YOGA VASISTHA NOTES



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ledge and devotion, and to the discharge of the duties of your station without failing.

FINIS OF YOGA VASISHTHA

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: 1930.

1. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA: "REASON & RELIGION."

The philosophers are also becoming more prone towards immediacy in knowledge. They are seeing the limitations of the old method of knowing God indirectly by means of certain so-called proofs. So long as the philosophical world stuck to the old definition of man as a rational animal, laying all the emphasis upon the differentia and none on the other aspects of his nature, it was inevitable that it should refuse to acknowledge that there could be any extra-rational mode of knowing. From that opinion the philosophic world is gradually liberating itself. We need not refer to Bergson and Croce in whose systems Intuition plays such a large part (for there is not primarily a religious faculty) nor even the 'feeling' of Bradley and the 'appreciation' of Royce in relation to the Absolute. But something akin to Intuition is to be found, for instance, even in Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. Religion, according to the former, is faith, not in the conservation of values but in deity--that ultra-human perfection which emerges in Space-time and completes the evolution of reality in God. "God is apprehended cognitively through the religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith." According to the latter, God is to be known by acknowledgment and natural piety. Here again are two impressive quotations from L.P. Jacks: "I will venture to suggest to anyone who is perplexed by doubts about the reality of God, not to trust the fortunes of his faith too unreservedly to the field of mere argumen-

tation." "All religious testimony, so as I can interpret its meaning, converges towards a single point, namely this. There is that in the world, call it what you will, which responds to the confidence of those who trust it, declaring itself to them as a fellow worker in the pursuit of the Eternal Values, meeting their loyalty to it with reciprocal loyalty to them and coming in at critical moments when the need of its sympathy is greatest; the conclusion being, that wherever there is a soul in darkness, obstruction or misery, there also is a Power which can help, deliver, illuminate and gladden that soul." And if a professional theologian is suspect, here is the view of Munsterberg whom nobody would accuse of a theological bias: "In science and art, in love and peace, in industry and state, in morality and law, in religion and philosophy: mankind is to unfold in freedom what is intended as necessary goal of its own will. ..But this eternal unity of outer world and fellow-world and inner world in the whole richness of their connections and unities and realizations would never have been possible if they were not all flowing from the same eternal absolute deed of the over-self. That this overself is real, and that its will really and unchangeably binds our world of values, and that our loyal life is therefore endlessly valuable, no knowledge can teach us. No knowledge could be sufficient. This certainty is founded on the rock of conviction, and on conviction, therefore, is based every value of truth, of unity, of realisation, of completion."

2. If the war of creeds is to be over and future conflict with science and philosophy is to be narrowed down, if not altogether avoided, religion must insist on three irreducible qualities for itself, namely, that it is an <u>immediate</u>

experience, that it is a unique experience, and that it is a comprehensive experience. Regarding immediacy, every religion must be a personal possession and not a mere acceptance of a revelation on faith. Every person, whatever be his creed, must feel that he is religious and not that he belongs to a religion. It does not debar him from taking the help of spiritual leaders, nay even of inanimate things as Jacob Boehme did; but the acceptance must go beyond a mere blind obedience to the commands of the prophet or the religious leader and must culminate in a personal appropriation of the spiritual illumination. The Church that one should attend is not merely the visible Church, where very often bodily presence sums up the process of spiritual participation, but also the invisible Church where the Holy Communion is performed in spirit and in truth. In immediate religion communal considerations have place only in so far as they make for spiritual advancement and hold society together in common fellowship in spiritual bonds. Anything that has a tendency to lower the spiritual standard is to be assailed wherever found. A religious man is not the enemy of faiths but of faithlessness; so toleration and sympathy come easy to him wherever godliness is to be found.

Spiritual religion is a unique experience. It cannot be reduced to any other type of experience. Even when the components of religious faith are laid bare, they do not explain religion entirely. There is in all religion an unanalysable sense of valuation which may be called the sense of the holy, of which a prominent part is contributed by what Otto calls the 'numinous' state of mind. "This mental state is pirectly su igeneris and irreducible by any other; and, therefore, like every absolutely

primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined." Like samadhi in the Yoga system it can be only evoked or awakened in the mind but not taught; you can point the way, but you cannot induce the feeling by instruction. Religion is realisation and not mere understanding. There are no doubt the ideas of unity, beauty, morality and spirituality involved, as also feelings like fear, dependence, sublimity, awe, mystery. But the feeling of the holy or sacred is not a mere juxtaposition of these concepts and feelings--there is a creative synthesis in religion, a blending of elements, as in the honey collected by the bee, which defies complete analysis. The rational and the non-rational elements are absolutely fused together and produce a unique attitude of mind. At times the rational element becomes aggressive and the non-rational element receds to the background; but this never exterminated and like free floating affects in neurosis, attaches itself to some object or other. It is strange that people wish to get rid of religious feeling but not of love or friendship, as if sentiment is rational in human relation but not in relation to the super-sensible. Sympathy, which gives such insight into their minds, is not a rational mode of perception why, then, of all non-rational modes of knowing, should religion alone be specially objected to? By simply analysing religion you may indeed point to the many elements that go to make it up, but you can no more make a religion out of them than you can reconstruct a living body with dissected tissues. You can analyse perception into many sensory elements and yet perception is a single act.

Objecting to religious knowledge because it is not like the ordinary mode of knowing is like objecting to the knowing capacity of the ear because it does not give vision. They respond to entirely different aspects of existence. We may now briefly refer to that in our closing paragraph.

Religious experience is a comprehensive experience. It is the reaction of the whole personality upon the total universe. It is not exclusive of any other type of experience, for a religious significance can be read into any and every experience of the human mind. Into our scientific pursuits and our social dealings, into our appreciation of the beauties of nature and the loftiness of human conduct, we may import a religious attitude which does not contradict or annul the specific character of the original experience but suffuses it with a divine glow. Just as although the botanist is not interested in the velvet sheen of the pansy and the zoologist ignores the gorgeous finery of the plumage in a bird of paradise the poet may yet grow rapturous over both, so also when pursuing our scientific and social pursuits we may neglect the halo that a religious experience is always able to throw over them; but that does not justify us in saying that the religious way of looking at the world of matter and spirit is not permissible. The little flower in the crannied wall may reveal the existence of God and the love for one's dear ones may open up a fountain of spiritual solidarity with the world. It is this world that then becomes transmuted into a footstool of the deity and the ordinary avocations of life are ennobled by a sense of divine presence. No one is then solitary in the world--not even in the midst of the intensest sorrow, for an

invisible presence is laying the soothing hand on the troubled soul. No one is powerless then, for the power that makes for perfection and rightenousness is invisibly operating all around to supplement human endeavour. Every fibre of our being then vibrates in unison with the invisible melody of truth, beauty and goodness, and we are lifted up above our limitations and feel the kinship of entire creation. True, this feeling does not give us a finished theory of existence, but it gives us enough conviction to place our feet firmly on the road of life and to take the next step without faltering. Creeds have their day and pass away with the advance of culture, but religion rises perpetually anew phoenix-like out of its own ashes. Trace religion to the sexual instinct, if you like, but do not forget that there is all the difference between brute and sexuality and sublimated passion--between the crude chemical that kills and the refined chemical that saves.

3. T.R.V. MURTI: "THE RATIONAL BASIS OF ADVAITISM. Hitherto, it was shown that the act of awareness must be different from the content and that it is not a product of experience because what is requisite condition of all experience cannot itself be conditioned by it. But here we fall into a dilemma. If the act of awareness be known then straight away it becomes a content and then a good deal more of it must be known that its mere form. At least it will prove that there is no hard and fast distinction between the apprehending consciousness and the thing apprehended as they can change places. If unknown, it is better in the interest of truth, that we cease talking glibly about it; it is only a fiction. Neither of these alternatives is acceptable. Unknown it cannot be for in that case even when

we have experience we may either doubt the knowing or even hold that we do not know. But this is directly contradicted by our experience. Any genuine doubt or denial pertains only to the centent side and is never about awareness. The other alternative is equally incompatible. If it is known as a content it will cease to be a transcendental factor; the consequence will be that we shall have to bring in another consciousness to apprehend the first and so on. This means that even the first experience is not established; we are drawing a conclusion which goes against its own premise.

We are therefore led to conclude that (1) the act of awareness is and can never be presented as a content--it is the eternal subject. (2) and yet it is to be known and this is possible only when it is considered self-conscious --directly and immediately known. It is self-established. The Kantian doctrine of the Transcendental unity of Apperception or self-consciousness involves this conception.

This factor of self-consciousness is not a mere logical form, like the rule of cause and effect, the law of identity etc. which guide us in drawing conclusions. A logical form never actually enters as a factor in experience for one can say that a logical dictum is always before the mind but not in it. But here the presence or absence of the factor of self-consciousness makes all the world of difference. Kant himself was very serious in his belief that he was giving another discipline, a Transcendental Logic closely parallel to the trandi-tional one. His successors Fichte and Hegel saw the true metaphysical significance of his critique and were not slow to profit by it.

Further, this conception of self-consciousness involves that it should be one, unitary

and invariable, otherwise the same impasse. Suppose the transcendental factors which condition our knowledge were many, they must then severally operate and make their presence felt as it is idle to maintain a mere possibility of their existence. Then they are known as many and the consciousness by which they are known are many must be different from them. And secondly, what is known as a content is not and cannot serve as a transcendental factor. This means that these many factors are not real and if they are there, the consciousness which knows them as many must really be one. Many consciousnesses appear to be contradictory; therefore it must needs be a unity.

The question of its being invariable (continuous) is allied to the question of its being a unity; the one refers to numerical oneness and the other to temporal oneness. The continuity of consciousness, like its unity can be proved only negatively by showing that the hypothesis of a break in consciousness is untenable. The undemonstrability of any positive ground for continuity, far from constituting a defect in the argument, rises from the very nature of the case. For we have already seen that it cannot be known as a presentation; but a positive demonstration implies its being presented.

Let us suppose then that there is a break in consciousness; then it is either known or unknown. If it is known, then far from proving discontinuity it reiterates the continuity of consciousness. The consciousness of breaks has overlapped and healed the break. Take the other alternative that it is not a conscious break, but a break all the same. We may at once dispose of it by questioning the evidence for such breaks and then the second alternative will really be reduced to the first. But

let us grant it merely to appreciate the consequences. By a break in consciousness we must understand that sometimes consciousness exists, at other times not. Just as sometimes we perceive things about us due to the presence or absence either of our attention or the things. The consequences of such a position would be that sometimes we would be having perceptions without our being aware of them. Some presentation will knock at the door and yet there will not be any Saksi-caitanya to cognize it. But this is not warranted by our experience. A presentation is known as such when it receives admittance. All cases of subconscious or unconscious ideas are really consciously perceived at the time of their occurrence, the difference being that they are not fully co-ordinated with the stream of waking ideas. This is evident from the fact that when they are unearthed and brought to light by removing the 'censorship', they are not disowned. The psychological status of the conscious and the so called unconscious and subconscious ideas may be different but not their epistemological one. They are known as presented from the very outset. We are not justified then in asserting a break in consciousness. We can say of consciousness that its light is never put out. It is abadhita and this cannot be said of any other.

If there is neither break nor end to consciousness, there is also no doubt in respect to its existence. Samkara disposes of the doubt concerning the atman in two ways. Firstly, there is no genuine doubt, as one actually doubts it. An analysis of doubt will show us that it pertains only to that which is presented as 'this' or 'that' or, as the Naiyayikas have it, to the content of knowledge expressed by the predicate. As consciousness--the eternal subject cannot be

presented as an object, it cannot be doubted. Secondly even if it is doubted the very doubt proves its existence.

From the non-presentability of the Atman (consciousness) some considerations follow; one that the Atman is attributeless for we cannot give it any content, any predicate, and hence no difference must be based upon special features--attributes. And these are absent in consciousness.

But the greatest difficulty still remains. It may be that consciousness is different from the content or the object, that it is not a product of experience but a prerequisite condition of its possibility and that it is not presented as content but directly and immediately known. But this is all in vain if it is proved that consciousness cannot be divorced from content, that the subject is indissolubly connected with the object so that if the one is not, the other also is not. The assertion of the Vedanta that there is no external reality and that the Absolute cannot be said to contain more than the Self, must fall to the ground. It is therefore to be shown that the self can exist without the object and its nature is in no way impaired. At least an unmistaken possibility must be pointed out. It may be objected that this problem is identical with what was essayed to be proved at the beginning that the act of awareness is different from the content as it is can apriori condition of all experience. But really the issue here is different. There we were interested in showing that experience is not possible without the apriori factor which has at the same time to be different from the content. Now we are interested in asking whether the apriori factor can be without the content

and still be unimpaired (In Vedantic language the Muktasvabhavata of the Atman).

The relation between the two, consciousness and content, seems to be indissoluble. Idealism in the West can be said to rely entirely on the strength of Relations. Berkeley was successful in proving that 'ideas' cannot exist without the mind, without a relating consciousness. But the argument really cuts both ways. The relating consciousness also cannot exist without the object to be related, as relation is internal i.e. bites into and grips the relata. No one has felt the implications of this position more strongly than Hegel. His whole dialectic rests upon the untenability of having the one without the other--the inherent contradiction of abstraction. So the Hegelian Absolute must needs contain all denominations, all the rich variety. It is to be a concrete universal. The Vedantic Absolute is quite the opposite; it repels all content, all richness. Both the systems assert vehemently that there is nothing beyond the Absolute. Hegel's argument is that, whatever cannot be abstracted away, must in reality be there already. The Vedantic argument is that, whatever can be absent or abstracted away without impairing the nature of anything really does not belong to it, must be thought of as an excrescence. The crucial test between the two views is the showing of the possibility or otherwise of any experience in which the object is unmistakably absent.

The position of Kant is rather curious. We have followed him till now in bringing out the implications of experience, in recognizing the apriori factor, the transcendental synthetic unity of Apperception. He begins to falter in assigning a status to that factor. He consi-

ders the self conscious unity as an empty form--I am I--when regarded apart from all the manifold which it apperceives. But still his instincts were right; he refused to confront the self eternally with the manifold. As he thought he could not prove the freedom of the self by pure reason, he fell back upon practical reason after having taken extraordinary precautions to silence understanding if it transcended its spheres. The Transcendental Dialectic serves this purpose of disarming understanding so that he may have a free hand with regard to his cherished doctrines, Free-will, Immortality and God. But Vedanta does not have recourse to Practical reason to safe-guard the freedom of the self. It relies upon more natural and common experience; it explores the implications of the various phases of experience--waking, dreaming, sleeping etc. Kant missed this chiefly because it is not the vogue in the west to explain these phases of life. If there can be a metaphysic of the waking experience, there is no prima facie reason why it should be denied to the equally common and universal experience of sleep. If there cannot be, at least the impossibility is to be shown. We have a real problem to be dealt with.

Sleep presents us three problems. Is there any consciousness at all there? This is tantamount to asking whether the self exists in sleep. There were not wanting persons even in the upanisadic times, who denied the self in sleep. Indra says to Prjapati that in sleep the self does not know its very existence, it comes to nought.

Secondly, what can be its true nature if some entity is accepted in sleep and thirdly is it strictly continuous with the preceding and posterior consciousness?

The importance of Susupti to the system has

been very well recognized by the Vedantic authors. The Mandukya upanisad and the karikas represent a brilliant attempt to reach Reality through an analysis of these states, which are there described as the Padas and Matras of the pranava. In the Bri. Up. there are two places where Sankara undertakes a very elaborate and suggestive discussion of the issues. The one is in connection with Ajatasatru's questions (addressed to Balaki after forcibly waking up a sleeping person)--"where was he," "whence has he come." The other is the persistent questioning of Yajnavalkya by Janaka, "By what light does the Purusa work and move about when all the empirical paraphernelia is taken away.

This is a common experience of all of us that "I slept well," "I was not knowing others not even myself." This has to be explained. It is possible to consider this either as a true experience, (experience actually undergone) or as illusory, meaning thereby that the content of one experience is falsely referred to another. A pre-sleep or a post-sleep experience of the absence of any concrete objects then, is falsely transcribed and attributed to the time of gap--a difference merely in the dating of the perception of emptiness. But this attempt at explaining away is futile, for the two states must be known--the pre or post-sleep state on the one hand and the gap state on the other, so that the content of either of the former can be falsely transferred to the latter (gap state), just as both shell and silver must be known to a certain extent if the one is to be mistaken for the other. But here ex hypothesi there is no knowledge of the gap at any time and hence it cannot enter as a term in illusion.

Let us take the other alternative that this experience is true, as really experienced. The

simplest hypothesis is to admit the existence of consciousness, that it was conscious of its having had nothing to cognize, of its being a spectator of an empty theatre otherwise usually crowded. Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya has very admirably shown to us in his lectures on the "Dissociation of the Subject"--that an adumbration of complete dissociation is given us in such psychical experience as the conscious non-perception of objects, trying to think, trying to imagine an ostensibly impossible thing as the square-circle etc. The self subject, is as it were in a knowing attitude but there is not anything to be known --through no fault of it.

What other alternative can be adopted if we do not want to accept consciousness in sleep with its invariable implications--its being self-consciousness, imdependent of objects and continuous and yet not going to the extent of treating the experience as illusory. There is the handy conception of the self as a substance, consciousness or thought appearing at intervals--the self remaining a permanent identical entity, because it is a substance. The example that will readily suggest itself is the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of the Atman as a substance with about nine special attributes no two of them existing simultaneously. The sleeping state does not present a problem at all to such a philosophy.

But this hypothesis does not really explain anything. If a thing has any property either it has it always or it has that not altogether. "Sometimes having the property in question" means that one substance (x) had the property A_1 at one time and a numerically different substance (y) has the property A_2 at this time.

The numerical identity of the two substances (x & y) cannot be proved, for, this can be done only through the numerical identity of the attributes; but for one who says that the attribute is sometimes present and sometimes not this is denied. If the attribute is present always and equally so throughout the substance, no useful purpose is served by the substance-hypothesis.

We have to conclude that consciousness is continuous in sleep; that it is self-conscious or else the very purpose of admitting a consciousness is defeated, and that no useful distinction can be made between consciousness and the self for the very same reason. The nature of the self must be such that it persists even when severely alone and we cannot assert anything else of it than self-conscious awareness. Naturally it follows that what can be absent without impairing the nature of an entity must be considered super-added to it, an appearance of it. The absence of the object does not impair consciousness hence the object is an appearance. The relation between consciousness and content is one-sided; though the latter cannot exist and be known without the former, the reverse is not true.

To sum up, the self is the only thing to which the criterion of Reality is applicable as it is continuous and invariable. It is self-conscious. We have also seen that it can neither be a system nor a substance. These are precisely the implications of the first premise.

4. G.R. MALKANI: "THE DUALITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT." We have seen that in all experience, the duality of subject and object is implied. It will now be said that all experience is not cognitive experience; and since we not only know but also feel and act, there

are evidently facts of experience which cannot be reduced to either of the terms of the above duality.

Now it is true that so far as the psychological analysis of facts of the mind is concerned, the different forms of mental activity will have to be distinguished one from another, and they may not be reducible to a common type. But we are as little concerned with psychological facts as we are with any of the findings of other empirical sciences. We leave to these sciences the investigation of the form of the facts relating to their particular spheres. Our problem is essentially a metaphysical problem; and the only point to be considered here is whether the dualism of the subject and the object is not ultimate so far as the whole range of our ordinary experience is concerned.

Psychology may regard certain facts as purely subjective, and distinguish them from those which it calls facts of presentation. But even in so distinguishing facts, psychology takes them as facts <u>of</u> experience, or in other words as "objective" to a standpoint which does not concern psychology;for that standpoint cannot be distinguished, it cannot be analysed,--it is not a fact <u>of</u> the mind. It is the business of metaphysics to take account of this unanalysable ground of all experience, and study its relation to facts which psychology and other empirical sciences make a subject of their special study.

It is sometimes said that our knowledge of facts--of feeling and of volition is <u>noumenal</u> and not phenomenal; for it is knowledge of facts as they are, unmediated by any specific sense. But while this is a reason why these facts cannot be reduced to or analysed into the merely presentative elements of

cognition in the strict sense, it is also a reason why our knowledge of these facts is fully comprehensive of them, and that the facts do not present a problem which cannot be dealt with on the basis of this knowledge. In knowing our volitional acts, for example, we know their genesis, their duration, their efficiency, their teleological character,--or in other words, everything that a volitional act is. This knowledge then, while it may not be regarded as itself a volitional act, is related to those objects. Any problem of reality must in the end be based upon the fact of knowledge, and the attempt to show that this fact is not the fundamental fact of experience will defeat itself; for all other facts of experience are to us those facts only as they are known,--or in other words only as they are objective in experience, and capable of psychological analysis and interpretation.

It will further be evident that we do not mean by knowledge, cognition in the strict sense. That is a form of mental activity which is in a sense separable from other forms of mental activity, namely feelings and volitions. It represents only a part of our mental life, and can in no sense be regarded as the fundamental fact. What is fundamental is that fact of knowledge to which all forms of mental activity themselves are objective, and which therefore cannot regard itself as its own object without contradicting itself. Even self-reflection is reflection on some objective content, the "me-object" as it has been called. It implies that which is not an object, but in the knowing of which the "me-object" itself is known. Self-reflection cannot reduce this fact of knowledge to a form of activity which may be reflected upon.

The standpoint of every empirical science is

subject to criticism; for every science starts by defining its facts and its postulates. We might even say that every science represents a certain form of mental thinking and the truth and falsehood of its conclusions is relative to that form of thinking. But the standpoint of knowledge which we have suggested is not subject to criticism; it does not represent any form of thinking. Rather all thinking implies it; there is no higher standpoint. It is this standpoint which is the rock of metaphysical certainty, and which gives a clue to the solution of any problem as to the nature of ultimate Reality. All other facts, whether they relate to facts of the mind as such or to facts of physical nature, are <u>equally</u> objective in respect of it. As Prof. Ward truly says in the article referred to, "Subjective knowledge is not in this sense more immediate than objective, nor do we obtain it by turning right away from this. Both constitute one experience, though, as said, it is only when this experience is organised beyond a certain degree of elaboration that it becomes self-revealing to the subject of it." Again he says "Self-consciousness is thus in its logical character and its psychological composition comparable with objective knowledge, using the terms as widely as before." It is in this sense that we hold that knowledge is the fundamental fact and experience is not wider than knowledge.

Mr. Bradley commenting upon the article of Prof. Ward referred to above, definitely draws a distinction between consciousness and experience. According to him, "the form of consciousness seems in hopeless contradiction with itself." It is not consciousness therefore but experience which is the fundamental fact. He says, "Now consciousness, to

my mind, is not original. What comes first in each of us is rather feeling, a state as yet without either an object or subject." And what is feeling? "It is immediate experience without distinction or relation in itself. It is a unity complex but withour relations. And there is no difference here between the state and its content, since, in a word, the experienced and the experience are one." When it is urged that "consciousness at all events at a certain stage exists," Mr. Bradley expresses his inability to deal with the question "how the transition is made from feeling to consciousness." He nevertheless makes the significant remark, "An experienced relation seems to involve an experienced whole, but this whole is at once supplied by feeling. For consciousness is superinduced on, and is still supported by feeling; and feeling is itself an experienced whole."

It appears to us that Mr. Bradley is here confusing sensation with feeling. But let us suppose that he is right, and that feeling is the primary fact. Now there is no doubt that psychologically feeling is subjective; it is a form of experience which does not imply an 'other'; we cannot distinguish feeling from that which is felt. But this is quite different from saying that it is the experienced whole on which the duality of consciousness itself is superinduced. Feeling implies a feeling subject, and it is objective to the subject which feels. Mr. Bradley however gives us the astounding proposition that "the real subject is always felt." We may ask, by whom is it felt? And is there any meaning in speaking of "the real subject" when there is no subject to feel,--when all that there is, is feeling? The fact is that if feeling is itself the whole, there can be no question of any experience, or of feeling itself; these will be

meaningless terms.

The most powerful objection against presentationism is that it explains away the subject, and regards presentations as virtually all that there is. Mr. Bradley who vigorously attacks presentationism, has unconsciously himself fallen into the same error of explaining away the subject. The fact is that the subject-notion can never be derived from something that is more primordial. It is as primordial as experience itself, although we come to recognise it explicitly only at a much later stage. All experience whatsoever implies the duality of subject and object.

The next question that confronts us is the relation of the subject and the object of experience. Now whenever we think of relation, we necessarily think of two or more terms between which the relation is supposed to subsist. A single term by itself cannot be thought of as related. Secondly, we also think of the terms as, in a certain sense, independent of the relation and of each other. To speak of them as constituted by the relation is to say what is meaningless; for in that case the relation will have to be conceived as logically prior to the terms between which it is supposed to be a relation. On the other hand, if we regard the terms as somehow independent of the relation in which they afterwards enter, we create other difficulties. The relation becomes a sort of an external tie, not only indifferent to the being of the terms related, but requiring some other relation whereby it may be related to the terms in question. This new relation will in turn require to be related and so on ad infinitum. We shall never be able, in this way, to complete the necessary links to get a relation.

It appears to us that we cannot give any

satisfactory analysis of what we call a relation, if we regard a reltion as a constituent of the world of objects, existing apart from the relating consciousness. A relation must not be there simply; a relation must relate; and relating is an activity that can be exercised by what is itself unrelated and what constitutes the essential unity of the relation, namely mind or consciousness. A relation is therefore the subjective determination of one object by another object, and does not exist between the terms related but in the mind that relates them. The question whether relata are first or relation is first, is quite meaningless; for neither can exist apart from the other; they are two aspects distinguished with one and the same piece of knowledge. What is first, if we may say so, is the unrelated ground of relations.

But is not the subject itself in some way related to its objects? Evidently, it is the supposition that there is a relation here which makes Mr. Bradley regard consciousness as a paradox, and to advance the theory that it is a superinduction upon what is according to him a more harmonious and consistent whole, namely experience or feeling. He says in one place "Is the subject given? No, for, if so, it would itself be an object. We seem, then to have one term and a relation without a second term. But can there be a relation with one term? No, this appears to be self contradictory, and, if we assert it we must justify and defend our paradox." But is there any relation at all? We think that Mr. Bradley has not faced this issue, and that therefore his attack upon consciousness is misdirected.

A relation is only possible between objects; for objects alone can be said to be mutually

determined. The subject, ex hypothesi, is not an object, and can never be. How can it then be related? It is true that we distinguish it from objects. But as soon as we have so distinguished it, it has ceased to be the true subject; it has become an object. The true subject can never be distinguished, and can never be related. Further, no relation is possible that is not grounded in what is unrelated. This unrelated ground, as we have seen, can be no other than the subject of knowledge. The subject, then, taken as subject and not as object, cannot be related. There would be no kind of a paradox if we so took it. The paradox arises because we are inclined to treat the subject both as subject and as an object at the same time.

Let us however suppose that the subject is related. The subject then becomes an object and we require another subject to know it. That in turn will require another subject to know it, and so on ad infinitum, with the result that the subject will not be known at all.

It might perhaps be argued that this difficulty is not a serious one; for after all the subject is distinct from the object. Prof. Ward for example says, in the article to which we have referred already. "If, however, on the other hand, we regard the subject knowing as distinct from the object known; then, in order that this knowing subject may be an object known, we require a second subject or at least a higher grade of consciousness. We seem committed not only to consciousness of consciousness but to consciousness of consciousness of consciousness, and so on ad infinitum. This has been regarded as a reductio ad absurdum from Aristotle onwards, and has led psychologists generally, either to shirk the whole question or to incline to the alternative of absolute

identity. But whatever may be our speculative preference for an absolute limit as against an indefinite regress, there is surely great force in Kant's doctrine that it is the business of science to abide by the latter. After all the regress will not be found to go very far." The hope here expressed will never be realised, for a question which is appropriate to start with will never become inappropriate by any number of mere repetitions of it. Besides, the issue as presented by Prof. Ward does not appear to us to be a correct one. For, if we cannot regard the subject as an object known, it does not follow that the subject must therefore be identical with the object. Such identity is incompatible with any form of knowledge, and nobody has seriously argued it. We cannot even regard it as a limiting case. Prof. Ward says, "A knowledge in which subject and object are one is at best a limiting case towards which we might perhaps conceive ourselves approximating in self-consciousness and even continue to approximate indefinitely." But do we approximate to this identity in self-consciousness? Then we rely more upon the form of this expression than we do upon the fact itself. Self-consciousness is not in principle different from objective consciousness; and the duality of subject and object does not become less evident because the object is one of reflection and not one of direct sensible apprehension.

The mistake lies in raising at all the question, how the subject may be known or how it is related to its objects. If it could be known, it would no longer be subject; and if it were related to its objects, it would, by this very relation, become its own object. The subject is subject, because it is unrelated; any attempt to conceive it in any relation will end by making of it a subject no longer.

It is perhaps natural for us to think (and this is because we think by making distinctions), that as an object has relations to other objects, so one of its many relations is its relations to the subject. But a little reflexion will show us that while all those relations of an object to other objects are relations between what is quite distinct one from another, neither the object nor those relations are distinct from the subject, and that this relation therefore cannot be one of the object's many relations. It is a relation, if relation we can call it, in which the terms supposed to be related cannot be held apart even ideally without destroying the relation. It is not a relation in any sense of the term that we know of.

We may put the same matter in a slightly different way. The object has many relations which are known. But its relation to the subject cannot be one of these relations; for, if we knew the relation of the object to the subject, the knowing relation itself would cease. There would then be no one to know and no relation. The complete knowledge of the object thus does not require the knowledge of its relation to the subject as a constituent.

This so called relation cannot supply us with <u>any</u> information about the object just as other relations of the object do. Shall we say, it is redundant? But how can it be redundant, when the object itself and all its relations are known only in this relation? The truth is that since the object and all its relations are only known in their "non-distinction from the subject," they have no reality apart from it. It is in this sense that we can maintain the identity of the subject and the object; and this identity is an actual fact and not a limiting case. It <u>is</u> based upon the recognition that the object

and all its relations cannot be disengaged from the relation of knowing which they are assumed to have to the subject.

It has been suggested that the subject and the object are neither one, nor separate and distinct. The subject and the object are correlative; and the fact of this correlation is the ultimate fact which any analysis of experience can possibly reveal to us. The attempt to find contradiction here will in fact defeat itself; for if there were any contradiction, there would be no possibility of that very experience upon which the attempt itself is ultimately based.

Now two terms are said to be correlative when they are constituted the terms they are not by anything that they are "in themselves" but by their relation each to the other. But how can such terms be known? If A has a necessary reference to B, and B in its turn a necessary reference to A, neither A nor B can be known. The fact that they are known can only be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are also known apart from the relation which constitutes their mutual bond. Can we say that the subject and the object can be known otherwise than in their mutual relation? If not, how are they known at all? But if they <u>are</u> known otherwise, their correlatedness cannot be the ultimate word about them.

We may also note that terms that are correlated can only be known as such by that which does not itself form a term of the correlation. This means that only objects can be correlated. The subject that known can never be known to be correlative to anything. When therefore we assert that the subject and the object are correlative, who can possibly know the fact? The truth is that although the subject may know itself to be correlated (for all knowledge is by

distinctions) still, in thus knowing itself, it is in its essential nature unrelated and the very ground of the known correlation. What it apprehends as correlated to the objects is we might say, not itself, but the objective "me,"--a very different entity.

Terms which are correlative are also, in a sense mutually exclusive. Now it is evident that a term which is exclusive of another term cannot itself be the ground of any relation to that term. The ground evidently must be inclusive of the terms related by it: and while it cannot be merely identical with either of the terms, it cannot also be a third term. A third terms would not relate, for it would itself require to be related. Mr. Bradley evidently commits this error when he treats the true subject as though it fell outside the correlation, as a possible third term in addition to the terms correlated by it. He says in the article to which we have already alluded, "The correlated terms are for a subject which itself is not given. The correlation falls in the experience of this new subject, which itself remains outside that object. And of the relation to this new subject the old puzzles are true. This relation must have two terms, terms more than their relation; and the 'more' again must be experienced, or else be nothing. Any attempt to pass from within the experienced to that which in itself is not experienced, seems quite suicidal. The distinction between the experienced and experience seems in the end totally inadmissible. And the infinite regress is but an actually unremoved contradiction. It is itself an absolute irrational limit." There is no case for an absolute irrational limit of this sort. The subject is nothing if it remains outside the correlation apprehended by it, a new term

requiring in its turn to be correlated. It is subject just because it does not occupy a ground in respect of the terms correlated by it, which these occupy in respect of each other. The subject is really not a term at all; it is rather the ground of any terms that are given; and a ground is nothing if it does not constitute a unity of the terms grounded in it.

The real meaning then of the correlation of the subject and the object is quite different from that which appears to be conveyed by it. It is that the given correlation itself would not be possible if the subject did not form the unrelated ground of it.

So far we have considered the correlation of the subject and the object in a general way. We shall now proceed to examine the relation of these two terms in actual experience. It must however be noted at the very outset that we could not do this unless experience were first analysed into its constituent terms. At the level of mere experience as such there are no distinctions, and no problems can be raised. All problems are problems of reflexion. But while it is necessary that we should have made some distinctions before we can raise a problem we are not to suppose that those distinctions are for us ultimate facts to which all our conclusions must conform. They are only our starting point. They have no doubt a sort of necessity for thought; for thought is formal. But experience is not formal; it is the true whole in which thought itself with its distinctions is a mere element. All problems are problems of thought; but they are relevant to experience only so far as the conclusions conform to experience as a whole.

It is a common-place to assert that the object implies the subject. But in what sense does it

imply it? Does it imply it as something distinct from it? We take an instance. I am aware of a rose. Not it is evident that in being aware of the rose, I am not aware of two things, the rose and myself. The fact itself, which I afterwards break up into these two elements, is an absolutely simple fact; and although I call it "awareness of rose," it is not composed of an object rose and rose. If it were thus composed, awareness would be only another object co-ordinate with the object rose, and there would be no awareness. The object then does not imply the subject as a second term to which it stands in some sort of a relation. If it did, the original fact of experience would go to pieces, and with it the very distinction of the subject and the object. The truth is that in actual experience the subject can never stand aloof or be given as distinct from the object, and when we say that the object implies the subject, we do not mean that it implies it as something distinct from it and related to it, but as its essential being.

Again it is said that the subject implies the object. Now it is true that when we think about ourselves, we distinguish ourselves from objects. But then we only know ourselves as we appear to ourselves by this distinction. An object is indeed known by its appearance. But the subject differs from the object just in this most essential respect; there is no appearance which I can truly call myself. No doubt we have to think in order to know that we are; but even in such thinking, the reality of the subject is presupposed, and this subject is never made our object at all. When thought tries to scrutinize it, it is simply trying to know it as it is not, or as it is foreign to itself. The subject therefore implies no-

thing apart from itself. It may be said to be known before anything that has implications itself may be known; for it is not known at all in the sense in which all objects of thought are known.

We might also note here that we cannot distinguish the <u>being</u> of the subject from the <u>knowledge</u> of it, as we are accustomed to distinguish the being of the object from its knowledge. The object is something that appears to us; it is formal and limited, and necessitates a movement of thought which seeks to go beyond the so-called given content. Our knowledge is thus said to be ideal in character as against the being of the thing which is real. But the subject does not appear. It has no formal content. It is not given. Thought can work no distinctions in it, and without the distinctions of thought we cannot oppose the self-knowledge of the subject to its being. In short the unity of being and knowledge is completely realised in the subject.

It will perhaps be said that whatever reflective difficulties we might make as to the subject implying objects, it is nevertheless true that the subject is 'subject' only so far as it knows what is objective to it, and is conscious and alove. If it does not know, or falls into a stupor, it is as little of a subject as stones and trees are subjects.

It is evident now that if the subject ceased to be subject at any time, the fact of its thus ceasing to be could not be known by it. How then do I know that it was <u>I</u> who slept or fell into stupor? Evidently I do not know this on the evidence of somebody else. Such evidence is by the very nature of the case impossible. Whatever another's experience may be, it can only be evidence to <u>me</u> so far as it describes <u>my</u> experience. This experience then is the

sole basis of my asserting that I ceased to be subject. And yet if the assertion is true, it could not be made; for a subject which ceases to be subject cannot <u>know</u> the fact of its ceasing to be.

One thing however is at once clear. I know myself to be the same person who was awake before sleep and who fell into it afterwards. If, in fact, I were not aware of a past continuous with the span of conscious life in which I find myself placed at present, I could not be aware of any interval during which I had ceased to be. It is this continuity of myself then which makes it possible for me to know the interruption of myself in sleep and such other states. But if I am really interrupted, I could not at the same time be continuous with myself. The conclusion is that my continuity with myself is not the continuity of conscious life; that I know to be broken. My continuity lies deeper than that, and the evidence of it consists in my being able to know the interruptions of conscious life at all.

This is further borne out by the fact that the conscious ego is objective to me. I am aware of it as that which comes and which goes. It is true that I do not know this as the ego itself knows something. When the ego ceases to be 'ego', there is no other entity which we can lay hold of, and which may be supposed to be watching its going or coming to itself again. We lose consciousness without knowing that we have lost it; and we regain consciousness without knowing that we are regaining it. The subject that may be said to continue to function in sleep can never to shown to be distinct from the ego, watching its appearance and disappearance. And yet it cannot <u>be</u> the ego; for the ego cannot know its own absence and its own inception. The true subject is subject in a more

fundamental sense than the ego. What is correlative to objects is the ego, and not that which the ego itself presupposes as its own ground.

It might be said that we are here confounding actual sound sleep from our knowledge of the same. When we known sleep, we are already wide awake and therefore subjects in the ordinary sense. But this is quite different from saying that we were subjects when we knew nothing at all. (1) Now it is true that if by "subject" is meant conscious and waking ego, we could not be subjects when the ego is laid to rest; if we were subjects in that sense, we could not be said to have been sleeping. (2) Accordingly, also, our present apprehension that the ego did not function in sleep cannot be a fact of ordinary memory. We have memory of that which we have observed as conscious subjects. But where no conscious subject exists, and no impressions are received we cannot be said to know anything in the ordinary sense of the term or to have a memory of it afterwards. The apprehension of the absence of the ego in sleep etc. is a fact of a different order altogether, and can only be made intelligible by a higher conception of our subjecthood than is warranted by the conscious and waking life (3) It is sometimes said that the subject in sleep can know without rendering its knowledge in terms of objectivity. It knows the absence of the ego or the absence of all knowledge of objects in some such way, and at the same time in a non-negative fashion (for all mere negative knowledge involves the knowledge of objects) and that it is this knowledge, which, on waking up, and by means of memory, is rendered objective and thereby cognisable by the ego. This explanation is necessitated, and becomes unavoidable, if we suppose that the sleep as actually slept and the sleep as known by us on

waking up are distinct, and that the distinction is ultimately true. But it may well be questioned whether we can intelligently speak about any sleep that is different from the sleep that is known by us on waking up and that is nothing if not objective to the knower, and whether we can appeal to any genuine experience of this so-called non-objective sleep that is supposed to have been known when we were actually in sleep. (4) Our view is that the actual sleep is not something different in nature from the sleep as later known by us, and that the appearance that they are distinct and that the one precedes the other in our knowledge is just due to a misapprehension to be corrected by discriminative thought.

It might be supposed that the whole problem is unreal, and that the ordinary subject never falls into a state of complete unconsciousness. This however would be opposed to the common-sense view that wakefulness and sleep, consciousness and unconsciousness, alternate each other. We might admit that in the deepest sleep or state of unconsciousness, there might be a certain amount of conscious activity which we fail to attend to and therefore fail to remember on waking up. But this activity would fall outside the history of the individual who supposes himself to have been in sleep, and who must be sure of being an individual with an unbroken history before he can know the fact of his having slept. So far as his experience is concerned (and all changes of state are significant only in that experience), anything that appears to him as a state of complete unconsciousness of himself, must be taken as true, as far as it goes.

The subject then which never ceases to be subject is not the conscious and waking ego. It is that which reveals the ego itself as ego. It

is the subject which never goes to sleep and does not wake up, for sleep and wakefulness themselves are known by it. It is beyond all states, and yet it is not like a watching ego; a watching ego would be objective to it. That then is the true subject, and it cannot be correlative to the objects of our conscious life.

5. R. DAS."THE IDEAL AS SACH-CHID-ANANDA." or "The Perfect Peace of Enlightened and Absolute Existence.": It may appear at first sight that the term 'absolute' before 'consciousness' is almost meaningless. There is no half-way house between consciousness and unconsciousness. If we are conscious of anything, it seems, we are absolutely conscious of it. When we become conscious we do so wholly and at once. There may be some indistinctness about the object of which we become conscious, but the fact of being conscious cannot be graduated. There is no relative or partial consciousness. It is always whole and entire, absolute.

All this is, in a sense, true; but there is also a sense in which we think we can legitimately speak of absolute consciousness. The fact of being conscious, of course, whenever it is there, is there wholly and absolutely. But still there are certain limitations to our consciousness. Who can be so bold as to say that he has the full knowledge even of a blade of grass or of a grain of sand? All our knowledge is partial and fragmentary, and of any particular thing what we do know is completely outweighed by what we do not know. Our knowledge is growing from more to more and there is no hope that it will ever become final. Our knowledge always remains partial and it is also a fact that we cannot remain content with partial and fragmentary knowledge. There is consequently a perpetual urge towards more and more knowledge. Absolute knowledge, therefore, in the first instance

means full knowledge in which no element of obscurity remains. All that has to be known is known to the full.

6. Again knowledge is generally supposed to have its seat in some personal centre which is the subject. It is the subject which knows and is thought of as conscious. The subject alone is enlightened; the objects are blind. But although consciousness is the essential property of the subject, it is incapable of realising it without the help of the object. No subject can be conscious without being conscious of something which is its object.

7. The subject and the object are given in their unity in the fact of knowledge. By analytic abstraction we can think of them as different; but in the concrete fact they inseparably united. If we try to separate them violently, the fact of knowledge will disappear, and the subject and the object will lose their characters. The principle of knowledge is common to them both and realises itself fully when they are brought into a unity. In fact the subject and the object are not two things with the relation of knowledge between them. The subject is generally taken (and we have also so far taken it) as identified with an individual person endowed with a psychophysical organism. Such a subject is not however the pure subject. The pure subject is the same as the principle of knowledge. Merely in the knower as knower we find no trace of personality or of its various limitations. So what in fact is there is the object unified with the principle of knowledge. When this principle is viewed in relation to the object, it is considered as the subject. Subjectivity is thus only a relative aspect of knowledge which in fact is the self-shining principle of manifestation from which no object can ever

be separated. We do not think that the hard things of the world have got to metamorphose themselves strangely into our ideas before there can be any knowledge of them, nor do we suppose that a sort of blind photography has to take place in order to generate in us any knowledge of external things. On the contrary we believe that the principle of knowledge which is present in all things of the world, comes to realise itself in us through the mediation of our senses. In knowing things we do not arbitrarily impose some subjective forms on an unintelligent manifold of sense; we simply identify ourselves, according to our capacity and in our degree, with the knowledge which which is already there.

Perhaps our use of the term knowledge or consciousness is a little inept in this connection, because knowledge or consciousness is generally understood in individual subjective reference. But we have seen how knowledge cannot remain entirely subject and perform its proper function. We are trying to get the idea of knowledge freed from all personal limitations. In fact we are trying to grasp a new principle which being one with knowledge in us, is also the illuminative principle of all things. The Sanskrit word chit stands for such an idea and the nearest English equivalent of it seems to be either knowledge of consciousness. We cannot properly define what we really mean by chit or absolute knowledge. We can only try to explain our idea of it by indirect description.

Now we maintain that manifestation of all things in the world can take place only in knowledge or through absolute blindness or darkness would follow, in which it cannot even be asserte that anything exists. When we say we know things we mean they show themselves to be what they are

But shuch 'showing' is essential to their being. If they refuse to show anything and prefer to remain concealed in utter darkness, they can do so only by reducing themselves to mere nothing. The being of things cannot be adequately conceived as absolutely unmanifest. A thing cannot simply be, but it has to be something. It will be a this or that and must have a what. But such notions have no scope or mæning when things are lost in the obscurity of unknownness. Such indeterminate unknownness would mean the annihilation of their being. So if anything is to be, it must be something and show itself to be such. It is not necessary however that you or I should be looking at a thing in order that it may show itself to be something. We do not doubt the fact that things do not depend for their existence on our individual subjective knowledge. Individuals come and go but things remain just as they are. But the being of things cannot be conceived as separated from knowledge as such; and so even when any of ús individuals is not there, we have to postulate the presence of absolute knowledge or of the pure subject.

We have so far tried to conceive chit or absolute knowledge as an independent principle which is in metaphorical language may be said to illuminate all things of the world. This being the principle of manifestation, we have further seen that it is essential to the being of things, because the being of things cannot be separated from their manifestation. It must exist therefore in its perfection in the ideal which claims to be absolutely real. In the ideal, knowledge has come fully to itself and is absolutely free from the accidental defects of human knowledge. In the first

place, all externality has disappeared from the ideal. Knowledge has no longer to be provoked, as it were, into being by a shock from external things, because there are no external things apart from knowledge. So knowledge does not happen as an accident to things but is really one with their being. In the ideal, complete harmony and unity has been achieved between the principle of reality and the principle of knowledge; the apparent dualism between being and knowing has disappeared. There it is not one thing to be and another thing to know or to be known. But being means being known. As being is not separated from absolute knowledge, there is in the ideal or for the ideal, no dark obscure corner which is not illuminated by the light of knowledge. If absolute knowledge means anything, it means knowledge running to the root of things. It is in such knowledge that all that claim to be real must realise their reality.

But even though the ideal is absolutely real and is in possession of absolute knowledge, its ideality does not seem to be fully expressed by these terms. It is no doubt a great thing to be absolutely real; it is a greater thing to enjoy such reality with perfect knowledge. But the most important thing for us about the ideal is not that it is absolutely real and knows itself to be so, but that it is the basis of abiding satisfaction. The ideal is ideal to us and deserves our ceaseless pursuit, not only because it guarantees permanent existence and full knowledge but specially because it promises ultimate satisfaction. The ideal will not be an ideal to us, in spite of its reality and knowledge, if it fails to satisfy us completely. We are inspired by a desire to realise the ideal because we believe

that there will be, for good, an end to all our sufferings when we have once reached the ideal. We believe that it is the ideal and the ideal alone which can guarantee perfect and ultimate satisfaction to us. It seems therefore necessary that there should be an element of ultimate satisfactoriness about the ideal. This element we can express by the Sanskrit word ananda or perfect peace. By 'ananda', we do not mean any pleasure which disturbs the equilibrium of our mind. All pleasures of sense are associated with such disturbance; they arise out of some mental excitement and are followed necessarily by some reaction. Such pleasures cannot be ultimately satisfactory. They can at best lead us from one state of unrest to another. Lasting satisfaction cannot be derived from them, because they are of the nature of temporary events which bring for a time a sense of elation to our spirits but leave a longer trail of uneasy depression or of thirsting vacuity. That satisfaction is likely to be permanent which arises from, or, rather, is one with a sense of equanimity and poise and thus expresses the self-sufficiency of being that comes with the attainment of perfection.

Perfect satisfaction is only the other side of perfect being. The state of unrest, in which most of us pass their earthly existence, is a sure indication of the fact that they have not attained to perfect being. We are not satisfied with our present condition. What we are does not appear to be quite sufficient for us. So we want to do or get things which we think will contribute to our ampler existence. We want to be bigger than what we are. If we could be perfectly satisfied with what we are, i.e. with our present being, we should not then

run after anything in the world. There should be no provocation for any further activity. But since we are not satisfied with what we are, we have to conclude that, rightly or wrongly, our present being appears defective to us. We are active and always seek to achieve something which we believe will result in a greater enrichment of our being and will thus remedy the short-coming of our present existence. It is with this belief that we go after riches and power; we think they will make us greater than what we are. In reality of course any extraneous accretion cannot result in a great enrichment of being. And unless we grow inwardly, our external possession will only make us worse or at best leave us where we are. But however misdirected our activity may be, there is no denying the fact that an urge or tendency towards greater being is always working in us.

8. R. DAS: "THE NATURE OF THE EMPIRICAL SELF."

Things are always found in relation with one another, An unrelated thing is an unreal abstraction. What is true of other substances in this respect is true also of the spiritual substance, the self. The self is never found in utter isolation from the rest of the world. All the contents of its thoughts and feelings have come from the world; and without such contents the self would be reduced to a principle of bare identity, which again is an empty abstraction. The body and the mind of the self have been built up by the co-operation of different factors of the world. We may even say that the very substance of its being has been the product of the action and reaction among various forces, both physical and spiritual, operative in the world. It preserves its being by carrying on a commerce between itself and the world around it.

9. Every man is found in some particular situa-

tion and his character cannot be truly understood if we view him apart from his situation. He is always a member of a group or a whole which shapes his character and which is in its turn influenced by him.

10. He has inherited a civilisation which has an individuality of its own. He is the product of an historical movement at a particular stage of its evolution. If the concrete reality of a man is to be understood, if, that is, we are to know him as he really is, we have to view him in these and many other aspects.

11. We find as a matter of fact that every man is bound by a network of relations with other human beings. The currents of his life and thought run into those of his fellow men's. A man is not a windowless monad imprisoned within the four walls of his private being. He lives and grows not only in intercourse and communion with his fellow men, but literally <u>in</u> them as well. It may sound strange, but nevertheless it appears to be a fact. Not only did the Father live in the Son, we ordinary mortals too seem to live in one another.

12. Where is the mind? One hypothesis will be that the mind is somewhere within the body or at best one with the nervous system. But if it is simply the nervous system or the brain, many serious difficulties will arise. If the mind is understood as strictly identical with the nervous system, the thoughts and feelings which are supposed to be in the mind, must be found somewhere in the nervous system itself. But these are never discovered in any part of the body or of the nervous system. So if thoughts and feeling are to be the contents of the mind, the mind cannot simply be identified with a physiological mechanism. If we think that the mind is somehow within the body, we can never understand how the knowledge of any object

outside the body can be possible. It is supposed that physical objects even from a distance, send forth currents of physical energy, which through appropriate organs reach the nervous system and so the knowledge of the objects takes place. But if the mind is entirely within the body, it can but be conscious of the last wave of the current which has reached it. The wave itself cannot inform the mind that it has come from a distant object; because the wave is not supposed to be an intelligent principle and it cannot itself declare that it represents some other entity. Even if it tells that it comes from a distant outside object, the mind will not understand it, because the mind has no acquaintance with such an object; for inference presupposes direct knowledge, and this being lacking in the present case, the inference too is not possible. So if the hypothesis we are considering were correct, instead of seeing a tree at a distance, we should merely feel a tickling sensation either in the brain or in the eye.

These difficulties compel us to suppose that the mind is not entirely confined within the organism, although it need not be denied that a physical organism is always associated with a mind. If the mind is not confined to the body alone, there should be no difficulty in supposing that it goes out to the object. The mind has always some content or other, and although the contents themselves do not constitute the mind, they do for a time form part of the mind. They cannot be in the mind and form no part of it. These contents again cannot be separated from the objects. To separate the objects from the contents is to say that the object can never be known. When we say we know some object, we mean that the object itself is the content.

13. Our being, at least as appearance, consists in its actuality. It is impossible to catch ourselves in the past or in the future. Neither the past nor the future is real as actual. The past is real in our memory, the future in our expectation. As thus made real, they may very well be part of our being without giving rise to any inconsistency.

14. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA: "THE VOLUNTARISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD." It has been asserted, perhaps more often than is necessary, that there can be no true philosophy unless one can get beyond the world of appearances and penetrate into the realm of being. To take events in their face-value is to live on the place of commonsense which is equivalent to crude thinking. Of late commonsense has had some vengeance with the help of the realists who in their various theorisings have sought to defent the popular way of thinking in many matters connected with sense-data. But even realists have been obliged to jettison some aspects of appearance in order to concentrate their efforts upon Essence and Existence, primarily of a non-mental type. They have revived pluralism, displaced relation from its pedestal of glory, and rigidly circumscribed the limits of mental operation. A distrust of the reality of mind, born apparently of a reaction against the ego-centric idealism of Berkeley, characterises the whole movement. Backed by a powerful revival in psychology of the behaviouristic standpoint, Realism has begun to ask such strange questions as to whether consciousness exists, whether mind is a mere cross-section of reality or a neutral stuff, whether thinking is mere sub-vocal speech, introspection a myth, intelligence a mere conditioned reflex and emotions only reactions of

the effectors and glands of the body.

It requires a certain amount of boldness now-a-days to assert that, in spite of the rapid development of the sciences, behaviourism and realism, there is still some such entity as mind and a greater boldness still to hold that reality is monadic in character and solipsism is not a dead creed. All honour, therefore, to H.W. Carr who is at present defending the forlorn cause of Leibnitz and fighting the battle of spiritualism. Even convinced spiritualists are fraternising with the realists and seeking a compromise in the concept of emergence that reconciles the originality of the real and the appearance of the spiritual. There is indeed an idea that there must be a nisus towards emergent or holistic activity, but spiritualism of older times that sought to base religion on an antecedent perfection is now out of fashion and, in consonance with presentday democratic ideals, a God that is to be, a primus inter pares, an impersonal spirit, a limited deity are somehow tolerated but not an Absolute or a Creator or even the founder of a pre-established harmony.

15. To those whose gaze is turned outwards the most obvious phenomenon is change in the external world, and it is from this point that they start on their enquiry after the nisus of being. Why should not things remain unchanged in character and position? What causes them to mature and decay or to change into something else? Why should there be any change of place? Is motion eternal? If not, when and how did it begin?

16. But to thoughtful minds the regressive method is only one half of the whole enquiry, for the other half is constituted by the progressive method whose function is the determination of the articulation of the real in the world of change, the urge that lies embedded in

the heart of reality whereby it abandons the security of calm and plunges into the uncertainty of restlessness. If reality was not dynamic at all times, how did it assume a changeful character? Was it deliberately done or was it an involuntary fall from a pristine quiescence? Was it self-imposed or was it introduced from the outside? Is it pushing towards any end or is it drifting helplessly and only acquiring momentary stability here and there? In other words, the problem of the essence and the appearance, being and becoming, reality and change, one and many, pops up its head as soon as a divorce is made between the static and the dynamic, substance and power, reality and relation.

17. Those who limit their observations to physical nature in its non-vital manifestations are likely to carry away the impression, however, that chance rather then system rules the procession of being. True, the different forms of physical energy are convertible to one another and reveal to that existent a principle of unity at their back; true also, the different forms of atomic integration and the sidereal system reveal the existence of a kind of organisation in the inorganic world; but there is too much of random activity in inanimate nature--earthquake and flood, cataclysms and eruptions, hurricanes and avalances, that take no account of human needs and are difficult to justify by reason in many cases. Events take place in nature, it may be, according to law; but that law has no reference to any ulterior good of any sentient being. It is relentless in its operation and unforgiving to the defaulter--it grinds the good and the bad alike, and has no tendency to preserve the achievements of the virtuous and obliterate the relics of savage vandalism. Like the random and spontaneous move-

ments of a child, physical changes may serve to keep the system going; but they have no aim beyond themselves and no tendency to change their character in course of time. The single natural laws from the unvarying groundtone of the world symphony--they can be implicitly taken on trust; but in their combinations they baffle human calculations and, in addition, unforeseeable agencies play crescendoes and diminuendoes in a disconcerting manner on their placid surface and complicate the chances of prediction and routined adjustment.

18. If then we range over the entire field of nature, we find that a restlessness characterises existence as a whole. When waves roll and stars shoot, winds blow and the earth trambles we do not generally interpret such physical phenomena as the working of a mind akin to our own, except in the poetic moods and pantheistic speculations. When we watch, however, the invisible sorting of materials that goes on in a living body and the definite structures that they gradually assume under our very eyes we grow more interested, for here at any rate is the beginning of that order which we have learnt to associate with the working of a mind. And when from structure we rise to function and note how in response to every changing circumstance the tiny mass of life adapts itself by useful action, whether tropistic, reflex or instinctive, the conviction is borne in irresistibly upon us that we are in a very familiar land and that only utter prepossession can refuse to see in these manifestations the adumbrations of purposive human behaviour. The mind has direct knowledge of only one cause of change, namely, a dissatisfaction with the present. The new that is more important or interesting always pulls the mind away from the old and the familiar; the need that the present satisfies is followed by

other needs which the new alone can meet; and so the eternal drama of life rolls on with need succeeding need and action following upon action with no higher aim perhaps than that a fuller life should be lived and a wider contact with nature should increase effort and enjoyment alike. Even when life is not illumined by a beatific vision there is enough of encouragement to plant its foot forward and to take the necessary next step on an onward journey that might after all prove interminable. It can hardly be said of life or mind that it is aiming at a final state to be quiescent at last, for their perfection is a greater activity of themselves, an endless quest and a limitless adventure which only the conditions of time and space and material can alone limit. Each manifestation looks like a finished product so far as it goes because it is adapted to its own immediate environment. But an invisible push from within and behind is upsetting all existing arrangements, and so life and mind are obliged to mount higher and higher to retain foothold in a more strenuous world where environments are anything but kind, neighbours anything but friendly and former adjustments anything but helpful.

19. The reading of a will into nature may be a poetic fancy or a splendid analogy, but there is no doubt that if all that evolutionism says is true the temptation to use the terms of human psychology is almost irresistible. That a chaotic nebular mass should form galactic and sideral systems and that on one of the planetary bodies the course of evolution should so shape itself that gradually, with the dissipation of heat and the formation of an atmosphere, conditions favourable to life should arise and living germs, brought from outside by radiant pressure or indigeneously produced, should increase, multiply, proliferate and evolve into innumerable

kinds of plants and animals which become naturally adjusted to one another in a progressive manner and that lastly consciousness should appear in the scene and supersede blind natural selection by rational selection--these successive stages of the world event look so much like the manifestations of an increasing purpose that an extension of the categories of human thinking becomes permissible. As in human life, there have indeed been many rejected motives, fruitless ventures and aimless wanderings; but on the whole steady progress has been maintained in the denouncement of the world-drama and even where progress has been thwarted and some backsliding has occurred, adjustment on a lower plane has been effected provided the conditions of life have not too rapidly altered.

This has enabled metaphysicians of the type of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann to see in the operation of nature the working of a will, aided occasionally by flashes of idea to tide over difficult corners and to advance to higher levels. We are not concerned with their particular formulation of the doctrine of the world-will and its ethical and religious conclusions. Here is a passage from Schopenhauer which will illustrate the line of thinking we are trying to understand: "Whosoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge in abstracto, and therefore clear and certain, of what every one knows directly in concreto, i.e. as feeling, a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to him as idea, both in his actions and in their permanent substratum, his body, and that his will is that which is most immediate in his consciousness, though it has not as such completely passed into the form of idea in which

object and subject stand over against each other, but makes itself known to him in a direct manner, in which he does not quite clearly distinguish subject and object, yet is not known as a whole to the individual himself, but only in its particular acts,--whoever, I say, has with me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as idea alone. He will recognise this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomental existences which exactly resembles his own, in men and animals as their inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to recognise the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation which acts so powerfully throughout matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,--all these, I say, he will recognise as different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as that which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than anything else, and which in its most distinct manifestation is called will."

20. G.R. MALKANI: "VEDANTIC MYSTICISM:" We may suppose that the vedantic philosophy is

quite complete in itself, and that it can quite well reason out the position of non-dualism. This will however only give us rational knowledge, or a certain intellectual view of things. It will not amount to the realisation of Brahman. To have this realisation, we must have recourse to some kind of meditative practice, sadhana, etc. As the result of such practice alone, we can have knowledge that will make us free. We may philosophise, but we can never achieve the goal without yoga and the revelation to which it alone can lead.

We may, on the other hand suppose that the Vedantic philosophy has failed in its purpose, and that its main position, namely the sole reality of Brahman, cannot be satisfactorily reasoned out. But where philosophy fails, mysticism takes up. It comes to the rescue. It alone can prove without a doubt that Brahman is the sole reality.

We shall take up the latter position first. Here again two different attitudes may be adopted; (i) the postulate of the sole reality of Brahman is inconsistent with facts. There is the physical world, and there are individual souls. These can never be proved to be unreal or illusory. If there is any Absolute, it must embrace the known differences. Vedantic Brahman does not embrace differences, and cannot explain them. It is an empty notion, far removed from actual experience.

Those who argue the unreality of Brahman in some such way, may have quite a plausible philosophy of their own. We have nothing to say to them here. But the only proper attitude of such people will be that the Vedantic idea is irrational, and if there is any such thing as Vedantic mysticism, it must be some form of erroneous perception, a perception that runs counter to the requirements of reason. In short,

Vedantic philosophy fails, and with it goes vedantic mysticism.

(ii) We do not propose to contradict Vedanta outright from some position of our own. For all we know we may be mistaken in our common notions of reality and unreality. We are therefore prepared to be taught. But we cannot be expected for forego the exercise of our own reason. We accept all that Vedanta wants to teach us; we accept that Brahman is the sole reality, that the world comprising both physical nature and finite individuals is an illusory appearance, that this illusory appearance is due to ignorance or avidya, etc. But having accepted this, we want to know whether these various positions are consistent with one another. What we find however is that they are not, and that the view of things here suggested is self-discrepant. We are therefore obliged to believe that mysticism will perhaps put things right, and that it will bring conviction where reason fails to do.

Let us examine this position at length. The inner discrepancy spoken of above may be put somewhat as follows: The world-appearance is illusory in character. It is true that an illusory appearance does not really exist; and since it does not really exist, Brahman may be the sole reality. But at the same time, we have to answer the question, how does this illusory appearance of the world at all become possible? Brahman cannot be its cause; for Brahman is the substratum, and the reality of the substratum is inconsistent with the reality of the false appearance superimposed upon it. Brahman also cannot cause anything; for it is actionless, unchanging and pure. We might even go further and say that the world cannot be caused or brought into being

by Brahman. If it were, it would cease to be illusory; for a real cause cannot have any but real effects. It is said that the illusory appearance is due to avidya. But then there must be this avidya in addition to Brahman, which will mean a real dualism. And then what is this avidya to rest on as its support? It cannot have Brahman as its support; for Brahman has no avidya; he is unconditioned, pure, and free from all those activities in which the manifestations of avidya consist. The finite individual too cannot be this support; for he is a product of avidya, and does not yet exist. The question therefore has to be answered,--how is avidya itself possible?

It will now be observed that if Brahman is the sole reality, we can only account for the appearance of the world by postulating avidya or the absence of right knowledge. The world can have no real cause. It is because we want to imply an unreal cause that we postulate avidya as the cause. Avidya then, taken as an explanatory concept, cannot be treated as signifying anything real. When we say that the world-appearance is due to avidya, we cannot mean that avidya is something real. Another point to be noted here is the demand to know the support of avidya. This means that we regard it as unquestionable that avidya cannot be real in itself, and that it can only be realised somehow in what is intelligent. Can we now turn round and say that the fact that there is avidya leads to dualism? Indeed if avidya can exist independently and side by side with Brahman, that would be so. But nobody has ever argued that position. The concept of avidya then does not challenge the sole reality of Brahman, but rather implies it.

21. We may call the world illusory, but it is there to be taken account of. It is not nothing.

If it were nothing, we should have had no broblem. But we do have a problem, which proves that it is something; and this something cannot be Brahman. How can we then escape a fundamental contradiction in all Vedantic reasoning? We philosophise, and then we cannot turn round and say that there is nothing to philosophise about, and no philosophy. That would be just like kicking away the ladder when we have reached the top. We must therefore recognise that if philosophy is a real process, the facts on which it is based and with which it starts cannot be wholly unreal; and yet their reality militates against the conclusion which this process of reasoning is supposed to have arrived at, namely the sole reality of Brahman. Is it not plain that there is something wrong with the process of reasoning.

22. What is certain is that any rational explanation must supersede the empirical view of things as being due to want or thought, and therefore to error and ignorance. It cannot be said to explain the latter, for it is opposed to it and supersedes it. Knowledge will drive out ignorance; it will not explain it. When therefore philosophy explains things rationally, it presupposes this difference of standpoint. It would be the height of absurdity now to turn round and say that a philosophical explanation is incorrect because it is inconsistent with the facts as given to empirical observation and with which philosophy itself had to start. There is no rational or philosophical explanation if such inconsistency does not arise, and is not from the beginning presupposed.

The world as known to us through our senses is shown rationally to partake of the same nature which the unreal snake has in respect

of the rope. If our reasoning is true, then we may see the world with our eyes, but with our reason we shall know it to be Brahman and not what it appears. The appearance is illusory, non-existent, and real only from a point of view which must be superseded. When we have superseded it, can we still insist that the appearance is somehow real and that it requires explanation? What non-empirical explanation can we give except that it does not exist in fact, and is due merely to ignorance?

23. Our conclusion is that Vedanta is not self-discrepant as a philosophical system. The self-discrepancy arises from a misunderstanding of its concepts. But even supposing that it is self-discrepant, mystical experience can do nothing to remove its contradiction. There remains only the first alternative, namely that Vedantic mysticism must be based upon the truth of Vedantic philosophy. It is because the system is true that there can be a true experience answering to its conclusions. The question may be raised,-- but what is Vedantic mysticism after all?

It is important in this connection to note that Vedantic mysticism is not a matter of some mechanical practice based on faith. Not action but knowledge is the way. The only question is how is this knowledge achieved? We think that it is only by right discrimination that it can be achieved. It may be said that knowledge thus arrived at will still be merely intellectual, and therefore indirect and unconvincing. To this our answer is that if our reasoning is not abstract, but based upon the facts of direct experience, then our conclusions cannot be divorced from the latter. Direct experience will remain intact; there will be change merely in our understanding of it. Knowledge thus arrived at will therefore be as direct as any experience can be; and "mysticism" is only a term to signify direct

experience of a particular kind, namely that which relates to what is not sensible. Our intuition of self is direct and not sensible. Here therefore we have the true basis of Vedantic mysticism.

Knowledge of Brahman which we obtain by discrimination is not like knowledge of America which we obtain by reading books, or hearing rports from persons who have visited that country. The latter is indeed indirect knowledge; it becomes direct when we ourselves visit that country and see things for ourselves. Knowledge by discrimination is quite direct; for we know Brahman already. There can be no mere direct contact with him than that which we already have. What divides us from him is not want of direct intuitive contact; it is merely an error of our understanding, or our misunderstanding. Discrimination removes this error. We may bring this out by taking a concrete instance although a very crude one. I know a certain person x doing work which I regard to be highly philanthropic. I come across evidence which proves to me conclusively that he has a selfish motive in everything he does. Can I now regard him as I used to do formerly? It is evident, I cannot. The man and his acts will continue to be just the same. But my understanding is now changed regarding them. I shall only see mischief and self-interest where formerly I saw high and noble purpose. Just in the same way, reality will continue to be known as I know it in the state of ignorance. The change will be merely in my understanding. But this change makes all the difference between bondage and liberation or moksha, the goal of Vedantic mysticism.

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS: Vol. XX.

1. WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN: "BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS IN CHINA & JAPAN." It is interesting not note that both Occidental and Oriental philosophy started with a similar problem, and having answered it in different ways continued thereafter to diverge. The speculators of Greece and India both began with the antithesis of Being and Becoming, or the Unchanging and the Changing, with which we may, in these days associate the conceptions of Space as opposed to Time.

Plato and Aristotle attempted to compromise between the Eleatic school and the teaching of Heraclitus, but their compromise was essentially in favour of the school of Being. According to Platonism, the phenomenal world is in a state of constant flux, is a Becoming, but behind it is the static world of reason, the unchanging noumenal world. The importance and value of this standpoint is obvious. It has been the rational basis of dogma, whether scientific, religious, or philosophical. Two and two are forever four; a is always a; a thing is, or it is not; there is an Absolute or there is not an Absolute.

Primitive Buddhism: In India, when an age of metaphysical inquiry arose after the decay of the primitive faith of the Vedas, the system which for a number of centuries secured predominance was Buddhism. This philosophy insisted upon the theory of change, of impermanence, of the eternal becoming. The noumenal and static aspect of the system, Nirvana, was never developed from the logical point of view.

The body was considered a living, complex, mutating organism, possessing no self-nature. The nature of the "soul" was supposed to be analogous. The percipient consciousness was no

fixed entity having a direct insight into truth through a stable and transcendental reason, but a compound effected by the chain of causation, and conditioned by its environment.

In its earlier stages this philosophy resulted in a curious form of agnosticism. Our minds being finite, we can obtain no definite information as to whether the world is infinite or not. We can only deal with facts and data of which we are immediately conscious; with states of consciousness; with an analysis of the emotions; with the universe as perceived, as opposed to the universe as it is.

Primitive Buddhism was built upon this psychological basis. The three "marks" or essential features are constructs arising from perceptual or emotional experience."(1) All is impermanent. (2) All is sorrowful (3) All is lacking a self." This last phrase refers not only to the soul, but to the universe as a whole. It consists not of simple or self-existing things, but of complex, caused, conditioned things. The fourth "mark" Nirvana, is no less psychological. By means of contemplation certain form of samadhi trance or ecstasy were experienced. Magnify the experience, consider it permanent, associate with it the abolition of sorrow, sin and ignorance, and the theory of Nirvana is formulated, for it must be remembered that originally Nirvana is purely a state of mind.

The so-called Four Noble Truths are derived from the same basic ideas. Transformed from an ancient Indian medical rune, they are:--(1) Suffering exists. (2) The cause of suffering is desire (and ignorance) (3) There is a possible end of suffering--Nirvana. (4) This end may be achieved by following the Noble Eight-

fold Path. The first and third "truths" are the same as the second and fourth "marks". The fourth is purely a point of ethics and does not concern us. The second is the most important and contains the seed of a very complete phenomenology, for at a very early stage "suffering" became in this instance, synonymous with life, and this "truth" was supposed to explain the origin of the experience world--the experienced universe let it be noted, for early Buddhism had no interest in the origin of the external universe.

Primitive Buddhism was probably realistic. It believed that there is an external universe closely corresponding to our sense-data, but it is subjective, the result of the action of the percipient consciousness (Vijnana) acted upon by external stimuli.

The theory of the origin, awakening, and development of the Vijnana is explained in the obscure Pratitya Samutpada or the twelve-linked chain of causation. A more lucid account is contained in the much later Prajna Paramita Castra, viz:--

Sense Organs)----(Sense Objects.

↓

Sensation
(Vedana)

|

Self-consciousness
(Vijnana)

|

Consciousness of external world
(Samjna)

|

The experienced Universe.
(Samskara)

The commentary states that the elementary mind substance (Citta) coming in contact through the five sense organs with the five sense objects gives rise to Vedana (sensation or perception). This, in turn, gives rise to Vijnana proper (here equivalent to self-consciousness), which again results in Samjna (Conception, ratiocination, here equal to consciousness of externality), and so the fully developed experienced world (samskara) comes into being.

The origin of the percipient consciousness is ignorance and desire. Without these the individual consciousness would disintegrate, and though the experienced universe cannot exist without object, it equally cannot exist without subject. Consequently when an Arhat (one who has attained Nirvana) dies, the experienced world for that personality comes to an end.

Such was early Buddhism, or so Japanese scholars suppose, and we are not at present concerned whether or not they are historically correct.

Mahayana Buddhism.: At this point Buddhism almost abandoned its essential spirit of insistence upon change and becoming, and approached the standpoint of Western Philosophy. The root instinct of the religion was too strong, however, and in the new Mahayana system which arose in India about the Christian Era a return was made to the principle of eternal transicence and impermanency. This Mahayana school took root in China and Japan and after Buddhism was expelled from India continued to flourish there.

The basis of early or undeveloped Mahayana is Cunya (literally emptiness or the void). This doctrine has frequently been totally misunderstood in the West and taken to mean

the theory of the non-existence of the universe or pure idealistic Nihilism. It is only recently that the conception has been properly expounded in Yamakami's Systems of Buddhistic Thought, and Suzuki's Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism.

Cunya is simply an insistence that all things have no self-essence, that they are compounds, unstable organisms even in their elemental stage. The science of the present generation believes that the supposedly rigid physical elements are not necessarily permanent; that they may be broken down; that the elements themselves prove to be compounds possessing the essential qualities of transformation and decay. In like manner the Cunya school, represented by the Madhyamika sect of Mahayana supposed that the Dharmas (elements) are impermanent, and have no existence-unto-themselves; that they may be broken down into parts, parts into sub-parts, and so on eternally. Accordingly, all phenomena have a relative as opposed to an absolute existence. In a word all of life was once more reduced to a single underlying flux a stream of existence with an everlasting becoming.

The next stage of doctrinal development was a very important one, and resulted in the formulation of a remarkably complete system of idealism. The stream of life was supposed to be the Essence of Mind, a fundamental mind-stuff that was permanent yet ever chaning like the ocean. From this all elements (the 75 elements became 100 in this school), and therefore all phenomena are derived. It was called Alaya Vijnana, Repository Consciousness, yet it was considered to be neither matter nor mind, but the basis energy that was at the root of both.

It would be easy to exaggerate this doctrine and to falsely identify it with many more

developed systems, but undoubtedly it has many points of contact with certain phases of modern Occidental philosophy. The Alaya Vijnana is like Elan de Vie of Bergson, the Energy of Leibnix the Unconscious of Von Hartmann. Like the last, though it is the essence of consciousness, it is not itself conscious in its early stages. It is mental yet there is a certain objective reality about it. Each unit of life may be regarded as a vortex in the sea of mind-essence. The action and interaction of these units, one with another, and with the common stream brings about the phenomenal appearance of the universe.

Accordingly the Alaya Vijnana is regarded in three aspects, viz. (1) as active, or the seed of percipient consciousness; (2) as passive, as the sensibilia of consciousness, and as receiving the influence of all things (3) as the object of false belief in as much as being the root of self-consciousness, each person comes to regard himself as an eternal ego entity.

We may, perhaps, better understand the nature of this Essence of Mind, and its development of the universe by enumerating its four faculties, which are:-

1. Form.. ..	..	Outer-objective.
2. Perception	..	
3. Ratiocination	..	Inner-subjective.
4. Reflection	..	

In Hinayana the external world is taken for granted and we start with the percipient consciousness fully developed. In Mahayana we are told that both the eternal world and consciousness are ultimately reducible to the Alaya Vijnana. The Alaya Vijnana in its yet unindividuated stage is the energy behind inanimate life, the world of minerals, etc. it is also the life force behind the vegetable world. As such it is Form or the essence of the

objective world. Eventually this life force attains the power of sensation or perception. It is latent in the begetable world and fully developed in the animal world. It becomes aware of the other currents in the stream of life or, if you place, the other phases of the Alaya vijnana, from which we understand why this essence is both subject and object.

As this sensatory or perceptive faculty develops there arises the ability to retain impressions, to compare and associate them. So it is that the third faculty, thought or normal consciousness comes into being. This is to be found only in the higher animals, etc. This in turn develops into self-consciousness or reflection, making man and the other possessors of this faculty capable of metaphysical speculation.

This may be called the cosmic development of the Alaya Vijnana, or the development of the universe itself, or the universe as it really is, as opposed to the experienced universe, In order to comprehend the latter we must examine the eight-fold division of normal human consciousness as taught by this school. These are known as the eight Vijnana. which each person creates for himself.

The first five Vijnana may be called the aspects of consciousness. They are co-ordinated with the five sense organs and serve as recipients of the stimuli given by them. The sixth Vijnana is normal waking consciousness, is similar to the rational faculty, and correlates the data presented by the first five vijnana. It functions through memory and reason. The seventh Vijnana is the focus of self-consciousness, distinguishing itself from the general stream of consciousness. The eighth Vijnana is the Alaya Vijnana, or the individualization of the essence of mind containing potentially all aspects of existence.

From this it is easy to see that from the relative point of view the first five Vijnana lead to an acquaintance with phenomena, as they are presented by the senses, the sixth by means of comparison builds up the mental constructs, and from the confused mass of sense data such as colour, form, etc., formulates and recognises the eject ink-pot. The seventh Vijnana seeks to find the real nature of the ink-pot, and its relationship with other phenomena, while the eighth Vijnana is the real basis of all this psychological action, is the root of all other seven Vijnana, and contains within itself a micro-cosmic replica of the macrocosm, being in fact the only reality behind all the seeming complexity of the phenomenal world.

This may be said to represent the idea of the school concerning the everyday activity of consciousness, but we are concerned with how this individualized experienced world came into being, and the real relationship between the eight Vijnana and external reality. We are told that the stages of the formation of the microcosm are as follows:

1. Before the development of the other Vijnana, the Alaya Vijnana in its active aspect, acting as the seed of life interacts with the passive or external Alaya, and so produces the essence of the world as perceived, the basis of the empirical universe, which is still faint and free from distinguishing characteristics.

2. In the meantime the seventh Vijnana or self-consciousness, that which firmly distinguishes between the subjective and objective having developed, it is fecundated by the Alaya and becoming aware of the nucleus of the external world proceeds to take it into its comprehension and so gives to it form and shape, which are, needless to say,

secondary or subjective qualities, and not inherent in the external world.

3. The sixth Vijnana or that which discriminates between the various phenomena of the universe then develops and, fecundated by the Alaya, adds to the gradually developing germ the concept of like and dislike, associating with it other objects with reference to cause and effect.

4. There then develop the remaining five Vijnana corresponding to the five sense organs. When these have been impregnated by the Alaya, they give, on coming into contact with the germ of objectivity the final touches of the external world. Thus, for example the first Vijnana, visual conscious-ness, gives the sense of colour and presents the phenomenon in question in the form which our ordinary sense impression makes familiar to us.

This doctrine of the Essence of Mind has played a very important part in Mahayana philosophy, and in the later schools has received much further development.

In China and Japan the doctrine of Being is known as Ke, the doctrine of Becoming as Ku (Cunya). In contrast to them both, the later Mahayanists offer the doctrine of Chu, the Middle or the Mean. In later Mahayana the Essence of Mind is known as Bhutatathata, literally Suchness--the Suchness-of-things-as-they-are. This they conceive to be like the ocean. The waves are life's phenomena. The ocean is always changing. Waves are always arising, and no two waves are alike. So does the stream of life ever go surging past, never remaining the same. Yet there is in a sense a certain stability, a certain Being, a fixity, a changelessness in this very changeability. This is the doctrine of the Mean.

The Essence of Mind soon received all the attributes of the Occidental Absolute. It was conceived as identical with Nirvana, and as the waves and the ocean are the same, so was the world of life and death and Nirvana the same. The goal was not to be gained by transcending the phenomenal world, but by the expression of the noumenal world in ordinary life.

Later a religious phase followed, and the Absolute was conceived as the Universal Buddha immanent in the hearts of all sentient beings. It was frequently symbolized as Amitabha Buddha, or the Buddha of Infinite Light. It was considered to be possessed of three bodies (kaya) or aspects, similar to the Sabellian heresy concerning the Trinity. All human Buddhas or sages were supposed to be the embodiments of this being, corresponding to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

All these points, however, belong to comparative religion rather than to philosophy, so that we must leave them untouched. (CONTINUED IN "MAHAYANA NOTES" page 136)

2. J.A. SMITH: "THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE." With varied emotions we have come to realise that the great Idealistic movement which took its rise with Kant in Germany, has not spent its force; that in Croce it possesses a champion not ashamed of its cause, but conceived that with it there came into the world a principle living and indeed immortal as the mind of man. Proclaiming not only Hegel but before him Kant as his spiritual ancestors, and acknowledging his unrepayable debt to their inspiration, he boldly throws aside as antiquated much that has descended from them; and, disengaging the essence from the accidental and contingent details, reconstructs almost from the foundations a system, in which he confident that the mind of the XXth century with its vastly increased store of scientific and historical experience can still find its home.

3. The ground upon which the whole structure of their philosophizing rests is of course, as it must be, experience. In that there is not, and cannot be, anything distinctive. But what sort of experience? It is not, as it is elsewhere, specially religious nor specially political nor specially ethical, and perhaps above all it is not specially scientific; to them the need for philosophical reconstruction does not appear as specially created by the success (or the failure) of scientific activity. What begets the desire for philosophy is the experience of History. In Croce this is particularly plain, for it was just his inner dissatisfaction with the actual practice, so to speak, of the historian that forced upon him the necessity of the search for a philosophy. Yet it is in a large measure true of all of them. The part success, part failure, of history in achieving a theory of itself drives them outward and inward in the quest for self-understanding. This it is which dictates the form of the problem which reflexion finds most urgent. Hence the problem is at once general or universal and particular or even individual. The task which philosophy accepts as now set to itself is that of understanding History, and imprimis its own history. And by History we must mean not merely (or at all) the History which unrolls itself before us, but the History which we enact, and again not merely (or at all) the History which we enact (historia historizata), but that which we more potently create in thought or judgement, in ceaseless commentation upon the bare and vanishing facts (historia historizans), a commentary which encroaches from the margin upon the text until the gloss extrudes and displaces the evanescent original. In fact, there is no such original; the text itself is the product of mind's self-

interpretative activity and fills the whole roll on which is recorded the content of such experience as alone we can have or at least have access to. All else follows the paths of dreams and is lost as soon as it is acquired. Nought remains or holds in being for the tiniest moment save what the mind distils out of what is done or suffered under the sun--out of what we have in the widest sense of the word "experienced." And lastly prerogative reality and worth attaches to what the mind by reflexion further distils out of this precious essence, and in the record of the results of man's philosophizing is the quintessence of all our experience. Out of the history of philosophy arises the need for further philosophizing, and so the life of the mind continues without end as it was without beginning. This is the universal position of mind, which creates at once its object and itself. In this view of its nature and its function lies also the supreme modernity of the philosophy of which we are speaking. For at the present time, surely what we most desire and demand is that the mind should frame and hold some theory of its activity as the interpreter of its own history, and primarily of the manner and justification of its procedure in passing judgments of fact or value upon its past achievements. Might we not define for ourselves the present-day problem of philosophy as the determination, organization, systematization of "the critical presuppositions of history?"

However that may be the group of thinkers whom Gentile occupies a leading place so understand the problem. Like Croce he takes it as in form determined by the essentially historical character of all experience and approaches it with a mind prepared for its self-imposed task by an acquaintance deep and wide with the

past of the human mind, with that past which still lives in him and in us. And he has spared no pains to lay deep and broad the foundations of his philosophy, sharing Croce's contempt for the shallow and second-hand learning of contemporary positivism. However high their Idealism may soar it springs from and returns to what Bacon calls "the right earth" of historical experience.

4. During the period of his development up to the first statement of his systematic position his mind was travelling along several distinct lines which gradually converged. In the first place, he was, as I have said, deepening and enriching his experience as a teacher, and meditating upon the practical and theoretic problems suggested by that experience. He took a large and active part in the public controversies which raged in Italy round the topic of education, especially of secondary education and the training of teachers for it, labouring always to raise the discussion to the philosophic plane, and contending for the necessarily philosophical character of the science of education. He protested against the purblind practicalism which ignores the necessity of clear-headedness about principles and dreams of carrying on without a conception of the nature and development of Mind, and also against the laicism which ignores the essentially religious character of all education.

5. The result of Gentile's preoccupation with the tasks and problems of the teacher's life has been in the main the conception of the life of mind as essentially a process of education, of self-education, that is, of self-formation or self-creation. Its life is the life in or of a school, wherein through the conflict and co-operation of minds, in appearance and divided but in reality one, ceaseless

progress is secured. In such activity lies all the worth, the joy, the sacredness of life, and it is of this that he seeks the philosophy, which is no extraneous addition to the activity which it interprets, but the continuance of that activity itself at a higher level of understanding and power. The universe is itself an immense school, the place as Keats has said, of "Soul-making," where Minds (for he would not accept Keat's distinction of Souls from Intelligences) are moulded into integrity and perfection.

6. The History of Philosophy is just the record of Mind's self-creation. In the study of it we become acquainted with, appropriate, and digest into the substance of our own minds, what Mind has in the past achieved and accumulated. Reviewing the more recently deposited strata in the process of their deposition, Gentile is conducted outwards from Italy and backwards from the present, and of the total process reaches a view wide at once in space and time, until the prospect has no bounds in either.

7. These identities depend upon, or issue from, the still more fundamental identity of Mind or Spirit with itself, of its being with its history, for it <u>is</u> what it makes itself, <u>is</u> the process of its own self-creation.

This is the cardinal principle of Gentile's philosophy, that Mind <u>is</u>, as he puts it, <u>atto puro</u>, absolute self-actualization--that and nothing more, less, or other. This is the open secret of its nature and its life, from which all the rest follows. To this as centre all roads of thought converse and out of it all diverge again to reach every quarter of experience. In this Thought, which is not thought merely but knowledge, self-knowledge, all facts of experience are dissolved, to be reborn as

themselves thought or knowledge. This all-dissolving but also all-creating or re-creating Thought is thought a priori and absolute, is the act or reality of thought at its highest. As it predetermines and prescribes the immanent method of its own development, it begets and maintains an endless philosophy, which may be called by various names, the Idealism of Actuality or Absolute Spiritualism. Nothing is real, such is its fundamental position, save Spirit, and Spirit is naught but the process, without beginning and without end, of its own absolute self-creation.

Now we have heard this often enough, and it may be said to be the end (which is rather the beginning) towards which was inevitably tending the current of thought that bore Hegel, and those who are not ashamed to avow that they have learned from him, onwards, or perhaps--to put the claim more boldly--towards which has been set the whole movement of modern philosophy. And yet it is hard doctrine, and we take it "with such a heavy mind." We cannot resolve to embrace it, to stake everything upon it, to commit ourselves finally to its control. We are fain to palter and compromise with the absoluteness of its claim upon us, and even those who first descried or discerned it lost faith in it and wandered back to more familiar and homely ground. But Gentile will admit no compromise or condition: this is to him the articulus stantis aut cadentis philosophioe.

What he offers or presses upon us is a principle of exegesis for the whole of our experience, and he offers it as the last and best result of Mind's reflexion upon the meaning of its whole past history, the process by which it has come to be what it is, by which it is what it is, and by continuance of which alone can it maintain itself in being; by which also

there is whatever else there is, or seems to be, as its environment. In this principle Mind has come to itself, and affirms itself as the knower of its own being, which is its own work and life. To it rien n'est donne, tout se fait; nothing is but thinking makes it so in the act of its own self-formation.

It may serve to make this end and beginning of reflexion clearer, if it be thrown up against the better-known system of Croce as its background. This way of presenting it must, however, not be understood as implying a judgment on my part that its emergence has put Corce's view into the background or has in any way superseded it. To suggest such a relation would be to do injustice to Croce, more especially as his development is by no means at an end and it may be that he will prove able to appropriate and overreach all that Gentile urges. Yet, taking Croce's view as it is set before us in his systematic presentment of it, what strikes the student of it is the prominence which is given in it to the articulation of the mind into the distinct grades of Theory and Practice, each with its two sub-grades. Doubtless behind this lies or lurks the unity of the mind which preserves its identity in and through these distinctions. But the unity seems to be separated from the articulation or genuine multiplicity, and is rather a problem than a solution. The articulation is not deduced, but given or assumed. What we start with is one, but it possesses also as its nature what may be called a statical structure; it does not give itself this structure or necessarily endow itself with it. And indeed it remains obscure how or why it distinctifies and diversifies its primordial unity, and so its essence and its existence fall inexplicably apart. The gap which sunders the one from the

other is concealed. In justice to Croce, it must be added, that in his actual philosophising the breach is healed, and that he practices better than he preaches. His grasp upon the primordial unity prevents the distinctions which he draws from stifferning into a dead rigidity, and the concrete manifestations of the life of the Mind, into whatever detail his interest follows them, never finally fall apart, or lose their vital connection with one another and the whole. The unity is no roi faineant. Yet it is not demonstratively or irregragably the single and sufficient source of all its complex but orderly multiplicity.

To Gentile it is so. In him perhaps the unity is even too much insisted upon, and upon it is thrown the responsibility of educing out of itself all the multiplicity that there is. The dialectical process which is its life is completely or absolutely immanent, and, as I have said, is always and everywhere without beginning and without end. The one spirit or mind posits and cancels or supersedes all oppositions and distinctions, and is the author of all forms, degress, grades, stages or being: it makes and unmakes everything whatsoever including itself, like Time begetting and devouring its own offspring. But it would be misleading to dwell too long upon the contrast between the two thinkers, lest there seem to be suggested more difference than there is.

It is more important to raise the question whether the principle which is so posited can do what is expected of it. Can it show itself capable of generating out of itself and by its own unaided power, such a system as the Universe is? Or rather must it do so? Does the starting point prescribe a dialectic which by an inner necessity develops into the whole wealth of concrete detail which is the filling of experience?

At first sight the principle seems empty and barren enough. But let us attempt to realize what precisely it is. What it is, is Mind in its proper being and existence, that is, Self-consciousness, not as a state or result but as a self-engendering activity. This is to us a paradox, for it is all too common to start with the misconception of it as an attitude towards something else which determines and is determined by it, being presupposed by Mind as theorizing and presupposing Mind as its fashioner or refashioner, not as its creator. Mind starts, so we say to ourselves, with an object over against it as subject, and its history is the tale of how it comes to know that object and modify it, moulding it to its purposes. Gentile bids us, however, go behind this, and remaind us that being what it is or is to be, viz. self-conscious, it can and must posit itself as object and concurrently itself as subject, while still it remains one with itself. The subject, the object, the synthesis of both, are moments in its being and life, moments in and to it eternally distinguishable and distinct, yet also phases or stages in its historical existence. Hence it may be spoken of as separating these from one another, and allowing them the fullest scope to become what they are. Into each in turn it throws itself wholly, so that each constitutes an absolute form of its experience; in each, however widely they are drawn asunder and however they put out of sight the bonds that unite them, it remains indefectibly what it is, consciousness, self-consciousness, in the making. As consciousness of the subject, it is Art; as consciousness of the object it is Religion; as consciousness of the synthesis of both it is philosophy. Art as the endeavour to develop to the full the moment of conscious-

ness of the subject as such, to be itself the whole being and existence of the mind, defeats itself, issues in empty and impotent subjectivity, and is driven by its intestine self-contradiction to pass into Religion: Religion taking up the task of self-integration finds its work endless if it denies itself the aid of Art, yet with that aid still fails unless it merges together with Art in Philosophy, in whose hands is the knowledge, the principle and method, and the result of the integration of both. "So that Philosophy is the final form in which the others are taken up and reconciled, and represents the Truth, the plenary actuality and the Spirit," which is the one and only Reality.

Thus we reach, or rather restore and confirm the principle that Philosophy, the supreme form of self-consciousness, is the consummate form of experience, and because experience is all that is or is real, Philosophy is also the whole and sole Reality. Nought is or comes to be save what Mind has created or is creating philosophando, that is, in the process of making itself the knowledge of itself.

To some this doctrine may appear as the mere extravagance of a subjective Idealism, conceiving all Reality after the pattern of its own inward nature and activity, which it, as it were, projects outwards upon all other (so-called objective) being. Like the earlier draft of the system it is open even to caricature, and may be represented as a philosophy which bids us regard the Universe under the figure of a University in which all the faculties are branches of philosophy with only a relative independence of their parent and sovereign--Philosophy itself. But, after, all, how shall Mind conceive its world save after the pattern of itself, and how best save after the pattern of its

own highest and happiest activity? Certainly we are bidden to read all our experience in the light of that experience which is most truly experience, because it is superlatively self-clear. And where else shall we find this guiding and illuminating or interpretative experience except in that where mind enjoys the maximum of insight into its own glassy essence and self-transparent life? Towards this clue to the enigma of existence from this quarter and that, the currents of modern speculation have long been convering: let us take heart of grace and assume this as the clue, bending our energies to its use in the constructive work of our philosophizing. Here we stand on firm ground; here we have reached a που στω, from which we can view all that is or can be, here and nowhere else.

We seek for Truth (or the Truth), and looking ever outwards we seek it in vain. Veritas habitat in interiore hominis; seeking it there, we find it, and finding it, go forth with renewed confidence to seek and find it elsewhere, projected outwards from the inner source of illumination. Yet all we find in the apparently outward returns and enriches the inward content from which it flows, and so the inward truth advances in clearness and power without hindrance or stay. The unclear or germinal experience is surrounded by a penumbra which shades illimitably into utter darkness where there is nothing, but it irradiates its surroundings with beams which light it up and returning to their origin feed and quicken the central flame. Thus, what seems opaque to its light has yet its office in the whole economy, breaking the white light into infinite variegations of colour, which, reflected to the centre, stir it to a heightened activity of emission till the whole world is

bathed in its effulgence. Such is the activity in which all that is, lives, and moves and has its being.

But, again, it may be asked how, even if this principle stand self-assured, shall we apply it? The answer, I repeat, is that, once accepted, it applies itself, prescribing by its nature the mode and method of its application, and we have but to submit ourselves to its direction and control. For the development of its consequences, I can but refer you to Gentile's own exposition in his essay called "The Method of Immanence" (in the volume entitled La riforma della dialettica hegeliana), where he distinguishes it over against "The Method of Transcendence," tracing the history of the latter from its origin in Plato, noting the dawn of the former in Christian thought, and its struggles to supplant its rival or competitor in modern philosophy (its false dawn in Spinoza, the apprehension of its principle by Kant, the efforts of Hegel to disengage it from its involution with tramelling elements of the other). To-day and for us, he contends, it is disengaged and has achieved complete freedom. We are free of it, but we must use our freedom in order to possess it. In this new-won freedom, of which the method is the self-imposed law, we find not a new organon of knowledge, but a beginning and a desire for further knowledge. What it offers is is not a result, but a program of continued work.

All this is to some of us--not, I hope, to all--so strange and even paradoxical that a last endeavour may be here permitted to bring home its significance. We are all at one in the quest for some clue to the riddle of existence: we all seek the principle of a metaphysics, a principle which of itself will expand

into the detail of a systematic account of ourselves and our world, bringing both at once and together into knowledge. And so far also we may be said to be agreed that the clue is to be found in experience or nowhere. Experience alone has a full title to be called real, everything else having a claim only in so far it is an element or factor or moment in experience, or is a feature or presupposition of it, etc. etc. And the experience which has this title must be (a) present or actual, the past and the future only holding whatever measure of reality they possess in dependence upon the present; and (b) total or universal, each part or parcel of it being similarly dependent upon its complete or self-contained reality. Experiences owe whatever reality (and worth) they have to their participation on the one and single Experience. Abating somewhat of the rigour of this doctrine (and abate it we must in order to appropriate it) we may say that Reality (which is Experience) is compact of experiences, which, however distinguished or severed, remain each an experience and repeat, each in its manner and degree, the structure of Experience. Each experience is experience, because and in so far as in its microcosm it mirrors the whole macrocosm of experience, and is higher or lower in the measure in which it effectly does so. Now let us ask ourselves what we mean by saying of this or that parcel of Reality that it is "an experience"; what it is that makes it an experience. It is not merely that in it something stands face to face with something else (which it apprehends or appreciates or appraises), or again that something moulds something else to its heart's desire, or is mixed with it

in alternate action and reaction, no nor that somehow they are twisted together like strands in a rope. Is it not rather our meaning that in such a fragment of the Universe there is somewhat that is self-begetting and self-begotten, a portion of that life which creates at once itself and its environment, no mere elan vital which adjusts itself to surroundings which dictate its form, but a free self-determining activity, the author at once of its world and itself? And where can we find a higher or better example, so to speak, of what experience so regarded means, than in those supreme moments of spiritual life when Mind generates the problems in the solution of which it celebrates the high triumphs of its power and its worth? In such experiences--for in such we are privileged to partake--do we not find the archetype of all experiences, the open secret of their being and existence, their standard of their value? In them at last we know; know ourselves and our world not as for ever sundered and apart, but as rooted and grounded in an Experience which is ours but not ours alone.

8. W.F. GEIKIE-COBB: "MYSTICISM TRUE & FALSE."

Two questions are to occupy us in this paper: the fact of mysticism and its value for philosophy. That mysticism is one thing; what it is is another thing, and it is one of the functions of philosophy to decide this latter question. Our initial difficulty is due to the many shades of meaning with which the terms mystic and mysticism are charged. And of this variety a few examples may be usefully given.

9. "The mystics of all ages have been so far justified in their contention that the form of our experience which presents the truest analogy to the experience of the Absolute must be supra-relational, or, in other words, that the

most real type of finite experience must be one which transcends the distinction of the subject and predicate." And again, "In holding that all genüine individuality, finite or infinite, involves a type of immediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational categories of thought and will, we may fairly be said to have reached a conclusion which, in a sense is mystica," and in his Problem of Conduct, he says truly: "As the Alexandrian Platonists knew, it is not by knowledge of science, but in an intuition that is something more and less than knowledge, and cannot be described in language appropriate to our roundabout conceptual modes of experience, that the absolute whole, if apprehended at all, would have to be apprehended." So Dr. McTaggart: "A mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break logic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to ignore it," and "The view that selves are manifestations of the Absolute, in such a way that they change and perish while the Absolute remains unchanged is one which has always had an attraction for mystics. It is especially prominent among oriental thinkers." "The course of philosophy is the transformation of the mystical conceptions of genius into rational cognition."

10. Mysticism has a double aspect, one preparatory, or partial, or perhaps improper, and one final, complete and proper. The former is to be recognized in the search for the meaning

of things, and the latter in the ecstatic experience in which subject and object melt into that mysterious Somewhat which is the ground of subject and object alike. Partial and successive experiences of a mystical character form a cumulative disposition which has its term in the mystical experience proper, much as progressive modifications of a structure emerge through epigenesis into something which, when it appears, we call a new creature.

It will perhaps be most useful if we illustrate a little what has been just called partial mysticism. And we will take first that study of nature which we call--

a. Science: All men are concerned with a study of the nature of things and the uses and purposes to be found in them. And it makes no difference to our present enquiry whether they are studied for a practical or theoretical end; indeed, these are at bottom indistinguishable, for the establishment of a complete theory has a practical value; the doctrine of the Absolute, for example, is as truly a practical as a theoretical good. The exact study of things, then, is an attempt to trace them back to their origin and to follow them to their final cause, and every success in ascertaining their nature is of a mystic character, inasmuch as it is a discovery of some aspect of the Reality hidden behind the Appearance. For Mysticism assumes that the life is more than the form, and it is incompatible with all realistic striving to state philosophic thought, or any other activity of life in mathematical formulae.

b. Mysticism is the ultimate explanation of phenomena such as those presented by instinct or impulse. The most thoroughgoing phylogenetic inquiry into instinct comes to a pause before the end is reached. The theory of heredity, even

though carried back to account for pre-human antecedents, or prehistoric conditions, leaves us still with some unknown cause not to be found in the history of the object. Even so no doubt it will be found that omnia exeunt in mysterium, but at all events the mystic's hypothsesis does carry us back, as does philosophic thought with which here it runs parallel, a stage further than science can. And to carry a process a step further back is always so far a service to science.

C. The theory of evolution, or, more technically, of epigenesis, seems incapable of being unified without a doese of mystiticm. For, presuming all species to have been derived from primordial protoplasm, we have to account for the power which has produced the many species out of the one root of their existence. We have to account also for the adaptive power which has given success to the survivors, for as all are supposed to have started on equal terms, we must assume an unknown x, which has acted as a differentiating factor. But this x making for improvement in the case of some species has a teleological value, and having the whole in view we can but recognise it as mystical.

11. In these examples of a partial or improper mysticism we note that the mysticism is of a nature akin to instinct. It dimly sees, but does not apprehend its object, and it builds on past experiences which now form the structure of the Unconscious. In fact, the mystic impulse is at once the ground of instinct, impulse, folk-beliefs, and the feeling for Nature, and also the vivifying principle which assures them their form and persistence in the Unconscious. Nature itself is in all those shapes already deposited in the Unconscious by aeonian experience. It is, however, the func-

tion of consciousness to survey the phenomena of the inner and the outer life in the light of reason, to point to their unity of origin and texture, and to bring the Manifold of experience under the One whose existence is a mystical postulate suggested by the intuitive unity of man's own mystical being.

The mysticism which we have up till now been considering is but the forecourt of the temple. It enshrines what has been; it suggests the ground on which the place of Truth itself shall be erected. It is conservative rather than progressive. It assumes what cannot be demonstrated--an upward tendency in the world; asserts that what has been achieved is but an earnest of what shall yet be done; and, most important of all, maintains that the mind of man is in living union with a spirit, or power, which is the spirit, or power, whose peculiar function it is to draw under law all things to their perfection in the whole.

12. True mysticism, on the other hand, is of a forward look. Its roots are not in the earth but in the eternal Reason which overshadows and penetrates all thinking. Hence, every mystical activity proper is due to the inspiration of a higher power with which the mind of man is in touch by virtue of its kinship of nature. They mystic experience begins as intuition and is perfected in judgment. It is true that the intuition is often so evanescent as to elude the grasp of reflection. It has but a glimpse "of incomprehensibles, and thoughts about things which thoughts but tenderly touch." But it does not seem to be correct to refer this intuition to feeling, if feeling be "the one capacity of the pure ego," by which it is either pleased or displeased with its presentation. Rather, the intuition

is the beginning of thought, and may, or may not, succeed in vindicating its right to become thought. The cases, therefore, in which it succeeds should be taken as illustrating the character of those in which it fails. Thus we should conclude that all mystic intuition is neither thought nor feeling, but that the consequent activity concerned comes under the category of thought, and not properly of feeling, thought of course here as everywhere some feeling is an accompaniment of the thought. In other words, mysticism proper is the most positive form which a moral valuation can take. It is a revelation not so much of the true as of the good; and though the good and the true have aspects in common, it has a positive, personal, unquestioning quality which is a necessary feature of a moral valuation even as we know it, whatever thought's ideal claims may be. It would follow from this that mystical experiences would be much more common were not most people content to take a shabby intellectualist interpretation of their most vital moments.

Mysticism, then, is an immediate apprehension of some interior good comparable to the immediate knowledge we have of the objects of the external world. It is empirical and not speculative. Saint Teresa (an unexceptionable witness) says of herself that "a feeling of the presence of God would come over me unexpectedly, so that I could in no wise doubt either that He was within me, or that I was wholly absorbed in Him. It was not by way of vision; I believe it was what is called mystical theology."

13. That knowledge alone, which depends on facts, or on ideas of Reason, can be communicated; all that lies beyond these lies also beyond logic, and to be known must be lived

through. But it is just this world of the beyond, this "excessive," which is the object of the mystic's awareness. And this world, by its very nature, is self-excluded from the operations of the intellect. Hence Philosophy is not called upon to pass judgment either on the fact that it is, or on what it is, apart from its expression. Its function in this respect is to pronounce merely whether what the reporter of a mystic experience says is or is not contradictory of its own accepted conclusions. But since these are confined to what Sense and Understanding jointly supply, and since mystic data are beyond these, Philosophy can only say: "Non ragionam di lor, ma guarda e passa." In other words, the function of philosophy when mysticism comes before it, is to accept the data of the latter as it does the data of the sensuous order, and then to find a place for them in its system of thought. In this sense the mystical intuition is perfected in judgment, even though here as elsewhere much of the living fact evaporates in the process of abstraction.

Here the objection might naturally be made that if the data of mysticism are of this intractable character their solution would be better found in hallucination, or alienation, than in the hypothesis of a reason of the heart which lies beyond the reasonings of the intellect. But in the first place it is noteworthy that acknowledged mystics have shown them-selves on their guard against these aberrations of the mind. The delight that comes from feelings or visions is "very suspicious to come from the enemy," says Hilton. "It is more natural that God should communicate Himself through the spirit than through the senses," says St.John of the Cross. "It is very important to prevent

souls from resting in visions and ecstasies; these graces are greatly subject to illusions; of this sort of gifts, the least pure, and those most subject to illusion, are visions and ecstasies," says Madame Guyon. We may say in general that the truer the mysticism the greater the caution shown in discriminating between the true and the false. And, speaking generally again, the test by which all auditions and visions, wether intellectual, imaginary, or corporeal, are tried, is not only the circumstances of their happening, but even much more their value. Revelations of any sort, if genuine, must inure to the heightening of the life of the spirit, must be clear, free from self-seeking, not self-contradictory, not referable to human agency, properly attested, and purely transmitted. And even so they are to be accepted with caution, and are not to be used as foundation for doctrine, but, though approved, are not more than."probabiles et pie credibiles."

In the second place, between pathological hallucinations and alienation and the mysti's sense of the presence of God, there is the difference of a whole scale of values. Between free memory-images and morbid hallucinations, are many degrees of reality, and in all a minimum of sensuous impressions is present. But the hallucination consists in the projection of a representation whereby it is mistaken for a presentation. The mystic's experience, on the contrary, whether justifiable or not, is, at all events, not of a hallucinatory character, because it lacks all reference to corporeal reality. "The immediate vision of the naked Godhead" says Suso, "is without doubt the pure truth; a vision is to be esteemed the more noble the more intellectual it is, the more it is stripped of all image and

approaches the state of pure contemplation." And although theologians have discussed the question whether the two outstanding figures of Catholic faith have appeared in bodily form, the evidence of the mystics themselves is against the supposition. St. Teresa, for instance, says that "when anyone can contemplate the sight of our Lord for a long time, I do not believe it is a vision, but rather some overmastering idea." And in general, the visions, locutions and auditions of mystic literature seem explicable in terms of ordinary psychology.

We are here reminded that the mystic experience proper is one thing, and the mode of its formulation is another. The vision is as long-lived as a flash of lightning, but before it is gone the mind has given it intellectual form. The essence of the mystical experience consists in a transcendental apprehension of the reality which <u>appears</u> in all ordinary experience. These appearances, according to mysticism, are the garment worn by the reality on which perhaps no man can look and live. The myth of Zeus and Semele enshrines a law. But the mind of man presses towards awareness, and awareness implies a mental form; but the form can hardly comprehend the full content of the concrete reality, the touch of which makes the mystic. Hence the form by which the seer seeks to represent to himself that reality is inadequate, and if pressed, is misleading. The mystic is not mistaken when he affirms that the boundaries of the flaming world have for him a brief moment been removed, but he cannot for all that be enabled to claim for his private explanation of that experience greater validity than that of a working hypothesis.

This is only to say that the mystic's explanation cannot transcend the limits of symbolism.

The touch of reality is an inexplicable fact; the formulation of it by the mind is symbolic. The one is an "irruption" of the Absolute into into consciousness; the other is the figurative expression by the mind of that which in itself is inexpressible. Indeed, every real particular is inexpressible, for what is expressed must be known as thought, and all thought is universal, and from the universal there has slipped out that particularity which makes the thing to be unique and unsharable. Hence the gulf between the _that_ and the _what_ in mystical experience is comparable to the difference which yawns between every _that_ and every _what_. In all the activities of thought the materials we work with are symbols, the _data_ of science no less than the _data_ of art, or of religion. And all are inadequate to express reality. But it should be observed that wherever thought is not a _chimoera bombinans in vacuo_ there is assumed necessarily the same union of the absolute reality and of its appearance, and the same symbolic relation of the latter to the former. The symbol is a joint product of the Absolute and of the materials already possessed by the mind for the purposes of thought. Hence, there is no _a priori_ ground for regarding the mystic fact as abnormal and therefore suspicious.

14. We should miss the secret of mysticism if we took its symbolic utterances for its unutterable experience. And perhaps we may share the robust common-sense of Dr. Johnson who, speaking of Jacob Bohme, said that "if Jacob had seen unutterable things, Jacob should not have attempted to utter them." But, then, how else could others have been stirred to emulate him?

15. Because the mystic is so deeply interested in the one incommutable Good he is open to the

charge of neglecting its differentiations for thought. The distinction between good and evil is not for him sharply drawn, nor that between being and not-being. Time and space seem to him negligible, and subject and object imply a division which would be better away. This disinclination to allow for phenomenal differences is ordinarily regarded as the cardinal defect of mysticism. It does not, however, derogate from its essential value, but serves at best as a reminder that it needs for its guardian both science and philosophy.

16. No term is more generally associated with mysticism than that of ecstasy, and it is on ecstasy that Royce bases his condemnation of mysticism. He regards ecstasy as giving "a certain limiting state of that finite variable which is called your knowledge," and as being the zero into which consciousness disembogues. The error in this judgment is in the assumption that the ecstatic state in transcending consciousness annuls <u>all</u> consciousness. What is unconsciousness with regard to us here is not necessarily unconscious to us there. The intuitive flash of genius, like the ecstatic vision, subsumes ordinary consciousness, and fuses all differences in a whole cognized synoptically. The differences, however, remain as moments in that whole ready for the service of discursive thought. The mystic Absolute is not only the goal but also the process. Consciousness is a transition stage between two different kinds of Unconsciousness, but what it borrows from the lower, and enriches, it transmits to the higher. It does not seem to be true that the mystic supposes that "the finite search has of itself no Being at all, is illusory, is Maya, is itself nothing." On the contrary, it is an admitted mystic dogma that Reality lives in its appearances; that in the <u>via negativa</u> you strip off

the accidental only, so what is left at every stage is real, though not the whole of reality; and that in the via eminentioe you start with what is real, find more of it as you climb, and at the top of the ladder retain what your discursive reason has garnered, and then intuitively crown it in a synoptic view. The mystic certainly does claim that his intuition puts him in touch with the real, and in this his claim differs in degree only from the claim of the poet that he is in touch with the real in the sensuous. But no mystic has ever claimed that, discursively or intuitively, he cognizes reality in its fullness; and he adds that he is not primarily concerned with reality under its aspect of truth. He differs from the physicist in method, but not in principle; to both finality is impossible.

Lastly, the problem of the mystic is the metaphysical problem of the nature of the self. If this be a mere "bundle or collection of impressions"; if it be nothing but the present thought appropriating the past; or if it be "an average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary force or fact," then the mystical fact does not emerge. This fact stands or falls with the fact of transcendental self. Of this self we have no sure knowledge by description, but I submit that we have by acquaintance. I think, and I can add to this that I think that I think; when I make the addition, as I do every day many times, the knower of the object becomes the knower of the subject. In other words, he reveals himself as capable of activity in another capacity or form whereby the subject in the "phenomenal" world becomes an object in the "noumenal." I, the Self that is aware of x, am also aware of my awareness, and I make the judgment on an intuition given by acquaint-

ance that the self which is aware is identical with the self which is awareness of awareness. In that case that self can and does function in the phenomenal and in a world which is transcendental to the phenomenal. That is, it is a member of the transcendental order, and as such it is at home with reality and with its two chief aspects. It this be once granted the mystical experience would seem as natural as the sensuous.

The soul, however, to the mystic is not "the apex of a didactical pyramid," a cold abstraction reached by thought. It thinks, of course, but its thought is not that of dry reason, but is informed by the passion of love. And it is because of the dominance in mysticism of love that mysticism has become identified improperly with "feeling." When the soul is in presence of the one "it takes fire, and is carried away by love."

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: 1936: (Vol.XII)

1. G.R. MALKANI: "UNIVERSAL RELIGION.": We are accustomed to regard experience as the only proper starting point for reason. But experience is various. The only experience which we readily recognise and which our reason finds most convenient to tackle is sensible experience. Reason is most at home with matter. But there is no self-evident truth in this sphere. All science is speculation and all truth is hypothetical. The immediate data of sense, which might be said to constitute our direct contact with matter, do not amount to self-evident truth. Have we any other experience which is non-sensible and immediate? Reason doubts. How is it then to reach the goal of self-evidence?

The revealed word at once points out to us a higher intuition of reality. It raises thought

to a new level by bringing out to more or less explicitness an experience which we had failed to recognize. Apart from it, and guided merely by reason, the experience would have been there, but we would have remained unaware of its presence. The ultimate authority of revelation then is not really in itself. It is not an external authority. Its authority is in the truth of the experience in us to which it points. If the revealed world spoke of things of which I could have no personal knowledge, I might well doubt its truth. I may accept its authority and yet reserve judgment. In a matter beyond reason, reason can pronounce no judgment. All true theology is in this predicament. It starts with the postulate of God, which remains to the end only a postulate. There is no direct evidence of God, and none is in the nature of the case possible. Advaitism does not merely postulate a super-sensible reality,-- a God who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. If it went no further, it would be just a system of theology. But when it asserts that "that reality art thou" it calls in and evokes our direct experience of that reality and raises reason to a new level. It is a new kind of experience with which reason finds itself confronted; and in the light of it, it can proceed to examine the truth of the statement. It is the only way that reason can come to its fruition. Advaitism is a true philosophy which is at the same time a real religion. We cannot distinguish the philosophy from the religion in it.

Religion, however is quite arbitrarily limited to belief in God and a relationship with God confined solely to feeling. Thus defined, Advaitism can indeed be no religion. But then what can we understand by a universal

religion? We can only understand by it a religion that brings together in one synthetic view the element of truth contained in every possible religion. Indeed, we have not to examine for this purpose every religion separately and then pick out the element of truth in it. We cannot possibly succeed in this way in getting a whole view. We should therefore take our stand on religious experience at its best and deduce from it the essential elements.

The highest religious experience centres round God. We must believe in God. But we cannot believe in a limited God. We are accustomed to associate a body with every spirit. But that would evidently involve a limitation to the spirit. Such a spirit would not be free. It would be confronted by other bodies and nature in general. God cannot be a spirit with a body. He must be pure spirit and in that sense universal. More than that. He must be efficacious as spirit. If the spirit by itself were powerless, the spirit with a body would be even more so. There would be no power anywhere. The very notion of spirit involves power. It is the true seat of power as against matter which must be conceived as being essentially passive God. The pure spirit, must therefore be all-power. He alone can act without external restraint and without the aid of a body. He is pure will; and whenever He acts, He does not act upon something; He only creates.

Nature cannot be independent of God. If it were, God would be limited by nature; He would not be God; there would be something outside of Him to limit Him. Nature accordingly has no self-existence. It is created by God. Whatever is other to God is His creation. The reality of nature is God. At the same time, nature is absolutely distinct from God and shares no common character with him. It is non-spiritual.

How is a man related to both? Man is in a sense distinct both from God and from nature. As opposed to nature, he is a spirit. As opposed to God, he is an embodied spirit and does not wholly stand outside nature. He cannot properly speaking be said to be created. A spirit is never created. We shall go further and say that spirit cannot be manifold. There cannot be many pure spirits. Man as spirit therefore cannot be distinct from God. That distinction must be essentially unreal. And yet embodied as he is, we cannot wholly deny the distinction. Man differs from nature in that he reflects his true source and ultimate reality which is God. He is not absolutely distinct from God as nature is. He is an image of God, and we can well say of him,--"By knowing the son, you know the Father."

Religion is often charged by sceptical minded men with anthropomorphism. But this charge is essentially misconceived. The truth of religion remains unaffected by it. It is evident that human spirit provides the only analogy for the conception of God. We have no other intuition of spirit as spirit. It is the business of religion to bring God nearer to man. An incomprehensible God would be no God. Man would not need Him. All that we need guard against is that we do not attribute to God the non-spiritual character of man; for man is a complex being,--he is a combination of nature and spirit.

All men would stand related to God just in the same way; or, as it is sometimes put, all men are alike in the eye of God. No man can stand in any special relation to God <u>essentially</u>, but only as he is God-conscious or conscious of his affinity to God. It follows from this that God does not incarnate in man or become man. It would be more proper

to say that every man is an incarnation of God. He shows forth God. The special incarnations are only object-lessons to us of our own primal relation with God.

To be God-conscious is to enter into a relation of love to Him. Love accordingly describes our most general relation to God. And the essence of love is expressed in the one word "thou"; "Thou art everything,--I am nothing." The consciousness of distinction is only the beginning of love; the end is complete self-negation in God. The end is not "union"if by union we understand "a meeting of different entities." It is not as though man became one with God; it is rather"man losing himself to find God"; or "man realising his own God-head." The emotion of love is a secondary matter. The essential thing is that man must deny himself in order to assert God in thought, feeling and act,--"not I, but the Father." God-realisation will then become true self-realisation. Man will lose himself to find himself in God.

These principles, in our opinion, are involved in all religious experience. And since that experience is common to different religions, they may be said to constitute the truth in them. The question is whether these principles can be made the basis of a new religion, distinct from all other religions, and deserving to be called, in contradistinction from them, the universal religion. Now what distinguishes one religion from another are the more concrete loyalties, the loyalty to a book, a person, etc. A religion based upon general principles only will be without these loyalties; and without these loyalties, it cannot be set up as a distinct religion at all; it will hardly have any rallying point.

Our conclusion is that Advaitism is the only true universal religion. It dispenses with the

need for a creed; and although it starts with the authority of the Vedas, and is in that sense a distinct religion, it by no means makes a creed out of it. It is the religion of truth; for it seeks to reduce the revealed truth to self-evident truth, or truth that may be seen and not merely believed in. It thus makes religious life free, natural and autonomous. Feeling and will do not need to be coerced. They fall in line with the perception of truth. Indeed it appears as though the truth has made religious life impossible. It has blown up and very foundation of it. The distinctions on which religious life thrives have been shown to be illusory and unreal. But this is only an external view of the matter. Real religion must be based upon truth, and not on illusions. Our interest in religion cannot be greater than our interest in truth, and we would not like to save the former at the cost of the latter. The relevant question therefore to ask is, what is the truth? Advaitism answers that question, and it seeks to give through it the ultimate satisfaction which we all seek in religion. There can be no religion higher than truth. If however we restrict religion to feeling, the only sense in which we can speak of universal religion is the sense in which religious experience itself is universal. We can indeed deduce certain general principles out of it, and set up a new religion on their basis. But the new religion must have its creed distinct from other creeds; and therein it will set up antagonism and cease to be universal. The only religion that is free from antagonism is the religion of truth; for it has no creed.

2. G. R. MALKANI: "SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

THEORY OF EVOLUTION FOR RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY."

Religion believes in the creativity of the spirit. God created the world. He created not only the physical universe, but also life that moves in any part of it. Man is the highest of creatures. He is also nearest to God, being endowed both with reason and a measure of freedom. He is in a way God's own image, a true spirit. How was he created? He was created by a special act of God. And so was every other species. According to Christian theologians, man was placed at the apex of creation. He was the main object of creation. Everything else was to administer to his needs. The rest of the creation was made for him, not he for the creation. He thus occupies a special privileged position. The Hindus too believe in creation. But no soul is ever created. Man is not the only being with a soul. The humblest form of life is endowed with a soul. But man is certainly pre-eminent among all living beings. He also is fit to reach directly in this life itself the ultimate destiny of the soul.

Science has no evidence for or against the creativity of the spirit. The spirit is no kind of datum to it. It cannot possibly disprove that God created the world and everything that is in it. Whether the world is created by God or it is not so created does not however affect the scientific procedure. Science studies the world as it is given. It does not and cannot go into the origins of the world. Within its own sphere however certain facts emerge which do not seem to be consistent with the theologians' views on the subject. Which then is in the right, science of theology? The presumption of scientists is that science alone is in the right and that theology must be scrapped or overhauled.

Science studies the general physical structure of each species. By a study of the fossilised remains of the species long since extinct it is surmised that the more efficient and stable form has developed out of the less efficient and less stable. This belief is strengthened by experiments in breeding. It is therefore thought that by continual modification and transference of the acquired characteristics to the offspring, higher and higher species come into existence. There is a close resemblance between man and some of the animals of the ape species. Is not man then, on his physical side the kith and kin of the latter? There is a strong presumption, amounting almost to certainty, to that effect.

Science goes further. It reconstructs the history of life on this planet. In the beginning was the protoplasm. That alone was. The other forms of life followed through natural causes combined with biological causes through the course of the centuries. Man is only the last product. He is one of the species, and the mode of his creation is the mode of creation of all other species. It is natural selection. There is no original creation anywhere in the biological series. It is a kind of natural hierarchy. So far as man is concerned, there is nothing peculiar in him of what is called the spirit. He is an animal among animals differing from the latter only in the quality of the physical structure and the modifications which this entails in the mode of his behaviour.

Science may be right. But it suffers from a certain limitation of stand-point. It studies certain <u>phenomena</u> of what it calls life. But it cannot say what life is. It may be that it is more than mere mechanism, and that each

organism embodies a soul or an entelechy that uses the organism for its own purposes. But this can be no possible datum for science. Science can never say whether there is or is not any such thing. Then there is consciousness. It too is no scientific datum, and science can never succeed in showing that it has evolved out of anything non-conscious. It is certainly no modification of matter or anything that can be intelligently related to it. Lastly, it is a postulate of the theory of evolution, that life is moving upward or towards the creation of more efficient species, efficient in the struggle of life and better adapted to the environment. If that is so, life is endowed with a purpose and an end. But purpose and end are outside the scope of science. If they are admitted we have admitted an efficiency which is non-physical, and there can be no good grounds for denying the causality of the spirit. Science to be consistent must deny this causality. It must deny life and spirit in general. But then what will remain of evolution except the integration and disintegration of physical systems without any end or purpose? The evolutionary process involves factors which go beyond science and which cannot be denied without rendering the whole process meaningless.

Life may be admitted. But it may be said that it has no aims and ends beyond itself. Its fundamental impulse is towards self-preservation and reproduction. There is no higher aim or end to which it moves. It is through the struggle which is consequent upon this and the need for adaptation to the environment that new types of life emerge. But is this uniformly true? Certain phenomena connected with human behaviour would give a lie to such a thesis. The idea of sacrifice is the very essence of

every religion. Let us suppose that a sort of materialism, the materialism of the spirit, is even justified. But, evidently, there is more in life of which we cannot but take account. It can generate movement which mere matter cannot do. It has <u>in itself</u> the cause of movement either of itself or of something beyond itself. It is endowed with what we may call spontaneity. Further, this self-initiated movement is consciously or unconsciously teleological. Whatever the end may be, self-preservation or something else, there is such a thing as movement towards and end. Mere matter has no tendency even towards self-preservation, and cannot therefore properly be said to resist disintegrating forces from outside. It would allow such forces to pass through it instead of holding them up in perception and reacting against them. To admit life is to admit causality of the spirit.

It may be said that these abstract considerations do not amount to much. They do not justify a non materialistic or spiritual interpretation of known facts--geological, biological and anthropological. We cannot deny that man is a late arrival on the biological scene; that he is gradually civilised and has gradually developed higher forms of culture; that as a species, he is the result of generations of mutual struggle in the domain of life and elimination of the unfit; that he is still subject to natural and biological laws; that the very failure of the evolutionary process in certain directions gives ground for the presumption that he is a chance product and that the causal agencies which produced him "did not know their mind"; and that although he is the highest of animals he has no reason to think himself the final

product of the evolutionary process or the lord of all creation standing in a special relation to his Creator. Man needs to give up the conceit about his own importance and contemplate himself as a purely biological entity governed by biological laws.

We contend that this is not the whole truth. It illustrates the fragmentary character of all scientific knowledge. Science has to stop somewhere and admit ignorance beyond a certain point in order to theorise at all. We cannot put together in our knowledge all the relevant facts of a case. We are therefore obliged to supply from imagination what we cannot get at directly in perception; hence the hypothetical character of this knowledge. Empirically, knowledge would always remain incomplete. We can never hope to complete it. The only alternative is to utilise scientific facts for a criticism of those facts. This criticism becomes possible because there is always a higher standpoint in our experience which it is the business of philosophy to explicate.

The phenomena of life may be traced to the protoplasm. But the question arises, whence the protoplasm? We cannot indeed trace the protoplasm to a more primitive condition. But we cannot avoid the general question of its origin or the origin of all life; and if we cannot give the origin, we must at least make the concept consistent with our general view of the universe as science conceives this. If it is true that in the beginning was the gaseous mass and out of it were formed the sun and the other stars, and out of the sun came the earth and the other planets; and that our earth was a burning mass which has cooled in the course of ages,--there could not possibly have been a germ of life during all this time. Whence has life come upon the earth? We cannot say, as it is sometimes said,

that it came from outside through a meteor or some other form of communication with the outside universe. This would be no explanation. The problem is merely shifted to that other source of life. It would also go counter to the notion of certain scientists that it is exceedingly improbable that there is life anywhere outside this planet. The conditions for the formation of a planetary system and the existence of life are exceedingly rare. But if it should prove to be the case that there is life elsewhere in the universe, there are evidently sources of life, which science cannot possibly tackle. The statement that in the beginning was the protoplasm would not be justified. It is quite possible that there are, simultaneous with our protoplasm, higher forms of life in other parts of the universe. It is also possible that man existed prior to the career of life on this planet, and has always so existed. On purely historical considerations then we cannot prove that protoplasm is the absolute beginning of all life. That statement can only be justified on the logical ground that the higher has developed out of the lower. But is this really the case? We shall later find reasons against such a view.

It may now be said that we need not go to any source of life outside this planet. Life has evolved out of inorganic matter. There is no unbridgeable gulf between the two. But in that case we shall have to enlarge our conception of inorganic matter. This matter, as we know it, is without any sort of individuality. On the one hand, there is no barrier whatsoever between one thing and another,--they constitute a continuous whole; on the other hand, each thing is divisible without any loss of reality. We may break a piece of

stone. The parts will be unaffected and continue to exist as before. Indeed we admit physical strains and physical change. But even here there is a certain amount of uncertainty in the scientific outlook. The older view was that a physical particle was entirely governed by mechanical laws. In any change that took place, there was what may be called an absolute "inevitableness." The constituents of matter were purely mechanical entities responding to mechanical action. The more modern view is that the ultimate constituents of matter exhibit a certain amount of spontaneity and that their reactions and their movements are in the end uncertain and unpredictable. If this view is held to be nearer the truth, matter ceases to be dead and inert. It becomes "alive" endowed with a soul as it were; it may truly be said to have a "will." Either then we make a distinction or we do not. In the latter case, there is simply no such thing as inorganic matter. We are reduced to a form of pan-psychism. The ultimate reality is what may be called a "monad" or some kind of soul substance. There is nothing real apart from this. In the former case, we have to account for the birth of an individual. Unorganised matter has no individuals. We can understand how a complex individuality is developed out of comparatively simple individuals. Each individual has a will or a purpose. And several individuals can have a common will and a common purpose. But if there is no individuality at all and the <u>law</u> is everything, how is the individual to come into being at all? The individual is a self-maintaining whole. He grows and changes, but maintains an identity through it all. He stands over against all mechanical laws for self-initiated action or spontaneity. How can he come to birth through the law? The hypothesis that organic matter has evolved out

of the inorganic is untenable.

Let us suppose that man is wholly subject to nature. Nature is everything and all else is an illusion. The moral of the theory of evolution is that man must not transfer his interest from nature to the impalpable things of what is called spirit. That way lies his ultimate doom. He must live strongly and dangerously. He must transfer his allegiance from God and the next world to nature. He must live by nature.

Is this view self-consistent? If things pertaining to the spirit are an illusion, does anything matter? Can there be any such thing as value? In one way, whatever man does would be according to nature. Man can only act as nature made him. There can be nothing in his life opposed to nature and nothing therefore that is wrong. In another way, there can be no such thing as natural value. Nature is blind and nature is inexorable. It is free from purposes and ends, and from the idea of higher and lower. Value comes with the conscious individual who has aims and ideals. If man, in formulating these, must have regard for his natural origin, he must pronounce them as unreal. Even his own well-being cannot be a value; for nature does not care for the individual. Can the well-being of the species be a value? But what does it matter to nature if a certain species is annihilated? The idea of value is simply inconsistent with the idea of our natural origin. The so-called survival value is simply no value at all. What value is there in mere survival? The lower creatures fill their life with the satisfaction of their biological needs. Man, with all his newly acquired powers due to his physical and intellectual superiority, must do the same. He is a more brutal brute; that is all. He is

an aggrandiser par excellence. What makes him greater than the brute are things of the spirit. But these are to be considered as mere illusions. They have no living value. The evolutionary process must be supposed to be quite neutral with respect to value.

It may be thought here that evolution as a progressive creation of higher forms of life is at least undeniable. But evolution is known to retrace its steps. And then how far can the process go on in the forward direction? Not only is there no ideal or goal for it to reach, but it cannot even go on indefinitely. For if it is true that certain physical causes beyond the control of any living creature have co-operated to bring about conditions suitable for the thriving of life, it is but natural to suppose that another set of physical causes will bring about a counter situation and all life may be extinct. We read of alternating geological periods of extreme cold and extreme heat in which living beings have greatly suffered. We also read of periodic floods. But these are only terrestrial processes. There can be a different kind of end due to non terrestrial causes and evolutionary process may terminate in chaos. Evolution is not necessarily an evolution to the higher.

The idea of evolution is associated with the idea of progress. This progress is further supposed to be without a beginning and without an end. But is this conceivable? The only way it can be conceived is not by a single series of changes in a single direction. To have a single series of this type, the series must begin somewhere and also end somewhere; then alone it would be possible to determine its direction; from this to this is a certain kind of progress or regress. If the termini are not fixed, the movement can have no single direction. If a pro-

cess is both beginningless and endless, it would have to be broken up into several processes. These processes cannot all be in one direction. If one movement is unward, the subsequent movement must be downward. In other words, evolution must be followed by involution, and vice versa.

If we accept this view of the evolutionary process, a new problem arises. The process has a beginning. This beginning can only represent a condition of things in which there is no differentiation and no movement. It must be a condition of perfect equilibrium, or a condition of matter qua matter on the mechanistic view. As matter cannot move itself and must be moved, we are obliged, in order to explain the possibility of any movement at all, to postulate a prime mover that moves but is not itself moved. Such mover can be nothing like matter. It can only be conceived on the analogy of our excercise of will. We will act, and lo! the act is there. The act is a result or a product. It consists in the willed movement. But the free will behind it, or the freedom that willed the act, is no kind of movement. It may properly be said to be the unmoved.mover or the prime mover. These considerations are equally valid with regard to the evolutionary process. They are even more relevant. We are used to the idea of action and inter-action between physical objects. The cosmic processes are supposed to go on without the intervention of any intelligent being. Matter is already in a state of activity, or disturbed equilibrium. We are inclined therefore to disregard free causality altogether. The cause of the movement of matter is supposed to be contained somehow in matter itself. But if we trace back this evolution, we should have to come back to an absolute beginning, or a state

of pure passivity. Any disturbance of this state cannot originate out of itself. The only possible way the evolutionary process may be started is through an impulse from outside. This impulse however cannot be conceived on the analogy of any kind of mechanical action or action of matter upon matter. That is ruled out. It can only be conceived on the analogy of free creation exemplified in our own spiritual activity.

This would have to be taken still further. All action that we can <u>imagine</u> is mechanical action. We must have two distinct images before we can understand the action of the one upon the other. There is no action which we can imagine which is not transeunt or an outgoing action. In other words, we cannot but materialise the elements that enter into an action. But in that case, can we be said to have realised free causality? Evidently, once we have recourse to this pictorial representation, the question cannot be avoided that there must be a cause of this cause. A free cause cannot be represented as a static element. It cannot be represented at all. It cannot properly be conceived as what acts upon a given something. What acts upon a given something must itself be given and have a cause outside of it. All imagined causality is mechanical causality. All causality that is exercised upon a given something is once again mechanical causality. Free causality will have to be conceived as radically different in character. It is not exercised upon a given something. It is purely and wholly creative. It creates the act and the embodiment of the act. If we have to admit this causality in the beginning of the evolutionary process, we can understand how God is the cause of everything. We have here gone beyond the evolutionary process, and admitted what may in contradistinc-

tion be called "first creation."

It is evident that before anything has begun to be there can be no time. Time begins when movement begins or the cosmos begins; and the cosmos begins when it is put forth by a non-temporal or free cause. Thus time itself is created. Indeed, once having been brought into being, we can extend it in the abstract and regard it as quite beginningless. But evidently, such time would not be real time. It would be without movement. Beginningless time would have movement when we conceive it as cyclic in character or as alternating in states of evolution and involution endlessly. The cosmos will then be created. It will be maintained in existence for some time. And then it will be destroyed to be created again. The whole process will issue from God and end in God. He will be the cause of the creation, the sustenance and the destruction of the world. However the evolutionary process is conceived, God is necessarily demanded. He is the first and the only cause. Apart from Him, there can be no causality; for there is no efficiency. The series of changes which constitute the contents of time would be wholly unintelligible. That series necessarily leads to a free and efficient cause which is God.

We are generally inclined to think that before creation there <u>was</u> time. This time was empty. It was without beginning. But evidently empty time represents no duration. It is not time. In what sense then can we speak of it as beginningless? Something can be beginningless when it is conceived as having an expanse, a length or a movement. Empty time has none. It has no duration in itself. It is only when it is contemplated not in itself, but as an <u>interval</u> or as a <u>moment</u> between two real durations, that it appears to be itself a limb of

time or some kind of duration. But then it is no longer beginningless. It is preceded by a real movement. There must be an earlier and a still earlier creation before the one which we contemplate. Empty time is thus brought back into the created time as a moment of it. It is not what precedes creation without beginning. That conception is essentially unintelligible and absurd. Time, wherever we find it, necessarily presupposes the timeless which is the cause of everything including time.

How do we conceive the being of God? He has no being comparable to that of the world. He is not of the world. In fact, in terms of all <u>known being</u>, He has no being; for all known being would form part of the world which is created. It would therefore be more appropriate to say that God is Freedom beyond being; or in other words, it is not static being, but being that is the same thing as freedom. We popularly call this being "free being." We have only to guard against the error of thinking that free being has anything in common with known being; for the idea of freedom would be quite foreign to the latter. The being of God thus conceived must necessarily be timeless. There can be no change in it. It is the ground of the change. All change issues from it. God stands outside the world and outside time. He creates these while Himself remaining unchanged and unmoved. He is Freedom that does things without in a sense doing anything. It is as though He does things without lifting a finger, or raising a voice or thinking a thought. All these are mere products. The cause remains beyond them, unmoved.

God may have created this world. But it may be asked, why exactly this world? The world as it is appears to be imperfect. Why did God create an imperfect world? Now we are familiar with the view of Leibnitz that God has created the best

of all possible worlds. The several possibilities were all equally within His reach and He chose the best for His creative act. But firstly, we cannot suppose that there was only a limited number of possibilities. Logically the possibilities must be unlimited. It cannot be argued that out of unlimited possibilities only some were workable. For what determines the unworkableness of a system? Given certain set laws or given a system, we may suppose that certain possibilities which went counter to those laws would not work. But different systems with different sets of laws would all be equally workable. What sets a limit to these? As long as the possibilities have not come to the plane of actuality, they are merely ideal; and on the plane of ideas there can be no conflict; different ideal systems must remain equally possible. If that is so, it is evident that God cannot be supposed to be determined by given possibilities. He could make and unmake possibilities.

Secondly, God cannot chose from possibilities that are already there. That would restrict His freedom. He would cease to be purely creative. If that is so, this is not only the best of all possible worlds, but the very best world unless we have reason to suppose that there is either lack of power or lack of moral perfection in God.

There cannot be lack of power in God. This follows from God's absolute Freedom. We have seen that this freedom cannot be conceived as operating upon something that is already there. Freedom is not freedom if it is not purely creative and unrestricted by anything from outside. What is then there to limit the power of its creativity? If there were an outside reality which restricted freedom that would certainly amount to a limitation of

power. But then there is no real freedom at all. We have only a sort of mechanical causality,--one thing acting upon another. It is part of the very idea of freedom that there should be no limitation of power to act. God as the first and the free cause cannot be limited in power.

Can God lack anything in the way of moral perfection? Now to practise the various virtues is no doubt part of moral perfection. Man practises them to a more or less degree. But what is virtue as such? What is morality in the last resort? It will be found on analysis that any act is moral which is the expression of freedom. There is no vice but that of subjection or bondage. We act under the bondage of desire. It is only as we free ourselves from this bondage and act without desire, that we may truly be said to act morally. But if that is so, moral perfection can mean nothing else but freedom itself. God is Absolute Freedom. Can He lack of moral perfection?

God is free. God is all-powerful. God is perfect. Can the world which He has created be in any way defective? This is the best of possible worlds. Does this mean merely that there is a preponderance of good over evil in the world? If that were so, the cause would be imperfect also. God would be limited in one way or another. He would not be perfectly free. But a God that is not perfectly free would be no God. Why postulate God at all? The world is perfect because it has come from a perfect God.

Is then there no evil? Indeed we cannot deny that we see evil. The question is whether we see it aright. We certainly do not see the world as God sees it. To God it is the expression of His freedom--and shall we not say of His joy? The world is not other to him and does not in

any way limit Him. If He has power to put forth, He has also power to retract. It is just the opposite with us. To us the world is simply given. It limits us in every direction. It is connected with our desires. We do not see the world as God has created it, but as it affects our personal well being. All evil is the result of this. There is no evil in the world. There is evil only in our likes and dislikes. We want certain things and do not want certain other things. Herein consists all evil. If we could get rid of every vestige of desire and contemplate the world with the freedom of God or as God made it, we shall see no evil in the world. All evil is in our short-sightedness and in our bondage to desire. Let us not credit God with the creation of evil.

It might here be said that this is not wholly conclusive. If everything is perfect and there is no evil, moral effort is useless. No value can be made or unmade. The process in time becomes meaningless. God has created the world with no end or object that is yet to be achieved. He has determined every thing to take place according to His original and first idea. Man's place in the universe becomes quite unimportant. He is as little free as the rest of the universe. Freedom in a created being is really an illusion. Because everything proceeds from Perfection which is at the beginning, creation can serve no object. The creative process has no goal. It is a meaningless process.

This objection arises from a misunderstanding of the nature of free causality or freedom. It is thought that if we do away with mechanical causality, we must replace it by teleological action. A free act is an act which is done with an object or an end. The

end is indeed not an external end. It is a self-imposed end. But there is an end nevertheless. The action is initiated to serve this end. God's freedom must still be supposed to be acting for the achievement of certain ends or purposes. If it does not, it is only a form of mechanical causality.

Now it is indeed true that without freedom, we cannot have any ends. And end is not simply there. And end has to be accepted. It is always a self-imposed end. I may have a certain end; but I also need not have it. To have an end is to have it freely. And when we choose an end, action does not immediately follow. We may hold it up indefinitely; and when we do initiate it, it does not follow a prescribed track. It is not as though we have let go a spring and the spring unwinds itself automatically. The same indeterminacy governs it throughout. Its direction may have to be continually changed according to the needs of the situation. It is not in the medium of ideas that we act. We act in a real world. And here we meet with obstructions and have to suit our act to the occasion. Thus teleological action implies freedom throughout the process.

This is however only the form which our limited freedom takes in order to express itself in a world of things which is no creation of ours. God's freedom cannot possibly take this form. We have to note in this connection that teteological activity is not synonymous with true freedom of action. It cannot be the highest expression of freedom. An action guided by an end is to that extent determined and not free. As Bergson has put it, "teleology is mechanism inverted;" and it the end here that determines the course of the action and not the first impulse. The end is

no doubt freely accepted. But it also cannot be denied that in every end, desire is a determining factor; and to act through desire is not to act quite freely. Even a benevolent action has an element of self-interest or self-conceit. Our highest ends e.g. reverence for the moral law, are contaminated with subjectivity or elements of personal emotion. Real freedom must have no such contamination. It can have no motive or end of action. It acts thus, because it acts. There is no reason whatsoever for the act. Any reason would detract from freedom. The only analogy we have in our own experience of a truly free act is sportive activity. We act here not with any ulterior object or end. The activity is itself its own reason. It is the expression of our freedom and of our joy.

We may here note an important characteristic of the exercise of freedom, namely joy. It is evident that frustrated effort leads to pain; similarly, any kind of restriction or restraint or limitation of power. We might therefore go so far as to say,--"where there is an <u>other</u>,there is pain." The other will, in accordance with its own nature, restrict and limit our power. But restricted freedom is really a self-contradiction. Freedom is nothing if it is not absolute--if it does not always and necessarily succeed. Freedom means achievement. God's freedom is certainly of this character. It is wholly and purely creative. It is not obstructed. This freedom cannot but entail joy. It is joy itself. The world is an expression of joy or bliss which is God.

We are accustomed to think that joy is the accompaniment of activity. Mere static being cannot have joy as part of it. Action is essential to happiness. This seems to be

evidently true with regard to that activity which is undertaken to satisfy some desire. But here there is no joy in the activity as such but only in the final product of it. What pleasure there is in the activity is wholly negative; it consists in the removal of pain which is inherent in desire. There can be joy only in an activity which is undertaken for its own sake, and which has no end beyond itself. It is the sort of activity which Aristotle set forth as the highest and the most sublime, the activity of pure thought or the activity of thought having no outside content. Similarly, every kind of free activity will be a joyful activity; for it has no end beyond itself. But if there is joy in this activity, it is only the expression of the greater joy which is freedom itself. Any expression of freedom is bound to be limited. Freedom itself is unlimited. Hence also the joy of freedom is unbounded joy. All other joy which is involved in activity is derived from this.

God is the only free cause. But if we accept this causality, the process of creation must be from the subtle to the gross. A free act or an act that is willed begins on the higher spiritual plane and completes itself in the physical world. The form of activity that is nearest to freedom is rationality. It is through reason that we seek to be free; and an act is free only in the measure that it conforms to reason. Freedom therefore may be said to express itself in rationality first. If God created the physical world, He could not have created it alone; nor could he have created it directly and before everything else. The process of creation must take the form of a descent from the higher to the lower. The higher is nearer to the spirit and more easily confounded with it. We can thus understand that nearness of man to God.

The account of evolution according to which nature is prior to man and man is the product of nature would thus appear to be the very reverse of the truth. It may be that man is a late arrival so far as the history of our planet is concerned. But the history of this planet is not the history of the cosmos. We must trace that history to real beginnings; and any real beginning must take us to a free cause. This is apart from the view of certain scientists that we simply cannot deny anti-chance in the creation of the universe. Historically then we cannot deny the creativity of the spirit; and logically, the higher has not developed out of the lower, but vice-versa.

We should take man as he is and nature as it is. Nature dos not explain man but man explains nature. The lower can never explain the higher,--and man is admittedly the higher. He is essentially spirit and not only a part of nature. He is akin to the ultimate cause of nature and makes it intelligible. Should we not say that he is truly the image of his Creator? The biological theory of evolution, based on a limited historical process, can prove nothing against this.

3. HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA: "THE PLACE OF FEELING IN CONDUCT IN BAUDDHA AND JAINA PHILOSOPHY." Whilst Buddhist ethical thought is marked by a thorough psychological analysis which would do honour to any modern system of psychological Ethics, the Jaina makes much of the metaphysical assumptions of the soul as conscious substance and of Karma as a material principle mysteriously affecting the soul, throwing psychological considerations to the background. Whatever the merits of a synthetic philosophy, either Eastern or Western, which claims to take an undifferentiated view of life and the universe, it is a special problem for

for the modern mind, whose watchword is the division of labour, to look at the different aspects of life in their proper perspective without confounding issues. Considered in this light Buddhism seems to make a nearer approach to psychological Ethics than Jainism, nay, in some sense, than any other system of Indian thought.

In estimating the function of feeling in conduct in the Buddhist thought one would do well, first of all, to understand what exactly the Buddhist means by a psychological individual. The psychological individual is a complex of nama and rupa. The nama is a collective term for all that is mind and mental, and the rupa for physical attributes. The Buddhist psychologist further differentiates this nama-rupa complex, this psycho-physical whole of an individual into the five-fold skandha or aggregate, viz. Rupa, Vedana, Samjna, Samskara and Vijnana of which the Rupa-skandha is the organic basis for the Vedana, Samjna and Jivnana skandhas, for affection or feeling, perception and conception respectively, to which the Samskara skandha serves as the synthetic mental function which is at once a source of all conation and of co-ordination of all the other mental faculties. Thus the conscious life to the Buddhist is an indivisible whole in which we can distinguish perception, feeling and will only logically, but not in an order of succession. The objects of consciousness are distinguished into the objects of sense and objects of thought. The objects of sense are five: sight, sound, smell, taste and touch; the objects of thought are also five: (1) Citta, mind, (2) Cetasika, mental properties, (3) Pasada rupa, sensible qualities and sukuma rupa, subtle qualities of the body, (4) Pannatti, name, idea or concept and (5) Nirvana. In Buddhist psychology, however, we miss all explanation of how

sensation is transmuted into ideation except the assumption that citta or mind which is both of the nature of thing and thought, only does transform the one into the other, reminding one of the psycho-physiological myth invented by Descartes in his pineal gland. We have indeed quite a lot of terms, like, vitakka, vichara, Sati anussati, patissati, sampajanna, cetana, sancetana, samkappa, and the rest, indicating how the Buddhist Introspective psychology had an incipient or inchoate conception of the ideational processes of judging, comparing remembering, mental alertness, even attention, and volution and concentrative consciousness; but we do not meet with any closer analysis of the intellectual process, which in modern European psychology, has been called representative or re-representative cognition or ideation, except reference to the general concept of Vijnana which stands for any 'awareness of mind' no matter how general or abstract the content.

4. It is the regeneration and not extirpation of desire, its expansion such as to embrace the well-being or happiness of the whole conscious existence that constitutes the true ideal of Buddhist morality, and not its narrowing down to egoism, making it more and more self-regarding and less and less other-regarding. The moral will of the Buddhist is not the unfeeling blank will of Kant, but it is super-saturated with the higher feelings and emotions of love and active sympathy for the entire universe.

It is evident then that Buddhist ethics is for the culture and not for curbing of emotions and desires. The aim of conduct is to produce happiness or well-being, not of the individual but of the society at large. Buddhist Ethics is therefore utilitarian in its outlook, but unlike the utilitarianism

of Bentham which looks more to the outward consequences of actions, it always attaches more value to their inner motive or spirit, which, it thinks, is discernible by reason or prajna of the psychical individual and is therefore intuitionistic as well. Another important question relevant to the subject is that of freedom which the Buddhist solves in quite a scientific spirit. There is the principle of Karma as the norm of the Universe and there is also the empirical self governed by that norm. The analysis of the empirical self into its qualities, the dhammas, the affections thinkings and willings and their samskaras or dispositions, is quite in keeping with psychological science with its limited sphere. Within the sphere of scientific psychology which describes the rise, growth and development of psychoses and traces causal connection amongst them, Determinism reigns supreme. But the marked peculiarity of the Buddhist psychological Ethics is that it has on the one side provided for limited freedom of human actions, and on the other, has saved them from Indeterminism which regards free will as an unpredictable force that alters or undoes the orderly working of the mind. Under the law of Karma the empirical self is a growing expanding and evolving process of psychoses whose present is determined indeed by the past, but whose future remains open and is created by the new direction of the will. The determination of the present by the past, however, is not a purely mechanical process, the present, though it accords with the past, and thus ensures continuity with it, yet is not the only possible result of it; for the suggestion in the Anguttara Nikaya as to the character of the of the reward to be won by deeds of man

unmistakably points at least to the limited contingency rather than to the iron necessity of human actions. On the other hand the Buddhist avoids the Bersonian Indeterminism of the human will, in so far as he is careful to assert the orderliness of the natural world by means of the Law of Karma and yet provides for spiritual growth, which, when it has attained the highest form, prajna, paramita, can overcome and transcend Karma, and reach beyond good and evil, but can enjoy the highest bliss.

5. Feelings, desires and emotions, intellection and volition, their mutual relation and particularly the problem of freedom which make up the psycho-ethical sphere have been relegated by the Samkhya system of thought to the realm of an inessential excrescence of the purusa, with the result that Art, Religion, and Morality which are the offshoots of emotion, intellection and volition fail to receive the share of importance and recognition they deserve.

Nor does the Yoga system ethically improve matters when it says that the life of the yogin is a long course of practical discipline undergone with a view to putting an end to the never-ending chain of the experiences of pleasure and pain giving rise in succession to mental and bodily impressions, memories of pleasure and pain, desires, aversions and actions which last again produce fresh pleasure and pain and so on. For even obviating the apparent logical paralogism involved in this so-called psychological analysis, we cannot save the yoga system from the common defect of the Samkhya whose metaphysical postulates it accepts, viz., that of making the psycho-ethical life of the empirical self a mere unreal scaffolding of the transcendental purusa which it kicks off, so soon as it realises its true nature as

pure consciousness.

In the Vedanta, however, the dualism of the objective and the subjective, the Brahman and the Atman, the cosmic and the psychic principles is overcome and we have a well-grounded metaphysic of morals. The Upanishads maintain that Brahman is Atman, the Infinite is immanent in the finite. It is the inmost being of the universe and all its phenomena. What is real is one but differentiates into the many. The world of many is at once the source of bondage so long as the many stand out as such and each of us clings to his individuality as an exclusive unit, as an ego sharply walled off from whatever is outside his physical, biological and psychical history. And this individualism, this egoity is the root of all that is morally bad and the truly good man is he who subordinates his individual and personal ends to universal and social ends--who realises the Infinite in the finite--who looks at things sub specie oeternitatis. The final goal of moral life is thus the realisation of the oneness with the universal consciousness whose essence is the highest and the fullest Bliss or Ananda. Every individual, everything that is, is a fragment of that Ananda whose full realisation is the lot only of the liberated. The liberated abdicates his narrow personal feelings and desires, his egoity and selfishness in favour of the highest Bliss or Ananda. Feelings, desides and emotions have a function and value in the ethical life of man in so far they, by their production of the opposite of what his intrinsic nature longs for through them, suggest a transvaluation of all his ordinary values--a true and abiding satisfaction as against the partial and insufficient ones they entail. The ethical tenets of the Gita also agree in all fours with those of the upanishads. The essen-

tially good life of the Jivanmukta is the same as that of the Sthitaprajna of the Gita. Disinterested actions are advocated in both the Upanisads and the Gita, perhaps a little more enthusiastically in the latter. Both the upanisads and Gita also agree in their acceptance of the organic relation between the psychical aspects of man who is regarded as the complex of reason, emotion and will. The only point of difference which seems to lie in their conception of mukti or ethical freedom, is one of degree and not of kind. The Gita makes salvation to consist in the union with the Godhead, the embodiment of wisdom, beauty and holiness, attainable by man who, though an integral whole of conscious existence, seems to work it out with occasional, apparent antagonism amongst his jnana, Bhakti and Karma aspects of his life. But the practical and religious tendencies which are incipient in the upanishads are made more emphatic in the Gita; and the latter, in its conception of Purusottama (making all allowance for the controversy as to the question) unmistakably points to a personal God in whose grace or gift lies the salvation of man.

If however, we are to take a purely scientific view of ethical life, divine grace or intervention in the matter of man's ultimate goal, as the upanishads and especially the Gita insists, can hardly have either logical or psychological justification. Both Buddhism and Jainism being humanistic in their outlook, holding man or the psychological individual as the supreme actor in the whole drama of life are rightly loath to introduce any deus ex machina. If liberation or ultimate freedom is something to be achieved and not awarded, it must be left entirely with the human agent to achieve it by extra-ordinary psychical endeavours in their superlative degree.

6. M. HIRIYANNA: "THE PLACE OF FEELING IN CONDUCT:" ADVAITA: Nearly all the Indian systems of philosophy teach, on their practical side, the necessity for cultivating vairagya. The reasons assigned for its cultivation may vary in the different systems, but they all agree that it is necessary. The need for it, so far as the Advaita is concerned, is clear from its inclusion in the fourfold aid to Brahma-knowledge set forth by Sankara in the very beginning of his commentary on the Vedanta Sutra. Now vairagya means dispassion or detachment from interest; and when we take this along with another of the qualification laid down as necessary for entering upon the life of a Vedantin, viz. discrimination between the eternal and the transient (nityanityavastu-viveka) with its emphasis on reason, it seems that feeling has no place in conduct according to the Advaita. The point that we have to consider is whether this conclusion is in consonance with the doctrine taken as a whole; and, if it is not, to find out what exactly is to be understood from vairagya. We shall consider the subject in two parts, as the discipline constituting the life of an Advaitin is broadly divisible in two stages. Before proceeding to this consideration, however, it is necessary to state clearly the sense in which the word "feeling" is used here. It is taken in the sense of feeling of value or interest which the conscious pursuit of an end always implies. I do not at present propose to ask in what other sense, if any, feeling is involved in conduct, and shall postpone what I have to say on this point to the close of the Paper.

The chief means recommended for the cultivation of vairagya in the earlier of the two stages referred to above is the adoption of the life of a householder. The underlying idea here

is that detachment cannot be achieved in the abstract, but only living in the midst of others and discharging the manifold duties that devolve upon one by doing so. The activities of a householder are, generally speaking, threefold: They include, in the first place, what are described as sadharanadharmas, or duties common to all without distinction of class (varna) or stages of life (asrama) such as the practice of kindness, forbearance and charity. Next come those like fortitude and temperance that have reference to the self, and may be described as duties of self-culture. Lastly, and for the most part, they consist of duties towards one's special environment which is conceived mainly, though not exclusively, as social. They are, for example, duties like fighting for one's country and king in the case of a prince and hospitality in the case of a householder. Being relative to the position which a person occupies in society, they are not binding on all; but, within the respective limits of their reference, they are quite obligatory and no one is allowed to choose from or change them at pleasure. In other words, they belong to the sphere of the hypothetical, and not to that of the hypothetical, and not to that of the categorical imperative. The first and last of these sets of activities, which aim at helping others, necessarily involve a good deal of self-denial. The second kind of activities also lead to the same result, but by directly imposing restrictions in various ways on impulsive action. Neither form of activity, however, precludes the pursuit of what is termed abhyadaya or lower human values like rank and riches, provided it does not come into conflict with the chief aim of the discipline of this stage, viz. self-culture and social service. It is the check upon selfish propensities implied in such dis-

cipline that is to be understood from vairagya in this stage, and not a complete abandonment of interests. Even in the case of activities whose end is not personal, there is a pleasure which the agent feels in the thought of others' good; for otherwise he would not choose to labour for it. Hence feeling is not excluded from conduct in this stage.

It may be said that, though the discipline of the householder's life as described above might not once have excluded feeling from conduct, it does so now, because the conception varnasrama-dharmas has since been totally transformed by the teaching of the Gita that whatever one does should be done without any thought of the result which may follow from it. This teaching may doubtless be taken to mean that duty should be done for its own sake, and that it should therefore be divorced from all interest. In that case there may be no room for feeling, in our sense of the term, in conduct. But, according to Samkara with whose doctrine we are now concerned, disinterested activity, in the literal sense of the expression, is a psychological impossibility; and to insist upon it in the name of morality is, as he observes to reduce life to a form of meaningless drudgery. There is accordingly no conflict between duty and interest; and even deeds performed in the spirit of the Gita teaching have in the end, viz. sattva-suddhi,'the cleansing of the heart' or 'the purifying of the affections.' What is meant by the counsel that all thought of fruits should be dismissed from one's mind in the doing of duty is not that it should be emptied of all motive but that the diverse purposes of the deeds that fall to one's lot in life should be replaced by one and the same end, viz. self-conquest or the moral improvement of the agent. There is thus an end here as much as

in the previous stage; only it is of a higher type, because it shuts altogether the desire for inferior values (abhyadaya) and aims solely at subjective purification. Vairagya means here the total abnegation of such inferior interests and not merely restraining one's natural inclinations. It thereby becomes much wider in its scope; but yet, as it does not altogether exclude the ideas of an end in which the agent is interested, feeling will continue to have a place in the conduct of this stage also.

It is necessary to dwell a little longer on the nature of this ideal for it may appear that, though it does not abolish all interest, the type of conduct (if we are to understand from it 'moral conduct') which it signifies is anything but the best from the ethical standpoint. The Gita teaching applies to all kinds of deeds--self-regarding as well as other-regarding; and the result of doing the latter also for the sake of sattva-suddhi will be to transfer the attention of the moral agent from their legitimate objects, viz. the persons and institutions whose interests they are intended to serve. Nobody questions the importance of subjective purification in a scheme of moral discipline, but the result of aiming at it in the Git manner seems to exclude the social aim which is essential to all true ethical conduct. It diverts the attention of the moral agent from others and concentrates it on his own betterment. In fact, the emphasis on the individual is a common charge brought against Hindu ethics in general and advaitic ethics in particular. In answering this objection it should be admitted that the Gita ideal does dismiss the social aim. But the dismissal of the social aim, we should add, does not mean the dismissal of the social view for, though the wel-

fare of society as such ceases to motivate action, it is not excluded from the agent's mind. This is clear from the emphasis laid on svadharma in the Gita. Its teaching, as we all know, insists not only on acting without any desire for fruit in the sense explained above, but also in the performance of one's own duties, i.e. of one's station in society. It is explicitly stated that their intrinsic character is of no consequence, and that it is their social significance that alone matters. Since it is the fulfilment, at all hazards, of these duties on which the Gita insists, it cannot be regarded as separating the individual from society. It is true that doing everything for self-betterment implies that all altruistic deeds are reduced to the level of a means instead of being regarded as ends in themselves. But that does not make the activity less objective. This aspect of the teaching becomes clear when we remember the alternative phrase used by Sankara for sattva-suddhi, viz. Isvarartham ('for the sake of God') which represents these duties as what one owes to God rather than to oneself. The training seems, no doubt, to care only for the agent, but it does not really ignore the gain that should accrue to society by one's membership of it. Its aim is not so much to take him away from society as beyond it. The fact is, that according to the Gita, social and individual ends cannot be completely reconciled; and the attempt made to adjust them in the previous stage can, at best, result only in a sort of working compromise. It is with the purpose of removing the very possibility of collision between them that the Gita substitutes for the dual motive of the earlier stage the single one of self-culture, purging it at the same time of all taint that may arise from the simultaneous pursuit of material and

such other lower interests.

The main aim in the second stage is to know the ultimate reality; and its knowledge, as we shall see, will further alter the significance of detachment. The person that enters upon this stage, as we stated before, already possesses this knowledge (viveka), but it is mediate and will just suffice to indicate in a general way the direction in which advance is to be made for knowing that reality immediately. His present purpose is to achieve this end. In order that he may accomplish it the better, he assumes samnyasa which like the other asramas has its own duties, so that the practical part of the discipline does not come to an end with its assumption. This stage again consists of two parts--one in which the disciple is striving to realise his purpose (vividisa-samnyasa) and the other in which he has succeeded in doing so (vidvat-samnyasa); and we shall consider each separately:

(i) In regard to the former, we should first point out that the adoption of samnyasa means taking a vow of non-injury (abhaya)--a fact which shows that the Vedantic disciple cannot grow oblivious of his environment, by which term we have to understand not merely human society but the whole of living creation including the meanest thing that feels. But it may be thought that, though he may not ignore the existence of others, his attitude towards them is purely negative and does not signify any positive striving for their sake. Even in the pessimistic schools of India which consider aloofness, or the isolation of the self from everything else, to be the ideal, the life of the saint is far from being self-centred; but, however that may be, it is certainly not so in Advaita. The best proof of it is found in the conception of Brahman, or the

ultimate reality to be realised here, as ananda or bliss. Since the Upanishads look upon all distinction as the source of pain, this conception implies the oneness of Brahman with the whole of existence. It is this oneness then which the disciple should now discover through his own experience, if he is to realise the highest reality; and he cannot obviously do so by neglecting others. This shows that his attitude towards the environment cannot be negative. On the other hand, it necessitates the cultivation of universal love, not in the sense of love for others as others but as oneself."He that sees all beings in himself and himself in all beings-- he will not turn away from them." Vairagya reaches its highest form here, and means the complete annihilation of egoistic interests implied in such love. That is, the aim here is not, as in the earlier stage, merely to seek for oneself an end which cannot come into conflict with that of others, but to transcend the very distinction between the self and the not-self. It may appear that that transcendence of this distinction, by eliminating all interests, will lead to the elimination of feeling from any conduct that may characterise the disciple thereafter. Such an objection can apply only to the culminating phase of the training, which we shall presently consider. So far as its other phases are concerned, the disciple is aware of himself as pursuing an end, and he therefore necessarily feels interested in it.

(ii) In one of the stages of discipline so far considered, whose common aim is to further the growth of detachment, is the kind of life, which the advaitic disciple leads, bereft of either altruistic activity or feeling. We have now to deal with the last phase of fruition or jivanmukti where that detachment has

become perfect. Here, however, we can take into account only the vyuthana or waking phase, for the other, viz. that of samadhi or trance is exactly like videha-mukti whose conception is eschatological. The latter is, no doubt, in strictness the final goal; but we are not concerned here with it, because it admittedly lies not only beyond the notions of right and wrong but also beyond all activity. There is not much to be stated in respect of this phase. The conduct of the previous phase here becomes spontaneous. That is, vividisa-samnyasa is transformed into vidvatsamnyasa or aspiration is replaced by achievement. One that has reached this state, the ideal stage, knows neither preferences nor exclusions; and everything is equally sacred to him--whether it be, in the words of the Gita, 'a cow or elephant or dog, the cultured Brahmin or the outcaste that feeds on dogs." He now ceases to belong to any class or order and becomes a citizen of the universe as we might put it. The moral striving which marks the lower stages is once far all left behind; but the elimination of strife does not mean the elimination of activity as is abundantly shown, for example, by the kind of life that Sankara himself led. Fruition does not mean rest. The activity, no doubt, is not directed towards any personal end because in attaining Brahman the sage has attained all. Aptakamasya ka sprha. But still it cannot be regarded as divorced from feeling, for it is inspired by his equal love for all, or his interest in the whole. The activity is, in fact, the concrete expression of that love. We may, if we like suppose that it involves self-interest also; only we should then bear in mind that it is not the egoistic, but the true or universal self that is meant. Vairagya

does not accordingly mean the abolition of interests but only the extinction of narrow egoism. Hence the present stage, like the previous ones is not bereft of either acitivity or feeling. But both of them come to have a new meaning by reason of the complete knowledge that has been attained. The one becomes wholly impersonal and the other is transformed into cosmic love.

It is time now to recur to the question alluded to in the beginning, viz. whether feeling, in any other sense, is involved in conduct. Broadly speaking, Indian thinkers conceive of the standard of moral judgment in two different ways. Some Mimamsakas, viz. the followers of Prabhakara, look upon it as a law which demands implicit obedience, while all the remaining schools of thought, including the Bhattas, take it as an end whose realisation is regarded as desirable. The advaitin adopts the latter view and describes the end as ista or what is desired by the agent. And since, according to him, the only object of desire is pleasure (or the avoidance of pain), it alone constitutes the end of all purposeful activity. Hence, according to the Advaita, feeling has a bearing on conduct not only in the sense of interest as implied in the conscious pursuit of an end, but also in that of pleasure as constituting that end. In other words, feeling is both an efficient cause of conduct and its final cause.

It will be objected that to represent pleasure as the goal of all conscious activity is to hark back to the hedonistic doctrine which has long been exploded by scientific psychology. But, seeing the remarkable measure of agreement that exists among Indian moralists on this point in spite of the ascetic outlook on life that prevails among them, it is difficult to believe that the theory is without a satisfac-

tory explanation. Confining our attention to the advaita, we may suggest the following interpretation. Pleasure is conceived here as a mode of the antah-karana; and, as no antah-karana is significant without a reference to a particular jiva it really stands for a state of the empirical self. Further, the pleasantness of such a state is in this doctrine, as distinguished from the Sankhya for example, due to the nature of the self of the self and not to that of the antah-karana. Consequently it seems that when pleasure is spoken of as the goal of all purposeful activity, we have to understand that what such activity aims at is the realisation of some state of the self. The goal is not therefore mere pleasure but a form or type of concrete experience of which pleasure or satisfaction is an invariable feature. The exact kind of experience which a person seeks at any time naturally depends upon his conception of the self at the time, or what comes to the same, upon his character. It is not possible, and it does not seem necessary, to consider this topic further before we close. If all purposeful activity alike points to 'pleasure' as its end, it may be asked what makes the difference between right and wrong action. In answering this question we have to remember that the satisfaction which can be realised on the empirical plane is notoriously unstable, and that there will sooner or later be a lapse from it. But when one rises above that plane and identifies oneself with all, it become final and lasting. It is this 'stable satisfaction' or abiding peace that is the ultimate goal of life, according to the Advaita; and it furnishes the criterion by which all conduct is to be judged. That conduct is moral which, by helping the conquest of the lower self in the manner described above,

prepares the way for such peace; and that which hinders it is the reverse. Moral conduct is thus only an aid to the attainment of the highest end which is beyond good and evil.

7. T.R.V. MURTI: "THE PLACE OF FEELING IN CONDUCT." Can the Vedantic discipline have any place for feeling as the means of reaching Brahman, the self? It is expressly stated that knowledge is the sole means of attaining freedom. To know is to be Brahman. Like the means, Brahman is also of the nature of knowledge. Rather, it is the conception of the absolute as knowledge that suggests the knowing path and excludes the other means.

What is known is, or should be, independent of the act of knowing; it is prior to and unconstituted by the latter. I only discover a being already there (Parinisthita, Siddha-vastu). Otherwise, the notions of truth and falsity have no meaning. Again, the content of knowledge is not for me alone, though I happen to know it. I believe it to be true precisely because it is what it is irrespective of me or any other percipient. It is self-existent and self-evident. It is really the unrelated, being fully significant without relation to other contents or to the knowing act.

What, however, is actually claimed to be known is not of this nature. We are not quite sure whether the object of our knowledge is not constituted, in some measure at least, by the subjective act of knowing. There is the need to realise it as a Being free from all process of willing. Secondly, the object of knowledge has also to be realised as unrelated to the knower, as something in itself without its appearance, as not even a relatum but only accidentally, freely, revealing itself. In the last resort, this would mean the abolition of

relational mode of approach, all relation being, in the main, a mode of feeling.

Spiritual discipline in the Vedanta consists in purifying given experience of all factors which are not knowledge, but which nevertheless <u>appear</u> as knowledge. There is no experience which does not imply Brahman, pure knowledge. Illusion itself is possible because of this pure Being. Though the most positive and prius of things, it is reached through negation. The truth is known by calcelling falsity. An example of empirical illusion would make this clear. It is only as we dissociate the "snake" from the rope, the false appearance from real being, that we are at all said to know reality. The "snake" is only <u>felt</u> not known, as it does not and cannot have a being of its own; it is nothing apart from its appearance is consciousness (Pratibhasamatra sarira). Not so the rope. It is real and was so even when we did not know it. But for its being there, the "snake" could not have even <u>appeared</u> as real. Brahman is of this nature. We may say therefore that what appears is illusory, and that the real does not and need not appear.

In actual procedure, there is first the suggested falsity of the world and the sole reality of Brahman through revelation. Then we have the "thinking criticism" of things whereby the distinction between the true and the false is made intelligible. The culmination is reacted in the purely contemplative or non-realtional consciousness (Akandarthavrtti) where even the duality of the false and the real, of the content and the act of knowing is transcended. The realised identity is not a relation, being devoid of all differences. Difference is not essential for iden-

tity, but there is identity in spite of the differences. It is of course true that only as we cancel the differences e.g. the differences in Tat and Tvam, that we become conscious of the inherent identity. The ultimate knowledge cannot be expressed as a judgement, but is the implication of all judgements.

We may now characterise the method. Brahman is realised through a critical analysis of experience, negation or cancellation of ignorance meaning only this. There is a progressive deepening of insight simultaneous with the abstraction and purification of the given. Throughout the whole process is informed by the light implicit from the outset. Though not intellectual in any narrow sense, it is knowledge purely. It might be seen therefore that feeling has no place as the accredited means of self-realisation. It is what is abstracted and rejected as non-knowledge like the snake. It is of course possible to admit feeling as a secondary means. Devotion to God and to the guru, disinterested loving of all beings etc. are accepted as leading to knowledge, through self-purification and detachment, so essential to knowledge.

En passant it may be pointed out that the place of feeling in conduct is analogus to the position of Isvara and the Saksi in advaitism. They represent the creative (willing) and the feeling functions of spirit which are not accorded the ultimate place; this is reserved for Brahman-spirit as knowledge. Not ultimate like Brahman, Isvara is still not phenomenal; he is the Lord, eternally free (Sadaiva muktah, Sadaivesvarah). So all is the Saksi. For the disciple, Isvara is an object of worship and meditation (upasana). Feeling devotion to him admittedly helps in the removal of ignorance; his grace, as that of the guru, may lead us to Brahman. Even a rigorous advaitin, accepting

knowledge alone as the means, can possibly have no objection to recognising feeling as a secondary means.

We now take up the question regarding the motivation of conduct. What is the urge behind it, why is it undertaken? The Naiyayika apparently is a hedonist. He contends that all conduct is motivated by pleasure or the absence of pain as the end. He refutes at some length the thesis of the Prabakara that injunction, the knowledge that one is so commanded or 'duty for its own sake' is sufficient incentive to conduct. Desireless action, Niskama-karma as inculcated by the Gita, would on this view, be a myth, an impossibility. However true this may be of natural (Naisargika) conduct, we cannot concede this as explaining all conduct. To do so would be to interpret higher conduct by the lower; the reverse may well be more consistent. The opposition between the life of desire and the life of reason is soon felt. Such an opposition, much less the preference for the path of reason exercised by a few individuals at least, admits of no explanation if conduct were guided by the desire of pleasure. The advaitin clearly allies himself with Kant and Prabhakara as against the hedonist. Spiritual life begins with Vairagya, with the abandonment of desire in all forms. The desire of an external end, the very attitude of gain and grab is unspiritural and is contrary to the urge to know Brahman. For, it outwardises the spirit and carries it towards phenomena. It would be a quibble to say that the advaitin desires desirelessness. Nor is it true that vairagya is a tentative or prudential measure.

8. Though not an external end, the Vedantic absolute is not devoid of feeling. Feeling is not aimed at precisely because it is the self

itself. Brahman is conceived not merely as knowledge but as bliss as well. It is Reality, Knowledge and Bliss all in one--Saccidananda. The concept is peculiar and needs some elaboration. Meantime, it is interesting to contrast it with the stage of freedom in the other systems.

9. The Vedantic approach is through knowledge, but Brahman is not merely knowledge. Importance attaches, in this connection to the conception of it as Joy. By a critique of experience it is shown that all pleasure is really the shadow of the Bliss of Brahman. The analogue on the cognitive side is that all knowledge is traceable to the pure consciousness.

Due to our inveterate objective attitude we believe that objects give pleasure; but in reality the object serves as an occasion for the inwardisation of the self-function (vrtti) and the resultant pleasure is only the index of the innate joy of the self. The enjoyment is circumscribed by the intensity and duration of the particular occasion; anon, the vrtti gets outward again. And hence empirical enjoyment is a pleasure not bliss; it is an emergent event not eternal and ever-lasting. But all these limitations pertain to the objective occasions engendering the feeling and not to the feeling itself. The close similarity of this analysis of feeling with that of knowledge is too patent to be missed. Brahman as joy is, in a very real sense, the fruition of all conduct.

10. G.R. MALKANI: "THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION. The standpoint of philosophy is that of reflection. The practical man or the man of the world has contact with reality. But he does not reflect on the nature of this contact. If he reflects at all, he reflects to get over some hitch in action. The scientist may also be

said to reflect. But he reflects in order to bring the objective world or nature in general nearer to his understanding. Neither the practical man nor the scientist reflects on the nature of our experience as such. Both are in a sense immersed in the object. It is not a problem to them, what is the nature of our contact with reality or whether we can be said to know reality at all. They take for granted that in immediate sense-awareness we are in contact with reality itself. The object of sense-awareness is for them the thing. It is what is known and thought. And it is also what interests them chiefly.

The common experience of reality on which the common-sense man and the scientist proceed is for the philosopher unreflective experience. It may be taken for all practical purposes to be immediate experience of reality. The essential characteristic of this experience is that there is no explicit awareness of the object as being to a subject, and therefore no explicit awareness of the distinction of the subject and the object. The subject remains always in the back-ground. There is no interest in it and no problem connected with it. Philosophical reflection begins with the explicit awareness of the distinction of the subject and object. The subject is for the first time recognised as an important factor in all our experience.

We may be said, in immediate experience, to know an object and implicitly believe in it. As long as this belief is sustained, there is no occasion to recognise the subjective. Our immediate experience is self-sufficient. There is no problem. There is no occasion for philosophical reflection. This occasion arises when our faith is not sustained. What we implicitly believed to be real is seen to be illusory; it

is cancelled. We become aware of the subjective in our knowledge. The object is no longer intelligible as being merely in itself but only as to a subject. The distinction of the subject and the object is forced upon us and we become philosophically reflective.

If what we have said is true, certain conclusions follow; (1) The distinction of the subject and the object is present in immediate experience; only it is not recognised. It is implicit there. Reflection does not manufacture the distinction. (2) Reflection does not come in because somebody wants to reflect, or says "Now let us reflect!" There must be an occasion for it; and this occasion is provided by the experience of disillusionment. (3) the object is necessarily thought in relation to the subject. This necessity it is that defines the very problem of philosophy. It is because the object is necessarily so thought that there is the philosophical problem, how should we get rid of the subjective and real self-evident truth. (4) The recognition of the distinction of the subject and the object is not merely the recognition of a fact unrecognised before. We cannot therefore stop with it. It is only a starting point for truth,--a truth of a new kind distinct from what we call empirical fact. It is not itself the truth which we are philosophically in quest of.

ll. We are supposed to have an immediate awareness of the physical world. The sensible object is what is immediately known so far as thought is concerned. This is the only knowledge that claims to be knowledge, that claims to be immediate awareness of reality. We may pronounce this knowledge to be false and its claimed immediacy to be only pseudo-immediacy or a form of mediate knowledge. But even to have this awareness of falsity, we must have knowledge

which is true. When we pronounce the snake to-
be illusory, we have knowledge of the rope which
is true. When however we pronounce knowledge
of the object as such to be illusory, the
knowledge which reveals this illusoriness must
be regarded as true. This knowledge is not the
knowledge of any object. It implies the cancel-
lation of all knowledge of object. This know-
ledge can only be regarded as being in itself
pure awareness without any object, and which
reveals, if it reveals anything, the falsity
of all other knowledge which claims to reveal
objective reality. True knowledge has no con-
tent. It is not the knowledge of anything. It
is present in all cases of supposed knowledge.
It is what shows up the falsity of the latter.

We can only explicate this true knowledge
through an analysis of our intuition of 'I'.
We have already seen that truth cannot be
found in the direction of any object. It can
only be found in the direction of the subject.
The only intuition of the subject is the in-
tuition of 'I'. Our intuition of 'I' however
is not the intuition of something isolated or
something in itself. It is not the intuition
of what we should call the pure subject. It is
a mixed form of intuition. It is an intuition
of the subject as related to the object. This
relation may be of different degrees of inti-
macy. There are objects of which we are merely
disinterested knowers. Others come very near to
us and affect us internally. And there are yet
others which are hardly distinguishable from us
and can only be distinguished through a deeper
insight. We must purify our notion of the sub-
ject starting with the intuition of 'I'. If we
did not have this intuition of 'I', if our
knowledge was wholly limited to the object,
there would not be any possibility of knowing
philosophical truth. In fact, there would be

no truth at all. The only reality would be the object, and the only true knowledge would be the knowledge of the object. This however is not the case. Philosophical reflection starts with the falsity of the object. And it so starts, because there is a higher intuition of reality or the intuition of the subject in the form of 'I'. What is needed is to see this reality more clearly and without those relations which transform it into some kind of object.

12. K.R. SRINIVASIENGAR: "INTERPRETATION OF SOME VEDANTA SUTRAS CONSIDERED." The life and soul of a philosophy doubtless consist in its inherent plasticity sufficient of development, growth, modification, reinterpretation according to changing circumstances. But when it is thus modified and re-interpreted, it must be unambiguously recognised as a modification, a qualified form, an altered interpretation, of the original version. There is nothing derogatory in this procedure either to the greatness of the original philosopher or to the genius of him who later on modifies it. On the other hand it distinctly redounds to the glory of both the master and the disciple. Such was the procedure adopted by all the ancient teachers and commentators, especially of the Advaita system. Why should not thought develop beyond Sankara? Have not various schools grown out of his system professedly differing from his conclusions on vital points? And yet we find that later commentators have fought shy of acknowledging their differences from Sankara and have tried to father their own views upon him. Of none else is this truer than of Appaiyya Diksita, a prolific writer and commentator of Advaita philosophy and of no other part of his teaching than of his doctrine of salvation.

Appaiyya is an enthusiastic upholder of Advaita and its nirgunavada. He has written

a critique upon Srikantha's Sivadvaita in which he undertakes to prove in a most painstaking manner the identity of that author's doctrine with nirgunavada. He clearly recognises and states in many places that departure on the path of the gods (archiradimarga) does not belong to the "Knowers of Brahman without attributes" who desire final release. The departure etc. belongs only to those who desire gradual release (Krama-mukti) as well as to those who mediate on Saguna Brahman desiring Iswarehood. He also admits that the knowledge of Nirguna Brahman (Nirguna Vidya) embodies the truth and that the knowledge of Saguna Brahman is valuable only as a preparation for the former, bringing about, as it is believed to do, mental purity, firmness and the power to concentrate on Nirguna Brahman. It is thus intended only for dull-witted ones who otherwise, not having sufficient strength of mind to contemplate the nirguna, may foolishly take to it and thus land themselves in destruction.

Yet admitting all this and much more besides, somehow at the very last moment Appaiyya's ingenuity betakes itself to twisting Sankara and fathering upon him the view of release that even by those who practice nirguna vidya only Iswarahood with attributes is attained in the first instance, while oneness with Brahman's being comes only after the final release of all (sarva-mukti) This may certainly be an improvement upon Sankara, however untenable on the Sankarite premises. But why the elaborate attempt to make it appear as Sankara's own view of release? Such an attempt Appaiyya undertakes both in his Sivadvaita Nirnaya as well as in his Siddhantalesha Sangraha.

13. Thus by closely examining Appaiyya's arguments, we come to the conclusion that his

own arguments in favour of nirgunavidya lead-
ing to Isvaraikya are inconclusive while his
appeal to Sankara leaves him really supportless.
In fact, the very hypothesis of the released
soul merging in Iswara is preposterous. A
reality of a lower order could merge in a rea-
light of a higher order, a vyavaharika (empi-
rical) in the paramarthika (transcendental),
a reflection in the original. But what sense
is there in saying that an empirical can merge
in another empirical, a reflection in another
reflection? If therefore the individual soul
is to merge in Iswara at all, it must perforce
be of a lower order than the latter, i.e. be
of a pratibhasika status like an illusion.

14. G.R. MALKANI. Review on 'Christian Morality
--natural, developing, final." by H.H. Henson.
The author approaches the subject of his lec-
tures with the attitude natural to his profes-
sion. He thinks that Christianity alone has
been able to "inspire a morality which is never
obsolete, and thus to vindicate a right to be
regarded as in unique and plenary sense, natu-
ral."

15. But it is one thing to be enamoured of one's
own religion, and another to pass judgment upon
the religion of others. For any Christian,
Christ may be the ideal man, the only begotten
son of God, etc. But these matters depend en-
tirely upon personal attitude and belief. They
are not open to discussion. Different persons
can assume for their devotees the character of
the ideal man or the God inspired man. We can
sympathise with the author's attitude on this
point. But we do not think that it is reasonable.
The author lacks the liberal attitude towards
other religions, and he cannot see the funda-
mental unity underlying different religions.

15. There is no doubt that most Christians be-
lieve that the record of the Evangelists is

literally true. This belief gives an added reality to the personality of Christ and thereby increases his power to influence others. Christians are greatly impressed by the idea that there was a time when God actually strode the earth. Why God should appear upon the earth once only throughout its long career in time passes our understanding. There is certainly more truth in the Hindu view that God appears upon the earth again and again in the interests of religion and morality. There is a more human touch in this view than in the idea of the sole incarnation. It is also quite unnecessary to over-emphasise the historical character of Christ. Belief that he was a real historical person does the work quite well. It is the psychological aspect that is all-important in religion. The actual state of things is quite unimportant so long as we hold a certain belief firmly. Religious belief does not need the support of history. Nobody consults the historical critics before believing in the story of the Gospels. The belief is independent of the actual facts of history and quite self-sufficient. After all the Gospels are human documents. They were written at least a generation after the last event of the life of Christ. They were not written by his immediate followers, but by persons whose information was derived from second-hand reports. How can we claim literal truth for every statement of the Gospels? It is sufficient that we believe in the historicity of the main outlines of the record. If the scripture itself is for us the final source of information and of authority, then our whole outlook is determined by the scripture as it is, and not by the fact that Christ really was, in actual fact, as the scripture depicts him. In religion, it is

not the historical element that is of real value, but the essential truth that is revealed to us. The historical is necessarily partial and non-abiding. It is on this account that Hinduism does not derive the ultimate truth from the teaching of any person at a particular moment of time. It regards truth as eternal and as impersonal. It was not thought out by a person and promulgated. There can be no final authority attaching to the pronouncements of any person. Once again we may disbelieve the non-personal origin of any book of revelation such as the Vedas, but there is great meaning <u>in the belief</u> that truth must be nonpersonal and eternal, and that persons declare it but they do not formulate it. The strength of Hinduism consists just in the fact that it does not derive the truth from a person.

We do not question the high level of moral teaching of the Gospels. But we do not think that everything contained in them strikes a high note. We have recorded in them various miracles which many intelligent and devout Christians believe are not possible, and which we ourselves think detract somewhat from the ethical value of the actions of Christ. If Christ indeed did what he is reported to have done, he had very little in common with man as man. We may regard him as divine. But we cannot at the same time regard him as "the very man"; and the whole purpose of incarnation is frustrated. That purpose consists in showing the way to man by one who acts on the plane of man. He struggles against evil and shows the ultimate triumph of man, his moral victory, under man's own conditions and limitations. If one reads the record of Buddha's life and also that of Christ, and honestly ask himself, which is more true to man as man, and which is more human, one will not hesistate to say that it is

Buddha's. There are no miracles going about. There is no mysterious atmosphere. The record of his life embraces the man from his childhood onwards, and shows him struggling like any ordinary man with stupendous will-power against temptations, against slackening, and triumphing in the end as any man with human qualities might do. We have no similar account of Christ in the Gospels. That account covers only a few weeks of his life. No attempt has been made to picture him as a struggling human being. The man has come all at once in power and glory. We shall naturally like to know more of the man as man and less of the miracles he wrought. Is it after all improbable that idealisation has been at work? In fact no human record can claim literal truth. There is always the personal factor. This naturally makes for error and exaggeration. To say that a record is historical is not to say that it is necessarily true. The claims of Christianity must be based upon the essential moral and spiritual teaching of the Gospels rather than upon the historical truth of the record of Christ's life.

16. In contrast with it we have the morality of the Gita. It is a morality which is based upon a principle that goes to the root of all moral action, and which the super-man no less than the slave will recognise as the essential moral principle that must govern his life. That principle is to act in all circumstances of our life without the desire for the fruit of our actions. It is the principle of true freedom, and therefore the highest moral principle. All other rules and principles of conduct are subsidiary to it.

The book is written with the dogmatism which is natural in a Christian preacher, but which we do not expect in a thinker. It is poor in reasoned argument and does not raise the dis-

cussion of the subject to a high dispassionate and scientific level. It can convince only those who are already convinced. They very title of the subject is revealing.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: 1937 (Vol.XIII)

1. K.C. GUPTA: THE STATUS OF THE PRE-ORGANIC WORLD IN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Modern Idealism, it has been repeatedly pointed out, should be clearly distinguished from phenomenalism, subjectivism or mentalism.

2. Critics of idealism have not, however, failed to point out the contradiction which such a position involves--a contradiction which is supposed to arise out of two conflicting tendencies in the idealistic argument. On the one hand there is the tendency to differentiate between the stream of processes which constitute a mind and the objects which are presented to it and on the other the tendency to make the existence of mind essential to that of objects. But if Nature has 'being in its own right's or nature moulds minds or is the instrument for their sculpturing--as is maintained by some modern idealists--it cannot also at the same time be true that nature is 'for'mind or 'presupposes' mind. This contradiction seems to come to a head when idealism attempts to give us an account of the existential status of the pre-organic world in consonance with its own principles. If we accept, as every sensible idealist unhesitatingly does, a state of the universe prior to the existence of human minds or even of living organisms it may be reasonable to take the view that all minds which appear subsequently are moulded or conditioned by the pre-existing physical world but how can it also be asserted at the same time that this pre-organic world depends for its existence on mind or consciousness? Through

what mind or minds does this world come to be? To assert that the pre-organic world depends for its existence on its relation to the Absolute Mind would be open to two serious objections. In the first place this would imply that the Absolute Mind is something different from finite minds--a proposition which modern idealists would reject without hesitation; and in the second place this would come into conflict with the very premises on which the entire idealistic arguments is based. After having deduced the dependence of the physical world on mind from the specific nature of the cognitive relation between finite minds and that world it would be extremely illogical to make it dependent on the Absolute Mind whose relation to the physical world may be, for aught we know, entirely different in nature from that of finite minds to their environment.

Thus if the physical world is 'for' mind and 'presupposes' mind it would be entirely meaningless to speak of a world which existed before the appearance of finite minds. If on the other hand we admit the existence of a pre-organic world we must admit that it was for its existence independent of any finite mind or minds inasmuch as ex hypothesi there was no such mind to cognise it when it existed. Can modern idealism solve this difficulty?

3. P.T. RAJU: "SCEPTICISM & ITS PLACE IN SANKARA'S PHILOSOPHY." We have to interpret our experience of the unknowable, whether it is the Absolute as in Sankara and Campbell or matter as in Santayana, as certainly due to consciousness, but to a different level of it from thought or pure reason. But all the levels of consciousness are continuous and the conscious subject is the same all through. In absolutism the Absolute and the supra-intellectual consciousness are postulated as the

very condition of the phenomena and our intellect. The critic of the unknowable has to be met by saying that our conscious life is too complex to fit into the deterministic explanation of the intellect.

Similarly, the contrary criticism that any experience of the supra-rational is a sign of unhealthy mysticism is also due to deliberately ignoring the complexity of our conscious life and the inordinate desire for deterministic explanations. This criticism too has therefore to be met by saying, as above, that human beings possess different levels of consciousness which are continuous and overlapping. If we were endowed merely with animal faith, we would have wondered how reasoning could be a good guide to existence. Similarly, we wonder from the level of the intellect what pure supra-rational consciousness would be like. Yet in the experience of beauty and in moments of moral conversion, we feel that we rise above ourselves. These facts cannot be deterministically explained. At this point we cannot attach too much significance to the demands of our moral consciousness that we should rise above ourselves and our circumstances. This idea of perfection may be very vague for the intellect; it may take this or that form; yet the human being is dissatisfied with each and is able to say, it is not this, it is not this. He feels the stirrings of the ideal within. This feeling may perhaps be dismissed as a pathological state of mind. Yet that really is at the root of all moral, nay, even all human progress. The presence of the ideal may not be felt by each and every person just as music, painting, philosphy and so forth are not appreciated by every man. Even when felt it is possible to ignore it by not caring to push explanations in logic and ethics to their ends. The presence

and the work of this ideal in history and in the individual show that the subject is not a mere counterpart of the object and explainable, like it, mechanistically, but passes beyond it, and is in touch with something more than the object and itself.

4. S.N.L. SRIVASTAVA: "IDEALISM AND MENTALISM." The idealism-realism controversy in philosophy, in spite of the bickerings of ages, seems to be an interminable one; while to many, a defence of idealism at the present day would appear a vain attempt at the resurrection of a doctrine on which death has sealed its inevitable doom. This is avowedly the attitude of modern realists. There are others still with whom the terms idealism and realism are merely "traditional battle-cries and watchwords rather than names of precision." However this may be justified on the ground of certain points of agreement between Neo-realism and Neo-idealism, the fact remains that realism and idealism continue to be antagonistic doctrines and promise no rapprochement in some most vital points.

The main point of attack against Idealism, and one which inspires the growth of a realistic tendency at the present day is that Idealism lands us into what may be called "the mentalistic predicament" or what Professor Perry styles as "the ego centric predicament." The modern realist thinks that he is doing yeoman service to the cause of speculative science by exposing the basic fallacy of idealism while idealists (such as have the courage of their conviction even today) are straining every nerve to show that 'mentalism' is quite a different thing from idealism and that idealism is not a doctrine which attempts to volatize or spirit away the reality of the external material world. "Certainly for myself," writes Bosanquet "if an idealist were to tell me that

a chair is really not what we commonly take it to be, but something altogether different (unless he meant 'a dance of electrons' or the like), I should be tempted to reply in language below the dignity of controversy." Passages could be cited from the writings of leading idealists to the effect that idealism does not deny the existence of a rerum natura which the mind does not create by its own discursive thinking but simply discovers or reveals, and that the objects of knowledge pre-date and post-date the particular acts of knowledge through which they are known. Though, in the writings of certain idealists like Berkeley, for example, passages could be found here and there lending countenance to subjectism, yet, on the whole the realist's charge of mentalism or ego-centricism against the idealistic doctrine seems to be an entirely unfounded prejudice. To clear up this point, let us see briefly what idealism properly understood means and how it escapes the difficulties of mentalism or ego-centricism.

Idealism is the doctrine which holds that the real is ideal in the sense that there is no reality which does not communicate itself to us through the ideas and ideals that are organic to our intellectual equipment or reason. That which cannot reveal itself or communicate itself to us in the medium of our knowledge is for us as good as non-existent. The world or reality exists for us only in the medium of our knowledge or consciousness and is intelligible or explicable only in terms of ideas through which we know it. Mind or consciousness is the organ through which nature as the entire system of objective reality expresses itself to us, and this argues for the supremacy and logical priority of the former over the latter. "All that exists for knowledge" says Schopenhauer "and, therefore, this whole world, is only object in relation to subject,

perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and the future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off, as of what is near; for it is true of time and space themselves, in which alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject and exists only for the subject." The vital point in idealism which no realist theory can ever damage is that knowledge alone is the medium of reality's revelation to us; that anything that in any sense is real cannot communicate its reality to us otherwise than through our ideas or knowledge; and that the reality of anything is intelligible only as a reality <u>for</u> a mind or consciousness which comprehends it. The principle that consciousness is the comprehending and revealing organ of reality, may then be called, the corner stone of all idealistic philosophy. The Aitareya Upanishad puts it as <u>prajnanetro lokah prajna pratistha</u>.

Now, it is a long way from this to say that all that is real is simply a set of ideas in the individual mind. That would simply be, in the words of Green "What a raw undergraduate understands by idealism." To say that knowledge is the medium of reality's revelation to us or that an existent becomes an <u>intelligible</u> existent to <u>us</u> only in so far as it enters into knowledge-relation with us, does not commit us to the doctrine that there is no reality beyond the passing stream of presentation in <u>my</u> mind. Much capital is made by the realist of the idealistic contention that things are knowable only through ideas or that all existence is existence for mind or consciousness that knows it. This, the realists have said times without number, lands us into the mentalistic or the ego-centric predicament.

Is it really so? To answer this question effectively we must understand clearly what 'being *for* mind or consciousness' means and *what it does not mean*. It means that an existent would not be an intelligible existent to you or one which could be said to have revealed its nature to you, unless it entered into knowledge-relation with your mind or consciousness that knew it. Reality receives articulation only as presented within the interpreting or revealing medium of knowledge.

It does not mean that there is no reality beyond the passing train of ideas and images in the individual mind nor does it mean that the objects of the world are the *creations* of discursive thinking. Nor do the idealistic premises constrain us to believe that a thing ceases to exist when no mind is perceiving or knowing it. The table I am writing upon did exist before I entered the room, and will exist after I leave the room. All that we are required to assert on idealistic premises is that we would not have *understood it as table with all that it connotes* unless it entered into knowledge-relation with us as the object of our consciousness. The intelligible universe, the world of our knowledge is what it is, not as a self-closed system, but as the object of our consciousness.

The ego-centric predicament blocks our way only when we make a confusion between (i) mind in the psychological sense of the individual course of ideas in an individual mind attached to an individual body and (ii) mind or consciousness in the comprehensive sense of the revealing organ of reality, and not simply *this* mind or *that* mind. If we say that all reality is for mind, taking mind in the former sense, then certainly we are brought to the ego-centric *impasse*, for that would not warrant a belief in anything outside the individual mind, and the existence of things during the

interval of perceptions by individual minds would be inexplicable. Nor would the introduction of an All-knower or Divine Mind save the situation, for, as Prof. Pringle-Pattison says "if knowledge has the same meaning in the two cases, the existence of a thing can no more depend on God's knowing it than on my knowing it."

So the charge of ego-centricism or mentalism usually levelled against Idealism is based on a serious misgiving, viz. that Idealism equates all reality with the passing course of consciousness or presentation in the individual mind. The correct idealistic position as expressed by Bosanquet is this: Knowledge is the medium in which our world, as an interrelated whole exists for us. This is more than saying that it exists in mind or presentation because the mere course of consciousness need not amount to knowledge. A world that is a system of things acting on one another, could not exist merely in the course of our ideas."

So, the whole muddle of pressing the idealistic point to a subjectivist or mentalist conclusion arises from a faulty interpretation of "in knowledge" or "in consciousness". It is a vital contention of idealism that the objective is in knowledge or consciousness and <u>not outside</u> it. For a proper appreciation of the idealistic stand-point, it is necessary to understand this both in its positive and negative signification. We have dwelt sufficiently on the positive meaning of the statement and we should give some consideration here to its negative implication. The objective is not outside knowledge: why not? For, if it were, there would be a bifurcation of reality which would have disastrous consequences for knowledge. There would then be two worlds: one the real objective world outside knowledge, and the other

the world as realised in knowledge which would in some sense be a copy or representation of the former. Now, on these premises, the real object is ex hypothesi outside knowledge and therefore for ever inaccessible to it. How then can we be sure that the world as realised in knowledge ever conforms to the real world outside it? The real object becomes an inscrutable x. We are simply shut up within the psychical circle of our own ideas. This is the cul-de-sac to which we are led, if we take the real world to be "outside" knowledge. "Outside" as Bosanquet says "is a relation of bodies to one another; but every-thing, about which we can so much as ask a question, is so far inside the mind, i.e. given in its continuum of presentation or idea." In knowing we do not pass from knowledge to reality, but develop a reality immanent in knowledge. Neo-idealism is right in asserting that knowledge does not stand in an external relation to an extraneous object in contemplating which it goes beyond itself. Reality is immanent in knowledge; there is or can be no reality which is not pervious to knowledge, and so far, all reality is ideal. But this ideality in the metaphysical sense must be distinguished from psychological ideality. It is only when this distinction is lost sight of that the nightmare of 'mentalism confronts idealism and exposes idealism to misunderstanding and ridicule.

A Further Question: We have shown then that idealism does concede extra-mental or extra-psychical reality to world and its objects holding only that no reality is outside knowledge or consciousness and that all reality is such as could only be determinable by the ideas and ideals of our intelligence. What then about 'matter'? Could we not say that the extra-psychical objects are material? Before we answer this question, we should specify our notion of

materiality and then see if there could be anything like matter in the sense we are wont to understand it. Leaving aside the different meanings which could be applied to the term 'matter', we may consider it here in the most usual sense of the term viz. something which is radically opposed in nature to mind or spirit, an inert passive something which is the object of our sense-knowledge. In common parlance we mean by material things "sensible things" or what Mill said in a more sophisticated language 'permanent possibilities of sensation.' Berkeley understood matter in the sense of a substratum of sensible qualities, a residual something, which causes or occasions the sensation of those qualities in our minds. This he considered to be the "philosophical meaning of matter" and in this sense alone he sought to deny the existence of matter. He would have no quarrel with the layman who applies the word "matter" just to objects of sense as we directly and immediately perceive them. Now, howsoever we may state our notion of matter, the important thing about it is that we mean by it something non-ideal in a completely thoroughgoing sense, an ab extra limit to the continuum of knowledge; so that the acceptance of "matter" necessarily implies a bifurcation of reality into two radically distinct elements--the ideal and the non-ideal or the material. The postulate of matter, howsoever we may define or understand the term, implies a dis-continuity in reality: the ideal is simply contiguous but not continuous with the non-ideal. Knowledge grasps, so to say, something utterly alien in essence to it.

Now, this appears to me an anomaly of the extremest type. How can something which communicates itself through knowledge be itself opposed in nature to knowledge? If all reality is

such that it manifests or is capable of manifesting itself only in the medium of knowledge, then the inevitable conclusion is that there is a community or parity of nature between knowledge and the reality that is known. In the end, there can be nothing which does not partake of the nature of knowledge, for if there be any such thing it would ipso facto be impervious to knowledge. To admit a reality alien in essence to knowledge is for ever to defeat the possibility of knowledge. If we admit that knowledge apprehends an object which is non-ideal *in excelsis*, we are constrained to posit a *tertium quid* which will account for the co-ordination of the two. But there is neither any theoretic justification nor any empirical evidence for a such a *tertium quid*. The notion of matter or materiality, then, is ultimately indefensible; and the objects of knowledge though as 'objects' are distinguishable from our knowledge of them, are none-the-less what I should call spiritual essences.

But does our disclaimer of matter bring us again to the mentalistic predicament which we sought to avoid in the last section of this paper? Certainly not. Though the object of our knowledge are ultimately spiritual or ideal essences, they are yet *external to* and *other than* the course of ideas and images in our individual minds. They are what such ideas refer to. As 'objects' they are distinguishable from the course of psychical presentation and cannot be equated with the latter. Such a position is quite in advance of anything that mere mentalism may offer. The objects, on our view, though spiritual in their ultimate essence, yet constitute a common order of reality for *all* minds.

The escape from mentalistic predicament does not lie necessarily in a 'materialistic'

realism or in affirming the reality of matter. The admission of a real external world, existing independently of individual minds, is not incompatible with a creed of immaterialism. The ideality of phenomena, according to our interpretation, does not imply that they are psychical existents in individual minds, but simply that metaphysically they are in their ultimate essence cannot be opposed in nature to knowledge but must themselves partake of the nature of knowledge. Psychological ideality must be distinguished from metaphysical ideality.

To conclude, Reality assuredly admits of an idealistic interpretation without involving, as it commonly is supposed, the mentalistic or ego-centric predicament. Such a precicament arises only when we give a subjectivist colouring to idealism (as the realist critic invariably does) and reduce all reality to ideas in the psychical sense. A doctrine can rightly be called subjectivist or ego-centric if it holds that all the external phenomena in experience are simply the creations of the individual mind; and I believe no idealist philosopher with the single exception of Fichte, lends countenance to such a view. Even Berkeley who resolved all objective phenomena into bundles of sensations and ideas, did not take the individual mind as their originative source but said that God caused all these sensations and ideas. Berkeley, the avowed mission of whose philosophy was to proclaim the glory of God as the creator and sustainer of all things, would be the last man to accept the subjectivist interpretation of his philosophy which instals man in place of God. Nor has any idealist worth the name come near denying the independent reality of the external world. According to Green "The fact that there is a real external world of

which through feeling we have a determinate experience and that in this experience all our knowledge of nature is implicit, is one which no philosophy disputes." "If the reader" says Bradley "believes that a steam-engine after it is made, is nothing but a state of the mind of the person or persons who made it, or who looking at it, we do not hold that we are tempted to call such a silly doctrine, and would point out to those who do hold it that at all events, the engine is a very different state of mind, after it is made, to what it is before." Even Berkeley who is stigmatised as the subjectivist in excelsis unequivocally declares: "By the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear or, anywise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever. There is a rerum natura and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force."

So the mentalistic predicament which has long been associated with idealism and said to constitute its basic fallacy, is more imaginary than real, more a distortion that a true interpretation of the essential message of idealism. We abstract from living experience when we take the independent reality of the external world to mean not only independent of the psychical stream of presentation, but independent of the illuminating and interpreting intelligence or consciousness as such. Nor is the idealistic contention damaged in the least if we disavow the reality of 'matter' and take an all-spiritual view of Reality. The distinction between the psychical and the objectively real would still hold true.

5. S.K. MAITRA: "WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?" What is the meaning of value? When we look at the world, we find that it presents itself to us in two ways: In the first place, it manifests itself

to us in two ways: In the first place, it manifests itself as something independent, as a self-contained existence. The sun, the moon, the stars and the various plants and animals constitute a gigantic world independent of myself. Compared with this gigantic world, I am only an insignificant dot. I can only gaze at it. I have no control over it; it is in no way dependent upon me; I am only a spectator, a mere witness of its incessant changes.

When I look at the world in this way, it appears to be nothing but a gigantic 'is'. Its neutrality is so clearly manifest that it is impossible to look upon it in any other way.

But this same universe presents itself to me in another aspect. It is intimately connected with my joys and sorrows, my struggles and disappointments, my good and evil. It makes me sometimes laugh and sometimes weep. I feel sometimes attracted to it, and sometimes I repel it in disgust. Sometimes it appears to me beautiful, sometimes ugly. In other words, it kindles different feelings in my breast. It is intimately related to my personality. It is then that I see <u>value</u> in it.

From the point of view of existence, everything exists. There is nothing which does not exist. Tables, chairs, trees, houses, all exist. Even the centaur and the dragon exist. If you ask, how does the centaur exist? I will reply it undoubtedly exists. It exists in the world of imagination, in the pages of mythology, in the books for children. But from the point of view of value, a centaur or a dragon has no value. To mistake a rope for a snake is a mistake, not from the point of view of existence, but from the point of view of value. The man who mistakes a rope for a snake sees something. It cannot be said that he sees nothing. What is false is not the seeing, but the estimation of that which is seen. Neither the rope nor

the snake is false; what is false is the ascription of the value of the snake to the rope.

From this it follows that in the world of existence, there is neither truth nor falsity. Truth and falsity exist only in the realm of values. The false pearl is false only, when the question of its value is raised. To the child not interested not interested in the question of value, there is no difference between the true pearl and the false.

What, now, is the true nature of value? I have already said that value is intimately connected with my inner world. It is not, like a tree or a house or a cow, something apart from me. On the contrary, it is something which is related to my personality.

But if value merely indicated my subjective attitude, it could never become a value. So long as it is confined within the four walls of my individual self, it does not rise to the status of a value. It must possess a universality which would lift it from the position of a subjective to that of an objective value. When I call a rose beautiful, my object is not to say that it is beautiful for me alone. If what I call a value is not a value to others, then it is not a value at all. Consequently, universality is a necessary characteristic of all values.

Indeed, the peculiarity of value is that it is at once individual and universal. Just as, on the one hand, it tells me about my own world, so similarly, it tells me also of the world of others, of the common world. This need not cause any surprise. The distinction between my world and the world of others is an artificial one. What is my world is such a way that it can never be anybodyelse's is one of which we can say nothing; it is absolutely inexpressible.

In fact, it is only feeling which can be said to be completely individual. But even if

this feeling is one which it is possible to express in words, if; for example, you strike me a hard blow and I cry out in pain, my pain, although it is individual, has still a universal element in it, for others can easily understand it.

We thus see that value is not individual, but universal, although it is intimately related to our personality. This relation to personality distinguishes it from existence. When a thing merely 'is', my attitude towards it is that of a spectator. But when it is related to my personality, it is no longer a mere existence but has already become a value.

The task of philosophy may be briefly stated to be <u>conversion of existence into value</u>. But existence itself must be called a value. It also enters into relationship with our personality, and therefore, it is a value.

Moreover, to admit two independent worlds, a world of existence and a world of value, is to create a hopeless dualism. If a value has no standing in the world of existence, then it cannot become a value.

In fact, a value is a citizen of two kingdoms. On the one hand, it is a citizen of the world of values, and on the other hand, it has citizenship rights in the world of existence. The example which I have already given, namely, that of mistaking a rope for a snake, will illustrate this. When a man mistakes a rope for a snake, he has a real perception. But this perception has place only in one kingdom, namely, the kingdom of the existent. It has no place in the kingdom of values. It is a citizen of one kingdom and not of two, and therefore we call it an illusion.

Philosophy seeks in all existence a value, or in other words, she converts all existence

into an existence plus a value.

Herein lies the main difference between philosophy and science. Science tries to keep as much as possible to the existent. She tries to keep personality as much as possible in the background. She attempts to adopt what she is very proud to call "the disinterested view of things." "The truth, the truth and nothing but the truth" is her motto.

It is no doubt a very laudable aim to prevent one's likes and dislikes, one's personal factor, from warping one's judgment. To do it successfully presupposes no small amount of training and no small tuning of one's life to a high ideal.

But the scientist is mistaken if he thinks that he simply sticks to the facts and has left all values behind. For what is truth but a value? It is, in fact, a fundamental value, for it offers one of the deepest satisfactions of our personality. It is one of those geeat values at the altar of which man has in all ages been prepared to sacrifice all his dear possessions, even life itself. It is its call which took Sakyamuni away from his dear wife and child and a rich inheritance to wander from place to place in search of it. It is again its voice which led innumerable saints and philosophers in the Middle Ages in Europe to face death cheerfully at the stake.

In the light of value of truth, the scientist does not hesitate to throw sensation and perception overboard. The unsophisticated man sees the sun rise or set, but the scientist corrects this sense-impression in the light of the value of truth and does not hesitate to pronounce it an illusion. The child moving in a train believes that the trees and other objects fleet rapidly past him, but the scientist in the interests of truth rejects this sense-impression as worthless.

In each of these cases, therefore, the scientist, like the philosopher, converts the existence into a value. But the philosopher wants to carry this work much further. Very often where the scientist stops, the philosopher begins his work. It is the same ideal of truth which inspires both of them, but the scientist, on account of certain inherited traditions, does not want to proceed beyond a certain point, whereas the philosopher carries on the inquiry further and further.

Another difference between the scientist and the philosopher is that while the former is interested in only one value, namely, truth, the philosopher has to keep in mind always all the different values and give a relative estimate of them. Thus if there is a class between the truth-value and the moral value, the philosopher has to take note of it and form his estimate of the total value accordingly.

6. G.R. MALKANI: "EXISTENCE." We have seen that consciousness cannot be denied. Also it cannot be treated as a kind of thing or object. If we place it side by side with matter, we conceive it objectively. But then it is no longer real consciousness. Real consciousness cannot be related to anything. It cannot be distinguished from amything. If it is real, it is real as a whole in itself.

We speak of consciousness and matter as constituting an ultimate dealism within reality. Everything that exists is either material or spiritual; and by the latter term we understand that which is conscious. This dualism however is not ultimate in the sense that both the terms have equal reality. They cannot both be real. If they are both treated as real, one of the terms, namely consciousness, will be reduced to meaninglessness. It will be degraded to the status of an object. It will not be

conscious any longer. The ultimate dualism of matter and spirit is in this sense inherently impossible. If we nevertheless try to uphold it, it will change its character. It will be a dualism of a sort, but it will not be ultimate in any sense. It will be a dualism of entities which can both be treated as objects. The dualism is ultimate only in the sense that the terms of it are mutually exhaustive, and further that they are so opposed to each other that both cannot be posited to be real. The reality of the one is incompatible with the reality of the other. There must be sublation. Reality must have either of these forms. It cannot have both.

We contend that consciousness cannot be sublated; for it puts forth no appearance whatsoever. We cannot reject nothing. We cannot also reject what does not appear to us. Consciousness is what does not appear to us. It is implied as real in all rejection. For when something is rejected, we do not reject the consciousness of the something. Again we do not reject the rejecting consciousness. Consciousness in fact represents our absolute certitude. On the basis of it, we distinguish the true from the false; we set up certain entities to be real and other entities to be not real. We have no question as to the reality of the evaluating and discriminating consciousness. Its reality is in this sense absolute. Consciousness as such is the limit of rejection. It cannot be rejected or sublated.

It will now be said that reality will be the poorer for the rejection of anything. We must not reject. We must include. If the objects of our knowledge are not the whole and the entire reality, they certainly are a part of it. They are something, not nothing. It is not a problem whether the objects are real, or whether the consciousness is real. The two are not given to us as distinct and separate entities. They are

both elements in a single whole. Neither can be real apart from the other. The whole alone is real. And this whole includes both the objects of consciousness and consciousness itself, both the object and the subject. Taken apart from the whole, each of these terms would be a mere abstraction, not a reality.

Our experience may be a whole. But evidently, it is a limited whole only. We know certain things, we do not know others. We must distinguish our experience from absolute experience which alone can be the real whole. This experience too must have a subject. But can we distinguish the subject of finite experience from the subject of absolute experience? This is not possible. We may analyse any experience whatsoever. We shall find in it a certain content. The subject will not be any part of this content. The subject has a certain function in experience. It is the function of synthesis or of unification of the content. Awareness arises only through this synthesis. Whether then we treat the subject as a certain function, or as mere awareness or as the pure subject, what is important is that it is never a part of the content itself. It is what constitutes the objectivity of the object. The object is <u>to me</u>. The object is not <u>in-itself</u>. The subject is in this sense the transcendental element in all experience. But if that is so, we cannot isolate the subject from any experience and characterise it. The subject in itself is neither finite nor infinite. It cannot be characterised at all. The so-called finitude or the infinitude of the subject would be relative merely to the extent of the content embraced by an experience. The subject as subject can have no quality.

This also proves that we cannot treat the finite individual as an adjective of the Absolute. The Absolute must be an experience. This experience must involve a subject. But we cannot

distinguish this subject from the finite subject. Moreover, the so-called finite subject is a unique kind of reality. It cannot be analysed away into the content of some experience, absolute or finite. The subject is essentially distinct from all content. It may be what we call finite, but it has an inner life or an inwardness which refuses to be reduced to an element of an outer whole or a whole of content.

The Absolute can only be conceived on the analogy of our finite experience; and the difference between the two can relate only to the nature and the extent of the content embraced by them respectively.

The whole whether finite or absolute, may be real. But is our conception of the whole at all valid? Must a whole be a differentiated whole, containing within itself a subject and an object? We may admit that the whole must be a spiritual whole. 'or the spirit can include matter within itself. But the reverse is not possible. Matter cannot include or explain spirit. Further, a spiritual whole must be an experience. That is the beginning and the end of any enquiry. Reality can have no meaning except as it is part of an experience. But experience necessarily implies both these elements, a subject knowing and an object known. The object implies the subject, and the subject implies the object. Neither can be real apart from its relation to the other. What may be said to have no further relation and to be real in itself is the whole of experience which includes the subject and the object. Thus the whole supersedes this dualism and yet it is a differentiated whole.

Let us admit that experience is a whole. But does it really contain a dualism? There may be as we say awareness of a content. But we can so speak, only when the self that is aware distinguishes itself from the content. But we can

so speak, only when the self that is aware distinguishes itself from the content. If the self were merely aware, the awareness would not fall apart from the content. The two would so to say coalesce. There would be no distinction and no ground for any dualism. It is only as the subject falls back upon itself or distinguishes itself from the object, that we can speak of a dualism. But then the original whole is already gone. We have a new whole in its place. The terms of this whole would be the distinction of the subject and the object on the one hand, and the awareness of the distinction on the other. And the same old question would recur, do the terms of this whole fall apart? If they do, we have already gone beyond the whole in question. A new whole has to be reconstructed, and of this whole the earlier whole will be but a part. If then we must have the whole, we cannot have the distinction. If we have the distinction, we are thinking of the part not of the whole. Distinction is at best real (and real only in a speaking sense) within non-distinction, which alone can be the character of a real whole.

We shall see this more clearly by a further analysis of our experience. It is evident that our experience, whatever form it takes, is always quite immediate. There is nothing more immediate. Everything that is not actually our experience is in a sense distant to us. All objects, conceived as something apart from our experience of them, are certainly not immediate. If they are immediate, they are immediate as part of the experience which is immediate. This experience is immediate <u>par excellence</u>. It is pure immediacy or pure presence. Other things may be spoken of as present <u>to it</u>, or as immediate <u>to it</u>. But it is not in this way related to anything else. It is not 'object' of any kind.

It may now be said that this total experience or immediate experience is of the nature of feeling. Feeling is not here understood in the sense of pleasure and pain. It is feeling in the sense that it is a whole of differences in which the differences have not become explicit. In feeling, that which is felt is one with the feeling of it. It has no reality in itself and apart from the feeling. The subject and the object make a similar unity in all experience. The differences are not lost or annulled. They are there. But they are necessary elements in the whole and have no reality apart from the whole. The whole alone is real, and it supersedes the dualism of the subject and the object.

We should naturally suppose that this is the character of all experience. It should be immediate. It should be beyond the dualism of the subject and the object. It should be a whole. But if that is so, can we distinguish our experience from the absolute experience? It might be thought that our experience is after all partial. What we know is but little. The Absolute alone knows the all. But if that is so are we treating our experience as quite immediate? Do we not think of it as an object of a sort, as the experience of such and such a matter? Once we sepak of an experience as partial or as limited, it ceases to be immediate experience. It becomes object in some sense of another experience. The truly immediate experience cannot be objectified. We cannot speak of it as the experience of such and such a matter; and we can never distinguish it from absolute experience itself. This experience cannot contain differences. Differences are possible only in the domain of the objective. They are not possible in that which is absolutely immediate and which is no kind of object.

It may be thought that this is not quite correct. In any direct and immediate experience we are not conscious of any duality at the time. But the duality is nevertheless real. It is revealed to us on reflection. And reflective consciousness is not a false consciousness. It merely analyses and makes explicit what is already there in the original consciousness.

It is evident now that we can only think of our experience, whatever that be, at the reflective level. And to reflection, all our experience appears to be necessarily dualistic. But what is reflection? It is not an instrument of passive apprehension. In reflection, we do not merely apprehend what is presented to us in the form of the original experience. The original experience is a unity. The differences have not emerged. If we could merely contemplate it passively, we should apprehend no differences. What reflection does is to break up this unity; and by breaking it up, it dissolves original experience. Original experience no longer remains original. It gives place to reflective experience. The undivided is seen as divided, the undifferentiated is seen as differentiated. How can we claim that the one is a true account of the other? The fact is that we cannot keep immediate experience as immediate and find differences in it. The moment we find differences, immediate experience has already ceased to be immediate. It has ceased to be experience. The reflective consciousness is not a superadded refinement of the original experience. It is a perversion of it. It is a false account. In fact, in reflection we have already superseded the original experience, and we can no longer speak of reflecting <u>into</u> the latter.

All experience, being immediate, must in-

clude the subject. It cannot leave out the subject which might experience it. It is a whole only in this sense. But if that is so, how can we reflect into it? To reflect is to reconstruct in objective terms. The conclusion cannot be avoided that any experience to be experience must be immediate. It cannot be a partial whole. And lastly, it cannot be differentiated. Experience understood in this sense contains no duality, and it cannot therefore be distinguished from pure awareness.

We cannot stop with the duality. The duality is not ultimate. It is not real in itself. It implies a ground which contains it. This ground is necessarily non-dual. It is not an element of any duality. We say that the subject is related to the object, the ego to the non-ego. But this relatedness itself is not possible without a consciousness which is not related. The object is related to the subject not absolutely, but in a consciousness. It is related only as the relation is presented, or only as the object is thought of <u>as to</u> a subject. If we do not so think it, the relation is not realisable. No relation is accomplished without reference to a relating ground which is not further related. In fact to have a relation, we must relate. This relating consciousness is not further related. If we conceive it as related, it will not relate. That alone can relate which is not itself related. We may indeed suppose that the relation of the subject and the object is <u>presented</u> to a consciousness; and because it is presented, it is "object" <u>to</u> this consciousness. The latter therefore cannot be understood to be wholly unrelated. It is the new subject, and is accordingly only a term in a further dualism. But this argument ignores the fact that this new dualism is not itself self-subsistent. It cannot be realised in it-

self. It requires a consciousness. This consciousness cannot be further related. If it is related, the same old question would recur. The series would have no last term. It cannot be completed. And no dualism whatsoever would be realised.

Consciousness is essentially non-dualistic. It is never opposed to any object. What is so opposed is already an object of thought. It is not the real consciousness or the real subject. The dualism of the subject and the object is realised only in thought. We must think it. But to think the dualism is not to be aware of it. Awareness itself is never related. It is essentially pure and unrelated awareness. It is implied by the dualism of the subject and the object, but it is not itself a term of any dualism.

This pure awareness is the ultimate reality. All experience points to it. This awareness is not opposed to being. It is not the awareness <u>of</u> anything. It has not reference to anything beyond itself. It is awareness that is itself being. It thus realises the very ideal of knowledge. All awareness that has reference to being as something beyond itself, is itself a form of being. There must be awareness <u>of it</u>. It thus ceases to be real awareness. Real awareness is that of which there can be no further awareness. Such awareness cannot be distinguished from being. It is being itself.

We distinguish awareness not only from objects. We also distinguish it from the self which is aware. But once the distinction of awareness from objects is seen to be unreal, the other distinction also cannot be maintained. We make these distinctions in empirical knowledge. There, we have not object, the awareness of the object, and the self which is aware. But empirical knowledge we hold to be no real

knowledge. For awareness as such cannot be related. The distinctions in question do not involve real awareness. They are based simply upon the object. We cannot for example have the awareness as distinct from the object except as it is qualified by the object; and we cannot have the self as distinct from the awareness unless it is qualified by this awareness. The three-fold distinction is a distinction within the objective. Real awareness which is no kind of object cannot be distinguished. It does not belong to the self. It is the self itself.

There is further reason for this identity. The distinction is, in the very nature of the case, incapable of being released. For, what can be the ground of the distinction? What can contain them both and hold them apart? We distinguish one object from another, and we can say that consciousness is the ground of the distinction. It is not a term of the distinction. It is in this respect neutral. But if we want to distinguish the self and awareness, what can possibly be the ground? Awareness cannot be the ground, for it is just a term to be distinguished. It cannot at the same time be the container and the contained. The truth is that all distinction is between objects. But neither the self nor awareness can be treated as objects. The self is even more clearly no kind of object. It is the seer of every thing. There can be no seer of it. But if it is not any kind of object, we can set no limit to its reality. It is necessarily unlimited. It is the Absolute or the whole.

The question is sometimes raised whether the Absolute is a person or not. We now find that the Absolute is the true person. It is the person greed from all limitations of an exclusive individuality. It is indeed indicated by 'I', and by nothing else. But it is more than the finite

ego which is what is denoted by 'I'. We can know the Absolute in no other way except thro' the abolition of our distinction from it or the abolition of our finite individuality. The Absolutē is our own self understood as infinite. It is the immutable person, the eternal person, the inmost person; and there is nothing that can be understood as being opposed to it or as being 'other' to it. It is the one without a second.

7. S.N.L. SHRIVASTAVA: "MEANING, METHOD AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY." In the case of integral experiences like self-knowledge, religious experience and aesthetic intuitions, our actual knowing or living through the experience is not an activity of logical ratiocination or conceptual schematising; but in the communication of such experiences, we do, of necessity, employ concepts albeit we know that they do not exhaustively convey the nature of the objects as they are grasped by us in living experience. Such conceptual rendering is, in the strict sense, only a verbal symbolizing of what in its essential nature 'bursts through' the concepts. Such experiences, then, though super-rational essentially, yet have a rational aspect in so far as we do and can apply concepts to them, though it should be remembered that such concepts are completely sui generis and are not used in the same acceptation of meaning as when applied to sensible objects. We apply, for example, the concepts of 'Mysterium' and 'Tremendum' to the Reality which confronts us in the religious experience but the 'mystery' and 'awfulness' of this experience is certainly not of the ordinary human kind. Even in communicating self-knowledge or the knowledge of his own self-being, the seeker uses the word I which is not a general concept in the sense that it

is applicable in the same sense to other persons as well for whom the word <u>you</u> is used. Self-knowing is a unique integral experience which is expressed through its verbal symbol 'I'. Self-knowing is non-conceptual.

So the dilemma that "if philosophy abjures altogether the integral experiences, it will be failing in its mission of giving a synoptic account of total experience; and if it takes within its purview the integral experiences, there is the impossibility of rendering them rationally intelligible and communicable" is removed when we understand that integral experiences <u>have</u> a rational character in so far as they <u>are</u> and can be expressed through concepts of <u>unique</u> significance and meaning. And philosophy, working as it does, with rational elucidation, need not keep outside its purview the integral experiences. Their rationality is implicit in them and can be explicated after they are lived through. Reason cannot help categorising whatever falls within man's experience, and anything <u>that is experienced at all</u> cannot be so completely non-rational or 'above reason' as to utterly escape categorisation or conceptual rendering. Such an utterly non-rational could only be the utterly non-sensical.

So what we mean by the super-rationality of integral experiences is not their utter non-rationality or incapacity to be communicated through categories (which is unmeaning) but only that the categories which are used to communicate integral experiences have a much wider and far different signification than what their literal meaning based on their applicability to sensible objects suggests. Philosophy, therefore, cannot and should not exclude from its purview integral experiences on the ground of their supposed non-rationality. We can profitably have a philosophy of moral experience, of

religious experience, of the beautiful, of self-consciousness, of values and so on. The question of the co-ordination of all these for an ultimate world-view shall be discussed in the sequel.

8. The method of philosophy, properly understood, is nothing but the elucidation of the first principles and fundamental implications of experience. All experience, for philosophy is immediate and organic to the knowing subject. Of what is ex hypothesi transcendent to experience, philosophy can make no assertions, it cannot even assert their bare existence. The postulation of what is called the Ideas of Reason is the proton pseudos of the Kantian Philosophy. But all experience is not logical in the sense that every piece of it can be rendered intelligible by means of our usual concepts and categories whose meanings convey only sensible properties as found in sensible things. Such concepts become inadequate for the comminication of integral experiences. We are wont to dub such experiences 'non-rational'; but this should not lead us into the misleading conception that they are wholly 'irrational' or 'infra-rational'. They have a rational character in so far as we can and do apply concepts to them, albeit in a unique and non-general signification. Philosophy cannot abjure the consideration of such experiences on the ground of their alleged non-rationality. In fact, their non-rationality means nothing more than their utter and radical dissimilarity to all sensible phenomena; hence the inadequacy of concepts which are 'evolved' from sense-experiences to communicate them. We originate concepts for them from the depths of Pure Reason. If they were simply irrational, they would simply be totally unintelligible,

and no concepts whatsoever could ever be applied to them. So, the task of philosophy, properly defined, is rational elucidation of the fundamental principles and implicates of experience taken in its totality and widest expanse.

Further, philosophy being the elucidation of principles that are intrinsic to immediate experience, the question of the veracity or certitude of philosophical generalizations which has of late been raised by the logical positivists, is only creating a problem where none exists. In philosophical reflection, thought rises to a level of direct and immediate apprehension of those deeper implicates of reality which are missed in the unreflecting naivete of everyday experience. This immediacy of apprehension is the real ground of the certitude of philosophical generalizations which do not therefore stand in need of any further or extraneous verification.

Now as to the final results of philosophical knowledge. To what extent does philosophy really succeed in giving a synoptic or unitive understanding of the structure of reality as a whole? For the most alluring prize which philosophy promises to its pursuers is just this ultimate knowledge about total reality. Now, in strict truth philosophy never reaches and never can reach anything like a complete understanding of total reality, if by that we mean the last word about the ultimate structure of entire reality or a knowledge so complete in itself as to border on omniscience. Like every other branch of human study, philosophical knowledge too has its limitations, and the claims of philosophers to have reached final explanation of the Universe are simply puerile vagaries. A certain amount of inscrutability about the ultimate truth of

of the Universe must always remain after the utmost searching by the human mind. Bradley concludes his great work Appearance and Reality with the admission: 'in the end Reality is inscrutable.' Yet, this is far from a position of thorough-going scepticism or agnosticism. The alternative to agnosticism is not omniscience, and the denial of scepticism is not incompàtible with the ideal of a progressive knowledge approaching Ultimate Truth asymptotically. The utmost that philosophical knowledge can achieve in the direction of discovering the ultimate truth of the Universe is to lay bare certain dominant pervasive features of reality so as to enable us to form an idea of what the Universe in its broad outlines is like. And this is no small gain. If philosophy has been able to unearth only a few first principles of permanent value in the realms of Epistemology and Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics and Axiology and in the great provice of religious experience, the achievement is by no means a mean one. Nay, it is grand enough to make philosophy a worthwhile and ennobling pursuit.

A.C. MUKERJI: A COMPARISON BETWEEN SHANKARA AND HEGEL.@@ The answers which Hume received at the hands of his German opponent was no doubt directly meant to refute the sensationalistic basis of his philosophy. But the answer touches far other aspects of of Hume's philosophy of which neither the questioner nor the respondent was fully conscious. While engaged in drawing the legitimate consequences of the empirical principles of Locke's philosophy, Hume was unconsciously exposing the dificiencies of a realistic and pluralistic metaphysics. Similarly in answering the difficulties of a sensationalistic philosophy,

@@ In Allahabad University Studies: 1928.

Hume was unconsciously exposing the deficiencies of a realistic and pluralistic metaphysics. Similarly in answering the difficulties of a sensationalistic philosophy, Kant was unconsciously laying the foundation of an idealistic metaphysics and dealing a death blow to pluralism and realism alike.

Whoever has made an impartial survey of the present state of comparative philosophy must have been struck by its apparent lack of centrality. A confusing mass of interpretations none of which has the remotest chance of being reconciled with the rest, is made all the more perplexing by attempts, often very ingenious and flattering, to infuse the spirit of the latest systems of European philosophy into the old body of Indian metaphysics. The object of the comparative study in philosophy, we believe is to discover the dialectic movements of universal thought; but this will remain a far-off dream or a mere pious wish till the different interpretations are dragged out of their subjective seclusion in the enjoyment of an ora- cular prestige into the region of objective criticism. What is wanted is a spirit of co-operation, and it is this spirit of co-operation which the following lines are primarily designed to foster. But it is a singular misfortune of the student of philosophy that he can seldom co-operate with another without opposing the latter's views; and in his speculative adventures in the region of Truth, he has often put on the appearance of a dictator in spite of his real attitude being that of a humble enquirer. Hence, it is necessary to remark that opposition in the domain of philosophy is not a sign of disrespect; on the contrary, it is in certain cases the highest tribute to the speculative profundity of the opposed views.

These difficulties, we must insist at the

risk of repetition, do not make comparative study a mere pious wish in the field of metaphysical thinking. They signify the dangers of isolating the fundamental conceptions of a philosophy from their proper setting. It is then important to make sure, before we could hope to achieve anything of abiding speculative interest by drawing together two different expressions of human reflexion on the nature of Reality, that in the act of interpreting one system in terms borrowed from the other, its basic notions are carefully restored to their historic lineaments. The important of these remarks can hardly be exaggerated when the systems compared are not simply separated by a long interval of continued and progressively definite attempts at solving the world problems, but they belong to two entirely different intellectual traditions which ran their courses without mutual influence on each other. If then we want to profit by thinking modern problems of European philosophy in Indian terms without misrepresentation of either and yet with a considerable clarification of both methods of thought, we must give up the practice of finding Kant and Hegel, for instance, in the Upanishads; these are misrepresentations which do not clarify but confound problems. No one possessing a really unprejudiced insight into Indian philosophy will deny that there is an ample supply of valuable dialectical weapons in the armoury of the ancient Indian schools and that they are as good for offence and defence in the battles of modern philosophy as they were when they were first forged. But no intellectual victory can be won by their indiscriminate use. The problems of epistemology and the methods of proof which came to prominence with Kant and Hegel, were evolved under the pressure of circumstances radically different

from any that could exist in India, and consequently we should be doing injustice to the speculative integrity of Indian philosophy if we had to expect from it satisfactory answers to even such problems of philosophy as, in the absence of similar conditions, could hardly engage the attention of the ancient thinkers.

This is not sufficiently realised by some of those who are otherwise doing inestimable service to the cause of national culture by rousing the curiosity and interest of the present generation in one of the oldest types of speculative efforts to decipher the mysteries of existence. The tendencies of modern comparative philosophy appear to be to bring Indian philosophy so close to its western namesake that they may be shown to have entered the same compartment through exactly the same gateway. Thus, for instance, there is a persistent tendency in some of the modern interpretations of the Vedantic system to read into it all the problems and philosophic methods which have ever been present in the speculations of modern Europe, specially on the monistic lines. This is nothing unnatural. For, the type of absolutism represented in the Vedantic thought is generally supposed to be analogous to the abstract pantheism of the west and this fell into disrepute owing mainly to the massive influence of the Hegelian philosophy commanded over the philosophical world of the 19th century. And there is no doubt that if the Hegelian contentions against abstract universalism be right, the Vedantic position will sustain an irreparable loss till it can be interpreted on other than the traditional lines. This is perhaps the reason why those who convinced of the finality of Hegelianism turn their gaze towards native thought, have to begin by disclaiming its relation to abstract universalism and vindi-

cate its affinities with what has been called higher pantheism. This nervousness, we are persuaded to believe, is altogether gratuitous, firstly because the finality of the so-called higher pantheism has been at least as often denied as asserted. In view of the fates which have been overtaking the metaphysical theories in the west during the last two thousand and five hundred years, the claims of finality in a reasoned system of thought can show nothing better than enthusiasm. Secondly, even supposing that philosophic wisdom reached the height of perfection in the German philosopher, we certainly deprive ourselves of the power of appreciating much that is valuable in the native lore by looking upon it as a briefer edition of Hegel's works. An attempt is therefore made here to bring together those features in occidental absolutism and Vedantism which have provided such alluring analogies between these two discontinuous streams of thoughts.

Origin of Knowledge: We may perhaps conveniently begin the enquiry by distinguishing the problems of knowledge from the world-views which follow from their epistemological conclusions. The charge of dogmatism which has frequently, and perhaps not unjustly when judged from the standpoint of the western conception of philosophy, been brought against Indian philosophy in general cannot be adequately met by pointing out that "most of the systems of philosophy in India discuss the problems of knowledge, its origin and validity, as a preliminary to the study of other problems." A philosophy, in spite of its critical intentions, may be highly dogmatic in so far as it depends for its final view of Reality on a source of knowledge which is supposed to be superior to and even subversive of, the ordinarily recognised methds of acquiring knowledge. The appeal to the Vedas

as the ultimate authority sitting in judgment upon the results of perception, reasoning and every other source of human knowledge, as is well known, is the differentiating mark of the so-called orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. This cannot but stike those who are in the habit of respecting only rational pronouncements in the field of philosophical researches as something very disquieting and perplexing. The metaphysical value of the analysis of normal perceptual and inferential knowledge, howsoever acute and complete, is seriously impaired in the presence of the embarrasing reminder that the ultimate reality is not to be reached through any of these avenues of knowledge. The western thinkers of the middle ages, notwithstanding their efforts at rationalizing Christian dogmas, were dogmatic precisely for the same reasons namely, an implicit faith in Revelation and a consequent distrust of the unaided Reason. To urge therefore, that "the appeal to the Vedas does not involve any reference to an extra-philosophical standard is extremely misleading till the place of Revelation in a reasoned system of knowledge is adequately explained."

Reason and Revelation. The relation between reasoned knowledge and revealed truths, as it is explicitly maintained in the scholastic philosophy of Europe as well as the orthodox systems of India, is one of antagonism or subordination. To parallel the scholastic beliefs that outside of the Church, there can be no salvation and no science, and that to philosophise is to explain the dogma, we have here such explicit expressions as that in the matter of Highest Reality whose knowledge is the sine qua non of emancipation, reasoning is an entirely unreliable support, and that the superiority of the Vedanta consists in its being mainly an exegesis of the

Vedas. Again, underlying the orthodox condemnation of the speculations of Charvaka, Buddhism and Jainism as heretical there are precisely the same reasons which led western scholasticism to discourage independent intellectual efforts after truth, namely, the reluctance of the heretics to identify philosophy with theology, the orthodox belief in the inherent limitations of our faculties of knowledge, etc. Lastly, as in scholasticism so in the history of Indian orthodoxy, efforts are frequently made to bring rationally reached conclusions into conformity with revelation by putting evidently forced interpretations either on the sayings of the original author of a system or the words embodying revealed truths; and equally frequently, these attempts at reconciling Faith with Reason culminate, by reason of their disappointing results, in a deep-seated misology. The declarations that real knowledge is not to be acquired by those who aspire after merely intellectual triumphs, that rational discussions are meant for very ordinary people, and that no finality can be claimed for reasoned knowledge in view of the possibility of its being subverted by a more expert logician, are clearly indicative of a distrust of reason which recalls the scholastic spirit. Indeed, this misology sometimes appears to reach the very absurd height of the Credo quia absurdum of Terullian, as e.g., in Kumarila Bhatta's avowed statement that contradictions in Smriti are nothing derogatory in so far as they are based on the contradictory statements of the Sruti (Tantra Vartika). A similar tendency in Vedantisim is suggested by Dr. Deussen's observations that "it is possible occasionally to make such statements about the Brahman as would be, according to worldly standards,

absolutely contradictory; for example that Brahman does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, and yet is without part."

Now, if philosophy is reasoned knowledge or "the thinking consideration of things," it cannot conceivably be based on a source of knowledge which is so opposed to the ordinary sources that its deliverances should admit of being couched in palpably conflicting propositions. No thinking consideration of things, it may seem altogether superfluous to point out, can afford to ignore the fundamental laws of thought. The inevitable conclusion that follows from an impartial survey of this evidently anti-intellectual tendency, we venture to think, is that the appeal to the Vedas is nothing short of an extra-philosophical criterion. This circumstance, however, does not make the orthodox system a mere aggregate of independent isolated and mutually conflicting expressions. On the contrary, admirable attempts at systematization are clearly visible not only outside but inside the Vedantic speculations. It has been rightly remarked that "Vedantism is not to be taken as philosophy based solely upon revelation or faith that has no rational justification...it is based upon the profoundest forms of thinking and argument." A similar remark, however, applies to the philosophy of the Schoolman, which abounds in the subtleties of dialectics. Scholasticism in spite of these intellectual attempts at systematizing the dogmas of religion has been condemned as dogmatic owing to its appeal to a standard external to Reason; and we must bear in mind that the function of reason, according to the explicit statements of the Vedantic thinkers, is nothing higher than the refutation of heretical objections to the revealed wisdom and the exposition of "the real meaning of the apparently conflicting ideas of the

Vedas." It appears to be very significant that a thinker nothwithstanding his implicit faith in an extra-rational source of knowledge should yet feel the necessity of so interpreting revelation as to bring it into conformity with the demand of reason for consistency. These attempts at rationalizing dogmas, whether in India or Europe, apparently involve a vicious circle. Though revelation is believed to have a higher authority than reason, yet reason sits in judgment upon revelation and makes it yield an account which would satisfy the demand of reason itself. That is, revelation which is believed to be the supreme norm of philosophic thought has to conform to reason, and to that extent must acknowledge the superiority of what is yet thought to have a derived and conditional authority.

Reason and Intuition. This appeal to a standard which is not only external to, but frequently subversive of, the natural means of knowledge is so opposed to our ordinary habits of thought, that the search for a reason in explication of this apparently irrational appeal is not infrequent in scholasticism as well as Indian orthodoxy. One of the most acceptable explanations is to refer the Scriptural Texts to a unique faculty of knowledge, generally called Intuition. Here we come upon a most characteristic feature of Indian speculations which has not received as much attention as it surely deserves in an unbiassed exposition of Indian thought and an unprejudiced critical study of methodological principles. It has passed into a truism that the different systems of Hindu philosophy, notwithstanding their divergences on many a vital point of real speculative interest, agree in insisting on the paramount importance of right knowledge as the indispensable condition of emancipation and the attainment of the High-

est Good. But what we miss in the modern interpretations of Hindu thought is the proper emphasis on the unique characters of Indian epistemology. It is perhaps high time to insist that right knowledge which is made the indisputable corner-stone of philosophy here is conceived in a way so different from the epistemological conceptions of occidental philosophy that their fusion can lead to nothing better than unseeming hybrids.

For a proper appreciation of the characteristically Indian analysis of knowledge, we have necessarily to bear in mind the well-known passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Shravan, manan, and nididhyasa, as the three distinct stages in the attainment of true knowledge may be rightly claimed to be the unique feature of the Indian theory of knowledge; and the ancient philosophers, though they differed widely on their detailed analysis of the psychological factors involved in the different types of cognition, accepted this methodological rule as one of the unquestionable certainties of philosophy. The important role which nididhyasan played on the ancient theories of knowledge may be easily realised from the way in which it is accentuated even in the Nyaya system that is generally supposed to be the least inclined to question the authority of the accepted avenues of knowledge. In the subtle analysis of our faculty of knowledge as it expresses itself in the manifold types of cognition, a high place is accorded to "vada" which is distinguished from "jalpa" and "vitanda", as being alone concerned with the determination of reality. This emphasis on the "vada" as a means of right knowledge which is characteristic of the Nyaya philosophy has evoked censorious reflection from the critics like Sankara who assign the philosophic advantage of Vedantism over Nyaya to its reluctance to accept

reasoning as the supreme norm of knowledge. Now, the really significant point which shows the essential unity underlying the superficial divergences of these systems in respect of the problems of knowledge is that Gotama, though fully realising the importance of rational arguments for the attainment of truth, is so convinced of the limitations of the ordinary sources of knowledge that he not only condemns them as illogical so far as they are inconsistent with "Sruti" but actually relegates the function of certain types of reasoning to the protection of truths against heretical onslaughts. The fact is that reasoned knowledge is never looked upon as the finally efficacious means of determining the real, and this sceptical attitude towards the efficiency of reason is all the more striking in a system which addresses itself to the task of discovering the morphology of knowledge. Right knowledge which leads to emancipation is not to be acquired through rational philosophising alone, for "manana" is only one of the stages in the progressive advance to truth. (For more explicit statements on the limits of reason within the Nyaya System we may turn to the fourth chapter, where Gotama openly insists on the need of a further discipline in the shape of Yogic practices, and of all the rules and observances that are subsidiary to Yoga. Prof. Max Muller rightly complains that this is a very humble view to take with regard to a system of philosophy which at the very outset promised final beautitude. To what extent a Naiyayika may be convinced of the value of immediate intuition may be gathered from Udayana's account of the origin of the different systems from the different types of intuitional excellence--See the concluding portion of the Atmatattvavivela)

The essential nature of the objects whose knowledge is involved in self-knowledge is, according to the orthodox systems, impervious to the ordinary faculties of knowledge, and so beyond the field of rational explorations. These objects or prameya therefore can be rightly known only through an extraordinary faculty of immediate intuition, though for this it may be necessary to reason about them as a preliminary measure of self-discipline. Nyaya limits its function to the exposition of right 'manana' leaving it to other shastras to point out the further method of intuition or Tatvasaksathkara.

When we come to the Monistic speculations of India, the superior claims of intuition become much more outstanding and impressive. The Vedantic writers do not content themselves with sub-ordinating the function of reason to a supra-rational faculty as is the case with the Naiyayikas. On the contrary, they are often ready to accept the extreme position of unqualified irrationalism by emphasising the opposition of intuitional deliverances to the testimonies of sense and reason. Thus, e.g., Sankara almost in the strain of the Latin Fathers of the Middle Ages, ascribes the inadequacy of all empirical knowledge ultimately to the innate Ignorance which is at the root of all evils. All the secular canons of knowledge, are limited to the province of Ignorance, because, we are told, "without the delusion that I and mine consist in the body, sense-organs, and the like, no knower can exist, and consequently a use of the means of knowledge is not possible." Such a sweeping remark on the part of a philosopher on the inadequacy and perversity of the ordinary means of knowledge will surely strike as altogether extraordinary to those who would like to reject the so-called higher faculty of an extra-philosophical criterion. Yet, Shankaracharya,

who is widely accepted as the most gifted of the Vedantic thinkers, is perhaps also the most emphatic in distinguishing between the apara vidya and the para vidya and in tracing our cognitive perversity to an innate cause. Now what is important for our present purpose is that Vedantism, more than any other Indian system, is characterised by a very persistent effort to stake its epistemological prestige on a type of extraordinary experience which is so opposed to our ordinary experiences that neither sense nor reason is supposed to reproduce its contents. This specific type of experience is believed to be indispensable for the attainment of the summum bonum inasmuch it alone reveals the substantial identity of the individual self with the universal substratum. The fact of this identity being unrealizable through the ordinary means of knowledge which produce the fiction of difference, truth is unattainable except through that intuitive experience. Until this experience is realized and actually lived, the individual has necessarily to rely on the unquestionable authority of the Holy Writ. Hence again Sankara insists that out of the pramanas which are useful for apara vidya, sabda is the only reliable guide. The paramount importance of intuition for the knowledge of the Real receives unqualified emphasis when it is urged that even the Scripture is not the final means of knowledge, but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition on the other hand, are to be depended on. This intuition is then the ultimate criterion, of which reasoning even when it is supported by the sacred texts is a subordinate auxiliary.

For a fuller justification of this Vedantic evaluation of the different sources of knowledge and the subordination of all the

ordinarily accepted means of true belief to an extraordinary immediate intuition, we must turn to the Yoga analysis of knowledge which, as suggested above, furnishes the underlying basis of the different epistemological theories of India. True knowledge, according to the Patanjali views, is not a matter of mere speculation. On the contrary, our theoretical endeavours are without exception vitiated by the inevitable presence of factors which obstruct the immediate vision of truth. Owing to the intimate association which ordinarily exists between the name and the meaning, and the necessity thence arising of thinking with the help of language, we always run the risk of mistaking the forms of language for the forms of thought. This mistake leads to a number of false beliefs about reality. Every form of language is supposed to have a corresponding form of existence, and this even where there is no such correspondence at all in reality. For a seeker after truth, then, it is absolutely necessary to destroy the associative links between the meaning or object of knowledge, and the names which are meant for their expression. Apart from the vikalpavritti which has its source in language, there is another distorting agency in our ordinary methods of acquiring knowledge, namely, the "I think". Hence the highest type of experience is not only conditioned by sabdhadasamkethasmrithi parisuddhi, but is also characterised by the complete absence of self-consciousness. It is called perception par excellence inasmuch as through this alone is revealed the real nature of the object. Here we come upon the real secret of that implicit faith in the Holy Writ which is a general feature of the orthodox systems. The supreme authority which is claimed for the Vedic lore and the reverential awe

with which the toughest intellect hastens to accommodate his epistemological findings to Revelation arise out of a preconceived ideal of knowledge, though is some cases it assumes the appearance of a blind faith in authority. Right knowledge then, as it is conceived by Indian orthodoxy, should be acquired through other than the ordinary means of communication. Hence again the need for a right preceptor who having realised the truth by means of an immediate intuition--hence called Tatva darsi --can also dispense with the help of language in transmitting it to his disciples. The more frequent method of transmission however, is to have recourse to the ordinary medium of language, and so the intuited content comes into contact with that self-same distracter which stood between the subject and the object. Hence again the necessity of Shravan, manan and nidi-dhyasan.

Vedanta and Yoga: It appears to be pretty clear in the light of the above considerations that a faculty altogether different from the ordinary ones was unanimously considered to be the supreme organ of knowledge. This was not only true of the so-called logicians who avowedly believed in the potency of rational discussion for yielding right knowledge; it was equally true of the monists who apparently thought it necessary to undertake a tational refutation of the Yoga philosophy. It is true that the Yoga philosophy does not meet a better fate than the other systems at the hands of the monistic thinkers, and Shankara in particular appears to be uncompromising in his polimics against the Yoga method of realization. But to interpret this as tantamount to an unqualified denial of the efficiency of intuitional experiences is to miss the real source of strength in these speculations. On the contrary, it is only on

the ground of a specific type of experience which is supposed to give us a direct perception of Reality, that Shankara rejects those methods that lead to other types of experiences. That is, it is first of all assumed by Shankara that the Real is revealed only in that type of experience in which the experient actually feels his identity with the cosmic consciousness, and then on the strength of this assumption he rejects the epistemological claims of those methods and experiences which contradict the method and the deliverances of that specific experience. Even the Shrutis are so interpreted--interpretation which is bound to appear to an impartial reader as forced and far-fetched on critical points--as to conform entirely to the contents of that experience, and then the rival systems are shown to have misunderstood the Sacred Writ. Whether that experience is called mystic intuition or not is a matter of words only. But the fact remains that the experience which is made the basis of Vedantic metaphysics is something so unique and opposed to the ordinary methods of knowledge, that the Vedantin should have no quarrel with the other orthodox philosophers in considering speculative philosophy as a mere auxiliary, incompetent by itself to reveal the Real. This in fact is clearly suggested by Vachaspati Misra when he hastens to add that the Vedanta Sutra, yethena yogahah prathyuktah, does not deny the evidential authority of the Yogic philosophy. And Shankara himself not only acknowledges the authority of those portions of Yoga which do not differ from his own monistic metaphysics, but he openly declares that the Self which is unevolved and entirely free from all plurality is seen by the Yogi. (Commenting on the Sutra III,2.24. Indeed the acceptance of yogic intuition by Shankara is strongly sug-

gested by innumerable passages of his commentaries on the Upanishads, the Sutras, and the Bhagavat Gita. The Vedantists have not only accepted the validity and usefulness of the Samadhis called savikalpa and nirvikalpa in general, but Patanjali's account and classification of Samadhi have been sometimes accepted without qualification. Sankara, however, is generally believed to have under-rated the yogic practices in so far as these are not recognised as sufficient by themselves to lead to the development of the identity consciousness. But whatever may be the meaning of yoga for Sankara there is no denying the fact of his appeal to an extra-ordinary experience as the final authority. The assertion that (without enquiry Gnan is not obtained) emphasises only the peculiar technique by which the identity-consciousness has to be obtained.) So, it has been justly pointed out that here the ultimate "warrant of authority is actual experience which is not a specific form of proof co-ordinate with other forms but the basis of all these--the Self itself of a supra-sensible kind..... If Then the Vedanta affirms that notwithstanding apparent plurality all is one...it is not merely because argument leads to a Monistic conclusion ...but because that unity has actually and really been experienced directly by those who affirm it... the Vedanta is not a mere system of philosophy in the modern western sense. It is based on Revelation. If not so based, it is worth no more and may be worth less than any other particular philosophy."

The conclusion then appears to be inevitable that the real strength of the orthodox systems of philosophy in general and that of Vedantism in particular lies in certain types of intuitional experiences which furnish the actual foundation of knowledge and belief. And here

we come upon the most deep-lying contrast between Indian philosophy and that aspect of western speculations which, inaugurated by the anti-scholastic respect for reason as the supreme court of appeal in matters of knowledge, crystallized into the epistemological doctrines of Kant, Hegel and all other subsequent philosophers of the west. Judged from this standpoint, we must candidly admit that the appeal to the Vedas does involve a reference to an extra-philosophical standard. Of course, every man is free to define philosophy in his own way, and we should not be denied the right of so conceiving philosophy as to place intuitional experiences in the very centre of our metaphysical adventures. But then we must be careful not to impair the centrality of these experiences by the desire to find for them a place in a rational scheme of the universe. It is no doubt true that the intuitional experiences are after all experiences and not mere figments of imagination, but to urge that these experiences should be taken into account in "any rational rendering of reality" is, we venture to think, nothing short of a serious confusion of issues. Intuition founded on the impotency of Reason cannot conceivably enrich itself by submitting to a rational interpretation. No subterfuge of language therefore should be allowed to obliterate the methodological contrast between Indian absolutism and the monistic philosophy of modern Europe, particularly that of Hegel. To put this contrast in a clear light we may just consider the strong conviction with which Dr. E. Caird says that "the claim of special inspiration is an anachronism for the modern spirit which demands that the saint should also be a man of the world, and that the prophet should show the logical necessity of his vision. For 'a man's a man for a' that,' and however sensu-

ous and rude his consciousness of himself and of the world may be, it is, after all, a rational consciousness, and it claims the royal right of reason to have its errors disproved out of itself. And a philosophy which does not find sufficient premises to prove itself in the intelligence of every one, and which is forced to have recourse to mere ex cathedra assertion, is confessing its impotence." Hegel's attitude to the mystical method is well-known. His invectives against immediate feeling as the organ of philosophy and his insistence on the need for meditation are too clearly stated to leave room for confusion between the intuitional method and the philosophical method of Hegel.

Yet, however, such confusions are not altogether wanting in the writings of the most gifted modern contemporary exponents of Indian thought. The Vedanta thinkers are supposed to have sometimes approached the problems of philosophy from the standpoint of the dialectical method of Hegel. In the Taittiriya Upanishad, it is said, "we find expressed the central contention of the idealist that in all systems of philosophy there are elements of truth as well as inherent defects, limitations which lead us on to some other more concrete development which, again, has to be transcended.... By an immanent criticism of conceptions, we are enabled to discover the most complete or the most fundamental idea, relatively to the rest." "We start with a lower category, criticise it, discard it as incomplete and progress to a higher one wherein the lower receives its fulfilment." That is, the Taittiriya Upanisad, far from being fanciful in its notions as judged by Dr. Weber exhibits the true spirit of speculation in so far as it illustrates the method of the "progressive discovery of reality or defining of

reality in terms of fundamental conceptions or categories, or a gradual passage from lower more abstract and indefinite conceptions, to higher, more concrete and definite ones." This method, it is hardly necessary to remark, is the full-fledged dialectical method of Hegel. Now the question is whether such an interpretation of the dialogue between Varuna and Bhrigue is justifiable or not. That the Upanishads are not very distinguished for their intellectualism, and that their logical basis is almost insignificant are almost unanimously accepted by the Indian as well as the Western orientalists. "There is not to be found in them," says Prof. S.N. Das Gupta, "any pedantry of gymnastics of logic," and their discussions "by themselves are hardly logically convincing, having, not unoften an almost infantine naivete about them." Now evern if it be granted for argument's sake that such sweeping remarks on the philosophical basis of the Upanishads are fundamentally untrue, arising from a partial view only, the dialectical method of Hegel and the Upanishadic dialogue do not appear to have a single point of contact with each other when they are judged on their own merits. It will perhaps be readily admitted that the generally accepted interpretations of the dialogue has very little in common with the immanent criticism of categories which for Hegel reveals the Absolute. The method of explaining the Absolute, as it is suggested in the Upanishads, is to begin with most easily apprehensible thing and then to lead the seeker after Truth thro' a series of progressively subtle things to the knowledge of the Absolute which is supposed to be the most difficult of comprehension. This method of gradual transition from the grossest to the subtlest is more than once illustrated in the Upanishads, and the terms of the series

are not generally repeated. Thus, apart from the numerous ineffectual attempts at defining the Absolute which are found throughout the Upanishads, the teacher often leads the student upwards from the conditioned to the conditioning, from the subtle to the subtler. The case of Brigu in the Taittiriya Upanishad, for example, is the same as that of Narada in the Chhandyogya Upanishad; and in explanation of this method it is said that like the mounting of a staircase, the exposition proceeds from the gross to the subtle and subtler truths. These explanatory things then are meant for drawing our attention to what actually lies beyond them, or rather, what is the essential Reality of which these are mere appearances. By negating the whole lot, the student is directed towards the positive basis of all negations. The Absolute is what remains over when all the sheaths or kosas are negated. This interpretation, it is hardly necessary to repeat, does not evidently bear any resemblance to Hegel's method. It rather points to the opposite direction.

Further, the attempt to dove-tail the Hegelian method on the Vedantic theory of Kosas is not simply to deprive Indian philosophy of its peculiar psychology, and metaphysics. It further leads to all the disadvantages of ignoring the historical lineaments of philosophical problems. Hegel's method of discovering Reality by an immanent criticism of our categories has an intellectual background so entirely unlike anything that existed in India and the presuppositions of these two types of philosophy are so different that nothing of permanent philosophical interest can result from reading one into the other. The theory of categories, as is well-known, developed out of Kant's attempt to reconcile the conflicting claims of empiri-

cism and rationalism about the origin of knowledge. The function of thought and that of sense in the constitution of knowledge were entirely separated from each other by the previous thinkers, and hence arose the necessity of a fresh analysis of perception in order to determine the role thought plays in perception in particular and knowledge in general. This analysis led to the all-important discovery that the ultimate forms of thought and the forms of existence are identical, so that it is possible to know the ultimate determinations of reality through an adequate analysis of reason. This identification of the intellectual necessity with the metaphysical which is strongly suggested by the Kantian analysis of knowledge could not be completely realized by Kant owing to his faith in something beyond the field of intellectual exploration. Hence the immediate duty of his successors was to adhere consistently to the central epistemological principles of the Critique by removing from it all the useless excrescences which had no organic relation with the main purpose of the transcendental enquiry. Thus Reason, in the hands of Hegel in particular, establishes its unqualified supremacy and the region of the Unknowable is once for all blotted out of existence.

It would be useless to repeat these platitudes about the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, had it not been necessary in studying philosophical problems to realize that notwithstanding the unity of the intellectual movements of different people, there are very significant differences too that are reflected not only in the special problems but also in the special methods employed for their solution. The theory of categories and the method of immanent criticism, we venture to think, are such specialities. With regard to the Hegelian dialectic, it has

been remarked that "it is not the only object of the dialectic to prove that the lower and subordinate categories are unable to explain all parts of experience without resorting to the higher categories, and finally to the Absolute Idea. It undertakes also to show that the lower categories are inadequate, when considered with sufficient intelligence and persistence, to explain any part of the world.. The whole chain of categories is implied in any and every phenomenon." It is further pointed out that "since we cannot observe pure thought at all, except in experience, it is clear that it is only in experience that we can observe the change from the less to the more adequate form which thought undergoes in the dialectic process. But this change of form is due to the nature of thought alone, and not to the other element in experience--the matter of intuition." It is evident from these characteristics of the Hegelian dialectic, how intimately it was connected with the contemporary distinction of pure thought from mere sense, of experience from reason, and finally of the immanent criticism of one category by another from the criticism ab extra of thought as such. The strong repugnance which Hegel had to all forms of transcendent criticism of thought was evident from his inability to accept even the "intellectual intuition" of Schelling. If the philosopher, to quote Dr.E. Caird once more, "assumes propretic airs, or speaks to ordinary men from the height of an immediate insight or transcendental intuition, from which they are excluded--he, as Hegel soon began to assert, is pretending 'to be of a different species from other men,' and is 'trampling the roots of humanity under foot.' The contrast between the dialectical method and the intuitional method cannot conceivably be presented

in a stronger form. There was not only no occasion in Indian philosophy to distinguish between the form and the matter of experience which gave rise to the Hegelian method, but the latter was developed in direct antagonism to what was accepted in India as the only right method of approaching Reality.

With regard to the first point, however, it may be asked if the Vedanta thinkers did not hold that "true insight is born of the union of the universal and the particular," and thus anticipated long ago what Kant discovered only in the 18th century, namely, that "percepts without concepts are blind; concepts without percepts are empty." Similarly, regarding the second point, it may be urged that "Intuition does not cease to be rational simply because reason is transcended. Intuition is the crown of reason." To begin with the latter point, though the belief that there is no necessary antagonism between intuition and reason has found favour with many a modern exponent of Indian thought, none has as yet been able to justify this belief. "The intuitional," it is urged, "is not contradictory of the logical, but subsumptive of it." It is however candidly acknowledge that we cannot form the remotest conception of the ways in which the palpably contradictory attributes are referred to the Upanishadic Absolute. Now even if it be granted that the belief is justifiable, and this is not our present contention, it does not affect the contrast of the Hegelian method with the intuitional. Hegel, we must observe at the risk of repetition, would be the last to subordinate reason to anything external to it; and however imperfect our knowledge of reality may be, he would never think of supplementing the deficiencies of reasoned knowledge by an appeal to a different faculty. Our knowledge as actually achieved may fall far short of our ideal of what it

ought to be, and perhaps the ideal will not be completely realised while man is man, as Green would suggest. But with all these admissions, Hegel would surely urge that "All true philosophy must be mystical, not indeed in its methods, but in its final conclusions." If we now turn to the first point about the analogy between Kant and the Vedanta thinkers, our conclusion will be the same. Notwithstanding a few fundamental points of contact between the Vedantic teachings and the results of the Critique, their methods are poles apart. By that admirably pithy expression regarding the relation of percept to concept Kant, as is known too well to need elucidation, meant to emphasise the functions of both thought and sense in knowledge. Knowledge for him is objective only in so far as the immediately given sense-data are brought under the interpretative activity of thought. Now, as already urged, such a distinction of sense and thought requires far other types of intellectual atmosphere to foster in than what could exist in India. In view of the complete absence of any reference to this distinction between thought and immediate experience in the philosophical records of India, it would be surely fanciful to foist the Kantian expression in the Upanishads. The fact is that the affiliation of the Kantian and the Hegelian thought to Vedantism has been made possible through putting extremely far-fetched interpretations upon the terms manas, vijnana, etc. as they occur in the monistic speculations of India. It is not at all easy to see the extent to which such terms as manas and vijnana have to be twisted before they can connote perception and understanding respectively, as they occur in the philosophical literature of the West. Our failure to see this

may be due to our short-sightedness, but we must emphatically maintain that these interpretations are entirely fanciful and unwarranted. Apart from this, such misinterpretations have the disastrous result of obscuring one of the unique characters of Indian thought. It has been contended above that intuitional visions play a very important part in Indian epistemology. They are intimately connected with the Vedantic theory of knowledge in particular, which includes among other thing meditation or contemplation. That immediate experience of Identity which is supposed to be the only true experience is but the last result of concentration and is preceded by other types of experience. Thus Bhagavat Gita describes the intuitionist par excellence as he who meditates upon God. Intuitional experiences are chiefly distinguished according as they lead to the perception of God of that of Self. Out of these two types, the latter is the final result of previous concentrations on the five sheaths or kosas one after another. It is true that these are recognised as aids to the knowledge of the Absolute; but their importance does not consist in their being categories or thought-forms. On the contrary they are objects of concentration of different degrees of intensity and thus useful for the control of the external and the internal senses. Shankara explicityly ascribes these five sheaths to Ignorance, and as the Absolute appears identical with these five outer cells, their discrimination results in the consciousness of identity between the subject and the ground of cosmic existence. Indeed, to interpret these calls as so many categories which by an immanent dialectic reveal the Absolute is to throw overboard the peculiarities of the Vedantic psychology.

We conclude then that the Hegelian method of

right knowledge. For the Vedantist, the ulti-
mate criterion of truth is an immediate expe-
rience; the function of thought or reason in
the western sense is either not recognised
at all; (I.e. Reason as the source of the fun-
damental principles on which our thinking and
action depend was never recognised in India
where the contradictions in the rationally
reached conclusions led to the condemnation of
the thinking process in general. This has been
called the "Superficial Doubt," as distinct from
criticism. --See Caird's Critical Philosophy),
and even when it is used in the approximately
Western sense, it is made subordinate to imme-
diate experience. For the Hegelian, on the con-
trary, no experience in its immediacy can fur-
nish the ultimate criterion and claim the ex-
clusive right to reveal the Real; for, it is
revealed only in so far as the mediating acti-
vity of thought has been allowed to operate
upon the multitudinous varieties of experience.
According to Vedantism, the falsity of an
immediate experience "is not to be judged a
priori"; for Hegel, an experience is to be jud-
ged false precisely in the same degree in
which it fails to satisfy the a priori ideal of
a coherent system.

The Absolute of Abstract Pantheism; We have so
far considered the problem of methodology and
attempted to bring out the apparently irrecon-
cilable contrast which Indian absolutism
presents in this respect to Hegelianism. As
we pass to the consideration of the nature of
the Reality as it is conceived in the east and
the west, this opposition again confronts us
almost in an unmitigated form. And here too
we may begin with western scholasticism, with
which the Vedantic method has been shown to
possess fundamental affinities. Philosophy in
the opinion of Scotus Erigena, the founder of

the Christian School, is the science of faith and its function is the understanding of dogma. God who is immanent in the cosmos, is the sum-total of being without division, or superior to all contrasts cannot be adequately described in language. But though God is incomprehensible through human categories, and hence in the absolute nothing for our thought, yet it is not equal to O. On the contrary, it is the positive ground from which the world is derived. Equally impenetrable is the innermost essence of the human soul which is identical with God. It is hardly necessary to point out that these thoughts of Erigena are so similar to those of Vedanta particularly of the Sankarite School, that they can be easily taken to be a short resume of the Vedantic metaphysics. Now, the main difficulty in such a metaphysics is that of describing the indescript. With its absolute sundering of the 'what' from the 'that', it takes away the possibility of distinguishing between being and nothing; for that which is supposed to repel all predication and essentially unthinkable on this account dwindles into nothing. Erigena's device to overcome this difficulty, like that of the mystics in general, is to resort to the vision or immediate knowledge of God. Outside the scholastic attemtps which sometimes reach the climax of intellectual nicety, it is in the works of Spinoza that we find a most serious tussle with this fundamental problem of pantheism. The problem is to ascertain how the ens absolute indeterminatum is related to the attributes. Spinoza appears to have left this relation sufficiently ambiguous to admit of two opposite interpretations, called formalistic and realistic respectively. According to the former view which has the authority of Hegel, the attributes are merely in intellectu, and

do not qualify the substance. It is merely from the view-point of thought or understanding--which can conceive of anything only by attaching predicates to it and for which consequently that which cannot be made the subject of significant judgments is absolutely nothing--that the indeterminate substance, existence in itself, or pure being, is changed into attributes. That is, Pure Being in itself is completely destitute of all determinations, and the attributes are what intellect "perceives" concerning it, as constituting the essence thereof. If this interpretation of Spinoza's thought be correct then the recognition of limitations of our intellectual faculty or reason appears to be a fundamental feature of his pantheism. Coming now to Indian philosophy a strikingly similar line of thought in connection with the self-same problem is illustrated in the schools of Vedanta. The school of Shankara represents Spinozism as interpreted in accordance with the formalistic view, while the realistic aspect is represented by Ramanuja and his followers.

The Brahman: Sankara's Absolute, like Erigena's God or the Substance of Spinoza, is explicitly described as Pure Being, altogether free from determinations and exclusive of difference. Distinctions, he points out, may be of three types only; namely, the difference of a thing from its parts, that of one species from another under the same genus, and finally that of one thing from another of a heterogenous type. The pure identity of the Absolute is entirely free from these theee possible kinds of difference. Indeed the unique nature of Sankara's monism which distinguishes it from other types of Indian thought consists just in this uncompromising insistence on the purely indeterminate analytic

unity of the Absolute. That this unqualified monism is Sankara's metaphysical position becomes obvious not only from what he himself teaches in the different parts of his commentaries; it is equally clear from the strictures it has received at the hands of the critics of different schools of thought as well as from the subsequent history of Vedantic thought in the school of Sankara. A system which takes the featureless analytic unity to be the foundational principle of the universe must necessarily stake its speculative excellence on the success with which it can reconcile the apparent plurality of the immediately given world of experience with the metaphysical pure unity of the cosmic principle. Apart from this central crux in all varieties of pantheism, Sankara has to tussle with the further problem of the emergence of qualities or attributes out of the perfectly indeterminate pure Existence. His answer to the first problem has much in common with that of Parmenides and Plato. Having rejected evolution or parinambada as implying potential plurality in and hence inconsistent with, the pure identity of the Absolute, his only alternative is to condemn all plurality as mere illusion or unsubstantial appearance. But the more the phenomenal world is condemned as a mere illusory appearance, the more pressing becomes the need of accounting for the existence of this illusion. For, a fact in order to be denied or judged false must at least exist, and till this existence of the Unreal is reconciled with that of the Real, we are left in a hopelessly dualistic metaphysics. Hence the phenomenal world is a great source of trouble to Plato, Parmenides and Shankara alike. Outside the Idea, Plato urges at every step, there is nothing but non-being; outside the Brahman, says Shankara, there is nothing but

Avidya which does not really exist. But in the very act of denial, the Non-being or the Avidya comes to possess a positive significance, and the critics of Plato as well as those of Sankara have demanded an explanation of this apparently second constitutive element, this non-being which, for the Greek as well as the Indian thinker, is the source of all plurality and evils. The Avidya has an eternity ab ante; how can this second principle which is co-eternal with the Absolute be reconciled with the sole reality of the One? This reconciliation in the opinion of many critics of Plato and Shankara is impossible; and so Shankara's analogy of the magician has failed to silence the critics who find in Maya a second principle that "refuses to be reduced completely to the unity of Brahman." Absolute monism, it is urged by Jayanta Bhatta, cannot dispense with a second principle, and the admission of another eternal principle alongside Brahman is fatal to a monistic metaphysics. (Shankara's only reply is that the difference between the Brahman and the Avidya is false, because it does not exist at a particular stage of illumination--See e.g. Brih. Up. III,5). This dilemma, indeed, is inevitable in some form or other in every type of monism. The illusion of Parmenides, the non-being of Plato, the Maya of Shankara, the matter of Plotinus, and even the negativity of Hegel and the matter of Bergson stand out as dualistic excrescences disfiguring the monistic purity of their systems.

Maya. Shankara's own device here is to fall back on metaphors which have opened the way to endless controversy within as well as without his own school. It is by no means an easy task to extricate a consistent notion of Maya from the apparently conflicting ac-

counts of it given by different monists, who differ from each other widely on a number of relevant problems of vital importance. Maya is described by Shankara as consisting of name and form or namarupatmika and not determinable either by being or by non-being; and the Absolute is Pure Being which by reason of its purity is mistaken as non-being. Prior to the creation of the universe there was mere Being. This, as Shankara is careful to point out, does not signify a subsequent distortion of the genuinely Real. Even now it is Pure Being but differentiated into names and forms, quite as much as the magician is never distorted by the magical show of his own making. Yet, when pressed for a definite answer to the relation between the Absolute and the Maya, he has to admit that the undistorted Brahman transforms itself into the transmigrating individual soul by means of its own avidya, and frees itself from this bondage by its own vidya. A similar difficulty attends the second characterisation of Maya as neither being nor non-being. As contrasted with Brahman which is pure existence, Maya is non-existent, but as the ground of the phenomenal world of experience it is not mere non-being. In this connection, it is sometimes pointed out that the non-being of Maya is not absolute. Though eternal ab ante, it is completely annihilated at the dawn of right knowledge; but Brahman is truly existent for it never ceases to be. So, if pure being or genuine existence consists in eternal being as is apparent from the technical definition of Satyatwam as Badharahithyam, then such a genuine reality cannot belong to Maya. Here too the pressure of logic has sometimes driven Sankara to the apparently conflicting admission that Maya is not only unreal in the sense of the transient, but it is absolutely unsubstantial and literally

false or anitya like the son of a barren woman. The Vedantic contrivance for reconciling these conflicts by means of the usual distinction between the esoteric and exoteric knowledge is well-known. But without considering the significance of this distinction and the right of introducing two heterogeneous standards of truth into a system of philosophy, it may help to clear up the issues to make a short reference to the second problem mentioned above, namely, the emergence of qualities out of the absolute indeterminateness of pure being.

Shankara, as suggested above, has to encounter here the same difficulties as Spinoza. How can that which is essentially an ens absolute indeterminatum be also described as possessed of determinations? Shankara, as is well-known, not only distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman, but he also proceeds to characterise the former as satyam jnanam, anantam, and thus makes himself liable to attack alike from the theistic monists and the logicians. That which is purely indeterminate, it is urged by the critics, can never be the object of knowledge. Hence those portions of the Sruti which have explicit reference to the indeterminate Brahman are not, it is said, to be interpreted as supporting absolute indeterminateness. They only signify the absence of ordinary qualities from God.

Shankara, however, was not wholly blind to the difficulty of describing the indescript or determining the indeterminate. To qualify, he says in effect, is to limit, and the absolute being all that is does not admit of limitation. But, though indeterminable in this sense, it can yet be defined in the same way as Akash is defined as that which gives space. How far it is a genuine solution of the difficulty which has in some form or other been present in every

agnostic system has been seriously questioned by the critics of agnosticism in India as well as Europe. The fearless agnosticism of Sankara however does not stop with this distinction between definition and delimitation. The last conceivable step is taken by him when he urges that the Absolute is not only entirely characterless, but not to be grasped through thought and speech. It is unthinkable and unutterable. The word atman, it is pointed out, cannot directly signify the indeterminate Absolute; its direct reference is to the determinate Absolute, or Self. But a word may by a sort of indirection refer to something beyond its point of direct reference when the latter is rejected, by a subsequent negation. So the word atman directly signifies the self as intimately connected with the super-imposed adjuncts like body. But when these adjuncts are subsequently rejected as not-self, the same word acquires the function of suggesting the pure Ego. This theory of suggestion or laksana is evidently indispensable for the unqualified monism of Sankara's school. It represents the Vedantic attempt to solve the fundamental crux of agnosticism by accentuating the positive significance of negation. Whatever may be the intrinsic worth of the theory, here we appear to approximate the limits of conceptual thinking. And it gives us a clue to understand the Vedantic distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric knowledge.

The abstract identity of pure being, though it is equal to nothing from the standpoint of conceptual thought, is the content of an intuitional experience. In the very act of naming this pure identity we have necessarily to superimpose determinations, and thus make it intelligible and communicable by associating it with what it is not. Hence it is indispensable, for whoever seeks to realize the Pure Being, to

think without language and thus have an immediate vision of the Real. The Real in so far as it has to conform to the conditions of conceptual thought must suffer an inevitable distortion and so in place of the Thing-in-itself, we are left with its phenomenal replica or shadow, while the Real reduces itself to a merely problematic concept. Consequently so long as there is the need of communication through the ordinarily recognised channels of spoken or written words the intellectual refraction of the Real will remain at best only symbolic of what cannot conform to the conditions of conceptual knowledge.

If this is a true account of the unqualified monism of the school of Shankara, its opposition to the idealistic metaphysics of Hegel and his followers appears to be unmistakably strong. If there is anything which can be said with absolute certainty about the Hegelian Absolute, it is this that it is not an immediate indeterminate being. It may not be possible for us to know the Absooute in all its determinations, yet it is not essentially indeterminable or unknowable. His criticism of Pure Being with which the Logic begins centres round just those elements in it which are so valuable for the intuitionist. He counts this pure being to be the isolation of an abstraction which results from Being and Nothing being placed out of touch with each other. Following the Kantian clue that what is real must conform to the conditions of conceptual thought and the inherent structure of reason, he develops a system of logic which claims to unfold the general structure of the entire universe, and to speak of a thing which is essentially inconceivable is, for him, an indirect admission that it is not within the universe of reality. The mystic and the agnostic may wax eloquent on the

indefinability and the unthinkability of the Absolute, and revel in the inscrutable mystery which enshrouds the inner essence of the universe. But the philosopher can ill afford to lay aside the principles of thought and reason, underlying as they do in all our assertions, positive and negative; and the validity of which therefore is presupposed in the very act of denying them. Hence the categories or laws of thinking, far from being like blinds which shut out the Real from our vision, are also the characteristics of the Absolute. They are not merely the definitions of the Real from the human standpoint, their function is not to present before us the disfigured picture of the essentially indefinable or a mere refraction of what is essentially beyond the categories. On the contrary, they <u>are</u> the Absolute. For him it makes no difference whether we say that the categories are the Absolute or that they are definitions of the Absolute; because, the ordinary conception of knowledge according to which our knowledge has to copy or represent a thing which is outside our mind being a sheer misconception of the nature of knowledge, the question of refraction or disfigurement together with that of correspondence does not arise at all. The indignant protest which the long line of post-Kantian philosophers beginning with Fichte enter against the Thing-in-itself arises precisely from the distinction which Kant could never get rid of between the world of knowledge and the world of faith, a distinction which is supposed to be entirely inconsistent with the general trend of the transcendental logic. And Kant's sad failure to keep the Thing-in-itself entirely free from the vitiating touch of the categories is generally taken to be an instructive discomfiture for every type of agnosticism. So the common article of faith which binds together the philosophers from Fichte onward into a

sort of philosophical fraternity is that the essentially inconceivable is absolutely non-existent, for that which cannot stand as the subject of a significant proposition is a mere naught or void, and so when we indulge in the agnostic's talks about the Real, we only amuse ourselves with empty words. Here we are in sight of an essential agreement between the critics of Shankara and the Hegelians. The theistic Vedantists of the Vaisnavite school and the logicians, as we have seen above, make a common cause against Shankara in rejecting as meaningless a featureless Absolute which by reason of its inconceivability cannot be the object either of perception or of inference and agama. Hence the pure Absolute, they point out, is not pure in the sense of being entirely above all determinations. Its purity simply signifies its freedom from the ordinary qualities.

How would a Shankarite reply to these objections? To understand this we must put in a word on the Vedantic psychology of mind. In common with the Samkhya philosophers, the Vedantin distinguishes pure consciousness from buddhi and its modifications. Buddhi, for Samkhya is by itself unconscious and so are its modes. These mental modifications appear to yield knowledge of objects, simply on account of the proximity of buddhi to pure consciousness. But the mental modifications being mere changes in Buddhi cannot by themselves reveal the objects, though they are the indispensable intermediaries through which pure consciousness can come into relation with extra-mental things. Here the only distinction between Samkhya and Vedanta consists in this that the latter, instead of admitting the actual independent existence of buddhi as a co-ordinate reality by the side of pure chit, looks upon it as a mere adjunct super-imposed on the chit. For Samkhya whatever is not chit belongs to the unconscious

prakriti which is a separate principle co-ordinate with purusha. For Sankara whatever is an object of knowledge is an unconscious entity which is not only falsely identified with the self, but is also grounded on an unreal principle. Apart from this ontological divergence Sankara agrees with the Samkhya philosophers in his psychological analysis of the functions of the different factors involved in knowledge. The self which is eternal consciousness in the ultimate source of all knowledge; the mental modifications which are involved in the knowledge of objects being themselves revealed by consciousness cannot reveal the subject consciousness. That is, the Pure Ego is never revealed through mental modification inasmuch as it itself is the revealer of all objects. Hence the necessity of knowing the ultimate knowledge in the state of an extraordinary vision or ecstasy. The series of mental modifications which are necessarily involved in ordinary knowledge must be laid to rest before the self is known as the universal subject and not merely as an object.

However fantastic such an account of Self-consciousness may appear to be,--and it has been called a monstrosity--there does not seem to be a less fanciful and more scientific solution of the problem. How is the knowledge of the knower possible?--has been one of the insoluble problems of occidental philosophy since the Kantian criticism of rational psychology. (Cf.specially Dr. James Ward's very instructive analysis of Self-consciousness and his conclusion that the subject though within experience cannot be an object of knowledge--Psychological Principles, Ch. XV.) Shankara's solution, whether it is accepted as final or not, does indicate a way out of the difficulty, and incidentally brings about a unique feature of Indian Absolutism. From this standpoint, to know the subject is to be the

subject, since the slightest duality is sure to convert the subject into an object, and then in place of the Pure Ego we are left with the empirical self only. Hence the impossibility of knowing the subject through ordinary knowledge which cannot dispense with the duality of subject-object, the subject on the one hand and the presentations on the other. This brings us to the reply which a Shankarite would make to a Hegelian. You cannot grasp, he would say in effect, the Pure Being or the indeterminate Absolute since your analysis of self-consciousness which yields the fundamental principle of unity in difference does not actually solve the problem. Instead of admitting the insolubility of the problem on the basis of your epistemological method, you have simply taken the duality as an inevitable paradox, an <u>eternal novelty</u>, or a standing enigma, and then on the basis of this admitted mystery, you discover the Absolute to be an Identity in Difference. As you have pledged yourself to the discovery of the Absolute through conceptual thought, and as the categories which are the indispensable instruments of such thinking contain identity of opposites, the Reality is distorted in being forced into the conceptual machinery. Indeed, the mystery is mainly due to the necessity of thinking with the help of language; it is this which is responsible for the difficulties which have taxed the intelligence of thinkers in the west since the fourth century B.C. when the puzzle about the Law of Identity was started by Antisthenes the Cynic. Judgments which are recognised to be the units of thought oscillate between abstract identity or tautology and mere difference or pure negation; and the paradox of inference manifests itself in the conclusion going out of yet remaining within the premises. The Pure Identity, then, which is a false

abstraction from the standpoint of conceptual knowledge--and it is Hegel's merit to have made it clear for all time--would be perhaps the highest reality if the demands made by the philosophers of India, specially by Shankara and Patanjali had been really met. It is an entirely different question how far those demands can be really met within the range of philosophy, and Hegel at any rate would be the last person to believe in the superior authority of a philosophical superstructure which is built on a universal scepticism about the efficiency of thought and reason. An Absolute which does not reveal itself in the terms of thought is, for him, a mere word. Hence, while former metaphysics, in the words of Prof. W. Wallace, "had dashed itself in vain against the reefs that girdle the island of the supersensible and noumenal, the supposed world of true being," he substituted for "the distant and transcendent Absolute which was the object of older metaphysics an Absolute self-revealing in the terms of thought." This brings out, with an unmistakable precision, the wide gulf which separates Indian absolutism from that type of idealistic speculations which because the common property of thinkers from Hegel onward.

The Idea: Whatever may be our final attitude to the problems raised above, this should not prejudice our judgment about the facts. Hegel could never sympathise with Shankara when the latter insists on the pure unity of Brahman, for this in the absence of determinations is a simple blank vacuity which can explain neither itself nor its 'other.' It does not matter, he points out,whether their abstract identity be named space, or time, or pure consciousness, ego; in so far as it is an abstract absolute, it lacks the condition of a synthesis, which consists in mediation or a reference to another;

"it is quite the same thing as what the Indian names Brahman, when, externally motionless and no less internally emotionless, looking years long only to the tip of his own nose, he says within himself just om, om, om, or perhaps nothing at all. This dull void consciousness, conceived as consciousness, is Being." But to plant ourself thus fast in the abstract absolute is an impossible feat for thought: thus "Parmenides with his illusion and his opinion must consent to own an opposite of being and of truth; as, similarly situated, is Spinoza with his attributes, modes, extension, motion, understanding, will, etc. The synthesis involves and shows the untruth of those abstractions; in it they are in unity with with their other--not, therefore, as self-substistent--not as absolute, but directly as relative." Knowledge, for Hegel, cannot find self-fulfilment in this abstract identity of pure being, its ideal cannot be a thing existing "not under relation," for duality is the very essence of intelligence. Its ideal is rather to be found in "the pure transparent identity-in-difference of self-consciousness"; and consequently, the absolute idea is the idea of "a self-consciousness which manifests itself in this difference, and by overcoming it, it may attain the highest unity with itself." Indeed this description of the Absolute has been unanimously accepted by occidental philosophy from the time of Hegel onward, and it has completely replaced the agnostic description of a relationless Absolute. The Absolute, says Bradley, is an individual and a system, and it is one in this sense that its differences co-exist harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing. "Our Absolute" he points out, "is no Thing-in-itself. It is against this empty transcendence and this shal-

low pantheism, that our pages may be called one sustained polemic. The Absolute is no sundered abstraction, but has a positive character... The Reality itself is nothing at all apart from appearances." The contrast of such an Absolute with the Brahman of Shankara is too clear to be mentioned in detail. The silghtest difference is absolutely incompatible with the pure unity of Brahman, and the synthesis of subject and object upon which the Vedantic monism is ultimately founded is not simply a transparent unity in the Hegelian sense, and so not within the capacity of intelligence. It is rather to be realised through an extraordinary type of vision. To lose sight of this contrast is to court misunderstanding, and confusion. We must admit that the tendency of Shankara's philosophy is mystical, if we agree with Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, in describing it as the tendency."to exalt the divine above all predicates, making it literally the unnameable, the ineffable, the un-knowable,"; and however indistinguishable it might be from nothing, it is yet the highest or rather the only Reality for the intuitionist. To put this contrast briefly, the Absolute of European philosophy transcends the finite in the sense of being more of the finite. It is simply the finest at its best. The Vedantic Absolute, on the contrary, is transcendent of the finite in the sense that it completely annuls the finite. According to the latter, finite self is an appearance in the sense of being a mere illusion; while for the former it is an appearance in the sense that it points to a fuller reality.

The relation between Hegel and Shankara in respect of their philosophical views, it has been our endeavour to make clear, is one of unreconcilable opposition. This, we have made an attempt to show in connexion with their philosophical methods as well as the results which follow from them. In fact, their conceptions of the Absolute

could not have any essential points of contact in view of the divergence of their philosophical methods. A philosophy that begins with a damaging criticism of conceptual thought is not likely to have any substantial agreement with another which is inspired by a staunch faith in the potency of reason and the universal validity of the principles of thought. The historic importance of Indian Absolutism therefore consists in its being one of the types of anti-intellectual retorts which, like the Bergsonian retort of our time, have their moorings in a deep misology or the distrust of the power of conceptual knowledge to reveal the innermost essence of Reality. Hence Shankara invokes the aid of an immediate experience for knowledge of the Real. We may put these contentions in a clearer light by noticing an interesting, though to our mind misleading, tendency to mitigate the antithesis between intuition and the reason either by looking upon intuition as the crown of reason, or by considering reason as the truth of understanding. The former line of reconciliation is suggested by the Indian view of the three stages of shravan, manan and nididhyasan in the complete realization of Truth, and this may be made the basis of insinuating the epistemological inferiority of a system of philosophy which is limited to only one of these three indispensable stages of knowledge. On the other hand, the Hegelian distinction between the standpoint of reason and that of understanding, is sometimes made the occasion for the distant suggestion that Hegel, by recognising the stage of reason beyond that of understanding recognised the partial truth implicit in the Pure Being of intuition. Thus it has been urged, that "the East is apt to believe that only identity is real, and that differences are illusory--which is in fact

explicitly stated in the doctrine that only the one is and that the world of difference and multiplicity is Maya, illusion. Its formula is A is A." But this formula, it is pointed out, is "the work of understanding." The Hegelian principle of reason, on the other hand, is the principle of the identity of opposites which "does not oppose, but includes the principles of the understanding." In face of such a disparaging criticism which is in fact suggested by Hegel's treatment of the category of being, the first impulse of those who think that the only way of justifying the study and estimating the value, of Indian philosophy is to extract out of it the quintessence of European thought will be to repudiate this identification of the abstract identity with the Vedantic Absolute and declare that "the Vedantic Absolute is not the abstraction of an <u>etre supreme</u> which deletes all differences but is a spirit that transcends and at the same time embraces all living beings." "The Maya theory simply says that we are uder an illusion if we think that the world of individuals, the pluralistic universe of the intellect, is the absolute reality." This declaration, however, as we have indicated above, can hardly be an unprejudiced account of the Vedantic Absolutism. It not only runs counter to what is explicitly taught by Shankara about the Absolute being entirely free from all the conceivable types of difference, but is further irreconcilable with his conception of salvation or emancipation as the immediate consequence of right knowledge realized only in the intuitional experience of identity. It is again a serious misrepresentation of the Maya theory, though it may help us to read the Hegelian theory of transcendence into Vedantism, to interpret Maya as the individual's confusion of

the relative with the absolute; for here too we have very explicit statements which unmistakably point to the Absolute unreality of the world of multiplicity. Maya, it must be remembered, is for Shankara the material cause of the phenomenal world which includes everything except the pure Chit, and not simply a subjective confusion. At the dawn of right knowledge its true character as pure nothing is realised, and with this realisation vanishes the belief of the reality of the phenomenal world. Thus the abstract identity, however defective it may be from the standpoint of conceptual knowledge, is the highest truth from the view-point of intuition. The distinction between these two standpoints is a vital aspect of Shankara's monism. One is Shastra dristi, which may be translated for our present purpose as the standpoint of intuition, and the other is yukti dristi or that of ordinary knowledge. According to the former, Maya never existed in the past, does not exist in the present and will not exist in future; but as judged in the light of the latter knowledge it is both the material cause of the world of multiplicity as well as the cause of our false judgment. It is then entirely unprofitable, and perhaps unnecessary too, to defend the Vedantic Absolutism by putting on it a far-fetched interpretation on the Hegelian line which it can hardly bear; for, if there is any point which may be fairly taken to be the central core of Shankara's teachings, it is the unity of the Brahman which excludes, and not simply transcends, all differences. Hegel might join hands with Shankara in so far as the latter holds that the Absolute is a unity which is above all differences and in reference to which we must account for all these differences; that it is not a finite thing in the democracy

of other finite things or a God which is yet to be; that the distinctions between spirit and matter, subject and object are not absolute. But Shankara not satisfied with the ideal of rational or conceptual knowledge, would proceed to point out that this unity is an absolute identity in which all differences disappear, Hegel would surely experience a severe revulsion of spirit as he did in the presence of the Schellingian Identity. The Brahman, he would then point out, is the unity of substance rather than of spirit.

If then it is a mistake to interpret the Vedantic Absolute as the ideal of reason which for Hegel was an identity in difference, no less serious is the error of thinking with the critic that the Vedantic Identity is no better than the abstract identity of understanding. The principle of contradiction which necessarily leads thought to determine or mark off one thing from another, and which accordingly emphasises the self-identity of things in their abstract exclusiveness may stand in need of correction from the standpoint of reason which brings out the impossibility of separating one thing from another so completely as to make their relation disappear. But the Identity which is realized in the intuitional experience is expressly asserted to be unthinkable and consequently the problem of differentiation and relation cannot be fitly raised in this connexion. Two things may differ from each other either in their spatial positions or temporal locations or merely in their contents. But these distinctions cannot be relevant to what is infinite in the sense of being free from these three types of limitation, or <u>desh-kal-vastu-parichhedshunya</u>. In other words, the principle of contradiction which has universal application in the world of plurality or multiplicity is surely a half-truth in so far as it accentuates

difference exclusive of relation, and so it was Hegel's great merit to have brought out the secret of the intellectual mechanism which in the very act of differentiating also unifies. But this is entirely irrelevant when we have to refer to what is beyond the mechanism; when the reference is to that which though unthinkable is still realizable in experience. The merit of Hegel, we are then persuaded to believe, so far as the present problem is concerned, is to be judged not with reference to his distinction between understanding and reason, but only in connexion with what he says against the intermediate or the Thing-in-itself.

A similar confusion appears to lurk in such statements as that "the weakness of the Upanishads lies in this that the synthesis is reached not by explicit reason but by intuition." If reason is thought, then to contrast the intuitional synthesis with the synthesis of reason seems to be as absurd as to contrast, to use Dr. Ward's example, what occurs in a given day with what occurs outside of a given door. That is, we can contrast a thing or event with another only in so far as they belong to a single context of reference; but when the Absolute is supposed to be unthinkable reached not by reason, we cannot possibly institute a comparison between the rational and the intuitional synthesis. It should be however distinctly understood that this does not mean that the intuitional synthesis is above all criticism. Whether it is so or not it is none of our present purpose to discuss. What we contend for is that an impartial criticism of intuitionalism should not seek a common ground by attributing to it what it expressly denies. So when it is urged by the intuitionist that

that what is absolutely beyond thought and speech can yet be realized in a living experience, it is not to the purpose to point out that the synthesis is not reached by reason; all that we can do is to consider how far the immediacy of an experience has a higher-truth-value than the systematic coherence of thought. This, as we have ventured to suggest on another occasion, is the root distinction between the Hegelian and the Shankarite standpoints.

To turn now to the second type of reconciliation, it has been urged that the thinking consideration of things which is identified with philosophy in the West is only a stage in the complete realization of truth. For the development of aparoksanubhuti rational discussions form only a propaedeutical measure of self-discipline. Their function is to remove the sense of impossibility about the revealed truths, and thus prepare the way to the actual experience in which alone 'reality' is apprehended with an immediate or intuitive certainty. It is such expressions as these which apparently lend countenance to the view that intuition is the crown of reason or that rational knowledge seeks self-fulfilment in something beyond reason. On closer inspection however it may be discovered that the Indian position does not admit of such an interpretation; firstly, because it runs counter to the explicitly misological tendency which, as we have noted above, is characteristic of the orthodox systems in general and of Vedantism in particular. Shankara is emphatic on the inefficiency of unaided reasoning. The strength of his conviction in this respect is evident from his reply to a possible objection which,--and he was too acute a thinker not to have seen it,--goes to the very root of the matter. Every serious quest of truth which begins by a repudiation of the claims of thought must sooner or

later face the problem if in the very act of proving the incompetence of thinking or reasoning, the validity of proof and consequently that of intellectual processes in general is not presupposed. Thus Bergson anticipating this inevitable objection asks if there is not a vicious circle involved in his attempt to go beyond intelligence. Shankara's reply to this and other allied objections, as is well-known, is that reasoning, based as it is on ordinary perception and inference, is incompetent to grasp the abstruse nature of the ground of the universe; so in such matters its validity has to be ascertained by examining how far its conclusions are supported by the holy Writ which in tern needs no proof. Whether satisfactory or not, this reply indicates Shankara's implicit faith in the intuitional experiences. Excessive Intellectualism, he says in effect, is not fit for deciphering the mystery of the universe. Discussions and debates however have a function in so far as they are measures of self-discipline indispensable for that profound transformations of our ordinary habits and dispositions leading to the intuitional experiences. This brings us to the second point in our arguments. Shankara's explicit rejection of the Yogic method of knowledge, together with what he says about the need of reasoning is sometimes supposed to be a sufficient proof of his respect for reason; and so it is contended that he at any rate does not found his philosophy on isolated intuitions. The method suggested by him is rather, it is said, that of reasoning which when conducted in the right spirit gives birth to intuitive certainty. It is through jnanam and not yoga that one is, according to Sankara, to acquire certainty. Now, it is true that the yoga and jnanam are sometimes described as two different methods of realization. It

will however lead to serious confusion of issues if we interpret this as indicating Sankara's rationalistic tendency. He could not surely have failed to notice the absurdity of blowing hot and cold in the same breath. When he accepts jnanam as the only method of realization he does not leave us in doubt as to what he means. Jnanam he describes as the ascertainment of what is laid down in the Shastras and it does not become vijnanam till the things are actually intuited. So it is apparently unquestionable that the Yogic method and that of Shankara do not differ from each other in so far as an ultra-rational and super-sensuous experience is advocated by both as the highest authority. Shankara however finds in reasoning an indispensable instrument leading to the development of that experience. Reasoning or discussion, if left to itself, cannot produce absolute certainty, for any proposition can be rationally defended provided we have the necessary forensic gift. All it can really achieve is to strengthen our belief in what is laid down in the Shastras by showing that the rational conclusion does not contradict Revelation. In other words, there are, according to Shankara, three stages in the development of belief; and reasoning which is necessary at the second stage has the negative function of removing doubt about the truth of the revealed dogma. But belief cannot reach the intensity of absolute conviction till the rational conclusion forms the content of a living experience. Here seeing is believing.

A problem. The conclusion then seems to be inevitable that the Indian view of the relation between intuition and reason is one of irreconcilable opposition. Intuition might be the crown of reason only if reasoning conducted in an absolutely impartial spirit had for its imme-

diate effect the intuitional conviction. But this it cannot do, for unaided reasoning upon metaphysical subjects is sure to lead to antinomies. Accordingly, Sankara has to warn, as Kant does at a later age, that a truth-seeker should avoid the transcendental illusion of applying the ordinary means of knowledge to things which are strictly metaphysical; and inasmuch as reasoning is one of these ordinary methods of knowledge, it must be always subordinated to intuition. Here arises a problem of vital importance. It has been pointed out by the critics of intuitionalism that in so far as it has to appeal to a subjective conviction as the highest authority, intuitionalism stands self-condemned. (c.f., eg. Prof.W. P. Montague, "The Mediaeval monks, the holy men of India, the Mohammedan dervishes, and the Christian Scientists of our own day are but a few of those whose souls have been flooded with an inner light bringing conviction to the mind and peace and courage to the heart...That each mystic should attribute the power of his mystical experience to the peculiar technique by which his state of illumination is attained, or to the truth of his particular creed, is natural enough, but of no logical significance." --The Ways of Knowing, p.59). For, no theory of knowledge, it is urged, can have a claim to our assent which fails to distinguish between the psychological and the logical validity of an assertion. This, however, leads us beyond the scope of the present essay which is primarily intended to expose the error of reading Hegelian absolutism into the philosophy of Shankara.

UMESHA MISHRA: "SYNTHETIC GRADATION IN INDIAN THOUGHT." (ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY STUDIES, VOL.1 1925)

1. Philosophy in India is not merely speculative. It has both theoretical as well as practical aspects. Scientific study to be worthy of its name, cannot afford to neglect either. Moreover, speculation, unless it is based on and has a counter-part in practical experience, is worse than useless. Such speculation cannot help anybody either here or in the world hereafter.
2. The different schools of Darçana, therefore, are the varied aspects of Truth viewed from different angles of vision.
3. The inquirer after truth, hearing of so many different views, finds himself unable to understand the exact nature of the Truth. He approaches the Çrutis, which he believes to be the only infallible source of Right Knowledge. He finds the right answer there. He learns from them the true nature of the Self, as described in the following: Tai.Upa. 2.1.); (Ibid, 2.2.); (Ibid.2.4.); (Ibid.2.5.); Cha. Upa. 6,2.1.) etc. Had he had full faith in the words of the Çrutis, he would have at once got the illumination needed. But as a human being, he is beset with doubts and wrong notions, which stand in the way of his immediate conviction. He then sets about collecting arguments in support of what he has heard from the Çrutis. This stage of reasoning, as based upon the premises, supplied by the Çrutis, is known as Manana. This is what speculative philosophy in India attempts to represent. But mere speculation cannot reach truth. It seems quite possible that the conclusions arrived at through speculation, i.e. manana, might be overthrown at any moment by counter-reasonings of a stronger nature. Examples of such supersession abound in both science and philosophy. The inquirer cannot rely upon this. It is necessary, therefore, to verify his rational conclusion through practical experiments; just as in geometry demonstration is supplemented by experimentation. This practical

verification is reached through Nididhyasana--contemplation. The conclusions of the previous stage are hereby realised as truth and are unassailable. These are the steps leading to the direct perception of truth.

4. All the Indian systems of thought, for instance, take their data from the Vaidika sources and build upon them the conclusions through rational arguments. They appeal to Yoga or Nididhyasana for their verification. This would seem to involve a kind of synthesis between the three Pramanas--instruments of right knowledge namely: Agama or Çabda, Anumana (inference), and Pratyaksa (direct perception), which seem to represent Sravana, Manana and Nididhyasana respectively.

Before we proceed to find out how the different systems in India have originated, it would be better to start with a clear consciousness as to the starting point and goal of these systems. It is held that removal of pain is the underlying common motive of the entire creation. No one would like to have things which he dislikes. This is the end towards which every conscious and rational movement tends. Philosophical enquiry, therefore, presupposes the stage where Pain is felt, and naturally it aims at its absolute cessation.

Here the question arises: The goal and the starting-point being common, why do we find so many different views? The answer is quite simple. It is due to difference in the intellectual equipments of the enquirer. Philosophy, in India, is just like a stream taking its rise from the mountain top, flowing successively through several valleys and falling into the great ocean. Now the same stream, e.g. the Brahmaputra, while passing through one valley to the other, has a particular shape, current, and sometimes name too, which begin to change as it proceeds onwards. If any one takes a

photograph of it, in its passage through one valley and then again another while it passes through another and so on, he will have different pictures, though all of them will represent the same individual river; and a man, who has not seen the stream from one end to the other, can hardly assure himself that these photographs are of the same river.

Similarly, though all aim at the same goal yet because of the varieties of their predispositions and capacities (Adhikara), the single path appears as so many different paths to them.

Or we may describe the final goal of Indian thought on the analogy of the Arundhati star. When the child asks the mother, 'where is the Arundhati?' the mother at once, directs its gaze towards the sky. There-upon, she points to a bigger star near the Arundhati, for she knows well that the star in question being very small, it is not possible for the child to find it at once. But when the child has acquired sufficient power of observation, it finds out the star easily.

In the same way, the supreme goal is so subtle that the Rsis--the seers of truth--thought that it would be quite impossible for all to grasp the line of thought which directly leads to it. Therefore, for the good of the people, they constructed so many steps, which if gradually followed would lead to the goal. People, not following these paths, are likely to be led astray and never to find the right path and the truth. So did Ksemaraja, in his Pratyabhijnahrdaya say clearly that all the systems are so many artificial stages of the progress of the Atman, just like an actor assuming various roles till the end of the play; or we may liken it to the reaching of the mountain top with a certain number of steps which must be crossed.

This shows that there is not only a mutual harmony but even a gradation in ascending order in the various systems of Indian thought; and every system is consistent within its limits. For in Nature there is unity amidst diversity. The world is governed by law, and no fact can be inconsistent with any other fact, however opposed the two may appear to be. This is true not only of philosophy, but on close analysis it will be evident in every branch of knowledge in India.

Now the question is: if all the systems are equally true, how is it that the propounders of a particular system repudiate the validity of the other systems? Even accepting the synthetic view, it is urged, it would have been plausible for the highest system alone to contradict the other views, as Çankaracarya has done in the Brahma Sutra Bhasya, Adhyaya II, Padas 1-2; but as a matter of fact we find all the systems speaking against one another. The answer seems to be clear; it is so, because each system wants to keep its own Adhikaris (those who are qualified for the sage represented by that system) firm in their respective positions (Adhikaras). Else they are likely to be entangled in a maze and thrown off their track. Moreover, if we closely follow the texts, we find that the higher systems do not really deny the 'Relative' truth of the lower systems. For instance, the Vedanta holds that though the Highest Truth is not to be found in the Sankhya, the Yoga, or the Pasupata, they have each its own sphere of usefulness which remains undisturbed.

5. The common-sense view. The removal of pain, it has been pointed out, is the common aim of all the schools and the stage where it is felt is the starting-point. This start-

ingpoint seems to be the stage of the common, or more accurately, vulgar people, or as the Buddhists call them Puthujjana. At this stage, truly speaking, there is no reason. They do not believe in things which they do not directly perceive through the senses. And consequently they have no faith in the Atman as something distinct from the body. Creation to them is due to chance. Their journey terminates, therefore, with the end of this body. There is nothing left after death.

6. The Nyaya-Vaisesika or Realistic view. When we become a little more intelligent, we feel that the above ideas no longer satisfy us. We do believe that whatever we see in the world around us has its real existence; but apart from these there is something else which seems to be of a different type. The feelings of pleasure and pain that we have, cannot be logically assigned to the body but to something else as is apparent from our experiences expressed in judgments--'I am happy', 'I possess the knowledge of this book etc.'. We also feel that the objects about us to which we cling with so much tenacity during life are perishable and are the causes of pain in the long run. It is an instinct that a man, or for the matter of that every animal, abhors pain and seeks to discover its remedy. Hence in this stage we feel naturally inclined to approach the Srutis as well as the illuminated teachers, whose knowledge of things is clear and immediate. For we can no longer satisfy ourselves with the conviction that death will terminate our pain, inasmuch as the Self (Atman) which alone feels the pain is believed to survive physical death.

There we are told that the knowledge of the true nature of the objects (Padarthas) of the universe will bring to us the 'Everlasting peace.' Upon this basis we proceed to argue

and then verify our conclusions by experiments, that is, Nididhyasana or yoga. This whole process takes a long time. But as the duration of a man's life is very short it becomes impossible generally to reach the gnosis in a single birth. Nevertheless whatever is done in a life is not at all lost. It sticks to us and forms the nucleus round which the developments of the next life will arrange themselves. Really we start in the next life where we stopped in the past, so that the thread of continuity remains unbroken. Thus we proceed till we come to the end of the second stage of our journey. It is clear from this that there is something which survives the dissolution of the physical body.

7. <u>The Sankhya Stage</u>. But really our progress does not stop here. There are subtler elements behind these. The next school, i.e. Sankhya starts with the eternal elements of the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The causal analysis of Sankhya leads gradually to Prakriti, which is Pure Matter and consists of extremely fine composites, called Gunas in a state of equilibrium. If we study the classification of the Tattvas of Snakhya, we shall find that we are lifted up step by step from the grosser to the more subtle elements until we reach the Highest Level.

Purusha is beyond the natural series and is the Principle of Intelligence. It is so closely associated with the Mahat that the confusion of one for the other is nature until the two are really separated off by discriminative knowledge. Purusa is a pure conscious entity. It is like a pure crystal in front of a red flower which makes the colourless crystal look coloured and possess attributes.

he state reached by Discrimination is Purification or 'Kaivalya', wherein all kinds of pain cease to exist and Purusha becomes isolated.

It then beholds the Prakriti or 'the state of equilibrium' as an uninterested spectator. It is apparent from the above that Sankhya has advanced a step beyond Nyaya-Vaisesika. It has established the 'cit' aspect of the Atman and has reduced the number of eternal entities to two.

8. Vedanta Stage. Vedanta takes up the enquiry where Sankhya had left it and seeks to resolve the Dualism of the latter into the unity of the Supreme Truth. It shows that Purusa must remain as it were divided, so long as it is associated with an Upadhi which is foreign to and other than itself.

9. In any way the realisation of Supreme Truth as One ends in the Realisation of the Infinite Joy of Self-Delight. This too subsides and then the Absolute alone remains.

10. We may conclude our brief survey with an illustration from the non-orthodox systems. We find that the Bauddha Darsana in its earlier stages was divided into a large number of schools; but its main schools, as recognised in later times, are (i) Vaibhasika, (ii) Sautrantika, (iii) Yogacara, and (iv) Madhyamika. The Sautrantika holds that though the external world exists, its existence cannot be directly vouched for by our senses, but that it is inferred from the multiple forms in which our consciousness, which is naturally formless and pure, presents itself. The 'doctrine of momentariness' both of external as well as mental phenomena is accepted by both.

Thus the real difference, between the two schools, both of which are equally realistic, consists in the attitude in which each looks at the order of external reality. The burden of emphasis appears to be shifting from the outer to the inner.

11. The Yogacara school, however, denies the objective character of the world. It posits an in-

finite number of ideas each momentary and self-contained and seeks to account for the phenomena of experience by means of these. It is due to Nescience that we differentiate an Idea, which is by nature self-luminous and indivisible, into the complex of subject, object and consciousness. This system has done away with the external world altogether and seems to have retired more into the Inner Sanctuary of Absolute Truth.

The Madhyamika School: The finishing touch is given by the so-called Nihilistic or Madhyamika school, which dispenses with the necessity of recognising the Vijnana or Idea as well. Thus all traces of phenomenal experience, both objective and subjective, are effaced, and what is left behind is the Serene Depth of an Infinite Void. It is called Sunya in the sense that it is eternally free from everything with which our subjective or objective consciousness is acquainted; it is above the world, beyond the world and even permeating the world, though not defiled by it, as its abiding background. It is neither Positive, nor even Negative (as the word might seem to imply), nor both, so that it is undefinable and in a sense has no 'character'. The Madhyamika explains the whole paraphernalia of cosmic experience from the stand-point of this Sunya with the aid of Avidya.

Studying the four systems in the order in which we have arranged them we find that there is a conscious attempt at gradual retirement from the external to the internal and from there into the Abyss of the Void which is the consummation sought for. The Doctrine of Momentariness is only a stepping stone to that of Universal Vacuity. Hence the conception of Nirvana has received a fresh purging at every stage until it has reached its true significance in the Madhyamika School, which is meant for the student of

of the highest Adhikara.
12. The systems run along parallel lines and aim at the same goal, though differently viewed. There is absolutely no contradiction between them, inasmuch as each being consistent with itself leads to the self-same destination. What we have said of the Bauddha or Jain Schools appears with equal force to the several branches of orthodox philosophy.

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GASTON DE MENGEL: "THE NOTION OF THE ABSOLUTE" (in Review of Philosophy and Religion Vol.III) (in various forms of Tradition: From the French in "Le Voile d'Isis," 1929).

There is, in the Absolute, nothing other than the Absolute Itself, the Infinite, called, in the Vedic doctrine, Brahma nirguna, and in the Jewish Kabbala, Ain-Soph, that is to say Limitless.

The Infinite is beyond being. For we derive the notion of being from finite things, hence we cannot apply this notion to the Infinite univocally; and even should we apply it to the Infinite analogically, that which would there be called being would so surpass the being of finite things, that it would be more exact to call the latter "non-being," because, compared to the Infinite, the finite becomes so to speak null--this comparison may be symbolized, transposing it in terms of abstract quantity (where the 'infinite' is in reality the indefinite), by the mathematical expression:

But this designation of 'non-being', applied to finite things, would be too contrary to our human habits of thought, and we find it more natural to invert the comparison, and to apply the expression "Non-being" to the Infinite; but, as points out the Kabbalist Isaac Meyer, this expression must be translated "non-Ens" (not a being), and not 'non-Est' (is not).

Besides, scholastic philosophy defines, or rather explains (since a true definition is impossible where, as in the notion of being, there is neither genus nor difference, those essential elements of definition) being as "all that which exists," or at least, "all that which is capable of existing" (id qui competit esse), which, be it noted, would not even permit the application of the term 'being' to the Infinite considered in its relation which the finite, that is to say, in so far as God the Creator (Isvara), nor to anything which, besides the Creator, belongs to the category of the Non-manifestable. Furthermore, being is already a determination (though the first of all), even if taken in a more extended sense than the scholastic, for it implies certain properties, such as unity, which themselves imply a distinction, incompatible with the Absolute, outside Which nothing is.

There is nothing outside Brahma, for Brahma is the Infinite, and "that outside which there is something cannot be infinite, being limited by that very thing it leaves out" (Rene Guenon, Man and his becoming according to Vedanta). "Outside Brahman there is nothing," declares Sankaracarya in "Atma-Bodha," "all that which seems to exist outside It can exist only under the mode of illusion, as the appearance of water in the desert." And so Mohyiddhin ibn Arabi ("Risalatul-Ahadiyah"): "There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that is outside Him (Allah)."

If outside Brahman there is nothing, that is because everything otherwise is, speaking analogically, contained in Brahman, and the contents cannot be outside the container. Brahma contains all things, for It is present in all things by Its active virtue (all things having their being through It alone); now, the incorporeal present in a thing by its active virtue

contains that thing ('because being in assumes on its part the character of a hold and a kind of enwrapping" explains Father A.D. Sertillange commenting Question 8, article I, reply 2, of the Summa Theologia of St. Aquinas) and is not contained by it (St.Thomas, S. Th.I q.52 I c). So in the Bhagavadgita IX,4, the Supreme, incorporated by His Word in Krishna, declares: "All beings are in Me, but I am not in them."

This notion of the transcendental character of the Absolute, which is beyond even being, and hence the avowal of the powerlessness of merely human intelligence to reach it, are common to all forms of Tradition, though, in the theology of the Catholic Church, the distinction between the Absolute and God the Creator is not always adequately made (whereas, in the Jewish tradition, to the Absolute corresponds "El Elion" i.e. the All -Highest (Jahve), and to God the Creator corresponds "Shaddai" i.e. the All-Powerful (Elohim), a distinction which appears, in corrupt form, in Gnosticism, as between the "Abyss" and the "Demiurgos").

"God is not a being," comments Father Sertillange, on the strength of St. Thomas (De Potentia,)...He is the Source of being...in the proposition "God is," the verb "to be" does not signify real being, being considered as an attribute; it is only the logical link in a true proposition, and is used in a sense which would be equally correct in the case of something without real being, as when one says: Blindness is."

"The Principle," says St. John Damascene ("On the orthodox Faith"), "it is impossible to say what He is in Himself, and it is more exact to speak of Him by the rejection of all terms. He is, indeed, nothing that is. Not that He is not in any way, but because He is above all that is, and above being itself."

"We do not cognize It," declares the Kenopa-

nishad, "and that is why we cannot teach Its nature. It is superior to all that is known, and it is even above that which is not known."

"God," affirms St. Denys the Aeropagite in the Mystical Theology,"can neither be named nor understood...He is neither one, nor unity, nor divinity, nor goodness...He is not spirit, as we understand spirit...He is nothing of that which is not, nothing even of that which is."

"Those terms: Father, God, Creator, Lord.. are not divine names," says St. Justin; "they are appellations derived from bounties and works."

"It is by His works that we say we know God," similarly writes St. Basil, "but we do not pretend to reach His Essence....To know that we cannot know Him, such is the knowledge we have of Him."

"When we advance towards God by the way of exclusion," explains St. Thomas "we first deny Him corporeal things, then intellectual things themselves in the form they take in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom. Then nothing remains in our mind but this: He is, and nothing more. But, in the end, that same being, in the form in which it is found in created things, we again deny Him, and then He remains in a sort of night of ignorance, and that ignorance it is which unites us to God in the most perfect way, so far as belongs to this life." (It is to be noted that Catholic theologians deny the possibility of 'jivan-mukta.')

The Sama-Veda echoes St. Thomas: "Not to have complete ignorance of Him is not to know Him."

And so Tchoang-tseu: "Not to know It, is to know It; to know It (in so far as Its external manifestations) is not to know It."

"Never be satisfied with what you know of God," counsels St. John of the Cross: "cling

rather to what you do not know of Him...For, the less you understand Him distinctly, the nearer you are to Him."

"We speak of God," exclaims Augustine "what wonder that you do not understand! If you understand, it is not God."

And similarly pronounces the Kenopanisad: "by him who thinks that Brahma is not understood, Brahma is understood; but he who thinks that Brahma is understood, knows it not."

From this transcendence of the Absolute follows that, strictly speaking, one cannot apply to It any affirmative attribute whatsoever: "Those", declares St. Denis, "who are raised to a higher degree of Knowledge...speak of God solely by negations; and this is eminently suitable: for...they were supernaturally illumined by that truth, that God is the cause of all that is, but is nothing of that which is." In like manner, in the Vedic doctrine, to the supreme Brahma are applied negative terms, and It is declared without origin, indivisible, immutable, eternal, alone (and hence "spread everywhere and in all things," but "affirmed in the Vedanta as absolutely distinct from what It penetrates" says Sankaracharya in the Atma-Bodha, for "Brahma does not resemble the World," which, though a reflection of Itself in Itself, represents it only as distantly as the finite is separated from the infinite). To those terms of the Veda correspond the "negative attributes" of Catholic theology: aseity, simplicity, immutability, eternity, unicity, immensity, which are nothing other than the negation of cause, composition, change, succession, multiplicity and location. Let us make a rapid survey of those negative attributes (to which we must add infinity, or the negation of limitation,) in the order in which they are usually expounded, taking note previously that those attributes are considered as non-distinct from the essence of God.

Aseity is, in affirmative form, the negation of cause, for the assertion "God is through Himself" (A se), implying that God derives His being from himself, cannot, in all strictness, be applied to the Absolute, which is beyond being. The most that can be said is that, God being by definition that First Cause the necessity of which has been proved didactically by Aristotle and St. Thomas, along the "Five Paths," He cannot be caused by anything else.

Infinity is a strictly negative attribute, being the absence of limitation. All limitation implies a limiting cause; but the First cause being by very definition beyond all cause, It is hence beyond all limitation.

Simplicity is, though apparently affirmative, in reality a negation: that of all composition. Every compound is limited by the number of its components, number which cannot be infinite, and besides, implies a cause uniting those components; but God is without limit and without cause, hence cannot be compound. There cannot even be in God a metaphysical composition, that, otherwise, of essence and existence,[1] and consequently of potentiality and act, of substance and accidents; for the union of essence and existence demands an efficient cause, as also the passing from potentiality into act, of which the apparition of accidents is but a particular case. As a corollary, it follows that there cannot be, in God, really distinct attributes, attributes being nothing also than accidents, and distinct accidents would constitute as many partial acts; now, as we have seen, there can be in God neither accidents nor parts. Brahma is thus in very truth "nirguna."

Immutability is by its very form a negative term. God cannot be mutable, because all change implies a passing from potentiality

1. Footnote at bottom of page 533.

into act; now in God there is no potentiality, potentiality being a limitation; moreover, as we have already noted, the passing from potentiality into act implies an efficient cause, and God is beyond all cause.

Eternity is not, as many erroneously think, duration without limit, but, quite on the contrary, the absence of all duration as of all sequence; for the notion of duration is derived from that of time, itself derived from that of succession; but all succession is a change, and in God there is no change, as has been said.

Immensity is, in affirmative guise, the absence of location. To be in a place implies limitation: furthermore, a localized being is potentially able to pass from one place to another; but these implications are incompatible, as we have seen, with the nature of God. The affirmative point of view of immensity, implied in the dogma "God is everywhere" is justified only in relation to created beings: every place is the result of the presence of a being created by God, and every thing, even though it be, as regards its attributes, the effect of secondary causes, holds its being immediately from God; and there where God gives being, there is he by His power,[2] which is not different from Himself: He is then in all things and therefore in all places.

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1. The scholastic philosophers employ the term 'existence' to denote the principle which immediately produces existence, much as Prakriti in Sankhya, 'essence' then corresponding to Purusha.
2. This is the sense in which should be understood the proposition, oft occuring with the scholastics: "God is in all things;" c.f. Brih. Up. III, 7. 15.

"Before the world was," says St. Bonadventure, "God was where He is now. Do not ask me now where he was; outside Him, nothing was: He was therefore in Himself."

"Ask me not if the Principle be in this or in that," says Tchoang-tseu, "It is in all beings....as end of the norm...Let us take ourselves in spirit, beyond this world of dimensions and localisations, and there will then be no occasion to wish to situate the Principle."

Unicity is, strictly speaking, the quality of being unique; and, in that affirmative form could not rigorously be attributed to the Absolute; for to be declared unique implies comparison, and the absolute can be compared to nothing, since there is nothing outside it. But that expression can be considered as equivalent to negation of multiplicity. There could not be two First Causes, because the First Cause is infinite, and there cannot be two infinites; as if there were two infinites, one of them would be distinguishable from the other, and all distinction implies limitation, which is contradictory to infinity.

DR. JAMES A. MCWILLIAMS, "BEING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS."© 1 Some sort of plurality lies at the very beginning of our knowledge. While I do not mean (as some take Hegel to mean) that we can have a positive concept of absolute nothingness, I do mean that in every experienced contrast one awareness is either contrasted against the total absence of awareness, or at least something which another awareness is not. Failure to recognize this led to the Eleatic impasse. Those thinkers maintained that we indeed know be-being, but they did not attend to the fact

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that being is known in contrast with non-being. Hence they asserted that being is one and undifferentiated, and denied the reality of the phenomenal world because it presents differences and contrasts. Another mistake of theirs, common also in our day, was to identify being with reality, and non-being with appearance; whereas both reality and appearance are being. The contrasts might be diagrammed correctly thus:

(being (reality
((
(non-being (appearance

The insuperable difficulty of the Eleatics and other monists is that appearance (the phenomenal world), however deceptive it may be, is being. We experience diversity, and the very experience is diversity of being. The term "being" should therefore embrace both reality and appearance.

2. Once however the distinction between self and non-self comes into awareness, we begin to regard knowledge in the subject-object relation. Thereafter further refinement of that relation can go on apace. Thus the seeing eye can be distinguished from the seen foot; one hand can be regarded as the feeling subject while the other is the object felt. But since all these perceptions are still united in consciousness, the ultimate subject retreats back as it were from the several bodily members to view them all as its objects, or rather it transcends them as something not confined exclusively to any particular member.

Only after the distinction between the ego and the non-ego has come into awareness can the question of reality and appearance arise. But, given a subject and object, then the dis-

tinction between reality and appearance concerns the status of the object. About the object we can raise two important questions: 1. Does the object exist when I am not aware of it? and (2) Is it conscious? Many experiences suggest the first question. An object which a child sees and holds has existence as truly as its own body; but if the object slips away it immediately ceases for the sense of touch, and though still held in sight, finally vanishes for that sense too. On its return it is in contact with the body. Another experience is that of force. Force is a primitive experience unlike any other kind and must be experienced to be known. A toy balloon responds to my efforts, a chair less so, a door-post not at all. Some invisible objects have considerable force, as the wind, or an object encountered in the dark; some visible objects have no force, as a beam of light. Such experiences as these, antecedent to all metaphysical subtilties, raise the question about the existence or non-existence of the objects of our awareness. Reality comes to mean a being which exists without our perceiving it; and appearance a sensation without an external object.

Many other experiences suggest the same distinction. An image in the mirror has no existence to the sense of touch. The hand held for a time in cold water can still feel the cold after the hand is withdrawn. Visual afterimages may be made to roam about where the other senses tell us there is no such object, and can best be perceived in the dark. Then there are revived sensations; sights, sounds, feels, tastes, odors can be recalled and made to co-exist with the very objects which actually here and now affect and senses. In the case of the child no small joy is produced by

freely conjuring up these past sensations and super-imposing them over the present unfree sensations. A sofa becomes an airplane, a rug is a lone raft in a limitless sea. But the child knows which set of sensations has en external objects, which has not. In the same way it may soon learn that its dream states can no more have real objects than its freely induced make-believe states have. Otherwise it could never, even in adult life, know which was which, nor so much as suspect a difference between them. All this is only saying that a child has not the degree of naive realism that is often ascribed to it and though it lacks the sophistication of later years is by no means a stranger to the questions so solemnly discussed by its elders. My point, however, is that we may be able to learn much from a consideration of how the materials with which we philosophise have been accumulated.

Let us now take up the second question: is the object conscious? Having learned that some objects may have no external existence, we can go on to regard even those that are here and now bombarding our senses as suspect. We can do this even with our bodily members. We then ask ourselves whether the only that that really exists is awareness. We can consider even the awareness of an awareness, and so on. But in this retreat from the object to the subject there is always a residue of awareness that we can't blot out. We can persist in this perversity to the point of wondering whether anything but awareness is possible, and on that ground we may feel inclined to refuse existence to any object that is not conscious. This, too, is a very early conceit. The child beating the ground after a fall, as Newman somewhere remarks, is under the impression that everything is conscious. But just as by a simple process of

reasoning we distinguish our own body from the rest of the world, and discover which objects are make-believe, so can we also discover which have consciousness. When we have reached this point in our mental development, we become aware of a marked distinction between two types of experience, the sentient and the rational. This last distinction I take to be essentially irreducibile, and such as to set the soul of man apart from that of all other animals. Experimental psychologists are no strangers to this difference, and either battle against it or admit it[1]. My point here is that if for one cause or another I choose to ignore that distinction, I have no way of determining which objects of my experience are real, which apparent; and I have become a phenomenalist or an idealist or a monistic realist.

It seems to me that it is just because we are human beings that we can play these tricks on ourselves. If our experiences were all sensitive as with the brute animals, or all intellectual as with the angels, we could not originate various broods of philosophies. But because we can play fast and loose with our two kinds of cognitive experiences we become perplexed by our own game. Continued satisfaction can be had only by recognizing all the factors of awareness, and giving each such a place as will not exclude the others. I must not ignore knowledge in order to assert knowledge. With that proviso, I shall in the remainder of this paper merely indicate another distinction which, at least to the reason of maturer years, naturally and easily arises from the data of first-hand experience.

Beings as we experience them are not only multiple, they are fleeting. They came into existence and pass out of existence, and in

1. Footnote at bottom of page 539

both their coming in and going out their being stands stark against their non-being. But such change is unintelligible unless there be an unchangeable Being back of it all. Change and plurality betray a finiteness which calls for a Being containing the beingness of them all without their limitations. From this it also follows that the many cannot be parts of the One; he cannot be their sum; nor can the One acquire anything by the continual coming into existence of the others. The first-hand objects of our knowledge, because they are many, cannot themselves be the ultimate Being. He must be distinct from them. But no less is it true that they lead us to that ultimate Being so all-embracing that they add nothing to him, for he already was all they are and far more. As from a roaring sea we pass into a quiet harbour, so from the tumult of creatures we pass at last to the knowledge of God. Yet by the very fact that knowledge of the world led us to the knowledge of God, we cannot reject either knowledge without rendering the other meaningless and invalid. The only way out is to admit no existence of the changing and the many except as entirely dependent on the One and unchanging. The world, including myself, displays an inherent lack of necessity to exist. The fact of its existence, in contrast to its non-existence, is therefore conditioned on the will of another. The unreality

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I. One of those who admit the distinction is C. Lloyd Morgan. Cf., for example, Mind Oct.1931, Vol.XL. (New Series) p. 409, ff., especially parts 4 & 7. This eminent psychologist even goes so far as to deny the principle, "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu." But he could have spared himself that denial had he attended to the usual acceptation of the principle, namely that "There is nothing in the intellect which was not in sense", although in a totally different manner.

of the world is no more, nor less, than its pretence to be self-existent; because only on the supposition of its self-existence am I forced to the conclusion that it is contradictory and unreal. If knowledge is to be saved at all the world must be taken as real but not self-existent; not absolute, but essentially related; and hence brought into existence by another.

From an altogether different angle the same goal is reached. Man experiences in his moral life that the supposition of his total independence is incompatible with morality. On the same supposition religion likewise vanishes. man's need for religion, which is the same as his need for God, is evidence of his dependence, his creaturehood. Just as to argue the world out of existence is to renounce knowledge, so to identify the soul with God is to renounce morality and religion. The soul knows that there is a super-reality, and that all other realities are dependent on him and lead to him. The reasoning process required for this is so simple that we are sometimes deceived into thinking we did not reason it out at all. Men may differ about the nature of that Being, but no man is long without the thought that there must be such a Being. Yet it is likewise a matter of experience that after man has come to this conviction he can still have the desire to be supreme himself. If, in rebellion against that knowledge, he follows that desire, he becomes irreligious. If, relinquishing the desire, he follows his knowledge, he discovers that, as his knowledge, so also his will finds its completion in God. His will then becomes not an enemy to his knowledge but its ally.

3. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA: "EXISTENCE & VALUE."

The Ego found it impossible to recognize this neat dichotomy of existence into subject

and object. The concrete fulness of spiritual life could not be divided by a hatchet into a subjective half and an objective half, each known in its entirety without reference to the other. The object got implicated in the subject and the subject failed to realize its punctual character as the focus imaginarius, divested of all objective reference. But intellectualistic metaphysics, which, in spite of Hegel's stricture upon Understanding, continued to swear by the cognitive relation, could not proceed beyond the problems as to whether the object or the subject was the basic principle of existence and how the one gave rise to the other, as also how the two entered into cognitive relation. The Cartesian dualism survived, though vanquished, both in realism and in idealism, and it is only now that philosophers are waking to the situation that possibly reality is psycho-physical throughout and so the interrelation of mind and matter is possibly a pseudo-problem in view of the fact that the two together make up a single reality. But so long as mind and matter retain their distinctiveness in thought and being, speculation is bound to be dominated by some kind of correspondence theory. Even when a disbelief in the possibility of knowing extramental reality in its true nature slowly crept in, the existence of this reality remained unchallenged, and to the conflict of realism and idealism was added the controversy between presentationism and representationism, ontological being and phenomenal appearance. Idealism itself was constrained to admit that human knowledge was not a self-contained whole: neither Berkeley nor Leibnitz could advocate individualism without reserve and each had to provide himself with a way of escape from the uncomfortable consequences of a solipsistic philosophy through the me-

dium of God.

The solution offered to the impasse of thought in extreme individualism by Berkeley and Leibnitz has furnished a pattern to all subsequent idealistic thought; and whether divine activity or divine thought was regarded as the ground of the uniformity of finite experience, the mind of the Absolute replaced the objectively real by supplying the basis of universal validity and thus fulfilled the same function as the extramental matter of realism did. As a matter of fact, the analogy was so great that even the distinction between reality and appearance, with which we are familiar in Realism, turned up in Idealism also. Some of the idealists, like the Cairds and Green, thought that there was no essential distinction in kind between finite and infinite modes of thought, and followed in this not only the tradition of the main line of post-Kantian speculation but also the Kantian suggestion about the consciousness in general. There might be some difference of opinion as to whether God's life of thought was eternal or temporal, but there was no doubt in the minds of these thinkers that whether human knowledge could grow in time and get a fuller and fuller revelation of divine thoughts or whether it could grasp those thoughts in a single act of intuition sub specie aeternitatis, it was a copy or replica of the thoughts and relations of the divine mind and that possibly, even corresponding to the externality of space in finite minds, there was something in the relation of the Divine thinker to His thoughts. The divine mind might supplement human thoughts and link together fragmentary human experiences into an organic whole, but not in such a way as to supersede them or to alter their

their character altogether. Conversely, it is possible for the human mind to annul its finitude and to arrange its thoughts after the pattern of the Infinite. A quotation from John Caird will suffice to illustrate this point: "As a thinking being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every moment of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine, every desire that belongs to me as this particular self, and to become the pure medium of a thought or intelligence that is universal--in one word, to live no more my own life, but let my consciousness become possessed and suffused by the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit." It is the same categories that operate in thought and being, and man, by virtue of his rational faculty, can enter upon his spiritual heritage by removing the contradictions which all lower forms of knowledge involve.

As against this ideal realism we have, on the other hand, a kind of ideal idealism where the finite thoughts are viewed as refracting divine thoughts in such a way as to suggest that what is in the mind of God is fundamentally distinct from what is in finite minds and that the fragmentary and temporal experiences of finites must be radically transmuted before they can be harmonized into the eternal spiritual life of God. We need not refer in this connection to those idealistic theories which consider the Absolute to be impersonal in character and therefore totally different from finite minds; but even when the spirituality of God is not denied, its character may be conceived to be so far removed from finite spirituality that there can be no comparison or correspondence between the two. Bradley is the great exponent of this line of thinking, and in his system we hear very little of that self-revelation and self-communication

of God which meets us in the pages of the Cairds and Green. No one can, of course, pretend to prove exactly what God's thoughts are; but if a theory deliberately follows the via negativa in reaching out to God and distinguishes human thoughts from divine in a radical fashion, it is debarred thereby from instituting any comparison between them. To hold that finite thoughts are somehow preserved in the Absolute and to believe at the same time that human knowledge is riddled with contradictions in such a way that reality cannot own it without radically altering its character can lead to only one conclusion, namely, that the correspondence between finite and infinite thought is negligible, possibly nonexistent, and that from the imperfect thoughts of man no direct access to divine mind is possible. Mysticism, if not agnosticism, is the inevitable result of such speculations--only that the mystic vision here vouchsafed may not amount to any revelation at all.

4. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, in spite of the strictures of Berkeley and the doctrine of Relativity, has not vanished either from philosophy or from popular thought. As distinguished from the realistic position, Idealism has been faced with greater difficulty regarding primary qualities than regarding secondary ones, and has tended on the whole to think that while it is conceivable that something akin to the apprehension of secondary qualities exists in the mind of God, the primary qualities are represented in His mind in the shape of relations towards and among His thoughts which by refraction assume the form of spatiality in finite minds. Thus the extreme otherness or opposition which the Absooute Spirit evolves and experiences in its own mental life is the

basis of the sense of materiality in us.

5. Hume advocated the view that the Lockean supposition of an unknown and unknowable substratum was a mistake and that a substance has no being apart from the being of the qualities that assemble together and persist through time in a more or less unchanging fashion.

6. The Upanishads and Vedanta make Truth (satya or jnana) and Bliss (ananda) and Consciousness (caitanya) the essence of Brahma and not its attributes. This would make the values not the attributes but the essence of God or reality, as the Upanishads and Vedanta make them to be.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not say that aspects of reality do not possess values of different kinds, attributively ascribed to them by the apprehending mind in a tacit or overt manner. Had that been so, the experience of value would have disappeared entirely. What we do say is that such ascription is legitimate in the case of the parts but illegitimate in the case of the whole: it is one more case of the fallacy of composition--in fact, a fallacy of both non-observation and mal-observation in addition. Just as it is true that a whole may possess a value which is not possessed by the parts separately, so also it is true that the parts may possess a value which is not reflected in the whole. In the ordinary idealistic theory of value there is a curious intermingling of the two ideas of causality and possession, i.e. it is alternatively supposed that the presence of values in the parts proves that the whole makes their existence possible, either because the parts participate in the values which it possesses as its own attributes. We have already said that about a progressing world no finality of judgment is possible. All idealists who have done so have tacitly believed that perfection has been eternally present in the world and that

the temporal process is more or less illusory. But by so doing they have thrown insurmountable difficulties in the way of relating eternity to time and evil to goodness in the realms of thought, feeling and action.

6. "REVIEW OF 'LIFE OF RAMAKRISHNA'" Reviewer K.V.G.) In chapter IV is described in a rightly sceptical spirit Ramakrishna's absolute identity with Brahman or the Nirvikalpa-Samadhi that he enjoyed continuously for six months. We may think such a phenomenon almost miraculous and not truly mystical. The one essential sign of all mystic stages is the presence of self-consciousness. While this condition of Ramakrishna, when he was not conscious, and had to be fed per force by his nephew, seems to be more abnormal than spiritual. One cannot but express a similar doubt as regards the psychological truth of the experience of the identity of all the religions as attained by Svami Ramakrishna. One can easily understand how a great Saint that had attained the highest spiritual experience may find his experiences confirmed by similar or identical experiences in the case of other saints or founders of other religions. But it is psychologically impossible for one that has once attained the Highest, to come down and re-live the life of different founders of religion and pass through all the stages of spiritual life, that they had undergone. Such accounts cannot but be regarded as mythological. Similarly, Svami Ramakrishna might have had visions of the different prophets, such as Mahomet, Christ, and Buddha; but the phenomenon, of these persons in his vision entering his heart and disappearing there, cannot but be interpreted as metaphorical. The identity and unity of all the religious experience can be realized without re-living the lives of the founders of other religions.

7. Ramakrishna's relation to his wife has been a subject of much controversy and adverse criticism. The marraige was of two souls, entirely spiritual, and having nothing carnal about it. Ramakrishna's readiness to abide by the wishes of his wife testifies to his magnanimity; but it may be remarked that married life is in no way incompatible with the mystical life. As for Vivekananda, Ramakrishna realized in him the vision that he had in the early stage of his spiritual life, wherein he had seen a great sage taking care of a child. The story of the conversion of this champion of Reason is fascinating, though miraculous. It is not argument but actual physical contact that makes Vivekananda lose all consciousness of himself and of the world about him, and is thus convinced of the truth of spiritual life. On three critical occasions in his life we are told how all his doubts about the reality of spiritual life were removed by such an intimate contact with the Master, whose touch made Vivekananda feel a kind of electric shock and lose all his consciousness in an ecstatic trance. His experience of absolute identity with Mother Kali with Brahman and of himself with Brahman was attained in a similar fashion. This method of convincing a religious aspirant of the truth of spiritual life strikes us as very strange, and cannot be easily accepted even by the most religious-minded. We refuse to believe that Mysticism has anything to do with mesmerism or hypnotism. Ecstasy of the mystic is entirely different from the hypnotic trance: the one is a supremely inward self-conscious state, attained by one's own strenuous efforts; while the other is something like a stupor, or temporary benumbing of consciousness, superimposed on the subject by an external agency. To compare a mystic in an ecstatic condition to a reservoir of electric power,

giving a shock to all persons that touch him, is to entirely misunderstand the real nature of mystical experience which cannot be transmitted in a series of electric shocks. We may doubt whether the transmission of the highest spiritual experience without personal efforts on the part of the aspirant, is at all a psychological possibility. We cannot for a moment deny the supreme spiritual greatness of Ramakrishna. We have only to submit that the account about the Nirvikalpa Samadhi of Ramakrishna, given by his biographers, is a serious misinterpretation of the phenomenon. Such a transmission of spiritual experience was forbidden to Vivekananda even by Ramakrishna himself, as the latter regarded it a dangerous pleasure for even a mystic of Vevekananda's calibre. Ramakrishna insisted upon a synthesis of contemplative and active life, and urged Vivekananda to realize this perfect aim of human life. He rightly insisted upon the realization of God in the service of man.

8. If God can be realized, even according to Vivekananda, only through the service of man, and if politics is one, and perhaps the most effective, way of ameliorating the miserable condition of one's people, it passes one's understanding why some mystics should be afraid of politics. This their dread of politics can be explained only by supposing that the passion of nationalism they regard as narrow and limited. But if after realizing the highest ideal, one can engage himself in all kinds of social reforms, one cannot understand why there should be such a scrupulous avoidance or even abhorrence for politics. That politics and mysticism are not antagonistic is proved by the lives and preachings of many Indian and European mystics.

9. N.G. DAMLE: "REVIEW OF 'SCEPTICISM AND CONSTRUCTION.'" No serious student of philosophy in these days can afford to ignore Bradley's

criticism of pluralism and realism, pragmatism and theism. But Bradley's claim to a place of honour among philosophers is based not only on his work as an acute and fearless critic but also on his work as a profound and constructive thinker. The negative and sceptical aspect of his philosophy is sometimes unduly emphasized and the positive and constructive aspect ignored, as being insignificant and even inconsistent. But we hold that for a proper understanding and appreciation of Bradley's comprehensive philosophy, both the aspects must be considered together. No aspect taken in isolation can give us the true picture of Bradley's philosophy as a whole. Bradley's positive contribution to philosophy is of great value and it is suggestive of the lines along which its underlying principles can be worked out. It is consistent with the best traditions of Idealistic thought and is inclined towards mysticism. It is incorrect to speak of the "Sceptical Principle" of Bradley, or to suppose that he is an advocate of Scepticism as an ultimate metaphysical theory. Such an incorrect view, we fear, is taken by the author of the book under review. It is no wonder that Bradley should be looked upon by some as a great sceptic if we remember how even Sankara was regarded by some as "A Buddha in disguise;" or Spinoza as 'an impious atheist!'

10. The third chapter entitled "The Noumenal and Phenomenal Truth" is meant to be taken as an attempt to bridge the gulf between Scepticism and Construction. Noumenal Truth, Truth in its ideal or ultimate form, being beyond finite intellect, <u>constructive philosophy</u> has to concern itself with 'phenomenal truth,' only; "and its highest achievement lies in the articulation of 'final phenomenal truths.'" These final truths are 'intellectually incor-

rigible,' though not 'intellectually satisfying.' As distinguished from provisional truths they are insusceptible of revision or modification under the conditions of finite experience. It may be remarked that, as Bradley says, Reality lives in appearances, Ultimate Truth also lives in phenomenal truths; any separation of the one from the other is, for Bradley, the result of abstraction, which howsoever convenient in practice, is, in theory, indefensible. Bradley may admit duality but dualism never.

11. Mr. Campbell has no patience with scientific or philosophical determinism which ridicules freedom of 'open possibilitis.' He entirely disagrees with Spinoza, for whom the conception of freedom 'provokes either laughter or disgust,' with Bradley and Bosanquet, who do not give him any genuine kind of freedom. Freedom, which is necessarily implied in all moral responsibility, praise and blame, is not to be confused with 'freedom of enlightenment.' The author holds that the idealist is right in urging that the freedom which is one with self-expansion and self-realization is antithetic not to 'submission to law' but to arbitrariness and caprice. He does not take the 'principle of indeterminancy' recently introduced in science, in support of his theory of freedom, which may be called libertarianism or indeterminism. The author's firm conviction is that the self and its freedom are at least our ultimate realities, possessing final phenomenal truth.

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1. GASTON DE MENGEL@: "KNOWLEDGE & IMMORTALITY"

Sensation is the most fundamental fact of our mental life: what we see, what we touch, what we hear, conspire to give us the expe-

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@ In Review of Philos. & Religion. Vol.4.1933.

rience of what we learn to distinguish as the "not-I"; they constitute the elements of our thought concerning it, determine our behaviour towards it, with its moods of pleasure and pain, and provoke our actions concerning it. Our entire experience of the sensible world, complex though it be, can by analysis be reduced to groups of classifiable sensations. What then is the nature of sensation?

Since we admit, on the evidence of its results, that the methods of discursive knowledge possess (with limits to be defined) a real value, which is currently accepted by modern scientists, let us call upon one of these, who has with much acumen defined the precise nature of our starting point in the exploration of sensation. "If one closely examines the question," says Alfred Binet, (Soul and Body: II, chap.2. pp.65-66,French Edition), "one finds that sensation, understood as an object of knowledge, is confounded with the properties of physical nature, identifying itself with them both by its mode of apparition and its content. By its mode of apparition, sensation is posited as independent of ourselves, for it is at each moment an unexpected revelation, a source of new knowledge, and presents a development enacted without our will and in spite of it; its laws of co-existence and of succession mean for us the order and march of the material universe. Besides, by its content, sensation confounds itself with matter. When a philosopher strives to picture to himself the properties of a material object--of a brain, for instance,--in order to oppose them to the properties of a psychical activity, what he describes as material in nought else than the properties of sensation....All that which we know as

material is not known in or by sensation, but constitutes sensation itself...Sensation is so little distinct from it that one is in error if one considers it as a means, a process, an instrument for the knowledge of matter...it is not by the help of sensation that we know colour, colour is a sensation; and the same remark applies to form, extension, resistance, and the whole series of the properties of matter; those are no more than our sensations vested in the guise of external bodies. It is quite legitimate, therefore, to consider a part of sensation--the object part, as physical in nature."

But if the properties of sensation are identified with those of physical nature, we must, before going further in this direction, admit nothing outside it, the mechanicians have endeavoured to find that explanation in the movements of matter. Alfred Binet has set at nought their pretensions: "Despite the prudence of some, and the equivocal ground on which others have been pleased to stand," he observes, "they have framed descriptions in the absolute, and not in the relative. To take their conceptions literally, they have thought that the movements of matter are something existing outside our eye, our hand, our senses, in other words, <u>something noumenal</u>,as Kant would say. In proof that such is indeed their idea, movement is presented to us as being the true external and explaining cause of our sensations, the exterior excitant of our nerves....What kind of reality do then physicists attribute to the displacements of matter?....A brief consideration suffices to show of what is made that mechanical model presented to us as constituting the essence of matter; it is of perceiving or imagining ought else....

Movement is a fact seen by the eye, felt by the hand; it enters our conception by our perception of solid macroscopical masses existing in the field of our observation, of their movements and of their equilibrium, and of the displacements which our body effectuates; such is the sensorial origin, very humble and very gross, of the entire atomistic mechanics; such is the stuff of our high conception. Our mind may indeed, by a purifying process, strip movement of most of its concrete qualities, and even separate it from the perception of the moving object, reducing it to, I know not what, mere idea or scheme; it is none the less a residue of sensations, visual, tactile and muscular; consequently it is still only a subjective state, tied to the structure of our organs.... Much effort is needed to drive from our mind those familiar conceptions, which are, as one sees, nothing but naive realism." To quote Binet again: "it is impossible for us to conceive matter in terms of motion, and to explain the properties of bodies by modalities of motion; for that theory is tantamount to giving to certain sensations, particularly those of the muscular sense, a hegemony over other sensations; one cannot explain, one has no right to explain, one sensation by another."

Our sensations being then nothing but physical properties, or, at the most, reflexions of those properties, it follows that sound logic forbids us to elaborate a theory of matter and its properties in terms which are none other in reality but those of our sensations; and it would seem then, according to certain schools of philosophy, that we can proceed no further, for, further is the unthinkable and the unknowable. Some there be even who, driving agnosticism to the point of negation, deny us the right to postulate anything exterior to

sensation; according to them, there is nothing but sensation (to which they assimilate ideas themselves), and the entire universe, comprising themselves and their fellows, in but a vast dream, a complex play of sensations which are but modalities of their one and aseitic consciousness. This is a theory which is the quite legitimate outcome of an unbending subjective idealism, and the arguments put forth by its partisans are not easy to refute; science may well analyze the structure of the external world and discover its elements; are not those elements described in terms of our sensations? What proof that they be anything else? And the exactitude of certain scientific predictions may be nothing more than the logical agreement of the elements of our thought. In spite of the complication it involves, might not integral subjectivism be the true doctrine?; for how can we prove otherwise, if nothing exists outside consciousness?

2. All the more is he delivered from the fetters of individuality, that apanage of the inferior states; his "self" has vanished, has been reabsorbed within his "self," his root-being, distinct from others only in relation to the Manifestation, which he has surpassed. He is in the Divine Word, <u>one</u> with all the delivered who have identified themselves with their root-beings (let us remember the promise of Christ; "Ye shall all be one in me"). He has become immortal, for such is the only true immortality.

What is too often called by that name is but the survival of the individual forma. To aspire to such a survival is a symptom of ignorance or intellectual inferiority; for the "entelechy" of the intellect, as Aristotle would say, is the knowledge of the divine, impossible outside Samadhi, which exacts the

stripping off of individuality. One sees the abyss dividing the oriental Yoga from occidental mysticism which, apart from a few exceptions it would be rash to specify, does not go beyond the realisation of the higher individual states: the very fact that sentiment plays so large a part in it is an indication of this, for sentiment is purely material. The declaration of St. Thomas that: "Every intelligent being desires its perpetuation, not only according to the species, but also according to the individual," is, coming whence it does, such as to cause stupefaction to an oriental intellect. And what must we think of these words of the Abbe Moreux, too typical, alas, of the occidental mind: "And when the instinctive faith of the human race (!), in accord with sane philosophy (!!), demands for our soul the prerogatives of immortality, note well that it is not a question only of knowing whether the metaphysical principle of our being will subsist; what we want, what we ardently wish, what is needed to quench our thirst for immortality, is the persistence of our person, of the self which has thought, acted and suffered here below, of the self which has loved, which has willed, which has fought against its passion, which has merited and perfected its moral life.--Let us go within ourselves, let us analyse our most intimate sentiments, that is what we wish, that and nothing else." Pace the Abbe Moreux, we find exactly the contrary, in common with a quite respectable number of easterners.

3. W.S. BARLINGAY: "THE STATUS OF SECONDARY QUALITIES." Bodily pains are dependent upon relationship to mind. Take a toothache for instance. It is difficult to conceive the toothache as being still there when he who is said to 'have' it is unconscious. It may, no doubt, be argued that consciousness is a necessary con-

dition for the apprehension of the toothache and not for its existence. Nevertheless, such an argument does not carry conviction. I do not mean, of course that the bodily event, which is, so to speak, a component of the toothache, and which we localize vaguely in the locality of the tooth ceases to exist when not perceived. What I mean is that this bodily event alone will not be the toothache. For it is of the essence of a toothache that it is a kind of pain. Eliminate the pain and what remains is not a toothache but a bodily event. It seems to me, then, probable that a toothache or any other kind of bodily pain has no being except as perceived.

4. It is found that in dreams and hallucinations one may apprehend sensible qualities although the sense-organs which in waking life are necessary for their apprehension are inactive, and there is no real object actually present before the mind. Thus, for instance, one may dream of a beautiful sunset, although one's eyes are closed and there is no real sunset before the mind. Conversely, there may actually be a real object before the mind, the organ requisite for apprehending its sensible qualities may be fully active, yet on account of some abnormal mental condition there may be no apprehension of the qualities of the object. In certain ecstatic conditions, for example an individual's eyes may be open and nevertheless there may be no apprehension of the objects which normally would attract his attention. And from such facts it is concluded that there is no real connexion between existent objects and what we call their qualities, that the one may quite well exist without the other.

The first thing I should like to point out in this connexion is the "singular inconsistency in the position of a man who (like

Bradley holds that the fact that without eyes we cannot perceive colours proves that colours are only appearances, and also holds that the fact that we dream about colours proves the same conclusion. When we dream about colours the objects of our dream perceptions are as coloured as those of waking life; the only difference is that we perceive them with our eyes shut. It is therefore an undue attempt to make the best of both worlds which proves that colours are mere appearances both because we can and because we cannot perceive them without using our eyes."

5. W.S. ROWLANDS: "AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICS:"

Logic has traditionally insisted on certain canons of proof which oblige us to withhold our assent from any but the most irrefragable conclusions: but Logic has not condescended to supply us with premisses which can claim to possess the infallibility which is expected of as right from the "truths" inferred by a correct process of argumentation. And yet Locke tells us that it is unphilosophic to expect our conclusions to be more certain than are the basic propositions on which they rest; for, if our reason does not start from certitudes it cannot end with certitudes. Granting for the moment that the mind can and does work with perfect logical accuracy, that the process by which valid conclusions are drawn is infallible; still, whether we derive our premises from sense or from intuition or from previous induction or from what not, our premisses are never beyond challenge, never perhaps above suspicion. They certainly cannot be guaranteed by reason, however infallible: for, to prove them, reason would have to appeal to unproved premisses. Hence, even if Logic enables us to reach 'valid' conclusions it does not necessarily lead us to Truth.

6. Over against the actual world we have constructed a conceptual world--the ghost of the actual--an attenuated abstract painfully distilled by thought from the rich and varied vineyard of our actual experience. It must be admitted that the conceptual frame-work set up by reason has immense value as an instrument for controlling the world in which we live, and that it impinges indirectly upon our experience: but it cannot be set up as the be-all and the end-all of the universe: it does not exist of itself or for itself, it has no real substance, but rests on a definitely subordinate footing. Relatively, the conceptual is unimportant; it is a means to an end, not an end in itself; in the last resort it is a sort of glorified calculus.

7. It is difficult to see how Logic can reach certain conclusions, since every premiss is infected with doubt. Even if an argument is a perfect syllogism, we still have no right to dogmatise; we cannot <u>be</u> certain however certain we may <u>feel</u>. Take any of the grand questions of philosophy--God, Freedom or Immortality--who can claim that final and indisputable solutions have been reached? Can any answer to these great problems pretend to general acceptance? Does any declaration about them command the belief of all men at all times and in all places?

8. It may indeed be admitted that, if we stay in a system of ideas, we reach necessary truths when our argument proceeds correctly; conclusions reached by valid forms of inference can triumphantly point to the very shape of their proof as an adequate guarantee that they <u>must</u> always be true. We may even go further: we may allow that the world of concepts has immense practical value in as much as it enables us to find our way through the labyrinth of experience

like the thread which guided Theseus to his heart's desire.

9. If we glance at the stars of the first magnitude which shine in the firmament of modern thought we pick out at random Locke, Hume, Kant, Spencer and Vaihinger, whose great intellect had one common feature--a sceptical and even an agnostic attitude, which refused to dogmatise about reality and questioned the very instrument by which man hoped to discover and prove the true nature of the Universe. They were all doubtful, and painfully alive to the limitations of human reason and to the consequent uncertainty of the conclusions which it fondly hoped to have established.

But the citadel of knowledge was gallantly defended against the onslaughts of Doubt. Rationalism rushed to the rescue, and giants like Descartes, Berkeley, and Hegel strode into the breach. The first of these champions, Descartes, was perhaps the most subtle; he pointed out that doubting implied the being of the doubter. He must <u>be</u> before he can be <u>doubting</u>. Hence the fact of doubting one's own existence proves that one exists. Doubt is thus enlisted to destroy itself; it is suicidal. When you doubt yourself you really establish yourself. I fear we cannot acquit Descartes of having squared his proof to his conclusion; "his methodological doubt was not conceived as a method of exploration but as a device for anchoring himself to an impregnable rock of uncertainty as speedily as possible."

10. <u>J.C.P. D'ANDRADE</u>: "<u>THE PROBLEM OF ERROR.</u>"

The problem of error has been considered one of the most difficult in metaphysics. In fact some thinkers seem to exult in regarding it as insoluble, because it furnishes them with one more reason for condemning the world as hopelessly irredeemable from the point of view of truth and reality. All that we know

is false, these thinkers hold, and reality is unknowable, or, if it is knowable at all, it has nothing to do with the world of appearance, which it wholly excludes. It is not my object in this article to discuss in detail the absurdity of holding that from appearance to reality there is no bridge and yet that we know that there is reality, or, what is worse still, that we can infer from appearance to reality but that the former is absolutely unreal while the latter alone is absolutely real. Error must be connected with truth, and appearance must be appearance of reality, and any philosophy that holds that there can be error unconnected with truth and therefore all false and that appearance can be absolute and yet unreal, is a philosophy that has not even understood the meaning of error and appearance and, so far, has failed.

Generally, a distinction between error and illusion is made. Error is said to be of jedgment and illusion of the senses, and the latter is supposed to offer an insurmountable difficulty which is not found in the case of the former. In illusion something is presented in sense which yet is not, while in error we only think something to be what it is not. When, for instance, I mistake a rope for a snake, I do not merely think that I see a snake, but I really see a snake, while, when I make the mistake of believing that two and two are five, I think that two and two are five and do not see or perceive, as objectively given, that two and two are five. But I think that this distinction is based on a double mistake. In the first place, in both cases, in error as well as in illusion, something is taken as objectively given which is not so given. Just as, when I see a snake in place of a rope, the mistake lies in not realizing that the snake is subjective, so also, when I take two

and two to make five, the error lies in not seeing that the relation is not objective. The difference between the two is merely that the so-called illusion is about a matter of sense and the so-called error is about a matter of thought. And the mistake of those who make error and illusion fundamentally different consists in believing that, while matters of sense are objective, matters of thought are subjective.

In the second place, in both error and illusion there is only a mistake of judgment. It is wrong to suppose that we can intuit what is not there to be intuited. There is no illusion, if illusion is distinguished from error. When a stick dipped in water appears bent, there is really no illusion. A stick dipped in water must appear bent. The bent look of the stick is an objective effect of objective conditions and is not unreal at all. It is only when we make a wrong inference from it that we go wrong. If, in expressing the phenomenon, we were to limit ourselves to the statement, "the stick looks bent," or "the stick is bent to the eye," there would be no error and no illusion. But as a rule we do not so limit ourselves, but say "the stick is bent" without qualification, and this means that the bent look of the stick is accompanied with its usual associates under normal conditions as well as that the stick is bent to the eye under all conditions. What we call an illusion in this case is dissociation of elements or aspects that are usually found associated, leading to an erroneous judgment. The senses are not at all deceived and so there is no illusion as distinguished from error. Similarly, when we see a snake where there is only a rope, there is nothing more than an error of interpretation based on association. We do not see anything that is not there. The sensuous element in our perception is real. It is the ideal complement

that is false. And so here also there is no illusion as distinguished from error.

There is one class of illusions, however, in which there seems to be not merely an erroneous interpretation but an actual deception of the sense. Such illusions are called hallucinations in psychology. When a man in delirum tremens sees rats, there are false sensations and not merely false ideal elements associated with real sensations. But even here, metaphysically, there is an error of judgment and not an illusion of the senses. For what is a false sensation? What the man in delirum tremens sees is as it should be and is therefore real. It is a real effect of real causes and not something that cannot be accounted for at all, not something that stands by itself and isolated from the context of reality. The error aris es when the man, because he sees rats, thinks that there are rats objectively. If he were to limit himself to saying "I see rats," his statement would be unexceptionable. Objectivity is not given in sense but in the work of judgment, and the man's mistake lies in objectifying his sensations, and therefore is an error of judgment. So we come to the conclusion that wherever there is what we call an illusion, there is really an error, and that therefore there is no separate problem of illusion as distinguished from the problem of error.

It will make our task considerably easy if, before entering upon the discussion of the status of error in reality, we clear the ground by making one important observation. It will help us to frame our issue precisely. There is no error unless there is truth. Error by itself, if we were absolutely confined within it, would be truth, or rather, perhaps, would be neither truth nor error, because it would be absolute. It is error only when it collides

with truth. If our life were only a dream, that dream would be our reality. It is because we wake up from our dreams and the dreams are found to collide with our waking life that we distinguish between dreams and waking experiences. And let it be observed that, strictly philosophically, we distinguish between dreams and waking experience and not between dreams and reality. For dreams also are real and reality must include them as well as our waking experience. Unless dreams and waking life were both included in a wider reality, they could not even collide, and so dreams would not be dreams. Thus error is error because it is included in a wider system of truth in which it is seen to collide with other elements possessing a higher degree of truth. If error were not so transcended and included in truth, there would be no problem of error. The very existence of the problem, therefore, implies that error cannot fall ourside reality, and the question for us is, not whether error can be reconciled with reality, but how it can be reconciled.

ll. How can there be error at all in reality? This is a question which has puzzled many thinkers and to a certain extent rightly. How can truth contain error within it without a contradiction and if there is a contradiction in truth how can it be truth? This seems to be a serious difficulty, and if it were insoluble there would be neither truth nor error. Nay, it is even impossible to conceive the hypothesis of its being insoluble. There is reality, and it is all-inclusive and there is no contradiction in it. This is an irrefragable postulate the opposite of which is inconceivable. Therefore error, which cannot be nothing, must have a place in reality without involving a contradiction in it. And this which is implied in

the very idea of reality and error can be shown to be true by a careful examination of the nature of error. Error is negative and exists as error only from a limited point of view. In the whole it exists, but is not an error. It is often overlooked that what is true of a part need not be true of the whole. We say that a part is insufficient, but it does not follow therefore that the whole of which it is a part must be insufficient too. What constitutes insufficiency in a part is its partiality, and it is precisely this partiality that is transcended and annulled in the whole, without, however, there being a positive loss of anything. And what is even more important is that there never is an error except when it is transcended and has ceased to be. If we limit ourselves absolutely to the mental phase in which a mistake is made, there is no error; and if we take the phase in which the mistake is recognized, there is no error either. When then we can say that there <u>is</u> an error. We can say there <u>was</u> an error when the error is transcended and is no longer present; and we can say there <u>is</u> an error when we consider another person's point of view from our point of view which transcends it. In either case the error is <u>outside</u> the experience that sees it. An experience can never contain an error in itself for itself. But an experience can contain in itself without contradiction what outside itself, in a more limited experience, is an error. Hence the whole cannot contain an error in itself, though it contains all errors that are found in experiences more limited than itself.

12. Error does not affect reality, and so to ask why there should be error in reality is to show a misunderstanding of the nature of reality. Reality is all, and nothing can be

conceived can fall out of it. The infinite cannot exclude anything. From this point of view it may be answered that reality could not be other than it is, because there is no 'other' conceivable. It might conceivably be less than it is, but then there would be a distinction between what it was and what it was not, and such a distinction is impossible unless we assume a higher genus beyond the terms distinguished--a reality beyond actual reality and possible reality. Reality then is all that is and beyond it there is nothing conceivable. And if there is such a thing as error possible, it must fall within reality, and if it falls within reality, it cannot introduce a contradiction into it, which is the same thing as saying that its place in reality cannot be impossible.

A.C. MUKERJI: "DEUSSEN'S ERRORS IN INTERPRETING OF VEDANTA."@ Some of the debatable points in Deussen's presentation of the vedanta thought have already provoked criticism. The following lines are intended to remove a few more misconceptions which his interpretation has helped to perpetuate, and some of which, though of a rather serious character, are still unchecked and unchallenged. As the result is that the modern students of the Vedanta thought, particularly of the advaita school, have so far failed to appreciate the value and vitality of that profound analysis of experience which is strongly suggested, if not always definitely formulated, by the advaita thinkers. A complete critical evaluation of Deussen's interpretation, therefore, is long over-due. The agnostic interpretation of the advaita position being fraught with very far-reaching consequences for its theory of knowledge, we need offer no apology for starting from this point.

@ in Allahabad University Studies, 1939.

The advaita Absolute, it is generally believed, is something unknowable and inconceivable and falls entirely beyond the ambit of ordinary experience; and so far it is supposed to be analogous to the "thing-in-itself" of Kant. This agnostic interpretation of Sankara was started by no less an authority than Paul Deussen who did so much for the spread and appreciation of the Advaita speculations, and whose works on the Upanishads and the Advaita Vedanta are justly regarded as pioneer works in the field of Indian philosophy. In showing the contrast of the standpoint of Ignorance, of Knowledge, and of superior Knowledge in relation to Brahman is an object of knowledge, and, as such, it must be seen, heard, comprehended, and reflected upon, yet very soon "it came to be realized that this knowledge of Brahman was essentially of a different nature from that which we call 'knowledge' in ordinary life." The conception of avidya, Deussen continues, was developed from the negative idea of mere ignorance to the positive idea of false knowledge, and this step "is the same which Permenides and Plato took when they affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception...which Kant took, when he showed that the entire reality of experience is only apparition and not reality ("thing-in-itself")". And the primitive source of the entire conception of the unknowableness of the Atman, it is further remarked, "is to be found in the speeches of Yajnavalkya in the Brihadaranyaka." These speeches imply that "the supreme atman is unknowable, because he is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge presupposes a duality of subject and object"; and secondly that "the individual atman also...is unknowable, because in all knowledge he is the knowing subject ("the knower"), con-

sequently can never be object." It is unnecessary to show in detail how Deussen has attempted to prove that the "unknowableness" of the self is a doctrine which, though in opposition to the general tendency of the Upanishads to seek after and to expound the knowledge of the atman, is more and more elaborated in them. The conception of the atman "is a negative and relative idea, which declares to us rather wherein the essence of man and of the universe is not to be sought, than affords us any positive information as to its real nature." And this, far from being a defect, is supposed to be its "philosophical value," because "the essence of things remains, as far as its nature is concerned, eternally unknown; and every attempt to make it an object of knowledge compels us to impose upon it definitions which are borrowed from that sphere of experimental knowledge that alone is accessible to our intelligence, and these again do not penetrate to the essential reality of things." This agnostic theory, according to Deussen, is strongly emphasised by Yajnavalkya and permeates the teachings of many Upanisads.

Once Deussen has been able to persuade himself that the unknowability of the essence of the universe is the most valuable theory of the Upanisads, he naturally seeks to find in the teachings of Sankara the same agnostic theory with its insistence on the absolute unknowableness of the Self through the ordinary means of knowledge or within the four corners of our ordinary experience. Thus, for instance, at the very beginning of his famous exposition of the position of Sankara, Deussen starts with the assumption that the fundamental thought of the Vedanta consists in the thought that "the empirical view of nature is not able to lead us to a final solution of the being of things;"

and this thought is supposed to be "the root of all metaphysics, so far as without it no metaphysics can come into being or exist." The step beyond physics to metaphysics "is only to be explained by a more or less clear consciousness that all empirical investigation and knowledge amounts in the end only to a great deception grounded in the nature of our knowing faculties, to open our eyes to which is the task of metaphysics." And here Sankara's attempt is supposed to be analogous to that of Parmenides and Kant, with this difference that while Kant discovered the final reason for the false empirical concept in "the nature of our cognitive faculty," the Vedanta did not seek it there. For this scientific foundation of the Vedanta, therefore, the Indians will accept the teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason "with grateful respect."

Considerations of space will not allow us to multiply quotations from Deussen's work to show in detail how his prejudices for agnosticism have coloured his interpretation of the position of Sankara throughout his monumental book. His conclusions about the advaita theory of Self are identical with those which he arrived at in the process of interpreting the Upanisads. "However much we may agree with the Vedanta," it is observed, "when it holds that a fathoming of Being-in-itself is only possible in our own 'I' and, in its metaphysics, pushes aside everything objective, and relies on the Subject only, we can as little agree with it when, disregarding the objections of the opponent....it finds the last basis of Being in the Subject of Knowledge. The consequence is that the Vedanta denies itself an immediate insight into the essence of things; for the subject of knowledge can never become the object for us, precisely because in every

cognition it must take the place of subject." But the Indians, it is continued, found out a "way of perceiving the subject, the Brahman." In all perception it "is assumed as the witness (saksin), that is, the knowing subject of knowledge. Yet there remains a possibility of knowing God: the Yogin, that is, here, he who has become one with God, sees him in the condition of Samradhanam, literally: perfect satisfaction, which Sankara explains as a sinking oneself (pra-ni-dhanam) in pious meditation." But, asks Deussen, does not the division of subject and object exist here also? Here the Vedanta thinkers answer this question "with a negative, but, as the basis of their view, can only bring forward similes and passages of scripture." But "an explanation of this unification of subject and object (as it actually takes place in the phenomena of aesthetic contemplation and religious devotion) cannot be obtained from their discussions."

Deussen's interpretation of the advaita system, which is certainly based upon wide scholarship and painstaking labour, has naturally commanded that sort of popularity which is enjoyed by every pioneer work. Consequently, his opinions here have been accepted as the most considered and careful views by all scholars within as well as outside India. "All that is important in Sankara's commentary of the Brahma Sutras," it has been remarked by one of our distinguished interpreters of Indian Philosophy, "has been excellently systematised by Deussen in his System of the Vedanta; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any long account of this part." This being the impression of an Indian scholar on the merits of Deussen's presentation of the advaita system, it is no wonder that the latter should be considered by all interested scholars as a re-

liable guide to the position of that important school of Indian monism which was represented by Sankara. In oppostion to this widespread tendency to accept Deussen's interpretation as final, we venture to hold that Deussen has failed to grasp the central thought of the teachings of Sankara as well as those of the Upanisads, and that the agnostic and mystic elements of the Vedanta system have been unjustifiably interpreted by him on the lines of western agnosticism associated with the names of Plato or Kant.

In justification of these contentions, we must begin with what we consider to be the central principle or the fundamental concept of the Vedanta philosophy, namely, the Brahman, as the Principle of Revelation (or svayamprakasa.) The Self as the ultimate principle of revelation, as is wellknown, is a characteristic tenet of the teachings of the Upanisads as well as of the school of Sankara. The Self, either individual or Absolute, is, according to them, the eternal conscious principle (nityacaitanyasvarupa) which reveals or illumines the entire world of objects while itself not standing in need of a more ulterior source of revelation, much as one light does not need another light for its own revelation. What it means, when put in another form of language, is that all our knowledge or experience may be ultimately analysed into a conscious principle to which are presented the "things" that are known. This, again, implies that the conscious principle itself, inasmuch as it is the ultimate principle of revelation, cannot be an 'object' of knowledge or experience. Though invariably present in all experience, the self cannot be known as an object. So much must be granted by all interpreters of the Vedanta.

But it will be nothing less than a blunder if we failed to emphasise the complementary aspect of the concept of self-revelation as it is used in the Vedanta literature. The conscious principle which illumines all "objects" of knowledge does not keep itself unrevealed or unknown; it cannot be said to be altogether falling beyond the limits of ordinary experience, simply on the ground that it is not known as an object. In other words, the term self-revelation or svaprakasa, here does not mean that the self reveals everything, while keeping us altogether ignorant or unaware of its own nature which, therefore, requires the aid of a higher faculty in the form of a mystic vision or religious ecstasy. On the contrary, what it does mean is that even ordinary experience implies a sort of self-experience which is the pre-condition of all knowledge of objects. This self-experience, of course, cannot mean the experience of the subject as an object, for, all knowledge of objects presupposes it; it is a sort of non-objectifying experience which is so far analogous to what S. Alexander calls 'enjoyment' as distinct from 'contemplation' or what Bradley calls 'immediate experience.' The analogy of light employed by the Vedanta thinkers is meant precisely to convey this important truth, and it would be nothing less than a disaster if interpreting the Upanishads or the position of the advaita thinkers we were to emphasise exclusively the truth that the self cannot be known as an object and miss the compelementary aspect, which is equally important to remember, that the self, while knowing an object, must also have an experience of itself. Without this self-experience no experience is possible, and every analysis of experience that misses this important element present in all experience must inevitably lead to the theory of 'thing-in-

itself" which may then be thought to be unthinkable after Kant or known through a kind of higher faculty as urged by mystics. It is not necessary to expatiate on this point again after what we have said elsewhere in explaining advaita concepts of svaprakasa and aparoksa.

To show, in the light of our interpretation of the concept of self-revelation, how much of Deussen's exposition of the Upanishadic tenets represents the genuine teachings of the Vedanta would be impossible within the limits of the present essay. But one point that must be stressed here is that he has, by virtue of an agnostic tendency derived from Kant's philosophy put Yajnavalkya's speculations in an extremely misleading light. All the passages he has quoted to show the agnostic tenet of Yajnavalkya's thought (particularly on pp. 79-80 and 146-156 of the Philosophy of the Upanisads), when correctly interpreted, mean no more than this that the Brahman cannot be known as an object. On the other hand, the terms cit, atmajyotih, caitanya, etc. profusely used in the Vedanta literature, point unmistakably to the truth that the Upanishadic Absolute, far from being unknowable, is knowable par excellence. That which is "the light of light" the "purest light," and consisting through and through entirely of knowledge," cannot be an unknowable subject. On the contrary, it is ever known in knowing every object, it is itself its own light. The ordinary facts of dream and dreamless sleep are particularly made use of for establishing its nature which remains difficult of comprehension in waking experience on account of the fragmentary character of our knowledge. Similarly, the negative descriptions, indicated by the expressions "not this", "not this", are not meant to assert that the Brahman is absoledge." All that it signifies is that the lutely unknowable through "experimental know-

Absolute cannot be known as an 'object of knowledge,' because it has none of the characteristics which must necessarily belong to the knowable objects. All relations and duality,--such as the duality of subject and object, space-relations, temporal relations, causal relations, etc. --constitute the very life-blood of the knowable objects; but they are inapplicable to the Brahman which is pure Consciousness. But this does not reduce the Brahman to a mere zero or a pure naught. Nor does it mean that the reality of Brahman cannot be established except through a higher faculty or mystic intuition. It is true that mystic intuition has a very important place in the entire Vedanta discipline. This mystic intuition (saksatkara) is the ultimate goal of reasoned knowledge (manana). But it would be unjustifiable to infer from this that there is no "Self-experience" in the life of the ordinary man. On the contrary, the entire tenor and drift of the Upanishadic thought is to identify the self with the Brahman and thus to emphasise that the Brahman, far from being a denizen of an alien world accessible to the mystics alone, is constantly present in our "self-experience" which experience none can deny.

Nothing is further from our thought than the suggestion that the Upanisads embody a uniform doctrine. That there are conflicting tendencies in their teachings has been admirably shown by Deussen with a wealth of matter and profound scholarship that must wrest admiration from his worst critics. But our contention is that he has missed what seems to us to be the central thought of most of the Upanisads, probably under the influence of his intellectual heritage derived from Kant. Kant's theory of pure ego, based on a relentless, yet quite just, criticism of rational psychology, reduced itself

to a mere 'X' in grasping which thought moved in a perpetual circle. Some of the Indian critics of Kant have thought that Kant's perplexities may well be removed by insisting that what eludes the grasp of thought is capable of being accomplished in mystic intuition, and it is this which is supposed to be the important lesson of the Vedanta. But, we submit, this would be doing injustice to Kant as well as to the Vedanta. If Kant's analysis was defective, its defect should, in all fairness, be fought on the open field and not through a sluice-gate. Black-mailing is as unjust in the intellectual field as in social intercourse. On the other hand, by reading Kant's theory into the Upanisads, we deprive ourselves effectively of the very important weapon forged in the Vedanta furnace for killing the agnostic 'inconvenience' which worked disaster in the Kantian camp. Kant was certainly right in insisting that there can be "no knowledge of the subject as an object." The "unity of consciousness," it is rightly urged, is "the supreme condition of the categories," and, as such, it must not be confused with "a perception of the subject as an object." The subject "cannot think the categories without presupposing its own pure self-consciousness, and therefore self-consciousness cannot be brought under the categories." But, having proceeded so far, Kant seems to have shuddered at his own shadow. The result is that, instead of courageously catching the essence of the self in this 'pure self-consciousness,' he throws it away as something "completely empty of content," yet admitting in the same breadth that it is "a consciousness that accompanies all conceptions."

Deussen's interpretation of the Upanishads suffers from the same lack of courage. The profuse extracts he has quoted from the Upanisads

in order to show how they all aim at a knowledge of the Brahman which is thought to be Being (sat) consciousness (cit) and bliss (ananda), should have convinced him that such an Absolute cannot be identified with the "Thing-in-itself." The Vedanta conception of cit, being entirely different from the relational concept of consciousness, Deussen missed its real meaning and supposed that the Absolute Self, though a foundational conscious principle, might yet be an absolutely unknowable "Thing-in-itself." He never seems to have realised that what is essentially svaprakasa can at no moment of time be unknowable. Thus, his interpretations are marred by the undetected presence of two incompatible ideas.©

That the Vedanta theory of the nature of the nature of the Absolute Self is different from the

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© That Deussen misunderstood the meaning of the vedanta conception of cit is also evident from the different ways in which he translated the term. It is sometimes translated as 'mind' (Ibid.,p.126), but at other places it is called the 'knowing subject within us' (Ibid.p.156). Yet in another place it is translated as 'intelligence' (The System of the Vedanta p.212).This might be partly due to the ambiguity with which the term 'mind' is used in English. It is well known that Green made an attempt to distinguish the term 'mind' from what he called 'the subject' But Deussen does not stick to even this important distinction in translating cit. He should at least have seen why Yajnavalkya, to whose theory of neti neti Deussen traces the absolute unknowableness of Brahman (The Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 82), was asked by Usasta to explain the Self which was supposed to be given in direct immediate experience (saksadaparoksad brahma--Brh. Up. III. 4.1.)

agnostic position is made all the more clear by Sankara who has carefully distinguished the Self from a mere zero or naught. One of his clearest expressions in this respect is to be found in S.B.III, 2.22. Here it is urged by Sankara that it is impossible that the phrase 'not so, not so' should 'negative' Brahman, 'since that would imply the doctrine of a general Void." "The phrase that Brahman transcends all speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that Brahman does not exist;" for after it has been said that Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, and Infinity, "it cannot be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence." The passage of the Brh. Up., Sankara concludes, has, therefore, to be understood as follows: "Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, consciousness, and freedom; it transcends speech and 'mind', does not fall within the category of 'object' and constitutes the inward self of all." The clear indication of these remarks is that Brahman, which is our own self, is something that does not belong to the class of 'objects'; it is avisayantahpati. Nor does it mean that Brahman "cannot be reached by the way of knowledge," as Deussen supposes. Because it, as the self in us, is ever given in an immediate non-objectifying experience (i.e. aparoksat ca pratyagatmaprasiddheh, as put by Sankara in his Introduction to S.B.)

It should be clear from such passages that the immediate experience, called aparoksanubhuti in the Vedanta system does not necessarily mean any Yogic perception. The latter, of course, is an immediate experience; but we cannot convert the assertion and urge that every type of immediate experience is a supernatural mystic perception. In other words, the advaita conception of aparoksanubhuti is much wider than what is known as the Yogic percep-

tion. Consequently, when the self is said to be given in an immediate experience, the term 'experience' must not be construed as any extraordinary mystic experience. This is a point of vital importance for a correct interpretation of the position of Sankara; because, the agnostic and mystic interpretation of the advaita position initiated by Deussen has been made possible only through an imperfect grasp of the term "aparoksa", as used by the advaita philosophers. That Deussen did not sufficiently realise the importance of the meaning which this term is intended to convery is evident from the way in which he generally avoids any reference to this term, as well as from the dubious tone in which he sometimes speaks of it.

It is evident, then, that the analogy between Sankara and Kant breaks down completely on a point which is of vital importance for a proper estimate of the contribution, which the former has made, to a sound theory of knowledge. The self is not an unknowable and inconceivable "X"; similarly, the Absolute is not, like the Thing-in-itself, something lying entirely beyond our ordinary experience of "experimental knowledge," as Deussen puts it. On the contrary, it must be urged at the risk of repetition, the Self, for Sankara, is constantly given in an immediate experience apart from which no knowledge of 'objects' would be possible. It is true that the Indian Monists of the advaita school held before themselves an ideal of Absolute Experience realised in the condition of mystic intuition or samradhanam, and it was further believed that a perfect comprehension of the nature of the self is possible in that condition only. But the passage from the ordinary to the extraordinary experience was never conceived to be one from nothing to being. That is, the Absolute Experience was not conceived as a <u>deus ex</u>

machina, and the process of development was not from an experience completely destitute of self-experience to another altogether different type of experience in which the self is experienced for the first time. On the contrary, it was always supposed that there is not only an immediate self-experience at every moment of our life, but in this self-experience is given an indefinite type of Absolute Experience which attains perfection and clarity at the end of the entire process of discipline.@

It would, therefore, be a serious confusion between the position of Sankara and that of the Buddhist nihilists to think that the Absolute of the advaita system cannot be theoretically known, because "in all knowing, it is the knowing subject, it can never be an object of knowledge for us." Such an interpretation, as we have urged above, is altogether incompatible with the advaita doctrine of the Self as the Eternal Conscious Principle (nityacaitanyasvarupah.) As we have put it elsewhere, "the assertion that the Absolute is theoretically incomprehensible would be as absurd as that there can be no theoretical knowledge of space on the ground that all spaces that are ever known are limited spaces, or that light is theoretically unknowable because what is known directly is an illumined object."

@ That there is an indefinite sort of Absolute Experience before the complete 'vision' has dawned is sometimes distinctly said by the advaita thinkers. Vidyaranya, for instance, remarks, in reply to an adverse critic who might object that an enquiry into Brahman would be useless because it was either impossible or superfluous, that though it is true that the Absolute, which is identical with one's own self, is known indirectly or directly, yet a philosophical enquiry is necessary for an unquestionable immediate experience of the Absolute.

That Deussen has definitely misunderstood the advaita doctrine of the self is further evident from his observation that "the Indian caitanyam comes very close to" the idea of Force. "All existence, in its essence, is nothing but a manifestation of Force and all Knowledge may be considered as a reaction against the crowd of impressions, and therefore as an activity of Force." The caitanyam, it is said at another place, "is, in our system, a potency which lies at the root of all motion and change in nature, which is therefore also ascribed, for example, to plants, and means thus rather the capacity of reaction to outer influences, a potency which, in its highest development, reveals itself as human intellect, as spirit." Such a misinterpretation of the vedanta term 'caitanyam' would not merit a refutation if it had not originated from such a scholar of Indian thought as Deussen. This term, as is well known, is at the very basis of the Vedanta system, and any arbitrary interpretation, therefore, would distort the system as a whole beyond all recognition. The concept of Force or Will can hardly be an adequate substitute for what, according to it, is the ultimate principle of revelation without which no object can be known. The predominantly epistemological character of the vedanta, with its emphasis on consciousness, knowledge, or jnanam, is sure to be completely obscured by the unwarranted assumption that the advaita conception of caitanya is an equivalent of Force or Will.

Similarly, if a metaphysical position which sees "in Will the final origin of Being" commends itself to Deussen, then the advaita position is altogether irreconcilable with his metaphysical prepossessions. Because, Being is held by the advaita thinkers to be the most

universal and irrepressible category, and, as such, everything is rooted in Being, and the Will cannot be an exception. A quid anterior to caitanya or consciousness--call it a Will, velle, or Nolle--would be as repugnant to Sankara as it is to the modern idealists. For parallel developments of thought in respect of this vital problem, one must turn, therefore, not to Schopenhauer, but rather to the idealists. The Absolute, we are told for instance by an eminent idealist of contemporary India, "is an eternally complete consciousness. Any lesser definition of it is self-contradictory, and raises anew all the difficulties for overcoming which the conception is framed." In a similar strain, it is remarked by Haldane that "behind the fact of consciousness one cannot go. It is our 'that' of which one can only inquire into the 'what'. To quote from the work of yet another accomplished idealist, the existence of a knowable nature implies "a principle of consciousness which, in relation to sensibility, yields laws of nature, which is not itself subject to those laws of nature."

Deussen's perplexities here appear to arise from the vedanta distinction between pure consciousness and what he calls the intellectual apparatus or the psychic apparatus of the mind. He admits that in so far as God is the metaphysical I of man himself, "his existence cannot be proved at all, but also it does not need to be proved, because he is that which is alone known directly, and thereby the basis of all certainty." And here he rightly compares the position of the Vedanta with the Cogito ergo sum of Descartes. But this does not convince him of the wisdom of the vedanta identification of the real self with consciousness, though, according to Descartes and Sankara

alike, consciousness alone can provide "the basis of all certainty." On the contrary, he fancies that the Vedanta, while rightly recognising the source of true knowledge in our own "I", wrongly "halts at the form in which it directly appeals to our consciousness, as a knower, even after it has cut away the whole intellectual apparatus, and ascribed it to the 'not I,' the world of phenomena." This is called "the fundamental want of the Vedanta system, which, among other things, causes the absence of its proper morality." The description of God as the Knower, it is observed elsewhere, indicates no actorship, and "the difference between God and the soul is a mere appearance, while liberation is a seeing through this appearance." But "all attempts of this kind to grasp liberation as a new form of knowledge, do not give, and cannot give, any satisfactory conclusion as to its nature, so long as it is not supplemented by the idea of the moral transformation which is so strongly accentuated by Christianity, but remained foreign to Indian thought."

So far as the "idea of the moral transformation" is concerned, the confusion of Deussen and a number of other interpreters of Indian thought has been thoroughly exposed by Indian scholars, particularly by Dr. Ganganatha Jha in The Philosophical Discipline. It has been emphasised, in particular, that Sankara's predominantly theoretical approach to the problems of philosophy does not make light of the necessity of a thorough moral discipline in the form of renunciation of all desires for the fruits of actions, tranquillity, self-restraint, duties of the "four life-stages," etc. In fact, a theoretical adventure without a moral background is definitely opposed to the genius of Indian philosophy. And Sankara's condemnation of the

empirical world as a mere appearance is not incompatible with a fixed criterion of truth or of morality. Here, the confusion, we believe, is due to a disastrous mixing up of two different standpoints from which Sankara is in the habit of arguing. The world of plurality, according to the advaita thinkers, has different values according as it is viewed from the standpoint of finite experience or of Infinite Experience. And, consequently, such terms as "truth," "reality," "unreality," "appearance," etc., have each an ambiguous connotation as it is used in the advaita literature. But this point needs no further elaboration in view of what has already been done by a number of contemporary interpreters. It has, for instance, been rightly urged that for Sankara "unreal the world is, illusory it is not".@ Consently, the doctrine that the world is a maya does not militate against any fixed criterion of truth or the need of a moral discipline.

@ Sir Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, P.583. This statement, we venture to suggest, is not entirely free from ambiguity though it is sufficient for counteracting the prevalent notion that the world of finite experience for Sankara is a mere illusion. A better rendering of the advaita view in the present context would perhaps run as follows: The world of plurality is perfectly real from the standpoint of finite experience; but when looked at from that of the Infinite experience, it is even less than a dream or illusion, and, as such, it has never existed in the past, does not exist at present, and will never exist in the future. To put it in the words of Sankara, that the world is a dream is a doctrine which must be understood in a distinctive sense. Our empirical world is not "real from the in-

What we must challenge here, however, is Deussen's identification of pure consciousness with "the unconscious." What he calls "the psychic apparatus" is, according to Sankara, a composite structure including within itself the conscious principle and what, in the opinion of the advaita thinkers, are unconscious mental modifications. The fruitfulness of this distinction as well as the perplexities arising out of their identification have been shown by us elsewhere. We have seen, for instance, that the problem of personal identity surviving the breaks in the psychical current in deep sleep, the perception of an object, the awareness of change, recognition, and memory,--all these require, for their adequate explanation, a clear recognition of the composite character of the so-called psychic apparatus. And a close approach to this advaita doctrine is made by some of the modern idealists in their analysis and

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finite standpoint" but it is perfectly real from the finite standpoint. Even the Vedanta term apeksika-satyam must not be translated as "relative reality," as is done, for instance, by Sir Radhakrishnan, (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Page 190), because this might lead to the confusion of Sankara's position with the modern theory of relativity of knowledge. The latter, in the hands of Einstein or the pragmatists, is a protest against the doctrine of absolute truth in human knowledge. For Sankara, on the contrary, there are absolute criteria of truth and morality in our knowledge, in spite of its nothingness when viewed from the standpoint of Infinite experience. It is, therefore, less ambiguous to translate the term "apeksika-satyam" as "absolute truth from the finite standpoint."

explanation of perception, particularly by T. H. Green.

Deussen's confusion here is surely due to a lack of clear distinction between consciousness and sensibility, or, to put it in the language of the vedanta, between bodha and buddhi. The latter, quite as much as the tree or the table, is an object of knowledge, and, as such, presupposes the reality of the former which, therefore, may very aptly be called foundational knowledge or foundational consciousness. And, as a matter of fact, many modern idealists, call it "Knowledge." In this respect, Knowledge or Consciousness, far from being an unconscious will or potency, is the prius of reality. It is not a "feeble faculty," as Deussen thinks, nor is it something unconscious;

@ We may remember here his indignant remark that in analysing the relation between the mind and the external world one should distinguish between several questions "the confusion between which has been a great snare for philosophers." (Works I,p.134). These questions, according to him, are those of relation between a sensitive and non-sensitive body, between thought and its object, and between thought and something only qualified as the negation of thought. The psychological method, it is said elsewhere, "has held to the position, conceded by the introspectionists, in which the whole work of consciousness is implicitly contained, is given ab extra through modification of the sentient organism. The objective psychologists, "having begun by confusing sentience with consciousness, come to regard 'the external' as independent of consciousness". (Ibid.P.482). Such remarks clearly indicate the need of distinguishing consciousness from sentience which approximately corresponds to the advaita distinction between cit or bodha and buddhi.

on the contrary, it is the ultimate principle of revelation without which nothing can be known.

Allied with Deussen's confusion on the so-called psychic apparatus is his view that the Vedanta finds "the last basis of Being in the Subject of Knowledge." The truth, on the contrary, is that the Vedanta finds in Knowledge the ultimate principle which is presupposed by all relations including the relation of the subject to the object. In other words, the subject-object relation, far from being an ultimate relation, has a meaning only because of the reality of the foundational knowledge. It is true that the term "knower" is sometimes used by the advaita thinkers to indicate the ultimate character of knowledge; but this must not be interpreted as implying the reality of an agent of knowledge of which knowledge is an activity. This duality of a knowing agent and the process of knowledge, though required for expressing in language of the highest nature of the self, is nothing more than a makeshift dictated by the linguistic exigencies; but it does not exist with the Self which in its ultimate nature is an undifferentiated and indivisible conscious principle. All distinctions are known in the light of this Knowledge, but there is no distinction <u>within</u> it. I can distinguish between "x" and "y", because I remain perfectly identical with myself while apprehending the distinction of "x" from "y." Without this identical conscious principle, no distinction can be known; consequently, a theory which introduces the distinction of the agent from the act of knowledge into the conscious principle itself must necessarily land itself in inextricable difficulties in accounting for our knowledge of difference.

This being the real position of the advaita

doctrine of Self, its denial of actorship, far from being a defect in its analysis of knowledge testifies to the thoroughness and depth of its epistemological insight. And it is, therefore, very misleading to characterise the genuinely advaita position as subscribing to the theories of intellectualism or of voluntarism. The fact is that it places the essential nature of the Self, neither in Knowing nor in Willing as supposed by Deussen, but in Knowledge or Consciousness which is taken to be the ultimate presupposition of all specific knowledge-events and all sepcial acts of will.

Here we find from a different standpoint the error of reducing the self in deep sleep to an imaginary cognition. The particular knowledge-events, it has been rightly seen by Deussen, do not exist in the state of dreamless slumber. But, inasmuch as these specific knowledges presuppose the foundational Knowledge, the absence of the former is no argument for denying the presence of the latter, much as the absence of illumined objects cannot be made the basis of the inference about the absence of light. What stands in the way of an adequate comprehension of the nature of the Self in deep sleep is the fact that the self in that stage exists as an unconditioned principle or a non-relational conscious principle. This is what is signified by the advaita tenet of the individual self "entering" in the Brahman; it does not mean that the Self, then, reduces itself to "an unconscious because objectless Cognition." The unconditional conscious principle is neither a mere nothing as some of the Buddhists fancied, nor is it an unconscious Will as supposed by Deussen. On the contrary, as we have repeatedly observed, it is the ultimate principle of revelation which forms the necessary background of all relational

and conditioned objects; and it is ever given, however imperfectly, in our undeniable self-experience or self-enjoyment.

We have subjected Deussen's interpretation of the Vedanta to a rather lengthy criticism in view of the influence it has exercised upon the subsequent interpreters of Sankara. It will be impossible to show in detail here the extent of this influence. We must, therefore, content ourselves with a brief reference to some of the unambiguous expressions of Sankara which show, on the one hand, that the Self, for him, cannot be an unknowable entity, to be known, if at all, through an extraordinary type of intuition; and, on the other hand, that the Self is not a Subject in the sense in which it means an agent of the activity of knowledge as distinguished from the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

In a well-known passage of the Gita, it is asked: How can there be a cognition of the Absolute Self in the truest sense of the term? The consummation of Absolute-Experience (Brahma-jnanasya para parisamaptih), it is said in reply, is of the same nature as self-knowledge (atmajnanam). But, again, the difficulty arises as to the way of self-knowledge. The self has been said to be formless (nirakara), but it is universally admitted that all cognition assumes the form of the object that is cognised; hence the problem is: How is the constant meditation of self-knowledge possible? In answering this apparently difficult problem, Sankara remarks significantly that the self being essentially the conscious principle within us, it is unnecessary to impart a knowledge of the self, "inasmuch as it is invariably comprehended in association with all objects of perception." All that is needed is the destruction of our habit of attributing to it the qualities of the not-

self (anatmadhyaropananivrttih eva karya). When this is done, it will be seen that the self, far from being something that has to be known as the distant ideal of knowledge, is "quite self-evident, easily known, very near, and forming our very essence." There is nothing in the world which is more blissful, self-evident, easily knowable and quite near. This self-knowledge, it is further observed, is difficult only for those who are either self-conceited or whose intellect is so engrossed with the external sense-given objects that they make no laborious study of the sources of real knowledge. The fact is that "the self is not a thing unknown to anybody at any time, it is not a thing to be attained or avoided, established or accomplished... Just as there is no need for an external evidence by which one's own body is to be known, so there is no need for such an evidence in the case of the knowledge of the self which is even nearer than the body." Similarly, "those who think that there can be no immediate perception of unconditioned knowledge must all the same admit that, since an object of knowledge presupposes the fact of knowledge, this latter is as immediately known as pleasure and the like." We, no doubt, seek to know an <u>object</u>, but not knowledge itself; knowledge, therefore, is self-revealed, and so is the self. (Atyantaprasiddham jnanam jnata api ata eva prasiddha iti.)

In view of the explanation we have already attempted of the advaita doctrine of the self as an ultimate principle of revelation, it is needless to say anything more in elucidating Sankara's contentions in these passages. That knowledge, for the advaita thinkers, is essentially unconditioned, and

that it is yet given constantly in a sort of immediate experience are particularly emphasised by them.

A.C. MUKERJI: "KANT'S ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD."@ 1. This being the condition of Kant's epistemology as explained by his accredited exponents, it is no wonder that its essence should have been missed by those who have neither the desire nor the patience to study an enormously complicated system of thought. It may, therefore, be useful to disentagle the essentials of the transcendental deduction from the debatable matter, and thus separate what is perhaps destined to live as a valuable contribution to epistemology from what may either die out, at least so far as logic and epistemology are concerned, or may find a place in the dissecting room of the historian and the aspirants after new theories of knowledge.

The object of the transcendental deduction, it is well known, is to prove the universal and necessary validity of a few ultimate principles of knowledge which lie at the very foundation of scientific investigations. Kant's whole point is that there is a universal and necessary element in thinking which makes scientific knowledge possible. But in regard to the method he adopts for proving this universal element, he differs fundamentally from two other methods of proof that are generally advanced by philosophers. One of these alternative methods which Kant distinguishes from his own is the empirical method which seeks to derive all necessary concepts from experience; or, as Kant puts it, the empirical method regards experience as that which "makes these concepts possible." This, however, according to Kant, cannot establish genuine uni-

@ In "Review of Philosophy & Religion Vol.6 .

versality. The category of cause, for instance, as explained by empiricism, arises in the following way: "from the repeated observation and comparison of many cases in which certain antecedents, we are first led to the discovery of a rule according to which the events invariably follow those antecedents, and then by reflection on the rule, to the general conception of cause." But in that case, it would be a merely empirical concept, and the rulse based upon it "would be just as contingent as the experience from which it was derived."

2. The only proof, therefore, is what is offered by the transcendental deduction the principle of which is "the possibility of experience." To quote Kant's words, "the objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought."

3. What Kant means here evidently is that what is self-consistent may not be true, although what is true must be self-consistent. But in spire of this difference the formal laws as well as the transcendental principles are the conditions or grounds of all knowledge. The former are universal and necessary, because they are the 'logical demands' of all self-consistent knowledge; and similarly, the latter are necessary, for, without them no object can be thought.

Here we get in a very simple form the essence of the transcendental deduction. The formal laws of thought are the "universal and necessary rules of the understanding," not because they are empirical generalizations; not, ~~again~~, because they are of the type of innate

ideas. Their universality and necessity are due to their being the grounds or conditions of all truth. To assert, for instance, that the law of contradiction is not the condition of all truth would be to knock off the ground of the assertion itself. And this may be easily realised if we consider that every assertion which claims to be true condemns as false a number of contradictory assertions; but when it is asserted that the law of contradiction may be false, the implication is that its contradictory may be true, and this at once knocks off the foundation of the assertion which denies the validity of the law of contradiction. Hence, according to the transcendental method, those formal laws which make an assertion possible are for that very reason necessary; and similarly, those concepts which make an object of thought possible are also for that reason necessary and universal. If, for instance, it can be shown, and Kant has no doubt that it can, that an event would lose its intelligibility if it had not been regarded as something happening at a particular time according to the principle of causality, then the principle is surely the transcendental ground of every event. As Kant puts it, "if, therefore, in my observation I am to obtain the knowledge of an event, that is, of something that actually takes place, I must think of it as preceded by something else, which it follows necessarily or according to a rule." In other words, "the principle of causality applies to all objects of experience that stand under the conditions of succession, just because it is itself the ground of the very possibility of such experience."

4. That Hume has once for all demolished the presuppositions which lie at the basis of scientific proof and that all laws of nature are

contingent and relative have been vouchsafed by a large circle of contemporary logicians who are but too ready to be deluded by the apparently harmless simplicity of Hume's analysis. Hume, as is well known, struck at the root of all scientific proof by his famous distinction between the relations of ideas and matters of fact. All demonstration according to him, is confined to the relations of ideas while propositions concerning matters of fact are undemonstrable assumptions. As the contrary of every matter of fact is conceivable, propositions such as the sun will rise to-morrow on the east, fire will burn man's finger in future as it does today, are, for Hume, more or less of the nature of hypothetical assumptions which may have their use for life, but they are demonstrable like the mathematical propositions. From this it is concluded that no propositions concerning the facts of nature can ever be accepted as necessary. And contemporary logic is here on all-fours with Hume's theory.

This uncritical alliance of contemporary theories of knowledge with the sceptical method of Hume has been one of the most deplorable facts for epistemology, and it amply corroborates our remark, made elsewhere, that scepticism is the only attitude of mind that can ever offer a logical alternative to criticism. On closer analysis, however, it may appear clear that the doctrine of contingency of the laws of nature, which formed the corner stone of Hume's analysis of knowledge, is as alluring as it is erroneous.

5. Hume was profoundly wrong in concluding that, because certain laws of nature may be conceived as not operating in future, therefore, all propositions concerning matters of fact are mere inductive hypotheses devoid of necessity and universality. The sun may not

rise tomorrow on the east, water may not quench thirst, ice may not be cold in the course of future experience,--such surmises clearly presuppose that the sun, water or ice, notwithstanding the supposed changes in their future behaviours, will not change beyond the possibility of recognition. It is only in so far as the sun's identity is recognised, and it is known as <u>the</u> sun, that one has the chance of wondering at its rise, say on the west or the north. If, on the other hand, the sun had changed its nature radically and completely, then, in the absence of recognition, the chances of wonder would also disappear. This means that the supposed changes in the sun's behaviours, notwithstanding all that may befall it to-morrow, will not militate against those general conditions or laws of its being which are implied in the process of recognition. The necessity of recognition, therefore, inevitably sets limits to contingency. Applying the same argument to the domain of science, it may be said that every scientific entity must have a definite nature that is identifiable in different contexts. The elctron, the waves, the quanta,--each of these, it must be admitted, can be recognised at different times and in different surroundings, and consequently, each must be supposed to possess a relatively constant behaviour through which alone it is known as <u>this</u> as different from <u>that</u>. However difficult it might be, for instance, to ascertain with the least amount of error the position of an electron without falling into a greater error in respect of its velocity, this uncertainty cannot affect the conditicns implied in such judgments as, this is the position <u>of</u> an electron, that is the velocity of the <u>same</u> electron, etc. That is, the electron's identity and identifiability have to be presupposed even

by the law of indeterminacy. The conclusion that seems to follow from such considerations is that everywhere contingency and relativity in some respects implies necessity and constancy in other respects. Or, to put it from the other side, the doctrine of contingency, when applied on a universal scale, refutes itself.

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1. A. C. MUKERJEE. "THE RATIONAL FOUNDATION OF ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY." In the case of such ideas as truth, falsity, real, unreal, existence, non-existence, etc. as they occur in the Advaita literature. As is well known, their meanings change according as the world is viewed from the standpoint of finite experience or that of Absolute Experience. From the latter standpoint the world of plurality is even less than a dream, it is tuccha. But when judged from the former standpoint, it is a stern reality and not a mere illusory apparition. I must not be drawn into answering the problem: Was Sankara justified in introducing a double standard of truth and reality? All I intend to emphasise here is that this double standard runs through all his discussions; and, consequently, the terms mithya, asat, etc. should not be interpreted uniformly as false or unreal, if we were to avoid confusions and approach Sankara in an appreciative spirit. He himself offers clear suggestions for distinguishing the real tree from the illusory tree within finite experience, and also for distinguishing Reality from the standpoint of Absolute Experience (paramarthasatyam) and the reals of finite experience (apeksikasatyam). The latter are not mere relative truths as taught by the modern theory of relativity, they are, on the contrary, real in the fullest sense of the term. Sankara, as far as I can see, would repudiate

the modern theory of relativity of knowledge as vehemently as he did the old theory of subjective idealism as taught by the Buddhists. Only we are to remember that what has a full measure of reality when judged from one standpoint is yet absolutely unreal as viewed from a different standpoint.

But I need not labour this point further in the present context, because the problem has been tackled by abler scholars of our time. The world of empirical plurality for Sankara, we have been repeatedly told, is not a veritable illusion. Unreal, it is, but illusory it is not,--this is how Sankara's views on the emprical reality has been summarised. I admit that such a brief formulation is somewhat misleading because even illusions are unreal and, consequently, the reality of the empirical world cannot be adequately comprehended if we content ourselves with saying that it is unreal. It, therefore, seems to me that the chance of misunderstanding will be minimised if we stick to the advaita distinction between the vyavaharika and the paramarthika standpoint respectively, and, instead of calling the empirical world unreal, use the longer expression i.e, real from the finite standpoint.

The second point which has to be emphasised is that the advaita philosophy is not merely a system of philosophy in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term. It is, on the contrary a spiritual discipline meant for bringing about a sort of religious conversion of the finite self leading to that Absolute Experience where alone the Absolute stands self-revealed and shines in its own light. What is needed for this conversion is the annihilation of the 'mind' or antahkarana. This spiritual significance is present in many other systems of

Indian Philosophy as well. But confining ourselves to the advaita system, what has to be remembered is that the dualistic view, according to the advaita position, is inseparable from the finite standpoint, and that the germ of this dualistic view is ingrained in the very nature of the "mind." Like a prism which decomposes the white light into multiple tints, the "mind" presents a world of multiplicity where there is in fact one Absolute without a second. The dualistic view cannot be entirely destroyed while the "mind" is there, hence the attempts to eliminate the very root of the disease. Now, the remedies that have been prescribed for the cure vary with various systems, and the advaita has its own prescription which is generally known as the path of knowledge, comprising sravana, manana and nididhyasana. In this complete scheme, rational disquisitions have a very important function to discharge in the shape of purging the mind of all theoretical doubts and suspicions which are created by rival theories or antagonistic interpretations of experience. Hence, again, the refutation of rival theories cannot be a mere frivolous pastime for the advaita thinkers; on the contrary, it plays an important part in the total discipline.

If, then, we were to use the term philosophy in the restricted sense of reasoned knowledge, it must be admitted, in view of what has been said above, that the function of philosophy, according to Sankara at least, is to offer a resoned systematic account of our experiences by a careful examination of all rival interpretations which might create doubts and difficulties in the way of accepting the advaita thesis. Sankara, therefore, has to rationalise and systematise notwithstanding what he sometimes says against the

efficiency of thought and reason.

2. The root cause of our differences appears to me to lie in the advaita conception of falsity or non-existence. It is true, for example, that a synthetic principle as such does not exist when there is nothing to synthesise; but can we not similarly say that a principle of revelation does not exist when there is nothing to reveal? Sankara's criticism of the Buddhistic doctrine of self as a series of 'vijnana's does not appear to me to be essentially different from Kant or Green's criticism of Hume's doctrine of the flow of "perceptions". I do not know, if the term 'synthetic' is to be rejected, how to translate Sankara's term 'Sanhantuh' as it occurs in his criticism of Buddhism (See The Nature of Self. p. 158). As for the materials for synthesis, these, according to Sankara, cannot be non-existent or unreal, they, as we have contended above, are fully real from the finite standpoint. Similarly, I find it extremely difficult to agree that the advaita Absolute is a transcendent principle. It is true that the express aim of the Vedantic discipline is to make the phantasm of finite experience disappear for ever. But I must contend, again, that nothing of our finite experience is a phantasm but fully real from the standpoint of finite experience. Until the Absolute Experience is realised, everything is real. "The entire complex of phenomenal existence", as Sankara puts it, "is true as long as the Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen, just as the phantoms of a dream are considered true until the sleeper wakes." (S.B. II.1.14). Till then, it is added, the whole course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded. On the other hand, when finite experience is sublated, the questions of immanence and transcendence become irrelevant, for the conditions under

which the ordinary means of right knowledge can be exercised are then altogether absent. Now, Being and Consciousness, when judged from the finite standpoint, are irrepressible. We cannot think of anything without being conscious of that thing, whether it is real, or illusory; moreover, consciousness is never sublated; Similarly, Being is never sublated. What are sublated are the specific forms of finite things, i.e, their determinateness and finitude.

It would not be, therefore, correct to think that the Absolute, for Sankara, is not immanent in our finite experiences or the empirical world. The absolute of the Vedanta, which is essentially a foundational Consciousness, cannot surely be a transcendent principle; and even granting that it alone does not explain our finite experience, one has yet to admit that, without the conscious principle, no experience can be explained at all. One should perhaps go a step further and insist that all experiences presuppose the reality, not only of a conscious principle, but that of an unchanging conscious principle inasmuch as finite experiences are in constant flux. Iffind it therefore, incomprehensible how the advaita philosophy, which seeks to explain finite experience by referring it to an unchanging basis may yet be said to explain it away. As regards the term 'immanence,' I would fain discard it if another suitable term had been available which would avoid the suggestion that the Advaita Absolute, like the Platonic Ideas or the Thing-in-itself of Kant, belongs to a region entirely different from the world of finite things. It is well known that the analogies used by the advaita thinkers for showing the relation between the Absolute and the world of finite things do not

favour such a split between the world of finite things and that of the Absolute. It is, again, true that we cannot get the Absolute in its pure form--i.e., as pure consciousness and pure being without 'name and form'--in our finite experience; but the latter certainly exists and is manifested only because it is rooted in the Absolute. Or, to put it in another form, the light of finite things is a borrowed light; and, consequently, we cannot accept the reality of a manifested finite thing while denying the reality of the source of light or the ultimate principle of revelation.

After what has been said above, I need not elaborate the reasons which have led me to think that universal scepticism is incompatible with the spirit of Sankara's position. Universal scepticism which is induced by an indiscriminate destructive criticism of all the categories of thought, far from providing an intellectual discipline as an important stage of the total discipline, refutes itself. And I am glad that Sankara, in spite of a tendency towards this position, has successfully withstood the devastating influence of this suicidal misology.

3. A purely destructive criticism of thought would have been a help rather than a hindrance in the way of the Vedanta, if thought had no function to discharge in the total vedantic discipline. I, however, agree whole-heartedly that the categories of thought are not applicable to the "pure self"; in fact, I have my self shown it in contrasting the Hegelian Absolute with the Advaita Absolute. But it is one thing to say that thought, which is necessarily discursive, cannot adequately comprehend the Absolute, while it is an entirely different thing to assert that thought has no part to play in preparing us for the Absolute

Experience or that it cannot even indirectly point to the "pure self" beyond the categories. Whether the part played by thought in the process of realising the Absolute should be called positive or negative seems to me to be a question of minor importance, provided it is admitted that the process of clearing the mind of all doubts born of rival theories--which is the real function of thought in the advaita philosophy--is indispensable for the dawn of the Absolute Experience. This process cannot be one of silencing thought but rather of strengthening the advaita position by exposing the hollowness of the non-advaita theories.

It has been said that no modern thinker will say that the Absolute is wholly unconnected with all objects. This, I believe, is quite true, though this contrast between Sankara and the modern absolutists is very often forgotten by those who seek to find in Bradley's position a faithful repoduction of the advaita position.

4. Thought is discursive and relational, yet he has tried to show the non-relational background of all relational experiences. As an attempt to translate into the language of discursive intellect what is essentially non-relational, the value of his achievements undoubtedly is greater than we are yet ready to admit.

5. G.R. MALKANI: "MYSTICISM." How shall we define mysticism? Mysticism involves a certain view about reality, and also a certain view about knowledge of this reality. As to the first, reality is supposed to be something wholly different from what it appears to us to be. It is super-sensible. It is also in an important sense a unity. It may be that the differences which are presented to us in ordinary sense-perception are part of reality.

But then those differences must be understood as real not in themselves, but only as they fall within the unity or as they are explained by the unity. The unity is all-important. The differences are relatively not so. It may also be that the differences are regarded as wholly illusory and unreal. The unity is what alone is real.

As to the second condition this reality can be known. It can be known directly and immediately. The only knowledge of this sort which we have at present is sense-perception. This knowledge is in its own way quite certain. It is at least as certain as we expect any knowledge to be under the present circumstances. But nevertheless it lacks the quality of complete certainty. We can doubt the presentations of sense. Reflection reveals them to be mere appearances without inherent reality. Mystical intuition differs from sense-perception in this respect. It is immediate and absolutely re-assuring. There is no room for any doubt. There is accordingly, on the side of the mind, a sense of certitude and complete self-confidence born of knowledge.

6. Mysticism is primarily a matter of experience. He is a mystic who believes in a more direct intuition of reality than we have at present. Indeed, this intuition is believed to reveal reality in its true character.

7. In religion, different mystics speak differently about their experiences. Their experiences are in large part due to their initial beliefs and certain psychological circumstances connected with their life. The experiences may be personally satisfying to them. They may be fully assured of the truth of those experiences, and they may feel their life renovated. But in the end we shall have to admit that their experiences are too private, that they do not admit of any rationalisation, and that their value is wholly personal.

8. Religious experience is no doubt an experience

is no doubt an experience <u>of reality</u>. But it is a peculiar kind of experience. It is more or less of the nature of feeling. We may be said to feel the reality of God or to feel the presence of God. We cannot quite say that we know this reality. Religious experience then is not a noetic experience in a literal sense, and it may not be admitted by philosophy as a common experience.

9. Philosophy is an interpretation of our common experience. But what exactly is this common experience? It is sheer dogmatism to say that all our experience is sensible. The nature of our experience is as much a point requiring elucidation as the nature of reality. The starting point of philosophy is experience, not sensible experience. Again, the method of philosophy is that of reason. But is reason incompatible with a mystic view of things? We may ask here, what is the function of reason in philosophy? It appears to us that it is neither induction nor deduction. We have induction in science, and deduction in mathematics. In philosophy the function of reason is simply that of analysis and interpretation. For this, it has to accept experience as it is. It cannot make or unmake experience; it can only bring out the peculiarities of certain aspects of our experience or indicate the meaning of experience as a whole. To interpret experience is not to make it different. It is merely to bring out a new meaning in it or a new understanding of it. It is in this way that reason deepens our insight into things, and gives us what we may call philosophical knowledge. This knowledge is not knowledge of a new set of truths. It is merely knowledge of the truth of our experience as it is. If now there are mystical elements in our present experience they cannot be avoided because reason is our

guide. Reason has to take note of those elements and develop their meaning to the fullest extent. Mysticism is not inconsistent with the rational method of philosophy.

10. What remains of the reality of experience itself? It may be that all our experience is sensible. But this only means that it relates to sensible matter. It does not mean that experience itself is something sensible. Experience is something over and above the things that are sensible, or it is nothing. If we deny experience in this sense, we may indeed have sensible matter. But the term "sensible" will be no longer significant. It has clearly a reference to something beyond the things themselves which is a "sensing" of them. This something we call consciousness.

The reality of consciousness cannot be denied. But how do we know consciousness? We do not know it as a sensible object. We also do not know it as a mental content. We do not know it as object of any sort. We may indeed be said to know it in knowing other things. But this would not be literally true. When we know other things, we know them alone. We do not know the knowing of them. But even if we could know the knowing of them, the real consciousness would be the knowing of this knowing; for that alone is the true subject; the series ends with it. This subject is not further known. And yet it is not something merely unknown. It has the immediacy of intuition as such. It is not known in a special act. But whatever we may know, we cannot deny the immediacy of knowledge or the immediacy of consciousness as such. It is the immediacy of absolute self-evidence. Here then is mysticism within the heart of reality. No philosophical consideration of reality can deny it. Reason must recognise the reality of the super-sensible, and an immediate knowledge of it quite different from sensible knowledge or knowledge

through the processes of thought.

It is but a step farther to recognise that this super-sensible reality cannot be a particular element of reality as a whole. For such an element would be naturally reducible to some kind of objective content, and therefore fully apprehensible by sense or by thought. The recognition of such a reality is bound to affect our view of reality as a whole. The sensible can only be intelligible in terms of the super-sensible, and not vice-versa.

11. McTaggart recognises that this is not the final or extreme form of mysticism. That form "asserts that the mystic unity is the only reality, and denies that there is any differentiation at all." "The one reality would be a perfectly simple Being difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from Nothing."

This extreme form is, in our opinion, the only true form of mysticism. All philosophy must in the end come to it. In fact, if it be the business of philosophy to apprehend the unity of things, mysticism of the extreme form cannot be avoided. We cannot stop half-way. We cannot accommodate differences in any rational view of the unity. The unity which is called organic is not a unity of existence. It is a unity based on purpose or end. The parts are one not existentially. Existentially, they must be different. It is only as they are different that they can enter into any relation. They are one, only as they act or contribute to one common end. Hence it is quite legitimate to suppose that for this unity to be real, difference must be equally real and fundamental. But this is at best a very indeterminate sort of unity. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say what is the end of all reality. Ends are all human. The very notion of an end is quite anthropomorphic. Reality as a whole can have no end. We cannot compare reality as a whole to a picture, or to a musical

harmony. Nor can we compare it to a machine or to an organic whole such as our body. For any aesthetic object to be realised as aesthetic, there must be a subject outside of it which should appreciate it.

12. We have tried to show that all philosophy in so far as its aims to reach a knowledge of the unity of things must end in a truly mystical note. But philosophy may have no such aim. The aim may rather be to dissipate all ideas which are mystical in character, and thus show reality to be entirely non-mystical, empirical and matter-of-fact. That may be a legitimate aim. But can we be satisfied with mere negation, or the driving away of chimeras? And it is absolutely certain that they are chimeras? It is difficult for any critic of these mystical ideas to be absolutely sure of the nature of his own experience. Very often he uses them in another form and quite unconsciously. Mysticism may be driven out in one form and it may come back in another. The horror of mysticism which some philosophic writers display is mainly due to their lack of appreciation of the finer aspects of their experience and their inability to correlate these with other aspects of the total experience.

Our own view is that mysticism in philosophy is both legitimate and natural. The intuition of reality with which philosophy must start must be common intuition common to all persons alike. But it would be sheer dogmatism to suppose that this common intuition of reality is entirely sensible in character. Within this common intuition of reality, one may find uncommon truth. It is the business of philosophy to bring out this uncommon truth and justify it to reason. It is in this justification that philosophy can lay claim to truth. Philosophical mysticism can yet be true philosophy.

The question is sometimes raised, is the

mystic unity good? It appears to us that the question of good and bad is outside real being. What really exists is neither good nor bad. The existent nature of things may not be in conformity with the whishes of sentient beings, and to that extent it may be regarded as bad. But then it is bad only in reference to something which stands outside and considers being not as it is in itself, but as it is related to its own satisfactions. If nevertheless we must relate being to value, we should have to admit that being is necessarily good. It is good in the sense that it is complete self-fulfilled. There is nothing left within being itself which it might make good. The very notion of "bad" arises from opposition to being--"this should not be", "this is not wanted," "this is unwelcome." etc. But such opposition is out of question within being taken in itself and as a whole.

Another form of this question is whether the happiness that results from mystic contemplation or mystic intuition is good, and should be indulged in. There appears nothing wrong in it, unless it warps our judgment about reality and makes us regard as unreal that aspect of reality which we do not like. This however need not be the case. Indeed habitual indulgence in this form of contemplation may make us unfit for practical work or it may make us neglect our duties. But unless the happiness itself is unreal, we ought not to condemn it. Mystic contemplation may make us eminently practical on a higher level of life, it may turn the whole direction of our activities, and it may transform existing values. As a purely personal pleasure, it is of a very order. In fact, there is no other pleasure which can stand comparison with it. It would be wrong to suppose that it is based upon an illusory perception. It is truer to say that

the pleasure has for its basis a deeper and unique perception of reality. The climax is reached when in the end, being and joy melt into one; the perception of reality is at once the highest joy.

13. G.R. MALKANI: "RATIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY."

In the end, all philosophical concepts are grounded in subjective experience. They are modes in which the immediacy of the self may be said to function. This self is the highest philosophical concept. It is the pure ultimate immediacy devoid of all objective meaning. In fact, it is that which informs all objective meaning and constitutes it the meaning that it is. All philosophical concepts will be found in the end to lead to this super-meaning. For they are merely partial expressions of it.

Our experience has several grades. It reaches from the lowest to the highest. But unless we rise to the conscious recognition of the highest we shall not be in possession of those concepts which are the most comprehensive and the most significant. It is these which give meaning to all the rest of our experience. The quest of philosophy is thus as much a quest for a higher experience or the most illuminating experience as it is for a set of concepts which will provide the most convincing intellectual scheme for the explanation of the entire range of our actual experience. The business of philosophy is not the uninteresting business of conceptualising or generalising from empirical facts. It is the nobler business of trying to see from a higher and a yet higher stand-point which will invest the ordinary facts of experience with a new meaning. It is the revaluation of meaning in terms of the highest meaning which is not a concept but essentially an experience incapable of being symbolised. Philosophy cannot do without experience in the best of circumstances.

Only this experience must not be interpreted in a very narrow sense. Our experience is much wider than the whole range of facts studied by the empirical sciences; and that is the only justification of a non-empirical or meta-physical study of reality.

Thus rationalism in philosophy is not opposed to empiricism, if we interpret the latter term in a more liberal sense. Philosophy has to do with the analysis of certain non-empirical concepts. But this analysis is only possible because these concepts symbolize certain very intimate subjective intuitions. The role of reason in philosophy may be quite primary and all-important. But reason presupposes experience. It clarifies experience. And when this clarification is completed, it has no further scope. The role of reason in philosophy is not constructive. It is purely analytical. This analysis will lead to no useful results, if the concepts analysed are divorced from experience and defined arbitrarily in accordance with traditinal ideas. The concepts of metaphysics are nothing if they do not symbolise our higher and more intimate experiences. Reason and experience must accordingly go hand in hand. The end is only reached when we have an experience which is recognised to be the solution of all ultimate problems suggested by thought.

Reason then has no further scope. Philosophy has ended in a form of mysticism.

14. G.R. MALKANI: "PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE."

Facts are supposed to be there. But meaning is not simply there. It is personal. We read a meaning in things. If there were no persons, there would be no meaning. Being or existence may be non personal. Meaning cannot be.

15. We are accustomed to think that the philosopher contemplates things from afar in a

detached and aesthetic mood of mind. He cares only for the truth. He eliminates every subjective feeling or desire or interest. But it is relevant to ask in this connection,-- if the philosopher has no personal interest in truth, why is he at all particular to know it? Is not his very disinterestedness a means to the realisation of a higher interest in truth? What is important for the philosophér is not the knowledge of bare existence, but how this existence is related <u>to him</u>. What light it throws on the ideals of his life and his ultimate destiny. The interest of the philosopher in truth is intensely personal. He seeks to bring out the true nature of the relation of things to himself. That will be their meaning for him.

How does he get at this meaning? He does not contemplate things as something in themselves and apart from his experience of them. He contemplates them as part of his experience. This experience is not of one simple variety, say the "knowing" variety. If all our experience were restricted simply to knowing, there would be no scope for meaning. Facts would be the facts as known, and that would be the end of the matter. But our experience <u>is varied</u>. Indeed, we may be said, in all our experience, to stand in some relation to the object. But this relation is not uniform, and it makes all the difference. We imagine something. Here we are no doubt in relation to some kind of object. But it is evident that this object is as we imagine it. It does not exist <u>in itself</u>. Then there is erroneous perception or hallucination or dream. Here we certainly do not consciously imagine. Yet it is a form of imagination. For the object supposed to be perceived does not exist in itself but only in our perception of it. It is dependent upon this perception. We have a more inclusive experience of this sort in willing. We will something. But the object of our

willing <u>is</u> only as we will it. We create the object, and we uncreate it. In knowing we are not supposed to be creative in any way but merely cognisant of something that is independent of our cognition of it. Lastly in feeling the object is not supposed to be independent of us, but in some sort of unity with us. We feel tooth-ache. This tooth-ache we do not create or will; its being is not dependent upon us. It rather assails us. But, on the other hand, it is not anything in itself and apart from our feeling of it. If nobody actually felt tooth-ache, there would be no tooth-ache at all. Here the object and the subject seem to be in a unity. And then there are levels in experience where object-consciousness does not enter as a necessary part of experience. It is because our experience is thus varied, and we stand in different relations to the object, that there is room for interpretation at all. What we seem simply to cognise may be found on analysis to involve other elements in such a way as to be wholly unrecognisable as cognition. Thus we have the fact of cognition which we cannot deny without <u>real</u> cognition, which becomes our ideal rather than a present fact. The same may be said about other aspects of our experience. We have to elucidate the ideal, and evaluate all relevant facts in relation to that ideal. The ideal alone is the meaning of the facts. It is no doubt implied in the facts. But it is not given to us directly as are the facts. We get at it only through a thinking process and an extension of our intuitive faculty.

Facts are quite palpable, but meaning is something impalpable. It may truly be said to be in the mind. It has direct relation to the spirit of man or the ideals that he stands for.
15.What is important for philosophy then is the analysis and criticism of experience. This is the work of reflection. To reflect upon an expe-

rience is already to transcend that experience. It is to reduce it to comparative falsity, and to rise to the conscious recognition of a higher truth. Philosphy is competent to know this higher truth, because experience in all its forms is an open book to it. It is also competent to answer all questions that arise, for all its questions arise from experience and can be resolved in no other way than by an analysis of experience taken as a whole.

16. The only final test of truth is contained in experience itself. The insight which philosophy gives is subjective only in the sense that a person must see the truth for himself. It is part of his experience. It is not something outside which he can only get at through an investigation of the facts. But it is not subjective in the sense that it is peculiar to each individual. The whole of experience of one individual is not peculiar to him. The experience of one individual is exactly like the experience of any other individual. There is no difference in that. There is difference only in our understanding, in our interpretation, in our analysis of that experience. This difference is unavoidable, because any agreed standard here is out of the question. Although everybody has the same experience, everybody does not have the same power of analysing his own experience or appreciating the finer shades of meaning within that experience. Differences are thus unavoidable.

17. R. DAS. "SANKARA AND MODERN IDEALISM." It is certainly true, as he has pointed out, that the self is not an object among other objects. The self does not stand in the same footing with any other thing in the world. But what exactly do we mean when we say that the self is known but not known as an object? What is the meaning of this term "object"? If it means an external thing, then the assertion that the self is not known as

an object is certainly true; the assertion will be true so long as we restrict the meaning of the term 'object' to anything other than the self. But if 'object' means merely 'known', as it always does in an epistemological context, then to say that the self is known but not as an object is to say that the self is known but as what is not known, which appears to be a contradiction.

Mr. Mukerjee of course means that there is a foundational consciousness which is the basis of all our thought and experience, and the self is, as Sankara teaches, one with this absolute consciousness. This consciousness is self-manifest, and does not need to be shown forth by a further act of knowledge directed upon it, which would turn it into an object. The self is not given in any objective mode of consciousness, but this does not mean that it is not revealed at all, because it is the very principle of revelation itself. Mr. Mukerjee is right in combating the view that Sankara's philosophy leads to agnosticism, and Deussen was clearly wrong if he held this view. Agnosticism means that the ultimate reality cannot be known at all, and that view surely is very different from agnosticism which says that the ultimate reality is the principle of knowledge itself.

We have said that our author draws his inspiration from Sankara, but it would be wrong to suppose that he uncritically accepts what Sankara teaches or what passes in the name of Sankara. It seems he has arrived at his position by his own thinking, aided by his study of other philosophers of the West, and finds and gladly accepts from Sankara what he takes to be a corroboration and completion of his own philosophic position. In consequence we are happy to find a touch of freshness in his interpration of the Vedantic position at many

points.
18. It seems that his mind is steeped in modern idealism. This is clearly seen not only from the thoughts and ideas, which he freely expresses, but even from the language in which they find their expression. But although an interpreter, whose mind has already assumed an idealistic cast, is better able to understand and appreciate many points in the Vedantic position I think, he is at times likely to go wrong if he uses in his interpretation ideas and expressions which are current in modern idealism.
19. When he denies that 'the Advaita Absolute is an altogether transcendent principle', his denial can be accepted only with some qualification. The absolute according to the Vedanta is our inmost self, and in that sense certainly it is not a transcendent principle. But so far as our finite experience or the emdirical world is concerned, I think the absolute may will be conceived as transcendent. We cannot certainly get it in our finite experience or find it in the world. Mr. Mukerjee argues that it would not "serve as an explanatory principle of our finite experience," if it were "out of all connexions with" it. But the point is whether the advaitists seek to explain our finite experience and do it through the absolute alone. That it is the business of philosophy to explain experience is what we have learnt from Western Philosophy, but it may not be true of the Vedanta. To explain experience is to substantiate it, but it is the business of Advaitic Philosophy to show that our finite experience has no substantial basis, and thus to lead us beyond finite experience. The express aim of the Vedantic discipline is to make the phantasm of finite experience disappear for ever, and if we cannot sublate finite experience by a direct knowledge of the absolute, we have to try by philosophy at

least to explain it away. Even when the Advaitists try to explain finite experience, they do not do so by the absolute alone, but require the indispensable help of maya or the principle of illusion.

Mr. Mukerjee may surely point out that the absolute is the basis of the world, and may argue that this would be impossible if it were wholly transcendent. But we should understand in what sense the absloute is taken to be the basis of the world. The absolute is the basis of the world exactly in the sense in which a piece of rope is the basis of the illusory appearance of a snake which is seen in its place. If we cannot say that a piece of rope is immanent in the snake, we can no more say that the absolute is immanent in the world.

In another place he says that "Being is immanent in the world of appearance." This statement is quite true in a sense, and we shall presently see in what sense it is so. Being (sat) may be taken as a name of the Vedantic absolute and so, if the above statement is true, it should be true to say that the absolute is immanent in the world. And if the world is sustained by the absolute, it appears reasonable to suppose that something of the absolute should come out in the world. The Advaitists would be willing to concede this point and admit that the being and manifestation of the world came from the absolute. The world manifests itself as having being, but manifestation and being do not inherently and ultimately belong to the world, but to the self or the absolute. And in this sense, we can say that being or manifestation, or, if you like, the absolute is immanent in the world. But we should take care to understand that although without being and manifestation, the world would be nothing, it acquires no better reality even with these. For being is under-

stood as infinite or pure being, and nothing in the world is made up of pure being. Everything in the world is made up of pure being. Everything in the world is determinate, finite and limited; determination, limitation or finitude is the essential character of the world and of everything worldly, and this character is not derived from the absolute, but imposed by maya or illusion. Thus we see that really even being is not immanent in the world. And the absolute, which is one with the self, is certainly not found anywhere in the world, and cannot, therefore, properly be conceived as immanent in it. Mr. Mukerjee says that the world of appearance, for Sankara, is not entirely false.

20. But if we have to discard thought in our attempt to apprehend the Vedantic absolute, what becomes of philosophy itself, seeing that philosophy is nothing but consistent and systematic thinking? With this question we come to the important topic which our author has discussed in the appendix under the title "The Role of Reasoning in Advaita Philosophy." All students of philosophy should be grateful to Mr. Mukerjee for emphasising, the important of thought, even in the Vedantic scheme of self-realisation. If any rational mind is to be content with the advaitic position, thought must play an important part for it. As thinking (manana) has been expressly prescribed as one of the three necessary means of realising the absolute, we can easily see that we cannot dispense with thought or philosophy altogether. But one would be wrong, however, if, from what Mr. Mukerjee says on this point, one were to suppose that thought has any positive contribution to make to our knowledge of the absolute reality or that thought by itself can lead 'to the highest type of experience in which the absolute reality stands self-revealed.' Since the absolute

cannot be grasped in any of the categories of thought, it is futile to expect that thought can give us any positive guidance in this sphere. Left to itself, thought will not lead us anywhere near the absolute reality without the aid of revelation or save direct intuition.

The view of reality propounded by the Vedanta is not particurlarly congenial to thought. The view of reality, which says that the absolute is a featureless, undifferenced unity, and the world which is based on it is, after all, an illusory appearance, appears prima facie absurd and impossible. Thought requires all its powers to persuade itself that this view is not really absurd or impossible and that all its categories, through which it seeks to grasp reality, are riddled with self-discrepancy and do not apply to reality at all. It is only this negative function of self-criticism that can legitimately be assiged to thought in the Vedantic scheme. It is however a necessary and important function. For we are by nature wedded to thought, and cannot honestly and sincerely accept a view of reality which defies thinking comprehension, unless thought has been already silenced by effective self-criticism.

Mr. Mukerjee writes as a rational thinker, and it is but natural that he should emphasise the importance of thought. We are grateful to him for his rational interpretation of many points in the Advaitic position, but it appears that in the process he has also somewhat assimilated the advaitic position to a type of idealism with which one is familiar in the West. One gets the impression that Advaitism is a type of idealistic philosophy, such as one gets in Green or Hegel, although at certain points, it may go beyond what Green or Hegel teaches. That we can rise to a true knowledge of reality by means of thought, that the absolute is the expla-

natory ground of the world or of our experience; and that the world of appearance is not entirely false--are points that we have learned only too well from Western idealism, and Mr. Mukerjee seems to imply that they are true even of Sankara's position. We have tried to show in what sense they apply or do not apply to Advaitism. If a student of modern philosophy is at all to understand the Advaitic position, he should realise first of all that it represents almost a type by itself, radically different from what he gets in modern European philosophy. No modern thinker will say, as Sankara undoubtedly says, that the absolute is wholly unconnected with all objects, a point which Mr. Mukerjee also recognises when he says that there is strictly speaking no relation between the absolute consciousness and the determinate objects. No modern idealist, so far as I know, has said that the World we must disappear with the rise of true knowledge or that the ultimate reality or our very self, is pure being without any determination or pure knowledge without any content.

In what I have said above I have merely tried to put, forward what I take to be the traditional orthodox point of view which surely Mr. Mukerjee knows so well. If at places he has expressly differed from the traditional view, it is because he holds the traditional view to be philosophically untenable or inconsistent with the expressed opinions of Sankara. In some places, the philosophical and rational bias of his mind, as it appears to me , has coloured his interpretation of the Advaitic doctrine, and has made it appear far more intellectualistic and far less mystical that it really is.

21. S.N.L. SRIVASTAVA: "A VINDICATION OF ADVAITIC TRANSCENDENTALISM." A very subtle, and to the Western students of Indian thought a very perplexing and baffling question arises. What

claims have the Dream, the Deep Sleep and Turiya States to be regarded as the essential moments of Experience? The answer is that the most fundamental implicate of experience viz. the correlativity of the experiencing consciousness and an experienced object which characterises the Waking State is also found to characterise the Dream and Deep Sleep States, and that a close scrutiny of these three states points to the possibility of a Fourth State (Turiya) in which the object can be sublated and the subject-object relationship cancelled. Experience, as we know it in the Waking experience itself, is a correlated whole of the subject and the object. And this correlation is <u>not absent</u> in the Dream and the Deep Sleep States. If by wakefulness be meant the awareness of an object, then in the Dream and the Deep Sleep States we are as much <u>awake</u> as in what we usually call the Waking State. The Dream and the Deep Sleep states <u>are not lapses into unconsciousness</u> as it is usually supposed. They are full-fledged states of <u>conscious</u> experience in which there <u>is</u> an object thought of characteristically different nature from that found in the waking experience. They do not mean <u>gaps</u> in the <u>continuity</u> of conscious experience. How can we say this? Because we have recollection of a <u>void</u> or of any state in which we were really <u>unconscious</u>. The man waking from a deep sleep recollects and says "Oh! What a happy and blissful sleep I had!" So also there is recollection of dreams. Nor can we say that these are semi-conscious states, for, the notion of 'semi-consciousness' is as ill-conceived as that of unconscious experience. Consciousness as such is never less nor more nor half nor three-fourths. Waking-Dreaming-Deep Sleep is one continuous conscious experience. The narrowing down of the range

of conscious experience to the waking alone is from the Hindu transcendentalist point of view the proton psuedos of all other philosophies.

Now, having conceded that there is no lapse or cessation of consciousness in Waking, Dream and Deep Sleep, we have to concede further that in all these States there can be no absence of the object; for, any state of conscious experience where the object is non est would be no conscious experience. Consciousness which is not consciousness of an object is utterly unthinkable. If in any conscious experience the cancellation of the perceiving consciousness is impossible, the cancellation of the object is equally impossible. The object is the necessary and inexpugnable correlative of consciousness. Our usual notion of regarding the 'world' of the waking consciousness as the permanent object of experience is an error analogous to that of regarding the Waking as the only State of conscious experience. If we are as much conscious in the Dream and the Deep Sleep as in the Waking, how can we help being conscious of an object? The object may be defined as what we are conscious of, the entire region of the comprehended not-self that confronts the comprehending consciousness, and thus defined the term becomes more comprehensive that our usual 'world' of waking experience. The Mandukya Upanishad tells us that the external physical universe of the waking Consciousness (Vaisvanar) the internal mental world of the Dream consciousness (Taijasa) and the non-differentiated unitary continuum of the Deep Sleep State (Prajna) are three different modes of all conscious experience. The Mandukya explains these modal differances as conditioned by the different adjustments of the psyche and the sensorial apparatus.

22. A man finds himself in his dreams seeing, hearing and interfering with things that are

miles away from where he is, and very often at places which he cannot locate at all on his waking.

All this is quite true. The dream-world is entirely a psychical or mental prpjection, a fabrication out of the nascent mental vestiges. That is why the Mandukya characterises the Dream as antah-prajnah whereas the Waking is bahisprajnah. But both the waking and the dream worlds agree in this that they are alike ekonavimsatimukhah, that is comprehensible through the nineteen channels mentioned above. Although in the Dream the sensorial and the motor organs do not function and the world is entirely a mental creation, yet it is essentially of the same nature as the world experienced in the Waking. In the dream world also the subject sees, hears, feels, handles objects and moves about etc. and therefore the dream world is also nineteen-mouthed in the same sense in which the waking world is. Hence the Mandukya rightly characterises both as ekonavimsatimukhah.

It should be remembered that we are concerned here with the consideration of the metaphysical implications of dream experience which is quite a different thing from giving a psychological account of its genesis or elucidating its psychological implications. Modern thinkers in the West have evinced great interest in the psychology of dreams, but none in the metaphysics of dream experience as such.

Now, let us turn to the dreamless Deep Sleep State. The Object is this State, unlike that in the Waking and the Dream, is a non-differentiated unitary continuum (ekibhutah) a seamless totum objectivum. This state of experience is described as chetomukhah, that is, one where the entire apprehending of the object is through consciousness itself unmediated by the mind and the senses. The susupti is a

state of experience where, due to the cessation of the functioning of the psyche and the sensorial apparatus, there is no splitting up of the homogeneity of the object into a "world" of differentiated objects. This is called by the Mandukya the State of prajna and is further characterised as being prajnanaghana (a seamless continuum of consciousness), anandamaya (endowed with an abundance of bliss) and anandabhuka (the experiencer of bliss). Here in this state we get an inkling of the ultimate unity of the subject and the object. A world of objects, like that in the Waking and the Dream being non est here, the object is presented only as a mass of homogeneous consciousness (prajnanaghana). Being free of all efforts and contradictions of the waking and the dream alike, it is a blissful experience. Another fact of cardinal significance that is brought out by the Deep Sleep State of experience is this that the manifoldness or differentiation which obtains in the waking and the Dream is entirely contingent and conditional upon our apprehending the object through the psycho-sensorial mechanism. That ceasing to function, there is no manifoldness.

Now, a scrutiny of the basic characters of the three States establishes three metaphysical principles of cardinal significance. Firstly, that the differentiated world, in its ultimate nature is purely phenomenal. The perception of multiplicity and the spatial, temporal and causal relationships of objects are all contingent upon the functioning of the psycho-sensorial mechanism. Our 'time-sense' itself becomes different in the Dream and the Waking States. Events that would require a considerably long time in the waking world would be done in an inconceivably short time in dreams.

Secondly, from the phenomenality of the object in the three States follows the possibility

of negation of the object as such. The sublation of the object in the noumenal or 'absolute experience' (turiya) follows as a matter of logical necessity from the phenomenality of the object in the three states. The Mandukya therefore characterises the Turiya experience as prapancopasamah or an experience where the entire phenomenal object is negated. This is the ne plus ultra state of experience where reality is appraised in its ultimate truth, primal homogeneity and undivided wholeness. The world or the object then, according to the Hindu transcendentalist standpoint, is phenomenally@ real and transcendentally ideal.

Thirdly, in the entire stretch of Experience, from the Waking to the Turiya, Consciousness is the permanent and non-negatable factor in reality, while the object is negatable and has no permanence. This ultimate, principle which is

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@ (re Avastatraya): It should be remembered in this connection that when the world is pronounced 'ideal' in Vedantism, it means nothing like what is known in European thought as "mentalism" or subjective idealism or solipsism. Subjective idealism is the view which equates the world of outer reality with the procession of momentary psychical states in the individual mind, thus nullifying the distinction between the act or process of knowledge and the 'objects' of knowledge existing independently of the knowing process. This is not the Vedantic position. It is only in the higher wakefulness of the Turiya that the object is sublated. In the waking experience the distinction between the passing course of ideas in the individual minds and the outer reality is fully recognised. Sankara's criticism of the Vijnanavada (subjective Idealism) of the Bauddhas is well known.

spoken of as Being-Consciousness-Bliss (Sat-Chit-Ananda) is spirit which is the foundation of all visible and conceivable reality. The concept of Spirit needs a little more elaboration. Spirit according to Hindu thought, is Primal Being (argrayam sat) and immutable Intelligence (kootastha Chaitanya). The problem of 'real being' has always been placed by the Vedantic thinkers in the very forefront of their philosophical enquiry. True Being, the Vedantins hold, is that which can subsist independently or in its own right. It is eternal, immutable, and non-negatable. Spirit alone has this being. Ontologically, the world or the objective order has no unsublatable being; for it is sublated in the Turiya, whereas what endures from the Waking to the Turiya is the comprehending Consciousness. The object is for Consciousness. We have also a direct apprehension of the self-subsistent being of spirit in self-knowledge or self-awareness. What is it that, in self-awareness, I grasp as myself, the reality answering to the concept I in my intimate and integral experience of "I am"? A close scrutiny of the specific experience of self-awareness will reveal the fact that what I realise as I or my "self" is a Something of the nature of an ultimate percipiere which stands consciously self-distinguished from the entire totality of things that are perceived or comprehended objectively, whose real nature is unmistakable (aviparyasta) whose reality is self-manifest in a direct or immediate experience (aparokshanubhavasiddha) and which is apprehended as the immutably self-same witness of the entire objective order which is mutable at every point of its being. Thus in self-knowledge we have a direct apprehension of self-subsistent, immutable and non-negatable Being which is Spirit. Spirit is real being for as the self-same witness of all

that <u>becomes</u>, it itself <u>never becomes</u> but always <u>is</u>. Objectivity and change go together. It is <u>possible</u> to raise the question: "Does the world really exist or not"? But the question "Do <u>I</u> exist or do <u>I</u> not?" is ruled out <u>ab initio</u> by the immediate certainty of "<u>I</u> am." Spirit is the deepest and the most certain truth in all experience.

Now we are in a position to answer the question whether the concept of Spirit is rational or not? The answer, it should be clear from what precedes, must be in an emphatic affirmative. The rational we said is that which can intelligibly be brought into coherence with the entirety of our knowledge and experience. If so, what concept can be more rational than that of spirit which is the very foundation of all experience, the non-negatable and self-subsistent factor in the <u>entire</u> totality of experience?

22. <u>S.S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI</u>. "<u>JIVANMUKTI</u>." The position, however, is different in the Advaita Vedanta. Spirit is not seer, but sight; he is self-luminous; in so far as the not-self is illuminated it is as superposed in the self, not as an independent reality. Nescience is both the cause and the stuff of the superimposition. Knowledge removes both at one stroke. On the view which admits only a single jiva there is no difference of the released from the unreleased; with a genuine attainment of release by the one jiva, the entire world is dissolved. There will be left neither a cognisable body nor other cognisers to dispute if it constitutes a bond or not. Even where such extreme solipsism is not adopted, knowledge, when it does come, is bound to remove the presentation of the world as world i.e. as a fetter, a bond, a cuase of suffering. Other jivas in whom this knowledge has not yet manifested itself may see

the mukta's body as if it were a limitation; whereas it is really such depends, however, on the consciousness of the mukta. He too in order to show his kinship with the other may affect to speak of himself as bound, or he may genuinely claim to be released even though a body is seen. In the latter case, we cannot dispute the claim, unless we can point to an inconsistency between the claim and facts. There would be such inconsistency if the claim were made by us who feel the body to be a fetter. If, however, another person finds it not a fetter, but a tool, how can we dispute his claim to be released, to be the master of maya, not its slave? "How" asks Sankara "can one's own intimate experience of Brahman-knowledge existing together with embodiment be denied by another?" The dissolution of the body serves no purpose in the Advaitin's scheme of salvation. Release is not inevitable in physical decease: nor should such decease be inevitable for release.

The co-existence of maya with release cannot be avoided at least by those Advaita schools which admit a plurality of jivas. When any one Jiva, say A, is released the simultaneous release of all other jivas does not follow; these have their own avidyas to be removed by wisdom attained through their own effort, with greater or less intervals according to their respective grades of present perfection. Is A aware of these other jivas? If not, he would be ignorant of fact, lack omniscience and so far fall short of the perfection that is release. If, on the contrary, he is aware of them, he should also be aware of their bonds, their individual avidyas. These co-exist with his own perfection, which would be synonymous not with the non-existence of something apparently foreign, but the ability fully to control this apparent other. The mukta would be Isvara, the mayin, the wielder of maya,

as contrasted with the jiva bound in its toils. What happens then is that on release the mukta ceases to be a personality separate from Isvara, but becomes Isvara Himself; as Isvara he views the world and controls the world. The body of the erstwhile bound jiva being part of such world, it continues to be controlled and actuated by Isvara. It may in due course get dissolved into its components. Whether it does get so dissolved and when are not considerations determinative of the release of the alleged mukta; for it is the mastery of the non-self that constitutes release, not its dissolution. From such a point of view, the problem for the Advaitin would be not release while embodied, but the fact of death. If, as Sankara says, "it is not possible to assume, in respect of the self, it being embodied in any other way than through illusory self, it being embodied in any other way than through cognition, consisting in the conceit of self in the body" and "non-embodiment is eternal, because it is not caused by an act" release must be the destruction of the erroneous conceit, not the destruction or dissolution of the body.

THE EASTERN BUDDHIST: Vol.1.

1. SENSHO MURAKAMI: "MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."
When the universe is swept clean of all its affirmations, there looms up for the first time the truth of absolute reality. The Eight No's may thus be summed up in one NO, which will stamp the seal of negation on the whole field of human ideation. Kichizo, the Chinese commentator on Nagarjuna's Dvadasa-Nikaya, says that these negations are what constitutes the essence of Mahayana Buddhism. If so, the Mahayana doctrine is ultimately the philosophy of Emptiness, (Sunyata.)

2. "The deep sense of the Mahayana consists in Emptiness"--this explains the whole thing. The

philosophy of Sunyata is then the foundation of the Mahayana thus distinguishing itself from the Hinayana, that is, Sarvastivada. According to the latter, the relativity of ego-lessness of things is the ultimate truth, but Nagarjuna now insists that things are relative or conditioned as they abide in Emptiness, or that they are ego-less because they are dependent upon Emptiness. The Sarvastivadins are right as far as they go, but they do not go far enough, they do not fathom the depths of Emptiness from which all things, related to one another and without an ego, derive their reason of existence. The basis of the relativity of things lies in Emptiness, that is, in the Seal of Absolute Reality. Hence the Mahayana paradox, "what is empty is real, and what is real is empty."

But Nagarjuna's theory of Emptiness ought not to be confused with nihilism or an empty abstraction. The truth of the Mahayana transcends the analysis of logic, and he alone can realise it whose insight has deeply penetrated into the reason of things, for such is really an enlightened one.

3. While Nagarjuna negated it, Asanga made a positive advance in the theory of the mind. He was not satisfied with the "sixth consciousness" of the Sarvastivadins, he created the "seventh consciousness" (Manovijnana) and even the "eighth consciousness" (Alaya-Vijnana), he then made the latter the carrier of all the seeds of work, from which this phenomenal world took rise.

4. The first point of superiority, according to Asanga, is that the Mahayana has a higher principle to explain the origin of universe and life, by which he means the hypothesis of Alaya-vijnana or the "eighth consciousness." All the seeds mental as well as material, are preserved here just as things are kept in a storehouse. "Alaya"

means "storing" and it is imagined by most people that this "Alaya" is the real ego-soul from which starts the consciousness of the self.
5. The second point of superiority claimed by Asanga is that the Mahayana distinguishes three aspects of existence whereby the Middle Way of Buddhism is effectively proclaimed. They are Relativity, Conditionality, and Reality. In short, we are all confused in our way of looking at things, for they are not really what they appear to the senses. In this respect they are empty, sunya, the subjective images are not necessarily the objective realities. Objectively considered, things are mutually conditioned and conditioning, they are phenomena woven in time and space, and they have no absolute independent existence. They are all governed by the law of conditionality. But this does not deny the existence of something really real. Asanga asserts there is a world of reality; when all is pronounced relative and therefore of no permanent value, this does not mean that existence is an absolute void but that it is not as it appears to our confused consciousness. The Alaya is no empty assumption. Thus the special feature of Asanga's Mahayana philosophy has come to be idealistic, strongly emphasising the subjective or psychological element of Buddhism. He thought the source of all things lies in the Alaya.
6. I have some strong grounds to believe that the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana which is traditionally ascribed to Asvagosha and which is the only work of his expounding his philosophical view of Mahayana Buddhism, is not really his, but a Chinese product, presumably trying to systematise the two Mahayana schools of Nagarjuna and Asanga. Logically there is no doubt that it is a synthesis of

Sunya philosophy and the Vijnanavadin. The main idea is based on the Avatamsaka doctrine of the Dharmadhatu, which forms the central thought of the Awakening of Faith. According to Asvaghosha's own terminology, the ultimate cause of the universe is "One Mind" or "One Dharmadhatu" or "Mind of all beings," and it can be viewed in two aspects, noumenal and phenomenal. From the noumenal point of view, it is true Suchness, the Sunya, and from the phenomenal point of view, it is subject to the conditions of birth and death.

7. According to the author, Mahayana may be explained from two points of view: first, he tells us what constitutes the substance of the Mahayana, and secondly he explains why this is to be denoted Great. (Maha). What constitutes the substance of the Mahayana is called by him the Mind of All Beings, that is to say, this ordinary everyday mind of ours filled with defilements is Mahayana, for from this all things are produced. The Mind is in its essence the suchness of things and remains forever unchanged and absolute; but at the same time as it is conditional, it becomes, is subject to birth and death, and for this reason we can distinguish three conceptions involved in it. They are Essence, Attribute and Work.

Nagarjuna is an absolutist, in him there is no trace of the idealist, but Asanga is the latter. Asvaghosha shows very strong proclivity toward idealism, but his "Mind" is not a duplicate of Asanga's Alaya. Asvaghosha calls it the Tathagata-Garbha in which all things are stored up, and, when conditions are furnished, it will bear fruit of all value. Asvaghosha's negative conception of the Mind as Sunya comes from the Prajna philosophy of Nagarjuna, while the positive side of the Tathagata-Garbha is derived from such Mahayana Sutra as the Srimala and Lankavatara, and to a great extent influenced by the Asanga's

Vijnanamatra theory.

Thus Asvaghosha stands in the middle way between the two Mahayana schools of Indian Buddhism, and in a happy way synthesises them. Therefore, Gangyo of Korea, one of the great commentators of Asvaghosha, remarks that the Awakening of Faith is the father of all treatises and the author is the king of all critics. The book is written concisely and at the same time most comprehensibly, so many thoughts, deep and suggestive, are compressed into a fasciculus containing a little over five thousand Chinese characters. One of the most original conceptions that influenced the later Buddhist scholars is that of the triple aspect of Mahayana, as Essence, Attribute, and Work. According to this, Mahayana is great in Essence, for the mind contains in it the absolute element of the universe: secondly, Mahayana is great in Attribute, for it embraces in itself innumerable possibilities which may develop into all forms and functions, and thirdly, Mahayana is great in Work, for when all these Attributes infinite in variety are disciplined and directed, they will accomplish an innumerable amount of work towards the perfection of Buddhahood. The Mind of all beings which constitutes the Essence of Mahayana, though humble in its phenomenality, is great, when its infinite possibilities are considered. Is not the Mind a storage of all good things which may finally mature themselves into Tathagatahood? By the Editor:

8. "The Lankavatara Sutra is one of the important Mahayana writings, in which the doctrine of the Tathagata-garbha and Alayavijnana is expounded, and it is noted as the text book which Bodhi-Dharma, the founder of Zen Buddhism in China, handed to his disciple, Yeka, as containing the main principles of his teachings."

9. BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI "BODHISATTVAS." Let

us conclude by considering one of the greatest Bodhisattvas in Mahayana Buddhism. I mean Manjusri or Monju as he is known in Japanese, who personifies intelligence and wisdom. Manjusri is supposed to be not only an ideal but to have had his origin in history and to have introduced Buddhism from India into Nepal. We do not know how much truth there is in this story, but the fact is that he is the patron and ideal of Mahayana Buddhism. His image is invariably found in meditation halls of the Zen temples in Japan; this is set up in order that the monks sitting on their mats in the act of meditation may have before them the representation of one who was such a mountain of wisdom and illumination. He is often represented in the triad of Sakyamuni, Fugen, and Monju. Where Monju represents wisdom, Fugen or Samantabhadra represents love and is often seen seated upon an elephant on the right side of the Buddha and Monju seated upon the left on a lion. While Monju has a masquline appearance, Fugen is more feminine and often in Japan is spoken of as a woman.

In this trinity of Buddha, Manjusri, and Samantabhadra, the central doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism is most symbolically expressed. Intelligence alone is not enough, love must cooperate with it, in order to accomplish the most sublime work of universal salvation. Love is the mother and intelligence the father, and these two are perfectly united in the person of the Buddha. This is really the principal topic of the Avatamsaka Sutra, especially of the chapter entitled, "The Entrance into the Spiritual World," which corresponds to the Nepalese Gandavyuha. In this Sutra Sudhana is the chief figure who inspired by Manjusri goes through a long spiritual pilgrimage. He interviews all kinds of people, men and women, kings and ascetics, men of immense wealth and women somewhat disreputable, but all of whom are

philosophers and saints in their own ways. He finally comes to Maitreya, the last of the long series of fifty-three teachers, each of whom has given him enlightening instructions according to his or her spiritual insight. Maitreya after teaching the pious pilgrim in religion advises him to go back to Manjusri, for it was through his mysterious ways that Sudhana was able to get instructions from the various philosophers. When he thinks of Manjusri with singleness of heart, the Bodhisattva suddenly appears to him, and teaches him to practise the deeds and resolves or desires of Samantabhadra. Sudhana, here throughout depicted as a youth seeking the light of truth, is no less than a manifestation of Manjusri himself, who, through the instructions of Maitreya, the future Buddha, now enters upon the path of spiritual life, which is love and wisdom.

One significant fact in the pilgrimage of Sudhana which must not escape our notice is that so many of the teachers this young Buddhist seeker of truth approached for enlightenment were women. Oriental people are generally imagined by the Westerners to be indifferent to the dignity and virtue of womanhood, but that this view is incorrect is most eloquently proved by Sudhana's religious pilgrimage. Before he comes to Maitreya, he is embraced in love of Mayadevi, for without her sanctifying love he could not appear in the presence of the future Buddha.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. XV. 1939.

1. T.R.V. MURTI: "THE CONCEPTION OF BODY."

The usual conception of the body is that of an object, as what is perceived as external to the self. The Cartesian conception is a well-known example. There are two insuperable difficulties which beset this conception. One is how an entity totally indifferent to

the self can function as our body at all. Secondly, even if it could, we cannot resist the claims of each and every object to be equally the body of the self.

2. Unless it were initially one with the self, it cannot function as the body at all. This is at least true of the most primary body, one through which we acquire other bodies. A direct consequence of this is that it is not a true statement of affairs that we have the self and the body as separate and unrelated entities at first, and that afterwards they get somehow related.

3. If it were one with the self, how then do we know it <u>as body</u> or even that it is or has been one with the self? This is to say that the distinction between the self and its body could never have arisen. There are two ways which facilitate the emergence of the distinction between the body and the self: want of consonance in our pursuit and the emergence of other bodies. No one is ordinarily conscious of one's seeing <u>through</u> the eye so long as the eye does not give one any trouble. But the moment it begins to pain or distort our perception resulting in a check to our usual pursuit, we begin to realise that <u>we have been</u> using the eye as an instrument of perception.

Again, suppose after seeing a coloured surface, I attend to sounds. When seeing the colour, I was not conscious of seeing it through the eye; I just see the object. But when I hear sounds subsequently, I am led to this sort of reflection. Now is one kind of sensations, now another; I am of course the same. There must have been some factor, not present now, which was responsible for the colour-sensum. Differences in the objective lead to the distinction of the self from the differents.

From the foregoing analysis, it follows that

the body while it is actually functioning as a body, is not, and cannot be, known as body. Only when it ceases to function, it is known as body. Our consciousness of it is invariably retrospective: it is always apprehended as what was the body and not as what is. The reason for this is obvious. The body is so intimately identified with the self that it cannot be known, perceived as object. And only as it gets dissociated from the self do we know it at all. Without bringing in the identification with the self and the subsequent dissociation from it, the body cannot be defined as something in itself. Its essence consists in this spiritual history, its relation with the self.

Identification is mistaken identity; one entity is taken for, and appears as, another. An analagous case is that of illusion, e.g. the "rope-snake." While we are actually in illusion, we are not conscious of the illusion. Cancellation, which effects a dissociation of the "snake" from the rope for which it is mistaken, is at once, the awareness of the previous state as illusion. Likewise, the body is known as body when we dissociate it from the self, when we annul its identification with the latter.

4. This unacceptable predicament of declaring the body to be illusory confronts us, it can be averred, because we have abstracted the body from the self and vice versa. It might further be suggested that body and mind are organic to each other: one cannot simply be without the other. If on the previous view (the Cartesian Conception) there is no bond of unity, on the present one there is no ground of distinction. If two things have been always together and will be so too, even the bare distinction of their duality cannot arise. We are not justi-

fied in taking them as two. All relation implies non-implicatory term which is not exhausted in the relation. That must be something in itself, irrespective of the relation. This cannot be the body, for we have no means of coming across the body apart from the self. The self is what is in itself.

So we can neither conceive the self and the body as independent of each other nor as mutually dependent. The only alternative that accords with facts is that the body is what it is in relation with the self and nothing apart from it. The body is the unreal appearance of the self, what is mistaken for it.

5. It is quite natural for the terrestrial observer to instinctively identify himself with the earth and locate and measure in terms of the earth's position and distance. For him the earth is the body at the time, for though its function is un-noticed, it conditions our sensa of the celestial objects. Normally, we are identified with the physical body; and all our sense-experience is conditioned by it. And when we actually perceive, the body temporarily, extends, as it were, to the object of perception. The sense-organs are so many tentacles which the physical body shoots forth in grasping the object. But this temporary extension of the body or its identification with the particular is not a conscious process: in perception we are not reflectively aware of the perceiving. And only as we withdraw our identification with the object, do we become reflectively aware of the previous act of perception. It is then that we make the bifurcation of subject and object. The identification with the object well explains the feeling of being in immediate contact with reality which is the unique characteristic of perception. This supplies the point of reference or direction to thought.

6. The endeavour of all spiritual discipline may well be to bring about a sure and lasting freedom from all body, to realise the spirit in its innate purity. And even to have raised the problem of the body is already to be aware symbolically at least, of the possibility of the freedom of the self from the body.

7. KALI PRASAD: "THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS."
The metaphysician is concerned with a reality transcending the phenomena of common experience about which alone the scientist makes his statements. The metaphysician rejects the methods of science as being unsuitable for his purposes, not because he believes them to be unfruitful in themselves, but because in the metaphysical domain they have no application. But it will be shown that this is a mistake. The defect of metaphysics is not that its methods are questionable or unfruitful but that the end that it has in view is itself chimerical. Whatever methods, whatever form of reasoning he may employ, it will be shown, that the metaphysician succeeds is saying nothing significant or meaningful. All metaphysical assertions will be shown to be pseudo-propositions, mere combinations of words devoid of any logical content.

8. In his Critique, Kant saw very clearly that speculative reason was utterly incompetent to answer the metaphysical riddles and when it did venture out beyond the limits of experience it irredeamably lost itself in self-contradictions and antinomies. This was a distinct service to science and philosophy but unfortunately Kant committed himself to the view that the fault lay at the door of reason: that it was an innate imperfection of man that he could not by his reason gain the knowledge of the transcendent reality which alone was ultimate in contrast with the world of phenomena. Consequently

he was at pains to show that where reason failed some other power like intuition might succeed.
9. We shall show that metaphysical sentences result from the violation of the rules of logic and grammar or rather, the rules of logical syntax of the language, that is they fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. A proposition is genuine when it has meaning, that is, when it is verifiable. We affirm that the meaning of a proposition can be given only by giving the rules of its verification in experience. We have throughout talked about a proposition being verifiable and not verified. This requires the elaboration of an important distinction between practical or empirical verifiability and logical verifiability or verifiability in principle, or, what is the same thing, empirical possibility and logical possibility.
10. "I am Brahman," "Thou art that." in all these sentences verification is <u>logically</u> impossible because though they appear grammatically to be sentences strictly they are <u>not</u> propositions at all. There are at least three defects: (1) words used in them which have no determinate meaning; (2) words which have some meaning in one context are used in a context in which they can have no meaning; and (3) where the sentences do seem to have meaning they turn out to be either contradictory or absurd when they are carefully translated into their proper logical mode.
11. 'There is indeed the inexpressible' is a proposition(or rather a pseudo-proposition) which on the face of it appears to embody some sublime truth. The atmosphere of awe and grandeur that is inspired by the word 'inexpressible' (particularly when it is written in Capitals) conceals from us its essential contradictoriness. There are two interpretations of this proposition which may be distinguished: (a) It might mean 'there

are unutterable objects," that is "There are objects for which no object-designations exist". Translating it into its logical form it would amount to "There are object-designations which are not object-designations." A contradiction. (b) It might mean, "There are unutterable facts" that is, "There are facts which are not described by any sentence." Translating this into the logical form it would be equivalent to "There are sentences which are not sentences." Again a contradiction! When the logical structure of such propositions is exhibited in this manner the contradiction becomes at once obvious. The original proposition is therefore, utter nonsense and is, in principle, incapable of verification. Thus, when we speak about verification we mean verification in principle and not necessarily actual verification.

12. From all this some Positivists have concluded that statements embodying general propositions of science as well as propositions about the remote past are meaningless and are inadmissible in logic as metaphysical assertions. But as this would leave very little for logic to busy itself with, they make a grudging concession in favour of the former. The general propositions of science and statements about the past on the one hand and metaphysical assertions on the other are both declared to be nonsense.

13. K.R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR. "THE ESSENCE AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD." Their motive in thus partitioning God, so to say, is to explain evil by regarding his entire nature as consisting of rational and moral laws of necessities and possibilities combined with an impotence or evil and qua this mixture, acting as a check or hindrance to God. By thus containing a mixture which is said to be a part of him, God on the one hand is made to "submit" to that which makes

him rational, good or loving (implying that in himself God is not so) and on the other he is converted into a devil-possessed God harbouring the soul of evil in his own heart. God is thus doubly limited and that by something which is his own nature and yet different from himself--a desperate recourse indeed to explain evil! Without his nature God would not be God. And since that nature is one and integral, it cannot be disrupted into parts. If we want to explain evil, the explanation must be offered in some other wise than by disrupting God's nature from himself.

God is Spirit. Spirit cannot as such be defined or described but can only be intuited. Spirit is not idea, or a system of ideas, or consciousness. God or Reality is conscious but not conscious. The thinker is not the thought. Consciousness does not think. God has experience but is not experience. God is not law or a system of laws though he expresses himself in laws. Laws and principles do not exist, any more than thoughts or ideas do, in their own right. Spirit, the thinker or actor, is the presupposition of ideas and activities and thinks or acts freely. Spirit is all that it could be or should be. The actual is the presupposition of the possible. Nor are laws and ideas a part of God either, as Brightman holds; they are purely spirit's interpretation of the modes or products of Spirit's activity. The instant a law or an idea or a sensation is regarded as capable of existing for itself and forming and recognising other ideas etc., the law, idea or thought itself becomes a thinker, a spirit. No Real or Spirit ever finds another Real within its own states of experience. Small wonder, then, that poor Hume, whenever he entered most intimately into himself, always stumbled on some particular perception or other,

and never could catch himself. To say therefore that Reality is, 'mind' or 'intelligence', or 'consciousness' or 'Reason' is misleading, for(unless we carefully interpret these terms to mean a living concrete Spirit or Agent <u>having</u> or <u>possessing</u> mind, intelligence etc.) from intelligence we easily pass to the rational and thence to a system, from consciousness to items or states of consciousness (ideas, sensations etc.) and soon we shall find ourselves saying (with Absolutism) that Reality is a System of Rational thought, or Ideas or experience etc. (Cf. Hegel's "the real is the rational). This is a serious error, for we have now forgotten our idealism and lapsed into phenomenalism. Spirit as Agent is different from Spirit as consciousness or states of consciousness. And when we put the whole world of manifestation into this consciousness or identify the two, and say further that this consciousness is Spirit is Spirit, we shall have a system including other systems, a system of ideas including other ideas etc. It must once for all be made clear that the ultimate Real <u>originates</u> manifestations and is other than manifestations. Indeed one is not sure that the term 'idealism' itself has not contributed to this confusion when what we really mean is something like 'spriti-ism.' The identification of God with nature--usually called pantheism--is also rooted in the same error of equating God, the author of phenomena, with the phenomena themselves, which further leads to materialism etc..

God is or exists (but is not existence). The kind of existence that we are familiar with its spatio-temporal location, and since God's existence is obviously not of this sort, we must make clear in what sense precisely God exists. To exist is primarily to be real. By the real I do not mean the rational or the self-consis-

tent. This is of course one feature of the real, but the true meaning of the real, is firstly, that it is the (logically) ultimate, the ineliminable or the irremovable. You can think away everything else, but you can't think away the real. And secondly, it is factually the condition of the existence of everything else including the thinker himself. It will appear accordingly that, so defined, God's reality is proved by Descartes's cogito more conclusively than the reality of the thinking self itself.

Of the existence of God, further, there are two distinguishable aspects. In one aspect, he exists for himself in all his essence, as he in himself is, just as he is. Here essence and existence are identical. His whole nature exists as fully realised. This existence is non-temporal and non-spatial--time and space do not exist for God here. In another aspect, God exists as the creator and the sustainer of the finite spirits as well as of nature. No temporal beginning can of course be assigned to the life of the finites; God creates them in the sense of being the cause of the condition of their existence. They have a nature of their own which is determined by anything else and which differs from God's nature as much as it agrees with it; but in order to actualise their essence, God's agency is necessary. To give an analogy which is nothing but an analogy, the father exists partially only in his son and for his son while he also exists for himself in his entire essence. This relational aspect of God's existence, however, is in no way separate from the other aspect in which he exists in his full essence.

14. What essence God's own existence involves we finites cannot conjecture, and even his relational existence we can understand only by

anology from our own. In general, however, we can say that God's nature consists of thought, feeling and will identifiable with power or energy.

15. Self-determination is not negation in the sense of privation of Spirit, it is on the other hand self-affirmation, enhancement of positive being in the consciousness, I am <u>all that</u> I am. It is negation only in the ordinary logical sense that being rational is not being irrational, being affectionate is not being cruel etc. And we surely don't want an indeterminate, inchoate, inarticulate God or Absolute who knows not <u>what</u> he is, who would break loose from his own nature just for a change or to show that he is unlimited, who is a hotch-potch of all possible contradictions and yet in whom all logical contradictions cease to be contradictions--another big contradiction!

16. God's relational existence means his experience, and this involves the creation of the finite spirits and the world and sustaining them in their endeavour to perfect themselves. In short, the world-process has a meaning for God. And God and God's experience are two different things. So that while we may admit that his experience undergoes change or development, we cannot conclude that God himself changes or progresses in any sense.

God's own existence is, I said, out of all relation to time and space. What such experience could be we cannot clearly conceive, but we can imagine its nature on the analogy of moments in our own life when we are so fully pre-occupied with the enjoyment of a present experience that we are unconscious of the passage of time as in reading an absorbing novel, in listening to a piece

of fine music, in enjoying a delicious bath etc. God's own existence may also be characterised as infinite, not in the sense of boundlessness of space, or singleness of being but in the sense of perfection or consummation of being. If anything realises the full essence of its being --all that it could be or ought to be--it is infinite after its kind. Since God alone in his self-existence exists in all his essence fully realised, God alone is truly infinite. Art is an attempt to capture the infinite aspect of finite things and immortalise it.

In relation to the finite spirits and the world, God exists eternally. Eternity is endlessness in time and as such must be distinguished both from non-temporality and the finite time in which embodied finite spirits and the world exist. Here time is in God but not God in time. As imposing upon himself the experience of a world-process which has meaning for him, in which he is interested and which undergoes changes, God comes into relation with time, but of course his time may not be of the same nature as the time of the finites, successive or epochal, as his relational existence is permeated through and through with self-existence which is non-temporal. The flow of time may be reversible for him.

17. God's love for his creatures is so profound and perfect that no evil on their part can possibly effect any alteration in it. Perfect love sees the evil and tries to overcome it, if possible, but is not affected by it. God knows moreover that the end, however protracted, is finally to be the winning of all souls to himself, and so is not perturbed over the process.

So much then for the essence of God and his existence. To complete the picture, we must now bring in the finites also. The material world is not set over against God an Other or a Check with which he has to contend. It is purely the expres-

sion of his own power working either directly or through intermediary beings, part of his experience. If is of course spiritual ultimately, for being of the spirit it cannot but be spiritual.

18. He is the one-in-the-many, constituting a whole which as we shall see, is partly given, but always in the making.

19. There is neither an internal limit to God in the form of a Given consisting of rational and moral laws and principles--this is his own nature; nor an external check in the form of an intractable or recalcitrant principle of evil (manichaeism) or a world of matter (materialism) which he has got to mould--this is his own power of mode of activity; nor finally an external bound in the form of finite spirits who are all equal and opposed to him in perfection, will and power--this would be pluralism pure and simple making God merely one finite among many finites; as a matter of fact, finites are in every way unequal, unopposed to God, and dependent upon him for existence and self-realisation. There are three principles in the scheme which safeguard the unity of the universe and the triumph of moral ideals: (1) the existence of an element of sociality in the finite Spirits which impels them to strive for unity-in-diversity; (2) the presence of God in them all as their Inner Guiding Spirit persuading and sustaining without constraining them; (3) his infinite love which is the guarantee of the ultimate redemption of humanity. Unity is thus achieved as a goal, but is not given as a metaphysical ground.

20. KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA. "OBJECT AND APPEARANCE." The central thesis of Berkeleyanism is that a real appearance, quite as much as a false one, is mental, because perceptive activity is the same in both cases. How much of this thesis

is true and where does it lead to?

First, what is meant by 'mental'? If it means 'in the mind' no appearance is mental. To explain the seeming outsidedness of an appearance as associational interpretation is absurd. A cannot be <u>interpreted</u> in terms of B unless it as actually felt has come to be associated with B.

Appearances then are outside. This however is no return to common-sense Realism. The outside may be mental in the sense of <u>depending on the mind</u>. When the same thing appears differently to different spectators these appearances except one are believed to depend on the mind, though none is felt 'in the mind'.

Some believe that these are not dependent on the mind. To use their terminology, these are sensa out of which the <u>thing</u> is <u>constructed</u>; or, as others argue, the thing has all these appearances as a porcupine has its needles.

This however is too much. One of these appearances is believed to be true and others as its aberrations. To explain this away as an ingrained prejudice is hasty. There need be no fetish of this one appearance. Nevertheless the distinction between the two types of appearances has to be explained.

There are two ways of explanation here. Either aberrations alone are dependent on the mind the one true appearance being independent, or both the types are dependent the difference between them lying in the degree of dependence. As there is no degree of independence both the types cannot be taken as independent.

We prefer the account that both the types are dependent on the mind. Reasons are given below.

To shew that even a true appearance depends on the mind. In sense-knowledge the sensation--better the representation--is said to be mental and the thing as non-mental. This representation

is however never introspected as in the mind. It is felt there in the thing. The representation then is nothing but the thing-as-known, the thing is the thing-in-itself. The thing-as-known is what is called appearance. Hence appearance--henceforward by 'appearance' we shall mean true appearance--is mental.

But if the representation is not found in the mind why should it be an entity other than the thing-in-itself? Is not the content of the two the same? In that case it would not be feasible to hold that the appearance is mental.

Such an objection however rests on a confusion. The concept of appearance as distinct from the thing-in-itself is cleared in the following paragraphs.

Perception is either perceiving act or perceivedness. In the second sense what is perceived, in stricter language what becomes perceived, is the thing-in-itself. But in the first sense what is perceived, in stricter language what I perceive, is the thing-as-perceived, i.e. the appearance. In plain language all knowledge is a double process--the thing-in-itself becomes known, and this thing-as-known becomes the content of my knowing act. There is no temporal sequence here. Nor does it mean that all knowledge is reflective. If I am not conscious of the knowing act taking place knowledge is unreflective. It means simply that the thing is <u>known</u>. If, on the other hand, I am conscious of knowing, knowledge is reflective. It means <u>I know</u> the thing-as-known.

All this is what introspection reveals. Knowing and knownness are two different concepts directly revealed; and immediately there is no reason to identify the two or infer one from the other.

Knowing apart then, the thing-as-known is appearance. It is mental, because a representa-

tion is accepted on all hands to be mental. Only traditional psychologists sought it somewhere near about the brain; we find it at the place where the thing is said to stand.

It is not true that an appearance is immediately felt to be mental. It is the thing as known and therefore mental. Not that the thing-in-itself is known first and the thing-as-known apprehended as other than it. Rather we start with the thing-as-known--appearance--and the thing-in-itself is felt to be <u>what this appearance is not.</u> The thing-in-itself can never be directly apprehended as it is always what the appearance is not. It is the necessary correlate of a true appearance, immediately believed on the ground of our passivity in perception, but never understood except as a function of the appearance itself, as what the appearance is not.

The content of the appearance is not the same as that of the thing-in-itself. So long as we are concerned with the knowing act its content is immediately felt to be the appearance, and nothing more is revealed in introspection. If on the other hand we are concerned with the thing-as-known, i.e. the appearance, there is indeed a consciousness of the thing-in-itself, but only as what the appearance is not, nothing more.

The true appearance then is mental in the sense of depending on the mind. The distinction between it as mental and its aberrations as mental is that in its case there is an agreement of different person's knowledge; in the other there is no such agreement. It must not be asked--How can there be agreement if the true appearance is dependent on the mind? For here there is the thing-in-itself which is independent of the mind and which becomes the appearance-- this becoming being understood as an inverse function of the appearance rather than any direct function of the thing-in-itself. In the case of aberrations

these are clearly dependent on individual minds without being at the same time agreed to.

As the thing-in-itself and its relation to the appearance are understood completely in terms of this appearance there should be no objection like--If the thing-in-itself is unknowable how can you speak of it, how can it be said to become the appearance etc.?

What has been established so far is that what we perceive around us are all appearances; but appearances themselves testify to things-in-themselves which are mere functions of these appearances remain ever unknown and unknowable in their true characters. An examination of the word 'mental' thus reduces Berkeleyanism to Phenomenalism which is a form of modern critical Realism.

21. Man necessarily starts in the objective attitude; only later in reflection he believes that the whole of an object is not independent, what is immediately felt being the subjective appearance, the thing-in-itself--the independent thing--receding as unknown and ever unknowable. Pan-Subjectivism is justified on quite a different ground to be described later.

Others go beyond Phenomenalism in another way without repudiating the thing in-itself. They take perception to be thought at a lower stage, and thought itself as not thinking only but thinking-object complex. The upshot is that Reality is but thought--thinking-object--developing from lower to higher stages. There is no transcendence of thinking, nor of the object, because neither is ever apprehended separately.

To this we reply that even in perception the object is immediately felt as capable of transcendence. And in thought its forms are non-transcendent only so far as they stand translated into object-symptoms in the sphere of

appearances otherwise as pure forms they are felt as transcendent, as living distincts in the thinking-object complex. The object as, transcendent may not be realisable. But at least thinking is so felt and may be realised either in the attitude of Practical Reason or in some other way.

The theory cancelled is generally known as Absolutism. A lower form of it is advocated by English Hegelians. It is stated that since the subject and the object are never found separately reality is subject-object. Some of them even describe a state of consciousness in which the distinction between the subject and the object has not yet emerged and often postulate a stage where it will lapse again.

To these thinkers in general there is the reply that both the subject and the object are felt as living distincts, and that the subject at least is realisable by itself. As against the pre-relational experience which some of them refer to, it is either a non-cognitive state or the misunderstood experience of the thing-as-known, knowing as an act not yet being attended to but to be admitted when we reflect on this primary stage. As for the supra-relational experience it stands or falls with their metaphysical presuppositions.

22. The Advaitin rejects the thing-in-itself on the ground that unlike knowing the object can always be imagined as negated. This however is not the easy-going Cartesian recommendation. It is a proposal to cancel the objective attitude altogether--a definitely spiritual prescription. For in the ordinary objective attitude the possible negation of the object sounds absurd.

The passage to the subjective attitude can be understood by means of an analogy. The good ordinarily appears as external to will. But on

reflection it reveals itself--let us assume--as posited by will itself. What appeared as an object is thus negated, and will enjoys itself in the subjective attitude. Some such moral transformation may be imagined to take place in cognition also. From such a point of view the world may possibly be looked at as what knowing posits illusorily as an object. This theory however is no philosophy in the objective attitude. It is a spiritual outlook from the start to the finish. Ordinarily the enjoyed knowing is inextricably connected, though felt as a living distinct, with known-ness. It is only in this spiritual attitude that knowing as enjoyed is dissociated from knownness; and subtler dissociations are conceivable as spiritual culture advances. Advaitism then is not in the same category with the theories already examined. It stands apart as a different type altogether with no imme-diate conflict with the one we are developing.

If the Advaita cancellation of the object is too spiritual, Materialism in all its forms --older and modern--is too hasty in repudia-ting the subject and the subjective.

23. D.M. DUTTA:"KANT AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF SPACE AND TIME." Sensibility is the passive aspect of the mind, which is affected by extra-mental factors and thereby the sensuous contents of the mind are given. Whatever is, therefore, given to the mind which is affected some foreign element and whatever is, there-fore, passively received is sensuous. The pure contents of the mind can be known by their contrast to the sensuous and also by proofs contained in the well-known metaphysi-cal and transcendental expositions (in so far as the intuitive pure contents are concerned). It is thus that colour, taste etc. can be known as sensuous affections of the mind,

whereas space and time are known to be pure and subjective. Again the sensuous contents like colour, taste, imply, according to Kant, the extramental elements which affect the sensibility and thus Kant comes to hold that the sensuous contents are appearances corresponding to which there must be the extra-mental things-in-themselves.

24. G.R. MALKANI: "THE ULTIMATE INDIVISIBILITY OF SUBSTANCE." The notion of substance is often called into question. It is argued that there is no permanent or standing being. Whatever is, changes. There is nothing that stands still. Thus change is the very stuff of reality. The notion of substance as some sort of standing being is outworn and must be given up.

This view does not appear to us to be very reasonable. Indeed, we cannot empirically point to something which never changes and which is substance par excellence. Whatever we can point to will after all be an element in the whole of reality and thus subject to change. But we can show that not only is the notion of substance without absurdity, but also that it is both necessary and inevitable. Without it, we cannot render our experience as it is intelligible.

Let it be granted that all that is, changes. But then could change be known? Change can only be known when the movement which it constitutes is held together in one undivided apprehension. Indeed this apprehension may itself be regarded as momentary. But then it presupposes some other consciousness which can apprehend its momentariness without being itself momentary. Again, change is not possible without assuming that there is something that changes and which therefore remains self-identical through change, or again that there is an unchanging back-ground in relation to which change occurs. We cannot have

all change without any stability anywhere. For such change would not be intelligible as change at all.

25. What the ultimate stuff of reality may be, we cannot say. But it is very natural to suppose that there is some ultimate stuff, and that all the substances which we know are made up of it. If A exists and B also exists, we are inclined to think that the differential character of A and the differential character of B are super imposed upon a common undifferenced being. Thus difference is adventitious and unity fundamental.

26. The particular cannot be self-sufficient as particular. It necessarily leads beyond itself to a whole which alone primarily exists. The particular as such does not exist.

What now is the nature of this whole? It is wrong to say that the whole is <u>made up</u> of particulars, as though the particulars had any being prior to it. It is the whole that has prior existence. This whole is differentiated by us into particulars. Further, this whole is not merely another particular of a greater scope. If it were, it would still be limited, and not be the whole. But if it is not a particular sort, can we say that it has any characters? A character is essentially a differentiating mark. When therefore there is nothing from which the whole may be distinguished, what character can it possibly possess? The only true whole is a characterless whole. We cannot describe the whole. We cannot say that it is such and that it is not such. Can we say that it includes differences? But that will be setting a limit to it. If we supply any content to it it will be a limited whole only; and a limited whole is no whole. It will realize a certain possibility and be distinguishable from some other possibility which it does

realise but which in fact limits its being. It will not achieve the completeness which is essential to it. The true whole must be an undifferentiated and characterless whole.

We conclude that the particular has no self-existence. The universal which is non-discrete and a real whole, alone has self-existence. It is therefore the true substance. This substance is undifferentiated. It is without character. It is the ground of the particulars. We speak of many substances. But there is only one real substance in all those substances. This substance cannot be described, but it can be indirectly indicated. It would be wrong to speak of it as <u>having existence</u>. It would be more appropriate to speak of it as universal existence or existence wherever we find it apart from its qualifying terms. This existence is not an abstraction. It has substantial being. It is the characters and the differences of substance which they constitute that are unsubstantial. Characters are all ideal contents or thought-contents. Substance is just the reverse. It is unlimited. It cannot be thought. And whenever it is thought, it becomes an abstraction; it becomes "something that is <u>necessarily characterised</u>." But this something can never be proved to be real and its relation to the characters is essentially unintelligible. The only solution out of these difficulties of thought is, <u>not</u> to think of substance as characterised or as thinkable and knowable. The only form of knowledge that is appropriate to it is a form of intuition that transcends thought.

27. <u>R. DAS</u>."<u>ON KNOWLEDGE</u>." When people deny or doubt the possibility of knowledge, they do not deny or doubt the possibility of consciousness as such. Consciousness is such a patent fact that it is impossible to deny or doubt it or its possibility. We can deny or

doubt it or its possibility. We can deny or doubt what appears in consciousness but consciousness itself cannot be doubted or denied. It is consciousness that makes doubt or denial possible, and they cannot reasonably be directed against what constitutes their ground, as also the ground of any other mental act. It is thus clear that when anybody says that knowledge is not possible he does not, and in fact cannot, mean that consciousness is not possible; that the denial of knowledge is consistent with the affirmation of consciousness. We find nothing strange in this position when we reflect that, although knowledge is a mode of consciousness, consciousness has other modes besides that of knowledge. The volitional and emotional modes of consciousness are distinguished from the cognitive mode. Moreover we know cases of error and illusion, which are admittedly not cases of knowledge, but nobody will ever contend that there is no consciousness present in them. Thus it is evident that we cannot equate knowledge with consciousness, but must regard it as a specific mode of consciousness.

A case of error or illusion is not a case of knowledge, because what we are conscious of in such a case is not a real object. When we see a snake in the place of a stick, the snake as thus seen is no real snake at all. If the snake were real as it appeared, it would be a case of knowledge and not illusion. If this is so, then I think we can define knowledge in the following way:--Knowledge is a mode of consciousness in which we are aware (conscious) of an object as it really is. Here knowledge is defined in terms of consciousness and object. We admit that consciousness is indefinable, but knowledge need not be so, in as much as we seem

to be able to assign its genus as well as its differentia. Consciousness gives the genus of knowledge and the 'reality' of its object defines its specific character as distinguished from other modes of consciousness. By the objet of a mode of consciousness we mean what appears in that mode. When the object is real as it appears in a mode of consciousness, then the mode of consciousness is one of knowledge. In all other modes of consciousness, the object has no reality, at least no being apart from and independently of the mode of consciousness in which it appears. The object of an illusion, for instance, has no reality, at least no being apart from the illusion. By the reality of an object of knowledge people have often understood its independent existence. Of course, the concept of reality and that of independent existence are not exactly identical; but in the present context, we should not object if the reality of an object of knowledge is held to involve its independent existence. Independent existence here does not mean independence of all things whatever. The independent existence of an object is to be understood only in reference to the act of knowledge by which it is revealed. When we say that in the case of knowledge the object appears as it really is, we mean that the object of knowledge has a nature of its own, which is not dependent on or constituted or created or otherwise modified by the act of knowledge in which it is revealed. The thing may be as dependent as you like, on various other things, but if it is to be known at all, it cannot be dependent on the act of consciousness which is to be its knowledge. If the thing had no independent being or nature of its own, we could not significantly speak of it as appearing in knowledge "as it really is." "As it really is" then comes to mean "as it

exists independently of the act of knowing."
28. But have we not heard of contemporary philosophers who declare that our knowledge is confined to sensa only and the so-called knowledge of physical (independent) objects is an assumption? Have we forgotten the teachings of Kant according to whom things-in-themselves are unknown and unknowable? Lastly do we not know of mystics for whom objective knowledge as such is illusory?
29. According to Kant things-in-themselves are not known, mainly because our knowledge is possible only through the forms of sensibility and understanding, and these forms being peculiar to human understanding not inherent in things themselves, we can never know things as they are in themselves. He further says that we have apriori knowledge of the object, because it is an appearance; if it were a thing in itself no apriori knowledge would be possible. I cannot with easy conscience deal summarily with this view which comes from a master mind and which has for good or ill influenced the whole course of modern philosophy.
30. An argument which the mystic may use in order to show that his unobjective vision or intuition fulfills the ideal of philosophic knowledge. It is always possible, one may argue, to doubt our objective knowledge because, as our knowledge has no essential relation with the object (we think) we have the knowledge, there is no guarantee that the object is there also. The possibility remains always open that the object appearing in a mode of consciousness, which is taken to be knowledge, may be absent. In other words, objective knowledge cannot guarantee its own validity and is therefore said to lack self-evidence. But when the object is dropped and we are left with pure knowledge, there is nothing which can ever be doubted, we

get knowledge which is self-evident and absolute-
ly certain. If philosophy seeks certitude, cer-
titude of the most perfect kind can be attained
in pure intuition which is free from the dis-
tinction of subject and object.

A high claim is here made on behalf of objectless intuition as fulfilling the ideal of philosophic knowledge. We have to consider what kind of knowledge is really sought in philoso-
phy, and whether its demand can be satisfied by the sort of intuition offered by the mystic. What we seek in philosophy is knowledge of reality as a whole, and with this knowledge we have also certitude, it will no doubt be consi-
dered as an additional merit.

31. What thought can achieve is a theory, so that what we get in philosophy at the end is no more than a theory designed to explain and coordi-
nate all the recognised facts of experience. We are supposed to be in contact with reality in our experience, and so a tolerable view of the whole reality can emerge only when all the facts of our experience have been organised into a comprehensive and coherent theory. The facts to be considered are so multifarious and compli-
cated that the best theory that human inge-
nuity can devise to cover them all can at most be only more or less probable. Unless in collusion with some religious dogma or some other deep-seated prejudice a philosophical theory, resting on intellectual grounds alone, can never claim absolute certainty. A theory may be very comprehensive and quite consistent, but still it cannot exclude all other possible theories, and so can never establish itself as <u>the</u> truth. To set up any particular theory as the only possible theory on any matter espe-
cially in philosophy, is to betray intellectual blindness and poverty of imagination.

But if a philosophical theory is only more

or less probable, can it give us knowledge at all? I confess that a philosophical theory does not represent the kind of knowledge which is possible of particular facts that are available for direct intuition. From the nature of the case, reality as a whole cannot be known in the way we know its parts. The parts may be directly perceived, but the whole can be comprehended only in a general theory. A theory is not presented as a given fact; it is a mental construction. So in entertaining a theory we never have the feeling of directly knowing a fact. But the theory is constructed in the interest of knowledge, and it does fulfil the condition of knowledge when it represents in idea the actual constitution of reality itself. This is the belief of the philosopher.

32. G.R. MALKANI: "REALITY AND PROCESS." The conclusion which we want to establish in this paper is that change is an appearance. By this we mean that it cannot be denied to be a fact of experience. But at the same time it is not real. As soon as we begin to analyse it, we find that it has implications which conflict with its reality. The concept of change is a self-contradictory concept. The self-contradictory cannot be real. It is repugnant to reason. But the self-contradictory can yet appear. All illusory appearances have, in the end, this character. Change partakes of the nature of an illusory appearance.

33. Reality is for us timeless and eternal. We shall now try to reach this conclusion by a criticism of all those views which regard time as real. The reality of time is no other than the reality of change.

34. For the appearance of substance is not substance. What appears to be substance is only a block of events. Everything changes.

The transition from one state of being to another may be imperceptible to us. But given a sufficiently long duration, the change becomes easily perceptible. There is nothing standing so far as our experience is concerned.

An appeal to fact is in any case a dubious appeal. We are just trying to understand the nature of ultimate reality. This would not be a problem on our hands, if the nature of ultimate reality were quite evident or if it could be known by an appeal to mere facts of experience. These facts are not simple facts. They need interpretation. And the only way to interpret them is to confront them with certain necessities of reason. Nothing is an ultimate fact unless its fact-hood is consistent with the requirements of reason.

35. That the Self is the ground of all change can be easily seen. There is nothing in outward nature that is beyond change. But even if there were comething which had this nature, it could not be shown to be the ground of change; and this for the very simple reason that it does not know change. The only thing that can be the ground of change is the intelligent self which knows change, and which on that very account canot itself be said to change. It is the only unchanging substance implied by change wherever the latter is found.

36. There is therefore no real substance outside of us. It is all a perpetual becoming or a perpetual movement. But this does not mean that there is no substance anywhere. The appearance of change equally imply a real substance. This substance is only found in the intelligent and the ultimate subject. It is the one stable point in all that moves. It stands outside time and gives reality to time itself. It is truly timeless and eternal.

37. T.R.V. MURTI: REVIEW OF "INDIAN REALISM."
The Yogacara is an absolutist and a transcendentalist. He urges the hollowness of the separate elements by refuting the externality of the object and establishes the reality of one undifferentiated, Pure Consciousness variously called, Dharmata, Dharmakaya, Tathata and Vijnaptimatrata. The Vijnanavadin realises, unlike Berkeley and other subjectivists, that the negation of the outer object necessarily entails the negation of the inner circle of ideas. Prof. Sinha seems to be too much preoccupied with the polemic on either side to notice the constructive side expounded in such works as The Abhisamayatamkara, Dasabhumika-Sastra, Mahayana-Sutralamkara and more systematically in the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi of Vasubandhu.

The main argument for the sole reality of consciousness is the identity of subject and object, their distinction being illusory. Consciousness is a unity of which subject and object are false abstractions. All distinction (relation) is within consciousness. Even the remotest object is equally within; the "known" and the "unknown" are conscious distinctions. There can be no relation between consciousness and something outside of it and co-ordinate with it. This is the most fundamental truth of Vijnanavada. The realist theories, one and all, seek to account for knowledge by relating consciousness with the object by way of representation (Sarupya), parallelism, causation or a unique relation called Svarupa sambandha (the Nyaya position). Prof. Sinha gives a very good exposition of the detailed arguments by which the Idealist refutes the realist theories. The insuperable difficulty in all such attempted relations between consciousness and object is that one or the other end

of the relation is unknown and unknowable. For consciousness has in that case to perform two functions at once: it has to appear as one of the terms related and as that which is conscious of the relation. On the representationist or causal hypothesis, knowledge has not only to be a copy or effect but at once to know itself as such. It has to assume two positions at once, that of a combatant in the arena and that of a spectator of the combat--an impossible feat. Consciousness is nothing if not all-comprehensive and universal. The object cannot be placed on an equal footing beside it. Hence the distinctions such as consciousness and object, which appear within the all-comprehensive reality, are false.

38. The typical realist position is that of the Nyaya: "When I know the object, I simply know it but do not know knowledge: later by a separate act of knowledge called introspection (Anuvyavasaya) I make the previous knowledge an object and thus become self-conscious." Though such a view is universally held, it is far from the truth. In the first act there is knowledge of object but no self-consciousness; the second act (introspection) has a different object (the first knowledge presumably), but again there need not be any self-consciousness. The content of the two cognitions is different, and one may even closely follow the other in time; but the mode of knowing is the same. If the previous one is not self-conscious, the other shares the same fate. If it be said that self-consciousness is that mode of knowledge in which the first knowledge (the act or subject) is made an object subsequently, the identity between the two is an unprovable assumption.

If consciousness were not already implied in the first act, we should have no means of becoming aware of it subsequently by a separate

act. The Vijnanavadin therefore says: "On the theory that consciousness is not self-evident, there cannot be knowledge of object even." This is not to be understood to mean that we first become aware of consciousness and then we have the knowledge of the object; but that consciousness is the implicate of all content-knowledge, much like space of spatial distinctions. Our awareness of the implicate of all knowledge is transcendental (Lokottara Prajna), but the awareness of content-consciousness is empirical--a distinction which it suits the convenience of the realists to ignore. They make their task all too easy by taking both the awarenesses to be empirical, and triumphantly show that the distinction lacks experiential basis.

Consciousness on the realist hypothesis is at best considered as an impressionable entity which records the outside world by its plasticity, and there might be a secondary recording of the inside world. But a record is not awareness. Its unique nature must be recognised. Consciousness is nothing if not self-evident. It can be distinguished from object, but cannot be conceived in terms of the object.

Why have the realist systems failed to appreciate the unique nature of Consciousness? Empiricists one and all, they have never tried to go beyond the commonly accepted notions of consciousness. They have even accommodated their philosophies to common-sense. We never become aware of the unique character of consciousness so long as our unreflective objective attitude is not transcended. It is illusion that awakens us from our dogmatic slumber. The Yogacara builds his system on an explicit recognition of this. As Vasubandhu states it: "Vijnapti is all (the sole reality), because

of the apprehension of unreal object." The object may well be unreal; but for the appearance of the unreal, for something to be mistaken for the real, Consciousness must be real. The Vijnanavadin cannot accept both consciousness and object as real--the realist position; nor can he hold both as unreal; the Madhyamika position.

The realist may answer that illusion is impossible without the reality of the two--the thing mistaken and the thing mistaken for, corresponding respectively to the rope and the "snake" in the stock-example. The "snake" may not be present here and now, but it is real elsewhere. Only the mistaking, the relation of the one with the other, is unreal. The object may not, as in dreams etc. be present there; nevertheless, illusion would be impossible but for the traces left by the previous experience of real objects. Thus even for the occurrence of illusion, for the suspicion of objectivity itself, the object must exist in reality. Sankara himself raises this objection against the Idealist. He asks: If the Idealists had no experience of the externality of the object, how then do they speak of consciousness as presenting objects as if they were external.

Sthiramati anticipates such objections and answers them in his commentary on the 'Trimsika' of Vasubandhu. The reality of the object superimposed is in no way necessary for illusion. What is required is that we should have an idea, a Vasana, of the unreal. A pillar might be mistaken for a ghost. This need not mean that the ghost is somewhere real or that it has been experienced before. It may well be that all our notions of the ghost are mere imagination, fantastic descriptions lacking any experiential basis. If it be contended that such fantasies themselves are based upon fact, then nothing will be unreal. Some realists have clearly per-

ceived the implication of this position. The Vijnanavadin says that we have only a false belief, a Vasana, of the object existing independently of consciousness. And a Vasana need not be the trace left by a previous experience, but it might be referred to another previous vasan and so on. It might be beginningless. However, the contention that the belief in objectivity is vasana, an illusion without any real basis, implies that consciousness as such in its pristine state is free from the false abstractions of subject and object.

This state is not only the prius and logical presupposition of the Yogacara contention, but in the light of that alone does it derive all its significance. Such a consciousness is non-empirical; it is beyond all thought; and concepts cannot define it. There is no indication in the entire body of "Indian Realism" that Prof. Sinha appreciates the transcendental standpoint. He appears to think that the ultimate of the Yogacara is the empirical series of states chasing one another. Vasubandhu is quite clear in the matter.

He first describes the three stratifications of Consciousness--Alaya, Manovijnana and Pravrittivijnana--which serve as the ground for the illusion of things and essences existing outside. The Alaya is the repository, the carrier, of all vasanas, the potential state of things. This might correspond in a way with the petites perceptions of Leibniz or the Mulavidya of the Vedanta. The other Vijnanas are connected with it as its consequences. The other two strata not only draw upon the Alaya, but also replenish it. It must be understood that the Alaya is not static; it is compared to a mighty stream. Our mental dispositions change every moment; they get augmented or are enfeebled. The Alaya is co-terminus with phenomenal existence.

If there were no alaya, one particular modification of consciousness or even a series of them will come to a dead stop. It seems that we are drawing upon our capital only to add something more to it. Again, if there were no alaya, the endeavour to achieve freedom from Samsara is meaningless. As it is the nature of one state to last but for a moment, no effort is required to remove it. The past, even if it be accepted, is not a source of trouble, and there is no possibility of any new state emerging from the Alaya. The Alaya is definitely taken as ceasing even in the Arhat stage, a stage corresponding to Jivan-mukti.

The second modification of vijnana is the process of intellection, Manovijnana. If the Alaya is a realm of possibilities, Manana is the state of actualisation, not the actualised state. We may conceive this as the categorising or the synthesising activity of the mind. The third modification of vijnana gives us the six kinds of objectivity,--namely the five external sense data and the datum of the inner sense.

These modifications of consciousness are projected outside, and there arises the apprehension of things as houses, trees, mountains, etc., existing independent of consciousness. But these do not in fact so exist, for reasons already urged. They are called Parikalpita, and are unreal by their very nature. They appear to be independent of consciousness but do not so exist. What about the reality of the ideas? The tree may not exist outside, but the 'tree-idea' certainly exists as a subjective fact, it might be held. Berkeley and other subjective idealists take this view. They are led to formulate a species of sensationalism--a doctrine which Prof. Sinha has fathered upon the Yogacara too. The real posi-

tion of the Vijnanavadin is totally different. Take away the object, and the idea, the subjective fact, also loses its distinctive character as this or that idea. The modifications of consciousness, including the alaya, are called Paratantra, the dependent. They are unreal in so far as they depend on the object for their determinate character. They are not however unreal in essence, as they are one with the Parinispanna, with Pure Consciousness, the Absolute. Hence the Paratantra--the subjective idea of the world of ideas--is said to be neither identical nor different from the Parinispanna. It is not identical with the Absolute (Parinispanna) as the Paratantra is infected with the duality of subject and object. Nor is it different; for the absolute is nothing else than the Paratantra without duality and without change and diversity. The Parinispanna is also called Dharmata or Tathata, the thatness of things. It is of one undifferentiated nature like space.

39. How are we to describe that state of Pure Consciousness? "It is not mind, not apprehension: but Transcendental Consciousness (Lokottaram Jnanam); alaya has ceased owing to the destruction of the two-fold delusion." "It is the undefiled Essence (Dhatu), unthinkable, benign, eternal, blessed--the Free Dharmakaya of the Lord Buddha."

40. The principles of Vijnanavada and their refutation by the realist systems can thus be shown to move on two totally different planes. The arguments and counter-arguments never traverse each other. Prof. Sinha does not seem to be conscious of the disparity of the two positions. The Vijnanavadin, by his dictum of unity of consciousness (Sahopalambhaniyama), implies that there can be no relation whatever between consciousness and

something beside it. The realist arguments urge that without such relation commonly accepted distinctions between subject and object etc. will be lost. Again, the realist's criticism of the doctrine of Self-evidence of knowledge (Sva-samvedana) misses the point: he understands it to mean that we first become aware of knowledge before becoming aware of a content. This puts consciousness and object on a par with each other which is clearly wrong. Nor is our awareness of the two successive and empirical. The true Vijnanavada position is that all content-knowledge implies the all-comprehensive consciousness.

This brings us to the second set of objections against the Vijnanavada--those from Vedanta and the Madhyamika. These are also absolutists, and yet they are far from accepting vijnanavada. We find them fiercely refuting each other.

41. The Vedantic Brahman may not be exactly the Dharmata or Tathata of the Vijnanavadin and the sunya of the madhyamika. The question may be mooted whether spirit can be conceived in more than one way. It may explain how Sankara adopts the so-called realistic view of the independence of the object. Committed as he is to the Absolutism of Truth, he could not have taken Being as existing only in relation to the knowing subject.

42. G.R. MALKANI: REVIEW OF 'EASTERN RELIGION AND WESTERN THOUGHT." His writing will generally appeal to the uncritical, who are swayed by word images and vague idealistic talk, but not to those who are used to more clear thinking.

43. According to that philosophy, as expounded by Sankara whom the author very often quotes approvingly, the individual in in fact the Absolute. It is only in ignorance that he

considers himself finite. He has confounded the self with the not-self. It is only as long as he is under this delusion that the world, together with the historical process, is real for him. Our ultimate good is not achieved through action. The results of all action are impermanent. Action is necessarily based upon the ignorance of the true nature of the self. It is only when this ignorance is dissipated through knowledge, that we realise the highest. We then know the world, and so the historical process, to have been all along unreal or illusory. We wake up as from a dream. The visible and temporal world has as little reality and value as objects of a dream that has ceased.

44. The term maya may mean different things in different contexts, but we should miss the real meaning if we merely said that "the mutability of things in part of the connotation of the word." In Vedantic literature, the word does mean the illusoriness of all empirical existence, including the existence of finite individuals. This is the accepted meaning. Any deviation from it would amount to the rejection of the Advaitic philosophy of Sankara, which is the crowning phase of Indian thought. If one knows the truth, the truth alone will make one free, there is nothing to be done, and there is no scope for creative activity. The historical process, in fact all temporality, is unreal. The only reality is the reality of the immutable Self. The world, and all that it stands for, is illusory. There are no degrees of illusoriness. A certain kind of existence is either real or it is illusory. There is no middle course. The world is not real. What else can it be? There is no doubt that it is compared to the illusory snake or to the objects of a

dream. It is our sneaking love for the empirical, for the known and the visible world, that makes us hesitate to apply the term 'illusory' to it. The conception of reality admits of no degrees. It only admits of a distinction between reality and the appearances of reality. But the appearances are not the reality. They can only have the status of illusory objects. Reality is perfect. Unreality is, by its very nature, devoid of perfection. The world therefore cannot be made perfect. Perfection is never made. What can be made can also be unmade. It is the realm of mutation and of imperfection. True perfection is eternally accomplished. All striving and all activity is part of the empirical appearances of things, and is in truth illusory in character.

45. What appears to us rather unusual in this account is that a Hindoo mystic should ever feel that the supreme is "working through the cosmos and ourselves for the realization of the universal kingdom." The Hindoo may be a dualist of a non-dualist; he may be a devotee or one seeking knowledge; but he is by temperament and tradition a pantheist. He does not think of the supreme as seeking to realise a universal kingdom. He is more likely to say, God is everything. He is all in all. There is nothing therefore wrong in God's own world. This God's world is essentially and eternally perfect. It is man's world that has gone wrong; and it can only be righted when man is spiritually reformed. Man must cease to have a will of his own. He must shake off his narrow self-interest, his egotism and submit to the will of God in whatever happens. He must cease to be an actor himself, and make God the sole actor in him. This is the Hindoo ideal of disinterested activity. But the object is not to realize the so-called universal kingdom. God's

kingdom is already perfect. The temporal process, or any Hindu conception of life, takes a back place. It has no ultimate value. It merely deludes us by its reality. It is God's maya by which is meant an unreal show like that presented to deluded eyes by a magician. The conception of a universal kingdom to be realised is foreign to Hindoo religious thought. It is definitely a Christian Idea.

REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION. Vol.7. 1938

1. SRI KRISHNA PREM: "INITIATION INTO ULTRA-MYSTIC YOGA." It is taught that we should live a life full of thought so that by degrees the mind may learn to be the master in its own house.

For this to happen, though, it is necessary for the thought to be always clear. An unclear thought can no more be a safe guide than crooked line can be said to point in any particular direction. We must above all check the tendency to allow vague and woolly thoughts to pursue one another in our mind like so many sheep. Such confused thinking is quite useless. Each thought must stand out clearly like an object seen in bright sunshine, for only then will it be able to resist the fatal downward pull and to escape the monsters of desire which are ever waiting with open mouths to drag it into the depths below.

2. It is time now to return to the mind and its thought processes, for, as the Upanishad quoted above goes on to say, "it is the mind that is the cause of the bondage or liberation of men." By listening to the voices of desire the mind has led us into all this suffering. Its winged freedom has been lost by stooping to the lure of the senses and its feet have become entangled in the sticky lime. This being so, some have thought to free it by a forcible asceticism, and torture the body in the

hope of freeing the soul. All such self-torture, whether crude or refined, is a mistake. The mind is not, on this plane of existence, something entirely separate from the body. 3. The tormented body reacts upon the mind and warps its vision so that it mistakes the distorted images of its own desires for truth. Many of its grotesque and fanatical cults have arisen in the world owe their being to this very cause and many a genuine mystic has lost himself among self-created illusions.

The best means of freeing the mind is not by weakening the body but by strengthening the mind itself by constant exercise. Whatever is not clear, whatever puzzles one in life should be meditated upon constantly until the answer comes. It may take a long time, especially at first, but if the meditation is persisted in it is sure to come in the end. It is necessary, however, to be sure that the problem is clearly set before the mind and that its terms are clearly understood. There can be no answer to a question which, through lack of clarity in its terms, is really meaningless. If, however, the question is clearly framed and the meditation is persisted in untiringly the solution is sure to be found, and, what is more important still, the mind will be strengthened in the process. If, on the other hand, the attempt is given up because of its difficulty and the subject is allowed to sink back into the limbo of unsolved problems, the mind will be correspondingly weakened.

This strengthening and perfecting of the mind is of the utmost importance because it is the mind which is the gateway to the real Consciousness, and as it is said in the Kathopanisad, "by the mind is It (the Atman) to be attained." This may sound strange to some who have always considered that yoga is the cessa-

tion of mental processes and to others who have read that "the mind is the great slayer of the Real." But the mind has two aspects, a higher and a lower, according as to whether it is united with desire or free from it (see Maitri Upanisad) and it is the lower aspect enslaved to desire, that is the slayer of the Real, while, as for the cessation of mental processes, it is sheer fact that such cessation is only possible when the aspirant is able to withdraw his consciousness through the mental door into the higher level beyond. Posed serenely on that higher level it is true that the mental flux will subside and cease, but all who have tried to reduce the mind to stillness will be aware of their failure to accomplish it except from that higher level.

The first step in fact is to find out the mind. While everyone talks glibly of his mind and his thoughts, yet it is a fact that most of what passes for thinking is mere verbal habit (as the Behaviourists would say), mere fragments of visual and other imagery floating on the tides of desire. Though all consider they possess minds there are few who really know what it is they mean by the statement and therefore the first step consists in finding out by introspection what it is that we really mean by the mind. It is not necessary to be able to give a definition of it but it is essential that the seeker should be able to recognise it for himself, to separate it out as it were, and to know in his own experience what it really is, whether he can describe it adequately in words or no.

Having found out the mind, found it in the sense in which one finds and recognises the colour red, indefinable though the latter

may be, the next step is to detach oneself from it. One should ask oneself the question 'whose is this mind and what is the 'I' who has found out and is contemplating it?' Once more, a verbal answer is utterly useless. One must be able to view the mind as something quite separate and distinct and then turn round, as it were, and see what actually is the viewer of the mind. It is not intended to give the answer here because the essential part of the whole process is that we should find the answer for ourselves and because whatever verbal description might be given would mean quite different things to different readers. It must be seen by and for oneself.

4. There is a certain mood of depression, a certain sense of the fatality of all that happens and of the uselessness of all struggle which sometimes masquerades as 'spiritual' state of submission to the will of God, of helplessness in the Divine hands or in some similar phrase. This state, however, differs from that of which it is a tamsika parody by the fact that the following stream is always lowered in quality, that its succeeding states of mind are recognisably weakening and inferior. This is merely an instance to show the way in which it is necessary to follow up the consequences of one's mental states until they are all known and can be recognised as harmful or beneficial. It may be added that the practice is not simply one for certain hours of 'meditation' but one which must be kept up at all times. It may also be observed in passing that this is the process that underlies all those classifications and analyses of mental states, that, in a rather tiresomely scholastic form, occupy large a part of Buddhist abhidharma literature. But no book knowledge will avail. Each must know his own mental states by direct awareness for himself. It may also be added that, if any reader is confident that he known them alread

without any further practice, let him read a little analytic psychology and he will very soon come to realize, probably with considerable horror, how very little he knows of what goes on within his mind.

Having observed the varying results of the different thoughts and feelings that flow through the mind, the next step, an obvious one, is to bend one's energies to the task of guiding them. Mental states which are now known to have harmful effects must be nipped in the bud before those effects have time to manifest and the easiest method of doing this is that of deliberately invoking their opposite states. Thoughts, on the other hand, which have been seen to be beneficial wshouldebe encouraged. Once more it must be emphasised that this is an individual process. No set of rules in books, no hard and fast ethical codes are adequate to replace living personal experience. There must be complete freedom from conventional ethical prepossessions if this practice is not to lapse into sterility.

One habit in particular must be carefully checked and that is the habit of allowing the mind to run on aimlessly from one thing to another, of letting it take sudden flights from one subject to another and then back to the first without any control at all. Such a habit of mind is fatal for yoga for it is the way of the mind when being led by desire, from which leading-strings it is the object of yoga to free it. Deep and dark run those, mainly unconscious, currents and when the mind is jumping about or drifting aimlessly it is always a sign that their sinister guidance is in operation and should be checked. Whatever one is thinking about should form the sole object of the mental processes, and, as said before, however many times it may be necessary to come

back, the effort to understand should not be abandoned till the problem becomes quite clear. Incidentally, the way to deal with a jumping or drifting mind is to stand back from it and observe where it is drifting to and why. Once that is found out it will usually be relatively easy to bring it into control once more; mere attempts to hold it steady by force are not likely to be very successful. As in the Japanese art of Jiu-Jitsu, not brute strength but skill is what is required.

The next topic that must be discussed is one which has already been dealt with in a previous article, but which, on account of its importance as well as for the sake of completeness, must be touched on again. Whenever the mind is faced by two alternatives there is always present an intuition, even if it be but the dimmest sort of 'feeling' that one of the ways is right and the other wrong or, at least, that one of them is better than the other and that, as the Kathopanisad puts it, the better (sreya) is one thing and the pleasant (preya) is another.

This intuition is always present, though, if not cultivated, it remains dim and we can easily blind outselves to its presence. Nevertheless it is of the utmost importance for it is the key to the door which leads from the lower mind to the higher and beyond. It must, therefore, be carefully cultivated and strengthened by paying attention to and following it. Just as the trained ear of the engineer recognises even a small 'knock' in his engines when nothing is perceptible to the ordinary untrained ear, so the aspirant must be always ready to listen for that subtle inner voice and, having heard it, he must always obey and allow that intuition to guide his other mental processes. Only in this way can he rise to a constant functioning in his higher mind. The path is extremely difficult and

it is no wonder that many psychologists throw up their hands and proclaim that the mind is inevitably and permanently the slave of desire. But there is a way out of that slough of despond and constant meditation along the above lines is the best way of treading it.

We now come to the problem of the control of the senses, a subject which many consider should be taken up at the very commencement. In the classical statement of the four qualifications, however, dama or control of the senses follows and not precedes 'sama' or control of mind. The senses are the offspring of the mind as the 'Samkhya' philosophy taught long ago. They are the indriyas of which the mind is 'Indra' or the chief. To attempt to control the senses before the mind is in control is like trying to bale the water out of a leaky ship without first stopping the leak.

At this stage, however, they too must be brought under control and this is done by keeping them under the guidance of a mind which is itself controlled by the inner voice referred to above. This is also the method recommended in the kathopanisad, where, having compared the body to a chariot, the senses to the horses, the mind to the reins and the buddhi (the inner intuition, the faculty giving certain knowledge of right and wrong) to the charioteer, it goes on to say: "He who is possessed of 'buddhi' whose mind always firmly adheres (to that 'buddhi') his senses are under control like the good horses of a chariot driver."

It will thus be seen that the often advocated plan of attempting to control the senses first and then passing on to the mind is contrary to Upanishadic teaching. It is also contrary to the facts. Without control of the mind, sense control is an impossibility, but, once the mind is trained to follow the inner voice, it

becomes relatively easy.

The senses should not be allowed to work at their own will in a random manner. Whatever is experienced through or by the senses should have a definite purpose and that purpose should be clearly focussed in thought before they are allowed to work. Later on the yogi will be able to withdraw his consciousness from his senses at will leaving them perfectly inactive, but in these initial stages the aspirant will find that difficult, if not impossible and he may content himself with allowing them to act under the discipline of the mind.

Above all, he should not try to kill out his senses by harsh treatment of them or by a forced inactivity. A wise moderation and not mortifying asceticism is what is needed. The latter has most disastrous results, for, while the outer senses are being deadened by torture, the inner senses, those that are manifest in dream or phantasy, run riot and destroy all peace within the mind. That is why ascetics of the type of the famous St. Anthony are always subject to illusions of being persecuted and tempted horribly by devils. Asceticism is not yoga and never does one see in the eyes of the typical ascetic that calm poise and inner serenity that is the mark of the true yogi. It should never be forgotten that the inner senses (which are connected with what some modern psychologists term the unconscious) will take a frightful revenge for any forcible suppression of their outer brothers. Neurosis will certainly and even insanity may easily follow any such misguided attempts. Certainly no inner peace can be attained by such methods.

Instead of an outward suppression the aspirant should try to understand why it is that the senses desire to function in a particular manner. Directing his controlled mind upon their

workings, he should calmly observe whether particular activities are followed by good results or bad, allowing the former quite freely, undeterred by the thought that the pleasure resulting is a 'sensuous' one, and checking the latter by the power of his mind. In this as in other matters he will do well to follow the wise practice of the Buddha: "When in following after happiness or after sense objects I have perceived that bad qualities developed and good qualities were diminished then I have considered that that happiness or those sense objects are to be avoided while, when I have seen that the reverse is true, I have considered them fit to be followed after." (Digha Nikaya 21, somewhat abridged.)

At the same time, the mind itself must not be allowed to be invaded and captured by sensuous thoughts. The untrained mind is only too willing to allow itself to be mastered by the swarming phantasies which surge up from the desire nature but the disciplined mind knowing that that is the downward path and leads to danger will carefully avoid such a state, and, however active the inner or outer senses may be allowed to be, will maintain its own watchfulness, calm and untouched by the sense life below.

One other warning may be added. The aspirant should never run away in fright from anything he finds within himself. The foregoing practices will have given him a great insight into his own nature (and, incidentally, into that of thoughts) and he will find within himself things the existence of much of which he had never suspected previously. Much of what he sees will be of a highly unpleasant sort, for, if it is true that within us all is a God, it is no less true that there is a devil there as well, a devil that is latent in even the most

saintly of ordinary men. But, however horrible a form it may wear and however aghast he may feel at the realisation of its presence within him, whatever he sees in his heart must be faced with perfect sincerity and fearlessness. If we run away shutting our eyes to the horror or denying its existence, all further progress is blocked. Our hearts will then become, not quite temples in which we can live in peace and serenity, but haunted houses thronged by ghosts, and horrors that we know exist and yet refuse to face. Whatever is within us must be contemplated with a calm gaze; if it is harmful it must be overcome and destroyed but never under any circumstances must it be feared or run away from with shocked denials of its presence, else we shall have to say with Job: "That which I greatly feared has come upon me." Moreover, this is as true of outer situations that give rise to fear as it is of inner tendencies that the mind cannot face. Both alike must be overcome.

The method for overcoming them is the one which has been outlined above. The intuition guided mind must be used as both compass and rudder to control the riotous phantasying of the inner senses, and, that being controlled, the outer sense life will come under control as well, just as the whole body of a horse is directed merely by turning his head. To give just one example, many aspirants fight a continuous losing battle against their sex desires simply because they try to control the outward manifestations while allowing the inner phantasy to play freely. The more they check themselves without, the more riotously surges the phantasy within, whereas, if they would first control the latter, the former would come quite naturally and easily to heel.

Finally, the aspirant should take care to

guard himself against any feeling of disappointment. This is one of the greatest snares on the path. The path is an arduous one, for the whole personality has to be remade so that it is centred above and not below. When we consider the countless lives we have spent upon the downward path and the fact that our whole environment, social, literary and scientific, is, in the majority of cases, of such a nature that it hinders rather than helps our struggles, it is small wonder that progress should be slow. All around us are those who say that the task is an impossible, even a chimerical one, and urge us to be content with the life of the senses. Even the so-called religious people are of little help for they say one thing with their lips but fear its opposite within their hearts. That is why it is inevitable that, from time to time, grey and despondent thoughts should steal into the heart, whispering that in all these years of practice no progress has been made.

But the seductive whispers are false and he who has strengthened his mind by yoga knows that they are false. If he will follow his proper technique and examine the causes for the arising of these moods he will find that they invariably arise from self-centred thoughts, hankerings after recognition, super-normal powers and other outward shows, which have taken advantage of a weakened mental control--perhaps through fatigue or slight ill-health--to revenge themselves for past suppression by blackening everything within their reach. Essentially the mechanism is the same as that seen in the small boy (and would it were only in small boys!) who becomes peevish and "will not play" because, in reality, some cherished and unspoken desire of his has been thwarted. Here again, the strengthening of the mind by constant practice of the yogic technique is

the great remedy for these black moods.

The finest timber comes from the slowest growing trees and he who expects to blossom into a yogi in a few months or even a few years of practice is bound to be disappointed and had better leave leave the subject alone. He, however, who has the sincerity and courage to face whatever is in him, the persistence to go on with his struggle in the face of obstacles within and without and the huminity to recognise that all that he has done is to take the first few steps on a tremendous journey is certain to achieve something which he would not give away in exchange even for the whole world, for, as Sri Krishna teaches in the Gita, even the seeker after yoga goes far beyond the hopes and fears of ordinary religion and "even a little of this dharma delivers from great fear."

5. P:B. ADHIKARI: REVIEW OF A.C. MUKERJI'S BOOK.

In his discussions on the various other methods of approach to the problem of self-knowledge and in his rejection of them as incapable of giving a right view of its nature as subject, he appears to have proceeded throughout on the assumption that the Kantian position in epistemology is the only admissible position. This is a point still in dispure among the present day thinkers in the West, except with the school of thought which owes its origin to Kant, and there too with some allowances and differences. Hence it is no doubt a very bold stand to say that Kant's is the last word on the theory of knowledge. Resting on the theory, the learned author asserts that any approach to self-knowledge is bound to lead either to objectivism or to agnosticism. But what is the harm if the subject is treated as an object? It would still remain an object of a different kind from all other objects of experience. It would then be,

the author will reply, the 'mind' and not the self as consciousness which must then remain unknowable. But could this agnosticism be altogether avoided? The existence of consciousness as the ultimate subject of knowledge is being disputed in some psychological and philosophical quarters to-day, because it can never be known as it is in its pure nature. Hence it is necessary, the author asserts, to appreach it with a different method, namely, that of immediate experience which is supposed to be above the distinction of subject-object. But how could there be even this immediate <u>experience</u>, unless the subject-object relation obtains there? To avoid this difficulty, the doctrine of 'svayamprakasa' (self-revelation) of consciousness is brought forward on the authority of Sankara. But this does not make the point clear or remove the difficulty. The condition of consciousness in which there is no knower and known (subject-object) is something beyond our comprehension. It cannot at all be called knowledge. It is something like 'nirvikalpa samadhi'--the distinctionless condition of consciousness. Supposing this is possible for some one to attain this condition by yogic practices, still it becomes difficult to see how a <u>memory</u> of the condition is left behind so as to make him able to say that consciousness is self-revealer, and memory is a function of the 'mind' which is regarded as different from the self. The analogy to the condition of dreamless sleep (susupti) would be of no avail here to clear the point, for this condition is otherwise conceivable as purely unconscious. There are some of the considerations which make it difficult to accept the position of Sankara as indubitably the final one on the problem of self. It is, therefore, not without reason that the later re-

presentatives of the Advaita Vedanta found that the problem was insoluble on strict logical grounds.

M.W. PRADHAN: "SHRI SAI BABA OF SHIRDI."

1. G.S. KHAPARDE (in introduction) I count it as the greatest piece of good fortune that circumstances led me to his feet, and the moment I approached them as humbly as I could, all the load of my worldly cares disappeared though only a few minutes before, it was felt to be exceedingly oppressive and such as to excite disgust of life.

2. He took up his residence there for a whole lifetime, helping everybody that came along without any distinction, securing the love and reverence of all without exception. He appeared to know the innermost thoughts of every body, relieved their wants, and carried comfort to all.

3. R.A. TURKHUD (in Foreword) Shri Sai-Baba of Shirdi was undoubtedly a great man--a superman--a man who had attained the realization of the All Pervading Self, according to the tenets and experiences of the highest Hindu thought.

4. The place where he used to sit, looked to all outward appearances as a tumble down old ramshackle sort of a construction. But in that small oblong room, Sai Baba sat in the North-east corner. Opposite to him in the opposite corner was the sacred fire burning night and day (it is still kept burning by the Sansthan Committee). Next to this sacred Dhuni (fire) were earthern - ware pots filled with water for Baba to drink, and perform ablutions. The wall had a niche, in which were placed a number of earthern-ware chillums (clay pipes). There was also a sack of wheat and a sack of country tobacco. This tobacco was put in the earthern pipes and smoked, the pipe being offered to various devotees, smoked by them and passed on to and fro to Baba. This went on practically all the times the visitors

came in his presence and even anon.
5. This wonderful place was called Dwarka Mai by Shri Sai Baba, who was heard many a time to say that whoever stepped into this Dwarka Mai, had his future assured.
6. The Mahratha mind is more practical and requires positive proof, as to the authority and capacity of the preacher of The Great Truth. Manifestation of the Divinity in Man is what the Mahratha mind insists upon and when that is forthcoming and realized, it will at once unbend and worship such a person.
7. The western minds and thoughts and men and young women imbued with the present day teachings of the West, with only a superficial aspect of life, are apt to utter in a hurried and thoughtless manner that Shri Sai Baba was a mere clairvoyant and a hypnotist.

That he was miles and miles above these misleading lowest rungs of the ladder of Spirituality, viz. clairvoyance and hypnosis the loitering in whose rungs, the highest Hindu Thought strictly enjoins to avoid and not be ensnared or entangled in, such a lapse being absolutely detrimental to the progress towards Self Realisation.
8. Sceptics will naturally make light of these experiences. Having graduated in science the writer was a sceptic himself and can well understand the working of the minds of people in the same position as he was in, till he had the great and good fortune of sitting at the feet of this wonderful Shri Sai Baba of Shirdi in 1910.
8. (The book commences here) Sai Baba at times used to please himself by uttering "Yade Haqq" (i.e. I always remember God) and avoided the expression "Anal Haqq." (i.e. I am God).
9. Sai Baba said, "Kaka, (uncle) I used to

give medicines to people before. Later on I gave up that, and began to remember Hari (God) Hari, and while remembering Hari, Hari, Hari met me." (Christian Science.)

10. During all these sittings Baba gave general advice which was universal in character and which has improved the characters of several devotees. The sum and substance of his advice was to have strong faith in God and patience for His realisation; to love all creatures alike; not to wound the feeling of others; to be straight-forward and honest in all our actions; not to take the service of others without due payments, etc.

11. Those taking interest in the above brief sketch of Sai Baba's Lilas will do well to visit Shirdi once and see for themselves whether Sai Baba's Samadhi's darshan itself puts them on the right track of Self-realization or not.

SRI KRISHNA PREM: REVIEW OF AUROBINDO'S 'LIFE DIVINE.'"© (Vol 1. only.)

1. Sri Aurobindo makes use of several rather specialised terms such as Supermind, Overmind, etc., which were somewhat baffling to outsiders. In this book they are fully explained.

2. One of its most striking and admirable features is its highly synthetic nature. The stress it lays upon the necessity of self-offering to the Divine resumes all that is most valuable in the Vaishnava tradition while its emphasis on the creative play of 'Shakti' links it with the higher Tantricism. At the same time, it is thoroughly and fundamentally Vedanta, though not the modern scholastic Vedanta, nor, altogether, the Vedanta of Shankara with its dichotomy (of attitude at least) between the world and the Brahman. Nevertheless it can fairly claim the Vedantic title since it draws its fundamental inspiration from the Upanishads, "the supreme

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ancient authority for these truths of a higher experience" and indeed, through them, from the Vedas themselves. Hidden in their symbols, the latter contain a wealth of teaching in no way inferior to that which is set forth in a more abstract or 'philosophic' manner in the Upanishads, but, between the learned ignorance of the Western scholars and the traditionalism of scholastic commentators in India, that teaching has become almost inaccessible to a world that has practically lost the power of reading symbols.

3. While Sri Aurobindo, as a modern man, makes use of the conceptual or 'philosophic' language that we moderns have evolved as better suiting the highly mental character of our epoch. Nevertheless, if we want to find the Indian antecedents of his viewpoint, it is to the Vedas that we must turn.

At the very outset he confronts us with the two negations, the materialists' refusal of reality to spirit and the ascetics' refusal of reality to the world of matter. We are at once remined of the Middle Path of the Buddha, a path that was intended to steer between these two very extremes but which inevitably tended, under an exclusive monastic leadership to lean too heavily towards the side of world rejection.

Materialism sees nothing anywhere but "the omnipotent march of matter" (wasn't that the phrase used by Lord Russell in the palmy days of 'A Free Man's Worship') while ascetic spirituality sees nothing but an unreal phantasmagoria, a cosmic nightmare, uselessly masking in some inscrutable way in timeless, static absolute of bliss. Sri Aurobindo insists vigorously that both these extreme views, though containing partial truths, are inadequate on account of their onesidedness. Each has a truth of its own but each denies the truth of the other, and so becomes, in part at least,

a falsehood. "World existence," he says, "is the ecstatic dance of Shiva which multiplies the body of the God numberlessly to view: it leaves that white existence precisely where and what it was, ever is and ever will be; its sole object is the joy of the dancing."

WE HAVE HERE ANOTHER RENDERING OF THE ULTIMATE REALISATION OF THE MAHAYANA, THE REALISATION THAT NIRVANA AND SAMSARA ARE THE SAME, A REALISATION THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE MORE ARDENT-MINDED WORLD-RENOUNCERS BUT WHICH IS THE EXACT PARALLEL OF THE UPANISHADIC "ALL THIS IS VERILY THE BRAHMAN."

That intensely white and stainless unity of the Brahman is undoubtedly the Real, 'satya satya; very Real of the real. But, as the Bhagavata (I think) adds, it is also 'rita satya netra,' that which has its two moments the 'rita' or Cosmic Order and the 'satya' or extra-cosmic Being.

We <u>can</u>, if we choose, elect to cleave only to the manifested universe and live in that, though even that same manifested universe contains infinitely more than materialists have any suspicion of, and, if so, continue to pay the price of suffering that is inherent in the separateness involved. Or, on the other hand, we can choose the other moment and, abandoning all manifestation as an unreal illusion, we can spread our wings for the great renouncing flight, alone to the Alone. In this latter case, also we shall have to pay a price though it is one that is perhaps not so easy to state in words, at least in words which will be at all convincing to a determined follower of that path. All we can say is that he who makes this choice, must, by his withdrawal from the Divine dance, inevitably lose the Divine joy that is its basis. If that joy was not something entirely quite impossible to accept the view, often ad-

vanced nevertheless by the more thorough paced world-renouncers, that the Cosmic Play is a cosmic blunder, something that had far better never have occurred at all.

The essence of Sri Aurobindo's view is that the Cosmic manifestation is as fundamentally a mode of the Divine Reality as is that other mode of stainless unity. The world is what it is to us, a palace of evil and suffering, only because we see it from the limited viewpoint of mind with its passion for seeing separateness where none exists.

But mind is only one stage, though an important one, in the Cosmic play. The mental vision is not even now, the only vision possible. Whatever man may be, mind is more emphatically not "the measure of all things." Rather is it the distorter of all things, though that is not to say that it must always be so. The mind is merely one of the robes that the Spirit has put on in the course of its creative adventure into manifestation. It is, even now, only one of the ways by which we apprehend reality. Above it is what Sri Aurobindo terms the Supermind.

This term, an understanding of which is of cardinal importance, does <u>not</u> refer to a merely glorified mind, but to a level of Divine manifestation that is above what we know as mentality and is the highest level in the strictly manifested universe. It corresponds very closely with what Plotinus termed the 'Nous' or Divine Mind. It is from and in a sense within that Supermind that all manifestation takes place and all further real progress for humanity awaits the presence on this plane of psychophysical vehicles ready and willing to serve as cups to receive the outpouring of that spiritual wine. In fact the whole aim of Sri Aurobindo's teaching might be said to be the praparation of such cups, for, when the cups

are ready, the wine will manifest.

One of the most interesting chapters in the whole book deals with the double soul in man. Jst as man has two minds, the superficial ego-mind of ordinary waking experience, and a deeper, wider mental being from which the former is, as it were, a selection, "so too we have a double psychic entity in us, the surface desire soul which works in our vital cravings, our emotions, aesthetic faculty and mental searching for power knowledge, and happiness and a subliminal psychic entity, a pure power of light, love, joy and refined essence of being which is our true soul behind the outer form of psychic existence we so often dignify by the name." This inner or higher soul in us is "a flame born out of the Divine.. the concealed Witness and Control, the inner light of the mystic. It is that which endures and is imperishable in us from birth to birth, untouched by death." (see p 672 mytyped vol "Ind. Philos & Aurobindo")

It is not the unborn Atman itself but, as, it were, its deputy here below and it is also this that is the real conscience or inner Guide of man as opposed to the merely superficial promptings of habit and environment to which we usually give that name.

This point is of immense importance because it is just the failure to take any practical account of this higher Soul in man that sterilises so much of modern Vedanta, which, recking nothing of anything between the ignorant personal ego and the stainless, unitary Atman is unable to make any effective use of the one ladder by which the ascent to the latter can be made. Too many ordinary Vedantists are like men who, despising the stairs, would leap all at one bound to the roof of the world house. As a result, they fall back again and again on the ground while he who uses the stairway, the same stair,

incidentally, by which the Spirit made its descent to these levels, however slowly and hesitatingly he may do so, will make at least such progress as he is strong enough to achieve and will, in his next incarnation, carry on the ascent from where he was forced to abandon it in this.

It must not be supposed, however, that the mere perfection of and constant living in that higher Soul can of itself constitute the final goal of yoga. At least there is a possible goal beyond. The achievements of spiritual self-finding are "great and splendid but they are not necessarily the last end and entire consummation; more is possible."

Space forbids the attempt to give any accurate idea of what the 'more' consists of and a hurried sketch would be worse than useless. All we shall say is that it is to be found in the possibility of the Soul's becoming a vehicle of the outpouring life of the Supramental Spirit an outpouring which would "liberate the mind from the knot of its divided existence," using its individualisation merely as an instrument of the all-embracing Supermind. "Is there any reason why he (supra-mental, divinised man) should not also liberate the bodily existence from the present law of death?...is it not possible that he may develop, as well as a divine mind, and a divine life, also a divine body?"

With regard to this last suggestion we should be careful not to misunderstand it. Sri Aurobindo's yoga is in no way intended to minister to man's ordinary cravings for a prolongation of physical life. He who seeketh to gain his life shall lose it and yoga has nothing to do with the gratification of man's egoistic and vital desires. Yoga, all yoga, is concerned with union with the Divine Reality and not in the least with

ministering to the comfort and enjoyability of a life lived in separation from that Reality. This is a mistake made by many modern dabblers in yoga, especially in the West, dabblers who seek, not the Divine, but enhanced powers to be enjoyed by their present selves.

4. It has none of the facile simplicity that characterises certain popular expositions of Vedanta and yoga. It could not have, for it is concerned with thought and experience of an order of subtlety quite other than that which is found in such books as we have referred to. Those who study it carefully, however, will be rewarded by an introduction to a world of thought and possible experience which is far more inclusive and satisfying than anything the orthodox schools or their popular exponents have to offer.

SRI KRISHNA PREM. "REVIEW OF 'MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.@

1. The Pali Buddhism of the so-called Hinayana lends itself to compressed exposition both on account of its inherent simplicity and because it represents the teaching of one school alone, while the Mahayana, especially in its Far Eastern forms, includes a numberof schools of very different type and is as hard to compress within the limits of a small manual as would be Hinduism with all its varying philosophical schools and devotional sects.

The unity of the Pali scriptures and the fact at as actual documents they are certainly older than the existing Mahayana Sutras has caused them to be more widely studied both in the West and in modern India and indeed, many consider them to represent the 'genuine' Buddhism of which the Mahayana is said to be a 'corruption.' Actually, however, neither set of scriptures can truly claim to be the actual words of the Buddha. Both alike are systematizations of his teaching as it appeared to different types of

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followers, some emphasizing one aspect, some another, a process which can be seen in operation among the pupils of any guru in India to this day.

The Pali school now flourishing in Burma, Ceylon and Siam tends to emphasize the goal of individual deliverance from sorrow by a monastic withdrawal from the world while the Mahayana which prevails in Tibet, China and Japan draws its essential inspiration from the Buddha's own spirit and emphasizes the need for its followers to strive for the enlightenment of all beings. Its ideal is not the Arhat, secure in his own Nirvana, but the Bodhisattva who sacrifices his own Nirvana (in the sense of world transcendence) in order to work for the welfare of all. Hence its title of the Great Career (Mahayana) as opposed to the Little Career (Hinayana) of mere self-salvation.

Its philosophy, though based equally with that of the Pali school on the fundamental Buddhist teaching of the transiency of forms, the sorrow of attachment to them and the unreality of the personal ego, contains ranges of thought and realization far profounder than anything to be found in the Pali and there is reason to believe that Gaudapada the paramguru of Sankaracharya, drew much of his inspiration from Nagarjuna's wonderful exposition of Sunyata, the 'Void,' while Sankara himself was accused by his orthodox opponents of being a Buddhist in disguise.

While the Pali school at an early date hardened into an orthodoxy with a fixed canon of scriptures revealed once and for all, the Mahayanists retained more of the true creative spirit of the Buddha and, with a confidence based on their own inner experience of the truth, did not hesitate to compose new Sutras of which it is sufficient to say that they bear

as indubitable marks of direct experience, and that, too, of the specifically Buddhist type, as anything in the Pali canon. This remark, of course, applies only to them at their best for in both sets of writings there is much that is merely scholastic, and, in the Mahayana at least, not a little of sentimental pietism. Many have thought them wildly fantastic and utterly 'unhistorical' but that was because they failed to realise that the profoundest truths can only be expressed in symbolism and that the Buddha of whom they treat is no longer merely the historical Teacher but the Buddha in the heart, the mystic Teacher and inner-most God within all living beings.

Mrs. Suzuki has based her manual mainly on the Sino-Japanese forms of the Mahayana, and, if we miss something of the incisive clarity that characterises the great Indian masters (for Maha-yana, no less than Hinayana, was an Indian pro-duct) it is compensated for by the warmth that comes from a living tradition and the beauty with which the Far East has always known how to invest everything it touches.

2. One must dispute the claim that in Hinayana the doctrine of non-ego (anatman) is "purely analytic and scholastic" as opposed to the "in-tuitive and experiential" conception of the Maha-yana. Analysis and scholasticism are not con-fined to the Hinayana and the realization of 'nairatmya' is as much a matter of intuitive insight for the Hinayanist as for his Mahayanist brother.

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI: "THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM." @ We read in I-Tsing's 'Correspondence from the Southern Seas' "There are two schools only in Mahayana Buddhism, one is the Madhyamika and the other is the Yoga-carya. According to the Madhyamika, things are real when they are real when they are viewed in the light of the samvritta truth, but they are

@ in the Eastern Buddhist. Vol.II. ,1922.

empty in the light of the paramartha, they are in essence void like vision. According to the Yogacarya, the external world (vishaya) has no reality, but the inner consciousness (vijnana) is real, all the particular objects are nothing but the productions of the vijnana. Both are in accordance with the holy teaching of the Buddha."

The Madhyamika and the Yogacrya are generally contrasted, the former is a philosophy of negation or emptiness while the latter studies consciousness as its special subject of speculation. The ultimate conclusion of the Madhyamika metaphysics is what is known as the system of Sunyata, while for the Yogacarya the Aliya-vijnana is the final reality. If we designate the former as the ontology of Mahayana Buddhism, the latter will be its cosmogony psychologically constructed.

The founder of the Madhyamika school is generally recognized to be Nagarjuna, whose doctrine was ably supported and brilliantly expounded by Aryadeva. The 'Madhyamika-Sastra' by Nagarjuna, the 'Sata-Sastra' and the 'Dvadasamikaya-Sastra by Aryadeva, are the principal works of this school. And on account of these three treatises on the Sunyata philosophy, the school is known in China and Japan as the "Sect of Three Discourses". The scriptural foundation of this system, Madhyamika, is, according to Chinese Buddhist scholars, the Sutras of the Prajnaparamita class.

The most prominent expositors of the Yogacarya school in India were Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu. The following is a list of the most important textbooks belonging to this school, which exist in Chinese translations, and the mastery of which will be necessary to understand thoroughly the intricacies of the Yogacarya philosophy: (1) Avatamsaka-Sutra; (2) Sandhinirmocana-Sutra; (3) Lankavatara-Sutra;

(4) Yogacarabhumi-Sastra, by Maitreya; (5) Mahayanasamparigraha-Sastra by Asanga; (6) Abhidharmasamyuktasangiti-Sastra compiled by Sthitamati; (7) An Exposition of the Sacred Doctrine by Asanga; (8) Madhyantavibhaga-Sastra, Commented by Vasubandhu; (9) Vijnanamatrasiddhi-Sastra, Compiled by Dharmapala and others.

In China the Yogacarya school is better known as the Dharmalaksha or Vijnanamatra sect, and Hsuan-Ts'ang and his disciple Jiwon (Tzu'En) were the chief agents in the propagation of this philosophy in the Far East.

SRI KRISHNA PREM: "PHILOSOPHY IN WARTIME." @

In these days of storm there must be many who ask whether any purpose is served by writings on philosophy and similar subjects. In England the State has, for the time being, taken the matter into its own hands and sanctions the publication only of books that it judges important. Here in India where the situation is not at present so urgent we still have a right--and also the duty--of deciding for ourselves whether our activities are of importance or not. We do not know how the licensing system is applied in practice but we may suspect that, while religious works may be allowed to have a 'consolation value', philosophical writings will be at least strictly rationed.

Man's extremity has been said to be God's opportunity, and though if that were altogether true, the Deific morals would have a rather dubious flavour and be something like those of the prison chaplain who plies his wares to a man who is just completing a spell of solitary confinement, yet is certainly a fact that in times of extrimity men do turn to religion, if only as a frightened child runs to its mother's lap to receive a soothing caress and the assurance that all is well.

On the other hand, the philosopher with a

@ In Review of Philosophy & Religion Vol.9.

tooth-ache is notorious. His philosophy deserts him, or rather, he deserts his philosophy, and ramps about the house showing in his pain rather less self-control than the ordinary man who has never toyed with ideas that pleasure and pain are mere illusions of the senses. Why is it that in periods of stress religion grows stronger and affords a welcome, if often largely superstitious, support while philosophy is apt to be a reed which breaks in the hand?

The reason is that, while, for most men, philosophy is a matter of the intellect alone, religion thrown down deep roots into our instinctive life. Do not men learn their religion at their mother's knees--a phrase, by the way, on which our Freudian friends would have some of their characteristic comments to make--and is it not therefore only natural that a terrible and hostile world should send back to those same knees for protection?

For philosophy, however, there are no such easily attained protective arms but a stern call to the facing of facts as they are. There can be no appeal to the 'mysterious ways' of an inscrutable Providence but only a determined enquiry into the nature of the horror which confronts us, a tracing of the evil to its roots in our own hearts, and, if the philosophy is to be more than the academic intellectualism nowadays dignified by that name, a steady effort to destroy those roots. This is a task for grown-up men and there is still too much of the child in our natures for it to be an easy one for us. To see this we have only to note how, under the stress of illness, sometimes even a trifling cold in the head, our behaviour takes on the fretful and peevish characteristics of a spoilt child.

Religious preachers are never tired of expatiating on the contrast we have just sketched though the moral that they draw from

it is not altogether the one which we ourselves are drawing. Nevertheless, the fact remains that no religious martyr dying in the supporting arms of a fanatical faith has surpassed the calm heroism with which the philosopher Socrates went willingly to an unjust death, entering the waters of the gloomy and terrible River with such a quiet and manful dignity that the beholders must have felt if they could not actually see his safe arrival on the Other Shore.

Clearly it is not philosophy that is to blame but rather philosophers. It is because our philosophy is an affair of our heads and not of our hearts (of which, incidentally, philosophers are usually rather afraid) that it is for us so often a broken reed. We construct 'systems' or, more usually, merely criticise the systems of others; we manipulate the pallid abstractions that we call ideas; proclaim that the real is the rational and the rational the real; assert that the objects of the world around us are 'only' ideas, or, going to the other extreme, deny reality to anything that is not perceptible to our senses. But it is not so. The real is far more than the merely rational--the present war, for instance, is certainly not rational--the world far more than mere 'ideas', while sense experience is but a picking up of ocean flotsam. Ideas are no more the whole of reality than a railway time-table is the railway and sense experience is no more the entire world than the flotsam on the surface of the waves is the whole content of the fathomless ocean.

Just now that flotsam is being hurled at our heads as the great waves from the inner worlds break in resistless fury on the shores of this so-called physical plane. From those waves some seek refuge in the parental arms of emotional

religion: "God's in his heaven, all's well with the world"; others in the text-book mentalism of a purely intellectual philosophy; "these trenches are not on my map--they can't be real." Both alike are haunted by the demons they fear to face, the former by the lurking doubts that, after all, the divine protecting arms are but "human--all too human", the latter by the thunder of great tidal waves that find no mention in the official almanac.

It is not behind emotional or intellectual 'Maginot Lines' that we can find security; it is in the open that we must meet our foes. Man's strength is in the Soul and he who would stand firm amid the tides of fear and sorrow must seek and find the pathway to that Soul. If religion or philosophy are to be of any real importance, they must be such as will set our feet on that pathway and must give us, not comforting beliefs, not intellectual opinions, not even firmly adhered to convictions, but that inner and certain Knowledge that burns us sorrow as the fire consumes chaff. That Divine Knowledge of the Soul, that penetrating insight into the nature of things as they are, into the modes of their arising and their passing away, that Knowledge exists now as it has always done. Now, as in ancient times, there are those who have mastered it in all its fullness; now, as always, there are those whole eyes are learning painfully to open to its divine Light. Religious traditions or philosophical adventurings that can give us any guidance to that Path are the most valuable possessions of the human race; their study and even their mere preservation are among the most valuable of all human activities. As for the rest, the philosophy and religion that are mere refuges from reality, the religion that is a parental head-patting for a frightened

child and the philosophy that is a mere arena for academic gymnastics, all these have little if anything to do with that Pathway. They are in fact mere actions and reactions of the human personality having about as much real significance as Turkish baths and cross-word puzzles.

Let us look into our own hearts and say in which category our own philosophy and religion are to be found.

2. SRI KRISHNA PREM. "THE MARRIAGE OF OPPOSITES."

The essentially creative act is the union of opposites. In mere mathematics the conjunction of a plus with an equal minus results in zero but in the real of real experience, this is not so.

3. Out of the marriage of the light and dark halves of the soul, the wonderful new birth, the spiritual birth, takes place, a thing which cannot happen as long as we artificially isolate one half of ourselves calling it virtuous good, respectable etc. Such isolation of all that we approve in ourselves to the exclusion of all the rest leads and can lead only to psychic sterility. We are afraid of all that is dark within ourselves not realising that it is but the shadow of what is light and therefore inseperable from it.

4. The union of opposites is in fact the great principle of the inner life. It is quite useless to imagine that we can have the one pole without the other, for all that happens is that in our frenzied efforts to isolate and develop the one we bring about an automatic degredation of the other which thereby becomes ugly and our enemy.

Let us consider this in the concrete. The state which we know as greed is one of the distinctly unpleasant aspects of human nature. But what is greed and how does it arise? There are two processes in the psyche just as there are

two in the universe; one a giving out and the other a taking in. For very good reasons these two have been symbolised since ancient times by the outgoing and the in going breath and the moment we have said this we are forced to realise that the two are entirely interdependent. Both of them are necessary and should be, as in yogic breathing, entirely balanced. The one is as necessary to psychic and physical health as the other.

Greed, then, is a manifestation, a distorted manifestation, of the inbreath and if that manifestation has become, as it certainly has, something ugly and sorrow-producing, it can only be because the corresponding out-breath has been emphasised in some exaggerated and one-sided way. We must not be misled by the commonplace antithesis of giving and getting and getting, in which one is considered 'good' and the other 'bad'. If our getting has become ugly it is because and only because our giving has become unwise and unbalanced.

5. It is by standing on the shoulders of a thousand vanished ages, profiting by the sacrifices of a million vanished lives, that the Soul has reached its present poise of wisdom. Must it not then have a duty to perform, the duty of handing on its wisdom to the lives that are yet to come so that thereby the past may be linked with the future by the living bonds of experience?

6. It can only be replied that these are the symbols carved upon the doorway of the temple, however imperfect may be the transcription here. He who would pass within (and there is no compulsion) must gain the power to read them for himself, for if without the power he set foot within the gates he will infallibly be lost in a whirl of illusions. Secondly, it must be stated that the so-called plain lan-

(continued at bottom of page 741).

REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH PROF. M. HIRIYANNA.

1. Yoga is of two kinds: i. preliminary or preparatory; it is also concurrent with study; this is to remove incompatible wrong ideas. ii.Nididhyasana which is final. It is a meditation on Tat Twam Asi. This latter stage, also called dhyana, is more than dhyana because it involves idea of constant repetition. It is described in Brahma Sutra under analogy of threshing paddy until you get the rice, 4,1, 1-12.Nididhyasana can only be done after other yogas have qualified one for it. It is to be done in the midst of activity and work. It has two stages, i. nunjana, which is still in process of conquering mind and ii. yukta, triumphed over mind; effortless.

2. Patanjali is both a yoga method and a system of philosophy: it expects to separate the Self from Prakriti as it is dualistic and pessimistic. Whereas in Advaita, yoga is only an essential method to merge self in Brahman, to forget its difference from Brahman.

3. Even if a man thoroughly understands Advaita and has no doubts, still he wont be realised until he gets the experience of Brahman. Hence intellectual conviction is not enough. Experience must follow and it is to be got by practise of dhyana until the experience comes. No formal practise is needed as it should go on all day. Experience of Brahman is an intuition of the essence of being One. In the first moment he gets spontaneous elation (ananda). It remains permanently in the sage. Its test is he feels love for all beings always thereafter. Until realisation he gets it in glimpses only and has lapses.

4. Re: Brihadaranyaka Tat Twam Asi has two stages, intellectual and yogic. Yoga is to intensify and deepen the thought of Tat Twam Asi and to remove obstructive ideas. Intel-

lectual conviction is not enough because vasanas crop up and interfere. A man may be selfish even though he have complete intellectual grasp of truth.

5. Re: Gaudapada: 3,36: Sankara's commentary is describing the highest state, the condition of one who is already realised. Dvivedi has mistranslated. Samadhi is used in two senses, that which is attained by its use and the formal earlier practice itself. Samadhi is not the proximate means of realisation. But it is an essential all the same. The proximate means is Tat Twam Asi. Analogy is a cablegram of news= Tat Twam Asi. Yoga= learning the language of cable which means concentration.

6. Sankara is the only Advaitin who criticises yoga. All others say it is essential. Even then he contradicts himself. Sankara does not discard yoga but puts it in its place.

7. There can be no knowledge without an object. Both the knowledge and its object are illusory forms.

8. Sankara's Commentary on Mandukya is not by him, I believe. Gaudapada is not accepted by some advaitins. Personally I do not believe that Sankara wrote that commentary.

9. No book earlier than Sankara and later men is now studied in Advaita, hence neglect of Gaudapada. All the earlier commentaries have been lost moreover.

10. We do not accept subjective idealism, but we accept objective idealism in the intermediate stage.

11. There is a penultimate standpoint, that of Isvara or cosmic universal mind. This is idealistic as Isvara is creator of the world-idea. But Advaita's ultimate standpoint drops even cosmic mind, Isvara, as illusory.

12. Sahaja Samadhi: i.e. literally= born with

us, second nature: natural: it does not occur as a term anywhere in the old texts but it is obviously like the niddhyasana.
13. The Unconscious cannot be equated with Brahman but with avidya, which is better called Implicit Consciousness. Unless there be the not-self there can be no self-consciousness; hence Brahman is not conscious of itself. However Isvara is conscious of itself.
14. It is not necessary in advaitic path to pass through Isvara, although some say it is. But from ultimate standpoint both world system and Isvara are illusory. We start with experience and grant its reality. Ultimately however we arrive at Nirguna Brahman.
15. Advaita was esoteric only in its beginning. Its texts were kept hidden in the earlier historic stages by the teachers.
16. Semantics is dealt with under logic, which is regarded as necessary to understand texts, but is subordinate. No one is allowed to study Vedanta until he has got some training in logic but it has no direct connection with the truth of Advaita.
17. Definition of truth is important in all systems except Sankara. Asparsa means non-contradiction= truth.
18. Reality= what transcends time, or what remains the same.
19. Reason: is intended to convince us of the truth of teaching of Upanishads, to remove its improbability, and to judge their truth: thus we do not depend on mere texts or blind faith alone: But reason gives only an indirect mediate knowledge, not experience. Intuition is the transformation of the indirect knowledge of reason into immediate experience of Brahman.
20.Nididhyasana has a negative function to remove the obstacles to realisation. Intuition arises from it.

21. See Gita where Sankara says the intellectual conviction must be made one's own by experience (or intuition or insight). 18th Chap. Verse 42: Anandagiri's Tika says Vijnana= the teaching is made ultimately dependent on our own experience, samadhi.
22. Sankara was the first to introduce the notion of Brahman as self. This was valuable because people might think of Brahman as Being, Existence etc. and all this would still be possible to think of as being outside themselves. Sankara brought the all within Self. (mem. by P.B. Hence suitability of term Overself)
23. Understanding is not enough; we must afterwards get conviction, rational belief in what one has understood.
24. Intuition is experience of what is already intellectually known, we do not use it in the sense of "discovery" of something previously unknown.like Einstein's for example.
25. Buddhi has two meanings (a) decision (b)thinking. Vichara is better for it means critical enquiry, pondering, reflection. Buddhi does not necessarily yield truth: it may also yield falsehood: It is subsidiary to the major premises we use. It is only an instrument, an organ, for thinking and for deciding.
26. The purpose of Brahma Sutras is to explain the apparent discrepancies in Upanishads. It was addressed to one already familiar with notions of Brahman. Hence it is justified in starting the first verse with Brahman.
27. Religion's place is very important because so few men can adopt the advaitic philosophy, but we must remember it is not the ultimate position. It is intended to help masses.
28. Yoga is useful for success in life because concentration of mind can give that.
29. Gnani=Siddha=Mukta= one realised Brahman.

49."That By Which All Else is Known," means that essence by which all other things, being of the same essence, are recognised; just as different ornaments are seen to be one and the same gold. Next, it points to the higher stage where the knower identifies this essence with himself and thus arrives at Tat Tvam Asi. TAT stands for Isvara, the source of the universe;TVAM = individual soul;ASI=the common basis or essence of both is non-different. This does not mean that Isvara and Jiva are identical, the same, but only that their underlying basis is. 50.ISVARA when analysed being found self-discrepant, we are driven to postulate something beyond Him. This is Nirguna Brahman and we have to find we are identical with it.Thus we aim beyond Isvara.
51.There is no evil in Isvara. Evil arises from man being finite,hence from his ignorance,hence from his karma and consequent suffering. Evil is due to wrong knowledge, to taking one thing for another.
52.DRG DRSYA VIVEKA is a necessary intermediate step in advaita. It is not the same as Western idea of Subject-Object series as the Subject still possess the organ of thinking mixed with it, whereas Drg is free from thoughts.It is therefore better to translate D/D as Self and Not-Self.
53. There are two ways in which knowledge is to be understood;empiric and transcendent. The element in all empiric knowledge which reveals the object to us is calledthe Drik, or Sakshin.It is the contrast between subjective and objective.Everything except this element is found to be drsyam. Even Isvara must have a Witness self. The Witness endures in sleep.
54. DRG DRSYA analysis begins by separating out all objective world-experience, then the same with ego experience. In both cases we ascertain what is transient as against what is permanent in each. The latter is the Drik. The next stage is to universalize the Drik and thus find it to be Brahman .
But when we docthis,both concepts are transceneed
Hence Drik sees itself as drsyam,retraces this
back to its source,notes itself as permanent and
drsyam as ever-changing.

55. Non-causality is an authentic Advaitic doctrine. But so long as the existence of empirical world is recognized then causality must also be recognised as existent. It is mentioned in Katha 2/14 and also in Brahma Sutras.
56. Time is placed on a higher level in Advaita than space. If you introspect your successive thoughts they could not be transcended but space can be transcended. Time and Isvara are beginningless and endless. Space has beginning and end in thought. But time, space and Isvara are empirical phases; they are what Brahman appears to us as.
57. Jivahood (the limitations and finitude of Jiva) disappears in realisation but not the Jiva. It is wrong to say he is lost in Brahman. Jiva cannot be destroyed, for Jiva is Brahman. Hence he who thought himself a jiva comes to think he is Brahman. He corrects his outlook, changes his point of view; there is no other change. There is a change in his knowledge of the situation, his substance remains.
58. On the empirical plane egohood is destroyed but not ego. Nevertheless ego is known to sage as being merely appearance.
59. Causality is denied for illusory imagined spheres like illusions, hallucinations, art and dreams but admitted for waking world. I do not agree with V.S.I. but his view harmonises with rejection of Isvara.
60. When you look beyond maya then all its consequences are nullified and non-causality reigns: but so long as you admit maya you must admit causality.
61. Immediate illusions can only be removed by immediate experience of reality.
62. Adhyatma Yoga is mentioned in Katha Upanisad, Pt.3 Verse 12.
63. Deusen's German translations of Upanisads are authentic.

103. Dhyana is the final stage of the quest.No Indian school has traditionally ever dispensed with it--except VSI's! And the final stage of dhyana itself is contemplation on the 4 great Mahavakyas, for they deal with pure spirit.But remember that dhyana does not directly give realization;nothing can do that for the Self is like the sun,ever-shining; it merely removes obstructions arising out of the load of vasanas brought over fr m past births. No knowledge got by thinking is immediate,only mediate whereas the knowledge arising after highest dhyana is immediate:self seeing itself.

104. DRG DRSYAM VIVEKA (DDV) analysis plays an important part in systematic Vedanta. It is essential at the beginning of this study.It is introduced to show (a)that universe is an appearance, (b)that universe is self-contradictory concept. Re 'a'it indicates that explanation of the world is not found in it but beyond it,just as the snake is not self-explanatory but indicates the rope behind it. Re 'b(' just as snake contradicts itself on enquiry so the drsyam makes us seek beyond for Drik. For a drsyam always implies the existence of a drik

105. Drsyam = known,appearance,object,not-self,unreal. Hence Sankara eliminates it as never having been:he does not use this term but the term'not-self' which I regard as the most accurate definition ofit.

106- Drik= pure Knowledge,pure Spirit,pure Con-sciousness. It is not the knower in an empir-ical sense for it does not function in any such limited sense;it deals with items only indirectly thru its association with antakarana Hence ego is a combination of drik & drsyam. It is reflected light,the mirror plus rays. Ego is not pure drik, for the individual mind comes and goes like drsyam.Ego knows only thru being associated with Knowledge, drik(unlimited

107. It is wrong to translate drg/drsyam by subject/object because we do not know what subject refers to.He who knows (as ego) may sometimes not know!Subject' is too loose a term,usually it means ego but not always. It may sometimes mean DrikSimilarly drsyam does not mean external or objective for it can be internal as thoughts. Self and Not-Self are best translations. Hegel's use of them approaches ours but doesnot go so far. His Absolute = Isvara but his Not-Self is our drsyam. His Absolute is Saguna,ours is Nirguna Brahman. Isvara is a glorified jiva and hence a combination of both drsyam & drik,only being cosmic he is evil-free.
108. The term 'self-consciousness' is much misued.If a man were conscious of himself, then self would become a drsyam whereas it is (when pure) the drik.
109. An actor who plays part of aking is never really at any moment a king.Similarly the drik seems to play the part of drsyam but never at any time is it other than Drik.
110. The sage acts in the world from the world's standpoint,doing what is necessary, yet without identifying himself withthis standpoint or being misled by it.Thus he may work in politics but will always keep his national politics in the light of the world's, being non-nationalistic at heart. its relationto
111. Just as Idealism teaches that an object always points to the presence of a mind--whether human or God's mind--so our Drg/Drsyam doctrine uses drsyam always to point to presence of a drik.The next stage is to show that drsyam cannot be explained by itself so we have to postulate a drik.We further show there is a constant element in all drsyam,which is Drik.III A:
Gita teaches disinterested service of mankind as best way of overcoming ego and thus progressing.

77.A most important function of metaphysical reasoning is negative; it is to remove all doub -ts, whilst an equally important function is positive; it is to establish thorough conviction in the utility of meditating on Brahman as the reality

78. Yes you may say that Isvara is holding his created thought of the universe in his mind and by his Maya making us see it.I accept Berkeley's teaching that objects are ideas in God's (Isvara's) mind, but I do not accept Subjectivism because it would make them ideasin the individual human mind.

79.If we regard our separate human personalities as real then Isvara is also really existent.If however we perceive that from ultimate standpoint only Nirguna Brahman IS, then Isvara becomes as illusory and unreal as does our personality.

80.There has been in India philosophy corresponding to Hegelianism, with its ultimate as the Absolute Whole and its 'real' evolutionary system, its 'real' creation of a universe, but Sankara has rightly criticised and demolished this position.Our advaitic ultimateis higher because it makes even the universe a fiction. The God of Hegelianism is really our Isvara and the cosmic God

80. There are two concepts of Isvara in India(a)that He is a Personal God, arbitrary, punishing here and there at his sweet will;a crude concept which I do not accept;(b)that he is Nurguna Brahman limiting Itself in order to become self-conscious

81.The purpose of evolution cannot be to make the Unconscious conscious because our human consciousness is too limited to constitute a goal.

82. Isvara is co-terminous with time whereas Nirguna Brahman transcends time altogether.Isvara is beginingless as is theuniverse as is time.In that sense you are right in saying that creation must be an inf -inite and ~~eternx~~ endless effort,incessant

83. Mundaka Upan:p 153,verse 9,"He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.Hencehighest knowing is being. Our theory is that by dwelling on a thing one becomes it

84. The Upanisadic teaching is not to kill one's attachment to body wife etc but to expand it to all other bodies wives etc to the same degree that it exists for our own. This is Love.
85. Self is the ground or root of all experience. This is the statement of Upanisads re upasanas.
86. The Self does reveal itself and is to be known despite its so-called transcendental nature, but it is not revealed or known as an object. Nor can it be known as a subject,for that would be the individual;it is what is behind both the subject and object.
87.Although waking and dream are different, the experiencing agent is one and the same.Brihad likens it to a fish which keeps on swimming from one shore of a river to another.
88. Realization is experience,not book knowledge. It cannot be got in deep sleep.The difference between latter and realization is that maya still continues there.Sleep is only a temporary obscuration of maya,otherwise the maya would not return.
89.Certainly 'Unconscious'would be unsuitable term for Atman,which is pure consciousness although not of human waking variety.'Subconscious' would be better if only it could be used with reference to entire universe and not to the individual alone.
90.Nirguna Brahman is not unconscious but un-self-conscious! Saguna Brahman is self-conscious Brahman, i.e. Isvara.
91. All the universal creation is idea in mind of Isvara, not of Nirguna Brahman.But its creation is not even in our individual minds.We are merely looking at things thru Isvara's eyes.We are in Him. He sees everything, however, whereas we see only a few things at a time. We participate in His vision of the world, as it were,and this is done thru His association with maya.But where we are deceived by the maya, Isvara is not.He is all-knowing,can't err.
92.Mandukya:verse 1 & 6 refer to Isvara.

93.SAGUNA BRAHMAN is Brahman regarded a sthe All, the Whole, the Aggregate of parts, the Totality of individuals, as a forest is a total of trees and does not exist apart from them Hence its individual entities are inseparable from it. Hence too there is no question of world being a magicians show in S.B.

94. ISVARA differs from above in that it does not depend for its existence on the parts or individuals as does S.B. Again,the world is a magician's show with Isvara as the magician. Further, MAYA is a part, an element in S.B. whereas and manifests itself there as the world hwereas with Isvara it is a power he wields to create the world-show.

95. From the ultimate standpoint both Saguna Brahman and Isvara are fictions or expedients used, as Sankara uses them, as tentative helps to the student not able to rise to ultimate view. Thus a solar eclipse is visible in one town and invisible at same time in another. The people of one place would deny its existence whereas the others assert it.Similarly jivanmukta sees truth where others dont;he sees Isvara as fiction but those who need Isvara declare him real.Thus it is all a matter of stanpoint. If we think world real, we must accept Isvara as real too;but if we know world as illusory then Isvara is ullusory too.

96. MAYA is that which keeps this ultimate truth concealed from the undeveloped

97.Everybody already knows the Real because he knows his personal self but it is only a dimly conscious knowledge of the Real Self, lacking fullness and clarity. It is a vague apprehension and needs to be expanded. We cannot throw or take up the consciousness of our own existence;its essence is always there.But like a light hidden in jar we have to break the jar and reveal the already-existent light, so we must break away from false ideas to see Truth.

98. Brahman is described as Existence-Knowledge-Bliss only for the purposes of verbal description Actually it is not the sum of these qualities,for qualities belong to Saguna not Nirguna.The phrase ~~is~~ means that there is no being outside of Brahman, no Thought outside of B. etc.We nay look at B. from different standpoints and thus describe it in differentways. B is described as Bliss because our ~~xxx~~ misery arises because we make thought and being separate. Thus we have a thought of something desired but not possessed;this leads to woe.But if we possess Brahman we possess everything,all being, hence there is bliss.

99.Time and space may be endless and infinite but they cannot be ~~that~~ absolute. We cannot say there is nothing outside space, because time is there; and we cannot say there is noting outside time because space is there. They are dual and one does not include the other. Brahman alone is both infinite and endless and yet absolute because it includes everything.

100. There are 12 Mahavakyas but only 4 are recognis-ed as important. These 4 are linked with each of the 4 Vedas and are taken from a Upanisad contained in that particular veda. Thus (1) Mahavakya=" Knoweldge is Brahman." --Rig Veda,Aitareya Up. (2) "I am Brahman." -Yajur Veda,Brihad. Up. (3) "That thou Art." -Samur Veda, Chandog.Up. (4) "I am Atma: This Self is Brahman."(pointing to the heart. —Athur Veda, Mandukya Up. Note that No. 3 is said by the guru as teaching;his pupil reflects on it, assimilates and absorbs it until it is understood and experienced;then pupil replies as per No.2.

101. There is only a single Isvara for the entire universe. It is wrong to say that each solar system has its own cosmic God.

102. Even Sankara admits that yoga is essential to realization in his Comment.on Katha,p.101,verse 18,Part VI.

112.A man may be born with good concentrat-
ionas result of work done in past births.
Hence he need not go in for preliminary yoga.
But none can dispense with advanced yoga of
meditation on the mahavakyas.
113. Where a man lacks the moral capacity
or mental equipment to follow the path fully
let him find a competent guru and have complete
faith in him and his views and guidance.He
will progress as a result,although in the end
this very progress will lead him to fulfil the
condition that truth must be made his own
and cannot be realized except thru one's self.
114.Panchadesi p.423,v.54 has been wrongly
taught by VSI. It really means that even if
you are of dull intellect, dont despair.Even
then go on thinking about the ultimate Brahman
although you dont understand it. In time some
light will dawn of itself mysteriously. For
the Self is ever there.
115. Gita demands complete disinterested self-
sacrifice for benefit of others without any
reservation. A family man will find this hard
or impossible so let him follow this ideal
to the extent which his circumstances permit.
116.Intense faith in the existence of Brahman
in the teachings of inspired books and in the
words of competent guru will surely bring
much progress to an unqualified man. But he
—like the lower yogi—will always be liable
to fall into doubts.Whereas the man who has
been through the metaphysical enquiry will
have met and faced all possible doubts and
overcome them for ever.
117.Drik cannot be annulled just as a man cant
overstep his own shadow.We bring it with us to
experience.It is immanent in all experience.
118. Drsya has its ground in Drik as serpent
has its ground in rope.
119. Just as we cant split space so we cant

split drik. It is one. But this does not mean drik is spatial for it cant be associated with form.Therefore it is not a unity, as one implies number.Hence we always describe drik negatively, as non-dual,humberless.(Cont below
120. Brahma Visnu and Siva are 3 personifications of 3 different aspects of one and the same Isvara.Only ignorant masses think of them as 3 separate beings,not intelligentsia.
121. Sankya-Patanjali yoga samadhi has two stages. (a) yogi is so sunk in the object of his meditation that he is unaware of self (b) nirvikalpa:even the object disappears here because mind itself goes and purusha-self alone is.Purusha is the underlying principle behind jiva. VEDANTA-samadhi is superior for it leads to non-difference. It is Brahman. ~~There is no Isvara here.~~ Its content is the partless identity of what the Mahavakya "I am Brahman" means neither.
122. Whoever wishes to meditate on Isvara may do so;it is not essential, just as whoever wishes to jump a couple of rungs up a ladder may do so also.Such meditation can only be a preliminary to meditation on Brahman later, for Brahman is the substance of Isvara. In the final meditation there is no world, hence no Isvara. It is optional as it is optional to meditate on any god,but only a step.It can yield intermiiten bliss only whereas Brahman yields unbroken permanent bliss
119a. You affirm unity only when there is numerical difference.Hence you can only affirm non-difference of Brahman or Drik,not unity. 123. Isvara is lord of universe,ego is lord of the body.Isv is Creator and ego is its creature.Isv is macrosmic and ego is micro -cosmic.Everything is in Isv.Remove these features which are accidental and the essential basis of both is revealed as non-different.

64. Directly seen illusion of snake can only be cured by directly experienced rope; which is the justification of mystic experience. This world is a direct experience. We see duality here. If such a strong illusion is to disappear there must be an equally strong and direct experience of world's unity. Intellectual knowledge of it is mediate and cannot remove the world illusion.

An indirect illusion is where you do not see snake but are told it is there. This can be removed by hearing or reading a contrary opinion as it is mediate.

65. Vichara plus yoga are essential. Vichara and Manana (reflection) must come first as we must get the intellectual conviction prior, to to get rid of long-standing belief in duality, the unconscious assertions of old habits and impulses and wrong ideas. As these will still appear dyana-yoga is needed to eliminate them.

66. Is mind-stilling without prior philosophic reflection enough to realize? I do not know but am doubtful if it suffices. Vedanta says it will not suffice. Patanjali says it will.

67. Avastatraya is also an authentic advaitic doctrine. It is not used to teach idealism however, but to show the continuing element, the Self, running through all three states, even in deep sleep, as recollection afterwards denotes experience. We make a distinction between waking and dream: they are not the same.

68. Maitri and Kaushi in Minor Upanishads are very good and authentic.

69. The Upasana practices are preliminaries; nothing more. Adhyatma= in regard to the self, i.e. concentrating on the Self.

70. The Vedanta(Sabkara) School restricts the scope of Intuition to knowledge of the Real whereas the Patanjali Yoga school, being dualistic, asserts intuition can known anything in this world because it is same faculty as Iswara has got.

71. I agree that it is better for you when writing to translate Brahman by "Overself" rather than by "Mind" because the latter is commonly restricted to theintellect and the former at once reveals that the narrow self is not meant. Moreover it is almost a literal translation of our term "Paramatma".

72. Knowledge of the Real can never be a direct result of cogitation but rather a spontaneous self-revelation in experience. Hence what reason cannot grasp immediately can only be grasped by the Intuition, the experience of anubhava, which transcends it. Nevertheless after the experience reason can comprehend it intellectually and before it indirectly.

73. Intuition of the final truth once known remains unbroken for ever, but during the preparation for it we do get glimpses, "lightning flashes," which lapse quickly and have to be repeated until they become stabilized. The intervals between the glimpses will get shorter and shorter. These lapses are due to vasanas proving too strong for us.

74. There are two stages of yoga. The elementary deals with various ways of establishing concentration, self-sacrifice and moral detachment. It may include meditation upon imaginary objects, or upon the point between the eyes or upon symbols. Theadvanced yoga deals solely with meditating on the great Mahavakyas, the formulas of universal truth, especially "Tat Tvam Aasi." & "Aham Brahmasmi.," & "Aum."

75. The lower intuition may be distinguished from the highest because former is dualistic and sees things as objective to oneself whereas latter is monistic and sees everything as within oneself.

76. The three stages of learning reflection and yoga-meditation (sravana, manana and nididhyasana) are traditionally regarded as being successive and not simultaneous.

30. There are no tests of a gnani. We can only get a probability through cumulative evidence, by watching him or living with him. V.S.I's tests of a gnani are quite insufficient. His outer life will naturally correspond to the kind of life he led before attainment. All gnanis are one only in inner intuition of the Essence.

31. "We should remember that yogic meditation is to follow intellectual conviction regarding the unity to be realised." In the above quotation from my book "Outlines of Indian Philosophy" the words "yogic meditation" refer to Nididhyasana.

%32. Sir Radhakrishnan's exposition of Advaita is correct as an outline, only it does not go deep enough into detail.

32. Philosophical logical study is necessary in order to secure the faith which will influence a man to undertake the rigorous practices of yoga and its disciplines, for only final meditation leads to the experience of realization. Study tells him the experience can be had; yoga makes it his own.

33. It is believed by all Indian schools--even the pessimistic--that Truth will ultimately conquer the world, and that it will never die out. Even if its living sages disappear still the texts will remain to enlighten others.

34. There is no compulsion upon a gnani to keep on returning to help this world, says one vedantic school; there is, says another. The point is indecisive.

35. The Vedanta Sara is an excellent textbook of Vedanta. My own translationis better than N's.

36. That even perfect philosophical knowledge of truth is not enough for realization, is admitted even by Shankara in his commentary on Bhag. Gita, Chapter VI, verse 8. Mahadeva Sastri's translation of this verse is not accurate enough. I translate

it thus:Gnana is what we learn from the scriptures.Vijnana is the same when it has been transformed into our <u>own</u> experience (svabhava)." This definitely places experience on a higher plane. Moreover M.S's translation of the Gita ~~xxxx~~ verse itself needs correcting:it should be thus;"It is only one who has acquired gnana and transformed it into vijnana,who is a yogi (sage)."

37.It is the practice of nididhyasana which leads to the 'lightning-flash.' If this flash is only once gained, that is sufficient to qualify a man to be a teacher--but not before, For after this first flash he will never be able to rest but will always be driven to seek to recover it. It has illumined the world for him and he cannot forget what he has seen, known. His next and final task is to repeat the flash and lengthen iit, until illumination is permanent.

38.Esoteric Vedantic teaching was never given in the afternoons,because that would be after meals, nor in the evenings because that was left for public teaching, general interviews, general public lectures, etc.It was given only in the mornings,because the students were then fresh and care-free in mind.

39Patanjali points out that occult powers are useful for worldly success but that they sidetrack the seeker and are thus obstacles to realization.No gnani cares for them

40.Samadhi is a temporary experience whereas the understanding gained by even the first lightning-flash is never lost.

41. I agree that the Gita description of asuras fits the Nazis,but the point to be noted is the reference to their "self-delusion."

42. Of Western thinkers those who come nearest to Sankara are Bradley and Spinoza.

42a:Remember that I have had no yogic experiences What I say is what I read in the Sanskrit books

43.VSI quotes Taityrria Upanishad p 501 which says buddhi/ is needed for realization.This contradicts other statements in the Upanisads. Whenever such contradictions appear--as they do --we must judge for ourselves in consonance with the adviata taken as a whole.// In this verse buddhi in its ordinary state is not meant, but,as stated, buddhie after it is sharpened (by yoga training) and subtilized (by philosophic study). Even this achieved is still not enough for realization.Nididhyasana must be added:(ni=very much,diya=reduplication)i.e. the meditative dwelling on the saying"Tat Tvam Asi" done intensively and frequently.

44. VSI quotes Gaudapada ChapterIII,verse41,as proof that success in yoga is impossible because an ocean cannot be emptied by a grass.He is not only wrong, but the meaning is the very reverse of the one he gives it. The verse is not negative as he affirms but positive.Instead of denying success it promises it! It merely means that great perseverance is needed for yoga, as is evident by the context of next two verses,which point out that only by constant patience can we withdraw from attractions and desires.The simile of grass is only to show the magnitude of effort required but it is not to be taken literally. It means that if one does not get tired he will succeed some day. VSI's denunciation of yoga is a most un-Indian idea.

45. 45.It is absurd for V.S.I. to say that samadhi is equated by sleep.Why then is tamas, the guna of lowest inertia,always correlated to sleep/ and satva to waking? Why is the yogi said to be satvik? Samadhi is a state ofconsciousness.

46.Light is the principle of mind which reveals everything else, just as the sun reveals all physical objects. But the sun does not reveal objects for its own sake and does not see them but reveals them for me, the witness of them, whereas the mind functions for itself,sees for

itself. 'Space' is a better symbol of Brahman than Light,although both are used in India.

47.ISVARA is Brahman become self-conscious. It is not out of time and space, but co-eval with them. It is the religious equivalent of the philosopher's Saguna Brahman. It is a trans-emprical experience. Common folk personify Him whereas philosophers treat him as impersonal deity, the Whole built of parts, like Hegel's Absolute. Bradley goes further than the Isvara-concept but hesitates just prior to the Nirguna idea. Sankara posits Isvara as a provisional Absolute, not as the Ultimate. Isvara is a magnified ego. From the ultimate standpoint He is as illusory as all else. We cannot descend from Brahman logically to Isvara or to the universe. Neither can be philosophically derived from the Ultimate Brahman. Therefore we ascend to the notion of Isvara from empirical experience and make it the highest point of that experience. When it is reached we analyse it and find it,like all else, discrepant and self-contradictory.But we also find that it is,like all else, twofold; one part is Real and expressible by Neti Neti; the other is unreal. That in Isvara which is real is found to be Brahman. He is a help to reach B. All advaitins recognise Isvara as being as empirically real as we individuals are. Those who dismiss Isvara fall into solipsism. There is then no Cosmic Mind (Isvara) to account for the world , for other individuals and for their own ego.

48.ISVARA is dynamic, ever-active whereas Nirguna Brahman transcends both ideas of static and dynamic. Isvara is ~~not~~ Brahman-realized like a gnani, but whereas the latter was formerly ignorant He was always illumined. He is universal. Heis intermediate between us and Brahman, to which it points. The mystic who describes his union in positive terms is talking of Isvara,for Brahman can only have negative description.Isvara is a thinking being.

134. Isvara is from Brahman's standpoint finite and individual but from ours he is practically infinite, having such an immensely larger scope. Moreover he is free from the evils associated with the human individuals finiteness. Again, Isvara is aware of particular objects like the ego is aware whereas Brahman is unaware of them. It is Brahman as ultimate light which makes isvara possess this awareness and Iswara in turn reflects this awareness to the egos.

135. T.Subba Row and H.P.Blavatsky placing the date of Shankara as B.C. are quite wrong. For in his writings there are references to Darmakrti and Dignaga and others, whose dates are known, and these alone compel us to place Shanakra near the date usually assignedhim; i.e. some centuries A.D. Even the present Shankaracharya who told you that their archivesprove he is B.C. omits to say that none of these are contemporary documents but were actually written within the past two or th ree 100 years. As for compiling by the list of successors, you must remember the average life here is much shorter than in West; consequently 66 successors here may mean only half that number of generations.

136. Samsara exists only in seed form in sleep whereas in dream it manifests itself.

137. DREAMS are principally caused by vasanas, and hence may include both memories of the present life as of former incarnations. Advaiata does not teach that prophetic dreams occur but the belief in them does exist; it is thought that tney occur at dawn, probably because the previous days impressions are exhausted by then and the mind is pure. Personally I doubt prophetic dreams-never having experienced them and because I believe the Uncertainty Principle renders the future elastic. 137a. Sleep shows that the ego is not continuous. 137b. In sleep the self sees that it has enjoyed its own bliss.

138. Ramanuja denies illusion and says it is only that our knowledge is incomplete that error arises. We do not know enough about things, he says, not that they are not there.
139. Illusion theory has been much misunderstood. It does not deny the existence of things but admits them. It merely argues about their status from standp oint of reality
140. Avastatraya is very important study in all systems of Indian philosophy. VSI is not wrong there but he is wrong in grossly exaggerating his criticisms of the West about it, because it has been dealt with by Western metaphysicians long ago and is now being dealt with by scientists, psycho-analysts etc. The chief point in avastatraya is sleep for that enables us to explain reality and world illusion relation. not dream. 141. The study of waking and dream is primarily to show that the experiencing agent, the subject, continues to be the same in both states even whilst the objective surroundings are changing. Secondarily it is to refute Buddhism which says the self is momentary, whereas we say it is continuous. Thirdly, it is to show that dream objects are really there outside us and have a definite place in time and space, that whatever is known really exists and not as idealism says, does not exist except as cognitions.
142. In both dream and waking the subject is one and the same, unchanged, whereas in sleep it is no longer there. This is because in former two states it works with manas but manas is absent from sleep, as evidenced by fact we do not think then. But this absence is never of the Self, only of ego as subject. The Self is there during sleep. It is the one permanent factor in all 3 states whereas manas is only in two of them. Sleep is valuable because it shows that the Self sees all but not in the ordinary sense; to do the latter it has to add manas and the 5 senses.

149. The outside object does exist, apart from the cognition of it.Ordinarily one of the causes of knowledge is the object before I get a cognition of it.Thus I start by positing a publicly existent table.The important thing is its prior existence,prior to the perception of course, not to inference or imagination of it.

150. Waking world is public and pereeptual, whereas dreams are private and perceptual. Being private it is illusory. For the duration of dream object's existence is co-terminous with the duration of knowing it,whereas public waking object continues to exist even when we are not aware of it.This refutes idealism.

151.Just as red color seen in white crystal exists really in flower juxtaposed and not in crystal,so the reality of dream objects belong to the dreamer himself but are/is superposed on the objects.

152. re Gaudapada,Isvara Hiranygarba and Virat are 3 states of the same cosmic selfand world which aparellel 3 corresponding states of the individual self,during waking dream and sleep.Thus dream is the interval state where things are only half-evolved,sleep= theunitary state of maya where all objects lie latent whilst waking indicates the world of variety fully evolved as we all see. Jiva is a sample of cosmic self originating originally Everything is in it that is in the world-self,Isvara only it is finite whereas It is not.But the essence of both is same. Hence cosmos is a self-evolving entity and nothing is outside guiding it.

153.Isvara is the general guide of world movement whilst individual is a specific agent. Both are needed. Hence if we are to be co-workers with God, as Personalists say, at same time the whole work is assured of success.Gita 11th chapter,gives vision of universal form and Krishna says:"Do you be a means" implyingthat Arjuna's help is required.Nevertheless in last chapter K says:"Now I have told you all.Do what you like."implying he is free to help or not,it wont matter.

154. Advaitic view of idealism: each individual sees an aspect of the object,i.e. his idea of it, and it is true that this is all he knows of it. But as the object is common to the perception of several individuals it must have an independent existence. Now the meaning of 'world' is a system,i.e. something which is constructed. The objective world must be a constructed one and the way in which the mind experiences it must be common to all.The world-idea must be a common construction. Its source is Isvara. Although logic should lead to metaphysics the view of idealism is after all merely a matter of logic. Subjective idealism, which would make the world utterly non-existent outside the individual mind,is discredited in the West and unacceptable to Advita

155. Just as we know our self not in the same way we know a table,i.e. as an object, but by an intuitive realization, so the knower of Brahman does not know it as an object apart, as a second thing, but by an intuitive becoming of Brahman. The term 'know' in this connection is imperfect; it would be better to say Brahman is 'experienceable' rather than 'knowable'

156.If we fall asleep whilst in the midst of reading a book, we wake up next morning and continue to read from the place where we left off the previous night. This proves that there is continuity of self-existence during deep sleep. V.S.I's teaching that ego dies in sleep is not held by any Indian school.

Its status is open to dispute but its existence not.

157. We correlate Nirguna Brahman with Turiya, i.e. the transcendental state and Iswara with deep sleep.

158. Brahman is the Apex wherein the illusions of both Iswara and Jiva meet although from the theoretical standpoint one may aspire direct to Brahman; from the practical standpoint we usually have to use the concept of Iswara as an intermediate goal. However even Sankara admits that if any one supposes altogether that Iswara is the highest one will have a complete coherent and satisfactory philosophy which will be perfect from the standpoint of logic. But from the standpoint

of metaphysics certain difficulties arise which are only to be solved by doing away with duality and recognizing only a single entity, that is Brahman.

159. Indian philosophy is pre-eminently one which deals with Values, especially the values of Dharma and Moksha. This is from the practical standpoint whereas from the point of view of logic the question of values may be left out.

160. Advaita is not based on Idealism. On the contrary it is a system. It may be called absolute Idealism. What it is opposed to is subjective Idealism which of course falls into the error of Solipsism. There are two extreme positions which are open to the seeker after truth both of which Advaita avoids. The first is that of naive realism which is the standpoint of the common man. He thinks the world exists apart from the mind and that mind exists apart from the world. The second extreme position which must be avoided is that of subjective Idealism which erroneously says that the world is my idea. Advaita agrees that the world is idea but not my idea. Were the latter true then each individual would have a different world. But experience refutes this because we all share a common world. Both I and the squirrel see the same tree. All men, after allowing for differences of merely personal interpretation share more or less the same world. It is coherent, co-ordinated, consistent, in short universal.

161. Why is it that all individuals experience a public world ? It is quite truth that the world we know is what is presented to consciousness. But the fact that the world is a consistent idea which we are all constrained to think in the same way points to the fact that it is really a thing, i.e. not necessarily a material

thing but an idea which is universal and independent of individual will or desire, something which goes beyond the individual's power to create. It is the same for every individual mind in every place, at every instant. Advaita agrees too that even an objective character of the world which makes it appear outside us is a supposition because nothing can be outside the mind.

162. The world idea therefore goes beyond what the individual mind constructs. This compels us to postulate the universal mind, which is thinking in us, which is mentally constructing the world in us. We are parts of this universal mind and actually participating in its activity. There is no outside material world apart from the idea of it which the universal mind is thinking in us. Nor can it be said that the universal mind first constructs the world as idea and then we think a second but individual idea duplicating the first. If this were correct it would imply that the universal mind i.e. Iswara exists before the creation of the world and before the creation of the individuals. But Advaita teaches that the world and individuals as Brahman are Anadi, that is, beginningless. Consequently there is only a single world Idea and not two. However as the universal mind is itself outside time and space whereas the world idea must necessarily be inside time and space it might be said that all the individually perceived aspects of the world idea (for each individual naturally perceives an aspect) when totalised constitute Iswara's own idea of the world. But really apart from the individuals Iswara cannot have a separate world idea because each individual is as it were a window through which Iswara is looking out on the world. Without these windows he would see not world at all. There

is no separate idea apart from the aggregate of the individuals. You cannot have too unlimited things as each would then limit the other. Mind being one Iswara has no existence apart from the individuals and individuals have no existence apart from him.

163. Iswara has the world experience but there is no sorrow or joy for him out of it. He has nothing to gain thereby. But the individual on the other hand has the experience for the purpose of acquiring values, pleasure gaining joy or suffering sorrow.

164. Iswara had no material whereby to create the world, no prakriti. Thought alone was his material. He merely thought and thus created the world.

165. If one thinks of Iswara as a separate entity outside the world it is a mistake. He does not present world to us from outside but from inside us. We are seeing the world with Him.

166. BRIHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD: Chap. IV. (References are to Madhavananda's Translation)

Section.1. Other teachers have imparted to King Janaka only a partial knowledge of Brahman. Yajnavalkya completes it; but the teaching, according to him, still remains defective in that it takes Brahman to be knowable. What is knowable must be phenomenal. Brahman is really beyond knowledge and it can be described only negatively as Neti, Neti. This Yajnavalkya proceeds to point out in the next section.

Section 2. The method adopted is not objective as before. He analyses the three states of the self, viz. waking, dream and sleep; and he shows that there is personal identity running through them all, though the physical environment changes almost totally from one state to another. But the self has some environment in all. Even when the sleep state is viewed from its cosmic side, the conception remains spatial.

To reach the true self, this limitation also should be transcended.

Section 3. The above view, which has merely been asserted, is here rationally developed; and the main results reached are:-

(i) The self is independent of the physical organism with which it is associated (pp.601-602, 605).

(ii) It is self-luminous and altogether devoid of change (pp.614-7)

(iii) It is one, is entirely detached and therefore beyond good and evil. (pp. 645-8, 652-5).

(iv) It is all-blissful in moksa where it has overcome avidya through right knowledge (pp. 655-68.)

167. The doctrine of Idealism is authoritatively Vedantic. It is given as such in Panchadasi. Bosanquet perhaps comes nearest to this view. It does not contradict Sankara except in the point of Panchadasi's taking up the question of ultimate value; i.e. what is to be gained from all this world process?

168. Indian philosophy does not agree with Western classification of subject and object. It replaces that by Self and Not-Self. For Self is a complex. We construct the self as we construct world 'I know myself' is illogical: it implies subject as object. Really the two are different. The eye cannot see itself. Any seeing agent cannot see itself. An object cannot be the subject. This is Drik Drsyam analysis.

169. The Witness does not construct the world, only the subjects. Isvara has a Witness too. For Isvara has Maya. It is the same as ours. This Witness, Drik, is Nirguna Brahman. Thus we can arrive at Ultimate Reality by ascending through Isvara.

ON DRK-DRSYA-VIVEKA: The following analysis of experience by the advaitin is based on the postulate of idealism that it is not legitimate to speak of anything as existing apart from reference to some centre of consciousness. That objects depend upon consciousness for their revelation is admitted by all. Here they are taken to depend upon it for their being as well. (a) The cognitive situation is usually taken to involve a subject and an object. The advaitin substitutes for them drk and drsya, the former meaning the self or what reveals and the latter, what is revealed. The reason for this substitution is that the other division is that the other division is not logically quite satisfactory. The subject includes not only drk but also drsya. It is really a complex of the self and the not-self. This is clear from statements like 'I know myself', where 'myself' must refer to some thought or feeling or, as Hume said, "some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." These perceptions, being observable, are drsya and necessarily point to some centre of consciousness beyond them.
(b) If drk is altogether different from drsya, it cannot be known by any other drk for then it would become a drsya. Can it know itself? According to many philosophers, both Indian and Western, it can; but the advaitin thinks it cannot. If it should know itself, it can be only in one of two ways: (i) One part of it should know another. That is, it should admit of internal division. But it is impossible to conceive of spirit as spatial and partible. (ii) It may know itself entirely, what is known being identically the same as what knows. This is equally inconceivable, for nothing can be both agent and patient in respect of the same act. The conclusion is that drk is not knowable.

Yet it is given; so it should be self-given. That is, it is the condition or ground of all experience.

(c) It is impossible to think of the absence of drk as having ceased to be or as not having yet come to be, for that thought itself would imply the presence of drk. Hence drk, in some sense, should be regarded as having neither beginning nor end, and therefore as eternal or timeless.

(d) We have seen that drk cannot have internal parts. It cannot be externally related to other drks, for a similar reason, viz. that it is not possible to think of any dividing line between them. The only way in which we can distinguish between one drk and another is by reference to their content or the objects they reveal. In themselves, they are indistinguishable. That is, drk is one or, more strictly, not many.

(e) Drk, being one and eternal, cannot be the same as what we usually mean by 'knowledge'. But the latter is not altogether different. Representing, as it does, a state of the 'subject', it partakes of its hybrid character, and includes within it the non-self, viz. antah-karana in one of its ever-shifting modes.

(f) To go back to the idealistic postulate. Objects may depend upon empirical knowledge for their revelation, but not for their being. It is empirical knowledge rather that depends upon objects for its emergence--at least sometimes, as in perception. So if they should depend for it upon consciousness, it must be only upon drk in the above sense.

(g) Now we cannot place drk and drsya on the same ontological level, for while the one has independent being (for its being is its revelation), the other has only a dependent one. What then is the relation between the two?

In the case of the 'rope-serpent' we have two things, which similarly belong to different orders of being. The rope, to speak from the empirical standpoint, has its own being, but the being of the 'serpent' is dependent upon it. We know here that the serpent is but an illusory appearance of the rope. On this analogy, the advaitin explains drsya as only an appearance of drk. But it is not non-entity, for it has its onw being though it is finally sustained by, or rooted in, drk, the ultimate Reality. Objects are; but they are not real ultimately. This shows that drk is not only one and eternal but also that it is all-comprehensive, in the sense that there is nothing outside it.

(h) It may appear that such drk is nothing but an empty generality because, in the end, it is abstracted from all objects of experience. It will be so, if we start from the assumption that the latter are concretely real. But to do so is to beg the whole question.

(i) Westerners are apt to think that when empirical knowledge disappears, then the drik disappears with it. This is wrong. The drik remains. And deep sleep offers the best proof of this.(see also 142) For when we awaken and remark we have been refreshed by enjoyment of peace ,how could we know that the deep state was one of peace unless we knew it at the time? For our remark is made subsequently. Hence we must have something in us to have noted this peaceful state.This somet ing is the Self. Hence too it notes and sees but not in the ordinary way, i.e. the empirical way.

143. MAYA is associated with the cosmic self whereas AVIDYA is associated with the individual self. This is done for purposes of exposition, but really they are not different. Avid.is thus a section of Maya.

111.

144.The experience of bliss in sleep is actual but we are prevented from knowing it specifically, as we have specific knowledge of a chair, because we are then enveloped by avidya.On awaking we do not speak in present tense but in past,saying "I was not aware."We really mean that "I was enveloped in avidya;moreover I had no manas then so could know know it specifically."
145. VSI's denial of maya and avidya is refuted by the whole tradition of advaita.He is wrong.
146.144a. Why then are we able to recollect this bliss even though there is no ego in sleep?It is because the ego is a complex which includes the Self and the presence of the Self renders recollection possible and the manas
146.The 4 stages of avastatraya are: Waking=Self+manas+common public objective world.
Dream=Self+manas+private objective world
Sleep=Self+ avidya and no objective world.
Mukti=pure Self. Hence slef is the only common element in all states and in all individuals.
147.Dreams may be irrational and inchoerent neverhtheless manas is still there even if its action is modified. Moreover even in waking we become incoherent on hearing bad news.
148.ILLUSION: In all illusory situations there must be some element of reality somewhere.Thus when we move in a train our illusion consists of transferring movement from train to trees,but the movement is the reality there.Where is the illusions?It lies in the transference .Similarly in dreaming we transfer reality from the Self to the dream objects.Here is our illusion. This throws light on the fact that if we take world to be real, for we are then transferring reality from Self to world.Now the rope is empirically real the snake is illusorily real, whereas the dream rope and snake are both illusorily real.It is all a difference of status, therefore.

170. Sankara admits that much of what we call ourselves is objective, is part of the world. He says that there must be a Witness. There is a constructed world which must have reference to the Witness. It underlies everything. In themselves the Witness in each individual is not different. It is the antakarana in each in each which differs because it is limited. As subjects we are different, as Witness we are all one.

171. The world gets into me through my mind. Hence it is my idea. Even God passes into you through the mind. Hence God is also my idea. At the same time world also has an independent existence as being common to all.

172. As illumination of all things in a room depends on a lamp, so actually it is only flame, not chimney that lights it up. But chimney itself is illuminated by flame. Here lamp=subject which is mixture of Drik and Drsyam. Flame=Drik. So all world-changes and world-constructions are <u>for</u> the Drik not <u>in</u> it. Just as the light is inactive,merely reveals, lights up, so Indian philosophy says Spirit is not active and does not construct world, whereas Western philosophy says it is active in a higher manner. We as individuals (subjects) construct world. But this is only possible because Drik is present. Drik is actionless and changeless. It does not construct. The entire world depends on the totality of individuals, i.e. Isvara, who in turn depends on Drik.

173. The central idea is that subject and object cannot be one and the same thing. The Drik is that which does not require to be known. Its presence is revelation just as in the case of a lamp we do not need to bring another lamp to see it. Every object is revealed by presence of Brahman whereas Brahman is its own reflection.

174. The difference between Western Idealism and Indian Idealism is not essential but only that the former does not go quite so far. For example, Bradley says the diversities are somehow reconciled in the Absolute whereas Sankara says they are not there.
175. The 'constructs' of all individual subjects correspond. Therefore we conclude that the human mind is the same in all. The objective universe would not have been there but for the operations of all our minds. Everything is constructed except, Sankara would say, the Onlooker, the Drik.
176. The world idea is dependent on me but has also a common independent existence which makes it objective to me. Its structure necessitates our thinking of it in a particular way. But Nirguna Brahma, Drik is at the back of each of us, of Isvara too.
177. Isvara in himself does not change but only in his body, i.e. world. We may regard Isvara as co-eval as a mediator with time because Isvara is active and this implies time. Isvara is more than a process, however, because He includes the Witness.
178. The practical standpoint is not wrong but it is only a preliminary one which is transcended by the higher one. It ceases to possess value when we take the higher view. Hence we cannot look for purpose in Brahman. It is only an Onlooker. From its higher dimension the lower purposes become meaningless.
179. All Indian thought not only teaches Karma but (except theosophy) teaches that men may be reborn as animals. If we accept Karma we must accept it fully and understand that men become animals and vice versa.
180. World is only an appearance for us: it does not arise for Brahman. Evil and Suffering were treated by ancient Indian philosophy under guise of Change.

181. Yes. Isvara regarded as immanent in us is the higher self. Brih. Up. Chap.3 Sec.7 verse 3 calls this the Antaryamin=Inner Controller. But he is <u>not</u> actually divided by this for he is also transcendent, unexhausted. There is only one antaryamin for all beings, not two. The sun and rays simile is incorrect here. Antaryamin is how Isvara sustains the universe. It is one of the functions of Isvara. C.F. Gita "Isvara manipulates all men as if they were mounted on a machine."

182. Individuals are <u>Phases of Isvara</u>: this is better term than <u>Point</u> in Isvara. You can say that individual who progresses through expansion of consciousness develops into recognition of presence of Isvara <u>within</u> himself as his true or higher self. This gives him only a phase of Isvara but does not enable him to acquire all the powers of Isvara. He can't create world . (c.f. p.508 verse 17 Brahma-Sutra) But being a phase it will be a distinct being, although harmonious with all other beings of same attainment. He has transcended evil and is sure of liberation. It is only a question of time. So one may call it higher self. Like six good men of equal knowledge and character, the viewpoint will always be the same. However it is only a temporary self so long as it is not realization of Nirguna Brahman. It is the ideal self, the wider self.

183. Jiva the narrower self as such disappears in realisation, says Sankara, but as substance or self he does not. For all along he was only an idea.

184. Consciousness is intrinsic to us. Isvara gives us only the <u>means</u> to manifest it. The principle of Consciousness is largely but not fully, all but completely, restored to us when we realize Isvara.

185. No Indian teaching that individuals are

beginningless and endless.
186. Antaryamin or Isvara includes knowledge of all that individual is and does. To that extent he is the observer of ego but not a mere spectator, but much more than that he is its inner controller. He is also actor. Only Brahman is a pure Spectator, inactive, in a transcendent sense.
187. There is no time apart from the cosmic soul. Time is a phase of it. It is along with it. Hence life becomes immortal when it is universalized as Isvara where there is no time and no space. (Plotinus also gives a higher position to time than to space.--PB)
188. Advaita puts time above space although ultimately it regards both as phenomenal. It is higher. So long as that lasts succession lasts. It is easier to forget space, i.e. thought of objects, than to forget all thoughts. Time was created before space, for you must first think in time before we can think in space. Time has no beginning. Hence it is co-eval with maya but space is a product of maya. For you can't correctly ask the question, When did time begin? It is equal to at what point of time did time begin? as the question itself involves contradiction like a man asking "Am I able to speak?"
189. Isvara is a Hegelian concept. It preserves and contains time and space within itself and yet transcends them for itself.
190. Isvara is co-eval with jivas. The latter have been in existence all along and well continue. The change is only from jiva-hood to isvara-hood. The jiva becomes Isvara-conscious.
191. Maya is Prakriti. He who controls maya is Isvara. If you recognize Isvara as real then you must regard Prakriti as real. As maya it is an ingredient or element in Isvara. But it is subordinate to Isvara as our body is subordinate to Isvara.
192. Drik is not the subject. It is the essence of the subject. It is the ultimate Self. (Cont over)

D. T. SUZUKI."THE FOUR JHANAS." © The first Dhyana is an exercise in which the mind is made to concentrate on one single subject until all the coarse affective elements are vanished from consciousness except the serene feelings of joy and peace. But the intellect is still active, judgment and reflection operate upon the object of contemplation. When these intellectual operations too are quieted and the mind is simply concentrated on one point, it is said that we have attained the second Dhyana, but the feelings of joy and peace are still here. In the third stage of Dhyana, perfect serenity obtains as the concentration grows deeper, but the subtlest mental activities are not vanished and at the same time a joyous feeling remains. When the fourth and last stage is reached, even this feeling of self-enjoyment disappears, and what prevails in consciousness now is perfect serenity of contemplation. All the intellectual and the emotional factors liable to disturb spiritual tranquillity are successively controlled, and the mind in absolute composure remains absorbed in contemplation. In this there takes place a fully-adjusted equilibrium between Samatha and Vipasyana, that is, between tranquillisation or cessation and contemplation. In all Buddhist discipline this harmony is always sought after. For when the mind tips either way, it grows either too heavy or too light, either too torpid in mental activity or too given up to intellection. The spiritual exercise ought to steer ahead without being hampered by either tendency, they ought to strike the middle path.

There are further stages of Dhyana called "Aruppa" which is practised by those who have passed beyond the last stage of Dhyana. The first is to contemplate the infinity of space, not disturbed by the manifoldness of matter; the second is on the infinity of consciousness

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as against the first; the third is meant to go still further beyond the distinction of space and thought; and the fourth is to eliminate even this consciousness of non-distinction, to be thus altogether free from any trace of analytical intellection. Besides these eight Samapatti ("coming together") exercises, technically so called, the Buddha sometimes refers to still another form of meditation. This is more or less definitely contrasted to the foregoing by not being so exclusively intellectual but partly affective, as it aims at putting a full stop to the operation of Samjna (thought) and Vedita (sensation), that is, of the essential elements of consciousness. It is almost a state of death, total extinction, except that one in this Dhyana has life, warmth, and the sense-organs in perfect condition. But in point of fact it is difficult to distinguish this Nirodha-vimoksha (deliverance by cessation) from the last stage of the Aruppa meditation, in both of which consciousness ceases to function even in its simplest and most fundamental acts.

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HIRIYANNA (cont)

124. The Mahavakya merely directs attention to Brahman but doesno more for it cannot describe It. Its content purpose and result is different and superior to those of inferior meditation.The latter is intended to free yogi from bodily attachment, strengthen his will and gain partial result. The former is intended to achieve perfect result, to fix in the mind truth previously got by intellect and to gain enlightenment. The latt -er may be done with mere faith alone whereas the former is done with knowledge. The latter may not have understood subject of meditation whereas former does

125.Reincarnation picks up the old ego-mind which is quite unchanged ;only the body is new. This permanent element is called antakarana;it is not pure spirit;it is the internal organ, mind, a single principle of which manas and buddhi are merely aspects or faculties.But writers do sometimes use manas as its equivale- nt. But Antakarana is not ego. Drik+manas=ego. If sun is drik and reflecting mirror is ego, then the mirror when no sun is present and hence no reflection, is antakarana.Ego is a complex, a blend of spirit and matter whereas antakarana is material (not physical).Both ant and ego last till liberation and are then destroyed,leaving pure spirit. This may be harmonized with Buddhism which denies transmigratingentity but admits a transmission of identity.

126.There is no fixed teaching about interval after death. Some Upanisads say we are at once reborn others say only after an interval.

127. VSI's misure of 'Panchadesi'p423,v.54 is typical of his distortions.There is no inference here that meditation is inferior,only that it is a different method.On the other hand dhyana is prescribed to superior aspirants by Panchadesi itself! SeeCapVII,v98,CapVII,v105

128.Drik+Maya=Isvara.Isvara may be regarded as the Cosmic Subject,the source of the Object, World and of our egos.But behind it is Drik as Drik is behind our ego-mind.These two Driks are non-different. Isvara is not Drik as it is associated with Maya. Vedanta re-thinks the subject-object relation which is a co-ordinate and discovers the drk-drsyam relation which is not a co-ordinate. Hence we drop the former.
129. The ego is a complex (i.e.mixture) of Drik and Antakarana. The drik illuminates its and makes knowing possible
130. Idealism is wrong from the empirical stand-point because we do not as egos produce the physical environment; it has to be there and then we observe. If it is not there we do not become aware of it. But Idealism is correct from the ultimate standpoint of the Drik for it is the latter which reveals the world as a drsyam. In other words the cosmic mind thinks the world through the power of maya which is inextricably associated with it; thinks the egos which thus become aware of this world; but this Isvara is itself a drsya to the ultimate Drik or Brahman.
131.In Nirvikalpa samadhi there is no antakaran whereas in savikalpa it is present although ignored because attention is wholly directed to the object of meditation.
132."Yoga Vasistha" by Valmiki is highly regarde-d although little read by pundits.Nevertheless I regard it as inferior, as not true to Sankara's thought (alt hough pundits assert it is) and as being too subjectivistic.
133. Why do we reject the infinite regress? Beo-ause it can never arrive at certainty, because it cant be final and chiefly because it implies the Absolute Drik at the end in any case. It is Relativism,which Bradley also says implies theA.

W.R. INGE:© Plato had maintained strongly that religion must be mythological in its earlier stages. Education must being with what is untrue in form, though it may represent the truth as nearly as possible, under inadequate symbols. He lays down certain standards (
) whereby we may distinguish 'true' myths from false. God is good and the cause only of good; He is true and incapable of change or deceit. 'True myths' ascribe these qualities to God; false myths contradict them. So Plato does not disapprove of the 'medicinal lie,' which has been used to justify all religious obscurantism. But he would banish all who try to misrepresent the character of God and the moral law in the interest of a priestly caste or a corporation. see Plato's Republic p 376

@@ Neoplatonism respects science, and every other activity of human reason. Its idealism is rational and sane throughout. The supremacy of the reason is a favourite theme of the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, who had drunk deep of the Neoplatonic spirit. 'Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual,' writes Whichcote to Tuckney, 'for spiritual is most rational.' And again 'Reason is the Divine governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God.' The difference between this reverence for man's intellectual endowments, which always characterises true Platonism, and the sentimental, superstitious emotionalism of popular 'mysticism' is much more than a difference of temperament. It is because he is in rebellion against nature and its laws, or because he is too ignorant or indolent to think, that the emotionalist flies to the supernatural and the occult. Very difficult is the Platonic spirit.

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@@ Prof. K.R. SRINIVASIYENGAR: Mysore: A MAHAVAKYA in Indian philosophy is one of the great fundamental pivotal sayings which neatly sums up in a nutshell the core of the teaching of a system, especially of the Vedanta: such as Tat tvam asi."

@@ Prof. P. NARASIMHAYA (of Travancore) Interview: (1) The only thing that you can really know is your own self. You cannot really get into another entity, not even by telepathy. For telepathy is explained by the akasha, not by union. Hence you can only know the world as such because you are really knowing it inside your Self.
(2) The Unconscious of deep sleep is not the same as the Unconscious of Turya. The former is a mere negation of self whereas the latter is a postive apprehension of the Absolute.
(3) We are logically compelled to rise beyond dualism when seeking an explanation of the Isvara/Jiva problem for they must have a third thing unifying them, which must be Brahman.
(4) Some pundits have had to reconcile the various standpoints as follows: They say: When you think, you must be a Shankarite; when you feel and adore you must be a Visishta-adwaitin; when you act you must be a dwaitin.
(5) The Jain view of Saptabhanga says that there is a truth for every standpoint but there is no absolute truth.
(6) I fully agree with you that a metaphysical training should be adopted by the mystic and a mystical training by the metaphysician in order to achieve balance; otherwise both degenerate into extremes and finally lose their way. The mystic gets into excesses of feeling. Puranas contain stories of mystics who fall from the path after being tempted by gods with a beautiful damsel; this is because they have feeling but not knowledge. On the other hand metaphysicians become dried intellectuals lost in words or logic, barren.

Prof NARASIMHAYA (cont)
(7) Isvara cannot from our standpoint, be called an ego, individuality; relative to us it is unlimited.
(8) Sankara does not deal with the problem of evil; in fact most Indian philosophy avoids this. Perhaps the only attempt to touch it is in Yoga Vasistha where Vasishta says that only a man who has got out of a rapid current and not the man drowning in it, can understand this problem properly. So our advaitic reply is it is useless to ask such a question; attain reality first; then you will see unreality mist-like nature of cosmos and evil disappears as a problem! Karma however accounts for the human portion of this problem.
(9) Hiriyanna is primarily a linguistic scholar in Sanskrit,his metaphysical ability being more limited so that he often uses a philosophy- P undit to help him.
(10) VSI's characterization of Mandukya as the most important Upanisadis nonsenical. The Brihad and Taitareya are far older .As for the quote from Muktipanisad recommending thelatter work is itselfonly a couple of centuries old! As for Gaudapada he is partly a Buddhist and Sankara's Comment on him is of dubious authenticity. No pundit holds Mandukya in more esteem than others
(11)My personal difficulty despitemy studies is to derive the Individual from the Absolute;the gap seems uncrossable.
(12) As Advaitin I regard Isvara as belonging to Maya and His worship is only for the lower minds

Sri KRISHNA PREM - Contd. from page 698.
guage of modern thought is a language of the mind alone while the knowledge that is sought is the knowledge that belongs to the Soul.Hence the uselessness of these realms of the spurious clarity of a language merely rooted in the mind and the necessity for learning to read and use the language of concrete symbol which is, as it has always been, the language of the deeper psychic levels.