a fiction simply because the stage of God-realisation is transcended; it is, on the contrary, an undeniable reality, representing a real stage in the entire process of realising the Absolute. It is true that with the realisation of the last stage of the discipline, there supervenes a radical change of attitude, and the entire universe of plurality reduces itself to a fiction, but this fact does not support the unreality or illusoriness of the universe at the pre-intuitional stage.

11. The advaita definition of the real as that

which is never sublated, or as that which is neither originated nor destroyed, the description of the unreal as that which is perceived to perish in the very same locus where it was perceived, the possibility of a reality above all determinations, the question of the location of maya--these are some of the points which, again, are not less controversial.

12. In view of the controversy on this head, any dogmatic assertions cannot be expected to throw much light on the advaita theory of God.

13. The history of the battle between Advaita and its critics has appeared to me to be mostly a history of what I have called the self-created delusion of philosophers; for, the encounter is not in reality so fierce as the battle cries would lead one to imagine. That relation and difference are inseparable from our knowledge, and consequently even the highest conceivable reality must be relational,--this has never been denied by any type of absolutism. Such a reality, as rightly contended by the critics of absolutism, must be determinate, and the relation between it and the world of multiplicity may be one of dependence. And, then, it may be urged that God being the unconditioned ground of the world, the latter has no independent existence of its own. This, I repeat, has not been totally rejected by absolutism, though the supposition that it is an entirely anti-advaita conception is mostly responsible for the protracted controversy. The really puzzling question is whether the highest reality of relational thought is in reality the highest. The puzzle has survived all attempts made, in Indian as well as Western thought, for a successful solution. It is well known how Plotinus, Spinoza, Schelling and a number of British absolutists have contested the pretensions

of discursive thought to reveal the highest reality, in a spirit which cannot fail to remind us of the general attitude of the advaita thinkers of India. Now, the really vital question, as repeatedly urged by the critics of the theory of ultra-relational reality, is: how can thought criticise itself? If thought is necessarily relational, the so called ultra-relational reality must fall beyond the scope of thought, and all discussions about it must be abandoned once for all. Even to remark that it is the non-relational ground of all thinking and other relations does not remove the difficulty, because the conception of ground is itself a relational category.

Anything like a detailed consideration of this puzzle cannot be undertaken at this place. I must, therefore, content myself with a brief analysis of the position of advaita, as a mere suggestion, in relation to this ultimate problem. That Reality is ultimately ultra-relational, and consequently above all determinations, is the central thought of the advaita philosophy. At the same time, it is clearly conscious of the relational character of all thinking and of all reasoning. It follows from these two positions that the ultra-relational is inconceivable for us. Yet, logical thought, according to it, being an indispensable stage in the entire process of realising the ultra-relational Absolute, the unthinkable has to be brought under the conditions of thought by means of attributing to it what really cannot belong to it; this, as is well known, is the necessity of superimposition. The Brahman, though absolutely distinction-less, is to be conceived as that to which belongs, as it were, the germ of all distinctions; and this may then be conceived as maya, sakti or prakriti of the omniscient Lord.

Thus, superimposition, which is but another name for accommodation to the conditions of discursive thought, occupies a prominent place in the advaita method of stimulating thought to go beyond itself.

14. KALI PRASAD. New realism in its attempt to maintain on the one hand the reality that is the independence of consciousness or the mental subsistent and on the other to deny any efficacy or substantiality or even activity to it has resulted in a very puzzling situation. If it has maintained the reality of all sensa or objects it has sacrificed the reality of the mental, and the problem of illusion and error has been impossible to solve. If it has maintained the reality of both the mental and the physical it has had to invent an intermediary (an idea, e.g.) to bring them together, and has resulted in representationism and scepticism. This is no less true of the old and naive realism than of the new and critical realism.

15. B.N. ROY.* The modern physicist's investigation into the constitution of matter has revealed that its constituents are not to be conceived of in the analogy of microscopic tennis balls as inert static entities; rather they are to be regarded as units of electrical energy and as such essentially dynamical. Thus the character of matter has been rendered less material. In the realm of psychology, again, there has been an attempt to understand consciousness without assuming anything which is not open to external observation. This method has been applied by a certain school of psychologists to the study of human behaviour, in view of its success in the field of animal psychology. Careful observers of animals have gradually discovered that they can give a more reliable account of the actions of animals without assuming anything like what we call cons-

*on "THE STATUS OF CONSCIOUSNESS"

ciousness. The objective method has been mainly instrumental in placing animal psychology on a truly scientific basis. The success of the animal psychologist has led the behaviourists to introduce objective method in the sphere of human psychology, and as a result of this we find them discarding the notion of consciousness altogether and resorting to behaviour as the proper object of psychological study.

The realist found himself in the midst of a situation which was perplexing to a degree. He could not ignore the new developments which were taking place in the domains of physics and psychology, resulting in the breakdown of the traditional dualism and in the removal of the barrier which had hitherto kept the two sciences apart. In view of these new developments he felt the necessity for reorientation of the whole field of philosophy. The idealist sought to build the conception of reality on apriori logic. Following the demands of such logic, he conceived reality as a coherent whole. The conception is indeed satisfying to thought, but if it fails to explain certain features of reality, such as, time, change, plurality, etc., which exist as facts for our experience. These features could not be put into the crucible of logic without doing violence to their nature. These considerations have led to the abandonment of the apriori method.

16. The traditional conception of consciousness as a spiritual entity was vigorously challenged by W. James. In denying however, the spiritual and entitative character of conciousness, he did not intend to deny its existence. What he really wanted to deny was the conception of consciousness as being endowed with some peculiar stuff or quality of being. He does not find any evidence either theoretical or empirical for

believing in the existence of an entity such as the self-conscious spiritual subject or the "I think." The only activity that one is capable of discovering is composed of sensations of bodily exertion and strain, or of feelings of the "tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph or the passive giving up." From these James concludes "that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked."

17. The extreme objectivism of Holt has broken down in the face of the problem of illusion and error. The recognition of the vital distinction between the subjective and the objective, the distinction between the mental act and the real object, is essential for a satisfactory explanation not only of the problem of knowledge, but also of the problem of illusion and error.

18. The recognition of the subjective character of conscious acts enables him to cope with the problem of illusion and error more successfully than it is possible in the objectivistic theories of the American realists. We are not led to hold, by the denial of the subjective, that every content of cognition is equally objective, error as much as truth, the real as much as the unreal.

19. NIKUNJA VIHARI BANERJEE: *"On Moore's Refutation of Idealism." These criticisms really miss their mark and fail to disprove the doctrine that sensa-data are mental. Let us first take into account Moore's objections against this doctrine. The main point of his anti-subjectivist criticism in his Refutation of Idealism is that the Idealist has been led into this doctrine in virtue of his erroneous view that consciousness and sense-data are analyti-

*on "MOORES REFUTATION OF IDEALISM"

cally related and that this doctrine would vanish as soon as it is realised that their relation is really synthetical, that sense-data no more depend on consciousness for their existence than the latter depends on their existence. Now, apart from the question whether it is a fact that Idealism really treats consciousness and sense-data as analytically related, Moore's conclusion that sense-data are proved to be physical or, let us say, at least non-mental by the view of the relation between consciousness and sense-data as synthetical,--does not follow in as much as sense-data, even if they are separate from, or are synthetically related to consciousness, may like consciousness, be mental just as two physical things synthetically related to one another may be equally physical, or two minds related to one another in the same manner may be equally spiritual. The position of certain modern Realists e.g. Stout, etc., who are no less insistent on the separation of the act of awareness from sense-data than Moore and his followers and yet regard sense-data as mental, may here be cited as contradictory to Moore's expectation. It must be particularly noticed here that subjectivism is the epistemological counterpart of, and is really deduced from the metaphysical doctrine called Spiritualism, according to which the whole universe including physical things is ultimately spiritual or mental. That being so, the refutation of the subjectivist position that sense-data are mental is not possible in the manner in which Moore and his followers attempt it, but must depend upon a deeper enquiry viz. the enquiry into the metaphysical foundation of that position which they have not undertaken.

Moore found later that although the failure to separate the act of awareness from its

object is the foundation of Idealism, the special argument of this doctrine proceeds from the relativity of sense data. This argument may be expressed as follows: Since it is a fact that one and the same object may, for instance, be apprehended as red under certain circumstances and as grey under certain others and since we can not treat any one of these sense-data as unreal but should rather regard both as real, in as much as both appear to be equally due to some real cause, and yet cannot hold that one and the same independently existing object is both red and green, the conclusion is that these sense-data are real as mental and not as non-mental or independent. This argument has been very seriously considered by most modern Realists. It is in fact the centre towards which the bulk of new realistic polemic gravitates. Before we proceed to assess the value of the Realist's criticism of this argument it is, however, necessary to analyse it carefully. This argument has two parts. One of these consists in the Idealist's assertion of the reality of conflicting sense-data, both red and green in the above instance being on his view, real. The other consists in his denial of 'independence' and ascription of 'mentality' to them. Now, although the second element in the second part of the argument viz.the ascrption of the mental status to sense-data presupposes the first part in as much as mentality which is an existential status, could not have been ascribed to sense-data except on the view of them as real, yet the former does not follow from the latter alone but must also presuppose the first element viz. the denial of independence to sense-data. Granted that conflicting sense-data

are equally real, as they are on the Idealist's view, there is nothing to prevent their being non-mental i.e. independently real except the denial of their independent reality. This denial on the part of the Idealist, however, follows from the fundamental logical principle of non-contradiction, according to which a thing which is, for instance, red cannot be not red, i.e. green etc.

20. Although, as pointed out above, the Idealists' denial of independence to sense-data in accordance with the above-mentioned logical principle is a presupposition of his view that all sense-data initially accepted by him as real or existent are mental, its real value consist merely in demonstrating that sense-data, initially accepted as mental in virtue of the metaphysical doctrine viz., spiritual, cannot be mental in view of the logical contradiction that would follow upon the conception of them as independent or non-mental but not in proving the proposition that sense-data are mental. That being so, the Realist, even if it be conceded to him that he has succeeeded in showing that the ascription of independence to all sense-data involves no logical contradiction, may at best take away the demonstrative certainty of the Idealistic proposition that all sense-data are mental, while the proposition itself stands unaffected, being ultimately dogmatic. This lends additional support to my earlier statement that in order to refute Idealism the realist must dive much deeper than he has done, i.e. must undertake an enquiry into the validity of Spiritualism, the metaphysical aspect of idealism.

I must now mention that from the point of strict realism the most objectionable part of the subjectivist argument is the assertion of the reality of all sense-data, which has been quite curiously admitted by most modern realists.

Although it is a fact that one and the same object may, for instance, be apprehended as red under certain circumstances and as gray under certain others, it is equally a fact that object must be either red or gray and not both red and gray; and consequently either red or gray must be unreal. The question how we are to determine which of the two conflicting sense-data is real and which is not, is indeed difficult but may not be impossible to answer. Even granted that the answer. Even granted that the answer is impossible, that does not seem to warrant the ascription of reality to conflicting sense-data. What seems to weigh most with philosophers in this ascription is not so much the fact of relativity as the consideration that the conflicting sense-data are all due to real causes. If that be so, illusory and hallucinatory images, which, as physiologists and psychologists would tell us, are also due to certain real causes, are also real. This is a position which must be admitted by those who advocate the reality of all sense-data. But Berkeley, although he is logically committed to it, avoided a scandal by refraining from talking about it, whereas many modern Realists have gone to the extent of openly declaring the reality of illusory and hallucinatory images.

21. The fact of the givenness of sense-data may be regarded as the sole ground for the strict realistic view that sense-data are non-mental or independent and that they are identically the same as physical things which we are said to know by means of perception, so that we cannot have any reason for drawing a distinction between sense-data and physical things.

22. Naive Realism is utterly unconscious of certain phenomena having a bearing upon the

of perception. The phenomena in question are relativity of sense-data, error, illusion and hallucination. Now it has been pertinently observed that "in a world in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowledge-relation (i.e. The naive realistic theory) would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity." Here I must add that this perplexity equally follows from the facts of the relativity of sensa-data, in as much as it is no less difficult to hold in the Naive realistic manner that sense-data which conflict with one another, are alike identical with physical things than hold in the same manner that the sense-data of our erroneous experiences are such.

23. Modern Realists have done a signal service to Epistemology by emphasising the importance of the phenomena of relativity, etc. in that science.

24. Idealism lies not so much in the doctrine that sense-data are mental as in its consequence viz. that the object of our perceptual knowledge, according to it, cannot be the independently existing physical thing--a consequence from which the modern realistic doctrines have not been able to extricate themselves. The critical realist who substituted subsistents or logical entities for ideas can no more deduce physical existence from subsistence than idealism can from ideas or mental existents. American New realism according to which sense-data are pure beings i.e. are neutral--neither physical nor mental, is open to the following difficulty. Supposing we agree with it in holding that the distinction between the mental and the physical is functional and not substantival, it seems that it has no reason for explaining how one functional collocation of neutral en-

tities is mental and not physical and another physical and not mental.
25. They hold that this can be done in the first instance by keeping clear of the idealistic view of sense-data as conditioned by perceiving, i.e. by the mental existence called consciousness which necessarily results in the main idealistic proposition that sense-data are mental, and secondly by positively delcaring that sense-data are conditioned merely physically i.e. are conditioned only by external objects, sense organs etc. In this they easily ignore the truth that the true interest of Realism cannot be furthered and the real consequence of idealism cannot be averted except on the realisation of the unconditioned aspect of the data given to the percipient.

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1. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA.* To such an unthinking substance occupying space is opposed, in popular thought, Mind with its quality of thinking, feeling and willing and its peculiar property of knowing itself alone by introspection. Mind is private while Matter is public; and even when the existence of the former in other beings can be indirectly known its character cannot be fixed with precision, with the effect that its conduct remains unpredictable at all times. Mind occupies no space although it is intimately associated with a body so far as our experience goes; even if external perceptions which seem to have extension and magnitude be omitted, there still remains the world of feelings in which extension seems to have no place. Common sense is not much worried over the problem of knowledge,--as to how an extended unconscious world gets known by an unextended conscious mind.
2. To crown all, came the isotopes of Aston, the relativity of Einstein and the indetermi-

*on "IDEALISM AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD"

nacy of Heisenberg to demolish that element of constancy in nature on which common sense had reared its faith. In fact, the recoil from rigidity began at all points simultaneously. 3. Common sense began to despair and philosophers began to think that in such a realm of inconstancy truth was unattainable--Vaihinger supposed atoms to be metaphysical fictions and Poincare regarded them as hypothetical in character. Thus even the imaginative faculty had to cry halt and the physical world came to be regarded more as an object of intelligence than that of sensation or imagination. In the meantime Time had ceased to be considered as independent of Space just as motion had ceased to be independent of matter. The combined result of all these currents of thought was to make common sense ashamed of itself and to depend upon mathematics and physics for an exact formulation of the nature of the physical world which seemed so simple to sensation and was so complicated to understanding.

The other attack against common sense came from the side of the philosophers. The Greek sceptics led the assault with the theory that it is not possible to formulate exactly the nature of the physical world as knowledge is subject to ten tropes or conditions and that therefore, it is relative if not subjective in character. In close alliance with them came the empiricists who taught that our knowledge is limited to the surface of things, that is, to the phenomenal aspects of reality and that our generalisations about physical events have only the value of probability and not that of certainty. The secondary qualities were the first to go under, as in their case relativity was greater than in that of the primary qualities. 4. The physical world is a matter of inference

from the data of sensory knowledge and is therefore liable to all the disabilities to which indirect knowledge is subject.
5. It is not his conclusion but his method that posterity chose to follow. In the hands of Berkeley and Hume, Matter was eviscerated of all reality and reduced to a system of ideas in mind. Kant's half-hearted attempts to rehabilitate the physical world proved a failure because he was more eager to show the contributions of mind to the constitution of the world than to establish the real ity of the world itself, with the effect that although, as in Locke, a shadowy thing-in-itself was allowed to remain, it was difficult to say what exactly it was. The very fact that subsequent idealism had no scruple in claiming this thing-in-itself to be spiritual shows that Kant's achievement was indecisive.
6. It is the Evolution theory that for the first time made a concerted attack on all fronts upon idealism in the interests of a material world. By tracing back things to a time when the mental had not yet evolved the doctrine of Evolution tried to establish the priority and independence of Matter.
7. It seems to me that the term Idealism can be used in three entirely different senses. According to the first usage the external world is in reality a system of ideas in the mind of a spirit or spirits. Berkeley is the great exponent of this type of Idealism in the West and the Yogacara school in the East. It is best to call this type of Idealism by the name of Mentalism, as suggested by Sidgwick, or that of Subjectivism or Subjective Idealism. In its extreme individualistic form it leads to the fantastic conclusion that each spirit is shut up within its own world of thoughts, some of which it regards as external to itself

--there is a projection of subjective fancies outside as in illusion of hallucination or dream and the thinking mind wrongly regards such subjective fancies as revelations of an independently existing external world. Students of the Vedanta philosophy are familiar with the stock illustration of a mother of pearl being mistaken for silver or of a rope being taken for a serpent. The analogy is not perfect, for the presentational element is not altogether eliminated in either case; even the comparison with a magician's art has some defect, for the hallucination there is not self-caused. There must be something within the subject himself to project an outside world to satisfy the strict conditions of a world of fancy taking the shape of an outside world, and the Yogacara school comes nearest to this position with its doctrine that within the stream of consciousness there arise conditions, prompted by latent desire (vasana) to produce the illusion of an external world just as a single mean looks double on a rippling surface of water. The rise of representations prompted by desire resembles very closely Leibniz's doctrine of each monad being endowed with a cognitive and an appetitive aspect; besides, according to both Yogacara and Leibniz, each spirit is windowless and its world of representation is due purely to psychic causation. In one sense the Buddhistic school is a purer type, for, being untrammelled by theistic traditions, it did not drag in a Monad of monads to complicate its solipsistic philosophy.

8. If the esse of things is their percipi, it would be necessary to explain the following features of the external world: (1) Externality and Extension: These two features are not the same and have to be separately derived out of mental states. Mental states have multiplicity

and simultaneity; but these two do not necessarily constitute extension. The only way in which extension could be derived out of mental states was adopted by Ward, and more particularly by James, who invested sensations with the quality of extensity; but neither of them thereby intended to imply that the physical world was a precipitate of thought nor did they think that mental extension could be manipulated in the same fashion as material extension was--the running-togetherness of mental states in which both expressed their belief by their respective doctrines of presentation-continuum and stream of consciousness cannot be equated with the divisibility and distinctness of material objects.

9. Matter is characterised by magnitude and measurability in a sense different from the magnitude and measurability of mind, if in fact the latter possesses those two characters at all.

10. As Ward points out, externality and internality primarily refer to the body and not to the mind, as everything that the mind knows is in a sense inside the mind. Idealism has proposed to use an ambiguous word, "object," to cover all contents of thought, and the relation between mind and matter has accordingly been regarded as a relation between mind and one order of thoughts. In this respect there is not much difference between Locke and Hegel, for both reduced the immediate object of cognition to an idea or a mental phenomenon although both agreed that thereby the possibility of positing an external world was not ruled out. Now, it is extremely difficult to make out in what exactly the transcendental reference lies. Why should the mind look upon some of its thoughts as instances of extreme otherness, as Hegel calls them, or as implying

the existence of an object other than itself, as Locke supposes? To say that in some of the ideas there is a sense of opposition involved is practically to assume that the mind has a sense of constraint in the matter of positing an external world and on purely idealistic hypothesis it is impossible to accept this distinction.

11. Much has been made of the fact that in dreams and hallucinations we have a sense of externality although the whole process is mental. The analogy breaks down at two points. The dream and hallucinatory images contain no qualities which have not been originally derived from sense-perception--a congenitally blind person can never perceive colour in dreams and hallucinations; and the same is true of externality.

12. Do ideas veil or reveal other realities? The fallacy of ego-centric predicament is at the root of the belief that ideas are not continued into another order of reality and it itself arises from the fact that ideas are taken without their implications and simply regarded as mental.

13. That the sense of externality requires something really external to explain it has been tacitly recognised by the idealists themselves, the great Berkeley not expecting. Failing to find a reason for exteriorising experiences, idealists have invoked a divine agency to create ideas in finite minds who, therefore, owe their ideas to something really external. Berkeley and Green were both guilty of this device.

14. While Berkeley and Green would probably hold that the world is consciously possessed by the Divine Mind at all times, Fichte would tell us that it is unconsciously projected out of the Absolute Ego, Sankara would explain

it as an illusory projection of the Absolute Consciousness. The fact is that according to every type of idealism seeking to evolve the physical world out of an absolute the process is shrouded in mysticism and obscurity--far more mysteri ous than the Genesis account that God created the world by His mere fiat. On none of the hypotheses shall we ever come nearer to an understanding of the mystery of the frozen thought or the petrified will.

15. Percepts have an aggressiveness which does not belong to images or ideas and we have to adjust ourselves more actively to the former than to the latter as those cannot be altered by our thought or made to vanish by changing the direction of our attention. A sense of compulsive thinking accompanies all cognitions of the external world. How pleasant would the world have been, had we the power to replace a headache by a sense of exhilaration, a revolting smell by sweet fragrance, or an excruciating sight by a lovely vision! If the world is a system of thoughts (even the idea of a system is an assumption in subjective idealism), how does it come to possess the element of objectivity? Why do we feel coerced by it?

The two answers that Idealism has thus far given are that (1) that even ideas produced by the self may have a compulsive force, and (2) that ideas in the finite minds are produced from the outside by the infinite mind and are accordingly coercive in character. We shall limit our discussion to the sense of compulsion in man without wasting our time over the attempts of Fichte and Sankara to explain the sense of coercion or illusion in the Absolute. Thus it has been suggested that just as a delusion or an obsession may have all the characteristics of an objective happening, although neither is anything but mental, and we have to

adjust ourselves to the creations of our own fancy, so it may be supposed also that the world is not anything other than our ideas in spite of the fact that we feel helpless before its activity. As contrasted with dreams and hallucinations which are sporadic in character, delusions and obsessions are more systematic. They also take place in conscious waking life like hallucinations but unlike dreams. But against them the same objection may be urged, namely, that none who has not otherwise known externality would have the least means of having a sense of compulsion from his own fancies. Again, we can be cured of abnormal mental states but not of the sense of the physical world. The Vedanta could see that the world of practicalities was not the same thing as the world of illusions and abnormalities.

If then we are not starting at the shadows of our own mind when we feel the impact of an external world, do matters improve much if we assume that we are passive recipients of Divine thoughts? The idea of God acting from outside is really a survival of that deistic mode of thinking according to which God is transcendent to man and His thoughts can come to man only as an outside force. That God could act within us without making us feel every time that we are being pushed against our will is not possible to accept on this supposition--we are to suppose that the external world is, as it were, the thought of God permanently opposing human thinking and compelling the latter to take cognisance of the former.

16. Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley is still the most cogent, namely, that it is only by kicking against the stone that you know it to be real and that without such active manipulation you are likely to take it as an idea in your mind. No idea, whether of your own mind or

of God, would hit you in the same fashion: the idealist has more in mind visual sensation with its picturing than tactuo-muscular sensation with its sense of resistance when thinking of man's knowledge of the physical world.

17. The physical world is not only external but relatively abiding. It has not that flow and flicker, which characterises all mental states in spite of all our attempts to hold them before the mind's eye for some time. You can leave off your analysis of a physical object and return to it again after some time and get practically the same impression as when you left it. Of course, we are not denying that changes are taking place in things as in thoughts, but they are mostly imperceptible and the serial cognitions that apprehend an abiding object have no suspicion that any change has taken place in the object. Let us attempt a similar serial cognition in the absence of any physical object and we shall soon find out that identity is the last quality that thought possesses as an inherent characteristic. To say that the similarity of successive thoughts is the cause of objective presentation and not the reverse would be a travesty of the facts of actual experience.

18. After the existence of other spirits has been proved or assumed, how are we going to have a world that is not private but public? Our feelings we do not suppose to be shareable by others; but we have no doubt that when we come to the knowledge of the Sun, Reid, who believed that ten men see the same sun, was more right than Hamilton, who believed that each saw a different sun.

19. Idealism has been obliged to adopt desperate devices to explain universality and uniformity. We have been referred to dreams that all dream together--to the Kantian dictum

that objectivity is universal validity, the only small difficulty being that such universal dreams are not vouched for by experience and that when one subject manipulates that dream actively there is no reason why the rest of the world should begin to change their dreams. When a carpenter is sawing wood he is doing something more than merely dreaming and yet the rest of the world beings to have an idea of the sawn wood, without having the other sense of muscular activity, as soon as the carpenter himself has it. So, unless we say that the process of sawing was not necessary on the part of the carpenter and that he would have got the idea of the sawn wood like other spirits without taking the trouble of sawing, we must be prepared to admit that the same dream-effect is being produced by different psychic causation.

20. Reality is a construct of mind and not merely subject to the limitations of finite apprehensions--in fact, we shall have to assume that where the same thing is being differently apprehended there is not one thing but many things, each corresponding to its own type of apprehension. Failing to get satisfactory answer to the problem of uniformity, Idealism has been obliged to drag in the operation of an Infinite and Omnipotent Intelligence to explain the similarity of experiences in different individuals.

21. Hume had said that something akin to the law of gravitation holds sway over the ideas so that they remain associated together without any soul, just as the planetary bodies keep one another in position without any connecting cord. We have not to reverse that kind of thinking and to suppose that just as ideas are held together by association so also the things of nature are associated by laws. But are laws of Nature thus derivable out of the laws of thinking? For one thing, men have ever been regarded

as exceptions to mechanical laws inasmuch as they are free agents. Then again mental associations are often multiple and variable; and it is this that led Hume to say that on the basis of experience alone we can only say that things are conjoined but never connected with the effect that regarding Nature's future events we can only say that they are probable but not necessary.

22. Berkeley's theory of Divine signs is not less unsatisfactory than Hume's theory of probabilism. To suppose that there are no necessary connections of things because all are ideas and one idea is not caused by another and that therefore we are only to suppose that when we possess one idea it is a divine sign that another idea is following immediately afterwards, places objectivity of laws on a divine basis and secures at the same time, through the same impartiality of God as establishes the uniformity of presentations in his system, their universality and uniformity.

23. According to Sankara whose philosophy is typical of absolutism the physical world has no reality as a system of ideas in the mind of God as conceived by Berkeley or Green or Hegel, as from the standpoint of ultimate truth there is no personal God who possesses the quality of thinking but only the impersonal Brahman whose essence is consciousness, wherein therefore it is distinguishable from the impersonal Absolute of Bradley in which finite thoughts are somehow conserved and rearranged. What then is the physical world? It is only a system of illusory ideas projected by Brahman under the influence of Maya --a principle which is neither real nor unreal but simply indeterminable (anirvacaniya).

24. It does not follow that because the world exists as a system of thoughts, therefore it

must consist of thinking behind each object of thought, or, in other words, that the thoughts belong to independent thinkers. From the idealistic position the existence of these independent thinkers is as difficult to establish as the existence of an independent world.

25. Gentile who saw this weakness in Croce's idealism had no hesitation in rejecting this infra-intuitive passivity and substituting in its place the notion of an earlier actual thought being superseded by a later actual thought and reduced by the latter from an act to a fact, from Spirit, which is activity, to nature, matter which is passivity. "Nature is just only past thought, which living thought beings to consider as other than itself, forgetting in the end that it is its own offspring." It is instructive to note that Stout, who has drawn the same comparison between memory-knowledge and knowledge of physical existence as Gentile.

26. Nature remains the same inscrutable indifferent power that it was in primitive times; and although an increased knowledge of its laws has enabled us to build better, its unforeseen furies have often carried away the noblest achievements of men, and the genius has been or will be no more immune from the ravages of time than the idiot or the imbecile. The microbe gains upon the man in the race for survival and monuments of art crumble into dust in course of time. In the face of these facts it is difficult to retain one's idealism and to believe that spirit is gradually triumphing over matter and using it as a pliant tool of its own greatness.

27. The anxiety of Idealism to bring nature within spirit rests on two grounds. The one is the knowability of the physical world; and regarding this it is held that knowledge is a re-

lation which can hold only between commensurable entities--as assumption for which there is only a doubtful justification. This epistemological ground made familiar to us since the time of Fichte and Schelling, provides a shaky foundation for the spirituality of nature: thoughts provide the medium through which we may reach out to spirits as well as to things. The second ground is the growing rationality of the world and its subservience of spiritual ends.

28. G.R. MALKANI "IDEALISM & THE PHYSICAL WORLD."

By Idealism I understand the view according to which spirit alone is real. Idealism thus defined can still take many forms. But I am not concerned with those forms. By spirit I understand "any intelligent entity that is indeed capable of knowing other entities, if any such exist in fact or otherwise, but is not itself known." We all know this spirit in our own individual selfs. Our self is capable of knowing everything beside itself, but is not properly itself known. Whenever and wherever anything is known, there is an entity that knows, and this entity cannot properly be the object of knowledge of some other entity. If it is known at all, it is in some sense known by itself or self-known. We shall have therefore to deny all knowledge, if we want to deny the reality of spirit.

29. It is absurd to think that what is physical in our sense of the term is something in the mind or that is mental in our sense of that term. But the matter is not so very simple. We have distinguished the mental from the physical. But if our perception of the physical world is mental, can the perception have a different kind of reality altogether? It might be supposed that this is possible. In that case, we shall be led to certain epistemological problems of a difficult nature.

30. I said that we cannot doubt the reality of the spirit unless we doubt all knowledge. But that we cannot possibly do. Also we know the spirit directly in our own self. There is nothing to mediate between it and our intuition of it. In fact it would be wrong to speak of an intuition of the self. The self is this intuition, and not some kind of object on which the intuition can be said to have a resting-place. We therefore properly speak the self, not speak <u>of</u> it. The self is thus absolutely certain. We can make no problem as to its reality. We can make a problem as to the reality of something that is at least a thought-content. The self is no such content. It is beyond thought. The reality of the self is thus not distinct from what may be called its intuition.

Can we now be said to have the same certainty as to the reality of the physical world? Indeed we are said to know this world quite directly and immediately in sense-awareness. But this is not literally true. Our sense-awareness is awareness that is mediated. The senses and other physical conditions play their part. Then there are subjective factors. Altogether we have no direct intuition of any object. If fact, however direct our perception of a thing may be, we cannot really be said to know it as it is. Our senses are not reliable instruments of knowledge. They are often known to err. Consequently doubt and error can never be eliminated from our perception of things. Thus the physical object, unlike the spirit, is certainly suspect. Our knowledge of it is neither immediate nor certain.

This sets a problem. We may indeed, like Kant argue that after all what we know is not the thing-in-itself, but a certain object which is in the main our own construct. The reality as it is in itself is for ever unknowable. We may try to shake ourselves free from this agnosti-

cism in various ways. We may suppose, for example, that nature is the objective counterpart of thought, and that this renders possible the knowledge of things as they are. Or again that nature is a system of signs through which the ideas in the mind of God are communicated by an undeceiving God to the human spirit. Lastly, we may suppose, as most realistic thinkers do, that we have in the system of empirical checks all that is needed to eliminate error in perception and make it true to the thing. But all these explanations seeking to validate our knowledge of things suffer from a common error. They seek to justify our knowledge of physical nature on grounds other than the ground of sense-perception itself. If however our only means of knowing what is physical in this perception, we must enter into a thorough analysis of it as a source of knowledge. This analysis reveals that perception is not a reliable means of knowledge, and that we cannot be said to know through it the thing as it is.

The independent existence of the object cannot be proved on the strength of our perception of it. Is the mental world in a different position? Has it a noumenal as against a phenomenal existence? That too is questionable. We know facts of the mind in introspection. But so far as they are thus known, they have already ceased to be real and become mere recreations of introspective thinking itself. What Kant called the inner sense may not be a real sense comparable to the outer senses. But it is a mode of apprehension which is, like our sensible perception, not at all direct. Mental facts are not present facts or given facts when they are introspectively known. They have thus only a ghostly existence. What is important to note is that both in the case of

physical nature and of mental life, there is no direct intuition of the thing. There is no meeting face to face or seeing pure and simple. Accordingly, the being of the thing falls asunder from the being as known to us. It is only in our self that being completely coincides with the knowledge of being, and there is no room left for error or doubt. We claim that it is the reality of the pure spirit alone that is absolutely certain.

31. Now if this real something or the thing-in-itself is needed to account for the possibility of perception, the assumption is quite gratuitous. We cannot analyse our perception into non-perceived elements, and then suppose that it is produced out of them. As a matter of fact, causality is a postulate of the sciences, and its only legitimate use is to connect one sense-content with another. It cannot account for the production of this content. For after all, what would be the nature of that from which all perceivable characteristics are abstracted? It would have no knowable or thinkable nature. It would be as good as nothing.

32. We cannot well have an idea of any kind of being that is essentially different from our own, or what is not-spirit. The primitive man was by nature anthropomorphic. We have outgrown his anthropomorphism in outer form. But we simply cannot get rid of that secret anthropomorphism according to which we can only conceive of any other kind of being on the analogy of our own. Just only try to think how any kind of being that is different from ours would feel like. I think it would only feel as our own being feels. We have no two intuitions of being, one proper to the spirit and the other proper to the not-spirit. Spirit and not-spirit are only distinguished through certain characteristics. Spirit is characterised, we say, by thinking, feeling, etc.

Not-spirit is characterised by "being thought, known etc." So far as the intuition of being is concerned, it is exhausted by the intuition of being a self. Or what is the same thing, we know only one kind of being.

33. Our conclusion is that the spirit alone is absolutely real. Anything beside it can at best be claimed to have a doubtful existence. But we cannot really stop with the doubt. The evidence for the reality of matter is found on analysis to provide us with just the proof for the non-reality of matter. The physical world with all its order and regularity is from a truly rational point of view an unreal appearance. The only reality is the spirit. Idealism in our sense of the term is the only possible theory that can give a consistent view of the facts of our experience taken as or whole.

34. J.K. CHAKRAVARTY."IDEALISM & THE PHYSICAL WORLD." The wonderful successes of the physical sciences induced men once again to believe in the existence of a world apart from and independent of mind, to the stuff of which is usually given the name of matter. So both by our animal faith as well as by what the sciences tell us we are driven to assume that a physical world exists, and it becomes exceedingly difficult for us, in this frame of mind, to accede to the doctrine of idealism that nothing but 'thinking entities exist.' In fact for the last quarter of a century idealism had been considerably discredited owing to its tone of indifference to external nature.

35. There are difficulties, in the first place, as to the meaning of matter. To this we may add the diffculty that the idealists are not all of one mind. There are included, in the camp of the idealist, the sceptic and the dogmatist, the empiricist and the rationalist, the immanentalist and the transcendentalist. In view

of such conflicting differences it becomes exceedingly hard to summarise their definite attitude towards matter. The central position of idealism is embodied in the proposition that "ultimate realiy is mental in structure and matter is a delusion."

36. In the first place I speak of the Berkeleyan type which is responsible for having enunciated and given currency to the well known doctrine:"Esse is percipi." The implication of the formula is matter of common knowledge. According to it the entire physical world is resolved into ideas or contents of perception of individual minds. Whatever is not perceived by me, i.e. felt as states of my own consciousness has no reality. Felt ideas alone have reality. To this an exception was made in the case of the individual soul and God. Neither the soul nor God is perceived as an idea. They are active spirits and capable of perceiving ideas, but are not themselves perceived. My self is real and along with this I accept as real all that my self perceives. But this position is immediately beset with the difficulty that I am sometimes obliged to accept as real the experiences of my dream-states and hallucinations on the score that they are experienced; and sometimes I am forced to disown the existence of the solid extended things of the world simply because I fail to perceive them. Even admitting that the whole physical world is dependent on mind it is extremely unreasonable to hold that it depends on my individual mind. Berkeley was aware of this and sought to remedy it by bringing in God and resolving the whole physical world into ideas of the divine mind. God's eternal act of perceiving sustains the world and uses it as a medium to let in his system of ideas appear in fragments in our consciousness. I do not enter here into the merits of Berkeleyan philosophy.

But whatever remedies he might suggest, the central doctrine remains unshaken, viz. that "whatever makes any piece of fact real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience."

Mention may be made, in the next place, of a new movement of thought, known as personal idealism, very much resembling the Berkeleyan type, yet differing largely from it in its ultra-nihilistic metaphysical outlook. Along with matter it denounces the substantial reality of spirit as well, and holds up in their place an unbroken continuity of an everflowing world of pure experience. Out of this world of pure experience there crops up, thro' selective interest, a local centre of subjectivity. This selective interest in its evershifting career, rears up a world of objects of diverse forms and names. The so-called material world is the temporary creation of such fluctuations of biocentric interests. It is idle to demand of such a philosophy what account of offers of matter. For according to it there is no substantial reality, spirit or matter, to which philosophy should cling. Strangely enough, there is a desire to emphasise the reality and importance of individual subjects, notwithstanding the fact that none of them have any abiding reality over against the flow of cosmic experience.

37. But there is a type of Idealism representing the classical tradition in philosophy that stands apart from the varieties of idealism enumerated above in that it proceeds with an unshaken faith in ultimate reality. It holds firmly to the doctrine that beyond and behind the temporal succession of things and events there is an everlasting reality that lends to the objects of our experience the seeming reality that they have. The personal idealists are

content with the temporal flux and spend no thought over the question of the eternal. The classical idealists, on the contrary, are concerned primarily with the eternal and defines philosophy's principal function as determination of the nature of this everlasting reality. By the method of pure rational speculation philosophy builds a system of conceptions about the ultimate reality of the universe and declares it to be an all-inclusive whole, so that it embraces and comprehends within its system all parts and phases of existence in such a manner that one of them can be resolved into the other, each element implying and being implied by the other. Such a conception turns decidedly in favour of monism and rigorously excludes dualistic and pluralistic suppositions. For although it is not opposed to the reality of the separate elements of experience it can never put up with their separate reality.

Idealism is distressed at the thought that existence should be resolved into a number of irrational entities. It is difficult to put up with such a doctrine that lands us in a cheerless world of chance elements drifting aimlessly without reason or purpose. It offers in its place a philosophy of faith, hope and promise. It brings into prominence the idea of reason and purpose as the constitutive principle of reality. Everything that is, is because of some reason. The universe is through and through rational, and the reason of the whole expresses itself in the reason of the parts and the reason of the parts finds completion in the reason of the whole. The central feature of classical idealism lies in the identification of reason and reality.

38. The popular belief in the existence of being independent of knowing is turned down, and in its place we are asked to accept the essen-

tial dependence of being upon knowing. If reality has no being apart from knowing it follows necessarily that all reality is cognitive which means that it must be mental.

39. Theorising about matter has been a fascinating game with modern science. The central drift of these speculations may be embodied in three distinct assertions: There is the initial supposition that the existence and structure of the world cannot be wholly reduced to events in the mental order. The world is neither mental nor mind-dependent. In the next place, it is assumed that the elements entering into the constitution of the world are not marked by any intrinsic qualitative differences. The only marks of distinction they possess are occasioned by the relations of space and time in which they occur. And so in the third place, among the ultimate principles we have to reckon with space, time and a number of primary simples. Science proceeds to investigate the nature of these reals under the name of Time, Space and Matter.

40. Originally matter was thought to be something that could be touched. In this respect it seemed to be thoroughly concrete. But in proportion as physics attained eminence it tended to move away from its concrete standpoint. The popular notions of matter as something extended and of space and time as existing separately, each in its own way, do no longer hold. The principle of relativity has thoroughly upset these notions and introduced in their place the notion of space-time as a single continuum--a four dimensional curvature into which objects are resolved. The space-time of relativity is thus very far removed from the space and time of uncientific experience. I do not pretend having understood the implications of these theories. But there is

one thing of which we may be sure. In investigating the nature of the reals modern physics finds itself busy with certain conceptions to which the world of our sensible experience bears no analogue, so that when the physicist talks of matter he is thinking of something far less material than anything which affects us through the senses.

In this process of dematerialisation modern physics is moving towards the teachings of empirical psychology of perception which resolves the objects of the world into contents of a perceiving mind.

From two directions, physics on one side and psychology on the other, we are now furnished with results to which a brief reference is needed. Physics reduces the whole physical world to certain entities that have none of the qualities of hardness, or rigidity characteristic of material objects. To the physicist's eye the real world is without smell, colour, extension and hardness etc. It is arbitrary, if rigidity and hardness are thus blown away, to characterise that world as material. If to this we add what the psychologist has to say we may venture into the supposition that the whole physical world is of the nature of ideas and has its being dependent upon an experiencing mind.

But such an offhand alliance between physics and psychology is far from excusable. The physicist's world, though not made of anything like sensible matter, is not on that score held to be wholly dependent on mind. On the other hand the psychologist's world, although delcared to be wholly mind-dependent, is felt to be very much like sensible matter, full of taste, smell hardness etc. The physicist's real world is a world of non-sensible entities, existing in their own right, and determinable by logico-

mathematical analysis. With such a world the psychologist has no acquaintance. On the contrary, the world which, inspite of its mind-dependent nature, is so very real to the psychologist is in the opinion of the physicist a mere passing show, a deceptive appearance to which unscientific minds, through prejudice, cling.

It is now clear that with regard to the problem of the physical world there is no common ground covered by physics and psychology. To the psychologist our question is whether it is correct to say that the objects of perception are wholly mind-dependent. Is perception a mere beholding of the contents of one' consciousness? May we not assume that the objects of perception have an extra-mental character? Do they not exist and continue to exist even when we are not perceiving them? On the other hand to the physicist our querry is whether the world of logico-mathematic entities to which he drives is not after all an artificial abstract scheme got up by paring away the fulness of qualities of the more concrete world of our daily acquaintance.

41. But it is not so easy to convince the psychologist that the world he perceives has an independent existence of its own. Analysis of perception induces him to resolve the entire world of objects into modes of his own consciousness, and the inevitable outcome is solipsism. To the solipsist perception involves a relation between an act (of a perceiving mind) and its content. But certain characteristics of the perceived content,--its aggressiveness and contingency,--oblige him to surrender the purely solipsistic position, and to assume the existence of something beyond what he perceives.

But with regard to this my only observation is that if perception be defined as beholding

the contents of one's consciousness there is no legitimate pathway from these contents to outside objects. The supposition must be no more than a mere conjecture.

42. The difficulty is that if we proceed with an initial supposition of a separation between thought and reality there is no way of restoring that connection. Nevertheless the belief that there is an objective foundation of our ideas swayed men's minds. It is significant in one way. It argues in favour of the possibility that something really exists outside and we have means of ascertaining it. If this belief is to be rendered philosophically justifiable we must either assume some mode of awareness; direct and immediate and yet not perceptual in character, or define perception in a realistic style.

43. The position is simple and in line with common sense belief, but simplicity is no test of truth. The possibility of dreams and hallucinations in which we have perceptions of objects that in fact do not exist has, many think, punctured the realistic theory of perception so that it is no longer accurate to hold that whenever we have perceptions there must be some objects existing independently of us.

44. Does perception necessarily involve the act of a perceiving mind? If we retain the act we cannot possibly exclude the content. But the admission of the content forces on us the cult of subjectivism from which neither the ontological argument nor the theory of representationism will offer any way of escape. If on the contrary, we eliminate the act and interpret perception as the outcome of certain manner of interconnections among objects that will not only come in conflict with the self-evidencing certainty of our self, but also necessitate a highly complicated theory of perception. Which-

ever line we choose our difficulty is insoluble.

45. The belief that there is a world of shapely, coloured and extended things moving in space and existing independently of myself and my perceptions, is widespread and deep-seated. Hardly does anyone hold that he and his thoughts are the only realities and the existence of other minds and things is a mere dream or streams of ideas and impressions in his mind. Assuming that there is unshaken belief in the physical world there are two distinct questions that have to be asked.

i. In what manner should we characterise this world? Is there any sense in which it may be treated as mental?

ii. Is it possible to offer any philosophical justification for this belief in the existence of the external world?

I intend to proceed with the second question first. It was in fashion to refer to the evidence of perception in support of this almost universal belief. But the evidence of perception, we have seen, is far from conclusive. It may be turned to either direction, to support realisim as much as mentalism. The belief in the existence of the physical world is an original asset of our life. We start our career with this belief and all that we do or know is the outcome of this belief. Speaking philosophically we may say that the belief is implicit in the very possibility of consciousness. Consciousness is, in truth, the meeting point of twofold awareness--on the one side of the self, and on the other of the world. Any one who tries to resolve the one into the other is inviting troubles on himself.

46. Science is without passion, without in-

terest. It accepts the given world as a finished fact and has no concern to see it otherwise than what it is. In the effort to have an understanding of the world it proceeds to pull it to pieces. But the outcome of this process of analysis is that the full-blooded world is destroyed into dead fragments. Real insight is born, as the great sage Bergson puts it, out of living sympathy with the thing, not by anatomising it into pieces. But it is difficult to cultivate that living sympathy which leads us straight into the heart of the thing unless one approaches it in the spirit of an artist with a will to raise it to its maximum value. The artist's mind is in love with the world.

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1. HUMAYUN KABIR. "THE CONCEPTION OF HEAVEN" (in 11th I.P.C. 1935). There is, first of all, the emphasis on conception, which suggests that heaven is something that may be intellectually grasped and interpreted in terms of universal meanings accessible to all rational beings. Heaven would in that case be an object of the cognitive consciousness, and, as such, share in the general characteristics, if any, which all cognitive objects exhibit. Knowledge involves a duality, for with the annihilation of the relation between the subject and the object, the phenomenon of knowledge also disappears. Also, this conceptual characterisation of heaven suggests that cognition or intellection is the sole or at any rate, the fundamental property of the experiencing self, a position not so very dissimilar from that of Descartes, and we are all aware of the difficulties to which such a simplification of human nature invariably leads. In any case, we cannot equate the subject of experience with the cognitive consciousness as a self evident proposition that requires no discussion or proof, and if we do so, heaven becomes some-

thing which must for ever remain alien or 'other' to the consciousness.
2. For it is in the cognitive consciousness alone that the distinction of subject and object is paramount, and the process of knowledge is but the unceasing effort to overcome that duality.
3. R. VAIDYANATHASWAMI, "WHAT IS REAL HEAVEN?"
To understand the general role of the 'I' in the knowledge-process in normal consciousness, we observe that here through attachment to the physical body, the 'I' is either identified with the body or conceived as a sort of substance or monad lodged therein, and is not recognised for what it is in very truth, namely an individuating movement of consciousness. The 'I' as an object of knowledge is fundamentally different from any other object which is known in normal consciousness; for the knowledge of the object 'I' is an intimate inward knowledge, the knowledge of a being which is absolutely unique, which exists in its own right, holding within itself the past as memory and the future as purpose, and which is not only absolutely precious, but is the sole standard and measuring rod of all values. The knowledge of any other object is never of this inward kind but superficial; that is, it is not knowledge of the object as an individual being, but knowledge of nama and rupa--the co-present universals and the external relatedness.
4. On account of this difference the subject and object enter into the perception of normal consciousness with quite different status and value.
5. The role of the 'I' in yogic samadhi is different. When concentration on an object is increased in intensity, a point is reached at which there is unconsciousness of one's own

body, and the I-sense is projected into the object, so that the object is now felt as the body of the 'I'. This phenomenon of Samadhi is possible precisely because the 'I' is not a monad, but an individuating movement of consciousness which could be initiated anew in different supports. In Samadhi, then, the individuating movement is annulled in its original adhara--namely one's own body--and through the focussing of the mind on the object is recreated there and superimposed in some mysterious manner on the individuating movement or 'causal stress' which is the essence of the object, with the result that the object is presented in the form 'I' and known in that inward and intimate way in which the 'I' is known. Since this Samadhi experience is the inevitable culmination of intense concentration, we have here a proof of the important fact that <u>an object can be known as unique individual being, if and only if it is presented in the form 'I'</u>. In other words, the 'I' is the universal form of the individual being. We may conclude that the new I-movement created in the object is <u>different</u> from the original and temporarily cancelled I-movement of the yogic, for two reasons: (1) during the samadhi there is no consciousness of the body or memory of experiences in the body: in fact the appearance of such memory is the signal for the return to normal consciousness, and (2) after return to normal consciousness there is no complete and coherent memory of the Samadhi experience, but there is a feeling of increased familiarity with the object and right knowledge relating to it is presented to the conscious mind from <u>subconscious memory</u>. Though Samadhi is an advanced power and opens the gates to the full exploitation and enjoyment of the world of mind, we see, that in respect of immediate knowledge, it does not carry

us in fundamentals beyond the limitations of normal consciousness. For the unicentricity of the mind and the unequal status of subject and object remain, since the annulment of the original I-centre appears to be a sine qua non for the creation by Samadhi of the new centre in the object.

The form of perception in the higher world or world of Vijnana is quite different. It is here for the first time that it becomes a matter of direct and immediate realisation that Caitanya or consciousness is the very stuff of which the entire world of experience is constructed, and the idea of the object as a passive and inert partner in the perceptual transaction becomes palpably false. In the Vijnana form of perception the 'I' or the conscious percipient is simultaneously in the subject and object and perception becomes a transaction between two individual beings each of which is presented both inwardly and outwardly since each functions both as object and subject in relation to the other,--a love-play or Lila between two centres of fundamentallly equal status. As has already been explained, this form of perception is not realised thro' Samadhi, which though an advanced power, still belongs to the lower world of separateness. The wide gap which separates Samadhi from Vijnana has been sought to be bridged in Tibetan monasteries by the following practice which is still current: the sadhaka performs samadhi on an object so that he becomes the object and is unconcious of his own body: while in this condition, that is to say, while stationed in the object, he tries to perceive as object the body he has left. Then he returns to his normal consciousness and again he repeats the samadhi as before, trying to alternate the two conditions as rapidly as possible. If

normal consciousness is regarded as the result of an act of Samadhi performed on one's own body, this practice would amount to the rapid alternation of Samadhi on the two centres engaged in the perceptual transaction. This practice pre-supposed advanced power of Yoga and may conceivably lead one on to Vijnana. That Vijnana is the form of perception in the higher worlds has been reported also by Swedenborg who in his description of heaven says that in heaven every one though keeping his own identity is in a sense identical with every one else. This description of the form of perception in the higher world appears bizarre and full of contradictions to normal human mentality; the records of Hindu culture however furnish ample evidence that it has been realised and established before and that it can be realised again. Apart from the strenuous methods of yoga, the practice of Krsna-Bhakti in particular, and Bhakti in general tends to culminate in Vijnana, as the Ista-devata becomes one with the Atman in the heart of all human beings, beyond a certain stage. The sourse of apparent contradictions of Vijnana lies in the inability of the intellect to apprehend the basis of 'identity' and 'difference' and the nature of the 'I' in terms of its apparatus of hypostatised concepts and the principle of the excluded middle. This is the content of the common-place of the Upanisads, that "the Reality is beyond the mind."
The Atman in the Higher world: The question of the ultimate knower and of its relation to the 'I' which is a knotty point of debate in Indian Philosophy, is not a particularly urgent one in the ordinary mental level when the Ahamkara has made for itself a permanent lodging in an organism, nor even with the Yogin who can perform Samadhi on any object at will, but becomes really acute in the Vijnana stage,

where the self is ubiquitous and myriad-faced and plays with itself in the Lila which is experience. Is the Self one or many, is it anu or Vibhu? To such questions, the answer cannot be one-sided. Behind the lightning transformation of the self, its myriad dartings to and fro, there arises the background of the one calm Self, the Ancient and Self-born, whose nature is knowledge itself or pure Cit, which itself pure and Acyuta is the support and the continent of all experience. Distinguishable from the Atman, though subsisting in and indissolubly linked with it, is the movement of individuation, of manifestation, which though not acit is subtly different from the Atma-cit, and has accordingly been termed in the Tantra-Sastras Cidrupini, of the form of Cit. The Atman and the manifesting movement which is not separated from the Atman are the ultimate forms arising in the analysis and explanation of immediate experience in the higher world. As Atman the self is one, and as individuating movement founded therein, it is many.

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1. H.H. The RAJASAHEB OF SANGLI. OPENING ADDRESS. (9th I.P.C. '34). If the essence of all philosophy be the endeavour to systematise experience and to render life intelligible, then I would claim that it is difficult, even for a layman, to live in these present times and not to feel, stirring within him, the impulse towards philosophising. For so much is going on, all around him, which seems to defy systematisation, and which at first sight appears beyond the grasp of understanding. There are times, in the world's history, when invisible forces seem to have seized Man by the hair of his head and to be dragging him irresistibly along a path that is not of his own choosing, and the end of which he cannot see. Such a

time, assuredly Gentlemen, is that in which we are now living. Forces are at work in the world to-day, with such statesmen strive in vain to cope and against which economists are powerless. Who would have thought, on Armistice Day, 1918, that within a brief sixteen years the world would be filled once more with fears and rumours of wars? Who, in the year 1922 or 1923 could have foreseen the disastrous financial crisis which, a year or two ago, struck down the richest nation in the world, and from the repercussions of which all other nations have since been suffering? What expectation was there, at the close of the Great War, that mankind would be entering, not on a period of peace and settlement, but on a time in which every human problem would rapidly become more acute and exhibit itself on an ever vaster scale? And yet all this has happened; and the man must be singularly dull of apprehension who does not occasionally ask himself: Why? What, he wonders, is wrong with the world? What is the virus that has entered into the veins of humanity and which no skill of physician seems able to expel?

I can conceive many answers to these questions; but one thing seems to me to be certain --and that is that restlessness and an upheaval on this gigantic scale must be one that goes down to the very roots of human life. The real issues, whatever they be, must be fundamental. All this trouble, all these apparently insoluble problems, all this bankruptcy of human remedial endeavour, can, I feel, denote but one thing--and that is some basic misunderstanding of life and its aims, penetrating into and so corrupting the whole of our modern civilisation. It is a matter, as a philosopher might put it, of "wrong values." And Nature, or the Time Spirit, or whatever we may choose to call the directive Influence behind human affairs, is

engaged in heading mankind back on to the right track by her familiar method of stultification. Whenever, in the world's history, we see civilisation on the verge of self-strangulation, we may be sure that it has gone wrong in just one of the ways which are the special subject-matter of Philosophy. The economist who would deal with the situation in terms of his special science, the politician who would deal with it politically, do not go deep enough. Only one thing can put matters right, and that is a fundamental change of outlook, a getting back to some philosophy of Man and the World, which shall be truer to the metaphysical facts of life.

2. The present deadlock cannot go on for ever; it must end somehow or other. And if it end in the breakdown of our present civilisation, under the weight of problems which it is strengthless to solve, then, as has happened so many times in the world's history, another civilisation will arise, which will develop, in practice, the ideals which its predecessor was unable to apply.

3. RASHVIHARI DAS. IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE:
The modern tendency to regard substance as as quite a dispensable, if not already an obsolute conception of thought. It is suggested that the substance-quality notion of metaphysics is connected with the subject-predicate view of judgments in Logic; and as the subject-predicate view is found quite inadequate in Logic, its correlates the substance-quality notion, should also be considered defective. Bertrand Russell thinks that people developed the notion of substance because they believed in the indestructibility of matter and of soul. But as physics no longer believes in the indestructibility of matter and psychology has no use for a persis-

tent ego, it appears to him quite useless to retain the notion of substance which has lost all its justification. Whitehead rightlv thinks that the idea of self-subsistence is involved in the notion of substance. But according to his philosophv, there is nothing that exists by itself and everything enters into everything else and so the notion of substance is found quite inapplicable in fact.

4. A.F. MARKHAM. "THE REALM OF VALUES." There are thinkers who tell us that the mind of man can only know the products of its own activity and that no knowledge is possible of objects as they are in themselves. Protagoras long ago taught that the whole content of perception is subjective and sought to reduce the world to the succession of man's sensations.

5. Can we reconcile the fact of evil with belief in the existence of a personal God? We might adopt the hypothesis of a finite struggling God or Professor Alexander's suggestion that though the world is pregnant with deitv, God is not yet born.

6. It is difficult to understand how the Absolute could possibly be regarded as a person. The Absolute should mean that which is freed from all relations but is sometimes taken to mean simply the one ultimate ground of all existence.

7. T.V.R.MURTI. PERCEPTION & ITS OBJECT: We have, in perception, no means of distinguishing knowledge from object or vice versa. For the rule--differents are also different from knowledge--could not be applied here, as we did in the case of judgment. Moreover, there is no evidence of anv gap between knowledge and object in perception. For, to be aware of a gap even when we are to be aware of the entities between which the gap yawns; then we are already acquainted with the entity between which and knowledge the

gap is posited.
8. On the analogy of the illusory, every normal perception can be considered as a case of illusion. The illusion here is that knowledge which excludes all exclusions and is, as one may say, the highest universal is identified with a particular object, thereby losing its universality; it becomes, as it were a mode of the object, getting localised and temporalised. In the stage of perception, as in the corresponding stage of illusion, there is no distinction between knowledge and object. When discrimination sets in, knowledge is at once sharply distinguished from the object. Every reflective knowledge cancels as it were, this false identification in perception. But reflection brings in another trouble; knowledge, though distinguished from object, is yet contrasted with it, as if the two were co-equals --objects that appear on the same plane of existence. And to that extent knowledge is still far from being realised as universal. The attempt to cancel the illusion of perception by reflection is like driving Satan with the help of Beelzebub. But it proves one thing: the right of knowledge can be vindicated; it can be freed; and discrimination shows the way, though the culmination of the vindication will mean the cessation of all discrimination in a stage of pure contemplation.
9. BHASKAR S. NAIK. EXPLANATION OF OBJECTIVITY AS FALSITY. A generalisation which will comprehend all the details of the positive sciences seems to be impossible. But granting the future possibility of such a generalisation, it would not amount to ultimate explanation. Because a generalisation is simply the description of the how and not of the why, of things. Causation as applied in the empirical sciences does not in fact amount to any real

explanation. Causation though an useful empirical concept becomes self-contradictory as an ultimate explanation. Philosophical explanation can not be also of the nature of a hypothesis in so far as philosophy claims to know the ultimate reality. It claims or should claim a degree of certitude unattainable by the natural sciences.

10. The ultimate ground is ultimate not because of its necessary connection with the world of our experience, but because without it the world could not have come into being. The rope in the illusory experience has no relation whatsoever with the illusory snake, but the illusory snake could not have presented itself without the rope being there. Illusion without a ground unrelated to it is an impossibility.

Epistemology of illusion illustrates but the doctrine of Ajnana. Ajnana is to be conceived in such a way that it implies the real, but the real is not at the same time affected by it. A single instance of the correction of an illusion shows the possibility of the annulment of the given objectivity, the reduction of the whole empirically to utter unreality. Absolute monism requires this, and all attempts to explain the dualism in our experience without reducing objectivity to unreality, to utter nothing, are doomed to failure.

11. If what we said is correct, if we really cannot posit any distinction between knowledge and its object on the purely epistemological level then the provisional distinction between perception and illusion cannot be taken to be ultimately valid. Texts say that there is not really any sequence (Purvapara bhava) between perception and its object in illusory experience. There is not even the instrumentality of the sense organs there. In the so called valid perception and its object also, we have

seen that epistemologically no distinction can be conceived. We ordinarily ignore the fact that the distinction of the object from knowledge is itself objective. We forget the significance of the fact that the distinction also is known, and take it to be prior to knowledge and at the same time as also cognized or known, the posterior knowledge apprehending the distinction which is prior to the existence of that knowledge. It is a question of what we understand by an epistemological analysis or explanation. Can we hope to bridge the gulf of the distinction between knowledge and its object, if we take that distinction to be ultimate? Or in other words, can we epistemologically conceive the possibility of the knowledge of the object as known even though the distinction between them were ultimate? If then the distinction is not ultimate, we have to conceive a peculiar undistinguished epistemic identity as the basis of the distinction, can we not say that perception is only due to the false identification of pure consciousness with the Vrtti? It is only when the illusion is corrected that the false identification of consciousness with the empirical vrtti is known, and thereby the unreality of the vrtti is realised.

12. M.V.V.K. RANGACHARI. "CAUSALITY". To-day science in the West supplies a sense of security to the Vedanta and the other Darshanas. While it is true that the progress of human thought had been "through Metaphysics to Physics" the reverse process obtains as well elevating the mechamical sciences to misty pedestals of infinite intangibles. Einstein, Plank, Heisenberg, Bohr, and Exner are some among the scientists that initiated the doctrine of indeterminacy. As indeterminacy involves the denial of the causality-principle, which is

the basis of science and withdrawal of their support by Einstein and Planck causes little surprise.

13. While theism assures itself that the reign of law in the universe is the great proof of cosmic intelligence, Sir Arthur Eddington comes along with a supposed discovery that there is no reign of law, no rigorous sequence of cause and effect. He sees God in chance, not in order, in accident, not in design, in indeterminacy rather than determinism. When he deduces the freedom of the human will from electronic misbehaviour in the sense of the unpredictability of the direction of their movement.

14. Miss. V. PARANJOTI: THE SIDDHANTIN'S CRITICISM OF MAYAVADA: The empirical world is seen to be full of contradictions. Its reality is at best only relative; and as ground of the relative, there must be the absolute. Our finite minds can grasp the world only through the categories of space, time and cause. But these categories do not lead us anywhere, for they end in contradictions. However, the mind is great enough to realise that it must follow a path different from the space-time-cause approach in order to reach the abiding real. It is possible in spite of our finitude to prepare ourselves by degrees so that we can intuit Brahman.

15. This supreme reality is all that there is. If so, how can this be reconciled with what is obvious to perception that there are a world and souls claiming independent existence beside the supreme Being? Brahman is the non-dual spirit over against which there is nothing either world or souls. All distinctions that arise are within Brahman and the external world the Mayavadin says that as ornaments arise from

gold, so the world evolves from Brahman.
16. The Siddhantin's criticism of most of these analogies is unwarranted. He presses the analogies in every respect so that absurd conclusions follow. This is not justifiable, for the analogy is used to make clear only the point or points mentioned by the writer, and need not compare with the matter to be illustrated in every respect. The analogy of the spider and web for instance, is intended to prove how the effect may be of a different nature from the cause so that it is possible for the inert world to arise from the intelligent Brahman. The Siddhantin deviates into side-tracks saying that whereas the nature of the web is uniform, the world is not; and whereas the spider is unremittingly engaged in producing the web, the creation of the world by Brahman is not thus continuous. These criticisms are beside the point, and moreover the facts stated are inaccurate, for neither is the web uniform, nor is the spider incessantly engaged in producing the web.
17. Neither can the empirical concept of cause apply to Brahman. Gaudapada after his thoughtful consideration of the concept of cause, avows that neither can waking life be the cause of dreams, nor Brahman be the cause of the world. Causality, whether as conceived by the Naiyayika or as set forth by the Sankhya is not acceptable. The Naiyayika's theory of arambhavada creates a cleft between cause and effect; for it maintains that the effect has no prior existence in the cause, but comes into being afresh. If the cause die before the effect, non-existence precedes the effect, and not any particular cause; if so, any cause whatever would do to explain the effect or rather, to be more accurate, non-existence will suffice to account for the effect. The

satkaryavada of the Sankhya is no more free from difficulties though it is certainly an improvement on the Nyaya concept. According to the Sankhya, the cause and effect are not different but the effect pre-exists in the cause. If so, the effect existing in the cause is either manifest or unmanifest. If manifest, then there is no need for the causal operation; if unmanifest, something is required to manifest the unmanifested, and to manifest what manifests, something else is required; and so on ad infinitum. The Advaitin finds that the concept of cause is full of inconsistencies, and that, though a condition of finite knowing it does not apply to ultimate reality. Cause and effect are not simultaneous like the two horns of an animal. There is temporal succession here; and in trying to ascertain the cause of an event, we have to go back to discover the conditions that produced it; and if the investigation is to be thoroughgoing, we have to go still further back to find out the circumstances which gave rise to the cause, and so on ad infinitum. It may be said that there are unproduced eternal causes which give rise to effects, but which are themselves not the effects of anything else so that infinite regress is avoided in these instances. However, this suggestion is not free from difficulties. For, such a first cause that is eternal, cannot itself change in order to produce the world, and yet be unchanging. The real cannot be subject to change; if it be, then the immortal would become mortal. It is the considered conviction of the Mayavadin that the concepts of evolution, causality and, all other such empirical concepts cannot apply to Brahman and, therefore, cannot explain the relation of Brahman to the world. If this be the Mayavadin's view, it is strange that he should use the analogies mentioned above, such as for instance, the

gold ornaments coming from gold, the spider producing the web, etc., which involve evolution and causality.

This difficulty is explained by the fact that one cannot straightaway reaise the Advaitin's position that the concept of cause being full of contradictions will not serve to explain ultimate truths. At first one will think along with the Naiyayika that the law of causation is a "self-evident axiom known intuitively as it were, and corroborated by experience." It will next be realised that there must be unity of cause and effect, which is the Sankhya position of satkaryavada. The pupil would now be ready to see along with the Advaitin that the causal concept is an impossibility, and that ultimate truth lies beyond all such finite concepts. As this advanced position of the Mayavadin cannot be attained without sufficient preparation, the analogies mentioned above are for those approaching the Advaita position. These analogies should therefore not be misconstrued as illustrative of the Mayavadin's final position. They help to lead to his standpoint, but do not represent that view-point.

If the Mayavadin believes that finite concepts such as evolution and causality do not explain the relation of Brahman to the world, then how does he conceive this relationship? It is important to remind ourselves that Brahman is essential to account for the world, for the latter is only relative or phenomenal, and as the ground of this is required the absolute and noumenal Brahman. The tests of reality are consistency and permanence; and judged by these, the world is found to be full of contradictions and to abound with change. Dissatisfied with the inconsistent and the inconstant, our minds seek to repose in what is consistent and cons-

tant. Beyond the relative and the changing, we long for the absolute and permanent.

18. Granting Brahman does not create the world, what is the relation between the two? Sankara abandons the concept of cause, and adopts the philosophical concept of non-difference to explain the relationship between Brahman and the world. Sankara's system cannot be classed as pantheism for he does not say that Brahman and the world are one, but that they are not different.

Why do we see the world as a multiplicity that is over against Brahman, instead of realising the truth that the world is not different from Brahman? Our finite knowing is responsible for this erroneous perception of plurality. Our finite concepts of space-time cause can never take us beyond the level of the phenomenal. If we wish to transcend this to reach up to the ultimate truth, we can only do it through intuition. It is only this form of experience that will lead us to the non-dual Brahman.

The view that the world is non-different from Brahman does away with the difficulties of causation, evolution and other temporal processes of the kind. The problem of cit producing acit also vanishes, for there is no inert world over against Brahman who is cit. Brahman is the absolute beyond which there is nothing. All distinctions arise within it and disappear therein. To those who have not yet risen beyond the concept of cause, and who require an efficient cause for the fluctuations of the universe, there is posited Isvara.

19. He who knows Brahman becomes one with it. From now onwards, his privileges are many. There is no conflict in his soul, for his victory over the world is complete. It is natural for him to lead a good life that is perfectly acceptable. their

20. Rituals are not an end in themselves. Their

value is only instrumental; and when the purpose for which they were intended is accomplished, their function is over, and there is no point in retaining them.

21. U.C. BHATTACHARJEE. THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN THOUGHT. Time acquired a new significance. Time and Change are involved in each other. We cannot think of change without time and the essence of time is succession. Perhaps we can think of Time without phenomena, as Kant contended, but after all it is an abstraction. In any case, the idea of change and that of time are closely associated. And hence the temporal and the changing have always meant the same thing. That which is in time, is subject to change.

On the contrary, the unchanging is what is beyond reach of the ravages of time. The unchanging and the eternal are the same. The contradiction between the changing and the changeless thus implies the contradiction between the temporal and the eternal. And that in its turn leads us to the opposition between the Becoming and the Being. May we not add to this another pair of opposites, viz. Appearance and Reality? That which appears, is in time and is, therefore, subject to change; the real is beyond time, eternal, and is, therefore, unchanging. It is obvious that these ideas have occupied very important place in philosophy since its very dawn.

22. To decry time is not to solve the problem of time. What appears may not be ultimately real, but how to account for it? Is Time real? Or, is it pure illusion? And what after all is the eternal? Is it not only what lasts for all time? If so, then the eternal is not timeless and eternity is only unending time, but after all, time.

23. Since Kant, Time has either been conceived

as an apriori condition of knowledge, or as common-sense would rather have it, as an objective possibility of change and motion.

24. RAMA KANTA TRIPATHI "THE MADHYAMIKA THEORY OF DIALECTIC." The Madhyamika is a thorough-going dialectician. We meet other dialecticians in the history of philosophy both in the East and the West; but they are so only to a limited extent. Dialectic with them is sub-ordinate; it is adopted only as a means towards the establishment of a certain position. The Madhyamika alone plays the game without any ulterior motives, logically to a finish. The Madhyamika Dialectic is the logical conclusion of the movement that begins with the early Buddhism. The Buddhists started in a spirit of revolt against the orthodox views: they were critical from the very beginning.

25. The Madhyamika enters into controversy with the realistic Buddhists. His objection is that pure terms without relations are pure abstractions, and are in no way less unreal than the rejected relations. Pure terms by themselves are simply inconceivable. The main thesis of the Madhyamika is that "all things are relative and hence indefinable in themselves; and so there is no way of discovering their essences. Since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essence of their own." They are characterless--Nihsvabhava; and in the last resort, they are void, nothing--Sunya. Consequently, neither pure terms, nor the relation, nor again the complexity of the two--each by itself or combined--is real or fact. They appear facts only through an inherent false belief--Samvrti satya. They are what they seem to be, not by themselves, but in virtue of others.

The Madhyamika argument against the independent facthood of an entity is as follows. An entity is not what it is by itself. If it were, it would have an absolute existence of its own. But this cannot be proved to be the case; for then it can neither affect nor be affected by any other entity; it would be as good as nothing. Nor can it be said that it is what it is, not by itself but because of others. For, the same question will arise as regards these others. For, the same question will arise as regards others. Are the others what they are by themselves? Certainly not; for then this alternative would be reduced to the former one. Nor again can it be put forth that an entity is what it is by itself as well as because of others. For it can be easily shown that this alternative is vitiated with the defects of the previous two combined; we shall be required to determine how much one entity owes to others and how much is its own. Nor in the last resort can it be said that it it is neither what it is by itself nor because of of others nor otherwise. For, it will be tantamount to accepting it and yet not speaking of it.

In a similar spirit and ruthless logic, the Madhyamika proves the utter untenability of the facthood of each and every thing on which the early schools rely, and cuts the very root of their radical pluralism. To illustrate his procedure a bit more, let us briefly consider his examination of causality. He says that only four alternatives are possible about the production of a thing. It may be said that it is born of itself; secondly, that it is born of others; thirdly that it is born of itself as well as of others; and lastly that it is born without any cause. No fifth alternative can be conceived of.

And all these alternatives, singly or collectively, cannot stand criticism. To take the first. There is no sense why a thing should be born of itself; there is no purpose in self-duplication. If it were admitted, it would lead to an infinite regress. Nor can it be held that it is born of others. Then any thing and every thing would originate from any thing and every thing, there being an absolute gap between one entity and another. Moreover, the same question may be asked of the other and this too would end in a regress. Nor again can it be held that it is born of itself as well as of others. For this alternative is open to the shortcomings of both the former views combined. Lastly, it cannot be pointed out that an entity comes to be without any cause. For, this would mean that anything should come at any time without regard for its cause.

The Madhyamika applies the same logic to the various theories that claim to establish the nature of ultimate reality.

26. The Madhyamika rejects all views without positing any one of his own. This attitude of the Madhyamika gives rise to certain serious considerations as regards his starting point, procedure and the result he arrives at. As we have seen, he starts with doubting everything, rejects all views and ends with pure negation.

27. This ends the difficulty regarding the procedure of the dialectic. We are now in a position to consider the objection concerning the result of it. It may be asked whether this negation itself would not be a content and stand over even if all contents are negated. This objection it may be pointed out, is raised under the impression that the negative attitude were itself a judgment. But it is not so. It is only a symbol; it is as it were put in a judgment-form on the analogy

of affirmation. As already pointed out, speaking the negation and negation are not different. We do not speak <u>of</u> negation, but speak negation. Hence this negating attitude should not be mistaken for a content in the last resort. The Madhyamika warns us not to have any attachment to negation--Sunyata--itself; Sunyata is Sunya. It is a contentless, positionless negation. It cannot be appreciated on logical grounds; it is extra-logical. This negation is a permanent illusion. It cannot be the ultimate position; this too is to be got rid of. But this cannot be accomplished by thought. Thought can only formulate a demand for the negation of this negating. It can only acquaint us with the permanent illusion. The removal of it is beyond its power. It is to be effected by actual realisation. This is precisely what the Madhyamika has in view in regarding thought as incompetent to judge reality.

28. <u>P.R. DAMLE</u>: Indian philosophy considers intellect as inadequate on objective and theoretical grounds. But it is not abandoned from the start. The negative value of intellect is always recognised.

29. <u>P.C. DIVANJI</u>. This <u>SAMUCCAYAVADA</u> appears to be a very live issue in the time of Sankara and his pupil Sureswara as we find an elaborate refutation thereof in the standard works of those two philosophers. The latter pushed the master's doctrine too far, laying special emphasis on the process of Sravana (study) as opposed to those of Manana (reflection) and Nididhyasana (meditation).

Another set of followers of Sankara, advocated the view that though knowledge was the immediate cause of emancipation and arose from Sravana, it arose only as the result of the perfection thereof by Manana and Niddhyasana which Sureswara looked upon as acts.

1. S. RADHAKRISHNAN: (Welcome Address) in 10th I.P.C. Pt.2.1934). The Scotsmen are said to require and rejoice in thought and contemplation in orderly attempts at reaching the root principles of things. It is clearly a proof of our Chancellor's genuine interest in philosophical studies and a recognition of the value of philosophy for our times when emotional excitement is everywhere uppermost and calm reflection is relegated to the rear. It is for students of philosophy to lead a bewildered and suffering world into the serene paths of rational understanding.

2. The different problems flow together and cannot be kept separate. One cannot be a politician or an economist without a knowledge of the things of the mind. In a famous passage of the 7th book of Plato's Republic, the final stage of a perfect education is described as one, where the youth has brought his piecemeal studies into a connected whole. For it is only, says Socrates, when you have attained to a general view of men and things that you become capable of asking and answering questions and of giving a real ground for what you think and believe. The problem of man himself, the human being never looked more threatening, more chalenging than it does today in the eyes of serious people. Mechanical efficiency and scientific ruthlessness combined with a contemptuous disregard of such imponderables as are manifested by the spirit and will of man are to-day receiving our admiration. The position which was once hold by philosophers and theologians is now in the hands of scientists and economists. Thousands of intelligent young men the world over are worshipping at their feet. Mechanised Utopias of cheap food and easy virtue like the proletarian paradise of Lenin or the universe limited of H.G. Wells, if achieved,

will be perfect like Orlando's mare; except for the one small defect of being dead. They will not contribute to the building up of human personality. Human beings are called upon not only to live but to live well. They should have not only physical efficiency and intellectual power but delicacy of mind and beauty of soul.

3. LORD ERSKINE: (Opening Address): Our generation has had the misfortune to be born into an age of transition. Indeed as calm and detached philosophers you may perhaps regret that your period of existence was not cast in quieter times. But although strife and change are not conducive to peaceful contemplation you will no doubt console yourselves with the reflexion that you are living in an age that will be of absorbing interest to future historians.

4. G.R. MALKANI: NATURE OF PHILOSOPHIC TRUTH. Scientific truth necessarily takes the form of certain generalisations or what are called the laws of nature. They do not really explain. Let us suppose that they are the formulations of certain causal connections. Given certain things, certain other things follow. But why do they follow? We do not know. And after all, any such formulation can only be provisional. We are never sure. We have no complete apprehension of the cause. As it is said, in any occurrence, however limited in time and space, the whole universe may be involved. Or as Lotze would probably put it, the nature of the unity or the nature of the whole dictates to each element what it is to be and how it is to act. No element of physical nature acts in isolation or has a will of its own. Its whole character, and its whole action in which that character finds expression, is bound up with the nature of the unity.

5. The fact is that we never get at the whole cause of things. We therefore disregard the wider causes, or causes which we cannot determine, limited as we are in power and comprehension, or causes over which we can exercise no kind of control. Our humanity and our finiteness prescribes us our problem (which is never the whole cause or the ultimate cause, but only the immediate cause or the controlling cause), and also the kind of solution which would for all purposes pass as satisfactory. Thus science is entirely a human affair, an expression of our finiteness.

6. There is no question of any theory being ultimate or incapable of modification. Limited as we are in the grasp of all relevant facts and in our power of suggesting the right explanation (i.e. both in the formulation of the question and in our ability to reach the right solution), we can only be certain that facts being as they are hitherto known to be, a certain explanation or a certain theory would do. We cannot possibly provide before-hand against all possible discrepancy in facts that they challenge it. The truth is that in the realm of theory which is the realm of hypothetical thinking or imaginative understanding of things (as opposed to direct seeing or intuiting) we can never reach certitude.

7. There are no absolute truths in science. There is only a growing presumption in favour of a certain view of things. But it may be falsified by a new observation or a new set of data that have come to light. There can be no final view of things or an ultimate explanation in science. It is in the very nature of things impossible. We never see the truth. We only theorise. We make an empirical generalisation; and no empirical generalisation can ever be self-evident or final.

Is this truth? Or if it is, can we be satis-
fied with it? Is there no higher form of truth?
We suggest that philosophic truth is this
higher form of truth.

8. Reality to it is one and entire, and the truths which is seeks to know are the truths about the whole of reality and not about any particular aspect or part of it. The question here is, are there any such truths?

9. The first thing to note about philosophic truth is that it is reared on no accepted facts or data that necessarily prescribe the form of the solution. In this, it differs fundamentally from scientific truth. The latter starts with certain undeniable facts or data that set the problem and to which every solution must conform. Philosophic truth has no such limitation. It has not to conform to any given fact. A true philosophy can only be based on a thorough-going scepticism. We must doubt all. If we do not, we lack the first essential of philosophy. There is no immutable fact. Facts are here as we understand them, not vice-versa; i.e. the given does not prescribe the understanding or restrict it or dictate to it; it is the understanding, the outlook, the concept, the point of view, the meaning, the intuition that dictates to facts and makes them significant. The given is mere fodder to be consumed, not an enthroned monarch to be worshipped. The given has to be annulled that truth may shine. The point of view or the understanding is the whole thing, the given relatively nothing.

It may be said that in science too we are not concerned with immutable facts. We are always trying to reach beyond the given to the explaining concept. It is this concept that gives meaning to the facts as known by us. And as we reach higher and higher concepts or more luminous generalisations, the given is seen

in a new light; it changes its meaning and becomes a different fact altogether.

10. What are facts for science are not facts for philosophy. Everything is doubted, everything is questioned. The truth may be said to be unlimited by contrast. It is wholly personal. The intuition or the understanding is the whole thing. The rest must conform to it or be rejected as no-fact. This intuition is not our ordinary experience or a generalisation from it. It interprets experience, and is therefore logically prior to and more fundamental than it.

11. There is no possible experience that can reduce it to falsity. Its truth is independent of experience. Philosophical truth is therefore timeless truth. It is truth that remains unchanging whatever our experience.

It may be said that this ideal is never realised and that there is no such immutability about the concepts of philosophy. No two philosophers hold identical concepts, and the same philosopher does not feel bound to hold the same concepts just in the same sense permanently. Now this would be a just criticism if we held that everybody who philosophises, philosophises just in the same way, or holds a common philosophical system. But this is in the very nature of the case impossible. There is no common philosophy and therefore no common philosophical concepts held by all.

12. What is important to note is that we cannot thrash out any truth through mere reasoning or formal argument. There are no objective checks here which set a limit to scientific thinking and scientific argument. The question here is principally one of seeing or insight; and unless we see identically, we cannot think identically. Philosophical truth is essentially personal truth and therefore incapable of verification.

13. <u>T.R.V. MURTI:</u> ILLUSION AS CONFUSION OF

SUBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS: Any ordinary mode of consciousness, as veridical perception etc. would equally involve them; but the preference for illusion is that nothing shows up the inner working of a mechanism as disorder; when it is well-attuned and smooth-working we seldom appreciate the precise functions of the several parts.

14. Illusion in contrast to a thinking error, involves an original belief; it is a perceptual fact, to all intents. The belief is so complete that we are not conscious of meaning its negation, and the possibility of its being otherwise. A thought, even an affirmative judgment, is always conscious of its possible negation. Again, it refers to, or seeks, a percept; it involves belief only in a very general sense, bearing general applicability to fact or percept. It is however to be sharply distinguished from figments of imagination, which are avowedly felt to have no such reference at all. When we become aware of an error in thinking, as in fallacious reasoning or miscalculation of a happening, we only realise what we apprehend even initially, namely the possibility of its negation. Hence the correcting thought does not intrude upon us as a shock like the cancellation of illusion. Nor is the correcting thought capable of negating, in entirety, the reference of the previous thought to fact; for, like any other thought, it carries the possibility of its own negation.

15. S.K.DAS. BRADLEY'S DOCTRINE OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE: Ward held from first to last, 'of all the facts with which he deals the psychologist may truly say that their esse is percipi, in so far as such facts are facts of presentation,' and if the exclusive business of psychology is to analyse and trace the development of individual experience as it is for

the experiencing individual.

16. SATIS CHANDRA CHATTERJEE. INDIAN & WESTERN THEORIES OF TRUTH. There are two main questions with regard to truth, namely, how truth is constituted, and how truth is known? The first question relates to the nature of truth and the answers to it give us the definitions of truth. The second question refers to the ascertainment of truth and the answers to it give us the tests or criteria of truth.

17. The truth of knowledge consists just in its being uncontradicted (avadhita). The absence of contradiction, however, is not a positive but a negative condition of truth. Knowledge is both made true and known to be true by its own internal conditions. It is only falsehood that is externally conditioned. So truth is self-evident, while falsity requires to be evidenced by external grounds.

18. There is no exact parallel to the above theory of truth in Western Philosophy. It is true that in modern European Philosophy, knowledge, in a strict sense, is always taken to mean true belief. But truth or validity is not regarded as intrinsic to all knowledge, independently of all external conditions.

19. Theories of self-evident truth or intrinsic validity give us a rather cheap and untenable solution of the logical problem of truth. It leaves no room for the fact of doubt and falsehood in the sphere of knowledge. This is the gravemen of the Nyaya criticism of the theory of intrinsic validity. But any theory of truth which fails to explain its correlate, namely, falsehood becomes so far inadequate. Further, it makes a confusion between psychological belief and logical certainty. Psychologically a wrong belief may be as firm as a right one. But this does not mean that there is no distinction between the two. Subjective certainty, as such, can

not be accepted as a test of truth. It is true that the theory of intrinsic validity does not appeal to any test of truth than the truth itself. It proceeds on the assumption that the truth of knowledge is self-evident, so much so that we cannot think of the opposite. In fact, however, there is no such self-evident truth. It is only in the case of the self that we can speak of self-evidence in this sense. The self is a self-manifesting reality. It is manifest even in any doubt or denial of its reality. Hence self-evidence belongs really only to the self.

20. To reduce the true to the useful is to make it almost meaningless. It is by no means the case that truth is only a matter of practical utility. The atomic and the electron theories of matter make very little difference in our practical life. Similarly, the different theories of truth involve no great difference in their practical consequences. But in the absence of any other test than that of practical utility we cannot say which one is true and which is false. Further, there are certain beliefs which are admittedly wrong but which are otherwise useful for certain purposes of life. It may sometimes be useful even to tell a lie. But no one would claim any truth for a wrong belief or a lie on account of its practical utility. Hence the Buddhist and the pragmatist theories of truth cannot be accepted as sound and satisfactory.

21. D.M. DATTA. SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SANKHYA SYSTEM. The object of this paper is not so much to solve any problem as to draw the attention of competent persons to certain problems which a teacher and a student of the Sankhya system of philosophy always feel.

22. The very first problem concerns the possibility of creation. The Sankhya shares the general faith of the orthodox schools that

the world is beginningless and proceed by alternate cycles of creation and dissolution.

23. What is the meaning of dissolution? Does it not mean the disintegration of all specific products into the homogeneous material cause prakrti in which there is no distinction and differentiation of specific objects? If so, does it not imply the cessation of determinate products like buddhi, ahankara etc? If that be so again, how can we then understand the imperfection or the bondage of the spirit during dissolution? Imperfection cannot surely be conceived without ignorance,--without intellectual confusion, which implies the functioning of the very buddhi which can not be conceived to exist before creation at the state of dissolution. If bondage be a precondition of the creative process and if bondage means the existence of at least the intellect, (buddhi) which is again said to be a product of creation, we get into a vicious circle.

24. We find then that dissolution of the objective world and the conservation of the conditions of bondage without which a fresh creation is impossible contradict one another and make the understanding of creation extremely difficult. Closely connected with this there is another difficulty namely whether transformation of prakrti is partial or total. The ordinary way in which the process of the evolution of the different products is described seems to mean that prakriti is transformed, without any reservation, into buddhi and that again, without any reservation, into buddhi and that again, without any reservation, into ahankara and so on. From this the student is apt to understand that prakrti is completely transformed into the next determinate state and so on till the most determinate products are evolved. But this meaning is not tenable, for the simple reason that it

would imply t at when the five gross that when the five gross elements and the eleven indriyas are evolved there would remain neither buddhi nor ahankara, which is absurd.

25. Another difficulty in connection with transformation is felt and it is further increased if evolution is conceived in the light of transformation of energy. Transformation of the potential energy to the Kinetic one is a process in time without which we can hardly think of it. Is the process of evolution also a temporal process?

The answer to this question seems to be in the affirmative. The texts and commentaries describe the different stages of evolution exactly as a successive series, the numbers of which are said to precede or succeed one another as the case may be. But this apparently valid description begins to be a doubtful one as we are told towards the end of the process that time itself is but a mode of the gross evolute akasa, before the evolution of which, therefore, the process cannot be conceived to be in time. How is this riddle--another petitio--to be overcome? The only escape from the difficulty seems to be to deny the temporal character of evolution. This makes evolution itself a meaningless category and quite inapplicable to the Sankhya process, which has to be viewed then as a logical process by which, for example, the conclusion is derived from the premises. Thus interpreted the Sankhya theory will resemble that of Spinoza, prakrti being conceived like Spinoza's substance, as the absolute logical prius which is presupposed by the conception of every object and the relation between prakriti and its so-called evolutes being conceived like that between the substance and its attributes and modes. This Spinozistic or logical version of the

Sankhya theory will require us to climb up to prakrti from the finite objects by the reverse logical process of finding out the logical presupposition of the given objects. But the greatest difficulty in accepting this innovation is that this will reduce the process of evolution or creation to a subjective one and will fail to preserve the realistic conception of transformation as found in Sankhya and therefore, the distinction between Vedanta and Sankhya theories of creation will be unintelligible.

26. Again if there be many spirits, how are we to understand the cessation of evolution on the attainment of freedom as described by the Sankhya writers? While one spirit is free, another is in bondage, and then there is at the same time the necessity of admitting the disappearance and the appearance of the world. This can be possible either if the process of evolution and disappearance is a subjective one and, therefore, a personal affair or if there are as many simultaneous objective worlds evolved as there are spirits in bondage. Which of these is to be accepted and which to be rejected? All these difficulties regarding the conceptions of nature, creation and spirit usually incline one to seek for their solution in Vedanta. But is there no escape from them in the realistic way that is generally known to be the Sankhya way? Is it necessary to believe that Sankhya perfected itself in Vedanta.

27. G. HANUMANTHA RAO. A REVIEW OF LEUBA'S STUDIES IN RELIGION AND MYSTICISM. Leuba's studies in religion and mysticism have attracted much attention in recent years. It has been felt by many that they have definitely proved once for all that religion and mysticism are illusory rather than objective. Considered as psychological studies of religion and mysticism they are open to serious shortcomings. It is

the object of this paper to refer to three of them. They are: (1). Confusion of standpoints; (2) Bias of Abnormal psychology; (3) Incorrect analysis and characterisation of religious experience as experience.

Confusion of standpoints: Leuba's studies are professedly psychological but their assumptions and arguments are not infrequently metaphysical. As a psychologist, it is his business to describe religious experiences as fully and accurately as possible and to bring out their distinctive character as religious experiences. Evaluating them or inquiring into their objectivity or validity falls outside the scope of his task.

28. This makes him doubly blameworthy: firstly because he does not confine himself to the psychological point of view which he clearly professes and secondly, because he fights shy of metaphysical argument even though his assertion demands it.

29. His documentary study of occidental as well as oriental literature on mysticism is far too incomplete for his study to rank as science. The strong point of science is the emphasis it lays on relevant data, both positive and negative, those that support one's hypothesis as well as those that are opposed to it. It is just here that Leuba's studies are weakest; they lay him open to the fallacy of non-observation. He takes into consideration only such facts as satisfy his bias and ignores such as do not suit him.

30. It is not uncommon for psychologists to bring the bias that they have acquired in one department of study to bear upon others clearly different from it. The studies of Freud are noted for this vicious tendency and Leuba's studies add further examples to it. The concepts of repression, suggestion, obsession and delusion that are valuable in

the study of abnormal experiences are made to do extra-duty in the field of the normal and healthy. Leuba has made excellent use of them in analysing abnormal religious experiences and in showing them to be diseases of the mind rather than divine revelations. By showing that such experiences are delusional he thinks that he has proved that all religion is a delusion and that all mysticism is a delusion. He is here committing what is called the "particularistic fallacy." In addition to this there is in evidence the fallacy of non-observation also. In quoting cases of mystic experience, he cleverly confines himself to the sickly forms of it and avoids altogether the more robust and intellectual types of it.

31. Leuba is here subject to the vicious tendency that is prominent in certain contemporary scientists, of reducing phenomena of one science into terms of another science. The psychologists are trying to reduce the religious, the moral, the aesthetic experiences into purely psychological terms and to deny of them everything distinctive. Similarly, the biologists are trying to reduce psychology into a branch of biology and the chemists, in their turn, are attempting to annex biology into their own domain. The physicist likewise tries to reduce chemistry into physics; finally the mathematicisn wants to reduce everything into mere equations.

32. Hocking very aptly points out "the misinterpretation of mysticism here in question is due to the fact that what is a psychological report (a true one) is taken as a metaphysical statement (and a false one). From the fact that one's experience of Gos is 'one, immediate and ineffable' it does not follow that God Himself is one, immediate and ineffable...It is true that this inference from the nature of the experience to the nature of its object is here of the closest order and it is also true that

many a mystic has committed himself to that inference. But it is possible and necessary to reject it."..."I judge then that the marks commonly attributed to the mystic absolute are in the first place so many contributions to mystic psychology." Merely because Hocking has shown that many a mystic has taken a mere illusion for a fact it does not follow that he holds that every mystic commits the same fallacy. From the fact that Hocking has shown that some mystics go wrong it does not follow as Leuba seems to think it does, that Hocking looks upon every mystic as going wrong. From the fact that Hocking asserts that the mystic experience in itself is no guarantee to its validity, it does not follow that mystic experience is necessarily invalid. In order to become valid it must square with reason. Hocking repudiates such as are not consistent with reason, not every form of mystic experience.

33. Mystic intuition, epistemologically considered, is of the same status as other forms of immediate experience but its content is different and the emotional qualities connected with it are also different. Hence what it reveals is not irrelevent to the search for God. It is more relevent to the quest of the divine than the contents of other intuitions, though in respect of its validity it is on a par with other intuitions.

34. M.S. SRINIVASA SARMA: ETHICAL RELATIVITY AND ITS BEARING ON "SITTLICHKEIT." The self is not an isolated atom, but is comprehensible only as a member of society. Man is what he is because of and in virtue of the community. It is his social significance that makes life valuable to him; and it is the emptiness of social content that makes life worthless and drives him to suicide. The child inherits everything valuable from the race before it

comes into the world; and its long period of infancy consisting of about twenty years is spent in assimilating from society the system of knowledge, the code of morals, and the form of religion which are indispensable to its development as a full blown personality.

35. The criterion which settles for us what specific duties are is to be found in the customs and traditions which embody the codifications of law-givers and the actual experiences and rational convictions of countless generations of men. The Germans have a very suggestive term to express this characteristic function of morality, namely, sittlichkeit which Fichte defines as those principles of conduct, which regulate people in their relations to each other, and have become a habit and second nature at the stage of culture and of which therefore they are not explicitly conscious. Sittlichkeit thus comprises the social conventions and rules of manners, and is the source of instruction regarding conduct, without which the individual would be practically helpless in determining the right courses of action in various situations. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act, and warns him against taking a selfish and narrow point of view.

36.Society is an unconscious and gradual formation; it is characterised by inevitable unity and continuity in its evolution. It conserves in its sittlichkeit the achievements of the past and the unrealised aspirations of the future. It is fortunate for progress that this is so; without these rules, each would be thrown on his own resources of reason and experience. Such a course would quickly reduce social life to chaos. Again if every one had to start anew to frame all his ideals and make his laws, we should be in as melancholy a plight morally as we should be intellectually if we had to build

each science afresh. The fundamental safe-
guards which the sittlichkeit provides against
individual impulse and passion, the conditions
of close association, interdependence and
mutual sympathy which the group affords, the
habituation to certain lines of conduct valued
by the group--all this is the root on which
the stem and flower of personality naturally
grow and thrive.

37. Psychologists tell us that the integrity
and the sanity of the individual are entirely
dependent on the vitality and continuity of
his memory. Even the smallest injury to memory
results immediately in incipient insanity. In
the same way, to break sharply with the past
is to court social amnesia which means the
death of society and the extinction of its
culture. The sanity and the unity of the group
consists in the continuity of its tradictions.
The saving of a great legacy of culture, the
maintenance of the best racial type, the wel-
fare of succeeding generations must be guided
by a sobering intensity of purpose and a pro-
found sense of responsibility. The lesson of
this line of argument for us is that we should
not insulate ourselves against the living
stream of thought and action that is our heri-
tage, the right assimilation of which alone
can give us strength.

38. But it should not be imagined that it is
proposed to put up a reactionary plea against
any progress. That would be neither desirable
nor possible. But the path of progress is not
the Nietzschean programme of moral revolution,
but the safe and steady path of reconstructing
and re-interpreting moral ideals and principles
in the light of varied experiences and new cir-
cumstances. Natura non facit saltum. Even if
were desirable to cut ourselves adrift from
the past and strike out an untrammelled course,

we should soon find that it is absolutely impossible to do so. A society, as John Morley says, can only pursue its normal course by means of a certain progression of changes; and these have a definite origin and ordered antecedents, and are in a direct relation with the past.
39. Progress is not the intrinsic quality of changes; nor is it inevitable. It can come about only by long range thinking, sublime vision, and determined effort. Change may be for good; it may also be for bad. There is no inherent principle of betterment in the evolution of the universe.
40. S.S. RAGHAVACHAR. SATADUSANI ON BHEDA: According to Advaita the central fact of the universe is a homogeneous unity of infinite consciousness and distinctions of any kind are illusory. This is established in two ways: 1. Epistemological: that difference can never be apprehended and 2. Ontological: that its nature is ultimately indefinable.
41. P.G. DUTT. REALITY & PERCEPTION: In spite of the various theories we have hardly risen above the Humean interpretation of perception. It is said that by interpreting sensation we form an idea of the thing which stimulates us and produces the sensation in our mind. It naturally follows that it is impossible for us to know the sensa, the reality, or the thing-in-itself and we are led to solipsism. Moreover the way in which the nature of real ity has been defined makes the quest after reality a hopeless task. Reality, they maintain, is something other than its attributes and different from the sensation produced by it on our minds.
42. S.N.L. SRIVASTAVA: ADVAITISM IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN THOUGHT. Each science gives a systematic account of its own limited sphere. Philosophy is an attempt to correlate the ultimate findings of all Sciences. Philosophy

is a search after the central and all-explaining principle of the universe. The philosophic genius of India culminated in the Advaita Philosophy, which has come to be regarded as the terminus ad quem of all philosophical thinking.

43. The starting point of modern idealism is the most fundamental fact of experience, the duality of subject and object, held together in epistemological co-ordination. The most general statement we can make about reality is that reality is subject-object. We have on the one hand the experiencing subject and on the other, the world of experiencing objects. "The supremacy of the spirit," writes Perry "is argued from the theory of the priority of the knowing consciousness itself, over all with which it has to do. The assertion of the priority of the Cognitive consciousness, the assertion that being is dependent on the knowing of it, may then, be termed as cardinal principle of idealism."

The self is epistemologically speaking the ultimate knower of the world objects, the world which as Bosanquet says "exists in the medium of knowledge." The self, in short, is the foundational intelligence the ultimate epistemological ground of the entire knowable universe.

So far with regard to the self. What is the Absolute? The Absolute in modern idealistic thought is more fundamental than the self. While the self is the epistemological ground of the objective world, the Absolute is the ground both of the objective world and the self that comprehends it. The self is the individual knower, the Absolute the All-knower.

Here we come upon a radical divergence between modern idealistic thought and Indian Vedantism. From the Vedantic standpoint the self is ultimately identical with the Absolute; though from an empirical or Vyavaharika stand-

point it appears differentiated from the Absolute. The unity or oneness of the self and the Absolute is the corner-stone of the Advaitic system.

It discards the distinction between the individual knower and the All-knower and suggests that there is but one knower, one comprehending intelligence as the foundation of all knowable or intelligible existence. The nature of knowledge itself suggests only one entity at the back of it.

44. In every act of knowledge that we have, we are immediately conscious of its origination from the self, so that every act of knowledge, as Hamilton says, can be expressed in the formula "I know that I know." Knowledge, as the Mimamsaka Prabhakara said, is a triputisamvita, where the knower, the known, and the act of knowledge are all simultaneously given in any act of cognition. It is impossible to have an act of knowledge, without the knower being revealed in the very same act. It is nothing short of sheer dogmatism to point to anything of the nature of an Absolute or an All-knower behind this knowing 'I'. The self as the ultimate knower cannot be equated with anything less than the first principle, the foundational reality. It exceeds and is subsumptive of all that is known. Individuality is a false attribute of the self, unreal metaphysically. The self is the Absolute.

It is because consciousness is the very essence of self that it comprehends the entire objective universe. Consciousness, we repeat is the very essence of self, and not merely its attribute. Modern idealism takes the self to be a finite centre of consciousness rooted in Infinite Consciousness or God or the Absolute. Now, there is an apparent contradiction in the very idea of a finite centre of consciousness. Can

a principle whose very essence is consciousness be finite? Can we put any limitation to consciousness? No, for the consciousness of that limitation would necessarily exceed it. All limitation is within consciousness. All limitation being perceived by consciousness, the perceiving consciousness ever exceeds it. Consciousness in its very nature is infinite. The Vedantic Philosophers never failed to realise this; hence they characterised consciousness as Vibhu.

It is the highest triumph of modern idealistic thought to have dealt a fatal blow to Naturalism by vindicating the logical priority of mind to Nature, and the supremacy of the former over the latter. Reality, beyond the range of knowledge, is simply conconceivable. All that is, is in knowledge. If anything could be called a first principle in Philosophy, then surely, no other principle could have greater claim for it than this. The relation of thought to reality is the central pivot round which the entire idealistic thought of to-day moves. The real world of our common experience is said to be outside the passing course of ideas and images in the individual minds and is construed as the permanent system of things to which the transitory ideas and images in the individual minds refer. Our fundamental contention is that the real that is in knowledge, could not exist otherwise than as knowledge. Berkeley's profound remark that ideas can be copies of ideas only, has unfortunately, been lightly passed over by modern idealistic thinkers. Reality is throughout such stuff as knowledge is made of. Josiah Royce has rightly observed "The world beyond all ideas is a bare mental that I know it." Only an existence which partakes of the nature of knowledge is capable of being apprehended in a knowledge process.

We are inevitably led to the conclusion that all reality is spiritual. The knower, knowing and the known (object) are distinguishable aspects in knowledge and of knowledge.

To mark off "ideas in the mind" from the rest of reality is to create an artificial division in the seamless and undivided unity of knowledge which reality is. What we are wont to call, or rather miscall "ideas in the mind" are the intermittently successive acts of knowledge, which construct for us the objective. Reality on our view is an undivided and indivisible continuum of knowledge, and the 'object' so called is in the last analysis found to be made of the very stuff of knowledge.

To sum up, our foregoing discussion has brought us to the recognition of one fundamental knower, the Root Reality, whether we call it the Self, or the Absolute or the Ego or by any other name, and that epistemologically viewed the supposed duality of self and the Absolute or the All knower is a sheer fiction. There is but one fundamental and foundational knowing principle, which epistemologically is the substratum of the entire knowable universe, and therefore of the entire range of the objective. Further the entire objective is sustained by a continuous ideal affirmation of the knowing principle which realises its inherent necessity of knowing by positing an objective which is known. This is Advaitism, the view that ultimately the One alone is the Real.

45. J.C. BANERJEE. INTUITION AND INTELLECT. Is it not too much on the part of those Intuitionists who draw a line of demarcation between intellect and intuition? Is intuition a distinct mode of knowledge as compared to intellect? If we understand by intuition a non-relational apprehension, how can it be a distinct mode of knowledge?

We think that intuition cannot set up alone as a sufficient way of knowing and the reasons are obvious: Firstly it cannot define what it perceives inasmuch as the definition presupposes a concept. Secondly it cannot express what it perceives or knows since language is made up of judgments and judgments of concepts. Lastly "it cannot defend its truth nor distinguish true from false interpretation" without the help of the intellect.

46. Is there an intuition of ultimate reality? If reality is known by intuition then that reality is not distinct from the intuition of it; and if it is so then there cannot be any state of reality which is not known i.e. the reality is ever known.

47. "INTO THE MATRIX OF MEMORY" (Author's name not given). Akasa or Ether is viewed as the so-called basic substance of universe within which we have our being. But memory is greater than Akasa. It is the basic principle not only of the universe of name and form but it underlies also the threee states of the self--waking, dream and sleep--though appearing differently in different states. It may be asked what is it that persists as memory throughout? The question is illegitimate for persistence implies time and time is an illusory creation of memory. To call it maya or 'avidya' is to go back a step further and not to explain it. Now is there any question of memory without or apart from a previous experience? But it begs the question, for it is the very thing that is to be proved or explained. Indeed memory is unanalysable or indefinable. There is no 'it' in memory for it implies existence and existence implies memory. Hence the fallacy of arguing in a circle.

Bertrand Russell in his 'Analysis of mind' attempts at a solution of this puzzle. Memory, he argues, is no doubt of the past but the act of remembering is always an act in the present and there being no logical connection between events it is not at all theoretically absurd to think that along with the act of remembering the past is created. Hence memory has only pragmatic value. Theoretically it is not tenable. But he warns us not to indulge in the serious hypothesis for, as he says, it is uninteresting (whatever that term may mean). Russell feels the difficulty but by calling the hypothesis uninteresting he simply avoids the question instead of facing it.

Again Russell distinguishes between memory and true memory. What actually occurs in memory is described as true memory. According to Bergson recollection alone is true memory. True memory has only pragmatic value. Memory as such cannot be described. It is immediate and can be referred to itself alone and that is why it is indescribable. It can only be experienced. Memory is always the present memory and the whole of the past that is remembered may be the illusion of the present moment.

Here Russell tries to hoodwink. Theoretically it may be impeachable but we cannot but feel that there is a past which we may rely on. Feeling of 'reality' is a characteristic of all illusion and on this feeling he builds up his system. Feeling cannot give us true knowledge and much of the intellect is often coloured by our feeling which hinders us from seeing clearly the truth.

Knowledge can only save us and with knowledge our illusion goes (the example of rope and snake) and we are face to face with the real. Hence the necessity of knowledge.

Now in knowledge as well as in ignorance one

thing that is certain, and without reference to which there cannot be any question of knowledge or ignorance, is self. In memory as mere illusion there is reference to self and it is self which bridges the gulf between memory and the past to which it is referred. But self must not be identified with false individuality. Self is something spiritual. It is not the life external but life internal.

Memory is pure experience. It is pure light and we are concerned with that experience for there is no 'it' there that is said to persist.

Metaphysics can go so far but metaphysics is not the ideal of reality.

Memory is the very life of experience. Intellect and will are based on it. Consciousness of anything is the memory of something as an object in thought or a percept in perception. Memory again is always present memory though it has reference to the past for when you remember you remember here and now. Therefore memory and consciousness are identical.

When we ask what persists in memory we try to understand consciousness itself. Consciousness gives reality to every situation by being what it is and memory brings in past, present and future in one trend and keeps reality going for without reference to time and space the world has no meaning and memory is the basis of time and space. True memory gives us perfect knowledge and false memory gives false knowledge for we remember something for something and it is called Adhyasa. But it then, too, is memory. Hence memory is the basic principle of the universe, as well as the very life of the Being. Thus the real is ever conscious of itself i.e. its memory of itself is ever perfect.

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1. A.G. HOGG: "THE CLAIM OF SOCIETY ON THE METAPHYSICALLY-MINDED." (in 11th I.P.C.Pt.2.'35).
Since that date, to track out all unconscious preconceptions, and to examine with ruthless honesty their title to acceptance, has appeared to me to be one part of the serious business of life. It is not, indeed, by any means the duty of every one; but for him who has the metaphysical bent of mind and leisure to exercise that bent, it is a sacred obligation which he owes to humanity and to his own soul.
2. Philosophy has fallen upon evil days. Her class rooms are all but deserted; her professional exponents are few; and the public lip-homage still paid to her does not prove its sincerity, in any notable degree, by sacrifices made for her sake. Now if society is treating philosophy so scurvily, is it possible that the fault may lie partly with her own devotees? Have we perhaps been failing to honour the claim which society rightly has upon us? Have the severely technical issues which are an inevitable by-product of the main philosophical undertaking drawn us away too much from that deeply human enterprise itself?
3. Specialisation breeds evil as well as good. And the primary social function of the philosopher is, I believe, to serve as the necessary intellectual counterpoise to the specialist and to provide a prophylactic against the harm that can be done to the general mind by over specialisation on the part of the leaders of thought.
4. It endeavours to become consciously aware of those assumptions and preconceptions which the ordinary man regards as so obvious that he does not notice them to be, for him, mere assumptions. It looks to see whether these preconceptions are demonstrably true. If they seem undemonstrable, it sets itself to determine whether they are nevertheless scientifically legitimate because

indispensable to all coherent thought. And it tries never to be betrayed into confusing together the demonstrable, the probable and the merely possible.

5. The questions which even the wisest of us ask ourselves are probably as inaptly framed as are a child's questions about mere every-day matters. So the real progress which metaphysics has made in the course of centuries--that is, the advance which is so definite or final that it should never need to be gone through again,--lies less in getting better answers than in learning to put better questions. By critical study of past Philosophy we are saved from the mistake, into which the untrained thinker on philosophical subjects frequently falls of expressing the philosophical problem in terms which have already been discovered to render it insoluble --the mistake of asking ourselves old questions so badly worded that both the answer "Yes" and answer "No" are necessarily false.

6. It consists in the attempt to answer the kind of questions which arise in a man's mind when, in a reflective mood, he interrupts the business of <u>doing</u> things, and of extending the <u>range</u> of his knowledge--interrupts it in order to ask himself, with regard to the world as he knows it, and the activities which make up life as he lives it, and it all means, what is its total significance and worth.

Typically, then, Philosophy is preoccupation with wholeness. It seeks to transcend the fragmentariness of our ordinary judgments, and to achieve an integralness of personality.

7. The very effort to reflect involves withdrawing the self from its unself-conscious immersion in the flow of experience, and setting the content of experience over against it

as an object of study.

8. No man can practise reflection only and all the time. Of necessity he must step back again into the active life. And as soon as he does so, the continuity of experience begins to reassert itself. His self ceased to be, in its own self-apprehension, a mere dispassionate centre of observation over against an independent real, and becomes again an immediate unity in which apprehension, feeling and activity are inextricably interfused. Continuity returns also to the world that he unreflectively apprehends.

9. Men came gradually to recognise more and more that in the nature of the case scientific constructions of the real cannot claim ultimate truth; and it was in the Idealistic criticism of categories that the growing recognition of this truth had its source. One may find an interesting illustration of this in Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science, published in 1892. From cover to cover the books reeks with contempt of the mere metaphysician, and yet it is in itself nothing else than a gruelling criticism of scientific categories.

10. Its collapse may have rendered moribund the crasser Materialism which finds the secret of our whole rich universe in the blind dance of pictorially imaginable atoms.

11. How comes it that the desire to apprehend reality in its wholeness makes the philosophical mind alert to detect the unconscious assumptions and uncritical conceptions on which ordinary thinking is so prone to rely? The reason is not far to seek. The very effort to apprehend reality as a whole requires the thinking subject to set over against himself as object not merely all outer existence but the whole of himself as he knows himself, all his habits of feeling, thought and action. What ordinarily

is most immediately his very self becomes, in that moment, something other than the thinking subject, something, therefore, which it falls to him to criticise and appraise. No longer may any habit of judgment be accepted by him simply because it is familiar, for he looks on it now as something merely given, something other than himself which is merely there, and is to be acquisced in only with deliberate responsibility and at his own peril. No longer may any belief be relied on solely because it is socially universal, for at that moment he is alone with the absolute, solitarily face to face with an 'other' which is absolute because at that moment all being has been funded into it without any remainder except the empty thinking subject. To have had that experience even once, with any vividness, leaves a permanent mark on a man's mentality for it evokes in him an unforgettable realisation of the precariousness of an untested preconceptions.

10. Let us never allow these special studies to render us forgetful of our social function of exposing and opposing the false abstractions, preconceptions and one-sidedness to which the philosophically untrained mind of the general community is inevitably so prone.

11. N.G. DAMLE. "INSUFFICIENCY OF THE INTELLECT." (title by P.B). The achievement of philosophy in proportion to its promise has been, it was contended, very poor and insignificant. In the conflicting and inconsistent conclusions of different philosophies nothing seemed quite certain. The barren speculations tended to engender skepticism of a thoroughgoing and fundamental character. With all its pretentions to consistency of thought each system appeared to be full of internal contradictions. Each system appeared to defend certain "prejudices"

on the basis of certain questionable premises with an elaborate Logic whose strength lay in its weakest link. Philosophy seemed to have lost its head in the clouds of abstractions of all sorts.

12. The new logic means an unsparing criticism and a thoroughgoing depreciation of the entire fabric of the traditional logic and metaphysics. To a daring modernist the natural, ratiocinating activity of human reason has become the procedure of a distorting and falsifying intellect. It is because of such a mental habit and mode of thinking that modernism in philosophy has become almost a cult of unintelligibility. Not only does it question the fundamental categories of human intellect but the very belief in the intelligibility of the universe which is a necessary pre-supposition in any attempt at the explanation of the world.

13. We can understand the criticism of reason upon itself. It is self-criticism. But that will always be of the nature of the delimitation of reason by itself and can never be the abandonment of reason which would be meaningless.

14. We may affirm that it is not an all-dissolving experience but an all-illuminating and all-sustaining one. It is a sense of fulfilment, a sense of rest that is attained in harmony and not in vacancy. It is a significant silence.

15. The doctrine of Intuition is not easy to propound. It is not to be confused with the Anti-intellectualism and Irrationalism of recent speculation. It is not the doctrine of A-Logism but supra-logism. It does not condemn reason, it does not belittle its importance, on the contrary; it strongly insists upon hard intellectual discipline. Reflective knowledge is a preparation for the Integral Experience which is 'purified vision of truth.' We cannot resort to Intuition simply to avoid the exertions of

hard thinking. If Intuition is a substitute for rigorous thinking, if it means superstitious beliefs and vague and thoughtless sentimentality it is certainly open to the charge that it 'covers a multitude of intellectual sins.' In Intuition the synoptic view of the rational philosopher blends with the beatific vision of the religious mystic.

16. We distinguish between intuition and intellect; but we must not construe that distinction into an entire disparateness or an irreconcilable opposition. The Great Indian Tradition has not committed that mistake. It has tried to complete the account of reason by the revelation of intuition, which is the wisdom gained by the whole spirit. Intellect is not despised as giving a totally distorted or a false picture of reality. It account is true so far as it goes, only it does not go far and deep enough. It tries to give us a cogent and coherent account of reality but it is more or less external and it does not penetrate into the heart of reality. Its thought-constructions are more or less abstract and lacking in directness and emotional warmth and intimacy which characterise intuition. The predominantly analytical, discursive and vacillating character of intellect requires to be corrected and supplemented by the wholeness, directness and utter certainty of intuitive vision. Intuition transcends reason, but does not contradict it. In the words of Spinoza, Intuition is thoughtfulness matured to inspiration." It is indeed the flower and perfection of intellect.

17. D.M. DATTA. IDEALISM Vs.REALISM. Even in a recent book The Scientific Outlook, ('31) Russell goes a step further to open the question of the belief in the existence of an external object even while it is perceived.

He plainly confesses that no strict logical argument can lead us from the sensations which we have about a reality, 'Jones,' to the belief in his extramental existence. He further points out clearly that 'Jones' is a convenient hypothesis.

18. The guiding thought of the realist is: Why disbelieve the object whose existence cannot be disproved? That of the Idealist is: Why believe in the object whose existence cannot be proved. Realists, like Mr. Russell, urge the first consideration in refuting the idealism of Berkeley. Idealists, like Stace, urge the second in rejecting realism. Both transgress the limits of valid thought, when they take it for granted that absence of disproof justifies belief and acceptance of that absence of proof justifies disbelief and denial.

19. S.K. MAITRA: "KANT'S VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL INTUITION. It is absurd, Kant thought, that God should know with the help of discursive reasoning, for the latter involves limitation. As Vaihinger has pointed out, even as early as 1755 in his Nova Dilucidatio Kant held the view that God's knowledge cannot be discursive.

God's knowledge, therefore, must be intuitive. But again, it cannot be through sensuous intuition; for sensuous intuition is always coloured by the forms of Space and Time. Kant, however, is emphatic in declaring that space and time are to be exluded from God's knowledge. In his Posthumous Works he affirms: "The present, past and future do not exist for God."

20. Discursive thinking is limited by the categories, and for God no categories can exist. Categorical knowledge is, moreover, always indirect knowledge; it is the knowledge of a thing through universals, and therefore, no complete knowledge.

20. It is only the presence of sensuous intui-

tion that stands in the way of human beings seeing things as they really are. If once this veil of sensuous intuition is removed by intellectual intuition, things would present themselves to us in a different light. They would no longer be phenomena but noumena.

21. Kant revives another of his pre-Critical views, namely, his view of the "transcendental object," or the absolutely undetermined thing-in-itself, existing completely outside of consciousness. Thirdly, as Kant proceeds with the Critique, a higher conception of reality dawns upon his mind, namely, that of a completely unified whole, to which he gives the name Idea of Reason.

22. S.N.L. SHRIWASTAVA: "DRG DRSYA VIVEKA MYSTICISM." (title by P.B.). Mysticism may be defined as the direct, immediate and veridical experience of reality in its ultimate essence. The philosophical tenability of mysticism depends on the truth that our rational interpretation of reality is not final; Our set logical categories fail to reach the final truth.

23. The first assumption is a direct refutation of what is tacitly assumed in all intellectualistic philosophies viz. that the reality which philosophy is called upon to reflect over and explain is only understandable and explicable in terms of the universal and a priori presuppositions of reason or certain ultimate and fundamental categories of thought.

24. Experience itself carries with it a positive indication of a supra-logical reality which is not only veridically given in experience, but is what makes logical or rational experience possible. The subject of experience, we shall attempt to show is such reality.

Let us start with what is the most general

character of reality, viz. that reality is subject-object, a knowing or perceiving consciousness or intelligence on the one hand, and a known objective on the other, a totum objectivum by which we shall mean here not only all that is actually known, but also all that is knowable as such--the totality of the known and the knowable, the entire region of objects which qua objects are distinguishable from the subject in having the character of knownness or knowableness. For a proper understanding of what follows these two distinct spheres of reality, the sphere of the subject and the sphere of the objective, with their characteristic differences well deserve to be borne in mind.

When we say that the universe is rationally interpretable or explicable in terms of the categories of thought, all that we can legitimately mean by such a universe is the sphere of the objective alone in the sense explained above, and not in the sphere of the subject. The subject does comprehend the objective on a rational plan, but it itself transcends the rational order, it itself, as Kant has pointed out, cannot be characterised by any of the categories of thought. The subject exceeds our set logical categories; it is supra-logical.

25. It is a principle of cardinal significance that through the mechanism of what we call our rational understanding, only the objective can be appraised and apprehended, and not the subject which, as all that is objective is for it, is the primal fact in existence, the initial reality.

To bring out fully the supra-logical character of the subject, we must eludicate a little the meaning of the subject. By the subject is here meant the ultimate comprehending consciousness which is the presupposition and precondition of

all that is objective, the entire region of the known and the knowable. Thus construed, the subject is distinguishable from all that is comprehensible as a content of knowledge, even from the egoity or 'I' which is usually called the self. The 'I' with all that it connotes is a comprehensible, and therefore properly speaking, belongs to the sphere of the objective. The real subject is not the 'I' but the transcendental condition of the comprehensibility of 'I'. What we appraise by our categories of thought is the objective not the subject.

The subject is the principle back of the reasoning process and is the precondition of rational experience. Rational knowledge is in its very nature discursive and relational, reasoning is harmonising or discriminating of facts. The universals with which our logical understanding works are identities in difference. Conceptual activity involves the combining or welding together of concepts that enter into every single act of judgment,--concepts that are discrete, isolated and appear successively. This process of synthesising the several distinct concepts and welding them together into a single act of judgment, requires as its precondition a non-relational and transcendental principle of consciousness, which is the ground of the process, the nexus which binds together the diversity of facts and concepts. That is the real subject, the prius of rationality and the rational universe. It is not thought or reason which is the prime reality, but the Ground Consciousness (Kootastha Chaitanya) or the subject which is the precondition and prius of thought or reason itself.

The subject, then, is wholly beyond the categories of thought; it is the supra-logical Real. And once we have conceded this, we

are constrained to concede further that a rational account of the universe cannot be final for the incontrovertible reason that the categories of thought appertain only to the objective counterpart of reality and not to the whole of reality; the subject being left out. To appraise the whole, it would require what Kant called intellectual perception which "would not know its object discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous perception." (Watson: The Philosophy of Kant). The only satisfying terminus of knowledge can be a unitive consciousness where the dualism between subject and the objective is got over. "The idea of an intuitive understanding," writes Caird, "an understanding which in the consciousness of its object...appears, therefore, as the necessary terminus or goal, toward which all our knowledge points; or, as the only kind of consciousness in which we could find a final satisfaction of the questions of our intelligence" (Caird: The Critical Philosophy of Kant Vol.2 P.13). This unitive consciousness is the common premise of the mystics all the world over. There is hardly a system of serious philosophy which does not end by pointing out the inadequacy of reason to be the oracle of final truth.

26. If the ideal of a unitive consciousness, the ideal of intellectual understanding in the Kantian sense be ever realisable, then the disparity between the subject and the objective, must in the end be only an appearance and not reality. Knowledge or experience can only be revelatory of what already is; if the unity of existence which obtains in the mystical experience were not already a fact, it would never be revealed there.

27. The world, as we will all admit, is a known world, a world which as Bosanquet says "exists

in the medium of our knowledge." All that is real, all that exists, is inevitably conditioned by knowability. All that is real must be knowable, though not necessarily known. The real is knowable. Having conceded this there should be no difficulty in determining the nature of the real. The real that can only be comprehended through the medium of knowledge, cannot in itself be opposed in nature to knowledge. Community of nature between knowing and the "known" is the very condition of the possibility of knowledge. If we admit the 'thing' or the 'object' known to be alien in its essence to knowledge, we are led to the necessity of positing a tertium quid which will account for the co-ordination of the two. Such a tertium quid by no stretch of imagination we can discover. To posit non-spiritual elements as the ultimate data of knowledge, is for ever to defeat the possibility of knowledge. Whatever be the analysis of science regarding the ultimate constitution of matter or atoms, the fact remains that in so far as they are capable of being known, their ultimate essence cannot be non-spiritual. This metaphysical truth will remain unshaken and is independent of all objective researches of physical science. Whatever be the terms whereby we choose to designate the ultimate data of experience "objects," "sense-data" etc., they are qua data of knowledge, simply such stuff as knowledge is made of. The 'objects' in the last analysis, are simply points of reference in the all-knowledge objective continuum. Knowing is an immanental reference from one point or centre to another within the oceanic stretch of the all-knowledge objective continuum. The world is throughout such stuff as knowledge is made of (Jnana-swarupa). The objective is of the nature

of knowledge, ideal in the most general sense.
The ideality of the world explains both its sublation in the mystic experience and the unitary nature of the latter. It is the ideal alone that can be negatable in any state of experience. The world is an ideal projection of spirit or consciousness which is the Sole Real, the fundamental Reality.

28. The question of the possibility of transcending the rational level of experience is the crux of mysticism. Now, what can prove the possibility of mystic experience is mystic experience itself. There cannot be a logical proof of what is ex hypothesi supra-logical. The case for mysticism, therefore, depends not on any logical credenda, but rather on those experiences of life which outsoar the boundaries of rational apprehension.

29. We have spoken of aesthetic intuitions as being supra-rational and we may note further that they are also trans-individual. The putting off of 'individuality' is a remarkable feature of mystic experiences and we have this characteristic in all genuine aesthetic intuitions.

30. Another positive instance of trans-individual experience is susupti or the deep sleep state. It cannot be denied that the deep sleep state is a positive state of conscious experience; were it not so, were it only a void or a lapse into unconsciousness as it is usually supposed, no recollection of it would ever be possible. Yet the I-sense or egoity is clearly absent in the deep sleep state.

A second significant feature of the susupti state, besides the absence of egoity, is the complete cessation of the functioning of the mind or the intellect and the senses. The susupti is described as Chetomukhah or having consciousness alone as the faculty of apprehension. Therein we have no apprehension by the pure light of

consciousness, unmediated by the instrumentality of the intellect and the senses. The susupti is a distinct instance of positive experience where the intellectual mechanism is laid aside, where the functioning of the sense-organs is completely suspended, and where the spirit apprehends by its own unaided light. The significance and metaphysical import of susupti is missed when we take it as a lapse into unconsciousness. Far from being this, it is a more intensified, more in-gathered state of consciousness--prajna-naghana as it is styled.

To conclude, what is the bearing of these observations on the philosophical tenability of mysticism? Can mysticism be maintained as a philosophical creed? The prevailing tendency in most of the contemporary philosophical circles is to regard mysticism as extra-philosophical. This tendency may be attributed to two things:--i. Inadequate analysis of experience, and ii. The uncritical acceptance of the principle that reason is capable of being the oracle of final truth.

It is the inadequate analysis of experience, a narrow perspective, the failure to bring within the purview of philosophical comprehension, such significant facts of experience as the susupti and the aesthetic intuitions. What we usually call the <u>facts</u> of experience do not exhaust the elements of experience; experience also contains as its constituent elements <u>values</u> and these have to be reckoned with in any ultimate theory of experience. With regard to the second point, we have made it sufficiently clear that our set logical categories are only fitted to appraise the objective and not the subject, which is the <u>primal</u> reality. It the primal reality be itself supra-logical, how can any logical theory claim to set forth the final truth of existence? If philosophy

has for its aim an insight into the ultimate nature of experience based on a comprehensive consideration of its diverse elements--facts and values and also such states of conscious experience as the susupti, it will necessarily point to mystical experience as the terminus of its enquiry. There can be no philosophical objections to mysticism, although mysticism finally means the transcendence of philosophy. Experience we have seen, does contain facts which lend support to the possibility of mystical experience with its supra-logical, supra-individual and unitary characters. Mysticism is, in the end, a faith; but not a blind faith which philosophy can dispute or experience challenge.

31. P.G. DUTT "THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA" In the sense in which reality is used in the Vedanta it cannot be ascribed to the empirical world, because the expression 'empirical reality' involves self-contradiction in the Vedantic sense. The empirical world is full of changes and is ever changing, whereas reality as reality never changes.

32. All the modern followers of absolute Idealism or mentalism have to accept in their practical dealings the reality of the phenomenal world. Thus there seems to be a great inconsistency between Idealism on the one hand and the practical life or attitude to the phenomenal world on the other. If we accept Philosophy to be the rational interpretation of the manifold of experience then as long as this inconsistency remains it would be hardly reasonable to accept Idealism, Mentalism or the Vedantic principle of Maya. To remove this inconsistency the Buddhists abandoned the Atman or Brahman altogether and considered the belief in the Atman as heresy. But the acceptance of eternal change without the reality which changes, as well as the doctrine of transmigration cannot be understood without accepting some reality, self, or matter which changes or transmigrates.

32. The modern people refuse to come to the philosophers for inspiration and guidance. They now go to the politicians, capitalists and industrialists for ideal and direction. Thus modern philosophers have lost their hold on the people.

33. Everything starts from the testimony of the Vedas and the Upanishads. But from these sources we get not only the unreality of the world or Maya but also the reality of the crude material world. If testimony be accepted as a true source of evidence there will hardly be any justification for us to accept the one and to reject the other. In order to remove this difficulty the great Sankara had to divide knowledge into two kinds, viz. para vidya (higher knowledge) and apara vidya (lower knowledge). In other words, Sankara admitted indirectly that in the Vedas and the Upanishads there is a great confusion between the para and the apara vidya, and it was from the standpoint of the apara vidya that the world has been described as real. This is no synthesis. It is rather another way of admitting the contradiction existing between the conclusions of our knowledge and the evidence of our sense-existence.

34. This notion of identity is really a quantitative relation and is expressable by the sign of equality (=) and cannot be expressed by the verb to be. When we say that A is B we do not mean that A=B, because A is B is not convertible relation. In order to express the identity between A and B we should say that A is B and B is A; but this even does not seem to express the entire idea contained in A=B. The notion of unity is behind A=B, whereas duality is prominently persent in A is B. So when we say "That thou art" we do not mean that Thou=That.

35. The facts and phenomena of this world seem to be isolated from one another and to possess independent existence of their own. But as a matter of fact, the Vedanta points out that all these are in Brahman and have no existence apart from Him. The ascription of isolated independent existence to the facts and phenomena of this world of our experience is really Maya, mithya, or false. We are all subject to this cosmic illusion and on account of its influence we view the things and beings of this world as having independent existence of their own. One rises above this Maya when he understands that this world is in Brahman and has no existence apart from Him.

This interpretation of Maya does not reduce the world of our experience to empty nothing and harmonises our practical life with the Vedantic point of view. The world therefore is not unreal. What is unreal or false is the appearance of the facts and phenomena of this world as having independent isolated existence of their own. This is also the legitimate conclusion from Sankara's statement that the objects seen in the waking world are unreal because they are capable of being seen. Reality or being lies on the other side of seeing or experience or transcends it.

36. S.N. ROY: THE PROBLEM OF ERROR IN SAMKHYA.

Buddhi fails to know the distinction between the real and the unreal and therefore error arises. Non-discrimination (Aviveka) is the cause of error. This Aviveka is an inherent property of Buddhi because as long as Buddhi functions, this non-discrimination prevails.But nothing can be known except through the instrumentality of Buddhi. Hence, all intellectual knowledge is inherently false.

37. If this Buddhi is purified more and more so as to become nearly as pure as Purusha then the knowledge of the Self dawns on us and the Buddhi

ceases to function. Buddhi therefore may help us to the realisation of the Purusha, although through it the true nature of the latter cannot be known. When Samyag Jnana dawns upon us we understand that the knowledge and the Buddhi are two different principles, and at that stage operations of Buddhi completely stop.

38. But ex-hypothesi things of the world can be known by the Self only through Buddhi, and if the Buddhi ceases to function no knowledge of things is possible. From this it follows that true knowledge is essentially different from intellectual or discursive knowledge because the latter is always partial and incomplete and can never attain to complete truth. To gain true knowledge we should adopt the Neti Neti method, i.e., it is not this, not this (Neti neti Tattagnanat). The self is not gross matter, it is not the sense data, it is not Manas, Ahamkara or Buddhi, but it is pure consciousness.

39. The correspondence theory holds that error means absence of correspondence. But what is correspondence? In what does correspondence really consist? If I perceive a snake in a rope, is the error due to want of correspondence? In my mind there is the idea of snake and in the outside world there is rope; hence it is held that there is no correspondence. But so long as I perceive a snake, the snake is believed to be existing in the outer space. It is only when the rope is perceived that we do not see the snake. If the thing is supposed to be extra-mental we are never sure if our ideas ever correspond with it.

40. Error is said to be lack of harmony between subjective order of experiences and an objective order of facts. This, however, reminds us of the correspondence theory which we have rejected.

41. Intellectual knowledge is intrinsically wrong for. intellect fails to acquaint us with reality. If chittavritti is completely stopped then the knowledge of the real nature of the knower and the known flashes in ourselves.
42. Buddhi's function is ascertainment of the nature of things, e.g., it tells us 'this is ghata', this is pata. In knowing Buddhi differentiates one thing from another and applies definitive qualities to things, but in so doing it may assign false attributes to things. In knowing Shell "this is Silver" the Buddhi falsely identifies 'this' which is given with Silver which is not given and therefore non-existent. In so doing it becomes modified as silver which is the object of knowledge whereas the 'thing' actually present is 'shell' not 'silver.' A distinction has thus been made between 'object and thing' by Samkhyakara. In a piece of true knowledge the 'thing' (vastu) is the 'object' (visaya) but in a case of false knowledge the object is different from the thing. But how are we to determine if knowledge in a particular case is true or false? This can be determined only by reference to our knowledge of a thing being sublated (vadhita) by our later experience of that thing. If our knowledge of a thing is sublated it is false, if not, it is to be accepted as valid.

42. RAJ NARAIN. SENSORY PHENOMENA IN MYSTIC LIFE.

The Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali, IV-I, it may be interesting to note, does not recommend but only recognises the use of drugs for the attainment of special mystic powers.

43. The mystic while experiencing a sensory phenomenon, is supposed to be in a state of self-hypnosis in which the sub-conscious suggestion is accepted as a reality. The difficulty with this explanation is that though it can explain meaningful experiences, and experiences in the

nature of wish-fulfilments, it fails to account for other types of sensory experiences. Moreover, the contents of the sub-conscious belong to the individual whereas sensory phenomena are universal. The explanations considered so far have proved to be incomprehensive and inadequate.

44. The most important point, however, is to recognise the existence of inadequate stimuli as a basis for sensory phenomena in mystic life. Such inadequate stimuli are mostly internal. May it be submitted that an aspect of mystic transformation consists in an increased capacity of the organism to respond to more numerous inadequate stimuli than a normal organism does. To illustrate by an analogy from dream-consciousness. In dream state a simple stimulus of smell translates itself into a vision of a garden of variegated flowers. Is not a similar process possible in mystic consciousness?

To come to the second factor then. The past history of a mystic also determines the nature of his sensory experience. The unconscious past history of the mystic is evident in the wishfulfilment type of sensory phenomena. The conscious past history accounts for the fact why Eknath should have a vision of four handed God and Catherine of Genoa a vision of Christ bearing the cross.

The influence of social stimuli can be easily traced in the case of those mystics who live in religious institutions like monasteries, nunneries, maths and ashrams. Social stimuli should be specifically studied with reference to (a) emotion, (b) predisposition or aufgabe, and (c) inter-stimulation. The practice of Sankirtan, communal prayer, and revival meetings are good examples of social stimuli.

45. P.T. RAJU. THE NATURE OF VITANDA AND ITS RELATION TO THE METHODOLOGY OF ADVAITA. The word vaitandika is a term of abuse in most of the systems of Indian philosophy. Vitanda is defined by Gautama as that kind of jalpa in which there is no attempt to establish the theory by the rival. Chala is attack by equivocation. Jati is attack by superficial analogy and difference. Nigrahasthana again is fallacious reasoning. Thus all the helps which a vaitandika makes use of are defective reasonings. In addition, he has no position of his own.

Under these circumstances, not only is it not easy to argue with a vaitandika, but also useless and harmful. His efforts are not aimed at seeking truth, but at criticism for the sake of criticism. His interest lies only in vanquishing the opponent, but he wants to fight without anything to stand on. At the most, the ground on which he fights can only be the ground of his opponent, and his endeavour is to destroy that very ground. And like the proverbial fool in the Sanskrit literature, who cuts the very branch on which he stands, he falls down, and makes the opponent share the same fate. Hence the reluctance to argue with a vaitandika is not without justification. To argue with him will not merely not lead to a positive result, but may land us in utter confusion and scepticism.

46. To win an adversary by equivocation and the like can never be in the spirit of truth-seeking. It is the idea of victory by any means that supplies the motive for the vaitandika. But what are we to say of that philosopher who does not profess to have a position of his own, but examines and criticises the theories of others to find out whether any is consistent and acceptable? One cannot refuse to consider his arguments simply because he has no position of his own. On the contrary, his arguments would be more valuable

than those of many others in that he is not prejudiced in favour of any particular theory, and consequently his arguments are not advanced in its interest, and so do not beg the question.

47. One may say that the attitude of criticising every theory without the critic himself holding any is that of mere scepticism. Or, this attitude must be engendered by intellectual pride which is certainly an impediment to the search of truth.

But advantage, it seems can be derived by the proper employment of vitanda. The Socratic method of argument is truly a form of vitanda. In argumentation, Socrates never gives his opinion, but elicits the truth by continuous questioning until a satisfactory answer is obtained. For example, he does not give his own definition of justice as against his opponent's, but goes on objecting to his opponent's definition and its reformulation until he is satisfied. The mere desire for success in vitanda is, of course, deplorable.

48. Vada, according to him is the discussion of those who are devoid of passion, and its result is the determination of truth. We are here reminded of Descartes who asks us to weed away all passions from our mind before we begin to think. Hence, so long as we are in the right spirit, it is not necessary to start discussion with a certain traditionally accepted theory of our own. On the contrary, the search for truth is hampered by preconceived notions.

49. Not only is vitanda not inconsistent with the spirit of truth-seeking, but it is the only method to defend oneself when some direct experiences are questioned. The truth of mystic experiences is a controversial point. Those who do not possess them speak of them lightly. They are regarded as mental aberrations, self-delutions and hallucinations. But how will the mystic be able to meet the jibes of his oppo-

nent? How will he be able to meet the formida-
ble array of their arguments to prove that he
is a dupe, if not an imposter? He cannot esta-
blish through arguments that his experiences
are true, that their truth can be deduced from
some universally established facts. For the mys-
tic experiences are not amenable to exact for-
mulation and communication, and so cannot be
either the conclusions or the premises of in-
ferences. So the only weapon left in the hands
of the mystic is vitanda. He has to meet his
opponent in his own field. He has to prove that
his opponent's conception, from which the fal-
sity of mystic experiences is deduced, are inhe-
rently inconsistent. Of course, to prove that
one's opponent is in the wrong does not amount
always to proving that one is in the right. But
when one's experiences cannot be defined, in
order to defend its truth one can do no more
than disproving the opponent's contention, that
is, preventing the contradiction of one's expe-
rience.

Not only in the case of mystic experiences,
but in that of all categorical knowledge, vitan-
da is the only way in which one can meet oppo-
sition. I see a red blotting paper before me,
and it is easy to question the fact that it is
red. It is of no avail here to attempt to prove
that it is red by measuring the number of vibra-
tions of the light rays that proceed from the
paper. For before we have correlated red colour
with the number of vibrations, we must have
started from the concrete sensuous fact red,
and then measured the number of vibrations.And
now to prove that it is red by pointing to the
number of vibrations would be moving in a circle.
So if it is denied that a particular sensuous
fact before me is red, the only reply possible
is by disproving that it cannot be red. This
disproof is possible only by attacking the

grounds on which the oppenent's argument is based. Lester-Garland, speaking of von Hugel, says "He starts with the incontrovertible fact that both in the sphere of Metaphysics and that of Religion man is conscious of 'intimations' of Objective Reality of varying strength and depth. The presumption is that this belief is justified. If any one says that it is illusory, the onus probandi lies with him. The method to be adopted by one who believed it to be true is therefore not to attempt to establish it by argument, but to rebut the arguments of those who say that it is false."

In all systems of philosophy which admit an irrational or supra-rational element in experience, vitanda plays an important part. Every experience has an uniqueness of its own which defies definition. For a definition of a fact is to be given only in terms of other facts. Man may be defined as a rational animal, but neither animal nor rational is the same as human, and we cannot understand how both are combined to constitute man. So the experience of man possesses an integral and intuitive nature which cannot be conceptualised and analysed. And when the truth of that particular experience is questioned, the experiencer has no other means of rebutting the questioner's arguments than vitanda.

One can surmise by the trend of the discussion that vitanda has a close relation to the methodology of Advaita. It is a philosophy which more than any other recognises the uniqueness of every fact. For it the whole phenomenal world is anirvachaniya, pervaded by an irrational element, and reality is beyond description, is supra-rational. Truth, according to Advaita, is self-revealing. Its existence cannot be proved by any kind of argument except immediate experience, and the insistence on the importance of Srutipramana by the advaitin is necessitated by

their view of the indescribability of reality. In this century the emphasis on Sruti is to be interpreted as the emphasis on the intuition of people who were vitaragas, not affected by passions. Reference has already been made to the opinion of Descartes that before we begin to think our minds should be freed from all preconceptions and passions. If purity of mind is required in order even to reason, much more is the need of purity in case of intuition. For imperfect beings that we are, there is much chance of our taking every fancy to be the objects of right intuition. But the seers of the Sruti are men who have for long, disciplined their minds and removed all passions from them. Therefore they are the least liable to be misled. And the basic truth of this view is the fact that truth is self-revealing and can only be intuited. And because it is beyond description, and consequently every description of it is liable to error, forms of proof other than direct experience are inadequate to it.

50. According to advaita, not only the ultimate truth but also the finite is indefinable, because every fact is unique.

51. As unique, even the finite truth must be self-revelatory. And as self-revealing, it must be known, not by knowing its agreement with other truths, but through itself. Yet the falsity of a cognition can be known through other cognitions, whereas the truth of a cognition is known through itself.

Now, therefore when a finite truth, which, as unique is self-revelatory, is questioned, it is impossible to defend one-self satisfactorily by trying to establish it by argument. The only method possible is vitanda. That is why, the advaitin in his disputations with other schools of philosophy, assumes the role of a vitandika. And his logic is the outcome of his metaphysics.

52. P.S. NAIDU. "ON INDETERMINABILITY." The principle of Uncertainty (called variously as the principle of Indeterminacy, Indeterminism, Unpredictability etc) has been extended by physicists as well as philosophers to cover the doctrine of free will and to lend authoritative support to it. It has been acclaimed with great enthusiasm as the precursor heralding a revolution in physical science, which will demolish the obstacles in the path of philosophical progress; and with equal enthusiasm it has been declared to be only a passing phase in scientific thought, and that determinism will once again be restored to its proper place.

53. While physicists have been stressing the suggestions in Heisenberg's principle, metaphysicians have been, on the whole, reluctant to go the full length with them. They have clung to the old deterministic position.

54. That physics should be willing now to yield the ground that metaphysics has been fighting for since the days of Democritus, and that metaphysics should be reluctant to occupy the territory so readily given up by physics is rather strange; but this strange phenomenon is merely symptomatic of a deep seated trouble.

European philosophical thought has been built up on a solid foundation of Science. We do not deny the solidarity of the foundation. As often as there was a change in the outlook of science, so often was there a change in philosophical outlook. Now that a fundamental general principle which in the opinion of Sir Arthur Eddington, seems to rank in importance with the principle of relativity has discovered, it is but natural that thinking minds should concentrate their attention on it and work out its implications.

Has philosophy any reason to be jubilant over the discovery of the Uncertainty principle? Does this discovery promise a safe haven for the ship tossed about in the stormy sea of metaphysical controversy? The answer is definitely in the negative. Our contention is that in the principle of Uncertainty mathematical physics is committing suicide, and a similar fate awaits philosophy if it does not forthwith forsake the unattractive business of following the lead of Positive science. The present position in physics points unmistakably to the conclusion that the metaphysician who applies the scientific method to the solution of ultimate problems is bound to come up against a dead wall sooner or later, and that if he would succeed in his attempts he should employ a method far other than that of analytic abstraction.

The principle of Heisenberg, which is bound to create a profound change in the general outlook of the physicists appears to be innocent enough. It states that "no information can be obtained about the velocity of a particle the position of which is known with absolute accuracy. Certain information can be arrived at, if we admit a certain amount of inacuracy of position. Thus the two inaccuracies remain tragically linked together in the formula:

Inaccuracy of position X inaccuracy of velocity= constant.

The inaccurancy, which is an insurmountable obstacle in the measurements of position and velocity of the electron, is held to be a characteristic of all physical measurements. We have, therefore to revise our notions regarding the absolute certainty of physical laws based upon such measurements.

54. A moments's reflection will convince us that there is nothing new in this principle of Indeterminacy. It is impossible to determine accurate-

ly both the velocity and the position simultaneously of any moving body (even if the body be a gross body). In the case of the gross body we are easily satisfied with approximate results. Indeterminacy should be a matter of common sense experience but it is hidden underneath a cloak of approximations and averages. Moreover Zeno pointed out ages ago the absurdities lurking in the procedure of physical measurement. If movement be analysed into a succession of stable position, and if duration be cut up into a series of static moments, then the dilemma of infinite divisibility of space and time is irrefutable. Long before Heisenberg, physicists realised the statical nature of the basis of their laws and epistemologists had a suspicion that something was fundamentally wrong with the method of science. As early as 1843 the physicist Waterston pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of the fundamental concepts of science. What, then, is it that invests Heisenberg's principle with the epoch-making importance claimed for it? It is the experimental basis which Heisenberg has discovered for what hitherto has been merely a theoretical speculation.

" $\Delta p \ \Delta q \quad h$"

The product of the two uncertainties is of the magnitude of 'h'. It is this 'h', the cosmic constant of Planck's constant, that has endowed the principle of Uncertainty with revolutionary importance. The cosmic constant has come to occupy a pre-eminent place in Quantum mechanics. Hence Uncertainty has been placed on a purely objective experimental basis. It is beyond all cavil.

But it is exactly at this point that opponents of the principle attack it. How could that which is uncertain have a basis of certainty? If Indeterminacy is in the very nature

of things how could it point beyond itself to an ultimate ground of certainty? Hence, it is argued, that determinism is after all the foundation of science. Elaborate arguments have been construected to reclaim determinsim. In one of the ingenious arguments it is pointed out that Heisenberg's principle is only the logical conclusion of an indeterministic starting point, and instead of pointing to an ultimate Uncertainty in the constitution of 'things' it serves to turn our attention to the indeterminacy in the premises from which we started.

55. Now on the metaphysical side the old dispute between determinism and indeterminism has been renewed with fresh vigour drawn from the new discovery in physics. Both the determinist and the indeterminist see in the physical principle of Uncertainty clinching argument for their respective positions. The most significant conclusion drawn from the principle is that just as the freedom of the atom rests ultimately on a deterministic basis, so free-will in man rests on self-determination. Freedom of action does not amount to anarchy. The electron does not fly off at random. Its vagaries are confined within strictly defined limits. So is free action of man confined within the limits strictly defined by his nature. At the prospect of such a conclusion the metaphysician is thrilled.

But there is no reason for jubilation. To the serious thinker Heisenberg's discovery serves as a grave warning against the futility of relying too much upon the abstract analytic method of science. European metaphysics has been led by the nose by science. Science explains while philosophy ought to <u>know</u> facts. The explanations of science based upon the fourth degree of abstraction reached through successive stages of analysis, classification, induction and generalisation--each stage carry-

ing the process of abstraction farther than the previous one--can but give us a very superficial knowledge of reality. It is difficult for the contestants in the dispute over determinism to realise this. It is almost impossible for them to realise that the absolutistic attitude, which they in subserviance to science have taken, cannot but lead them into a cul-de-sac.

56. It is time that the philosopher took a warning from the muddled state of affairs in science. The metaphysician should use science as a stepping stone, transcend it and finally approach reality in the spirit of Bergsonian Intuition. Along that path and no other lies the hope of escape from the maze into which he has entangled himself by following the lead of science.

57. T.R.V. MURTI. "THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY."

The Thesis suggested in this paper is that the subject-matter of philosophy and, consequently, its method are different from those of science. Despite the commonly held notion, philosophy is not general or universal science; not does it explain: it is not a theory but a spiritual discipline concerned with the discovery of the self. One direct advantage of this concept is that there is no conflict between science and philosophy, the subject-matter and method of the two being different. This is not however adduced by way of proving our conception. The proof will lie in showing that the concept of universal science is self-contradictory.

58. Can any universal proposition true of all things fall within science, i.e. provable at all? Such a proposition, if it is not to be a speculative luxury, must be subject to verification by other propositions which are, for the time being at least not under question. It is evident that these testing propositions,

because of their validating function, do not fall within the scope of the supposed universal proposition; they would have to be excluded from our sweep. And even if a subsequent effort were made to cover them, the supplementary proposition shall itself require to be tested by others and so forth. The process might be repeated to weariness without our alighting upon a verifiable universal proposition. It might be thought that this predicament is inevitable when we start with a priori or theoretical scheme and then apply it to facts. Instead, one may proceed inductively from the given to arrive at the most general features that underlie all things. This hope, however, is futile. We have no legitimate means of passing from phenomena to the noumenon, from the given to the transcendent. All the processes of knowledge, inference etc. are from one given fact to another, which at least can be given, and not to something that transcends the given. The attempt is like seeing the limit of visual field when ex hypothesi all that we see is within the visual field and not anything beyond it that can serve as its boundary. The two notions, universality and science, work contrariwise and cannot be combined without nullifying the nature of each.

59. The fallacy underlying this conception of universal science is that difference of subject-matter does not entail difference in the method or that the one is not organic to the other. Cognate with this is the notion of the universal in quantitative terms as something big. The true universal however is to be conceived qualitatively, as what is self-contained, involving no reference to anything outside itself; it is what is complete by itself. It can readily be seen that the notion of verifiability is incompatible with universality: for to verify is to test a proposition by certain conditions external to and independent of it. We seek to verify a theory,

a symbol which stands for other things. For we then ask whether our conceptual, and therefore necessarily hypothetical, pattern answers to the facts which it seeks to bring under its formulation. This externality is at once the strength of science and the cause of its restriction. It follows that if anything is to be universal, self-contained, it cannot be a symbolic representation. It cannot make assertions which necessitate it to go beyond its datum; its activity should be strictly analytic, not synthetic or symbolic. Universality would rather lie in divesting the concept of its symbolic function to know it as such. This is made possible by the consciousness of the breakdown of this function due inevitably to its illegitimate extension to the super-sensible. This is all that dogmatic metaphysics really succeeds in achieving.

In this we agree with the recent "No Metaphysics" School (the protagonist of which is Wittgenstein) that the propositions of metaphysics, one and all, are undemonstrable, unlike those of science. The conclusion about the impossibility of Metaphysics follows only if science and philosophy had the same subject-matter and pursued the same method. It is here shown that the failure of what may be termed, pseudo-metaphysics points to a real inaccessible to science and unamenable to scientific methods.

The very attempt to universalise and establish philosophy as the ultimate arbiter of the sciences contributes to conflict and confusion. Once the restrictions of scientific procedure which constitute their accuracy and exactness are taken away, the floodgates to unbridled speculation are opened. The result is the warring of philosophies; and their dissensions and disputations are, by their very nature, interminable. Metaphysical

assertions if they are to cover the same ground as the particular sciences, go beyond phenomena to seek their ground in the transcendent. Such propositions are undemonstrable in principle.

60. We contend that philosophy gets its subject-matter, its datum, only as it recognises the metaphysical disposition as such, only as it realises that the Ideas of Reason are illusion, however inevitable and permanent they may seem.

There is only the disposition when we indulge in assertions about the super-sensible, treating them as on a par with objective entities and even asserting that we arrived at them in a perfectly natural and logical manner, i.e, by employing the same methods as in science. This would simply be the metaphysical disposition and not a conscious awareness of it <u>as</u> such. An analogous case will explain matters. To be in illusion is certainly different from being conscious of being, or having been, in illusion. In the one case, we do not contemplate illusion, for we are in illusion; in the other, we make illusion a topic of our enquiry, whatever interest that may have for us. How then, it might be asked, do we become conscious of the metaphysical disposition; for in the case of illusion there is actual cancellation? Here it is the illegitimate use of the concept beyond the sensible and the inevitable contradictions and antinomies that result. We may place no credence in the merits of the various metaphysical disputes; in fact we disbelieve them. But the dispute itself is indisputable. This then, is a realm inaccessible to, and untouched by, science.

61. The question that can naturally be raised is: "How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible," i.e. how could this illusion arise, that something that is not knowledge be mistaken for knowledge, and how is it inevitable, universal and natural. This enquiry is

about the composition of the subjective distemper, as it were.

62. It might be thought that Kant has answered the question. He has not. For what all he does, and he does this thoroughly enough, is to show the presence of the self-functions in perception and science (Trans. Aesthetic and Analytic) and that these functions do not amount to knowledge (Trans. Dialectic). That is, he has pointed to us the realm of the subjective and given us an idea of the datum of philosophy. What he does not attempt is an account of the subjective itself and a theory of Avidya, as one might say. Again, to Kant the CRITIQUE is not philosophy itself, but its ante-chamber, a propaedeutic; the Critique is meant to make it safe for faith to get under way. As for Kant is concerned, the Critique is a luxury and naturally critics have asked, how long will this whetting the knife will last, expecting that something else should be forthcoming as metaphysics proper.

63. An analysis of any empirical illusion will be valuable as an indication of the structure of illusion; but it will not give us the analysis of the illusion coincident with all knowing i.e, the world-illusion. Prima facie, it might be seen that mistake is possible because of confusion between two or more things. And we may surmise that there is more than one subjective function at work in all experience. A critique of experience will bring out the interlacing and involution of the various grades of subjective functions and their order. It will also be led to account for the confusion of the functions, as the presence of the functions need not be tantamount to their confusion. That is, it will give us a theory of Ignorance, and thus lead us to the origin of all phenomena.

It is far from the scope of this paper to enter into the actual analysis; we are concerned

with defining the subject-matter and the problem of philosophy. Such a critique of experience may well be termed Transcendental Psychology, as opposed to the objectivity or outward attitude of science and common-sense.

64. How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible? If it were to repeat the method of science framing certain hypotheses, verifying them and so forth, it would but be involving itself into further illusion. But the recognition of illusion is not to fall into illusion; to become aware of a theory is not to theorise, but to be self-conscious of it. No new matter or concept is introduced; we only see or seek to see the same situation more clearly, more truly; we do not as in science, understand or symbolise it <u>through</u> concepts. Cancellation, where we become aware of illusion, is not a situation or state different from illusion; it is but the analysis or the clarification of the latter. Otherwise, the one will not cancel the other, the object of the two being different. Analysis is concentration of attention, raised to a new potentiality, this being conducive to clearer perception. Negatively, it is but the annulment of distraction only. Philosophical activity is of this nature, purely analytic, and confines itself to the given. Its certitude is also immediately felt; we do not have to know cancellation as cancellation by a subsequent act of knowledge; at least, there would be some cancelling consciousness which cannot be doubted. Explanation on the other hand is a synthetic activity; for therein we frame a theory or a conceptual scheme, which we apply to facts, to verify it thereby. To frame a theory is not at once to be aware of it as such. The two functions are different. The one is a forward movement seeking to relate the concept to fact; it is not necessarily self-conscious, i.e. we have

nothing to do with the theorising activity itself there. This is the method of science. The other is a backward movement, as it were: a withdrawal of the concept from fact, divesting it thereby of its symbolic use; it is necessarily self-conscious. This is the method of philosophy. The Concept of philosophy then is not the appropriation of certain concepts as philosophical, but the <u>self-consciousness or the return to itself of the concept, of every concept</u>. Philosophy however differs from Fine Art. In the latter, the concept is not used symbolically to explain facts, but intrinsically as valuable in itself. There is thus no question of the withdrawal of the concept from fact, as in philosophy. Fine Art is a creation; philosophy is reflection, recognition of the concept.

It is readily seen that philosophy can have only one end in view--the curing of the subjective distemper. Because philosophy does not make any assertion, frame any theory or explain, it cannot be helpful to, or helped by, science. Nor is it a substitute for science as its function is different. Philosophy is the withdrawal of the concept from fact, the return of the concept to itself, the recognition of its self-hood its universality and actuality.

-65. We recognise, realise reflectively, only as we withdraw these functions, apprehend them as illusion, as not independent realities. The Self is or can be said to be known only in this manner; it is not an entity requiring a particular mode of apprehending it. Negatively, it is as we annul the object or externality that we know the self, but not through any special sense. Philosophy as the unravelling of the concept is the freeing of the concept, the return of the self to its pristine purity. To philosophise and to realise the spirit are

one and the same thing, for the concept, as we have seen, is the self function itself. The question of practical realisation is not left over. There is no divorce here between theory and practice, philosophy is an actual spiritual discipline; it is not a body of tenets but an activity--the freeing of the Concept.

66. RASVIHARY DAS. "THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION." Most philosophers nowadays seem to be agreed that what we immediately perceive are what they call sense-data, and the physical object is reached or obtained by us by logical construction or symbolic reference or by some other mystic process. The sense-data at most are sometimes parts (of the surfaces) of physical objects, but very often they are not physical at all, as for instance, when we see an ellyptical patch of brown in the place of a round penny.

67. If by perception we mean direct and immediate knowledge and by physical object what is capable of existing independently of perception and of being perceived in common by several percipients, it is clear that the physical nature of a thing is never given in any perception because the fact that the thing perceived can exist unaltered outside the perception and is or can be perceived in the same way by several perceivers is not revealed in the perception itself.

A thing presents different appearances to different persons looking at it from different angles of vision or from different places. It is these appearances which are primarily given in our perception. But since they differ among themselves and the physical object is supposed to be one, we cannot say that in knowing any of the appearances we know the physical object.

Since these appearances alone come within our knowledge and one appearance as appearance is exactly of the same sort as any other, we cannot even suppose that there is a standard

appearance which is one with the physical object, so that in knowing this particular appearance we know the physical object.

68. If we do not directly perceive physical objects, we may legitimately ask, what is it that we directly perceive? People may answer that we perceive sense-data, and thus also rebut our foregoing argument by suggesting that there are entities which are spatial and possessed of sensible qualities, but are at the same time quite distinct from physical objects.

69. What we are most concerned with in life are substantial persons and things and not mere surfaces without depth, which seem to be the meaning at best of the so-called sense-data. I suggest that there are no such things as sense-data and nobody ever believes in them. It is always a chair or a table or something else which we see, and never mere patches of colour floating in the air. We have to start with perception, since we do not know any other experience more primitive than this, and all our perceptions which are external.

70. It may be suggested that it is on account of the practical bent of our ordinary understanding that we jump to the belief of some underlying substance conceived as physical, but for a theoretical or artistic understanding there may be appearances capable of being contemplated merely as such. But such contemplation, I imagine, merely holds in abeyance the natural function of knowing, and cannot determine the nature of things as they are or as we believe them to be. Rightly or wrongly we c cannot know, and so cannot also perceive, without bringing in the notion of substantiality. And since we are not prepared to regard sense-data as substances, in which case there would be nothing to distinguish them from physical

objects, I conclude that we cannot perceive sense-data as such.

71. JYOTIS CHANDRA BANERJEE. "THOUGHT AND REALITY." Bradley's process is different. His 'immediate experience' is quite distinct from thought or consciousness. Thought, according to Bradley, is essentially relational--its function is always to separate 'existence' from 'content.' It is analytical, discursive. Thought always falls short of Individuality. Our logical judgements can grasp only partial and fragmentary aspects of the ultimate judgements. The attainment of such an ideal realisation and comprehension of thought is what Bradley suggests as thought's suicide. What thought can utmost do is that it attains truth and Reality in varying degrees--and in this sense only thought may be said to be participating in the nature of perfect truth and Reality. But he cannot side with Hegel in asserting the judgement that "thought attains an immediacy above the dialectic."

Bradley views that ultimate Reality as systematic and individual Absolute whole and his conception rests on three points:--(1) Reality presents itself in 'immediate experience' which is felt as a totality and thereby non-relational in character. (2) Non-contradiction is the criterion of truth and Reality.

72. D.M. DATTA: "CAN A QUALITY BE PERCEIVED WITHOUT SUBSTANCE?" In the history of modern European philodophy Locke, as it is commonly known, started the distinction between the knowledge of qualities and that of substances by pointing out that while the qualities were known through simple ideas yielded by the senses, substances were known through complex ideas formed by the mind. This distinction was accepted by subsequent thinkers, even when they dif-

fered from Locke in many important respects. Standing on this distinction Berkeley tried to show, among other things, that sensation does not reveal to us material substances; our belief in them is based on confused imagination and it cannot be rationally upheld. Hume also accepts the same distinction in casting doubt on our beliefs in all substances material, as well as spiritual when he points out that the idea of substance involves a belief in some necessary connection which sensation cannot yield.

73. The main ground on which Hume is sceptic about substance is that substance, in his conception, involves some necessary connection, say between itself and its qualities or among its different qualities; but such necessary connection can never be proved by experience and consequently the belief in a substance cannot be justified by reason. When we think of a substance as the cause of its qualities, or as that which ties together different qualities or as that which synthesises also the successive states along with the co-existent ones, we may have to think of a necessary connection which cannot be sensed or perceived but has to be supplied by thought.

74. We can neither accept the idealism of Berkeley, in so far as it accepts Locke's view that a material substance is never perceived and attempts to show therefrom that the supposition of such a substance is unnecessary, nor accept the scepticism of Hume in so far as he also proceeds from Locke's analysis and shows that unperceived substance is beyond all proof.

75. MAKHANLAL MUKHERJI: "THE FUNCTION OF DIALECTIC." Even the single thinker in his solitary meditations is debating with himself.

The philosophical attitude that is born of this thinking consideration of things begins not with wonder as Aristotle said, but with doubt. This doubt is a form of self-reflection that will not take things on trust. It is not, however, the blank doubt of the skeptic, but in a way the methodical doubt of Descartes which consists in doubting whatever seems to be doubtful.

76. Since it is doubt that casts on all sides the seeds of contradiction, we want to overcome contradictions by taking that to be true which is not contradicted.

Nothing short of non-contradiction can be the test of truth or reality--this position stated and defended from the standpoint of Sankara.

ATMANATMA-VIVEKA OF SANKARA ACHARYA "DISCRIMINATION OF SPIRIT AND NOT-SPIRIT." Translated by MOHINI M. CHATTERJI (in Five Years of Theosophy.)

Nothing is Spirit which can be the object of consciousness. To one possessed of right discrimination, the Spirit is the subject of knowledge.

This discrimination of Spirit and Not-spirit is given below:

Q. Whence comes pain to the Spirit?
A. By reason of its taking a body. It is said in the Shruti: "Not in this (state of existence) is there cessation of pleasure and pain of a living thing possessed of a body."
Q. By what is produced this taking of a body?
A. By Karma.
Q. Why does it become so by Karma?
A. By desire and the rest (i.e. the passions)
Q. By what are desire and the rest produced?
A. By Egotism.
Q. By what again is egotism produced?
A. By want of right discrimination.

Q. By what is this want of right discrimination produced?
A. By Ignorance.
Q. Is ignorance produced by anything?
A. No, by nothing. Ignorance is without beginning and ineffable by reason of its being the intermingling of the real (Sat) and the unreal (Asat). (It does not mean the negation of everything; it means "that which does not exhibit the truth," the "illusory.") It is a something embodying the three qualities and is said to be opposed to Wisdom, inasmuch as it produces the concept, "I am ignorant."

The origin of pain can thus be traced to ignorance, and it will not cease until ignorance is entirely dispelled, which will be only when the identity of the Self with Brahma (The Universal Spirit) is fully realised. Anticipating the contention that the external acts (i.e. those enjoined by the Vedas) are proper, and would therefore lead to the destruction of ignorance, it is said that ignorance cannot be dispelled by Karma (religious exercises.)

Q. Why is it so?
A. By reason of the absence of logical opposition between ignorance and act. Therefore, it is clear that ignorance can only be removed by Wisdom.
Q. How can this Wisdom be acquired?
A. By discussion--by discussing the nature of Spirit and Not-spirit.
Q. Who are worthy of engaging in such discussion?
A. Those who have acquired the four qualifications.
Q. What are the four qualifications?
A. i. True discrimination of permanent and impermanent things. ii. Indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions both here and hereafter. iii. Possession of Sama

and the other five qualities iv. An intense desire of becoming liberated (from conditional existence).

Q. What is the right discrimination of permanent and impermanent things?

A. Certainty as to the material universe being false and illusive, and Brahman being the only reality.

Indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions in this world is to have the same amount of disinclination for the enjoyment of worldly objects of desire (such as garlands of flowers, sandal wood paste, women and the like) beyond those absolutely necessary for the preservation of life, as one has vomited food, etc.

Q. What are the six qualities, beginning with Sama?

A. Sama, Dama, Uparati, Titiksha, Samadhana and Shradda. Sama is the repression of the inward sense called Manas,--i.e. not allowint it to engage in any other thing but Shravana (listening to what the sages say about the spirit), Manana (reflecting on it), Nididhyasana (meditating on the same). Dama is the repression of the external senses.

Q. What are the external senses?

A The five organs of perception and the five bodily organs for the performance of external acts. Restraining these from all other things but Shravana and the rest, is Dama.

Uparati is the abstaining on principle from engaging in any of the acts and ceremonies enjoined by the Shastras. Otherwise, it is the state of the mind which is always engaged in Shravana and the rest, without ever diverging from them.

Titiksha (literally the desire to leave) is the bearing with indifference all opposites (such as pleasure and pain, heat and cold etc)

Otherwise, it is the showing of forbearance to a person one is capable of punishing.

Whenever a mind, engaged in Shravana and the rest, wanders to any worldly object of desire, and, finding it worthless, returns to the performance of the three exercises--such returning is called Samadhana.

Shraddha is an intensely strong faith in the utterances of one's Guru and of the Vedanta philosophy.

An intense desire for liberation is called Mumukshatva.

Those who possess these four qualifications, are worthy of engaging in discussions as to the nature of Spirit and Not-spirit, and, like Brahmacharins, they have no other duty (but such discussion). It is not, however, at all improper for householders to engage in such discussions, but, on the contrary, such a course is highly meritorious. For it is said: Whoever, with due reverence, engages in the discussion of subjects treated of in Vedanta philosophy and does proper service to his Guru, reaps happy fruits. Discussion as to the nature of Spirit and Not-spirit is therefore a duty.

Q. What is Spirit?

A. It is that principle which enters into the composition of man and is not included in the three bodies, and which is distinct from the five sheaths (Koshas), being Sat (existence), Chit (Consciousness) and Ananda (bliss), and witness of the three states.

Q. What is the Antahkarana?

A. Manas, Buddhi, Chitta and Ahankara form it. The functions of these four components of Antahkarana are respective doubt, certainty, retention and egotism.

Q. What is Not-spirit?

A. It is the three bodies (described above), which are impermanent, inanimate (jada)

essentially painful and subject to congregation and segregation.

Q. What is impermanent?

A. That which does not exist in one and the same state in the three divisions of time (namely, present, past and future).

Q. What is inanimate (jada)?

A. That which cannot distinguish between the objects of its own cognition and the objects of the cognition of others...

Q. What are the three states (mentioned above as those to which the Spirit is witness)?

A. Wakefulness (Jagrat), dreaming (Svapna), and the state of dreamless slumber (Sushupti).

Q. What is the state of wakefulness?

A. That in which objects are known through the avenue of (physical) senses.

Q. Of dreaming?

A. That in which objects are perceived by reason of desires resulting from impressions produced during wakefulness.

Q. What is the state of dreamless slumber?

A. That in which there is an utter absence of the perception of objects.

Q. Why is the spirit said to be different from the three bodies?

A. That which is truth cannot be untruth, knowledge ignorance, bliss misery, or vice versa.

Q. Why is it called the witness to the three states?

A. Being the master of the three states, it is the knowledge of the three states, as existing in the present past and future.

Q. How is the Spirit different from the five sheaths?

The indwelling of the notion of 'I' in the gross body during wakefulness is Vishva (world of objects), in the subtile body during dreaming is Taijas (magnetic fire), and in the causal body during dreamless slumber is Prajna (One Life).

A. This is being illustrated by an example: "This is my cow," "this is my calf" "this is my son or daughter, "this is my wife," "this is my Anandamaya sheath" and so on--the Spirit can never be connected with these concepts; it is different from and witness to them all. For it is said in the Upanishad (The Spirit is) "naught of sound, of touch, of form, or colour, of taste, or of smell; it is everlasting, having no beginning or end, superior (in order of subjectivity) to Prakriti (differentiated matter); whoever correctly understands it as such attains Mukti (liberation)." The Spirit has also been called (above) Sat, Chit Ananda.

Q. What is meant by its being Sat (presence)?

A. Existing unchanged in the three divisions of time and uninfluenced by anything else.

Q. What is being Chit (consciousness)?

A. Manifesting itself without depending upon anything else, and containing the germ of everything in itself.

Q. What by being Ananda (bliss)?

A. The ne plus ultra of bliss.

Whoever knows, without doubt and apprehension of its being other-wise, the self as being one with Brahma or Spirit, which is eternal, non-dual and unconditioned, attains Moksha (liberation from conditioned existence.).