

Indian Philosophy and Aurobindo

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¹ The original editor inserted "only" by hand

² The original editor corrected "MUKERJI" by hand

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1. SIR HARI SINGH GOUR. (WELCOME ADDRESS) in 13th I.P.C, @ 1937). The philosopher has to transcend these faulty stretches in his thought. He has to start with no postulate and curb his mental yearning that clouds his mental vision. A mind that seeks to search for truth and the true causes of things and their inter-relation cannot swallow quack pills presented to him in aphoristic tabloids without scrutiny or rational support, for philosophy does not claim to discover all link in the chain of causation but merely strives to test and examine them in the dry light of reason, aided by such facts as the allied sciences have discovered by a similar process. (@ INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS)

2. Their impact upon our institutional religions and social systems has created a worldwide ferment much to the discredit of such religions and the displacement of its consequent social orders based on them.

In the mediaeval age, when mutual intercourse between nations was difficult and communications slow, such ideas took time to influence human action; but with the invention of air transport and the radio it is possible to influence mass action with greater effect and no loss of time, with the result that cataclysmic changes in world conditions have taken place and are taking place, as if the world had met to confer and act at a single gathering. The repercussions of philosophic thought require now no time to permeate all classes of society, literate or illiterate, resulting in sweeping changes in our political, economic and religious beliefs so that the philosophic doctrine is no longer studied in the cloistered solitude of the academy but is engaging the quickened intellect of the man in the street.

An erroneous view of life, its obligations and duty may convulse the age-long established order such as has transformed the map of Europe

(continued from the previous page) and is at the present moment repainting the map of Asia.

It is the duty of the philosopher to take note of these convulsive upheavals, to examine their cause and correct their wanton vagaries.

3. R.D. RANADE: A PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT. I want now to call your attention to certain contemporary researches in the field of Neurology, and particularly, to the researches of Mr Head on the function of the "Thalamus" which has been proved to be the seat of emotions. By the application of the three methods of (1) the study of lesions, (2) the study of pathological cases, and (3) the extirpation method practised especially on higher animals, we arrive, says Head, at the conclusion that the Thalamus is the seat of the emotions. It has been for a long time admitted that the cortex is the seat of intellection. Now, cut below the cortex, and there is exaggerated emotion, e.g. excessive weeping, excessive hilarity, excessive sexuality and so on. Again, cut below the Thalamus, and we find that there is mere automatism. Thus, says Mr Head, the Thalamus may be regarded as the seat of emotions. The significance of the discovery of the function of the Thalamus for philosophy is that we clearly see how the intellect is meant to 'control' the emotions, following the idea of the control of the higher over the lower in Sherrington and Hughlings-Jackson. But, at the same time, emotions are more internal; they are "antaratarata," that is to say, nearer reality. Thus neurological discoveries bring to light the problems concerning the conflict and co-operation, the inhibition and summation—to use Sherrington's phrasology—of intellect and emotion, or of Jnana and Bhakti. The ideal would be a perfect harmony and co-operation between intellect and emotion.

4. Croce's is a bastard spiritualism; his

(continued from the previous page) spirito is nothing but mind or thought. Both Croce and Gentile decry religion, and elevate moralism and infinite progress; and their doctrine of approximation, though true of the individual, is false about the whole. Croce's ever-evolving absolute is the very philosophical prototype of Mussolini's never-ending political ambition. Mussolini's Fascism might well be regarded as rooted in Croce's philosophy of the never-ending Absolute.

5. The philosopher's work is not done when he has realised within himself the peace of mind about which Mr Joseph speaks. His supreme business is to bring about peace and harmony in the Society, the State, and the world at large. From this point of view, it may be said, without exaggeration, but the future of the world rests with the "philosophers."

6. RASVIHARY DAS. KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. When I say that I know physical objects, I may be told that I do not really know them, but only believe them to exist.

7. Although the word 'knowledge' is used in different senses, some philosophers claim that knowledge, in the strict sense, is sui-generis, and is not further analysable. It may be true that the term is not strictly definable; but nevertheless it cannot be denied that we know very well what sort of thing knowledge is, and unless we can express what we mean by knowledge, we can hold no intelligible discussion about it. Knowledge is a state of consciousness, and consciousness or awareness, I admit, is absolutely indefinable. From various signs you may infer correctly, whether I am conscious or not, but if you have not already realised in yourself what consciousness is, I shall never be able to make you understand what consciousness means, by any signs whatever. The fact is that consciousness shows forth every thing else, but it itself cannot be shown.

8. In what sense is a sense-datum known? When I see a brown patch, does the sensum exist where I see it to appear? If it does not, then my assumed knowledge is mere illusion.

Has the sensum any being apart from my act of knowing it? If it has not, it is no proper object at all, and there can be no knowledge of it. It may be argued that even in an illusion there is no doubt that I am sensing a sensum. But then what I know in that case is not a sensum, but myself as having a sensum. Am I sensing when I am dreaming? Can I always be sure whether I am sensing or imagining?

9. I am therefore inclined to think that there is no radical difference between belief and knowledge as we have it. When we feel that the sense of reality associated with any content needs no justification or is quite well-founded, we use the word knowledge, and when we find that it needs justification or is not quite well-founded, we use the word belief. Knowledge is a subjective experience with an objective reference, but there is nothing in the subjective experience itself which can guarantee the validity of the objective reference. It can be validated only by further experience or by some objective considerations. All our knowledge therefore is always theoretically open to doubt. Mr Price says that in knowledge a particular (or a fact) is directly present to consciousness. But I suggest that we never know an uncharacterised particular and whether the character really inheres in the particular, we can never know for certain from the state of consciousness in which it is revealed. The being there of a content does not literally come out in any act of consciousness. In cognitive terms, it

(continued from the previous page) means no more than an assertion, and assertion always requires, theoretically at least, some justification.

10. N. VENKATA RAMAN. "THE NATURE OF MIND AND ITS RELATION TO THE SOUL." It is a well-known and striking fact that Indian Philosophy invariably distinguishes between the Mind and Spirit, Soul, or Atman; whereas European Philosophy confuses between the two, often identifying them—this confusion and identification giving rise to endless other confusions, difficulties, and 'problems' in modern philosophy. The Mind or antah Karana together with its several faculties, is only an organ or "instrument" according to all schools of Indian Philosophy—It is an organ or instrument of spirit who is the real perceiver, knower, or user of the instrument. Its relation to spirit is the same or analogous to that of the latter to other organs, like the eye or the hand. And, spirit is the only conscious entity—the mind, like the sense-organs and the body, being absolutely jada, or unconscious.

11. It is only mind that is ever-active; and thoughts or ideas are the result of its activity.

12. Descartes' failure to distinguish between subject and object, and his confusion between what properly belongs to the two opposed categories, when he once goes beyond his cogito ergo sum lands him in a series of insoluble problems and chief among which is that of the relation between body and mind; and directly arising out of it, the problems of knowledge. The whole course of modern philosophy subsequently has been an attempt to find a solution for these problems and we cannot say that we have their right solution even today; for, they arise out of false presuppositions; and are incapable of solution in the form they have emerged out of those presuppositions.

N. VENKATA RAMAN. "THE NATURE OF MIND AND ITS RELATION TO THE SOUL."

13. Even Kant, who was far more thorough-going in his analysis of the conditions of knowledge and experience and who accordingly reaches the conclusion that the nature of the self is pure thought only, cannot get over the confusion and separate the self-conscious knower from the known mind with its objective contents and knowledge forms.

14. DR C. KUNHAN RAJA. (Presidential Address). The question of Adhikarin is an important factor in the study of Indian philosophy. Sankara addressed a particular class of people and the illusionism of the Universe is a doctrine meant only for those particular persons. In order to keep those persons whom Sankara did not address from stepping into the region of the illusionism of the Universe, there were strong currents working in those days.

15. In samnyasa there is absolutely no question of suppressing any human cravings. When one has enjoyed life and all possibilities of the physical world to such an extent that there is no craving for any further enjoyment, or in other words when there is no feeling of a want, when there is everything, that stage is what is called Samnyasa. At the time of Samnyasa, there is no question of relinquishing anything. Everything has already dropped off and the soul is in its pure condition.

16. DR N.V. BANERJEE: (Presidential Address): "Sense-datum" and "sensum", the terms which modern Realists have substituted for the term "sensation" or 'idea' save the object from mentalistic interpretation.

17. Kant's view that knowledge is judgment and, as such, is inseparable from the activity of the subject is indeed very valuable, its real value, however, depending upon how that activity be understood. As regards Kant himself, he holds that the subject's function in judgment

(continued from the previous page) is manipulation and not mere exploration. This involves the assumption that the immediate data of our experience are in themselves unintelligible, and amounts to holding that the intelligibility of the object known must proceed from the activity of the subject, no other source being possible. Kant's difficulty here is that he has no reason of his own for this assumption from which the present view is deduced, but seems to have been committed to it by his tacit acceptance of Hume's mistaken view that the immediate data of our experience are a medley of unconnected sensations.

18. ANIL KUMAR SARKAR. "DURANT DRAKE "ON PERCEPTION." The problem of perception is the most important problem in philosophy. It is this problem that has given us to think of "appearance" and "reality". Philosophy tries to reconcile "appearance" with "reality."

19. KANTI CHANDRA PANDEY: ABHINAVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE AESTHETIC THEORY. The aesthetic experience, according to Abhinava, is the experience of a basic mental state at its highest pitch because of identification of the percipient with the focus of the situation, through complete self-forgetfulness. The expression basic mental state is here used to convey the idea expressed by corresponding Sanskrit word "Sthayibhava." It is the central fact in the aesthetic experience.

20. The aesthetic experience presupposes the experiences similar to those which are intended to be aroused through the artistic presentation or representation. And there cannot be any difference of opinion that no experiences are more common than those of love.

Let us, therefore, suppose that we are walking in a beautiful garden, along a riven bank or sea shore; or over a lovely hill with snow-covered peaks; or in a valley; and analyse our experience. Such a walk will naturally be found to be pleasant

(continued from the previous page) by every one. But suppose that the age at which we got the opportunity of having this pleasant walk is the youth and suppose also that in this walk we are having with us one whom we love most and that she is beautifully giving expression to her experience of what is around. This situation gives rise to an experience. Now the question is, will this experience, in any way, be different from the one that we have when we walk alone in old age in these very surroundings? And if so, why? The physical surroundings are the same, their physiological effect is the same. What is it that makes the difference in the experience. Is it not a mental fact, a fact which can in no way be fully externalised and, therefore, is simply suggested by the peculiar tone in which the words, expressive of the general experience, are uttered, or by the movement of the eye or the expression of the face? And is it not this very fact, the consciousness of which, as aroused by any one of the aforesaid means, is responsible for the superiority of this experience to that which we have when alone? Is not this mental fact the primary source of the superior pleasantness of the experience?

This central or basic mental fact which gives a peculiar colour to the entire surrounding, a colour which would be absent if he were to walk alone and which is dependent not upon his companion's physical being so much as the mental fact that is contained within; for, the peculiar colour of the surrounding changes if this mental fact somehow were to become absent, the fact which is suggested by every facial expression, every word that is uttered, every movement that is made. This mental fact is technically called Sthayibhava.

21. It would be a little misleading to call aesthetic experience, with which we are dealing

(continued from the previous page) here, an emotive experience, because in what is understood as "emotion" the physical aspect is very much emphasised: in any case, much more than the psychological, the organic changes are more intense in it. But in the aesthetic experience it is the latter that is more emphasised. Further, in the emotive experience it is the directly perceived, which serves as stimulus; but in the aesthetic, the directly perceived is simply a medium through which the real object of experience is conveyed much in the same manner as that in which the object of mystic experience of a devotee is brought before his mind's eye through the medium of an idol or something similar to it. Hence we call this mental fact "basic mental state."

Aesthetic experience consists in the state of rest of the self due to the subjective realisation of a basic mental state at its highest pitch reached because of the harmonious unification of the situation, the mimetic changes which establish a mental communication among the human beings involved in the situation and the consequent transient mental states. This experience is different from the feeling of sympathy and pity, etc. Which according to Bradley, are aroused by Shakespearian tragedy. For, while the latter is due to the objective perception of the presented; the former arises from complete self-forgetfulness and consequent identification with the focus of the situation. It consists in a temporary suspension of all cognitive functions of the self and its resting within itself as affected by the basic mental state but free from all the limitations which constitute the individuality of the individual self. Hence it is spoken of as similar to but not the same as the mystic experience in the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. (Brahmananda sahodarah). It is

(continued from the previous page) similar because the individual self is free from the limitations of individuality; but it is not the same as Brahmananda because the affection by basic mental state being there the self is not altogether unaffected as in Brahmananda.

22. Every day experiences result from the dyadic relation of the subject and the object. The aesthetic experience is totally different from it. It is an experience of an experience, not through objective perception of the presented but through subjective realisation through identification with the focus of the situation. Thus in it there is the triadic relation of the identifying subject with the identified through the medium of the artistic presentation.

23. J.C. BANERJEE: SPACE & TIME IN KANT. The truth which Kant's theory of time and space brings out is then that the representation of objects is possible only through the synthetic act of putting them and their parts together. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant no doubt seems to say that prior to their being subsumed under the categories of the understanding sensations are experienced as arranged in space and time, but in the exposition of the Principles of Pure Understanding it is clearly shown that even the perception of an object as a phenomenon in space and time is possible only through the intellectual synthesis of the manifold. If so then certainly we do not know how Kant draws an absolute line of demarcation between sense and understanding. Thus to interpret Kant from the standpoint of Hegel we may draw the conclusion by saying that "it is not that space and time are pure forms of intuition which receive and arrange the manifold of sense and thereby make experience possible,

(continued from the previous page) but that experience being a one in many and a many in one necessarily has for its forms space and time and presupposes the unity of self-consciousness as its constituting principle." Hence for Hegel space and time are both subjective and objective. They are not only the a'-priori forms of finite minds but also of the Absolute Mind of which Nature is an objective expression.

24. The question comes as to the separate treatment of space and time. Modern science considers space and time not as separate entities but as blended into one viz. space-time. This welding of space-time, according to Alexander, is the ultimate reality out of which the separate existences of space and time and consequently all empirical qualities of the universe are abstracted. For Eddington matter has been reduced to space-time relations which are ultimate in character. And this ultimate fact he thinks, is not physical in nature – rather logical or mathematical.

Einstein's theory of relativity has given up the notion of the objectivity and the absoluteness of space and time and supposed the law of nature as "such that it is impossible to determine absolute motion by any experiment whatever." And consequently he disproves their separate existences. The idea of mechanical ether has been discarded in modern science and the theory of space-time 'continuum' has been approximately supplied in its favour. This continuum according to Einstein is nothing but 'four dimensional space' – the three dimensions being that of ordinary space and the fourth one as acted by time. "Time," he thinks, "enters into physical phenomena in the same way as directions in space." Further he proves this four-dimensional continuum as something not infinite but finite though 'unbounded.' Unlike Newton, Einstein

(continued from the previous page) thinks that gravity is not a force but a property of space. For Einstein then the reality of the world is blend of space, time and matter. There is no empty space—all bodies move in space-time. So the trinity of Space-Time-Matter is comprised in one actual reality. He takes up the problems of motion, direction etc. and proves mathematically that they are all relative. His theory proves the relativity of all phenomena of the world in relation to the observer. Both space and time are relative—there is no such thing as absolute space or absolute time. By measure we can know space and all measures are relative. What is true of space is true of time.

This in short is the sum and substance of Einstein's "Theory of Relativity." And we are concerned here specially with its affinity to Kant's doctrine of Space and time. Russell, of course warns us against misinterpreting Einstein's view of space and time against that of Kant. Einstein himself also has objected against the twisting of his theory into metaphysical speculation. He is said to have remarked in a press interview that 'philosophers play with the word (relativity) like child with a doll.' However, Russell's warning may be admitted to be as not absolutely without foundation in so far as its one aspect is concerned. Kant like the Cartesians could not think of objects without space whereas for Einstein "the primary ingredients of nature are not objects existing in space and time, but events in continuum." Evidently it seems as it were that there is a polar distinction between these two theories in so far as philosophic conclusions are concerned. But with all its seeming opposition we naturally ask the question: Can we logically interpret otherwise? Is it not the necessary conclusion after all deduced from the relativity of Space-time that they are but subjective

(continued from the previous page) in nature, the necessary precondition of all sense-experience? We are not concerned here with the different theories of idealism as depicted by Haldane, Smuts, etc. in contemporary philosophy. We shall not deal with the problems here whether Kant's doctrine actually means to say that space and time are the 'part of Mind' as Haldane puts it in his interpretation of Kant (vide *The Sciences and Philosophy*). All that we can argue here is that Kant's reasoning of the refuting of space and time as something objective has gained favour by Einstein's new conception of space and time. Is it too much to conclude from this view that since they are relative they must depend on individual's perception of it so that they have no objective reality apart from human consciousness? The 'events in continuum, if understood in terms of Whitehead are certainly subjective and thus mental in character. He regards space-time as the "specification of certain general characteristics of event and of their mutual ordering." (*Science and the Modern world*.P.82.)

RAI BAHADUR RAM KISHORE (Welcome Address), 12th I.P.C. Pt.2. 1936. I should indeed like to see Indian Philosophy take its deserved and legitimate place in the University courses of study, not to supplant but to supplement Western philosophy. I shall not, however, be content to see it studied as Aristotle was studied in Europe before the Renaissance. I feel inclined to think that Indian Philosophical thought has not advanced appreciably after the well known systems had been formulated. Commentaries on commentaries have been written by distinguished scholars, but there has been little progress in original thought. The old masters have been taken as authoritative and even when a commentator has departed from the meaning of

(continued from the previous page) the text, he has taken good care not to make the departure evident. Even discerning and critical students have lacked the courage to say anything new, not supported by any authoritative text. On the other hand, the interpretation of the text has, if necessary be adapted to the thought of the commentator. This attitude of the mind is not conducive to originality of thought. I hope therefore that Indian Philosophy will be taught and studied in a spirit of enquiry, and that it will stimulate thought in our students and inspire them with the love of truth so as to make constructive work possible.

2. S.N. DAS GUPTA (Presidential Address): When Alexander invaded Indian the naked ascetics, numerous then as now, excited his curiosity and he questioned them through interpreters. They told him roundly that he was a nuisance to the world with his silly conquests, he had come all that way from his home only to plague himself and every one else, and all of the earth that he would ever really possess would be what sufficed for a grave to cover his bones. Alexander, says the historian Arrian, praised what they had said but continued to act in opposition to their advice.

3. After the eleventh or the twelfth century when the creative side of Indian Philosophy became more and more sleepy, there was an awakening of the logical side which with its tendency and over-emphasis for logical definition, precision of expression and dialectical discussion grew in such an alarming way that it almost engulfed the spirit of Philosophical spontaneity and fresh imagination by the 17th or the 18th century. I fear that both England and the continent are at the present moment passing through a similar crisis.

4. SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA: SPIRITUAL LIFE AND ITS REALISATION: It is this self-realisation through conscious self-objectification that constitutes according to Hegel, the life of the Absolute as concrete spiritual reality. Spirit unconscious of itself, spirit without conscious objectivity is empty, abstract spirituality without life, the dead carcase mistaken for the concrete, living spirit. Reality is spiritual as an eternal self-filling and self-concretion—it is spirit conscious of itself as objective and objectified experience. The movement of experience is the objective unfolding of the eternal spiritual reality, the spirit's self-mediation in conscious self-objectification. Even religion does not take one into the heart of the spiritual reality. It presents the absolute content as felt experience, i.e, as feeling or subjective certitude. Thus the absolute of religion lacks objective necessity, i.e, falls short of its character as self-justifying reality. And so as art is superseded by religion, religion in its turn merges into philosophic realisation. What religion presents as a subjective necessity of feeling, philosophy realises as an objective necessity of thought. The triad of art, religion and philosophy are thus the three ascending stages of the absolute consciousness realising itself as objective and objectified experience.

5. Nor is Hegel's view of art as realisation altogether free from confusion. Croce is unquestionably right in denying the consciousness of reality in art, art, according to him, being distinguished from logic by the absence of reality-consciousness. Hegel's view of art as realisation thus betrays an obvious confusion of expression and realisation. To express is not necessarily to realise. That art is conscious self-expression is undeniable, but it is sheer

(continued from the previous page) confusion to mistake the enjoyment of the expressed emotion for the consciousness of its reality. Art, we hold, is both enjoyment and free contemplation, enjoyed objectively as well as the detached contemplation of it. Art, in this respect, may be regarded as a kind of spiritual self-emancipation, the spirit's self-freeing from its conscious objectivity. It is emancipation however not as realisation in a sensuous objectivity as Hegel says, it is emancipation rather as transcendence of the enjoyed self-objectivity. It is, in short, a kind of free subjectivity contemplating its own objectivity with detachment. We may say that art is a preparation in this respect for the higher freedom of pure subjectivity which Indians call svarupavasthiti. Svarupavasthiti is the spirit's rest in itself, spiritual self-repose, the freedom of unadulterated spirituality emptied of all objectivity. Art is a preparation for this higher subjectivity as the detached contemplation of an enjoyed self-objectivity.

6. According to Sankhya and Vedanta the self is pure consciousness as the unobjective light that illuminates all objective contents. Hence the self is the self-luminous intelligence that reveals contents without being itself a content. Contents are the other of the self, the objectivity which the self posits and makes significant. The self is the unobjective negation of the objectivity it posits, the self certifying reality that is at once the affirmation and cancellation of all objectivity.

The self thus being both the position and negation of all objectivity, the so-called objective movement of experience must be read as a process of progressive disillusionment rather than as objective self-fulfilment.

7. What ordinary religion is unable to defend except on grounds of a faith not translatable into experience, mysticism claims as a matter

(continued from the previous page) of immediate realisation in the personal experience of the mystic. The fact must not be overlooked however that mystics very rarely agree amongst themselves as regards the content of their mystical experiences. If the mystical content were an over-individual objective filling of the individual life as the mystics claim it to be, it would hardly admit of that wide diversity and variety which characterise the mystics' descriptions of their respective experiences. The widely divergent and sometimes conflicting accounts of mystical deliverances thus create a just suspicion of a subjective touch in mystical realisation which therefore cannot be taken as an unmediated revelation of an objective content. We conclude then that mysticism is in no way better off than ordinary religion and that common piety and mystical realisation are alike illustrations of a self-fostered illusion which thrives for want of an empirical corrective.

8. Art, as we hold, stands higher in this respect than both mystical and ordinary religion. Art is the spirit contemplating its own objectification with detachment. It is not mere intuition as individualised expression of inner tumult, as Croce says; it is also the unruffled and so far the disinterested and detached contemplation of the objectified self-expression. This is true both of art as creation and art as appreciation, both being at once the objectification of the spirit and its detached, and so far free, contemplation and enjoyment. Art is an advance on the logical consciousness in this respect, being conscious freedom from the obsession of a limiting reality. The object which to logic is part of a reality that circumscribes and limits is to art a logically neutral object that is matter only for contemplation and enjoyment. Art is thus the subject's emancipation

(continued from the previous page) from a reality that engrosses and so far restricts the free spirit.

Art however represents only the first stage of spiritual emancipation from the objective thralldom. What is only negatively foreshadowed in the intellectual and practical life as an inherently futile object-seeing is first of all adumbrated in art as the positive freedom of spiritual detachment, i.e, as the unruffled contemplation of the self-objectivity. Art is thus both self-objectification and its transcendence at the same time, enjoyed objectivity as well as conscious self-freeing as the witnessing of the enjoyed self-objectivity. The absence of reality-consciousness is only a reflex of this witnessing consciousness: as detached witnessing art is also freedom from the reality of the enjoyed objectivity. A higher level of spiritual freedom is reached when the disappearance of the reality-consciousness goes with the appearance of an unreality-consciousness in its place. Here the spirit contemplates its objectification not as a neutral objectivity but as unreal appearance. This is the penultimate stage of Vedantic intuition, the realisation of spirit as the unrealisation of the objective, spirit's self-affirmation as the eternal negation of the objective unreality. This however falls short of the complete subjectivity of svaruavasthiti, the pure self-rest of spirit, for it entails at least a negative relation to the falsified objective appearance. The highest stage is thus that of asamprajnatasamadhi, of pure self-centred subjectivity wherein the negative relation to the object vanishes as a mere semblance of a relation. This is the Brahma-hood of the spirit (corresponding to the Atmasaksatkara of Sankhya), the rest of the spirit in itself which is free even from a

(continued from the previous page) negative relation to the non-spirit. In the above we have elaborated the Yoga and the Vedanta view of the self-realisation of spirit as the spirit's self-finding as the un-objective light that illuminates all objectivity. We have thereby rejected the western conception of the spiritual life as the spirit's self-concretion and objectification.

9. We hold that Kant is an exception to the general run of western thinkers in this respect. He appears to us to be the only western philosopher who has not surrendered to the objective obsession. With a sure intuition which is almost oriental, Kant repudiates the objectivity of the spirit both as intelligence and will. That the intellect objectifies without being itself objective, that the spirit knows without being a known content is the conclusion he arrives at as the result of his critical enquiry into the theoretical consciousness.

10. M. SHARIF. "DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM."

Although Dialectical Materialism was never elaborated by its founder, Karl Marx, its basic principles, however scattered are all found in his works in almost clear cut terms. These principles were further worked out by Engels and Lenin into a well-rounded system, and it is this system of which I now proceed to give a brief account.

Dialectical Materialism has been defined as "the science of general laws of the motion—both of the external world and of human thinking." Whether it is a science or not, it certainly is a philosophical doctrine, and as such it can be viewed as a theory of existence, a theory of knowledge, a theory of social life and a theory of the fundamentals of economics.

Dialectical Materialism, as a theory of existence, declares that reality is material in the sense that it is fundamentally concrete and objective

(continued from the previous page) and not ideal and subjective. The various forms of idealism (rational, empirical, transcendental and dialectical) propounded by a whole train of idealists from Plato to Hegel and the Hegelians are all false. Reality is essentially existence. Primarily it consists of just the world of concrete objects, which in "scientifically controlled perception" and "ideas induced" thereby we know in their entirety. Our scientific knowledge truly reflects the world of objects, and the proof of it lies in human action. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them—what we call defective reasoning." "If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and when your senses have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing in itself,

(continued from the previous page) Kant's celebrated unknowable Ding an sich." Thus reality being just the world of concrete objects many of which are reproducible, all religious entities, God, angels, soul and the like, are mere mental fictions and false notions. Everything in the world of objects is perpetually changing and its change is not a mere mechanical change determined by sheer external forces. Objects are self-moving, which means, they are processes. Objects change by necessity but not by a mere necessity. They change rather by a dialectical necessity. The world-process develops by a dialectical determination or dialectical causation—causation through contradictions and their syntheses.

The process of reality is a process of becoming and becoming is not 'being.' It is always "A—becoming-not-A but B." Hence it involves emergence of contradictions and their syntheses. A is the thesis, its opposite, not-A the antithesis and B in which both are united is the synthesis. A section (horizontal so to say) of the dialectical process which completely exhibits its dialectical necessity consists of (i) one objective reality in a lower form (2) its development by creating from its own being its opposite or negation, (3) the unity of the two into a synthesis. As appearance of the synthesis causes disappearance of the negation, it is aptly called the 'negation of negation.' This also implies the reappearance of the thesis in the synthesis in a new garb. The birth of synthesis is the death of the negation. The dialectical process is not therefore, only a process of creation but is also at the same time a process of destruction. It creates the new by destroying the old. It is a development in which decomposition and disintegration have a dialectically assigned place.

The linkage of concrete opposites is not a mere mechanical linkage. In their continuity, they involve reciprocal struggle, interpenetration and interdependence. Both the thesis and the antithesis struggle against each other, penetrate into each other, till the antithesis gets dominant and the time is reached when it may result in the antithesis.

But this struggle may take thousands of years, as in nature, or a few centuries or years, as in social life, or even a few minutes as in experimental science. Where consciousness plays a part, effort is made to reduce this time to the minimum.

In the struggle of the thesis and the antithesis sometime one may get stronger, sometime the other. There are ups and downs. When the thesis gets stronger, there is the phenomenon of retrogression, but this is always a temporary and an accidental retrogression. Finally the struggle must result in the dominance of the antithesis and culminate in the appearance of the synthesis. What is true of objects is equally true of movements and laws. The natural process being dialectical, its development is not gradual. It is a development by 'leaps' rather than by gradual succession. The opposites struggle with each other, act and react upon each other, penetrate into each other and when gradually the antithesis gains dominance, which by dialectical necessity it must gain, at once with a sudden leap comes into being a new entity, the synthesis. This sudden change is characteristic of all existence. Chemical combinations for instance, are all examples of a sudden change. Molecules of Hydrogen and Oxygen at a certain temperature, not gradually but suddenly change into water. It is again "a development that repeats as it were, the

(continued from the previous page) stages already passed, but repeats them in a different way on a higher plane" – "a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line." So much indeed is the nature of existence, according to Dialectical Materialism.

11. Social history is not a loosely connected pageantry of kings and heroes, but a complex of self-developing interconnected phenomena. Society, like nature and thought, by its inner move, evolves and evolves by dialectical necessity in a spiral pattern.

12. This sketch of Dialectical Materialism, brief as it is, brings out the fact that the doctrine combines within itself elements drawn from several currents of thought. It is a synthesis of the 19th century Hegelianism, Post Hegelian Humanism, Materialism, revolutionary Socialism, classical economics and natural sciences. From Hegelianism it takes its dialectics leaving out its idealism. From Humanism it accepts its realism, historicity, communism, its emphasis on the social foundations of religion and its bias for making man and his needs the central theme, rejecting, at the same time, its ethics (Moses Hess), Pantheism (Strauss), criticism (Bruno Bauer), liberalism (Arnold Ruge), altruism, anarchism (Max Stirner), religiousness, sensationalism, anthropomorphism (Ludwig Feuerbach), ideologies and doctrines of truth. From French materialists and revolutionary socialists, it borrows its socialism and materialism, rejecting its absolutism and utopianism. From classical economics it gets its theory of value leaving out its husk of individualism, egoism and hedonism. From physical sciences it takes their notions of energy and motion, discarding their purely quantitative view-point and from Biological sciences, their concept of organism, modifying their concept of evolution.

13. Whatever the professions of its authors, it is consciousness of human needs and social injustice which spurred their thought to dialectical flight and it is chiefly these, despite their veil of material terminology, which appeal to humanity.

14. For the dialectical materialist, however, belief in God is a falsehood and a phantasy.

15. The word materialism as used for this doctrine is a misnomer. It is not used in its ordinary sense—not in the sense that reality is ultimately made of one irreducible, unique stuff, matter, though that is also sometimes implied. It is primarily used in opposition to idealism. The word materialism in this case is thus employed to distinguish reality from thought and to express that reality is prior to thought. These ideas are better expressed by the word realism. Dialectical realism is, therefore, a more appropriate name for the doctrine in view.

16. To the criticism that the dialectical process will cease with the ceasing of class struggle, Lenin replies that "antagonism and contradiction are far from being the same. The first will disappear, the second will remain in socialism." But antagonism is really opposition or contradiction in action, while contradiction without action is a mere thought-contradiction. If mere thought contradiction remains in socialism, the dialectical process does continue, but only as a thought process; and to hold this, as I have said before, is nothing but to hold Hegelian idealism.

The same conclusion follows from Engels statement that thought movement is the highest stage of the dialectical process. If this is true, then thought contradictions really are the contradictions which would work in a highly

(continued from the previous page) developed society and shall guide will-movements of men. In such a case, not action will determine thought, but thought will determine action, for lower processes are mere accessories to the higher ones. Thus dialectical materialism, with each effort of getting out of idealism, lands itself into idealism.

17. D.M. DATTA: THE REVOLT OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM. I am interested in Indian philosophy not as a mere historical fossil, but in so far as it contains some living issues and ideas, not yet antiquated by the progress of human thought. One of the immortal elements of Indian philosophy is its method of ascertaining truth after considering first the views of all possible opponents. If Indian philosophy, by which I mean philosophizing in India by its modern inhabitants, is once more to acquire life, it must move out of the antiquarian's sanctum and squarely face all modern problems.

18. Logical Positivism is more systematic and thorough-going than many earlier forms of revolt against metaphysics. It does not merely point out the mistakes of metaphysical theories; nor does it merely show the impossibility of metaphysics by proving the unknowable character of reality or the limitations of human mind. It goes further than Hume and Kant to hold that the very problems of metaphysics are meaningless. If there is no significant problem at all, the so-called historical metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems and the answers to them, that is, metaphysical theories are neither true nor even wrong, they are all meaningless.

19. This attitude of Logical Positivism rests on two chief grounds, namely its conception of metaphysics and its criterion of meaning. By metaphysics these positivists mean any theory about reality behind the experienced phenomena.

Briefly the argument is:

All significant propositions are at least theoretically verifiable by experience.

No metaphysical proposition (dealing with superphenomenal reality) is so verifiable.

Therefore, no metaphysical proposition is a significant proposition.

It would appear that in condemning metaphysics, they do not condemn the whole of philosophy; but philosophy in so far as it tries to enquire, or assert theories, about any reality lying beyond experience. Besides this illegitimate function of philosophy, there is its legitimate part, which it can profitably play by analysing propositions about empirical facts.

20. The task of synthesizing the partial truths of science into a grand view of the universe as partial truths of science into a grand view of the universe as a whole used to be the privilege of philosophy especially under the auspices of Hegelian metaphysics. But the whole wisdom of this course is seriously questioned. If the so-called 'science of sciences' is to justify its claims, its method should be strictly scientific and experimental and its results should be scientifically verifiable. But no system of synthetic metaphysics is able to justify its world-view by experimental verification. Really these synthetic views are the work of poetic and aesthetic imagination and should be classed apart with them and not confused with scientific views.

But if philosophy is driven, on the one hand, from the study of any reality behind phenomena on the ground that it is a meaningless pursuit, and, on the other hand from the study of empirical facts because it is a trespass into the domain of the sciences, where does it stand?

21. The Logical Positivists and their allies return the same verdict. Philosophy must continue, but it must also observe the following conditions strictly. (a) It must shed all meaningless inquisitiveness regarding reality behind phenomena. (b) It must give up all ambitions of lording it over the sciences by playing the absurd role of the science of sciences and building world-views. (c) It must restrict its activity to logical analysis of scientific findings; it must never question the authority of the sciences, but only try to clarify the meanings of scientific propositions to the simplest and the most concrete ones. To put it more pointedly, science needs the help of many analysts chemical, bacteriological and even logical. The office of logical analysis is mercifully allotted to philosophy.

22. If the logical positivist be right, Monistic Vedanta with its belief in the falsity of the phenomenal and the reality of the absolute would be a totally absurd philosophy. But this would not be all. The other schools of Vedanta, in so far as they believe in God, soul, immortality and liberation beyond earthly existence would not escape refutation.

23. It is not far to seek, therefore, that if any system of Indian thought (except the Charvaka which can be hardly called a system) has to maintain its existence in the modern international field of philosophy, and not merely live in the minds of blind followers, it must regard this strong new movement as a formidable opposition i.e. as a purvapaksa, that has to be met boldly.

24. The greatest service it has done, is to emphasize the vital importance of philosophical analysis of Language. This marks a new epoch in western philosophy. Hume and especially Kant revolutionized philosophy in Europe by

(continued from the previous page) according priority to Epistemology. It was achieved by showing that before we philosophize we should examine the nature and competence of our mind, the instrument of philosophising. But the other important fact that our thinking and at least the philosophical expression and enunciation of all our thoughts depend on language, which instrument also should be philosophically examined, was not so long realized by modern western thinkers. Moore and Wittgenstein realized it; their continental followers, the Logical Positivists have succeeded in carrying their thoughts further, so as to achieve a new revolution in philosophy by giving to the philosophy of language the supreme place which Epistemology enjoyed since the days of Kant.

It is important to note that Indian thinkers, recognised the necessity of the philosophical analysis of language and grammar many centuries ago. The philosophy of the meanings of words, propositions, syntax, etc. which is being developed today by the Logical Positivists in the west was discussed threadbare by these Indian philosophers. It is a pity that this part of Indian philosophy has not attracted much attention of the modernized students of Indian philosophy, and possibly because western philosophy, whose standard of valuation they follow, did not so long attach any philosophical importance to the analysis of language. But as this attitude of western philosophy has changed, it may be expected that Indian speculation on language would receive closer attention. It will be found that the Sabda-Khanda of later Nyaya, as well as the methodology of Mimamsa, contains a rich store of linguistic theories which can compare very favourably with the modern researches. To these we may add the

(continued from the previous page) many works on grammar and rhetoric, in which also we find here and there, materials for the study of the philosophy of language.

A good result of the positivist's method of analysing complex and abstract philosophical propositions into the simplest and the most concrete ones to ascertain their exact significance and correctness is the clarification of problems. Though we may not accept fully the positivist's criterion of significance, we must agree with them, in the main, that there are many problems in philosophy which are found on analysis to be meaningless or value and, therefore, it is a waste of energy to try to answer them. It would always be desirable, therefore, to analyse the problem before we exercise our mind over it. To give some examples of our own: The problem "Does God exist?" cannot be answered. The positivist will declare that this question is meaningless, because it is about some super-phenomenal reality beyond experience and verification. Even if we do not go so far, we must admit that this question is at least vague and cannot be answered without ascertaining the meanings of the words "God" and "exist," which carry for different persons widely different meanings. Similarly, the problem of the one and the many would be found to be vague and unanswerable, unless we fix the meaning of "unity."

25. Kant also showed it long ago, that by the force of blind habit we try to predicate of certain things predicates which are inapplicable to them and thus many of the metaphysical puzzles and quarrels arise to keep us uselessly busy for ages. If we can sift away the pseudo-problems from the real ones, the burden of philosophy would be considerably lightened.

26. Another good teaching of the positivists is the clear distinction they make between scientific and metaphysical doctrines. There are

(continued from the previous page) everywhere philosophers who are fascinated by the success and popularity of the special sciences and try to pass their pet philosophical theories as scientific. Even in India, we find some scholars, as well as, half-informed propagandists busy capturing the popular mind by demonstrating the scientific nature of Vedanta, Sankhya, etc. The positivists have done a service by pointing out clearly that metaphysical doctrines (those that deal with superphenomenal reality) cannot be likened to scientific ones, because unlike the latter they are experimentally unverifiable. It is true that the word 'science' has a sense wider than the one we find in "special sciences" and that sense is 'systematic knowledge.' But this is so common and unattractive, that very few among philosophers who envy really the fortune of the special sciences would care to own it.

The realization of the distinction between the scientific and philosophic theories is absolutely necessary, for the correct interpretation of Indian Philosophy in this scientific age. For though it might not prevent the attempt of Indian missionaries abroad who imitate their Christian colleagues and weave science into Yoga and Vedanta to recruit western followers, yet it should at least be able to prevent Indian scholars from thinking, for example, that Vedanta can be scientifically justified by proving the identity of chaitanya with electrical energy, or the identity maya with the most modern Einsteinian relativity.

27. By ignoring the possibility of any other standard of value except the scientific, it tries to affiliate Philosophy to science. Lest the old vessel of Philosophy would sink in modern scientific waters, it lightens the burden of philosophy by throwing overboard every other cargo, except the "Analysis of propositions

(continued from the previous page) scientifically certified." Philosophy thus shrinks into Logic and Logic confines itself to the grammar and syntax of Language. It shuns metaphysics and is indifferent to Ethics, theology and political philosophy.

This liquidation of Philosophy in favour of science is psychologically due to the blind awe and admiration at the triumph of the special sciences and forgetting the distinction between science and philosophy. Positivism covets the honour enjoyed by science and tries to put on the scientific garb.

28. Should philosophy then be unscientific? The reply to this would be—"No, Philosophic may be non-scientific, though not unscientific." It may also be added, that philosophy can even be scientific, if 'science' is taken in the wider sense of 'systematic knowledge; and then it may not be necessary for it to satisfy the canons of the experimental sciences, which the positivists apply to philosophy.

29. Let us then examine the view that if metaphysics deals with super-phenomenal reality it deals with meaningless problems. This proposition rests, as already shown, on the central doctrine of logical positivism, namely that a sentence is significant only if it is verifiable, if it is not verifiable it is meaningless. The criterion is not satisfactory. Confusion between Intelligibility and Verifiability: Because this criterion of meaning involves a confusion between two distinct attitudes we can have about a statement namely understanding its meaning and believing in its truth.

30. When we read in a story, or better, in a scrap of paper picked up from the street, "Once upon a time, a dog got a bone on the street," do we understand its meaning? And if the meaning is understood, (which must be admitted unless the usual meaning of 'meaning' is changed by these

(continued from the previous page) common-sense philosophers), we would ask where is the theoretical possibility of verifying this statement? Can we even imagine any situation in space-time whence this could be verified to be true or false? That Mr Ayer forgets the commonsense distinction between the questions of understanding a statement and believing it—between significance and truth—is quite clear from some of his statements.

31. It would be found here that while attempting to show what observations or conditions would make a statement significant, he speaks of what will make it true or false, as though the conditions of truth and falsity were identical with those of significance. There seems, therefore to be a serious defect in the formulation of the criterion of meaning, on which the Positivists' logical superstructure raises its head to scoff at metaphysical problems as meaningless. If the reader has never had any direct or indirect experience of what is meant by a dog, bone street, etc. the sentence would convey no meaning to him. It would be a meaningless jumble of sounds.

32. We have often heard the realistic precursors of the Positivist's complain that Idealism ignores the very facts from which it starts and on which it stands, does not the same criticism also apply to this outrage on the commonsense meaning of significance which is the starting point of Positivism? It is all the more strange because, some Positivists explicitly declare, like Sankara, that as to meaning of words we have to depend on usage and have no right to legislate.

33. Let us mention incidentally that the conditions on which significance of statement depends were discussed by Indian thinkers, the grammarians, rhetoricians, Naiyayikas, Mimansakas and other schools during a few centuries and the resultant views might be found to be

(continued from the previous page) more weighty than the views of the Positivists in their present experimental stage. We have discussed these Indian views elsewhere and it would be out of place to repeat them here (vide author's *Six Ways of Knowing*: Allen & Unwin, '32).

34. But we should also mention a few other difficulties of Positivism. Supposing for a moment, that statements about super-phenomenal reality are meaningless, what becomes of the reports of science about the reality of electrons, protons, energy, etc? Are they themselves empirically verifiable? Can we perceive any of these really? Or do we not simply perceive their effects or some phenomena which are explained with the help of these non-perceptible reals?

35. Is it possible to verify, in the light of an individual's own experience, that the object of another man's experience is identical with the objects experienced by him? If not, would not scientific statements about such identity be meaningless according to the Positivist's criterion?

36. The Positivists declare that theories like realism and idealism are meaningless, because we cannot ascertain with absolute certainty, whether the object perceived is real or ideal. It shows that uncertainty (i.e. inability to decide a question with absolute certainty, either in the affirmative or in the negative) does not simply belong to metaphysical questions about reality beyond given experience; uncertainty also belongs to questions regarding the nature of 'the given itself.' If the nature of what is given were absolutely certain how would even the Positivists differ among themselves and with their own previous selves? And once the doubt is raised about the very nature of observation and the observed fact in general it cannot surely be removed by observation itself, which is doubted. Are not, then positivists themselves also dealing

(continued from the previous page) with problems and theories which are meaningless, according to their own criterion?

37. It is important to realise that solipsism by which the Logical Positivists were scared from holding Mach's theory of atomic sensory facts as the meanings of words (vide Nagel's statement in J.Ph. Jan.16.1936, p.35) is present in another form in behaviourism too. If as, Reichenbach states,—the given experience is 'nothing but physiological process in our brains', the very legitimate question arises,—“How do we become aware of any object other than the brain?” If the answer be, the brain process implies the existence of its cause, the extra-cerebral object, we may still ask, how can we think of the external cause without first proving the existence of any extra-cerebral object; If, however, the answer is that our experience of response implies an object responded to, the difficulty is not removed. For even response is nothing more than a condition of the body. How can we prove the existence of an external object, responded to, by the very response itself? (Are there not false responses, even as false ideas?) We are then confined to the knowledge of our own bodies and cannot assert the reality of any external fact.

Behaviourism, is logically driven therefore to this position which threatens the possibility of the positive sciences. We can name this position “physiological solipsisms” to distinguish it from 'idealistic solipsism.' The former can be legitimately certain only of the physiological ego ('I, the body, only exist') just as the latter was certain only of the spiritual ego ('I, the mind, only exist')

38. The criterion of meaning which renders all metaphysical problems, meaningless is defective. Therefore the case against the

(continued from the previous page) the possibility of metaphysics is unproved. But if the criterion be assumed to be true then there arises a confusion between intelligibility and verifiability. And Logical Positivism assumes the role of a critique of science and gives up its original attitude of unquestioning acceptance of scientific statements. Even the problem of the nature of the 'given' the bed-rock of Positivism, becomes meaningless, because it cannot be decided with certainty, as disagreeing positivists themselves prove.

39. By allying itself with a thorough-going behaviourism, Positivism commits itself to materialism (which is empirically unverifiable like Idealism and therefore meaningless, according to its own criterion) and it lapses into metaphysics.

Though the accusation against metaphysics might be shown thus to be rationally unwarranted, the attitude of Logical Positivism has come to stay, at least as long as the blind force of reaction against transcendental metaphysics and the awe for scientific achievements is not spent up. The quest for absolute certainty, the resolve to stay within the sphere of the positive and the certain have periodically recurred in the history of philosophy in the East and in the West. But even the most rigorous anti-metaphysical sceptic has once and again unwittingly lapsed into beliefs which are suicidal to his attitude. Buddha refused to discuss the questions of super-sensuous metaphysical realities like God, soul and immortality. Wittgenstein solemnly preaches almost in Buddhistic strain, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." But it is curious that the followers of both unwittingly develop metaphysical tendencies and step beyond the certain. In the very enunciation of a criterion of certainty the positivist uncritically assumes some metaphysical

(continued from the previous page) theory and the number of such assumptions go on increasing with the working out of the system. The short history of the youthful movement is a repetition of this historical phenomenon. Metaphysics, it is found, is not simply useful, but to a certain extent it is inevitable. One who tries to propound systematically the impossibility of metaphysics, only teaches another system of metaphysics. The contemporary revolt against metaphysics has already begun to prove once more this ancient truth.

40. R. DAS. LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION. The phrase 'logical construction' is gaining some currency in the philosophical literature of the present day. When it was first introduced into philosophy, even the author of the phrase was not probably very clear as to its exact meaning and significance, and those who heard it for the first time, of course, misunderstood it in various ways. But although misunderstood, it was at least supposed to have an important philosophical meaning with a metaphysical implication. Subsequent writers have tried to clear up the misunderstanding and to define its exact meaning. It is interesting to consider whether the phrase when cleared of the misunderstanding, still retains any philosophical meaning and whether the notion even when exactly defined, does not give rise to other difficulties of its own.

I do not know who was the original author of the phrase, but I believe it was from Russell that I first learnt that a physical thing, e.g. a table, was a logical construction. I tried to understand it in some such way. Sense-data alone are directly given to our experience, but they vary with different experiments and do not exist when the experience ceases. But a physical thing is the

(continued from the previous page) same for different experiments and exists both before and after the act of experience. A physical thing as such can never be given to our experience. As it is not originally known at all, we cannot even infer it from sense-data. Thus a physical thing is not a fact of experience at all, and still if we are to explain our notion of a physical thing, we can do so by the theory of logical construction. Our of the transient sense-data of our actual experience, we construct the idea of a standing physical thing. The physical object is regarded as a construction of sense-data because we can know it only in terms of actual and possible sense-data. Why the construction was called 'Logical' was not very clear to me; I took the construction to be a work of the mind. The metaphysical implication of this view consisted in the idea that a physical object was no part of actual reality in which in fact only sense-data were to be found, the physical object being but a mental fiction or ideal construction.

It is now pointed out clearly by competent writers that the idea of a physical object being a logical construction involves no such consequences. We are told that to say that tables are logical constructions out of sense-data is merely to assert a verbal proposition to the effect that to say something about tables is to say something about sense-data. In other words when one says that tables are logical constructions, one merely means that sentences about tables can be translated into other sentences in which the term tables does not occur at all, but in which we suitably use the term sense-data instead.

41. The whole situation as presented by the theory of logical construction appears somewhat confusing to me. It seems that logical construction is exclusively concerned with the translability

(continued from the previous page) of certain sentences. In the last resort it means nothing but the linguistic equivalence between statements referring to different things. But the original sentences are either intelligible by themselves or they are not. If they are not intelligible, they can not possibly be translated. And if they are intelligible, to what end should we take the trouble of translating them? The translation is supposed to increase our understanding of the original sentences. Is it really the case and how is it possible? Suppose the original sentence is about a material thing and you translate it into other sentences which refer to sense-data. The original sentence speaks about a material thing and our understanding of it may be said to be increased only when in the translation we are given better information about the material thing; but that information cannot possibly be given when you are speaking of something else altogether different from the material thing.

42. If you said that there are no physical things and sense-data alone exist, we could understand that while we speak of physical things we are saying something about sense-data. But when you grant that physical things exist and there are also objective entities like sense-data, I do not see how a statement about a physical thing can be literally equivalent to another statement about a physical thing can be literally equivalent to another statement or a number of statements about sense-data.

43. I may frankly recognise that when a sentence is translated in this way, we have in many cases a better understanding of the original sentence. As much confusion and vagueness prevails in our ordinary thought and speech, this work is undoubtedly quite valueable. But I do not see that this amounts to anything more than linguistic clarification. Since the

(continued from the previous page) translation is equivalent to the original assertion, it cannot say in substance anything more than what is already said. It will particularly decide nothing as to the truth or falsity of the original statement. If this so-called philosophical analysis adds nothing to, or does not in any way alter, our ordinary views about life and the world, I do not see in what sense it is philosophical at all.

44. I therefore conclude that logical construction which involves so-called philosophical analysis and ultimately means nothing but a kind of translation, cannot claim any great philosophical significance.

45. PROF. SURES CHANDRA DUTT. A REALISTIC THEORY OF ILLUSION. An illusion is a wrong perception. It is a common place of philosophy that the distinction between a valid perception and an illusion is not psychological at all, but ontological. It is the purpose of this paper to show that even their ontological status is the same, that valid perceptions have no better credentials in theory than illusions, that no perception is wrong per se, that every perception is veridical in principle, and that the distinction between the two is entirely practical. In fact, in one sense, though a very limited one, every perception of an object may be declared as illusory relatively to another; but from the absolute point of view they are all equally valid.

Such statements are no doubt paradoxical, but their soundness becomes obvious as we begin to reflect on the conditions of perception, both subjective and objective. The first step in understanding the problem is to take full cognizance of the fact that perception is not such a one-sided affair as radical idealists, on the one hand, and extreme realists, on the other, would have us believe; but it is an

(continued from the previous page) active interaction of two equally real agents, viz. the perceiving subject and the object perceived. Neither does the mind conjure up the object out of airy nothing through its own ideas, nor does the object simply manage to get itself reflected on an impotent mirror called mind which has no power either to add to or alter the object. But there is an active give-and-take between the perceiving mind and the thing perceived. But for perverse metaphysics, nothing is plainer than that when I see a given tree, my capacity to see is as much responsible for this phenomenon as the power of the tree to appeal to me.

46. "The stick is crooked" in this context means that it excites in the observer, when seen partly through water in the special way described, a reaction which may be called the perception of the crooked shape of the stick. It means further that the power to excite the above reaction in the percipient is patent in the stick only when those conditions are satisfied, and otherwise it is always latent in it. "The stick is straight" means, mutatis mutandis, precisely the same thing. That latter has, on theoretical grounds, no higher credentials than the former. Dr A.C. Ewing finds the direct realist impaled on the horns of a dilemma: the latter, according to him, is either landed in untenable self-contradiction by holding that the real stick is both bent and straight or compelled to fly into the arms of his opponent the representationist.

47. The principle of selection by which one appearance out of a host is dubbed Reality and the rest designated by the humbler appellation of Appearance is entirely pragmatic.

48. An appearance, though pragmatically unreal, is ontologically real. But every appearance

(continued from the previous page) does not deceive us, and it is only a deceptive appearance that is called illusion. The bent stick never deceives an experienced adult. He lightly dismisses it as irrelevant or useless, that is, as a mere appearance. But an inexperienced child will be deceived, he will expect it to behave as bent under normal conditions also. Such deceitful appearance alone is illusion. So we sum up: reality, appearance and illusion have the same ontological status.

49. KALI PRASAD. THE NATURE OF SENSE DATA. An investigation of the problem of knowledge cannot be profitably undertaken without a prior inquiry into the nature and status of sense-data which are supposed in some sense to constitute the basis of knowledge. But what this means is no easy matter to decide. "Sense-data," "basis" and "knowledge" are terms which in spite of (or rather because of) their such frequent use are scandalously ambiguous and an attempt to make their meaning clear is always a task of extreme difficulty.

50. There are three well known ways in which sense-data are often considered viz. 1. that they are phases or states of the objects that we perceive by means of them. In other words, they are Physical in nature. 2. That they are events in the percipient's mind. That is, they are Psychological. 3. That they are events in the percipient's brain. That is, they are Cerebral.

51. If sense-data are revelatory in character, we may ask what exactly do they reveal? And, the answer is unmistakable on the mental substratum theory: they reveal the mental substance, which in itself is independent of them.

52. Sense-data, then, cannot be phases of a Mind which is other than they and which stands over against them as an unmitigated residuum.

But if sense-data are not phases of the mind, in what sense are they mental? It will be answered, in the sense that they 'belong to' the mind, for they do seem obviously to belong to it in some sense. But what do we mean by this relation of 'belonging to'? There are several ways in which the relation is understood and the following occur easily: Belonging to the mind may signify (1) affection or modification of the mind, (2) dependence on the mind (3) produced by the mind, (4) inherence in the mind, (5) being in the mind, (6) being for the mind (7) being in spatial or temporal proximity to the mind (8) quality or attribute of the mind (as red 'belongs' to the rose).

53. They are not in the mind in any special sense though they are in the mind in some sense. It may be suggested that they are in the mind in so far as they depend upon it. But we may ask depend for what? Do they depend upon the mind for their origination or their continuance or meaning or what? In other words, is the dependence causal? Does the mind cause or produce the sense-data?

We have only to formulate the question in this manner to return a negative answer to the theory of dependence. We cannot answer why sense-data occur, why they continue (if they do) and how they mean, without assuming some one or other principle which in itself would need justification. If we say that mind causes them because they would not be if mind was not then we are arguing in a circle, for how do we know? We cannot divest ourselves of mind in order to see whether we can have sense-data or not. Besides, the causal theory arbitrarily assumes (1) mind to be cause without explaining what the mind itself is and (2) that there are no other causes. A

(continued from the previous page) causal explanation is inherently defective and incomplete: it leads from one assumption to another in an infinite regress until it assumes either a final cause i.e, gives up the notion of causality or it lands us in a sceptical position which is beyond justification or cure.

But it will be said that if sense-data are not caused by the mind they at least inhere in it and in this sense are its affections. But what is inherence? A quality inheres in something when (i) it attaches or qualifies it permanently (2) when it is supported or continually held by that in which it inheres. In both cases it is a relation between substantive and adjective and not between substantives alone. This notion of inherence is part of the substance attribute doctrine, and in consequence, is bound up with the theory of causality which we have already found to be untenable.

54. When it is said that sense-data are mental the implication is that we know fully what the adjective mental means, just as when we say that the wind is icy-cold we know perfectly well what the adjective icy-cold means. If, however, we do not know what mental means then to say that sense-data are mental is to utter an unintelligent proposition – a proposition which is neither true nor false for the simple reason that it is not a proposition at all. Thus, the inherence theory fares no better than the causal theory upon which it must be based in order to have even a show of plausibility and like the latter must be rejected.

55. K.C. GUPTA: STATUS OF PRE-ORGANIC WORLD IN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY: While emphasising the mind-dependent character of the physical world modern idealism does not seek to reduce it to the flickering states or processes of finite individual minds. It is consistent with idealism

(continued from the previous page) to maintain that the world of our sense-perception is genuinely external to individual minds and yet that it can exist only through them and is thus only a complement of mind or consciousness.

56. The type of dependence to which reference is made when we assert that the physical world exists 'through' mind or that it 'presupposes' mind to be clearly distinguished from other types of dependence such as spatial dependence, causal dependence etc., if any clear thinking is to be possible. This relation may be best described as ontological dependence. It would be wrong to assume that such a relation necessarily implies that the minds and the objects which depend on them would necessarily occupy the same position in the temporal series as experienced by us. The world of the remote past is an object of knowledge to the minds which exist now and if the knowledge-relation is a constitutive relation at all that world must also depend for its existence on its relation to minds which know it now.

57. It will be argued that the pre-organic world may be said to depend on the minds which exist now only in the sense that it is a thing of the past and lives only in our imagination but this does not imply in any sense the truth of the idealist principle so far as that world is concerned. The real question is: On what minds did that world depend for its being when it actually existed? From the ordinary commonsense point of view such a question seems to be capable of being answered only in one way but a little reflection will show that the question itself makes assumptions which require careful analysis and examination. It is assumed, for instance, that the flow of time stretches backwards even beyond

(continued from the previous page) the first appearance of mind or consciousness and that a state of the world prior to the existence of all minds actually existed in the past, the world 'actually' being taken as identical with the expression "independently of what we do, think or experience at present." It is no wonder that once these assumptions are made the question mentioned above admits only of one answer viz. that given by realism.

Now, we may be ready to admit that the pre-organic world existed or even that it actually existed in the remote past but we may have to interpret the word 'actually' in a sense different from that given to it by uncritical commonsense or even by philosophical realism. Let us examine the evidence on which our belief in the past existence of the pre-organic world is based. How do we know that there was a stage of the universe before the first appearance of sentient beings? Why should we not suppose that the universe came into existence simultaneously with life and mind? It is important to raise the question since the sort of evidence that we use in order to prove the past existence of the pre-organic world would determine the sense in which that world may be said to have existed and any attempt to go beyond the proof must be regarded as unwarranted. The belief in the past existence of a pre-organic world can be based only on some such reasoning as the following. As the causal law holds good in respect of every single event in the universe the present state of the universe as a whole must be regarded as having been caused by the state of the universe immediately preceding it and that again by the previous state and so on. We must be prepared to go backwards in time in this manner without halting if we are to account for the present characteristics of the world completely. We cannot suppose that time itself came into existence at any particular instant

(continued from the previous page) since the creation of time would be an event and as such must take place in time. In attempting to account for each preceding stage of the universe we inevitably come to an epoch when this earth (which alone is known to certain sentient creatures) must have been a blazing mass of fire which could not possibly contain any living being. Thus our knowledge of the present state of the universe compels us to admit the existence of a period in the world-history during which there were no sentient beings at all. The supposition that the world as a whole came into existence simultaneously with the appearance of life and sentience would do violence to the law of causality and therefore cannot be entertained from the scientific point of view. The world as it was presented to the earliest percipient or conscious being must have been preceded by another out of which it was generated but which was not presented to any such being at all.

From this it is clear that the sole evidence for the past existence of the pre-organic world is contained in the nature of the present world as experienced by us now. No finite mind has a direct memory of the objects and events belonging to that world, nor is it possible for us to possess man-made chronicles of such objects and events. There is thus no other evidence which can prove that the pre-organic world existed and therefore none which can show that it existed as something unconnected with the present world. The past existence of the pre-organic world can be established only on the ground of its being the sole and sufficient, though remote, cause of the world of the present day. Whatever we know of the former is derived from our experience of the latter. In other words, all the different stages of the world form one unitary system and the world of the remote past

(continued from the previous page) must be looked upon as the continuation or prolongation of the world in the midst of which we 'live, move and have our being.' If we have reasons to believe that this world of our experience has no reality apart from its relation to conscious centres the same may also be said of any remote stage of the universe. To say that the pre-organic world actually existed does not then mean that it existed at any time independently of conscious minds but only that such a world is as necessary for the world of the present day as some objects which we do not perceive are necessary to complete the existence of those which we do. The assumption that the pre-organic world existed independently of conscious mind existing now requires proof which is not forthcoming.

I will now⁵ try to meet the most obvious objection that may be urged against what has been said here. All that the foregoing argument has established, it will be said, is that our knowledge of the pre-organic world is derived from that of the present world but this does not show that the pre-organic world itself, while it existed, was dependent on us in any way whatsoever. This objection will be found to be invalid if we keep in view the real force of the argument. The point which should be emphasised is not merely that our knowledge of the present world enables us to infer the pre-organic world but that it proves the latter to be essentially of the same nature as the former. The relation between the pre-organic world and the present world of our experience is not analogous to the relation between the thing-in-itself and phenomena or even between the scientific object and *sensa*. The two are essentially of the same texture throughout and there is unbroken continuity between them. The materials of which the world of the remote past is composed are exclusively drawn from the present world and the data supplied to us by the

⁵ The original editor changed "not" to "now" by hand

(continued from the previous page) latter cannot be manipulated in any way so as to yield the notion of a world essentially different in nature from it. The world of any moment taken as a whole must be regarded as the sole and sufficient cause of the world of the succeeding moment taken as a whole. If a cause is identical in essence with the sum total of all its immediate effects the pre-organic world must be essentially identical with every succeeding stage of the universe in turn and therefore with the world which we experience to-day, and if the present day world depends for its existence on minds we have every reason to hold that each preceding stage of the world including the pre-organic world must be likewise mind-dependent in character.

We may now dispose of another objection which may be urged against the position taken up here. It may be contended that the pre-organic world can really explain the nature of the subsequent stages of the universe only if we assume it to have existed in the past in the realistic sense and the idealistic argument can proceed at all only if this assumption is made. If the pre-organic world is to explain the next succeeding stage of the world causally it must be supposed to have existed before the latter and before any body could begin to think about it. It cannot now come into existence through the processes of thinking which take place in a mind or minds since in that case it would not precede the successive stages of the world which we have known and thus cannot causally explain any of them. In reply to this objection we should point out that by saying that the pre-organic world depends on mind or consciousness idealism does not mean that it is to be reduced to a dream of phantasy existing in an individual mind or minds or that it is generated by their thought-activity. We have to reconstruct the pre-organic world strictly on the basis of the data supplied to us by the

(continued from the previous page) present world and in accordance with universal principles such as those of causality, conservation of energy etc. Our private desires and inclinations in so far as they are recognised as such have nothing to do with the construction of the different stages through which the world has passed. The pre-organic world thus constructed existed objectively in the past but the illusion that this world, while it existed, was independent of mind or consciousness arises out of our habit of contemplating a stage of the world-history as complete in itself. In as far as all the different stages of the world are regarded as forming a single unity we must assign the same status to the universe as a whole though one part of it is in the past and another in the future. Thus the statement that the pre-organic world existed objectively before the emergence of life and sentience is not inconsistent with the statement that it was dependent for its existence on the minds which exist now. The existence of any stage of the world would have been impossible unless there were at some place and at some time centres of sentience and thought to know it. It is not necessary to assume that the world of the remote past existed in the realistic sense.

We have thus seen that the essential nature which we can ascribe to the pre-organic world on the strength of the evidence which we possess is compatible only with the idealistic view of its ultimate status in relation to conscious experience. The difficulty arising out of the temporal interval between the pre-organic world and the minds which exist now should not stand in the way of our accepting this conclusion if we bear in mind that according to the idealistic doctrine maintained here the incidents of temporal sequence fall on the side of appearance rather than on that of reality. It is not possible to undertake a thorough discussion of the nature

(continued from the previous page) of time at this place but the fact that the temporal aspect is only a fragmentary and therefore unreal aspect of the universe becomes clear when we find that the character of time is closely connected with the imperfections and limitations of our experience. The temporal aspect is but the perspective in which the world appears to a finite being when he looks at it from the particular standpoint of his own 'now'. The distinction between the past and the future exists only in relation to his 'now.' In so far, however, as we are able to transcend the limitations of our standpoint we find that the past, the present and the future coalesce together and the succession of events in time loses its significance. If the ultimate reality is not in time at all minds are really co-eternal with inanimate nature and the fact that a vast temporal interval apparently separates a particular fragment of the universe from minds should not be taken to imply that the former cannot be ontologically dependent upon the latter. The universe viewed under the temporal aspect is a mere string of unconnected sections or phases exhibiting a multiplicity of detail the inner significance of which is not apparent to ordinary commonsense, while to philosophic insight the universe exhibits its inner unity as the embodiment of a coherent system. In such a system the temporal aspect is relegated to a subordinate place and the status of each element in that system is to be determined by reference to its connection with the whole. The difficulty in ascribing an idealistic status to the pre-organic world vanishes when we view it as an element in the total scheme of reality.

58. P.T. RAJU. SCEPTICISM & ITS PLACE IN SANKARA'S PHILOSOPHY. The question, whether Sankara is a sceptic, may draw different and

(continued from the previous page) even quite opposite answers. It has been usual to regard Sankara as a sceptic and an agnostic for the reason that he time and again declares that the absolute reality is beyond thought. Sankara maintains, like Bradley, that reality is neither substance nor attribute, neither cause nor effect; in short, it is none of the things which we perceive and think of. The advaitin or the Sankarite tells us that perception is not the sole guide to set aside; even inference is unreliable.

On the other hand, it may be maintained that Sankara is not a sceptic because he holds that the ultimate reality can be experienced. Like the Greek sceptic, he does not end in blind subjectivism, but maintains that knowledge is of the object. He does not accept the syavada, the theory that every cognition is full of contradictory possibilities, of the Arhatas.

59. We read in Sankara's commentary on Brahma-sutras that Brahman is the cause of the world. But what Sankara means here by 'cause' is a moot question. Yet it is certain that he does not use the word in the ordinary sense.

60. Even Hegel, by considering scepticism to be an essential moment in the dialectical process of reaching truth, follows Descartes to some extent. But the acceptance of scepticism as a moment in his method does not lead Hegel to analyse a concept into its simple components in order to ascertain its truth. Coming after Kant and having the advantage of the discoveries of the critical philosophy, he uses scepticism as a means to eliciting the whole within which the conflict that generates scepticism occurs. Scepticism thus provides the spur to the discovery of a synthesis that quiets the conflict of scepticism. But in this discovery the sceptical spirit, Hegel maintains, is not left back, but is carried up, sublimated, and turned into an essential moment

(continued from the previous page) of speculative reason. The conflicting moments, thesis and anti-thesis, become moments of the synthesis.

Even in Advaita we can discern some scepticism which is significant as a method. The advaitins's denial of every finite concept as not the reality, as neti, neti, and consequently the denial of all the instruments of determinate knowledge to grasp the ultimate real has much in common with scepticism. This denial is a gradual process which, if it does not lead to any positive conclusion would be little different from scepticism of the most morbid type. In fact, the sceptic presupposes some reality; for without this presupposition there would be no meaning in doubting. We doubt the certainty of our judgment only on the assumption of a fact about which the judgment is made.

61. Sankara's position is unambiguous on this point. His declaration that cognition is dependent on the object, and that illusion has a positive real basis leaves no room for a controversy. It is the Vijñānādinis who maintain that, because of the relativity of our knowledge of things, there are no objects, and objects are nothing but our ideas. They fail to see that the difference in our knowledge of things in our knowledge of things is not a sufficient ground for maintaining that there are no objects at all. It is a sufficient ground only to maintain that the innate nature of the object is not revealed to us through our senses and mind. The very presence of error and evil shows that there is something not ourselves in this world.

It is the aim of Sankara to point to the innate nature of the object, and he declares that none of the concepts express it, and none of the means of finite knowledge enable us to grasp it. Thus even in Sankara's system scepticism is made a stepping stone to the

(continued from the previous page) attainment of truth.

62. Rationalism is iconoclastic, it is destructive of all superstitions and falsities. It therefore doubts whenever the slightest contradiction is found. Some philosophers may use the method of doubt, and express it in formulas; others may unwittingly make use of it. Sankara has no formula of doubt to apply systematically. Yet his scepticism of the final certainty of the finite knowledge leads to the view that the Absolute alone carries final certainty and that it is experienceable.

63. Sankara, therefore, is not a pure sceptic. He may be called a mystic; yet he is not a mystic of the pathological type. His mysticism is based on rationalism. It is the result of a system of philosophical thought, and is not adopted as a method. We may therefore say that he is a sceptic in method—not forgetting that he differs from Descartes even here—and a mystic in results. Every form of mysticism, by maintaining the truth of an ultimate reality not realisable through the senses and the intellect, may be regarded as a methodological scepticism.

64. Sankara distrusts finite intellect as inadequate to grasp the nature of ultimate truth. For him, the ultimate truth is known by a consciousness above finite intellect but continuous with it. This view, one may imagine, leaves room for all kinds of superstition and spiritism. Further, it may be thought that Sankara's view that every cognition is its own standard of truth supports and encourages all superstitions. But no. The other part of Sankara's epistemological theory, that every cognition is made untruth by something other than itself, dissipates all superstitions. The critical or negative function of thought, which turns every cognition contradicted into an untruth, is made good use of by him.

It might be questioned whether the doctrine of

(continued from the previous page) maya is not in principle a sceptical doctrine. Maya of course involves some scepticism, but not the scepticism of despair. Maya is the principle of inexplicability, which regards the world as a hard and stubborn fact. We may try to understand the world in terms of cause and effect, reason and consequent, creator and created; but we always fail. We fail to understand the nature of even a finite thing fully. There is always some core of individuality and impenetrability left out in our explanations, which is irreducible into terms and relations. The doctrine of maya is the necessary outcome of the view that intellect cannot grasp the ultimate reality. The doctrine results as the postulation of a non-rational element by the intellect as the very condition of explanation. Unless the nature of ultimate reality is known fully and in detail, we cannot understand the nature of the phenomenal world. We have to bring down the Absolute to the level of the phenomenal world in order to fully explain it. But this is an impossible task. So the phenomenal have to be accepted without full explanation. Yet we can understand them enough for our practical life. Hence Sankara's scepticism does not land us in despair and inactivity. As we have already noted, Sankara's scepticism is inherent in our very conscious life with its different levels. Every lower level must be sceptical of its powers to grasp the experiences of the higher, unless it rises up. But then it ceases to be what it was at first.

65 Consciousness is identified by many of the Western philosophers with thought, when it is said that thought cannot have final certainty, it is understood that man cannot have it. But for Sankara the self is more than the intellect. Final certainty which the intellect fails

(continued from the previous page) to have can be had by the self.

66. RAM MURTI LOOMBA. DOCTRINE & EXPRESSION IN MYSTICISM. The fundamental principle of all the seemingly different mystic doctrines is the principle of ineffability. And the common motive by which they are actuated is an attempt to express the inexpressible.

67. For this inadequacy of language to express mystic truth four principal reasons have been pointed out: firstly, that the truth is infinite, secondly, that it is too 'sweet' and enrapturing to be told, thirdly that it can not be described in terms of the categories of the intellect which are also necessarily the categories of language, and last, that the subject-object identity which is the essential mark of mystic experience makes description impossible.

68. Had, however, all mystics adopted for themselves the rule of complete silence, great difficulties would have arisen. All the philosophical interest in mysticism which is in these days at a stage of vigorous revival would be impossible; the valuable studies of mysticism we possess today would have never been written. Nay, the religious man's pursuit after 'experience of the Deity' would have remained an unguided journey on an unlighted road. Fortunately for mankind, mystics have, instead of adopting the muteness of silence, left rather profuse accounts of their experiences and observations.

69. The commonest type of expression which the mystic adopts to articulate his knowledge in Indian as well in Western mysticism, is expression in the language of what might be called negativism. Plotinus' description of the mystic vision is full of negatives; it is a state in which there is no movement, no emotion, no desire, no reason or any thought, no concern with the beautiful, no self-presence

(continued from the previous page) before the gods, and finally no vision. The description of Brahman offered by Upanishadic mysticism is famous, nay, some would say, notorious, for its negativism. We are offered only a bundle of negations. But the mystic does not thereby reduce himself to any barren or meaningless position; the complaint against negativism on this account is hardly reasonable. Mystic truth, ineffable as it is, cannot be described in terms of the intellectual categories of language. The best course, accordingly, for him who burns to express himself is to take these categories one by one and to reject them as not being applicable to the absolute experience.

It will be particularly interesting here to note a peculiar type of extreme negativism in the history of mysticism, where it culminates in something that has the appearance almost of nihilism and is also very often confused with it. This is the type instanced in the Chinese mystic Lao Tze's work, Tao Teh King, where the absolute reality, Tao, is named the Non-existent, in the Buddhist mystic Nagarjuna's doctrine of Shunyata, which is rendered by many scholars as a theory of 'Void' or 'Non-being,' and in Silesius' *Cherubinischer Wandersmann*, which calls God a lauter Nichts, a perfect Naught. Neither the doctrine of the Tao, however, nor that of Shunyata, nor, again, that of the latter Nichts, amounts really to a metaphysical nihilism. All of them are characterised by a fundamental insistence on the realization in personal experience of a positive ultimate reality or 'essential nature' of the universe. But they also specially take it upon themselves to emphatically voice the inadequacy of the categories for its characterisation. Since the absolute does not belong to any category it is neither this, nor that, nor anything else.

70. SHARSHI BHUSAN DAS GUPTA: "The FREUDIAN & THE YOGA CONCEPTIONS OF REPRESSION: The dominant idea in Freud which has to a large extent influenced modern psychology, particularly in the departments of neurotic and therapeutic psychology, consists of the belief that we are born with certain unconscious tendencies, which in a way largely determine our experiences. In the course of our experiences also our passionate nature, as determined by the unconscious within us tries to manifest itself in diverse ways; but they have to be curbed by us by the means and restrictions of our social environment. These passions, thus repressed, sink back into the sphere of the unconscious and contribute additional strength to the unconscious both pathologically and psychologically. It may be assumed that, he regards the emotions as the dynamic factor of our life; but it is somewhat surprising that he should give such an undue pathological importance to the sex emotions. But however that may be, the whole principle seems to be, in brief, that repressed emotions (sex) are turned into unconscious tendencies which operate adversely on our nerves and produces, on the one hand, diverse kinds of dreams and diseases and, on the other hand, manifests themselves in the peculiar nature of the interests that we may take in different affairs of life and art. He holds that it is possible to discover the nature of the repressed emotions by an interpretation of the dreams, which are only the manifestations of those emotions in a symbolic manner. By a narration of the dreams as well as the narration of the personal history of the individual, he things, it is possible to discover to an individual the nature of the emotions that he unconsciously repressed. He holds further that, by rousing the dormant emotion and bringing it into the conscious field the pernicious influence of

(continued from the previous page) repressed emotions, which were sending forth arrows from behind the arena, could be destroyed.

The significance of the idea is that emotions can exercise their destructive force at their best only when they operate as parts of the unconscious mind. In certain ways it may be regarded that he also believes that the unconscious could be modified to a certain extent; but according to him, the mode of this modification consists in dissociating certain elements from the unconscious by becoming conscious of them. The hypothesis then seems to be, that whenever any element of the unconscious translates itself into the conscious, its force in the pathological of psychological nature becomes largely destroyed. Incidentally he thinks that repression of emotions by which they are forced to retire from the conscious field before being manifested in it is injurious to our system.

The Hindu view on this subject, however, tends entirely in the opposite direction. Thus Caraka who flourished in the first century of the Christian era in the Sutra-sthanam (ch. 7) gives an enumeration of the different kinds of tendencies which are to be repressed and which are not to be repressed.

71. The theory of Psycho-analysis assumes the existence of the primitive unconscious, which may be equated with instincts and which are not explicable by the a posteriori experience of our lives. In the Yoga-theory of psychology the unconscious may be equated with the complex of 'Vasana' and 'samskara.' The "Vasana-samskara" complex is also primitive as the Yoga asserts that it is transmitted to us in the beginningless series of previous existence in other births. Even if the theory of rebirth be admitted to be true, "Vasana-Samskara" complex is primitive and original so far as this life is concerned. The conscious mental states

(continued from the previous page) can be equated with the *vr̥tti* of the Yoga psychology. The Yoga psychology holds that the *vr̥tti* passed into Samskara and is conserved there as a power by which the Samskara Vasana complex may at any time project that *vr̥tti* in the same or a distorted form owing to the resistance of other Samskaras. According to such a theory, the repetition of such a *vr̥tti*, increases its potential power in the Samskara and increases the chance of its projection as a *vr̥tti*. But it is quite possible that *vr̥tti*, which has not its power strongly presented in the Samskara-complex, may find itself projected in a distorted manner in association with other partially manifested *vr̥ttis*, or, under conditions of resistance of other Samskaras. Here then, we may have a theory, which may be regarded as a plausible alternative to the psycho-analytic theory, for, if by suggestion the potency of the *vr̥tti* can be increased and its mute struggle in the Samskara be thereby annulled, the course of the destructive *vr̥ttis*, or, the conflict in the samskara may also be annulled, and we may have such cures as are claimed by psycho-analysis.

But we are not interested here in elaborating an alternative theory of the cures of morbid patients; but we wish to affirm that the unconscious and the conscious form a homogeneous whole, such that the conscious strengthens and develop the unconscious and the latter insures the recurrence and the strength of the former. Such an assumption changes the nature of the so-called un-alterable unconscious. For, though the unconscious may be original and primitive with us and in some sense beyond our control, yet it is not entirely so; for, by determining the sphere of the conscious we may determine to any extent the nature of the unconscious, which is itself a prolongation or extension of the conscious and at once homogeneous with it.

72. The Yoga-psychology holds that it is possible to arrest the mind on a particular conscious state, such that the constantly fluctuating tendencies of the mind in relational lines may be arrested. It further holds that such a steady arrest of the mind in a particular mental state produces a new type of knowledge (prajna) which has a subversive effect on the Samskara-Vasana complex. These prajnas appear in the conscious plane but are heterogeneous to the Samskara-vasana complex and, therefore, cannot be absorbed by it, but is, on the other hand, attenuated or gradually annihilated by it. We have thus a concept of repression which is applicable not only to the conscious mental state, but also to their original sources, the unconscious. While partial repression of conscious mental states may be unhealthy under certain circumstances, the trained and organised repression of the conscious and the unconscious may lead to a happy regeneration of the conscious and the unconscious in a new plane of elevated existence. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the psycho-analytic theory is a very partial statement and cannot explain the true significance of repression in the application of practical psychology for the regeneration of our mind and morals.

73. C.D. DESHMUKH. "THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION". Modern psycho-analysis has not yet fully recognised (1) the possibility of completely annulling the effects of past experiences and actions, and the possibility of complete sublimation of the libido. But this is largely due to its being exclusively based upon abnormal data, and its somewhat ungenerous attitude towards the entire range of super-normal experience.

The most essential requirement for Liberation is that the individual should be able to

(continued from the previous page) step outside his limiting personality in the sense that his vision is no longer clouded by exclusive concentration of interest in his own self. The limitations of consciousness are ultimately rooted in some kind of deep rooted ignorance about the place and the function of the individual in the totality of Life. The understanding of life is perverted by the fact that the individual has a tendency to judge everything and to re-act to it from the point of view of the ego. The ego creates duality and all the complications of duality. It divides life into fractions and destroys its harmony and integrity. The individual, therefore, constantly lives in a sense of conflict, frustration and limitations. But if through intense love and understanding, the individual succeeds in dropping the idea of his being separate from life, he breaks through his limitations and is united with the one indivisible Reality.

73. This type of Nirguna Mukti is not to be looked upon as result of a process whereby the individual becomes what he was not; it is rather a culmination of a process of self knowledge whereby he realises fully what he already is, has been and ever will be.

74. S.S. JALOTA. "THE CONCEPT OF THE TRANSCENDENT. When Philosophers, even professional philosophers talk about the transcendent ego, or reality, they seem to be talking about something that is absolutely divorced from the phenomenal apparent existence. With a curious awe they lift up their hands, and point perhaps unconsciously, to an immeasurable distance that exists between the simply sensible and the merely conceivable actual object. I have noticed the transfiguration in the tones of the speakers in this house as they pass on from the discussion of the so-called psychological 'me' to the philosophical 'I'. It seems that one of them is eking out a miserable

(continued from the previous page) existence, grovelling in mud and slime; and the other enjoys a lordly liberty and reigns the sole monarch of the seventh heaven.

Is this partiality justified? Some of you may think 'yes.' The one is real, permanent, and changeless, but the other is an impostor, a non-existent illusion, and a false-hood. But I believe the situation is a good deal different. Let us take the transcendent object for our consideration. It is evidently a conceptual construct. By a certain process of reasoning we have arrived at a logical universal. When through our behaviour we describe it as 'above and beyond,' we are treating this logical universal, this bloodless concept, as a real substantive entity. This position is evidently akin to that of mediaeval conceptualism – universalia unt realia ante res –, rather than the very different transcendentalism of Kant, etc. So although we assert that the thing-in-itself is not-knowable, yet our gestures betray the apotheosis of a Platonic archetype, eidōs.

Further, to assert that reality is transcendent is not necessarily to deny that Reality is also immanent, the supporting tail of each ephemeral appearance. The fact of the immanent aspect of reality is, however, conveniently neglected during the reverential preachings of the transcendence of reality. I submit that the concept of immanence is the result of the same process of rigorous logic, as in the concept of transcendence. So I do not see any reason why the present-day philosophers should give one-sided emphasis to a partial truth.

74. RAMDAT BARADWAJ. "DREAMS": "Dreams partake of the nature of hallucinations" says Dr Stout, "in so far as the dreamer appears to see and hear what does not really exist in the external world.

75. It is Hindu belief that the dream experienced in the first quarter (prahar) of the night bears fruit in a year; in the second quarter, in six months; in the third, in ten days; and at the end of the night or at sunrise, very soon. Can it be that in the case of a dream experienced in the last quarter, the immediacy of the results is due to the readiness of the sleeper's mind to receive telepathic missions?

76. I have the experience that one living human being can give a dream to another at will. By hypnotic suggestions I gave two dreams to a friend. On one occasion I suggested the murder of Julius Caesar as described by Shakespeare; on another a scene of a very beautiful garden. Both these dreams lasted for about fifteen minutes to my friend who had been induced to a slight doze both the times, who remembered nothing on waking, but who recollected his experience at my suggestions.

77. Dreams may be due to six causes. They are caused in sleep by the repetition of the conscious sensuous experience of the waking hours or by the subconscious experience during sleep itself. As such they may be termed as "reproductive" or 'anubhuta' dreams. They may also originate in the conative impulse (conscious or repressed, sexual or otherwise) of the dreamer, and may be called 'conative' or 'prarthita' dreams. They may again be brought into play by the pure imagination of the dreamer, and may thus go by the name of 'creative' or 'kalpita' dreams. Besides they are caused by the affection of the sensory areas by toxins or carbonic acid or 'visual dust' etc. or any other physical stimulus, and may therefore be called 'physiological' or 'doshaja' dreams. Then again congenital ideas and tendencies of this as well as of previous lives may give birth to certain dreams, which may be called 'congenital' or

(continued from the previous page) 'bhabaja'. Lastly come the dreams induced by gods or human beings, living or dead, and may fitly be expressed as 'imported' or 'prerita' dreams.

78. PRIYA GOVIND DUT. "MISUSE OF LOGIC." The way in which Logic is being misused in every sphere of life is simply astonishing. The commonest blunders committed by most of us are of three kinds, viz. (1) we parade our probable statements and empirical generalisations as absolutely certain; (2) we treat analogy as satisfactory explanation, and (3) we demand that ideas in order to be true should be capable of being pictorially represented and we frame questions about the fundamental verities of life requiring the pictorial representation of non-pictorial things. The first sort of blunder is not confined to the busy housewife and the ever-pushing business men but also to the learned physicians, lawyers, economists, historians and politicians. The second and the third kind of blunder are frequently committed by philosophers and all those who are philosophically minded. People who are not fortunate enough to receive any accurate logical and meta physical discipline invariably confuse analogy with explanation.

79. Inconsistency which we are required to avoid has almost become the fashion of the day. One of its causes is our appreciation of figurative and synonymous statements in literature though these are discredited from the standpoint of truth. The dialectic argument which has produced wonderful result both in Europe and India is not free from defects of this nature. This method was at first used to bring out the absurdity and inconsistency of a view by putting questions to and eliciting answers from the upholder of this view. Though such a method seems to be harmless yet a closer

(continued from the previous page) analysis shows that it is logically unsound as it invariably rests on two fallacies, viz. the fallacy of many questions and the fallacy known as *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. Occasionally it is found to involve the fallacies of composition and division. It is a matter of analysis and details to elicit the fallacies underlying such questionings. To those who cannot see through these questionings this method is really embarrassing and at the same time convincing. The *syadvadists* however have shown to what absurd situation it leads us.

80. Such a method may be very successful in the law court but in the quest for truth it should be carefully avoided. It is unfortunate that we overlook the fact that the dialectic method is identical with the dilemmatic method and dialectic arguments invariably rest on false suppositions, unreal relations or non-exhaustive alternatives. Doubt about the cogency of this method has been expressed by F.H. Bradley in his famous book, *The Principles of Logic*, where he says, "We must not, if we can help it, introduce into logic the problems of the dialectic view." Again he remarks: Like every other question of the kind, the validity of dialectic is a question of fact, to be discussed and settled upon its own merits, and not by an appeal to so-called "principles." He has not simply expressed his doubt about the dialectic method but has explicitly condemned it as a logical method. He describes this method as a case of pure illusion and the dialectical conclusion arbitrary and defective. Hence we have sufficient data to conclude that we must think thrice before applying this dialectic method in our philosophical investigation.

81. The scientific and the ordinary people both suffer from the misconception of the evidentiary value of illustrations and so they believe that a

(continued from the previous page) few illustrations of a proposition are sufficient to prove it. This erroneous method of illustration appeals to the people because their minds are never satisfied unless and until they can pictorially represent all their ideas and propositions. In other words the ordinary people fail to conceive non-spatial colourless ideas and so view all things as existing in space, occupying space, and possessing colour. The very constitution of human mind and language makes the task of rising above this temporal bias immensely difficult.

82. We vehemently preach throughout the year that truth does not rest on the number of cases supporting it but on the nature of the cases, yet we give up this attitude towards number as soon as we leave our class room. We forget that number is a brute force and whenever anything is proved or enforced on the authority of number we commit the fallacy.

83. Philosophers in a body should now raise their voice against the black art that is being practised all over the world and the idolas that have crept in all the spheres of life and thought. The enormity of the fallacies committed all over the world is really profound. Let us hope that the logicians and philosophers of the world will devise means for eradicating these and stopping this stupendous misuse of Logic.

84. JYOTISH CHANDRA BANERJEE: THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIONS. This type of Philosophy, unlike the common sense view, never separated mind from its object, nor even at the end attempted to bridge over the gulf of this difference like fatal dualism. From the very start this considers consciousness as involving a subject-object relation. The position is quite clear from its doctrine of ideas. An 'idea,' according to this theory, is nothing but the "name

(continued from the previous page) given to a mental state when referred to something objective" which is universal in its nature. The mind employs this as a symbol or meaning.

85. This school of Idealism further establishes the continuity of thought and its objects by arguing that consciousness as such has the form of a continuous judgment and that 'consciousness always appears as holding things in relation. ' – This is in short the 'speculative Idealism' of Bradley and Bosanquet.

86. If accordingly we look to our everyday experience, we find that a man always perceives an object from his perspective only. He cannot and does not perceive the object in all its conceivable relations – which are only possible in the conceptual world. His perception is 'always relevant to purpose.' If we abstract the concept of relation out of the perceptual world of relations and if we go on thinking about the nature of relation then of course one relation is needed to be hooked on by another relation and this second one by another third, and so on ad infinitum. But such an infinitum is never felt in the concrete experience. Apart from the consideration of relations in the Absolute or Reality if we take up the relations as based on the finite experience, all relations are to be viewed as purposive – i.e. 'relations are relevant to purpose.' Reality to be an Absolute Reality must be an alogical principle and hence beyond any such relations. Relation always means the relation we have in the perceptual world. Such a doctrine of 'relevant relations' indeed supports the view of the internality of relations.

87. Whatever criticism might be put forth by the Neo-Realists, mind must be given a due credit in the construction of the world – rather it must be given a place in the heart of Reality. Pure

(continued from the previous page) external relations are meaningless and unthinkable. But equally meaningless and unwarranted by experience to assume the doctrine of equal relevancy of relations as indicated by the views of Bradley and Bosanquet. Relations are internal no doubt but can we not also suppose the varying degrees in the internality of relationships as Leighton has expressed?

88. M.V.V.K. RANGACHARI. "THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARXISM." (Title by P.B). To understand that the ideology of Marxism drew largely from the Hegelian Dialectics of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis and further to realise what close parallelism runs between Sankara's Vedanta and Hegel's philosophy may help as proof against a judgment exparte in condemnation of a cause least attempted to be understood. Marxism claims to show that the general trend of political and social developments cannot run counter to economic forces. These in their turn do not run counter to the more unconscious development of science and technique. The idealism of Hegel leaves the world in the dream-land of abstraction. Marx and Engels evolved a plan of collective life in the practical surroundings of western society, with its class-wars and industrial exploitation.

From the Marxist point of view, thought and action form an inseparable unity. The stratification of a group of people who produced thought without action was the result of the emergence of class-societies. The priests or theorist-philosophers mostly helped to cloak over the inequalities of wealth and power in society by mythological or meta physical formulations. Attached to and living on the wealthy these myth-makers and theorists acquired for their modes of abstract thought the prestige that attaches to wealth and power.

89. The universe is an inter-related changing process. We apprehend it in parts, separating out, in thought, certain partial processes. Such aspects as society, means of production and similar words may be named as isolates. They are things that we drag from their environments in space, time and matter. They are mere fictions for dialectically nothing is free of its environment. The experiment and observation of physical science is based upon this isolation of phases, rendering them neutral to the rest of the changing universe. Analysis and experiment would be impossible unless the thing analysed or experimented upon remained immune from external changes. Care is taken for instance that electricity is insulated so that the tests sought to be applied may respond with precision. The isolates of science are measurably immune from the personality of the scientist. The personal factor does not enter into the experiment. The core of the scientific process is the investigation of cause and effect, of discovering the principles of determinism, of finding out complementary isolates forming a neutral combination. Cause and effect are thus dialectically interlocked.

The application of these very principles to human psychology, and to social life, by chopping off the object of investigation, disconnecting it nationally with the rest of its environment for purposes of study and better concentration is the method of social science gradually gaining in importance in our time. But the scientist would be committing a mistake if he fails to restore the isolate in its original setting as when he forgets to put back the apparatus or to return the books he has borrowed out of the library.

Any isolate, be it a physical object, a live animal, an individual mind, or even a whole

(continued from the previous page) nation, operates simultaneously in two different modes. In functions under the influence of its environment, and it is itself the dynamic that reacts on its environment.

90. Ramanuja did less violence to the pre-existing form of social thought, economic structure, and allegiance to textual authority, while evolving a scheme for mass-emancipation, where-under caste was assigned a secondary position, and social service (prapatti) was put in the forefront. Economic collectivisation was also started in temples and mutts that afforded food and culture on the group-basis (Goshthi). If the balance of social economic and philosophical tradition was maintained under him, it was because reform at pedestrian pace fulfilled the social need of his hour. But the indication of active reform is patently marked, whatever the turn social changes took since then.

Karl Marx was faced with different material. The level of production, the state of technical development, and the fact that ownership and control of machinery were vested in a class determined his approach to the problem. Population was socially and economically stratified, and the class-structure resting on exploitation of the property-class does not remain static. History witnessed the emergence of internal forces giving rise to passage to new phases of society. It is undialectical to ignore history, as much as to suppose that history affirmed status quo, irrespective of present conditions.

91. A recognition of the social conditioning of philosophy at once reveals the absurdity of claiming absoluteness for any of its phases. Dialectical Materialism is conscious of this social reference. It is materialist because it defines the central problem of modern society as a material problem and hence insists that any philosophy which is conscious of reference must start at this point.

92. The paradox of social order negating itself is accomplished through an invisible process. Action through inaction, and inaction, in visible action is the formula (Karmanyakarmayah pasyedakarmanicha karmayah, Gita, IV 18). Astronomical bodies are not determined by apparent motion. Seemingly at rest, a body may be undergoing rapid changes, like the sleeping top. This dynamic sleep is Yoga, alive and active in the stillness of night while the ordinary pre-occupations of life convey no sublime significance (cf. Yanisa sarvabhutanam, yasyam jagrati samyami: Gita II.69). Sunlight reveals objects on the earth, but it screens from view, the brilliance of the stars. The darkness of night closes down the world but displays the glory of the heavens. Darkness is the negation of the sun, but starlight is the negation of that negation. Vice versa, starlight is negation of darkness but the sun is the negation of that negation. Marxian dialectics are simply the application to social life of the principles of Hegel's idealism.

93. In the capitalist era, production is for profit rather than for social service. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the producer over the whole world. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connection everywhere. This exploitation of the world market, gives a cosmopolitan character to production, and consumption in every country. It has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood.

94. But for scientific technology, capitalism would not have been where it has come to stay. But for the capitalist impetus, science would not have invented so richly in her time. Scarcity stands for the well-being of the privileged few, as it meant larger dividends. The increase of technical application worked in the contrary direction.

95. MANUBHAI C. PANDYA. "THE PROBLEM OF APPEARANCE & REALITY: PHENOMENAL & ABSOLUTE STANDPOINTS." The Greek word "phenomenal" is defined by Webster as "An appearance; anything visible; whatever is apprehended by observation." The seers of India however have proclaimed time and again that "the phenomenal world was but a series of changing shifting forms and events, nothing being, abiding, or permanent. To the mind of the sages, none of these phenomenal things was or were "Real" in the sense of existing, fixed, permanent or constant, just as we use the term in connection with Real property, – Real estate – Reality etc., in law to-day. And accordingly, the sages bade their students recognize that the Phenomenal universe was not "Real" in the philosophical sense of the word."

96. SHANKAT RAO. "STRAIGHT & CROOKED THINKING." Is his pride just, when he often turns, twists and even mangles truth by crooked reasons and fallacious arguments? Is his claim rightful despite the manifold errors, and glaring fallacies that he frequently commits?

97. I will recount before you some of the crooked ways of thinking, and a few of the common, dishonest tricks in our arguments. You would see for yourselves how easy it is to avoid these errors and how blindly we swallow some of the validity-coated pills of false conclusions.

98. "Dog" is relatively colourless, but "cur" is coloured with emotion. Take another word 'native.' At first it meant simply an original inhabitant of a country, then it took on the sense of a member of non-European or uncivilized race, later on its import conveyed hatred and contempt. Again what is 'invincible heroism' in the case of our allies becomes "ponderous foolhardiness" in the case of our enemies. From the above-quoted examples it

(continued from the previous page) would be clear that there are two kinds of words: 1. Those in which the objective meaning predominates; and 2. Those in which the subjective attitude or emotional attitude predominates. The fallacy called "Coloured Thinking" for want of a better name occurs when the subjective words are used where objective words are required, and emotion takes the place of reason, and poetry the place of Logic. In asking you to avoid this fallacy, I do not mean that one class of words should be sacrificed for the other class of words or one might be thrown out of the dictionary altogether.

99. Was not Biology checked in its march of progress, when the traditional "nobility of man" was threatened by his proposed "base origin" in the form of the Evolutional Doctrine? "The Descent of Man from the Apes" – that little phrase – gave a greater setback to the theory than all other counter-arguments put together.

100. This slight digression was made to show that the growth and advancement of the modern sciences, and the exactness of the conclusions reached by them, have been very largely the result of their ridding themselves of all such terms as suggest emotional attitudes, and their restricting themselves to those objective words or symbols that merely indicate objects, properties, or relations. The proposition that I wish to maintain is that the common use of emotional words in scientific, political, and religious thinking is as much out of place as would a chemical, or an algebraic formula be in the middle of a poem.

101. Emotional thinking has its place, but its proper place is not where important decisions are to be made. Its legitimate place is in poetry, romantic prose, drama, and fiction, where the chief aim of words is to produce certain emotions.

102. Take another example, how Joseph Jastrow characterizes Freud's theory of Psycho-analysis. He calls it "talking cure," "Chimney sweeping," Parodying Longfellow's famous lines: "Dust thou art, to dust returnest, was not spoken of the soul," he says "Sex thou art, to sex returnest, was decidedly spoken of the Freudian soul." Freud's dream theory is described as a "boot-leg traffic in repressed desires."

103. All and some Fallacy—Making a statement in which all is implied but 'some' is true. It springs up from the uncertainty as to whether the predication is made of the entire subject or a part of the subject. This is a very common fallacy. No other error, I believe, has been the cause of so much cruelty, injustice, and bloodshed throughout the history of the world at this error. It might sound strange, but it is nevertheless true that this piece of crooked thinking lies at the bottom of many of your communal riots, affrays, feuds and fights among different factions, wars and general massacres.

104. In the realm of reasoning the props to prestige—such as the titles of distinction, Fellowships of Royal Society, University degrees, morning coat and top-hat and Rolls Royce—are quite out of place. We should always stand on guard, with the club of logic in our hand, whenever any one tries to speak to us in "Thus saith the Lord" manner. These prestiges and pretended authorities are often abused. Respect authority by all means, but do not give it undue respect which should lead to neglect to examine the evidence for and against a given proposition.

105. What the gullible public forgets is that a professor of English Literature may be an authority on Shakespeare, Milton, or Bernard

(continued from the previous page) Shaw, but he knows precious little about medicines or insurance companies. We have to learn that men are to be trusted exclusively within the limits of their own experience, and in their own profession and pursuit.

1. D.M. DATTA "REFUTATION OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM" (Title by P.B.) (In pt.I.13th I.P.C. 1937). If we are not at liberty to tamper with the accepted meanings of words (which can be gathered only from usage and not from any mandate of either metaphysicians or phenomenologists), we cannot call a statement 'meaningless,' because it happens to be unverifiable. Some readers may be too much dazed by the positivists' complex definitions (which look like stunts made to imitate mathematical accuracy) to remember the common sense distinction between significance and verifiability.

2. This would plainly convince any unbiased person that the understanding of the meaning of a statement must precede any attempt to verify it and, therefore, the meaning of the statement is different from, and independent of being understood prior to its verifiability. If we study the gradual development of this recent line of positivistic thought, we find that at first they attempt to prove that metaphysical problems are not simply insoluble, but altogether meaningless, by showing that meanings of words are derived from sense-experience, and, therefore, words can signify only objects of such experience. But when their criterion of meaning is criticized and shown to render even scientific statements meaningless they gradually change it, only taking care that the criterion might be employed to save science and denounce metaphysics, without caring to preserve the usual meaning of "meaning." Though their technical meaning of "meaning" is quite different, positivists persist

(continued from the previous page) in using the word "meaningless" in denouncing metaphysics, because to call it by the more accurate word "unverifiable," would not arouse all the associations of worthlessness which "meaningless" would.

Having thus artificially and arbitrarily fixed the criterion of meaning—taking care that it may affect metaphysical statements and not scientific ones—positivists deduce in many ways the utter futility of metaphysics, with a show of demonstrative, geometrical certainty. When the logic of the positivists' procedure is exposed, it is found to involve a petitio principii. They start with a faith in science and bias against metaphysics, lay down criterion of significance which will not affect science, but only metaphysics and deduce from it the proof that science deserves that faith, whereas metaphysics should be shunned as meaningless.

But even in this fallacious procedure, they cannot always consistently uphold scientific laws and concepts and at the same time denounce metaphysics. For imperceptible entities and principles of science, like the electron, energy etc. become meaningless like the metaphysician's substances, such as, God, soul and matter; but these kinds of things being unverifiable by sense experience. This forces some positivists to give up even the ordinary conceptions of science and try to adopt a thorough-going phenomenalism, which withdraws all belief from imperceptible entities of science as well as metaphysics. We have no quarrel with this recent development of Positivism into Phenomenalism. It would only be a return to Kant, at best. But we find in practice that the phenomenalism of the modern positivists has neither the depth nor the rigorous consistency of Kant's thinking.

3. We may examine the soundness of the positivistic criterion of significance from another point of view. This criterion, as we have seen, depends on the assumption that our words are based upon experience and can symbolize only empirical objects. How far is this assumption true? If we examine the words of any language we find that while many words signify sense-objects, there are a good many that do not refer to any such object. Abstract terms like virtue, honesty, sincerity, quality, magnanimity do not correspond to any experienced object. It may be said by the positivist that though these words do not signify any object directly experienced, they derive their meanings from such objects ultimately. But it may be asked then: What is the process of this derivation? This process, consisting of comparison, abstraction, generalization etc. cannot be said to be the same as the experience of sense-contents. And consequently we can scarcely hold that experience which according to the positivist, is the source of the knowledge of meanings is always sense-experience. In other words it must at least be admitted then, as was done by Locke, that in addition to sense-impressions which are passive, there is the activity of the mind which forms complex ideas, out of simple ones given as sense-contents. The meaning of experience cannot, therefore, be simply sense-experience, which seems to be the tacit assumption of the positivist; experience must have a wider meaning and must include the activity of the mind on or about the sense-contents, i.e. a thought.

4. If in this way we examine the significant words in any language, we find that even though it may be admitted that the meanings of words can be understood only by reference to some experience, there is no reason to confine the meaning of experience only to sense-experience. And

(continued from the previous page) if the verifying experience need not necessarily be an actual experience, but a theoretically possible one, as some Positivists themselves admit, then there is no reason why a word like 'God' cannot be a significant word. The theoretical possibility of mystic experience about God cannot be ruled out; nor can the actual existence of the feelings of reverence, love about God be denied. Ayer contends that mystical experience, cannot be put to empirical test, therefore, statements about its object, God, is meaningless (p.181-2 Language, Truth and Logic). This would seem, in the light of what has been said before to be based on an unjustified narrowing of the meaning of experience and, therefore, an unjustified demand on the mystic. Though one may agree with Ayer that to feel the presence of God in religious emotion is not to make God the object of cognition and, therefore, God's existence cannot be theoretically proved thereby, he may not conclude like him that, therefore, 'God' is meaningless.

5. In criticizing metaphysics, they say that God, soul, matter, which are words for super-phenomenal reality are meaningless. But this very criticism, to be significant, implies that the positivist is aware of what a word like God means; for otherwise his criticism would turn out to be about words which are unintelligible to him. In fact when he says that 'God' is meaningless because it refers to some super-phenomenal reality, he betrays at least his partial knowledge about the meaning of 'God.' When we say that a word like 'abragada,' is meaningless, we would not say "It is meaningless, because it means such and such a thing." To say so would be to commit self-contradiction.

6. "By mere deduction from what is immediately given, we cannot advance a single step

(continued from the previous page) beyond," for, "As Hume conclusively showed, no event intrinsically points to any other". But if the first principles of metaphysics be a priori, then every apriori truth being tautology, what is deduced, the system of metaphysics, is also tautological. As regards the occasional attempts of philosophy to build systems on a priori truths, even if we accept for the time being, the positivistic view which is doubtful, namely that all a priori truths are analytical and therefore tautological, we cannot reject such a priori system as useless. For, according to this view the whole of Euclidean Geometry or any other treatise of pure mathematics is regarded as tautological, being based on a priori propositions which are analytic and tautological. Even a positivistic philosophical work like *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* is admitted tautological. But in spite of tautology these branches of knowledge are considered to be useful even by Positivists. It is said that even "analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs." (*Language, Truth and Logic*, P. 104.).

7. The world-view thus reached by philosophic imagination can hardly be accepted as definite knowledge. It is of the nature of poetic, metaphorical imagination at bottom, only, the philosopher pursues and works out its manysided implications. The selection of the fundamental concept (or the root metaphor as it has been recently called by some) is a matter of choice which is influenced by the philosopher's bent of mind. But the working out of this concept obeys the laws of deduction. Criticism of one philosophical system by another affects only this process of deduction, and consists in examining self-consistency and the errors of reasoning.

8. But in spite of this uncertain nature of its result metaphysical speculation cannot cease, because it is a part of human nature to try to understand the world. As Kant puts it in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic:—"That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches, entirely is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be Metaphysic in the world; nay every one, especially every man of reflection will have it, and for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern."

9. INDRA SEN. "WHAT IS PHILOSOPHIC KNOWLEDGE." "Every particular system is nothing," says Collingwood, "but an interim report on the progress of thought down to the time of making it." The validity of these systems is only relative to the personal development of the individual thinkers and the state of culture to which they belong.

10. Knowledge of the universe shall accordingly have to be conceived as a norm, an ideal, which like the moral ideal has to be continually pursued and realised only by stages. History of Philosophy represents the process of such realisation. The various philosophies would then possess only relative validity. Claim of finality would not be tenable with respect to any, though certain parts of them might ultimately show to have possessed finality. Perfect knowledge of the universe will come only to perfected personality.

10. Logical positivism is the other important thought-current which pins its faith to logical analyses. There are obviously certain psychological reasons for the development of this thought. Under similar circumstances it has appeared before, too, a number of times in the

(continued from the previous page) history of Philosophy. The present variety of Positivism has developed a striking doctrine of meaning, which is used to prove that all metaphysical propositions are meaningless. The meaning of a proposition, it is said, consists in its verifiability and since metaphysical propositions are not verifiable, therefore they are meaningless. But the concept of "verifiability" as propounded by the logical positivists presents many serious difficulties. We differ from them fundamentally in regard to their view of the nature of Philosophy itself. Philosophy according to them, cannot be concerned with any reality behind the phenomena. All that it has to do is to logically analyse propositions established by science. In fact even outside logical Positivism Philosophy is too much a matter of concepts. Philosophy as predominantly a logical activity, one can easily trace back to Kant and Hegel. To Kant a Philosopher was an investigator of concepts. Hegel defined Philosophy as the thinking consideration of things. But Fichte has emphasised the whole man as the Philosophising agent rather than intellect.

11. The position that we have taken above implies that Philosophy is more a seeking than a doctrine. This seeking is directed towards taking up a harmonised position—a position which is free from internal contradictions. This is further the position of the whole man involving the affective and conative aspects of his being as much as the cognitive. And since all the three aspects of human existence are intimately intertwined perfect knowledge will only come, as we have said above, to perfect personality.

12. G.R. MALKANI "SCIENCE AN UNSUITABLE BASIS OF PHILOSOPHY." (Title by P.B.) Philosophical knowledge must therefore be a very different sort of knowledge as compared to the knowledge which sciences give us. It would be wrong to

(continued from the previous page) call philosophy a universal science, if what is meant is that the only difference between the two is one of the scope of the subject-matter and none as to their respective methods of approach and the kind of illumination that is expected.

Scientific truths are of the nature of hypotheses. They can be verified. There is a set of facts which will validate a particular hypothesis. There is another set of facts which will invalidate it. A certain theory may be true now. But it may fail to satisfy when new facts have been brought to light. Scientific truth has necessarily a hypothetical character. It can never be absolute truth.

Philosophical truth is nothing if it does not claim a certain completeness and absoluteness in itself. This is because philosophy is not after empirical truth. It has no problem as to the empirical content of knowledge. This empirical content will change as science progresses and brings new facts to light. Philosophy leaves that business of investigating matters of fact to science. What it is concerned with are the fixed and permanent forms of experience. These do not change. For instance the content will retain the same fixed form and the same meaning for all time. Philosophy is concerned with this forms and this meaning. It is therefore wholly unaffected by the progress of science. It is a mistaken view to suppose that we require a new philosophy when there are new developments in science. It is only when we mix up the two kinds of enquiry and do not know where to draw a line between them, that the one seems to be affected by the other and vice-versa.

Philosophical truth is quite independent of science. It is truth which cannot be verified, or better still, the same set of facts seems

(continued from the previous page) to lend itself equally to different philosophical interpretations. Idealism and realism of various grades and varieties, have been reared up upon the same set of facts. And all those different systems seem, to all appearances, to be equally justified. We have merely to look at facts through the understanding of each different philosopher. Each thinks that he is in the right and that the facts support him. This does not mean that any philosopher has ever succeeded, or can ever succeed, in proving his opponent to be in the wrong.

13. But it does not mean that we have to repudiate our present experience, reject the guidance of reason, and evolve some kind of mystic intuition. What is meant is that we must rise, through a criticism of our sense-knowledge to a higher knowledge which is more adequate to our conception of knowledge. This higher knowledge is already implied in the criticism. It is the business of philosophy to bring it to explicit consciousness.

14. All that we can do is to analyse and interpret our experience as it is, and this experience is wholly objective experience. We may construct a world-view, from experience as it is. We must not start from above, say the Absolute, and then begin to do violence to facts of experience. We must keep experience as it is. And even if we must accept the Absolute, we must admit that it cannot be a matter of knowledge to us and is at best a regulative idea of reason. To seek to know it is to leave the anchorage of reason and of experience and take refuge in pure mysticism.

15. Let it be granted that philosophy is an interpretation of experience. But what is this experience? Is sensible experience all our experience? Evidently, our experience has a wider scope. We have aesthetic, moral and religious

(continued from the previous page) experience. If we interpret experience, we must take experience as a whole. Now in religion we believe in a super-sensible world-ground. Has that no significance for philosophy? As we cannot repudiate the world of sensible experience, so neither can we repudiate the super-sensible world of religious experience. If it is argued that in the one case we know and that in the other case we do not, that would not be quite true. It is an open question whether we know truly when we know sensible objects. And although we cannot exactly claim to have any knowledge of the super-sensible, it certainly sets a problem in knowledge. A belief which is justified on grounds of feeling and of will cannot be wholly unrelated to our knowledge; in fact it demands to be so realised, i.e, realised in knowledge.

Let us however suppose that knowledge is concerned with the object alone and that it is the business of philosophy to analyse this knowledge. But then what can the analysis possibly achieve? Will it not be reduced to an analysis of the conventions of language or an analysis of what we mean when we make certain statements about matters of fact? Will this not be a new form of dogmatism, a dogmatism which repudiates out of hand all knowledge of the super-sensible? It appears to us that this restriction of experience to sensible experience is altogether unphilosophical. To go no farther, there is always an element in our sensible experience it-self which is non-sensible and which cannot be denied to be real, namely the subject. Can the subject be wholly ignored by philosophy as it is ignored by science? The contention that philosophy is concerned with an analysis of our objective experience cannot but be barren.

Philosophy must be based upon the whole of our experience. This experience cannot be restricted

(continued from the previous page) to sensible experience. It may now be asked, but what is the function of philosophy with regard to experience as a whole? In our opinion, it can be no other than that of the interpretation and the elucidation of the true meaning of experience. We have experience. But its real significance is lost on us through lack of thought. The result is that we have all kinds of false beliefs based upon it. Philosophical analysis must introduce rationality in our belief, and make them conform to experience as it is. The result is that our whole experience is renovated. We see things in a new light. Our experience remains the same, and yet it is not quite the same. It has turned into a new perception of the truth. Thus philosophical knowledge does not take the form of dry intellectualism. It is not merely a matter of some kind of belief about the whole of reality, a belief which may be false. It is a new perception or a new wisdom. Our reason has been used not to construct empty and abstract notions of the Absolute, but to interpret and to evolve a new meaning in our experience. It has been used to resolve certain problems that occur to thought in terms of thought. But this resolution has not been purely an intellectual matter like an abstract problem in mathematics. It has raised experience to a new level. We can thus see that philosophical truth cannot be hypothetical in character like scientific truth. It necessarily takes the form of a new perception. Philosophy is not merely an intellectual game that has no relation to our intuitive experience and to life which is based on it.

The question may be asked, does philosophical knowledge differ in principle from all other knowledge? It appears to us that there is a sense in which it does. It alone realises fully and completely our meaning of knowledge. All

(continued from the previous page) other so called knowledge is only an appearance of knowledge. Let us see how this is the case. Knowledge in general may be taken to be revelatory of reality. Wherever there is knowledge there is something real that is revealed or known. If the real is not known, nothing is known. The unreal, the illusory, the imaginary, etc. cannot be said to be known. But is this meaning of knowledge, about which there is general agreement realised in our so called knowledge of objects? It is evident that our consciousness does not directly come into contact with things and reveal them as they are. Things and consciousness do not, so to say, meet face to fact. The consciousness is, as we say, in our. The things are ever outside of us. The consciousness is clearly determined by the state, the structure and the activity of the senses on the one hand, and the interpretations of the mind on the other. Our knowledge is mediated. What the exact nature of reality is cannot be determined by any analysis of our knowledge as it is. All that we can say is that possibly it is also determined in part by the things themselves. But this is only a presumption, and an unnecessary presumption. It does not help. We have no means of turning the presumption into a properly validated truth. We cannot say what the contribution of things is, nor that there is any contribution at all. Things seem far off if there are things at all. Our notion of knowledge is incapable of being realised here.

A change in the notion is somehow demanded. That change cannot relate to the part which consciousness plays in knowledge; for consciousness is a self-revelatory principle. As we cannot doubt what knowing is, so we cannot doubt what consciousness is or does. The change can only relate to our notion of reality. As long as we assume that reality is something

(continued from the previous page) external to us, our knowledge will lack immediacy. We cannot do away with all those means and instruments of knowledge which keep us away from reality. More than this knowledge of external reality cannot but lack one essential characteristic of all true knowledge. It is an essential characteristic of true knowledge and therefore of knowledge as such, that it must vouchsafe its own truth. It must be self-evident. It must be found, on analysis, not only to give ground for the faith for that what is known may be real, but that it cannot be otherwise than real. There should be no room for any doubt or error. This is clearly not possible with any knowledge of external reality, which therefore does not realise our meaning of knowledge.

It will here be argued that it is not part of our meaning of knowledge that it should be self-evident. No knowledge is that; and no knowledge can be that. We have a certain piece of knowledge. It is merely that knowledge. It says nothing about its own truth or falsity. Certainly, it may be true or it may be false. To determine this, we must refer it to a wider context. We must ask whether there is any cancelling knowledge. We must ask whether it is consistent with the rest of our experience. Thus the test of truth lies not in the self-evidence of a piece of knowledge for no piece of knowledge has this quality, but in the general coherence of experience. Further, no piece of knowledge can be absolutely certain. Certainty is wholly a psychological matter. It is not a quality that belongs to knowledge. We may feel certain in different degrees. But knowledge as such is merely that piece of knowledge. It may be confirmed or it may be cancelled by later knowledge, but in itself it can be proved to be neither true or false.

It appears to us that this is a mistaken view.

(continued from the previous page) It makes short work of our whole conception of knowledge. That no piece of empirical knowledge is self-evident may be granted. But then it is an open question whether it is real knowledge. Let us grant that no knowledge can be self-evident, and that any particular piece of knowledge is true when it is confirmed by a later knowledge. It is evident that if this is the case, truth becomes unattainable. The later knowledge will require to be confirmed and so on ad infinitum. No piece of knowledge will be true in itself or absolutely true. But then it is not knowledge in the strict sense of the term. It is an essential element in our conception of knowledge that it should be revelatory of reality. But if it itself gives no complete evidence of reality, in what sense can it be said to reveal reality? It would appear that self-evident knowledge alone is knowledge; for it gives evidence of reality, it reveals reality, while nothing else does.

Certainty and uncertainty in relation to knowledge may be a psychological matter. It is certainly so, when legitimate doubt is overruled by a subjective attitude of self-assurance, and any piece of so-called knowledge is taken to be real knowledge. At the same time, our psychological attitudes may also be governed by logical and metaphysical reasons. Where doubt is legitimate, the attitude of self-assurance is wholly out of place. But where there is no room for doubt, can we continue in uncertainty or withhold assent? Certainty and uncertainty may in this sense be transferred to knowledge itself, for it is on the internal structure of knowledge that our attitudes depend.

We may thus modify our conception of knowledge. Knowledge is revelatory of reality, but this reality cannot be an external reality. Knowledge is, we should say, the self-revelation of reality.

(continued from the previous page) It cannot be that reality is there, outside – and that knowledge is in me. Reality and knowledge must be coincident. Or in other words, reality must be self-conscious.

We have the basis of this knowledge in our own self-consciousness. The reality that is known here is the self. But this self is not known by another self or by something that is external to it. The reality of the self is self-evidenced reality. It realises in our experience, as nothing else does, our meaning of knowledge. May it not be the super-sensible and the metaphysical reality which we seek to know in philosophy? It is a matter which we leave to a fuller discussion of all the philosophical issues involved. It is our own opinion that self-knowledge is the end of the philosophical quest.

16. R.R. SARMA "THE ULTRA-MYSTIC PHILOSOPHIC INSIGHT." (title by P.B.)
By philosophical knowledge, I understand a special kind of insight that is capable of revealing the true nature of the whole world of experience. Philosophical knowledge, as distinguished from other kinds of knowing, is a kind of awareness that can enter into the very heart of reality and unfolding its nature, can satisfy once for all a spiritual den and to reach the final truth about it. It is enlightenment or knowledge par excellence; but in all probability, its nature is not accurately described when it is said that philosophical knowledge is an intellectual apprehension, or thinking consideration of the nature of reality; for, such apprehension appears to me to be utterly incapable of unveiling the mysteries of the universe and thus falls far short of the ultimate truth about it. All knowledge is illumination and as such it must always reveal its object. Philosophical knowledge is revelation of a particular kind.

17. Knowledge is something that reveals its

(continued from the previous page) object, or makes its object known. In other words, it is something that dispels the darkness of not-knowing or ignorance which appears to cover up the object and hide it out of sight. This veiling of the object again appears to be of two principal types. Ignorance has the potency to obscure either the intrinsic nature of the object which may be otherwise known to exist, or it may cover up the very existence of the object with the result that the object is believed not to be at all. Two different kinds of knowledge seems to be necessary to dispel these two kinds of not-knowing. It is to be noted that when the former kind of ignorance is removed, the latter is automatically destroyed along with it, but not vice versa. When the specific nature of the object is known, both kinds of ignorance must necessarily be removed. But if only the latter kind of ignorance is dispelled, the intrinsic nature of the object may still remain unrevealed. What we call immediate experience and mediate experience have respectively the power to destroy ignorance of these two different types referring to the real nature of the object or to its very being. Knowing in the sense of thinking, for instance, appears to be competent to remove ignorance of the latter kind only; for, when an object is known through thought, it may be possible to know almost all the details regarding the object known, but still, such knowledge, however accurate it may be, cannot reveal the nature of the object as it is and thus falls far short of the immediate experience of the object through direct content. Hence knowledge that has the potency only to establish the existence of its object may not be competent to illumine its real nature. And for that purpose some other kind of knowledge will be necessary. It must naturally be a kind of knowing

(continued from the previous page) without thinking. Philosophical knowledge, which claims to reveal the true nature of the real, must be such that it can remove all kinds of veiling of its object. In other words, it must be an experience most immediate and direct.

Philosophical knowledge, therefore, must be the immediate or intuitive apprehension of reality. Any other kinds of experience of the real will be the knowledge of a particular kind but not philosophical knowledge. Intellectual knowing or thought (by which I mean any relational experience involving the subject-object distinction including perceptual judgment) seems to be powerless to grasp such realities as the self or the absolute as they are. Even assuming that intellectual experience of such realities is possible, the knowledge thus derived will be only mediate and indirect and as such incompetent to reveal the true nature of those realities. It may be argued that intellect is the only instrument at our disposal, and if it is actually found that there are certain realities which are beyond the reach of intellect, then, the obvious conclusion will be that such realities are unknown and unknowable; and if philosophical knowledge must be knowledge of the real as it is, then, such knowledge from the very nature of the case, is unattainable. This argument however, is not convincing, for, to be conscious of unknownness is itself a kind of knowledge of the very object that is alleged to be unknown. Moreover, there are realities which are undoubtedly known but certainly not through intellect or thought. The knowledge of our own self, for instance, is conclusive proof that there is a different way of knowing things and it must be knowing without thinking.

Philosophical knowledge must reveal the ultimate nature of reality. By reality we mean the basic principle of the universe as a whole. An

(continued from the previous page) analysis of the whole field of human experience reveals that in the universe there are four principal categories of knowable objects, namely, the physical world, the mental states, the knowing subject and also a superpersonal spiritual principle. This is not an arbitrary classification but it is based on solid facts of actual experience. Of these knowables, no body apparently questions the existence of the physical world as well as the different states of the human mind, which are universally recognised to be knowable. In regard to the existence of the self, despite difference of opinion regarding the knowability of the self and the possible way of knowing it, there is common agreement in so far as a unity in conscious life is believed to be a fact. Besides, the consciousness of the existence of self is so universal an experience that it cannot be consistently denied. If sense-perception is a guarantee for the existence for the external physical world, the immediate apprehension 'I am' is a much more convincing proof for the existence of the self. In the same manner, the universal belief in the existence of God, however superstitious and unscientific it may appear to be turns out in some as vivid realisation in concrete religious experience and as such it is competent to prove the existence of a super personal spiritual principle.

Of these knowables the last named is the ultimate reality. Reality is that which has being in itself and for itself and can never be denied. It exists eternally in its own right. Of all things that we are aware, it is only consciousness, that constitutes the inmost essence of our being, that satisfies this test. The physical world of objects is undoubtedly there and may continue to be there for ever. But its non-existence is conceivable. It can be denied. It is not self-subsistent and therefore

(continued from the previous page) it cannot claim absolute reality. Compared to this, the self has a greater degree of reality in it. The denial of the self is not only inconceivable but impossible. The self is the reality because it can never be negated. But the personal self or the subject is not the final truth. For in actual religious experience the limitations of personality are transcended and the self realises the existence of the super-personal reality which is not something different from it, but is its inmost essence, free from all the limitations of personality and therefore absolutely real. This is the most positive of all facts and has being in the true sense. We cannot go beyond it. It must therefore be the ultimate reality. The denial of the physical world is possible because we are conscious of the existence of the subject and the denial of subjectivity is possible because there is the absolute self. This is something which is self-subsistent and continues to be what it is eternally even when all other things cease to exist. Knowledge reaches its highest perfection when this reality is completely grasped. Philosophical knowledge, if it claims to be the apprehension of the ultimately real, must be the immediate intuition of the absolute self.

18. The self is revealed intuitively through the apprehension "I am." Its existence is thus guaranteed beyond doubt. But most of us have no clear knowledge of our self. Our consciousness is engrossed in the external physical world, very seldom, if at all, does it turn back upon itself. Self-consciousness is not a living experience with us. In ordinary men like ourselves it is an extremely rare phenomenon. A living experience of the super-personal self is rarer still, and the inevitable consequence is this that most of us have very great doubts whether such a reality exists at all. To know this

(continued from the previous page) reality consciousness must transcend the limitations of personality not theoretically but in actual apprehension. From the very nature of the case, it is extremely difficult—so difficult that it appears to be altogether impossible, and one is very easily led to think that such a reality, even if it exists, must be unknown and unknowable. But it has already been pointed out that this reality is the very essence of our being and as such already revealed to us to some extent. But this knowledge is so imperfect and vague to most of us that it is generally considered to be no knowledge at all. But the facts of religious experience which can not be explained away, conclusively demonstrate not only the existence but also the complete knowability of this reality. Philosophy, if it is to be worth its name, must reveal the true nature of this reality. It must remove all the ignorance and misconception with regard to it and bring to light its intrinsic nature.

Immediate apprehension of all the knowables referred to above is possible. We have intuitive experience of the external physical world in sense-perception, of the mental states in introspection, of the self in enjoying self-consciousness and of the super-personal self in concrete religious experience. Of these four different kinds of immediate apprehension, only the last appears to be truly immediate. Compared with this the rest are only more or less immediate. Sense-perception is immediate, no doubt, but such experience is always the result of a process and is invariably accompanied with the idea of the separateness of the subject and the object. In introspective awareness of the psychical states the distinction of subject and object is at work although in a subtler form and the experience is also conditioned by certain other mental factors. In self-consciousness

(continued from the previous page) the opposition of not-self is not altogether absent. In the actual experience of the super-personal self the limitations of personality are transcended and the oneness of the knower and the known is completely realised. Through this experience the I becomes or enjoys itself as an inherent distinction of the subject and object. But gradually this distinction is transcended and the subject becomes absorbed in the object. Personality is lost.

19. It is obvious that such apprehension must be unique and it is extremely difficult to indicate even indirectly what the actual content of such experience will be. But this much can be asserted with certainty that it must be perfect illumination revealing the intrinsic nature of the absolute reality. Through such experience the self completely realises its nature or truly becomes itself. To know in this case is to realise one's identity with the known or the revealed, not theoretically but in actual experience. To know here means self-realisation—to be what oneself really is. It should not however be supposed that at times the self is not what it is essentially. It is always what it is. Only its intrinsic nature is obscured through not-knowing.

20. It should not, however, be supposed that such realization is impossible, for the simple reason that the ultimate principle to be realised happens to be the very essence of our being. The only condition to be fulfilled is the complete removal of all kinds of limitation due to ignorance. This is the only remedy for the ills of life, and consciously or unconsciously, we are all after it. But we do not actually feel that this is the object we are aiming at; for, we do not know what we seek and what we are striving for. Beyond this human aspiration cannot go. It is the consummation of the philosopher's enquiry.

21. What is the possible way of reaching the ultimate truth? It has been pointed out that such truth is to be realised only within one's self. The ordinary ways of knowing are ineffective, although each one of them contributes its shares in rousing it, negatively by removing the obstacles in the way. Sense perception and inference cannot grasp the absolute that transcends all relations. The only possible course open is to rely on the testimony of those who have already realised it in their own self. In every walk of life the ignorant has to depend for light and guidance on the verdict of those who are competent to speak with authority. A man of average intelligence has certainly no right to assume that with all his limitations and imperfections he is competent to solve the ultimate problems of life. In spite of its apparent charm, the doctrine of equality is of doubtful utility even in the ordinary affairs of life and is positively harmful in the sphere of ultimate spiritual values.

1. R. DAS. SOME THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: (in *The PHILOSOPHIC QUARTERLY* 4/'25). When metaphysics is deriving its clue from epistemology and in epistemology the problem of error plays the part, more or less of a deciding fact, it is not improper that so much attention, should be given to it by contemporary thinkers.

2. Perhaps the difficulties of the problem arise from the very paradoxical nature of the question we are called upon to deal with here. We all know that there is the fact of error and that it has its being in knowledge; outside knowledge there is no error. Error is not a thing among other things of the world. We can conceive of the independent existence of things (if we disregard for the time being the protests

(continued from the previous page) of certain idealists here) but error can never be so conceived – it is real in knowledge and in knowledge alone. But it is just here that we think that error should not find a place. Knowledge is no knowledge if it is infected with error. Knowledge is thwarted in its purpose and so ceases to be knowledge at all in any real sense of the word if we find any taint of error in it. But at the same time it is only within knowledge that error can at all be found. We are thus confronted with the paradox – Error requires knowledge but knowledge tolerates no error; without knowledge there cannot be any error; with error there can be no knowledge. There must be knowledge in order that there may be error but where there is error, there is no knowledge and without knowledge error cannot be.

Further, we of course say that there is error. But where is error? Can we ever catch ourselves in error and find ourselves face to face with it? When we are in error we do not recognize it; when we are out of it, we do not find it. The essence of error lies in this that when we are in error we are not conscious of it. If in making a false judgment we are conscious of its falsehood we can not be said to be in error even though we pretend to believe in the judgment. The erroneous character of an error must not obtrude on our consciousness so long as we are suffering from it and as soon as we recognise it as an error, it does not exist for us. One can easily imagine how difficult it would be to deal satisfactorily with a phenomenon of such a peculiar character. When it is upon us we do not know it; when we come to realise it, it has already vanished away from us.

We have suggested above that although knowledge is destructive of error, it is yet required for the very being of error. We may be told here that knowledge as a conscious process is certainly the basis of valid knowledge as well as of

(continued from the previous page) erroneous knowledge, in the sense that they both occur in a conscious process. What appears to consciousness is, of course, known but valid knowledge is not conterminous with knowledge of this sort. Much may be false in it and false knowledge is error and it is not opposed to knowledge as such but only to valid knowledge. The paradoxical character of the situation seems to be resolved if we view the question in this light.

Now we should remember that the essence of error lies in its claim to the status of valid knowledge. When there is no such claim there is no danger of error. When I know a thing falsely I can in no sense be said to be in error if I do not labour under the misconception that what I know is, to all intents and purposes, a piece of valid knowledge, if, that is to say, my knowledge does not put in a claim to validity. But this claim to validity is an integral part of all knowledge. Whenever we know we claim to know validity. At least this is our intention and belief at the time. We give up our claim and admit our failure to reach our object only when we are effectively contradicted by some external fact or some internal discrepancy is shown in our thought. We can go further and say that all knowledge comes to us as valid knowledge. The validity of knowledge does not come to it from outside but pertains to its nature as knowledge. In the case of what we call false knowledge, the falsity is due not to the nature of knowledge as knowledge but some other circumstances. If knowledge itself were not valid, it could never be validated, for let us suppose that an act of knowledge is known as valid by another act of knowledge which lends it its validity, we have then to enquire how we shall know the validity

(continued from the previous page) of the second act of knowledge; if for its validity we are to be referred to a third act of knowledge then we do not know where we can stop and how we can avoid the fallacy of regresses ad infinitum.

3. G.R. MALKANI: "BEING." It is one of the most difficult and at the same time one of the most important problems of philosophy to define Being. The difficulty is the greater, because every one, the philosopher as well as the lay-man, seems to think that he knows what is to be meant by Being. There is hardly a concept of more general application, and we are not surprised that many thinkers either fail to see a genuine problem here, or think that it is capable of an easy answer.

4. What do we mean when we say that anything whatsoever is? If what we meant is that taking experience as it is, we have to answer certain questions regarding it which suggest themselves to thought, by thought, and that this procedure involves an initial intellectualization of the real which the real does not warrant, we shall have to admit that our problem is formal. But then no philosophical problem can be anything else. Philosophy starts with the assumption that the whole of reality can be reduced to "thinkable content."

It is a natural expectation on our part that a concept which is to be significant must not only represent to us that which it includes, but also that which it does not; it must have a distinguishable content. In order therefore to associate a definite meaning with Being, we must be able to distinguish the concept of Being from that of non-Being.

5. But a difficulty arises here. All the constituents of our thinking signify Being, which alone is the fundamental idea. Being then in the sense in which philosophy is bound to take note of it cannot be negated. From this point of

(continued from the previous page) view it would appear that Hegel's standpoint in his Logic is fundamentally wrong. The pure Being of philosophy simply cannot lead to the notion of non-Being. It is only when we conceive Being as objective content that its negation becomes a necessity for thought.

6. We shall now proceed to show the difficulties of the opposite view, the view namely that Being consists in the actual existence of things and their relations and that our idea of it is derived from these. This is sometimes expressed by saying that universal Being or pure Being which philosophy is after, is not a reality. What is real is the particular. Universal Being is a mere concept abstracted from the particulars of our experience, and then supposed to be either incorporated in the particulars or transferred to an independent and ideal existence.

It is quite evident now that we cannot have a concept of Being without there being given to us an intuition of Being. Let us look at the procedure of thought in arriving at general concepts. We have the concept of horse. In this case we have seen many things called horses; and out of these several experiences, we construct a generic image which is more or less like the image of any particular horse. The concept "horse" at once calls to our mind this generic image. Similarly, when we think of an abstract quality such as "Justice," "courage" etc. we construct out of the several acts of justice or of courage etc. a general mental attitude which is specified in each of those particular acts; thus when we think of justice, a particular mental attitude of being just comes to our mind. Can it be maintained that the concept of Being is derived in this way?

It might be supposed that it is from our experience of things and processes that we abstract the idea of Being. But what we see are things

(continued from the previous page) and processes. We do not see any such quality as "being" with which things might be supposed such to acquaint us. In fact we might even say that we credit things with "being" before we have had time to compare them in order to the possibility of arriving at any general concept. The notion of Being is thus found to be prior to all the specific qualities which constitute things; it is not got out of the latter.

Universal Being has an ideal character, inasmuch as it has no objective existence, like the things which are said to be. And yet it is not ideal in the sense that it is in some way a product of thought, and so a mere abstraction from the real. So far as visible things are concerned Being is ideal; and so far as the products of mental life are concerned, Being is not ideal but real. There will be no sense in the being of anything but for the affirmation, which according to the very soul of things.

So far we have been trying to prove the non-dualism of Being and the affirmation of Being implied by all that claims to be.

7. Our self is the one stable point in the whole moving mass of things. And it is the self-affirmation of this that takes the form of the affirmation of all things that are or can be affirmed, the created as well as the uncreated. The effort of which I am aware is not the effort to maintain myself in Being. That requires no effort. This effort therefore does not involve any contradiction in our meaning of Being. Rather it shows what we should take to be real Being in apparent Being.

(July 25 issue)

8. R. DAS "SOME THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY." When one is engaged in the discussion of the problem, he discovers very soon that there are so many questions connected with it, to which he would like to find some satisfactory answers. There is the question of determining the logical meaning or error as well as

(continued from the previous page) that of finding out the psychological conditions under which error is made possible. Then we may consider the general metaphysical implications of those judgements of perception which turn out to be false and try to determine in this connection the ontological status of an illusory object. Lastly we may like to know how far this problem affects the possibility of attaining certitude in knowledge.

"Akhyativada" comes nearest the truth as a psychological explanation of the fact of error. We know that our judgments of perception are not absolutely determined by what actually comes to us without. Our past experience, present interest and accompanying circumstances are responsible for much that we seem to see or hear. In the case of error certain impressions are surely revived in our mind by the similarity in appearance of the presented object and we are prompted to make the erroneous judgment. So it seems that Akhyativada gives the psychology of error more or less correctly. (I have not sharply distinguished between error and illusion in this paper. An illusion of an error of perception and what is illusion from the point of view of Psychology is error from the point of view of epistemology). It is also that in error we are not able to preserve the distinction between what is given to us from without and what is only revived in our mind. So we may say that there is in a sense non-apprehension of distinction in error.

But the erroneousness of knowledge does not consist merely in the non-apprehension of distinction but in the positive apprehension of one thing as another. On this point "Anyathakhyativada" seems to be correct. Every error implies corresponding knowledge in which the object of knowledge has been reached by knowledge. We get error when the object does not reveal itself but appearing as another eludes the grasp of

(continued from the previous page) knowledge. This theory seems correct also on the point that a thing must have been real at some time in order that we may be able to mistake for it what is presented to us in perception. We must have some knowledge of it so that we may be able to ascribe it to another. It may be said that that knowledge may be of the illusory sort as the present one. But if that knowledge is to be an illusion, there must be some ascription in it and it would necessitate previous knowledge of the ascribed thing. Thus, it seems unless we choose to be referred back and back to an endless process we have to admit that at some time of our life we must have had real knowledge of the illusory object. But it would be wrong to insist on the present existence of the object or to suppose that its existence in some other place is given in our present knowledge.

So far as the ontological status of the illusory object is concerned, it seems to be of an absolutely negative character. What we think to be there is simply not there. "Asatkhyativada" brings out this point and we can easily understand when looking from this view point how "Atmakhyativada" also is right when it says that the presentation in error is nothing but the self-presentation of the idea we have in our mind. But from this we cannot reduce the world to nonentity or all knowledge to a mere flow of ideas.

But if ontologically speaking the illusory object is not there, how does a mere nothing then come to possess causal efficiency—how i.e. does the silver which is not there attract us or the snake which is not (in the rope), produce fright and perspiration? This peculiarity of the case is emphasized by "Anirvachaniyakhyavada." Mere absence of the thing out there or the presence of it in idea does not appear to be a sufficient explanation of facts. But then it is

(continued from the previous page) the very characteristic of error that we are influenced by what in reality is nothing and see things where they are not. This theory gives us a more or less correct description of the situation but not an explanation of it.

The last theory is anxious to point to certain of its implications which are of great importance for the metaphysics from which it draws its sustenance. It points out that all our knowledge of the world has the same doubtful character and our so-called knowledge is not essentially different from error; there is nothing in the world, as we see it, to distinguish it essentially from an illusory object. We must refrain from postulating existence or non-existence behind the world-appearance but should take it as it is—valid so long as it lasts, so long i.e. as it is not cancelled or contradicted. The ultimate validity belongs to the knowledge of self which is never doubted or contradicted.

I am not sure whether one will be so readily persuaded to turn away from the world in the search of philosophical truth but I think one will be constrained at any rate to admit the hypothetical character of all our intellectual constructions and a critical examination of our experience will reveal to us that much that we suppose to be there—in the world as it is posited by us—is the product of such construction. Unless we have the robust faith of the Naiyayikas—and of Realists generally—that our instruments of knowledge are competent to give us truth and they play us false only when they are vitiated by some defects which with caution and care we can very well remedy we shall always find reasons to suspect uncertainty and deception in every act of knowledge. Theoretical reasons may not be sufficient to save us from the resulting agnosticism and doubt.

9. G.R. MALKANI: "EXISTENCE" It is often-times claimed that what undoubtedly does exist is that which is in time and space. So strong and universal in fact is this belief, that some people have thought that existence belongs only to spatial and temporal reality, and that if there is any reality which is non-spatial and non-temporal it should be called by some other name. To exist is supposed to be a possible perception-datum.

We do not dispute the above claim. We almost feel that it must be beyond the wit of man to show that something which is in time and space does not exist,—that it is nothing at all. But while we accept the common-sense verdict, we also desire to get at deeper meanings of things. This may involve reasoning which is perhaps strange to common-sense. But it will recreate for us the humdrum world of common-sense into something of greater power and inwardness.

That which is in time and space does exist. It exists in that sense of the term which we must accept as self-evident. But evidently it can only exist within the limits set by time and space. It can only exist at a particular time and in a particular place. It cannot exist absolutely, i.e. at all times and in all places.

10. The thesis which we want to suggest is that to be substance is to have no nature at all,—it is simply to exist; and contrariwise to exist simply and merely is to be substance. No doubt it would be argued that to exist is to exist as something; and in this we have a nature attached to existence.

11. Reason has not to be dictated to, and that its satisfaction, which is the only thing ultimate, is not necessarily bound up with the common-sense view of things which seems so plausible and yet on analysis so unintelligible. We have to remember that a rational interpretation of the real is bound to be, in an important sense, pickwickian; and that unless we are prepared to

(continued from the previous page) accept that position, we are likely only to add to the mystery and the unintelligibility of the real by creating unreal problems or pointing to solutions which merely re-state the original problem in another form.

12. True existence does not imply any quality or relation. At the same time, it will only be to us an idea unless we keep in view the essential characteristics of substantiality which we have already enumerated. These might be summarised in the single dictum: Substance is non-natural and its only characteristic is self-conscious of self-attested being.

13. G.R. MALKANI: IS THOUGHT COMPETENT TO JUDGE THE NATURE OF REALITY? It is no doubt true that in sense-experience, we suppose ourselves to be directly acquainted with a world of real objects. But we shall have to recognise that all our knowledge of things is by way of predication. The eye, so to say, never meets its object in a single view. What we actually do is to detach a certain quality, a universal, and predicate it of the object, the supposed object of our perception. This universal is evidently a thought-product. It is distinct from the subject of which it is predicated, by the abstraction which it involves as against the particularity or substantiveness of the subject. The impress of thought then is clearly visible in all our experience.

It will not be seen that it is just because of the above limitation of thought, that the dualism of knowledge and reality is forced upon us. If sense-experience had that directness which is commonly associated with it, we should have no ground for attaching much importance to the above distinction. To see something would be the same thing as to be convinced of its reality. There would be no room for doubt. It is because mere sense-contact is not a complete thing, and because in order

G.R. MALKANI: IS THOUGHT COMPETENT TO JUDGE THE NATURE OF REALITY

(continued from the previous page) to get a percept we have to go about an object rather than to it, that we become aware of the crudities of sense and so of the inevitable doubt as to the exact nature of things. Thought-knowledge then, we may take it, necessarily involves the dualism of thought and reality, and so an agnostic view of things.

It is clear that this view of thought precludes the possibility of our ever being able to know reality. But this is not the whole truth. The very fact that we are able to distinguish the existent from our knowledge of the existent is an indication that we are not locked up in the narrow circle of what we suppose to be our knowledge as opposed to the actual being of things. We do seem to imply by this distinction that the reality is not as we know it.

14. It will now be said that our problem is not whether thought can know reality, but whether it can know Ultimate Reality. And here we come upon a new concept. We may admit that thought can and does know the reality with which we establish contact in sense-experience. But objects of sense do not constitute the whole of reality. We have every reason to suppose that reality extends beyond them; and it is here that thought fails us.

15. It is not by some a priori process that thought arrives at the conclusion that reality must be non-sensuous. It arrives at this conclusion by the analysis of experience. And when misunderstanding has been cleared up, and it has been definitely determined what reality is not like, the experience with which we started must point the way to reality must be conceived to be in order to be real. To suppose therefore that thought is competent to affirm that reality is non-sensuous, but not to answer the question, what it is like,—is completely to misapprehend the problem. There are not two questions here, but only one; and that one question is either answerable

(continued from the previous page) in its entirety or not answerable at all.

Scepticism in the power of thought does not really rest on any analysis of reason leading to a sense of its deficiency. It rests upon a dogmatic assumption that Reality or Ultimate Reality is somehow inscrutable. We do not take the trouble to ask, in what respect is it inscrutable, and how do we say that it is there at all. We must mean something by the inscrutable, and if thought cannot know it, how are we to mean anything by it? Are we to stand at the brink of Reality for ever and wonder without sense?

We have enveloped Reality too much in an atmosphere of mysteriousness. The reason for this attitude is to be found in that indolence which finds it more convenient to relegate truth to some super-sensuous intuition which will automatically, and may we not say magically, solve all problems,—than to pursue what is called the long and weary way of thought. The way of thought may indeed be weary; but it is at least free from those moody fluctuations which beset the path of the mystic. It is the surer way of truth.

16. R. DAS. "THOUGHT & REALITY." I am persuaded that thought can judge of reality because I find that the opposite view—whether it is expressed in frank negation or in qualified affirmation—is untenable. Will thought grant that there is reality of will it say that there is no reality? If it can say that there is no reality, then, of course, it will be saved from saying anything about it. But it cannot possibly deny all reality; at least the denying thought will be there and this will be the reality. So reality cannot be denied without self-contradiction and thought cannot in silence accept self-contradiction.

(continued from the previous page) If we are absolutely ignorant about anything, we cannot even know that it exists. Since thought admits that reality is, it must have sufficient knowledge about reality to give meaning to its admission.

17. Why is thought incompetent to judge of reality? Has reality some inherent defect which makes it incapable of appearing before thought or is thought itself incapacitated to reach reality? We cannot say that reality is incomprehensible because of some defects in it; for the knowledge of defects will necessitate some knowledge of what is defective—i.e, reality. We must then ascribe the incomprehensibility of reality to the incapacity of thought. Now thought is not all incapacity; if it were so, it would not be at all. The fact that thought is there and knows and judges things shows that it has some capacity too. So the incapacity of thought is to be understood only in reference to the knowledge of reality. This can only mean that there is some incompatibility between the character of thought and the constitution of reality and this is evident to the judging thought which pronounces thought to be incapable of knowing reality. Unless thought realises this incompatibility it cannot pronounce reality to be incomprehensible. Now, we can judge two things to be compatible or incompatible only when we have got sufficient knowledge of them both. If we simply know that a thing is and nothing beyond its existence, we cannot say whether or not it is compatible with another. To be able to say that reality is not compatible with thought, more knowledge of it is required than what is given in the idea of its mere being.

How is it that thought confesses to itself its own inability to know reality when the avowed object of all thoughts is to reach reality? Is

(continued from the previous page) thought weary of its prolonged journey towards reality and its confession of failure an expression of fatigue? Or did thought strike itself against reality and find its edge blunted and so unable to make any incision in reality? In the former case, thought as thought cannot be said to be incapable of comprehending reality. In the latter case its impact against reality will, I suppose, give it sufficient knowledge about reality to pronounce judgments upon it.

It may be said, first, that reality is not altogether incomprehensible but it is incomprehensible by thought and secondly that though thought can judge reality, it cannot judge ultimate reality.

18. However let us take for granted that it is possible to have some mystic intuition accompanied by a sense of much spiritual exaltation; but how are we to be assured that we have got reality in such an intuition? We can think of a unique experience but that we have got reality or truth in that experience cannot be testified to by that experience itself. The supposed experience cannot be of the form "This is reality" because it will then lose its uniqueness and be like thought. It is only by some later thought that one can convince oneself of the truth of such an experience. Any knowledge that claims to be a knowledge of reality must receive the impress of thought in order to be able to validate its claim.

Coming to the question of ultimate reality I find that the concept of ultimate reality is a spurious one. It seems to imply that there is some other reality from which it is distinguished as ultimate. Have we got various sorts of reality? Have we i.e. some proximate or penultimate realities to be distinguished from the ultimate one? What we think to be real is either there or not there. If it is there,

(continued from the previous page) it is real; if it is not there, it is then, not real at all; we can not have variety or degrees in the being of things. The question of ultimacy does not at all arise in the case of reality when we are solely interested to know whether it is there in fact or is only a figment of our imagination. Then the ultimate reality either includes or excludes other realities. If they are included in the ultimate reality, then they form part of the ultimate reality and so become themselves ultimate. If they are excluded, then losing all ground of their existence they cease to be real at all. So there seems to be only one reality and if we know it, we know all that there is to be known.

19. R. SANATUM: "THOUGHT AND REALITY". Let us now examine the drift of Mr Das's arguments. He has given many reasons in support of his affirmative position. These reasons have the appearance of being conclusive at first sight but if we examine them closely we shall find they are apt to produce confusion rather than conviction.

Thought is obliged, it is said, to grant that there is reality; and in order to be able to say that reality is, we must know what it is. But is it absolutely necessary? We may know that there is such a science as Integral Calculus studied in colleges but we may not exactly know what Integral Calculus really is. Moreover if the principle enunciated in this argument of Mr Das were a valid one, everyone of us would have become omniscient. We know all things in the world are and according to Mr Das we must therefore know them all. Mr Das overlooks a very patent distinction between our knowledge of the bare existence of things and our knowledge of their nature. If to know that reality is were to know what it is, the knowledge of reality must be supposed to be ever present in thought. In that case metaphysics would be rendered a vain and useless

(continued from the previous page) pursuit. Metaphysics is supposed to embody man's endeavour to arrive at a correct knowledge of reality but nobody runs after a thing of which he is already in possession.

20. The first act of thought does not necessarily give us the knowledge of reality we desire. Even those who believe that thought is competent to know and judge reality, will admit that reality does not reveal itself to weak and indolent thought. Thought is supposed to reach reality only by resolute efforts. Now what is attainable only after efforts of a certain degree of intensity have been made may not as well be attained at all.

Having thus shown that there is no absurdity in the idea that reality may be inaccessible to thought, I shall now try to show how it is actually so. We have seen that reality is not already known to thought. It is also easy to understand that reality is not one with thought so that thought being there, reality would also be there and thought by being conscious of itself would be conscious of reality. If thought were identical with reality there would have been no question of thought judging reality; for what is judged cannot be the same as that by which it is to be judged. So it is clear that for thought reality has got an otherness which we are obliged to recognize.

21. The standard set up by thought is its own standard and there is no knowing that it will be submitted to by reality. The laws of thought may not be the laws of being. The standard conceived by thought may not really be applicable to reality. When thought says that reality must be of a certain character, it does so without previously consulting reality and we should not be surprised if reality does not prove itself conformable to such prescription of thought. What is acceptable to is conceivable

(continued from the previous page) and the opposite of it inconceivable. But reality cannot be supposed to be bound by the limits of conceivability. The capacity or incapacity of thought cannot be a measure of reality. The belief that thought represents reality correctly cannot itself be justified by thought which is yet away from reality.

22. Reality cannot be found out by mere apriori thinking. We have to go to experience in order to know what reality actually is. But experience presents us with all sorts of things and any thing and everything cannot be taken to be real. We have all the familiar experience of error and illusion and we cannot take anything to be real simply because it is presented in experience. There are contradictions and inconsistencies in experience and thought relegates them all to the realm of unreality. Thought determines reality by applying the principle of non-contradiction. It says that reality must not contradict itself. But we shall presently see that this principle gives us but poor information about reality. There may not be a single element of contradiction in a fictitious story but it will not on that ground be asserted to be true. So it appears that a thing has to be more than consistent if it is to be real. But what that "more" is, is not easy to determine.

23. Thought in the form of sense-experience cannot reach reality because the experience of this kind is entirely relative. What is presented to our senses is dependent upon the constitution of our sense organs and as they cannot be known to be free from all defects and there are chances of error and illusion, we cannot be sure that the real state of things is revealed in any of our sense-experience. Moreover in our sense-experience, we shall never come upon anything as reality. Any particular fact of experience cannot be supposed to be the reality we are in

(continued from the previous page) search of; for every other fact has the same status and can put up the same claim. The totality of facts also does not give us reality for we can never get at the beginning or the end of experience and so the facts can never be totalled. Nor can thought in the form of concepts reach reality. Concepts are only fictions of thought.

24. Reality is either given to thought or is constructed by it. What we have already said will have made it clear that reality cannot be given to thought. On the other hand what is constructed is only a creation of thought and cannot be the same as the thought-independent reality. Moreover such construction of thought will always have a hypothetical character.

25. Reality is either the same as what thought has already known or is something new, not known to it before. If it is already known, thought will not seek after it and will not raise any question about it. If it is something novel, thought will not be able to grasp it; for thought understands its objects only by affiliating them to forms previously known to it.

26. Thought will understand reality either as one or as many – either as permanent or as changing. But if it takes unity to be characteristic of reality, its diversity will remain unexplained; with multiplicity as real, unity becomes inexplicable. Similarly in the case of permanence and change. To say that there is in reality unity in multiplicity, permanence in change is to accept a manifest contradiction.

We see therefore that thought, at least with its present faculties, is entirely baffled by reality. When it finds that it cannot satisfy its own ideal it has to confess that it is too ambitious for it to hope ever to reach and judge reality.

27. GEO H. LANGLEY: AN ANALYSIS OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS: (October 1925 Issue). The self or the mind cannot be described, as it has sometimes been described, as consciousness. It includes much that is not within consciousness and part of this may never become conscious. But consciousness is an essential feature of the mind.
28. G.R. MALKANI: INTUITION: The truth of intuition however is absolute. There is no canon which is quite so self-evident as the fact of intuition itself. We have not to go to some other intuition in order to substantiate the truth of the intuition which we have. Intuition cannot be made part of a more comprehensive fact. We grasp its nature unerringly, and without the aid so to say of anything but its own radiance.
29. N.C. SEN. "RUSSELL'S DOCTRINE OF REALITY. "We must make a distinction between sense-data and sensation. The name of sense-data is given to those things that are immediately known – sound, colour etc.; and sensation to the act of sensing, i.e. the awareness itself is called sensation. So what is immediately known is sense-data only. What is the character of sense-data? It is Hume who first maintained that objects were identical with our perceptions.
30. Idealists took the sense-data to be mental, as, according to them, the different appearances in which an object appears to different men, could not co-exist simultaneously in the same place.
31. Our past experience and habit play an important part in the causation of our images. Images differ from sensations in this that they have primarily a mnemonic cause, though they may have a physical cause also, but sensations have physical causes only. The meaning of the image seems more primitive than the meaning of the word.

32. Does the knowledge of externality depend upon the concurrent testimonies of many minds?

33. We instinctively believe that there is an external object which corresponds to our sense-data and exists independently of our own experience; though we find that we are deceived if we believe that the sense-data in dreams have got corresponding external objects.

34. Does the thing live in these appearances? If we answer the question in the affirmative, then we are in a dream world and to Mr Russell "there is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us."

35. S. TATTVABHUSHAN. THE MONISTIC SPELL IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: The apparently transient nature of thought—of relational knowledge, the knowledge which implies a distinction of subject and object, of the knower and the known, seems to indicate that it has no permanent place in ultimate Reality. Even our best thoughts are fugitive. They leave the field of our individual consciousness for great lengths of time. Memory, which vouches for personal identity, is one of the most fleeting things in our experience. In sound sleep there is a total collapse of our individual consciousness. These facts seem to indicate an ultimate reality of which thought and relational knowledge are not essential attributes. That our finite consciousness, with all its contents, persists in the Infinite even in our hours of sleep and oblivion is evident from the fact of its re-appearance in re-awakening and memory.

1. G.R. MALKANI: "THE PROBLEM OF PROOF" (in Vol. 2 No. 1, April 1926 of Philosophical Qly) Would it be right to call those objects independent of the fact of their being sensed?

(continued from the previous page) At least we should require some evidence that these objects exist in that way before we can admit the fact. And is there any such evidence apart from the evidence yielded by the senses? If there is none, which will be admitted by all, will it be right on the present evidence of the senses to believe in the past being of their objects? All that the senses can prove is that the objects sensed by them have a certain being at the time of their being sensed. They can adduce no further evidence.

2. The proof of the table for example is my perception of the table. But what is the proof of my perception? The very question is absurd. My perception would not be the proof of the table if it were not an ultimate intelligent act and required no further proof. The only proof that I perceive is the fact of my perception. Nothing is more fundamental or more self-evident. Neither the evidence of any other sense nor any intuition of reason can prove for example that I see a visual object before me. If that were not so, the evidence were needed or could be produced, my perception would not be an intelligent act and could not be cited as proof of anything. The idea of proof has its limitations only in the self-evident, for the self-evident is its own proof.

3. It may be admitted that the relation between the sensing and the object sensed is very intimate and that the latter cannot be proved to be real apart from the former. But it will be asked does the object come into being in the act of being sensed? If not, as it appears to be quite evident, the dualism of being and knowledge must after all be admitted to be fundamental and irresolvable; and the objects must be supposed to have some sort of being independently of their being sensed.

We may at once admit now that our senses do

(continued from the previous page) not create anything, if by creation is meant bringing something into independent or self-dependent being. But it is the very idea of this being that is questioned by us. It is true that we are accustomed to think of being as that which simply is, and to which the relation of knowledge is accidental. But what ground have we for saying that such being is more than an idea? Unless we know the being which has the character here ascribed to it, we cannot admit such being to be real. The being which we know has nothing but objective characteristics in its composition; and these necessarily involve a percipient mind, and cannot be real a part from it. It is no doubt true that if we knew the "being" of the idea otherwise than as the idea, it would not be the "being" of the idea that we shall know. But that only shows the inherent self-contradiction involved in our seeking to ascribe to this being a reality which it does not and which it cannot possess, namely the reality of the plane of perceptual experience.

But at the same time, the fundamental fact is not that something is there, but that I apprehend something there. To translate my apprehension of something into something simply and merely being there, can only be justified if the latter proposition is understood to signify no more than what is signified by the former. It is not at all to the point that we are not aware of any creative act on our part. We should be aware of such an act if we translated something from one kind of being into another. But the objects perceived have simply no other being. They are just as they are apprehended, and so long as they are apprehended.

4. The question will naturally arise, is there not an ultimate ground of perceptual evidence itself? Evidently there is. While it is true

(continued from the previous page) in a sense that my vision proves objects of vision and my touch proves objects of touch etc., it is not difficult to see that my vision, touch etc. are themselves variations of one intelligent principle, the "I". Let us for a moment suppose that our senses are so many independent entities unrelated to each other, and not capable of being unified. We shall not only in that case have no ground for calling them independent (for this would involve their unification in one principle), but we shall be reduced to the absurd position that vision sees instead of that I see, that touch touches instead of that I touch etc. Vision then will not be a function distinguishable from other functions of myself. It will be a percipient and a self by itself, — a position in direct contradiction to our experience.

The conclusion is forced upon us that the subject, the 'I', is the true and the ultimate ground of all proof. It informs vision, touch, hearing etc. and makes of them the means of proving things. It is truly beyond proof, for it is the basis of all proof. Neither vision, nor any other sense, nor thought can know it. It is what knows in them all. It is that which truly realizes in itself the unity of being and of knowledge, the ideal of Truth.

5. M.N. TOLANI. "CONSCIOUSNESS." Even for popular usage, we find that the words consciousness and "awareness" have somewhat different shades of meaning. Thus "conscious" is used primarily in connection with what is felt within, whereas we use "awareness" in connection with what is perceived without one's self.

6. I shall broadly distinguish four different meanings which are generally attached to consciousness —: viz. that it is an awareness, that it is an awareness of the self (Main-de-Biran), that it is identical with some one of the mental processes (Cousin and James Mill), and that it

(continued from the previous page) is identical with all the mental processes in their totality (Contemporary Psychology).

7. Starting with the most current way in which we speak of "Consciousness," i.e. in the sense of awareness, as when I speak of my awareness of my mental processes, that I am aware of my thoughts, feelings and desires etc., we find that what we really mean is that there is a form of cognition in me, and that I am cognising my own thoughts, feelings and desires. Awareness is essentially an initial stage of cognition; it is a mere apprehension of an object, without active attention to it. As such, there is no reason to speak of consciousness in this sense, when we can better use awareness or cognition for it. Awareness and consciousness cannot therefore be identified, because our emotions and desires are equally conscious processes. Feeling and willing are along with cognition conscious processes, or processes of consciousness. And so this notion of "Consciousness" is untechnical. Secondly, we find some psychologists speaking of "Consciousness" in the sense of awareness of one's self.

8. This like the first narrows the notion of consciousness, and unnecessarily limits it to our feeling of individual existence. Moreover, what do we mean by a feeling of individual existence? Is it a mere conviction, or awareness that I exist as a separate individual, distinct from other individuals? If so, it is based on my knowledge of my own mental states, and the mental states of other, and so conscious comes to have a very derivative and secondary sense. The perceptive content of this feeling of individual existence, again, is very restricted, consisting of organic and muscular sensations, together with a particular feeling of activity, on account of which we feel that we are spontaneous acting personalities.

9. James Mill identifies consciousness with our

(continued from the previous page) experiencing a feeling. The French philosopher Cousin identifies it with intelligence. Taking James Mill first, we see, that when I experience a feeling, say of pleasure, what really happens is that a certain occurrence of which I was or am aware, affected me in a positive way; i.e. it produced in me pleasure, and that I was pleased. It is quite true that while I was so affected I was conscious, or that that state of my experiencing a feeling was a state of consciousness; but my desires and thoughts are equally states of consciousness. Cousin's notion is likewise erroneous. We find that along with intelligence, other aspects of mental life are equally there.

10. The two terms are not synonyms, consciousness is an abstract term, mind a concrete one. We might first of all legitimately ask what we mean by mind? Mind is not any substantial unity behind the different mental processes. At the most we can say, that it is a sort of an organic unity of mental processes in an individual. If this is what we mean by mind, there is no need to postulate a consciousness which must stand for the sum-total of all our individual mental states. The two terms—mind and consciousness—really become identical; and there is no reason why, if "mind" can signify the sum-total of our mental states, should we employ "consciousness" to serve the same purpose.

11. Taking the view of Mr Russell, we find he says, "whatever may be the correct definition of consciousness, consciousness is not of the essence of life or mind."

12. We find thus, that "consciousness" as standing for the sum-total of our mental processes, is apt to produce confusion in psychology. If however consciousness is not another word for 'mind' or the totality of our mental processes, what are we to make of it? If it is neither

(continued from the previous page) awareness of something nor awareness of the self, nor any one nor the sum-total of our mental processes are we to give up using it? This has been the opinion of some of the leading writers on psychology, like Prof. W. James. Prof. James in his above mentioned essay says, "Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking is only a careless name for what when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The "I think" which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the "I breathe" which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracerebral muscular adjustment etc...) and these increase the assets of "consciousness" so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception; but breath which was the original of spirit...is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness.

This passage from Prof. James' Essay bears a close resemblance to David Hume's rejection of personal identity. Hume said speaking about personal identity, "For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." It is quite true, that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness, and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish; it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; yet the other element can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and know that there

(continued from the previous page) is something to look for.

13. The two passages quoted above from Prof. James and David Hume when read together suggest that if consciousness is not any special faculty it is nothing else but the self or the subject itself. And paradoxical though it may appear, yet it looks highly probable that the two—consciousness and self—are identical. Whether it is an entity or not we have no reason to say. All that we have to suggest is that probably the two are identical, and hence the inability of introspection to know Consciousness. It cannot be denied that my thinking, my feelings and my desires are all processes of consciousness. They all have this much in common that they are my processes as a conscious being. If I were not conscious, I can have neither thoughts, nor feelings nor desires. Consciousness is not a faculty in addition to other faculties, but is implied in the functions of my mind—it is an essential property of every process that goes on within my mind. Without consciousness there will be no mental life, and a psychical fact is only a fact in consciousness. And it is the same thing as regards the self or the subject, without which we cannot explain our mental life. An analysis of our experience shows that we cannot deny the existence of the subject. We may not be able to say what it is; but as the history of philosophy shows, to use Prof. Ward's words, "All attempts to extrude it are futile, because the concept of the subject has remained implicitly not more in Berkeley who accepts it in fact, than in Hume who treats it as a fiction." The same must be said about consciousness. What it is, we cannot say, as also in the case of the self. It is undefinable, and like all ultimates we simply accept it as the condition of the explanation of all else.

14. R.DAS. "METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS." By starting

(continued from the previous page) from empirical data, philosophy has the chance of being more generally intelligible than by beginning with some a priori principle. Moreover many things in the world, to a mind philosophically bent, appear uncertain and hypothetical and even illusory. There may be disputes about the nature and status of the data of experience. But experience itself cannot be denied. Should we be so rash, philosophically, as to deny everything, even experience with all that it implies, we shall be then left with a perfect blank where we ourselves shall be lost and annihilated. This is of course psychologically impossible and logically indefensible.

15. There are grades and levels, kinds and varieties in experience. Our ideals and aspirations, though they can be neither heard nor seen, are as unmistakably the constituents of our experiences as the sounds we hear or the colours we see. Philosophy which is frankly empirical cannot afford to ignore the varied richness of our experience and be content with neutral entities only. The onesided view of things is always the false view, and philosophy cannot successfully discharge its function if it confines its attention only to the lowest levels of experience. It must take note of the depth as well as the breadth of experience. It is incumbent on philosophy therefore, that it should take account of these facts and find a satisfactory explanation for them. A philosophy which will satisfy the demands of reason must, besides fulfilling other conditions of sound thinking, find room for the facts of the moral life in its scheme of reality. If it does not take note of them or leaves them unexplained, then it will betray its inadequacy – and will therefore be condemned – at the first call of duty.

16. K.R. SRINIVASIENGAR: "IS LOCKE AN EMPIRICIST?" (Vol.2, Nos.2 & 3, July Oct. 1926 issue of P.Q.) The main argument in proof of the existence of material bodies turns upon the characteristics of sense-perception. The ideas of actual sensation possess a coercive force, and they constrain us to refer it to a reality which is extra-mental. The sensory ideas generated by looking at the sun or by tasting wormwood are of a different character, in his opinion, from those derived from merely thinking of these objects and they carry the weight of reality with them. Besides the assurance from our senses, we are confirmed by other 'concurrent reasons': the sensory ideas differ from memory-images; they are often accompanied by pain; they corroborate each other's testimony.

On these grounds therefore, Locke admits that we have knowledge of external objects, but it is a very hesitating admission for, after all, such knowledge does not fulfil the theoretical requirements of genuine knowledge. For we can perceive no necessary connection between the content of sense-experience and the external thing, nor do we have any intuitive certainty in this case as in the case of our own existence. Hence, although it goes beyond bare probability and puts us past doubting such knowledge is neither intuitively certain, nor demonstrably necessary. And moreover, this sensitive knowledge as Locke calls it, of material bodies is necessarily confined to the existence of particular things while they are actually perceived, and we can make no inference as to their continued existence either in the past or in the future. It is no wonder that Locke declared any Science of nature to be impossible, when, apart from the question of the necessary co-existence of qualities, the existence of the very object itself cannot be assumed independently of actual sense-perception.

17. G.R. MALKANI: CREATION OR ILLUSION: The chief interest of man in reality is naturally his own self. But this self is not given apart a something that may be known in isolation from the rest of the being. The very consciousness of it involves a direct reference to a not-self, contact with which is essential to the possibility of life and experience. A study of ourselves then means also a study of nature and our relation to nature.

18. It will be admitted on all hands that what is most characteristic about nature is its changeableness. Nature never takes rest. It offers in this respect a marked contrast to life. But we have no intuition of change so far as these things are concerned. We have this intuition only in regard to our own conscious processes. It is here alone that we intuit that continuity element of permanence without which change must necessarily be unintelligible. When therefore we say that the natural situation b succeeds the natural situation a, we are forced to translate this in terms of mental life and initiate a mental process of which a and b form two different moments.

19.⁶ The illusory appearance cannot be further explained. Its sufficient explanation lies in the fact that it disappears when reality is known. We cannot indeed prove the world to be an illusory appearance on the same grounds of evidence on which we prove it to be real. It is only by discriminative thought that the common evaluation of the world based on sense evidence is undermined. The disillusionment therefore is rational rather than sensuous. It is not to be thought that when truth is known by discriminative insight, the world will disappear to our sense in the same way that an illusory appearance within the world disappears on closer

⁶ The original editor inserted "19." By hand

(continued from the previous page) examination. The illusion here is rather of the understanding, and it is immaterial whether the world after the dis-illusionment continues to appear to the senses or it does not. The important thing is that reason forces us to discriminate between reality and appearance, and that on the ground of this distinction the world is seen to be no more than an appearance.

The question is often raised, how was the world brought into being? That it was ever brought into being is merely a fortuitous assumption. But if it really was brought into being and has a cause outside it, would not that cause have some other cause and be itself included in the causal series which constitutes the world? How could there be any satisfactory answer to the question here raised? The truth is that once we start on explanations, it would be only arbitrary to stop short of what is self-explained; and there could possibly be nothing that is self-explained in a series of this sort. The world taken as an objective whole can only be self-existent, and eternal; it could have no cause beyond itself. A higher revelation about it only comes to view when we cease to regard it as a real whole and take into account its relation to the subject of experience or a self-conscious spirit. It is in this relation alone that it forces those ultimate questions upon which no philosopher can ignore, and of which the only possible solution in our opinion, is the one indicated in these pages, namely that the world has no self-existence, and that it is a mere appearance that ceases to have the sway of reality the moment it is recognised as appearance. As an objective whole, the world was never brought into being and will never come to an end. From the point of view of self-conscious reality however the world has being only so long as the self has not discriminated itself

(continued from the previous page) from elements of the not-self, and therefore its only contact with reality is through and ordinary instruments of knowledge, the senses. The world has therefore come into being so to say with the lack of discrimination in this respect, and it ceases to be real when this discrimination has set in and the self knows its freedom.

It is important to note here that illusion cannot be in the nature of things. What is in the nature of things must be things themselves and that is what gives truth. A consistent non-dualist thinker will refuse therefore to admit any illusory appearance. For him there is only one reality, the self, and what we call the world simply does not exist in it or outside it. The doctrine of illusory appearance or maya is necessitated by the less consistent thinker pressing for a place in reality of something admitted to be different from it in nature. This doctrine therefore represents a form of thought which does not deny the world absolutely, and you can find no place for it in reality. The world is not real. And yet so far as it appears, its only explanation is that it appears. Philosophically we cannot go further unless we achieve the impossible task of reconciling the intelligent and the unintelligent, the self and the not-self under a single view of reality.

The theory of maya is conceived in the spirit of an ultimate explanation of things. It is not an explanation in the ordinary sense. For it expresses nothing. The why and the wherefore of the world remain as unanswerable as ever. Only we have shown that such questions are meaningless. For they imply a cause of the world which is outside the world. Such a cause even if it existed, would not satisfy us. The old question will have to be repeated, and we shall be led on from cause to cause ad infinitum.

(continued from the previous page) The only proper question to ask is, what is the true nature of the world regarded from the point of view of the experient, or self-conscious spirit. This inquiry reveals that it is a mere appearance to his senses and that it lacks, that self-consciousness which is the only indication of being. This explains the strange position taken up by Advait Vedant that the world is unreal because it constitutes our object. We are accustomed to the thought that the one unmistakable indication of reality is the objectivity of a thing. Here we are told that objectivity just constitutes the unreality of it. How far this is true can only be understood by an analysis of the implications of objectivity, the implications which we have set out in the first part of this paper. The object has no ground of being in itself. It has at best dependent being, which is no being at all. It is simply what it appears, and what appears is nothing in itself. This is the best description, from the philosophical point of view that could be given of the world as such.

It is nevertheless insisted that if the world is an illusory appearance, it must somehow be real. It is asked, can a wholly unreal snake be mistaken for a piece of rope? It is because we have seen a real snake at some time in the past that the illusion becomes possible. It is however forgotten here that in any sense in which the snake is real, its appearance does not constitute illusion. A snake may have been seen before. But it is not a snake previously seen that is seen in the place of the rope. The previously seen snake will be a matter of memory,—it cannot occupy the locality of the rope; and it cannot be an illusion. The snake seen in the place of the rope has absolutely no relation to any real snake. Just so about the world. It has no real relation to that which exists, and cannot be

(continued from the previous page) explained by it. If it had any relation, it would not to that extent be a mere appearance; it would be something real, and quite as real as the supposed underlying reality. An illusory appearance is constituted just in its lack of relation to reality. It is therefore essentially inexplicable. In other words, illusion consists in the creation of something which is not, in the place of something which is. It does not consist in the creation of something which is, in the place of something else which also is,—i.e. of one reality in the place of another. So far as mere realities are concerned there can be no illusion, and no creation either, of things other than those which do actually exist. In a certain sense therefore it is true to say that illusion alone can be created. There can be no creation of a real thing.

Common-sense no doubt wants to retain some reality even for the false appearance as such. And we should agree. Only this would not be self-consistent. If the appearance has some reality, why not absolute reality at that? It is so to say in entire possession of its own being, however unimportant that being might be. To be consistent therefore we must admit the absolute reality of the appearance if the appearance has any reality at all. The Advaitic system of thought we are trying to expound here is not altogether oblivious of such a standpoint. It recognises vyahvaric sata for the world, which is absolute sata or reality at a certain level of thought. When that common-sense level of thought is passed and we come to regard the matter philosophically, there is no halting place till we recognise the absolute unreality of the world. Nay! we are obliged to go further and assert that since the appearance has no reality when the truth is known, it

(continued from the previous page) never was real at any time and that from the very beginning it was a misapprehension of the truth. The common-sense view of retaining some reality for the appearance is wholly illogical.

20. M.N. TOLANI. "THE PROBLEM OF THE INFINITE." We find that of these two concepts, the notion of infinity is subsequent rather than prior to the finite. The savage and the child can have no idea of what the infinite can be. To them even the appreciation of the idea of our limitation would be rather a difficult matter, for limitation is an abstract idea, and the child and the savage can only to some extent understand particular cases of limitation. The concept of the infinite however must have arisen after a full appreciation of our limitation. Everywhere in the world we find limitation. There is the limitation to my power, activity and perfection. From these we form the idea of limitation; and by removing all limitations we form the idea, always imperfect, of the unlimited, of the perfect, and of the infinite. I can do only certain things, the infinite can do all things. My knowledge is imperfect and limited, but the infinite knower reaches perfectly every truth etc. In the same manner, knowing that we are dependent on many other persons and things, both for our very existence and for our activity; knowing that all beings are thus dependent on one another, and that they have manifold relations, we conceive the idea of the perfectly independent infinite. This very clearly shows that the infinite is a mental concept—it is our construction. And because a mental concept and our construction, it must be endowed with some meaning.

21. It is vaguely used in popular language. In this sense, it really means a very large quantity or magnitude, and refers to a point at which we cease to appreciate magnitude.

22. The number of grains of sand on a definite

(continued from the previous page) piece of shore, though it may be very large is not infinite. This meaning of the infinite is purely quantitative, and as such self-contradictory. A quantity means a determinate amount, bulk or size of anything—anything in fact which can be increased or measured. Measurement is an essential property of a quantity, and hence quantity can never by any stretch of imagination be infinite; it implies by its very meaning, a limit and so is a finite category. To speak of an infinite quantity would be as absurd as to speak of a round square. In this sense, therefore, infinity is only a big word which impresses people because they do not understand it.

23. Mathematicians also make use of this concept of the infinite, and from the technical nature of their subject one would expect that this concept must have got some very clear and definite significance. But the actual results in mathematics, and a brief survey of the works of Poincare, G. Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrasse and Keyser suggest strongly a revision of Lord Kelvin's optimistic estimate that "mathematics is the only true metaphysics." The axiom of infinity in mathematics is only a pure assumption, a mere postulate.

24. The quantitative use of the concept of infinite even in mathematics, is as defective as the popular one, and equally self-contradictory, because it neglects the fact that the category of quantity is inapplicable to it. An infinite quantum which the mathematicians would like to postulate, is a contradiction in terms, since the very root meaning of infinite suggests that it cannot be limited to any conception of whatever sort, be it of quantity or of magnitude. For being infinite, no measure can exhaust it, whereas a quantity is that which is composed of units of measurements.

25. The most elementary process of thought involves as we know a distinction within an identity—the A and the not-A within the sphere throughout which these terms are intelligible.

26. We have seen so far, that all quantitative conceptions of the infinite are foredoomed to failure, since they make an attempt to combine two contradictory concepts of quantity and infinity. A non-quantitative view would therefore be on safer grounds, and probably by far the truer of the two. This non-quantitative conception of the infinite is to be found only in the sphere of religion, although even here it is apt to be sometimes confused with the vague quantitative one. The concept of the infinite has its proper sphere in the realm of religion.

27. R.D. RANADE: ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE ELEATICS. Parmenides' identification of Thought and Being: This very thought he reiterates in his poem once more when he asserts "thinking and that by reason of which thought exists are one and the same things." Plato and Aristotle understood these expressions quite correctly as implying an identification of the real and the rational. Some modern critics, however, have despised this interpretation, and have found in Parmenides' philosophy a crass materialism, and Burnet thinks it is a mistake to call Parmenides the father of Idealism. The fundamental mistake of Burnet and Zeller and other similar interpreters of Parmenides consists in their fallacious identification of an analogy with a fact. Shutting their eyes deliberately to the general tenor of Parmenide's poem which is unmistakably ontological, these critics have pinned their hope on a single passage.

Now anybody who will take the trouble of interpreting this Greek passage will see immediately

(continued from the previous page) that Being is here "compared" to a sphere, and not 'identified' with it. It must be remembered that Parmenides here uses the word which implies that he regards being as "resembling" a sphere. The root-source of the fallacious interpretation of Burnet and Zeller lies in the confounding of resemblance with identity. Being is like unto a sphere in point of its perfection all round, and in point of its subsistence in equality. There is neither rhyme nor reason in understanding an analogy to be a fact. When Homer compares Hector to a bold hound, we have not to understand that Hector was actually a hound. When he compares Pericles to a lordly bull, we have not to understand that he was actually a bull. The materialistic interpretation of Parmenides, based upon understanding the expression "like a sphere" to mean "**spherical**" is no less ridiculous. It is gross injustice to the spirit of Parmenides to pin one's interpretation of him on a single passage without looking to the tenor of the whole, and then to distort it in such a way as to make his ridiculous.

28. According to Plato, Parmenides is the father of Ontologism. He tells us in the Sophist that Parmenides regarded Not-Being as unspeakable, inconceivable, irrational, meaning thereby that in order to exist, anything must be thought, conceived, and reasoned about.

29. Aristotle lays down that Parmenides regarded the world as a rational unity, while the plurality that one meets with in the world is to be regarded as merely sensible, and therefore, as only apparent: "of necessity he things that Being is one, and there is nothing else....and being compelled to account for phenomena, he assumes that things are one from the standpoint of reason, and many from the standpoint of sense."

⁷ The original editor inserted "133-A" by hand

25. It is only as a specimen of the Parallelism of Greek and Indian thought that we shall briefly notice in this place how Shankaracharya, who represents an ancient tradition of long duration should have come to the very position of Parmenides. His philosophy of the one Absolute Existence which is Being and Thought, Sat and Chit, at the same time, his recognition of Not-Being, which is even a verbal equivalent of the word Maya, as being conceptually antithetical to the idea of Being, and as essentially non-existent, his explanation of the plurality of the world which is only apparent, his distinction of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the Vyavaharika and the Paramarthika, which recalls to our mind the Parmenidian distinction of opinion and truth, would go a long way in enabling us to call Sankaracharya the Indian Parmenides.

26. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA: EMPIRIC FAITH: Philosophy has often been defined as an interpretation of experience. But philosophers have nevertheless felt some difficulty in giving an exact definition of the experience which philosophy is supposed to interpret. The empiricist takes it to mean the crass experience of our sensuous nature—the information with which the senses store the mind. The rationalist and the intuitionist regard this as an undue limitation of the meaning of the concept and think that man is capable of other types of experience than sensuous and that a philosophy that does not take account of such other experiences is bound to be narrow and one-sided. Moral and spiritual experiences are as much mental phenomena as sensuous experiences are, and a philosophy that ignores the former altogether is false to its creed while a philosophy that reduces them to the latter does injustice to their specific character. The former are value-experiences and reveal to us an aspect of the world which sensuous experience cannot

⁸ The original editor inserted "B" by hand

(continued from the previous page) grasp. Morality and religion may not be sensuous or scientific but they are none the less real.

27. The founders of religion, while not unmindful of some of these aspects, have put their emphasis upon the sensuous aspect of divinity and sought to secure support for faith by appealing to the sensuous faculty of man, which, to all but the professional philosophers, is still the most indubitable aspect of our mental life. The warmth of certainty always clings to our sensations (why else should sensationists and hedonists be so hard to over-throw?), while reasoning and faith have a vagueness and uncertainty about them that fail to attract the unthinking laity (and even the cultured congregation.)

28. Certain things become seasonable by age: religion is one such thing. Its full strength is felt when it has gathered a certain amount of hoary antiquity about its head and accumulated a mass of legends, traditions and dogmas that appeal less to our reason than to our trustfulness in their veracity, begotten of innate credulity or acquired idleness. It is in this way that certain empiric elements persist in all creeds and provide opportunities for criticism, schism and superstition to different temperaments.

29. In Hinduism we have empiric faith of many types. The deities are themselves sometimes sensuously conceived and regarded as possessing qualities (and being decked with clothes and ornaments) that can be sensuously apprehended. They are conceived as peopling another super-mundane realm and engaged in the pastimes and occupations of mortal men (and according to some speculations they are themselves mortal). Or again they may be less personally conceived and yet be identified with certain natural

(continued from the previous page) forces which are sensuously perceived. Once more, they may be regarded as incarnating themselves in earthly forms (and sometimes as descending in their heavenly forms before their worshippers) either to rid the world of a torment or to preach the true faith. They may also be regarded as inspiring an idol when certain conditions of invocation are fulfilled and to take up residence there for a longer or a shorter time. In all these forms the sensuous element is never absent.

30. If further proof be needed to show to what extent sensuous factors enter into popular conception of God, it will be furnished by referring to the ways in which His presence has been sought to be felt. In all religions this distinction has been made and special holiness ascribed to certain places and objects. A visible symbol standing out prominently in the midst of commonplace objects by virtue of some objective peculiarity or of some subjective awe or veneration, serves to concentrate attention more satisfactorily and becomes the locus of divine worship or superstitious veneration. A sensuous god naturally requires a sensuous setting, and consequently the materials of worship are all sensuous. Idolatry may therefore be regarded as a kind of radical empiricism in religion in which all spiritual facts are converted into sensuous symbols. The precincts of the gods acquire an artificial sanctity, and men and things associated with their worship are looked upon with religious or superstitious veneration. The origin of holy places and priestly classes together with pilgrimage to the one and presents to the other is easily explained in connection with idolatry, especially when permanent figures are set up and entail continuous worship.

31. It is what we put into a visible symbol that makes it sacred or profane, and this is why

(continued from the previous page) the most sacred object of one set of people may be the vilest abomination to another set. There is really no sanctity anywhere unless there is a will to believe.

32. Whether miracles are at all possible or not is a philosophical problem that has not yet been satisfactorily solved—that they should abound in ancient accounts and get rarer with the dissipation of ignorance and credulity has been urged as a strong argument against their possibility.

33. M.N. TOLANI. THOUGHT AND ITS LIMITATIONS. It is held by some people that we can know Ultimate Reality by thought or reasoning alone. An analysis of their arguments in favour of this view however shows that they base their judgment solely on negative considerations. It is held by some, for instance, that it is wrong and even irrational to speak about the limitations of thought, for how can thought know its own limitations. Moreover, they argue that to be able to say that thought cannot know Ultimate Reality presupposes a certain amount of knowledge about Ultimate Reality; and so according to them such a view contradicts its thesis in the same breath. This argument may appeal to some; but there is really nothing to commend it, except the paradoxical and catching way in which it is couched. If it were so easy to decide this question we would never have got so much controversial literature for or against the ability of thought to know ultimate Reality.

34. Whatever be the nature of Ultimate Reality, be it physical, mental or spiritual—the only way to know it is to experience it. Thought may amplify this experience, but it can never afford to neglect experience. Even when thought bases itself on experience, its conceptual procedure may have certain social advantages; but can it be of any value to a person who has no experience of that sort? Thought can describe

(continued from the previous page) in its conceptual fashion the detailed nature of reality after I have experienced reality; but such a conceptual description of thought would be as adequate to impart this knowledge to a man who has not experienced reality, as say my descriptions of colour would be to a blind man.

35. One wonders if, it does not occur to them, why even the most consistent rationalists differ in their views of Ultimate Reality. If thought is able to know Ultimate Reality, why should not the most consistent of rationalists agree in their views about Ultimate Reality?

36. A consistent rationalist would be the most irrational of persons, since he cannot avoid the conclusion that nothing could ever be known.

37. Philosophy need not be defined as Mr Malkani does, as the attitude of reason towards reality. It would be more modest to say that, it is an attempt on the part of thought "to conceive the world as a whole." Such a definition does not assume that thought will be able to unravel the mystery of the Real.

38. Though thought is the only accredited instrument for knowing truth in philosophy, it has not yet succeeded in its venture. And every sincere intellectualist must ultimately come to the same condition of mind in which Faust finds himself in his Gothic Chamber, when in a restless state of mind, he says:

And here I stand with all my lore,
Poor fool, no wiser than before.

39. S. RADHAKRISHNAN. THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM: The very endlessness of the process of prakriti marks it off as unreal and relative. The Advaita Vedanta faces this conclusion and regards the world of prakriti as maya.

40. Subject and object are aspects of a higher unity, distinctions within a whole. If we are

(continued from the previous page) at the empirical level, even then we shall have to say that all consciousness is consciousness of an object and all reality is the object of consciousness. It is only in distinguishing ourselves from and relating ourselves to an objective world that we know the self at all. We deepen our consciousness of self in widening our experience of the world. If we assume the essential unrelatedness of subject and object, it would be impossible to pass from the one to the other. The unity of the two terms in the presupposition of their difference. It is simply due to our avidya, our ignorance or want of reflection on the nature and conditions of experience, that we fail to recognise the ultimate oneness of subject and object. It is quite true that the dualistic conception of mind and object is natural to our minds, but a little reflection tells us that if the two are independent we require a tertium quid to connect the two. The moment we realise the utter unsatisfactoriness of this tertium quid hypothesis, we are left with the view that the two are aspects of one ultimate consciousness, which is the basis of all knowledge as well as existence. Failure to recognise this ultimate unity is the fundamental mistake of the Samkhya theory.

41. The Samkhya does not rise to the truth of monistic idealism, but is content to remain at the level of mere understanding, which insists upon the distinction between being and non-being, and regards the opposition between the two as real and their identity as unreal. It was not able to realise all that is involved in the questions it raised – questions the difficulty and importance of which have been brought to light by ages of conflict and controversy – still less to reach a satisfactory solution of them. Yet withal it is a great

(continued from the previous page) effort of the human mind to reach a comprehensive view of the universe in which no element of reality is suppressed or mutilated. The different aspects of things must be clearly defined and distinguished ere their true relations can be seen, and the Samkhya analysis of experience prepared the ground for a more adequate philosophy.

42. A.R. WADIA: POLITICS & SOCIOLOGY: The Freudian discovery of the Unconscious has once for all exposed the root fallacy of all Western Psychology in the past, viz., that human mind means the conscious mind. The Indian seers had built better and probed deeper into the recesses of human mind, but their psychology was so immersed in their general philosophical systems that the value of their psychological ideas failed to receive due attention. Hence to Freud must be attributed the credit of unravelling the secret workings of the unconscious.

B.M. BARUA PROLEGOMENA TO A HISTORY OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY:

1. The systems of philosophy (erroneously counted six) are seldom studied in the spirit and manner of a bold seeker after truth, to see things for himself, to formulate principles from his own experience, to frame definitions from his own concepts, to adduce proofs from his own reason, in short, to go beyond existing systems or to evolve, if possible, a new philosophy. Perhaps the learning by rote which engenders in a great majority of cases false pride without giving understanding, and which is truly the bane of modern Sanskrit Scholarship in India, is largely responsible for it. It is so because, as we perceive, there is at the bottom of Sanskrit learning in general that reliance on authority, that veneration for traditions, which imperceptibly leads men to glorify

(continued from the previous page) the past without a sufficient knowledge of what the past is, or in what relation it stands to the present. This naturally begets a kind of self-satisfaction in mind, acting as a deterrent to all enquiries.

2. "A person," says Kant in illustration of his significant distinction, "who, in the usual sense, has learnt a system of philosophy, e.g. the Wolfian, though he may carry in his head all the principles, definitions and proofs, as well as the division of the whole system, and have it all at his fingers' ends, possesses yet none but a complete historical knowledge of Wolfian philosophy. His knowledge and judgments are no more than what has been given him.....knowledge in his case did not come from reason, and though objectively it is historical only...knowledge which is rational objectively (i.e. which can arise originally from a man's own reason only), can then only be so called subjectively also, when they have been drawn from the general resources of reason, from which criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt, may arise."

What is the logical consequence of such a paucity of *cintamayi panna* or "rational knowledge," and of such a prevalence of *sutamayi panna* or "historical knowledge"? Neither the hair-splitting discussions so powerfully carried on by the Pandits, nor the arduous studies of famished, parrot-like Sanskrit, Pali, and Prakrit scholars can give birth to a new philosophy, worth of the name.

3. Prof. Ranade finds in the great net-work of Avacchedakas woven in the New Logic of India another sad instance of the cobweb of the Logic of the Schoolmen, which in spite of the fineness of its texture, is absolutely of no substance or profit.

4. The theses put forward by the *Madhyamika*

(continued from the previous page) aimed at most at invalidating all dogmatic pretensions. But the Madhyamikas, instead of giving a positive conception of reality, landed philosophy in the realm of universal void (Sunya) or dilemma where nothing remained to fall back upon but empty concepts or ideas dressed with all manner of logical subtleties. It was a most embarrassing situation in which philosophy had ever found itself. Thus we see how necessity arose for supplementing the content of Madhyamika philosophy with some sort of positive conceptions of reality. The task naturally fell upon Sankara, whose was not only a doctrine of Maya, but also that of Brahman. The transition from the doctrine of void (Sunya-vada) to that of Maya-and-Brahman took place in a logical order, the which we might suppose to be paralleled in its fundamental character by the transition of Bradley's thought from his book on "Appearance" to that on "Reality." The two books are really complementary, representing together as they do a single work on "Appearance and Reality." The nature of the transition here contemplated may be brought out by means of Bradley's own words with which his book on Reality begins:—"The result of our first book (i.e. on Appearance) has been mainly negative. We have taken up a number of ways of regarding reality, and we have found that they all are vitiated by self-discrepancy. The reality can accept not one of these predicates at least in the character in which so far they have come. We certainly ended with a reflection which promised something positive. Whatever is rejected as appearance is, for that very reason, no mere non-entity. It cannot bodily be shelved and merely got rid of, and therefore, since it must fall somewhere, it must belong to reality."

5. The categorical imperative of research demands

(continued from the previous page) that before embarking upon the study of "Buddhism", one should unlearn all the misconceptions that this prejudiced age has circulated broadcast.

In the absence of a first-hand knowledge of the Buddhist texts one may profit to some extent by the judgments of those who by their earnestness and prolonged studies have acquired rights to command attention.

6. Impelled by a necessity of more or less subjective character Buddha organised a Brotherhood. In connexion with it his views, at least some of them, underwent a process of modification, nay, contradicted themselves, as would naturally be the case when logical consistency has to conform to the Paradox called life. The Brotherhood brought him into close contact with the busy and blind world of mankind from which he kept himself aloof for a long time. In order to win over the people to your way of thinking, you must partly accede to their wishes and in a country where mentality of the people is so very varied you must narrow the border-line between your deepest convictions and the current beliefs down to its utmost limit. Buddha Gotama, however enlightened he might be, had to pursue this policy. The result was that a new standpoint—Lokiya, sammuti or Practical, supervened, compelling him to throw antithesis between it and the Lokuttara, Paramattha or transcendental standpoint into clear relief.

The history of the Samgha shows that at the start there were no formulated rules or laws of any kind. The first band of his disciples was recruited without any sort of formality. The persuasive call of "ehi" (come ye) was enough for ordaining a disciple. If we look forward, a curious coincidence is presented by the history of Christianity. But as the

(continued from the previous page) Brotherhood grew into a regular society of men, the question of discipline became paramount. The rules, laws, formalities, conventions from which he recoiled in theory, followed one another in uniform succession until a complete code, the Patimokkha, came into existence. The conflicting interests of the Samgha gave rise to so many complications that he had no other alternative than to accord religious sanction to this body of rules, which was primarily intended for the use and guidance of the Bhiksus and Bhiksunis.

In theory he was not prepared to admit seniority by age, and in fact he plainly told the wanderer Sabhiya that seniority went by wisdom only, but in practice he had to introduce seniority by age, however different was the method of calculation.

7. Turning at last to the main question as to the conception of three selves of the ancients Buddha tried to guard against a possible misunderstanding. These selves came to be treated of in some circles as if they were three separate entities or self-subsistent principles. He pointed out clearly and definitely that considered in isolation, the gross, material or animal self, the rational or thinking self, or the noetic or spiritual self was a mere abstraction there being no impassable barrier, in fact, between one self and another. "When any one of the three modes of personality is going on, it is not called by the name of the other. For these, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And of these I, too, make use indeed, but am not led astray by them.

8. It will be a great mistake to deny him the name of a philosopher on the ground that he dismissed a certain number of problems from the domain of speculations. It is not however

(continued from the previous page) wholly true that he discarded or undervalued them altogether. When he said that he suspended his judgments on this or that ontological problem, he really meant us to understand that no one answer (ekamsika) can be judged as adequate for the purpose. As these problems relate to "matters of fact" (lokiyadhamma), the best thing for us would be to approach each of them from more than one point of view, from several (anekamsika).

And judging from different standpoints, the Eternalist and the Annihilationist can both be proved to be right as well as wrong.

So far as he tended to withhold his judgments on this or that problem of Metaphysics, and craved for mental imperturbability by preserving a neutral attitude towards this or that dogmatic view, to that extent he was an Eel-wriggling, prevaricating sceptic or Agnostic. So far as he conceded that something could be said for and against any dogmatic view, to that extent he was a "Paralogist" (Syadvadin). And so far as he clearly and precisely pointed out the standpoints looking from which the dogmatist position could be both defended and overthrown, to that extent he was a Critical philosopher (vibhajjavadin.).

WHERE THEOSOPHY AND SCIENCE MEET. (Part III).

1. B.L. Atreya: Immanuel Kant set before himself the task of critically determining the sources and validity of human knowledge. Before him there had been a prolonged dispute as to whether all human knowledge originates in sensations (Empiricism) or in some inborn (innate) ideas of the intellect, (Rationalism).
2. After prolonged thought Kant came to the conclusion that Rationalism was justified only insofar that some ideas do not come from

(continued from the previous page) the senses, namely, those which make knowledge necessary and universal. The idea that every event must have a cause, for example, cannot originate in sensation. Empiricism, on the other hand, was justified only insofar that sensibility alone gives us reality. For scientific knowledge, therefore, which aims at formulating universal and objectively valid judgments about the real world, both sense and understanding (sensations and ideas) are necessary. Kant has also determined what exactly is the contribution made by the mind to scientific knowledge.

Knowledge consists of (1) sensations and (2) their synthesis brought about by the active mind and completed in three stages, namely, (a) Perception, (b) Understanding and (c) Reason. Let us note the contribution of the mind at each stage of the synthesis:

(1) Perception: Perception has two aspects or factors, (a) content of manifold and variable sense-qualities, and (b) uniform and fixed relations of space and time in which the former are placed. The latter are not received from without as sensations (a posteriori), but are contributed by the perceiving subject as a priori (prior to experience) forms. All sensations have to be cast in the forms of time and space which the mind supplies immediately whenever it receives the sensations. The mind has got these forms readymade for the purpose. They are necessary for all perception, hence universal. It is only on account of all sensory experience being cast in these forms that mathematical judgments are valid for all experience, mathematics being the deductive science of space and time.

(2) Understanding: Perceptions are synthesized by the Understanding. The latter constructs out of the former, objects, relations and laws which form the world of our knowledge. The synthetic forms of the understanding which are the constitutive

(continued from the previous page) principles of the world are called Categories by Kant. By a thorough study of all possible kinds of judgments under which we comprehend the world, he discovered 12 such categories, namely, Unity, Plurality, Totality; Reality, Negation, Limitation; Substance, Cause, Reciprocity; Possibility, Essence and Necessity. Like time and space on the lower stage of synthesis, the categories are a priori principles. They are not derived from sense-experience; they are pure, innate and transcendental. They synthesize all perceptions, and express this synthesis in the form of judgments. So they have objective necessity. They are the fundamental laws of nature, for all determinate knowledge must be cast in them. Our world, therefore, consists of objects, relations and laws formulated by the categories of understanding. Although the categories are a priori, and although no knowledge of the sensible world is possible about them, they have no validity outside our experience. A common world and science are possible because there is a transcendental Unity in the categories. Each man's understanding operates in the same way. This fact presupposes a Consciousness of humanity, a Universal Self, a Super-consciousness, a higher "I" than the individual ego, which acts in each ego as the transcendental unity of apperception. This Self is not found in experience, but is a necessary postulate to account for the unity and universality of knowledge. Just as the Subject of knowledge is beyond the pale of all knowledge, so are the objective sources (stimuli) of sensations. Nevertheless they have to be postulated. Kant calls these ultimate causes of sensations "things-in-themselves," as distinguished from the objects of our knowledge which are "things-for-us." We can never know the former as they

(continued from the previous page) are, for all that we know is constituted by sensations and the a priori forms of our own understanding.

(3) Reason. There is a still higher synthesis of knowledge which the faculty of Reason brings about. In its synthesis Reason does not keep itself confined within the sensible experience, but comprehends even that which is beyond the limits of actual or possible experience, that which is unconditioned and unrelated. The judgments of Mathematics and of Physics (empirical sciences) are valid and universal, for they deal with the a priori forms of all experience (space, time and categories), but the doctrines of Metaphysics, a product of Reason, do not enjoy universal validity and acceptance, because they deal with those things which are beyond our experience (actual or possible). The synthetic forms of Reason, namely, the Ideas of Self, God, and Totality of the Universe, can never be made objects of our knowledge, and so should not be thought of in terms of the categories of understanding, which have no legitimate use outside sensible experience. But when we do so, contradictory judgments are equally upheld with reference to God, Soul and the Universe. The ideas of Reason are, however, not altogether useless. They are Regulative Principles of our knowledge.

3. Although Kant made room for morality and religion, he closed doors to metaphysics (Ontology). His philosophy sets limits to human thinking, and bids it confine itself within the phenomena, and never to talk of the noumena beyond merely postulating their existence as "things-in-themselves." In fact if we are strictly Kantian, we cannot even say that "things-in-themselves" exist. They are unknown and unknowable according to Kant. The Soul and the "things-in-themselves are mere postulates. Discussion about them is bound to lead us into a jungle of

(continued from the previous page) antinomies. His immediate successors in Germany, however, did not pay any heed to his advice. They began their metaphysical thinking where Kant had ended it, and built huge mansions of philosophy by their extraordinary intellect and insight.

Fichte. The Ultimate Reality, according to Fichte, is the Moral Ego which he variously calls the Pure Will, the Active Reason, the Spirit, and God. It expresses within us in the feeling of Ought. There are no "things-in-themselves" behind the objects of our experience. The entire objective world or nature which Fichte calls Non-Ego and all the individual egos originate in the Moral Ego. The Moral Ego ('I') being a free Moral Activity, it creates the Non-Ego ('Not-I') as a field for its activity, and as an obstruction to itself which is necessary to all moral ideals through them. Thus the world is a unique theatre of moral action, where not only the drama, but also the actors and the stage are created by the Creative Director, the Moral Ego.

4. Schelling: The Ego and the Non-Ego being correlatives we cannot rightly regard the former as the Source of the latter. Both must be derived from a higher Principle which may be neither Ego nor Non-Ego. It should be neutral and indifferent in its nature. Thought does not produce reality. The former can only reproduce the latter. So they are correlatives. They too must have a Common Source which is the same Indifferent and Neutral Absolute. The Absolute Reality, therefore, according to Schelling, is the Transcendent Impersonal Reason. It gives rise to both mind and nature. The highest kind of self-realisation occurs when both will and sense (morality and science) are transcended in self-forgetfulness of the

(continued from the previous page) aesthetic experience. Aesthetic feeling is the summum bonum of man, for the Universe is the work of Divine Art. It is in the contemplation of the beautiful, both in Nature and in Art, that the presence of the Deity is realized, and not in mere theoretical knowledge where the presence is merely conceived. Schelling's philosophy is called Aesthetic Idealism.

Hegel: The Ultimate Reality, according to Hegel, cannot be outside the pale of our knowledge. The common Source of the Ego and Nature does not transcend them, but is immanent in both. Nature and mind are the successive modes of the perpetual process which itself is the Absolute Reason. The self-unfolding process of Reason is immanent in the Universe, and is perfectly knowable. The real is rational and the rational is real. Having passed through the successive stages of inorganic and organic evolution, the Absolute Reason becomes personified and self-conscious in man. It is both the subject that knows and the object that is known. The Categories of Reason (discovered by Hegel with great labour) are not mere modes of thought; they are also the modes of being of things. There are no "things-in-themselves" beyond the self-unfolding process of Reason, which not only conceives reality but also produces it or rather expresses itself through it. So logic and ontology are the same for Hegel. Philosophy, in which Reason becomes fully self-conscious, is the highest expression of the Absolute Reason. The Absolute cannot be conceived as one or the other of two opposite notions, as it is an all-comprehensive Idea in which all contradictory notions are synthesized. The Absolute is not a single limited reality, not a composite of particular realities, not a system of related partial realities, not matter not life, not even the totality of all lives. It is the All-comprehending Absolute Spirit which

(continued from the previous page) is manifesting in every partial reality in order to realize itself as the Self-Conscious Idea. Hegel's Idealism is called Logical Idealism.

5. By idealism, which is very closely allied to spiritualism, we mean a world-view which insists that the Reality as a whole is most precisely conceived in terms of ideas or thoughts rather than in terms of matter and motion, that the entities behind the phenomenal world are more of the nature of mind and spirit than of the nature of the unconscious atoms, and that the values—truth, goodness and beauty—are not merely subjective creations of man, but they have a cosmic significance, and are discovered rather than invented by him. The greatest leaders of this movement in contemporary philosophy have been Fechner, Lotze, Eucken and Husserl in Germany; Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward, Sorely and McTaggart in England; Ravaisson, Renouvier and Lachelier in France; Croce and Gentile in Italy; Lossky in Russia; and Royce and Hocking in the United States of America. We summarize below the doctrines of some of these philosophers.

E. Husserl: All beings of things is being in consciousness. Subject and object differ only in degree and not in kind. Over and above the empirical ego there is a transcendental ego which is the source of all objects and their essences. The totality of all the transcendental egos in the Supreme Being or the Spirit.

F.H. Bradley. The Ultimate Reality is the immediate Experience, the undifferentiated whole in which being, knowing and feeling are all one. Distinctionless in itself, it contains the possibility of all distinctions. All the concepts of science are self-contradictory and therefore mere appearances. They are rooted in the Absolute Experience which cannot be

(continued from the previous page) characterised by any one of them. The Absolute is much more than all the appearances taken together. The appearances do not mar the unity of the Absolute. In the Absolute all the appearances get transmuted and fused, and their mutual conflict is overcome. The Absolute is above all changes and evolution, although within It countless waves of evolution may be going on.

J. Lachelier: Thought is the Ultimate Reality. The entire objectivity, regularity and orderliness of the world is a construction of thought. Thought creates objects in time and space by its own free will. The Universal Thought is called God.

B. Croce. There is a unity throughout nature. Thought and objects are not independent except by abstraction. All that we know is conscious experience. Over and above the experience of finite minds there is the Spiritual Reality which is not exhausted by them, and which is the beginningless, endless, ever-active and creative historical process.

N.O. Lossky. The objective world consists of events and processes which are expressions of the activities and processes of purposive spiritual entities, although all of them may not be fully conscious. The world is an organic whole grounded in the Super-Cosmic Absolute which is the source of all free substances.

6. H. Vaihinger: The chief contribution of Vaihinger to philosophy is that thinking cannot unravel the mystery of the world. Most of our ideas about reality are no more than fiction. All the concepts of science, religion, ethics and aesthetics are merely fictitious solutions of our real problems which can never be solved intellectually. It is only when we really live and come in intuitive contact with the Reality that we understand life. Then all speculative problems disappear.

7. S. Radhakrishnan: We shall note here five great contributions of his to the thought of the West from the treasure of Indian philosophy: First, he has pointed out and emphasized that the concept of the Absolute Reality is not to be confused with that of God. "While the Absolute is the total reality, God is the Absolute from the cosmic end, the consciousness that informs and sustains the world." He has attempted a beautiful reconciliation between Reason and Intuition, which is characteristically Indian and quite new to the West. "Intuition is only a higher stage of intelligence, intelligence rid of its separatist and discursive tendencies...carries out intellectual conclusions to a deeper synthesis...It is a deeper experience which by supplementing our narrow intellectual vision, amplifies it." "Any sound rationalism will recognize the need for intuition." "Intuition is beyond reason, though not against reason. As it is the response of the whole man to reality, it involves the activity of reason also." He has pointed out to the West that, to understand and fully know the Reality, a great sadhana or purification of life is the essential requisite. "To know better, we must become different. We can realize the potentialities of Spirit only by a process of moral ascesis which gradually shapes the soul into harmony with the invisible realities." He has given to the West a very clear idea of "mystic experience" in his famous Hibbert Lectures.

8. The Reality of change, plurality and imperfection has to be accepted and explained by all philosophy. The Universe is now conceived more as a process, a movement, a stream of events than as static something. In it there is no rest.

9. In India, philosophy is more than a mere disinterested pursuit of knowledge of the Reality

(continued from the previous page) as a whole. It is a darshana or vision of the Reality. Being a darshana or view of the Reality, every philosopher views it from a certain stage or level which he occupies by virtue of his spiritual evolution. At every higher stage of spiritual evolution there is more extensive and better vision of the Reality than at the lower. One vision (darshana) differs from another, not because the Reality as such is different, but because it is viewed from a different level, height or storey of the tower of spiritual evolution. As the same landscape presents different views from different heights or angles, so does the Reality to different philosophers who differ in their intellectual and intuitive capacities. This idea lies behind the Jaina doctrines of anekanta vada that the reality has infinite aspects, and naya-vada that every system of philosophy looks at the Reality only from a particular point of view and notices only certain aspects, remaining blind to others. A philosopher should always remember that most of the statements about the Reality can only be relatively true (syad-vada) and seldom absolutely so. It is in this manner that the various schools of Indian philosophy are studied in India.

10. The Objectivity and Pseudo-Materiality of Mind is a special feature of Indian philosophy, and is commonly accepted by a number of schools of Indian thought. There is hardly any Indian philosopher who identifies the Self (Atman) with the mind (manas). In Theosophy also the mind is not the Self.

11. Buddhism: According to Buddhism, as according to Bergson, there is nothing static either in the self or the world outside the self. Everything in the Universe is in perpetual flux, is as much a momentary complex as any material object is. Self is only a name given to a series

(continued from the previous page) of changing complexes of mental events. There is nothing in all our experience which may be called a simple, permanent entity or self (atman). The ceaseless stream of personality however, does not come to an end at the time of bodily death. It continues in the form of another personality for which a new physical body has been prepared by the cosmic forces under the control of the law of Karma. It reincarnates in body after body in accordance with its longings and actions. To bring the ever-changing streams of consciousness which continue to flow in the samsara (cycle of births and deaths) to an end is the summum bonum of life. The most effective means to bring about this end (nirvana) is the denial of the will to live and of the desire to enjoy worldly or heavenly pleasures. This is brought about by living a life of renunciation and service.

12. Against the Samkhya view the Vedanta says: The ultimate dualism of Prakriti and Purusha is not a fact of experience, nor does it stand the test of reason. Subject and object are distinguishable but not separable. Their mutual relation of knowledge implies a deeper spiritual reality underlying both of them. They must be regarded as finite expressions of this deeper reality which cannot be characterized as either.

13. The main contentions of the Vedanta against Buddhism are: i. change alone is not what experience reveals. Without an unchanging element in consciousness there cannot be an apprehension of change. The witness of change must be outside change, for the elements involved in change cannot be aware of each other as their being is confined to the moment in which they endure. ii. We cannot say that A has changed into B unless there be some underlying Substance

(continued from the previous page) continuing unchanged in both of them. So, mere non-being cannot be the stuff of the world. Underlying the perpetual change of names and forms there must be a Reality, inexpressible, of course, in terms of them. iii. Grouping of elements, whether material or mental, however momentary they may be, also cannot be intelligible without presupposing a uniting principle bringing about the momentary union of discrete elements. iv. The Nirvana for which a Buddhist aspires cannot be mere cessation of individuality, for nobody can aspire to cease to exist. All of us long to be free from suffering, limitation and imperfection. In Nirvana there can be no cessation of our being, but only of our individuality and imperfection.

14. The four-fold being of Man: Man exists in four states, namely, Waking, Dream, Dreamless Sleep and Turiya (the fourth). Only a careful and systematic study of our experience in these four states can give us a correct notion of ourselves. A view of life based on the study of man in the waking state alone is bound to be fragmentary and therefore unsatisfactory. Western thinkers have yet to learn this elementary truth.

15. God as a Limited Form of the Absolute: The Power that creates, guides, controls and dissolves the Cosmos is called God. According to Indian philosophy (especially the Vedanta School), this Power is not the Highest and the Ultimate Reality. It is only a limited Form of the Absolute Reality, meant for the purpose of creating, preserving and breaking a Cosmos. In the Absolute Being, which is in and above all its limited manifestations, countless such Gods rise and fall every moment. They have their birth, life and death. Every Cosmos is a limited and temporary product of the eternal playful activity going on within the Absolute,

(continued from the previous page) but in no way affecting the Absolute, which as such is above all disturbance, change or decay. We cannot describe the Absolute Reality, for all our terms are relative. Very few western thinkers (F.H. Bradley is one of them) have risen to this idea of the Absolute.

16. L.J. Bendit. "We Europeans are not the only people on the earth. We are just a peninsula of Asia, and on that continent there are old civilizations where people have trained their minds in introspective psychology for thousands of years, whereas we began with our psychology not even yesterday, but only this morning. These people have insight that is simply fabulous, and I have to study eastern things to understand certain facts of the unconscious. "...CARL JUNG.

17. This acceptance of introspective psychology where the person is, at the same time, both the observer and the object of his observations, must clearly take one away from the two-dimensional view of science as measurement. Moreover, it introduces a new aspect to the question, as relating to time-consciousness.

For western science observes longitudinally in time: it considers the sequence of events, looking for the causes leading to certain effects. In studying consciousness, however, the attempt to do this must result in a lack of solidity and true perspective. It is Jung who argues that the science of causality is not the only science; but that there is another science for which he has coined the word "synchronicity," attempting thereby to translate the elusive principle of Tao, on which, he claims, Chinese science is based. Tao, in this sense, represents a cross-section of time—the present. And it takes into consideration, not as to why a certain effect comes chronologically after a certain cause, but rather the coincidence and relationship of a number of phenomena, no matter of what nature, at a particular moment of time.

18. Every intelligent child sooner or later experiences the feeling, "I am I," and thereby, as a corollary, he realizes himself as different from other objects with which he comes into contact. This occurs often at the age of four or five, sometimes much later, as an explicit and clear conscious experience; but in whatever form it manifests itself, the behaviour of the child changes at about the age of four or five; this is the age at which he begins to realize the need to adapt himself to his environment, and no longer lives in a purely ego-centric universe. It may be taken to correspond to the time when, according to Theosophy, the Ego of the child takes possession and control of his body, the culminating point being at about seven years of age. Consequent upon this dawn of self-consciousness which is perhaps, the best word to apply to the awareness of a relationship between the subjective and objective worlds (as distinct from awareness of oneself, though closely linked to it). comes the first action.

19. There is one good reason to believe that most people only remember a fragment of their dreams, occurring just before waking, and that these are in reality dramatic representations of an endo-psychic situation, rather than an objective experience.

The Freudian school would have it that the whole meaning of a dream is to express an unfulfilled sexual wish, more or less veiled. But, apart from the failure of this as a practical proposition, the view is too narrow, and does not cover facts, so that the psycho-analytical school has had to devise theories which are often illogical and contrary to bring their explanation within the scope of their sexual corpus dogmaticum.

More tenable is the view that dream have a teleological meaning, stating a situation, and

(continued from the previous page) offering the solution, in much the same allegoric and cryptic way as did the oracles of old. The nightmare is a statement of a dilemma in which the key is not to be found; but the dream thus becomes a factor of evolutionary value, a means of vicarious experience and solution of problems.

J.C.P. D'ANDRADE: "THE PRINCIPLE OF IDEALISM." (in *Philosophic Quarterly*: Vol. III No.3 Oct. '27)

Much misunderstanding about the true nature of idealism would have been avoided if almost all idealists had not attempted to base it on the "esse is percipi" principle as their starting point. This makes the realist think that all idealism is epistemological first and last, and that the so-called objective idealism of the Absolutists is either thinly disguised subjective idealism or else realism ashamed to call itself by its real name. Now there is no doubt that objective idealism is realism from the point of view of the finite individual, and that if we start with epistemological idealism from the standpoint of the individual percipient, we cannot get out of the circle of subjective ideas. But it does not follow that true idealism is not different from realism without being identical with subjective idealism. Let us first examine the "esse is percipi" principle and see how it either leads to subjective idealism or plays into the hands of realism.

What does "esse is percipi" exactly mean? Does an object exist only so far as it is perceived, or in other words, is the reality of an object the mere fact of its being perceived? If so, no mistakes, no illusions would be possible, and there would be no difference between truth and error. The principle, therefore, must mean that whatever else a real object may be, it must necessarily also have

(continued from the previous page) the characteristic of being perceived. This constitutes the difference between subjective idealism and objective idealism. The former identifies the object with the fact of perception and so leaves no room for the distinction between truth and error: the latter distinguishes between the object and the fact of perception, holding that the former goes beyond the latter, that the latter refers beyond itself to the former, and so makes the distinction between truth and error possible. Objective idealism is distinguished from realism in that while the latter makes the object independent of, existentially separate from, perception, the former makes object and perception two sides of one concrete whole. Object is perception, says subjective idealism. Object is not perception nor is it dependent on perception, says realism. There can be no object without perception though object is not perception, says objective idealism. Objective idealism is thus seen to be a synthesis of realism and subjective idealism. The analogy of a word and its meaning may be useful in understanding the distinguishing characteristics of the three theories. The word is not its meaning, and yet the meaning depends upon the word. Every word refers beyond itself to something which is not itself and which yet does not exist independently of itself. Similarly an object is content of consciousness, and nothing exists which is not content of consciousness, the apparent independence being due to an illegitimate abstraction.

But is objective idealism a legitimate synthesis of realism and subjective idealism? Is it quite self-consistent? The objective idealist escapes the solipsism into which subjective idealism inevitably falls by making consciousness refer outside itself, so that what the

(continued from the previous page) individual percipient knows by his perception is independent of the individual percipient though not independent of all percipients. Is this consistent? If an object can exist independently of the individual percipient, why not independently of all percipients? When I perceive a chair, for example, it is admitted that a chair exists in rerum natura whether I perceive it or not, that the existence of the chair is not dependent upon my perception at least and that my perception makes no difference to the chair. This subject and object at any rate are not indissolubly bound up. Why not then go further and admit that an object is not dependent on any percipient? There seems to be no reason why it should be assumed that an object, though independent of the individual percipient must depend upon some percipient. There might be some reason for this (though it would not be strictly logical) if it were impossible for an individual to find any object independent of his perception. But not only is this not impossible, but on the contrary in order that an object may be real for an individual it must be independent of his perception.

Perhaps it may be said: we cannot understand existence except as relation to consciousness; if so, how can we transcend the point of view of experience? But is it true that we cannot understand existence except as relation to consciousness? What then, we may ask, has one to prove in order to show predicament has been sufficiently exposed by the new realists, and it is not difficult to see that it must ultimately lead to solipsism; for it becomes impossible in consequence of it to admit the existence of other centres of consciousness. How, it may be asked, are two centres of consciousness related to each other? Is one centre object to another and, if so, is it also dependent for its existence on that other, and

(continued from the previous page) is this latter also dependent for its existence on the first? It may be answered that this is the case, that the several centres of consciousness are mutually dependent, and that only the Whole is independently real. But the line of reasoning by which this result is achieved is, it must be confessed, not quite conclusive. If the starting point is strictly adhered to, the only result can be the dependence of everything upon the individual centre, and this would not be objective idealism at any rate. It is apparent, then, that one centre of consciousness, even though it may be indissolubly linked with another, has not an existence only in the consciousness of that other and therefore cannot be merely its content or that of any other. And if this is so, if one centre of consciousness may be an object to another and yet have an independent existence, why may not the same be the case with any other real object?

Again, let us consider another point. How can an object be in two minds at the same time unless one of the two minds be in the other, so that the container may contain the contained? But what is meant by being in a mind? If by being in a mind is meant being known to a mind, does being known to a mind exhaust the essence of a thing or is being known to a mind essential to a thing? The language of idealists seems to imply that mind is a particular kind of thing as opposed to matter, that there is a kind of mind-stuff and that matter is the content of this mind-stuff. And this amounts to making the knowledge-relation essentially different from any other relation. No doubt the knowledge-relation is more pervasive than any other relation and in this sense it is different from the other relations, but this is only a difference of extent and degree and not of kind, so that what is not true of any other relation should be

(continued from the previous page) true of it. Because, for instance, A loves B, we do not say that B is in A's love or that love is a kind of stuff of which B is the content. Similarly also there is no reason why we should say because A is conscious of B, that therefore B is in A's consciousness. Consciousness is a relation and not an entity, though we have a tendency to reify it. Even supposing that we admit the doctrine of internal relations, we are not necessarily driven to epistemological idealism. To say that the relation between A and B is internal is not to say that A absorbs B or that B absorbs A; Similarly "A is conscious of B" need not mean, as the idealists make it mean, that A absorbs B so that the latter becomes ideal or mental. At most we can say that there is an underlying unity in which A and B are related, which does not mean that this underlying unity is of the nature of A rather than of B.

We must be careful to distinguish between an object, and the experiencing of an object. When we say that an object exists we do not mean that the experiencing of an object exists. Now if for an object *esse* is *percipi*, for perception also *esse* must be *percipi* and therefore there must be another act of perception to perceive the existence of perception. And this will give us an infinite regress. To put the same thing in another way: When we say that an object exists, say a chair because there is a perception of a chair, do we mean that in a perception of a chair there are two existences? Or is it that the perception as perception does not exist? If the former, either there will be something whose *esse* is not *percipi* or there will be an infinity of existences. If the latter, an existent object will be the content of something non-existent. The truth is that for the idealist *esse* is not

(continued from the previous page) only *percipi*, but also *percipere*; and this gives away the principle of idealism (epistemological) though not of spiritualism. So far we have seen no reason to think that consciousness is anything more than a relation between entities, which are not therefore both necessarily mental. But what about such things as Hamlet and universal truths? Are these entities of which we are conscious but which exist independently or is their existence mental? Here it must be admitted there is a difficulty, but the difficulty is not all on the side of the realist. For even admitting that Hamlet and universal truths are mental, they must be recognised to be objective and then what becomes of their mental nature? The difficulty is perhaps due to the fact that they are not spatial and that we cannot conceive a thing which is not spatial to be independent of mind. But may it not be that though not physical, they are also not mental, but as Russell might say, neutral? It must be observed that there is a difference between these two kinds of non-physical realities. Universal truths are not individual and perhaps not entities and they are constituted by relations between characteristics of individual entities. Their truth therefore depends upon the individual entities between whose characteristics they are relations, and they are just as independent of mind as those individual entities. Into the difficult question of the nature of universals we need not enter here. Suffice it to observe that their *esse* cannot be exhausted by their *percipi* any more than the *esse* of physical things can be exhausted by their *percipi*. The other kind of non-physical realities is constituted by such things as Hamlet, which is not a universal truth but a concrete individual entity. What is its nature? Not physical, and therefore it is held to be mental. But it exists in the spatiotemporal

(continued from the previous page) system and does not merely subsist in the world of universals.

One last point remains to be considered before we dismiss the "esse is percipi" principle. If, it may be asked, the objects we know are independent of the act of knowing, how can we get out of the circle of our own ideas and know that the objects are as we know them to be? But this difficulty seems to be of the idealist's own making. One may as well ask when one object touches another how that object can get out of the circle of its own contact. But this, it is clear, makes no sense. There is no such thing as a circle of contact; for contact is by its very nature contact with something else. Similarly there is no such thing as a circle of ideas; for if ideas mean anything at all, they mean that by which we get out of ourselves to other things.

It is clear now that if we base our idealism on the "esse is percipi" principle as our starting point, we are necessarily driven to subjective idealism and solipsism. But it is also clear that there is no reason why we should make that principle our starting point. Is idealism then demolished and are we left with realism as our only theory? It will be seen in the sequel that what is demolished is that spurious idealism, which the realist thinks can be the only consistent idealism, but that the true idealism still remains standing and even absorbs realism into itself.

What the idealist seems to have really in mind when he says that reality is dependent on consciousness is that anything that is real must be linked with consciousness through it may transcend it. What the realist seems to have really in mind when he says that reality is independent of consciousness is that a thing to be real need not be given in consciousness as merely its content. That reality

(continued from the previous page) transcends the individual consciousness and that in the case of consciousness at least, in the last analysis, its reality is not dependent on consciousness, are facts that add force to the contention of the realist. But then the realist is confronted with the following difficulty: How is to be explained consistently with realism that the criterion of reality is found in consciousness? And this enables us to return to the real position of the idealist. Reality is continuous with the finite thinker and is in a sense given in him, not given as his content but as implicitly bound up with his content so that he can anticipate reality in its general character. This anticipation takes the form of an ideal. Ideals are nothing but transcending reals immanent implicitly in the finite thinker. And these transcending reals are not so many independent reals but elements in one system in which the finite thinker also is an element. Thus the finite thinker, and the objects he perceives, and everything else constitute one continuous whole, an inter-related system, such that if we know a part we are necessarily driven from that part to other parts, the nisus to other parts being somehow in each part. This then is the real principle of idealism, that reality is a whole and teleologically continuous with the finite thinker. And this principle is not a gratuitous assumption, but a necessary postulate which we discover by the method of implication. The contention of the realist that whether reality is one or many must be left an open question is based on an ignorance of the true nature of scientific enquiry. All scientific inquiry has for its fundamental postulate the principle that everything has an explanation, that everything necessarily connects itself with everything else or with something else at least, so that we cannot rest until we have

(continued from the previous page) completely unified experience. To allow at the start that reality may be many, is almost to kill enquiry at its birth, for it is to admit the possibility of gaps, to introduce an irrational element and thus to put man to intellectual confusion. And it must be observed that the gaps admitted to be possible are gaps that split reality, gaps that cannot be bridged, that cannot even be perceived as existing between what they separate, and therefore gaps that are essentially unknowable and for all purposes non-existent. The Law of Sufficient Reason is the great principle of monism and also of teleology, and the principle of idealism. To admit teleology is to be monist in the end, and to be a monist is to admit teleology and whoever admits or is a monist cannot be an idealist.

True idealism is in the first instance ontological and not epistemological, though in the end it turns out to be epistemological also. Reality is mind. Mind is animated or rather thinking body; and a thinking body is distinguished from a non-thinking body by the fact that its processes are teleological and have a unity that explains itself. Wherever there is a complete teleological unity there is a mind. But are there bodies which are not minds? The answer to this question will depend upon the answer to another question. Are there bodies whose states or processes are purely mechanical and cannot be made to enter into a teleological system? If we remember that no explanation is complete until the mind is satisfied, it will be admitted that no mechanical explanation is ever completely satisfactory, for it is ever taking us beyond itself, and that therefore bodies whose processes cannot be referred to a teleological system are so many surds, irrational

(continued from the previous page) parts of a rational system, which is self-contradictory. Matter is a negative conception. Whenever we speak of matter we mean that its teleology is not self-explaining. But it is always capable of entering into a wider whole which is self-explaining. We speak of a man as a mind. But every party of man is not a mind though it is mental. To a tiny animal with a very limited perception finding itself on a part of a man's body, that part will not be different from any other portion of matter that we call dead matter. Nevertheless it is a portion of living flesh, a part of man and therefore not mere matter. Similarly what we think to be mere matter appears to be so because our perception is limited and we do not see it in its proper relations to the system into which it enters as a living part.

We have seen that teleological monism is a postulate without which scientific inquiry is impossible. Every bit of existence is thus an element in a teleological whole and therefore every bit of existence is mental. What degree of unity is necessary to constitute a mind may not be an easy question to decide. If reality is one whole it is obvious that the whole alone possesses a complete self-explaining unity and that all other subordinate unities possess different degrees of completeness.

It is now not difficult to see how in the whole esse is percipi; for outside the experience of the whole there is nothing. But with regard to the finite thinker we cannot say that what is real must be content of his perception or rather part of his mind. The whole being mind, every part of it is mental and so self-conscious in various degrees. Just as in the case of the human body every part is sentient, so every part is sentient, so every part of the whole of reality is sentient. In fact, mind is not a psychic entity distinct from matter. To think so would be

(continued from the previous page) to taken an abstract view of mind. Mins is a particular organisation of what is called matter. Thus the dualism of subject and object disappears as well as the dualism of percipi and percipere. Reality is not the content of an entity called subject, nor is it a synthesis of two distinct entities called subject and object, but it is a subjective object or a self-conscious object, its self-consciousness being the expression of its teleological nature.

To sum up. The true principle of idealism is not that esse is percipi, but that everything that exists is an element in a teleological system, and that to be teleological is to be mental, mind being a complete teleological unity. The finite thinker cannot start with epistemological idealism, for that would make havoc of objectivity and lead to solipsism. But ultimately idealism is epistemological. To be a pluralist is to be a realist and a realist must necessarily be a pluralist, but pluralism is impossible consistently with the postulate of scientific inquiry, and to be a monist is to be a teleologist and therefore an idealist.

1. G.R. MALKANI "NEGATION." (In Philosophical Quarterly Vol.3 No.4, Jan. 1928). Thought is by its very nature unstable. It involves restlessness and effort. Negation is of its very essence. A reality therefore which derives its sustenance from thought and thereby participates in the negative and antithetic character of thought must be as unstable as thought. It cannot be reality, if by reality we mean something that is self-accomplished, something that is entirely itself, something that is and does not merely form a moment in a process that by its very nature can never come to an end. In any case thought demands a situation in which the goal of its effort may be reached, namely something

(continued from the previous page) that does not necessitate any movement of thought for self-completion, and does not therefore derive its sustenance from thought. The situation may be that of pure non-being if that is possible, or being that transcends thought.

2. A certain school of western thinkers has tried to solve this problem. Thought, according to them, is the most fundamental activity of intelligence. To say therefore that anything has an intelligent character is to say that it has its reality in thought or that it is the expression of thought. Thought is in fact the true essence of all things. But since all finite thought contradicts itself, and thereby tends to transcend itself, there must be, as the end of all this movement of thought, thought that is absolute, conciliatory of every contradiction, and therefore fully comprehensive and stable. This absolute thought is the true and ultimate nature of reality. It is free from restlessness, and has all the fullness and perfection of eternal being.

This mode of thinking, it appears to us, makes philosophy not a matter of strict reasoning but of imagination. There is no doubt that thought employs categories of different applicability and value in its effort to grasp reality. But no category of thought is of universal application, or can be. The category of self-consciousness may be said to be the highest category of thought. And yet this highest category is significant to thought only as it involves the distinction between what is self-conscious and what is not. The restlessness of thought is never superseded; and if this negative force of thought were gone, there would be no significant use of the category in question. What is truly wanted is that which may be said to be significant without thought, and false in it. It is a paradoxical demand, but it is the only rational one

(continued from the previous page) for the ultimate satisfaction of thought itself. Thought must be brought to recognize by an act of self-transcendence that something is more true to itself when it is not thought than when it is; for when it is thought, it partakes of the instability of thought and cannot be of the nature of the ultimate. No category of thought can satisfy this demand, and there is no category of thought which may be said to lead up, by an inner reason, to this final result.

We cannot break with thought. But instead of deducing from its formal and abstract nature, an imaginary absolute category, we must look for an indication of the nature of the real in experience as a whole. For this purpose, it is essential to recognize the limitedness of thought. Thought is never self-intuitive; it is not intuitive at all. It is relevant only to that which is supplied to it from outside so to say on a more or less independent ground of intuition. It has a necessary reference to an "other." We may try to break down the barrier between thought and sense; but still the fact will remain that what is the object here is not made and manufactured by thought. It is something that is simply received,—which is certainly a limiting idea to the idea of thought-activity. There is no doubt that certain objects are merely conceived, and are real only as they are conceived. But they have no existence, and they do not prove that thought is intuitive of reality. Thought cannot intuit itself and it cannot intuit anything that is regarded by it as real; and it is relevant to reality only so far as this reality has a distinct intuitive ground.

Reality is not and can never be simply as it is thought; it is not thought. Whatever it is, its realism is only recognisable in some sort

(continued from the previous page) of immediate perception. And thought is not immediate; it is not perception. If it were, it would commit suicide; it would not be thought. There is no sense then in saying that thought is the very essence of reality. It is only the essence of error, doubt and uncertainty, and if the effort to be free from these which is philosophy.

It might here be argued that thought is self-intuitive. How otherwise could we know that there is thought? Now there is no doubt that we do know that there is such a thing as thought. But it is not the thought that is known that knows itself. It is always another thought by which we know the thought that is gone. And this another thought itself is not truly intuitive; for how can intuition operate when the thing intuited is not present and can never be present. The fact is that what intuits thought is not itself thought. It can never be thought. It is reality which thought, in order to be thought, must presuppose. It is in the beginning of thought and at the end of it; for otherwise the intuition in question would never be possible. And yet if by reality we mean what thought can directly make its own object and know as such, it has no being. It is not sustained by thought. It is the non-being in which thought would supremely desire to find its rest. It is what we may call the intuitive ground of every intelligent being, or more simply "the self."

2. The feeling of the 'I' is as evanescent as any other psychical element. We are conscious of what we call our self just for a moment and no more. We may suppose that this consciousness is present in all our conscious activities. But evidently it is not present in the same sense as it is present when I make my self my own object.

(continued from the previous page) Shall we call that self-consciousness in which there is no consciousness of the self as self and as something distinct from the not-self? But let us suppose that it makes no difference, and that when we have distinct self-consciousness we only make explicit what was implicit in all conscious activity. We may admit all this. There is however still a difficulty. There might be an implicit ego-sense in all conscious activity. But it does not indicate any reality. It is at best a psychological feeling which endures a little longer than any single element or group of elements of the mental stream. It vanishes when sleep and other states of unconsciousness supervene. It does not seem to endure through these states, and there is no reality corresponding to it. Shall we say that it is the intelligent ground of the individual, – that it is essentially distinct from things? Clearly not. As the things are to us a "that," so this ego-sense is a "that"; and we also know that it ceases to exist just as we know that things cease to exist.

3. It must be admitted that there is something intelligent that is deeper than the ego. This something must also bear a very interesting relation to the ego; for it must be even more subjective, if anything, than the ego itself. It must first of all be in its essential nature indistinguishable from what we call "I"; the only name appropriate to it would be "self" – something that is subjective in its most ultimate and through-going sense. Secondly, it must not be capable of being brought within the scope of an objective concept as is the case with the ego. Of the latter we may be said to have a certain sense or feeling which is quite definite and essentially objective in character. This something however must be

(continued from the previous page) incapable of being thought, conceived or presented. Thirdly, it must be intelligent, and essentially so. We distinguish a subject from and object because of its intelligent character. Here we have something that is the very last word in subjectivity, – the very 'I' in its essential nature. Fourthly, all the being that we can think of is already negated in it. We cannot negate it or hope to know its negation. We can negate that which can be thought, and which being negated is still our object. But this something which we are considering is not itself our object, nor can its negation be our object, nor can we even initiate an intellectual process regarding it. It is a reality which we might well say has already negated in it all that could possibly be negated. There can be no room for any further negation.

Here we strike the very ultimate ground we were seeking to know. We wanted to know something, whether being or non-being, which could be intelligently posited, which could be prior to thought, and which therefore would not partake of the instability of thought. We wanted to know something that would be in the very nature of things, that would be in the very nature of things, that would be always itself, even if it were in the form of a state of complete annihilation or non-being. We have here, in the principle of the self, something that satisfies all these requirements; for the negation of the self can never be significantly conceived. It is itself the ground of all negation, all instability, all non being; there can never be any negation of it. It is the only natural thing, – the only thing that is in the beginning as well as in the end of all existence that can be thought; for it is in the beginning and in the end of thought itself.

4. U.N. GUPTA. "AMERICAN REALISM." All philosophy, even the extreme ones, contains in a sense, some element of truth. Ordinarily a philosophy,

(continued from the previous page) especially in its extreme form, emphasises some aspect or aspects of truth. Its fault often lies in not seeing the whole truth and regarding a part for the whole. I do not know whether to see the whole truth is at all possible for man, finite as he is. But it will certainly be a truer philosophic outlook to give each system, however partial and incomplete it might be, its due and to harmonise and co-ordinate, if possible, all such partial and incomplete systems into the synthetic unity of a whole. Such reconstruction is possible only at occasional periods of history. What is true of philosophy in general will be true also with regard to particular problems.

G.R. MALKANI: "REASON AND DOGMA." (in The PHILOSOPHIC QUARTERLY Vol. IV. No.1. April 1928).

1. Unfortunately, modern philosophy has no orientation. The sense of the average student is that philosophy can prove nothing definitely and finally. One writer starts with one set of postulates and arrives at a certain conclusion. Another writer starts with exactly the opposite set of postulates and arrives at the very opposite conclusion. There are thus all sorts of cross currents in modern philosophy, and the honest seeker after truth is confounded. He does not know where truth lies, or even whether truth is attainable in this sphere of thought.

2. Another result of this over-rationalisation is that no one is ever convinced. Even the honest protagonists of certain views cannot make up their mind to be positive. They realise that reason favours no sort of absolutism. Opposite positions with regard to the nature of reality can in fact be advanced with equal plausibility, if only a person is endowed with sufficiently developed powers of reason, powers to make nicer distinctions, and in general to multiply issues where there was supposed to be only one real

(continued from the previous page) issue. For the one real issue is always capable of being analysed into many issues (equally real), according as one wants to have it answered in one way or in another. This is so, because in philosophy, we do not solve a problem by pointing to evidence which everyone so to say can see. That may be so in science. In philosophy, it is all a matter of how you take the evidence placed before you. Every philosophical problem is in the end an interrogation of experience.

We raise a certain question. We then proceed analysing it. Is the question to be interpreted in this way or in that way? What was meant to be asked? When that was asked, what was admitted? Was the admission justified? If it was justified, what were its implications? This analysis may be carried on till the original issue is lost sight of; or we may come to dogmatic assertions as to the nature of actual experience, and here reason has no place; it becomes all a matter of the one asserting and the other denying a certain proposition, of the one regarding it as self-evident and the other as questionable. What then can we say is the rational or the philosophical way? Those who seek guidance from reason alone do not know. They are left without guidance and in doubt.

3. One consequence of this attitude is that the present-day philosophy has only a very slight contact with life. Philosophy has become an intellectual effort for the mere sake of that effort. It does not arise from any deep-seated need of life, and does not in the end administer to any such need.

4. We are accustomed to minimise the philosophical effort of the ancients who always reasoned from a dogma, and who, it appeared, simply reasoned towards it. The method had its faults.

5. Another thing about dogma is that its appeal is to the whole man, and colours all his reasoning.

(continued from the previous page) He may try to give justification for the belief he holds, and his justification on the whole may be quite good in its way. But the real truth is that the justification is an after-thought, an improvisation. Logic will be manipulated to give the required conclusion. And this is not difficult; since logic, as the science of abstract thought has no content of its own.

6. No-body can be dogged in action without being dogmatic in thought. Political men and newspaper editors who speak and write so freely and never seem to want an argument, have their dogmas, which they elevate into principles of statecraft. Philosophers who consider dogmatism as the greatest sin are proverbially indecisive in thought and weak in action. They are always weighing and wavering. No conclusion appears to be rational enough for them. They are over-critical, over-meticulous. They see difficulties and puzzles everywhere. They cannot solve one. Their reason leads them nowhere. People regard them as the true type of philosophers. For do they not exhibit the true character of the philosophical spirit,—over-punctiliousness as to the rationality of one's beliefs? Those among them on the other hand who show themselves to be positive and bold in constructive thought are not dignified with the name of "philosophers." They are called visionaries and mystics,—which is a polite way of saying that they lack the power of reason to save them from illusions.

7. The truth is that if we do not care to be dogmatic consciously we do not even care to be rational. For reason, is impossible without an initial orientation. We cannot go on reasoning interminably, and have the satisfaction that we have reasoned well. We may exalt an unending search after truth over truth itself.

(continued from the previous page) But let us not expose our unwisdom by declaring that it is the better thing.

8. The work of reason is purely negative; it is to remove error; and the removal of error is all that we can possibly mean by rational truth. Different philosophers see error in different places; and they formulate the problem of philosophy in terms appropriate to what they see. Direct experience we all have. Only it is mixed up with erroneous beliefs. The work of reason is to set us free from the latter.

9. B.N. RAY. "THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE." In intellect we have only a mediate awareness of reality, and such awareness is expressed in terms of logical judgments or propositions.

10. The great contribution of Kant to philosophic thought consists in the discovery of certain universal and necessary forms of thought whereby the understanding organises and apprehends experience. Human understanding is essentially a synthesising and relating activity; it applies its universal and necessary forms to the manifold data of sense experience and transforms them into definite and coherent knowledge. Logical or conceptual judgment, which is the unit of human knowledge, is the product of the imposition of these universal and necessary forms, by the synthesising activity of the understanding, upon the manifold data of sense intuitions. Judgments or propositions, then, as Kant showed, are the necessary forms in which conceptual knowledge is expressed.

11. Pursuing again the analysis of Kant, we observe that the conceptual consciousness is essentially relational and discriminative in character, and is necessarily limited to the apprehension of sensuous experience.

12. The value of logical knowledge should be recognised only so far as it goes, and should not be allowed to transcend its legitimate bounds.

(continued from the previous page) The human mind would, indeed, be a poor thing if conceptual knowledge were the only kind of knowledge it had at its disposal. That this is not the case, and that religious truths are apprehended in a way altogether different from the way of logical meditation, and that adequately too, is abundantly proved by the testimony of religious people who claim the knowledge of such truths.

13. It is no doubt true that the conceptual rendering of religious experience is fragmentary, inadequate and necessarily imperfect in character, but this does not warrant us in doubting its genuineness as far as it goes, and labelling it as essentially false. On the contrary, the conceptual expression of religious experience is a necessity of the human mind which defies evasion. As soon as the experience, the vision, passes away the mind is of necessity obliged to translate it into conceptual terms and render it permanent: and until this has been done, the mind is not satisfied. The gulf that separates religious knowledge from the conceptual is not absolute. The two modes of knowledge are distinct, but not absolutely opposed. They are complementary to each other, and the one supplies what the other lacks. Conceptual formulation begins when the experiences ceases, and however inadequate such formulation may be, it is invaluable in universalising and perpetuating an experience otherwise completely unique and personal.

14. I believe that both conceptual and religious apprehension fall under the higher category of rational knowledge. Reason is not co-extensive with relational and discriminative understanding, although the latter is included within it. The term "rational" cannot be restricted to merely conceptual or ratiocinative understanding, and what is non-logical may also be rational, although it may be

(continued from the previous page) on-relational. We feel justified in such extension of the scope of the term 'reason' in view of the fact that it is not without precedent, and is exemplified in the Platonic use of the term "Nous." The recognition of the wider connotation of the term "reason" is of immense advantage in so far as it enables us to explain the truth-value of religious experience which is otherwise inexplicable.

15. Intuitive insight is not an unintelligible or a mysterious process, but is a deeper experience in which our intelligence is enriched and amplified. In intuition, reason abandons the piecemeal and fragmentary character of its apprehension, and rises to a vision of its object as a totality which is grasped by a simple act of immediate awareness. It is in this way that the object of religious experience is given to our knowledge.

16. The criterion commonly employed to distinguish between veridical and illusory perceptions, consists in the fitness of such perceptions with the rest of experience. An illusory perception is rejected because it contradicts with other parts of experience, whereas a perception is recognised as true because it coheres with the rest of our knowledge. When a veridical perception thus coheres with the rest of experience, its truth-value manifests itself in a consistent conduct which symbolises a smooth flow of life.

17. The clearness of vision and the perspicuity of judgment which generally accompany an ordered and a balanced mind, are exhibited in an eminent degree in a religious person. He brings in a clarity of vision and a refined sense of judgment to the discernment of the most complex situations of life, and discovers even in its most commonplace occurrences and trivialities the potencies of future promise. These qualities

(continued from the previous page) which a religious person possesses, form invaluable assets in his practical life, and give him a distinct advantage over others in dealing with the concrete situations of life. The charge of unpracticality is, therefore, unjustly levelled against him. The disqualification of a religious person for being associated with the active spheres of life is often too exaggerated.

18. SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA: "THE SANKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE." It is the very nature of thought to point beyond itself, to refer to that which is not itself. Without the vishaya, the external object to think of, thought is an unreal abstraction. Thought thus always looks beyond itself, refers to an object different from itself. Its nature as a quality of the self is to reveal not itself, but an object as the other of itself. Thought thus does not think itself, but only the object which is not itself. Thought is thought of or thought about reality. All the same, thought does not think itself, but only an other of itself, a vishaya or object from which it is distinguished as vishayin or thought of the object. The very nature of thought as vishayin is to comprehend not itself but an object other than itself as vishaya. Thought therefore is the subjective activity of apprehending an object as an object. To know it in its distinctive character of a subjective cognitive act it must itself be made the object of a secondary retrospective act. In other words the primary act of apprehension of the object must itself be apprehended in a secondary act of retrospection.

19. H.D. BHATTACHARYYA: "FOUNDATION OF LIVING FAITHS." Hegel considers religion as a passing phase of human experience, destined ultimately to merge in philosophy.

A more potent danger is, however, that religion

(continued from the previous page) may be attenuated to such an extent in the process of rationalisation that it ceases altogether to fulfil its function. Reason has, therefore, been regarded by Faith as a dangerous ally. It insinuates itself into the graces of faith by championing some of its dogmas, but, when once securely established, it turns against faith itself and ends by denying the basis of its existence. There are three consequences of the application of reason which every positive religion dreads, namely, scepticism, agnosticism and atheism. A comparison of creeds may lead one to think that, in the absence of substantial agreement, truth is probably possessed by none and that a wise man should suspend his judgment and adopt an attitude of "wait and see." In the presence of conflicting testimonies it is hazardous to pin one's faith on any creed and one should sit on the fence when any religious question crops up. A few bold spirits however, do not like this attitude of caution or this spirit of vacillation. They think that it is impossible to prove the cardinal doctrine of faith, namely, the existence of God, by the exercise of reason. God cannot be proved to exist either deductively from a higher premise for the very simple reason that God is the highest principle, or inductively from this world of finite things because inductive reasoning holds between objects of the same type and not from finite objects to the infinite which is unique in its character. Agnosticism, therefore, is the inevitable result of applying reason to faith. Some orthodox theologians have unconsciously played into the hands of these agnostics, as a reader of Flint's volume on Agnosticism can see for himself. If reason is incapable of proving the existence of God, should we not appeal to our immediate experience and say that if God be not in our head he is in our heart? Thus, by withdrawing the apprehension of God

(continued from the previous page) from the domain of reason and planting it on the shifting basis of individual immediacy, the theologians bring in a mysticism into religious experience which is not far removed from agnosticism. When to this position is added the incomprehensibility of divine nature and attributes, in which some mystics believe, the identification with the agnostics becomes almost complete.

20. R. DAS. THE IDENTITY OF THE SELF. This theory of illusion is always the necessary pendant to the theory of the pure self, which is supposed to remain unaffected by the joys and miseries of mundane existence. This is the only defence that can be offered in support of the supposed immutability of the self. A mistake or an illusion is possible when a thing is taken to be other than what it really is. The thing in fact must be different from what it is taken to be. There cannot be any illusion of a thing which is always identical with that for which it is taken—whose being i.e., is identical with the being of that which appears in knowledge. There cannot be any mistaking about it.

21. Consciousness seems to be essential to the self. The self would be no self if it had no consciousness. And the continuity of the self should include the continuity of consciousness. But it is open to serious doubt whether there is any continuity in the consciousness of the self. By sleep, and sometimes by swoon, the self is deprived of its consciousness. These are supposed to occasion undoubted gaps in its consciousness. How can we then maintain that there is any continuity at all in its consciousness?

It may be supposed that the self is not mere consciousness, it is body as well, and there is no break in the continuity of its

(continued from the previous page) body and this accounts for its identity. But it should be remembered that when I pass any judgment of identity about myself, I do not do so after realising the fact that my body has all along been continuous.

22. G.R. MALKANI. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF META-PHYSICS. It is evident that the standpoint of a science is necessarily very much limited. Observation reveals that facts of nature fall into certain well-defined groups or classes. Each science studies the facts that are relevant to a particular class only. It is indeed true that the student of science is sometimes conscious of the arbitrariness of the line dividing one class from another. But still the line has to be drawn somewhere. Science cannot tackle the whole of reality taken together. It can only do so by isolating one set of phenomena from another and treating it as a more or less completed system. This behaviour is not all. Science makes another postulate, namely that facts of nature are unaffected by the fact of their being known. Indeed it cannot prove the truth of this statement. Nor can it consider facts other than the facts known. The only data for science are the sense-data which are the products of man's perceptive faculties.

23. We have accordingly recourse to certain general descriptive formulae the truth of which is merely hypothetical and can never be seen. These formulae or laws as they are called in science are simply our ways of thinking together certain perceived uniformities in the isolated phenomena of nature,—they do not give us a peep into nature's own ways.

24. Philosophy as the universal science is unhampered by the stand-point of any particular science. It can take a wider view. It can examine, criticise, and co-ordinate the results of different sciences, and thereby help to arrive

(continued from the previous page) at a more unified and self-consistent view of reality. But the labours of the different sciences are essential to the realisation of this goal. Philosophy cannot afford to ignore scientific research. And if the sciences are yet incomplete, any system of philosophy reared upon them must be incomplete also. We think it is a wholly false view according to which science is what matters both in method and in substance, and philosophy is no more than a sort of general index of the sciences. There is such a thing as a philosophical approach to reality, and the justification of it lies in a new problem and a method of tackling it which is quite distinct from the method of the sciences.

25. The work of the intellect can at best be negative. It can clear certain misunderstandings about the Deity. It cannot give any positive knowledge of It. A meta physics then which seeks to grasp the Deity, the whole, or the Invisible All, must, at the very outset, point distinctly to an intuition of It.

26. True philosophical reflection begins with the consciousness of the pain of life, and especially the pain that is due not to the special circumstances of a life-time but to the very nature of a limited and circumscribed existence, in short, the pain that is inherent in earthly life or bodily existence as such. The greatest of these pains is the pain of death or fear of self-annihilation. Philosophical reflection aims to unravel the mystery of the self or to distinguish our true nature from the super-imposed nature, and thus enables us to get over this pain. If pain is in the very nature of our being, the desire to be free from it must be an illusion. But the very fact that there is this desire and this desire supplies the very power of life, is an indication that things are not as they seem, and

(continued from the previous page) that our true nature must be different from the nature to which we find pain such a necessary adjunct. The urge to philosophical reflection is the desire to be free from pain and to attain to supreme happiness. This can only be achieved by knowledge of the true nature of our self. This knowledge is the only guarantee of our present well-being and ultimate good.

27. Intuition there must be. But this intuition requires to be interpreted and its true significance brought out. It is an intuition that passes unnoticed ordinarily, because it is opposed to the common habits of thought and the every-day interests of life. It is the business of reason to reserve these habits and to bring out the true importance of things as they are viewed by us in their inmost nature. We have simply to realise the full meaning of a reality that we know,—and yet know not, because we have so many misconceptions about its true character. This reality as we have seen is the self, and the intuition of it is our consciousness of the self or self-consciousness.

28. The progress of science is bound to be gradual and endless. The field of its inquiry grows with knowledge. As more is known, more remains to be known. Philosophy cannot proceed like science bit by bit. A philosophical view of reality is nothing if it is not a whole and completed view of things as they are. The problem is fixed. Its solution must be fixed. Our knowledge of things in detail may change. But that can never affect our view of the whole.

29. G.R. MALKANI: "INTUITION OF SELF." We know physical objects. This knowledge is mediated by our body. The result is that we do not know the thing; we only know certain aspects of the thing as determined by the nature of the body. These aspects further are liable to change for many

(continued from the previous page) reasons; and the content of one perception can never be determined to be identical with that of another. We know mental events or states of the mind. This knowledge is indeed not mediated. Still what we know is very indeterminate in character. We may no doubt be said to experience a state as it is. But to experience a state is one thing and to know it is another. To know it truly, we should have to undertake an analysis of mental life which will take us far beyond the state in question. A mental state is not simple; it is a very complex object; its true character is determined by motives, tendencies and per-dispositions which are not always at the surface of mental life.

30. Our intuition of self is not mediated. The self does not present any aspect to us. It has not even the objectivity of a mental state. Its only character is "I-ness" or by what is mental. This character is one and the same no matter who intuits it. There can be no varieties of it. There can be varieties only of what is objective. Our intuition of self then implies a content (if content we can call it) that is necessarily unchanging and self-identical.

31. We have then to start from the fact of self-consciousness, and we have to admit that the true self is somehow known; for it is the subject in knowledge, and the subject is relative to the object. We can only start with ordinary self-awareness. But in this we must distinguish the true ground from the false appearance. We must analyse away every relation of the self which gives it objectivity. The self thus got at will not be a matter of any image. We cannot even think it; for thought is confined to objects. The true knowledge of the self is merely a matter of understanding. We have simply to know what to guard against, what errors to avoid.

32. The self can never become the known. About this self we can have no problem. Our problems relate to the ego, the subject or the knower. It is by the study of this that we get to the deeper significance of the self. For all practical purposes then the self is identical with the ego. The ego has all the inwardness which we can, in thought, associate with the self. We shall now proceed to ask is a real entity, so far as mental life is concerned, and is the unity of this life explained by it? It is sometimes maintained that there is no single entity 'I' which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension of an individual. It is possible that the entity which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension which I call "mine" is numerically different. But even then it must be distinguished from the apprehension. It cannot be the apprehension itself. If the apprehension is the entity "I apprehend" must mean that the apprehension apprehends,—which is meaningless phraseology. There is also no possibility of the consciousness of 'I' in respect of a mere apprehension. An apprehension is distinguished by its objective content, and this gives to it a not-self character. But if there is no consciousness of self, there is no self to be explained or explained away. There is no problem.

We must then suppose that there is the apprehension, and there is the entity that apprehends in it, and that the two are somehow distinguishable. But even so self-consciousness will not become possible. It can only become possible when the entity that apprehends further apprehends that it is what apprehends. A momentary perception will not yield self-consciousness. The entity that apprehends in it will have passed before it is aware that it is aware of anything. It cannot distinguish itself from the apprehension, and cannot therefore rise to the

(continued from the previous page) consciousness of itself. We conclude therefore that it is essential to the possibility of knowledge in general and to self-awareness in particular that the entity which apprehends in the different acts of apprehension should be one and the same. It is because of this that we can distinguish the different acts of apprehension themselves, and find in them evidence of something that knows a subject or self.

33. The whole of our experience cannot be an illusion. It is the fundamental postulate of every system of philosophy that our experience has a meaning which gives us a clue to the real state of things or the actual fact. No conclusion then is valid which does not validate in a way our experience. What we have to do is to give the right analysis of this experience, and not to suggest a meaning which will render experience itself meaningless and impossible. The analysis of the self which we have given is implied in all our experience and renders that experience intelligible. That is its only justification.

34. G.R. MALKANI: THE SELF AS SUBSTANCE. Consciousness is what characterises all mental life. This consciousness as consciousness is not identical with cerebral processes. It may be a bye-product or a side-effect, but it can not be the same thing as a process in a material medium. We can, on the other hand, only think of the effect as continuous with the cause. We cannot think of any sort of continuity between the two sets of phenomena, physical or mental.

35. What is primary to us is the fact of consciousness. It is by and through this fact that matter and its processes are intelligible to us. While therefore mind cannot be deduced from matter, it is not such a hopeless task to

(continued from the previous page) explain matter entirely in terms of mind.

36. Psychical processes differ from the physical just in this very respect. Every mental state belongs to a self. There can be no sensation without the subject which has it. This is still more evident when we compare ideas. "Any comparison of two ideas, which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the absolutely indivisible unity of that which compares them: it must be one and the same thing which first forms the idea of a, then that of b and which at the same time is conscious of the nature and extent of the difference between them." All mental life involves this relating principle,—this indivisible unity of consciousness. The inner world of individual experience is not made up of ideas coming one after another without relation. The ideas are held together and arranged according to an intelligent purpose and by the relating activity of one pervading principle. This element cannot be material. It must be intelligent and can therefore in no way be different from the unity of consciousness itself.

1. RASVIHARY DAS. VEDANTISM AND THEISM. (in The Indian⁹ Philosophic Quarterly, Vol. V. No.1: April 29) If the absolute, which is conceived as pure intelligence or consciousness (Sudha chit) without subject and object, were alone there, the philosophy of Vedantism itself would not arise. The very fact that we, as subjects, and the world-appearance, as the object, are there shows that there must be something, beside and absolute, at the root of our experience. This something is conceived as ajnana or ignorance (literally, non-knowledge.)

2. Vedantists are convinced by their own reasons as well as by the sayings of the Upanishads that the self alone is real, that it is infinite and immutable. But when in ordinary experience they

⁹ The original editor inserted "Indian" by hand

(continued from the previous page) do not find or take it to be so, they have to admit that the so-called experience is nothing but a mistake (Bhranti). And this mistake can be due only to an illusion which they call ajnana.

3. The statement when interpreted in terms of knowledge comes to mean that the absolute misunderstood or viewed under the influence of illusion is God. God along with everything else in the universe owes his origin and being to ajnana or illusion. There is no real God side by side with the absolute which alone is real. Just as the world is only seen to be there without in fact being there, so is God only imagined to be there (Kalpita), although in fact there is no such thing as God. That is the meaning and consequence of "the theory of individual creation by perception" (dristisristivada) according to which the individual creates the world when he sees it and which is supposed to give us the ultimate teaching of the Vedanta philosophy. (Mukhya Vedanta Siddhanta) (c.f. Madhusudana Saraswati's Siddhanta Bindu).

4. When it is said that Vedantism explains our ideas of God, man and the world, we are not to understand that it vindicates the validity of these our ideas. By showing how they have arisen only under the influence of an all-pervading illusion, Vedantism only proves that they cannot claim any ultimate validity, It is not true, therefore, to say merely that Vedantism goes beyond theism; it should be clearly recognised that Vedantism is antagonistic to all forms of theism.

5. By inculcating belief in a higher reality in the form of Brahma or the absolute, Vedantism seems to offer us a more or less suitable substitute for God.

6. Even when the Vedantic mystic has got the

(continued from the previous page) intuition of the absolute (Brahma Saksathkara) which is supposed to effect his freedom from the world, he does not cease to see the world or to be affected by any bodily feelings.

7. K.R. SRINIVASIENGAR. FATE OR FREEWILL. (V, 2) I shall now pass on to treat of the Indian answer to this question. Determinism is true to a certain extent. Character and circumstances do envelope the individual and dictate the line of his choice. The true solution of the problem of Fate or Freewill lies therefore in a combination of this particle of truth in determinism with the general thought of freedom or self-determinism.

8. Few doctrines have been so systematically ridiculed, misunderstood and misstated—both wittingly and unwittingly—as the Karma doctrine of India. As remarked above, it has been said that it has made the Hindus fatalists. But how can a race of people some of whom believe that the self of the individual is Brahman itself, and some others that it is an amsha of the Divine, while all hold unanimously that it is pure, uncontaminated and essentially free in its nature—how can such a race of people be characterised as fatalists in any real sense of the term?

9. It is necessary to maintain that Karma is thought of by every school of Indian thought as a Regulative Principle of the Universe—as the law of cause and effect in the widest sense, governing the operations of both the world of Nature and the world of man. It is the Principle of Harmony, the Law of Compensation or Measure in the universe, something not unlike the conception of the Law of Natural Justice or Fixed Measure in Heraclitus. This is the objective aspect of Karma. Subjectively, however, Karma has application to the individual acts and thoughts in the human mental world, and here we must carefully distinguish between two regions of reference

(continued from the previous page) or fields of influence.

10. Thought preceded act, and desire was the father of thought. Hence it is natural to expect that on this plane of thought and desire, like and dislike, loves and hates, the act—and the thought and desire behind it—should leave a more indelible impress which thus becomes part and parcel of the individual's character and moulds or modifies it accordingly. This influence of the whole act on the mind and character of the individual is technically known as *samskara* or *vasana* in Indian thought. The nearest equivalent that can be thought of is 'tendency', but a tendency appears too subjective and self-originated, which is not the meaning of "samskara." A better word, if possible, would be 'influence', but an influence seems to be completely external and objective which again is not the meaning of the Sanskrit term. "Inherited capability," though cumbrous, appears to bring out the implication of these terms more approximately than anything else providing that "Inheritance" is understood in the larger sense given to it in the following pages.

11. The causes which any particular being, in working out his prarabda, produces in his present life—so that, added to the being's store of sanchita, they will develop and fructify one day in the future—these are reckoned as the agami. Since they are engendered in the working out of the prarabdha in the present life, they are also characterised as the Kriyamana.

But all hereditary tendencies, it is freely recognised, are liable to be modified, altered, strengthened or weakened, enlarged or diminished in the course of their realisation. In other words, the working out of these capabilities in present life according to the needs of the environment both natural and social, is

(continued from the previous page) Kriyamana which, read in this light, is the same thing as adaptation; and it cannot be gainsaid that in adapting oneself to environment, the inherited vasanas by themselves open to modification or alteration, as above said. Not only so; it is quite conceivable that Kriyamana or adaptation, in working the inherited capabilities to their gradual perfection, may acquire altogether new samskaras or characters (agami) which, given a sufficiently long period of 'probation' and 'practice' may come to be incorporated into the original characters themselves. (It will be remembered that Indian thought believes that acquired characters may be inherited provided they are allowed sufficient time and entertained constantly in the "desire" plane of the individual's mind. The result of the working together of both prarabdha and kriyamana heredity and adaptation, is the position of the individual at any given time.

Where then is the element of freedom in this chain of causes governing the past, present and future of all beings? I have said that the Karma doctrine reconciles freedom with determinism. The force of character – of inherited tendencies or vasana to act in certain lines and to abstain from acting in certain other lines – cannot be overestimated. Conduct is three-fourths character and the path of character is pretty well determined. And every time conduct is determined in the path of a given tendency or vasana, say, stealing, the samskara in question gains strength and the individual becomes weaker under its influence, and it impels him, forces him, or inclines him in future more and more towards stealing and less and less towards desisting from the deed.

12. The part which prarabdha plays in determining the conditions of individual life is often misunderstood. It determines, as we have seen,

(continued from the previous page) the immediate conditions of any particular birth—both objective and subjective. Subjective conditions refer to mental and moral characters in the sense above explained while objective conditions signify external circumstances in life such as birth, health, accidents, fatalities, sudden turning up of good or bad fortune etc.—all those circumstances, in fact, which are thoroughly beyond the control, if not also beyond the knowledge, of the individual. Successful achievement in life is also partly due to prarabdha because it is the fruit of working out through self-effort prarabdha causes that were nearly but not quite ripe; whilst failures, in spite of the honest and sufficient efforts of the individual, are to be attributed to the same cause—to unfavourable prarabdha causes which have so far developed that they are able to over-power and defeat present effort. In this sense and in this sense only is Indian thought fatalistic, but even, here, it will be seen, is evinced the desire of the Indian mind to trace everything to natural causes, however remote, and in most cases (but not in all), uncognisable these latter may be.

13. Conduct is three-fourths character, character is four-fifths habit (in the larger sense of habit as the resultant of the samskaras of the present as well as of the past lives.

14. The karma doctrine allows the individual the largest possible amount of freedom consistent with a well-established character. His character is doubtless made, but in as much as he himself is the author of his character, by means of a uniform course of repeated voluntary acts, he still possesses the power of altering it for better or worse. His circumstances are assuredly given, but objective conditions

(continued from the previous page) are not half so invincible as subjective ones, and when the latter themselves can be transcended, there is no need to be anxious about the former. But on every occasion of a conflict, the samskaras must be faced, and they are likely to determine him in their own way unless he asserts his power of free choice over them. It is these samskaras that come to us in the form of our fate-tendencies of character to determine us in given directions, but always remaining tendencies merely with only a difference of degree in intensity or force.

15. Such has been the Hindu answer to the problem of freewill. Man is neither a marionette pushed by springs from behind, nor a skipping will-o-the-wisp pulled by seductions from without. Much less is he a one-idea'd obsessionist irretrievably borne along the current of his own conceptions and character.

16. The inheritance of certain tendencies towards certain lines of action need not be construed as annulling or abrogating man's freedom to act upto or against those tendencies, to adapt himself to new demands, new situations, both moral and physical.

17. Psycho-analysis again,—a theory which explains the present by the past, the conscious by the unconscious, the manifest by the latent, and the waking by the dream state—may seem to show that all a man's acts are the result of affective-conative forces working in the unconscious with their own surcharged energies—and working, be it remembered, uncognisedly—and that it is no more possible to escape their direction than it is possible for a thrown-up stone to escape the inevitableness of being drawn to the centre of the earth.

18. HARI SHARAN SINGH. "A DEFENCE OF COMMONSENSE.

Neo-Idealists like Gentile and Croce also maintain the Creative theory of perception by

(continued from the previous page) saying "Nothing is but thinking makes it so in the act of its own self-formation." They contend that if to know is to copy reality a pre-existing model it is a useless duplication of something already there. If the contention be true objects would exist only when, and so long as, a mind perceives them. Hume clearly saw these consequences and Neo-Idealists also recognise that "All history is contemporary." The theory also leads to solipsism but Hume fought shy of the issue.

Identity of things:—Berkeley was led to the Creative theory of Perception by his attack on the Representative theory of Perception which was accepted by Locke and others and which is still followed by critical Realists. The theory owed its origin to the transmission theory of heat, colour and sound. Berkeley abolished the represented reality, for from the nature of the case we can never know its existence or its correspondence with our ideas. It may be noted further that the Representative theory is inconsistent for according to it subject-object are compresent in inner perception but not in outer perception where ideas intervene. If knowing process is alike in all cases a third entity should intervene between ideas and subject in introspection and so on. When Berkeley abolished the represented reality, he was left with ideas. To him as well as to all his contemporaries ideas were psychical images and so necessarily mind-dependent. This Andrew Seth thinks is the "original defect" of the school. The mistake lies in calling the perceived content an idea and then equating it to a psychical image. Of course in that case we can never go beyond our ideas.

19. If we start with sensations which are quite private, it is difficult to see how we can have a public object. Bradley and Bosanquet say that it can be brought about with the

(continued from the previous page) help of "logical meaning" of an idea. If "logical meaning" stands for physical content, there is no quarrelling with them. If not, how can animals with whom we have a common world understand "logical meanings?"

20. Closely connected with the problem of identity is the problem of the continuity of unobserved objects. Hume was of opinion that things exist only when and so long as we observe them. In his youth Berkeley wrote "In sleep the soul existeth not," but later on he gave up the view. Hume too accepted the unobserved continuity of other selves.

21. Modern Idealism does not care much for the creative aspect of perception, it only maintains that the subject-object relation is universal and necessary. The Idealist maintains that we can never think of an object apart from its being known. However the difficulty is not due to the nature of things but to the procedure of argument. The principle involves the dilemma that either all known things are known or all things are known. The first is a mere tautology, the second is an absurdity.

22. It is quite clear that the realm of Being is wider than that of knowing and the realm of Thought wider than that of speech. Subject-object relation is universal within the limited world of knowledge only.

23. Kant contended that we know mind and matter as they appear to us and not as they are in themselves, the implication being that they are modified when known. Even if such modification takes place we cannot know that. As far as Relativity is concerned Kant's service lies in showing against Locke that mind is active in the act of knowing.

24. In modern times we hear of another sort of relativity which is associated with the name of Einstein. The Kantian relativity was based on

(continued from the previous page) the relation between subject and object, the modern one on the relation between object and object or rather on the position of the object in a Space-Time Continuum. I daily come to the philosophy department by following what I think to be the same route but the route every moment changes its position with regard to the sun. I may be able to tread the same path in a year, but that too would be impossible if our sun is moving round another star. The light coming from a distant star may be seen at the same time with the light coming from an electric lamp and yet they are not contemporary. If a man moves at the same rate with the report of a gun the sound will be constantly heard for howsoever long a time he may travel on.

25. SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAM. PHILOSOPHY OF YAJNAVALKYA: Maitreyi is bewildered by this doctrine, for it seems to her to amount to a denial of immortality. Her bewilderment will be shared by many, for personal or individual consciousness is the only form of consciousness intelligible to them. Where therefore this form of consciousness does not exist, there seems to be no consciousness whatever, and where there is no consciousness, immortality is unmeaning. But Yajnavalkya has an idea of universal unindividuated consciousness in which the knower and the known, the subject and the object are not distinguished. According to him such a Consciousness alone is primal, original, eternal and indestructible. It is its individuated form which seems to be born and to die. Really it only appears and disappears, but continues to exist throughout all its changes. The finite individual distinguishes itself from other things and persons about it. But this distinction and the duality implied in it are only apparent and not real. The Universal Consciousness as identified with everything, does

(continued from the previous page) not know any thing or person distinct from it.

26. It is only when the Universal Consciousness individuates itself into subject and object that there is what we call knowledge,—the distinction of the knower and the known. But when the subject or individual knower lapses into the Undifferentiated Consciousness, the distinction of knower, known and the ultimate Ground or Source of this distinction is impossible. But, if that is so, how does the Undifferentiated Consciousness come to be known? If it is not known, how is its existence asserted? Since knowledge, with its distinctions is only apparent and its testimony unreliable, it cannot itself attest the reality of Yajnavalkya's Absolute. It therefore remains unknown and doubtful. It is something worse,—it is a logical abstraction.

27. In what we call our waking state we, as finite individuals, are not fully awake. What we know at a particular moment disappears from us the next moment, so that the major part of what we know in that state remains in the background of our consciousness,—remains practically unknown to us. And yet the world thus known and unknown to us by turns is believed by us as existing permanently.

28. Is the feeling of duality which characterises the waking state absent in the dreaming? Certainly not. The distinction of subject and object, of unity and difference, is present in both. The difference between the two states which Yajnavalkya means to emphasise seems to be this, that while unreflective people take the waking state as unmistakably presenting a duality, an externality of object to subject, they may be easily made to see that the duality characterising the dreaming state is only apparent. The horses, chariots, house, streets, tanks and rivers seen in that state are nothing but creations of the mind. If so, then the mind

(continued from the previous page) or Self has the power of producing an apparent difference of subject and object, though all along continuing to be identical with itself. The implication is that the duality seen in the waking state is apparent in the same manner and the creation of the Self.

29. Yajnavalkya now passes to the state of dreamless sleep. He conceives it as one of undifferented unity and as indicating what Brahman really is and what we shall be after death. The Self then retains its power of knowing, though it does not actually know.

30. S.C. CHATTERJEE: WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS.(V.3) For all the illustrious representatives of the scientific spirit in modern psychology, such as Mill, Bain, Spencer, Sully, Wundt and James, consciousness is neither an entity nor the attribute, essential or inessential, of any other entity. It is only a collective term denoting all mental events or experiences. By consciousness is meant the totality of mental occurrences, such as sensations, perceptions, images, ideas, thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires and volitions.

31. Consciousness can neither be measured by a tape nor weighed in a balance. "The phenomena of the mind," says Guido Villa, "form a group by themselves which cannot be reduced to the laws of quantity." To measure consciousness, if that is at all possible, is to have a particular consciousness which is no measurement at all. If experiments in psychology throw any light on the working of the mind it is only in the light of some previous knowledge gained by immediate experience or introspection of it. Hence physiological and experimental studies are aids to psychology and not psychology itself.

Finally, the natural scientific standpoint in psychology rests on certain unscientific

(continued from the previous page) assumptions regarding the mind. That there are mental facts in the world just as there are physical facts, that experiences and their objects are distinct and that 'cognising' and 'being cognised' are clearly different elements in experience must be admitted by all of us. The existence of mind or of mental acts is too hard a matter of fact to be easily suppressed or summarily dismissed. For each of us, such mental acts are apprehended in immediate experience to which different writers give the different names of 'introspection' 'reflection', 'self-observation,' 'inspection' and 'enjoyment.' When the results of immediate experience of mental processes in each of us severally and all of us collectively are systematised, we have psychology as a science of mind. The naturalistic standpoint in psychology is the result of a confusion between fact and theory. That the mind has no real existence or that consciousness is a quality of neural activity is not a fact of direct experience, but is the construction of experience, in the direction of a philosophical theory. Consciousness is never perceived as a quality of any neural process in the same way in which the colour red is perceived as a quality of the rose. To say that consciousness is a quality of the body is as much a matter of speculative theory as to say that it is an attribute of the soul-substance. Hence when the attempt is made to naturalise psychology by denying the reality of mind or by making mind a quality of the body, what happens is that the scientific character of psychology is vitiated by its commixture with some sort of philosophy. It is indicative not so much of the scientists' regard for actual facts of experience as of a bias for some particular science or system of philosophy.

32. SATINDRA KUMAR MUKHERJEE. "SANKARA ON THE NATURE OF THE OBJECT. There may be a possible objection to the existence of external things

(continued from the previous page) on the analogy of our dream experience where we seem to see external things though there are none. The argument is, on the face of it, an extremely cogent one. It is very difficult to draw the line of demarcation as to where waking ends and dream beings, for while dreaming we are so sure of those experiences that unless we cease to dream, perhaps we will never be able to understand that we had been dreaming. And supposing a man dreams all along his life, the dream world will be to him as good a world—a world of joys and sorrows— as the real world to a waking man. But inspite of all these, the difficulty should not be pressed too much, for there are some intrinsic differences between these two states of a man's life, and the very fact that we are always able to distinguish the waking state from the dream points to such a difference. If we compare the dream and the waking state, two differences of great moment come out. I dream for example that I am being murdered. I am caught with fright; but on waking up to my utter relief I find myself quite safe in the bed. Or suppose I dream myself to be a king enjoying all that the position and power brings along with it; but when the dream passes away, I find myself again in my poor bed. The experiences of dream are, thus, contradicted by our waking experiences. But is that so with the waking experiences? A man is murdered and murdered for ever never to open his eyes again; and if, fortunately, a poor man becomes a king he remains a king. The waking experiences are not contradicted. Again, dreams are due to the function of memory. What we perceive in our waking state is somehow jumbled together and we remember it all so vividly that it appears as real. I see horses and men; and in dream I see a man with a horse's face; this fact of the play of memory

(continued from the previous page) accounts for the absence of external things in dream. But in our waking state we perceive a thing without the help of memory and so it is that when the thing is removed we fail to perceive it, though we continue to remember it. There is enough of difference between remembering a friend and seeing him with my eyes.

33. If any body tries to deny the existence of external things on the strength of dreams, he may be accused of wrong analogy, in as much as he ignores the fundamental differences between the two states of experience.

34. In his Gaudapada Karika Bhasya Sankara seems to contradict what he has said in his Sutra Bhasya.

35. The waking state is thus a prolonged dream state.

36. Sankara says by way of explaining these “mental creations.” – “Iswara....creates the external things like the earth, etc....by variously creating them in his mind.” (Mandukya, 2, 2, 13). Ananda Giri commenting on the statement under discussion says – “As a potter or a weaver intending to produce a pot or a piece of cloth first of all makes an idea of them in mind and produces them in actuality, so also the Creator...makes an idea of the world...in his mind and then produces it for the perception of all; and thus the ideas are actualised.” The mental creation of the external things, thus does not refer to our mental creations, but to that of Isvara; it is not we that create the external world in our imagination; or in other words, the world is not an externalisation of our ideas as in dream, but they are the ideas in the mind of Isvara. The great difference between dream objects and waking objects is this that though they are both mental creations yet while the former is due to our ideas, the latter is due to those of Isvara. Berkeley’s theory of “esse est

(continued from the previous page) percipi" is also liable to the same misinterpretation unless one takes care to see how he has himself explained it. "When in broad day light I open my eyes" says Berkeley "it is not in my power to choose whether I will see or not, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; so likewise as to hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them." (Principles of Human knowledge, Sec. 29). The objects of the world are, not, according to Berkeley, our ideas, but ideas in the Divine Mind. Similarly, with Sankara the objects of the world are ideas of mind, but not of our mind—they are the mental creations of Isvara. To say that external objects are creations of the mind, does not necessarily mean that they are creations of our mind, and when Sankara agrees with Berkeley that they are ideas in the mind of God, he can say with Berkeley that inspite of all differences between creations of our mind and those of Isvara, the fact remains that "they both equally exist in the mind", and when charged with subjectivism, both of them can reply that "by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature..... There is a rerun natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. All that we are concerned to show here is that even the theory that the world is a "mental creation" does not contradict his views in the Sutra Bhasya; and also that it does not make the world depend on our private whims.

We are now in a position to understand Sankara's theory of the unreality of all objects of thought whatever. Let us proceed. When we dream, our dream is false because no objective reality corresponds to it; when we are awake

(continued from the previous page) and see things, our ideas are true, because they correspond to external reality; but when we know that objects of waking life are but ideas in God's mind, they lose their independent existence outside mind; so that though to us individuals, things are external, yet they are not so to God – they are but passing phases in God's mind, and therefore, do not exist. To understand this, let us enquire into the nature of our ideas. What is the nature of Ideas? They are objects for the subject. The subject is always distinct from the object, for without a distinction between subject and object, knowledge is impossible – and objects are objects only if there is a subject who perceives them. Moreover, ideas are by their very nature ever-changing – one idea is sublated by another, and the second by the third but the Atman, that is the real subject according to Sankara, is permanent. These two are the marks of all our ideas whether in perception or in dream – they are equally distinct and equally changing, and from this standpoint there is no difference between them, though there is much difference between them in their more or less, direct or indirect, reference to reality, as we shall see later. Now, if the ideas – whether of dream or perception – be of the same sort, and if things of the world exist as ideas in Isvara's mind, they are also but changing states or in other words, these divine ideas as objects of thought, are on the same level with ideas of dream.

37. It may seem to be a strange contradiction that Sankara should fight so much for proving the existence of the external world, and yet abolish it by declaring all objects of knowledge to be unreal. But it is improper to dismiss the matter as a contradiction without further consideration. It is a matter of ordinary experience that as we rise from a lower stage of thought to a higher one, there is a consequent difference in the valuation

(continued from the previous page) of things. However great the difference be between stone and water in our ordinary estimation—and this even the scientist in his ordinary affairs of life, does not disregard—yet to the eyes of the scientist they are both combination of atoms, and as such there is no difference between them. To a philosopher who has risen sufficiently high, inspite of great difference between dream and waking state, both of them appear to be but passing phases of the spirit—the dream is the creation of the individual mind, while the external world, that of the universal mind; and as passing phases of mind—whether of the individual or universal—they are on the same level. One may certainly be charged with subjectivism if he says that there is no difference between dreams and waking object in the world of practice—or Vyavaharika Jagat as Samkara would call it,—but one is certainly not a subjectivist when from a higher region he looks upon both of them as but phases of mind, for in his system the difference between dream and real object remains intact. Or in the words of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan “The relatively enduring framework of the external world is not expunged from Sankara’s picture of reality.” For him there is enough difference between facts and fictions in pragmatic world, but ‘Sub specie aeternitatis’ (to borrow a phrase from Spinoza), both of them are fictions when compared with the Immutable One. So he is neither a subjectivist, nor is there a contradiction between his Sutra Bhasya and Karika Bhasya. The classical distinction of Paramarthika, Vyavaharika and Pratibhasika truths is based on this consideration.

Now that the pragmatic world is secured, we are in a position to show that all the ideas we have—however true or however false they be—are still based upon our experience of that external world. The whole of our empirical life

(continued from the previous page) can be divided into two broad parts viz. ideas of perception are directly caused by the external world through the senses, while those of memory, depending on those of perception are, we may say, indirectly caused by the external world. When one remembers a dead friend, this remembrance is not possible without previous perception of his friend, so that his memory is in a sense, dependent on the external world. Dream and illusion also depending on memory are, more indirectly, caused by the external world. Sankara's famous definition of illusion as "the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, of something previously perceived in some other thing," shows this clearly. It shows three things, (1) that it is a case of remembrance, (2) that the remembrance depends on a thing previously observed and (3) that the illusion rests upon an external thing which is now present. Sankara is clear, as we find here, that illusion is dependent on memory; he also tells us, as we have seen before, that dream depends on memory; and memory, we see from his definition of illusion, depends on previous perception so that dreams and illusion also depend upon perception. We may therefore say that memory dreams and illusions, are all dependent though indirectly, upon perception, and since perception is dependent upon external things, it follows that the former three also are more or less dependent upon external things. We have divided our empirical consciousness into two broad parts, viz: ideas of perception and ideas of memory, and the difference between them is, as we see, from the standpoint of the present discussion, one of degree of dependence upon external objects. Sankara will perhaps agree with us if we say that dependence upon external objects (*Vastutantrata*)—or in the words of Bradley (with a slight change of meaning) "objective

(continued from the previous page) reference" is the mark of all our ideas however much this "Vastutantrata" or 'Objective reference' may vary in degree.

38. RAKESRANJAN SARMA. THE BUDDHISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION: What is the exact nature of the object of perception? According to the Yogacaras the object is nothing but a modification of Vijnana generated by the Vasanas or impressions. Perception means an immediate consciousness of the object thus generated. Judging from this stand-point Dignaga's definition seems to be the only possible definition that may be acceptable to the Yogacaras. Every object is thus generated by the corresponding Vasana and a direct cognition of the object is valid perception. The source of sensation, therefore, is not any external object, but a construction of the Vijnana and hence there is no possibility of any error in perception. Error can only come in when a particular piece of knowledge is contradicted by some other experience. Error presupposes a permanent order in the system of external objects with reference to which a particular knowledge may be regarded as erroneous. But for the Yogacaras there is no external object. And consequently error cannot be explained as a misrepresentation of the object in knowledge.

39. We cannot go beyond ideas. The object of direct perception is not the external object, but the idea of it. For according to the Sautrantikas the external object is not directly experienced, but is inferred as a necessary condition of the variety in our experience.

40. There is a difference of opinion between the two Schools on the question of the source of sensation—the Sautrantikas holding the external object as the source and the Yogacaras holding the Vasanas as the source of sensation. But as regards the problem of knowledge

(continued from the previous page) none of the Schools can go beyond sensation.

Dharmakirti has tried to make a distinction between the object of perception which he says, is real and the object of inference which, is of an assumed nature.

41. There is no way out of the circle of ideas which the Sautrantika has put around him. That is to say, true to his Philosophy, he must be ready to join hands with the Yogacaras who were bold enough to discard external reality.

42. RASHVIHARY DAS. THE IDEAL AS THE ABSOLUTE: (Vol 5 No. 4). Bradley himself has admitted that "why there are appearances and appearances of such various kinds are questions not to be answered." In other words Bradley seems completely to give up the idea of explaining our experience. Our experience is presumably confined to appearances and we do not know why there should be any appearances at all, far less why there should be such appearances as we experience in our daily life. We are not asking why reality should be what it is. This question may well be quite illegitimate. But the question why there should be appearances if in truth there is only reality appears quite legitimate and this remains unanswered. We find no reason why reality should go so far out of itself as to present itself as appearance. The conclusion seems inevitable that knowledge of the absolute is impossible for us. We cannot know it truly so long as we (appearances) are there; we cannot of course know it when we are not there. Agnosticism seems to be the only legitimate conclusion of Bradley's philosophy.

43. S.C. CHATTERJI. THE NYAYA CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE. After all the definition of knowledge as an activity, be it physical or ideal, is only a symbolic description. Knowledge or consciousness is the most fundamental fact of reality. It is implicitly present in all reality and

(continued from the previous page) comes to an explicit recognition as finite self in man. It is the reality itself and does not require to be attached as a quality to any other reality, say matter, mind or soul. It is just the self.

44. D.G. LONDHE: THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE:

When we want to speak about the nature of the Absolute, the very first thought brings home to our minds the difficulty of expressing this nature in any positive terms. A positive term as applied to the Absolute, will suggest by implication the absence of qualities expressed by other terms. This will mean that the Absolute has a nature which admits of some particular attribute to the exclusion of other attributes. But this can be true of finite things only. What is Infinite or Perfect cannot be thought of as suffering from any defect or want. The Absolute, therefore, must have a nature which cannot be expressed in positive terms. Hence the "Neti, Neti" of the Upanishads and the "Negative Theology" of European thinkers.

We fully admit the force of these considerations. Still if we do not positively, indicate its nature there is an obvious danger that the method of successive elimination of the particular and finite may land us into nihilism. We shall therefore try to understand the Absolute as knowledge or pure awareness. We should remember that knowledge which constitutes the being of the Absolute is quite distinct from the particular cognitive acts. The latter are only the manifestations or appearances which reveal the nature of pure awareness, not as it is in itself but in a more or less 'distorted' form. Awareness as such is above duality or difference, while the manifestations have necessarily to take the form of the duality of subject and object. It may be asked, "What is the proof of this homogeneous, non-dual awareness?"

Our answer is that the proof is given in self-awareness.

Self-consciousness is taken to mean two distinct things. It may mean cognition of myself, that is that kind of awareness of myself which implies a duality of subject and object, a relation between the knower and the known. In this sense awareness of self is on a level with awareness of objects, or my acquaintance with other selves. Taken thus, self-consciousness leads to serious difficulties of an epistemological character. For instance, how can subject be identical with object in one and the same act of knowing? We know that the subject, that which knows, cannot be the same as object, that which is known. In the experience "I know a table" I am not the table I know.

45. We now consider the other sense in which self-consciousness is understood, or rather ought to be understood. Self-awareness stands on a footing quite different from that of awareness of objects or awareness of fellow-beings. If this much be granted, as we think it must be, it follows that my awareness of myself is immediate in a manner which is unique. This means that there is no distinction of subject and object, no relation of the knower and the known, in my acquaintance with myself. Otherwise I should be as foreign to myself as any other man but myself to me! The essence of self-consciousness consists in this immediate intimacy and certainty.

46. It will be easily seen that self-awareness rightly understood is an experience which is prior to all the distinctions such as the one between self and not-self. It is the most certain and indubitable fact of our existence. It needs no proof as all proofs presuppose it. Self-awareness is an experience in which knowledge and being meet, so that we can say that it is in self-awareness that to be is to be aware. If on

(continued from the previous page) any experience we can safely raise the superstructure of the doctrine of the nature of the Absolute, it is on self-awareness understood in this sense that we can do so.

Sankara has said that Reality or the Absolute is known in self-awareness. (Asmat pratyaya gochare vishayini chidatmake). This should not be taken to mean that the Absolute or the Atman is different from the Self and that it is known in Self-awareness as a table being different from awareness is known in its awareness. Self-awareness, according to Sankara, is the awareness in which self and awareness do not remain as two things one standing over against the other but it is an experience in which being and awareness are one and the same.

47. Self-consciousness understood thus is the clue to the nature of the Absolute. That is to say, self is the Absolute. Pure awareness as prior to the duality of subject and object is reality. The nature of the Absolute is awareness and not will or feeling.

We have already said that the Absolute is the original unity that is prior to all distinction. We must, therefore, critically consider the rival view which maintains that the Absolute is the whole of existence. It is a common supposition that a partial existence is unreal but the whole of existence is real. The Absolute is thus regarded as a Whole. But this view takes merely the quantity of existence as the criterion of reality. We fail to understand how by putting together all the existences with all their imperfections and contradictions, we get a whole which is free from contradictions. Between relative existence and Absolute existence the difference is not merely one of quantity. In the Absolute the quality of existence, the very mode of being is different. Again, this conception of the Absolute does not explain the finite existences

(continued from the previous page) rather the finite existences explain the Absolute, that is to say, the finite existences become primary and fundamental and the Absolute secondary and derivative:

It is therefore, clear from what has been just said, that the Absolute is not the whole, the sum total of the finites. The Absolute is one. The experience that is prior to all distinctions must necessarily be one. For, when we have gone to a state of experience where the distinction of subject and object has vanished, we have already risen above the distinction between one individual and another; because the only vital distinction between one individual and another is that of subject and object. I am subject while all other individuals are, to me, objects. This is true of every individual; he is subject while all other individuals are objects to him. If we take each person as he is in immediate self-awareness, there would be nothing by which you can distinguish one self from another. It is, here that we find that the distinction between one self and another is "formal" and accidental. The illusion of the separateness of selves is deep-rooted in us, because we still think of selves as we think of material bodies occupying different points of space. Self is of a non-spatial nature, as awareness which is its essence cannot be conceived as existing at this point of space or that. It is only the body which is locally separate from other bodies. Thus we see that the illusions of separateness of selves is due to the failure to recognise the non-spatial nature of self. Immediate self-awareness gives us a unity which transcends distinctions of 'mine' and 'thine' because it is prior to all such distinctions. It is in this sense that the Absolute is one. When we maintain that the Absolute is one we have to join issue with the pluralist. He contends that there are many independent centres of experience. When it is maintained by a pluralist that there

(continued from the previous page) are many independent existents, what is naturally meant by him is that there is nothing common to the existents, that in other words, the difference which separates any two existents is as real as the existents themselves. This logical implication of the reality of difference is, in our opinion, vital to the pluralist's position. For, if the differences between the independent existents, say, a, b, c, d, are not real but only illusory and their unity will be real; this is diametrically opposed to what the pluralist seeks to maintain. It is therefore essential for the pluralist's view that the differences that separate existents should be real.

48. The plurality of absolutes, thus, is found to be inconceivable. The Absolute must be one. The exact significance of this statement is likely to be missed. It might be supposed that the Absolute has the numerical character of being one; this however, is a mistake. The real significance of the statement is that the Absolute is above the category of number. Sankara in the last verse of Dasha-shloki, says, "It is not even one, how then can it be two?" Plotinus in a similar strain has observed: "The name one expresses no more than the negation of the manifold...The object of the employment of this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first principle, to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as the best possible. Indeed this name is not adequate to designate this nature," The truth is that the Absolute has a nature which is non-numerical. It is for this reason that in Advaita Vedanta, the Atman is described only negatively as a-dvitiyam, non-dual. (@ Plotinus, Eanneades V. 5, 6; quoted in Lossky's *The World as an Organic whole*, page 65).

R. DAS. ("Philosophy & Mysticism") PART I, 14th I.P.C. 1938). (1) The mystic himself does not require the support of logical thought, but for the benefit of those who have not yet got the mystic insight, he may use logical arguments to demonstrate the necessity and validity of the mystic intuition.

(2) According to mysticism all thinking leads to error, because while truth is undifferentiated unity, no thought is possible without discrimination and division. If this is so, it is idle to imagine that thought can really justify anything, i.e. establish anything as true or right. The so-called truth of mysticism, therefore, does not and cannot admit of any rational justification. To offer it to thought for justification is to have falsified it already. As a matter of fact, the mystics also recognise this and to cover up their rational bankruptcy, they adopt the uneasy expedient of supposing that thought proves for them its own falsity and the mystic intuition justifies itself.

(3) Now the supporter of mysticism may well ask the philosopher, what system of philosophy or philosophical theory is there that is completely secure against all criticism and is fully justified by reason? There is no system of philosophy, there is even no philosophical theory, which is accepted by all students of philosophy. This means that there is no theory which is wholly justified.

The fact that we have so far had no philosophy which is entirely satisfactory to our reason, shows only that the ideal which the philosopher follows has not yet been realised in any existing systems.

The fact that the philosopher does not find this view already present in any existing system in the history of philosophy does by no means condemn, but is really the motive spring of his philosophic activity. If the pursuit of

(continued from the previous page) of the philosophic ideal appears too arduous or even seems much like a wild goose chase to you, you may not and need not go after it. You may well be satisfied with a vision or a faith ready to your hand.

(4) So long as our senses function and the mind things, we are obliged to recognise facts of various kinds and they show no tendency to disappear from the scene to oblige the mystic. And so, in order to get rid of them, some mystics try to stop their senses and to still their mind. But success in this endeavour is bound to be very temporary and uncertain. So the mystic has to find other means of dealing with them. And the means are principally two. (1) By arguments the mystic may try to throw doubts on the evidence of sense and thought and thus render all so-called facts highly uncertain. (2) Or he may hold on to the faith that some day the nightmare of the world-illusion will pass away and he will no more be troubled by sights or sounds, thoughts or ideas. The first method is not particularly successful. All that the arguments can possibly effect is that the facts of experience are all doubtful. But to render a fact into no fact, we must be able to deny it altogether, and not merely to doubt it. And no kind of argument can lead us to the denial of a visible fact so long as we are obliged to see it, no matter however strong may be the doubt engendered by the argument in our mind as to the fact-hood of the thing seen. The second method appears more straight-forward and may be more effective, but the requisite faith may not and indeed is not available to us all.

(5) The true mystic, as I imagine, needs no support of philosophy or philosophic arguments. He is content with his illuminative insight. He, in all probability, sees the world as we see it, and may even recognise the knowledge claimed

(continued from the previous page) by science and common sense. But he has also a clear and convincing intuition into some deeper unity of all things, which strikes him as all-important. Thus while he would recognise the existence of external things and of our every-day knowledge, he would only say that by the side of his intuited reality, the reality of external things pales into insignificance and the so-called knowledge is no better than ignorance. He would say so not on the strength of any reasoning but only on the sole strength of an overpowering feeling, which he does not and cannot simply question. He goes even so far as to say that this is the highest good. We clearly see that the mystic does not use the words reality, knowledge and good in their ordinarily accepted meanings. Reality for him is not what can be touched or seen; Knowledge is not apprehension through sensibility and understanding, good does not consist in virtuous conduct. When he says that the world is not real or that all our knowledge is mere ignorance, we should not understand this assertion quite literally as a statement of fact but should take it as an estimate of value. He means that from his point of view, the world or our knowledge of it is quite unimportant. With mysticism so understood, we can have no real controversy, because controversy is possible when both the parties use common words with common meanings.

Philosophy stands for the systematisation of our common experience, and is the culminating achievement of our common understanding; mysticism, in its extreme form, stands for the abolition of understanding and breaks away with our common experience.

We thus find that philosophy and mysticism are quite disparate things and not only is there no room for mysticism in philosophy, or for philosophy in mysticism, the two can hardly be compatible with each other, and it is idle to attempt

(continued from the previous page) to supply any philosophical basis for mysticism.

(6) D.G. LONDHE: "Philosophy & Mysticism." Experience is the primal fact, an undeniable datum. Yet it is equally undeniable that contents of experience are partial, fragmentary and sometimes mutually contradictory. Philosophic endeavour aims at such a constructive synthesis and interpretation of experience as to remove fragmentariness and contradictions and to present a comprehensive and consistent view of experience. To plato philosophy was a synopsis, seeing all existence together, a Whole-View of experience. To the Indian philosophers also a system of philosophy was a "Darshana," and the highest and the best philosophical perspective a "Samyag-Darshana," a view of things as they are, and not simply as they appear to be.

(7) Logic is not vital for philosophy, for there have been philosophers who have called in question the infallibility and the adequacy of reason to lead us to truth. What is particularly noteworthy is that they asserted this belief as a philosophical proposition and not as a mystic's personal opinion. When Sankara stigmatised logical reasoning as baseless, he was not committing a philosophical suicide, but was seeking to save philosophy from the vagaries of word-quibbles and the vanity of wanton dialectics, and thus to place philosophy securely on the bed-rock of experience.

(8) Even mysticism cannot afford to violate the laws of Identity and Non-contradiction. For the mystic also, A is A is not not-A. The mystic will not dare to commit the fallacies of reasoning forbidden by logic. But the mystic while duly honouring the laws of the logic of the intellect, cannot help feeling the fragmentariness

(continued from the previous page) and the inadequacy of that logic. The logic of the intellect does not exhaust the critical consideration of the law-abiding and the systematic character of the human psyche. The logic of reason is but a part of the logic of man's integral being. The logic of intuition should supplement the logic of intellect. It must be said to the credit of mysticism that it recognises the logic of Intuition in addition to the logic of Intellect. But the logic of Intuition is yet to be written. Traditional logic, the logic founded by Aristotle and developed by the Scholastics is merely a truncated logic. What we need is a logic of the whole personality of man, a logic that will co-ordinate reason, intuition and will. The plausibility of the contention that mysticism is divorced from logic is to be traced to the narrow conception of logic. Moreover mysticism is concerned with ultimate reality, and if ultimate reality transcends the bounds of reason, mysticism at best would be alogical and not illogical. Mysticism cares little for the logic that circles in the blind alleys of the categories of the understanding and longs for the logic that leads straight to reality.

(9) It does not follow that ratiocinative processes are not possible or desirable after the occurrence of the mystical intuition. What intuition sees in a flash, reason may subsequently explain, justify, interpret at leisure.

(10) The Advaita Vedanta is essentially a system of philosophy, following a well-recognised logico-epistemological method. The fact that it accepts experience (Anubhuti) alongside logic as a criterion of truth should not embarrass us simply because this experience is not a supernatural experience accessible only to the select few but it is an experience which is common and universal, one for which all are eligible and which is the basis, the

(continued from the previous page) starting point and the ultimate reference in all the divergent theoretical constructions in interpretation.

(11) Just as modern science in the hands of Eddington, James Jeans and Russell tends towards metaphysics, even so modern metaphysics may tend towards mysticism. The point of view of Science being purely descriptive needs to be supplemented by the point of view of philosophy; similarly the point of view of philosophy being purely intellectual and discursive needs to be supplemented by the mystical intuition. Thus in a sense mysticism is the culmination and fulfilment of the interpretation of experience offered by philosophy. The passage from the point of view of philosophy to the intuitive illumination in mysticism is a transition not simply from one part of experience to another part of experience but a transition from the point of view of the parts to the point of view of the whole. The whole is not a mere summation of the parts, but the ground and substratum of the parts. This is probably the reason why the mystical intuition appears to contradict and nullify the philosophical knowledge. In reality the mystical illumination fills in the lacunae in the intellectual grasp of existence and in completing the picture transforms the perspective of looking at experience.

(12) The non-mystic cannot pronounce a judgment of subjectivity and invalidity on the mystic's experience, simply because the latter contradicts the former, just as the experience of the man under illusion cannot prove the falsity of the experience of the man who sees the reality behind the illusion, simply because the former contradicts the latter. Mystic's intuition should not be regarded as a mere matter of feeling or emotion. Feeling may be distinguished from reason but may not be disparate from or

(continued from the previous page) incompatible with reason. One can experience an emotion about what he is convinced through reason. There is no inherent opposition and contrariety between feeling and reason, though at times they are opposed to each other. Mystic's feeling or emotion may not be divorced from reason.

13. RAM MURTI LOOMBA "Philosophy & Mysticism" Is there any place for thought on the mystic path? What is the relation between reason and the mystic intuition? Does mysticism involve a special philosophical point of view? And, is there any place for rational justification in mysticism? The second question, likewise, raises at least two important issues. Does an alliance with mysticism deteriorate philosophy? And, does mystic experience carry with it any philosophical significance or value?

14. The first stage on the path for all mysticism is an essentially intellectual discipline consisting in a resolution of one's metaphysical doubts and uncertainties with the help of fully developed reasoning powers. In fact the greater part of the mystic's journey is covered by 'the negative path' which is essentially characterised by a rational sceptical critique of all categories of ordinary experience resulting in a conclusion of the illusoriness of the external world.

14. What is, then, the relation between mystic intuition and reason? There is a prevalent tendency to maintain an opposition between them by asserting that mysticism stands for the abolition of understanding and describing it as offering only non-rational feeling or sometimes as practical rather than theoretical. All such descriptions, however, virtually attribute to mysticism a nature quite foreign to its own. For mysticism claims to surmount the entire antithesis between thought and feeling and between

(continued from the previous page) theory and practice. In fact mystic intuition is said to transcend all distinctions of feeling, thought and action lying at the basis of the empirical level of consciousness. It stands thus in as much contrast to one of them as to the other two. All three are equally fragmental and one-sided. Yet all the three are held to be equally dissolved into the unity of mystic experience. It follows that for mysticism neither one of the triad opposites can be said to be more basic or fundamental than the others. Mysticism, therefore, may not be viewed either as opposed or even as organically related to reason but only as a consummation in which reason as well as action and feeling all find their dissolution. It is true that mystics have refused to regard their peculiar experience as intellectual comprehension. But what they speak of as contemplation or meditation involves in a particularly unique form both the elements of cognitive attention as well as effective and conative elements. It involves an element of ecstasy which however is not simply rapture but has a warmth of intimate understanding with it. It has an element of activity which however does not intend action to be performed upon an object but seeks to merge itself into it as a way of gaining insight into its essential nature. Likewise it involves a knowing element which however is free from the dualisms and inconsistencies of discursive thought.

For another reason, too, I cannot see how mystic intuition can be described as feeling or emotion. Here I must reiterate what I have already said in an earlier paper while discussing the relation between intuition and emotion. Intuitivism is essentially an epistemic principle which offers an insight that enters into the very depths of the being of the object that forms its content. But emotion, in spite of its

(continued from the previous page) absorbing character, is essentially a psychological disposition rather than an epistemic attitude and must therefore be transcended if a really intuitive insight is to be obtained. In fact while intuition is always meaningful, it cannot be said that it is essentially emotional. No doubt ecstatic emotion might result from intuition; it might be its constant accompaniment or implication. But it cannot be asserted to be its necessary condition. It is quite natural perhaps that intuitive knowledge, by its absolute and unique character, should express itself in ecstasy. We can then say that because of knowledge there is ecstasy. But it is manifestly absurd that ecstasy can at all be a necessary condition of knowledge, that the emotional character of an experience can be the essential basis of its value as insight.

(15) According to them intuition, though spontaneous, "possesses also the glimmerings of reason." But the intuition thus characterised is far short of that attested to by the mystics. It is a name for either the vague undeveloped ideas that later find elaboration in complete explicit argument or for the higher reaches of the intellect where many complicated processes of thought are carried out in the back chambers of the mind, the subconscious and the unconscious. It is sometimes described as 'akin to instinct' where in effect it is conceived as but instinct itself. The mystic intuition, on the other hand, comes out of the spiritual nature of man with an authority superior to any which intellect can confer.

(16) For, though mysticism might be negative in the discipline which it prescribes for its initiates, or as often, in its characterisation of the reality known therein, it offers yet a positive experience of absolute truth as a result of the discipline, of which the negativistic description is perhaps the best account in the conceptualistic

(continued from the previous page) terms of language. Moreover, philosophy too proceeds most often by a negative path in the shape of the method of initial scepticism which since Descartes expressly and since Socrates implicitly has almost insistently adopted. Even in regard to expression and formulation of conclusions, most of the terms in which we couch our positive statements in philosophy receive at best but negative definitions. No less, again, is philosophy symbolic. Almost all our philosophical terminology, though used to express abstruse concepts, are mainly drawn from the ordinary language of the spatial world. Only, the philosopher's symbols belong ordinarily to the scientific sphere, while the mystic often considers aesthetic symbols to be expressive to a greater degree of the ultimate nature of reality. And, finally, regarding appearances and their place in the entire scheme of reality we must note that, according to the mystics, on the attainment of the intuitive experience, all appearances, finite objects and fragmentary views of the universe lose their being as such and are reintegrated into and reinterpreted in the light of the illusion received. They therefore stand at, and exist only for, the lower stages on way to the attainment of mystical intuition. In this sense, appearances find their proper place in mysticism not as existences but as various lower stages of consciousness, as the ways in which at these stages consciousness interprets reality. And this seems to me to be a solution to the problem which avoids the objection of double existence as such.

(17) Even where it mocks philosophy, as it often does, it is only carrying out its eternal mission of protesting against the abstraction of philosophical thought from concrete life and immediate experience, and there indeed it

(continued from the previous page) is truly philosophic. For, in rejecting what it points out to be but pseudo-philosophy, it claims to give us what most truly deserves the name. While thus it will never reconcile itself to being called mere philosophy, mysticism certainly always has a philosophy. As such it has both a theoretical and a practical aspect, and the theoretical aspect consists of both a metaphysics and a theory of knowledge.

18) It is sometimes believed that mysticism belongs to a low, immature and primitive stage of intellectual development and that therefore it is not possible for philosophy to discharge its function properly if it allies itself with mysticism. Listening thus to contemporary detractors of mysticism, one might imagine that philosophy has accomplished its emancipation from the primitive but imposing self-deceptions which it attributes to mysticism. The truth, on the other hand, is rather that all those philosophers who have initiated the greatest strides in the progress of philosophy have been men charged with some sort of mystical element in them.

19) It is sometimes doubted if mystic experience is not after all only a kind of mental vapour, luminous, rainbow-tinted, beautiful, but self-created, compounded out of emotion, imagination, strong individual will and rhetoric, rather than any piercing behind the veil of sense or of a vision of the innermost transcendental reality.

20. If mystic experiences are subjective creations, of emotion, imagination, and the like, so are philosophies webs, we must admit, of speculative ideas, evolved and woven into systematic patterns, grand, sublime, but individual self-creations with the help of instinctive beliefs and intellectual construction. Expressions of the philosophic spirit have been always changing with the advance of the times. They are attempts to give an appearance of rationality

(continued from the previous page) to pictures of the universe that happen to catch the imagination or the temperament of individual thinkers. Does not every philosopher, as even Bradley confesses, think too much of his own metaphysical constructions and ascribe to them an importance not their due?

21) We talk of the philosophies as if they were complete systematic wholes, while they are all but approximate limiting conceptions, one-sided imperfect and incomplete. We do not condemn the character of philosophy as an ideal. It is undoubtedly of great value as a motive spring for arduous activity. There would even be some justification for discrediting mysticism on this account, if the latter were to offer no more than just 'faith' and 'a vision ready to hand.' But, as it is, mysticism, being not mere religiousness, is not content with either of these. Its claim is fundamentally a claim of definite actual attainment of an actual experience.

22) The way in which mysticism finds expression changes several times during the course of history, due to the scientific, philosophic, cultural and religious aspects of the epoch in which a mystic lives, the race and nationality to which he belongs, his social and vocational position, his personal life-history and his individual temperament and intellectual disposition.

23) K.R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR: "MODERN STATE" Totalitarian states are said to be a sign of the failure of democracies. The precise significance of this failure is not, however, often understood. It simply means that failure is inherent in the very nature of a democracy which allies itself with a profiteering capitalism which hitherto has largely worked blindly. Conscious rationalist planning is the only remedy for this disease.

24. Land, buildings, plants and other principal

(continued from the previous page) resources of production and distribution would be owned by the state but rented out to the guilds (with no right of disposal, of course) which would hold them simply as trustees of the state, and, secondly, that the guild organisation, ending with the National Guild Congress, while constituting, so far as purely economic matters are concerned, and adequate provision being made for safeguarding the consumers' interest, an imperium in itself based upon efficiency and qualification, would nevertheless be subject to the control of the political state in the final settlement of all conflicts that may arise and in matters of general economic policy such as importation of foreign labour, negotiations with other countries regarding conditions of trade etc. To find work for all is obligatory upon the Guild Congress and wages would be proportionate both work and need, the idea being to cut off great inequalities rather than to establish absolute equality.

1. PROF. P.M. BHAMBHANI "KARMA & FATALISM." (Part I, 15th IP.C.1939:) What then is Karma? The word appears in Sanskrit language and indicates a theory in Indian Philosophy that every act has a causal necessity attached to its nature and as such produces its result without fail and invariably. Karma literally means action or activity which may be potential or kinetic, the former being pure energy hindered from acting due to an opposing amount of energy and we may call it potential Karma or the activity that may be in store due to the energy in reserve. Potential energy is therefore a fund of energy kept in reserve for any future action. Energy essentially implies activity or Karma and is never without motion or action, so that when it seems to be sleeping or inactive and no result is produced, it simply means that two forces are acting against each other and that the seeming no-result

(continued from the previous page) means equilibrium or absence of motion because the two forces are equal and opposite. The two forces are working but they are working to oppose each other's motion and are successful in checking it because from each side an equal amount of force is opposed to the other.

2) All the things of the Universe are therefore active: activity or Karma is the life of the Universe. Science would call this activity motion and state that all things are in motion. There is no rest in nature. Nature abhors rest just as she abhors vacuum; and because all things move, so through motion all things change. We have seen above that according to Heraclitus there is nothing that does not change. So change is the essence of the Universe.

3) What is this subject of Change is the question. Who changes? — that is the crux of the problem. There seems to be some contradiction in the above statement of Kant. "That which changes is permanent" simply implies, in other words, that which changes does not change. The contradiction is however only apparent due to the difficulty of language. The meaning is that that which causes the change or is the eternal or universal ground of change or Karma, or the Universal or Creative Energy which forms the basis of all movement or action does not change although it causes Karma or the changes we apparently notice. The Creative and Universal Energy is creating remains itself constant.

What is this Creative Energy or Subject of Change? Spinoza calls it Substance possessing modes and attributes and yet remaining the permanent Substance despite the changes occurring in its attributes. Kant calls it the Noumenon which is the language of Herbert Spencer was termed the Unknowable and which with Hegel assumed the name Absolute. But he calls it Absolute because in his meaning the Absolute

(continued from the previous page) cannot be called Absolute if it changes, for in the latter case it becomes relative to the changes it under goes. Here in India the philosopher Shankara calls it Brahman—the Universal Consciousness, the Universal Being, and the Peace, Sat, Chita and Ananda,—the eternal Being the basis for all beings, the ground of all life, the life of all life.

4) It is maintained that both individual voluntary Karma and social voluntary Karma have the efficacy of gathering merit or demerit according to their quality, and that as an individual must in course of time reap the fruit of his actions so should a society; and that all upheavals in the social history of a nation, in the form of revolutions, riots, wars, agitations, changes of Governments, reforms social and political and other events of life description are the results of some past Karma on the part of the particular country or community which on this account suffers or gains an advantage in the form of an advance and lastly that even the Karma of an individual may be sacrificed before the overwhelming deluge of the combined effects of a Social Karma.

5) How then is Karma connected with Fatalism? The idea of Karma originated from the fact that the world presents considerable variation in the condition and quality of men and other members of creation. The variation e.g. is that of rich and poor, healthy and sick, beautiful and ugly, powerful and weak, ruler and ruled, master and servant, man and woman, human, animal, plant and mineral, happy and miserable, independent and free etc. It is said that this diversity which amounts to that of well-being and suffering is due to man's karma or actions done by him in his previous life or lives and that in this life he has been born to reap their fruit whether good or bad, the former

(continued from the previous page) in the shape of reward and the latter as a punishment. Even the kind of body a doer may take depends upon his past life the karma where of determine what form he should take appropriately to the fruit that his karma destine him to receive. Only we cannot say by this theory when Karma began and what determined the first born in which each of the multitude of beings were born. According to Buddha the Karma being eternal no one knows what form a man took for the first time, as it is impossible to know what his first act was.

6) The results of Karma may be immediate or remote in the future and in the latter case leads to rebirth. But it is agreed that according to what our actions may ordain, we take the kind of body which is, as said above, the most appropriate to our growth as well as to the fruit which we must reap through the new body.

7) Karma is unsatisfactory because it fails to explain how the first birth could have taken place without any Karma, as no one could perform any Karma before it is born for the first time. But barring this difficulty, it is a plausible and a fruitful hypothesis as it explains all conditions of life in which men live, move and have their being. It is at the same time a good consolation to a man in trouble or suffering and saves him a considerable part of worry to which he would otherwise be subjected. It also keeps a man prepared for any ills he is destined to suffer, as he knows the inevitable necessity which characterises Karma, with which it must bring its own result. It also helps to purify his mind of his wrong which he now feels he must have some day done and inclines him to pray for deliverance from the evil tendency which may still lead him on to it.

It is said that this theory is educationally

(continued from the previous page) unjust, since the sufferer does not know what he is suffering for; but such an appraisal is impossible as there is none to appraise him of it except his own Karma which lasting through the ages of several births has not the efficacy of keeping the memory intact through several variations of the physical bodies changed like clothes off and on. The charge of making a man idle is also levelled against Fatalism; since thinking that one is sure to have what is destined to have and never a shell more or less, one may refuse to put in effort enough to make him prosper or even to save himself from any calamity. To this criticism the reply may be that being circumscribed by the limitations of the apparent world and consequently not knowing the effects of one's Karma in a full measure, one should ever try to behave as a human being and never as a god whose function one can never arrogate to himself. Therefore let us do what seems to be right and let the mysterious go with the Mysterious whose law is inexorable. So then the giver of the fruit of our Karma is not God as some of us think, but a return of our own action unto ourselves; or what we call in Newtonian terms, a reaction of our own actions which fact must in this sense be regarded as a result of the law of Nature.

But is a man at any time during the period of his several lives free to perform a new action, unhampered by the effect of past Karma? Can he at any time while he suffers the pleasures and pains of his own previous actions, do actions which may be regarded as having nothing to do with his past life as its result, and which may be considered as activities so entirely fresh as to produce results in this or a new life? In other words in human life, do Necessity and Freewill go together or are they theories that mutually deny each other as being fully contradictory as principles of doing and suffering regarded

(continued from the previous page) as reciprocally apart.

8) Max Plank a scientist of today's renown is certain of what Kant doubts. There is no freedom says he. Man seems to himself to be free, because he cannot watch himself from outside himself, as an astronomer may wish to watch the earth from another planet as an impartial observer from outside. If only we could detach ourselves from ourselves in space, and can physically go out of the limitations imposed upon us by our existence here and now and within our personality, we should, he thinks find ourselves impelled by the universal necessity imposed upon us by the eternal Absolute.

9) There is yet another argument in support of human freedom; and coming as it does from several great men engaged today in scientific research, it deserves a special consideration. This argument is based upon the element of uncertainty which has been observed to exist in Science. It has been noticed that the effect of causes cannot be predicated with as much precision as used to be possible of late, because certain irregularities of quantity and quality in the occurrence of these effects or phenomena have been discovered. It is argued therefore that this element of uncertainty which fails to affirm a cause as equal to its effect makes for a certain residue which leans on the side of freedom as probable.

Professor Bridgman bases it on relativity and says that "it is impossible to measure exactly both the position and velocity of the electron." Now on account of this impossibility and the consequent uncertainty it is affirmed that later discoveries may lead to the discovery of spontaneity instead of necessity.

But even here one cannot understand how, when knowledge reaches the farthest of its possible limits, it will be found that certain events could occur without a cause. Not understanding

(continued from the previous page) in full measure the cause of a given phenomenon is one thing and to believe that the phenomenon has no cause is another; and if we have faith that every phenomenon has a cause and that one day we shall acquire full knowledge about it, we need not fall into the trap of the dogma of freedom. Moreover uncertainty is after all uncertainty and cannot be interpreted as the kind of certainty which proceeds from and characterises knowledge. A belief in the Freedom of the Will, or, better still, freedom of the self or personality must proceed from knowledge which is another name for truth; and truth cannot depend upon probabilities which must be reduced to certainties before we call them items of knowledge.

10) M.A. VENKATA RAO. "The Doctrine of Karma and Fatalism." Karma and re-incarnation are regarded as parts of one idea and one existence. One means the other. It is one of the unique features of Indian thought that souls are conceived to be 'beginningless', un-originated. They are not created out of nothing at a point of time. In fact, the very idea of creation is given up as self-contradictory. God and nature are souls, however they may be termed in different systems, have been regarded as eternal in the strict sense of being beginningless and endless. It appears to me that the principal ground on which the belief in re-incarnation is held is a profound and inarticulate realisation of the infinite potentiality of the human spirit, however cribbed, cabined and confined it may appear to be in ordinary life. There is so much in us demanding expression, there is so much in the universe to explore, to understand, and to master; but the brief span of years allotted to each separate incarnation in the body is pitifully meagre. We close our eyes by the time we understand the game. The

(continued from the previous page) idea of Karma conceives of life as a long career extending from life to life in a continuous series, each life a new chance and a new opportunity for the soul to make or mar itself.

11) Every deed sets up a chain of consequences both in the ensemble of body, mind and soul, which we call ourselves, and in the external world of nature and society. Nothing can annihilate these waves of consequences. They travel for ever. Life has an apparatus for automatic registration, which nothing can efface. Further even our innermost thoughts and impulses owe their inclination or bias to sources in the past, and guide our steps to a self-made destiny.

12) Grace and repentance make a renovation, a rebirth of the soul possible, but the pain and suffering we have drawn upon our heads by our deeds must be endured.

13) An extraordinary individualist emphasis is another of the characteristic aspects in the doctrine of Karma. We must, each one of us, paddle our own canoe, and take the consequences of our own deeds upon our own heads. Others can assist us, no doubt, but the choice is our own. The responsibility cannot be shared or delegated. In the end, every person must plough his own lonely furrow. In the depths of the personality, each soul is alone before God or the universe. No vicarious suffering is possible. Social relationships such as those of the family, the circle of friends, society and the state are temporary scaffoldings or scenes in the long journey of the soul to its immortal destiny. Freedom and responsibility go together.

14) The idea of determinism may be said to imply that creatures are free to act within limits but the quota of consequences in the way of pleasure and pain are irrevocably fixed. Nothing that we can do can alter this. Whoever falls

(continued from the previous page) from a certain height or drinks a certain drug must undergo a fixed sum of suffering. But he is free to meet it in his own way. He may howl with pain or hold his teeth manfully.

15. The doctrine of Karma postulates that we inherit our own past achievement—good or evil—in the shape of the initial endowment, physical and spiritual, and of the initial social situation, the family and the society into which we are born. We shall take up the endowment first and see how far the doctrine entails fatalism in that respect.

Our past constitutes our capital—the quality of body, mind and spirit, compact of dispositions, tendencies, *vasanas*, *samskara*, funded culture. But the very words *vasana* and *samskara* indicate tendencies and do not connote determinism. The past only urges and introduces a powerful bias, but Karma means the present choice, which is creative and strictly free. We may work against the past. We must counter-act the past. That is the very purpose of a fresh opportunity. When the body and mind have lost spring and elasticity, and the daily scene becomes dull by familiarity, the old apparatus is scrapped and brand new instruments and fresh workshops are given to us. Karma therefore does not logically entail fatalism, on the contrary, it is only intelligible if freedom of fresh self-making is assumed.

Further, there may be an element of determinism in the general nature of the universe and the general nature of the soul. But this only fixes the field of endeavour. They are postulates of life and realisation. They are limits inherent in the very meaning of existence and activity. Time and space, body and mind, are necessary for the race of life. They are conditions and channels of activity. They are fetters only in the stage of ignorance. They become means

(continued from the previous page) of joyous self-realisation in the stage of knowledge.

16) From the standpoint of external situation, natural and social, an element of chance and fatalism seems inescapable. Karma determines our field, our family, nation and race and time. Shakespeare or Napoleon in the South Sea Islands could not have risen to the heights they did, it may be said. The doctrine holds that there is no element of chance even here. There seems to be a law of economy in the universe by which souls find themselves in the situations in which they can make the best of themselves, and which their deserts demand. Desert matches capacity. The how of this tremendous cosmic adjustment may be a mystery, but the doctrine in import is an effort to rationalise the element of contingency in the matching of person to situation; whether the effort is logically sustainable is another matter.

17) It assumes a formative self in human individuals, which is sufficiently real for the reliving of values inherent in the universe. An unoriginated and endless soul-substance is not necessary for the doctrine. Buddhism in its metaphysical outlook postulates only a stream of successive waves of consciousness. The empirical self is a bundle of dispositions. Nor is it necessary to assume an un-originated status for the self. An idealist may postulate the origination of finite centres as a part of the self-expression of the infinite consciousness; they may endure till their game is played out one way or the other, and there is an end.

18) R. RAMANUJACHARI: "Karma & Fatalism." Primarily intended to bestow on him the reward or punishment which is his due (Karma - phala), this initial equipment with which the person starts the journey of life, incidentally predisposes him to courses of action which are in

(continued from the previous page) harmony with his own previous deeds.

19) Far from encouraging an attitude of passivity or submission to the inevitable, the theory of Karma furnishes a persistent inducement to progress. It does not shut the doors of hope and opportunity. Fate implies that man's future is irrevocably fixed and that human effort can only feebly flutter and fall. Karma, on the other hand, asserts that the issue of life is never fore-ordained and that it depends upon the individual. That without human effort (purusakara) there can be no success in life is the repeated teaching of the religious literature of India. Yajnyavalkya declares that the fruition of an act depends both upon human effort and upon destiny (daiva). After mentioning the several views that seek to explain the fruition of an act on the basis severally of destiny (davia), nature (svabhava) time (kala), and human effort (purusakara), he favours the view that the success of an action is dependent upon the co-operation of all these factors. The chariot provided with one wheel alone does not move; even so in the absence of human effort, nothing can be achieved by destiny alone. The Anusasana Parva of the Mahabharata in a section entirely devoted to a consideration of this problem emphasises the importance of human effort. Just as the soil, though well-tilled bears no fruit so long as the seed is not sown, even so in the absence of human effort destiny is of no avail. Human effort may be likened to the soil; and destiny, to the seed. From the union of the soil and the seed crops flourish.

20. A person's actions are determined by his desires; his desires, by his vasanas; and the vasanas, in their turn, by previous deeds. Since the vasanas set up a tendency to repeat the

(continued from the previous page) the same deeds in the future, the performer of wicked deeds, for example, would inherit vasanas which make him repeat the wicked deeds. He could not help being caught up in sin. Thus man finds himself under the sway of impulses which drag him along like the flood or the violent wind.

Is it possible, in the face of this, to maintain that the individual is free? The answer is that man is more than a mere bundle of instincts, dispositions and the like. The vasanas are not the sole determinants of action. Of the two results of past deeds (1) the Karma-phala (pleasure and pain) and (2) Vasanas favouring the repetition of previous deeds—the first is inescapable. The vasanas, however, are not irremediable handicaps. When the vasanas suggest certain desires, it is quite possible for man to abstain from acting in accordance with those desires. Though impelled by hunger to eat food set before him, the hungry person promptly inhibits the impulse the moment he knows that the food has been poisoned. Again, the wood-cutter, who is desirous of gathering firewood, when taught the means of securing a great fortune, will stop gathering firewood and go in search of treasure. It is evident that in spite of a desire caused by vasana, either consciousness of sin or knowledge of a higher goal can prevent the original desire from being fulfilled and initiate a new course of action. Herein lies the jiva's freedom. As a spiritual, moral being, the jiva possesses the capacity to resist the force of vasanas and direct its actions to certain defined and deivable ends. He has awareness of values; he distinguishes the lower from the higher desires; and he strives to realise his ideals in his own conduct. Thus, man is free in every one of his

(continued from the previous page) decisions. He can rise above the enslaving chains of vasanas by exercising his freedom of choice.

21) P.T. RAJU: "Negative judgment in Relation to Reality." Many philosophical schools in India and the West believe that negation is real, not merely that it is logically real, but also ontologically. It is only some extreme forms of Absolutism like the Advaita and the Mahayana Buddhism that deny it ontological validity, though they concede it the logical. According to the Advaita, it is only the logical. According to the Advaita, it is only the positive or sat that can have ontological validity; abhava or negation always presupposes bhava or the positive.

22) Judgment is about things finite, and finite things as finite, even according to Bradley and Bosanquet, are not ultimately real. So much is implied in Bradley's theory that thought finally destroys itself in its attempt to reach reality. The difference between the Advaita and these two philosophers is due to the latter's persistence in treating reality as logical in spite of their recognition that it must be beyond logic.

23) When the bhava which is the object of the affirmative judgment is finally negated as not real, that is, when the phenomenal world itself is declared to be not real, this negation must be based upon something positive, which of course is not a judgment, but the ultimate basis of every judgment, like the ultimate subject in Bradley's logic.

But the Mahayana Buddhist, especially the maddhyamika, denies that abhava belongs to reality, because his reality is beyond both bhava and abhava. It is bhavabhavatita. It is called Sunya by the madhyamikas and Alaya by the Yoga-charins. The reality of both these schools is beyond our intellect. Both Bhava and abhava belong to the noumenon. Thus though the Mahayana schools place both bhava and abhava on the same level they refuse to attach ontological validity to either.

24) Curiously enough the madhyamika argues that his Sunya or reality is beyond both bhava and abhava, because both are on the same level and belong to the phenomenal world. Both the Hegelians and the madhyamika start from the same premises but reach different conclusions. But the Advaitin does not place both on the same level, and so he can treat reality as bhava, though as beyond abhava.

25) The truth is that unreality cannot be a part of reality. If this is not accepted, our logic and epistemology would be of no use and achieve nothing. It is true that unreal objects are perceived, for example, the snake in the rope, and imaginary objects have mental existence. But it is to distinguish between the sort of existence which belongs to them and the existence which is reality that we begin our logic and epistemology; and we try to reach reality by excluding the existence that belongs to the objects of illusion and imagination. We treat such existence as no existence. The distinction between reality and unreality is therefore final, and without it logic and epistemology would be aimless.

26). PROF. A.C. MUKREJI. "NEGATIVE JUDGMENT." The bifurcation of Reality, for instance, into the ontological on the one hand and the logical or intellectual on the other may be left undiscussed without prejudice to the main issue before us, because the problem of negative judgment is pre-eminently one which has a meaning within our intellectual world only; and the assertion of an ultra-intellectual Reality lying beyond what alone is intellectually knowable throws no light on the relation of negative judgment to that Reality which it claims to describe.

27. The gulf between the logical and the ontological, or, as he sometimes puts it, the sphere of logic and the sphere of existence, is

(continued from the previous page) left so deep as to make it impossible for the ontological reality to function as an explanatory principle of anything that belongs to the logical domain. "Absence", and difference are said to be logical constructs, and, as such, cannot belong to reality; similarly, all judgments are logical constructions, and this is true not only of the negative but also of the affirmative judgments, and consequently, they are 'removed' from reality. The only legitimate consequence of such an unqualified scepticism about the efficiency of thought and logic would naturally lead one to the position of Pyrrho's sage, and, then, even the distinction of the ontological from the logical would lose all its meaning.

28) The Absolute for Bradley does not exclude the appearances, and his emphatic condemnation of "empty transcendence" and "shallow Pantheism" ought to show the limits of the analogy between his position and that of the Advaitins as interpreted by Dr Raju. It is therefore, positively incorrect to think that for Bradley and Bosanquet the finite things are not ultimately real in the same sense in which they are unreal in the advaita system. The Hegelians will never identify self-transcendence with empty transcendence, and their Absolute must somehow embrace all diversity. That is, the Absolute for Bradley is an immanent principle whereas the Advaita Brahman, as interpreted by Dr Raju, far from expressing itself in the appearances, lives a solitary life positively hostile to the whole range of appearances.

We may now see why the Advaita Absolute cannot be the ideal of logic and thought in the same sense in which the Absolute of Bradley can. The Absolute for Bradley, whatever else it may be, is at least a whole though it is beyond intellect. As this ultra-intellectual whole cannot

(continued from the previous page) be realised by discursive thought or the rational way of knowledge, thought must commit suicide in entering the whole. Thus the intellect for Bradley commits suicide, not in the interest of a foreign ideal, but for the realisation of its own ideal of a harmonious whole. The Brahman on the contrary, whatever else it may be, is not a whole, and, as such, it cannot be the ideal of logic and thought as Dr Raju insists. Consequently, if intellect has to commit suicide here, that is because its ideal is opposed to the 'ontological' Reality which on that very account remains as inscrutable and unthinkable as the 'Thing-in-itself' of Kant.

29) It is futile, as we have already suggested, to attempt to solve a purely logical question about the nature of negative judgment by reference to a Reality which ex hypothesis falls beyond all judgments. Such a procedure is unjustifiable because it confers on one side the right of using the logical intellect while depriving the other side of the same right.

30) If reality is all-inclusive, it does not appear to be clear how "we try to reach reality by excluding the existence that belongs to the objects of illusion and imagination." Granted that both logic and epistemology would be aimless in the absence of a distinction between truth and error, or between the real and the unreal. But will not our epistemology be depthless if, instead of accounting for the objects of illusion and imagination, we were simply to treat such existence as no existence? Even in the advaita philosophy, which is followed by Dr Raju, Being or Existence is taken to be all-inclusive and everything, including illusion and dream, is supposed to be rooted in Being. This perhaps will not be denied by Dr Raju, but then he must admit that his treatment of error is very inadequate, if not positively wrong.

1. A.R. WADIA: "NATIONALISM." (Part 1, 16th I.P.C. 1940). Anthropologists and ethnologists themselves cast a doubt on the authenticity of the race concept. As against the authority of Count Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain, who are fundamentally dreamers, we have the authority of sober scientists who look upon race as just a myth. Daniel Defoe in his satiric poem The Englishman shows up the different national strands that go to the make up of the Englishman. In the Englishmen of to-day who can distinguish the descendants of the old Huguenots or the political refugees from different countries in the 19th century? What applies to England applies to France as well. A Mittelhauser of obvious German descent is today a French general fighting against the Germans, and the ranks of Germans would not be free from men of French extraction. But the most striking example is the United States of America. The original streak of English blood has been inundated with millions and millions of the Irish, the Poles, the Russians and the Italians. In fact there is no country in Europe to-day that has not given its quota to the rapid growth of American population in the last century.
2. The subtle Bengali has as much Mongel blood in him as Aryan, while the people of the Punjab bear distinct traces of varied blood inheritance: Persian and Greek, Afghan and Moghul. The evidence of history finds support in the conclusions of scientists like Julian Juxley, who has no hesitation in asserting that race is a myth and quoting the cynical but not inapt definition of nation as "a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbours."
3. With a concept so vague and yet charged with emotional dynamite the task of political philosophy to clarify political issues becomes

(continued from the previous page) doubly hard. Where has the concept of nationality led the world to? Circumspice! Nationalism by itself is fraught with dangerous possibilities. Minorities impelled by nationalism may rebel against their political masters. Civil war is the least of its dangers. But what catastrophes happen when the sense of nationalism develops into a superiority complex and its leaders begin bursting with the sense of their historical missions and conquering innocent peoples.

4) The League of Nations was in itself a perfectly sound principle, but the terrible uncertainty of American politics made it a leaky vessel from the very beginning. From its birth the League became a League of the European nations, and even so a League of the European victors. The astuteness of Mr Lloyd George made the component parts of the British Empire individual members, which only gave the British Empire a predominating position so that the future success or failure of the League rested on how England with her Dominions would give a lead in every important question that cropped up. Politically the League has proved a tragic failure with the ghosts of Manchuria and Abyssinia haunting its council chambers. The mischief that an excessive veneration for the principle of nationalism has wrought in our times is fully illustrated by history.

5) What then is the ultimate value of nationality as a political concept? That it has been of great cultural value in the past cannot be denied by anybody. But in these days the radio and the aeroplane have made the world really so small as to annihilate distances, and the commercial contacts have become so intimate that every war is an economic disaster. This is an axiom which Sir Norman Angel has laboured hard to prove, and every successive war has

(continued from the previous page) only served to support his thesis. Politically a war becomes even a greater disaster, for in these "civilised" days of aerial bombs and poison gasses and vast armies of millions the distinction between the civilian and the soldier has practically disappeared. And it is certainly an odd solution of the problem of population to send the very best of men—and perhaps even women—to be slaughtered in their millions. And the end of it all is just that ground drinks blood like wine.

Militant nationalism does not take long to degenerate into an aggressive imperialism. Nationalism as an ultimate principle of politics stands out in all its naked bankruptcy.

6. We cannot be blind to the fact that the days of the city states had been numbered, that they had had their day, but they had outlived their usefulness, in fact they had become a hindrance to the further progress of the Greeks. True, Greece lost her freedom, but she dies only to live again in the East and the West. The Greek culture, which used to be confined within the narrow limits of the four city walls now burst these prison walls and became the culture of half the world. The same line of thought applies to the nation states today. Each nation big and small, vaunting its own greatness, eager to exploit the weaknesses of their neighbours has become a danger to the peace of the world. The scramble that followed the German rape of Czechoslovakia, when Hungary and Poland thought of enlarging their own domains, forgetful of the fate that hung over their own heads is worthy of being a theme for a comic opera, were it not for the fact that such comedies usually prove to be the preludes to grim tragedies.

6) Must they go? They need not, but in a new world order the superstition of the ultimate supremacy of the nation state will have to go. If

(continued from the previous page) a big nation state is a threat, a small nation state is a temptation

7) The compact federation of the U.S.A. is a model for the rest of the world to follow. Even the loose federation of the British Empire has its own lessons to teach. A nation that is perpetually haunted by the fear of war and can never hope to be strong enough to resist any aggression through its own unaided efforts has really no right to an independent existence. This sounds harsh, even cruel. But life is cruel and he who lives in a fool's paradise does so at his own peril. To expect non-violence of the Gandhian variety to replace war is a dream, which in one sense is impossible and in another sense is not even desirable. Non-violence can hope to be real and to achieve its end only on one condition: that life is reduced to a dead dullness of uniformity with all our wants practically reduced to zero. In such an insipid world without beauty, without comfort there will be nothing in the world to envy anyone about, and there may be no war. But such a world is just a rustic Arcadia, which looks fine on paper perhaps, but few would care to see literally realised with life slipping back into the era of bullock carts and flickering wicks. When poverty is equalised and life unindustrialised there may be no war but the remedy may prove worse than the disease.

For our political thought to end in so life-less an ideal would be to proclaim its bankruptcy. Surely there may be a middle path by which we can attain all the goods of life and reduce the risks of war. Politics has never known an absolute best. Each age has its own problem and its own solution. We know enough of life to make us realise the futility of mere utopias. Take man as he is: a mixture of good and evil, capable of being disciplined through fear and the development of a social sense, which has made

(continued from the previous page) him in the past pass through all the stages of hordes, clans, tribes, city states and country states and empires. A world state may be still desirable, but it is a distant dream. With the given material and with the human nature as it has been: not so evil as it was, not so good as it might be, what can be done to-day to reduce the risk of devastating wars and to give a certain stability to human life? Ethics will have its say, and economics its own pet formulae. What has politics to say? I think the political solution of our present problems is to create the age of federation.

At present we have a few big powers who think of the world in terms of themselves; balance of power, status quo, a league of nations (a few conquering and European) are all nostrums which have failed to preserve peace. Small nations by themselves are likely to preserve peace—though even of this we cannot be absolutely sure—but they become pawns in the hands of big power diplomacy. A League of large federated unions may succeed where the old League of Nations failed so miserably.

8). The world needs a political organisation on the basis of large federated unions. Within each federation the component parts can have their own individual, cultural life—and this is the only part of nationalism worth conserving—while the federal parliament will look to the economic and military organisation of its resources as a whole. If it is argued that no nation worth the name can sign its own death warrant to be merged into a big partnership with other bigger or smaller nations, my answer is that the fostering of such a narrow nationality is itself a danger inviting a total annihilation, whereas a voluntary sacrifice of some power in relation to foreign policy and military organisation may ultimately lead to the preservation

(continued from the previous page) of all that is beat in that vague and shifting term: nation.

9) We must not forget that behind and beyond all nations lies Humanity. Prophets of all claims have struggled to paint in bright colours the claims of man as man, of the brother-hood of men in the highest sense of the term. Narrower loyalties have always defied the hopes of the prophets. But in the course of our human evolution our narrower loyalties have been slowly but steadily overcome. The next step lies in the large federations I have been speaking about. Perhaps through such a step humanity will come nearer the ideal of oneness of humanity.

10) J.F. BUTLER: "NATIONALISM." No one could deny the great importance of nationalism in the world to-day; but it would be hard to say just what is meant by the word. I shall use it here, still rather vaguely, in the sense of the doctrine which lays great stress on the nation as much the most important unit of social organisation.

This definition, of course, brings us face to face with the deeper and more difficult problem, What is a nation? Is it held together by common race, common soil, common economic needs? Or by what? Here I must simply bow in respect to this problem, and pass on. The problem of the connotation of 'nation' is intensely difficult; but we can sufficiently recognise what is meant by 'nation' by its denotation, by reviewing in our minds the large-scale organisations of our political life, the political units which claim a complete or a very high degree of independence, of 'sovereignty.'

11) If it is forgotten that individual rights severely limit each other, and also that man, individual man, is essentially a social animal, desiring and needing societies (even societies that call for much self-sacrifice) if his being

(continued from the previous page) is not to be frustrated. If such truths are forgotten, the stress laid on the individual leads to such errors as *laissezfaire* in economics and self-centredness in ethics; and the combined prevalence and danger of such errors is doubtless responsible for much of the modern exaggerated stress on the nation.

12) Everywhere it is taken for granted that some sort of international order must come, if mankind survives at all; the question is simply whether it will be an imperialistic or a democratic one, an imposed or an agreed one, and, if it is to be democratic and agreed, of what sort it shall be.

13) There was a growing body of opinion that if more government were done from regional capitals such as Edinburgh the life of the 'provinces' would be invigorated, and at the same time the definitely unhealthy growth of London would be checked. Certainly Britain by its neglect of local government, has come to be faced with twin evils—its local councils have come to be in the hands of the retired-small-capitalist type (a poor type for the purpose), and its central Parliament has no political personnel to recruit itself from except retired-big capitalists, baristers, professional politicians, and professional labour leaders (a most unrepresentative collection). In such cases, some degree of decentralisation might seem to be the way of wisdom.

14) The nation is a useful unit, if and when it is curbed by an effective internationalistic sentiment above it, and by a revitalised regional sentiment within it, and by a healthy sense of the centrality of the individual as the basis of the whole social structure.

15) Political philosophy is directed at every step by the facts of history and of human nature.

(continued from the previous page) But it still retains some degree of generality, by dealing with history only in its broad outlines with only the universal elements in human nature. It can thus arrive at comparatively general conclusions, which will have both the merits and defects of their comparative generality; i.e., they will have some application to every situation, but perfect application to none.

Although, then, I have here arrived at a condemnation of nationalism as a general, a 'philosophical' principle, I am quite prepared to admit that in any actual situation concerning nationalism which may arise in politics, ('the art of the possible'), there may be circumstances which make it either right, or necessary, or both, to lay far greater stress upon the nation that is right in normal circumstances.

16) The only practical advice, in this matter, which the political philosopher can offer to the politician is that, whether the politician in any immediate problem can apply or must override the general principle, he will do well to keep it fully in mind when long scale planning is in question.

17. The fact, on which all we contributors seem agreed, that nationalism is a sentiment, means that our main problem is a psychological one, and one to which, so far as I know, the psychologists have not yet given us a solution. For, if nationalism is a sentiment, and we wish to curb it and replace its extremes by stress on an enlarged community, we have got to know how to curb one kind of social sentiment, namely nationalism, and how to replace it by some other. I am not aware that the psychologists have quite got round to this problem yet. Nationalism, regarded as a static thing, has been fairly thoroughly studied by social psychologists.

18) For reasons that plenty of psychologists have already told us, it is easy to feel nationally; for reasons that plenty of sociologists have told us, it is essential to feel internationally: our problem is how to get the emotion into the internationalism. It is hard enough for us philosophers, who would probably claim that our training had put our emotions considerably under the control of our intellect; how much harder for the masses of men! Yet till the masses of men feel a passion for internationalism, no nation will surrender its sovereignty, no international police force will be able to be manned by anything but the worst type of mercenaries; and in other ways the international idea is bound to break down.

The international sentiment has three foes to cope with; firstly, the already ingrained nationalism; secondly, man's difficulty in feeling enthusiastic for what is large-scale and remote and strange; thirdly, the fact that the international order, once established, can by definition have no external foes, and so is deprived of war, which the nations have found to be the great whipper-up of social enthusiasm. These it must fight, so far as I can see, with man's sense of economic self-interest, with his capacity for sheer altruism, and with religion, which is (among other things) the greatest instrument for turning intellectual convictions into enthusiastic sentiments.

19). J.C. BANERJEE. "NATIONALISM": The concept of a State as an organism whose soul is conscious in its citizens and in which the individuals are totally absorbed has been derived from the philosophical Idealism of the Absolutists. According to this theory, the State is "something real" whose morality is 'Social Righteousness.' It has got a higher morality than that of the average individual. The originator of this absolutist

(continued from the previous page) theory is Hegel; and much of its offshoots are but the elaborations made by his school. In England, it was popularised by a group of Oxford Philosophers, known as Neo-Hegelians, among whom Green, Bradley and Bosanquet are the most prominent.

20) By the dialectical process of the evolution of mind Hegel has attempted to show its history as evolving, 'towards a fuller consciousness of itself and a fuller freedom', in which its determining laws are its own creation. Like Burke, he also thinks of the laws of the State as 'the product of the whole past history of the people accumulated in the form of conventions, customs and constitutional laws, and not as 'a product of the sovereign will of the people expressed in the legislative assembly', as Rousseau maintains. Thus, the history of mind, for Hegel, is the history of the world. This in essence, is his Philosophy of History.

21) Marx, though after all originally a Hegelian, distinguishes himself from Hegel in respect of his materialistic conception. His Dialectical Materialism agrees with the Logical Dialecticism of Hegel in so far as it holds that 'the development of both thought and things is brought about through a conflict of opposing elements or tendencies.' But unlike Hegel, Marx maintains that the driving force of the dialectical process is not the ideas themselves or mental but a physical event or material.

22) PROF. SHYAMA CHARAN. "ON CAUSALITY" The entire point of view of physics has been changed by the discovery of the so-called principle of uncertainty by Werner Heisenberg. It has led some scientists and philosophers to suggest that the movements of atoms and electrons are just as indeterminate as human nature!

It has been found that every experimental method which permits of an exact measurement of

(continued from the previous page) the electron's position does not lead to an exact measurement of its velocity. Further it has been discovered that the consequent inaccuracy in the measurement of its velocity varies inversely with the accuracy in the measurement of its position and vice versa.

This phenomenon is governed by a law which is accurately defined in terms of Planck's quantum constant h . ($h=6.55 \times 10^{-27}$ seconds-ergs)

23. It is not hard to discover the reason for these uncertainties. To measure the velocity we must measure s , the distance through which the electron moves during a short interval of time t . The ratio s/t , when t is made as small as possible gives its velocity. This is not the velocity when the electron was in its first position at the beginning of the time interval t , but gives the average velocity between the two positions. Hence when the position is accurately determined, its velocity cannot be determined at the same time, and vice versa.

We can find the position of a moving electron only if we can see it, and hence it must be illuminated by a beam of light. The photons of these light rays come into collision with the electron and thus alter its velocity in a way which is impossible to calculate. The more accurately it is desired to determine the position of the electron, the shorter must be the light waves employed to illuminate it, the stronger will be the impact, and the greater the inaccuracy with which the velocity is determined.

In spite of these uncertainties, is it not marvellous that their product is accurately deter- minable in terms of the Planck's constant h ?

Because of these uncertainties, some scientists and philosophers say, the application of the causal connections here must be abandoned. On the other hand, whether or not the causal connection be true in reality, is a question that has no

¹⁰ The original editor inserted "x" by hand

(continued from the previous page) meaning for the physicist for the simple reason that in atomic physics he cannot apply it.

24. It seems that in the external world a certain regularity prevails, the observation of which leads one to the very useful and practical concept of a necessary causal connection between one natural event and another.

25. Like the dual nature of Light, human will also possesses duality. Sometimes it appears to be free and at others bound.

Scientists with their experiments on jada (life-less) objects, and philosophers with their logic and arguments only will never be able to get at their real nature.

Only those who are able to transcend the limitations of our space and time may be able to penetrate behind the veil of this mystery.

26) B. VENKATESACHAR: "ON CAUSALITY." The advent of the quantum theory has made the above position untenable in the domain of atomic physics. In order to be able to predict the state of a material system at a future time with any desired degree of accuracy, the present positions and velocities of the components should be known with a corresponding degree of accuracy. Since there is no theoretical limit to the accuracy with which these positions and velocities can be determined by the use of measuring instruments there is no limit to the accuracy with which the future state can be predicted. In the limit we may say, that the future is accurately predictable. This is the position in classical physics. The quantum theory sets a limit to the accuracy attainable in the measurements of positions and velocities at any instant. It must be emphasised that no imaginable refinement in the apparatus employed in the measurement can overcome this difficulty. The very fact that we attempt to make a measurement

(continued from the previous page) theoretically implies this defect.

Let us take the case of an electron. In order to find its position we must use some kind of light (radiation) to see electron. The shorter the wave-length of light used, the more accurate is the measurement of the position. But the shorter the wave-length of the radiation, the more energetic (heavy) is a quantum of this light and when the quantum hits the electron, the velocity of the electron changes; this change in the velocity increases with the increase in the energy of the quantum. That is, the shorter the wave-length of the light used in observing the position of the electron the greater is the change of its velocity produced in the act of observing the electron. The greater the accuracy attained in determining the position, the more is the inaccuracy introduced in our knowledge of its velocity and vice versa. The result of these considerations is that a precise knowledge of the initial condition by measurement becomes meaningless. In large scale phenomena such as those of the motions of celestial bodies, the discrepancies in measurement contemplated in the above considerations are vanishingly small and do not matter. This is not the case when we are dealing with atomic phenomena.

27) In microscopic phenomena, (atomic and sub-atomic physics), the law of causality as understood in classical physics becomes meaningless. The physicist is compelled to apply to these cases the calculus of probability.

In macroscopic or large scale phenomena, for example, the motion of celestial bodies, what appear to us as the reign of the strict law of causality can be shown to be extreme cases of statistical laws: the accurate predictions are cases where the probability of occurrence differs from one (i.e) certainty by a quantity which is vanishingly small.

28. There is, however, another school of physicists who refuse to give up the principle of causality and hold that the aim of the physicist should now be so to modify the statement of the principle of causality as to meet the present situation; (i.e.) the law of causality must be re-stated so as to meet the present situation. Prominent among physicists of this way of thinking are Planck and Einstein. In passing it may be noted that it is Planck's quantum theory that led Heisenberg to postulate his principle of indeterminacy, the sheet anchor of the indeterminists. The position of Planck may be summarised thus:

(i) It has been remarked above that as a result of the quantum theory the apparatus used in the measurement introduces an error into the measurement, an error which no refinement in the instrument can avoid. Planck suggests that the law of causality and the consequent strict determinism can be maintained provided the experimenter and the apparatus employed are included in and taken account of as part of the physical system which is under observation and on which the measurement is made.

(ii) In the above suggestion the measured description of an event in the objective world is not independent of the observer and his measuring instrument. Of this defect Planck is deeply conscious. To remedy this defect Planck introduces the concept of an all-knowing ideal mind whose knowledge is independent of measuring instruments.

P. NARASIMHAYYA: "THE MANDUKYA APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY." (in Vedanta Kesari, July 41)

I. The Mandukya is one of the shortest Upanishads, consisting of only twelve brief passages. But so vital is its teaching that a later Upanishad, the Muktikopanishad declares

(continued from the previous page) it the epitome, and Sankaracharya calls it the essence, of all the Upanishads.

Even in its brief compass it represents one distinctive approach to philosophy. It proceeds by an analysis of the human consciousness and its states. Other Upanishads made their approach through other problems such as those of immortality and the criticism of the objective categories of experience. The distinctive approach of the Mandukya consists in a direct analysis of the subjective states of 'consciousness.'

These are waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleeping. They are so obvious and simple that they hardly need an explicit statement, and they do not look as if they have any revelation to make to us in Philosophy. However, their analysis and investigation are so highly valued in Indian philosophy as to be made a distinct pathway to reality. In later thought, it is usually referred to as the principle of the avasthatraya—the three states of consciousness.

II. Even in the bare statement of these "conscious" states there is one factor which immediately rouses wonder and reflection. This is the fact of unconsciousness as an aspect of "consciousness." Sleep with its character of unconsciousness has much exercised thought in East and West. Its origin and cessation are still dark in modern physiology and psychology. Psycho-analysis has brought the unconscious mind into prominence in contemporary psychology. The psychology of memory has wrestled with this problem in explaining the retention of past experiences. And then, there is the common 'unconscious' experience of deep sleep forcing this problem on us. It is of course difficult for us to picture exactly this condition. We may conceive of it as an extremely low degree of attention, on the analogy of the

(continued from the previous page) waning of attention from the centre of a field of consciousness towards its outer and outer regions. Or we may regard it as a residual condition, on the analogy of the memories of past experiences. Or we may regard it, as the Mandukya would, as a potential condition of consciousness, a condition of causative potency which has not yet realized its effects. However, so familiar a phenomenon as sleep presents to science and philosophy this great problem of the unconscious and the conscious and raises the question of the true nature of the Self.

III. The other states of consciousness, too, viz. waking and dreaming are full of difficult problems. Our waking perception of an external world has shipwrecked many a school of philosophy, — the Buddhist, the British empiricist, the Greek sophist, and the modern Associationist. Our dreams too are more complex than one would suspect. Their problems exercise the psycho-analyst, the psychic researcher, and the general psychologist.

IV. Besides the analysis of 'mental' states, the Mandukya tries also to furnish a brief classification of the psycho-physical organization of man. Briefly, there are the five aspects of life (Prana); the five sense-organs of outer perception; the five organs of activity; the inner sense of mind (Manas); the capacity of determinate judgment (Buddhi); individuality and the awareness of it as the 'I' (Ahamkara); and the general principle of consciousness (Chitta). No formal list of this kind can do more than barely indicate the main aspects of the highly complex and organic character of the individual and his consciousness. Inevitably, it leaves out all the emotional colour of life, its wonderful unity, and the depths from which its highest aspirations surge.

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A list of this kind gives one the false idea that man is a piece of cumbrous machinery. The German philosopher Kant, who attempted to give such a list, has been often criticized for his cumbrous picture and it has even been remarked that the clanking and creaking of Kant's machinery can almost be heard!

Such a caustic criticism apart, there is no doubt that even a brief analysis is a good protection against narrow theories of knowledge like sensationalism.

V. All this analysis is not the whole story, or even the best part of it. Some schools of philosophy like Positivism are apt to stop here. But the Mandukya finds that the very logic of its threefold classification urges it to go on and recognize a deeper aspect.

This is the fourth—the Turiya. At the basis of all states of consciousness and unconsciousness, there is this fourth state which is deeper than them all.

In a passage which is rarely equalled even in the other Upanishads in its solemn and hymnal tone and its depth of fervour, the Mandukya declares this basis and essence of the Self:

"Neither the outer consciousness, nor the inner, nor both together; neither the general principle of consciousness nor any particular mode of it; nor unconsciousness; unperceivable, unphenomenal, incomprehensible, beyond description, without defining and limiting qualities, beyond all verbal epithets; comprising the self alone, supernal, peaceful, good, the one universal. This is the fourth state of the self. This is the true self (Atman). This indeed is the state to be realized."

The last two statements, that it is only a fourth state and yet the self to be realised, seem inconsistent. But their real significance

(continued from the previous page) is to point to its reality as the basis of all states and as the ultimate reservoir and essence of the self. It is the live core of which all states are the manifestations.

VI. The Mandukya is too brief to convey an adequate account of this principle. But its implicit teaching is that this principle, which in our analysis we reach as the fourth, Turiya, stands for the highest aspirations of man. It represents his highest fulfillment in knowledge, action and feeling; in Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

Furthermore, it is in essence the same as the law and substance of the objective universe. The whole is a manifestation of one ultimate reality. From this point of view, the Mandukya gives a picture of the Absolute as more than a dull unconscious or 'neutral' substance but as a self, an Intelligence. It is not inappropriate or untrue to speak of the Ultimate Reality in terms of the four states of consciousness. The physical world is its gross manifestation as well as the object of its waking state. The dream world is its subtle manifestation, comprising the residues of its past experiences. The third stage of unconscious sleep would correspond to Its unmanifested causal stage prior to all objects and effects. The fourth aspect would correspond to Its essential nature as the Infinite and the Absolute. To this aspect belongs all that the three lesser stages cannot express. The third condition corresponding to dreamless sleep, and expressing the unmanifested causal condition of the ultimate, may seem to be the highest condition,—its pure form as a God antecedent to creation. But not so, to the seers of the Upanishad. The Mandukya declares: "The Atman is indeed above this unmanifested." The unmanifested is only one condition,—one partial

(continued from the previous page) condition of being. The Mandukya presses on to a more comprehensive point of view. The Absolute comprehends not merely the first unmanifested condition but also the process and the goal of the manifestation. It is hopeless for us to try and get a clear picture of such an infinite and absolute. But this is no reason why we should deny or not adequately recognize such features of it as experience and logic force on us. We are driven to accept an absolute which we cannot describe in any single category without realizing that it is also more than that category. It is transcendent and yet also immanent; it is the origin and yet also the goal of all manifestation. It is the beginning the process, and the end of all things.

The Mandukya tries to illustrate its supernal, absolute character, with reference to two factors, time and verbal symbolism.

It is immanent in the past, present, and future 'moments' of time. It bears all the actuality of the present and the potentiality of the future. And yet, as the basis of all these changes, and the passage of time, it is above process,—it is non-temporal, timeless, eternal.

Similarly, It is above all symbols. The symbol Aum with its three components of A, U, M, can only describe the three lesser aspects of the absolute, but not the fourth, its transcendent nature. It is not a mere totality of these or any parts, but a life above any one of them or their summation.

VII. The reality of such an Absolute is one of the impregnable conclusions of true philosophy. It raises several problems which to the formal intellect appear insoluble. Two such problems are the creation of the finite and the nature of finite individuality. Commentators on the Mandukya, like Gaudapada, Sankara

(continued from the previous page) and others extend the scope of this Upanisad to include inquiries into these special problems. But the Upanisad itself is content to make a comprehensive analysis of the states of consciousness and point the way to the Absolute, and the solidarity of all life and existence.

SWAMI ISVARANANDA (CONJEEVARAM) in letters:

1. I could not see how deep sleep could be drsyam when the Self alone remains and the Self is never Drsyam, unlike dream and waking. Hence there is a material difference, in that these latter states there is the appearance of a second.
2. I accept the suggestion that "realised" may not be the proper word, as there is no buddhi in deep sleep to realise, but the Self remains simply as it is. The Upanishadic word suggests attaining. Hence I suggest that "attained" may be used.
3. I agree that there is no Vrittijnanam or Vidya in deep sleep. It is free from both Vidya and avidya and no one is a gnani for having slept. This I myself have pointed in the article. I believe there would have been no misunderstanding in this point if it had been carefully read. I hold that in deep sleep there is no avidya in either sense. If absence of avidya is construed as vidya, this also is absent. What remains is Vidya Phalam, (the result of Vidya) viz. pure consciousness but not brought about by Vidya but by the natural lifting of avidya. It is called Vidyaphalam by Sankara because what remains is the same whether attained by Vidya or by sleep. But Vidya is necessary. when there is the appearance of a second i.e. in the waking state (Dream not excluded as it is a waking state).

4. The nature of deep sleep as described in the Mandukya Upanishad is not a complete and thorough analysis of this state but only a prima facie view and that in all other six or seven sections in the various Upanishads the views on deep sleep and Sankara's commentaries thereon differ from the view of Mandukya Upanishad.

5. I hold with you that a study of the other two states also leads to this knowledge. But we must have some experience in those states which corresponds to the avishesha vijnana (= no special knowledge) of the deep sleep state; if not we have no proof that the world of objects is not an independent reality. That avishesha vijnana we may get between two cognitions in the waking or dream states or between a waking and a dream or in the state of nirvikalpa. If there is no such avishesha vijnana state it will mean that a second is never sublated and the Drsyam cannot be proved to be the same as Drk. This avishesha vijnana state is more easily distinguished in yoga, nirvikalpa and in sleep, of which the former is known only to yogis, but the latter is everybody's experience and hence particularly suitable for study and analysis.

6. I also hold that all experience can be brought under two categories: that in which there is visesha vijnana and that in which this is absent. Jagrat and Swapna, that is to say, all states of cognition of any particular object or idea is visesha vijnana and what remains when these are absent is avishesha vijnana (= objectless knowledge) and this latter is found in deep sleep. Once this fundamental basis of classification of experience is adopted, all distinctions between Turiya and Samprasada (the Self in deep sleep) have

(continued from the previous page) to be dropped, for both are avishesha vijnana, para Chid, as no distinction is possible between two states of avishesha vijnana in themselves. Distinctions such as samadhi and sleep etc. are only from the standpoint of the state of the Upadhis, of such as mind and body etc. as they are found in the state of visesha vijnana and is not a distinction which can be applied to the direct experience itself in these states.

7. The distinction between Turiya and Prajna (deep sleep consciousness) in the Mandukya Upanishad is the result of incomplete analysis of deep sleep, and the importation into it of theological concepts such as sarvajna, sarveswara etc. for who has seen in deep sleep the sarvam, all this? Who has experienced in deep sleep that he is ruling over these worlds? Who has known the past, present and future in deep sleep? Who hath seen the beings entering into and coming out of oneself in deep sleep? Does any one know "I am enjoying bliss now" in deep sleep as he does in the waking?

8. It is the conception of the deep sleep as a state like the other two that has necessitated the positing of the Self as the fourth, as the Turiya. If deep sleep had been presented after thorough analysis it could not have been presented in any other words than those used for presenting the Turiya. In fact Sankara uses words of negation to describe the Samprasada in the Prasna.

9. V.S. Iyer's reply to Isvarananda: (a) You write deep sleep is the key to the knowledge of reality. V.S. Iyer says that deep sleep only leads to the knowledge of reality but then a study of the other two states also leads to this knowledge. From the point of view of Brahman all the three states have the same value i.e. they are Drsyam. (b) You say: "The Absolute is realized in this experience of deep sleep." V.S. Iyer says it will be more correct to alter the word realised to suggested. (c) You quote Sankara's view that there is no Avidya in deep sleep. V.S. Iyer says Sankara wrote to the Pandits and theologians who regarded Avidya as a separate entity with an existence of its own. In this sense, of course, It becomes non-existent in sleep. If, however, Avidya is taken to mean merely ignorance of the Truth which appears to be the sense which your context suggests then your statement will mean that every sleeping man and every sleeping dog become Gnanis.

SHASTRI's "ESSENTIALS OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY."

(a) If you study these philosophic texts very carefully, you will find in them much that can throw light on many controversial points of modern philosophy. For instance, you find that the Upanishads distinctly speak of the mind being much wider than consciousness. Modern psychology is coming towards the same result, although for more than a century the two terms mind and consciousness have been used synonymously. In sleep, we are told by the Upanishads, there is a break of consciousness, a time gap in the stream of thought, but the mind still endures. The mind can never sleep. Moreover, there is also included in to totality of the mind, whose one section is called consciousness.

(b) Behind the changing mental states there is an abiding and eternal reality, the light within us, the reality that transcends the body and the

(continued from the previous page) mind, which also transcends all relations, and yet makes the subject-object relation possible.

(c) To such a philosopher creation has no meaning. That which is void in the beginning and in the end must also be void in the middle. But the Upanisads have a message not only for the select few who may have attained to such spiritual perfection, but for the less fortunate as well. To them creation is a process in time. They ask the question, how was this world produced? How did this creation come about as a fact of our experience? Is there any creator?

PROF. P. LAKSHMI NARASU: THE ANATMAN DOCTRINE@

1. The silence of the Buddha when he was questioned by the Brahmana of the Vatsagotra: When questioned by Ananda as to his silence the Buddha declared: "Had I responded that there was a soul, it would contradict the truth about things, since the soul is neither a dharmā nor has it any connection with any dharmā. Had I said that there was no soul, I should have only augmented the folly of the Brahmana. He would at once jump to the conclusion that the soul was annihilated. Now, in comparison with the foolish belief in the existence of a permanent soul (sasvata anta) the folly of disbelieving in a soul is worse, as it might lead to the extreme doctrine of annihilation of fruits (uchchedaanta)." Taking note of the harmful nature of heresy, the Buddha has employed different expedients in his teaching just suited to the mind and intention of his hearer. Kumaralabha has explained this point as follows: "The Buddha was pleased to construct his doctrine concerning the dharmas with greatest caution, just as a tigress holds her cub by her teeth, so that her grasp is not so tight as to hurt

@ In BUDDHIST ANNUAL OF CEYLON 1931.

(continued from the previous page) the cub nor so loose as to let it fall. The Buddha saw the wounds produced by the sharp teeth of the dogmatic belief in an eternal soul on the one hand and by the failure of responsibility for one's actions on the other side. If mankind accepted the idea of an existing soul, it would lie down wounded by the sharp weapon of dogmatism. But if it ceased to believe in the existence of a conditioned self, then the tender child of moral merit would perish. Since a living being (jiva) does not exist, the Buddha did not declare that it is different from the body. But he has not also declared that the soul does not exist, as he feared that this might be understood as a denial of the empirical self. There is in the stream of dharmas a certain life in the sense of actions producing good or bad results, and if the Buddha had said that there was altogether no living being the Brahmana might have supposed that such a living being too did not exist. Nor did the Buddha declare that a living being is merely a conventional name given to a set of dharmas for he had to deal with a man incapable of realising the absence of a real entity in the stream of dharmas appearing in mutual dependence. Thus it was that, being questioned by the Brahmana whether the soul did or did not exist, the Buddha considered the intellectual level of his interlocutor and gave no answer. But if a soul did exist, nothing could have prevented him from disclosing that it did."

@@ FRANCIS J. PAYNE: (BUDDHIST ANNUAL OF CEYLON)

"I have fathomed this Teaching, profound, hard to perceive and understand, bringing quietude of heart; which is exalted, not to be found by reasoning."

SRI AUROBINDO: THE LIFE DIVINE. (Vol. 11 Pt. 1).

1. To describe the fundamental character of the universe as Space or Time or Space-Time does not help us; for even if these are not abstractions of our intelligence which we impose by our mental view on the cosmos, the mind's necessary perspective of its picture, these two are indeterminates and carry in themselves no clue to the origin of the determinations that take place in them.

2. It is only when we follow the yogic process of quieting the mind itself that a profounder result of our self-observation becomes possible. For first we discover that mind is a subtle substance, a general determinate—or generic indeterminate—which mental energy when it operates throws into forms or particular determinations of itself, thoughts, concepts, percepts, mental sentiments, activities of will and reactions of feeling, but which, when the energy is quiescent, can live either in an inert torpor or in an immobile silence and peace of self-existence. Next we see that the determinations of our mind do not all proceed from itself; for waves and currents of mental energy enter into it from outside: these take form in it or appear already formed from some universal Mind or from other minds and are accepted by us as our own thinking.

3. For we cannot limit it by saying it is not this, it is not that,—nor by our affirmations, for we cannot fix it by saying it is this, it is that, iti, iti. And yet, though in this way unknowable to us, it is not altogether and in every way unknowable; it is self-evident to itself and, although inexpressible, yet self-evident to a knowledge by identity of which the spiritual being in us must be capable; for that spiritual being is in its essence and its original and intimate

(continued from the previous page) reality not other than this Supreme Existence.

4. If we insist on applying a finite logic to the Infinite, the omnipresent Reality will escape us and we shall grasp instead an abstract shadow, a dead form petrified into speech or a hard incisive graph which speaks of the Reality but does not express it. Our way of knowing must be appropriate to that which is to be known; otherwise we achieve only a distant speculation, a figure of knowledge and not veritable knowledge.

5. It is evident that such a Consciousness and Will need not act in harmony with the conclusions of our limited reason or according to a procedure familiar to it and approved by our constructed notions or in subjection to an ethical reason working for a limited and fragmentary good; it might and does admit things deemed by our reason irrational and unethical because that was necessary for the final and total Good and for the working out of a cosmic purpose. What seems to us irrational or reprehensible in relation to a partial set of facts, motives, desiderata might be perfectly rational and approvable in relation to a much vaster motive and totality of data and desiderata. Reason with its partial vision sets up constructed conclusions which it strives to turn into general rules of knowledge and action and it compels into its rule by some mental device or gets rid of what does not suit with it: an infinite Consciousness would have no such rules.

6. An experience of some one aspect of the Infinite is valid in itself; but we cannot generalise from it that the Infinite is that alone, nor would it be safe to view the rest of the Infinite in the terms of that aspect and exclude all other view-points of spiritual experience.

7. Thus too, if we see only the aspect of the self, we may concentrate on its static silence

(continued from the previous page) and miss the dynamic truth of the Infinite; if we see only the Ishwara, we may seize the dynamic truth but miss the eternal status and the infinite silence.

8. We must not commit the mistake of emphasising one side of the Truth and concluding from it or acting upon it to the exclusion of all other sides and aspects of the Infinite. The realisation "I am That" is true, but we cannot safely proceed on it unless we realise also that all is That; our self-existence is a fact, but we must also be aware of other selves, of the same Self in other beings and of That which exceeds both own-self and other-self.

9. The difficulties which meet our intelligence when it tries to conceive the absolute and omnipresent Reality, we shall see that the whole difficulty is verbal and conceptual and not real.

10. But the contradiction disappears when we understand that the indeterminability is not in its true sense negative, not an imposition of incapacity on the Infinite, but positive, a freedom within itself from limitation by its own determinations and necessarily a freedom from all external determination by anything not itself, since there is no real possibility of such a not-self coming into existence. The Infinite is illimitably free, free to determine itself infinitely, free from all restraining effect of its own creations. In fact the Infinite does not create, it manifests what is in itself, in its own essence of reality; it is itself that essence of all reality and all realities are powers of that one Reality.

11. Into the central fact of the two sides of the nature of the Absolute, the essential and the self-creative or dynamic, no real contradiction enters; it is only a pure infinite essence that can formulate itself in infinite ways. One statement is complementary to the

(continued from the previous page) there is no other solution than the spiritual cannot but grow and become more imperative under the urgency of critical circumstance. To that call in the being there must always be some answer in the Divine Reality and in Nature.

The answer might, indeed, be only individual; it might result in a multiplication of spiritualised individuals or even, conceivably though not probably a gnostic individual or individuals isolated in the unspiritualised mass of humanity. Such isolated realised beings must either withdraw into their secret divine kingdom and guard themselves in a spiritual solitude or act from their inner light on mankind for what little can be prepared in such conditions for a happier future.

273. It might be necessary to follow the age-long device of the separate community. It might be that, in such a concentration of effort, all the difficulties of the change would present themselves with a concentrated force; for each seeker, carrying in himself the possibilities but also the imperfections of a world that has to be transformed, would bring in not only his capacities but his difficulties and the oppositions of the old nature and, mixed together in the restricted circle of a small and close common life, these might assume a considerably enhanced force of obstruction which would tend to counterbalance the enhanced power and concentration of the forces making for the evolution. This is a difficulty that has broken in the past all the efforts of mental man to evolve something better and more true and harmonious than the ordinary mental and vital life.

274. It might even be questioned whether conflict and collision would not be the first rule of their relation, since in the life of the Ignorance there is present and active the formidable influence of those forces of Darkness, supporters

(continued from the previous page) of evil and violence, whose interest it is to contaminate or destroy all higher Light that enters into the human existence.

275. But it is to be supposed that the new and completer light would bring also a new and completer power. It might not be necessary for it to be entirely separate; it might establish itself in so many islets and from there spread through the old life, throwing out upon it its own influences and filtrations, gaining upon it, bringing to it a help and illumination which a new aspiration in mankind might after a time begin to understand and welcome.

276. It is evident that in a life governed by the gnostic consciousness war with its spirit of antagonism and enmity, its brutality destruction and ignorant violence, political strife with its perpetual conflict, frequent oppression, dishonesties, turpitudes, selfish interests, its ignorance, ineptitude and muddle could have no ground for existence.

277. It is almost universally supposed that spiritual life must necessarily be a life of ascetic spareness, a pushing away of all that is not absolutely needed for the bare maintenance of the body; and this is valid for a spiritual life which is in its nature and intention a life of withdrawal from life. Even apart from that ideal, it might be thought that the spiritual turn must always make for an extreme simplicity, because all else would be a life of vital desire and physical self-indulgence. But from a wider standpoint this is a mental standard based on the law of the Ignorance of which desire is the motive; to overcome the Ignorance, to delete the ego, a total rejection not only of desire but of all the things that can satisfy desire may intervene as a valid principle. But this standard of any mental standard cannot be absolute nor

(continued from the previous page) can it be binding as a law on the consciousness that has arisen above desire; a complete purity and self-mastery would be in the very grain of its nature and that would remain the same in poverty or in riches: for if it could be shaken or sullied by either, it would not be real or would not be complete. The one rule of the gnostic life would be the self-expression of the Spirit, the will of the Divine Being; that will, that self-expression could manifest through extreme simplicity or through extreme complexity and opulence or in their natural balance,—for beauty and plenitude, a hidden sweetness and laughter in things, a sunshine and gladness of life are also powers and expressions of the Spirit. In all directions the Spirit within determining the law of nature would determine the frame of the life and its detail and circumstance. In all there would be the same plastic principle; a rigid standardisation, however necessary for the mind's arrangement of things, could not be the law of the spiritual life.

278. That would mean a supermanhood of the Nietzschean type; it might be at its worst the reign of the "blonde beast" or the dark beast of any and every beast, a return to barbaric strength and ruthlessness and force: but this would be no evolution, it would be a reversion to an old strenuous barbarism.

279. But earth has had enough of this kind in her past and its repetition can only prolong the old lines; she can get no true profit for her future, no power of self-exceeding, from the Titan, the Asura: even a great or supernormal power in it could only carry her on larger circles of her old orbit. But what has to emerge is something much more difficult and much more simple; it is a self-realised being, a building of the spiritual self.

(continued in typed vol "BUDDHIST STUDIES" page No. 667)¹¹

¹¹ The original editor inserted at bottom of page read: "(continued in typed vol "BUDDHIST STUDIES" page No. 667)" by hand

T. SUBBA ROW'S "ESOTERIC WRITINGS."

1. Inanasakti: Literally the power of intellect. The following are some of its manifestations when placed under the influence or control of material conditions: (a) the power of the mind in interpreting our sensations, (b) its power in recalling past ideas (memory) and raising future expectations, (c) Its power as exhibited in what are called by modern psychologists "the laws of association" which enables it to form persisting connections between various groups of sensations and possibilities of sensations and thus generate the notion or idea of an external object (d) Its power in connecting ideas together by the mysterious link of memory and thus generating the notion of self or individuality.

The following are some of its manifestations when liberated from the bonds of matter: (a) Clairvoyance, (b) Psychometry.

2. Kriyasakti: The mysterious power of thought which enables it to produce external, perceptible, phenomenal result by its own inherent energy. The ancients held that any idea will manifest itself externally if one's attention is deeply concentrated upon it. Similarly an intense volition will be followed by the desired result. A Yogi generally performs his wonders by means of Ichasakti and Kriyasakti.

3. We have thus shown that there are no reasons for placing Sankara in 8th or 9th century after Christ as some of the European Orientalists have done. We have further shown that Sankara was Patanjali's chela and that his date should be ascertained with reference to Patanjali's date. We may perhaps now venture to place before the public the exact date assigned to Sankaracharya by Tibetan and Indian Initiates. According to the historical information in their possession¹²

¹² The original editor inserted "possession" by hand

(continued from the previous page) he was born in the year 510 B.C. (51 years and 2 months after the date of Buddha's Nirvana). As Gaudapada was Sankaracharya's Guru's Guru, his date entirely depends on Sankara's date; and there is every reason to suppose that he lived before Buddha.

4. The Karana-sarira is said to be in a state of sleep, but this is no ordinary sleep, it is Yoga sleep. It is the calm after the tempest spoken of in Light on the Path (Rule 21).

Samadhi includes the realization of Yoga Anandam, but it is a generic term used to denote several conditions. It is absurd to suppose, as stated in some of the books, that the solar system is contained in the Susumna. What is meant is that when consciousness is fixed for the time being in the monad circulating in the Susumna, the Yogi becomes en rapport with astral light and the universal mind and thus is able to see the whole Cosmos.

The six chakrams are located in the Sthula-sarira, but they are not visible when a body is dissected, because the leaves and petals described in the books have no objective existence, but represent so many powers or energies.

For instance, Sahasraram is considered to have eight main petals, and the meaning of this is that the brain has eight poles. Similarly the letters, characters, symbols, goddesses, etc. said in the books to exist in these chakrams, all symbolise different powers.

5. Some say that, in order to attain Raja Yoga, one should investigate Mahavakyam; others that the mind must be concentrated on a point and the Yogi must contemplate Parabrahmam; some say one's own Guru is the true subject of contemplation, and it is enough to lead a good life; some say the repetition of the Pranava is in itself Raja Yoga, and others say you must cultivate will-

(continued from the previous page) power: which of these ways is the true one?

All these are necessary and much more – read Light on the Path.

6. When a great adept has passed away from incarnated life, his spiritual self may select some suitable person on whom to impress his teachings, who thus becomes his unconscious medium and apostle: this chosen exponent of the adept's wisdom may not recognise the source of his knowledge and power; to recognise their source is almost impossible, since these ideas are instilled into the inmost spirit of the man, the deep, secret place of his nature, from whence arise moral leadings and spiritual ideals. Such apostles have often found that their wisdom left them even in life; when their work was done, the over-shadowing adept often withdrew his inspiration. The overshadowing by a high adept is what is called a divine incarnation, an avatar.

7. The fact that the Atma observes one class of objects is indicated by saying that such and such a state of consciousness is active. The sixth factor is the mind, which rules and guides the senses, and draws deductions from their impressions when collected and arranged. The seventh factor is the atma, which is the observer of the generalisation which the mind makes from the impressions of the senses. It is the self, the sense of 'I' in us, behind which it is impossible to go, either in logic or in observation. The seven factors must be present in every plane: in dreaming, for example, objects corresponding to the senses of sight, touch, taste, smell and hearing, pass before the dreamer: his mind classifies these impressions and he feels the sense of 'I', the observer which is the subject of these subjects. There is the sense of 'I' on each plane, but it is

(continued from the previous page) not quite identical, only the kernel, or basic notion of 'I' remains unchanged.

8. He must make his further progress, till he has succeeded in merging his life in the life of the Logos – the grand fountain-head of light and power.

When this mergence takes place, the man does not suffer loss of individuality; rather he enjoys an almost infinite extension of individuality.

9. In the dying man the struggle between the physical and the astral man goes on till it ends in physical death. This result produces a shock stunning the astral man who passes into a state of unconscious sleep until he re-awakens into the Kama-Loka. This sleep is the second state of existence.

It is because this struggle is silently going on that the ancients enjoined solemn silence in the awful presence of death. When the man awakens into the Kama-Loka, he begins his third state of existence. The physical organisation, which alone enables man to produce causes, is not there, and he is, as it were, concerned only with those affinities which he has already engendered. While this struggle in the 5th principle is going on, it is almost impossible for the entity to manifest itself upon earth. And when a dweller on this earth tries to establish a connection with that entity, he only disturbs its peace. Hence it is that the ancients prohibited these practices, to which they gave the name of necromancy, as deadly sin.

10. The nature of the struggle depends upon the tendencies engendered by the individual in his physical life. If he was too material, too gross, too sensual, and if he had hardly any spiritual aspirations, then the downward attraction of the lower affinities causes an assimilation of the lower consciousness with the 4th principle. The

(continued from the previous page) man then becomes a sort of astral animal, and continues in that state until, in process of time, the astral entity is disintegrated. The few spiritual aspirations that he might have had are transferred to the monad; but the separate consciousness being dragged into the animal soul, dies with it and his personality is thus annihilated. If a man, on the other hand, is tolerably spiritual, as most of our fellowmen are, then the struggle in Kama-Loka varies according to the nature of his affinities; until the consciousness being linked to the higher ones is entirely separated from the "astral shell," and is ready to go into Devachan. If a person is highly spiritual, his Kama-Loka is of a very short duration, for the consciousness is quickly assimilated to the higher principles and passes into Devachan.

It will thus be seen that in any case intercourse with the Kama-Loka entities is detrimental to the progress of those entities and also injurious to the persons indulging in such intercourse. This interruption is just as bad and even far worse than the disturbance in the death-chamber on this physical plane. When it is remembered that the 4th principle by its contact with the 5th has assimilated to itself the essence of the latter, it becomes an easy matter to account for those rare phenomena in which a high degree of intelligence has been exhibited by the Kama-Loka entities dragged into mediumistic seances. Of course, there are cases in which an "astral shell" acts merely as a mirror through which the intelligence of the "medium" is reflected, as there are others in which "elementals" make use of these "astral shells". But in those cases where the Kama-Loka entities actually appear and exhibit a rare intelligence, it is on account of the essence absorbed by the 4th

(continued from the previous page) principle during its connection with the 5th. There are again cases in which the Kama-Loka entities of "suicides" and of persons dying unnatural and accidental deaths may appear and exhibit rare intelligence, because those entities have to live in Kama-Loka for the period they would have passed on earth if those accidents had not carried them away—before the struggle between the astral and spiritual affinities commences. The causes engendered by them during earth-life are not yet ripe for fruition and they must wait their natural time. But to recall these into "mediumistic" circles is equally dangerous as in the above-mentioned cases, and for the very same reasons. It may not be positively injurious in all cases, but at any rate the process is fraught with danger and should not be undertaken by inexperienced persons.

10. Whatever it may be, the Hindus have a horror of those elementaries, and instead of dragging them into seances they try by every possible means to release them from the earth's atmosphere.

When the struggle between the lower affinities and the higher aspirations of the man is ended in Kama-Loka, astral death takes place in that sphere as does physical death on this earth. The shock of death again throws the entity into a state of unconsciousness before its passage into Devachan.

11. I am not permitted to state in an article the views of the ancient Rsis concerning these five stages—the spiritual counterparts of the 5 chambers of construction above the King's chamber in the great Pyramid of Egypt—or the philosophy underlying the Buddhist doctrine regarding these 5 Buddhas. But it is enough for my present purpose to state that these celestial "Dhyana-Buddhas" came into existence (according to Vyasa) before the last work of creation or

(continued from the previous page) evolution commenced, and consequently, before any Deva or Angel was evolved. Therefore, they are to be regarded as occupying a higher position (in a spiritual sense) that even Brahma, Visnu and Iswara, the three highest gods of the Hindu Pantheon—as they are the direct emanations of Parabrahman.

12. The existence of any state or condition beyond the Sodasantam (sixteenth state) mentioned in my review is altogether inconceivable. For, it is the Turiyakala which is Niskala; it is the Grand Nothing from which is evolved, by the operation of the external law, every existence, whether physical, astral, or spiritual; it is the condition of Final Negation—the Maha Sunyam, the Nirvana of the Buddhists. It is not the blazing star itself, but it is the condition of perfect unconsciousness of the entity thus indicated, as well as of the Sun, which is supposed to be beyond the said star.

13. The mischievous pranks of Pisacams or elementals may be often mistaken for the subjective appearances of solar angels or living adepts. The account of Kut-Humi's visits will be sufficient to show how very easily the learned author may be deceived by devils and elementals, or by his own uncontrolled imagination.

14. The condition ultimately reached by ordinary men after going through all the planetary rounds during countless number of ages in the gradually ascending order of material objective existence is reached by the adept within a comparatively shorter time, then required by the uninitiated. It is thus but a question of time; but every human being, unless he is utterly "wicked and depraved" may hope to reach that state sooner or later according to his merits and Karma.

15. Since in this mad inrush of controls the poor sensitive may at any time be knocked off his moral feet down the precipice of spiritual degradation, why tamper with so dangerous a gift? We invite our brother's attention, in reference to this quotation, to what Manu says (IV, 123, etc.) of this practice. The Sama Veda dealing with the spirits of the dead, he says that "even the sound of it (the Sama Veda) is impure."

16. Anything like argument with the Spiritualists is worse than useless. Mere phenomena, however wonderful, can never prove to their satisfaction either the actual existence of Adepts or the nature of true Adeptship. Any phenomena that you may show them will at once be attributed to the agency of spirits (as they are called by them) or elementals as we call them, and classed with their own seance room manifestations.

17. The dark goddess herself is Avidya. It is the dark side of human Nature. It derives its life and energy from the passions and desires of the human soul.

18. I have never meddled with this disgusting, profitless, and dangerous branch of investigation. Your Spiritualists do not know what they are really doing. Their investigations are likely to result in course of time either in wicked sorcery or in the utter spiritual ruin of thousands of men and women.

19. This is one of those vague general arguments which seem to mean a good deal, and which take easy possession of the minds of people who are not generally in the habit of scrutinizing or analysing their own ideas.

20. What springs up in the Logos at first is simply an image, a conception of what it is to be in the cosmos.

21. It is non-consciousness, because it is not consciousness in any way similar to the consciousness realized by us in any of the conditions with which we are familiar.
22. If Parabrahmam is regarded as absolute unconsciousness violence will be done to the first principles of our philosophy. Unconsciousness is the negation of every form of consciousness, and therefore, without any relation thereto; to derive the latter from the former is to establish some sort of relation between the two, which, as we have seen is impossible
23. The emanations of Mulaprakriti became conscious by the reflection of this absolute consciousness. But the interposition of the veils of Maya, this absolute consciousness gives rise to conditioned sopadhikam—consciousness, or conscious existence. The details of the process cannot be entered into here, as they touch many grand secrets of initiation.
24. I must not, however, be here understood, that the ideation of the Universal Mind is set in motion by an act of that mind's volition; quite the contrary. The ideation of the Demiurgos is governed by an eternal chain of causation, and is absolutely involuntary.
25. Mr Sinnett has written his book in vain for readers of his Vice-President's stamp! Is the idea expressed above, that Nirvana, the final goal of man, is nothing but annihilation, justified by the teachings of "Esoteric Buddhism?" For, it is stated on page 163: "All that words can convey is that Nirvana is a sublime state of conscious rest in omniscience." Is the state of Nirvana which is attempted to be shadowed forth by Mr Sinnett, in the above words, nothing but annihilation? If so, the sooner it is recognised that language has ceased to be the medium of communication between man and man—the better.

26. He is not conscious or intelligent in OUR sense of the word, because both these terms imply duality, an entity to cognize and a thing to be cognized, whereas He is All in All and in Him, we and all things, move and live and have our being, but still that He is All consciousness and all intelligence. The believers therefore in an Impersonal God.

27. Jesus declared that nobody had ever seen the Father; Buddha was silent when he was questioned about the nature of the Absolute and the Infinite, and our Sankaracariar said that all that was written on these questions only revealed the depth of human ignorance.

28. When the great mass of the people are unaccustomed to philosophical enquiry and precise modes of thinking, the charge of Atheism is sufficient to lower in their estimation any particular individual or association.

29. In dealing with the phenomena of our present plane of existence John Stuart Mill ultimately came to the conclusion that matter or the so-called external phenomena are but the creation of our mind; they are the mere apparances of a particular phase of our subjective self, and of our thoughts, volitions, sensations and emotions which in their totality constitute the basis of that Ego. Matter, then, is the permanent possibility of sensations; and the so-called Laws of matter are, properly speaking, the Laws which govern the succession and co-existence of our states of consciousness. Mill further holds that properly speaking there is no noumenal Ego. The very idea of a mind existing separately as an entity distinct from the states of consciousness which are supposed to inhere in it, is in his opinion illusory, as the idea of an external object

(continued from the previous page) which is supposed to be perceived by our senses.

30) The chain of our mental states of consciousness is "a double-headed monster" according to Professor Bain, which has two distinct aspects, one objective and the other subjective. Mr Mill has paused here confessing that psychological analysis did not go any further, the mysterious link which connects together the train of our states of consciousness and gives rise to our Ahankaram in this condition of existence, still remains an incomprehensible mystery to Western psychologists, though its existence is but dimly perceived in the subjective phenomena of memory and expectation.

On the other hand, the great physicists of Europe are gradually coming to the conclusion that mind is the product of matter, or that it is one of the attributes of matter in some conditions. It would appear, therefore, from the speculations of Western psychologists that matter is evolved from mind and that mind is evolved from matter. These two propositions are apparently irreconcilable. Mill and Tyndall have admitted that Western science is yet unable to go deeper into the question. Nor it is likely to solve the mystery hereafter, unless it calls Eastern occult science to its aid and takes a more comprehensive view of the capabilities of the real subjective self of man and the various aspects of the great objective universe. The great Advaiti philosophers of ancient Aryavarta have examined the relationship between subject and object in every condition of existence in this solar system in which this differentiation is presented.

31. Prajna or the capacity of perception, exists in 7 different aspects corresponding to the 7 conditions of matter. Strictly speaking, there

(continued from the previous page) are but 6 states of matter, the 7th state being the aspect of Cosmic matter in its original undifferentiated condition. Similarly there are 6 states of differentiated Prajna, the 7th state being a condition of perfect unconsciousness. By differentiated Prajna, I mean the condition in which Prajna is split up into various states of consciousness, either objective or subjective, for the time being as the case may be, and a state of perfect unconsciousness which is the beginning and the end of all conceivable states of consciousness, corresponding to the states of differentiated matter and its original undifferentiated basis which is the beginning and the end of all Cosmic evolutions. It will be easily seen that the existence of consciousness is necessary for the differentiation between subject and object. Hence these two phases are presented in 6 different conditions, and in the last state there being no consciousness as above stated, the differentiation in question ceases to exist. The number of these various conditions is different in some systems of philosophy. But whatever may be the number of divisions, they all lie between perfect unconsciousness at one end of the line and our present state of consciousness.

32. In these three conditions the objective Universe is not the same. But the difference between the Ego and the non-ego is common to all these conditions. Consequently, admitting the correctness of Mill's reasoning as regards the subject and object of our present plane of consciousness, the great Advaiti thinkers of India have extended the same reasoning to other states of consciousness, and came to the conclusion that the various conditions of the Ego and the non-Ego were but the appearances

(continued from the previous page) of one and the same entity – the ultimate state of unconsciousness. This entity is neither matter nor spirit; it is neither Ego nor Non-Ego; and it is neither object nor subject. In the language of Hindu philosophers it is the original and eternal combination of Purusa and Prakrti. As the Advaitis hold that an external object is merely the product of our mental state, Prakrti is nothing more than illusion, and Purusa is the only reality; it is the one existence which remains eternal in this universe of Ideals. This entity then is the Parabrahman of the Advaitis. Even if there were to be a personal God with anything like the standpoint of an Advaiti there will be as much reason to doubt his nominal existence as there would be in the case of any other object. In their opinion conscious god cannot be the origin of the universe, as his Ego would be the effect of a previous cause, if the word conscious conveys but its ordinary meaning. They cannot admit that the grand total of all the states of consciousness in the universe is their deity, as these states are constantly changing and as Cosmic idealism ceases during Pralaya. There is only one permanent condition in the universe which is the state of perfect Unconsciousness, bare citakasam in fact.

When my readers once realize the fact that this grand universe is in reality but a huge aggregation of various states of consciousness they will not be surprised to find that the ultimate states of unconsciousness is considered as Parabrahmam by the Advaitis.

The idea of a God, Deity, Isvara, or an impersonal God (if consciousness is one of his attributes) involves the idea of Ego in some shape or other, and as every conceivable Ego or non-Ego is evolved from this primitive

(continued from the previous page) element (I use this word for want of better one) the existence of an extra-cosmic god possessing such attributes prior to this condition is absolutely inconceivable. Though I have been speaking of this element as the condition of unconsciousness, it is properly speaking, the citakasam or cinmatra of the Hindu philosophers which contains within itself the potentiality of every condition of "Prajna," and which results as consciousness on the one hand and the objective universe on the other, by the operation of its latent citsakti (the power which generates thought)

33. It is distinctly affirmed in the Upanisads that Parabrahmam which is but the bare potentiality of prajna (the power or the capacity that gives rise to perception) is not an aspect of prajna or ego in any shape and that it has neither life nor consciousness. "H.X." will be able to ascertain that such is really the case on examining the Mundaka and the Mandukya Upanisads. The language used here and there in the Upanisads is apt to mislead one into the belief that such language points to the existence of a conscious Isvara. But the necessity for such language will be perceived on examining the following remarks.

From a close examination of Mill's Cosmological theory as explained in my last article, it will be clearly seen that it will be extremely difficult to account satisfactorily for the generation of conscious states in any human being from the standpoint of the said theory. It is generally stated that sensations arise in us from the action of the external objects around us; they are the effects of impressions made on our senses by the objective world in which we exist. This is simple enough to an ordinary mind, however difficult it may be to account for

(continued from the previous page) the transformation of a cerebral nerve-current into a state of consciousness.

But from the stand-point of Mill's theory we have no proof of the existence of any external object; even the objective existence of our own senses is not a matter of certainty to us. How, then, are we to account for and explain the origin of our mental states, if they are the only entities existing in this world? No explanation is really given by saying that one mental state gives rise to another mental state as may be shown to a certain extent by the operation of the so-called psychological "Laws of Association." Western psychology honestly admits that its analysis has not gone any further. It may be inferred, however, from the said theory that there would be no reason for saying that a material Upadhi (basis) is necessary for the existence of mind or states of consciousness.

As is already indicated in my last article, the Aryan psychologists have traced this current of mental states to its source—the eternal cinmatra existing everywhere. When the time for evolution comes this germ of Prajna unfolds itself and results ultimately as Cosmio ideation. Cosmic ideas are the conceptions of all the conditions of existence in the Cosmos existing in what may be called the universal mind (the demiurgic mind of the Western Kabalists).

This Cinmatra exists as it were at every geometrical point of the infinite Citakasam. This principle then has two general aspects. Considered as something objective it is the eternal Asath—Mulaprakrti or Undifferentiated Cosmic matter. From a subjective point of view it may be looked upon in two ways. It is Citakasam when considered as the field of Cosmic

(continued from the previous page) ideation. These three aspects constitute the highest Trinity of the Aryan Advaiti philosophers. It will be readily seen that the last mentioned aspect of the principle in question is far more important to us than the other two aspects; for, when looked upon the this aspect the principle under consideration seems to embody within itself the great Law of Cosmic evolution. And therefore the Advaiti philosophers have chiefly considered it in this light, and explained their cosmogony from a subjective point of view. In doing so, however, they cannot avoid the necessity of speaking of a universal mind (and this is Brahma, the Creator) and its ideation. But it ought not to be inferred therefore that this universal mind necessarily belongs to an Omnipresent living conscious Creator, simply because in ordinary parlance a mind is always spoken of in connection with a particular living being. It cannot be contended that a material Upadhi is indispensable for the existence of mind or mental states when the objective universe itself is, so far as we are concerned, the result of our states of consciousness. Expressions implying the existence of a conscious Isvara which are to be found here and there in the Upanisads should not therefore be literally construed.

It now remains to be seen how Advaitis account for the origin of mental states in a particular individual. Apparently the mind of a particular human being is not the Universal mind. Nevertheless Cosmic ideation is the real source of the states of consciousness in every individuals. Cosmic ideation exists everywhere; but when placed under restrictions by a material Upadhi it results as the consciousness of the individual inhering such Upadhi. Strictly speaking, an Advaiti will not admit the objective existence

(continued from the previous page) of this material Upadhi. From his standpoint it is Maya or illusion which exists as a necessary condition of prajna. But to avoid confusion, I shall use the ordinary language; and to enable my readers to grasp my meaning clearly the following simile may be adopted. Suppose a bright light is placed in the centre with a curtain around it. The nature of the light that penetrates through the curtain and becomes visible to a person standing outside depends upon the nature of the curtain. If several such curtains are thus successively placed around the light, it will have to penetrate through all of them: and a person standing outside will only perceive as much light as is not intercepted by all the curtains. The central light becomes dimmer and dimmer; as curtain after curtain is removed the light becomes brighter and brighter until it reaches its natural brilliancy. Similarly Universal mind or Cosmic ideation becomes more and more limited and modified by the various Upadhis of which a human being is composed; and when the action or influence of these various Upadhis is successively controlled, the mind of the individual human being is placed en rapport with the Universal mind and his ideation is lost in Cosmic ideation.

34. A distinction between Paramatma and Jivatma. This distinction or separation is denied by real Advaitis.

35. Controversies like the present one can never come to any satisfactory conclusion unless the disputants clearly understand each other. Philosophical disputations apparently formidable in their appearance have often been found to have their origin in the various meanings attached to a single

(continued from the previous page) word; and it will be no exaggeration to say that innumerable creeds and sects have arisen from disputes about mere words. Under such circumstances, it may be humbly submitted that it is extremely improper on the Svami's part to lose his temper in spite of his Nirvikalpa Samadhi as soon as an attempt is made to analyse his question and ascertain its real meaning. One has to thoroughly understand and assimilate before criticising them.

36. For the purposes of this controversy it must be explained that Prakriti may be looked upon from two distinct stand-points. It may be looked upon either as Maya when considered as the Upadhi of Parabrahmam or as Avidya when considered as the Upadhi of Jivatma (7th principle in Man). Avidya is ignorance or illusion arising from Maya. The term Maya, though sometimes used as a synonym for Avidya, is, properly speaking, applicable to Prakriti only. There is no difference between Prakriti, Maya and Sakti; and the ancient Hindu philosophers made no distinction whatsoever between Matter and Force. In support of this assertion I may refer the learned hermit to "Svetasvatara Upanisad" and its commentary by Sankaracarya. In case we adopt the four-fold division of the advaiti philosophers, it will be clearly seen that Jagrata, Svapna and Susupti Avasthas are the results of Avidya, and that Vaisvanara, Hiranyagarbha and Sutratma are manifestations of Parabrahmam in Maya or Prakriti.

37. The Editor of the Theosophist has never maintained that Avidya, illusion or ignorance, is eternal. Why should, then, the learned hermit require the editor to prove that which he has never claimed? I cannot help suspecting that the erudite Svami is confounding Avidya with Prakriti, the effect with its cause.

38. If, however, the learned Svami is prepared to say that Mulaprakrti itself is not eternal, I beg to inform him that his views are clearly wrong.

39. In truth, Prakrti and Purusa are but the two aspects of the same ONE REALITY. As our great Sankaracarya truly observes at the close of his commentary on the 23rd Sutra of the abovementioned Pada, "Parabrahmam is Karta (Purusa), as there is no other Adhistatha, and Parabrahmam is Prakrti there being no other Upadanam." This sentence clearly indicates the relation between "the One Life" and "the One Element" of the Arhat philosophers.

40. Mulaprakrti is undifferentiated according to our doctrines. Mulaprakrti is not dead or jadam, as Purusa – the one life – always exists in it. It is in fact Caitanya dipta (shining with life) as stated in Uttaratapini (see also Gaudapada Karika). Mulaprakrti is not temporary but eternal. When subject to change it always loses its name, reassuming it after returning to its original undifferentiated condition.

The learned gentleman is in fact confounding Avidya with Maya. Indeed, he says that Mulaprakrti is Avidya; I shall be very happy if he can quote any authority in support of his proposition. I beg to inform him again that Avidyalayam is not necessarily followed by Prakrtilayam. It is the differentiation of Mulaprakrti that is the cause of Avidya or ignorant delusion, and when the differentiated Cosmic matter returns to its original undifferentiated condition at the time of Mahapralaya, Avidya is completely got rid of. We are obliged to use the word matter as we have no other word in English to indicate it.

Sankaracharya speaks of undifferentiated Prakrti as "Akasakhyamaksaram" pervading it everywhere.

(continued from the previous page) Our opponent seems to think that as every Yogi is asked to rise above the influence of Avidya, it must necessarily be assumed that Prakrti is not eternal in its undifferentiated condition. This is as illogical as his other arguments. Illusion arises from differentiation or, Dvaitabhavam as it is technically called; and absence of differentiation, whether subjective or objective, is the Nirvana of Advaita. If the Svami only pauses to consider the nature of "this one element" in its dual aspect, he will be able to see that it is but an aspect of ParaBrahman.

41. At a certain stage in a man's spiritual progress, it begins to sound in his heart, as described in Light on the path. It gives him the supreme directions he has to receive, opens out the further path of progress, points out the way and disappears.

So there is hardly a single Adept who can dispense with the Christos. There is this mysterious entity with which he must come into contact before he becomes a Chohan. It is everywhere and nowhere. You cannot locate it on any one plane. It seems to be on all the planes. When it does incarnate, it begins to sound like the voice, and remains in the man and establishes a relation with his principles for the time being. Then you say it has incarnated.

It is this mysterious presence which is so unaccountable. It cannot be seen by the highest Adept. It seems to be omniscient and omnipresent. It seems to be its business to help as many human beings as it can, and it has been looked upon as God by all great Initiates. It is not Parabrahman. It is the indwelling Presence of the first Ray Logos, the mysterious power always present in it.

This is an infallible voice and must be obeyed.

(continued from the previous page) It comes but once and gives directions, and tells you the meaning of your own Ray, points out the path to your own Logos, and then goes away. It will not come before you are prepared for it. It is open to any man to obtain the teaching of Christ in himself from the "still small voice."

I have long doubted whether there was ever a real man Christ. Even now it seems possible that there was not such a man. But it does not much matter. The individuality of Christ was due to the mysterious power acting through Him.

The Voice comes to you all of a sudden when you do not expect it, and gives you important directions. It is when a man is getting near Adeptship that it comes. This is the Voice of the Silence, which is Christos.

42. Man is called a Cross because his four principles are arranged in the shape of a cross. The four points of the cross represent the four principles in man—the four Avasthas (svapna, etc.) (Waking, dreaming, sleeping, 'ecstasy'). The highest is Turiya Avastha, the Enlightened Jagrat Avastha (Waking).

43. "The word was God." The Word=the Voice. The Light=Daiviprakrti. The Darkness=One's own Ego which does not understand the Light—vide Light on the Path. He=Christos. His own=Humanity.

44. Isvara is the Logos. The seventh principle strictly speaking must be called the Logos.

Even the existence of infinite space depends upon the perceiving ego, thus the existence of prakrti depends upon the existence of the Logos which is the perceiving ego and when this happens there is differentiation between subject and object.

When once the Logos ceases to exist, the whole objective space ceases to exist.

45. How do you know Kundalini action? Because you feel it from the accession of fire to the brain—as if a hot current of fire is being blown through the tube from the bottom of the tube.
46. Karana sariram being in the condition of sleep how can it act? It is not that kind of sleep, but yoga sleep. It is the rest after the tempest in Light on the Path.
47. Parabrahmam=consciousness unmanifested.
48. You are not correct in stating that Theosophy contradicts itself by stating first that the highest spiritual improvement is possible for every human being and next that karma influences possibility. You must admit that there is no contradiction in the two statements, when you see that karma itself is a product of human effort and of human action, and can be altered and varied by human endeavour. Karma is not a settled and invariable cause, existing from eternity to eternity, predetermining the fate of every human being through thousands of incarnations.
49. Every cat may as well complain that the College professors have blocked up its way and prevented it from learning Newton's Principia. The evil passions of humanity at the present stage block the way, not the Adepts. They are willing to help every man who is fitted for this kind of study, if he is really willing to help himself.
50. You commit a mistake in but taking one phase of his character into consideration. No one is immaculate and no one is entirely vicious. You have to take all his virtues and vices into consideration before you pronounce your judgment. My own opinion is, taking him as a whole, he is better than the ordinary run of humanity. This opinion is the result of

(continued from the previous page) three years' close observation, and you may take it for what it is worth. Anyhow he is not a Chela, and there is no "special patronage" to be strictly accounted for.

51. Why cannot Adepts control the evil magnetism of the world and live here? This is your curious question. Why should they? is my question by way of reply. Their difficulties are great enough as they are; why should they enhance them and waste their energy and power in overcoming the same, and even endanger their existence for the purpose of satisfying the curiosity of the common herd. The select few can go to Them as they do now. Their influence on the progress of humanity will be the same whether they live in Their retreats or in a place like Madras.

52. In practising pranayaman, try to concentrate your mind in your heart and imagine yourself in it as if your consciousness was all focussed there. Pronunciation of the word OM seems to rouse up the air in the lungs and send it up to the throat. If kundalini goes up your head, it may bring you the elixir of life; if it remains below, it does nothing. It opens a passage in susumna, and cleans and purifies the same. When it gets into your head, you increase your vitality, and it draws vital electricity from the sun into your head.

In the case of one given to sexual irregularity, he will never be able to rouse it up. When a man's mind is distracted by worry, excitement, overwork, etc., he will never be able to rouse it up. The greatest danger from the elementals comes when you have aroused Kundalini. They at once notice the centre of disturbance that has been created, and begin to congregate for the purpose of

(continued from the previous page) examining the individual who has set it up, and then sometimes you may see them.

When an elemental appears, it searches your mind and finds out what you do not like and are most afraid of, and assumes that very shape.

(Continued and completed in "Advanced Philosophic Notes." page 295).

APPENDIX to SUBBA RAO: H.P. BLAVATSKY.

1. We have already pointed out that, in our opinion the whole difference between Buddhistic and Vedantic philosophies was that the former was a kind of Rationalistic Vedantism, while the latter might be regarded as Transcendental Buddhism. If the Aryan esotericism applies the term Jivatma to the seventh principle, the pure and per se unconscious spirit—it is because the Vedanta postulating three kinds of existence—(1) the paramarthika—(the true, the only real one), (2) the vyavaharika (the practical), and (3) the pratibhasika (the apparent or illusory life)—makes the first Life or Jiva the only truly existent one. Brahma or the ONE SELF is its only representative in the universe, as it is the universal Life in toto, while the other two are but its "phenomenal appearance," imagined and created by ignorance, and complete illusions suggested to us by our blind senses. The Buddhists, on the other hand, deny either subjective or objective reality even to that one Self-Existence. Buddha declares that there is neither Creator nor an ABSOLUTE BEING. Buddhist rationalism was ever too alive to the insuperable difficulty of admitting one absolute consciousness, as in the words of Flint—"wherever there is consciousness there is relation, and wherever there is relation there is dualism." The ONE LIFE is either "MUKTA" (absolute and unconditioned)

(continued from the previous page) and can have no relation to anything nor to any one; or it is "BADDHA" (bound and conditioned), and then it cannot be called the ABSOLUTE; the limitation, moreover, necessitating another deity as powerful as the first to account for all the evil in this world. Hence, the Arhat secret doctrine on cosmogony admits but one absolute, indestructible, eternal, and uncreated UNCONSCIOUSNESS (so to translate), of an element (the word being used for want of a better term) absolutely independent of everything else in the universe; a something ever present or ubiquitous, a Presence which ever was, is and will be, whether there is a God, gods, or none; whether there is a universe, or no universe; existing during the eternal cycles of Maha Yugas, during the Pralayas; as during the periods of Manvantara; and this is SPACE, the field for the operation of the eternal Forces and natural Law, the basis (as Mr Subba Row rightly calls it) upon which take place the eternal intercorrelations of Akasa-Prakrti, guided by the unconscious regular pulsations of Sakti—the breath or power of a conscious deity, the theists would say—the eternal energy of an eternal, unconscious Law, say the Buddhists. Space, then or "Fan, Bar-nang" (Maha Sunyata) or, as it is called by Lao-tze, the "Emptiness" is the nature of the Buddhist Absolute. (See Confucius' Praise of the Abyss) The word Jiva, then could never be applied by the Arhats to the Seventh Principle, since it is only through its correlation or contact with matter that Fohat (the Buddhist active energy) can develop active conscious life; and that to the question "how can Unconsciousness generate consciousness?" the answer would be "Was the seed which generated a Bacon or a Newton self-conscious"?

To our European readers: Deceived by the phonetic similarity, it must not be thought that the name "Brahman" is identical in this connection with Brahma or Isvara—the personal God. The Upanisads—the Vedanta Scriptures—mention no such God and one would vainly seek in them any allusions to a conscious deity. The Brahman, or Parabrahman, the ABSOLUTE of the Vedantins, is neuter and unconscious, and has no connection with the masculine Brahma of the Hindu Triad, or Trimurti. Some Orientalists rightly believe the name derived from the verb "Brh," to grow or increase, and to be in this sense, the universal expansive force of nature, the vivifying and spiritual principle or power, spread throughout the universe and which in its collectivity is the one Absoluteness, the one Life and the only Reality.

2. I have adhered to the threefold classification—of body, soul and spirit—in Isis Unveiled, because had I then adopted the septenary division, as I have been compelled to do later on for purposes of strict analysis, no one would have understood it, and the multiplication of principles, instead of throwing light upon the subject, would have introduced endless confusion. But now the question has changed, and the position is different. We have unfortunately—for it was premature—opened a chink in the Chinese wall of esotericism, and we cannot now close it again, even if we would. I for one had to pay a heavy price for the indiscretion, but I will not shrink from the results.

3. Prajna, or the capacity of perception, exists in seven different aspects, corresponding to the seven conditions of matter. Strictly speaking there are six states of differentiated

(continued from the previous page) prajna I mean the condition in which prajna is split up into various states of consciousness.

4. "Once we pass from the plane of pure subjective (or metaphysical, hence purely theoretical) reasoning on esoteric matters to that of practical demonstration in occultism, wherein each (lower) principle and attribute has to be analysed and defined in its application....to post-mortem life (that of spooks and pisacas), the seven-fold classification is the right one." These are my words, which every spiritualist will understand. Vedantin metaphysicians, denying as they do objective reality or importance even to our physical body, are not likely to lose their time in dividing the lower principles in man, the compound aspects and nature of the phantom of that body. Practical occultism does; and it is one of the duties of those Theosophists who study occultism to warn their brethren of the dangers incurred by those who know nothing of the real nature of those apparitions: to warn them that a shell is not spirit.

5. My "four principles" have to disintegrate and vanish in the air, before any amount of criticism can make me regard my ten fingers as only four; although metaphysically, I am fully prepared to admit that they exist only in my own mayavic perceptions and states of consciousness.

6. I hope, this may not be construed into a desire of claiming any great knowledge for myself; for I certainly do not possess it. All that I seek to establish is, that such secrets do exist, and that, outside of the initiates, no one is competent to prove, much less to disprove, the doctrines now given out.

7. The sentence presents no sense to our mind,

(continued from the previous page) trained as it has been by our great Masters to think of "spirit" as of something formless and entirely beyond the ken of our sensual perceptions, and, therefore, not to be considered apart from, or independently of, corporeal existence. UNIVERSAL INTELLIGENCE and the ONE LIFE, as we call it, conceived of, apart from any physical organization, becomes vital essence, an energy of force; and none of these we believe can be considered as a distinct entity, a substance, or, as having a being or even a form separate from matter.

8. The something, or rather the no-thing, called Spirit, has by itself, no form or forms in either, progressive or stationary "states of development"; and we say again that the expression is perfectly unintelligible to every real Advaiti. Can a void be annihilated? And what is pure, absolute spirit but the "void" of the ancient Greek philosophers? Well, says Lucretius, "there can be no third thing besides body and void; for if it be to the smallest extent tangible – it is body; if not – it is void." And let it not be urged, on the strength of this quotation, that because we quote the words of a great "Atheist", a materialist, as an authority, we are therefore a materialist and an atheist (in the usual sense of both terms) ourself. We object to the very term "materialism" if it is to be made identical with, or a synonym of "corporealism," that is to say, an antithesis of "Spiritualism." In the light we, Occultists, regard matter, we are materialists. But it does not at all stand to reason that because of that, we should be, at the same time, "corporealists," denying in any sense or way the reality of the so-called spiritual existence, or of any being or beings, living on another plane of life, in higher and far more perfect worlds than ours,

(continued from the previous page) having their being in states of which no untrained mind can have the smallest conception. Though we are aware that there exist, even in the present age of science and enlightenment, persons who, under the pretext of religion, teach the ignorant masses that there was a time when matter did not exist (since it was created) implying thus that there will come a moment when it will be annihilated, we have never yet met any one, whether atheist or deist, materialist or spiritualist, who would presume to say that spirit – whether we call it “void” or “divine breath” – can ever be annihilated.

Our “assertion” then means the following: Undifferentiated cosmic matter of Mulaprakrti, as it is called in Hindu books, is uncreated and eternal. It would be impossible to prove this assertion from a priori reasons, but its truth can be tested by the ordinary inductive method. In every objective phenomenon perceived, either in the present plane of consciousness or in any other plane requiring the exercise of spiritual faculties, there is but change of cosmic matter from one form to another. There is not a single instance, or the remotest suspicion of the annihilation of an atom of matter ever brought to light either by Eastern Adepts or Western scientists. When the common experience of generations of Adepts in their own spiritual or psychic field of observation, and of the ordinary people in theirs – (i.e. in the domain of physical science) points to the conclusion that there never has been utter annihilation of a single material particle, we are justified we believe, in saying that matter is indestructible though it may change its forms and properties and appear in various degrees of differentiation. Hindu and Buddhist philosophers

(continued from the previous page) have ages ago recognised the fact that Purusa and Prakrti are eternal, co-existent, not only correlative and interdependent, but positively one and the same thing for him who can read between the lines. Every system of evolution commences with postulating the existence of Mulaprakrti or Tamas (primeval darkness). Leaving aside the great authority of Kapila on the subject, we may refer to the celebrated Rk of Rgveda describing this Primeval Chaos, and using such expression as: Tama eva purastat abhavat visvarupam and Astva it amagra Asith, etc. ("Primeval darkness resulted as the manifested universe" and "Asath or Prakrti existed first.") scattered throughout the Veda and the Upanishads in support of our assertion.

Gaudapada and Sankaracarya have given expression to their views on the subject in their works, and those views are in perfect accordance with their doctrines of the Arhat philosophy. The authority of the latter two great philosophers will, we believe, be sufficient to show to the learned Svami, since he is an Advaiti, that our statement is correct. And primeval Cosmic matter, whether called Asath or Tamas, or Prakrti or Sakti, is ever the same, and held to be eternal by both Hindu and Arhat philosophers, while Purusa is inconceivable, hence non-existent, save when manifesting through Prakrti. In its undifferentiated condition, some Advaitins refuse to recognize it as matter, properly so called. Nevertheless this entity is their PARABRAHMAM, with its dual aspect of Purusa and Prakrti. In their opinion it can be called neither; hence in some passages of the Upanisads we find the expression "PRAKRTI-layam" mentioned; but in all such passages the word "Prakrti" means, as we can prove – matter in a state of differentiation, while undifferentiated

(continued from the previous page) Cosmic matter in conjunction with, or rather in its aspect of latent spirit is always referred to as "MAHA-ISVARA," "Purusa" and "Paramapada."

9. In a case of natural death, the citadel of life is captured, so to speak, only by gradual approaches; in deaths of violence it is taken with a rush. If fright, or joy, or the lethal current of hatred be the cause, the body will show no wound yet life be extinguished all the same. Sorcerers' victims usually appear as though killed by heart disease or apoplexy; chemical analysis will afford no clue to the assassin's method, nor the surgeon be able to find a suspicious mark upon the surface of the cadaver.

10. Like some of our distinguished Western metaphysicians, our opponent seems to regard matter and energy as two distinct things, whereas the Esoteric doctrine recognizes but one substratum for everything visible or invisible – "Purus-Prakrti" and vice versa.

11. It is precisely because we claim to know something of "practical" Occultism in addition to being a Theosophist that we answer without in the least "evading the question" that a mortal wound may be inflicted "not only upon, but also by one" inner man upon another. This is the A.B.C. of esoteric mesmerism. The wound is inflicted by neither a real dagger or a hand of flesh, bones and blood, but simply by WILL. It is the intense will of the "Gospoja" that guided the astral or inner body, the Mayavirupa of Frozya.

12. Knowing that matter is indestructible, as also spirit or rather energy – we say with all the esoteric Advaitis that matter and spirit are ONE.

13. "Why do you not call a piece of wood or stone spirit?" I am asked. "Because it is not usual to call them by such a name. Nevertheless we maintain that there is in a piece of wood or stone as much of latent spirit or life as there is in a week-old human foetus.

"How then can matter or Prakrti be called eternal? If matter is merely a manifestation of spirit, why call it by the false name of matter instead of its own name spirit?" I am asked. "For the same good reason that we call a chair by its 'false' name of chair instead of calling it by that of the 'oak' or any other wood of which it was made."

14. If "activity is also eternal" then how can our philosophical antagonist maintain that matter is not so? Can activity (in the usual sense of the word), whether physical or mental, manifest itself or exist without, or outside of, matter, or to be plainer—outside of any one of its seven states?

KOVOOR T.BEHANAN: YOGA; A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION.

(1) POSTURES:

In the progressive development of a yogin special attention is paid to the building of a healthy body. The third of the eight stages of the yogic discipline deals with a series of gymnastic exercises which are meant to improve the various parts of the organism.

Although yoga consists of eight stages, the reader should not consider the yogin as mechanically progressing from one stage to the next. The guru or teacher determines, as we have already indicated in a previous chapter, the requirements of a disciple and prescribes the necessary exercises in line with his capacity and needs. There is no uniform formula that is applicable to all. This important point should be borne in mind in reading this and the following

(continued from the previous page) two chapters. While in theory these physical exercises are available for those who may benefit by them, one may directly proceed to the mental exercises, ignoring this stage altogether. It is assumed that in such cases the individual does not need, from the yogic point of view, any development of the physical side other than that which he already possesses. Nor is there any definite regulation about how long a time one may devote to a particular kind of exercise. Here, also, the teacher from time to time lays down the necessary instructions.

While yoga makes sufficient allowance for individual differences, certain general rules are generally enforced. The exercises described below are to be practised at dawn and sunset on an empty stomach. Several hours must elapse after a meal and before the exercise is begun. Dietary regulations are to be strictly followed. The yogin should not take sour, pungent, or spicy food. Meat and intoxicating drinks are to be religiously avoided. All yogic exercises are carried on in a place free from disturbing factors. A firm but soft seat is chosen. Yogins generally use some kind of tanned hide or carpets made of grass to sit on.

Asanas, as these exercises are called, may be best translated as postures. It is interesting to note that, as against Western exercises, a posture, once the position is assumed, is held for a long time – anywhere from three or four minutes to half an hour. Rapid or violent movements are against the yogic tradition. Space does not allow us to enumerate more than a few of the several available postures which, it is hoped, will convince the reader that an all-round development of the body is contemplated in the yogic scheme of postures. There are one or more exercises for every part of the body.

Apart from the general development that is claimed to follow from these postures, some of them are said to have specific therapeutic value. Traditional claims are often exaggerations, if not entirely unfounded. It would seem reasonable, however, to believe that there is a substratum of truth in these claims. One of the modern yogins with a scientific tern of mind, Kuvalayananda, who has utilized these postures in his work with patients, is convinced of their therapeutic advantages. We shall refer to some of his claims made for certain postures.

An immense difficult posture and one of great discomfort to beginners is the lotus posture.¹ Each leg is bent at the knee and the foot is kept resting at the opposite thigh-joint, with the soles turned up and the heels pressing against the lower side of the abdomen. The hands rest on the knees or on the toes, one on the other, with the palms turned upward. The beginner is repeatedly advised of the importance of maintaining an erect spine.

The lotus-posture, along with three others which all follow more or less the same principle, is utilized in the breathing and concentration exercises, and hence is known as the meditative posture. The technique of yogic deep breathing, described in the next chapter, demands certain movements of the head and hands. On the contrary, during meditation the head is held erect and the eyes closed.

¹ Each posture has a Sanskrit name which often signifies the resemblance of the posture to an inanimate object or animal. I am following the very appropriate English translation by Kuvalayananda (Kuvalayananda-Asanas, Part 1, Popular Yoga, Vol.1; Kaivalyadahama, Lonavla, India.

The topsy-turvy-posture is an exercise in which the student stands straight on his head. After kneeling, the student makes a fingerlock by interlacing the fingers of both hands. With the forearms on the ground and with the elbows a foot apart, the head is placed in the curve formed by the fingers, which serves as a support to the back part of the head. As the toes are brought nearer the head, the trunk is raised to a vertical position. The legs are then raised to form a straight line with the spine. Although this posture is rather uncomfortable in the beginning, practice enables one to maintain the position for twenty minutes or even more.²

The pan-physical-posture, as the name would indicate, is said to influence the whole body and its functions. As it is meant to direct a liberal supply of blood to the thyroid and parathyroid glands, it is possible that there is substance to this claim. It is also interesting to note that this exercise is very commonly practised in the West. After lying on the back, the legs are slowly raised, until they make a right angle to the ground. Next, with the elbows planted on the ground, the trunk is raised with the help of the forearms. The body is raised sufficiently high to allow the chest to keep pressing against the chin. This posture is sometimes maintained for half an hour or more.³

² The main purpose of this exercise would seem to be to divert a large supply of blood to the brain. On the therapeutic side, it is maintained that dyspepsia and constipation, when caused by digestive disorders due to deficient blood supply, can be treated satisfactorily by means of this posture (Asanas 67).

³ Yogins hold this posture in high esteem and consider it to have great therapeutic value. Besides the general improvement in health through developing a healthy thyroid, according to Kavalayananda, this posture has a beneficial influence on weak sex glands. A very ancient yogic tradition prescribes this posture with a milk diet for patients in the initial stages of leprosy (Asanas,75).

The fish-posture (so called because the posture enables one to float like a fish in water for a considerable time without exertion) is a complement of the pan-physical one. After assuming the lotus-posture, the student lies on his back and the trunk is raised with the help of the elbows, throwing the head backwards as far as it will go. The eyes keep looking across the forehead. The posture is completed by taking hold of the toes with the fingers.

To assume the plough-posture (because it imitates the Indian plough), while lying on the back, first the legs are raised and then the lower part of the trunk. Slowly the legs are lowered beyond the head, the toes touching the ground as near the head as possible. The trunk is raised higher and higher, the toes are moved farther and farther away as far back as they will go. Now the hands are brought together to form a finger-lock around the head as in the topsy-turvy posture. With this support for the head, the toes are pushed even farther back until the chest presses tightly against the chin.

To execute the cobra-posture, while lying on the back and with the palms on either side, first the head is raised and thrown back as far as possible. Very slowly, then, the thorax is raised, and then the lumber section. As one advances in this practice, the pressure on the hands is reduced and the back muscles brought into action. Those who are well established in yogic deep breathing are expected to hold their

(continued from the previous page) breath while doing this exercise. As a complement to this, the locust-posture is practised. While lying on the chest and with the hands kept at the sides (with clenched fists) the legs are raised after deep inhalation by putting pressure on the chest and hands. When it is no longer possible to hold the breath, the legs are slowly lowered. The bow-posture combines the features of both cobra- and locust-postures. The ankles are held, and the head, chest, and the legs are raised.

In the posterior-stretching exercise, the student first sits with his legs stretched out. Hooks are made with the forefingers and the toes are grasped by bending the trunk a little forward. Next, the grasp is made firmer and the trunk is bent still farther forward until the face rests between the knees, and the elbows rest on the ground.

In most of the postures described so far, the spinal column is bent either backward or forward. But in the semi-Matsyendra-posture (so called after a famous yogin of ancient times) enables one to twist the spine sideways. The student sits on the floor with the legs stretched out. The right leg is bent, the heel is set against the perineum, and the sole against the left thigh. The left leg is bent and the foot made to rest on the right side of the right thigh. The right hand is passed around the left knee to grasp the left toe, so that the shoulder keeps pressing against the knee and allows the body to be twisted to the left. The maximum possible twist is effected by bringing the left hand behind the back to grasp the right thigh below the groin. The head is also turned to the left in line with the left shoulder. To make the right twist, one may start with the left leg and introduce the corresponding changes.

The pelvic posture: while seated, either one of the legs is folded and, with the knees raised, the foot is made to rest in front of the corresponding buttock. If the student starts with the left leg, he leans a little to the right. The sole is turned up and the toes brought behind the corresponding buttock, where they remain pointing to the right. The right leg is then arranged likewise. With the spine held erect, the palms are brought to rest on the knees and the eyes are closed (This is a meditative posture too). The supine pelvic posture is a continuation of this, in which the student lies on his back with the forearms serving for cushions under the head.

In the peacock-posture the student balances the body horizontally on the two forearms—a very difficult posture to maintain and one which involves great expenditure of energy. While kneeling down and resting the body on the knees and toes, the palms are turned backwards and pressed against the floor. The elbows are brought together and held on the abdomen a little below the umbilicus. As pressure is put on the forearms, the toes are raised and thrown back in a line with the body. The head is held at a slight elevation to counterbalance the lower limbs.

We now come to the last posture, one which aims at the relaxation of all the muscles of the body. It is called the dead-posture because the subject lies on his back as motionless as a corpse. First the thoracic muscles are relaxed, then the abdominal, and so on. In attempting to relax, one concentrates on the part worked upon and imagines that the part thought about is relaxing. If necessary, the eyes are closed. Although one begins by working, one by one, on the different muscle groups, one's ultimate aim is to relax them all at once when so desired. With the muscles relaxed, one begins to regulate breathing. First, without

(continued from the previous page) attempting to control, one simply observes the inflow and outflow of breath. After a time the irregularities in breathing are rectified by voluntarily equalizing the time taken for both inhalation and exhalation. Finally, volume is increased, making respiration deeper. Each stage is attempted only after the successful completion of the previous one. If the student were to find that he had over-exercised himself, he would customarily practise the dead-posture to recover equilibrium.

If we are to get a complete picture of the purely physical exercises of yoga, it is not enough to describe the postures. Several minor exercises, grouped under technical names, are utilized by the yogins. Some of them relate to the disposition of certain anatomical parts during the execution of the postures. Others are merely purificatory devices for cleansing the stomach, colon, etc. A few are practised independently of the postures. If we overlook the yogic way of grouping them (into bandhas, mudras, etc.) we may divide them into two broad groups, viz. those dealing with particular anatomical parts and those that are purificatory in nature. We shall first consider the former.

Two ways of steadily gazing at some point of the body are practised by yogins as a preliminary exercise in concentration, either as a part of the technique of the meditative postures or independently. In one of the, the nasal gaze, the student stares unflinchingly at the tip of the nose. Tradition considers this gaze as part of the lotus posture. In the frontal gaze, the eyes are directed to the mid-point between the eyebrows. Since this gaze might sometimes injure the eyes, yogins take care to warn enthusiastic beginners against overdoing. It is claimed, however, that when cautiously done these gazes help immensely to conquer the wandering propensities

(continued from the previous page) of the mind.

Yogins place a great deal of emphasis on abdominal exercises. One of these is designed to raise the diaphragm. The student stands with the feet a few inches apart and the knees and the trunk bent a little forward. The hands rest a little above the knees. As the knees are pressed, he exhales completely. A vigorous mock inhalation is then attempted by raising the ribs and producing a pronounced depression of the abdomen. When it is no longer possible to refrain from inhaling, the abdomen is brought back to its normal position.⁵ This exercise may be practised in several positions, sitting cross-legged, squatting, etc.

In the chin-lock, the head is bent down so that the chin presses the jugular notch. Throughout the period of retention in yogic breathing, the head is held in this position. It is claimed that this exerts an upward pull on the spine.

Yogins attempt from very early in their practice to gain control over the anal sphincters. The first effort in this direction consists of repeated contraction and relaxation of the sphincters for several minutes in succession. The same procedure is repeated during the diaphragm-raising exercise. With every inhalation the sphincters are relaxed and in exhalation they are contracted. One of the developments of the topsy-turvy-posture consists of practising the diaphragm-raising exercise while maintaining this posture with slight modifications. While inhaling and exhaling in this position, the sphincters are also manipulated. A few days' practice in various positions enables the student to accomplish his objective—that of gaining complete voluntary control over the

⁵ This is claimed to have great therapeutic value against many abdominal troubles (Asanas 51)

(continued from the previous page) sphincters.⁶ Once the control is established, while the abdomen is withdrawn for the diaphragm-raising exercise, the sphincters are opened to force out the gases from the lower part of the colon. When the abdominal muscles are relaxed, the same process is repeated, this time to take fresh air in from the outside.⁷

An exercise called the symbol of yoga is executed by forming a foot-lock as in the lotus-posture. The hands are brought behind the back, the right hand grasping the left wrist. With the body bent over the heels, the forehead is made to touch the ground.⁸

There are a few exercises that are generally practised only by advanced yogins. One such is the tongue-rolling exercise in which the tongue is rolled backward and upward to cover up the nasal cavities posteriorly leading into the

⁶ This is not merely idle claim. In one of the purificatory exercises, to be described shortly, we shall see how this voluntary control over the sphincters is utilized.

⁷ "The nerve supply of the rectum and the anus is mainly from the sympathetic; and the nerve endings in the skin at the anal orifice are exceedingly numerous. The work of Asvini-Mudra (the anal exercise to control the sphincters) principally lies with this part and through it the sympathetic is probably stimulated." (Yoga-Mimamsa, Vol.1, 133, ed. by Kuvalayananda; Kaivalyadhama, Lonavla, India).

⁸ On the therapeutic side it is claimed that the pressure exerted by the heels against the pelvic loop and the cecum induces movements in these portions of the colon, and hence this pressure is a good remedy for constipation (Asanas, 118).

(continued from the previous page) pharynx at the base of the skull. Ordinarily, since the tongue is tied to the region below by the frenulum, its movements are checked and hence cannot reach the posterior openings. To overcome this difficulty the frenulum is cut. According to the prescribed procedure this cutting is done, little by little, once every week, until the fibrous band is removed. Every day the student enhances the flexibility of the tongue by rolling it to both sides. He lengthens it by pulling it out slowly until it is long enough to reach the posterior openings of the nasal cavities and to cover them up. This is practised as an adjunct to the breathing exercises by those who are able to hold their breath for a considerable time. While it may be difficult for the layman to see what could possibly be accomplished by this the yogins are unanimous in attributing great value to it. It is claimed by some that this practice induces secretions of great physiological value. All of them maintain however, that it helps the practitioner to advance towards samadhi— the highest stage of yoga practice, the ideal and the supreme objective of all yogins.

We may now take up the purificatory exercises which are utilized to cleanse the different parts of the body. It is not necessary for every yogin to practise any or all of them as a regular part of the daily yogic routine; only those with certain irregularities or those suffering from defective functioning of any particular region need undertake them. Everyone, however, is expected to know the technique of doing these so that, when the occasion arises, he may easily utilize them.

The most important of the purificatory exercises is the one in which the two muscles, recti abdomini, are isolated; first together and then each independently. In a sense this is a continuation

(continued from the previous page) of the diaphragm-raising exercise described above. When the diaphragm has been raised, with the practitioner in a standing position, a downward and forward push is given to the abdominal portion above the pubic bone. After considerable practice, sometimes running over several months, one is able to isolate the two muscles. This forms the first stage. Next, the attempt is directed to isolating either one, keeping the other relaxed. If the isolation of the left rectus is desired, the body is bent a little to that side and a corresponding change is introduced for isolating the right muscle.

When the student has succeeded in isolating the two recti, together and then independently, he is ready to pass on to the final stage, which consists of rolling manipulations. This is achieved by the rapid contraction and relaxation of the two muscles in quick succession and is also practised both ways, from left to right and vice versa.⁹

Yogins have developed a very interesting method for washing the colon. While the recti abdomini muscles are isolated a partial vacuum is created in the colon which enables the student to take water through the rectum, provided the sphincters can be voluntarily opened.¹⁰ We have already described the practices by which one can gain control over the sphincters. In traditional practise, for those who could not voluntarily open their sphincters, it is customary to insert a bamboo tube into the

⁹ Kuvalayananda, after some X-ray studies as well as some therapeutic application of this exercise, concludes that it is one of the finest exercises for several abdominal and intestinal complaints. (Yoga Mimamsa Vol.1.Nos. 2,3)

¹⁰ On experimental evidence, K'ananda claims that a partial vacuum of 30 to 47 mm. Hg. was in evidence every time the two muscles were isolated (Yoga-Mimamsa, Vol.1, 28).

(continued from the previous page) rectum. After the water is in, the student practises the diaphragm-raising exercise and the isolation and the rolling manipulation of the recti abdomini before the water is let out.

Another interesting consequence of the isolation of the two muscles is the development of a partial vacuum in the bladder as well. Just as in the case of the colon, this is utilized by the yogins to wash this organ. In traditional practice a silver or lead tube is used to force open the urethral sphincter which gives a ready access to the bladder. The student inserts the first one as far as the bladder. The outer end of the tube is left in a bowl of water and the recti abdomini are isolated. Immediately the water rushes up through the tube. Before the muscles are relaxed, the tube is pulled out and the water is retained in the bladder for a few minutes, after which it is let out. Sometimes in modern yogic practice rubber catheters are used.¹¹

There are several exercises to improve the stomach. One of them is aimed to develop control over the stomach to the extent that one could voluntarily vomit the contents. The student drinks four or five glasses of water on an empty stomach. The student bends the trunk slightly forward, spreads the legs and rests the hands on the knees, and then inhales deeply. With the hands pressed firmly against the knees, the abdominal muscles are thrown backward and upward, and then relaxed again. This is repeated at the

¹¹ The writer has seen both these practices, viz. taking water into the colon and the bladder by isolating the recti abdomini. In the former no tube was used, since the practitioner was able to open the rectal sphincters voluntarily, while the traditional silver tube was availed of in the case of the bladder. About half a glass of water was drawn into the bladder.

(continued from the previous page) rate of approximately seven or eight times a minute. After a few months of practice, most students gain full control over the stomach and can vomit the contents at will.

In an unusually striking practice to cleanse the stomach and massage its walls, the yogins swallow a long piece of cloth. A strong but thin piece of cloth about 22 feet long and three inches wide is used for the purpose. One end of the cloth, which is moistened and held in one hand, is inserted into the mouth and the student begins to swallow bit by bit. Very often it takes considerable practice to swallow the whole piece, leaving out only a few inches. With the cloth in, the student practices the diaphragm raising exercise for a few minutes and follows this by the isolation and the rolling manipulations of the recti abdomini. The cloth is pulled out after twenty minutes or so by the alternate use of the two hands.¹²

The breathing exercises, described in the next chapter, constitute, according to the yogic classification, the fourth among the eight stages. Yet there is a type of rhythmic, shallow breathing known as kapalabhati which is considered a purificatory exercise. The pause between inhalation and exhalation, the main feature of all yogic varieties of breathing which are claimed to have spiritual value, is conspicuous by its absence in kapalabhati.

It may be practised in any one of the four meditative postures, preferably the lotus-posture.¹³ Since this is a diaphragmatic variety of

¹² Two specific advantages are claimed for this practice – absorption by the cloth of the fluids collected in the stomach and the massage given to its walls (Yoga-Mimansa, Vol.2.174).

¹³ Any one of these postures is good enough as long as kapalabhati is practised for a short time, say, four or five minutes. When practised for a longer period, however, the lotus-posture is the only one available. The reason is that when the breathing is carried on over long periods certain vibrations are started all over the body and this, coupled with a feeling of exhilaration, results in a lessening of the motor control over the limbs. But in the lotus-posture the legs are formed into such a firm lock that it is impossible to undo them without the help of the hands, and hence not likely to be disturbed by the lessening motor control.

(continued from the previous page) breathing, the abdominal muscles play the major role. The student starts with an exhalation brought about by an inward stroke of the abdomen. Inhalation follows immediately after exhalation, there being no interval between the two. Muscular contraction beyond that involved in one moderate inward stroke is avoided. In actual practice, inhalation is so passive and automatic that the student pays no attention to this phase. Two exhalations per second is about the usual rate, and one minute the duration of one round (one hundred and twenty respirations). After the maximum number in one round is reached, the student rests for a short period ranging from a few seconds to one minute. Then the second round begins. Three such rounds generally practised in one sitting. Students who have had long practice, however, sometimes prolong the session to thirty minutes and increase the speed to four exhalations per second.¹⁴

We may now conclude this chapter with the observation that, from the yogic point of view,

¹⁴ "As an exercise of great oxygen value, kapalabhati has no parallel. Its nerve culture value is also very great. Its effect upon the circulatory and digestive systems are of considerable physiological importance. The massage of the abdominal viscera which the exercise effects is obvious." (K'ananda-Pranayama, Part 1. p.97.)

(continued from the previous page) a correct and harmonious physiological functioning of the various organs of the body is more important than either mere physical strength or muscular power. The exercises described above seem to have been developed primarily for that purpose. It is a well-rounded system in that no part of the body has been left without an appropriate exercise or exercises for its development. These coupled with the breathing exercises, help the yogins to maintain their bodies at a high level of physical efficiency.

(2) VARIETIES OF BREATHING: In the minds of many people, both in India and in the West, yoga is very often associated with pranayama, i.e. with certain types of breathing, sometimes to the exclusion of all other practices. In point of fact pranayama occupies the fourth stage in the yogic curriculum, which in turn is followed by the mental exercises.

There is a substantial reason why yoga has come to be associated with pranayama in the popular mind; it is the connecting link between the physical and the mental aspects of yoga. We can make this point clear by considering the general nature of the postures and the effect they are supposed to bring about in the organism. They are physical exercises intended to develop a physiological balance and as such have very little to do with the induction of any extraordinary mental experiences. But with sufficient practice in pranayama the yogins find that changes occur in their mental states; in a marked way their awareness of the external world diminishes.

Pranayama comprises different types of breathing. "Prana" means "breath" and "ayama", "pause"; hence the compound "pranayama" literally means a cessation or pause in the movement of breath. While in the earlier writings, especially in Patanjali's Yoga Sutras, the word is free from all mystical and symbolic interpretations, in

(continued from the previous page) the hands of later writers it became equivalent to some psychic force or cosmic element. We shall ignore this unnecessary mystification of the word and use it in its original and correct sense, referring to the normal function of respiration.

Each act of breathing, according to yogic teachers, consists of three parts: inhalation (puraka), holding (kumbhaka) and exhalation (rechaka). Holding may refer to the stage when the air is held in the body or outside it. The time relation between these three parts of respiration is one of great importance to yogins. The most authentic tradition demands that if inhalation should take one time-unit, then holding and exhalation should take four and two respectively. This means that in the successive order of inhalation, holding, and exhalation the ratio is 1:4:2. There are two other traditions, one of which prescribes the proportion as 1:2:2 and the other has a uniform measure for all the three acts.

Beginners generally follow the second ratio, i.e. 1:2:2, although one may practise according to the first proportion after a time when it is deemed desirable. For that matter the beginner is even advised to omit retention altogether in the first few days of pranayamic practice. It may be taken up after the student has made satisfactory progress in inhalation and exhalation in the proportion 1:2. All yogic pranayamas are practised slowly, and one should not continue under a sense of discomfort or feeling of suffocation. The adjustments that may demand conscious attention in the beginning follow as a matter of course with practice.

Advanced yogins practise pranayama four times in the course of twenty-four hours, i.e. morning (at dawn), midday, evening (at sunset), and midnight; for beginners, however, morning and evening is sufficient. Just as a light stomach is

(continued from the previous page) necessary in the case of postures, so also it is imperative in pranayama. If the postures and pranayama are both practised in one session, the latter should invariably come second. Concontration exercises, if practised with either postures or pranayama or both, should always come last.

According to one of the generally accepted traditions there are eight varities of pranayama: ujjayi, bhastrika, suryabhedana, sitkari, sitali, bhramari, murchchha, and plavini. We shall now turn our attention to a description of these.

Ujjayi: After assuming one of the meditative postures in which the spine and the head are held erect, the student is ready to start the first part of the respiratory act, inhalation. After a slow, but complete, exhalation the chest is expanded and the air allowed to flow in. Inhalation is done slowly and deliberately. The disposition of the glottis deserves particular notice. In normal breathing it is customary to keep the glottis wide open. But in ujjayi the glottis is partially closed. When the student inhales, consequently, a sound similar to that produced in sobbing is heard even at a little distance. The frictional sound sometimes produced when the nasa passages are not clear is religiously avoided. It is important to bear in mind that the force exerted during inhalation must be uniform until the last cubic centimeter of air is in, and further, that no jerky movements of the muscles of inspiration should take place.

Since ujjayi is a thoracic variety of breathing, the abdominal muscles play only a passive rote. It is customary, for most people to draw out the abdomen in any kind of deep breathing. This, however, is not countenanced

(continued from the previous page) in yogic pranayamas. On the contrary, the abdominal muscles are held in a state of slight contraction throughout the inhalation.

Inhalation is followed by holding, and a few changes are introduced in the disposition of some parts of the body. First the glottis, which remained partially closed during inhalation, is now tightly closed. Next, the chin-lock is formed, i.e., the head is bent down in front so that the chin presses firmly against the jugular notch. This position is maintained throughout the period of retention.

The student then closes his nostrils, using the right hand for this purpose. With the index and the middle fingers bent so as to touch the palmar side, the thumb and the other fingers are held straight. While arranged in this fashion the fingers are kept on the bridge of the nose. If the practitioner desires to close the right nostril, the thumb is moved down and pressed against the septum and the hard bone above. Similarly, to close the left nostril, the extended fingers are brought down. If both nostrils are to be closed the fingers as well as the thumb are brought down and pressed against the septum.¹ In ujjayi both nostrils are closed during retention.

Before exhalation begins, pressure is relieved from the left nostril, and the right one still remains closed. The head is then raised and brought back to its original position; and the glottis is partially opened. The student then exhales through the left nostril, maintaining a uniform speed to the end. In order to make the exhalation complete, the abdominal muscles are contracted more and more as the air supply is exhausted. This completes one round of ujjayi.

¹ In some varieties of breathing, as we shall see later, it is necessary to open and close the right and left nostrils alternately; hence this arrangement of the fingers is a convenient one.

One may begin with a few rounds and increase the number every day. With some practice one is enabled to increase the duration of each round and develop the right ratio. It is desirable to practise eighty rounds in one sitting. In doing this, care should be taken to avoid the inhalation of extra air between the rounds.

So far we have described ujjayi as it is taught according to tradition. But Swami Kuvalayananda suggests a slight change which is based on his experiences as well as those of his several disciples. According to him, instead of exhaling through the left nostrils, beginners would do well to make use of both nostrils for this purpose. He is also convinced that this minor change in technique does not greatly affect the results. Beginners generally find the frequent manipulation of fingers for opening and closing the nostrils very irksome. The advantage of the suggestion is that this part of the technique, i.e. closing both nostrils after inhalation and later opening the left one before exhalation, may be conveniently avoided.

We have already mentioned that all yogic pranayamas are practised in one or another of the meditative postures. Even according to traditional teaching there is one exception to this. This is ujjayi. One may practise this also while walking. The chin-lock, etc. which generally go with the different kinds of pranayamas, are avoided in this case. This then becomes nothing more than deep breathing. When so practised, yogins maintain that one cannot expect from ujjayi those spiritual results that are claimed to follow from pranayamas.

Utmost concentration is invariably demanded in all yogic pranayamas. The student is asked to concentrate on that point in the nasal

(continued from the previous page) passage where the first touch of inhaled air is felt. It is claimed by yogins that such concentration has, in the long run a steadying effect upon the mind.

Bhastrika: Bhastrika is a pranayama which is held in high esteem by yogins. This type of breathing is claimed to be best among all the yogic pranayamas for arousing the spiritual forces and for preparing the practitioner for concentration (dharana) and meditation (dhyana). There are four varieties of bhastrika, the one common characteristic of them all is the short-rhythm-breathing, i.e. quick and sudden exhalations followed by equally sudden inhalations. The short-rhythm-breathing part of bhastrika is exactly the same as in kapalabhati, described under the purificatory exercises in the previous chapter. This is, however, only the first part of bhastrika which is followed in all the four varieties by the same sort of deep breathing that is found in ujjayi. The sound produced by the incessant expulsions in the first part of bhastrika is similar to that of the bellows of a village smith; hence the name, "bhastrika", meaning "bellows."

In the first type of bhastrika one starts with kapalabhati, the number of rounds being determined by the needs of the individual. Twenty rounds is considered a good average for beginners. After this is completed, one round of ujjayi is practised with a slight change, viz., the glottis remains wide open throughout inhalation and exhalation. Because of the kapalabhatic type of breathing preceding ujjayi, the duration of the latter in bhastrika is longer than it would be otherwise, because the student takes advantage of the apnoea resulting from the short-rhythm-breathing. The end of deep exhalation

(continued from the previous page) completes one round of bhastrika. Several such rounds, depending on individual needs, are practised.

In the second variety of bhastrika the kapalabhatic part is slightly different from that of the first. Instead of keeping the glottis completely open, as is generally done in kapalabhatic proper, it is slightly contracted. The student takes particular care to see that the closure effected is so slight as not to cause any friction consequent on the rapid movement of the breath in and out. After the prescribed rounds of kapalabhatic are over, the student begins ujjayi. Here he inhales through the right nostril, effecting the necessary closure of the left nostril with the fingers of the right hand. This is followed by retention, the formation of the chin-lock, etc. In exhalation, air is let out through the left nostril in the same manner generally used in ujjayi. This completes one round of the second variety of bhastrika. As soon as the ujjayic part of bhastrika is over, the right hand is brought down and held against the right knee. The hand is again raised to make the adjustments during the ujjayic part in every round.

The most conspicuous feature of the third variety is the alternation between the right and left nostrils for the expulsion of air during the first part of every round. If the right nostril, for example, is used for expelling air in the first round, the left is used in the second, and so on for every odd and even number. Inhalation in the ujjayic part is done through the same nostril as in the preceding kapalabhatic part and exhalation through the other. Since the right hand is frequently used for closing one or the other of the nostrils in the kapalabhatic and ujjayic

(continued from the previous page) parts of this bhastrika, the student finds it helpful to keep the hand on the bridge of the nose throughout this exercise.

In the fourth variety there is a change in technique only in the first part of the exercise. The student inhales through the right nostril and exhales through the left. The order is reversed in the second round. Thereafter all odd rounds follow the first and even rounds the second. The second part of this exercise is similar to the corresponding part of the second variety of breathing: the student inhales through the right nostril and exhales through the other nostril.

Suryabhedana. The name "suryabhedana" is related to the yogic claim about the effect of this particular pranayama on the organism. It is generally held by yogins that inhalation through the right nostril increases the temperature of the body, while inhalation through the left lowers it. Since inhalation is done through the right nostril in this pranayama, it is called "suryabhedana" and the word "surya" (meaning 'sun') is expressive of the result expected.

After making the adjustments with the right hand to close the left nostril, the student inhales with partially-closed glottis through the right nostril. This is followed by retention as in ujjayi. Exhalation is done through the right nostril. The distinguishing feature of suryabhedana, in short, is the use of the right nostril for both inhalation and exhalation.

Sitkari. This pranayama involves inhaling through the mouth, although the disposition of the various parts is as in ujjayi. The tip of the tongue is kept between the two lips with sufficient space between the upper lip and the tongue to allow the air to flow in. With this arrangement the student inhales through the mouth producing a wheezing sound. A kind of breezy and pleasant sensation is felt on the forepart of the

(continued from the previous page) tongue. As soon as inhalation is over, the lips are brought together and the mouth closed. The chin-lock is formed at the beginning of retention. Exhalation is done through both nostrils.

Sitali. This pranayama is very much like sitkari, in that inhalation is done through the mouth and exhalation through the nostrils. The arrangement of the tongue and the lips is, however, slightly different. Both lips are contracted and between the two the tongue is folded like the beak of a bird. The tongue is found to protrude a little beyond the lips. After inhalation the mouth is closed and retention begins. This is followed by exhalation through both nostrils, thus completing one round.

Bhramari. This is usually practised at some time past midnight when external sounds are at a minimum. The ears are closed with the thumbs and inhalation and exhalation produce a sound like the humming of bees ("bhramari" means a "bee"). It is claimed by yogins that in this pranayama the palate is set vibrating.

Murchchha As far as inhalation and exhalation are concerned there is nothing unique about this pranayama. It is, however, the only pranayama in which exhalation is done with the chin-lock and thus is an exception to the general rule. It is claimed that this type of breathing is particularly capable of calming the mind.

Plavini. The unique feature of this pranayama is that it is practised while floating on water. The legs are crossed in a fashion similar to that of the fish-posture which is described in a previous chapter. The disposition of the head is just the opposite to what is done in the chinlock, i.e. it is thrown back and the hands are crossed behind to give it

(continued from the previous page) support. This arrangement of the body helps one to float in water with considerable ease.

We have so far described the eight varieties of pranayamas that are available to the yogins. It is not always necessary to practise all of the eight kinds to obtain the desired results, and very often yogins confine themselves to the most important varieties like bhastrika and ujjayi. In all the texts all of them are said to possess spiritual significance, inasmuch as they are all conducive to the awakening of spiritual forces. Some of them are claimed to have specific virtues. Ujjayi and suryabhedana, for example, increase heat in the body, while sitkari and sitali have the opposite effect. Bhastrika is supposed to preserve an even temperature. Murchchha is particularly effective in producing a state of mental passivity that is highly desired by yogins. As far as physical health is concerned, all the pranayamas are said to have a beneficial effect on the system. In actual practice gurus attach utmost importance to ujjayi and bhastrika.

In one form or another the different kinds of yogic pranayamas are, from a physiological point of view, variations of deep breathing with a few changes in technique, e.g., the meditative postures in which the flexor muscles remain contracted, the partial closure of the glottis, the chin-lock, etc. It is perhaps possible that the unusual disposition of the different anatomical parts of the body may have something to do with the mental changes claimed by yogins to follow upon these practices. Equally important are the results that are likely to be produced in the retention period. When we realize that the yogins attach a great deal of importance to, and try their utmost to prolong, the holding period, we are justified in concluding that this stage in

(continued from the previous page) pranayama probably has important bearing on the physio-chemical changes leading to the mental states alleged to supervene and hence deserving of our experimental attention. The subjective experiences that arise in the course of pranayama are so varied that it would be very unscientific to advance any hypothesis which does not take all the phenomena into consideration. Very many avenues will have to be experimentally explored before we shall be in a position to state exactly the changes that take place in the organism as a result of the yogic pranayamas.

(3) EXERCISES IN CONCENTRATION. It is our task in this chapter to explain the last stage of yoga, a stage which involves mental exercises or exercises in concentration. They are meant to influence directly the mind as against the gymnastic and breathing practices designed to control the body. The four stages comprise: sense-withdrawal (pratyahara), concentration (dharana), contemplation (dhyana), and trance (samadhi). Anyone who seeks precise theoretical distinction between these four stages will be disappointed, for there is considerable overlapping and gradual but distinguishable development from one stage to another. For practical purposes, however, it is possible to differentiate each stage from the others.

It would be useful at this point to clarify the technical meaning of the word "concentration" in yogic terminology. In popular language the process implied by the word is one of intense application to a particular subject, to the exclusion of extraneous thoughts that have no relevance to the subject on hand. But within the circumscribed "area," attention is allowed to range over innumerable ideas before

(continued from the previous page) a decision or solution is arrived at. One might characterise this as the intensification of the process of discursive reasoning within a narrow field. The mind, by an effort of the will, is made to limit its range, but within the chosen "circle" the stream of consciousness knows no cessation, passing from idea to idea and thought to thought. Reason and intellect function at the highest level of efficiency. If the attention is directed to an external happening, then the appropriate sense would also participate in the process.

How different is all this from the yogic idea of concentration may be easily grasped by the following consideration. The objective that the yogin lays before himself in practising the exercises is the complete elimination of thoughts, or, rather that of getting behind thoughts, i.e., transcending the activities and fluctuations of the *citta* or mind-stuff. The ideal is not reached until all thoughts are suppressed. To the mind as such, yoga attaches no importance, regarding it as an obstacle or veil, so to say, that hides the true self. When the yogin succeeds in suppressing the activities of the mind by means of his mental exercises, then he is said to have realized himself. This is the "pure consciousness", untarnished by the modifications of the mind-stuff which usually result in sense-perception, reasoning, intellectual activities, etc.

To reach such a goal, the mind has to take a different turn and concentration has to be of an entirely different order. The yogin is advised, therefore, not to place a premium on discursive faculties, to ignore the primary as well as the secondary qualities of the object of concentration, and to retain just the bare idea of the object in the mind. Attention is to be narrowed down to a vague, "qualityless" point—a kind of monoidism claimed to be essential for auto-

(continued from the previous page) hypnosis. The reader may gain some idea of this kind of concentration by gazing steadily at a minute object or by thinking continuously of the meaning of a word. This would result first in a cloudiness leading sometimes to a mental vacuum. The distinction in the use of the word "concentration" should convince us that as practised by yogins the process is one of regression, i.e., he begins with the fluctuating mind-stuff with its propensity to "fly" from thought to thought; he then steadies the mind-stuff by practice and effort of the will, until at last by intense concentration even the steady mind and its single thought are surpassed.

After this digression we may turn now to the practical, if not the theoretical, differentiation of the four stages in the development of yogic mental practice. The exercises in concentration usually come after a few rounds of deep breathing (pranayama) and it is needless to reiterate that the practitioner continues to sit in one of the meditative postures described in a previous chapter. In pratyahara or the sense-withdrawal stage, a deliberate effort is made to diminish the impulses streaming in through the sense organs. The student attempts to establish a control over the senses which restrains the communication of external impressions to the mind. This is only the negative aspect. On the positive side, the physical exhilaration and mental passivity induced by the heavy breathing facilitate the sense-withdrawal.

The state of the mind in this condition may be thought of as one of detachment from the external world, but in no way does it approach a rigid immobility. The yogin, for example, is alive, and advised to be so, to certain sensations in the body that are produced by the pranayamic breathing. It is claimed that certain

(continued from the previous page) vibrations are generated in the lower part of the spine.¹ The impulses thus initiated are in

¹ Yoga has devoted considerable attention to the anatomical and physiological description of the human body. Here is an illustrative description: "In the body of man there are 350,000 nadis (nerves?); of them, the principal are fourteen....All these principal nadis....are like thin threads of lotus. The other nadis rising from muladhara (a region in the pelvic area, sacro-coccygeal plexus?) go to the various parts of the body, e.g., the tongue, organ of generation, eyes, feet, toes, ears, abdomen, armpit, fingers of the hands, scrotum and the anus. Having risen from their proper places they stop at their respective destinations, as above described. From all these fourteen nadis, there arise gradually other branches and sub-branches so that at last they become three hundred thousand and a half in number, and supply their respective places. These nadis are spread through the body cross-wise and length-wise; they are vehicles of sensation and keep watch over the movements of the air...These nadis are the seeds of mystery, or the sources of all principles which constitute a man and show the road to Brahma." (Siva-Samhita, II, 13, 17, 29, 30, 31 and V.121; ed. by Major B.D. Basu, The Panini Office, Allahabad)

Brahmadanda or the merudanda (spinal column?) is said to be like a column or stick that extends from the lowest part of the trunk to the occiput. Within this column is a thin cord sushumna (spinal cord?) which, because of its supreme importance, is called Brahma-nadi (nerve of Brahma) by the wise. The rest of the nadis are subordinate to it. To the left side of the long column is Ida and to the right, Pingala, each ending in the opposite nostril (the two some indirect way responsible for inducing those higher experiences that are to come. As one advances in his practices, these sensations are not of those who lay claim to casual mystical experiences, kundalini might be accidentally released.

(continued from the previous page) ganglionic chains?). Both of these have their connection with the sushumna somewhere in the navichakra (pelvic area).

It should be borne in mind, however, that what the yogins have said on this subject is clothed in such mystical and allegorical phraseology that it is difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the precise significance of the terms used. Any attempt to interpret this terminology in modern scientific language is very likely to end in confusion, since the yogic conceptions of the functional significance of the different parts of the body are far removed from those of the present day.

Even the higher experiences of the yogins are said to be generated by the arousal of a psychic energy known as kundalini. The importance attached to this force, kundalini, is unsurpassed by anything in the whole realm of yogic theory and practice. Under ordinary circumstances kundalini is claimed to be sleeping like a coiled serpent. Although psychical in nature, it has a physical counterpart and is located in the region somewhere at the end of the spinal column (Brahmadanda). The paramount aim of yoga practice is to arouse this normally static energy into action. Once aroused, its influence extends through the sushumna (spinal cord?) to the sahasrara of the thousand-petalled centre (upper cerebrum?). Kundalini, then, is the divine power in man which when liberated becomes a causal factor in all higher experiences of the yogin. Quite naturally yogic descriptions are interspersed with references to this force. Some yogins have pointed out that, in the case

(continued from the previous page) confined to the lower part of the spine alone, but slowly ascend along the spine, step by step, until they reach the head. No doubt individual difference plays a part. It is claimed, for example, that in some people these vibrations may originate anywhere along the spine. Instead of vibrations, one may experience a sensation of throbbing.

To summarize: in pratyahara or the stage of sense withdrawal one is responsive only to those stimuli that have a spiritual value. When the yogin finds that his mind is able to "detach" itself from those stimuli that are unnecessary and useless for his spiritual progress, he is ready for the next stage, dharana.

The word dharana means restricting the mind to one point. In practice, however, this stage is more comprehensive and connotes more than the literal meaning of the word would indicate. What is known as introversion of the mind, for example, plays a conspicuous role in dharana. While introversion and one-pointed concentration are both included in this stage, the former is only a step or aid in achieving the latter condition.

The practitioner is asked to let the continuous procession of thoughts, a kind of reverie which inevitably becomes real when relaxation follows upon pranayamic breathing, take its own course. The mind may observe the thoughts in this stream as they come and go without attempting to restrict or control them. The mind is turned on itself, becoming a disinterested spectator of its own processes. The precept has been well described thus:

Seat yourself for a while and allow your thoughts to take their own course freely.
It behaves

(continued from the previous page) like a frisky monkey. Let the monkey jump about; wait and take note. Your thoughts will entertain ugly ideas, so ugly that you will be surprised. But day by day, these errings will become less numerous and less extensive. During the first months you will have a thousand thoughts; then you will have no more than seven hundred; and the number will progressively diminish.²

The next development in introspective observation is one of singling out the thoughts. Up to this point the thoughts have been observed as a continuous stream, but now they are separated as distinct from one another. This is found, of course, to introduce a certain amount of artificial interference with the free flow of thoughts. In trying to observe each thought, one should make sure that the vague beginning, the rise, the highest peak, the fall, and the vague disappearance of each thought are well observed. Similarly, the next thought is taken as a separate entity and the student likewise follows its course. This procedure, according to yoga, reveals the fact that, although our thoughts appear to be continuous, in reality they are discrete.

Next, attention is to be directed to the interval between succeeding thoughts. One can understand the yogic contention that the most important part of this stage begins with the observation of the vacuous gap between successive thoughts, when one realizes that their immediate aim is to make the citta (mind) calm and still. Since thoughts are the fluctuations or modifications of the mind-stuff, it is impossible to reach this goal until they are eliminated. The interval, however, is free from fluctuations and consequently it is to

² Baudouin, C. – Suggestion and Autosuggestion, 178; Dodd. Mead & Company.1922.

(continued from the previous page) the yogins a good handle, as it were, for the prolongation of the vacuous state and the suppression of the rising thought. He who succeeds in this endeavour may be said to be well on his way to succeed in yoga. The idea that the pure self lies hidden behind the thoughts is conveyed by a metaphor in which the mind is compared to a necklace of beads where every bead is a thought. The thread runs through all the beads, but its existence, because it is covered by the beads, is not obvious. By separating two beads the hidden thread is bared. Likewise, when the gap between two thoughts is prolonged, one gets a "taste" of what the pure self is like. All the studied introspective efforts of yoga, therefore, are only attempts to bring the mind to a thoughtless state which is then prolonged.

Another road open to the yogin to achieve his special goal is that of concentration, where attention is focussed on a point. If a flower is chosen as the object of concentration, there is no consideration of its size, weight, or any other qualities whatsoever; it is mentally reduced to a point and kept before the mind as a mere idea. Any thought about the qualities or relations of objects only leads to a perpetual succession of ideas and this is precisely what the yogin wants to avoid. However barren this kind of focussing of attention may seem, yogins claim that one-pointed concentration is dynamic enough to reach deeper levels of consciousness.

The object chosen for concentration may be mental or physical, the latter being either external to the body or within it. It is a usual practice of yogins to concentrate on certain spots in the body—the tip of the nose, the point between the eyebrows, the navel, etc. Imaginary objects also are sometimes employed.

Another method of creating a mental vacuum is

(continued from the previous page) by repeating innumerable times some sacred word like "OM." The two letters in the word are separated and uttered distinctly at a pitch that is kept more or less uniform throughout the period of repetition.³

Whatever the means, the goal is the same: to have before the mental eye nothing more than a bare idea. Attention remains spontaneously immobilized. An important point, the role of the will, should receive careful attention here. Does the yogin, in this state, have any sense of effort? In the initial stages of practice, before one gets used to holding the object for any considerable time, it may be necessary to exercise the will. But the yogins claim that until one is able to induce this as a matter of habit and without any feeling of effort, one cannot be considered to have advanced very far. Whatever the will may be in philosophic language, it is, to the psychologist, nothing more than a muscular adjustment, with the accompanying feeling of effort.

³ It is a well-known fact that certain words have the power to arouse mild and sometimes intense states of ecstasy. Words like "Mesopotamia," "Philadelphia," "woods", "forests" etc. can sometimes transport people into realms of ecstatic feeling. Certain fragrant odors and musical sounds can open undreamt-of vistas. In a lesser degree words and phrases of lyric poetry have a similar effect on a great many minds. Repetition of one's own name can bring about a transformation in the mind. "A kind of waking trance I have frequently had" wrote Tennyson to a friend, "quite up from boyhood when I have been alone, This has generally come upon me through repeating my own name two or three times to myself silently till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this is not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest..."

One of the tangible results of relaxation is the diminution of effort and progressive disappearance of the will. The greatest contribution of the Nancy school of Coue is the demonstration that autosuggestion, to be effective, must be practised in that somnolent state just before sleep and after waking. To relax is passively to withdraw into ourselves – a condition contrary to the activities of the waking hours where the will is more or less an important determinant.

It would seem, therefore, that in the mental exercises of yoga a progressive relaxation is also accompanied by the diminution of the will until at last in the highest stage, that of samadhi, a complete paralysis of the will is reached. The will may intervene in the early stages to give a general twist to the mind in the direction of introversion and also to bring the wandering one-pointed object or idea again and again before the mental eye. But once the habit is developed, effort is replaced by spontaneity and, instead of having the attention hold the object, the object holds the attention.

The next stage, dhyana (meditation), in spite of its many points of likeness to the previous one, is technically considered a step beyond concentration (dharana). In actual fact both are merely stages of concentration. Even those who are not given to yogic practices may sometimes legitimately claim that they, too, can concentrate though only for a short period; hence the question arises whether this can be classed as dharana or dhyana. To make a practical distinction, yogins have introduced the time factor. In pranayamic breathing, a holding period of a 12-second duration is usually considered the

(continued from the previous page) lower limit. The upper limit is 108 seconds. A dharana would then be twelve times pranayama, i.e., lower limit 144 seconds and the upper limit 1296 seconds, and a dhyana twelve times dharana.

There is, in addition to the quantitative factor, a qualitative difference between dharana and dhyana. The nature of the object of concentration in the dharana stage is invariably gross; during dhyana, on the contrary, the gross matter "disappears" and leaves in its place the subtle infra-atomic constituents which make up the ultimate elements of matter. The gross objects begin to give way to their subtle form. The ability to perceive these subtle things depends on the "purity" of the concentrating mind. Some minds do not advance beyond the gross matter, but those that do are able to penetrate deeper levels. By passing through varying degrees of subtlety the yogin finally reaches the last state, trance-contemplation (Samadhi.)

Since samadhi is the last of the eight stages and the goal towards which all efforts are directed, it is important to understand the nature of the yogin's experiences in this condition. Even here several grades are said to exist and the one quality which characterizes them all is the relative or total loss of subject-object awareness. That state in which the mind is one with the object (artha), together with the concept (jnana) and the name (sabda), called savitarka, is the lowest kind of samadhi. The object remains gross because it is identified with concept and name. In short, the associations formed in our waking life still persist.

The next stage of samadhi, nirvitarka, is a grade higher than the above, in that the associations of name and concept are dropped off. The object is just the object without predicate

(continued from the previous page) relations. In the savicara prajna, the grossness of the object is no longer felt; its place is taken by the subtle constituents of matter (tanmatras). Perception, if one may call it such, is determinate because the tanmatras are subject to time, space, and causality. In the fourth kind of samadhi, nirvicara, the tanmatras are finally dispossessed of the conceptual notions of time, etc.

These four stages are also called conscious-samadhi (samprajnata-samadhi), because there is, though only vaguely, a union between the subject and the object; the object is, so to say, still there. The buddhi continues to function as long as the object remains and the feeling of personality, accompanied by deliberation (vitarka), reflection (vicara), and joy (ananda) persists.

But the yogin's aim is to surpass the citta stage entirely. This condition is reached in the superconscious-samadhi (asamprajnata-samadhi). Prakriti (nature), through citta, does not bind the purusha any more, the sense of personality and the resultant joy are no longer experienced. The ultimate truth dawns on the yogin and the purusha abides in itself. Inasmuch as it is not possible to remain in this condition indefinitely, complete deliverance is attained only after death.

Yoga claims, as we have mentioned before, that our ordinary knowledge is vitiated by concepts dealing with the general characteristics of things. This artificial cloak—a veritable symbolic structure—keeps us from knowing things as they are. Consequently, the superconscious “perception” is the door that leads to a new insight, an insight which is considered superior to the knowledge derived through perception, inference, and valid testimony. If our language is not an effective vehicle for conveying this experience, it is because it deals with a different

(continued from the previous page) order of reality. Frequently, however, the yogin warns us that his negative description should not mislead us into thinking that it is a state of nescience. Consciousness in its purest form, with the potentiality for ideation, remains. It is not a negative state of absolute silence and darkness, but one of pure consciousness free from thoughts – a mill that does not grind.

SAYINGS OF BUDDHA SELECTED BY P.B.

1. (Ch.IV). "Who are the beings," someone asked "who will pass beyond birth and death?"

A severe ascetic answered: "They who remain seated for a long time in one place."

Another said: "They who make sacrifices and burn offerings."

Then the Buddha said: "We thank you, Brahmans and citizens; if a dense forest or thick jungle had caught fire and had (afterwards) been soaked by rain (and put out) would it grow again?"

"Certainly, Venerable One."

"And why so?"

"Because the roots have not been destroyed."

"Well, so it is with those who practise wevere asceticism, or who remain seated (motionless), passions will spring up afresh, because they have not completely destroyed attachment."

2. (Ch.XIV) "As a man awakened does not see those he saw in his sleep, so he does not see the beloved who have passed away and are dead."

3. (Ch.XVII-K) "Fools of poor understanding are their own worst enemies, for they do evil deeds which bear bitter fruits."

4. (CH.IV) As a fletcher makes straight his arrow, a wise man makes straight his trembling and unsteady thought, which is difficult to guard, difficult to hold back.

5. (Ch.IV). "If a traveller does not meet with one who is his better, or his equal, let him

(continued from the previous page) firmly keep to his solitary journey; there is no companionship with a fool."

6. (Ch.V) Buddha thought: "I have taught the truth which is excellent in the beginning, excellent in the middle, and excellent in the end; it is glorious in its letter. But simple as it is, the people cannot understand it. I must speak to them in their own language. I must adapt my thoughts to their thoughts. They are like unto children, and love to hear tales. Therefore, I will tell them stories to explain the glory of the Dharma. If they cannot grasp the truth in the abstract arguments by which I have reached it, they may nevertheless come to understand it, if it is illustrated in parables."

7. "The slanderer is like one who flings dust at another when the wind is contrary; the dust returns on him who threw it. The virtuous man cannot be hurt, and the misery that the other would inflict comes back on himself."

8. He who offends an offenceless man, his sin recoils on him like dust blown against him by the wind.

9. "The fool who knows his foolishness is wise, at least so far. But a fool who thinks himself wise, he is a fool indeed."

KOVOOR T. BEHANAN: "YOGA: A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION." (continued from page 486).

4. Thus Atman came to mean the imperishable Self within, the ultimate principle in man which ever remains the unifying ground of all experience sometimes referred to as the psychical principle or self-consciousness.

5. In an interesting Upanishadic dialogue between Prajapati and Indra (Chandogya Upanishad, VIII, 7-12) the conception of the self as the ultimate substratum underlying all experience is brought out.

6. After another long interval of learning, Indra is told that the true self is he "who

(continued from the previous page) moves about happy in dreams." Thus dream-consciousness is made identical with the self. This time, before he reaches the gods, Indra realizes that what had seemed to him to be precious truth is in reality full of contradictions. It is true that in dreams our thoughts seem relatively independent of the body. They are free from bodily deformities. Dreams do not differ from individual to individual because a few are crippled and others are not. "But," says Indra, "do we not feel as if we are struck or chased in our dreams? Do we not experience pain, and do we not shed tears in dreams? I see no good in such a self." Dissatisfied, and eager for more light, Indra again approaches Prajapati.

This time Indra is told that the true self is to be identified with the consciousness in deep sleep. While there are fluctuations in dream states, deep sleep is a state of continuous repose and perfect rest. There is a changeless unity of the self in deep sleep which is entirely different from the succession of states characteristic of waking and dream conditions. A self to be the true self must itself be permanent and yet be the ground of the stream of consciousness. Prajapati realizes that Indra would perceive the desirability of such a conception of the self. Immanuel Kant recognized that such a unity was necessary to explain knowledge and called it "transcendental unity of apperception." This self, according to Prajapati, must exist if knowledge of the external world is to be registered on a common ground. It may only be a shadow, but a necessary shadow. Although there are no objects to be perceived Devadatta (John Doe) after sleep is the same Devadatta as before sleep. Sleep is not a break as far as the real self is concerned; otherwise it is difficult to explain the continuity

(continued from the previous page) of experience. A necklace of pearls could not exist without the string, but the string could remain without the pearls. The subject is supreme over the object, maintains Prajapati; and Indra is satisfied for a time and goes back to the gods.

Constant meditation, the creator doubts, begins to spread dark clouds over Indra's mental horizon. He reflects: if the self knows no objects, does not react, knows not that it exists, what is it but a barren fiction, a euphemistic term for unconsciousness, non-existence, and mere nothingness? Who could take this for final wisdom? A box without the sides, bottom, or top is not a box, but empty space. The concept of a self deprived of positive qualities has been deemed inadmissible again and again in the history of thought.

Like the empirical psychologist of the modern day, the indomitable Indra could find no useful purpose served by such a shadowy self. But, while the psychologist is prepared to rest content without any self at all, Indra continues his quest. Seeking light, he again puts his difficulty to Prajapati thus: "...In truth that dreamless sleeping subject does not know himself that he is, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this."

Where upon Prajapati gives his final answer: Atman is nothing but Self-consciousness, existing in itself and for itself. Through all the phenomena and processes of the universe, in the subject and in the object, in the finite and in the infinite, Atman constitutes the basic reality. Being the universal self, it is both the subject and the object. It is not in experience because it is the permanent possibility and basis of experience; it is not consciousness,

(continued from the previous page) for it illuminates consciousness. The eye which sees cannot itself be seen. It is the Kantian "I am I," the supreme Self-spectator.

Throughout the dialogue, Prajapati is trying to point out that the Atman is not an empty abstraction. In its true state, it knows only itself. But the problem was, and remains: is it possible to realize this self? According to the Upanishadic teachers, the way of the intellect with its reason and logic all molded after the demands of the objective world is not the path to the realization of the Atman. Mystical intuition, or whatever else it may be called, is the condition of this knowledge. Ultimate reality from the subjective side, Atman, is attainable only through a super-intellectual, mystical process.

7. It is one thing to lay down the dictum that all things flow from the Brahman and quite another thing to picture it in understandable language. The various attempts in the Upanishads to describe the Brahman aim to illuminate two aspects, viz., that the Brahman is definable and yet unknowable. To define it is to do injustice to its supreme transcendence, but not to define it at all would be tantamount to making the ultimate a fiction, a negative abstraction, a zero. Much ingenuity has been brought to bear on the problem by the "ultimate-intoxicated" authors of the Upanishads in their attempts to straddle the horns of the dilemma.

On the positive side Brahman is said to be pure existence, consciousness, bliss. Bliss appears not as an attribute or state of Brahman, but as its essence. Without existence, attribute has no meaning; therefore Brahman is continuous existence. It is a unity of existence and essence, the latter being conceived in terms of bliss.

8. More than all other modern Western philosophers, Immanuel Kant has pointed out that our empirical order of things is subject to the laws of space, time, and causality, and that the self-existent, in contrast with the empirical system of the universe, is not in space but space less, not in time but timeless, not subject to, but independent of the law of causality. Upanishadic philosophy has brought out this point very clearly by ascribing contradictory and irreconcilable qualities to Brahman.

9. The reader may ask, what is the difference, if any, between the two concepts, Brahman and Atman? Well, the answer is "none". The most important step in the development of Indian philosophy was taken when the Brahman, the cosmic principle, and Atman, the psychic principle in man were looked upon as identical. Thenceforth the two have been used synonymously. Long before Plato recognized the identity of subject and object, the notion was accepted as a cardinal doctrine of metaphysics in India. The identity is briefly expressed by the saying "that art thou" (tat twam asi); and "I am Brahman."

10. If Brahman is the only source of all that is manifest, it is fair to ask what is the status of all that we experience. The evolution of the organic and the inorganic world from the less to the more complex, the reality of an objective world which only madmen could deny, a sense of plurality which no theoretical belief in ultimate unity can explain away; these and many other problems need to be elucidated. The Upanishads, like all philosophies, are sometimes vague and often self-contradictory in their attempts to answer these problems. Humility born of a realization of the limitations of human intellect made them admit the impossibility of

(continued from the previous page) obtaining a satisfactory explanation of many things that we would like to know. Heroic attempts, however, were made with the help of symbols, metaphors and parables to bring about some kind of understanding.

11. What is implied here is the relationship of cause and effect. The world is not to be considered either as external to or apart from Brahman. The cause and effect are never identical, yet the effect is a transformation of the cause; similarly, Brahman is not identical with the world, yet the world is in an essential sense the transformation and expression of Brahman. There is nothing in the Upanishads to suggest that the phenomenal world is unreal, a fiction of the imagination, a foggy illusion like the "stuff of which dreams are made." Earlier interpreters of the Upanishads, Western scholars in particular, conveyed the impression that the Upanishadic teachers considered the world an illusion. But the overwhelming majority of subsequent investigators have discredited this interpretation.

12. According to the pantheistic view reality is so completely exhausted by the world that there is nothing beyond it; in the deistic view reality is so detached that the world bears no trace of it. Neither of these views is entirely applicable to the Upanishads. Brahman is both in the world and above it. The world of experience derives its reality because it is in Brahman like a net in the ocean; but in a very real sense it is also transcendental. By manifesting itself in the world process. Brahman has not exhausted its nature. The logic of the intellect, which is the logic of the finite, may not be able to grasp fully this relationship.

13. It is startling how a doctrine of rebirth like this, which can never be verified, has

(continued from the previous page) been accepted and believed as a solution for the riddle of existence. Cultured and illiterate alike find in it a just answer to the inequalities and sufferings of life. It inspires in its adherents a hope for the future coupled with submissive resignation in the face of present suffering.

14. The caste system and the misery it heaped upon countless human beings were complacently explained on the basis of karma. Thus a theory developed to free men from primitive bonds served only to enslave them all the more. It is easier to preach a democratic religion than to establish it. Doctrines evolved to explain human suffering have sometimes been utilized to make it greater. The way to heaven becomes the way to hell. At any rate it was so in India.

15. Every critical philosophy begins with an analysis of experience, and no matter how brilliant might be the attempt of a philosopher in explaining or explaining away matter, or even mind, the antithetical character of the two is a persistent residuum for naive experience. This is the riddle that has cropped up in every generation and age which has given any thought to deep problems of life. If we separate the two and treat them as belonging to two distinct orders, we are immediately confronted with the problem of knowledge: how can the mind gain experience of the external world when there is no relationship between the two? If we regard both as two aspects of one and the same original substance, we have to give a satisfactory explanation of this differentiation in terms of evolution.

16. Among the recurring problems of philosophy is that of the relation between the temporally changing and the eternally ever-the-same. The interaction of co-operation of the two will always

(continued from the previous page) remain an impenetrable mystery to the extent that the dividing gulf between the two orders of existence is broad and deep.

17. Some of the later commentators of the samkhya have tried to introduce God into the system, but their attempts, instead of creating harmony, look like patch-work.

Although yoga accepted samkhya metaphysics, certain changes were introduced here and there. Practice and not theory is the all-important thing in yoga. So Patanjali, the author of the yoga aphorisms, contends that God as an object of devotion is an aid to the yogin, for he (God) by his kindness might make the physical and mental discipline of yoga easier to bear.

One gathers the impression that Patanjali introduced God into the system because he found that concept useful. He must have been an astute psychologist who knew that faith helps. His reasoning could be summarized thus: If belief in and devotion to God help you in your practice, then you may assume that he exists; if this does not help you, you may equally well assume that he does not exist. While yoga was at great pains to defend a metaphysic that would justify its practices and aims in the eyes of the public, it allowed for extreme deviations in the matter of philosophical beliefs. The practices were taken over by other schools because of their alleged efficacy to point a way of salvation.

The result is that the passages devoted to the discussion of God (Isvara) in the yoga aphorisms are extremely vague and irrelevant to the rest of the system. The arguments are unconvincing.

18. The similarity of yogic formulations and Kantian ideas of the soul is close enough to deserve brief mention in passing. Objects,

(continued from the previous page) according to Kant, are a manifold of qualities or facts in a set of mutual interrelatedness. But in perception the manifold appears as a unity, which is due to the synthetic way in which the mind handles the manifold. Kant admitted that experience is an essential prerequisite for knowledge, but the way in which we perceive is determined by the mind. The materials of sense-impressions are made to conform to certain categories supplied by the mind. For example, space and time are not objectively real, but our mind is so constituted that we project these on the objects.

The lower faculties retain the object in all its diversity; it is however, the function of the higher faculties, like intuition, apprehension, understanding, etc., to produce unitary perception. The "I think" is the necessary condition of the higher "Unity of Apperception." The consciousness of Self, although implied in all experience, need not always be actually realized; it may remain hovering in the dim background as a potentiality capable of realization. This is the Pure Ego to which he gave the name "original transcendental synthetic Unity of Apperception." Kant, like the yogic philosophers, knew perfectly well the utter futility of any attempt to explore the nature of such a quality-less soul. We could not even know whether it is material or immaterial, simple or substantial. Since it is beyond our introspection, Kant admitted that psychology could gain nothing by this metaphysical entity; instead, the empirical "Me" should constitute its proper subject matter. In the language of yoga, Kant's empirical "Me" would correspond to the individual buddhi and its manifestations. But the Pure Ego of Kant and the transcendental purusha, both dim barren abstractions, look very much like two peas from

(continued from the previous page) the same pod. They may be necessary logical postulates for speculative metaphysics but entirely inaccessible to scientific methods.

19. What about the concepts of evolution and dissolution found in the samkhya? That the universe is alternately subject to growth and decay, that creation is a myth fit to be believed in by the weak but meant to be despised by the wise, is an accepted doctrine in almost all systems. The concept of God and creation, whenever found in Indian philosophy, may be easily inferred to be a concession to the demands of the finite mind that was never taken seriously by any philosopher. There is a breadth and depth in Hindu philosophies that is a challenge to the unimaginative theistic conceptions of the West.

20. There are undoubtedly some conflicting accounts of ahamkara in the ancient books. One may safely say, however, that its function is essentially practical rather than cognitive. It merely takes part in the false attribution of individual experience to the purusha, the real self.

21. The underlying reason for this cosmic-individual differentiation is to find a theoretical basis for the so-called "miracles" like telepathy, clairvoyance, etc. which are claimed to be genuine experiences in the higher stages of yoga practice. In the organism citta appears as effect pervading the whole body. But citta as a cause is cosmic and all-pervading. By concentration, according to yoga, it is possible to turn the limited mind into the cosmic mind-stuff and thus establish contact with other minds. This may be compared to the relationship between space as limited by the four walls of a room and the cosmic space in which all objects inhere. Only the four walls

(continued from the previous page) divide the room-space from cosmic-space. Individual citta (karyacita) is limited by the organism, but it is not separate from cosmic mind-stuff.

22. Through language we falsely attribute diversity to things that are identical, and identity to things that are diverse. The purport of the whole discussion is to point to the questionable nature of most of our thinking. The concepts and names with which we build our syllogistic propositions may have an instrumental value in furthering a limited kind of knowledge. But they cannot be a valid source of knowledge, for they are only partial representations of processes in nature. Abstract thinking cannot be carried on without the aid of symbols, but we should constantly be watchful lest we identify symbolic knowledge with real knowledge.

23. The yoga method demands that, in order to attain the highest stages in concentration (one-pointed mind), it is necessary to suppress all five kinds of modifications of the citta. It is also true that the highest state thereby reached is a condition of thoughtlessness. One might argue from this that there is a similarity between such a state (samadhi) and sleep, for in the latter the citta is relatively suppressed. This would be an erroneous conclusion because in concentration sattva is predominant and in sleep tamas is. As a matter of fact the progress through concentration to the highest stage of "modificationlessness" is in a direction completely contrary to that of sleep. Only by steadying the citta, by increasing the power of sattva and suppressing the tamas, can we improve our concentration.

24. The feeling side that accompanies every kind of modification of the citta deserves emphasis. Knowledge and feeling are inseparable as

(continued from the previous page) the obverse and reverse side of a medal. All life is suffering and it is the feeling side of mental and emotional life that gives the urge to live its dynamic motivation. The cardinal feelings are three, pleasure, pain, and ignorance. The doctrine of the universality of suffering which is an axiom in all Indian philosophies leaves no room for choice between pleasurable and painful feeling. All experience is tinged with pleasure and pain, the former being inevitably followed by the latter. It is impossible to acquire knowledge which is not tinged with feeling.

25. Although seldom attained by men, there is a state in which the citta could be free from fluctuations where neither knowledge nor its twin, feeling, could exist. This state can be reached by slowly steadying the mind through exercises in concentration.

26. Our normal life, says the yogin, is one of confused thinking; we never see clearly the motives of our actions nor the consequences of our deeds. Automatism is characteristic not only of our body but also of our mind. We follow the line of least resistance, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. We are victims of habits developed in early childhood which are aimed to make living more efficient and successful. But how many of us stop to ask whether these habits, which constitute our character, are desirable from a spiritual point of view? If one were to sit down at the end of a day and recapitulate all that he had done from morning until evening, he would find that very little was undertaken after conscious deliberation.

27. For practical purposes avidya may be thought of as that tendency which inclines us to mistake the real for the unreal and vice versa. What is meant here is the instinct

(continued from the previous page) of man to seek sensuous pleasures, and thus drive the nexus of our enslavement more deeply into the complex whirlpool of prakriti. If life itself is the cause of our suffering, then it cannot be an isolated error or confusion, but only a generalized ignorance affecting all the activities of mind, than can induce us to cling to the pleasures of life—a doubtful good no better than the cooling shade of a cobra's outstretched hood. Instead of making haste to retrace our steps, instead of realizing that the highest pleasure is tinged with pain, we allow ourselves to be victimized by avidya. The supreme ethical task of yoga, therefore, is the uprooting of avidya; and this is accomplished by steadying the discriminatory knowledge that arises in the beginning in scattered moments of insight.

28. It is the feeling that certain things are mine that leads to identification of the ego with them. While egoism is necessary for the successful continuance of life, yoga contends that it is an obstacle to the realization of the higher self. Egoism and yoga are mutually incompatible. For the former dulls spiritual vision, keeps the victim in a state of perpetual subservience, and helps to evaluate the values of life in wrong perspective.

29. Yoga claims that these desires can be "tamed" by inculcating in the mind of the neophyte the thought that they are extraneous to his true inner self. We shall show in a later chapter that the method by which this is accomplished is different from what we usually understand by the word "repression." Here it may be pointed out that the chief aim is neither to ignore nor deliberately to suppress them, but to treat such experiences as external or as having nothing to do with the individual. Everything must be consciously appraised from a detached point of view,

(continued from the previous page) never allowing the subject and the experience to become one. It is possible, says the yogin, to have an emotion and yet be neither in it nor of it. Only because we feel that we have something to gain or lose if a certain situation develops one way or the other do we become indentified with the emotion; and this develops into a passion. It is a true insight that has made poets and artists depict love and anger as blind passions. A man at seventy, who had been the victim of a blinding passion in his youth, looks at his previous experience in a very different light. He is able to objectify it and even smile at himself for having taken certain things so seriously. By a conscious effort of the will we should be able to detach ourselves from emotional experiences. In the case of the yogin a long period of training is necessary before he achieves a relatively important degree of success.

30. All that we wish to point out here is the futility of lumping together, as some writers have done, all these phenomena (steady discipline, ethical preparation of yoga, and extremes of physical torture) in one grand category and then dismissing the whole thing as manifestations of psychopathic traits.

With regard to disciplining the mind in the early period of a yogin's life, it is necessary to find something that would absorb his time and attention. The previous interests, of course, have to be discarded; hence reading of books that treat of spiritual life and problems is prescribed. By developing this habit one is weaned away from old mental attitudes and the interest in the new life is developed.

31. If while trying to establish the new habit and mode of life, the yogin finds that he is assailed by thoughts of his old life, desires and cravings, what is he to do? When such

(continued from the previous page) resistance is very great, he is asked to think of what the consequence might be were he to leave the path of yoga. This is known as contrary production in psycho-analysis. The language in which the opposite thought is formulated is often very strong.

32. The unconscious is likewise the basic proposition of yoga. Its practice from beginning to end is a long-range plan to get at the unconscious by various methods and to destroy its generating power. As long as the unconscious retains its potency, the yogic does not consider himself to have made any progress. The essential part of mental life is both psycho-analysis and yoga is, therefore, the unconscious.

The role of the conscious in both systems is also the same. Its content is transitory and changing, "like the flame that bends in all directions." Freud compares the conscious to a sense developed to meet the demands of the external world. We have already pointed out in a previous chapter how yoga also treats the conscious part of the mind as the sixth sense, assigning to it an assimilative function. Consciousness or awareness is not the whole of mind; it is only a quality or property—an insignificant one at that—of mental life which in its totality includes all the past experiences of the individual. There is a difference between the two systems as to how far back the influences of the unconscious extend.

33. Other psychologists who, while not accepting Freudian theories, have found it impossible to account for certain occurrences, like slips of speech, loss of memory, etc., except by means of a dynamic unconscious that extends far beyond the conscious.

34. Neither psychoanalysis nor yoga would admit that conscious and mental are identical.

(continued from the previous page) But it is true that the overwhelming tradition of several centuries and the terminology of academic psychology have used these terms interchangeably. Since there is no indubitable evidence to prove the identity of the two, the adherents of the doctrine of the unconscious are quite justified in treating the conscious as a property or manifestation of the mental.

35. The underlying thought of the same basic energy manifesting itself in different forms, as mind and body, have enabled yoga to conceive of the mind (citta) as a subtle material entity which is the depository of thought life. The unconscious ideas are said to exist in the citta as traces, potencies, or impressions (vasanas). They are active and ever able to influence the conscious. The important point in connection with the yogic theory is that the mind, being a substance, can retain all the past ideas as traces. The theory of transmigration made necessary the continuity of a material individual mind that could pass from one organism to another. In both psycho-analysis and yoga an unconscious idea means an idea which is "latent and capable of becoming conscious." When we advance beyond this working assumption, every theory of the unconscious, including the physiological theory of Prince, appears full of glaring contradictions—one more evidence that the mind is a "horned" problem. The difficulty of picturing the unconscious in physiological terms seems to have been felt in the two systems. Freud prefers to talk in terms of energy, working principles, and clinical realities. Yoga, having been born in a pre-scientific age, worked out a cosmic scheme of evolution with transformation of energy as a basic concept and matter and mind as special developments.

36. This is a well-recognized device, found in

(continued from the previous page) all systems of psychotherapy, to break up the old habits and automatisms and initiate new ones. As far as yoga is concerned, every disciple is made to apply himself "intensely to some one thing," usually the study of the Scriptures. During the first few years of yoga practice this is an absolute necessity.

The relation of the patient to the analyst and of the disciple to his guru (teacher) brings us to an element common in both systems. The phenomenon known as transference is well attested to by the experience of all analysts. As the hidden complexes are unearthed and as the analyst penetrates deeper into the hidden experiences of the psyche, the patient begins to objectify his emotions on the physician. He is sometimes loved and at other times hated, a phenomenon which has no parallel in yoga. This may be due to the difference in approach to the patient. The yogic disciple, while not in intimate bond with the guru, is always under his watchful eye. But in analysis a session lasts for not more than a hour during which period the analyst makes a concentrated effort to get at the psychic complexes either by letting the patient relate his own story or by interpreting his dreams.

It is apparent, however, that the analyst and the guru are in a very real sense confessors. Whatever may be the law underlying this phenomenon, a psychic tension is at least partially relieved when related to an "understanding soul." It has the effect of a mental purge—a fact well recognized by the Catholic Church. The dependence on and devotion to the guru are vastly more important in yoga than in any other system of psychotherapy.

In conclusion it might be pointed out that therapeutic similarities exist between psycho-analysis and only the earlier phases of yoga.

(continued from the previous page) The higher stages of yoga are reached by psychophysical and mental exercises for which psychoanalysis has no parallel.

37. While the supernatural forms the kernel of such movements, in yoga it is merely a superficial crust kept alive by the weight of popular recognition. The yogins themselves are reticent about these miracles.

38. A critical examination of some of the claims of yogins might reveal that the mind under certain conditions is capable of reacting in strange ways. One might see apparitions, hear strange sounds, and smell fragrant odors. Most of the yogins know them to be hallucinations and accordingly advise the new disciples to ignore them.

Not so the theosophists and such experts in "psychism." They point to yoga with the same feelings that a devout Muslim has for the birthplace of the Prophet. They insist on treating the fictions of their imagination as realities, mixing philosophy and science, abdicating reason and fact to wishful thinking. Our experience and long conversations with yogins have convinced us that they have a greater appreciation of logic and reason than the mystery-seekers and spirit-chasers.

39. Whatever may be its emotional value, the word "supernatural" has no special meaning for science. When the investigator is faced with new kinds of phenomena, his first task is to establish relationships.

40. While the student of science knows these things and conducts his research accordingly, the lay public, which is easily deceived by the claims of psychic research, theosophical caricatures of yoga, etc., is not equally appreciative of the difficulties of the problems involved. For those who have a scientific interest in yoga, it is important to know the pit-

(continued from the previous page) falls of supernaturalism. "What is fiction and what is fact" should be asked at every turn. Most of the alleged "miracles" of yoga will, on scientific investigation, turn out to be fictions which may be pleasing to the imagination but of no moment for science. The history of psychic research demonstrates this more than any other movement. The group of problems known in the English-speaking countries as psychic research is called "metapsychis" in France and "parapsychology" in Germany.

41. Experiments in telepathy and clairvoyance, if thoroughly established, will lead to some radical changes in our theoretical conception of the mind. Most of the theories of psychology in the West have been built along lines which do not take into consideration telepathic manifestations. It is, therefore, worthwhile to point out that yoga has held that such phenomena are not only possible, but also that they have been confirmed by the experiences of yogins; and so yoga makes the distinction between the individual mind and the collective mind (karanacitta and karyacitta). The mind under certain psychological conditions somehow seems able to "made connection" with other minds, without at the same time Losing its identity. Each mind is an isolated organism in one sense, and at the same time it exists in a cosmic whole. This is the yogic contention. If and when extrasensory perception is established beyond any doubt, theoretical considerations would probably lead to an hypothesis not very different from the yogic theory. What is the mental state that makes telepathy possible? Among them are complete bodily relaxation, a blank mind and an inward turning of the mind, i.e. withdrawal or turning away from the ordinary stimuli of the external world.

The reader will do well to bear these observations

(continued from the previous page) in mind while reading the succeeding chapters, for this is exactly the mental condition the yogin claims to strive for in the early stages of his mental exercises. The term "concentration" should not mislead us. Circumscribed concentration leads to a state of blankness sooner or later as against intense application to a particular topic, which is what we usually mean by the term in popular language.

42. In discussing the borderland-phenomena of psychology, critical students usually separate the grain from the chaff, those that deserve experimental attention from the hallucinatory experiences. But the popularizers and super naturalists, by the natural inclinations of their spiritual propensities, are wont to attribute the same degree of reality to all. Yogic "miracles" constitute an ever-recurring theme in the repertoire of such writers.

Anyone who looks into the history of mystics of all countries and ages may satisfy himself that hallucinations are common at certain stages.

43. "All the greatest writers on mysticism, are unanimous in their dislike and distrust of all visionary and auditive experiences. Such things, he considers, are most often hallucination: and, where they are not, should be regarded as the accidents rather than the substance of the contemplative life – the harsh rind of sense, which covers the sweet nut of "pure ghostliness." – Underhill.

44. When we are disturbed by noises pouring in from all sides, nothing but greater effort can accomplish the same task which might have been performed easily under more favourable circumstances.

45. One might ask why the yogic way of inducing relaxation does not lead to sleep, while Jacobson's subjects pointed out that progressive relaxation culminated in a complete loss of

(continued from the previous page) consciousness. As a matter of fact, yogic teachers invariably advise the practitioner to guard against a natural inclination to sleep in the course of concentration and meditation—an indirect proof of the underlying similarity between the two states. The yogins, however, counteract this inclination with their effort to concentrate. This, we should think, is enough to explain the differential result. Since relaxation leads to a condition of general passivity, any attempt at concentration—and that too according to the difficult technique of yoga—would be like trying to swim against the current. Yogins are the only persons who, as a group, have made such practices as part of their mental training. We may presume, therefore, that such practices may lead, as the yogins claim, to interesting mental modifications as yet unknown to present-day experimental psychology.

46. We may venture the opinion that hypnotic phenomena are far removed from the mental modifications of yoga.

47. An hypnotized person has no memory of what had transpired during the trance (except when it is suggested that he remember). But the yogins are relatively conscious of their experience during and after the trance. Their statements of indescribable joy and blissfulness certainly are indicative of a real remembered experience which, because of its sheer ineffability, is found difficult to convey through the medium of language. The experience itself may be transitory, but it does leave a vivid impression on the practitioner—so vivid and blissful as to make him long for further trance experiences. This is an important point of difference between the two.

There is one feature which is strikingly common to both hypnosis and yoga. It is well

(continued from the previous page) that hypnosis can be induced by staring steadily at an object or by thinking exclusively of one idea. This monoideism has its parallel in yoga during the meditative period when the yogin aims to eliminate from the mind everything but the thought of the minute object of concentration.

Hypnosis comprises various stages ranging from mind drowsiness to deep trance. Yoga, likewise, has its gradations of experience. We might expect, therefore, that it would be possible to indicate, as we have done, elements that are similar and others that are different. Experimentally, however, we know only very little about hypnotic phenomena and practically nothing about samadhic (trance) stage of yoga. It would be mere speculation of doubtful value either to affirm or deny that the two are essentially similar.

48. One thing seems rather unique. In yogic breathing, while the respiratory muscles are exercised in the execution of deep cycles, the other groups of muscles remain relatively inactive. Thus it differs markedly from the deep breathing incident to riding a bicycle. Here, although the trunk and arms are rather inactive, they can hardly be relaxed and the lower limbs are called upon to do vigorous exercise.

49. The contraction and relaxation of the respiratory muscles are accomplished slowly, while jerky movements are avoided. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to believe that the chief purpose of the yogic breathing exercises is to increase the consumption of oxygen with the minimum of physical exertion, under conditions probably favourable to the storage of oxygen.

50. One of the great problems of individual psychology is to map out the upper and lower

(continued from the previous page) limits of human efficiency and powers. Just as it is possible to stretch a rubber band to a certain limit without breaking it, so the human mind, in like fashion, has always shown an unusual capacity to muster untapped reserves of energy when confronted with obstacles. Biographies are full of episodes in which, by infinite patience and perseverance, human beings have demonstrated their ability to rise higher than they had ever dreamed possible. Of course, like everything else, this phenomenon has its limits; but it should make us wonder if we are fully aware of the limits of our powers. One who has been so weak to carry a load across the street may be seen carrying his wife and children out of a house which is on fire. Everyone must be familiar with such examples of heroism of which the human organism is capable under excitement.

The key which unlocks these deeper reservoirs may differ with individuals. A passing display of the American flag is enough in some to open the flood-gates of moral enthusiasm and great deeds. Religious, economic, and political conversions are equally crystallized emotional transitions that call forth higher degrees of moral ardor. Who could deny that there has been an alteration in the personality of a new recruit to Christian Science? All these are realities of daily life which we are as yet unable to represent in terms of charts and weights.

51. The nasal gaze—this alone of the two was utilized by me—is an aid to checking the wandering propensities of the mind, but when practised too long in one sitting it resulted sometimes in a feeling of strain. I have no doubt that, if carelessly done, this practice might lead to unfavourable complications.

The most difficult part in mastering the technique of breathing exercises was that of regulating the speed of each cycle and the time

(continued from the previous page) ratio between inspiration, retention and exhalation—a matter claimed by yogins to be of considerable importance. I overcame this difficulty by mental counting. Here, also, a few months of practice enabled me to achieve a satisfactory uniformity. I no longer find it necessary to count; the act has attained the precision of a well-established habit. Tipping the head to bring the chin to touch the jugular notch forms a characteristic feature of yogic breathing, and great results are said to follow from it. My feeling, however, is that it merely makes retention easier.

52. The breathing part of my practices may be divided into two phases. In the first few minutes (approximately 15 to 20) I feel a “physical excitement”, if I may use this uncommon expression. I feel as if my system were very active and alive. In the second stage all this excitement dies down and is followed by an extremely pleasant feeling of quietude and relaxation. Every kind of noise now becomes very disturbing. Kinesthetic sensations are at a minimum. Slowly, but unmistakably, one begins to feel that the mind takes a turn, becoming more and more “centripetal.” When I find that I have practised breathing for a time sufficiently long—generally about 30 minutes—to induce this pleasant feeling of quietude and isolation, I begin ordinarily the period of concentration.

It has been very difficult for me to keep the object of concentration before the mental eye. Before I know it, I am thinking of something else, and considerable effort is required to keep up concentration successfully. Practice has shown progressive improvement, and what was accomplished with great effort in early days has become relatively easy. Very often it happens that, when and if concentration

(continued from the previous page) is successful, the object becomes vague and ill-defined, a condition which leads to a kind of mental vacuity. In this condition any sense of effort is lacking, though dimly I am aware of what is happening. On the affective side, this condition is one of extreme pleasantness, and I would like to prolong it indefinitely if it were in my power to do so. Before I know it, however, I am out of this state and there is no more vagueness about the object of concentration. An interesting observation that I have made just as I come out of this hazy period is the consciousness of a change in the level of respiration, i.e, I am struck with the fact that in that condition my respirations have been very few and shallow. Our experiments however, do not point to an actual decrease in the rate or depth of respiration; hence I am inclined to believe that this is a purely subjective feeling. All through the period of concentration one becomes less and less aware of the body, and as concentration wanes the process of respiration forces itself on one's consciousness. Probably this may lead one to believe, as in my case, that respiration may have been at a reduced level during concentration and more particularly in the state of relative mental vacuity.

In spite of the inevitable subjectivity of the above remarks, I cannot refrain from putting on record a change in my own emotional life which seems somehow to be an outgrowth of these practices. They have led to an emotional stability and balance which I do not remember having possessed prior to taking up these exercises. Of what does this mental-emotional integration consist? In the final analysis, I think, it is that quality of inner feeling which is the subjective counterpart of our reactions to the events of the world, particularly those that

(continued from the previous page) immediately affect our own personality. This inner quality, immeasurable though it may be, has changed in me as yogic discipline has progressed. My mental-emotional life is no longer a blind catch-as-catch-can and, unlike the two snakes that intertwined their bodies so inextricably as to make each feel the other a part of itself, I seem relatively able to prevent self-victimization by emotional extremes.

53. The graduated series of exercises, which offers a practical way of achieving emotional stability, distinguishes yoga from other systems of discipline whether religious or moral. Almost all systems expect of their adherents some kind or change in attitudes and the quality of inner response, but they fail to offer a practical way of achieving this change. Whatever may be one's opinion of the yogic theory of the mind and its evolution, its success in developing a healthy emotional equilibrium is empirically verifiable. Nor does one need to reach the higher stages of its practices to attain this desirable adjustment. Whether or not the yogic way of life is desirable in its entirety is beside the point. It offers a practical program for the attainment of what any judicious person would admit is an enviable frame of mind—one that is not easily perturbed by emotional conflicts.

54. While there is unanimity of agreement among all mystics with regard to the effective nature of their experiences, irrespective of the extreme diversity of the philosophical presuppositions, we search in vain for any kind of clear objective interpretation of the content of experience. The Vedantist in his mystical state finds that Brahman is the sole reality in which the individual soul (Atman) is merged, while the yogin "sees" his own soul (purusha) existing as a separate entity. On the other hand, the Christian mystics in general conclude that personality

(continued from the previous page) is never lost. Again, from the point of view of the intellectual content, naturalistic mystics fall into a different group. To each, then, the absolutely certain experience of the mystical state provides a valid justification for his own particular intellectual outlook.

In the face of such extreme diversity of intellectual interpretations, the objectivity of mystical perception becomes a matter of questionable validity. To be sure, the experience itself is sufficiently real and valid to the yogin to be the starting point of a new set of values. The diversity of intellectual interpretations should incline us to believe that the supernormal experiences are, to say the least, predominantly subjective. They constitute no valid source of knowledge.

J.W. DUNNE. AN EXPERIMENT WITH TIME.

1. It is a permanent obstacle in the path of our search for external reality that we can never entirely get rid of this individual. Picture the universe how we may, the picture remains of our making. On the other hand, it is, probably, equally true that, paint the picture how we will, we have to do it with the paints provided. But there is no reason why either of these limitations should invalidate the result regarded as a map by which we may safely set our course.

2. Presentations may be divided into two sharply differing classes. The first of these comprises all phenomena which appear to the observer as directly attributable to the action of his outer sensory organs or nerve endings. That they are truly associated with the activities of such surface machinery is evident from the fact that movement of, or external interference with, the organs or nerve endings question results in an alteration of character of the phenomena observed, and from the equally significant fact

(continued from the previous page) that, in the absence of such movements or interferences, the phenomena remain unaltered and unescapable. They cannot, in popular parlance, be “willed away.” Such phenomena are styled “Impressions.”

Images. But now, picture to yourself a room which you remember. There is no doubt that what you are observing is a visual presentation—a mental picture. The process is not one of saying to yourself: “Let me see: there was a sofa in that corner, and a piano in the other, and the colour of the carpet was such and such.” Rather does the whole of what you remember come before your eyes in the form of a simultaneous vision. If, however, you want to make absolutely certain that such visual pictures are not things which you deliberately manufacture from a catalogue of verbally remembered detail, you may try the following experiment. Look carefully at a painting of a landscape; then, after half an hour, try to re-visualize what you saw. You will find that you can re-observe much of the exact colouring of the original impressions—the peculiar olives and browns and greys—even though many of these colours were quite beyond your powers of artistic analysis, let alone verbal description. So you must be observing, as an ‘image’, an arrangement of colours similar to those which you saw as impressions.

3. We have seen that if Time passes or grows or accumulates or expends itself or does anything whatsoever except stand rigid and changeless before a Time-fixed observer, there must be another Time which times that activity of, or along, the first Time, and another Time which times that second Time, and so on in an apparent series to infinity. And we might suppose that every philosopher who found himself face to face with this conspicuous, unrelenting vista of Times behind Times would proceed, with-

(continued from the previous page) out a moment's delay, to an exhaustive and systematic examination of the character of the apparent series, in order to ascertain (a) what were the true serial elements in the case, and (b) whether the serialism were or were not the sort of thing that might prove of importance.

4. Serialism in Time is almost bound to signify serialism in other matters. In actual fact (the reader had best be warned of the worst) we shall find that it involves a serial observer.

5. The nature of the series is now beginning to become apparent. It is akin to the 'Chinese boxes' type—the type where every term is contained in a similar but larger (in this case dimensionally larger) term

Its laws may easily be ascertained. As the first we have (1) Every Time-travelling field of presentation is contained within a field one dimension larger, travelling in another dimension of Time, the larger field covering events which are 'past' and 'future', as well as 'present', to the smaller field. (2) The serialism of the fields of presentation involves the existence of a serial observer. In this respect every time-travelling field is the field apparent to a similarly travelling and similarly dimensioned observer. Observation by any such observer is observation by all the observers pertaining to the dimensionally larger fields, and is, ultimately, observation by an observer at infinity. (3) The focus of attention in any field has the same number of dimensions as has that field, and is a dimensional centre of the fact of attention in all the higher fields, up to and including attention in the field at infinity.

6. How would you define rationally a 'self-conscious' observer—define him so as to distinguish him from a non-self-conscious recorder such as a camera? You would begin, I imagine, by enunciating the truism that the individual in question

(continued from the previous page) must be aware that something which he calls 'himself' is observing. Putting this into other words, the assertion is that this 'self' and its observations are observed by the self-conscious person. But it is essential that he should observe this objective entity as something pertaining to him — he must be able to say: This is my-self'. And that means that he must be aware of a 'self' owning the 'self' first considered. Recognition of this second 'self' involves, for similar reasons, knowledge of a third 'self' — and so on ad infinitum.

It is difficult to see how such a serial observer can exist anywhere in the three dimensions of Space alone, but the analysis in our last chapter has shown that he can — and does — exist very nicely in the multitudinous dimensions of Time.

7. It is obvious that, although the 'observer at infinity' is nothing more magnificent or more transcendental than one's own highly ignorant self, he is beginning to look perilously like a full-fledged 'animus'. Now, it has been pointed out, that belief in the animus must have originated in the study of dreams. Savages and men of poor education, remembering their dreams, could have come to no other conclusion than that, in dreams, they were in a field of existence entirely different from that of ordinary waking life. That belief has been supposed to be childish and absurd. If it were really so, then the case for the animus would have to be regarded as tainted at its source.

I have thought it correct procedure, therefore, to begin by putting the savage before the court, and by showing, empirically, that his dreams did, in fact, occasionally provide him and his 'seers' and his 'prophets' with ample grounds for the belief that the dream field was something quite other than the waking field,

(continued from the previous page) and that his ultimate self enjoyed a degree of temporal freedom denied to the waking individual.

8. It is a remarkable fact, however, that you never find pain or any acute bodily feeling mingled with the dream-images unless you are actually experiencing such feelings in field I at that very moment of absolute Time. And this despite the fact that your attention is travelling among brain-states, past and future, in which bodily discomfort was, or will be distinctly present to you when awake.

The reason of this may not be far to seek. It is a well-known fact that intensity of bodily feeling depends very largely upon the degree of concentration of attention. The soldier in battle often does not know that he has been wounded; you are unaware of toothache when you are running a race; attention to bad pain will cause a smaller one to vanish. While, if you concentrate attention on even a very minor discomfort, this waxes until it becomes almost unbearable. Now, in the absence of the travelling three-dimensional focus of field I as a mark, all the other foci of concentric attention become, on our present supposition, less concentrated. Hence, in dreams—the true dreams of unbroken sleep—you are never dazzled by bright suns, deafened by loud noises, irritated by uncomfortable garments, scorched or frozen or fatigued. Dreams, although they seem real enough, lack all these unpleasant intensity-characteristics of waking life; we are barely aware of the presence of our bodies.

Pain, of course, is, according to our modern view, a sensation as distinct from other sensations as are light and sound. It has a separate neural apparatus of its own, and must not now be confused, as in the past, with that feeling of discomfort which accompanies the over-stimulation of sensory organs of other kinds. Pain in the eyes is something different from exceptionally

(continued from the previous page) brilliant light. The modern view may be expressed by saying that pain is the most disagreeable of sensations rather than that it is the sense of disagreeableness. Like all other sensations, its range of experienceable intensity must be limited. One cannot perceive colours down to an unlimited degree of dulness, or up to an unlimited degree of vividness. That one does not experience pain of less than a certain degree of intensity is obvious to any experimenter; that unconsciousness intervenes when the intensity of that sensation rises to a certain limit was the outstanding difficulty of the medieval torturer. Pain's extreme unpleasantness, and the fact that it partly distracts attention from other sensations, does not mean that this range of observable intensity, from the just perceptible to the absolutely unbearable, is a long one. Certainly it is not a range which, like that of colour, contains a great number of separately distinguishable degrees. The fact, then, that pain is not apparent at all to an observer using the relaxed field 2 focus of 'dreamland' may mean merely that the range of observable intensity pertaining to this unpleasant and overbearing phenomenon is considerably shorter than the range which pertains to the observable intensities of the sensation of light.

9. There is one great difference between the conditions of this waking experiment and those which obtain in dreams. In the former case the cessation of field I attention, which sets free field 2 attention, is not accompanied by the cessation of body-maintained cerebral activity. The eyes may be open, transmitting to the cerebrum light-stimulations differing in intensity at different parts of the field of vision. Noises of various degrees of loudness are assailing the ears. Cerebral action is flooding

(continued from the previous page) associational tracts, presenting those hosts of associated images to which attention (this, as we saw, is the very essence of the waking experiment) must be determinedly refused.

This shows that the theoretical distinction between the focus of attention of the observer at infinity and any line in the substratum which it may habitually follow is a real one, and so we are bound to regard it as always possible for such focus to be separated from any such line. And, where the two things do coincide, the observer at infinity must be regarded as an accessory, passive or active, to that coincidence.


All of which, of course, is to admit that the observer at infinity is an individual potentially capable of exercising what is called, rather vaguely, 'freewill', though how far he may be said to have developed that capability is quite another matter.

That he can, and does, direct attention in field 1 is now plain enough. But his control in field 2 seems to be as limited as in his comprehension of that area. We may note, however, that, throughout his dreams, his rudimentary intelligence is extremely active in attaching interpretations to that which he observes. (Indeed, as I remarked earlier, he is a master-hand at attaching wrong ones.) And it is a matter of common knowledge that he employs this function of interpretation in weaving a dream story—a drama of personal adventures—out of the various presentations upon which his attention becomes focussed. If he can direct his attention at all in this field, he can modify the trend of that story; can, in fact, build the drama to please himself. He has an immense wealth of material. He is, as we have seen, potentially capable of exercising that control, and, judging from my own experience, I am disposed to think that he does so to a small extent, and that his effectiveness in that

(continued from the previous page) respect increases with practice.

10. But an individual observer 2, be it remembered, is not the substratum contents of his field. The analysis has shown that he is an independent entity, who observes those substratum contents. Why, then, is he tied to them through all their spatial windings and through all their interventional changes in spatial position?

This can be accounted for only by regarding the individual observer 2's as the intersections of the substratum with a universal, Space-filling observer 2 possessing a universal field 2 similar to the plane $efhg$ ¹³ in Fig. And the places of intersection between this universal observer 2 and the various reagents in the figure must constitute the individual field I's.



Now, we have seen that the ultimate thinker in the series pertaining to each individual observer is learning to think in terms of mechanical brain-thinking. So, if we halt at this stage, the universal observer must be, throughout his Space-filling area, the unknown element which lies at the bottom of self-consciousness and mind, and he is differentiating himself in certain widely separated places as a connected network of individual thinkers.

We may sum up, therefore, by saying that this superlative general observer, is at this stage, the fount of all that self-consciousness, intention, and intervention which underlies mere mechanical thinking; and that he, in his intersections with the cerebral substrata, is incarnate in all mundane conscious life-forms, in every dimension of Time; and that he must—owing to the unity of the network thus formed in himself and the ability of his attention to range over that network's full extent—contain in himself a distinct personification of all

¹³ The original editor marked correction its not clealy legible by hand

(continued from the previous page) genealogically connected conscious life—a Synthetic Observer. And we may add that this ‘personification’ must be capable of thinking on a scale rendered ampler than ours by the immense Time-range and Space-range of his field 2, and by the immense length of his experience of an ‘ultimate thinker’ in that field. We have wandered from our main task into what appears to be a region for exploration by the theologian.

In the superlative observer we individual observers, and that tree of which we are branches, live and have our being. But there is coming ‘absorption’ for us; we are already absorbed, and the tendency is towards differentiation.

Its proof of the unity of all flesh in the Super body and of all minds in the Mastermind supplies the logical foundation needed by every theory of ethics.

It accounts for dreams; it accounts for prophecy; it accounts for self-consciousness and ‘freewill’; while, in its disclosure of the relations between the general and the individual fields of presentation, it provides the first essential to any explanation of what is called, loosely, ‘telepathic communication.’

11. What about that curious feeling which almost everyone has now and then experienced—that sudden, fleeting, disturbing conviction that something which is happening at that moment has happened before?

What about those occasions when, receiving an unexpected letter from a friend who writes rarely, one recollects having dreamed of him during the previous night?

What about all those dreams which, after having been completely forgotten, are suddenly, for no apparent reason, recalled later in the day? What is the association which recalls them?

(continued from the previous page) What about those puzzling dreams from which one is awakened by a noise or other sensory event—dreams in which the noise in question appears as the final dream incident? Why is it that this closing incident is always logically led up to by the earlier part of the dream?

What, finally, of all those cases, collected and tabulated by the Society for Psychical Research, where a dream of a friend's death has been followed by the receipt, next day, of the confirmatory news? Those dreams were, clearly, not "spirit messages", but instances of my 'effect'—simple dreams associated merely with the coming personal experience of reading the news.

I had done nothing but suppose, in hopelessly unscientific fashion, for a week or more, and it seemed to me that I might as well complete my sinning. So I took a final wild leap to the wildest supposition of all.

Was it possible that these phenomena were not abnormal, but normal?

That dreams—dreams in general, all dreams, everybody's dreams—were composed of images of past experience and images of future experience blended together in approximately equal proportions?

That the universe was, after all, really stretched out in Time, and that the lop-sided view we had of it—a view with the 'future' part unaccountably missing, cut off from the growing 'past' part by a travelling 'present moment'—was due to a purely mentally imposed barrier which existed only when we were awake? So that, in reality, the associational network stretched, not merely this way and that way in Space, but also backwards and forwards in Time; and the dreamer's attention, following in natural, unhindered fashion the easiest pathway among the ramifications, would be continually

(continued from the previous page) crossing and recrossing that properly non-existent equator which we, waking, ruled quite arbitrarily athwart the whole.

The foregoing supposition was not, be it noted, perceive as a possible explanation. The mixture in the order of actual experience—viz. dream, memory of dream, corresponding waking impression, and memory thereof—would still have to be accounted for. But it would put the problem on an entirely different footing. There would no longer be any question as to why a man should be able to observe his own future mental states; that would be normal and habitual. On the contrary, the initial puzzle would be. What was the barrier which, in certain circumstances, debarred him from that proper and comprehensive view?

All this was seen in, so to say, a single flash of thought, almost too rapid for analysis.

12. The dodge for recalling the forgotten dreams is quite simple. A notebook and pencil is kept under the pillow, and, immediately on waking, before you even open your eyes, you set yourself to remember the rapidly vanishing dream. As a rule, a single incident is all that you can recall, and this appears so dim and small and isolated that you doubt the value of noting it down. Do not, however, attempt to remember anything more, but fix your attention on that single incident, and try to remember its details. Like a flash, a large section of the dream in which that incident occurred comes back. What is more important, however, is that, with that section, there usually comes into view an isolated incident from a previous dream. Get hold of as many of these isolated incidents as you can, neglecting temporarily the rest of the dreams of which they formed part. Then jot down these incidents in your notebook as shortly as possible; a word or

(continued from the previous page) two for each should suffice.

Now take incident number one. Concentrate upon it until you have recovered part of the dream story associated therewith, and write down the briefest possible outline of that story. Do the same in turn with the other incidents you have noted. Finally, take the abbreviated record thus made and write it out in full. Note details, as many as possible.

13. The morning after the first night she came to me and told me that it was quite hopeless. She had tried to remember her dreams the very instant she woke; but there had been nothing to remember. So I told her not to bother about looking for memories of dreams, but to endeavour instead to recollect what she had been thinking at the moment of waking, and, after she had got that, to try to recall why she had been thinking it. That worked, as I had known it would; and on each of the next six mornings she was able to remember that she had had one short dream.

14. The next trouble lies in the extremely tiring nature of the experiment itself. Everyone seems to be agreed about this. Recalling one's dreams induces very great mental fatigue. Moreover, the previous determination to remember those dreams begins, after the fourth or fifth day, to affect one during the dream itself. One realizes, actually, that one is dreaming and that one must make an effort to fix the dream in one's memory. The resulting worry is detrimental to sound sleep, and people stop the experiment for fear of inducing insomnia.

J.W. DUNNE. THE SERIAL UNIVERSE.

1. Was the universe the product the product of Mind, so that it, and experience of it, must illustrate Mind's axioms?

In the height of the discussions, an Irishman, Bishop Berkeley, threw into the philosophic duck-pond a boulder of such magnitude that the resulting commotion endures in ripples to this very day. He asked an entirely different question. If sensations such as those of colour, form, and feeling, plus their derivatives of memory-images, associated 'ideas', concepts and the like, were the sole bases of our knowledge,—the only objects with which we were, or could be, directly acquainted,—what evidence had we that there existed any substantial, non-mental world at all?

You may imagine the joyous rallying of rationalists which followed the appearance of this 'Idealism' (as Berkeley's theories were called). No physical universe! Nothing but a vast, collective hallucination! The Mind was Lord of All.

2. But the idealists were not only assailed from without; they were betrayed from within. There arose quickly a critic who said, in effect, 'What is all this talk about a "collective" hallucination? I all that I can know directly are my sensations, and no external universe can be inferred from these; then I have no reason to suppose that there exists any mind other than my own. I am the only experiment, and the hallucinatory external world is my world, and mine alone.' The logic of the argument seemed to be unassailable. No answer could be found then: none was found later.

Most of the idealists were unable to face this unescapable consequence of their thesis. 'Solipsism' (as this completed theory was called) proved too indigestible for any but the absolute purists. The rationalist quarter, moreover, had been worried considerably by the logical discoveries of Hume, who proved that,

(continued from the previous page) untrue, but not precisely that aspect of the truth which it was the business of philosophy to discover.

They were quite unable to put this feeling into words. They wandered off into loose talk of 'complexities', which was a dubious charge, and of 'contradictions', which was a libel unjustified in anyone with any pretensions to intelligence—for a contradiction produces no regress at all, and the whole trouble about the infinite regress is its damnable logicity. If the truth of the premiss (i.e., the double character of the second term) is acknowledged, the regress becomes mathematically inevitable. Yet the feeling has persisted to this day: it crops up afresh whenever some new regression, to the sight of which we have not grown accustomed, is discovered. And Bradley, perhaps, gave it its nearest approach to verbal expression when he said, "Reality cannot be an infinite regress."

The answer, I think, is this:

The truth or falsity of Bradley's dictum depends upon the meaning it attaches to the word 'reality'. If it refers to reality pure and undefiled by any attempt at translation into terms of human comprehension, his statement, probably is true (though you must not ask me to give reasons for that belief). But if the word means reality in the scientific sense,—rational cum empirical reality,—then the assertion is, definitely, wrong. The difference is that which lies between 'things as they are' and 'things as they seem to be.' Of 'things as they are' we know nothing rational; and, if we suspect Bradley to be right, it is merely because of the feeling of dissatisfaction aroused in us by any regress. But of 'things as they seem to be'—things as they affect an observer—we can say a great deal. As I hope to show in this book, we can say, with absolute assurance, that 'reality'

(continued from the previous page) as it appears to human science must needs be an infinite regress. And it is only when it is expressed in that form that we can treat it as the reality upon which we can rely.

4. He began by drawing, in the centre of a huge canvas, a very small but very finely executed representation of the landscape as he saw it. The result (except for the execution) was like the sketch labelled X_1 in Figure 1.

On examining this, however, he was not satisfied. Something was missing. And, after a moment's reflection, he realised what that something was. He was part of the universe, and this fact had not yet been indicated. So the question arose: How was he to add to the picture a representation of himself?

Now, this artist may have been insane, but he was not mad enough to imagine that he could paint himself as standing in the ground which he had already portrayed as lying in front of him. So he shifted his easel a little way back, engaged a passing yokel to stand as a model, and enlarged his picture into the sketch shown as X_2 (Figure 2).

But still he was dissatisfied. With the remorseless logic of a lunatic (or genius—you may take your choice) he argued thus:

This picture is perfectly correct as far as it goes. X_2 represents the real world as I—the real artist—suppose it to be, and X_1 represents that world as an artist who was unaware of his own existence would suppose it to be. No fault can be found in the pictured world X_2 or in the pictured artist, or in that pictured artist's picture X_1 . But I—the real artist—am aware of my own existence, and am trying to portray myself as part of the real world. The pictured artist is, thus, an incomplete description of me, and of my relation to the universe.

So saying, he shifted his easel again, seized his brush and palette, and, with a few masterly strokes, expanded his picture into X_3 (Fig.3).

Of course, he was still dissatisfied. The artist pictured in X_3 is shown as an artist who, though aware of something which he calls himself, and which he portrays in X_2 , is not possessed of the knowledge which would enable him to realise the necessity of painting X_3 . — the knowledge which is troubling the real artist. He does not know, as the real artist knows, that he is self-conscious, and, consequently, his pictures himself, in X_2 as a gentleman unaware of his own existence in the universe.

The interpretation of this parable is sufficiently obvious. The artist is trying to describe in his picture a creature equipped with all the knowledge which he himself possesses, symbolising that knowledge by the picture which the pictured creature would draw. And it becomes abundantly evident that the knowledge thus pictured must always be less than the knowledge employed in making the picture. In other words, the mind which any human science can describe can never be an adequate representation of the mind which can make that science. And the process of correcting that inadequacy must follow the serial steps of an infinite regress.

This pictorial symbol does not lend itself very readily to detailed analysis, and we shall make little further use of it. It provides, however, an excellent illustration of the differences which underlay the views of (1) the old-fashioned man of science, (2) the materialist, and (3) the average philosopher. The classical physicist held (wrongly, as we shall see) that the picture X_1 , which contains no reference to an artist, ought to prove self-consistent




FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2



X3

(continued from the previous page) and self-sufficient. The materialist (wrongly, as we have seen) that the second picture, X_2 (q.v.), would describe closely enough for practical purposes the relation between man and his universe. He omitted to note that the artist shown in that picture is only the first term of a regressive conception, and that, to get at the practical information, which is expressed in such a series, we must study the second-term individual. The average philosopher found himself in a quandary. He could see that the materialist was at fault, but he was unable to point to the error without pointing to a regress which he did not know how to handle. Consequently, he hesitated—while the error gained adherents. And thus there became established that picture, so popular today, which exhibits the universe as nothing more or less than an indifferently gilded execution chamber, replenished with continually with new victims. The materialist was scarcely to blame: he was honestly myopic. But the philosopher was a politician.

The regressive picture of our symbol contains, not only a series of artists of increasing capacity, but also a series of the landscapes which such imagined individuals would draw. One might suspect that the details of those landscapes—the hills and trees and houses—ought to bear some witness to the increasing skill of the draughtsmen and exhibit a serial progress towards a regressive perfection. Now, we shall discover, in the course of this book, that the entire symbol, with this additional interpretation, is absolutely correct. This means that, whatever the universe may 'be' in itself, all sciences thereof must be regressive, so that we are faced with what is, for all empirical purposes, a serial world. And, when we recall that the relation of such a world to ourselves—the repetitive relation which makes the regress—is

(continued from the previous page) given by the second term and not by the first, it will become evident that the theory of the "execution chamber" was a particularly a ludicrous blunder.

Omitting the arguments, the conclusions of the theory I call 'serialism' are, briefly, as follows:

We are self-conscious creatures aware of something which we are able to regard as other than ourselves. That is a condition of affairs which it is impossible to treat as rational (i.e. systematic) except by exhibiting it in the form of an infinite regress. Consequently the first essential for any science which can satisfy us as fitting the facts of experience is that it shall employ some method of description which is suitably regressive. It turns out that the possibility of viewing all experience in terms of 'time' provides us with just the method of description required. The notion of absolute time is a pure regress. Its employment results in exhibiting us as self-conscious observers. It introduces the notion of 'change', allotting to us the ability to initiate changes in a change-resisting 'not-self.' It treats the self-conscious observer as regressive, and it describes the external world as it would appear to such a regressive individual. Thus it fulfils all the requirements of the situation. But time does more than that. By conferring on the observer the ability to interfere with what he observes and to watch the subsequent results, it introduces the possibility of experimental science. The notion of experiment implies always an interference with the observed system by an observer outside that system. This is the cardinal method of physics, which postulates, thus, from the outset the possibility of interference with every system by an observer who,

(continued from the previous page) in relation to that system, is 'free'. The essential point here, however, is that physics, as a science of experiment, – of 'alter it and see', – is based upon the notion of time.

But is this regressive way the proper way to describe the universe? That question has little, if any, meaning.

We use the time regress because it gives us a valid account of the universe in its relation to ourselves, that is, in its reaction to experiment. It is the proper method for its purpose, and I know of no profounder meaning in the word 'proper'. But this I do know: It is impossible to imagine a more effective way of losing knowledge than that of expressing it in the form of an infinite regress and then restricting attention to the first term alone. And that is what mankind has been doing.

All talk about 'death' or 'immortality' has reference to time, and is meaningless in any other connection. But a time-system is a regressive system, and it is only in the lop-sided first term of that regress that death makes its appearance. It will become clear in the course of this book that, in second-term time (which gives the key to the whole series) we individuals have curious – very curious – beginnings, but no ends. Is that a horrible thought? Perhaps, but I do not think so. The present-day terror of immortality is based, almost entirely, upon an imperfect appreciation of what that immortality means. We try to imagine it as fitted somehow into the first-term world, (where, of course, it won't go), and so plague ourselves with a lugubrious picture of bored individuals dragging memory's ever-lengthening chains, desperately sick of themselves and the world and all that therein is, craving an extinction which they cannot find.

(continued from the previous page) We imagine, in fact, our present kind of daily life continued for ever. If that were true, there could be no act more cruel than the act of giving birth to a child. But, fortunately, our immortality is in multi-dimensional time, and is of a very different character.

And now for the proofs. These must develop so to say, backward. We must take the world of our present-day knowledge, show that it is regressive, show that it is described as it were viewed by a regressive observer, and show that this imagined regressive individual would constitute a self-conscious human being. That will be conclusive evidence that we are self-conscious creatures who are using that regressive method of defining ourselves and our surroundings.

5. The French philosopher Descartes, while engaged in subjecting all so-called knowledge to the acid test of doubt (in the hope of discovering something indubitable), was seized by a sudden inspiration. "I am thinking," he exclaimed, "Therefore I exist."

Critics have declared that this saying embodied two assertions concerning two empirical discoveries and that these findings should have been announced in the following order:

(a) "There is thinking going on" (an undeniable fact, 'given' to introspective observation).

(b) "This thinking is my thinking."

For awareness of activities, and awareness that there is a 'self' which is active, are two very different matters.

Be that as it may, the initial fact which Descartes announced (before he brought in his unnecessary 'therefore') was: I am (thinking). And it is important to bear in mind that he was seeking, at the time, for something which he could regard as indubitable. So that he was

(continued from the previous page) regarding it as 'given' to him, without necessity of argument, that there was an 'I' – thinking. Thus, intentionally or unintentionally, he was claiming for 'self-consciousness' the status of given, undeniable knowledge.

We are, all of us, aware of our thoughts. We can watch, critically, the sequence of mental operations we are performing in any reasoned argument, so that an error is detected and arrested before the next step is made. We can retrace any train of ideas we may happen to have followed in mind-wandering. Indeed, it was only because a great part of our thinking processes – remembering and associating – are observable to introspection that science of psychology came into existence.

But, if it is, for you – the present reader – an experimentally ascertainable fact that you can observe such thinking processes, this involves, not only your direct knowledge of the processes but also your direct knowledge of the something – called or miscalled 'yourself' – which thus observes them.

Now, if there be such a 'self', it is not readily discoverable by introspection. We seem to know of it, in fact, from the presented verdict of mental processes which we have been unable to follow. Yet the knowledge thereof is, certainly, 'given', in the sense that we cannot rid ourselves of it by any means whatsoever – not even by reflections on the obscurity of its origin.

Most people are prepared to accept self-consciousness as a fact; even though they regard it (wrongly) as a fact which plays no part in our interpretation of the physical world. But everyone finds it unsatisfactory to be confronted with something which claims the status of existence while declining to submit to examination.

(continued from the previous page) I suggest, therefore, that we make one more attempt to track down this elusive 'self'; and, since our powers of conscious introspection seem to be too feeble for this purpose, I propose that we set about our task in an entirely different fashion.

We shall begin by imagining that there exists a 'self-conscious' observer. He is to be aware of his 'self' from an antithesis—a 'not-self'—also observed. And he is to be aware of his 'self' as an intermediary entity—an instrument—which he can employ in observing the 'not-self'. In other words, he is to be aware, by observation, of what is called 'the subject-object relation'.

Then we shall ask ourselves what sort of a thing such a creature would need to be in a rational world—a world which science could handle.

When we have ascertained those requirements, we shall look around to see whether there is, or is not, in nature as we know it to-day, anything which meets that bill.



We shall find that our bill or requirements constitutes an infinite series.

6. When we are trying to describe what we mean by self-consciousness, we say that you are aware of 'yourself', that I am aware of 'myself', that she is aware of 'herself', but that he is aware of 'himself.' This last is a bad error, for the possessive pronoun is all-important. There could be nothing rational in a Jones who was aware of Jones, and science could have no dealings with such an individual. You are speaking quite properly when you say that you are aware of 'yourself'—-wnr not of 'youself.'


The only 'self' that you could be aware of, in a rational world, would be something which was an object to the ultimate, real you. But

(continued from the previous page) your self-consciousness does not lie merely in your being aware of such an object—it involves the recognition of that object as yours. Suppose you decide (rightly or wrongly) that your body is 'yourself'; you do not do so because you are aware of a body—a body belonging to, say, Smith—but because you have aware of the body in question as yours. And so it is with any subtler object you may designate by that title of 'self'. A man who was aware that 'he' was observing would be aware of an observing thing which was an object to the ultimate him; but, to be self-conscious, that man would have to be aware of that observing thing, not as an object apparent to the human race in general, but as an entity pertaining strictly to him. He would need to be aware of it as his observing self.

It is easy to see, now, that any rational self-consciousness would involve an infinite regress. For, whatever were observable to a man as a proper 'self' would need to be observable to him as his self, involving awareness of something owning the self first considered. Let us suppose, for example, that B is recognised by the self-conscious individual as his observing self and A as the object (the 'not-self') observed—an arrangement which we can tabulate thus, putting (for future convenience) the observing entity to the right of, and below, the entity observed. Then, since the self-conscious creature regards B as his self, he must be aware of a self C which owns B. So that the table must be extended thus, indicating that C observes B while B observes A. But, since our friend is aware of C as a 'self' owning B, he must be aware of that C as his self, and so be aware of a self D owning C, thus, where D is



(continued from the previous page) observing C's observations of B's observations of A. D, of course, must be a 'self' observed by an owner E, and so on ad infinitum.




It looks rather fantastical, as do all regressions when we first encounter them. But there is no getting away from it. Unless D is aware of C, he cannot regard B as his self—not, at least, in that rational world.

The reader, however, studying this table, will ask the following question: "If C observes B while B observes A, how can C be aware of A as distinct from B? Surely he would observe B's response to A as merely a modification in B." This criticism is quite justified. It is, indeed, the basis of the philosophy called Idealism—the theory which denies the separate existence of A.

We must recognise, then, that our table, though correct, is incomplete. There is a great deal missing.

A, being something observed by B, is merely a character abstracted from some entity in the world which contains B. We can describe A, therefore, as an A₁ abstracted from an A₂, and can amplify our table in the fashion shown below. Since there may be any number of A₂ entities affecting B, we may call A₁, 'World as observed by B'.



Now since it is to be, for C, an unavoidable judgment that B is observing some character of A₂, he must have a knowledge of A₂ as much 'given' as is his knowledge of B, that is to say, it must be knowledge by observation. So we can fill in a little more of our table; thus:

World as observed by B	A ₁		
World as observed by C	A ₂	B	
			C

Nos, since A₂ and B are observed by C, they must be characters abstracted by C from corresponding entities in some more fundamental world containing C the observer. So we can change B into B₁ and can tabulate the two more fundamental entities as A₃ and B₂; thus:

World as observed by B ₁	A ₁		
World as observed by C	A ₂	B ₁	
			C
	A ₃	B ₂	

Here, C is aware of an objective A₂, and of B₁ as an object which is being modified by the character A₁.

We know that, since B₂ is having its character B₁ modified by A₁, it is recording the presence of A₁. But to record the presence of A₁—the character of A₂—is not to record the presence of A₂ as a whole. A₂, as a whole, is not being observed by B₂, and B₂ is not abstracting A₂ from A₃. It is C who is doing that, i.e. A₂ is that character of A₃ which is relative to C, but it is not in any way relative to B₂.

But the regress of self-consciousness, which we studied declares that C itself is only a 'self' observed by a remoter owner, D, who is the real, ultimate observer of the series, as far as we have considered this.

Now, by our hypothesis, this (so-far) ultimate observer D has to know that A₂ is an object existing independently of his self B₁. Of course, C records, as we have seen, the separate existences of A₂ (containing A₁) and B₁; But these recordings are only modifications of, or changes in C. The question is, again, how can this ultimate observer D know that A₂ (containing A₁) and B₁ are existing independently of, and being observed by, C, and are not merely modifications in the structure of C. D cannot discover that by merely observing C. The answer is that to discover that A₂ and B₁ are observed by C is to perceive that C abstracts them from some more fundamental entities. The entities from which C does abstract them are, as we have seen, A₃ and B₂. D, therefore, must perceive that A₂ and B₁ are abstracted from A₃ and B₂ by C. But, as a preliminary to observing this function of C, he must be able to observe A₃ and B₂.

So we can amplify our table by labelling the third row, "World as observed by D."

World as observed by B ₁	A ₁			
World as observed by C	A ₂	B ₁		
World as observed by D	A ₃	B ₂	C ₁	D

Then, again, since A₃ and B₂ and C are observed by D, they must be characters abstracted from more fundamental entities, A₄, B₃ and C₂, in the same world as D. So we can change C into C₁ and extend our table thus:

World as observed by B ₁	A ₁			
World as observed by C ₁	A ₂	B ₁		
World as observed by D	A ₃	B ₂	C ₁	
	A ₄	B ₃	C ₂	D ₁

But the regress of self-consciousness insists that D, itself, is only a "self" observed by a remoter owner E, and so on ad infinitum.

Clearly, then, if we wish to complete our analysis of an individual to whom it is 'given' that his 'self' is observing something, we shall have to extend our table to infinity, repeating the old arguments for each new entity introduced.

It is to be noted again that the abstractions are all performed by the series of observers B₁, C₁, D, etc., along the diagonal edge, and not by any other entities shown in the table. We saw, before, that B₂ does not abstract A₂ from A₃, and similar arguments will show that B₃ does not abstract A₃ from A₄, and that C₂ does not abstract B₂ from B₃. Thus rule must hold good throughout the infinite regress.

It is evident that, in the four-world table shown, there is only one world adjudged as being real—the world of the bottom row. The 'worlds' tabulated in the other and upper rows are merely lists of characters abstracted from that more real world by D employing the primary observing instrument C₁ and the secondary instrument B₁.

The character of the regress is clear enough. We have a horizontal series of entities, indicated by the alphabetical sequence A, B, C, etc. and a vertical series of characters of those entities, indicated by the numerals 1,2,3 etc. The regress of the self-conscious observer who is aware of an object A₁ other than his 'self' lies along the diagonal edge B₁ C₁ D, etc.

That the ultimate observer should be able to treat the series of entities A_1, B_1, C_1 , etc. as independently existing systems is a condition essential to his possession of any knowledge of a 'self' situated in an external world. But that is only the half of our trouble. In order to fulfil our requirements the observer in question must be able to recognise, not only that A_2 exists independently of B_1 , but also that A_1 is being observed by B_1 ; which means that he must be able to perceive that the modification in B_1 is caused by the nature of A_2 . And, similarly, throughout the regress, he must be able to perceive, not only the separate existences of the observing instruments and the systems from which those instruments are abstracting, but also the fact that the instruments are being affected by characters of those systems. Now, our present table does not show how the ultimate observer is enabled to perceive this: it merely assumes that he can do so. And that, of course, is insufficient for our purpose.

It will be realized that our test is very drastic. We have to discover, in our everyday, scientific methods of describing the universe, some unnoticed assumption which actually takes into account all that infinite series of different entities indicated in the horizontal extension of the table. In addition, this commonplace method of description has to make it clear that the ultimate observer will perceive the observing entities as observing and the observed entities as observed. And not till we have discovered this immensely significant assumption, and have shown that all our empirical sciences are founded upon it, shall we be in a position to assert that we are self-conscious individuals, aware of an external world, and employing the regressive method

(continued from the previous page) of the artist and the picture because it shows in a reliable and useful fashion the otherwise incomprehensible relation between ourselves and our universe.

That descriptive convenience exists. We put it to everyday use. And, if you like to say, in view of the enormous difficulty of the problem, that any such device would need to be the product of a master Mind, I, for one, shall not attempt to contradict you. But the greater marvel, I think, lies in the fact that the device which solves the problem of rendering systematic an otherwise incomprehensible world proves to be, at the same time, of such a character that the veriest half-wit, lacking all clear understanding of its nature, is compelled to employ it. The Mind which devises the method devises it for the advantage of both the genius and the fool.

Let M represent a particular configuration of the external world as this last is described by you from observation, experiment and calculation. The particular configuration which M is to represent is the one which is open to your observation at the present moment. Let L represent, similarly, a past configuration remembered. From your knowledge of L and M you calculate, let us suppose, what will be the character of a future configuration N. Your descriptions are made in the language of classical science.

If, now, you examine your three descriptions, you will discover that these amount to no more than descriptions of three separate worlds. For there is nothing to show that one description refers to anything more or less real than does another. Equally, the descriptions give no indication that any of the configurations are past or present or future.

Further examination brings to light that the

(continued from the previous page) three worlds described differ from one another in the condition known to science as 'entropy,' and that the nature of this difference is such as to allow you to consider these worlds as arrangeable in order of entropy (an arrangement which will correspond nicely with our alphabetical order LMN). This entropy order we may hope to describe, presently, (though we are not yet entitled to do this), as time order. So far, however, the descriptions fail to show (1) That they refer to successive states of one and the same world, or (2) That those states have any relation to a 'now.'

As we shall see shortly, these two requirements are merely different ways of expressing the same thing. We cannot assume condition (1) without assuming condition (2). But we need not enter into that question here. It is sufficient, for the moment, to note that our descriptions do not fulfil condition (2).

Examining condition (2), we remember that M was to represent the configuration which is open to your observation 'now'. A doubt assails us here. For a great many people have supposed that the notions of a 'now' and of 'happening in succession' are references to a psychological observer which ought not to be made. The order exhibited in our present descriptions L, M and N, provides, it has been said, all that is needful for scientific purposes.

Very well, suppose we ignore the fact that the actual starting point of your description was your observational knowledge of M and your remembered knowledge of L. We have no shadow of right, of course, to do any such thing; but we are trying to put ourselves into the position of these objectors. Let us say that the reference to yourself as the observer – the reference which was implicit in the demand that M was to represent the configuration open

(continued from the previous page) to your observation at the present moment – was a reference which ought not to have been made. Let us say, if you like that the ‘now’ is psychological – though classical psychology was as ‘now’-less as classical physics. Let us say, even, (since we have lapsed into nonsense, and may as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb), that the ‘now’ is an ‘illusion.’ Good. Our present description of L, M and N has been made by yourself from memory, observation and calculation – we cannot avoid that – but it contains no reference to the observer and describer, and no unique ‘now’. It is, in fact, the description which, according to these people, describes three temporal ‘states’, and which they assert to be entirely sufficient for the practical purposes of any man of science.

We must agree that it is very satisfactory to have arrived, by this drastic process of elimination, at a reliable account of the universe around us. But how can we be sure that it is reliable? Ah! that is the beauty of science as distinguished from mere philosophy. We can test the truth of its assertions by actual experiment. Splendid. Let us test the accuracy of our present descriptions, L, M and N. Let us make an experiment and see.

The best configuration for us to employ for this purpose will be, I suggest, the one we have described as L; because, by experimenting upon (altering) that one, we shall be able to note whether configuration M is changed according to the calculated result, and to see, also, whether the change carries through to configuration N.

What’s that you say? We cannot alter L: Why not? Because L is past: But we have just agreed that the world which we have described as L, M and N, is devoid of such mystical

(continued from the previous page) characteristics as 'past' or 'present' or 'future', and that this is the world with which experimental science has to deal. What, then is wrong with my proposal that we should experiment with the state L? Something was omitted from that description! Well, perhaps you are right. But what did we omit?

It needs no pointing out that any system which can be classified as an object to be experimented upon must be distinguishable—arbitrarily or otherwise—from the instruments which are regarded as interfering therewith for the purposes of the experiment and as measuring the results of that interference. The two systems must be treated as extraneous to each other. Now, the essence of a scientific description has been, always, that the validity of the description must be experimentally verifiable by everyone, including the describer. This limits the universe which can be described. It must be one which the describer can regard as extraneous to his instruments and as subject to interference by these.

But, if the objective universe which is thus described is regarded by the describer as a series of 'states' possessing time order, it is, as we have just discovered, an essential condition that he regards his experimental apparatus (the excluded system which interferes) as operative at only one 'state' in that apparent temporal series—the 'state' he calls 'now'. And anyone who delegates to him the task of verification must agree with his verdict concerning which is that unique, assailable 'state'.

But how does the describer know which is this critical 'state'? What marks the 'now' for him? Is it physical as well as 'psychological'?

Consider this 'now-mark'. We know that it has a reference to the experimenter system. We

(continued from the previous page) know that it is a finger-post reading: 'This way to the interfering system which we left outside.' Consider, again, that we must regard this finger-post (whatever it may be) as changing from association with one configuration of the object series to association with the configuration which the describer regards as next in time order. Thus only can the mark indicate an important aspect of the problem, viz. that, if the experimenter system postpones its interference, it will find that its chance of altering the configuration which was 'now' has gone. The interfering-and-observing system follows, of course, these changes of the finger-post.

But, in these circumstances, the excluded instruments of the experimenter system, following the changes of the 'now', must mark that 'now'! Quite so. And they constitute a physical 'now-mark' which the observer has made for himself. For, when he extrapolates the observed system in time, he leaves his instruments, automatically, at the psychological 'now'.

When we have taken into account this behaviour of the 'now-mark' (the observer's instruments)—a behaviour indicating clearly that the series of configurations in entropy order, pertaining to the observed system, is being presented to the observer's instruments in succession—we shall be entitled to say that these configurations have been described, quite properly, as states successive in time—to those instruments.

And that is the truth about the time device as employed by all experimental science. It separates the observed and observing systems in the most effective fashion possible—by providing them with what are (as easily may be proved) two different time systems interacting at a 'now.'

In their actual work, all the men of science,

(continued from the previous page) guided by sound intuition, avoided the materialist's fallacy. They had no clear notion that they were relegating observer and observed to two different time systems, or that they were entertaining the idea of a material 'now-mark' changing from association with one state of the system observed to association with the next. But they did this, unconsciously, whenever they separated the experimenter and his instruments from the system to be experimented upon, and accepted that experimenter's view of the object system as a series of states in time order. And they did that in every experiment they made.

Before we go on, there is one rather remarkable fact to which we should direct attention. All this means that 'determinism' is 'non-suited.' Not only has it no case to present: it never had a case. Classical science involves, employs and asserts the contrary view—the view of every observer as an external potential interferer with an otherwise determinate universe. We need no microscopic 'Uncertainty Principle' to assist us there. The determinist bogey — that alleged offspring of classical science — was never even conceived, and the birth certificate signed by the materialist was a fake.

7. We are trying to discover whether there is any method of describing the universe which would satisfy the needs of the self-conscious observer we imagined. Anyone with the initial intuitive knowledge of a 'now' must have an intuitive knowledge of the serial dimensions of time, and can be a self-conscious observer.

8. There are certain phenomenal objects, e.g. a 'chair', which, when you apply force to them, move. Given the intuitive appreciation of resistance and the intuitive appreciation of space,

(continued from the previous page) the resistance appreciated multiplied by the appreciated distance of displacement of the phenomenal object constitutes a complete appreciation of physical energy. The appreciation of this complex is not elementary,—it is a 'percept' and not a 'sensation',—but that is immaterial. External physical energy can be discovered.

Next, let us look at the matter from the point of view of psycho-physiology. Among the various kinds of neurones with which your nerve endings are equipped, there are some which can be stimulated by simple pressure. These are to be found in the skin, in the muscles and embedded in those parts of the joints which roll upon each other. The pressure registered by the muscular neurones is a measure proportionate to the strain exerted by those muscles in moving a limb: the change in the pressure from one neurone to another in the rolling surfaces of the joint gives you direct information as to the amount of rotation of the limb. Consequently, when you move a limb, you can perceive PS, or energy.

In both cases the energy appreciated is a percept, and a percept which is just as much 'phenomenal' as is that percept of the coloured sphere which you learn to regard as an 'orange'. In both cases assimilation and association are at work to produce the complete percept.

Now, let us add the appreciation of time, T. Whenever you move a particular portion of your body, a curious law comes into operation; and this law is open to your appreciation. In all the changes of P, S and T accompanying the change of position of the limb there is one quantity which remains constant, and that quantity is the force divided by the acceleration. That quantity is the mass of the limb. The process of learning what force to apply in order

(continued from the previous page) to produce a required acceleration of the phenomenal limb (or acceleration of the rate of change of pressure from one neurone to another in the joint) is precisely the same thing as learning what is the mass of the limb involved. There is, then, no reason why a child in the pre-natal condition should not become aware of the world of mass.

And the possibility of discoveries of this kind is not confined to the realm of the body. The pressure neurones in the skin of your finger tip will inform you of the resistance offered by an external object of which you have no other sensory appreciation. If you move the finger, the joint neurones inform you of the displacement of that point of resistance. But the pressure recorded will be less than the pressure recorded by the muscular neurones, because the pressure in the latter case is that needed to accelerate both the limb and the external mass, while the finger-tip pressure is that which is needed to produce the same acceleration in external mass only.

Thus the intuitive knowledge of time and space accepted (on trial) plus the sensation of pressure (demonstrable in any psycho-physiological laboratory) provides any purely psychological observer with all that is necessary for the discovery of an objective physical world.

If the reader does not like this theory, he will have to fall back on one which is, I regret to say, rather popular nowadays. The idea is that the child distinguishes, after birth, phenomena appearing and disappearing at certain points in space; discovers, by consultation with his nurse or other children, that other people perceive similar phenomena; arrives at the conclusion that these other people are real; then, by a tremendous effort of imagination, invents

(continued from the previous page) something which is not the phenomena to occupy that point in space; then, reading the laws of Sir Isaac Newton, arrives at the notion of 'mass' as the occupant; and, finally, just about at the time he is leaving school, learns that his limbs—being composed of fixed quantities of Newtonian 'mass'—will accelerate in proportion to the amount of force he applies to them. This discovery, made in the nick of time, enables him to perform the motions necessary to take him to a university.

The fact that we are equipped with a special psychological apparatus for discovering the physical world, without having to call upon any sensation save that of pressure, came to me as a considerable surprise. I had imagined before that the physical universe was something which, somehow or other, was abstracted from such sensations as light and sound and heat and cold. But none of these is involved. Pressure is the only sensation required. Consequently, with the acceptance of P, S and T as terms for physical description, (as we have done) we have a complete physical universe running through from the remotest visible star in A_1 , to the ultimate psychological observer at the unreachable end of our table.

It is interesting to observe how this direct acquaintance with the physical world, by means of the sensation of force, is related to the remainder of the sensations. You are constantly changing on these other psychological phenomena. Your eye-lids tire, and you let them fall. Immediately, a previous visual phenomena vanishes. You move your hand; and, forthwith, a previous unpleasant feeling of heat disappears. In such cases, you, the psychological observer, interfere. But it is important to note that you do not interfere directly with the sensation. You close your eyelids: you remove your hand.
And

(continued from the previous page) the eyelids are not the visual phenomenon; the hand is not the sensation of heat. Here you become aware of a new class of objects, existing independently of the purely subjective sensory presentations—the colours, lights, sounds, etc. You may open and close your eyes in darkness, when there is no visual phenomenon to be observed. You may move your hand when it is touching nothing. And experiment shows that, if we classify the ordinary psychological objects as phenomena observed, we call classify this second class as observational facilities and observational restrictions. It is with this world of facilities and restrictions that we interfere when we change an elementary phenomenon.

We may pause here to note that one value of the physical universe seems to be that it ensures a community of experience without which we should be eternal strangers to one another.

We see, then, that the physical world constitutes a thread running straight through the hitherto separated sciences of physics and psychology. The ultimate source of the energy transferred to the external world in the course of an experiment is the psychological observer himself. He is the regressive physical entity. So the question arises: How are we to bring brain into our table?

8. A stimulation of the nerve by something external to the brain is the essential condition to the experience of what psychologists call an 'impression'.

Precisely similar considerations apply if you trepan your enemy Smith and look at his brain. Seeking for the physical correlates of the consequent visual phenomenon, by the simple method of exploration with your hand, you find that these comprise a connected

(continued from the previous page) chain of physical objects starting with Smith's brain and including part of your own. The method, of course, leaves you ignorant of any but the most macroscopic details of the chain, but it suffices to assure you that you – as the psychological observer B_1 of the phenomenal objects A_1 at the 'now' – must place your own brain in the same world as Smith's, viz. among the physical correlates of the A_1 phenomena.

We know, all of us, that the energy which initiates an experiment with an instrument comes from the experimenter's brain. And I suppose most of my readers expected (as I did myself) that brain would enter the regress as the observer C. We see now that it does nothing of the kind. The experimenter's interfering brain comes into A_1 , with all the rest of the objective physical world, including the physical instrument we employ as B_1 .

9. The extensions of modern science: Relativity; Wave-particle effects; the Quantum itself: these have proved to be merely examples of the fact that a time picture is necessarily a regressive picture, and one which could not be initiated save by a regressive observer aware of a travelling 'now'. If we substitute, for the real observer I, the instruments of our laboratory, and proceed to make a time picture, we find that we are fitting those instruments into the 'now' of the real observer I we have hoped to escape, so that the object world exhibits itself to those instruments as it would to him, did he possess the same accuracy of observation. And we are left, still, with the fact that the source of certain energies which make their way into the external world during an experiment, and have to be accounted for, lies at the unreachable end of the regress of the real observer.

10. Man must be a self-conscious observer employing

(continued from the previous page) time as one of his terms of description because its regressive character fits his needs and gives him the only kind of picture he could regard as both rational and empirically true. But we discover a great deal more than that. We find that such an observer cannot be otherwise than immortal in his own time 2, whatever he may be in anyone else's time 2. He survives the destruction of his observer 1, and survives with the whole of his time 1 'past' experience as his four-dimensional equipment. It is unalterable, because it is fitted to the unalterable past of the objective world. This constraint—this interference with his freedom—constitutes his observation of that objective world.

Lest the reader be unduly alarmed by this picture, I may say here that there is plenty of evidence to show that observer 2 is essentially a creator of imagery—imagery which seems unreal to us now, but entirely real when we glimpse it, as we do, in our dreams. But none of this last falls within the province of the exact sciences. All that these can say is that, since man views the world in terms of time, he must be immortal in time 2.

10. Is the universe rational or irrational? And the answer is: Rational in everything save in the ultimate observer who makes the picture. He, with his self-consciousness and his will and his dualism of psycho-physical outlook, is irrational; but no matter how far you may pursue him, you can never discover this. For when you reach any observer in the series, and put him into the picture, he promptly transfers the irrationality to the observer next behind him. Thus, rationality, in the philosophy of an epistemologist, lies in an infinite regress. To a metaphysician, it lies in refusing to consider any subject-object relation whatsoever. And that involves the denial of all

(continued from the previous page) knowledge obtained by experiment.

The reader is at perfect liberty to become a metaphysician and to say that the time picture is all wrong. But he cannot then claim that the particular metaphysical picture he may favour can be tested by experiment. Moreover, that will not enable him to escape his immortality. For when he talks about 'after' death, he is reverting to the time picture, and in that picture he is immortal.

Do we desire this immortality, now that we may feel reasonably assured that we possess it? Some of us dread it, having the false notion thereof I referred to on page 532. But all of us hate, with a hatred too deep for expression, the notion of the whole of Nature being, to Life, no more than 'an indifferently gilded execution chamber,' 'replenished continually with new victims.'

But, for me, the question resolves itself very simply. There is adventure in eternal life. There is none in eternal death. And I am for adventure.

J.W. DUNNE: "NOTHING DIES."

1. If you start by examining the outer end of the stick—the end which you call the 'external world'—and work thence inward, you will never reach that other end which is you.
2. A plainer signal of the termination of your possible knowledge in that direction could not be imagined. But what is odd is that the elusive thing in this case does not recede steadily: it goes back in a series of jumps. Now, no scientific man should ignore a challenge to his intelligence like that. Serialism accepted that challenge. It wasted no time in the pursuit of an unobtainable goal: instead; it sought to discover why that goal should recede from each of us in this peculiarly jerky fashion. It is the knowledge

(continued from the previous page) acquired in that research which has proved so unexpected and so enlightening. This knowledge, moreover, can be tested in a multitude of directions: and, so far, these tests have shown that serialism is right.

You will realize that the advent of serialism is a major disaster to the inheritors of metaphysical tradition. Always they had dreaded that rainbow like recession or "regress" as properly it is called. It was the one thing which could write an unmistakable finis to their claim that there was no limit to what metaphysics could discover. Not only had they refused to study it: they had agreed tacitly that, because it would deny their pretensions, it ought to be presumed, without further inquiry, to be fallacious. This remarkable policy had hardened slowly into a rule. The result, today, is that they find themselves in the absurd situation of having drafted a law to prohibit themselves from discovering a distasteful truth. To accept serialism would be calamitous; to deny it is impossible: they fall back upon their law, and cry: "This thing is forbidden us."

Now let us return to your high window. What is that (we are pretending) you observe? Lights and colours and sounds. But this brings us up against a very important fact. There are no such lights or colours or sounds in the world dealt with by physical science. They are what are called 'sense data'. 'Data' means 'things given'; and the non-physical elements in sensory phenomena are said to be 'given', because, if you had never experienced, say, the redness of a field poppy or the sound of a tolling bell, you could never, from other knowledge, infer that there existed anywhere in the universe such extraordinary facts. They are not physical, because, to be physical, means to be describable in the language of physical science;

(continued from the previous page) and no description of moving particles—lumps possessing nothing but inertia—no description of shifting stresses in an ether, no mathematical formulae can provide a man who has never experienced redness or sound with the remotest conception of what these phenomena are like. How then, did the materialists deal with these sense data? Well, those who were least intelligent dubbed them 'illusions'—a word which they misused with considerable frequency without troubling to consider its essential meaning. But the task of the materialist was to explain how the element of redness got into that 'illusion', when by 'illusion', he meant some motion or other of brain particles.

3. Sense-data make their inexplicable appearances only when certain tracts in the brain are in a state of excitation. Granted that the motions of brain particles cannot create sense-data, the fact remains that these two different kinds of event—psychical (which means 'mental') sense data, and neural (nervous) activity—invariably accompany each other.

The law in question was called the law of 'Psycho-neural parallelism', a name which describes the recognized facts without committing anyone to a statement as to which is horse and which is cart—the sense-datum or the neural activity. It is supremely important to note that the parallelism is between sense-datum and nerve activity, not between sense-datum and anything that may be happening outside the brain.

4. Now, you, I repeat, observe sense-data. You are not a conglomeration of sights and sounds and tastes and smells and pressures: you are something which can adopt definite attitudes towards these phenomena. You can study them: you can compare any two of the same class: you can like them or dislike them: you can attend

(continued from the previous page) to them or ignore them. And you can treat your memory-images of these sense-data in precisely the same objective fashion. Since the sense-data and their memory-images are 'paralleled' by activities of the material brain, what is there, in that same brain, which parallels the you who observe, objectively, those sense-data?

The leaders of the materialists recognized that this was a challenge which would have to be met; because, if no such neural parallel to you, the observer of sense-data, were discoverable, their opponents would point that there were no grounds for claiming that you must come to an end when your brain disintegrated. The rest of the scientific history of materialism, is the story of a long and unsuccessful search, first in the higher centres of the brain, and then in the brain as a whole, for something physical which would correspond, in its treatment of and attitude towards, nervous impulses, with the psychical you and your treatment of, and attitude towards, sense-data. We may leave classical materialism there—where it came to an end—because later discoveries showed that all the arguments of both parties had been conducted on wrong premises. They had assumed that sensory phenomena are paralleled by nervous energy; whereas, as modern science has shown, the phenomena in question are paralleled by energy-multiplied-by-duration. And that, as it turns out, upsets the whole materialist apple-cart.

4. You are able to divide, mentally, the total world in which you believe into two parts, namely, (1) something which you regard as other than you, and (2) the you to whom that something is other.

It is hardly necessary to point out that you could never imagine such a division unless

(continued from the previous page) unless you were a self-conscious creature.

You may meet apologists for nineteenth-century materialism who will say: 'I admit that I am vaguely aware of something which I call my 'self'; but I suspect that this 'self' is only an illusion, or possibly no more than a name for an accumulation of personal memories. We shall see later that these apologists are wrong. Self consciousness was a fundamental fact outside their science.

5. What we are going to ascertain is merely: what relation would you have to bear to a world which you could divide into yourself and not-yourself?

6. You, being self-conscious, know, of course, that you are the man who is capable of forming that particular opinion and of doing so from observation. The relation which a person with those limited characteristics bears to the world other than himself, which world he is portraying, can be represented symbolically by an artist, B₁ standing in a countryside, A₂, and making the A₁ picture there of.

The limited characteristics in question are those faculties and that amount of knowledge which were employed by you when you drew A₁ as representing your opinion of A₂ only. These you symbolized as the artist B₁. What you asserted thereby was: I myself am something which is aware of a world.

C₁ symbolizes yourself as equipped with more knowledge than is granted to B₁. C₁ is aware of a self, B₁; but B₁ is not credited with any knowledge of B₁. C₁, moreover, knows that B₁ in his (limited) self. For he represents the you who knew that B₁ was your limited self when you drew Fig.2. C₁ and A₃ constitute, therefore, a more adequate representation of the yourself and not-yourself into which you divide the total world you know – more adequate than do the unself-conscious

(continued from the previous page) B₁ and the A₂ countryside. You say, in effect: I myself am something which is aware of both a world and a limited self.

The question, therefore, of how you are related to the world which you divide into yourself and not-yourself has become the question of how you are related to the world which you portray as C₁ standing in A₃.

But, if you proceed to draw a further picture showing yourself as D₁ standing in a countryside A₄ and drawing fig.3, then D₁ and A₄ will become a much improved picture of the world which you are able to divide yourself and not yourself. For D₁ will be a picture of someone possessed of the knowledge which enables him to draw Fig. 3, which is the knowledge that you utilized when you drew Fig.3, while C₁ will be a picture of someone possessed of only so much knowledge as will enable him to draw Fig.2. You, in drawing fig.3, have given evidence of a degree of mental clarity which is not possessed by the individual represented by C₁. But that higher degree of mental clarity depends upon the initial fact that you are self-conscious.

We have it, then, that D₁ will be aware of C₁ (as you were aware of C₁); and he knows that C₁ is self-conscious. But C₁ is not aware of C₁. He describes himself as B₁, an un-self-conscious creature. D₁ will be, therefore, a picture of what you recognize as yourself which is more adequate than was the picture C₁.

And so it must go on. For no description of yourself that you can contrive will describe a you possessed of the degree of knowledge which you, in effecting that description, give evidence that you possess.

We can translate that last paragraph into simpler language, thus: The description of mind made by any science of yours must be, always,

(continued from the previous page) an inadequate description of the mind which can make that science. Thus, no description of mind as something evolved mechanically from dead matter can be a true description of the facts.

5. We note that the only description of B_1 that we possess is the description made by C_1 . We may say then, that the B_1 in fig. 6 is the self as this is described by C_1 . Now C_1 is standing in the countryside A_3 . Of that countryside he will observe just as much as his observational faculties permit, and no more. What he does observe he describes in his picture as A_2 . That is the picture into which he puts B_1 , portraying that individual as a supposedly real object standing in the supposedly real countryside A_2 .

6. The step into the regress—perfectly logical—wants for anyone who refuses to recognize that he has come to the end of useful knowledge and who repeats an earlier type of question. And the entire regress waits in endless mockery for anyone foolish enough to cry, 'But—where is the symbolical representation of the real, complete artist and the real world in which he stands?'

7. Imagine the state of chaos which must occur when knowledge which ought to be classified thus is presented in such a form that an A_1 item can be mistaken for a B_1 or an A_2 and B_1 can be confused with C_1 .

8. Each artist is shown as picturing what lies before him, so that the introduction of that artist into the next picture involves that the easel is shifted to a position behind that artist. Each successive picture has more foreground than had the last. This continued increase in the depth of the countryside (to accommodate the artist last considered) symbolizes the fact that each successive owner of a self regards the real objective world as differing from the world last described to the extent that

(continued from the previous page) it is able to contain a self which was absent from that last-described world. But, apart from this addition in scope, the successive landscapes, symbolizing the successive worlds, are described in the same terms. Obviously, it is improbable that there should be an infinity of categorically difference terms of description to describe the infinity of selves.

9. Suddenly, I saw daylight. The first item of every series to infinity differs from all the remaining items. It is what one might describe as a lop-sided thing. Each of the remaining items has a double, facing-both-ways character: it bears one kind of relation to the earlier item and another kind of relation to the item which follows. But the beginning item lacks this duality – there is no earlier item to which it can be related. For example, in a regress of children and fathers, the first item is child only, while the second item, and every succeeding item, is both father and child.

No series to infinity can be, therefore, entirely meaningless. The second item differs vitally from the first, so that in passing from the first to the second we are bound to add something to our knowledge.

10. There was an outcry that I had made the regress by typifying time as a line, and that it was this linear representation of time which was wrong on my part, and incidentally on the part of all science. I set to work to prove that time must exhibit itself as a regressive concept.

11. It is useful to bear in mind that, in this analytical representation of time by a line, it is time which is turned into space, not space into time. The serial table has the merit of bringing that out clearly. There has been, hitherto, a great deal of confusion on that point. Dynamical science, as I said before,

(continued from the previous page) employs three terms of description: Time, Space and Mass. All these ought to be regressive, if our table is valid.

12. Our regress of any self-conscious individual and any world which he divides into self and not-self was purely logical. The discoveries of the regressions of Time, Space and Mass constitute empirical tests of the validity of that logic.

J.W. DUNNE: "THE NEW IMMORTALITY."

1. You. Well, what comes next? I suppose you are going to tell me that View 2 is the view I shall get when I die. It sounds interesting, and it is a pity we cannot all get a glimpse of it before death. That would be, indeed, startling evidence of what seems, theoretically, to be true enough. But, there we are: View1 is the view we observe; and View 2, containing the A_2 of your table, is merely thought of.

I. I am not going to argue that you can observe everything you think of. But modern physiological science proves experimentally that when you are observing sense data you are observing Action, which means that you are observing A_2 , and not A_1 .

In A_1 you are observing only the abstracted intensity of a sense datum. Moreover, A_2 is real, four-dimensional world; so, if you are a real being you must be a similarly four-dimensional thing, with a four-dimensional outlook. Clearly, then, you are normally in the condition of an observer who can observe that which is really present to in A_2 , but who is concentrating attention around the abstracted intensity in A_1 provided for him by B. Withdraw your attention from what B provides, and you ought to be able to observe the rest of A_2 .

You. What are you talking about? Spiritualism? Religious ecstasy?

I. I am simply advising you to try withdrawing your attention from View.1.

You. But I cannot do that.

I. I can well imagine that you feel it difficult. Habit in psychology is a terrifically potent thing; and your attention has been glued to View 1 whenever possible for longer than you can remember.

I. But it is quite easy to get that view.

You. Have you achieved it?

I. Hundreds of times.

2. You: But why is it that, in an unbroken dream, one does not encounter pain? There were plenty of extremely painful episodes in one's past life.

I. Because sensory impressions are four-dimensional things; and the greater the width of our focus of attention in the time-like dimension, the less is the intensity of what you observe. Pain exhibits itself within only a very short range of intensities, and you cannot concentrate to the necessary degree anywhere except where B gives you the required three dimensional mark. Even when waking, and using B, pain subsides when attention widens.

This absence of the higher intensities, without absence of apparent reality, is a most noticeable feature of the four-dimensional world.

But emotions are very greatly accentuated. Pleasure is far more intense than in waking life, and so, for that matter, is displeasure.

3. A dream is a controllable thing. You can dream what you please, once you realize that you are dreaming and are the creator.

There is no boredom in dreams. Boredom depends upon dragging 'memory's ever-lengthening chain'. There is memory in dreams, but it is extraordinarily short and evanescent.

4. The 'self' of which one is aware in dreams is not the 'self' at B. It is the owner

(continued from the previous page) of that 'self' – the owner to which you refer when, speaking of B, you say, 'my-self.'

5. Imagine that all the sensory impressions which you perceive in the course of your life are standing before you in a row – like a long strip of cinema film. On the back of that strip there is another picture, showing the various states of your brain which correspond to the sensory impressions exhibited upon the forward side. You, who are not your brain have a view covering the whole of that array of sensory impressions from beginning to end. You are standing opposite to it, and you see that array with all its parts equally present. Your attention can wander to and fro over that view as you please. But, along that array, there travels, with the velocity of light, an entity whom I shall call, 'observer 1'. This entity is the thing which you observe as a private 'self.' If we call the whole array, 'time 1' (although it is, really, only a pseudo-time), your 'self' constitutes a travelling 'now-point' in 'time 1'. That point is of very great importance to you; because at that point, and at that point only, physical energy can pass between you and the stretch of brain we have mapped out along 'time 1.' At that point, also, the sensory impressions take on momentarily a peculiar acuteness, arousing, in the case of one particular sensation, the experience of pain. But the energy can pass either way, so that you can, at that important point, interfere with the state of your brain and make that organ take action to avoid the things which cause that pain. This would be equivalent, in our present illustration, to cutting the film and substituting a new forward part. For this reason, though you remain stationary, your attention, highly concentrated, follows observer I and cares not stray elsewhere.

Now, when observer I reaches a blank place in the film, that is to say, a place where the brain is dormant, he has nothing to convey to you. So you lose your acute sensations. Your focus of attention, consequently, expands and starts wandering in puzzled fashion over the wider view which you have been neglecting. That is the explanation of a 'dream'.

It is a funny business. Your attention has been trained drastically to following the 'time I' tract in one direction only, and you try to continue doing this in your dreams. But lacking its accustomed and still sought-for mark—the view provided by observer I—your attention becomes unstable and divided. The result of this is that you discover yourself to be possessed of a very remarkable new power.

You find that you can blend two or more sensory impressions widely separated in 'time I' into a single but more complex impression. For, example, suppose that, when awake, you see, as your attention follows observer I, a blue dress in a shop window, and that a hour later you see a girl in a stationer's shop. In the following night's dreams, you may see the girl wearing the blue dress. The result of this ability to blend, is to equip you with the ability to build, out of what observer I would call, 'the past', any scene or any drama which pleases your fancy—build it as something real and happening to you. There is nothing speculative about that statement: the briefest study of your own dreams will show you that you are doing this as hard as you can.

Your dream life has other compensations. Emotions are more intense, the appreciation of beauty is greatly increased. There is no pain, save when you partially wake, and there is no boredom. Your broader focus of attention saves you from the former: your shorter memory

(continued from the previous page) preserves you from the latter.

You continue dreaming until observer I at the 'time I now' comes again to a place where the brain is in a waking state. Then energy pours through to you once more, via observer I, and your attention flashes back to the vitally important point. The gap may be long or short; but you continue dreaming until it has been traversed. You are not travelling through it: you are staying opposite to the 'time I past', busy with what you see there. Well, then, suppose that the gap proves to be endless. Suppose that observer I never comes again upon the brain in a waking condition. What is there to interrupt you dreaming? Nothing.

An examination of the essential geometrical diagrams shows nothing which can bring you to an end in real time, and nothing which can destroy your view of the whole 'time I past' of your sensory experience. Everything that you have ever known is immortal, but you see it in a new light and possessed of new values.

6. We need, again, in our new analogy, something to represent the 'time I' series of sensory phenomena accompanied by their corresponding states of the brain. The fixed key-board of a piano will serve this purpose admirably. The striking of a note will represent very fairly the focusing of attention at that point, for it is a well-established psychological law that phenomena which are not attended to are not noticed. The key on the extreme left represents the beginning of your 'time I' life-history; the key on the extreme right stands for the state where the brain ceases to function. There should be gaps here and there in the key board to represent places where the brain is sleeping, but we shall have to imagine these.

Along that keyboard there travels, from left to right, observer I at the 'time I now'. You are stationary, but your attention follows observer I, with the result that you experience a sequence of single events.

7. Now for the dreamer. He has lost, temporarily, his travelling 'now' mark, and is staring at the keyboard. He can direct his attention to any note he pleases, in any order that suits his wishes. But his mind is confronted with his now vastly greater opportunities, he is little better than a child. His attention flickers wildly. He dreams of the "time I past".

There is evidence that he dreams of the 'time I future.'

He constructs blends of increasing complexity.

In fact, he behaves just like the child that he is.

He is glad to wake up and return to normal life.

8. But now let us imagine that our friend has lost his 'now' mark for good and all. It has reached the end of the keyboard, and has vanished, so far as he is concerned. The scene now is all 'time I past'. His mind is being drilled no longer to the daily ritual of forward progression. He learns to appreciate his four-dimensional view, and to control his flickering attention.

'But', you may say, 'that will not be real life! It will be only a dream—a world of illusion!'

My dear sir, the only thing which is real, in the sense of non-subjective, in the entire business is the 'time I' stretch of brain plus sensory phenomena represented by the key-board of the piano. And the waking experience which arises when you inspect that

(continued from the previous page) stretch is in no way more 'real' than is the effect which you will perceive when you can do this.

Think of what you can do. The whole range of musical composition lies before you, and this with an instrument the keyboard of which is a lifetime of human experience of every description. Do not fear or shirk that experience. The more varied it is, the finer becomes your instrument, and the richer the possible effects.

I am now scientifically certain, the Hand of a Great Conductor will become manifest, and we shall discover that we are taking part in a symphony of All Creation. To hear that symphony, while playing your own part therein, is Absorption.

9. Objection. It is not real. It is not real. I know dreams, and they are not at all the same sort of thing which I encounter when I wake up! Reply: The next time you see, at a cinema, one of those amusing pictures of athletes repeating, in slow motion, feats which previously they had performed at racing speed, notice much more real-seeming have become the figures of those men rising inch by inch from the ground. It is the fact that they stay there to be looked at in detail which makes them appear more real. Something of the same effect is what strikes you on awaking from a dream. You return from a view of racing instabilities, due to the instability of your own darting, divided attention; from a view in which change of scene follows directly upon mere change of thought; from a world in which an act of faith will remove mountains; from a world in which there is terrific inertia, to be overcome only by violent exercise of force; to a world in which change is a familiar, steady drifting into a non-existent 'past'. You say, according to your temperament 'Oh damn.' time to get up,' or, 'Thank goodness.' it was only a dream.'

(continued from the previous page) But it is impossible for us to doubt any longer that those two worlds are merely one and the same world viewed from different standpoints.

There is another aspect of this question—one that almost invariably is overlooked. When you compare on waking supposed 'reality' with the dream, you are comparing present impressions with a mere memory. To get into a position where you can begin to exercise judgement you should compare the memory image of a vivid dream with the memory image of something which you have experienced when awake.

10. In the world of what we may call the lesser 'now' a meeting is a state where the bodies of two people are in close proximity. The attentions of both persons are focused on that instant of pseudo-time, and the communication between mind and mind which is the essence of the meeting follows through the ordinary media of speech or signal. In the greater 'now', your attention may revisit such a scene, and you may see again the one you seek. You may hear again the spoken words, you may receive and give the same caresses. But the attention of that other may not be there. In that case, there is no meeting.

Moreover, in the world of the greater 'now', communication is not by word or gesture, but (as I shall show later) through the medium of a common field of consciousness. Mind communicates direct with mind.

Very well, then: a meeting in that world requires, if it is to last for more than a fleeting instant, mutual desire. But it requires something more than that if you are to savour it in full perfection. That is where the ethics come in.

Bear in mind, please, to begin with, that the one you seek is engaged in her or her world-building, and that the edifice aimed at is

(continued from the previous page) fairly certain to differ in many essentials from that which you would plan.

Now, you can be a little god in your own little kingdom. You can make everything happen exactly as you please. You can meet again every one you have ever known, at any age you can remember. They will welcome you gladly – if you wish it. They will acknowledge that you had been right, after all, in those little quarrels. But, presently, unless you are beyond measure foolish, you will realize that this docility does not ring true. It will be a terrible moment when you discover that the words are dictated by you: that the affection is of your own inventing. You will have what you have wanted always in this life – a world wherein every wish is fulfilled. It is a little heaven of private pleasure – and a hell of utter loneliness.

To avoid, or to escape from, that, you must be willing to surrender some of your sovereignty. You must be prepared to build to please others.

Where there is unselfish love there must be, obviously, the required measure of agreement. Then you will meet very fully that other whom you seek. You will encounter once again that difference in outlook and desire which makes that other than you. You too will do things together. Your solo will cease and become part of a duet.

11. I hate my fellow men. I cannot bring myself to tolerate them. I suppose that it is unnatural – something wrong with my brain. When I revisit the 'time I past' of my brain shall I continue to hate?

Answer: Not if you hate your hatred, as I think you do. Your mental operations in that world are not the concomitants of currents of nervous energy in the 'time I pat' of your brain.

12. Up to now the materialist, confining his argument to terms of a pseudo-time, has been able to produce psycho-neural parallelism (see page 558) as evidence for the validity of his prophecy. I have destroyed the value of that argument by showing that his alleged 'time' is merely a pseudo-time. It is his turn to move and to prove that we die in real time. I could have rested my argument there. The glimpse of an existent past which is afforded us in dreams is an extra argument. The materialist is, so to say, two points down. To recover his position he has to disprove first the evidence provided by the way in which the existence of, and character of, dreams fits in with the general theory. But that is half his difficulty. Thereafter he would be required to advance some strong new reason for supposing that we die, after all, in real time.

13. Musical chords represent so perfectly the effect of blending together sensory phenomena which are widely separated in the 'time I stretch'. But, as regards the tremendous power of creation which is latent in the mere ability to re-observe unblended phenomena in any time order you please, there is an illustration which will serve very well.

I have a typewriter. The order in which the letters are arranged is fixed. Let us use that order to represent the 'time I past' series of sensory phenomena. The striking of a key will represent, as before, the act of attention to a sensory phenomenon.

My little body found that the easiest way to produce effects with this apparatus was to follow the letters in the simple order in which they are arranged already on the machine. He produced (omitting the numerals) this:

QWERTYUIOP1/4ASDFGHJKL:@ZXCVBNM,?

qwertyuiopasdfghjkl; zxcvbnm

(continued from the previous page) and he seemed very pleased with his result. It did not appear to occur to him that the keys could be struck in any other order—it was, to him, the natural way in which one reads anything, i.e. attends to a row of letters, which he regarded, clearly, as a far more sensible arrangement.

So does the awakened dreamer.

Now, I, learning under instruction, of course, did better than that. With considerable strain on the attention I managed to bring into visible existence that famous sentence:

The brown fox jumps quickly over the lazy dog.

The sentence which leaves no key untouched.

But, If I handed the instrument to an expert, he could produce without the slightest difficulty that most beautiful and most poignant of sudden outcries, a poem.

VIHARI-LALA MITRA: (in Prolegomena to Yoga-Vasishtha). 1. Om is the verbal symbol of Brahm signifying the Universal spirit. This meaning is obtained from Om=on signifying being or existence, and referring to the totality of existence expressed by the word Brahma, universal pervasion.

Om is used also to denote the vast magnitude of Brahm in the Maitri Upanishad, which says "Om is the greatness of Brahman, says one who continually meditates thereon." (See Cowell's translation of Id.IV. 4.p.253). This idea is naturally suggested by the infinity of the Universe.

2. The circle of O is considered the most perfect of all geometrical figures, as it was held by the Pythagoreans to be the best symbol to

(continued from the previous page) represent the perfections of the Supreme Being. It is the sign of divine immutability from the fact of every other figure changing its shape by constant rotation round the centre and becoming a spheroid which is no more susceptible of change. Such is the changeable nature of all things until they become one with the Divinity.

Om the symbol of God is said to be knowable, because every part of its circumference is equidistant from the central observer. So is God said to be knowable in Yoga philosophy for his knowableness to every one by means of meditation. Hence the Yoga system is called gnosticism contrary to the unknowableness of agnoism.

Om is called eternal, because its circular form is the representation of eternity, having neither its beginning nor end: so it is the symbol of infinity, the circle being described by an infinite line.

3. Om is said to be the first and last of all things, because, says Taranatha, every thing proceeds from its centre as its source, and returns to that centre as its reservoir. Or that everything like the line of the circle meets at the same point from where it is drawn and stretched.

4. Fire was the first object of adoration of the Rigveda and of the fire whorshippers of India and Persia. It is believed to be the arche or beginning of all things according to Heraclitus.

“Om is light and manifest as light, the sleepless, deathless and sorrowless light.”

5. Light was the first work of creation and the ‘first born’ of Heaven. God said Lux fiat et lux fit. – “Let there be light and there was light.”

SRI AUROBINDO.
"UTTARA SPEECH."@

After sitting on this seat a command has come to me to tell you and all those in our land about the words I received while I was in prison. I was in prison just for one year, within which period many changes have taken place in our land. I do not now see those friends who were working for the advancement of our land. They have been scattered in all the four directions by the storm of Imperialist suppression.

At the time when I went to prison there was a great awakening in our land. There was a new feeling in the minds of men which made them buoyant. The air was filled with the chorus 'Vande Mataram'. The belief that our land would get liberation was rife. where is that feeling now? All has evaporated. Only confusion and doubt are now reigning in the hearts of people. Thoughts of "what shall we do next, what can we do?" harrass the minds of our people. My mind also is troubled by similar thoughts.

Yet I assure you of one thing. That same God who was the cause for the chorus of 'Vande Matharam' is also the cause for the present confusion. It is that same God who put me into prison when renouncing everything else I cheerfully devoted myself to the service of the country. There He put me into solitary confinement, gave my mind a great peace and blessed me with a message. We must believe that some such ulterior motive is the cause for the present commotion and abide by his divine command.

When Bepin Chander Pal was in prison he was blessed with a vision of God who gave him also a change of heart. He had a direct experience of the feeling that God is in every man and also pervaded the whole of the movement for the service of the country. It was because of this that in the lecture he delivered here, there was less

@ Translated by Gopal from a Tamil version.

(continued from the previous page) of politics and more of religion. In other places too he expressed the idea that to forward our movement in the right direction we must seek more of divine help than of human help. I was also in prison like him. After release there from I also came here. I am also going to talk of religious matters like him. The change of heart he underwent while in the Baksar prison came to me also in Alipore jail. God bestowed on him great wisdom while he was in Baksar jail, and in a like manner while I was in Alipore jail for one year He bestowed on me the same wisdom in slow degrees.

I have been commanded to tell our contrymen of these two experiences of mine. Soon after I underwent these experiences I had the conviction that my prison life would not last long. Was it not God who entrusted me with a mission and also showed me the way how to do it? I felt convinced that I was put into prison for one year only to be in solitude and the practice yoga and that none can do anything against the decees of God. Now suddenly there comes a command which it is impossible for me to transgress. Giving it the supreme place, I am going to talk about it, leaving aside all the other topics on which I had previously intended to discourse upon. Till now I had no mind to divulge them.

When I was arrested and put in the Lal Bazaar lockup my faith in God began to shake for I could not understand then for what purpose I was imprisoned. Therefore feeling depressed I directed my thoughts to Him "Lord, Why this affliction to me. With the firm faith that I owed a duty to my motherland I entered heart and soul into it. By your grace I thought that nothing would obstruct me in my work till it was finished. That being so, why did you bring me here? Is the charge against me true?" Thus

(continued from the previous page) I bewailed. The first day passed, the second day too passed; on the third day the divine voice whispered: "Wait, you will know the Truth." In obedience thereto I simply kept quiet with mental calmness. From Lal Bazaar jail I was transferred to Alipore jail where I was in solitary confinement for a month. In that solitude I attuned my mind and waited listening to God's commands. I had an experience: "One month before did I not issue you a command? Stop your present activities. Be in solitude. Did I not tell you to practise self enquiry and approach me?" Such questions rose in my mind. Then remembrance came to me. It is true that I got such a command. But I did not dare to act up to that. Because I had a great liking for the work I was doing and because of the egoistic thought that if I did not myself do it, it would not be done properly by others. I now felt sorry that I could not obey the command. Then I had another experience: "I have broken the chains which you were unable to undo. I did not ordain that work for you, nor did I command you to take it up. The work I have in store for you is a different one. That is why I brought you here. I will instil in you that wisdom which you are unable to obtain yourself. I will make you my instrument." Thus God blessed me and placed the Gita into my hands.

That instant the propounder of Gita (Lord Krishna) entered my heart. "Practise (the yoga of) Gita," commanded He. Moreover he vested me with power necessary for the practice and showed me the yoga path. It was the self-same path that Arjuna followed. "Without desire or hatred, without caring for the fruits of action, without selfishness and egoism, with a calm mind one should do his duties, becoming a tool in my hands. Looking upon all, whether rich or poor, with equal love, and indifferent to success or failure

(continued from the previous page) love or hatred, one should do his work, but still without any diminution of interest. You should never forget the fact that all the actions you do are all my actions. This is the path chalked out in the Gita. Gita-Yoga will be realised only if you follow these." Thus He taught me. Now I realized the truth of Hinduism.

Many among us talk about Hinduism and Sanatana Dharma; yet very few know its truth. Belief in some of the important aspects of other religions too will still be adherence to Hinduism or Sanatana Dharma. It is not a great thing to simply have faith in its tenets. Only by following Sanatana Dharma will all mankind get salvation. This is the reason why our ancients preserved this as a valuable treasure. We must understand that India is progressing today only to teach Sanatana Dharma to the rest of the world. This is not done with any selfish motive like other countries nor to subjugate other lands. It is only to spread Sanatana Dharma's glory to the whole world. Sine time immemorial our land was not selfish. Even now its wish to come forward and progress, is only so that it may work for the benefit of other lands.

God granted me another favour also. He put the idea into the minds of my wardens to recommend to their English master that I was suffering in solitude and that I may be permitted to stroll in the open space near my prison. He was also pleased to permit it. At this juncture I felt the power of God entering my heart. What experiences did I have as a result? On looking around me on all sides what did I see? Did I see the high prison walls? No. No. I saw only Vasudeva (Krishna). When I walked under the shade of the nearby tree in front of my cell it was not the nearby tree but Lord Krishna himself spreading the shade. The iron door of my prison was also Vasudeva. The watchman who stood near my

(continued from the previous page) iron door was none other than Lord Narayana himself. At night when I slept on the coarse carpet Sri Krishna, like a bosom friend petted and protected me. Even when I saw other prisoners convicted for theft, murder and other heinous crimes, who appeared before me? It was only Vasudeva. Even though their body and mind were blackened by the sins of their dark deeds yet Sri Narayana did not desert them. This divine vision was the first effect of his power. Although they were sinners many among them appeared to be of very good nature at times. Sympathy, Love, Kindness to all, service to others without caring for oneself and all such good qualities were apparent in them. I felt surprised at them and was ashamed that such good qualities were not in me. I must tell you about one of them in particular. He was an illiterate. He came from a low caste, and was looked down upon by others. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment having been involved in a highway robbery. Yet I thought that he was an eminent flawless devotee. Then God issued me another order: "You must do my duty, remaining in the midst of people like these: That is why I sent you here. I have brought about this movement only for the upliftment of these people."

The case in which I was implicated was taken up for enquiry in the lower court. My friends and I who were the accused were brought to court. Then also God gave me a few words. "When you were first imprisoned, you became dejected and thought of me and asked me why I forsook you and whether it was not my duty to save you." Thus you bewailed. "Now look at the judge. Look at the vakil whom the Government have appointed to conduct the case against you," said He. I accordingly looked up. The man seated on high,

(continued from the previous page) was not the judge: He was Lord Narayana himself. Nearby was seated no Government Vakil by my dear friend Krishna. Seeing that I had such a divine vision, God proceeded to say: "Hereafter you need not fear. I am the indweller in the hearts of men. Every word that they utter, every act that they perform is subject to my will. I am protecting you. Don't fear. You need have no cares as regards this case. I shall attend to it. I made you stand here not for the case. It was for some other purpose. Realize that."

A vakil suddenly appeared on my behalf. He was my friend Sri Chittaranjan Das. Leaving aside all his work, he took up my cause and toiled day and night with real earnestness and because of that he fell ill. When I saw him, I felt satisfied. I wanted to intimate certain points to him and jotted them down. But I never sent him the notes because a voice told me: "This is the man who is going to work for your deliverance. Set aside your notes. I shall myself tell him what all is required." Thenceforth I never said a word about the case on my own accord. Even the few points which I said as replies to his questions turned out to be of little use. You all know how the case ended.

During the whole conduct of the case God was always by my side. "Don't fear, I shall arrange that everything is in your favour. Never forget the purpose for which you were brought to the jail. Continue to do my work. Even after release from prison you must continue the task earnestly. Never retrace your steps. You may be frightened. The mind may become worried. Danger may cross your path. You may have to undergo sufferings. Intense dejection that nothing is possible to be done

(continued from the previous page) may overwhelm you. In spite of this be adamant to carry out my orders without heed of consequences. I am Vasudeva. I am Narayana. I am the cause for the present commotion. If I will anything, it will certainly come to pass. None can prevent that." Thus He told me repeatedly.

During this period Iswara did another thing also. He transferred me, who was in solitary confinement, to be a co-prisoner with the other accused. I must tell you a few words about them. In this gathering you praised me much. You expressed that my service to the country was unique and that I have renounced everything for it. I heard the same praise from other places also. When I hear all these, I feel joyful and sorrowful, because I know my defects very well. I am a man of weak determination. I am not at all a hero. And as a result I have omitted to do certain things. I know this truth even before I entered the prison. When I began to contemplate deeply in the solitude of the prison house the above defects were revealed to me in their fullness. At such a time my mind will become strengthened and I will feel the power of God entering into me. Many of my friends who were with me were brave by nature. In serving the land, without caring for their own selfish interest, they were much better than me. One or two of them were not only brave and unselfish, but also superior to me in intellect. As soon as I realized this truth, God gave me another message. "I have ordained that your friends here and also other patriots who serve the country should become brave. Are they not better than you? Why then should you be bothered? Even if you do not do anything at all, this work of service to the country will go on. It will be done much better than what you can ever do. Yet something else has been destined for you to be done. And that is with the power I bestow on you, you must teach certain truths for their betterment."

Another event occurred suddenly. I was transferred back to solitary confinement. I have no orders to reveal to you what all fresh experiences I underwent in that solitude. However I can tell you one thing. Making the wonderworking powers of Maya (illusion) appear before me He initiated me into the hidden truths of the Hindu Religion. Formerly I had doubts about some of the tenets of the Hindu Religion. I had thought that some aspects were not true and were impostures. This was due to my stay in foreign countries since boyhood. In the solitude of the prison-house, by the grace of God the truth of the Hindu religion was brought home to me. I experienced it in my physical body; I felt it in my mind. As a result I came to understand many hidden truths yet inaccessible to and unexplored by the latest scientific researches.

Many years ago when in Baroda I began to perform an 'upasana' (mystic practice) on God. I was then neither a devotee (Bakta) nor a sage (Gnani). At times I had doubted the very existence of God. However I thought that the Gita, Yoga and Vedanta could not be false. To get to the truth of these I took up the practice of yoga. This is what I prayed for: "God, now I have no firm conviction about the reality of your existence. If at all you exist, you cannot but become aware of what is transpiring in my heart. I don't want salvation (Moksha), I do not pray for what ordinary people pray for. Endow me with strength to serve my land in such a way as to bring about its welfare and advancement. Grant me this boon."

I practised yoga for many days. I attained siddhis (mystic power) to a measure. But I did not get what I wanted. That is, my future program was not revealed to me. Therefore I prayed again and again. However when inside the solitary prison God gave me two messages. Firstly,

(continued from the previous page) "I have allotted you a work and that is the upliftment of the patriots. You will be released soon. I have not ordained that you should either be convicted or be in prison for long like your co-patriots." Secondly, "During this one year of prison-solitude you have learnt the truth of Hindu religion beyond all possibility of doubt. I have ordained that this Hindu religion should be uplifted. Through Rishis, devotees and incarnations this religion is to be expounded and spread so as to be accepted in other lands also. I have brought about this commotion only to serve a larger end and that is the spread of the Hindu religion throughout the world. The truth of Hindu religion is everlasting. Now you have realized this truth. To solve all your doubts, did I not adduce evidences to you both internal and external? Therefore when you talk to your countrymen it must be about Sanatana Dharma. You must bring home to the patriots that their success and upliftment is not for their country's benefit, but is only a means to the upliftment of the whole world. If India is to be uplifted, Sanatana Dharma must reign supreme. If India wants a proud place in the scheme of things, then Sanatana Dharma must find its supreme place. If India is to spread, it means that Sanatana Dharma must spread to other lands. I created India for the main purpose of upholding Dharma. India will get name and fame if it will preach the truth of Hindu Religion. I have proved to you that I am omnipresent and the indweller of all hearts. It is I who live in the hearts of those who serve for the upliftment of the country as also in the hearts of all those who stand opposed to it. There is no place where I am not present. All acts done by the different peoples are only in fulfilment of my purposes. They are doing my work, like tools in my hands.

(continued from the previous page) None are my enemies. It is true that you did not understand the purpose of your acts. You have witnessed that your acts did not bring about the results for which you worked. It is my divine power that is working in the hearts of all and propels them into actions. For a long time since, I have brought about this commotion. And it is I who am going to bring about its successful completion."

This is what I have to tell you. You have named your association as "Madha Rakshana Sangam." (Association for Preservation of Religion). Our duty lies in the preservation and the spreading of the Hindu Religion throughout the world. What is Hindu Religion? What is Sanatana Dharma, which is in existence since time immemorial? Because this religion, held sacred by the ancient Aryans, fostered by them in this holy land of India from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, is called the Hindu Religion. But as the truths of this religion are not only for the benefit of the Aryans, but should be for the benefit of the inhabitants of all the other lands also, we call this religion by the name of Sanatana Dharma (Everlasting Truth). A religion which is confined to any particular country, and has no benefits for all the inhabitants of all the other lands cannot be called Sanatana Dharma. Such religions get preached to a small class of people and yield a small benefit only for a few. It is only the Hindu Religion which refutes atheism, contains within itself all the facts of physical and other sciences thus far explored as also all the facts that are going to be found in future researches. It also comprehends all the doubts and difficult problems arising out of discussions of philosophy and is capable of answering all of them. It is the only religion which preaches that God is

(continued from the previous page) Omni present, He is the indweller in the hearts of every one of us and also chalks out clearly all the different paths by which He can be sought and His state reached. It is true that other religions also state that God is everywhere and is the indweller in the hearts of all. Yet it is only the Hindu Religion that does not stop with such a mere statement, but points out the ways by which every one of us can understand and realize this truth in one's own personal experience, as clear as daylight. It is the Hindu religion alone which teaches that this world of ours is the sport (Lila) of Vasudeva, and that in this sport we have ways and means of reaching our goal and also teaches the profound truths, supreme virtues underlying this Lila. Combining within itself all the toutines of our daily life, expounding the true significance of Death, that is, what the real nature of immortality consists in, it is only the Hindu religion which reveals all these.

God ordered me to tell you all the fore-going. He prevented me from telling you what I had intended at first to talk about. I have nothing more to add to what He Himself has revealed. Once before I had an inspiration and talked to you. I then said that the present commotion was not to fight against the present regime, but to adopt Nationalism as a doctrine and a faith. Now I do not stop at that but say that by Nationalism we must mean Sanatana Dharma. Sanatana Dharma came into existence with the origin of the Hindu race. Now it is practised by them alone. Through them it is being spread. If Sanatana Dharma gets weakened, the Hindu race also suffers. If ever Sanatana Dharma gets lost then the Hindu race will cease to exist. Sanatana Dharma is Nationalism. This is the message of God that I have to tell you.

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. VII

1. S.K. DAS. "A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF SELF IN ABSOLUTISM:" It is with no reservation but in strict fidelity to the realities of the situation, that we can affirm that the self or mind is its states—a continuum of specific acts of awareness, which is its own exemplar,—and is in no other way definable. The analogy of the 'part and the whole' and the like cannot be employed without falsifying the essential nature of the self and its states. Whether one is prepared to subscribe to Leibniz's metaphysical principle that activity 'is of the essence of substance in general' and thus holding that everything exists only and in so far as it is active, one is bound to confess, however, that the human individual, at least—the self, in the strict sense of the term—reveals itself only in and through its acts of awareness, in virtue of its essential power of mirroring the universe from its own unique point of view.

2. Concerning the question of the reality of the Ego or Self, his conclusion that the "Ego is a mass of confusion" or the self "a mere bundle of discrepancies" — which out-Humes Hume himself — is liable to the trenchant criticism he has himself urged against Bain in his Ethical Studies. "Mr Bain collects" so it is phrased, "that the mind is a collection. Has he ever thought who collects Mr Bain?" Does not the same argument apply mutatis mutandis with equal force, against his view of self as an 'inconsistent construction'?

Nor would it do to argue from the fact of the derivative character of self-consciousness or the unity of self, that the self is a mere abstraction. Assuredly, the self of self-consciousness is no mere abstraction—having, as it does, no reality apart from its contents

(continued from the previous page) the awareness to wit, of which its structure is composed. It may thus be said to be an organized system of such awareness, of which the form and the content must be held in inseparable unity. It is too late in the day to learn that the form which is but the organisation of the content, is strictly inseparable there from, and is not merely an empty mould into which content is poured. That Bradley is labouring under this misapprehension is apparent from the very Language—"the mere form of the self,"—that he employs to discredit and overrule any interpretation of the nature of self other than the one he has himself offered. It is no wonder, therefore, that he would readily charge every other characterisation of the nature of self with taking a mere abstraction for reality. But the onus probandi lies, properly speaking, on him who imputes the charge of abstractionism to any other view of self. The only other alternative to his theory he conceives to be 'the notion of myself as a thing standing over against the world, externally related to it in knowledge,' or even 'a theory of Monads' with its ascription of 'independent reality' to 'each self.' Those who have employed the principle of self-consciousness with such admirable results would, in the first place, take exception to the attenuation of the self of self-consciousness to a mere 'form' and the consequent externalism of its treatment in the knowledge-relation for, wherein do we possess a more typical illustration of the internal relation, which interpenetrates at least one of its terms, than in this very relation of knowledge? Secondly, they would repudiate altogether a monadistic interpretation of the nature of the self; for, the self as a monad or an existent entity with an articulate unity and identity is a clear non sequitur from the unity and identity of the self of self-consciousness.

3. G.R. MALKANI: "ARE THERE MANY SOULS?" He may adopt the stand-point of common-sense, and he may argue in some such way: I am indeed not aware of other selves as I am aware of my own self. But that is only because other selves are not my self. On the other hand, I have every reason to believe, on the ground of my own experience, that other selves exist. I have as definite a meaning for the term 'I' as I have for the term 'you.' There might indeed be an objection that all your experience is restricted to your own states, and that therefore you can never know what does not form a state of your own being. But that is an impossible interpretation of experience. Experience would not be experience if that were so. Its essential character consists in suggesting a meaning that goes beyond what is strictly private and personal, namely the states of my self. There is therefore no contradiction in saying that, on the ground of experience, there is reason to believe that there is extra-mental reality, such as the physical world or other selves; or as Bradley puts it, "If experience is mine, that is no argument for what I experience being nothing but my state."

We are not here concerned with the general interpretation of experience. That interpretation, in our opinion, would not support the view here put forward. But however that may be, we have no such experience of souls that we may deduce from that experience the extra-mental reality of those entities. We do not experience directly a soul or a self as we may be said to do a physical object. Still, if souls are really outside us, they must be capable of being directly experienced by us in some such way. We rely entirely on direct experience to posit a world outside. But there is no direct experience to conduct us to a soul outside.

4. A consistent solipsist however cannot be put down in this way. If he denies the reality of other souls, he will also deny that his behaviour has anything to do with real souls at all. The so-called other souls are just creations of his experience; and his behaviour towards them is no more real than his behaviour towards the souls created in a dream-experience.

5. It may be argued that we can know objectively that there is a purpose behind a certain movement. Now it is indeed true that, as a matter of fact, we regard movements of certain bodies as being controlled by purposes. The primitive man went so far as to suppose that all natural changes were brought on by intelligent beings. But still purpose is essentially subjective. There can be no objective evidence of purpose. A purpose might be entertained, and yet there might be no physical movements initiated to express or carry out that purpose, and when these movements are initiated, they are still physically possible without the purpose. There can therefore be no indubitable evidence of purpose in movements objectively known. The only indubitable evidence of purpose is the subjective fact of purposing. In fact, when I read purposes in the objective world, I really project my own purposes therein, real or imaginary. I read the evidence in the objective world of what my mind thinks is or should be the purpose. Purpose as such is never objective to anyone, and can never be thus known. The possibility therefore of any inference from behaviour to an intelligent being is ruled out. All the facts objectively known to me are lacking in the character of intelligence. They can provide no ground for any inference to that which is essentially intelligent.

5. How then must we distinguish souls? Is there anything peculiar to our own awareness of self, which, with some variation, may constitute another

(continued from the previous page) soul or self? But our own consciousness of self is of something that always knows and is never an object to itself. How can this essentially unobjective being of the self have any peculiarity to distinguish it from anything? If it had, it would forthwith become an object. It is only an object that can have any character or any peculiarity to distinguish it from something else, which in its turn must be another object. The self must necessarily stand alone, undistinguished, and unpartnered. It is true that ordinarily we distinguish one individual x from another individual y . But then we do not distinguish souls as such, which we do not know. We distinguish certain objective characters which we assign to supposed souls. The souls are not there for us to know them, and if we persist in knowing them as distinct from ourselves and from each other, we shall only succeed in knowing certain lifeless and soulless shells. The truth is that what is distinct is so by virtue of some distinguishable content or objective limitation. It must therefore be capable of being held and contemplated as object by a subject that distinguishes it. But a soul can neither be contemplated truly by itself nor by some other soul. To distinguish a soul therefore is to kill its soulhood or its essential spirituality.

The common-sense belief in many souls requires a new interpretation accordingly. We should have to say that all these souls are essentially the same soul. This soul is the universal knower, and is indicated in each of us as the 'I'. What I call 'myself' is exactly the same entity which you call 'yourself' and which every-one calls 'his self'. To know this one in self-intuition is therefore to know the knower of all and the knower in all. It is the only self. This self knows through different bodies, and appears as

(continued from the previous page) manifold as the bodies which it assumes. Each body-soul becomes an exclusive centre of experience (the exclusiveness being wholly due to the body), it becomes a historical individuality, and the popular imagination regards it as an ultimate, eternal, and unyielding atom of being. But all the while, the true soul-substance is one and the same. It is not lodged in any body. Indeed, so far as it knows through any particular body, it may be said to be limited by that body which limitation we express by saying that A can never know what B knows; and vice versa. But even then it is not truly limited; for it knows the limitation, and distinguishes its own experience from the experience of other individuals. It could not do this, if it were really limited by its own body-experience. The finite individual is thus seen to be in his true nature, not finite. It is the infinite. There is nothing to limit his vision. He knows all limitations and goes beyond them.

We thus conclude that there cannot be many selves. The proper question to raise is not whether you and others exist beside me. There is a sense in which you and others can certainly be admitted so to exist. The question is whether you and others can be different from myself in our truly spiritual natures. We have seen that there can be no difference here, and that therefore all the selves are really one self, and that self is neither mine nor yours, but is the self of all of us. Still, as the only valid starting point is that of individual experience, it would be quite legitimate to say that the self of the individual is the Absolute Self. This however must not mislead any-one into thinking that each individual can take his self to be the Absolute Self, and that

(continued from the previous page) therefore there can be many absolute selfs. There is no possible point of view from which there can be many real selfs at all. Start where you will, the one will always absorb the many.

6. RASVIHARY DAS. "APPEARANCE." The fact of illusion primarily gives rise to the idea of appearance as distinguished from that of reality. Whenever there is an illusion we are presented with an appearance which does not correspond to the thing to which the appearance is referred. But an appearance need not always be illusory. In veridical perceptions things are believed to appear just as they are, and in these cases we may suppose that appearances are real appearances. But as from the cases of illusion we see that the being of a thing may be different from its appearance, we come to from, though not necessarily contrasted with, that of reality. The term 'appearance' has thus come to stand for that which is given in knowledge with no assurance as to whether or not it is real in fact.

The idea of appearance however has not got exactly the same significance in different systems. For the Vedanta the category of appearance covers up the entire sphere of knowable universe. It is all appearance and stands in sharp contrast to the absolute (Brahma) which alone is real and which negates all empirical existence. Here the relation between appearance and reality is that of opposition. The truth of reality shines when the falsity of appearance has come to be recognized.

7. D.M. DUTI: There is an aspect of the philosophy of Berkeley which should be of immense interest to the students of contemporary philosophy. It concerns Berkeley's theory of spiritual substances – self and God.

It is generally known to students of history of philosophy that while Locke believes in two kinds of substances, Berkeley believes in one and Hume believes in none. But it is not realised very clearly that though Berkeley believes in the existence of spiritual substance his conception of a spirit is a peculiar one, that is as different from that of Locke, as from those of the many idealists who either preceded or succeeded him.

In his "Principles of human knowledge," Berkeley defines a spirit as an essentially active substance which is the cause of all ideas,—those of imagination as well as those of sensation. He also states that this is the only kind of substance we can reasonably believe in. If Berkeley rested here, his conception of a spirit would be neither difficult or understanding nor very different from those of ordinary thinker. But he lays down two other principles which make the conception of spirit very peculiar, if not positively unintelligible.

These principles are:—(1) The nominalistic theory that universal ideas are abstract ideas which the mind has no power to conceive; and (2) the theory, very emphatically asserted, that an idea is essentially passive and static and that consequently we cannot at all have any idea of a spirit.

8. Now this principle of Berkeley (viz. that the mind cannot form an abstract idea of the mind of general notion) though so explicitly applied by him for the reputation of the conception of matter is not so fully applied to the conception of a spirit. But as this nominalistic principle forms a corner-stone of his philosophy we cannot think that he would ever ignore it, with respect to any of his conceptions or that he would resist any of the logical conclusions following from it.

When we try, however, to apply this principle to the conception of spiritual substance we get a result which would most probably disappoint the philosopher, though he might not disown it. For we find that just the conception of material substance involves a general abstract idea of matter which the mind has no power to form, the conception of spiritual substance also involves a general abstract idea of spirit, which also according to the same principle the mind cannot form. And if again material substance does not exist because it is inconceivable, spiritual substance also does not exist because it is inconceivable. In other words, spiritual substance conceived as a general substance is unthinkable and cannot be thought to exist.

Berkeley might perhaps, try to avert this suicidal result of his theory of abstract ideas by saying that by spirit he does not mean any genus under which all spirits would come, but only an individual spiritual substance like a self or God. But this defence can scarcely be accepted. Because in the definition of a spirit we find him saying, "by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term." And does not this notion of a spirit also involve an abstraction and generalisation? How can we think of a spirit that is the common substratum of those different activities of thinking, willing and perceiving? Surely, not by thinking of it as identical with the momentary substratum of a fleeting act of thinking, willing or perceiving, but by thinking of it as that which is the abiding substratum common to all these acts. And thinking of this kind involves an abstraction and the formation of a general idea. The notion of an individual spirit also depends, therefore, on abstraction, and if abstraction of this kind,

(continued from the previous page) is impossible, as Berkeley in other contexts so strongly asserts it to be, then a spiritual substance is as unthinkable as a material one; and if the existence of the latter is denied on this ground, that of a spiritual substance also has to be denied. To be plain, the self conceived as the common substratum of all activities of the mind and God, conceived as the common cause of all the ideas of sensation, are both unthinkable, being abstract notions and therefore they do not exist.

This suicidal logical conclusion of the first principle will, however, be apparently set at naught by the second principle we have mentioned above. For according to it an idea being passive and inert cannot represent a spirit, which is essentially active and consequently we cannot have any idea of spiritual substance. So Berkeley can say in defence of the existence of self and God, that they are not at all known through ideas, — general or particular, — and, therefore, it is meaningless to say that we cannot have a general idea of self or God, they do not exist. As a spirit is not known through an idea, there is no change of the knowledge of a spirit depending upon any abstraction or generalisation. The above criticism, therefore, falls to the ground.

9. It appears from these words, that according to Berkeley, the existence of other spirits is not immediately known; it is inferred from the effects, i.e. the ideas produced by them in our minds. The existence of the Divine Spirit is also inferred from the effects produced by it. Through in the passage quoted above he says that God is known 'immediately', he does not mean thereby that he is directly perceived; he simply means that He is known without much difficulty or delay. Otherwise Berkeley could not say that God is known in the same way as spirits, other than ourselves, are known. That God is known inferentially

(continued from the previous page) from His effects as manifested by the phenomena of Nature is evident, beyond all doubts, from other well-known passages, which need not be quoted here.

Now, if we try to deduce the conceptions of self and God from this theory about the knowledge of spirits, we obtain strange results. It is found that the only possible way in which I can conceive my self would be as an activity (of thinking, willing or perceiving) the existence of which is directly felt. It is doubtful whether I can think of it even as a substance that supports such an activity. Because the activity of the self is alone directly felt. The existence of the substratum of such an activity can be proved, if at all, not by direct feeling, but by implication or inference (e.g. an activity must belong to some substance; hence the thinking activity implies a substance to which it belongs.) But an inference being a process of mediate knowledge necessarily involves ideas. And if we have an idea of a substance—and not a direct feeling of it—then that substance cannot be an active or spiritual substance, for according to Berkeley there can be no idea of a spirit. Consequently the substance whose existence is proved by inference is anything but the self, —it is a false shadow of the self that tries to usurp the place of the self. The real self is, therefore, never known as a substance. Similarly unity, continuity and other properties, which Berkeley seems to ascribe to the self fail to give a knowledge of the real self. My real self is, therefore, known as the activities of thinking, willing etc. which can be directly felt, but which cannot be expressed by ideas or concepts.

But what then can we know about other spirits and God? As we can never feel the internal activities of another spirit, we cannot

(continued from the previous page) have any direct knowledge about it. And the mediate knowledge that, Berkeley thinks, we have of another spirit being, as already shown, necessarily involved in ideas and concepts does not give us a genuine knowledge of that spirit. What then can we really know about other spirits or God? Nothing, except a few symbols. The ideas with the help of which we try to infer their existence, may be taken as symbols or signs which may help us to realise that there are spirits, which possess activities like ourselves. To know other spirits we have really to transfer through imagination, our own activities to other centres. Consequently we can imagine other spirits as having only those qualities the existence of which we can feel in our selves. The qualities which we do not feel in ourselves cannot be understood as being in other spirits; for we have to depend on our own selves alone in understanding a spirit. It follows, therefore, that infinity, omnipotence, omniscience etc. which are ascribed to the Divine spirit or God can be understood only if they are known to exist in us. God and other spirits can be understood, therefore, only as series of activities, like those we feel in our selves.

But even this meagre knowledge of other spirits and God is possible only if we can really imagine the existence of spiritual activities in other centres. the objection may be raised that imagination cannot work without ideas and that the imagination of spiritual activities is, after all, having ideas of such activities, which is believed to be abjured by Berkeley. And then we have to confess that we cannot even imagine the existence of other spirits. Berkeley's idealism would then be reduced to solipsism pure and simple.

Strange as these conclusions might appear to

(continued from the previous page) to the students of Berkeley's philosophy, they are the only logical conclusions from the two principles standing on which he refutes materialism and establishes the existence of spirits.

10. BHASKAR S. NAIK. "THE SELF AND THE EGO." Thus we find that besides the subject and the mind, we require the ego to explain our experience. There is no doubt about the fact that happiness and unhappiness are states of the mind and if the mind is merely an object among other objects the states of the mind should be recognised as merely objective states that is, we should think of them as merely there and not belonging to us. But we do not simply say that there is happiness or unhappiness but we say that we are happy or unhappy. This is possible because happiness or unhappiness is not a state of the mere mind but of the mind as identified with the self. The mind united with the self or the subject is the ego.

The concept of the ego is necessary for another important purpose. Merely with the subject we cannot explain the particularity and privacy of our individual knowledge. There is no distinction or differentiation in the subject as such. The subject in me cannot be distinguished, as subject, from the subject in you. If the subject alone knows and if the same subject is present in both you and me, then my knowledge should as well be your knowledge. But this is not so. The fact that a student can learn from his teacher what he does not know shows that the knowledge of one person is not always the knowledge of another person.

There is another point. We have seen that the subject does not change. If this is so, then its knowledge should not also change. This means that there should be no acquisition of any new knowledge and no forgetting of past

(continued from the previous page) knowledge. But this goes against the accepted facts of experience. We have therefore to accept that besides the subject and its knowledge there is another way of knowing which comes and goes and takes place like any other transitory event.

Knowledge as such is not possible without the subject. The subject should be there whenever and wherever there is knowledge. If there is to be any impermanent knowledge, there should be some changing element in association with the subject. This changing element is supplied by the modifications of the mind. In every case of empirical knowledge, the mind undergoes some change in accordance with the object known. Every act of such knowledge is nothing but a state of the mind illuminated by the presence of the subject. As one state of the mind is different from another state, one act of knowledge is different from another. Similarly, since the mind of one person is not the mind of another the knowledge of one person, so far as it is dependent upon mental states, is necessarily different from that of his neighbour.

We see thus how with the help of the ego, we can explain the privacy of our individual knowledge as well as the acquisition of new knowledge. The ego is one with the mind. It is that which is happy or unhappy. It owns experience and knows things by undergoing modification in itself.

We have already seen that the ego is different from the self. Even the pure subject is not the self. The subject has to be distinguished from the object. The object stands over against the subject; without such opposition between subject and object the subject has no meaning. But such distinction is part of ignorance and so the subject, which has to be understood only with such distinction, is not altogether dissociated

(continued from the previous page) from ignorance. The seer, as seer, is there so long as there is something to be seen. In the pure self or outside it, there is nothing to be seen. So it is not in itself a seer or subject, but seeing or knowledge itself.

11. J.N. CHUBB: THE NATURE AND VALUE OF APPEARANCE IN BRADLEY'S PHILOSOPHY: An appearance which is inconsistent with itself, cannot as it stands be true of the real. Reality cannot accept a self-contradictory appearance as a real or possible predicate, at least in the character which it reveals itself to us, for the "nature of the real is to possess everything in a harmonious form." Appearances must therefore be transformed before they can enter as elements in the real.

12. Discrepancy is not a character which appearance reveals under certain conditions, but it is its very nature. Appearances are discrepant, not because they are viewed in isolation, but because they lack self-sufficiency, because in short they are ideal.

Bradley has admitted that the essence of appearance consists in its ideality. Whatever be the nature of the transformation that appearances have to undergo, reality must ultimately consist of elements that in varying degrees fall short of the Whole. This constitutes the ideality of appearance. But that which is ideal is determined by relations from without and as such reveals inner discrepancy. As Bradley rightly puts it "to be defined from without is in principle to be distracted from within." So long then as appearances are contained in reality they possess ideality and so long as they are ideal they can never be made to renounce their discordant and discrepant nature. Reality may be a very powerful absorbant indeed. It may be able to suck out the life and blood from

(continued from the previous page) appearances, so that in the real world these latter are more ghosts and phantoms of their former selves. But one transformation reality can never effect. It can never succeed in sucking out the self-contradiction and the discrepancy which is at the heart of appearance.

13. G.R. MALKANI: "THE SELF IN RELATION TO KNOWLEDGE." It is agreed that the form of all knowledge is personal,—I know this, that etc. The 'I' that is thus known is called our empirical self. This self is strictly relative to some objective content that is known. If nothing is known objectively we have no evidence of the empirical self. It is only known in relation to a concrete act of the mind involving reference to an objective situation. When therefore we do not know anything we cannot be aware of the empirical self. Does the self then exist in some way proper to its own essential being? We appear to have no data on the basis of which a decision can be arrived at. We are aware of the self as long as we know objects. When we have ceased to know objects, we have also ceased to become aware of the self. How can we prove the self to exist apart from any relation to objects? And if we cannot prove that, the self is indeed real in so far as it is implied in all knowledge, but it cannot be proved to have any substantial being. It is merely a formal unity of knowledge.

This argument would be correct if there were no facts within our present experience which went beyond the subject-object relation in knowledge. But we have awareness that in deep and sound slumber we did not know any object. Is this awareness false? Evidently it cannot be false. This knowledge is never contradicted. Our conviction that in sleep we did not know anything is never shaken. But if that is so, how is our present awareness, which is of the

(continued from the previous page) form of memory to be accounted for? It can only be accounted for on the supposition that in sleep the self does not cease to become aware; and since it cannot be aware of any object, it is aware of no-object. The awareness of the self is never interrupted in sleep. If it were interrupted, there would be no consciousness on waking up that we slept or that there was a state of our own being in which we did not know anything. While therefore we can, by the very nature of the case, have no direct empirical evidence of the existence of the self when there is no awareness of any object, we cannot really deny its existence during any such interval. The self can thus be shown to be more than a formal unity of knowledge that involves subject-object relation. It exists when there is no knowledge of any object.

There is another important consideration which proves the substantiality of the self, and that is the reality of knowledge. Knowledge is something distinct from the objects that are said to be known. It is not itself an object. Also it is not a quality of objects, or a relation between one object and another. An object can never be said to know, or to be related to another object through knowledge. Knowledge is not a physical phenomenon. It is not in any sense a fact of outer nature. If then knowledge is not an illusory appearance resting on things that are physical, it must be grounded on a substance that is spiritual. This substance we call the self. The self alone knows. Thus the reality of knowledge implies in some sense the reality and the substantiality of the self. If the self were no more than a formal and evanescent unity of knowledge without any character of its own, knowledge would itself be reduced to an unreal appearance resting on physical things. We conclude that the

(continued from the previous page) self is a real entity that exists even when there is no knowledge of objects as such, and that it is in this sense a substance.

The next question is, how is the self and knowledge related? We shall suppose that they are distinct. The self knows, but the self is not knowledge. But if that is so how are the two related? It is said that knowledge is a quality that inheres in the self. Let us suppose that it is a quality. This quality must either be occasional and separable, or it must be inseparable from the self. In the former case the self will sometimes know and sometimes not know. But if there is any time when the self does not know, then it must evidently be devoid of the quality of intelligence. Such a self can never be proved to exist. In fact an unintelligent self would be a contradiction in terms. The self is nothing if it is not essentially intelligent and knowing. It is spirit and not matter, and the essential quality of spirit is intelligence.

Let us suppose that knowledge is an inseparable quality of the self and that the self always knows. But if the self always knows, and the knowledge is part of the very nature of the self, what ground is there for distinguishing the two? An indeterminate something is made determinate in knowledge by the qualities it possesses. The self is not an indeterminate something that is known from outside. It is not an object, and truly speaking it is only an object that can be said to be indeterminate or to possess qualities. The self is, if anything self-known; and what is self known cannot properly be the object of any knowledge. It cannot be shown to possess any quality.

It may however be admitted for the sake of argument that there is distinction. But if that

(continued from the previous page) is so, both self and knowledge cannot be self-known. Whatever is self-known is properly not known at all. To be known is to be known by what is different from itself. The same thing cannot be subject and object at the same time. If then both self and knowledge are self-known, then neither of them can be known at all. But if neither of them is known, how can the supposed distinction of the two be known or postulated? Each will constitute the absolute, and there is contradiction in saying that there are two absolutes.

We shall suppose that knowledge alone is self-evident and self-known, and that in one and the same act of knowledge both the object and the self are known. But if the self is thus known, it is no better than an object that is itself unintelligent and is only illumined from outside. Such a self cannot be said to know. Will it be a self in any sense? But even if this view is correct then knowledge cannot be known. Such knowledge is indistinguishable from real self-hood. We therefore reject the view that knowledge is self-evident and self-known while the self is not.

Let us suppose that the self alone is self-known. It will now be objected, — but is not the self known? Certainly it is in a way known. But as known, it cannot be the knower; and the knower alone is the true self. This self cannot stand to itself in the relation of an object. It is truly self-known. The object-self is finite and limited. It is known only in relation to certain acts of the mind, and may be said to be as impermanent as those acts. The true self is never known. It alone is what may properly be called self-known.

The self may be self-known. But can we say that knowledge is known by it like any other object? If that were so, then this "knowledge

(continued from the previous page) of knowledge" would not be known. We shall have to admit that the real knowing is not itself known. If it were known, there would be no such thing as knowledge of objects as distinct from objects. Evidently then knowledge is to be admitted as not itself any object. It at least occupies the middle position of relating the objects to the self and thus making them known by the latter. We know, by our ordinary experience, that light makes objects which are otherwise hidden known to us. Similarly sense-organs help to reveal objects. Is knowledge to be compared to either of these in its function to make objects known?

Now light may be helpful in making the objects known. But it is like them a physical phenomenon, not self-revealing but requiring to be revealed by what is beside itself. Its function as revealing then is dependent upon the function of the sense-organs that reveal it. But for the latter, it can make little difference to the known-ness of objects whether the objects are in light or in darkness. If knowledge were like light, it would require to be illumined, and not itself properly reveal the objects of the self. But there is no conceivable entity that can reveal knowledge itself.

Is it like the sense-organs which reveal the object, without themselves requiring to be revealed? The eye that sees is not itself seen. But the eye does not really see. If the spirit does not act through the eye, or as we should say popularly the attention is diverted, there is no revelation of the object. The eye helps to know an object; but once again it is like light a physical entity that does not by itself help to bring the object any the nearer to the knowledge of it by the self. If knowledge were like a sense-organ, it might come in contact with objects, but no knowledge would ensue.

(continued from the previous page) It would be as unintelligent as the objects with which it has come in contact.

The truth is that knowledge is not any object or something unintelligent. It is not a relating medium in the sense in which light, sense-organs, and the modifications of the mind may be supposed to be. It works through the latter, but it is not unintelligent or jada like them. It has the relation of identity with the self and partakes of the self-known character of the self. Knowledge in its truly revealing character is the self. It is distinguished only because of objects, that appear to be distinct from the self and to be revealed to it in knowledge.

We conclude that the relation in essence is one of identity. Knowledge may be said to constitute the essential intelligence of the self. The apparent distinctness of knowledge from the self that knows is false, and is only relative to objects known.

14. DHIRENDRA LAL DAS. "INTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN KANT." It may be of some interest to re-state the doctrine of creative understanding in the Critical philosophy.

Although knowledge is preeminently an activity of the knowing principle, it still carries a passivity which, as far as man is concerned, Kant thinks, is ineradicable and alien. You may explain a large part of cognitive facts in terms of mental activity, but there is a remainder that is different in character and hence requires a distinct explanation.

The sense-data represent this obdurate factor of cognition. To use Hume's expression, they strike upon the mind and do not own themselves up to the cognitive principle. They are independent, being the effects of an extra-mental existence. When this brute datum is worked upon by the formative activity of the

(continued from the previous page) self, cognition of an object arises. In the case of knowledge of a coloured thing, for example, we receive a manifold of impressions, in the first place, whose only description is that they are visual occurrences not subjectively initiated. They are an unverbaised content possessing no cognitive value. In order that the chaotic mass may be intelligible it requires to be invested with psychic determinations by mind. The raw visual affections do not become definite awareness of a coloured object unless they are worked up by the forms of mind.

In a cognitive situation the mind, supplying as it does the form, has by far the larger role to play. It must nevertheless depend for its content on without. Understanding maketh nature out of the materials that it does not make, so goes the oft-quoted proposition. The sense-manifold constitutes the matter of knowledge and is independent of mind, but in itself it is meaningless and hence awaits to be intelligised by mind. Knowledge therefore reveals a disparity of form and content, each proceeding from a distinct source—sensa from things outside and formative principles from the self.

Thus the things that the sense-particulars imply and the self that relations indicate are two realities set over against each other. The result is that the former remain inaccessible to the latter.

15. Even supposing that sense-particulars are what the realists take them to be, the case for human knowledge would not have improved in the least. For sense-materials, in the very act of being received by the mind, would have been thoroughly metamorphosed. Mind cannot receive them except by overlaying them by means of its forms or categories. The ordered sensa then become more or less a new creation, a mind-work.

Were the human mind self-sufficient, that is

(continued from the previous page) to say, could it supply content like form from within instead of depending for the former on without, there would be no opposition or duality that makes knowledge relative. If we were endowed with the faculty of intellectual intuition instead of sensuous perception, we would not have been limited to mere phenomena.

By 'intellectual intuition' is meant the mode of knowledge that possesses no receptivity but is entirely spontaneous. The spontaneity of human knowledge consists in the formative activity that the mind exercises in the course of fashioning up the datum which is received, not created. But in intellectual intuition nothing is received and the whole process is the act of the spirit; mind there has not to be confronted with an other world from which it is to draw its content. In intellectual intuition the mind is autonomous. True knowledge betrays no dualism. There may be a synthesis of form and matter but the synthesis is not of two disparate elements derived from different sources but of these two originating in the unitary activity of cognition. Knowledge is not a mechanical fabrication out of two diverse factors but is a differentiated spontaneity of the subject.

Such intuition, according to Kant, is possible only in God. Divine cognition alone is spontaneous. Divine perception is original – *intuitus originarius*. The objects of divine perception do not emanate from an outside source but are created in the very act of perception. For divine knowledge it is not necessary that the sense-manifold should stream down through the windows of sense. Materials come from the same source that supplies the principles of organisation. While human perception is dependent upon the existence of the object and is possible only because mind is acted upon by the object, objects

(continued from the previous page) are produced in and through God's intuition. God's perceiving is creative. To perceive for Him is to create. Intellectual or creative intuition is thus similar to artistic vision in which creation and apprehension coincide.

As we have noted above, Kant attributes a kind of spontaneity to understanding. But that is purely formative. Our understanding is active inasmuch as its function is synthesising. But the act of synthesis cannot be exercised except in reference to a perceptive material. Without the manifold our understanding is ineffective. Understanding that works through the categories and thus orders the manifold of perception would have nothing but logical function, if divested of it.

16. Descartes dichotomised reality into mind and matter. This tradition found its full expression in the Lockean representative theory according to which knowledge consists of images or representations produced by external things on mind. Mind that is originally blank faces a thing and receives its image through some sense-organ or organs. The thing does not migrate into mind; it remains unknown.

The obvious difficulty of the representative theory is that if all that mind knows are images or ideas, how is it possible to get beyond them to the things, the alleged sources of sensations, and postulate their being? Therefore Berkeley and Hume dismissed the external substance altogether and held that "mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and cannot conceive of any kind of existence but those perceptions." (Hume). This was sensationalism. Human sensationalism seemed to convey a great truth with Kant. He found it impossible to disagree with Hume when the latter said that the sensations were the ultimate data of knowledge. But he was unable to explain

(continued from the previous page) the passivity of sensations in terms of mind which he conceived as an active thinking principle. The Lockean theory of an external reality causing sensations was taken recourse to as the only explanation. With Locke he held that sensations were not made of the stuff that things were; they were merely the effects that the things produced in us through the sense-organs. The inability to explain passivity except by means of a thing outside is the crux of Kantian epistemology.

Kant regarded form and matter as fundamentally different and attributed the two to two different sources; the content being uncaused by mind, the activity of mind is simply constitutive and not productive. Intuition, therefore, with him means the act of receiving into space-time forms the thing-generated impressions.

Without repeating the oft-repeated criticism; how is it possible to know that the impressions are caused by things when things themselves are unknown, it may be asked, how are the sensations to be characterised and their being asserted? That sensations qua sensations have no cognitive value Kant himself admits. If sensations are prior to space-time forms, that is, the first intelligising activity of the mind, it is not possible to know them and affirm that they are. Kant says, they are sensuous affections. But sensuous affections on which even the primary cognitive activity has not worked are difficult to understand. They have no experiential significance. Events that do not partake of the nature of things nor have psychic characteristics have not status. Croce aptly says, *sensum* is the limit of intuition—formless matter which spirit can never apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can possess only with form and

(continued from the previous page) in form, but spirit is obliged to postulate the notion of it as a lower limit. Far from being an externality or effect of an external something, matter outside concrete experience is an unreality.

17. Matter, according to Croce, does not exist. "What exists is the form.. When a philosopher speaks of matter he means only the concept which has been fashioned, by a work of abstraction and for a definite end, and which has no value except for that end. The concept matter may help us to make clear by contrast that the essence of art (intuition) is in the form, but it does not denote an effective reality. It can indeed be presented as if it referred to something existing; but in such case existence affirmed is simply metaphorical—a mode of expression useful in giving plastic form to our thought.....matter does not exist but it is posited for the convenience of exposition."...(Croce).

The denial of matter automatically means the abolition of things in themselves; for if matter nowhere exists in knowledge, there is no necessity of supposing an external thing in itself as the precondition of the passive element in cognition. Knowledge thus ceases to be receptivity and becomes all spontaneous.

What Kant calls sensibility is unknown to Crocean theory of knowledge. While intuition with Kant is the process of giving form to impressions received from outside, the primary cognitive process in Croce is a creative one. It is called intuition also. But Intuition activity, a kind of aesthetic activity that knows and brings forth simple immediate, individual objects.

18. The ideal that, Kant thought, was beyond human powers Fichte regarded as the unique

(continued from the previous page) characteristic of cognition. Our self-consciousness is not the simple 'I think,' 'the poorest of all ideas,' – it is rather 'I create.' Reality is the product of the activity of ego, will or spirit. There is no independent thing in itself. But the Fichtean concept of Anstoss set a further problem to philosophy.

The next attempt to actualise Kantian ideal is made by Schelling according to whom ego and non-ego, thought and being, are derived from a higher neutral principle which is neither the one nor the other. But the haze that shrouds the notion of an indifferent transcendent entity makes it unacceptable to rational metaphysics. At bottom it is an abstraction.

Hegel makes next the greatest attempt to bridge the duality. Ego and non-ego he describes as the modes of one progressive life.

The post-Kantian thought, in short, is the history of varied attempts to surmount the opposition of subject and object that Kant considered impossible to rise above. And it is significant that the problem that was epistemological in character became ontological the moment the thinkers attempted to solve it.

It was correctly apprehended that from the individualistic standpoint of Kant—a standpoint which was the mainspring of all 18th century thought—no solution of the opposition of sense and understanding, matter and form, object and subject, non-ego and ego, was possible. What was done, therefore, was to transfer the synthetic unity of apperception to the beginning of things—to the Absolute to which nothing can be given from outside and which must create its own matter if it is to realise its own spirituality. Thus the necessity of positing a matter that waits

(continued from the previous page) to get form and a form that waits for matter to begin its operation was obviated; and although no two philosophers were agreed as to how the matter could, in spite of its origin out of the necessity of a spiritual life, assume an alien aspect and be accordingly regarded as being an other, it was admitted by all that somehow the two aspects of spiritual life—sense and understanding—must be indissolubly connected or knowledge could never arise,—much less, absolute knowledge. Whether the projection of the matter (or non ego) was due to an unconscious operation (Fichte) or blind will (Schopenhauer) or the preponderance of the real aspect of the Absolute Substance (Schelling) or a necessity in the life history of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) it was certainly not an accident: without that projection the spiritual principle of all being would not get any opportunity to reveal its own existence. The gradual mastery of mind over matter, the progressive spirituality of the world as a whole, is not brought about by a clash of opposing principles—one wholly other and contingently operative and another wholly spiritual and merely formative, but by a re-organisation of the different forces, all resident within the life of the spirit. It is in fact a conquest by the self of its own dark and hidden forces which are no less spiritual in their origin. In knowledge, therefore, we see enacted a drama of the triumph of spirit over its own unclear aspects and not a conflict of mind and matter. The shapeless fancies of the artist begin to get form under the dominating impulse of a creative imagination, and out of an apparent chaos a cosmos is produced. This is God's creation of the world out of nothing. In intellectual intuition man catches himself in a similar creative act; but in as much as he is finite, he is

(continued from the previous page) always oppressed with the impression that the materials that he is fashioning are not his own. This is true in a sense, for the finite aspect of spirituality can never be wholly creative and it is only when we feel that in the finite there is something infinite, that knowledge is in a sense both creation and communication from above, that in every act of knowledge we live, move and have our being in the life of God, that we can get rid of the oppressive feeling that we are living in an alien world that not only baffles understanding but also thwarts moral endeavour. Unfortunately, on this point Kant was destined to behave like Moses who could show the promised land from a distance but could not enter it himself.

19. H.D. BHATTACHARJEE: "THE NEED OF A VOLUNTARISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY." In so far as philosophy is defined as a thinking consideration of things it finds itself committed before hand to an intellectualistic interpretation of experience, although even then the question is not necessarily barred out as to whether the intellect itself is not necessarily barred out as to whether the intellect itself is not shot through and through by the conative aspects of our mental life. The cold neutrality of intellectual judgment in philosophical matters is an ideal that can be realised so long as man is defined as a rational being. As a matter of fact, intellectualism in philosophy has found it very difficult to resist the appeal of asceticism in morals or to deny that true insight into the nature of things is synonymous with intellectual intuition or a vision from which all effective and volitional factors have been completely banished. Indian philosophical speculations may point a moral in this matter, for in almost all the

(continued from the previous page) major systems the ideal of spiritual endeavour has been equated with a passionless existence where all but the highest intellectual knowledge of self (or its implicate, the Absolute) is absent. Consistently, therefore, the self has been regarded as being in its true nature only a seer and only in its empirical character also an enjoyer and an agent.

It is being gradually recognized, however, that in man there is a good deal that is not rational and that a philosophy of life cannot afford to ignore those aspects of human nature that are themselves non-intellectual but nevertheless determine the intellectual aspect in a material way. The rise of the many personalistic theories of reality in recent times with their emphasis upon the importance of the individual and the need of taking the entire personality into consideration in any metaphysical scheme can be easily explained if we remember that the Absolutism of the preceding generation had not only minimised the importance of the finite individual but had eviscerated him in all that constitutes a being of flesh and blood—the affective and conational equipment with which he is endowed. Depriving him of the faculty of asserting his reality, it reduced man to a passive spectator of the world-drama or at best a miniature centre of consciousness with little freedom to shape the world according to his effective and conative organisation. He had, so to say, no metaphysical franchise although he enjoyed in a way the benevolent despotism of the Absolute. To explore one's place in the scheme of things and to keep to that place were the only objectives of human thought and action: it was never for a moment suggested that he could take an effective part in the governance of the world and create a place for himself by personal endeavour.

20. Voluntarism welcomes with equal eagerness the changes that have been introduced of late into our conception of the nature of the physical world, whether by science or by metaphysics. The rigid framework proposed for nature by Atomism was found to creak under the pressure of new discoveries; and scientists turned involuntarily to mathematical physicists like Boscovich and Faraday who had proposed the reduction of atoms to mathematical centres of force, or to Ostwald who had propounded the theory of energetics. The physical world was found to be unstable both inside and outside the atoms, and although these were not endowed with a whimsical will, as in the system of Epicurus, when the electronic theory was originally advanced, recent thinkers are daring to ask whether after all there may not be an indeterminacy in nature as suggested by Heisenberg. Schrodinger's wave mechanics, according to which we are not to conceive the electrons apart from their motions but to think of the electron-in-the-orbit as the ultimate element of nature, have revived interest in the older 'energetics' theory.

21. Meanwhile the social sciences had been busy popularising the doctrine that society and civilisation were undergoing development through human effort. Reforming movements and social services presuppose a faith in the power of the human mind to bring about changes in the social constitution. If everything had to be taken by natural piety in a passive fashion, if man were a mere spectator in the game of evolution, then there was no point in pushing social endeavour in the direction of reclamation and uplift, education and spirituality. The need and possibility of active participation in the bettering of the world can be defended only on the ground that man is in

(continued from the previous page) some way the architect of his own destiny and that it is possible for him to mould his physical and social environment in such a way as to make him better adjusted to the world and the world to himself. If the drama has been ideally played out in the life of the Absolute and the evolution of the world be nothing but a widening knowledge of what has been accomplished without man's co-operation and effort, then social service would lose all significance. Only if we are fellow-workers with God in the task of ushering in a better state of things, can we have our heart in our social work, and to be a fellow-worker we must have initiative in addition to intelligence, purpose in addition to penetration. Experiment and insight must go hand in hand; both in our appreciation and in our idealisation we must take the help of our conative life.

22. In their wake come the philosophies of science by men like Poincare who claimed that many so-called scientific facts were really hypotheses or constructs of the human mind and were not exact descriptions of real events. Vaihinger showed how extensively in all fields of knowledge we take fictions for facts and forget that it is only to meet our practical needs that we are obliged to think as if they were descriptions of realities. Meanwhile realistic metaphysics had begun to attack the rigid character of reality in two ways. Boutroux aimed at demolishing the necessary character of the laws of nature and showed that, far from governing phenomena, they were themselves contingent—a view which has been repeated by Heisenberg and Dewey by declaring that laws are mere statistical averages of phenomena and liable to deviation at any time. Emergent evolutionism again made familiar the fact that in the heart of things there was seated a nisus or urge or holistic activity, closely

(continued from the previous page) akin to the appetitive aspect of a Leibnizian monad—an impulse to transcend the existing condition and to disturb the placid routine of a monotonous world. Creative evolutionism also, by its emphasis upon the practical character of the human intellect and upon the unforeseeability of the process of evolution, enhanced the prestige of the non-rational in thought and reality.

It is no wonder, therefore that the cumulative effect of all these converging lines of thought should be to raise new problems about knowledge and reality. To Kant the problem of will, either as a part of our noumenal constitution or as a basis of interpretation of experience was not sufficiently interesting; and although Schopenhauer conceived the world in terms of human will and Fichte tried to deduce the categories from the deed-act of the ego, the epistemological side of voluntarism remained barren till Pragmatism took the field. Pragmatism revitalised philosophic thought by its insistence upon the conative (and also effective) element of mental life both in the organisation of knowledge and in the construction of a realm of reality. It drew attention to the psychological factor in all philosophic thought and the necessity of testing theories by the touchstone of human satisfaction and fulfilment of human purpose. It showed the impossibility of getting at disinterested truth and the necessity of keeping in touch with human experience in all theoretic formulations. Its use of economic language in the assessment of truth and error—expressions like cash value, for instance—and its disavowal of metaphysical inclinations, together with a partiality towards individualism, did not conduce to endow it with philosophical respectability; and although it made every

(continued from the previous page) philosophical school think furiously and examine closely its presuppositions, it failed to develop on the ontological side in equal pace with its psychological and epistemological developments.

23. Unless we abandon the entire contribution of Kant to philosophy and go back to the empirical position that every aspect of knowledge can be derived by a passive reception of impressions from outside, we must admit that those features of experience that fail to be envisaged by the intellect and yet are essential to the proper appreciation of facts and events must be ascribed to some non-intellectual aspect of our being. Thus the difficulty of cognising minds other than our own has arisen because we attempt to understand them in the same way in which we try to understand things with which we do not stand in a relation of active interchange of thoughts and actions. Berkeley saw the impossibility of cognising spirits in the same way as other things are known and used the word 'notion' in this connection: the idealistic tradition did not permit the use of any other terminology. Similarly, when in a moment of forgetfulness Leibniz permitted a mirroring of other monads by a windowless monad and ignored its appetitive or active aspect, he was paving the way for the solipsism of Wildon Carr. If reality is constituted by activity, there is only one way of establishing its existence, viz. by providing for an appreciation of the active aspect of things, and this can be done by conceding to our own active aspect its legitimate share in shaping the world of experience. Extreme voluntarism has claimed to understand the world realistically, with a set of concepts materially different from that used by intellectualism. It is like replacing the Newtonian

(continued from the previous page) set of equations by the alternative set of equations of Einstein in understanding the nature of the world in Physics. The world of speculation undergoes a transformation in concepts as we pass from idealism to voluntarism – the same facts are explained with different principles.

24. The more the warmth of affective and volitional life depart from our apprehension, appreciation and interpretation of experience the more abstract does the world-scheme become. In absolutism the abstracting mind disappears in the midst of its own creations and at once we are presented with a panorama of impersonal categories working out their relentless dialectic. The charge against Hegelian Logic is that it really represents the progressive abstraction of an individual mind, while professing to be an evolution of the categories themselves apart from all human context. It needs telling that Philosophy of this type represents only one order of thought-abstraction carried out by the human will and that its intellectual character is really an index of its abstractness. The philosophic scheme of intellectualism has preferred to base universality upon abstraction: it has insisted that personal attitudes and individual satisfactions must be set aside in the interest of universality. The voluntarist prefers another way: he holds that universality must be based upon congruence of needs or community of satisfaction. Metaphysical craving or intellectual dissatisfaction is at bottom the desire of a willing self to put an end to an intellectual situation that, by pressing simultaneously opposite possibilities of action, paralyses all endeavour. Even truth and error or determined in the last resort by reference to the satisfaction that the former yields and the disquiet

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(continued from the previous page) that the latter raises. If the intellectually contradictory were equally satisfactory with the intellectually coherent, then all quest after truth would have ceased. As soon as Life's interests alter, the philosophy advocated alters too: If the Scholastic systems no longer have any appeal for us, it is because our Life's interests have shifted from the eternal to the temporal plane. Religious values are still less intellectually coherent than philosophical beliefs, because religion takes into consideration human hopes and wishes and does not leave everything to the abstract intellect. Religious truths are accordingly more private and individual than philosophic truths. In them we seek the satisfaction of personal ideals and aspirations more than agreement with others. It is only when we value agreement with our social surroundings above private convictions that we yearn for social backing and universality in religious faith.

KAREL WEINFURTER'S "MAN'S HIGHEST PURPOSE."

1. As soon as one has been given the power to carry out the mystical practice—of whatever character he may have been before—he is also given the mercy of gradual purification and of overcoming all bad Karma which may await him. The accumulated Karma will ordinarily work itself out already before the beginning of this practice, in different sufferings following in quick succession.
2. The Indian way i.e. the ascetic way is impossible in our milieu, evidence of which is for example that those who have come from India to Europe or U.S. and have already been sufficiently advanced, have had to run away to avoid being overcome by the evil influences of our society.
3. All bad habits and in general, harmful acts

(continued from the previous page) will gradually disappear from the life of the practising mystic. There will be hindrances put in his way, so that he will not be able to commit sinful acts, for he will be cautioned against coming temptations. If the student, however, falls in spite of all, then he must raise himself quickly, and before all he must not think of his stumbling. When the student has fallen there will always come a quick punishment, which must be endured for reconciliation. This is an evidence that a new karma is no more formed, in order not to hinder the student in his progress.

4. After certain time the mystic's life will become so peaceful that it will flow like a quiet river to its end. If the student has reached a certain higher degree in his evolution—the mystical marriage—he is brought into such circumstances that he may live for a certain time in solitude and complete separation from the people. This he needs in that stage for the higher concentration of all spiritual powers on one point, and for its attainment strict quietude and solitude are necessary. Every student will feel in the beginning of his way a disgust towards the world and a longing to leave society for some solitary place. This longing is the first reflection of such a solitude, which may be fulfilled only later after long years. The student must not give way to this longing, for he would commit a great mistake, as in this world and this society in which he lives he has to do the duties he has accepted. Everyone can be sure that as soon as the suitable time for it arrives, he will be freed from his duties and only then will the time of isolation have come.

5. The Mystic, through his practice, sets the highest forces into motion, and therefore it is also obvious that his concentration will

(continued from the previous page) also affect his outer fate. When he has reached a certain stage, he can ask whatever he desires and it will be given him.

6. To make the practice easier, it is recommended to listen both spiritually and physically to our inner being, as though waiting for a communication therefrom.

7. Meditation is only a preliminary training: its purpose is to accustom our thinking principle to become concentrated. For it we need to create a logical circle of thoughts, which shall bear upon ideal or religious conceptions. Then we have to constrain our thinking principle to continually rotate within this circle. There are however people who do not need this preliminary practice, as they are at once able to start the proper concentration. The latter is the most important and the one and only mystical practice, leading direct to the goal: it is the concentration of thought or yoga.

8. It is all one whether we concentrate our thoughts on a conception, or whether we succeed in blotting out all thoughts and all sense perceptions whatever, whereby our attention is concentrated on one internal focus. But this last mentioned practice is the most difficult but it is the quickest one, as through this practice the student succeeds in making his interior quite void, and, as in physics, the void permits of being filled with something else, namely, the perceptions from the man's higher self, whereby the mystical connection is immediately produced.

9. When in doubt address a prayer to the Divinity before going to bed, and perseveringly ask for the solution of your question. Of a surety you shall shortly receive the answer in dream or through inner presentation.

When at a loss how to explain something or when the student does not know in important

(continued from the previous page) cases of his earthly life what decision he shall take, he can concentrate his thoughts in his interior, just as he does at his mystical practice, but he must not await his answer from within because he could thus bring himself in danger of becoming a medium and could take the voice of some spirit for the true Inner Word. Therefore he must not wait for a direct answer but has to hold out through the night till next morning eventually remaining in bed after his awakening for a few minutes, and recalling the question he put to himself. Then, in 9 cases out of 10, the answer will appear in his thought quite clearly and "self-evidently" Yet if often happens that the student, blinded by his outward mind, does not conform to these counsels, recognising his error after he has been harmed.

11. He who has acquired Yoga concentration, can lose it never more.

12. The concentration faculty is connected with a certain mental effort, which is quite natural for we can control our thoughts only by will. As soon as we have practised for a short time we are no more aware of that effort and perceive quietude and in particular mental silence and emptiness. The student then loses the sensation of his body, but never his consciousness. The emptiness then increases and the student gets the sensation as of being suspended over an infinite precipice. This sensation is known in literature as "the Gnostic's Abyss."

13. Students who concentrate on the physical heart fall asleep and become deprived of the faults of their effort. He who concentrates his thoughts on (in - R.H.) the mental heart this being in the middle of the chest, does not fall asleep.

14. The present time is of great advantage to anyone longing for attainment; there is no need of having a leader and everybody may practise for himself and for a long time. As soon as the student has attained a certain stage there will come a leader of a higher rank. The lore of the inner evolution of man, which was concealed for a long time, is now entering the stage of revelation, of which the present book bears the best evidence. It is the first plain revelation of those mysteries. This is possible only by higher authority. It is because a new era is arriving; because before long the mystical practice will be spread among people. It is also possible that for more than ever it is to be brought into connection with the prophecies of the coming Saviour.

15. We concentrate our attention on our interior. Even the conception must disappear later on, when our consciousness, our Self planted in the depths of our inner being and in God's womb, is better conscious of itself and the object of its longing i.e. it is God and nothing else. No sense-perception at all, no thought though the purest, no image though the holiest, must eclipse our thinking principle at that practice. Whatsoever appears therein has to be immediately repelled, and we have to return to God's womb to stay there inflexibly. Thus we may attain the entire evacuation of our thought, we shall suppress the transformations of our thinking principle and before long shall attain the right concentration.

16. The deep mystical concentration is important when we (or others) are threatened by any perils of the astral world. As soon as we have succeeded in concentrating our thinking principle, to at least the first degree (Dharana) we cause around us in the astral a very vigorous whirl to a diameter of 10 to 12 yards.

(continued from the previous page) No astral body can enter this whirl, no 'spirit', no elemental being can enter that circle of ours as they would get torn to pieces. Proof of this is at a spiritualitic setting, where as soon as a Mystic begins to practise, all phenomena and voices are at once discontinued.

17. He who has attained to Dharana will again be able to become concentrated – not at any chosen time but of a surety at certain intervals, at least in the beginning. The more he then practises the shorter becomes the intervals, until finally he reaches the desired stage at each practice. As soon as the student has reached that stage he has only to remain uninterruptedly therein for 12 seconds. For Swami Vivekananda writes in "Raja Yoga": "If the mind can be fixed on one centre for 12 seconds, it will be a Dharana, 12 such Dharanas will be a Dhyana, and 12 such Dhyanas will be a Samadhi."

18. This second degree or Dhyana leads to high occult and mystical powers, for to persevere in a 144 seconds concentration is an enormous labour.

The third degree of Samadhi is the highest, as we may attain therein to union with God. In that stage, though the Mystic is in full consciousness. Yet his body becomes torpid and insensible.

19. The spiritual evolution of man has been the same since the beginning of the Universe with all nations. The transformations taking place inside the student to-day are identical with those of the time of Atlantis, Egypt, India, Persia, Ancient Greece, and Rome. Therefore the Mystic is the one and only key to all Mysteries, which in their essence are quite analogous.

20. When practising, the student has to keep his back and head in one straight line, as

(continued from the previous page) otherwise the practice might injure him, the Serpent Power ascending only if the back-bone is straightened.

21. The overcoming of the lower self, which is represented by a beast—a lion—is attained by means of the mystical concentration practice.

22. The mystical concentration, i.e. the suppression of the thoughts, is the highest sacrifice because our thoughts are our selves, and by keeping them silent we are killing them, that is we are sacrificing ourselves.

23. The mystical practice requires full attention and peace: without it our thoughts do not reach their target—the concentration on our Divine Self.

24. Would-be occult societies to-day say you should first purify yourself and then take up practical training. They ask you to be a saint first of all and then allow you to start. By that they mix up the cause with the result as the union with God is ONLY to be attained by patient training (mystical meditation—R.H.), and no one can become a saint of his own accord. Purification is not brought about by a man himself, but the God within him.

25. Inner mystical experience are to be carefully concealed from the uncalled, the profane. Only a mystical brother may know them. He who does not act accordingly will lose for a long time what he gained. Though the degree he attained is not taken from him, yet the contact with the divine is interrupted, and the student appears to be quite forsaken. It is quite necessary to conceal all experiences from the uninitiate. He who does not comply with that law will immediately lose an enormous part of his spiritual possession.

FAR EASTERN YOGA:

A. LU TZU: SECRET OF THE GOLDEN FLOWER: 1. In meditation how to gaze at the end of the nose?

(continued from the previous page) When the eyes are opened too wide one makes the mistake of directing them outward, whereby one is easily distracted. If they are closed too much then one makes the mistake of letting them turn inward, whereby one easily sinks into a dreamy reveries. Only when the eyelids are sunk properly half-way is the end of the nose seen in just the right way. It is taken as a guiding line. The main thing is to lower the eye-lids in the right way, and then allow the Light to stream in of itself, without trying to force the Light to stream in by a concentrated effort. Looking at the nose serves only as the beginning of the inner concentration.

2. Next fixt one's thinking on the point which lies exactly between the two eyes and then the light streams in of its own accord. This is "fixating contemplation". It ensures the strengthening of illumination.
3. The work depends entirely on the backward flowing movement, i.e. that the thoughts are gathered together in the Heavenly Heart, i.e. between the two eyes. If a man can be absolutely quiet, then the Heavenly Heart will manifest itself.
4. When men are set free from the womb, the principal spirit dwells between the eyes.
5. The light in the physical world is the Sun, in man it is the eye.
6. Release is in the eye. To concentrate the seed flower of the human body above in the eyes, that is the great key of the human body. Take heed. If for a day you do not practise meditation, this Light streams out, who knows whither? If you only meditate for 1/4 hour, you can set 1,000 births are rest. All methods take their source in quietness.
7. All holy men have bequeathed this to one another: Nothing is possible without contemplation.
8. One must sit in a quiet room, let the lids

(continued from the previous page) of both eyes be lowered: then look within and conserve the seed. Let the tasting power of the tongue be diminished, that is the tongue should be laid to the roof of the mouth. Let the breathing be made rhythmical. If the pupil cannot hold his thoughts to the place between the two eyes, the cause is probably that the breathing is too loud and hasty.

9. In the first period there are two mistakes: laziness and distraction. But that can be remedied: the heart must not enter into the breathing too completely.

10. When our hearts go very fast they pass imperceptibly into fantasies. Thus the clarity of the spirit is depleted.

11. Since heart and breath are mutually dependent, the circulation of the Light must be united with the rhythm of breathing. The heart cannot be influenced directly; therefore the breathing power is used as a handle.

12. When a man can let his heart die; then the primordial spirit wakes to life. To kill the heart does not mean to let it dry and wither away, but it means that it is undivided and gathered into one.

13. Buddha said: When you find your heart on one point, then nothing is impossible for you. The heart easily runs away, so it is necessary to gather it together by means of breathing power.

14. To become conscious the inattention (during practice) is the mechanism by which to do away with inattention. It is as in sickness: if one feels pain one can help them with remedies.

15. If one becomes sleepy during meditation that is an effect of laziness. Breathing alone removes laziness.

16. Although the breath that flows through the most is not the true breath, the flowing of the true breath is connected with it.

17. The breath (in meditation) must not be heard with the ears. If it can be heard, then laziness and absent-mindedness develop. The heart alone must be conscious of the flow of breath. It is use without use. One need only let the light fall quite gently on the hearing.

18. If one becomes sleepy or lazy, one should stand up and walk about. When the spirit has become clear one can sit down again. If there is time in the morning that is the best. In the afternoon human affairs interfere and one can therefore easily fall into laziness.

19. One must breathe in and out quite softly so that it remains inaudible to the ear; and only the heart quietly counts the breaths. When the heart forgets the number of breaths that is a sign that it has gone off into the outer world. The mouth must be tightly closed and the teeth clenched firmly, or the heart will hasten outward.

20.¹⁴ If the ear does not listen attentively or the eyes do not look at the back of the nose, the heart often runs off outside.

21.¹⁵ There is need at most of daily work of a few quarter-hours for heart and breathing to come into the right sort of collaboration. Then one need no longer count and breathing becomes rhythmical of its own accord.

23.¹⁶ If too much trouble is taken in directing the thoughts toward the right procedure, there is error. Right behaviour lies in the middle way between being and non-being. If one can attain purposelessness through purpose then the thing has been grasped.


Illustration to Chinese Yoga:
(Sketch representing yogi in meditation)

¹⁴ The original editor inserted "20." By hand

¹⁵ The original editor inserted "21." By hand

¹⁶ The original editor inserted "23." By hand

Separation of the spirit body for independent existence.



TAO DARKNESS
IMPERSONAL BEING
PERSONAL BEING
GHOST BEING. (decays
after death returns to
earth.

24. One must not fall victim to the ensnaring world where five kinds of demons exist. When, after fixation, one has chiefly thoughts of dead ashes and dry wood, when the power is cold and many images of coldness and decay display themselves. If one tarries there long one enters the world of plants and stones, which is a mistake. Nor must a man be led astray by ensnarement. This happens if, after the quiet state has begun, one after another all sorts of ties suddenly appear. One wants to break through them and cannot. One follows them and feels relieved by this. If a man tarries in this state long he enters the world of illusory desires. The Master has become a servant. At best one goes to heaven; at worst one goes enjoying mountains, wind moon, flowers trees and grass. All these are wrong paths.

25. If the primordial power becomes cold and the breathing heavy, the empty fantasy-world may be entered.

26. If, when one has set a long time, ideas rise up in crowds and one cannot stop them but submits to being driven by them because it feels easier, when this happens one must under no circumstances go on with meditation but must get up and walk around a little while until heart and power are again in unison. Only then can one return to meditation. In meditating, a man must have a sort of conscious intuition so that he feels power and breathing unite; he must feel that a warm release belonging to the true light begins to stir. Then he has found the right place and when this right place has been found one is released from the danger of getting into the illusory world.

27. Conformatory experience. If, when there is quiet, the spirit has continuously a sense of great gaiety as if intoxicated or freshly bathed

(continued from the previous page) it is a sign that the Light principle in the whole body is harmonious; when, further one has the feeling that the great earth is a world of light and brilliancy, it is a sign that the Golden Flower is opening. The whole body feels strong and firm...When the Golden Being, Buddha appears, this is a great confirmatory experience.

28. Or if one feels as if drawn upward and it is too difficult to remain sitting. This is called: The spirit returns and pushes against Heaven. In time one can experience it in such a way that one really floats upwards. This too, is a confirmatory experience.

29. Different things appear to each person according to his gifts.

30. Master Lu Tzu said: When there is gradual success in producing the circulation of the Light, a man must not give up his ordinary occupation in doing it. If the occupations are regulated by correct thoughts, the Light is not scattered by outside things, but circulates according to ability to react always to things without any thought of others or oneself, that is a circulation of the Light arising out of circumstances. It is the first secret.

31. If, early in the morning a man can rid himself of all entanglements and meditate from one to two double hours, and then can orientate himself towards all activities and outside things in a purely objective reflex way, and if this can be continued without any interruption, then after two or three months, all the perfected Ones come from Heaven and sanctify such behaviour.

32. "A man ought not to give up his calling in life as a citizen." The Master is concerned lest the pupil may not have fulfilled his karma, therefore he speaks in this way.

(continued from the previous page) Now if the work has led into the blissful fields, the heart is like the reflecting surface of water. When things come, it mirrors things; when they go, spirit and power spontaneously unite and do not allow themselves to be carried away by outside things.

33. At the beginning of the work of meditation, when spirit and power are still scattered and confused, one should put aside household affairs or engage someone to look after them, so that one can take pains with complete attention. Worldly affairs can then be kept at a distance and a quiet place found where one can concentrate with all one's power. But when the work is so far advanced that secret confirmations are experienced, it does not matter if, at the same time, the ordinary affairs are put in order so that one can fulfil one's karma. When a man lives in contact with the world and yet still in harmony with the Light, then he lives among men concealed, yet visible; different and yet the same: then no one takes note of our secret life and being.

34. The most important thing is: non-action in action. Non-action prevents a man from sinking into numbering emptiness and a dead nothingness. Non-action prevents a man from becoming entangled in form and image (substantiality).

35. As soon as the Heavenly Heart is stirring, one must immediately mount with all one's feeling to the house of the creative, where it expands in complete freedom. Then suddenly it wants the deepest silence. Not a single thought arises; he who is looking inward suddenly forgets that he looks. At this time, body and heart must be left completely free. All entanglements disappear without trace. Then I no longer know at what place the house of my spirit and my crucible are: This condition is the penetration of Heaven into Earth.

36. SEX; The deepest secret is the washing of the heart and the purification of the thoughts: it is the bath. The secret of the bath is confined to the work of making the heart empty. There-with the heart is set at rest.

37. The way leads from the sacrum upward to the summit of the creative, then it sinks through into the solar plexus and warms it.

38. If at the time the true power (sex) has been copiously gathered together, the pupil does not let it flow downward and outward but allows it to flow backward, that is the Light of Life, the method of turning the water wheel must be used. If one continues to turn the true power, returns to the roots, drop by drop. Then the body is clean, the power is fresh. If one does not wait to use the power until it has been collected sufficiently, it is then too tender and weak, and the elixir is not formed. If the power is there and not used, then it becomes too old and rigid, and also the Elixir of Life will hardly be produced. When it is neither too old nor too tender, then is the right time to use it with intention. This is the sublimation of the seed into power. If the pupil does not understand this principle, and lets the power stream away downward, then the power forms into seed. Even man who unites bodily with a woman feels pleasure first and then bitterness. When the seed has flowed out, the body is tired and the spirit languid. It is quite different when the adept lets the spirit and power unite. That brings first purity and then freshness; when the seed is transformed the body is healthy and free. The ancients really attained long life by the help of the seed-power present in their own bodies. The fool wastes the most precious

(continued from the previous page) jewel of his body in uncontrolled pleasure, and does not know how to conserve the power of his seed. When it is finished, the body perishes. The Holy and Wise men have no other way of taking care of their lives except by destroying lusts and safe-guarding the seed. The seed that is conserved is transformed into power, and the power, when there is enough of it, makes the creatively strong body. (It goes on to hint that the power of sex must be drawn back and centred between the two eyes.)

B. CHINESE YOGA: Master PAI-CHANG: (Zen School 8th century:

38. “Retire into a quiet room, with dress loosely adjusted about the body. In case the half-cross-legged posture is permitted, simply rest the left leg over the right one...The eyes are slightly opened to avoid falling asleep. Great Masters of meditation from old have their eyes kept open. When meditation advances the wisdom of this practice will grow apparent.. When the exercise is kept up steadily and for a sufficient length of time, disturbing ideas naturally cease and there prevails a state of oneness. This is the essence of practising meditation...Only be not too easily deceived as to what is regarded as Self-realisation. When there is an enhanced spiritual quality there is much susceptibility to the Evil Ones, temptation, which comes in every possible form both agreeable and disagreeable. Therefore the practitioner must have his consciousness rightly adjusted and well in balance...When the practitioner wishes to rise from meditation, let him slowly and gently shake his body and quietly rise from his seat (which should be a thick well-padded cushion). Never let him attempt to rise suddenly. After the rising let him always contrive to retain whatever mental power he has gained by meditation; as if he were watching over a baby; for this will help

(continued from the previous page) him in maturing the power of concentration.”

C) KEIZAN: “ZAZEN YOJIN KI.”

39. The tranquil session, called Zazen is as follows: “Arrange a seat of matting and lay a cushion on it. Then sit in Padmasana. Then put on robes and a girdle not too tight. Then put the right hand (palm upward) on the calf of the left leg, lay the back of the left hand upon the palm of the right hand, and let the tips of the two thumbs touch each other. Keep the body erect inclining neither to right or left, bending neither forward nor backward. Let the nose be directed toward the abdomen. Lay the tongue against the roof of the mouth and keep the lips closed. The eyes should be kept open; the breath should flow gently through the nostrils. Exhale a deep breath: swing the body slightly to right and left. Thereafter proceed to the contemplation of what is beyond thought.

D) MANLY HALL: ON ZEN:

40. Men do not study Zen. They achieve it through the actual process of becoming it. It is not taught as we understand teaching but it is communicated as a state from those who possess it to those who are capable of receiving it. Zen is a meditation for the becoming of self. Zen rejects in to the importance of spiritual authority or tradition, affirming that truth can never be communicated by any outward method but must be realized internally by the mind. When the mind of the Teacher is en rapport with the mind of the disciple, the mysteries are silently communicated, and in this way alone has the esotericism of Zen been communicated for over 26 centuries. With its rejection of the Scriptures, Zen also rejects prayer, fasting and the observance of monastic rules. Those who perform such acts are worshiping only the phantom of truth.

41. Zen is not a negative procedure. It is the achievement of tranquility in strength rather than in weakness.

42. Boddhidharma taught that all who try to express outwardly the secrets of the Law expose themselves as ignorant of the secrets. Zen was for the strong and not for the weak; for the resolute and not for those who could be easily intimidated. Only the one who possessed the discrimination to pass through external appearances and discover the underlying reality was regarded as worthy to receive enlightenment. Boddhidharma therefore accepted as disciples those whom he could not frighten away or repel.

43. Boddhidharma, at the Shao Lin Tea Monastery in China, sat in meditation for nine years in a small courtyard with his face turned towards a blank wall. He earned the name "The Wall-gazing Brahmin." He remained awake for three years. Then he fell asleep—a weakness most un-Zen-like. After awakening he chewed tea leaves and discovered that they removed his sense of fatigue. Since that time tea has been widely used by Zen monks who desire to remain awake during long periods of meditation.

SRI AUROBINDO: "THE LIFE DIVINE." (Vol.I)

(Continued from Red Leather I.P.C. Typed volume, page 474:) (1). The Two Negations: Matter expresses itself eventually as a formulation of some unknown Force. Life, too, that yet unfathomed mystery, begins to reveal itself as an obscure energy of sensibility imprisoned in its material formulation; and when the dividing ignorance is cured which gives us the sense of a gulf between Life and Matter, it is difficult to suppose that Mind, Life and Matter will be found to be anything else than one Energy triply formulated, the triple world

(continued from the previous page) of the Vedic seers. Nor will the conception then be able to endure of a brute material Force as the mother of Mind. The Energy that creates the world can be nothing else than a Will and Will is only consciousness applying itself to work and a result.

What is that work and result, if not a self-involution of Consciousness in form and a self-evolution out of form so as to actualise some mighty possibility in the universe which it has created? And what is its will in Man if not a will to unending Life, to unbounded Knowledge, to unfettered Power?

2. Even in the world of Matter there are existences of which the physical senses are incapable of taking cognisance. Yet the denial of the suprasensible as necessarily an illusion or a hallucination depends on this constant sensuous association of the real with the materially perceptible, which is itself a hallucination. Assuming throughout what it seeks to establish, it has the vice of the argument in a circle and can have no validity for an impartial reasoning.

Not only are there physical realities which are suprasensible, but, if evidence and experience are at all a test of truth, there are also senses which are supraphysical and can not only take cognisance of the realities of the material world without the aid of the corporeal sense-organs, but can bring us into contact with other realities, supraphysical and belonging to another world.

3. The increasing evidences, of which only the most obvious and outward are established under the name of telepathy with its cognate phenomena cannot be resisted except by minds shut up in the brilliant shell of the past, by intellects limited in spite of their acuteness through the limitation of their field of experience

(continued from the previous page) and enquiry, or by those who confuse enlightenment and reason with the faithful repetition of the formulas left to us from a bygone century and the jealous conservation of dead or dying intellectual dogmas.

4. At the other end, if we stress too much the unreality of the objective world, we arrive by a different road at similar but still more trenchant conclusions,—the fictitious character of the individual ego, the unreality and purposelessness of human existence, the return into the Non-Being or the relationless Absolute as the sole rational escape from the meaningless tangle of phenomenal life. And yet the question cannot be solved by logic arguing on the data of our ordinary physical existence; for in those data there is always a hiatus of experience which renders all argument inconclusive.

5. The extension of our consciousness, to be satisfying, must necessarily be an inner enlargement from the individual into the cosmic existence. For the Witness, if he exists, is not the individual embodied mind born in the world, but that cosmic Consciousness embracing the universe and appearing as an immanent Intelligence in all its works to which either world subsists eternally and really as Its own active existence or else from which it is born and into which it disappears by an act of knowledge or by an act of conscious power. Not organised mind, but that which, calm and eternal, broods equally in the living earth and the living human body and to which mind and senses are dispensable instruments, is the Witness of Cosmic existence and its Lord.

The possibility of a cosmic consciousness in humanity is coming slowly to be admitted in modern Psychology, like the possibility of more elastic instruments of knowledge, although still

(continued from the previous page) classified, even when its value and power are admitted, as a hallucination. In the psychology of the East it has always been recognised as a reality and the aim of our subjective progress. The essence of the passage over to this goal is the exceeding of the limits imposed on us by the ego-sense and at least a partaking, at most an identification with the self-knowledge which broods secret in all life and in all that seems to us inanimate. Entering into that Consciousness, we may continue to dwell, like It, upon universal existence.

6. And, if we choose, we can proceed farther and, after passing through many linking stages, become aware of a supermind whose universal operation is the key to all lesser activities. Nor do we become merely conscious of this cosmic existence, but likewise conscious in it, receiving it in sensation, but also entering into it in awareness. In it we live as we lived before in the ego-sense, active, more and more in contact, even unified more and more with other minds, other lives, other bodies than the organism we call ourselves, producing effects not only on our own moral and mental being and on the subjective being of others, but even on the physical world and its events by means nearer to the divine than those possible to our egoistic capacity.

7. And the mind when it passes those gates suddenly, without intermediate transitions, receives a sense of the unreality of the world and the sole reality of the Silence which is one of the most powerful and convincing experiences of which the human mind is capable. Here, in the perception of this pure Self or of the Non-Being behind it, we have the starting point for a second negation, — parallel at the other pole to the materialistic, but more complete, more final, more perilous in its effects on the individuals

(continued from the previous page) or collectivities that hear its potent call to the wilderness,—the refusal of the ascetic.

It is this revolt of Spirit against Matter that for two thousand years, since Buddhism disturbed the balance of the old Aryan world, has dominated increasingly the Indian mind. Not that the sense of the cosmic illusion is the whole of Indian thought; there are other philosophical statements, other religious aspirations. Nor has some attempt at an adjustment between the two terms been wanting even from the most extreme philosophies. But all have lived in the shadow of the great Refusal and the final end of life for all is the garb of the ascetic. Therefore all voices are joined in one great consensus that all in this world of the dualities can there be our kingdom of heaven, but beyond, whether in the joys of the eternal Vrindavan or the high beatitude of Brahmaloaka, beyond all manifestations in some ineffable Nirvana or where all separate experience is lost in the featureless unity of the indefinable Existence.

8. As the impulse towards Mind ranges from the more sensitive reactions of Life in the metal and the plant up to its full organisation in man, so in man himself there is the same ascending series, the preparation, if nothing more, of a higher and divine life.

9. Nor is this, even, enough to guard us against a recoil from life in the body unless, with the Upanishads, perceiving behind their appearances the identity in essence of these two extreme terms of existence, we are able to say in the very language of those ancient writings: "Matter also is Brahman."

10. If we assert only pure Spirit and a mechanical unintelligent substance or energy, calling

(continued from the previous page) one God or Soul and the other Nature, the inevitable end will be that we shall either deny God or else turn from Nature. For both Thought and Life, a choice then becomes imperative. Thought comes to deny the one as an illusion of the imagination or the other as an illusion of the senses; Life comes to fix on the immaterial and flee from itself in a disgust or a self-forgetting ecstasy, or else to deny its own immortality and take its orientation away from God and towards the animal. Purusha and Prakriti, the passively luminous Soul of the Sankhyas and their mechanically active Energy, have nothing in common, not even their opposite modes of inertia; their antinomies can only be resolved by the cessation of the inertly driven Activity into the immutable Repose upon which it has been casting in vain the sterile procession of its images. Shankara's wordless, inactive Self and his Maya of many names and forms are equally disparate and irreconcilable entities; their rigid antagonism can terminate only by the dissolution of the multitudinous illusion into the sole Truth of an eternal Silence.

The materialist has an easier field; it is possible for him by denying Spirit to arrive at a more readily convincing simplicity of statement, a real Monism, the Monism of Matter or else of Force. But in this rigidity of statement it is impossible for him to persist permanently. He too ends by positing an unknowable as inert, as remote from the known universe as the passive Purusha or the silent Atman. It serves no purpose but to put off by a vague concession the inexorable demands of Thought or to stand as an excuse for refusing to extend the limits of enquiry.

11. It is necessary and helpful that man should test separately, in their extreme assertion,

(continued from the previous page) each of the two great opposites. It is the mind's natural way of returning more perfectly to the affirmation it has lost. On the road it may attempt to rest in the intervening degrees, reducing all things into the terms of an original Life-Energy or of sensation or of Ideas; but these exclusive solutions have always an air of unreality. They may satisfy for a time the logical reason which deals only with pure ideas, but they cannot satisfy the mind's sense of actuality. For the mind knows that there is something behind itself which is not the Idea; it knows, on the other hand, that there is something within itself which is more than the vital Breath. Either Spirit or Matter can give it for a time some sense of ultimate reality; not so any of the principles that intervene. It must therefore, go to the two extremes before it can return fruitfully upon the whole.

12. In Europe and in India, respectively, the negation of the materialist and the refusal of the ascetic have sought to assert themselves as the sole truth and to dominate the conception of Life. In India, if the result has been a great heaping up of the treasures of the Spirit, —or of some of them, —it has also been a great bankruptcy of Life; in Europe, the fullness of riches and the triumphant mastery of this world's powers and possessions have progressed towards an equal bankruptcy in the things of the Spirit.

13. As soon as we begin to investigate the operations of mind and of supermind in themselves and without the prejudgment that is determined from the beginning to see in them only a subordinate term of Matter, we come into contact with a mass of phenomena which escape entirely from the rigid hold, the limiting dogmatism of the materialist formula. And the moment we recognise, as our enlarging experience compels us to recognise, that there are in the universe

(continued from the previous page) knowable realities beyond the range of the senses and in man powers and faculties which determine rather than are determined by the material organs through which they hold themselves in touch with the world of the senses,—that outer shell of our true and complete existence,—the premise of materialistic Agnosticism disappears.

14. Reality Omnipresent: We have found already in the cosmic consciousness a meeting-place where Matter becomes real to Spirit, Spirit becomes real to Matter. For in the cosmic consciousness Mind and Life are intermediaries and no longer, as they seem in the ordinary egoistic mentality, agents of separation, fomenters of an artificial quarrel between the positive and negative principles of the same unknowable Reality. Attaining to the cosmic consciousness Mind, illuminated by a knowledge that perceives at once the truth of Unity and the truth of Multiplicity and seizes on the formulae of their interaction, finds its own discords at once explained and reconciled by the divine Harmony; satisfied, It consents to become the agent of that supreme union between God and Life towards which we tend.

15. In the light of this conception we can perceive the possibility of a divine life for man in the world which will at once justify Science by disclosing a living sense and intelligible aim for the cosmic and the terrestrial evolution and realise by the transfiguration of the human soul into the divine the great ideal dream of all high religions.

16. Perfect man would combine in himself the silence and the activity, so also would the completely conscious soul reach back to the absolute freedom of the Non-Being without therefore losing its hold on Existence and the

(continued from the previous page) universe. It would thus reproduce in itself perpetually the eternal miracle of the divine Existence, in the universe, yet always beyond it and even, as it were, beyond itself.

17. We discover that all affirmations are assertions of status or activity in the Unknowable; all the corresponding negations are assertions of Its freedom both from and in that status or activity.

18. The real Monism, the true Adwaita, is that which admits all things as the one Brahman and does not seek to bisect Its existence into two incompatible entities, an eternal Truth and an eternal Falsehood, Brahman and not-Brahman, Self and not-Self, a real Self and an unreal, yet perpetual Maya.

19. We are justified in supposing that even dualities of the universe, when interpreted not as now by our sensational and partial conceptions, but by our liberated intelligence and experience, will be also resolved into those highest terms.

20. The Destiny of the Individual: We will put aside then the trenchant distinctions of a partial logic which declares that because the One is the reality, the Many are an illusion, and because the Absolute is Sat, the one existence the relative is Asat and non-existent. If in the Many we pursue insistently the One, it is to return with the benediction and the revelation of the One confirming itself in the Many.

21. But if the passing from one domain to another we renounce what has already been given us from eagerness for our new attainment, if in reaching the mental life we cast away or belittle the physical life which is our basis, or if we reject the mental and physical in our attraction to the spiritual, we do not fulfil God integrally, nor satisfy the conditions of

(continued from the previous page) His self-manifestation. We do not become perfect, but only shift the field of our imperfection or at most attain a limited altitude. However high we may climb, even though it be the Non-Being itself, we climb ill if we forget our base. Not to abandon the lower to itself, but to transfigure it in the light of the higher to which we have attained, is true divinity of nature. Brahman is integral and unifies many states of consciousness at a time; we also, manifesting the nature of Brahman, should become integral and all-embracing.

Besides the recoil from the physical life, there is another exaggeration of the ascetic impulse which this ideal of an integral manifestation corrects. The nodus of Life is the relation between three general forms of consciousness, the individual, the universal and the transcendent or supra-cosmic. In the ordinary distribution of life's activities the individual regards himself as a separate being included in the universe and both as dependent upon that which transcends alike the universe and the individual, it is to this Transcendence that we give currently the name of God, who thus becomes to our conceptions not so much supra-cosmic as extra-cosmic. The belittling and degradation of both the individual and the universe is a natural consequence of this division; the cessation of both cosmos and individual by the attainment of the Transcendence would be, logically, its supreme conclusion.

The integral view of the unity of Brahman avoids these consequences. Just as we need not give up the bodily life to attain to the mental and spiritual, so we can arrive at a point of view where the preservation of the individual activities is no longer inconsistent with our comprehension of the cosmic consciousness or our attainment to the transcendent and

(continued from the previous page) and supracosmic. For the World-Transcendent embraces the universe, is one with it and does not exclude it, even as the universe embraces the individual, is one with him and does not exclude him. The individual is a centre of the whole universal consciousness; the universe is a form and definition which is occupied by the entire immanence of the Formless and Indefinable.

17. Brahman preserves always Its two terms of liberty within and of formation without, of expression and of freedom from the expression. We also, being That, can attain to the same divine self-possession. The harmony of the two tendencies is the condition of all life that aims at being really divine. Liberty pursued by exclusion of the thing exceeded leads along the path of negation to the refusal of that which God has accepted.

18. By accepting the Becoming freely as the Divine, we invade mortality with the immortal beatitude and become luminous centres of its conscious self-expression in humanity.

19. Man in the Universe: The progressive revelation of a great, a transcendent, a luminous Reality with the multitudinous relatives of this world that we see and those other worlds that we do not see as means and material, condition and field, this would seem then to be the meaning of the universe,—since meaning and aim it has and is neither a purposeless illusion nor a fortuitous accident. For the same reasoning which leads us to conclude that world-existence is not a deceptive trick of Mind, justifies equally the certainty that it is no blindly phenomenal existences clinging together and struggling together as best they can in their orbit through eternity. An existence, wholly self-aware and therefore entirely master of itself, possesses the phenomenal

(continued from the previous page) being in which it is involved, realises itself in form, unfolds itself in the individual.

20. It exists already as an all-revealing and all-guiding Truth of things which watches over the world and attracts mortal man, first without the knowledge of his conscious mind, by the general march of Nature, but at last consciously by a progressive awakening and self-enlargement, to his divine ascension. The ascent to the divine Life is the human journey, the Work of works, the acceptable Sacrifice.

21. This becoming of the infinite Bliss-Existence-Consciousness in mind and life and body,— for independent of them it exists eternally,— is the transfiguration intended and the utility of individual existence. Through the individual it manifests in relation even as of itself it exists in identity.

The Unknowable knowing itself as Sachchidananda is the one supreme affirmation of Vedanta; it contains all the others on it or on it they depend.

22. Out of the rhythmic slumber of material Nature unconscious of the Soul and the Idea that maintain the ordered activities of her energy even in her dumb and mighty material trance, the world struggles into the more quick, varied and disordered rhythm of Life labouring on the verges of self-consciousness.

23. If, beyond his present attainment, he perceives or is touched by the power, light, bliss of a self-conscious infinite existence and translates his thought or his experience of it into terms convenient for his mentality,— Infinity, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, Freedom, Love, Beatitude, God,— yet does this sun of his seeing appear to shine between a double Night,— a darkness below, a mightier darkness beyond. For when he strives to know it utterly, it seems to pass into, something which

(continued from the previous page) neither any one of these terms nor the sum of them can at all represent. His mind at last negates God for a Beyond, or at least it seems to find God transcending Himself, denying Himself to the conception. Here also, in the world, in himself, and around himself, he is met always by the opposites of his affirmation. Death is ever with him, limitation invests his being and his experience, error, inconscience, weakness, inertia, grief, pain, evil are constant oppressors of his effort.

24. The Ego and the Dualities: The essential cause and condition of universal existence is the Lord, Ishwara or Purusha, manifesting and occupying individual and universal forms. The limited ego is only an intermediate phenomenon of consciousness necessary for a certain line of development. Following this line the individual can arrive at that which is beyond himself, that which he represents, and can yet continue to represent it, no longer as an obscured and limited ego, but as a centre of the Divine and of the universal consciousness embracing, utilising and transforming into harmony with the Divine all individual determinations.

We have then the manifestation of the divine Conscious Being in the totality of physical Nature as the foundation of human existence in the material universe. We have the emergence of that Conscious Being in an involved and inevitably evolving Life, Mind and Supermind as the condition of our activities.

25. The methods of Vedantic knowledge: Reason, on the other hand, asserts its pure action, when accepting our sensible experiences as a starting-point but refusing to be limited by them it goes behind, judges, works in its own right and strives to arrive at general and unalterable concepts which attach themselves not to the appearances of things, but to that which stands

(continued from the previous page) behind their appearances.

26. But the concepts of metaphysical knowledge do not in themselves fully satisfy the demand of our integral being. They are indeed entirely satisfactory to the pure reason itself, because they are the very stuff of its own existence. But our nature sees things through two eyes always, for it views them doubly as idea and as fact and therefore every concept is incomplete for us and to a part of our nature almost unreal until it becomes an experience.

27. We have to go beyond the mind and the reason. The reason active in our waking consciousness is only a mediator between the subconscious All that we come from in our evolution upwards and the superconscious All towards which we are impelled by that evolution, The subconscious and the superconscious are two different formulations of the same All. The master-word of the subconscious is Life, the master-word of the superconscious is Light. In the subconscious knowledge of consciousness is involved in action, for action is the essence of Life. In the superconscious action re-enters into Light and no longer contains involved knowledge but is itself contained in a supreme consciousness. Intuitional knowledge is that which is common between them and the foundation of intuitional knowledge is conscious or effective identity between that which knows and that which is known; it is that state of common self-existence in which the knower and the known are one through knowledge. But in the subconscious the intuition manifests itself in the action, in effectivity, and the knowledge of conscious identity is either entirely or more or less concealed in the action. In the superconscious, on the contrary, Light being the law and the

¹⁷ The original editor inserted "647.A." by hand

(continued from the previous page) principle, the intuition manifests itself in its true nature as knowledge emerging out of conscious identity, and effectivity of action is rather the accompaniment or necessary consequent and no longer masks as the primary fact. Between these two states reason and mind act as intermediaries which enable the being to liberate knowledge out of its imprisonment in the act and prepare it to resume its essential primacy. When the self-awareness in the mind applied, both to content and content, to own-self and other-self, exalts itself into the luminous self-manifest identity, the reason also converts itself into the form of the self-luminous intuitional knowledge. This is the highest possible state of our knowledge when mind fulfils itself in the supramental.

28. For if we examine carefully, we shall find that Intuition is our first teacher. Intuition always stands veiled behind our mental operations. Intuition brings to man those brilliant messages from the Unknown which are the beginning of his higher knowledge. Reason only comes in afterwards to see what profit it can have of the shining harvest. Intuition gives us that idea of something behind and beyond all that we know and seem to be which pursues man always in contradiction of his lower reason and all his normal experience and impels him to formulate that formless perception in the more positive ideas of God, Immortality, Heaven and the rest by which we strive to express it to the mind. For Intuition is as strong as Nature herself from whose very soul it has sprung and cares nothing for the contradictions of reason or the denials of experience. It knows what is because it is, because itself it is of that and has come from that, and will not yield it to the judgment of what merely becomes and appears.

¹⁸ The original editor inserted "B" by hand

29. Intuition is unable to give us the truth in that ordered and articulated form which our nature demands. Before it could effect any such completeness of direct knowledge in us, it would have to organise itself in our surface being and take possession there of the leading part. But in our surface being it is not the Intuition, it is the Reason which is organised and helps us to order our perceptions, thoughts and actions. Therefore the age of intuitive knowledge, represented by the early Vedantic thinking of the Upanishads, had to give place to the age of rational knowledge; inspired Scripture made room for metaphysical philosophy, even as afterwards metaphysical philosophy had to give place to experimental Science. Intuitive thought which is a messenger from the super-conscious and therefore our highest faculty, was supplanted by the pure reason which is only a sort of deputy and belongs to the middle heights of our being; pure reason in its turn was supplanted for a time being by the mixed action of the reason which lives on our plains and lower elevations and does not in its view exceed the horizon of the experience that the physical mind and senses or such aids as we can invent for them can bring to us. And this process which seems to be a descent, is really a circle of progress. For in each case the lower faculty is compelled to take up as much as it can assimilate of what the higher had already given and to attempt to re-establish it by its own methods. By the attempt it is itself enlarged in its scope and arrives eventually at a more supple and a more ample self-accommodation to the higher faculties.

30. Nowhere in the Upanishads do we find any trace of logical reasoning urged in support

(continued from the previous page) of the truths of Vedanta. Intuition, the sages seem to have held, must be corrected by a more perfect intuition; logical reasoning cannot be its judge.

31. And behind the thought of all, variously presented, survived as the fundamental conception, Purusha, Atman or Sad Brahman, the pure Existent of the Upanishads, often rationalised into an idea or psychological state, but still carrying something of its old burden of inexpressible reality.

32. The Pure Existent; We instinctively act and feel and weave our life thoughts as if this stupendous world movement were at work around us as centre and for our benefit, for our help or harm, or as if the justification of our egoistic cravings, emotions, ideas, standards were its proper business even as they are our own chief concern. When we begin to see, we perceive that it exists for itself, not for us, has its own gigantic aims, its own complex and boundless idea, its own vast desire or delight that it seeks to fulfil, its own immense and formidable standards which look down as if with an indulgent and ironic smile at the pettiness of ours. And yet let us not swing over to the other extreme and form too positive an idea of our own insignificance. That too would be an act of ignorance and the shutting of our eyes to the great facts of the universe.

For this boundless Movement does not regard us as unimportant to it. Science reveals to us how minute is the care, how cunning the device, how intense the absorption it bestows upon the smallest of its works even as on the largest.

33. To Brahman there are no whole and no parts, but each thing is all itself and benefits by the whole of Brahman.

34. Even when it begins to philosophise, does

(continued from the previous page) not assert that the world only exists in and by its consciousness? Its own state of consciousness or mental standards are to it the test of reality; all outside its orbit or view tends to become false or non-existent. This mental self-sufficiency of man creates a system of false accountantship which prevents us from drawing the right and full value from life. There is a sense in which these pretensions of the human mind and ego repose on a truth, but this truth only emerges when the mind has learned its ignorance and the ego has submitted to the All and lost in it its separate self-assertion. To recognise that we, or rather the results and appearances we call ourselves, are only a partial movement of this infinite Movement and that it is that infinite which we have to know, to be consciously and to fulfil faithfully, is the commencement of true living.

35. There is something behind the phenomenon not only infinite but indefinable. The very conception of movement carries with it the potentiality of repose and betrays itself as an activity of some existence; the very idea of energy in action carries with it the idea of energy abstaining from action; and an absolute energy not in action is simply and purely absolute existence.

36. We have the Nihil of the Buddhists with existence as only an attribute of an eternal phenomenon, of Action, of Karma, of Movement. This, asserts the pure reason, leaves my perceptions unsatisfied, contradicts my fundamental seeing, and therefore cannot be. For it brings us to a last abruptly ceasing stair of an ascent which leaves the whole staircase without support, suspended in the Void.

37. All things that are conditions and appearances of the movement pass into That from

(continued from the previous page) which they have come and there, so far as they exist, become something that can no longer be described by the terms that are appropriate to them in the movement. Therefore we say that the pure existence is an Absolute and in itself unknowable by our thought although we can go back to it in a supreme identity that transcends the terms of knowledge. The movement on the contrary is the field of the relative and yet by the very definition of the relative all things in the movement contain, are contained in and are the Absolute.

38. But all this, it may be said, is valid only so long as we accept the concepts of pure reason and remain subject to them. But the concepts of reason have no obligatory force. Even if we can go behind extension in Space and perceive it as a psychological phenomenon, as an attempt of the mind to make existence manageable by distributing the indivisible whole in a conceptual Space, yet we cannot go behind the movement of succession and change in Time. For that is the very stuff of our consciousness. We are and the world is a movement that continually progresses and increases by the inclusion of all the successions of the past in a present which represents itself to us as the beginning of all the successions of the future, – a beginning, a present that always eludes us because it is not, for it has perished before it is born. What is, is the eternal, indivisible succession of Time carrying on its stream a progressive movement of consciousness also indivisible. Duration then, eternally successive movement and change in Time, is the sole absolute. Becoming is the only being.

In reality, this opposition of actual insight into being to the conceptual fictions of the pure Reason is fallacious. If indeed intuition in this matter were really opposed to intelligence

(continued from the previous page) we could not confidently support a merely conceptual reasoning against fundamental insight. But this appeal to intuitive experience is incomplete. It is valid only so far as it proceeds and it errs by stopping short of the integral experience. So long as the intuition fixes itself only upon that which we become, we see ourselves as a continual progression of movement and change in consciousness in the eternal succession of Time. We are the river, the flame of the Buddhist illustration. But there is a supreme experience and supreme intuition by which we go back behind our surface self and find that this becoming, change, succession are only a mode of our being and that there is that in us which is not involved at all in the becoming. Not only can we have the intuition of this that is stable and eternal in us, not only can we have the glimpse of it in experience behind the veil of continually fleeting becomings, but we can draw back into it and live in it entirely, so effecting an entire change in our external life, and in our attitude, and in our action upon the movement of the world. And this stability in which we can so live is precisely that which the pure Reason has already given us, although it can be arrived at without reasoning at all, without knowing previously what it is,—it is pure existence, eternal, infinite, indefinable, not affected by the succession of Time, not involved in the extension of Space, beyond form, quantity, quality,—Self only and absolute.

The pure existent is then a fact and no mere concept; it is the fundamental reality. But, let us hasten to add, the movement, the energy, the becoming are also a fact, also a reality. The supreme intuition and

(continued from the previous page) its corresponding experience may correct the other, may go beyond, may suspend, but do not abolish it. We have therefore two fundamental facts of pure existence and of world-existence, a fact of Being, a fact of Becoming. To deny one or the other is easy; to recognise the facts of consciousness and find out their relation is the true and fruitful wisdom.

Stability and movement, we must remember, are only our psychological representations of the Absolute, even as are oneness and multitude. The Absolute is beyond stability and movement as it is beyond unity and multiplicity. But it takes its eternal poise in the one and the stable and whirls round itself infinitely, inconceivably, securely in the moving and multitudinous. World-existence is the ecstatic dance of Shiva which multiplies the body of the God numberlessly to the view; it leaves that white existence precisely where and what it was, ever is and ever will be; its sole absolute object is the joy of the dancing.

39. Conscious Force: The problem of consciousness is not solved by this theory; for it does not explain how the contact of vibrations of Force should give rise to conscious sensations.

40. The answer most approved by the ancient Indian mind was that Force is inherent in Existence. Shiva and Kali, Brahman and Shakti are one and not two who are separable. Force inherent in existence may be at rest or it may be in motion, but when it is at rest, it exists none the less and is not abolished, diminished or in any way essentially altered. This reply is so entirely rational and in accordance with the nature of things that we need not hesitate to accept it. For it is impossible, because contradictory of reason, to suppose that Force is a thing alien to the one and infinite existence and entered into it from outside or was non-existent

(continued from the previous page) and arose in it at some point in Time. Even the Illusionist theory must admit that Maya, the power of self-illusion in Brahman, is potentially eternal in eternal Being and then the sole question is its manifestation or non-manifestation.

41. But there is no reason to suppose that the gamut of life and consciousness fails and stops short in that which seems to us purely material. The development of recent research and thought seems to point to a sort of obscure beginning of life and perhaps a sort of inert or suppressed consciousness in the metal and in the earth and in other "inanimate" forms, or at least the first stuff of what becomes conscious in us may be there. Only while in the plant we can dimly recognise and conceive the thing that I have called vital consciousness, the consciousness of Matter, of the inert form, is difficult indeed for us to understand or imagine, and what we find it difficult to understand or imagine, we consider it our right to deny. Nevertheless, when one has pursued consciousness so far into the depths, it becomes incredible that there should be this sudden gulf in Nature. Thought has a right to suppose a unity where that unity is confessed by all other classes of phenomena and in one class only, not denied, but merely more concealed than in others. And if we suppose the unity to be broken, we then arrive at the existence of consciousness in all forms.

42. Necessarily, in such a view, the world consciousness changes its meaning. It is no longer synonymous with mentality but indicates a self-aware force of existence of which mentality is a middle term; below mentality it sinks into vital and material movements which are for us subconscient; above, it rises into

(continued from the previous page) supramental which is for us the superconscient. But in all it is one and the same thing organising itself differently. This is, once more, the Indian conception of Chit which, as energy, creates the worlds.

43. But what right have we to assume consciousness as the just description for this Force? For consciousness implies some kind of intelligence, purposefulness, self-knowledge, even though they may not take the forms habitual to our mentality. Even from this point of view everything supports rather than contradicts the idea of a universal conscious Force. In the operations of inanimate Nature we find the same pervading characteristic of a supreme hidden intelligence, "hidden in the modes of its own workings."

The only argument against a conscious and intelligent source for this purposeful work, this work of intelligence, of selection, adaptation and seeking is that large element in Nature's operations to which we give the name of waste. But obviously this is an objection based on the limitations of our human intellect which seeks to impose its own particular rationality, good enough for limited human ends, on the general operations of the World-Force. We see only part of Nature's purpose and all that does not subserve that part we call waste.

44. Delight of Existence: The Problem: All being Sachchidananda, how can pain and suffering at all exist? This, the real problem, is often farther confused by a false issue starting from the idea of a personal extra-cosmic God and a partial issue, the ethical difficulty.

Sachchidananda, it may be reasoned, is God, is a conscious Being who is the author of existence; how then can God have created a world in which He inflicts suffering on His creatures, sanctions pain, permits evil? God being All-Good,

(continued from the previous page) who created pain and evil? If we say that pain is a trial and an ordeal, we do not solve the moral problem, we arrive at an immoral or non-moral God,—an excellent world-mechanist perhaps, a cunning psychologist, but not a God or Good and of Love whom we can worship, only a God of Might to whose law we must submit or whose caprice we may hope to propitiate. For one who invents torture as a means of test or ordeal, stands convicted either of deliberate cruelty or of moral insensibility, and if a moral being at all, is inferior to the highest instinct of his own creatures. And if to escape this moral difficulty, we say that pain is an inevitable result and natural punishment of moral evil,—an explanation which will not even square with the facts of life unless we admit the theory of Karma and rebirth by which the soul suffers now for antenatal sins in other bodies,—we still do not escape the very root of the ethical problem,—who created or why or whence was created that moral evil which entails the punishment of pain and suffering? And seeing that moral evil is in reality a form of mental disease or ignorance, who or what created this law or inevitable connection which punishes a mental disease or act of ignorance by a recoil so terrible, by tortures often so extreme and monstrous? The inexorable law of Karma is irreconcilable with a supreme moral and personal Deity, and therefore the clear logic of Buddha denied the existence of any free and all-governing personal God; all personality he declared to be a creation of ignorance and subject to Karma.

In truth, the difficulty thus sharply presented arises only if we assume the existence of an extra-cosmic personal God, not Himself the universe, one who has created good and evil

(continued from the previous page) pain and suffering for His creatures, but Himself stands above and unaffected by them, watching, ruling, doing His will with a suffering and struggling world or, if not doing His will, if allowing the world to be driven by an inexorable law, unhelped by Him or inefficiently helped, then not God, not omnipotent, not all-good and all-loving. On no theory of an extra-cosmic moral God, can evil and suffering be explained, – the creation of evil and suffering, – except by an unsatisfactory subterfuge which avoids the question at issue instead of answering it or a plain or implied Manicheanism which practically annuls the Godhead in attempting to justify its ways or excuse its works. But such a God is not the Vedantic Sachchidananda. Sashchidananda of the Vedanta is one existence without a second; all that is, is He. If then evil and suffering exist, it is He that bears the evil and suffering in the creature in whom He has embodied He has embodied Himself. The problem then changes entirely. The question is no longer how came God to create for His creatures a suffering and evil of which He is himself incapable and therefore immune, but how came the sole and infinite Existence-Consciousness-Bliss to admit into itself that which is not bliss, that which seems to be its positive negation.

Half of the moral difficulty – that difficulty in its one unanswerable form disappears. It no longer arises, can no longer be put.

45. It seeks new forms of itself and in the passage to higher forms there intervenes the phenomenon of pain and suffering which seems to contradict the fundamental nature of its being. This and this alone is the root-problem.

How shall we solve it? Shall we say that Sachchidananda is not the beginning and end of

(continued from the previous page) things, but the beginning and end is Nihil, an impartial void, itself nothing but containing all potentialities of existence or non-existence, consciousness or non-consciousness, delight or undelight? We may accept this answer if we choose; but although we seek thereby to explain everything, we have really explained nothing, we have only included everything. A Nothing which is full of all potentialities is the most complete opposition of terms and things possible and we have therefore only explained a minor contradiction by a major, by driving the self-contradiction of things to their maximum.

46. Delight of Existence: The Solution: The world of which we are a part is in its most obvious view a movement of Force; but that Force, when we penetrate its appearances, proves to be a constant and yet always mutable rhythm of creative consciousness casting up, projecting in itself phenomenal truths of its own infinite and eternal being; and this rhythm is in its essence, cause and purpose a play of the infinite delight of being ever busy with its own innumerable self-representations.

47. That which we call ourselves is only a trembling ray on the surface; behind is all the vast subconscious, the vast superconscious profiting by all these surface experiences and imposing them on its external self which it exposes as a sort of sensitive covering to the contacts of the world; itself veiled, it receives these contacts and assimilates them into the values of a truer, a profounder, a mastering and creative experience. Out of its depths it returns them to the surface in forms of strength, character, knowledge, impulsion whose roots are mysterious to us because our mind moves and quivers on the surface and has

(continued from the previous page) not learned to concentrate itself and live in the depths.

In our ordinary life this truth is hidden from us or only dimly glimpsed at times or imperfectly held and conceived. But if we learn to live within, we infallibly awaken to this presence within us which is our more real self, a presence profound calm, joyous and puissant of which the world is not the master—a presence which, if it is not the Lord Himself, is the radiation of the Lord within.

48. He becomes the master of his own responses to the world's contacts, no longer the slave of external touches. In regard to physical pleasure and pain, it is more difficult to apply the universal truth; for this is the very domain of the nerves and the body, the centre and seat of that in us whose nature is to be dominated by external contact and external pressure. Even here, however, we have glimpses of the truth. In many cases it is only when the nerves are able to reassert themselves and remind the mentality of its habitual obligation to suffer that the sense of suffering returns. But this return to the habitual obligation is not inevitable: it is only habitual. We see that in the phenomena of hypnosis not only can the hypnotised subject be successfully forbidden to feel the pain of a wound or puncture when in the abnormal state, but can be prevented with equal success from returning to his habitual reaction of suffering when he is awakened. The reason of this phenomenon is perfectly simple; it is because the hypnotiser suspends the habitual waking consciousness which is the slave of nervous habits and is able to appeal to the subliminal mental being in the depths, the inner mental being who is master, if he wills, of the nerves and the body. But this freedom which is effected by hypnosis abnormally, rapidly, without

(continued from the previous page) true possession, by an alien will, may equally be won normally, gradually, with true possession, by one's own will so as to effect partially or completely a victory of the mental being over the habitual nervous reactions of the body.

Pain of mind and body is a device of Nature, that is to say, of Force in her works, meant to subserve a definite transitional end in her upward evolution. The world is from the point of view of the individual a play and complex shock of multitudinous forces. In the midst of this complex play the individual stands as a limited constructed being with a limited amount of force exposed to numberless shocks which may wound, maim, break up or disintegrate the construction which he calls himself. Pain is in the nature of a nervous and physical recoil from a dangerous or harmful contact; it is a part of what the Upanishad calls jugupsa, the shrinking of the limited being from that which is not himself and not sympathetic or in harmony with himself, its impulse of self-defence against "others". It is from this point of view, an indication by Nature of that which has to be avoided or, if not successfully avoided, has to be remedied. It does not come into being in the purely physical world so long as life does not enter into it; for till then mechanical methods are sufficient.

49. The Divine Maya: This play of all in each and each in all is concealed at first from us by the mental play or the illusion of Maya which persuades each that he is in all but not all in him and that he is in all as a separated being not as a being always inseparably one with the rest of existence. Afterwards we have to emerge from this error into the supramental play or the truth of Maya where the "each" and the "all" co-exist in the inseparable unity of the one truth and the multiple symbol.

50. The philosophies which recognise Mind alone

(continued from the previous page) as the creator of the worlds or accept an original principle with Mind as the only mediator between it and the forms of the universe, may be divided into the purely noumenal and the idealistic. The purely noumenal recognise in the cosmos only the work of Mind, Thought, Idea: but Idea may be purely arbitrary and have no essential relation to any real Truth of existence; or such Truth if it exists, may be regarded as a mere Absolute aloof from all relations and irreconcilable with a world of relations.

51. It is conscious Reality throwing itself into mutable forms of its own imperishable and immutable substance. The world is therefore not a figment of conception in the universal Mind, but a conscious birth of that which is beyond Mind into forms of itself.

52. But it is only when we cease to reason and go deep into ourselves, into that secrecy where the activity of mind is stilled, that this other consciousness becomes really manifest to us—however imperfectly owing to our long habit of mental reaction and mental limitation.

53. The Supermind as Creator: A principle of active will and Knowledge superior to Mind and creatrix of the worlds is then the intermediary power and state of being between that self-possession of the One and this flux of the Many. But since this consciousness is creatrix of the world, it must be not only state of knowledge, but power of knowledge, and not only a Will to light and vision, but a will to power and works. And since Mind too is created out of it, Mind must be a development by limitation out of this primal faculty and this mediatory act of the supreme Consciousness and must therefore be capable of resolving itself back into

(continued from the previous page) it through a reverse development by expansion. For always Mind must be identical with Supermind in essence and conceal in itself the potentiality of Supermind, however different or even contrary it may have become in its actual forms and settled modes of operation.

53. We need a name, and we need a starting-point. For we have called this state of consciousness the Supermind; but the word is ambiguous since it may be taken in the sense of mind itself super-eminent and lifted above ordinary mentality but not radically changed, or on the contrary it may bear the sense of all that is beyond mind and therefore assume a too extensive comprehensiveness which would bring in even the Ineffable itself. A subsidiary description is required which will more accurately limit its significance.

54. We see at once that such a consciousness, described by such characteristics, must be an intermediate formulation which refers back to a term above it and forward to another below it; we see at the same time that it is evidently the link and means by which the inferior develops out of the superior and should equally be the link and means by which it may develop back again towards its source. The term above is the unitarian or indivisible consciousness of pure Sachchidananda in which there are no separating distinctions; the term below is the analytic or dividing consciousness of Mind which can only know by separation and distinction and has at the most a vague and secondary apprehension of unity and infinity, –for, though it can synthetise its divisions, it cannot arrive at a true totality. Between them is this comprehensive and creative consciousness, by its power of pervading and comprehending knowledge the child of that self-awareness

(continued from the previous page) by identity which is the poise of the Brahman and by its power of projecting, confronting, apprehending knowledge parent of that awareness by distinction which is the process of the Mind.

Above, the formula of the One eternally stable and immutable; below, the formula of the Many which, eternally mutable, seeks but hardly finds in the flux of things a firm and immutable standing-point.

55. This intermediary term is therefore the beginning and end of all creation and arrangement, the Alpha and the Omega, the starting-point of all differentiation, the instrument of all unification, originative, executive and consummative of all realised or realisable harmonies. It has the knowledge of the One, but is able to draw out of the One its hidden multitudes; it manifests the Many, but does not lose itself in their differentiations. And shall we not say that its very existence points back to Something beyond our supreme perception of the ineffable Unity,—Something ineffable and mentally inconceivable not because of its unity and indivisibility, but because of its freedom from even these formulations of our mind,—Something beyond both unity and multiplicity?

56. Supermind is the vast self-extension of the Brahman that contains and develops. By the Idea it develops the triune principle of existence, consciousness and bliss out of their indivisible unity. It differentiates them, but it does not divide.

57. In Supermind knowledge in the Idea is not divorced from will in the Idea, but one with it—just as it is not different from being or substance, but is one with the being, luminous power of the substance. As the power

(continued from the previous page) of burning light is not different from the substance of the fire, so the power of the Idea is not different from the substance of the Being which works itself out in the Idea and its development. In our mentality all are different. We have an idea and a will according to the idea or an impulsion of will and an idea detaching itself from it; but we differentiate effectually the idea from the will and both from ourselves. I am; the idea is a mysterious abstraction that appears in me, the will is another mystery, a force nearer to concreteness, though not concrete, but always something that is not myself, something that I have or get or am seized with, but am not. I make a gulf also between my will, its means and the effect, for these I regard as concrete realities outside and other than myself. Therefore neither myself nor the idea nor the will in me are self-effective. The idea may fall away from me, the will may fail, the means may be lacking, I myself by any or all of these lacunae may remain unfulfilled.

But in the Supermind there is no such paralysing division, because knowledge is not self-divided, force is not self-divided, being is not self-divided as in the mind; they are neither broken in themselves, nor divorced from each other.

This is the justification of the current religious notions of the omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence of the Divine Being. Far from being an irrational imagination they are perfectly rational and in no way contradict either the logic of a comprehensive philosophy nor the indications of observation and experience. The error is to make an unbridgeable gulf between God and man, Brahman and the world. That error elevates an actual and

(continued from the previous page) practical differentiation in being, consciousness and force into an essential division.

58. The Supreme Truth-Consciousness: We have to regard therefore this all-containing, all-originating, all-consummating Supermind as the nature of the Divine Being, not indeed in its absolute self-existence, but in its action as the Lord and Creator of its own worlds. This is the truth of that which we call God. Obviously this is not the too personal and limited Deity, the magnified and supernatural Man of the ordinary occidental conception. We must not indeed exclude the personal aspect of the Deity, for the impersonal is only one face of existence; the Divine is All-existence, but it is also the one Existent, — it is the sole Conscious-Being, but still a Being.

59. The Triple Status of Supermind: But when we thus assert this unity of Sachchidananda on the one hand and this divided mentality on the other, we posit two opposite entities one of which must be false if the other is to be held as true, one of which must be abolished if the other is to be enjoyed. Yet it is the mind and its form of life and body that we exist on earth and, if we must abolish the consciousness of mind, life and body in order to reach the one Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, then a divine life here is impossible. We must abandon cosmic existence utterly as an illusion in order to enjoy or re-become the Transcendent. From this solution there is no escape unless there be an intermediate link between the two which can explain them to each other and establish between them such a relation as will make it possible for us to realise the one Existence, Consciousness, Delight in the mould of the mind, life and body.

The intermediate link exists. We call it the

(continued from the previous page) Supermind or the Truth-Consciousness, because it is a principle superior to mentality and exists, acts and proceeds in the fundamental truth and unity of things and not like the mind in their appearances and phenomenal divisions. The existence of the supermind is a logical necessity arising directly from the position with which we have started. For in itself Sachchidananda must be a spaceless and timeless absolute of conscious existence that is bliss; but the world is, on the contrary, an extension in Time and Space and a movement, a working out, a development of relations and possibilities by causality – or what so appears to us – in Time and Space.

60. Somewhat as the thoughts and images that occur in our mind are not separate existences to us, but forms taken by our consciousness, so are all names and forms to this primary Supermind. It is the pure divine ideation and formation in the Infinite – only an ideation and formation that is organised not as an unreal play of mental thought, but as a real play of conscious being.

61. The Divine Soul: The divine soul living in the Truth of things would on the contrary always have the conscious sense of itself as a manifestation of the Absolute. This presence of the Absolute would not be with it as an experience occasionally glimpsed or finally arrived at and held with difficulty or as an addition, acquisition or culmination super-imposed on its ordinary state of being; it would be the very foundation of its being both in the unity and the differentiation; it would be present to it in all its knowing, willing, doing, enjoying.

62. Moreover such a divine soul would live simultaneously in the two terms of the eternal

(continued from the previous page) existence of Sachchidananda, the two inseparable poles of the self-unfolding of the Absolute which we call the One and the Many. All being does really so live; but to our divided self-awareness there is an incompatibility, a gulf between the two driving us towards a choice, to dwell either in the multiplicity exiled from the direct and entire consciousness of the One or in the unity repellent of the consciousness of the Many. But the divine soul would not be enslaved to this divorce and duality. It would be aware in itself at once of the infinite self-concentration and the infinite self-extension and diffusion.

63. Man and Supermind: The eternal Seer and Thinker, perfectly luminous, perfectly aware of Himself and all, knowing well what He does, conscious of the infinite in the finite which He is creating.

64. The fundamental error of the mind is, then, this fall from self-knowledge by which the individual soul conceives of its individuality as a separate fact instead of as a form of Oneness and makes itself the centre of its own universe instead of knowing itself as one concentration of the universal. From that original error all its particular ignorances and limitations are contingent results. For, viewing the flux of things only as it flows upon and through itself, it makes a limitation of being from which proceeds a limitation of consciousness and therefore of knowledge.

65. Yet is all ignorance and all perversity only the distortion of the truth and right of things and not the play of an absolute falsehood. It is the result of Mind viewing things in the division it makes, avidyayam antare, instead of viewing itself and its divisions as instrumentation and phenomenon of the play of the truth of Sachchidananda. If it gets back to the truth from

(continued from the previous page) it fell, it becomes again the final action of the Truth-consciousness in its apprehensive operation and the relations it helps to create in that light and power will be relations of the Truth and not of the perversity.

66. Life: Mind thus appears as a creative cosmic agency. This is not the impression which we normally have of our mentality; rather we regard it primarily as a perceptive organ, perceptive of things already created by Force working in Matter, and the only origination we allow to it is a secondary creation of new combined forms from those already developed Force in Matter. But the knowledge we are now recovering, aided by the last discoveries of Science, begins to show us that in this Force and in this Matter there is a subconscious Mind at work which is certainly responsible for its own emergence first in the forms of Life and secondly in the forms of mind itself, first in the nervous consciousness of plant-life and the primitive animal, secondly in ever-developing mentality of the evolved animal and of man. And as we have already discovered that Matter is only substance-form of Force, so we shall discover that material Force is only energy-form of Mind.

67. Why has the Eternal wantonly inflicted this evil, brought this delirium or insanity upon Himself or else upon the creatures brought into being by His terrible, all-deluding Maya? Or is it rather some divine principle that thus expresses itself, some power of the Delight of eternal being that had to express and has thus thrown itself into Time and Space in this constant outburst of the million and million forms of life which people the countless worlds of the universe?

68. Death Desire and incapacity. Mind is the final individualising operation of the all-comprehending and all-apprehending Supermind, the process by which its consciousness works individualised in each form from the standpoint proper to it.

69. Mind has to unite itself consciously with the Supermind from which it is separated by the action of Avidya.

70. The ascent of life: The goal itself can only be reached by Mind passing beyond itself into that which is beyond Mind, since of That the Mind is only an inferior term and an instrument first for descent into form and individuality and secondly for reascension into that reality which the form embodies and the individuality represents. Therefore the perfect solution of the problem of Life is not likely to be realised by association, interchange and accommodations of love alone or through the law of the mind and the heart alone. It must come by a fourth status of life in which the eternal unity of the many is realised through the spirit.

71. The problem of life: The first of these four positions, the source of all this progressive relation between Consciousness and Force, is their poise in the being of Sachchidananda where they are all one; for there the Force is consciousness of being working itself out without ever ceasing to be consciousness and the Consciousness is similarly luminous Force of being eternally aware of itself and of its own Delight and never ceasing to be this power of utter light and self-possession. The second relation is that of material Nature; it is the poise of being in the material universe which is the great denial of Sachchidananda by Himself; for here there is the utter apparent separation of Force from Consciousness, the specious miracle

(continued from the previous page) of the all-governing and infallible Inconscient which is only the mask but which modern Knowledge has mistaken for the real face of the cosmic Deity. The third relation is the poise of being in Mind and in the Life which we see emerging out of this denial, bewildered by it, struggling—without any possibility of cessation by submission, but also without any clear knowledge or instinct of a victorious solution—against the thousand and one problems involved in this perplexing apparition of man the half-potent conscient being out of the omnipotent Inconscience of the material universe. The fourth relation is the poise of being in Supermind: it is the fulfilled existence which will eventually solve all this complex problem created by the partial affirmation emerging out of the total denial; and it must needs solve it in the only possible way, by the complete affirmation fulfilling all that was secretly there contained in potentiality and intended in fact of evolution behind the mask of the great denial. That is the real life of the real Man towards which this partial life and partial unfulfilled manhood is striving forward with a perfect knowledge and guidance in the so-called Inconscient within us, but in our conscient parts with only a dim and struggling prevision, with fragments of realisation, with glimpses of the ideal, with flashes of revelation and inspiration in the poet and the prophet, the seer and the transcendentalist, the mystic and the thinker, the great intellects and the great souls of humanity.

72. The double soul in man. We have distinguished a four-fold principle of divine Being creative of the universe,—Existence, Conscious Force, Bliss and Supermind. Supermind, we have seen, is omnipresent in the material cosmos

(continued from the previous page) but veiled; it is behind the actual phenomenon of things and occultly expresses itself there, but uses for effectuation its own subordinate term, Mind. The divine Conscious-Force is omnipresent in the material cosmos, but veiled, operative secretly behind the actual phenomenon of things, and it expresses itself there characteristically through its own subordinate term, Life. And, though we have not yet examined separately the principle of Matter, yet we can already see that the divine All-existence also is omnipresent in the material cosmos, but veiled, hidden behind the actual phenomenon of things, and manifests itself there initially through its own subordinate term, Substance, Form of being or Matter. Then, equally, the principle of divine Bliss must be omnipresent in the cosmos, veiled indeed and possessing itself behind the actual phenomenon of things, but still manifested in us through some subordinate principle of its own in which it is hidden and by which it must be found and achieved in the action of the universe.

That term is something in us which we sometimes call in a special sense the soul,—that is to say, the psychic principle which is not the life or the mind, much less the body, but which holds in itself the opening and flowering of the essence of all these to their own peculiar delight of self, to light, to love, to joy and beauty and to a refined purity of being. In fact, however, there is a double soul or psychic term in us, as every other cosmic principle in us is also double. For we have two minds, one the surface mind of our expressed evolutionary ego, the superficial mentality created by us in our emergence out of Matter, another in subliminal mind which is not hampered by our actual mental life and its strict limitations,

(continued from the previous page) something large, powerful and luminous, the true mental being behind that superficial form of mental personality which we mistake for ourselves. So too we have a double psychic entity in us, the surface desire-soul which works in our vital cravings, our emotions, aesthetic faculty and mental seeking for power, knowledge and happiness and a subliminal psychic entity, a pure power of light, love, joy and refined essence of being which is our true soul behind the outer form of psychic existence we so often dignify by the name. So too is the subliminal soul in us open to the universal delight which the cosmic soul takes in its own existence and in the existence of the myriad souls that represent it and in the operations of mind, life and matter by which Nature lends herself to their play and development.

73. The true soul secret in us – subliminal, we have said, but the word is misleading, for this presence is not situated below the threshold of waking mind, but rather burns in the temple of the inmost heart behind the thick screen of an ignorant mind, life and body, not subliminal but behind the veil, – this veiled psychic entity is the flame of the Godhead always alight within us, inextinguishable even by the dense unconsciousness of spiritual self which obscures our outward nature. It is a flame born out of the Divine and, luminous inhabitant of the Ignorance, grows in it till it is able to turn it towards the Knowledge. It is the concealed Witness and Control, the hidden Guide, the Daemon of Socrates, the inner light or inner voice of the mystic. It is that which endures and is imperishable in us from birth to birth, untouched by death, decay or corruption, an indestructible spark of the Divine. Not the unborn Self or Atman, for the

(continued from the previous page) Self even in presiding over the existence of the individual is aware always of its universality and transcendence, it is yet its deputy in the forms of Nature, the individual soul, chaitya purusha, supporting mind, life and body, standing behind the mental, the vital, the subtle-physical being in us and watching and profiting by their development and experience.

74. Matter: We have now the rational assurance that Life is neither an inexplicable dream nor an impossible evil that has yet become a dolorous fact, but a mighty pulsation of the divine All-Existence.

75. In a certain sense Matter is unreal and non-existent; that is to say, our present knowledge, idea and experience of Matter is not its truth, but merely a phenomenon of particular relation between our senses and the all-existence in which we move. When Science discovers that Matter resolves itself into forms of Energy, it has hold of a universal and fundamental Truth; and when philosophy discovers that Matter only exists as substantial appearance to the consciousness and that the one reality is Spirit or pure conscious Being, it has hold of a greater and completer, a still more fundamental truth. But still the question remains why Energy should take the form of Matter and not of mere force-currents or why that which is really spirit should admit the phenomenon of Matter and not rest in states, velleities and joys of the spirit. This, it is said, is the work of Mind or else, since evidently Thought does not directly create or even perceive the material form of things, it is the work of Sense; the sense-mind creates the forms which it seems to perceive and the thought-mind works upon the forms which the sense-mind presents to it. But, evidently, the individual

(continued from the previous page) embodied mind is not the creator of the phenomenon of Matter; earth-existence cannot be the result of the human mind which is itself the result of earth-existence. If we say that the world exists only in our own minds, we express a non-fact and a confusion; for the material world existed before man was upon the earth and it will go on existing if man disappears from the earth or even if our individual mind abolishes itself in the Infinite. We must conclude then that there is a universal Mind, subconscious to us in the form of the universe or superconscious in its spirit, which has created that form for its habitation. And since the creator must have preceded and must exceed its creation, this really implies a superconscious Mind which by the instrumentality of a universal sense creates in itself the relation of form with form, and constitutes the rhythm of the material universe. But this also is no complete solution; it tells us that Matter is a creation of Consciousness, but it does not explain how Consciousness came to create Matter as the basis of its cosmic workings.

76. Mind is me know it creates only in a relative and instrumental sense; it has an unlimited power of combination, but its creative motives and forms come to it from above: all created forms have their base in the Infinite above Mind, Life and Matter and are here represented, reconstructed—very usually misconstructed—from the infinitesimal.

77. The appearance which this form of Spirit assumes to our senses is due to that dividing action of Mind from which we have been able to deduce consistently the whole phenomenon of the universe.

78. The inconscience, the inertia, the atomic disaggregation of Matter must have their source

(continued from the previous page) in this all-dividing and self-involving action of Mind by which our universe came into being. As Mind is only a final action of Supermind in the descent towards creation and Life an action of Conscious-Force working in the conditions of the Ignorance created by this descent of Mind, so Matter as we know it is only the final form taken by conscious-being as the result of that working. Matter is substance of the one conscious- being phenomenally divided within itself by the action of a universal Mind,—a division which the individual mind repeats and dwells in, but which does not abrogate or at all diminish the unity of Spirit or the unity of Energy or the real unity of Matter.

79. If we go back to the spiritual basis of things, substance in its utter purity resolves itself into pure conscious being, self-existent inherently self-aware by identity but not yet turning its consciousness upon itself as object. Supermind preserves this self-awareness by identity as its substance of self-knowledge and its light of self-creation, but for that creation presents Being to itself as the subject-object of its own active consciousness, the object of a supreme knowledge which can by comprehension see the object within itself and as itself and also can simultaneously by apprehension see it as an object within the circumference of its consciousness and a part of its being but put away from itself, that is to say, from the centre of vision in which Being concentrates itself as the Knower, Witness or Purusha. We have seen that from this apprehending consciousness arises the movement of Mind, the movement by which the individual knower regards a form of his own universal being as if other than he; but in the divine Mind there is immediately or rather simultaneously another movement or reverse

(continued from the previous page) side of the same movement, an act of union in being which heals this phenomenal division and prevents it from becoming even for a moment solely real to the knower. This act of conscious union is that which is otherwise represented in dividing Mind as contact in consciousness between divided beings and objects, and with us this contact in divided consciousness is primarily represented by the principle of sense. On this basis of sense, on this contact of union subject to division the action of the thought-mind founds itself and prepares for the return to a higher principle of union to which division is made subject and subordinate. Substance, then, as we know it, material substance, is the form in which Mind acting through sense contacts the conscious Being of which it is itself a movement of knowledge.

80. Thus not any eternal and original law of eternal and original Matter, but the nature of the action of cosmic Mind is the cause of atomic existence.

81. Matter is Sachchidananda represented to His own mental experience as a formal basis of objective knowledge, action and delight of existence.

82. The knot of Matter: Substance, we have said, is conscious existence presenting itself to the sense as object to that on the basis of whatever sense-relation is established the work of world-formation and cosmic progression may proceed. But there need not be only one basis, only one fundamental principle of relation immutably created between sense and substance; on the contrary, there is an ascending and developing series. We are aware of another substance in which pure mind works as its natural medium and which is far subtler, more flexible, more plastic than anything that our

(continued from the previous page) physical sense can conceive of as Matter. We can speak of a substance of mind because we become aware of a subtler medium in which forms arise and action takes place; we can speak also of a substance of pure dynamic life-energy other than the subtlest forms of material substance and its physically sensible force-currents. Spirit itself is pure substance of being presenting itself as an object no longer to physical, vital or mental sense, but to a light of a pure spiritual perceptive knowledge in which the subject becomes its own object, that is to say, in which the Timeless and Spaceless is aware of itself in a pure spiritually self-conceptive self-extension as the basis and primal material of all existence. Beyond this foundation is the disappearance of all conscious differentiation between subject and object in an absolute identity, and there we can no longer speak of Substance.

Therefore it is a purely conceptive—a spiritually, not a mentally conceptive difference ending in a practical distinction, which creates the series descending from Spirit through Mind to Matter and ascending again from Matter through Mind to Spirit. But the real oneness is never abrogated.

83. But what after all, behind appearances, is this seeming mystery? We can see that it is the Consciousness which had lost itself returning again to itself, emerging out of its giant self-forgetfulness, slowly, painfully, as a Life that is would-be sentient, half-sentient, dimly sentient, wholly sentient and finally struggles to be more than sentient, to be again divinely self-conscious, free, infinite, immortal. But it works towards this under a law that is the opposite of all these things, under the conditions of Matter, that is to say

(continued from the previous page) against the grasp of the Ignorance.

84. Man is such a finite-seeming infinity and cannot fail to arrive at a seeking after the Infinite. He is the first son of earth who becomes vaguely aware of God within him, of his immortality or of his need of immortality, and the knowledge is a whip that drives and a cross of crucifixion until he is able to turn it into a source of infinite light and joy and power.

85. The principle of division is not proper to Matter, but to Mind; Matter is only an illusion of Mind into which Mind brings its own rule of division and ignorance. Therefore within this illusion Mind can only find itself. Now it is true that the principle of division in Matter can be only a creation of the divided Mind which has precipitated itself into material existence; for that material existence has no self-being, is not the original phenomenon but only a form created by an all-dividing Life-force which works out the conceptions of an all-dividing Mind. If, in other words, it is not merely a mental being who is hidden in the forms of the universe, but the infinite Being, Knowledge, Will which emerges out of Matter first as Life, then as Mind, with the rest of it still unrevealed, then the emergence of consciousness out of the apparently Inconscient must have another and completer term; the appearance of a supramental spiritual being who shall impose on his mental, vital, bodily workings a higher law than that of the dividing Mind is no longer impossible.

86. The ascending series of substance: There is no necessity in the essential nature of mind, sense, life that they should be so limited: for the physical sense-organs are not the

(continued from the previous page) creators of sense-perceptions, but themselves the creation, the instruments and here a necessary convenience of the cosmic sense; the nervous system and vital organs are not the creators of life's action and reaction, but themselves the creation, the instruments and here a necessary convenience of the cosmic Life-force; the brain is not the creator of thought, but itself the creation, the instrument and here a necessary convenience of the cosmic Mind. The necessity then is not absolute, but teleological; it is the result of a divine cosmic Will in the material universe which intends to posit here a physical relation between sense and its object, establishes here a material formula and law of Conscious-Force and creates by it physical images of Conscious-Being to serve as the initial, dominating and determining fact of the world in which we live. It is not a fundamental law of being, but a constructive principle necessitated by the intention of the Spirit to evolve in a world of Matter.

87. The oldest Vedantic knowledge tells us of five degrees of our being, the material, the vital, the mental, the ideal, the spiritual or beatific and to each of these grades of our soul there corresponds a grade of our substance, a sheath as it was called in ancient figurative language.

88. But it is possible to become conscious in our other bodies as well and it is in fact the opening up of the veil between them and consequently between our physical, psychical and ideal personalities which is the cause of those "psychic" and "occult" phenomena that are now beginning to be increasingly though yet too little and too clumsily examined, even while they are far too much exploited. The old

(continued from the previous page) Hathayogins and Tantriks of India had long ago reduced this matter of the higher human life and body to a science. They had discovered six nervous centres of life in the dense body corresponding to six centres of life and mind faculty in the subtle, and they had found out subtle physical exercises by which these centres, now closed, could be opened up, the higher psychical life proper to our subtle existence entered into by man and even the physical and vital obstructions to the experience of the ideal and spiritual being destroyed. It is significant that one prominent result claimed by the Hathayogins for their practices and verified in many respects was a control of the physical life-force which liberated them from some of the ordinary habits or so called laws thought by physical science to be inseparable from life in the body.

Behind all these terms of ancient psycho-physical science lies the one great fact and law of our being that whatever be its temporary poise of form, consciousness, power in this material evolution, there must be behind it and there is a greater, a truer existence of which this is only the external result and physically sensible aspect. Our substance does not end with the physical body; that is only the earthly pedestal, the terrestrial base, the material starting-point.

89. The Sevenfold chord of being: The Supermind is the divine Gnosis which creates, governs and upholds the worlds: it is the secret Wisdom which upholds both our Knowledge and our Ignorance.

90. This self-bliss may become subconscious, seemingly lost on the surface, but not only must it be there at our roots, all existence must be essentially a seeking and reaching out

(continued from the previous page) out to discover and possess it, and in proportion as the creature in the cosmos finds himself, whether in will and power or in light and knowledge or in being and wideness or in love and joy itself, he must awaken to something of the secret ecstasy.

91. This power indeed is nothing else than Sachchidananda Himself; it creates nothing which is not in its own self-existence, and for that reason all cosmic and real Law is a thing not imposed from outside, but from within, all development is self-development.

92. The Infinite would not be Infinite if it could not assume a manifold finiteness; the Absolute would not be the Absolute if it were denied in knowledge and power and will and manifestation of being a boundless capacity of self-determination.

93. For Mind is essentially that faculty of Supermind which measures and limits, which fixes a particular centre and views from that the cosmic movement and its interactions.

94. Mind once existent, Life and Form of substance follow; for life is simply the determination of force and action, of relation and interaction of energy from many fixed centres of consciousness, — fixed, not necessarily in place or time, but in a persistent co-existence of beings or soul-forms of the Eternal supporting a cosmic harmony.

95. Supermind, Mind and the Overmind Maya: But it has still to be made clear how this division came about in the indivisible, by what peculiar self-diminishing or self-effacing action of Consciousness-Force in the Being: for since all is a movement of that Force, only by some such action obscuring its own plenary light and power can there have arisen the dynamic and effective phenomenon of the Ignorance. It must be in its essential character an exclusive concentration

(continued from the previous page) on one movement and status of Conscious Being, which puts all the rest of consciousness and being behind and veils it from that one movements now partial knowledge.

96. Mind as we know it is a power of the Ignorance seeking for Truth, groping with difficulty to find it, reaching only mental constructions and representations of it in word and idea, in mind formation, sense formations, – as if bright or shadowy photographs or films of a distant Reality were all that it could achieve. Supermind, on the contrary, is in actual and natural possession of the Truth and its formations are forms of the Reality, not constructions, representations or indicative figures.

97. Intuition is in its very nature a projection of the characteristic action of these higher grades into the mind of Ignorance. It is true that in human mind its action is largely hidden by the interventions of our normal intelligence; a pure intuition is a rare occurrence in our mental activity: for what we call by the name is usually a point of direct knowledge which is immediately caught and coated over with mental stuff, so that it serves only as an invisible or a very tiny nucleus of a crystallisation which is in its mass intellectual or otherwise mental in character; or else the flass of intuition is quickly replaced or intercepted, before it has a chance of manifesting itself, by a rapid imitative mental movement, insight or quick perception or some swift-leaping process of thought which owes its appearance to the stimulus of the coming intuition but obstructs its entry or covers it with a substituted mental suggestion true or erroneous but in either case not the authentic intuitive movement. Nevertheless,

(continued from the previous page) the fact of this intervention from above, the fact that behind all our original thinking or authentic perception of things there is a veiled, a half-veiled or a swift unveiled intuitive element is enough to establish a connection between mind and what is above it; it opens a passage of communication and of entry into the superior spirit-ranges

98. The phenomena of genius are really the result of such a penetration, – veiled no doubt, because the light of the superior consciousness not only acts within narrow limits, usually in a special field, without any regulated separate organisation of its characteristic energies, often indeed quite fitfully, erratically and with a supernormal or abnormal irresponsible governance, but also in entering the mind it subdues and adapts itself to mind substance so that it is only a modified or diminished dynamis that reaches us, not all the original divine luminosity of what might be called the overhead consciousness beyond us. Still the phenomena of inspiration, of revelatory vision or of intuitive perception and intuitive discernment surpassing our less illumined or less powerful normal mind-action are there and their origin is unmistakable. Finally, there is the vast and multitudinous field of mystic and spiritual experience.

99. The first most ordinary result is a discovery of a vast static and silent Self which we feel to be our real or our basic existence, the foundation of all else that we are. There may be even an extinction, a Nirvana both of our active being and of the sense of self into a Reality that is indefinable and inexpressible. But also we can realise that this self is not only our own spiritual being but the true self of all others; it presents itself then as the

(continued from the previous page) underlying truth of cosmic existence. It is possible to remain in a Nirvana of all individuality, to stop at a static realisation or, regarding the cosmic movement as a superficial play or illusion imposed on the silent Self, to pass into some supreme immobile and immutable status beyond the universe. But another less negative line of supernormal experience also offers itself; for there takes place a large dynamic descent of light, knowledge, power, bliss or other supernormal energies into our self of silence, and we can ascend too into higher regions of the Spirit where its immobile status is the foundation of those great luminous energies.

100. The mental reason sees Person and the Impersonal as opposites: it conceives an impersonal Existence in which person and personality are fictions of the Ignorance or temporary constructions; or, on the contrary, it can see Person as the primary reality and the impersonal as a mental abstraction or only stuff or means of manifestation. To the Overmind intelligence these are separable Powers of the one Existence which can pursue their independent self-affirmation and can also unite together their different modes of action, creating both in their independence and in their union different states of consciousness and being which can be all of them valid and all capable of co-existence. A purely impersonal existence and consciousness is true and possible, but also an entirely personal consciousness and existence; the Impersonal Divine, Nirguna Brahman, and the Personal Divine, Saguna Brahman, are here equal and co-existent aspects of the Eternal. Impersonality can manifest with person subordinated to it as a mode of expression; but

(continued from the previous page) equally Person can be the reality with impersonality as a made of its nature: both aspects of manifestation face each other in the infinite variety of conscious Existence. What to the mental reason are irreconcilable differences present themselves to the Overmind intelligence as co-existent correlatives; what to the mental reason are contraries are to the Overmind intelligence complementaries.

101. To the Overmind, for example, all religions would be true as developments of the one eternal religion, all philosophies would be valid each in its own field as a statement of its own universe-view from its own angle, all political theories with their practice would be the legitimate working out of an Idea Force with its right to application and practical development in the play of the energies of Nature. In our separative consciousness, imperfectly visited by glimpses of catholicity and universality, these things exist as opposites; each claims to be the truth and taxes the others with error and falsehood, each feels impelled to refute or destroy the others in order that itself alone may be the Truth and live: at best, each must claim to be superior, admit all others only as inferior truth-expressions. An overmental Intelligence would refuse to entertain this conception or this drift to exclusiveness for a moment; it would allow all to live as a necessary to the whole or put each in its place in the whole, assign to each its field of realisation or of endeavour.

102. Here there comes in the Overmind law of each Force working out its own possibilities. The natural possibilities of a world in which an original Inconscience and a division of consciousness are the main principles, would be the emergence of Forces of Darkness impelled to maintain the Ignorance by which they live, an

(continued from the previous page) ignorant struggle to know originative of falsehood and error, an ignorant struggle to live engendering wrong and evil, an egoistic struggle to enjoy, parent of fragmentary joys and pains and sufferings; these are therefore the inevitable first-imprinted characters, though not the sole possibilities of our evolutionary existence.

103. Overmind in the descent towards material creation has originated modifications of itself, — Intuition especially with its penetrative lightning flashes of truth lighting up local points and stretches of country in our consciousness, — which can bring the concealed truth of things nearer to our comprehension, and by opening ourselves more widely first in the inner being and then as a result in the outer surface self also to the messages of these higher ranges of consciousness, by growing into them we can become ourselves also intuitive and overmental beings, not limited by the intellect and sense, but capable of a more universal comprehension and a direct touch of truth in its very self and body. In fact flashes of enlightenment from these higher ranges already come to us, but this intervention is mostly fragmentary, casual or partial; we have still to begin to enlarge ourselves into their likeness and organise in our the greater Truth activities of which we are potentially capable.

104. As Life and Mind have been released in Matter, so too must in their time these greater powers of the concealed Godhead emerge from the involution and their supreme Light descend into us from above.

A divine Life in the manifestation is their not only possible as the high result and ransom of our present life in the Ignorance but, if these things are as we have seen them, it

(continued from the previous page) is the inevitable outcome and consummation of Nature's evolutionary endeavour. (*continued in my "BUDDHIST STUDIES" page 640*)¹⁹

THE PHILOSOPHIC QUARTERLY: Vol. VIII. (1932) S.K. DAS: "THE SPIRIT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY:

1. While it is true, as a matter of principle, that there is a continuous development of thought from the Rigveda, which is but Vedanta in the making, to the Upanishads or the Vedanta proper, one must not construe this principle of thought-continuity with a literalness that strikes at the very root of the notion of development. In fact, it is not possible, within the meaning of the law of all development, to have the flower along with the fruit for the simple reason that the decay of the flower is the condition of the appearance of the fruit. The attempt, on the part of those well-meaning apologists of the Vedantic thought as a whole and in detail, to claim immutable perfection on its behalf is symptomatic of the absolutist's Absolute which, on Bradley's rendering of it, 'has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit and blossom.'

2. The prolific myth-making of the Rigveda has often been made a target of attack by its critics. For better or for worse, the first flutter of the new-fledged philosophic impulse on the Indian soil clothed itself in poetry of unending charm, with an abundance of myths, as the machinery just meant for the purpose, standing to the credit of a fertile imagination or creative phantasy, native to the soil. This characteristic of early Indian speculation, by no means uncommon in the history of speculative thought in other lands, attests inter alia the truth of Vico's dictum that 'poetry is the first operation of the human mind.' Now, no one need be apologetic

¹⁹ The original editor inserted "(continued in my "BUDDHIST STUDIES" page 640)" by hand

(continued from the previous page) for the poetic or mythical representation of philosophical doctrines as systematically carried out in the Rigveda. Even the purists among dialecticians, while labelling the myths of Plato as mere lacunae or lapses in his otherwise rigorous logic, have yet to acknowledge that there is in all of these a rich kernel of truth concealed under what is mere myth. The relation of the two, viewed in a time-perspective may be pithily expressed by saying that the myth is but truth in the making. There is, however, no denying the fact that a poetic or mythical representation of philosophical doctrines at the present day would at once be tabooed as being a matter of historical anachronism. Even Plato refers in the Republic to an 'old feud between poetry and philosophy' and condones the 'noble untruth' of poetry and the imitative arts in general in so far as they tend to lead one astray from the strict pursuit of truth. The so-called 'feud' to which he refers is an interesting study in psycho-analysis. It is only an objectification of a crisis in his mental history precipitated by a growing conflict between the two fundamental tendencies of his nature. For, it is no mere exaggeration to say that Plato was primarily and temperamentally a poet, but a philosopher by profession. When, therefore, he was ordaining the exile of the poets from the ideal Republic, he did not know – such was the irony of the situation – that he was signing the warrant of his own extradition from the Ideal State. Indeed, much of the authority that attaches to Plato's pronouncements on the 'first truths' is due to the dual role in which he appears and the double voice with which he speaks. It is Plato, the poet, that conceived or

(continued from the previous page) had the vision of the world of Ideas or archetypal Forms; it is Plato, the philosopher, that sought to justify the 'vision,' with regard to the things of sensible experience. Accordingly, the poetic or mythical presentation of the Hymns of the Rigveda has nothing *prima facie* to invalidate their truth-claim.

3. There may, roughly speaking be distinguished six stages in the history of human civilisation and culture, and it is usual to reckon six stages in the development of a philosophical doctrine or thought-type, the second half recapitulating the first half on a higher plane and thus constituting what has been aptly called the method of spiral progress. The first in the original (first) half is the Magic stage which invariably expressed itself in social instinct and postulates embodied in rituals. The second is the Myth stage in which the ingained mythopoic activity of the race bursts forth in the form of myth, folklore, beast fables, etc. The third is the Symbol stage which evinces a growing maturity in symbolization and sublimation of myth and ritual. Now, the fourth stage in the series (which is but the reproduction of the first on a higher place in this spiral progress), is the stage of Dogma manifesting itself in varying degrees of conceptual abstraction – in pictorial imagination, in *vorstellung* and in creeds. The fifth is the stage of Rationalisation proper with its elaboration and perfection of the conceptual apparatus in the form of Critique and Dialectic – of Purvapaksha, Uttarapaksha, and Siddhanta. The sixth and final stage in the series is the stage not of $\theta\epsilon\omega\iota\alpha$ ²⁰ merely, but of $\pi\rho\alpha\chi\iota\varsigma$,²¹ of sadhana or realisation. Applying this formula to the famous doctrine of Karma and its evolution in this history of Indian Culture we have the following series. The first stage is that of

²⁰ The original editor inserted " $\theta\epsilon\omega\iota\alpha$ " by hand

²¹ The original editor inserted " $\pi\rho\alpha\chi\iota\varsigma$ " by hand

(continued from the previous page) Yagna karma as ritual drawing its inspiration from the instinct of continued personal existence or will-to live and expressing itself in ritualistic performances for heaven (svargah) and from the instinct of race-preservation and manifesting itself in rituals for fertilization, fecundity, or race-multiplication. The germinal beginning of this law of Karma makes itself felt also, in this very first stage, as certain samskaras, family and tribal customs, as sacraments and the life. The second is the stage of myth-formation which crystallizes as the myth of the double path of prayana (outward journey) and of punarvritti return (journey), of Heaven and Hell and the like—pointing unmistakably to what is known as the doctrine of the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis. The third stage in the evolution of the law of Karma is that of symbolization or sublimation of Yajnas, Tapas, Samskaras, as rituals—such as we have in the different Upanishads, and the Gita. The fourth stage which marks the beginning of conceptual formulation naturally expresses itself in the Dogma of Karma conceived as a Law along with the entire paraphernalia of sanchita and prarabdha, accumulated and initiated, Karma together with the idea of a cyclical existence. The fifth stage is that of Moral causation and its dialectic revealing itself in a code of injunctions and prohibitions (vidhinishedhau), niyoga or injunction being the ground of Karma. It is on this stage that a rational enquiry into the relation between karma as Law and free-will of man and karma and Isvara or Moral Governor of the universe, is fully envisaged. The sixth and final stage in the development of the law of Karma is the emergence of the notion of value (purushartha) intrinsic and instrumental, πραξις²² and Sadhana, and of the relation of the Way of

²² The original editor inserted "πραξις" by hand

(continued from the previous page) karma (karmamarga) to the Summum Bonum (Paramapurushartha) and Redemption (Moksha) as a final release from the domination of the inexorable Laws of Karma.

4. It was reserved for the illustrious Sankaracharyya to rise equal to the height of this great argument and to give the exact bearings of his historic pronouncement. Quite in keeping with the underlying spirit of the utterance, Sankaracharyya has voiced in unmistakable accents what was left unvoiced, but one the less clearly suggested. He avoids, on the one hand, the aberrations of devotionism which imports a 'feeling of absolute dependence' up to the liminal intensity of a 'creature-consciousness' and, on the other, he steers clear of egoism which, by a misplaced emphasis easily slips into the egotism that is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship itself. Proceeding thus he brings to light the edifying implications of the cult of spiritual worship when he sums up his comments in the forceful words: "Moreover, I do neither beg of thee in the manner of a slave".

Cryptic and negative as it is in formulation, the statement is clearly symptomatic of a radical change in outlook. Figuring as the dividing line between the Rigvedic and the Upanishadic age, the change in question bespeaks a momentous influence in the history of Indian religion and culture—a spiritual Renaissance in ancient India that compares, not unfavourably with the no less significant transition from the bondage of the Leviticus unto the freedom of the Gospels. What is specially noteworthy in this spiritual awakening is that there is no more of that paralysing spectacle of the human worshipper being awed into submission—no more of coaxing and cajoling, petitioning and propitiating beings, supposed to possess benevolent

(continued from the previous page) as well as malevolent impulses. In place of stupefying admiration that thrives by working upon the baser instincts of man—fear of retribution and hope of reward—one has here that elevating trust in the spiritual dignity of man which is the best ministrations to religious worship. “Fear of the Lord”, as it has been truly observed, “is the beginning of all wisdom.” But it is only the beginning—and neither the end nor the essence of wisdom. The cult of spiritual worship must necessarily be in a minor key where man shrinks into the comparatively insignificant position of a bare point on the circumference, bereft of the central importance he is by nature entitled to. On the contrary, a cosmic expansion of the soul of the worshipper, an identification of it with the Spirit behind this mighty frame of nature, is the surest way to kindle those higher emotions and aspirations that possess the specific flavour of worship.

5. But bravery is one thing and bravado quite another. There is, accordingly, more sanity in the counsel “Because thou must not dream, thou needst not then despair!”

6. For, what is exactly missing here is that Promethean spark that can be a miracle, as it were, transform the gospel of ‘unyielding despair’ into an evangel of elevating hope—a hope that has potency enough to re-create itself out of its own wreck. The fear of relentless matter rolling alone—and, as the psycho-analyst will assert, the proud defiance is but the paralysing fear turned inside out—may faithfully reflect the scientific temper, but it is conducive neither to intellectual honesty, nor religious edification. Summarily speaking, the sense of being overwhelmed and paralysed into submission by an unconscious, albeit stupendous, power and the sense of defeatism, born of despair, negate the very

(continued from the previous page) spirit of worship. The free man in the republic of the Vedanta does not confess to an indigence of this kind. He does not appear as one craving a kind consideration, nor does he stoop to conquer. He appears as one asserting his spiritual birth-right, and that is what invests his pronouncement with an authority and importance all of its own. When all is said and done, the fact remains, however, that whatever we may choose to think of its merits as a philosophical dissertation, there is no disputing the point that "A Free Man's worship" is destined to rank, by sheer force of its 'austere beauty' and stylistic charm, if not, also, in respect of its philosophic depth or vigour, as one the masterpieces of English literature, and, certainly, as one of the philosophical classics of our age. Passages after passages may be quoted to show the consummate artist he is, and it will be readily discovered that their appeal lies not so much in any lure of intellectualism, but in the aesthetic effect produced by words of chiselled beauty and vivid imagery. While, therefore, we feel unconvinced by his logic, Mr Russell impresses us with a peculiar persuasiveness that defies analysis into reasons.

7. Here, as elsewhere, freedom has to be saddled with safeguards so that it may be pressed into the service of philosophic thinking. That is why unbridled reasoning (niramkusatarkah) or argumentation for the sake of argumentation—wherein the license of free thinking so often terminates has never found favour with the Indian mind; and, as a matter of fact, it has been placed by Samkaracharyya under a perpetual ban. For, in India at least, philosophical thought has never been an intellectual pastime merely, cut off from the moorings of all other values of life. This is a fact that has to be accepted as such, and the judgment in question should not

(continued from the previous page) be surreptitiously converted into a judgment upon fact.

The much-needed adjustment of the respective rights of Authority and Free thinking, of Dogma and Criticism, or of Faith and Reason, has been effected, once for all, in the domain of Indian Philosophy.

8. The sutra does not leave us, in the end, with a barren, abstract, colourless universal that rides roughshod over the particular. It is the universal in the particular and the particular as embosomed in the universal, — or to use the oft-quoted phrase “the concrete universal” — that is not merely the ‘secret’ of Hegel, but the ‘open conspiracy’ of the Real.

9. If the vocation of the philosopher is to be a “spectator of all time and all existence,” he must have the eye to discern in time ‘the moving image of eternity.’ This clearly reveals an attempt to take time seriously, and at the same time not to lose touch with eternity. If truths “wake to perish never,” neither antiquity nor modernity can either add to, or detract from the validity of these. Mr Bertrand Russell’s dictum that the recognition of ‘the unimportance of time is the one gateway of wisdom’ surely has its force in this regard.

10. In the spiritual economy of the universe there can be no meaningless duplication of functions. It is because and so far as East is East, and also West is West that they can and must meet to their reciprocal advantage at the philosophical exchange. No one knows what cross-fertilisation may mean in the world of thought.

11. If, in short, it is contended that such a vision of the Infinite in the finite is too good to be true, the Vedantist at least will meet that contingency by saying that the vision

(continued from the previous page) is too good not to be true. It is no mere remote theological mystery but, God be thanked, it is interwoven with the very texture of our everyday experience.

12. P.B. ADHIKARI: "FACT AND FICTION." Are the common objects of knowledge mere fictions, i.e. are what we make them to be, having no independent reality belonging to them? Here lies the fundamental issue between the Realists and the Idealists.

13. Can we hope to go behind our meanings in our ordinary experience? The Gestalt psychology of the day, as presented by its staunch advocate Kohler rejects this doctrine as a final solution of the difficulty here, and it does so rightly as far as it goes. But on a closer view it would appear that this new psychology too is in the same dubious position here: it does not escape the influence of the mental (even in the sense of physiological) in the building up of our usual experience of things; rather in a way it supports and emphasises the same conclusion.

Now the fundamental assumption made here remains still to be justified, namely, that the world, as we experience it, is a fiction. Do the objects as we know them, whether ordinarily or scientifically, support the assumption? They do, if we would but view them critically with an open mind. This can be easily and widely illustrated by examples drawn from our sense-knowledge itself, commonly supposed to be direct and free from any influence of mind. The attitude of present-day physical sciences towards sense-objects points to the same conclusion. But scientific knowledge also is not free from fictions which are supposed to abound in the common-sense view of things. The superiority of scientific knowledge to the common-sense way of regarding objects of experience lies in the wider application of its ideas and conceptions. But

(continued from the previous page) these are still fictions, and as such limited in extent and consequently relative in their application. No science can claim absolute truth.

14. There is nothing there but the play of protons and electrons underlying the so-called sensible qualities. But their own protons and electrons, what are they? Are they not ideas (fictions) put into the situation to handle it better until they come to be replaced by more successful ones? Our traditional psychology is still very naive in its outlook. It has proceeded on certain assumptions (fictions again) which require a justification not yet sufficiently made. No wonder, therefore, that the traditional position here is coming to be replaced by others attempting to go deeper into the situation. But even in these new departures the bare facts are not touched yet. They remain still far to seek.

It would perhaps be asked now—is there anything of this kind—a bare fact behind the appearances? The Phenomenalists, from David Hume down to the present day radical empiricists, are welcome to deny it. But their phenomena, what are they? Bare facts or fictions? Are they not also what we make them to be? What is their original stuff here? They would perhaps say in reply—there is nothing of the sort there. Then the whole world of sense comes to be reduced to mere fictions—an extreme form of personal and subjective idealism. The question would still arise—whence come these fictions, and why and how, again, the fictions assume a similar type in different minds giving what is called a common objective world. Thus the phenomenalist attitude can hardly be called a satisfactory one here. For a true solution of the mystery, if it can be solved at all by the usual ways of knowledge and discourse, we have to look elsewhere.

The point which raises a serious difficulty here is that the phenomena of common experience

(continued from the previous page) have a character of their own that appears to have an independence of the minds to which they are presented. This is the case also with the law and order in which they appear. They may be fictions of the mind. But the law and order, is it also a fiction? If it is, the fictions must have their origin in a deeper level than what we regard usually as our mind. As a matter of fact what we usually call matter and mind in their characteristic contract are themselves fictions, which have had a long vogue in philosophy since Descartes formulated their dualism. The whole course of philosophic thought since his time has been ego-centric in this sense. And unless we can rise above this prevalent tendency of thought, we cannot hope to find a solution of this difficulty here. Hence both the Spiritualist and the Materialist, as the Idealist and the Realist, would have to divest their minds of the usual conceptions of mind and matter in their respective approaches to the solutions of this problem. The deepest thoughts of some philosophers have recognised this, and so they have tried to face the problem by boldly admitting a source of knowledge other than the commonly accepted ones.

The nature of the ultimate reality underlying its appearances can never be realised by the usual methods of handling experience, which have but to do with the world as already fashioned by inevitable fictions. The mystery would ever evade our grasp unless we can rise above these fictions with which we endow our experience both inner and outer. Behind both these lies the original stuff which is mysteriously worked out into the forms we are familiar with and deal with practically. The level again from which this work proceeds is not always apparent to us—it lies deeper somewhere else than what we usually take our mind to be, which is itself a

(continued from the previous page) fiction among other fictions. The ultimate source of original forms—even the sensible data and the laws of their appearance—eludes our grasp by the usual modes of approach. The psychological account of their origin that we find in the current text-books is too crude and superficial. It does not touch the main problem here. The new departures from the traditional lines of explanation that we find in the day are indeed a hopeful sign of what is to come in the future indicating at least a recognition of the problem, if not its solution. A true solution will come, however, when we give up the usual time-honoured path of approach and seek it in another source of knowledge, little recognised as yet in the field, call that by whatever name you would—mystic vision, Higher Intuition, Immediacy, Reason, Aparoksha.

15. E. AHMED SHAH: "APPEARANCE AND REALITY."

Besides Ramanuja a majority of modern scholars are unanimous in declaring that the word Maya as used in the older Upanishads does not mean illusion, but power, wonderful power, creative power, mysterious power. As for instance Dr Thibaut writes:—"It is well known that, with the exception of the Svetasvatra and Maitrayani, none of the older Upanishads exhibits the word Maya. The term indeed occurs in one place in the Brihadaranyaka, but that passage is a quotation from the Rik Samhita in which Maya means "creative power". Professor Max Mullar writes: "The power which enabled Isvara to create was a power within him, not independent of him, whether we call it Devatmasakti, Maya or Prakriti. That power is really inconceivable, and it has received such different forms in the minds of different Vedantists, that in the end Maya herself is represented as the creative power, nay, as having created Isvara himself." Prof. Macdonell strongly

(continued from the previous page) endorses the view held by Dr Thibaut and Prof. Max Muller by saying that if the historical development of a language is given any consideration, as it certainly should be given, then the word Maya has come to mean illusion after gradually passing through three distinct stages of meaning, namely, creative or mysterious power, skill like that of a magician, and appearance, i.e, the phenomenal appearance. Of these four meanings the older Upanishads used the word in the sense of Creative or Mysterious power.

It is abundantly clear that Sankara's scriptural basis, when judged in the light of scholarly historical evidence, does not seem to stand the test.

Philosophical Support: His philosophic reason is based on an assumption as to the nature of reality, which he obtains from the scriptures. Reality is one. Whatever is, is in reality one. There exists only one Universal absolute being called Brahman.

In the first place, he takes for granted the nature of reality, and then in order to justify that assumption an explanation is offered showing the illusory character of the world. He takes his stand on a priori grounds. But when an attempt is made to understand that reality on a posteriori basis, starting inductively from that which is given in experience, it becomes difficult to maintain such a view. For, if the nature of reality is one, an absolute unity, then, either the given something, the Many of human experience, is unaccountable, or the nature of such a reality cannot be conceived, known, thought or even named by men. (Compare Mund.Up. III. 1.8. Brih. up. III 9,26. Taitt, II, 7: Mund;1.1.6). Such a conception of reality is as unprofitable as it is inapprehensible. The logical consequence of such a position is

(continued from the previous page) its unknowableness. Truly nothing can be said of such a being but *Neti Neti*.

Secondly, is not the philosophical argument regarding the illusory character of the world in view of his conception of reality as 'One without a second' refuted on its own basis? Does it not contain a self-contradiction? Shankara the upholder of the theory that all that is other than Brahman is an illusion (*Maya*) says the theory of *Maya* is true. But the theory itself being a theory of something other than Brahman stands disproved on its own ground.

Edward Caird has expressed the same truth in the following words: "If the world we behold without is an insubstantial pageant, we ourselves to whom it appears must be such stuff as dreams are made of." Locke's words on the point cut the foundation of the edifice on which such a theory is built. He writes: "If all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it does not much matter that a waking man should answer him."

Thirdly: Having seen that the metaphysical result of his position leads us to the unknowable, and the logical conclusion implies a self-contradiction, we maintain that the world of our experience as apprehended and known by the mind is not an illusion, but real.

For other reasons also Shankara's position: "This entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done is a mere illusion" cannot be maintained.

It cannot consistently be fitted in with the theory of Creation given in the Upanishads. The most important theory of Creation is given in the Chandogya Upanishads. VI.2.3. There, if anywhere, the illusory character of the world should have been hinted at, but not a word to

(continued from the previous page) that effect is met with anywhere.

16. K.R. SRINIVAS IYENGAR: "THE DOCTRINE OF WORDS AS THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS." Jaimini as well as Panini the grammarian, hold that over and above the letters there exists a supersensuous entity —, called the sphota, which is immediately manifested to the buddhi by the letters, and which thereupon in its turn, itself manifests the sense of the word. The apprehension of the meaning of a word is according to them a mediate process made possible through the sphota alone.

17. Sankara hammers out at wearisome length that the world is nothing but the letters in their aggregate, unerringly intimates to it their definite sense; hence there is no need, according to him, to assume a sphota over above the letters. This, it would appear is the plain common sense of the matter. But if this were the whole truth, how are we to interpret the sutra statement that the world originates from the word—a statement borne out, as Sankara himself points out, by various passages in the Sruti and the Smriti? Do these various passages simply mean that letters created the world? It is hardly possible that the school of reverend Upavarsha should be right in this matter. According to Madhavacharya, on the other hand, "The eternal word, called Sphota, without parts and the cause of the world, is verily 'Brahman' and he straightaway quotes a passage from Bhartrihari which declares that "Brahman" without beginning or end; the indestructible essence of speech, which is developed in the form of things and whence springs the creation of the world."

Here in a nutshell we have the idealistic philosophy of the Vedanta that the world and its various things exist as eternal ideas in Brahman—ideas from which proceed the actual

(continued from the previous page) concrete phenomena. If sabdha is to be of creative potency, it must not only be eternal, it must be an eternal idea, a conception, a form, an Akriti—representing a species or jati—and only as an Akriti can it give rise to a vyakti, and it is this Akriti which is the sphota in its philosophical signification. It is little wonder then that having such a firm grasp of the metaphysical significance of the idea, Madhavacharya should come to the conclusion that "the meaning of all words is ultimately that summum genus, i.e. that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality (Brahman.)"

18. In a similar strain Machava writes further. But his thought has already become clear. Words as meanings denote species or forms (Akriti) and these various forms are different forms of that summum genus "Existence" which is identified by Madhava (and by Vedantic thought in general) with Brahman. Brahman or Existence, being divided when found in cows etc. by reason of its connection with different subjects is called this or that species and on it all words depend; i.e. all words depending ultimately on Brahman or Existence, denote only the different forms of this existence (ideas). Stripping this language of its popular or empirical garb, we find embedded in it the idealistic thought that the so-called 'forms' or Akritis are all 'ideas' sustained in the Divine Mind, Brahman, which, through them, gives rise to the world of name and form. For unless we thus interpret Existence or Brahman as an Infinite Mind and the forms which are said to be parts of it as its eternal ideas, we can neither maintain the eternity of the word, and consequently of the Veda, nor understand how the world originates from the word. We find that in perceiving a horse or any object for that matter, we do not perceive

(continued from the previous page) them in relation to a mind which is also perceived to be universal, permanent, unchanging, infinite in character – for it is only in relation to such a mind that sensations with their characters can be known at all. All objects and qualities and relations, and relations, again, which such a mind apprehends, while on one side particular, perishing existences, are on the other side persisting unities, conceptions, meanings, powers, functions, categories, ideas, standing for species as well as for individual objects – of such an infinite or absolute mind. Hence Madhava's contention that all names – all words – are truly the names of God naturally follows, as well as the thesis that the Veda – the sum of all knowledge is eternal and uncreated for it consists of words, and words, as ideas or conceptions of the Divine Mind, are themselves eternal and uncreated.

19. Denotation, therefore, which confers existence on objects, implies that objects are members of a series, order or system. But what determines then, the precipitation of universals which subsist into objects which come to exist? Obviously the answer of Vedanta as well as of modern epistemology, is space and time. According to Vedanta space and time form the net-work which catches the Absolute mind with all its ideas and crystallises them in the form of a world of objects. It is position in space and time that differentiates the particular from the universal and whatever thus secures position in space and time poses the capacity for interaction and change.

20. "Among many other topics it discusses the meaning of words (sakti, laksana & vyanjana), the origin of symbolic function, the nature of sentence (vakya) and the factors that engender a complete coherent meaning. The highly technical doctrines – Anvitabhidhana Vada and Abhitanvaya Vada – are lucidly set forth. In this chapter,

(continued from the previous page)there is only one thing to which I should take exception. I have always considered it a gross mistake on the part of the Advaitins not to have recognised the true significance of the Sphota theory. Instead of acclaiming the grammarian as a kindred spirit that has reached the Absolute through the word-essence, the Vedantic has chosen to ally himself with the mimansaka in condemning the Sphota theory. Its significance has not been properly understood. Words and sentences are thought to be constituted of discrete parts – the syllables and words etc. But that we are at all able to construct relative wholes out of discrete entities presupposes an apriori knowledge of the whole; for it is that alone which guides the grouping of only certain elements (lacking unity in themselves) in a certain order only. To contend that this presupposed whole itself is an entity created out of parts is to fail curiously in critical thinking.".. (T.R.V. Murti).

21. T.P. RAJU: "THE PROBLEM OF THE INFINITE." It cannot but be accepted that the infinite does not exclude the finite. Hegel's criticism of the position that the infinite is not the finite is certainly right, if that negative relation is to be interpreted as exclusion. For then, the infinite falls short of its infinitude by just so much as it excludes. But most of the philosophers whom Hegel attacks do not mean by the negative relation only exclusion. Hinduism—by which term Hegel seems to understand only Sankara Vedanta—never says that the finite and the infinite are two entities, each standing by the other and thus excluding it. When it says that the finite is not the infinite, it denies every relation between the two. In a similar vein, says Bradley: "I am perhaps

(continued from the previous page) remind the reader that to speak of a relation between phenomena and Reality is quite incorrect. There are no relations properly except between things finite. If we speak otherwise, it should be by a license."

It may be objected here that according to Bradley the infinite is beyond the reach of thought. In his Absolute thought disappears as such. The relational form exists only so long as thought exists. But with thought the relational form vanishes in the Absolute. Hence as the Absolute cannot be an object of thought, the latter cannot relate the finite and the infinite. But according to Hegel, the infinite is not beyond the reach of thought. So on his principle, the objector may conclude thought can relate the infinite and the finite. The reply is that Hegel's principle here is incorrect. The infinite certainly is not an object of thought. If it is, for that very reason, it ceases to be an infinite. The position involves that the infinite as an object has thought standing beside it. But unless the infinite includes thought it is not an infinite, and the moment it includes it, it no longer remains an object. And thought no longer remains to relate the finite and the infinite.

Here the question may be asked, if the infinite is not an object of thought, how can we think of it? None of the idealists have denied that we are able to think of the infinite. All admit that it is a logical presupposition of our finite knowledge. Sankara, in the commentary to the first sutra, foresees this objection. Is the Brahman known or not? If known, there is no need of an enquiry regarding it; if not, no enquiry is possible. He answers by saying that we have the idea of Brahman. But the descriptions of its nature are various.

(continued from the previous page) Hence arises the need of enquiry. And Wachaspati in explaining a passage in Sankara's introduction to the first sutra points out that we have a vague knowledge of the infinite. We have an idea of it, but we perceive it only through upadhis or limitations. It may be said that our knowledge is rather a suggestion. In this sense even if we call it an object of thought, it is not an object in the ordinary sense. Thought cannot determine its nature. Hence it cannot fix the relation between the finite and the infinite. There is no meaning, therefore, in asking: what is the relation between the finite and the infinite?

There are of course certain passages in Hegel which try to prove that thought can determine the nature of the infinite. The Absolute Idea is the unity of the subjective and objective Idea. It is thought's return to itself, a being-for-self. But as this whole unity is of the nature of thought, there is nothing in it that is impermeable to thought. The unity is mediated immediacy, where immediacy as such is removed. But such an idea of the infinite gives rise to a difficulty that is ruinous to Hegel's conclusions that thought can determine the nature of the infinite. For if the immediacy is removed, how can thought exist? Thought is mediation, but it must have something to mediate. So if the immediacy is removed, the mediation too goes with it. Dr McTaggart also thinks that thought cannot exist without immediacy."

It is at this stage of development from Hegel that Bradley is useful. He admits that we have an idea of the Absolute, yet denies any conceivable relation between it and its appearances. Thought detaches the predicate from the subject, and yet tries to restore the

(continued from the previous page) original integrity. It is its very nature to divide an original whole into parts, to make distinctions within an indistinguishable unity. This is what Hegel means when he says that it is by its very nature that the infinite expresses itself in judgment. There is again the return movement of the infinite to its original integrity, to self-containedness. The process of this circular movement is the relational form of thought. We now understand Bradley's assertion that thought cannot transcend the relational form. It is the nature of thought to distinguish and try to synthesise. But it has no power to unite as it cannot get rid of its other trait. So Bradley leaves aside thought and states that the nature of the Absolute is sensuous experience. In this way does Bradley conceive the original integrity and makes a sure advance upon Hegel. But the latter believes in thought. It is true that thought is both analytical and synthetical. But the latter nature is a tendency but not a power, and can restore only as much unity as is possible in any relation. Hence thought cannot be the nature of the infinite. If it is, then, while the lapse into judgment is sure, the infinite cannot regain its original unity. There will even be no meaning in saying that the infinite lapses into a judgment. For thought is relational, and the infinite too as thought cannot but be relational, i.e., it exists always only in the form of a judgment; and hence there is no need of a lapse from the original unity. But then the infinite can never get rest from its exertions to gain a unity. It cannot be self-contained and will remain always restless

Furthermore, Hegel's infinite can be to an accomplished fact. It always remains in the process of accomplishment, but never attains its end. The end always remains an ideal for thought. This is why Bradley says that truth

(continued from the previous page) is always an ideal, which, so long as it remains as such, is never realised. But so soon as thought attains truth, thought commits suicide, and truth becomes reality. Hence as an end eternally attained, the infinite is not of the nature of thought.

22. If the good is eternally accomplished, if the infinite is eternally present, then what is the relation between it and that which is in the process of being accomplished? Of course, as we have noted above, Bradley denies any relation between the two. But can Hegel, who is emphatic in his assertion that the nature of the infinite is thought, explain the relation? Here he falls back upon illusion. But then he is admitting the bankruptcy of thought. If the infinite is thought, if thought itself is creating the illusion, it must be able to understand its own mystery. That thought is unable to do so is sufficient proof that the nature of the infinite is no thought but transcends it.

Bradley has thus been able to save both the immanence and transcendence of the logical infinite. It is immanent in thought, because it is the presupposition of all our knowledge, the underlying basis on which the superstructure of thought rests. It is the ideal unity of the separate element of thought. Yet it transcends thought, because thought must vanish, if the ideal is to be realised.

So far Bradley has escaped some of the difficulties found in Hegel. Yet he could not leave aside his Hegelian bias. Though the infinite is beyond the reach of thought, Bradley proclaims it to be a harmonious system.

23. Bradley is still regarding Philosophy as only a mode of thought and not as a process of life. He could not summarily dismiss the

(continued from the previous page) claims of thought to be adequate to comprehend the nature of the infinite. But such a hesitation leads to absurdities. Feeling is the basis of the superstructure constructed by thought. It is the original integrity, and the ideal of thought. Hence it ought to be the reality. But Bradley wants to treat it as only an element in a higher unity of which the relational form forms the other element. But then how is the unity to be attained? And of what is it an ideal? It cannot be an ideal of thought. For thought does not exist as such in the integrity of the feeling. The latter is of a different level altogether. Hence thought cannot relate the two, and cannot, in failing to bring them together into a unity, think of an ideal. Further, we may want another unity which includes the higher unity on the one side, and the related feeling and the superstructure of thought on the other, as its elements. And the process may go on ad infinitum. The only solution of the difficulty is to admit that the original integrity is indescribable, because thought exhausts itself completely by the time it reaches it.

24. Says McTaggart: "He (Hegel) lived in an age of Idealism, when the pure scepticism of Hume has ceased to be a living force, and when it was a generally accepted view that the mind was adequate to the knowledge of reality." Kant fought the sceptics and established the ideas of God, Soul and the world, through his transcendental proofs. Now that they have been established. Hegel appropriates them as objects of thought. But if he is to face the sceptic, his constructive method, which can work only when thought is admitted to have the powers which he attributes to it, has to yield. "For," says McTaggart "the transcendental form becomes necessary when

(continued from the previous page) the attacks of scepticism are to be met, and its absence, though due chiefly to the special character of audience to whom the philosophy was first addressed, has led to the reproaches which had been so freely directed against Absolute Idealism, as a mere fairy tale, and as a theory with an internal consistency, but without any relation to facts." The existence of the infinite can be proved only by a transcendental argument, and never in the way as Hegel wants to do.

We now arrive at the position of Sankara. He does not deny that we have a knowledge of the infinite as the presupposition of all our finite knowledge. But it appears to us only through limitations. Hence the inquiry as to its real nature. Philosophy in its attempt to grasp the infinite may fail as a process of thought, yet it may lead to another way, viz. the process of life, which is religion. Hence the inadequacy of thought to the knowledge of the real is no reason for our giving up the attempt. Besides, we must know that our thought cannot comprehend the real before we give up that attempt. And thought itself must prove its short-comings to us.

All this discussion may appear as a mere negative criticism. In a sense it is. To describe the infinite there is no better way possible. It can only be described in negative terms. We have shown that the infinite is not what is opposed to the finite. It includes the finite only in the sense that the latter loses itself in it. The denial of any relation between the two must be interpreted as the inconceivability of any relation. It is meaningless to raise the question as to whether there is any relation at all between them. The question should not arise. If otherwise interpreted,

(continued from the previous page) Sankara would be found open to all the charges against him by his critics.

The same reply is to be given to Hegel's criticism that the infinite is not an acid in which all things dissolve, but a spirit. But giving it a name does not explain the fact. The infinite may be called a spirit, but how are we to explain the relation between it and the finite? No relation is conceivable. To say that the relation is an identity in difference is only a restatement of the problem, but not its explanation. If it is an identity in difference, what is the relation between identity and difference? To take it as an ultimate fact, with no possible further explanation, is to admit that thought is permeated through and through by an inexplicable element. Hence identity in difference is not an ultimate logical explanation for the very reason that thought itself is not satisfied with it, but craves for something higher. The only explanation is the admission that there is no conceivable relation between the finite and the infinite. Thought cannot overcome the other element so long as it remains thought.

Besides, it is very essential that the finite in no way affects the infinite. The dialectical process, as Hegel says, is a process from error to truth. Yet the Absolute Idea is not a process, and is in no way to be affected by the process. Hegel thinks that the process is due to illusion. If so, the process in no way affects the Idea. Hence the relation between the finite and the infinite is not organic. As we have shown above, it is useless to postulate a higher synthesis as McTaggart does. Here Sankara disagrees with Bradley whenever the latter says that the finite or thought becomes part and parcel of the infinite when it

(continued from the previous page) enters it. For such a view implies that when thought has not become merged in the infinite, the infinite is not perfect. But the implication is ruinous to the principle that the infinite is everlastingly perfect.

It may be here objected that if thought disappears in the Absolute, the latter must be unconscious. But no such conclusion is justified. The Absolute would be unconscious only on the assumption that thought is the only form of consciousness. But this, thought is not. The infinite is attained only in the attempt of thought to overcome the immediacy, to absorb the object. But as we have shown above when the immediacy is removed, mediation or thought too goes with it. Without an object thought cannot exist. Everything says Hegel is a judgment. It is the very nature of thought to have an object within which it makes the distinction of subject and predicate. And in a judgment, as Bradley says, the full meaning and content of the subject is not before thought. Nor is it possible for thought to comprehend its full significance. The explanation lies in the very nature of thought. We may, therefore, conclude that impermeability is an essential nature of objectivity. The object is never fully transparent to thought. Yet the object falls within thought. So thought is never completely transparent to itself. But the moment thought makes the object fully transparent, the object vanishes. Any residue of objectivity means so much opaqueness. Hence we cannot say that the infinite is unconscious.

Here also Sankara differs from Bradley who says that the Absolute is of the nature of feeling, or sensuous experience.

25. To sum up what we have said. (i) The infinite

(continued from the previous page) does not exclude the finite. (ii) It is immanent in the finite and yet transcends it. (iii) Hence it is not possible to give a logical description of it (iv) We are not to be understood as saying that we have no idea of it, but only that we cannot determine its nature. (v) For the same reason we cannot conceive of any relation between the finite and the infinite. (vi) The infinite is in no way affected by the finite. (vii) Hence the finite categories as they appear in our thought cannot exist in the Absolute. (viii) Hegel's argument that because we have a knowledge of the limit, the unlimited falls on this side of consciousness, is not valid. (ix) No relations can exist in the Absolute, and therefore no distinctions can be made in it. For the same reason the infinite is not a one in many or an identity in difference. (x) The Absolute is not of the nature of feeling or sensuous experience.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. IX. (1933-34)

1. P.N. SRINIVASACHARI: "ATMANISM." It is said that we now know too much about matter to be any longer materialists. The materialistic theory is the result of the scientific methodology of selection and abstraction. In the interest of exactitude the scientist restricts the subject-matter. The theory of matter as the cause of sense-data, of space-time without consciousness, is merely the result of hypostatizing an abstraction. Matter as the unthinking mother of the world is unthinkable. As Eddington says, matter of the physicist is a cycle like the house that Jack built. Smuts thinks that the make-up of matter should be explained as an inner activity holistically and not arithmetically as a whole of parts.

2. The tension in matter, according to Smuts,

(continued from the previous page) becomes the attention of psychology; the chemical affinities become appetite in life, purposiveness of will, and finally, the ideals of life. The holistic activity starts with the dynamic creativity of matter, and ends with the self as the last term in the series. In explaining the higher by the lower, the end by the origin, naturalism puts the cart before the horse. As Smuts himself says, the naturalist wrongly infers the primacy of matter from its priority, and, in the name of simplicity, the concrete becomes shadowy and the abstract becomes real; the physical is the primary and the metaphysical secondary. The scientific understanding in its excessive zeal for objectivity has an aversion for the metaphysical. But, as Ward points out, we can never divest ourselves from our consciousness. In ignoring the work of thought, it presupposes thought. Naturalism deals more with the mechanical cause than with reason and it rules out teleology, denies moral freedom and banishes spiritual autonomy and its metaphysical meaning. In seeking the object the scientist forgets the subject which is his own self, and his thinking is therefore only sectional.

3. The problem of the self, as Smuts says, is the great mystery of the universe. It is at present a "wide and wild no-man's land, and unexplored region and may in future be the key-stone of all knowledge." Science in its zeal for averaging and generalisation ignores the uniqueness of the self and its moral and spiritual values. As the body consciousness, it is an infinitesimal speck in the infinity of space-time, but spiritually it is the very image of the infinite and the eternal. But naturalism and absolutism depersonalise and despiritualise the self and make it a series,

(continued from the previous page) and thus ignore its inner work. The law of variation and self-persistence which is a mystery can be explained only biographically and not biologically, and then it would be the basis or pivot of a truer metaphysics. Smuts suggests the name of personology as more comprehensive than the term characterology coined by Ward; but his view that personality is the last term in the holistic series or a fresh emergence of holism is entirely opposed to the idealistic view. Personalism and the humanistic sciences are concerned with the same problem.

4. Though the world of space-time-cause emerges and the self subject to space-time evolves and is in the making in an infinite series, the Atman is the absolute consciousness and indeterminate activity and freedom. The finite self exists, but connotes the absolute, and freed from self-idolatry and self-centred consciousness, it shifts the centre of reference. Its being and blending with the absolute is a sacred mystery. Pan-psychism, like monadism, is a purely spiritualistic view of reality which starts with the bare life of the plant and ends with Brahma. It is the self that contracts as a microbe and expands as a mahatma; owing to its moral freedom it can grow into a God or sink into the vegetative and sensitive world. Panpsychism ignores the philosophy of nature which insists on the externality and eternity of the natural order. Matter is external to the finite self, but not to the universal consciousness.

5. The Atmanistic theory saves the finite existent, but destroys its externality. The absolute Atman pulsates through the finite and vivifies it without being infected by finiteness and its imperfections, and when it realises that it is an organ of the absolute, the

(continued from the previous page) self remains without selfishness and is immersed in the ananda of the Atman. Hoernle is anxious to save the appearances and the saving experience is the eternal gift of the universal to the universe.

6. Smuts' holistic evolution is opposed to materialism, monadism and absolutism and is a vera causa implying creativeness and novelty. The universe is not the explication or unfolding of implicit content but is the record of the whole-making activity in its progressive development. It starts as realism and ends as idealism and both are at the heart of things. Matter is an inner activity which is not additive but creative and the mother of the universe, and the holistic progression is exhibited in the following scale:—

The physical reality which is a mechanical togetherness of self-repeating things externally related. Organic unity involving inner co-ordination and selective activity. The emergence of consciousness as a new synthetic activity.

The self is the apex of the holistic universe though it is only a recent arrival. Here holism is not only creative but also self-creative. Wholeness thus starts with the small centres and ends with the self or the all-whole. The absolute of metaphysics is not static but creative. It is a monism employing the immanent ideal, but it does not refer to a block universe, but is progressive and pluralistic. It is the emergence of the absolute values of personality. While Smuts thus recognises the existence of the main concepts of reality, he does not, owing to his naturalistic bias, bring out the primacy of spiritual values and wholeness of the whole, which alone avoids the polar disparities of the series. It is the Atman and

(continued from the previous page) and not matter that has the promise and potency of perfection, and creativity and spirituality is the actualising of the spiritual possibility of the Atman. Progress is in reality and not of reality.

7. The absolute Atman is the only explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the intellectual demand of comprehensiveness by recognising the value of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics.

8. No one worships space-time as the absolute and finds saving experiences in it; it is an unorthodox messianic hope expressed in modern thought.

9. Absolutism has the merit of explaining the lower by the higher. But the theory of the absolute unfolding itself by a dialectic or emanational process and the idea of the possible becoming the actual, in which the whole harmonises and transcends all discord, suffers from the defect of predicating imperfections to reality and making evil a necessity. The theory of creationism has likewise failed to reconcile the goodness of God with the reality of sin and unmerited suffering. How the one evolved into the many or how the absolute divides itself into finite centres is ultimately inexplicable. The co-existence of the absolute and the self is a sacred mystery. Creative evolution rejects the idea of the cast-iron or block universe, but it is against the view ex nihilo nihil fit. Moral and religious consciousness requires us to throw the responsibility of contingency, contradiction and other imperfections on the finite self rather than on the absolute, which is immanent in the finite self rather than on the absolute, which is immanent in the finite without being infected by its imperfections. While the finite relies on the infinite Atman for its life, the infinite is self-related and perfect. Value is

(continued from the previous page) more important than genesis and to know the way up to the absolute is said to be more relevant to our moral and spiritual needs than to trace the way down from it.

The absolute is the ground of existence and the goal of experience. This view recognises the world of existence and values and thus reconciles realism and idealism from the point of view of relevancy and comprehensiveness. Every judgment, logical, ethical and aesthetic, ultimately refers to the whole of reality. In an epistemological analysis of a perceptive judgment like "This is a lotus" there are four factors: the physical theory refers to the things given in sense perception, physiology to the neural process, psychology to the sensation and panlogism to reason. But neither realism, subjective idealism nor objective idealism can bridge the gap or the saltus in these sectional points of view. The ultimate unifying factor is the inner atman or real reality that alone gives a meaning to matter, life, sensation and self. And it is the universal that underlies the particulars and gives them substantiality. Likewise in an ethical judgment, the ultimate self is not the body or life or reason or the finite self but the inner controller of all thinkers and things; and this view offers the right perspective to hedonism, rationalism and eudaemonism. Divine possibility functions through moral freedom.

10. Atmanism thus satisfies the demands of metaphysics for unifying experience, the ethical need of the summum bonum and the aesthetic aspiration for absolute beauty and bliss.. The absolute Atman is thus the only self-explanation of the validity and value of the concepts of matter, life, consciousness and self, and it alone satisfies the

(continued from the previous page) intellectual demands of comprehensiveness by recognising the equal values of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics and it is no disaster to philosophy to pay these metaphysical compliments to the absolute.

The absolute Atman alone explains the subject-object relation and the pluralistic experience. While extreme pluralism insists on the manyness and the unrelatedness of the elements of reality and explains away its unity, monism relies on the self-identity of reality and the absoluteness of the one, and dismisses the world as an illusion. But Bosanquet observes in another context, there can be no unity without the universe or the universe without unity, and Atmanism recognises the claims of both and offers the true perspective. They are the ultimate facts or factors of reality and neither can be resolved into the other and both are distincts and not opposites. The ever-changing physical world serves as a suitable opportunity for the evolving self and the self seeks its own subject, the real reality, which environs and vivifies all things. As Broad says, the realist is unable to see the wood for the trees and the idealist the trees for the wood. In the words of Sorley, the monist, is in truth the essential dualist and the downward way of the monist is as uncertain and treacherous as the upward way of the pluralist. But Atmanism, as a speculative philosophy, sees the pervading identity in the persisting facts. It is the absolute that is immanent in the finite, but the finite cannot exhaust its infinity. The reals of nature and self co-exist as ultimate factors of reality and nature is external to the self but not to the in-dwelling self which informs both and infuses them with reality. As the eternal is rooted in the temporal, all

(continued from the previous page) development is in and not of reality. At the naturalistic level, the self becomes an off-shoot of matter; when it rises to the spiritual level, it realises its eternal nature by spiritual induction, and lastly, when it intuits the absolute, it is atmanised, and attains its eternal bliss.

11. Philosophy makes intuition intelligible and makes it the most articulate expression of experience. Thus all the views of reality ultimately converge in Atmanism. The term Atmanism is preferred to the terms Holism, Organism, Harmonism and Absolutism. While Holism has a naturalistic bias, Organism a biological accent, Harmonism has an ethical flavour. The synoptic view is not synoptic enough. The words soul, spirit and self lack definiteness and are not free from animistic and spiritualistic difficulties. Atmanism is more comprehensive than any of these expressions. It recognises the relative positions and perspectives of the various theories but corrects their tendency to sectional thinking by using a 'large scale map' of reality. Atman is Jnanam, Satyam and Anandam. When metaphysics is based on science and mathematics, it illumines the intellect, but when it is allied to ethics it lays stress on will and its values, and exalts life. In its aesthetic aspect, it is applied to art, and insists on the appreciation of Reality as the absolute Beauty. When it is the philosophy of mysticism and saving experience, it thinks of the eternal ecstasy of the unity-consciousness. It is not a new spiritual adventure after the unattainable, but is the stability and safety in which aspiration is crowned with achievement. When the philosopher develops this Atma-Drsti, he sees all things in the self and the self in all things under the form of eternity.

As the self-actualisation of the cosmic possibility, the absolute Atman realises its sportive spontaneity and, as the cosmic goal or hope, it is the home of all values and its Ananda or saving love is fulfilled only when the whole series of selves is atmanised.

12. D.M. DATTA: "THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL COROLLARY TO THE WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION."

Western psychology is almost unanimous as to the view that in the perception of an external object the mind does not come into direct contact with it. Even those psychologists who admit causal interaction between mind and matter hold that the mind knows an external object through the impressions created in it by changes in the body generated by influences coming from the object. Among Indian philosophers there were some who held the theory of the direct contact of the mind with the object—secured in the case of visual perception, for example, by the going on of the antahkarana to the object. But no such theory is found among Western psychologists. All Schools of Western philosophy accept the above psychology of perception; but they try to foist on or deduce from it different epistemological conclusions. The purpose of this paper is to consider the legitimacy of some of these important conclusions and to show what kind of epistemology is strictly consistent with this accepted psychology.

The specific epistemological theories which we consider in the light of this psychology are those which concern the two cognate problems, viz. (1) Do we know any external object? (2) If so, is it known immediately or mediately? Now, if it be a fact that the mind has no direct contact with the object of perception and comes to know the object through the sensations created by the physiological changes generated by the stimuli coming from the object, the most

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(continued from the previous page) satisfactory answer to the two questions will be "Yes, we know an external object and that mediately." Two other answers also are theoretically possible and actually given by some philosophers though they are not in strict consistency with the psychological theory from which they start; namely: (i) We know the existence of an external object and that immediately; and (ii) We do not know the existence of any external object and, therefore, the question as to how it is known does not at all arise. We shall try to show one by one how these two answers are inconsistent with their psychological premises and then show also the reasonableness of the view that external objects are known mediately.

Let us take the second answer first. It is the answer given, as is well known, either by sceptics who deny the knowledge of external objects or by subjective idealists who altogether deny the existence of the external objects. The chief objection against this answer is that unless we believe in an external object we cannot explain why there should be any sensation, the nature and duration of which are not wholly dependent on our minds. Some idealists have tried to explain this charge away by holding that the reason why there are some perceptions which are not wholly dependent on our wills is not that these are caused by extra-mental objects, but that these are caused by some forces within the mind which are not under the control of the mind as the knower. But this defence only admits in a round-about way the existence of factors other than and therefore external to ourselves as knowers and thus amounts to the confession that there are realities external to the knower. There are many other well-known grounds on which subjective idealism is

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(continued from the previous page) rejected; but as this one is sufficiently conclusive, we need not mention any other here. In fact, so far as the psychological premise in question is concerned, subjective idealism is wholly incompatible with it, because the premise involves the belief in external objects as the sources of the sense-stimuli. The psychological account of sense-perception can stand only if subjective idealism be false and subjective idealism also can stand if the psychological account be false. The attempt to deduce subjective idealism from the psychological view (as is sometimes done by some who start with the psychological origin of sense-impressions and showing thereby that all that we know about the objects are the mental changes, conclude that we do not know anything except these changes) involves the contradiction of the premise.

13. In criticising subjective idealism we have already shown the reason why at all we are led to suppose something other than the knowing self as being responsible for a sense-perception. We find that the nature and duration of the sensation are not wholly dependent on ourselves and hence we are not satisfied to think of the sensation as being wholly due to ourselves.

14. P. NARASIMHAM. "THE SOUL OF KNOWLEDGE." Introspection has become unpopular of late with certain psychologists, and yet it is forgotten that by that method of study alone we seem not only to understand ourselves as conscious entities but also put ourselves in a position to interpret others even by the results achieved by so-called external observation and analysis. There is no other method of enquiry to get at the self in conscious experience. In ignoring the self (whatever be its metaphysical status) in a psychological study, we are like the person who, seeing the world with his eyes open, and yet not "seeing" his own eyes, declares that the

(continued from the previous page) eye is not proved but that there is only seeing in evidence! It is thus that Hume denied the self; he forgot it was the subject "directly known as such," but looked for it in the "objects" of knowing. Similar has been the case with the problem of knowing. The main question how "a subject" can know an "object" is ignored.

15. If we accept evolution as a fact of the process of becoming in nature, the living as well as the non-living, then there must be a whole, a unitary something, from which the process obtains meaning and intelligible status. The various activities and the corresponding building up of forms are to be interpreted as the results inspired by an all-brooding and every-where-present principle, remaining as the one Source of Life and consciousness as well as accounting equally for the very formation of the original "lifeless atoms." It is as a sort of psychologist's fallacy that we attribute to each organism an individuality and separateness of its own and speak of it as prompted by instinct or as being itself intelligent. We forget that even our personality, is, on ultimate analysis, a camouflage, a myth, neither its beginning nor its ending being within our ken. We merely act and think as though we were individuals. It may be that the same Something that has worked out the inorganic world of "matter" with its various laws, and is the informing life of all the sub-human instinct-guided organisms, is also trying towards individualisation through "intelligent" action in man. In spite of all protestations to the contrary there is nothing that is one's own in the world either inorganic or organic. We have not yet become; we are yet in the process of becoming. A little introspection will convince

(continued from the previous page) any one that not only one does not know when and whence one has come into being as a conscious entity, but that one is equally ignorant and unconscious of the rising and fading of one's thoughts, and of where one is going to find one's end.

16. To such a one there can be no knowing of a "what" that is as an "other"; the process of knowing itself will consist in the unification of the object with the intelligence, the subject. The subject and object become as one. It is knowing by the process of becoming or rather being the very object itself. There, doubt and error find no place. The knower, the known and the knowing stand as one and the same. If from such a point of view we say we have known an "object" as for example, our own body, we become, as it were, the very body itself, the very units of the cells of our body with their various activities and inter-relations, living their very life both as parts and wholes. Such knowing will be a state of being at-one with the object in one's consciousness; while now it is as a picture-show working quite unconsciously and externally to ourselves by the fiat of the one Great Life called ordinarily Nature. Such is the inner and central the timeless and spaceless knowledge that we associate with Divinity alone. It is called the knowledge "Brahmic" in the Upanishads. We do not possess it now. We are "knowing" at present "mayavically" as external observers, as in a show. We are merely presented a panoramic picture of the process—leaving good room for theorisation,—we are not become the substance itself, the Thing-in-Itself. Hence we say we know now only unconsciously. Man as a higher animal is slowly evolving to be Ensouled, to be the temple of the one Great soul of the Universe. He is now only the "flower" of

(continued from the previous page) evolution waiting to become the "fruit" that contains within it the very "seed of Existence." It is but so, because in any fundamental sense there cannot be but one Soul, one Life, one I, that is also the Universe. There can be no other meaning metaphysically tenable for individuality – there cannot be two "absolutes" in the Universe. "By Its Light alone all these shine," says an Upanishad. That unique single principle is called at once Brahman and Atman, the former meaning the Reality or Object and the latter the Subject, the Eternal knower, yet one only in every sense. It is at once the Soul of all-knowing and of all Being.

Broadly speaking we may note three important stages of Evolution in knowledge: the unconscious, the pseudo-conscious and the conscious. The first is what is working as the uniformities or laws of the inorganic and a large portion of the earliest organic world. The second comprises the whole of the reflex-instinct system of the later organic world up to the animal man. And the third is the future consummation of the evolution process in the completed man commencing with his intelligence-instinct. We may say that the very trend of evolution, viewed from the inner or central point, is progress from the unconscious to the fully self-conscious, just as from the biological point of view, that is of forms, it is one of change from a homogeneous and undifferentiated state to one of definiteness of structure and function. Form is the symbol externally of the definiteness in the stage of progress, and the perfection of form will therefore represent the goal of Evolution. Form has meaning and status only for Life, and conversely, Life without its form has no real

(continued from the previous page) existence. To speak of a life beyond and without any form will therefore be only an abstraction, a figure of speech, something that has not come to exist. Evolution would be a meaningless life if the goal be considered as anything formless. We cannot therefore agree with any Vedantin or Buddhist that the goal of our life is a post-mortem state in some other "world" than here on Earth; but take it as what must be accomplished, completed and made to stand as a fact here, in the world of facts. The long and laborious process of evolution should otherwise appear as either childishness or lunacy.

17. We cannot agree that a Berkeleyan Idealism that shows scant respect to the normal "instinctive" distinction that man (let alone the brute, which is only an "idea" for Berkeley) makes between his subjective act of knowing and an objective being, that seems to voraciously swallow up all objects by simply knowing them, and that miserably impoverishes all reality by reducing it to "bare" human souls, a god and the play of "ideas" between them as if by a sort of miraculous wireless. It makes the story of evolution from the lowest to the highest forms a meaningless delusion. We would rather have a Leibnizian view that regards everything as at once both real and living. But from the point of view maintained here regarding real knowledge, the phrase *Esse is percipi* may be interpreted rather as containing a profound truth, as pointing out towards the very one-ness of knowing and being. While it is not true of the mere "mortal" man, it is utterly true of "divine" man. It is the "saving knowledge" of the Upanishads that the ultimate Subject is only one and the object is also Himself. We are not yet able to take up

(continued from the previous page) our stand at the centre of things to fully appreciate its significance; we seem to be roaming about round and the deluding circle at whose centre lies the Soul of Existence, the Eternal Truth, Knowledge and Reality in unity, the Upanishadic Atman.

18. HANUMANTA RAO: "THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF IDEALISM:" Absolutism tends to make philosophy speculative, transcendental and preposterous in theory and unprogressive in practice. Even if we admit the absolute as a philosophic principle for the sake of argument the assumption leaves us no better today than it left us in the days of Plato. To have recourse to the Absolute as a solution of life's problems is like a person in financial difficulties having recourse to day-dreaming as a solution of his economic problems. What experience needs for the solution of its problems is a dynamic whole that transforms the possible into the actual, a whole in the construction of which our thought and will are exercised from time to time, a whole which when thus constructed leaves us intellectually, economically, ethically and religiously in a better position. The chief defect of Absolutism is that it asserts a mere unverifiable possibility or as Newton said, a hypothesis nonfingo. What is needed is a working programme or, in the phraseology of science, a working postulate which we may check and verify and record progress.

19. The epistemological assumption that the world as an intelligible whole is an idea, has in recent years played so important a role in the history of idealism that it has technically come to be recognised as the cardinal principle of idealism. It is no doubt true that the assumption is epistemologically

(continued from the previous page) important, and idealistic philosophers have striven hard to develop it. But the stress that has been laid upon it so as to make it the cardinal principle of idealism, is out of all proportion to its real importance. The fact that much thought and effort has been expended in developing and elaborating it from the days of Descartes down to our time, does not entitle it to be called the cardinal principle of idealism. It can at best be regarded as one of the important features of the idealistic programme. It was the peculiar epistemological turn that Descartes gave to modern philosophy that is responsible for making much of it. The fact that such a turn was given does not make it valid. An ethical or religious turn might as well have been given and that would not have justified our making an ethical idea or a religious idea the cardinal principle of idealism. Just as it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted, if an ethical or religious conception is made its cardinal principle, even so it would make a philosophy narrow and stunted if it would make an epistemological assumption its central assumption. For a healthy philosophy epistemology should be no more important than physics, or ethics or religion. Each of them is a basis of philosophy, not the basis of philosophy. It is the aim of philosophy to evolve a conception of the universe that explains and unifies the manifold forms of experience. To unify experience in terms of any one of these is to turn away from the true aim of philosophy. Such a procedure has tended to make idealistic philosophy sectarian, and it has left us without a cardinal principle that could serve as a common platform for idealists to meet. Each idealist in trying to make his own bias – epistemological, ethica, aesthetic or religious – the principle basis of idealism, has contributed

(continued from the previous page) to the disintegration of idealism. It is of utmost importance for the revival and reintegration of idealism to create a platform wide enough for idealists of different interests and temperaments to meet and work in a co-operative spirit.

20. Conceived thus, idealism will gain in strength and vitality. It will considerably weaken opposition in so far as each of the fundamental human interests—*aesthetic, scientific, economic, ethical and religious*, is given its proper place on the idealistic platform. It would not be inconsistent for an idealist to be a scientist as well as a theist a logician as well as a mystic. Just as being a scientist does not come in the way of one's enjoying a novel or a poem is not science, even so, being a scientist does not prevent his heart from going up to God even though God is studied by other methods than those that physics employs. Similarly, being a logician does not prevent one from becoming a mystic though the method of mysticism is not the method of logic. Though I should admit that if a thing is to be known it should be known according to the laws of logic, yet I am not prevented from giving myself up to feeling when knowing fails to put me in possession of reality. If idealism is worked out in a catholic spirit as a method of viewing things, it may even win many a realist to the side of idealism. Though it would take a long time for persons like B. Russell to come under the away of idealism, it would not take a long time for persons like S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgon and A.N. Whitehead to come under its banner. Then we could say with Croce that all philosophy is essentially idealistic philosophy.

21. AKSHYA KUMAR BANERJEA: BRAMHASUTRA AND

(continued from the previous page) ADHYASA-VADA: The fundamental postulate with which he begins his introduction is that the subject and the object – the self and the not-self – the spirit and matter – are obviously distinct from and opposed to each other in their essential characteristics, and neither can really be in communion with the other, or participate in the nature and the attributes of the other. The only relation that can possibly exist between them is that of adhyasa, i.e. the false attribution of one or of one's characteristics to the other. This adhyasa gives birth to a relative or phenomenal or apparent reality, which may be described as a combination of the real and the unreal, the true and the false, – the real in respect of the adhithana or the substance to which what it is not is attributed and consequently the true character of which remains hidden or unmanifested, and the unreal in respect of that which is attributed to it and which falsely appears as real and pretends to present the real character of the substance.

Acharya Sankara asserts that the whole phenomenal world with which we are acquainted – the world of subjects and objects, egos and non-egos, in intercourse with one another, – the world of finite spirits and minds and matters – the world of substances and attributes, causes and effects; spatial and temporal externalities – is the product of a general adhyasa, the natural causeless beginningless attribution, to the one timeless, space-less, differenceless, absolute Spirit or Self, called Brahman or Atman, of a plurality of names and forms, which by themselves possess no reality, and likewise the attribution of the reality and spiritual characteristics of Brahman to these names and forms. All knowledge, emotion and activity, – all consciousness of Me and mine,

(continued from the previous page) Thee and Thine, the actual and the ideal, happiness and misery, ought and ought-not, – are the creations of this adhyasa.

Adhyasa, evidently involves two elements, – the concealment of the true nature of the substratum (adhithana) and its appearance as what it is not. This again refers to an observer from whom the true character of the substance is hidden and to whom it appears with false names and forms. With reference to such an implied observer, it is to be conceived as due to avidya or ignorance. This avidya is destroyed by Vidya or true knowledge. When the observer, by suitable spiritual discipline, attains Vidya or true knowledge of the real character of the Substance, viz. Brahman, adhyasa vanishes, the world of names and forms falsely attributed to Brahman disappears or no longer appears as real, and Brahman alone shines in His absolute infinite differenceless attributeless character. The observer himself also, as a separate entity, vanishes, or rather, having realised his absolute identity with Brahman, is completely merged in His differenceless unity.

Acharya concludes his introduction with the assertion that in course of his interpretation of the Sutras he will establish this to be the true significance of all the teachings of the Vedanta.

22. The individual spirit is primarily related to one body at a time. Through ignorance born of the will of Brahman, it identifies itself with the body for the time being and attributes its movements and sufferings and enjoyments to itself. It passes from one body to another according to its karma born of ignorance. But Brahman is at all times related to all bodies and is the self of all selves. The individual self, being related to the body, loses partially the consciousness of its supra-physical,

(continued from the previous page) supra-mental and supra-human character (swarupa), and becomes a victim to karma and its fruits, bondage and liberation. The indwelling universal spirit is not at all touched by the imperfections and limitations of the bodily existence, never loses even in the smallest measure the consciousness of His blissful perfect transcendent character, never attributes any action to Himself or suffers any consequences, never comes under any form of bondage and therefore requires no liberation. Nevertheless, all activities of the individual spirits and their consequent enjoyments and sufferings, the courses of their destinies and their bondage and liberation, are controlled and managed and regulated by His eternally perfect will. He is unconditionally the supreme object of their worship, the ultimate object of their quest, and the final goal of their progress. When they attain Vidya and realise their entity with Him, when they feel themselves in Him, by Him, from Him and for Him, when they see Him and Him alone within and without, when they experience nothing,—not even themselves—apart from Him, they are emancipated from all bondage and limitation and enjoy the blessedness of His perfect existence, being one with Him. This of course does not imply that the Jeevas have really no individual existence, and no bondage and liberation, and their varieties of experiences are all illusory. At least Badarayana in his sutras does not appear to draw such an inference.

23. As in a state of bondage the Jeeva identifies itself with the body and mind, so in a state of Mukti it identifies itself with Brahman. In reality the finite spirits are, as it were, sparks of the fire of Brahman, the spiritual parts (angsha) or partial self-manifestations

(continued from the previous page) (abhasa) of the Supreme Spirit, in whom they always 'live and move and have their being,' – unknowingly in the state of bondage and knowingly in the state of mukti. The relation between the Spiritual Whole and the Spiritual Parts, the Absolute Spirit and His spiritual self-manifestations, is one of identity as well as difference. The parts, though having no existence and essential characteristics apart from those of the whole, cannot be regarded as absolutely identical with the whole. The parts have limitations and changes of states and embodiments and environments; but the whole is absolutely free from them. The life of the whole pervades the lives of the parts, the self of the whole is the ultimate self of the selves of the parts, the whole governs the parts; but still the parts are parts, and they are not completely identical with the whole. When these parts become perfectly self-conscious, when their essential character, freed from the veil of ignorance and the consequent limitations, is perfectly unveiled (abirbhuta-swarupa), when their pure non-material supra-mental spiritual nature is perfectly realised they experience the whole – the supreme spirit – as their true self, their egoism which apparently divided them from the whole and the other parts is gone, and they identify themselves with the whole. There being no spatial externality between the Spiritual whole and the Spiritual part, the part in the state of perfect self-consciousness is in experience identical with the whole. But the difference of states of existence, the liability to ignorance and error, etc. imply the individualised existence of the parts. The reality of this individualised existence is presupposed by the very possibility of adhyasa

(continued from the previous page) and vidya. Badarayana is nowhere in the sutras found to deny the reality.

24. The objective reality of the world is most emphatically and unequivocally affirmed by him in connection with the refutation of Buddhistic Subjective Idealism, where he gives a solemn warning against the identification of perception and its objects, and the interpretation of the waking experience on the analogy of the dream-experience. The expressions like "neti, neti" of Sruti, he interprets as implying the denial of the limitedness (etabattwam) of Brahman within the range of His self-manifestations, and not the denial of the existence of the world. Brahman is not exhausted or exhaustible in His effect, but eternally unmanifested (avyakta) as well. By expressions like "Neha nanasti kinchana" he means that there is no plurality other than and independent of the one absolute Supreme Spirit. According to the Sutrakara, Brahman is everywhere in Sruti described as having an apparently dual character (ubhayalingam Sarbatra hi) viz. manifested and unmanifested, immanent and transcendent, differentiated and differenceless, active and inactive, saguna and nirguna etc. But the Sutrakara does not, like the Bhashyakara, think it necessary to harmonise the two aspects by saying that the one is real and the other is unreal, the one represents His true nature and the other is falsely ascribed to Him under the influence of beginningless avidya or ignorance. Thus from a comparative study of the Sutras and Bhasya, Sankara's theory of adhyasa appears to be adhyasta (somehow attributed) upon the philosophy of Badarayana.

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1. G.R. MALKANI: "REALITY AND VALUE." This love does not start from any self-seeking impulse but from a self-surrendering impulse, — "thou art

(continued from the previous page) everything, I am nothing!" Thus in this feeling we take up a higher and more spiritual being and share in its freedom. This being is wholly transcendental. All that there is on earth, all that we can think of in pure conception, is at best a symbol of it, — a sort of idol which we have created to symbolise it. It has no thinkable being. Our knowing attitude is here completely frustrated. The differences between mystics of different religions are differences therefore of symbolisation only; the reality which is truly divine and to which alone they offer their love cannot be thus differentiated.

We need a symbol, because we are finite. We want a thinkable something, a cognitive point of reference for what is beyond cognition. The symbol supplies this need. It is what we know. We do not know the symbolised. The latter is realised in our feeling only, or our love. The question of the knowledge of God therefore does not arise; and when it arises, it is taken to be quite illegitimate. To seek to know God is to make Him less than God, — it is to do violence to His divine and infinite nature. This attitude is quite natural. The reality of god is quite immediate in feeling. It can never be immediate in knowledge. Hence the complete meaninglessness and worthlessness of a presentation of God or a sight of God on the lines of our cognitive experience. The eye which can see God must be the eye of love, and not the physical or the mental eye. For the same reason, the God whom we worship cannot be an external God. It can be truly said of Him that He is love. God is love.

This is the highest freedom of feeling, because the feeling has no other object except the pure spirit; and spirit is freedom. The

(continued from the previous page) satisfaction too is complete. We can give ourselves entirely away, forget ourselves, and lose ourselves as we can never do in any finite thing. The consciousness of self is the source of all our sorrow; because it is the consciousness of limitation, of our finitude and smallness, thus giving rise to a constant effort to establish ourselves against a hostile world. All this is cancelled. We have found our peace in God. We are completely satisfied or fulfilled. This then appears to be the highest development of feeling or the Absolute of feeling. But is it a real Absolute?

We might now adopt a more critical attitude. It will be found that this feeling to be possible must presuppose a certain thought-scheme of reality. It would offend a true lover of God if we told him that God did not exist outside his feeling, or that God was love in the sense above indicated. Objectivity of God is something quite as real to him as his love for God. A Christian thinker would insist that a healthy religious attitude is an objective attitude. Pantheism and subjective mysticism are the products of a diseased and sentimental religious feeling. We cannot really argue against this view that it needs correction. For correction would cancel the feeling. Feeling only works within the frame-work of cognition or a set of beliefs about the nature of reality. And so God is not only love, but He is also the creator of the world or the Father in heaven etc. It thus becomes relevant to ask, does God exist? If he does, He must be capable of being known and not merely felt. Indeed faith can to a large extent supply the place of knowledge and initiate feeling. But faith leaves our desire for reflective moments assailed by doubts. This hampers feeling. Hence the need of an ideal which is not only an ideal of feeling

(continued from the previous page) but completely satisfies our desire for knowledge as well. In other words, the highest satisfaction must be co-incident with the Absolute Reality which is the ideal of knowledge.

It may here be argued that the evolution of feeling is in no way dependent upon knowledge. All that is needed is a belief in a transcendental reality. Starting with this belief, we can have an evolution of feeling which would terminate in what can properly be called the Absolute of feeling. But what is the nature of this ultimate realisation? Is it a feeling? The highest love needs to be felt by somebody toward some-one. It is only as long as there is this dualism that feeling of any kind can become possible. But can we say that with this dualism, feeling can reach its maximum or its highest level? It is certain that the slightest feeling of duality would act as a law to the complete fruition of the feeling of love. And so we are told by the mystics that in the end feeling ceases to be. The highest love completely forgets both itself and its object. It remains a pure radiance or a pure feeling. It is the mystic union. All distinctions disappear in it. Love become the Life, the Absolute or God.

This development of feeling is possible. But evidently the realisation of this ideal of feeling is not a feeling. We may call it love. But it is unrecognisable in its usual form. It is love that is more akin to being rather than to feeling. Being can be unitary or something entirely in itself. Feeling cannot be unitary, and it cannot be maintained except through a process. The ideal of feeling thus cannot be a feeling but being. And

(continued from the previous page) this is also the ideal of knowledge.

The question further arises – but is this kind of mystic union the true ideal of religious feeling? It appears to us that we can only think of the ideal on the above lines. At the same time, the maximum development thus attained would be some kind of state of being, essentially unstable in itself and finite in character. It would thus imply a higher standpoint in consciousness and so a higher reality. We should not therefore seek the true ideal of feeling in the direction above indicated. The only true ideal is one which is eternally accomplished; and its attainment, if we may so speak of it, can only take the form of removal of ignorance through knowledge. We shall find that this ideal is indicated in all our criticism of feeling. Religious feeling then, if it is to help towards the attainment of the ideal, must at some stage get transformed into knowledge, which alone is the way.

2. A.F. MARKHAM: "THE REALM OF VALUES:" There are thinkers who tell us that the mind of man can only know the products of its own activity and that no knowledge is possible of objects as they are in themselves. Protagoras long ago taught that the whole content of perception is subjective and sought to reduce the world to the succession of man's sensations. He denied that there is any such thing as contradiction and thus destroyed any theory of subjective knowledge whatever.

3. Berkeley was right in maintaining that no ideas can exist apart from a mind that perceives them. Values are eternal ideal objects which man can discover but, as Berkeley says, "all objects are eternally known by God."

I can find no meaning in an ideal self-existence apart from any mind or in an object which subsists somehow as that which is not yet but

(continued from the previous page) some day may be discovered by a mind.

4. The enigma of evil remains unsolved. The attempts of Leibniz and others to solve this problem are well known to you and perhaps considered inadequate. Lotze, in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, after explaining the inadequacy of the suggested solutions of the problem concludes:

"The above-mentioned incapacity of our speculative cognition for the solution of this enigma of evil had to be very plainly expressed. For there ought not to remain any seeming as if there were, in expressions which cannot be understood and which can only commend themselves to the imagination through intuitive images, any real speculative proof for the correctness of the religious feeling upon which rests our faith in a good and holy God, and in the destination of the world to the attainment of a blessed end.

5. The use of the word "God" as a synonym for reality as a whole or for the idea of perfection has led to confusion of thought. An impersonal reality or ens realissimum that cannot be related to anything else actual or possible is not the God postulated by religious experience or the locus of all values. Moreover it is difficult to understand how the Absolute could possibly be regarded as a person. The Absolute should mean that which is freed from all relations but is sometimes taken to mean simply the one ultimate ground of all existence. In the former sense God is not the Absolute. There cannot be anything excluded from the Absolute which embraces all finite spirits in a systematic whole. A whole which is composed of persons or finite centres of consciousness cannot itself be a person. Persons are capable of entering into a fellowship which is a real unity but to call such a unity a person would be to commit the fallacy

(continued from the previous page) of composition.

The Absolute is sometimes regarded as that which is complete and perfect in itself. Thus Aristotle thought of God as pure thought eternally contemplating itself. "A second great mistake," writes Mr Douglas Fawcett, "made by many idealists is to postulate the Absolute. The Absolute cannot be defined simply as "the whole of reality," since disputes would arise as to the filling of this whole. It is the world-ground as certain idealists, in love with a spiritual re-reading of appearances, conceive it. The Absolute as this spiritual ground of appearances, "complete, perfect and finished" confronts us in the Vedanta philosophy of India. It may have been first conceived by tired, not men in the plains, who liked finished tasks, rest and quiet, not only in their practical lives but also in the thought that matched them. Braman accordingly is above change, but what of the changing world in which we ourselves are changing? The answer is that this world (lie the Bradleian 'false' and 'contradictory' appearances showing change, causation, time, space, evil etc.), has only 'practical reality;' appeal to Maya saves the situation—for not too exacting critics. Prof. Deussen of Kiel, it is true, welcomed this Absolute, would not allow that it belongs to the past. But he defends it as a student of Kant, asserting that space, time, causation etc. are merely features of our phenomenal world. The absolute is above space and time, changeless, complete, finished; it is veiled by the forms of finite perception and judgment. I reply that a truly objective idealism accepts and stresses a real space-time world of change, and affirms therefore that the world-principle is manifest therein. A different hypothesis about the World-principle is required. The doctrine of Maya does not necessarily involve

(continued from the previous page) the falsity of the world. Maya is the mysterious power of creation.

6. C.A. TULPULE: "MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES: ARE THEY A REALITY." When man is trying to approach the Divine, he does so because he is confused and pained by the maddening diversity of his surroundings and the effect they have upon him. Not that he wants to get rid of his circumstances, but to find a peaceful co-ordination existing between them and himself. He wants to eliminate the jarring notes that are produced in his mind by the effects of things about him, and to find out how in the case of each isolated experience, he can lead a life of harmony, which is not disturbed or destroyed by remnants of memory or imaginings of the future. To do so he has to cultivate an attitude of the mind in which there will be an extreme adaptability in relation to each consecutive thought, without in any way disturbing his mental equipoise, without which the adaptability will have been cultivated in vain. Finding that Nature changeful but eternally unchanged, the seeker seeks to effect a change in himself. Giving up the task of trying to be true to ever-changing and indestructible circumstance, he attempts to be true to himself.

7. With his gaze thus concentrated upon his spiritual objective, he passes through a variety of experience. Beginning with an accentuation of the form of the particular idea, that is then present in his mind, accompanied by a wiping out, partial or total, of all other phenomena of thought a relaxation of senses and their objects, he goes to meet a world, with which he finds himself in growing sympathy; he finds his understanding becoming more full, his sympathies more universal and his joys increasing. There is a sort of mental illumination, a panoramic picture in which, against a background

(continued from the previous page) of the yet Unknown Dark, which holds forth possibilities of phosphorescent brilliance, are dotted the objects and individuals of the physical world; so many points of glowing lights, which warm the heart and delight the intelligence as manifestations of an all-pervading unity. This larger sympathy with life, this unclouded delight in all creation, is accompanied by a feeling that his own body is almost made up of something lighter than what it used to be; he feels that his outlook of life has become more impersonal and as such more truthful, that his thoughts are getting less and less soiled by his desires, that even his enjoyment of life has taken up the colour, not of hectic but short-lived passion, but of steady and sympathetic appreciation, a calm light sending out rays of cool and collected strength. Sometimes the seeker has a feeling that he has been, as it were, taken in hand by the Divine, that his acts and impulses are only manifestations of the Divine purpose, that he has been made the object of particular favour, as the mouthpiece of God. He feels that he is surrounded on all sides by the divine mystery and that even his heart is suffused by that Presence. He feels himself to be the particular object of Grace. God speaks to him in human voice and his eyes are blessed by being allowed to linger upon the beauty and majesty of His face. Passing from this stage of a personal and intensely human companionship, to that where he cherishes the Presence as something above substance and form, his vision is sometimes wrapped up in brilliancy of light, and his attention is absorbed in the eternal music of the Unspoken Voice.

8. G.R. MALKANI: "REALITY & VALUE." It is true that every feeling is finite. If therefore the

(continued from the previous page) ideal is felt, it too must be finite. But this is no reason for saying that there is no other form of consciousness beyond feeling in which the ideal may be realised. We have already indicated the possibility of it. It is a timeless consciousness wholly beyond feeling. In what sense can it be said to be finite? We can go beyond it neither temporally (it being not given to us in any sense), nor in any series of satisfactions arranged as higher and lower (it being the only possible terminus of such a series.) At the same time we cannot say that we have no evidence of it. The whole of life of feeling is its evidence. We are all conscious of a need, a dissatisfaction, a restlessness which we together call our unsatisfied aspirations. How are these possible? What is the impelling force behind them? We suggest that it is the infinite of feeling or the ideal and complete satisfaction. Paradoxical therefore as it may appear, all desire and aspiration is already fulfilment; it arises from it and is an appearance of it. It is thus true to say both that (1) the ideal is not felt, because there is always the need to feel it, and (2) because there is the need, we cannot deny all feeling of it. The ideal is in this way directly connected with our subjective experience. It can therefore only be thought of as our most immediate self, and not as some distant reality.

The idealistic tendency of thought is admitted. But why cannot thought rest in a finite satisfaction? The truth is that it is only through a certain pressure of reality upon thought that all upward movement is intelligible. We say that a particular satisfaction is "not all that it might be." This "might be" is only an unconscious rendering of what is at a level higher than thought.

9. The ontological argument as to the reality of God is not without certain point here. The argument is put in some such way: We have the thought of a most perfect being. But perfection involves existence. The thought of a most perfect being must therefore be the thought of a really existing perfection or a real God. The objection against this argument is that mere thought can prove nothing. It can never prove existence. To prove existence there must be intuition. We have no intuition of God. The thought of God can therefore as little prove God as the thought of a hundred-rupee note in my pocket can prove the existence of the note.

The criticism wholly misses the point of the ontological argument. The analogy of the note does not hold. The thought of a hundred-rupee note in my pocket is clearly a mere imagination, and no doubt may be said to arise in our mind as to its reality from the very beginning. The thought of a most perfect being is not similarly an imagination. There are no elements drawn from our ordinary experience which we can be said to put together in the idea of perfection. The perfect being at least might be. He is not disproved in the thought of it. Rather this thought suggests a problem. It is sheer dogmatism to reject the idea out of hand as illegitimate.

The point of the ontological argument does not consist in the denial of all intuition of the most perfect being. It consists in the necessity and the obligation of thought to think the idea of this being. Could we not do away with the idea? Need thought transcend itself? The answer is that the structure of reality is such that thought is obliged to think the idea. We have seen how in order to render intelligible a finite satisfaction, we have to postulate an infinite satisfaction. The finite by itself has

(continued from the previous page) no character and cannot be realised as finite. The infinite which we are thus obliged to postulate is not out of all relation to our intuition. If it were, it could not possibly exercise any pressure upon our thought. All we can say is that intuition here loses its subjective character; it becomes one with reality. In short, the infinite and the perfect must be real if anything known or felt by us is to be real.

The ontological argument thus understood is free from the objections ordinarily levelled against it. It is quite a valid argument. The thought of a most perfect being is symbolic of a really existing perfection. This perfection is intuited at a level higher than thought. The intuition is not strictly subjective, or mine as opposed to yours. It may in a sense be said to combine the two necessary elements of subjective certainty and objective validity and reduces them to an ultimate adequacy in which the subjective and the objective gets lost. It is an over-individual intuition which alone accounts for the Kantian ideas of Reason or the ultimates of thought in general. This intuition is the inmost of us. It is beyond introspection, and yet all introspection leads us back to it as its presupposition. It is implied by all our experience, whether it is cognitive, emotional or conative, and yet in itself it is quite indistinguishable. We think it under different forms according to the needs of our experience as it is, and the necessity of conceiving different ideals in order to explain that experience. In itself, the reality is a whole, without distinction, and without the possibility of any kind of relation subsisting within it. It is without aspects and without thinkable content; and yet it sums up in its own indivisible and dimensionless unity all aspects

(continued from the previous page) of our experience and all possible content. The inmost is thus not exclusive of the outmost but inclusive of it. It is the Absolute Reality.

10. The view which we suggest is that the highest happiness or the highest satisfaction is just the satisfaction of pure being, and not something which is distinguishable from the latter, or something of which being is conscious. We are accustomed to think that all happiness is happiness felt by a person,—"I am happy," etc. But what exactly is the relation of myself and happiness here? I may be conscious of happiness. But so far really I cannot be said to be happy. It is paradoxical, but it is true. I can only be said to be really happy, when I am not conscious of it, when in truth happiness does not fall apart but is coincident with me or is myself. All real happiness consists in this identity or this indistinguishableness of happiness from being. I am most happy when I least know it.

We shall see this principle illustrated in all our finite satisfactions. All felt happiness consists in the consciousness of a certain passage from one state to another. This passage has a certain felt direction; it is always from a state which is comparatively painful to a state which is not, or from pain to pleasure. We cannot really pass from pleasure to pleasure, unless the earlier pleasure has entered on a stage of fatigue or has more or less ceased to be felt as pleasurable. The question is,—granting the passage, is not the succeeding state in itself pleasurable?

The succeeding state, we contend, is really no state in it. Its whole character is derived from the nature of the passage. Any state whatsoever, taken by itself, would be just pure

(continued from the previous page) being, identical with it, without any pleasant or painful character. Whenever we are conscious of pleasure, we are conscious of a passage from a state of pain to one of comparative painlessness. It is not any newly arisen state that is pleasurable, but the process of freeing ourselves consciously from a state of pain or of desire. Any possible new state would be just like the one from which we have freed ourselves, as becomes evident when any supposed pleasure begins to stay. We tire of pleasure also. What is really pleasurable is not any state, but the process of freeing ourselves from what has become a dead weight on the soul or a positive pain. Hence also the maximum of pleasure is felt not at any stage of the process, but when the process is completed, and that weight is lifted, and we are fully satisfied. We are at this moment in no real state at all. We are simply enjoying we might say the freedom of being, or freedom from all desire and states of being; for all states are a dead weight upon the soul. True happiness thus consists in being free. And the highest happiness or the summum bonum is absolute freedom, and not any condition or state of being. The idea of happiness as something supervening upon being, or as a positive experience of being, or as a state of being, are all notions of transitory happiness, which is so far as it is happiness at all conforms to the absolute type and realises a measure of its freedom. All happiness is freedom of being; it is this free being itself, and not any state or condition of it.

11. U.C. BHATTACHARJEE: "THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN THOUGHT."
In the philosophy of Plato – and as a matter of fact in ancient philosophy throughout –
Time is considered less

(continued from the previous page) real than eternity. And it would not be altogether wrong if we said that the tendency is rather to regard Time as unreal. Degrees of reality may be an inadmissible conception. In that case, Time is unquestionably unreal; but if reality may be conceived as less and more, then time is undoubtedly less real than eternity. The temporal order is an appearance—the changing is passing and unstable. And Reality is the changeless and the eternal; it is Being, while becoming is only a passing show. The difficulties which such a view of time has involved are well-known.

12. Is Plato's eternal order of things, therefore, a negation of time or an affirmation of all-time?—a beginningless and ceaseless flow of time? Kant gives a new turn to the problem of Time. Time is only a form of intuition. The things-in-themselves are not in Time, though we have to think of them as in time. The fact of Time is recognised, only Time is now purely subjective, having no objective reality.

13. For Bergson, Time is the stuff of which reality is made. Time is not only not unreal, but is reality itself. It is a force that creates. Succession we are told, is an undeniable fact.

14. Now that the time-concept has acquired this new importance, may we not turn to the ancient heritage of Hindu thought and see what it has had to offer regarding this problem?

About Space, Indian Thought offers two distinct views: one is that space was created, the other is that it is uncreated. In the Vedanta Sutras the doctrine is definitely laid down that space was created and that it was created at a particular stage in the process of creation. But against this doctrine, we have the view of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school that space is a dravya and is thus ultimate.

U.C. BHATTACHARJEE: "THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN THOUGHT."

But what about Time? The account given of Time is somewhat wavering. Commonsense had its own view about Time as about Space; and some of the systems also give a clear and definite theory about Time. But still, as in Europe, so in India, Time has offered difficulties which could not be so easily overcome. And hence about Time we find more diverse views than about Space.

Time is a more difficult and complicated idea than Space. We can think of a space-less reality—such as a soul. But can we think of any existence without time—or, as Bergson would put it, without duration? A time-reference is more inevitable in our thinking than a space-reference. Besides, the fact of change cannot be accounted for by Space. Time alone can explain it. Whether ultimate or not, change is a fact. And Change and Time are correlated ideas. This also adds to the difficulty of any clear definition of the time-idea.

Popularly, in Indian thought, time, for which the word Kala is the usual name, has been variously described. In the Gita X.30 we are told that God was himself the time (Kala) that is used in reckoning and in X.33 He is identified with the changeless time (aksayaKala). One is time that is measured, and the other is absolute time. And, again, in XI.31 Time is identified with God, is spoken of as the destroyer of things (lokalaksayakrt). Commentators would not take these passages as a theory of time but would rather take the time and Kala in its half-mythological and half-mystical sense of a power and a deity. Yet the way in which Time or Kala is spoken of in other places as well leaves little doubt as to the fact that all these statements presupposed a more or less definite theory of time. In the Mahabharata itself there are scores of

(continued from the previous page) passages where some such theory is advanced. (in V.32.24). Time is spoken of as the cause of things; VI.14.60 also speaks of time as a determinant—as a cause of things; and in VII 78.6 Time is described as the force that rules and regulates all things.

In XII 25.5. we have a long discourse on the omnipotence of time, which reads like a passage from Bergon.

"Man owes everything to time. Nothing happens out of its turn, but everything in its time. Time determines the course of things. Time brings fast winds and time again is the cause of rain. Time makes flowers to bloom. The phases of the moon—the full and new moon—are all determined by time. Rivers do not flow more swiftly than their allotted time. No one is born except in his time and no one dies before his time. The sun does not rise before its time and nor does it set after its time."

In XII.139 we have a lecture on Time in a similar strain, viz. that time is responsible for man's birth and death, his sorrows and sufferings as well as his enjoyment and happiness. Similar thought is expressed in numerous other places also.

In XIII. 274. we have what is apparently a philosophical discourse. There, too, time is spoken of as an element which along with the five well-known elements of earth, water, etc. constitutes the material cause of the world. The passage is somewhat obscure, but the recognition of the elemental character of time is clear.

In iii 312, 118. Time is described as the great consumer of all things. The same idea is repeated in xii 321, 92, and also in xi.2 and xvii.1.3.

In these and plenty of other passages, the theory²³ of time advanced seems to be that it is

²³ The original editor corrected spll "thory" to "theory" by hand

(continued from the previous page) a force—a driving power—a kind of necessity—which determines the flow of things; and that it is not controlled by any power beyond it, because there is no power above and beyond it.

But in V.68.12-13, a passage which has been approvingly quoted in some of the Vaisnava writings, specially of Bengal, we have a statement that the wheel of time is controlled by God of the Universe. Time is not an independent reality, it is under the direction of God. But still it is a force that determines the events of the world, and not a mere form of perception.

A consideration of these views leads us to the conclusion that the prevailing popular view about time was that it was a potent agent—a kind of necessity—that made each event of the universe appear in its proper place in the series, and the sequence of things was determined by it either independently or under the guidance of God.

In the Puranas, Time or Kala is also identified with the God of destruction. That time destroys all temporal things—all things that have a beginning—is a common experience. It is no wonder, then, that it was regarded as a force that brought about the end of things and that the end of things was a necessity that could not be evaded.

Can we brush aside these views as a mere mythology or as mere figures of speech? There is a tendency to think that the Puranas including the Mahabharata are full of mythological and allegorical statements. Without entering into the merits of this view, we may remind ourselves that these very books were regarded as the expression of sober truth by many men; and that texts of the Mahabharata—specially the Gita—have been taken in their literal sense and have been referred to as authority by no less a person than the author

(continued from the previous page) of the Vedanta-Sutras. This fact stands in the way of our summary rejection of the views about Time that have found expression in the Mahabharata. And if we accept them as an expression of sober beliefs, we cannot but conclude that in India time was regarded by many as a force, just as it is regarded by Bergson today.

This conclusion finds some collateral support in the doctrine of Karma. Karma also is a kind of blind necessity that determines the course of a man's life. Apart from the question of free-will, which did not assume in India the proportions it did in the West, and even assuming that Karma was originally a free act of the agent, it cannot be denied that, according to the leading opinions, Karma once done was a necessity that must spend itself out: it was a force that must spend itself out in consequences it may be neutralised or given a new direction by a contrary force; it may even be consumed—reduced to ashes, so to say, (cf. Gita iv.38) by knowledge. But until this is done, it is a force that works, and works with a relentless necessity.

It is no wonder, then, that a series of parallel observations led the Indian mind to view Time also as a force. Death occurs when death is due and a flower blooms only in its proper time. The course of events has a regularity—an order, which cannot escape notice. What determines this order—this clock-like regularity? Each thing happens in its time. Time, therefore, determines every happening.

A popular view there was that time was a force. How was Time accounted for in the systems? Nyaya-Vaisesika regards Time like Space as one of the dravyas—and as such ultimate. How does Vedanta account for it? In the chapter

U.C. BHATTACHARJEE: "THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN INDIAN THOUGHT."

(continued from the previous page) on creation, we have space accounted for as created and the order of creation also is fully discussed. But nothing is said of time. Of course when we remember the general position of Vedanta that Brahma is the sole cause of the world and when we further remember that the world is viewed as in space and time, we may conclude in a general way that time like space also owes its origin to Brahma. But, however logical such a conclusion might appear at first sight, it cannot be so easily reconciled with other aspects of the Vedantic position.

In the first place, there is the order of creation. If the order is not logical—and there is no indication to think that it was logical—clearly it is a temporal order. And if creation is a process in time, time is beyond creation and is uncreated. Secondly, there are the passages in Sruti (e.g. Br.Up. i,4.1. etc) which speak of the existence of Brahma before creation. Now, before and after imply time; Brahma, therefore, in so far as he was existing before creation, and created the world at a point of time, was himself in time.

Add to this the conception of eternity. Brahma is universally described as eternal or nitya. Now, what is the meaning of nitya? We have a categorical statement of Ramanuja that nitya means existing for all time—(sarva-kalavarttitvam hi nityatayam). Can we really doubt in the face of these facts that the Vedantist understood eternity as all-time? If so, was not time an ultimate reality? And if this view of time be accepted as correct, what becomes of the absolute monism of Sankara and his School? Brahma has a second in so far as there is time which is not himself. Or shall we take time as identical with Brahma? In that case we

(continued from the previous page) sink back into the puranic conception of time.

It will perhaps be admitted that the Vedantist view—or, rather the absence of any view in Vedanta—of time is not quite satisfactory. But to the ordinary man and the religious mind, the ravages of time appeared as quite real, and time, with or without a God to guide it, was considered to be a potency—a force—a necessity that ruled the fate of things. That the processes of the world were determined by time, was clearly recognised. The evanescence of individual life and its joys and sorrows, the fickleness of the "boast of heraldry" and the 'pomp of power' led the Indian mind quite clearly to realise that the "paths of glory lead but to the grave." The temporal character of the world was perceived; and with it was also perceived the destructiveness of time. This in itself, however does not give any comprehensive account of time and its relation with the world. Admitting in a general way that time is a determining condition of the world, its relation with the world may be understood in either of two ways:

We can think of time as in the world and also we can think of the world as in time. The two do not mean the same thing: they are alternative views, though according to both, time determines the world. According to the first view, the finite mind alone has to think of the world in time, but strictly speaking it is not in time. According to the other view, even to the infinite mind the world appears as in time. If time is in the world, whatever its importance in it may be, time is not real beyond the world of phenomena and hence we have to think of the Creator of the world as himself above time, yet imparting to the world its temporal character. But if, on the other hand, time is believed to be real beyond the world

(continued from the previous page) of phenomena—if it determines the world-processes from outside and the world is in time,—then we can hardly avoid thinking of it as an ultimate reality; and of God as living in time. That appears to be the view of the Vedanta. Brahma is nitya in the sense that he pervades all time but still he is in time. Indian thought does not appear to have gone beyond this point.

Again, taking Time as real, Indian thought has emphasised over and anon the fact of its destructiveness. It has often been described as a force but a force that kills. That time not only makes the present past but also ushers in a future—not only destroys things that are but also brings new things into existence, does not appear to have impressed the Indian mind. Time not only destroys but also creates. But Indian thought seldom recognised this creativeness of time. It was left for the genius of Bergson to discover it. Perhaps the fuller view of time is that it destroys in order to create and creates in order to destroy.

15. G.R. MALKANI: "THE ABSOLUTE." The one absolutely undeniable fact is experience. This experience has levels. At the primitive or unreflective level, it is immersed in bodily activity. All instinctive actions are intelligent actions; but here intelligence is not separable from the activity as that which initiates the latter. The separation comes with the birth of the intellect; and with intellect comes reflection and freedom of action and movement. All our problems arise at the reflective level. We cannot say exactly what experience is like at the unreflective level. But once reflection has come in, a dualism has automatically come into being. We make a distinction between a reality that is given and our experience of it.

All philosophical problems originate from

(continued from the previous page) dualism. The fundamental philosophical problem therefore is whether this dualism is ultimate and in the nature of things. It is certain that it is non-existent to the primitive mind and to the mind of the mystic. It is real only for reflection. Is the reflective form of experience a true experience of reality? One thing seems certain. Reality for us is not an absolute something that has a meaning independently of our experience of it. What reality is or signifies depends upon the way we know it. The reflective form of experience would be a true experience if it were internally coherent and stable, and did not give rise to problems that are insoluble. This however, is by no means the case. Having created a dualism, the gulf can never be properly bridged in knowledge. All knowledge of reality at the thought level involves subjective uncertainty and objective doubt. This uncertainty and this doubt can only be eliminated if we could know reality face to face, directly, and without any form of mediation. This is not possible to reflective consciousness itself, for which a factual distinction of the subject and the object or reality and experience appears to be altogether undeniable. The truth of reflective consciousness must therefore be contained in a higher consciousness, in which the above dualism disappears; knowledge coincides with reality and becomes this reality; or as it is said "to know Brahman is to become Brahman."

Philosophy is possible only at the reflective level. And it is possible, because the higher consciousness is implicit at every stage of reflection. This has a bearing upon the nature of the solutions that can be reached. We cannot give positive answers to positive questions. We can only analyse the questions to see what are their ultimate presuppositions, whether

(continued from the previous page) those presuppositions are warranted, and whether they should not be given up in favour of others which approximate self-evidence. Self-evidence is for reflection the ideal of truth. All questions must be led back to the ultimate ground of self-evidence, and then they will be seen not to arise at all; for the self-evident is that which is believed in and which yet cannot be made the subject-matter of any problem, doubt or question. "There is an explicit consciousness," as Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya says, "of doubt about its being unintelligible." Again, "to be conscious of a content as self-evident is to be conscious not of its negation being unmeaning but of the problem of meaning its negation not even arising." All philosophical problems thus lead us back to the self-evident which is their truth and contains their ultimate solution.

The self-evident is not the object of any consciousness; for any such distinction of object and subject would at once give rise to the old problems. It is the higher consciousness itself, which is higher because it is internally stable and self-sufficient, and gives rise to the old problems. It is the higher consciousness itself, which is higher because it is internally stable and self-sufficient, and gives rise to no problems that are soluble in reflective or any other consciousness. It has implicit in it and is its own truth. Philosophy is no doubt a matter of reasoning, but it is reasoning back to the self-evident or experience at its highest.

If what we have said is true, there can be no intellectual solution of problems that are intellectually raised. Every attempt to construct a system intellectually perfect, so that all problems of reflective thought would find

(continued from the previous page) their solutions in it, is doomed to failure. Speculation in philosophy must not be a through intellectualisation of reality, but through criticism of experience at the intellectual level to rise above that mode of experience. We must recognize that the intellect necessarily involves us in self-contradiction, and that at its best it provides alternative solutions that are equally valid. An intellectual solution therefore can never be complete and final. It is no solution at all.

The absolute is the ultimate ground of self-evidence. It is reality as well as experience or the unity of both. It is not something to be known. What is to be known exists prior to the knowledge of it, and can only be related to knowledge as what is distinct from it. The old dualism and the problems consequent upon it will remain. Indeed it can be argued that the dualism is not a duality, and that at no level can reality and knowledge or subject and object be conceived as separable. Reality is necessarily to be thought of in relation to knowledge. If this were not so we could not talk intelligently about reality or raise any problems about it or philosophise. This may no doubt be true. But even then, we cannot be satisfied. The dualism demands to be reduced to a unity (materialistic or idealistic), or as an alternative to be further elaborated or defined, leading to fresh problems.

The Absolute is not something to be known. It is the higher consciousness which is implicit at every stage of reflection, and so real from the very start. Still there is a sense in which the Absolute is to be realised; and contradictory as it may appear, it is to be realised intellectually. What does this mean? Some

(continued from the previous page) philosophers speak of an intellectual intuition of the real. This would be unintelligible if it were understood as some form of intuition visualisable by the intellect. The intellect must lose itself or cease to function. Are we then to have recourse to pure mysticism, leaving intellect entirely out? That too is inadmissible. What is necessary for the realisation of the Absolute is a complete resolution of all the problems and doubts of the intellect in the light of a timeless experience or absolute intuition. The intellect loses itself because it is fully satisfied, and recognises what is self-evident and the very ideal of truth.

16. Consciousness necessarily exists before the knowledge of any content. To know a thing is to know what was previously unknown. This transition from no-knowledge to knowledge could never be known if consciousness did not exist prior to the knowledge of the content in question. For the same reason we can never prove the non-existence of consciousness once a series of conscious events has been postulated. Consciousness is necessarily self-continuous and without any break. It can never be proved not to be at any point. All such proof would contradict itself. We cannot say the same about any object. There can be no possible proof that the object exists when it is not known. Such existence can at best be an inference from the actual knowledge of the object. But this inference is unjustified in view of our experience of dreams and illusions where we have apparent knowledge but no real objects. It is not necessary that objects should really be in order that we should appear to know them.

We conclude that consciousness alone is real.

(continued from the previous page) It is wrong to say that it has a necessary relation to the content, and is itself nothing without the relation. The real consciousness or the pure subject is no known content of any kind, and its reality is incompatible with the reality of any content. There is thus no real relation between them or any relation such as may be supposed to exist between two contents. If we take the latter relation as the type of all relations, the relation between content and consciousness has to be entirely denied. If we realise this, consciousness is freed from its relatedness to content. It becomes the Absolute, the only free, real and self-contained being. The ideal which we reach in this way is not the realisation of any non-implicational distinction, or some kind of unity of subject and object but the realisation of the complete falsity of one of the terms and through it the freeing of the other of its apparent and misapprehended relatedness.

17. P.P.S. SASTRI: "THE PLACE OF GOD IN ADVAITA." In philosophy, as in religion, "God" signifies that Being from whom the universe has its source.

18. Any Being that transcends happiness and misery, that does not recognise a distinct soul to be cheered and comforted, any undetermined Being that is called the Absolute or Ultimate cannot be called God; and it is not so called in the advaita system. The term most closely approximating to God is Isvara; there is a place for Isvara in the Advaita; that may or may not be a satisfactory account of Isvara, but there is no justification for what Mr Raghavendrachar has done – the identification of God with the Ultimate.

19. The dvaitin has always resorted to the trick of setting up dummies and knocking them

(continued from the previous page) down. The characterisation of the Advaitin's Brahman as indeterminate is a case in point. The indeterminate is the characterless; it is a blank, a void (sunya); it is against such a conception of the advaitin's Absolute that Prof. Hiriyanna so rightly protests (p.375, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*). The Absolute is undetermined, while the finite by its very nature is determined. The finite, however, is not determinate; for, to be determinate is to have character, to have self-subsistent reality unaffected by change from within or without. Such character (not characterisation or characteristic) belongs truly to the Absolute alone. To call that the indeterminate is to prejudge the case against the advaitin making him out to be no better than a sunyavadin. The Absolute is the undetermined.

What is the justification for maintaining not merely that the undetermined is real, but also that it is the sole real? The answer comes from our conception of reality. When in our every-day experience we claim something to be real and dismiss something else as unreal, what is it that we employ as our criterion? Uniformity, consistency, persistence, not being subject to variation by adventitious circumstances, non-sublation, in a word. Dreams, we say, are unreal, because they are sublated. We take waking experience to be real, because its sublation is not seen so far. But so long as there is another place or time or thing we have not experienced, what we now experience is subject to the possibility of sublation. To guard against sublation effectively one must, therefore, look for reality in what is above determination, whether in space or time, or by any other object. Hence the conception of the undetermined as the sole real.

20. The jiva is enveloped in nescience located in himself. As a consequence, though he is in reality identical with the one secondless Absolute, he feels limited in time and in space and by other objects, intelligent and non-intelligent; though of the essential nature of intelligence, he feels his cognitive capacities limited to particular objects and particular means; though having no desires to satisfy or purposes to fulfil, he finds himself limited to acting in specific ways for specific ends with uncertain success; as the logical presupposition of such limited capacities, known to be limited, he feels compelled to project not a being that is essential knowledge, but one that is the cogniser of all, not a being that has no purposes, but one that has all purposes fulfilled. This postulated Being is common to all jivas; for, whatever their starting point, they arrive at the conception of the possession of all capacities; they agree in what God is, though they may differ in their conceptions of the mode in which He is a complement to each of them. This God has maya as adjunct, for, if He were adjunctless, He would be knowledge, not knower. But by the very conditions of the postulation, He is not conditioned by maya, as jivas are. While jivas are maya-bound, Isvara is the controller of maya (mayam tu prakrtim vidyat, mayinam tu mahesvaram); He is limited by maya only in so far as He should have something to control.

This conception of Isvara remains, however, still on the level of the dualistic conception of the world. It implies distinction among finite intelligences, and from the supreme intelligence, also from what is non-intelligent. But it gives room for moving on to non-dualism when these distinctions are transcended, maya

(continued from the previous page) apprehended as phenomenal, and Brahman realised to be the sole real. That is why the advaitin finds it possible to admit Isvara. So long as there is ignorance, it is bi-polar, involving a distinction of locus from content. It is located in the jiva and refers to Isvara. The being with finite powers posits not an infinite being, but a being with infinite powers. God is an indispensable postulate of the thinking man. But when the thinking is thought out, when it has ceased to be discursive and has fulfilled itself in experience, when, as the advaitin would say, it has culminated in the intuitive realisation of the Scriptural declaration of oneness, then there is neither God nor man. These two were like the prototype and the reflection; the reflecting medium having been realised to be unreal, there is neither prototype nor reflection, but pure intelligence alone.

21. The advaitin's Brahman is said to be supra-relational, while even Isvara is said to be phenomenal, since He is in the world of relations. It is meaningless to say that "the real is necessarily relative." On the contrary what is relative cannot as such be real.

VEDANTA KESARI: REVIEW OF AUROBINDO'S "LIFE DIVINE." The present work, which brings together the series of articles that Sri Aurobindo had originally contributed to the Arya is a comprehensive exposition of the philosophy of the author. It seeks to be a new presentation of the wisdom enshrined in the Vedanta. As such, a criticism of the older systems of Vedanta, especially of the Mayavada associated with the name of Sri Sankara, occupies an important place in the book. These criticisms, coming as they do from so highly creative a mind as that of Sri Aurobindo, are

(continued from the previous page) no doubt very illuminating, but they leave the relevancy of the Maya doctrine in the Vedanta practically untouched. The central problem of all systems of spiritual philosophy, especially of the monistic type, is to explain how the perfection of the Deity is not marred by an imperfect world, which springs from, and subsists in, Him. Whatever its other defects be, the Maya doctrine has the supreme merit of giving a satisfactory answer to this knotty problem. If the world is only an apparent manifestation of Brahman, very real, no doubt, at the level of individual consciousness, but only an appearance in reference to the Brahmic consciousness, the intellect can possibly understand the statement that God is unaffected by the imperfections of the world. For a thing that is only an appearance can have an existence of a kind without affecting the integrity or the real nature of the substratum, of which it is an appearance.

A unity of existence, achieved through the denial of absolute reality to multiplicity is not acceptable to the system advocated in this book. According to it, the Absolute, no doubt, transcends both the One and the Many, the Changeless and the Changeful. But so long as the Absolute cannot be conceived by the mind, it will be a partial and fallacious reading of It to ignore any of these two aspects in which the mind apprehends It. It is this fallacy that has found expression in one-sided doctrines like asceticism and materialism, the first denying the reality of the Many and the second of the One. Both these one-sided theories have had disastrous consequences on civilization, that of the first being greater than that of the second in many respects. So Sri Aurobindo's system seeks to steer clear of these two, the Scylla and Charybdis of man's mental

(continued from the previous page) life, by insisting on the equal reality of both change and changelessness, of both the One and the Many.

While the inherent realism of our mode of thinking is thus satisfied, it is open to question whether this is not achieved by an unnecessary mystification of things. For the system of thought represented herein is monistic, asserting the unity of existence, and unless it be by sanctifying mystification, one's understanding gets simply puzzled as to how the ultimate Reality does not lose its identity in the real multiplicity into which it breaks. To help the mind in overcoming the difficulty, other categories like Truth, Consciousness, Supermind, Overmind, etc. are brought in as intermediary terms between the Absolute and the relative. While they have much mystical value, they do not, unlike the clear analysis of the Mayavada, help in the least in comprehending how the One remains the One in the midst of change. For if these intermediary categories are different from Sachchidananda, Dualism is the inevitable consequence. But that, the system of Sri Aurobindo never claims to be. The only other alternative – and that is the one adopted in this book – is to assert that the Absolute remains unaffected in spite of real change in It, be it through intermediary terms. One wonders how this is an improvement on Mayavada, as it is claimed to be, unless an intellectually absurd concept must necessarily be an improvement on an intellectually understandable one. For what this doctrine leaves as a mystery, fit to be established only by the power of repetition and sanctification of contradiction, the Mayavada seeks to explain by telling us what "change" means to the Absolute.

Incidentally it is also relevant to note here, that it is not quite correct to describe

(continued from the previous page) Sri Sankara's doctrine as Mayavada, as his critics often do. His doctrine is essentially Brahmvada. The unity of Existence is its fundamental principle; the relative reality of the world (Jaganmithyatva) is only what follows from it. A proper appreciation of this would disarm much of the criticism directed against Sanakra.

The system of thought advocated in the present work as also in the other writings of Sri Aurobindo is sometimes spoken of as a new development in Hindu philosophy. This is not, however, quite correct. For it is not much different from that well-known aspect of Hindu philosophy. For it is not much different from that well-known aspect of Hindu philosophy described generally as Bhedabheda of Identity-in-difference, and the type of monistic philosophy advocated by the cult of Shaktism. What is, however, new is the ethical implication drawn out of this doctrine, supplemented by certain extensions of the modern theory of evolution. For example, it is argued that if Matter is only a manifestation of the Spirit, there is no reason why the perfection of the Spirit should not express itself in an increasing measure in life at the physical level. This increasing expression is the meaning and implication of evolution. Evolution has not stopped with the coming of mind and the dawn of our present human consciousness. The next stage in it is the expression of the Supermind at the plane of our earthly consciousness and the consequent appearance of perfect life on earth. Spiritual aspirants in the past have attained to the Supramental consciousness by passing out of earthly Consciousness. This process, which is described as the ascent to the Spirit, is

(continued from the previous page) different from the higher stage of evolution referred to above, and is distinguished from it as the descent of the Spirit into matter.

But one wonders whether a total rejection of the Maya doctrine, which is so intrinsically related to the theory of spiritual monism, is after all necessary to establish the view of life described above. Maya doctrine is in no way opposed to the concept of evolution and the coming of a higher kind of life on earth; it only questions the wisdom of characterizing evolution as a real modification of the Absolute; for that would be equal to saying that the Absolute loses Its perfection—its character as Sachchidananda. The question as to whether evolution has a purpose or not is relevant only within the field of evolution; to carry it into the Absolute will be to take a purely personal view of It, which is tantamount to denial of the Absolute. So the Mayavada merely states, by its doctrine of appearance, how the Absolute is not in the least affected by change while making ample room for evolution and progress in a limited sense within the field of change. This view of evolution and its course have been set forth by Hindu thinkers in their doctrine of Cycles. According to this doctrine evolution is not a movement in an endless straight line towards greater and greater perfection, but a cyclic or wave-like motion with ups and downs or periods of progress followed by periods of decline. So the coming of a more evolved type of human beings, with higher powers than reason developed in them, is in no way against the Maya doctrine. The darkness of the age of mind may be lighted by the dawn of supramental consciousness. But no worldly perfection is of eternal duration; for that is impossible in this world of change. So in

(continued from the previous page) the wheel of evolution a set back or decline will follow a period of rise or progress. Thus, in the light of the Hindu theory of evolution, even if there is to be an age of supramental consciousness and world transformation, that will not be eternal, nor be the unconditioned perfection of the Spirit.

From the fact that in a monistic philosophy Matter is not different in substance from Spirit, it cannot be argued, as is done in this book, that the perfection of the Spirit can become manifest at the plane of Matter. From the point of view of real transformation, if this occurred, Matter will resolve into Spirit, there being no longer that difference in vibration responsible for the state called Matter. From the viewpoint of apparent transformation, which is that of Mayavada, the universe of manifestation, though non-different from the Spirit, is of another order of reality, being only a reflection, an indication, of the Supreme Spirit. From both these points of view, therefore, the perfection of the Spirit is gained only when consciousness is free from all limitations, which is but another name for Matter. There is, however, this difference: In the former case this freedom can be attained only with the disappearance of Matter, whereas in the latter case the persistence of Matter does not bar the realization of this freedom at the level of consciousness, provided the Spirit's non-affectedness and one's identity with the Spirit are recognized. It would therefore seem that an ethics based on a doctrine of perfection in life, which is the one that Sri Aurobindo holds, has some sort of sanction only in the light of the monism advocated by Mayavada. Even this is not the perfection of Matter, but the realization of the Spirit's perfection at the level of consciousness. All that we call perfection in Matter is

(continued from the previous page) only an imperfect reflection of the Spirit's perfection.

The concept of the supramental is the key to the psychology advocated in Sri Aurobindo's system of thought. The supramental, according to him, is the intermediate link between the individualised mentality of men, with its divided outlook, and the absolute unity of Sachchidananda. The supra-mental is the Sachchidananda Itself, 'but Sachchidananda not resting in Its pure, infinite invariable consciousness, but proceeding out of this primal poise, or rather upon it as a movement which is its form of Energy and instrument of cosmic creation.' It 'is an equal self-extension of Sachchidananda, all-comprehending, all-possessing, all-constituting. But this all is one, not many; there is no individualization.... All is developed in unity and as one; all is held by this Divine consciousness as forms of its existence, not as in any degree separate existences. Somewhat as the thoughts and images that occur in our mind are not separate existences to us, but forms taken by our consciousness, so are all names and forms to this primary supermind.'

This linking principle of Supermind is of great practical importance in the system of Sri Aurobindo. For it is pointed out that if there were only the unity of Sachchidananda on the one hand and the divided mentality of our human consciousness on the other, perfection of the Spirit in the physical life would have been impossible. Spirit and the psycho-physical nature of man would be two opposite entities, one of which must be abolished if the other were to be enjoyed. But the Supermind, the link and the transition between the two, assures the possibility of man realizing the one Existence, Consciousness, and Delight in the mould of the mind, life

(continued from the previous page) and body.

Does not the idea of Divine immanence, common to all systems of Indian thought, including Dualism, give this very assurance which Sri Aurobindo finds in the concept of the Supermind?

The book is full of very original and striking²⁴ thoughts, which, like the one stated above, shed much light on obscure problems of religion and philosophy. Although we cannot agree with the central metaphysical position adopted in the book – namely, its unmerited hostility to Mayavada – we have no hesitation to state that the work is a first-rate contribution to modern Indian thought, and it will require the labours and skill of many interpreters to bring out in clear and simple language all the implications of the doctrines set forth in it with an abstruseness, dignity and versatility characteristic of a first-rate creative work on philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. XI. (1935-36)

1. J. MACKENZIE: The Calling of the philosopher.²⁵ The Greeks went on to discover many kinds of relations among facts. There is nothing in history till we come to our own times to equal the marvellous progress which they made in many branches of science—in mathematics and astronomy, in what we would call physics and chemistry, in biology and in medicine. And one of the most interesting things about them is that they did not allow all this variety of detail into the pursuit of which they were led, to divert them from the overmastering desire to see things as a whole and to know the "why" as well as the "how" of things. I doubt whether in the history of human thought we have anything more significant than the account which Plato reports

²⁴ The original editor corrected spell "strinking" to "striking" by hand

²⁵ The original editor inserted "The Calling of the philosopher." By typed

(continued from the previous page) Socrates as giving of his own intellectual experience in the Phaedo. He tells of his disappointment with the older thinkers, and with their physical theories. He was delighted when he found that Anaxagoras held that mind was the disposer and cause of all, but was disillusioned when he went on to read his works for himself.

“What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to ‘air’ and ‘ether’ and ‘water’ and other eccentricities...I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.”

This is a passage which is worthy of attention because it reveals the fact that while the greatest Greek philosophy grew out of science, it transcended science of both the range and depth of its enquiries. The connection between science and philosophy continued to the great advantage of both.

2. Philosophy is rather an attitude of mind than a programme of enquiry. The name itself simply means “love of wisdom”, and historically it has been common to call anyone who had the spirit of the intellectual enquirer a philosopher. The word “metaphysics” is in some ways equally suggestive. It is not uncommonly understood to apply to what lies “behind physics.” Actually the name, first applied to one of Aristotle’s treatises, had the more humble significance of “after physics”, in the order in which it appeared in Aristotle’s collected works. But the name has never lost the significance which it got from its application to the work which Aristotle himself called “first

(continued from the previous page) philosophy" the subject of which is "being so far forth as it is being." It is in this sense that Bradley has defined metaphysics as "an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole." The spirit of the philosopher is the spirit of the thinker who cannot rest in partial truths or in unproved or uncriticised assumptions, but who will always push his enquiry further.

3. It is true there is a great difference between what Aristotle and what Sankara understood by knowledge. For Aristotle this knowledge at its highest means participation in that pure thought in which the being of God consists. But this thought is not the negation of discursive thought but its crown. With Sankara, on the other hand, the knowledge which is the goal is a knowledge in which relations are completely transcended.

4. G.R. MALKANI: "THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR." Take away from the particular all that thought has put into it, and it becomes quite indeterminate. It can become object of no knowledge. It has no cognisable being. It is as good as nothing. We can neither posit it nor speak of it. The real is to us thought-determined and not self-determined.

This most significant and important truth has been questioned. It has been argued that all knowledge is indeed our knowledge and that we cannot think of a thing except as known. But we cannot argue from this self-evident fact, that the things themselves are not when we do not know them? We presume too much upon our knowledge. We put upon it a construction which is not warranted by it. It is our predicament

(continued from the previous page) that in speaking about things we are in a way confined to our knowledge. But this is only an accident of knowledge. It is not the meaning of knowledge. That meaning refers to us to the independent thing known. We have turned the accident of knowledge into the very essence of knowledge, and argued that because knowledge is always ours and we cannot think of anything except as known to us, the known object has no reality in itself, that it is nothing in itself, and that it has been entirely constituted by the knowledge of it.

This criticism of idealism is, in our opinion, wholly pointless. Philosophy has nothing to do with reality as such, but only with its significance to us. All our problems are problems of meaning. In this sense we might say that the whole subject-matter of philosophy is pre-determined. It is no problem to us whether something may not exist which is never known by us. All our problems arise from knowledge and relate to matters of fact given in knowledge. We cannot leave the ground of knowledge and raise any significant question about reality. The only significant question we can raise in this connection is whether any analysis of our knowledge warrants the reality of something that may or may not be known without detriment to its being. When we have thus circumscribed our problem, we have also as inevitably circumscribed the nature of our answer. If knowledge has indicated anything of the kind, knowledge must also render it significant to us. We must be sure that this self-existing reality is not an unmeaning reality, — that it satisfies the requirements of meaning. If then something exists in itself, even when all the universal elements which thought has imposed upon the real and which

(continued from the previous page) are realised only in knowledge are abstracted, what meaning is left? Evidently nothing is left that has any meaning for us. If my analysis of knowledge drives us to this non-determinate something, it also annuls it. For this kind of reality represents no meaning which could distinguish it for us from non-reality. Our predicament is in fact our only strong-hold of meaning. We shall go further and say that the concept of reality itself is a secondary concept, in-as-much as it is got by analysis from our knowledge and by disregarding the fact of knowledge.

5. Thought can never reach the thing. The concepts which it employs are understood to be mere abstractions. No concept can ever take in the entire specificity of an actual thing in any of its attributes. It leaves out an indefinite extent of content. It does not even indicate how much it leaves out. As a matter of fact what it leaves out is literally speaking inexhaustible and finitely more than what it actually determines of the thing in our knowledge of it. The particularity inherent in the thing thus cannot be translated into the particularity constructed out of the universals of thought. Does this not amount to agnosticism? Those thinkers who take their stand upon thought can well argue that since every universal of thought through which we try to know a thing ignores an indefinite extent of content, and no matter how far we went in the process of determination the thing still remained indeterminate, we never know the thing. We could escape this conclusion only by taking the other extreme view, namely that we know the thing itself in direct and immediate sense-experience. But is this perfect gnosticism justified? If it were, sense-experience would

(continued from the previous page) have to be more infinitely more than what it is. There would be no problem connected with knowledge and no room for error and illusion. Can this be a legitimate answer to agnosticism? We think it is not.

6. This rigour is sought to be toned down by some thinkers. They argue that we have unduly emphasised the distinction of sensation and thought. The two are not entirely opposed. The one merges into the other by slow degrees. At the lower limit there is sensation with the minimum of thought. At the higher limit, sensation tends to give place to the relations of thought. There is no perception without some universalisation of its content; and there are no universal relations without some basis in sense-material. This however is only a psychological solution. The metaphysical problem remains. The distinction of the particular and the universal is quite ultimate. The one is given to sense, the other is only thought. If we can have a direct intuition of the particular that does not implicate the universal, or if we can have a thought of the universal that is quite significant in itself and without reference to a percept, that would be quite intelligible. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case. How are the two to be distinguished and at the same time related in our experience? The different theories we have so far considered do not satisfy.

An attempt may be made to break down definitely the opposition between things and thought. Things are supposed to be indicated by perception and thought is supposed to work upon the material thus supplied. But what is a thing after all? Is it not a construction of thought? Has it any content which cannot be universalised and which can therefore elude thought? If it has, then that content is for ever unknowable.

(continued from the previous page) And what is unknowable can never be posited. It is not what is real in any intelligible sense. Thus a thing can be wholly analysed without residue into thought-relations. It has no real content apart from these. Indeed the thing appears to be not merely thought, but something other to it, and opposed to it. But even this appearance of otherness is a trick of thought. Can anything be opposed to me which I do not conceive or think to be so opposed? Opposition itself cannot be unless it is a posited or an affirmed opposition. Thus there is no real opposition to thought. There is only an appearance of it; and this appearance is accounted for by thought itself. We can thus rear up a self-consistent system of idealism based on thought, which will solve our problem by showing the initial dualism of sensation and thought and so of thought and reality with which we have started to be no real dualism at all. We must subordinate reality to thought and explain the former entirely in terms of the latter. Thought alone is the reality.

It is not difficult to see however that on such a view we really do away with a real objective world or a real system of things which thought may know. Thought has as a matter of fact created its world and given it what reality it has. The world is not real in itself but only in thought. Can it have any reality other than the subjective, or any reality that is materially different from the reality which belongs to an imaginary world? We think not. Those who put forward the above view are however quite emphatic that the world is a real world, and that in knowing this world we are knowing reality. We do not think that this view is consistent with the view that thought alone

(continued from the previous page) is responsible for all the reality there is in the material world. We shall have to admit that a real world must be independent not only of our thought but of all thought. It must in some sense be a matter of perception and not merely of thought. For it is primarily perception alone that indicates both reality and independence. Without perception, there would not be so much as even the appearance of an independent reality. Thought cannot draw the whole world to itself and at the same time render intelligible the appearance of otherness and independence.

7. We must therefore reject immediacy in knowledge at any time during the process or at the end of it. We are not directly aware of anything. All that we can say is that knowledge consists in relating. There is no such thing as knowledge in the sense of a revelation of the real or an uncovering of the real. What we call knowledge of the real is a creative activity on our part. As we relate, so we know. Even the given element is not really given. If it were, that at least would be immediately known. But there is nothing that is immediately known. Knowing is creating. It has nothing really to distinguish it from imagining or willing.

This is the logical conclusion of the view that we do not perceive the indeterminate as such or the determinate as such, but only the indeterminate as qualified by the determinate. It means that we do not really perceive; or conversely, it is never the reality that is known or perceived. Our knowledge is a constructing or a creating.

Let us suppose that knowledge in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term is somehow possible. But can we be said to perceive that

(continued from the previous page) the determinate qualifies the indeterminate, or belongs to it or even that it refers to it. We often say that we perceive that something belongs to something else. But belonging is a relation; and a relation, even though conceived as objective in some sense, is no kind of entity to be perceived. A relation is not a thing, a something here or there, or a something that can stimulate any of our sense-organs. To know that two terms are related, thought must proceed to related them; it must refer the one to the other. It is only an illusion that a relation appears to be directly presented to us in sensible experience. But no relation is ever that, and the illusion needs to be corrected. Relation is always thought, it is never perceived. Any real relation is thus only a relating.

8. The only thing that can be intuited is being as such or being without any character. Thought tries to grasp this being by characterising it or determining it. But all such characterisation is falsification. Reality does not receive it. We impose these characters of thought upon reality. We misconstrue reality.

Two corollaries follow from this view. (1) There can be no error in immediate awareness. And if sense-awareness as such is understood to be an immediate awareness, it must be free from error. (2) There can be no truth in any kind of mediated knowledge of thought-knowledge. To say that reality is such and such is to say what reality is not. Reality simply has no determinate character which thought attributes to it. It follows that there is no logical distinction between what we call valid perception of things and what we call erroneous perception of them. The distinction has no theoretical value. For in theory, immediacy is the only form of our intuition of being, and there can

(continued from the previous page) be no varieties of it called sensible and supersensible. What distinguishes the two for us are certain elements of thought which thought associates with the one and does not associate with the other. Take those elements away, keep intuition pure, and the so-called sensible awareness would in all respects be supersensible. It would be intuition of being pure and simple.

This view may be found hard of acceptance by many philosophers. They might argue that we have made immediate awareness through the sense-organs too innocuous for either truth or error. We have left no character to it which can make it knowledge of reality. We have instead turned it into some kind of pure awareness which is not awareness of anything whatsoever. But such awareness is no possible fact. It is not real. We must take sense-awareness as we find it and not in a hypothetical form which is incapable of being realised in experience. If sense-awareness is anything, it is awareness of some object. It must have some content or other however indefinite that might be. There can be no sense-awareness which does not refer to something that is outside of us.

Let this be so. But it is evident that thought will be implied in all such awareness. All that can be argued is that the fact that it is implied is immaterial. Thought is not arbitrary and its presence does not condemn our knowledge as untrue. It is necessitated in a way. It is constrained by sense. Or what is the same thing from the point of view of sense, we actually see the determinations of thought in the things themselves. We see a something to be in fact red, sweet round, etc. It is enough therefore if we simply say that we have sense-awareness of reality or of something that is really red, sweet, round, etc.

Now this is no doubt our belief. But is it a rational belief? Can it be justified? We shall now proceed to show that the belief notwithstanding, no sensible perception of reality is ever warranted a true perception. To understand this, a preliminary point needs to be cleared. How is the truth of any perception to be determined? It can only be determined in one of two ways: (1) We may determine the truth of a perception on the strength of the internal evidence of the perception itself. (2) We may determine this truth in so far as the perception in question coheres with other perceptions of reality or falls into a systematic whole of knowledge. So far now as the first criterion is concerned, there is nothing to distinguish what we call a true and what we call an erroneous perception. Each has a prima facie truth-claim which cannot either be conceded or withheld on the grounds of any evidence supplied by the perception itself. It is no criterion. A perception may therefore only be determined true by the coherence-test. But this test is in reality not relevant to perception at all. It is of the essential nature of a perception as we here understand it that we know in it something that is really outside of us. Our perception then must do justice to this reality; and any test of truth of a perception must bring out the conformity of this perception with the nature of the given reality. Such a test would not be needed if we had no erroneous perception. But the very fact of erroneous perception has created a gulf between our knowledge and things. Either we must therefore suppose that there is no erroneous perception (which would be against recognised facts of experience), or we must provide a test which is adequate for distinguishing the

(continued from the previous page) false from the true. The coherence-test does not bring out the conformity of perception to things. It is a purely subjective test, and would only be efficacious, if at all, if we denied an objective world altogether or regarded the object as a function of the subject. As it is, it decides nothing as to the actual truth of a perception. It leaves open the possibility that the whole system of our knowledge may be false, and that we are not knowing but consistently dreaming; and in actual practice, any particular perception may be upset by a subsequent perception. There is no evidence of the truth of a perception in perception itself, and all other evidence is really irrelevant.

The conclusion is forced upon us that certain perceptions of supposed reality are definitely known to be erroneous, and that those which are not thus known conform in all essential respects to the former. On what logical grounds can we base our conviction that in sensible experience we know reality? But if this conviction cannot be justified, can we claim that sense-awareness is a form of awareness which is true to things?

Our analysis of sense-experience thus shows that in so far as we determine reality in thought, we do not know it. All determination of reality is a falsification of it. Reality is only directly intuited. This reality has no character and can be no object. All thought-knowledge is a misrepresentation of the truth.

9. J.C.F. D'ANDRADE: "THE NATURE OF VALUE."

The problem of value is an old one, but it has acquired a new significance in recent times and an interesting philosophy has grown around it, mostly of the realistic type. Attempts have been made to explain value as a purely objective quality residing in things

(continued from the previous page) independently of their relation to mind, and some of them are highly ingenious and very stimulating, but none of them appears to me to be completely satisfactory. I still think that the good old idealistic attempt to solve the problem is the least unsatisfactory of all, and it will be my object here by a careful examination of the nature of value, to bring out the failure of the explanation which the "objectivists" give of it.

For the purpose of this inquiry value and good may be regarded as identical in meaning, and in what follows I shall use the two terms indiscriminately. Whatever has value in good, and whatever is good has value. Obviously, good here does not mean moral good alone. Moral good is only one species of good and not the whole of good. Much confusion will be avoided, I think, if this distinction is borne in mind. Very often, when we say that anything is good without qualification, we mean that it is morally good; and so if we give a general definition of good, it may be found that some things to which our definition applies are yet not good in the moral sense and our definition may consequently appear faulty. But if we remember that what is good in one sense may not be good in another, or that what is good relatively may not be good absolutely, such a misunderstanding will not be possible. We shall see later that to be morally good is to be absolutely good, and that an adequate theory of value must admit degrees of good.

G.E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* gives an elaborate argument to prove that value cannot be defined. It may be possible to give the verbal meaning of value in other words, but definition such as Moore thinks to be important cannot be a matter of words. It must take the idea for which the term to be defined stands

(continued from the previous page) and analyse it into its elements. Now the idea for which the term 'good' stands is a simple idea and so cannot be analysed. Therefore 'good' cannot be defined. We may point out the conditions of goodness, we may determine what makes value, we may give the criterion of good, but all that will not be the same thing as explaining what good means. "Good" is like "yellow," for instance. They are both names of unanalysable notions, and therefore neither can be defined. I shall not stay to discuss whether value can be defined or not. I think Moore finds it undefinable because he does not or cannot see its real complexity. If the relation to mind is not admitted, the true nature of value is not understood and the only course then left is to confess that it is inexplicable. Moore's contention that value is undefinable, to my mind, only bears witness to the fact that his theory fails to explain it.

10. It may be questioned whether everything that is pleasant is good. May we not sometimes doubt whether what is pleasant is really good? And will not this mean that to be pleasant is not necessarily to be good, though what is pleasant may sometimes be good? My answer is that what is pleasant is always, so far, good, but that it is not always absolutely good. Pleasures are not to be taken in isolation, and we find that one pleasure may conflict with another which is preferable, and so, though relatively good, may not be good under all circumstances. The science which considers values in relation to one another so as to determine which are to be preferred and which not, is Ethics, which may thus be said to be the science of absolute values in the sense in which absolute values are possible. When we doubt whether what is pleasant is really

(continued from the previous page) good, what we doubt is whether it is morally good. We may put it in another way and say that what we doubt is whether what we desire in a certain state of knowledge we would desire if our knowledge were complete, or whether what we find pleasant under certain circumstances would continue to be pleasant under all circumstances.

Ross, who will not accept the essential reference to the judging mind involved in a judgment of value, makes value a quality of the object by itself, independently of any relation of the object to mind. But he makes it a quality of a peculiar character—a consequential quality like a logical 'property,' but, unlike a logical property, always strictly consequential and never constitutive. What is ordinarily called a property in Logic is arbitrarily or conventionally so called. We might just as well have selected it to be an essential attribute and what are considered essential attributes might have been regarded as properties. Ross does not say that value is the only property that is strictly consequential, and as a matter of fact there are properties other than value which are not properties only by arbitrary convention. Man's capacity for speech, for instance, follows from his rationality and cannot by any means be regarded as a fundamental attribute, with rationality following from it. But man's capacity for speech, though strictly consequential, is a constitutive quality of man. A quality that is strictly consequential may, then, be a constitutive quality; and so, if value is not a constitutive quality, it cannot be only because it is consequential. The difference between a consequential quality like value and a consequential quality that is also constitutive, is that, while the latter cannot exist independently of the fundamental

(continued from the previous page) quality from which it follows but can be known independently of it, the former can neither exist nor be known independently of the fundamental quality from which it is said to follow. This is so because a consequential quality like value does not follow from the so-called fundamental quality by itself but follows from it as known. And this is the whole contention of the idealistic theory of value.

There is thus necessarily a subjective element in value. I do not like the distinction usually made between subjective and objective. It is very vague, and I doubt whether there is anything that can be called purely subjective. Many of those who maintain the objectivity of value in the sense of complete independence of mind seem to think that if value is not objective in this sense it must be purely subjective. But this is a mistake. Unless there are minds there can be no value, as I have tried to show above; but this does not mean that value has no objectivity at all. It does not mean that if I think something good and another person thinks the same thing bad, both of us may be right. When, for instance, I say "I like sugar" and another person says "I do not like sugar" the two statements do not contradict each other, because I make a statement about my taste in relation to sugar and the other person makes a statement about his taste in relation to sugar. But when I say "pleasure is good" and another person says "pleasure is not good," we do contradict each other, because the two statements are about the same thing. The reference to mind which there necessarily is in such judgments is not to an individual mind as in "I like sugar," but to mind in general. Judgments of value are objective in

(continued from the previous page) so far as they are not subjective like such judgments as "I like sugar"; but they are also subjective in so far as they are not objective like such judgments as "this rose is red." They are subjective-objective. I think there is some confusion when it is held that a beautiful object would still be beautiful even if there were no mind to appreciate it. The confusion is between what is valuable and its value, between what is good and its goodness. Benevolence, for instance, is good; but the "objectivists" themselves admit that its goodness is different from itself, being a consequential quality, while benevolence is a constitutive quality. What the "objectivists" have in their mind is that the judging subject does not add a valuable quality to an object, that, for example, the judging subject does not make a man benevolent; and so far they are right. But what the idealists maintain is, not that the judging subject adds a valuable quality to an object by judging it, but that the quality judged valuable would not be valuable if there were no subject to judge it. And this much, I believe, may be admitted without difficulty. For why should anything be good or bad except so far as it satisfies or does not satisfy? Why should dishonesty, for instance, be bad in itself? If it exists, it exists, and there is nothing to be said about it. When we call it bad, we mean that it conflicts with a standard, falls short of an ideal, frustrates a purpose; and in order that this may happen it is not enough that dishonesty alone should exist, but there must also be the standard, the ideal, the purpose, by reference to which it is judged. Will the "objectivists" say that standards, ideals and purposes can exist independently of minds?

It may be asked what mind or minds must be satisfied in order that a true judgment of value may be possible. Must a thing to be good satisfy

(continued from the previous page) a particular mind, or any mind, or the minds of the majority of mankind, or the minds of all mankind? Whichever of these alternatives is chosen, it can be shown that the judgment need not be true, and therefore it may be concluded that whether a thing is good or bad does not depend upon any one's mental attitude. But I think the question is not to be settled by votes; it is not a question of number at all. Whether one man finds a thing good, or many find it good, or all find it good, is quite immaterial. Value is what satisfies a mind whose ideas are clear and comprehensive and coherent. That finally is the only reliable test in every case, whether of truth, beauty or goodness. The criterion has to be internal and is necessarily fallible in application, though theoretically infallible in character. We can never be absolutely sure in any case that a judgement about truth or goodness or beauty is true. All judgements have to be only relative and are liable to correction as our experience grows more comprehensive and coherent.

11. G.R. MALKANI: "REALITY & EXPERIENCE." Our notion of reality is that of something which merely is. It is something in-itself. Its existence is not dependent upon anything else, least of all upon its being experienced by someone. It is what it is because of itself. As opposed to this, there may be something which is that something only to me. It has no being in itself. We call this illusory. The illusory properly speaking is not. It appears to have being but has no being.

We appear to know reality in sensible experience. But is this reality? Can reality appear to us? One thing is certain. Anything that appears to us is a matter of doubt. Scepticism is quite natural with regard to is. We can always

(continued from the previous page) ask, is it really that or something different? We may silence our doubts by an appeal to practical considerations. But what is known by us implies us. It is that something in relation to us. And yet there is no means at our disposal for resolving the implication and proving that what is to us would also be without us, or that it is not merely something to us but also something in-itself.

Can reality be known? Can it be an appearance to us? This appears to be doubtful. At the same time, one thing is quite certain: reality cannot be wholly unrelated to us. If it is how shall we distinguish the real from the non-real. The non-real is never related to us and is not anything to us. The real will conform to the standard of the non-real as far as we are concerned.

12. We do not deny that there must be real knowledge somewhere. What we want to know is whether it is of a piece with all cases of apparent knowledge and has nothing in its internal structure to distinguish it from the latter. The question would not arise, if any prima facie fact of knowledge were real knowledge. But this is far from being the case. Whenever we appear to know, we are not really knowing as a rule. What we take to be real to start with does not always turn out to be real. We must therefore have in knowledge itself the means of distinguishing the real from what is not real. If there is no such means, there is no guarantee of real knowledge at all; and we can only conclude that our characterisation of knowledge is not based upon any real knowledge and is to that extent self-contradictory.

13. It is evident now that there is no knowledge of object which any intelligence can have which may not prove to be illusory knowledge. From the point of view of the subject, the difference between the real and the illusory can

(continued from the previous page) never be made out or appreciated. The reason is plain. We do not know A and also know that A exists. It cannot therefore be said that in the case of real knowledge, we know a certain object and also know that that object exists. We have simply no intuition of the existence of A which is over and above the intuition of A itself. As long as there is no subjective difference or differences in the mode of our apprehension, there can be no difference in the status of the object either. Thus no possible intelligence can distinguish real knowledge from false knowledge on the internal evidence of knowledge itself. Have we then real knowledge at all. And is our characterisation of knowledge as the revealing of the real based upon any real fact of knowledge? It appears that we must look elsewhere than to our knowledge of objects for a real case of knowledge.

Let us say that to know the real the intelligence must get over the subjective standpoint. We view things subjectively. The thing is such and such to us. This reference to us simply cannot be eliminated. And as long as it is there, we are confined within ourselves and estranged from reality. But the question is, how are we to get out of ourselves and know reality as it is?

It has been suggested by some philosophers that thought materialises what is in itself spiritual. It takes only a static and an outside view of things. We must, by an effort of intuition, place ourselves at the heart of things and inside of them. Now this may be in a way possible. There may be different degrees of sympathetic insight into things such as the poets and the mystics of all ages have. Reality to them may be quite spiritual. But would this be knowing reality? And even if we admit that it is knowing, what ground have we for asserting

(continued from the previous page) that the poets and the mystics have truly divested themselves of every bias and every subjective element in their outlook upon things? The very fact that their versions of reality differ, and their insight admits of degrees of depth and of comprehension is evidence that this form of knowledge cannot be free from doubt.

The truth which we seek in philosophy is truth indicated by reason itself. And so far as reason is concerned we may well ask, is reality other to the intuition of it or it is not? If it is not, then all talk about placing ourselves inside of things etc. is meaningless. There are simply no things, and no inside and outside of them. If it is, how have we got out of the subjective standpoint? Reality for us would be thought-determined. It can never be quite immediate to the intuition of it, and we can never be said to intuit it as it is in itself. To get out of our subjectivity we must realise that the real can be no object to us. The objective is the illusory. The real cannot be externally related to us. It cannot be other to the intuition of it. The only relation appropriate between the two – the real and its intuition – is that of complete non-duality. The question is whether this reality is indicated in our own experience.

Our answer is that it is the only reality indicated. We are generally agreed that if anything claims to exist, it is the objects of our knowledge. We do not doubt their existence. If we doubt the existence of anything, it is the existence of something that can be no object only. We can never doubt the existence of what is no object to us. Further, this reality which is no object to us in the only undoubted thing in our knowledge of objects. We call this

(continued from the previous page) reality the self. Something is object only in reference to the self which is no object. When I say that something is there, I implicitly mean that I am different from the something, that I am neither there nor here, that I am not a given at all, and that without reference to this reality which is not given there would be nothing that is given. We can doubt the existence of the object; we cannot doubt that without which the very appearance of the object would not be possible.

Objectivity itself is a derived character. It is not a self-evident character of what we call objects. If we were confined merely to objects, objectivity would not emerge as their common character. Since everything possesses it, it would not distinguish anything from anything else. It is only when we can distinguish the entire universe of objects taken as a whole from what is no-object, that objectivity can emerge as a common character of objects. It is only as this no object is realised as fact in our experience that we can significantly speak of anything being an object to us.

This also disposes of the contention that the notion of being is a simple notion, that it implies nothing beyond itself, and that there can be no necessary relation of being to experience. It is only on the supposition that reality is external to the knowledge of it, that the above contention can be justified if at all; we can abstract from the relation of knowledge without in any way undermining the reality of the real. Indeed we shall be hard put to, to make intelligible to ourselves the notion of this being when we have abstracted from our intuition of being what we may call the positing of being or the subjective affirmation of being. But at least

(continued from the previous page) once the abstraction from experience has been conceived, the idea of being may be looked upon as evident enough. If however we realise that reality cannot be external to the knowledge of it, and that reality and intuition do not constitute two terms but a fundamental non-duality which we break up owing to our limitation, how can we regard the so-called simple notion of reality as at all intelligible? Being becomes the same thing as intuition, and the two cannot be held apart even in idea. The notion of being as mere being and as having no necessary relation to knowledge is an incomplete and abstract notion. It does not do justice to real being. Real being is not mere being. It is real because it is the very self of knowledge. We call this real being, pure intelligence or the Self. It reveals everything. There is nothing to reveal it. Or what is the same thing, it may be said to be revealed only as it reveals. There is no other revelation proper to it.

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