MĀYĀVĀDA

OR

THE NON-DUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

(VEDĀNTA)

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The Critical Examination
OF
The Non-dualistic Philosophy (*Vedānta*)

INTRODUCTION.

It has been explained in Book I that according to this school of religio-philosophical thought the ultimate Reality and Ground of the universe is one non-dual differenceless, changeless, attributeless, self-luminous Existence or Consciousness, in which there is no distinction of parts or aspects, which admits of no real modification, which cannot be really related as a cause to any effect or as a substance to any attribute, and which cannot be an object of any knowledge nor can have any subject-object-relation within Itself. This theory demonstrates that though this non-dual self-luminous Existence is the ultimate Ground and Reality of all existences, still the universe cannot be either the true modification (परिणाम) or the real qualification (विशेषण) or the actual reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब) of this absolute Reality, but it must be conceived as an illusory appearance, produced on this changeless substratum through the apparent identification with It of a neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable positive principle destructible by true knowledge of that substratum. This inexplicable principle, called Cosmic Ignorance, being eternally identified with the non-dual consciousness, modifies itself into the forms of various kinds of conscious and unconscious entities, which are illusorily manifested as the products of that Reality.

According to this school, the self-evident scripture, which is the verbal embodiment of the self-revelation of

the Absolute Truth, is the highest authority about the nature of this Reality. They think that no argument can invalidate their conclusion about Reality, because all arguments are inevitably based on normal experience of invariable relations and the interpretation of and generalisations from them made by finite human understanding. The adherents hold that the exclusive validity of the conceptions learnt from the scriptural texts can also be logically proved. The exponents of this doctrine, as we have found in Book I, adduce various arguments to prove their conceptions.

I. To prove that the ultimate Reality is one absolute non-dual and attributeless consciousness, they show that (a) Being or Existence is the one universal substratum of all objects, that (b) Consciousness is the witness of the universe, that (c) the essence of the said consciousness is self-luminosity and it is non-different from Existence.

II. The illusory character of the universe in relation to the Absolute Reality they establish by examining the nature of causality and pointing out that the theory of *illusory* causation is the only reasonable theory, which can consistently explain the appearance of the world on the substratum of changeless non-dual Existence and that the world cannot be explained either as existent or non-existent or existent as well as non-existent. Such an inexplicable thing, they say, is at no time really present in its substratum.

III. That the cosmic Ignorance is the material cause of the universe, they prove by showing that the inexplicable effect produced on the changeless Substratum should have an inexplicable principle associated with the Substra-

tum as its modifying material cause. Having proved that cosmic Ignorance is the root material cause of the illusory appearance of the universe and that the Substratum of the universe is Existence-Consciousness, the upholders of the said doctrine explain Godhood as due to the universal identification of the non-dual Existence-Consciousness with Cosmic Ignorance ; so God is conceived by them as the non-dual self-luminous Brahman apparently conditioned by inexplicable Ignorance and as such He is regarded as having a relative conditional apparent existence. Thus God is conceived relatively and conditionally as the one self-conscious and self-determining omniscient Personal Being and as the illusory material and efficient cause of the universe.

In our critical examination of the above doctrine, we have to consider the following points :—

I. Whether there is any proof or argument in favour of that Something which they call attributeless Reality, II. whether the theory of Illusory causation can be proved, III. whether Ignorance can be taken as the modified cause of the universe, and finally whether even after granting the validity of the conclusion about the witness-consciousness and positive Ignorance, it is possible to ascertain even empirical reality of God.

Now, let us proceed to show that the afore-said conclusions cannot be reasonably held.

SECTION I.

The Proofs in favour of the attributeless Reality Examined.

(a). Self-evidence of the Scriptures Refuted.

The first and primary proof for ascertaining that the ultimate Reality is an attributeless, differenceless Consciousness is that it is so proclaimed by the scriptures, and these scriptures are the self-evident sources of knowledge. Let us show at first that self-evidence of the scriptures cannot be admitted. When we find that different scriptures contradict each other, that the same scriptural text is diversely interpreted and that efforts are made to create in others a belief in those scriptures, we cannot be sure about the self-evidence of the scriptures. It is popularly believed that the scriptures are self-evident, because they are the scriptures. But this argument is either tautological or illogical. As yet their self-evidence has not been proved, so the reason put forward above cannot be accepted. What is the subject of a discussion cannot be taken as established from the very beginning. What is to be proved by an inference cannot be brought forth as its reason. It is irrational to accept the Vedas as infallible authority without any questioning. The advocates, by means of an analogy from the acceptance of the laws of thought and of self-evident truths, seek to show that the procedure is perfectly rational. This is of course a common, but surely an erroneous, view. The laws of thought are necessarily, not voluntarily, accepted by Reason. They are presuppositions of all reasoning and simply cannot be questioned, because any inquiry into their validity necessarily presupposes their

validity. Nor are self-evident propositions which are not presuppositions of all reasoning accepted through faith. We just apprehend that they must be true, and this apprehension of necessity is not an exercise of faith, but of reason at its purest. Besides, the Vedas is not a proposition and cannot be reduced to one. There is no semblance of rationality about accepting the Vedas on its own authority as infallible. The question, Why in particular the Vedas? is legitimate, and that means that the theory of Vedic infallibility must be examined in the same way as any other theory.*

* The Vedāntists declare that reasoning is without any finality (तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्), that is, they want to discard reasoning and establish the validity of the Scriptures as a superior source of true knowledge. On the ground that one person's careful reasoning is found to be refuted by others, they think that they are justified in discarding reasoning as a source of the knowledge of the ultimate truth. But this well-known fact will not establish their right to uphold the validity of the scriptures. It is also a well-known fact that the same scripture is interpreted differently by different commentators. If owing to the fact that one's reasoning is refuted by another, reasoning itself is discarded, then they should not also try to ascertain the meaning of the scriptures in their own way, because their interpretation of them may also be refuted by others. To ascertain that this is what the scriptures say, our only refuge is to make out their meaning by the help of reasoning. If mere reading of the scriptures would have yielded their conclusive meaning, then there would have been an end to divergent views among those who regard the very same scripture as valid. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that without first ascertaining the purport of the scriptures, one cannot find out reasonings which favour the theme of the scriptures and which does not. So the assurance that you put forward reasoning which favours your scriptures is meaningless. Nor can you label antagonistic reasonings as defective without finding fault with them.

Besides, it is well-known that without the help of a source of valid knowledge, nothing can get established. Now let us ask what proof is there in favour of their contention that all reasoning is non-

The inference, namely, that the scriptures are self-evident because they contain informations about supersensuous truths, is not also sound. As long as these supersensuous entities are not observed or otherwise logically proved, their validity cannot be established. The assertions made in these scriptures might as well have been the products of the imagination of the individual thinkers. That the scriptural assertions are something more than products of imagination and charming hypothesis requires to be proved by valid reasoning. The various grounds stated by different schools of thought for proving the infallibility of the scriptures we have considered at length in the first chapter of this Book and they have all been found unconvincing. Hence we are not justified in accepting the assertions of the books regarded as scriptures without rational proof. It is argued that the scriptures create in us the knowledge of final. It cannot be perception, because innumerable reasonings of the past and the future cannot be perceived. Nor can all reasonings of the present be present, so that they may be perceived by any one. The alleged proof cannot be inference. The inference of the non-finality of reasoning demands putting forth some reasoning. That reasoning must be either established or non-established? If it is non-established, then their theme will not be established. If it is established, then the non-finality of reasoning is thereby disproved. In other words, as their own reasoning is established, they cannot reasonably say that all reasonings are non-established. Nor by verbal testimony, the above can be proved. Because perception and inference are unavailing, verbal testimony cannot in this case command recognition.

Thus it is shown that the advocates of the scriptural authority cannot be allowed to accept the validity of the scriptures without giving any reason for their belief in them. And the alleged grounds of this belief, we have refuted already. Thus it comes to this that they cannot, on the assumed authority of the Scriptures, at the very beginning take for granted the non-dual Reality as the substratum of all appearances.

the eternal transcendental Truth, which is not and cannot be negated at any time. But this is itself a dogmatic assertion and cannot be accepted as a rational argument. Before the validity of the scriptures has been established, and the reality of the object or objects they speak of is rationally proved, this reason cannot be advanced. Besides, the question may be asked, is there any evidence other than the scriptures themselves to prove that the truths which these scriptures claim to establish are eternal immutable undeniable truths? If any such evidence is admitted, then the authority of the scriptures as the conclusive source of the knowledge of these truths need not be believed in, and the exponents of the theory have to establish these truths on the ground of such independent evidence. If on the other hand no such evidence is available, then the authority of the scriptures is not established, because there is the fallacy of interdependence; the eternity and immutableness of the subject-matter of the scriptures being proved by the authority of the scriptures, and the authority of the scriptures being proved on the ground of the eternity and immutableness of the subject-matter.

It is argued that when the scriptural text produces the knowledge in a properly disciplined mind prepared for receiving it, the truth reveals itself to it with the stamp of eternity and immutableness and produces the conviction that it can never be contradicted and proved to be false at any time. Thus this conviction of eternity and immutableness in the present time is the evidence for the eternity and immutableness of the object of the knowledge, and as this knowledge could not be acquired from any source other than the scriptures, the authority of the scriptures also is established.

Now, the question is, what is meant by this stamp of eternity and immutableness of the scriptural truth? Does it mean that when the knowledge of such a truth is produced, the object is experienced as related to the beginningless past and the endless future and found to be uncontradicted by any knowledge of the past or the future? Or does it mean that when the knowledge is attained from the scriptures, the object is experienced as undeniable at that present moment and hence it is inferred that it is undeniable at all times? Or does it mean that eternity and immutableness are attributes characterising the object of scriptural knowledge and that the knowledge of these attributes forms part of the knowledge of the object? The first alternative is not sound. In that case all possible knowledge of all knowing beings of the past and the future as well as all possible objects of all such knowledge have to be simultaneously present along with the knowledge of the alleged scriptural truth at the moment of the production of this knowledge, in order that this truth may be compared with all other objects of all possible knowledge. This is obviously absurd and cannot be claimed by the exponents of the scriptural authority. The second alternative is not tenable. The inference would then be obviously groundless, because even in cases of illusions, hallucinations, dreams and hypnotic suggestions, the objects of knowledge appear as undeniable for the time being. Hence this conviction of undeniableness at the time of experience cannot be a criterion even of the validity of phenomenal knowledge, not to speak of the eternity and immutableness of the object of knowledge. The third alternative is not logical. In that case also, it cannot amount to a proof of the reality of these attributes of the object of scriptural knowledge. Because the question would arise, what is the nature of this knowledge? Is it perceptual knowledge or

inferential knowledge or a different form of knowledge arising from the authority of the scriptures? The alleged eternal and immutable truth cannot evidently be an object of sense-perception, and no object of sense-perception can be regarded as possessing these characteristics. The knowledge cannot be regarded as inferential, for no invariable concomitance is available in the world of sense-perception to serve as a ground for the inference of such a reality. If it is a special kind of knowledge produced by the authority of the scriptures, then these scriptures become the sole ground for accepting the validity of such knowledge, and the validity of the scriptures, when put to the test, cannot be established on the ground of such knowledge, without committing the fallacy of Interdependence.

Another question that arises in this connection is, does the same scriptural text produce exactly the same knowledge with the same degree of certitude in every mind? There is ample evidence to show that it does not. If it did, the believers in the scriptures would not differ so much in their conception of the ultimate Reality and different authoritative commentators would not lay emphasis upon different texts as representing the true nature of the Reality. When any particular interpreter claims acceptance for his own version, he has to take his stand on reason. Hence it is the logical validity of a doctrine that is accepted as the final criterion of truth even by the believers in the scriptural authority. Consequently, the appeal to the scriptures becomes superfluous, or at least the scriptural texts may be regarded as hypotheses to argue upon.

Moreover, it is said that in order to comprehend the true meaning of the scriptural texts, a systematic course of moral and religious discipline is necessary for creating a

right attitude of mind and preparing the mind for receiving them in the proper spirit. The simple implication of this preliminary training of the mind appears to be that with differences of mental outlook the scriptural texts are likely to produce different ideas about the ultimate Reality and that without an already acquired unquestioning faith the knowledge produced would not appear with the stamp of certainty, eternity and immutableness of the truth. Hence the reliableness of the scriptures does not lie so much in their own self-evidence as in the relying attitude of the particular mind. Consequently they cannot be universally accepted as the source of valid knowledge about the ultimate Truth. What is ultimately true must stand on independent evidence and necessary laws of thought and must not depend upon any mental attitude or any outlook created by some particular type of moral and religious discipline.

Moreover, you yourselves, inspite of your belief in the supreme authority of the scriptures, cannot treat them as ultimately valid, because in that case either you are to regard God as the object illumined by scriptural knowledge which is independent of Him and expressible by scriptural words which do not owe their existence to Him, or you are to regard God as the revealer of this knowledge and author of these words, and both of these alternatives are inconsistent with the self-luminosity and attributelessness of the ultimate Reality. To conceive the ultimate Reality as the attributeless changeless absolute consciousness beyond thought and speech and at the same time to regard it either as the author or as the object of scriptural knowledge and words involves an obvious self-contradiction. Hence the scriptures can in no way be accepted as the source of valid knowledge about the ultimate differenceless attributeless changeless Reality.

(b). The possible ways of knowing Reality Examined.

Now, let us examine if the attributeless Reality is capable of being proved by the sources of valid knowledge recognised by the advocates of this view.

(1). Perception cannot prove attributeless Reality.

Perception cannot be a proof in favour of the attributeless Reality. No undifferentiated, attributeless Reality can possibly be an object of perception. Perception requires a direct contact between the senses and the object, and such an object must have attributes capable of producing impressions upon the senses, and must have form limited in space and changeable in time. The existence of any Reality devoid of these characteristics cannot be an object of sense-perception. Hence it is out of the question to prove the existence of an attributeless changeless Reality by means of perception.

(2). Inference cannot prove attributeless Reality.

By inference also such an attributeless consciousness cannot be established. An inference must be dependent on the knowledge of invariable concomitance furnished by experience. The knowledge of invariable concomitance is the ascertainment of the particular relation of the ground of inference with the thing to be proved. This relation is perceived by the perception of both the related terms. If either of the terms be unperceived or beyond the scope of perception, then the concomitance can not be established. In the present case, Brahman is admittedly not an object of sense-perception. And hence the relation of the ground of the alleged inference with Brahman will not be known.

Consequently, there is no means of establishing the existence of a differenceless attributeless consciousness or Brahman on the strength of any kind of invariable concomitance.

Moreover, if you are to infer the existence of the attributeless Reality, then you are to treat this Reality as the cause of the effect-world. Thus, the character of the world as an effect would be the ground of your inference. But on the ground that the world is an effect, it cannot be inferred that its cause must necessarily be the attributeless consciousness without sufficient additional reasons for such an inference, because otherwise various other rival hypotheses may be framed to account for the production of the world. Whether the reasons adduced for proving the production of the world from such a Reality are strong enough to establish this claim, we shall consider hereafter.

Moreover, as the attributeless Reality is not and cannot be really the cause of any thing, therefore it is not valid to infer that Reality on the ground of the character of the world as an effect. By inference we can know simply that, since every effect must have a cause, the world being of the nature of an effect must have some cause. But we cannot infer what the character of that cause must be, far less that the cause is attributeless. We can rather draw a contrary inference, viz. that the cause of the world must have attributes, because in our experience all causes of all effects are found to have attributes.

Besides, according to this theory, the relation of attribute with substance is a difference that does not differentiate the existence of the former from that of the latter,

and it also maintains that a difference between two terms can be regarded as real only when the existence of one is differentiated from the existence of the other. Accordingly it has to be concluded that the difference between substance and attribute is not a real difference. This unreal difference can be explained only by regarding the attribute as not real in the sense in which the substance is real. By the application of this principle it is deduced that the attributes ascribed to the ultimate Reality i. e. Brahman are unreal and hence Brahman must be inferred to be essentially attributeless. But if the relation of the attribute with its substratum is taken as unreal, then the difference between the substance of sense-experience and the attributes perceived in them, such as the pot and its colour etc. also must be regarded as unreal, and consequently all the substances of the world of experience should have to be regarded as attributeless. That is, in accordance with this principle we cannot say that the pot is really possessed of the particular size, shape, colour and other attributes, because they are not really related to the pot. Consequently, the pots, the cloths, the trees, men, etc. should all be regarded as essentially attributeless and there should be no difference among them. Hence this method of proving attributelessness of Reality is not sound. Later on we shall show the incongruities involved in the recognition of the same sort of relation between the cause and the effect. Thus we find that the existence of the attributeless ultimate Reality cannot be established by means of the process of inference.

(3) Analogy cannot prove attributeless Reality.

Nor is such Reality capable of being established by means of analogy. Analogy is based on the knowledge of

similarity. But because the said Reality is taken as beyond all attributes, its similarity with anything whatsoever, whether conscious or unconscious, cannot be experienced, and hence analogy cannot be operative in its case.

(4) Implication cannot prove attributeless Reality.

The source of valid knowledge known as implication (अर्थापत्ति) cannot apply here, because Reality is taken to be indifferent (उदासीन) i. e. absolutely unrelated. When we see things which cannot be accounted for except by guessing something else not perceived, then that something is accepted as real by virtue of the necessity of explaining those objects of experience. Implication has applicability only in such cases. Because the said Reality is conceived as indifferent or neutral or unrelated with all things of experience, it cannot explain anything and consequently the recognition of its existence cannot be necessitated to account for any object of experience. If it be argued that in order to account for the production and sustenance of the world-process, the recognition of this ultimate Reality is necessary, then that Reality cannot be regarded as indifferent or unrelated to the world-process and conception of the ultimate Reality, as cherished by the exponents of this view, will be contradicted. Whether the conception of such a Reality is logically maintainable and whether its recognition can in any way help the explanation of the world-process will be examined in details afterwards.

(5) Occult perception or Yogic vision cannot prove the attributeless Reality.

Though sense-perception, inference, analogy or implication cannot give any valid knowledge of the ultimate Reality, it may be supposed that the attributeless conscious-

ness is knowable through occult perception or Yogic vision (योगिक प्रत्यक्ष). We come across persons, who as a result of some specific forms of physical and mental self-discipline and continued practice of such vows as systematic prayer, fasting, sacrifice, mortification, utterance of mystic words (*Mantras*), concentration of mind upon certain objects, etc. under specified conditions, acquire extraordinary powers of perceiving phenomena which occurred in the past or which will occur in the future or which are occurring at present beyond the range of sense-perception or which are otherwise incapable of being perceived by the senses. The validity of such perception is often verified by unmistakable positive proofs. It may be contended that as in such cases direct perception of objects takes place without any contact between the senses and the objects, such direct occult perception by the suitably cultured minds of *Yogins* may be the reliable source of valid knowledge of the Absolute Reality.

But by analysis of the facts referred to here, we find that the contention is not tenable. In such extraordinary cases also, it is found that what are seen are objects with visible properties, what are heard are objects with audible properties, and so on, though the spatial and temporal remoteness of the objects from the physical body of the percipient and the limitations of the ordinarily developed senses of perception may render the objects incapable of being perceived by the senses. By suitable practices the powers of perception as well as of action of the mind and the senses may be immensely developed and the mind may even acquire the power of receiving subtle impressions which are left by past objects that disappeared from the range of gross perception, those which are coming from distant objects that are outside the range of gross perception as well as those which are produced by future objects that have

not yet come within the range of gross perception. These facts of supranormal perception may be adduced by thinkers to prove that the past objects are not absolutely extinct and the future are not absolutely non-existent to come newly into being. They may go some way to show that our conception of the past, the distant and the future are relative to our imperfect powers of the mind and the senses.

Whatever may be the explanations of these facts of occult perception, they furnish no ground to believe that a Being without any perceptible properties can be the object of such perception. Moreover, the validity of such perception also requires to be verified by reference to facts of direct normal experience ; otherwise mere occult experience of particular individuals can be no sure proof of the reality of the objects of such experience, since it may be vitiated by confusion with auto-suggestion, external suggestion, imagination, predisposition etc. But such verification of the occult perception (if possible) of the Absolute Reality is not possible. Hence the attributeless Existence cannot be known to be real by means of occult perception.

(6) Trance-intuition cannot realise the attributeless Reality.

Another source that may be claimed for the knowledge of the Absolute attributeless Existence is Trance-intuition (समाधिज प्रज्ञा). It is held that when as a result of the practice of deep meditation the mind is for the time being completely free from unsteadiness and perfectly emancipated from the impurities of desires, passions, prejudices and sensuous impressions, it attains the state of trance (समाधि). It is claimed that at this state of the mind the Absolute

self-luminous Reality reveals Itself as It essentially is to this pure steady transparent mind. The mind, being then free from all sorts of modifications and uninfluenced by any other changing finite object of knowledge, becomes identified with the self-luminous attributeless consciousness and experiences this consciousness as the non-dual Reality.

Here the first question that should arise is whether the state of trance is or is not a state of the mind like the states of waking, dream, deep sleep, swoon, hysteric fit etc. If it be a state on a par with, though distinct from, the other states, how can the experience of the mind at that state have any exclusive claim to be regarded as representing the true nature of the Absolute Reality as It is? Just as in the other states of the individual mind there are characteristic experiences, so in the state of trance also there may be some specific experience. As in dream there is the experience of diverse kinds of objects, as in deep sleep there is the experience of peace and ignorance, so in trance there may be the experience of differenceless blissful consciousness. Since it represents the experience of a particular state of the mind, it is purely subjective, and cannot be accepted as the true knowledge of the Absolute Reality, unless there are adequate rational grounds for accepting it as such. If on the other hand the trance is not regarded as a state of the mind, then it has to be explained what it is. It is universally admitted that trance is attained as the result of the practice of deep meditation, though in exceptional cases there may be a sudden cessation of all other mental functions and the experience of trance. Now, if the trance is not a special state of the mind, then either the mind is to be regarded as dead and non-existent or it is to be regarded as existing in an altogether unmanifested state without any function whatsoever. That the mind is not dead or non-

existent is evident from the fact that there is rise (व्युत्थान) from trance and the various functions of mind are experienced after it. Hence the mind is to be regarded as existing at the time of trance in an unmanifested and functionless state. If the mind is functionless, then according to the view under discussion, the differenceless witness-consciousness alone shines in its self-luminosity, and there being no subject-object-relation within its nature, it can have no experience, and even if the differenceless consciousness can be said to have any kind of experience, it is unrelated to the mind and therefore unknowable and unrememberable to it.

It is maintained by the exponents of this theory that no knowledge or experience, in the sense in which we understand it, is possible without modification of the mind or the ego, illumined by the self-luminous consciousness ; the non-dual self-luminous consciousness, being by itself without subject-object-relation and being the illuminer of knowledge as well as ignorance, can not in its essential character be either the subject or the object of knowledge. Now the question is, does any mental modification occur at the state of trance ? Here, those who practise deep meditation and attain *Samādhi* or trance, distinguish between two stages of trance, viz. trance with subtle mental modification (सविकल्प) and trance without any mental modification (निर्विकल्प). They are also regarded as trance with knowledge (संप्रज्ञात) and trance without knowledge (असंप्रज्ञात). The trance with subtle mental modification is admitted to be the culmination of the practice of deep concentration or one-pointedness (एकाग्रता) of the mind upon some definite desirable object. As a result of continued voluntary practice of such concentration, the mind becomes temporarily modified into the subtle form of the object and the uninterrupted

stream of mental modification into the form of the same object flows without any will or effort for some time, the attention being so deeply absorbed in the object that it is not even diverted towards the subject itself as distinguished from the object. If the concept of the self itself is objectified and concentrated upon, it leads to the experience of the subject becoming the object,—to a sense of complete unity within and without. But in this form of trance the subtle mental modification continues, the subject-object-relation exists, and the object of experience is nothing but the idea of the object already chosen for meditation, this idea being most vividly realised within and engrossing the entire modifying mind. In this trance knowledge in a general sense is no doubt present, but what is asserted to be intuition of Reality or realisation of Truth is nothing but the perfect self-forgetting self-identification with a cherished Idea or Ideal. According to the differences of ideas or ideals cherished at the time of the practice of meditation, the actual trance-experiences also, as testified to by the different types of *Sādhakas* after coming down from the trance-state, are found to differ. Hence this sort of trance with mental modification or knowledge cannot be regarded as the valid experience of the Absolute Reality. Even if the trance-knowledge had any objective validity, it could not make the differenceless subject-object-less self-luminous Existence its object, for this would be inconsistent with the self-luminosity and non-duality of this Existence. Since according to this theory the ego, the object and the modification are all illumined by this Existence, this Existence cannot be the object of the mental modification.

With regard to the other, which is regarded as the highest form of *Samādhi*, viz. that in which no mental modification is present, there cannot be, according to the

admission of the exponents of this theory, any kind of knowledge at all. The mind is then merged in the unmanifested state. There is no consciousness of the ego or any object at that state. Hence it is meaningless to say that the non-dual Existence is known at the highest state of trance.

(7). Verbal testimony can be no independent source of the knowledge of Reality :—

Verbal testimony is sometimes spoken of as the source of the knowledge of the differenceless Existence. It is said that for the attainment of this knowledge we are first of all to hear (श्रवण) of this Reality, then to rationally reflect upon It (मनन) and then to deeply meditate upon It (निदिध्यासन). But in order to hear of the Reality, It must be conceived as an object of speech. Only objects of which some attributes or properties can be predicated can become objects of speech, and hence only related conditioned qualified objects can be spoken and heard. The attributeless unrelated unconditioned Existence cannot therefore be an object of speech and hearing. It may be argued that though direct speaking and hearing about the Reality is not possible, It may be spoken and heard with the help of indirect expressions. Even if this be admitted, whose testimony about the Reality can be relied on and accepted as the source of valid knowledge about It ? Those whose testimony have to be relied on must themselves have some valid source of knowledge of this Reality. If they also have to rely on other persons' testimony, then the fallacy of infinite regression would arise. If this is to be avoided, then at least some person or persons must have some independent source of valid knowledge of this Reality. These persons must acquire this knowledge either through per-

ception or through inference or through analogy or through implication or through occult perception or through trance-intuition. But all these have been shown to be incapable of giving any valid knowledge of the Reality, as It is conceived to be. Hence in the absence of any direct source of valid knowledge about the Reality, verbal testimony about It can not in any case be accepted as reliable. It cannot be said that persons can get this knowledge from God Himself, because this would involve the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*. The existence and nature of God being the point at issue, the reliableness of God cannot be unquestionably accepted as the basis of His existence. We have at last to fall back upon the reliableness of the Scriptures. But it has been already found that there is no valid ground for believing in the reliableness of the Scriptures as the independent source of the knowledge of the Reality.

Thus we fail to discover any independent source of the valid knowledge of the Reality, as It is conceived by the exponents of this theory.

(8) Non-apprehension cannot prove attributeless Reality.

As the above-mentioned proofs are not capable of knowing Reality, so its attributelessness cannot be known by the source of valid knowledge known as non-apprehension. Non-apprehension only refers to negation which is dependent on its counterentity. If the Absolute Reality could have been known by means of any valid evidence, the non-apprehension of its attributes might somehow be regarded as an evidence for its attributelessness. But as there is the absence of any undeniable evidence for recognising the Absolute Reality, the question of the apprehension or non-apprehension of its attributes does not arise at all.

By the above discussion it is proved that by perception, inference, reliable testimony and the like which are acknowledged as means or instruments of correct knowledge, the existence of the attributeless non-dual consciousness, as conceived by the theory under examination, cannot be established.

Thus it is found that the attributeless Reality canno be the object of any kind of valid knowledge (प्रमाण). We have now to examine if there is any possibility of establishing it by any form of logical reasoning (तर्क).

SECTION II

The Arguments for Absolute Reality Examined.

Now, let us examine the conception of Absolute Reality and the reasonings put forth to uphold it by the advocates of this theory. At first let us consider (1) their conception of Being or Existence as a universal substratum, then we shall examine (2) the conception of consciousness as the witness of the universe and afterwards we shall critically analyse the conceptions of (3) self-luminosity, (4) non-duality and (5) non-difference between Existence and consciousness.

(1)

The conception of Being Examined.

Now about Being or Existence. In order to prove that Existence is all-pervading, non-dual substratum of the universe, the advocate of the view has to rely either on the scriptures or on normal experience or on supernormal experience. It has already been proved that scriptures cannot be accepted as the final proof in any matter. It has also been shown and will be further shown in another connection that Samādhi-intuition cannot be a guarantee for the truth of any object. So the exponent of the view has to take his stand on normal experience and rational proof based upon it. But this also will not serve his purpose. He takes the ultimate Reality as without any attribute, and as such beyond the reach of the senses ; accordingly it cannot be claimed that Existence as it is in itself, becomes the object of direct perception.

(a). The Doctrine of Existence as non-dual substratum represented.

It is argued that though Existence,—the pure attributeless formless Existence, which is the ultimate Reality—is not by itself an object of direct perception, the perception of this Existence is involved in every normal perception of objects. Whenever we experience any object, we experience it as existent. When we perceive a pot or a cot, we perceive that the pot is existent, the cot is existent, and this is true in every case of perception. Now, how can we interpret this experience ? Either it should be said that existence is the universal attribute of all objects of experience, or it should be said that existence is the universal genus of all objects, or the particular objects should be regarded as particular existences, there being no difference between the pot and its existence, the cot and its existence, etc., or Existence should be conceived as one absolute universal Substratum which appears in the diverse forms of the objects. The exponents of the doctrine of attributeless ultimate Reality point out that all the interpretations except the last are vitiated by various logical fallacies, and the only interpretation that can logically stand is the last. Hence they conclude that Pure attributeless formless Existence is the one absolute non-dual Substance or Reality, and all the particular substances with diverse forms, attributes and limitations, that become objects of our particular perceptions and appear along with the perception of Existence, are only qualifications and particularisations of this Absolute Existence. They also show that these qualifications and particularisations in the forms of particular objects do not really pertain to the essential nature of this universal Substratum, and hence the real nature of Existence is not qualified or particularised

or diversified by them. Thus they conclude that the pure attributeless formless changeless undifferentiated Existence, as the ultimate Reality, is proved by the analysis of our normal experience itself.

(b). The fallacies involved in this Doctrine.

Now, this interpretation of our normal experience appears to involve the fallacy of substantialising a logical abstraction. We always experience the pot as existent, the cot as existent, and so on; but never do we experience Existence as the pot, Existence as the cot, etc. The direct objects of our experience are the particular things, like the pot and the cot, having sensible forms and attributes, and the idea of existence goes along with them. There is no valid ground to hold that Existence, without any sensible forms and attributes, is the true object of perception, while the ideas of the pot, the cot and of the particular forms and attributes go along with the perception of Existence. In cases of dreams and the like also, the objects are perceived as existent for the time being, but when those states are gone and the normal state of consciousness returns, the existence of those objects is denied, though the fact of the perception and the forms and attributes of the perceived objects cannot be denied. It cannot be said that in those states also Existence was perceived in those forms and it proved to be non-existent afterwards. That would involve self-contradiction.

Further, even if in accordance with this interpretation Existence be regarded as the real Substance perceived in various qualified and particularised forms, what would be the ground for maintaining that Existence is essentially attributeless and formless ? If the theory has to take its stand on normal experience, it must be admitted that the Exist-

ence-Substance is invariably qualified by forms and attributes, though these may be varying. In that case the very nature of Existence should have to be conceived as modifying itself into various forms and the world of diverse objects should have to be regarded as the real self-manifestation of Existence. This would not be consistent with the attributelessness and changelessness of Existence.

In fact if we have to rely upon the analysis of normal experience for the knowledge of Existence, we can discover no reason for establishing that Existence is an independent substantial Reality. It is always found with and inseparable from the concrete objects of experience. The concept of existence can be separated from that of the objects only by conceptual abstraction. Such an abstract idea cannot be regarded as the absolute independent Reality, unless its non-dependence upon the concrete objects of experience and its transcendent self-existence can be proved by other irrefutable evidence.

(c). The sense-perception does not testify to the existence of an all-pervading Existence.

Further, when we perceive the particular objects as existent, how can it be proved that it is the same Existence which is perceived in and through the perception of all these objects ? These particular perceptions can supply no proof of it, because we perceive the objects as different from one another. If it be said that existence-being the common factor in all these perceptions, it must be conceived as one, the argument becomes too weak to establish the conclusion, because this fact may be explained by regarding existence either as a general attribute or as a general class. If it be argued that at the time of the perception of the cot we recognise the same Existence as we perceived at the time

of the perception of the pot, then we assert something beyond what is justified by actual experience. Such recognition is possible only in cases of particular objects of sense-perception. If Existence had been a particular object of experience qualified by particular characteristics distinguishing it from other particular objects, then only it could have been ascertained that it is the same individual object with the same distinctive characteristics that we perceived on the previous occasion. This is not possible in the case of what is regarded as an attributeless formless entity.

Further, Existence is regarded as the one absolute all-pervading Reality. If at the time of perceiving particular objects, this Existence had been perceived as a substance, it must have been experienced as the all-pervading entity. But this does not happen. Not only that, the sense-perception of all-pervading entity is itself impossible.

(d). Existence, if perceived as different from objects, would have distinguishing characteristics and would be many.

Besides, when it is asserted that with the perception of every particular existent object, like the pot, Existence also is perceived, it may be asked, is the particular object perceived as different from the Existence or non-different from it ? If Existence and the particular object are perceived as different from each other, it cannot be maintained that Existence is the real substance and that it appears as qualified in the form of the particular object. Existence and the existent objects being in that case perceived as distinct realities, Existence also would have to be regarded as one of the objects of perception, limited by and differentiated from other objects, and this differentiation would imply the presence in it of certain distinguishing characte-

ristics. Consequently Existence would not then be attributeless. Further, it would not be established that the same Existence is perceived in the perception of every object. The Existence perceived along with the perception of the pot may be regarded as different from the existence perceived along with the existence of the cot. Hence there might be conceived innumerable existences in the world of sense-perception.

(e) The non-perception of distinguishing characteristics also does not prove absolute oneness of Existence.

It may be said that as there is no distinguishing attribute which can differentiate one existence perceived along with the perception of one particular object from another existence perceived along with the perception of a different particular object, Existence must be admitted to be one, though the particular objects in and through which it reveals itself to the faculty of perception are different. This however is not an adequate proof of the oneness of Existence. There may be a series of perceptions of a series of particular objects, all of them possessing the same characteristics. When we observe a flame blazing uniformly or a stream of water flowing continuously, we really perceive a different object at each succeeding moment, though there being no distinguishing attribute to differentiate the object of the perception of one moment from that of another, the object appears to be one. Hence the absence of any distinguishing attribute in the existences perceived with the perception of different objects can be no proof of the absolute oneness of Existence. If it is argued that in the cases of the perception of the objects of uniform character, like the

instances just cited, some attributes are present, which distinguish them from objects of different nature, but in the case of Existence, there is no attribute whatsoever, then in reply to this argument the possibility of the perception of Existence will be questioned. In the case of the absolute negation of all possible perceptible characteristics, perception can in no way be possible. Thus the absolute oneness of Existence perceived along with but differentiated from the perception of particular objects cannot be rationally established.

(f) Oneness of Existence would imply non-perception of different limited qualified objects.

Let us now consider the second alternative, which holds that in every perception, Existence and the particular object are perceived as non-different from each other. It may be asked, if Existence and the particular object are both objects of perception, how can it be maintained that they are non-different from each other ? It is the common experience that when two or more objects are perceived either simultaneously or successively, they are differentiated from one another. In case of non-difference two objects would not be perceived, but only one object would be perceived, though it may be given different names at pleasure. Hence if Existence and the particular object be really non-different then existence would be merely another name for the particular object, or the particular object would be merely another name for existence. If it be admitted that existence is only another name for the particular object, then existence must be regarded as a limited qualified object and there should be different existences in case of different perceptions. If on the other hand we adhere to the oneness of existence and the particular objects perceived be

regarded as only different names for that one existence, then it would imply that we really do not perceive different limited qualified objects anywhere, but we perceive only one existence in every case. This would be a violent contradiction to what is actually experienced.

(g) Particular objects are not the illusory appearance of Existence because the conditions of illusion are absent.

Advocate—Our actual perceptions of different limited qualified objects are illusory. The one unlimited attributeless Existence is the universal Substratum of these illusory perceptions.

Critic—Then it cannot be said that we actually perceive the Existence along with the particular object, because it is by concealing the nature of the Substratum that illusions appear and they can be known as illusions only when with the perception of the Substratum they vanish. The Substratum as it is and the illusion about it cannot be perceived together. Hence if it is maintained that Existence and the particular object are perceived together, the particular object cannot be regarded as an illusory appearance of Existence. In order to be aware that the particular object is illusory, it is necessary that at the time of the perception of this object Existence is not perceived and that Existence becomes perceived in its true character apart from the particular object and proves the particular object which was previously perceived in its place to be false.

Advocate—The Substratum need not be wholly concealed for making room for illusory perception, but a partial concealment is sufficient for it.

Critic—Then it must be admitted that Existence has more than one aspect or attribute, so that in respect of one aspect or attribute at least it may be perceived along with the perception of the illusory object, the other aspects or attributes being concealed. This will be contradictory to the assumed nature of Existence. As Existence is conceived as the partless, aspectless, attributeless, differenceless Substance, it cannot consistently be regarded as partly veiled and partly unveiled, unperceived in some aspects and perceived in some other aspects. Hence the supposition of illusory perception of objects on the substratum of Existence cannot be consistently maintained.

Advocate—The partial concealment and partial manifestation of Existence in the illusory perception of particular objects may be supported on the ground that the perception of Existence as such is present in the perception of every object, but the infinity, absoluteness, consciousness and blissfulness, which pertain to the essential nature of Existence are veiled in this perception.

Critic—The question is, are they the different aspects or attributes of the Existence-Substance or do they together with Existence constitute the different aspects of another Substance, or does the very notion of the Existence-Substance involve the notions infinity, absoluteness etc. ? If they are regarded as different attributes or aspects of the Existence-substance, Existence cannot be called the one attributeless aspectless differenceless substance. It is then to be conceived as having several distinct aspects or attributes, some of which may appear at one time in isolation from the others. This would not be consistent with the conception of differenceless unity of Existence. Further, in that case the existence which is associated with the particular

objects in the perception of them must be admitted to be one of the aspects or attributes of that Existence-Substance, and cannot be regarded as that Existence-Substance itself ;—it should be existence of Existence, and not the same as Existence. Thus the contention of this school that Existence as the changeless substance is perceived in and through the perception of every object will not be substantiated. If existence as well as infinity, absoluteness etc., be regarded as the attributes or aspects of another Substance, then also the position of the advocates of the view will not be established, because the character of that Substance cannot then be ascertained on the strength of the perception of the attribute, viz, existence, in the perception of particular objects. If existence is an attribute, it may as well be an attribute of the particular objects as of that supposed Substance. There is no proof attainable on the basis of normal experience that existence is an attribute only and exclusively of an unknown Substance.

Lastly, if the very notion of Existence as such involves the notions of Infinity, absoluteness, consciousness and blissfulness, and these are not taken as different attributes of Existence, then the perception of Existence cannot be divorced from the perception of Infinity etc. In that case either Existence would not be perceived along with the perception of particular objects or every particular object would be perceived as infinite, absolute, conscious and blissful; that is to say, either there would be the perception of existenceless particular objects or there would be the perception of only one infinite absolute conscious Existence, and no particular object would be perceived.

Thus we find no logically consistent interpretation of our normal experience, by means of which it can be maintained that the perception of particular existent objects involves

the perception of one absolute differenceless attributeless Existence and that the particular objects are but illusory appearances on the substratum of Existence.

(h) Recognition of non-dual Existence through the sameness of perception not warrantable.

Some advocates of the doctrine of Absolute attributeless Existence try to prove the perception of the Existence-Substance in another way. They hold that when we perceive a particular object as existent, there are not two processes of perception, one of the object and another of existence, in which case the object and existence might be differentiated from each other. But in one single process of perception the object and the existence are perceived together. Being the objects of one undivided process of perception, the particular object and the existence must be accepted as non-different from each other. This does not of course mean that the particular object is the existence or the existence is the particular object or that the particular object and the existence are the two names for indicating the same reality. But both the particular object and Existence appear to the perceiving mind as non-different from each other, in the same way as the earthen pot and earth are perceived as non-different from each other because of their being the objects of the same process of perception.

But this argument for proving the non-difference of Existence and the particular object is not valid, because the sameness of the process of perception does not necessarily indicate the non-difference of its objects. This is evident in cases of the perception of an aggregate of particular objects. Take the case of perception of a forest

consisting of a large number of trees or of a class consisting of a large number of students. In such cases the particular trees or students are perceived by the same act of perception. On account of the unity of the act of perception, the idea of a unity, in the sense of an aggregate, arises in the mind, but the differences of the particular objects constituting the aggregate are not merged in the unity of the aggregate, and these objects cannot be regarded as non-different from one another. In the same way even if it be admitted that the existence and the particular object are perceived together by the same act of perception, we cannot be aware that the one is non-different from the other, but we can only know the unity in them in the sense of aggregate or togetherness. Thus we find that the perception of Existence as the one identical substance in and through the perception of the diversities of the particular objects can by no means be logically established. Hence the claim that one absolute attributeless differenceless Existence is the ultimate Reality and that it can be proved on the evidence of normal experience fails to substantiate itself.

(2)

The Conception of Consciousness as the changeless witness of all inner and outer facts of experience Examined.

Now about consciousness. The main argument on which the existence of one changeless attributeless consciousness behind the changing world of mind and matter is sought to be established is that remembrance cannot be explained without the recognition of an eternal consciousness as the witness of the subjective as well as the objective world. It is argued that witness-consciousness is the neces-

sary implication of remembrance,—the term 'necessary implication' meaning a postulate which must be taken for granted to account for the phenomenon of remembrance, but which cannot itself be substantiated by any other independent evidence. But necessary implication can be regarded as a proof of the existence of something, when that something involves no self-inconsistency or inconsistency with other established truths, and when it is the exclusive means of adequately accounting for the phenomenon in question and all other possible rival hypotheses are proved to be false or inadequate for the purpose. In the case in point, first it is to be established that by the recognition of witness-consciousness alone, remembrance can be explained. That the existence of a changeless attributeless differenceless consciousness as the ultimate Reality cannot be established by any valid independent means, i e. on the strength of the generally recognised sources of valid knowledge, has been already shown. Here we are to examine mainly the arguments by which the advocates of the view try to prove that without the recognition of such a consciousness as the changeless self-luminous witness behind all the mental states and functions, remembrance and other phenomena of the mind cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

(a) Witness-consciousness cannot explain remembrance of waking, dream and sleep.

It is argued by the exponents of this view that the witness-consciousness must be taken for granted as the only possible ground of the explanation of the stages of waking, dream and dreamless sleep and the remembrance of them as belonging to the same individual.

But by logical examination of this position we find that a changeless neutral eternal consciousness cannot explain these states. Because the three states do not remain at the same time, they become recognised through the help of remembrance. But this remembrance is not possible in eternal changeless consciousness. Remembrance requires that the previous experience should remain in the subtle condition in the consciousness and it should be revived and reproduced in it afterwards. Hence to account for the fact of remembrance of the states of waking, dream and sound sleep, the advocates of the view are required to admit that consciousness itself passes through these states and the impression of each state remains in a subtle condition in it. This implies that consciousness is to be admitted as subject to these modifications or changes of states. But this admission would involve the abandonment of the changeless eternal consciousness as the neutral witness of the states. Thus the witness-consciousness is not proved by these changing states.

Advocate—To explain these stages we also recognise the changing phenomenal consciousness (वृत्तिज्ञान) illumined by the changeless self-luminous eternal consciousness. These different stages are experienced and their impressions conserved and reproduced by this phenomenal consciousness, which accounts for the validity of remembrance. The eternal changeless consciousness, which illumines these states, their experiences, their impressions and their remembrance and in the absence of which they would not be manifested and unified, transcends this phenomenal consciousness and is not affected by the process of knowledge and change of states.

Critic—Here let us ask, whether through the production and destruction of each particular experience the subject

of the experience also becomes transformed or not. If it is said that the subject also becomes transformed, then again the question : Does the whole subject or only a part of it become transformed ? If the whole becomes transformed, then as with the destruction of the particular experienced state, its subject also is destroyed, it can not be existent at the time of remembrance, and therefore this remembrance cannot be explained by it. The whole subject being destroyed along with the destruction of its experienced state, it cannot be regarded as existing as the witness and rememberer of the destruction of that state. If it is said that only a part of the subject is transformed, then along with the disappearance of the state, that part of the subject, which experienced it, will also disappear, thus there will remain none to remember. Nor can it be said that the experience of the part will be remembered by the whole. If the whole is different from its part, then it cannot remember the experience of the part. In case they are different, there cannot be between them the relation of the part and the whole. If they are non-different, then the whole will be destroyed with the part, so it cannot be called the whole, nor can any subject remain to remember the experienced things. If it is asserted that through the rise and destruction of temporal states and their experiences, their subject is not affected, then it should not be recognised as modified phenomenal consciousness as distinct from the supposed unmodified eternal consciousness and those temporal states should not be reckoned as its modifications. Thus the recognition of mind-stuff or the phenomenal consciousness would be useless for the purpose of explaining remembrance, because either it is destroyed along with the destruction of the particular states and experiences, or being changeless and wholly untouched by those states and experiences it does not retain any impression of them and

cannot therefore reproduce them. Hence neither one changeless consciousness alone nor the phenomenal consciousness side by side with the eternal consciousness can explain the remembrance of the stages and experiences of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. Hence the existence of the eternal consciousness cannot be established on the ground that it is necessary to be postulated for explaining the fact of the remembrance of these different states of consciousness.

(b) The Doctrine of Consciousness as the witness of mental modifications Examined.

Another argument which is adduced to prove the existence of the witness-consciousness is that there must be one permanent changeless knower of all phenomenal cognitions which are modifications of the mind-stuff. As among the successive cognitions one cannot make another its object, there would be no unification of knowledge and remembrance of the past in the future in the absence of one unmodified permanent knower which illumines them all and to which they appear. It is further asserted that these phenomenal cognitions being the modifications of the mind-stuff are non-different from it and at the same time it is maintained that the mind-stuff, which is modified into those cognitions, remains as an abiding entity inspite of the production and destruction of these cognitions.

Now, this position is not logically tenable. If modifications and the modified are non-different, then owing to the abiding of the modified support, its modifications, viz. the particular cognitions, will also abide, and consequently there should be no appearance and disappearance of phenomenal knowledge. If there is one mind and if the modifications were non-different from it, then a variety of

knowledge could not take place, but there is the experience of the successive production and destruction of various cognitions. On the other hand if the mind and its modifications are regarded as non-different and the production and destruction of the cognitions are also admitted, then when a modification passes away, the mind should also disappear; that is to say, the mind-stuff would be destroyed. If the modified abides even after modifications have passed away, then the non-difference of the two will not be substantiated. So the modification of the mind and consequently the particular cognitions cannot be logically explained on the supposition of the non-difference of modifications and the modified. If to evade this difficulty, it is supposed that they are different, then there would be no ground for regarding the phenomenal cognitions as the modifications of the mind, because the cognitions would be as good as other objects appearing externally to the mind and the mind would remain merely as an unmodified witness. In that case the witness-consciousness need not be recognised for the explanation of those temporal cognitions. Further, in that case there should remain no distinction between the internal and the external objects of experience, and the relation between the mind and the objects of knowledge also could not be established. Thus knowledge cannot be explained by regarding the particular cognitions either as non-different from the mind or as different from it. Hence the relation between the mind and the particular phenomenal cognitions must be regarded as inexplicable in terms of difference and non-difference.

Even granting mind and its modifications, consciousness cannot be proved as their unmodified knower (witness) by being related or proximate.

Moreover, admitting that the particular cognitions are the modifications of the mind and that this mind as a modi-

fying entity retains its identity in and through the transitory cognitions that are produced and destroyed, how can the neutral presence of one changeless consciousness account for these modifications of the mind and the remembrance of them? To answer this question the relation between the mind and this consciousness has to be ascertained. If the consciousness be regarded as the actual knower of the particular modifications of the mind, then these modifications must be conceived as the objects of the knowledge of that consciousness. In that case with the production and destruction of the particular modifications of the mind in the shape of transitory cognitions of particular objects, there should be changes in the consciousness itself. The knowledge of the particular cognitions, the retention of them in memory and the reproduction of them at the time of recollection should all be in that case the functions of this consciousness. Such consciousness cannot be regarded as the eternal changeless consciousness. If it be said that all these functions are the functions of the mind, then the mind should be regarded as itself the knower of its own modifications and capable of retaining and reproducing them; in that case the recognition of the transcendent consciousness becomes superfluous. If it be argued that the mind being not self-illumining, the presence of the transcendent consciousness is necessary to illumine and reveal its modifications, then the question should arise, does this self-illumining consciousness illumine and reveal these mental modifications by being related to the mind or by remaining unrelated to it. If it is related to the mind, it cannot remain untouched and unaffected by its modification and therefore cannot be said to be eternally changeless and attributeless. Further, it may be asked, is this relation eternal or temporary? If the relation is eternal, the mind

should always be illuminated, and in that case all its past modifications should be equally illuminated and always remain as shining objects of its knowledge along with the present modifications. There would then be no room for forgetfulness or deep sleep or any unconscious state of the mind. If on the other hand the relation be regarded as produced, the temporary presence and absence of relation has to be accounted for and some cause for producing and breaking the relation has to be discovered. If any such cause be admitted, the relation between that cause with consciousness on the one side and mind on the other has to be ascertained, and similar difficulties will arise. Moreover, the production and cessation of relation with the mind and its modification cannot but affect the consciousness and rob it of its changeless character.

If it be said that there is really no relation between the consciousness and the mind, then it is unintelligible how the mind and its modifications can be illuminated by the consciousness with which it has no relation. If on account of the mere presence of the consciousness in the proximity of the mind, the mind is said to imbibe the character of the consciousness, then there is no reason why owing to the same proximity the consciousness should not imbibe the character of the mind and admit of modifications. Here again the question would arise whether the proximity is eternal or occasional, and we should be faced by the same difficulties as mentioned above. Then again it will be asked, what is the nature of this proximity? Does it mean any spatial nearness? In that case both the consciousness and the mind should have to be regarded as occupying space, but this is a property of material objects of sense-perception. Does it mean temporal proximity? In that case

they should be reduced to events in time. How otherwise can we form an idea of the nature of proximity ?

The arguments in favour of witness-consciousness and their refutation : The supposition of the inexplicable relation between mind and witness-consciousness is no solution.

Being unable to define and establish any real relation or real proximity between the changeless consciousness and the modifying mind, the exponents of this theory argue that the consciousness is not the real knower of the mind and its modifications in the sense in which we generally understand the term, that it does not pass through any actual process of knowledge with the successive mental modifications as the objects and does not therefore undergo any change or modification ; nor does the mind become a really conscious entity by imbibing the character of the consciousness. The mind passes through various kinds of modifications ; the particular cognitions, their retention in memory, their reproduction at the time of recollection, are the modifications of the mind, and the mind preserves its identity in and through all these modifications. But consciousness cannot be a property of such a changing being as the mind. The mind and its modifications must therefore appear to and be illumined by a changeless consciousness in order that they may reveal themselves and function according to their own nature. The relation or the proximity of the consciousness and the mind is admittedly indefinable in terms of logical categories. But still some indefinable inexplicable relation must be postulated in order to explain the possibility of the mental modifications viz. the manifestation of the particular cognitions, their retention and reproduction. The relation being inexplicable in logical

terms may be said to be an 'apparent relation'. On account of this apparent relation, the mind appears to become a permanent self-conscious Ego with its own modifications as the objects, and the consciousness also appears to undergo modifications and to be influenced by the diversities and the impurities of the mind. But in truth, the consciousness remains eternally untouched by these modifications, diversities and impurities, because without the recognition of such a transcendent nature of the consciousness, these facts cannot be explained.

Now, in reply to this sort of arguments the critics may retort that if for the purpose of furnishing a logical explanation to the facts of actual experience one is required to have recourse to some principle which is itself logically indefinable, inexplicable and unjustifiable, it is more logical and more sincere to admit that these facts themselves are incapable of being logically accounted for. We have shown in the earlier part of this discussion as well as on previous occasions how difficult it is to maintain logically that any substance like the mind modifies itself into diverse particular forms and at the same time preserves its identity unimpaired throughout all these changes. In the present case it is necessary to show that it is not only possible for the mind to retain its identity amidst all these modifications, but also that it is possible for it to make those modifications the objects of its knowledge, to conserve the impressions of the past modifications within its bosom while the present modifications are going on, to rouse these impressions and reproduce them in the forms of fresh modifications on any future occasions, to link together all these modifications and to experience them as belonging to the same ego, and so on. The changeless neutral consciousness, which is supposed to throw light on these

functions of the mind to make them appear on the scene, does not throw any light on the problem as to how all these functions are possible for the same mind. If the consciousness is allowed to intervene in supplying grounds for these functions, it can no longer be regarded as neutral, functionless and changeless. Now, if all these functions of the mind are accepted unquestionably on the ground of general experience, what is the harm in regarding this mind as endowed with the property of consciousness as well on the same ground of general experience ? If it be said that various insoluble logical difficulties arise from such a supposition, the answer would be that the supposition of a changeless functionless self-luminous consciousness also does not solve the logical difficulties and that the supposition of an inexplicable relation between the mind and the consciousness, an illusory appearance of the Ego-hood of the mind due to this inexplicable relation, a neither-real-nor-unreal ignorance as the cause of this relation, and so on and so forth, is virtually an admission of the insolubleness of the logical difficulties.

The detailed examination of the doctrine of apparent or illusory relation as well as of the absolute unity of the changeless consciousness in this kind of relation to all individual minds will be given in another connection. For the present from the above discussion we find that the existence of the changeless witness-consciousness cannot be established logically on the ground that it must be admitted as the permanent knower of the mental modifications.

(c) Witness-consciousness cannot be admitted as the explanation of stream-cognition.

Another argument to prove the witness-consciousness is that it is necessary to admit it for explaining what is

known as the stream-cognition (धाराज्ञान). It is held that when I remember a case of a continuous series of cognitions having the same particular thing as their object, I remember three distinct entities inseparably inter-related, viz. the ego as the subject of these cognitions, the particular thing as the object, and the series of cognitions forming a continuous stream. If these three are not known by one knower, which remains un-modified throughout, this remembrance cannot be accounted for. Since one cognition cannot be the cogniser of another cognition, the knowledge of the continuity of the series would be impossible without the witness. That it is the same object which is cognised in all these cognitions would also not be known and the unity of the ego also would not be experienced without it. But this also is not an invincible argument to prove the changeless consciousness, because the remembrance referred to here cannot be logically explained by the recognition of the eternal unchanging neutral witness-consciousness. If this consciousness is, as it is conceived, absolutely unconcerned with the particular cognitions and their object and the factors related together in the said remembrance, it cannot be regarded as their knower or rememberer and can be of no help in accounting for this knowledge and remembrance ; and if on the other hand it makes them its objects of knowledge and remembrance, it should be regarded as itself modified and altered, and should, according to their own process of reasoning, presuppose another knower and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor the recognition of a phenomenal consciousness can be of any help in avoiding the difficulty, because either this changing phenomenal consciousness with its objects should be the object of this transcendent changeless consciousness, in which case the same objections will again arise, or it should be the object of another pheno-

menal consciousness, and that again of another, and so on, in which case there will be an infinite regression.

Witness-consciousness as the explanation of the ignorance about all things other than the object of stream-cognition cannot be accepted.

There is another argument to prove the necessity of recognising the existence of a changeless self-illumining consciousness. After the continuous flow of knowledge of any particular object, when we look back upon that state of the mind, we remember that we did not so long know anything else. This means that we have the remembrance of the ignorance about all things other than the particular object of that stream-cognition. If this ignorance had not been experienced at the time of the said continuous knowledge, it could not have been the object of recollection afterwards. This ignorance must therefore be regarded as having been experienced. But it cannot be the object of experience to the mind, because then the mind would be modified into the form of ignorance and the said knowledge would in that case be impossible. The mind cannot be modified into knowledge and ignorance at the same time. Further, it is not possible for the mind to know its own ignorance, because knowledge and ignorance contradict each other. Hence to explain the fact of the remembrance of the ignorance, this ignorance must be regarded as the object of the eternal changeless transcendent consciousness. Knowledge and ignorance are both illumined by this self-luminous consciousness, and afterwards as knowledge is revived in memory, so ignorance also is revived in memory. Hence the transcendent consciousness must be recoguised to account for the remembrance of ignorance.

Now, this way of establishing the changeless consciousness as the transcendent knower of ignorance is also not satisfactory, because it cannot supply any logically sufficient and consistent explanation for the fact referred to. What is the nature of this ignorance? Is it a positive entity or merely the absence of knowledge with regard to any object? If it be regarded as a positive entity, what is its relation to the mind on the one hand and the consciousness on the other? If ignorance be regarded as existing side by side with the mind, then as the cognitions about particular object are conceived as modifications of the mind-stuff, so the particular cases of ignorance with regard to particular objects must also be conceived as modifications of this ignorance-stuff. Now, if these particular modifications of ignorance be the objects of the knowledge of the transcendent consciousness, then all the difficulties, mentioned before, associated with the conception of the particular modifications of the mind as the objects of that consciousness, should unanswerably be present in this case as well. Further, if ignorance be a positive entity, how can it take as its objects all the things of the universe save and except the particular object of the particular stream-cognition of the time? In our experience we recollect that we were ignorant of all other things of the world; how can this recollection be explained by means of this theory? Moreover, supposing that the transcendent consciousness experiences the particular modification of ignorance in the form of the ignorance of all other objects, it may be asked, when this particular modification disappears, where should the impression left by it be conserved in order that it may be an object of recollection afterwards? If it be said that it is retained in the consciousness, then the consciousness, being not merely the knower or illuminator of the modifi-

cation of ignorance, but also the recipient of its impression and the retainer and reproducer of it, cannot be regarded as unaffected by it. If, on the other hand, the impression of the modification is conserved in the ignorance itself, then the recollection also, instead of being in the form of knowledge, ought to be in the form of ignorance, that is to say, there should in that case be no recollection at all.

Remembrance is a form of knowledge and as such it should be regarded as a modification of the faculty of knowledge and not of the faculty of ignorance. If a particular ignorance, i. e. an ignorance of particular objects, be a modification of the faculty of ignorance as distinct from the faculty of knowledge, how can it be revived as a modification of the faculty of knowledge, i. e. of the mind. The experience of one cannot be the object of remembrance to another that has not experienced it. It may be said that the ignorance and the mind are so related that the modification of the ignorance may appear in a different form as the modification of the mind. But what can be the character of that relation? The answer may be that the transcendent consciousness being the knower or illuminator of both establishes the relation between the two. But the question is, are the ignorance and the mind illumined by the consciousness on account of any real relation between them and this consciousness? We have already found that various logical difficulties arise, when we try to form a definite conception of the relation between the mind and the consciousness. Similar difficulties are sure to arise if we try to form a definite conception of the relation between the transcendent consciousness and the positive modifying faculty of ignorance. Even if it be agreed that the consciousness, though remaining neutral and unaffected by the modifications of

the ignorance and the mind, can illumine them, how can it explain the reappearance of a modification of the ignorance in the form of a modification of the mind ?

Advocate.--The consciousness, when illumining the modification of the ignorance, becomes illusorily identified with it and through this illusory identification it becomes the knower of this modification. Through similar illusory identification the mind,—the faculty of knowledge—is also illumined by the consciousness. Hence the mind and the ignorance, being both identified with the consciousness, become related together, and the impression of the modification of the ignorance is transmitted to the mind and revived there in the form of recollection.

Critic.—The difficulties of recognising a relation of illusory identification have been discussed elsewhere. It is virtually an admission that the problem is insoluble. Further, admitting this illusory identification, do the knowledge and the ignorance become identified with the consciousness at the same time or at different times ? If at different times, then the knowledge of one thing and the ignorance of other things cannot occur at the same time, and the recollection that at the time of knowing this I was ignorant of other things would be falsified. If they occur at the same time, do the knowledge and the ignorance retain their distinct characteristics at the time of this identification or not ? If they do not, the actual knowledge of something and ignorance of other things would not be possible. If they remain different at the time of the identification with the same Reality, it is difficult to explain why these two mutually antagonistic faculties should not negate or destroy each other. As they do not actually destroy each other, it must be admitted

that in spite of their identification with the same consciousness, they are not mutually related. Consequently it remains unexplained how the impression of the modification of the ignorance can be transmitted to the faculty of knowledge and reproduced there in the form of its modification as recollection. As the last resort, it should be said that the consciousness really experiences this modification of the ignorance and retains its impression in a subtle state and then infuses it into the faculty of knowledge. In that case the consciousness would not be a neutral inactive changeless consciousness as it is conceived to be, but would be reduced to a phenomenal consciousness admitting of activities and changes of states.

Thus we find that if the ignorance be conceived as a positive entity distinct from and independent of the mind or the faculty of knowledge, the remembrance of any particular ignorance cannot be accounted for even by an appeal to the supposed transcendent consciousness. If by abandoning this position, a causal relation be admitted between the mind and the ignorance, or knowledge and ignorance be regarded as states or experiences of the same self-conscious self-modifying permanent ego, the recoguition of the transcendent consciousness becomes superfluous for the purpose in view. Into the logical difficulties of these alternative suppositions, we need not enter here, because we are at present concerned only with the examination of the reasoning for the establishment of the transcendent consciousness.

So far we have discussed whether the necessity of recognising the existence of the transcendent changeless consciousness can be proved to account for the recollection of any particular ignorance, on the assumption that ignorance

is a positive entity like knowledge. Let us now consider the position which would arise by the acceptance of the other alternative, viz., that the ignorance remembered in this case is merely the absence of the knowledge about those objects. If it be held that the absence of the knowledge of other objects at the time of the continued knowledge of any particular object is the object of recollection afterwards, then it must also be assumed that this absence of the knowledge of other objects was an object of experience at that time. If it had not been experienced, it could not be remembered and reproduced afterwards. Hence the question is, whether the absence of knowledge can be an object of experience at all. If for the sake of the possibility of remembrance, it is held that it can be an object of experience, then, it should be asked, by what can it be experienced? This should lead to the question, what is the nature of this ignorance, considered as the absence of knowledge? Knowledge is regarded as a particular modification of the mind. Accordingly, this negative ignorance can be conceived as the absence of that modification. Now, where can this absence of knowledge reside and to what object can it be related? Suppose, a pot is the object of knowledge. The absence of this knowledge must also refer to the pot as its object and it can reside in the mind, not at the time when the pot is known, but at other times. As after the stream-cognition of a pot we remember that we had been ignorant of all other things, the possibility of the absence of the knowledge of all other things must therefore imply the presence of the knowledge of all other things at the time of the recollection or at least at some other time. But the knowledge of all other things can never be present to the mind, i. e. the mind can never modify itself into the knowledge of all other things. Consequently the absence of this knowledge also cannot reside in the mind, and there-

fore there is no possibility of its being the object of remembrance. It may be said that the absence of the knowledge of all other things does not presuppose the actual knowledge of all other things; the remembrance referred to merely implies that nothing but the pot was then the object of knowledge, i. e. there was the absence of the knowledge of *non-pot*. Then the question would be, was *non-pot* at any time the object of actual knowledge? Evidently it was not. The knowledge of non-pot itself follows from the knowledge of the pot. The absence of the knowledge of non-pot cannot therefore be an object of remembrance, but only of inference. Further, even if it be accepted that the knowledge of the non-pot is possible, and therefore its absence also can be recognised, then it must be admitted that the experience of the absence of the knowledge of the non-pot must at the same time involve the memory of the knowledge of the non-pot. In that case to account for the recollection in question, it must be admitted that along with the continuous flow of the knowledge of the pot there is the recollection of the previous knowledge of the non-pot or all things other than the pot, as well as the experience of the absence of this knowledge at that time. This is evidently impossible, because the knowledge of the pot cannot proceed continuously, if it is intervened by the said recollection and the said experience. Thus we find that the experience of the absence of the knowledge of all other things at the time of the stream-cognition and its recollection afterwards cannot be consistently established. Hence this can be of no use in proving the transcendent consciousness.

Advocate.—The continued knowledge of the pot and the absence of the knowledge of all things other than the pot are both experienced and illumined by the transcendent

consciousness. Since the experience of the transcendent consciousness is altogether of a different character from the knowledge arising out of the modification of the mind and does not involve any process or modification, there is no incompatibleness between this experience and the said continued knowledge in the mind, and hence remembrance also can be accounted for.

Critic.—This position also can not be logically estab lished. When a particular modification of the mind is illumined by the supposed transcendent consciousness, it becomes a phenomenal experience, and it can be retained in memory and revived in recollection. But when there is no modification of the mind, the said transcendent consciousness has nothing to illumine, it exists in its own eternal self-luminous character and produces no phenomenal experience. If without the modification of the mind, it could produce any actual phenomenal experience, then the entire world would always be the object of our phenomenal knowledge. Hence the question is, does the absence of the knowledge of all things other than the pot mean the absence of the modification of the mind into any form other than into the form of the knowledge of the pot, or does it imply another form of the modification of the mind? If it implies the absence of modification, it cannot be illumined by the transcendent consciousness into any actual experience capable of being retained in memory and reproduced into the form of a recollection. If it be regarded as some form of the modification of the mind, then the modifications of the mind into the form of the knowledge of the pot and into the form of the absence of the knowledge of other things must go on either simultaneously or successively. They cannot go on simultaneously, because the mind cannot be modified into the form of knowledge and the form of

the negation of knowledge at the same time. If they go on successively, the continuity of the flow of knowledge cannot remain unbroken. Hence it is found that the transcendent consciousness cannot furnish any logically tenable explanation for the remembrance of the ignorance taken in the sense of the absence of knowledge.

Thus whether ignorance is taken in the sense of a positive entity or in the sense of the mere absence of knowledge, in no case can the fact of the remembrance of the ignorance of other objects associated with the continued knowledge of any particular object can be adequately and consistently accounted for by the supposition of one transcendent consciousness as the changeless self-luminous knower.

(d) Witness as the knower of the cause-effect-relation between any two mental modifications cannot be proved.

Another argument to prove the necessity of the witness-consciousness is that the cause-effect-relation that subsists between any two mental modifications (such as the knowledge of dancing and joy) cannot be known, unless these mental modifications and the invariable sequence between them are experienced by such a consciousness as transcends all these mental modifications and remains changeless in and through these changes. But the knowledge of this causal relation can not be logically proved to be attainable even by admitting this changeless consciousness, which being immutable in nature cannot be the actual knower of such a relation.

By analysis of the knowledge of the cause-effect-relation between two entities, we find that it involves a knowledge of the cause, a knowledge of the effect and a

knowledge of the immediate invariable succession between them. Now, when the cause and the effect are both mental modifications, the transcendent consciousness, which is supposed to be their knower, must not only experience them, but also compare them and establish the relation of succession between them. As the effect follows the cause, at the time of the experience of the effect, the cause is not the object of direct experience, and at the time of the establishment of the causal relation between the two, both may be events of the past. Hence it is the idea of the preceding mental modification that has to be compared to the idea of the succeeding mental modification, and the relation of invariable succession between them is to be established. Now, if it is the supposed transcendent consciousness that is to be regarded as the source of the knowledge of this causal relation, then this consciousness has to be conceived as not only capable of knowing the mental modifications as they occur, but also of forming, retaining and reproducing ideas about them and comparing them with one another. This would imply that the consciousness is capable of modifying itself into the forms of those ideas and at the same time making those modifications the objects of its experience, and it would also imply its active function of comparing those ideas and establishing relation between them. But the recognition of all such capacities and functions and of the self-modifications with self-identity of the transcendent consciousness would mean the abandonment of its eternally changeless functionless attributeless neutral character. If it be said that the consciousness only illumines through its eternal self-luminous character the particular modifications of the mind as they present themselves to it and through that illumination they become apparently identified with it and objects of its experience, then the relation of succession

between any two mental modifications,—not to speak of their invariable succession—can in no way be the object of its experience, because this relation is not a mental modification. Further, how can the time-sequence be an object of experience to the consciousness, which has no relation to the temporal phenomena ? Being a changeless immutable self-luminous entity, it should always be of the nature of the experience of Eternity, i. e. sequenceless Time. The consciousness of the sequence in time would imply a modification of the consciousness in accordance with the changes in time. Thus it is found that the knowledge of the cause-effect-relation between the mental modifications cannot be consistently explained by reference to the absolutely changeless self-luminous consciousness.

Further, even admitting that the said consciousness, though immutable, can experience the mental modifications, in order to know the cause-effect-relation, it must know the destruction (negation) of the cause, viz. the previous mental modification and the prior negation of the effect, viz. the succeeding modification. But these cannot be known by the witness. According to them, the mental modifications are apprehended by the witness ; but can they consistently maintain that their negation or absence also is apprehended by it ? When they hold that the negation of knowledge in the pot and other material things is apprehended not by the witness, but by the source of valid knowledge called non-apprehension, they should for the sake of consistency admit that the negation of knowledge is everywhere to be apprehended through the same source.

Advocate.—Whatever is known by anyone, its negation also must be known by the same. Hence we admit that both knowledge and its negation are known by the witness.

Critic.—Consistently with your admission, you cannot cite this rule. In the case of the knowledge of the absence of the pot on the ground, the operation of sense-organs, you say, is exhausted in knowing the ground, but the absence of the pot there is known by a new source of valid knowledge viz. non-apprehension which has no other operation besides giving this knowledge. Hence though the pot is known by sense-organs, the negation of the pot is not known by sense-organs. Thus, you yourself violate your own rule.

Thus it is shown that negation of knowledge should be known by non-apprehension and cannot be known by the witness whose function it is not to know negation. Besides, when you say that knowledge is directly known by the witness, you must admit that knowledge is present because, according to you, only that which is present can directly be known by the witness. So when the knowledge is present, its negation will not be found. That is, if either of these two, namely knowledge and its negation, exists, the other will not exist. When negation is not present, its identity with the witness-consciousness is not possible. Consequently it cannot be directly apprehended by the witness whose direct apprehension, according to you, is nothing but the identity of the object with it. Moreover, the perception of negation is always qualified in character, in as much as it requires the knowledge of the substratum of negation and the remembrance of its counter-entity; but the witness is taken as devoid of all qualifications, so it cannot have the perception of negation. Besides, negation is known by a source of valid knowledge called non-apprehension; therefore it cannot be supposed that negation will be known by a consciousness (the witness) which is

yond all sources of valid knowledge. Thus it is found that the witness-consciousness cannot be proved as the knower of the cause-effect-relation between any two mental modifications.

(e) Witness-consciousness cannot be proved as the illuminator of extramental objects with the attribute of unknownness.

There is another argument to establish the changeless self-luminous witness-consciousness. When I experience an extramental object, this knowledge of the thing is attended with the knowledge that the thing existed independently of my knowledge from beforehand, but it was unknown to me. This implies that the thing had, before my knowledge of it, the property of unknownness, which was destroyed by the property of knownness, which was produced in it when it became the object of my experience. Now, this property of unknownness cannot be regarded as pertaining to the nature of the thing, for in that case it could not have been destroyed by my knowledge and my knowledge of the thing also would have been impossible. This property, therefore, must be regarded as owing to my ignorance of the thing. Since this ignorance could neither be a modification of my mind nor a self-existent and self-revealing reality, it must be a positive entity distinguished from my mind and owing its existence and revelation to a transcendent self-existent and self-luminous consciousness. Again, as this ignorance is the material cause of the property of unknownness of an object external to me, and as it is an admitted principle that the material cause must exist in the place where its effect is experienced, it must be accepted that this ignorance also has an existence outside of myself. From this it follows

as a matter of course that the consciousness by which this ignorance is sustained and revealed must also be present outside of myself. Now, since all the external objects of my experience must have the property of unknownness prior to my knowledge of them, the existence of ignorance must be admitted everywhere in the objective world and consequently the consciousness also must be recognised to be immanent everywhere as the sustainer and revealer of this ignorance.

Further, since the consciousness is the sustainer and revealer not only of ignorance, but also of knowledge, the properties of unknownness and knownness of things should both be regarded as ultimately due to the presence of this consciousness. As the known and the unknown things constitute the entire universe, the transcendent consciousness must be conceived as all-pervading.

Let us now examine this argument. The argument is principally based on the recognition of the property of unknownness in the things. Here the question that immediately strikes us is, whether this property of unknownness is *objectively* present in a thing independently of its relation to any particular subject, or it appears to be only *subjectively* present in it in relation to some particular subject. If it is taken in the latter sense, then the property is there only in relation to the particular person concerned and not in the thing apart from its relation to him, and so long as the relation between the particular person and the thing is not established, the property cannot be conceived to be existent in the thing. Hence there would be no meaning in holding that the property of unknownness had been really present in the thing before I knew it and that it was destroyed by my knowledge of it. Further, if the

thing had really the property of unknownness before my knowledge of it, I could never have known this property; because when this property was present, I had no knowledge of the thing and therefore no knowledge of its property, and when I know the thing, the property of unknownness is not there. Since my knowledge of the thing and its unknownness are contradictory, they can never meet. Thus, as the presence of the positive property of unknownness in the thing in relation to me before my knowledge of it cannot be logically proved, the admission of the presence of positive ignorance as the material cause of this property is unnecessary, and its existence is unprovable. Hence the existence of the transcendent consciousness also as the sustainer and revealer of this ignorance cannot be established. Moreover, if such a property of unknownness is admitted, then in relation to every individual that does not know it, a separate property of unknownness has to be supposed, and the thing instead of having one unknownness, should have innumerable unknownnesses. In that case there should be innumerable ignorances also as the material causes of these unknownnesses. Hence the consciousness which is recognised as the sustainer and revealer of the ignorance giving rise to the property of unknownness in relation to me cannot be proved to be the same as in relation to others. In my own case also there should be the admission of different ignorances for originating unknownnesses in diverse objects. If such different ignorances in connection with different individuals as well as different objects be not admitted, the knowledge of one thing by one person ought to destroy the ignorance of all persons with regard to all things, and hence nothing should remain unknown to anybody. Thus we fail to explain with logical consistency the phenomenon of our acquisition of new knowledge of things by means of the theory that

there is a subjective property of unknownness in things, which is produced by ignorance sustained by the transcendent consciousness and which is destroyed by our knowledge of them.

Let us now consider the logical position of the theory that unknownness is an objective property of the things, arising from the objective ignorance sustained and revealed by the all-pervading transcendent consciousness. Here two questions have to be answered first, viz. whether unknownness and knownness are contradictory to each other, and whether unknownness is one or many. With regard to the first question, if they are not contradictory, then even after a thing becomes known to a person, it should remain unknown to him, because though as a result of his knowledge the property of knownness is produced in the object, the property of unknownness will not disappear. That is to say, the same thing should be known and unknown to the same person at the same time. This is obviously impossible. If they are contradictory, then as soon as any individual acquires knowledge of a thing, the property of knownness is produced in it, and the property of unknownness in it is destroyed. The objective property of unknownness being destroyed, the thing ought to appear as known to everybody. But this does not happen. It may be argued that though the property of unknownness is objective, the knowledge of the thing is dependent upon contact between the thing and the sense-organs of a particular person or the mental modification of a particular person into the form of the thing. When this knowledge becomes the destroyer of the unknownness of the thing, it does not absolutely destroy it and hence does not make it known to everybody. The knowledge being relative to a particular individual, the property of unknownness disappears only in relation to

him and not in relation to others. Now, according to this interpretation of the doctrine, the knowledge is subjective, though the property of unknownness in the thing and the ignorance which produces it are objective. Here the question is, does the knowledge of the thing acquired by a particular person (whatever may be the means of acquiring it) produce the property of knownness in the object ? If it does, how can this property of knownness be manifested in the object without destroying its property of unknownness ? How can the property of knownness appear in the thing even in relation to a single person in the presence of the objective unknownness in the same thing ? In that case two contradictory properties, viz. knownness and unknownness, should have to be conceived as equally characterising the same object, and this is against the fundamental principle of thought. Moreover, if knowledge is regarded as a property of the individual person, it may be asked, how can it produce the property of knownness in the object of knowledge ? The advocates of the view under consideration infer the presence of objective ignorance from the presence of objective unknownness in the externa object on the ground that the material cause must be present in the same region where the effect appears. By parity of reasoning knowledge also which is the cause of the property of knownness in the object, ought to be conceived as having objective existence. In that case knowledge and ignorance should both have objective existence and neither should negate the other, consequently their effects viz knownness and unknownness, should also be always the properties of every object ; as a result everything should always be known and unknown to everybody. The absurdity of such a position is beyond question.

It may be said that knownness is not an objective property of the thing, and hence the objective existence of

its cause, viz. knowledge need not be admitted ; but as the unknownness is not the product of any effort or any mental modification of any person, while its denial would be the denial of a fact of experience, its objective existence has to be admitted. In reply to this, we have to ask, what is the fact of experience that compels us to admit the objective existence of the property of unknownness in the external object ? The fact is that I know the object anew, it was existent before my knowledge and I did not know it so long. How my want of knowledge of an existent thing can compel me to admit the presence of a positive property of unknownness in the thing itself is not easily intelligible to commonsense. It can at most lead to the admission of the presence of ignorance somehow related to me, which stood in the way of my knowledge being extended to the object or which acted as a veil over my mind and obstructed its view of the object. If my knowing an object does not entitle me to infer the objective existence of knownness in the thing, my not knowing the thing also cannot entitle me to infer the objective existence of unknownness in the thing. If from my knowledge of the object I am not justified in inferring the existence of an external knowledge unrelated to any particular knowing person, then from the experience of my ignorance of the object also I am not justified in inferring the objective existence of an external ignorance unrelated to any particular person. Hence the appeal to the necessary implication of my experience of the previous absence of knowledge of particular existent objects cannot establish the objective property of unknownness in the object and the objective existence of ignorance as the cause of it.

Further, it is the generally accepted principle that two contradictory qualities cannot be present together in the

same thing at the same time. Accordingly the knowledge and the ignorance of the same thing cannot exist in me at the same time. The knowledge of a thing, when produced in me, can and must destroy the ignorance, which previously existed in me, with regard to the same thing. But if ignorance be regarded as having an objective existence independent of me and if that ignorance be regarded as the cause of the property of unknownness in the object, how can the knowledge arising in me destroy that external ignorance and remove that external unknownness ?

If we admit that the property of unknownness is actually produced in the object itself by a positive ignorance sustained and revealed by a transcendent consciousness, the second question which arises is, whether *this* unknownness is one or many. If it be one, then the disappearance of this property should also be regarded as one occurrence, produced once for all, by whatsoever cause it may be produced, and if this property of unknownness be the reason for the object not being known, its disappearance ought to make the object universally known. If it be argued that the actual knowledge of a thing by a particular person is conditional upon other co-operating causes, such as sense-contact, mind-modification, etc., then the question would be, whether the presence and absence of these so-called co-operating causes alone can or cannot adequately account for the presence and absence respectively of the knowledge of the thing. If they can, the supposition of the presence of one positive ignorance producing one positive property of unknownness in the object would be against the Law of Parsimony. Even accepting the position of the advocate that they cannot, let us take any one case in which, all the conditions for producing true knowledge of the thing are fulfilled ; should we not then admit that the ignorance

which veiled the object or produced the property of unknownness in the object is destroyed? If the ignorance and the property of unknownness it produced be regarded as destroyed by the requisite knowledge even in this one case, how can they again be objectively present in connection with that particular thing? Or are we to suppose that inspite of their destruction, it does not become known to others on account of the absence of the co-operating causes? We are thus placed between the horns of an unpleasant dilemma;—either we have to suppose that inspite of the presence of the ignorance and the unknownness pertaining to a thing a person can know it through the help of the co-operating causes, or we are to suppose that inspite of the absence of the ignorance and the unknownness other persons cannot know it owing to the absence of those causes. Thus we fail to account for the knowledge and the want of knowledge with regard to a single particular thing by reference to the theory of one objective property of unknownness originating from one positive ignorance. It need not be mentioned how infinitely more difficult and absurd the position would be, if one positive ignorance, contradictory to and destructible by phenomenal knowledge, be regarded as veiling all objects unknown to particular persons and originating the one property of unknownness in them all.

If to avoid these difficulties, many unknownnesses are admitted, then also there would be no logical ground to stand upon. It would apparently be consistent with our actual experience, because every individual person knows many things and does not know many other things, and every individual object is known to some persons and unknown to many other persons. But the logical corollary from the theory would be that every particular thing should

be regarded as possessing an indefinite number of unknownnesses and knownnesses at the same time. With the increase of the number of persons knowing it, the number of unknownnesses should decrease and the number of knownnesses should increase. However awkward the supposition may appear to be, let us for argument's sake concede it. But how can the numerous unknownnesses be distinguished from one another? If there be no mark of distinction, they should be identical and consequently reduced to one; and in that case the aforesaid difficulties should reappear. If they are to be distinguishable, each property of unknownness must be particularised. But how can a property of unknownness be particularised, except by its relation to the particular person not knowing it? Accordingly, to form a conception of the innumerable particular properties of unknownnesses pertaining to any particular thing, it must be related to all persons of the past, the present and the future, who had not, have not and will not have any occasion to come in contact with it or otherwise to have any knowledge of it. This implies that we should have to suppose actual relations among all possible objects of knowledge and all possible knowing beings in the universe. The supposition is evidently irrational.

Then the question would arise, whether one ignorance should be supposed to be the cause of all these unknownnesses or different ignorances should have to be imagined to account for different unknownnesses. It is evident that without the destruction of the ignorance that produces and sustains the property of unknownness in a thing, the property of unknownness cannot be destroyed, and that unless the property of unknownness is destroyed, the knowledge of the thing cannot be established. Accordingly, the knowledge of a thing implies the destruction of the ignorance that

is at the root of its knownness. Now, if there be one single ignorance as the cause of the unknownness of all things in the world, then the knowledge of any particular thing by any particular person would involve the destruction of that ignorance. If this ignorance disappears, there would be nothing to sustain the unknownness of other things; hence the property of unknownness would have to disappear from all things, even though they are not actually known. In that case there would be no necessary relation between the property of unknownness and its being or not being known. This is a conclusion which the advocates of the view can never admit, because in that case the very necessity of recognizing the property of unknownness and the ignorance as its cause would disappear.

If on the other hand a particular ignorance is supposed as the cause of each particular unknownness of every particular thing, there would be innumerable positive ignorances to account for the phenomena of knowing and not-knowing. Here again, in order to mark out the ignorances from one another, each must be conceived as particularised by a relation between a particular thing and a particular mind that can possibly know it. If an ignorance is thus conditioned by the relation between a thing and a mind, this ignorance must presuppose the relation, since that which is conditioned presupposes that by which it is conditioned. This would involve the supposition that every thing is related to every mind, irrespective of all temporal and spatial distances. Even if for the sake of the theory we are prepared to make such a supposition, how can such innumerable relations of innumerable actual and possible objects with innumerable actual and possible minds be defined and accounted for? None of the categories, in terms of which the relations are logically

defined can be applicable here, and no verifiable explanation can be supplied for the establishment of these relations. However, if such relations are admitted, then the conclusion should be that ignorance is the name for a particular type of relation between a mind and an object, and knowledge is the name for another particular type of relation between a mind and an object, and that these two types of relation are such that between the same mind and the same object one cannot appear without destroying the other. But this conclusion is not consistent with the view under consideration. If ignorance be regarded as a particular type of relation between a mind and an object, it cannot be conceived as a positive entity existing independently of the minds and producing the property of unknownness in the objects.

We have thus found numerous logical difficulties in the supposition that unknownness is a property of the things experienced as having been previously unknown and that ignorance is a positive entity which produces this property in those things. Now, the exponents of this theory hold that there is the changeless self-luminous transcendent consciousness which is the sustainer and illuminator of this ignorance. As a result of our foregoing discussion we may here say that as the positive property of unknownness in the things and the positive ignorance as the cause of it could not be logically established, the argument that the changeless transcendent consciousness is necessarily implied by them and is therefore to be accepted as necessarily real, becomes automatically groundless. Besides, on a previous occasion we have found that the transcendent consciousness cannot furnish an adequate explanation for the phenomenon of ignorance. Here the difficulty is increased by supposing the external objective existence of ignorance along

with the object unknown. It may be asked in this connection, whether the witness-consciousness which illumines the knowledge is the same as the consciousness which sustains and reveals the objective ignorance. The advocates of the theory cannot of course admit that they are different, because that would mean the recognition of innumerable self-luminous consciousnesses. Even if they had accepted this position, the relations among these consciousnesses could by no means be established. But the oneness of the consciousness illumining the internal knowledge and that illumining the external ignorance is a conclusion which has to be proved, and cannot be accepted without proof.

The only proof that can be accepted from the logical point of view is that it is the only adequate means of accounting for the phenomena of normal experience. Here we are concerned with the question whether the recognition of one transcendent consciousness is necessary for and capable of adequately explaining the phenomena relating to knowledge and ignorance of things. It is maintained by the exponents of this view that knowledge which consists of the modification of the mind into the forms of things and ignorance which is a positive entity apart from the mind and which produces the property of unknownness in things are both sustained and illumined by the one consciousness. It is also maintained that knowledge and ignorance are both identified with this consciousness and it is through this identification that they are revealed and they perform their respective functions. Further, the knowledge and the ignorance are regarded as antagonistic to each other.

Now, when a knowledge is revealed and is thus identified with consciousness, it is difficult to understand

how its antagonist, viz. ignorance, can also remain identified with it. If it can, then the ignorance relating to the thing which becomes the object of knowledge should not disappear with the appearance of this knowledge. If it cannot, then when one knowledge appears, all ignorance ought to disappear. But this does not happen. How then can the one consciousness explain the knowledge about one object appearing at the same time with the ignorance about other objects. If to avoid this difficulty the one consciousness be conceived as particularised by its relation to particular minds and to the external objects, then further difficulties would arise. It would not be capable of supplying any reasonable explanation of our acquaintance even with the supposed property of unknownness in the objects. The witness-consciousness is particularised by its relation to the mind, while the property of unknownness is in the outside thing and the ignorance which is its cause is also in that external region; so neither the unknownness nor the ignorance is related to this witness. Hence according to this view, there cannot be the perception such as 'I do not know the pot'. To explain : The individual ignorance (तूलाविद्या), which is seated in the consciousness particularised by the thing, cannot be experienced as in touch with the knower particularised by the mind. It may be supposed that there is ignorance in the consciousness particularised by the mind ; so ignorance is not distant from the said consciousness. But this is not true. The individual ignorance related to the consciousness particularised by the thing cannot be said to be the same as or non-different from the root-ignorance (मूलाविद्या) which is in relation to the consciousness particularised by the mind. It cannot be said that by its mere relation with consciousness, the unknownness of the pot may be the object of perception, because in that case there will be an unwarrantable stretch and in that

case there should have been the perception of the unknown-ness of the thing even long before its normal knowledge; but this is not experienced. Nor can it be said that by the mental cognition which eliminates the unknownness of the thing, this property of unknownness in it will be revealed, because the former has no relation with the latter. Thus, it is shown that in no way can the alleged illumination by the witness-consciousness explain our acquaintance with the unknownness of the object. If you say that there is a 'simple relation' (the 'Swarupa'-relation) between the seer and the seen, the consciousness and the object, then it can be pointed out that the illogical character of the simple relation (oneself cannot be one's own, etc.) has already been shown. Moreover, if the alleged simple relation be a relation, then in the case of the attribute and the substance and the like, it will be the relation; hence the recognition of the relation of identity will be to no purpose. Besides, you cannot determine exactly what the nature of the object of consciousness is. Taking it for granted that there is a simple relation between the seer and the seen, it may be observed that as not merely the particular object concerned but all objects are so related to the seer, all of them will be equally the object of consciousness; and thus there would be no meaning in the specification of the pot, the cot etc. as its objects. The result of such a view would be that all particular usage would be removed and every object would be confused with everyother in daily practice resulting from such knowledge. If you say that the capability (योग्यता) of being the object of consciousness is the peculiar property of the pot, and as such the pot and not the cot becomes the specific object of consciousness, then the question is : how will that capability be the object of cognition ? Plainly it follows that in that case, the first capability will be known through a second capability, and the second through a third,

the third through a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus it is found that for the knowledge of a single object, an infinite number of capabilities has to be known. But infinite capabilities necessary for the cognition of a single object cannot be known in their particulars ; so they become unestablished. From a general knowledge of those capabilities alone, the nature of the object cannot be established. Thus, you cannot determine the nature of the object of consciousness and so it is meaningless on your part to speak of unknownness as the object of consciousness. In short, your assertion namely the unknownness of an object becomes revealed by the witness-consciousness is not logically tenable.

(3)

Self-luminosity of Consciousness Examined.

(A) The Doctrine of self-luminosity Explained.

Let us now consider the doctrine that consciousness is self-luminous, that self-luminosity constitutes the very nature of consciousness and is therefore absolutely inseparable from it, and that nothing other than consciousness is or can possibly be self-luminous. It is argued by the exponents of this doctrine that every concrete knowledge involves two elements, viz. an object illumined and that which illumines it. If the object itself had been self-luminous, it would have shone by its own light without being the object of knowledge. In that case its objectivity would disappear. Its very nature as an object means that its existence and character are revealed by the subject, to which it appears. The subject as the revealer should therefore be regarded as the self-luminous entity. It is further pointed out that the objects may be of various kinds and each object may be changing, but the knowledge of these

varieties and changes is possible only on the ground that they are all revealed in their relations to and by one self-luminous subject. This is true not only with regard to the external objects, but also true with regard to the mental processes, functions and modifications, in the waking as well as in the dream state. These also, being objects of knowledge, are non-self-luminous and also reveal themselves by being illumined by one self-luminous subject. It is further argued that this self-luminosity, being the essential character of the consciousness, which is the changeless subject in relation to all objects, never forsakes it. Even in the states of sound sleep, swoon or trance, the self-luminosity of consciousness remains unaffected and consciousness does not become unconscious in these states, though objective knowledge is absent. It is further maintained by the advocates of the theory, that this consciousness is not only identical in the same person throughout all changes of knowledge, all mental modifications and all vicissitudes of life, but it is also identical in all persons of all ages and all places. Thus it is sought to be established that one and only one absolute consciousness is alone the self-luminous entity in the universe.

(B) Criticism :

(a) Subjectivity does not necessarily mean Self-luminosity.

Now, let us examine first of all whether the above analysis of knowledge is sound and whether the conclusion sought to be established from it stands on a sure logical foundation. In every knowledge there is the experience that "I know the object." The experience of 'I' as the subject, the thing or change or relation as the object, and the connection between the subject and the object, invariably

appears at the same time and in the same cognition. It is only by reflection and abstraction that we separate them from one another. As the object is revealed only in relation to the subject, so the subject also is experienced only in relation to the object. As we never experience the existence and character of the object independently of the subject, so the existence and character of the subject or 'I' also is never experienced except in reference to some object, whether material or mental. Hence it may be legitimately contended that the subject of knowledge owes its self-revelation as much to the object as the latter does to the former. How can then it be unquestionably established that the subject alone is self-luminous and that the object is devoid of self-luminosity and shines by the light of the subject ?

Then again, it is not an established truth that the objectivity of any entity lies in its being non-self-luminous. It is quite conceivable that the same entity may have self-luminosity as its attribute, and that this may be known to itself or to another subject. There are many thinkers who maintain that self-luminous entities may be objects of knowledge. There is no unassailable ground for holding that self-luminosity as an attribute cannot itself be an object of thought and cognition.

(b). Self-luminous consciousness cannot be an object of knowledge.

But if with the advocates of the view in question we assume that an object of knowledge is necessarily non-self-luminous and that a self-luminous entity can never be an object of knowledge, then we are automatically led to the position that there is no means of knowing the

self-luminous subject or consciousness. Consciousness with its essential attribute of self-luminosity can be established as a real entity, only if there is any valid means of knowing it as such. Now, consistently with the position to which the exponents of this theory have led us, if there is any valid means of knowing the consciousness, it becomes an object of knowledge and must therefore be non-self-luminous, and on the other hand, if there is no means of knowing it, its self-luminosity cannot be established. Accordingly, the existence of consciousness as the self-luminous subject of knowledge is far from being proved on the strength of the nature of knowledge.

(c) Self-luminosity not proved by perception.

Moreover, if the exponents of this doctrine argue that though the self-luminous consciousness is not of the nature of the object of knowledge in general, there are some valid ways of knowing it, their inconsistency becomes palpable from the following considerations. There cannot be any perception of its self-luminosity, because according to universal admittance perception is possible only of the objects of sense-perception.

(d) Self-luminosity not proved by Inference.

Nor by inference can it be proved. Inference is produced through the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance. In order to infer through positive concomitance it should be observed somewhere. But this is not possible in the present case, because no instance of any self-luminous object can be found anywhere in the world of our experience, there being nothing else except consciousness, which is admitted by them to be self-luminous. There

is no example of the identity of the subject and the object. The light cannot be cited as an example of alleged self-luminosity. The light is known by a person through the eyes, and it cannot be regarded as the subject. Thus, light is merely an object of knowledge and not both the subject as well as the object. Now, about negative concomitance. The expression of negative concomitance must involve reference to the absence of what is to be proved (साध्याभाव). This method of inference could be applied, if we could find instances in which in the absence of self-luminosity there is the absence of the same thing being both the subject and the object. But this observation of the absence of something along with the absence of something else becomes meaningless and can lead to no conclusion, unless it is preceded by the observation of their concomitance in presence. The negative concomitance is resorted to only to strengthen or confirm the conclusion suggested by the observation of positive concomitance. In the absence of the knowledge of positive concomitance, the knowledge of negative concomitance cannot be of any use. But in the case under discussion, no relation of positive concomitance between self-luminosity and the same thing being subject as well as object of knowledge is anywhere observed in our experience; so the question of the negative concomitance demanded by the alleged inference cannot arise here at all.

(e) Self-luminosity not proved by "Arthāpatti".

The only mode of establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness, which the advocates of this view can fall back upon, is what is known as *Arthápatti* (implication), which means here that, without assuming the existence of some self-luminous consciousness, the illuminations of the non-self-luminous mental and material objects, cannot be

logically accounted for. But it may be mentioned that other schools of philosophy have also attempted to account for the processes of knowledge—the illuminations of objects,—and many of them have not resorted to the assumption of any such changeless self-luminous consciousness to attain their end. This shows that we find a plurality of rival hypotheses to account for the same class of phenomena. That this is the only hypothesis, which alone can furnish the most adequate explanation for them is not satisfactorily established. That this hypothesis also suffers from logical defects we have shown in connection with the examination of the witness-theory and are also going to show here. Besides, in our ordinary argumentations, whenever we accept *arthāpatti* as an evidence in any particular case, the existence of that which is legitimately supposed for furnishing the explanation sought for, is or has to be proved on independent grounds, and the relation of concomitance between that which is supposed to explain and that which is to be explained must also be known or has to be established by some other valid means. That some person must be taking his meals secretly at night can be accepted as a valid hypothesis for accounting for the strength and robustness of his physique from the observation of his not taking his meals at the day-time, only when the fact of meals being taken by men and the dependence of the strength and robustness upon it are known from other sources of valid knowledge. Otherwise the hypothesis suggested on the ground of *arthápatti* cannot by itself be accepted as the sufficient evidence for the existence of that agency and for the invariable causal relation between it and the phenomenon it is to explain. In the case under consideration, the very existence of the self-luminous consciousness and the necessary relation between such an unchangeable self-luminous entity and the phenomena of

knowledge are questionable and are not known from any other independent source of knowledge. The hypothesis must have reference to *vera cause*—a real cause,—i. e. a cause the reality of which can be independently known. It cannot by itself furnish an adequate evidence for the reality of the agent it supposes. Hence on the strength of *arthápatti* or valid hypothesis we cannot be sure of the existence of the self-luminous consciousness. So long as a satisfactory independent evidence of the existence of such an entity is not available, it must be regarded as a happy conjecture, but not a logical proof.

(f) Self-luminosity not proved by the Scriptures.

In the absence of the possibility of valid perception and inference, the advocates of this doctrine may fall back upon the scriptures for furnishing this independent evidence; but the weakness of this evidence we have pointed out on numerous occasions. Thus we fail to obtain an adequate proof of the existence of the self-luminous changeless consciousness behind our knowledge.

(g) Self-luminosity of Consciousness in dreamless sleep, swoon and trance not proved.

Further, it is held that self-luminosity is ever-present with consciousness, and it is not absent even at the time of sound sleep, swoon, trance etc. But what is the proof of this assumption? Is consciousness then conscious of itself? It would in that case be subject and object of knowledge at the same time. Consequently, in accordance with the fundamental assumption of the exponents of this theory, it would be self-luminous and non-self-luminous at the same time. This is obviously absurd. Further, in the waking state, we retain no memory of our self-consciousness

of the preceding states of sound sleep etc. Again, at the times of sound sleep, swoon etc., the body, the mind, the external objects are all present ; why is not the self-luminosity of consciousness reflected on them in these states ? Why are not they illumined by and revealed to consciousness ? If it be argued that on account of the absence of mental modifications, the self-luminous consciousness cannot reveal them to itself nor can it reveal itself to itself, then it follows logically that the actual luminosity of consciousness is dependent upon the mental modifications in its presence and in touch with it. In that case it may be legitimately held by the opponents of this view that the luminosity does not pertain to the essential character of consciousness, but that it is the product of the mutual relation or the action and reaction between the consciousness and the mind. Hence the self-luminosity of consciousness is not proved to the satisfaction of the requirements of logic.

(4)

The non-duality of consciousness based on self-luminosity Refuted.

Now, the exponents of this theory not only maintain that there is a permanent self-luminous consciousness in every knowing person ; but they further hold that there is one and only one self-luminous consciousness in the universe, that the knowing subject in all the apparently innumerable knowing beings is one without a second. They argue tbat one self-luminous consciousness cannot possibly be an object of the knowledge of another self-luminous consciousness, for this would contradict the very nature of self-luminosity. If there had been a plurality of such consciousness, each would have a distinct objective universe

of its own, and there would be absolutely no relation among these consciousnesses and among these universes. So far as one universe is concerned,—and this is what we can conceive—there must be only one self-luminous subject, by which all the diverse objects and events within it are illumined and manifested.

It is evident from their arguments in support of this doctrine of the non-duality of the self-luminous consciousness, that they rely for the validity of this doctrine chiefly upon the validity of their conception of the necessarily self-luminous character of the subject and the necessarily non-self-luminous character of all objects. But we have found in the foregoing discussion that this conception of the subject and the object does not itself stand on a sure logical foundation. How then can the corollaries that are drawn from it claim acceptance from men of logical thought? In course of our examination of the theory of one non-dual universal witness-consciousness, we have pointed out the logical and psychological difficulties which arise from the supposition of one such consciousness as the knower in all cases of knowledge and in all knowing individuals. We need not repeat them here. That the non-duality of the self-luminous consciousness lacks logical proof is evident from what we have already said.

(5)

The doctrine of the Identity of Existence and Consciousness Examined.

The school of thought we are discussing here has arrived at a conclusion of great philosophical importance from its unique conception of Existence and consciousness. By analysis of and reflection upon the nature of the existent

objects of the universe, these thinkers conclude that there is one infinite and eternal, changeless and attributeless, absolute Existence, which is the sole substratum of the numberless finite and transitory, relative and contingent existences, that constitute the universe. On the other hand, by analysis of and reflection upon the nature of knowledge, and the possibility of the illumination, revelation, manifestation or appearance of those existences as objects of experience and thought, they are led to the conclusion that there must be one infinite and eternal, changeless and attributeless, self-luminous knowing consciousness, which is the sole Subject, illumining and manifesting all objects. Thus the Existence is found to be the absolute ground of the phenomenal existence of all things and the Consciousness is found to be the absolute ground of the manifestation of all things,—the Existence is the sole supporter and the Consciousness is the sole revealer of the entire universe of thought and existence. Now, the question arises, what is the relation between the Existence and the Consciousness ? The exponents of the view in question assert they are not two Realities, but one and identical. If they had been different, if the ground of existence and the ground of manifestation had been two distinct Realities, there could not obviously be any connection between them. That is to say, the existent objects would remain eternally unmanifested and the manifested objects would remain eternally non-existent, and this is obviously an absurd position. Or else, we would have to recognise a unifying Principle above both the Existence and the Consciousness to bring about the connection between them and to get rid of the absurd position. But such recognition would lead us to another impossible position, for in that case the unifying Principle, being above Existence and Consciousness, would have to be

conceived as itself non-existent and non-self-luminous. Hence the Existence and the Consciousness must be conceived as the same identical Reality. The ultimate source of all being and all knowing is the same,—to exist and to be manifested, to be and to be known, must have the same ultimate Ground. This means that the Substratum of the world of diversities is the infinite and eternal, self-existent and self-luminous consciousness.

Now, let us examine the strength of this doctrine. We have previously examined the doctrine of one absolute Existence as the Substratum of all the diverse objects of the world, and we have found that there are various logical difficulties, which the doctrine cannot satisfactorily meet. We have also examined the doctrine that one universal Consciousness is the sole subject of all knowledge, the sole unchanging witness to which all objects appear, the sole self-luminous subject by the light of which all objects are manifested. The examination has shown that the existence of such a universal Consciousness is far from being logically established and even by the supposition of such a Consciousness the problems with regard to knowledge and the manifestation of the innumerable subjects and objects of the phenomenal world are not solved with logical adequacy and consistency.

Now, as the truths of the Existence and the Consciousness as supplying the ultimate explanations for the phenomena of existence and knowledge are found to be not logically established, the question of the identity or difference of them loses much of its philosophical importance. But even assuming that the Existence and the Consciousness have been separately obtained as the ultimate grounds of explanation for the existence and the knowledge of

objects, we find that the attempt at the establishment of their identity has not been quite successful. To point out the absurdities that would arise out of regarding them as two independent Realities is not enough for proving their identity, and this is particularly so in the present case, because the Existence and the Consciousness, as conceived by the advocates of the theory do not themselves stand on a secure logical foundation and are not recognised as such by other schools of thought. It may be contended by these latter that if the two ultimate conceptions arrived at by different ways of approach as a result of reflection upon two different orders of phenomena, viz. those of existence and those of knowledge, are finally found to be irreconcilable and as such contradicting each other, both of them may be abandoned and fresh attempts may be made from new stand-points to solve the problems in question.

The Three Ways to establish Identity between Existence and Consciousness Examined.

Existence and Consciousness are, to common understanding, two different conceptions. In order to establish the identity of the two, either it has to be proved that in their ultimate analysis the two conceptions are really identical,—that they are only two modes of conceiving and expressing the same Reality,—or one of them is to be resolved into and deduced from the other, or one of them is to be shown to be the attribute of the other. The first of these alternatives does not seem to be possible. Both the notion of Existence and the notion of Consciousness are admittedly elementary notions, and neither of them admits of further analysis. If they are treated as complex notions, admitting of further analysis, the whole structure of the doctrine under examination will be demolished. In

their analysis of the objective world as well as of the phenomenon of knowledge through which it finds manifestation, the exponents of this doctrine have gone to the furthest possible limit in accordance with their view-point and stopped at the conceptions of Existence and Consciousness owing to the impossibility of advancing further in this direction. Hence any attempt to prove their identity by deeper analysis would involve self-contradiction. Nor can it be maintained that they are two modes of conceiving and expressing the same Reality. Existence refers to being, and consciousness refers to knowing; Existence is that which is, and consciousness is that which knows; Existence is Substance, and Consciousness is Subject. Being and knowing cannot be regarded as the same phenomenon. That which is does not by itself mean that which knows. The fact that Something exists does not necessarily imply that it knows. Existence and Consciousness may both be characterised by infinity and eternity, unconditionalness and all-pervadingness, changelessness and attributelessness, simplicity and undividedness; but that would not imply that they are identical. The conception of Existence does not involve the notion of self-luminosity and knowingness. If the conception of consciousness be regarded as involving the notion of Existence, then either this existence has to be conceived as an attribute of consciousness, or this consciousness has to be conceived as a particularised expression of Existence, and both these alternatives would be unpalatable to the advocates of this doctrine. Thus the identity of the two notions cannot be established.

The second alternative also cannot be resorted to by the supporters of this view. The notion of Existence cannot, according to them, be resolved into and derived from that of Consciousness, nor can the latter be resolved into and

derived from the former. If Existence, as conceived by them, could by itself furnish an adequate logical explanation for the phenomenon of knowledge and the revelation of things as objects of knowledge, if without reference to the presence of a self-luminous consciousness as the witness or Subject, the illumination of the objective world could be accounted for by reference to Existence alone, then only could Consciousness be reduced into and derived from Existence, i. e. it could be regarded as a particular form of the self-expression of Existence. Then the position would be that Existence, which is in its ultimate character unconscious, (or you may call it supra-conscious, if you please) somehow manifests itself as the conscious subject and the unconscious objective world. Consciousness, in that case, would not be the ultimate Reality; it would then have only a derivative reality. Further, consciousness would then have to be conceived as derived from the unconscious. All such corollaries that should follow from the attempt at deriving consciousness from Existence would be inadmissible to the supporters of this doctrine. On the other hand it is evidently absurd to try to derive Existence from Consciousness. If Existence is to be regarded as derived from consciousness, consciousness must have to be conceived as non-existent, and we have to suppose that it is from the non-existent consciousness, that Existence is produced. Further, the existent objective world has to be conceived as being illumined and exhibited by and manifested and revealed to a non-existent self-luminous consciousness. Nothing can be more absurd than such conclusions, which inevitably follow from the conception of Existence as derived from consciousness. The exponents of this doctrine also do not of course adopt this absurd method to prove the identity of Existence and consciousness.

The third alternative remains. Either Existence may be regarded as the attribute of Consciousness, or Consciousness may be regarded as the attribute of Existence. This also is not consistent with the view under consideration, because it does not conceive either Existence or Consciousness as an attribute, but both as attributeless substance. Existence being the Substratum of the world of objective realities cannot be regarded as an attribute of anything, and Consciousness being the self-luminous witness and the ground of the manifestation of all objects, mental and extra-mental, cannot be consistently conceived as the attribute of any other Reality. Therefore the identity of the two cannot be attained by this process. Moreover, if Consciousness be a necessary attribute of Existence, and if this conscious Existence be inherent as the substratum of all objects, all objects ought to be self-illumining, shining and revealing themselves by the inner light of the attribute of consciousness inherent in their own substratum. Everything ought then to be conscious, and there should be no distinction between conscious and unconscious beings in the world. Knowledge and being should then be identical everywhere in the universe. The same difficulties would arise if Existence be taken as the attribute of Consciousness. Even if these difficulties are somehow overcome, the purpose of this school of thought would not be served. If one of them be regarded as the attribute of the other, it is the relation of Identity (तादात्म्य) that is established, but not their absolute oneness, and hence the differenceless attributeless non-duality of the ground of the existence and revelation of the world of diversities is not proved.

SECTION III.

THEORY OF CAUSATION EXAMINED

Introduction

The protagonists of the view under examination having proved Existence as non-dual substratum of the universe have, as we have noted before, attempted to establish its identity with consciousness. This consciousness they conceive as the universal self-luminous witness, without recognising which the manifestation of the universe cannot, according to them, be accounted for. After having proved the identity of Existence and consciousness they prove this ultimate Reality as the one unchanging material cause of the world. Afterwards by analysis of causation they find out that this causation is of the nature of illusory appearance and that there is another inexplicable principle as the modifying material cause of this illusion.

In our examination we have shown that the nature of Existence and Consciousness as well as their identity, as upheld by the advocates of the theory, is not tenable. Thereby their claim to have found out the ultimate changeless and attributeless material cause of the universe is also repudiated. Here we prove that their theory of causation is defective.

The Doctrine of the advocate Described : the effect has non-different existence from the cause and has unreal difference from the same: cause has higher order of reality and effect has a lower order.

They admit that there is difference as well as non-difference between the material cause and the effect. But

they also assert that the difference and the non-difference between the same two objects cannot be of the same order of reality.

They differentiate between three orders of reality, viz. absolute, phenomenal and apparent. By absolute reality they mean that which is eternally true and can never be either proved to be false under any condition or changed into any other reality. This is the highest order of reality, in comparison with which every other reality is of a lower order. By phenomenal reality they mean that which is true so far as our normal experience goes, which is established to be true by sense-observation and inference, but which is proved to be unreal by the knowledge of the absolute reality. In normal experience it is found to be subject to production, change and dissolution, and in transcendental experience it is found to be an expression or appearance of the absolute reality. By apparent reality they mean that which appears to be true under some special subjective conditions, but which is proved to be unreal when those conditions disappear. It is the appearance of phenomenal reality as something else to some individual mind under some circumstances, and when the knowledge of that phenomenal reality in its true nature is attained, this appearance vanishes. Of these three orders of reality, the apparent reality is regarded as illusory appearance or fiction of our imagination, in comparison with the order of phenomenal realities, and in our ordinary discourse the latter is spoken of as real and the former as unreal. Consequently, when there is an apparent reality by the side of a phenomenal reality, we cannot speak of them as two realities, because the one is not real in the same sense as the other, and even if the former is found to be contrary or contradictory to the latter, the latter is not really contradicted,

but the former is spoken of as illusory or imaginary or unreal. Again from the stand-point of the absolute reality all phenomenal realities also appear as illusory or unsubstantial appearances. Hence if the absolute reality is one, it does not become really many owing to the presence of numerous phenomenal realities, which are its appearances. The nature of the absolute reality is not in any way modified or influenced by these phenomenal realities, because these are as good as non-existent to it.

Now, having analysed the relation between an effect and its material cause, as we normally experience it, these philosophers point out that the effect necessarily participates in the nature of the cause, but is at the same time distinguished from it, for otherwise the cause-effect-relation would not be established. The earthen pot is substantially the same as the cause, earth, but it is also distinguished from it in respect of its special features. If the pot be not identical in essence with earth, it cannot be called its effect, and on the other hand if it be altogether identical with it and has no point of difference, then also the pot would be earth itself, and not its effect. Accordingly the effect must be regarded as identical with and at the same time different from its cause. But if identity and difference be taken as belonging to the same order of reality, they would logically contradict each other. Hence the identity and the difference between the effect and its material cause have to be so conceived that the one may not contradict the other. Havaing criticised all possible alternative conceptions with regard to the relation, they come to the conclusion that the only way in which we can logically conceive it is that the identity belongs to a higher order of reality because the substance remains the same, and the difference to a lower order, because the difference

lies only in name and form. Thus in the relation between the pot and earth, the identity between them is essential and the difference non-essential, the identity phonemenal, the difference apparent, the identity real and the difference unreal. Accordingly from the stand-point of the higher phenomenal order of reality, the earth has not become anything other than itself, the substance has not really undergone any change, it has remained identical with itself, what is called the pot is substantially identical with and not different from the earth. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the lower apparent order of reality, the pot is something different from the earth,—the effect, being taken along with its specific distinguishing features—its name and form—is distinguished from its material cause. This apparent distinction—the distinction in name and form—does not contradict the substantial and real identity, but only apparently serves as a limitation of it.

The exponents of the view warn us against regarding this relative unreality as total absence or negation of existence like that of the hare's horn or the castle in the air. The apparent reality has a positive existence; but the way in which it is perceived or conceived from the lower standpoint is invalidated, when viewed from the higher point of view. Thus the distinction between the effect and its cause is not to be regarded as altogether absent, this distinction positively exists; but the identity has a higher order of existence and from that point of view the distinction loses its importance and is regarded as non-essential and apparent.

Arguing in this way the exponents of this view assert that in every case of causal relation, the cause is the real essence of the effect, and the effect is an apparent form of

manifestation of the cause,—that the effect is really non-different from the cause and apparently different from it. This theory of causation is the corner-stone of the system of philosophy, which, on the strength of this theory, seeks to establish that one transcendent absolute Existence-Consciousness, which is essentially changeless, actionless differenceless and attributeless is the material cause of the changing world of diversities, which is, quite consistently with this view of causation, regarded as essentially non-different from It and only apparently differentiated from It.

Critical Examination.

(a) Logical Explanation for Causal Relation not ascertainable.

Now, let us examine this view of causation. So far as the primary analysis of the relation between cause and effect is concerned, we can readily accept it. In all such cases of causal relation, e. g., in the case of the relation between the pot and earth, we actually experience the identity of substance as well as the difference of features and attributes. But when in the logical attempt to reconcile the identity and the difference, the advocates of the view take recourse to their theory of different orders of reality, we must join issue with them. The identity and the difference are both matters of actual normal experience. What justification is there to assert that the difference belongs to a lower order of reality and the identity to a higher order? Does the effect disappear or turn out to be false with the appearance of the knowledge of the cause? Of course not. If it be argued that there is no other means of reconciling these two contradictory notions

of difference and non-difference, then in the absence of any incontrovertible justification for introducing the notions of different orders of reality, it ought to be frankly admitted that it is not possible to furnish an adequate logical explanation for the causal relation or to reduce the causal relation into simpler relations.

(b) Conditions of lower and higher orders of reality unfulfilled.

The first question that we would put to them is, what is the source of the recognition of such higher and lower orders of reality and what is their real significance? Evidently this source is psychological. We experience certain facts at certain times and form certain ideas about them. Afterwards as a result of closer observation, we become convinced that the real nature of the facts are not as we experienced them previously and the ideas we formed about them do not represent their true character. Thus our present knowledge of the facts invalidates the past knowledge. The facts as we experience them now are then regarded as real, and in comparison with these facts, those of the past experience are regarded as unreal. Since they also had been objects of experience, they cannot be said to have been absolutely non-existent, and since that experience is now invalidated, they cannot be said to have been really existent; hence such objects of invalidated experience are said to be apparently existent, and having a lower order of reality. The cases like those of the experience of a snake and a rope with reference to the same object may be cited as examples. Sometimes our perception of a thing may be invalidated by valid inference; and though on account of the inherent imperfection of our power of perception, we may not get rid of this invalidated percep-

tion, still the nature of the thing as we know it by such inference is regarded as representing its real nature, while in comparison with it, the nature of the thing as we perceive it is regarded as unreal or having a lower order of reality. The case of the Sun or the Moon, as we perceive it and as we know it by scientific inference may be cited as an example. We need not multiply instances. Whenever with reference to the same thing or the same class of things, our previous knowledge is invalidated by other knowledge based on stronger evidence, we are led to draw the distinction between reality and unreality or between the reality of a higher order and a reality of a lower order. It is thus as a result of the two kinds of subjective experience or knowledge with reference to the same objective entity, that our conception of the different orders of reality, higher and lower, arises. Accordingly, a higher reality means the object of valid experience or knowledge and a lower reality means the object of invalidated experience or knowledge.

We have not so far made any reference to the absolute reality, which is regarded as of the highest order, and in comparison with which, all the realities established even by the strongest evidence available in the domain of normal experience are of a lower order and are regarded as having only apparent existence. But here also the basis of the distinction is the same. According to the advocates of the theory, men of extraordinary spiritual attainments are believed to obtain a kind of experience, that may be called transcendental experience, which invalidates all the experiences of diversities, in the light of which all diversities of normal experience constituting the world-system are proved to have only apparent existence, and the one absolute eternal differenceless Being-Consciousness is alone

known to be real. The source of the distinction of the orders of realities is here also psychological. That which is known by transcendental experience is regarded as the Reality of the highest order, because it is the most valid experience, believed to be incapable of being invalidated by any other experience, and the world of normal experience is said to have a lower order of reality or to be comparatively unreal, because this experience is, according to the advocates of the view, invalidated by the transcendental experience.

Now, we find that whenever we draw any distinction between a higher and a lower order of reality, it is in its true significance a distinction between two ideas or two products of knowledge with regard to the same objective entity, one of them being superseded and invalidated by the other. From this we cannot deduce that one entity is by itself possessed of a reality of a higher order than another entity. Nor can we maintain that two such realities, one of a higher order and another of a lower order, exist together to constitute the actual nature of anything, of any concrete object of valid experience.

(c) Causality implying real non-difference and unrea difference not provable.

Let us then proceed to the examination of the question at issue. It is held that non-difference between the effecl and its material cause is of a higher order of reality and that of difference between them is of a lower order of reality. What can this statement mean? The legitimate interpretation that can be given to it in the light of the above discussion is that our knowledge or experience of the difference between the effect and its material cause is

invalidated by our knowledge or experience of non-difference between them. But we find that non-difference between the effect and its material cause, such as between the pot and the earth, between the cloth and the threads, etc., so far as their substance is concerned, are known and experienced along with the relation of difference between them. The one is not found to invalidate the other. Had non-difference invalidated the relation of difference, the latter could not be experienced at the same time with the former. If, however, as in the case of the Sun etc., the true nature had been established by valid inferential proof, and the relation of difference had been a matter of perception, then it might be said that the product of valid inference, which is of a higher order of reality, is present along with the product of invalidated perception, which is to be accepted as only apparently real. But in instances, like those given above, of the relation between the effect and its material cause, the point of non-difference and the point of difference are equally matters of perception. How can an invalid perception and a valid perception exist together and co-operate with each other to constitute the nature of one entity viz. the relation between the effect and the cause ?

Moreover, when we recognise two realities as of two different orders, we are not justified even in speaking of them as two, for the one does not stand on the same plane of existence with the other. Accordingly, if the difference and the non-difference perceived in the relation of causation be regarded as belonging to two distinct planes of existence, if the one is not recognised to be as real as the other, then we are not justified in holding that the causal relation consists of the relation of difference and the relation of non-difference. In one plane of experience or from one point of view, the causal relation should then be regarded

as a relation of difference in the same way as a pot is different from a cloth; and in what is called the higher plane of experience it should be regarded as a relation of non-difference, in the same way as the earth or the cotton is non-different with itself. But both these points of view would lay the axe at the root of causal relation itself. If the relation of difference is emphasised, then one of the related terms cannot be called the cause of another, as the pot cannot be called the cause of the cloth. On the other hand, if the relation of identity or non-difference be emphasised, then also there can be no causal relation, for the terms related are really one, and the same thing cannot be its own cause. Thus the way in which the exponents of the theory under discussion attempt to analyse and explain the causal relation leads to the virtual denial of the causal relation itself.

It may be argued that absolute difference is nowhere to be found. In the case of a pot and a cloth, there is identity in respect of materiality. Even in the case of a spirit and a material thing, there is identity in respect of existence. Yes, this is quite true. Unless there is some point of identity, no comparison between two entities is possible, and no relation of difference between them can be established. The relation of difference invariably implies some identity at the back-ground. Similarly, whenever we speak of a relation of identity between any two entities or objects of thought, it necessarily implies some element of difference, for otherwise they would not be two entities, and to speak of any relation in such a case would involve evident self-contradiction. Thus the relation of difference and the relation of identity or non-difference necessarily imply each other,—each involves an inevitable reference to the other. We think and speak of the

relation of difference or non-difference according as the one or the other is predominant in our experience or thought: it implies not the absence of the other, but the presence of the other as its background. In each case the one is qualified by the other; the relation of identity is always qualified and particularised by the relation of difference, and the latter also is always qualified and particularised by the other. Unqualified non-difference as well as unqualified difference is nowhere to be found and is logically and psychologically impossible to think of.

But we are concerned with two questions. The one is—can every such relation be regarded as a causal relation? Simply because the elements of identity and difference are both present in the nature of the relation between two things, do we or can we regard one of them as the material cause of the other? Would it not be destructive of the law of causation itself? The answer to this question is obvious. The second question is, is there any justification for regarding either identity or difference as of a higher or a lower order of reality in relation to the other? To this question also, the answer should not be difficult, if our foregoing analysis is accepted. In so far as identity and difference qualify, determine and particularise each other, both must be regarded as true on the same plane of experience. In the relation between an effect and its material cause also, we experience identity and difference qualified, determined and particularised in some particular way by each other. We therefore find no justification for regarding the one as real and the other as merely apparent,—the one as true on a higher plane of experience and the other as true only on a lower plane, which is superseded by the higher.

(d) The Doctrine of identity of substance with difference in features or attributes criticised.

It has been said and it is generally agreed that the elements of identity and difference qualifying each other in any and every way cannot constitute a causal relation. It is a particular form of the relation of identity with difference that determines the relation between the cause and the effect. It is held by the protagonists of the theory, which we are examining here, that when the points of difference do not affect or transform the nature of substance, when the relation of difference arises retaining the identity of substance intact, this form of identity-with-difference constitutes the relation between the cause and effect. The pot is regarded as the effect of earth, because in the production of the pot the substance of the earth is not changed, while several distinguishing characteristics arise differentiating the pot from earth in general. Thus identity of substance with difference in features or attributes is what constitutes the character of the relation between the effect and its material cause.

Now the question is, does the difference in features or attributes touch or in any way affect the nature of the substance of the cause or not? If it does not, either the differentiating features or attributes should be regarded as existing separately side by side with the substance and externally related without touching its nature, or they should be regarded as unreal and apparent, only illusorily appearing to be related to the substance without really being so. If the former of these two alternatives be granted, various difficulties would arise. The production of the differentiating features or attributes would be inexplicable, and the law of thought which demands a sufficient cause

for the production of every object and event would be violated. Again, if their production were granted, no relation between them and the substance could be logically established. In the absence of any relation between the substance of the cause and the differentiating characteristics of the effect, the very idea of effect would be impossible. The pot would not be conceived as a pot at all, unless the specific features of the pot are related to the substance of earth, and the two are taken together in thought as qualifying each other. This would lead to the absurd conclusion that the substance of the cause is present, certain specific features inexplicably arise, they remain with the substance, but are not connected with it, and the effect is really not produced. Thus as a result of the attempt to explain the relation between cause and effect, the effect vanishes, the causal relation which was the subject-matter of explanation is found to be nowhere.

If the latter alternative be resorted to, viz. that the distinguishing characteristics of the effect are unreal, then also the causal relation itself would have to be regarded as unreal. This would mean that what is called a cause is not really a cause, it is not really producing any effect, it is merely what it is. Now, as every object in the world of experience, is found to be an effect of some material cause, as every object is a cause in relation to some object and an effect is relation to another, the unreality of the causal relation would make the entire world of experience unreal. This would be a great violence to our experience and knowledge, and inconsistent with the very notion of causation, which is a fundamental principle of our thought. Further, the unreality of the distinguishing features of the effect could be recognised only if the distinguishing features were at first experienced and afterwards this ex-

perience were invalidated by the valid experience of the substance, i. e. if with the perception of the nature of the substance of the cause, the distinguishing features of the effect were found to disappear. But this never happens in our normal experience. We experience the substance and the specific features of the effect, i. e. the points of identity and difference between the cause and the effect at the same time; we find no inconsistency between the two, and consequently do not feel the necessity of regarding the one as real and the other as unreal.

Advocate—The relation of difference, which being associated with the relation of identity of substance distinguishes the effect from the cause, is not unreal in the sense that it is invalidated by and disappears with the experience of the identity of substance; but it is called unreal or apparent or belonging to a lower order of reality, because though actually present, it does not really qualify or determine or particularise the nature of the substance.

Critic—Such an argument would involve the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*. That the nature of the substance is in no way modified by the difference that arises with the process of causation is not independently proved. It is sought to be proved by the unreality or apparent reality of the difference, and the latter is sought to be established on the ground of the former. Such arguments cannot of course be accepted as fair. Here the main point of contention is whether the nature of the substance is in any way modified by the production of the effect. If the non-modification of the substance is to be proved on the ground of the unreality of the relation of difference, the latter is to be proved on independent ground. If this unreality of the difference is

to be proved on the ground that it does not modify the substance of the cause, this absolute identity of substance in causation has to be proved on other independent grounds. But such proof is unavailable. Therefore the character of the relation between the identity and difference involved in the cause-effect-relation remains unexplained.

(e) Invariable identity of substance in causal relation disproved by instances of causes transformed.

Advocate—In cases of the relation between an effect and its material cause,—such as between a pot and the earth, a cloth and the threads, a gold bangle and the gold etc.,—we actually experience that the nature of the substance of the material cause remains unchanged—we know by direct observation that the earth, the threads and the gold remain exactly the same in substance after the production of the pot, the cloth and the bangle respectively as before their production. Such observation may be regarded as supplying us with a ground for inferring that in all cases of the production of effects from material causes, the substance remains identical.

Critic—The generalisation is too hasty, for the observation is one-sided. In numerous other cases we observe that the material cause is modified and transformed substantially in the process of the production of effects. Thus milk changes into curd, a seed is transformed into a tree, food is transformed into the tissues of the animal body, and so on. In cases of the production of effects by the process of chemical combination, the material causes which combine together are found to be modified into altogether new substances. How can we, in

the face of such instances, arrive at a general conclusion that the nature of the substance of the material cause remains unmodified through the production of effects ? How can we establish that though certain specific features arise in the cause to constitute the nature of the effect, the substance of the cause is untouched by these distinguishing features ?

Advocate—Though in the instances of the kind mentioned above the identity of the substance of the cause in the effect is not so obvious to normal observation, still deeper insight and closer examination can discover this identity of substance. If such identity were not present and could not be found out, then anything might be regarded as the material cause of anything else, and there would be no order or system in the relation between cause and effect.

Critic—The argument may be accepted as partially valid ; but it does not prove the theory we are criticising. There may be some identical element between milk and curd, but that identical element is by itself neither milk nor curd. But since milk is accepted, from the stand-point of normal experience, as the material cause of curd, it cannot be admitted that the material cause has remained as it originally was, that its nature has not been affected in any way by the process of causation. It may be contended that the particles of milk, which really constitute the substance of milk, are only re-arranged in the production of curd and hence the identity of substance remains intact ; but this interpretation would not be applicable to the relation between the seed and the tree, the food and the tissue, and many other cases. What can be justly and safely asserted from the observation of the various kinds of effects and their respective material causes, is that some identity

between the cause and the effect always remains in and through the emergence of differences. It cannot be said that the cause is wholly transformed into something altogether different from itself, nor can it be said that the substance of the cause admits of no change or modification at all in the production of the effect; but what is actually found is that certain differences emerge out of the cause for the formation of the effect, some essential identity also is preserved. The identity and the difference are both perceptible in the causal relation, and each of them is found to qualify, determine and particularise the other. We find no adequate logical ground for regarding the one as more or less real than the other. Hence the theory of causation, expounded by the school of thought we are criticising, is found to be not justified by convincing logical reasoning.

Concluding Remarks.

On previous occasions we examined the theory of Modification, holding that the material cause is actually transformed into the effect which is really different as well as non-different from it, and also the theory of absolute Origination, holding that the effect is something altogether different from the cause, but originating from it. We found that these theories also are beset with difficulties and vitiated by logical inconsistencies. Thus we are painfully led to the conclusion that all the attempts which have been made by the different schools of philosophical thought to supply a logical explanation for the riddle of the causal relation and to bring about a reconciliation in terms of the categories of abstract logic, between the relation of identity and the relation of difference involved in the relation between the effect and its material cause have been futile. From the stand-point of logic the causal relation,

though experienced and acknowledged by everybody, appears to remain as unexplained as ever.

The Theory of Existence as the material cause of the world Represented.

In the foregoing discussion we have examined the theory, which holds that in the production of effects, the material cause remains essentially unchanged, and that the various elements of difference which are observed in the effects belong to a lower order of reality and are therefore relatively unreal. The exponents of this theory apply this view of causation to their attempt at determining the nature of the ultimate cause of the universe. They hold that all the particular existences of the world are of the nature of effects, and hence must be produced from some material causes. What are found to be material causes in relation to their effects are themselves also found to be produced and are therefore effects in relation to their own material causes. This chain of causation must have an ultimate end, for otherwise the demand of our thought for a sufficient cause of all effects will remain unsatisfied. This ultimate end of the causal series must be a self-existent absolute cause,—a cause which eternally exists by itself and is not the effect of any other cause. This cause must necessarily be of a perfectly simple nature, for whatever is of a complex nature must be capable of being analysed into simpler elements, must have a particularised form of existence and must be of the nature of an effect. Pursuing this line of argument, the exponents of this theory arrive at the conclusion that the entire universe of complex temporal existences must have as its ultimate material cause one absolute eternal Being or Existence. In accordance with their view of causation, this Being or

Existence does not undergo any modification or transformation in the production of these diverse effects. It remains identically the same throughout eternity, and is nevertheless the material cause of this diversified world. This world of diversities has no substance other than the substance of that Being, and hence the world is identical with that Being in substance. It is not that the substance of the Being has been actually modified into particularised substances qualified by various elements of difference and has thus produced or transformed itself into this diversified world. According to their interpretation of the causal relation the Being or Existence, which is the material cause of the world of effects, remains essentially unchanged, unqualified, unparticularised, but *somehow* differences arise in the effects. The significance of this *somehow* will be discussed in the sequel. These differences, in accordance with their theory, are of a lower order of reality, i. e. are not real in the sense in which the identity of the substance is real. They speak of the identity of the substance as transcendentally or absolutely real, and the differences observed in the effects as phenomenally or empirically real. The lower order of reality cannot, according to them, truly modify, determine or particularise the higher order of reality. Consistently with this theory, they infer that the world of diverse effects, though produced from the Being or Existence, does not really bring about any modification, determination or particularisation in the nature of its cause. Hence according to this doctrine, from the standpoint of transcendental or absolute reality, the Being or Existence, unqualified, unmodified, unparticularised, is alone real, and the world of diversities is unreal. From the standpoint of phenomenal or empirical reality, the world with differences is real, and it is from this lower point of view that the Being appears to be qualified, modified and particularised.

Thus the exponents of this view are led to the conclusion that the conception of material cause is ultimately identical with the conception of substratum, and the conception of effect is ultimately identical with that of appearance or illusory manifestation. Accordingly what is called causation is merely a link, from the point of view of normal experience, between two orders of realities, or between the real and the unreal, between the real substratum and the unreal appearances experienced on it. The world of diversities may accordingly be called either the effect of the Being or the appearance of the Being, and the Being may be called either the material cause of the world or the substratum of the world. With regard to the relation between the world and the Being, the conclusion, that follows from their line of thinking, is that the world is really non-different from the Being and is only apparently different from It. In the light of what they regard as absolute or transcendental experience, the eternally self-identical, changeless, attributeless Being alone really exists by Itself, and the ideas of causation, manifestation, particularisation, etc. are found to be unreal products of the lower planes of experience.

Critical Examination.

Now, we pass to the critical examination of this doctrine. We have already examined the conception of one attributeless, changeless, differenceless Being or Existence as the ultimate substratum of all the beings or existences of our experience, the conception of one attributeless, changeless, differenceless, self-luminous consciousness as the knower and revealer of these beings or existences, and the conception of the absolute oneness of the Being and the Consciousness. We have found that the advocates of this doctrine could

not base these fundamental conceptions of their philosophy on invincible logical grounds. The arguments which they adduced for establishing the truth of their conceptions could not stand the test of logical scrutiny. Then we have examined their theory of causation, on the strength of which they seek to establish that this Being-Consciousness, though not undergoing any change or modification, though without any attribute or activity or difference in its real nature, is the material cause of the world of diversities. The examination has shown that their interpretation of the relation between cause and effect does not explain, but rather seeks to explain away, the fact of causation, that they cannot offer any convincing logical justification for their regarding the effect as a reality of a lower order than the cause, or, in other words, asserting the effect to be an unreal appearance of the cause, that they fail to prove how the emergence of differences in the effect can be possible without any change or modification of the substance of the cause.

Now, with the refutation of their conceptions of Being and Consciousness and their identity, and of their logical interpretation of the relation between cause and effect, their theory that the Being-Consciousness is the material cause of the diversified world becomes groundless. Hence any elaborate refutation of this theory becomes unnecessary. Let us, however, examine it a little more closely on the assumption of the correctness of their interpretation of the nature of the relation between cause and effect.

According to their interpretation of the causal relation, the substance of the cause remains identical, unmodified, untransformed in the effect, and the elements of difference, which distinguish the effect from the cause and differentiate

one effect from other effects produced from the same material cause, are only apparent. They establish it on the strength of the observation that in all effects produced from earth, the substance of earth remains identical and the nature of earth is in no way changed. Similarly in all objects produced from gold or iron or wood or any other substance, the nature of gold, iron etc. remains unaffected. In all such instances of causal relation, only some differentiating features, attributes, relative characteristics and consequent different names appear in some way and are added on to the permanent unchanging substance of the cause. Not only that; in these cases when the effect is destroyed, the destruction happens only to the apparent elements of difference, while the substance which is identical in the cause and the effect is not affected by it. Hence in all the states of the production, the sustenance and the destruction of the effect, the material cause remains identically the same.

Let us ignore the various other kinds of instances of cause and effect, to which this interpretation is altogether inapplicable, and let us, with the exponents of the view in question, admit that the nature of the substance of the material cause remains identically the same in all effects produced from it, and that all these effects, though distinguished from one another as well as from the cause in respect of those apparent or unreal features and attributes, participate in the essential nature of the cause and are substantially identical with it. Now, let us see if this interpretation can be consistently applied to the relation between the world and its supposed material cause, viz. the ultimate Reality. According to the expounders of this conception, Existence, consciousness and self-luminosity are not attributes of the ultimate Reality, because the ultimate

Reality is attributeless. Hence self-luminous-conscious-Existence is the real substance of that Reality. If the substance is regarded as remaining identical in all the effects produced from it, the plurality of objects in the universe, however apparently different from one another in respect of their particularised forms and features and relative attributes, must participate in the nature of self-luminous-conscious-Existence. Accordingly, the essential nature of every object of the world ought to be conscious and self-luminous. But this is contrary to all experience.

It cannot be consistently argued that the self-luminous-conscious-Existence is really present as the substance of all objects, but that it is not experienced. In all the instances, on the observation of which they base their conception of the causal relation, the nature of the substance is observed along with the apparent elements of difference. In none of them do we find that the apparent differentiating characteristics transform the essential nature of the substance beyond recognition. It is only in cases of illusion that the nature of substratum is found to be altogether veiled by the apparent unreal elements. But a case of causal relation is not a case of illusion ; it is a case of valid knowledge. The advocates of the theory also have not derived their conception of the relation between the material cause and its effect from the experience of illusion. How then, consistently with their view of the causal relation, can they infer that the world of unconscious objects is the effect of consciousness ?

They may contend that Existence is found to be inherent in the nature of all objects, that all objects, as they appear as particularised forms of Existence, participate in the essential nature of Existence. They may fur-

ther point out that the presence of self-luminous consciousness also is evident from the manifestation of objects. Thus, they may argue, that it is not true that Existence-Consciousness is not substantially perceptible in the nature of the objects of the world. But this contention does not meet the point at issue. They themselves also draw a clear line of distinction between conscious and unconscious objects. How can it be said that the unconscious objects are essentially conscious and that this consciousness is perceptible in their nature ? Then again, Existence, in the sense in which they conceive it, implies self-existence ; but this self-existence is evidently not perceptible in the nature of the effects. Thus even according to their interpretation of the causal relation, it is difficult to establish the causal relation between the attributeless Being-consciousness and the objective world.

Again, whenever in the world of our normal experience, we observe the production of effects, we find that either the material cause has an inherent power and tendency to modify or manifest itself into particular kinds of effects, or it acquires this power and tendency by coming in contact with other co-operative factors, or some agent, i. e. efficient cause, acts upon it and produces the effects out of it. None of these conditions are fulfilled by Being-Consciousness, as conceived by the exponents of the theory in question. As this Absolute Reality is conceived as an attributeless, powerless, actionless entity, It cannot be a cause of the first kind and cannot by Itself supply us with any explanation for the production of the objective world. Since it is one without a second, It cannot be regarded as dependent upon and moved by any extraneous co-operative factors or efficient agencies to produce the diversities of the world. Thus the actual production of the world of effects

cannot be accounted for by reference to Being-Consciousness as conceived by this school of thought.

To elucidate: Wherever we observe any causal relation, the cause is found to have a potency to produce the effect. Nowhere do we find a cause, which is without any potency or attribute or activity, which exists in, by and for itself, but which still produces some effects. To think that an Entity does nothing and has no capacity and inclination to do anything, and at the same time to think that it produces a diversity of effects, appears to involve a logical self-contradiction. But the exponents of the view under consideration maintain that Brahman or Being-Consciousness is absolutely without any potency or power or attribute or tendency, existing solely in, by and for itself, and that such Brahman is the cause of this world of diverse effects. We may find in our experience material causes, which are by themselves inactive and indifferent to the production or non-production of effects; but in such cases also these causes are found to possess particular characteristics, by virtue of which they can become causes of particular kinds of effects, and some efficient causes are found necessary to act upon such material causes in order to have those particular kinds of effects produced from them. But pure Existence-Consciousness is conceived as not possessing any such characteristics, and there is no second Being that can possibly act upon it as an efficient cause for producing the world of effects. How can then this Being-Consciousness be conceived as the cause of this world? Moreover, the admission of the causal relation would make Brahman relative in accordance with the principle of the mutuality of cause and effect.

The advocates of the theory find themselves placed in a puzzling situation. If the world be accepted as a real

effect of a real cause, they cannot reconcile such a real causal relation between Brahman and the world with their conception of Brahman as the changeless, attributeless, powerlsss Existence-Consciousness. On the other hand, if Brahman be not regarded as the cause of the world, this world of the plurality of effects has to be conceived either as a self-existent Being outside of and with no connection with Brahman or as the product of some other cause existing independently of Brahman. All such alternatives are unacceptable to them, because they are inconsistent with the non-duality of Brahman. To get rid of the situation, they have recourse to the theory of Illusory causation.

Having failed to explain causally the actual production of the world of diversities consistently with and in terms of their conception of the Absolute Reality, viz. the one non-dual, attributeless, changeless, powerless, inactive, self-luminous Being-Consciousness, they feel compelled to have recourse to the theory of Illusion. They suppose that causation is illusory, that this beginningless and endless world of a countless variety of well-ordered objects and events is an unreal appearance on the real substratum of Being-Consciousness. They suppose that the world is the product of a mysterious dynamic power, which is neither real nor unreal, neither different from nor identical with the Absolute Reality. That power inexplicably makes this attributeless Reality appear as this world of wonderfully harmonious diversities without in the least affecting its non-duality and transcendent self-luminous character. We shall now expound and examine this theory of illusion and Illusory causation.

The Theory of Illusory Causation Represented.

Illusion is a fact of our normal experience. When we analyse this fact of Illusion, we find that (1) there is a

substance, the real nature of which is veiled, (2) there is an object which appears on the substratum of that substance and which is actually perceived, (3) there is a perceiving subject, to which that illusory object appears, (4) this perception is invalidated by valid knowledge of that substance. Take the case of my illusory perception of the shell-silver. In this case the shell is a real substance, the true nature is veiled at the time of the illusion; silver is the object which appears on the substratum of this shell and becomes the object of perception; I am an individual perceiving subject, to whom the silver appears and who perceives the silver in the place of the shell; when I examine the nature of the object closely, I acquire valid knowledge of the real substance, viz. the shell, and am convinced that my perception of the silver was false and that it was never really present at the place where I perceived it.

It is undeniable that all these factors are involved in the nature of Illusion. Now, the question is, what is the logical character of this object of illusory perception, e. g. the silver in the above instance? Is it to be regarded as existent or non-existent or both existent and non-existent or neither existent nor non-existent? This question is connected with another question, viz. is the illusory perception truly a case of perception, or is it a case of imagination or remembrance misinterpreted as perception?

The exponents of the view we are considering have most carefully pointed out the fallacies of regarding this illusory perception as a case of imagination or remembrance projected on the substance. If the object of this perception could be proved to be a product of imagination or memory and falsely superimposed upon the real substance and

misinterpreted as a perceived object, then this object might be regarded as absolutely non-existent, so far as this particular place is concerned. But at the time of illusion all the conditions of perception are found to be present, and all attempts to explain away perception or to reduce it into any other form of experience are also found to be futile. All the consequences of a valid perception of an object are also experienced, so long as the illusory perception lasts, such as producing the feelings of fear, lust, anger, greed etc. and the impulse to act for attaining, removing, destroying, flying away from, etc. according to the nature of the object so perceived. Hence, according to the view in question, this illusion must be regarded as a case of perception, and the object of this illusory perception must be regarded as not non-existent.

But as this perception is invalidated and superseded by more careful perception or some other valid knowledge, it must be regarded as false perception, and its object cannot be accepted as really existent. When the substance, the nature of which was veiled at the time of illusion,becomes truly known, the object which was illusorily perceived on it is proved to be not really existent. Thus the object of illusory perception cannot be regarded either as really existent nor as absolutely non-existent. It cannot be conceived as both existent and non-existent, because such contrary predicates cannot be affirmed of the same object. Therefore it must be regarded as having apparent existence,—existence which is of a lower order than that of the substance itself on which it is perceived and is therefore capable of being falsified or cancelled by the true knowledge of the substance. Arguing in this way the exponents of this view recognise an order of existence, which is distinct from real existence as well as from non-

existence. The object of illusory perception is regarded as having this kind of apparent existence.

Now, as the illusory object has some kind of existence, it must be produced by some cause. Here the substance cannot be regarded as its cause, nor can the perceiving subject be regarded as its cause. The cause must be of such a nature, as can veil the real nature of the substance and can make it appear as something else, and also it must be capable of being destroyed by valid knowledge of the substance. Such a cause the exponents of this theory find in Ignorance. Ignorance is thus established by them as the material cause of the illusory object, because it is this Ignorance which produces it and sustains its apparent existence, and with its destruction this object also is destroyed. This Ignorance also is regarded as having a positive, but apparent, existence,—neither absolutely real or absolutely unreal—sustained by Existence-Consciousness, but destructible by valid knowledge.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION

Introductory.

We have to examine first whether this explanation of the fact of illusion is logically justifiable and then to see how far it helps the advocates of the view to explain the origination and existence of this world of diversities. We have in another connection examined the notion of Ignorance and shall have to deal with it again in the sequel. We are to examine its nature here only so far as it is necessary for our present purpose. The experience of illusion is essentially distinct from such experiences, as, "I did not know anything during my sleep," or "I did not know the substance which I know now," or "There

are many things in the universe which I do not know." In all such cases 'not knowing' is the principal phenomenon of experience. We have noticed previously how this phenomenon the philosophers of this school sought to explain by the supposition of this positive Ignorance, and how they failed to establish their supposition with adequate and consistent logical reasoning. To explain the phenomenon of illusory perception, they further develop their notion of Ignorance and attribute to it a dynamic power to create various objects of perception.

In the case of Illusion there is not only the unknownness of the true nature of the substratum, but also, as they hold, the production of the illusory object with particular features and attributes, which the person under illusion appears to actually perceive with his senses. Can Ignorance, in whatever way it may be conceived, be spoken of as the material cause of these perceptible features consistently with their theory of causation ?

The three grounds for proving Ignorance as material cause of illusion inconclusive.

First of all, three grounds are mentioned for establishing Ignorance as the material cause of the illusory object.

(1) Without ignorance relating to the true and complete nature of the substance, the illusory object does not appear, (2) the illusory object continues to exist only so long as this Ignorance exists, and (3) the illusory object disappears with the disappearance of this Ignorance.

Now, these three grounds, even if accepted as valid, do not prove that ignorance is the material cause of the illusory object, because they are found equally in the material cause as well as in any necessary condition of an

effect. For instance, without the presence of light, the colour does not appear, the colour continues to be perceived so long as light exists, and it disappears as soon as light disappears. Can we on that account infer that light is the material cause of the colours perceived? Similar is the relation between sound and air. We can hear sound only when and so long as there is air? Can air be regarded as the material cause of sound for that reason? We can multiply instances. There may be necessary conditions, on which the existence of au object depends, but which cannot on that account be regarded as the material cause. When cloth is produced from the threads, should the threads or the particular arrangements of the threads be regarded as the material cause? The grounds mentioned above are present in both. Thus Ignorance is not proved to be the material cause of the objects of illusory perception, as distinct from one of their necessary auxiliary conditions.

Then again, the reasons mentioned here are not applicable to all cases of illusion. In the case of the mirage, the illusory perception continues even after the ignorance with regard to the true nature of the substance disappears. Our perception of the sun as a small shining object rising and moving and setting continues, even when we are fully convinced that it is an immensely big fixed substance round which the earth and the other planets are revolving. When we travel in a railway train or any other swiftly moving vehicle, though we know full well that we are moving and the rows of trees and other things around us are fixed, still what is actually perceived is that those trees and other things are moving in the opposite direction. In the face of such facts how can it be established that Ignorance relating to the nature of the substratum is the material cause of the illusory object and the ground of its perception?

It may be argued that illusory perceptions are produced and maintained by the defects of our organs of perception, the distance of the substance, the deep-seated impressions in our mind, the impressions left by the preceding perception upon the succeeding perception and so on and so forth, and that they serve as the auxiliary conditions co-operating with Ignorance for producing and preserving such effects. But as we find that even in the absence of Ignorance with regard to the nature of the substratum illusion may be produced and sustained by those so-called co-operating conditions, how can it be accepted as an established truth that Ignorance is the material cause and they are mere conditions ?

We have noticed here different kinds of relevant facts. In one kind of instances, such as the absence of knowing anything in sound sleep, the previous want of knowledge of things which we afterwards newly know, Ignorance is present, but no illusion is produced. In another kind of instances, such as the perception of silver on the substratum of shell, serpent on the substratum of rope, etc., Ignorance is present, and illusion also is produced. In some other kinds of instances, such as the perception of the mirage, the smallness of the sun, the movement of the trees etc., Ignorance is absent, but illusion is present. From the observation of such different kinds of instances, we cannot even establish a necessary concomitance between Ignorance and illusory perception. We find that the mere presence of Ignorance cannot produce Illusion, that when illusion is produced, Ignorance is invariably associated with other circumstances, that the presence of certain circumstances can sustain illusion even in the absence of Ignorance. Is there then any justification for holding that Ignorance is not merely a condition, but the true material cause of the illusion ?

Logical requisites of a material cause absent in the case of Ignorance.

Even if an invariable connection between Ignorance and Illusion could be established, would that be a justification for regarding Ignorance as the material cause of Illusion? Are the logical requisites of a material cause present in the Ignorance even in the cases where the appearance of the illusory object presupposes it? It is the shell and the rope which manifest themselves illusorily as the silver and the serpent respectively to some particular perceiving subject. The shell does not appear as the serpent, and the rope does not appear as the silver. Thus the nature of the substratum plays an important part in the formation of the nature of the illusory object. If the particular substratum is absent, the particular illusory object becomes absent. It is the existence of the substratum, which gives existence to the illusory object; it is the nature of the substratum, which determines the nature of the illusory object; it is the continuous presence of the substratum, which is necessary for the sustenance of the illusory object. Hence it is the substratum, which ought reasonably to be regarded as the real material cause of this object. Ignorance relating to its real nature is merely an occasion for its manifesting itself as something other than what it is, and its appearance in this or that particular form depends upon other co-operating conditions. Thus Ignorance may be proved in such cases at most as a necessary co-operating condition; but there is no justification for its being regarded as the material cause for the production of the illusion.

Illusory Causation Unprovable.

That the substratum also, viz. the shell or the rope, cannot be regarded as the material cause of the illusory

object, viz. the silver or the serpent, in the same sense as the earth, the thread and the milk are the material causes of the pot, the cloth and the curd respectively, is evident to everybody, and we have pointed it out in connection with our discussion on the theory of causation. If it were a real material cause of the illusory object, the illusory object would have an objective existence, even though it had a lower order of reality than the cause, and would then be an object of experience to all perceiving subjects at the same time. But it is found that the same shell or rope is perceived by a particular person as silver or serpent, but not by others. It cannot be argued that Ignorance conceals the real nature of the substratum with reference to a particular perceiving subject and makes it appear as the illusory object in relation to him alone ; because the question would arise here, whether this Ignorance has an objective or a subjective existence, and neither alternative would satisfactorily account for the phenomenon. If Ignorance be regarded as having an objective existence and as residing in the substratum, there is no reason why it should give rise to the illusory object in the perception of one individual and not of others, who are looking at it at the same time. If on the other hand Ignorance be regarded as subjective, residing in the perceiving subject, then the material cause of the object of illusory perception should not be regarded as existing outside of the subject, and consequently illusion should not be considered to be a case of perception at all. Moreover, if Ignorance pertains to the nature of the subject even for the time being, no reason can be assigned why at the same time it should conceal and distort the nature of one substance and not of another. Thus we find that neither Ignorance alone nor the substratum in conjunction with subjective or objective Ignorance can be logically proved to be the material cause of the objects

of illusory perception. Hence the phenomenon of illusory causation remains unexplained in terms of the substratum and Ignorance related to it.

Production of illusory object not established, hence Ignorance as material cause cannot be recognised.

All these arguments have been made on the basis of their hypothesis that the object of illusory perception is actually produced and sustained on the substratum of something outside the perceiving subject, and that the subject perceives it as it perceives any other perceptible object. This object is, however, regarded as having an apparent reality, because this perception is invalidated and superseded. Now, whatever form or order of existence the object may possess, perception demands that there should be contact between the perceptible properties of the object and the corresponding organs of perception. The sense-organs of different men, being similarly constituted, the same perceptible properties of the same object are expected to produce similar impressions upon sense-organs of different men, and the same object is expected to be perceived similarly by them. But the object of illusory perception is not found to be similarly received by different individuals present at the same time and in the same place. Sometimes one man illusorily perceives objects at a place where other persons in his company perceive nothing at all. Could such a state of things be expected, if it were a case of perception, i. e. if some object were present there and produced impressions upon the sense-organs of the perceiving man from outside, and the man were a mere recepient of the impressions? Hence the hypothesis of the actual production of objects with apparent reality in the cases of illusion cannot be satisfactorily established.

Now, if the production of the object itself cannot be substantiated, the theory of the dynamic causality of Ignorance, which is resorted to for explaining this object, becomes analogous to the recognition of the existence of a mother for explaining the birth of an unborn child.

The Doctrine of the Illusory Appearance of the World represented.

It is this theory of the causality of Ignorance,—which the advocates of the view under consideration enunciate for the explanation of the phenomenon of illusion,—that they apply to the problem of the creation and preservation of the universe. They hold that Brahman,- the eternal, changeless, attributeless, differenceless, absolute Being-Consciousness- is the Substratum of this universe, that the universe consisting of innumerable varieties of objects and events is an illusory object perceived on this Substratum, and that there is one cosmic Ignorance which veils the true nature of Brahman and makes it appear as the world of diversities. In accordance with their theory of Illusory causation, they maintain that though this world is actually produced, it cannot be regarded as either absolutely existent like Brahman or as absolutely non-existent like the hare's horn, but as a positive entity having an unreal or apparent existence. Such existence, since it is distinct in character from both existence and non-existence in the true sense of the terms, since it cannot be explained in terms of these categories of existence and non-existence of formal logic, is regarded as *inexplicable*. This inexplicable existence of the world of effects does not qualify or limit or in any way affect the real absolute existence of the Substratum—Brahman. Hence Brahman exists eternally as the one non-dual, differenceless, attributeless, self-luminous, absolute Reality.

Let us now elucidate the notion of the inexplicable or apparent existence of the world. As we have noticed in the preceding section, by the term "inexplicable or apparent existence" is meant that form of existence, which is distinguished from real existence as well as from the absence of existence. Real existence means that which can never become non-existent, which can never be denied at any time or repudiated by any valid knowledge. Accordingly an entity can be regarded as really existent, if it has neither production, nor destruction nor transformation. Its nature must eternally be what it is. Its nature cannot be changed by any process of activity or modification, nor can it be proved to be other than what it is by any process of valid knowledge; on the other hand, by non-existence is meant the total absence of existence, that which can never be an object of experience, or the idea of which involves any self-contradiction. The question of production and destruction does not arise in the case of the non-existent.

Now, in accordance with this phraseology, the world of the objects of our experience cannot be regarded as really existent, because all the objects in it are subject to production, destruction and transformation. They are all of the nature of effects. They have their beginning of existence. What appears in one form at one time passess into a different form at another time. Every particular form of existence has its end. Can any of these objects be regarded as really existent in the above sense? Everything of the world is experienced as having been non-existent before production and becoming non-existent again after destruction, and at the period of existence also it does not remain in the same form all along. It is of such

things that the world is made up. This world, therefore, cannot be regarded as really existent.

That it cannot be regarded as non-existent in the aforesaid sense is obvious to everybody. The world is actually experienced. Though it is a changing world, its presence cannot be denied.

Thus as the nature of the existence of the world cannot be defined either in terms of absolute existence or in terms of absolute non-existence, it is described by the exponents of the theory under examination as 'inexplicable' – *i. e.* as a kind of existence not explicable in terms of existence or non-existence. It is of a lower order of reality than absolute existence but is not absolutely devoid of reality.

It is quite evident, they assert, that an entity having this kind of existence, cannot be self-existent. A self-existent being cannot have any birth or death. That which has birth and death must have derivative existence. It must have a cause, from which it is produced. It is the ultimate cause – the cause which has no birth and death, whose existence is not therefore derivative, and which is consequently not the effect of any other cause, – that alone can be regarded as self-existent. The predicate of existence in the absolute sense of the term can be applied only to this ultimate cause. Accordingly, the world must be regarded as having only derivative existence and as being the product of some self-existent cause. This self-existent cause must also necessarily be self-revealing or self-luminous. This is their conception of Brahman or Being-Consciousness.

This Brahman alone is absolutely real. The world derives its existence from Brahman, its existence is sustained by that of Brahman, it is revealed by the self-luminosity

of Brahman, and when it is destroyed, its diversified existence is merged in the pure existence of Brahman. This effect-world must have a lower order of reality than that of Brahman.

Now, since Brahman, as the ultimate cause of the boundless world of innumerable varieties and changes, must be regarded as having absolute existence, and as such it must be conceived as eternally of the same unchanging nature, and without any complexity or difference or relativity within its character. Thus the position is that Brahman is eternally simple, changeless, differenceless, unrelated, self-existent Being, and at the same time the cause of the world.

Can we explain such a causal connection in the light of any relation of causation that we experience in this world? The exponents of this theory assert that the most notable instances of the causal connection of this kind we experience in the cases of illusory causation. We find that the shell, the rope etc. manifest themselves as the silver, the serpent, etc. without undergoing any change whatsoever. In other cases where the effects are actually produced from their causes, the latter are found to be transformed into the former. Such transformation or modification is not consistent with the notion of absolute Existence. Therefore the experience of illusory causation must be taken as the basis of the causal connection between Brahman and the world. Accordingly the conclusion is drawn that Brahman is the Substratum, and the world illusorily appears on this Substratum.

The existence of this world of experience must then necessarily be conceived as illusory existence, or in other words, false or unreal existence. It appears, but does not

really exist. The terms, falsity, unreality, inexplicability, appearance, illusion, apparent reality are used by this school of philosophy almost synonymously. They all imply that the world is not really existent i. e. self-existent, that it appears on the substratum of Brahman, that it is not explicable in terms of the categories of existence and non-existence, and that the valid knowledge of the Substratum would invalidate the knowledge of the world as it is experienced.

It has been found that to explain illusory causation this school of thought finds it necessary to recognise the positive, but not absolute, existence of Ignorance, which is regarded as the cause of the illusion, making the substratum appear as the illusory effect. It recognises a similar existence of one cosmic Ignorance, which is the cause of making the attributeless, changeless, Being-Consciousness illusorily appear as the world of diversities. This Ignorance also, though a positive entity, is not a self-existent Reality like Brahman, and is, therefore, conceived as a neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable agency like its effect, the world. This cosmic Ignorance, being not a self-existent Reality, does not affect the absolute non-duality of Brahman, and thus accounts for the existence of the world as we experience it consistently with the absolute unity and eternally changeless, differenceless, attributeless existence of Brahman.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

(a) The Meanings of Existence and Non-existence technical and unjustifiable.

We have here given a brief exposition of the conception of this school of thought, with regard to the nature

and origination of the world of our experience, in order to examine its logical validity. We have found that these philosophers have attached a technical meaning to the terms of common usage, viz. existence and non-existence, reality and unreality, to suit their purpose. Ordinarily by 'existent' we mean what is and by 'non-existent' we mean what is not. Similarly, by 'reality' we mean that the existence of which is proved by valid knowledge, and by 'unreality' we mean that the existence of which is disproved by valid knowledge. The philosophers of this school also generally begin with such meanings of the terms as are sanctioned by common usage, and by means of some logical manipulation they skilfully abandon the common ground and arrive at the technical sense.

They argue in this way :—'*what is*' cannot be '*what is not*'; that which has beginning and end *is not* before the beginning and after the end; therefore, that which has beginning and end cannot be called '*what is*'; *what is must be* what it is at all times and under all circumstances. Arguing in this way they remove the entire world of effects from the domain of the *existent* or *what is*, and reserves the term for what has no beginning, no end, no change. But have they any right to squeeze out, by the forced application of the laws of identity and contradiction, a conception from a commonly used word, which never implied it.

Further, the application of these laws of formal logic is not quite fair in this case. The element of time has no place in formal logic, but in the field of the valid knowledge of the world of mind and matter, it is found to have an important place. In our experience, in the domain of our valid knowledge, we find no justification for the principle assumed here, that *what is* must always be and must

remain unchanged in character at all times. We find objects, the existence of which is most satisfactorily established by the most careful observation and experiment as well as by valid inference, but which had not existed as such before and which ceases to exist as such afterwards. What justification can there be to regard all such things as *other than existent*, merely on the ground of the abstract principles of formal logic? These principles of course compel us to admit that a thing cannot be existent and non-existent at the same time; but they do not demand that a thing which is existent at one time cannot be non-existent at another time.

Hence this mode of reasoning does not justify these philosophers to regard this world of valid experience as inexplicable in terms of *existent* and *non-existent*, and to invent a category of *neither-existent-nor-non-existent* to determine its nature. The violence which it does to our experience and thought becomes palpable when through this conception of *neither-existent-nor-non-existent* they lead us to the conception of illusory appearance and want us to regard the entire universe as illusory like the rope-snake or shell-silver.

They may argue that though the existence of the changing world of effects, appearing to our valid experience, cannot be denied, it must be distinguished from the existence of the eternally changeless, self-existent Reality, and consequently if the term, *existence*, be applied to the latter, it cannot in the same sense be applied to the former. This argument also is not convincing. There may be different kinds of existent objects, some constantly changing and others relatively permanent, some short-lived and others existing for a long time, some retaining its identity through rapid changes, and others existing in the same

condition with unchanged characteristics for a great length of time. As we experience so many different kinds of existent objects, we may suppose also an existent Entity, which does not admit of any change. How can it be logically demanded that if the latter be called *existent*, the former cannot be called *existent* ?

It may be said that all the objects that we experience as existent at any time, however they may differ from one another in different respects, have the common characteristic of having beginning and end, and must therefore have only derivative existence ; they cannot consequently be described in terms of the same category of *existence* as the beginningless, endless, changeless Being. But commonsense will reply that though non-eternal derivative existence is essentially different from eternal self-existence, existence is a concept which cannot be denied of either of them, and hence there is no justification for regarding the entities possessing non-eternal derivative character as other than existent.

(b) Transcendent Existence as cause or substratum of the universe cannot be established through normal and supernormal experience.

Then again, a question may arise. So far as our experience goes, all the objects of experience within the world are, no doubt, found to have non-eternal changing derivative existence. But what is the proof that the world as a whole also has its beginning and end and can therefore have only a derivative existence ? We know that every object within the world has a cause ; but we find also that the cause of every effect is within the world. So far as our knowledge goes, the causal relation exists between two objects or phenomena within this world. How can we

infer from such observation that the world as a whole also must have a cause and that that cause must be some self-existent Entity transcending this world ? Such an inference would evidently involve the fallacy of Composition. Thus the transcendent, self-existent, eternal, changeless cause of the entire universe is far from being logically established.

The advocates of the view would say that such an eternal, changeless, self-existent Reality is not altogether beyond the possibility of experience. Changeless Existence is perceived as underlying all objects of experience. There can be no object of actual or possible experience, which can be conceived as without Existence. The forms and attributes of objects may be different and changing and of innumerable varieties. But Existence is common to them all, and cannot be conceived as either various or changing. Therefore one unchanging eternal Existence must be conceived as the Substratum of all the various kinds of objects. As all the diverse kinds of objects of actual and possible experience constitute the world, this changeless, eternal, *all*-pervading Existence must be accepted as the substratum of the entire world.

With regard to this argument of the advocates of the view, we may refer the reader to our discussion about the conception of Existence or Being. In this connection it may be enough to say in reply that though the premises of this argument may be accepted, the conclusion does not follow from them. Existence is a common factor in all the objects of the universe, and the universe as a whole also must be conceived as having existence. But does this mean that Existence is by itself an absolute self-existent Reality and that it is the substratum of all objects within the universe as well as of the universe as a whole ? Until and unless

this changeless, non-dual Existence can be experienced in isolation from the concrete objects of experience or its self-existence can be proved on any other independent evidence, the charge of treating a logical abstraction as a self-existent Reality against this view will remain unrepudiated.

It is evident that Existence apart from the existent objects cannot be object of sense-perception, because it does not possess the perceptible properties. Nor can it be an object of inductive inference because no relation of invariable concomitance, on which a valid induction with regard to Existence might be based, is available. Nor can its independent reality be deductively inferred, because we can find out no higher principle from which it can be deduced. The only logical process by which we can arrive at the conception of Existence is logical analysis and abstraction, which cannot establish its independent reality. How then can it be proved that Existence is the ultimate Reality which is the cause from which the existence of the world of objects is derived or which is the substratum on which this world appears ?

It may be contended that Existence apart from any object is experienced in the state of trance. If this be put forward as an argument for establishing the unrelated absolute Reality of Existence, several difficulties would arise. First of all, if the validity of this experience is challenged, one cannot prove it to another. Secondly, those who claim to have experienced this state, are not unanimous with regard to the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Thirdly, it may be asked, what is the nature of the trance. If it is a state of the intense concentration of the mind, then it is quite possible that on account of the attention being fixed on one aspect of a thing,—in the present case, upon the universal changeless existence-aspect of all objects—the

other aspects of things as well as all other things may be absent from the experience for the time being; but this would not prove that other things or aspects are non-existent or really unconnected with it or that it is an independently existent Entity. Moreover, if it were really an object of valid experience in some particular state of the mind, viz. the state of trance, then also it could not be regarded as the absolute transcendental Reality, because every object of experience must be related to the subject and be illumined by the consciousness of the subject and hence must be of the nature of a dependent relative reality.

Thus, reflecting upon the main arguments of this school, we fail to discover a solid logical ground, on which the independent absolute reality of Existence, which is found to be common to all objects of the world, can be established. If then Existence cannot be proved as the absolute independent Reality apart from relation to the existent objects of experience, no reason can be assigned for regarding these objects as of a lower order of *reality* than Existence,—not to speak of considering them as not existent at all in the sense in which Existence is existent.

(c) Nine conditions of world's being the illusory appearance on Brahman enumerated.

We have previously analysed and examined the nature of Illusion. If we have to accept the doctrine that the world of plurality is an illusory appearance on the substratum of the attributeless changeless unmodifiable eternal Being-Consciousness, viz. Brahman, and as such it is inexplicable in terms of either existent or non-existent in the absolute sense of the terms, we are to be satisfied by incontrovertible logical proofs, (1) that the substratum, Brahman, has

an independent existence unrelated to the world, (2) that its existence is incapable of being denied at any time, past, present or future, (3) that its real nature as the changeless attributeless eternal self-luminous Being is capable of being veiled, (4) that this veiling does not necessitate the recognition of any causal power existing outside and independently of, but related to Brahman, (5) that this veiling does not also require the existence of any external conscious subject, in relation to whom Its nature should be veiled, (6) that without the recognition of any self-existent knowing subject, or any independent causal power or any external co-operative factor, the false appearance of the attributeless powerless changeless Brahman in the form of the diversified world can be adequately accounted for, (7) that the realisation of the true character of Brahman amounts to the repudiation of the world of plurality as a really existent object, (8) that such realisation is true knowledge and its truth can be substantiated, and (9) that in the light of this true knowledge the world is proved to have never really existed in the past, to be not really existing in the present and to be not capable of really existing in the future. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the world cannot be proved to be an illusory appearance on the Substratum of Brahman.

(1) The first condition unfulfilled, that is, Brahman cannot be known as having independent existence unrelated to the world.

(1) With regard to the first condition, it has already been found that there is no valid means of knowing that Brahman has an independent existence unrelated to the world. It has been found that neither perception, nor inductive or deductive inference nor the trance-experi-

ence can make the attributeless Brahman its object. If Brahman were the object of any such valid knowledge, It would no longer remain an eternal attributeless transcendent Reality beyond the world, but would be one of empirical realities having attributes and modifications, because from the nature of such knowledge only the empirical realities can be its objects. We have also noted the fallacies that would be involved in regarding this Being-Consciousness as the necessary hypothesis ; this would violate the principle of *vera causa* and also commit the fallacy of Interdependence. The exponents of the theory have to fall back upon Revelation embodied in Scriptures, but the drawbacks of the adoption of this course have been discussed at length on many occasions. Even if the Scriptures were accepted as a source of valid knowledge, they also would not be able to give true knowledge of the transcendent unrelated self-existence of the attributeless Brahman ; because they must give knowledge through *words*, and *words* cannot possibly make such a Reality their object. Even a definite conception of *such* a Reality is not found possible, because as soon as *It* becomes an object of conception, It becomes a relative, conditional, empirical Reality. Thus the very first condition remains unfulfilled. If Brahman cannot be convincingly proved to have a transcendent existence by Itself, whether the world exists or not, how can Brahman be regarded as the Substratum, on which the world illusorily appears ?

(2) Brahman as non-cancelled in all times cannot be known.

(2) The second condition automatically goes with the first. But even if somehow the transcendent existence of Brahman could be known, the impossibility of its being

negated at any time, past, present or future, could not be the object of any valid knowledge. Direct knowledge can make only a present entity its object and it cannot be related to the past or the future. From the knowledge of the present existence of an entity, we are not justified in inferring that it was never non-existent in its present nature even in the remotest past or that it will not be so in any remote future. From the absence of the knowledge of any change or modification in the entity at the present time, we cannot infer that it is incapable of any change whatsoever at any time.

Two arguments may be put forward to prove the impossibility of the existence of Brahman being negated at any time. First, Brahman is Existence, and Existence cannot be thought of as non-existent at any time without committing the fallacy of self-contradiction. Secondly, if Brahman be conceived as subject to origination, change and destruction,—at however long intervals these may be,—It would be of the nature of an effect and would presuppose a cause. If that cause also were of the same nature, it must be the product of another cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. The ultimate cause, which must be recognised for satisfying the demand of the principle of causality, must necessarily be conceived as without origination, change and destruction i. e. It must be eternal and incapable of Its being negated at any time. From the standpoint of Formal Logic, these arguments are very strong indeed; but formal argument cannot prove the real existence of anything. The concept of Existence is certainly contrary to the concept of Non-Existence, and the one cannot be thought of as the other. But that an Entity corresponding to the concept of Existence really exists outside our thought is not proved thereby. By examining the idea of existence as involved

in the nature of the existent objects, we have found that it can be explained in different ways, and that its being the absolute substance, of which all objects are only particularised manifestations or appearances, is not logically established. The second argument also is of no avail, because there is no incontrovertible ground in our experience on which we can stand to show that the law of Causality demands an eternal changeless cause of all changing non-eternal entities, and that such a cause really exists beyond and behind the world.

(3) Brahman itself cannot be conceived as capable of being veiled.

(3) Now with regard to the third condition. If the unrelated absolute existence of Brahman is assumed to be true, is the conception of *veiling* consistent with Its nature, as conceived by the exponents of this doctrine? Brahman is conceived as self-luminous Consciousness without any attributes, without any parts, without any difference of aspects or features. Can the nature of such a Being be veiled, so as to make possible any illusory appearance on It as Substratum? In every case of illusion experienced in the world of normal experience, such as in the cases of rope-snake, shell-silver etc. the substratum upon which the illusory object appears has a general and a particular aspect. The particular characteristics, which can reveal the substance as it truly is, are veiled; while its general aspect remains inherent in the nature of the illusory object. If the entire nature of the substance were completely veiled, there would be absolutely no relation between the substance and the illusory object, and there would be no reason for regarding the former as the substratum of the latter. Further, in that case, anything might be illusorily perceived in the place of anything what-

soever, as silver in the place of rope and snake in the place of shell. Illusory objects would then have to be regarded as appearing and disappearing by themselves without any reference to the substratum. Therefore some general feature of the substratum must be recognised as present in the illusory appearance superimposed upon it. It is needless to say that if the complete nature of the substance were revealed, there would be no illusion at all. Thus it is found that the difference between general and special features in a substance is a necessary pre-condition of the possibility of illusion upon it.

In Brahman, as it is conceived by the advocates of the doctrine, this very fundamental condition is absent. Brahman is conceived as without any kind of difference within Its character. It is regarded as absolutely devoid of attributes, parts, aspects, features or forms. Hence it cannot be said of It that Its nature is veiled in some aspects and exhibited in other aspects,—that Its special features are veiled and general features are exhibited in the nature of the illusory world.

Advocate.—The aspect of existence of Brahman's nature is found exhibited in the nature of the illusory world, while Its self-luminosity, eternity, infinity, absoluteness, etc., are veiled from view; hence there can be no objection against Its being the substratum of this world of appearance.

Critic.—This argument would imply the virtual abandonment of your conception of Brahman. Do you seriously mean to say that existence is the general character of Brahman and self-luminosity etc. are the special features? In that case Brahman would no longer be what you conceive It to be, viz. attributeless, featureless, changeless Being-Consciousness. Existence, self-luminosity, eternity, infinity

absoluteness etc. are not regarded as distinct attributes or characteristics of Brahman; but they are regarded as identical in ultimate significance, so that the idea of each necessarily leads to the ideas of the others. Hence the veiling of self-luminosity or absoluteness would involve the veiling of the entire nature of Brahman, and the exhibition of Existence would also involve the exhibition of the entire nature. Hence the differenceless nature of Brahman must be either entirely veiled or entirely exhibited. In either case the phenomenon of illusion becomes impossible. Nor can it be said that Being-Consciousness has fancied general and particular aspects and so there can be illusory knowledge of Reality. Because the imagined general and particular aspects of Reality are due to illusion, therefore there will be the absence of those imagined aspects before illusion. And because the distinction between the particular and general aspects of Reality in that case will be illusory, so that distinction cannot be the cause of illusions in general. So the possibility of illusion on the Substratum of Brahman is in no way proved.

(4) Veil of Brahman through some Power inconceivable.

(4) Even if, inconsistently with this school's conception of Brahman, it be maintained that the nature of Brahman may be partly veiled and partly exhibited and thereby illusion may be possible, the question would arise, is there anything in the very nature of Brahman that creates the veil over certain aspects of Its nature or is there anything existing outside and independently of Brahman that is the cause of this veil? Both these alternatives are inconsistent with the conception of Brahman. So far as our normal experience is concerned, nowhere do we find any object which veils itself by its own power. We cannot even con-

sistently conceive that what veils and what is veiled are the same entity. However, if it be held that Brahman has the mysterious power of partially veiling Its own nature, then Brahman would no longer be the powerless, actionless Being-consciousness, but it must be conceived as possessing an active power within Itself. Further, some questions should arise,—does this power belong eternally to Brahman? If so, does it pertain to Its essential nature or is it an inseparable accident in Its nature? If not, is the power produced in His nature? If the veiling power pertains to Brahman's essential nature, then Brahman should be conceived as essentially of the character of veiled self-luminosity, veiled absoluteness, veiled infinity, and veiled consciousness; that is to say, It should be self-luminous as well as non-self-luminous, absolute as well as relative, infinite as well as finite, conscious as well as unconscious in His essential character. This is evidently inconceivable. If this veiling power be an inseparable accident eternally related to Its nature, then Brahman would have to be conceived as eternally possessing an essential nature and an accidental nature, and in Its essential nature It should be eternally conscious, self-luminous, absolute and infinite, and in Its accidental nature It should be eternally unconscious, non-self-luminous, relative and finite. Even if this position were agreed to, the relation between the essential and the accidental natures could not be logically determined. Further, this veiling power, being eternally present in Its nature, whether as an essential or as an accidental feature, would never disappear, and hence the illusion caused by it could never be destroyed. In the absence of the possibility of the illusory object being destroyed, there would be no ground for regarding it as illusory. Thus the very foundation of the theory of the illusory appearance of the world would be shaken.

If on the other hand this veiling power be regarded as non-eternal and produced in the nature of Brahman, then some cause for the production of this power has to be discovered, and that cause again must be either within or outside the nature of Brahman. If it be within the nature of Brahman and eternally present therein, all the difficulties mentioned above would arise in this case also. Further, no reason could be assigned why the cause being eternally present, the effect would be non-eternal. If this cause also be non-eternal, there would arise the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. Moreover, the production of any such power in the nature of Brahman, whether by a cause within or outside It, would inevitably imply a change or modification in its character. All these are certainly inconsistent with the recognised conception of Brahman.

Thus we see that the advocates of this theory cannot consistently maintain that the veiling power, whatever its character may be, is within the nature of Brahman. Can they accept the position that the veiling power (*or the* cause of this power) exists outside and independently of Brahman ? This would be quite incompatible with the doctrine of the non-duality of Brahman. Even if the non-duality of Brahman could be abandoned, no relation could be established between Brahman and this veiling power, and hence the illusion could not be accounted for in terms of such an unrelated foreign power.

(5) As Brahman cannot be said to be unconscious, conscious or self-conscious, it cannot be veiled.

(5) In all cases of illusion with which we are acquainted in the domain of our normal experience, there is a

knowing subject with imperfect power of observation, to which a substance illusorily appears as something other than what it really is. The nature of illusion, when logically analysed, points also to this requisite condition of its possibility. The substance which becomes the substratum of illusion, may be either conscious or unconscious, and if conscious, it may be either self-conscious or not-self-conscious. If the substance is unconscious, it cannot exhibit itself to itself either in its true nature or in any false nature. Its appearance, whether true or illusory, demands the existence of some conscious subject. If a substance is conscious, but not self-conscious, it can know only external objects which appear to its sense of perception, but cannot form any definite conception of its own self as distinguished from the objects of its knowledge. Hence such a substance also cannot be a substratum of illusion, unless it becomes an object of the knowledge of another subject, that perceives it imperfectly, takes a partial view of its nature and superimposes a different object upon it. If a substance is self-conscious, it does not in the normal waking condition appear to itself as what it is not. But in dream, in hallucination, under the influence of intoxication, or as a result of self-forgetful imagination, reverie or meditation, a self-conscious substance sometimes appears to itself as what it is not. But in these cases also there is difference between subject and object. It is the mental modification, which becomes the object, and the permanent knowing consciousness that distinguishes itself from them and at the same time becomes conscious of itself in relation to them, is the subject. We are not here concerned with any explanation for the possibility of this subject-object-relation within the nature of the self-conscious substance. But it is a fact of experience. In the absence of such a real subject-object-relation within, no self-consciousness

would be possible, and hence no error with regard to one's own nature would be possible. Thus it is found that it is only in the case of a self-conscious substance having the distinction of subject and object within itself, that the same substance may be said with some plausibility to be the substratum of the illusion as well as its perceiver.

Now, the question is, can Brahman be regarded as the substratum as well as the perceiver of this illusory world ? To answer this question, it has to be decided whether Brahman is unconscious, conscious or self-conscious. If it be held that Brahman, though pure consciousness and the ground of all revelation, is not Itself conscious of any object, then Brahman must be the object of knowledge to some other knowing subject, to which Its nature should be partially veiled and partially manifested and which should be the perceiver of the illusory world. If it be said that the finite knowing subjects are the perceivers of this illusory world, then these subjects being presupposed by the appearance of the illusory object, must be regarded as already existing before and independently of this cosmic illusion. In that case the existence of the finite subjects should have to be conceived as outside and independent of the existence of Brahman, as well as outside and independent of the illusory cosmos. This is of course not accepted by the exponents of the theory of cosmic Illusion. If, as it is maintained, the finite subjects also are the products of cosmic Illusion, the production of Illusion cannot be explained as in relation to them. If it is said in reply that the finite subjects and the illusory world of diversities are both without beginning in time, then it will be retorted that in that view of the case, instead of regarding the finite subjects and the objective world as illusory, they ought to be recognised as eternally real and essentially related to the nature of the Absolute

Reality. If it be said that the necessity for the recognition of the logical priority of the attributeless changeless absolute Being-Consciousness leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the world of the changing diversities is Its illusory manifestation, then it will be asked, why do you not for the same reason recognise the finite subjects, which are the logical presupposition of any illusion on the substratum of the attributeless Existence, as being independent of this illusion ?

Further, how can the finite subjects know that the world is an illusory appearance, and not the true objective reality as they experience it to be ? Evidently this can be possible, if they can make the true and complete nature of Brahman, the substratum of this cosmic Illusion, the object of their knowledge. But if they are the products of this Illusion, they can never possibly know the real nature of Brahman, because so long as they are, the illusion is evidently present and when the real nature of Brahman is revealed,the illusion being gone, they also are not. Thus the finite subjects can never know the world to be an illusion, because its negation can never be experienced by them. Even if it be admitted that the finite knowing subjects, though within the world, have some transcendental aspects, by virtue of which they can transcend this world, then also the difficulty cannot be avoided, because Brahman has in that case to be recognised as having real properties through which It can become an object of valid knowledge to those subjects. Thus if the world of illusion be regarded as the object of the experience and knowledge of the finite subjects, no consistent explanation for this cosmic phenomenon can be offered.

If this alternative be rejected and it is asserted that Brahman is a self-conscious Being and is Itself the percei-

ver of this illusion, just as a man falsely perceives himself in various forms and in various relations in dreams, reveries etc, then alse insoluble difficulties would arise. If Brahman be conceived as a self-conscious Being, then It must be a subject and object at the same time; i. e. It must have in Its essential nature an objective feature as distinct from the subjective consciousness, and this objective feature, according to the view of the advocates of this doctrine, must be non-self-luminous. Then again, Its knowledge of Itself must be imperfect, so that Its nature may be partially veiled and partially manifested to Itself as the subject. Moreover, Its nature also must be complex, having different aspects and features, some of which may be veiled and some revealed. Further, It must be regarded as capable of having different states, corresponding to the states of waking, dreaming, reverie etc. of a man, i. e. Its nature must be subject to modification. All these are inconsistent with the conception of Brahman. If these different states of Brahman are not admitted, It must be conceived as eternally manifesting Itself in the form of the world of diversities, and in that case it, being never negated, cannot be regarded as illusory. Thus we find that the fifth condition of the possibility of the cosmic Illusion on Brahman as the substratum is not fulfilled.

(6). Even admitting veil appearances cannot be accounted for.

(6) Even assuming that the ultimate Reality behind the world is the attributeless changeless infinite eternal Being-Consciousness, called Brahman, that Its nature is capable of being partly veiled without any external force or external subject, can it be adequately explained consistently with this conception of Brahman, how such a

well-ordered universal system comprising such a bewildering variety of objects and events is illusorily produced and regulated ? Mere veiling of the specific nature of a substance is not enough for the production of any illusory object. My ignorance of the presence of a rope before me or my vague apprehension of something present which I cannot recognise as a rope, will not necessarily give rise to the perception of a serpent in its place. Specially when the so-called illusion does not consist in the sudden perception of one object with which I was already acquainted in other places, but it consists in the observation of a series of undreamt-of objects and events harmoniously related and systematically regulated in accordance with definite laws and principles, the mere ignorance of the nature of some substratum cannot of course be expected to adequately account for it. How then can such a world,-which is boundless in time and space, in which all the innumerable diversities of objects and events are found to be so organically related to one another and to be governed by such inexorable laws, in which many events that will occur in the future can be predicted long before with accuracy and precision,—be expected to be fully accounted for by mere reference to the veiling of the nature of Brahman ?

Even if the attributeless Brahman is accepted as the ultimate Reality and even if for the sake of logical consistency with this conception of Reality, the world has to be regarded as an illusory appearance, even then for the purpose of accounting for what the actual nature of this world is, some cause has to be admitted, which should be adequate to explain the wonderful order and adjustment that is discovered and proved in its nature. The advocates of the theory under consideration do not give us any idea

of the character of this cause, but merely appeal to the presence of a positive Ignorance inexplicably pertaining to the nature of Brahman. We have on several occasions examined this conception of Ignorance, and found the logical defects of this conception. We have also found that even if Ignorance be assumed to have a positive existence, it may at most explain the veiling of the nature of a substance, but not the production of a variety of illusory objects on that substratum. We shall revert to the cosmic Ignorance in the sequel also.

(7, 8, 9). Realisation of Truth and subsequent cancellation of the world unfounded hence illusoriness of the world non-established.

(7, 8, 9) The fundamental test of the illusoriness of any object of experience is that when the valid knowledge of the true character of the substratum is attained, that object either disappears altogether or in the light of that knowledge it is convincingly proved to be not what *it* appears to be, and in both the cases the decisive con*clusion* is reached that it never really became what it appeared to be. Is there any possibility of such disillusionment in the case of the world? It would require the valid knowledge of Brahman as the unrelated attributeless non-dual Substance. Is such knowledge attainable? Does Brahman ever become the object of knowledge? We had occasions to discuss this point on several occasions, and in connection with the first and the fifth conditions of this section as well. We have found that the possibility of the valid knowledge of Brahman as the unrelated, attributeless, non-dual Being-Consciousness cannot be established. The absence of the consciousness of the world at the time of trance is no proof of the disappearance of the world as

false, for this absence of the consciousness of the world is found in the state of deep sleep, etc. as well. There is no proof that at any time such valid knowledge is attained viz. that the world never really existed,—that its real existence is deniable at all times. Hence the illusoriness of the world is far from being established.

(d) Illusoriness defined as absolute negation of the world in the Substratum-Brahman untenable.

It may be said that in the very conception of Brahman, there is the notion of the denial of the real existence of the world. Let us examine this logical position of the advocates of this theory. Here the question is,—is that negation apparent or empirical or transcendental ? Now, if this negation is taken as apparent, then the illusory character of the universe will not be proved, because a negation of a less essence (apparent) cannot prove the falsity of its counter-entity (that which is negated) which being empirical is of a greater essence. That negation can not be called empirical, because it is well-known that a counter-entity which is empirical in character is contradictory to an absolute negation of the same character.

The so-called negation in dream of a dream-object cannot be cited in support of the contention that a negation can falsify its counterentity of the same essence, because there is in this case no valid cognition of the substratum upon which the illusory object is superimposed. The knowledge of real negation invariably implies the knowledge of a substratum which is greater in essence than the entity negated, because the said substratum becomes endowed with the absolute negation of the illusory object superimposed upon it. Moreover, in the cases of illusory

objects like shell-silver, rope-snake etc., we experience thei 'being' and 'non-being' as of unequal essence, that is, 'being' in those cases is illusory and 'non-being' is empirical. If being and non-being of the same essence are at the same time recognised in the same object, then in no case would contradictories contradict each other. Hence because it is impossible for a counterentity and its negation of the same essence to remain together, the negation of the empirical world cannot be said to be empirical.

The negation of the world cannot be said to be transcendentally real, because in that case there will be the loss of non-duality. If it be asserted that there is no loss of non-daulity because this negation of the world is of the very essence of Brahman, then our reply is that, it will not be possible for that negation, which is qualified by the property of negativity, to be the essence of Brahman. To admit that negation is the essence of Brahman in its pure form is absurd. A negation cannot be of the nature of pure consciousness, because a negation is dependent on the counterentity, but consciousness is not of such a character. Besides, because the negation is not recognised at the time of illusion, but consciousness is in some respect known at the time of illusion, negation and consciousness cannot be of the same character. So the said absolute negation is not transcendental in character. To consider the alleged negation to be of more essence than empirical entities, it should be recognised as of the nature of pure consciousness. In other words, it has to be admitted that this absolute negation which is transcendental in character is of the nature of the substratum of the universe. But this pure nature of consciousness is not contradictory to any counterentity. The negation of the nature of pure consciousness cannot be determined by any counterentity, hence to speak of it as

contradictory of any counterentity is meaningless. Besides, if the negation be of the nature of Brahman, then owing to the impossibility of the relation of support and the superported in the case of non-difference, negation will not reside in Brahman which is the substratum of the universe, and thereby the falsity which consists in the negation being co-existent with the counter-entity will not be possible.*

Thus it is found that even if it be accepted as a hypothesis that the world is an illusory appearance and that the negation of this world is involved in the conception of its substratum, Brahman, the nature of this negation cannot be logically determined and its validity cannot be established.

Concluding Remarks.

From all these considerations, it is evident that there is no satisfactory ground for proving that the world of our normal experience is an illusory appearance superimposed upon the attributeless changeless Being-Consciousness. The very possibility of the appearance of such an illusory world has been found to be incapable of being

* According to the advocates of the view under consideration, the falsity of the world is primarily proved on the strength of scriptural testimony, and there are reasonings which favour the substantiation of the same conclusion. This procedure is not sound in as much as it involves the fallacy of interdependence. On the strength of inference, the meaning of the scriptures should be ascertained, and after that ascertainment has been done, inference will be brought forward in favour of the meaning of the scriptures ascertained through inference. Because the scriptures (श्रुति) have for their purport non-dualism, inference will make us aware of the unreal thing; and the knowledge of Reality will be attained, when the falsity of the world will be inferred, and through the inference of the falsity of the world, the scriptures will have for its purport the non-dualism of Reality. Thus, there is interdependence.

logically established, consistently with the doctrine of the non-duality, attributelessness, partlessness, changelessness, self-luminosity and absoluteness of the ultimate Reality, viz. Brahman.

When this illusory character of the world of diversities remains unestablished, the category of inexplicability or neither-existence-nor-non-existence, invented for describing the nature of this world becomes unwarranted, because it is not proved that the category of existence is inapplicable to it.

SECTION IV.

Cosmic Ignorance Examined.

INTRODUCTORY.

We find that for the purpose of accounting for the origination and preservation of the world, the exponents of this theory have felt the necessity of making several assumptions. First, they have assumed that the ultimate Reality is an attributeless changeless inactive self-luminous non-dual Being-Consciousness. Secondly, as this world of changing diversities must owe its existence and continuance to this Reality, they have to admit that this ultimate Reality is the cause of the world. Thirdly, as the recognition of the presence of an effect on the same level of existence with the cause would be incompatible with the absolute non-duality of the ultimate Reality, they, in search for some way of escape from this uncomfortable position, have relied on the experience of illusion in this world and have declared the entire world as illusory. Fourthly, for the purpose of giving a plausible explanation for the cosmic Illusion, they have recognised a cosmic Ignorance.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

Cosmic Ignorance cannot be inferred as the cause of the inexplicable effect.

The main argument of this school in support of the supposition of cosmic Ignorance, is that an effect, which is inexplicable or neither-real-nor-unreal in character, requires a causal principle of similarly inexplicable character, because the indifferent existence of the changeless substratum cannot alone account for it. Now, it has been found that the illusoriness and the consequent inexplicable character of the world have not been established, and even the definition of inexplicability or falsity is not tenable. Moreover, if the substratum-consciousness becomes through ignorance the object of experience, then illusion takes place, and if illusion takes place, then the said consciousness becomes the object. Thus, the falsity of an object will be proved, if the knowledge of it is illusory and the said knowledge will be proved to be illusory only if the object of knowledge is taken as false. The supposition of an inexplicable cause for the explanation of the alleged inexplicable effect, namely, the world of experience is therefore of little logical value. Besides, as the advocate holds that from scriptural knowledge which is itself illusory in character, the knowledge of the Real is produced and that from a cause, an effect which is distinct from it ("विलक्षणत्वात्") is produced, so consistently with those admissions, he cannot hold that the inexplicable effect requires an inexplicable material cause.

Cosmic Ignorance cannot be taken as the veil of self-luminous partless Brahman.

As the non-dual attributeless character of Reality has not been logically proved, so the advocate cannot be justified, for the sake of consistency with this conception of Reality, in inferring any principle having the power of veiling the undifferentiated character of that Reality and manifesting differences in it. Over and above, because the substratum is assumed to be without the distinction of the inner and the outer, all-pervading, partless, unassociated, indifferent and ever-manifest luminous consciousness, so it is illogical to imagine a veil that hides its nature. The veiling of the self-luminous is contradictory and as such cannot be conceived. It cannot be said that due to the difference of portions, such veiling of the self-luminous is possible. The portion may either mean a part of the whole or an attribute of a substance, but the self-luminous is neither a whole with parts, nor a substance with attributes. Nor can it be said that to account for its non-manifestation in its undivided and ever-full forms, the veiling of the self-luminous ought to be supposed, because in the differenceless, there is the absence of any form. If the substratum is not veiled, the difference of its forms cannot be supposed, and unless and until the difference of forms is supposed in it, the question of its veiling cannot at all arise.

Thus we find that the logical necessity for supposing the cosmic Ignorance is not substantiated.*

* In accordance with their scriptures, the advocates believe that one, illusory Power (Māyā or cosmic Ignorance) having for its substratum,—the attributeless Consciousness,—is discovered by adepts in the state of deep meditation (ध्यानयोगानुगता). Here let us show that

Cosmic Ignorance cannot be the modifying cause of the world.

Now, let us examine how this cosmic Ignorance, even if accepted as a hypothesis, can explain the diversified the Illusory Power cannot be discovered during meditation. The said Energy is accepted by them as of the nature of a veil. Where there is merely the veil (आवरण), there cannot remain the ego, which is according to them a product of that veil. So the veil cannot be known by the ego. That is, while the cause alone is there, the effect, namely the ego, cannot exist. So by the ego which is an effect, its veiling cause cannot be known. Moreover, meditation and discovery are not possible without the ego. So by meditation, the said Energy can never be known. Nor can it be supposed that by transcending the ego and being identified with the witness–consciousness, the veiling Energy is discovered, because such a state is not possible at all. Even if we imagine such a state, then also that cannot be called discovery because there is no egoistic sense or ascertainment. Nor can it be imagined that the pure witness, having intuited the Energy in that state, remembers or infers it in its wakeful state, because the witness does not admit of change of states, and intuition, remembrance and reference are not the functions of the changeless witness. Further, even if this function of witness were admitted, the difference of opinion among those who practise trance could not be explained. Thus we find that the very possibility of the direct knowledge of the veiling Power in the state of trance cannot be established, and how can it be maintained that it is actually attained? They can however argue that the existence of this Energy is necessarily implied by the state of trance. The witness, being changeless, to explain that state of trance and the awakening from it, something else distinct from the witness must be recognised to be present in the state of trance. This something, according to their view, being neither the ego nor the mind, should be regarded as nothing but that veiling capacity, with which the mind and the ego are identified. Because the effects cannot remain without the cause and because they have no independent existence apart from their material cause, the effects, viz. the ego and the mind, cannot alone remain without that cause. So it should be admitted that the veiling capacity accounts for the alleged remembrance or inference of that state. This, however, is logical argument

world. It is held that this Ignorance is the modified material cause of the universe. Here the question is : Does the said ignorance become modified by being transformed or by not being so ? If it is not transformed, then all the faults shown in the last chapter with regard to the doctrine of unmodified causality will apply here. Moreover, in this case, it will be altogether superfluous to recognise, along with the Substratum, Brahman, another causal principle which also does not admit of any transformation. It should also be noted that modification without any transformation is logically inconceivable. Nor can Ignorance be said to be the transformed cause of the universe. Because if it is regarded as partially transformed, it has to be conceived as consisting of parts, which they cannot logically admit, and in case there is its total transformation, there will be the absence of the prime cause (Ignorance) distinct from the world as an effect. To explain : As such total transformation implies the total abandonment of original nature of what is transformed, and the production of an altogether new form, the necessary conclusion would be that with the origination of the world, Ignorance has been destroyed. It would further follow that Ignorance, which is regarded as the producer of the diversities, being destroyed in the very first moment of the origination of the world, from the second moment there would be no more appearance of diversities. Not only this. Since Ignorance is considered to be the cause, not only of origination, but also of the

for and not the direct intuition of the veiling Energy, and to discover this, adepts need not take pains to practise meditation, because this can easily be done on waking from every case of dreamless sleep or swoon. Thus we find that we have practically to depend on reasoning to ascertain whether the veiling Energy is to be accepted, and not on the scriptures or intuition.

continuance of this illusory world, the total transformation and the consequent destruction of the nature of Ignorance at the very first moment of the creation of the illusion would lead to the immediate disappearance of this world. We have already given in many places the refutation of the doctrine of modification. So neither the causality of Ignorance which is taken as modified nor the causality of attributeless Reality accompanied by such Ignorance can be accepted as a logically self-consistent view.

Besides, the question is: Does Brahman become the ruler (अधिष्ठान) of cosmic Ignorance through its mere presence or through conscious will (ईक्षण). If the first alternative is right, then there will be modification for ever, because Brahman is ever-present. If modification is admitted as dependent on conscious will, then inasmuch as this will itself is the modification of that ignorance, that modification will require another such will and so on. Thus, there will be the fallacy of an infinite regression.

In case, the modification of Ignorance is admitted, then either it must remain naturally (स्वाभाविक) in Consciousness or conditionally (औपाधिक). It cannot be innate in Consciousness, because It is by its nature self-luminous, unrelated and non-dual. Reality which is an unrelated differenceless and non-dual, cannot have the inherent properties of being the support or of being an object or of being the illuminator of something. Nor can it be said that Ignorance conditionally exists in consciousness. If ignorance is the condition of itself, then there will be the fault of self-dependence (आत्माश्रय); if it will require any other condition, there will be interdependence; and if that condition will require another condition and so on, then there will be the fallacy of infinite regression. According to the theory under consideration, consciousness with condition

is imaginary (कल्पित); in that case being itself imaginary, if it imagines itself, then there will be the fault of self-dependence, and if another conditional reality be the cause of this imagination, then it will require another conditional reality to imagine it and thus there will be an infinite regression. And if the relation of consciousness with Ignorance is due to another Ignorance, there will be an infinite regression, because the second ignorance will require a third and so on. Moreover, we have to consider whether the alleged conditional Ignorance remains in one portion of the pure consciousness or all over it? There cannot be partial pervasion, because consciousness is without parts. Moreover, because consciousness is naturally free from parts, if any part of it be thought of, such part must be imaginary or conditional, and the cause of such imagining or conditioning must be Ignorance; so, as shown above, there will be an infinite regression. If the second alternative is granted, then there will be no differentiation of conditions. As each condition affects the whole of consciousness, it would be difficult to distinguish among the conditions.

The doctrine that the universe is the modification of Ignorance is based upon the assumption that the content of illusory experience is inexplicable in character. The advocates of the theory first of all trace the alleged Ignorance as the material cause of the inexplicable shell-silver and then finding the same characteristic of inexplicability in the world of experience consider it as the modification of the same Ignorance. Now, we have already shown that neither the perception of illusory silver nor the modification of Ignorance can be logically explained by them, as a result the attempt at inferring Ignorance as the material cause of the universe becomes baseless.

They hold that as an effect of the modification of Ignorance, an illusory object, e. g. shell-silver, is produced on the substratum, e. g. shell, and becomes the object of perception. Again, when the valid knowledge of the substratum is attained, the Ignorance in relation to it is destroyed, the negation of the illusory object in the substratum is experienced, and the object is conceived as really non-existent. Now, a question may be put to them. Is the production of the illusory object prior to or posterior to or simultaneous with its perception? If it is prior to perception, then the external existence of the object independent of perception has to be admitted, and its illusory character would be disproved. It cannot be posterior to perception, because there cannot be any contact between the sense-organ and what has not yet come into existence. It cannot also be simultaneous with the perception, because unless the object has been already present, the sense-contact cannot occur, and hence at the first or even at the second moment of its production perception is not possible. Hence the dependence of the illusory object on the perceiving subject and the inexplicable existence of the object due to the modification of Ignorance relating to the substratum, cannot be logically reconciled. Besides, according to their view, there are two kinds of knowledge,—one is the eternal witness-consciousness (स्वरूपज्ञान) in which there is no process of knowledge, and the other is phenomenal knowledge, which involves a process (वृत्तिज्ञान). This process is taken as twofold, one is the modification of the mind-stuff and the other is the modification of ignorance. Now by the consciousness alone, you cannot know the illusory silver. Without the modification produced from the sense-contact, it is not possible for the witness-consciousness to know the said silver. If it were possible, then a blind man also might get the notion of silver in the shell, and joys and

sorrows also would have been visible. Besides, by such a recognition, the remembrance of the illusory silver cannot be explained. The mental modification cannot have the form of apparent objects, which do not previously remain unknown. The shell-silver cannot be the modification of ignorance. If ignorance is empirical, it cannot modify itself into the form of apparent effects, because the modified cause and its effects must have the same essence or existence. You cannot avoid this fault by recognising ignorance as apparent, because there is no proof about such a character of ignorance. Moreover, in that case it cannot be the cause of empirical objects. Besides, modification, according to you, is but the attainment of another form of equal essence. But as ignorance is not taken as having parts or apparent, it cannot modify itself into the apparent silver.

Moreover, according to you, Ignorance cannot be treated as one. In that case, when it is once eliminated, there will be the absence of illusion. Ignorance cannot be said to be many, because it is not the object of any source of valid knowledge. Ignorance cannot be said to be different from the self, because it is not apprehended as independent. Nor can Ignorance be regarded as non-different from the self, for then it would participate in the self-luminous nature of the self and would not veil it. It is not with parts, because in that case it would become an effect. It is not partless, because then the complete elimination of it would occur by the true knowledge of any of its effects.

To conclude :—As Ignorance cannot satisfy the conditions necessary for being a cause and as the recognition of Ignorance as the modified material cause of the universe is riddled with contradictions, so Ignorance cannot logically be asserted as the cause of the universe.

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD EXAMINED.

(a) The doctrine of God as Illusory material and efficient cause represented.

The exponents of this theory derive their conception of God from their conceptions of Being-Consciousness and cosmic Ignorance. As a result of their ontological search after the ultimate Reality, they arrive at the idea of one non-dual attributeless Changeless differenceless self-luminous Consciousness, which alone is regarded as having absolute existence. Since it is necessary to explain and account for the existence and nature of the world of our phenomenal experience by reference to the ultimate Reality, they trace the origin of this world to that Consciousness as its absolute cause, material as well as efficient. But the idea of the ultimate Reality as the attributeless differenceless non-dual Consciousness is inconsistent with the idea of It as the real efficient and material cause of a real pluralistic universe. Hence they hold that this universe has only a phenomenal existence, that it illusorily appears on the substratum of Consciousness, and that there is the inexplicable cosmic ignorance, which having veiled the true nature of Consciousness, makes it appear as what we experience it to be. This ignorance and its product viz. this universe, though without any beginning in time, are not real in the sense in which that absolute Consciousness is real, and do not therefore vitiate the absolute non-duality of that ultimate Reality; but their phenomenal reality is unquestionable.

It is evident that Ignorance, apart from the Substratum, Consciousness, is meaningless and can not be regarded as the cause of the world, and it is also evident that Consciousness, in its essential attributeless changeless character,

cannot be regarded as the cause of this world. Hence to trace the cause of this world the idea of Consciousness and that of Ignorance must be taken together. Thus it is held that the attributeless changeless powerless actionless differenceless Consciousness,—which alone is the ultimate Reality,—being apparently conditioned and determined by and illusorily identified with the cosmic Ignorance, which has an inexplicable reality, but has no beginning of existence, eternally appears as God and becomes the sole absolute cause of this world. Thus, according to this view, God is the conditioned and determined Being-Consciousness, and the conditioning agent, viz. Ignorance, being only phenomenally real, God also has only a phenomenal reality, and the true knowledge of the ultimate character of Being-Consciousness will invalidate Its God-hood along with the invalidation of the world-creation. But all the powers and attributes, that are required to be supposed in the cause in order to account for the wonderfully regulated nature of this boundless diversified world, are attributed to God or the conditioned Brahman, from the phenomenal point of view. Accordingly this God is recognised as omnipotent and omniscient, all-pervading and all-transcending, the sole creator, preserver, ruler and destroyer of the objects and events of the world. God is thus the apparent self-manifestation through cosmic Ignorance, of the attributeless Consciousness, in relation to the entire world-system.

But this Consciousness has another form of self-manifestation through the same Ignorance. This cosmic ignorance modifies itself into innumerable special or individual ignorances, appearing in the forms of particular egos and minds. The same Consciousness, as conditioned and determined by and identified with these particular egos and minds, manifests itself, from the same phenomenal point of

view, as innumerable finite selves (*jeevas*). Thus God and the *jeevas* are, from the transcendental point of view, absolutely identical, because they are nothing but pure attributeless Consciousness, but from the phenomenal point of view God is the creator and ruler of the *jeevas*.

(b) The conception of God based on unestablished conclusions.

Now, the validity of this conception of God and of the finite selves is completely dependent upon the validity of conceptions of the attributeless changeless Being-Consciousness as the non-dual ultimate Reality, the world of diversities as the illusory appearance on this substratum and as having a neither-real-nor-unreal inexplicable existence, and the cosmic Ignorance as the inexplicable agency that veils the real nature of Being-Consciousness and modifying itself into various forms exhibits the diversities of the world on that substratum. In the preceding sections we have examined each of these conceptions and their implications. *It* has been found that each of them is beset with various *logical* difficulties, and none can be carried to their logical end without being entangled into inconsistencies and absurdities. This conception of God and of the finite selves follows as a matter of course from those unestablished conceptions, and hence obviously it is also far from being established.

(c) The conception of God is a hypothesis and not founded on proof.

If we analyse and reflect upon the nature of this universe of phenomenal experience, and follow the demand of the law of Causality to account for it, we are required to suppose a cause which should be sufficient to supply an adequate ground for the beginningless and endless existence

as well as the wonderfully regulated and harmonised plurality of this world. This mode of thought may lead to the conception of a cause, which must be self-existent, which must have the unrestrained and unlimited power to produce a world of plurality out of itself without any help or hindrance from any other agency, which must have the unlimited wisdom to regulate the course and determine the nature of everything in harmony with all other things, past, present and future, which must be self-conscious and by whose consciousness all things should be manifested. From the empirical point of view the conception of God is the result of this mode of thought. But unless the real existence of such God can be proved by some other means of valid knowledge, God must remain a hypothesis, but His existence will not be an established truth. We have noticed before that no such incontrovertible proof is forthcoming. It is for this reason that God's nature and His relation to the world have been conceived in different ways by different schools of thought, and even among the supporters of the doctrine under consideration different views are found They ultimately rely upon intuition and scriptures; the value of this reliance for the establishment of truth has been examined previously.

(d) Ontological and logical necessities for the recognition of God wanting.

The exponents of the theory we have been discussing, have gone further and analysed this conception of God into the conception of one absolutely real attributeless Consciousness and one apparently real Ignorance. From the standpoint of the causal argument, is there any convincing justification for this analysis? If Consciousness as conditioned and determined by Ignorance has to be recognised as the sole material and efficient cause of the world, then some un-

avoidable rational necessity has to be shown for not regarding this so-called conditioned consciousness or God as the ultimate Reality.

The necessity may be two-fold,–one logical and another ontological. The ontological demand of thought leads to the conception of one non-dual attributeless Existence as the ultimate Reality. But unless additional independent evidence can be found for establishing the existential truth of this conception, there is no bar against regarding it as a substantiation of an abstract feature of God. In course of our examination of this doctrine of attributeless Existence, we could find out no satisfactory evidence for establishing the independent real existence of this supposed attributeless Existence. The logical necessity lies in showing that if God is to be regarded as the ultimate Reality and the real material and efficient cause of the world, He is to be conceived as eternally modifying Himself into the changing plurality of the world and at the same time remaining eternally the unchanged one. This is self-contradictory, and to escape from this logical absurdity, an equally unwarrantable assumption of a unique unthinkable power in Him has to be made. The charge is of course legitimate, and we have discussed the fallacies involved in the conception of the self-modification of God in a previous chapter.

But here the question is, how do the exponents of the theory under examination gain by dividing the concrete nature of God into attributeless changeless Consciousness and cosmic Ignorance? The attributeless Consciousness can be of no help in explaining the nature of this vast complicated harmonious world of plurality, except that the existence of this world may find its support in the existence of Consciousness. All the other powers and

attributes,—viz. omnipotence, omniscience, the formation of plan and design for this wonderful cosmic order and adjustment, the creation and regulation and organisation of different, but inter-related, orders of finite beings, inorganic, organic, sentient and rational, etc.—have to be ascribed to Cosmic Ignorance. It is inconceivable how such powers and attributes can be associated with Ignorance, the conception of which is originally based upon the observation of the not-knowing of certain objects by particular finite knowing beings and the veiling of the true nature of certain substances at the time of illusion with reference to particular perceiving subjects. The ascription of such powers and attributes to Ignorance is at least no more comprehensible than the ascription of these powers and attributes to God. Thus the nature of this world of effects is not logically explained, either by regarding God as the ultimate Reality or by analysing His nature into attributeless Consciousness and Ignorance.

(e) The conclusion that Ignorance being associated with Brahman produces the world implies the abandonment of the advocates' doctrine of the ultimate Reality.

It will of course be admitted by the exponents of the theory of Ignorance that Ignorance by itself cannot possess these powers and attributes, but that being imposed upon and associated with the absolute Being-Consciousness, it becomes endowed with these incomprehensible powers and attributes. If instead of being associated with Brahman, it had been associated with any finite being, it could not of course modify itself into and make that finite being appear as such a boundless complicated world-system extending over all space and all time and with such wonderful

harmony. If this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the cosmic Ignorance owes the limitless wonderworking powers and attributes, which are exhibited in the world-process, to the Absolute Reality, with which it is eternally associated, and that it is able to make that Reality appear in the form of such an intricate temporal and spatial world-system, because that Reality has in Its own nature the capacity and possibility to appear as such. This admission would amount to the admission that the Absolute Reality is not really attributeless and powerless, but It has eternally inherent in its nature the supreme and limitless powers and attributes, which the world-system implies. It may be added that these powers and attributes would remain eternally undifferentiated and therefore unmanifested, if Ignorance, by what may be called its own specific character and power of partially veiling and partially manifesting and diversifying the nature of the Substance upon which it is imposed, had not paved the way for their partial and gradual manifestation in the shape of the world-process. This would thus mean that Brahman is the eternal repository or embodiment of all possible powers and attributes, and the cosmic Ignorance is only the medium through which they are gradually manifested. The acceptance of this position by the exponents of the theory would amount to a great slackening of their original position with regard to the nature of Brahman and Ignorance.

But their admission may not stop here. It is recognised by them that the cosmic Ignorance does not come from outside to impose itself upon Brahman, that it has no beginning in time, that it has originally no reference to any external perceiver, that it has no existence apart from the existence of Brahman and that it eternally pertains to Its nature. What would this conception of cosmic Ignor-

ance, taken along with the previous admission, imply ? It would mean that this agency or power of veiling, differentiating and diversifying the inherent powers and attributes of Brahman and thereby manifesting them in the shape of the world-system, is not a distinct agency having separate existence, but eternally exists in and for Brahman, and may therefore not illegitimately be conceived as its nature or power or tendency of self-manifestation.

The admission of this would of course mean the abandonment of their doctrine of the ultimate Reality being attributeless Existence and of Ignorance being inexplicably associated with it, and the acceptance of God or Brahman with inexplicable power and attribute as the ultimate Reality that can be reached by Reason.

(f) **The attributeless non-dual Reality though not known by any other valid source of knowledge is accepted by the advocate on the ground of faith in the scriptures and liberation.**

The exponents of the theory will say that from the empirical or phenomenal point of view they have no objection to accept God as the ultimate Reality ; but still God cannot be recognised as more than the ultimate phenomenal Reality. From the transcendental point of view, however, God's complex existence must be resolved into and deduced from Pure attributeless Existence-Consciousness, which again must necessitate the supposition of the cosmic Ignorance. Therefore they must accept God without abandoning the attributeless Consciousness and Ignorance.

But the question is, what is their source of the knowledge of what they regard as the Transcendental Reality

and what is the ground of their regarding the self-diversifying power of God as Ignorance? It has been found that the non-dual attributeless changeless Being-Consciousness cannot be satisfactorily proved to have a real existence by itself, apart from its relation to what they call Ignorance or the power of self-diversification. It has been found that neither perception nor inference nor trance-experience can make such a Being its object. It has also been found that such a Being is not a pre-supposition absolutely necessitated for the explanation of the world-process. Why then are they so very earnest for establishing It and prepared for making any number of unprovable hypotheses for Its sake?

They will at last have to say in reply that their doctrine is inseparably associated with their faith in the Scriptures and their conception of *Mukti* or liberation from the world, and hence to be true to these, they must adjust the course of their logic to the proclamations of the Scriptures and the possibility of *Mukti*. The Scriptures, which are believed by them as infallible, speak of the non-dual attributeless changeless Being-Consciousness as the Absolute Reality, and this must be accepted as the foundation of all philosophical discourses. These Scriptures again have declared that by the knowledge of this Reality the finite spirit realises its absolute unity with It.

(g) Scriptural authority Unacceptable.

We have discussed the question of the validity of the Scriptures as the source of true knowledge about Reality in the earlier part of the book as well as on several other occasions. It has been found that they can in no way be regarded as an independent source of valid knowledge. Even if their validity be conceded to, the position of these non-dualists is not established. Not only do the different

Scriptures differ, but even the same Scripture speaks differently in different contexts. It is by the exercise of logical reason that the different texts of the Scriptures have to be interpreted, and for the sake of logical consistency among the different texts, sometimes meanings which are not literally conveyed by the texts are imputed to them. The exponents of this theory also do the same and also regard some texts as having superior value and strength in comparison with others. No Scriptural text, if found to be logically self-inconsistent or inconsistent with other texts, is accepted on its face value. Hence unless the non-dual attributeless Being-Consciousness as the ultimate Reality can be logically established, It cannot be accepted as such merely on the authority of any Scripture. The believers in the Scripture would rather be well-advised to interpret the texts literally conveying this sense in harmony with those texts, the validity of which can be logically substantiated.

(h) The doctrine of Mukti (liberation) represented and criticised: Mukti involves nine assumptions which are self-contradictory.

Secondly, with regard to the conception of *Mukti* or liberation, it is not the same idea of *Mukti* that is preached by all the Scriptural texts. Every system of philosophy also has its own conception of *Mukti*. The idea of the unity of the finite spirit with the Absolute Reality, conveyed in certain texts can also be differently construed. Whether the *Mukti*, referred to here, can be actually realised or experienced is also a debatable point and will be discussed hereafter.

The idea of *Mukti*, which is essentially connected with this absolute non-duality of Brahman, is that the indi-

vidual selves realise their non-difference from Brahman at the time of their attainment of *Mukti*. It is held that if the individual selves are not really non-different from Brahman, this realisation would be meaningless. But as the realisation must be accepted as valid, the individual selves must be regarded as really non-different from Brahman, and their difference from Brahman or the ultimate Reality —the ultimate Source of the world—as experienced in the worldly state of existence, must be regarded as illusory. Whatever is illusory must be due to ignorance. Therefore the experienced difference of the individual self from Brahman must be due to Ignorance. When this Ignorance is destroyed, individuality disappears and the non-dual Brahman alone remains. Now, if the world-system is real, the individuality of the selves, having particular place and function in it, cannot be illusory. Hence the real unity of the self with Brahman implies the illusoriness of the world as well. Accordingly, the world as well as the individuality and finitude of the selves must be regarded as due to Ignorance. But as this Ignorance is capable of being destroyed (for otherwise *Mukti* would be impossible), the isolated existence of Brahman apart from relation to Ignorance must be admitted. Hence on the ground of the validity of *Mukti*, as conceived by these non-dualists, the absolute non-dual attributeless powerless changeless Brahman as the ultimate Reality must be recognised, and consequently the Ignorance that makes It appear as the world must be regarded as not pertaining to the nature of Brahman, but present as an inexplicable entity capable of being destroyed. This leads to the conclusion that God must be conceived as Brahman illusorily conditioned by Ignorance and hence as possessing only an empirical—or from the stand-point of the Absolute Reality, Brahman, only an illusory—existence.

We shall deal with the question of the validity of *Mukti* afterwards. Here we note a few striking assumptions which are made for the sake of this *Mukti*. First, Brahman, the absolute Reality, is Pure Consciousness, but not self-conscious,—is self-luminous, but incapable of illumining Its own nature. Secondly, as self-luminous Being-Consciousness It is the support and witness of Ignorance, but being unacquainted with Its own true nature, It becomes subject to illusion created with regard to Its own nature by that Ignorance and looks upon Itself as a plurality of finite selves, surrounded and oppressed by a bewildering diversity of objects. Thirdly, it is under the influence of Ignorance that the self-luminous Consciousness becomes conscious of its own existence, and when It becomes so conscious, It finds Itself to be finite, relative, conditioned, and suffering from misery. Fourthly, Brahman, the Absolute Reality, though unknown to Itself as such, can be the object of knowledge to the finite-self, i. e. to Itself, when It becomes under the influence of Ignorance a finite relative individual self. Fifthly, the self also, which is identical with Brahman, does not know itself or Brahman through its own self-luminosity, but through the modification of the mind, which is a modification of Ignorance. Sixthly, Ignorance which is not destroyed, but rather sheltered, by the self-luminosity of Brahman or the Self, is capable of being destroyed by the mental cognition i. e. by a particular form of the modification of the mind, whose very existence depends upon and is sustained by Ignorance. Seventhly, for the possibility of the knowledge of Brahman and the destruction of Ignorance by the finite self and the attainment of liberation by the latter, it has also to be assumed that at the same moment of time, there must be the correlated existence of Brahman as the object of this knowledge, the finite self as

the subject, the mental modification as the process of knowledge, the mind as the instrument, Ignorance as the sustainer of the mind and the distinction between Brahman and the self. In the absence of any one of them, it is not possible for the finite self to attain the knowledge of its unity with Brahman and to attain liberation ; on the other hand, if Ignorance can co-exist with this liberating knowledge, there is no antagonism between them, and it is difficult to conceive how the one can kill the other. Eighthly, it is one Brahman that has been appearing as many individual selves, which are therefore really one, and it is one Ignorance that has modified itself into many minds related to them. If one individual self, through the right sort of the modification of one mind, attains the knowledge of non-dual Brahman, it is to be expected that the cosmic Ignorance should be destroyed, the world should be negated, and all the apparently different individual selves should be liberated. But according to this theory, it has to be assumed that the same Ignorance, though destroyed, is not destroyed, the same real self, though liberated, is not liberated. Ninthly, the self-conscious self, having attained *Mukti*, again becomes non-self-conscious pure Being—Brahman—and therefore again liable to be conditioned by Ignorance and to fall into bondage.

Thus, it is found that in order to stick to their conception of *Mukti*, they have to make so many self-contradictory assumptions. How then can this conception of *Mukti*, be the basis of the conception of the ultimate Reality ? Hence it is evident that in no way can the exponents of this theory establish the attributeless changeless powerless knowledgeless pure Being-Consciousness or Brahman, as the ultimate self-existent Reality and as the ground and substance of the world, nor can they point out

any independent evidence for the neither-real-nor-unreal existence of Ignorance, which is eternally associated with Brahman, but still destructible by phenomenal knowledge of Brahman. Accordingly, their conception of God as the transcendentally real Being-Consciousness apparently conditioned by the neither-real-nor-unreal Ignorance, does not stand on any solid foundation, and the idea that this God is an empirical Reality, capable of being transcended by the knowledge of the absolute Reality, viz. attributeless Brahman, is not rationally established.

Godhood and selfhood further Examined.

With regard to the question of the validity of the conception of God and the individual selves of this school of thought, some other objections also may be raised from its own point of view, and we refer to them below.

They hold that one non-dual attributeless witness-consciousness, being conditioned by Ignorance becomes identified with the sum-total of conditions (समष्टि उपाधि), produced from it, and thus appears as God, and by being identified with particular sets of conditions (व्यष्टि उपाधि) appears as finite selves ('Jiva'). Now let us examine these conclusions.

Let us first consider how owing to the existence of Ignorance, Brahman may appear as one God and a plurality of finite selves. If Ignorance is either only one or many, then in both cases there will be no God as distinguished from individval *Jeevas*. To explain, if the first view is accepted, then because of the relation of one undivided consciousness with one and only one Ignorance, there will only be one 'jiva' and other so-called living beings will be mere phantoms (जीवाभास). If Ignorance is distinct and many, then due to the relation of those Ignorances to one consci-

ousness, there will only be different individuals and no God. If in the principle of Ignorance there is the conception of an aggregate which is considered as made up of parts, then due to the relation of Consciousness to the parts as well as to the aggregate, there will be both individuality (जीवत्व) and Godhood simultaneously.

Now, let us show that the oneness and manifoldness of Ignorance cannot be ascertained and therefore the nature of God and individual living beings remains undetermined. We have here to examine the capacity of our finite understanding to come to any definite conclusion with regard to the unity or manifoldness of Ignorance, and thereby to form a definite estimate of the validity of the conceptions of God and finite spirits.

The living being considered in its subjective aspect is constituted of the gross body, the sense-organs, the mind-stuff, the power of activity, the modification of Ignorance, and the witness-consciousness. Now let us see if by any of these, we can know the number of Ignorance.

The oneness or manifoldness of Ignorance cannot be ascertained by the self-luminous witness, because it is without any activity. To ascertain the number of a thing, the knowledge of its various members is needed. Because the witness-self is without modification, there cannot occur in it such knowledge. Hence by the witness-consciousness, the number of Ignorance cannot be settled. Also in order to count the number-two, the number-one should be kept in remembrance. So where there is no modification in the form of remembrance, there cannot be the knowledge of the number. Because the witness-consciousness is one uniform, eternal luminosity, it cannot be destroyed or lost, so no impression can be produced by the destruction of

that consciousness ; hence there cannot be the remembrance by the awakening of that impression. Moreover, without the relation of the ego, remembrance cannot be possible. In order to have remembrance, the knowledge of the unity of both previous and later egos is necessary. But in the witness-consciousness, there is no egoistic sense. Because what makes possible the knowledge of numbers namely—antecedent and subsequent time, succession, continuity, egoism, remembrance—is not possible in the consciousness which is without modification and beyond mind, therefore the number of Ignorance cannot be determined by the witness-consciousness. Though Ignorance is taken as being witnessed by that consciousness, still it cannot be asserted that its oneness and manifoldness can be known by that witness, just as the positive and negative characters of ignorance, they say, remain unknown to the witness.

By mind also the number of ignorance cannot be fixed, because ignorance is not the object of the mind-stuff. When in dreamless sleep, all knowledge produced through instruments sinks, even then ignorance is taken as known. So its knowledge does not depend upon produced cognitions which are only the modifications of the mind-stuff. Besides, that which becomes the object of mind can be determined as one or many, so mind is the cause of the knowledge of number. But as ignorance is not cognizable by mind, so its number cannot be determined. Also, the mental modification called knowledge is contradictory to ignorance. At the rise of knowledge the ignorance relating to respective things is not apprehended. When there is ignorance about something, at that time there cannot be knowledge about that object in the form of a mental modification. At the time of the experience of ignorance, the absence of the valid cognition which drives out ignorance must be recog-

nised, otherwise there would not have been the experience of ignorance. The mental modification, called knowledge, is not the destroyer of ignorance, but it is of the nature of the destruction of ignorance. In order to destroy ignorance which is of the nature of the veil, it is necessary that something should be produced which is of the nature of its destruction or which is of the form of its destroyer. The modification of mind called knowledge is not the destroyer of ignorance, because what is the cause of its destruction should remain immediately before its destruction. But the mental modification called knowledge which is produced about some object does not remain immediately before the destruction of ignorance of that object. Hence the mental modification is not the destroyer of ignorance, but it is of the nature of the destruction of ignorance. Because at the moment, when the reference of ignorance is felt, the said mental modification does not exist, so the said modification will be of the nature of destruction of ignorance. Thus it is shown that ignorance cannot be known by mental modification. Because it is not known by mental *modification*, so its number cannot be ascertained by that. *If* at first, there be the production of mental modification and then there be the destruction of ignorance, then ignorance would become known for sometime after the production of that mental modification. If the mental modification could make ignorance its object, then there would have been the simultaneous experience of both knowledge and ignorance. But in one object there cannot be the experience of simultaneous awareness and unawareness. If ignorance would become objectified by mental modification, then there would be no contradiction between ignorance and that modification, and no possibility of the destruction of ignorance by knowledge. Moreover, mental modification drives out the unknownness of an object; that which is not felt *to*

have been unknown cannot be an object of knowledge through mental modification. Since it is through ignorance that objects become unknown, the unknownness of ignorance itself cannot be admitted. The unknownness of ignorance being not possible, it cannot be known by mental modification whose function is to drive out unknownness. Thus by mental modification the oneness or manifoldness of ignorance cannot be known. If two entities are contradictory, the presence of the one implies the absence of the other; so the number of the one cannot be determined by the other. Ignorance and mental modification, being contradictory in character like darkness and intense light, the ascertainment of the number of the former through the latter is impossible.

By sense-organs also, the number of ignorance cannot be counted. Senses take as their objects external things with colour etc. But ignorance has no colour etc. and it is not a gross external object. At the time when sense-organs cease to act, then also ignorance is felt as in the case of dreamless sleep. Moreover, the ascertainment of number is not the function of sense-organs. If ignorance were the object of the senses, then there would have been no controversy about its being positive or negative, one or many. By the action of vital airs also, the number of ignorance cannot be ascertained. The work of ascertainment is done by the power of knowledge and the vital airs have no such power. In dreamless sleep the vital airs work, but still there is no knowledge of things. It is needless to state that by the gross body and the organs of action also, the number of ignorance cannot be ascertained.

The modification of ignorance itself cannot be the source of the knowledge of the number of ignorance. If the modification of ignorance could produce such know-

ledge, then even in the state of dreamless sleep, there would arise due to such modification the awareness of the distinction of the subject and the object, or of the knower and the known, and the result would be the breach or the virtual absence of dreamless sleep. Moreover, the modification of ignorance is not separate from ignorance. Being itself ignorance, it cannot be the object of its own knowledge and hence it cannot ascertain its own number. Thus the modification of ignorance will not be of any avail in the ascertainment of its number.

There is no other means to ascertain the number of Ignorance. Hence it is proved that whether Ignorance is one or many or one having many parts can never be ascertained. In short, because Ignorance is the object of the inactive witness-consciousness and is not the object of the mental modification, its number will ever remain unknown.

Now, it may be assumed that a more powerful person can know the number of Ignorance and determine the nature of God. But this is impossible, because all capacities belong to the mind. And in the case of the ascertainment of the number of Ignorance, greater power will not count, that is, where mind cannot reach, mind's greater power has nothing to do. Moreover, if any one's mind can know ignorance and through its knowledge can ascertain its number and through that ascertainment arrive at a sure conclusion about Godhood, then it has to be admitted that the mental modification of that person does not drive out ignorance and unawareness due to it. So there will be no valid cognition on the part of that person and his living on this earth will be a difficult affair. Hence because the number of Ignorance cannot be ascertained, Godhood and Individuality (जीवत्व) based on that ascertainment can never be validated. It is for this reason that we find various

divergent theories about God and individual self among the upholders of the said theory. These are conjectures or guesses and are products of faith and not of knowledge.

Thus, having examined from all points of view the doctrine of God as the illusory material and efficient cause of the world, we find no solid rational foundation on which it can safely stand.

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APPENDICES

A B & C.

APPENDIX A.

The Law of Karma Examined.

I

Let us consider the difficulties in the way of determining the *Law of Karma*. In order to ascertain a law, facts should be observed. If we find that certain events happen in a uniform manner and there is no exception to this uniformity, then those events can be subsumed under a law. Thus, a law is inferred (and not perceived) from the observation of uniformity among facts. So in the present case to ascertain the *Law of Karma*, we have to examine relevant facts. If we find that the person who performs virtuous actions invariably enjoys happiness and the person who commits vicious deeds invariably suffers pain, and that the doer of good acts does not suffer pain nor does the doer of bad acts enjoy happiness, then only can we establish the cause-effect-relation between virtuous deeds and happiness and that between vice and sorrow. But this we do not always experience. Virtuous persons are not unoften found to suffer and wicked persons are found to enjoy. Besides, the *Law of Karma* demands also that the result accruing from any action should be enjoyed or suffered by the very same person who performs it. But we do not find it always to be the case. Often we experience that many virtuous persons suffer miseries on account of the wicked deeds of one or a few vicious men or on account of natural calamities for which they are in no way responsible. Similarly vicious men are found to enjoy the benefits of the good actions of good men. Hence, the uniformities of the kind necessary for establishing the *Law of Karma* being unavailable in our experience, the Law cannot be regarded as based on logical grounds.

Advocate.—The absence of harmony that we observe between the virtuous and vicious actions performed by the individuals in this life and their present enjoyments and sufferings cannot be put forward as a contradiction to the *Law of Karma*, because the life of an individual does not begin with the birth of the present gross body nor does it end with the destruction of this gross body. We cannot notice the beginning of the existence of the individual *soul* nor its end. Every individual soul passes through many states of existence, some with gross bodies and some with subtle bodies. Though we actually observe the continuity of the existence of an individual only from the birth to the death of a particular gross body, the life of an individual has in reality a continuity throughout all these states of existence. The operation of the *Law of Karma* has to be understood by reference to the individual's entire span of life. Many actions of the past states of existence may bear fruits in this life, and many actions performed in the present life may be incapable of producing their respective consequences within the life-time of this gross body on account of the stronger powers of the effects of the actions performed in previous states of existence. They will fructify in future lives. With regard to cases of the enjoyments or sufferings of men on account of the actions of others, it is to be known that only those persons are beneficially or injuriously affected in this way, who deserve them on account of their own past deeds. Thus the apparent inconsistencies between actions and their immediate results upon the doer may be easily accounted for, if this life before the birth and after the death of the present body is taken into consideration.

Critic.—This argument of the exponent of the theory takes for granted the very law which has to be proved. For

the establishment of the *Law of Karma* it has to be definitely proved that joys and sorrows of individual beings are regulated according to their respective virtuous and vicious actions. If this law were established beforehand on the strength of an overwhelming mass of evidence supplied by experience, then only could we reasonably attempt to explain the other facts, which appear to be inconsistent with the Law, by making certain assumptions, which might remove the inconsistency. In the present case, the *Law of Karma*, the existence of the permanent individual soul, the plurality of the lives of the same soul and the bond of connection among them, the possibility of virtuous and vicious actions in all these states of existence,—all these are assumptions and none of them is independently proved. These assumptions are resorted to as supplying evidence in favour of one another. This cannot certainly be accepted as sound logic.

In the above discussion having granted the validity of virtue and vice, we have proved that the *Law of Karma* cannot be established. But the question may be raised, whether there is any rational ground for maintaining the validity of the distinction between virtue and vice, and whether it is possible to form a definite conception of this distinction.

Some maintain that those acts which take us Godward or towards Salvation are virtuous; others think that virtuous actions may not have the aforesaid nature, but those actions which are prescribed by the Scriptures are virtuous. But we cannot ascertain the virtuous character of actions in either of these ways.

The definition, viz. that virtue consists in activities leading us towards God, takes for granted that God exists,

that it is possible for us to approach towards Him and ultimately to attain unity or proximity with Him, and that certain types of actions lead us towards Him and others away from Him. All these are assumptions which are lacking in logical proof. Even if the existence of God be assumed, there is no proof that He is approachable by us and that some kinds of actions lead us towards Him and some astray from Him. What we actually experience is that every action produces some physical and some psychical results i. e. every action produces some changes in the external world and some changes in the mind. There is nothing to demonstrate that these changes are in any way connected with the supposed ultimate Reality or the ultimate Cause of the world-system. Moreover, there appears to be no satisfactory ground for believing that to attain unity or proximity with the ultimate Cause of the universe is or ought to be the final object of human desire. That the ultimate Cause of the world-system should also be the ultimate ideal of human life demands proof which is unavailable. Even if this were accepted, what is the authority that can assure us that such and such practices should unite us with God and such actions should not.

The conception which seeks to define virtue and vice in terms of Salvation is also lacking in rational ground. Whether salvation is possible at all, and if possible, what its true nature is, cannot be logically ascertained. The idea of salvation is connected with the idea of the self, and both these ideas differ in different systems of religion. That certain actions are causes of salvation and others are obstacles to it is a matter of faith, not based on any valid rational ground and is not generally admitted. Even if it were admitted, different ideas about salvation would lead

to different ideas about virtue and vice. There being numerous conflicting views about the nature of salvation, there should naturally be conflicting views with regard to what actions are virtuous and what actions are vicious. The same types of actions should be admitted as virtuous from one point of view and condemned as vicious from another point of view. Because actions are done in the sole interest of the self and because spiritual practices cannot be proved to have any reference to any ultimate reality and because there is no agreement in presence as well as in absence between the alleged virtuous actions and their imagined results, the nature of virtue remains undetermined.

To get rid of these difficulties, many pious men hold that whatever actions are approved by the Scriptures should be accepted as virtuous and whatever are condemned by them as vicious should be regarded as such. But this claim also does not stand on a more solid foundation. Different religious sects have different Scriptures, and it is difficult to determine which of them has a higher authority. The different Scriptures enjoin duties in accordance with the nature of the ideals they set up as the *Summum Bonum* of life. These ideals being conflicting, the ideas about virtue and vice also become conflicting. As no ultimate ideal, acceptable to all, can be logically established, and as the efficacies of particular kinds of actions for the realisation of such an ideal also cannot be demonstrated, the claim of any kind of actions enjoined by any Scripture to be regarded as virtuous cannot be logically justified.

Some think that moral consciousness is an essential factor in man, and as the fundamental logical laws for the determination of truth and error come from the theoretical

aspect of his rational nature and are *a priori* true, so the fundamental moral laws for the determination of virtue and vice come from the moral aspect of his nature and are similarly *a priori* valid. Accordingly, virtue and vice should be ascertained by reference to these fundamental moral laws, of which the universal moral consciousness inherent in the nature of every man is the ultimate source. But this definition is not sound. It assumes that the moral consciousness is universally present in every individual, and that it lays down positive rules of virtue and vice which every man must accept on account of that common moral character. But in actual experience we find no justification for this assumption. Though the notions of 'ought' and 'ought not' may be found to be common to men in general, we find no general rules with regard to 'what ought to be done' and 'what ought not to be done' in the human society. If like the fundamental principles of logic, we could discover fundamental principles of morality readily admitted by all rational beings, then only the determination of virtue and vice by such a uniform moral consciousness could be established. But what we actually find is the contrary of this. The principles of rightness and virtue are found to be so conflicting among the different sections of Humanity, that we find no rational ground for believing in the *a priori* character of the moral laws. Hence the appeal to such supposed moral law can be of no use in determining the character of virtue and vice.

Men are not found to be naturally endowed with ethical ideas from their very birth. The notion of duty does not naturally arise in children, but is the result of education. Though we find among people the discrimination of good and bad actions, still from that no ethical law can be determined. What is considered as good in one

society is taken as bad in another ; what is reckoned as good in one state is counted as bad in another state; what is good to one in one state is bad to another in that very state. For the sake of the preservation and development of a harmonious relationship among the members of the society, for bringing about some sort of reconciliation among the divergent and conflicting interests of the people and for keeping up a uniformity among their varied actions, the notions of goodness and badness of actions are introduced by influential individuals or by groups of them. If some common purpose is the motive force and controlling power, regulating individuals' actions, then the society is managed well and the individuals can live comfortably and pursue their own ends without any clash with one another, but rather with the friendly co-operation of one another. The notions of goodness and badness introduced for the requirements of the society get also changed in accordance with the difference of place, time, the characteristics of the people, their political and economic conditions and modes of training. Owing to the similarity of social aims on the one hand and the likeness of human nature on the other, sometimes the same action is regarded as good or bad in different societies. Hence no universally applicable law of morality can be established ; so the ascertainment of goodness and badness of actions according to such law is not possible.

There are others who think that actions which are done with good motives are good. But this definition involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*. Without ascertaining the goodness of actions the goodness of their motives cannot be determined. Moreover, it cannot be laid down that the nature of actions will be according to the respective attitude of mind.

Others consider those actions as good, which are consistent with the voice of conscience. But this definition is not also reliable. The alleged voice is not constant. It is merely a state of mind, which gets transformed according to education and the environment. What is deemed good by one's conscience is considered otherwise by another's. The rule of following conscience cannot be justified, for it would involve setting the ethical convictions of one man, or group of men, above those of another. And there is no more ultimate authority than conscience itself or ethical conviction, by which such a procedure could be justified. Moreover, it is not unoften experienced that the alleged voice of an individual's conscience dictates a course of action which is generally condemned as vicious and which is regarded by others as putting obstacles in the path of moral and spiritual progress. Thus it is altogether unsafe to rely upon the voice of our conscience as final in the determination of virtue and vice. In fact, no section of the human society leaves the question of virtue and vice to the uncertain dictates of individual conscience.

Others think that the goodness and badness of actions are known by their beneficial and injurious results. But this also is not proper. What gives joy to some persons does not give joy to others. The notions of benefit and injury vary according to place, temperament, age, mood, mental development and the like. Owing to different attitudes of mind, the same thing may be regarded by the same man as beneficial on certain occasions and injurious on others. Thus variable subjective feelings like pleasure and pain and changing ideas of benefit and injury cannot be the standard of objective goodness and badness of actions. So virtue and vice cannot be determined by the standard of benefit and injury or of joy and sorrow. Moreover, we

have no capacity to determine, how, where, why, when, and how much our actions will bear fruits. Though we sometimes experience that our actions bear some fruits, yet we cannot measure, how many causes have contributed to the production of the said result, nor can we know what sort of fruits such actions will produce elsewhere in some unseen region or at another time. From results produced by actions we should not determine the nature of those actions, because we find that particular kinds of actions do not uniformly produce the same results. It is sometimes observed that all persons do not attain to the same result even though they make at one time the same effort for the accomplishment of the same object. So from results of actions, we cannot determine the nature of actions.

Some consider actions done without any self-interest (निष्काम) as good. But this is simply absurd. An action has its root in desire, and the satisfaction of the desire is always the object of every voluntary action. Thus self-interest is the motive of all conscious efforts. All activities are guided by the motive of attaining some agreeable objects and getting rid of some disagreeable objects. In the absence of attachment and aversion towards any object, there cannot be any impulse to activity. Moreover, no conscious and active individual self can ever be completely free from desire. The desire for self-preservation, self-development and self-enjoyment is inherent in the very nature of its existence. Without this desire, life would be impossible. This desire must express itself in the forms of particular desires for particular appropriate objects. This desire belongs to the mind or the self, and as long as there is the sense of self-hood, desire must remain more or less. So any absolutely disinterested action is not possible. Hence the above definition is untenable.

Thus we find that all possible attempts to define the nature of virtue and vice are beset with logical as well as practical difficulties. Hence, as the character of virtue and vice — goodness and badness — is itself unascertainable, it cannot be rationally accepted as the basis of the *Law of Karma*.

Besides, the exponents of the *Law of Karma* regard the relation of the individual self with the body as due to *karma*. Now, the following questions arise: Do *karma* and body eternally and inherently pertain to the nature of the self, or are they associated with the self, which is essentially free from them? Secondly, does the self's body presuppose its *karma* or does its *karma* presuppose its body, or are *karma* and body attached to the self without any of them presupposing the other? If the answer to the first alternative of the first question be in the affirmative, then the self being eternally and essentially embodied and active can never be free from the relation to body and activity, and hence *moksha* (liberation) would be impossible and the ultimate purpose of religion would be baffled. If they are associated with the self without pertaining to its essential nature, then their association must have a cause. What is then the cause of this association? If you call it ignorance or indiscrimination or anything else, the self's relation to that cause also being not essential to the self's nature must presuppose another cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. You cannot say that the self is essentially free from body and *karma*, and still they are related to it without any ground or cause. With regard to the second question, if the self's body presuppose its *karma*, then the bodiless self should be regarded as having activity and acquiring merit and demerit. But this is not admitted, because in that case *karma* would constitute the

nature of the self, the self would eternally be a phenomenal entity and its *moksha* would be impossible. Moreover, action implies a change or modification, but the *simple* nature of the self cannot admit of change or modification. The nature of the self being *simple*, any change in it would mean its destruction, which is of course inadmissible. It can be the seat or support of changes, only when embodied. There may be changes or modifications of the body through activity, the self remaining their permanent support. Hence the self cannot by itself be active and related to *karma*. If then the second alternative be accepted, viz. that *karma* presupposes the self's body, then the self's relation to the body cannot be regarded as dependent upon its *karma*. If, again, the body's being the effect of *karma* be abandoned, then the body must be conceived as essentially related to the self. In that case the very conception of the self has to be changed, and the self should be regarded as an embodied being. Even if this be accepted, then *karma*, being the inevitable product of the self's relation to body, would never forsake the self and would thus make liberation impossible. If, again, the third alternative be accepted, i. e. if the self be regarded as by itself eternally embodied and eternally active, then the conception of the self should be altogether changed, the self would be under the eternal bondage of *karma* and bodily limitations, *moksha* would be impossible, and above all, *karma* and body being independent of each other, the very *Law of karma* itself would be abandoned.

Besides, the conception of *Karma*, whether having beginning or having no beginning, defeats *Karma-Law*. To explain: Here it has to be considered whether I, *karma* precedes the existence of individual living beings, or II, the existence of these beings precedes the production of

karma, or III, both remain together and become produced, or IV, both are eternally related.

(I.) The first alternative is inconceivable, because *karma* cannot exist without something to rest on. Moreover, in that case, we fail to explain how this *karma* belongs to this individual and that does not. Besides, in that case, every individual would originally be affected by the *karma*, which it has not acquired by its own activity. This would destroy the very fundamental principle of the *karma-theory* itself. Further, if *karma*, originally unrelated to the individuals and unacquired by them, become afterwards related to them, there is no reason why *karma* of different individuals should be different; and if, on the other hand, the original *karma* be taken as uniform, then there would be nothing to produce differences among the careers and destinies of different individuals afterwards. If *karma* be assumed to be different from the very beginning, then it has to be admitted that there are many self-existent *karma*, whose differences are independent of any actions or agents. In that case, as their original differences are not caused by anything other than themselves, the same may be supposed to happen lower down in all the stages. That is to say, at every stage in the lives of the individuals, the differences of destinies may be supposed to be independent of their previous actions. Thus the recognition of *karma-theory* becomes unnecessary.

(II.) The second alternative also cannot be consistently maintained. In this case there will be no necessity of accepting the *theory of karma* for explaining differences among individuals, because before the production and the relation of *karma* with these beings differences are already there. If the world is regulated at one time without *karma*,

then it is not sound logic to accept *karma* as the cause of the regulation of the universe at other times. So the *karma theory* falls down.

(III.) If the third alternative is accepted, then *karma* will not be the cause of the relation of the self with the body and thus of its being a particular individual. So the *karma-theory* is not valid.

(IV.) The fourth alternative cannot be upheld. *Karma* must presuppose the existence of a doer. If, however, the doer i. e. the self, is by nature under the domain of *karma* and is not the cause of it—that is to say, if *karma* is not the result of the action of any doer, but is associated with every self and eternally determines the course of its actions—then there should be no room for freedom of will, duty and responsibility and hence virtue and vice. But the very foundation of the *Law of Karma* is that every individual self is the builder of its own destiny, i. e. every self is responsible for the actions performed by it and its enjoyments and sufferings, births and deaths etc. are the fruits of its own actions. This foundation will be shaken by the acceptance of the above doctrine. Further, if every individual living being be considered to be equally burdened with beginningless *karma*, how to account for the differences among different individual selves, what explanations can be offered for different individuals acting and enjoying and suffering in different ways, and for their being born under different kinds of circumstances and getting different kinds of opportunities and difficulties? Either it should be admitted that from the same cause different kinds of effects can be produced or that there are different kinds of *karma* eternally guiding the destinies of different individual selves. The first alternative is incon-

sistent with the universally accepted Law of Causality and the second would virtually mean that the divergences of tendencies, actions, enjoyments and sufferings are not explicable in terms of any uniform principle. Hence the real purpose of the enunciation of the *Law of Karma* would be frustrated.

Moreover, the advocates of this theory admit that *karma* has no beginning and at the same time it has an end. But this is difficult to understand. If the selves are eternally under the controlling influence of *karma*, if *karma* is regarded as determining the courses of the lives of all individuals, how can the *karma* be destroyed ? Is it to be supposed that *karma* destroys itself ? This is self-contradictory. Even if it were admitted that it is the nature of *karma* to destroy itself after a certain period, no explanation can be offered why it will destroy itself at different times in the case of different selves. It cannot be said that it is the knowledge of truth which destroys it and thereby its destruction at different times in different cases is explained; because the production of knowledge also, according to this theory, must be determined by *karma* and hence ultimately *karma* becomes the cause of its own destruction and the objection remains unanswered. Further, it is difficult to maintain that the uncaused eternal entity, viz. *karma*, should have an end. Besides, the power of knowledge to destroy *karma* is not logically established. Knowledge can destroy only its opposites, viz. ignorance and error. If knowledge be regarded as the destroyer of *karma* as well, then *karma* should be conceived as the product of ignorance or error of the particular selves, and hence not beginningless. Moreover, the capacity of ignorance or error to produce *karma* is also not demonstrated.

Thus it is proved that if *karma* is with beginning, the *Law of Karma* fails; and if the *karma* is without beginning, then also the *Law of karma* fails.

II.

Other theistic views Examined.

Those who do not believe in the evolution of the mundane existence of the self through numerous forms of living bodies hold that it has got its span of active life from its birth in the human body to the destruction of that body and that it reaps the consequences of the actions of this single life eternally in heaven or hell.**

**We propose to place before the readers a free and candid examination of the main doctrines of the four great theistic non-Indian religious sects viz. Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism. In this criticism we take for granted the nature of God and the relationship between God nd man as conceived by those adherents. These conceptions are as follows.

1. Zoroastrianism:—(*a*)"The fundamental idea of the Zoroastrian creed is dualistic. At the beginning of things there existed two spirits—Ahuró Mazdāo (Ormuzd) and Angró Mainyush (Ahriman)—who represented good and evil (*yasna*, 30.3). The existence of evil in the world is thus presupposed from all eternity. Both spirits possess creative power, which manifests itself in the one positively and in the other negatively. Ormuzd is light and life and all that is pure and good,—in the ethical world law, order, and truth; his antithesis is darkness, filth, death, all that is evil in the world, lawlessness, and lies. When the two are spoken of as *yēma* ("pair"), this is not to be interpreted as meaning that they are twins: (Later sects sought to rise from the dualism to a higher unity. Thus the Zavanites represented Ormuzd and Ahriman as twin sons proceeding from the fundamental principle of all, Zrvana Akarana, or limitless time). It simply denotes a duality, an opposed couple, a *dvandva*. The two spirits had until then counterbalanced one another. The ultimate triumph of the good spirit is an ethical demand of the religious consciousness and the quintessence of Zoroaster's revelation.

Now, with regard to the first point the question is, does the self come into existence with the production of the body

The evil spirit with his wicked hosts appears in the Gāthās much less endowed with the attributes of personality than does Ahura Mazda. Within the world of the good Ormuzd is Lord and God alone.....Of other gods beside him the doctrine of the Gāthās knows nothing. The natural and symbolical gods of the popular belief have no place in it. Yet Ormuzd is not alone in his doings and conflicts, but has in conjunction with himself a number of genii—for the most part personifications of ethical ideas. These are his creatures, his instruments, servants, and assistants, like the ministers of an autocrat sovereign.....Of the elements fire alone ("the son of Ahura Mazda") receives personification and figures as his ally.

As soon as the two at first absolutely separate spirits (comp. *Bundahish*, 1. 4,) encounter one another, their creative activity and at the same time their permanent conflict begin. The history of this conflict is the history of the world. A great cleft runs right through the world: all creation divides itself into that which is Ahura's and that which is Ahriman's. Not that the two spirits carry on the struggle in person: they leave it to be fought out by their respective creations and creatures which they send into the field. The field of battle is the present world.

(Cosmogony:—"In forty-five days, I, Ormuzd, aided by the Amschaspands, worked with care and created the heavens. In sixty days, I made water; in seventy-five, the earth; in thirty, the trees; in twenty, the animals; in seventy-five, man".—Quoted in "French views on Zoroastrianism".)

In the centre of battle is man; his soul is the object of the war. Man is a creation of Ormuzd, who therefore has the right to call him to account. But Ormuzd created him free in his determinations and in his actions, wherefore he is accessible to the influences of the evil powers. (*Yasna* 31.11).....Man takes part in this conflict by all his life and activity in the world. By a true confession of faith, by every good deed, by continually keeping pure his body and his soul, he impairs the power of Satan and strengthens the might of goodness, and establishes a claim for reward upon Ormuzd; by a false confession, by every evil deed and defilement he increases the evil and renders service to Satan."

(Taken from "Zoroaster" in vol. XXIV. Encyclopædia Britannica—Ninth edition.)

or does it descend from the state of liberation into the state of bodily existence? If the former, then it ought to perish

(*b*) "The leading idea of his (Zoroaster's) theology was *Monotheism*, i. e. that there are not many gods, but only one, and the principle of his speculative philosophy *Dualism*, i. e. the supposition of two primeval causes of the real world and of the intellectual, while his moral philosophy was moving in the *Triad* of thought, word, and deed."

(M. Haug's "Essays on the sacred language, writings, and religion of the Parsees.")

II. Judaism :—(*a*) "How far post-Exilian Judaism was moulded by Zarathustrian conceptions is a very difficult question; but no historical student can doubt that its cosmogony, its angelology, and even its anthropology, were largely modified by contact with Persia. But not only was Zarathustrianism active in and through Judaism. In itself, it spread westward, and became directly and indirectly both a precursor and a parent of Gnostic speculation. Certain forms of Gnosticism seem little else than adaptations of the Persian dualism to the solution of the great problem of good and evil. In other forms of it, again, the Pantheism of India seems to have been a pervading influence. This, too, has its representative in the Jewish schools of the time in the secret doctrines of the Kabbala, which many carry considerably beyond the time of Christ."

(Gnosticism in Vol. X Ency. Brit.).

(*b*) "The first article of the creed is the belief that God is one, alone and incomparable.....The serving of other gods is the gravest offence against God.....Closely allied to the belief in the unity of God, is the love of God. The love is reciprocal...To the Jew, therefore, the ideal to strive for, is the imitation of God. God is good, righteous, just and merciful. Man must be good, righteous, just and merciful.....Man is governed by the will of God, but he is also a free agent. His knowledge, on which his faith is to rest, enables him to distinguish between right and wrong, and thus he is responsible for his actions and their moral quality.....But God is not a stern and implacable Judge. The relationship is rather that of Father and Son..... Vicarious atonement which Jesus brought to mankind, is an idea opposed to the spirit of Judaism. The belief of the Jew was, and is, that every man shall die for his own sin, that no intermediary

with the body and there is no ground for believing that it will exist eternally in a disembodied state, whether in

between himself and God is required; God being a God of justice and mercy, delights when the wicked turns from his evil ways and seeks pardon.....The doctrine of original sin is un-Jewish....Finally, the incarnation, and the doctrine of the Trinity made the Unity of God unintelligible to the Jew. It is on the Unity of God that Judaism rests."

(E. Levine's "Judaism").

III. Christianity:—(*a*) "The God of the Old Testament is also the God of the New. Christ and the apostles accepted what Moses and the prophets had taught concerning God; they assigned to Him no other attributes than had already been assigned to Him. Like Moses and the prophets also they made no attempt formally to prove the existence or logically to define the nature of God, but spoke of Him either as from vision or inspiration. ...God is represented in the New Testament as revealing His fatherhood through His Son, Jesus Christ... According to the New Testament, God is not merely infinitely exalted above the world and definitely distinguished therefrom, nor merely immanent and everywhere operative in nature, but also incarnate in Christ...("The Logos, eternally divine, then became also essentially human, so that Christ was perfect God and perfect Man; one not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God"—Incarnation. Vol. VII. Everyman's Encyclopaedia). God is exhibited in the New Testament as the Spirit, the Holy Ghost, who dwells in the spirits of men, to work in them the will of the Father, and to conform them to the image of the Son."

(Theism—in Vol. XXIII. Ency. Brit.)

(*b*) "The philosophical idea that matter is the source of evil that matter has always some stubborn element in it by which it can defy the ideal, gave rise to a whole series of ancient and mediaeval heresies. The Gnostics in all their various sects distinguished between God and the Creator. The good God, they held, could not defile Himself by contact with matter, and therefore could not be the God of creation and providence. Christian theology, on the other hand, has always confessed God to be the Almighty Maker of heaven and earth, and all things seen and unseen, and the necessity for such a doctrine of creation consists in the fact that the

heaven or in hell. Further, according to the principle that whatever is produced or has a beginning of existence must be of the nature of a changing phenomenon and must have a phenomenal cause, the self also must, according to this view, be of the nature of a phenomenon and be the product

Christian consciousness demands the absence of any thing that might come in between God and the furtherance of His plan of salvation. It demands that all things be thought of as dependent on God, in order that He may be able to make all things work together for the good of His people, and so it has strenuously asserted the doctrines of creation and providence in opposition to an independent matter and the reign of fate."

("Heresy" in Vol. XI. Ency. Brit.)

IV. **Mohammedanism** :--(*a*) "They (professors of Mussulman theology) employed a quasi-philosophical method, by which, according to Maimonides, they first reflected how things ought to be in order to support, or at least not contradict, their opinions, and then, when their minds were made up with regard to this imaginary system, declare that the world was no otherwise constituted. ...God is the sole cause or agent in the universe; it is He who, directly, or by the mediation of His ministering angels, brings everything to pass. The supposed uniformity and necessity of causation is only an effect of custom, and may be at any moment rescinded. In this way, by a theory which, according to Averroes, involves the negation of science, the Moslem theologians, believed that they had exalted God beyond the limits of the metaphysical and scientific conceptions of law, form, and matter; whilst they at the same time stood aloof from the vulgar doctrines, attributing a causality to things. Making the uniformity of nature a mere phantom due to our human customary experience, they deemed they had left a clear ground for the possibility of miracles."

(Arabian Philosophy in Vol. II. Ency. Brit.)

(*b*) "Man is a free agent within his limited sphere: The ordinances of God lay down the eternal principles of human conduct. He has pointed out two courses--the one leading away from Him, and that is *evil*; the other bringing man to Him, and that is *good*. Every individual is free to choose and follow whichever course he

of some cause. Such an entity cannot be conceived as being endowed with eternal life after death. Moreover, in that case, at the very time of their coming into existence, different selves must have different characteristics, which would compel them to live different modes of life and perform different kinds of good and evil actions. As these characteristics are not the products of their own *karma*, they ought not, according to the *Law of Karma* itself, to enjoy happiness or suffer misery for the manifestations of these characteristics in actions. If God be regarded as the creator of these selves, He must be held responsible for their divergent characters, and hence for their actions as well as the so-called consequences of their actions. Consequently He cannot be conceived as the Dispenser of justice, rewarding virtue and punishing vice of those finite selves. The doctrine assumes a dreadful appearance when it is held that these created selves may suffer inconceivable miseries eternally in hell as a result of such vices perpetrated in this life. The difficulties increase considerably, when we think of the cases of abortions, still-born children and those who die in infancy or early youth. Should it be affirmed that they also acquire sufficient merits for going to eternal heaven or sufficient demerits for going to eternal hell, as the result of their unconscious or conscious actions in the mother's womb or the lying-in-room or the play-ground. Is it the application of the *Law of Karma* ? We need not discuss this obviously untenable view further.

likes, and receives his deserts accordingly... A belief in the unity, power, mercy, and supreme love of the Creator is the cardinal principle of Islam." (Its cardinal tenet is distinctly anti-trinitarian).

(Ameer Ali's "Islam")

In the above-mentioned four religions we find similarity of ideas about God, Angels and Satan, theory of creation and destruction and about the last judgment day and the Resurrection of the body at the time of the last judgment (at the time of the grand act of resurrection God will make the life everlasting).

If, on the other hand, the individual selves are conceived as coming down into the state of human existence from some state of liberation (whatever the exact nature of that state may be, whether in God or by the side of God or in some unrelated or detached condition or in some spiritual world), then also the divergent characters of the psycho-physical organisms and the environmental circumstances in which they are put at the time of their birth cannot be regarded as the consequences of their own *karma*, and they cannot be held responsible for the different kinds of activities that follow from them. Hence it is meaningless to say that their enjoyments and sufferings are regulated by the *Law of Karma*. If the mental, physical and external conditions are the creations of God, if the omnipotent and omniscient Creator and Governor of the world deliberately associated the originally innocent and pure particular selves with different kinds of conditions at the time of their birth, He must be regarded as having intended the diverse kinds of so-called virtuous and vicious deeds to be performed by them and therefore as the real doer of those actions. In that view of the case, He cannot have any reasonable right to pass moral judgment upon those individual selves, and reward some and punish others for doing what He made them do. If it be held that the divergent inner and outer conditions which exercise influence upon the modes of lives of the selves and cause them to perpetrate sins are the creations of Satan, and not of God, then on the one hand God cannot be thought of as the sole unrivalled omnipotent creator and regulator of the universe, and on the other He should not, as the just and righteous judge, punish the selves for the sins for which Satan, who is uncontrollable even by Him, is responsible. As the executor of the *Law of Karma*, He ought not to inflict miseries upon one for the deeds of another, here Satan being the producer of the evils, why should He inflict miseries upon the innocent selves? Why should there be the eternal damnation of a child without

any will of its own for a sin committed six thousand years before the child came into existence. Hence the *Law of Karma* must be said to be violated.

Then again, since new men are being born in the world every moment, it must be held according to this theory that new selves are being constantly brought down from the pure faultless liberated state into the embodied state of mundane existence and placed under the influences of Satan or at least sin-producing physical and moral conditions. What *Law of Karma* regulates these new births of the innocent selves? Does it not imply the will of God that the pure individual selves should not eternally remain in the peaceful and blissful liberated state, but that they must be subjected to the Satanic influences and made to undergo changes of states and suffer miseries? Does it not imply further that the selves, which are allowed to pass through virtuous deeds into the blissful liberated state in heaven from this mundane life, should have the possibility of being sent down again and again into this world and subjected to sins and miseries? What is the ground for asserting that those selves which once passed through the mundane life should not pass through it again and that newer and newer selves must always be sent down for tasting the fruits of mundane existence? Thus the doctrine of eternal bliss in heaven at the end of one pious life in the world cannot be consistently maintained in accordance with this theory. Moreover, if there be an infinite number of individual selves at the disposal of God for being sent down to the world, what is the law by which the turn of each to fall under these Satanic influences be determined? Is there any law other than the law of chance or the law of the caprice of God? These are of course no laws, and certainly not the *Law of Karma*.

Further, many of these selves, after passing through the mundane state, are said to become worthy of dire punishment

on account of their sins in this life, and they are regarded as condemned by God to eternal hell. What it implies is this:—pure selves, which had originally been in the faultless and blissful spiritual or supermundane state, is unaccountably dragged down by chance or Divine caprice into the mundane state, subjected to Satanic conditions of this life, made to commit sins and then led to the dreary dungeon of hell for suffering eternal misery. This career of the unfortunate selves must of course be admitted to be designed for them by the infinitely benevolent and merciful God. The poor helpless creatures are not even allowed to have a second chance of human existence to mend their lives and fight with the Satanic influences and become worthy of returning to heaven. Obviously such a conception of God and of the law of His creation and regulation of the world-process cannot be acceptable to any rational mind.*

* It may be argued that God created human beings with the freedom to act according to their will and to build up their own destiny by dint of their own free actions. It is the abuse of this freedom which is the cause of all the sufferings of the world. God, however, out of compassion for them has been ruling their destinies in such a way as finally to emancipate them from their sufferings.

Here the question is :—Who is responsible for the will directed towards the abuse of freedom? It cannot be said that the previous actions of men gave this direction, because the first men created by God could not have any previous action. If it be said that human nature itself is the cause of this wrong direction of the will, then either this nature is to be regarded as self-caused or the author of this nature must be responsible for this abuse of freedom. As the first alternative is unacceptable to the believers in God's creatorship, the second alternative must be accepted, and then God would be responsible for this abuse as well as for the consequent sufferings. If it be said that this will to abuse arose accidentally in the human nature, then it would imply that the human nature was not created according to any definite plan and this would be inconsistent with the omniscience and wisdom of the Creator. If it be said that men having fallen under the influence of an Evil Power (Satan) was tempted to

abuse this freedom, then the question would arise whether that Evil Power is created by God or exists independently of Him. In the second case God would not be the absolute creator of the world-system. In the first case He would be responsible for the evil. Hence in no way can we reconcile the sufferings in the world—so wide-spread, so intense, so unjustly distributed, so useless, and so morally detrimental—with the compassionate nature of the Omniscient Omnipotent God.

If God is active for the sake of emancipation of living beings, then the living creatures should not have been actively engaged in bringing about an accumulation of fresh *Karma*. Moreover, who is responsible for the law that the destinies, or the accumulated merits and demerits of the living creatures, have to be exhausted by the enjoyments and sufferings of their fruits? If God Himself is the maker of the law, then His will is the cause of the sorrows of the creatures. It cannot be said that God is under the necessity to make and enforce this law of the fruits of merits and demerits, in order to create and preserve the varieties of the world. In that case, God is not the sole designer of the world-system, but He has to depend upon other things for carrying out His purpose. Even then He may be regarded as a just Being and not a compassionate Being. No compassionate being can be expected to inflict sorrows upon his creatures willingly even by reason of their demerits, because compassion lies in the forgiveness of demerits, and not enforcing punishment for them. Further, when the law-maker is himself the dispenser of justice, he cannot be discharged of the responsibility for the sorrows that arise out of this justice. The production of sorrow, you admit, is subject to God's will, therefore, if He is unwilling to produce sorrow, there should be no sorrow at all and the beatitude of the nature of the absolute liberation from all sorrow would consequently have been attained without passing through these sufferings.

Further, the alleged rule of the intelligent God over destiny serves no purpose. If, in this rule, He is dependent on destiny, then His compassion will be to no purpose. And if there is no such rule, then owing to the absence of sovereignty on the part of God, the unconscious destiny would be inoperative. The result would have been that there would be no conjunction of the individual selves with bodies, sense-organs etc., which are the effects of destiny, and thus there would have been no sorrow at all. So how can the occupation of God be justified as an act of kindness?

Moreover, where there is kindness, the kind person himself feels sorry with the sorrows of others, and to remove that sorrow of his own as well the person acts. So the kind person too occupies himself with the work of relieving others in order to relieve his own sorrows too; that is, he wishes for the relief of his own sorrows arising out of others' sorrows. Thus the kind person also is ultimately actuated by self-interest. Hence if God's activity is a result of His kindness, He must be selfish as well as sorrowful and then He would no longer be God.

APPENDIX B.

METAPHYSICAL REALITIES EXAMINED.

INTRODUCTORY.

In Religio-philosophical systems of India we find four views (called *Sanghātavāda, Ārambhavāda, Parināmavāda, Vivartavāda*) about the production of the world. According to *Sanghātavāda* (as advocated by the Buddhist Realists), several causes (four kinds of momentary atoms viz. the earthy, watery, fiery and aerial atoms) being conjoined with one another (being aggregated) appear in the form of an effect (momentary like lightning), which therefore is neither a newly originated substance nor a modification of the causes. (According to this view, particulars are alone real, there exists nothing what is called universal). According to *Ārambhavāda* (as advocated by the Naiyāyika-Vaisheṣikas), the effect is *newly originated* from the conjunction of causes and its new properties also are produced from the properties of the causes. The effect does not exist in any unmanifested form in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*), but it is produced from them and is altogether different from them. (Particulars are quite separate from universal genus). According to this view the above-mentioned four kinds of atoms (not momentary but stable, eternal) originate the world gradually through the dual atoms, triple atoms etc; what was non-existent is produced through the functioning of the Agent (as a weaver makes cloth from many threads). As these atoms are inert and unconscious, a conscious active efficient Cause (God) is recognised to account for their movements, combinations and regulated operations. According to *Parināmavāda* (as advocated by the Sānkhyas, the Pātanjals, the Pāshupat-Shaivas and Mādva-Vaiṣnavas), the cosmic Energy called *Prakṛti* (unmanifested material cause) constituted of three

*Gunas** modifies itself as the world through the grades of Intelligence, Ego etc. These schools deny the absolute origination of the effects at their production and their absolute non-existence in the cause before their production, and they maintain that the relation between the cause and the effect implies the pre-existence of the effect in the potential or unmanifested state in the cause before its production (*satkāryavāda*) and that its production consists in the modification of the cause so as to bring it out from the unmanifested state to the manifested form (*Parināmavāda*). Accordingly causation means, not new creation, but transformation of the cause into the effect. Hence so far as the form is concerned, the effect is different from the cause, but so far as the substance is concerned, the effect is identical with or non-different from the cause. Thus a relation of difference as well as non-difference (*bhedābheda*) must exist between the cause and the effect. When this principle is applied to the investigation of the ultimate cause and its relation to the effect-world, it is inferred that the ultimate cause must be of the nature of absolute potentiality, that it must be an absolutely unmanifested entity (*avyakta*) in which the entire world of effects is existent in the undifferentiated unmanifested imperceptible state, and that the production of the world must consist in the progressive modification and transformation of this entity from the unmanifested to the more and more manifested forms, from the undifferentiated to the more and more differentiated forms, from the subtle and imperceptible to the more and more gross and perceptible forms. (One universal material cause embraces

* While the constituents of *Prakṛti* are each all-pervading and have no colour, taste, odour, touch and sound, the four kinds of atoms viz. the windy, fiery, watery and earthy are endowed with touch, colour, taste and odour respectively. (Sound is taken by some as an attribute of air, by some as a non-eternal attribute of an eternal substance called ākāśa and by some others as an eternal substance.)

particulars). *Prakṛti* is conceived by the Pāshupat-Shaivas and Mādva-Vaiṣnavas as the Power or Energy, as governed and regulated by one supreme omniscient and omnipotent self-conscious Being, who is regarded as the efficient cause of the world of effects. (*Prakṛti* gets modified into many effects through the agency of God as earth gets modified into many forms through the agency of a potter.) The Sānkhyas and Pātanjals maintain that *Prakṛti* spontaneously manifests and evolves itself into this world of effects (like the evolution of dream from dreamless state) and that there is no necessity of recognising any self-existent God to move it or to regulate its actions. This School of Philosophy believes in the existence of countless individual Souls (*Puruṣa*) which are eternally associated with *Prakṛti* by way of some inexplicable indiscrimination and in the interests of which the evolution of *Prakṛti* occurs. Some other schools of *Parināmavāda* regard the Power or Energy as belonging to the self-existent self-conscious self-determining Being, who is one without any other rival self-existent entity and who is therefore the material as well as the efficient Cause of the diversified universe. According to this view, this sole ultimate Reality, the absolute self-existent self-luminous Entity, becomes itself modified into the world of effects by the exercise of Its inherent power or energy. The world of effects is regarded as existent in the unmanifested or potential state in Its power, and It is regarded as modifying Itself freely into this manifested world.*

* Taking the analogy of *Jeeva* (individual living being) who causes joy, sorrow and the like in himself the advocates of this view (Bhāskara, Nimbark, Chaitanya, Vallabha) recognise Brahman with *Prakṛti* His Energy (different as well as non-different from Him) as the modifying cause of the world. Bhāskara and Nimbark acknowledge the world as the modification of the Energy alone, leaving God untouched by the process of modification ; Chaitanya and Vallabha take the world as the modification of God Himself through the modification of His Energy; some Śāktas accept intelligent Energy

Some other schools of thought (Vir-Śaiva, Srikantha-Śaiva, Ramānuja) are of opinion that Brahman becomes qualified with (and not modified into) the diversified world, subtle and gross, and these unconscious (modifications of *Prakṛti*) and conscious beings though different from Brahman become inseparably related to Him. To explain,—material causality of Brahman may be of three kinds—(1) He may be modified in His essence as is found in the case of earth from which the pot comes into being; (2) He may be illusorily manifested as an effect as is the case with the rope appearing through ignorance as the snake; (3) He may become qualified by conscious beings and unconscious things, subtle as well as gross, as is the case with the self which, though qualified with the different states of boyhood, youth etc., does not become modified into those states. The third alternative is accepted by these adherents (the Ramānujist and the Shaiva Sects).*

(cosmic Energy endowed with consciousness) as the modifying cause of the universe. Other Śāktas as well as the Kāshmiri Śaivas do not look upon God as being modified (what is full *Purna* cannot have another state or modification) or illusorily manifested in the form of the world (because the world as a whole can never be cancelled), but regard the world as the manifestation of the Supreme Self due to His independent Will. They take the analogy of the manifestation in imagination of fancied towns and the like (which are regarded by them as neither real nor false) which are of the nature of reflection (*Prativimba*—not differentiated from its support) owing their existence to the independence of will of the knower.

* Metaphysical idealism may be grounded in one of two different, though not mutually exclusive, ways. We have seen that–if existence is to be comprehensible—we must presuppose a principle of unity, a something "which holds the world together from within." If it be asked what this is, if a nearer determination be demanded, it is convenient to use the analogy with the unity which psychology discovers in the human consciousness. Just as it is evident that the different states and elements of my consciousness are united in an inner inter–relation, so that they belong to one and the same ego, so the states and elements of existence may be conceived as united in

According to *Vivartavāda* (as advocated by the non-dualistic School of Vedānta–Śankarāchārya and his

one all-embracing ego. In existence, as much as in individual consciousness, we get the relation between a unity and a multiplicity, and perhaps we may be able to get a clearer idea of the cosmological relation if we conceive it as analogous with the psychological relation. This was the path struck out by Kant's speculative successors in Germany (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), and it has also been adopted by later thinkers in search of a solution. The other way starts from the fact that, if we want to convince ourselves that any other beings have a conscious life, analogy alone can supply us with a basis for this assumption. It is argued as follows: As our expressions, movements, and actions are related to our psychical states, so the expressions, movements, and actions of other beings are related to similar states in them. Immediate observation of the psychical states of other men will always remain without the bounds of possibility. But now may we not be justified in extending this conclusion by analogy? Why should we stop at animals? Since there has proved to be such close continuity on the material side of existence with regard to its elements and laws, why should we not assume that the psychical side of existence is also continuous, although beyond our own conscious life it can never be the object of immediate observation? And since we are only in a position to make quite clear to ourselves what it is to be a psychical being, while, on the other hand, the material can never be anything but an object for us, can never become immediately one with our own subjective ego, we shall gain the most comprehensible solution of the riddle of existence if we conceive the psychical to be the innermost essence of existence, and the material as an outer, sensuous form of this inner life. This interpretation reveals to us the nature of what the 'thing-in-itself' is; it is no longer an *x* but a something that is in its essence akin to that which we know immediately in our own breasts. Leibnitz adopted this line of thought in his day with great clearness and of set purpose; in modern times it has been followed by Schopenhauer, Beneke, Fechner, and Lotze. But this thought made its first appearance in the history of human thought in the philosophy of the Vedantas (the Upanishads) which replied to the question: What is Brahma, the principle of being? It is Atma, it is the soul within thy breast, it is thou thyself". (Hoffding's "The Philosophy of Religion.")

followers), self-luminous non-dual attributeless Brahman through an inexplicable or unreal Energy (Ignorance or Māyā) is imagined or superimposed in the form of the world because it is the substratum of all the illusory manifestations. They accept the analogy of a dreamer who illusorily manifests the illusory dream-world. (Universal attributeless Being as substratum is the only Reality ; particulars are inexplicable or false.)

Let us see if all these conclusions [viz. (1) the world is merely aggregate of unregulated material atoms ; (2) it is absolutely new product from divinely regulated material atoms ; (3) it is manifestation from an absolutely unmanifested unconscious entity called *Prakṛti* ; (4) it is the modification of one Energy regulated by God ; (5) it is self-modification of one self-luminous omnipotent God Himself ; (6) it is the attribute of the substance-God absolutely different and inseparably related to Him ; (7) it is the illusory manifestation of attributeless Brahman as substratum] can really stand the test of free and open examination.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

SECTION I

Atomic Theory.

A

The atomic theory of the Buddhist Realists viz. effects are the conglomeration or aggregate of (non-different from) momentary atoms is not tenable. By a mere conglomeration (*Sanghāta*) of imperceptible atoms (which are non-spatial and without magnitude) the production of perceptible effects cannot be explained. Moreover, they assert that several causes being conjoined with one another appear in the form of an effect; but if this had been the inevitable nature of the causal relation, then no effect could be produced from one cause. In our normal experience, however, we meet with cases of an effect produced from a single cause as well as those of an effect produced from a conjunction of causes. Further, in cases of such conjunction, does the effect possess the same nature and the same properties as the constituent causes? If the same nature and the same properties of the constituent causes are present, then in truth no effect is produced. If the effect is something different with different properties from the combining causes, as it is generally found to be, then a new thing must be regarded as having originated from the causes. Moreover, do the conjunction of causes occur by chance, or does any fixed conjunction pertain to the essential nature of the ultimate causes, or is it the nature of the causes to pass through different forms of conjunctions and to appear in newer and newer forms, or are the various conjunctions due to the action of some extraneous agency upon the causes? The acceptance of chance-combination would be inconsistent with the principle of Causality itself and would lead to the denial of any system or harmony in nature. In the second

Buddhist Atomic Theory refuted. Nyāya-Vaiś. Atomic Theory represented.

case, the same effect or effects would be eternally present and there would be no causal operations and no productions and destructions in the world. The acceptance of the third alternative would virtually amount to the acceptance of the doctrine of the spontaneous modification of the causes into effects, because without modifications in their internal nature there would be no ground for different forms of conjunctions. In the fourth case, there arises the necessity for recognising some efficient cause different from the material causes. Moreover, if all things, not excepting the ultimate causes, have only momentary existence, as the upholders of this view of causation maintain, then not only every effect must be regarded as newly originated, but there would be no possibility of conjunction of causes at all. This would logically lead to the denial of the law of Causation and the acceptance of the universally condemned theory of Spontaneous Generation or Causeless Production.

B

The fundamental basis of the atomic theory (advocated by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśesikas) is that the effect is entirely different from its material cause and it becomes inseparably related to atoms—the ultimate particles—which are regarded as the material cause, by means of the relation of *Inherence*. All effects are complex entities, and all complex entities are of the nature of effects. Ultimate causes must, according to this view, be innumerable simple indivisible substances, called atoms, from the various combinations of which the world is produced. The doctrine of the absolute distinction of effects and their material cause in its turn is founded on the theory of the non-existence of the effect in the cause before the effect is produced and after the effect is destroyed. Now, let us show that these views viz.

(a) The theory of non-existent effect *Asatkāryavāda*, (b) the doctrine of *Inherence*, (c) the conjunction of atoms,

Refutation of the theory of non-existent effect.

and (d) the proof about the existence of atoms—cannot be validated.

(a) If the effect is taken as non-existent before its production (and thereby the separateness of the effect from the material cause be established), then the time prior to the production of the effect, because of its having no relation with the effect, will not particularise the effect, that is, will not determine the absence of the effect. Because of the non-existence of the effect being non-particularised by time, the advocates cannot hold that the effect will be existent after its production. Because the non-existent cannot be related to a particular time, so what is non-existent at some time must always be non-existent. Hence what was non-existent before its production can never be brought into existence. If it were possible, then there ought to have been the possibility of the production of such absolute non-existents as hare's horn and the like.

Advocate :—Because there is no 'prior-negation' (*Prāgabhāva*) of hare's horn etc. in any cause, they are not produced; but there is the prior-negation of pots etc. in their material causes, so their production is possible.

Critic :—Had there been some relation between the non-produced pot and the alleged prior-negation, then there might have been the difference of it from hare's horn. When the pot is non-existent at that time, it is meaningless to speak of its prior-negation at that moment. At that time it is without any essence or nature (*svarūpa*), so it cannot possibly have the relation called *svarūpa* ('simple relation', i. e. final relation which is not different from terms and hence without a third relating unity) with negation. Besides, the pot, if non-existent, cannot have the attribute of being the counter-entity (*Pratiyogī* counter-correlative) of prior

Doctrine of *Inherence* criticised.

negation. Since there is no ground for particularising the negation and establishing its special reference to the pot, to speak of the production of the non-existent pot is as good as talking of the production of hare's horn.

(b) As the effect cannot be taken as non-existent before production and after destruction, and as during its existence it is not experienced as distinct from the cause, the relation of *inherence* which is distinct from both the terms related and which inseparably unites two separate terms should not be recognised. In other words, the recognition of an independent category (*inherence*) which inseparably unites two separate terms cannot be accepted as valid. If the separateness of the related terms (such as cause and effect, substance and attribute) could be established first and later their relation be perceived, then we would be forced to admit that the relation of *inherence* binds together two separate entities. But this is not experienced in actual experience, the effect is always perceived along with its material cause. Because also the advocate's theory recognises the relation of *inherence* as different from the related terms, it cannot explain the perception of the inseparability of two other related terms. Moreover, the determination of the existence and character of a relation depends on the determination of both the existence and the character of the terms it relates, as in the case of the relation of conjunction. But according to the advocate the relation of *inherence* exists independently of the two terms it relates. So the alleged *Inherence* does not fulfil the conditions of a relation. Besides, if *Inherence* which is not dependent on related terms is to become a relation, then the universal existence (*sattā*) or space (*gagana*) etc. would perform the function of such a relation, hence where is the necessity for the recognition of *Inherence* ?

Conjunction of atoms inexplicable. Atoms disproved.

(c) The conjunction of atoms is not possible. There cannot be conjunction between partless entities inasmuch as conjunction always appertains to parts of entities conjoined. If the partless atoms become conjoined wholly with one another, then the effect of such conjunction cannot possess extension or magnitude. If the conjunction having no particularisation (*niravacchinna*) be admitted, that is, if it be admitted that conjunction pervades the whole extent of its relata, then it would imply that there is one and only one conjunction, conjoining every particular atom with all other atoms as well as the all-pervading entities like the selves, space and time. To make such conjunction possible, either every atom would have to be all-pervading and would lose its atomic condition, or those all-pervading entities would have to be atomic. Both these alternatives are unacceptale. Thus the conjunction of atoms can by no means be explained.

(d) The very existence of atoms cannot be inferred on the strength of observed facts, because there is no ground for the establishment of such a universal law that the effect-substance is always produced from causes having less quantity than itself or that one effect is produced from the conjunction of many causes. Because the atoms, their conjunction, the absolute difference between the parts and the whole cannot be proved, it cannot be concluded that all the substances which are effects are produced from the same kind of atoms and their conjunction.*

* The above refutation will be applicable to the atomic theory advocated by some sects of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsakas. These Mīmāṁsakas as well as the Jainas regard the *Law of Karma* (and not God) as the regulating principle of these diversified phenomena. The Jainas, however, recognise that the *Pudgalas* (having the qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour) are particular types of atoms (innumerable) by whose combination (atoms are not constant in their nature, but are subject to change or development *pariṇāma*) all material things are ultimately produced. This theory is invalidated by the refutation of the doctrine of Modification.

Knowledge of atoms invalidated.

Let us now examine the conception of an atom. What is the source of our knowledge of an atom? Do we find any atom or any substance of atomic size in our experience? By an atom we understand an indivisible particle of matter, occupying a unit of space. In the scientific circle the existence of such atoms is a matter of hypothesis, adopted for the suitable description of material objects occupying space. All bodies occupying space are found to be divisible into parts occupying smaller space. This process of division is supposed to have a limit. Ultimately every such divisible substance is supposed to be reducible into indivisible particles, which are called atoms. The process of division cannot be actually continued upto the limiting point, and therefore atoms cannot be actually perceived. Since in no field of our experience do we perceive atoms, we can nowhere observe any concomitance between atoms and bodies occupying space, and therefore there is no adequate logical ground for the legitimate inference of the existence of such atoms. We observe bodies in space; but we never observe any ultimate indivisible point of space or any substance occupying such a point of space. It is therefore not unreasonably supposed by many philosophers that every material body is infinitely divisible, there being no actual finality in the process of division, and space also, if divisible at all, must be infinitely divisible. According to some schools of thought, space is one indivisible whole,—it cannot be divided into parts. According to others again, space has got no objective existence, but it is merely "a form of intuition" or the form of external sense by means of which objects are given to us as existent without us, and as existent also apart from and beside one another. There being such divergences of opinions with regard to the nature of space itself, a point of space and a substance occupying such a point are only objects of imagination or abstract thought. From the standpoint of

Nyāya-vaiśesika account of causation further criticised.

normal experience, the objects occupying space or received in the form of spatial relations may be accepted as really existing; but a point of space and an indivisible particle of substance, called an atom, occupying such a point of space are mere abstractions, like geometrical points and lines. Such abstractions may be useful for scientific description of real objects, their relations and changes; but they themselves cannot be ascertained to be real entities.

Now, let us further consider the theory of the Naiyāyika-Vaiśesikas and show that their view does not give a true account of the nature of causation. As the effect is considered to be altogether different from the causes, and not present in them in any unmanifested or potential form, it cannot account for the reign of law in the causally related objects of the world, because in accordance with this conception of causality any effects may be produced from any causes. An appeal to what is called Prior-negation is useless, unless it is something positive and means the capacity or the *potentiality* for the production of the effect. If the presence of the capacity or the potentiality to originate the effect before the production of the effect is admitted, it would virtually mean the recognition of the presence of the relation between the cause and the effect even before the manifestation of the effect, and this would amount to the acceptance of the doctrine of the *pre-existence* of the effect in the unmanifested form in the cause. If, on the other hand, prior-negation is nothing more than mere negation, then it would mean merely the absence or non-existence of the effect, and its special reference to any particular entity would be absolutely meaningless; hence in that case no fixed and systematic cause-effect-relation would prevail in the world.

If this potentiality of the effect in the cause is admitted, then the effect cannot be regarded as altogether different

Relation between God and atoms (or Energy) unaccountable.

from the cause. There must be at least the identity of essence between the cause and the effect. Moreover, in that case, the ultimate cause of the world of effects cannot be a plurality of distinct self-existent material atoms of fixed characters, because the potentiality of the effects cannot be present in any one of them separately, nor in any combination of them, for no such combination originally exists. This should therefore lead to the recognition of one ultimate material cause with the potentiality of all the effects constituting the world.

Further, the appeal to a conscious efficient cause also is of no avail, because if the material atoms are self-existent units of eternally fixed characters and altogether distinct from and of different natures from the so-called efficient cause, how can there possibly be any relation between it and them, and how can it possibly act upon and regulate them according to its plan and purpose? If recourse is had to the omniscience and omnipotence of the efficient cause, then the materlal atoms as material cause would be unnecessary, the power of its thought and will being sufficient to produce all effects without any material.*

God.

Exposition : —

There are some schools of thought which recognise God as merely the efficient cause of the world of effects. The

* This refutation will equally apply to the view of the Pāśupata-Śaiva and Mādva-Vaiṣṇavas, who regard God as the regulator of *Prakṛti*, the ultimate unmanifested cosmic Energy. In this case also, if the Power or Energy, which is modified, has a distinct self-existence and has a definite nature of its own different from that of the self-conscious Being, the relation of the regulator and the regulated between the two remains unaccountable, and if this self-conscious Being is really omnipotent and omniscient, the recognition of a separate material cause for the production of the effects becomes wholly unnecessary.

God proved by inference as the Agent and Regulator of the world

exponents of the theory demonstrate the existence of the supreme Being (God) in this way. From observation we know that every corporeal body is non-eternal and is of the nature of an effect. Thus a relation of invariable concomitance is established between corporeality and non-eternity and so also between corporeality and "effectness." We find that whatever is of the nature of an effect has an efficient cause. Thus invariable comcomitance is established between effectness and efficient cause. Hence we infer that the earth etc., being corporeal, are non-eternal and therefore effects, and being effects must have an efficient cause. Now, we observe that the intelligence and power, that should be present in the efficient cause of any effect, must be adequate for the production of the effect, that is, must be greater than or equal to, but never less than what is required for the production of the effect. Hence the intelligence and power of the efficient cause of all the effects constituting the effect-world must be super-mundane, omniscient and almighty. Thus an all-knowing, almighty, eternal and self-existent Agent must be recognized. He must be bodiless and His knowledge, will and effort must be eternal and without any limit. Whoever is embodied falls into the category of effect, and his knowledge, will and effort must be non-eternal and limited. The order and adjustment, the laws and regulations, the plan and purpose, which are evident in the constitution and process of the world-system, clearly indicate that He (the active self-conscious Agent) is also the governor and regulator of this world.

Criticism :—

(a) This argument, though apparently very cogent, is not convincing. In every inference the knowledge of the particular relation (invariable concomitance) subsisting between the inferred object and the ground of inference is

Reasonings to show that the inference about God is fallacious.

required. There would be the inference of God as an agent of effects, if we could experience the invariable relation between all or any particular effect and the omniscient, bodiless agent. If God could become an object of direct experience, then it could be known that the world is related to Him. The world is no doubt an object of perception, but God is not. If God also were an object of perception, then nothing would be achieved by dragging in inference to prove His existence as the believers do. Nor would there be then different views current about God. So the very attempt of the advocates of God to prove His Existence by means of inference is itself an evidence to show that He is not an object of direct experience. If God were an object of perception, perhaps then it would have been possible to know the relation between God and the world. This world alone is experienced; whether it is related to God or related to something other than God cannot be experienced. The relation between the objects of perception and the objects beyond the possibility of perception cannot be perceived; because to know relation, the knowledge of the related terms is necessary. The perception of the related terms becomes the cause of the perception of relation. Because God is not the object of perception, His relation cannot be known through perception. As relation exists between two terms, it cannot be known through the knowledge of only one term. Now, the effect whose particular relation with its cause is not known cannot help us in determining its particular cause. The inference being dependent on the universal concomitance of the ground and the consequent, whatever is known as particularised by this relation can alone be inferred. Now, God, as has been pointed out, is beyond the capacity of our perceptive powers, and hence His relation with the effects, viz. earth etc. is by no means established. Consequently, His existence can in no way be

God unprovable by method of agreement in presence-in absence.

inferred from the existence of these effects. Because inference is not independent of the previous experience of relation and because it requires similarity existing between things inferred and known things, the existence of God cannot be proved on the strength of inference. By the inference having for its ground the character of something as an effect, the existence of some cause, may be proved at most, but a particular cause, having specific properties, can hardly be inferred or proved.

To sum up : There are two kinds of inference. The first is observed in cases where both the related terms are perceived, but as God is beyond sense-perception the first type of inference is inapplicable in this case. By the second type of inference, we can establish only general conclusions whose particular features remain unknown ; so by this inference, we can establish at best that the effects have a cause or causes, but any determinate thing or the particular feature of the cause or causes cannot thus be known. As we cannot make sure whether this cause is one or many, conscious or unconscious etc., we cannot know the nature of God through such an inference.

Besides, in order to know that all these things are produced by some intelligent efficient cause, called God, we have to discover that the existence of the said cause being there, those effects follow (अन्वय), and the existence of the cause not being there, there is an absence (व्यतिरेक) of those effects. Because the supposed efficient cause, viz,. God, being not regarded as an object of perception, the "agreement in presence" cannot be tested, and the non-existence of the earth and the like being unobservable, the " agreement in absence " also cannot be tested. Thus the existence and non-existence of the earth and the like can never be proved as following the existence and

General effectness being not established God cannot be inferred.

non-existence of any intelligent being. Hence the existence of God as the efficient cause of the effect-world cannot be established by this mode of reasoning.

Advocate—If the actual observation of the presence and the absence of both the cause and the effect were necessary to establish the causal relationship between any particular cause and particular effect, then a particular observed effect, such as smoke, could not be inferred to be produced by an unobserved cause, such as fire in the mountain. If in such a case, we seek the cause-effect-relation between general smoke and general fire, then in this case also, there will be the cause-effect-relation between the general property of being an effect and an intelligent efficient cause.

Critic—What we actually experience and can legitimately accept is that particular effects are produced from particular causes and that the causal relation always involves reference to particular related terms. As the particular effects have always reference to particular causes and have to be understood in different qualified forms in different cases, we can discover no ground of concomitance on the strength of which we can infer the existence of any effectness characterising all effects in the universe. Thus on the strength of perception and inference, what we find is that there is the cause-effect-relation between the potter and the pot and not between the alleged maker of all effects and effects in general. As the general property of being an effect is not established, some agent as the efficient cause of all produced things, such as the earth and the like, cannot be legitimately inferred. Besides, the inference of fire from smoke on the mountain is possible because we are inferring fire which is similar in its nature to fire perceived in the fire-place. But the inference of God

Observed relation between effort and effect disproves Divine effort.

is improper because we are inferring in that case an intelligent Being hardly akin in its nature to intelligent beings already known.

Besides, the inference of the existence of one eternal all-knowing all-powerful God as the agent of all effects of the world is fallacious, because the very idea of effort on the part of the efficient cause to produce an effect involves logically the idea of its non-eternity. All efforts are experienced as produced; wherever there is production through effort, there is production by produced effort. Now, if we accept the argument that whatever is of the nature of an effect must be the product of an effort, we are led to the position that whatever is an effect must be the product of a produced effort. If we apply this conclusion to the earth etc., which are taken to be effects, we are bound to infer that the earth etc. also must be the products of produced efforts. But this conclusion comes in conflict with the view that the earth etc. are effects and consequently produced by effort, but not produced by any produced effort. If we admit the negation of the property of being produced by produced effort in the earth etc., then in accordance with the above principle, the property of being produced by any effort will have to be denied of them, because production by an effort implies production by a produced effort. Hence, as the theory maintains that there is a property of being an effect in the earth etc., but not the property of being produced by any produced effort, this amounts to a virtual contradiction of the invariable concomitance that wherever there is the property of being an effect, there must be the property of being produced by produced effort.

Advocate—The recognition of invariable concomitance between the property of being an effect and the property

Contention about law of parsimony and non-production of effects refuted.

of being produced by effort involves parsimony of hypothesis.

Critic--Your assertion is not true. We ask whether you have ever known eternal effort. If the relation of eternal effort with effects had been observed, and that of non-eternal effort with effects had as well been observed, then the question of the said parsimony of hypothesis could have arisen. But when you have never come across any instance of eternal effort, you cannot say that the granting of the invariable relation of the effects and efforts would economise thought. Owing to the impossibility of comprehending the property of production through effort in cases of effects like earth etc., which are known as not produced from produced effort, the question of the law of economy for the sake of applying the concomitance to such cases does not arise at all. Besides, when you have no knowledge of eternal effort and as it is simply a creation of your imagination, if you try to establish the invariable relation between effects and efforts with the idea that this would favour your hypothesis of eternal effort, you are really indulging in a superfluity of hypothesis, because against the verdict of experience, you are upholding the existence of a supernatural effort.

Advocate-- If earth etc. could be produced without an agent, they would never have an existence, because from a cause not presided over by intelligence, effects are not observed to be produced.

Critic--This reasoning also cannot be applied without deciding that every effect must be the product of some intelligent being possessing the attribute of effort. In other words, if the necessity of an agent for the production of of every effect could be proved, then only it may lead to the conclusion that in the absence of an agent there will

Proving God by scriptures of Divine origin erroneous.

be an absence of the effect. But this cannot be ascertained as has been pointed out in the previous discussion. So the above reasoning is forceless. Besides, if it is recognised that the particular kinds of effects are alone produced by intelligent persons making efforts, then the non-observation can be explained, without holding your view. If on the ground of our non-observation of particular effects in the absence of an agent, we believe that all effects are produced by an agent, then the conclusion will be forced upon us that every effect is produced by an embodied being. But this is denied by you. So there cannot be knowledge of the invariable concomitance that whatever has the property of being an effect must have the property of being produced by effort. Effort is always non-eternal and produced through body. The person who makes an effort is endowed with a body. One having no body can never make an effort. These proofs favoured by the law of economy of thought are destructive of the said invariable concomitance, and the effort of God for the production of the effect-world cannot be proved. Thus we find no ground for the inference of the existence of God as an agent of the world of effects.

The exponents of the view may appeal to the testimony of the scriptures as a last resort for establishing causal relation between eternal effort and the effects like earth etc. But this refuge in the scriptures is unavailing. What is the source of the reliableness of the scriptures? Is it because God has revealed them? But it is the existence of God that has to be proved, and hence the argument involves the obvious fallacy of *Petitio Principii*.* If the

* That is, God is proved through the scriptures, and God is taken as the author of the scriptures and the validity of the scriptures is granted on the ground that it is the production of God. Moreover, if God be regarded as the author of the scriptures, we have to accept one of the following alternatives :—

Four possible proofs about Divine origin of scriptures examined.

testimony of the Scriptures is to be relied on because they are embodiments of the wisdom of highly intelligent persons, then, however intelligent they may be, their knowlege also must be based on observation and inference. But as we have proved that observation and inference cannot establish this

(1) The scriptures are caused by the *Will* of the Lord who is formless and omniscient, or (2) formless God has impelled someone to write the scriptures, or (3) formless God having modified into form has produced the scriptures, or finally (4) God as an embodied Being is the author of the scriptures.

(1) Among these the first alternative is not tenable. In this case, our only recourse is inference. Inference is based on observation of the universal concomitance, so it will have to depend upon similitude of observerd facts (दृष्टसाधर्म्य), and cannot establish the existence of something dissimilar or contradictory to the known. Hence inference cannot prove anything lying beyond the senses without any help from example. So to infer that formless God wills, we must observe somewhere that a formless being has will. But this we never experience. Knowledge, will and effort are universally observed as characteristics of the corporeal, and not of the incorporeal. Will is nowhere experienced except in the case of organised body. Whether the will is a function of the mind or an attribute of the self or an entity distinguishable from the self and the mind, in no case do we perceive its existence except through the mediation of the mechanism of the brain. Whether the brain is regarded as the instrument and the means, or the condition and the cause of mental functions including the function of the will, on none of these suppositions can we infer the presence of any active will as dissociated from an embodied being. It will be argued by the believers that the Divine Will is absolutely different in nature from the human will, and like ourselves it does not depend upon the conjunction of mind and body or upon any previous experience and memory for its function. But the very possibility of a will of such an exceptional character requires to be proved and its assumption begs the question at issue. We have found that there is nothing in our experience that can justify us in inferring the possibility of such a will.

Two alternatives about God's existence viz. He is in time or timeless.

causal relation, it cannot be accepted merely on the strength of our reverence for the greatness of those persons. Thus the existence of Divine effort is not proved.

Thus from the foregoing arguments we find that we can discover no adequate ground in our experience for the *conclusive inference* that God, as we conceive Him, is the doer or maker of the world.

(b) "Even if we grant, to the believers in a first cause, that an unending regress of causes is impossible, their position will be untenable. For the hypothesis of a first cause involves us in hopeless difficulties.

The argument conceives God's existence as having no beginning in time. But this leaves two possibilities open. Either God's existence is in time, and has no beginning, because he has existed through unending time in the past. Or else God's existence is timeless, in which case of course there could be no question of a beginning.

(2) The second alternative is not also tenable. For a formless God, it is not possible to possess the power to instruct or dictate. In order to prove such a possibility, it is necessary to point out at least some instances of a formless being instructing others within the range of our normal experience; but no such instance is discoverable. Hence to believe that the formless God impells others to write the scriptures is a mere fancy.

(3) The very conception of the modification of a formless God into form has already been shown to be logically untenable. Thus it cannot be held that the formless God becomes modified as the form and produces the scriptures.

(4) It has already been shown that God cannot be conceived as possessed of any eternal bodily form. So, the view that God as an embodied Being is the author of the scriptures has no ground to support it.

In short, the four possible alternatives regarding the Divine origin of the scriptures do not bear examination.

Examination of the hypothesis that God's existence is in time.

On the first alternative — that God exists in time — we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time. Now if one substance is admitted to exist in time without being caused, why should not other substances do so too? And, if any substance other than God can be uncreated, then the necessity of assuring the existence of God to create them has disappeared. I cannot see why it should be said, of three substances existing in time, that God did not need a creator, but that a man and a pebble did. If God is held to be timeless, indeed, it might possibly be maintained that all substances existing in time required a creator, while God, who was out of time, did not require one. But we are considering at present the hypothesis that God's existence is in time.

The universe, however, does not consist merely of quiescent substances. It contains events. And the argument before us says that, apart from the creation of substances, God is required as the first cause of the events which occur to these substances. This contention depends upon the principle that every event must finally be derived from a cause which is not an event, in order to avoid the infinite regress which would ensue if every cause was an event, and therefore required a cause. But how does God cause an event to happen at a particular time which did not happen before? Is it by an act of volition which occurred at a particular time, and did not occur before? Then that act of volition is an event, and itself requires a cause. And if that cause is found in a previous event in God's mind, and so on, we should get back to the unending causal regress which the argument started by declaring impossible. We must therefore suppose that God causes changes without changing. Either he directly causes an event without forming a volition which is an event, or, if he does form such a volition, then the cause of the volition is not an event. (We are not yet discussing, it will be remembered, the hypothesis that God's nature is

God's nature if unchanged in time or timeless cannot explain change.

timeless, but the hypothesis that, while itself remaining unchanged in time, it can be the cause of an event—that is a change in time). But is this possible? How can that which is changeless be the sole cause of any event? A changeless state can, no doubt, be *part* of the cause of an event. But it would contradict the law of Causality to ascribe an event to a cause which contained no change. For in that case the cause would first exist without producing the effect, and would then produce it. And this change in the action of the cause would be itself an event which would have occurred without a cause.

If we pass to the second alternative about God's nature — namely, that it is timeless, it is clear that it is also incapable of change. And thus we get back the difficulties which we have just considered. An event happens, and makes the state of the universe different from what it had been before. The cause is said to be God's timeless nature. That nature is the same, however, before and after the event. Then there is nothing in that nature which accounts for the change; and it cannot be the cause. If, while the so-called cause remains the same, the effect varies, it is clear that the variation of the effect — that is, the event — is uncaused. As to the substances, other than God, if they are held to have come into existence at a particular moment of time, the event cannot be explained by a timeless nature of God. If, on the other hand, they are held to have existed through all past time, they have lost that characteristic — their commencement — on the strength of which it was asserted that a creator is necessary. It has been suggested that the series of events in time will appear, to a timeless being, as a timeless reality, and may thus be due to an eternal and unchanging volition of that being. But, if the true nature of what appears as temporal is timeless, it is not really a series of events, and

Three possible ways of proving God. Physico-theological argument examined.

therefore the law of Causality does not apply to it. It needs a cause no more than God himself. And thus the argument breaks down.*

It may perhaps be replied that these objections are valid as far as they go, but that God's nature is beyond our comprehension, and that in some way which we do not understand he may be the first cause of changes, in spite of his own changelessness....With regard to this particular

* "There are only three kinds of proof of the existence of God from speculative reason. All the paths that can be followed to this end begin either from definite experience and the peculiar nature of the world of sense, known to us through experience, and ascend from it, according to the laws of causality to the highest cause, existing outside the world; or they rest on indefinite experience only, that is, on any existence which is empirically given; or lastly, they leave all experience out of account, and conclude, entirely *a priori* from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is *physico-theological*, the second the *cosmological*, the third the *ontological* proof. There are no more, and there can be no more."

(Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"—Max Müller's Edition.)

[Note:—For the criticism of ontological argument see foot-note Sec. IV; the cosmological argument has been refuted by the above remarks.]

(*a*) "According to the physico-theological argument, the inference is drawn from the beauty and order of the universe that they must have an adequate cause. This cause is supposed to be a Being who possesses all perfections. By analyzing the argument, however, we find that it amounts to this: the beauty and order seen in nature are effects; these effects have an adequate first cause which is perfect and unconditioned (cosmological argument); and because I am obliged to conceive such a cause in order to explain phenomena, therefore an object corresponding with this idea of a first cause also exists (ontological argument). As both the ontological and the cosmological proof have been found unsatisfactory, of course the physico-theological one, which rests on them, is also invalid."

(Stuckenberg's "The Life of Immanuel Kant".)

Of four requirements of Teleologic Proof 1st and 2nd invalidated.

argument, however, it may be specially noticed that it requires us to be convinced, not only that we do not know the nature of God, but that we do not know the nature of a cause. The position we are discussing maintains that God is changeless and a cause. Our objections were directed to

(*b*) "The *Teleologic Proof* seeks to attain certainty of the reality of God from the purposiveness in the world. In order to be convincing, it would have strictly to fulfil several requirements with regard to which we have long ago seen that it can satisfy them only with various degrees of probability. It would *first* have to show that there is in the world a purposive connection which *cannot* result from an undesigned co-operation of forces, but have been designed by some intelligence. But we have seen that even conscious design can effect the realisation of its purpose only by means of instruments, from certain conjunctions of which that which is desired proceeds as a necessary result; and that even the conjunction of instruments for this result is only possible when the conjoining design works also upon each of them with a blind force, which in accordance with general laws is able to move it in the way necessary to bring it into such conjunction with the rest. Hence though it may be in a high degree improbable it yet remains possible that a course of Nature destitute of design may of itself have taken all the steps, which in order to realize a purpose must have been taken under the guidance of design; and therefore this first requirement cannot be fulfilled.

And we do not succeed better in fulfilling the *second* requirement—in showing that purposiveness does not occur merely here and there but that it pervades the whole world harmoniously and without exception, so that not merely do intelligent actions occur in it, but the whole is embraced in the unity of one supreme design. How little does our actual experience suffice to show this! How much seems to us wholly inexplicable, purposeless, even obstructive to ends of which we had assumed the existence! The few brilliant examples of a harmony that we can at least partly recognise, which are presented principally by the animate creation, may well confirm an already existent faith in God, in the conviction that in that also which we do not yet understand the unity of the same wisdom may work purposely;

3rd and 4th requirements of Teleologic Proof unfulfilled.

show that a (complete) cause could not be changeless. If this is to be doubted on the ground that the changelessness may be possible in some way which we do not understand, then what may be possible in this mysterious way is not but empiric knowledge of the purpose in the world does not furnish the means necessary for enabling any one to attain indisputable faith who does not yet possess it. Taken alone it would much more easily produce the polytheistic intuition of a plurality of divine beings, each of which rules over a special department of Nature as its special genius, and the varying governments of which agree so far as to attain a certain general compatibility, but not a harmony that is altogether without exceptions.

Not merely the defectiveness of the scientific knowledge which we have through experience but also internal difficulties hinder the fulfilment of the *third* requirement — that, namely, of showing that creative wisdom in carrying out its designs never experiences opposition, and is never forced to produce that which is even only indifferent as regards its purposes ; but only if this were so would wisdom be omnipotent. Not merely, however, does observation show us much which at least our limited knowledge can understand only as an accidental and accessory effect of the struggle between a formative design and the independent and resisting nature of the material to be formed ; but, moreover, general reflection cannot get clear the notion of design without contrasting with it some material independent of it by elaborating which it attains realization ; and thus all our consideration of purpose leads us only to the notion of a governor of the universe and not to that of a creator, which was what we sought.

Finally, how little men have succeeded in fulfilling the *fourth* requirement, and in proving the unconditional worth and sacredness of the designs which we plainly see pursued in the world, is taught by a glance at the development of the doctrines which attempt this proof. For has not philosophy often pointed out to us as supreme and unconditionally sacred cosmic ends much in which living feeling can find no worth at all? Have not popular faith and dogmatic theology found cause in the ills of the world, and the logical consistency with which evil develops, to divide the domain of the

Assertion that God's nature is beyond our comprehension is suicidal.

merely a changeless God but a changeless cause. This means that a cause may be what our reason says it cannot be. Now, if we do not understand the nature of a cause sufficiently to trust what our reason says about it, the whole argument for a first cause breaks down. If we are to be so sceptical about causes, we shall have no right to believe that every event must have a cause, or that an endless regress of causes is impossible, since these conclusions rest on what our reason tells us about causes. And the argument for a first cause depends, as we have already seen, on the exclusion of the alternatives of an uncaused change, and of an endless regress of causes

Thus the hypothesis of a first cause is useless for the purpose of extricating us from the difficulties, whatever they may be, involved in an endless causal regress.*

world between God and the devil, taking comfort in the thought that even of this apparent discord there may be some explanation inaccessible to human reason ? But though that which is inaccessible to human reason may indeed be an object of faith, it cannot furnish any proof that such faith is true ; and that the Teleological Proof is destitute of all demonstrative force, however great and unmistakable may be the efficacy with which it brings together for the strengthening of faith all that is best in secular knowledge".

(Lotze's "Microcosmus" Vol. II.)

* "But how about perceptions of God or of the universe? And in the first place, are there any such perceptions at all in our present experience ? It has been asserted by various people that they have had such perceptions. I doubt, however, whether this is a correct account of what they have experienced. No doubt they have experienced something, and, if our theory of the nature of spirit is correct, that experience must really be perceptions. But when they say that they have perceived God, or the universe, they mean that they have had perceptions of them, as distinct from judgments about them, or imaginings of them. In the language we have adopted, they are

Concluded that the perception of God is due to confusion and mistake.

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speaking not only of perceptions, but of perceptions which are apparent perceptions.

In such cases, I am inclined to think, a judgment has been mistaken for a perception. (For the sake of brevity, I speak of judgments and perceptions, instead of perceptions appearing as judgments, and perceptions appearing as perceptions). It is not difficult to mistake an immediate judgment that something exists for a perception of that thing. Nor is it difficult to make the mistake, even when the judgment is not immediate, but has been based on reasons, provided that the judgment is firmly held, and is one of sufficient interest to excite a strong emotion in the person who makes it. To the possibility of these mistakes, and, indeed, to the great difficulty of avoiding them, I believe that most people would bear witness who have any experience of mystical states of mind, and who have the power and the resolution to analyse the states they experience. And it does not seem improbable that the cases in which people have supposed themselves to have perceptions of God, or of the universe, are cases in which a judgment has in this manner been mistaken for a perception.... When there is a perception at all, there is a perception of the object as in time, together with a judgment that the object is eternal, and these two are confused together and mistaken for a perception of the object as eternal."

(Mc. Taggart's "The Nature of Existence", Vol. II.)

Section II.

Prakṛti (Cosmic Energy).

The existence of *Prakṛti* is sought to be established on the ground that the cause must be essentially of the same nature with the effects, and accordingly the world must have as its ultimate cause an entity which is essentially of the same nature with the world. Taking their stand on this principle the advocates of this view hold that all the objects of the world, mental as well as physical, being constituted of three elements, viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, the ultimate material cause also must be constituted by the same three elementary principles, technically called *Guṇas* (as has been shown in Page xxvii). When a thing is by nature subject to modification, it must have a stage from which modification should start and there must be some element of resistance to modification at every stage. This implies its inertia, which is called *Tamas*. Secondly, the process of modification implies an element of effort for overcoming resistance, i.e., a dynamic element, which is called *Rajas*. Thirdly, it involves the element of the effect or fulfilment of the process, which is potentially present in the original causal state and operates in a subtle way as the regulative ideal in the process and which is manifested as the actual reality at the end of the process. This is called *Sattva*. In whatever condition a body may be, whether mental or material, it is always subject to change or modification, and therefore it must involve the presence of these three elements. Now, if it is accepted that all things of the universe, mental as well as material, are always changing, then these three *Guṇas* may be accepted as the constituent elements of all phenomenal realities ; but it would not mean that these are three distinct independent entities related together in the constitution of things. They being really three moments of the process of modification, to regard them as separate ingredients

Definite substantial nature of ultimate cause not determinable.

combined with one another would amount to substantiation of abstract features. That is to say, these *Guṇas* are neither real elements constituting the substances of the effects nor positive characteristics of the effects; they are merely three elementary principles involved in the nature of all kinds of modifying or evolutionary objects. The discovery of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* in all things would merely signify the discovery of the fact that all things of the world are changing or modifying. Moreover, according to the principle of causation accepted by the exponents of the doctrine, it is asserted that every effect is potentially present in the cause and is evolved out of it,—what exists in the unmanifested state becomes manifested through the process of modification. It is inferred that the entire world of diversities must be potentially present in the ultimate material cause, that this cause must be a modifying entity with inexhaustible potentiality and must therefore consist of these three *guṇas* as constituting its essential character. Even in the unmanifested state, when these three moments are at an equilibrium there is some sort of subtle modification going on within it, though on account of the equilibrium this does not lead to the manifestation of any effect. However, to speak of the ultimate cause as having modification does not amount to the determination of any definite substantial nature of it. The doctrine of the modification of *Prakṛti* will be shown unjustifiable by the following considerations.

According to this theory the effect exists in a subtle unmanifested state in the nature of its material cause and its production consists in its transformation into the manifested state from it. It is not a case of coming-into-existence of anything previously non-existent, but the appearance in the manifested form of what already exists. Now, it cannot be said that effects remain in a subtle form prior to their production,

Theory of the production of the pre-existent effect criticised.

because the subtlety of the effect can be explained only on the assumption that the effect-substance was less in quantity when it was in a causal state than when it is out in the state of an effect. Without admitting that the effect was less in quantity when in a causal state, its absence in that state in its gross form can never be explained. Such an admission would lead to the recognition of an intrinsic difference in nature between the cause and the effect inasmuch as the formal quantity of the two differs. For example, on account of the difference of quantity, the gross pot produced from the pot having less quantity in the earth will be another substance. Hence the gross form will be non-existent in the causal state of the effect. So it is futile to imagine a subtle, causal form of the effect.

According to this theory, the effect remains before its production in the form of the cause, but there is a veil on account of which this nature of the effect is not manifested. Now, we ask what that is? Is it the cause itself or something else present in the cause? If the former, then the production of the effect would imply the destruction of the cause. For instance, the nature of the pot would be manifested when its cause, viz , the earth, disappears. But this is not admitted, because the earthen pot cannot exist in the absence of the earth. Again, if something else present in the cause be regarded as the veil, what can that something be? Is it the particular form in which the cause exists before the manifestation of the form of the effect? If so, the particular form not being the cause itself, it is to be regarded as a particular effect of the same cause. For example, the form of the lump of earth is the veil of the form of the pot. Granted this, one effect of the cause is the veil of another effect of the same cause. If what you say is right, then when earth is reduced to the state of the lump, that lump also might become veiled by the pot which even at the time is supposed to exist in

Criticism with regard to veil of effect before production continued.

some form; and so we should not perceive that lump even. Thus, the lump of earth, the one effect of earth, will be the veil of its another effect, namely the pot, and the pot will be the veil of the lump. That the pot can be the veil of the lump is corroborated by our experience that when earth is in the state of the pot, the lump is not perceived. Now in order to meet this objection you have to admit some peculiarity in the prior unmanifested state of the effect as distinct from its nature in the manifested state. That is, you have to say that the pot in its manifested state becomes the veil of the lump, but at the time when there is the lump, the pot remains in a state, in which it does not veil the lump. Therefore you have to admit that the effect as manifested, being distinct from the effect as unmanifested, is non-existent prior to its appearance in the manifested form, and consequently also you have to fall back on the theory of the non–existence of the effect before production. The effect being absent, there is no significance in saying that the effect is of the nature of the cause, because it can never be that the very same thing is and is not. Thus, the theory of the production of the pre–existent–effect (*Satkāryavāda*) breaks down.

According to the theory under discussion, it is held that the entire world is existent in an unmanifest state in the nature of *Prakṛti*, the primal Energy. *Prakṛti* modifies itself in successive stages for the manifestation from within itself the whole world of effects. During this process *Prakṛti* does not lose its essence. Thus the theory of *Prakṛti* is closely related to the doctrine of the *pre–existence of effects*. Having considered the validity of the theory of *Pre–existence of effects* we now proceed to examine the nature of the modification of *Prakṛti*.

The question may be asked, whether the modification be due to the loss of the former form of *Prakṛti* (Cosmic

Prakṛti (Energy) cannot produce world by changing partially or wholly.

Energy) or not ? If modification does not imply the loss of its former form, then there is actually no modification and the term modification itself will be meaningless, because what is called the cause remains as it is without any change whatsoever. If the first alternative is granted, the question should arise whether the form constitutes the nature of the cause or it does not. If it is taken as constituting its nature, then the change of forms will mean the loss of the intrinsic nature of the cause, and hence the cause will have to be regarded as destroyed and replaced by another thing of a different nature; so it cannot be called its modification. If form does not constitute the nature of the cause, then the change of form may not imply the destruction of the cause, and this change of form of the self-same cause may be called its modification. Now the question arises, will that change of form affect any particular part of the cause or the whole of it ? So far as *Prakṛti* (Primal cause) is concerned, this change cannot occur in one part of it, because it is one undivided Energy not having any division of parts. Nor can there be the modification throughout its whole extent, for then the entire *Prakṛti* will have to be regarded as destroyed and there will be the production of another thing altogether different from it. Hence it will not be a case of a mere change of form of a previously existent thing, but that of the destruction of the one and the production of another. Hence the modification of *Prakṛti* is found to be incapable of logical proof. What is without parts cannot have modification. No modification is observed independent of the arrangement of parts distinct from that which already exists. Taking that it undergoes modification the whole Energy will get modified in the form of effects and thus there will not be Energy different from effects because parts are not possible in the partless. In other words, the Energy in such a case will be exhausted in the

Contradictions in the theory of *Prakṛti* or three *Guṇas*.

process of modification in the form of effects and will not remain in the form of Energy, inasmuch as what is wholly modified cannot retain its original state. What is thus modified will necessarily be non-eternal. Moreover, in that case, at the time of every successive modification, all previous modifications would be lost and thus there would be no combination of elements (भूत), sense-organs and intelligence, and will give rise to an impossibility of all normal experience.

Moreover, in accordance with the advocates' doctrine of the pre-existence of the effects in the cause, sound, touch, etc. which are produced from *Prakṛti*, must be existent in the nature of *Prakṛti* in a subtle state. But even according to their own exposition, *Prakṛti* is not characterised by the properties of sound, touch, etc. How then can such objects with new characteristics evolve out of a cause, in which they are evidently non-existent? The non-difference of the cause and the effect being admitted, when the effects are with parts, their cause cannot be said to be without parts. Three *Guṇas* (constituents of *Prakṛti*), being all-pervading cannot of themselves be variously conjoined and there is also the absence of any other substance that would serve to conjoin them.* If the *Guṇas* are all-pervading, there will be no action in them and thus it will be contradictory to hold that *Rajas* is of an unstable nature. If all the causal substances are all-pervading, then the limitation of effects would remain unexplained. Thus, it is shown that the theory that the universe is a modification of *Prakṛti* (primal Energy) is groundless.

* According to the advocates, the ultimate unmanifested modifying cause is a distinct real entity, called *Prakṛti*, essentially unconscious, and having eternal conjunction with an indefinite number of self-luminous individual souls, the presence of which is necessary to illumine it and to enable it to modify itself. But they cannot offer any satisfactory logical explanation as to how two such

Observation disproves advocate's theory.

Besides, the advocates have to be asked, what do they really mean by the essential sameness between the cause and the effects? When we analyse the nature of the different kinds of effects in the world, we find that they have essential points of difference among themselves. That the advocates of this view also recognise these differences to be essential is evident from their enumerating them as *tattvas* (orders of realities). Can we not, according to the principle laid down by them, expect that these essential characteristics of the diverse kinds of effects should be present in their ultimate cause? If not, why should they expect us to accept that only the three *Guṇas* imagined by them as present in all effects should constitute the nature of that ultimate cause? If the cause can differ in some essential aspects from the effects, it may differ in others also. Thus from the observation of the nature of the diverse orders of effects in the world, we can discover no ground for inferring that the ultimate material cause of the universe should be one which is the state of the equilibrium of the three *Guṇas*. Hence the existence of *Prakṛti* is not proved. Besides, when you admit that the prime material cause consists of the three *Guṇas*, how can you say in the same breath that the universe has one undivided partless material cause?

absolutely distinct kinds of entities can be conjoined together, how the self-luminous souls can be related to and influence and have agreeable and disagreeable experience of the modifications of the material cause without being themselves changed or modified in the least, how the absolutely distinct self-luminous individuals can be related to the same objective world and can possibly know one another, and how all of them being eternally conjoined to the ultimate material cause, different souls can possibly experience the effects with different degrees of joy and sorrow and some are disjoined and liberated from them. Nor can they explain the well-regulated self-modification and self-manifestation of the unconscious material cause without reference to some such self-luminous agency.

Combination of *Guṇas* inexplicable.

Besides, the advocates of the view assume that wherever there is an inseparable relation, there must be a common cause and unity of essence. But this cannot be accepted as a law. The relations that we find are matters of experience. But is there anything in our experience that can supply a gro nd for such an assumption? On the contrary, we observe in our experience such a variety of relations between substances and substances, between substances and their attributes, between attributes and attributes, between agents and their works, that we cannot trace them to any common material cause, so far as our experience goes. If we refer to any common cause beyond our experience for finding out the unity, it would involve the fallacy of begging the question, for it is the necessity for supposing a unity that has to be proved.

It cannot be said that it is a fundamental law of our thought to refer to such a unity, for there are various schools of thought that do not recognise the necessity of postulating a unity in all such cases of relation. That the advocates of this theory also do not regard it as a fundamental law of thought is evident from the fact that they do not trace the origin of the relation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣas* to their being derived from a common material cause.

Besides, the question should be, have these *Guṇas* (constitutents of *Prakṛti*) any sensuous properties or not? Evidently they have not. How then can sensuous objects be produced by their combination? Further, mixture or combination is possible only of substances having parts. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are not regarded as substances having parts. How then can they combine in different proportions, so as to produce diverse kinds of objects. It is also difficult to conceive how the increase or decrease of any one of the three constituents can produce substances of altogether

Representation of witness-consciousness and its criticism.

different characteristics. Thus the theory of the combination of the *Guṇas* cannot explain the production of the world.

Puruṣa (Witness-Consciousness)

Exposition :—

The argument which is adduced to prove the existence of the witness-consciousness is that there must be some permanent changeless knower of all phenomenal cognitions which are modifications of the mind-stuff. These states are not self-luminous. In that case one state would not be the object of the knowledge of another, hence their comparison and the apprehension of their difference and manifoldness would not be possible. The states are variable and mutually exclusive. So these states cannot be known by anyone of them or by each other. Even a stream of consciousness cannot be conceived without unity as its background. That something (mind) which is identified with the states cannot witness them, because at the production and destruction of every state it also gets transformed. So some consciousness which pervades all these, but is at the same time without states, should be accepted. Otherwise we cannot explain remembrance, difference of these states and their production and destruction. As among the successive cognitions one cannot make another its object, there would be no unification of knowledge and remembrance of the past in the future in the absence of the unmodified permanent knower which illumines them all and to which they appear.

Criticism :—

Now, this position is not logically tenable. Admitting that the particular cognitions are the modifications of the mind and that this mind as a modifying entity retains its identity in and through the transitory cognitions that are

Changeless Consciousness [self] cannot know mental modifications.

produced and destroyed, how can the neutral presence of the changeless consciousness account for these modifications of the mind and the remembrance of them? To answer this question the relation between the mind and this consciousness has to be ascertained. If the consciousness be regarded as the actual knower of the particular modifications of the mind, then these modifications must be conceived as the objects of the knowledge of that consciousness. In that case with the production and destruction of the particular modifications of the mind in the shape of transitory cognitions of particular objects, there should be changes in the consciousness itself. The knowledge of the particular cognitions, the retention of them in memory and the reproduction of them at the time of recollection, should all be, in that case, the functions of this consciousness. That is, this consciousness has to be conceived as not only capable of knowing the mental modifications as they occur, but also of forming, retaining and reproducing ideas about them and comparing them with one another. This would imply that the consciousness is capable of modifying itself into the forms of those ideas and at the same time making those modifications the objects of its experience, and it would also imply its active function of comparing those ideas and establishing relation between them. But the recognition of all such capacities and functions and of the self-modifications with self-identity of the transcendent consciousness would mean the abandonment of its eternally changeless, functionless, attributeless neutral character. If it be said that the consciousness only illumines through its eternal self-luminous character the particular modifications of the mind as they present themselves to it and through that illumination they become apparently identified with it and objects of its experience, then the relation of succession between any two mental modifications, — not to speak of their invariable succession — can in no way be the object of its experience, because

Timeless Consciousness cannot experience sequence in time.

this relation is not a mental modification. Further, how can time-sequence be an object of experience to the consciousness, which has no relation to the temporal phenomena? Being a changeless immutable self-luminous entity, it should always be of the nature of the experience of Eternity, i.e., sequenceless time. The consciousness of the sequence in time would imply a modification of the consciousness in accordance with the changes in time. If it be said that all these functions are the functions of the mind, then the mind should be regarded as itself the knower of its own modifications and capable of retaining and reproducing them; in that case the recognition of the transcendent consciousness becomes superfluous. If it be argued that the mind being not self-illumining, the presence of the transcendent consciousness is necessary to illumine and reveal its modifications, then the question should arise, does this self-illumining consciousness illumine and reveal these mental modifications by being related to the mind or by remaining unrelated to it? If it is related to the mind, it cannot remain untouched and unaffected by its modification and therefore cannot be said to be eternally changeless and attributeless. Further, it may be asked, is this relation eternal or temporary? If the relation is eternal, the mind should always be illuminated, and in that case all its past modifications should be equally illuminated and always remain as shining objects of its knowledge along with the present modifications. There would then be no room for forgetfulness or deep sleep or any unconscious state of the mind. If on the other hand the relation be regarded as produced, the temporary presence and absence of relation has to be accounted for and some cause for producing and breaking the relation has to be discovered. If any such cause be admitted, the relation between that cause with consciousness on the one side and mind on the other has to be ascertained, and similar difficulties will arise. Moreover, the production and

Relation between Consciousness and mind logically untenable.

cessation of relation with the mind and its modification cannot but do affect the consciousness and rob it of its changeless character.

If it be said that there is really no relation between the consciousness and the mind, then it is unintelligible how the mind and its modifications can be illuminated by the consciousness with which it has no relation. If on account of the mere presence of the consciousness in the proximity of the mind, the mind is said to imbibe the character of the consciousness, then there is no reason why owing to the same proximity the consciousness should not imbibe the character of the mind and admit of modifications. Here again the question would arise whether the proximity is eternal or occasional, and we should be faced by the same difficulties as mentioned above. Then again it will be asked, what is the nature of this proximity? Does it mean any spatial nearness? In that case both the consciousness and the mind should have to be regarded as occupying space, but this is a property of material objects of sense-perception. Does it mean temporal proximity? In that case they should be reduced to events in time. How otherwise can we form an idea of the nature of proximity?

Now, let us consider what can be the nature of the association between consciousness (self) and cosmic Energy (*Prakṛti*). Admittedly it cannot be of the nature of spatial conjunction, because both the self and the Energy are above space. There can be no relation of *Inherence* between them, because though the relation is without beginning, they are conceived as independent realities capable of being separated from each other, and the relation between them is not analogous to that between substance and attribute or cause and effect or universal and particular, etc. The relation is said to be of the nature of proximity. But has proximity any meaning apart from spatial or temporal nearness, both of

Inconsistencies in the conception of relation between self and Energy.

which are of course inadmissible? The exponents of this view however hold that it is not pure proximity, but proximity involving indiscrimination. Let us see whether the idea of conjunction or association or proximity or indiscrimination is consistent with the conception of consciousness and Energy. The experience of indiscrimination presupposes the conjunction or association between the two and cannot be the cause of or constitute the nature of the conjunction or association. Both of them are conceived as partless supra-spatial entities. How can partless entities be conjoined to or associated with each other without complete identification? They cannot be conceived as existing side by side, because they are without spatial properties; they cannot touch each other, because they have no tactual properties; they cannot be partially mixed up with each other, because they have no parts; they cannot be completely identified with each other, because they are essentially distinct and unique and unanalysable entities. There is no justification on our part for supposing that the nature of one is reflected on the other, because in our experience we find such reflection only in the cases of objects occupying space and possessing parts. When the sky is found to be reflected on water, it is not the infinite colourless ether that is observed to be reflected, but it is the blue vault of the sky, as we actually see it, that is reflected. Even in our thought we cannot form any definite conception of a formless supra-spatial infinite entity being reflected on another spatial or supra-spatial entity. Further, reflection can possibly occur in respect of those attributes only which one object has the capacity to project and the other has the capacity to receive and that also in a favourable collocation of circumstances. The redness of the *Jabā* flower is not reflected on rough piece of stone or earth. The crystal also does not

Advocate's contention about noumenal self invalidated.

receive the softness or the peculiar taste of the *Jabā* flower. No reflection between the crystal and the flower occurs in darkness. Hence the possibility of mutual reflection between consciousness and Energy must presuppose special properties in them for projecting and receiving particular attributes. No such special properties are admitted to exist in consciousness (self).

Moreover, if there is no actual conscious relation between the self and the 'I', if the self in its essential character is in no way interested in whatever happens to 'I', is it not meaningless to assert that every individual 'I' implies an individual self (though the latter has no consciousness of individuality)? It may be contended by the exponents of the theory that the 'I' being the phenomenal self of an individual cannot be self-existent and must rationally imply the existence of a noumenal self, which alone can exist by itself. This contention can be accepted as valid, only on condition that there is a rational passage for descending to the phenomenon from the noumenon, that a logical means can be found out for deducing the phenomenal self (mind) and its modifications from the nature of the noumenal self, that the noumenal self as conceived can furnish an adequate explanation for the course of evolution of the phenomenal self. But we have found that this test is not satisfied by the noumenal self as conceived by the advocates of this theory.*

* The problem of relation between self and mind arises with regard to the Vedantic view also who hold witness-consciousness as non-dual. Evidently it cannot be a relation of *conjunction*, because they are not separately existent substances of the same order, coming in contact with each other. There cannot be any temporal or spatial relation between the two, because the noumenal Self is above space and time, and the phenomenal consciousness also, though being modified in time, does not occupy space. There may be a relation of

Vedantic view of inexplicable relation is no solution.

succession and even of simultaneity among the modifications of phenomenal consciousness ; but the changeless eternal noumenal Self cannot be conceived as either being preceded or succeeded by the phenomenal consciousness or occurring simultaneously with it. Nor can we conceive any real causal relation between the two, because a real causal relation implies a modification of the cause into the effect and therefore the phenomenal nature of both the cause and the effect. Nor can we regard the one as a substance and the other as an attribute inherent in it, because in that case either the modification of the attribute would imply the modification of the substance, or otherwise the attribute would have to be conceived as having a separate existence and its relation to the substance would remain inexplicable. Obviously the relation between the two cannot be one between the whole and its part, because the noumenal Self cannot be regarded as a composite body and the facts of the phenomenal consciousness as its constituent parts. Being unable to define and establish any real relation or real proximity between the changeless consciousness and the modifying mind, the Non-dualistic School of *Vedānta* postulates some indefinable inexplicable relation. But if for the purpose of furnishing a logical explanation to the facts of actual experience one is required to have recourse to some principle which is itself logically indefinable, inexplicable and unjustifiable, it is more logical and more sincere to admit that these facts themselves are incapable of being logically accounted for. Besides, if all these functions of the mind are accepted unquestionably on the ground of general experience, what is the harm in regarding this mind as endowed with the property of consciousness as well on the same ground of general experience ? If it be said that various insoluble logical difficulties arise from such a supposition, the answer would be that the supposition of a changeless functionless self-luminous consciousness also does not solve the logical difficulties and that the supposition of an inexplicable relation between the mind and the consciousness, an illusory appearance of the Egohood of the mind due to this inexplicable relation, a neither-real-nor-unreal Ignorance as the cause of this relation, and so on and so forth, is virtually an admission of the insolubleness of the logical difficulties.

Section III.

Brahman as Modified.

There is another school of thought which regards *Prakṛti* not as a separate reality, but as the Power or Energy of God, so that God Himself being identified with *Prakṛti* comes to be conceived as the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe.

Exposition :—

The world being of the nature of an effect, reason demands an ultimate cause to account for its existence, and that cause must be adequate to explain its origination, its continuity of existence and the uniformity and harmony among its phenomena. As no particular effect can be produced from a cause, in which the potentiality of that effect is not present, the ultimate cause must be conceived as of such a nature that the potentiality of the entire universe is present in it; in other words, the entire world of effects must be regarded as existing in a potential or unmanifested form in that cause. This cause accordingly must be potentially everything, but actually as good as nothing. It is the perfect unmanifested form of the universe, but the tendency to manifest itself as or transforming itself into the diversified universe is naturally present there. This is the conception of Energy. As we cannot conceive of the beginning or the end of the world of phenomena in space and time, the Energy must be conceived as infinite and eternal and as having eternally infinite potentiality to produce. Thus it must be conceived as eternally modifying itself into manifested effects without any exhaustion or diminution of its potentiality.

Wherever there is uniformity in diversity, an order and harmony in multiplicity, an adaptation of means to ends and of parts to wholes, our reason infers that the cause is not

Non-dual Consciousness with Energy as modifying cause of the world.

only modifying itself into effects, but that some ideal is operating in the cause, so that the effects can be produced with a plan and purpose. By the study of the nature of the world-process, we find these conditions present in it. This implies that the cause of the universe is not an unconscious cause, but that a conscious principle is governing the cause and systematising the process of its modification into effects. As these effects comprise all derivative existences throughout space and time, this entire universe must be the object of that consciousness, which must therefore be without any limitation. This consciousness being the eternal guiding and controlling principle of the Energy must be regarded as eternally the same and therefore without any change or modification. Thus Energy is transforming itself according to the direction of the consciousness which is changeless. As the consciousness is immanent in the very nature of the Energy, and not exercising control over it from outside, there cannot be any separation between them. Each is therefore to be conceived in inseparable relation to and in terms of the other. Thus consciousness is the consciousness immanent in the Energy and the Energy is the Energy belonging to that consciousness. The Energy is the field of the self-expression of that Infinite consciousness, and the consciousness is its eternal ruler and master. It is as endowed with Energy that consciousness acts and exhibits the glory of its nature, and it is as existing for and governed by consciousness that Energy transforms itself into a well-ordered universe. Thus infinite and perfect consciousness eternally endowed with this inexhaustible Energy is the true conception of God, and Energy as existing and transforming itself for and by God is the true conception of Energy. It is in this sense that God is regarded as the efficient as well as the material cause of the

Criticism :— Theory of difference + non-difference refuted.

world. The unchanging character of God is reconciled with His self-modification into diversities on the infallible authority of the scriptures.

Criticism :—

Let us proceed to the examination of this doctrine. Here it may be asked whether the Energy (*Śakti*) is non-different from God or different from Him or different as well as non-different from Him. If Energy is God Himself, then there will be no distinction of Energy and the One having Energy. Besides, in such a case there will be virtual denial of Energy, and what has been explained as the transformation of Energy will have to be conceived as the transformation of God Himself, Who should therefore be admitted to be a changing substance. If Energy is conceived as a reality distinct from and independent of God, we cannot assert any eternal and inalienable relation between God and Energy. The theory of difference as well as non-difference cannot at all stand unless a way can be found to interpret these two notions viz., difference and non-difference in such a manner that they do not remain contradictory to each other. But according to the meanings generally attached to them, these two notions are known to be contradictory and cannot be affirmed of the same thing at the same time. Let us prove this by illustrations. Even when we actually see two moons in the sky, as soon as we are convinced that the one is really non-different from the other, the idea of difference vanishes, and the perceived difference is taken to be illusory. Similarly, the notion of non-difference of the body and the self is negated as soon as there is the knowledge of their difference. In all such cases difference and non-difference contradict each other and the affirmation of the one necessarily implies the negation of the other.

Supposing that the relation of difference and non-difference exists together, the question is: Are God and His

God and Energy cannot be different + non-different wholly or partially.

Energy different as well as non-different as a whole or are they different in some parts and non-different in other parts? With regard to the first alternative, the following question arises: Is difference as well as non-difference of whole simultaneous or successive? If there is difference between two entities as a whole at the same time, then to speak of their non-difference is meaningless, because the essence of the two things in that case, will be exhausted in being different. Similarly, if they are entirely non-different, to speak of them as different at the same time would be meaningless. Nor can there be the successive difference and non-difference of two entities as a whole. If the antecedent form remains, then the opposite of it namely the subsequent form will not be there, and in case, the antecedent form is lost, then also because of its absence there will not be there the subsequent form. That is to say, the two forms which are identical being entirely distinct from the two forms which are different, there will virtually be difference of two entities and non-difference between two other entities. Consequently the same identical thing cannot be regarded as different as well as non-different. Nor can there be partial difference and non-difference between God and Energy, because neither of them is conceived as divisible into parts.

Besides, the relation between God and Energy cannot be determined in terms of Conjunction, Inherence, Identity and 'simple relation' (*svarūpa*).* These are generally

* There can be no such relation as *Svarūpa* relation. If the 'simple relation' is of the nature of related terms, then there will be no difference between quality and one having quality; thus there will be an end to the differences in the world and thus there will be no world at all. If the relation is of the nature of related terms, then it can never be called a relation. If a relation is not established, the terms related by

Primary or derivative relation between God and Energy disproved.

recognised as the Primary Relations, and all other relations are regarded as derivative. Consequently the validity of every other possible relation has to be examined by reference to them. As these primary relations are found inapplicable to the case of God and Energy, God cannot be logically conceived as endowed with Energy and as being the material as well as the efficient cause of the world.

To account for the production of the multiplicity of effects in the physical world the advocates suppose the existence of Energy (*Prakṛti*), and to account for the order and adjustment in it they postulate the existence of

it will not also be established, because those which are related are called terms. Besides, how can relation whose nature is to be supported on terms be the support of the nature of terms? Besides, if a relation is admitted to be of the nature of the related terms, then the question is, whether by the term one of the two terms is meant or two terms? If one term alone is meant, then what should prevent the pot from being its own relation? If it is said that in the pot, the relation of the pot is not experienced, then the reply is that if one term alone is the relation, then in the case of the pot also, there will remain the relation of pot and it will be experienced also. When a thing is there, it must be experienced. But there is no such experience. Hence the relation is not of the nature of either of the related terms. If the relation is of the nature of two terms related, then the relation of knowledge with an object remains unexplained. Take for instance, the case of the knowledge of the jar. Here if the relation of the jar and knowledge be of the nature of the two terms, namely jar and knowledge, then as knowledge would become reduced to the relation itself, knowledge cannot become related to the jar, in as much as it is no longer a term. If relations are taken to be of the nature of terms, then it must be admitted that a thing has itself for its substratum, but this is plainly absurd. Hence relation is not of the nature of two related terms. If one's own self is affirmed as a relation, then it will be contradicted by the experience, namely the possessor (स्व) is not the possessed (स्वीय).

Relation of Energy and Consciousness to God logically untenable.

consciousness as the governing principle. Now, what is the bond of connection between consciousness and Energy? Are they two substances co-existing in the nature of God? Or are they two attributes inherent in His nature? Or is Energy an attribute of consciousness? Or is consciousness an attribute of Energy? In this way various alternatives are possible and none of them is logically found to be satisfactory. If consciousness and Energy be conceived as two co-existent substances in the nature of God, then the nature of God should be distinguished from each of them, and His existence has to be proved on some other independent ground. If the demand for a material cause leads to the conception of Energy and the demand for an efficient cause leads to the conception of consciousness, what other valid ground is there to infer the existence of God? Even if God's existence is taken for granted, what should be regarded as constituting His essential nature? Is He pure *Being*? But Being is the universal predicate of all existent substances, eternal as well as non-eternal. To speak of God as pure Being is as good as speaking nothing of Him. In that case we cannot even say that God exists, for existence, the universal predicate of all things, will be God. Then again, can Being be the bond of connection between consciousness and Energy? This would be meaningless, for in that case, whatever object has existence may be said to be inseparably connected with every other existent object. Thus consciousness and Energy cannot be regarded as eternally co-existent substances in the nature of God. Nor can consciousness and Energy be consistently regarded as two attributes embracing each other in the nature of God. First of all, an attribute cannot be conceived either as the material cause or as the efficient cause of the concrete things of the world. It is only a really existent substance that can be the cause. If Energy be the material cause of the world, it must be regarded as a real substance possessing the potentiality, the

Appeal to God's unique nature unavailing.

tendency and the capacity to transform itself into a variety of effects. Similarly consciousness must, in order to be the efficient cause, be conceived as a substance having the quality and power of guiding Energy and producing order and harmony in the produced world. It may be said that it is one substance viz., God, that as Energy becomes the material cause and as consciousness becomes the efficient cause. This would mean that when we speak of Energy we really think of God as the material cause, and that when we speak of consciousness, we think of the same substance, viz., God, as the efficient cause. Should we then say that the nature of God is composed of two elements, viz., consciousness and Energy, each of which is distinguished from, though related to the other? Is then God to be conceived as having a composite nature? In that case God is not to be regarded as the ultimate substance, but a derivative substance produced by the combination of two ultimate substances, viz., consciousness and Energy.

It may be said that God has a unique nature of His own, and that unique nature combines within itself the two elements, viz., consciousness and Energy. But in that case an attempt should be made to form a definite conception of that unique nature. Unless any logical conception can be formed of this nature, it would amount to taking shelter under an indefinite inconceivable hypothesis for the purpose of establishing another unprovable hypothesis. Then again, what should be the relation between that unique nature and the said consciousness and Energy? Should it be different from them or non-different from both or any one of them? If it be different from them, no bond of connection between it and them can be found out. If it be non-different from one and different from the other, the same difficulty remains. If it is to be conceived as non-different from both, it is necessary to form such a conception of it as may unify in

God or Consciousness cannot be proved as modifying cause of the world.

itself the conceptions of consciousness and Energy. But no logical conception appears to be possible of an entity which is conscious as well as unconscious, changeless as well as changing, differenceless unity as well as self-differentiation into diversities, at the same time and in the same sense. Thus to have recourse to a unique nature of God is of no avail.

Now, let us consider if consciousness (or God) itself can be conceived as modifying itself into the world of effects. The partless cannot have modifications, either simultaneous or successive, because it must be of a uniform nature and cannot be subject to increase, diminution, or differentiation. From a thing whose essence is such that it never departs from its own intrinsic nature, there cannot arise modifications in the form of effects which are inconsistent to its nature in all respects. Consciousness which is undivided cannot, by having abandoned its original state, be modified into effects. If it could do this, then nothing but effects would exist, because what is partless cannot have a remainder. Because consciousness is partless, it cannot be said that one part of it becomes modified and the other part remains unmodified. Consciousness, if modified, will be wholly modified and so no part of consciousness can remain over to be modified afterwards to the end that its successive modifications may be made possible. If consciousness does not abandon its original nature, then it should not be regarded as subject to modification. If the same condition of the consciousness remains unaffected, then there will be nothing to show the distinction of cause and effect. If the mark of distinction is allowed, then in that accidental special form consciousness will become modified, so its immutability will not remain unbroken. Because the production of entirely non-existent effects is not admitted, these effects should be regarded as having the nature of their cause. So it has to be allowed

Further inconsistencies in the doctrine of God as the modifying cause.

that the material cause attains to the condition of those effects. Therefore the production and destruction of effects will affect the said material cause. Hence the immutability of the material cause cannot remain unaffected. The theory of modification of consciousness into the forms of the experiencer, the experienced and the regulator implies that the imperfections of transformations etc., inhering in the unconscious and the imperfections of experience of pleasure and pain inhering in the conscious will affect the nature of consciousness.

Moreover, according to the view of the advocates, the non-dual self-luminous Being must have to be conceived as at the same time the subject and the object, the illuminer and the illumined, the regulator and the regulated, the manifestor and the manifested, the modifier and the modified, the creator and the created. The presence of such distinctions within the nature of the Being would make It a being of complex nature and therefore of derivative existence. It would make that Being composed of parts or aspects or organs and therefore a composite embodied Being; and every composite embodied being is non-eternal, liable to development and degradation and destruction. The exponents of the doctrine of the real self-modification of God — the supreme self-luminous Being with Energy — cannot logically explain how God can remain the same unchanged Being, while modifying Himself into the plurality of conscious and unconscious finite realities of the universe. If the Energy pertains to His essential nature, the transformation of the Energy must mean the transformation of Himself, and the original eternal God should be regarded as non-existent in creation. If the Energy is regarded as essentially foreign to His nature and accidentally related to Him, some causal explanation would be demanded to account for this relation

Recognition of modified and unmodified aspects in God illogical.

and this is of course unavailable. Further, though God may in this view be conceived as retaining His identity, He cannot consistently be asserted to be the material cause of the universe, because the modification of the Energy would not mean His self-modification. If it be held that God with the Energy inherent in His nature modifies Himself into the world of effects and still maintains His identity in the same way as the individual ego maintains its identity in and through the mental modifications, then this knowledge of the unity in the midst of changes must imply the existence of a changeless witness--consciousness above that self-modifying God. To hold that God Himself is in one aspect the changeless witness-consciousness and in another aspect modified into diverse phenomenal realities would also raise various logical difficulties as to the significance of and relation between these two aspects. Are these two aspects equally essential to the nature of God? If they are, can there be changes in one of the essential aspects without affecting the other? If this be possible, should it not imply that the Divine nature is composite, essentially constituted of two altogether distinct natures and should not reason demand a superior cause for this composition? If this change in one essential aspect of the Divine nature with any change in the other is not regarded as possible, on the ground that the two aspects pertain to the one eternal nature of God, then either the entire Divine nature should undergo changes and God would lose His identity, or the entire Divine nature should remain changeless and God would not be the self-modifying material cause of the world. If neither of the alternatives be acceptable, then one of the so-called aspects may be regarded as constituting the real essential nature of God and the other as non-essential and unreal expression of His nature. If this view is accepted, then the changeless self-luminous consciousness must necessarily be regarded as constituting His real essential

Timeless Absolute (God) cannot explain the succession in time.

nature, because this alone demonstrates His unity, non-duality and identity, and the changing Energy must be regarded as the non-essential unreal expression of His nature. From the logical point of view it is useless to proclaim that God has the *unique inscrutable power* to modify Himself into the world of effects as well as to exist as the changeless transcendent witness of those modifications, because it is the nature of the so-called inscrutable power that logic seeks to analyse and rationally conceive, and leaving it as inscrutable would mean the admission of the insolubility of the problem and the abandonment of the rational quest of truth.*

* "How could a timeless reality be the cause of a succession in time?..... So far as a thing is timeless, it cannot change, for with change time comes necessarily. But how can a thing which does not change produce an effect in time? That the effect was produced in time implies that it had a beginning. And if the effect begins, while no beginning can be assigned to the cause, we are left to choose between two alternatives. Either there is something in the effect — namely, the quality of coming about as a change — which is altogether uncaused. Or the timeless reality is only a partial cause, and is determined to act by something which is not timeless. In either case, the timeless reality fails to explain the succession in time.....For the process in time is, by the hypothesis, the root of all irrationality, and how can it spring from anything which is quite free of irrationality? Why should a concrete and perfect whole proceed to make itself imperfect, for the sake of gradually getting rid of the imperfection again? If it gained nothing by the change, could it be completely rational to undergo it? But if it had anything to gain by the change, how could it previously have been perfect?.....For any self-determination of a cause to produce its effect must be due to some incompleteness in the former without the latter. But if the cause, by itself was incomplete, it could not, by itself, be perfect. If, on the other hand it was perfect, it is impossible to see how it could produce anything else as an effect. Its perfection makes it in complete harmony with itself. And, since it

Advocate's appeal to Scripture as infallible proof of God disallowed.

Let us consider whether the charges are really refuted by the appeal to the scriptures. With regard to the authority of the scriptures, we have previously examined the validity of their claim to infallibility from various points of view. All the grounds for the infallibility of the scriptures as suggested by the thinkers belonging to religious sects, have been found to be incapable of satisfying a rational mind.*

is all reality, there is nothing outside it with which it could be out of harmony. What could determine it to production?

Thus we oscillate between two extremes, each equally fatal. If we endeavour to treat evil as absolutely unreal, we have to reject the one basis of all knowledge—'experience.' But in so far as we accept evil as a manifestation of reality, we find it impossible to avoid qualifying the cause by the nature of the effect which it produces, and so contradicting the main result of the dialectic — the harmony and perfection of the Absolute."

(Mc. Taggart's "Hegelian Dialectic").

* The grounds, upon which the infallibility of the scriptures is based, may be summed up under the following heads:—The scriptures are (*a*) the expressions of the spiritual experiences of the *Sādhakas*, who have realised the ultimate Truth in *Samādhi*; (*b*) the utterances of the omniscient human beings, who are above errors; (*c*) the revelations, by God Himself, revealing the truth about Himself; and (*d*) the scriptures — the *Vedas* — are the eternal linguistic forms of the eternal truths authoritative by themselves and not produced by any agency, human or Divine.

The validity of the doctrine (*d*) has been examined in a foot-note pages 48–49 and has been shown that the *Vedas* cannot be proved to be eternal and authorless. The doctrine of the Divine origin of the scriptures (*c*) has been examined in a foot-note pages xlvii–xlviii. (*b*) Omniscience of human beings has been examined in foot-notes pages 20–22; 46–47.

(*a*) It has been shown that what is called intuition in trance with thought is mere individual awareness which is subjective, and

Reason and not scripture is the final court of appeal.

The source of their own authority being not established, how can they be accepted as a valid source of knowledge? If, however, all the scriptures of all the religious sects were found to have independently arrived at the same conception with regard to the character of consciousness and to have been unanimous in their description of the nature of the ultimate cause of the universe, then their unanimous assertion might have been accepted as at best a very strong hypothesis, demanding a very respectful consideration. But it is found that they widely vary in their conception of consciousness, of the ultimate cause of the universe, of the process of creation, and various other things believed to be of a supersensuous character. The evidence of which of the scriptures should be accepted as authoritative? In the absence of unanimity among the scriptures, we must rely on the resources of our own understanding. And we have found that there is no means by which we can rationally understand that there can be any entity, which is absolutely unchangeable in its nature and is at the same time modified into a world of particular effects, which is one and many, conscious and unconscious, cause and effect at the same time. In the absence of any rational means of conceiving it, how can we accept this view of consciousness? Even if the scriptures had unanimously proclaimed such a nature of

that in trance without thought there is absence of all experience; hence we cannot grant that any person has ever realised or will even realise Truth by means of *Samādhi*. Nor the validity of the scriptures through authorship, direct or indirect, of any such person can be believed in.

Thus the scriptures cannot be proved to be eternal or to be the production of any infallible Being or beings. Hence they must be considered as a composition of human beings, who, however specially gifted, must be subject to error. Thus the belief in the infallible authority of the scriptures is found to be without any rational basis.

Advocate's doctrine of God as Absolute having world His attribute represented.

ultimate Reality, as is inconceivable to our reason, reason could not have accepted it without changing its own essential character, i. e. without becoming unreason.*

Brahman as Qualified.

The world consists of two kinds of objects, viz. conscious and unconscious. These conscious and unconscious beings may be conceived as the attributes of God (Brahman). God in His essential character is the one infinite self-conscious omniscient and omnipotent Being with all the excellent qualities eternally present in Him. The conscious and the unconscious beings constituting the world are regarded as attributes which though different from His essential nature, eternally belong to and qualify His nature. Thus He is eternally the qualified God. These qualifying attributes, viz.

* The above remarks are equally applicable to the refutation of the doctrine of *Vilās* (sports), technically called *Pratibimba* (reflection), as advocated by the Pratyavijñā (Kāshmiri Śaiva) and Śākta-Tantra. The non-dual self-luminous Brahman (called Śiva—Consciousness qualified with self-conscious Energy) may be conceived as manifesting Himself as the world in three different ways. He may be taken as being modified into the diversified world and at the same time as having remained unmodified through His unique inscrutable Power or He may be qualified with subtle and gross phenomena (which are absolutely different from and inseparably related to Him) without getting Himself modified or Brahman may be illusorily identified with the phenomenal appearances. As according to the advocates, Śiva, through His own free will, sees differences in Himself which are nothing but His own *reflection* and which constitute His very nature, and also as according to them the world cannot be cancelled and thereby proved to be illusory, their view cannot be taken as Qualified Non-dualism or Monism. Hence they have to fall back on the aforesaid first alternative. This has been shown to be logically untenable.

Relation of attributes to God criticised.

the conscious and the unconscious beings, remain unified with His essential nature in the unmanifested state, but become manifested in a variety of forms or modes at the time of creation. But in both the states they are inseparable from His nature. Though as attributes they are really different from Him, they being not separate entities or substances do not contradict the doctrine of the non-dualism of God and can in this sense of inseparableness be regarded as non-different from Him.

Now, according to this interpretation, two kinds of attributes are ascribed to God. One kind of attributes pertains to His essential nature, and it is in respect of these superexcellent attributes that the perfection of His character is sought to be preserved. But the other kind of attributes, consisting of the conscious and unconscious beings, which manifest themselves in the diversities of the world, is regarded as qualifying His nature, but not forming the essence of His nature. But if these attributes are eternally and inseparably associated with the nature of God, it is difficult to conceive how they can be regarded as non-essential to His nature and incapable of affecting it by their imperfections and how only the other kinds of attributes which are regarded as good qualities can be regarded as constituting His essential nature. If it be said that attributes pertaining to a substance are to be regarded as different from the nature of the substance, then the good qualities in terms of which God is glorified must also be regarded as different from His essential nature, because they also are attributes. In that case the substance of God would have to be conceived as the attributeless pure Being. This would be inconsistent with the conception of God, as cherished by the exponents of this doctrine. According to this doctrine an attributeless substance is inconceivable, because a substance is always conceived in

God's qualification with attributes will affect His nature.

terms of its attributes. If this be so, the changes of the attributes must be construed as changes of the substance, the impurities and imperfections, if any, of the attributes must be regarded as impurities and imperfections of the substance itself. Accordingly by interpreting the diversities of the world as the attributes of God, His nature cannot be conceived as untouched by the changes, impurities and imperfections of the world. Because the qualified is non-different from both the attributive and the substantive *Brahman* will suffer transformation in case the substantive alone or both the attributive and the substantive together are taken as the material cause. Finally, how the objective realities of the world, the really existent conscious selves and unconscious material bodies, can be regarded as attributes or products of attributes, would pass the comprehension of men of commonsense. Further, if these realities be parts of His being, His being would be of a composite nature and hence of the nature of an effect. If they are different from Him, then His existence will be limited by their existence. Further, on account of their being eternally associated with Him, not only will their nature be regarded as conditioned by His nature, but His nature also will have to be regarded as conditioned by their nature. He would then have to be conceived as a conditioned Being and not an Absolute Being. In this way various difficulties would stand in the way of conceiving Him as an infinite, absolute and perfect Being and at the same time as being qualified by the existence of the world of conscious and unconscious beings inseparable from Him.

Moreover, let us examine another interpretation of this doctrine. The relation between God and the world may be conceived on the analogy of the relation between the soul and the body. God is the universal Self, the Self of the universe and all that exists in it; and the universe is His

Doctrine of the Absolute as organic disproved.

body. Now, the question is, what is the essential nature of this universal Self? Is this Self to be conceived as an omnipotent and omniscient, self-conscious and self-determining formless Being, or as an embodied conscious Being with infinite power and knowledge and with the world of diversities as eternally constituting His body? If the first alternative be accepted, then a Being essentially formless has to be conceived as having a body. Is this body created by Him or does it eternally pertain to His nature? If the world, which is regarded as His body, is conceived as having been created by Him, then the world-process must be thought of as having a beginning in time. If the formless Self had been without a body prior to the creation of the world and then at a particular period of His life exercised His unlimited knowledge and power for creating a body for Himself, it must be admitted that some change took place in His nature and outlook for passing from one condition of existence to a different condition and that there must have been some sufficient reason or cause for this change, either in the shape of some uneasiness within His consciousness, or in the shape of some impelling or compelling force from outside. All these conclusions, which necessarily follow from the supposition of the creation of the world-body by God, are of course inconsistent with the fundamental conception of God.

If on the other hand (according to the second alternative) the world-body eternally pertains to Him, — though it may exist sometimes in a subtle or potential state and sometimes in a gross and kinetic state — it cannot be maintained that God or the Self of the world is essentially formless. It is inconceivable that He is eternally bodiless and eternally embodied. If the world-body is conceived as eternally present, in whatever form it may be, then either it should be regarded as forming an essential part of God's nature, or it

Another form of Absolutist doctrine criticised.

should be regarded as a different entity eternally in contact with His nature. The difficulties of the latter supposition have already been pointed out. If the former supposition is accepted, then God is to be conceived as essentially an embodied conscious Being. In that case the very conception of God would involve the conception of the world,—the conception of the Self would include the conception of the body. The acceptance of this conception would of course mean that all the characteristics of the body, all the transformations, imperfections and impurities of the body, must affect the nature of the Self. The position of the Self would then be reduced merely to the position of the principle of unity of a living organism. As the diversities form organic parts of the nature of God, the defects and impurities of all these finite parts must be regarded as pertaining to the nature of God. God in that case cannot be regarded as the ideal of purity and perfection, free from the touch of any impurity, limitation and deficiency, as He is conceived to be.*

* "There seems to be a contradiction in holding that the same experience can be both self-contradictory as it stands, as absolute idealism usually holds, and yet through some process of transmutation perfectly harmonious and self-consistent as part of the Absolute. Either the contradiction in my experience is real, or it is merely apparent. If the former, my experience cannot be real even as part of the Absolute, for, if it really contradicts itself, it simply cannot exist, and if it is internally self-contradictory it cannot be made self-consistent by being brought into relation to other things. B + not − B + C + D must still be as contradictory as B + not − B was by itself, though no doubt this difficulty was obscured for the absolutist by the views I have criticised in my account of 'Degrees of Truth.' If, on the other hand, the contradiction is merely apparent, then the absolutist doctrine that all parts of a true whole are, when taken alone, self-contradictory breaks down, and the so-called contradiction is merely a mistake of ours, though perhaps an inevitable one."

(A. C. Ewing's "Idealism: A Critical Survey").

Section IV.

Brahman as Transcendent (attributeless).

Exposition :—

There are advocates (viz. the non-dualistic School of Vedānta—the Śāṅkarites) who regard Brahman as cause and substratum (hence transcendent Reality) of the numberless finite and transitory, relative and contingent existences, that constitute the universe. They hold that all the particular existences of the world are of the nature of effects, and hence must be produced from some material causes. What are found to be material causes in relation to their effects are themselves also found to be produced and are therefore effects in relation to their own material causes. This chain of causation must have an ultimate end, for otherwise the demand of our thought for a sufficient cause of all effects will remain unsatisfied. This ultimate end of the causal series must be a self-existent absolute cause — a cause which eternally exists by itself and is not the effect of any other cause. This cause must necessarily be of a perfectly simple nature, for whatever is of a complex nature must be capable of being analysed into simpler elements, must have a particularised form of existence and must be of the nature of an effect. " As we cannot say that an original being consists of so many derivative beings because these in reality presuppose the former, and cannot therefore constitute it, it follows that the ideal of an original being must be conceived as simple." Pursuing this line of argument, the exponents of this theory arrive at the conclusion that the entire universe of complex temporal existences must have as its ultimate material cause one absolute eternal Being or Existence called Brahman. Now, since Brahman, as the ultimate cause of the boundless world of innumerable varieties and changes, must be regarded as having absolute existence, and as such it

Criticism—concept of God as transcendental Absolute is a mere idea.

must be conceived as eternally of the same unchanging nature, and without any complexity or difference or relativity within its character. Thus the position is that Brahman is eternally simple, changeless, differenceless, unrelated, self-existent Being, and at the same time the cause of the world.

Criticism :—

Let us proceed to the examination of the above view. From the standpoint of Formal Logic, these arguments are very strong indeed ; but formal argument cannot prove the real existence of anything. The concept of Existence is certainly contrary to the concept of Non-existence, and the one cannot be thought of as the other. But that an Entity corresponding to the concept of Existence really exists outside our thought is not proved thereby.*

*(1) "For if we take the issue as being that which is here stated, namely, *first*, that from any given existence (it may be, merely my own existence) we can correctly infer the existence of an unconditionally necessary being ; *secondly*, that we must regard a being which contains all reality, and therefore every condition, as being absolutely unconditioned, and that in this concept of an *ens realissimum* we have therefore found the concept of a thing to which we can also ascribe absolute necessity — granting all this, it by no means follows that the concept of a limited being which does not have the highest reality is for that reason incompatible with absolute reality. For although I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is involved in the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not justified in concluding that its existence must for this reason be conditioned ; just as I cannot say, in the case of a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition (in the case under discussion, the condition of completeness in accordance with [pure] concepts) does not hold, the conditioned also does not hold. On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that any limited beings whatsoever, notwithstanding their being limited, may also be unconditionally

Mere idea of God cannot prove its objective reality.

By examining the idea of existence as involved in the nature of the existent objects, it will be shown that it can be explained in different ways, and that its being the absolute substance, of which all objects are only necessary, although we cannot infer their necessity from the universal concepts which we have of them. Thus the argument has failed to give us the least concept of the properties of a necessary being and indeed is utterly ineffective."

(Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"--
—Norman Kemp Smith's Abridged Edition.)

(2) "The refutation of the 'Ontological' proof is one of the best-known passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant speaks of the argument as the 'ontological' (or Cartesian) proof. He examines it only in the form in which it had been revived by Descartes, and was apparently not acquainted with its earlier history. His objection, put briefly, is simply this, that the proposition 'God exists' can only be got out of the concept of 'God' if existence has already been included in that concept. If I define God as a 'really existent X', of course I can make the true proposition, 'If there is such a being as the God thus defined, then that being exists'. But I am not entitled to assert that there is such a being, and consequently not entitled to assert the consequent of the foregoing hypothetical proposition ('God exists') categorically. In fact existence is not a real predicate. The concept 'a hundred dollars' has precisely the same content whether the hundred dollars actually exist in my pocket or not. 'Our concept of an object may contain what and as much as you please, still we must go outside it to impart existence to the object'. Hence the entological proof is not really a proof of anything. 'The Idea of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most useful Idea, but just because it is merely an Idea it is wholly incapable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone.' Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and exalted concept of the Supreme Being. The

Kant's criticism of the transcendental proof about God validated.

particularised manifestations or appearances, is not logically proved. Besides, there is no incontrovertible ground in our experience on which we can stand to show that the Law of Causality demands an eternal changeless cause of

present writer does not feel that Hegel's witticisms on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension'. The logical investigations which have issued in the creation of the modern 'exact' or 'symbolic' logic of Frege, Peano, and Russell have made this point even clearer than it could have been to the first readers of the *Critique*. If it is immediately evident that there is a member of the unit-class of which 'supreme being' is the class-name, there is neither room nor need for proof. If this is not immediately evident, proof is wanted. In general it cannot be inferred from the definition of a class that the class has members. If the class 'supreme being' or 'most real being' is an exception, we require proof that it is an exception to the rule, and neither Hegel nor any one else has ever offered anything in the way of proof. Thus, as against Descartes, Kant's argument is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive. Nor does he see that the original Anselmian proof fares any better. It is not directly touched by Kant's denial that existence is a predicate, since Anslem does not rest his case on the assertion that existence is a predicate. But Kant's counter-argument can equally be stated without raising this question. Whether existence is a predicate or not, it is equally true that we are not entitled to infer from the hypothetical proposition, 'If there is a God, that God is an existent', the categorical proposition, 'God is an existent'; and this is what Anslem tries to do. He is really committed, as every defender of the ontological line of argument must be, to the attempt to prove that it is irrational to suppose that there might have existed nothing at all. In point of fact most of those who have tried to turn the edge of Kant's criticism have not attempted so desperate a task. They have consciously or unconsciously assumed as a premiss the proposition that something exists, and have been content to argue that, since something exists,

Kant's refutation of ontological argument further elucidated.

all changing not-eternal entities, and that such a cause really exists beyond and behind the world. Besides, so far as our experience goes, all the objects of experience within God exists also. In doing this they tacitly admit the truth of the contention of Kant and St. Thomas that no purely *a priori* proof of theism is possible."

(A. E. Taylor's "Theism" in Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12.)

(3) "Kant presents his argument in still another form. If we think in a thing every kind of reality except one, the missing reality is not supplied by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with the same defect with which I have thought it. When, therefore, I think a Being as the highest reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be lacking of the possible real *content* of a thing in general, something is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thinking, namely, knowledge of its existence ; and such knowledge can never be obtained save in an *a posteriori* manner. That is owing to the limitations imposed by the conditions of our sense-experience. We never confound the existence of a sensible object with its mere concept. The concept represents something that may or may not exist : to determine existence we must refer to actual experience. And Kant has already stated, the actual is always for us the accidental, and its assertion is therefore synthetic. A possible idea and the idea of a possible thing are quite distinct. A thing is known to be possible only when presented in some concrete experience, or when, though not actually experienced, it has been proved to be bound up, according to empirical laws, with given perceptions. It is not, therefore, surprising that if we try, as is done in the ontological argument, to think existence through the pure category, we cannot mention a single mark distinguishing it from a mere logical possibility."

(N. K. Smith's "A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.")

Transcendental cause disproved. Advocate's conception of Existence as substratum.

the world are, no doubt, found to have non-eternal changing derivative existence. But what is the proof that the world as a whole also has its beginning and end and can therefore have only a derivative existence? We know that every object within the world has a cause; but we find also that the cause of every effect is within the world. So far as our knowledge goes, the causal relation exists between two objects or phenomena within this world. How can we infer from such observation that the world as a whole also must have a cause and that that cause must be some self-existent Entity transcending this world? Such an inference would evidently involve the fallacy of Composition. Thus the transcendent self-existent eternal changeless cause of the entire universe is far from being logically established.

Exposition :—

The advocates of the view would say that such an eternal changeless self-existent Reality is not beyond the possibility of experience. Changeless Existence is perceived as underlying all objects of experience. There can be no object of actual or possible experience, which can be conceived as without Existence. The forms and attributes of objects may be different and changing and of innumerable varieties; but Existence is common to them all, and cannot be conceived as either various or changing. Therefore one unchanging eternal Existence must be conceived as the Substratum of all the various kinds of objects. As all the diverse kinds of objects of actual and possible experience constitute the world, this changeless eternal all-pervading Existence must be accepted as the substratum of the entire world and the world as its illusory appearance.

Perception or recognition of attributeless formless Existence disproved.

Criticism:—

Now, in order to prove that Existence is all-pervading non-dual substratum of the universe, the advocate of the view has to rely either on the scriptures or on supernormal experience or on normal experience. It has already been proved that scriptures cannot be accepted as the final proof in any matter. It has also been shown that Samādhi-intuition cannot be a guarantee for the reality of any object. So the exponent of the view has to take his stand on normal experience and rational proof based upon it. But this also will not serve his purpose. He takes the ultimate Reality as without any attribute, and as such beyond the reach of the senses; accordingly it cannot be claimed that Existence as it is in itself, becomes the object of direct perception. These particular perceptions can supply no proof of it, because we perceive the objects as different from one another. If it be said that existence being the common factor in all these perceptions it must be conceived as one, the argument becomes too weak to establish the conclusion, because this fact may be explained by regarding existence either as a general attribute or as a general class. If it be argued that at the time of the perception of the cot ('cot exists') we recognise the same Existence as we perceived at the time of the perception of the pot ('pot exists'), then we assert something beyond what is justified by actual experience. Such recognition is possible only in cases of particular objects of sense-perception. If existence had been a particular object of experience qualified by particular characteristics distinguishing it from other particular objects, then only it could have been ascertained that it is the same individual object with the same characteristics that we perceived on the previous occasion. This is not possible in the case of what is regarded as an attributeless formless entity. Besides, there may be a

Instances cited to disprove absolute oneness of Existence

series of perceptions of a series of particular objects, all of them possessing the same characteristics. When we observe a flame blazing uniformly or a stream of water flowing continuously, we really perceive a different object at each succeeding moment, though there being no distinguishing attribute to differentiate the object of the perception of one moment from that of another, the object appears to be one. Hence the absence of any distinguishing attribute in the existence perceived with the perception of different objects can be no proof of the absolute oneness of Existence. If it is argued that in the cases of the perception of the objects of uniform character, like the instances just cited, some attributes are present, which distinguish them from objects of different nature, but in the case of Existence, there is no attribute whatsoever, then in reply to this argument the possibility of the perception of Existence will be questioned. In the case of the absolute negation of all possible perceptible characteristics, perception can in no way be possible. Thus the absolute oneness of Existence perceived along with but differentiated from the perception of particular objects cannot be rationally established. Besides, it is observed that with regard to the pot and the cot which are distinct entities, there is knowledge which refers to both the pot and the cot as substantives, that is, one knowledge referring to more than one independent object (समूहालम्बनज्ञान); here though knowledge is one, still the contents of that knowledge are not one. So from one knowiedge with reference to different objects, the advocates cannot be allowed to assert that there is one pervading object, namely universal Existence.

It is argued by the advocates that the particular object and Existence appear to the perceiving mind as non-different from each other, in the same way as the earthen pot and earth are perceived as non-different from each other because

Argument to prove non-difference of Existence and particular object invalidated.

of their being the objects of the same process of perception. But this argument for proving the non-difference of Existence and the particular object is not valid, because the sameness of the process of perception does not necessarily indicate the non-difference of its objects. This is evident in cases of the perception of an aggregate of particular objects. Take the case of perception of a forest consisting of a large number of trees or of a class consisting of a large number of students. In such cases the particular trees or students are perceived by the same act of perception. On account of the unity of the act of perception, the idea of a unity, in the sense of an aggregate arises in the mind, but the differences of the particular objects constituting the aggregate are not merged in the unity of the aggregate, and these objects cannot be regarded as non-different from one another. In the same way even if it be admitted that the existence and the particular object are perceived together by the same act of perception, we cannot be aware that the one is non-different from the other, but we can only know the unity in them in the sense of aggregate or togetherness.

Even if the premisses of the advocate's argument are accepted, the conclusion does not follow from them. Existence is a common factor in all the objects of the universe, and the universe as a whole also must be conceived as having existence. But does this mean that Existence is by itself an absolute self-existent Reality and that it is the substratum of all objects within the universe as well as of the universe as a whole. Existence is always found with and inseparable from the concrete objects of experience. Until and unless this changeless non-dual Existence can be experienced in isolation from the concrete objects of experience or its self-existence can be proved on any other independent evidence, the charge of treating a logical

Transcendent reality of Existence cannot be known by proofs or by *samādhi*.

abstraction as a self-existent Reality against this view will remain unrepudiated.

It is evident that Existence apart from the existent objects cannot be an object of sense-perception, because it does not possess the perceptible properties. Nor can it be an object of inductive inference, because no relation of invariable concomitance, on which a valid induction with regard to Existence might be based, is available. Nor can its independent reality be deductively inferred, because we can find out no higher principle from which it can be deduced. The only logical process by which we can arrive at the conception of Existence is logical analysis and abstraction, which cannot establish its independent reality.

It may be contended that Existence apart from any object is experienced in the state of trance. If this be put forward as an argument for establishing the unrelated absolute Reality of Existence, several difficulties would arise. First of all, if the validity of this experience is challenged, one cannot prove it to another. Secondly, those who claim to have experienced this state, are not unanimous with regard to the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Thirdly, it may be asked, what is the nature of the trance. If it is a state of the intense concentration of the mind, then it is quite possible that on account of the attention being fixed on one aspect of a thing,—in the present case, upon the universal changeless existence-aspect of all objects—the other aspects of things as well as all other things may be absent from the experience for the time being; but this would not prove that other things or aspects are non-existent or really unconnected with it or that it is an independently existent Entity. Moreover, if it were really an object of valid experience in some particular state of the mind, viz. the state of trance, then also it

Doctrine of Brahman as non-negated in all times cannot be validated.

could not be regarded as the absolute transcendental Reality, because every object of experience must be related to the subject and be illumined by the consciousness of the subject and hence must be of the nature of a dependent relative reality.

Even if somehow the transcendent existence of Brahman could be known, the impossibility of its being negated at any time, past, present or future, could not be the object of any valid knowledge. Direct knowledge can make only a present entity its object and it cannot be related to the past or the future. From the knowledge of the present existence of an entity we are not justified in inferring that it was never non-existent in its present nature even in the remotest past or that it will not be so in any remote future. From the absence of the knowledge of any change or modification in the entity at the present time, we cannot infer that it is incapable of any change whatsoever at any time. Besides, the application of the laws of formal logic (viz. *what is must be* what it is at all times and under all circumstances) is not quite fair in this case. The element of time has no place in formal logic, but in the field of the valid knowledge of the world of mind and matter, it is found to have an important place. In our experience, in the domain of our valid knowledge, we find no justification for the principle assumed here, that *what is* must always be and must remain unchanged in character at all times. These principles of course compel us to admit that a thing cannot be existent and non-existent at the same time; but they do not demand that a thing which is existent at one time cannot be non-existent at another time.

Now, let us show that the advocate's view viz. the world is the illusory manifestation on the substratum of Existence is

C

Doctrine of Brahman as substratum of world-illusion disproved

not logically justifiable. The difference between general and special features in a substance is a necessary pre-condition of the possibility of illusion upon it. In Brahman, as it is conceived by the advocates of the doctrine under discussion, this very fundamental condition is absent. Brahman is conceived as without any kind of difference within Its character. It is regarded as absolutely devoid of attributes, parts, aspects, features or forms. Hence the homogeneous nature of Brahman must be either entirely veiled or entirely manifested. In either case the phenomenon of illusion becomes impossible. Nor can it be held that Brahman has fancied general and particular aspects and so made thereby the illusory knowledge of Reality possible. Because the imagined general and particular aspects of Reality are due to illusion, there will necessarily be the absence of those imagined aspects before illusion. Because also the distinction between the particular and general aspects of Reality being illusory, that distinction cannot be regarded as the cause of illusion in general. So the possibility of illusion on the substratum of Brahman is in no way proved. Besides, in order to prove that the world of plurality is an illusory appearance on the Substratum of Brahman, we have to be satisfied by incontrovertible logical proofs, (1) that the Substratum, Brahman, has an independent existence unrelated to the world, (2) that its existence is incapable of being denied at any time, past, present or future, (3) that its real nature as the changeless attributeless eternal self-luminous Being is capable of being veiled, (4) that the realisation of the true character of Brahman amounts to the repudiation of the world of plurality as a really existent object. Since these conditions have been shown to be unfulfilled, the world cannot be proved to be an illusory appearance on the Substratum of Brahman.

Observation proves Ignorance to be condition and not material cause of illusion.

Thus we find no logically consistent interpretation of our normal experience, by means of which it can be maintained that the perception of particular existent objects involves the perception of one absolute differenceless attributeless Existence and that the particular objects are but illusory appearances on the Substratum of Existence.

Cosmic Ignorance.

The advocates recognise Ignorance as the material cause of illusory appearance and hence it is inferred that cosmic Ignorance is the cause of the illusory manifestation of the world on the substratum of attributeless Brahman. Let us proceed to the brief examination of the doctrine. We notice different kinds of relevant facts. In one kind of instances, such as the absence of knowing anything in sound sleep, the previous want of knowledge of things which we afterwards newly know, Ignorance is present, but no illusion is produced. In another kind of instances, such as the perception of silver on the substratum of shell, serpent on the substratum of rope, etc., Ignorance is present, and illusion also is produced. In some other kinds of instances, such as the perception of the mirage, the smallness of the sun, the movement of the trees etc., Ignorance is absent, but illusion is present. From the observation of such different kinds of instances, we cannot even establish a necessary concomitance between Ignorance and illusory perception. We find that the mere presence of Ignorance cannot produce illusion, that when illusion is produced, Ignorance is invariably associated with other circumstances, that the presence of certain circumstances can sustain illusion even in the absence of Ignorance. Is there then any justification for holding that Ignorance is not merely a condition, but the true material cause of the illusion ?

Ignorance cannot explain order and harmony of the world.

According to the advocates, Ignorance is a veiling something which eternally appears to and is illumined by the non-dual Brahman and becomes the cause of the manifestation of the plurality of subjects and objects constituting the universe. In this view of the case, the nature of Ignorance has to be determined in such a way that it may be sufficient to account for the nature of this phenomenal world of plurality. This world-system, when more carefully scrutinised, is found to be not only a natural order, but also a moral order. This is admitted by the exponents of the theory under consideration. Now, in order to account adequately for this phenomenal world-order,—the design and purpose in this world of effects—it is necessary to suppose, in accordance with the law of invariable concomitance established within the domain of our experience, the powers of pre-vision, judgment, selection, adjustment, regulation, etc. in the cause. These powers cannot obviously be ascribed to the essential character of the changeless attributeless non-dual Brahman. Hence these powers ought to be regarded as pertaining to the nature of Ignorance, which is conceived as the cause of this phenomenal universe. But the capacity of merely veiling the true character of the Noumenal Brahman does not involve the presence of these powers. Hence Ignorance, if it be conceived as some inexplicable positive entity merely veiling the true nature of Brahman, cannot offer any explanation for the order and harmony in this phenomenal universe.

It will of course be admitted by the exponents of the theory of Ignorance that Ignorance by itself cannot possess these powers and attributes, but that being imposed upon and associated with the absolute Being, it becomes endowed with these incomprehensible powers and attributes. If instead of being associated with Brahman, it had been

Conditions of rope-snake-illusion unfulfilled in the case of Brahman.

associated with any finite being, it could not of course modify itself into and make that finite being appear as such a boundless complicated world-system extending over all space and all time and with such wonderful harmony. If this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the cosmic Ignorance owes the limitless wonder-working powers and attributes, which are exhibited in the world-process, to the Absolute Reality, with which it is eternally associated, and that it is able to make that Reality appear in the form of such an intricate temporal and spatial world-system, because that Reality has in its own nature the capacity and possibility to appear as such. This admission would amount to the admission that the Absolute Reality is not really attributeless and powerless.

There is no justifiable ground for holding that Ignorance being illumined by the changeless self-luminous Brahman, whose nature it veils, becomes characterised by these powers, or that Brahman being conditioned by or reflected upon Ignorance becomes endowed with these powers. When an individual with imperfect powers of observation perceives an illusory snake in the place of a rope, the real character of the rope is *partially* veiled through the *ignorance of the perceiving individual* and it appears as the snake through the influence of some other co-operating causes, such as the impressions of the snake already present in the mind, the reproduction of the impressions at the sight of some partial features of the rope on account of some kind of similarity, the dimness of light, distance, etc. The mere veiling of the true character of the rope cannot be the sufficient cause of the appearance of the snake with its special features. In the case of Brahman, there is no other observing individual with imperfect knowing power, there is no possibility of the similarity of features between

Veiling Ignorance illumined by Brahman cannot possess wonderful powers.

Brahman and anything else, there is no possibility of Brahman's being partially veiled and partially manifested, there is no possibility of the presence of the impressions of the phenomenal world and its order and adjustment in any knowing mind nor of the presence of any other co-operating causes. The recognition of any such possibility would be inconsistent with the theory of the non-duality of Brahman. Hence even if we admit the possibility of the presence of Ignorance without the presence of any ignorant observing mind, and also the possibility of this Ignorance being illumined and manifested by self-luminous Brahman to which it pertains, this Ignorance as illumined by Brahman can somehow be conceived as the cause of the veiling of Brahman and its appearance as what it is not ; but it can by no means be conceived as an omnipotent and omniscient creative power capable of producing and sustaining such a wonderfully ordered and regulated world-system consisting of a mutually adjusted and organically united plurality of minds and material objects. The changeless attributeless actionless impersonal Brahman also, on account of the mere veiling of its true character, cannot be conceived as becoming an active self-modifying personal creator endowed with the attributes of knowledge and will and the powers of pre-vision, judgment, selection, gradation, adjustment, etc. Even if infinite non-phenomenal consciousness and infinite non-phenomenal bliss be abstracted from pure Existence and regarded as the essential attributes of non-dual Brahman, the veiling of these attributes by Ignorance would mean Its appearance as pure Existence and not as an omnipotent and omniscient personal Being, capable of producing and sustaining this harmonious world-system.

What, then, should be regarded as the material and efficient cause of this harmoniously and teleologically

Doctrine of Ignorance as creative power inconsistent with advocate's view.

designed natural and moral order of the phenomenal universe boundless in space and time, which is, as proclaimed in this theory, illusorily ascribed to the nature of non-dual Brahman? If Ignorance is to be regarded as this cause, it is no longer to be conceived either as the absence of knowlege or as a veil, but as a positive creative power with an inexhaustible fund of wisdom, with a supreme ideal in view, and an infinite capacity to realise this ideal progressively in a phenomenal world-order. If, again, such a power be conceived as pertaining to the nature of non-dual Brahman, Brahman cannot be conceived as attributeless pure self-luminous Existence or changeless impersonal Consciousness, but must be conceived as essentially and eternally a Supreme self-conscious Personal Being with infinite creative power. This would be inconsistent with the theory under review, and this is certainly not what Ignorance connotes to an ordinary rational intelligence. If, however, Ignorance is accepted in the sense of such a creative power and if it is regarded as pertaining to the nature of non-dual Brahman, there would be no justification for regarding it as unreal and its products as illusory.

Now, if, as shown above, Ignorance in the ordinary acceptable sense cannot offer any adequate explanation for he appearance of the phenomenal world-order, as it is experienced, the plurality of subjects and objects of this world cannot be regarded as illusory. The Supreme Self may be conceived as creating by the exercise of His creative power the plurality of subjects and objects in the universe, or may in view of the essential non-difference of the power from the possessor of the power, be conceived as manifesting Himself in the plurality of subjects and objects; but He cannot be rationally conceived as illusorily appearing in the

Author's metaphysical conclusion—human understanding should ultimately surrender itself to the consciousness that the mystery of the world is insoluble.

forms of such subjects and objects, because there is no justification for the application of the idea of illusion in this case. We are not here concerned with the objections that may legitimately arise against the view of the Supreme Self as essentially endowed with real creative power. We have discussed them elsewhere. The human knowledge being confined within the domain of phenomenal consciousness, ought not the inquisitive rational faculty of man rest contented with the realisation of its inability to solve the supra-phenomenal problems with regard to the ultimate grounds of individual identity, the possibility of knowledge, remembrance, etc., the relation between the subject and the object of experience, the origin of the phenomenal universe, and so on and so forth?

APPENDIX C

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR SĀDHANĀ WITHOUT METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS.

The desire to shake off sorrow and to enjoy happiness is inherent in the nature of all men, and this is the principal motive force which prompts them to various kinds of activities under various circumstances. The inner motive which leads men to have recourse to religion is the thought and desire of getting rid of all kinds of sorrows, including those whose cause is neither known nor is under their control. It is however not possible to avoid sorrow altogether. So long as we are identified with our body and mind and we have dealings through them, there must be variations in our mental patterns and consequent joys and sorrows. When this identification with the body and the mind is thrown off for any period, we have no consciousness either of sorrow or of happiness or even of our existence. So the problem is—how to suppress sorrow? Another question arises in this connection—what is the root and ultimate cause of sorrow? When we look to philosophers we find divergent opinions among them. Some say that it is due to disbelief about God; some others say that it is due to non-discrimination about self and not-self; some are of opinion that it is due to ignorance about the non-duality of self as consciousness; some others assert that there is no God, no self and the root-cause of sorrow is the affirmation of ego resulting in attachments; some others hold that verily there is no God, but there is none the less self, which is stable and eternal, and that our sorrows are rooted in beginningless *Karma*. Now, if we examine our actual experience we find that the cravings for satisfaction of complex desires produce mental uneasiness.

Practice suggested for the suppression of impurity.

Even when particular desires are satisfied, the transitoriness of the enjoyments becomes the cause of fresh sorrow. The memory of these enjoyments and the cherishing of them create fresh troubles. These not being satisfied intensify sorrows again. We also experience that fickleness (चञ्चलता), weakness (दुर्बलता) and impurity (मलिनता) have a causal relation with the intensity of our sorrow. How to get rid of these defects is therefore the practical problem of life.

The means of their suppression can be suggested, though this suggestion should be taken as based on our experience and observation and not on any universal law.

For the suppression of impurity, such means as (1) *discrimination*, (2) *self-control* and (3) the *formation of a counter-idea* should be resorted to. (1) The foul habit of thinking oneself a sinner should be avoided. By labelling one's *thought* as either virtuous or vicious and thus superimposing subjective notions on *things* that are themselves devoid of these characters, one only invites misery. So one who will refrain from so labelling his thoughts will be relieved of much mental perturbation. (2) Where there is uneasiness due to physical causes, the practice of self-control will be helpful to minimise the suffering. (3) By such practices one cannot stop the recurrence of such thoughts, for which sustained practice of counter-thought is necessary. It is well-known that ignorance and error can be superseded by knowledge ; feelings of hatred, malice etc. can be superseded by the feelings of universal love, sympathy, benevolence, etc. ; ideas of conflicts of interests can be superseded by ideas of community of interests ; the experiences of troubled and agitated conditions of mind can be superseded by the experiences of calm, tranquil and peaceful states of mind.

Practice suggested for overcoming weakness.

Now about overcoming weakness. The more a man acquires strength and suppresses weakness, the more does he succeed in controlling his sorrow. How to increase the strength of mind? We may suggest here some effective methods for attaining this end. (1) Try always to cultivate an attitude never to fall a prey to weakness; try to be habitually content with whatever state you may find yourself in; (2) when weakness comes, give yourself strong suggestions and strengthen the resolve; weakness, the cause of trouble should be watched and mind should be kept alert again and again so that you are not subdued by the weakness; immediately affirm to yourself that you will not consciously contribute to sorrow; (3) the tendency to magnify sorrow should be shaken off and the spirit of endurance, calmness and defiance should be cultivated. By such self-teaching one can gather mental strength and defy sorrow.

The cultivation of an opposite attitude of mind is recommended in every *Sādhanā*. By mere faith in God we cannot shake off sorrow, but only when our mind becomes overpowered by the thought of the majesty of and love towards God, does our sorrow become suppressed temporarily. The mere recognition of the self as distinct from not-self does not render us devoid of sorrow, but when we think intently of the self as untouched by sorrow, then alone we can defy sorrow born of the interconnection between self and not-self. The mere belief that Brahman is non-dual cannot rid us of sorrow, but by intense contemplation about our self as Brahman which is above and beyond these phantoms of dream, we can avoid sorrow. But those who do not strenuously apply themselves to long and continuous practice of these thoughts cannot hope to conquer their weakness by these *sādhanās*. These *sādhanās* do not affect

Meditation is the only means for the suppression of fickleness.

the actual weakness, but by the habit of contemplation and by restraining from secular dealings they acquire an attitude of mind which enables them to remain untouched by these sorrows. This is practicable for the exceptional few only and not for all. Hence to suppress sorrows which are rooted in or provoked by weakness one should seek support from the above methods.

It is generally observed that people try to forget sorrow by singing, dancing and the like. By these means they may forget their sorrow for the time being, but these are not the remedies which root out the sorrows. Even though they remain free from sorrow for the time being, they soon afterwards sink into the same intense state of sorrow. Unlike this, the intelligent and conscious use of auto-suggestion recommended above lays axe at the root and produces permanent effect by minimising the strength of weakness, thus after each effort the aspirant becomes invigorated and is able to easily defy sorrow born of weakness.

Now about the suppression of fickleness. This is the most difficult task. Meditation (ध्यानाभ्यास) is the only means for checking fickleness and getting rid of sorrow resulting therefrom. This voluntary concentration really consists in a repetition of successive efforts to bring back a subject to the mind. When the attention is fixed upon one particular object of intense desire or attachment or enjoyment, even in secular life, the concentration of the mind is achieved for the time being without any conscious struggle, because the other desires and thoughts and remembrances are almost automatically suppressed by the power of that one-pointed attention. But during the practice of meditation, when the mind is not intoxicated with the thought of any such object, the *Sādhaka's* mind is troubled

Obstructions to the practice of meditation and their remedy

sometimes by the spontaneous reproductions of the previously acquired impressions in the forms of desires, thoughts, visions and recollections, sometimes by drowsiness and slumber, sometimes by the chaotic wanderings of attention and so on, and hence it becomes imperative to make conscious effort to check them. Thus we find that in secular dealings there is merely the presence of concentration and no struggle as is in the above case. The same thing applies to concentration derived from wild excitement, loss of self-control such as singing, dancing and the like produce. Thus it is evident that concentration of the type described does not lead to the suppression of acquired impressions nor render them ineffective. The case is different with calmness arising out of meditation which is attained after conscious struggle to force back awakened impressions.

Among those who practise meditation, there are many who have implicit faith in the existence of God, and who form such a conception of God as may be an object of attraction, love and desire to their mind. They intoxicate their mind with the idea of such a God, adopt various means for the intensification of that intoxication and fix their attention upon that image in meditation, so that much conscious struggle against any distracting forces may not be necessary. But those who, finding the unsatisfactory character of the grounds on which the faith in God is based and the logical inconsistencies in the various conceptions which the worshippers form of Him, are led to think that the worship of and meditation on such a God would be inconsistent with thier pursuit of rational truth, must practise some form of self-discipline and meditation, in which there would be no necessity for the assumption of any metaphysical Reality, like God or Soul or any unverifiable transcendent ideal like the attainment of

Method of meditation demanding no belief in metaphysical realities.

the unity with or the proximity of God, the ascent to an eternal Heaven and so on. The meditations which are based on respective metaphysical conclusions cannot be strictly adhered to by an aspirant who has no faith in the validity of these conclusions. So while engaged in meditation, such an aspirant should not busy himself in concentrating his attention on some revered dear form conceived as divine or superhuman, nor should he intensify his thought on the self as a metaphysical entity, nor should he project his mind to become one with any all-pervading metaphysical Reality. The most suitable method of meditation for such a *sādhaka* is to try to make his mind vacant by withdrawing his attention from all kinds of objects, physical or mental, empirical or non-empirical. His attempt at concentration should be directed to the non-thinking of any object and the suppression of every impression that may be automatically roused in course of the meditation, and thus keep the mind contentless or vacant as far as practicable. As the aspirant does not make efforts to see any fancied form, or to retain any pre-conceived notions about the nature of the self, or to cultivate the thought of any so-called pervading entity separate or non-separate from himself, or to attend to any other object, his mind does not get concentrated on any such concept. During this practice of concentration in which there is no object to meditate upon, the aspirant should try to stop every thought at its very birth. He should struggle to negate imagination. His practice of meditation should be directed to the complete stoppage of the diversified flow of thought or consciousness. It would mean virtually the cessation of all thought, because if you think of nothing, you do not think at all.

At the initial stage of this practice one realises that more varied thoughts in more vivid and troublesome forms are

Three stages of afore-said meditation described with practical hints.

rising in his mind. But after continuous and watchful fight to cut at the root of every thought as it rises, the ardent aspirant can suppress even the most obstinate wandering tendency of the mind, which appears to be indomitable to those who are slow, feeble-hearted, non-persevering or impatient and whose practice is disturbed by intervening periods of interruption. The *sādhaka* should preserve the spirit of evenness ; that is, he should be careful that he does not become slow in practice, nor should he strain his mind and nerves too much. In the first case, various thoughts will creep into his mind and disturb its tranquillity ; in the latter case it may be that the brain and the physical organism of the *sādhaka* are affected and produce incapacity for continued practice. At the outset, the beginner is apt to strain his mind. But when fatigued by this process, let him relax allowing his thoughts to roam at will. The attitude should be thus :—let me watch the mental states, let them wander at will without obstruction on my part, let not myself be affetcd by them, let myself be the disinterested on-looker of the mechanical flow of the thoughts. Such meditative alertness will give rest to the thinking power and at the same time help concentration. After this practice the aspirant should again struggle to make his mind fixed in a tranquil state. By arduous practice it will be felt that the roaming of the mind is getting less and the distracting forces are getting weak, and thereby the mind is becoming more tranquil and peaceful. This enjoyment of peace will serve as a spur to a more vigorous fight. Afterwards deep calmness is felt, and there is no more rising of thoughts. At more advanced stages that calmness becomes more and more natural and lasts longer and longer through the force of habit.

This practice should be distinguished from other practices in so far as in them there are two kinds of efforts, namely

Progressive stages of other kinds of practice of meditation.

the effort at the suppression of the aroused impressions and that of concentration on the desired object of meditation; whereas in this practice there is merely the effort to suppress those impressions and no such object to fix the mind upon. At the first stage (प्रत्याहार) of those *sādhanās* (*sādhanās* having object or idea to fix upon) there is the effort of mere turning away of the sense-organs from objects. In the second stage (धारणा), the mind of the person, whose sense-organs have turned away from objects, is persistently applied to a particular object of contemplation. Afterwards there are three more stages namely (1) meditation (ध्यान), (2) trance which is the means to the forthcoming one (this is called साधनसमाधि or सविकल्पसमाधि or संप्रज्ञातसमाधि), and (3) trance which is attained through that means (this is called साध्यसमाधि or निर्विकल्पसमाधि or असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि). The difference of these three stages should be known as due to greater or less intensity of the ripeness of meditation.

At the very first stage (in प्रत्याहार) the struggle to withdraw from other objects is predominant; at the second stage (धारणा) the mind sometimes becomes fixed and at short intervals it gets detached from the object of contemplation; at a higher stage (ध्यान), after long practice, the mind becomes fixed upon the object for a longer period and acquires the capacity to intuit the object (ideal) of contemplation; after increased concentration the object alone appears to the aspirant, the sense of seership viz. the consciousness "I am realising the object" becomes faded, though not altogether effaced; after more practice there is no feeling of the experiencer and the experienced: This is *samādhi* (trance) without thought. Here there cannot be apprehension of anything because there cannot be any apprehension in the absence of thought and the presence of apprehension would negate "trance without thought".

Stages called *dhāraṇa*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* distinguished.

When the mind withheld from various objects is concentrated on one desired object and does not fly to other objects, and the sense-organs do not become unsteady by being affected by objects, that state is called the focussing of consciousness or a steady abstraction of mind (धारणा). The difference between the ordinary state of waking and this state is that in the ordinary state, after one wave another of a different kind rises in mind, but in this state the waves are of the same kind. In this state of focussing, though there is a flow of fickle thoughts, still they are of a uniform nature, and the thought of the next moment is the same as the previous one. By the practice of such focussing, the mind attains to the state of meditation (ध्यान). The difference of the states of focussing and meditation is that at the time of the former the succession of thoughts is of uniform nature, but at the time of meditation the succession of thoughts is not known, but the endurance of a single thought is experienced. In other words, in focussing, the flow of similar ideas is felt, but in a closely attentive state it is experienced that a single thought is occupying the field of consciousness. In focussing, thoughts flow on in a broken line in a successive order, but in the state of meditation the break is not felt, and the thoughts flow like a continuous stream. Here the flow of a thought is unmixed with any different thought. It is not directed towards any object which is not desired or pointed at, but is concentrated only on the object desired. Here the contemplation of the object is uninterrupted or continuous. When meditation becomes mature, the mind attains to *samādhi* where very subtle thought persists. In the state of meditation, the distinction of the one who meditates, the act of meditation and the object meditated upon persists, but in the aforesaid samādhi-state that distinction remains indistinct. What happens is this : in meditation mind functions in three ways. In one

Two kinds of *samādhi* and progressive stages of objectless meditation described.

part it is the meditator, in another part it is the meditation, in still another part it is the object upon which meditation is applied. In trance with thought meditation loses its aspects and becomes manifested as the meditated object. We may watch four successive stages in deep meditation. At the first stage, the aspirant retains the remembrance that "at present my mind is occupied with this object," which is designated by some word. At the second stage, there is no such remembrance, and the mind at this stage becomes coloured by the object which appears to be very subtle. In the next stage, the feeling of the slight and subtle difference experienced in the second stage is gone, and the object of meditation appears as if non-different from our knowledge. In the fourth stage it appears as if the object alone flashes. By the practice of *samādhi* with thought another state is acquired which is without any thought. There is no other state of mind above or beyond this; so no higher state can be reached, but by practice merely the time of the enduring of this state may be lengthened.

Now, let us make clear what happens in the *sādhanā* we suggested, as distinguished from these. In this *sādhanā* the mind does not refer to any object nor is any object realised or intuited. In the progressive stages of this *sādhanā* we experience ideas becoming gradually more and more subtle; the steps leading on, first, ideas having reference to gross objects outside, then to subtle thoughts alone with less intensity of reference, and afterwards to a very subtle state of mind where no objective reference can be distinguished and voidness is experienced. In this state if any thought of concentrating on any object creeps into the aspirant's mind or some thought rises spontaneously, he feels this desired or aroused thought as an object intuited; but those who practise this objectless *sādhanā* generally try to lengthen

Three states of mental suppression distinguished.

the period of the enjoyment of the pure calmness and silence of the mind. After strenuous practice that feeling also, involving a subtle distinction between the feeler and the felt, lapses and the state of trance without any distinct consciousness is attained.

Let us show the distinction of the different states wherein mind becomes suppressed. Those who practise meditation attain to three stages, through which they may be said to reach a steady contentless differenceless motionless state of the mind. In the first stage such calm state of the mind is generally attained at intervals of the practice of concentration. This is like temporary sleep. The second stage is what is referred to above; it is attained after a long practice of meditation. It should be distinguished from sleep and thoughtless trance. In this there is a subtle self-enjoyment of objectless undiverted consciousness, arising from the cessation of the rising of troublesome varied thoughts, whereas in the other two there is no such feeling. When the last faint struggle to forget even the subtlest ideas subsides, there is the trance without thought, which is a state of consciousness without any actual consciousness. Though it is, by nature, like dreamless sleep, nevertheless there is a world of difference in the case of an aspirant rising from meditation. Owing to continuity of the practice of meditation no new impressions due to transactions with the outside world and wishful thinking within, find chance to enter into the mind. After a long and constant struggle for concentration, the weakening of impressions is felt and calmness is enjoyed. As a consequence of intense practice, uncommon concentration is produced and the previously acquired defects get suppressed. On account of the suppression of desires which results from the long practice of meditation,

Results of meditation; its impracticability. *Sādhakas* warned of Gurudom.

dream cannot disturb the aspirant with the same intensity as before and self-control is sustained*

The result of meditation varies in proportion to the difference in intensity and continuity of practice. Those who cannot practise constantly and for long will feel that meditation has done no good to them. So it is a few persons only (without distinction of race, creed, caste or sex) living in retirement, who have got good health and strong will and undertake resolute effort, whose mind is not carried away by strong desires, who can enjoy the serenity of such meditation and none else.

As the above qualifications are to be found only in exceptional persons, the attainment of a serene and sublime state, is practicable only for a very few persons, while it is within the reach of every one in all paths of life to make the mind strong by giving it strong suggestions or by cultivating the habit of *reconciling oneself to* every occurrence with cheerfulness and in a spirit of indifference. Besides, Samādhi-practice is not only very difficult, but, if continued, it breeds inactivity and encourages idleness. By supression

* The effort at concentration, because it is personal and internal and also because there is nothing new in this connection which can be learnt, does not necessitate any external aid, namely *Guru*. The evils such as blind following, sectarian bias, the presumption of false joy, unwarrantable hopes should be shunned by a *Sādhaka*. The sudden flight of mind through artificial means, for example through hypnotic suggestion or the touch of another person or through excessive emotion, merely arrests the awakening of latent impressions and consequently there is no conscious effort involving continued restraint of impressions and therefore it results in producing no inner change in the aspirant; whereas the slow and steady struggle to fight the rising of latent impressions bears much fruit. It should not be forgotten that there is no short cut or royal road to mental tranquillity, but that the calm of peace can only be won through aspirant's confidence in himself, his determination to succeed and his striving with earnestness.

Author's conclusion distinguished from religionists. Concluding remarks.

of weakness alone, one can feel less pain and enjoy life to some extent. This is about all which can be safely said with regard to *Sādhanā* as applied to this life. What next? I can't answer. I confess—the whence, the whither and the why of man—I do not know.

Our conclusion should be distinguished from that of the religionists. The religionists have positive conclusions about the nature of the ultimate Reality; they think that *sādhanā* has reference to such a Reality and recognise that *sādhanā* procures during lifetime results which are constant and that after death it will secure permanent results in the shape of liberation or heaven. As against this, our conclusion is as follows : *Sādhanā* has no metaphysical or ethical end; no metaphysical Truth can be rationally established, nor can it be intuited; there is nothing supernatural in what is called Truth-realisation, realisation is due to the constant affirmation of one's thought and it is a projection of images shot through and through with personal feelings; *sādhanā* has no objective reference, that is, it does not refer to any independent Reality or Truth and is wholly subjective; the results gained through habit cannot be taken as constant, because such habits become strong or weak according as the difference in practice is dependent upon the difference in intensity and continuity of impression; about the result to be gained after death, no assurance can be given : these *sādhanās* have no intrinsic property to produce the results anticipated, nor can invariable concomitance between them and those results be ascertained and no reason can be given to prove that these *sādhanās* will procure the said results.

The psychological discipline, recommended above, embodies, according to us, the only possibility left open to a sincere rationalist.

CONCLUSION

On account of differences of modes of thought, differences of fundamental assumptions, differences of texts and interpretations of different scriptures and differences of spiritual experiences of respective saints, diverse kinds of ideas about the nature of the self and the Absolute Reality and the other topics connected with religion are prevalent among the diverse religious sects. For the purpose of the religious discipline of life, any system of doctrines with regard to these ultimate problems, if not grossly self-inconsistent, may be accepted as sufficient. The different systems of metaphysical doctrines may give rise to different forms of spiritual discipline. Accordingly the pious men of different religious communities may adopt different courses of discipline and proceed in different paths. These diverse paths tend to spiritualise the lives of the individuals who are on any of the paths, and they achieve that result by way of diverting their energy from the pursuit of worldly objects and putting restraint upon their particular desires and passions.

But a rational truth-seeker cannot admit the subjective utility of a doctrine, even in the field of spiritual culture, as an adequate criterion of its truth. He must apply the logical test to examine the validity of a doctrine. The necessity for the application of the logical tests is felt more and more keenly, as he becomes acquainted with the divergences of views held by different religious sects and advocated by the highest orders of saints of those sects with regard to the same ultimate problems, and finds them irreconcilably antagonistic to one other. Such antagonistic conceptions about the nature of the Absolute Reality, the nature of the self, the nature of the world, the nature of the ultimate ideal of life, etc. cannot logically be accepted as equally true by any seeker after truth. He therefore feels the necessity

God is an object of faith, and not of knowledge.

of making a systematic rational inquiry into the validity of these conceptions and to discover if any of them stands on a logically sound basis and can be accepted as ultimately true.

We have examined the validity of the diverse typical views with regard to the nature of the ultimate reality, and we are led to the conclusion that none of them stands on a logically unassailable foundation. We have applied the logical test to the various conceptions about God, the ultimate object of religious worship to all the theistic sects, and we have found that all of them fail to satisfy the tests.

If the world be the aggregate of momentary atoms, or if it be the transformation of stable atoms regulated by some unconscious Moral Law, or if it be ultimately the modification or manifested form of some unconscious Cosmic Energy (unmanifest) which begins to act of itself, then there is no necessity for recognising God (conscious Principle) as the ultimate cause of the world. Our recognition of the existence of God may be supposed to be the product of the direct experience of God, or of logical inference from the nature of the world of internal or external experience, or of the infallible authority of the Scriptures, or of the consciousness of subjective necessity. The first three sources have been found to be unacceptable to a rational mind and incapable of establishing the existence of God. Hence we can fall back upon the fourth alternative. But from mere subjective necessity, which also is not universally felt, only a conception of one God may be formed and cultured, but the objective reality of God as an independent Entity cannot be proved. Such a God would have conceptual or ideal existence, and would not be proved to be a real existence. He would be an object of faith, and not of knowledge. The sincere recognition of such an eternal infinite perfect Being as the absolute Reality and the

Reasons why we accept God a real Being. Conclusions about self and world defective.

sole creator, sustainer, regulator and support of this phenomenal universe, the systematic contemplation and meditation on His ideal character and the earnest attempt to put our life in tune with this cherished conception may be of great practical importance in giving a sense of satisfaction to the innermost subjective demands of nature. As a result of such discipline, there may ultimately arise a feeling within us that we have actually experienced God or become united with Him. But all these cannot amount to the valid knowledge of God as a Being existing independently of our conception. But as the demand for an adequate causal explanation of the world of our sense-experience and of the phenomena of our consciousness is inherent in our reason and as such adequate explanation is not found in any other phenomenal or noumenal entity, this God of our conception and faith is alone believed to supply this explanation in spite of the logical difficulties in the way of perfect proof. Hence the God of faith is accepted as the God of knowledge.

The different conceptions of self (viz. self as the support of consciousness *inherently* related to the self, self as the support of consciousness related to the self through *identity*, self as consciousness itself—momentary or eternal) have been found to be logically untenable. About the world it may be supposed that it is unproduced or produced. If produced, it may be creation or manifestation, and its cause may be consciousness or anything endowed with consciousness or unconscious something be it one or many. These alternatives have already been refuted. Besides, we found that the world can be ascertained neither as existent, nor as non-existent, nor as both, nor as different from both, nor as anything beyond all these alternatives. Every view has been found to be faulty. Besides these, we cannot

Reasons why our criticism of all metaphysical conclusions exhaustive.

discover any conclusion which may be defectless. Metaphysics is based on a few fundamental concepts such as existence, non-existence, existence as well as non-existence, or a category different from these three (there cannot be any fifth category), or difference, non-difference, difference as well as non-difference, or a category distinct from these three, and it is bound to deal with these concepts in conformity with the principles of formal logic. In terms of these categories we can think of no metaphysical theory which is not included in any of the alternatives mentioned in the previous discussion. But we have found that none of them can be accepted as free from logical fallacies. With respect to the ultimate ideal of human life also there are divergent views, and though each of them has got its importance in exercising *regulative* influence upon the lives of particular sections of mankind, none can be logically established as absolutely true. It is inevitable that all attempts at the rational ascertainment of the true nature of Liberation must suffer the same fate as the attempts at the rational ascertainment of the ultimate nature of the self and God. All these problems are essentially linked together, and all the diverse ways in which philosophers have sought to solve them have been found to be beset with insurmountable logical difficulties. In most cases it is not reason, but faith in some particular system and reverence for particular authorities, that secures the adherence of a particular group of men to certain particular religio-metaphysical conclusions or assumptions.

We find that the diversities of the world are explained by some religious sects (e. g. Śaiva, Pārsi, Jew, Christian, Mohammedan) (1) as the result accruing from the mere sweet will of God; some schools of philosophers (e.g. Pūrva-Mimāṁsaka, Jaina, Buddhist) are of opinion that there is no

Doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths groundless.

God and that the beginningless course of diversities (2) is regulated by beginningless *Karma*; others (Śaṅkarācharya and many others) hold that (3) God creates, sustains and determines the course of the beginningless world-process in accordance with the diverse *Karma* of the eternal phenomenal selves; there are some sects of worshippers (such as the Vaiṣṇavas) who recognise the *law of Karma*, but do not regard God as being wholly bound by such *Law* and (4) accept the power of God to dispense generously His grace; there are other philosophers (the Sāṅkhyas) who do not recognise God nor do they recognise *Karma* as ultimate cause, but they accept (5) *Prakṛti*, an unconscious Energy, as the ultimate explanation of all these diversified effects. By a rational enquiry, sincere and free, we found out the logical inconsistencies of these conclusions or assumptions.

The fundamental differences among the different philosophical systems as well as the logical inconsistencies involved in each prevent me from accepting the doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths. *Sādhanā* cannot be proved to have objective reference, so it cannot be rationally supposed to reach ultimately to some definite objective goal. So the doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths cannot hold ground. The untenability of the doctrine can further be shown through the consideration of the advocates' conclusion about the ultimate Reality, and by the discussions about the natures of Causality and Samādhi-intuition.

The doctrince of the Harmony of all Faiths is taken by some adherents as based on the conclusion that the non-dual Reality is with attribute (सगुण) as well as without attribute (निर्गुण). Leaving aside many other pluralistic and dualistic conclusions if we take for granted (of course we find no reason in its favour) the Reality as non-dual, even then it cannot be supposed that Reality is attributeless as

Doctrine of Harmony further examined from different view-points.

well as endowed with attribute. Power or attribute, whether manifested or unmanifested, must be regarded as pertaining to the nature of Reality, and It cannot be called attributeless and powerless. The attributes whether innate or external cannot be reconciled with the assumption of the attributelessness and non-duality of Reality. It is really self-contradictory to maintain that the same thing is at the same time with parts and without parts, with attributes and without attributes, with changing states and changeless at the same time. One partless entity cannot have twofold existence, because it is only things with parts that can possibly have one kind of characteristics in one part and a different kind of characteristics in another part. It is not right to hold that in one partless entity, there remain the contradictory attributes of change and changelessness, eternity and non-eternity, infinity and finitude, sameness and differentiation. (Analogies are essentially limited in application.) An absolutely unchangeable ground of continuous change is unthinkable. Hence the doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths founded on such conclusion must inevitably be erroneous.

When we consider the nature of causality we find divergent theories about it. According to some philosophers (Naiyāyika–Vaiśeṣika–Prābhākaras) the effect does not exist, in the material cause, before its production and after its destruction (*asatkāryavāda*); according to others (Sāṅkhya–Pātañjalas) the effect does exist unmanifestedly in the material cause before its production and after its destruction (*satkāryavāda*); according to some others (Jainas, Rāmānujists) the effect is non-existent in the cause in some form and existent in it in another form (*sadasatkāryavāda*); according to others (non-dualistic School of Vedānta) effect is inexplicable i. e. it is distinct from being non-existent

Doctrine of Harmony of all Faiths is not based on samādhi-intuition.

or existent or both (*anirvacanīyavāda*); according to others (Nāgārjunists) the effect cannot be subsumed under any of the above four categories (not even the fifth which is impossible—चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तवाद). The above-mentioned theories are accepted by those who take the world as non-momentary or stable. There is still another theory about causation which holds that everything is momentary. According to this view, though the effect is non-existent in the cause, still there is no real production, but the effect only follows the cause (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Among these six theories of causation the establishment of any one means the refutation of the others; that is, these theories are so incompatible with one another that if we accept any one of these we must necessarily undertake the refutation of the rest. So there cannot arise any occasion or question of compromise regarding these mutually exclusive concepts. Consequently the metaphysical conclusions which are rationally based on the divergent theories of causation must be divergent and they can never be harmonised.

Now about samādhi-intuition. In trance with thought (*savikalpa-samādhi*) there is the feeling of subtle ego, and in trance without thought (*nirvikalpa-samādhi*) there is no such feeling. Hence the last point of *savikalpa* reaching to *nirvikalpa* cannot be marked or observed. In order to mark it, ego should stand at the end of *savikalpa* and at the beginning of *nirvikalpa* as well as in the middle of the two points. This would mean the annihilation of *nirvikalpa* (owing to the retention of ego). Hence the goal or the reaching to or pointing towards it cannot be realised or intuited by anyone. Such a realisation, if at all possible, as has just been shown, will render *nirvikalpa* impossible. Thus it is evident that the discovery viz. all *Sādhanā* lead to the same goal cannot be made in *nirvikalpa*

Adherent's arguments in defence of Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa's conclusion.

nor in the middle of *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*. In the state of *savikalpa-samādhi* the subtle consciousness of ego persists, and that object alone which is under contemplation flashes before the mind. As other ideals do not and cannot enter the mind all at a time, harmony among them cannot be realised or intuited. As the object intuited is not constant, but shifting at every interval, it should not be called the goal. So the Harmony of all Faiths is not a matter of intuition.

It is said of Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa that he had taken up one by one the courses of discipline instructed in the scriptures of the principal *bonafide* religious systems and practised meditation in accordance with each of them. At the time of practising any particular system, he adopted the names, forms and relative attributes, which were associated with the conception of Truth in that system. He rose step by step to the higher and higher stages of meditation along each path, though on account of his extraordinary power of concentration he completed each course within an unexpectedly short period. On coming down from the highest stage of realisation obtained through each system, he of course retained the memory of the nature of Truth, as he then realised, dissociated from the names, forms and attributes which each system associated with it. As a result of his experience of the pure nature of Truth attainable through each system, he had, in the plane of discriminative thought, the extraordinary opportunity of drawing a comparison among the goals of all these systems. It is in this way that he could come to the conclusion that Truth, free from the particular names, forms and attributes, that different systems associate with its nature, is the same, and that the course of spiritual discipline enjoined by each system is meant to

enable particular minds to take the help of those garbs and gradually to transcend them for the realisation of the same pure Truth. Thus the doctrine that all systems of religion are particular paths to the same ultimate goal is the result not merely of samādhi-intuition, but of mature reflection and judgment, based upon the realisation of the goal through particular courses of discipline in accordance with a great many systems of religion.

Now, let us examine this argument adduced by the exponents of the doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths in defence of the position of the great Spiritual Master. The entire argument is based on the assumption that the same Truth is realisable in the higher stages of trance with thought reached by the systematic pursuit of all the various courses of religious discipline and that the exact characters of the realisations obtained through different methods can be remembered and compared by discriminating intelligence.

With regard to the first assumption, our first question is,—is the object of the realisation attained through any particular method absolutely without any form or attribute or has it some sort of form or attribute? If it is absolutely without any form or attribute, nothing can be predicated of it and without any kind of predication it cannot be said to be known and what is not known cannot possibly be remembered. The same question, which is connected with the first, is—are the ego and the mind present at the time of this realisation or not? If they are absolutely absent, there can be no actual realisation. Without the subject and the instrument of realisation, no object can appear and the nature of an object, even if present, cannot be apprehended. In the complete absence of the subject-object-relation, no knowledge is possible, as in the case of trance without thought. Hence it must be admitted that the ego with the

Doctrine of Harmony proved to be unpsychological.

mind is present in the state of trance with thought, though in a purer and subtler form. Therefore it must also be admitted that what is called Truth can at this state appear to the ego only as related to the ego and the mind.

Now, since the ego and the mind cannot conceive or realise the nature of any entity except as somewhat qualified, i. e. as having some predicate, what is called Truth, in order to be the object of actual realisation to the ego and the mind, must have some qualification, i. e. some form or attribute. Here another question arises,—can the ego and the mind exist and function absolutely without any determination? When the ego and the mind are deprived of all determining specific characteristics, they lose their individuality and pass into the unmanifested and functionless state, and no realisation is possible in that state. Hence it must be admitted that at the time of realisation, the ego must have an angle of vision and the mind must have some impressions influencing its mode of receiving what appears to it. The outlook of the ego and the mind at each state of spiritual progress must again be the product of the preceding stage, though with deeper concentration and more earnest attempt to visualise what they accepted as the idea. Consequently the influence of the conception of the ideal, with which and for the realisation of which the individual begins his *sādhanā* never forsakes his ego and mind, until the state of trance without thought is attained. Therefore the realisations of the state of trance with thought cannot but be influenced and coloured by the *sādhaka's* initial conception of Truth. Hence it is unpsychological to suppose that the nature of the truth as realised through *sādhanā* actuated by one kind of conception should be identically the same as that realised through *sādhanā* actuated by an opposite kind of conception.

Reasons which might have led Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa to the conclusion about Harmony.

Thus the fundamental assumption underlying the argument of the exponent of the unity of the goal of all religions, when critically examined, cannot be substantiated.

Moreover, even if at any stage of the spiritual advancement of an individual belonging to a particular sect, a concept, alike in nature to that which is regarded as the highest ideal of Truth by another rival sect, appears on the surface of the mind, produces a deep impression upon it and assumes the form of realisation, he will, as soon as he regains the power of reflecting upon it, make efforts to transcend it and realise his own ideal. So long as the realisation does not correspond with the ideal conceived in the beginning, the *sādhaka* is not satisfied. The ideal may however be changed many times in the life of a spiritual aspirant. But the formation or the change of ideal is a matter of discriminating intelligence. Through meditation the ideal accepted by intelligence is realised, but the nature of the ideal is not changed. As the ideals are formed in accordance with the different conceptions of Reality of the different religious systems, the realisations also necessarily differ.

But the comparative study of the conceptions of Reality of the different systems has shown that in many of the conceptions there are some points of agreement and some points of difference. While reflecting upon them, some may attach greater importance to the points of difference, and some others may assume an attitude of indifference to the points of difference, and regard the points of agreement as of all-absorbing importance. This is greatly due to the temperamental difference of the thinkers.

The Master might have formed the ideal of unity in the plane of discriminating intelligence, and after descending

Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa's conclusion about ultimate Truth cannot reconcile religio-philosophical views.

from the plane of meditation and realisation, he might have ignored the differentiating elements of the objects of realisation and emphasised the elements of agreement. This cannot be construed as the actual realisation of the unity of the goal of all paths in the state of trance.

As the objects of realisalion through all paths cannot be accepted to be the same, the argument that they are afterwards remembered and found to be the same by comparison becomes baseless. Hence whether there can be one ultimate goal for all religions depends upon whether there can be one conception of ultimate Reality rationally acceptable to all men, and this is a matter for philosophy to ascertain by logical arguments.*

* Master's view viz. Brahman (non-dual Reality) is really with power and attributes as well as without power and attributes, can be neither logically justified (as has been shown already) nor practically able to reconcile the rival philosophical views. This view cannot be reconciled with the Jaina conclusions (non-Vedic) because the Jainas recognise the world as dual i. e. as constituted of conscious (*jīva*) and unconscious (non-jīva) entities. According to them the world is not created by God. Beyond *Karma-Law* there is no regulator of the world. They do not admit any non-dual consciousness as having Energy or attribute or as the substratum. Similarly, the above view cannot be made compatible with the view of the Mīmāṁsakas (Vedic), because they also, like the Jainas, regard the world as having no beginning and are of opinion that *Karma* alone is the regulator and there is no non-dual consciousness. The above view is hardly reconcilable with Buddhistic conception. According to the Buddhistic doctrine of impermanence (momentariness) of all conditions, physical and mental, things cannot be treated as productions of cosmic will (God), because there is no enduring ego that can work. Such a view is hardly in consonance with the Nihilistic Buddhism. The Nihilists (i. e. the Mādhyamika-Buddhists who

Disharmony further shown.

The Doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths cannot be rationally inferred after waking from *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, because that state has been explained and must necessarily

consider the world as not belonging to the four categories viz. existent, non-existent, existent as well as non-existent, and inexplicable in the restricted Vedantic sense) refute production from one's own self (स्वत:) and from other self (परत:) ; so they cannot admit the existence of either immanent or transcendent God. According to this School both the consciousness (ज्ञान) and the unconscious (ज्ञेय) are illusory, so they do not acknowledge the existence of any real consciousness (Brahman without attribute) as the substratum of the illusory world. The above view cannot be harmonised with that of the Sāṅkhyas. According to the Sāṅkhyas the operation of *Prakṛti* is natural and not intelligent. *Prakṛti* is self-moved (स्वत: परिणामिणी). As motion (as *Rajas*) is an aspect of its being, the Sāṅkhyas do not recognise a principle of effectuation in *Prakṛti* outside of its own nature (स्वभाव). Regular modification is the nature of *Prakṛti*. The activity of Energy is not through the influence of any external agent because *Puruṣa* (selves) is inactive (witness of activity) and ego is an after-product. Hence the primordial modification of Energy is not the result of any will (will must necessarily be product arising from combination). The Sāṅkhyas do not regard the *Puruṣa* as non-dual or as the substance having *Prakṛti* as its Energy or attribute, or as the substratum of *Prakṛti*. Hence Brahman with or without attribute cannot be accepted by the Sāṅkhyas. There cannot be any compromise of the said view with Pātañjala-conception, because, according to the Pātañjalas, there is no non-dual, undifferentiated consciousness with or without attribute. The Pātañjalas infer God as an all-knowing Person, on the ground that there must be a Supreme Personality in whom the gradation of knowledge, which we experience, must have its highest stage of development eternally realised. He is conceived by them as essentially self-fulfilled and unconcerned, i. e. as one who does not create, preserve or destroy the world. There cannot be any compromise of the said view with that of the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas, because according to them there is no such non-dual attributeless consciousness nor is the material cause (atoms) non-different from the efficient cause. Nor can the view be in agreement

Concluded that the Doctrine of the Harmony of all Faiths is based neither on intuition nor on reasoned inference.

be explained in very divergent ways by different philosophers in accordance to their various view-points and assumptions. The compromise or harmony of these inferences is an impossible achievement.*

Thus the doctrine of the unity of the goal of all religions is found to be incapable of being proved either on the basis of direct realisation, or on the strength of remembrance and comparison of samādhi-intuitions, or on any ground of reasoned inference.

with the Pāśupata Śaivas and Mādhva-Vaiṣṇavas, because they also accept the difference of the prime efficient cause (God) and the material cause (*Prakṛti*). The view cannot be acceptable to the Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Caitanya, Ballabha, Srikantha, Vir-Śaiva schools and other sects of worshippers of the East, nor to the Christians and the Mohammedans and the other non-Indian theistic communities, because, according to them, God must be regarded as a self-conscious Personality and not as attributeless consciousness. There will be no compromise of the said view with that of the Śāṅkarites, because according to them that which is with attributes is illusory and hence there cannot be real identity of the Real and the unreal. Thus it is difficult to conceive how the all-harmonising mission of the Master can be fulfilled. It becomes only one particular view amongst so many already existing views.

* Those, who advocate the theory of non-dual attributeless Reality (the non-dual School of Vedānta), think that in *Samādhi* without thought the mind assumes the nature of Reality; that is, in that state the mind modifies itself into the form of the Reality (तदाकारकारित). Some others do not accept an attributeless reality, but count Reality as qualified non-dual. According to them (Rāmānujists), *samādhi* without thought has for its content the non-dual Reality possessing attributes ("निर्विकल्पमपि सविषयाविषयमेव"). Those who do not recognise non-dual Reality have different ideas about that state.

Author's view of *samādhi* alone can reconcile divergences of conclusions about ultimate Truth.

Now, let us consider the practical aspect of our view of *Samādhi*. If our conclusion about *Samādhi* is not accepted, then we submit we don't find any satisfactory solution of the difference of opinion about ultimate Truth among various religious sects, specially among those who attain to *Samādhi* and sincerely hold to their own sectarian conclusions. If our conclusion is not taken to be genuine, then it should be acknowledged that some have realised Truth in *Samādhi* and others have not, or that there are different grades, higher and lower, in the realisation of Truth, or that different Truth-seers realise only partial aspects of Truth, and no one the whole Truth.

The acceptance of any of these alternatives will not be helpful to the establishment of a harmonious relationship

Some (Sāṅkhya-Pātañjalas) think that in that state the self becomes mere witness ; that is, the self which is the witness of intelligence remains even in *samādhi* as of the nature of consciousness, but owing to the absence of objects to be seen, namely modifications, it does not see. Some do not believe in such a witness-consciousness. According to them (Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika-Prābhākaras) in the state of *samādhi* the self, because of the absence of materials, does not know any object, as in the cases of swoon and dreamless sleep. Hence it remains unconscious and there is the absence of knowledge in general. Others do not acknowledge non-dual Reality with or without attribute, neither do they admit the witness-self, nor the self with the attribute of knowledge. According to them (some Buddhist Schools), intelligence is momentary, and there is no permanent self underlying it. In the state of *samādhi* without thought, owing to the lack of objects, its objective determination is no more ; hence at that stage intelligence does not operate and becomes lost, as is the case with a lamp whose wick is burnt out.

Thus we find that inference about the alleged synthesis is not possible, if we consider the grounds of different metaphysical conclusions.

among the different religious systems. All the religious systems claim to be founded on the highest spiritual realisations of their founders. Now, if the first of the above alternatives is accepted, then only one of the religions has to be regarded as based on the knowledge of the highest Truth, while the founders of other rival religious systems should be thought of as not having realised it and these religious systems also should be considered as of a lower order. The acceptance of the second also will lead to the same conclusion. It will imply that some religions are lower than others, and that the prophets and saints of some religions are of an inferior type in comparison with those of others. The acceptance of the third alternative would lead to the conclusion that no religion is based on the realisation of the complete Truth, that none of the recognised holy men and spiritual teachers of the world attained perfect knowledge, and that being founded on partial knowledge, each religious system, if pursued steadily to the end, can help to attain only a particular aspect of Truth.

Now, if the different religious systems and their founders are judged in this way, the practical effect of such judgment is not likely to produce the desired result, viz. a spirit of harmony among them. Moreover, if the highest truth of one religion is to be regarded as representing the ultimate nature of Reality, and among the highest truths of other religions also, a gradation of values is to be made, what should be the criterion of judgment, as to the lower and the higher and the highest knowledge of Truth? Will it be the realisation of the latest of the prophets or truth-seers? But how can it be ascertained that his realisation also is not of a lower order, that it is also not a partial view of Truth? Thus the appeal to realisation cannot bring about a harmony of faiths, because it cannot persuade the members of any

Author's conclusion about the so-called Truth-realisation as subjective and individualistic is logically justifiable.

religious community to accept a lower position for their own prophet and his teachings. Consequently the final court of appeal is Reason. But by logical reasoning also we have found that no finally satisfactory conclusion with regard to the ultimate nature of Reality can be attained.

Thus our conclusion is that neither by logical reasoning nor by samādhi-intuition, can the ultimate nature of Reality be perfectly ascertained. We do not deny the validity of the intuitions as such of any of the illustrious founders of religious systems or of any individual that systematically practises deep meditation. But we assert that they are valid only as subjective spiritual experiences, varying according to their preconceived ideas and objects of meditation. This accounts for the differences of intuitions of different sincere truth-seekers, and none of them need be judged as higher or lower. There cannot be various grades of spiritual realisations, for it is due to their predilections that different aspirants choose different objects for their meditation, and as a result of this private psychological habit, the variation in their realisations takes place. This being the case, the last object of one's realisation may legitimately be the first object of another's realisation and thus there can be no fixed order of spiritual realisations. Had there been any such order, the objects of intuition could not have changed their nature according to individual choice. Besides, in these realisations, there is no evidence of the objects existing independently of the state of meditation of the person. Hence, the object referred to should be admitted to be a mental ideal. On the other hand the distinction of higher and lower grades of realisation presupposes an objective standard, the realisation of an objective reality. As there is no means of ascertaining

their objective validity, there is no reason for regarding the realisation of some as the fullest knowledge of Truth and of others as partial knowledge, or the intuitions of some as leading to the goal and of others not leading to the goal. Hence there is no ground for any quarrel among the exponents of different religious views, for all of them are based on and have for their ideals unascertained and unascertainable truths.

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