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SIDDHESWARANANDA

ESSAYS



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BY

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SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA

&

OTHER PHILOSOPHERS.

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"THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA OR NON-DUALISM."
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The philosophy of Advaita is the title under which the metaphysics of Vedanta will be treated here. The system of thought characterising the Upanishads or the final portion of the Vedas is known as Vedanta. It is philosophy in the sense that it makes an enquiry into Truth and Reality; but, unlike pure speculation, it claims to arrive at positive results. In other words, the Truth it reveals is not a mere theory, liable to modification with the advance of scientific knowledge, but is positive and ultimate, verified and verifiable. It does not take its stand on the shifting facts of phenomenal life, but is firmly rooted in those of life in all its aspects and in the very nature of consciousness itself. Being the science of Reality it avails itself of all the sources of knowledge, viz. experience and intuition, and embraces all states and conditions through which life passes or is supposed to pass. Non-dualism denies that number can enter into the constitution of Reality.

"Great scientific discoveries," says Mr. Wildon Carr, "are often so simple in their origin that the greatest wonder about them is that humanity has to wait, so long for them. They seem to lie in the sudden consciousness of the significance of some familiar fact, a significance never suspected because the fact is so familiar," This observation particularly applies to the facts on which Vedanta is built up. The states which punctuate life are are presented to us persistently and we experience them every day in our lives; and yet it is the ancient Upanishads and they

alone that have discovered their significance which has enabled them to arrive at ideas of Truth and Reality defying time and change.

It may be questioned whether no thinker has hitherto subjected the states to his scrutiny and what is the peculiar virtue attaching to the Vedantic method. Who knows not that sleep is a state of rest for the brain, and dream but a fantastic affection of the nerves? Psychoanalysis is engaged in the problem of exploring the region of the unconscious, and of accounting for certain maladies by referring them to repressed conations. There is indeed some kind of felicity which we experience in deep sleep, which otherwise is only a state of unconsciousness. What more can the labours of scientists and philosophers reveal as to the nature of life or Reality? How can observations be pushed into the religion of unconsciousness except by studying the changes wrought on conscious life? Now we quite admit that some attention has been paid to these two states by scientists, and medical men especially and we may justly hope for fresh additions to our knowledge as time passes. But Vedanta owes its significance to its unique attitude towards life, which it views from an angle of vision altogether its own. While others concentrate their attention on the world before us which is taken to comprehend all the reality that we can know, and while sleep and dream-experiences are utilized to explain the phenomena of waking life, Vedanta proposes to deal with life as it manifests itself in all the three states and so determines the nature of Reality as a whole. The two viewpoints differ fundamentally. If the one, the waking world represents all our real interests, and sleep and dream are gently shoved aside as the mere appendages of waking; but in the other,

each of the states is given a right place and is invested with equal significance. The man contemplating them easily rises to a condition in which his individuality and narrow views are automatically shed and the time-place-change-ridden world ceases to molest him. In the one case we are hopelessly merged in a mysterious world, which baffles all efforts to solve the enigma, in the other the results are so grand that they exceed all expectations. Besides, in speaking of sleep and dream our intellect which can grasp things only as external objects plays a trick with us which we never suspect. Though they are independent of waking, we yet reduce them to the same terms of waking. When did he sleep? How long?--are questions which hide the contradictions they involve. They are not like questions relating to waking acts, such as, when did he come? How long did he stay? In the latter case the acts are placed in waking time, and quite correctly. But we extend the same form of expression to sleep and dream, though these are <u>not</u> waking acts and hence cannot be measured in terms of waking duration. "When did he sleep?--is a plain contradiction for it would mean, at what point of waking time did he sleep? implying thereby that sleeping is a waking act! Similarly, the states are not external things which we cognize by means of our intellect. They are known to us as immedicies by intuition. We intuit sleep and dream, and, what is more surprising, we intuit waking also. For consider the dilemma--do we wake first and then perceive the world and then wake to it? The latter conception is self-contradictory since perception presupposes waking. The former is equally untenable as the order in which

the acts take place--waking, perceiving--
requires a basis of time, and waking time
would commence before waking! It is thus
evident that the sequence in one time-
order. If it were otherwise, the states
would be an inexplicable puzzle. Dream-
events would then have to be placed in
waking time and space, leading to a gro-
tesque confusion by no means removable. A
man lying on his bed would have to account
for his being suddenly transported to a
scene and surroundings thousands of miles
away. Time cannot be inserted between state
and state, and only the Spirit remains to con-
nect them. Thus the study of the states can-
not be carried on solely through the intel-
lect which is bound by time and space, but
through the aid of intuition by which as
Bergson says, we place ourselves by sympa-
thetic insight in the middle of a state. We
need not observe it merely from outside or
translate the experience into the terms of
an alien. Now no one can affirt that such a
study has been hitherto attempted or accom-
plished, except by Vedanta.

We shall now deal with the analysis of the three states as effected by Vedanta. Sankara its greatest exponent, has systamatized the teachings of Upanishads in his comments on the BRAHMA SUTRAS which has condensed them under various topical headings. In his comments on the SUTRAS, the Upanishads and the Bha-gavat-Gita, we find a rational, consistent and exhaustive treatment of all the problems of truth and reality as they arise in the course of his exposition of Vedic Monism.

WAKING EXPERIENCE:--In his introduction to the Sutras, Sankara, imbued with a truly scientific spirit, discusses the foundation

of empirical life. We can discover in him no traces of a theological or scholastic leaning. "Subject and object--the Self and the non-self--are so radically opposed to each other in notion and in practical life that it is impossible to mistake the one for the other." After this grand beginning he adds, "yet we find that the mistake is universal and we can never trace it to its source, for our common life cannot do without this initial error." Without identifying the Self (subject) with the non-Self, viz. the body, the senses and the mind we could not describe ourselves in terms strictly applicable to the latter. We could not say, "I am lean or stout", " I am waking or sitting", "I am blind or deaf", I feel, I perceive or act." Hence we unconsciously confound the pure subject or the witnessing consciousness with its own objects, and conversely, we confound the ego with the witness, whereby the real unattached character of the pure consciousness is lost sight of altogether. Admittedly this is due to a fundamental illusion on which all our waking activities are based; and to attain to Truth and Reality we must, realizing this illusion, rise about by means of a rational enquiry. Reason which points out the illusion must also be competent to release us from its hold. Sankara is not alone in drawing our attention to this illusory nature of empirical life. Plato, Kant, and Hegel adopt the same strain, and in recent times, Bergson, equipped with all the knowledge of modern science, arrives at the same conclusion. The intellect, he says, disguises Reality misrepresents it and presents to us a static world, while the Reality is pure movement, change, or the wider consciousness. According to both Sankara and Bergson the illusion is

necessary to practical life, though none the less it is an illusion. Sankara does not favour the reality of the idea as aganist that of the object. The testimony of consciousness itself establishes their distinctness. While the one, viz the idea, is admitted only by contradistinguishing it from that of the object, still the reality of the idea and the object cannot be held to transcend the state in which both are experienced. In other words, their claim to reality is valid WITHIN the state, not beyond. This is a philosophical view that disposes of the dream-experience also. If we are true to us, the objects and notions of dream are presented as indisputably real at the time, and are discovered to be illusions only after dream gives place to waking. We cannot suppose that waking experience can survive waking, any more than dream-experience, dream. For that would be self-contradictory. Waking life may thus seem to be reduced to a long dream; but, as Locke would say, "Even then the thinker and the critic being equally involved in the dream, their mutual relations remain the same as if the condition was one of waking." Hence the eternal world with its multiplicity of other minds and objects, together with the internal world of judgments, feelings and volitions, like the ego cognizing them and engaged in action and enjoyment, is all on one level of reality which correlates them. It is wrong, therefore, to imagine that Vedanta is solipsistic, that while it concedes reality to the ego, it denies it to the non-ego.

Nevertheless, this does not conflict with the fundamental principle of Sankara that

life is made possible only by the spontaneous ascription of the qualities of the subject to the object and vice versa. For the reality of the experience of each state is ineluctably confied to it, the reality is such only for the state, is only relative, not absolute. That waking like taken by itself is a mystery teeming with endless contradictions in whatever way we view it, and that the army of scientiest and philosophers carrying on an incessant fight with nature to discover the matrix from which things originate and grow are faced with an ultimate neplus Ultra in all their investigations, are unquestionable facts to which all human researches testify. The very categories of thought are so many riddles; substance quality, action, the universal, the particular, relation, space, time, causality, change--these are a phalanx of grenadiers whom every thinker has had to encounter in a close fight, of which the issue has remained doubtful to this day. Sir James Jeans in THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE concludes with these words: "Our main contention can hardly be that the science of to-day has a pronouncement to make, perhaps it ought rather to be that science should leave off making pronouncements: the river of knowledge has too often turned back on itself." The view of modern science is given as follows: "To sum up a soap-bubble with irregularities and corrugations on its surface is perhaps the best representation... of the universe revealed to us by the theory of relativity. The universe is not the interior of the soap-bubble but its surface...and and the substance out of which this bubble is blown, the soap film, is empty space welded into empty time."

This modest estimate of the power of science is but fitting, for Vedanta declares that the whole universe spread before us, as well as our achievements in it, is but a manifestation of Pure Consciousness. To find the Ultimate Truth in the universe itself is a hopeless task, but to peer through it and detect the Reality that it disguises is the first duty of every thinker. For, situated as we are, our view of the world can be only external, and we must proceed from knowledge to knowledge which can never be final, since it cannot be of an object as it is in itself, but as it is known. We shall now examine the dream-state with two or three preliminary remarks.

Waking or dream is not a state in the strict sense of the term. A state implies change occuring in the soul or its object. When we compare waking with dream, the soul assumes the position of a witness of the two, and no change can be allowed in the witness. The two states seem to offer themselves successively for trial, but as they are not events in one time-series, their sequence is an illusion. Neither can we suppose a change in the objective order which would demand a continuity of the same time-series. Moreover, we labour under the disadvantage of having to judge from memory of dream which cannot be called up to confront us as a present experience, and this memory is itself of a strange character. Memory ordinarily refers to the past--a past time moving backwards infinitely from the present moment at which it terminates, that is to say, to a continuous time-flow related to the present. Dream-experience however, does not belong to this time-series, and cannot be included in its past. Again, just as we cannot know when waking begins, so we cannot know when dream begins for both seem to

be uncaused. A cause connects one event with another of the same time-order and the cause of a state would have to be inside the sate, so that to transcend the state in order to discover its cause would not merely be illogical but impossible. Further, the soul as the witness of the two states intuits both, and that is how we know both. Hence the witnessing character of the soul claims special consideration. It behaves as an entity free from attachment to the bodies, the minds, the snse-groups and the percepts of the contrasted states, and becomes a metaphysical element which can be realized only as the 'I' but with the 'I' divested of the egoity of waking or dream. While it is difficult and impracticable for us to eliminate, in waking, this Witness from the ego-complex, and the witness might seem to be a mere abstraction, our ability to remember dream and appropriate it to ourselves proves that nature does for us the analysis which we are unable to do for ourselves. She does this in virtue of the undeniable fact that the Witness is the Reality, the essence of our being. In discussing sleep, we shall come upon another feature of the Witness which then passes off into Pure Consciousness.

DREAM STATE. From the waking point of view, dream is a case of typical illusion, or rather hallucination. Without admittedly an external ground a whole world rises into view, and no suspicion is aroused that we are bamboozled. Scene after scene follows originating fealings and acts with the stamp of genuineness. We are actors in a drama, playing fantastical parts, enjoying and suffering we know not how or why. There is no limit to the grotesqueness of the pageantry, over-leaping the bounds of waking possibility. Yet at the time there is no

surprise; everything looks natural. We take things at their face value. All the elements of waking are reproduced, time, space, change. In the very midst of the drama, we might jerk into waking, and, behold, it was all a dream! The usual explanation offered is that the impressions formed on the waking mind remain latent in the background of the unconscious and suddenly gain scope for activity, manifesting themselves in the shape of dream-experience. Sleep is the region of the Unconscious and we are then admitted behind the scenes to the sight of how the impressions, in their various degrees and strength, act and react upon one another in the depths of our nature. No impression apparently ever dies, and, when it is denied adequate scope in waking, obtains it in dream, which is a realm of life for the latent impressions. The space and time are creations of the mind, and the relation of cause and effect is improvised. The intellect suspends its consorship and our critical faculties are laid to sleep. Such is the dictum of waking reason. But this theory of impressions loses sight of the fact that if the theory be right, an impression has to be endowed with the power to create a world of realities at a moment's notice, rather without any notice at all.If the mind by a fit can crate actualities, where is the need or place for matter which is the object of absorbing study for the scientist? How can this indispensable factor of life be brushed aside so lightly? What is sauce for the goose must be the sauce for the gander. If the reality of matter in waking life depends on our belief in our close observation and experimentation, how is our involuntary belief in the reality of our dream occurrences to be accounted for?

How can we take two contradictory attitudes towards life, the one solipsitic and the other realistic? This explanation is therefore suicidal and demolishes the very foundations of science. We can, besides, never notice the beginning or the origin of a dream. All our notions of propriety are outraged, without still engendering any surprise in us. Our consciousness which guides our judgment suddenly turns capricious, and one that lies down in Calcutta might find himself in a moment, as it were, in London. A single moment might expand into days and years. The dreamer might be transformed into a bull, a goat or an insect. And the learned explanation is belated. It comes after the illusion is over, for there are no certain marks or characterics by which we can identify a dream, as such at the time. In truth, dream cannot be defined; otherwise we could not fail to detect the trickery when it repeated itself a second time; but a man's, even a philosopher's life must include dreams to his dying day, and nature's power to delude is irresistable, supreme. A dream can indeed mimic all features of waking, but one element remains triumphant and beyond its utmost power to mimic, and that is Consciousness. All the rest is plastic in the omnipotent hands of dream, and can be moulded into any shape it pleases. Time, space and causation are its avowed slaves, and obey its autocratic bidding. Consciousness alone defies its tactics and remains an unruffled witness of its whims.

We have hitherto viewed dream as an object of the waking mind, as an external object. We shall now examine it from within, by placing ourselves sympathetically in its midst. This is properly to judge dream as dream, without the waking bias. Dream now appears to be a

a perfect replica of waking. A world is unrolled before us; we never notice its suddenness or its incongruity with waking; on the contrary it comes with all the impress of waking. Time, space and change are inevitably present. No element of life is missed--other minds, natural scenes, familiar faces and objects, the earth below and the star-studded sky above. We think, and act. We refer happenings to the past, and forecast them for future. Miracles are common occurrences which do not strike us as anthing extraordinary. We acquisce in all, we appropriate all. Memories and emotions stream in, giving birth to strange conations. We converse with gods and ghosts. Sometimes the future is fore-shadowed. We acquire new powers, occupy new positions; nothing is impossible. We fly without wings and fall from hill-tops down, down through endless space. Nevertheless, we belive that all is real and nothing shocks us. After waking we condemn dreams as an irrational, self-contradictory and unreal illusion, and resolve to be no more befooled. But in the next dream there is the same masque enacted and the same helplessness on our part to detect it, and this is repeated without end to our eternal chagrin through all our living days. It will not do to brush aside this aspect of life as a mere phantasy. "There are few subjects" write Dr. F.C.S.Schiller, "which philosophers have more persistently forborne to work out, not to say neglected, than the philosophic import of dreams!" To regard that dream-experience is unreal is to subordinate it to waking, and to accept the biassed decree of the latter against a sister-state. And on what is the claim of waking to reality based? Evidently on its own pronouncement. If so, is

entitled to equal reality according to its own pretensions? If it is objected that waking is never stultified whereas a dream is, the answer is, how can a state which is accompanied with a sense of waking stultify itself while it continues? A state which is believed to be waking can never be conceived as liable to stultification while it lasts, and every present state claims to be waking, flinging to its rear a stultified dream. Compare the instance of a dram within a dream. No state can be disloyal itself. A dream proper is never known to be such at the time. A stultified state appears as a past dream and the present is ever waking. No state is self-identical. Thus a sympathetic examination of dream leads to the conclusion that it is a rival state as real as waking; and owing to the indeterminable discrepancy between the two in the time flow, added to the unconscious and timeless interval between, they must be adjudged equal independence as different realms of Reality of which they are expressions. The word 'interval' used above is, owing to a defect of language, meant to denote what is timeless. For if a time-interval were imagined, it would connect waking and dream, and make them a single continuous state, which would militate against all experience. Waking-time rules waking and stops with it, and dream-time is coeval with a dream. The interval is metaphysical. It is Pure Consciousness

We are now free to consider the results obtained at this stage of our enquiry. The examination of dream was made possible only by our individuality being laid aside. The mind and the body constitute our personality and our individual life depends on our connection with them. These two factors can

hardly be supposed to be identical in both waking and dream, as our experience is to the contrary. So are the two worlds distinct. In setting the states side by side in our study, we have mentally disentangled ourselves from both and have attained to an attitude in which, free from the trammels of individuality, we comprehend the two manifestations of Reality as unstinted wholes--an attitude quite different from that in which we think of the waking world. In the latter case the world is not seized as a whole, since, as our object of attention, it is separated from ourselves and placed right against us in thought. We conduct our examination of dream, not as one ego contemplating the other, but as the soul divested of its egoity altogether. The simple experience denoted by the words "I dreamt" raises us to the level of the witness and above that of the ego. The soul is thus proved to be an entity at the back of the mind, taking its stand as the metaphysical basis of life. The monabasic view confined to waking, of theology throws it on the mercy of the scriptures or revelations to establish the soul or God. They are matters of faith. But Vedantic analysis makes them indisputable elements of life and identifies them. The world as a correlate of the mind, concomitant with it. The question of other minds is limited to the fugitive states and is devoid of meaning with reference to the soul as their Witness. The soul thus sheds its individuality and becomes Universal Spirit, beyond the region of Meum and Toom. The mind perceives the world, while the soul

or spirit intuits both waking and dream, projects both, and absorbs both. The difficulty that perplexes the enquirer, viz. "When I am sleeping, is there not a world outside in which simultaneously there are other minds awake and active, whom I rejoin when I awake? How does my sleep affect the real affairs of the world which go on uninterrupted for all my sleep and the waking of others ceases when the comparative view of the states is taken. This is possible only with the individuality dropped. Moreover, the waking world composed of other minds and matter, with which waking connects me and from which sleep releases me, is strictly bound up with waking, and to aver that my waking or my waking-world persists when I am sleeping is not only illogical but inconceivable. The world has no status outside of my waking. The physical organism together with its brain, nerves and breath is limited to waking. To carry it over to another state, where another set obtains free play, is unwarranted. Similarly, birth and death, the evolution of the world, are integral parts of waking, and beyond it, meaningless. Solipsism of Subjectivism is easily transcended, for the Witness is no ego and Reality attaches to the former alone. Thus we have arrived at an entity which is the universal basis of life, which is ALL life, beyond time, change and individuality. Why then should we examine sleep? For the simple reason that it is the primary state without which waking and dream would be impossible. We dream in sleep and wake from sleep.

Meanwhile we shall advert to some philosophical problems which receive their solution from our enquiry so far. The question of perception dissolves itself. The Spirit manifests itself as matter and mind, which appear as the

correlated elements of experience in each state. Their metaphysical basis is one, and this affinity in their source accounts for their mutual adaptiveness. The spirit as the mind perceives Spirit as Matter. The puzzles of Realism and Idealism evaporate. For the principle on which we explain waking perception must apply equally to dream perception. If in the one case our knowledge is real, so must it be in the other. No purpose is served by affirming or denying the reality in either. Pragmatism is right in regarding judgments as only truth-claims with a tentative value. Every manifestation of life or Spirit must necessarily promote life-purpose. For life is supreme and its apparent frustration by death is but a delusion. Death itself is a manifestation of life which transcending the states is immortal.

DREAMLESS SLEEP. We commonly believe that deep sleep is a state of absolute consciousness. What can we know of it? In answering this question, we must bear in mind that waking, dream and deep sleep are states that we intuit and that cannt create any conceivable break in life. They are known as immediacies and are not observed externally. Hence our knowledge of them is more intimate and perfect, less liable to error or misunderstanding than that of objects. I see a chair, and my notion of it agrees with that of seferal other minds, and practical life is pivoted on such agreement. But as to what a chair is in itself apart from my perception, generates a problem which has endlessly exercised the intellect of scientists and philosophers. Our knowledge of objects must be infinitely progressive, because of the disability with which we start, because we cannot know them as we know or realise our feelings and sensations. The

very structure of the intellect precludes the contrary. But this habit has so grown upon us that we forget the limitations of our power to know, and instinctively believe that that knowledge alone is true which we acquire by observation and experiment. We call it scientific. The states which cannot be so handled we are prone to ignore, as not allowing of the scientific method of approach. Now there must be something fundamentally wrong in this attitude, since the states are sine qua non of life, the elements of which it is made up. The world which is the theatre of our activities, enjoyments and ambitions, with its comic and tragic sides, is unfolded to us in only one theme. In the other there is a mimicry of it, and in the third it is conspicious by its abscence. Experimental Psychology, which presumes that the nature and the capacity of mind can be accurately known and measured by "behaviour", cannot go to the root of the matter. It takes its stand on the outside and forms its views from what it observes. This is opposed to the very nature of the mind, viz. to conceive it as an object and study it as an alien, when all the while we have privelege of knowing it immediately by reference to our own feelings and sensations. The scientific description of sleep from our observation of the condition of the sleeper's body is, in the words of the Upanishads, to beat the ant-hill and imagine the snake inside to be killed. With whatever care we pursue our method of external observation, we shall never realize the nature of sleep or dream. As to waking, we are still more helpless. We cannot observe before we wake; and as all our acts are circumscribed by waking, and involves it, we can never arrive

at an objective notion of its nature. For it is as much an intuition as the other two. The only reliable source of knowledge about them is our intuition, and a study of the latter gives us a more, not less, scientific view of them than we have of external objects.

We have found that the entity that connects waking and dream is not the ego of either state, but the Witness or the Spirit which is free from individuality. We have now to ascertain the principle which pieces together all the three. We have first to tackle deep sleep. This is produced in three or four ways. First, in the natural manner; secondly by means of drugs like chloroform; thirdly by the practice of mental concentration known as Yoga; or fourthly through devout meditation. The nature of the experience, however, does not vary, for in each instance the mind that alone can detect difference ceases to operate. As the sleep which comes to us naturally every day is the only form familiar to us universally, and as even yogis cannot help sleeping, a close study of sleep is rendered possible to all, and obviates the necessity of that of the other forms. Tho' fancied to be a mere blank, a state of unconsciousness, we shall presently realize that it is the home of Reality, the temple of God, and the true nebula giving birth to both mind and matter. It is the treasure-house of all truths; and in spite of our prepossessions we shall know it as the rock-basis of life.

To begin with, we have to dispose of the common notion that sleep is unconsciousness. This evidently is a serious misapprehension. For conscious beings as we are, though we may have a notion of unconsciousness, the notion when examined will be found to have no content. A notion is formed in consciousness and the

latter cannot conceive its own absence, while it is there to testify to itself. Unconsciousness cannot be a link in the chain of life; and we could never speak of sleep if it did not constitute an integral element of conscious life. So it is not a mere idea. A person complaining of sleeplessness does not suffer from an inability to form the idea. As Wildon Carr observes: "When we say that a man is unconscious in his sleep, we do not mean by unconsciousness a complete absence of consciousness, as when we say that a stone is unconscious. We mean that the consciousness which is present is blocked or hindered from being effective. Rouse a man from his sleep...and consciousness returns." Besides, the statement "I was unconscious during sleep," contradicts itself. For how can you say that you were unconscious unless you were conscious of your unconsciousness? If one retorts, "I know now that I was unconscious" his position is not improved. How can you now refer to or describe a past occurrence unless it was part of your experience? And an experience of a conscious being presupposes consciousness at the time of the experience as well as at the time of recollection. Further, the memory of sleep points it as a period of felicity or bliss essential to life. It is thus futile to argue.that sleep is a period of absolute unconsciousness. We can never be AWARE of such a state. We cannot own it or describe it as thus and thus.

"I was aware of nothing, neither of myself nor of the world." This is how a man roused from deep sleep describes it, and thereon hangs the whole possibility of metaphysics as a positive science. If a man says he was aware of

nothing, he must have been aware of this awareness. Do what we may, we cannot rid ourselves of awareness in some form or other. "I was not aware of myself or of the world". This disposes of the ego and non-ego in sleep, and discloses their eternal concomitance. I was not aware of the non-ego, because I was not aware of the ego. Just as the presence of the one necessarily demands and depends on the presence of the other, the absence of the one must spell the absence of the other. In waking we perceive the world, because there is the to perceive it. In sleep we are aware of neither, because neither is present. To suppose an outside world flourishing all the same by the side of the sleeper is not to the point. It is illogical. The world persisting is obviously the waking world connected with the individual sleeper, which is cognized by the waking critic, but the sleeper, has shed his individuality when he has passed into sleep, into pure Spirit, and no world can attach itself to spirit. For the world is seen to be concomitant with the individual ego, and it is the mind, the senses and the body that individuate Spirit. When, however, these shackles of determination are flung off as in sleep, still to hold that the world exists in relation to Spirit, is neither rational nor consonant to experience. The world comes and goes with the waking state; and as I can change my states, so I can, when I move into the next state, switch off the world, which is my cumber in waking, along with the ego, its counterpart, The recognition of this truth requires some clear thinking, as the mind and the present ego act as clogs impeding the higher view revealed by intuition.

What then is the awareness characterizing deep sleep? It is not one craving an object and an ego. It is not of the subject-object variety that we are familiar with in the waking and dream. It is what Vedanta calls the Transcendental or Pure Consciousness. We shall call the other the empirical consciousness and the life predominated by it the empirical life. We shall now more closely examine sleep as Pure Consciousness. In the first place, it is a state of absolute unity. In the absence of time and space there is no room for change or plurality. Ramanúja indeed believes in the persistence of the ego, and some other thinkers in that of the non-ego also then in a latent condition. But evidently they are wrong. For we have seen how the entity which alone links up waking and dream as the Witness, is already divested of egoity, and our present examination of sleep is rendered possible only by the persistence of the same witness in sleep also, that is to say, of the Witness divested of the psychic set (mind and senses)and the physical body, which are individualizing elements. Time ceases to operate outside of the states and is absent from sleep. Hence the ideas of latency or patency which are confined to sphere of a time-order are inapplicable to the contents of sleep. We carry over to sleep our waking bieas when we conceive multiplicity in a potential condition in it: and we forget that it is an independent state to be judged and understood by itself and not to be translated into the terms of the others whereby we should forfeit the advantage of a new experience. There is neither a potential world in sleep nor an actual world besides the sleeper, the Scylla and Charybdis to be avoided in Vedantic sailing.

In the next place, it is not a state (1) in which Pure Consciousness abides, but is itself Pure Consciousness. The popular view that it is a state (fourth state) is due to a misapprehension of its true nature which a careful analysis can alone reveal. For it is timeless and changelees and to call it a state under the circumstances is a misnomer. The Witness has transformed itself into Pure Consciousness, for without it we could have no knowledge of sleep. But its report of the non-existence then of the ego and the non-ego shows that it has assumed the role of pure consciousness. It is hence clear that the Witness of the ego and the non-ego in the other states is also the Witness in their absence, and that the Witness and the Pure Consciousness are identical. A mirror reflects

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(1) This is only the view of a group of modern thinkers. The orthodox school of thought represented by Sankara, Sayanacharya and others considers dreamless sleep (Sushupti) as a State in which Avidya inheres in its causal form. The assumption of the state of Sushupti as Pure Consciousness, i.e. 'a state of absolute unity' without the least vestige of Avidya being latent in it, results in the consequent negation of the indispensableness of any spiritual discipline so strongly enjoined in the Sruti and by the Acharyas. In fact, it is only in the state of Samadhi attained through a rigorous course of spiritual discipline that this veil of nescience which persists in a latent form even in dreamless sleep is torn off; and as a result the Supreme Reality, the abiding Witness in all the three states of waking dream and sleep, is realized at the Turiya (transcendent) divested of all the tentacles of Maya. Ed.

objects presented to it, but in the absence of objects it ceases to be a reflector, though the power to reflect is ever inherent in it.

In the third place, the states are independent expressions of Reality, so many wholes in which Reality manifests itself; for, being free from time and space, it is indivisible. For the same reason, not only waking and dream are each whole but every one of their constituents is such. The plurality perceived within a state stands as an obstacle to our recognition of the indivisiblity of Reality. "Standing undivided amidst beings, yet appearing as divided" (Gita XIII.17.) But in sleep we have Pure Consciousness, presented as the whole which is the masterkey with which we have to unlock the doors of the other states. The metaphysical nature of the latter is thus revealed as Pure Consciousness which determines the value and the nature of the rest. We thus arrive at the equation:

Waking Dream Pure Consciousness.

Having analyzed the states we are in a position to discuss those philosophical questions which obtain a final solution in the light of Vedanta. First, what is Reality? Since the three states exhaust all life and experience, Reality is that which invariably accompanies the states and persists in the midst of and in spite of the varying contexts. It is thus seen to be Pure Consciousness which pervades all life, whose nature is such as to make even an idea of its non-existence unthinkable. In defining Reality as that whose non-existence cannot be conceived or imagined, both Sankara and Bergson agree. But whereas Bergson, whose observation is limited to the waking state, identifies Reality with unceasing

change, Sankara identifies it with Pure Consciousness or the Witness, but subject to change. Pure Consciousness is not merely the Reality but the All. Its remaining single and secondless in sleep, its indivisibility and its ubiquity through life shows that it is the radical principle on which hang the wholes, waking and dream. It includes manifestations, it is all-inclusive. This knowledge is the truest, the highest that we can or need possess. It is the Absolute Truth, relating as it does to the all-inelusive Reality; and from this standpoint it is clear that Bradley was right in declaring that truth and knowledge merge in Reality and are one with it. The authority of the Vedas which unfold this Truth becomes unquestionable. Their testimony is the voice of life and experience. To deny it is to strangle that voice. On the contrary, if the Vedas be interpreted to support Dualism, they must forfeit their claim to reveal the Oneness reached by a rational analysis of life, and their authoritativeness will pass into an arbitrary assumption.

One may imagine that the methodology of Vedanta which eschews external observation and experiment, is defective inasmuch as it fails to throw light on the nature of the world. This is a grave mistake. In studying the inner life we rise above its manifestations, and get at the very root from which the ego and the non-ego of the states branch out. Yet the relation is not organic, but metaphysical. Reality does not develop, by a process in time, into waking and dream but seems directly to manifest itself as the latter. There are no intermediate states. Reality does not bring into being what was Non-est, but apparantly becomes its own "other" for even while appearing as the objective world, it

remains an undiminished Whole. And the advantage of the inner analysis lies in this that it discloses Reality no less than our identity with it. It is we before whom the states are furled and unfurled, it is we who are resolved in sleep into Pure Consciousness which like a canopy covers the whole of life and that is life. It is our Self that co-ordinates the states. Placed beyond time and generating the time-flow of each state, it is immortal and by immediate experience we know it is to be perfect Bliss. This is the Highest Being which the Upanishads call Brahman. It gives being to the objects and occurrences of the states as well as to the states themselves, and this imparted being is real within each state. A state and its contents mutually determine their own reality, but as a manifestation this reality is not ultimate. Since we are real and the objective world is Reality, we can never know unreality. The contents of the state as much as the states themselves, however, when viewed as separate from Pure Consciousness fade into nothing. They are mere abstractions, void of reality. Again, Reality as the Eternal Witness cannot rightly be treated as an object, and number and quality which apply to objects cannot be predicated of it. Being an immediacy, it allows of no doubt, hypothesis or predication concerning its nature. It is not transcendent, but trancendental. It is the Absolute, bearing no relation to any other. For in the absence of time and space, no relation can exist between Reality and its manifestations, since the terms of the relation cannot meet on the same level of reality.

The question how the world arose is altogether impermissible. Causality works only in time, and

the waking world must find its cause in waking which circumscribes the sphere of causation. Neither can we ask why we wake and dream--- for we intuit the states, those intuitions being the prices of our mental and bodity activities are primary and so beyond the pale of time and causation. We can now indeed turn our minds forwards and backwards but when we approach the question of the origin of the state that brings form the mind we realize our limitation and are struck dumb. Waking limites the sphere of causation. This, however, does not affect our conclusions. Pure Consciousness being the All, waking and dream can only be its expressions, no less than the world which they bring into view. Their fugitiveness and contingency mark them as realities of the second or subordinate degree.

We shall now advert to another interesting point of enquiry. What is the nature of Pure Consciousness or the Witness? Is it, as Pure Being, a concrete or an abstract idea? If it is abstract or empty of all contents, it cannot give rise to the states or to their worlds, for nothing can come out of nothing. If on the contrary it is concrete, it already contains in solution all the elements that afterwards crystallize into creation. In this case the Unity is not an undiluted Absolute, but a real complexity in a subtle condition. Non-dualism would be a mere web of fancy and so also the various degrees of reality. This objection has been raised by Hegel against Vedanta, from a total misconception of its position. The Pure Consciousness of Vedanta is neither an idea nor an object, and is known to us more intimately as our Self than any object can possibly be. It cannot be classed in any of the categories of thought as these are products

of thought and no category can precede consciasness which it presupposes. Thus the dilemma whether Pure Consciousness is an abstract or a concrete idea is meaningless. To treat Pure Consciousness as an object would be to do injustice to its nature. But not to be an object is not to be nothing. It is more real than any other, because it is our own self, whose reality is a primary assumption with us, it is a truth we start from, before we ascertain the reality of other things. To question its reality is to question whether we live. Hegel started with the error that the world of perception and all life must be derived from an original principle by a gradual dialectic process which assumes everything going before as implicit in a present idea which is its explication, so that the movement of ideas being circular, every idea is a microcosm, differing from others only in the proportion in it of implicit and explicit elements. This self-movement without a goal or an aim is an unintelligible mystery. Vedanta does not trace the world to the Absolute either directly or indirectly. Its truth is based on facts of experience. In sleep we find Pure Consciousness without a second and in waking and dream the worlds unroll themselves before us, in addition to Pure Consciousness. Since this view exhausts all reality, we can legitimately suppose only that the second element in the states, viz. the world is but the the original pure Consciousness, without loss of integrity appearing as the object to itself. As there is no change in Pure Consciousness the second element appearing as an alien must be a delusion. It is not alien. Thus to resolve all into Pure Consciousness is

highest function of reason. It is wrong to derive waking from sleep. All three are independent of one another, and the temporal relation of posterior or anterior is the creation of our own time-ridden mind. There is no time to connect them. Only a comparative survey of the states enables us to assess their metaphysical value.

Tow important considerations force us to recognize this truth. First, the notions of 'I' the subject or consciousness, are peculiar in their nature and inhibit plurality in strict thinking. We cannot conceive two 'I's, two subjects or two consciousnesses unless these are turned into objects. This radical fact no pluralism can explain. Secondly, why we believe even illusions to be real at the time, baffles all psychology, and is rendered intelligible only in the light of the truth that as we are real we can never experience unreality neither perceive or conceive it. That it was an illusion is an after-thought, which then deals with the reality of That discovery. In this manner, we transfer in every instance our reality to the object of knowledge. Both the 'I' and the world bear on them the sure proofs of their origin in Pure Consciousness. Like Pure Consciousness, the 'I' cannot be pluralized and the world is out there only for a cognizing consciousness. This concomitance of the world with consciousness must point to a common source of both in which they have their kinship.

As children fear darkness, says Schopenhauer, so do people fear annihilation. Exactly similar is the fear of Brahman, devoid of qualities and individuality. But the fear must be overcome, if we are face facts and not indulge in comforting fancies. Is there, however, room for fear?

Gaudapada remarks: "They conceive fear in what is free from all fear" (Man.Up.III.39). How then is this repugnance to Brahman to be accounted for? In the first place, when we try to comprehend it, we require it to be described in terms of what we know in waking life, that is to say, in empirical terms. It must be presented as an individual person with power, wisdom and mercy, in short, as the God of Theology, who alone can hear our prayers, hasten to our help, absolve us from our sins, and be our Saviour. But our experience of sleep is a precise negation of these features. Who can be satisfied with Pure Consciousness? This feeling evidently proceeds from the waking bias that ever predominates over our judgment. If in its true nature Brahman cannot be described in familiar terms, we ought not to conclude that it is nothing. Our whole nature revolts against such a vew and we cannot conceive nothing. Our Self surely is not nothing. On the contrary, the aim and object of manifestation would seem to be the objective realization of Brahman as expressible in manes and forms. The ideas of power etc. displayed in life must be traced to Brahman and we cannot define or describe it in other terms. To make it acceptable to our empirical conception, even personality must be imposed on it. Thus the interpretation of sleep as a negation of all that we know is but a natural criticism from the view-point of waking. It is an external view. In itself, it is a Unity consisting of Consciousness and Bliss divested of all alien elements. Since such is our essence, our opposition to it is futile.

Those that cannot make up their minds to accept the unadulterated truth, are free to regard Brahman as clothed with attributes

which the manifestations suggest and justify. In fact, dream and waking are nature's comments on sleep. All the power, mental, physical and moral, that they display, all the goodness, mercy and wonder that we discern in them, must be ultimately traced to Pure Consciousness, though these manifestations do not affect it in the least. Says the Bhagavat-Gita X, 41: "Whatever is glorious, good, beautiful and mighty, understand thou that to go forth from a fragment of My splendour." Metaphysically there is no evil as there is no alien, although from the empirical view both are real and give rise to Ethics. Theology contemplates Reality clothed with attributes, though it does not realize the true basis on which its faith must eternally stand. Vedanta supplies that basis. God then is not fictitious, but is the Real of reals. Our faith in Him is not without its fruit, for life is Brahman and no unreality can be smuggled into it. Still the path of Reason is distinct from that of Faith. While knowledge removes the fetters of ignorance immediately faith steps us endlessly in dualistic life in which perfect peace cannot reign, from which contradictions cannot be banished. The dualities of common life are appearances whose essence is the One.

Ethics is the eldest-born of Vedanta. As the interests of the individual are secured by the relation of the soul to God as one of Self to Self, so the ends of morality are ensured by the recognition of the same Self in others. The Gira declares (XIII.29): "He that sees the One Ruler existing everywhere cannot injure another who is his own self, and so attains the Highest Goal." And the goal is harmony and peace. The sense of individuality and the seeking of individual

interests are wrecked on the rock of Universal Identity, the refusal to perceive any other entity than Self, or Brahman, which is the All and includes ALL. Theology which emphasizes distinctions can neither enjoin aimless self-denial nor ensure God's sympathy. For, if God and the souls are essentially distinct, their interests may collide and never be identical. On the contrary, he who realises his oneness with God, the all-inclusive Being, triumphs over his narrow views induced by a sense of individuality, and can find no evil in life that does not ultimately tend to confirm his conviction. To see the seal on it, he becomes pure in though, word and deed, which are its inevitable forms of expression. "Vedanta" says Paul Deussen, "is the greatest support to morality." It fixes the standard of right and wrong and explains the instinct imbedded in us in the form of the categorical imperative or the preference of the good over the bad.

The aesthetic feeling or the sense of the beautiful is due to a temporary suppression of individuality and objectivity, to an unconscious realization of Oneness. This can never be explained by Pluralism. Culture, training and personal predilections are contributory factors. But the effect, viz. annihilation of 'otherness' would be impossible if the 'other' were absolutely real. The aesthetic delight is a metaphysical experience, bringing to light the essentially blissful nature of Spirit. For beauty is externalized bliss. In accounting for the second element of life, Vedanta propounds a theory. Brahman manifests itself as the world in order to obtain an objective view of itself. It suffers separation into the subject and the object, and through eternal

change it contemplates its own inexhaustible nature. Self-expression is for self-realisation. Brahman works assiduously in the person of the scientist to ransack all corners of nature to make them intelligible. Hence the progress of science is bound to be unlimited. The Vedantic spirit supplies the most powerful stimulus to the cultivation of science in all dempartments of life. While the truths so discovered cannot be final, owing to the ceaseless change that rules the universe, they can never affect the Vedantic truths which envisage all the three states and relate to a sphere transcending time. The reader will carefully remember that Vedanta has fulfilled its function when it has established the One Reality which is all-inclusive and which resolves everything into itself leaving no remainder. The doctrines of Maya and Avidya are offered only to help the aspirant to rise to the plane of the Absolute Oneness, for the appearance of an out-standing second element might operate on him as a hold-back. When the Oneness is reached, however, there is no worry with a second.

The eschatology of Vedanta is among its dogmatics. It concerns the fate of unenlightened souls, and as its pronouncements are neither verifiable nor refutable, they must be tested only by the moral principles they involve. On the one hand the soul is eternal, and on the other, its embodiment must continue while it remains ignorant of its true nature. Hence the doctrine of Karma and Rebirth are formulated to determine its course through its spiritual evolution. Heaven and hell are described as places in which the souls of the dead experience joy and suffering respectively as the strict consequences of their deeds in life--

"according to acts and culture"--and not as rewards or punishments. (Katha V.7). When the period is over, they take new births, the nature of which is determined by the moral sum of deeds in the previous life. Their migration from body to body continues until enlightenment occurs, which puts an end to further migrations and brings on release. God as our truest friend guards and guides the soul through all its wanderings and can never desert it, for He is its very Self. His solicitude for its well-being never ceases till it is safely landed on the shore of deliverance. No soul is left to perish in the waters of Samsara (transmigration). Sin which arises from attachment to non-Self creates a distance between us and our very Self, God. Prayer meditation and worship bring about communion, and facilitate approach. Those that lean on faith must pass through a very strict discipline in life, practising self-control, celebacy and renunciation, devotion and service, worship and meditation. Through thr grace of God so obtained and through special experiences they receive enlightenment leading to release. A vedantin cannot decry these means warranting a pure and disinterested life, for he alone can truly appreciate the adamantine basis on which they rest.

We shall now briefly consider the doctrines of Mana and Avidya, which as we have seen have no place in the strict system of Truth. (For a fuller idea see the writer's Vedanta or the Science of Reality). Maya is the power with which Brahman is regarded as invested, in order to account for the phenomenal life. The term is also used to indicate the phenomena. The contradiction which runs thro'

all empirical life points to its unreality by itself and demand a basic Reality to make it effective. The belief in objects taken by themselves comes to us naturally and is due to Avidya or ignorance of the Truth. Empirical life endowed with an existence independent of God is common delusion, the source of all evil. In truth Brahman neither creates nor destroys. It is above change and time and is beatitude itself. In the strictest sense we are Brahman. Much of the unpopularity of Veddanta is due to the reckless manner in which the Truth is expounded. The idea that all Brahman is inspiring, while the notion that all is Maya or illusion is to most people disconcerting, paral paralysing. The Bhagavat-Gita in its own gripping style refers to the Absolute and the relative phase of the same Reality: "Shining with all sense-faculties, without any senses; unattached, supporting everything; and free from qualities, enjoying them" (XIII.15) The one is the transcendental and the other the empirical view.

The reader who has so far followed the Vedantic reasoning will readily perceive that the question of a cause never arises with regard to Maya or Avidya. Maya is a theoretical concession to the Avidya-ridden soul to satisfy its craving for an explanation of the world, and Avidya or ignorance must in all cases be traced to the absence of enquiry. The order of evolution is fixed and immutable: First, Avidya or ignorance, the then intellection. Causation cannot precede ignorance, for it presupposes intellection. Knowledge is the implacable foe of ignorance which it completely destroys. Causation is defunct in the plane on which Maya and Avidya work.

There is an impression that Vedanta is mysticism

and that the latter is the culmination of its teaching. The two, however, are wide and distinctly apart. The Upanishads no doubt deal largely with Upasanas or meditations which aim at the experience of mystic Oneness and the ecstesy resulting from it. This is evidently meant for those who avoid discussion and reasoning. The rational portion stands out more prominently and the methodoloty is based on it. The distinction between the two is radical and far-reaching. Mysticism seeks private experience by conscious effort, while Vedantic reason builds on universal experience. Although philosophy must throw light on all kinds of human experience, its Truth cannot be be drawn from social experiences, however rare; for the latter are not within the lives of all. Vedanta aims at knowledge of Truth; mysticism ecstasy.

In contemplating life we seem to be spactators of a strange drama, a play of shadows in the shape of states enacted before us. The actors and the scenes are ourselves transmuted, without the least loos of our integrity. So long as we take the shadow for substance, we are merged in joys and sorrows, in birth and death. When we remember that it is but a shadow and that Reality can cast no shadow, the play now known to be an illusion deceives us no more, and the states rolling and unrolling themselves before us fool us no more. We are left to admire the greatness of Brahman which can project such scenes and withdraw them into itself, leaving no trace behind. To dispel the fear of illusion Santayana suggests a way. It is "to entertain the illusion without succumbing to it, accepting it openly as an illusion and forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it obviously has; and that whether it profits me or not, it will not deceive me."

(K.A.K.IYER) VEDIC SUPPORT FOR NON-DUALISM.

Before claiming the support of the Vedas for Non-dualism or Advaita, it is necessary to sift the foundations on which the Vedic authority itself rests. The Christians, the Mahomedans and the Buddhists repudiate and reject it. The Arya-Samajists assume it, the Meemamsakas imagine they have established it, and the Dvaitins and the Visishtadvaitins of every shade confidently build upon it. But the naive question remains unanswered, viz. Why should we believe in the Vedas? The Meemamsakas, with an unconscious inconsistency resort to reasoning when they attempt to solve the problem. "Articulate sounds are eternal, the Vedas consist of words made up of articulate sounds, ergo they are eternal. They are likewise authoritative as they cannot be traced to any personal being, not even God, as their author. Their distinct identity, besides, which entitles them to special consideration depends on the invariable order of their words and sentences. The sentences being thoughts made up of eternal concepts disclose absolute truths demanding our implicit acceptance, since there is no personal factor to taint them." These arguments are supposed to have a cumulative force which is logically irresistible. Now even if these reasons some of which are obviously too wide were admitted, the net result would be to enhance the status of Reason and lower that of the Vedas. If on the contrary the Vedic truths are alleged to be self-valid, so might those of other revelations be similarly claimed to be. If they are to be validated by Reason, they must be harmonised with life and experience from which all reasoning draws its breath.

This is a question of central importance to us, Hindus, for it vitally affects the very root of our beliefs. In this age of universal and unrestrained questioning no perscriptive right or traditional authority will be left untouched, and if we failed to settle the question now, we should be prepared to meet a dismal future for our Religion and Philosophy, a future of rampant scepticism, irreligion and chaos, or of drivelling and degrading superstition. No theology, however well fortified by ancient beliefs, by scholastic learning and by supernatural miracles, can stand the persistent attack of reason and enlightenment; and our renowned stronghold of religion and philosophy must yield to forces which are relentless in their work of destruction. Most of the creeds holding sway at present over human minds were founded many centuries before the dawn of Modern Science, and the rapid progress of the latter is an increasing menace to the continuity of their influence or prestige. Old idols along with mystic rituals and unchallenged dogmas cease to inspire faith in men of culture, and the claims of special Revelations must follow in their wake, never again to be advanced or admitted. The founders of religions never could spy in the sweep of their vision the possibilities of a scientific era, and cooly believed that the dogmas which satisfied them would also satisfy future generations without end. Hence if we are earnest and loyal in our allegiance to the Vedas, we must ransack every means of proving their claims for an assured place in cultured life.

In tackling this problem we shall derive no help from a reference to ancient writings.

Their authors believed instinctively in the Vedas, and so long as there was no formidable opponent, it was easy enough to dispose of all opponents as atheists or unbelievers. Yet, two of our adversaries may be mentioned as remaining unvanquished, the Buddhists and the Jains, against whom no reasoning has been hitherto successful.

What then is our present duty? Since the validity of the Vedas must in any case be made good, the mere citing of the views of great men of the past would be futile; and by elimination, we arrive at Reason and Life as the only arbiters of the destiny of the Vedas. Now since obviously the portion of Works relates to effects to be looked for only in the future after death they cannot carry their own evidence with them, and it is only the portion of the Upanishads which treat of the nature of the soul that allows of their being subjected to rational examination. Even here if the realisation of the truths concerning t the soul and of its release were only after-life events, we should be left with nothing positive to be discussed or verified; and, as in the dark all cows are black, so all eschatologies would be equally incapable of verification.

Fortunately for us there are these remarkable words of the Upanishads ever ringing in our ears. "One enjoys Brahman here. This vibrant voice of the Upanishads cannot be ignored. The challenge must be taken up and the reasonings examined with all care and caution. The angle of vision is provided by the verse: "He is the witnessing consciousness, one and without attributes) and the angle covers the three states. If the inquirer can adjust him-

self to the angle, see through the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep and arrive at the conclusion "I am Brahman" then the truth of the Upanishads is placed beyond all dispute. It is inconceivable how a conviction so arrived at can ever be affected by all the changes that characterise the inside of the States. Even if one should provisionally adopt the position he would feel that he was left without an opponent. The truth becomes absolute to him, though it may require some time to sink into his blood, so that every moment of his is coloured by it and confirms it. This is the bed-rock of experience that we have reached in seeking for the basis on which Vedic authority can stand for all time, and Vedic pronouncements be fearlessly proclaimed from the house-tops. In other words the Vedas are the highest revelations of the true nature of man because they reveal a fact which goes to the very root of our life. Their authoritiy becomes unimpeachable because the truth they unforld is verified in life and so precludes all doubt or controversy. While the Upanisads thus rise to the rank of unquestionable authority, they also at the same time contribute to elevate the rank of the portion of Works, since both constitute parts of an integral whole. The promises regarding after-life must be true and acceptable, for the general varacity of the Vedas has been placed on an incontrovertible basis in the only case in which the challenge can be verified, and that confessedly the most esseential, viz. the nature of our soul. Thus the Meemamsakas who fancy that they can rely independently upon a system of their own are lost in the quicksands of dogmatism and

superstition, unless they subordinate the Works to Jnana by which their own position can be ensured. Similarly, with all Hindu theologies. God can be proved to be an undoubted entity only on the basis of the Upanishadic method which takes the aspirant to the very Reality of all life, viz.Brahman. The authority of the Vedas being shown to turn on their declaration of the one principle of existence, whenever by interpretation the Vedas are taken to teach a dual principle, the conception saps the very foundations of Vedic testimony and becomes suicidal. For the existence of two or more ultimate and transdendent principles can never be referred to common experience, and God as well as the individual soul as distinct entities can never be established except by reasoning which dissolves their separateness. Hence if the Vedas are assumed to teach theological distincts, they are not entitled to superior claims--superior to those similar scriptures of other nations. Whatever is imagined to be peculiar to the Vedas will be sure to be confronted by features similarly peculiar to the other Revelations, so as to result in a hopeless ruin of all.

We shall now turn to the next point. How far can the Vedas be alleged to support Non-dualism? The truths beings expressed in an ancient tongue, we have necessarily to derive help from early commentaries. The older these are, the nearer they take us to the original import. But another difficulty now rears its head. If these commentaries differ, which are we to prefer and on what principle? This is a real objection. While to discover the meaning of an ancient passage we inevitably depend on the help of scholars, it is possible that their explanation receives the

tinge and the complexion of their private conviction. How should we know what the import of the text is apart from the personal predilections of the commentor? This gives a picture of the narrow and dangerous strait we have to pass through, but I believe the picture is overdrawn. For, it cannot be maintained that there are no sentences in the Upanishads which one who knows Sanskrit cannot understand without the commentary. That would be to constitute the commentary into a fetish--a disposition which has arrested the growth of independent thought for several centuries in India. Surely "One only without a second: That thou art: This Self is Brahman: There is not the least multiplicity here; It is worldless, Peace, the Good, and the Secondless" --these short, simple, transparent sentences do not stand in need of any abstruse comment to expound their meaning. An emphasis on onene-s with an embargo on plurality furnishes us with a positive and a negative proof as to the Advaitic import of the Vedas. If in all the various, sometimes vague, teachings of the Upanishads we come across any equally clear statement opposed in tenour to oneness, if oneness were interdicted and pluralism upheld or commended, then we should despair or ever harmonising Vedic truth with life and of finding impeccable grounds on which to defend the authority of the Vedas. The commentators, therefore, who employ their subtle scholarship in interpreting the Vedas so as to favour Dualism, do it at their peril. Although life abounds in duality this duality characterising a portion of an aspect of experience, must be sharply distinguished from <u>Dualism</u> which posits an

ultimate dual principle to account for experience, operating behind the phenomenal sphere and at the same time immanent in it. If Philosophy's function is to explain the duality of common life, the formulation of duality again as its source or basis is not to explain duality as such. It is to admit a non-plus. Duality can be traced only to non duality. The prevailing tone of the Vedas is monistic as is evidenced by the fact that Ramanuja, the great supporter of real distinctions and of the individual identity of the souls and objects, was obliged to provide for a conception of Unity in the fancied embodiment of the principle of Reality, a figure admirable as rhetoric, but certainly inappropriate in the region of precise thought. Even this interpretation is made possible only by excluding from consideration the claims of the States (waking, dreaming and deep sleep) as the more inclusive elements of experience. For, the examination of the States lifts us to an angle of vision in which the plurality and the reality of individual things have to be confined to the individual States and cannot be raised to an interstatal value, while the witnessing consciousness is realised as the one and secondless principle, the changeless entity before which the great and unique drama of Life is enacted in the shape of the States with their contents, never appearing together, never succeeding each other in one and the same time series, and never absolutely identical in any of their individual aspects. We then discover that the pure undifferentiated consciousness of deep sleep is the basis of all manifestation, remaining litself unchanged and unmodified throughout. The manifestation of every State is the manifestation of the whole of Reality, as, other-

wise, we cannot explain why the States are not experienced in juxta-position of the other, or why they are not externally connected by time. The truth is that Reality transcends all time, space and change. If now by this method of pure introspection and observation we find that Life or Reality is one indivisible whole and all the varities of things and occurrences cannot affect the integrity of Reality, we have every reason to be reverential in our attitude to the Vedas which declare this truth and point out the unique method of its realisation. Besides if all that is witnessed within the states is only a manifestation, a creation of the Reality, the Vedas themselves must be admitted to be such, and as this highest unifying truth is to be found only in them and only by later adeption, if at all, in other scriptures and systems of thought, the Vedas have an exclusive claim to be regarded as an infallible authority, not only on what they have brought within our experience, but on what they postulate as future possibilities.

But it is wrong to think that Vedanta as the Science of Reality is a sectarian Dogma, a scholastic basis of Hinduism. All Theology in fact stands on uncertain ground so long as God and the Soul remain unproven affirmations, and so long as the universal instinct which makes men crave for a higher and more perfect life and bliss cannot be satisfied by an ex-cathedram injunction. "This shalt thou believe or perish." On the contrary the Vedic system of monism must be welcomed by all Theologians as that which supplies the living principle on which they all stand or fall. It proclaims not a sectarian by a universal truth endorsed by the nature and experience of all humanity.

That is its claim to supreme authority, not resting on authorlessness or antiquity, but on an analysis of life within the power of every one of us to make for himself, unfolding an immutable truth indubitably verified. It is therefore to me unaccountable why it should rouse antipathy or hatred in the bosom of the Theists. Sankara, the greatest exponent of Hindu Monism came, like Christ, to build up, not to pull down. Under the auspicies of his system, Theology, Ethics, Freedom and Immortality are endowed with a new and unending lease of life. Opposition to it is not merely futile but disastrous. Do the critics realise this? Sankara, indeed, appears, in different capacities, as a theologian, mystic, and scholastic: but the dominant and unmistakable tone of his writings is that of the philosopher, of one seeking the Absolute Truth. In fact, even the Upanishads from which he quotes and on which he comments, are cast in a rational mould. When they deduce the ultimate truth, they lean on no authority, either their own or of God, but on positive experience, and this contrast is striking between them and the theologies. In the latter, stress is laid on dogmas like the original sin of man, the need of a saviour and of faith in him. The Upanishads on the contrary speak of the divine nature of man and set out the ways in which it can be realised, by works, by meditation, but immediately by knowledge. In the Brihadaranyaka and Chandogya, the secret truth is revealed through a strict course of reasoning on the States and no external authority is invoked to confirm it. Yajnavalkya and Prajapati are rational thinkers, and Sankara

following in their wake cannot have turned theologian needlessly. Although he seems to follow the texts very closely, remember the doctrines that he ultimately enforces. "The creation is illusory. The reality is the resting place of the self in sound sleep. Knowledge alone can bring about release. Works only purify the mind and qualify the aspirant for enquiry. Meditation which culminates in trance is only for the ignorant who cannot rise to a direct realisation of oneness. The enlightened are immediately set free. Those that practise meditation of God, a personal being, may be taken to Heaven, God's abode, but must still await the dawn of enlightenment for ultimate Release. The abodes of all gods are only a replica of the dual conditions prevailing here. They are not the final haven of rest. Rebirth and Karma again are true only in the illusory stage. Truth puts an end to all phantasies of a second being, second to the self." The effects of works or meditation, says Sankara, are problematical, that of knowledge is immediate. In his majestic introduction to the Sutras, he starts with the concepts of subject and object and proves by reference to universal usage that this empirical life is a bubble floating on the sea of illusion, and even the structure and activity of our mind presupposes it and flourish on it. The supreme fact that he never beings with a prayer, as a theologian would do, is never anxious to adduce scripture for his opinion, but makes the premise that the Upanishads, of which the Sutras are but brief summaries, only teach what he has established from a study of life and human nature, ought to point eloquently to the philosophic cast of his mind, capable of the

widest grasp, but turning to its own purpose evry phase of life and experience. Brahman is simply our self, the highest Reality.

Dr. Otto relying on a mere will-o'-the-wisp concludes that Sankara was essentially a mystic. He is said to teach oneness, the oneness of trance. Still his mysticism is inferior to that of Eckhart, for Indian is not Palastine. Such assertions are only worthy of that type of self-complacent Christian critics to whom any statement torn from its context is sufficient to warrant a predetermined conclusion. "Sankara does not undertake to explain Avidya, ergo, he is not a philosopher." This is something like the statement "The king wears a beard, therefore he must be a monk." In the first place, every writer of a book of any kind, every speaker, whatever his subject, that has figured on the different stages of human life, <u>presupposes</u> the ignorance of the reader or the listener on the subject-matter of his treatment, and has never once, poor man, thought of explaining the origin of that ignorance. As the scientists, philosophers and sages come under this universal indictment. If Dr. Otto be right, there never was a philosopher born. Neither Plato, nor Kant nor Hegel can pretend to that privilege, let alone Jesus, Luther or the Popes. For, they have invariably assumed the ignorance of the world on the points on which they strove to let in some light. Dr. Otto himself who has read their works must confess his previous ignorance of them, and if he is a philosophic critic must account for it in his own case. In the next place, it is one thing to use the word ignorance in common parlance, but it is quite another to employ it as a philosophic term. In the latter sense, Sankara

clearly proves our common ignorance of Reality and our mistaking the unreal for the real which runs through all life, as an inevitable thread. Time, space and causality are amongst its products and the tendency to ask for the cause of any thing is itself rooted in this original perversion of truth. All un-Atman, being unreality, dissolves completely when the truth about the real is known, and as the oneness of Reality precludes a second entity, even Avidya evaporates with Knowledge. To assume a cause for Avidya under the circumstance is to betray a mind impervious to reason, for Avidya giving rise to time itself cannot have originated in time. It is that with which all intellection, all empirical life starts. "Why" or "how" are questions valid within the walls of Avidya. They cannot and, in strict logic, must not overleap them. If Sankara were a mystic, his insistence to the end on reasoning would be an anomaly. He could have simplified his labours by emphasising Samadhi which, on the contrary, he classes with dreamless sleep. In deep sleep, trance, etc., is a recurrent phraseology with him.

A scholastic is one who takes up a theological dogma and justifies it by clothing it in the form of an Aristotelian syllogism. The doctrine of Christian Trinity, Resurrection, the Messiah, The Ascension, Reappearance and Millennium--these are the topics that exercise the ratiocination of the scholastic, who invents new articles of belief to support the old. But Shankara, to whom similar Hindu doctrines are bereft of any value from the higher standpoint, makes no secret of his real purpose which is to guide the human soul to

a recognition of its oneness, and treats these incidental means as strictly pertaining to the sphere of Avidya-- (All Scriptures are meant to enlighten the ignorant). But, with a merciful regard for the average minds, he does not think of explaining them away. For if the fundamental truth is known, what do the forms of faith signify?

I might appear to have digressed far from the subject into questions not directly connected with it. But it seems to me that the issue raised by them is vital to the cause of truth and to a right understanding of Sankara. I hope that I have clearly shown that both affirmatively and negatively the Vedas inculcate the truth of non-dualism and their authority is thereby ensured. To avow that they teach Dualism is to bring them down to the level of other Revelations and plunge into a conflict with these and with reason, a conflict which shall remain doubtful for all time. So long as no text can be put forward which clearly and expressly states that Dualism alone is true and that non-Dualism is untrue, so long as there is no positive and negative support in the Vedas for Dualism as the final truth, such as we have for Monism, there is every justification for us to affirm that non-Dualism alone is the teaching of the Vedas. Besides, if texts are known are to be met and superseded by texts unknown, if fact is to be borne down by fancy, then the context will be unfair and unequal. For, while the realm of Fact has a limit, that of Fancy will have none. The mere circumstance that the Vedas are couched in words, and that words imply concepts, and these, plurality, is meaningless. For all expression must con-

form to conditions of empirical life which appears real during the continuity of the same State, but is sublated in another. The meaning of the Vedas is evident from their own statements (There is no multiplicity here in truth it is one) which both negatively and positively inculcate oneness. Plurality is not Pluralism. Further, the Dualist or the pluralist has necessarily to explain, if Dualism were the real drift of the Vedas, why Non-Dualism should be mentioned or extolled even for once, and why Dualism should be positively condemned in unambiguous terms, (All this duality is but illusion: in truth it is one). The alternatives, it seems to me, are clear and coercive; either give up the Vedas or give up Dualism. As to the invectives and anathemas shot at the monists, the effective answer is that monism carries, on its very brow and in its very name and concept, the badge of security from all evil and suffering. (Fear proceeds from a second). Dualism on the contrary must raise in us an eternal and inevitable presupposition that what is offered by it as the final state of release must, reasoning from the known to the unknown, about in all the struggles of empirical life multiplied through endless time. We have the unquestionable logic of though and life on our side, while the dualists have their interpretations and unfounded faith on theirs.

THE SYSTEM OF RAMANUJA WITH SIDE-LIGHTS ON THOSE OF MADHVA AND SANKARA (K.A.K.Iyer)

The controversy between idealsim and realism is as old as philosophy itself. In the West, Idealism scored a number of notable victories under the leadership of Kant, Hegel, Locke, Berkeley, Mill, Croce, Gentile etc., while Realism, although it often sustained defeats, never altogether lost her hold on the common minds. The pendulum of thought is again swinging towards Realism, mainly as the result of the marvellous advance of physical science. In America Pragmatism, New Realism and Behaviourism have become the cultured cults: and in England, the decisive views of thinkers like Bertrand Russel and others are distinctly opposed to Idealism, which is rapidly retracing its steps before the aggressive march of its opponents. Realism and Pluralism have once again regained their lost influence: and, supported by the dominant voices of the scientists, are likely to hold the field for a long time to come.

In India the history of Philosophic movement presents a similar spectacle. Sankara's monism was keenly opposed by Ramanuja and Madhva, and after these and through the influence of their writings, a number of scholastic thinkers reopened the polemical warfare between Illusionism and Realism which has continued down to the present day. Between Physical science and Philosophical speculation a most intimate relation exists, and new discoveries in the one must lead to inevitable repercussions in the sphere of the other, affecting more especially Realism and Realistic theology.

The old notions of substance, cosmic time, infinite space, and universal causality must undergo revision, and the world of Science recede farther and farther from the world of ordinary perception. The claims of consciousness as a basic or independent entity must be re-examined, and many sanctified myths of religion abandoned once for all. The idea of revelation must submit to modification, and its authoritativeness limited and narrowed. Every form of faith must pass through a firebath of fact and verification; and no one school, however ancient or numerous, can afford to stand still, if it is to convince culture, or influence life. The inner realm (psychological and psychic) as well as the outer, spread before us in Time and Space, has to be studied with care, and the new truths so discovered must replace the old dogmas. The very slogan of the modern thinkers is 'no absolute truth.' Truths emerge in experience, and are tentative, subject to verification. The universal laws so-called are only generalised experience condensed into formulas, which are not eternal, but enjoy a brief vogue. Experience must continue to determine knowledge, and observation cast it into inevitable new moulds. Modern Thought denies it finality.

Philosophy is thus driven into a corner by science, and its power and ambition relentlessly confined to a very narrow groove, the dubious and dangerous groove of sheer faith or assumption. It would therefore be not only profitable but necessary to re-examine the foundations of Theologies and systems of Thought which have long enjoyed popularity and to reassess their strength and firmness; and more than any other the pretensions of

Vedanta as the Science of Reality.

Hinduism, as a Religion or a Philosophy, must face the storm of modern research and mere old Shibboleths or papal bulls can scarcely help to lengthen her life by a single day. Beliefs hid in the dark corners of the heart must be dragged out in the open arena of discussion, and their basis, either scriptural or traditional, subjected to the severe scrutiny of Reason and experience. Facts must overthrow fancies; and faiths, divested of their imaginative elements, be reinstalled in the hearts of men.

Idealism is comparatively more secure against the deadly onslaughts of Science. As it deals with mind and its creations,--the ideas,--it need not come into serious conflict with the progress of empirical knowledge. On the contrary, for Realism the contest is unequal and fatal. In India, it is hard to distinguish between a religion and its philosophy. They are so intertwined that theological doctrines are defended on philosophical grounds and philosophical truths are assumed on theological authority. In Europe secular thought was long ago emancipated to a large extent from the leading-strings of Religion, but in this country we have yet to achieve that independence, without, of course, prejudice to the interests of truth, and in perfect harmony with the declarations of Science. I consider it therefore a necessary, though not a light task to review the position of Hindu Realism as it prevails at present, and I choose the School of Ramanuja for my purpose, not only because it is typical of all realistic thought of our own day but because it has a philosophical importance of its own. Many of my observations may equally apply to Madhva

whose Realism is less compromising, and far more developed in detail than Ramanuja's. Few modern concepts have advanced farther than Madhva's in pushing Realism to its ultimate issues.

RAMANUJA (1019--1139 A.D). Ramanuja's interpretation of the Brahma Sutras marks a schism from the long established School of Sankara. Like Madhva after him, he rejected the theory of Maya or Illusion and fought for the maintenance of the realities and distinctions of common life. The majority of people had suffered the doctrine of Maya to sit like a nightmare on their beliefs. On the one hand the Vedas declared in unambiguous terms the Unity of Brahman, and Pantheism seemed to be the sanctioned creed. On the other hand, facts of experience eloquently demanded recognition of multiplicity and real distinctions. The spirit of the times cried for a teacher who could release the human mind from the horrid grip of Illusionism, and rehabilitate life with joy and beauty. Neither the dicta of the Vedas should be disallowed, nor the pronouncements of common sense denounced. Ramanuja came to fulfil these conditions. By his extraordinary intellect, skill in dialectics and wide learning, he succeeeded in giving a new orientation to the Vedic teaching, and his Sri Bhashya is the remarkable product of his extraordinary intellect. He agreed with Sankara that the prevailing tone of the Upanishads was Monistic but denied the Monism that necessitated an Illusionism as an inevitable drag.

The history of Southern India shows that the Hindu community during this period was in the midst of a religious ferment. Sankara's doctrines, pitched too high for the common mind, were misunderstood and misapplied. Rare

scholars mused in corners on the etherial oneness which nearly benumbed their faculties. The metaphysical truths were thrown into syllogistic forms till they were reduced to intellectual abstractions. Fervently religious natures found in them nothing to comfort or cheer them. A reaction followed. The Puranas and the epics were read with avidity. Idol worship and temples acquired a new interest. Miracles were readily believed in, and every deity was clothed with attributes most agreeable to the devotees. Theism triumphed and metaphysics amused only the erudite few. A new society known as that of the Bhagavatas, which must have long existed in the country unknown and secluded, now suddenly became popular and active. Its members were still not numerous but they were scattered over large areas, and the cult broke through barriers of caste and custom. in importanct centres like Conjeevaram and Sri Rangam, men belonging to this group formed organisations and held private meetings at which belief in a Personal God was expounded; devout songs were sung, and stories were related of extraordinary religious experiences. Every one was encouraged to hold communion with God, and eagerly believed that his life was under the personal care of the deity he adored. This class soon became a brotherhood, a set of freemasons who, though all polls (?) were ready to fly to the help of their brother when he was in trouble and even to lay down their lives for their glowing faith. They were known to the outside world as Vaishnavas.

Among the members of this faith, the most renowned at the time for the purity of his life and the loftiness of his teaching was a

poor Non-Brahmin called Tirukachchi Nambi (Devotee of Conjeevaram). He was reputed to be so holy as to be able to hold teta-a-tete talks with God Varada, the idol representing Vishnu. It was but natural that Ramanuja whose devout nature sympathised with the beliefs of all pious men, irrespective of birth or denomination, soon became an admirer of this holy man, and was admitted to the secret brotherhood. It was equally natural that when he found his mind torn between his allegiance to the Vedas and his craving to re-establish the realities of life, he communicated his doubts to the Nambi; and obtained from the latter a promise that he would place the question before the deity at his next meeting, and report the result. This was no sooner proposed than carried out. Ramanuja to his infinite relief learned that the deity upheld the distinctions of life, and that of the soul from Brahman. This incident in the life of Ramanuja might appear insignificant to us, but the times were peculiar and highly charged with the spirit and enthusiasm of theistic revival, when visions, prophecies, oracles, dreams and miracles were the order of the day.

Meanwhile, things were taking a new turn at Sri Rangam. Yamunacharya, the Head of the Vaishnava Brotherhood, who was on his death-bed sent a messenger to bring young Ramanuja to Sri Rangam. His intention was to utilise the intellectual gifts of Ramanuja for the advancement of the cause of the Sri Vaishnava cult, which he was sure would be safe in Ramanuja's hands. Ramanuja hastened to Sri Rangam, only to find himself, alas, a few hours too late. The saint had died. Ramanuja keenly regretted the loss of a chance of

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meeting the saint while still alive, but he noticed a remarkable circumstance. On the right fingers of the dead body three were bent. What could it mean? Did the sain intend thereby that he had three objects to be fulfilled by Ramanuja? Believing in the probability of his conjecture, he cried out alound with all the fervour of his soul: "O Great Saint, I am ready to carry out your commands. I make this vow to that effect, before all. Is the writing a Commentary on the Brahma Sutras, according to the Bhagavata School, one of your wishes?" He paused for a response. One of the fingers slowly straightened out. He then put two more questions and the other fingers similarly straightened out. Ramanuja's highest ambition was now realised. He found himself at the head of a community of religious men whom he could serve with all his zeal and capacity. He unreservedly placed his genius and learning at their disposal, and the Sri Bhashya was the glorious outcome.

To understand clearly the causes that led to the promulgation of the three different systems of thought and belief on the part of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva, it is fundamental to bear in mind their several attitudes towards Truth. Sankara relied on experience and reason as the only guides to an understanding of Truth and fond his conclusions marvellously confirmed in the Upanishads. Ramanuja and Madhva on the other hand, started with an implicit faith in the Vedic utterances interpreted in the light of practical life, and employed reason to justify that faith. Their procedure was diametrically opposed to and their conclusions poles asunder from, those of Sankara. To ascertain truth, Sankara studied life with a perspicacity sharpened by learning. He thus

cleared the ground for an original and courageous interpretation of the Upanishads, laying aside even tradition when it clashed with his direct derivation of Truth from universal experience. The other two thinkers assumed their Principles, God and the Individual Soul, as revealed by the Vedas, and troubled themselves no further to place them on a rational basis. They both interpreted the scriptures so as to harmonise with the realites and distinctions of common life. Madhva supported pluralism while Ramanuja agreeing with him substantially, invested his system with a monistic garb by explaining that the souls and the material world are the body of God, so that there is only one Reality, God, of whom the rest are parts. Reality is one organic whole. In this respect Ramanuja's idea comes nearer to the Vedic Teaching which constantly lays emphasis on Unity, while Madhva has to explain away the Unity as figurative.

Much of the reasoning employed by Ramanuja and Madhva to establish the superiority of Vishnu over Siva in uninteresting to a modern. The Brahma Sutras treat of the Neuter "Brahman", and the commentators may break each other's heads over the question whether Vishnu or Siva was meant by the term. Badarayana, the author of the Sutras, coolly leaves it as a bone of contention among the succeeding theologians. Sankara finds that it serves his purpose admirably, as in his system both personal and impersonal concepts of Reality are provided with their proper places. On the whole, all the three agree in the following points:--(1) that a man should not be decoyed by unusual pleasures; (2) that life

on earth is, at the best, full of woes; and (3) that freedom from birth and death is to be won only by control of passions, acts of devotion, self-sacrifice, renunciation and True Knowledge. All the three stress the need of securing Divine Grace by a holy life free from attachment.

DOCTRINES. Stripped of sectarian dogmas, Ramanuja's teaching may be summed up as follows:--There is one God and he is a Personal Being. He is the only Reality. He must be regarded as embodied, the individual souls and inert matter forming his body. As, in common life, the soul is connected with a body, so is the Supreme Being wearing, in his turn the souls and matter as His body. He is all-powerful, omnicient and all-merciful. He has infinite auspicious qualities, and He and His constituent body are, down to the very atom, eternal. By Himself He is changeless but Hus body undergoes periodical swelling and shrinking which correspond to Creation and Dissolution--processes which He allows for His sport. The soul, as well as matter, is subject to this expansion and contraction. During the expansion, each soul becomes embodied; and, according to individual Karma, passes through birth and death till, through knowledge of the soul's relation to God--which is one of complete subordination--and through the aid of His grace, the soul attains Release from Samsara or embodiment. Although all-pervading, God has His special residence in the highest world known as Vykuntha and the released souls gain admittance to it and may optionally stay there or move through infinite worlds, enjoying the beautiful vision of God's magnificent creation. The souls then partake of all the power, wisdom

and bliss of God, with the exception of the ability to create the world, or control it. The idols in temples are not stones, but God Himself who has assumed that form for the convenience of his devotees. At the inception of creation souls and material objects are invested with name and form, which they lose in their subtle form at dissolution. While God is greater than the greatest and smaller than the smallest, the soul's size is atomic.

The soul retains its individuality eternally, even after Release. One soul differs from another in its special qualities, but not <u>qua</u> soul. All souls are of identical nature but, individually ever soul differs from every other, and the distinction is eternal. Knowledge that qualifies it for Release is not the simple removal of Avidya or ignorance but is of the nature of meditation on the great qualities of God, accompanied with self-surrender and service. Salvation is effected through God's grace so obtained. Inanimate matter is distinct from the soul and God. Each object is real and distinct from the rest.

The Vedas are the only sources through which the existence of God, and His nature as the Creator, destroyer and the moral Controller and Saviour can be known. Scripture is similarly the source of our knowledge of the eternality of the soul as an entity distinct from the body, of its transmigratory life, and of Release. Evil and suffering are the effects of Karma and can be overcome only by Devotion, Prayer and Meditation, and by pious works in the Service of God.

To Madhva (1128-1200 A.D.) as to Ramanuja God and the individual soul are transcendent

entities to be known only from scripture. Agreeing with Ramanuja in the reality and distinction of God, souls and matter, Madhva differs from him in the following respects. God does not wear the other two categories as His body, but pervades them. The souls are distinct from one another, eternally, by their individual capacity or characteristics. Hence in Release, though each is filled with bliss, the degrees of bliss enjoyed by the souls will never be identical. East released soul will have a natural conscious body and senses, which enable it to enjoy every kind of imperishable joy. The bliss of Release depends entirely on the soul's consciousness of its distinction from God and from Matter, and of its dependence on God for its salvation. The souls of the Monists or Mayavadins, according to Madhva, are destined to undergo endless suffering in Hell. Even God cannot avert the penalties due to their nature. A third class of souls will be sweltering in the eddies of Samsara helplessly through all time. The fates of the last two classes are irrevocable. To both Ramanuja and Madhva the soul is atomic in size. Both rely alike on scripture to establish God as a Personal Being, and the soul and matter as independent and real entities. The soul is morally free, but this freedom is a gift of God's through mercy.

Although Ramanuja started with the aim of re-establishing the real distinctions of life, he has opened no new avenues of thought by which they can be established on a rational basis. His reliance on the Vedas and on common sense robs his utterances of any philosophical value, while his denial of all illusions makes one stare and gasp at his assurance. In ordinary

life we do observe distinctions and we do assume their reality, but a simple appeal to this common belief will not help to invest them with a speculative significance. Objects are cognized by the senses, and the latter usually do not deceive. But how are the illusions accounted for? To say that there are no errors, no illusions is to be untrue to life. Besides, a dream is a palpable hallucination; there is nothing outside of us to support or survive it. Dreams are everyday occurrences, and the objects beheld in them have no pretensions to reality. The explanation that they are momentary creations of God is the device of a theologian, and not of a thinker. Quotations of texts and interpretations are out of place, and dream experiences being unquestionably real can be shoved away only at the cost of philosophical solidarity. Similarly, the illusions of waking life have to be reckoned with if the absolute reliability of the senses has to be placed on an unimpeachable basis. Illusions and hallucinations are not detected as such at the time. They appear real and natural. The discovery of their nature comes later and explanation follows. The mind and the senses behave alike in true or in false perception. There is no blunting or quickening of the faculties in the one or the other case. Besides, how the senses which only serve to effectuate perception, should also guarantee the reality of the objects presented as well as their own must be made to rest on a philosophical principle which determines the nature of reality, instead of the senses being saddled with the double function of aiding perception and at the same time testifying to the reality of the

percept. Ramanuja has failed to furnish such a principle, nor has Madhva succeeded where Ramanuja failed. Ramanuja cannot be said to have demolished the position of the Idealist. The objects of common life presuppose consciousness for they are known to us only as percepts which imply a perceiver. Their reality is thus not independent of consciousness. Further, their individuality distinctions and multiplicity, which would entitle them to reality, are only relative, not absolute. An object, as Gentile remarks, is individualized by its position in time and space, by its where and when, not on account of any virtue in itself. (P.324 "Vedanta or the Science of Reality."). Its distinction from the rest is due to qualities each of which is a universal, referring to a class, and therefore communal. When we say that a man is tall, his tallness is relative only. If all men possessed absolute tallness, distinctions would disappear. As Caird observes: "An absolute distinction by its very nature would be self-contradictory, for it would cut off all connection between the things it distinguished. It would annihilate the relation implied in the distinction and so it would annihilate the distinction itself." (P.135. Hegel). Similarly, multiplicity implies unber, and number inheres only in an individual belonging to a class, thus pointing to their common character. A horse and a dog are two animals. A dog and a stick are two things, entities, beings. Hence even plurality, or multiplicity in not an indepdent concept, but depends on that of community. Thus the conception of a multiplicity of individual as distinct objects cannot justify their claims to absolute reality. They are

real only for practical purposes. If individual things were absolutely distinct, their multiplicity would be robed of all signification. If, as Ramanuja contended, there were no degrees of reality, but the world, the soul, and God Himself were reduced to one level of order of reality, then the reality of God as well as of the rest would be interdependent and relative, never absolute.

But Ramanuja might be imagined to urge that the triad namely, the world, the soul and God, is one, as God owns the other two as His body; and since God is the Highest Reality, the rest also must partake of his nature and be equally real. Here we knock against his other concept namely, the embodiedness of God. He reconciled the unity of existence declared by the Upanishads, with the multiplicity required by common experience, by conceiving God as including the souls and matter as His body. This solution appeared to him as the triumph of commonsense. But it presents an insuperable difficulty. Without establishing on unimpugnable grounds the soul as an entity distinct from the physical body, and God, as the Moral Ruler of the Universe his position does not admit of a rational justification. In the first place, what is the relation between the soul and the body? A relation is seen to exist between things of the same kind, betweeen one material body and another. But if the soul should be connected with the body, even temporarily, the connection is unimaginable. Conceding, however the possibility of such a relation between the two, how can we extend the relation so as to conceive it between God on the one hand and the souls and matter on the other? A body is an object cognizable by the soul, and the latter cannot

by its very nature play the role of an object except to itself. If, therefore, in the sense in which we speak of a soul and its body, we refer to the soul as God's body, the term "body" becomes meaningless. I can regard God as the object of my meditation or thought, but ever retaining the nature of a subject, as I must, I cannot regard my soul, as the object of God; and even if I force such a conception on my mind, it resists the coercion and regains its subjectivity. Both God and the notion of my being His object become simultaneously turned into an object of my present consciousness, proving thereby the futility of my endeavour to conceive an impossibility. A relation can exist only between two distinct terms or objects. Between the soul and God who is all-inclusive no relation can be conceived, as neither is essentially an object.

Ramanuja anxiously discusses the various connotations of the term "body" and decides upon adopting it in the sense of (1) complete subordination or control (2) a means of activity and enjoyment to the soul, as the possessor of an organic body. This parallelism between God and an organism has its own pitfalls. An organism can have freedom to act only when it possesses the corresponding member or limb. Its own hapiness and preservation depend on its members. In the next place, although externally an organism may boast of its control over the members of its body, it certainly cannot direct its own digestion, circulation of blook and secretion of vital juices, which are due to a higher power, Nature, to which the organism in all its aspects is but an unquestioned slave. Reasoning from these known data of experience, it is unintelligible how God can retain His control over the souls or matter, if they are His body,and

how in that case, He can escape the predi-
cament of losing His independence, if His
integrity rests upon His connection with a
body. Besides, if God is a conscious being,
the individual soul must affect Him only as
an object and if still the soul is His body
the soul might, with a parity of reasoning,
claim God for its body, because He is its
object. In any case, God cannot realise the
subjective nature of the soul, cannot be to
the soul what the soul is to itself. More-
over, a body individualises spirit, and is a
clog on its freedom, as Ramanuja himself ad-
mits in his comment on the Brahma Sutras III
2 & 5. A soul is turned thereby into an indi-
vidual among individuals. Invested with a body,
likewise, God is individualized, and He finds
Himself in a realm comprising but His own
complex unity, and not in a real comprising
other individual spirits opposed to Him <u>as a</u>
<u>whole.</u> Further God ceases to be an all-inclu-
sive Reality, since He cannot include me to
whom He is an object. The make-up of the sys-
tem is thus poetical, and cannot stand the
test of reason. For when this imaginary cement
of God's embodiedness is dissolved, and the
mask is uplifted, Ramanuja's position betrays
its unmistakable identity with the undiluted
pluralism of Madhva; and the surviving entities
God, souls and matter are left to stare help-
lessly and eternally at one another in all
their mutual opposition, without a single
principle to unite them, left in a chaos of
independence and plurality.

This indissoluble tie between God and His
body is inconvenient to God Himself. If the
body depends on God for its existence, so
does God depend upon His body for His life.
Logically, a relation affects both the terms

that it unites. If the body is said to be only a mode of God, but a real mode, then all the changes to which the mode is liable must affect God Himself. There is no possible escape from this logical necessity. Spinoza indeed postulated modes to God, but they are unreal. They are limitations that we impose upon him.

There is an intrinsic weakness likewise in Ramanuja's explanation of Creation and dissolution as arising from the contraction and expansion of God's body. In the first place, the souls cannot be conceived to swell and shrink,--processes confined to material bodies. In the next place, a relation between God and his body being admitted, God cannot be free from the effects of the changes to which His body is subject. Either the relation must be thinned to a vanishing point, or the immutability of Divine nature must be wholly abandoned.

In the third place, to God a body is either natural or necessary. In the latter case He is imperfect, in the former, helpless. Either way God deserves our sympathy more than our admiration or adoration.

Moreover, an organic being with its body,--an idea which has furnished Ramanuja with the ground for his theory--is seen extended in space and develops in time. That is to say, an organism lives in time and space. God as an embodied being must similarly be bound by time and space, a condition to which Ramanuja's system must submit, as he regards God to possess the souls and matter as His parts. Now parts imply space; and contraction and expansion, time. It is regrettable that Ramanuja has not attempted to tackle time and space which he seems to have looked upon as elements extraneous

to the world and not demanding an explanation. Creation and dissolution to the world he describes as God's sport which laughs at causation.

The relation of God to His body might be explained not as that between the Universal and the Particular. In that case, the individual object resulting from their combination must be admitted to be unrealexistent. For the Universal and the Particular are equally concepts; and, as Hegel claims, are both real as objective concepts, while an object of perception which is an existent is unreal, being nothing more than a bundle of Universals. This view, however, cannot be acceptable to Ramanuja from whose system all unreality is banished. Besides, the notion of expansion and contraction which is advanced to explain the creation and dissolution of the world will not allow of the relation between God and His body being conceived as that between the Universal and the Particular. For the two latter as concepts cannot swell or shrink like a material object.

Unfortunately Ramajuna did not start with a clear idea of reality. In his eagerness to claim claim reality for the world and the manifold he went to the opposite extreme of denying all errors and illusions. These he resolved to dispel from God's Universe. His notion of reality seems to be based on four assumptions: (1) The senses are organs of true perception. (2) Things are real as they produce real effects. (3) A thing to be real need not be found in every place and time. Whatever exists is connected with space and time and is by that circumstance made real (4) Whatever is not sublated by subsequent experience is real. We shall now discuss

the validity of these criteria.
(1) The senses behave in the same manner in false as well as in true perception. At the time, they give no indications of the falsity of an experience. A shell appears like real silver, and the mistake, when detected is invariably referred to as a past experience. This would not be the case if the senses always guaranteed true perception. In an immediacy of presentation the eye cannot detect the falsity of the appearance. If it can show the real to be real, then to be a safe guide it must report the false to be false at the moment and not wait for a subsequent experience to comment on the first. This it can never do. The illusion is an after-discovery. In Science, History and Mathematics, errors of observation, of narration and of calculation are continually shown up by subsequent thinkers, and progress means elimination of errors, and revelation of new truths. To say that there is no illusion or to explain it afterwards on scientific principles is to overshoot the mark and does not help to remove actual errors or illusions from life. When, for instance; I stand before a mirror at a distance of say three feet, I find the reflaction at a distance of six feet from me. Is the space between the mirror and the image real? In which part of real space can it be located? It must be admitted to be purely illusory. The mirror may be useful in a hundred ways, but the reflection is clarly illusory. The authority of the senses cannot be final in apprehending reality.
(2) The argument that things are real because their effects are real, as if effects were not things, is obviously untenable. A

child, and even some grown-ups run screaming with terror from the figure of a snake though of lacker-work. Besides, causes and effects belong to the same order of existence, and the reality of the cause cannot be inferred from the assumed reality of the effect. They stand or fall together and the reality of the effect demands the same explanation as that of the cause. In dreams, we meet with causes and effects both sublated by waking.

(3) The next point to be considered is whether the mere fact of being in space and time can confer a right upon a thing to be admitted as real. Now, what are the credentials of time and space to pronounce on the reality of an object? On what grounds does their own reality rest, since they do not themselves exist in time and space? We have instances of dream-objects existing in unreal space and time, and of unreal space and motion in all reflections in mirrors. This test fails also.

(4) The test of sublation by subsequent experience has the disadvantage of being servicable at the moment of actual perception, and the possibility of later sublation ever threatens every experience. Practical life would be impossible if we were not to act, till all chances of sublatability of a present experience by a future one should be exhausted. In life we assume perception to be real till it is proved to be otherwise. It is this universal tendency that makes dream-perceptions "terribly real" and stands as an irremovable obstacle in the way of one's being convinced of the unreality of waking perception waking lasts. Ramanuja, however, seems to waver

in adopting this criterion wholly. While, on page 75 of his comment on Sutra I,i 1, he concedes that the dream objects are unreal because of their sublation in waking life, he claims reality for them in III, 2 and 3, for they are God's creations though of a short duration, and God cannot create anything unreal. (Vide Thibaut's translation of Vdanta Sutras. Part III).

It would thus seem that none of the aforesaid criteria are adequate to define reality. Sankara contrived to leap over these speculatiive hurdles by his illusionism so-called. Reality he defined as that which cannot be denied, that cannot be conceived to non-exist; and to accommodate practical life, he postulated three degrees of reality. His philosophical cabinet, accordingly, contains three shelves. On the highest he placed the Self or Pure consciousness, whose non-existence can be never imagined. It is absolute reality. On the next lower shelf, he placed the objects of waking life, which cannot be denied while waking lasts, but which are concomitant and conterminous with waking. This is the sphere of religion, science, speculation and action. Into the lowest he shoved dream objects and illusions or waking. The reality of these cannot be denied till they are known to be such when sublated by later experience.

Madhva brings forward no new reasons why the external world should be regarded as real, and the remarks made on Ramanuja's position apply to his, pari passu.

Ramanuja's as well as Madhva's explanation of Evil as the effect of Karma, though it may have a dialectical valùe is far from satisfactory. It is a sore place in his uncompromising view of God as a Personal Being. For it is the

paramount duty of every theist to safeguard the interests of God, to preserve intact His Power, Wisdom and Goodness; and the permission for Evil to enter the region of mortal life is a libel on His Power, or his mercy or both. To introduce an alien element Karma, as a real inevitable curb put on God in His exercise of those divine virtues is to dethrone God, and to blast the tender hopes of poor humanity. Though Sankara, too drew upon the theory of Karma he dropped it the moment he felt its real inadequacy. (Vide his comment on II, 1.33 Br.Sutra).

As a religious system, however, offered to the hungering souls, Ramanuja's must be admitted to be as great as any other conceived by man. Its insistence on self-surrender and service ennobles life and spiritualises it. His love and sympathy for all, irrespective of caste or denomination, the great social reforms he initiated, the spirit of universal brotherhood withwhich he leavened his doctrines and his selfless labours for the uplift of man, in the face of persecutions and privations, must place him in the first rank of benefactors to the human race. The defects in his philosophy are not traceable to any want of clear vision--for his intellect was of the highest order--but are obviously due to the inherent difficulty of the problem which he ventured to solve,--the problem of reconciling Theism with Reason, for the proper real of Theism is Faith. He has not succeeded in a task in which no one is likely to succeed. Nevertheless it detracts nothing from the glory of his life and endeavour.

THE SYSTEM OF THOUGHT REVEALED IN THE GITA.

I look upon it as a great honour and privilege to be asked to address the members of the Sanskrit Academy on the system of thought in the BHAGAVAD GITA. The Gita forms an integral part of our scriptures from which all our notions of Vedanta are derived and takes equal rank with the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. Each of these sources has unique virtues of its own and they confirm or supplement one another. The Upanishads lay stress on Knowledge and Meditation. The Sutras give a systematic and rational exposition of the Great Truths and the Gita discloses the spirit in which they are to be applied to practical life, the spirit of love and devotion which ought to inspire our acts and purposes. While the central truth is never lost sight of, we find in the Gita no abstruse principles elaborated by subtle reasoning, no conscious attempt to justify every point by reference to a higher scriptural basis, but an insistence throughout on the control and purification of mind, on single-hearted devotion and on righteous action, in a tone of absolute authority warranted by the situation. Its teaching is modulated to suit the capacity of all and the popularity it has won is due to its theological aspect and the prominence it assigns to devotion, above all meticulous and mechanical performance of works and a passive absorption in abstract speculation. The generality of men and women delight in concrete images and crave for a Personal Being to whom they would offer worship in all meekness of soul.

In dealing with the subject of this paper, namely the system of thought expounded in the Gita, I know I am sailing not on "smooth seas",

but on tempestuous billows created by the numerous and powerful interpreters whose conclusions are at open war with mine. A word on interpretations will not be out of place. Now, interpretation of scripture is no doubt necessary and helpful to comprehension, but its guiding principle must be furnished by Life, not by Scripture. Otherwise we shall be involved in the fallacy of mutual dependence. One part of the scripture cannot be reconciled with another part, apparently opposed to it, except by subjecting both to interpretation. Surely there must be an external standard by which we judge the statements. We are not unthinking machines to accept the arbitrary doles from the hands of the interpreter, who, as a man, ought also to depend on some objective reiterion on which he relies for common acceptance. What is this objective standard? It cannot be tradition which is man-tongued, being subject to change by time and social contingencies and divisions. It cannot be individual predilection which will not appeal to all minds. It cannot be perception or inference, as these are confined to a narrow part of Life, while the Truths disclosed by the scriptures relate to all Life. The only trustworthy point of reference, the only basis on which all interpretations must take their stand, if they are not to be of a merely scholastic sort, must be Life and Experience as a whole. The dicta of Texts must be checked by experience which includes our intuition of the three states, waking, dream and dreamless sleep. A harmony between these two terms of the equation establishes the authority of the scriptures, whose service in enabling us to realise the highest Truth becomes thereby invaluable and incontrovertible.

In my work entitled VEDANTA OR THE SCIENCE OF REALITY, I have endeavourted to show by reasoned steps that the voice of Life is clear in pointing to the unmistekable unity which it presents, and which is in perfect accordance with the teaching of the scriptures. The system of Truth is known as Non-Dualism or what I can "Vedic Monism." Its man doctrines briefly are (1) the empirical reality of the Non-Self (2) the absolute reality of and (3) the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Spirit or Pure Consciousness. To explain the appearance of the Non Self a principle is assumed known as Maya, and a Ruler known as Iswara. Since this implies the reality of Maya and God as distinct entities, the reality so granted is only of the empirical grade, for all assumption of empirical life is due to ignorance of our real nature, to realise which is to dispel that ignorance and get rid of the fancied second element. All, then, which appears to favour multiplicity, God, Maya the external world and the human soul--are, both collectively and individually, in the highest sense, Reality which abhors a second entity. This knowledge that we are essentially Brahman, or Reality, strikes at the root of narrow views based on selfishness, and is the foundation of ethics. This Higher Self is of the nature of Bliss, as displayed in our instinctive love of Self; and to recognise it in others is to bring about social harmony, for no one will be inclined to harm himself. It paves the way for spiritual and moreal perfection, and no higher destiny can be conceived for man. Action based on desire leads to pain; and the soul is visited with repeated births and deaths, so long as desire originating from ignorance is unextinguished. I shall now proceed

to show that the divine utterance of Lord Krishna inculcate beyond doubt this doctrine of Vedic Monism. To imagine that they endorse Dualism or Pulralism or Qualified Monism, is to seek the pitfall of grammar and misapplied logic, and ignore the straight road to facts and reason. The path of devotion which the Gita emphasises, demands, not that the manifold must be absolutely real, but relatively so, is real for the time being; and devotion is not only perfectly possible by only possible on the suppostion, that the soul and God are essentially identical, as otherwise no reason can be shown why God must be merciful to man, or how man can cultivate the deepest love to an alien entity. The popular figures of speech by which God is represented as Father, Mother Protector and Grandfather, would still leave a chasm of distinctness unbridged, and no real comfort or consolation can be achieved by an afflicted soul, or depressed heart, from metaphorical conceptions. God is our Saviour, because, in truth He can never cease to be our Self. We can never cease to love God, for He is our Own self.

Some scholars are of the view that the Gita teaches mysticism. The stress laid on meditation on God and the reference to Samadhi would seem to support the position. But this meditation is simply a theistic form given to the various meditations dealt with in the Upanishads, and is evidently meant for those that wish to be engaged in some kind of mental activity sanctioned by scripture which they regard as the practical way in which to intuit metaphysical truth. If they attain to Samadhi or trance they feel their end accomlished. But as all meditation presupposes duality, the activity is still within the regionof Karma and therefore of ignorance.

and can never take the place of direct knowledge. In the Gita, accordingly, we find knowledge elevated to the first rank, and the Lord identifies Himselfe with Jnanin.

We may here dispose of the question how far Sri Krishna's system was influenced by (1) the Upanishads, (2) the Sankhya, and (3) the Bhagavata systems. As to the first, verbal reporduction of the views of the Upanishad Seers, is an incontestable evidence of their influence, and I believe that the fact is indisputable. As to the second, references to Prakriti and the Guans place it beyond controversy that the Sankhyas can claim a reasonable share in determining the position of Sri Krishna. One pre-eminent feature, however, should not be lost sight of. Whereas the Sankhyas declare the independent reality of Prakriti, side by side with that of Purusha, so that their view is plain, unvarnished dualism, Lord Krishna concedes to it but a subordinate place, and makes it subservient to the Will of Iswara. And as he claims that the whole phenomenal world, dyed in the different colours of the Gunas, proceeds from Himself and is absorbed in Himself, He becomes the only Reality, and Monism is left in tact. Coming now to the Bhagavata system, I must insist that its existence previous to Sri Krishna has got to be wholly discounted. It is putting the cart before the horse. Although in the uncertain condition of Hindu chronology, it would be dangerous to dogmatise, yet having an eye to facts, I must say that in the Gita there is very little justification for the view that the system known as the Bhagavata preceded it and influenced it to any sensible extent. On the contrary, the omission of Sankarashana, Aniruddha and Pradyumna, which are names imbedded in the

technics of the Bhagavata system, and the absence of the doctrine of God's embodiedness, are irregragable evidences of Sri Krishna's system being totally innocent of the Bhagavata touch. "All this is Vasudeva" is too wide a statement by itself to support that system exclusively. In the Vishnu Purana incidents in Sri Krishna's life are pointed out in which He acquired the various names by which he is now known and the names Sankarshana etc. as those of members of His family occur in it. The more probable view is that Sri Krishna Himself is the origin of the Bhagavata system which developed after him into all the details which characterise it. Its popularity was increased by its emphasis on the independent reality and distinction of the souls and matter, and on theistic devotion which appealed to the emotions, and demanded no intellectual strain, in any high degree.

To determine the system of Truth advocated by Lord Krishna we have to bear in mind the epic setting in which it is disclosed. Arjuna placed between the two forces, marshalled on opposite sides, casts his eyes on the figures of the Great Heroes who were to take part in the fatal fight. There were Drona, Bhishma, other relations and friends ready to sacrifice their lives in the struggle. Naturally, Arjuna is overcome by humanity, throws down his weapons and exclaims, "How can I, Oh Lord think of slaying my preceptor and my own grandfather who are entitled to my reverence and affection? How can I knowingly commit this atrocious sin? I should sooner die myself than engage in such a brutal act. I feel confused. I know not if it is not preferable to retire from the field, even at the

of my life. My sense of duty is disturbed and I would fain withdraw from the contest. Do tell me, O Lord, what I'd better do." The poet's sense of humour is notable here. Although the smoothness of the flow of Sri Krishna's words pregnant with wisdom, is never ruffled, He is shown to have been rather warmed to a mind heat on two remarkable occasions. This is one of them. "Whence" says Sri Krishna, "this wretched hesitancy at the wrong moment, which no self-respecting man would approve, which slams the door of Heaven in the face of the Hero approaching it and which would rebound to your eternal infamy?" The second occasion presents itself at the close of the Lord's teaching. "If you fail" the Lord warns, "to follow my directions, you will surely make your way to perdition." With these two exceptions, the current runs smooth and deep throughout.

Now let us ponder the situation. Arjuna does not wish to kill Drona, Bhishma and others. He does not solicit a discourse on philosophy. But the Lord knows that Arjuna's error lies deeper. He has confounded the physical body with the Spirit. Drona is not the figure standing before Arjuna's eyes, but the Spirit which lies within. Now Arjuna has to learn that though the physical appendage may be subject to change and destruction, the Spirit is eternal.

If so, Lord Krishna's first care must be to disillusion Arjuna of his grave error and unwarranted sorrow. The soul was to be shown to be eternal and the body perishable. Accordingly he addresses himself into the common category of souls, denies the non-existence at any time, of himself, of Arjuna, or of the royal heroes. He then makes an exiomatic statement that the real can never cease to exist, nor the unreal ever have being. In illustration of this truth

he says that the soul, which is a reality, can never perish and the body, being unreal, must be subject to destruction. The terms in which the soul is described--immortal, all-pervading, uncognisable constant, immutable--are such as can be indifferently applied to the finite soul or the Absolute Spirit. This indiscriminate depiction of the soul would have created the greatest confusion, if Sri Krishna meant to draw a sharp line of distinction between the individual soul and the Supreme Self. Besides, it would not be pertinent to the occasion to refer to the Divine Nature at all. Arjuna showed no solicitude to know the nature of Iswara. His anxiety lay with the fates of Drona and Bhishma, who were but individual souls. Lord Krishna's directly launching into panegeries on the glory of God's being would have been particularly out of place. Yet the Gita is called Brahma Vidya or the Science of Brahman, and there are many texts in which Brahman is named and identified with Sri Krishna Himself. In the whole work we never meet with a question from Arjuna relating to the nature of Brahman except incidentally at the beginning of Chap. VIII, arising from the Lord's suggestion at the end of Chap.VII. This fundamental fact must receive our first consideration in disposing us to affirm or deny the indentity of the soul with God.

Besides this circumstantial evidence, there is that of the intrinsic nature of the soul itself, which is the basic argument, a clincher, on which its eternality is founded. Lord Krishna describes the soul as "Aprameya" (II.18), uncognisable, "Drashta" XIV,19), the Seer, and Himself as "Sakshi" (IX,18), witness, "Atman" (X,20) Self. Now the

concept underlying these terms does not by its very nature admit of plurality. It baffles all the commentator's ingenuity and learning to smuggle plurality into the concept. "Aprameya" is that which cannot be an object of knowledge, being the eternal subject. The mention of this characteristic feature of the soul within the body is portentous. It knells the conception of plurality. "There is no other Seer than the Atman" declare the Upanishads. Nanyotisti Drashta; Dtrashta or witness can be but one. Self cannot be pluralised as, to the Self, all else is "Non-self". Hence if the soul is Drashta, and God is the Witness, they can be but one, for, a distinction between them is unimaginable. Also the characterisation of the soul as "Nirguna" is just in keeping with its nature as the witness. For the soul as witness naturally isolates itself from all qualities and Gunas, of all attribution.

The third evidence is in the form of authoritative statements made by Sri Krishna Himself. In II,45, the Vedas relating themselves, as they do, to the Gunas, Arjuna is urged to rise above them. Now it is impossible to conceive plurality in the plane in which the Gunas are wholly absent. In II,72, Arjuna is advised to attain to a position of desirelessness by true knowledge which Sri Krishna calls the stand in Brahman, for, that would secure the Peace of Brahman. In III, 42, a profound psychid analysis is made, in which we rise from the objects to the senses, from these to the mind, and then to the intellect and lastly to the Reality beyond. The guiding principle is one of greater and greater inclusiveness, and of a nearer approach to Unity from multiplicity. From the infinity

of the objects, we are led to the senses which are definite in number, from these we are taken on to the mind with its multiple functions, then to the intellect with its judgments, and lastly to the unchanging Witness, the deepest element in man, the all-inclusive "Self." The realm of plurality is thus transcended and we are set down on the shore of Reality, Bliss-eternal. One commentator on this profound teaching which is a variant of what is to be found in the Upanishads, identifies the sense-objects, mind, Buddhi, Mahat, and Avyakta, with Parvati, Rudra, Saraswati, Brahma and Lakshmi; and intimates that Sri Krishna's aim is to show the superiority of Vishnu over all these deities. This unfortunate blinking of the real issue has frightfully punished itself. In an analysis of man's nature, his very soul fails to claim a place--a tragedy of scholasticism to which the history of thought scarcely furnishes a parallel. The pernicious tendency reappears in Chap.XIII where the division of all existence into Kshetra and Kshetrajna, is confined by the commentator to God and inanimate nature, to the utter exclusion of the individual soul. Another commentator regards the whole group of the senses, etc., to be foes, greater than the intellect, is desire, which Arjuna is enjoined to vanquish. On this line of interpretation, we should expect the mention of Rajoguna, parent of desire, as the worst of the lot. Besides "Kama" being a mental function cannot overpass the mind in its entirety. Such interpretations miss the essential truth conveyed by the verse, namely, the identity of the soul, as witness, with Reality.

Lord Krishna's Statements. In IV, 10, the enlightened one is stated to have attained the nature of Sri Krishna or the Godhead. In IV.14, those that realise that God is unaffected by acts or is unattached to results are said to be themselves not bound by action (Karma). This is impossible unless the identity of the nature of both is presupposed. In IV.24, it is said that he who identifies all accessories of sacrifice, the sacrificer himself with Brahman. In V,2 the self of the Yogin, is identified with the Self of all beings. In V,24, it is said that the Yogin, who realises the light within himself, being Brahman, attains to the Peace of Brahman. In VI,14, Sri Krishna says, "The Yogin ever absorbed in the contemplation of Brahman, attains the highest bliss characterising Me (Sri Krishna)".

Extracts.IV.35. Thou wilt see all beings in thyself and likewise in Me.
VI,27. The pure-minded Yogin who is Brahman attains the highest happiness.
VI,31, The Yogin who meditates on Me, the Lord, for he is established in Unity or Identity.
VII,18. The enlightened is Myself (the Lord).
X,20. I am the Self residing in the heart of all beings.
X,37. I am thou among the Pandavas.
XIII,2. Know Me as the witness in the body.
XIII.16. I remain undivided among beings, though seeming to be divided.
XIII.18. Knowing this, one attains to My nature or essence.
XIII.28 He who perceives the one Lord dwelling in all beings as their Self cannot harm another, for the Self cannot harm itself.
XIII 30. Who perceived that the manifoldness of beings has its locus in the One attains Brahman.

XIV,19. When the soul as the Witness refers all agency to the Gunas and realises what is beyond them, he attains to My nature (Godhead).
XIV 26. My devotee transcends the Gunas and becomes fit for Brahmanhood.
XVIII.16. He that looks upon the secondless Self as the agent is deficient in understanding.
XVIII,20 That is pure knowledge by which the undivided One existing in all beings is realised.
XVIII,55. My devotee enquiring into My nature, and knowing Me as I really am, enters Me.

It may occur to one that the Lord's statement that the Jiva is a part of Himself,-- in XV, 7--militates against the idea of perfect identity. But we must not overlook the fact that the Jiva spoken of is the Spirit individualised by the mind, the senses and the body, and acting in Time and Space, and a Jiva is certainly one among many such. But the Spirit, which is the essence of the Jiva, which is not limited by the Upadhis, cannot be divisible or partible by Time, Space or any other circumstance; and this indivisibility of its nature is explained in both XIII, 16 and XVIII, 20, particularly because, the witness cannot be conceived to allow of division. The concept of Reality as the Witness is thus the keystone of the monistic edifice and no arguments or interpretations can prevail against this fundamental law of thought.

The charge of Solipsism is easily met. When one realises himself as Brahman, he identifies himself not as one being with another, but with all reality. For Brahman includes all, and, as individuality is so transcended, there

will be no unreality to be negatived or vetoed.

The opponents of Non-Dualism may set some store by the division of Purushas into Kshara (the Varying), Akshara (the Constant) and the Supreme Atman, the Highest, different from the two former. But this distinction need not present any difficulty, when Purusha in its primary sense is understood to be the witness dwelling in the heart. As there can be no other witness, the term Purusha applied to the rest is only by courtesy, and the Atman's title to it is established not by comparison but by its absolute nature. For there can be nothing common between the witness and the objective element. Uttama Purusha would only mean Purusha in reality. Thus the Gita indubitably teaches the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Spirit. The reader who cannot break with his own nature or cease to play the role of witness, must realise himself to be Lord Krishna.

Having dealt with the question of Identity, I shall proceed to the other points of the Monistic system which next claim our attention. First in importance stands the problem of Maya. Sri Krishna identifies Prakriti with Maya, for he derives the Gunas from either indifferently. In VII,14, Maya is described as consisting of the Gunas. In III,29, the ignorant are referred to as deluded by the Gunas of Prakriti. In VII,13, the Gunas of Prakriti are described as deluding the ignorant. In VII,4, Sri Krishna refers to His Prakriti or Nature as being two-fold, the Superior which manifests itself in organic life and the Inferior made up of the five elements, together with Mind, Reason, and Egoism. In VII, 14, the

Lord says, "Those that seek Me transcend My Maya." In VII, 25, He declares "I am enveloped in Power-Illusion." In V.15, the understanding is shown to be enveloped in ignorance which deludes all mortals. In XIV, 8, Darkness is traced to Ajnana or ignorance which dwells in all embodied beings. In X,11, Sri Krishna says He destroys the ignorance of His Devotees, out of compassion. From these extracts, it is evident that Maya is not merely the power of Iswara, which may be exercised by Him solely for the good of the world, but is an agency of delusion which has its root in ignorance, and which has to be transcended by wisdom or True Knowledge. This is in perfect consonance with the system of Non-Dualism, which refers all multiplicity to Avidya or ignorance, by which we naturally transpose the qualities of the Seer to the Seen and vice versa. Arjuna's delusion itself is based on his confounding the physical body with Atman. When by Avidya the Supreme Spirit is invested with qualities and is converted into the Creator, the same Pure Spirit passes over into the individual soul wrapped in ignorance, and the world as an appearance is born, with all its features of time, space and causation. Accordingly we read in VII,24, "Men devoid of reason regard Me, the Unmanifest, as having become manifest, for they know not My higher nature, which is not subject to change or destruction, and then which a better cannot be conceived." The notion of Iswara, then, as the Creator of the world, through the instrumentality of Maya, is a product of ignorance, and He loses His separate entity, when ignorance is dispelled by wisdom. But this does not mean the unreality of God, of the world, or of the soul. Their

reality and distinction are not diluted in the smallest degree so long as wisdom has not risen. With the rise of the Knowledge of Oneness, all these phantoms of the Maya-ridden intellect must disappear and the soul come into what is his own by birth-right. This disposes of the stock objection of the Realists, namely why, if the Omniscient Lord knew that the world was unreal, did he address His teachings to Arjuna, as if he were a distinct entity? Now the whole picture of distinctions presented by the epic poet is of the empirical grade and is entitled to empirical reality. To the unenlighted reader, they have an empirical validity. When, however, he realises his own nature, he becomes one with all beings; and the distinctions of life such as the Scripture, the Preceptor, Duty, Meditation, in short, the whole panorama of diversified universe becomes transmuted into the One Great Reality; and objections and answers are alike put out of court, silenced.

When Sankara was similarly questions, "Which is the locus of ignorance--the soul or the Supreme Self?" he replied unhesitatingly, "It is you, the questioner." "But according to you, I am the Highest Self", rejoined the objector. "In that case" answered Sankara, "there is no ignorance, for all distinctions are extinct."

An explanation of the world now becomes easy. "All this is Vasudeva" in VII,14, is but a verbal variant of "All is Brahman" of the Upanishads. The antithetical terms in which Sri Krishna described himself and the true Yogin, can be reconciled only if two points of view, empirical and transcendental are admitted.

IX,4 & 5 All the beings are in Me, yet they

are not in Me. Behold my Yogic power!
VI, 29. The Yogin sees the Self in all beings and again all beings in the Self.
IV.13. I am their Creator, though I create nothing and am indestructible.
V,8. The Yogin, while he is seeing, eating, moving, etc., will, knowing the truth, think that ie is not doing any act.
IV,20. The unattached, though engaged in acts, does none.
VII,26. No one knows Me.
IX,4. This world is pervaded by Me who am Unmanifested.
IX, 15. Those that seek wisdom meditate on Me as the One and as the manifold.
XIII, 14 & 15. Without the senses, I seem to shine with sense-qualities; attached to nothing, yet supporting everything; free from qualities, yet enjoying them; not moving, yet moving.--Here a note is called for. In commenting upon Gunabhokta the master-hand of Sankara laconically adds the necessary word, "iva" (as if), to intimate the impossibility of imposing Gunas or their enjoyment on the pure witness. In V,19, which describes the immediate release from birth even in this life of those whose mind rests in the Oneness of Brahman, Sankara bases the purity of Brahman from the taint of the Gunas, on its being of the nature of consciousness. Samam he interprets as "one" (V.18) so that Sanye means 'In the Oneness of Brahman' a use analogous to that of "Samane" in "Samane Vrikshe" on one tree; (Mundaka).
XIII,16. Existing undivided in all beings, yet like one divided.--In these descriptions the one set relate to Empirical Life and the other to Transcendental Truth. To conceive that the soul is atomic in size or forms the body of

Brahman, is to convert it into a corporeal entity, to degrade Spirit to the level of matter. The idea is repugnant, even revolting to its nature as the witness. There is no conceivable way of embodying the witness as such.

The essence of the world is declared to be the Lord Himself.

XIV, 3. I impregnate the Mahat, the Material cause of the world.

XIV.2. I am the seed, the Mahat is the soil.

IX.17. I am the object (percept).

VII.6, I am the origin of the entire world and its dissolution.

VII.12. The Gunas proceed from Me alone.

X,8. All emanate from Me.

Arjuna says addressing the Lord: XI,38.

Thou art the Knower, the Known and the Highest Abode of Release.

XI,39. Pervading all--Thou art all.

The attributes of pervasion and support predicated of the Lord are imagined to favour Pluralism; but it is forgotten that the idea of all-pervasiveness pushed to its logical extreme leaves nothing external to itself. For if a residue is left, then the spirit ceases to pervade it, just as an angle continuing to widen infinitely ultimately attains to the form of a straight line in which no inclination of sides can survive. The idea of support, similarly, is sublated by the identity of the elements, supporting and supported, before creation and after dissolution. If the Lord started with Himself, He must have Himself alone to manifest and relapse finally into Himself, though remaining ever the Unmanifest. Creation etc. can thus be admitted only in an empirical sense. That the world is the

body or the eternal wrap of the Lord is further untenable, first, because the Lord is essentially the witness, and secondly, because the world is declared to issue forth from Him as the pre-existent, and thirdly, because time, space and causation, which are ternal and inevitable constituents of the world, and which all action presupposes cannot admit of creation, cannot admit of expansion, or contraction. The mythicality of the world-process is further brought out in the likening of the world-process is further brought out in the likening of the world of Samsara to the Asvattha Tree, which Arjuna is exhorted to cut down by the weapon of unattachment. Surely, no real tree can be destroyed by a mere change in our subjective attitude towards it. In XVIII,20, the purest knowledge is declared to consist in the recognition of the One Reality in all beings, which remains undivided. The idea of plurality, as of embodiedness, has therefore to be banished altogether.

The transfiguration of Lord Krishna described in the XIth Chapter is of central importance in enforcing Monistic truth. Krishna, who appeared as an individual person both before and after the event, suddenly grew in stature and power so as to include the three worlds; and Arjuna beheld the transformation of the Lord into the whole universe and back again into Himself. How can we explain the miracle? Did a new universe suddenly develop before the eyes of Arjuna, side by side with that which was familiar to him already? Were the two identical and real? If so, how can there be a duplication of time, space and causation, all real, at the same time? In the actual world, the heroes of the battle were still alive and

kicking; in the other, some of them had their heads already crushed to powder. We cannot make up our mind whether to believe the prodigy as fact or fancy. All the miracles related in other sacred works dwindle into insignificance before this display of Divine Power. You cannot have possibly two different universes, the one representing an advanced stage of the other, and both real at the same moment. All realistic commentaries are tongue-tied. The only explanation lies in the truth of Vedanta. The supernatural occurrence is intended, as in the calf-miracle of Bhagavata, to take a concrete hold on our soul, to appeal to our realistic instinct and produce in our the conviction that we, every one of us, is the Lord Himself, and the multi-coloured, multi-tongued realm of objects and events spread before us is but an exhibition of His Eternal Magic, neither real nor unreal (XIII,12) being the effect of His Maya, who is pre-eminently the Lord of Yoga. The theory that God is an embodied being, all else forming His body cannot hold water for a moment. The fact that Arjuna stood out as spectator to behold the Divine Thaumaturgy before him, ought to show that he was not the body of the Lord. Otherwise, he must have been taken up and wholly inserted in the show. Besides, His (LORD Krishṁa's) identifying Himself with Sankara, Vishnu, Vasuṁdeva, and Rama cannot be understood to mean that they are His Vibhutis or highest instances of His Power or Splendour; for, one of these, Vasudeva, happens to be Himself. To invent an ever-varying and precarious principle by which identity can be evaded is to betray the inadequacy of the comment and the futility of the commentator's device. The sentence "Behold in My body, the

the whole world of Gods, men and other beings," distinguishes between His body as the container and the Gods, etc., as the contained. In truth, the picture is but an empirical representation of the All-inclusive Reality. God as the witness, cannot be cumbered with a body. The idea of all-pervasiveness breaks to bits, when an independent distinct entity is let in. For however porous it may be, it must still retain the threads of its individual texture. Hence the explanation that God pervades all and is therefore said to be all, will not rest till the all is dissolved in God and nothing is left to exist, besides. Finally pervasiveness is a material concept, and will do only for an empirical description of God.

The identity of Sri Krishna's teaching with the Vedic Monism of the Upanishads being established, I shall on a future occasion touch on the ethical and devotional elements which are the unique characteristics of the Gita. I need not discuss whether the Gita is a medley of various and divergent systems of thought, as held by some modern scholars; for after showing that in all the essentials, the teaching clearly gravitates towards Monism, I feel that other considerations are rendered unprofitable and fanciful.

It is not only the metaphysical value of the truths of the Gita--Immortality, Freedom, Bliss and One-ness of Rality--that has made it so irresistibly attractive, but its sublime ethics, its insistence on devotion, its universal tolerance, and the correct guidance it gives to conduct in practical life. These, however, demand a separate treatment.

Non-Dualism or Advaita is often anathamatized

dreaded, abominated, avoided, evaded, repudiated, compromised and apologised for. But it is a simple, innocent, undeniable view of life, which need not evoke any pain, terror, or opposition. Put into modern words, it is the doctrine of the Sole Reality of Spirit, the individual soul is Spirit and there is really nothing but Spirit. It is often offered accepted, or belived in, not in its full strength but considerably watered and scented with theistic forms. I hope I have shown that this venerated scripture of the Gita inculcates from beginning to end this Unity of Spirit, and makes an irresistible appeal in diverse ways to the modern mind, torn by doubt, uncertainty and despair. One of the most serious problems we have to face in India is the religious. Fanaticism awakens in men the most destructive forces making for social disruption and disaster. The Nationalist who neglects Vedanta will deprive himself of the most effective means of deducing order out of chaos, of replacing ill-will, hatred, suspicion and discord by love, sympathy, trust and harmony, in an atmosphere seething with antagonism and dissidence. India, the birth-place of warring creeds, is also the spring-head of Truth and Peace, supplying a heavenly balm for distracted souls.

Vedic Monism is not opposed to devotion, but its truest nursery. For, a devotee, trusting in God as an alien power may, in times of trials and tribulations, be overcome by despair or serious doubt. But a Vedantin knows that he puts his trust in the Reality, in his own higher Self, and will not, cannot, under any circumstances, give way to vaccilation or uncertainty.

F.C.S.Schiller, referring to the rarity of really important novelties, in the history of thought, says, "I find I cannot recognizedmore than nine of such (first class) discoveries. Of these I should credit the first, the Absolute or one of Monism, to the Hindus, although a case may perhaps be made out for Parmenides for an equal share of this discovery. Still it was in India that the ethical and logical implications of the monistic line of thought were worked out in their completest and most consistent form." If Schiller had realised the value of the concept of Reality as the witnessing consciousness, which appears as a revelation for the first time in the Brihadaranyaka, he could not have wavered in assigning the merit of the discovery wholly to the Hindu Seers. This concept is the highest to which human mind can rise, and is still unknown to the West. Its profound significance in the realm of thought remains un-appreciated to this day. The only other concept of the same rank must also be adjudged to the credit of India, for it is to the genius of Sankara that the world owes the idea of Adhyasa, superimposition. Hence we may claim to have enriched world-thought by not one but at least two original concepts, which are destined to live for all time. But the greatest contribution to the Science of Reality--the critical analysis of the Three States--dates from the Upanishads and has been developed and perfected by Gaudapada and Sankara, the two incomparable lions of thought. By the less gifted Indian Critic and System-builder it has been turned, alas! into additional Puranic grist brought to the mill of Theism.

Thus Vedic Monism, originating in a keen study of life and experience on the part of the Upanishadic Seers, rationalised into an immaculate system by the Brahma Sutras, and declared to be the highest Truth by Reality itself in the person of Lord Krishna, has in its favour all the evidence which can be adduced--Scripture, Life and Reason--and as an impregnable stronghold laughing alike at the destructive power of time and the superstitious roarious voice of adverse criticism.

SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA. (lecture)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DREAMS.

One of the most important methods of research into the nature of Truth that is common to certain schools of Buddhist systems of thought and Vedantic is based on the analysis of experience covering the triple states of waking, dream and sleep. This may be considered as a very queer way of approach and strange technique by thinkers in the Occident, or set aside as a peculiar one to the Indian mind. Any attempt at placing this subject before the Western world a few decades ago would not have gained any attention from the serious-minded. But at present there is a welcome change of attitude, for the scientific minds in the West in considering all datum of human experience, are researching into the phenomena of dreams. Although at present, the attention now paid to the dream problem is based on therapatic or psychological considerations, the Indian mind is hopefully expecting that ere long the metaphysical and philosophical implications of

the same problem will soon become a matter of vital issue in discussing and understanding the problem of Truth and the nature of Reality. Our present day analysis of experience is purely monobasic i.e. it is based only on data gained from waking state only. But everyday we pass through two other states, that of dream and dreamless sleep.

We find people solely rely upon the knowledge gained from the waking state, believing that alone to have the mark of certainty or reality. Waking experiences cover only a fraction of the data of life and so it can give us only partial views of Truth. However advanced, accurate or scientific our knowledge of the waking state may be, it is defective for purposes of evaluating the philosophic truth and in as much as that knowledge ignores the other two states of dream and dreamless sleep. We can study each of the three states separately or any portion or aspect of any of them. Take, for instance, the waking experience. It may be divided into several departments, or groups of enquiry such as the various sciences and arts, and invaluable truths gleaned from each. The generalisations we get from such study are valid only to the waking state. We study the dream problem most often to find the cause of dreams or to know whether we can be favourably influenced from the suggestions we receive while dreaming, most of fortune telling, character, or as some others condider whether we attain in dream astral and mental states having in their opinion a greater degree of reality than the waking. The psycho-analyst has his own interest in the dream problems. He seeks to find, through dream interpretations

the deep lying complexes and resistances of the 'subconscious' or 'unconscious' mind of that which create in his opinion maladies in the neurotic. The significance we give to dreams is not from any of these standpoints. We shall consider in this paper the implications of a study of dreams, co-ordinating it with the waking state. We shall consider dream as one of the limbs of that totality of experience we gain in our everyday life--not only in the state of waking but comprising equally of other states.

In almost all parts of the world, there have been people who had intuitions to compare life to a dream and to infer that perhaps all that we sense and experience in the waking world are of the same pattern of reality and of the same stuff of which dreams are made. In spite of these intuitions we laugh at the idea when we are told that this life is a dream, a nine day's wonder, for we have a grand sense of the reality of the waking state--the Jagrat, whereas we know dreams have no substantial reality behind them. It is a matter of common knowledge that objects perceived in dreams are unreal and those seen in waking state are real. But it is also felt that things are not what they seem. Experience tells us that so long as we feel in the waking state although sense of reality as clear as we feel in the waking state although this may be only for the period the dream lasts. While we are in the dream state we possess equally a sense of distinction between real and unreal and we can say that this is a common feature of both the states. While the dream is on, to the dreamer not only are dream objects, but the dream state is a waking one. He feels it waking because he somehow ~~dis-~~

distinguishes it from other states. We have at times experienced dream within a dream and also deep sleep or dreamless sleep--all happening within a bigger dream. In this bigger dream itself which for the moment was a waking state, there happened other variations of states that made it possible for the dream state to appear for a period as waking. Our knowledge of things, our perception of objects arise because of differentiation. If there be only one colour we can have no idea of red blue or black or any other colours. Itis because ofthe differences, one can call one colour white, another black and so on. White and black are not colours. See spectrum. Hence we cannot use them for similies. The possibility of recognising one state as waking, another as dream and another as sleep arises because of differentiation of states. The sense of reality we possess gives us the capacity to distinguish one thing as real and the other as unreal. The <u>real</u> is that that does not change. To a mind that does not seek the final and ultimate nature of reality, the apparent non changing nature of things as distinguished from thoughts make it believe that things are real and thoughts unreal because of the "ideal" nature of thoughts which does not permit them to remain more than a second within the field of our awareness, whereas things have the capacity of again and again presenting themselves to consciousness through the gateways of the senses. The capacity to return to the same environment that does not (seemingly) change, is to the ordinary man the test of the reality of the objects. We consider the waking world as real, because after sleep or dream, we again and again find ourselves in the same environment and on the contrary, when

when we dream we do not again and again return to the same dream environments. We must not look at the dream state from the waking standpoint when we are analysing the dream state as a specimen for our observation. We must take the state by itself. We then observe that during the dream state, that the state was a real waking experience and here there is the capacity to return to the same dream environment, as for example when a dream within the dream breaks; and it is because of the existence of states within one state itself, we have this sense of reality so long as the dream lasts. Further we sometimes see illusory objects in dream and feel surprised when the first impression wears off which impressive we consider as unreal in the dream itself.

Secondly, we consider dream objects as subjective while the objects seen in the waking one are considered as objective, as their existence is reported to us through the medium of our sensorial apparatus. What created the difference is sajd to be the operation of the sense organs of whose functions we are aware of in the waking state. But if we observe carefully we shall see that such a distinction equally pertains to dream as there are sense organs operating in dream personalities as actively as they function on waking bodies. And close study teaches us that this distinction between subjective and objective elements in relation to cognition objtains as fully in one state as in the other. Thus in the dream dominion the sense organs and the physical bodies are as active as they are in the waking world. In the world of dream creations also we smell, see and touch objects besides occupying ourselves with thoughts, imaginations and even working out difficult problems in mathe-

matics or other obstruse subjects arriving at clear, logical results. From this we are to understand that in a dream state itself there exists material and mental worlds as clearly as in the waking. In each state the sense organs appear as external to us and this makes the organs appear as objects as distinguished from thoughts and ideas that appear for a moment and disappear. The sense organs of one state is negated in the other state. Again dream experiences are said to be private in character. But our analysis should make us know, that the dream considered as a universe by itself has its own stars and planetary systems, its human inhabitants with their problems of life and the movements of their destinies. Within its own dimensions every inhabitant of that world participates in life in the same manner and thus the dream universe has the same public or universal character as waking. We cannot accept to demarcate one state as private and another as public.

Thirdly in the waking world we find one another important characteristic. Things endure for appreciable periods of time. For example, take a mountain. We see in the universe that we perceive when we are in the waking condition. The mountain you and I see today was in existence thousands of years ago, and we expect to see them in, natural course of affairs, for many many more years to come. Close analysis would show us that duration extending over years is found to be a feature of the objects seen in dreams also. Although according to the waking clock-time, we might have passed only ten minutes in the dream world, the sense of of time is different and we feel that at times we have lived out even years during this dream period and in that condition we experience in

the dream world the same characteristics of the percepts of the waking world, i.e. durability for an appreciable period of time. The sense of time is present in both the s tates. We shall later on discuss in greater detail the lessons regarding the concept of Time and we gather by a study of dreams.

Fourthly, another potent argument brought forward to prove the fallacy of comparing dream with waking world is that Frances and centimes of the dream world cannot purchase the bread of the waking man. We can reply that the gold of the waking world cannot bring us the clothes need by one met in dreams. In other words, the test of reality is thought by some to be "what works". We answer this by saying that dream objects are means to dream ends as the objects seen in waking state are to waking ends. Just as we feel the time sense operating in the dream world, we also experience in it the working in the same manner of causal relations. The dream world has its own logical sequence though from waking standards they appear only as a riotous conglommeration of dissociated memory fragments picked up from waking life and ingeniously and somehow related to create a bizarre or absurd picture. This picture appears bizarre or absurd or waking in logical sequence only when we apply our standards of "relation" collected from the waking life. Take the state by itself. During the state, the whole phenomena as it happened was normal. The abnormality of the contents of dream springs on us as soon as we wake from the dream. Each state has its own notion of propriety and though each state appears to be real. So long as the state lasts, each is regulated by the other. I have the memory of a very interesting dream where the waking expe-

rience appeared as a dream within the dream. For a long time I had occasion to nurse a friend whom I loved very much. Months had passed in intense anxiety as everyday we expected the unexpected and everyday we longed for his cure. Eventually he had to be taken back from the place we nursed him and he died immediately he arrived at his native place. I received the news by a telegram and that had given me much sorrow. At night I had a dream. I was addressing my friend whom I found in excellent health and I told him, of course, in a dream conversation, that I had dreamt of him as suffering and our nursing him and eventually of his leaving us to his own native place where he died. I felt so joyous in recounting the dream the begger dream broke and I lay remembering the dream within the dream, the sense of reality was so great that I could not believe my friend had passed away. I had to switch my lamp to make myself sure that there was a real telegram and my friend had really died! In this example, the whole contents of the waking experience presented themselves as a dream within a dream, thereby stultifying the whole of a waking history in the dream. Unsophisticated minds like those of children often make no distinction between the waking and dream world objects. They consider both of them as real. Minds weak or primitive in character believe they actually see real ghosts, spirits, gods and goddesses. But enquiring and developed minds find both experiences but to yield only unreal i.e., mental objects, and those we are midway, who rely upon experience but not upon essence, take the waking objects to be differently

constituted from those of the dream ones. I have often found that when the implications of dream are suggested, a derisive smile curl the lips of my listeners, implying that the subject considered to be so childish is engaging such a serious attention. This is because superficial thinking cannot yield the rich treasures hidden behind our daily experiences. There is no ground in relegating the enquiry of the dream problem by labelling it as a form of animism fit only for purile minds.

Fifthly dream percepts are considered to be highly fantastic, grotesque and at times bizarre. We do not often find their correspondences in the waking world. Such presentation however grotesque it may appear seems to be perfectly normal to the dreamer. This attitude is based on our unanalysed conviction that a certain thing to have a real existence, must conform to an external standard which can be applied to all. In this attitude we are suffering from a bias. We consider externality only in terms of the waking life. The bifurcation of consciousness into external and internal is characteristic of both waking state as well as the dream state, in applying the correspondence theory of Truth of the waking state to prove the unreality of the dream contents. We are committing the fallacy of misappropriating one state "the universe of reference" of another state. In dreams, there is that presentation by which consciousness has dual modes, internal and external. The persons in the dream have their own minds and thoughts. They have their external world around them as distinct from their internal world of imaginations, dreams and ideas, although the whole state itself is no more than a subjective happening in the mind

of the dreamer. We are not considering here the cause of dreams. We are considering the state as such.

Sixthly, our dream realisations are all refuted by waking ones. On the contrary we do not realise a state where the normal waking experiences are all contradicted. I have already mentioned a personal experience where actually in a dream the memory of happenings of the waking world inverted itself into a dream within a bigger dream. This was actually a case of the waking judged in dream. This experience may be thrust aside as a feature not happening regularly in the lives of all men. Then what justification have we to place the two states on a parallel footing. Our only reply is an appeal to the court of experience which every one possesses. Do we not realise at the time of dream that it has a waking reality. In encoutering a serpent or a tiger in dream we get startled and run away for life. If at the time of dreams we knew them only as unsubstantial shows, we should not have got puzzled. But in fact we do so and we are possessed by all the characteristics of waking--that sense of reality. What virtually happens is only a series of waking states only. That is to say, one group of real objects coming after another. And in making a comparison we are only placint the objects of one state by the objects of the other states. And this means, that the objects of one waking state are judged by the objects of another. When an entire group of such waking states are discovered as unreal, by applying to them the standard of another waking state, we call that group a 'dream'. The most important characteristic of a waking ex-

perience is that objects as seen therein are
felt to be real and is it not interesting to
observe that it is these very objects that we
once raised to the status of 'reality', we now
debase from value, and call them dreams. It is
a case of one waking state refuting another
waking experience. And thus from these expe-
riences we get the suggestion that this waking
world though different has no higher value than
the dream world. A little reflection on what
is happening to us every moment would tell us
that one has not even to wait for dreams to
learn this lesson. In the self-same waking
state our past experiences appear to us only
as memories or like dreams. Sometimes these
very memories are proved false by the waking.
In India we give the illustration of a rope
seen in dim light and mistakenly understood
as a snake. Subsequent experience would tell
us that this was only an error in perception.
What has become of the snake, perceived du-
ring the temporary period of illusion. That
snake but has become a memory. Both dream
and past waking experiences are no more than
memories or ideas. In a delusion, as for
instance of a snake seen in a rope, the ex-
perience covers only a part of a state, where-
as in dream it covers, an entire state. The
same happens in a magicians trick where a
crowd of people is influenced by the illusion.
If the test of reality is the capacity of
being observed by a large number of people,
the objects that have a universal application
in presenting themselves to our consciousness
here we have such an instance. Still the en-
tire happenings of magic were nullified by
reference to another real state and when the
rope trick was going on, the illusion set a
fascination on the crowd that made it real

for a period. Both dream and past waking experiences are no more than memories or ideas. In a delusion the experience covers only a part of a state whereas in dream it covers an entire state.

Seventhly, what is it that gives an unquestioning stamp of reality to the waking world. It is return to the same objects as one's parents, relations, home and surroundings every time the waking state appears. Every night we go to dream and the contents of these dreams are universally different. We do not meet the same dream world again and again. But in the waking world it is just the contrary. Every time we return to a particular envoronment we meet the same surroundings. To this charge, we once again request the objector to consult experience and once more remember that dream state (at the time of experience) has a waking reality. In one particular state, the reason for one sensing reality is, that in that of reality, one has also a sense of unreality. In the dream state itself one encounters unreal things and by this contrast certain happenings acquire the value of reality. This feature is present in the waking state also. We feel certain things as real and it is this characteristic of presenting red or seemingly unchanging things that distinguish the waking state.

Eighthly, we feel a sentimental objection. Are we to say that our dearest and nearest possessions on earth, our kith and kin would be no more than shadowy ideas, which we have come to know to be the value of things in dreams. This is an attitude very repugnant to our feelings. We reply that this difficulty comes only when we consider ourselves i.e. our

egoes as real, and resolve everything else as ideas. Let me take the example of a dream when I became an air-pilot. When the pilot was working his machine he never had the shadow of a thought or sentiment that his machine, the skies and the skill with which he was doing his work were all ideas. His environments were as real to him as his body, his thoughts and feelings. When after the dream breaks we resolve the contents of the dream, including the ego of the pilot that figured in the dream have all been converted into memories or ideas. If the 'I' appears seemingly real, then everything with which it establishes relations are also seemingly real. It is when men think that their own egoes or bodies are real and that the egos or bodies of their fellow-beings as real as ideas, that an absurdity confronts them. When I have body consciousness to think that other bodies are ideas is arrant nonsense. One has to take an extremely detached view point and possess good introspection to have the capacity of standing back and review one's personality, thoughts and ideas in the same manner one views objects around and measures or understands them. In other words our own personality must become an object of our consciousness. Then we can realise that this personality to which we attach so much importance is only an idea. But this is an extremely difficult process. One must have intense capacity to concentrate. Else this truth of truths that our own bodies are no more than ideas will not dawn on us. One must have the scientist's attitude. The consciousness that reviews our own personality should be made so prophylactic as not to be contaminated by any shadow of personal emotions and prejudices. We must be able to consider ourselves as "spe-

cimens for enquiry with only an enlightened moral background in us we can undertake this. Every scientist must have his instrument. To see the stars one must have a telescope. To observe the microbes one must have a microscope and to really understand the nature of our ego, one must possess a pure and subtle mind. A pure mind will not suffer from the violence of emotions. And when emotions predominate in the composition of our natures, and that most often unhealthy ones, we will not get the necessary detachment to allow a portion of our consciousness to stand out of our skanda-conditioned personalities to understand the "ideal" (pertaining to ideas) character of our own egos. This analysis of one's own self is considered so very important in all Buddhist systems and Vedanta. One has to pay a very heavy price for the successful undertaking of this process. The first endeavour should be to release the mind from its slavish dependence on the objects of the senses. Every specimen has to be isolated for purposes of analysis and so the very preliminaries before beginning an experiment demand of us extreme self-denial and purity of life. Thus philosophy becomes a virtual way of life. And realisation of the end of our analysis, would lead us to the state of Nirvana or Jivan Mukti, the state of complete liberation in this very life, when that life has been chastened by an honest discipline in the ethics of renunciations and self-control. This possibility gives the process of scientific precision and rescues it from all theological make-beliefs and post-mortem securities.

To return once more to our topic of comparing the "states". Ninthly, it can be argued that only in dreams that ideas look real and

the world of the wakeful, the real looks real and the unreal, unreal. We should remember that when in dream we must with certain objects we do not stop and deliberate in our minds and question whether what we sense and perceive are unreal or real. Because the sense of reality as possesses us we believe in the external existence of the objects in space and never the thought enters in the mind of the dream observer that perhaps these are all ideas in the mind of one who dreams. In waking and in dream states the relation between real and ideal (pertaining to ideas) exists and in each state the real is real and the unreal, unreal (ideal).

In the cause of illusion of snake in rope, till the truth is known the snake is a real presence before us and when we get startled we do not in the least believe that the snake is only a creation of our minds. Such experiences are sufficient to establish the truth that subjedtive ideas can stimulate as objective real things. It can be remarked that illusions are only exceptions. Are there realities in the waking world which are hallucinations. Let us examine this position. One has body at six and has it also at sixty. But it is not the same. The body I possessed at 6 is only a memory to me now. Everything that I see as real, instantaneously pass on to the realm of memory or in other words, becomes an idea. Our object is not, barely to study the phenomena of waking experiences by itself; but to co-ordinate waking and dream experiences and find what conclusions can be drawn from them. From what we have been able to analyse, we get the folliwng general views. We find that two

issues are involved herein:

1. In both dream and waking states we perceive objects. What is the nature of reality as found in perceived objects. 2. And when we do become aware of the nature of any such reality.

1. Taking our stand on waking experience, we have no right to say that waking is the same as dream. The states are different. The contents of dream are only ideas whereas that of the waking are real and actual. The dream is always a past experience whereas the waking is in the present. To realise that in their essence the contents of both dream and waking are ideas, we have to take a stand by detaching ourselves from the two states. It can be asked how are we to detach ourselves from the waking state while we are in the waking state. Any such operation can be performed only when we can stand out of the field we want to examine. They can be done if the awareness of the working is shorn of its contents. The presence of ideas may have, so long as they are known to exist they cannot be the effects of non-existence. To argue analogically, the absence of objects cannot prove the absence of the light that illumines them. Similarly, the absence of percepts or cognitions cannot establish the absence of the perceiver or the cogniser. Above all, to say that nothing exists, one must be aware of non-existence, which necessarily implies the existence of what becomes aware of such thinking. Awareness of non-existence cannot exist. Above all, the inconceivability of the opposite of non-existence of one's own awareness which leads witness to all, proves the untenability of Nihilism

or absolute non-existence.. What then exists cannot be the 'I' or 'my' mind but that into which these merge. It may be called pure mind or the mind itself and when ideas spring as waves in the ocean; what stands as ocean in relation to waves of ideas, is the mind that projects every thought and object. When this is grasped, the whole universe of experience will be understood and realised as mind-made. The Lord Buddha compared the teachings of Dhamma to salinity in sea water. It is saline at the top, it is saline in the middle, it is saline at the bottom. When the highest truth will dawn on one he will know that only mind exists in every feature of existence 'real' reality. If we hold on to the forms as reality we shall ever be trapped in illusion for forms are ever changing, ever in a flux and if we try to find the anatomy of these forms, we shall only be attempting the unattemptable. One cannot catch air by a pair of tongs.

In every act of perception, there are two factors, the subject and the object, the seer and the seen. Thoughts become aware of things, and thoughts become aware of thoughts. If we now begin to analyse what it is that finally sees things, we find it is only that basis into which all ideas sink. If ideas give us awareness of a particular thing, then that into which all ideas dissolve must be awareness without a content and that awareness without a content is mind, pure and simple. In our deep sleep condition we are not aware of ideas. What has become of ideas during this period? Our only logical conclusion is that ideas are resolved back into the basis from which they have sprung. We have found ideas have the capacity to appear as ideas or as three dimensional objects. Ideas have the

the power to exteriorise and appear as solid objects external to us.

The question has again and again been asked, "if you want to place waking and dream on the same level, are there occasions when one is conscious of the vanishing of the waking state as we are conscious of the vanishing of the dream. Our answer is "is there any room to doubt this?" Have we ever seen an object, ever remaining in the same manner, in the same real form we first men that with, without being the lesat affected by the flux of time. The very instant we enquire into the objective reality of a thing, the subject of our investigation immediately becomes an idea. And what grounds have we now to think that this world is not an idea at the bottom. The mechanistic theory of the universe is now breaking down. In that thought provoking book of Sir James Jeans "The Mysterious Universe" we find that savants of his mental calibre have begun to realise that perhaps the whole of this universe is only a 'mind' construct. If we say that only this universe is any thought, whose thought is it? Religions and theologies take refuge in pointing to a God. I have known many a person who after partially understanding the metaphysical implications of certain tendencies in modern science have given up independent pursuit of truth and surrendering their reason and judgment in accepting once for all theological beliefs. For they all expected to gain from science an understanding of the final cause of things. Recent tendencies in science have shown us the incapacities of the theory of determinism. The frontiers of science are shifting from the external universe to the internal one, the kingdom of the mind. Science is now positing a position very much

the one, hundreds of years back, the great Buddhistic metaphysician and seer Nagarjuna and Vedantic Acharyas (teachers) enunciated. Gaudapada expressed in their respective Karikas (short treatises) by a close study arising from problems of the waking, dream and dreamless, sleep states. The conclusion of some of the scientists that causal sequence itself is a presentation of mind and it is only a habit of the individual mind to find 'relations' causual, has long been arrived by as strict research that modern laboratory conditions can impose, by the Savants mentioned above. They adhered to the same experimental method of analysing experience. Whenever mind presents ideas, there arises a subject, object relation, there arises the individuation the ego as the first idea that projects from mind, as the hub of a wheel into which fits all other spokes that touch the circumference of life, and make the eternal wheel of Samsara roll on.

With this individuation of the ego, there sumultaneously arises space-time, as well as causal relations. In every idea that appear as thought, in every idea that concretises into objects, there exists only the self-same mind and this mind is not a mathematical unity made of several parts, but to put in an imagery--however defective it may be--a monogeneous mass of the same substance i.e. mind. This mind considered abstractedly without ideas, that give us their awareness, is neither a personality, nor a extra cosmic God, or any such mysterious being. It is mind pure and simple. When one realises this truth an honest man can never give any description of the final nature of Reality. The Lord Buddha's example is well-known. This skanda-conditioned illusory personality of man cannot give an objective

demonstration of the final cause of things. At the very touch of analysis the individual becomes naught. The wandering ascetic Vachagotta puts two questions successively to the Buddha, first whether there is an ego, and next whether there is not an ego. The Buddha remained silent to both these questions and the ascetic thereupon goes away. Then Ananda asks the Master the reason for his silence, and the Buddha thereupon replied: "If, Ananda, when the wandering monk Vachagotta asked 'Is there the ego' I had answered 'the ego is', then at Ananda, would have confirmed the doctrine of the Brahmanas and samanas who believe in permanence. If I, Ananda, when the wandering monk Vachagotta asked me 'Is there not the ego' had I answered 'the ego is not' then that Ananda, would have confirmed the doctrine of the Samanas and the Brahmanas who believe in annihilation." What could this possibly mean except that the Ultimate Reality is subject objectless, or that the eternal knower cannot be known. 'The mind into which all ideas sink is the eternal knower for as we have mentioned above, if the nature of ideas is to give them their awareness, then the nature of that into which ideas dissolve must be awareness pure and simple or contentless consciousness as some prefer to call it. "The sight of the seer is eternal, He who knows that the sight of the seer is eternal, does not wish to see it in any other way. This wish to see the seer automatically stops because of its very impossibility." For the moment we visualise the seer, it becomes "concept" an idea and ideas are ever in a flux and have no stationary existence and "nobody hankers for a thing that does not exist." The Lord Buddha's

doctrine of Anatta has been very much misunderstood by unsympathetic critics. When we have found that our own egos are nothing but ideas, to try to arrest that and discover a soul within, is to contradict all reason. The self cannot become an object of consciousness; take hold of any personality in flux, we must with indreams. Their bodies and their minds are constantly in flux and when we try to analyse them that will be like peeling off onions or burning camphor. Nothing tangible to our objective vision is left back as a final residue, that is not affected by the flux, by the constant movement on mind of ideas. If we try to find a soul hiding within the personality, one will only be mistaken. The bodies we possess in the waking are not differently constituted from the bodies we perceive in dreams. Our own objective bodies of particular dimensions as well as the thoughts that vibrate as brain-waves are all only Mind, as in dream.

One of the most important lessons we learn by a study of dreams is the Truth of regarding time and space. The conceptions of time and space ever go together. We cannot have a conception of timewithout reference to space. Generally, our conception of space is as something external to us in the same manner our notion of time is a movement existing irrespective of it. It is clock time, or sun-dial that regularise the movement of time for us. What is time. Time is only a succession of moments. When do we become conscious of a moment? It is certainly when we have an awareness of an idea. These sense of time is regulated by the movement of ideas. Ideas move with tremendous velocity and when one idea is different from another idea, the consciousness

of difference, between each idea gives us the sense of time. Subjectively we feel intensely the length of time when difference between ideas are violently felt. Take the example of a convict condemned to the gallows and awaiting overnight the fatal hour. One night may appear to him as even years. On the other hand take the case of a person drowned in an aesthetic or mystic experience. Hours as judged by the clock time may appear only as a moment. But whether an objective or subjective reference, Time sense can come to us only in reference to space. It is not absolutely necessary that eternality should be an existence outside our bodies. This conception of externality and internality comes into existence when ideas spring in mind. The attitude of looking at externality as some unit outside our consciousness does not stand the test of reason; we cannot have any knowledge except in terms of consciousness. We cannot have any real report of any existence except as an idea in our minds. Any external object brings to us the certificate of existence only in and thro' mind perceiving the object: When I use the term "mind perceiving" I mean the awareness. which implies mind becoming conscious of an idea. Without this awareness we cannot get any report of the externality. When mind becomes aware of an idea we have seen its potency, not only to click in our brain as a thought, but also to exteriorise as a three dimensional unit subject to the sense organs as an object of perception. What really happens in either case is nothing but a series of operation of ideas and immediately two ideas appear we have the sense of space-time. The division of Time and Space into subjective and objective is

entirely arbitrary. When two ideas present themselves before consciousness the perceived idea is external to the idea that became aware of it, and this sense of externality is the root of the space sense. And we have seen ideas have the power to present themselves external to our own bodies as solid objects. It is in relation to the movement of an object in space, as the Sun, we get the idea of time and subjectively too it is in relation to the movement of ideas we get the notion of the passage of time. The area of the mind where movement of ideas take place is called in Sanskrit Chittakasa (mind space) as distinguished from the area external to our individual mind called Mahakasa (Great Space). It is only when movement of ideas begin we become conscious of space-time. Sometimes when the same idea is repeated, though there is succession of thought, as one idea is not distinct from the other. Time would appear static. In Samadhi, the Yogic mind, deep sleep, swoon or chloroformed condition there is no awareness of ideas at all and so time-sense becomes static. So also there can be no idea of extension, if the same point in space is touched often and often. To have the sense of space there must be the consciousness of having covered by touch or measurement different parts. There is an inseparable unity between ideas for all ideas are only in mind. Ideas that appear as thought and ideas that appear as objects are mind-made. Time sense arising from the birth of ideas and space sense born likewise are all mind-made.

Here we may be accused of the charge of solipsism. But solipsism is only 'half-baked-idealism.' The solipsist asserts that 'all that I

know of us is only my creation, my mind is presenting a group of sensations that have no independent positions,'that he wants to build up a philsophy to convince others which in other words is only an admission that he attributes to others a value richer than that of ideas. If he really feels that things he meets with are only sensations, why does he turn propagandist. Secondly, he has a narrow definition of idea. To him it can only be a thought wave and nothing more. To assert that a thing is only a thought, one must have the consciousness of somthing other than a thought. The knowledge that "such and such" is thought can only arise in contradistinction to "object". In the dream of my becoming an air-pilot, the pilot can never say the universe around him was produced by him. Then why has he not the capacity to convert mountain peaks into masses of clouds. Living within a waking state and identifying with it, one cannot say that the universe is produced by him and that it is only an idea. But the truth of the whole thing reveals itself when the whole situation is viewed impartially i.e. when the contents of one waking state vanishes, as in dream. Then only it is known that the waking state vanishes as in dream. Then only it is known that the pilot has thoughts and ideas and the whole universe that environed him are really mind made.

The mystics are charged with paying too much attention to subjective Time. If the mystic does not realise the birth of truths that the time-sense is a fabric of the mind he is only continuing his existence in a world of illusion. The mystic at times indulges in moods of various and ecstacies or in

in other words creates consciously a living dream, only to be experimentally convinced that a universe can be created from mind and a universe can also dissolve in mind. Miss. Lounsbery has told me, that in certain Tibetan meditations, such vision seeking are encouraged even, not to be impressed by them or give them a higher value of Reality, but to get the illumination that the whole process is a play of mind. This would tranquilise the mind of the aspirant and when he begins to analyse his own "skandas" he could without any emotion dissolve its unreal nature and realise the truth of Nirvana. He could then understand the Truth of Truths enshrined in Lord Buddha's doctrine of Anatta. The Vedantic scripture--Yoga Vaisishta--gives us the story of a man who lost a very promising son. The family was mourning beside the corpse. Because of extreme fatigue, the father of the boy became somnolent. The mother could not bear this and chastised her husband for his hard-heartedness. But the father mildly replied "During the short moment of sleepiness, I passed through a dream and saw many incarnations of myself. In one such life I had such a similar calamity, but only much more serious, six of our children were drowned and I was in great grief and the dream vanished. I am not hard-hearted dear, I am only thinking for whom should I weep now! for the six- drowned children or for the one before us!" When one knows that the whole universe is only mind and mind alone (Mind with a capital M), then we realise our identity with All and this understanding alone gave the correct rational basis for all our ethics and morality. This understanding

alone will take us across the ocean of Dukkha created by the false identification with our egos which creates all differentiation and ignorance. The whole substance of my to-day's talk has been pithily expressed by the Philosopher Sankara, who lived in the 8th century A.D. in the following verse:

"In dream though things are absence by its own power, a Universe is created and that is known to be all mind. In the same manner with our waking condition ALL that we see and experience is nothing but a movement of mind." Again:

"Thus shall ye think of all the fleeting world;
A star at dawn; a bubble in a stream;
A flash of lighning in a summer cloud;
A flickering lamp, a phantom and a dream".. from «Prajna Paramiti Sutra»

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"MODERN SCIENCE AND NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC."

1. The need for a new orientation. It is generally recognised that we are living in a period of profound reorganization in human culture. There is a demand not only for practical readjustment in the social order, but there is now developing the belief that we need also a fundamental reconstruction of the theoretical foundations of science. A searching investigation would probably reveal that these two developments are not isolated manifestations, but phases of the same unitary phenomenon--the demand for a new mode of orientation.

The statement that we need a new mode of orientation to deal with the practical and theoretical difficulties which confront us

is more radical than some might suppose. We are here referring not merely to the content of our "thoughts" but to the very forms themselves. So thoroughgoing is this proposed reconstruction that it reaches down into a critical examination of the "logical" and linguistic tools we employ in all our orientations. In other words, one of the reformations which is now being advocated as an essential part of the new methodology is that we develop a theory of coherence to take the place of the traditional Aristotelian "logic" which the human race has employed for over two thousand years, and adopt a non-Aristotelian system, thereby rejecting the most fundamental "laws of thought" which have regulated our "reasoning" processes, inductive as well as deductive. If such a proposed reconstruction of our "thinking" technique should succeed in establishing its claims, we would be in for all intellectual revolution which would alter the entire character of our culture.

In his recent book, The Search for Truth, E.T Bell states that Euclid hog-tied mathematics and Aristotle hand-cuffed human thought. And just as Lobatchewsky in the 19th century emancipated mathematics from the idea of "truth" in geometry, so Bell holds that non-Aristotelian systems free man from slavery to traditional "laws of thought." In the one example of non-Aristotelian systems we shall examine, that of Count Alfred Korzybski, Aristotelian logic, Euclidian geometry, and Newtonian physics are regarded as forming one coherent system, with non-Eucldian geometry, non-Newtonian (Relativity) physics, and non-Aristotelian system forming another coherent system.

The demand for a non-Aristotelian system is

not an isolated phenomenon. The several independent sources of the revision are found in physics, organic phenomena, and mathematics.[12] We cannot here examine these several non-Aristotelian "logics" but will confine ourselves to the system of Alfred Korzybski, as presented in his treatise, Science and Sanity, An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. (1933). We turn our attention to this system mainly because Korzybski has much to say about biological and psychological phenomena which is of interest to students of human nature. Before passing, on owever, it may be pointed out that Kurt Lewin has contrasted what he designatures as the Aristotelian and Galileian modes of thought. If Lewin had taken the additional step of establishing a necessary connection between the Aristotelian "mode of thought" and Aristotelian "logic" he might also have arrived at the conclusion that modern scientific findings require a non-Aristotelian system for their organization. That gestalt psychology will eventually have to adopt a non-Aristotelian approach is a point on which there can be little doubt.

Returning to Korzybski, the first observation to make is that the focal point of attack in his system is against "identity". The most fundamental of the three traditional "laws of thought," implicityly assumed in Aristotelian logic, is that a thing is what it is, or is identical with itself in all respects. On the basis of this "law" traditional thought has argued that the human "mind" observing these "identities" in nature, can generalize the observed uniformities and make statements about classes of objects and these constitute

the "laws of nature". Thus science was tied up with logic developed by ancient Greek thought. This view, as Korzybski points out, was elaborated long before the theory of relativity. Now the Minkowski-Einstein doctrine teaches us that a physical thing is a space-time fact, and that the temporal dimension cannot be separated from the spatial coordinates. For this reason the statement that an electron, or an apple, or any thing, is "identical" with itself is false to facts, since there is no such thing as an identical piece of matter at successive times. No object ever occupies the same ("identical") space-time twice. Human beings, by virtue of their power of abstraction, can isolate "things" from their "environments" and label these supposedly self-identical objects with names; but we must not let language mislead us into believing that because we use the same name for an object, it is therefore the same object. Every object is unique, and should have a unique symbol. To avoid the fallacy of false identification, Korzybski states, we should label all our names with subscripts indicating dates, thus--apple-1, apple-2 etc. Any given object is a complex of sub-microscopic events in space-time, which can be treated as an "object" or "substance"when its behavior remains invariant in a given situation; but no two macroscopic objects are alike in "all" respects, and the "same"object is not identical with itself at some previous instant of time. Since it is language which misleads us into making these false identifications, it is necessary to consider in more detail the relation between language and thought.

2. Language and thought. It is quite generally

known that in primitive thought word-magic is an essential part of the culture-pattern. (on this point see THE MEANING OF MEANING, by C.K.Ogden and I.A.Richards, 1923). The conception of an occult connection between "words" and "things" leads to taboos against the use of certain sacred words and to such practices as giving evil names to dolls representing your enemies, on the assumption that the original of the manikin will thereby be injured. But that this verbal magic also crept into the culture of Western Europe, largely through the influence of Greek Philosophy, is not so generally recognized. And yet this fact is not difficult to establish. The momentous consequences of this fact will appear as we proceed.

That some of the Greeks regarded words as the revelations of the nature of things is familiar to all students of ancient Greek philosophy. This is true, for example, of Heraclitus. As F.M. Cornford (in FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY) states of his philosophy: "The Logos is revealed in speech. The structure of man's speech reflects the structure of the world; more, it is an embodiment or representation of it." This Logos doctrine, interpreted in terms of the creative power of sound, entered into Christian theology through the Gospel of St. John, as everyone knows.

This fact itself is of great historical importance in the subsequent history of Western European culture, but when we take into consideration the interplay of thought and language in Aristotelian logic, and the tremendous influence of the Aristotelian tradition, the significance of word-magic in our

own civilization becomes far more obvious and important. This is a strong statement, and it becomes all the more impressive if we grant the validity of the contention of Bertrand Russell, who on several occasions has declared that he doubted whether anyone trained in Aristotelian logic could ever free himself sufficiently from that tradition to think clearly. Russell's view that the civilization of Western Europe has been corrupted by its slavishness to Aristotelian habits of thought rests in part on his theory of the tyranny of language. In his book, The Analysis of Mind, Russell argues that many philosophers have erred in assuming that the structure of sentences corresponds to the structure of facts. He here refers to the doctrine of Sayce, who maintained that all European philosophy since Aristotle had been dominated by the fact that all philosophers spoke Indo-European languages, and therefore supposed that the world, like the sentences they used, was necessarily divisible into subjects and predicates. This theory of the relation of thought to language is entirely consistent with the statement of Mauthner that "if Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Dacotan, he would have had to adopt an entirely different logic." The fact is, however, that Aristotle <u>did not</u> speak these languages, and so we find that, for better or for worse, Greek language and logic have formed the backbone of Western science and philosophy.

To see how this came about it is necessary to make a brief excursion into "theory of knowledge."

3. <u>The problem of permanence and change.</u> One of the most obvious things about the universe is that it is constantly suffering change but

but that in the midst of change there are foci of permanence. To explain this problem of change it has been the natural tendency to postulate some underlying substratum as the seat of qualitative changes, which are therefore regarded as transformations of this primal stuff. One of the earliest problems of Greek philosophy was to describe the nature of this original "stuff". The formulation of the view that qualities inhere in a thing-like core, as pins stick in a pin cushion, is generally credited to Aristotle. In favour of this view it may be noted that the categories of "substance" and "quality" first appar explicityly in Aristotle's system, who is therefore held responsible for fixing in human thought the notion of the "thing"as the bearer of the qualities which inhere in this "substantial" substratum.

It is held by some that this metaphysics of matter is a consequence of the Aristotelian logic of classes. The foundation of Aristotelan logic is the doctrine that every proposition must affirm or deny a predicate of a subject. Since Atistotle's definition of a primary substance is that which can be a subject but never a predicate, propositions about subjects must predicate qualities of the substances. In other words, in propositions the subjects are represented by class names, and in a logic of classes the predicates are the ascription b or denial of, a quality or attribute to the subject terms. One aspect of this logic which is especially noteworthy is the way in which the verb "to be" functions in expressing the various relations between subjects and predicates. The relations of "class inclusion", "identity" and "class membership" are regarded

in modern mathematical logic as distinct in nature, and therefore requiring distinct symbolization; but in Aristotelian logic they are lumped together under the common form of "A is B". According to Bertrand Russell, the use of "is" to express both predication and identity is a disgrace to the human race!

To be sure, there is room for difference of opinion on the matter of just what Aristotle meant by "substance". Among those who take the stand that the faulty Aristotelian conception of substance is intimately connected with the Aristotelian logic of classes is Professor A.N. White-head. As Prof. Whitehead (cf. The Concept of Nature, 1920. Prof. Whitehead repeats his criticism of Aristotelian logic in his more recent book, Adventures of Ideas,'33. Probably it is due to the influence of Prof. Whitehead's teaching that Charles Hartshorne describes Aristotle's notion of substance as "meaningless" c.f. Metaphysics for Positivists, Philosophy of Science,1935.Vol. II) says:

"Aristotle asked the fundamental question, 'What do we mean by 'substance?' Here the reaction between his philosophy and his logic worked very unfortunately. In his logic, the fundamental type of affirmative proposition is the attribution of a predicate to a subject. Accordingly, amid the many current uses of the term 'substance' which he analyses, he emphasises its meaning as 'the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else.'

"The unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian logic has led to an ingrained tendency to postulate a substratum for whatever is disclosed in sense-awareness, namely, to look below what we are aware of for the substance

of the 'concrete thing'. This is the origin of the modern scientific concept of matter and ether, namely they are the outcome of this insistent habit of postulation." This criticism of the Aristotelian notion of substance as a thing-like core was anticipated by E.G. Spaulding (cf. The New Rationalism p.29-35. 1918) who also regards it as a consequence of Aristotle's logic. In justice to the situation, however, it needs to be kept in mind that there are those who hold that this is not an adequate interpretation of Aristotle. Thus, in connection with Prof. Whitehead's views, J.D. Mabbott (in his article on "substance" Philosophy Vol10.1935) argues that Whitehead has misunderstood Aristotle. Mr. Mabbott holds that while Prof. Whitehead claims to be attacking the notion of substance as it comes down to us from Aristotle, he really accepts the Aristotelian conception of substance and is attacking the notion of a permanent independent physical object as it has come to us from the Greek atomists. Somewhat along the same lines, we find that Prof. Leighton (Man and the Cosmos 1922) has protested against the misinterpretation of Aristotle as embodied in Professor Spaulding's presentation.

Whatever its origin, this substance-quality view has influenced all subsequent philosophy and science. One needs only to note that it is the metaphysical basis of the religious doctrine of transubstantiation to see its importance in Western thought,--an importance which was not nullified until, as V.F.Lenzen points out, relativity physics, through the electrodynamic conception of matter, eliminated the last vestige of Scholasticism from physics.

Perhaps also, the contempt for matter as a principle of evil (e.g. as in Puritanism and Christian Science) is to be sought in the turn which the Greeks gave to the problem of "being" and "becoming." Both in Plato and in Aristotle a dualism appears between the purposive activity of the "idea" or "form" and the resistance of matter. In science this notion of matter as a "retarding" principle re-appears in the concept of "inertia". Here the consequence of Aristotelian physics was definitely unfortunate. Aristotle's law of falling bodies, making velocity dependent upon mass, was false, and had to be corrected by Galileo. (It makes no difference to the argument whether Galileo established the new law by experiments from the leaning tower of Pisa, or whether this alleged historical event is only a myth, as Lane Cooper states.) This substantialistic view of matter as a substratum of inertial mass--identified with the "primary qualities" of space-occupancy, impenetrability, etc.--exercised its authority in determining the theory of "space" as the vessel or container in which the motions of "matter" occur; of "time" as the history of the transformations of matter in space; of "force" as the active cause of the motions of matter; and of the "ether" as the underlying continuum of the interactions of the "bodies" of nature. It is only recently that we have sufficiently disengaged ourselves from this attitude to permit ourselves to ask whether a thing-like stuff represents the foundational reality, or whether events and relational structure are more fundamental. The subsequent history of physics, guided by the Newtonian conception of "space",

"matter", "force" etc. as absolutes of nature and the transformation of Newtonian mechanics into the additive-particle-picture of Laplace is the story of the inevitable movement of thought toward the inescapable consequences of the materialistic theory. This story is so well known as to make its retelling here a work of supererogation.

This, in brief, is the story of the alliance between Aristotelian logic and classical physical science. Now modern science must undo the cumulative effects of two thousands years of tradition. Physics is the first of the contemporary sciences to demand a new orientation. Relativity (non-Newtonian) physics is moving toward a new system which requires a non-Aristotelian approach. The attach on the classical system was first directed against the traditional notion of "substance" as an absolute and self-identical underpinning of the phenomenal world. Events (space-time facts) are now conceived to be primary in nature. "Particles" must be regarded as nodes of permanence, invariant within their contexts of contemporaneous change. Complex "matter" is an aggregate, a relatively stable equilibrium, of such foci of electrical density. "Substance" is only a kind or resting-place for thought, expressing an unwillingness to analyse further. Einstein's thesis concerning the equivalence of "matter" and "energy" destroys the materialistic philosophy of Newton and Laplace. The old Aristotelian, subject-predicate (substance) logic is gone, never to return.

This is the present situation in physics. But what are the implications of this logical-physical revolution for science in general?

Let us here return to Korzybski's views.

4. Non-additive Relations and Organismic Processes. We have said that Korzybski has been the most thorough investigator thus far to trace out the consequences of these ideas in biology, psychology, etc. Indeed, one of the most interesting features of this writer's views is the manner in which they link up with other contemporary movements in science. Korzybski has much to say about organism-as-a-whole processes, and by this he seems to mean what others express by non-summative, gestalt, or emergent properties and behaviour. For Korzybski this type of process is an instance of phenomena represented mathematically by non-linear equations. Until Korzybski, no one--with the possible exception of W. Kohler--has stressed this connection between organismic processes and non-linearity.

In every instance where we are dealing with organisms-as-a-whole processes we are face to face with a situation in which the function of the sum (whole) is not the sum of functions of the part processes. Thus we have two types of equations to represent the two types of processes: linear or additive functions and non-linear or non-additive functions (equations). Korzybski suggests (ibid.) that the following equation based on additivity, be taken as a definition of linearity: $f(x+y) = f(x)+f(y)$. In linear equations of this type a function of the sum is equal to the sum of functions, and has only one solution. Such a relation holds in vector analysis when the addition of vectors is defined by the familiar parallelogram of forces, and in calculus when we deal with linear equations where the "derivative of the sum is the sum of the derivatives" and

the "integral of the sum is the sum of integrals." But in all cases where the effect of two or more causes working together is not the sum of their effects working separately, linear equations are inadequate.

Count Korzybski points out that the notion of organism-as-a-whole is central in biology, psychiatry, etc., and terms this general principle non-elementalism, meaning by this that an organism is not a mere algebraic sum of its parts, but is more than that and must be treated as an integrated whole. Bodily changes are frequently non-additive, as, for example when the heart, for any reason slows down the circulation, this may produce an accumulation of carbonic acid in the blood, and so throws more work on the already weakened heart. In the same way the superposition of a new neurological processes on old ones is non-additive, for this may fundamentally alter the whole character of the organism. "Thought" also represents the reaction of the organism-as-a-whole, and like all associative connections may be non-additive function. Similarly, fears are not an additive or a linear function, but follow some more complex function of a higher degree. In general, the typical functioning of the nervous system is connected with what Korzybski calls time-binding, which is represented mathematically by an exponential function of time.

It is part of Korzybski's thesis that this same general situation appears in physics, and that the theory of relativity illustrates the principle of non-elementalism. He states that only since Einstein have we come to see that the simplest and easiest to solve linear equations are not structurally

adequate. These non-linear equations are more complex and difficult to handle, and are often solved by approximations; but it is no one's fault that the world does not happen to be an additive affair. In relativity theory this appears when the ordinary theorem con - cerning the addition of vectors (or compound- ing of velocities) is rejected. The correspond- ing parallel between gestalt theory and rela- tivity was apparently first pointed noting the (In a review of Korzybski's book in the Ameri- can Mathematical Monthly (1934) Prof. E.T. Bell makes this interesting comment: "There is nothing sacrosant about the linearity of cer- tain differential equations (and hence the additivity of their solutions) that makes most of mathematical physics as we know it a possi- bility; a more competent generation may find that linearity is a gratuitous concession to present mathematical disabilities. It has been conjectured (although possibly not in print) by Einstein that some of our failures to give a coherent (='semantic' in Korzybski's sense) account of some physical phenomena may be root- ed in the traditional demand for linearity.")

fact that there is much false-to-facts "think- ing" infantilism, and consequent maladjustment in the out by George Humphrey, (In "The Theory of Einstein and the Gestaltpsychologie: A Pa- rallel" AmJ.Psychol.Vol.XXXV (1924.) and the writer (In "Gestalt Psychology and Philosophy of Nature" Phil.Rev.Vol.XXXIX (1930), in commenting on the analogy, expressed doubts as to its value, but in the light of Korzybski's thesis this judgment may have to be reconsi- dered.

We have stated that Korzybski's claim to the development of a non-Aristotelian system

rests upon the fact that his system rejects "identity." It is true that Korzybski also is committed to abandonment of the "law of excluded middle"; thus the two-valued "logic" which requires that a proposition be either "true" or "false" is replaced by a multiple-valued system. Since Korzybski's notion of what he terms infinite-valued orientations has points in common with this more general non-Aristotelian movement, it is unfortunate that lack of space compels us to pass over this phase of his system. Before leaving this matter, however, it needs to be pointed out that this system should not be described as a non-Aristotelian "logic." All existent "logics" Korzybski argues, are elementalistic, in the sense that they claim to study the activity of "reason" of "thought" independently of "emotion" whereas in reality the separation of "intellect" and "emotion" is just objectionable as the separation of "space" and "time", or "mind" and "body". The science of the adjustment of man to his environment is a psychologic, and this is based on a non-Aristotelian system rather than a logic.

It is because of the broad scope of its principles and applications that the system of Korzybski is of interest to psychiatrists and educators. And this brings us to what might be called the pragmatic sanction of this system. World , and noting the fact that certain types of insanity are based upon false identifications, and that there are obvious analogies between the irrational "thinking" of schizophrenics and the magic of primitive peoples (as Dr.Alfred Storch has shown in his study, The Primitive Archaic Forms of Inner Experience and Thought in Schi-

zophrenia), Korzybski concludes that if we abandon "identity" we will at one stroke render impossible, not only the type of disorientation we have in insanity (delusion and false identifications), but also the unsanity of those who are functioning in accordance with Aristotelian habits of "thought." The practical need for a non-Aristotelian semantics rests upon the fact that human problems grow out of linguistic abuses. Our difficulties of adjustment are by retraining in an extensional orientation neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic. Only can we undo the evil effects of false identifications. The infinite-valued adjustments of Korzybski's system require a new canalization of energy. This is a laborious process, but the end justifies the means. The results, Korzybski assures us, are automatic, far-reaching, and entirely beneficial.

Having thus presented in thumb-nail sketch some of the important features of Korzybski's system and suggested a few of its applications, it now remains to say something of the criticisms that are made of this interesting scheme.

5. A Critique of Non-Aristotelianism. In looking over some of the reviews of the book, Science and Sanity, and talking with interested parties, I find that some of the main reasons critics give for regarding Korzybski's argument as not convincing are as follows:

(a) It will be argued by some that the very fact of false identifications presupposes that there are also true identifications. Thus John Doe, a patient in a psychiartic institution, may be there because he suffers from the delusion that he is Napoleon; but

this "false identification" would never have occurred had John Doe observed the "law of identity"--that John Doe is John Doe. Moreover, in order to observe this principle of personal identity we need not be guilty of confusing the name of the man with the man himself.

(b) Again, it will be argued by some critics that Korzybski is forced to employ the very principle he claims to eliminate from his system. This, it may be held, is illustrated in a number of ways: (1) The law of identity is presupposed in observing the principle that in any given "universe of discourse" the meanings of our terms (defined and undefined) are to remain constant. (2) The notion of isomorphic structures, which Korzybski cannot get along without, and which is becoming increasingly useful in all natural science, is an instance of "identity" of logical structure. (3) Even though in nature we never discover true instances of "absolute identity in all respects" nevertheless, we need the notion of identity in our thinking. Emile Meyerson, for example, has argued at great length that the formulation of scientific laws and theories involves the process of "identification." For Meyerson the "irrational" is simply that which defies such "identification."

In connection with Meyerson's thesis concerning "identification", let us be careful to note that if we take a mathematical equation as an example of an "identity", as Meyerson proposes, it turns out that the "equality" asserted between what is on the left and the right sides of the equality sign is by no means an "identity" as has been pointed out by Prof. A.N.Whitehead.(in principle of Relativity).

Moreover, certain non-Aristotelian enthusiasts might argue, even in purely formal logic the meaning of, and necessity for, "identity" still remains to be established. The classical work in the field of mathematical logic is the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. But no less an authority than F.P.Ramsey (In The Foundations of Mathematics 1932), argues that one serious defect of this monumental work is found in the treatment of "identity". Ramsey holds that the definition "does not define the meaning with which the symbol for identity is actually used." To escape the difficulties he suggests that we adopt the proposal of Wittgenstein (c.f. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein) and eliminate the sign of identity, replacing it by the convention that different signs must have different meanings.

This argument might be put forth by some non-Aristotelians as final confirmation of the repeal of this famous "law" of traditional logic. But in reply the opposition will argue that this is only another example of fools rushing in where angels fear to tread. To avoid grave mistakes it is necessary to know precisely what is being done in the above instances. The real fact is that Wittgenstein and Ramsey have never criticised the Aristotelian principle of identity. They are concerned with the concept of identity, and find fault with the Leibniz-Russell definition of identity as derived from the principles of the identity of indiscernibles, when interpreted as a convention stipulating unrestricted mutual substitutibility.

It will be recalled that Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles appeared legi-

timate to him because of the atomism of his system; the perfect individuality of the monad made it a completely closed entity through all eternity. Without accepting Leibniz's monadology, the modernised version of this principle has found it very useful in the logic of analogies, etc. Thus the identity of an object may be defined in terms of its properties, and a and b are identical if all the properties of a are properties of b, and vice versa. In the Principia Mathematica a similar use is made of this principle when it is asserted that two classes are identical if the propositional functions from which they are derived are "equivalent." Unfortunately this definition of identity in terms of predicative functions makes it self-contradictory for two things to have all their elementary properties in common. As Max Black (In The Nature of Mathematics,1934), points out, there is clearly some difficulty here, for, aside from the fact that to say two things are identical is merely a clumsy way of asserting that in reality there is only one thing, there is the additional difficulty due to the fact that it is not permissible in the logistic scheme to speak of <u>all</u> the properties which two things have in common. This last difficulty is met in Principia Mathematica by the use of the axion of reducibility (i.e. to any characteristics of a lower order), but this axiom in turn has created more problems than it has solved. Thus, say the opponents of non-Aristotelianism, the difficulties in mathematical logic on this point are a result of treating "identity" as a propositional function of two arguments, and these difficulties are by no means insuperable.

And now what can those who advocate non-Aristotelian system say in reply to this? Since it happens that the foregoing argument represents the statement of one of the outstanding logical positivists, let us address ourselves to this view-point. It is recognized that logical positivism is pretty well committed to the "operational" theory of meaning. On this theory the meaning of a concept is found in its consequences, its implications, and how it functions in its own system. Moreover this view subscribes to the tautological theory of implication: deductive reasoning in logic and mathematics consists in the elaboration of strings of tautologies. Since inference is the result of the manipulation of meaningless symbols according to arbitrarily selected rules of operation, we can grind out of the symbolic machine only what we put into it. But on this view the Aristotelian "laws of thought" become mere conventions (or postulates) which validate certain forms of inference, and one could equally well substitute other postulates (rules of operation on symbols). Either this, or we must deny that other rules are possible, in which case we return to the traditional view and assign the old unique status to the three traditional "laws of thought" of Aristotelian logic. But this is to abandon the tautological theory! How can we say that the laws of Aristotelian logic are no more and no less important than, e.g. the cummutative law, admit that this latter principle may be set aside (as in the non-commutative algebra of the new quantum theory), and then turn around and deny the possibility and utility of a non-Aristotelian logic? Professor Herbert Feigl has re-

stated the Peirce-Wittgenstein criterion of meaning thus: An unverifiable difference is no difference. I wonder if we may in turn revise this formulation and say: An unverifiable identity is not identity? If so, where are we?

. So far as the validity of Korzybski's system is concerned, it seems to me that one's views on the question of whether Korzybski has made good his case for the elimination of "identity" will be determined in some measure by one's reaction to his claim that the notion of "levels of abstraction" renders unnecessary Russell's theory of types. This theory, plus the very troublesome "axiom of reducibility" was supposed to provide an escape from the fallacy of "illegitimate totalities" and the vicious circle paradoxes arising out of the use of "all." According to Korzybski, the vicious circle arises from identifying different orders of statements; statements about statements represents the results of new neurological processes, their content varies, so that multi-ordinal terms (like "class") have a unique meaning only in a given context, where the order of abstraction is definitely indicated. If, therefore, we observe the rule of non-confusion of orders of abstraction, abandon the term class and the "is of identity", and accept the four-dimensional language of abstractions of different orders, with a temporal co-ordinate, the axiom of reducibility becomes superfluous. Thus says Korzybski.

For my own part, I can only say that physical identity is really a limiting case of na analogy, as two things become more and more alike, and this ideal limit is an asymptotic

goal which no two things or situations ever attain. And so far as pure logic is concerned it would be better to term the "law of identity" the principle of symbolic univalence, thus avoiding the ambiguity which has always resided in this "law". In justice to Korzybski it should always be remembered that he is little interested in formal logic. His system is really a psycho-logic, and is concerned with the harmful effects of identifications as an orientation. However else we may react to Count Korzybski's views, let us not make the mistake of judging the new system by the conventions of an alternative logic.

(Note: The above essay is an expanded version of a paper presented before the Psychology Section of the A.A.A.S., Dec.1934. Some of the changes which appear are the result of suggestions made by Count Alfred Korzybski. The liberal use of quotation marks is necessary in the non-Aristotelian system which is here being expounded.

2. For a statement of the sources of Non-Aristotelian developments see the writer's paper "Non-Aristotelian Logics" MONIST, Vol.XLV (1935) See also the writer's book, Philosophy and the concepts of Modersn Science

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON.
THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TIME.

(In THE MONIST: Vol.XXX ,1930).1. There is no word which makes a greater impression upon our imagination than the word time. Voltaire propounded in riddle form some of its mysteries.

"What is it which is at once the longest and the shortest thing in the world? the swiftest and the slowest? most divisible and most extensive? most neglected and most regretted? without which nothing can be done? which consumes everything that is small and gives life to everything that it great?"

"It is time. Nothing is longer, since it is the measure of eternity; nothing is briefer, since time is necessary for all we think; nothing is slower for him who waits; nothing quicker in pleasure. Time extends to the infinitely great; it comprehends the infinitely small; all men neglect it, and all men regret the loss of it; nothing happens without it; it covers with oblivion that which is unworthy of posterity, and immortalizes the great things of life."

There is no other idea which holds a greater place in our thoughts, for there is no order of facts in which time is not a factor. Ought we not, therefore, to regard time as one of the great forces of nature--the greatest, perhaps, since nothing is made without it and nothing can withstand it? Time is the indispensable condition of all evolution, of all development, of all progress. Everything which we see is the work of time, and of all things that are there is not one which time does not sooner or later destroy--in the social order as well as in the material world.

The slow hand of time levels the mountains and fills up the seas. What is a year, a decade, a millennium to the earth, which takes a million years to lay down a bod of chalk? Sir Walter Raleigh's famous apostrophe to Death were as true an apostrophe to time: "O eloquent and just and mightie Time! whom none can advise, thou hast persuaded; what none hath dared, thou hast done; and whom all the world flattered, thou only has cast out of the world and despised. Thou hast drawn together all the far-stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty and ambition of man, and covered it all over with this narrow word--Finis."

Fifty years ago man's past was supposed to include less than six thousand years. Today the beginning of the race are traced back for hundreds of thousands of years. The so-called ancient history of Egypt and Mesopotamia is modern compared with the earliest ch chapters of mankind's history. And yet, altho although we know that early man was a contemporary of the mammoth and a "function of the ice-age," as the late Henry Adams put it, nevertheless, enormously long as the stem of the race may seem, compared with the first appearance of organic life upon the earth, man is among the youngest of terrestrial phenomena. For if organic terrestrial life were but twenty-four hours old, the human race would have appeared only within the last six seconds.

The idea of time has ever appealed to philosophers and poets of all ages and all tongues. From remote antiquity poets have personified and apostrophized time. Religions haveadored it as a potent divinity. Time is

the condition of production of all phenomena without exception, even of thought. It is the coefficient of everything that is. Renan said: "Time seems to me more and more to be the universal factor, the eternal coefficient of creation." To say that a thing becomes, is to say that it is within a certain time.

Each fact that is produced at a given time is closely linked with all other simultaneous or previous facts. It is the issue of all the past and it contains all the future. Nothing can happen save upon condition of not only being accompanied, but being preceded and prepared by a more or less long succession of other phenomena. Time is necessary for the accomplishment of mechanical actions: for chemical combinations; for the temperature to rise or fall. The fruits of the earth require time to ripen. Young animals require time to grow. Even thought, the most instantaneous thing of which we can think, takes time to mature. The law of time rules all the events of our life, physical, intellectual, moral; and in the degree in which we have direct and immediate knowledge of facts we establish relations of contemporaneity, of priority, of posteriority which unite them. Perception of relations is the origin of our idea of time.

The physical sciences have to deal with the influence of both space and time upon phenomena. For movement, change, is a relation of them together in the material world. The moral sciences, on the other hand, have only to deal with the factor of time. The facts of knowledge have between them relations of time, but not of extent. They appear in a settled order, but there is no motion attached to their change or alternation. Time

is the factor in each and all of them. Time conditions them, not space. Every given fact of knowledge lies between certain anterior facts of knowledge and certain posterior facts of knowledge--between a "fore-knowledge" and an "after-knowledge" and between these two there is no interval, no void.

Every moral fact is born out of a temporal environment, so to speak. Every material fact is born in a spatial environment. When we think of it, time has a certain inalienable majesty pertaining to it. Is not my past knowledge still present with me? And is not my past knowledge as much a part of myself as my present knowledge? The future is an hypothesis, and all the past before the beginning of my knowledge is an hypothesis. Yet, even though the "before me" and the "after me" are inferences, between them is the present time in which I am I.

Time is an inseparable concomitant of all our perceptions. All perception represents a certain degree of intensity. Perception is due to the distinction which we make between phenomena. Every act of knowledge implies differentiation, i.e. comparison. We are not conscious of the pressure of the atmosphere, or of the rotation of the earth, for the reason that their action is constant. Our senses are unable to perceive any differences or variations. It has been ingeniously demonstrated that if, for some reason, the resistence of the ether were changed, or the rise and fall of the tides altered, or the rotation of the earth accelerated or retarded all our conclusions with reference to time would be upset.

2. Pleasure and pain affect us wholly differently, according as they last for but a mo-

ment or endure. The prolongation or the repetition of pleasure increases the charm of it; but too much of even a good thing brings satiety and indifference, even repugnance. The key to the sentiment is time.

On the other hand, time moderates grief and softens disappointment. Griefs which we revisit in memory do not increase our original sense of pain or loss. All of us are more or less incapable of sustaining a continuous tension. Things of every kind impinge upon our minds, and in proportion as our attention is diverted the tension relaxes. Pascal has described in unforgettable language the power of occupation to assuage grief. Charles Lamb showed it by example.

We often hear the saying: "Times have changed." But the different sectors of time are absolutely identical. Time changes nothing, but things change with time. For nothing in nature is immutable, neither feelings nor material things, neither emotions nor realities. The great verity at the bottom of Buddhism is the impermanence of everything. "All things flow", said Heraclitus; "a man does not bathe twice in the same river."

The truth is that the innumerable facts which succeed one another with bewildering diversity arouse new impressions in us, and under their influence and during their duration we change, not time. We are never the same. Sometimes we change or are changed greatly and suddenly; more often we change slowly and gradually, so imperceptibly that it requires a crisis or a lapse of years for us to perceive the difference.

Time possesses no quality in itself. It does not vary in pace or intensity. It cannot

of itself cause either pleasure or pain. Does time really then exist? Has it a separate, distinct quality independently of what we make of it? All bodies revolve in space, all phenomena are produced in time. Time and space are the first verities. They are called self-evident. But are they? Time is not an entity, nor even a quality. It is neither long nor short; show nor fast, except as we make it so. Is time not then a formal element of knowledge?--i.e., not an objective reality, but only the subjective way in which we recognize realities which in themselves are non-temporal?

Morally speaking, time maintains an absolute neutrality toward us. It has no value except as we employ it. It is indifferent to good or evil. Yet it is a supreme factor in our lives. We are born at a certain time. Our life is made up of a series of longer or shorter events which necessarily terminate at last, i.e. in time. It is impossible to modify the course of time, to arrest it , to hasten it, to retard it, to return upon our path and recover time which has been lost.

"What's time?" Browning makes one of the characters in A Grammarian's Funeral exclaim "Leave 'Now' for dogs and apes. Man has forever."

3. Economics teaches us that labour is not the only essential to success. One must work at the right time. The operations of agriculture illustrate this. Homer describes the Greek chieftains as grown wise through time. Even so. The wise man makes the counsel of years against the moment, and the wisdom of the centuries against the years.

What we call "progress" is really intelligent valuation of time, not only the present

and the future, but the past also. For the nation which despises tradition, which rejects the cumulated heritage of the race is going backward.

4. Time has no material guise. It cannot be perceived. It has not the quality of objects. Scientifically it is a quantity, a duration. In other words, time is not absolute. The idea is wholly relative. To say that time is either long or short means nothing, for it depends upon comparison, upon the criterion of measurement. What is a day? Is it 24 X 60 minutes? Is it 1/365 of a year? The same interval of time may seem long to one person and short to another because the standard of measurement is a personal equation and varies according to the feelings or the interest of each individual.

When we speak of "an interval of time" what do we mean? Mathematicians have shown that we have no direct intuition of the euqlity of two intervals of time. We cannot perceive the difference, and have to depend upon instruments of precision to inform us. When we compare some events of our life with other events, each has a different quality. There are a certain number which, for one reason or another, have a preponderant importance. These serve as terms of comparison. They are the mile-posts along the road we are travelling; but unlike highway markings, they are not all equally far apart.

Philosophers and scientists have demonstrated with great power and imagination that for beings whose life is much longer or much shorter than ours, time moves at a very different space. Dwellers on Saturn and the Martians--if there be any--must have appreciations of time very different from ours.

William James pointed out that if we were creatures capable of noting distinctly ten thousand events in a second, instead of ten, and if our life was made up of the same number of impressions, it would be a thousand times briefer. We would live less than a month and personally know nothing of the change of the seasons. If we were born in winter, we should think of summer as we now think of the terrible heat of the carboniferous age. The operations of nature would be so slow to our senses that they would be inferred, not perceived. The sun would hang stationary in the sky. The moon would seem almost changeless. On the other hand, if we assume the hypothesis of a creature able to experience only a thousandth part of the sensations which we have within a given time, summers and winters to such a person would be like quarters of an hour. The grass and the flowers would grow so quickly that they would seem instantaneous creations. The movements of animals would be as invisible to him as the flight of a cannon-ball is to us. The sun would traverse the sky like a meteor, leaving behind a diaphanous trail of fire.

Janet has very ingeniously shown that we have very unequal estimations of the same period of time, according as to whether it is in the past or in the future, according to whether we are young or old. When we mentally review the happy and the unhappy episodes of our life, the events in which we have been actors, or which we have witnessed, the years are far from having an unequal value in our eyes. The phrases "lately" and "long ago" which have a profound

significance from the subjective point of view, have no objective sense. Sometimes we apply the former word to remote events, the latter to events which really are not far removed.

Our observation of the heavens is not easy in all climates nor at all times; nor can we measure short intervals of time from watching the sky. Accordingly instruments have been invented like hour-glasses, water-clocks, balance and spring clocks, to produce regular movements which indicate exactly short divisions of time. The stop-watch will measure a fraction of a second. But let us not be deceived. The indications afforded by these intruments are nothing but signs; they have no significance or value except as these indicia awaken a thought or emotion within us. What is a day, an hour, a minute? Words! words! There are no two moments of our existence when they say the same thing. There are no two persons who understand them in the same way. "Time travels in divers paces with diverse persons. I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he stands still withal." (Shakespeare, As You Like It.) An hour is insufferably long when we are forced to listen to a dry sermon; it flies on the wings of the wind to lovers.

Nothingmore modifies our sense of the lapse of time than our thoughts, our feelings, our interest. Patience is a complex virtue, one only fully possessed by philosophers. Romantic writers sometimes praise the patience of the lowly, like the peasantry in many parts of Europe, and of Orientals. But theirs is not patience, it is mental immobility which

from poverty of ideas or imagination; from the fact that their intellectual life is so poor that a single idea or impression fills their mind to the brim. The "brooding thought" of the East is chiefly lack of thought; its "patient deep disdain" largely lack of imagination. Time means nothing in the Orient. It is everything in the West, for the reason that the Western mind is Aristotelian, inquisitive, alert, inquiring.

5. Time and space are each measureless. But for the poet and the philosopher the thought of infinite time is more impressive than the thought of infinite space, for the reason that time is so intimately associated with the idea of birth, of growth, of development. When the astronomer measures space in terms of light-years, what staggers the mind is not so much the millions or billions of miles as the immensity of time which may elapse between the first projection of a star's rays and the moment it reaches the earth.

There is a magnificent quality attached to the contemplation of time which does not characterize our thought of space. For time is measured in terms of moral value, and space in terms of physical value. This is the reason why the idea of time has always made so strong an appeal to the imagination of the poets, philosophers and moralists. Nobody can moralize about space. One can hardly fail to perceive the moral content of time. Eternity is a universal conception of deity. Immanency is not. The most magnificent panegyric of deity which I know outside of the Old Testament contains but one reference to any spatial attribute of God: "The eternal, the Uncreated, the

to whom time brings no change, for time is ever-flowing, and never stays; it is a vessel charged with birth and death; it has a 'before' and 'after', a 'will be' and a 'was'. It belongs to the 'is not' and the 'is'. God is, and that not in time but in eternity; motionless, timeless, changeless eternity, that has no before or after."

Spatial attributes, when applied to the idea of deity, are vestiges of primeval or crude and undeveloped conceptions of God. Mr. Cornford in his admirable book, FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY, has shown how early Greek theology (he calls it Olympian) was "dominated throughout by the concept of spatial externality" and, guided by that concept, culminated in geometrical atomis and physical science. On the other hand, Orphism was "dominated by the concepts of time and number, the measure of time" and so developed the idea of justice and righteousness, and at last culminated in a great religion.

6. From the seasonal round of summer and winter it is an easy transition to worship of the heavenly bodies. Sophocles compares the turning wheel of human destiny to the waxing and the waning of the moon. "Sorrow and joy come round to all as the Bear moves in his circling path."

7. To those having eyes to see and hearts to understand, the myths of Aphrodite and Kronos and Rhea were intimations of God. But they taught by mystery and allegory, not by dogmatic and theological exposition. Just here was the ground of feud between Julian and the Church of the fourth century. The myths told Julian that the Gods are, which is what the Christians denied. The dying paganism of the

fourth century believed that "Greek philoso-
phy was the relic of a primeval revelation."
8. With the triumph of Christianity and the
dogma of immortality a question was raised
in the minds of men which pagan thought, so
far as I know, busied itself but little with.
Where was the soul, the I, the Me, before birth?
birth? Was it in time? or from eternity?.
9.The idea of time unceasingly teased the
minds of medieval schoolmen because eterna-
lity is an attribute of God. One of the most
remarkable doctrines of St.Thomas Aquinas
is the profound idea that, for God, time or
succession, whether in the past or in the
future, does not exist. If God remembered
the past and was ignorant of futurity, his
reason would be like that of man himself, and
his knowledge would increase according to
the development of his own creation. This
would be an imperfection in the Deity. God
would be finite, not infinite; mortal, not
immortal and eternal. For God the past, the
present and the future are an immobile, immu-
table present, an eternal vision.

The contrast between this stupendous con-
ception of time by the mind of the greatest
of medieval philosophers, and the naive mind
of the medieval peasant is very striking.
It is an important truth for the historical
student to perceive that men belonging to
wholly different orders and periods live
side by side. The mind of the common man is
necessarily compelled to concrete expression.
10. There is comfort found in illusion.
What the world calls reality, to some seems
utter unreality. The materials of life are
common to all of us. But the kind of archi-

tecture is our own. Is a castle in Spain less real than an actual edifice of stone and mortar? To some of us Bohemia has a coast. To some objectively means incompletely; fulness is only found in the subjective. Time, which is another way of saying life, is what we make of it. It is, as the late Professor Nettleship wrote in his diary (his Meditations unto Himself, like those of Marcus Aurelius)--"It is really true that this world is everything to us, if we only choose to make it so; if only we live in the present because it is eternity."

HERBERT L. STEWART. (MONIST '19)

CARLYLE'S PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY.

Carlyle was not, in the technical sense, a philosopher. According to one eminent critic it is a monstrous thing to have applied such a name in any sense to the man who never set out from premises and reasoned his way to conclusions, and who never thought calmly but always in a passion. Indeed the objurgatory tone in which Carlyle alludes to the current systems and controversies may well suggest a complete detachment from any "philosophic" interest whatever.

2. He held that they could reach no positive result, but that they must be pursued to their end, that they must be judged, as our Hegelians would say, by themselves at a further stage. It was something that reflection should thus be brought to a wholesome crisis, that it should be made to demonstrate its own futility, and the fire of scepticism thus burn itself out.

3. Our author points out that the quest for a theorem of the universe proceeds from a break-up of the true spiritual unity. And at bottom what it asks is impossible. The universe cannot

be put into a theorem by any definite mind. The whole spurious problem means an attempt of the mind to pass beyond itself, to reach a point of view from which it can judge not only other things but itself also ab extra. The act of knowing is everywhere conditioned by the subject-object contrast; yet the metaphysician would fain compel this very machinery to account for the conditions of its own action. He would know absolutely that which ex hypothesi, he can know only as related.

4. It was easy to see why the labour of thousands of years had been so inexpressibly unproductive. For instance, how pathetic, yet how fatuous, had been the attempts to demonstrate a God! As if a God who could be proved, or--more ludicrous still--rendered probable, would not thereby take his place as just one object among other objects, rathern than as that in which all alike live and move and have their being! What, asks Carlyle, was this problem which the poor deists set themselves, but to ground the beginning of all belief in some belief earlier than the beginning? And was it not high time to confess that if intellect, or the power of knowing and believing, is synonymous with logic, or the mere power of arranging and communicating, no proof of a Deity is to be had? At the utmost one might reach that Etre Supreme, the subject of Robespierre's "scraggiest of prophetic discourses." Metaphysical theology had been but the multiplication of words, until the earth groaned under accumulated phrases, but the enterprise was foredoomed from the start.

5. For Carlyle's own part, the utmost he had got from metaphysics--and it was no small gain in a sense--was the bliss of becoming delivered from them altogether. Hume and Diderot on the

one side, Kant on the other, served but to refute the alternative conclusions, and to confirm by trial what might have been foretold from the very terms of the problem, that the metaphysical road leads nowhere.

I has often been said that a thoroughly consistent scepticism ought to be silent, and one might conclude from the foregoing argument that its author would advance no positive doctrine of his own upon subjects which he had thus declared inscrutable. Moreover, he repeated insistence on the vanity of all "speech about the unspeakable things" has given rise to the well-worn just that Carlyle preached the gospel of silence in thirty volumes. But we have seen that the discussion which on these high altitudes he condemned as useless was that of the logical or demonstrating type, where the basis of all thought is forced under thought-categories, and the arguer affects to prove that which is already assumed in every process of proof. if the sphere of science may be compared to territory which we can look at from outside, what is the analogue to that ground which we cannot see, just because we have to stand upon it in order to see all the rest? If it should turn out that logical demonstration is not man's only organon of truth, one may without incoherence set forth in words that other spiritual functioning, so far as words will serve to give it expression.

6. Destructive criticism has so far simply cleared the ground. If it has been correct it has shown that the methods of the sciences, and of that metaphysic which is more than a unification of the sciences, can tell us nothing on the problems which matter most of all, problems of the ground of all being, of freedom and necessity, of good and evil, of the

nature and prospects of the soul. For that with which the sciences deal is always something which I may call mine but which I cannot call me. Every attempt to resolve the latter into a combination of the former may be convicted of contradiction, for it takes as independently real those objects which can exist and contain meaning only in reference to a subject. Science is thus always a study of some species of clothes, and to know the limitations of science we require above all a clothes-philosophy. "Let any cause-and-effect philosopher explain, not why I wear such and such a garment, obey such and such a law, but even why I am here, to wear and obey anything." The real question thus becomes one which it is scarcely possible to formulate, and wholly impossible to answer, within the categories of cause-and-effect reasoning. For the thing we seek to know is not what particular effect was produced by a particular cause, but what is the total significance of a universe in which such a nexus is itself an instrument in a deeper plan. Our very capacity of putting this problem is itself a token that we are not mere items in the series whose meaning we thus challenge. We are able somehow to get outside of it, to become its critics. And although the intellectualist metaphysicians have so far attempted the absurd task of construing it as a whole through principles which are valid only from part to part, they very persistence of their effort proves how fundamental is that impulse which they have so blunderingly followed.

Thus for Carlyle as for Wordsworth the unique position of man in the universe was evidenced above all by his "obstinate questionings of sense and outward things." Man's

unhappiness came of his greatness.
7. Exactly in the spirit of the Critique of Practical Reason, he lays it down that the approach to a constructive philosophy must lie through the consciousness. "The true Shekinah is man." And it is man not on the side of his discordant impulses, or his mushroom speculations. It is man as conscious of duty, as recognizing within him a categorical imperative. Carlyle is very insistent that on the rational and objective, as contrasted with the emotional and subjective, the doctrine of conscience the whole fabric of one's world-view must depend.
8. Carlyle's mysticism was at least worked out in an individual way. We get it, for example, in his scorn of those who dwell only "in the thin rind of the conscious," who recognize like the Encyclopaedists no truth except that which can be debated of, and to whom in consequence the "sanctuary of man's soul stands perennially shut." We get it, again, in his famous theory of genius as ever a secret to itself.
9. If he talks Berkeleianism, he does so not as one who is assured of that system's truth, but rather as one who sees in it enough to stagger the confident apostles of matter and motion. Common sense is convicted of resting upon a spiritual postulate, the postulate that the world is interpretable.
10. Carlyle welcomes the demonstration by Kant that space and time, the essential forms in which all scientific knowledge has come to us, are products from within, not data from without. He sees here an intelligible construing of the religious doctrine that God is omnipresent and eternal. For its difficulty vanishes once we

realize that God exists neither in time nor in space Thus the Ultimate Reality is conceived almost as Spinoza conceived his Absolute, revealed under attributes to the human understanding, but in no way bound under such attributes in its essential nature.
11. Metaphysic, otherwise a confusion in which any judgment is as demonstrable as any other, becomes an intelligible whole.
12. He attributes the immense progress of that conception during the earlier years of the century to two causes, the definiteness of scientific results and their utility of application by practical needs. Side by side with this progress one recognizes a decay of the interest generically spoken of as "metaphysical." Its position could not be re-established until men saw again that science, however definite and certain, moves in a limited sphere, and that the needs of the human spirit go far beyond anything that can be described as "practical."
13. But if Carlyle's strength lay in flashes of intuitive genius rather than in sustained and disciplined thought, a corresponding account must be given of his weakness. Much that he said of the futility of science must be allowed to have been mere wild and whirling words. Spencer hit the nail on the head when he complained that Carlyle spoke incessantly of the "laws of this universe" and our need to reverence them, but at the same time poured contempt on those who were patiently discovering what these laws are. His contempt for logic was its own nemisis, when he laboriously built up a system to prove that systems are impossible. The idea underlying his famous description of metaphysics

as disease was, of course, far from new, and in the enforcement of it he seems to have been the dupe of his own vivid rhetoric torturing a very partial analogy.
14. Even granting that the so-called times of faith were free from our modern restlessness, the inference is not that enquiry is at best an inevitable evil. Many of the things by which it is awakened may be evil, but in itself inquiry is an intrinsic good, and the evils which provoke it would not be less but greater if it were absent. Peace of mind comes either from rising above or from sinking below the problems that would disturb it, and surely Carlyle of all men should have been the last to suggest that the mere happiness of intellectual immaturity or intellectual stupor is not dearly bought.- - -

SWAMI DESIKANANDA ON VEDANTA.

1. The difference between deep sleep of ordinary man and the Jnana-state of a Sage is that in former causal complexes are latent which become active on his waking and fill him with desires, worldly attachments, etc. whereas in latter these do not reappear; again former thinks he is waking into the real world whereas latter knows that the waking world is but an idea. Otherwise the states are similar.
2. The sage is unconscious in deep sleep as the ordinary man.
3. There is no state higher than deep because in it egoism disappears, but the fact that it reappears in waking shows that it had existed all the time during the deep sleep and was not destroyed.
4. Everything is relative. If you think in terms of the body alone then the religious

doctrines of God, karma, rebirth, spirits etc.are quite true. But if you ascend higher and seek Truth absolute in the causeless world then these things are seen to be but ideas. Hesinger's Theory of Indeterminacy has done away with causality and approaches Vedantic truth, therefore. This does away even with need of God, philosophically.

5. Of all the modern scientists, Eddington has dared to come closest to Vedanta.

6. When mind is active you see the world. When it is inactive as in deep sleep, you do not see it. Hence the world is created by the mind.

7. The Upanishads are the highest Indian Sacred Literature. Even the Gita belongs to Smriti, or 2nd class literature.

8. This 'I' or the ego is as much an object of perception as any groos object is. The only difference is that the gross objects are outside of the body and the 'I' is in the body. The constant changing of this 'I' or the ego is clearly brought home to us in our dream and deep sleep. It is within the experience of all of us that when we dream we are mostly other than what we in our waking state call 'I'. In deep sleep the 'I' entirely disappears for we are not conscious that weare sleeping in such and such a place. If we are conscious of our 'I' during deep sleep it is no more a sleep. In the waking also we must have often experienced our self-forgetfulness when we are deeply engrossed in any thought or object of appreciation. This fact that the 'I' constantly changes, comes and goes, and is an object of our consciousness or awareness is borne out by the psychologists

and the scientists. "Alone in the silence of the night and on a score of thoughtful occasions we have demanded, can this self, so vividly central to my universe, so greedily possessive of the world, ever cease to be? Without it surely there is no world at all! And yet this conscious self dies nightly when you sleep, and we cannot trace the stages by which in its beginnings it crept to awareness of its own existence." (The Science of Life. by H.G.Wells and Julian Huxley).

"The ego is first and foremost a body-ego, it is not merely a surface entity, but it is itself the projection of a surface.....that it is first and foremost a body-ego" (S.Freud The Ego & the Id). The Buddhists also said that 'I' is an aggregate of Skandhas, and it is not only unreal but is changing every moment. But they did not know that consciousness which knows the bundle of skandhas or which is constantly changing is the real 'I'. For a change can be known only by that which never changes. Then what is our real nature or which is the real 'I'?

Our true nature or real 'I' is that consciousness which sees or knows the coming or going of the ego or the 'I' in the waking, dream and deep sleep. Therefore this fundamental contentless consciousness or the awareness is the true background not only of our own nature but of the whole universe. This is clearly known to us from deep sleep; for when we get up from deep sleep the first thing we are aware of is our own body and the next is the objects around us.

9. God, as He is, can, therefore, be realised by becoming one with, that is to say, when the identification with external objects and body

objects and body and mind ceases, we become That. The relation of identity with our true self or being, which is also the God as he is, has not to be established or attained from elsewhere, for, it is already there. For example, everyone is experiencing that identity with his own being always in sleep. For in sleep every one goes to his original and true nature. But he is not aware of it, owing to ignorance. The Vedas do not enjoin that this identity with our being or self should be 'established'. In the Upanishads it is said that true knowledge alone can bring about this identity of the self with Brahman. And this knowledge of realising the thing as it is, is what is known as Vastutantra--i.e.knowing the thing as it is, or the self as it is. All that we have to do is to remove the false or erroneous knowledge that we are the body, mind and senses. When this is done, the true self stands revealed.

When one has, therefore, gone through the practices of Yogas and sadhana-chathustaya he becomes a proper student or Adhikari for Vedanta. The acid test is the life of the aspirant.

To know Self, God or Truth one has to enquire into the nature of self and non-self. It is ignorance which has covered the Real from us. This wrong knowledge can only be removed by right knowledge. It is said that our misery Bandha is due to our wrong knowledge, Avidya, that we are the body and the senses. This can only be removed by the right knowledge, Samyag-Gnana, that we are the secondless self and nothing but self. This knowledge is not like the knowledge of the objects of perception but knowing the thing or the self as it is. This Vasthu-tantra is contrasted with knowing the object with our mind, or what is called

Purusha Tantra. The Self or God as he is, is not separate from us, as it is our very Being. But we assume or imagine that to be separate from us, or is non-attained, because of our ignorance of it. It is therefore, clear that the non-attainment of Self or God as He is, is but due to ignorance. The attainment of It is simply the removal of the obstructing ignorance by knowledge. It is like the recognition of the tenth man who was all the while there but who was omitted in the count by everyone of the ten! The Vedas therefore definitely declare that "Being but Brahman, He is merged in Brahman.

SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA.

Criticism on "TIME" chapter of SUAREZ' book on Krishnamurti.

Surez does not use terms with philosophic precision. I remembered words written when he says: "Many are the poets that are born of nature, but wanting in the accomplishment of verse." So, too, many are the enquirers of Truth, born of Nature, but wanting in the accomplishment of a precise philosophy --phraseology--and for that matter we should not condemn them. Suarez is one such enquirer. The value of the paper, though not clear in the use of words--words very often loosely and unphilosophically handled--consists in the struggle the author puts forth to argue a case for a truer conception of Reality.

2. The Things-as-they-are-Reality. In this, an attempt is made which approximates a certain degree to Shankara's Vastu Tantra. i.e. reality independent of man's reading of it. The Vastu Tantra method is scientific. Two plus two is four independnet of X, Y. Z's attitude towards numbers.

3. Fear deals with a religious attitude.
4. Analysis of time comes with Philosophic enquiry
5. Dostoevsky is considering time purely as a mystic experience.
6. This is purely a religious experience. In Vedanta Kesari of 1935, November, this significance of negation of time is discussed.
7. Philosophy alone gives understanding and it must consider all datum for research and analysis. Any procedure that leaves out anything from understanding is a withdrawal of evidence that stultifies sound judgment. That is not search after Truth.
8. The value of this paper, though not clear in the use of words, very often loosely and unphilosophically handled, consists in the struggle the author puts forth to argue a case for the 'Things-as-they-are' conception of reality, without being warped by man's private experience, sustained in what Suarez mentions as "Duration."
9. Time is considered in terms of "duration" i.e. subjective consciousness of self, i.e. memory, of a group of ideas, related causally, forming the ego, as in the attempt to describe here: "Just as a dream character is made up of the very substance of dream, so the self is made up of duration." This time duration is the cocoon that preserves the 'I' consciousness. Analysed, we find that this 'I' consists of body, intellect, thinking processes and the satisfactions derived therefrom, are all-Mind, or rather ideas, which are in the language of Shankara, only functions of kind and we become aware of these only when Mind functions, as in dream and waking, giving us a Time-sense. The inner

sense of Time Suarez calls duration, and is purely subjective to the individual. But this inner sense of Time can only be received by reference to an outer object, click of the clock or movement of sun, etc. That "outer time reference" Suarez calls, "concrete, human, the Things-as-they-are-Reality"--stopping "duration" i.e. inner sense of Time, is only a mystic process. The outer reference (without which the inner sense of Time could never arise) which is the world will remain unexplained until the all that constitute the world, are equally known through Reason, in Jnanam, as ideas, or Mind.

10. Suarex has rightly criticised Dostoevesky. "D" has not considered that Time-sense has an objective reference without which that sense would never arise. Time sense is this very mind that appears also as externalised world of Reality--the Kshetra of "Geeta" and Mr. V.S.I. It is an error to think that Time-sense can be stopped by purely internal processes of subjugating thoughts. If that were real, he who has once subjugated all thoughts, should have "short-circuited" the thinking processes of all humanity for all time. But the world goes on as merrily or as stupidly as before!! The Time sense itself rests on a reference to an emperical world external to the ego--we might falsely attempt to commit mental suicide. But the outer world, is inextricably bound with the inner (for mind is non-dual), and the sense of outer and inner drawn by the ego, will invariably call us to attention and force the reality of the outer world, when we are once more ourselves, after the narcotising process of our inner mind, as Mr. V.S.Iyer will say,

has failed to kill thoughts. When, after that, "Thoughtless" stage, one faces the world, he would only say, "I did not know the lapse of time" and according to the suggestion given before entering that stage, would characterise it as one of "ignorance" or "illumination." And when the knowledge of the negation of time comes to us in the waking world, that can become "understanding" only by reference to the external world of being. When my senses awaken to the being of the external world, then only the consciousness of lapse of Time comes. Thus even when formulating the experience of "Thoughtlessness" we cannot release ourselves from the demands--the external world--the Objective Time, is making in us.

11. "The re-absorption of the self." This only that to the man of Jnana, the Self, the personality and everything that goes to make it, i.e. the body, the mind, memories, everything that can be made an object of awareness, form part of the external world, i.e. objective time, and the nature of every one of these have to be investigated. Loosing oneself in metaphysical eternity will not help. "Time becoming real". only means Time looked at objectively without prejudices of ego.

12. Metaphysical eternity is really a contradiction in terms. Our conception of eternity is a futile arithmetical process when counting swoons in the very attempt to touch any limit of numbers.

13. Objective is also used in the sense of "Things-as-they-are."

14. When every constituent that makes up the ego are all known as ideas, mind--the degrees of distinction between inner world and outer world--where one begins--ending the other--

all these vanish in Jnana for <u>all</u> is known. Reality--Things as they are.

15. This is the beginning of memory and consequently 'I' consciousness. Memory links ideas with objects. Simultaneously giving us the time-sense. Time can be equated with Mind. When Mind splits <u>as it were</u> into ideas we get succession. i.e. Time. The objective reference of Time is Space. i.e. Mind splitting in dimensions, and mind splitting <u>as it were</u> in antecedence and sequence, gives the causal relationship. Time, Space and Causation, all <u>is</u> Mind. Terms are used by the ego with a particular reference of experience. In all these references, there are two halves of Reality. The Mystics refuse to Kshetra aspect. Mr. ——— matter of fact-world--"The twist in space-time"--is used by Einstein. (?)

16. The idea of duration is from the sub-consciousness," i.e. from memory. Consciousness is used in terms of immediate awareness, and beneath this immediate awareness, conscious of only a single perception, at a given moment the storehouse of memories in the "subconsciousness." The idea of non-duration is inextricably bound with the idea of persistence, its opposite. So Reality is Cyclop-eyed. Remember what Guru told us: We have the idea of waking up because there was the experience of non-duration in sleep. In this portion, Suarez attempts <u>through a very weak language to express</u> the philosophic truth, that non-persistent duration implies persistence of Self, thereby cutting at the Mystics position and forcing our attention to the world of outer expression and consideration of that world in studying Reality.

17. It is all silly to say that Krishnamoorty has destroyed temples. Some external temples may go, and so long as the "Idols of the Cave" in man are still in man, such destruction of temples has no value.

CRITICISM OF "THE QUEST OF THE OVERSELF," by MONK GIBBON & SWAMI SIDDESWARANANDA'S REPLY to

"I have no quarrel with him. Like a number of modern writers he attacks the validity of time and uses these attacks as a jumping-off ground for vindicating eternity. Time according to him is only 'subjective', an hallucination of our own brain. We ourselves can extend or contract it to any length we choose. It is only "a form of self-consciousness"..."But surely all these arguments affect consciousness rather than time. Surely beside subjective or self-conscious time, there is objective or 'clock' time, valid for a million individuals if invalid for the one who has been drugged or is undergoing a mystical experience. Time is not merely a mental condition, it is also a succession outside our consciousness. Do the planets only imagine the sequence of their movements? It is only a spatial and temporal illusion which keeps them in place, and if they stopped thinking for a moment would they collide? Even the argument--advanced once more by Mr. Brunton--that a sufficiently distant star with appropriate range of vision could observe an event now, which happened on this planet centuries ago, is to my mind a quibble, for what the star would observe would not be the event but the light rays once set in motion by that event. Mysticism gains nothing by a too complete surrender to subjectivity." ..(THE SPECTATOR 10.12.3

REPLY: The discussion centres round the distinction the critic is determined to keep between Objective Time and Subjective or Self-conscious Time. But before allowing him to entrench himself, we should ask him what after all is Time? Can a Time Sense arrive without reference to objects or external world? There never can be, (to explain more clearly) a time sense <u>without reference to Space</u>. Even when one thinks, there are two factors, "The ideas" and the "knower" of ideas; and ideas present themselves to the "knower of ideas" as <u>something external</u> to the knower of ideas; although all these movements happen within the self's mind, i.e. to use your nice language, happenings within "the inverted bowl of bone we call our brain." And because they happen inside the brain and others cannot see therein we call them subjective. We must know that without <u>differentiation</u> of ideas in mind (mind itself splitting as it were into ideas, when one idea comes in intaposition to the other ideas) there can be no consciousness of the passage of time. The area where all these ideas hand on (if such a term can be used), is the "mind-space" called in Sanskrit "Chitta Akasa", or mental space. Please note the term Akasa or space used here. In the subjective world, in Chitta-Akasa, what stands as a clock or sun as a measurer of "succession" is ideas themselves. The thing external to a perceiver we shall call "object" (of perception). <u>Without reference to the object of perception no time sense can arise</u>. Wherever there is a conception of <u>externality</u> we become conscious of ideas and there is space sense, and simultaneously in relation to this space sense Time arises. When there is a succession of ideas within my mind, every idea I become conscious

of is external to the idea that went before it. For two ideas cannot remain coalesced, one must be external i.e. separate, from the other. Thus even when we so arbitrarily speak of subjective and objective worlds, even in the so-called subjective there is the sway of these two dominions--subjective and objective. This only means that whenever mind functions, it is by differentiation into subject and object, i.e. ideas, which in other words means Time and Space. When this differentiation is felt within the self's mind that space is called Chitta Akasa. Our external world space is called MahaKasa. For our conception of space is derived from objects in space. Any unit that can be perceived, is to us "an object." Ideas are objects because they are being perceived by other ideas. In the objective world of stars and planets, the object is a three dimensional unit, figuring in space, whereas in the subjective world the object is a non-dimensional unit and they figure in mental space. Now-a-days, we have the conception of a fourth dimensional unit. We may discover any more dimensions, still because they come within the field of perception exterior to the perceiver we call that--object. The idea of succession gives rise to time. The perception of the interval between two ideas gives us that sense. Ideas move with tremendous speed and when one idea is different from the other idea, the consciousness of difference between each idea gives the sense of self conscious Time. In the subjective sphere the medium, for each idea to move, is mind itself. If between one idea and the succeeding idea there is no difference, there will not be this sense of time, for then there is no reference to an "object". i.e. to space, a unit external to the idea or different from that particular idea.

If one concentrates on one single idea and allow that alone to possess the mind, he won't be conscious of passage of Time at all. Take a mystic experience where one idea alone vibrates. A man may be immerced in it for four hours according to clock time. But to the mystic it may be just only a few seconds. It is this experience that makes the mystic believe he has transcended Time! On the other hand, take the example of a thinker becoming too conscious of a flow of ideas, especially when one is agigated; for instance, a murderer condemned to the gallows awaiting over a night the dreadful event. One night would appear perhaps as years or centuries according to the degree of agitation. Thus in self-conscious time also there is an external element, though this external element is felt within oneself. When the agitation becomes too pathological ideas would personate as real, three-dimensional objects and this is called hallucination.

Let our critic know that in his so-called Self-conscious time there is an objective reference as well, (It is hiding in us!) and without this objective reference there would have have arisen the sense of Time, self-conscious or otherwise. It is objective time functioning "outside his consciousness" with reference to a standard--clock or sun--has universal application to him and others, and because this is so he considers <u>that</u> as <u>real</u>. But we shall ask him, dear friend, are you conscious that in your conception of "Validity for a million individuals," i.e. universality, you are only finding an _____ (?) strong relation between subject and object, i.e. idea and object. One idea is linked up

to an object, we get one perception. The same idea is linked up (apparently) in the same manner in another person or another and so to the N^{th} number. So we conclude whenever the same idea is linked up in the same manner, anywhere there must be the same perception, and thus the case of universality is emphasised. But, Mr. Critic! the same order subsists also internally, and the same conception of universality applies also. Subjectively: Only the universe of observation changes and one should not interpolate, as it were, in one universe the status or content of another, which begets a fallacy.

The frontiers of our consciousness as subjective is itself arbitrary. Can we say at which point a sensation changes from objective to subjective, i.e. at which point in the chain of sensation a neural impulse is converted into an idea?

Time has always reference to space and space sense comes to us by means of objects in space. The sun rises in one point in space, and sets in another, and this spatial reference to movement of the sun, indicates also the idea of succession, moment to moment. Contrariwise, without reference to succession of moments there can be no sense of space. Succession of thoughts gives us idea of succession of movements, and every thought generates either <u>perception or an apperception</u>. And when at times the same idea is repeated, Time would appear static. In the same way, if I place my finger at one single point, repeatedly touching the same point, such a process would not convey any idea of dimension or space. In Samadhi, deep sleep, swoon, or chloroformed condition, there is notsuccession of ideas, in fact no

ideas at all; and so no sense of time. Consciousness of a movement of thought comes when there is an immediate reference to space- Time. i.e. when there arises the sense of difference through consciousness of ideas, and that on which these dissimilar ideas function, we call space in terms of Extension, and Time in terms of succession. This medium may be for holding three dimensional matter or for non-dimensional ideas. But to the seeker after the Truth they are all objects, that come within the range of perception. (Drik-Drsya).

Vedanta does not concede either to idealism or realism. Our critic argues as an hardened Realist. Vedanta enquired into the root of things and finds that all our universe, subjective and objective are only Drk-Drsya, (Seer-seen) (mental) constructs. Mr. Critic comes to quarrel with us, for his conception of mind is only as a seat of ideas within his brain. But to the Vedantist, to the Jnani-Mystic it is MIND--with capital letters--the Over-self as you prefer to call that MIND which is also the same as connoted by Brahman. And it produces both ideas and objects--as in dream--I dream as a cowherd tending cattle and attacked by a tiger. The time sense of the cowherd comes from his idea of succession of moments which is a direct product of his spatial world. He adjusts his time in relation to his sun-rise which is relentless as he cannot change the order of the sun's course. According to the intensity of his imagination, as he lay on the mountain slopes when his cattle were grazing, he contracts or extends his subjective Time. But the universe resting in external space outside him, and the non-dimensional ideas within the mind of the cowherd as he lay imagining--all are only modifications of my mind that

dreamed all these. The cowherd did not produce the three dimensional objects outside him. His mind, the container of his ideas was only an agent in the perception of matter which his mind did not create. All thoughts of his mental world and all objects of the universe around him, were equal products of my mind. Both objective time regulated by the sun of the cowherd and his subjective time, were the "spurt" (Sphuranam in Sanskrit) of the dreamer's mind.

Our critic need not fear that we stand to gain by emphasizing subjectivity, and if at times we do it, we do it with a purpose which I explain later on. The critic is childish to emphasize, so unphilosophically, two varieties of time--the self-conscious time and the objective time. Individual sense of time he calls the self-conscious time which according to individual capability one can extend or contract. But the mystic does not say he extends or contracts another person's sense of time (unless it be a mesmeric occult process of pushing one's will on others. But that is not the point in discussion). Real Jnani Mystics like Shankara, Ramakrishna, or the Maharishi never make such a claim. The Jnani Mystic goes to the root of all problems. He takes the totality of experience in realistic or idealistic worlds. He asks our critic not to commit the fallacy of misreading and misplacing the universes of experience. In the universe of the mystics he has his own standards which he does not impose on the external world peopled by millions of others. If the mystic is one for ecstacies and visions he only sets up another order or Reality with a definite purpose. The Sadhaka Mystic creates a world of his own as a discipline, In an ordinary man's Consciousness there is the subconscious

feeling that material objects alone are real; for to him ideas have no dimensions and they flicker a moment and go out! while three dimensional objects remain for him to be.felt to-day, tomorrow and so forth. But when real critical thinking begins whether by a philosophic discipline as in India or a scientific research as in Europe, one knows that ideas are as much objects, as matter, and they stand under the same category. Mystic discipline helps to make this conviction an experience. The mystic undergoes courses of meditation and he may revel in Self-conscious time. When he find the mind in action after the experience of completely stilling it, he observes that everything is a Mental Construct. The Savikalpa experience, if he had any, of visions etc. he knows all as mind made. According to Northern School Buddhists, some of these "vision-manufacturings" are encouraged; only to impress on the Sadhaka (aspirant) the capacity of mind to masquerade as ideas and objects. Mystic beomes Jnani when he knows this and he does not seek visions etc., afterwards. He comes to Sahaja state and in this perpetual Jagrat there is only UNITY. The Ajnani (ignorant) only sees Names and Forms, ideas and objects. But the Sahajastak the root of these absorb the Jnani's focus of attention. Each unit of experience to an ordinary man is bi-polar, i.e. ideas are generated at one end and at the other there are objects. Non-recognition of the common "Root" of both ideas and objects, creates as the Maharishi would say, "Blut-Jada Granltu" --"The tie between Spirit and matter, which creates experience of the "I" and unity wake, every other experience. But as the Jnani Mys-

tic he has broken the central hub of the wheel of ignorance i.e.--the 'I' for him, through every experience pulsates the Jnana of non-duality--that all is Mind. (Refer Vivekachudamani--Verse 170). We get this state unconsciously through deep sleep. But this must be caught consciously. That is why the Sahaja State is Jagrat (Conscious) sleep.

only symbolises non-differentiation, and the in-Sahaja there is the invitation for the same through a conscious endeavour. If the Sadhaker Mystic becomes an introvert, it is for a purpose. He creates consciously (in contradistinction to unconscious dream process) conditions that give the Jnana that everything is Mind. Every scientist demands his own laboratory conditions. Why Mr. Critic denies our Mystic his laboratory conditions. The Mystic delvs for Truth that shapes ideas and objects and finds it is of its expression; Self-conscious time or Objective time--is moulded by splitting of ideas in the mind.

"Do planets imagine....collide." We do not profess all that he says. In stating all that, he wants to make us believe that our individual thoughts have created planets etc. We never are foolish to concede to this statement. We say that, Eternity(or Overself or Brahman) has pronounced the sequence of their (planets) movements, as well as my mental condition. Planets are objects and their movement is not worked by thoughts of an observer--as the sun in the cowherd's vision did not move because of the cowherd's imagination. But planets, and my imaginations are all modifications of the Overself (or eternity). You can say you stand to vindicate Eternity and you mean by Eternity that which does not change; the root of ideas

and objects as well. He makes a distinction between consciousness and time. Time does not exist independent of Consciousness, if Consciousness is meant as an <u>idea</u> of awareness. Critic wants to isolate Consciousness. Can an idea of itself hang in the void. An awareness always means duality--splitting or mind into ideas and when one speaks of awareness you must ask awareness of what? Abstract awareness is only a conception of the mind. We shall maintain (in spite of his observation). Time is also "subjective," when to the subjective we give the seats of ideas. Time functions in mind, (The individual Slef's mind). The time sense is my experience. But we <u>modify</u> this statement, saying this idea is ever interlinked to an object. objective time has no meaning without the object at the other end being connected with an idea. In your similie of the "distant star" you must tell your critic that everything taken as an "event" is an interpretation made by a conscious being and not by a "star". The observation of the light rays is made by an individual. An individual in a particular planet is expected to see some phenomena of "light rays" and by <u>mind would interpret that phenomena</u>. When you say a star observes, and according to the individual's degree of capability, to interpret the experience he would "discover" the event. Even now, if I see from a distance Vesuvius in erruption, If I am an ignorant man I will not be able to interpret that experience as it would be done by an educated man. I may just see some "light phenomena" and may not know the event. The knowledge of the event is according to the degree of the understanding of the truth of the thing.

Coming to your second letter, if we state deep is the "goal" everyone would laugh at us. Then people can humourously ask us to remain drugged with chlorogorm all through the time! Mr. V.S.I meant (by placing this so nakedly as you have stated) that only the Vedanta implication of deep sleep. Its connotation of non-duality. Instead of "deep sleep" one can as well say "samadhi" is the goal i.e. Stilling all thought; But even here the connotation will not be complete unless you explain that by Samadhi you mean the realization of non-duality. So when deep sleep or Samadhi is used, we only refer in a symbolic language, the nature of Jnana: that it is ever non-dual, and the Jnani ever remains poised in non-duality as Maharishi.

If I said the "Overself does not transcend deep sleep, what I meant was that there is no special place for Overself, for the conception of transcending means going across from one place to another. For whenever a conception of space coms there is differentiation. Brahman is fully Brahman (Overself) when it is in deep slep, dream or Jagrat. It does not suffer dimunition or enlargement. That is why you use the term Overself. Take the dream example, and the universe of the cowherd. The Self of the cowherd did not create this universe. His self may undergo many manifestations--of deep sleep, dream or Jagrat--or if he becomes a Yogi, he may know that he has "transcended" the three states and got Turiya. All these changes, ascending, descending or transcending may function in the self of the cowherd. But the Overself (my mind) in relation to the cowherd, was ever the same. It neither ascended, descended nor transcended. When the Self of the cowherd was in

deep sleep, Overself had not transcended that state. The idea of Overself of Brahman is as the Final Cause of things when human mind seeks a cause. The final cause of every unit is the universe of the cowherd is my mind.

"It is not pure awareness"--When I state a thing is "Pure awareness" it is my concep-tion of Overself. Any conception is really "beyond the scope of the term as well as the concept "Self." (
) and we must know that Brahman or Overself is beyond all possible specification of It that we may know of." (Brh.Up. 345). "In Yoga books you should say so." For Yoga aims at getting Samadhi--state of Being, where mind is evacuated of all ideas." But "this meditation is only an idea," (Brh.UP.154), for all throughout the Sadhaka has been sug-gesting that the highest state is the "state of evacuation of ideas." i.e. Pure Awareness and in the degree he suggests, he gets the realisation of this state. As for instance, let us take one day he got this "still state of mind." As there were no ideas, there was no consciousness of the passage of time. Suddenly at one point meditation breaks. The objective clock time (of our critic!) tells he had forgotten Time; Transcended Time by four hours. The Sadhaka then calls this state as one of True Awareness, which is only an idea in the mind of the Sadhaka. But this is to be encouraged, otherwise there is no possi-bility for a Jnana dawning, which is always in Jagrat, after the mood of meditation. Does he, the Sadhaka know then the Truth of things: does he know as the Sphurana--Spirit of the universe that both himself, his idea, Time,

space and the whole universe is only MIND. (Vide Verse 17 of): "All is a manifestation of the mind." If he gets Jnana then he has possessed Reality" in the "palm of his hands" and after getting this wisdom, he may like Maharishi, talk, walk about sit, in stillness or do anything, he knows then the SHAPE OF THINGS;!! Ageain when I told you "that the Overself is unconscious deep sleep" I only meant through the symbol of deep sleep to describe <u>the state of non-duality.</u> Please note this in your note book. <u>But the Jnana of this non-duality can come only in Jagrat</u>; and we should encourage samadhi-makings, for then the keen mind, under our mental laboratary conditions can note the junction between the world experience and Pure Awareness experience--and <u>KNOW</u> that everything is MIND (Vide P.12). In fact if we can make observation intensely keen, <u>we can know that in between two ideas there is Sushupti even in Jagrat</u>. But we cannot observe it. So just as a specimen is mounted on a glass plate for being placed under a microscope for observation, the Yogi prepares this mount through Samadhi. But very often the Yogi ends his endeavour by preparing the mount, and he refuses to take notice of world; and as often as possible plunges back in the state of "stillness"--evacuation of ideas which wont give truth. For he takes only half of Reality,--the Static. He must recognize the dynamic and know that both static and dynamic are all only MIND. The ordinary man feels dynamic in Reality, Static, very often gets stuck up in it. (Vide Gita Chap.4 Verse.18) . Swapna (dream) and Jagrat, are possible because there is deep sleep.

In Swapna and Jagrat we get perception. Perception comes by difference. Suppose the case of a man who has no deep sleep. Can he have any idea of perception at all. Perception is possible because of its antithesis--non-perception (in deep sleep). The Yogi in trying to have Jnana wants the knowledge of the static side, and seeks Samadhi. And when he gets wisdom he knows that Swapna and Jargat are possible because of . He knows that dynamic and static represented by the states are all mind and this knowledge is that on non-duality. The Maharishi's experience of conscious sleep--also reported in Yoga is this: To know Truth.

Mysticism is highly necessary to induce people to enquire into Truth; and them from Mysticism of Pure Awareness, one must come to a waking world where alone Realisation can take place. Maharishi's words are literally true, and there is no conflict between the two view points. (When I said the Truth is unconscious deep sleep, it was to emphasise that the Overself beyond all possible specification, and the clearest experience of it in daily life we get is . But do not place deep sleep as the goal of life! My God! That will be a terrible error!!

SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA ON VEDANTA.

1. Everything may be reducted to a category of THOUGHTS or OBJECTS. In the dream state we experience both these, yet after awaking we know they are merely the product of mind, hence, nothing but mind. Similarly we should regard the waking state as the same, as a kind of dream composed of these two categories, the latter being nothing but the mind, also in the waking state.

2. Never give up meditation. Keep it up along with the Vedanta. Although yoga is inferior to philosophy, when latter is merely intellectual, academic, yet it is needed to secure practical results and for teaching. Unless yoga is taught the students are going to become mere academic pupils of philosophy.
3. Detachment from world is only for beginners. Everything is Brahman, including the world.
4. If we follow the waking state position only, it is foolish to say that the whole world is an idea, for, the idea of an idea can come only in contra-dictinction to an object. Therefore Berkeley's conclusions that there is no external world cannot stand scrutiny, but his position is valuable for undermining the crude materialist's position, through logic. Similarly Shankara assailed the Buddhists who affirmed a similar idealism. Shankara, from the lower standpoint, refutes this and asserts existence of external world (in II,2,29 Sutra Bashya) That is only from the waking standpoint. For the more advanced he takes a higher position viz. the totality of three states. These by comparison with dream condition one understands that both ideas and objects are all Mind only; whereas Berkeley denied the objects, Shankara admits them, but resolves them into mind. Neither the materialists nor idealists are fully correct; Only true philosophy can integrate them.
5. The scientists give us an approach or method to use for the investigation of reality: metaphysics gives us the logical conviction of unreality of external world, independent of our consciousness. Bertrand Russell has come close to this position of his "Analysis of Matter, Analysis of Mind."

Proposition 1. External world exists, although nature is debatable.
Proposition 2. Mental sensations are only things we can know (by intellectual processes)
Proposition 3. Mental sensations can exist only in relation to external objects, just as waking state could exist only in relation to sleep.
Proposition 4. Both sensation and objects are only expression of Mind. Proof. (1) From waking standpoint--solipsistce viz. world exists because I exist. Without me no world. (Fallacy is that otherman is real). (2) From modern science: World is only one big thought. (3) From two states: In dream world extends in time and space, time when you accept in world of experience.
Proposition 5. When you know world as dream, there can be no more doubts.

SWAMI DESIKANANDA on AVASTATRAYA:If you come to the ashram in search of me and find that I am out, this s ould be Vedantically stated thus: "None,other than I,was at the asram." Similarly if you examine the state of deep sleep, the correct statement of this experience is: "None, other than I, was present in the sleep." For just as you were the observer at the asram, so must you have been an observer during sleep in order to have noted the fact that neither the ego nor the world was present This proves that you are not the ego but something deeper (b) **After you eliminate the Seen, that which remains is the Seer.**

SWAMI SIDDESWARANANDA on "SRI RAMAKRISHNA."

1. Religious truths have come to mankind in various epochs under various forms. But often in the hands of the followers of the Master to whom came the rich revelation, these truths assumed the prerogative of monopolies. Truth got institutionalised. It become a prisoner and thereby lost its value. There is the possibility of understanding the same truth in multiple ways. The Vedic seers recognised this cosmopolitan character of truth. In Gita we find Krishna teaching the same ideal when there was a crying need of its re-formulation. Right through the coridor of time we had great, broad ideals in religion. In India we make a distinction between Mata and Tattva; Mata is religion and Tattva is Truth. All Matas lead one to the same Tattva, and that mental reading of Tattva through one's faith towards the ultimate realities of life is one's religion.

2. From this point of view there can be many religions as there are invididuals; but the truth to which they take us is always, One, whose multiple expressions are the religions. Lack of comprehension of this has created the greatest misery in the world. True civilisation is always a co-operative endeavour; but instead of this attitude when sectarianism and a feeling of monopoly to hold and propagate truth seizes human minds, it is worse than insanity. And our earth instead of becoming a haven of peace is turned into a valley of tears. To restate the true value of religion as paths leading to Truth, great Masters bless this world of ours. The hates and passions of men prevent their acceptance. Still they come, and give us their life-giving messages. The life of Sri Ramakrishna is one such cry in the wilderness. Will the world hearken

to the understanding of these messages which alone can enfranchise man from the thraldom of the senses and slavery to passion? Perhaps at no other epoch there is a pressing need to gain this understanding; today under the guise of the war of ideologies we are once again in the grip of a wave of hatred which recalls to us the wars of religions in the Middle Ages with its history of persecutions, inquisition and massacres; if the future of humanity is a "federation of the world in the parliament of man" as poet Tennyson has put it, then that can be inaugurated only by an understanding of each other's ideologies. The live of Sri Ramakrishna is a living commentary on this phase of truth and to-day we celebrate his birthday anniversary.

3. Sri RAMAKRISHNA we consider not merely as a personality but a principle. And that principle is the spiritual value the world has ever recognized from time immemorial. Sri Ramakrishna came not to show us anything new; but his life is an extra-ordinary searchlight under whose illumination one can have true perspective of these very eternal values we have dreamed as the culmination of spiritual experience. And herein lies the universal importance of the teachings of the Master exemplified through his life. "Ekam sat vipra bahuda vadanti" "Truth is One; sages call it by various names." This is one of the greatest discoveries made by the Upanishadic sages. Herein we get the most literal charter of spiritual freedom and tolerance the world has ever known; and the life of Sri Ramakrishna is a manifestation of the possibilities of concretising in actual life the spiritual treasures enshrined in these Vedic utterances.

France had the honour of bringing to Europe the light of the Orient in philosophy and religion. It was Anketil Duperon in the 18th century that for the first time published a publication of the Upanishads. Study of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy has now become a feature of almost all the universities of the Occident. East and West stand once more united as in the Hellenic period when there was deep cultural contact between the two continents. If to-day we meet here, it is only to pay our homage to one of the master-minds of modern Indian Renaissance, but it is also to bring our offerings to the temple of true culture and civilization that we by our united efforts have to build, so that humanity may be saved from a second lapse into barbarism and savagery. In these days of despair when we doubt the foundations of human culture, the memory of the great ones gives us cheer and hope and makes us feel that all is not lost. The sleeping forces of good once more revive in us; and again we hear the Upanishads murmur: "Uttishthata Jagrata Prapyavaran nibodhata:Arise, Awake, stop not till the goal is reached.

SWAMI SIDDESWARANANDA ON VEDANTA: If Vedanta, in the west is to become an influence on life we must touch that substratum of society that will not be emotional. This work of sowing the seeds of Vedanta will be a work for ages. For even in India where these metaphysical ideas have been nurtured for ages, not even a fringe of society is directed by these ideas or are capable of understanding. To release human minds from all opinion is a cathartic process that would take ages. Reason is the most valuable faculty: without it all are not men but candidates for humanity.

Shankara and Buddha's teachings may easily be equated as they are really identical to one who understands them properly.

$ It is impossible to attain consciousness without thoughts and retain it throughout the waking state. It can be done only in deep sleep or in trance, and then you know it only after you emerge from both, as the string of thoughts make up the personality. However for beginners in meditation I tell them to aim at this thought-free state as a goal in meditation, but when they are advanced in the practice I tell the truth. For the Gnani even thoughts are part of his daily consciousness, the same as with the ordinary man and not separate from it.

$ The Gnani has power to acquire the occult powers if he wishes any of them, <u>without</u> performing the yoga practices necessary to acquire them. But of course he will be free of the desire for them and will only use one under special circumstances. In fact, anything of any kind he desires will come to him.

$ The whole of existence can be condensed into object and idea. To an unreflective person, an object is a thing which remains in time-space, is subject to causal laws and is external to oneself, whereas an idea is internal. Thoughts exist in time; objects exist in space and time. But after analysis we discover that both are mind only.

$ We can never have a purely ideal state, (which is only half of reality) nor a purely real state (which is also only half of reality) but the totality of experience is the whole of reality (See Vivekachudamani Verse. 108.).

$$ To get rid of theological connotations V.S.I. often prefers to translate Brahman as Mind, (capital M).

$$ The samadhi of the Raja jogi who imagines he has reached Nirvana is precisely the same as the Samadhi of the Hatha yogi who is buried under earth. Both experience blank unconsciousness, the same as deep sleep of ordinary man.

$$ THE FINAL FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF VEDANTA IS GIVEN ON PAGES 16/26 OF BRIHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD. IF YOU MASTER THAT, YOU HAVE THE BASIS OF V.S.I'S TEACHING.

$$ Brahman is reality viewed from cosmic standpoint. Atman is the same viewed by Yogi turning inwards; Gnani finds both are one.

$$ The Gnani may dream at night and have deep sleep. It will make no difference to his Gnana. If he dreams he will realise that it is just like another phenomena of waking state and know he is dreaming.

$$ Socrates saying "Gnauti Sauton", is same as the realization of Brahman.

$$ From the waking standpoint, the theory of Idealism can be established only on a solipsistic basis. This solipsism, according to V.S.I. is only half-baked Idealism.

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SWAMI DESIKANANDA.

"ON VEDANTA". (CHAP.2)

1. The true 'I' is a mere witness and as such it is neither agent nor enjoyer. It is the One without a second, also known as Brahman, Drik and the non-dual Atman.

2. Gaudapada's analyses and conclusions may be briefly put thus: He starts with an enquiry into the experience of the dream state. It is generally known to all that dream experience is false or unreal. He compares and contrasts the experience of dream and the waking states and concludes that there is no difference between objects that are perceived in both. The experience of objects in the dream is unreal because of the absence of the proper time and place with which such experiences are associated. For example, the dreamer in Rameswaram goes to bed, and he wakes up from the dream a few minutes later in Rameswaram itself! And this unreality is brought home only when he wakes up, for during the dream itself the experiences were as real as one would experience them while awake.

The subject-object relation or relation of the seer and the seen are present equally in both the dream and the waking states. These two states are also identical on account of the characteristic of "being perceived" in either of the states. Even illusions like mirage and water, rope and snake are also perceived in both the dream and waking states! Again, as in the waking state, so also in the dream, we do make a distinction between real and unreal objects. The continuity of perception in the waking state is also experienced in the dream. It might be said that dream experience is only individual as contrasted with that of the waking state. This is not so. For, we do have personal contact and intercourse

with men in the dream with dream men just as we have in the waking state. As regards the criteria of utility (prayojanam) also we have the same experience. We may have had a hearty and sumptuous meal before going to bed, but in the dream we do experience hunger or the fullness of a meal. A dream meal does satisfy us in the dream as much as a meal in the waking state. Dream coins are of as much value as the currncy of the waking transactions. All these experiences are similar in both the dream and the waking states. The causal relation is also experienced with equal clarity in the dream as in the waking state. It may be contended that most of the dream objects and percepts are queer, fantastic and un-natural as contrasted with those experienced in the waking. But should weredmember that while dreaming they seem to us to be perfectly normal. The differences are experienced when viewed from the waking state. Whatever we perceive while awake is not perceived in the dream and vice-versa, and both the types of objects and experiences are not perceived in deep sleep. (Sushupti).

Thus we can posit that the dream objects are unreal and if the objects of the waking state are similar to the dream objects, the irresistible conclusion is that the objects of the waking state are also equally unreal. We find it difficult to understand this truth because of our attachment to the body and our identification with the waking state, as being real from the very beginning of our life.

3. While recognizing relative truth, however, the Vedic sages called ultimate truth as Satyasya satyam, Truth of Truths, and described it as self evident and non-contradictable, being non-dual at the same time. Relative truths do not negate nor confuse the ultimate truth.

4. We know that the waking experiences are negated by the dream experiences and the dream

by the waking experiences. Both are again negated by deep sleep. We have already seen that "waking objects" are similar in experiences with the dream-objects, and that dream-objects are unreal as they are the creation or the imagination of the dream-mind. The conclusion, therefore, is that the waking objects may be as much creations of the mind as are the dream objects. It is also our experience that the waking ego or I is not the dream ego or I. For, in dream the body and the senses with their consciousness are dead, as it were. Yet we experience all things just as if we were awake! and we also remember our experience when we wake up from dream. Again, both the waking ego and the dream ego are entirely absent in deep sleep. But yet we know that we slept well and we feel very refreshed when we wake up from sleep! We are therefore led to the irrestible and inevitable conclusion from the analysis of the three states that whatever is seen or perceived undergoes change--be it the object or the ego-consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a consciousness underlying all these which knows all the three states and their experiences. This fundamental consciousness which is aware of all three states is not the same consciousness as we feel and experience in each of the three states. For, we hava already said that the consciousness of one state negates the consciousness of the other each in its turn. And this consciousness with its respective objects which it is aware of, is the object of the fundamental consciousness which knows the coming and going of waking, dream and deep sleep consciousnesses. It is this consciousness per se or the pure consciousness which knows the three states as coming and going as also of the disappearance of the ego or I every night. This I is not only aware of the I or ego but is also

aware of the ideas of this ego-I. This pure consciousness which knows the changes of the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, as a witness, is known as Turiya, the fourth.

5. Modern psychologists also are of the same opinion that what we are aware of or conscious of directly is our own mind and the object we perceive is only a remote something, an inference.

6. If we critically analyse the different theories of causality, we see that each contradicts the other. In the first theory clay pots and gold jewels are taken to be the effects of clay and gold respectively. But it is idle to say that clay pots or gold ornaments are different from clay or gold. Secondly, Parinamavada says that something new comes up in the course of evolution which was not in the cause e.g. mango-seed and the plant or the fruit. This is open to the serious objection that an entitty cannot come out of a non-entity. How can something come out of nothing? Thirdly Vivarthavada makes it clear to the enquiring mind that the so-called effect viz. the snake caused from the rope is but an illusion, for in truth, the rope did not produce the snake at all. It is but an imagination or projection of the mind owing to erroneous knowledge. So the Ajata-vada was declared as true by Gaudapada who said that nothing is born, nothing is produced, (ajati).

7. When the notions of the reality of world and Jiva are clearly examined i.e. their un-real nature is realised what remains is pure Atman. This Atman remains as the sole real factor and entity which is aware of the unreal or the changing nature of this universe and objects.

8. The fact that the universe exists is known by a knower. This knower of the universe is verily ourselves. Generally speaking, the existence of a knower is made known because of an object that is known. So, knowledge means and includes the subject-object relation, and it is the awareness of the object by the subject. This kind of knowledge we are having in our everyday experience in the waking state and in dream. We refer to this kind of experience when we say that "I know this", "I experience this." So, wherever and whenever a knowledge or an experience of a thing takes place, we always conclude that there should be subject-object relation, or the relation between a knower and a thing which is known. So, our knowledge comprises in knowing a thing. But the Vedantins say that there is a kind of awareness when there is no subject-object relation, or to be explicit, there is knowledge without an object, for example in deep sleep. In deep sleep there is no object and yet the sleeper feels when he awakens that he had slept well. None can deny that this is not an experience.

So, we generally take 'I' or ego to be that experiencer or knower of body and the senses, and of this universe. And in the West, this ego or I is said of the knower of the waking state only, whereas in the East some Vedantins go further and take the waking state and the dream experiences as well. It is also our experience that the waking 'I' is not the dream 'I'. And in deep sleep this 'I' ceases to be. But yet, we know that we had the memory of waking experience, dream experience and deep sleep experience. One thing becomes clear from this analysis that the so-called 'I' exists only so long as objects exist. When the objects ceast to exist, as in deep sleep, the 'I' also ceases to be.

9. If 'I' dies every night in sleep and if we

are this 'I', then we should every morning get up a new or separate person. But we continue to be the same person and have the memory of our previous actions and experiences.
Then what is the 'I' or ego? And who is this awareness that knows the changes of this I or this clnscious self which dies every night? This 'I' which says "I am Mr. So and so" and which identifies itself everytime with the activities of the body, mind and senses, as the Judge in the High Court, the father before his children, the husband before his wife and the master in the presence of servants, is the 'I' which we know in our every day life. Freud, the great psychologist of our day, says that "The ego is first and foremost abody-ego, it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surace...that it is first and foremost a body-ego. (S.Freud - "The Ego and the Id.")
So the psychologists agrees with us that the so-called 'I' is but body-consciousness.
The Buddhists also say that 'I' is an aggregate of the body, feeling, perception, will and reason and it is not only unreal, but is changing every moment. Then the doubt arises what is this 'I'? Or what is this self-consciousness which is expressed as "I know; I feel; I enjoy; I am miserable; I dream; I slept well." If this self-consciousness or 'I' is only a "body-ego" and "dies nightly" what is that consciousness which knows the body-ego and its nightly death? Really if the constant change of the 'I' and the death of 'I' or self is to be perceived, the perceiver or the knower of this change and death should naturally be unchanging, and if it is unchanging, it must be eternal and if it is eternal, it can be one only, without a second.
Then what is the relation of this unchanging a

and eternal consciousness to that changing
I'?

It is in everybody's experience that a thing cannot change its nature e.g. fire can never be cold anywhere at any time. If the 'I' is at one time happy and at another time unhappy and is also undergoing changes from the waking state to the dream and from the dream to the deep sleep, the conclusion is that it is a passing phase of something else and is dependant on something else for its sustenance and status quo. To the Vedantin anything other than the perceiver is object; that is to say, all the percepts including the bodies and the ego are objects and as such are unreal and changing. So, as already said, change and unreality is perceived by that which is unchanging and real. That which is unchanging must be one without a second and hence it must be beyond misery and happiness, for where is happiness or misery where and when there is only one without a second?

10. If the so-called I is constantly changing and is also happy at one time and miserable at another, and this fact is perceived by me, then I must be that perceiver who knows the change, happiness and misery of the so-called I. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that I am the perceiver of the change, happiness or misery and hence I must be beyond change, happiness or misery. Ashtavakra, therefore, says that "Boundless as space as I. The phenomenal world is like a jar. That I am like the ocean and that phenomenal universe is like the wave. I am indeed in all beings and all beings are in me. This is knowledge."

"This is one without a second. It is therefore present every where and is conscious of everything as it is everything. This is always the knower or the witness and as such it is Pure

Consciousness (without subject-object relation) is the perceiver or knower of the change of the ego-I am I. The ego-I is only a reflection of the true I which I am. This true I when it identifies itself with the upadhis (adjuncts) is called the transmigrating, enjoying or suffering I. This true I is my true nature, and as such I have no change, neither do I suffer or enjoy, for I am always a witness (Drik) and a Seer."

LORD HALDANE'S WORK IN PHILOSOPHY. (In "NATURE" 1928) by (1) G.DAWES HICKS.

In 1907-8 he was president of the Aristotelian Society, and he contributed many papers both to its PROCEEDINGS and also to MIND.

Lord Haldane's first published article, written in collaboration with his brother, Dr. J.S.Haldane, on "The Relation of Philosophy to Science," appeared in 1883 in the volume of "Essays in Philosophical Criticism" dedicated to the memory of T.H.Green,--a volume which also contains contributions from several other men who afterwards became well-known, such as Andrew Seth, Bosanquet, Sorley, Henry Jones, and W.P.Ker. In this essay the Hegelian position, to which throughout his life Haldane steadily adhered, is concisely and lucidly set forth. The term 'mind' has, he insisted, a twofold significance. It may mean the ultimate reality to which all existence is referable; and then it indicates not a substance or individual object of experience, but the creative synthesis of thought which, precisely because it is that which constitutes experience, cannot as such be made an object of experience. Or it may mean the individual conscious life, mind conceived as it appears, as its own object--having transformed its nature and become a definite part of experience --the subject matter, namely, of psychology. Thus mind may be regarted as at the same time creator and created, as at once infinite and yet a finite self.

Assuming, then, that the ultimate ground, the essence of reality, is mind or thought or self-consciousness, Haldane tried to show that notions such as those of causation and subs-

stance are but abstract categories, limited ways of thinking of things in knowledge, and that they do not indicate independent ways of existence in Nature. When the attempt is made to explain by their means the phenomena of life and psychical being they become, he argued, wholly indadequate. The properties of a body *qua* organised can no more be expressed in terms of these mechanical categories than the properties of a stone can be expressed in terms of moral judgment. He insisted that, if science is to do more than merely observe and record facts, it must recognise the necessity of a department of inquiry that shall deal critically with the categories it employs, assign to them their true position, and make clear the real nature of scientific method.

In the Gifford Lectures the line of reflection that had been thus adumbrated was elaborated in detail. In these lectures Haldane espoused Hegelianism with all the fervour of a prophet; he presented it as almost an inspired revelation which, when its meaning was grasped, would be seen to dispose of the enigmas that have long perplexed human reason. Once recognize the implications of the principle that the objective world, and the system of universals which it exemplifies, are but the workings of a mind which is not another than ours, but the mind in which all reality, our minds included, has its place, and one by one the problems of philosophy would be found capable of solution.

It seemed to many of us then, as it seems still, that Haldane took the "pathway to reality" even though entered upon under Hegelian auspices, to be a much shorter cut to that destination than we are entitled to sup-

pose it is; but no one could doubt the sincerity of his assurance, or help admiring the pertinacity with which he sought to explain and defend the leading ideas of his idealistic system. Probably the most permanently valuable and original part of the work is that which is concerned with the method of scientific investigation and the relation to it of a criticism of categories. He submitted to scrutiny some of the main concepts of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, for the purpose of showing that the categories of physics are less abstract and consequently nearer reality and truth than those of mere number, those of chemistry than those of physics, those again of life than those of chemistry, and those of mind than those of life. Particularly suggestive was his exposure of the notion of a special 'vital force' as the re-introduction, under another name, of the old mechanical theory; and, again, of the delusion of imagining that, because no specific 'vital force' can be detected, life must be simply a complicated mechanism.

After the publication of the Gifford Lectures, Haldane appears to have devoted a great deal of attention to the philosophy of mathematics, and especially to the mathematical conception of infinity. In his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in 1907 he endeavoured to show that recent developments in logical theory, particularly those relating to the meaning of the notion of quantity, had a close bearing on the principles of the calculus. He pointed out, truly enough, the confusion into which Leibniz and some Leibniz's contemporaries had fallen in speaking of infinitesimals as minute discrete

quanta, the magnitude of which might be disregarded, just as the magnitude of a grain of sand might be disregarded which compared to the size of the ocean. A procedure of that sort would rob the calculus of any claim to exactness. The source of the confusion lay he contended, in neglecting the consideration that quantity has two aspects, each implying and inseparable from the other, continuity and discreteness. If quantity be thought of in the latter aspect alone, the only 'infinite' conceivable will be, he argued, the 'false' infinite of mere unendingness in increase or decrease of finite quanta. On the other hand, the infinity which belongs to the continuous aspect of quantity cannot be reached by addition or subtraction; and, this being realised, the so-called infinitisimal calculus may be consistently treated as a science of infinitesimals but of 'rates', its peculiar province being quantity regarded as a state of continuous change. Thus we may arrive at the notion of infinity in the sense of what is self-contained. But still the relations so treated would be abstract; what is abstract has been wrenched from a context, and has, therefore, something outside itself. The 'true' infinite must be both concrete and completely self-contained; and only the Absolute can be that.

It must, I think, be admitted that, although his criticisms of Leibniz were perfectly justifiable, Haldane was, in this context, flogging a dead horse. In working out a theory of the calculus, the modern mathematician no longer assumes either infinitely small quantities or infinitely small numbers. He proceeds from the funda-

mental concept of a limit--a purely ordinal notion, which involves no reference to quantity at all, and no such entities as "infinitesimals" or 'negligible differences.' The modern mathematical conception of the infinite may not be free from logical difficulties, but it would seem to be as remote from what Hegel called the 'false' infinite as it is from what he called the 'true' one.

It is worth noting that in the early essay to which I have alluded, of 1883, Haldane had already laid stress upon the consideration that space and time are not separable from, or independent of, one another, that they exist only in co-ordination as contributing to the constitution of a highly concrete reality which they do not exhaust. He was thus to some extent anticipating the merging of space and time into space-time, which is probably the most radical innovation introduced by the theory of relativity, and that aspect of it which is of chief philosophical importance. Of course, in the large volume published in 1921, Lord Haldane reasserted the same contention, here, however, as an outcome of the scientific investigation of the 20th century. But he went now much further, and maintained that the theory of relativity is, in truth, simply an illustration of the application of what he called the philosophical principle of relativity to a special domain. By the term 'relativity' in the philosophical sense he understood the doctrine that Nature is unintelligible apart from a structure which is 'foundational' in the knowledge of every individual knower. Einstein, he insisted, was concerned with a series of meanings which possess veracity

only relatively to knowledge.

Notwithstanding the ingenuity with which this thesis was enforced, it has failed, I think it must be confessed, to produce conviction. So far as I can see, the physics of Einstein takes no more account of the relativity of Nature to knowledge than did the physics of Newton. It is true that in popular expositions of the theory reference is frequently made to the 'observer.' Yet that surely is merely an expository device for indicating that the relations observed are in each case dependent upon the space-time framework to which the body of the observer belongs. The 'observer' might be replaced by a photographic plate, and the facts with which the scientific theory of relativity is concerned would remain unaffected.

The interest of the book lay, however, not in its handling of the scientific theory of relativity, but in its comprehensive presentation of that form of idealism upon the elaboration of which Lord Haldane had spent so many years of patient thinking and reflection. This was far from being a mere restatement of what he had said before; it was the result of a careful working over again of the old material, in the light of maturer insight and wider experience. He had not been uninfluenced by the movements of speculation since the days of his Gifford Lectures. It now seemed to him advisable to name the essence or prius of reality not as thought or experience but as knowledge,--knowledge in the fullest sense, including within it both feeling and conation. By 'knowledge' he evidently that which must in some way be conceived as a synthesis of both knowing and the known. Human

experience was undoubtedly a type of knowledge; but it implied, as the ground of its possibility, knowledge that is final and ultimate. The world confronting us is, indeed, actual, and independent of us, its observers. Yet that is not the last word about either it or ourselves. Both belong to a greater entirety; and only in so far as they fall within the sphere of knowledge have they either being or meaning.

I have but little space left in which to refer to Lord Haldane's activities as an educationist. No politician of his time was more alive than he to the necessity of a thoroughly efficient educational system for a democratic State. He saw clearly that no system of elementary education ever can be efficient unless it form part of one comprehensive scheme in which the universities are given the lead. Frequently he laid before large assemblies, sometimes of students, and sometimes of business men and manual workers, his conception of the ideal of intellectual culture, and of what the effort to realise it would mean for the welfare of the whole community.

(2) by T.P. NUNN. For the War, which left nothing unchanged, has transformed the British Empire we know into a Commonwealth of Sovereign Nations, and so created problems, legal and constitutional, of the utmost gravity and delicacy. It is characteristic of Lord Haldane's profound practical intelligence that he appreciated at once the emergence and significance of the new order, and of his patriotism that, ignoring medical warnings, he spent the whole reserve of his physical strength in seeking to guide upon

sound lines the most amazing and possibly the most hopeful political experiment the world has seen.

When we consider what the country owes to this great public servant and how inadequately the debt was acknowledge, one is tempted to think that it scarcely deserved him. It is true that the ignorant and almost insane detraction which drove him out of the Cabinet early in the war is now silent, and that during the last years of his life he enjoyed increasingly general respect. Yet the respect was undoubtedly cool--even, one must admit, a little grudging. This is explicable in part by his lack of certain personal and temperamental gifts that make an easy popular appeal; but the fundamental cause lies in a defect of the public mind which has again and again been deplored in the pages of NATURE. We do not mind a minister's having a little learning, provided he wears it solely as a flourish upon his more solid qualities; but we are incurably suspicious of one who attempts to bring theoretical ideas to bear upon important public business.

Now Lord Haldane was guilty of this fault in its worst form. It would have have mattered that, bred a student of philosophy, he remained one to the end. The serious thing was that his philosophy was the mainspring of his life, and that he sought deliberately to bring his immense practical capacity under its control. His mind was formed, at Edinburgh and Gottingen, under Hegelian influences, and these remained strong with him throughout life. (A month before his death he told the present writer that he had returned to the great works of Hegel and was pondering them, nightly

sentence by sentence, in bed; and added, with pathetic humour, that he deemed himself to be the last Hegelian left in Britain.) The value of his contribution to the Hegelian tradition is considered in another article, but it is essential to note here that for him its central doctrine took the form of a conviction that reality is to be identified with knowledge; for conviction gave unity and force to the whole of his life, and is the key to an understanding both of his achievements and of his limitations. From it was derived the profound appreciation of the value of science--rare both in a philosopher and in a minister of the Crown--which was expressed in his cultivation of personal relations with his great scientific contemporaries, in the eagerness with which he sought to grasp the significance of modern developments in biology and physics and his ability to understand and utilise fully the services of expert advisers of the Government in matters of great national movement.

From it above all sprang his passionate belief in education. What Lord Haldane did in this field is not likely to be fully revealed for so much was done behind the scenes and incidentally. But the cause of national education in all its grades had no more powerful friend; and the immanse progress that had been made in recent years owes a great deal to his wide vision, to his warm and watchful sympathy, and to the power of his persuasive advocacy exerted in quiet corners and at critical moments. University education, both in England and in Ireland, is particularly indebted to him; and it was, perhaps, fortunate that the great friend of the new universities was one

who had not been hypnotised by the traditions of Exford and Cambridge. From Haldane's philosophical point of view, nothing was more essential to national wellbeing than a strong and comprehensive university system. The universities were, in his view, centres of consciousness where cultural and practical experience, in its chief modes, was to be worked up into that exact knowledge which would raise the level of reality of the nation's life. Thus is to be explained, for example, his enthusiastic co-operation in the founding of the London School of Economics and his general interest in enlightened professional education.

$$ Lord Haldane was so accessible and so widely known that it would be impertinent for one who cannot claim exceptional intimacy to attempt a sketch of his personality. Such a one may, however, be permitted to record that in prolonged conversations in recent years, during which the great statesman, student, and man of affairs talked freely about many phases of his wonderful experience, he never uttered a word of bitterness, and that one caught glimpses of a faith, a courage, and a spiritual nobility that could not but evoke reverential esteem.

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SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA'S REVIEW of Dr.M.SIRCAR'S "EASTERN LIGHTS.".

The shock of conquest and shame of subjection unsettled the even tenor of India's life. A catholic understanding required the adjustment of the new forces of culture. The world learnt what really to seek in India and appraise her true value in the economy of international life. In Shankara critical Europe sought new light to guide its thought and influence its

conclusions. Within the last century centres of Oriental learning formed part of European Universities and the place of Indian scholars was properly appraised and honoured. The present volue under review comes within the same group of interest in modern Indian thought. In this new book Dr. Sircar plays a new role. He adopts a more popular vehicle of expression and interprets the soul of India to Modern Europe. As an ambassador of Indian culture, Dr. Sircar has meritoriously performed his mission. As one reads through the book one gets the impression of a masterly mind grappling with recondite problems, exegetical analyses and synthetic solutions. He often leaves the hinterland of Siddhantic disputations and breathes in the high grounds of experience. This gives his writings a particular setting with an appeal to the academit mind as well to the religious aspirant. Dr. Sircar deals with the problems of philosophy from a living centre of interest--life. He efficiently criticises philosophers and shows how the same topics have been solved with deeper understanding by Indian thinkers. Henri Bergson comes in for a large share of criticism. The French savant "interprets the dynamic expression of Indian life as due to her contact with western civilisation. He believes that in India "mysticism in action is liberated through the influence of Christianity, and Dr. Sircar replies, "Indian spirituality shows infinite phases of life in its richness and fullness, and in them all the chords of life have their full satisfaction. The overemphasis has produced the erroneous idea that human mind is not alive to dynamic verities.

Psychic powers do never give redemption which only knowledge can. Self is the ultimate

cocept of the Upanishads. Upanishads present both dynamic expression as well as static silence. Bergson fails to see the dignity of silence. Freedom implies complete self-transcendence beyond the "bounds of space and stream of time." "The bondage comes because of our tendency to seek a cause"--due to the urges of the "unenlightened intellect."

They read the life's rationale in creation and creator. Such a God does not represent the Truth of the Upanishads. It is a "concession to human ignorance." Truth recognises no gradation of Reality. "A man returning from deep sleep does not return with the illusoriness of time, the man returning from the state (Turiya) does so return. All philosophers may not agree with Dr. Sircar in grouping Turiya as an Avastha. It is called an Avastha only by courtesy. The negation of the time-sense consciousness is a religious experience of the transcendental state of Samadhi. Philosophy is a critic of every experience, mystic or otherwise. An experience of the absence of timeless state cannot be grouped as an Avastha religion. But the report of the illusoriness of time which that state claims to bring must prove its credentials by explaining the world with which alone philosophy is concerned. Mystic experience is a fact in the universe of experience. Philosophy claims to investigate the truth behind all experience. Truth is Vastu Tantra. Any single reference cannot issue a copy-right of truth.

The Gita is the philosophy of the synthesis of thought. Its discipline is harmony. It is a book of philosophy and inspiration. It avoids extreme theories and blends them in harmony.

The Bhagavata Purana represents a fuller synthesis of knowledge, Yoga, devotion and

action. Its place is next to the Upanishads and Gita. It emphasises the concrete Divine the spiritual dynamism over spiritual calm. The expression of power is far below spirit's expression as love. The Bhagavata does not give a high place to aspirants who are anxious to "transcend history completely and pass into silence."

Dr. Sircar opens his chaper on Reality by weighing the relative claims of intuition in determining the nature of Reality. Intuition is the direct worship of truth. Dr. Sircar quotes Prof. Whitehead: "Intuition is a private psychological Habit and is without general evidential force." Intuition is a function of rare and exceptional movements." A long drawn battle is still being waged between those who contend that reason is the final court of appeal and those who stand for the varieties of intuition. Pure philosophy gives the palm to reason while the mytics "claim immediate awareness" in intuition and say that in philosophy "the evidential character of propositions must stop and point to their self-evidence and self-consistency." Dr. Sircar says that the criterions of Truth are self-sufficience which reason finds out, and self-awareness which intuition reveals." "Reason, of course, cannot formulate judgments in conformity with intuition, but the finest rational construction must ultimately be in harmony with intuition." Dr. Sircar appears to be divided in his allegiance to philosphy and mysticism. His philosophic outlook definitely makes him admire the claims of reason; but the deep fervour of mysticism in him makes the book very interesting to religious aspirants. He disqualifies philosophy to lay hands

to lay hands on the contents of the mystic experiences and says, "Philosophy is never committed to integrate all experiences." But in another place he makes amends for this statement by telling, "Philosophy builds up by observing and accepting the full facts of life." Indian philosophy takes takes into consideration, the ecstatic experience of Samadhi also. But beneath this apparent divided loyalties, one can clearly see the profile of the philosopher in spite of the luxuriant language he uses to placate the mystic's position. Dr. Sircar's intuition is evidently the Vedantic Reason--that which gives the final certainty to all experience by resolving all forces of contradiction in the centre of Buddhi. The intuition of common parlance should not be confused with the learned professor's use of the term. It is too dangerous to measure Truth with it. The intuition of common parlance is an impressionism whose roots are hidden in the logic of the sub-conscious or the unconscious, to use Bradley's term whose sudden jets through the layer of mind is mistaken as a visitation of Truth from the pure region of the soul. The earthly character of such intuitions gives various shapes to it, often one contradicting the other. Such intuitions must ever be judged by reason. But the intuition that springs from Buddhi can have no dual character. As a witness of all modes of consciousness it remains constant. As Dr. Sircar's outlook is essentially synthetic, he reconciles the divergent claims of mysticism and philosophy by claiming the former as a discipline and the latter as a way of life.

Dr. Circar's study of the Indian conception of the Beautiful is very well represented. No

student of aesthetics can read it without being better illumined on the topic. Beauty belongs to the dynamic expression of Spirit.

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SWAMI SIDDESWARANANDA'S VIEWS OF VEDANTA. (Talks D.P.B.)

$. The tests of Truth. The two view points: The first that of common every-day life. The second that of final, ultimate Truth. The different approaches to Truth, religion, mystic, yogic, philosophic, scientific. etc. The difference between universal, absolute Truth and invidi-dual, private opinion. The ultimate Truth is one; the ultimate Reality is also one, and both are identical. The Overself is the source of all.

$$ The relativity of dreamless slumber to the other two states. How ideas cease. Where all mental impressions are stored. Deep sleep the hidden cause of waking. The gap between two thoughts is nothing but deep sleep. No per-ceptions of ideas is possible without this mysterious, hidden background of deep sleep in the mind. Mind still exists in deep sleep, but not ideas.

$$$ When analysed every object resolves itself into a group of mental sensations or into a memory-idea. No object can be separated from the idea which we form of it. Impossibility of separating nerve transmission changes from the internal concious ideas. Hence unity of the mind which functions both through the brain that regards objects as outside, and also thro' the ideas of the objects themselves, thus bi-furcating itself.

#$ Intellectual knowledge always liable to contradict. Uncontrolled brain activity does not suffice because there is no limit to the pros and cons it can produce. Truth must be

that

that which is universally and eternally unchanging, incontrovertible and beyond the possibility of doubt.
#$$/. Knowledge possible only when the mind gives birth to two or more ideas, one of which will be constantly the "I" idea. Knowledge impossible where these two ideas are absent, as in deep sleep.

#/ From the standpoint of drawing a parallel between the waking and the dreaming process, we must necessarily look into dreamless sleep, because dreaming ultimately lapses into deep sleep. The view of regarding deep sleep as spiritual reality is wrong. It is only a symbol of non-duality. Were it really spiritual reality then the chloroformed patient in a hospital, or the hatha-yogi in unusual trance would be experiencing spiritual reality, but we know they do not. The truth is that deep sleep in only a part (the static half of reality). Dreaming and waking (name and form) constitute the other half of reality. What exists in the names and forms of the waking and dream states? Answer: Just as it was only a rope which existed in the form of a coiled snake, so it is only Mind which exists in these forms. This is the consideration from the standpoint of the witness-self. When, however, Mind is considered as being without ideation, by creation of names and forms, or, if names and forms are considered as being only Mind, we do not advance further than a state of non-duality, that is, of the non-possibility of comparison with something else.
$$ Is there a fourth state? Only in terms of the other three. For it is only conventionally called the fourth, which makes it relative to the three. To the Sage there is only the Absolute Unity, one state, but the numbering is necessary to help beginners and to satisfy the intellect.
$$ Atman is isolated derivation, noncausal, the basis of individual consciousness, never of Universal Consciousness. Atman is the witness and can never be an object of perception, even as an idea.

¶ V.S.I's Pamphlet on AVASTATRAYA contains the essence of Gaudapada's teaching that both dream and waking experiences are no more than ideas.

¶ Analyze trance, anaesthesia and swoon to enable reader to grasp that there IS a state where ideas cease, just as waves are resolved back into the ocean. This state is the lumber room which stores and preserves all mental impressions, all forms. From the waking standpoint, deep sleep is the cause of the world, but it is not the cause of anything when regarded as a state by itself. From this non-causal standpoint there is a state where there is no duality

Note that it is impossible to think of dreaming and waking (both of which are similar, according to the parallel traced between them), without taking deep sleep into comparison, for the existence of deep sleep makes the existence of the waking and dream states possible.

At every moment when an idea comes man's awareness is in the waking state. When ideas stop his awareness in in deep sleep; therefore <u>the waking state is no-thing but a chain of ideas.</u> Therefore between two ideas there must be a time interval of deep sleep. This means that even in the waking, everyday state of man, deep sleep exists, however hidden, for without it there would be no possible perception of ideas.

Hence the dynamic can exist only within the static. The fact that ideas sprout up in man's mind indicate that there are moments when they do not, so the waking state of ideation becomes possible only because deep sleep exists. Ideas come from mind. MIND WITHOUT IDEAS IS DEEP SLEEP. Individual ideas dissolve back into the stuff of which they are made, so really both are the same. Truth is non-dual, hence deep sleep and waking are continuous, one and the same.

This explains the state of the Sage who has achieved the fourth, or highest consciousness, and dwells perpetually in Sahaja Samadhi, that is, conscious sleep, for when you <u>know</u>, the mind is one and the same, waking or sleeping. Consciously we must know the non-duality of everything. This does not mean falling into

falling into a state of psychological slumber, hence the attainment of the Sage demonstrates a tremendous vigilance over the mind. Unity is not a mental process of totalizing reality, but a supreme unrelaxed mental effort.

$$ What is mind? What is the nature of an idea? Analyse them psychologically: (p.116 Mandukya.) An object which is equal to an idea, standing between two points in time, will inevitably vanish or become another by changing. Hence its form is a temporary, changing and vanishing illusion. Mind which is nothing but the totality of changing ideas is ultimately an illusion, but Mind in its reall essence is THAT into which ideas sink, is Brahman. Ref; Drg Drsya Viveka.

$$ TRUTH AND ERROR OF THE WESTERN IDEALIST PHILOSOPHERS.

Indicate briefly to readers the doctrines of Hume, Berkeley and Locke, so as to show that the search for Reality and Truth is the same everywhere. Berkeley is correct only when the waking state standpoint is not considered. But if you yourself are the Universal Self the objective Universe can only be YOUR own mental creation. But because neither Berkeley nor any other western philosopher has ever taken the standpoint of the complete three states, none of them can fully prove his position. Adequate proof demands avastatraya. Berkeley is incorrect from the waking standpoint but quite correct from the three states standpoint. However, he runs into solipsism, which is irrefutable. Berkeley is correct from the solipsistic viewpoint, that is, of every individual for himself, but he is not correct for teaching others. For teaching, correct viewpoint would be the objects exist as manifestation of Cosmic Mind, which has the power of projecting its ideas and objects. Objects are Cosmic Mind, as for example in dreams.

$$ Objects do exist but only in relation to a subject, -thus the idea of the cup and the cup itself. When you have an idea of a cup, then there is not only the idea existing in your mind, but there must also be a cup or you could not have formed an idea of it. However, this is not to say that the cup is what it appears to be. It also is an idea but not your individual idea. It is an idea in the Cosmic Mind. Hence the entire objective universe exists as a manifestation of Cosmic Mind.

Swami Siddheswarananda Contd.

$$ Berkeley is correct up to, but excluding, his theism. The difference between the esoteric viewpoint and Berkeley's is: Berkeley denies the object but retains the idea. The esoteric doctrine accepts object and idea, but converts them into Mind. Both are only one Mind. This acceptance of the object is, of course, made only from the waking standpoint. It does not say that the object is material, but simply that it is Mind. "I"-thoughts and objects are all Mind.

$$ Reality for the ordinary man is the capacity for an object to reportitself through the sense-organs, but ideas have the power to do the same, as in the example of the snake and the rope. The material world is simply that which preaent itself externally to the sense organs.

$$ Show illusory nature of all ideas as when the mind in delirium of fever creates visions of animal horrors. On recovery these are seen to be illusory. Show the dream value of all dreams as mental pictures and imaginings; then show their private character and lack of universality. Show that the idea is ultimately rooted in the Real. Each name and form when traced to its root, still has the basic Brahman-reality underneath. Ref. Vivekananda's Gnana-yoga. Ideas of objects (which are externalised ideas, that is, external to our heads only) are ultimately in essence the glorious Overself, for after all each inch of the snake was still a real rope. If event and place in my dream was only my mind, the idea can only become the real, by merging away its name and form.

$$ Truth can have many faces, but Reality can only be One.

$$ Causation forms an integral part of time, arising and disappearing together with time. From the truth standpoint there is no creation in reality. Ref: Panchadasi.

Creation and evolution exist only from the waking position, but as this is only part of truth, it is not a fully correct view because

all the three states must be taken into account.
$$ PURPOSE OF YOGA is to enable one consciously to induce sleep, dreamless sleep wherein all mental activity stops. Only a few can get this state, so difficult is it to attain. The Adept-Yogi watches for that point where the mental waves swing back into the ocean of Universal Mind. Even for him, when his trance breaks, the wolrd is precipitated once again into his consciousness.
$$ Solipsism says: Everything is only my Idea. That is an irrefutable objection. How can we get an idea of an idea? Only by considering three-dimensional objects; but this implies that the latter exist. Yet when we inquire into what these objects are, we discover that they also are ideas, hence both objects and ideas are Mind. Then what is the difference? From the standpoint of mind there is none. From the standpoint of human ignorance alone does this exist. The difference disappears completely when the witness attitude is adopted. Who tells us that the world is an Idea? He is correct when one steps out of waking into the Witness state, but not when one limits oneself to waking experience.

A thing is mental only because non-mental things exist, but this is not true from the ordinary waking standpoint. F. Collyn Simon follows Berkeley in saying that an object is a group of sensations--mental things. But how does he know? Only by comparison with non-mental things. Therefore his teaching is in danger of being solipsistic.

$$ Knowledge is possible only when the mind gives birth to two or more ideas, one of which must be the 'I' idea. Knowledge is impossible where these two ideas are absent, as in deep sleep.

$$ There are different approaches to Truth:-- religions, mystic, yogic, philosophic, scientific, artistic etc.

$$ The mind splits itself into the brain, which thinks that objects are outside, and into the ideas of those objects. There are no two sepa-

rate mediums but only one Mind which bifurcates itself into the brain that thinks objects are outside, and into Ideas of those objects. Strictly speaking, the individual and the world are not separate and all is non-dual. The object and the idea which we form of it are identical. When this is demonstrated it breaks the chain of causation, and shows there is no cause. To prove a causal link there must be two ideas, but when both are shown to be one and the same, there is no causal relation. Ref. (a) Brihad. Upanisad; commentary by Sankara, p.16 to 25. (b) Yoga Vasista, (c) Mass hypnotism, Indian rope trick, hypnotic shows, demonstrating that idea can really appear as object to the senses.

$$ Application of Einstein's Principle of Relativity to man's method of gaining knowledge and to his states of Consciousness. An epoch-making significance of Einstein's discoveries. Partial and relative Truth cannot finally satisfy the enquiring mind of Man. $ The value of doubt to clear the ground of the weeds of false belief and unfaced intellectual problems. Difficulties in arriving at truth because the brain functions endlessly and produces every kind of opinion. $ Intellectual knowledge always liable to contradict. Uncontrolled brain activity does not suffice because there is no limit to the pros and cons it can produce.# Truth is that which cannot be controverted or contradicted, which is universally and eternally unchanging and beyond the possibility of doubt.

(continued from bottom of page 206)

Now your present book should bridge the gulf between mysticism and Vedanta to a point where the Witness is given greater importance than the Witnessed.

The European situation is puzzling. Passion seems to rule and I do not know when the intelligence of man will operate and make him feel he is Man.

SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA'S CRITIQUE OF "THE SECRET PATH."

by P.B.

But in his chapter on "The Awakening of Intuition" he is not able to rise up to the method of enquiry he had planned when he set out to experiment. The method of Atma Vichara is primarily metaphysical and not barely psychological. Mr. Brunton speaks of the yielding up of "all thoughts to intuitive feeling." But intuitive is as much an object of perception as the many others which he has noticed and discarded as unreal in taking an inventory of the human personality. So to arrive at true understanding, which is Jnanam, a real investigation of even the contents of the Anandamaya-kosha, which is the basis of Brunton's intuitive feeling, has to be mercilessly carried out. And in that final understanding which is to be arrived at by the method of negation--Neti Neti, -- all that has been discarded as fugitive and unreal, takes on transcendental values and appears in their true nature as Brahman. Then feeling, feeler and the felt are all understood as one indivisible entity with no variation in their values. It is on this strand alone one can understand and realize the significance of the verb "to be."

Copy of letter from Swami Siddheswarananda:

In this book you must examine and develop the different aspects of truth from the lay man's point of view. Just give some indications for there must be a gradual development of the presentation you give your readers. You know that you have a vast number of readers and you must not all of a sudden pitch a different key to them. You have the responsibility towards the population of earnest truth seekers, and you must find their Adhikari-level. From seeker-mysticism of your earlier books you came and became the mystic of "The Secret Path" and developed the idea in greater detail in the "Quest of the Overself."

(contidued at the bottom of previous page)

1. It placed them in relation to the whole scheme of things. It joined up such historical facts as they knew into a whole. It explained their patriotic feelings, cleared up their conceptions of international relationships, and reationalized their political and social activities. It was something for which they had been ripe, and were waiting.

2. The first harvest of biological knowledge was well-nigh forgotten. shrank to neglected manuscripts in the libraries of the acquisitive illiterate, and

3. The great age of Greece was an exceptional release of intellectual courage in the ancient world. Man has always been, and still is, disposed, perhaps instinctively, to suppression and panic at plain statement; it is the hardest task of the educationist to train him to look facts in the face. He is curious by nature--yes, but he is meanly and furtively curious. He does not like to be caught looking or suspected of thinking.

4. The resistances to knowledge are not merely passive. It is not only that most human beings are indisposed to know and learn; they are afraid of and hostile to all that they do not know and they seek to prevent it in others. The human mind is much more tortuous and indirect than it will consciously admit; it often fails to understand its own motives. Since the great revival of scientific work in the 16th century there has been a steady undercurrent of depreciation and antagonism which rises very easily to active obstruction and suppression. The self-love of the ignorant has demanded that the man of science, in play and story, should be caricatured, ridiculed, and misrepresented. From Laputa

to the Pickwick Club, British literature, for example, spits and jeers at its greater sister, and to devote a life to science and the service of truth is still to renounce most of the common glories and satisfactions of life for a hard and exalted mistress. But while the pomps and glories of every other sort of human activity fade and pass, the growth of science is a continuing and immortal thing.

5. Antagonism to biological knowledge is by no means dead. There is a constant struggle to keep physiological or pathological information from people who might put it into beneficial practice, and to prevent the complete discussion of such questions, for example, as the possible control of the pressure of population upon the reserves of the community. There is little or no reasoned justification for these suppressions. In some of the more backward regions of the United States, moreover there is a formidable campaign for the penalization of any biological teaching that may seem to run counter to the literal interpretation of the Bible.

6. Now, until a century or so ago it was commonly believed that the world as we know it to-day had begun suddenly. It had been created, with man and all the species of beings as we know them to-day. Great numbers of people, including most educated people, held to the view with great tenacity. They had adjusted their moral and religious ideas to that view, and they did not realize that these ideas were not inseparably dependent upon it. All of us are prone to resist changes in our fundamental ideas. We feel instinctively that it may mean a disturbance of our

way of living and the abondonment and change of objectives; it is a threat to our peace of mind and our satisfaction with our lives. The idea of the earth's going round the sun was considered to be just as impious in its time of novelty as was the idea of Evolution by the Fundamentalist of the backward States to-day.

Then steadily and more and more abundantly came evidence to show that the existing forms of life were not all the forms of life, and that there had been a great variety of animals and plants which had passed away, a greater variety and multitude indeed than that which still exists. The science of geology became a new region of intellectual activity, and in the study of the earth's crust the traces of a past infinitely longer than men had hitherto suspected were unfolded. Varied and wonderful as was the present spectacle of life, the series of faunas and floras that has preceded it and passed away was found to be more wonderful. Life had a past, anstupendous past. So far from it being a thing of yesterday, the creation of a few thousands years ago, it had a history of enormous variety and infinite fascination. We can still imagine something of the excitement of our grandfathers when the fantastic and marvellous dinosaurs, the vegetation of the coal measures, the flying dragons of the Mesozoic Period were revealed to them. Continually now that once incredible catalogue is expanded. Every year the palaeontologist, the seeker and student of fossils, adds fresh details to this history of living forms.

7. These ancient forms were not so strange and incredible as they seemed. Life had produced them on its way to its present state.

Generation by generation it had changed from the wonder it was to the wonder it is. There had been no Creation since the beginning of life. Life had unfolded--or, to latinize it unfold, it had been "evolved"--from some remote and very simple beginning.

8. We are making no suggestion as yet as to how it has been brought about. We are simply declaring that life has come to its present variety through the modification year by year, and age by age, of simpler and less various ancestral species. In making this declaration we are denying a belief formerly very prevalent, the belief that animal species, as they are now, came into being suddenly, through some abrupt act of Creation. That belief has now become impossible in the face of an assemblage of countless known and established facts.

9. We are not attempting any account here of why species have changed. We will write later of the various theories by which an explanation of this central fact is attempted. We are not discussing here the Theory of Natural selection, or the theory of creative Evolution or any theory at all of how Evolution has been carried on. First the facts and then these more stormy issues may be faced. Here we traverse ground upon which scientific men of every creed and school are now agreed.

We make this distinction between fact and theory here an, so to speak, underline it, because we know there is still a considerable confusion in the public mind between the facts of evolution and the conflicting theories about how it works. Dishonest creationists, narrow fanatics, and muddle-headed people attempt to confuse the very wide diversity of opinion among scientific men upon the questions

of how and why their assertion of established fact. Through this confusion it is suggested that the hated fact is still unproven. It is, on the contrary, proven up to the hilt, and here we shall unfold as much of the evidence as is necessary for conviction.

10. Man is an inhabitant of a thin rind on a negligible detached blob of matter belonging to one among millions of stars in one among millions of island universes.

And his insignificance in time is as overwhelming as his insignificance in space. The time of the universe is almost all spent in what to us seem wholly meaningless activities. Stars shrink and dissolve into radiation. The matter of which they are composed is engaged in an atomic and electronic dance, frenzied beyond belief, but persistent through periods which make even the whole past of terrestrial life quite negligible. Man is so far from being central or essential that the tale which the rest of the cosmos has to tell seems meaningless in the light of all his ideas and aspirations. If he is to find justification for these ideas and aspirations, he can no longer seek it in the outer universe, but must look within himself. Human dignity rests upon nothing but itself, and man's activities must have value in themselves and for their own sake if they are to have value at all. That is the outcome of modern astronomy's impact upon the complacency of ordinary thought.

11. If there is one obvious lesson of evolutionary biology, it is that life is inseparably interwoven with its surroundings, changes responsively with them, and is, indeed, meaningless thought of apart from its environment.

12. When we take a number of examples of what common-sense would call high animals and a number of what common-sense would call low animals, and reflect on the differences between them, we see that there is a real criterion of high as against low, of progress against standing still or degeneration. In a word, the higher creature has more control over the environment, and is more independent of it; it is in touch, through its sense-organs and brain, with more of the world about it--the world for it is larger and more varied; and so far as we can judge from analogy with our own minds, its mental capacities of knowing and feeling, learning and foreseeing, are greater.

13. Without an efficient intelligence service of sense-organs most of the environment is a closed book; one has only to think in what a monotonous and tiny black box of a world a creature like an amoeba or Hydra is imprisoned ---without either eyes or ears to give any knowledge of events at a distance, its whole experience apparently consisting of touches and tastes.

14. Man happens to be the highest animal at the present time, and is evidenced, among other things, by the extent of the control he is exerting over the fellow-inhabitants of his world.

15. The slipper animalcule swims about, seeks and consumes its prey, and avoids hostile influences. To us it is almost incredible that so small an equipment should suffice.

16. Can we imagine so limited a creature as having a conscious mind? Let us assume so for a moment, and see what kind of mind it must be if it exists at all. The first important difference between its experience and ours is that

it has no special sensory apparatus, such as the eye or the ear, for determining the direction from which such agencies such as light arrive, nor for determining their relation to each other in space. It knows nothing but its own body, and the things that touch its body. Neither has it, as far as we can judge much power of discriminating between different kinds of influence; it gives one reaction only, the avoiding reaction, to such diverse conditions as a hard obstacle, too-acid water, too-alkaline water, salt water, hot water, chilly water, and so forth. Presumably it experiences but one kind of sensation for all these things, since it gives but a single response. So that we can read into the mind of our paramecium no variety of qualities, colours and tones; no images, no sense of near and far; at most, nothing more than monotony of faint pleasure and displeasure.

17. The world of a slipper animalcule does not consist of a number of objects as it does for us, each object, like a tree or a dog, possessing a number of properties, some concerned with shape, others with hardness and heaviness, others with temperature or smell or taste or colour. There are no <u>things</u> in its experience, only separate stimuli; it apparently has no capacity for perceiving two kinds of stimuli joined up into one compound experience, for thinking them together, as we do when we think of the yellowness and roundness of an orange. There is no space in its experience, no right nor left; it has no capacity for telling where anything is in relation to anything else; nor can anything in its experiences can have a shape--all the stimuli that beat upon it are as formless as smells are to us. And there is no time in its experience; it lives only in the narrow

boundary between the past, and the future. Once an experience is past, it is blotted out for ever; past and future have no meaning and, indeed, no existence for parameium. Most of the lower animals live their dim and windowless existence in a world of this limited kind. Let us think of one or two. Even for such a complicated creature as a snail, for instance, the sun does not exist; there are only degrees of light and warmth. And it cannot see things. It only becomes visually aware of objects when they are between it and the light; and then they are merely shadows or more or less intensity. The world of crustacca begins to acquire more of a framework and a greater richness within the framework. A crab scuttling over the shore at low tide can see on which side of him you are approaching; and objects begin to exist for him, because he can distinguish something of sizes and of flat shapes if not of solidity. But, all the same, the shapes are wretchedly blurred and dim; he sees men as trees, walking; his visual world is little but a world of dark dangers of different extent, between which he can draw no further distinctions.

To such creatures as hermit-crabs, objects with solid shapes begin to exist. This is more or less of a necessity for them with their shell-inhabiting propensities; and experiment has shown that they can distinguish spheres from cubes and flat from pointed cones.

With the perfection of the eye as an image-forming camera instead of a mere light-perceiving organ, and with brains capable of linking up impressions from other senses like touch or smell with those from sight,

the world of evolving life grows rapidly richer; it comes to have some resemblance to the world we know, by consisting of solid objects in space. When a bee is flying to and from its hive, across our garden, it sees the same objects as we do. It may not know that this is a chair or that a tree; but at least it sees them and distinguishes them. Even so, the world of such a creature may differ from ours in many ways. It may, for instance, be a world of black and white since the animal has no colour-sense; and most insects are deaf, so their world is soundless.

There are other frameworks in our human world besides that of space; there is the framework of time and the framework of cause and effect. These evolve long after that of space. The story of the evolution of mammalian intelligence, which we shall give in a later section, is in large part a story of life making groping experiments in the direction of these new frameworks. A dog is just beginning to put two and two together; but his powers in that direction bear about the same relation to our human capacity for digging out causes and drawing deductions as the power of a crab's eye to distinguish the shape and pattern of things does to a dragonfly's or a bird's. So with time; the non-human animal does not have its life fitted to a framework of time. The past may be alive in the present for it; but so far as we know, the past does not exist in its own right, as it does for us, as something to which we can have access when we wish. The length of time for which an animal can hold an image in its head is very short; the image speadily gets

crowded out by the insistent throng of new sense-impressions.

18. With man and man's greatest invention, language, the world once more becomes richer: it becomes an orderly whole with at least the possibility of having all its aspects related one to the other.

Cell-colonies acquire a purely physical unity; they are marked off in space; cell-colonies then become many-celled animals, and the nervous system confers on them a unity of behaviour--they act as wholes; the human cerebral cortex provides men with an inner unity of experience--their world of thought becomes a single whole. Looked at from a slightly different angle, we see the aggregates of cells we call higher animals acquiring a physical unity quite early in their evolution; but only at the very end, in man, do they come to possess an individuality of the inner conscious life. Before, any inner life there may have existed has been a mere aggregate of shreds and incidents of consciousness; now it becomes organized--a personality.

There are thus three main kinds of worlds, in which animals live. There are spaceless, timeless worlds consisting of mere stimuli. There are worlds consisting of stimuli put together to make objects, things with shapes and sizes. And there are world of space and time, of objects held together in bonds of cause and effect to make orderly constructions.

19. Perhaps the most interesting of all the many interesting things that wait to be done in biology would be to take a group of clever chimpanzees and see what could be accomplished by fifty generations of selective breeding for

intelligence. They are so near the critical point at which language and abstract thought begin; could one help them across it?

This loss of contact with reality is the most constant symptom of insanity. In mania and melancholia it is the emotional tone which is out of contact with reality. In this woman, reality is simply shut out from making any contribution to mental life and growth; the particular way in which it is here shut out is by the sufferer turning inwards, as it were, and living a dream. This turning inwards into self and away from outer reality is the essential feature in a great number of kinds of insanity which are now generally grouped together under the title of schizophrenia, or mind-splitting--the splitting being not, however, that which we have discussed as dissociation, but a more radical divorce between inner and outer self and reality, wish and experience. And the most common of such disorders is that which is called dementia proecox, precocious loss of mind, in which the symptoms usually begin to appear about the time of puberty. The disorder generally first manifests itself in moodiness and depression, reluctance to work, over-preoccupation with self, long fits of day-dreaming now and then broken by emotional outbursts. Gradually the sufferers grow less and less interested in the world about them, sit idle and refuse to work, and develop delusions, fixed ideas, or queer actions. Like manic-depressive insanity, dementia proecox is psychologically incurable once it is fully established. Once committed to an asylum, patients continue their progress towards imprisonment in self. The delusions, the dreams, and the actions, abraded,

as it were, by constant repetition and not fed by new experience from without, tend to become more stereotyped and often degenerate into mere symbols, or hints of their former selves; until finally a large proportion of the patients sink into an apparent stupour-- "those cold lifeless ruins" as Kretschmer calls them, "who glimmer dimly in the corners of asylums dull-witted as cows." Mind can degenerate through disuse even more radically than muscles or tendons. But even in these unfortunates there seems always to be a nucleus of inner life, atrophied by disuse, but still revolving round a trace of some self-centred idea.

We can follow a series of stages in this downward and inward progress. Over there is one of Kretschmer's "cow-like" cases-- for ever silent and apathetic.

21. Sometimes inwardly-directed thoughts become focused, not on a personal desire or simple wish, but on some more impersonal construction of the mind. This happens when the man has an intellectual bent; and the result is the crop of "men of one idea" who believe that their idea is to save or revolutionize the world. When they and their ideas happen to be in harmony with reality and to fit in with accidental circumstances they become the great prophets, reformers, and creators of history. When their notions are less in touch with reality and the spirit of the times, we call them faddists, cranks, unpractical fanatics; they found sects, develop new theories of the universe without worrying too much about facts or verifications, preach at street-corners, or promulgate vew "isms". If their ideas are too flagrantly unreal, we say they are insane and

and shut them up.. Don Quixote is the immortal embodiment of a borderland case of this type; and every asylum contains his like, though each will be focused on his peculiar craziness.

22. The contrast and the relations between the world of feeling within, the subjective world, and the world of exterior reality, the objective world, can no longer be disregarded. They must now be discussed.

They have to be discussed, they have to be stated, but let us say clearly they cannot be explained. This duality of all our individual universes, this contrast of objective and subjective, is an inexplicable duality. So perhaps it will always remain. It is a fundamental condition of life as we experience it. It is possible that a day will come when all the processes which go on in the brain when we think or fall in love, will be described fully in the physiological terms--of matter and energy. The explanation may be complete in its own sphere--but the experience of thinking, or of being in love, will not even have been described, let alone explained. That applies with equal force to simple sensation. When we have sensation of redness light of a particular wave-length is stimulating a certain kind of cell in our retina, and there it sets going nerve-impulses to certain centres in our brains. But no amount of knowledge of wave-lengths and retina cells and nerve centres will make a blind man understand the unique quality of redness as opposed to greenness or blueness. We can describe and explain the machinery underlying sensation, but not the sensation

itself. Material processes cannot explain consciousness any more than consciousness can explain material processes; they are different qualities of being.

We can, in general terms at least, explain the physical mechanism of brain; we cannot how its working makes us feel and know--or indeed, why we feel and know at all. There we come to a riddle that smiles away any completeness from a purely physiological, mechanical account of life.

23. Men still differ profoundly upon the quesion whether this dualism is, so to speak, a dualism on equal terms, or whether consciousness is dependent upon objective reality, as the picture in a mirror is dependent upon the things that pass before that mirror. Is consciousness merely a reflection in a mirror, or is it associated with other kindred powers or qualities so that it can be not only affected by objective things, but active and able to react upon them?

24. Let us consider first what we know about consciousness at the present time. Let us ask how far it extends in the world about it?

25. We know by direct knowledge of no consciousness but our own. We know that individually we think and feel. Or rather, I know. But that people about me feel, I assume and infer. I have no direct knowledge of that. We infer that other people feel from their behaviour--from the movements of their facial muscles that give smiles or frowns; from their actions that imply a conscious purpose; from the words they use, which we interpret through long familiarity so wholly in terms of meaning that we are apt to forget they are only symbols, themselves mere air-vibrations

of peculiar and arbitrary form. But no sane person hesitates to infer that all normal human beings are as capable of conscious thought and feeling as he himself.

25. In each one of us we are now free to recognise there has been an unbroken development from fertilized egg to adult conscious human being. Yet no one will maintain that the ovum or the early embryo can be conscious in the same way that the man is conscious. None the less, it is impossible to draw any sharp line in development and to say, "Here consciousness enters the embryo or the infant." There is an imperceptible sliding into conscious life.

26. This is not the common way of looking at these things. For many centuries a very emphatic dualism has ruled human thought and impressed itself upon language. We still talk of body, soul and spirit; we put physical and psychic into antagonism and treat them habitually as systems of reality separable not merely in thought, but in fact. But from these time-honoured established ideas modern biology is steadily breaking away and moving towards this newer conception of a single universal world-stuff.

27. It is difficult to the point of impossibility to say where psychology ends and where physiology begins. What is the subject of psychology? Consciousness; the thing that knows and feels.

28. The mind I possess, and into which I look, and which is, I gather from information and observation, not profoundly dissimilar to the minds of other people, presents itself to me as an active process of which strangely enough, I can recall no

beginning; an active process which undergoes intermissions of which I am only subsequently aware, such as sleep, insensibility, and forgetfulness. By noting the development and action of other minds, I conclude that my mind is the outcome of a process of synthesis, elaboration and, at last, remembrance, giving continuity to the transitory feelings and responses of myself as a baby, and that at the end of all its activities and intermissions comes a final intermission that, for all I know, may lengthen out into and endless cessation, death. That for other people may may be the end of my mind, but manifestly my mind can never know of my final cessation. My mind thus viewed by itself is a very paradoxical thing indeed, without either a definite beginning or any end that I shall ever perceive and yet with an effect of continuing process.
29. In no science perhaps is terminology so metaphorical and inexact as in this field of of psychology. Consciousness as consciousness seems to be nonspatial andthe Unconscious is of the same nature, yet, for want of anything better, we are continually driven to use spatial metaphors in talking about its acitities and to speak of "parts of the mind," to distinguish between "superficial" and "deep" mental processes and the like. So long as the loosely metaphorical quality of such statements is remembred, we may not be greatly misled by the.
30. Occurrences such as automatic writing, which play so large a part in psychical research, appear to be only phenomena of the split mind.
31. There is no ground for believing that automatic writing is the work of extraneous

"spirits"; the recesses of the mind have a sufficient population of partial personalities to account for all the automatic scripts that have been published.

32. A well-tried rule in science, as in practical affairs, is what was known to scholastic philosophy as William of Occam's razor, which being translated into modern terms, lays down that unnecessary causes should be avoided; if you can explain your facts with the aid of well-tried principles, do not drag in new ones.

33. This rule is very much to the point as regards mediums and their "controls". All the facts, remarkable as they are, can be explained perfectly well as being due to the activity of secondary systems in the medium's own mind--repressed ideas, split-off personalities of varying degrees of completeness, deep layers of the Unconscious.

33. In the former ages dreams were considered to be of the utmost significance in life and simple people have always believed them to have a prophetic and warning quality. But the disposition of psychology up to the time of Freud was to belittle their importance. To him and his associates we owe our modern realization of their great symptomatic value. Essentially a dream is the appearance between sleeping and waking of an uncriticized and uncontrolled flood of associations. Repressed complexes get an opportunity in these unwary phases for more or less complete expression before the normal self is fully reconstituted and alert. They reveal themselves, albeit often disguised, distorted, and symbolized, to the trained observer.

34. When inner longings come into conflict with

reality, and the impulses from which the longings spring can find no other outlet, it is the unsatisfied desire which is repressed or split off.

35. Such a delusion is an example of what is called projection. The repressed complex, felt as something alien which the sufferer would like to get rid off is projected outside, as it were, and attached to some quite innocent scapegoat in the externalworld. Here again, we find all gradations from insanity to everyday behaviour.

36. The most striking characteristic of lunatics, after their loss of contact with reality, is their lack of logic. They lady who calls herself "Rule Britannia" is still a good scrubber of floors; and she does not let herself belief in her regal state interfere in the least with a perfectly cheerful and thorough performance of her daily task of cleaning the ward. The two sets of ideas concerned with royalty and with floor-scrubbing might seem to be incompatible. So they would be if they met; but they do not meet. They are-prevented from meeting by the machinery of dissociation and repression. Dissociation does its best to keep them in separate compartments and make it hard for them to achieve contact; should they begin to do so, repression steps in, forces criticism into the Unconscious, and substitutes absurd "reasons" for Reason. The mind thus becomes divided into what have been aptly called "logic-tight compartments" in which different systems of ideas can develop in splendid isolation. Sheltered behind such barriers, the lamb of a delusion can grow and flourish safe from the wolfish logic that would otherwise devour it.

Repression and dissociation are not simply

phenomena. Their morbid manifestations are exceptional; normally they are adaptive and useful. They are the protective part of the mind's machinery, for defending itself from disruption when confronted with two opposing impulses or two incompatible sets of ideas. The world is so complicated, conduct so difficult and yet the need of firm belief and speedy action so vital, that it would be impossible to work out every problem of thought and morals on its rational merits. If we did try to do so, our minds would either disintegrate, or we should be immobilized like the ass in the fable, between the two exactly equal bundles of hay.

The arrangements by which the mind conserves its unity and its force in the midst of a chaos of warring facts and ideas are, we may recapitulate, of several kinds. There is first, the capacity, for belief by suggestion, submission to authority, unquestioning loyalty, and obedience. This disposition, most evident in the earlier half of life, must have done much to facilitate gregarious tribal existence in the opening stages of human society. Next, there are the faculties of repression, and dissociation, which parcel out the mind into compartments. Some repressing or inhibiting force is always needed to maintain dissociation, so that the two agencies generally act in conjunction. Sometimes the split is complete, the compartments become quite impervious to each other's ideas and impulses. More often, however, there is a certain leakage of ideas from one compartment to another. When this is so, another faculty of the mind comes into play--distortion. Repressed ideas which cannot be altogether repressed

are distorted and disguised so that they can gain expression and enter consciousness without a disabling conflict.

37. Certain things are always bad--long-continued and ardent repression, extreme dissociation that turns the mind into a set of separate compartments, persistent self-justification by inventing "reasons" that undermine the sanity of the general outlook, persistent flight into the interior world of dream or whish or memory. And it can be further laid down that a solution of a conflict which is brought about with the aid of consciousness and reason is almost invariably more satisfactory than one accomplished with the aid of unconscious processes alone.

38. The most obvious of differences among human beings are differences in intelligence. Choose a thousand children at random; there will be a few who are brilliant, avid of knowledge, a few who are slow of comprehension that, however well taught, they always plod on far behind the average children of their own age; there will be a number of distinctly able but not brilliant children, and a number who are distinctly stupid though not deficient; and the janority will be just ordinary in their capacities. Of late years, methods have been devised for measuring intelligence.

39. The extrovert is able to keep conflicting ideas apart--to use a popular phrase, in "water-tight compartments"--and thus to assimilate cheerfully and with equanimity the most divergent experiences. In the introvert, on the other hand, the mind is more unified; its different parts cannot be kept apart, but are continually infringing on each other; and much of his mental life is occupies by their attempt to fit themselves together into logical, harmonious schemes.

The more discordant elements are fiercely repressed and may become troublesome complexes, while in the extrovert they are simply walled off from the rest of the mind.

40. There is the abstract thinker, exemplified most clearly by the pure mathematician, who has apparently left the solid ground of sense-images and words and floats among abstractions. What is strongly developed in him is the capacity for perceiving the relations between things and ideas;he moves among problems in higher algebra as securely as the visualizer among remembered scenes. The same word is to one man a picture, to another a sound-image, to a third a cog in a logical chain; small wonder that human beings find difficulties in the way of complete mutual understanding.

41. With the introduction of the subjective element into our account of vital phenomena we have departed from that atmosphere of clear cold statement, proof, and certainty we were able to maintain so long as our method was still wholly objective.

42. We have already said something of the essential paradox in things. We have pointed out how comparatively easy it is for us to regard the whole world, including our fellow-creatures, as a system entirely mechanical and determinate, until we come to ourselves. But within ourselves we find it is at least equally true that we choose, that we will to do this and refuse to do that; that we are not fated, but free. Your sense of your own freedom is as primary as your sense of my complete subjection to controlling causes. You may deny this practically, but your every act will assert it. For all practical ends your liberty and your sense of your

personal responsibility for what you do are ineradicable.
43."Where precisely in this seething mass of mental activity does the self begin and end?" Or, "Am I all my mind or only some of my mind raiding about amidst the rest of itself?" At times it has been almost as if we described the coming and going, the conflicts, overlappings, and replacements of clouds in the sky.
44. The leading psycho-analysts have evidently been haunted by the same dissatisfaction as the reader. They have made, and they are still making, attempts to mark off the regions or activities of the mental stir with a clearer definition. We have already noted Freud's distinction of the Ego, the Id, and the Super-ego.
45. As the starting-point of the self-conscious life of a man or a higher mannal, he explains, is the realization of the 'I' the 'Ego'--the realization of oneself as pitted against the universe. To the very shallow and unthinking this ego is all that one is, but, as we now realise, a great undefined field of mental activity goes on in everyone, outside the conscious ego, and nearly everyone discovers sooner or later divisions of motive which are in a sort of struggle for the control of the ego.
46. On this sea of general unconsciousness preconception and sustained by it, floats our individual ego, with the persona it has gathered for itself in the full light of consciousness and its anima hidden below the surface. By such a figure--and again we remind ourselves and our readers that all this field of science is still at the metaphorical stage--we may convey this conception of the "collective Unconsciousness" which all of us have practically in common.
47. It becomes manifest under such a scrutiny

that, in the inner world, just as in the outer, the individuality comes and goes, that it changes, is now more and now less, now fainter and now intenser, that it assimilates and again rejects. We untrained people assert and believe so firmly in our complete unity and our unbroken identity because, when our identity weakens or changes or dissolves, we are by that very fact no longer there to observe and deny.

48. One of the most important and one of the most neglected aspects of self-knowledge is a measure of the quality and extent of our moods. The stupid man thinks he is the same man always; children and immature minds cling to the same delusion. The trained observer of mental states knows that he plays the theme of his individuality with many variations; it may even be a fague with interlacing themes. Many people, the majority of people perhaps, still go through life without realizing how their minds are coloured and diverted by, for instance, physiological states.

49. Steadfastness is a strain and should be realized as a strain. Repressions accumulate below any line of conduct continually followed. Life is change; when change ceases life ceases, and many of these close and important relationships tend to become habitual in their manifestations and lose their stimulating quality. In spite of their great intrinsic value to us they cease to interest; they begin to bore and the anima gathers vigour. One of the commonest experiences in the lives of saints is the discovery that all the opening ecstasies of faith have faded, that the wonderful life of holiness has lost its light, that God has hidden himself away. Lovers can have the same

dismaying experience. They the way is open to irrelevant impulses and many soerts of self - contradiction.

50. Psycho-analysis shows him that, all unawares, his ego has been perpetually imposing interpretations upon the intimations of fact that come to him.

51. He is not entitled to all that privacy. It was a narrow and cunning idea of existence. He belongs, he now apprehends, to something greater than himself, something that modern science is gradually enabling him to realise. He is a part. He is not a cut-off unity. He is neither a beginning nor an end.

As this realization soaks into peoples minds, it change their attitude to conduct very profoundly. They develop what is called "the scientific attitude of mind"; the scientific style of behavour.

52. We are all experiments together, says biology; we are all serving in the education and growth of life, and all the plotting and planning and hiding things from each other for small private and personal advantages that constituted the bulk of human reactions in the past is seen suddenly for the wast and folly it is.

53. The exterior things were the easiest to achieve, steam and electric mechanisms, ships of steel, great guns, chemical dyes, aeroplanes submarines. It is more difficult to undermine and replace mental organizations.

54. The affairs of this swiftly developing world of mankind are now being conducted, obstinately and tenacicusly, in accordance with traditional pictures of the univrse that are anything from 50 to a 1000 years out of date.

55. The first and the most imperative needs of our organism have first to be assuaged. There

There is no possibility of a general scheme of conduct when one's mind is obsessed by overpowering hunger or thirst or fear. Until these are assuaged the rest of life's problems are in suspense. These provided for we have next to consider our sexual urgencies. To multitudes of people and to most of the young, morality is little more than a feverish struggle for sexual adjustment.
56. The sexual complex is a thing that bulks enormously in our mental life. We must admit that, even if we do not go all the road with the extreme Freudian. Its most perplexing aspect is the way in which it spreads its tentacles from the lowest to the highest strata of our minds and the rapid interaction between highest and lowest that it makes possible. If sex were a mere physical need it would present no problem of any difficulty to the moralist. Satisfy it, he would say, and take any necessary and obvious precautions that may be necessary so that it does not disorganize your population balance nor disseminate any infectious or contagious disease. So far as disease goes, prompt douchings and washings with such a substance as potassium permanganate in any case of doubt becomes a moral obligation, and any germicide that will kill the spermatozoa or any contrivance that will bar efficiently the access of the spermotozoa to the ovum, is manifestly sufficient to meet the needs of his second qualification. It is not within the purview of THE SCIENCE OF LIFE to discuss these matters in detail; suffice it here to say that what we may call the coarse control of sex, that is to say the easy elimination of its possibilities of undesired offspring or disease-dissemination, is quite

within the reach of intelligent people. The complete abolition of such hideous diseases as syphilis and gonorrhoea could be achieved in two or three generations if a world-wide observance of a few perfectly simple precautions could be imposed. But at present the mental and moral confusion of our species forbids any hope of such a feat of hygiene.

57. In its general trend biological science is at one with all these higher and more intuitive developments of religious thought that are called "mysticism." In all the more highly intellectual developments of mysticism there is a struggle to escape from too intense preoccupation with the "self" ("the body of this death" to quote Saint Paul) and an endeavour to identify oneself with some greater, more comprehensive, immortal being. Now as we have unfolded this general outline of biological fact we have found a constant dissolution of our ideas of the primary importance of individuality, as a growing realization of the continuity of life as one whole. All that has gone before in this work, the physiology, the comparative anatomy, the genetics, the psychology, has agreed in showing that individualities such as ours are temporary biological expedients, holding great somatic aggregations together in one unity. Our sense of the supreme importance and unbreakable integrity of our "selves" is, in fact, a dominating delusion with great survival value. We feal it most in yough and ignorance. Then our concentration upon self is most intense, and the thought of defeat, frustration, or death exquisitely intolerable. We fight for self-expression, for our own survival, for our re-

production, with extreme effort. But ripening knowledge and the progress of adolescence temper this fierce self-concentration. It seems possible that man is being evolved past this phase of extreme selfishness and self-concentration. The tendency of all moral teaching and of all progress in conduct throughout the development of civilization has been to replace selfishness by fellowship, to treat secretiveness, cunning and secret motives, greed, injustice, self-assertion, disregard of the feeling and good of others with increasing reprehension.

58. It is not in the sphere of science to offer fundamental "explanations". Science is simply a scrutiny and a putting together of scrutinized facts. Mind has come into our picture and we have traced its entry phase by phase. We have observed this new side of existence becoming more important in the scale of being until in ourselves it has the effect of an inner world reflecting all the processes of the material world, and conscious.

59. There is a copious--a terribly copious--literature recording facts that seem to show that the mental states of one person may produce impressions upon the mind of another without the use of any means of communication at present known to the biologist.

60. The possible action of one mind upon another, so that a more or less exact parallel to a mental process in the one is induced in the other, is called telepathy. It is, to use a very clumsy parallel, a sort of mental wireless telegraphy.

61. In the same way, too, by this insistence upon the parallel working of similar things, it may be possible to account for the remarkable

unison in the flight of social birds and in the movements of gregarious herbivora.

It increases the difficulty of this discussion that every shade of credibility is to be found in the cases cited, from the unimpeachable integrity of Prof. Murray to manifestly dishonest witnesses and observers.

62. To-day we know that the phenomena of mesmerism were compounded from three sources. Some, the majority perhaps, were fraud and charlatanism; others were the result of exaggeration, self-deception, or misinterpretation; but there remained a residuum of facts which we now call the facts of Hypnotism. Under competent and critical investigation these were elucidated. And the study of hypnotism has now become an important aid to our modern deeper knowledge of the human mind. The metapsychic controversy may follow a similar course. Such bodies as the British and American Societies of Psychic Research will go on with their work, avoiding as far as possible the sensation-seeker and mercenary imposter on the one hand and the implacable sceptic on the other.

63. This disagreement is stupendous; apparently there is not so much one future life as a thousand thousand, varying in quality with the imagination and mental texture and equipment of the seer. These stories do not really support each other; they smash each other to pieces.

64. This obscure and often distressing and grotesque boderland of biological science would have demanded attention, if for no other reason, because it comes so close to another question we have all asked ourselves. Alone, in the silence of the night and on a

score of thoughful occasions we have demanded, Can this self, so vividly central to my universe, so greedily possessive of the world, ever cease to be? Without it surely there is no world at all! And yet this conscious self dies nightly when we sleep, and we cannot trace the stages by which in its beginnings it crept to an awareness of its own existence. Mr. Everyman sets down the printed word and reflects. "I am I" seems to him the statement of a veracity beside which number and space and time seem flimsy abstractions. But then he reflects upon a number of things. THE SCIENCE OF LIFE has brought before him. All the way through this work has been throwing light upon the nature of individuality. We have recognized grades of individuality, the cell individual centred on a single nucleus, the individual metazoon, the individual colony made up of individual zooids. We have found it impossible to define individuality in the case of many creatures; in the case, for example, of the sponges and Obelia and other colonial polyps. We have seen individuals melt together and become one, and individuals break up into many. In our study of mental life we have seen that in one single brain it is possible for separate and even antagonistic individualities to exist. Even in clearly defined human individuals we are constantly aware of a conflict of motives, a war between a batter and a worse self, a divergence of loyalties and ends. Is the whole subconscious and conscious self the immortal part, or is it the persona only? Is it an inflated self that survives? Many of Mr. Evryman's intensest passions do not so much further his individual interests as they do those of the race. Sometimes he would rather

love than eat.

Some of the best things in our lives are the least individual things. When a man is exalted by high aims, possessed by some exquisite effort or occupied by profound study, he becomes altogether self-forgetful. In moments of great passion he "forgets himself." These are no metaphors. The conscious self is not the whole of a man. It is the central bureau for his general bodily behaviour, but it is subjected to systems of motivation, rational thought, scientific curiosity, loyalties, mass-suggestions, which come into his being from without, as general instructions from headquarters come into the semi-autonomous activities of a branch bank. Many of our sense-impressions undergo interpretation in the brain. Perhaps the collectivity of our sense-impressions is interpreted to suit the needs of our mind. It is possible that it has served the ends of survival that Mr. Everyman should think himself as much more independent being than he is. Personality may be only one of Nature's methods a convenient provisional delusion of considerable strategic value.

Moverover, individual death is one of the methods of life. That we have already enforced in our comments on rejuvenation. Every individual is a biological experiment, and a species progresses and advances by the selection, the rejection or multiplication of these individuals. Biologically, life ceases to go forward unless individuals come to an end and are replaced by others. The idea of any sort of individual immortality runs flatly counter to the idea of continuing evolution. Mr. Everyman makes his experiements, learns and teaches his lesson, and hands on the torch of life and experience. The bad habits he has acquired

the ineradicable memories, the mutilations and distortions that have been his lot, the poison and prejudice and decay in him--all surely are better erased at last and forgotten. A time will come when he will be weary and ready to sleep.

It is the young who want personal immortality, not the old.

Yet these considerations do not abolish the idea of immortality; they only shift it from the personality. In the visible biological world, in the world of fact, life never dies; only the individuals it throws up die. May there not be another side of existence of which our consciousnesses seem to be only the acutest expression that we know, a perceptive side of matter, if one may strain a term, which also is more enduring than any individual experience? Just as our bodily lives stipple out the form of the developing species, so our mental lives may stipple out its dawning consciousness. Though we are mortal as ourselves, we may be immortal as phases and transitory parts of an evolving undying percipient continuity. When we philosophise in the stillness it may be not ourselves alone, but Man that feels his way to self-realization through our individual thoughts.

65. With the development of speech, percept was added to example and members began to be transmitted from old to young. Homo was the first living creation to form a picture of his universe that transcended individual experience. The elders supplemented their stories of what had happened to them and what they had been told by thir predecessors with imaginations about the beasts and rocks and the sun and moon; myth and legend were added to tradition.

66. Primitive human thinking was like the thinking of children and uneducated people to-day. Something was imagined and either liked and sought, or disliked and avoided. Things were grouped in the mind to see how they looked and felt together. Countervailing ideas were evoked to alleviate, distort or suppress disagreeable realizations. Thinking was more like reverie and had little use for words until it had to be told. It has only been vry slowly that an acuter observation, an exacter definition, a more logical process has come to the aid of these primitive methods, and now begins to supersede them.

67. From the period onward, the earlier mythological method of expression, dream-like in its quality, gave way slowly but surely to philosophical analysis and openeyed scientific classification. We are still in the closing centuries of that phase of transition. Only now does it become possible to present the ordinary human being with a picture of the universe that is generally valid and divested of fabulous interpretations. The bulk of mankind is still thinking mytholgically. Only now is it possible to replace dogma by rational direction.

In The outline of History, the expansion of man's pictue of the universe is traced. Step by step we see how man passed from a picture of the universe centering upon his family and his tribe and having a radius of a few score miles, a little fear-girt picture, filled with the projection of his personal reaction to his father and his associates, to broader concepts to the picture of the city, the nation, the state or the empire. His mythology in that story of the past retreats before the advancing realism of his thought, his sympathies expand, his sense of fellowship replaces an animal hostility

to strangers and unfamiliar types. Throughout that story there go on a concurrent improvement of his means of transport and a steady development of his methods of expression, record and communication. In spite of hates and brutalities, of an inherent disposition to distrust, of the crazy egotism of the ordinary individual in a position of power, of a troublesome inheritance of greed, cowardice, sloth, and self-protective illusion --in spite of all these things, this advance continues steadily. We live in a clearer and a cleaner light than the men of the past. The average person is more lucid and less obsessed. An ever-increasing proportion of human beings realize sane and comprehensive pictures of the universe. Loyalties grow wider and more rational. It is a process of mental personal expansion to which the only visible limit is our planet and the entire human species.

68. The more intelligent and comprehensive man's picture of the universe has become, the more intolerable has become his concentration upon the individual life with its inevitable final rejection. No animal, it would seem, realizes death. Man does. He knows that before his individuality lies the probability of senility and the certainty of death. He has found two alternative lines of accommodation. The first is a belief in personal immortality, in the unendingness of his conscious self. After this life, we are told, comes the resurrection--and all necessary rejuvenescence. This idea is the essential consolation of several of the great religions of the world. We have already discussed its credibility.

The second line of accommodation is the realisation of his participation in a greater

being with which he identifies himself. He escapes from his ego by this merger, and acquires an impersonal immortality in the association; his identity dissolving into the greater identity. This is the essence of much religious mysticism, and it is remarkable how closely the biological analysis of individuality brings us to the mystics. The individual, according to this second line of thought, saves himself by losing himself. But in the mystical teaching he loses himself in the Deity, and in the scientific interpretation of life he forgets himself as Tom, Dick, or Harry, and discovers himself as Man, The Buddhist treatment of the same necessity is to teach that the individual life is a painful delusion from which men escape by the conquest of individual desire. Western Mystic and Eastern Sage find a strong effect of endorsement in modern science and in the everyday teaching of practical morality. Both teach that self must be subordinated; that self is a method and not and end.

69. A quality of fantasia comes into our writing as we follow up these possibilities. Yet it was not fantasy but hard fact that brought us to this point. Arising out of the thought and effort of to-day, it is plain that human achievement marches on to fresh powers and fresh vistas--until our utmost imagination is strained and exhausted. We are dazzled by the conquests we deduce; we laught; our minds gasp like newborn children when they first meet the free air.

And will the personal life in these coming ages of man's complete ascendancy be as happy and exciting as it can be to-day? In that great age the subordination of self will certainly play a part. But the subordination of self is not by any means the same as self-

sacrifice. The individual life may be infinitely richer as a part than as a whole; the whole sustains and inspires its members; experiences we cannot dream of may lie before our descendants.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.by S.C. CHATTERJEE, AND D.M. DATTA.

1. Like all other living beings man struggles for existence. But while the lower beings struggle more or less blindly without any conscious plan and purpose, and work by instinct, man uses the superior gift of intellect to understand the conditions and meaning of the struggle and to divise plans and instruments to ensure success. He wishes to lead his life in the light of his knowledge of himself and the world, taking into consideration not merely the immediate results of his actions, but even their far-reaching consequences. Desire for knowledge springs, therefore, from the rational nature of man. Philosophy is an attempt to satisfy this very reasonable desire. It is not, therefore, a mere luxury, but a necessity.

2. Like most other branches of knowledge, philosophy proceeds, therefore, from the known to the unknown, The foundation of philosophy is experience, and the chief tool used is reason. But the question arises here: "What experience should form the basis of philosophy?"

3. All the systems regard philosophy as a practical necessity and cultivate it in order to understand how life can be best led. The aim of philosophical wisdom is not merely the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, but mainly an enlightened life led with farsight, foresight and insight. It became a custom, therefore, with an Indian writer to explain, at the beginning of his work,

how it serves human ends.
4. Indian philosophy is pessimistic in the sense that it works under a sense of discomfort and disquiet at the existing order of things. It discovers and strongly asserts that life as it is being thoughtlessly led is a mere sport of blind impulses and unquenchable desires; it inevitably ends in and prolongs misery.
5. If Indian Philosophy points relentlessly to the miseries that we suffer through shortsightedness, it also discovers a message of hope. Pessimism in the Indian systems is only initial and not final.
6. The teachings of these masters need not make us wholly unwordly and other-worldly. They are meant only to correct the one-sided emphasis on 'the here' and 'the now'--the short-sightedness that worldliness involves
7. Philosophical truths momentarily established and understood through arguments were not enough to dispel the effects of opposite beliefs which have become a part of our being. Our ordinary wrong beliefs have become deeply rooted in us by repeated use in the different daily situations of life. Our habits of thought, speech and action have been shaped and coloured by these beliefs which in turn have been more and more strengthened by those habits. To replace these beliefs by correct ones, it is necessary to meditate on the latter constantly and think over their various implications for life.
8. Our indriyas, i.e. the instruments of knowledge and action (namely, the mind, the senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, sound, and the motor organs for movement, holding things, speaking, excretion and reproduction) have always been in the service of these blind im-

pulses of love and hate and they have acquired some fixed bad habits. When the philosophic knowledge about the real nature of things makes us give up our previous wrong beliefs regarding objects, our previous likes and dislikes for those objects have also to be given up. Our indriyas have to be weaned from past habits and broken to the reign of reason. This task is as important.

9. As there are no data for fixing the <u>first</u> beginning of the universe, Indian thinkers, in general, look upon the universe as beginningless (anadi). They try to explain the beginning of the present creation by reference to previous states of dissolution and creation and think it idle and meaningless to enquire about the <u>first</u> creation. Any term of a beginningless series can only be said to be earlier or later in <u>relation</u> to others; there is no-thing like an <u>absolute first</u> term in such a series.

10. Every judgment that we ordinarily pass about a thing is, therefore, true only in relation to a particulas aspect of the thing seen from a particular point of view. We should remember, therefore, the limited nature of our knowledge and judgment, and should refrain from thinking that any view is the whole truth about any thing. We should guard and qualify our own statements and also learn to appreciate the possibility of the correctness of others' views.

11. The Yogacara or Vijnanavada School:--This holds that external objects are unreal. What appears as external is really an idea in the mind. But mind must be admitted to be real. It is self-contradictory to say that the mind is unreal; for, then, the very thought that mind is unreal stands self-condemed, thought

being an activity of the mind. This view is called subjective idealism.

12. Consciousness is not an essential quality of the self. It is an accidental or adventitious quality which ceased to qualify the self in the state of mukti or liberation

13. Although the self is in itself free and immortal, yet such is the influence of Avidya or ignorance that it confuses itself with the body, the senses and the mind. It is the want of discrimination (aviveka) being the self and the not-self that is responsible for all our sorrows and sufferings. We feel injured and unhappy when our body is injured or indisposed, because we fail to realise the distinction between self and body. Similarly, pleasure and pain in the mind seem to affect the self only because the self's distinction from the mind is not clearly perceived by us. Once we realize the distinction between the self and the not-self including the body and the senses, the mind, the intellect and the ego (viveka-jnana), our self ceases to be affected by the joys and sorrows, the ups and downs of life. It rests in itself as the dispassionate observer of the show of events in the world without being implicated in them. This is the state of liberation or freedom from suffering which has been variously described as mukti, apavarga, kaivalya, etc.

14. There are two kinds of yoga or samadhi, viz. samprajnata and asamprajnata. In the first we have yoga in the form of the mind's perfect concentration on the object of contemplation, and therefore, involving a clear apprehension of that object. In the second, there is the complete cessation of all mental modifications, and, consequently the entire absence of all knowledge including

that of the contemplated object.

15. To make the conception of Maya more intelligible to ordinary experience, he interprets it in the light of ordinary illusions that we have in daily life, when a rope appears, for example, as a snake or a glittering shell appears as silver. In all such cases of illusion there is a substratum or a reality (e.g. rope, shell) on which something else (e.g. snake, silver) is imagined or superimposed due to the ignorance of the substratum. This ignorance not only conceals the underlying reality or substratum, but also makes it appear as something else. Our perception of the world's objects in the One Brahman on account of our ignorance (avidya or ajnana) which conceals the real Brahman from us and makes it appear as the many objects.

16. Like the Epicureans of Greece, the Carvakas in India have been more hated than understood. 'Carvaka' in the mind of people at large is a term of reproach. But it is useful for a student of philosophy to remember as well what Indian philosophy owes to Carvaka. Scepticism or agnosticism is only an expression of a free mind that refuses to accept traditional wisdom without a thorough criticism. Philosophy, as critical speculation, claims to live sceptic, the sounder it can hope to be. By questioning the soundness of popular notions, the sceptic sets new problems, by the solution of which philosophy becomes richer. Kant, one of the greatest philosophers of the West, recognized his debt to scepticism when he declared: "The scepticism of Hume roused me from my dogmatic slumber."

17. Every judgment that we pass in daily life about any object is, therefore, true only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the

aspect of the object considered. It is because we forget this limitation and regard our judgments as unconditionally true, that we come to quarrel and disagree very often in life. The story of the blind men who formed their ideas of an elephant by touching its legs, ears, tail and trunk respectively and thus came to quarrel about the real shape of the animal, illustrates this truth. They quarrelled because each thought that his knowledge was the only true and complete knowledge and should be accepted unconditionally. The quarrel was over as soon as each of them realized that his knowledge was only of one of the many parts of the animal.

18. They fail to realize, therefore, that the different views may be true like the different descriptions of the elephant. In view of these facts, the Jainas insist that every judgment (naya) should be qualified by some word like 'somehow' (syat, i.e. in some respect), so that the limitation of this judgment and the possibility of other alternative judgments from other points of view may be always clearly borne in mind.

19. This Jaina view is quite in keeping with the view accepted by Western logicians generally, namely, that every judgment is passed in a particular universe of discourse or context and must be understood only in reference thereto. The universe of discourse is constituted by different factors like space, time, degree, quality, etc., which are left unmentioned partly because they are obvious and partly because they are too many to be stated exhaustively. Now, if these conditions cannot be exhaustively enumerated, as some modern logicians like Schiller also admit, it is good for the sake of precision to qualify the judg-

ment explicitly by a word like 'somehow' (syat).

The principle underlying 'syadvada' makes Jaina thinkers catholic in their outlook. They entertain and accept the views of other philosophers as different possible versions of the universe from different points of view. The only thing that the Jainas dislike in other thinkers is their dogmatic claim that they alone are in the right. This claim amounts to the fallacy of exclusive predication.

20. Though an object can be described from different points in different separately or successively, it cannot be described at all if so such distinction of standpoint and aspect is made. An object in general is an indescribable entity. Secondly, this also points out that philosophical wisdom does not always consists in the ability to answer a question by a straight affirmative or negative, but also in realizing that some questions, by their very nature are unanswerable. Thirdly, the recognition of this form of judgment shows that the Jaina logic does not violate the principle of contradiction. On the contrary, it shows that obedience to this law makes the Jaina confess that incompatible characters can not be simultaneously predicated of any subject.

21. There are two kinds of relativity, idealistic (as of Protagoras, Berkeley, Schiller), and realistic (as of Whitehead or Boodin.). And if the Jaina is to be called a relativist, he must be understood to be of the realistic type. Our judgments about things are relative--but relative to or dependent upon not simply the mood of the judging mind, but upon the relational

characters of the many-sided reality itself.

22. If we consider, then, an object in the light of its own positive characters and also in the light of the characters of all other objects which are absent in it, the object would no longer appear to be a simple thing having only a limited number of qualities, as we ordinarily take it to be. The object, on the contrary, turns out to be one possessed of unlimited characters. But when, moreover, the element of time is taken into considera-tion, and it is remembered that the object takes on new characters with the change of time, the object is found really to possess infinite characters. (anantadharma)

Jaina writers, therefore, remark that he who knows <u>one</u> object fully, knows everything. Only an omniscient person (kevali) can have such complete knowledge of an object. For practical purposes (vyavahara) a partial knowledge of what an object is and is not, is, of course, quite sufficient. But this should not make us think, as we do, that a finite object is really possessed of limited characters. Nor should we think that our ordinary knowledge about it is complete and perfect.

23. The Jaina believes in the inexorable moral law of karma which no mercy can bend. The conse-quences of past misdeeds can only be counter-acted by generating within the soul strong oppo-site forces of good thought, good speech and good action. Everyone must work out his own salvation. The liberated souls serve only as beacon lights. The religion of the Jaina is, therefore, a religion of the strong and the brave. It is a religion of self-help. This is why the liberated soul is called a victor (jina) and a hero (vira).

24. After he had attained nirvana, he was at first seized with a temporary relectance to work for the deliverance of others; but he shook this off when he perceived that it would be shirking duty. His enlightened heart then beat with sympathy for the countless beings who were still writhing in pain. He thought it proper, therefore, that the raft which he constructed with toil and with which he got across the flood of misery, should be left for others and not allowed to perish. Nirvana, he thus shows by his own example and precept, does not require the Arhat to shun activity; on the contrary, love and sympathy for all beings increase with enlightenment and persuade the perfect man to share his wisdom with them and work for their moral uplift.

25. Right mindfulness (sammasati or samyak-smrti).-- The necessity of constant vigilance is further stressed in this rule, which lays down that the aspirant should constantly bear in mind the things he has already learnt. He should constantly remember and contemplate the body as body, sensation as sensation, mind as mind, mental states as mental states. About any of these he should not think, "This am I" or "This is mine." This advice sounds no better than asking one to think of a spade as a spade. But ludicrously superfluous as it might appear to be, it is not easy to remember always what things really are. It is all the more difficult to practise it when false ideas about the body, etc., have become deep-rooted in us and our behaviours based on these false notions have become instinctive. If we are not mindful, we behave as though the body, the mind, sensations and mental states are permanent and valuable. Hence arise

attachment to them and grief over their loss, and we become subject to bondage and misery.

26. He gives up all false emotions and affection for the body, his own and others. By similar intense contemplation about sensation, mind and harmful mental states he becomes free from attachment and grief regarding all these. The net result of this fourfold intense contemplation is detachment from all objects that bind man to the world.

27. Right concentration. (sammasamadhi or samyaksamadhi.)--One who has successfully guided his life in the light of the last seven rules and thereby freed himself from all passions and evil thoughts is fit to enter step by step into the four deeper and deeper stages of concentration that gradually take him to the goal of his long and arduous journey--cessation of suffering. He concentrates his pure and unfuffled mind on reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (vicara) regarding the truths, and enjoys in this state joy and ease born of detachment and pure thought. This is the first stage of intent meditation (dhyana or jhana)

When this concentration is successful, belief in the fourfold truth arises dispelling all doubts, and, therefore, making reasoning and investigation unnecessary. From this results the second stage of concentration, in which there are joy, peace and internal tranquillity born of intense, unruffled contemplation. There is in this stage a consciousness of this joy and peace too.

In the next stage attempt is made by him to initiate an attitude of indifference, to be able to detach himself even from the joy of concentration. From this results the third deeper kind of concentration, in which one

experiences perfect equanimity, coupled with an experience of bodily ease. He is yet conscious of this ease and equanimity, though indifferent to the joy of concentration.

Lastly, he tries to put away even this consciousness of ease and equanimity and all the sense of joy and elation he previously had. He attains thereby the fourth state of concentration, a state of perfect equanimity, indifference and self-possession--without pain, without ease. Thus he attains to arhatship or nirvana. There are then perfect wisdom (prajna) and perfect rightеousness.

28. "Goodness is a function of intelligence" said Matthew Bassendime.

29. Transitoriness of life and worldly things is spoken of by many other poets and philosophers. Buddha logically perfects this view into the doctrine of impermanence. His later followers develop this further into a theory of momentariness, which means not only that everything has conditional and, therefore, non-permanent existence, but also that things last not even for short periods of time, but exist for one partless moment only.

30. If, for example, a thing like a seed be not accepted to be momentary, but thought to be lasting for more than one moment, then we have to show that it is capable of producing an effect during each moment it exists. Again, if it really remains the same unchanging thing during these moments, then it should be able to produce the same effect at every one of those moments. But we find that this is not the case. The seed in the house does not produce the seedling which is generated by a seed sown in the field.

But it may be said that though the seed does not actually produce the same effect always, it always has the potentiality to produce it and this potentiality becomes kinetic in the presence of suitable auxiliary conditions like earth, water, etc. Therefore, the seed is always the same. But this defence is weak; because then it is virtually confessed that the seed of the first moment is not the cause of the seedling, but that the seed modified by other conditions really causes the effect. Hence the seed must be admitted to have changed. In this way it may be shown regarding everything that it does not stay unchanged during any two moments, because it does not produce the identical effect during both moments. Hence everything lasts only for a moment.

31. This continuity is often explained with the example of a lamp burning throughout the night. The flame of each moment is dependent on its own conditions and different from that of another moment which is dependent on other conditions. Yet there is an unbroken succession of the different flames. Again, as from one flame another may be lighted, and though the two are different, they are connected causally, similarly, the end-state of this life may cause the beginning of the next. Rebirth is, therefore, not transmigration, i.e. the migration of the same soul into another body; it is the causation of the next life by the present. The conception of a soul is thus replaced here by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness as in the philosophy of William James. As the present state of consciousness inherits its characters from the previous one, the past in a way continues

in the present, through its effect. Memory thus becomes explicable even without a soul. This theory of the non-existence of soul (anattavada) plays a very important part in understanding the teachings of Buddha. He, therefore, repeatedly exhorts his disciples to give up the false view about the self. Buddha points out that people who suffer from the illusion of the self, do not know its nature clearly; still they strongly protest that they love the soul; they want to make the soul happy by obtaining salvation. This, he wittily remarks, is like falling in love with the most beautiful maiden in the land though she has never been seen or known. Or, it is like building a staircase for mounting a place which has never been seen.

32. In the Lankavatara-sutra (quoted by Madhavacarya himself) it is stated that the real nature of objects cannot be ascertained by the intellect and cannot, therefore, be described. That which is real must be independent and should not depend on anything else for its existence and origination. But every thing we know of is dependent on some condition. Hence it cannot be real. Again, it cannot be said to be unreal. Because an unreal thing, like a castle in the air, can never come into existence. To say that it is both real and unreal, or that it is neither real nor unreal, would be unintelligible jargon. Sunyata or voidness is the name for this indeterminable, indescribable real nature of things. Things appear to exist, but when we try to understand the real nature of their existence our intellect is baffled. It cannot be called either real or unreal, or both real and unreal, or neither real nor unreal.

33. Every character of a thing is conditioned by something else and, therefore, its existence is relative to that condition. Sunyavada can, therefore, also be interpreted as a theory of relativity which declares that no thing, no phenomenon experienced, has a fixed, absolute, independent character of its <u>own</u> (svabhava) and, therefore, no description of any phenomenon can be said to be unconditionally true.

To this philosophy of phenomena (or things as they appear to us), the Madhyamikas add a philosophy of noumenon (or reality in itself). Buddha's teachings regarding dependent origination, impermanence, etc. apply they hold, only to the phenomenal world, to things commonly observed by us in ordinary experience. But when nirvana is attained and the conditions of sense-experience and the appearance of phenomena are controlled, what would be the nature of the resultant experience? To this we cannot apply the conditional characters true of phenomena. The Madhyamikas, therefore, hold that there is a transcendental reality (noumenon) behind the phenomenal one and it is free from change, conditionality, and all other phenomenal characters. As Nagarjuna says: "There are two truths, on which Buddha's teaching of Dharma depends, one is empirical (samvrti-satya) and meant for the ordinary people, another is the transcendental or the absolutely true one (paramartha-satya). Those who do not know the distinction between these two kinds of truth, cannot understand the profound mystery of Buddha's teachings."

34. While agreeing with the Madhyamikas, as to the unreality of external objects, the Yogacara school differs from them in holding that the mind (citta) cannot be regarded as unreal. For then all reasoning and thinking would be false and the Madhyamikas cannot

establish that even their own arguments are correct. To say that everything mental or non-mental is unreal is suicidal. The reality of the mind should at least be admitted in order to make correct thinking possible.

The mind, consisting of a stream of different kinds of ideas, is the only reality. Things that appear to be outside the mind, our body as well as other objects, are merely ideas of the mind. Just as in cases of dreams and hallucinations a man fancies to perceive things outside, though they do not really exist there, similarly the objects which appear to be out there, are really ideas in the mind. The existence of any external object cannot be proved, because it cannot be shown that the object is different from the consciousness of the object. As Dharmakirti states, the blue colour and the consciousness of the blue colour are identical, because they are never perceived to exist separately. Though really one, they appear as two due to illusion, just as the moon appears as two to some due to defective vision. As an object is never known without the consciousness of it, the object cannot be proved to have an existence independent of consciousness.

35. The Yogacara view is called Vijnanavada or idealism because it admits that there is only one kind of reality which is of the nature of consciousness (vijnana) and objects which appear to be material or external to consciousness are really ideas or states of consciousness. This theory may be described further as <u>subjective</u> idealism, because according to it the existence of an object perceived is not different from

the subject or the perceiving mind.

One of the chief difficulties of subjective idealism is: If an object depends for its existence solely on the subject, then, how is it that the mind cannot create at will any object at any time? How is it explained that objects do not change, appear or disappear at the will of the perceiver? To explain this difficulty the vijnanavadin says that the mind is a stream of momentary conscious states and within the stream their lie buried the impressions (samskara) of all past experience. At a particular moment that latent impression comes to the surface of consciousness for which the circumstances of the moment are the most favourable. At that moment that impression attains maturity (paripaka), so to say, and develops into immediate consciousness or perception. It is thus that at that particular moment only that object whose latent impression can, under the circumstances, reveal itself, beomes perceived; just as in the case of the revival of past impressions in memory, though all the impressions are in the mind, only some are remembered at a particular time. This is why only some object can be perceived at a time and not any at will.

The mind considered in its aspect of being a storehouse or home of all impressions is called by the Vijnanavadins Alaya-vijnana. It may be regarded as the potential mind and answers to the soul or atman of other systems, with the difference that it is not one un-changing substance like the soul, but is a stream of continuously changing states.

35.Nagarjuna says in the Bodhicitta: "Therefore, all Bodhisattvas, in order to emancipate sentient beings from misery, are ins-

pired with great spiritual energy and mingle themselves in the filth of birth and death. Though thus they make themselves subject to the laws of birth and death, their hearts are free from sins and attachments. They are like unto those immaculate undefiled lotus-flowers which grow out of mire, yet are not contaminated by it."

36. This ideal of Bodhisattva is nurtured by the Mahayana philosophy, which comes to think that all individuals are unreal as separate particular phenomena, and that they are all really grounded in one transcendental Reality (Alaya-vijnana, according to some Yogacaras or Sunya or Tathata, according to some Madhyamikas), of which they are the partial or illusory manifestations. This philosophy favoured the rejection of the idea of the individual ego and acceptance of an universal absolute self (Mahatman or Paramatman) as the real self of man.

37. Moreover the idea that the transcendental Reality is not away from but within the phenomena paved the way for the belief that perfection or nirvana is not to be sought away from the world but within it. Nirvana, says Nagarjuna, is to be found within the world by those who can see what the world really is at bottom.

38. Existence of ideas and images, feelings of pleasure and pain, is dependent on some mind. These cannot exist unless they are experienced by some mind.

39. Idealism on the other hand, holds that things or objects can exist only as they are related to some mind. Just as feelings and cognitions exist only as they are in some mind, so the objects of the world exist only as they are actually experienced or at least

thought of by us.
40. A word may mean different things in different cases. Whether it means this or that thing in a particular case depends on the intention of the person who uses the word. To understand the meaning of a sentence, therefore, we must consider the intention of the writer or the speaker, who uses it. Thus when a man is asked to bring a 'bat', he is at a loss to understand whether he is told to bring a particular kind of animal or a wooden implement, for the word means both. This can be ascertained only if we know the intention of the speaker.
41. Space is inferred as the ground of our cognitions of 'here' and 'there', 'near' and 'far'. Time is the cause of our cognitions of 'past', 'present' and 'future', 'older' and 'younger'. Although one and indivisible, akasa, space and time are distinguished into different parts and thus conventionally spoken of as many by reason of certain limiting conditions (upadhi) which affect our knowledge of them.
42. There are two kinds of souls, namely, the individual soul (jivatma) and the supreme soul (paramatma or Isvara). The latter is one, and is inferred as the creator of the world. The former is internally or mentally perceived as possessing some quality when, for example, one says, 'I am happy', 'I am sorry' and so forth. The individual self is not one but many, being different in different bodies.
43. Advaita Vedanta holds that the self is pure eternal consciousness which is also a blissful existence (saccidananda-swarupa). It is one in all bodies.
44. It is pure consciousness (jnanasvarupa)

in the sense that the changing states and processes of the mind, which we call empirical consciousness, do not belong to the self. The self is the subject or witness of the mental changes as of bodily and physical changes, but is as much distinct from the former as from the latter.

45. So long as the mind or the intellect of a man is impure and unsettled, he cannot properly understand anything of philosophy and religion. We must have a pure heart and a tranquil mind if we are to know and realize the truths of philosophy and religion. Now the practice of yoga is the best way of self-purification, i.e. purification of the body and the intellect. Hence it is that all systems of Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Carvaka, insist on the practice of yoga as the necessary practical side of a philosophy of life.

46. There are five levels of the mental life (cittabhumi). These are called ksipta or restless, mudha or torpid, viksipta or distracted, ekagra or concentrated, and nirudha or restrained. In the first, called ksipta, the mind is under the sway of rajas and is tossed about by objects. It flits from one thing to another without resting in any. The second, viz. mudha, is due to an excess of tamas in the mind and produces the states of sleep and the like. In the third level, called viksipta or distracted, the mind attends to this or that object for a short time, but is dusturbed by thoughts of other objects and withdrawn from the first. This is a stage of imperfect or partial steadiness of the mind. The fourth level, called ekagra, is a state of undisturbed attention to some

object for a long time. It is the prolonged concentration of the mind on the object of meditation. In this state, the mind continues to think or meditate on sone object, and so, even here, the mental processes are not altogether arrested. At the last level, called nirudha, there is the cessation of all mental functions including even that of concentration which marks the previous stage.. Here the succession of mental states and processes is completely checked, and the mind is left in its original, unmodified state of calmness and tranquillity. These last two levels are conducive to yoga in so far as both manifest the sttva element of the mind to the highest degree and are helpful for the attainment of the ultimate goal, viz. liberation. In fact, ekagra or the state of concentration is called samprajnata yoga or the trance of meditation, in which there is a clear and distinct <u>consciousness of the object</u> of contemplation. It is known also as samapatti or samprjnata samadhi, inasmuch as the mind is, in this state, entirely put into the object and assumes the form of the object itself. So also, the state of nirudha is called asamprjnata yoga or asamprajnata samadhi, because all mental modifications being stopped in this state, <u>nothing is known</u> or thought of by the mind. This is the trance of absorption in which all psychoses and appearances of objects are stopped and there are no ripples in the placid surface of the mind. Both these kinds of yoga are known by the common name of samadhi-yoga or the trance of concentration.

47. Samadhi or concentration is the final step in the practice of yoga. In it the mind is so deeply absorbed in the object of contemplation that it loses itself in the object

and has no awareness of itself. In the state of dhyana, the act and the object of thought remain distinct and separate states of consciousness. But in samadhi the act of meditation is not separately cognised; it takes on the form of the object and loses itself, as it were. So here only the object of thought remains shining in the mind, and we do not even know that there is a process of thought in the mind.

48. In the Upanisads themselves we are told that even after the study of the Vedas with other branches of learning a man's education is not complete till he receives instructions in the Upanisads.

49. The Upanisadic doctrines were esoteric, ie. they were very secretly taught only to the select pupils seated close to (upasanna) the teacher. The Upanisads were regarded as the inner or secret meanings (rahasya) of the Vedas, hence their teachings were sometimes called Vedopanisad or the mystery of the Vedas.

50. In the Katha we are told: "This Self is concealed in all things, and does not, therefore, appear to be there. But it is perceived by the keen-sighted with the help of a sharp, penetrating intellect." (3.12).

51. The method of self-realization lies thro' the control of the lower self, its deep-rooted interests and impulses, and through study, reasoning and repeated meditation (sravana, manana, nididhyasana), till the forces of past habits and thoughts are completely overcome by a firm belief in the truths learnt. It is a difficult path which can be followed only if one is strong and wise enough to reject what is pleasant (preyas) for what is good (sreyas).

52. If we try to understand the process by which ordinary illusions in life take place, we find that an illusion, say, of snake in a rope, is due to our ignorance of what really is there behind the appearance, i.e. ignorance of the substratum or ground (adhisthana), in this case, the rope. If we could know the rope as the rope, there would be no illusion about it. But mere ignorance of the rope cannot give rise to the illusion. For, otherwise, even a person who has never known what a rope is would always see serpents in things. The ignorance creating an illusion does not simply conceal from our view the real nature of the ground, the rope, but positively distorts it, i.e. makes it appear as something else. Concealment (avarana) of reality and distortion (viksepa) of it into something else in our mind are then the two functions of an illusion-producing ignorance (avidya or ajnana).

When an illusion is produced in us by some one else, for example, when a magician makes one coin appear as many to us, it is an illusion for us, the perceivers, and not for the conjurer. From our standpoint, then, illusion is the product of our ignorance, which prevents us from seeing the real nature of the thing and which makes us see something else in its place. If any spectator can persist to see the one coin as it is, the magician's wand will create no illusion for him. For the magician, the illusion is only a conjuring will, by which his spectators are deceived, and not himself.

53. While speaking of Sankara's theory of creation, it is necessary to warn the reader against a very common misunderstanding of

his theory, for which some of his latter-day followers also are partly responsible. Sankara wants us to understand that the world is _like_ a dream or illusion but is _not identical_ with it. If he believed that the objects we perceive normally in waking experience are of the _same_ status as dream or illusory objects, then he would accept subjective idealism. But we find that he rejects such idealism of the vijnanavadins and asserts in that connection that the bojects of ordinary perception do not possess the same status as dream-objects, because the latter are contradicted by waking experience, while the former are not. Contradiction (badha) is the test of error, whereas non-contradiction (abadhitatva) is the test of truth. The world is unreal in the sense that it is contradicted by the experience of one who realizes that Brahman is the only reality. Till the world-appearance is so contradicted by that superior expeience, it enjoys uncontradicted reality.

54. They are real for our senses experience, but not ultimately real, or, as Kant would say, they are empirically real and transcendentally ideal.

55. Ramanuja makes an attempt to deny the possibility of illusion altogether, on the ground that every apprehension is true. If his contention be true then the Advaita position breaks down altogether. The Advaitins therefore, take great care to discuss the nature of error, and their literature on the theory of error is so vast.

56. Sankara's theory thus should be called not nihilism but _phenomenalism_. Though the world is, in a certain sense, illusion

according to him, it is not a groundless illusion but is, to borrow Leibniz's phrase, a well-grounded phenomenon (phenomena bene fundata). What is falsified of the world by the knowledge of Brahman is the diversity of particular phenomena, but not the pure existence on which it is grounded.

57. The positive aspect which inspired the Upanisadic sages with the sense of a living presence of God in the world and made their life so joyous. It is thus that the Vedanta can redeem life from the sloth that its misunderstanding has caused and spiritualize the daily life in its practical sphere.

58. Reasoning is necessary for the understanding of the teachings, for removing doubts, and realizing their cogency. By itself reasoning is an empty form or method of thinking which can work only when materials are supplied.

59. Distinction between standpoints is always made by us in life and is nothing new or queer in Advaita philosophy as it may appear to some. In daily life, we say that a currency note is really paper, but conventionally it is money; a photograph is really paper but appears as a man; the image in a mirror appears as a real object but is not really so; and so on. This ordinary kind of distinction between the apparent and the real is philosophically utilized by Vedanta for explaining the relation of God to the world. Thus the vyavaharika and the paramarthika--the empirical (conventional or practical) and the transcendental (absolute or irrelative)--which the Vedanta distinguishes are neither uncommon nor unintelligible. It is only the extension of a common distinction.

Though God as creator is only apparent, yet His importance and value should not be ignored. It is only through the lower standpoint that we can gradually mount up to the higher. Advaita Vedanta, like the Upanisads, believes in the gradual revelation of truth in stages through which spiritual pregress takes place. The unreflecting man who regards the world as self-sufficient reality feels no urge to look beyond it and search for its cause or ground. When he comes to realize somehow the insufficiency of the world and looks for something which sustains the world from behind, he comes to discover God as the Creator and Sustainer of the world. He feels admiration and reverence and begins to pray to the Creator. God thus becomes the object of worship. With the further advancement of thought, so the Advaita thinks, the man may discover that God whom he reached through the world, is really the only reality, the world is only an appearance. Thus at the first level, the world alone is real; at the second, both the world and God; at the last, only God. The first is atheism. The second represents theism as we find in Ramanuja and others. The last is the Absolute monism of Sankara.

60. When a man is awake, he thinks himself identified with the gross body, as well as with the internal and external organs. When he falls asleep and dreams, he is still conscious of objects that arise from memory-impressions, and, therefore, the feeling of his limitation as a subject or knower opposed to objects still persists there. When he has deep, dreamless sleep, he ceases to have any ideas of objects. In the absence of objects, he ceases to be a knower as well. The polarity

of subject and object, the opposition between the knower and the known, vanishes altogether. He no longer feels that he is confined to and limited by the body. But yet consciousness does not cease in dreamless sleep; for otherwise how could we remember at all on awaking from sleep that we had such a state? How could we report 'I had a peaceful sleep, had no dreams', if we were unconscious then?

The study of dreamless sleep gives us a glimpse of what the self really is when dissociated from its feeling of identity with the body. The soul in its intrinsic state is not a finite, miserable being. It does not separate itself from the rest of existence and does not limit itself by a feeling of the 'I' (aham) opposed to a 'thou' or 'this' or 'that'. It is also free from all worries that arise from hankerings after objects. The self, really, then is an unlimited consciousness and bliss.

The attempt of Sankara and his followers is to show how this intrinsic, pure condition of the self can be regained. The fact that the blissful state of dreamless sleep is not permanent and man once more returns to his finite, limited, embodied consciousness on waking up, shows that there remain even in dreamless sleep, in a latent form, the forces of karma or avidya which draw man into the world. Unless these forces, accumulated from the past, can be completely stopped, there is no hope of liberation from the miserable existence which the self has in this world.

The study of Vedanta helps man to conquer these deep-rooted effects of long-standing ignorance. But the study of the truths taught

by the Vedanta would have no effect unless the mind is previously prepared. The Mimamsa which teaches the performance of sacrifices to the various gods, rests on the wrong conception of a distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped. Its spirit is, therefore, antagonistic to the absolute monism taught by the Vedanta. Far from preparing the mind for the reception of the monistic truth, it only helps to perpetuate the illusion of distinctions and plurality from which man already suffers.

61. With such preparation of the intellect, emotion and will one should begin to study the Vedanta with a teacher who has himself realized Brahman. This study consists of the three-fold process: listening to the teacher's instructions (sravana), understanding the instructions through reasoning until all doubts are removed and conviction is generated (manana), and repeated meditation on the truths thus accepted (nididhyasana).

The forces of deep-rooted beliefs of the past do not disappear so soon as the truths of the Vedanta are learned. Only repeated meditation on the truths and life led accordingly can gradually root them out. When wrong beliefs thus become removed and belief in the truths of the Vedanta becomes permanent, the seeker after liberation is told by the teacher 'Thou are Brahman.' He begins then to contemplate this truth steadfastly till at last he has an immediate realization of the truth in the form 'I am Brahman'. Thus the illusory distinction between the self and Brahman at last disappears and bondage, too, along with it. Liberation (mikti) is thus attained.

Even on the attainment of liberation the body may continue because it is the product of karmas which had already borne their

effects (prorabha-karma). But the liberated soul does never again identify itself with the body. The world still appears before him, but he is not deceived by it.

62. Liberation is not the production of anything new, nor is it the purification of any old state; it is the realization of what is always there, even in the stage of bondage, though not known then. For, liberation is nothing but the identity of the self and Brahman, which is always real, though not always recognized. The attainment of liberation is, therefore, compared by the Advaitins to the finding of the necklace on the neck by one who forgot its existence there and searched for it hither and thither. As bondage is due to an illusion, liberation is only the removal of this illusion.

63. The liberated man is the ideal of society and his life should be worthy of imitation by the people at large. Inactivity or activity that would mislead them should, therefore, be avoided by the perfect. Social service is not, therefore, thought by Sankara to be incompatible with the perfect life, but rather desirable. In his own life of intense social service Sankara follows this ideal. This ideal is also advocated by some eminnt modern Vedantists like Swami Vivekananda and Lokamanya B.G. Tilak.

64. This objection is due to the confusion of the lower and higher standpoint. From the empirical standpoint, the distinction between right and wrong, like other distinctions, is quite valid. For one who has not yet attained liberation, any action which directly or indirectly leads him towards the realization of his unity with Brahman, is good and that which hampers such reali-

zation, directly or indirectly, is bad. Truthfulness, charity, benevolence, self-control, and the like would be found to fall under the first category even according to this criterion, whereas falsehood, selfishness, injury to others would come under the second. One who has attained perfect knowledge and liberation would look back upon these moral distinctions as being relative to the lower standpoint and, therefore, not absolutely valid. But neither would perform a bad action in so far as the motive of every bad action is based on the ignorant identification of the self with the body.

65. It is true that such a system fails to appeal to those who turn to philosophy for the justification of their imperfect ideas of worldly distinctions and worldly values, or to those who turn faint-hearted to religion for help and mercy. The philosophy of Ramanuja would be more satisfying to them. Like the teachings of early Buddhism and Jainism, the monistic philosophy of Sankara is only for the strong-hearted who can follow logic dauntlessly and face conclusions however subversive of ordinary ideas of reality and value. But, for those few who have the heart for it, Advaita monism is not without recompense and is not even without emotional satisfaction. As James puts it: "An Absolute One, and I that One,--surely we have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has a high pragmatic value; it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of security." "We all have some ear for this monistic music: it elevates and reassures."

"CIVILISATION AS A CO-OPERATIVE ADVENTURE" by Prof. A.R. WADIA. (1) The theme is great, but at first one is apt to lean towards a view like that of the brilliant but erratic thinker, Count Keyserling, when he says: "History, like life, is a tragedy, an insoluble equation or a surd."
2. The philosopher who has found the reign of matter or of mind as the case may be in the whole realm of nature will not submit to the brute contingency of history. A Hegel will insist on seeing the play of mind in all history.
3. Socrates boasted that he was a gad-fly to Grecian society and Napoleon did not inappropriately adopt the stinging bee as his emblem. Human pride and self-complacency need to be pricked, and the powers that guide human life see that this pricking is done whether its victims like it or not.
4. It may not be possible for us to accept whole-heartedly the materialist philosophy of history for which Karl Marx and the Bolshivists have made themselves responsible. But it would be futile to deny the core of truth it has: the prime need of satisfying our enonomic needs.
5. Japan has once again proved the age-old lesson of history that isolation does not pay, that refusal to learn whatever new can be learned spells death. Japan has been westernised, but has not lost her peculiar characteristics. She has borne witness to the fact that the East lives and is not sunk in the inactivity that masquerades under a defunct spirituality.
6. Any one who is obsessed with his own importance and is unwilling to learn from others is apt to be left behind in the surging tide

of advancing knowledge, and to cherish the idea that Sanskrit learning attained such perfection that there is nothing more to learn from modern knowledge is on a par with the fatuitous statement traditionally, though wrongly, attributed to Caliph Omar that all books except the Koran should be destroyed.

7, The Pundit of to-day has become a fossil. Compared to the other oriental countries the progress that India has made in modernism has been very disappointing.

8. Things are changing. The supremacy of the Westerner is no longer regarded as a divine dispensation, but as a matter of mere history toridal incidence. The non-European world has awakened from its sleep of centuries and is trying to make up for lost time. This will be achieved in course of time. Europe is bound to realise that her supremacy will be challenged and she will lose her dominating position both in commerce and in politics. It is only in this sense that the west will decline: but that is a matter of relativity. If the Europe as we know her to-day ever declines and dies, it will not be before she will have transfused her spirit into the rest of the world.

9. The westerners who feel distracted by the jurry and skurry of their native environment wistfully turn to India to secure that rest, that ananda, which through ages has been the quest of Indian sages. The East to-day, and particularly India, however, needs something of that nervy activity which is the characteristic of the full-blooded westerner; it needs that zest for social service which scorns individual peace of mind when there

is a cry of suffering near by. On the other hand the West needs that spirit of calmness which would enable it to resist the incessant call of the flesh and to appraise life in all its bearings; it needs the strength of a calm spirituality which does not make its men and women victims of the passing moment, but actors in an eternal drama: the drama of life.

10. Reason in its essence is free. This is what philosophers have been teaching for centuries. It was science that again and again tried to back up determinism in the interests of what it was pleased to call exact knowledge. But even science has ceased to be determinist. Einstein has enthroned relativity at the heart of things.

"ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY" by J.S. MACKENZIE. 1. The general problem of time seems to me to be the most difficult in the whole range of philosophy.

2. The subjects that are most commonly regarded as specially philosophical are Psychology, Logic, Ethics, and Metaphysics.

3, The general problem of implication seems to be clearly philosophical. The discussion, for instance, in Hegel's logic of the ways in which such conceptions as those of Being, Number, Substance, etc., imply others, and the exhibition of the whole network of implications that is there given as being involved in our conceptual view of the world, are in a high degree philosophical. Such a treatment forms the basis for a general theory of the universe. Such a consideration of ultimate conceptions, however, is perhaps rather to be described as metaphysical than as logical, in the more specific sense of the term. The implications of ordinary dis-

course and of the terms used in the particular sciences can be dealt with in an instructive way without raising issues of so far-reaching a character; and to do this seems to be the appropriate province of logic, so far as it can be regarded as a special science. On the whole, however, it must be recognised that such a science would be even harder to separate from philosophy than psychology is.

4. It would seem that the special problems of metaphysics are those relating to the general nature of knowledge, the fundamental conceptions that are involved in it, and especially the theory of reality.

5. There are some grounds for regarding the general theory of knowledge as a distinct subject. Kant, who despaired of metaphysics, did not despair of the doctrine of knowledge.

6. Philosophy has to take account of the general results of the investigations of all the other sciences, but especially of those sciences that are concerned with the most fundamental issues; and, on the basis of these results it is its special task to endeavour to construct a general theory of the universe, and especially of the place of human life in it. In this enterprise, it is mainly dependent on metaphysics, but to a considerable extent also on logic and psychology; while, on the other hand, ethics and aesthetics are largely dependent on it.

7. It is well to recognize at once that the only things that we <u>can</u> doubt are judgments. Any simple experience that we have, such as pain or joy or a colour or a sound or a tree, cannot really be doubted. We can only doubt some judgments that we form with reference to these experiences--such as: This pain is se-

vere, This joy persists, This colour is green
This is the sound of thunder, This is an apple-
tree. Any judgment may be either true or false;
and it seems clear that a judgment is the only
thing that can be either, true or false, in
the strictest sense of the terms. Now, what may
be either true or false can, in general, be
either believed or disbelieved, or regarded as
more or less doubtful. The contention of Des-
cartes, however, is that there is one kind of
judgment that can only be believed, not disbe-
lieved or doubted--viz. the judgment "I am
thinking"; and this appears to involve three
things: 'I', 'thinking' and 'am', which are
here bound together in essential unity. What is
the exact significance of this analysis and
this unity. And in what sense is this judgment
incapable of being doubted?

8. Whatever we may think of the subsequent spe-
culations of Descartes, it certainly does
appear that he brings out at this point some-
thing that has a fundamental importance, and
that may well serve as a starting point in
philosophical enquiry. For, however we may
interpret the ultimate problems of philosophy
it is evident at least that they all circle
round the question of belief.

9. The imagination has command over all its
ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them
in all the ways possible. It may conceive
objects with all the circumstances of place
and time. It may set them, in a manner, be-
fore our eyes in their true colours, just as
they might have existed.

10."We all believe many things" as Mr. Russell
remarks, "which we have no good ground for be-
lieving, because, subconsciously, our nature
craves certain kinds of action which these be-

liefs would render reasonable if they were true."

11. We commonly distinguish believing from knowing, but to cognize, in the wider sense of the term, means simply to be aware of some object, whether that object is felt, believed, thought about, doubted, denied, loved, hated, desired, willed, remembered, feared, hoped for, or in any other way apprehended. It is important to bear this distinction in mind. Otherwise we may fall into great confusion. The use of the term cogito by Descartes appears to be not altogether free from such confusion; since it is sometimes used for the general fact of cognition and sometimes for that more special mode of apprehension which we call thinking. What we are referring to at present is cognition in the wider sense, i.e. any mode in which an object is apprehended by some subject. These terms also, however, call for some explanation.

Subject and Object.--In referring to a subject of cognition, we must not be understood to mean anything more than what has been already indicated. We are not concerned at present with the problem of personality, either as regards its nature or its persistence. If an oyster is conscious of anything, it would be a subject, in the sense at present required, quite as truly as an Aristotle. We mean nothing more than that there is some centre at which some object or objects are apprehended. By an object, again, we understand nothing more than some distinguishable presentation. It may be a pain, a smell, a colour, a plant, a number, a proposition, or any other definitely apprehended thing. In speaking of subject and object, we simply call attention to the fact that distinguishable things are apprehended at a

conscious centre.
12. A judgment is expressed in some form of language; but it consists essentially not in the words or symbols that are employed, but in the meaning that they convey.
13. Aristotle attempted to classify the kinds of information that are conveyed by judgments and called the Categories.
14. The importance of Meaning has been much emphasized in recent times. Prof. Meinong's remarkable work Ueber Annahmen has probably thrown more light on the subject than anything else that has been written. But certainly the first chapter of Mr. Bradley's Principles of Logic also contributed very powerfully to the establishment of a clear distinction between what is meant and what is pictured; and the discussion of Internal and External meaning by Royce (The World and the Individual) threw further light on this distinction.
15. To select one thing is to reject another, and this applied to judgments, no less than to other things. The judgment that has to be rejected, when a particular one is chosen, is commonly called the contradictory of the latter; and the fact that the selection of the one involves the rejection of the other is sometimes said to be a fundamental law of thought.
16. This leads us, further, to the recognition of the general fact of implication. In believing a particular statement we do not always ask ourselves definitely what other statements we are rejecting. It is only on reflection that we see definitely that in affirming one thing we are denying another. Similarly we do not always realize all that we are affirming in accepting some particular statement. It is the special business of Logic to bring out such implications.

17. We must try to make clear the general place of judgment in the world of knowledge. Now, a judgment is a thought; and it will be best to begin with an attempt to see what is to be understood by thought.

18. The general meaning of this term "Idealism" is what is thought is real; but this may be understood in senses that are not only very different, but that are even somewhat sharply contrasted. Parmenides appears to have been the first who insisted that what is thought must be regarded as real; and his contention was in more modern times repeated, almost in the same words, by Descartes. The contention of the former led to the idealism of Plato: that of the latter to the idealism of Spinoza. These types of idealism were afterwards more fully developed by Hegel. All these forms of idealism rest on the view that the world, as apprehended in thought, is real. But there is another sense in which the term "idealism" is sometimes understood--the sense that is best represented by Berkeley. According to this view, reality is found only in individual consciousness and their thought processes. When this view is fully developed, it becomes a scepticism, such as that of Hume, and is then almost the direct antithesis of the other type of idealism. What they have in common is the emphasis on thought; but the one emphasizes the objective aspect of thought, while the other emphasizes its subjective aspects. The two views sometimes approximate to one another. Even Berkeley made some approximation to the Platonic position; and Leibniz may perhaps be taken as representing a still closer approximation between the two views. Nevertheless, they are essentially distinct and even opposed.

19. Scepticism, such as that of Heraclitus of that of Hume, is based in general on the denial of universality. Heraclitus said that we "cannot step into the same river twice"; and Hume said that every perception is distinct and independent. Yet it is obvious that we know what we mean by a river.
20. All the judgments to which we have referred have been expressed in words; and it would be difficult to think of any judgment that should not be so expressed.
21. There is no explicit knowledge of meaning until some exact definition has been arrived at. This statement may, no doubt, be challenged on the ground that some significant terms are incapable of definition. It may be asked how we can define a simple colour or sound or smell, or again how we can define good or beautiful, or perhaps even art or the State.
22. There is thus a great deal of meaning that is apprehended but is not made explicit. Similarly when Carlyle and others declare that "Right is Might," it may be taken as certain that they do not mean that these two conceptions are to be identified. What they mean is probably that in human life the rightness or wrongness of an action has a considerable inflence in determining the possibility of carrying it out successfully. But this meaning is not made explicit in the wording, and very probably not in the minds of most of those who utter or hear the expression. Such lack of explicitness is, of course, a great source of confusion.

In dealing with judgments, it is often difficult to determine how much meaning is intended to be conveyed. Sir William Hamilton insisted strongly on the importance of making

the meaning explicit.

23. The whole system of implications would collapse, and there would be no such thing as thought. Hence some of the ancient sceptics, who doubted any such persistence of connected meanings, sought to abandon thought, and with it language, and to limit their expressions to pointing at individual objects. This was, in a way, logical; and yet, in saying that it was logical, we imply that they were thinking. As human beings we cannot really abandon thought. We can only try to understand what is implied in it. In order to do this, we must now proceed to consider more difinitely what are its fundamental laws or conditions.

24. Every one must recognize that, if our thinking is not consistent with itself, there must be something fundamentally wrong with it. Hence attempts have been made to formulate the fundamental laws that are necessarily involved in all thought. The laws that are most commonly stated are those of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Sufficient Reason. They are not to be interpreted psychologically, i.e. they are not to be regarded as laws of the subjective processes of our thought, in the sense in which the principle of association may be said to be such a law, or in the sense in which the use of images or of some form of language may be said to be a general condition of thinking. Psychological conditions such as these influence our thinking in the sense that it is difficult, or even impossible, to carry on any process of thought without observing them. This can hardly be said to be true of the fundamental laws of thought. It is quite easy to think inconsistently. The difficulty is all in the opposite direction.

Not only does it seem clear that untrained minds are apt to fall into contradictions. Writers of high repute, such as Emerson or Carlyle or Nietzsche, may almost be said to glory in their inconsistency.

25. If reality be understood in a different sense, as opposed to mere appearance, it is not at once apparent that reality in this sense must be self-consistent. We cannot assume that the actual is reational, though we may take it as a working hypothesis, or even be able to prove it by an elaborate course of argument. Parmenides may on the whole be regarded as the first philosopher who definitely sought to maintain the rationality of the actual; but Zeno, his chief disciple, was apparently only able to defend his position by urging that any other view led to difficulties and contradictions that were at least quite as great as those involved in it. Plato, largely by reflection on the work of Parmenides and Zeno, was led to a fresh effort to maintain in rationality of the actual; but he maintained it by the method of dialectic--i.e. by showing the contradictions that are involved in any way of thinking that does not grasp reality as a whole. This line of thought was, in more modern times, elaborated, with German thoroughness, by Hegel; and, still more recently, it has been reinforced, in a more tentative way by Mr. Bradley and others. According to any view of this type, the self-consistency of the whole involves the contradictoriness of all partial views of it. If a doctrine of this kind is correct, self-consistency can only be established as a fundamental presupposition. It is, moreover, very difficult to establish a view of this kind in such a way as to make

the coherence and self-consistency of ultimate reality thoroughly clear; and, until such a doctrine is definitely established, it cannot be held that there is any inherent absurdity in the views of those who doubt or deny that system. Such doubt or denial may either be set forth in a defintely sceptical form, such as that of Gorgias, or it may simply be stated as an objection to the view that the nature of reality can be intellectually apprehended. It may be supposed to be apprehended by some form of intuition or faith, rather than by clear thought. Heraclitus, for instance, seems to have maintained that contradictoriness lies in the essential nature of things; and it appears to have been largely in opposition to him that Parmenides was led to formulate his doctrine. Plotinus, again, partly following Plato, held that reality can only be grasped by intuition, not in a definitely intellectual way; and, in our own time, a similar view has been set forth by M. Bergson, and, in a somewhat different way, by Mr. Balfour, with a great deal of eloquence and persuasive power. Kant also urged that, in attempting to form a coherent view of the universe, thought falls inevitably into self-contradiction and that ultimate reality must be held to be incomprehensible.

26. The tension of opposites, that was emphasized by Heraclitus, has still to be recognized as a fundamental aspect of our universe, however we may seek to reconcile them.

27. The essence of a conception lies in the definiteness of its meaning. Until it has been clearly defined, we can hardly be said to apprehend it at all.

28. There are but few people who can be said

to know definitely what is meant by life, art, religion, morality, government, truth, reality, value, and many other concepts; although almost every one is able to make some use of them for practical purposes, and even to think about them in a vague way. It is only when they are clearly defined that they acquire a fixed meaning.

29. Clear thought is not possible unless we continue to use our terms in exactly the same sense. We cannot make any definite statements about unity, motion, redness, sweetness, pain, or any other concept, unless we are able to assume that every time the term is used it conveys a meaning that remains identical with itself, and is distinct from any other meaning. If we mean by religion sometimes one thing and sometimes another--even if the two things are very closely related--if we use it sometimes in a sense that would include Fetichism and sometimes in one that is only applicable to such religions as Buddhism or Christianity, our thinking about religion is almost certain to be, in some degree, fallacious.

30. The difference between a belief and a proposition or judgment is that, while the latter is simply the expression of a complex meaning the former is the acceptance of that meaning as true by some particular person.

31. Sometimes it is only a source of blindness. Most people in this country chose to believe that a great continental war was almost impossible, in spite of all the warnings that they received, and all the evidence of preparation for it. This did not make the catastrophe any the less real, or enable them to meet it more effectively. Nor does optimism or pessimism

with regard to its outcome--often based largely on individual temperament--have much direct influence on the actual result. But it seems clear, from such instances, that the ground for our beliefs is often a psychological ground.

32 Beliefs may be based rather on social pressure than on individual inclination. The weight of custom and tradition is often greater than that of personal bias. It is inevitable that we should accept many things on the authority of experts or on the general ground of the trustworthiness of human testimony. A man may believe that he is immortal, not merely because he wishes it, but because it is one of the doctrines of the Church to which he belongs. The Church may have other grounds for its doctrine; and the individual may have other grounds for belonging to the Church. But in both cases it may be true that the explanations are historical and pyschological, rather than logical. Again, a man may believe that "the whole is greater than its part" because it seems to be self-evident. He may believe that if he steals he will be punished, because it is a valid inference from what he knows of the social order. He may believe that there is a uniform three-dimensional space, because without this conception he cannot deal with the problem of Euclidean geometry.

33. In what is commonly called Formal Logic, only one kind of implication is dealt with--viz. that involved in the conception of classes. From the point of view of modern thought, this is a little more than a game. It was not a game for its founder, Aristotle, because he regarded classification as the

great aim of science. The formal treatment of thought can, however, be extended, as it is in modern mathamatical logic, so as to deal with other relations than those of classes. The treatment of fallacies is, moreover, often combined with the study of formal logic; and in dealing with these, the implications of language have to be considered in a more concrete way. The study of the methods of the special sciences, in the more empirical types of logic, involves the consideration of some of the chief forms of objective order, notably that of causation. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, seeks to deal with all the fundamental conceptions that are used in thinking, and to bring out all their implications. Thus it seems right to say that implication is the one subject with which every kind of logic is concerned. It is confusing to mix up with psychological enquiries into the processes of thinking, or with the meaning of truth and reality, except in so far as questions may arise about the implications of different conceptions of knowledge or truth or reality. The one aim of all logic is to make our meaning clear, both with regard to what is meant and to what that meaning implies; and it would be well if it could confine itself to this. No doubt in doing this it is incidentally helping us to discover truth--at least if truth is something that can be made clear. At any rate, the laws of thought with which we have here been dealing, would seem to be simply the fundamental conditions of clearness.

34. We have now to enquire, more definitely what is to be understood by saying that any thing is true. When we say that it is true

that 2 + 2 = 4, and false that 2+2 = 5, we are referring to relations that hold within the scheme of numbers. We are not referring to anything else. We only mean that a set of four contains two more units than a set of two. Now, this is clearly not a matter of opinion. It is involved in the structure of the numerical scheme; and so, within that scheme, it is objectively true. So again, if we state that blue is nearer to green than to yellow, this is true with reference to the scale of colours, and is not a matter of opinion.

35. Correctness and error, unlike truth and falsehood, admit of degrees.

36. Reality is a somwhat ambiguous term. There are a number of senses in which it may be understood.

37. Reality as existence.--This is probably the most common acceptation of the term. Here we are concerned with one special order--viz. the order of experience. Whatever is experienced, or appears, or appears to be implied in experience, is said to exist. Whales exist, but centaurs do not. Reality as the Absolute or Eternal.--It may be urged that nothing is really real when its reality is subject to qualifications--i.e. when it can only be said to exist at some particular place and time, or as apprehended from some special point of view, or as contained within some limited order. Thus the phenomenal is contrasted with the noumenal, and only the latter is held to be, in the strictest sense, real. When Gorgias denied that anything is real, it would seem to have been in this sense that he denied it; and there are recent philosophers also who either deny reality in this sense or doubt whether it exists or can be known or expressed.

38. Every particular thing, as we have seen, has to be regarded as distinct from every other particular thing. A is A, and A is not B. There is thus both a positive and a negative aspect in the assertion of any existence.

39. There may be a sense in which it is legitimate to speak of an antithesis between appearance and reality, or of different degrees of reality; though both these expressions are open to some objection. It seems better to confine ourselves to the statement that there are degrees of completeness in our apprehension of objects.

40. As Plato and Spinoza both urge, it is extremely difficult to attain knowledge in the fullest sense of the word. The unsatisfactoriness of knowledge that is not fully grounded is perhaps best brought out in the Theaetetus of Plato. We may have to admit, in the end, that perfect knowledge is rather an ideal for the human mind than an actual possession, at least with regard to some of the most important problems. Still, it is well to understand what the ideal is, and not to pretend to have knowledge when we have only some form of opinion.

41. When we say that we know a thing--e.g. a proposition in Geometry or a fact of history--we may have forgotten the exact grounds on which we believe it; and yet the grounds may be perfectly adequate. But there is always a danger, in such cases, that our belief may be partly erroneous. We may think that the grounds support more than they will actually bear. Dogmatism is usually understood to mean the holding of opinions without adequate realization of the grounds that support them.

42. It is evident that many of our beliefs are based on the information derived through our senses. "Seeing is believing"; touching, hear-

ing, tasting, smelling, and other modes of sense apprehension, are hardly less potent in conveying a certain kind of conviction. The contribution to knowledge that is thus received is comparatively slight: yet it would seem to be considerably greater than has sometimes been supposed. Hume described the material contributed by the senses as a stream of disconnected impressions; and Kant also followed him so far as to refer to the "manifold of sense" as the matter from which our knowledge is built up.

43. The view that the universe can be regarded as a completely intelligible system, is the goal at which all science, and especially all philosophy, must be regarded as aiming.

44. Such a scepticism as that of Hume, which rests on the supposition that all our perceptions are distinct and separate, is--as, indeed, he was himself pretty clearly aware--essentially unreasonable. Such an agnosticism as that of Kant, however, which rests on the view that the attempt to view the world as a completely intelligible system breaks down, is still a possible attitude.

45. It may be that the pursuit is the ultimate human attitude, rather than its attainment. But this would not justify agnosticism, in the sense of a definite belief that the conception of the world as an intelligible system is intrinsically impossible. We may at least hope to give grounds for believing that the difficulties in the way of the interpretation of our world are not such as to force us to adept any such conclusion. If we cannot establish a dogmatic theory of the structure of the universe, we may at least hope to prevent the establishment of the dogmatic theory that it has no intelligible structure.

46. What is indicated in the previous section may be made somewhat more definite by means of the distinction between absolute knowledge and the knowledge of the Absolute. Scepticism, in its most extreme form, is the denial or doubt of the possibility of any absolute knowledge; while Agnosticism, in its most definite sense is the denial or doubt of the possibility of any knowledge of the Absolute. By absolute knowledge I understand a belief that is known with complete certainty to be correct. By knowledge of the Absolute I understand a correct belief with regard to the structure of the universe as a whole.

47. So long as we retain our reason, it seems clear that there are some things that cannot be doubted. Doubt is a mode of belief: it is the belief that something is uncertain by distinguishing it from things that are certain. To doubt whether anything is certain is also to doubt whether anything is uncertain. Scepticism, in this sense, is "a medicine that purges out itself along with the disease." What it leaves is the recognition that, while a few things are certain, a much larger number are only probable--i.e. we have some grounds for believing them, but not grounds that are absolutely conclusive. To this class belong most, if not all, of our scientific theories.

48. The general principle of causation is less open to question; but, even with regard to this it can hardly be said to be absolutely absurd--however improbable it may be--to suppose that there is some element of chance of contingency at some point in the Universe.

49. The term idealism has been used to characterize two very different points of view, one of which is most conspicuously represeted by Plato, the other by Berkeley.

50. Berkeley's view, on the other hand, may be briefly expressed by saying that reality consists of conscious centres, together with what they apprehend at the moment at which it is apprehended. These views, which (as we have already noticed) are almost the opposites of one another, have both been called idealism in consequence of a change of meaning in the word Idea. At first it meant a Form, then it came to mean a Universal, then the Universal as apprehended by some conscious centre. The term Realism has undergone somewhat similar transformations. At first it was applied to the doctrine that universals and orders are real, and are not dependent for their reality on their apprehension by conscious centres. In this sense Plato is the most conspicuous representative of Realism, just as he is of Idealism in its older sense. But Realism has since come to mean any doctrine that asserts the reality of anything as being independent of its apprehension by conscious centres. In this sense even Berkeley is a Realist, is so far as he held that conscious centres themselves are real independently of their apprehension by one another. Hume came nearer to complete opposition to Realism in this, or indeed in any, sense. What Berkeley chiefly denied was the reality of material substance; and this was one of the few points that he had in common with Plato. Hence Realism has sometimes been understood to mean the doctrine of the independent reality of material substance. When understood in this sense, Realism may be fairly said to be opposed to the Idealism both of Plato and of Berkeley. But in recent times the term has been applied to the views of certain writers who are mainly concerned with the affirmation of the

reality of universals and orders. Some at least of these writers do not affirm the independent reality of material substance. Some even agree with Berkeley in thinking that certain things that we apprehend are real only in so far as they are apprehended by conscious centres. Thus it has become very difficult to distinguish between idealists and realists. It may, however, be urged at least that the Berkeleyan type of idealism can hardly be supported. What we have now seen with regard to the meaning of knowledge and reality leads us to recognize that it is fundamentally erroneous.

Berkeley's view rested, as Reid pointed out, on the doctrine of representative perception, which is traceable to Descartes. Descartes, as we have already noted, affirmed that the only thing that could not be doubted was the reality of the conscious centre at the moment at which it is aware of itself. Other things, he contended, are not known directly, but only through their representations, which called ideas. Berkeley sought to improve on this, by holding that the representations alone are real; and that we have no real ground for maintaining the reality of that which they represent or picture. This he urged chiefly as an argument against the reality of material substance; and on that particular point he may have been right. We shall have occasion to consider this at a later stage. But it seems obvious that the general doctrine of representative perception is erroneous. We do not apprehend pictures of numbers or colours or sounds or degrees of heat or time or extension. What we apprehend is numbers in themselves, colours, and so forth. And it seems clear that the meaning of what is

thus apprehended is not dependent on the fact that a particular conscious centre apprehends it. Whether it is in any way dependent on the existence of conscious centres in general may be more open to doubt.

51. The early Greek philosophers begain on the whole with the assumption of the general validity of ordinary knowledge, and were only gradually led by the emergence of dialectical problems, to realize the difficulties that are involved in it.

52. These philosophers, however, were animated by a sturdy faith in the power of rational reflection to solve all the difficulties that it raises--a faith which they only partially succeeded in justifying. Hence a time of scepticism gradually supervened; and it is only through the labours of many generations, initiated in the main by the constructive efforts of Descartes, that it has been possible to restore something that at least approximates to the confidence by which the work of Plato and Aristotle was inspired.

53. The doctrine of representative ideas, as understood by Descartes, can be pretty easily explained. Having adopted the view that the only things of which we are immediately certain are the self and its ideas, he conceived that the latter could be rightly described as being "in the mind." This implies a kind of metaphor, the full significance of which will call for some further discussion. It involves as it has been put, the comparison of the individual mind to a picture-gallery, the pictures being characterized as ideas. One of the pictures is that of the gallery itself--i.e. the idea of the individual mind as a thinking substance; and this picture must be supposed

to have been always in it, so that the idea may be said to be "innate". Some, such as the ideas of centaurs or chimeras, may be regarded as pictures that have been painted or constructed by the self. Some, such as emotional expsiences and purely sensible qualities, not being clear and distinct, may be held to be mere daubs, of no special significance for knowledge, though of some practical value. But there are some that appear to be elaborate portraits; and these may be supposed to be the portraits of beings external to the mind, and to have been, as it were, handed in by them--presented, as Mr. Bradley has put it, with their compliments.

52. It seems to have been only by a truly magnificent inconsistency that Locke ever conceived himself to be entitled to pass from ideas in the mind to qualities in things, and to the knowledge of the reality of substance. Apart from the comprehensiveness of his survey and some useful contributions to psychological analysis, the value of this work lay almost entirely in preparing the way for the subjective idealism of Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume. He did this chiefly by emphasizing the difficulty of forming any positive conception of substance, any intelligible idea of power or causal efficacy, and any coherent theory of the apprehension of universals, as distinguished from the ideas of particular things.

Subjective Idealism--The subjective idealism of Berkeley grew immediately out of the position of Locke; but it may also be connected pretty directly with that of Descartes. Kant, in his Refutation of Idealism, deals with the views of Descartes and Berkeley together, dis-

tinguishing their attitudes, with regard to this particular problem, as problematic and dogmatic respectively. Referring back to our account of Descartes' manner of thinking of the mind and its ideas as a picture-gallery containing portraits, we may say that what Berkeley urges is that, if we only see pictures in a gallery, we have no real reason for thinking that they ever exist in any other way that in a gallery. If we did not paint them ourselves, the most reasonable supposition is that they were brought in from some other gallery, in which they were painted by a productive activity similar to that which we find in our own. The chief difficulty about this is that it does not account for those pictures that were in the gallery from the first--i.e. from the ideas of self and God--and those that represent permanent conditions of all experience, such as time, space, number, causal sequence,,and other forms of relation--in general, for those fundamental determinations that are commonly referred to as categories. Berkeley was forced to deny that these are properly to be regarded as ideas at all; he describes them as Notions. We have notions, he says, of the self, of other selves, of activity, and, in general, of all modes of relation--i.e. as he explains, we know what we mean by these conceptions, though we cannot be said to picture them, and though their reality does not consist in our apprehension of them.
53. Even Berkeley distinguished between the sense in which ideas are "in the mind" and that in which the characteristics of the mind itself--e.g. its attitude of choice--may be rightly so described; and, indeed, in acknowledging that the same idea may be transferred

or communicated from one mind to another, he was almost admitting that ideas have a certain independence of the particular mind by which they are apprehended.

54. Recurring to the Cartesian metaphor of the picture gallery, we may say that Hume's argument was that, if we only see the pictures, the supposition that they hang in a gallery is gratuitous and unwarranted. They may be taken to be nothing more than dream-pictures; and the dreamer may be supposed to be only an aspect of the dream. His own image--a less convincing one--is that of actors on a stage. We see only the actors, and have no real ground for the supposition that we stage or theatre within which we place them is anything more than the sum of their movements. This is a reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine of representative ideas; and Hume was well aware that he was not propounding a positive theory, but only calling attention to a sceptical conclusion. What he essentially urged was that, according to the doctrine that was then in vogue, and which he provisionally adeopted in default of a better, there could be no real knowledge of anything but a series of individual perceptions--whether the lively ones that are called impressions and beliefs, or the fainter ones that are called ideas and fancies--"succeeding one another with inconceivable rapidity, and in perpetual flux and movement." He saw, indeed, that such a view made even the appearance of definite knowledge incomprehensible; but he did not see how any better doctrine could be devised. He stated his difficultly clearly thus: "There are two principles which I cannot consistent; nor is it in

my power to renounce either of them--viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficultly in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions." In these words he stated quite definitely the problem that was afterwards dealt with by Kant.

Dualistic Realism.---Reid, writing somewhat earlier that Kant, attempted to meet the scepticism of Hume by setting forth a new doctrine of dualistic realism, based on the denial of the theory of representative ideas. What he was chiefly aiming at was the affirmation of the essentially objective character of our experience. He does not seem, however, to have explained at all clearly what it is that is objectively apprehended; and his most notable disciple--Sir William Hamilton--in trying to make the position clearer destroyed its chief value by maintaining that sensation is essentially subjective. The main result of Reid's work was to restore the dualism of Descartes and Locke, without the purely subjective conception of knowledge which was really inconsistent with the affirmation of that dualism.

The critical Philosophy. A more hopeful me-

thod of dealing with the scepticism of Hume was introduced by Kant; but his treatment is so technical and complicated that it cannot be easily summarized withought the omission of some aspects that are of considerable importance. In the main, what he did was to bring out the significance of what Berkeley had described as Notions. Kant urged that we cannot, without absurdity, regard our knowledge as being confined to the separate perceptions that are apprehended by us at any particular time. We have to recognize certain fundamental orders, such as those of space, time, and causal succession, which carry us beyond our immediate data, and necessarily imply a coherent system of connections. He thus denied both the fundamental principles which Hume found it so difficult to reconcile. He continued to regard the immediate data that we apprehend by way of sensation as purely subjective.

In his refutation of Idealism (by which he means Subjective Idealism) he urges, as we have already noticed, against both Descartes and Berkeley, that the recognition of coherent order (especially in the form of what is called substantiality) is more directly involved in the apprehension of objects distinct from the self than in the awareness of the subject; and that our knowledge of the persistent reality of the self must, consequently, be regarded as comparatively secondary and derivative, rather than as what is most immediately apprehended. He contends, moreover, that the order which we are bound to recognize in the connection of the objects that we apprehend, is an order that can never be reduced to a completely systematic form;

and must, consequently, be treated as only, "phenomenal" and distinguished from the real order, which may be supposed to belong to the relations between "things-in-themselves" and which we are led to postulate chiefly on moral grounds. But Kant's doctrine carried conviction, at least with regard to the necessity of recognizing that some kind of reality belongs to the more mediate forms of apprehension, as well as to those that are more immediate. When the significance of this is fully realized, it leads to the doctrine that may be characterized as that of epistemological realism--i.e. the doctrine that everything that we in any way cognize has a kind of reality, which is not simply to be identified with the fact that it is immediately apprehended at any particular time.

The subjectivism that continued to permeate Kant's philosophy is largely to be traced to that process which he described as his Copernical revolution. As Professor Alexander has pointed out, it was, on the whole, rather the reverse of the revolution that Copernicus effected; and, indeed, it was not much of a revolution at all. Copernicus substituted a heliocentric for the old geocentric reference; whereas Kant sought to substitute an ego-centric for a cosmocentric attitude.

55. It is probable that Hamilton was a good deal influenced by Kant, in emphasizing the purely subjective character of sensation. Among recent psychologists, even Prof. Stout seems to me to have followed them too closely in this respect. On the general significance of Reid's work, Prof. Pringle-Pattison's book on The Scottish Philosophy should be consulted.

56. Spencer conceived that we can only have definite knowledge of mind in relation to matter and of matter in relation to mind; and that the dualism in which we are thus involved can only be overcome by the supposition of an Absolute beyond experience, in which the antithesis is annulled. The Absolute which is thus postulated has to be conceived as super-personal, and as such it is to be regarded as worthy of worship. Some other forms of Agnosticism admit a much more complete ignorance; and indeed it would seem that, if we admit as much knowledge as is conceded by Spencer, it ought to be possible to advance somewhat farther.

57 In recent times there has been a considerable group of writers who have laid special stress on the objective aspects of knowledge, as distinguished from the attitude of the individual mind in apprehending its objects. As we have seen, there is apt to be a good deal of confusion with regard to this. Such terms as Sensation, Perception, Imagination, Conception, Thought, may be used either with reference to the attitude of the mind towards an object, or with reference to the object that is apprehended--with reference, as Prof. Lloyd Morgan puts it, to the apprehend*ing* or the apprehend*ed*. We may say that we get a smell *by* sensation, or that a smell *is* a sensation; that we apprehend a distant object *by* perception, or that the object thus apprehended *is* a perception; that we follow a fairy-tale *by* imagination, or that a fairy-tale *is* an imagination; that we are aware of a number *by* conception, or that a number *is* a conception; that we interpret the meaning of a judgment *by* thought, or that a judgment *is* a thought.

Prof. Meinong has helped very much to make such distinctions clear; and Mr. Russell, by insisting on the use of such a term as "sense-datum", instead of sensation, as well as in other ways, has rendered valuable service. Others, such as Profs. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan and Dr. G.E.Moore, have also done much in the same direction. The general result is to destroy the attitude of pure subjectivism.

58. We have thus to think of the Universe as a many in one; and, if we are to form any intelligible view of it, we must try to see, as clearly as we may, what is to be understood both by its manifoldness and by its unity.

59. Hegel's main objects seems to have been to show that no one of these conceptions, taken by itself, can be regarded as an adequate characterization of the whole. He shows this by urging that each of these conceptions implies another which is distinct from it, and, to some extent, opposed to it.

60. One of the most interesting criticims is that of Dr. B.Croce, who objects to the emphasis that is laid by Hegel on antithesis as the instrument for unfolding the implications of conceptions. He points out that, in many cases, it is the counterpart, rather than the opposite, that is implied in the meaning of a particular conception. This appears to be true. Being may be said to imply Non-being; Order may be said to imply Disorder; in the sense that no definite meaning can be assigned to these conceptions without reference to their opposites. On the other hand, Unity implies Plurality, which can hardly be described as its opposite.

61. Primary and Secondary Qualities. Attempts have frequently been made to distinguish between the primary and secondary qualities that

be referred to particular objects. The primary qualities are generally understood to be mainly spatial, modes of extension and movement; and consequently they do not at present concern us. The secondary qualities are such as colour, sound, smell, taste, temperature, and the like. These are conceived as being subjective, in a sense in which the primary are not. The distinction turns largely on the relative permanence of the one kind of quality and the relative variability of the other. The spatial extent of the objects that we apprehend, changes much less readily than their colour or temperature. Tastes, smells and sounds are, on the whole, still less permanent characteristics of complex objects. Colours vary to a considerable extent with different persons, different conditions of light, different points of view from which the objects are regarded, and other circumstances. Hence they have been supposed to be purely subjective.

62. General conception of Causation.--We have noticed already that we do not believe anything without some ground that seems to us sufficient. In general, the ground for the acceptance of any judgment as true is found in some other judgment or set of judgments on which it depends in accordance with some recognized order.

63. Causation may properly be regarded as a mode of order that connects things that are different in kind.

64. Aristotle was the first who made a definite attempt to set forth the different ways in which causation may be conceived. He distinguished, as is well known, between material formal, efficient, and final causes.

65. Nothing can never give rise to anything different from itself. Yet so little confidence had Descartes in this doctrine that he actually held it as being axiomatic that the existence of a living being at one moment could not be the cause of the existence of the same being at the next moment. It would seem, therefore, that his view really amounts to saying that the cause must be absolutely identical with the effect. But this surely means that there is no such thing as efficient causation. This conclusion appears to have been drawn by Spinoza, who holds that every existing thing or mode must be regarded as being deducible from--i.e. eternally contained in--the structure of the whole. This seems to be the logical outcome of the doctrine of Descartes; and it makes causation purely formal.

66. We are here brought back to the consideration of the final cause. When something is chosen, it is selected as being in some way good; so that the question now is, In what way can the apprehension of something as good be seen to be efficient? Obviously there are some limitations to its power. The choice of something--e.g. a house--as a desirable end leads to a series of movements directed towards its realization. It is clear that these are not all under the direct control of the will. Hence Berkeley, like the Cartesians before him, supposes them to be guided by another will--the will of God.

67. Hume's theory of Causation-- Reflection on the unsatisfactoriness of these theories of Descartes and Berkeley led Hume to deny that the element of efficiency could ever be discovered in any case of apparent causation.

Hence he urged that all that we are entitled to state is that we discover certain regular ways in which things in themselves different are connected--especially a certain regularity in the sequence of similars--and that we are thus led to expect that such regularity will be continued. Experience justifies this expectation; but we know of no real ground for believing that it will always justify it. We are in the same position in which they may suppose the lower animals. A fowl that has frequently been fed by a particular person at a particular time of day seems to get into the habit of expecting to be fed by that person at that time. This expectation may continue to be justified for many days; but a day may come at last when that person, instead of feeding it, will wring its neck. So it may be with us. The orderly system of our ordinary experience may at any time lapse into chaos. We do not apprehend any efficiency in the causal order, but only a certain regularity of sequence, which contains no absolute guarantee of permanence. Hum's treatment of this aspect of the subject is so clear and convincing that he may be said to have achieved in it one of the very few decisive victories in philosophy.

68. Kant contends that the persistent reality of the causal order is as necessary an assumption for our knowledge of the objective world as that of time and space. Kant, however, did not believe that time and space have any absolute reality; and hence it cannot be said that he wholly disagrees with Hume.

69. We are led to ask whether any system can be conceived which should be, in the full sense of the word, self-explanatory. Such a system would be, in Spinoza's language, causa sui.

Now, it seems possible at least to point to certain approximations. They are to be found especially in the region that was specially familiar and attrative to Spinoza, and to the Cartesians in general--viz. mathematics. The system of numbers may almost be said to be self-explanatory. Once we know what the conception of number means, all the relations between numbers can be deduced, without appealing to anything that lies outside of that particular order. All that it seems to presuppose is a manifold of distinguishable elements; and, as we cannot think even of a complete chaos without supposing such a manifold the conception hardly seems to call for any explanation.

70. Huxley urged that the appearance of a colour, following on a particular mode of motion, is as mysterious as the appearance of the Djin on the rubbing of Aladdin's lamp. But the growth of a plant or (as Lord Kelvin suggested) the behaviour of a spring, or of a magnet, is, in reality, hardly less mysterious.

71. Characteristics, such as colour, are more variable, and are commonly referred to as secondary. It has often been said that the latter exist "in the mind" of the being by whom they are apprehended, and that their relation to the particular object is only causal. Berkeley extended this way of speaking to the primary qualities as well. If we rightly understand what is meant by "in" this way of speaking may be justified. When a combination of qualities is apprehended as belonging to the unity of an object, the apprehension belongs to a particular conscious centre; and the qualities cannot properly be said to exist except in the sense that they occur in certain connections. Hence they are rightly referred to the particular

mind as well as to the particular object. This will have to be considered further in connection with the unity of consciousness.
72.That in a certain sense the objects that we apprehend are in consciousness is clear-- viz. the sense in which to be "in" means to be apprehended. In this sense every object and relation and mode of unity of which we have any direct knowledge may be said to be in consciousness.
73. What is vividly present to consciousness is said, in the widest sense of the word, to be attended to. One who is nearly asleep is not attending to anything. But one may be awake to certain things and not to others. One may be awakened by a loud noise or by becoming aware that it is time to rise. In the former case it would seem that the intensity of the object leads to vividness of consciousness; in the latter case the vividness of consciousness is due rather to a subjective interest. The primary meaning of attention, then, would seem to be simply that certain objects are vividly apprehended; but we generally mean also that the objects become not only vivid, but distinct; and this will at least usually involve a definite process of consciousness directed in a particular way.
74, Even among human beings it seems clear that a highly civilized and cultivated person has certain powers more fully developed than an uncultivated savage, though the latter mayoalso be superior in certain respects. In general it would probably be true to say that the savage has more vividness in some of his apprehensions of sensible qualities, but less completeness in the power of intellectual discrimination, especially in the definite apprehensions of universals and orders.

75. We have already had occasion to notice his contention that our first certainty is that of our own conscious experience. From this he was led to affirm the reality of self; and he conceived that other kinds of reality are only indirectly derived from this. Berkeley, from the same point of view, urged that a thinking substance is the only kind of substantial existence that we know, or that we have a right to assume.

76. Hume had already urged, in a clear and cogent way, that, if we observe our own conscious states, what we are primarily aware of is their incessant change, rather than their persistent unity. Kant pointed out that the apprehension of change implies the recognition of something that persists throughout the change; but he agreed with Hume in maintaining that we do not directly apprehend what it is that thus persists in our conscious states; and that we have a much more direct apprehension of persistence in the case of objects that we distinguish from ourselves.

77. It is more and more recognized that the activity of consciousness cannot be regarded simply as a function of the brain, or its content as being something that is stored up in that organ.

78. What seems to constitute our specific individuality as persons is the compact system of our conscious possessions, and especially our valuations. These may, no doubt, be in abeyance for a time--as they are in profound sleep, or in our ordinary dream experiences, or even throughout considerable tracts of our waking life--without any loss of personal identity; but only on condition that they are recoverable. Now, it is certainly conceivable

that a person might pass through a series of successive incarnations, in which the consciousness of his previous existences remained latent; and might at last reach a stage in his successive experiences would appear as a continuous development. In a small way, something of the kind does happen in our everyday existence. We pass, for instance, from one set of interests to another; and, while we are absorbed in the second, we may be quite oblivious of the first. Sometimes the change may be almost as great as that from Dr. Jekyll to Mr. Hyde. Yet we may return again to the previous interest, and bring it into connection with that by which it was interrupted; and, in the end, we may realize that there has been no essential change in our personal attitude, but only that our consciousness has been enlarged and enriched by the double set of experiences. To suppose that our personal existence may be prolonged throughout a number of successive lives, in some such way as this, has undoubtedly a certain fascination; and, as it allows for breaches of continuity at the points at which the transition is made from one embodiment to another, it does not appear to be open to those objections that have been so far brought forward. It is felt that a view of this kind serves to remove the sense of incompleteness and frustration that we so constantly experience in the contemplation of the lives of those in whom we are interested. Even one whose life was to comprehensive as that of Goethe had, up to the end, a keen sense of the need for further expansion; and Kant urged that a continuous personal development is a necessary postulate for the realization of that perfection which is a demand of man's rational nature.

79. Napoleon may have been actuated by personal ambition; but it is certainly to a large extent true, that he was working for the ideas of the French Revolution, for the liberation of mankind from despotism and the establishment of social justice. As has been already noted, he regarded himself as as instrument for this purpose, rathen than as a private individual.

80. The individual who recognizes himself as a member of a spiritual unity could at least hardly seek for any continuance of his own life in separation from the whole to which he belongs. Nor would he seek, it would appear for the continuance of those limitations that are specially characteristic of his existence at particular moments.

81. Indeed, even the individual who specially values his own personal existence, would hardly wish for the persistence of every particular aspect of it. The child does not, in general, desire to persist as a child, but rather to become a man; and yet this involves a considerable change of his personality. Similarly, the individual who has realized, in any considerable degree, the nature of the ultimate aim for which he strives, does not desire the persistence of his limited nature but rather the attainment of a more perfect mode of being.

82. Some of the early attempts that were made in India are highly instructive; but, in general, they appear to be suggestive rather than logically coherent, resting on intuitions to which it is difficult to give exact form or to provide a basis that can be established by cogent argument. The early Greek speculations appear to be partly traceable to Oriental sources. Most of them have a certain

clearness, and they helped to give definiteness to mathematical and physical conceptions, and to lay the foundations of logical method; but they did not furnish any intelligible theory of the Cosmos.

83. We cannot appeal to any metaphysical system as claiming absolute validity; and we must be content to struggle along as best as we may.

It is evident that it is very difficult to form a coherent view of the universe as a whole; and this is perhaps not surprising.

84. The universe, as apprehended by human beings at any time, or its general features a apprehended at all times, may be referred to as the phenomenal world, or the world of appearance. This does not necessarily mean that it is in any way unreal; but only that we recognize its incompleteness, and that, if we could apprehend it in a more complete way, our conception of its general structure might be considered altered.

85. All have some temporal reference, in the sense that they are apprehended at some particular moment; and all have some spatial reference, in the sense that, at the time when we apprehend them, our consciousness is related to an organism standing in spatial relations to other objects.

86. No existent thing seems to persist for any considerable time; and, as we have already seen, there are some grounds for believing , in accordance with the recognized laws of Thermodynamics, that the whole physical system with which we are connected is destined, within a measurable time, to dissolve completely and "leave not a wrack behind." It would seem, therefore, that the universe that we know cannot be regarded as a permanent part of a

perfect order; and, if it is not permanent, it is not easy to see how it can have any real place at all in such an order.

87. The fact of change has always presented a serious problem to constructive philosophers since the time of the Eleatics, if not even from an earlier date. Permenides, at any rate, was convinced that what really exists must be supposed to exist always.

88. If we were to assume that the phenomenal Universe is the dream or imaginative construction of a great Spirit, we might suppose that it has a coherent significance, to which every part is relevant; and we might suppose also that it persists eternally. We commonly think of our dreams as unreal, because they lack the kind of coherence that belongs to what we call the world of fact. A thoroughly coherent dream would be perfectly real, especially if it could be supposed to persist eternally. But, it may be asked, is it not at least somewhat absurd to suppose that the consciousness of one being can be only the dream of another? Is it not a supposition that belongs rather to the realm of Alices Adventures than to that of sober speculations? Did not even Alice rightly resent the supposition that she was only a part of the Red Queen's dream? I think it must be admitted that the conception of a dream has some degree of inadequacy at this point. It might be better to think rather of an imaginative construction. The persons in an imaginative construction have a certain independence of their creator. Iago is part of the imaginative construction of Shakespeare; but he has a character of his own as well, quite distinguishable from that of his creator.

89. As Hume said, "all doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions." The

viviews that our desires lead us to adopt are generally too limited in their outlook to be finally decisive, not merely as to what we are entitled to believe, but even as to what we ought to hope, i.e. what is really desirable. What we tend to desire, in general, is something that contrasts with what we happen to have suffered.

90. The conception of Infinity presents itself in philosophy primarily as a mode of escape from the difficulties involved in the existence of finite things.

91. A particular extent of space, it was urged, can only be definitely conceived by being thought of as cut off from a larger whole, which, in the end, cannot be supposed to be itself limited. It must be regarded as being infinite in its kind; and this way of thinking of it leads very naturally to the supposition that other things also are to be supposed to be infinite in their kind.

92. This way of thinking leads pretty directly to the doctrine that all determination is, in its essence, negation. To say that a thing is blue, is to say that it is not of any other colour.

93. Such problems are somewhat on a par with some of those in which the Megaric school of philosophers appear to have delighted. A Cretan, for instance, is supposed to affirm that Cretans never speak the truth. If this is true, it must be false, since it is uttered by a Cretan. The value of this puzzle seems to consist simply in showing that it is possible to make a statement that is intrinsically absurd--a fact that might be illustrated in many ways. The supposed problems about infinity do not carry us much farther.

94. It would be necessary to consider all the fundamental conceptions that are implied in the structure of a knowable universe. As we have already noted, Hegel's Logic is the most thorough attempt in this direction. If such an attempt can be successfully carried out, it provides us with a system of conceptions that may be said to be self-explanatory; and mathematical conceptions would have a definite place among these.

95 We have to recognise the sense in which every positive conception seems to imply its negative. Heraclitus was perhaps the first who definitely brought this out, though he set it forth in somewhat "dark sayings". His contention that the Perfect only becomes intelligible in relation to the Imperfect, was adopted and developed by Hegel; and it would seem that it is only by the recognition of this that we can see the significance of the negativity, imperfection, and evil that are so painfully apparent in the Universe as we know it.

96. The distinction between what is real and what is imaginary is not one that can be finally maintained. What is imagined is, so far as it goes, real. To imagine what is imperfect or evil, is to have it present before us; just as, to apprehend yellow, as the colour contrasted with blue, is actually to have yellow present. On the other hand, it may equally well be contended that all existing things are, in a quite intelligible sense, imaginary. Change may be said to be the revelation of the unreality of what exists. Alles was entsteht Ist werth dass es zu Grunde geht. It is an aspect of reality; but what it essentially is, is not truly seen in the

passing show. It is here that Professor Bergson's conception of the temporal flow has its value. We fix our eyes on the passing moment, and give it a prominence and permanence that do not rightly belong to it. According to the way of speaking that we have here provisionally adopted, it may be thought of as only a passing phase in the eternal dream of reality. Time, as Plato said, is "the moving image of eternity"; or rather, it is eternity itself in its aspect of movement. Thus, what passes in it may be said to be at once real and imaginary--real when viewed sub specie aeternitatis, imaginary in its apparent isolation.

97. The cultivated man studies the past, not that he may be ruled by it, but that he may learn its lessons; and certainly, among its lessons, not the least important are those that are concerned with the apprehension of values.

98. The conception of all life as the unfolding of a single life may seem to lead to a denial of the persistence of the individual as such; and, in one sense, I think it does. It hardly permits such a hypothesis as that of the resurrection of the body; or even of the persistence of the individual person, with the same characteristics and limitations that belong to him as he is known by others, or even as he knows himself in his ordinary conscious experience. But it is not fatal to the conception of some form of individual survival. We have already noted that the conception of human immortality that is now ch chiefly current among reflective people, is that of what is commonly described as reincarnation. This can hardly be supposed to

mean that there is some entity--a little self enclosed within the organic self--which passes from one body and enters into another, as the cruder forms of Animism appear to suggest. Real continuity of life would seem to be unintelligible except as continuity of conscious experience; and, as we have already noticed, our ordinary, conscious experience is so intimately bound up with our organic existence, that it could hardly be supposed to be, in any direct way, transferred to another form of such existence. If we are really expressions of a larger life, it would seem that what we must suppose is rather that our ordinary consciousness is only a part of the larger consciousness to which we are related.

99. It is well known that some Oriental sages profess to have definite memories of previous existences with which their present lives are, in some intimate way, identified; and I understand that there are now a certain number in the West who claim to have had similar experiences. Such purely personal experience cannot be tested in the way in which facts open to general observation can be tested; and can, consequently, not be made into a very secure basis for philosophical theories.

100. Eternity is sometimes taken to mean the infinite extension of time, both backwards and forwards. This may be a valid interpretation of it; but the difficulties in the way of such an interpretation, which seem to me insuperable, have already been considered. Those who have at all fully realized these difficulties have generally met them by maintaining that time is essentially unreal, or that it has only a subordinate degree of reality. Eternity is thus understood to mean timelessness. It may

be possible to interpret this in a way that is fully intelligible; but, on the face of it, it seems to me to be an evasion of the difficulty, rather than a solution of it.

101. The Vedantists, as I understand them, arrive at this antithesis by the following line of thought. They start from an argument somewhat similar to that of Descartes, with regard to the reality of the Self as having a greater degree of assurance than that of the objects that it apprehends. But, while Descartes identifies the self with the conscious person in the act of apprehending objects, they seek more definitely to separate the pure self from all the content of our conscious experience. Hence they direct special attention, not to the self as presented in our waking life or in the consciousness of dreams; but rather to the self as it may be supposed to exist in dreamless sleep, when no particular objects are apprehended by it. In this state, they urge, it is simply aware of itself; and they conceive that in this pure contemplation (or rather enjoyment --to adopt Professor Alexander's antithesis) there is to be found a certain peace and felicity that cannot be gained from the apprehension of any objects either in drams or in our waking experience. As, however, there is really nothing to distinguish one such self from another, they regard the distinct existence of such conscious centres as essentially illusory, and contend that ultimate reality is to be sought only in the one eternal being called Brahman. We apprehend reality and gain perfect happiness by identifying ourselves with this being, rather than with our individual conscious-centre. All else is, in a certain sense, illusion or mere appearance. But the illusion has to be accounted for; and they explain it as due to

the activity of Maya, which issues somehow from Brahman and produces a sort of dream-experience. This dream is the time-cycle, which eternally repeats itself, and which is the source of our ordinary experience of the world. The great end of life is to escape from this dream or illusion by identification with Brahman, a difficult process which is only brought about through successive reincarnations.

The chief objection that may be brought against this way of thinking appears to be the following: The state of dreamless sleep is assumed to be a conscious state. This assumption seems to rest, at least partly, on a rather obvious fallacy. We are said to be "conscious of nothing" when it would seem to be more correct to say that we are"not conscious of anything." The pure self-consciousness of which they speak is rather like the pure Being of Hegel, which cannot be distinguished from non-entity.

102. If it is our supreme end to identify ourselves with Brahman, this must surely mean that we appropriate his dream as well, and appreciate its significance. It would seem to follow from this that the pessimistic view about the world of our experience which seems to be inseparable from such a conception of the absolute as that which is set forth by the Vedantists, ought to be eliminated

103. The building up our knowledge may be compared to the construction of a child's picture-puzzle. The picture is there, but it comes to us in fragments, the place of which within the whole is not at first apparent. We are guided, in the growth of of our knowledge, by the conviction, which

tends to become stronger and stronger as we proceed, that the universe with which we are dealing does form a connected picture, and we are gradually discovering more and more definite relations among its parts. We are thus led to go on, from point to point, in the hope that a perfect picture will be constructed in the end. But we cannot really see the picture until it has been built up, though we may, to a certain extent, anticipate it. To this constructive process there appears to be no real reason for assigning any bounds.

103. We have been led to recognize that the ultimate aim of human endeavour is to reach a certain completeness of insight and appreciation which would seem to involve identification with the point of the view of the whole.

104. If God is taken to mean a being distinct from the Cosmos, creating and guiding it, it would seem that the existence of such a being is neither established nor rendered probable. But, as Mr. Bradley puts it, a God who should be capable of existing (i.e. who should simply be one being among others) would be no God at all.

105. What I am inclined to claim for philosophy is not that it provides us with any ready-made doctrines, on these or on any other subjects (rather, in philosophy, every dogma is a heresy), but that it enables us to take a general survey of the totality of our experience, and to see clearly, as indicated in the foregoing sections, that we have some right to hope and a still more manifest duty to strive. It does not supersede other forms of knowledge.

106. It has not, as Hegel so strongly urged, the business of philosophy to provide us with any kind of cheap edification. Yet, like other

forms of enquiry, it aims at finding some satisfaction for fundamental human needs. It leads us to an ultimate mystery, and does little more than hint that there may be a solution of it.

107. We can gradually increase our knowledge and our insight, and we can gradually make life more sane and more beautiful.

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA ON PHILOSOPHY IN 1939.

The philosophical school which attracts most notice continues to be the analytic positivist school one branch of which is inspired by Wittgenstein and another by men like Carnap and Reichenbach. It only commands actual allegiance of a moderately small minority of philosophers and there are considerable differences of opinion between different members but it is not sufficiently united to be called one school and represents the best opinion and strongest current of opinion in philosophy at the moment.

The most noteworthy book of the year in connection with the movement is Schlick's Philosophio-chi Abhandlungen edited posthumusly by Waismann (which includes essays in English and French as well as in German) and the work treats meaningful statements divisible into two classes: 1. those which can be conceivable by, verified by sense experience and are therefore empirical and synthetic. (2) those which are derivable from linguistic conventions and are therefore, a priori not because they assert necessary objective facts but because to contradict them would be, to use his words, in a way which has no sense according to rules of language. This naturally leads to the denial of metaphysics if this is understood as a set of propositions giving new facts beyond those included but because it is meaningless and

and the elimination of all the traditional philosophical problems is due to the misunderstandings concerning the use of language. This is typical of the school and its members are now tending to defend the "verification principle" not as a true proposition but as a methodological device i.e. they do not say that a statement is meaningless unless it is verifiable (or " falsifiable") in one of the two ways above mentioned but they tell you to ask of all statements how they can be verified as a necessary preliminary to determining their nature (vide Wisdom article in Mind Oct. 38). They still think however that the use of this method will have the effect of eliminating the tendency to ask metaphysical questions in the old sense. Whether they have solved the philosophical problems which they claim to solve or not, this school of philosophers have thrown valuable light on the use of language and its bearing on philosophical problems and on the difference between different kinds of statements and have the merit of having worked out of empiricism more consistent than that of Hume or Mill. Other works published in 1938 by members of this school are H. Reichenbach's "Experience and Prediction" in which he works out a theory of probability in terms of relative frequencies and advances a Humean account of induction and W.H. Watsons "Understanding Physics" in which the method inspired by Wittgenstein is applied to this science.

Still a great majority of philosophers still do not think that the traditional problems can be settled in any such way. There is no well marked single school which opposes those mentioned. Though there are a great many philosophers who believe that proposition about physical objects are to be inter-

interpretted in terms of human experience or sense-data, Idealism, in the sense in which it was held in the 19th century has become very rare among the older men.

THE VEIL OF ISIS.

by THOS. E. WEBB.

1. In philosophy, as in political economy, there are innumerable speculators, who have set up trade, as it were, without any of that intellectual capital which is found in the accumulated thought of their predecessors.
2. The history of philosophy appears to the cynical spectator to be a wild Babel of confusion.
3. Truth, as I have elsewhere said, is a polygon and not a point; but before the polygon is constructed the sides must be described, and, by a natural prejudice, the philosopher who insists on one aspect of a general question is supposed to ignore the existence or to deny the importance of the rest.
4. Berkeley started the question by asking how it is possible for us to know that material substances exist; and having shown that we cannot know this either by sense or reason declined to believe in the existence of that of which he had no knowledge. Hume, less sceptical than the dogmatic theologian, admitted that the existence of material things must be assumed as a fact in all our reasonings, but contended that if the existence of an external world be based on instinct it is contrary to reason, and that, if referred to reason, it is unsupported by any evidence that reason can accept. Generalized by Kant, the conclusion of Hume assumed a more scientific form, and among the philosophers of the present day there are few who would venture

reject the critical conclusions--that no object external to ourselves is presented to our consciousness; that if an object be not given, its existence cannot possibly be proved; and that if it cannot be proved, its existence must remain for ever a mere object of belief.

5. Speculative curiosity remains unsatisfied, and where the field of knowledge is closed, the region of hypothesis expands before us. Are the objects of our knowledge distinct from the subject which evolves them? Are those objects three, two, or one? Is the Deity for example, to be excluded from the theory of real existence? Is the world, on the other hand, to be regarded as nothing but a phantasm? is there no real existence to be recognized except the soul? And as to the soul itself, is it anything but a system ov vanishing ideas? Is there any substance in existence? The answer involved in each of these questions is a system of metaphysics.

6. We see the constant recurrence of those various guesses at the riddle of existence which are called systems of metaphysical philosophy. They are all based on a limited number of fundamental conceptions, the permutations and combinations of which may be rigorously ascertained. To the curious mind it cannot but be an object of interest to contemplate the sum total of the hypotheses which the human mind is competent to frame on a question which it is incompetent to solve. To know the possibilities of thought is knowledge. It is not by a history of names, however, but by an evolution of conceptions, that such a result is to be attained.

7. The Veiled Isis, as we learn from Plutarch, was the Egyptian symbol of mystery of being. I

endeavoured to illustrate the impossibility of solving this mystery.

8. Three years after the publication of the "Principles of Human Knowledge", another thinker combined the idealistic elements with which the speculations of the times were fraught. In his Clavis Universalis, Collier, like Berkeley, attempted a demonstration of the non-existence of the world; and the perfect correspondence between the independent speculations of the two idealists is one of the most curious facts in the history of thought. It was the correspondence of the clocks of Leibnitz. Collier, like Berkeley, declined to allow the question to be decided by an appeal to Holy Writ with Malebranche, or by an appeal to common sense with Locke. Like Berkeley, he started from the phenomena of vision, and proved that the world of vision could have no existence but in mind. Like Berkeley, he transferred his idealism from the realm of vision to the realm of touch. Like Berkeley, he held not only the non-existence, but the impossibility of the existence, of a world of matter.

9. In some respects the idealism of Collier is more philosophical than that of Berkeley. He is a more consecutive, if not a more consistent, thinker. He shows what Berkeley omitted to show, the ambiguity of the word idea. Above all he shows, in opposition to Berkeley's theory of vision, that the quasi-externality of visual objects is part and parcel of perception, and that it is as much an attribute of the figments of imagination as of the facts of sense. This question is fully discussed, and, in my opinion, finally determined by Mr. Abbott, in his work on Sight and Touch. Mr. Abbott satisfactority shows that if the idea of outness is not primarily given it can never

be

be subsequently acquired.
10. Voltaire said it was pleasant to think that ten thousand cannon balls and ten thousand dead men were only so many disagreeable ideas. Johnson looked on the whole ideal system as worthy of no better refutation than that supplied by his memorable kick. Even Reid, who had himself been a Berkeleian, recanted his heresy, did penance as a man of common sense, and recommended his quondam friend the idealist to run his head against a post, and to be clapped into a madhouse for his pains. So remote indeed was his idealist philosophy from received opinions.
11. But the influence which Berkeley was destined to exert was far more powerful than any of his contemporaries suspected. From his time philosophy ceased to concern itself with matter. The authority of the Church was disregarded; the reference to revelation was ignored; and philosophy became ideal.
12. It is not to be denied that the idealism of Berkeley had its starting point in the philosophy of Locke. Locke had taught that the soul is conscious only of its own ideas; and that these bounds were ample enough for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, though it takes its flight further than the stars.
13. This is an injustice to Locke's philosophical acumen. "There can be nothing more certain", he says,"than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge; but whether there be anything more than barely an idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such objects

affects their senses." Locke, however, evaded the difficulty, and took refuge in the arms of common sense. The confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, he said, is the greatest assurance we are capable of, concerning the existence of material beings. "If after all" he said, "any one should be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality, and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything; I must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, he doth but dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him."

14. The same point has been reached by the disciples of a different school. It was a first principle in the philosophy of Descartes, and Leibnitz, and Malebranche, as it was in that of Locke, that the mind is conscious only of its own ideas. These philosophers, it is true, maintained the existence of a material world without us; but they held that mind and matter are essentially opposed; that, in the words of Norris, they are separated by the whole diameter of existence; and that consequently mind, if left to its own unaided force, can never take cognizance of matter. To bridge this chasm between mind and matter, different philosophical structures had been framed.

15. Of all the philosophers who preceded Berkeley the one who approached most nearly to his conclusion was Malebranche. The French metaphysician regarded it as an indisputable fact, that it is only by means of ideas that

the unextended mind can become cognizant of extended objects. He contemptuously rejected the argument for the existence of the external world which is based on common sense.

16. He avowed that according to his way of thinking matter could not even be accepted as the cause of our perceptions or sensations. The experience of delirium and dreams, he said, establishes that there is no necessary connection between the presence of an idea and the existence of a corresponding thing without. He admitted, as we have seen, that if the world were ahhihilated, and if God should produce in our minds the ideas which are now produced in them on the presence of external objects, we should perceive everything that we now perceive. How then are we to account for the existence of our sensible ideas? Malebranche considered it evident that these ideas could not be created by the mind itself, for they were not the creatures of the will, and the mind must have had a knowledge of them before it could produce them.

17. Berkeley protested, in the person of Philonous, that he could not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the <u>essence</u>, or any part, or like any part, of the essence or substance of God. Revelation, he said, had used words in their vulgar acceptation; and the ideal philosophy did not deny the existence of anything. But the question at issue was one to be determined not by revelation but by reason. And what were the dictates of reason on the subject? They were obvious. If primary and secondary qualities are only 'ideas existing in the mind' why should we make any distinction between

ideas and sensations? If it is possible that we might be affected with all the ideas that we have, although no bodies existed which resembled them why might not bodies be regarded as the perceptions of a waking dream? If the world is not known as object, and cannot be inferred as cause, what reason have we to believe in its existence?

18. But Berkeley pushed the argument still further. He contended, not only that we are unable to demonstrate the existence of the world of matter, but that we are able to demonstrate its non-existence. The supposition of an external material world, he said, was unmeaning--it was replete with contradictions ---it could not even be conceived. How can we conceive objects existing unconceived, he asked, and professed himself willing to put the whole controversy upon that single issue. True, the series of sensations of which we are conscious, he said, must have some thinking substance or substratum to support them, as sell as some active cause by which they are produced and changed. But what is the cause in question? Not a mere physical antecedent to be found in antecedent ideas; for our ideas are 'visibly inactive'. Not corporeal substance; for it has no existence. Neither could the cause in question be ourselves; for the ideas perceived by sense have no dependence on ourselves--they are not the creatures of the will. The cause must, accordingly, be God. The whole argument is neatly summarized by Hylas:- "I find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fel fleeting, dependent beings; they have therefore

some cause distinct from me and them, of which I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas". Hylas, it is true, makes an abortive attempt to identify this primeval cause with matter; but the inexorable Philonous asks, "Though it should be allowed to exist, yet, how can that which is inactive be a cause, or that which is unthinking be the cause of thought?" Hylas is coerced into recognizing the agency of mind. "From (the mere perceptions of the senses)" says Philonous, "I conclude that there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. Thus while the attributes of the Infinite Mind are collected from a contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things,' its existence is necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world'--and this consideration, in the opinion of Philonous, at once baffles the most strenuous advocate of atheism.

19. Whatever may be the force of the argument thus constructed, it is so clear that it might well have been supposed to bid defiance to the powers of misconception. But Berkeley has not escaped the fate which has overtaken philosophers in every age. He has been systematically misunderstood. Mr. Mill has remarked that "he was excelled by none who ever wrote in the clear expression of his meaning, and the discrimination of it from what he did not mean"; yet, he adds, "scarcely any thinker has been more perseveringly misapprehended, or has been the victim of such persistent ignoratio elenchi his numerous adversaries having generally occupied themselves in proving what he never denied, and denying what he never asserted."

20, As to the Ideal Theory, see Reid's Works. Stewart's Works, Hamilton Reid, and Disc., Mansel's Prolegomena Logica, Mill Ut infra.

21. But what are the Ideas of which alone we are thus asserted to be conscious? According to the Scottish School, the idea of Berkeley is a separate entity--a something numerically distinct from mind. What place a representative idea such as this could have had in a system in which there was nothing to represent it is hard to imagine. Brown clearly perceived that the existence of ideas as separate from the mind is an assumption as gratuitous as the assumption of the external existence of matter itself could have been, and that, in point of fact, permanent and independent ideas are matter under another name. He clearly saw that to believe that these entities exist in the mind is to materialize intellect under the pretence of intellectualizing matter. That in this respect, Berkeley has been egregiously misconceived is certain.

22. States of mind exist, and may therefore be called existences; they have a being in the mind, and may therefore be properly denominated beings.

23. In the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley states it to be self-evident that the sole 'objects of human knowledge' are ideas--imprinted on the senses, ideas formed by memory and imagination, or ideas perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind. But nothing can be an object of knowledge unless it be presented to something which knows, and accordingly Berkeley assumes the existence of 'an incorporeal, active substance or spirit'--one simple undivided, active being' which 'as it perceives ideas is called the understanding.

24. It is true that Berkeley--and it is the great defect of his philosophy--gave no systematic explanation of our notions, and has even left his views in obscurity as to the

mode in which these notions are evolved.
25. Reid failed to observe that while Berkeley recognized the principle of substance in all its metaphysical reality, Hume, differing from both him and Locke, ignored it. He failed to recollect that, while Berkeley held that matter was a mere bundle of sensations, he held that it was a mere bundle of sensations in the mind, and that mind, as the 'substratum of those ideas' must of necessity be a substance.
26. The simple denial that ideas are anything more than the mind itself affected in a certain manner; since in this case our ideas exist no longer than our mind is affected in that particular manner which constitutes each particular idea.
27. Accepting as he allwed on all hands, the opinion that sensible qualities cannot subsist by themselves, and rejecting the ordinary hypothesis of their existence in an insensible substratum, he concluded that they must, therefore, exist in a mind which perceives them, and that they have no existence apart from being perceived.
28. Sensible qualities, according to Berkeley's view, are only sensible ideas, and sensible ideas themselves are nothing but sensations; and the statement, that sensible qualities, thus understood, continue to exist when we do not perceive them, is ambiguous. Our sensations cease to exist when our perception of the ceases.
29. It is this relative existence which, in the opinion of Berkeley, constitutes the world to us. So completely relative is that existence, that it is relative not only to the person but to the moment. The world is nothing but successive phenomenon and evanescence. Our ideas have no continuous existence. They disappear to be

succeeded by ideas which are similar, but not the same; and these successive ideas in their similar succession are mere sparkles on the stream of thought--mere bubbles on the river, which glitter in the sun and burst.

Berkeley carried out this view of the fleeting nature of ideas to its most sublime result. If the world exists only in idea, and if ideas are mere evanescent states of mind, it follows that the Divine Energy is for ever engaged in creating and recreating worlds.

30. He saw that something subjective was a necessary and inseparable part of every object of cognition. But instead of maintaining that it was the ego, or oneself, which clove inseparably to all that could be known, and that this element must be thought of along with all that is thought of, he rather held that it was the senses, or our perceptive modes of cognition, which clove inseparably to all that could be known, and that these required to be thought of along with all that could be thought of. These, just as much as the ego, were held by him to be the subjective part of the total synthesis of cognition, which could not be any possibility be disconnected. Hence the unsatisfactory charecter of his ontology, which, when tried by a rigorous logic, will be found to invest the Deity--the supreme mind, the infinite Ego--which the terms of his system eompel him to place in synthesis with all things, with human modes of apprehension, with such senses as belong to man.

31. But the greatest obstacle in the way of the Berkeleian conception of the world is the difficulty of realizing it in thought. The boundless space with its infinitude of worlds,

the immense geologic periods through which our own world has existed, the stupendous convul-sions of which the fabrid of the earth has been the scene, the mighty revolutions to which the human race itself has been subjected ever since its first appearance on the planet, and the mys-terious social forces and miraculous agencies of nature, which are constantly obtruding them-selves upon our wondering gaze--all these potent realities persistently decline to be superseded by ideas, and to be relegated to the realms of shade. But not only does the ideal theory tax the imagination beyond its strength--it posi-tively reverses all our natural modes of thought. We have been accustomed to believe that the world contains the soul; but we are required to believe that the soul contains the world. We have been accustomed to believe that the body contains the mind; but we must learn to believe that the mind contains the body. We have been accustomed to believe that our fellow-creatures exist without the mind; but we must constrain ourselve to believe that while their souls exist without the mind, their bodies exist within it. Nay, further, we have been accus-tomed to think that 'the great globe and all that it inhabit' are contained in space; but we have to learn that <u>within</u> and <u>without</u> are mere relative ideas, and that space is nothing but the absence of resistance. We have been accustomed to believe that we exist in time; but we have to learn that there is no time for us to exist in--that time is nothing abs-tracted from the succession of our thoughts. All this must be followed out to its rigorous results. If there is no space but only the idea of space, then there is no motion but only the idea of motion. If there is no time but o

only the idea of time, then there is no duration but only the idea of duration. The mind therefore is motionless amid commotion; it is a mere punctum stans amid the lapse of years. These paradoxes Berkeley fearlessly accepts, and transfers them from the Enneads of Plotinus to the Siris. Speculations like these may silence but they do not satisfy the mind. As Hume remarks, they admit of no answer, but they produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which, as the great sceptic remarks, is only scepticism in disguise. For what, in a speculative point of view, is the value of the idealist philosophy? Consider the points which Berkeley endeavours to establish. He maintains the absolute impossibility of matter.

32. But possibility is not proof; and what is the proof which Berkeley adduces that these possibilities are facts? To establish his ultimate conclusion he seems to followaa rigorously inductive method. He professes first to ascertain the facts of consciousness, and then, by these facts to test the various hypotheses which have been elaborated to explain them. He collects the various anticipations of the mind; he effects the requisite exclusions or rejections; and he seemingly arrives at the necessary conclusion by induction. The cause of sensation, he says, must be either the world, the soul, or God; but it cannot be the world or the soul,; therefore it must be God. But this is a mere travesty of the Baconian process. It is the form of induction without the power. The principles which it assumes are unverified; the very facts by which he affects to exclude the hypotheses which he rejects are incapable of proof.

For how does Berkeley attempt to prove, as a substantive proposition, that there is no material world? In the first place, he assumes as an axiom, that admits of no dispute, that the mind is conscious only of its own ideas. If it be contended, as it is contended by Hamilton, that the mind has a presentative, objective, intuitive knowledge of material things--that the material world is presented as an existing object, and not merely inferred as an efficient or as a co-operative cause--the idealist appals to consciousness and denies the fact. We do not perceive matter objectively, he says; we have no immediate intuition of its existence; we are conscious only of our own ideas. But, if matter be not give, why may not its existence be iferred? To conceive matter as existing without the mind, says Berkeley, you must conceive it as existing unconceived; and this, he says, is a contradiction in the very terms in which the so-called conception is expressed. But if, as Berkeley himself insists, we can conceive God and finite spirits as existing independently of our conceptions, why may we not conceive the world as similarly existing?

33. There is a psychological difficulty in the way of Berkeley which aggravates the difficulties in the way of his ontological demonstration. He admits that his system is opposed to vulgar notions. Berkeley boldly refers the belief to the vast number of prejudices and false opinions which are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenacity by the unreflecting portion of mankind.

34. He resolves our idea of causation into 'our tendency to believe, that a relation which subsists between every individual item

of our experience as a whole and something not within the sphere of our experience.
34. It is strange that two philosophers who deal so freely with the laws of human belief should appeal so confidently to the Law of Percimony--the one to establish the existence of an ontologic fact, the other to establish the truth of the merest psychologic guess. It is true that entities are not to be multiplied in vain. It is true that neither more nor more onerous causes are to be assumed than are necessary to account for the phenomena. That has been the language of philosophers from Hamilton to Occam. But this so-called law of percimony is a mere regulative principle of thought; it is not a law of logic, and still less is it a law of things.
35 This overlooks one of the most important of philosophical distinctions--that between spontaneity and volition. It is well known that far below the surface of consciousness and will, in the depths of our mental being, there are agencies at work which manifest their presence only by the effects which they produce. Our instincts, our tendencies, our appetites, affections and desires, our very capacities of receiving sensations from without, if indeed our sensations are to be regarded as determined from without, are instances of this.
36. Kant, advanced half way to Fichte, by insisting that our intuitions of space originate within, while he contended that our sensations are determined from without. But why may not the sensations which supply the matter, as well as the intuitions which supply the form, originate within? Why may not the phenomena of sense be regarded as the mere spray and sparkle

thrown up by some central fount of intuition? Why may not the Soul be regarded as the creator of the world, which, ex hypothesi exists within?

37. Why should philosophy have recourse to God for this? A soul which could create the world within, and then project it outward, could surely people its creation. For what says Cudworth? "There is also another more interior plastic power in the soul, if we may so call it, whereby it is formative of its own cognitions, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep, or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses between itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which often-times it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartées, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable." See, then, how Berkeley's argument from dreams and frenzies recoils upon himself; see how the law of parcimony serves him.

38. Where then is the logical contradiction in the Egoistical doctrine, that there is originally but one substance, the Ego, and that in this one substance all possible accidents, all possible realities , are placed. If we may idealize matter, why may we not deify the mind? On the principles of Berkeley, there is no answer to Fichte when he relies on the law of parcimony; there is no answer even when he contends that the notion of God as a particular substance is contradictory and impossible.

The Idealism of Berkeley is a bold effort to solve the mystery of existence--an ingenious guess at the eternal riddle of the sphinx--an abortive attempt to life the impenetrable veil. It gives philosophical expression to

to a vague and floating fancy which will ever haunt the intellects of subtle and refining men. But it is utterly incapable of proof, and it assumes principles which, if we follow them, conduct us to that vast abyss in which man sees noting reflected but his ignorance and terror.

Compare for a moment the rival theories of Berkeley and Malebranche. The points of contact between the systems of these famous philosophers are many; and yet each point of contact suggests a point of contrast. Both of them believed that though the mind is conscious of nothing but its own ideas, it is able to reach the existence which lies beyond the sphere of self. But while the Oratorian recognized the existence of the three great ontological realities, the Anglican recognized the existence of but two. Both of them believed that the being and attributes of God are susceptible of demonstration. But while the Cartesian endeavoured to demonstrate these momentous facts from our idea of infinitey, the follower of Locke endeavoured to demonstrate them from the existence and coordination of our sensible ideas. Both of them were devout believers in the infallible authority of revelation. But while the Catholic, following the tradition of his Church, clung to the literal interpretation of Scripture, and held that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; the Protestant, exercising the right of private judgment, adopted a different method of interpretation, and held that the creation spoken of by Moses was a mere metaphysical creation. Each agreed that naturally we have no objective knowledge of the world of matter. But, while the one admitted its existence on the supposed authority of revelation, the other rejected its

existence on the supposed authority of reason.
39. But the moment that Malebranche thus attained reality, he was confronted by a perilous dilemma. Is the Divive idea numerically distinct from that of the human being who perceives it? The cognition of an act beyond the sphere of self is as difficult to realize as the cognition of a world of matter. Is the human idea identical with the divine? The world of matter, it is true, is gained, but forthwith the phantom of Pantheism stares us in the face. Nor did the Catholic philosopher recoil in the presence of the dreaded apparition. And so the Vision of Malebranche dilated into Pantheism, and all human personality disappeared. The existence of God, it is true, was not lost in the hallucinations of self; but all self, all individuality, was lost in the abyss of Gd.
40 The eagle, however powerful his pinion, cannot soar out of, cannot outsoar, himself. The mind, however powerful its principles, cannot, by their aid alone, transcend the mind. Let it mount into the heavens, or plunge into the abyss, it is still the soul, and nothing but the soul--the sould concentrated in itself.
41. The being of a Spirit powerful, and wise, and good may be sufficient to account for all the phenomena presented to the mind; but then comes the Egoist, with his irreverent and inexorable law. You have the principle of causality--why postulate the existence of any cause beyond yourself? If the soul can create the world, and people it with finite spirits, why may not it create the Infinite himself? The Infinite is a mere imagination of the finite--God, like the giant phantom of the Hartz, is the mere self-projection of the soul--God is

nothing but the moral order. Here, then, we find ourselves at the opposite end of the diameter of thought. Flying from Malebranche, we are met by Fichte. The Pantheism of the one philosopher is exchanged for the Panegoism of the other. The world of matter fades into a dream; all finite spirits vanish; God is a mere vision of the night; and the soul is left the solitary of the universe--the universe is absorbed in self.

42. Berkeley admits that it will be found no easy task to abstract the existence of a spirit from its cognition. Here, then, the theological idealist reaches the position where Hume and Hegel are entrenched, and proclaims the identity of thought with being. In the system of Berkeley this element lies latent; but in the system of Hume it is evolved, developed, and avowed. Hume denies the existence not only of corporeal, but of incorporeal substance. He maintains that 'the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.' He holds that 'our perceptions may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence.' He boldly asserts that man is 'nothing but a bundle of collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.' It is true that, in his Essays, the work which he expressly desired to be regarded as alone containing his philosophical opinions, he does not repeat these various assertions. But his earlier creed has survived him, and is the creed of his disciples. Following in the footsteps of Berkeley, Mill defines matter to be a permanent possibility of sensation; following in the footsteps of Hume, he defines mind to be a permanent possi-

bility of feeling. Claiming to be a Berkeleian, he discards the ministering principles of the philosophy of Berkeley, causality and substance. He accepts the doctrine that the mind is a mere series of sensations--a series which is destitute of substance--a thread of consciousness,

43. This, then, is the result in which the philosophy of Berkeley ends. The philosophy which was to banish atheism, and idolatry, and irreligion from the world; the philosophy which was to renovate the sciences, which was to purify morals, which was to spiritualize religion, which was to bring man face to face with God--this high and aspiring philosophy but ends in this.

44. The great speculator, says Mackintosh, aimed at proving that from the structure of the understanding we are doomed for ever to dwell in absolute and universal ignorance. In fact, the scepticism attributed to Hume by the Scottish school was that which the doctor expounds to Sganarelle:- Notre philosophe ordonne de ne point enoncer de proposition decisive, de parler de tout avec incertitude, de suspendre toujours son jugement. Sir William Hamilton, it is true, offers to explain away this ultra-Pyrrhonian doubt.

45. the tone of sad but lofty eloquence with which Kant commences his Kritik of Pure Reason is familiar to every student of philosophy. Metaphysics, once the queen of the sciences, he said, had been deposed. Like Hecuba--modo maxima rerum--she was condemned to poverty and exile. Like Rome, once the mistress of the world, she had been destroyed by internecine feuds, and was the spoil of the barbarians. She was the object of universal indifference,

contempt and scorn. With an eloquence less lofty, and perhaps with a feeling less profound, Hume, the predecessor of Kant indulges in a strain of similar reflection. Philosophy, he said, was in a most unsatisfactory condition. The very rabble out of doors might judge, from the noise and clamour which they heard, that all was not going well within.
46. But Hume, like Kant, perceived that the metaphysical spirit was immortal in the mind of man. It was vain, he said, to hope that men, from frequent disappointment, would abandon such airy speculations. The motive of blind despair could have no place in science. Every adventurous genius would find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failure of his predecessors. "The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions" he says in his later work "is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects." It is only 'after deliberate inquiry' that we can reject 'the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning'; and 'we must submit to this fatigue,' he says, anticipating the very words of Kant, 'in order that we may live at ease for ever after'.
47. The absolute necessity of self-examination as the preliminary step is mental science was no novelty in the history of thought. Bacon had insisted on a thorough purification of the intellect, before the marriage of the rational and the empirical faculties could be celebrated. Hobbes had proclaimed that philosophy, the child of the world and the mind, was all within; and that it was the function of the thinker, as it

that of the statuary, to remove the superfluous mass. Locke, with still greater distinctness, had enounced the true method of philosophical inquiry; and his sense of its importance had suggested the composition of his immortal Essay. He had seen that the first step towards satisfying the curiosity of man, in the remote inquiries into which it was so apt to run, was to take a view of the understanding, to examine its powers, and to ascertain the subjects to which it was adapted.

48. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced."...Hume.

49 Of the creatures and inventions of the understanding which were recognised by Locke, he places in the forefront of his philosophy the idea of Substance which all our ideas of substance suppose. "When we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances," he says "though the idea we have of them be but a complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we used to find united in the thing," yet, "because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject." All this was foolishness to Hume. "The opinions of the philosophers about substance and accident," he said, "are like the spectres in the dark. " We have no ideas of

substance; he said,'distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities.

50. The idea of Causation plays as prominent a part in the philosophy of Hume as the idea of substance does in that of Locke.

51. Hume is undoubtedly entitled to the credit of seeing that, as far as the external senses are concerned, we only find that one fact is followed by another.

52. We have not ideas of connection and power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning whatsoever."

53. Hume developed a system of psychological idealism without any metaphysical admixture whatsoever. Recognizing nothing in the world but mind, and recognizing nothing in the mind but a system of perceptions, he regarded perception as the sole existence. "There is no impression nor idea of any kind of which we have any consciousness or memory," he says, "that is not conceived as existent; and it is evident that, from this consciousness, the most perfect idea and assurance of being is derived." "From hence," he continues, "we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagined, viz. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be derived from a distinct impression, conjoined with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object." His determination is, that "the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent." He thus reaches the conclusion which Parmenides, from a different starting-point had reached--

He teaches the doctrine which was taught by Plotinus in the Alexandrian schools. He anticipates, in fine, the famous postulate of Hegel, and proclaims the identity of thought and being.

54. All our experimental arguments are based on the anticipation of experience which is implied in the law of physical causation, and that therefore this law must be regarded as a determination of the mind itself.

55. By applying our intuitions of space and time the reasoning which he had applied to our conception of causation. He held that "the ideas of space and time are no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order in which objects exist"; and that "as it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time."

56. All attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond their bounds are mere sophistry and illusion.

57. Hume maintains that others 'may perceive something simple and continued which he calls himself: but he is certain that there is no such principle in him; and the fact that we have no satisfactory notice of substance, whether mental or material, seems to him a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul and makes him absolutely condemn the very question. In his Transcendental Theology, Kant proclaims that the fallacy of every attempt of the speculative reason to establish the existence of a God by way of demonstration is shown by this--that "in whatever way the understanding may have attained

to a conception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the conception."

58. It was with regard to the Senses that his scepticism was most pronounced. The trite topics which Cicero, as the representative of the Academic school, had adduced, when arguing with Lacullus, Hume did not insist on. He proposed an argument more profound than that based upon the crooked appearance of the oar in water, or the shifting colours on the bosom of the dove. He acknowledged it to be evident that "men are carried by a natural instinct, or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated." But, he said, "it seems also evident, that when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images presented by their senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other." "But this universal and primary opinion of all men," he says "is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object." "So far,

then," he continues, "are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict, or depart from, the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses." "But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics". It is evident that 'it is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them'; and this question of fact, like all other questions of fact, must be determined by <u>experience</u>. "But here", says Hume, "experience is and must be silent, for the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. Is the question then to be determined by <u>reason?</u> 'To justify the pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and consistent argument exceeds the power of all human capacity'; "for by what argument", he asks "can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them, if that be possible, and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself.

59. "Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the eternal object. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion that the perceptions are only representatives of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments, and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing

argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects." This is Humes dilemma. The opinion of external existence, he says, "if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and, if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer."

60. When men follow the blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external objects.

61. This Transcendental Illusion, as Kant calls it, involves the human reason in a conflict with itself. Had the world a beginning, or had it not? Is matter infinitely divisible or not? Is a free causality necessary to originate the phenomena of the world or no? Is there, or is there not, a necessary being required to account for the existence of the world? On each of these questions the thesis and antithesis are alike sustainable by reason, and this conflict of reason with itself was the Transcendental Antithetic. Kant settles the dispute by proclaiming that the combatants are fighting about nothing, and that it is no transcendental reality that is presented to us, but phenomena. Again, this is the philosophy of Hume. He, too, contemplated this conflict of reason, and perceived the true solution. "As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses" he says in the Treatise, "without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question."

62. This contrast between the speculative demands and the practical necessities of human

nature is constantly insisted on by Kant. "If anyone could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest" he says, "and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason, attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences which follow from them, such a person, on the supposition that he knew no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continued hesitation." "But" continues Kant, "if he were called to action, the play of the mere speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest would dictate his choice of principles." This passage, again, might pass for a paraphrase of a dozen passages to be found in Hume. "Though a Pyrrhonian", he says, "may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples." and,

63. "These principles" he says, "may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the schools, and by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals."

Such being the condition of human nature, the advice which Hume gives to the philosopher has been strangely overlooked. 'Be a philosopher,' he says, 'but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man."

64. He made no distinction between the well-

grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of the reason. He merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were; and he created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ingnorance.

65. In holding that nothing can be present to the mind but an image or perception, and in denying that the images presented to the senses are external objects, or things subsisting by themselves, he enounced the conclusion which the Transcendental Aesthetic professed to have established.

66. Hume saw as clearly as Kant that men will never be induced to abandon the airy sciences from disappointment; that the only method of freeing learning from those abstruse inquiries was to make an exact analysis of the powers and capacities of the human understanding; and that we must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease for ever after; but, unfortunately, he did not style his analysis a Propoedeutic or a Kritik. He saw that the mind in all its experimental conclusions anticipates its experience without seeing this was a Synthetic a priori Judgment; and when he saw that such judgments could not be formed without a determination of the mind, he failed to see that this was the solution of the grand Transcendental Problem of Pure Reason. He said that the law of causation could not be founded on arguments from experience, because all arguments from experience are founded on the law of causation; but he had no suspicion that this should be called the Transcendental Method. He said the mind was a centre of perceptions; but he did

not baptize it the Transcendental Unity of Consciousness. He held that objects are nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination into one; but he did not confer upon the collection the title of the Transcendental Synthesis of the Imagination.

67. He saw that when men follow the instincts of their nature they suppose the images presented by the senses to be the external objects; but he did not dream that this was Transcendental Realism.

68. He saw that the mind was involved in absurdities and contradictions in its ideas of the world, and that its conclusions as to the nature and essence of the soul were inconclusive; but words of such pretence as the antinomies of Cosmology, or the Paralogisms of Psychology, were foreign to his simple tastes. He saw, in fine, that the mind, in straining after the infinite and absolute, was constrained to form the last and most ennobling of ideas;

69. The fact is that Hume employed the simple language of ordinary men, while Kant invented an aritificial language for the schools. And the effect of this diversity has been dicisive. The two philosophers have spoken a different language, and they have been regarded as holding hostile views. Hence, too, while that of the sceptic has been depressed. In the system of the one there was nothing to impede the progress, and the treacherous facility betrayed the reader into the belief that he was learning nothing; in the system of the other there was a language to be mastered, and the difficulty of mastering it inspired the student with a respect for the thinker who imposed upon him such laborious toil. Nor did the effect terminate in this. The Kantian student is apt to mistake the mastery of a language for the ac-

quisition of a science. Conscious of the pos- 349
session of a recondite learning, he is inspired
with the conceit of a superior knowledge. The
vulgar, too, are apt to look with mysterious
awe upon what they cannot understand, because
they cannot understand it; and hence the dif-
ferent estimation in which the two great phi-
losophers of Modern Europe have been held. In
the one, the stream of speculation has appeared
to be shallow because it was so clear; in the
other, it has been regarded as a dark profound,
and has been deemed to be the deeper because
it was so dark.

The moral deduced from the paralysis of the
speculative reason by the transcendentalist
and the sceptic was the same. Each, while he
surrendered the power of cognising, reserved
the power of cogitating, the supersensible.
Each while he abolished knowledge, made room
for belief. Each left the space which had been
left vacant by speculation to be filled by the
principles of action. According to both, the
weakness of our intelligence should induce us
to moderate strength of our assertions. Accord-
ing to both, the fallaciousness of sense, and the
incompetence of reason, should teach us mo-
desty and mutual toleration and reserve. Ac-
cording to both, the result of the most pro-
found philosophy was the limitation of our
inquiries to such subjects as are best adapted
to the narrow capacity of human understanding.
The lesson taught by both, in fine, was that
which was taught centuries before by Socrates,
and which generations before Socrates had been
inculcated by that first and saddest of books,
the inspired idyll, in which Idumean patriarch
bewailed the weakness and the ignorance of man.

What then is the attitude assumed by Hume
with regard to the great mystery of sense, the

problem of the world? By anticipation he rejects the Natural Realism, or, as it might be better named, the Cataleptic Idealism of Hamilton; for he denies that there can be any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object.

70. In holding that the mind is nothing but a collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement--above all, in holding that "the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent"--he seems to accept the Psychological Idealism of Mill.

71. Yet in his metaphysics he finds himself compelled to admit that our impressions have a cause, and thus to recognize with Kant the existence of a non-sensuous cause of our sensations. This cause, however, he regards as essentially unknown, and accordingly he refuses to identify it with God, and rejects the Theistic Idealism of Berkeley. For the same reason he refuses to identify it with the soul, and rejects the Egoistical Imdealism of Fichte.

72. He seems never to have thought of applying the formula by which he had determined the nature of our conception of causation to the determination of the nature of our ideas of time and space.

73. He proposed to philosophy a problem, and he confronted it with a dilemma. His problem was the ground of the opinion of external existence.

74. Hume had professed to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe, though they are not able , by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these

operations, or to remove the objections which may be brought against them."

75. Reid was shocked at the discovery that the mind in which he had supposed the world of ideas to exist was destitute of substance. He found that in descending the winding pathway of ideas he had been conducted, unaware, to the abyss.

76. That we do not perceive external objects immediately is, undoubtedly, the accredited doctrine of philosophy. The great majority of philosophers have agreed with Descartes that all our knowledge, whatever its extent, is essentially subjective.

77. They have agreed with Condillac, that whether we ascend to the heavens, or descend to the abyss, we never issue from ourselves, or perceive anything beyond our own perceptions. They hold with Kant that in whatever way our knowledge may relate to objects, the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of intuitions. They hold with Cousin that neither the outward world, nor God, nor the soul itself, as substance, are objects of consciousness, and that the only objects of consciousness are the operations of the mind--its ideas, conceptions, and beliefs.

78. These ideas, says Reid, were first introduced into philosophy in the humble character of representatives of things; but by degrees they supplanted their constituents. They had led to the negation of material things by Berkeley, and to the negation of all substantial reality by Hume.

79. It is true that the followers of Democritus held, in the language of their laureate, that our sensible ideas are the effigies and spectral forms of things--simulacra stripped

from the surface of the object--films flitting away in every direction through the air. But seventeen centuries before Reid this theory of entity images had been overwhelmed with ridicule. What are these images of yours, said Cicero to Velleius, and whence are they derived? How is it that one image comes into my mind, and another into yours? How do you explain the image of a scylla, a chimaera, or a hippo-centaur? How do you stamp the image not only on the eye but on the mind? Such, in effect, was Cicero's polemic against the Epicurean doctrine in the "Tusculan Questions." and the "Discourses on the Nature of the Gods."

80. Unless the ray alights upon the eye, unless the pulsation strikes upon the ear, there is neither sight nor sound. Hence the language of emission and impulse and impression; hence the supposition of vibrations and vibratiuncles in the nerves, of traces and motions in the brain. All these physical facts have abusively been named ideas, and it required the learning and the power of subtle distinction of Hamilton to show that the philosophers had distinguished between the cognitive reason within and the motion or image from without; between the species expressa of perception and the species impressa from the object; between the idea in the mind, of which we are conscious, and the idea in the brain, of which we have no consciousness whatever.

81. To attempt to confute the idealism of one who founds his argument on consciousness merely, and professes to have no knowledge of anything beyond it, would be idle.

82. Hume accepted the principles of common sense as principles of action, though he

refused to rely upon them as principles of speculative science.

The characteristic feature of Reid's philosophy is its attempt to convert the principles of common sense into an organon of the speculative reason. And this opens before us a new vista for investigation. We have considered the critical portion of Reid's philosophy; les us now examine its constructive aspect. Did Reid admit the fundamental position of idealism, that the mind is conscious only of its own ideas?

83. That unwholesome admixture of things, human and divine, which Bacon describes as the apotheosis of error, and which, he says, produces not only fantastic philosophy but heritical religion.

84. There is a story in the Turkish Tales, which is told by Addison in one of the earlier numbers of the Spectator, which may illustrate the point in question. An unbelieving Sultan had ridiculed the famous passage in the Koran which records how the Angel Babriel, having taken Mahamet out of his bed one morning, gave the Prophet a full view of hell, conducted him through the seven heavens of paradise, enabled him to hold ninety thousand conferences with God, and brought him back again to his bed before the bed was cold, and before the pitcher, which was capsized at the moment the angel carried him away, was emptied. A doctor in the law, who had the gift of working miracles, undertook to convince the Sultan of the truth of this passage in the history of the Prophet. The holy man bade him plunge his head into a tub of water. The Sultan did as he was bid, and found himself alone at the foot of a solitary mountain by the sea. He made for a forest which he saw in the distance, and met some woodcutters

who conducted him to a neighbouring town. He married a lady of the land by whom he had seven sons and seven daughters. He was afterwards reduced to abject poverty, and was compelled to ply as a porter for his living. Walking one day by the seashore he was seized with a fit of devotion, and threw off his clothes with the design of performing his ablutions after the manner of the followers of the Prophet. He plunged headforemost into the water, rose to the surface, when, lo and behold, he found himself still standing by the tub, with the great men of his court around him, and the holy man who had performed the miracle, beside him. He had not stirred from the place where he originally stood. He had been leading a magical existence--he had been enchanted. Told by Addison, to illustrate the doctrine of Malebranche and Locke as to the relativity of time, the story admirably illustrates. He had a vivid conception of all these various objects, and an unwavering belief in their existence. Everything was intensely real, and yet everything was mere illusion. He was the fool of a false conception and belief.

85. The possibility of perceiving what does not exist, in Reid's sense of perception, may be submitted to a crucial test. Astronomers tell us that there are fixed stars at such an immeasurable distance from the earth, that their light, with all its inconceivable velocity, takes period of years to reach us. They tell us, also, that stars are extinguished and disappear for ever from the wilderness of worlds. Suppose, then, the cause of an extinguished star. Suppose the rays which it emitted during the period immediately preceding its extinction to reach the earth. The ray would strike upon the organ, the impression would be

follow

followed by the sensation, and the sensation would be followed by the conception and belief which constitute perception. For years we should be forced by the constitution of our nature to form a conception of the non-existent star, and a belief in its existence. According to Reid's theory we should perceive the non-existent star; and the non-existent star, because we perceived it, would exist.

86. Reid says, "The vulgar undoubtedly believe that it is the external objects which we immediately perceive, and not a representative image of it only." But this natural and irresistible belief is false. Hamilton admits it to be false, for he says we do not see the sun 'but only certain rays in connexion with the eye.' Reid admits it to be false, for, holding that we merely form a conception of the sun, and entertain a belief of its existence, he says, "that the object perceived is one thing, and the perception of that object another, I am as certain as I can be of anything." But everyone may be as certain as anyone can be of anything, that common sense and natural instinct confound the two. Men believe, and irresistibly believe, the conception of the thing to be the thing conceived. But this belief is confessedly erroneous. As Hume remarks, this universal and primary opinion of all men is destroyed by the slightest philosophy. Here, then, Reid is confronted with the dilemma of the sceptic. The opinion of external existence, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason; and, if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct.

87. "Philosophers" he says, "affirm that colour is not in bodies, but in the mind, and the vulgar affirm that colour is not in the mind,

but is a quality of bodies.
88. What then, once more, is the external object? To the eyes of the vulgar it is something coloured and extended. To vulgar apprehension the colour is inseparable from the extension, and the extension is inseparable from the colour. No man of common sense will admit that the extended colour is within, and that the coloured extension is without. Accordingingly Berkeley contended that both colour and extension are within. What has Reid, the quondam Berkeleian to reply? Again he is involved in a dilemma. He cannot assert that the total thing perceived exists <u>without</u>, for that would be an outrage upon reason; he cannot assert that the total thing perceived exists <u>within</u>, for that would upon common sense. Again reason and natural instinct are at issue.
89. He turns the matter in his mind, and comes to the conclusion that perception is different from the thing perceived; and he abandons the vulgar, and ranks himself with the philosophers whom he had derided. The vulgar protest that the earth is green and that the sky is bule, and that the see is the same colour as the sky, and Reid is again found shifting to the vulgar. The Philosophers maintain that colour as perceived is nothing but a mere apprearance in the mind; and Reid acknowledges that a sensation is no more like a quality of body than a toothache is like a triangle, and finds himself a philosopher once more.
90. In holding that there is no necessary connexion between our perceptions and material things, he conceded to Hume that the mind cannot attain to any <u>experience</u> of the connexion of material things with our perceptions. In holding, as he systematically held, that it is

not by a train of reasoning and argumentation that we come to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive, he in like manner conceded Hume's position that by no possible argument could it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external and resembling objects.

91. He conceded in the amplest manner that men are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses, and to believe in the existence of an external universe, which has no dependence on perception. But Hume insisted that this natural belief, though sufficient for the purposes of life and action, was insufficient for the purposes of science. He showed that it confounded perception with the thing perceived. He showed that it transferred to the thing perceived what was confessedly mere perception. He confronted it with its inconsistencies and its errors. He formulated his objections in his dilemma and his contradiction; and he called upon it to vindicate its character, and to substantiate its claims to be regarded as the oracle of truth. But, again, Reid virtually admitted everything for which Hume contended. He admitted that the process of perception could not possibly be explained. He admitted that the mystery of sense was involved in impenetrable darkness.

92. A man might as well attempt to draw the moon from its orbit as to destroy our belief in the existence of external things.

93. The existence of a system of things, such as we understand when we speak of an external world, cannot be proved by argument; and the second, that the belief of it is of a force which is paramount to that of argument.

94. Like Bacon, Kant claimed to have opened a new road to the human mind, and to have supplied it with fresh aids to knowledge. He demanded that men should regard his method, as not a mere opinion, but an opus. Let them know, he said, that we are not founding a sect, or system, but are laying the foundations of the happiness and dignity of man.

95. To read the works of Kant, the reader would imagine that Descartes and Leibnitz were children in philosophy, that Locke had done nothing for the human understanding, and that Berkeley and Hume were honest, well-intentioned men who had mistaken their vocation. And it is this intellectual arrogance which is one of the secrets of his fame. His precise nomenclature, his systematic exposition, his philosophical epigrams, his bursts of eloquence, his flights of elevated thought, and, above all, his profound mastery of his subject--these constitute his real claims to the consideration of posterity. But a man of ability is generally taken for what he claims to be. Assumption is a source of authority. To speak confidently begets confidence; and the dogmatism of Kant, like the dogmatism of Hobbes, is one of the causes of the intellectual predominance which he has achieved.

96. The transcendental philosophy, like the inductive, aims to effect a union between the rational and the empiric faculties. It refers all the disputes which had agitated philosophy to their estrangement; it sees the only hope of progress and improvement in their reconciliation; and the Kritik of the Reason, like the Instauratio Magna, to use the phrase of Bacon, is a mere epithalamium to celebrate their marriage.

The Novum Organum is an instrument for the

advancement of physical science; but even in physical investigations Bacon, so strangely considered as the leader of the empiric school, is constantly insisting on the necessity of the initiative of the mind. Whether in the conduct of our experience, or in the process of induction--whether in interrogating nature in order to ascertain the fact, or in interpreting the answers of nature in order to ascertain the form--the mind, according to Bacon, must invariably assume the lead with nature.

97. As Locke fastened on the conception of substance, so Hume fastened on the conception of causation; and as Locke had resolved substance into a collection of attributes, together with a supposition of something we know not what, so Hume resolved causation into a succession of phenomena, together with an anticipation of something we know not why. What is the origin of that anticipation? On this point, Hume, as we have seen, professed to have discovered no light in anything that he had read.

98. Hume not only anticipated the problem--he anticipated the method to be pursued for its solution. The conception of causation cannot be deduced from experience, he said, for experience only reveals the 'constant conjunction' of two objects in the past, whereas the conception of cause and effect involves the idea of their 'necessary connexion' in all time past, present, and to come. 'It is impossible' he says, 'that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance.' Hume accordingly, as we have seen, arrives at the

conclusion that 'the efficacy of causes lies in the determination of the mind,' as distinguished from a determination of the object; and holds that when we draw an inference from one object to another, after the discovery of their constant conjunction, 'the necessary connection depends upon the inference, instead of the inference's depending on the necessary connexion.' The Kritik of Kant is nothing but a generalisation of this idea.

99. 'It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects' says Kant in his Second Preface; 'but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition."

100. Hume's argument that a given conception cannot be given by experience, because all conclusions from experience are based on the conception, may be regarded as the formula of the Transcendental Method. That method lays it down that whatever is presupposed by experience must be regarded as necessary to experience, and as prior to experience, and as transcending experience, and therefore as transcendental and a product of the mind. The difference between this mode of reasoning and the ordinary procedute of the a priori school is obvious. The transcendental method does not argue that certain principles must be regarded as a priori because experience is incompetent to explain them; it argues that they must be regarded as a priori because they themselves are necessary to the explanation of experience.

101. All this is involved in Hume's position, that the mental inference in causation is not determined by any necessary connextion in the objects, but that the supposed necessary connexion in the objects is merely the result of the mental inference.

102. "Objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of those representations, nor ever can be, but respectiving which, in experience, no injury is ever made." In thus asserting that space, as known to us, is a mere form of our sensibility, and not an independently existing thing, Kant separates himself from all previous philosophers, idealist and realist alike.

103."All objects of possible experience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, whether regarded as extended bodies or as series of changes, have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought." What then, according to the transcendentalist, are Space and Time.

104. Our internal experience is only possible under the previous assumption of external experience; for Kant holds, with Locke, that ideas of reflection must be preceded by ideas of sensation. Space, therefore, in this sense, is anterior to time. Time, moreover, is in a state of continual flow, while space is permanent, and determines things as such.

105. All objects of possible experience are nothing but phenomena, which have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought.

106. "Human reason, in one sphere of its speculation, is called upon to consider questions

which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty which is possesses"; and teaches the lesson that it ought never to attempt to soar above the sphere of possible experience.

107. How difficult it is for any idealist to realise his own idealism, or to reconcile it with the unsophisticated view of common sense.

108. The imagination encounters still greater difficulties when it attempts to realise the purely idealist conception of time. Hegel ridicules the passage in which Haller describes eternity as awful, with its mountains of millions its ages piled on ages. The only really awful thing about it, he says, is the awful wearisomeness of ever fixing, and anon unfixing, a limit, without advancing a single step. But the wearisomeness of the effort to contemplate the everlasting Now, which is the only idea of objective time which the idealist admits, is quite as awful. The effort, moreover, from the very nature of the case, must prove abortive. We cannot divest ourselves of the idea of an objective time in which all objective change occurs. Changes are real. Time may be a mere form, in so far as it is the form of the continual change in our representations. But there are objective changes. We ourselves, whatever we may be, begin to exist, and have therefore an objective beginning of existence. Of such an objective fact no subjective form can be the explanation. As far as we can judge objective changes can only occur in an objective time. Nor does Kant when properly understood, deny the existence of such an object. It is true, he says that time is not somthing which subsists of itself--that if we take objects as they are in themselves

time is nothing--that time cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition. But, in this connexion, what are we to understand by Time? According to the doctrine of the Kritik, time regarded as a real object is not presented to any of our perceptive powers. As in the case of every other real object, the only mode in which our knowledge can relate to it is by means of our intuition; and here, as elsewhere our intuition, being merely sensuous, can never give us the object of intuition in itself. But if the object be not given by intuition, its existence, according to the teaching of the Kritik, can never be discovered by any analysis of our conceptions. Time, therefore, as an absolute reality, is something which, for us, remains unpresented and unknown. It is only presented to us as a form of sense. Consequently it is only as a necessary representation lying at the foundation of all our intuitions of sense, and all our conceptions of change that we have any cognisance of time. As the real form of our internal intuition, it is something real, but this reality is not the absolute reality of a thing subsisting by itself. To regard any mere modification of our sensibility as a thing subsisting by itself would be to maintain that obnoxious transcendental realism against which the whole Kritik is one continued protest. As a form of intuition, therefore, time is nothing when abstracted from the phenomenon of sense; as a form of intuition, it cannot be reckoned as an attribute of things. But the existence of things in themselves is recognised by Kant, and in addition to the time which is a form of sense there may be a time

which is an existing thing. If time, as an absolute reality, is not given, it does not folow that it does not exist. If time, as an objective existence, is not known, it does not follow that its existence may not be an object of belief. Kant has met all such inconsequential reasoning in advance. He answers both those who deny his doctrine and those who would extend it. They do not reflect, he says, that both space and time, without question of their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which has always <u>two aspects</u>--the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, the other, the form of our intuition of the object.

108. In the opinion of Kant, the very severity of his criticism had rendered an important service to the interest of thought. By showing the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning objects beyond the boundaries of experience it had fortified the mind against all counter affirmations. If it had shown the inability of human reason to supply any demonstration of the existence of a Supreme Being, it had also shown the utter fatuity of denying his existence. If it had shown that mere reason is incompetent to demonstrate the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, it had shown that reason was equally incompetent to demonstrate that we are not immortal and that we are not free. In fact, according to Kant, the greatest if not the only use of a philosophy of pure reason was to be found in its purely negative character--in the protection which its very negation of knowledge supplies.

109. In spite of its loud appeals to experience materialism is nothing but a form of metaphysic.

The metaphysic of matter is as incapable of verification as that of mind. To convert the principles of experience into conditions of the possibility of things, and to reduce the universe to matter, is just as transcendent a procedure as that which appeals to the principles of thought, and affects to demonstrate the existence of the objects of our ideals and ideas. Materialism may be one of the possibilities of things; but even if materialism be possible it does not exhaust the sphere of possibility. There are other possibilities which are equally worthy of regard. It is possible, for instance, that our actual life is nothing but a sensuous representation of a pure spiritual existence--that the sensible world is but an image hovering before our faculty of sense--that, if we could see ourselves as we actually are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connexion with which did not begin at our birth, and will not cease with the destruction of our bodies. But Kant struck at the root of idealism as vigorously as he struck at the root of materialism. Idealism, he said, is not to be obtruded as a dogma--it is not even to be regarded as a fixed opinion. It is a mere transcendental hypothesis--a hypothesis which is not to be valued as an instrument of discovery, but as a weapon of defence. As a weapon of defence it is available against the attacks of materialism, but that is all.

110. Resolving the World into a sensuous phantom, and God into the moral order, Fichte declared the Ego to be the only substance, while Hegel resolved the Ego itself into its ideas--left ideas without any origin in causation or any support in substance--made the Absolute Idea the sum total of existence.

111. He conceded the premises of Hume . He conceded that in perception there is nothing present to the mind but the perception. He conceded that there is no immediate intercourse between mind and matter, and that we have no experience of the connexion between our perceptions and material things. He conceded that the existence of the world of matter cannot be possibly proved by reason. We are irresistibly led by a natural instinct to believe in the existence of an external world which is independent of our perceptions; when we yield to this natural instinct we are irresistibly led to believe that our perceptions are themselves external.

112. The impossibility of basing a system of philosophy on common sense in any consistent meaning of the term is apparent.

113. He believes the world to exist, because he is immediately cognisant of its existence. He will inevitably admit to Hume that he believes the images presented to the senses to be the external objects. He will inevitably admit to Hume that the sensible qualities, such as colour, heat, and cold, which are mere sensations of the mind, are, in his opinion, inherent in the object.

114. But these beliefs Hamilton admits to be at once inevitable and erroneous. He holds that it is incorrect to say that the sun, or moon, or stars are, or can be, perceived bu us as existent, and in their real distance in the heavens; and he repudiates the natural realism of the vulgar, which transfers our sensations of colour to the subject. He admits that what is common is not sense, and that what is sense is not common--that what is natural is not real, and that what is

real is not natural.

115 "It has been almost universally denied by philosophers, that in sensitive perception we are conscious of any external reality--on the contrary, they have maintained, with singular unanimity, that what we are immediately cognitive of, in that act, is only an ideal object in the mind itself."
116. The fact is, that common sense is incompetent to give any satisfactory answer either as to law or as to fact; and the appeal to such an authority can have no result but that of arraying the prejudices of the vulgar against the speculations of an opponent. It is a mere speaking to the gallery--an appeal to the prejudices of the mob. Abandoning the shifting ground of common sense, and taking his stand upon the ground of reason, Hamilton deviated from the procedure of Reid in dealing with the idealistic question.
117. The datum of the natural consciousness, or common sense, of mankind proclaims that in perception we are conscious of the external object immadiately and in itself.
118. Space is a native, necessary, a priori, form of imagination, and so far, therefore, a mere subjective state.
119. If asked indeed--how we know that we know it?--how we know that what we apprehend is sensible perception is, as consciousness assures us, an object, external, extended, and numerically different from the conscious subject? --how we know that this object is not a mere mode of mind. Do we necessarily believe that we know the material world as existing?
120. "A thing to be known in itself must be known as actually existing; and it cannot be known as actually existing, unless it be

known as existing in its When and its Where. But the When and Where of an object are immediately cognizable by the subject, only if the When be now (i.e. at the same moment with the cognitive act), and the Where be here (i.e. within the sphere of the cognitive faculty); therefore a presentative or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object present to the mind, both in time and space."

121. How is it that we seen the coloured and extended object? A ray alights upon the eye--an inverted image is depicted on a small expanse of nerve--and on the instant, as if by the touch of an enchanter's wand, an ideal universe exists. In this ideal universe the material reality is absent--the existence of the inverted image is unknown--the idea, the inference, is all in all. Vision is literally what Swift described it to be--the art of seeing things which are invisible. Malebranche was right in saying that the science of optics is merely an explanation of our optical illusions. The theory of Berkeley is triumphant, and the world of vision turns out to be nothing but the vision of a world.

122. "If" says Reid, "we shall suppose an order of beings, endued with every human faculty but that of sight, how incredible would it be to such beings, accustomed only to the slow informations of touch, that, by the addition of an organ, consisting of a ball and socket of an inch in diameter, they might be enabled in an instant of time, without changing their place, to perceive the disposition of a whole army, or the order of a battle, the figure of a magnificent palace, or all the variety of a landscape." It is no marvel that Reid should have regarded such a perception as a revelation.

123. In visual perception the real fact, as stated by Hamilton himself, supplies their justification. Here at all events we cannot believe that we are immediately cognisant of the world of matter as existing. The world of vision, so far as it is perceived, exists merely in idea.

124. The informations of sense must be <u>telegraphed</u>, as it were, along the nerves, and the recognition of the object can never be regarded as immediate.

125. The soul contains the body, rather than the body the soul.

126. Here the natural realist is involved in a dilemma. Is the notion of space a mere idea? Then external space,and all that it embosoms, may, for aught we know, be a mere objectification of a form of sense, a self projection of the mind, a mere metaphysical mirage; and natural realism is lost in the transcendental idealism of Kant. Is this notion of space an apprehension of space in its objective existence? In this case we believe in the existence of an external world of matter, because we believe in the existence of motion in an external world of space; and natural realism is enveloped in a mist of paralogism and again is lost.

127. Hamilton is betrayed into the very absurdity with which he constantly taunts his opponents, and which he regards as decisive of the fate of that form of philosophy which the cosmothetical idealist maintains. How can you deny to mind all cognisance of matter, he asks, yet bestow upon it the inconceivable power of truly representing to itself the external world which is ex hypothesi unknown? This was the argument which Hamilton constantly employed.

128. But here his argument unexpectedly recoils upon his own philosophy; and it recoils with a peculiar force. The cosmothetical idealist does not profess to know that the idea corresponds to the unknown; he only professes to believe it.
129. It proves space to be only a law of thought, and not a law of things.
130. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, and you in a manner annihilate it.
131. To avoid the inevitable conclusion that in perception the mind has nothing present to it but its perceptions, Hamilton exhausts the resources of his learning, but in vain.
132. We are carried by a natural instinct to suppose an external universe, which exists independently of our perceptions; but when we follow this natural instinct, we suppose the images presented by the senses to be the external objects.
133. Berkeley accepted the natural instinct which leads us to believe that our sensible ideas are external objects, and boldly identified objects and idea.
134. If natural instinct accredits natural realism by asserting the existence of external external things, reflection accredits absolute idealism by asserting that we assume to be external things are nothing but our own ideas.
135. The common sense of that illustrious man Kant preserved him from illusion. He disclaimed the exercise of the arts of magic. He was a plain man, he said, who knew of no intuition but the vulgar intuition of the senses. He saw nothing in the understanding but a certain faculty of judgment; and the intellectual intuition, with its ecstacies and its absorptions and its unintelligible swoons, he left with the

Teutonic Theosopher, the Alexandrine Mystic and the Indian Mouni.

136. If the existence of objects external to ourselves can neither be perceived nor proved why, it was asked, should we insist on their existence? Philosophy for centuries had plagued itself with abortive attempts to determine the relations subsisting between the subject and the object. Kant had shown that the development of the subject was not the mere result of the action of the object; why not assume that the object is the mere creation and projection of the subject?

137. Hegel was styled the King of Thought. Forster compared him to Alexander, and said that on hid death the throne of philosophy became vacant, and the provinces of thought could only be governed by his satraps.

138. The Hegelian system is the final result of philosophy, and that Hegel had the genius to discover and the courage to proclaim that a universal thought is the absolute, and the sole existence. But if the position that thought is the sole and absolute existence is the last result of philosophy, it was also one of its earliest results. The Greeks, who anticipated everything, anticipated even this. Centuries before the Christian era Parmenides had proclaimed in sounding hexameters that thought and its objects are the same. Gorgias had amused the youth of Athens with the paradox which proclaims the identity of Nought and Being. In fact Heraclitus, in metaphors which darkened knowledge, had given forth adumbrations of the whole Hegelian doctrine. When he said that all things are in ceaseless flow, he announced the dogma, according to Hegel himself, that Becoming was the fundamental category of all that is. When he proclaimed that

strife is the parent of all things, he proclaimed the Hegelian axiom that plurality and contrast were the conditions of knowledge and perception.

139. Hume had unconsciously reproduced the ideas of Parmenides and Heraclitus, and laid the lines of the Hegelian Logic. He said to himself that "as long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrased by any question.

140. Space was nothing but the "manner in which objects exist"--Body was nothing but "a collection, formed by the mind, of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities of which objects are composed, and which we find to have a constant union with each other."

141. Fichte submitted the question of external existence to the experiment to which Hume had previously submitted it, and to which, for that matter, it had been previously submitted by Berkeley. Try, he said, the experiment of thinking any given object, and then of thinking the ego, and you will infallibly find that the object thought and the ego thinking are the same. He rejects, with even more contempt than Hume, "the wonderful assumption that the ego is something different from its own consciousness of itself, and that something, heaven knows what, lying beyond this consciousness, is the foundation of it."

142. The ego from which Fichte's theory of knowledge starts is nothing but the identity of the conscious subject with the object of which it is concious. But Fichte goes on

to say that the ego referred to is not to be identified with the individual or a person. All individual finite spirits, he says, are merely modes of the infinite life, which is God. He holds in fine that "the one reality, the one life, the life of consciousness, which is the manifestation of God, breaks itself up into an endless multiplicity of individual forms--forms which in the experience of the finite spirit must present themselves as independent self-existing facts, but which for thought are only modes of the one infinite life.

143 Even in the logical aspect of Hegel's system there is little that is absolutely new. The principle that there is no thought without plurality and contrast is as old as Heraclitus, and had been made one of the commonplaces of philosophy by Hobbes. The axiom that the science of opposites is one dates back to the Stagyrite. The famous dogma that all position is negation had been enunciated by Spinosa. The secret of the triple nisus, the mystery that reasoning and judgment are only forms of simple apprehension, had been revealed by Hume. The paradox that Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same is merely a disguise for the platitude that there is no such thing in the world as pure Being, and even that had been propounded by the brilliant Sophist.

144."The Absolute" Hegel says, "is the universal and one idea, which, as discerning, or in the act of judgment, spacialises itself to the system of specific ideas, which, after all, are constrained by their nature to come back to the one idea where their truth lies". Here the distinction between subject and object once again emerges.

145. "The things that we immediately know about are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature and without our interference; and these things, finite as they are, are appropriately described when we say that their being is established not on themselve, but on the divine and universal idea."

146. There is no course of nature but the course of thought, the course of thought requires to be anticipated as much as the course of nature. The categories are constituents of thought. Thought may be developed according to the laws of thought, but what guarantee do we possess that the laws of thought will be continued? The acute thinker who first observed that the supposition of the continuance of the laws of nature could not be derived from experience, because all experimental conclusions presupposed it, observed also that it could not be regarded as matter of demonstration, because it involves no contradiction that the course of things may change. This reasoning, it is evident, is equally just, whether we regard the course of nature as something which exists without us, or as something which exists within.

147. The impossibility of evading this conclusion is conspicuous in Mill. Holding, as he did, that we have knowledge of nothing but our sensations, and the laws of their occurrence, Mill adopted an idealism as absolute as that of Hegel. He repudiated the Hegelian conclusion that "the laws of physical nature were deduced by ratiocination from subjective deliverances of the mind."

148. "The world is produced and developed according to the laws which govern consciousness"

--that "we make the world by knowing it."
149. Reason has advanced from the age when man made weapons of flint, to the age in which we live.
150. Hegel tells us that "when we hear the Idea spoken of we need not imagine something far away beyond this mortal sphere."--"the Idea is rather that is completely present, and it is found in every consciousness. But, before we can say that the Idea is completely present, its presence must be proved, and before we can prove its presence we must prove that it exists.
151. Parmenides, the philosopher who first proclaimed that thought and its object are the same.
152. The futility of the ontological argument for God had been still more clearly pointed out by Kant. The definition of the idea of existence, showed that it was futile. The word <u>being</u> did not really predicate existence, it was merely the copula of logic. The analysis of a conception could never establish the existence of its object; and we might as well hope to increase our store of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as to augment our wealth by the addition of a multitude of noughts.
153. "God, far from being <u>a</u> Being or Essence even the highest, is <u>the</u> Being.
154, "In every dualistic system", says Hegel, "and especially in that of Kant, the fundamental defect makes itself visible in unifying at one moment what a moment before had been explained to be independent and incapable of unification". But things may be similar in essence without being unified in thought. The leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the links of the chain of sense--all this transition is thought, and

nothing but thought." But if thought leaps into the supersensible, the supersensible into which it leaps is not something out of and beyond itself. Out of and beyond itself not even thought can leap. What thought as thinker things, on the principles of Hegel, it creates. If it thinks a Being or Essence which is God, then God himself is its creation. And it is in this sense that Fichte must be understood when he proclaimed to his astonished audience that in his next lecture he was going to create God. The mind of man does not exist in God; on the contrary, God exists only in the mind of man. The world, the soul, and God are nothing but imaginations. 155. He was only shown that the universe is a mere evanescence. And what of the sphinx enigmas of existence, and the problem of the painful earth? Hegel solves the enigma by declaring there is no enigma to be solved. He finds no difficulty in conceiving that things may subsist without a substance and originate without a cause. He assumes the existence of our sensations without enquiry as to where they come from, and how it is that they arise. He assumes their co-existences and their successions and their laws without asking how the co-existences and successions are determined, by what power those laws have been imposed. The logic of Hegel gives no answer to the questions which cannot be evaded by the philosopher any more than they can be evaded by the common man. "Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Kant asked them, and left reason trembling on the verge of the abyss of necessity, which he regarded as the ultimate support of all existing things. These questions the philosophy of Hegel ignores;it ignores the very craving of intelligence by which they are suggested.

156. They may be the mere play of philosophic imagination, the romance of reason.
157. It appears to us as if sense actually apprehended things out of itself and in their proper space. We make no distinction between the object existing and the object known. We presume not only that the world exists, but that we know it as existing.
158. All the variegated colours of creation, are admitted to be mere sensations. Everything which seems presented from without by vision is admittedly projected from within. What we take to be reality turns out to be a mere conception of the mind. It is the idea of which we are conscious, and not the actual thing. But with the instinct of reality still strong upon us, we are unable to accept the doctrine of a pure, unqualified idealism, which admits the existence of nothing but the mere idea. Convinced that in the perception of the distant we are only concious of an idea, we nevertheless regard the idea within as representative of the thing without. The theory of Representative Perception thus emerges. We suppose the existence of a reality which our idea represents, and Hypothetical Realism, to employ the phrase of Sir William Hamilton, is the first conclusion which we adopt when we abandon common sense and instinct for philosophy and reason.
159. Unless the rays of light impinge upon the retina of the eye, unless the tympanum of the ear be struck by the vibrations of the air, unless there be an effluvium of the particles of odour soliciting the membrane of the nose, we neither see, nor hear, nor smell. How, then, is the mental fact, the fact of consciousness, to be explained?

160. A deeper and more serious question arose. Matter and mind, it was said, are different in their nature; they are separated by the whole diameter of being. Not only must philosophy explain how the mind can perceive matter at a distance--it must explain how mind can perceive matter in contact, or at all.
161. Matter is conceived as essentially unthinking; how, then, can it be conceived as the cause of thought? The conceptions of the human mind are the measure of the possibilities of things.
162. Philosophy accepted from theology not merely the agency of a God, but the existence of a revelation, to enable it to solve its problem. On the authority of revelation it assumed the existence of an external world, and then it had recourse to reason to explain the knowledge of the existence so assumed. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth"--and therefore, said Malebranche, the heavens and the earth have a material existence. Of that material existence we can have no knowledge, for mind cannot take cognisance of matter.
163. If all that the mind is conscious of is a series of conceptions;if that series of conceptions in the mind can never be produced by matter; if the Deity must be invoked to account for the appearance of sense--why suppose the existence of material things? Their existence could not possibly be proved. True, there must be some cause of the continual cussession of ideas which we experience; but that cause must be an incorporeal active substance other than ourselves.
164. But if we come to the conclusion that there is "a mind which affects us every moment with all the sensible impressions we perceive" the consequence is clear. The soul does not

exist in the world; the world, on the contrary exists only in the soul. Space cannot exist without the mind, and its idea is a mere abstraction; even time itself has no existence abstracted from the succession of our thoughts.
165. If we listen to the dictates of nature, the existence of body must be taken for granted in all our reasonings. As an agent, he said, I am quite satisfied with this; but as a philosopher I want to learn the ground of my belief. The ground of the belief, according to Berkeley, was a mere illusion arising from our consciousness that our sensations are imprinted from without. The tenet in question involved a contradiction. Strictly speaking, there was and could be no belief in the existence of objects independent of the mind. This, it is evident, was a new departure. In recognising the existence of matter, preceding philosophers had deferred to the authority of common sense; in denying the existence of matter, Berkeley committed common sense and philosophy to an internecine conflict.
166. The ideas of space and time are not separate and distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner in which objects exist.
167. If space and time are presupposed in all sensible experience, why should we not regard them as the forms of sense? The things which we intuite in space and time are nothing but phenomena, and phenomena are nothing but representations moulded in the forms of sense, which have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought.
168. If a cause for the world of sense must be assumed, why should we seek the cause beyond ourselves? The activity of the ego was manifest in consciousness. In its action it evolved

all the conceptions with which philosophy was concerned: why should we deem it insufficient to accounht for the appearance of sense?

169. The subjective idealist recognized an infinite life, of which every individual is a mode; the absolute idealist recognised an absolute idea, of which every individual is a phase.

170. If consciousness is unable to transcend itself, then the infinite like and the absolute idea are as far beyond its reach as the most transcendental, the most transcendent, object. It is vain to resolve the elements of the universe into thought, and to exclaim, Alles ist Ich; that is a position which cannot be consistently maintained unless we are prepared to hold that Ich ist Alles. Egoistic Idealism, therefore, with its world of subjective conceptions, is the bourne for which all idealism is ultimately bound.

171. What is Panegoism itself when the ego is - destitute of substance? On the acknowledgment of Fichte it is merely Nihilism in disguise. "The sum of all", he says, "is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. Images there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there bing aught to witness their transition--that consist, in fact, of the images of images without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images. Perception is a dream; thought--the source of all the existence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destination--is the dream of that dream." That is the last word

which

which idealism has to utter.

172. Impelled by an unreflecting instinct, we first imagine that we grasp the thing; instructed by awakened reason, we are fain to confess that what we are conscious of is nothing but the idea. With the instinct of reality still strong upon us, we are prompted to regard our ideas as representatives of things. Baffled in the endeavour to conceive the nature of the relation between mind and matter, in our inability to explain the inexplicable we invoke the Deity, and speculation enters the domain of hyperphysical influences, miraculous causes, imaginary harmonies, and theosophic visions. The Deity having been invoked to account for our knowledge of the world of matter, the existence of the world of matter is ignored as unnecessary to the operation of the Déity, and our ideas of sense are conceived to be excited in our minds by the unassisted agency of God. But as the world was superseded by God, so God in his turn is superseded by the soul. The mind, which first rushed into materialism, then burst into the region of theology, falls back exhausted on itself. It first declares space and time to be mere forms of sense; it next denies the existence of all external causes; and, finally, it ignores all substance. It resolves the universe into unsubstantial thought, and hails this unsubstantial entity which trembles on the verge of non-existence as the All.

What, then, is the impression left upon the mind by the contemplation of so many shadowy and shifting systems? In these lofty solitudes of thought we see nothing but the mists which boil around the glaciers, and, like Manfred on the summit of the Jungfrau, we are giddy. But it is not in vain we have reached these

silent heights. It is something to have climbed the mountain; it is something to have seen the mists. We have tried our powers; we have satisfied our curiosity; we are content. But is this the only benefit that those high speculations are calculated to confer? By no means. They have shown us our ignorance, it is true, but in ascertaining our ignorance we have increased our knowledge. We know what we may aspire to know, and we know what cannot possibly be known. To use the phrase of Locke, we have learned the length of our tether, and we are satisfied to sit down in quiet ignorance of the things which lie beyond the reach of our faculties of knowledge. And our ignorance as to these subjects is quiet because it is complete. We have learned to regard with indifference any new demonstrations of the old indemonstrable dogmas. We know that it is as impossible to prove thought to be a function of matter as it is to prove matter to be a phantasy of thought. We know that the materialist cannot prove the very existence of that matter by means of which he would fain supersede the necessity of recognising any spiritual existence either within us or beyond us. But what is this absence of knowledge of which the agnostic so bitterly complains? In reality it is of no significance whatever. We are so constituted, that upon those all-important subjects which we cannot know we are compelled to think.

173. They were ready to take their chance in higher things. Bacon would rather believe all the fables of the Legend, the Talmud, and the Koran, than that this universal frame was without a mind; and Napoleon, looking up into the star-lit heavens, appealed to the principle of final causes as confidently as Butler or as Paley.

The fact is, we hold the possessions of our higher life by the same tenure as that on which we hold our possessions in the world of sense. And it is here that philosophy, even in its negative or agnostic side, has rendered a service to religion. It has shown that we can live upon a world the existence of which we cannot prove. It has shown that we can associate and act with a multitude of fellow-creatures whose existence is as incapable of demonstration as that of the Deity himself. It has shown, in fine, that in the most ordinary events of life, as in the deepest mysteries of religion, we live by faith and not by sight. For the whole universe is concealed from us by the veil of our ideas. What is it that exists beyond the veil? That is a question which we can neither answer nor evade. The mind of man is haunted by the supposition of something he knows not what, which is beyond him. It is in this sense of the unknown that all philosophy and all religion have their source. But the highest intelligence is as helpless as the lowest when it tries to grasp it. The mystery of existence is as inscrutable to the modern philosopher as it was to Plato; and it was as inscrutable to Plato as it was to the ignorant Egyptian who forty centuries ago bowed before the Veiled Statue of Isis, and worshipped the symbol of existence as the Unknown God.

174. No one now-a-days contends with Reid that Locke's idea was a <u>tertium quid,</u> existing in the mind like a wafer in a box; everybody believes it to be, what Locke persistently asserts it to be, an act of perception --a modification of thinking--a mere act or affection of the mind.

175. The criticism of Leibnitz on this doc-

trine of Locke is well known, and it supplies a key to all the misunderstandings and misrepresentations which have follwed. "Experience is necessary, I admit" says Theophilus to Philalethes, in the New Essays, "in order that the mind should be determined to such or such thoughts and in order that it should take note of the ideas that are in us; but what of the means by which experience and the senses are competent to supply ideas? Is the mind a window? Does it resemble a tablet? Is it like Wax? It is clear that all who think thus make the mind material. I shall be met with the received maxim, that there is nothing in the soul which comes not from the senses; but we must make an exception in favour of the soul itself and its affections.
176. It is one thing to contend against misleading phraseology, and another thing to contend against the truth. Locke objects to the phraseology of Lowde as "misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation."
177. Whence has the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge? Locke replies, "in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself". This one word unfortunately supplies the sum and substance of all that the critics seem to know of the philosophy of Locke; and they never ask themselves what the one word means. In the first place, what are the materials which experience supplies? The answer of Condillac and his followers is, sensations only. But the theory of transformed sensations ignores the fact that, on its own showing, sensations are transformed. It ignores the fact that if sensations are transformed, they can only be transformed by certain operations of the mind. It ignores the fact that of these operations of the mind the mind itself

must sooner or later, in point of time, take notice. It ignores the fact that the mind could not take note of its own operations, unless it possessed a capacity of reflection. None of these considerations were ignored by Locke, and accordingly he agrees with Kant in regarding the fountain of experience as comprising two sources, sensation and reflection, or, as he elsewhere terms them, in the very language of the Kritik, external and internal sense. In the Kritik it is laid down that our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, sensibility and understanding--the one a "receptivity for impressions" the other a "spontaneity in the production of conceptions." Does Locke recognise the spontaneous production of conceptions by the understanding? It is here that the philosophy of Locke has been in a peculiar manner misunderstood; and it is here that his own language has most materially contributed to the misunderstanding. Locke undoubtedly lays it down that "simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by the two ways, sensation and reflection."

178. Not only does he admit that the understanding can separate, compound, and compare the ideas with which it has been furnished by the senses, but he admits that, over and above the simple ideas which the understanding gets from the senses, "there are others it gets from their comparison with one another." These are the ideas of relation which are "added by the mind." Such is the idea of causation which the mind "collects" in observing the constant changes which occur around it.

179. Locke is not content with even this. He makes a further effort to explain himself."To

explain myself and clear my meaning in this matter" he says, "all the ideas of all the sensible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by sensation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, knowing etc. come into my mind by reflection; the ideas of these qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by THE MIND to be by themselves inconsistent with existence; or as your Lordship well expresses it, 'we find that we can have no true conception of any modes of accidents, but we must conceive a substratum or subject, wherein they are, i.e. that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves."

180. "In some of our ideas", he says, "there are certain relations, habitudes, and connexions, so visibly included in the nature of ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever.

181. Such is the empiricism--such is the sensualism of John Locke! But, unfortunately for philosophy, the error as to his true character has become inveterate. It is embodied in all the histories of philosophy. It is stamped with the authority of great men, whose writings are in every hand, and whose names are upon every tongue. For two hundred years Locke has been regarded as a mere empiric; and it is to be feared that, in spite of all that may be said to the contrary, he will be so regarded to the end of time.

182. As usual, detraction followed in the footsteps of dislike, and no philosopher in the annals of misrepresentation has been so systematically misrepresented as the founder of the Nominalism of modern times.

183. The qeustions as to the origin of language again, which within the last few years have been popularised by the ability of Max Muller,

are only a phase of the question raised by the Nominalists as to the origin of general terms.

184. What is the object present to the mind in its general reasonings? Is it a thing, an idea, or a name? Is the Realist or the Conceptualist, or the Nominalist, right?

185. What a critic, however intelligent, conceives a great philosopher to have been a fool, it is within the limits of possibility that the fool after all may be, not the philosopher, but the critic. Before we ridicule we should refute, and before we refute we should strive to understand, and before we can understand we must carefully weigh the language of our author. Let us try, then, in the first place to understand what was meant.

186. Hobbes, in his Computation undoubtedly states that "the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received them from the imposition of others."

187. Whether Hobbes was right or wrong in considering language to be arbitrary, he is undoubtedly right in his conception of the relations which subsist between the thing, the idea and the name. "A name is a word taken at pleasure, to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which, being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not, before in his mind." But names are "signs of our conceptions"; and, "one universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accident." Accordingly Hobbes tells us that "a man that seeketh precious truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will

find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs--the more he struggles the more belimed." He tells us "that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science"; and he concludes his discussion with the weighty apophthegm, that "words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man."
188. This process of abstraction he regards as the prerogative of man; and he delights in magnifying the difficulties that attend it. "General ideas" he says, "are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine." "Does it not require some pains and skill" he asks, "to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once."
189 It is never with impunity that a writer sacrifices precision to point. Locke's abstract idea of a triangle is as enigmatical as the Aelia Laelia Crispis of the schoolmen; and accordingly from the first it has been the butt of philosophers and wits.
190. Locke's critics, to use Locke's metaphor, have all been lost in the great wood of words. They have failed to observe that parts of inconsistent ideas are not necessarily inconsistent, and that ideas may be obtained by abstraction without being capable of being imaged in the abstract. The abstract idea is not so much an idea as a "measure of name", and it is the very essence of a definition

that it should comprehend all particulars and be identified with none.

191 He does not contend that "a man need stand to recollect and make an analysis" of the meaning of the word every time he happens to employ it--all he insists on is, "that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases."

192. It must be admitted that in our general reasonings we employ words without any conscious reference to their meaning, and merely as algebraic symbols. It must be admitted, at the same time, that, if our reasonings are not to end in nonsense, our words must have a meaning, and that their meaning must be determined by their definition, whether denominated abstract idea, scheme, or concept. It must be admitted, moreover, that if our general reasonings are to conduct to any practical result, our conceptions should not be mere chimeras, but should accord with the facts of nature and the realities of things. But then again it must be admitted that every-thing which exists, whatever may be the physical cause that determines the mode of existence, is <u>particular</u>. At the same time it cannot be denied that in contemplating a multitude of particulars the mind is struck with a sense of their <u>resemblance</u>, and that it selects the point of resemblance by a process of abstraction and combines them into a scheme or concept. But can this scheme or concept be present to the mind as an image or idea? No; and even if it could be, it would be particular. The only means of <u>generalising</u> it and keeping its abstracted elements together is by the imposition of a name.

193. In one point Locke and Bacon have been

subjected to a common error. Both have been regarded as champions of the Empiricism which, according to the critics, is characteristic of their nation.

So far was Bacon from being a mere empiric, that the whole object of his philosophy, as stated in his Distributio Operis was to effect a reconciliation between the rational and the empiric faculties, the divorce of which, he said, had thrown all human affairs into confusion. The true process of science, he said in his Novum Organum, was neither that of the ant, which merely stores what it has collected from without, nor that of the spider, which spins everything from within, but that of the bee, which gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and the field, and by its own faculty digests them and converts them into honey. The influence of reason in the development of science from experience is never for a single moment either denied or ignored by Bacon.

194. In his Aphorisms Bacon asserts that the contemplation of truth is something far higher and worthier than any mere utility. And in his Essays are the words, which every man of education has by heart: "Howsoever these things are in men's depraved judgments and affections; yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth, that the enquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of human nature."

195. We have seen that Hume systematically distinguishes between the results of experience and the elements of geometry--that he protests against confounding the principles of philosophy with the principles of action--that he maintains we are under the necessity of acting upon

beliefs which no reasoning is able either to produce or to prevent.

196. The whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator. You (the Sceptic) alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections. You ask me what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity, and here I stop my enquiry."

197. Hume, as we have seen, recognises the principle of efficient causes as the ground of our belief in the existence of a God, while he recognises the principle of final causes as the ground of our belief in his intelligence and goodness. As regards natural causes he has the conspicuous merit of being the first to popularise, if not to establish, what is now an accepted truth, that the sole object of the physical inquirer is to ascertain the constant conjunction of phenomena in the vast sequence of changes which constitute the laws of nature. This is Hume's theory of causation in the proper sense. But the existence of these constant conjunctions in the past is no guarantee for their continuance in the future. That the sun rose yesterday is no proof that he will rise to-morrow. Our belief in the future continuance of the conjunctions which we have experienced is not to be accounted for by mere experience, according to Hume, but by an instinct of our nature called into play by the recurrence of the phenomena which we have experienced, and supplying a fresh instance of the principle of final causes.

198. If the evidence for each of them be regarded as a cypher, it is plain that no multiplication of cyphers will constitute a unit.

S.C. CHAKRAVARTI.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS. (Part 2).

1. This book has been written with the object of restoring the purity of the great truths uttered by the ancient thinkers of India which, unfortunately, has been obscured by a mass of prevailing misconceptions. It is an irony of fate that the land which gave birth to the incomparable thinkers of the Upanishad period, should have lacked in persons who could properly expound their thoughts to posterity. One reason for it lies in the fact that the Upanishad truths which are extraordinarily deep and comprehensive, have been handed down more in the form of final results achieved than in the ordinary mode of exposition, so very necessary to the treatment of philosophical subjects. Another reason is the great change that has since overtaken human outlook, due to the manifold forms of life in which adult humanity is manifesting itself. Those who are anxious to bring back the form of simplicity that distinguished infant mankind are completely mistaken in their estimate of the manner in which life gradually infolds itself.

2. The stress felt in the practical fields of life may extinguish the real spirit of philosophical enquiry, but religion continues to exercise its sway, and its influence becomes greater, for the unhappy adjustment of the practical demands of life drives more rapidly a person to obtain that solace from religion, which unfulfilled desires in life fail to give. The theologians had therefore everything in their own way and the philosophy of the land suffered considerably.

3. The task of properly expounding the Indian philosophy primarily rests on the Indians, who

should, because of their natural aptitude, give the lead in the matter.

4. The notion widely prevails that philosophy made its appearance at an advanced stage of human progress, when man was able, by reason of his accumulated experience, to systematise his thoughts and to take a comprehensive view of the world, and of possible things beyond it.

5. In support of the view that philosophy is the late result of the developed human mind, the argument is advanced that for a long time the need for it was not felt, as the need for it is not felt even now by a considerable portion of mankind.

6. An easy-going manner of spending life, taking things as they come, without bestowing much thought on the future, has nothing in it to raise it to the rank of philosophy, and that, therefore, the thoughtless manner in which the bulk of human beings spend their lives justifies the conclusion that philosophy is the exclusive occupation of the advanced and the seriously minded few.

7. Notwithstanding the desire on the part of a considerable section of men to wash their hands of all philosophy, which they hold in great dread, and to perpetuate what they are pleased to call the care-free way of leading their lives, it remains a fact that their notion of existence has got its assigned place in the history of world's philosophies, and in spite of their eagerness to part company with philosophers, they form a class of thinkers by themselves. Who has not heard of the Indian Charvakas, the followers of Brihaspathi, and the Greek Hedonists?

8. It may be laid down broadly that, in the remote past, the philosophy of a particular

epoch invariably gave birth to the religion of the times. As the philosophy of the people of an epoch was, so became its religion. Those who claim the position of a privileged class of thinkers, would not like the idea of making religion on offspring of philosophy.

9. The fundamental fact that man is a rational whole, and that you can no more cut one aspect of life from another, than you can sever any limb from the body of man, and keep it alive, disjointed from the rest of the organism.

10. Philosophy properly speaking begins, where the sciences end, though the sciences themselves are in the main feeders of philosophy. Gaps always remain, though scientific method may have been carefully followed in analysing the facts of experience.

11. He has never been able to understand things as parts of a connected whole, without taking them at first piecemeal. The links connecting the different groups of experience, he taks a long time in understanding, and understands last, if he understands at all.

12. Faith is the essential basis of religion, the scrutiny of reason was shut out from its sphere, and the blind submission to dogmas, now and then clothed in the garb of reason, began to be rigidly enforced. Such is the cumulative effect of continuous thinking, within narrow grooves, and the obstinate habit it engenders, that even the brightest of intellects of modern times would hesitate to give philosophy unqualified admission into the domain of religion.

13. The heart of man is yearning to believe those things that have the stamp of reason on them. Man is eager to regain his integrity of thinking. In this state of things, in an age in which reason is trying to take its rightful

place, how are the members of the class in charge of the religious beliefs of the race behaving? Unable to remain complacently satisfied by basing their claims solely on faith, they have become restive, and are trying their utmost, by means of utterances, written and spoken, to secure for the dogmas whatever semblance of reason they can lay their hands on.
14. God is not dethroned or chased away, but only an attempt is made to form an intelligent idea of Him, religion has nothing to be afraid of.
15. How deep is the desire on the part of man to find out a really abiding faith, to which he can cling in hours of necessity, a necessity which is ever on the increase, in this world of miseries and distresses. Man is panting to rest on beliefs which, though they may not improve his worldly condition, may at least provide him with really consoling thoughts, armed with which he may boldly face the vicissitudes of life, just as a warrior, fighting for a cause that he feels to be just, boldly faces the enemy and death.
16. Truths can be drawn only from experience. The truth should be always objective, never subjective. By this is meant that a method or process, which works in the case of an individual, should also be found to work in the case of every other person, in similar circumstances, by reason of which the truth becomes objective. The method must be capable of being explained and followed. We do not know and cannot permit the existence of what may be claimed as super-normal experience.
17. Truth can only be gained through the channel of experience, with the hold of the scientific method. But the truths of science, which are

analatically arrived at--often the facts of one branch of science being developed in isolation from the other branches--have to be synthetically put together by philosophy. In so far as philosophy tries to put together synthetically the results of the different branches of science, it is pursuing the method of arriving at exact knowledge.

18. They should be kept secret and not imparted to those who are unworthy to grasp them, for, if not properly understood, instead of doing good, they would produce great confusion in the minds of unworthy persons. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that the teachings of the Upanishads were looked upon as secret teachings and great caution had to be excercised in imparting them to others.

19. It is a truism that ideas or thoughts are expressed by words or speech. Human thought first found vent, or burst forth, by means of articulate sound. For that reason, in the eyes of the primitive peoples, word or speech came to possess, from the very beginning, an important significance, and it cannot be said that this view of the matter presented itself only to the minds of ancient Indians, though in their case, owihg to their environment and bent of mind, it assumed in course of time, a sacred and mystic character.

20. If by means of progressive thinking, carried on through a long course of time, it is ultimately found that certain matters are only the attributes of a thing, though for a long time, each of the attributes was mistakenly taken for the thing itself, any subsequent attempt, to resuscitate the attributes into life and treat them as the thing itself should be looked upon as the outcome of a desire to bring back

the ascendency of the old mode of looking at things. So long as in the search for a final controlling cause of the creation, sometimes Indra or sometimes Agni or Varuna, is taken as the ultimate cause, these attempts may be looked upon as natural stages in the search for a first cause, but when once the One or Tad Ekam is clearly and definitely found, as the ultimate cause, from whom Indra, Agni and Varuna derive their powers, the attempt to reinstate in their old places Indra, Agni, Varuna or any other deity, must be looked upon as a distinct act of metaphysical regression, manifesting nothing more than the desire to go back to the old state of things, which had in past exercised great fascination. With the help of this criterion will be detected cases of unfair attempts made to push back distinctly later stages of thought, and to bring in their places ideas that had been already superseded.

21. The absence of the Godhead did not trouble them. They inwardly thought, what the Buddhists afterwards preached from door to door, that in this world of unmitigated sufferings there was no room for a bnevolent Creator, for if to such a being the authorship of the creation was to be ascribed, it could not be imagined why he did not relive the miseries of the created beings.

22.The Neo-Platonic philosophy, at first at Alexandria and Rome and subsequently at Athens tried to find out the ultimate principle, by means of ecstasy, mystical annihilation of self, and theurgy.

22. The writer of the Patanjali Sutras, by introducing the topic of the Supreme Purusha last, wants to make it quite clear that for the purpose of obtaining the results of con-

centration, the focussing of thoughts on the Supreme Purusha is not essentially necessary.

23. Even a man of such broad outlook as Sir Oliver Lodge, referring to the subject of concentration, the main theme of the Yoga Philosophy, which considerably helped the Indian philosopher in getting at the highest truth writes, "It is a most tiring and tiresome thing to stare at a letter, or a triangle, and to think of nothing else for the space of two or three minutes. Whether the term 'thinking' can properly be applied to such barbarous concentration of mind as this I am not sure; its difficultly is of the nature of tediousness."

24. Every philosopher was a Yogin, though every Yogin was not a philosopher. No one could then claim recognition as a thinker of repute, if he had not submitted himself, in the first instance, to a course of discipline, which the Yoga system had laid down. This discipline consisted of several stages, and only a limited few could reach the ultimate stage which the system contemplated. When it is remembered how very difficult it is to concentrate attention for a length of time upon matters of general interest, which lie outside of ourselves, the stupendous nature of the task which the Yogin was required to perform may be imagined.

25. In its purity and simplicity, shorn of the accumulations which in course of time have gathered round it and obscured its worth, Yoga, which is nothing more than concentration properly understood and rightly applied, is sure to produce wonderful results. A Newton or a Marconi, an Edison or an Einstein, would tell you that. Take away from them the depth of concentration into which each had plunged himself, and you may be sure that they would

not have been what they became. Every one of them had strayed into the methods which Yoga advocates, without knowing to have done so.

26. The thoughts of the philosophers of the times used to be converted into the tenets of religion. The earliest founders of the religions of India were its philosophers. To philosophy every theologian in India directed his mind for inspiration and support.

27. The Atman doctrine is very clearly stated, leaving no room for doubt that the ultimate reality is to be arrived at, not by a process of elimination, until an abstract Absolute, unknowable and unthinkable, is lfet, but by a synthesis of everything known and knowable.

28. Mandaka is taken to mean razor, which implies that as a razor removes hair, so this Upanishad removes the errors of mind.

29. It will be really strange, if the ultimate reality is to stand discredited, and considered as evanescent or non-existent, because it has not been reduced to something very palpable to the human senses, or identified with a familiar human notion. By many the living warm personal touch of the One of Philosophy is felt necessary to make the heart respond, and the them the philosophy of the Upanishads would appear to be vacuous, as there is no room in it for the play of the feelings and sentiments, to which they are accustomed. But if the value of a philosophy has to be judged by such sentimental tests, one had better relinquish the path of philosophy, which the more one pursues the more one finds bestrewed with things with which one is not familiar, but which nevertheless are the determining elements in the ultimate reality. Sentiments will have to be remodelled, just as thoughts and ideas will have to be reshaped.

30. Just as a young man looks upon the thoughts of his boyhood and is astonished that he should have been at one time so much swayed by the feelings of that age, just as adult reviews the thoughts of his youthful days and wonders that he should have attached such exaggerated importance to the feelings and sentiments that were uppermost in his mind once, so there would come a time when adult humanity would look upon the sentiments of the present times and the current value attached to things as extremely childish.

31. I do not acknowledge the existence of any method that may be called mystical. Everything is brought about in the natural way--there is nothing which can be called super-natural. I have tried to explain Yoga as a natural method, by which knowledge things can be more speedily acquired than by the ordinary processes of the senses.

32. Th human heart looks upon the world as real, for though it may be the abode of griefs and miseries, which overpower the individuals, it is still the place where are to be found the joys to which the individual would like to cling. The age was unprepared to receive the profound truths which the Upanishads contained.

33. Those who belong to the school of Sankara are never tired of saying that the Self or Brahman is unattached, that he does not suffer, because he is unfettered, that he has no feelings, because feelings belong to a lower order of existence. From the Self or Brahman, who is immaculate and devoid of feelings, the last vestige of emotions should be chased away.

34. The Indian thinkers were only a set of dreamers, blind to the actualities of existence, and devoid of appreciation for what is good and true in life.

35. The mockery of a philosophy which has lost its touch with the advancing truths of science is the most grotesque of all spectacles.
36. The individual, here on earth, has a foretaste of the stage of oneness, when he falls asleep. In that state of sleep, the individual becomes self-illuminated. He then finds out that there are no blessings, no happiness, no joys, but he himself sends forth blessings, happiness and joys, there are no tanks there, no lakes, no rives, but he himself sends forth tanks, lakes and rivers, He is indeed the maker. In other words, when the stage of duality passes off, and the stage of oneness prevails, he finds himself to be the maker of everything, since everything springs out of him.
37. Gaudapada did not bring out any other Karikas except the Mandukya-karika, the first chapter of which is employed in interpreting the Mandukya Upanishad, whence the entire work is known as Mandukya-karika. In his Mandukya-karika which consists of four parts, Gaudapada deals with the four states of the self, unreality, unity, and the extinction of the burning coal.
38. All that the Upanishads say is that we should reduce the many into one in order to to find out the ultimate reality.
39. Bergson starts with a distinction, which admits of no controversy, so far as it goes, that ideas are different from material objects. Ideas do not occupy space, that is to say, are not extended, while material objects occupy space and are extended.
40. The clear insight into the meaning of physical physical science which is given by modern scientific philosophy shows that by its inherent nature and fundamental definitions is but an abstraction.
41. The quarrel of the majority of the so-called Godless men is not with a Being, who

may be placed on high and called God, but with the current ideas relating to the Being.
42. While the world is rapidly moving and thoughts are undergoing radical changes, religion remains stationary, because its doors have been shut against the entry of demonstrated truths.
43. The rules of Yoga are also stated, but nowhere anything of the nature of mysticism is attributed to them. Everywhere they are treated as rules of concentration, by means of which knowledge may be obtained. The aphorisms of Patanjali make this perfectly clear. The view that mysticism comes as a necessary sequel to the philosophy of the Upanishads, is as uninformed as it is full of mischief.
44. The value of the practical side of the Upanisaddphilosophy for mankind cannot be overrated. It proclaims to the world a unique standard for assessing the value of things. People are oppressed with the idea of evil. Evil is, as it were, dogging the steps of man and giving him no rest. There is no getting rid of it. The Atman doctrine sends the cheering message to all that no such thing as evil really exists.
45, The world has yet to pass through numerous stages, spread over long periods, before it will reach its destination.

(Part 1. of Chakravarti's "Philosophy of the Upanishads" will be found in Mogul Notebook No. 4 "Books")

VISCOUNT HALDANE: "EAST AND WEST" in the Hibbert Journal.1. With Kant a new rendering entered the world of reflection. He was succeeded by men like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, by whom, in ways which varied much, his basic principle was developed with even more thorough-going penetration.
2. We are not as well informed about the contributions to reflection that have come from the East. We ought to have diffused among us information that we have not. There are competent students of Indian Philosophy, in Europe and America, but they are relatively few in number and the results of their researches have not penetrated widely.
3. The more thorough the method of a science is, the less does it pin itself to imagery. This is as true of metaphysics as it is true of other forms of inquiry. The elimination of metaphor as far as is consistent with being intelligible is highly desirable. It cannot be wholly eliminated, but over-indulgence in it is a fertile source of error.
4. We have got beyond the category of substance to a subject or self or mind which has for its nature what is universal, existing both in itself and for itself. But because human knowledge always distinguishes between knower and known the universal self cannot be known. It is the condition of experience, but is not itself experienced.
5. But the teaching of the Upanishads became so flexible as to embrace within it the most diverse forms of doctrine, from a refined idealism to a crude symbolic idolatry, and the higher religion became in danger of being swamped by the lower. It was against this tendency that the Buddhists and the Jains revolted. It was Buddhism in particular that emerged as really important in

in this revolt. The Buddha is a name for the ultimate reality, the universal and transcendental self that is subject as distinguished from substance.

6. It is now time to turn to the parallel conceptions of the West. For if we go deep enough down we seem to find the same thoughts, only differently expressed. In the East much is rendered difficult to interpret by the copious use of metaphor. In Western metaphysics scientific methods of logic have on the whole dominated.

7. In the Western world there has grown up a view of the nature of final reality which is akin to that which we have found in the history of Indian thought. Much attention has been devoted here, in every period, to the nature of knowledge itself. Psychologists have sought to dissect experience into constituent and self-contained elements out of which it can be treated as being built up. The initial simplicity of these elements of an experience thus broken up has been regarded as enabling the relation of object and subject itself to be reduced to a vanishing point. Time and space become relations between mere point-events and groups of such events. The other relations, such as those of substance and cause, and the apparently limitless multiplicity of categories, are resolved into simple relations of externality of elementary kinds, between the basic and simple events which are fundamental in experience. The process of investigation along these lines has been pursued with great keennes, and with much thoroughness and grasp of the scientific methods of thrity years ago.

Probably it was the want of knowledge of our scientific methods that prevented this life of investigation from growing up in India.

8. This mode of approach to the problem of reality is characteristic of the West alone, and in the West it has been keenly and powerfully followed.

9. Behind the supposed scientific search there lies concealed a problem of which many over here are keenly aware to-day. It is not merely the psychological object-world but the psychologist himself that has to be accounted for. That world implie his presence. Evolution can only take place within such a universe, and that universe has meaning and therefore existence only as object for some mind that knows it. Evolution pre-supposes mind, and not mind evolution. We cannot get behind our starting point, experience. That was really why the Indian thinkers came back to mind as the prius. Just as they did, so in Europe men came to find that in every form of the constitution of the object world reflection of some kind was involved.

It is no part of the purpose of this article to defend this, the idealistic position. Many over here do not accept it. The important point is that it did emerge in the West, just as it had done in the East, and that the self came to be looked on, not as a substance, but as subject, itself the manifestation of self more liberally and widely conceived. That was how in both West and East God, under whatever name, came to be looked on, not as an outside power, but as immanent. The human mind was only among the finite forms in which God expressed and so realised himself. However difficult it may seem to regard a finite mind is given an absolute significance, beyond and outside which there is nothing even conceivable. The problem becomes one of knowledge that is all-inclusive, and no longer is one of substance confronting substance. That seems to have been the view

shadowed forth in the Vedantas, and in Gotama's teaching, and it is also the view of modern idealists like Leibnitz and Hegel. Thus we find in East and West a common doctrine very differently expressed, but tending in the same direction.

10. We have not explored the philosophical systems of India and the East with the same keenness that we have brought to bear on philosophy and science in Europe. There have been exceptions, such as Schopenhauer and in a less degree Hegel. But the work has been mainly left to scholars, great of their kind, but insufficiently trained in philosophical research.

11. It is said against us that underlying the popular creeds of India there is a system of analysis in truth not less comprehensive than that of the idealism of the West. It is, of course, far less precise in its language, and has suffered from insufficient training, on the part of those who wield it, in the theory of logical forms. Still, it is added, there is the analysis and there are the ideas which have resulted.

12. We have enjoined on us a discipline which is described as being indispensable for the attainment of the true idea. We find that the ambition of those who practised the yoga discipline was, not to be able to assert that the world had no pleasures or joys, but to develop the passion for attaining the highest good, the true self, so fully that it would admit of no compromise with any other desire.

13. His life is selfless. The idea of the self so purified is one which it is impossible to define. But so in Western thought also has the self, the 'I' been a conception which has baffled the metaphysician, and driven thinkers

to look rather to the highest aspirations in social life and its duties as the actual ideal that has to be defined. The Indian doctrine goes beyond this. For the view of the truth in which it terminates is not only non-rational but also even non-intuitional.

14. It is difficult to extract any clear account of the mind in this condition. The vacuity of Nirvana is no conceptual condition, even like the pure self which we find elsewhere in Yogism. It is more akin to what has been described, as far as such a state of mind and will can be described, by Schopenhauer (World as Will and Idea,): "Death is the moment of that deliverance from the onesidedness of our individuality which does not constitute the inmost kernel of our being, but is rather to be thought of as a kind of aberration of it. The true original freedom re-enters at this moment, which, in the sense indicated, may be regarded as a restitution in integrum. The peace and quietness upon the countenance of most dead persons seems to have its origin in this."

15. Wealth and comfort they all appreciate as do people everywhere, but they all know that money is not everything, and that peace of mind and the ultimate good of man cannot be secured through it or any other worldly thing.

16. That assumption once got rid of a new task is opened up, the task of learning to govern India through a mutual understanding and sympathy which may carry us a long way towards the solution of a problem that seems insoluble largely because we have made it so.

LORD HALDANE "THE CHURCHES & HIGHER EDUCATION." in Hibbert journal.: 1. We are at every turn more than we take ourselves to be. The finite even in the form of a creed, is still the

finite only. It points beyond itself to what is more than itself, to a basis in infinity.
2. It is when we have before our minds the idea of an entirety of knowledge from which no phase of it is excluded that we can find a basis on which the apparently different outlooks can be brought together. The truth, here as elsewhere, is the whole and nothing short of the whole.
3. The attempt is easiest when based on the certainty that comes from great knowledge. That is where the advantage of the highest education comes in. It prepares men and women to search always for the principle of the whole, and to be content with nothing short of the consistency which comes from inclusion in a whole. Such a search does more than guide to a large outlook. It also tends to exclude the narrow concentration that creates difficulties in interpretation where they need not exist.
4. The Universities are the schools charged with the duty of giving the highest kind of intellectual training to students. Short of training of this standard there is nothing complete. When the Universities have accomplished the higher education of the student he is able to go on educating himself, and his self-education should go on to the grave. If he has become keen enough, if his intellectual curiosity has been stimulated, if the passion for excellence has been awakened in him, he will go on educating himself through the course of life.

$$ The search for truth, which the HIBBERT JOURNAL has always proposed to itself and to its readers, is by no means an innocent occupation. There never was an important truth discovered and published but that somebody was hurt by it--a circumstance that gives a

certain tragic quality to the life of the thinker when he recognizes, as sooner or later he must, that with every forward step some illusion has, painfully, to die.

2. Truth has an interrogative as well as a positive form, and is often better expressed by a question asked than by an answer given, it may then be pleaded that the failure of the Journal to solve these problems is not conclusive against the utility of its efforts in the service of truth.

R.G. COLLINGWOOD. 1. The Greek mind, for good and ill, was radically intellectualistic; that is to say, its instinct was to demand an argued demonstration of everything. Faith, therefore, was to the Greek a rather scandalous thing, a thing clean contrary to his scientific cast of mind.

2. Aristotle put forward a theory of knowledge according to which everything required syllogistic proof except the ultimate principles from which this proof was in the last resort derived.

3. Nor, for that matter, can you concentrate your thought permanently upon the infinite; if you do, it evaporates into a sickly mysticism which out of its own corruption generates a host of saprophytic and verminous finite objects, the creatures of a superstitious fancy.

4. Was it by reason or by faith that Descartes assured himself of his own existence? Not by reason, because, as he pointed out, the thing was an ultimate intuition. And not exactly by faith, because faith had always hitherto contained a suggestion of arbitrary adhesion to a belief which, if one had so wished, one might have denied. Now the con-

viction of one's own existence is a conviction which one cannot help having. It is not in one's power to have it or to reject it. Its possession does not depend on one's having undergone certain special kinds of experience. Some experience one must have; but any experience will do.

What Descartes has done here is to indicate a point at which faith and reason absolutely coincide. In the certainty of my own existence I have a conviction which is rational in the sense that it is universal and necessary, but a matter of faith in that it rests not on argument, but on direction conviction. Descartes' methodic doubt is not fides quoerens intellectum, nor yet intellectus quoerens fidem; it is a search for something absolutely certain, which anybody, however situated, must recognise as absolutely certain. Its certainty does not depend on proof, not even, like that of the Aristotelian first principles, on indirect proof, but on the fact that it cannot be denied.

J.L. STOCKS. To such thinking the individual always presents itself as an inexhaustible complex, an unknown or unknowable. By abstraction it simplifies the problem, but at the cost of a divorce between knowledge and reality: "The individual may exist" it says, "but it is the universal that is known." In a word, for such thinking, and for purpose which is its practical embodiment, there is no individual.

REVIEWS:- By L.S. STEBBING: Percepts are said to be "patches of colour, noises, smells, hardness, etc. as well as perceived spatial relations." Relation between percepts, e.g. difference, may be a percept. In the Outline

what is stressed is "that percepts are what we can know with the most certainty; and that percepts contain what naive realism thinks it knows about the world". A percept is discovered by what Mr. Russell calls "self-observation, i.e. introspection. Hence, percepts are private. Yet percepts are the sole data for physics. Hence, "the facts of physics, like those of psychology, are obtained by what is really self-observation, although commonsense mistakenly supposes that it is observation of external objects."

2. The method of psychology, viz. self-observation, is the method of physics. Accordingly he is faced with the peculiarly difficult problem of getting outside the circle of his own percepts. It would seem that he must take refuge in solipsism. There is one passage where Mr. Russel seems almost to admit that this conclusion is inevitable.

3. He traces the chain of events that proceed from a physical object to the brain and finds that our percepts "come at the end of a physical events leading spatially from the object to the brain of the percipient." Hence, from the standpoint of physics, our percepts are in our heads. Our percepts are, however, the indubitable, "hard" data of which we are in search. Hence, what we know most certainly is an event in our brains. What we observe is not at all what we suppose to be. The percept is not of course perceived in our brains; it is perceived "out there" in perceptual space.

R.F. RATTRAY. No object is static, but every object is in constant change. Moreover, it is in reciprocal relation with the surrounding universe, which, of course, is also in constant change. A stone, for

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example, regarded as something that has become and is becoming, is integrally part of the universe. Everything is, as it were, its own epitome of the history of its reactions to the rest of the universe.

2. Mathematical physics as represented by Prof. Eddington, reports that the external world is, at least very largely, our own creation; that it is even possible that we can experience nothing but what we have created and that the greatest of our mental creations is the material universe itself. Prof. Graham Kerr maintains that the universal vision of the universe is colour is illusion, that in fact the universe is dark waves of ether. He says that we happen to have a particular type of sense organ, the ear, tuned to catch an insignificant little proportion of the pulses of matter, and out of these we make the world of sound, whereas science shows that the universe is actually a universe of eternal silence. Which means, of course, that all the wealth of colour and sound is the product of the mind.--Presidential Address to the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow.1924.

F.M. STAWELL. So long as it is impossible to show that any given "intuition"is evolved in ordinary thought (as Hegel, for example, believed he could show of many), and so long as the intuition is not shared by other reasonable beings, so long a certain measure of doubt must attach to it. It does not, however, follow that these "intuitions" are valueless. They may be of the greatest value, only he who has them should not speak of them as though they were certain in the way that sense-impressions common to all the world are certain, or as the deductions of science are certain when confirmed by observation.

EDMOND HOLMES: in Hibbert Journal: The more deeply science penetrates the secrets of the Universe the more successful is it in exposing the impostures of immobility, both as regards individual things and as regards the world as a whole. Things that seem, for years and even centuries, to be solid, stable, self-consistent, self-same, are found, when analysed, to be in a state of perpetual whirl and flux. Not a single atom in the outward world is at rest, in the sense of being free from internal com- motion, even for the smallest imaginable fraction of a second. The electrons of which of which each atom is composed are ever revolving round the proton, their central orb, and the rapidity of their movements baffles imaginative thought.

Meanings vary from age to age, from people to people, from person to person, from con- text to contest.

G. DAWES HICKS. According to Russell, a per- ception looked at from within is the genus of which colours, sounds, tastes, etc., are the species. But, he objects, colours or sounds are what we see or hear, and not our seeing or hearing something. So, too, Rus- sell's description of perception regarded from without must be erroneous, for a physical process in our brain cannot be a perception, but at best only what we perceive. And if the two accounts of perception are considered in combination, it will be seen that Russell is virtually maintaining that a certain pro- cess in our brain and what he calls a per- cept, e.g. a patch of colour, or a sound, are one and the same thing. Yet these can no more be identical than can the end of a

line and an emotion, and neither can possibly be a perception, as distinct from something we perceive.

L.J. RUSSELL. Man's reason which when applied to abstract, matters takes on the colourlessness of geometry, becomes, when applied to the real, to the God in whom all things live and move and have their being, rich and palpitating with life. To describe it in its highest form Spinoza uses the term "intellectual love"; its closest parallel is the concept of Philosophia--love of wisdom--of Plato. For Spinoza, as for Plato, it was the beacon light to guide his path. He left all else to follow it.

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THE MONIST. Vol.XLVI. (1936). JOHN F. BUTLER

1.'Definition' may itself be defined as 'a statement of the meaning of a term.' This definition is ambiguous, because "meaning" is a very ambiguous word. It indicates the relationship between the words symbolising and the thing symbolised; and this relationship covers difficulties of two kinds, (a) as to how far meaning is a matter of words, and how far meaning is a matter of words, and how far of things, (b) as to how much of the being of a thing is involved in its meaning.

2. A definition is verbal when its purpose is merely to state the way in which a word is going to be used--to indicate that one word or set of words is to be regarded as equivalent to another.

3. Here and throughout 'thing' is used in almost its widest possible sense, viz. as meaning that which has any kind of being other than merely verbal being.'

4."When I use asword"Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,"it means just what I choose to mean--neither more nor less.""The question is,"

said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things." "The question is" said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master--that's all."..ALICE THRO' LOOKING GLASS. L. CARROLL.

5. I am concerned with what my previous writers have meant by it; with what general usage means by it.

6. Whether this form of words really gives the full or essential connotation of the things it denotes or is a full or essential explication of the concept it indicates.

7. I take this concept to be shared by my auditors or readers, and to be sufficiently indicated to them by the form of words used.

8. A 'dictionary definition' fastens on the concept which the hearing of the word brings into the mind, e.g. of an Englishman qua Englishman or a chemist qua chemist, and for the sake of fixity and clarity restates it in other words, which will be recognised by the general public.

9. On the other hand, 'dictionary definitions' can never be entirely free from the personal element. If I were writing a book on miracles, and accordingly wished to say what 'common usage' meant by 'miracles' how should I decide on that point? I should doubtless begin by ignoring any wild usages like "miracles are acts resulting in the production of tea-chests," if I had found any such in any writers, and by determining to confine myself to the consideration of what might prima facie be taken as 'correct' or 'sufficiently correct' usages. I will not pause here to ask how I can, at this stage, decide what are prima facie correct usages, without begging the question; or by what logical right the prima facie is taken as a starting-point; or what is meant

by 'sufficiently', and by what right whatever is meant by it is meant by it. Suppose these awkward preliminary questions settled--and then, what? I am met by a Babel of usages not obviously 'incorrect'--as can be seen in any large collection of definitions of a single subject from various hands.

10. Hence any definition I may finally give as 'the meaning' of 'miracle' will have to be a matter, to some extent, of personal choice.

11. Very often a definition must be content to 'indicate roughly' the subject of a discussion. It cannot always claim to express anything exactly but only to indicate and mark off something vaguely.

12. D.M. DATTA. Leibniz adheres strongly to the theory that the effect is entirely contained in the cause, being confirmed in this belief as much by his studies of Greek philosophy as by the biological investigation of his time. On the other hand, he clings fast to the Christian idea of creation as a real fact. But he scarcely realises the inconsistency between the two. If he followed out the first belief with logical rigidity, he might have found himself in the position to the Eleatics or the Vedantin and have declared change or creation to be an illusion.

13. If all phenomena that appear before the mind well up from within the mind, what is the necessity of believing at all in any other mind?

14. According to Leibniz even perceptual ideas are evolved from within the mind.

15. CHARLES M. PERRY. As the ultimate principle of the universe, thought has arrived at

totality, and therefore at true objective internality, and not merely the subjective internality that predicates concerning an externl. Thought is what is--the perennial, the external, and every determination there- of embodies or prefigures this, its nature. It is the internal for which the external is evanescent. It plays with form, for it itself is the substance, and the one substance in and of all forms."

16. We need Harris' passionate faith in the supremacy of reason, his belief in the sym- bolic connectedness of all parts of the uni- verse. We need his sturdy defense of the individual and yet at the same time his in- sistence that the individual should do his distinctive part as a member of the infinite whole. We need his persistent application of philosophy to life in every phase.

17. EDWARD L. SCHAUB "HARRIS AND JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY". There was a grow- ing number eager to acquire the satisfactions which philosophy affords. Furthermore, science itself, as it seemed to Harris, had reached a crisis. Against the various attempts in the early part of the century to portray physi- cal nature speculatively and metaphisically, science had reacted with such violence as to embog itself in a swamp of dense facts. As Harris put it in a phraseology reminiscent of Hegel, science had rejected pure thought in favour of a "sensuous knowing" which, "rests on mere isolated facts of experience; accepts the first phase of things, or that which comes directly before it, and hence may be termed the stage of immediateness." The result was "crude, undigested masses all co-ordinated; each....(being) in and for

itself, and perfectly valid without the others." Inevitably, however, thought began its work not merely of testing and relating, but, more especially, of discovering dependencies. It learned, as Harris stated it, that "the first phase of objects is phenomenal, and depends upon somewhat lying beyond it." As the culmination of the earlier stage came attempts, such as Humboldt's Cosmos, to put results into encyclopedic form, and further to investigate such subjects as matter and masses. But then reflection entered, and with it came an investigation of functions and a recognition of the abstract category of force; and, writes Harris, "straightway we are in the second stage.

18. To show its self-contradictory and self-negatory character, and thus to lead thought on from the stage of the understanding and reflection to that of speculation at which reason "considers a phenomenon in its totality, and thus seizes it in its noumenon"--such was one of Harris' chief concerns.

19. Speculation and speculative philosophy meant a transcending of simple and sheer empiricism to an apprehension in which particulars are constructed as indissoluble from universals, the finite from the infinite; a transcending also of the view that things, while to be sure not existing isolatedly and not knowable immediately through sense, are yet fully intelligible through processes, called reflection or understanding, which disclose the relationship of things with one another--a transcending, we say, of this view to one which realizes that things must be recognized as possessing self-iden-

tity, and that the organ of genuine comprehension is therefore the concrete universal. It meant a transcending of the standpoint from which identity and distinction, immediacy and mediacy, are irreconcilable contradictories to one which permits a recognition of their inseparability, a recognition which implies that the ultimate principle of intelligibility is that of self-relation, such as we find exemplified, in its most complete expression, in self-consciousness and self-determination. Thus speculative philosophy meant to Harris a metaphysical as contrasted with a positive doctrine; and a metaphysics which declares that the acquisition of truth is within the power of intelligence, that reality is comprehensible, and which therefore proceeds to invade and to place under the mastery of reason that territory which Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer had declared unknowable. Such conquest, however, requres a procedure quite other than those describable by the principles either of inductive or formal logic.

20. That system of philosophy must be valid which is implied by all others and which itself harbors no negative, in that it includes within itself all antinomies and all that any of its constituent elements require for their stability, so that in it thought finds its complete expression and satisfaction. Such a system Harris believed was put forth, at least in its genral pattern, by Hegel.

21. Philosophy does not represent a superficial and inaccurate rehearsal of the general findings of science and history, nor a mere stringing together or external synthesis thereof. It possesses a standpoint altogether

its own, and a method and content peculiar to itself. Hence its terminology and its mode of expression must be unique if they are to be appropriate. Where, as in the case of philosophy, the form is organic to the content and the method is inseparable from the subject matter, the linguistic expression can be faithful and intelliglbe only if it is rigorously dominated by the requirements of philosphy itself instead of being attuned to the familiarities of the non-philosophical. Concessions to the latter can but obscure and thus render unintelligible, rather than intelligible, the philosophical ideas which the writer aims to communicate. Really to open the field of philosophy to all one must present philosophy itself. The use of non-philosophical modes of expression, however, can but bar the gates of philosophy while yet deluding readers into the belief that they are being guided within its realm. Thus, one cannot but expect that philosophical conceptions and the course of reasoning essential to them will seem dismally dark to such as have not ascended to a plane of reason which transcends not merely sense and picture thinking but likewise abstract reflection, in order through the medium of concrete universals, to afford rational insight and comprehension. To Harris and his associates their procedure meant not the adoption of some philosophical esotericism from which some are excluded either arbitrarily or by choice; it meant the procedure characteristic of all distinctively philosophic thought. The comprehension thereof, they realized, was indeed an arduous matter and many there doubtless would be who would fail to achieve it--many others, also, who

would make no serious effort in that direction and for whom philosophical converse could therefore be but as gibbering voices in the blackness of night.

To some minds only simple straightforward sentences are intelligible; others are not rebuffed by longer linguistic structures of a conditional and hypothetical nature.

22. KURT F. LEIDECKER. "HARRIS & INDIAN PHILOSOPHY" Harris is ready to acknowledge the value of Hindu thought for Western culture, though he cannot see how we can ever recognize the validity of its fundamental ideas. He says: "Its value is chiefly negative, aiding us in getting rid of sensuous conceptions in the realm of thought. It is a sort of cathartic for the imagination."

23. In the case of Indian philosophy, language has concealed more than it revealed. Harris had a little knowledge of Sanskrit, but he did not have enough to allow him to penetrate philologically the spirit of the Hindu philosophers. In his own words, language, as "spiritual protoplasm" opens the inner workings of the mind of the race. Parenthetically he in one passage remarks: "A philologist of insight would know when he saw the Greek language, and the form of its sentences, that there was a nation designed under Providence to solve the theoretical problem of the world." If this is true of Greek, it is true to an even higher degree of Sanskrit.

24 The Hindu does not endow his ultimate metaphysical principle with human foibles and nature's frailties; he says neti, neti, not this, not that, if you wish to define Brahman by concepts taken from the phenomenal.

But he also says with the Upanishads: Brahman sarvam idam, Brahman is this world-all, and, if fullness were taken from fullness, fullness would yet remain. Brahmam purnam, brahman is the plenum.

25. No Hindu following any of the philosophical schools will grant that his ultimate ground of existence is unconscious. He will assert the very opposite, that Brahman is consciousness par excellence, and he will discover this error in Harris' definition of consciousness.

Harris makes consciousness contingent upon the existence of an object-subject relation. And since in brahman there is avowedly no distinction whatever he concludes flawlessly that Brahman is an unconscious entity. Also from another angle Brahman to him must mean unconsciousness. Since consciousness is limited apparently to and by a self, and Brahman is infinite, the latter must also lack consciousness.

Really, a misunderstanding of Sanskrit terms lies at the root of Harris' statement that it is an Oriental tenet that consciousness is finitude. A somewhat similar error based on deficient translations made Schopenhauer recognize his blind will as a metaphysical principle in the Upanishads.

At least in one case we can definitely point to an erroneous interpretation of terms. Harris takes ahamkara to mean conciousness. Now, ahamkara, is literally, the "I-maker". It may never be translated by consciousness. Here, a complete view of Hindu philosophy must be called in for an understanding. As philosophic principle, ahamkara is on a lower plane than consciousness, and is, indeed,

the principium individuationis which, psychologically, is often interpreted as selfishness, and then associated with abhimana.

26. He impressed us with the practicality of philosophy, inasmuch as he could flash into the questions of the day, or even into the questions of the moment, the highest insight of philosophy, and solve their problems.(By HARVEY GATES TOWNSEND)

27. KURT F. LEIDECKER.(cont. from 25) "When mind recognizes the external world to be phenomenal" the soul is cognizant of the fundamental truth, ceases to wander about in error and dispels Maya. The significance of this passage cannot be over-estimated. Had he adopted the last view, Harris would have held the master key in his hands that would have unlocked all Indian thought and showered its treasures into his lap.

28. When Harris speaks of Maya in the sense of delusion of untutored reflection or illusion of the senses merely, of the dualism (maya) of ex-istence which must be comprehenced or grasped together, and when he speaks of the maya of thought, including the abstract categories, concepts and laws which must pass through the fire of the dialectic--then we have in such Hegelian phraseology a correct use of Maya.

29. LEDGER WOOD. "PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM". Criticism, while it is not the whole, is an extraordinarily important part of the philosopher's task. He subjects to critical scrutiny systems of the past as well as views of his contemporaries and then frames his own theories in relation to these criticisms.

30. The estimate of a philosophical position involve canons or norms of sound philosophical thinking. These principles, although they are constantly used, rarely receive explicit statement. They are the concealed weapons of the philosopher's critical onsloughts, and he may even be unaware that he is in possession of them. But the elusiveness of principles does not relieve the philosopher of the obligation to render them explicit.

31. Absolute scepticism is shown to be self-refuting because the claim that knowledge is impossible is itself an item of knowledge. The denial of knowledge is an implied affirmation of knowledge. In this instance the principle of criticism appealed to is the logical law of contradiction.

While the laws of formal logic are indispensable to the philosophical critic, it must not be supposed that they alone suffice. There is perhaps no more devastating weapon of philosophical criticism than the principle of contradiction, and there are some critics who are disposed to rely on it almost exclusively.

32. Philosophical principles and pre-suppositions may be compared to the rules of a game--provided the analogy be accepted with due caution and restraint. The rules, let us say of contract bridge are not a priori truths which we must accept; they have been literally made by successive generations of players. The rules of the game have evolved under the specific conditions of the game; and they must be accepted by anyone, if he wishes to play the game. The necessity of the rules is hypothetical and conditional. If an

individual does not choose to play at all he need not; but once having adepted a given set of rules he is under a certain compulsion to adhere to them. The adherence to norms and laws of thought is a sine qua non of intelligent thought and discourse. If we are to think, we must abide by them but anyone may, at his own peril, refuse to think. Principles are ginding upon all those who desire to engage in the intellectual enterprize.

33. The principle of Consistency, the principle of Relevancy and the principle of Adequacy--these are the only principles operative in philosophical criticism to day. I do not claim that this enumeration is exhaustive.

34. A philosophical system shall be internally consistent; in other words, it shall contain no mutually contradictory propositions. If a philosopher on one page of his writings asserts that A is B, and elsewhere that A is not B, one of his statements is in error. Contradictions are not ordinarily so obvious and easily spotted. The contradiction more often is latent or implicit; otherwise it could scarcely have deceived the author. It exists between the implications of statements; not between the statements themselves. Thus if I assert that A is B and C is D, and if the former statement implies that P is Q while the latter implies P is not Q, I am guilty of implicit contradiction. The principle of contradiction is, as William James has aplty remarked, "a most imperious claimant" and any philosopher who repudiates it thereby commits logical and philosophical suicide.

35. There is in certain quarters a tendency to treat the principle of contradiction with contempt if not with actual disdain--a tendency which has been aided and abetted by logic. In particular the invention of various non-Euclidean geometries has undermined the prestige of the principle of contradiction. It was thought at one time that mathematics is a system of absolute and self-consistent truths derivable from a few self-evident axioms. Leibniz, a mathematical genius second to none, regarded the whole of mathematics as demonstrable from a very few primitive propositions. These primitive propositions were true beause their attempted denial resulted in self-contradiction. Thus for Leibniz the whole of mathematics could be generated from the principle of contradiction alone. This view of mathematics was invalidated once and for all by the advent of non-Euclidean geometries. One of the postulates of a non-Euclidean geometry, the so-called parallels postulate, is a contradictory of the corresponding postulate in the Euclidean system. Mathematics thus embraces alternative geometries which are mutually contradictory. Is not this a flagrant violation of the time-honoured principle of contradiction? And if the mathematician can throw the principle overboard why must the philosopher and the logician continue to pay homage to it? The argument is plausible, but I do not think well founded. Although contradictory geometrical systems are mutually contradictory, the validity of the principle of contradiction within any given system is no wise impugned. It would be a mathematical impossibility to erect a geometry on a set of

postulates which are lacking in consistency.

Turning now to the validation of the principle of consistency, I repeat that no ultimate principle admits of strict logical validation. One cannot demonstrate the principle for all demonstration presupposes it. The principle is accepted, or rather postulated, because without it no intelligible thought or discourse would be possible. The choice is between consistent thought and no thought at all.

36. Mere absence of contradiction is not enough; a system of philosophy must also have the positive virtue of coherence, coherence being defined as the mutual relevancy of a body of propositions.

37. Two or more propositions are relevant if they are about things of the same kind and therefore capable of entering into logical relations with each other. For example, the propositions: "There is no change" and "Motion is a change of place" are relevant propositions; they share the common concept change and can be brought together as premises to yield the conclusion "There is no motion." Even mutually contradictory propositions are according to our definition relevant. They could not contradict each other unless they were about the same thing.

38. Those who part company with coherence talk disconnected nonsense. We may very properly difine sanity as the ability to think coherently; and hence those who declare complete and absolute independence of the principle of coherence, however true their individual statements may be, are candidates for the lunatic asylum. It is better to be coherent and inconsistent than consis-

tent and incoherent. Incoherent and thoroughly unsystematic speculations do not deserve to be called philosophy.

In demanding coherence of any sould philosophy I am not espousing the so-called coherence theory of truth. This theory asserts that what is coherent is ipso facto true. This I would emphatically deny. True systems must be coherent, but a coherent system need not be true. I believe it is possible to formulate a thoroughly consistent and coherent theory of materialism and then an equally coherent system of idealism, and yet one, at least, of the theories must be false. The history of science also affords innumerable examples of coherent yet conflicting hypotheses.

39/ The principle of consistency and coherence are both formal--they are tests of the validity of a philosophy but not of its truth.

40. A philosophy pretends to be an interpretation of reality; the formula which it proposes is a short-hand statement of the salient aspects of reality.

41. I wish to repudiate at once the view that a theory is a literal copy in the mind of an extra-mental reality. A thought-construct, whether it be a simple judgment of perception, a scientific hypothesis, or a philosophical world-view, is not like a map or a photograph which must exactly reproduce its original. The assertion that "the distance between New York and Princeton is fifty miles" in no way resembles the geographical situation by virtue of which it is true. The judgment is true because it stands in a meaning or symbolic relation to an empirically verifiable state of affairs. The actual verification of the proposition in question would involve the measure-

ment of the distance by speedometer or otherwise, or else its indirect computation by the aid of the scale of a map; it would not involve a comparison of the thought with its supposed object to see whether they resemble or differ. The older form of the correspondence theory of truth with its demand for photographic accuracy is nothing short of an absurdity.

42. Kant's self-styled "critical method" is a rigorous and thorough-going examination of knowledge and its presuppositions. It is the supreme example of reflexive criticism, that is to say, of the mind's critical analysis of its own powers and limitations.

43. Criticism and construction are two inseparable moments of the philosophical method. Criticism without construction is barren and futile; construction without criticism is mere dogma.

44. JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM. No evidence of the early recognition of something meaningful in duality is more striking than is to be found in that ancient well of wisdom the Tao Teh King of Laotze, in these words: "The difficult and easy are mutually opposites. Just as the long and the short, the high and the low, the hard and soft, the before and the behind, are all opposites and each reveals the other." What does this ubiquitous, multifarious and deepseated diremption mean? Is it merely the way in which things appear?

45. The first form of duality to attract attention is manifestly contradiction. Of two juxtaposed propositions, one possesses the quality of truth, in the sense of correspondence with factuality, and the other of untruth, or error.

This is the realm of either-or, the validity of which is essential to reliable thinking. Contradiction, while its nature is logical, has its sphere of application in phenomena. Either water seeks its level or it does not. Either racial migrations have occurred or they have not. Either one was at a given place at a given time or he was not.

46. The first appearance of dialectic is usually ascribed to Socrates, who used it as a method of awakening the mind by means of a succession of probing questions, exposing the contradictions and confusions which characterize the thoughtless mind and the unexamined life.

47, It was the great awakener, Kant, who by the two-edged sword of the Critical Philosophy dividing asunder bone and marrow (knowledge and its objects) necessitated the rise of modern dialectic. His antinomies were really pair s of disguised contrapletes and his sharp diremption of them, together with his distinction of phenomena and noumena, his dualism of subject and object, and his emphasis upon the freedom of the self over against the determinism of nature, introduced the dialectical method of modern philosophy.

48. LEO ABRAHAM: "WHAT IS THE THEORY OF MEANING ABOUT?" The increasing prominence of the word 'meaning' and its various derivatives in the 20th century European and Americal philosophy is a result of the convergence of several distinguishable cultural tendencies. First, the classical rationalistic opposition to vague vagueness, emotionalism, and mysticism is a perennial support to any methodological demand that philosophers express their 'meaning' with clarity, precision and consistency, at the pain of being charged with talking nonsense.

Second, the equally classical anti-rationalistic insistence on empirical exemplification and verification, more recently abetted by the growth of a positivistic and experimentalist emphasis in modern natural science, transfers the demand for 'meaning' from the plane of the abstract to the level of the particular, from the realm of conception to that of perception.

49 The dialectical definition of the Socratics, the rigorous intellectual distinctions of the Scholastics, and the quest for 'clear and distinct ideas' of seventeenth century rationalism, are three expressions of this rationalistic contribution.

50. Finally, numerous independent semantic, logical, and philosophical researches during the last fifty years have given considerable impetus to the development of a distinct science of symbolism and signification.

51. Various concepts of meaning appear to a large and increasing body of philosophers as the key to numerous metaphysical and philosophical problems which preceding central ideas have failed to solve. Underlying this optimistic outlook is the growing conviction that, when it is seemingly impossible to determine whether a philosophical statement is true or false, correct of incorrect, it is only because it is 'meaningless.' The truly sensational charge that supposed problems which have occupied the minds of men for centuries are in fact not problems at all, but pseudo-questions expressed in empty, emotionalized phrases, imparts a vitality and a challenge to philosophical discussion in which it is found that are almost lacking in more traditional

channels of philosophic opinion. When generalized and expanded, this normative conception of 'meaning' leads to a supposedly new philosophical discipline, the 'theory of meaning' which, by determining the limits of significant discourse, is expected by its enthusiasts to produce most far-reaching and beneficent consequences in philosophy and science. An apparently novel and, to all intents and purposes, fundamental category has thus come to the forefront of current philosophical thought.

52. Among the outstanding contributors to this movement are M. Muller, H.Taine, C.S. Peirce, F. Mauthner, G. Frege, A.Meinong, G. Gomperz, G.F. Stout, B. Russell, G.E.Moore, L. Wittgenstein, C.K. Ogden, I.A Richards, R. Carnap, R.M.Eaton, E.M. Whetnall, and S.K. Langer.

53. Logical positivists not only hope, but some of them definitely expect, the future of philosophy to be quite different from its past as a result of their activities in the 'theory of meaning.' (E.g.,c.f. M. Schlick, "The Future of Philosophy" 1932 Berkeley, California College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy p.45). The theory of meaning as a basis for future advance in the scientific world has recently been vigorously advocated by a group of scientists led by P.W.Bridgman, who is of the opinion that the 'operational theory of meaning' can help us "to understand so thoroughly the character of our permanent mental relations to nature that another change in our attitude, such as that due to Einstein, shall for ever be impossible" (The Logic of Modern Physics).

54. There is no one category to which the word

'meaning'unambiguously refers. Like many other philosophical terms, 'meaning' is extraordinarily ambiguous. Its radical ambiguity may most readily be indicated by the following groups of more than fifty typical quotations from philosophical and psychological writers in each of which the term 'meaning' is used in a different sense.

(a) "Every one of us as philosopher requires at least these three suppositions: First, that things have a meaning; Second, that we human beings are competent to grasp that meaning, or some of it; Third, that it is worth while to do so, and ought to be attempted...There is nothing meaningless in the world...I have used the word 'meaning' and am making an incidental assumption that we can so far control its context as to understand it in the same sense. Perhaps the less I discuss this point the more intelligible my remarks will be. Let me make just this note, that the word 'meaning' has established itself in philosophical discourse because it conveniently covers both reason and value. This is not an ambiguity; it is an extreme generality, almost too extreme to be manageable. Its difficulty coincides with its utility" (from the presidential address of W.E.Hocking to the American Philosophical Association, reprinted in 1928 Philosophical Review 141-42).

(b) "Meaning is an activity taken up towards objects and energetically projected into them like an alpha particle". F.C.S.Schiller in MIND 1920).

(c) All that comes under this broad term 'meaning'...is brought to experience by the mind. (C.I. Lewis, MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER).

(d) "The word is a symbol, and its meaning

is constituted by the ideas, images, and emotions which it raises in the minds of its hearers" (A.N. Whitehead, SYMBOLISM: ITS MEANING AND EFFECT).

(e) "We come then to the conclusion that meaning is practically everything. We always see the meaning as we look, think in meanings as we think, act in terms of meaning when we act. Apparently we are never directly conscious of anything but meanings." (W.B.Pillsbury. "Meaning and Image" 1908 Psychological Review).

55. The practical consequence that the chronic and almost scandalous inability of philosophers to agree on any clear-cut use of their basic common tool, words, would gain another illustration. This consequence might conceivably be avoided by a strict adherence to the Utopian resolution that spoiled words like 'meaning' be rigorously excluded from the philosophical and scientific vocabulary..

56. The conflicting nature of such intuition, as revealed in the numerous putative real definitions of the major notions in the history of philosophy, is positively overwhelming. This notorious historical diversity of philosophical definitions renders largely ineffectual the uncritical belief, ultimately basic to the workability of the conception of real definition, that human beings possess a common, perhaps innate, stock of ideas which they can recognize by name without necessarily being able to analyze.

57. It is obviously impossible to answer the question "What is meaning of meaning?" because, if we are not merely mouthing syllables or attempting to contradict ourselves in one and the same breath, we have in the very ask-

ing of the 'question' assumed the 'answer' to be given.

58. The question "What do you mean?" posed with the intent to secure greater specification of reference, has been asked by philosophers, one should imagine, since the very beginning of philosophical thought. Only after a great deal of philosophical training, and this of rather a special sort, does one become sophisticated.

59. Practically all philosophers have the unfortunately chronic habit of employing crucial words in different--perhaps ever so slightly different--senses from those in which they are used by earlier and contemporary thinkers. They may do this from sheer love of variety; or because they prefer to be widely read and misunderstood rather than understood by a more restricted public; or because they simply lack the patience, inclination, or ability laboriously to create a new and consistent terminology of their own. Whatever the causes, the result is that the philosophical vocabulary is enormously smaller than the stock of philosophical conceptions. This is one of the marks distinguishing philosophical from scientific discourse. It is therefore not perplexing that the term 'meaning' should have come, sooner or later, to mean many different things.

60. This critical motivation is a more logical or formal outgrowth of the desire to eliminate barren and futile controversies in philosophy and science. It is expressed in the view, becoming increasingly noticeable in contemporary thought, that a science of 'meaning' or linguistic syntax must be developed if human beings, especially philoso-

phers, are to be saved from saying what cannot be said. Such a formal science of significant utterance is regarded as a fundamental discipline logically prior to the factual sciences and to all the common branches of philosophy, perhaps even including logic itself. The insistence of this movement upon logical priority, however, is its undoing. For if all scientific and philosophic propositions are to depend for their validity on a theory of 'meaning' that theory of 'meaning' cannot depend for its validity on any scientific or philosophical proposition. If the theory is so dependent, if it rests, however slightly, upon any philosophical, psychological, or other scientific generalization, it obviously cannot be prior to all science and philosophy. An absolutely formal theory of 'meaning' the condition of all significant utterance, could consist only of sheer tautologies or definitions and would, at best, take its place as a rather novel species of pure mathematics. The attempt to formulate such a theory is but another example of the ancient and fruitless philosophical quest for a significant basis of criticism prior to all dogma. Any respectable theory of 'meaning' regardless of its pretensions to formality and priority, or priority without formality, must rest, at some point in its development, upon definitely factual philosophical or scientific considerations.

61. We find C.S. Peirce making the following observation in support of a pragmatic theory of meaning. "Man is so completely hemmed in by the bounds of his possible practical experience, his mind is so restricted to being the instrument of his needs, that he cannot

in the least mean anything that transcends these limits. The strict consequence of this is, that it is all nonsense to tell him that he must not think in this or that way because to do so would be to transcend the limits of a possible experience. For let him try ever so hard to think anything what is beyond that limit, it simply cannot be done". (COLLECTED PAPERS,1934).

62. BENJAMIN GINZBURG. "METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE: The formulation of mechanism as a guiding set of ideas for modern science begins with the famous enunciation--or rather re-enunciation, since the ancient atomists had anticipated this aspect of mechanism--of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Very clearly in the seventeenth century, after the concentration on mechanical problems and the success in their solution had suggested motion as the basic key to the knowledge of the external world, we find Galileo laying down the distinction in this wise:- "As soon as I conceive matter or a corporeal substance I feel compelled to conceive at the same time that in relation to other bodies it is large or small, that it is in this or that place, at this or that time, that is in motion or at rest, that it touches or does not touch another body, that it is one, several or many; by no act of imagination can I separate it from these necessary conditions. But I feel no compulsion to think that it must necessarily be white or red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or mute, of a pleasant or unpleasant taste. If the senses did not guide us, imagination and discourse would perhaps never arrive at these sensations by themselves. It therefore seems to me that these

tastes, odors, colors, etc. are nothing but names in regard to the things in which they seem to inhere; they reside solely in the perceiving body....But I do not believe that anything else is requisite in external bodies besides magnitude, figure, multiplicity, and low or rapid motion in order to call forth in us tastes, odors or sounds." (Il Saggiatore, Opere, Nat. Edition. VI, p.347).

The distinction which Galileo sets down was repeated in different forms by Descartes and by John Locke, and has become the basic postulate of the modern scientific approach to external nature. There are certain qualities which exist in the external world and these are the primary qualities; there are other qualities which exist in the body or mind of the perceiving subject and these are the secondary qualities. Finally some philosophers have made a separate third category of spiritual qualities, like esthetic beauty, moral purposes, truth and goodness, which inhere only in the rational mind.

63. The general philosophic difficulties in the way of breaking up the world into primary and secondary qualities were known in antiquity, when atomism proposed essentially the same approach, and these difficulties, logically speaking, are unanswerable.

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Haeckel had never cultivated the widely practised academic habit of inspiring youthful listeners by means of skilfully and diplomatically developed sentences. He always spoke to the point.

2. Haeckel acknowledges that the riddle cannot be solved: "The essence of substance becomes more mysterious and enigmatic the deeper

we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes, matter and force or energy, and the more thoroughly we study its countless phenomenal forms and their evolution. We do not know the "thing-in-itself" that lies behind these knowable phenomena."

3. He naturally assumes that the problem of the universe is a scientific problem and scornfully rejects the introduction of metaphysical methods. Science, however, deals with facts and asks the question what is their nature and order of sequence, under what generalizations may the facts and their sequence be comprised, while the inquiry into the source and origin of the facts, the question why there is an experience at all and why the sequence presented therein is what it is does not concern science as such but is a metaphysical question. It is precisely this which constitutes the riddle of the universe.

4. JUUL DIESERUD."SPACE AND THE WORLD IN SPACE": The postulate of the unknowable essence of things, the Ding-an-sich, and the unsolvability of certain cosmic riddles the so-called antinomies, are older than Kant, and have since his day in certain quarters almost reached the value of a rock-ribbed dogma. In the words of a late exponent, Prof. Paul Natorp the "thing-in-itself" is the x of an equation, the solution of which may again and again be attempted but never, fortunately, with any chance of complete success. That would be making an end of the eternal search for truth, which is one of the main blessings of humanity. Being is never given in its essence; it is continuously being created by thought, as

scientific research founded on experience advances from standpoint to standpoint. The road, the method of research, is consequently everything, the goal nothing.

5. The attempt to make time a substantial stuff that can act and influence physical or psychical processes, is a course utterly futile and hardly worthy of serious consideration. It is almost incredible that the personification of time in every-day speech, and by the Greeks as Kronos devouring his own children, should deceive anybody in a critical age like ours. Time is, to speak with the late Dr. Paul Carus (Fundamental Problems,) "not a thing...it is nothing but a measure of the changes taking place around us. We employ as measures such changes as appear most regular, such as days and years. But there is no time apart from changes. Since we can imagine that some changes will always take place, and, even if they did not take place, since we could measure the time of a supposed rest by some certain measure (days, years, millenniums, billenniums) we say that time is infinite."

6. The standpoint is well expressed by Lotze in his Metaphysics (Oxford,1884): "There is no such thing as space in which things are supposed to take their places. The case is rather that in spiritual beings there is formed the idea of an extension in which they themselves seem to have their lot and in which they spatially present to themselves their non-spatial relations to each other." And more recently (The Monist, July '18) Prof. W.B.Smith hazards the statement that "all forms of seeing, hearing, touching, etc...are modes of constructing or forming space-and-time symbols that are not in space and time...

the real is what we all construct alike." And, consequently, he easily gains his point, that a soul is not in a body, since the body is merely a construct of that very soul.

7. Berkeley once and for all proved the subjective quality of the primary characters of matter. Seeing what he really did and noticing how well he succeeded in making a bold assertion look like philosophic proof, one cannot much blame Herbert Spencer for losing his usually polite manners, speaking of the insanities of idealism.

"Matter being once expelled drags with it so many skeptical and impious notions" wrote Berkeley. "But really" says Prof. Riehl, "it drags with is so much else of which the pious philosopher cannot have taken earnest thought...Our knowledge is indeed relative, but only so far as concerns the character of its objects. It is not relative with reference to their existence."

But even this so-called Kantian standpoint is open to grave criticism. When Kant made space and time a priori or necessary forms of thought, he practically reduced even extension to a phenomenon, which in itself might be entirely different from what it appears to be. While energetically denying Berkeley's contention that there is no independent reality underlying the world of appearance, he uncritically accepted the theory of the subjectivity of the character of the extension of things. The new view was supposed to come to the aid of science as against the attacks of Hume and empirical skepticism, but its immediate effect was to furnish a loophole for the possibility that

the underlying basis of the visible world may lack even extension, being entirely unknowable; and so the chief gainer was after all Berkeley's idealism.

8. Extension as we perceive it is, to be sure, a very relative affair, but it is such a necessary form of thought just because it is derived from reality, from the extended things around us by a wonderful process of evolution in living beings. The burden of proof for its non-existence, for its pure subjectivity, must necessarily rest with the idealistic philosophers, who undertake to deny a palpable fact of every-day observation. But their finespun more or less ingenious phrases are given the lie at the first move they make at their own writing table.

9. Space is necessarily infinite and in this respect different from existing things and even from time and the numerical series which are only potentially infinite. This is a legitimate conclusion from the logical reasoning, that we cannot possibly imagine any bounds to it, which would not in their turn be either extended things filling space, or things with empty space beyond. We cannot help thinking a beyond to every supposed limit.

10. Pure space is not properly speaking a phenomenon. It is the absence of sense-things or phenomena. It is an inference drawn from our sight and touch experience, but it has never been seen by a human eye or touched by a human hand. There is no appearance whatever, only gaps between appearances.

11. The primitive conception of the world was naturally too narrow in every race and tribe. Our little earth was considered the centre

and fixed base of everything there is, and human beings counted for something in the make-up of the universe. Recent speculations have generally gone to the opposite extreme, making old Tellus only an insignificant speck in an infinite abyss of stars and habitable planets.

12. But for the fearless and sober investigators of the world riddle, for those who are continually striving to get ever nearer to the unknown x of the world equation, it is, I should think, of some importance to get rid of the hazy and mystic veriage connected with the discussions of the infinite, in order to be able to concentrate attention on immediate and more fruitful problems.

13. HANS FRIEDENTHAL. "ON THE EXTENT OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE LIMITS OF SPACE AND TIME."

The sentence, Quod non est in sensu non est in mundo ("What does not exist in human consciousness /Bewusstsein/ does not exist in the Universe"), can be correctly understood only when we keep clearly in mind that there are three stages of human consciousness; There are sensations (Empfindungen); there are concrete images (Vorstellungen); and there are concepts (Begriffe). In these three instances the words "there are" (es gibt) have such different meanings that a large part of all differences of opinion in religion and philosophy can be referred to the different usages of the words, "there are (or exist)". All human beings possess the same mode of drawing conclusions logically. Differences of opinion arise either from lack of agreement in regard to the premises, or from the different use of exactly the same words, especially the words "there are." The conflict of minds is at the

same time a conflict of words.

There are sensations. This reality not only does not require proof but is not even susceptible of proof, for none but our own sensations possess this certainty of reality. Sensations of other living beings are always inferred from motions by analogy with our own sensations. There are no sensations of other beings in the sense that there are sensations of our own, but for these two very different realities our language possesses only the one expression, "there are."

The case is even worse with the content of our third stage of consiousness--ideal constructions or concepts (Begriffe). Here we need only consider the controversies and proofs for and against the existence of God, and the dreadful tribulations which we want of understanding regarding the existence of concepts or ideal constructions has brought upon unnumbered people, in order to show the importance of the demonstrability of a content of consciousness. Again, there is freedom, or there is beauty, in quite a different sense from that in which we can say there are eyes or ears, and to endeavour to prove the existence of a concept, rather than its applicability, is merely to display one's own want of understanding. The world of concepts lacks proof for the existence of its content as does the world of sensations, for proof belongs to the world of concrete images in their reference to human sense-impressions.

14. It is not objects of the external world (as we call the computable part of the world of our consciousness) but our sensations that we count. Therefore it is only concrete images that can be counted and not concepts or ideal

constructions, for they cannot be thought of as directly connected with sensations.

15. But space and time have not simply remained concrete images; they have developed farther into concepts which can no longer be thought of as connected with human sensation. We speak of four-dimensional and multi-dimensional spaces which have nothing in common with our concrete image of space but the word "space" without the slightest connection with human sense-impressions; we have within us a concept of time which is thought of as independent of the imageable course of human sensations. It is in this sense that man constructs also the unreal concept of eternity.

16. Hence the question of the extent of the universe changes into that of the limitation of our concrete images of space and time.

17. The poverty of human language can only gradually meet the increasing demands made by the constant formation of new concepts by constructing new words. If we ask about the extent of space and time, or, as many express it, the infinity of space and the eternity of time, we shall have to determine first of all whether space and time belong to concrete images or to concepts, or whether these words are after all used for both images and concepts. The last is the actual state of things. Space and time are directly connected with sense-impressions and depend on them. It is only by sense-impressions that we have a concrete image of space and time; therefore, there can be no doubt that the words "space" and "time" belong to the second stage of consciousness, which is at all times connected with sense-impressions or can be regarded as so connected.

18. The following speculation may enable us to form a faint notion of the length of this period of time. There is a German fairy-tale in which the following answer is given to an enquiry as to the duration of eternity: Within a forest stands a mountain of purest diamond one mile long, one mile wide and one mile high. Every thousand years a little bird comes, sings a song, and whets his bill against the diamond mountain. When the whole mountain has thus been whetted away so that nothing at all is left of it then the first second of eternity has passed.

S.N.PATTEN. (19) . Science drove God out of the sensory world. This defeat the philosophers accepted but tried to save the concept by a retreat from the world of sense. Such a position has never proven satisfactory. God must be a God that sense can reach or be dethroned with the fairies, ghosts, and demons. All there is to the First cause and similar concepts is the associations which philosophy has created, which associations should be altered to meet new conditions just as astronomy was transformed by the growth of science.
20. Christianity has always been at cross purpose with itself because it includes the wish to be immortal and the concept of losing life to live in others. The two views are patched together by theological interpretation but the opposition is not thereby dimmed. Christ doubtless expected death as did Socrates.
21. Tomorrow's sun must rise on another world. Each form must die to make way for a superior.
22. WILLIAM M. SALTER. When I reflect at all about the matter, I see that colors, sounds, odors, resistances, weights, etc. are evanescent phenomena--they are feelings, experiences,

coming and going; there is no steady, constant red and no steady, constant weight--indeed, such experiences would be intolerable, and inconsistent with the practical necessities of life. The world that stretches out beyond (and includes) our bodies is a world of our imagination or thought rather than one of actual immediate experience--we picture and spread out a panorama of what we have experienced or other people have experienced, or of what we think we or others might experience. We customarily think of this largely possible world as an actually existent and relatively constant thing; but it is in good measure neither actual nor constant, if experience is an inseparable part of it, for experience, as we humans have it at least, is momentary and fragmentary.

23. The foreground of thought and its background are not on an equality. I believe--perhaps I cannot say more than "believe"--that what gives me feelings of sweet or heat or sound or weight is or may be more permanent than sweet or heat or sound or weight itself, that it may be very little if at all affected by the fact that it works these changes in me, that it is to this extent an independently real and would exist just the same whether I were on hand to be affected by it or not.

24. (Edl). Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain succeeded not only in partly disguising the feebleness of his arguments, but also in concealing from the superficial reader the fact that his platitudinous-sounding opinions are, as a rule, composed of equal parts of truism and fallacy.

25. J.E. TURNER: The triumphs of mind, since the Renaissance shattered the midnight of the Dark Ages--the splendid conquests of science--have produced (if we go beneath the surface of popular thinking) a strange aftermath, inasmuch as they have deposed man from the age-old throne where as "a little lower than the angels"- he ruled for ancient thought. And the Copernican revolution, even as counterbalanced by its philosophic analog, seems to have given humanity, the puny and transient offspring of eternal galaxies, its final and proper status; for which the despair of Schopenhauer, or the dogmatic of Omar, appears the fittest philosophy.
26. Modern thought is something more than the mere successor of previous speculation--it is also its heir, enriched by its bequests and warned by its errors.
27. R.W.SELLARS. Hume reduced reality to a manifold of passing elements which had no permanence or sameness. In other words, he clearly saw that data are not physical things, and yet he was so much influenced by Berkeley's idealism that he was unable to work out a theory of knowledge of a realistic sort.
28. Kant's phenomena are really contents and not objects. Although he is an empirical realist, he is not a physical realist. Or, to put it otherwise, these phenomenal contents which he takes to be objects are constructs related to the postulated synthetic ego and dependent on it. Kant is an idealistic naive realist, that is, he does not want to drop back into psychologism with Hume, and yet he is convinced that what is given is mental. To put it frankly he was puzzled. No one can read the Critique of Pure Reason without feeling that. He tries

to keep the realism as against the percipient while admitting the idealism in relation to a logical ego. It is this "objective" idealism which modern idealism takes refuge in.

29. Epistemology is a critical science which studies the meaning and claim of knowledge at the level of adult experience in the light of what are decided to be inevitable and well-grounded distinctions.

30. If we are to secure mastery in philosophy we must also bear in mind those categories which concern knowledge. We must be able to get the correct interpretation for such terms as subject, object, idea, awareness, datum, phenomenon, consciousness, etc. We must be able to appreciate the structure of consciousness, its distinctions, claims,and affirmations.

31. W.O. Brigstocke: "LOGICAL FICTIONS".
Our chief foe is common sense that takes so much for granted. Many take the common-sense view that just as water is water, so thoughts are thoughts and knowledge knowledge. That's good enough for them; they do not feel the need for more. But a few feel they must look more closely. In all ages, perhaps, men have tried (without much success) to analyze "knowledge" and to understand how we get it.

32. "space " and "time" in the commonsense meaning are as irrelevant to our problem as a sheet of paper to the sum that is done on it. It is important to realize from the outset that common-sense ideas of time and space are merely useful habits that express in a crude way certain subtle differences in what we call "here" and "there"; if used for analysis they are grossly misleading. It is, for instance, misleading to speak of the pre-

sent as if it were time at all like past and future; it is only the locus of abstracts that do not exist in time. The future and the past are two aspects of the same time which is the locus of all instances of numbers (inter alia). The moment these instances are recognized as individuals they are localized in space.

Common sense misleads us even in the use of our senses. It is hard, as a rule, to get ourselves to look at what we see; usually we look only at what we think we see--a different thing altogether. When we look out of a window we fancy we see things at various distances, but we don't. We see nothing but many colors and shades.

Again: most of us think that we are bound to see what we think we see. There may be cases, we admit, where we "see wrong"; but we feel that the thing was there to see all the time. It is a little hard to persuade ourselves that we see things only as we choose to see them. It is folly (but, practically speaking, a very necessary folly) to imagine that there is one way in which things must be seen: for if we look at a sheet of paper with a black disk in the center, it is obvious that you can see it either as a dark globe in front of the paper or as darkness behind seen through a hole in the paper. Any one will admit that there may be cases where we cannot say for certain what it is we see. We cannot always say whether a cloud is behind or in front of another. But we all find it hard to believe that the more we have "a good look all round it" and touch it and move it, the further do we get from what we see, because we are mentally constructing a complete picture which

is invisible except to the mind's eye.
33. If, then, things can thus be seen in various ways, what is it makes us decide one way or another? The difficulty of this question will not be appreciated unless it is recognized that we can never see anything completely: what we see is a part (often an irrelevant part) which acts as a symbol to suggest the rest. There is no real difference between seeing a circular black spot either as a disk or globe on this side of the paper or as darkness beyond; seeing the sing "I" as a figure on this side or as darkness beyond; seeing "I" as a symbol of self. In all these cases, what we see is a mere fragment which suggests a great deal that is "not there". It is no exaggeration to say that all these symbols open a window on an infinity. It is the same when I recognize you or your dog in your house. In no case do I see the whole of what I mean by you, your dog, or your house. But something or other calls up what I mean by you or your dog or your house. It is quite possible I might recognize you by all your shadows, just as I can recognize you by words that stand for you, or photos. We admit that pictures are symbols; we hesitate to admit that what our senses receive is a symbol and has been ever since early childhood.

A symbol of what? For what we put there. If we were standing outside a room and heard sounds coming from within--voices, dishes, foot-steps, glasses, knives and forks--we could build up a mental picture of what might be going on. Then if we opened the door, we should not be least surprised to find that we had not got the picture right. Our eye would at once modify the picture, and we

should then have a new one which we foolishly suppose to be final. For we do feel surprised now, if told that this new picture is no more likely to be final than the other. In fact, so little finality is there in it, that the longer we look the more we change it, because we notice something new each moment. Even granting that we could at any moment see such a picture in "final shape" as it "really is"-- would it stay as such more than a moment? So engrossed are we with our mental construction (which is comparatively easy to fix) that we notice only with great effort that the "solid fact" which I call your house looks so different at different times of the day and from different points of view, that it would be quite unrecognizable unless treated as a symbol: we recognize your ever-changing house as easily as we recogize the word house, however carelessly or quaintly written.

34. Neither peasant nor scientist can explain light; both find a solution that signifies them; if a peasant finds it easy it is because he is easily satisfied.

35. If, then, we all read the face of the world just as we read a book, seeing symbols and by their meanings making a mental construction which we call reality; and if we all instinctively veil as soon as possible anything mysterious or inexplicable with an explanation in order to feel masters of the situation: do we have to learn to read the external world just as we learn to read a book?

36. Knowledge is founded on consciousness, which it is for physiologists to explain. We start with being aware of nothing; since then we have never been (and can never be) aware of nothing--we can only be aware of something or something else.

37. MARGARET W. LANDES. Object has no existence independent of thought. Both teach that the object of knowledge is phenomenal, not real. That the sensuous content of knowledge has no objective existence was not an absolutely new doctrine even in Burthogge's time. Locke, like Descartes, had already taught the ideality of the "secondary" sense-qualities. But that the mind itself, independent of sense-experience, actively contributes to the make-up of its own object is a doctrine which, according to the usual view, was promulgated for the first time by Kant.

38. "But sensible things themselves..." says Cudworth, "are not known and understood either by the passion or fancy of sense, nor by anything merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it." These words of the quotation italicized by Professor Lovejoy to emphasize their agreement with the Kantian teaching, seem rather to show plainly that Cudworth is simply falling back on the familiar "innate ideas" theory in order to prove to the atheist that the mind is quite capable of getting on without any assistance from matter.

39. Neither Burthogge nor Kant ever denied the existence of reality external to mind. But since they find that the object of knowledge has no independent existence, they are forced to hold that reality, conceived as the thing independent of consciousness, is unknown.

40. EMILE BOUTROUX. To the ancients, in the golden days of the classic age, philosophy was pre-eminently the noblest exercise of the human intellect. Once the demands of nature satisfied and leisure won by effort,

man felt awakening within himself a loftier faculty than practical activity, the faculty of knowing and contemplating the order of nature and co-operating in thought with universal reason.

41. When examining itself, ever since the days of antiquity, reason has frequently wondered if the absolute it seeks is really accessible and if its ambition does not transcend its powers.

42. Space is inseparable from our perception of it, quantity is a quantification performed by the mind.

43. The human mind, which reflects on everything that comes before it, cannot possibly refrain from inquiring what is itself, when everything it studies depends on the being in which it participates. The ancients clearly saw that this exercise of reason was a noble and beautiful function, well deserving to occupy man's leisure hours: for the moderns, it is something inevitable, since both religion and science, which claimed to make philosophy useless, are unable to satisfy the very needs they themselves call forth and keep alive.

44. RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. The independent existence of matter, Dr. McTagard argues in familiar Berkeleian terms, is a perfectly gratuitous and superfluous hypothesis. Science is by no means committed to a materialistic hypotheses. The "laws of nature" may quite as well be conceived as the laws according to which human sensations are related. We are therefore not bound to regard the self as a mere activity of the body.

45. Conclusive proof of immortality can come, if at all, only from metaphysics.

46. The adoption of the hypothesis of pre-exis-

tence, moreover, enables us to explain in a more satisfactory way than is otherwise possible, certain puzzling features of our present life. In the same environment different tendencies and qualities which we ambiguously call innate manifest themselves in different men. These tendencies and qualities are often of the sort which are due in the lives of other men to the condensed results of experience. On the theory of pre-existence these tendencies and qualities are naturally explained as being indeed the condensed result of experiences in past lives. This explanation is more satisfactory than the explanation in terms of heredity. Again, the usual explanation of the sudden growth of intimacy in certain personal relations, as due to the capriciousness of sexual desire, is inadequate, since the puzzling sudden intimacy is to be found in friendships which have no connection with sexual desire. "On the theory of pre-existence such relations would naturally be explained by the friendships of past lives.

47. Theists, believing that each man lives his one life on earth and is thereafter immortal, have been confronted with the difficulty of contemplating the immense assembly of spirits that would thus be accumulated thro' the ages. William James, while he urges ua to be forbearing and democratically tolerant with the endless throng of fellow-immortals, realizes the mental enormity of the task. "The very heavens themselves, and the cosmic times and spaces, would stand aghast...at the notion of preserving eternally such an ever-swelling plethora and glut of it."

48. In his parergon, A NEW LOGIC, where he (CHARLES A MERCIER) attacks what he imagines to be Aristotelian logic with the vigour of

complete misapprehension; assuming that logic "is much in the same position that was occupied two hundred years ago by witchcraft. Without being formally attacked, it is crumbling to ruin, and losing its hold upon the minds of men." (Longman's Greed & Co: also Open Court Publishing Co. Chicago.1912)

49. Essays in Common Sense Philosophy by C.E.M. JOAD expound the New realism, and are as the author claims, "sufficiently philosophic to sound singularly like nonsense to the plain man, while they are sufficiently akin in spirit and conclusions to the plain man's view of the every-day world as we know it to appear pedestrian and unsatisfying to most philosophers."...He applies the realistic attitude of mind, as defined in the Introduction, to the relation of thought to temperament, pointing out that a man's philosophical opinions are really coloured by his temperament.

50. R.W.SELLARS. Few categories have aroused more controversy than has space. The reason for this divergence of opinion lies, in part, in its basic character; in part, in its various forms and implications. Let the reader ask himself whether he can conceive the physical world apart from space? Does he not even locate--vaguely enough it may be--even his own sensations and emotions? Again, how many perplexing problems cluster around space as a centre! Is the world infinite in extent or finite? Is it infinitely divisible? Is space a receptacle in which things somehow exist, or is it simply a term for the peculiar order of things?

51. It requires some temerity to attempt to cover the philosophical essentials in a brief

article. And yet this is our task. But we can pluck hope from the fact that process and result are in a way incommensurable. Just as years or experimentation can be condensed into a single formula, so years of reflection and persistent pushing-through of a point of view can find relatively brief expression.
52. Let us see whether we can create this concept in a genetic fashion as we did space, and in this way succeed in relating each level to a context in which it becomes significant. We shall, I think, find that the preceding examination of space will aid us--especially in the study of kinetic and mathematical time.
53. No concept is more baffling and has more subtle apparent contradictions than has time. As one other writer has put it: "All things live in time and it lives in nothing; all things die in time and death is not able to attain it." But may it not be that it is this very mystical tendency to substantialize time that leads us into our difficulties? Because we have not sufficiently distinguished the various meanings and contexts which the term has, we are the more easily led to regard time as a mysterious form or receptacle in which events somehow happen.
54. The elementary experience which is at the foundation of what we roughly call time is the immediate feeling of change.
55. W. CURTIS SWABEY. "ON REALISM". What is real about consciousness is simply the fact that beings said to be conscious make certain responses to the environment which others do not. We assume an inner principle to explain these responses, and we call this principle consciousness, but we know

only the manifestations of the principle. It is behavior that is observable and consciousness is merely assumed metaphysical explanation of behaviour; now the elimination of consciousness from our list of real beings is in accordance with the general tendency of modern science to eliminate non-empirical explanatory principles, essences, vital principlies, etc. and to keep to the observed facts themselves.
56. Now while subjective idealism is, from the point of view of common sense, an extremely paradoxical doctrine, it nevertheless forms the key-note of a great deal of thinking that falls under the more general heads of idealism and pragmatism. Subjective idealism may be briefly described as the position that the world exists only as the content or idea of consciousness. There is no external world, according to this doctrine, but only souls and their ideas.
57. There is no permanent tree which we can experience or perceive at different times and which different persons can experience or perceive.
58. As Schopenhauer said, the world is my idea, and the only difference between the real world and the world of dreams is the greater regularity and system to be found in the so-called real world. Such was the doctrine of the bishop Berkeley, who thought to have found an invincible argument against materialism and atheism by denying the existence of a material world altogether.

Now subjective idealism, or this paradoxical reduction of the whole cosmos to ideas, is regarded by the realist as the cardinal principle of idealism. Hume was a follower of Berkeley whose radical empiricism led him to

even more paradoxical consequences. Hume, in a word, abolished the soul (and tacitly God). He thus reduced the world to a chaotic stream of sense-impressions. And the philosophy of Kant, from which all modern idealism flows, is an answer to Hume. It consequently moves in the same world of thought in which Hume's investigations moved, and has certain deep similarities with Hume's system. For Kant the only world which is open to scientific investigation is what he called the world of possible experience, and not things as they are independently of us, i.e. things in themselves. Now it is clear that this is the system of Berkeley in a new form.

In Kant's system the world of possible experience, the world which constitutes the object of science, does not exist independently of consciousness. If no consciousness existed there would be no space, no time and no permanent mechanism of nature. Consciousness produces these things. In the first place, the sensuous world, colors, odors and sounds, etc., is relative to the sense-organ of the percipient. If there were no eyes, there would be no colours; no ears, no sounds, no noses, no odors. If our organs were different from what they are they would perceive a different world. But this is only the vestibule of Kant's idealism. Not only are the sensible qualities dependent upon the faculties of the perceiver, but the rational or logical form of the world is relative to the understanding of the thinker. It is we who arrange nature in space and time, and who subordinate it to a strict mechanical causality. Our minds read that into nature. Space and time, then, and also the categories of

the understanding, causality, substance, necessity, etc. possess for Kant a subjective character. They are relative to the mind that thinks them.

The mind that thinks them, however, is not the private consciousness of the individual. Here we reach the distinctive characteristic of Kant's idealism. Kant begins by assuming the truth of mathematical science, especially as exemplified in the system of Newton, of which he was a great admirer. The truths of mathematics and physics are true for every one, valid for all minds. The world of Mathematics and physics, therefore, is an objective world in precisely this sense, that, namely, it possesses universal validity. Universal validity is in fact for Kant the very meaning of objectivity. Now if the world of mathematics and physics possesses universal validity, if its truths hold for all minds, then it cannot be the mind of the individual to which that world is correlative; it must be what Kant called consciousness in general, Bewusstsein uberhaupt. Thus Kant is obliged to make use of the notion of a universal mind, to which all the phenomena of the world of space and time are relative. It is this notion of a universal mind which forms the central doctrine of what is called objective idealism. And it is objective idealism which most of the later idealists recognize as the only tenable form of idealism.

Objective idealism, then, or the doctrine that the world is relative to some sort of universal or cosmic intelligence, is an attempt to correct subjective idealism. If subjective idealism were true there could be no world of mathematics and physics with autho-

rity over all minds; each one of us could have a private arithmetic, geometry and mechanics. But Kant starts with the assumption of the universal validity of exact science. And he also assumes as part of his starting point that what is known cannot be independent of the mind that knows it. This assumption is, as the realists have shown, the cardinal principle of idealism proper and is first clearly stated in the doctrine of Berkeley. It is this assumption which the realist makes bold to deny, thus affirming that what is known may be independent of the mind that knows it. It is obvious that in denying the root principle of idealism he has necessarily denied the more complicated and derivative form of idealism which is known as objective idealism. Objective idealism appeals from the individual mind to an assumed universal mind in order to maintain the universality of scientific truths.

59. The chief fallacies of which the realist convicts the idealist are those of definition by initial predication and of argument from the ego-centric predicament. The procedure of the idealist in the first case is very simple. He declares his intention of looking at the world from the standpoint of experience. This means that he proposes to regard the world primarily as an object of experience, in other words, as an idea, or perception. There is no doubt that the world is in part the object of experience; in other words, many things in the world are perceived or felt or conceived or imagined, in other words, experienced in some way. But for the idealist this aspect of the world, the world as an object of possible experience, the world as idea, is definitive. It

is the very essence of the world to be a possible experience. In other words, the relation to consciousness belongs to the essential properties of the world. Now it has long since been observed that the "essence" of a thing depends upon the point of view from which you regard that thing. Thus a table presents a different character depending upon whether it is approached from the standpoint of physics or chemistry or biology, the latter regarding the table as essentially made up of wood from a certain variety of trees The idealist regards the psychology of the table, the table as a perception, or as an idea, as the ultimate and definitive essence of the table. It is true that the table can very well be regarded as an experience or as a perception but what the idealist has not proved and cannot prove is that the psychological way of approaching the table has any higher degree of ultimacy or absoluteness than the physical or chemical ways. He defines by initial predication; that is, he first regards the table as a perception and he then arbitrarily considers this one aspect of the table to constitute the true and absolute essence of the table. We may remark in passing that the whole tendency of realism is to deprive psychology of the falsely central position it has assumed.

60. The second fallcy pointed out by the realist in his attack on idealism is named the fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament. This argument is shown to occur in the system of Berkeley and also in other idealistic systems. The idealist draws an unwarranted conclusion from the ego-centric predicament in this way: To establish his conclusion the idealist calls on the realist to show him

something which is not perception, experience idea. The realist, perhaps, refers to the side of the moon which is never turned toward the earth. Here, he says, is something which is not experienced, and is not perception or mental content in any sense. There is no reason to suppose that any actual mind perceives the remote side of the moon. But to this the realist replies: Ah, but you are thinking of the other side of the moon now yourself. You can't think of it without thinking of it; consequently even the other side of the moon is dependent upon consciousness. Now the egocentric predicament consists in this undoubted but tautologous fact: that what you think of, you think of. The idealistic fallcy is to infer from this flat tautology that the opposite side of the moon, to revert to our example, exists only in consciousness. It is true that the realist is unable to think of anything which is not thought of by him at that moment but it by no means follows that there are not many things in existence which are not content of any sort of consciousness.

61. This internal theory of relations, as we find it in, say, Bradley, amounts to the theory that the world is an organic whole. Everything is related to everything else; nothing is isolated; and these relations are not accidental, fortuitous, to the things related but are essential, internal, to them. A thing's relations belong to its inseparable essence. Such is the doctrine of the idealist. He goes on, however, to say that if nothing is independent of anything else, then nothing can be known until we know everything else. This theory directly contradicts the independent and absolutely autonomous character of mathe-

matics. It implies, moreover, that science follows a false path when it analyzes, abstracts, considers one thing at a time. It breaks up that which is by nature continuous, indivisible, and instead of mastering its object now under one set of circumstances and now under another, and endeavours to measure the effect of each set of circumstances, on his object. If, however, the world is a living organic whole, if everything in the world is enextricably bound up with everything else, then scientific analysis is impossible.

62. It is the doctrine of the necessity of scientific analysis upon which the realist takes his stand in exposing that he is pleased to regard as a typical idealistic fallacy. The error of pseudo-simplicity has been one of the chief possessions of the idealists. This fallacy consists in arguing that because a thing is simple before analysis it must be so afterward. It confuses the immediate, first-hand simplicity of an experience, a simplicity which is simply the correlate of our ignorance, with the simplicity of that which is regarded as resisting further analysis on some rational grounds. The realist, in other words, takes a strong stand against immediatism. The immediatist appeals to his "immediate" unreflective experience, his "concrete" experience, and he regards this crude starting-point of knowledge as possessing higher authority than the same experience viewed in the light of scientific analysis and reflection. The realist finds, for example, that consciousness has been given a pseudo-simplicity, We are thought to have an immediate, intuitive, apprehension of our selves, our wills, our intellects, etc. Every attempt to

analyse consciousness into simpler elements is met with the charge that consciousness is itself simple, unanalyzable, immediate; that we cannot reduce consciousness to its psychological elements without destroying its peculiar essence. The realist and the experimental psychologist, however, regard this apparent simplicity of consciousness as a pseudo-simplicity. Consciousness seems simple only beause we have not tried to analyse it. It is simple to unreflective experience, simple in the concrete life of the unscientific. This immediate simplicity is, however, no guaranty that life is ultimately simple. The realist thus takes his stand on the results of scientific analysis and reflection upon the world as understood, as seen by the intellect, rather than the world as immediately given, that is, as it is found in crude experience. The preference for the world of unanalyzed experience, for what is vague and unintelligible, however, is very wide-spread among contemporary writers on philosophy. This spirit of anti-intellectualism can no doubt be traced back historically to the influence of Rousseau and romanticism, with their doctrine of a return to nature. The gospel of science, however, is rather, that of an advance to nature, nature being precisely what the savage, with his immediate experience, does not understand, being, in fact, not the starting point but the ieeal, and infinitely removed, goal of scientific research.

63. The ultimate objection against all forms of relativism and skepticism: that, namely, all the theories which say that man is the measure of all things and there there is no

truth, all these theories themselves claim to be the truth and thus contradict themselves. 64, All that we regard the world to be, either en masse or in detail, is here interpreted as man-made. This is pragmatism's humanism. If man were a lion, then were God also a lion, said Xenophanes. 'But man is man' says humanism, and, therefore, is everything after the image of man. But whether even this advanced degree of pragmatism's evolutionism is sufficiently consistent is still a question. For, it is still important to ask, whether man himself is thus known as he really is, or only as a mere invention, a growth, a 'working point of view' an hypothesis? But, if he is this, then it may be asked, Where is the leverage, the restingpoint, the πού στῶ of the system? Must there not be 'somewhere' a reality that is not man-made, that is not relative, and that is not dependent in any way whatsoever, on being known? Does not the position presuppose this, and, also, that this reality is correctly known, even though it be (known) only as a pliable, plastic 'something' that as knowing-processes appear in the evolutionary series, may be modified, altered, and, in sort, 'made' in the form in which it is now known by virtue of its causal relation to the knowing process? Finally, is this radical evolutionism itself man-made and humanistic, and relativistic in the sense that another thery might have become man-made? Or does it present the real state of affairs? To these inquiries the reply must be, that Humanism presupposes a definite ontology, and that it accepts this ontology on the basis of a realistic epistemology. Thus "no matter what attitude the pragmatist may will explicitly to express in indignant denial of this, (prag-

matism) contradicts itself by explicitly developing the difinition of all truth as relative and by then making a tacit exception to thid definition as regards the truth of itself as a theory."

The realist is thus interested in showing that pragmatism itself presupposes its opposite. This is in line with Kant's endeavour to get back to the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge, the unyielding logical foundations of existing systems of philosophy rather than with the logical foundations of science. Spaulding states in his Preface that the purpose of the New Rationalism is to "ascertain both what are those postulates from which each philosophical system is derivable, and also whether there is finally, one body of principles that is common to all systems and logically presupposed by them."

It is his "conviction both that there is such a 'doctrine' difficult though it may be to discover what it is, and also that this doctrine is logically present in every attempt to philosophize rationally."

The system of realism thus consists in a set of ultimate logical postulates which are contained, whether implicitly or explicityly, in all attempts to construct a system of philosophy. It may very well be true that no thinker has yet presented, or even can at the present time present, an adequate formulation of these ultimate principles; their nature constitutes on the contrary the essential and unavoidable problem or task of philosophy.

65. The realist, however, is interested in the presuppositions of other systems of philosophy rather than in the presuppositions of the sciences. The realists have done much to re-establish

that healthy correlation between science and philosophy which is always the sign of sound philosophy, but it is hardly to be denied that they have devoted the greater part of their energies to the technical refutation of other systems of philosophy. This work was necessary and has been well done, but the spirit of realism cannot rest with this result. It must rather advance to the consideration of the foundations of the sciences themselves. And in doing so realism will necessarily establish new relations with all those of the classical philosophers who have already laboured on this problem. The problem of the logical foundations of the sciences is really identical with that of what Kant called transcendental logic. Kant's problem, in turn, was not a new one but was rather the perennial problem of the scientific tradition in philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume can all be studied with profit on the question of the logical foundations of science. Realism, in other words, must lay aside its spirit of youthful revolt from the history of philosophy and learn all it can from the great thinkers of the past.

66. It must not be thought, however, that this system of ultimate logical postulates will ever be brought, in the course of human history, to a complete and final formulation. The work of criticism of science, like that of science itself, is essentially eternal. Each generation of thinkers must formulate anew its theory of science as well as its theory of everything else. And self-evidence can never be an adequate test of what constitutes a true scientific presuppostion. What is self-evident to one may not be so to another. The philosopher must in

the end rely on his concrete insight into science in its historical character. The presuppositions he seeks will evidence themselves by their efficiency in rendering science intelligible, in showing it as a unified system. A further development of science will therefore always demand a reconsideration of what were supposed to be the ultimate logical foundations of science. Thus the evolution of systems of non-Euclidean geometry was profoundly significant for the philosophy of mathematics, while the recent Einstein-Minkowski theory of relativity in mathematical physics will no doubt involve far-reaching changes in our notion of what physics is.

Realism, then, has practised an effective criticism upon the more or less frankly anti-scientific doctrines of idealism and pragmaticism (speculative theology and skeptical relativism) and has itself made some start in understanding the logic of the sciences. Spaulding's critical attitude toward the concepts of substance and causality, the bulwarks of the Aristotelian logic, is, as may be safely said, a decided step in the understanding of the mathematical sciences.

67, L.L. PIMENOFF. Why has the goal not been reached? Why has our civilization, apparently at its highest point in material achievements and in thought, gone bankrupt? Why did it culminate in the terrible world catastrophe which has just inflicted upon humanity such appalling losses of life and treasure?

68. Humanity at the crossroads eagerly listens for an answer to the "Quo vadis?" listens to Bergson who speaks of freedom for man to create his soul, to Boutroux who tells of freedom

from the fiat of nature's laws. The cocksure materialism of the last century, which aimed at the reduction of all spiritual phenomena to the interaction of matter and force, is generally discarded by modern thinkers, and the very science which upheld it formerly now furnishes weapons for its downfall. In the latest view of the ultimate units of power as "electrons" and the modern explanation of all energy phenomena as electrical, matter disappears, and is accessible only to ideal-istic conceptions. Nor does the theory of psycho-physical parallelism avail to establish the claims of materialism. It fails utterly to explain consciousness; all it can do is to proclaim the concurrence of psychical with physical phenomena. The two occur together, but why, is beyond its power to explain. No matter how much we attenuate the brain-tissue we are unable to locate thought.

68. Professor Hyslop says: "If philosophy is to have any legitimate function in the world, it must be convertible into the language of common life at some point of its meaning. No doubt, it has its esoteric aspects and that it cannot be understood as a whole by every one. But it is not a true philosophy unless it touches life in some general doctrine or belief."

69. JAMES LINDSAY. "A trained logician may be a very poor reasoner, and a very good reasoner may know nothing of logical science." That does not keep logic from being an aid to correct thinking, and the improvement of the discriminative powers.

70. In respect of the seeming arbitrariness of the logico-grammatical method of Occam and the terminists, we have to rememver that,

in the dependence of thought upon language, language was formed long before mental processes were interpreted by psychology. James has said that "philosophy has always turned on grammatical particles." Even yet we recognize how little conceptual thought can have its development carried through without the aid of language, especially through the formation of general concepts. The concept is conserved, grows fixed and definite, by means of the specific verbal symbol; words being, as Hamilton said, the fortresses of thought, even if the fixity and definiteness should remain--and desirably so in a developing order of things--no more than approximate. And this elaboration of concepts proceeds as we now recognize, through the processes of attention, comparison, analysis and generalization, until universal ideas are reached.

71. W.O. BRIGSTOCKE. A word is as hard to pin down as a thing (like the space between tow trees) and it is as hard to say what a word means as to foretell what speculative shares may be worth in a year's time.

72. Thus considered, what we call words are fictions, just as a tree is a fiction. It is impossible to say what a word is: but all of us recognize what is a word, because it becomes a word the moment we admit that it answers to our idea of a word.

73. The conception of time has become so habitual with us that an educated man has to undergo a special training in order to think without it. It is true that the uneducated still use a very primitive time scale; but the uneducated take no part in building up any conception of the universe that would

help them to explain the past or the future to any one's satisfaction, except perhaps in some narrow field of knowledge, such as husbandry or sheep rearing.

We have already seen that the popular idea of time covers two distinct things; there is, on the one hand, the present which is outside time altogether; on the other hand, time which is a pattern like any other and supplies a scale which (owing probably to its origin) has before and after aspects which are purely spatial; and it is curious to note that the time scale has much more of what is commonly called space than the space scale. The hope of ever discovering the origin of such a conception as time is no doubt vain. There can be little harm, then, in conjecturing that it arose from the fact that men lost themselves in deserts or on the high seas. In both these places the space scale fails: one is not interested--or rather there is no use--in knowing where he is, but it is profitable to know when he is, whether at the third or fourth or fifty day's lapse. Such distances were not measured by space but by a more useful scale of time, and the mere fact that the space scale measures the tangible and the time scale the intangible gives some idea of the stride that was made by the first men who learned to use a time scale.

Popular superstition attributes a measure of reality to the "past" which it denies to the "future"; it is important to recognize that this is nothing but a convenient fable. In practice and in theory it is necessary to work from the assumption that the only knowledge possible is in the present, but that by means of patterns and scales we can get the conceptions

a here and a there, a now here and a now there. Later we shall get a conception of what lies between here and there and between a now here and a now there. By this time we shall be well on our way to an intelligent view of the universe, but no amount of progress would ever make the past or the future visible: both the past and the future are constructions made subjectively (with "We" patterns, it is true) in the present, and of the two the future seems the better known, for our construction of the past is one which (by definition) is not so readily tested or verified. The babblers and gossips are the great authories concerning the course of history yesterday; he who dares to tell the history of to-morrow must weigh his words and understand to-day as only a wise man may.

74. There is nothing that we can think of, that cannot be thought of as being infinite; but the moment we think of it as infinite, it ceases to be that thing. A point may logically be any "size;" in practice it is always impossible to arrive at a position without magnitude (it may seem very perverse to do so, but there is no doubt whatever that we can).

75. Mr. Bertrand Russell in a recent article says, "I shall continue to protest it was not I who made the world."

76 R.W. SELLARS. There has been a working dualism growing out of the data of the sciences. This has meant an ignoring of questions of the nature of consciousness as not relevant to the content of knowledge. The scientist's cognitive interest was in the physical world and not in consciousness; and in the world so known through the data of observation he could find nothing which reminded him of consciousness as he understood that

that term. The point is a somewhat subtle one and to some extent involves the first motive. Consciousness was often conceived as something which could be perceived if it were in the physical world. By naive realists--or at least intuitionalists of a conceptual sort--the physical world was thought of as something directly observable, and the tendency was to assume that consciousness, also, was something of like possibility; why could not consciousness be perceived if it were there? Need I point out that the critical realist affirms that this whole argument has no validity? The physical world cannot be intuited, for what we perceive is the content of perception; and the recognition of this situation makes it absurd to seek to perceive consciousness as an object in the sense that the physical existent was supposedly perceived. Even were consciousness in the physical existent, it could not be perceived in the naive sense, for no part of the existent is intuited in this sense.

77. R.W. SELLARS. Our conclusion is that consciousness is a part of mind but by no means the whole mind. It is too evanescent and passive, too little self-explanatory, to be so considered. It is relative.

78. J.M. THORBURN. "MYSTICISM AND ART" It may seem strange that a generation exteeming itself enlightened through the achievement and the discipline of scientific thinking, and disullusioned through its disastrous encounter with an insulted and apparently revengeful universe should seek refuge in mystical modes of thinking. But whether or not the mystical inclinations of to-day have borne real fruit, it is just through the bitter experiences of knowledge and enlightenment and

disillusionment that sometimes in the past men have transformed these selfsame things and set them upon a higher plane. Our hope must be that they should do so again. For as on the plane of practical activity, they find the results of their science terribly disappointing, being deprived of the convenience and order of their economic systems at the very points where they had expected to gain most by them; so in the shpere of purely scientific or philosophic thinking there is a parallel dissatisfaction, a discovery that thought is deprived of the satisfaction that seems due to it--a profound and intimate contact with the world whose nature it had set out to learn, and whose problems it had determined to solve. This disappointment is, of course, old as the history of thinking humanity. But it is none the less acutely felt in an age where reflection is keen and critical as ever and pursued with more help from the accumulated results of past experience.

To start from the point of view of the thinking instinct itself, what are the remedies that thought proposes or seems inclined to adopt to free itself from the tyranny of its own criticism? In the first place, there is the instinct to forego thought altogether, to give up, to find refuge in some non-intellectual form of experience. And this movement gains the assent of thought itself. For it lies very deep in human nature, and is not by any means symptomatic of shallowness or poverty of life, to declare that thinking is in vain, at once painful and fruitless.

79. Music, in particular, to so many severely scientific thinkers seems to offer such a refuge from thought--from its demands and

from its dispeace. Experience is, however, unable to maintain itself at this degree of tension. It has been found, for example, impossible in practice for the thinker altogether stop thinking. And in those lapses back into thought, he is conscious of new discoveries.

80. But, for all that, the radical defect of thought would remain; and yet, because of its richer experience, the mind will think in a new way, and with new views of its own thinking process and of the results of its thought. The paradox within which it will find itself moving will be something like this. Thought is forever inadequate to achieve the perfect comprehension and the deep and intimate penetration that it desires of the world which it sets out to know. The mind's very act of bringing precision into its aim shows it at once that this aim demands the clear recognition of the distinction between mind and the world which it knows and the need forever to maintain this distinction if thought is not to deny itself, render futile its own movement and stultify its own effort; while yet the very ground of its aim is the aspiration to rise above the distinction. The driving power of the mind is at variance with its method of procedure. The will to know is in contradiction with itself.

However we are to formulate the solution of this antinomy, there is actually an experience by which in some sense it is achieved. The point is reached where thought can no longer take refuge from its own dissatisfaction with itself by passing outside itself, as, for example, into art. It is now compelled not so much to relinquish itself as to transform itself while yet maintaining itself. This is the ex-

perience of mysticism.

The distinction, then, from the point of view of the thinking process, between mysticism and such other forms of intuitive experience as we have typified, say, in music is quite clear. As opposed to the movement by which thought abandons itself and compels the mind to fly for refuge to the emotional and to the sensuous, mysticism is the demand which thought makes upon itself to reconcile its aim with its method, and heal the wound which the falling apart or the two is forever inflicting upon the mind.

81. If mysticism comes to birth within the thinking-process itself, and is not something added to it from some other source, its contrast with science as in some way antagonistic is like the unreal contrast of genius to the patient and laborious work out of which its swift illumination arises, and which is, after all,.the only soil that it can spring from. In all kinds of intellectual work, there is no doubt a certain strange transition from the merely laborious and painstaking to the brilliant and creative. It shows itself equally in science, art and philosophy--probably in far wider fields than these--but in these for certain. In philosophy it shows itself in the transition from scientific reflection to mysticism.

82. Starting from the idea that the mystical tendency is a true development of scientific or reflective thinking, we should hesitate to identify it with intuitive forms of experience like poetry and art.

83. There are many critical thinkers who would challenge the possibility of a movement in philosophy through which the mind should be

able to overcome the opposition between itself and its objects.

84. GERALD A. KATUIN. "WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IN TEACHING PHILOSOPHY?" The prime reason for demanding that students spend a certain amount of time in the study of philosophy is due without doubt to tradition and custom. During the past decades a certain amount of philosophical culture was necessary to any one who wished to be classified as a person of culture.

85. The students get a certain amount of philosophic knowledge, but this knowledge is not at all connected or related to other facts of life, and is, consequently, as far as the student as an individual is concerned, absolutely valueless. This mass of knowledge, being unrelated and entirely independent of other facts of life, cannot be utilized and is, thus, soon forgotten.

Seldon, if ever, is the attempt made to give students consecutive courses in philosophy. Instructors in philosophy on the whole have not learned the value of knowledge in its setting. They have designed courses which consisted of dipping here and there into the stream of philosophic thought and taking simple courses in Kant, in Hegel, in Plato, in Aristotle with the greatest sangfroid. One student has taken this one, another has taken that one. The knowledge that they have obtained is not knowledge that can help them in their practical life, nor is it knowledge that can help them very much in cultural life, and the quizzical expressions on the faces of some of these students in philosophy is pitiable and is in itself a terrible indictment.

Just what reasons can philosophy give to ju-

justify its place on the curriculum of required subjects of the undergraduate? Is the knowledge that one gains in studying various systems of philosophy a knowledge that is useful and essential in practical life? If that were all that philosophy could give to justify her place, she would indeed deserve to be thrown out at once, tooth and claw. Philosophy is a study that does not put content into the mind, but it develops the individual view-point; it teaches the individual to interpret and evaluate life in a philosophical manner. It furnishes no new materials from which to build new structures of knowledge, but it digs around in the dump hills and ash heaps of commonplace and finds there rare and costly ornaments and materials which the individual never knew of and which he can use. Philosophy can be compared with a piece of agricultural machinery: the machine does not add anything to the soil, but by using the machine the soil can be better cultivated in a shorter space of time and the result is a vastly increased profit for the owner. Philosophy, then, is a view-point and a method, rather than a certain branch of knowledge, which must be learned and digested into activities of life.

To improve this machinery of the mind, to give this philosophical outlook upon life should be the aim of philosophy. With this aim firmly established it becomes one of the most important and vital subjects that the undergraduate must take. It establishes then for itself a secure, firm basis, and "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Is value becomes stupendous, for it furnishes the foundation for all the knowledge that the

student gathers; it becomes, in other words, the corner-stone for his education. Philosophy will cease to be underestimated as it is now so ofttimes, and will be able to take its place among the subjects that are essential and important.

But just how do we go about this process of improving the machinery of ideas? What are the essential things that must be taken into considerations? The key-word to the whole process is "interest". Material must be selected and handled in such a way that the student's interest will be aroused, his curiosity must be stimulated, and then by proper handling of these materials an abiding interest in philosophy and a philosophical attitude toward life can be created.

Instead of chopping philosophy up, as is the custom at the present time, into logic, ethics, metaphysics and aesthetics, we will take the whole field of philosophy as it lies stretched out before us with its beginnings in the distant post, and stake out a clear-cut path through the wilderness. The important philosophers of the ages, those that have contributed heavily to the philosophic thought of the world, will be studied as a unit. Each philosopher that is dealt with will be discussed from the standpoint of his ethics, his metaphysics, his logic, etc. Instead of giving separate courses in ethics, in logic, in metaphysics, these philosophers will be studied in consecutive order, and thus we shall in a gradual way unfold to the student the philosophical thought of the ages. The instructor need not worry then about holding the interest of his class, for he shall have definitely settled that problem. Philo-

sophy is the most interesting study when handled in a scientific manner. A general course like this in philosophy should run throughout an entire academic year. I know some will shrug their shoulders, if they do nothing worse, at this profanity. "How could it be possible" they will exclaim, "to give a student more than just a bare inkling of the subject in this space of time?" To those I would say: "Examine your teaching methods. If you can't give a student something more than just a superficial knowledge of your subject after you tach him an entire year, there is something wrong with your methods or with you." The philosophy of the present and of the past is not found in great verbosity. In order to give knowledge it is not necessary to use great volumes of words or to wax eloquent in language. Of course, organization is necessary, and it is taken for granted that you know how to present your materials. I know that when I tach a class in general philosophy for an entire year, I shall perhaps not have been able to give them an all-comprehensive knowledge of the subject, but I am assured that they will at least have a fairly thorough knowledge of that subject.

By combining logic, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of religion all in one a great deal of valuable time will have been saved: moreover, these fields are more or less inter-related, and when we tear them apart and abstract them from each other, as we are doing at the present time, we are creating an artifical division within the mind of the student which is entirely unjustified, and, in consequnce, we rob these subjects of a large part of their value. For instance, when you

study Plato, why not study his metaphysics, his logic, his ethics, his political philosophy all at once instead of taking each one separate and labeling them under different courses?

85. What should I stress in philosophy to the average student who is not making a special study in the field of philosophy? This is perhaps the question that is heard most frequently. It is an important question, and the way in which this question is answered is what determines whether or no a course in philosophy is a success. To the average student, it seems to me, the ethical and social side of philosophy should be stressed. The ethical side of philosophy, not so much the historical side, but the live ethical questions of the day can be made very interesting, and here the instructor has untold possibilities in developing the thought of his students. He can take live ethical problems and criticize them and pass judgment upon them in the light of the ethical concepts of the past. Of course, some historical background and some psychological background will have to be presented, but by confining himself mostly to the philosophical problems involved he will have the most success. In the same way he can treat the social side of philosophy. This would include politics, religion, etc. Here he would have a field which is just as interesting to-day as it was two thousand years ago. By emphasizing these sides of philosophy the instructor could instil into his class this philosophical attitude which spells rationality and science.

The personal equation cannot be overlooked in the teaching of philosophy. Too often men are chosen for other reasons that ability to

fill our chairs of philosophy. This, of course, is entirely unjustifiable. It is customary in many of our universities of to-day to judge a man's teaching ability by a book or some books that he has written. As a matter of fact, this is no gauge for his ability as an instructor. Many men that have a fine literary style are, nevertheless complete failures as instructors. The inevitable result of this we can see. Every man that is holding down a chair of philosophy, or that is in any way connected with a department of philosophy, is anxiously attempting or has attempted or has succeeded in writing one or more books. I would in no wise belittle these efforts, for they are in themselves very creditable, but is such a course of procedure fair to the students who are in their classes? During the last ten years a great number of philosophical books, about two hundred and fifty a year, have been dumped on the market. How few of them have attained to any popularity! Books--books--books--and still more books until we are to all intents and purposes snowed under by them. What seems to be our greatest need is to make more students of philosophy so that there may be a public to read these books. We need more honest, earnest endeavour among our instructors in philosophy in regard to their actual teaching of the subject. We must get away from the notion that it is only the successful writer who is the successful instructor. Frequently it is just the opposite: it is the successful instructor who is too busy with his students, too conscientious in his treatment of them, for him to have time to write a book. If instructors could be rated for efficiency would we not often find the first last and the last first?

To develop this philosophic attitude toward life should be the aim of philosophy. As stated above, philosophy differs from science in that it can furnish no proof for its conclusions: it can give no content to the mind, but it can turn the mind in certain directions ---it can inculcate certain view-points which are essential from a philosophic standpoint. This type of mind can be developed in no other way than through philosophic studies-- through a critical survey of the very bases of our existence and of our institutions. It is highly important, nay more, it is essential to the man or woman of to-day who must go out into the mart of the world, to have this philosophic view-point, for it is only through this that they can have poise, self-reliance, and ability which come from a well-grounded knowledge and a personal interpretation of life. To develop this philosophic view-point, not to instil some system of philosophy or some code of ethics into the mind of the student of the student, should be the aim of every true instructor in philosophy. Given this aim, the teaching of philosophy becomes the noblest of professions. It means to be a conspicuous unit in the great progress of developing rationality, and more than that, it means bringing to the men and women who study under you a sureness of purpose and a tranquillity of mind which nothing else can give.

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1. WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH. He had tried hard to keep his own conversion out of the pulpit, to inhibit or restrain its influence on his preaching and his pastoral ministrations, but in vain. Despite his utmost efforts he found

that it coloured his speech and his life, that he was no longer the same man but undisguisably another. To him the change was a great uplift and illumination, and to his flock in general it seemed not unwelcome; they heard him gladly and were ready to follow whither his thought might lead. Not so with the "rich deacons" the officers, and the representatives of the "vested interests" in the church. Of these the opposition seemed irreconcilable.

2. He will not compromise his convictions in any measure. He will not tamper with the truth as he now sees it clearly, but will abide the consequences with the firmness of a Luther.

3. It is very true that the "Eternal Gospel" of nonotheism may fail to stir the depths of the present already nomotheistic consciousness; but in the beginning it was not addressed to any such, but on the contrary to a consciousness intensely, exclusively, and often fanatically polytheistic. This monotheistic Gospel was precisely the one and the only conceivable one to arouse, excite, enchain, enthrall, and finally completely overcome and transform that polytheistic consciousness.

4. JAMES LINDSAY."THE GREATEST PROBLEM IN VALUE." There are important thinkers to-day who allow only those judgments to be true, of which the objective fact is really existent. Surely there are evident judgments, where no concrete actuality of the objectives are concerned, that cannot be false. Mathematics and formal logic are examples in their remoteness from ordinary reality; truth, in their purest results, springs up in independence--it might even be said, because of the

independence--of real existents, since they both belong to the sphere of things not seen. Why, then, can it be quite satisfacory for philosophers to keep on binding all truth to association with the really existent? These truths--I mean, of pure mathematics and formal logic--may be pure abstractions, but you do not deny them the name of truth, because they are abstract and independent of reality, even though they may not be incapable of being brought into some sort of relation to, and bearing upon, reality. I am, of course, well aware of those philosophical quarters in which it is blankly denied that there is any abstract truth, or truth in itself, but I do not think such denial is conformable to true reason. The truths of pure mathematics and formal logic, of which I have been speaking, are completely and unconditionally true, independently of their place in this or that particular mind. So absolute are the truths of pure logic that to deny them is simply to reassert them in new form.

3. Pragmatism and instrumentalism make all truth instrumental and relative, and reduce truth to a biological and psychological value. Truth, in such a view, grows with our growth, and changes with our needs. Truth is, on this theory, just our control of the objects of experience, and that is the use of scientific hypotheses. The truth of ideas lies in their empirical value, in how far they "work". This is made the sole criterion of truth. Truth is a mere social product, to this view. A useful enough aspect of truth, so far as it goes, but inadequate, as a theory of truth, since it is too individualistic, and never gets so far as to become objective, and supra-

temporal in significant import; it is one which was not wholly absent from Socreates, the Sophists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, though developed and set in novel forms in our time. But the true in itself is not sought, nor believed in; what is true is true only for the subject; individual instinct figures too largely in pragmatist knowledge, instead of the theoretic knowledge which seeks after universal rules. But will does not make a knowledge content for truth; truth in its objectivity is independent of the knowing subject's acknowledgment of it.

4. The efforts of Bradley and others towards a monistic theory of truth--a logical monism resting, in a certain way, on an ontological monism.

5. I am by no means sure that the modern attempts at simplicty and unification, in respect of truth, are improvements upon the forgotten efforts of the older philosophers. They saw the difficulty of arriving at a single definition of truth, its significance being so wide at the fullest, and the forms of truth so diverse and variant.

6.They distinguished between the different kinds of truth, however, and surely philosophy is still concerned with definition, distinction, and difference, through which alone satisfactory ultimate unity can be reached. Some of them enumerated logical truth, or the correspondence between thought and its laws; conceptual truth, or the correspondence between thought and object; ontological--sometimes termed transcendental--truth, or the correspondence of thought with being; the moral truth.

7. They all recognized the importance of the

fundamental category of being, as the ground of all truth--that truth "by which a thing is what it is"; and we have need to recognize the manifold senses in which we still speak of being or reality.

Truth may be the simple equivalent of reality, so long as you are only speaking of things, but there is wider reality than that of things, and to this wider reality truth or thought is related.

8. Our leading philosophers speak of values without attempting any such articulation of the values, which they uncritically assume as common sense or mere face values.

9. Philosophy is not mere crude empiricism, even if christened "radical" and the question of ultimate truths and principles we have found to be far from an idle or unanswerable one. We have found to be far from an idle or unanswerable one. We have seen that value is always for a subject, but the strange fact remains--one difficult of reconcilement--that value does not yet come and go with the subject, that experiences value.

10. The contention of some philosophers that truth, without a subject that thinks it, is a mere abstraction, is scarcely justifiable.

11. WESLEY RAYMOND WELLS. "BEHAVIOURISM & THE DEFINITION OF WORDS." The propensity of philosophical studies to lead only to interminable arguments is one of the most striking features of the whole history of philosophy. Arguments are good, but only for the sake of conclusions; and unfortunately too many philosophical disputes lead to no results. The fact that so much discussion is rendered fruitless through lack of clearness in the definition of words, makes the study of language

imperative. Before talking, take thought for the instruments of speech. This is as significant as injunction as the one that bids us inquire into our means of knowing before dogmatically building up systems of knowledge. If observance of this rule results in fewer words, no harm will be done. As Emerson has said, "Good as is discourse, silence is better, and shames it." If, on the other hand, greater precision of speech and thought result, the aim of the precept will have been attained.

A scientific study of whords succeeds best if based upon behavioristic psychology. Speech is a form of behaviour. It probably arose in the form of gestures, an obvious form of visible behaviour while vocal speech may at first have been the incidental accompaniment of gesture speech. However this may be, developed language consists of spoken and written words signs. Spoken words are the result of articulatory movements, and consist of sounds in the air; and written words consist of marks upon paper, or upon wood, stone, etc. When a man talks or writes, he is obviously doing something: he is then a proper subject for the behaviourist to study. Speaking and writing are actual responses. The words are "response relics"--the more or less permanent product of responses, like footprints on the sand.

Developed language is a complex system of signs. Each word is a sign, which expresses a meaning, and which usually refers to an object ---which always refers to an object in such a theory as Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie according to which every name or word has an object, or denotation, though not, in all cases,

either an existent object definable in terms of sense-data, or a subsistent universal. A word always refers at least to a situation, by virtue of which it may be defined.

The statement of a behavioristic view of language-signs will be facilitated by a discussion first of signs in general. For this I shall be indebted to Mr.C.S.Peirce, the giver of the term "pragmatism" to philosophy. His terminology, at least, is valuable. Mr. Peirce defines a sign as "anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum. "

12. Mr. Peirce distinguishes icons, indices, and symbols. As the usual use of the words suggests, an icon resembles, an index points to, and a symbol has only an arbitrary connection with, the object denoted. Mr. Peirce employs the terms in a more precise sense, and not, in all cases, a wholly acceptable one. It is sufficient for our purposes to distinguish indices and icons, which do not, according to Mr. Peirce's definition, depend for their existence upon being interpreted as signs, and symbols, which depend upon interpretants for their existence, and which have only an arbitrary connection with the objects to which they are made to refer by the action of interpretants. An algebraic symbol, for example, neither resembles nor points to the object that it stands for. It has simply been taken by the mathematician to stand for some object, with which it has no inner or intrinsic connection.

13. If by definition of a term we seek to

tell what the term stands for, what it denotes, we see that the term intrinsically denotes nothing at all. To discover its acquired denotation we must observe the whole community of persons for whom the word is actually a sign. This community consists, with respect to the word in question, of indexical interpretants, and observations of such interpretants will disclose the denotation of the word. When we say that we must inquire of human usage to discover the definition of a word, we are recognizing that human usage is an indexical interpretant of the sign, and is the only guide to the denotation. If, on the other hand, we seen by definition to tell the meaning, as distinguished from the denotation, we must still seek for the denotation first as a guide to the meaning. A word refers at least to an objective situation in which its meaning may be sought in cases where there is no existent denotation.

The case of seeking the definition of a word is precisely analogous to the case of a stranger to a language seeking for denotation of a word through observing the responses that it releases. In defining words one should stand outside the problem, with no preconceptions of one's own, and observe what the word-symbol is actually a sign of in human behaviour. The definer can discover the class of objects to which the word refers by observing for what responses the word has become a stimulus, and then observing what class of objects such responses are a function of.

14. DOROTHY WRINCH. Reality and non-reality are sometimes asserted of the same kind of thing. To call one's sense-data real in waking life and unreal in dreams is not to be identified

with asserting primary existence of some of one's sense-data, and not of others. All our sense-data have equally primary existence.

15. RICHARD A ARMS. We come to the development of the Euclidean system, based upon axioms which are justified by their self-evidence. The close intimate connection with the physical world-order fades into obscurity; the lines and figures of geometry are not bodies or parts of bodies but independent mental constructions. Finally the Kantian criticism expounds the view that the axioms are true, not because they apply to the external and independent world-order, but because they are necessarily bound up with our forms of thought, because we can think in no other way without contradiction. Whereas at first human choice had nothing to do with mathematics because of the hard, unyielding character of physical fact, under the critical view, it is summarily dismissed because of our total inability to alter the make-up of our understanding.

The dicovery of the non-Euclidean geometry has gradually created a revolution in this point of view. It is seen with ever-increasing clearness that a decision of the will is involved in the establishment of each set of axioms, and that choices are involved which no future experiment can condemn or justify. For example the amount by which the angle-sum of a triange differs from two right angles may be so small as to baffle any observation, and it is thus entirely possible that we are dwellers of a non-Euclidean world. From a study of the objective and independent, mathematics thus becomes more and more concerned with a subjective element of arbitrary choice. Self-evidence disappears as a criterion, and is given its death-blow by Weierstrass in his

brilliant example of a continuous curve which does not have a tangent.

Freed in this way, a fact which is at once a privilege and a restraint, mathematics develops in a double direct.

16. The doctrine of formalism tells us that a term is indefinable and a proposition postulated only in reference to a particular system of axioms and terms, in another system we have the terms defined and the propositions proved. Because of this relativity we may well inquire as to the essential nature of this number system upon which mathematics is supposed to depend. Is it itself something plastic, responsive to our demands, or is it objective and independent? The formalist is forced to admit that an infinity of different sets of axioms for the positive integers are possible. Why should we use any particular one of these rather than another? If no single one is to be preferred, and the essence of arithmetic lies in the theorems, and not in the postulates and indefinables, then our choice seems to have nothing to do with the matter. Confronted with this situation, the formalist is forced to an extreme position and enunciates the theory of nominalism,-- that numbers, and, in fact, mathematical entities in general, are nothing more than mere words; that they are not real as physical objects are real, but are free creations of the spirit with no necessary connection with objective existence. Not use, interpretation, or application is the goal of mathematics, but consistency, alone; and apart from the requirements of consistency, all limitations are to be case aside as fetters on the intellect.

This radical nominalism is, it should be

noted, in distinct and admitted opposition to the original character of the science as it developed from the study of the hard and fact physical problem. The only law which is recognized is the law of logical consistency, and the mathematician believes himself to have attained his goal of independence and freedom. Yet wherein can he boast of freedom? Divorced from restraint and reality, he seems to be reduced to contemplation and admiration of his own mental processes, and submissive to self-imposed rules alone.

17. Logic itself is serene and independent. It is the articulate expression of <u>the way men ought to reason</u>. Just so long as this contention remains in its pristine vagueness, is the adherent of such a theory safe from attack;--but let him descend from his abstractions and formulate a particular code, that <u>thus</u> and <u>so</u> is the way men ought to reason, and he will be objected to from all sides. The proponent of the code is unable to justify his concrete propositions except by reiteration of their self-evidence and his own personal convictions; he is prevented from appealing to the verdict of experience by very definition, since in no way can we derive what ought to be from what is, or has been.

18. The logic, however, must in its turn be justified. How can its postulates be shown to be consistent and mutually independent? The answer is short and to the point, they <u>cannot.</u>

We are led to a new point of view. Logic does not contain an "ought" nor yet an "is"; it is an accepted code of validity, a kind of gentlemen's agreement, the violation of which should lead to scientific ostracism. So much in the abstract, but how are we to give this code of

content? If individual choice is allowed to interfere, we destroy the acceptability of the code, its universality. The Gordian Knot is not to be loosened; it must be cut.

19. The logician, from this point of view, no longer dwells in lofty a priori solitude, holding absolute dominion over science and mathematics, but descends to the uncomplaining study and interpretation of the content of these subjects, having learned that true mastery is to be gained by service. Thus we are led again to the sphere of the concrete event and we might be supposed to have returned to our starting-place. The process is not a circle, however, and this new point of view is infinitely higher than the first. When we fully realize that consistency itself is given content by the will to be consistent, we see how it is that mathematics is an expression of that will exercising itself upon and in an independent world. The freedom which is present is not a freedom which is to be desired, but which is to be resolutely denied.

20. Logic is the articulate development of of the determination to be rational, and the process of exact thought brings with it an increasing comprehension of the fact that the will to be rational is at once its motive power and its goal. The aim toward independence of the subjective does not give us independence, but it keeps us moving in that direction in which independence lies,--for he alone is a slave who is content to be one. The study of scientific and mathematical method may not give us forthwith our goal of a universally accepted code; we may not be able to realise the conception of a time when the way men ought to

reason, the way men do reason, and the accepted code will coincide in part and whole. Yet it is no small thing that we are able to appreciate that the march of rational thought lies along this line, that logic is given content by the impulse toward rationality and that the knowledge of this content is to be gained by a study of the process itself. We are at least in possession of the differential coefficient.

21. Wm. MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN. There is no such thing, as far as our knowledge goes, in the material world which is a thing in itself all things being but combinations or complex things. Thus, for example, we are all aware that there is no such thing as a stove or a table in itself, each being but a combination of parts, parts of sub-parts, sub-parts of molecules, molecules of atoms, atoms of electrons and so on until we get back to the final ether, the only thing which may be said to have an absolute existence. Now being a combination of other things, and not a thing in itself, that stove or that table is bound sooner or later to destruction, for it is an axiom both of Buddhism and of science that only simple things are permanent, a complex being in its very nature bound to be dissolved although this dissolution may be put off indefinitely.

22. BERTRAND RUSSELL. "THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM." If you shut your eyes and imagine some visual scene, the images that are before your imd while you are imagining are undoubtedly there. They are images, something is happening ándtwhat is happening is that the images are before your mind, and these images are just as much part of theworld

as tables and chairs and anything else. They are perfectly decent objects, and you only call them unreal (if you call them so), or treat them as non-existent, because they do not have the usual sort of relations to other objects. If you shut your eyes and imagine a visual scene and you stretch your hand to touch what is imagined, you won't get a tactile sensation, or even necessarily a tactile image. You will not get the usual correlation of sight and touch. If you imagine a heavy oak table, you can remove it without any muscular effort, which is not the case with oak tables that you actually see. The general correlations of your images are quite different from the correlations of what one chooses to call "real" objects. But that is not to say images are unreal. It is only to say that they are not part of physics. Of course, I know that this belief in the physical world has established a sort of reign of terror. You have got to teat with disrespect whatever does not fit into the physical world. But that is really very unfair to the things that do not fit in. They are just as much there as the things that do. The physical world is a sort of governing aristocracy, which has somehow managed to cause everything else to be treated with disrespect. That sort of attitude is unworthy of a philosopher. We should treat with exactly equal respect the things that do not fit in with the physical world, and images are among them.

"Phantoms," I suppose, are intended to differ from "images" by being of the nature of hallucinations, things that are not merely imagined but that go with belief. They again are perfectly real; the only odd thing about

them is their correlations. Macbeth sees a dagger. If he tried to touch it, he would not get any tactile sensation, but that does not imply that he was not seeing a dagger, it only implies that he was not touching it. It does not in any way imply that the visual sensation was not there.

23. The phantom is in itself just as much part of the world as the normal sense-datum, but it lacks the usual correlation and therefore gives rise to false inferences and becomes deceptive.

24. The distinction between what some people would call real existence, and existence in people's imagination or in my subjective activity, that distinction, as we have just seen, is entirely one of correlation. I mean that anything which appears to you, you will be mistakenly inclined to say has some more glorified form of existence if it is associated with those other things I was talking of in the way that the appearance of Socrates to you would be associated with his appearance to other people. You would say he was only in your imagination if there were not those other correlated appearances that you would naturally expect. But that does not mean that the appearance to you is not exactly as much a part of the world as if there were other correlated appearances. It will be exactly as much a part of the real world, only it will fail to have the correlations that you expect. That applies to the question of sensation and imagination. Things imagined do not have the same sort of correlations as things sensated.

25. I think the importance of philosophical grammar is very much greater than it is generally thought to be. I think that practically all traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes

due to bad grammar.
26. You do not know what is the actual meaning of the symbols that you are using. The meaning they have <u>in use</u> would have to be explained in some pragmatic way: they have a certain kind of practical or emotional significance to you which is a datum, but the logical significance is not a datum, but a thing to be sought.
27. The sort of thing you are aiming at in the physical analysis of matter is to get down to very little bits of matter that still are just like matter in the fact that they persist through time, and that they travel about in space. They have in fact all the ordinary every-day properties of physical matter, not the matter that one has in ordinary life--they do not taste or smell or appear to the naked eye--but they have the properties that you very soon get to when you travel towards physics from ordinary life. Things of that sort, I say, are not the ultimate constituents of matter in any metaphysical sense. Those things are all of them, as I think a very little reflection shows, logical fictions in the sense that I was speaking of.
28. You can start from what is empirically given, what one sees and hears and smells and so forth, all the ordinary data of sense, or you canstart with some definite ordinary object, say this desk, and you can ask yourselves, "What do I mean by saying that this desk that I am looking at now is the same as the one I was looking at a week ago?" The first simple ordinary answer would be that it is the same desk, it is actually identical, there is a perfect identity of substance, or whatever you like to call it. But when that apparently

simple answer is suggested, it is important to observe that you cannot have an empirical reason for such a view as that, and if you hold it simply because you like it and for no other reason whatever. All that you really know is such facts as that what you see now, when you look at the desk, bears a very close similarity to what you saw a week ago when you looked at it.

29. What is the empirical reason that makes you call a number of appearances, appearances of the same desk? What makes you say on successive occasions, I am seeing the same desk? The first thing to notice is this, that it does not matter what is the answer, so long as you have realized that the answer consists in something empirical and not in a recognized metaphysical identity of substance.

30. It is a little easier to the untrained mind to conceive of an identity than it is to conceive of a system of correlated particulars, hung one to another by relations of similarity and continuous change and so on. That idea is apparently more complicated, but that is what is empirically given in the real world, and substance, in the sense of something which is continuously identical in the same desk, is not given to you. Therefore in all cases where you seem to have a continuous entity persisting through changes, what you have to do is to ask yourself what makes you consider the successive appearances as belonging to one thing. When you have found out what makes you take the view that they belong to the same thing, you will then see that that which has made you say so, is all that is <u>certainly</u> there in the way of unity. Anything that there may be over and above that, I shall recognize as something I cannot know. What I can

know is that there are a certain series of appearance linked together, and the series of those appearances I shall define as being a desk. In that way the desk is reduced to being a logical fiction, because a series is a logical fiction. In that way all the ordinary objects of daily life are extruded from the world of what there is, and in their place as what there is you find a number of passing particulars of the kind that one is immediately conscious of in sense. I want to make clear that I am not denying the existence of anything: I am only refusing to affirm it. I refuse to affirm the existence of anything against which there is no evidence, but I equally refuse to deny the existence of anything against which there is no evidence. Therefore I neither affirm nor deny it, but merely say, that is not in the realm of the knowable and is certainly not a part of physics; and physics, if it is to be interpreted, must be interpreted in terms of the sort of thing that can be empirical.

31. I have talked so far about the unreality of the things we think real. I want to speak with equal emphasis about the reality of things we think unreal, such as phantoms and hallucinations. Phantoms and hallucinations, considered in themselves, are, as I explained in the preceding lectures, on exactly the same level as ordinary sense-data. They differ from ordinary sense-data only in the fact that they do not have the usual correlations with other things. In themselves they have the same reality as ordinary sense-data. They have the most complete and absolute and perfect reality that anything can have. They are part of the ultimate constituents of the world,

Just as the fleeting sense-data are.
32. The things that we call real, like tables and chairs, are systems, series of classes of particulars, and the particulars are the real things, the particulars being sense-data when they happen to be given to you. A table or a chair will be a series of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction. Those particulars will be on the same level of reality as a hallucination or a phantom. I ought to explain in what sense a chair is a series of classes. A chair presents at each moment a number of difference appearances. All the appearances that it is presenting at a given moment make up a certain class. All those sets of appearances vary from time to time.
33. So you get a series in time of different sets of appearances, and that is what I mean by saying that a chair is a series of classes. That explanation is too crude, but I leave out the niceties, as that is not the actual topic I am dealing with. Now each single particular which is part of this whole system is linked up with the others in the system. Supposing, e.g. I take as my particular the appearance which that chais is presenting to me at this moment. That is linked up first of all with the appearance which the same chair is presenting to any one of you at the same moment, and with the appearance which it is going to present to me at later moments. There you get at once two journeys that you can take away from that particular, and that particular will be correlated in certain definite ways with the other particulars which also belong to that chair. That is what you mean by saying--or what you ought to mean by

saying--that what I see before me is a real thing as opposed to a phantom. It means that it has a whole set of correlations of different kinds. It means that that particular, which is the appearance of the chair to me at this moment, is not isolated by is connected in a certain well-known familiar fashion with others, in the sort of way that makes it answer one's expectations. And so, when you go and buy a chair, you but not only the appearance which it presents to you at that moment, but also those other appearances that it is going to present when it gets home. It it were a phantom chair, it would not present any appearances when it got home, and would not be the sort of thing you would want to buy. The sort one calls real is one of a whole correlated system, whereas the sort you call hallucinations are not. The respectable particulars in the world are all of them linked up with other particulars in respectable , convational ways. Then sometimes you get a wild particular, like a merely visual chair that you cannot sit on, and say it is a phantom, a hallucination, you exhaust all the vocabulary of abuse upon it. That is what one means by calling it unreal.

34 The argument about emphatic particulars is so delicate and so subtle that I cannot feel quite sure whether it is a valid one or not, and I think the longer one pursues philosophy, the more conscious one becomes how extremely often one has been taken in by fallacies, and the less willing one is to be quite sure that an argument is valid if there is anything about it that is at all subtle or elusive, at all difficult to grasp. That makes me a little cautious and doubtful

about all these arguments, and therefore although I am quite sure that the question of the truth or falsehood of neutral monism is not to be solved except by these means, yet I do not profess to know whether neutral monism is true or is not.

35. CHAS. MERCIER. It would be profitless for me to follow Miss. Wrinch point by point; for the difference between us is fundamental, and no discussion could diminish it. She regards causation, or causality, as she prefers to call it, from the standpoint of philosophy, as a matter of words, or at the utmost of thoughts, for philosophers to wrangle over. I look upon it from the standpoint of science, as a matter of actual occurrences in the world of experience, occurrences whose nature is to be explained, whose occurrence is to be investigated, identified, and accounted for. I assume that it is a thing or event that actually happens in the world of experience, occurrences whose nature is to be explained, whose occurrence is to be investigated, identified, and accounted for. I assume that it is a thing or event that actually happens in the world of experience. Miss Wrinch follows professor Pearson and Mr. Bertrand Russell in assuming that it is a word that can be banished from philosophical discussion, and will then cease to exist. There can be no reconciliation between these two attitudes of mind--I apologize for this expression, which Miss Wrinch objects to but which will, I think, be generally understood. If I were to traverse her criticisms, I should be belabouring what seems to me to be shadows, and entering upon a profitless verbal wrangle. I trust Miss Wrinch will not think me discourt-

eous if I say that, living as I do in a world of realities, I have something better to do.

36. DOROTHY WRINCH. My attitude was merely that of impartial inquiry When he critizes the work of great thinkers in a way which seems to me to miss all the important points, it is, I feel, time to lodge a protest. But I am at a loss to understand how this can enable Dr. Mercier to deduce anything about my own opinions--or how they are relevant to the discussion. If my view is of any interest to him--and I could never have guessed that that it would be--I may say that the questions which Mr. Russell has discussed in his work on causation do not seem to me to be shadowy, neither do they seem to me to turn on verbal points. All the criticisms which I have made remain unanswered. In particular it is to be regretted that Dr. Mercier has not seen fit to deal with the points I brought up in connection with modern logical theory, which seems to me to be of vital importance in such subjects as causation and belief. A general and wholesale condemnation of philosophers seems hardly the best way to meet criticism.

37. J.C. BUSHNELL. This was the dominant theory of truth quite naturally during the centuries when, the means of knowledge being limited and monopolized by the few, the masses of the people were like children under the tutelage of their autocratic rulers. The masses have largely outgrown despotic tutelage. The democratic revolution has brought, as its very heart, a thought-revolution as sweeping as that of the Copernican theory of the solar system. It is therefore no accident, in this day when the citizen is becoming the sovereign, that truth as an autocrat is being replaced by truth as a servant.

38. JOSHUA C. GREGORY. It has often been supposed that we attain to the notion of cause by observing series of events that conform to a regular sequence. Thirst disappears after drinking and, since drinking must precede the disappearance of thirst, we think of the drinking as cause and the disappearance of thirst as effect. Hume thought that causes and their effects appear to us to be linked by a necessity beause we notice that they constantly occur in succession. When B happens after A has happened and B never takes place without the previous occurrence of A, the belief naturally arises, Hume argued, that A produces B--that there is a necessary causal connection between A and B. The primitive conception of transformation as metamorphosis constrained by a magical force recognizes, however, a tie between cause and effect without recognizing the necessity or even the existence, of uniform sequence. The notion of a tie between causes and their effects is the essential element in the concept of causality. A uniform sequence, as of day and night, may be repeated ad nauseam without coming under the adjective "causal."

39. Uniform sequences need not be causal and causal connections need not be repeated--it is possible to think of repetitions as uncaused and it is quite possible to recognize that one event may cause another on its one and only occurrence in the universe.

One trend of modern thought threatens a curious fate for Hume's argument. Hume argued that uniformity or regularity of succession imposes upon us the notion of necessary connection or causation. Many thinkers now suppose that science is relieved by the existence of uniformities from the necessity of believing in causes. Science, according to their view, has merely to

describe the uniformities that occur and formulate their rules. The universe has certain regular habits. Hume's argument that we deduce from regularity to cause is replaced by the notion that regularity only requires a formula or merely a description of the regularities observed.

40. Two dominant conceptions concerning all transformations and happenings separate the primitive from the modern mind. The primitive mind is dominated by the notion of metamorphosis--by the belief in the operation of magical forces that are unrestricted by causal paths. Magical petency converts life into death, seed into plant, or draws the fire from the stick. Experience slowly but surely replaces the principle of metamorphosis by the principle of orderly passage or development, as causal sequences come to light and force on the mind the recognition that causal action has sequences prescribed for it.

41. PHILIP E.B. JOURDAIN. It has been my intention to depreciate religion simply because of its very sparing use of logical deduction and overwhelming number of indefinables and indemonstrables. There seems, indeed, some ground for objection to the admission of primitive ideas and propositions which seem to be partly arbitrary and partly based on very slender evidence--the report for example, derived from unknown sources, that somebody else alleged such and such a thing to have happened, other evidence for the happening of the thing being somewhat conspicuously absent.

42. It is a matter for wonder and thankfulness that such ideals exist, even if a pri-

mitive credulity and hankering after magic seems always to accompany them at first. This is by no means the case with religions alone.

43. J.E. TURNER. The philosophy of the ultimate nature of time and space determines, to a greater or less degree, the entire conception of world-order.

44. The use of "object" here may be thought again to presuppose the issue; but it is used in the sense in which everything without exception which can in any way be brought before consciousness, is thereupon an "object" for consciousness.

45 The spatial image produced in perception, according to Lotze, consists "in a number of excitations of nervous points"; and the question thus thus arises. "How this fact of nervous excitation becomes an object of knowledge for the soul." But, surely, this is a radical imsstatement of the real facts of perception. Each spatial image is certainly connected in some way with excitations of nervous points; but the image is not these excitations. The nervous processes themselves are imperceptible molecular motions, which never appear in perception at all, whereas the spatial image has form and colour and is in perception. Lotze has here plainly confused the nervous changes which are conceived by science, with the actual image perceived by means of the eye; and vision in itself has little to do with making nerve excitations "an object of knowledge". That is the work of physiology and has nothing to do with vision as such.

Lotze next conceives these excitations are undergoing "the transition to conscious-

ness"; and since consciousness is non-spatial their character must now be dispensed with, and so "the continuation of the process consists...in the production of an idea--the idea of space....From this non-spatial material the soul has to re-create entirely afresh the spatial image that has disappeared"; and this it does "for unknown reasons."

46 A.J. SCHNEEWEISS. If we ask why it is that we apparently live in a world which endures in time, changes and develops, there is no answer. Or we may say, suppose you are right in showing that a rational analysis of experience leads to a conception of a static and timeless Absolute, it is still your business to show, why we should have this world of appearance, and, furthermore, what really is the relation between these two worlds. To that--if we take Mr. F.H. Bradley as their spokesman--the answer would be, we do not know, all we can say is that it is so, and the rest is a mystery.

The absurd contradictions which the analysis of time and development leads to, forces the speculative philosophers to the conception that time and development are only illusory. The best illustration of that we find in Mr. Bradley's book APPEARANCE AND REALITY, in which he employes "Zeno's method" to prove his conclusions. He finds that the concept of continuity in the principle of causality involves empty space between the cause and effect, and also that the concept of causation leads us into infinite regress; furthermore, the fact that we arbitrarily select the cause of an event from plurality of conditions leads him to suppose that the concept of causation

is only an appearance and not a reality.
47. The world which we know, the world which we experience, the world in which causality is real, is an illusion, and after all the real world remains timeless and perfect.
48. Our postulate is illegitimate and false, and furthermore, as a postulate for scientific logic, unnecessary.

Now let us examine the concept of teleology in speculative philosophy. If the universe is an absolutely perfect organic unity, changeless, timeless, in which there is always a perfect equilibrium, how can we speak of the world in teleogogical terms? The absolutist says we cannot. The universe as a whole is not teleological, teleology holds true only of the world of appearance. It is true they say that teleology is a higher concept or is of a higher order than the concept of causality, but nevertheless teleology does not pertain of the Absolute because teleology is a sub-form of individuality while the Absolute is not a self, because a self presupposes a not-self, says Bradley. Consequently selfhood or personality is an appearance.

49. H.H. WILLIAMS. Prof. Russell's infinite is not impressive. 2/7 involves a series, 285714, 285714, 285714. This is a series that repeats itself in six terms. That is, the process of dividing tow by seven cannot be conpleted. As far as we go in the dividing, the results are clear, exact, correct, and definite. Manifestly 2/7 is not infinite. It is less than one. The dividing is not infinite. It is simple, clear and correct. The series is a six-term series. It is different from a one-term series. The six terms are not infinite. They are old friends, quite finite. And two or several of them will

will not be infinite. The mystery lies in the repetition. If one insists that a fraction of 1 is infinite, I know of no mode of stopping him. But this much is clear. Before we can proceed satisfactorily, we must agree upon our term. What are we to understand by infinite?

. Infinite is one of a verbal trinity used to designate reality. Reality is infinite, absolute, universal. These words mark different functions of reality and have been uncovered by separate lines of intelligent activity. As I understand, we owe the knowledge that reality is infinite to mathematics. Mathematics is the "look-out" on the bridge. It reports the infinite in the offing. It tells us nothing of the crew, the cargo, or the history of the craft. What is the content of the word infinite? What does it tells us of reality?

50. The space on one side of the moving point is exactly like the space on the other side. We do not stop the space, but the moving body. That is, we have in space a case where the moment of negation is absorbed. Space is not affected by change, by ends, or differences.

51. When the moment of negation ceases as difference, we get beyond the finite. We have the infinite. Space uncovers this function of reality. It was the merit of the geometricians to get this vision. It was a master vision and has brought wide service to man and mathematics. The infinite is not any definite space, but space as not affected by interruption. Space does not absorb the interruption. It maintains itself beyond the reach of interruption. That is, as Hegel would say, space negates the moment of negation. The interruptions remain to carry on their business.

Hence to set up the infinite as full reality is to practise idolatry. What we wish is an infinite that not only resists change but absorbs all change. An infinite in which change is a moment of itself, ceases to be in any sense different. Here we uncover the basis for the true and the false infinite.

52. Let us return to our example, 2/7. This is called an infinite series. The 2/7 is manifestly not infinite. It is dependent upon one and is less than one. The division is not infinite. It is finite, clear, correct. We get 285714, 285714, and so on as long as our patience and industry sustain us. It is a six-term series. If we take 4/14, we have the same situation. The mystery is not the 2/7, nor the division. It is rather that which the division cannot reach. Try as we may, it eludes us. That is, it is not affected by the process. It lures the process of dividion, and yet is utterly beyond it. It maintains itself permanently beyond the process. To this extent the process is negated. But the process of division is not absorbed. The two stand over against each other. We reach this conclusion. The 2/7 are not infinite; the six terms are not infinite; yet the infinite is present compelling the repetition, yet remaining beyond its reach. The case is this way; Reality is infinite. The humble fradtion, 2/7 shoes the infinite. This discovery we owe to mathematics. This is a high service to philosophy. Philosophers are appreciative and publicly give thanks.

53 Philosophy has a task of its own. Philosophy is not ungrateful to mathematics. But it regards the work of mathematics as quite preliminary, hardly more than that of Columbus, as far as its own problem is concerned.

54 It is not the case that Monism is the offshoot of mysticism, a disease of thought reverting to a savage ancestry, but rather that mysticism owes much more to philosophy than philosophy can ever owe to it.

55 The treatment of certain religious expe-
rinces in the light ofmodern knowledge of abnormal psychology seems to be a step in the direction of a healthier point of view with regard to mysticism and the various problems involved.

56 It is explained that in the idealistic philosophy, formal logic could not cope with mathematical deductions, and so idealists condemned mathematics. It is indeed stated that all idealims, constructive or destructive, are based on the ultimate inability of mathematics to defend its own position. In the course of her defense of idealism our author has therefore to show that even now no satisfactory account can be given of infinity and continuity and the various conceptions with which mathematics deals.

57 Our author suggest the kind of way in which Cantor, Russell, and Whitehead maintain that space and time are no longer internally refutable. To appreciate the cogency of such arguments, arguments which do in fact establish the thesis that space and time are not internally refutable, some slight knowledge of the modern theory of series is needed, and this is not given in the discussion: the result is that the man in the street is puzzled and the logician unsatisfied.

58 It is amusing to see the extraordinary and paradoxical conclusions at which philosophers can arrive when they try to meet mathematical subjects --wheich have of course a method of their own, adequate to deal with them --with themethods of the idealistic school.

Who would attempt to boil potatoes with the help of knowledge of Greek or attach the problems of sociaology with the apparatus of chemistry? Why then treat the technical developments of modern mathematical logic with the all embracing intuitions of the idealists.

SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON PHILOSOPHISES. by C.E.M.JOAD in SPECTATOR".. Review of Sir. A.E's THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE." Sir Eddington's new book--a reprint of the Tarner lectures delivered at Cambrindge last spring--is concerned with the nature of our knowledge of the world which physics studies. Of what spirit Sir Arthur asks is this knowledge? What is the degree of its subjectivity and what is its relation to every forms of knowledge? The subject os one of quite peculiar difficulty. The view which is most generally accepted among physicists is according to Sir.Arthur that physical science is "concerned with the rational co-relation of experience rather than with the discovery of fragments of absolute truth." Sir Arthur agrees and maintains that knowledge obtained by physics is "a structural knowledge of the sensation in consciousness." So far so good; but whatever they believe in theory all physicists in practice refuse to treat physics as if it were an account of the co-relation of their experience and do treat it as if it were an account of the objective world. Sir Arthur pertinently suggests that if they really believe that physics dealt with personal experience they ought to employ terms fit to describe experience and not such as are suitable to a description of the movements of matter. Physics in other words, if taken seriously ought to be regarded as a branch of psychology and pursued by the methods of psychology.

Very possibly: But if this is true of physics is it not also true of the leading sciences; for example of Astronomy? Suppose, to take an instance, given by Sir Arthur that we were to discover unmistakable signs of life on another planet; would not such a discovery by properly described of as a fragment of absolute truth about the universe? Presumably it would. But why then one wonders, should the subject matter and aim of astronomy by so totally different from the subject matter and aim of physics. After all the methods of the two sciences are not so very different--one obtains astronomical data by looking through a telescope, physical data by looking through a microscope---and there must, one supposes, be bonds at which they overlap.

At this point a further question suggests itself. What account are we to give of the familiar world of everyday life? The structure of physical science has been built as the result of a very closer and more intensive examination of the matter of which common objects are composed. Now, if Sir Arthur *qua* physicist finds that chairs and tables are really composed of atoms and electrons and if *qua* philosopher he decides that statements about atoms and electrons are really about co-relations of our experience ought he not *qua* consistent thinker to conclude that statements about chairs and tables are also statements about co-relations of our experience? At times he seems inclined to accept such a conclusion---for example when he denounces the commonsense assumption that "sensation makes us aware of something in the external world --something different from the sensation itself because it is non-mental." At other

times, however he seems to be inclined to the view that the physical universe is not wholly subjective; its laws are subjective but its substance, he maintains, is objective. When he appears to adopt this view--and it is, I think, his dominant one---the philosopher with whom Eddington has most affinity is not Berkeley but Kant. Thus his general attitude which he denominates "selective subjectivism" is introduced by an ingenious similie which likens a procedure of the physicist to that of a man who casting his net into the waters observes that none of the sea creatures that he brings up is less than two inches long. If he were then to conclude that "no sea creature is less than two inches long" he would be making the obvious mistake of confusing statements about the nature of fishes with statements about the nature of nets or rather about the nature of the particular net which he happened to be using. In other words he would be making a mistake of thinkin g that a statement about the necessary condition of his experience was about the nature of things in general. Sir Arthur concludes that the world of physics is only a selection from the objective world, a selection determined "by the sensory and intellectual equipment which is our means of acquiring observational knowledge."

Two questions suggest themselves. First one wonders again why if this is true of the world of physics it is not also true of the world of commonsense; and if the answer is that it is true of the commonsense world what is the principle whereby the two worlds are distinguished from each other? Are not both of them products of selections made by the same "sensory and intellectual equipment?" If so, why are there

two selections? Secondly if the world of physics is subjectively selected from the objective world of physics how are we to know that it is, unless we know that there is in fact an objective world of physics to be selected from? But how can we know that there is such an objective world if (a) all our knowledge is of a world subjectively selected and (b) if physical knowledge is knowledge of the corelation of our own experience?

These questions are the expression not so much as a critical spirit in the reviewer as to the recognition of the extreme difficulty of the subject matter with which Eddington's book is concerned. It is perhaps inevitable that a philosopher should wonder whether any useful purpose is served when eminent physicists write philosophy. Sir Arthur justifies his incursion by claiming (1) that the philosophy of science is unlike philosophy as a whole capable of progress and that his present system is an advance on every other; and that the Philosophy of Science gives a "very effective contribution to the physical outlook as a whole." I should, however take leave to doubt whether the present book affords convincing evidence in justification of these claims.

"MIND" July 37. J. LAIRD "THINGS AND APPEARANCES". 1. According to Mr. Paton "the concept of appearance itself implies some correlative which is not an appearance. An appearance is nothing in itself; it must be an appearance to something and an appearance of something. The latter point is the one which Kant is especially concerned. The very word appearance implies a reference to "something" in itself, that is, to an object independent of our sensibility.

2. If an "appearance" is what is here described as being, it must be regarded as a technical term with a highly specialised connotation.

3. If the truth be, as I believe it is, that there is nothing intrinsic to any apparition that distinguishes clearly and finally between its illusory and its non-illusory appearance, then we are never entitled to say for certain that any particular appearance is "given" in the absolute sense that is required. We are not entitled to say it of Hume's "impressions", for Hume admits parenthetically that the phenomena of dreams, madness or fever may cheat us if we do. We are not entitled to say it of a sensum-theory of perception, unless we are prepared to admit dream-sensa, memory-data, etc., among the "sensa" on which our theory of perception is based. We are not entitled to say it of any theory which relies upon future verification in sense-experience, unless this theory can distinguish clearly between an illusory and a non-illusory verification of this kind. But we are also not entitled to say it of Kant's theory.

I think that most people who are not theory-

ridden would admit that our trust in sensation as a witness to "reality" is principally based upon waking sensations, and in these not absolutely but with some reserve. If so, a vigilant (and on occasion a critical) attitude towards sensation is presupposed; and it is commonly believed that young children have to acquire this critical attitude, and that the "imaginative" stage of their development would be more accurately described if it were called uncritical with respect to "reality."

4. Kant's argument that it would be "ludicrous that there should be an appearance without something which appears."

5. "Things as they are in themselves", Mr. Paton says in one of his many statements of this characteristically Kantian position, "are the very same things that appear to us, although they appear to us, and because of our powers of knowing must appear to us, as different from what they are in themselves."

6. Naive realism, as it is called, succumbs to a bombardment of factual difficulties but is not in itself nonsensical.

7. Spatiality and temporality seem to suffuse our sensa so radically and so intimately that if they were stripped away in thought it would be immensely difficult to hold that things-in-themselves, thus stripped, would not be very different indeed from sense-appearances.

8. We know the thing only as it appears to us, or as it is in relation to our minds; and consequently we do not know whether we can rightly speak of it as 'existing' or 'possessing characteristics' since for us these terms must imply a reference to time and space."

9. "If we can determine the nature of space and time independently of experience" he says,

"and thereby legislate for all possible objects of experience, this can only be (according to Kant) because space and time are due to the nature of our sensibility. No other explanation can account for the fact that our abstract knowledge of space and time possesses apodeictic certainty and also applies to all objects of experience. Kant's theory is not merely possible or probable. It claims to be absolutely certain."

10. One of Kant's major contentions is that, for human beings, all that is given is sensed and all that is sensed is given. Hence he inferred that a real logic, that is to say a logic that can do business with actuality, must be a kind of sensitised intellectuality or logicised sensitivity. The function of such a logic is to universalise and to necessify what is given in sense and therefore real. This argument, therefore, is based upon the exclusive givenness of sense in human experience, and upon the consequent restriction of "real" logic.

11. Kant professed empirical realism, and repudiated empirical idealism, because he mistakenly supposed that an empirical idealist such as Berkeley had no answer to the criticism that empirical idealism reduced waking life to dream life. That, in fact, as Mr. Paton would admit, was the very first of the objections that Berkeley clearly saw and vigorously answered. He may not have been wholly successful, but his answer to say the least, was a better attempt to distinguish between "real" and illusory sense-ideas than Kant's simple assertion that for him the given in sensibility was an "appearance" (technical) of T. For

Berkely's argument was reasoned and was not a naked dogma. For the rest Kant's Refutation of Idealism is an attempt to prove that the spatial appearance of our apparent world is a perfectly genuine and unimputed feature of that appearance. But this supplementary argument would not even distinguish dream from waking, since dream-castles look as spatial as Balmoral.

12. Berkely claimed the privilege of "thinking with the learned and speaking with the vulgar."

13. Kant believed "not that we have ideas to which the world and the self correspond, but that the phenomenal world and self are directly present to our minds through thought and sense". In the second of these statements the word "idea" must surely be used in a sense that Kant does not always disown, and the word "directly" in both statements puts a strain upon the wrinkles of one's forehead. What is it except a curious rendering of our odd old acquaintance the "given" mysterious, enigmatic and, one might almost say, Charismatic? The most that could be "directly present to our minds", according to the critical philosophy, would be an epistemological object and not a thing. And vulgar speech refers to things. Kant may and does speak (sometimes) with vulgar realists; but he also unthinks what they say.

14. It would have been competent for him to try to restore the plain man's world, or even the naive realism that philosophers suppose to be the plain person's belief. This tender affection for "common sense", however, seems to have been more characteristic of Berkeley than of Kant.

15. B. VON JUHOS."PRINCIPLES OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. Logical criticism of philosophical

realism has led to a gradual development of certain points of view, whose relationships to another may be characterised in the following way. It is characteristic of Metaphysical Realism that it distinguishes two or even more "realities". "Appearance and Reality" are perhaps the most appropriate terms we can employ to denote this distinction. The "world of appearance", the world of the senses, is also "real"; only we attribute to it transitoriness, changeableness, subjective dependence, etc., properties which ought not to be ascribed to the properly "real", unchangeable world, the Dinge an sich.

16. The Physicalists are of the opinion that as soon as we speak of language and its statements as opposed to facts and reality, we can easily misled by this mode of expression, into constructing metaphysical pseudo-problems. This can be shown, for instance, in the following example. If statements are compared with reality in order to test their veracity, the individual can only do this by means of "his own reality", i.e. only through his own experiences. Then, however, an intersubjective verification is impossible and the statements in question are unintelligible to others, and consequently, empirical science, which is comprehensible to all, would be an impossibility. Therefore it is necessary to reform the above-mentioned mode of expression, to speak only of language, but not of a "reality" as opposed to language.

17. From Newton's point of view, reality is composed of masses, which are to be found in certain localities, and possess definite impulses. According to Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, it does not make sense to

to speak of the existence of such "realities" in regard to micro-processes. Consequently, when the attempt is made to correlate language and reality, one is forced to speak of many "realities" or of a "true" and a "seeming" or "less true" reality--in short, to use expressions which are entirely metaphysical.

18. A.C. EWING."MEANINGLESSNESS" In this article I intend to examine the conditions under which a sentence may be said to be meaningless. I have been stimulated to do so by a belief that present-day thinkers are often far too ready to dismiss a philosophical statement as meaningless, and particularly by my opposition to the theory that the meaning of all statements is to be analysed solely in terms of verification by sense-experience.

19. I shall first take the extremer form of the theory, according to which a statement is said to be verifiable, and therefore to have meaning, if and only if its truth could be conclusively established by sense-experience. "Sense-experience" is used to include (a) sense-perception, (b) introspection of images and emotions. Positivists would not usually admit that the occurrence of "mental acts" could be verified by experience, and would presumably have either to regard these as logical constructions out of sense-data and images, or deny their existence altogether. Still less would the term cover apprehension of "non-natural" properties or relations. Now I should have thought the first duty of any advocate of a verification theory of meaning would be to inquire how his theory itself was to be verified, and I propose to be a good positivist in this one case at least and put

the question myself. How could we verify the statement that all meaningful statements are verifiable?

20. It does sometimes happen that philosophers are led through verbal confusions into making statements which are meaningless. What I do refuse to admit is that all statements which cannot be established or refuted by sense-experience are meaningless. The asking of these questions may help us to get rid of some metaphysics, but not of all metaphysics. The great majority of metaphysical statements that have been made by philosophers in the past are, I think, false or ungrounded, but not meaningless. A few are true or near the truth.

This rejection of metaphysics comes from the unwarranted narrowing down of "justification" to "justification by sense-experience."

21. H.J. PATON."KANT'S SO-CALLED COPERNICAN REVOLUTION." Kant begins his preface in the second edition with a contrast between the sure path of science and a mere groping about. In so doing he is concerned with those cognitions which belong to the province of reason. Of these he considers logic to have followed from earliest times the sure path; and its success he ascribes to its limitation, to the fact that it abstracts from the differences in objects and considers only the form of thought. Where reason has to do with objects, as in the sciences proper, its task is bound to be more difficult.

So far as reason is present in the sciences there must be xomething in them which is known a priori; and this pure part, whether great or small, ought to be examined separately. The two theoretical sciences with

which Kant is here concerned are mathematics and physics, the former being entirely pure, while the latter contains both pure and empirical elements.

The early history of mathematics is obscure, but in the time of the Greeks it ceased to be a mere groping about and entered upon the sure path of science. It must have done so with difficulty, since reason is not here concerned, as it is in logic, merely with itself. The transformation must have involved a revolution, a revolution in our way of thinking.

22. The essence of this revolution is that the mind is not concerned merely with the empirical object or with the concept derived from empirical objects by attraction: it is concerned with its own act of construction, with what it puts into the figure in accordance with the concept. Our a priori knowledge in mathematics arises from the mind's cognisance of its own operations.

23. The examples of mathematics and physics, which have become what they are by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to make us reflect upon the essential character of this transformation in their way of thinking.

24. Kant therefore suggests we should at least try whether we might not be more successful if we assumed instead that objects must adjust themselves, or conform, to our knowledge.

25. At this point the first reference to Copernicus is introduced. Kant's suggestion is on precisely the same footing as the first thought of Copernicus. After Copernicus was unable to make satisfactory progress with the explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies when he assumed that the whole army of

stars revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not succeed better by making the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest. And Kant adds that in metaphysics we can make a similar experiment.

26. The new method was of the same kind, the method of attending to what the mind puts into its objects. It seems to me as clear as day that Kant here is looking for a comparison which will illustrate his central thesis, and in so doing he is singularly successful.

SOME POST-KANTIAN PROOFS FOR THE REALITY OF GOD: by S.S. RAGHAVACHAR. in Prabuddha Bharata.

1. "Kant" observes Bertrand Russell, "undoubtedly deserves credit for having made evident the philosophical importance of the theory of knowledge." Chiefly owing to his labours Epistemology secured its legitimate position in philosophic systems. The centre of gravity, from his time onwards, shifted from ontological speculation to logical and Epistemological analysis. Kant has made us aware of the first principles of knowledge; and the fundamentals of philosophic thought are less liable to be ignored now than in pre-Kantian speculations.

If this is his positive contribution to the general evolution of philosophy, Kant is more emphatically remembered for his powerful negations of the deep-rooted traditions of the preceding philosophies. Nothing received a ruder shock and a more final rejection from him than the traditional proofs for the existence of God. Theological safety built on such sure foundations was lost and any thing

like a rational affirmation of a supreme being became a definite self-contradiction. Pure reason and conviction in the being of Divine Power assumed a sharply antithetical character.

But in post-Kantian idealism attempts are made to construct theories of a divine principle. Many of these theories hâve their origin in Epistemological doctrines themselves. They accept the supreme function alloted to Epistemology by Kant and find the idea of a cosmic power necessary for the theories of knowledge they develop.

2. An absolutely extra-mental order of existence cannot possess any kind of self-identity which is the characteristic gift of intelligence. In the fine language of Bosanquet this is the "driving force of idealism." A system without unity is a self-contradiction. Therefore no category that is sub-spiritual can constitute the essential nature of the infinite whole.

It cannot be a finite mind either, for a finite mind is one among the other finite minds and so requires a larger system to depend upon. The rejection by the Absolutists of the claim of the concept of personality to the ultimate has the same ground. Personality, in the common acceptation of the term, stands for finite individuality. Hegelian thought distinguishes itself carefully from Solipsism. The lowest extreme of Solipsism is what is known as the Solipsism of the moment. This exhibits exactly the same weakness as the theory of Reality as non-mental, because it sticks to a particular perishing existence as the ultimate and excludes the reign of unity necessary to the system.

THE LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE. by RUDOLF CARNAP. (1) The logical analysis of philosophical problems shows them to vary greatly in character. As regards those object-questions whose objects do not occur in the exact sciences, critical analysis has revealed that they are pseudo-problems. The supposititious sentences of metaphysics, of the philosophy of values, of ethics (in so far as it is treated as a normative discipline and not as a psychological investigation of facts) are pseudo-sentences; they have no logical content, but are only expressions of feeling which in their turn stimulate feelings and volitional tendencies on the part of the hearer.

2. Even the supposititious object-questions are logical questions in a misleading guise. The supposed peculiarly philosophical point of view from which the objects of science are to be investigated proves to be illusory, just as, previously, the supposed peculiarly philosophical realm of objects proper to metaphysics disappeared under analysis. Apart from the questions of the individual sciences, only the questions of the logical analysis of science, of its sentences, terms, concepts theories, etc. are left as genuine scientific questions. We shall call this complex of questions the logic of science.

3. According to this view, then, once philosophy is purified of all unscientific elements, only the logic of science remains. In the majority of philosophical investigations, however, a sharp division into scientific and unscientific elements is quite impossible. For this reason we prefer to say: the logic of science takes the place of the inextri-

cable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy.

4. The problems of traditional epistemology, are always permeated by pseudo-concepts and pseudo-questions, and frequently in such a way that their disentanglement is impossible.

5. He has shown that the so-called sentences of metaphysics and of ethics are pseudo-sentences. According to him philosophy is "critique of language", its business is "the logical clarification of ideas", of the sentences and concepts of science (natural science).

6. Wittgenstein's second negative thesis states that the logic of science ("philosophy") cannot be formulated. Consistently Wittgenstein applies this view to his own work also; at the end he says: "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out of them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

7. The habit of formulating in the material code of speech causes us, in the first place, to deceive ourselves about the objects of our own investigations: pseudo-object-sentences mislead us into thinking that we are dealing with extra-linguistic objects such as numbers, things, properties, experiences, states of affairs, space, time, and so on; and the fact that, in reality, it is a case of language and its connections.

8. Universal words very easily lead to pseudo-problems; they appear to designate kinds of objects, and thus make it natural to ask ques-

tions concerning the nature of objects of those kinds. For instance, philosophers from antiquity to the present day have associated with the universal word "number" certain psuedo-problems which have led to the most obstruse inquiries and controversies. It has been asked, for example, whether numbers are real or ideal objects, whether they are extra-mental or only exist in the mind, whether they are the creation of thought or independent of it, whether they are potential or actual, whether real or fictitious.

9. All pseudo-questions of this kind disappear if the formal instead of the material mode of speech is used, that is, if in the formulation of questions, instead of universal words (such as 'number, 'space' 'universal'), we employ the corresponding syntactical words ('numerical expression', 'space-co-ordinate', 'predicate', etc.).

10. If the material mode of speech is employed in relation to the psychological language (by the use, for instance, of universal words like 'the psychical', 'psyche', 'psychical process', 'mental process', 'act', 'experience', 'content of experience', 'intentional object' and so on) and if, in the same investigation, it is also used in relation to the physical language (either the everyday language or the scientific language), hopeless confusion frequently ensues.

11. Even where no contradictions or ambiguities occur, the use of the material mode of speech has the disadvantage of leading easily to self-deception as regards the object under discussion: one believes that one is investigating certain objects and facts, whereas one is, in reality, investigating their designations, i.e. words and sentences.

12. The material mode of speech is not in itself erroneous; it only readily lends itself to wrong use. But if suitable definitions and rules for the material mode of speech are laid down and systematically applied, no obscurities or contradictions arise.

13. Especially when important conclusions or philosophical problems are to be based on sentences of the material mode of speech, it is wise to make sure of their freedom from ambiguity by translating them into the formal mode.

14. Here is an example:

Material mode of speech	Formal mode of speech.
Philosophical questions are sometimes concerned with objects which don't occur in the object-domain of the empirical sciences. For example: the thing-in-itself, the transcendental, & the like.	In philosophical questions expressions sometimes occur which do not occur in the languages of the sciences; for example, the expressions: "thing-in-itself" "the transcendental", etc.

15. Translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the touchstone for all philosophical sentences, or, more generally, for all sentences which do not belong to the language of any one of the empirical sciences. In investigating translatability, the ordinary use of language and the definitions which may have been given by the author must be taken into consideration. In order to find a translation, we attempt to use, wherever a universal word occurs (such as 'number' or 'property') the corresponding syntactical expression (such as 'numerical expression' or 'property-word', respectively).

able, is still confined to a small group of specialists. And beyond its narrow limits the old prejudices still prevail, and it is still widely believed that Indian and Egyptian antiquities are really no better that curiosities. India, in fact, "suffers to-day in the estimation of the world."

2. The term Upanisad is derived from the root sad with the prefix ni (to sit near); and it originally meant according to Max Muller, the act of sitting down near to a teacher and of submissively listening to him. According to Deussen it means "Secret instruction." There are passages in the Upanisads which clearly show that the word is really used in this sense. Max Muller also accepts this meaning. Sankara, however, derives the word from the root word sad (to destroy) and holds that it is so called because it destroys ignorance and imparts to the reader the right knowledge.

3. The Gita bears the tile of Upanisad and its commentators have all unanimously upheld its claim to that title in the wider sense of the term. It is indeed almost universally regarded in India as containing the very essence of the teachings of the Upanisads. "The Upanisads are the cows" says the Vaisnaviya Tantrasara "the cowherd's son, Srikrishna is the milkman, Partha is the calf, and the nectar-like Gita is the excellent milk."

4. The Buddhists, on the other hand, denied the reality of both self and not-self, and resolved all existents into unconnected moments of consciousness.

5. Sankara, in his interpretation of the Vedanta and the formulation of the theory of

Illusion, Maya, was immensely influenced by the teachings of Gaudapada, and he has actually borrowed almost all the similes and metaphors used in his exposition of the Illusion theory from Gaudapada.

6. The world of plurality, we are told, is like the objects experienced in a dream. The latter last as long as the dream lasts. The world of experience, likewise lasts as long as Ignorance lasts. And, as soon as the individual is roused from ignorance and realises his identity with the Absolute, the world of plurality vanishes, as dream-objects vanish on the return of consciousness. Both Gaudapada and Sankara have compared the manifold of experience sometimes with dream objects, sometimes with fictitious magical appearances, and again sometimes with such other kinds of optical illusions as mirage and the like. Brahman, which alone is real, appears to be broken up into fictituous appearances of a world of plurality.

7. "The dawn of true knowledge procures freedom from this bondage of Ignorance; and the dream of the world of plurality, of action and change, of generation and death, forwith vanishes." This is Sankara's Unqualified Monism. The modern followers of Sankara, concious of his constant shifting of the ground, have necessarily been driven to maintain that Illusion possesses the two-fold property of veiling and distorting, and that it causes the individual to set a limit to its infinitude, and to regard himself as subject to change and vicissitudes, and at the same time makes the Reality itself appear as other than what it is, and split up into a world of fictituous finite existents.

8. A difficult system is always liable to misapprehension; and the more complicated it is

the greater to room for misinterpretation. And thological interests and prepossessions often only aggravate the difficulties of right understanding.

9. Vedantism has, in those estimates, been held by various thinkers to resemble the teachings of the Eleatics, Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Spinozism, Kantianism, as well as the systems of Fichte and Schopenhauer. Such comparisons do betray, to say the læast, a good deal of looseness and confusion of thought. These Western systems have, no doubt, several points of similarity amongst them, as well as with the Vedanta. But these points of similarity are more superficial than fundamental in any sense of the term. They lie on the surface whereas the differences among these various systems are radical and deep-seated. In fact, no two of the aforesaid systems can be treated as fundamentally alike.

10. Plato, has no doubt, endeavoured to bring into somewhat closer connection and harmony the world of Ideas and the world of experience but to use Adamson's words, "the effort is a failure." The ideas put outside of the particulars, serve neither to explain the existence of the particulars nor our knowledge of the same. Thus, with Plato, there is an inherent antithesis, an unbridgeable gulf, between the transcendent world of eternal and immutable ideas, and the world of change and generation. But with Spinoza, the world of change and generation, the Substance revealed in its multiplicity of modes, and viewed as an eternal process, is all in all, and constitutes the only Reality.

11. The Pure Being of Xenophanes and Parmenides, as totally devoid of all positive contents, is evidently an abstraction pure and simple. "It resembles the garment of the King"

in the fable, as Weber's puts it, "the finer texture of which everybody,"admired "until, at last, a little chind exclaimed in the simplicity of his heart: 'why, the king is naked." Instead of being the richest of the categories, Pure Being is, indeed, the lowest and the poorest of them all. Divorced of all positive contents, it is equivalent to empty nothing, mere vacuum and, as such, incapable of explaining even the least and smallest of the existents.

12. Spinoza's erroneous conception of Substance was the weakest point in his system. Substance is not a substratum. It is the essence or reality considered as a necessry principle of activity, as Weber puts it. It is a living and energising totality of its modes. But though a totality of its modes, it is not in any sense, a mere mechanical aggregate, as it is in Spinoza's system. It is a living totality, united with all its modes by an organic tie. It is the efficient and dynamical cause of its modes and not a cause in Spinoza's sense, and, as expressions of one identical Reality, the modes are but its effects or modifications. The Vedantic Brahman is such a Substance, and as the dynamical cause of its expressions, it is indissolubly bound up with, and immanent in, the effects; the effects also, as expressions of the self-same cause, are inseparable from it.

13. Vedantism is the synthesis of the two opposed systems of Platonism and Spinozism, and is, at the same time, widely different from each of them, taken by itself. Such a systhesis, Plotinus at Rome, Philo at Alexandria and Proclus in Syria, endeavoured to accomplish in Neo-Platonism; but they failed.

14. In Neo-Platonism, more particularly in the teachings of Plotinus, the Greek genius made its last serious attempt, to state clearly

the results of the ten centuries of reflection and to express its final conclusions concerning God, the world, and the human soul.

15. Schopenhauer, it is true, asserted that "the world is my idea" but he, like his master Kant, never denied its reality. He only distinguished between the world as it is in itself and as it appears to be. He, no doubt, regarded the phenomenal world as the product of the very constitution of the human mind, but nevertheless he held that it is the manifestation of a Reality which exists independently of all finite sentient and thinking beings. Though the world of phenomena is the produce of our intellectual organisation, there is still a higher Reality, an Absolute, a thing-in-itself, he tells us, which reveals itself to us through our sensibility. The sensations are received from without and come from a real cause existing independently of us; and the understanding refers them to an external cause conceived as existing apart from our bodies and acting in time.

16. "The world" says Schopenhauer "instead of being the 'best possible world', is the worst of all." All history, he adds, "is merely an interminable series of murders, robberies, intrigues and lies" and "the alleged human virtues...are nothing but refined egoism."

17. The Samkhya-Karika was translated into Chinese between 557 and 587 A.D. with Gaudapada's commentary on the same. The Indian tradition regards the Karika as a production of the 1st century B.C.

Gaudapada, the commentator on Samkhya-Karika has been confounded by scholars with his namesake, the teacher of Govinda, preceptor of Sankara, and author of the Karikas of

Mud. Up. The former must have lived about the 5th century A.D. and the latter about 200 years later. And this clearly explains Prof. Max Muller's reluectance to accept the information suppled by Mr. Beal about Gaudapada's commentary on the Sankhya-Karika as having been translated into Chinese before 582 A.D. "How is that possible" he asks, "without upsetting the little we know of the date of Gaudapada, the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Sankara, whose "literary career began, as is generally supposed about 788 A.D.? " But this apprehension is altogether groundless; for the two Gaudapadas are not identical.

18. The Yoga philosophy of Patanjali is only a semi-theistic presentation of the Samkhya system. The metaphysical basis of both the systems is the same. And the union of Yoga practices and belief in an extra-cosmic personal God with Samkhya doctrine was Patanjali's work. And, although subsequently Samkhya and other systems were re-examined more fully, he has not said anything more about the Yoga philosophy. It is, therefore, evident that, even in Badarayana's time, doctrines analogous to those of Patanjali's Yoga had existed, and that Yoga and Samkhya systems were metaphysically virtually alike as they are found to-day. And that was what led Badarayana to think that the refutation of the Samkhya system also amounted to that of Yoga. In the Vedanta Sutras, having first refuted the Samkhya doctrines, Badarayana has simply named the Yoga system and observed "Yoga is also refuted thereby."

19. Philosophical utterances, found in the pre-Upanisadic literature, gave a rude shock to the hymnal theology, with its rituals and ceremonials. But it continued to hold its sway upon popular imagination until the advent of the

Upanishads. And it was in the Upanisads themselves that the old and semi-animistic theories of the origin (and periodical dissolutions) of the universe were, for the first time, definitely and finally discarded, and the Cosmological problem was re-formulated in a strictly metaphysical form.

20. The Greek theory assumed the objects as independently of thought, and regarded the intellectual processes as entirely dependent upon the objects; at the most, it was the mission of the intellectual processes to reproduce these objects by way of copy, or allow themselves to be guided by them. Kant discovered that the objects of thought are none other than the products of thought itself.

21. All these are regulated by Reason (Prajnanetram); likewise declares Ait. Up III, 3, "rest in Reason (Prajnane pratisthitam). The world is led by Reason, Reason is its support; Reason is Brahman.

22. Hegel solved the difficulty by declaring the identity of thought and being. But "the idea which involves reality, thought which implies force, is", to use Weber's words, "more than an idea, more than thought."

23. Badarayana himself has most distinctly told us that an illustrated simile is always menat to illustrate one point only, and not all, <u>omne simile claudicat</u>, for otherwise it would not be a simile at all, and that, as such, a simile must always be taken strictly in the sense it is intended to convey, and must never be understood in a wider sense. Nimvarka, Sankara, Ramanuja and scores of other commentators on the Vedanta have also echoed and re-echoed this warning. But, in spite of all such warnings, the Vedanta has been grossly misunderstood.

24. Philosophy now aims at a consistent and satisfactory explanation of the world-whole and a clear conception of men's place, function and destiny, as factors of the cosmic order--a conception perfectly consistent with the facts of experience, and adequate for the satisfaction of the needs and demands of our moral natura. Philosophy is, thus, "the search for a comprehensive view of nature, and an attempt at a universal explanation of things." It is, however, "the science of the universe, not in its particular details, but in respect of the principles which condition all its particulars." (Ueberweg).

25. But how is knowledge at all possible? In modern philosophy, criticism of knowledge began with Descartes. But his criticism only took the shape of provisional doubt; and he was too easily satisfied. The formulation of Cogito ergo sum, was indeed an epoch-making achievement, but Descartes failed to grasp its full significance, and to make its proper use. In the rest of his work, he, accordingly, proceeded as dogmatically as did Reid and his followers os Scotland. Locke next took up the problem, and, from an inadequate analysis of knowledge, endeavoured to show that all knowledge was derived from experience, and that "nothing was in intellect which was not previously in the senses." He, however, failed to avoid dogmatism, and contradicted himself in various ways. Hume, by a consistent application of Locke's aforesaid dictum, subsequently laid the foundation of sensationalism, and resolved all existents into mere clusters of sensations. Sensationalism of Hume, ended in universal agnosticism and scepticism in metaphysics. To Locke's emprical dictum, Leibniz had already suggesed an important modifi-

cation

cation, namely, 'Except the intellect itself.' But he had gone to the other extreme, and endeavoured to explain knowledge as the product of reason alone. The task of Kant was to meditate between the sensationalism of Hume, and intellectualism of Leibniz, and to show that sensations by themselves are blind, and that notions without the given presentations of sense are empty.

26. In their analysis of knowledge, the Buddhists resolved, as did Hume and Mill, in Europe at a later age, all existents into mere bundles of sensations.

The Vedanta, however, in opposition to popular dogmatism, had always held self-consciousness, or Atmapratyaya, as the ultimate foundation of all knowledge. Buddhistic sensationalism and nihilism, on its advent, accordingly met with the fiercest opposition from the Vedeanta, and also received its death-blow from it. The Vedantists had given a deeper significance to the term perception, made a distinction between sense-perception and intuition, and had held the unity of self-consciousness as the ultimate basis of all knowledge. To make knowledge possible, they must, says the Vedanta, be interpreted and synthesised by the rationalising activity of the thinking subject, and, in so doing, the thinking subject, the Vedanta tells us, knows itself as the common subject or witness of its sensations, and the latter, as its own states or affections, caused by stimulations from without. It is only through such organising activities of the self, as the common subject of all its sensations, and as aware of itself as such, and, therefore, as always identical with itself, amidst all variations of states, that discrete and unconnected sense-

presentations can be united into the unity of a single experience. "If there is such a thing," declares the Vedanta with Green (Prolegomena to Ethics) "as a connected experience of related objects, there must be operative in consciousness a unifying principle, which not only presents the related objects to itself, but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each of this act of presentation, and which is single through-out the experience.

27. The fact of the possibility of memory caused Mill so much trouble, but the Vedantist had seen in it a clear and unmistakable proof of the continuity and unity of the thinking subject, and of its consciousness of itself as such.

28. There are certain fundamental notions, or caterogies, which underlie all our judgments. In thinking of a thing, we have to think of it as something standing in certain relations to, and capable of affecting, or producing effects on, other things, and, in its turn, being acted on by them. Things, in other words, can only be conceived in their interrelations to one another, in and through the reciprocal actions and reactions, by which they manifest themselves, and give evidence of their own existence and reality.

29. By Substance naive Raalism understands something which stands under or supports its attributes, the substratum of its qualities. Hume and Mill went to the opposite extreme, and denied the substantiality or essence of things altogether, and resolved all existents into mere bundles of unrelated attributes, mere, 'permanent possibilities of sensations.'

30. Naive Realism treats space as an objective

reality, as an object among objects. Hume holds it as a mere appearance and therefore subjective. Leibniz also, though from an opposite point of view, held space as unreal and subjective.

31. Hume and Mill have reduced all causality to a mere relation of immediate and invariable sequence. But they evidently evaded the difficulty instead of solving it. The empirical account of causation does, in fact, explain neither the 'how' nor the 'why' of it.

32. The doctrine of Causality constitutes, one may say, the very corner-stone of the Vedantic metaphysics. The ordinary conception of causation represents the effect of a new creation, an origin out of nothing. In Vedantic terminology, this position is known as Asatkarjya-Vada, the theory of origin out of void, or more precisely, the theory of (previous) non-existence of the effect in the cause. This popular view of causation, in a later age, found a formal and methodical expression in the Nyaya Philosophy. The Buddhists, following a quite different line of thought, had also propounded a form of the same doctrine of origin out of nothing. All existents, they held, were momentary. The cause of a previous moment must have, therefore, ceased to exist, they argued, before the effect came into being. Every effect was, therefore, an origin out of nothing.

33. The true function of Philosophy is to explain experience. Philosophy, accordingly starts with the plurality of existents, which experience reveals to us and tries to rise from a world of plurality to a consistent and comprehensive conception of the world-whole as a system.

34. The Yoga religious practices do, no doubt, to some extent, resemble those of Proclus and his followers; but these practices and the Yoga 'devotion to God' are mere means to the ultimate end of the attainment of self-centredness and detachment from the world of sense, and not to securing the soul's return to God as in Neo-Platonism.

35. The Ultimate Reality is, with the Eleatics, Pure Being, which is above all change and differentiations. And, as it is above all change and movement, the world of plurality is, it necessarily follows, nothing but the appearances and illusions. The position of Gaudapada and Sankara in India, greatly resembles that of the Eleatics. Sankara accordingly concludes, "pure, unqualified existence alone is real."

36. Does personality belong to the Absolute? A class of thinkers have maintained that consciousness and personality necessarily imply duality and opposition, and that, as such, the Absolute must be unconscious and impersonal. The consciousness of the existence of the non-ego, contends Dr. McTaggart, for instance, is an essential condition of the personality of man. "Such a consciousness," says he, "the Absolute cannot possess. For there is nothing outside it, from which it can distinguish itself...We know of no personality without a non-ego. Nor can we imagine what such a personaligy would be like. For we certainly can never say 'I' without raising the idea of the non-ego, and so we can never form any idea of the way in which the Absooute would say 'I!" (Studies in Hegelian Cosmology).

37. The finite spirit, with Hegel, is not anything apart from, or independent of, the Infinite. It is only an essential and necessary

aspect or moment of the Infinite Spirit. And, as such, it has necessarily the mark of immortality stamped upon it. Very likely, therefore, Hegel was not, as Dr. McTaggart suggests, personally much interested in the problem. In his belief that, in the Absolute, man is eternal, he probably did not think it worth his while to devote much of his attention to the question of personal immortality.

38. Dr. McTaggart is quite right in treating Hegel's reticence on a problem of so vital interest to humanity, as a defect in his work. "This is a question", as Dr. Mc.Taggart rightly observes (studies in Hegelian Cosmology) "which no philosophy can be justified in treating as insignificant." "A philosopher may answer it affirmatively or negatively, or may deny his power of answering it at all. But, however he may deal with it, he is clearly wrong," adds he, "if he treats the problem as unimportant. For it does not only make all the difference for the future, but it makes a profound difference for the present...We can scarcely exaggerate the difference which will be made in our estimate of our place in the universe and, consequently, in our ideals, our aspirations, our hopes, the whole of the emotional colouring of our lives."

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