Mahayana Notes

CONTENTS.

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."	1
UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO.	11
"VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA" On EMANCIPATION:	26
NAGARJUNA'S MAHAYANA VIMSAKA	48
BRUNO PETZOLD: THE CHINESE TENDAI (T'IEN-TAI) TEACHING	53
N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S	
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."	71
C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY & VEDANTA."	
AVATAMSAKA SUTRA:	106
RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI; "ANCIENT INDIAN EDUCATION."	117
THE SHINGON SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM	
WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION	
TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."	136
SRI AUROBINDO: in letters to disciples:	157
SUDDHONANDA BHARATA: "NOTES OF AUROBINDO'S TEACHING."	
THOMAS CARLYLE:	162
LO-TSU:	162
SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM	165
W.M. McGOVERN. "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."	213
"THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA	
DOCTRINE – THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE	
PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA."	226
"LIFE OF ATISA." (Trans. Sarat Chandra Das)	
Prof M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."	
G.R. MALKANI: "THE PRINCIPLE OF INEXPLICABILITY IN PHILOSOPHY."	285
"SADDHARMA-PUNDARIKA" or "THE LOTUS	
OF THE TRUE LAW." (Trans. H. Kern)	
R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."	305
IRENE RATHBONE: "THE SOCIAL CREDIT STATE."	358
M. HIRIYANNA: "THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION."	361
SANTIDEVA: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": An	
Anthology complied in the 7th century	
from Mahayana Buddhist Texts	366
OLIVER L. REISER: Review of Irving Lee's "Language Habits in Human Affairs."	372
WILLIAM H. GEORGE: "THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION."	374
BEPIN VEHARI RAY: "DEMOCRACY AS PLURAL GOVERNMENT."	384
G.R. MALKANI: "SOLIPSISM."	389
G.R. MALKANI: "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?"	391

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."	398
ANGELO MOSES: "BERKELEY & HUME."	407
MORTIMER ADLER: "GOD & THE PROFESSORS"	412
SIDNEY HOOK: Reply to Adler "The New Medievalism."	435
FRANK H. KNIGHT: Reply to Adler: "God, And Prof. Adler and Logic."	
Editor's reply to Adler:	434
QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler "Absolutism & Democracy."	438
MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA & MADHYAMA BHIKSU	
YUVATCHARYA BALTARI: "GURU ATISHA OF TIBET."	444
MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA & ANANDA MAITREYA	
BALTARI: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY."	447
Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT."	457
MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA &¹ ANANDA MAITREYA	
BALTARI: "THE BUDDHA."	
BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI: "INSIGHT INTO REALITY."	469
BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI: "BODHICITTA."	475
Dr D.T. SUZUKI: "THE REALM OF NO-KARMA"	479
DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI: "THE MESSAGE OF BODHI-DHARMA."	484
H.P. BLAVATSKY: "ON MEMORY."	491
P. NAGA RAJA RAO: "KANT & SANKARA."	493
PHILIP C. JONES: reply to P. Naga Raja Rao on Kant	496
G.R. MALKANI: THE PROBLEM OF NOTHING	
Dr D.T. SUZUKI: WHAT IS ZEN?	500
Dr D.T. SUZUKI: BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN	504
Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPATHY	523
A.H. HANNAY: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM	537
W.H. WALSH: KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS	550
SOHAKU OGATA: ZEN FOR THE WEST.	553
ALAN W. WATTS: "WHAT IS REALITY	554
ALAN W. WATTS: THE WHAT AND THE HOW	
ALAN W. WATTS: THE TRUTH THAT IS MORE THAN TEACHING	563
ALAN W. WATTS: IS THERE A SELF?	
ALAN W. WATTS: THE FALLACY OF DETERMINISM	571
ALAN W. WATTS: EDUCATION FOR PROGRESS	572
ALAN W. WATTS: NOT ONLY BUT ALSO.	575
ALAN W. WATTS: SIMPLE LANGUAGE.	
ALAN W. WATTS: THE BUDDHIST WAY OF LIFE	
ALAN W. WATTS: THIS WORLD AS REALITY	
ALAN W. WATTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MYSTERY	589
ALAN W. WATTS: THE MONKEY-MIND IN RELIGION	597
ALEXANDRA DAVID NEEL & LAMA YONGDEN:	

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 $^{^{\}rm 1}\,\mbox{The original editor inserted "VAHINDRA &" by hand$

MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET.	605
VEN TAI HSU: BUDDHISIM IN MODERN LIFE	612
P. LAKSHMI NARASU: THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM	616
SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA:	644
INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED YOGAVASISHTHA;	651
GARUDA SARODHARA: THE MEANS OF LIBERATION	655
SANKARACHARYA: YOGA TARAVALI.	657
UMRAO SHER GIL: "ON TIME."	662
UMRAO SHER GIL: BIRTH AND DEATH.	665
A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARACHARYA OF KOLHAPUR:	669
SANKARACHARYA: THE MOON OF SPIRITUAL AWAKENING	671
V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO	673
A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARACHARYA OF	
KOLHAPUR: VEDANTIC DIALOGUES	690
R.V. KHEDKAR: COMMENTARY ON THE BHAGAVAD GITA	709
R.V. KHEDKAR: THE VEDANT PHILOSOPHY	717

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER:² "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA." [@] Is this the time to think of Philosophy as it signifies to the modern mind? Metaphysical speculations, Mystic or Yogic intuitions, Religious inspiration, the illuminations of Art, Theological and Scholastic wrangles or interpretations, nay, even theorisations of Science and whatever else may go now under that name, do undoubtedly bring satisfaction or consolation in various ways to individuals. But do these personal or private satisfactions mean common comfort in life and common public peace, in this world, to the millions in agony as at this moment? A glance at the history of the world shows that none of these philosophical courses have succeeded in checking human sorrow or suffering in general. On the contrary, most of them have aggravated conflicts and consequent misery. The more man grows in thought, the more are the differences and the breaches, not only in religion but also in life in all its aspects. Men have been demonstrating this on an ever increasing scale. When, in the past, was waged a war involving four continents at the same time, as at present? And this after at least two thousand years of the discipline of the best religions and philosophies! May it not then be asked "Does Philosophy as such in India, teach anything different?"

In this country, Philosophy <u>as such</u> is not concerned with the "spinning of yarns (of novel concepts and intellectual riddles) from within one's own brains" or with seeking consolation or refuge in the "Intuitions" and the "Ecstasies" that soothe those individuals and even those groups that have suffered from "baulked struggle, strained emotion or baffled enquiry." It is, as the highest ancient authorities have declared:3 "What promotes the happiness of <u>all</u> beings and conduces to the welfare of <u>all</u>, in <u>this</u> world,"—not in any other region.

While India has been, in respect of her culture, immensely benefited by her contact with the West, she has forgotten some things that are of permanent value.

Philosophy is a Western word and not the least noteworthy feature of it is that it implies variety, difference and disagreement. As has been pointed out by some eminent thinkers of the West, there may be said to be as many philosophies as there are human beings. For every man has his own view of life and of the universe. The more words and phrases he uses and the more he spins out of his <u>imagination</u> as a poet does, the greater is the admiration for his originality. It is then no wonder that every religious novelty, nay, every fresh effort of imagination, now claims to be philosophy in some sense. And the bewildering plurality of philosophy has driven many a serious mind away from it to the open field of Science.

^{2 1}

[®] In The Aryan Path, 1942.

³ 2

The West has begun to realize that the way to Philosophy proper lies through Science, but America and Europe have not risen as yet to the level of realizing that whatever is characterised by difference in any respect is not philosophy proper, but religion, Yoga or Mysticism, Escapism, Theology, Scholasticism—at the best Speculation (scientific or metaphysical), if not mere "Blab, blab, blab." Let it not be thought that variety and difference are to be condemned. They are necessary stages or steps of thought, stimulating enquiry and leading finally to Truth.

Naturally, the Western exponents of "Indian" Philosophy, as they could understand it, have admired the wealth of differences among the schools4 of India. They could not see anything more in it. Walking in their footsteps the most distinguished of modern "Indians" also take pride in the wealth of such differences in India. Modern Indian teachers and students of Philosophy are not able, as yet, to free themselves from the "Western complex." They dwell on the variety and the differences of such thought in this country also. The market is flooded with publications containing accounts of the differences between Patanjali, Kanada, Kapila, Vyasa, Jina, Buddha, Nimbarka, Ramanuja, Sankara, Madhwa, Basava and a host of others. All this is perfectly appropriate, at the preliminary stages. But what about philosophy as such, which takes the whole human experience, including Science, into account finally? Modern Indian exponents are so deeply impressed by the "Western complex" that they do not care even to ask why Western Philosophy is beginning to take its stand on Science. Let India not ignore what made Carlyle exclaim "Which of your philosophical systems is other than a dream—a net quotient confidently given out when the divisor and the dividend are both unknown?"; or what made Shakespeare say: "There are more things in heaven and earth...Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

If all that Philosophy can do in the West as well as in the East is to divide mankind and to accentuate or to multiply the differences, not only in thought hut also <u>in life</u>, is it worth while pursuing it any longer?

India answers: "Yes." Her experience has taught her that all calamities in life are traceable to the single fact that every one thinks that what satisfies or pleases him or her, is Truth and that action based on it is Right.

What India of the <u>past</u> and a few of the most eminent thinkers in the West have seen, is that philosophy proper is concerned solely with Truth, but⁵ not with satisfaction derived from faith, intuition, emotion, even intellect, or the like. Millions mistake for philosophy "the cave, the theatre and the couch."

⁴³

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."

⁵⁴

Such eminent thinkers in the West attach so much importance to Truth; yet Western <u>philosophy</u> has done so little good to mankind <u>as a whole</u>; and why? Because the West has not reached the stage of feeling the need for pursuing <u>Truth to the end</u>. It has not seen that there is a higher view of Truth than that attained even by Religion and by Science. When the scientist himself becomes aware of the incompleteness of his view of truth, he often slides back to Intuition or to Mysticism, instead of proceeding forward.

The part that Truth plays in Hindu philosophy is best indicated by one of its greatest exponents thus: "God Almighty (Vishnu Siva or Brahma) Himself may inspire or declare something. But it cannot be accepted unless it be <u>proved</u> to be truth." Can the world show a parallel to this attitude?

In India he that seeks to enter the gates of philosophy <u>as such without first</u> ascertaining the meaning of Truth is either a child or a coward.

The variety of the senses in which the word Truth is used, is so great that most writers on "Philosophy" <u>deliberately</u> avoid committing themselves to any definition of their own, though they freely quote numberless authorities, which leads us nowhere. Owing to this drawback, the writers, neither in the East nor in the West, are able to get beyond differences of views and distinctions created by their schools or isms. Europe has been familiar with the problem of Truth even from the days of Protagoras and Socrates. Pontius Pilate's famous query "What is Truth?" has not yet been answered there, though nearly 2000 years have elapsed.⁶ Some of the modern thinkers echo the same query.

But what puzzles one is this. Even those who say that Truth cannot be defined and that its implications cannot be clearly described, do possess some vague idea of it. If they did not, their words would amount to nonsense. So the Hindu philosopher holds that there is none who does not possess some <u>instinct</u> of Truth. Even the insane and the higher animals reveal it, though in some primitive form, which manifests itself when they try to avoid a repetition of what causes pain or error. But not many men have become aware of its existence and very few have cared to study its nature. Everyone that speaks of Truth, believes that what <u>agrees</u> with what one <u>likes</u> is truth. But it is deeper enquiry that leads to its meaning.

To begin with the common analysis. Just as one apple added to another is more than one to a white man or a black man, to an aged woman or a young child, to a Muslim or a Christian, a Jain or a Buddhist, a Parsi or a Brahmin, so Truth is the same to

^{6 5}

all. Similarly fire is felt to be hot and ice, cold, by all except those that are mentally or physically diseased. This non-difference in experience is the chief feature of truth; it leads us to the two characteristics of "Universality" and "Necessity." But this emphasises objective reference. To take into account the truth of thoughts and feelings, which are of a subjective nature, the Hindus add two other features: "Non-contradict ability" and "Being beyond the possibility of doubt." Where doubt or difference is possible there truth exists not, nor "Philosophy <u>as such</u>."

The great controversy as regards the distinction between Truth and Reality has a value only at the first stage of the quest for Truth. When the stage of non-contradiction is reached, we find no such demarcation; Ultimate Truth and Ultimate Reality⁷ mean the same. But it is held by thoughtful men that there are religious and mystic truths, metaphysical truths and, above all, scientific as well as practical truths. But those truths carry their own meanings. It is a matter of universal Knowledge that the same word is often used in several senses. Those truths are not the same for all, nor are they beyond the possibility of contradiction, nor even of doubt. As has been stated already, those views imply only that whatever agrees with what one likes is Truth. Philosophy, however, freely recognises the fact that all these have great value as steps leading to truth and marks them with various qualifying terms such as "partial," "empirical", "compartmental", "fractional," "tentative",—not to refer here to theories like "copy", "coherence", "correspondence", "pragmatic" and so forth, which attempt to explain their various meanings.

One has to ask what the common feature of all truths is, to get at Truth proper. Therefore pure philosophic Truth is labelled <u>in India</u>, "the Truth of truth," or "the Ultimate or the Highest Truth," which latter expressions are familiar to the West also. But truths (in the plural) are all characterised by differences which lead to disputes and, what is worse, even to quarrels, bloodshed, human slaughter and unlimited suffering. This, then, is the <u>test</u> of Truth, of Philosophy <u>as such</u>: It leads to non-difference or non-contradiction <u>in thought</u>, and at the same time to harmony and Universal Well-being <u>in</u> this life.

If one but persevered in the pursuit of Truth one sees that "Beauty" and "Goodness" are nothing but stages of Truth, not distinct entities, as the Greeks thought.

That the several kinds of truths referred to above <u>are said</u> to be attainable, if not here, at least <u>in the next world</u>, is a matter of general knowledge.⁸ While Scientific truths are <u>publicly</u> demonstrated, Intuitive or Ecstatic truths are <u>privately</u> or

⁷ 6

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."

^{8 7}

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."

individually verified by some. It is the Truth <u>Universal</u> that is upheld by philosophy <u>as such</u> but that, however, has cast the greatest doubt.

Is our concept of Truth, then, a chimera?

Here comes India's original and most valuable contribution. Truth is the most indispensable factor of all thinking. The philosophers <u>as such</u> in India have reached it, beyond all doubts, nay, have verified it in the most scientific manner possible. But the method is so difficult and the discipline needed so exacting, that men dislike and shun it. They are <u>satisfied</u> with the assumption "I know," as the Indian philosopher puts it. To modern minds in general, as has been pointed out, whatever agrees with what one likes is Truth.

"Philosophy <u>as such</u> is an <u>impossibility</u> to him who does not start with an exact definition of Truth. The Hindu philosopher's final declaration in this matter is: That alone is philosophy that is based entirely on Truth; that alone is Truth that makes contradictions, doubts and differences impossible, of which the sole practical test, in the words of the Mahabharata, is, "Truth alone can free (not individuals but) the <u>world</u> from sorrow."

Nevertheless, Europe and America are averse to the pursuit of Truth to the end. As an Indian philosopher of the past points out, most men treat with indifference, nay, even with contempt, the enquiry regarding Truth. It is nothing strange that the appeal made in 1937 to the authorities of the Nobel Prize award to include the pursuit of Truth or Philosophy proper in their subjects, was ignored. And they now see the condition of their country and the world in spite of all the great encouragement they gave to⁹ other kinds of knowledge.

Philosophy <u>as such</u>, which is concerned with the <u>whole</u> of Existence, cannot confine itself to the world of "Concepts," for which people often mistake it. Conceptual Knowledge has, as so many philosophers have said, no value in this respect unless verified <u>in life "as a whole."</u> Conceptual knowledge and private experience do undoubtedly give <u>satisfaction</u> to the <u>individual</u>, but they do not reveal Truth or Final Truth, which is beyond the possibility of difference of any kind. We have therefore to turn to verification of the Universality etc. of Truth in Philosophy proper.

What preparation, then, does philosophy demand?

He who does not define Truth <u>before</u> proceeding to make any enquiry into the Universe as a whole will only be wandering in a maze of words. He alone can be a

⁹⁸

philosopher <u>as such</u>, who asks <u>himself</u> at every step the question: "How do I know that what I think or know is Truth?"

It is only when contradiction or disappointment is experienced that one begins to open his eyes and to enquire. But most men, even scientists, who are most keen on Truth, do not or cannot pursue to the end, as they get disgusted or exhausted early.

What are the methods, then, that the <u>Indian</u> philosophers adopt to attain their object? What determines Truth "Universal", "Necessary" "Beyond doubt" and "Noncontradictory" is not intuition, emotion or intellect, Which reveal the other, or qualified truths, and which are characterised by differences, but is <u>Reason</u>—"God-like" Reason, as Shakespeare has it. It is Reason that finally distinguishes "Truth" from "error."

But Reason which in Universal and which is found to exist even in the insane and in the lower¹⁰ animals, is mixed with intuition, emotion, and intellect, that give us the various kinds or degrees of Truth. It is therefore a matter of supreme necessity to free Reason from them.

Why are these mental factors said to misdirect Reason, when it is associated with them? They are inseparably bound up with the "Ego" which is called the "Black Serpent" by some Hindu Philosophers. Europe has not failed to see the misleading influence of the "Ego" or the "Self." Science, the <u>best</u> introduction to, nay, an <u>indispensable</u> preparation for, the pursuit of Truth or Philosophy <u>as such</u>, is most emphatic on the absolute necessity for "self-elimination" or "De-personalization."

Nor knowing the next higher step of reason, but being convinced that the intellect is incompetent to get at philosophic Truth, the late Professor Bergson fell back upon intuition, which we find is no better than emotion or in-intellect, in as much as they all signify differences.

Why philosophy is barren in the modern world is that it has not yet appreciated the worth of Truth and Reason or analysed them as thoroughly as the ancient Hindu Philosopher <u>as such</u> has done. Truth can <u>never</u> be reached till Reason is distinguished from intellect and the rest and till the Ego is kept within its bounds first, and then <u>eliminated</u> altogether.

In 1937 when the writer was touring Europe, he could find five among the eminent thinkers there that appreciated this feature of the Indian philosophical method. They were the late Prof Bergson, Prof. Max Planck, Dr E.J. Steiner, and Prof. Lalland.

^{10 9}

Thus prepared, if one proceeds to analyse life or experience or knowledge, <u>as a whole</u>, it will be found resolvable into two factors: Awareness, or ¹¹ Consciousness per se, or Knowingness, on the one hand, and, on the other, that of which Awareness is aware or conscious—that which is known. The latter consists of the entire Universe of thought, feeling and matter. Here the Eastern as well as the Western thinkers display their numberless isms, with their endless differences. For they ignore the definition of Truth that demands the wiping out of the Ego, a feat which appears almost impossible for mankind in general.

Further, Truth is reached positively only when one takes into account the <u>whole</u> of experience, that is, the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep, which is something <u>unknown</u> to <u>European</u> philosophy. Hence its endless differences and inability to get at truth or Final Truth. It confines itself to the waking state alone. European Science, however, is just beginning to study dreams. It has not yet thought of the significance of sleep.

This knowledge of the three states reveals the meaning of the "causal" relation and of the duality of Consciousness and that of which one is conscious, be it God, angel, man, matter, or multiplicity.

If with this Indian Torch of Truth men will investigate existence <u>as a whole</u>, they will <u>realize</u> that where there is a possibility of difference there is no philosophy <u>as such</u>, and that such philosophy means nothing else than "the happiness of <u>all</u> beings and the welfare of <u>all</u>." That is the goal of existence.

Is it possible, it may be asked, for all mankind, the young and the old, the uncultured and the cultured, the unthinking and the thinking, to realize this Truth so that all, at the same time, may enjoy perfect peace and happiness, on every part of this globe? Nothing can be more patent than that such a stage is¹² an impracticability. So long as the world is what it is, such a stage cannot even be conceived as a possibility. What Indian philosophy says is that wherever the leaders or rulers attain to a knowledge of Truth, there the social bodies following them, or influenced by them, will reap the benefit of philosophy. In this view the Western Socrates and Plato are in perfect agreement with the Eastern Yajnavalkya and Vyasa.

If, however, one be not a leader or a ruler, which most men cannot be, of what use is philosophy <u>as such</u>? Will it not then be the same as Religion and the like in making the philosopher also seek individual or personal consolation or satisfaction?

¹¹ 10

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."

¹² 11

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER: "PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH IN INDIA."

No, the "philosopher as such" will <u>never</u> rest satisfied with prayers or yogic illuminations or even with most original speculations. He <u>cannot</u> see in actual everyday life any <u>difference</u> between himself and another, in respect of either joy or sorrow. To the extent to which he realizes this, to that extent he does approach Truth. Whoever lives such a <u>life</u>, whatever be his religious or other conviction, whatever his race, colour, or clan, the philosopher recognizes, in him or in her, the fellow pilgrim to the peak of Truth. And, what is more, he will lose no opportunity of helping others to grasp and to realize Truth. He knows that he exists solely for alleviating the sufferings of humanity wherever they may be found. For Truth alone can free from sorrow, not merely this or that individual but the "world." "Virtue not in action is vice." This is philosophy <u>as</u> such in India.

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO.

- 1. She was in semi-darkness, with her eyes closed; employing a system of mental concentration which she has been practising off and on for several years, and mentally suggesting to her subconscious mind to bring her whatever was in the mind of her brother-in-law. Having become satisfied¹³ that the image which came to her mind was the correct one—because it persisted, and came back again and again—she sat up and took pencil and paper.
- 2. The griefs of other people overwhelm Craig like a suffocation. Strangers take one glance at her, and instantly decide that here is one who will "understand." She has always said that she "gets" the feelings of people, not by their words, but by intuition.
- 3. Two years ago Craig and I heard of a "psychic," a young foreigner, who was astounding physicians of Southern California, performing feats so completely beyond their understanding that they were content to watch without trying to understand. He had the ability to produce anaesthesia in many parts of his body became rigid and cold; and I put his head on one chair and his heels on another, and stood in the middle, as if he were a two-inch plank. He would hold on to his secret arts which he had to go all the way to India to get. Jan was a hypnotist; and my wife had come to realise that all illness is more or less amenable to suggestion. She had the idea of being hypnotised and given curative suggestions. An essential part of Jan's technique, as he had explained it, was in outstaring the patient and never blinking his eyes.
- 4. The late Professor Quackenbos, of Columbia University, who wrote many books on hypnotism as a therapeutic agency, and tells of numerous cases of the same kind. He himself would sometimes go involuntarily into hypnotic sleep with his patient.

¹³ 12

- 5. The trick depends upon a process of intense concentration, which will later be described in detail. After this concentration, Craig would give to her subconscious mind the suggestion, or command, that it should bring to her consciousness a vision of what Jan was doing. This¹⁴ giving an order to the subconscious mind is much the same sort of thing that you do when you seek to remember a name; whether you realise it or not, you order you subconscious mind to get that bit of information and bring it to you. Whatever came to Craig, she would write it out, and when next she met Jan she would verify it.
- 6. Jan goes into one of his deep states—a cataleptic trace, he calls it—in which his body is rigid and cold. He has the power to fix in advance the time when he will come out of the trance, and his subconscious mind apparently possesses the power to keep track of time—days hours, minutes, even seconds. I have seen him amaze a group of scientists by coming out on the second, while they held stop-watches on him.
- 7. If you want to learn the art of conscious mind-reading, this will tell you how. The first thing you have to do is to learn the trick of undivided attention, or concentration. By these terms I mean something quite different from what is ordinarily meant. One 'concentrates' on writing a chapter in a book, or on solving a problem in mathematics; but this is a complicated process of dividing one's attention, giving it to one detail after another, judging, balancing, making decisions. The kind of concentration I mean is putting the attention on one object, or one uncomplicated thought, such as joy, or peace, and holding it there steadily. It isn't thinking; it is inhibiting thought, except for one thought, or one object in thought.

You have to inhibit the impulse to think things about the object, to examine it, or appraise it, or to allow memory-trains to attach themselves to it. The average person has never heard of such a form of concentration, and so has to learn how to do it. Simultaneously, he must learn to relax, for strangely enough, a part of concentration¹⁵ is complete relaxation.

There seems to be contradiction here, in the idea of simultaneous concentration and relaxation. I do not know whether this is due to a contradiction in the nature of the mind itself, or to our misunderstanding of its nature. Perhaps we each have several mental entities, or minds, and one of these can sleep (be blankly unconscious), while another supervises the situation, maintaining the first one's state of unconsciousness for a desired period, and then presenting to it some thought or picture agreed on in advance, thus restoring it to consciousness.

Anyway, it is possible to be unconscious and conscious at the same time! Almost everyone has had the experience of knowing, while asleep, that he is having a bad

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

¹⁵ 14

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

^{14 13}

dream and must awaken himself from it. Certainly some conscious entity is watching the dream, and knowing it is a dream; and yet the sleeper is 'unconscious.' Or perhaps there is no such thing as complete relaxation—until death.

All I can say is this: when I practise this art which I have learned, with my mind concentrated on one simple thing, it is a relaxation as restful, as seemingly 'complete' as when I am in that state called normal sleep. The attention is not allowed to be on the sensations of the body, or on anything but the one thing it is deliberately 'concentrated' on.

Undivided concentration, then, means, for purposes of this experiment, a state of complete relaxation, under specified control. To concentrate in this undivided way you first give yourself a 'suggestion' to the effect that you will relax your mind and your body, making the body insensitive and the mind a blank, and yet reserving the power to 'break' the concentration in a short time. By making the body insensitive I mean simply to relax completely your mental hold of, or awareness of, all bodily sensation. After giving yourself this suggestion a few times, you proceed to relax both body and mind. Relax all mental interest in everything in the environment; inhibit all thoughts which try to wander into consciousness from the subconsciousness, or from wherever else thoughts come. This is clearly a more thorough affair than 'just relaxing.'

Also, there is something else to it—the power of supervising the condition. You succeed presently in establishing a blank state of consciousness, yet you have the power to become instantly conscious, also, to realise when you are about to go into a state of sleep, in which you have not the power of instantly returning to consciousness. Also, you control, to a certain degree, what is to be presented to consciousness when you are ready to become conscious. For example, you want a message from the person who is sending you a message you do not want a train of subconscious 'day dreams'.

All this is work; and so far, it is a bore. But when you have learned to do it, it is an art worth knowing. You can use it not only for such experiments as telepathy and clairvoyance, but for improving you bodily health. To relax thoroughly several times each day while holding on to a suggestion previously 'planted' in the sub-consciousness is more beneficial to health than any other one measure I know.

The way to relax is to 'let go.' 'Let go' of every tense muscle, every tense spot in the body. Pain is tension. Pain can be inhibited by suggestion <u>followed by complete relaxation</u>. Drop your body, a dead-weight, from your conscious mind. Make your conscious mind a blank. It is the mind, conscious or subconscious, which holds the body tense. Give to the subconsciousness the suggestion¹⁷ of concentrating on one idea, and then completely relax consciousness. To make the conscious mind a blank it is necessary to 'let go' of the body; just as to 'let go' of requires 'letting go' of consciousness of the body. If, after you have practised 'letting go' of the body, you find

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

¹⁷ 16

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

¹⁶ 15

that your mind is not a blank, then you have not succeeded in getting your body rid of all tension. Work at it until you can let both mind and body relax completely.

It may help you to start as follows: Relax the body as completely as possible. Then visualise a rose or a violet—some pleasant, familiar thing which does not arouse emotional memory-trains. Gaze steadily, peacefully, at the chosen object—think only of it—try not to let any memories it may arouse enter your mind. Keep attention steady, just seeing the colour, or the shape of the flower and nothing else. Do not think things about the flower. Just look at it. Select one thing about it to concentrate on, such as its shape, or its colour or the two combined in a visual image: 'pink and round.'

If you find that you are nervous by this effort, it is apt to be due to the fact that you are thinking things. Maybe the object you have chosen has some buried memories associated with it—something which arouses unconscious memories of past unhappy events. Roses may suggest a lost sweetheart, or a vanished garden where you once were happy and to which you long to return. If so, select some other flower to concentrate on. Flowers are usually the most restful, the things which are not so apt to be involved with distressing experience. A bottle of ink might suggest the strain of mental work, a spoon might suggest medicine. So find a peace-inspiring object to look at. When you have found it, just look at it, with undivided attention.

If 18 you succeed in doing this, you will find it hard not to drop asleep. But you must distinguish between this and the state you are to maintain. If you drop asleep, the sleep will be what is called auto-hypnotic sleep, and after you have learned to induce it, you will be able to concentrate on an idea, instead of the rose, and carry this idea into the sleep with you as the idea to dominate the subconsciousness while you sleep. This idea, taken with you into sleep in this way, will often act in the subconsciousness with the same power as the idea suggested by a hypnotist. If you have ever seen hypnotism, you will know what this means. You can learn to carry an idea of the restoration of health into this auto-hypnotic sleep, to act powerfully during sleep. Of course this curative effect is not always achieved. Any idea introduced into the subconsciousness may meet a counter-suggestion which, if you are ill, already exists in the subconsciousness, and a conflict may ensure. Thus time and perseverance may be necessary to success.

But this is another matter, and not the state for telepathy—in which you must avoid dropping into a sleep. After you have practised the exercise of concentrating on a flower—and avoiding sleep—you will be able to concentrate on holding the peculiar blank state of mind which must be achieved if you are to make successful experiments in telepathy. There may be strain to start with, but it is getting rid of strain, both physical and mental, which constitutes relaxation, or blankness, of the conscious mind. Practice will teach you what this state is, and after a while you can achieve it without strain.

¹⁸ 17

- 8. It is best at first to experiment in the dark, or at least in a dimly lit room, as light stimulates the eyes and interferes with relaxation. If 19 you experiment at night, have a table lamp within easy reach, so that you can turn the light off and on for each experiment without too much exertion, as you must keep your body and mind as passive as possible for these experiments. If you have no reading light near, use a candle. You must also have a writing pad and a pencil beside you.
- 9. Stretch you body full length on the couch. Close your eyes and relax your body. Relax completely. Make the mind a complete blank and hold it blank. Do not think of anything. Thoughts will come. Inhibit them. Refuse to think. Do this for several moments. It is essential to induce a passive state of mind and body. If the mind is not passive, it feels body sensations. If the body is not relaxed its sensations interfere with the necessary mental passivity. Each rests on the other. Hold it so far a few moments, then give the mental order to the unconscious mind to tell you what is on the paper you hold in your hand. Keep the eyes closed and the body relaxed, and give the order silently, and with as little mental exertion as possible.

However, it is necessary to give it clearly and positively, that is with concentration on it. Say to the unconscious mind, "I want the picture which is on this card, or paper, presented to my consciousness." Say this with your mind concentrated on what you are saying. Repeat, as if talking directly to another self: "I want to see what is on this card." Then relax into blankness again and hold blankness a few moments, then try gently, without straining, to see whatever forms may appear on the void into which you look with closed eyes. Do not try to conjure up something to see; just wait expectantly and let something come.

My²⁰ experience is that fragments of forms appear first. For example, a curved line, or a straight one, or two lines of a triangle. But sometimes the complete object appears; swiftly, lightly, dimly-drawn, as on a moving picture film. These mental visions appear and disappear with lightning rapidity, never standing still unless quickly fixed by deliberate effort of consciousness. They are never in heavy lines, but as if sketched delicately, in a slightly deeper shade of grey than that of the mental canvas. A person not used to such experiments may at first fail to observe them on the grey background of the mind, on which they appear and disappear so swiftly. Sometimes they are so vague that one gets only a notion of how they look before they vanish. Then one must 'recall' this first vision. Recall it by conscious effort, which is not the same thing as the method of passive waiting by which the vision was first introduced. Instead, it is as if one had seen with open eyes a fragment of a real picture, and now closes his eyes and looks at the memory of it and tries to 'see' it clearly.

¹⁹ 18

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

20 19

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

It is necessary to recall this vision and make note of it, so as not to forget it. One is <u>sure</u> to forget it—indeed it is his duty to do so—in the process of the next step, which is one of blankness again. This blankness is, of course, a deliberate putting out of conscious mind of all pictures, including the one just visioned. One must now order the subconscious not to present it to the conscious mind's picture-film again unless it is the right picture, i.e., the one drawn on the card which is held in hand. Make the conscious mind's picture-film again unless it is the right picture, i.e., the one drawn on the card which is held in hand. Make the conscious mind blank again for a brief space. Then look again on the grey canvas of mind for a vision.²¹ This is to test whether the first vision came from subconscious guessing, or whether it came from the deeper mind—from some other source than that of the subconscious, which is so apt to offer a 'guess' or false picture.

Do this whole performance two or three times, and if the first vision persists in coming back, accept it. As soon as you have accepted it—that is, decided that this is the correct vision,—turn on the light, and without looking at the card, or paper, which contains the real picture, pick up the writing pad and pencil and make a sketch of every detail of the vision-picture. This is a nuisance, as it interrupts concentration and the desired passivity. But it is absolutely necessary to record the vision in every detail, before one looks at the real picture, the one on the card he has been holding in hand. If one does not make a record of his vision in advance of looking at the card picture, he is certain for forget at least some part of it—maybe something which is essential. Worse yet, he is apt to fool himself; the mind is given to self-deception. As soon as it sees the real drawing, it not only forgets the vision, but it is apt to imagine that it visioned the picture it now sees on the card which may or may not be true. Imagination is a far more active function than the average person realises. This conscious-subconscious mind is 'a liar', a weaver of fiction. It is the dream-mind, and also it is the mind of memory-trains.

Do not omit fragments which seem to be out of place in a picture. These fragments may be the real things. If in doubt as to what the object of your vision is, do not try to guess. But if you have a 'hunch' that something you have seen is connected somehow with a watch, for example, or with an automobile, make a note of this 'hunch.' I use this popular word to indicate²² a real presentation from some true source, something deeper and more dependable than our own subconscious minds. I call this the 'deep mind' in order to have a name for it. I do not know what it is, of course—I am only judging from the behaviour of the phenomena.

10. This technique takes time, and patience, and training in the art of concentration. But this patience is in itself an excellent thing to learn, especially for nervous and sick

21 20

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

²² 21

UPTON SINCLAIR: MENTAL RADIO

people. The uses of mental concentration are too various and tremendously beneficial to enumerate here. The average person has almost no power of concentration, as he will quickly discover by trying to hold his undivided attention on one simple object, such as a rose, or a bottle of ink, for just a few minutes. He will find that a thousand thoughts, usually associated trains connected with the rose, or the ink, will appear on his mental canvas, interrupting his concentration. He will find that his mind behaves exactly like a moving-picture film, or a fireworks display. It is the division of attention that uses up energy if I am not mistaken.

Of course this technique is not 'original'. I got it by selecting from hints here and there in my reading, and from my general study and observation of the behaviour of the mind.

11. Another difficulty is the way things sometimes appear in fragments, or sections, of the whole picture. A straight line may appear, and it may be either only a portion of the whole, or it may be all there is on the card. Then I have to resist the efforts of my imagination to speculate as to what object this fragment may be part of. For instance, I see a pair of points, and have the impulse to 'guess' a star. I must say no to this guesswork, unless the indescribable²³ 'hunch' feeling assures me it is a star. I must tell myself it may be indeed a part of a star, but, on the other hand, it may be a complete picture of the drawing in hand, perhaps the letter W, or M, or it may be a part of a pennant, or what not. Then I must start over, and hold blank a while. Then repeat the request to the deep mind for the true picture. Now I may get a more complete picture, or maybe this fragment reappears alone, or maybe it repeats itself upside-down, or doubled up in most any way.

I start all over once more and now I may get a series of fragments which follow each other and jump together as do the comic cartoons which are drawn on the screen with pen and ink. For instance, two points appear, then another appears separately and jumps to the first two, and joins up with them, then two more. The result is a star, and this may be the true picture. It usually is. But sometimes this is the subconscious mind, or perhaps the conscious, trying to finish the object as it has 'guessed' it should be. This error of allowing the conscious or the subconscious mind to finish the object is one to be more careful about. As one experiments, he realises more and more that these two minds, the conscious and the subconscious, are really one, subconsciousness being only a disorderly storehouse of memories. The third, or 'deep mind,' is the one which gives us our psychic phenomena.

The conscious mind, combined with the subconsciousness, not only wants to finish the picture, but decides sometimes to eliminate a detail which does not belong to what it has guessed should be there. Here was conscious mind making a false decision. But by obeying the rules I had laid down in advance, I was saved from this error of consciousness.

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^{23 22}

- 11. Here²⁴ was a grand mix-up of the false guesses of consciousness and subconsciousness, and the true presentations from the 'deep mind'.
- 12. From this kind of interference by the consciousness, I realised that it is indeed no simple matter to get things into consciousness from the 'deep mind' without guesses and additions and subtractions made by the subconsciousness. Why the subconscious should meddle, I do not know. But it does. Its behaviour is exactly like that of the conscious mind, which is also prone to guessing. All this sounds fantastic—to anyone who has not studied his mind. But this is how it seems to me. True vision comes into the subconsciousness, not directly from the drawing, but from another mind which has some means of knowing, and sending to consciousness via the subconsciousness whatever I ask for it.
- 13. I wanted to find out if the true vision could in any way be distinguished from 'imagination,' or these busy guesses of the subconsciousness. To help myself in this matter, I first made an examination of exactly how these guesses come. I said to myself: every thought that ever comes to consciousness, excepting those due to direct outside stimulation, may proceed from some deeper source, and by subconscious memory-trains attaching to them, appear to be the work of subconsciousness.
- 14. There was a difference between the way this true vision came and the way the 'idle' vision came. When the true visions came, there usually came with them a "something" which I call a 'hunch.' There was, of course, always in my consciousness the question: Is this the right thing, or not? When the true vision came, this question seemed to receive an answer, 'yes', as if some intelligent entity was directly informing me.

This²⁵ was not always the case. At times no answer came, or at least, if it came, it was obscured by guesses. But usually it did—after I had watched for it, and a sort of thrill of triumph came with it, quite different from the quiet way in which the moneybag had appeared in answer to my uncertainty. The subconscious answers question, and answers always falsely; its answers come quietly, like a thief at night. But the 'other' mind, the 'deep mind' answers questions, too, and these answers come, not quietly, but as if by 'inspiration', whatever that is—with rustling of wings, with gladness and conviction. These two minds seem different from each other. One lies and rambles; the other sings, and is truthful.

^{24 23}

- 15. During the earliest experiments, I developed a headache. I think this was due to the fact that I strained my closed eyes trying to see with them. I mean, of course, trying to see a vision, not the card in my hand. Using the eyes to see with is a habit, and habits are not easily overcome. I soon learned not to use my eyes, at least not in a strained way, and this was the end of the headaches.
- 16. That it is an intense concentration upon one suggestion—the narrowing of the attention to one focus—which produces the cataleptic trance is something which my wife set out to prove, and by going close to the border-line she feels that she did prove it. When Craig had relaxed, she told me that she had known what was happening; there had been one point of consciousness left, and she had the belief that she could let that go in another moment, but was afraid to do so, because she might not come out again. For an instant, she had felt that strange terror one feels at the moment he ceases to struggle against the fumes of gas or ether, and plunges into oblivion. The²⁶ difference is that, in the case of gas or ether, one cannot hold on to consciousness, but in the case of the cataleptic state, he can recall his receding consciousness. Craig, of course, had not concentrated with complete attention to one idea; one portion of her mind was concentrated upon achieving rigidity, while another was watching and protesting against oblivion.
- 17. The state of concentration is not one of tension accompanied by the suggestion of rigidity, or of fear, but on the contrary is a state of relaxation, accompanied by the suggestion of control or supervision. This matter of supervision has been carefully set forth by Craig in her statement. It is one of the mind's great mysteries; how, while thinking about nothing, you can not only remember to give a suggestion, but can also act upon it. Craig insists that we have three minds; and she has in this the backing of William McDougall. The psychic Jan gives such 'auto-suggestions' to himself when he goes into a trance, and tells his trance mind to bring him out at a certain moment. How that trance mind can measure time as exactly as a clock is another of the mysteries; but that it happens is beyond doubt. It is obvious that when the psychic lets himself be buried six feet under the ground in an ordinary pine-wood coffin, he is staking his life upon his certainty that he will not come out of the state of lethargy until after he has been dug up. He also stakes it upon the hope that the physicians who have the test in charge will have sufficient sense to realise the importance of having him dug out at the time agreed. In one case they were several minutes late, and Jan nearly suffocated.
- 18. What telepathy means to my wife is this: it seems to indicate a common substratum of mind, underlying our individual minds, and which we²⁷ can learn to tap.

²⁶ 25

Figure the conscious mind as a tree, and the subconscious mind as the roots of that tree: then what of the earth in which the tree grows, and from which it derives its sustenance? What currents run through that earth, affecting all the trees of the forest? If one tree falls, the earth is shaken—and may not the other trees feel the impulse?

In other words, we are apparently getting hints of a cosmic consciousness, or cosmic unconsciousness: some kind of mind stuff which is common to us all, and which we can bring into our individual consciousness. Why is it not sensible to think that there may be a universal mind-stuff, just as there is a universal body-stuff, of which we are made, and to which we return?

19. All Craig's work so far has depended upon a state of complete peace and relaxation. As she has pointed out, it is a matter of "undivided concentration," and even such disturbing things as light and noise are an interference. One friend who has tried to experiment lately at our instigation gave it up because of automobile horns in the street outside. She declared that these had never disturbed her before, but that the effort not to hear them when concentrating only caused her to concentrate on the horns, and so threatened to give her a case of "nerves."

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At that time Sariputra, through the power of Buddha, thought within himself thus: "If it he true that when the Bodhisattva is pure in mind, then his world is pure, why is this Buddha-land of ours so impure as we see it, which was established by the Buddha out of his²⁸ pure mind when he was a Bodhisattva?" The Buddha knowing his thought spoke to him and said "What thinkest thus, O Sariputra, is it the fault of the sun or moon that the blind cannot see the brightness thereof?" Nay, O Lord, it is not the fault of the sun or moon, but it is the fault of the blind." "The Buddha continued, "Then, O Sariputra, it is not the fault of the Tathagata that beings who, because of their sins, cannot see the pureness of this Buddha-land of ours. Really, O Sariputra, this land of ours is ever pure; but it is thou that canst not see its purity." Sariputra said: "As I behold this world of ours, it is full of hills, mountains, dens, pits, thorns, pebbles, clay, rocks, and many other un comely things." Sankhacuda said: "Inequalities are in thy own mind. Thou seest this land not through the wisdom of the Buddha; therefore thou thinkest this impure. I tell thee, O Sariputra, the Bodhisattva pure in his firm mind looks upon all things impartially with the wisdom of a Buddha, and therefore this Buddha-land is to him pure without blemish."

2. "O Maitreya, the Blessed One assured thee that thou shouldst obtain supreme enlightenment after only one birth; now tell me what birth does that assurance refer to.

[®] Translated by Hokei Idumi in The Eastern Buddhist 1923.) A Mahayana text)

²⁸ 27

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

Does it belong to the past, or to the future or the present? If it be of the past, it is already past. If it be of future, it is not yet come. If it be of present, it never abides. It is taught by Buddha: "O Bhikshus, at this very moment ye are being born and growing old and dying. If the assurance be of no-birth, no-birth is of the true order, and in the true order there is neither the assurance of enlightenment nor even the supreme enlightenment itself. O Maitreya, how canst thou obtain thy assurance in one birth? Didst thou obtain the assurance at the birth of Suchness or at its extinction?²⁹ If thou didst obtain the assurance at its extinction, Suchness has no extinction. All beings are of Suchness. All things too are of Suchness. All the sages and worthy men are of Suchness. Even Maitreya thyself is of Suchness. If thou art capable of obtaining the assurance, all beings too should be capable of obtaining the assurance.

"And why? Such is one and not divisible nor is it differentiated. If thou O Maitreya canst attain to the supreme enlightenment, all beings too can attain to it. And why? All beings have the nature of enlightenment. If thou, O Maitreya, canst attain to Nirvana, all beings too can attain to it. And why. All the Buddhas know that all beings have ultimately the nature of tranquility, that is Nirvana, and are never to be annihilated again.

3.30O Maitreya, thou should strive to make those gods abandon the false idea that there is Bodhi distinct by itself. And why? Bodhi cannot be obtained by the body or the mind. Tranquility is Bodhi as in it all things are tranquilised. Not-seeing is Bodhi as it is beyond all relations. Not-working is Bodhi beyond all thought. To cut is Bodhi as it exterminates all heresies. To separate Bodhi as it prevents all desires from rising. Notentering is Bodhi as it is free from covetousness. Accordance is Bodhi as it is in accord with the truth. To abide is Bodhi as it abides in the nature of things. To reach is Bodhi as it reaches the ultimate. Non-duality is Bodhi as it is separated from consciousness and its object. Equality is Bodhi as it is equal to the sky. An uncreate is Bodhi as there Knowledge is Bodhi as it understands the mental is neither birth nor death. dispositions of all beings. Not-coming-in-contact is³¹ Bodhi as it is not to be known by any senses. Non-union is Bodhi as it is detached from the influence of passion. Nonabiding is Bodhi as it is without figure or form. Unreality of name is Bodhi as names are empty. Being like a phantom is Bodhi as it is far above grasping and abandonment. Not being disturbed is Bodhi as it is eternal calm. Serenity is Bodhi as it is pure in nature. Non-grasping is Bodhi as it is far above all attachments. The absence of difference is Bodhi as all things are same. The incomparability is Bodhi as it is beyond analogy. Subtility is Bodhi as all things are unknowable.

²⁹ 28

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

³⁰ The original editor inserted "3." By hand

^{31 29}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

- 'I have come from the Bodhimandala, place of enlightenment.' I inquired: 'Where is the Bodhimandala?' He replied: 'Sincere mind is the Bodhimandala as it is without falsehood. Activity is the Bodhimandala as it accomplishes all works. The deep mind is the Bodhimandala as it increases merits. The enlightened mind is the Bodhimandala as it is without errors. Charity is Bodhimandala as it expects no Morality is the Bodhimandala as it fulfills all vows. rewards. Patience is the Bodhimandala as it knows no impediment in all beings. Diligence is the Bodhimandala as it is never slothful. Meditation is the Bodhimandala as it controls the mind. Wisdom is the Bodhimandala as it directly sees all things. Mercy is the Bodhimandala as it treats all beings with equality. Compassion is the Bodhimandala as it endures exhaustion and pain. Joy is the Bodhimandala as it finds pleasure in the law. Impartiality is the Bodhimandala as it destroys both love and hatred. Supernatural power is the Bodhimandala as it is endowed with the six supernatural faculties. Emancipation is the Bodhimandala as it is able to turn away and leave out.
- 5. All beings are the Bodhimandala as it knows them³² to be selfless. All things are the Bodhimandala as it knows them to be empty. Vanquishing the Evil Ones is the Bodhimandala as it is immovable. The three states of existence are the Bodhimandala as they have no fixed abodes for beings. Roaring like a lion is the Bodhimandala as it knows no fears. Knowing all things with one thought is the Bodhimandala as it attains omniscience.
- "What are the pleasures of the law?" He replied: "There are the pleasures of 6. ever believing in Buddha. There are the pleasures of desiring to hear the law. There are the pleasures of revering the order. There are the pleasures of being far above the five senses. There are the pleasures of regarding the five Skandhas as enemies. There are the pleasures of regarding the four elements as if they were venomous snakes. There are the pleasures of regarding the twelve Ayatanas as if they were a deserted village. There are the pleasures of regarding and guarding the thought of supreme enlightenment. There are the pleasures of bestowing happiness on all beings. There are the pleasures of revering the teacher. There are the pleasures of practising universal charity. There are the pleasures of being faithful to discipline. There are the pleasures of being patient and meek. There are the pleasures of being diligent in accumulating merits. There are the pleasures of being not distracted in meditation. There are the pleasures of wisdom clear and without blemish. There are the pleasures of spreading the thought of enlightenment. There are the pleasures of repressing all Evil Ones. There are the pleasures of destroying passions.
- 7. There are the pleasures of being not wishing to reach the goal before maturity. There are the pleasures of being friendly to one's fellow-believers. There are the

³² 30

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

pleasures of cherishing³³ an unimpeded mind among the teachers of heresy. There are the pleasures of guiding misled friends back to the path.

- 8. The maidens asked Vimalakirti, 'Tell us how we should conduct ourselves in the palace of the evil one.' Vimalakirti said: 'Well sisters, ye should know that there is the doctrine named the inextinguishable light. By the inextinguishable light is meant this—just as from one light we can produce a hundred or even a thousand other lights, brightening up darkness, yet the original light is not thereby exhausted; thus O sisters, a Bodhisattva can teach a hundred or even a thousand beings to cherish the thought of supreme enlightenment; yet his own thought of enlightenment is not at all extinguished, but (all beings) grow in their merits according to the doctrine. This is (what is meant by) the inextinguishable light. Though yet be in the palace of the evil one, yet possessing this inextinguishable light ye can made the innumerable gods and maidens cherish the thought of supreme enlightenment. Thus can ye recompense the grace of Buddha and also greatly benefit all beings.'
- 9. For the sake of salvation thou shouldst cherish the thought of great compassion. For the maintenance of the true law thou should cherish the thought of great compassion. For the maintenance of the true law thou shouldst cherish the thought of joy. For the attainment of knowledge thou shouldst dwell in the thought of impartiality. Removing all covetousness, virtue of charity should be practised. To teach the trespassers of morality, rules of discipline should be observed.
- 10. Teaching beings (the thought of) emptiness should be cherished. Not abandoning the created things cherish (the thought of) formlessness. Manifesting human birth cherish (the thought of) non-action.³⁴ For the maintenance of the true law, necessary means should be cherished.
- 11. Follow judgment knowing the thoughts of all beings and preaching the law according to each one's need. Follow the discriminating intelligence knowing how all things being far beyond either giving or taking enter the domain of the one form. O noble youth, thus is the ceremony of gifts of spiritual things.
- 12. Sir, what is the cause of thy sickness? How long has it lasted? How can it be cured? Vimalakirti replied: "From ignorance we hold attachment, and my sickness is thus caused. Since all beings are sick, I am sick. If they are no more sick then my sickness would cease. And why? A Bodhisattva enters (a life of) birth and death for the sake of all beings; where there are birth and death, there is always sickness. If all beings

^{33 31}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

³⁴ 32

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

were free from sickness, then there would be no more sickness with a Bodhisattva. Again thou hast inquired about the cause of my sickness. The sickness of a Bodhisattva is caused only by his great compassion."

- 13. He asked: "Where is the emancipation of all the Buddhas to be sought?" He replied: "In the mind of all beings. Again thou asked why here I have no attendants; but all evil ones and all heretics are my attendants; and why? All evil ones find pleasure in birth and death; and a Bodhisattva never abandons birth and death.
- 14. Then Manjusri asked Vimalakirti: "How should a Bodhisattva console another Bodhisattva who is not well?" Vimalakirti replied: "Preach to him about the impermanency of the body but not about abandoning the body. Preach to him about liability of the body to suffer but not about enjoy ability of Nirvana. Preach to him about selflessness of the body and preach how³⁵ to teach and lead beings. Preach to him emptiness of the body but not about the ultimate annihilation. Preach to him about his past sins but not about fixing his thought. Sympathise with others who are sick, because of thy own sickness. Thou shouldst remind him of the suffering undergone in the past existences through countless ages. Thou shouldst let him remember that all beings are to be benefited, remember the merits accumulated in the past, and remember his pure life. Let him not cherish sorrow, but always to be diligent.
- 15. Manjusri asked: "Sir, how should a Bodhisattva who is sick conquer his mind?" Vimalakirti replied: "A Bodhisattva who is sick should dwell upon such thoughts as these: this sickness of mine has been caused by illusions, errors and passions in my past existences, and it has no real substance. Who is the sufferer in sickness? (No man). And why? Because the four elements are combined together, there is the combination provisionally called the body. There is no ruler of the four elements besides themselves; nor is there any self in the body. Again, this, what we call sickness comes from the attaching oneself to Self. Therefore let him not be attached to Self. Therefore when the cause of sickness is known then he should abandon all the thoughts both of Self and beings, and cherish the thought of objectivity. He should dwell upon such thoughts as these: 'the body consists of several constituent parts combined together. When it is produced, it is objects only that are produced; and when it perishes it is objects only that perish. Again, those constituent parts are strangers to one another; when they are produced, they do not say; (we are produced) and when they perish they do not say: (they perish).

Then again he should abandon even the thought of objectivity and dwell upon such thoughts³⁶ as these: 'the thought of objectivity is also an error, and this error is a

^{35 33}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

³⁶ 34

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

great calamity; it should be removed; how should it be removed? Free thyself from the ideas of me and mine. How the ideas of me and mine be removed? It means to remove two things. What is meant by being removed from two things? Think neither things without nor within and live the life of equity. How is (the thought of) equity to be dwelt upon? There is equity in self. There is equity in Nirvana. And why? Both self and Nirvana are empty. Why are they empty? They are empty because they are mere names. These two things have no definite nature. If a Bodhisattva would attain to this equity there would be no more sickness but that of emptiness; and this emptiness is also empty. This sick Bodhisattva receives sense-impressions as if he did not. Not being endowed yet with the Buddha's law he does not exterminate sensations to attain to the state of enlightenment. If he suffers he should cherish the great compassion comparing himself with those who are in the unhappy (states of) existence. (And he should dwell upon such a thought as this:) Having conquered myself I will cause all beings to conquer themselves. He ought only to remove his disease but not things themselves. In order to exterminate the origin of disease it should be taught (thus): What is the origin of disease? It is bondage. Where there is bondage there is disease. By what is it bound? It is bound by the three states of existence. How is it exterminated? It is exterminated by (the thought of) nothing to obtain. Where there is nothing to obtain there in no bondage. What is (the meaning of) nothing to obtain? It is to be free from the two (opposing) heresies. They are (false ideas) of both things within and things without; they are nothing. Manjusri, this is the means by which³⁷ a Bodhisattva who is sick can conquer his mind and exterminate the sorrows of old age, disease and death. This is the Bodhi of a Bodhisattva. If he does not do thus, that which is exercised is destitute of efficient result. Just as (one) conquers his enemy is said to be courageous, even so he is a true Bodhisattva who conquers both (his mind and) old age, disease and death.

Again, a Bodhisattva who is sick should cherish such thoughts as these. This sickness of mine is neither real nor existent and the sickness of all beings is also neither real nor existent. When he thinks thus, if he cherished a compassion born of passion, it should be abandoned. And why? Exterminating all passions which are like external dusts a Bodhisattva should awake great compassion. So far as the compassion born of passion is concerned, there is in his mind abhorrence of birth and death. If he is free from (passion) there is no more abhorrence. And whatever birth he may undergo he is never affected by his passion. As his birth is free from bondage he is able to preach the law to all beings and make them free; as Buddha taught: it is untrue to say that one who is bound can make another free from his bondage. Therefore a Bodhisattva should not be bound. What is bondage? What is deliverance? To covet the taste of meditation is the bondage of a Bodhisattva.

16. When a Bodhisattva adorns the land of a Buddha, perfects beings therein, with his mind not born of passion, and conquers his mind without ever feeling tired

^{37 35}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

according to the law of emptiness, no-form, and non-action, he then is said to have the wisdom endowed with the necessary means which is deliverance.

17. To benefit untiringly all beings though a Bodhisattva may be sick himself in this world of ³⁸ birth and death—this is the necessary means. Again as we look upon the body, the body is not separated from sickness, nor is sickness separated from the body; here is sickness, here is the body, the one neither precedes nor follows the other—this is said to be wisdom. Though he may be sick in his body, not to enter into Nirvana—this is the necessary means.

"Manjusri, a Bodhisattva who is sick should conquer his mind in such a manner; he should live neither in the conquered mind nor in the unconquered mind. And why? If he lives in the unconquered mind, he follows in the way of the ignorant, and if he lives in the conquered mind he follows in the way of the Sravakas.

"Therefore a Bodhisattva should live neither in the conquered mind nor in the unconquered mind. To be far above these two states of mind is said to be the live of a Bodhisattva. Not to commit impure deeds even in (the world of) birth and death, and never to enter into Nirvana, while he is living in Nirvana-this is the life of a Bodhisattva. Doing neither the deeds of an ordinary man, nor the deeds of a saint is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though wishing renunciation yet never to extinguish the body and mind is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the emptiness of things yet to accumulate a stock of merits is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the formlessness of things yet to save all beings is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the non-acting of things yet to manifest in the body which suffers is the life of Though realising the six Paramitas yet to comprehend all mental a Bodhisattva. conditions of beings is the life of a Bodhisattva. Thought realising the six supernatural powers yet never to make passion extinct is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realizing the four-fold infinite mind yet never to covet to³⁹ be born in the world of the Brahman is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the Dhyana and Samadhi of deliverance yet never to be reborn in their respective worlds is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the fourfold meditation yet never to be separated either from the body or the sensation or the mind or the external objects is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though realising the fourfold diligence yet never to abandon the diligence of the body and mind is the life of a Bodhisattva.

18. Though realising that things have neither beginning nor end yet to adorn himself with splendour is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though appearing as a Sravaka or a Pratyeka-Buddha yet never to abandon the law of Buddha is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though following the absolute purity of all things yet, when necessary, to appear as

³⁸ 36

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

³⁹ 37

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

himself for the sake of others is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though comprehending all the Buddha-lands as absolute empty, yet to show all the pure Buddha-lands is the life of a Bodhisattva. Though attaining to the ways of Buddha, rolling the wheel of the law, and entering into Nirvana, yet never to abandon the ways of a Bodhisattva is the life of a Bodhisattva."

When he had spoken these words eight thousand deities in the large assemblies which had accompanied Manjusri all cherished the thought of supreme enlightenment.

- 19. The Law is that which knows no attachments; if there be attachments in the Law, Nirvana itself is an attachment; this is not seeking the Law.
- 20. A Bodhisattva should regard all beings as a magician regards his magical creations created by himself; he should regard them as a wise man regards the moon in water, as his own reflections in a mirror, and again as mirage in the summer season, as the echo of a calling voice, as⁴⁰ clouds in the sky, as foams in the stream, as bubbles on the surface of water.

Manjusri then asked: "When a Bodhisattva regards (all beings thus), how can he practise mercy?" Vimalakirti replied: "Having thus regarded all beings a Bodhisattva should think this: 'I should now preach this Law for the sake of all beings'; this is true mercy.

- Practice the mercy of equity as the past, present, and future are the same. 21. Practice the mercy of solidity as the mind is never destroyed. Practice the mercy the Bodhisattva as he bestows peace on all beings. Practice the mercy of the Tathagata as he attains to the nature of suchness. Practice the mercy of the Buddha as he enlightens all beings. Practice the mercy of Patience as it protects himself and others. Practice the mercy of Diligence as it protects all beings. Practice the mercy of Meditation as he enjoys no sensuous pleasure. Practice the mercy of Wisdom as he knows what the proper time is.
- 22. A Bodhisattva who wishes to save all beings should remove his passions." Again he asked: "If he wish to remove his passions, what should he practise?" He replied: "He should practise the right thought." Again he asked: "How should he practice the right thought?" He replied: "He should realise that there is neither birth nor death." Again he asked: "What is that which has no birth and what is that which has no death?" He replied: "The evil is never born and the good never dies." Again he asked: "What is the root of the good and the evil?" He replied: "The body is the root of both." Again he asked: "What is the root of the body?" He replied: "Desire is the root." Again he asked: "What is the root of desire?" "False judgment is the root." "What is the root of false judgment?" "Erroneous perception is the root." What is the

40 38

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

root of 41 erroneous perception?" "No-abiding is the root." "What is the root of no-abiding?" "As to no-abiding, it has no root. O Manjusri, all things come from the root of no-abiding."

- 23. So far as the Law of Buddha is concerned, if any mendicant has discrimination in his mind he is said to be unlawful; if there be no discrimination nothing is unlawful; Behold those Bodhisattvas to whom the flowers never cling, because they have exterminated all thoughts of discrimination. Just as when a man has fear in his mind evil spirits take the opportunity to enter into him, even so since these disciples cherish fear of mortal existence, things such as form, sound, odour, flavour and touch take the opportunity to tempt them.
- 24. Sariputra asked: "Is it not liberation to be free from passion, anger and ignorance?" The heavenly maiden said: "Is it not liberation to be free from passion, anger and ignorance?" The heavenly maiden said: "Buddha calls it liberation to be free from passion, anger, and ignorance, only for the sake of beings who are self-assertive. To those who are not self-assertive Buddha declares that the nature of passion, anger, and ignorance is liberation itself." If one thinks that he has either obtained or attained to something, then he is said to be self-assertive in the Law of Buddha."
- 25. The Bodhisattva is said to practise the way of Buddha when he is ever merciful and patient, while appearing as if practising anger; when he is diligent in virtue, while appearing to be slothful; when he is ever abiding in meditation, while appearing to be distracted in mind; when he is in possession of the wisdom both of this world and that of the world beyond, while appearing to be ignorant; when he is pure in mind, while appearing the practise passions; when he eradicated the root of disease and is gone far beyond⁴² the fear of death, while appearing to be subject to old age and disease; when he is ever meditating on the transiency of things and is never covetous, though in possession of property; when he is far above the mire of the five senses, though he possesses wives and children; when he saves beings and leads them in the right path, while appearing to be in the wrong path.
- 26. Just as a lotus flower can never grow on a high dry land but only in the filthy mire, even so he who enters the "state of fixedness" by seeing the uncreated can never bring forth the law of Buddha; it is only in the mire of passion that beings bring forth the law of Buddha. Just as one can not obtain the inestimable treasure buried in the deep ocean unless one dives into it, even so no one can obtain the treasure of omniscience unless one enters the great ocean of passions.

^{41 39}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

^{42 40}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

- 27. The joy of hearing the law is his wife; the mind of mercy and compassion is his daughter; and to possess good will and sincerity is his son; absolute emptiness is his house.
- 28. The nobles of India in his time had in their house a professional musician, whose duty it was to awaken them in the morning by soft music.
- 29. He is the Bodhisattva who though being conscious of evil yet he follows evil deeds of evil; and he manifests those evils according to his will, through his wisdom of the necessary means. He shows himself as subject to old age, disease, and death in order to teach all beings; though he knows that (things are) even as a phantom, yet he understands their real nature in a most thorough manner.
- 30. He causes a world conflagration and reduces the universe into nothing; this is to make all beings realise transiency of things, as they are possess by the idea of permanency.
- 31. If⁴³ a great battle takes place, the Bodhisattva opposes the enemy with an equal force; manifesting a mighty power he subdues them and restores peace.
- 32. Though he appears as if enjoying the five senses, yet he practises meditation; thus causing confusion in the mind of the evil ones he gives them no chance to assert their power.

To see a lotus flower flowing right in fire, this is indeed a rare thing; even so to practise meditation while leading a sensuous life, this is rare indeed.

Manifesting himself as a harlot he attracts those sensuously minded; this is to catch them by the book of sensuality, and induce them later into the wisdom of Buddha.

He will sometimes be manifested as a burgomaster, or as a leader of traders, or as a national teacher, or as a minister of state, and benefit all beings.

He manifests himself as an inexhaustible store of treasure for all who are in need, and by this means persuades them to cherish the thought of enlightenment.

33. Then Vimalakirti spoke to all the Bodhisattvas and said: "O Sirs, how can a Bodhisattva enter the doctrine of non-duality? I beg of you to explain it according to your way of understanding."

There was in the assembly a Bodhisattva named Dharmeswara who spoke thus: "O Sirs, birth and death make a duality: but things are essentially uncreated, and therefore now they are not to be annihilated. To attain to the acquiescence in the law of no-birth – this is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

⁴³ **41**

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

- 34. If one penetrates into the true nature of impurity, one sees that there is no purity and thus attains to the state of annihilation. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality." Sunakshatra⁴⁴ said: "Moving and remembering make a duality; if there is no moving, there is no remembering, and if there be no remembering, then there is no discrimination. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."
- 35. The Bodhisattva-mind and the Sravaka-mind make a duality; if we understand that the nature of mind is empty like a phantom, there is neither the Bodhisattva-mind nor the Sravaka-mind. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Pushya said: "Good and not-good make a duality; if we entertain no thought of good and not-good, then we attain the realm of unconditionality and have a thorough understanding of truth. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Simha said: Sin and morality make a duality; when one fully understands that the nature of sin is not different from that of morality and penetrates this characteristic (of the truth) by the diamond-wisdom, he realises that there is neither bondage nor deliverance. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Simhamati said: Passion and passionlessness make a duality; when one understands that all things are equal, then he cherishes not the ideas of passion and passionlessness, and neither does he attach himself to form nor does he abide in formlessness. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Sudhamati said: The created and the uncreated make a duality; when one is separated from all ideas, then his mind becomes like the sky, and, being in possession of pure wisdom, it is not hindered by anything. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Narayana said: Worldliness and unworldliness make a duality; when one comprehends that the nature of this-worldliness is empty, then he attains unworldliness; there is neither coming nor going from one to the other, and there is also⁴⁵ neither overflowing nor scattering. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

Sudhamati said: Samsara (transmigration) and Nirvana make a duality; but when one understands the nature of Samsara, then he understands that there is neither Samsara nor bondage nor liberation nor burning nor extinction. To understand thus is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

36. The body and its annihilation made a duality. The body is in itself its annihilation. And why? When one understands the true nature of the body, then he cherishes no longer the idea that there is the body and there is its annihilation. Not to be astonished at this, nor to be afraid of it, is to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

^{44 42}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

⁴⁵ 43

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

- 37. Darkness and light make a duality. When there is neither darkness nor light, then this duality disappears. And why? When one enters the contemplation of the extinction of sense and thought he sees neither darkness nor light; even so are all things. He who comprehends equality therein he is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality.
- 38. To be attached to Nirvana and not to be detached from the world—these make a duality. When he is not attached to Nirvana and renounces not the world, there is no longer duality. And why? If there is bondage then there is deliverance. If there is nothing bound from the beginning, who will seek for deliverance? When there be neither bondage nor deliverance then there is neither attachment nor detachment. This is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality.
- 39. Then Manjusri asked Vimalakirti: "Now each of us has expressed his view: O Sir, I wish thou wilt express thy view as to what is meant by Bodhisattva's entering into the doctrine of non-duality." 46 Vimalakirti remained silent and said not a word.

Then Manjusri praised him saying: "Well done, well done, ultimately not to have any letters of words, this is indeed to enter the doctrine of non-duality.

- 40. Just as severe pain which penetrates even to the bone is to be inflicted upon an elephant or a horse in order to bring it to complete subjection as it is so obstinate and difficult to subdue, even so severe words must be spoken to discipline those beings who are obstinate and difficult to subdue.
- 41. Sakyamuni, the world-honoured one, concealing his infinite power of independence which is never restricted, and manifesting only those things desired by the poor delivers them from suffering), and also these Bodhisattvas of this world who are never wearied and always ready to condescend to become poor, are born in this land of Buddha cherishing infinite great compassion.
- 42. A Bodhisattva who would be perfect in deeds and be born in the pure land must practise the eightfold law in this world. What is the eightfold law? To bestow happiness on all beings without expecting reward, to endure all suffering for the sake of all beings, and to bestow on them all the stock of merit one has achieved; to bring his mind down to the minds of those beings ever in perfect humiliation.
- 43. Buddha then spoke to those Bodhisattvas: "There is a doctrine which is hindered neither by things limited and things unlimited; and this ye ought to know. What is meant by things limited? They are things created. What is meant by things unlimited? They are things uncreated. A Bodhisattva ought neither to abandon the created nor to

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^{46 44}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

attach himself to the⁴⁷⁴⁸ uncreated. What is it not to abandon the created? It is this; not to abandon great mercy and compassion; to cherish the thought of omniscience and never to be negligent; even to teach all beings without weariness; ever to remember and practise the law of the fourfold acceptance; not to spare body and life for the protection of the true law; to accumulate a stock of merit without wearniness; ever to have the mind abiding in peace with the necessary means and the transference of one's merit to others; to seek the law diligently; to preach the law without sparing; not to fear entering a life of birth and death as he strives to honour all the Buddhas; to be far above either sorrow in poverty or joy in prosperity; not to despise novices; to revere sages like the Buddhas; to make those who fall into passion return to the right thought; not to deem the pleasure of renunciation the best; not to get attached to one's own pleasures but to rejoice at other's pleasures; to regard meditation as the hell.

- 44. What is it not to abide in the uncreated? It is not to regard emptiness as something attained even though one practises emptiness; not to regard formlessness and aimlessness as something attained even though one practises them; not to regard causeless ness as something attained even though one practises it; not to shun the accumulating merits though realising transience (of things); not to abhor birth and death though meditating on pains of this world; never to become weary of teaching others though realising selflessness (of things); not to pass to annihilation forever though meditating on annihilation; to practise goodness both in the body and mind though meditating on abandonment; to take refuge in the law though there is no refuge; to care for all beings with the laws of the⁴⁹ world though seeing that life has no existence; not to exterminate passions though seeing passionlessness (of things); to teach beings with the practice though seeing that there is no practice; not to abandon great compassion though seeing emptiness; not to follow the Hinayana though seeing the ranks of certainty; not to neglect merit, meditation and wisdom so long as the original vow is not fulfilled, though seeing that all things are false, having neither substance nor personality nor master nor form; to practise such things is said of a Bodhisattva not to be abiding in the uncreated.
- 45. All the Bodhisattvas, excellent men practising such things, neither abandon the created, nor abide in the uncreated; this is the way of the law called the liberation from the extinguishable as well as from the inextinguishable.
- 46. Vimalakirti said "Just as I regard the reality of my body even so do I regard the Tathagata. I regard the Tathagata in this manner: he came not in the past, will not go in

^{47 45}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

⁴⁸ The original editor deleted "attach himself to" by hand

⁴⁹ 46

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

the future, and stays not in the present; I regard him neither as form nor as thatness of form, nor as the nature of form; neither as sensation nor as conception nor as confirmation; neither as consciousness nor as thatness of consciousness nor as the nature of consciousness; he is not caused by the four elements; he is even as the void.

- 47. Vimalakirti said: "When there is neither going nor coming, why dost thou ask me saying 'whence hast thou come to be born here?' what dost thou think when a conjurer produces either a man or a woman, is there any coming or going?" Sariputra said: "There is neither going nor coming; hast thou not heard that Buddha taught that the form of all things was like a phantom?" He replied: "Even so it is; when the form of all things is like a phantom, why doest thou ask me saying 'whence hast thou come to be born here?" O Sariputra, to leave is a form of destruction shown⁵⁰ in unreal objects. A Bodhisattva never exterminates his stock of merit even when he goes out, he never lets evils grow even when he is born."
- 48. O Blessed One, why should this man wish to leave his pure land and come here into a world full of anger and danger?" Vimalakirti spoke to Sariputra: "What dost thou think when the sun rises? Does it unite with darkness?" He replied: "Nay, when the sun rises there is no longer darkness." Vimalakirti again asked: "Why does the sun go round the Jambudvipa?" He replied: "In order to remove darkness by its brightness." Vimalakirti said: "Even so is with a Bodhisattva; though he is born in the land of impurity in order to teach all beings, he is never united with the darkness of the passions of all beings."
- 49. Buddha spoke to Maitreya and said: "O Maitreya I now give over to thee the Sutra leading to supreme enlightenment, which I have gathered during countless millions of Asamkyeya kalpas of the past. In the generations that follow after the passing of Buddha, ye should all widely proclaim and propagate this scripture through your supernatural powers in this Jambudvipa and never permit it to become extinct.
- 50. O Maitreya, there are two ways by which Bodhisattvas though comprehending the profound doctrine yet harm themselves and can never attain to the acquiescence in the eternal law. What are they? To despise novices among Bodhisattvas and not to teach them is the one, and although they comprehend the profound doctrine, yet to explain it according to their own ideas is the other; these are the two ways.
- 51. When Buddha preached this scripture Vimalakirti, the wealthy householder, Manjusri, Sariputra, Ananda, and all the deities, Asuras and all of the great assembly, having heard that which was preached by Buddha, greatly rejoiced in 51 it, believed in it,

^{50 47}

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA" - ON EMANCIPATION

⁵¹ 48

and practised it. (See also my bound volume "Six Buddhist Pamphlets" (Eastern Buddhist Vol.3 No.2. p. 138 for additional excerpts not included in above.)

NAGARJUNA'S MAHAYANA VIMSAKA.[®] 1. The Madhyamika philosophy of Buddhism goes in China under the name of the San-lun school, which literally means the school of the three treatises, which are Nagarjuna's Madhyamika-sastra, Dvadasadvarasastra, and Aryadeva's Sataka. In Tibet there is a Buddhist school known as the Prasangika which claims to transmit the tradition of the Madhyamika philosophy as was expounded by such later followers of Nagarjuna as Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. The Prasangika school has five treatises by Nagarjuna for its doctrinal authority. They are known as "rigspahi tshogs sde." (Division of Norm-collection) and consist of (i) Mulamadhyamika, (ii) Yuktishashtika (iii) Sunyatasaptati, (iv) Vigrahavyavartani, and (v) Vaidalya.

2. The Yuktishashtika differs not only in its subject-matter but in its tendency of thought from the rest of the Madhyamika works, and what we especially notice in this book is that it betrays an idealistic way of thinking. This is shown in the following extracts: "What are known as the elements etc., are included in Vijnana (consciousness): knowing this; would one think of the elements as separate from Vijnana? The elements so regarded are the result of wrong discrimination." (verse 34).

And again in verses 36 and 77, we have this: "This world is said to be conditioned by ignorance; when ignorance vanishes, the world too vanishes. Being so, the world is no more than discrimination."

In the Mahayanavimsaka whose Tibetan texts along⁵² with the Chinese version are given below, this idealistic tendency is more pronounced than in the Yuktishashtika. There is no doubt that the philosophy of the Prajna-paramita Sutra and the theory of Sunyata as advocated by Nagarjuna are derived from the phenomenalism of the Buddhist teaching that things (bhavah) have no reality of their own because of the law of conditionality. Thus naturally Nagarjuna is ever intent everywhere in his philosophical treatises to dwell upon the ten similes in the Prajna-paramita Sutra illustrative of the theory of Sunyata (emptiness), saying that all things are like dreams, visions, the moon reflected in water, and images in the mirror. The reason, however, why we see all these actualities before us in spite of Nagarjuna's phenomenalistic interpretation of existence, is according to him, due to our ignorance which stirs up our minds to create all these dream-like existences. This absolute idealism or subjectivism which denies the reality of an external world in itself, logically leads to the Vijnanavada

[&]quot;THE VIMALAKIRTI SUTRA"- ON EMANCIPATION

[®] Translated by Susumu Yamaguchi in the Eastern Buddhist 1926.

point of view as held by Asanga and Vasubandhu. According to this teaching, Vijnana alone exists (vijnanaptimatra), no reality is granted to external objects (artha), and even mind (citta or vijnana) as one such objects cannot claim any reality; in brief, apart from the comprehended (grahya) there is no comprehending subject (grahaka) either.

While the philosophy of Nagarjuna is based upon the theory of Sunyata as expounded in his encyclopedic commentary to the Prajna-paramita Sutra, it is also supported by the Avatamsaka doctrine, the final word of which is that "the triple world is mind only"; and indeed his treatise on the ten stages (dasabhumi) of Bodhisattvahood is no more than the confirmation of this psychological dictum. In this respect the Mahayanavimsaka⁵³ is quite explicit as we see in verses 6, 8-12, 17-20, 22, etc. especially in verse 10 which corresponds to the utterance of Nyorairin Bodhisattva at the Yamadeva's Palace as described in the Avatamsaka: "Mind is like an artist Variously producing the five skandhas."

Verse 17 begins with the following: "As we read in the Sutra, O sons of the Buddha, in the triple world there exists mind only."

This is in full agreement with the idea of the Vimsikavritti, where we have this: It is as if in dream evil deeds are actually committed.

Again verse 16 reads: Our knowledge of reality is like a dream in which things appear as if real, but there are no objective realities in dreams, and in like manner how can we prove the reality of an objective world?

We may add that the various currents of thought to be discerned in Nagarjuna's works above referred to including the Mahayanavimsaka are traceable in his stupendous commentary on the Mahaprajna-paramita-sutra. In the 15th volume, Nagarjuna comments, "If all existences (bhavah) are real, it is impossible for mind to know them. If they exist because of their being known by mind, this is not to be called as existing." In Volume Eight we have: "All existences are like a plantain-tree; all is created by mind. But when you know that things have no reality, the mind itself ceases to exist." Nagarjuna's comments on the ten similarities explaining the theory of Sunyata also testify to the idealistic tendency of his philosophy.

- 3. The Text: Adoration to Manjusri-kumara-bhuta. Adoration to the Three Treasures.
- (i) The Buddha who is undefiled and enlightened elucidates⁵⁴ well, being full of mercy, that which is not a word nor is to be expressed in words; therefore I adore the (Buddha's) power which is beyond thought.
- (ii) From the absolute point of view there is no birth, here again is there no annihilation; the Buddha is like sky, so are beings; they are of one nature.

^{53 50}

- (iii) There is no birth on the other side, nor on this side; Nirvana too in its self-nature exists not. Thus when surveyed by a knowledge which knows all things, empty are the created.
- (iv) The self-nature of all things is regarded as like shadow; they are in substance pure, serene, non-dualistic and same as suchness.
- (v) To think of self or of no-self is not the truth; they are discriminated by the confused; pleasure and pain are relative; so are passions and emancipation from them.
- (vi) Transmigration in the six paths of existence, the excellence and enjoy ability of the heavenly world, or the great painfulness of the purgatories,—all these come from apprehending the external world (as reality).
- (vii) One suffers very much when there is nothing pleasurable; even when there are things to enjoy, they pass away because they are impermanent; but it is so settled that goods indeed come from good deeds.
- (viii) Things are produced by false discrimination where there is no origination, so, when the purgatories, etc., are manifested, the erroneous are burned like a forest fire.
- (ix) Like unto things magic-created, so are the deeds of sentient beings who take the external world (for reality). The (six) paths of existence are in substance magic-creations, and they exist conditionally.
- (x) As the painter painting a terrible monster is himself frightened thereby, so is the fool frightened 55 with transmigration.
- (xi) As a stupid child making a muddy pool himself drowned in it, so are sentient beings drowned in the mire of false discrimination and unable to get out of it.
- (xii) As they regard non-existence as existence they suffer the feeling of pain. In the external world as well as in thought they are bound by the poison of false discrimination.
- (xiii) Seeing that beings are weak, one with a heart of love and wisdom is to discipline oneself for perfect enlightenment in order to benefit them.
- (xiv) Again, if one with such (a heart) accumulates (spiritual) provisions, one attains, from the relative point of view, a supreme enlightenment and is delivered from the bondage of false discrimination. Such an enlightened one is a friend of the world.
- (xv) When a man perceives the true meaning (of reality) as it becomes, he understands that the paths of existence are empty, and cuts asunder (the chain of) the first, middle and last.
- (xvi) Thus regarded, samsara and nirvana have no real substance. Passions have not any substance. Such notions as the first, middle and last are done away with when their self-nature is understood.
- (xvii) As perception takes place in a dream which when awakened disappears; so it is with sleeping in the darkness of ignorance: when awakened, transmigrations no more obtain.

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⁵⁵ 52

- (xviii) When things created by magic are seen as such, they have no existence; such is the nature of things.
- (xix) They are all nothing but mind, they established as phantoms; therefore a blissful or an evil existence is matured according to deeds good or evil.
- (xx) When⁵⁶ the mind-wheel ceases to exist all things indeed cease to exist; thus there is no ego in the nature of all things and therefore their nature is pure indeed.
- (xxi) When the ignorant wrapped in the darkness of ignorance eternity or bliss in objects as they appear or as they are in themselves, they drift in the ocean of transmigration.
- (xxii) Where the great ocean of birth and death filled with waters of false discrimination, who could ever reach the other shore unless carried by the raft of Mahayana?
- (xxiii) When it is rightly understood that the world arises conditioned by ignorance, where could false discrimination obtain?

BRUNO PETZOLD: "THE CHINESE TENDAI (T'IEN-TAI) TEACHING. 1. The great Mahayana teacher, Nagarjuna, who is believed to have lived in Southern India in the second or third century and is placed at the head of various Mahayana schools, is also regarded as the ancestor of the Tendai school. But the real originator and first patriarch was the Chinese priest Emon, in Chinese pronunciation Hwei-Wen or Hwui-Wen. We know very little above him, as he has not left any record behind. Still, so much is clear, that he lived in the early part of the sixth century, his death year being 550 (?), that he was a native of Northern China (Pe Tsi, the Northern Tsi Kingdom) and that he first discerned the great fundamental truth of Tendai teaching. He was like a Moses who could see the new country, but was not allowed to enter it.

The second ancestor of the Chinese Tendai school is Emon's disciple, Nangaku Eshi, in Chinese pronunciation, Hwui-Sz or Hwei-Si, of Nan-ngo or Nan-yo, of whom we know much more, as we still possess four works attributed to him.⁵⁷ Namely: i. the Text of Nangaku Eshi's Prayer; ii. The Samadhi-Teaching of Non-Discord (i.e. of the Perfect Amalgamation of all Dharmas); iii. The Dharma Gate (i.e. Teaching) of Mahayana Shi Kwan (i.e. of Tendai meditation); iv. The Meaning of the Anraku Practice. Nangaku was a great master of meditation, and his outlook on Buddhism was so new and provoked such antagonism, that twice he was in danger of being assassinated by fanatical fellow-monks. He died in 577. His greatest disciple was Chiki or Chisha Daishi, by the Chinese called Chi-che-ta-shi, or ChiK'ai or Ch'en Chi-k'ai or

^{56 53}

K'i, the Great Sage of the Thien-thai mountains in Chekiang, also commonly called Tendai Daishi – The great Teacher of Tendai.

He is the real founder of the Tendai school of Tendai teaching which was systematised by him, Emon and Nangaku being only its predecessors. Chisha Daishi was born in 531 A.D. in the reign of Emperor Wu Ti, a few years after the death of Theodoric the Great and the execution of Boetius. He himself died a peaceful death in 597.

2. Chisha Daishi who was born in Southern China in the province of Ke, in the village of Kwa Yo, saw as a boy the downfall of the Ryo Dynasty, that is, of the Southern Empire, and his mind became early impressed with the futility of earthly greatness and with the vanity of the pomp and splendour of kings. He migrated with his family to the city of Cho Sa, the capital of Honan.

At the age of 18 years he became a Buddhist novice and at the age of 20 full priest. His genius soon became noticed by the leaders of Buddhism of that time and attracted the attention of the Imperial Court of Nanking. He was invited there and became the religious teacher⁵⁸ of the crown prince. Two emperors were his protectors and intimate friends. But the atmosphere of the court was not to his liking, and he preferred to live far from the madding crown on Rozan, famous as the seat of the White Lotus Society, or on Thien-thai mountains, the "Platform of Heaven," teaching those whose minds were entirely detached from worldly ambitions and sensual pleasures.

- 3. The Tendai school highly respects all sutras and rejects none. But it has a special veneration for two sutras, the "Saddharma-Pundarika Sutra," or "The Lotus of the True Teaching," and the "Maha-Pari-Nirvana Sutra" or "Book of the Great Decease,"—the first called in Japanese "Myo Ho Ren Ge Kyo," or more shortly "Hokke Kyo," and the second "Dai Nehan Gyo," or as abbreviated "Dai Kyo," the "Great Sutra." Of the Hokke Kyo we still possess the Sanskrit text which already has been translated twice into a European language: once into French by Burnouf and another time into English by Kern.
- 4. To the Kokke Kyo, the most popular of all Buddhist texts used in China and Japan, the name "The Lotus Evangel" has been attached by certain foreigners, who have become familiar with it. Arthus Lloyd used to compare it even with St. John's Gospel. I shall not stress the point. But the meaning of the comparison will appear when I recall to your mind, that the Sakyamuni of the Hokke Kyo is no more the itinerant preacher in flesh and blood, who for 50 years walked through the fields of India, but a being, divested of all historical individuality and identified with the cosmic principle, with the Truth itself. This Sakyamuni of the Hokke Kyo is no Buddha of physical body, but the Buddha or original enlightenment from all eternity. He did not die in past time, nor

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⁵⁸ 55

will he be born in the future. He is one and the same with those whom⁵⁹ he enlightens. His mind contains all phenomena in time and space. His essence is oneness, and there is nothing besides him. So, we and all living beings are already Buddha, but in a latent state; we could never become de facto Buddha, if Buddhahood were not already in us. This great teaching of the Hokke Kyo that every being possesses Buddhahood and will become real Buddha, involves the principle that there is only one truth, or, to speak in the language of the Hokke Kyo, that there is only one vehicle, namely the Buddha Vehicle, and not three distinct Vehicles, - the so-called Sravaka, Pratyeka-Buddha and Bodhisattva-Vehicles. As these three Vehicles are one, so is all mankind only one,—all men, even all living beings forming a universal community of reciprocal participation, a mutual partnership. Our misery, the misery of nations and states, is caused by being blind to this fundamental oneness, and our highest duty consists in striving zealously, with all our might, to realize this oneness.

- 5. "Maha-Pari-Nirvana Sutra" (Nanjio 113,114) a Mahayana text, must not be confounded with the Hinayana text of the same name. In this Sutra, very similar in spirit to the Hokke Kyo, and delivered when Buddha laid himself down for the last rest between the twin Sala trees-a most positive interpretation is given to the idea of Nirvana, which for a long time, was only negatively, or we may perhaps better say, quite colourlessly, conceived by Buddhism. Nirvana, in this Sutra, is identified with Bodhi, with the highest enlightenment itself, or what comes to the same thing, with Buddhahood. It is no longer unqualified deliverance from Samsara, the stream of becoming and decaying: it is still less 'annihilation,' but a positive state, which possesses four virtues, namely, Eternity, Supreme Happiness, Self-Existence, and⁶⁰ Purity.
- Here we find acknowledge an Ego, Ga, which, distinct from and in juxtaposition 6. to the ordinary Ego, is called the True Ego, or the Great Ego, and is identified with Buddha, the cosmic truth. For the first time we hear of a 'true' Ego in Buddhism in connexion with the Vatsiputriya school, the so-called heretical school of Buddhism, which in spite of being a Hinayana school maintained the existence of a self, different from the ordinary self and not perishing at death, but transmigrating. But the true ego of the Vatsiputriya school and of the four schools derived from it was after all a phenomenological entity, while the true ego of the Maha-Parinirvana Sutra is a metaphysical entity.
- 7. According to the founder of the Tendai school, after Buddha had reached complete enlightenment, he remained for some time in a state of beatitude, enjoying his

^{59 56}

newly-gained knowledge. Then still in an ecstatic frame of mind, he preached the Kegon Kyo or Avatamsaka Sutra which contained the full truth, which Buddha had gained after his struggle with Mara, the demon of darkness. This Sutra Buddha preached in nine meetings and in seven different places without moving from his place of quiet meditation under the tree of enlightenment, to innumerable Bodhisattvas, gods and human beings. But only the beings of the highest intellectual capacity, namely the Bodhisattvas could understand this sutra, which is a teaching of pantheistic idealism, to the effect that the mind, Buddha, and all living beings have the same nature as the absolute spirit, the Weltseele, which is poured through the universe, the whole world being nothing else than a revelation of the absolute spirit. Of this great teaching the audience of lower capacity could not understand even a word, and without asking questions, they ran⁶¹ away upset and disconcerted as if they had been knocked on the head.

After Buddha had convinced himself in this way that human beings and those lower than human beings, were not ripe for the deepest Mahayana truth, he started to preach the Hinayana Sutras, which conformed to the understanding of common mankind. The truth which Buddha was now preaching, was not the full truth, but the accommodated truth containing the elementary principles of Buddhism, - namely the so-called Four Noble Truths, The Eightfold Path and the Twelvefold Chain of Causation. This doctrine was contained in the many Agama Sutras, preached in the second period, and could be understood by the beings of lower capacity.

- Buddha now became aware that he could risk advancing one step further. He 8. suggested to his audience, that the Sutras, which had been preached by him in the Deer Park and in other places, made famous by the Pali Canon, did not contain the last word which he had to say, but that beyond the range of ideas involved in the Agama Sutras, there was a higher truth, to which one had to penetrate in order to gain real enlightenment and deliverance. This higher truth was the Mahayana teaching. The Buddha, however, very wisely refrained from preaching the Mahayana truth once more in its whole fullness, as he had done in the so-called Kegon Period, but stated only the general character of the Mahayana truth: namely, that far higher than the ideal of the Arhat, who was striving for his own salvation, there is the ideal of the Bodhisattva, who first strives for the salvation of others and only in the second instance thinks of his own salvation.
- In the following period, the fourth, the Buddha⁶² attacks very abstract and metaphysical problems. He asks: "What is the nature of the absolute?" which was taught in the third period, and he answers: The absolute is free from all attributes and

is unconditioned; it cannot be defined, because it surpasses all human conceptions; it is the "void" or "sunyata." This teaching which, very wrongly, has been characterised by European scholars as a teaching of absolute Nihilism, belongs to the so-called half-developed or provisional Mahayana doctrine and is contained in the Maha-Prajna-Paramita Sutra.

6. It maintains that, from an absolute point of view, there are no opposites, and that all distinctions are only conventional distinctions made by our imperfect apparatus for thinking. They are, to speak in Kantian style, only Anschaungsformen, peculiar ways of looking at the world, which are inborn in us, but have no objective reality. Therefore, opposites like Subject and Object, Ignorance and Enlightenment, Samsara and Nirvana, Mara and Buddha, are only artificial constructions, the distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana being likewise only a conventional one. In the third or Hodo period, the difference between Hinayana and Mahayana had been pointed out by Buddha. As now, in this Hannya period, the unity underlying Hinayana and Mahayana doctrines is shown by him, it is clear that the Hannya teaching means an advance beyond the Hodo teaching. This advance was moreover of a very practical purport, as hitherto many Buddhist believers had considered Mahayana as an ideal which was far too high for their own limited talent and only suitable for superhuman beings. believers, by learning the truth of the relativity of contrasts, gained sufficient courage to identify themselves with the so-called Mahayana teaching.

The 63 negative formulation of the absolute, preached in the fourth period, was replaced by a positive formulation in the fifth and last period, which began only after Buddha had already spent forty years in preaching. In the Hannya Period, Buddha had stated the absolute non-existence of contrasts; in the Hokke and Nehan Sutra he formulated it as pantheistic realism. From the point of view of the fifth period, the teachings of the former three periods are only preparatory teachings or "hoben," i.e. artifices. True reality or "shin jitsu" is the teaching of the fifth period only. But in the last instance there is no difference between the preparatory teachings and the true teaching, between "hoben" and "shin jitsu": when we open "hoben" there appears "shin jitsu," as the kernel of a nut appears, as soon as we open its shell.

7. We turn now to a description of the second part of Chisha Daishi's system, from which we shall see how the founder of the Tendai School systematised the whole of Buddhism according to the methods, which had been used by Buddha in preaching. These methods or styles of teachings are four, and they are called: i. Ton-kyo, or the sudden teaching (tun in Chinese; ii. Zen-kyo, or the gradual teaching (tsien); iii. Himitsu-kyo, or the secret teaching (pi-mi³⁄4; iv. Fujo-kyo, or the undetermined teaching (pu-ting).

^{63 59}A

The sudden method means the method which refrains from all preparatory instruction and is suitable only for beings of highest ability, who can immediately grasp the truth. It was the method adopted by Buddha in preaching the Kegon Kyo or Avatamasaka Sutra.

The gradual method, or the method which advances step by step, intends to lead men of mediocre ability gradually up from Hinayana to Mahayana; it is of a threefold kind, being sub-divided⁶⁴ into beginning, middle and end. The Hokke and Nehan teaching which is identical with the highest Mahayana teaching, is neither sudden nor gradual, but is beyond all methods, as this teaching represents the ultimate object of Buddha and is therefore exempt from all "artifices" or "hoben."

The secret method does not of course mean Tantric method, as Tantrism was 8. entirely unknown was entirely unknown to Chisha Daishi. By secret method he understood the method which Buddha uses, when he speaks secretly to somebody, and when he can only be properly understood by the individual to whom he addresses himself. The "secret" or "himitsu" method in Tendai Daishi's system is explained by the phrase: "The hearers and the teaching are both unknown," – i.e. the hearers do not know each other, and the teaching is not known to all hearers in common, but only to every hearer individually.

The "undetermined method," or "fu-jo-kyo," on the other hand, is explained by the phrase: "The hearers are known, but not the teaching," – i.e. the teaching as in the case of "himitsu-kyo", is only know to each individually, according to everybody's individual understanding, but the hearers know each other's faces and forms, while in "himitsu kyo" they do not know each other.

These two methods, the secret and the undetermined, were used when Buddha had to teach beings of different intellectual capacity and of different degrees of spiritual perfection at one and the same time, — when he had to instruct very mixed audiences.

9. Like the gradual method, the secret and undetermined methods explain away all seeming contradictions in Buddha's teaching. Some former Buddhist metaphysicians had maintained the theory,65 that these seeming contradictions were merely different ways of understanding the Buddha, who speaks with one voice only and does not use various preachings. Chisha Daishi rejects this theory. He boldly acknowledges that Buddha purposely speaks with many voices, but that these many voices at last are harmonised into one voice in the Hokke and Nehan period.

According to this view, as maintained by Chisha Daishi, the differences in Buddha's teachings are not to be ascribed to the different interpretations by the hearers, but to Buddha's own intention, who by his wonderful power at one and the same time

BRUNO PETZOLD: "THE CHINESE TENDAI (T'IEN-TAI) TEACHING

65 60

BRUNO PETZOLD: "THE CHINESE TENDAI (T'IEN-TAI) TEACHING

^{64 59}B

communicates quite different meanings to different hearers, when speaking to a mixed audience.

The voice, physically considered, may be the same. But what this voice expresses and carries to the mind and heart of every hearer, can be very different. So, in his "hoben" teaching Buddha speaks at one and the same moment many different languages in various degrees of profoundness, and it is not to be considered as an effect of their own perversion, when the hearers understand Buddha differently, because Buddha speaks at one and the same time to every one differently, exactly as everyone can understand him. When Buddha conceals from each other the individuals forming his audience, as he does in using the "secret" method, his intention is to put everybody at ease, to avoid making anybody in the audience feeling ashamed, because the Buddha preaches to him a teaching addressed to other hearers. A school-boy of an elementary or middle school (corresponding to the men of the two Vehicles, namely to the Sravakas and Partyeka Buddhas) would not like to be taught together with university students (corresponding to the Mahayana Bodhisattvas), he⁶⁶ would prefer to be taught, when the other hearers, who receive the higher teaching and who might laugh at the ignorance of a mere beginner in scholarship, are not present. Therefore, the Buddha skilfully arranges it, that nobody knows and sees each other.

In other cases, the Buddha finds it more convenient and considers it the best way, to work out the salvation of everybody, by addressing his different teachings to an audience in which everybody knows each other, and then he uses the "undetermined" method.

10. This threefold classification of Chisha Daishi, far from being a phantastic chimera, really means a great and ingenious effort to bring to order and system into a vast and seemingly contradictory mass of ideas, and to understand the history of Buddhist dogmas and theories as an evolution from primitive conceptions to higher and higher views.

"Zo kyo" or the Tripitaka teaching attacks this problem analytically. It dissolves the Subject and the Object of this world of experience,—or the Atman and the Dharmas, as they are called in Buddhist philosophy,—into their smallest parts, and proves that the Subject or the individual Ego is only a constant stream of momentary states of consciousness, where one wave supersedes another wave, and that the objects or Things are momentary combinations of elements, which incessantly unite and disintegrate again. There is no constant subject, no constant object from this analytical point of view, only a continual becoming and passing away, an endless repetition of birth and death, regulated by the law of cause and effect. We can only escape from it by renouncing our thirst for existence; that is the Nirvana of Zo Kyo, which is a mere negative conception, as it means deliverance from this flux of cause and⁶⁷ effect.

^{66 61}

"Tsu kyo," understood as elementary Mahayana teaching, deals with the fundamental metaphysical problem synthetically. It does not dissolve the Atman and the Dharmas into their smallest parts, but considers them as a whole. The idea of non-existence or emptiness of the subject and of the object is here derived from the consideration that the categories of our thinking are themselves empty (Sk. Sunyata, Jap. "Ku") and of a mere conventional nature as our whole thinking is moving in contrasts: every negation presupposes an affirmation and in every affirmation a negation is concealed. Our whole thinking, from this "tsu kyo" point of view, is only a meaningless play with concepts, a hunting for empty illusions. We have here a subjective conception of emptiness, while "zo kyo" or Hinayana teaching was a purely objective conception of emptiness. Being a subjective conception of emptiness, "tsu kyo" only denies our illusions, but does not deny reality itself. It says: our subjective conceptions of the Ego and of the objective reality are illusions, but it does not say that the Ego and the objective reality themselves are illusions; it does not deny that there is a subjective and objective reality independent of our illusions.

"Betsu kyo" (pronounced, bekkyo), or the teaching of speciality, places the idea of an absolute reality, which in "tsue kyo" emerges only on the boundary of our thinking, in the foreground, and for the first time the universe is considered, from an absolute point of view, as a totality. The phenomena, which in "zo kyo" or Hinayana teaching had a quite isolated existence and were not in any way considered as inherent in an independent absolute substance, now for the first time are considered as parts of a while. These parts are related to each other, inasmuch as they are derived from one and the same origin: Tathata as cause with the help of avidya as condition creating the phenomena or parts. But still they are parts, and like children of one and the same mother, the phenomena of the special teaching have all their own individuality.

"En kyo" or the teaching of perfect harmony, does away with this individuality of parts by identifying all phenomena with themselves. The dualism of the parts and the whole now disappears, and with it disappears the indirect identity between the phenomena and the absolute, which is replaced by a direct identity: now in every particle of dust, in every single-moment's thought, the whole universe is contained.

11. The three forms of existence of all dharmas are: i. Emptiness, or ku (Chinese, k'ung); ii. Temporal existence, or ke (Chinese, kia); iii. The Middle, or chu (Chinese, chung).

When I take all dharmas and make them entirely free from all my subjective views and passions by immersing them in the sea of unconditionality, then these entirely unconditioned dharamas are the truth of "Ku" or emptiness. This truth is also called the truth of breaking, as it breaks with all subjective illusions. It is the negative

form of existence of all dharmas and corresponds to what we are accustomed to call the state of transcendence or universality.

This emptiness or unconditionality of dharmas of course does not mean "nothingness." If it were nothingness, how could it break all illusions? Emptiness is indeed so far away from nothingness, that it postulates the idea of temporal existence. "The particular," as Prof. Anezeki has justly remarked, "derives its being from the universal nature of things, while the universal could not fully realise its true nature without manifesting itself in a particular."

This⁶⁹ particular is not the phenomenal world in ordinary meaning, but a phenomenal world, which is an antithesis of the universal world or emptiness. Therefore, Chisha Daishi calls it by the name "ke" to distinguish it from the phenomenal existence in common meaning, which is called "U". This "Ke tai" or truth of temporal existence is also called truth of establishment, because it establishes all dharmas temporally. It is the positive form of existence of all dharmas and corresponds to what we are used to call the state of immanence or particularity.

This thesis of emptiness and antithesis of temporal existence find their synthesis in the truth of the middle or "Chu", which harmonises universality and particularity, transcendence and immanence, the negative and positive in one absolute entity.

It may be helpful for the understanding of this problem, to use the metaphor of the magnet, which has a negative and a positive polarity and is itself a perfect harmonisation of both. Goethe at several times has expressed his world-view by this simile, and we may also use it here. Only I must ask you to keep in mind that it expresses neither the deepest view of Goethe himself nor the deepest Tendai truth.

- 12. If the essence of the dharmas were not empty, they would exist by themselves, without waiting for their birth by causes and conditions. The third line says that these same dharmas, which are non-existent through their real nature, show temporarily the form of existence, or to express it a little differently: the true nature of all dharmas is not phenomenal existence itself, but only appears temporally of phenomenal existence. So we find here a distinction made between the "true nature" (jitsu-so) and the "temporary form" of the dharmas, the true nature, which is empty, assuming the outside show of existence, which, however, is only temporal and not absolute reality. If they are real emptiness (jitsu-ku) as well as temporary existence (ke-u), but at one and the same moment neither the one nor the other, then there must be something inexpressible beyond them, which harmonises emptiness and temporary existence.
- 13. The practitioner must first go through the truth of emptiness, then climb up to the truth of temporary existence and finally he will reach the truth of the middle.

^{69 64}

In this teaching of speciality, the empty and the temporary existence form a couple and are differentiated:—they belong to the realm of matter; the middle, however, does no more know such dualism, being the one absolute and equal truth;—namely the absolute reason (ri). When we consider the 10,000 phenomena from the point of view of emptiness and temporary existence (ku and ke), they are eternally differentiated; but when we make them go back to their fundamental origin, namely to the truth of the middle (chu), they are absolutely equal to each other.

This teaching first introduces into the realm of Buddhist metaphysics the positive conception of absolute truth, called by different names, "true likeness" (Japanese, shinnyo; in Sanskrit "tathata), "real form," "Dharma-body" "Dharma-nature", "Store-house of the Tathagata" or "Vairoshana," all these terms being identical with the term "chu", the middle.

14. We come to the last interpretation of the gatha, as we find it in "En kyo" or the perfect teaching, which, as you will remember, is identical with the Tendai teaching proper. According to this teaching, the three truths of the empty, the temporary existence, and the middle are no more arranged in horizontal and perpendicular order, as was the case in "Betsu kyo," but they are perfectly amalgamated and melted together: the empty being directly identical with the temporary existence or the middle, and the temporary existence being directly identical with the empty and the middle.

The emptiness of the dharmas, according to this teaching, means that all the innumerable dharmas are without any differentiation and perfectly amalgamated with each other in the absolute truth of true likeness (shin-nyo). This true likeness never increases nor decreases, it is not born, nor does it die, but nevertheless is constantly changing its forms. It is similar to the great ocean, whose water is a constant quantity and stability, but whose waves are for ever changing, rising, and disappearing. The waves of the ocean are the nature of the water itself; similarly the changing forms of the dharmas are the nature of Shin-nyo itself, and not caused by the help of some other extraneous factor, namely, by Mu-myo: Mu-myo is directly identical with Shin-nyo. As the absolute perfection comprises these two truths of emptiness and temporary existence, it is also the middle truth.

The "En kyo" view of the three truths, to the superficial observer, comes very near to the "Betsu kyo" view of the three truths, and yet there is a great difference between them, as great as between heaven and earth. The special teaching only acknowledges the dharmas as empty, after they have been absorbed by the absolute truth. The perfect teaching considers that all dharmas are in the absolute truth from the beginning and are therefore empty from the very first, fundamentally and originally.

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⁷¹ 66

- 15. "Maha-Prajna-Paramita⁷² Sastra," on the contrary, gives a positive formulation of the ultimate reality and was, therefore, selected by the Tendai school as its main canonical commentary. This preference given to the "Dai Chi Do Ron" by Tendai, is easy to understand, when we consider that the Tendai philosophy is an offshoot of the Madhyamika philosophy: the negative foundations of this Indian school having become inverted by the Chinese Tendai school and adopting a positive meaning. The middle way taught by the Madhyamika school was absolute emptiness; in Tendai philosophy the middle way is identical with the whole universe, which exists in our thought of any one moment: expressing the identity of the subject and of the object, or the truth that the human mind and the universe are both one and the same absolute reality.
- 16. Another threefold identity is established by a famous formulation of the Tendai School, which says that <u>Buddha</u>, the <u>mind</u>, and all <u>living beings</u> are one and the same absolute reality. When the absolute reality is the knowing and distinguishing force in myself, it is called the "mind"; when revealed in the external animate world, it is called "all living beings"; when it is revealed in the work of enlightenment and considered as effect, it is called "Buddha"—such revelation being of course no revelation in a literary meaning, i.e., something which exists only <u>a posteriori</u>, as the One Absolute Reality, according to our mormer statements, involves the identity of the a posteriori and the a priori.
- 17. Of the meditative system of Chisha Daishi, and here I came to the second misconception which I want to correct, the excellent Buddhist scholar, Beal, has given an outline in his 'Catena of Buddhist Scriptures'. But unfortunately he⁷³ selected for translation the "Small Meditation" or the "Sho Shi Kwan" by Chisha Daishi, also called "Do Mo Shi Kwan" or "Meditation for Childhood," in two fasc. Nanjio 1540 which, as the name indicates, was considered by the author himself as a mere A B C book for beginners. The "Great Meditation" or "Maka Shi Kwan" by Chisha Daishi, which with Keikei's commentary, comprises forty volumes and really contains the practical Tendai philosophy, was not even mentioned by Beal, so that the reader gains the entirely erroneous impression that the "Small Meditation" is the last word that Chisha Daishi had to say on Meditation.

In Bodhi Dharma Zen School, meditation is the one and only thing. In Chisha Daishi's Tendai School meditation or, as it is called here, "Shi Kwan," i.e. "fixedness of mind and observation" in Sanskrit, Samatha (=calm) and Vipasyana (=insight) is also indispensable, but not more and not less than philosophy proper. While in the Zen School meditation is only a discipline, in the Tendai School meditation is associated with philosophy. While Zen Buddhism acknowledges intuition only, Tendai Buddhism

^{72 67}

acknowledges both intellect and intuition considering them as the two wheels of the vehicle, which carries us to enlightenment.

It goes without saying that Tendai meditation, making full allowance for philosophy, i.e. for religious ecclesiastical philosophy, is of a much more intellectual character than Zen meditation and must make a much stronger appeal to intellectual people. The philosophical conceptions of the "empty," the "temporal existence," and the "middle," which are the central ideas of Tendai theory are also the main objects of Tendai meditation. And these three meditations are all involved⁷⁴ simultaneously in the mind of one moment: "Isshin Sangwan, - "One Mind Three Meditations" - being the fundamental formula of the practical teaching.

What this meditation in "En" teaching means, we can best understand when we compare it with the meditation in "Betsu" teaching.

According to "Betsu" teaching: When the practitioner fully understands the truth of emptiness, he annihilates the ordinary bewilderments of feeling and thinking; when he fully understands the truth of temporal existence, then he annihilates the innumerable "sand and dust" bewilderments; when he fully understands the truth of the middle way, then he annihilates the delicate bewilderments of ignorance (avidya). The whole path of saint ship is traversed according to a definite order, consisting of 52 definite steps: before the practitioner has gained the wisdom of emptiness, he cannot gain the wisdom of temporal existence, and before he has gained the wisdom of temporal existence, he cannot gain the wisdom of the middle way.

In the "En" teaching, on the contrary, enlightenment is suddenly and completely gained without any definite order.

The mind, by which and on which we meditate, is our normal, everyday mind, which has only to be purified, in order to become identified with the highest truth. This normal, human mind possesses, according to the Tendai view, three possibilities of gaining knowledge: namely, by hearing or reading, by intellectual operation, and by intuition. From these three sources of knowledge all worldly wisdom as well as all Buddhist knowledge is derived: even in the highest Buddhist teaching, namely the "En" or perfect teaching, we still find hearing wisdom and thinking wisdom associated with intuitive wisdom. This last way of Erkenntnis may, from a relative or conventional⁷⁵ point of view, be considered as the highest one; for an absolute point of view, it is of the same order as the two former ones; in fact, all three are fundamentally one.

Let me conclude by a short and very famous passage from Chisha Daishi's 18. "Great Meditation" which still to-day is used as a daily prayer by all Tendai priests, and is commonly called the "En-Don Chapter" of the "Maka-Shikwan."

It may help you to form an opinion on the worth or worthlessness of Tendai teaching. It reads: "To practise the perfect and sudden meditation (en-donshi-kwan) means, to meditate from the first moment on the True Reality (i.e. Absolute). Any object meditated on is the middle way (i.e. absolute truth) itself, and there is nothing but truth. Tranquillise your subjective condition, until it becomes harmonised with the absolute universe! Then any single colour or odour will be nothing other than the middle way. The ego, the Buddhas and all animate beings are also the same (i.e. the Skandhas (i.e. the five aggregates forming every human being: body, sentiments, perception, Sanskara and consciousness) and the twelve Ayatanas (i.e. the sex senses and six objects of the senses) are all Tathata (i.e. Suchness or the Absolute). Consequently, there is no pain to be relived of! Ignorance and passions are enlightenment itself. Consequently, there is no need to cut off the origin of suffering (i.e. the passions). The extreme ideas (i.e. of emptiness and temporary existence) or the wrong ideas (i.e. the heresies) are the middle or the right meditation; there is no way to practice. Birth and death are Nirvana. Consequently, there is no annihilation of passions, in order to become enlightened. There is no pain and no passion: therefore, there is nothing super-worldly. There is only the One True Reality, there 76 is nothing besides True Reality. The absolute calm of the Dharma Nature (i.e. the absolute Reality) is called fixedness of mind (Japanese, shi, Sanskrit, Samatha): the quiet but eternal wisdom (of the Dharma-Nature) is called intuition (Japanese, kwan, Sanskrit, Vipasyana). We may speak of beginning and end (in the practice of meditation); but (really) there is no such difference. That is called "En-Don Shi Kwan" (the perfect and sudden meditation.)"

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.":

"That even amidst the distractions of actual campaigning metaphysical speculation can serve as a refuge and a solace is shown by the memorable example of General Smuts. He has himself told us that on his raid into Cape Colony in the South African War he carried with him for evening reading the Critique of Pure Reason."

- 2. It is really concerned with the analysis, which Kant gave, of sense-perception or sensibility and space and time as the conditions of sensibility.
- Kant's answer is very roughly as follows: Space which appears to us (on the 3. view of commonsense) to be a property of physical objects, is really a property of our minds.

- 4. It will be enough if we understand Kant to mean that whenever we are affected by objects, we have, or receive a sensation; and that when we have or receive a sensation, it is a sensation of something. There is of course, the "cause" of our sensations which is the thing-in-itself. But the point is that we cannot know the thingin-itself only in so far as it is given in sensation; only in so far as it is the object of our sensibility. That which is given in sensibility or in sensation, Kant names appearance.
- 5. Our sensations, whatever may be their source, are given; and they are capable of being ordered and 77 related. Sensations, in other words, are a "manifold" and they require to be ordered and related. Thus there is the distinction, in our sensations, between a "manifold" and 78 something which orders and relates them. 'Form' is simply the way in which sensations can be ordered and related.
- 6. Form must lie ready (in the mind) before the matter of sensation can be received, or that matter must "conform to" form.
- 7. Kant thinks that the characteristics of strict universality and necessity in propositions about space, are due to the fact that space is a "form" of sensibility. And he thinks that there are only two forms of sensibility or forms of perception: space and time.
- 8. Kant offers an independent proof of the proposition that space is a priori. He says that space is a condition of all outer appearances and adds this sentence to make his meaning clear. "We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think of it as empty of objects."

What he means could be illustrated somewhat as follows. Most of my sensa or sensible appearances, have the properties of colour, hardness, etc., and the property of extension. No outer sensible appearance will have the one and lack the other. There is no object which is purely spatial without being coloured, i.e., without having some other property besides extension. Now, I can think away from outer sensations, all other properties except extension. The fact that I cannot think away the property of extension from my (outer) sensations, does not mean that the property of extension is an invariable accompaniment of (outer) sensations. We must not also suppose that there is the empty form of space <u>plus</u> something in sensation. On the contrary, Kant appears to think that our inability to remove in thought, or abstract from our sensations, the property of extension, is⁷⁹ a proof of his view: that space is a priori.

^{77 72}

⁷⁸ The original editor marked correction its not clear by hand

Both are necessary for the possibility of experience or knowledge but have different functions to perform. The understanding, as we shall see, is a faculty which creates and employs concepts: while sensibility is a faculty which passively receives sense-impressions.

The real reason lies in the nature of the concept. A concept is, or stands for, or represents, the common character of the different instances or individuals that are subsumed under it. And the process by which concepts (empirical or general) come to be arrived at involves abstraction. Thus, a concept is a design to represent to ourselves the common qualities abstracted from different individuals or instances. I conceive squareness, but see, or 'intuit', (to use Kant's word) this square box. And the word "this" indicates that "intuition," or perception, is of an individual object, while a concept is an "idea" for the common characteristics or marks of different objects.

- 10. The characteristics of propositions in Geometry are characteristics of the (spatial) form which the mind presupposes in perceiving objects; and that this form does not vary from individuals to individuals. The laws of geometry are therefore simply the universal laws of our perception. These laws have their seat and origin in the subject or the percipient.
- There are, or they are given to us, sensible appearances and that we perceive 11. them; because the mind pre-supposes the form of these sensible appearances when it perceives them.
- 12. It is stated that we have no experience of empty time. It is argued that our sensations and images succeed each other and disappear, are related to other sensations and images but are not preceded by, or followed by, the perception or experience of empty time. This is true.⁸⁰ When we perceive change we always perceive this or that as changing. Our perception of change is not the perception of the empty form of time, if there is such, as changing; but something as changing: changing its place or its qualities or states. Thus change implies or pre-supposes two things: something and the form of time.
- 13. At this stage, the a priori means, and Kant says so, that which is absolutely independent or experience. The meaning of a priori changes, in the later portions of the Critique to the relative and hypothetically necessary.
- How is Natural Science, or knowledge of Nature, possible? His answer very 14. roughly as follows. What we call Nature is "not a thing in itself, but is merely an aggregate of appearances." And "appearance" is a representation to a mind. Now the

^{80 74}

fact that we are able to have knowledge of the laws of Nature is due to the fact that they are laws of the mind.

- 15. What is given in sensation is not "subjective" in the sense that there is nothing outside our sensations to correspond to it. There is in fact, something which corresponds to what is given in sensation. If there were nothing corresponding to what is given in sensation, we shall have to suppose that there is appearance without something appearing, which is absurd. There <u>is</u> something appearing, and there is appearance. The word "appearance" means in Kant: <u>that which is the object of a perceiving mind</u>. It does not mean, as in Hegel, something which has its ground in something else. Nor does appearance mean in Kant what it means to F.H. Bradley: that which is contradictory.
- 16. Kant says that only if appearances are 'synthesised' in accordance with certain definite set⁸¹ of rules, which he calls "categories" will there be "objects of experience." And when appearances are so synthetised, related and grouped in accordance with the 'categories', they are not only objects, but are entitled "phenomena" or "phenomenal objects." Thus there is the distinction between 'appearance' and 'phenomenon'; but Kant often relaxes the distinction and speaks as if there was no distinction between the two. Appearance, moreover, is a manifold. Something which is given in sensation is not only undetermined, but is also varied. It requires to be ordered and related; for, "everything might be in such confusion that no knowledge of objects or of laws relating to appearances was possible."
- 17. Before we come to know what are the laws or rules that relate to, or apply to, appearances and combine them into perceptible objects, we have to take into account certain facts of our experience; for, "Nature is the sum of the objects of experience."
- 18. Now these facts of experience are the following:- (i) That our experience is temporal; that it is serial; (ii) that our sensations refer to something external—the fact of their objective reference; (iii) the fact that we are not only aware of a succession, but that we are conscious of the awareness; or the fact that we are conscious of the identity of our person or self. Now, if the sceptic were to doubt and even to deny the reality of ii and iii, he cannot deny the reality of i. He cannot doubt that our experience is essentially temporal; that it is serial in character, however mysterious or paradoxical, the nature of time might be.

Now it is the great merit and originality of Kant to have recognised that these three facts are only apparently different. His merit consists in having seen that the underlying condition of any one of them is the underlying condition of the⁸² other two

^{81 75}

will be possible. In ordinary language, we generally use one word to denote all the three apparently different factors; and that word is <u>experience</u>. We seem to mean by this word, the fact that our experience is essentially temporal, and, the fact that there is not only a succession of sensations experienced, but that we are conscious of this succession.

19. The underlying ground of any one fact is the ground of the other two facts. It is impossible that there can be experience of succession without experience of objects and vice versa; or that both should be possible without consciousness of the identity of our person; or that there can be meaning in consciousness of the identity of our person where there was no experience of change or experience of objects. If there is consciousness of identity at all which excludes either experience of change or experience of objects, Kant thinks rightly, that it is merely the empty form of identity: "I am I."

If the ground of any one of the facts is also the ground of the other two it would follow, I think, that it is logically indifferent which of the three facts we shall take as the major premise, or as the starting point, in order to discover the grounds on which "experience" as a complex fact is possible.

- Kant rejected this kind of idealism which denied the empirical reality of external 20. objects. He rejected totally the major premise of their argument: On the contrary, Kant said that there is no direct knowledge of the self; at any rate of the self as it is in itself; there is no introspective awareness of it. Such "images" as we are directly aware of, were objects of "inner sense" having the same status as the sensations of "outer sense." And,83 both are appearances. While objects of "outer sense" were spatial having shape and position, objects of "inner sense" had the characteristic of being in time; otherwise there is no difference in their content. And the "self" of which we are supposed to be aware of is the "empirical" self or the self as it appears to us with its content of desires, feelings, images, etc., – an entity of the same status as the "empirical" or phenomenal And both rest upon "transcendental" conditions. And if there is any object. "knowledge" of the self or the "I" at all, there is "apperceptive" knowledge. "The consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition, but merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject.
- 21. "Self-consciousness, whether transcendental or empirical, pre-supposes consciousness of objects. For the transcendental unity of apperception can only be realised in unifying objects, and empirical awareness of the appearance-self (introspection) pre-supposes awareness of physical objects. But this is held by him, rightly or wrongly, only to justify a realism within idealism, though the relative

independence and objectivity of the physical world is strongly asserted." A.C. Ewing, 'Idealism'.

- 22. If experience or knowledge is possible at all then, as we can see from the above illustration, at least <u>one</u> very important condition will have to be fulfilled. No sensible appearance or sensation could be unrelated to other sensible appearances or sensations if experience or knowledge is to be possible at all. "For knowledge is essentially a whole in which representations stand compared and contrasted. Therefore the condition on which either experience or knowledge is possible is such that given sets or series of sensations are sensible appearances should be related to other given sets or series⁸⁴ of sensations or sensible appearances. And such a condition will be a very <u>general</u> condition including other minor conditions. Now, the general condition Kant calls "Synthesis".
- 23. The word 'succession' is ambiguous. It may mean a succession which is dependent upon my will. For instance, when I look at an object, say a house, I may begin my perception (or inspection) of the house either from the bottom, or from the top or from the sides, or in any manner I like. But in whatever manner I begin my perception of the house each perception, or act of perception, will be succeeded by other perceptions. And all of them are dependent upon my will. But it is not in this sense that we usually use the word "succession" when we say that our experience is essentially temporal or successive. We mean rather the particular kind of succession in which, for instance, the order of my sensations is given, but is not dependent upon my will. If we like to distinguish between these two senses of the word, we may name the first kind "subjective" and the second "objective" succession.
- 24. If the earlier sensation, A, vanished altogether from my mind, before my mind reached B, I shall never know A as preceding B and B as succeeding A; that is, no experience of succession will be possible at all. If this is true, it is evident, then, that at least one condition should have to be fulfilled. There should be a <u>type</u> of synthesis, 'of running through and holding together' the successive sensations before my mind. This is an elementary type of synthesis; without this it would never be possible to represent either space or time. It is the type of synthesis to which Kant has given the name "Synthesis of Apprehension."
- 25. It⁸⁵ is not the case that when I run through and hold together two sensations and compare and contrast them that the earlier sensation is literally present before my mind; rather, it is present in my memory as an <u>image</u>. My acts of comparing and contrasting

^{84 78}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." 85 79

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

are possible only on the condition that I am able to <u>reproduce</u> images of past sensations. But this is not all. Whenever I perceive two objects in conjunction or whenever I receive two sensations in conjunction, it is the case that they become associated in my mind. If I think of the one, I shall always reproduce the other. This empirical fact is grounded on the transcendental act of a faculty which reproduced images and past sensations. This Kant names "Imagination."

- 26. It is not sufficient merely to be able to reproduce images of past sensations. It will mean that whenever I reproduce images I shall introduce new content, but no order and unity into my experience. That, however, is possible only if I am able to recognise images of past sensations as standing for the sensations I actually experienced. If this were not so, it would be useless to reproduce images of past sensations. recognition is possible only through concepts. Experience would be impossible if we could not make a statement of this kind: "This has happened before", where the word "this" is not a name, but a concept standing for an occurrence which has been experienced before. And to employ concepts is to introduce order and unity into the manifold of succession. Thus, there is synthesis of recognition and this is possible only through concepts.
- We have arrived at an important truth: the use of concepts in all experience. But 27. we cannot, obviously, stop here. We have to ask, in what is the ground of the unity of synthesis to be found? Let there be no mistake about this question. We are not asking now which faculty it is that performs the 86 acts of synthesis; on the other hand, what we are asking is the ground of the unity of synthesis. This ground Kant says, is original, pure, unchangeable and one. It is underived and ultimate, it is non-empirical or transcendental and it is a condition which precedes all experience and makes it possible. It is unchangeable and one in the sense that it is numerically the same in all its acts or in all its functions of synthetising the manifold of sensations into one experience. This is the transcendental unity of apperception or the transcendental unity of self. This is the ultimate ground of experience of time; and it is the ultimate ground of experience of objects which, we have yet to prove.

So, experience of time involves various types of synthesis; it involves the use of concepts; and concepts in so far as they are necessary rules for the synthesis of the manifold, have their ultimate source in the transcendental unity of consciousness. Thus, experience of time involves consciousness of self.

28. The synthetic activities are as Prof. Kemp Smith says, the "generative conditions" of consciousness. They are the conditions by which we come to be aware; but there is no awareness of the process of awareness. All these activities will have been completed long before there is consciousness or awareness of objects. We cannot introspect them;

and the faculty which performs these acts is <u>Imagination</u>, which, Kant says, is "a blind but indispensable faculty of the soul."

Is Imagination, then, unconscious? Most Kantian commentators think that it is unconscious: and Kant's language, helps this interpretation; but, as the word "Unconscious" has other associations in modern psychology, it would be better to say that Imagination is unreflective.

- This⁸⁷ is 'synthesis in general'; while "pure synthesis", which is the work of the 29. understanding, brings the unity of synthesis into conception, or into conceptual unity. It appears as if understanding carries forward the work of the Imagination to a stage when the unreflective act issues in a judgment: "This is a so-and-so."
- 30. In knowing or perceiving a house, I am not only synthetising the given sensations here and now, but I am unreflectively adding and supplementing from my memory-images, and expectations, etc. This is an act of synthesis in general and it is a synthesis mainly of empirical intuitions. But this is not all; on the other hand, I am imposing, in the act of synthesis, certain universal characteristics on all the objects of my perception. And the act of imposing universal characteristics is an act of "pure synthesis."

Thus, I not only synthetise given sensations into the empirical concept of a 'house', but I know that the house occupies a 'temporal extention' or lasts through a period of time. I impose on it, as on other objects of my perception, the universal characteristics of "being in time" and "occupying space".

- 31. "Imagination, on this view, is the same faculty working blindly and unconsciously, which we call understanding, when the principle of its action is brought to light and consciously applied."
- 32. The activity of the imagination constitutes the 'generative condition' of consciousness; and the work of imagination and understanding is involved in awareness, which is essentially one of meaning. Wherever there is recognition, there is judgment and this involves conceptual reflection; but there can be no doubt about the enormous work of supplementation and correlation that we habitually and unreflectively make. It would be as difficult to isolate a sensation (or88 to discover a 'pure sensation') which did not involve supplementation and correlation from memory, habit, expectation and interpretation as it would be difficult to isolate the reflective activity of judgment and inference from the unreflective activity of what Kant calls (reproductive) "imagination."

^{87 81}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." 88 82

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

- 33. Our experience is not only an experience of time (with which we have begun this chapter) but is experience of objects; or, we can say that knowledge refers to, or implies an object.
- 34. The relation between the object and our knowledge of it is such that, the object exercises a <u>necessity</u> upon our thinking. We are obliged to think of the object (and of its relations to other objects) in a way that is not simply dependent upon our will. Moreover, all knowledge of objects demands the use of <u>concepts</u> through which alone propositions about objects can be expressed. If this is true then it implies the truth of the following propositions:— (i) that if, and only if, sensible appearance are thought through or synthetised under concepts, do they become "objects of experience", or objects of knowledge (ii) That the concept of an object (unitary, or relational: thing or cause) is a rule of unity; and that it is a necessary rule.

It must be clear from even the brief discussion of the nature of judgment discussed in the First Chapter, that necessity cannot be empirical; that necessity cannot be a matter of inductive generalisation. Experience, as Hume discovered, yields merely the empirical sequence of association. But Hume was content to stop with the fact of association and he did not try to inquire on what association itself was based. We introduce, no doubt, so some degree of unity into our experience through concepts and the power of association. But such a unity would simply be accidental; and association itself rests upon transcendental conditions. Therefore, in our attempt to discover the nature and ground of the rules of unity, we have, says Kant, a guiding principle to rely upon and to follow: that all rules of unity have to be a priori; they have to do with the pure form of thought itself.

- 35. It will help the reader of the Critique if he bears in mind the following propositions, which Kant is trying to prove. (i) That consciousness of objects is impossible without there being some <u>rules</u> of unity for combining appearances into "objects of experience." (ii) That these rules are <u>a priori</u>: that they rest ultimately on the possibility that there can be not only consciousness of objects (as of time), but that the self can become conscious of its <u>identity</u>, or the identity of its function, in being aware of objects (as in experiencing time).
- 36. It will be patent that Kant's argument has undergone a modification. We started originally, with the two fold distinction between sensible appearance and the thing in itself. But we could not say that either of these was what we meant by "object". There is an object in all knowledge which is neither the sensible appearance nor the thing in itself. Only if sensible appearances become unified in accordance with certain very definite rules (called categories) will there be "objects". Now, Kant calls such objects

^{89 83}

"phenomenal" objects. Thus we get the threefold distinction between (a) sensible appearance; (b) the thing-in-itself; (c) the phenomenal object or phenomena.

- 37. The problem with which this chapter must deal is the discovery of the fundamental forms or types of thought and their classification if any; and 90 through that classification the discovery of the several <u>rules of unity</u> which combine sensible appearances into perceptible, or phenomenal, objects. Kant calls these rules of unity "categories," and the problem of this chapter will be the <u>deduction</u> of the categories.
- 38. Thought is, or becomes, its own object in Logic. It examines the canons of valid thinking and attempts to classify the fundamental types of thought. The title, "Critique of Pure Reason," has a reflexive meaning. Pure Reason examines itself and, by its own canons. Reason is, or becomes, its own object in this investigation. It criticises itself.
- 39. There is something in us which is nonsensuous, but which is related to sensibility in the manner in which an organising agency is related to what it organises. This faculty Kant names <u>Understanding</u>. The understanding is a faculty which employs <u>concepts</u>, and the concepts which it employs are <u>pure</u>, or non-empirical. And these concepts are as necessary as the sense-impressions to which they are supposed to apply and combine them into objects. It is a well-known dictum of Kant <u>that concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind</u>.
- 40. The activity of the understanding is two-fold and issues in two types of judgments: Analytic and Synthetic. But both these are based upon one and the same function of the understanding, which is to introduce unity. For example, in the proposition, "All bodies are divisible", the understanding introduces unity in the objects names 'bodies' through the concept of 'divisibility.' This act of the understanding produces an analytic unity in the form of a judgment. Next, there is the act of synthetising a given manifold into the synthetic unity of the form which issues in 91 the judgment; "This is a house". The synthesis is performed, as we have seen, by the unreflective activity of the imagination but "to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding."
- 41. What is a Schema? The only positive statement that Kant makes about it is to say that it is a <u>third something</u> between the pure concept of the understanding and the manifold of sense. And through it is possible the application of the categories to sense-experience. The schema, says Kant, <u>is a rule of the synthesis of imagination</u>; while a category is a rule of the pure synthesis of the understanding. Kant-means that the

^{90 84}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." $^{91}\,85$

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

schema is a product of the synthetising yet unreflective activity of the imagination and is in conformity with the pure reflective and synthetising activity of the understanding. Kant says that the process of schematism is an "art concealed in the depths of the human soul." This metaphor is employed very probably to illustrate the fact that schematism, and the faculty of imagination which performs it, is unreflective and to distinguish this from the 'reflective exhibition' of the category which takes place in the reflective, or self-conscious, faculty of the understanding.

- 42. Our sensations have magnitude and that we never perceive empty space and empty time but something as having both spatial and temporal characteristics. But we must recognise the important fact that our experience is essentially temporal.
- 43. Succession, cannot be ascribed to time itself. For, this would need another time, etc. So change and succession do not affect time itself, but something existing in time: appearances. And, as we never perceive the pure form of time, or empty time, our perception of time must be, and in fact is, through the perception of the succession of appearances. But, in bare succession 22 existence appears and vanishes, begins to exist and ceases to exist; therefore, succession and change are possible on one condition: that something persists, that something exists "at all times". Therefore, change and succession is possible in something that persists; or, only that which is permanent and that which persists is altered. And this is Mind Substance.
- The long argument of the Analytic has proved "that the only object, or at least, 44. the only direct object of the mind is this mental reality itself, which is the object of reflection: in other words, that the only immediate object of the mind comes to be thought of as its own idea.

Is not "knowledge" then of the "real"? No one who does not raise this objection can claim to have understood the discussion in the Analytic; and no one who was ever content with this objection as final, can claim to have understood the argument of the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. Anyone who reflects on the problem of knowledge at all, must meet with this difficulty at some stage or other. The objection raises a problem which is at issue between Idealism and Realism: the meaning of "minddependence."

45. Each of us has to find what he thinks is the analysis of "mind-dependence"; and this, I think, is partly a matter of language also. We do not use the same language as that of Kant; so it would be unfair to accuse him of mistakes or read the meaning of words we use, into him. For instance, the words "knowledge" and "real" do not mean the same for us and for Kant. We use these words in a way which means that knowledge is of the real. Kant, on the other hand, uses the word knowledge in a way

^{92 86}

which implies that knowledge is not of the real, but <u>only of phenomena</u>. (He does not of 93 course deny the distinction between "reality" and "appearance"). Because of the distinction he makes in the Critique, between "knowing" and "thinking" he restricts the meaning of "knowledge." But the distinction between "thinking" and "knowing" is non-existent for us; because, the corresponding distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is also for us non-existent. At any rate, the thing-in-itself is peculiarly Kant's own; it is necessary to Kant's system. At the same time the Idealist usage of the word "knowledge" as an affirmation of reality, and their use of the word "real" as that which is self-consistent and not contradictory, are both derived from the Analytic part of the Critique of Pure Reason. And yet it is of this part that objection we raised, alleges that it does not prove that "knowledge" is of the "real".

- 46. Let us reflect upon the fact that our experience is serial. We have discovered that experience of a series is possible only by the synthetising activity of the imagination by which the mind is able to hold a succession in one act of perception. This is a condition of experience of serial or temporal succession. But this gives rise to problems of a speculative nature which we cannot help asking; nor, do we ask these out of ignorance. We must ask: Is there a limit to the series? Is there some event in series which is the absolute beginning of the series? So far as our experience is concerned, every term or event in the series, is caused by, and followed by, other terms or events in the series. So, we must ask: is this a rule without an exception? Is there some term or event which is not the effect of a cause but is absolutely unconditioned? This will give rise to other questions: is the existence of such a term necessary or contingent? Every event, at least in our experience, is part of another event; so we⁹⁴ must ask: Is there some event or 'temporal extension' which is not part of another event? i.e. which is absolutely simple. In this manner reflection upon the facts of experience gives rise to purely dialectical or speculative questions.
- 47. At this stage there is a complexity. It is not always the case that, when Reason draws an inference, the premisses from which the inference is drawn must be two, or must be any definite number at all. There may be a <u>series</u> of premisses and the series may be endless. There may be an "infinity of reasons", as Leibniz said, why I must be writing now. And however far I may go in the regress into the past, I may not be able to complete the analysis. And, again, from the fact that I am writing now an infinity of consequences, (which is exalting to reflect), might follow.
- 48. Our experience of time has the following characteristic. We can distinguish in that experience between a past, a present and a future. And with a reference to a given

^{93 87}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." 94 88

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

"now" we can distinguish between a moment that is past and a moment that is future. Thus, past, present and future form a series. And the "regress," or the movement in our thought which traces the conditions of a given now, is always to the past.

- 49. Till now we are treating space as if it is independent of time; as if it could be "taken in and by itself" But it is impossible thus to isolate space from time, although time is independent of space.
- 50. We must once for all understand the central teaching of the critical philosophy of Kant; for upon this rests the solution or otherwise of the antinomies. The central teaching is: there is no object outside experience. There is no object outside the combined fact that something is given in sensation which is related and unified into an "object", by the special rules or categories relating to the unity of experience.
- 51. If 95 the central teaching of the critical philosophy is true, then, all the difficulties raised in the Antinomies are "dialectical." The way to define a dialectical difficulty and to get out of it is as follows: when you are driven to intellectual despair by being presented with two alternative pairs of propositions, neither of which you can deny or assert, you can escape from the very awkward situation, first by becoming suspicious, next by saying quite plainly that both of them are false. You can say that the propositions, 'the World has a beginning in time' and, "The World has no beginning in time', are both false. You can go even farther; you could say that in order to deny one of these propositions, it is not necessary to assert the other. For simple contradiction, it is not necessary to assert the other proposition as a part of the denial of the first proposition.

If there is no object outside experience, then, outside experience there is no Nature or World; for, what is called world or Nature is the sum total of the objects of experience. The world "in itself" or Nature "in itself" there is none. The world is an object of a possible experience and does not exist outside such experience. If it does not exist outside experience, its characteristics also do not exist outside experience. The characteristics of finiteness or infiniteness, do not exist outside experience. Therefore, there is actually no object which is finite in itself or infinite in itself. The alleged antinomy about the world is really an antinomy about (my) experience. Thus the world is neither finite nor infinite; these are rather characteristics of my experience. My experience is serial, and I can always go from a given term in the series which is conditioned, to its antecedent conditions. This regress to antecedent of conditions is always possible; and it is even a task that is intellectually obligatory. But the regress does not exist apart from a mind or apart from an experience. And there can be no end

^{95 89}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." $^{\rm 90}$

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

to the regress. Any remotely antecedent term I shall reach in the regress, I am prevented by the faculty of Reason from considering that term as the last; on the contrary I must go on.

- 52. There is a part of ourself which is an appearance (which implies there is another part with is not an appearance) and is a natural event, and like a natural event is governed by the Law of Universal Causation. But this part which is an appearance has its ground in some other part which is non-sensuous.
- 53. In so far as we are determined to action by our sensible impulses, our actions are subject to the Law which governs natural events. But we have in us the idea of something, which no series of natural events can give rise. This is the idea of "ought." We say, or it is possible for us to say, that we ought to do something which we have not done, and that we ought not to have done something which we have, in fact, done. Now, this notion does imply that I am free, or that there is freedom. considerations alone do not prove the reality of freedom; but they make it possible for us to say that universal causation is not at least inconsistent with freedom.
- 54. In the possible regress into the past it appears as if the regress is from appearance to appearance only. It appears as if one natural event is conditioned by another natural event; and that the whole series is thus conditioned. Nowhere in this series is the unconditioned to be found.

Now, it is possible to reconcile both these⁹⁷ ideas: conditioned and unconditioned existence. The self is both sensuous and non-sensuous; and the nonsensuous is the ground of the sensuous. And in seeking that ground we are really going outside the series of conditioned terms. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in the ideas of conditioned and unconditioned if they referred to different objects, or if one was the ground of the other.

55. Many people appear to think that each one of us is directly conscious or directly acquainted with his self; and believe that because of this supposed direct acquaintance with our self, we are more certain of the existence of our self than we are of external objects. They seem to think that if we know external objects at all, we know them only by inference: i.e., we know them by the mediate knowledge of our sensations or, indirectly through their effects upon our sense-organs. This was the opinion held by the philosopher Descartes, He argued that we are intuitively certain of the existence of ourself, while the existence of outer and other objects is merely 'imaginary.' Kant refuted this view in his Refutation of Idealism.

56. Kant's theory is that we have no direct knowledge of the self; it is better to say that we have no direct knowledge of the self as it is in <u>itself</u>. If we have any direct knowledge of the self, it is of the self as it <u>appears</u>; but of the self as it is in itself, we know only <u>that</u> it is, but do not know <u>what</u> it is. Kant says, we have only an "apperceptive" or to use a term which is more familiar to us, "descriptive" knowledge of the self as it is in itself; or, we have only a <u>thought</u> of the self. It is a <u>something</u>, an X, which is the transcendental ground of the possibility of experience.

The constructive side of Kant's theory of self is related to his analysis of knowledge. If 98 experience is to be possible at all, or if there could be objects of experience for us, given sensations must be synthetised by the mind. And all the acts of synthesis have as their condition or ground the unity of consciousness. The unity of the object, or the unity of the object of experience, is a reflection of the formal unity of consciousness. The object of knowledge has as its condition the unity of consciousness. This condition is not derived; it is original or as Kant would like to say: it is the pure, He names it the Transcendental unity of original unchanging consciousness. Apperception. Even the unity of space and time is impossible without intuitions or sense-perceptions being related to this original, pure and unchanging unity of Consciousness. Besides, there is another point: the unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind could not become aware of the identity of its function in its synthetising acts. "I think" must accompany all acts of the self. Thus the unity and identity of self are the conditions on which experience and knowledge are possible. But we have no direct knowledge of the self; such knowledge as we have of the self is knowledge by "description": that which is the conditioning ground of the possibility of experience.

- 56. <u>Inner sense is the passivity of the self to itself.</u> But how can there be two selves, one of which is active and the other passive, and yet both constitute or appear to be one and the same subject? A similar doctrine is to be found in the Advita system of Indian philosophy: The self which is named Saksin or the subject. "This is not known except when it is combined, or rather confounded with inner sense, which is knowable. To give an example from visual perception: pure water is⁹⁹ invisible, but becomes visible when coloured in some manner. The knowable self which is complex is the 'ego' (ahimpadartha) as distinguished from the Saksin, which is simple and unknowable." I owe this to Prof. M. Hiriyanna.
- 57. How can I know myself as an object? These are questions that the doctrine of inner sense raises and we must tackle this very obscure doctrine as well as we can. Now it may appear strange, but it is true, that the passivity of the self is a source of

^{98 92}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." 99 93

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON."

knowledge of the self, not as it is in itself, but only as it appears. The self has to act upon itself in order to produce knowledge of itself as an object.

- 58. Outer sense <u>can</u> receive sensations passively without the synthetising activity of the "mind", or strictly, of the Imagination. On the other hand, it appears, that inner sense cannot receive anything <u>without</u> the synthetising activity of the Imagination. Now inner sense is the way by which we introspect our mental states; and, mental states are always changing. That is, the inner sense, we perceive our self or selves as changing; but change and succession are possible only if we pre-suppose the form of time. But experience of time is possible only through the synthetising activity of the Imagination. Therefore, the passivity of inner sense is impossible without the synthetising activity of the Imagination; and through that activity, inner sense produces a contingent unity and consciousness of the self.
- 59. Now the passivity of the self as regards inner sense is so peculiar that it distinguishes our consciousness from that of animals. It is not known that animals have the power of being aware of their self; i.e., of being aware of the unity of a succession.
- 60. This difference between inner and outer sense, does not mean that we know ourself in a way 100 different from outer or physical objects. What is the reason for this? The reason is the time, as the form of inner sense, has the same characteristic or is on the same level as space. In other words, time and space are both modes of perceiving and not of conceiving; and nothing that is given in sensibility, and under the forms of sensibility, can be known as it is <u>in itself</u>. We do not know things in space as they are in themselves, but only as we are affected by them in outer sense; similarly, we know ourself only as we perceive ourself under the form of time: i.e., not as it is in itself, but only as it appears.
- 61. It is said that we have no direct knowledge of external objects; such knowledge as we have of them is an inference from their effect on us in sensation. We know external objects only mediately; and it seems to be held as a general premise that, the existence of a thing which can only be <u>inferred</u> has doubtful existence. But we must object that, the premise has no tendency to prove the unreality of external objects, although it might throw doubt on their existence. This view is a kind of Idealism, which Kant names: 'Problematic Idealism.' Now this kind of Idealism assumes that the existence of mental states is on a different level from the existence of external objects. It is assumed that mental states have more reality in them than external objects. And because of this (fallacious) assumption, it is said that we have to infer the existence of outer objects.

^{100 94}

But this is not proved. It is not proved that mental states have more of reality than external objects. The point is that mental states and external objects have the same status or have the same kind of reality. Both are appearances. Besides, it is not proved that mental states are <u>caused</u> by external objects; on¹⁰¹ the contrary, they might be as Kant says, "a mere play of inner sense."

What could be the meaning of saying that my mental states are not caused by external objects, but are merely "the play of inner sense"? If the former alternative: that my mental states are caused by external objects is not true or is doubtful, the latter alternative: that they are a mere play of inner sense, has, certainly, the appearance of being a paradox. It appears paradoxical to say that my mental states are <u>caused by</u> my self. I do not know how this can be explained except by recognising that it is a paradox; although there is nothing unintelligible in it. When I say I know my self, or I am acquainted with my self, I mean that I am acquainted with the self as it appears to me. My mental states <u>are</u> appearances; they are not more real than objects of outer sense. This position, and the view implied in it, is the position of <u>transcendental</u> idealism. Transcendental idealism is not inconsistent with <u>empirical</u> realism; i.e. the existence of outer objects is not merely inferred but can be <u>directly perceived</u>. This is repeating what we have said elsewhere, that both the objects of outer sense and inner sense are objects of perception or that they are perceived; and as such are appearances.

What I have discussed is entitled the Fourth Paralogism. It criticises the Problematic Idealism of Descartes from the position of Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

62. From the constructive side of Kant's theory of self we learn that the possibility of experience implies the co-operation of sensibility and the activity of the imagination and the faculty of understanding. We learn that given sets of sensible appearances are related and grouped by the activity of the imagination in accordance with the purely logical concepts of the understanding, into 102 perceptible or phenomenal objects. In all this activity, the essential condition is that the self must be conscious of the identity of its function; it must not merely say or judge "S is P", but "I think S is P." All the acts of the self must be related to the "I think"; and the "I think" is supposed to express the unity and the identity of the self. (But we must note that the argument proves that the self is a unity and is conscious of the identity of its function only so far as knowledge is concerned.)

That the "I think" accompanies all my acts merely proves that the "I" is present in all thoughts or states; but it does not prove that it is an abiding subject. What Kant intends to mean I suppose is something like this. An organisation of course implies an organising agency; and to this agency must be referred all acts of the organisation. The agency exists as a co-ordinating factor; but the organisation may cease; and with it the

^{101 95}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.": 102 96

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.":

organising agency may also cease to function. As long as, or if, the organisation functions, the co-ordinating activity of the agency will be felt in all branches of the organisation. Similarly, I suppose, the possibility of knowledge has as its essential condition the reference of all acts of the self to the "I think." But, as Kant I think rightly contends, this alone cannot prove that the self is a permanent and indestructible something. It proves that the "I think" is present as a co-ordinating activity in all mental states. But this premise alone is insufficient to prove there is a permanent something amidst its fluctuating states which survives these.

63. Is there numerical identity of the self? It appears that this is hard to deny; at any rate, Kant has assumed it as an essential condition of 103 experience of time and possibility of knowledge. He has assumed that if knowledge is possible at all, the self must be conscious of the identity of its function in its synthesising acts; i.e., it must be conscious that it is one and the same self which combines what is given in sensation. All its acts must refer to the 'I think'. Moreover, the self experiences succession and is also aware of this as a succession; i.e., in experiencing change or succession the self is aware of itself as a unity; it is aware of itself as the same self in its experience of time or succession. But we must hesitate to draw this inference.

It is true that I am conscious of myself at different moments; i.e., I am conscious of my self as the same self. But what does this mean? It means only that "the I which is conscious of itself at different moments" is an abstract formal condition of my thoughts. The I is purely a logical identity.

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA." @

Nature appears to contain opposites but is contained by neither. In its unceasing movements it transcends and annuls them. Here Idealism offers magnanimously to exalt everything to the rank of mind, and Materialism graduating itself into Realism, threatens invidiously to degrade everything to the level of the inorganic stuff. Reality has however brought man on the terrestrial stage, has determined his environment, has given him his equipment for life and nursed him through long hours of infancy. But does it promise also continuous direction of his career? Does the cosmos indicate the plan and method of future development? It will doubtless be comforting could we be assured that the universe deals with man according to strict standards of value. 104 But this statement meets the refutation of hard experience. The cosmic struggle for survival has too often been, what Huxley called it, 'the gladiatorial theory of existence.'

^{103 97}

N.A. NIKAM: "AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.":

[®] In "Vedanta Kesari", 1942 January issue.

^{104 98}

Anything that can be reduced to a method, can also be reduced to machinery. The popular teleological evolution, in the words of Mary Whiton Calkins, in which man appears at the top of the ladder which other organisms are trying to mount, is a romantic vanity. It is equally legitimate to describe it as a successful attempt to attain death. Man's life on this planet is a unique phenomenon in the universe; and he will in vain consult the stars or the heavens above to chart his course. If he thinks to find patterns and premeditated plans 'there' for what should be 'here', he sees only visions which his own thought and imagination have created. Thought roams far a field but there is always a home-coming where account must be taken of the human significance of the journey. Do cause and purpose that are supposed to be active in the realm of nature really signify anything more than a way of human reckoning in the final?

Cause is generally taken to denote a previous condition. It is impossible in this way to arrive at the First Condition, as it is impossible to arrive at the first hour of existence. An event in time presupposes it previous condition only. We do not light upon anything at the exact cause of any event, in the current sense of the term. Vedanta may prove emphatically that cause is unreal. Still the human craving for knowledge of this world continues. The several antecedent conditions taken as the causes, are found to be one with the present, and the imaginary breaks in the continuity of the empirical phenomena are only the different views of the One Great Event (if event it can be called) that is beginningless. Those 105 that have an eye on the result of knowledge, may assure us that it has an end. They say 'it ends by knowledge'. Philosophy is a poor thing if it ends its task with a proposition. The world does not disappear with knowledge. The cosmos viewed as a whole does not seem to have come into existence or likely to disappear at any distant time. Even if it is proved to be an illusion, the illusion continues without a purpose, for purpose has an end in view. The idea of the world as an independent reality, a second entity, may collapse in 'our' view. But the proof of its unreality does not erase it from existence. Its disappearance is therefore purely metaphysical - not even mental. The mystics may see a blank, but it does not help us in any way. When fancies overpower reason, human mind delights in individual illusions or forgets itself in honest hallucinations. We are not concerned with these psychological cases. The world continues (to appear) as long as we are "awake". The cause of it, if we mean it as a previous condition, must be included within that beginning less continuity. Therefore cause, if it means a previous condition or For purposes of combination of circumstances, has no meaning in philosophy. elementary knowledge of science sun's heat might be pointed out as the 'cause' of rain. The question, "How this heat causes rain?" would be answered by pointing out certain other facts connected with the event...But no 'cause' is got at! Cause may also be taken to mean motive or purpose. This is the Philosophic field. The question, 'how', implies the 'why', and the 'why' presupposes the 'who'. The 'how' is only the way of it and it need not engage our attention. What is the motive behind this universe which we call

as a creation? Even an illusion must be accounted for. That is the nature of mind. 106 Why is the nature of mind so, is another question. By its very nature mind is incapable of answering this. Cause in the sense of purpose, engages the attention of the philosophers. In this sense it is purely subjective. It is what Vedanta aptly describes, as the Avidya. We cannot detect any motive in the inanimate objects. Therefore cause must be sought in the thinking subject and never in the object. To quote Warner Fite's words (Contemporary American Philosophy Vol. 1. p.360) 'the object serves highly useful and even as the indispensable means of communication; but it is never adequate; and it never stands for more than "so to speak", "as it were", or "as if". The cause of the object and hence of the subject, is the philosophic problem. The object is only the occasion for the subject being called the 'subject.' The existence of this division into subject and object is the very thing to be accounted for and the accounting for is impossible from the side of the object. Impersonal experience is denatured experience. Knowing is an experience of personal intimacy. The verb, 'to know' requires both (a) a personal subject, (b) a personal object. Modern Behaviourism cancels illogically this distinction between the subjective and the objective. But it is the tragic conflict between them that gives birth to philosophy. As the 'motive' or 'purpose' is individual it is reasonable to attempt explanations from the side of the subject only. The ambition of philosophers of the grand style has been to organise science into a system of reason, starting from definite data in the form either of self-evident principles or of particular contents of perception, and proceeding step by step with logical regularities. indefiniteness in what is denoted by the term universe, makes all sorts of contrary propositions true of it. In¹⁰⁷ the words of Morris R. Cohen (Contemporary American philosophy Vol. 1 p.234) the universe is neither given in experience nor is it a mental construction; yet it is certainly in some sense given...Obviously the total universe includes more than we can ever perceive or form into an image. Our experiences taper off into the indefinite; and the extent and complexity of the world is beyond our power of synthesis. Hence to seek the purpose or the cause in the objective is to capitalize our ignorance with big word. For, the purpose of the cause is not 'there'. We shall see how far Vedanta takes us in this limited field of enquiry.

Why should I see a world before me? This is the philosophical problem. By a rigorous reasoning based on the time-honoured method of 'Avasthatraya' I come to know that the world is not real. That is, it is not a permanent appearance, for it ceases to be in my deep sleep. Here a word of caution is necessary regarding the character of the Vedic Method of 'avasthas.' Most modern writers wrongly suppose that it is a psychological method. It has nothing to do with psychology as psychology is a science confined only to the waking experience. It is wholly a metaphysical method signifying the totality of the subject's experience. Waking, dream and sleep exhaust the whole

106 100

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

^{107 101}

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

possibility of the subject's experience. Now the motive for going to sleep must be sought in the waking mind. But the motive for the waking cannot be sought anywhere, for, the mind and the world are concomitants which appear together in dream or waking and cease to be in deep sleep. Where there is no mind there can be no motive. Therefore it is impossible to think of a cause for this waking world because the actual motive is absent with the mind (even if it is illogically imagined to be) in a previous state. No state is previous to or subsequent to another state, where, as 108 we know, there is no common time to connect them. It is illogical then to think of a cause for the subject-object existence and impossible to get one within it. The subject cannot be the cause for the object nor can it have a motive for its object. A true Vedantin holds that nothing can be regarded as causing some other thing in this universe. That is the conclusion of Gaudapada in his Karikas. The subject is as helpless as the object in this. But the subject alone can have a motive or cause in general. It has however no power over the cause of its existence. The best that it can do is to think of some personal creator and attribute motive to Him. The personalistic view of nature is not inconsistent with the view of science. But that is not the region of philosophy.

There can be no 'cause' for this subject-object existence, for by 'cause' we mean only a motive or purpose. Within it is impossible. Therefore we are driven to the conclusion that 'cause' is only an individual possibility neither an objective factor nor a transcendental power in any form. As a universal power it is an illogical concept. "All cosmologies" says Theodore De Laguna (Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. l. p.419) 'are only figures of speech. To take them literally is to make nonsense of them...The common theistic conception of a creator and His infinite power of adapting means to ends is typical. From a logical standpoint cosmologies are the result of ignoring the limitations of the human knowledge. There is no science of the universe and there is no science of God! Cause then has no place in the beyond and is powerless within the existent, for it can only mean an individual's motive. The idea of motive rules the world and enters also the field of metaphysical enquiry, and the problem of the cause of this world is the 109 result.

But on careful analysis it is found to be no problem at all. The cause is as such an illusion as the world, after a careful enquiry. Individual activities have their motives behind; and this idea by habit, is extended to the whole of existence. To call it purposeless is without any meaning, for the idea of purpose is impossible in the sphere which transcends individuality. But individual existence is not purposeless or aimless, for we see it guided by purposes, ideals and ends. Motive has place so far. Hence cause as motive is curcumscribed.

We will also examine if cause has any other meaning, a hidden one perhaps, that the mind is not clear about. If it means the basis of all this show, it is something to be

108 102

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

¹⁰⁹ 103

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

known and really knowable. What is the reality behind all this existence? What is the permanent factor based on which the whole show of creation is made possible? This is the way of the Upanishadic treatment and is the only question which is possible under the circumstances. If the term cause means this, then the question is not illogical, for the mind which includes the world must have a basis. If this basis is found to be permanent and invariable in any state, every bit of creation can be traced to it, not certainly as time-bound cause but as the time-free essence. It is the one changeless Essence that manifests itself in manifold forms. Cause in any other meaning is impossible. To make it real a creator has to be posited—where and when, it is impossible to achieve even in fancy, let alone is helplessness in that well-ordered chaos! If there is a God at all He must be identical with this Essence which by Avasthatraya we prove to be our real self, the transcendental conscious entity. If there is a cause at all, it must mean only this, and therefore Brahman is spoken of as the cause of this world.

It¹¹⁰ is in this sense, I think, the Vedanta Sutra treat of Brahman. The first Sutra talks of Brahman in general. The second speaks about the underlying cause or the basis of this whole existence. Lest we should suppose it is inanimate, its nature as perfect consciousness or intelligence is brought out in the third Sutra which talks of Brahman as the basis of knowledge. It is spoken of as cause just as clay is to the pots and gold to the jewels. It is the underlying principle or essence that is the object of real enquiry and any other meaning for that spirit of enquiry is only due to the ignorance of the real issue. Cause therefore in any other meaning, fails in itself.

If Sankara, the best exponent of the Vedanta Sutras, has anywhere said that Maya is the cause of creation, preservation and destruction of this universe, we can find fault with him. He has made his rational position clear in his commentary on the second Sutra which if properly understood, would remove all our quarrels and be sufficient for our knowledge of the universe. Sankara nowhere brings in his Maya to cause this world. What is beyond an explanation what is incapable of being explained by its very nature is Maya which is only a bare statement of fact. For instance an explanation or even an attempt to explain the waking state will be illogical from the start. And yet we have every right to question how we got up from sleep, if there is really no cause for this waking sleep. 'Maya' says Sankara in answer. The problem is an illusion—why, the one flaw, i.e. the getting up from sleep being only a waking idea, is enough to make us feel what Maya is or means. It means the ignorance of the real issue or of the actual facts. The actual facts do not warrant the raising of this question. Hence it is identical with Avidya or individual's ignorance¹¹¹, the nature of which is clearly described in Sankara's Adhyasa Bhashya. Adhyasa is the way of the mind to mistake one thing for

¹¹⁰ 104

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

¹¹¹ 105

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

another, the unreal for the real, and to imagine a cause where there is no cause at all. Adhyasa is not the cause of the appearance of this world but only the cause of mistaking it as the Real. What is this world then? It is consciousness only. Warner Fite expresses this statement in a very humorous para (vide p.357 Contemporary American Philosophy vol.1) thus: "Your true academicist is careful to confine himself to the third person or to the impersonal 'it is so.' 'It is so' rather than 'I think so' because the use of 'I' implies an immodest intrusion of his unworthy self into a realm of divinely impersonal...If I should write 'it is so', I could not but feel that I were speaking with the voice of God-since God alone can properly say 'It is so.' " The idea of a world independent of consciousness, is a pure myth, an illusion. If any existence is possible at all, it must be in and for a consciousness only. Adhyasa makes however the conscious beings forget their own consciousness the one and indivisible 'reality', and thus helps to continue their mistaken notions of distinctions and differences, veiling the one unalterable truth that consciousness of the two, three or the manifold, is always one and second less. Adhyasa, Avidya and Maya all these mean the same and none of them mean the cause of this world or even cause in the general meaning that we give it. It is only in this light that knowledge can be of any use, for individual's knowledge can get rid of individual illusion. If Maya is a universal force, knowledge will be a mere wild goose chase. The spark of human knowledge may be a frail thing and it may be vanishing. But it is the only thing that counts with us and signifies our participation in¹¹² the world's meaning. A life lived by my thinking self is an irreducible certainty with which the truth of the universe can never be incommensurate.

AVATAMSAKA SUTRA:@

<u>Preface by D.T. Suzuki:</u> To understand the Avatamsaka Sutra, the following remarks will be found useful.

Besides the general Mahayana notions, the Avatamsaka has its own philosophy or world-conception constituting the fundamental tenets of the Kegon School of Buddhism, which is regarded by some to be the culmination of the Buddhist experience of life.

First, the Buddha as the central figure naturally occupies the most important position throughout the discourse. Unlike in the other sutras, the Buddha himself does not deliver a sermon, or a series of sermons; all the lecturing whatever there is done by the attending Bodhisattvas: not only the lecturing but the praising of the Buddha's holy merits, of which there is a great deal in this sutra, in fact more than in other sutras, —all this is the doing of the Bodhisattvas. The part played by the Buddha is just to show himself in radiance, and this is the important point in the understanding of the

^{112 106}

C.T. SRINIVASAN: "CAUSALITY AND VEDANTA."

[®] In 'The Eastern Buddhist. Vol.1. 1921.

Avatamsaka. The Buddha here is not the historical Buddha, but one in the Sagaramudra Samadhi, which means "Ocean-Seal Samadhi." According to Kegon scholars, the Buddha in this Samadhi keeps his mind so serene and transparent as the ocean in which all things are sealed or impressed, that is, reflected as they are in themselves; the world thus appearing to him is not a world of the senses, but one of light and spirit. This world is called the Dharmadhatu¹¹³, that is a world of pure beings, or simply a spiritual world, and is technically known as the "World of the Lotus Treasure."

When the world is contemplated by the Buddha in this Samadhi, it is radiant with light; for the light issues from his body, from every part of his body, in fact from every pore of his skin, illuminating the ten quarters of the universe and revealing the past, the present and the future. The Buddha himself is reflected in every object on which his light falls. His gaze turns towards the east, and all the holy lands of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas with their innumerable attendants in that quarter are manifested; when it is directed to the west, or south, or north, the same miracle takes place. This applies not only to space but to time as well.

In the heaven of Sakrendra it is said that there hangs a network of pearls which is so arranged as to make each one of them reflect the light of another, so that when one of the pearls is picked, every one else is seen mirrored in it. In a similar manner, the Dharmadhatu of the Avatamsaka Sutra is a network of Lights, where when you take up any one of them, in it you will see the whole world reflected. In other words, "In every particle of dust there are present Buddhas innumerable, Revealing innumerable worlds of indescribable sublimity; And they are perceived in one thought, And all the kalpas past, present and future are also manifested in one thought," or, "All the Buddha-lands and all the Buddhas themselves, Are manifested in my own being, freely and without hindrance, And even at the point of a single hair a Buddha-land is perceivable."

When Genju Daishi of the T'ang Dynasty discoursed on the philosophy of Kegon, his disciples found it difficult to follow up this theory of interpenetration. Thereupon, the Buddhist scholar had a number of mirrors stand all around a light so¹¹⁴ that the latter would be reflected in them all and each of them in turn would reflect all the others. This apt practical demonstration greatly helped to enlighten his disciples on the subject.

Interpenetration or inter-mutuality sums up the doctrine of Kegon. This may be hard to comprehend when this world is observed in its gross sense-provocating aspect as we do in our ordinary life; but let us once be introduced into the spiritual light of Vairocana Buddha and everything in the world will assume a totally different aspect, full of radiance, not only in itself but reflecting in it the whole world with all its multitudinous objects. The Sutra depicts this world of pure light, which is the world as it appears to those who have attained to the Perfect Wisdom (prajna).

¹¹³ 107 AVATAMSAKA SUTRA

¹¹⁴ 108

AVATAMSAKA SUTRA

This Kegon conception of the world is not pantheism; for what it teaches is that each object is not only itself but every other object, and that all things are mutually conditioning to such an extent as the withdrawal of one of them means the disturbance of the whole system, which is to say, the world grows imperfect to that extent. When this theory is pushed to its logical conclusion, the complete network of interrelationships of all things rests on the point of a single hair. As this pen moves along the lines of this ruled paper, the triple chiliocosm moves with it, and as I think out my thought, in it are reflected all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the past, present and future, even as the moon and stars and all other heavenly bodies are mirrored in the ocean, eternally serene and undisturbed. This is what is known as the spiritual freedom, thoroughly unfettered, of an enlightened being.

The world of Kegon is thus known as the world of interpenetration, which is regarded as 115 one step gone further than the idea of the oneness of the phenomenal and the noumenal world,—this latter being the doctrine of "imperfect" Mahayana Buddhism.

So long as this insight is not attained, our world remains sense-bound, and untold misery dogs our steps wherever they are directed. This the Buddha pities, and with his overflowing love he embraces the world and all creatures in it; his activity which is called the "deeds of Samantabhadra" never ceases until every being is delivered; he will go to Hell, even to the lowest one, Avici, in order to get the suffering souls out of it. The Bodhisattva follows the example of the Buddha, for he strictly observes the Six Virtues of Perfection (paramita). Indeed these Virtues are what constitutes the essence of Bodhisattva hood. By strength of the merits a Bodhisattva accumulates through countless ages by the practice of these Six Virtues, he finally attains to Buddhahood.

The Six Virtues called the "Bodhisattvacarya" are: 1. Almsgiving (dana) which is not only giving away material things but preaching the truth and sacrificing one's life for the cause; 2. Observance of the precepts (sila); 3. Untiring in work (virya); 4. Long-suffering (kshanti); 5. Wisdom (prajna) which is not mere accumulation of knowledge, but a penetrating insight into the very nature of things; and 6. Meditation (dhyana). AS to this last subject, Meditation, a special treatment will be required, as this, together with Wisdom (prajna) and Precepts (sila) constitutes the three branches of Buddhist discipline.

There are many other points in the Kegon Sutra requiring enlightenment, but this short introduction I hope will be of some help to those who are not quite familiar with the Mahayana in its various aspects of development. (The¹¹⁶ Text: Chap. VIII). At that moment, rays of light emanated from the soles of the World-honoured One, universally illuminating the great triple chiliocosm, and revealing everything in it all at once in his

light. Through the miraculous power of the Buddha, all the Bodhisattvas came to this holy gathering, and the Bodhisattva Manjusri uttered the following gathas:

Even when one attains enlightenment And deliverance, and is detached from all out-flowing evils, And knows how not to cling to things worldly, Yet one may not have acquired a pure eye of wisdom.

If one understands the Tathagata as free from any idea of possession And knows how things dissolve and are finally destroyed, One may soon attain to Buddhahood.

If the mind follows the path of sameness And enters upon the truth of non-duality, He will he one beyond comprehension.

The wise know that innumerable things are in one thing, And that one thing is in innumerable things, And that things are not real because they undergo a continual transformation, Therefore, they are free from fear.

Seeing how sentient beings are oppressed in misery and beclouded with follies, And how they are stung with lusts and passions, The Bodhisattva seeketh after the incomparable truth; and this is the teaching of all the Buddhas.

He is neither a nihilist nor a realist And seeing things as they are and have been, He preacheth the incomparable Wheel of the Law that has never been preached before.

Throughout innumerable kalpas The Bodhisattva keepeth on wearing the armour of the Great Vows; For he desireth to carry all beings across the ocean of birth and death; And this is the way of the Great Sages.

To¹¹⁷ fight courageously and vanquish the evil ones, And to make all beings feel at ease with loving words: This is the way of mercy unsurpassable.

To hold the deepest wisdom within, To destroy all evil passions, And to see all things in one thought: This is the display of a power free and unfettered.

Beating the drum of the perfect Law, The sound of which reverberates throughout the ten quarters, The Bodhisattva maketh all beings attain to the truth incomparable: For this is the way of the innerly enlightened.

He disturbs no conditions which are innumerable, And goeth about through all the lands also innumerable, And he is not attached to any particular reality, He is indeed as free as a Buddha.

When you think of the Tathagata As pure and immaculate as space, The heart will overflow with unparalleled joy, And all the needs will be fulfilled.

Entering into the lowest Hell For the sake of all sentient beings, The Bodhisattva may undergo an everlasting torture, And yet his heart is as pure as the unsurpassable one.

He whose life and all are always devoted To the cause of all the Buddhas, And whose patient heart practiseth all deeds of merit, Will attain to the virtues of Tathagatahood.

Forsaking all pleasures worldly and heavenly, The Bodhisattva harbours a great pitying heart, In order to save all creatures.

¹¹⁷ 111

Believe in the Buddha with singleness of heart, Be immovable in faith, And never cease thinking of all the Buddhas, Departing from the ocean of birth and death Enter into the stream of Buddhism, And abide in the purity and calmness of Wisdom.

Look into the real nature of thy existence, And¹¹⁸ know that all is abiding in the serenity of truth; For this will free thee from the thoughts of ego and non-ego.

Looking into the hearts of all beings, Detach thyself from falsehoods and unrealities, In order to attain a world of realities.

Measure all the worlds, Drink up all the oceans, And be the possessor of the power that is great and miraculous.

However exquisite one's physical eye, It has no power to perceive the Trainer; The assertion of its power betrays a hallucination, And the inability to understand the incomparable Law.

The form of the Tathagata No one of the world is able to see; He may think of him for ages, And yet how can he realise his power divine?

The Tathagata has no form, For he is formless and serene; Yet from his transcendental nature in which everything is found, He manifesteth himself in response to our needs.

The Perfect Law of all the Buddhas is incomprehensible, As it is beyond the power of the understanding; It never combines or dissipates, It is eternally serene.

The Tathagata is not a physical body, And if you think truthfully and cling not to form, You will obtain an unlettered understanding which will permit you to his presence, The Tathagata who is where words fail and thoughts vainly struggle.

Transcending the dualism of mind and body, The Tathagatha is released from all hindrances, inner and outer, And his thoughts are eternally undivided, Unfathomably deep, and have no attachments.

The Tathagata in his enlightenment Illumineth all the worlds; His pure, all-knowing eye Penetrateth everywhere, deep and far.

The one is manifested in the immeasurable And the immeasurable in the one; Knowing the nature of 119 all things, The Tathagata revealeth himself everywhere.

The Body has no whence, No whither either; It is unreal, Yet revealeth itself in many a form.

All the worlds are born of illusion, That has no substantial existence; And the true nature of all this The Buddha alone knoweth. He who thus understands Sees the Leader.

The Buddha's wisdom is unfathomable, And his deep doctrines have no parallel, He hath gone to the other shore, beyond the ocean of birth and death; His life is unlimited, His light is incomparable; Eternally free from the burning of passions, He hath accomplished great merits.

¹¹⁸ 112 AVATAMSAKA SUTRA ¹¹⁹ 113 AVATAMSAKA SUTRA Even the depths of Buddhism are sounded, As if they were his own nature; Viewing things past, present and future, He knoweth no fatigue.

The world of senses he taketh in, But his mind is free from illusion; He seeth all things, yet hath no thoughts of them; He revealeth himself in form without attaching himself thereunto.

Inwardly he is serene in his meditation, Yet he is unfettered in his thought; Viewing things as they are, He truly understandeth them; His mind is concentrated in right thought, And he always practiseth the truth of Nirvana.

Holding fast to the Dharma which is hard to practise, The Bodhisattva exerteth himself, day and night, and is never tired nor loath; Crossing the ocean which is hard to cross, He roareth like a lion, "I will now help all beings to cross."

They are drifting helplessly in the sea of birth and death, They are sinking under the waves of lusts and passions, They are being entangled in the meshes of folly and confusion, They¹²⁰ are trembling with fear in the darkness of ignorance; They are left alone and without a guide, Long they have wandered in the paths of evil, The fires of avarice, anger, and infatuation are ever consuming them, And they know no means of deliverance.

Thus going astray from the right path, They fall into all manners of evils, Because they cling to the thought of an ego, There is an endless chain of birth and death.

The wise chat have destroyed the cause of ignorance Lift the torch of intelligence hight, And build the boat of the Perfect Law, Or construct the bridge of the Law, whereby they carry all that is to be carried Across the ocean of birth and death.

In the prison of birth and death, Untold sufferings are suffered. Old age, disease and death follow one after another, And unceasingly, day and night.

Understanding the deepest truth of all things, And practising the wisdom of "skilful device," The Bodhisattva hath vowed to save all things from these sufferings: This is indeed the life of a Bodhisattva.

He listeneth to the unfathomably deep teaching of the Buddha, And believing it he cherisheth not a shadow of doubt in the mind; Perceiving the truth calm and serene, His heart is altogether devoid of fears; And revealing himself everywhere, he is identified with all form: This the great teacher of men and gods.

Eternity is viewed in one thought, Where there is no coming, no going, or no abiding; Of all things that are and are not, The Bodhisattva knoweth the whole truth.

The peerless name is resounded throughout the countries in the ten quarters, And saveth us from the perils of birth and death; It reached¹²¹ indeed everywhere in the world, preaching the doctrine loaded with deep meanings.

Ever since he made the first offerings to the Buddha, The Bodhisattva hath enjoyed himself in the deeds of patience deep in meditation, He revieweth the truth full of signification, And leadeth all beings joyfully towards the Tathagatha.

Where the Bodhisattva practiseth this teaching, He will soon realise the truth unsurpassed: A heart filled with delights pure and immeasurable, Expandeth all over the ten quarters, Preaching the truth to inhabitants of all lands, Who are thereby cleansed of defilements and come to abide in the truth of sameness.

When the Bodhisattva thus behaveth himself, He will be a companion of the Tathagata.

The Tathagata transcends form and is eternally serene, But let no one regard him as apparitional; If he does he is like a blind man, He may face the Tathagata and yet knoweth him not.

Those who cling to illusions Cannot see the Tathagata, But who is free from the idea of possession Will see the true Buddha.

Sometimes beings countless in number are all undergoing their manifold karma: Forms, inside and outside the ten quarters, are beyond measure, And so is the Body of the Buddha filling every point of the compass; He who knows this is the Great Leader truly.

It is like those innumerable lands occupying space, The whence and whither of which are unknowable; It is again like the creation and destruction of the world taking place no one knows how; So is the Body of the Buddha filling the vacuity of space.

<u>Shugaku Yamabe</u>: In the Avatamsaka sutra we read that the artist does not know what he is painting ¹²², it grows out of himself, in spite of himself; he is moved or urged by something greater than himself; and what he does is more than offering himself to the unconscious direction. To be a great artist, therefore, means that he is capable of offering himself as a more perfect and manageable instrument to a spirit. He does not try to analyse the spirit, he simply gives himself up to its control. When something comes between artist and spirit there is no artistic creation. For the product is maimed. The artist in this sense is an emancipated person, "one who thus comes," or "one who thus departs," that is Tathagata.

The spirit of Mahayana Buddhism may thus be summarised in one word, tathata or suchness; and those who have realised this suchness in any field of life as either a statesman or an artist or a capitalist or as a working-man, he is a true follower of Mahayana Buddhism. He will build up his own world of suchness according to his own light in response to his environment. All that is specially considered religious—repentance, humility, gratitude, worship, and so on, will have its proper function as it is stirred in the bosom of a religious person. Without this grasp Mahayana Buddhism will

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not yield its secrets to anybody. No scientific study of Buddhism will penetrate into this inner sanctuary of Buddhism.

RADHA¹²³ KUMUD MOOKERJI: "ANCIENT INDIAN EDUCATION." Steps of Self-realization: For this self-realization the following steps are thus prescribed: i. Sravana, "hearing of Vedanta texts as expounded by the teacher"; ii. Manana, "reflection on their meaning"; iii. Nididhyasana, "constant meditation on the Self described in those texts."

This process is to be continued until the immediate apprehension of Reality is achieved.

Meditation and its stages: Constant practice of meditation is required to develop the faculty whereby the Self can be realized, just as constant practice alone can awaken the musical faculty which enables a perception of the niceties of sound and tone.

But it is not easy to meditate on and realize the Self at once. A start may be made by taking Him as the Sun (as his most conspicuous manifestation) and then as Akasa.

These minor Meditations will lead up to the final Meditation on the true Self.

Meditation is always to be practised in a sitting posture or one conducive to its uninterrupted continuance, for which the best time and place should be selected.

This Meditation as a means and process of self-realization presupposes much preparation. First, the body as the vehicle of mind is to be purified by penances. Then, the mind has to be cleansed by Restrains (yama), Observances (niyama), and Austerities (tapas). For the Mind, the most important discipline is its one-pointedness (ekagrata) or concentration, the best of virtues, to be achieved by overcoming its usual states defined as (i) Kshipta, "distraction"; (ii) Vikshipta, "lack of continuous concentration"; (iii) Mudha, "sluggishness." Ekagrata then leads to the final stage of mental discipline, the stage of Nirodha or total suspension of mental activity (vritti). The Mind¹²⁴ is also to be further purged of its notions of 'I' and 'Mine' as impurities so as to enable it to receive the knowledge of the Self.

Sankara marks out three stages in this Meditation leading up to a knowledge of the Self, viz. (i) the seeker after Truth is to start by meditating anything he chooses either within his own "heart" (as representing a specific centre of experience in spiritual discipline), or outside his body as apart from its name and form; (ii) the second stage is that of uninterrupted meditation upon the One Entity, Absolute, Impartite, of the

124 118

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI: "ANCIENT INDIAN EDUCATION

^{123 117}

nature of Sat-Chit-Ananda, "the Supreme and only Reality, Self-luminous Consciousness, and Bliss"; (iii) in the third stage the sadhaka remains completely immobile in rapturous self-realization, in which all notion of 'mine' with reference to the body (dehatmabodha) has melted away and the Higher Self is realized. henceforth passes all his time in meditation.

It will thus be apparent that such supreme knowledge can come only to one who has conquered desire for son, wealth, and fame, has renounced the world, and is in the fourth asrama of life, as a wandering mendicant marked by the virtues known as Sama, "control of the overt behaviour." Dama, "regulation of the inner impulses," Samadhana "attention and concentration of mine," Sraddha, "faith", Titiksha, "ability to bear with equanimity the tensions caused by the operation of stimuli coming from antagonistic qualities, and by the appetites of the body," and lastly, Uparati, "ability to withdraw one's mind completely from the external stimuli."

In fine, Sankara's scheme of Vedantic discipline is that thought and feelings, attitudes and dispositions, impulses and behaviour, are all to be shaped into new configurations. Conscious reflection on the background of these mental¹²⁵ patterns brings home to the disciple a new order of values, other than those of ordinary life. Thus the study of the Vedanta is to proceed on the basis of such a re-oriented personality.

Views of other philosophers: Suresvara presents his scheme as follows. To achieve liberation (naishkarmasiddhi), one must destroy his ignorance which is nonrealization of the unity of Self. This cannot be done by performance of religious rites which can, however, help it indirectly by purifying the mind by detaching it from all pleasures of this world or the next, as they are found to be ephemeral. Thence arises vairagya, renunciation, followed by meditation on Vedic texts like "Tat Tvam Asi." Another help towards this consummation is stated to be ashtanga-yoga by which consciousness of external objects is lost. These eight angas or factors of yoga are (i) Yama, "restraints in the form of virtues like ahimsa, non-violence, and santosha or aparigraha, continence,"; (ii) Niyama, "observances like cleanliness, saucha, sacrifices, repeating of Mantras, pouring of libations into fire, offerings to forefathers, charity, fasts, etc."; (iii) Asana, postures for meditation; (iv) pranayama, "regulation of breath by its inhalation, inhibition and exhalation"; literally "control of prana, the vital plane, i.e. control of springs of impulses"; (v) Pratyahara, "detachment"; (vi) Dharana, "retention and elaboration"; (vii) Dhyana "contemplation of divinities like Siva, Vishnu, and the like", and (8) Samadhi, "absorption in meditation."

^{125 119}

<u>Vidyaranya</u>; In his Anubhutiprakasa, Vidyaranya repeats the three means of attaining knowledge, viz. Sravana, Manana, which he defines as reflection on what has been heard to remove doubts, and Nididhyasana, defined as constant meditation to check tendency to error. He further points out that renunciation is indispensable to such meditation, because¹²⁶ property entails activity. Therefore, property, i.e. all longing for progeny, wealth, fame, has to be given up for attaining knowledge. This implies the life of a householder which alone can made such renunciation possible. Meditation is possible only where there is no thought except thought of Self.

<u>Sadananda</u>: To Sadananda we owe this interesting addition in his Vedantasara that students of Vedanta must guard against four obstacles to meditation, viz. (i) Laya, mental inertia or laziness of mind, (ii) Vikshepa, distraction, turning of mind on things other than Truth, (iii) Kashaya, passion which impedes and (iv) Rasasvada, "tendency towards emotive enjoyments."

<u>Ramanuja</u>: While Sankara eschews the study of Vedic texts relating to Dharma and concentrates on those relating only to Brahma, Ramanuja does not believe in such restriction. His scheme includes a course of study of the whole Veda with its Karma-Kanda, because he believes that such a study will lead to the knowledge that the results of rituals are uncertain and transient. This disillusionment will be followed naturally by the desire for that which can secure permanent results. Thence arises brahmajijnasa, the earnest quest of Brahman. Thus, in the opinion of Ramanuja, "the enquiry into the nature of Brahman" may be preceded by a study of Dharma and practice of Vedic rituals so as to rate them at their proper worth and produce a sense of the eternal.

Nimbarka. Nimbarka follows the line of thought indicated by Ramanuja. He interprets the term atha to include a study of Dharma and performance of its rituals and argues thus: (i) A study of the Veda with all its six limbs (Vedangas) leads to (ii) reflection on the true nature of Karma and its results which are perceived to 127 be ephemeral and not as aids to salvation. (iii) The result of this reflection kindles a desire for a truer understanding of the Veda by (4) a study of Purva-Mimamsa. This study gives an insight into Dharma in all its phases and consequences as a system of ultimate laws. Then comes (v) a lively realization of the futility of Karma, of the method of rituals in the religious sphere, and of a life of objective activity and energy in the secular sphere. When the life of Karma is thus valued and exposed, (vi) the problem of salvation reappears as the problem of problems, and (vii) touses fully "the inquiry into Brahman."

¹²⁶ 120

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI: "ANCIENT INDIAN EDUCATION

¹²⁷ 121

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI: "ANCIENT INDIAN EDUCATION

The scheme of Nimbarka is ultimately an interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras from the standpoint of devotional love. First, the resources of ritualistic religion must be fully exploited, their elements of devotion, and incentives to energy and activity, by means of a thorough Vedic study and intellectual culture. It is then only that one can take advantage of the higher spiritual discipline which takes possession of the total trends of the personality. Hindu thought takes philosophy in the sense of a totalitarian discipline and education.

It is to be noted that in all these authoritative expositions of the system of training and education suitable for the study of Vedanta, a very minor part is assigned to study proper i.e. study of the prescribed texts or literature to which so much importance is attached in modern and secular education. The pivot of this ancient system is not study of literature but an arduous struggle for realization of truth, a process of the gradual transformation of the mental plane through a progressive purification of the springs of action or action-tendencies (chittasuddhi) as a means of meditation on the heights of which settle the eternal sunshine of the 128 verities of Being. Education here is a living process of growth and not an 'additive' process.

THE SHINGON SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.@@

- 1. <u>Beatrice Lane Suzuki:</u> Shingon is the name of a Buddhist sect in Japan which was founded by Kobo Daishi in 807, A.D. It was known at that time in China as Chen-yen, and it was there that Kobo Daishi, who was then called Kukai, studied it and brought it to Japan. Shingon means "True Word," and its teaching is esoteric. The element of secrecy has always played a prominent part in the doctrine and in its entirety is taught only to initiates. It is considered to be a teaching that was first imparted by Buddha Mahavairochana in his spiritual body, and its full and perfect instruction is given only by oral transmission to qualified disciples. Although some of the secret teaching has been divulged to the world in these modern days, much is still withheld; for, according to Shingon, certain religious truths and practices can only be taught orally and are known by a secret communication between teacher and pupil, and are never to be given out through the printed page or in a crowded assembly.
- 2. My own definition of the true meaning is: "All is One. Realise that. That is the True Word." Shin means, "true and genuine," gon signifies "word" or "teaching", so Shingon means "the teaching of true words." Shingon is a translation of the Sanskrit mantra and the sect is often called the Mantra Sect. According to Shingon, the teachings

@@ In Eastern Buddhist. Vol. V. (1929-'31)

^{128 122}

of the Buddha given out in his life-time are divided into two classes: Kengyo or revealed teachings, and 129 Mikkyo or mysterious or unrevealed teachings.

- 3. The exoteric is temporal, and it expounds how to become a Buddha by practising for long ages, while the esoteric is the absolute teaching of 'Sokushinjobutsu' which instructs beings as to how to become Buddha at once in this very body. In the exoteric (Kengyo) the process is from the lower to the higher, but in the esoteric (Mikkyo) from the beginning one abides in the ultimate stage far above the process.
- 4. According to Kobo Daishi, Kengyo or the exoteric teaching simply strives to remove the ignorance of beings, but Mikkyo (esoteric) abides in enlightenment. The former maintains the doctrines or emptiness and non-self, but Mikkyo directly shows the divine substance and activity of the Tathagata. Kobo Daishi felt that the Kegon and its doctrine of "Ji ji muge" came the nearest to enlightenment, and, therefore, that it was only a last step to Shingon. In Kengyo, said Kobo Daishi, there are Buddhas and beings, but in Shingon there is only Reality, the One, in which, however, all have an individual and conscious part. We can attain to this divine unification by the practice of the Three Secrets. The emphasis in Shingon is positive. The exoteric schools strive to draw men from evil and ignorance, but Shingon lays stress upon the attainment of the state of Buddhahood.
- Dharmakaya is the reality of Shinnyo (tathata) the absolute substance pervading all objects in the universe. The Sambhogakaya is the body of bliss and blessing obtained in consequence of meritorious deeds performed in numberless existences. The Nirmanakaya is the one in which the Buddha appears as teacher in some place, in some time, in the world, as, for example, the Buddha Sakyamuni who appeared in human form in a human world. Shingon says that the Kengyo or revealed doctrines were taught by Sakyamuni in his¹³⁰ transformed body, but that the Mikkyo (Secret Teaching) was imparted by Mahavairochana (the Buddha in his Dharmakaya form)himself, but that Sakyamuni while in Samadhi (deep meditation) understood, taught, and practised the Mikkyo. So the Secret Doctrine is traced to a secret transmission from the Buddha Mahavairochana himself and he makes known his true words to those hearers who are prepared for them. In the Dainichikyo we read: "The person alone may clearly understand it, but no other is able to see it." This is the Secret Teaching of Shingon which cannot be imparted to others with words but is to be understood only through personal experience. In this respect we find an affinity with Zen Buddhism which asserts the same thing. The doctrines taught by Sakyamuni in his human body are the exoteric doctrines which are intelligible to all beings, but the teachings given by the

^{129 123}

Buddha in his spiritual body are signifying the highest truths and are understood only by those prepared to receive them in their spiritual bodies, that is, by their spiritual conception of consciousness.

5. In the Dainichi-kyo the Ten Minds, or Ten Stages of Thought, are mentioned. These illustrate the different thoughts of different living beings, but Kobo Daishi used them to explain the difference between the sects. The first nine Minds may be taken to belong to the Kengyo and the tenth alone to the Mikkyo; and yet from another point of view all ten belong to the Mikkyo, the first nine being considered lower stages of the one Mind. So the exoteric sects are really a part of Shingon, for they are the various stages through which the Shingon believers must pass. All these teachings, then, are really nothing but the states or stages in the development of the mind of Shingon believers;¹³¹ the first nine being taken as the exoteric or lower stages of the esoteric doctrine. The 'Jujushin' teaches us that we must not be content with relative perfection, but to proceed to deep faith and full enlightenment with realisation of our oneness with the Buddha.

The first stage is called Isho-teiyo-shin. In this stage beings are unenlightened, opposed to any teaching, are set upon temporary pleasures, and commit the ten sins without restraint. Yet even for these beings, because they possess latent Buddhahood, there is hope for them to enter the stages if they receive good instruction from a superior person. This is the stage of the ordinary man of the world.

The second stage is called Gudo-jisai-shin. Here the being is like a foolish boy but he has begun to practise morality and has an ideal of virtue before him. The followers of Confucius and of ordinary Christianity fall into this group, but of course, Kobo Daishi himself only referred to Confucianism.

The third stage is that of Yodo-mui-shin. The being in this mind is not satisfied with temporal fame and wealth but aspires to an ideal state, i.e. heaven. According to Kobo Daishi, the practiser in this stage has progressed into the Three Secrets and follows the precepts. We may say, according to Shingon scholars, that the more modern Jodo sects and the higher Christianity would be included here.

Yuiun-muga-shin is the fourth stage of mind, which is that of the Sravakas (or hearers) Here the man realises the theory of non-ego and strives to enter Nirvana by meditating upon the Four Noble Truths. This stage corresponds to Hinayana Buddhism which is taught in the Kusha sect of Japan.

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¹³¹ 125

Now we come to the fifth stage, Batsugo-inshu-shin, which corresponds to the Pratyekabuddha who¹³² devotes himself to his enlightenment without having deep compassion for others. The Sravaka gains enlightenment through meditation on the Four Noble Truths, while the Pratyekabuddha meditates upon the Twelve Nidanas, through which he realizes the real nature of transmigration (samsara). The idea is to get rid of re-birth, and to do this an end must be put to life in human or celestial worlds. The cause of re-birth is Karma, which is caused by delusion, which in turn is caused by ignorance (avidya). To extinguish Avidya is to root out the cause of Karma and the way to do this is through the method of the Twelve Nidanas.

In the Taen-daijo-shin of the sixth stage, the mind of beings is compared to the Hosso point of view. Here compassion for others is stressed and desire is aroused to attain enlightenment for self and others through the practice of the Six Perfections (paramitas). In this stage it is realised that the three worlds and all the Dharmas are produced by one Mind and we can thereby get rid of attachment and a wrong view of life.

The seventh stage, Kakushin-fusho-shin, corresponds to the mind of a believer of the Sanron sect. In the sixth stage it was realized that delusion can be overcome by the belief that all the dharmas are produced by the one Mind, but in this seventh stage we find that all objects are empty. The believer in Sanrontries to realise his true nature by the practice of the Middle Way. He dispels his relative delusions through the realisation of the Eight Not's: not-birth, not-death, not-temporal, not-eternal, not-one, not-many, not-coming, not-going. One in this stage thinks that the Absolute, the Bhutatathata, alone is real. His ideal is to realise the truth of the Absolute through¹³³ the wisdom of the Middle way, which does not go to extremes.

The eighth stage is that of Nyojitsu-ichido-shin, the state of mind of Tendai believers. Ichido means the "one way," which is the path of the 'Hokke Sutra' (Saddharma-pundarika). In the seventh stage the noumenon was emphasised, but in this stage the endeavour is to make clear the interrelation of the phenomenal world and the noumenon. Tendai tries to realise the real nature of the mind which is pure, through a knowledge of the three truths of non-being, being, and the middle. In this stage Shinnyo (Absolute) is the same as the phenomenal world.

In the ninth stage, Gokumu-jisho-shin, we have the mind that corresponds to that of the Kegon sect (Avatamsaka), with its doctrine of the interpenetration of Shinnyo, beings and phenomena.

120

THE SHINGON SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

133 127

THE SHINGON SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

¹³² 126

The tenth and last stage, the Himitsu-shagon-shin depicts the mind of the Shingon Mikkyo, which gives a perfect and true explanation of the real nature of the universe and its becomings.

6. The main reason why Kobo Daishi established the new sect of Shingon came from his earnest desire to save both superior and inferior people and to show them the shortest cut to arrive at Buddhahood. In the Hotsubodaishinron we are taught that when any person becomes well versed in the meaning of Bodaishin (Bodhicitta) after searching for Buddha's wisdom, he can ascend at once to the throne of greatest enlightenment with his mortal body which he has received from his parents: so Shingon teaches the way to open Buddha's wisdom in us, to enable us to acquire Buddha's power in us, and to develop the various virtues of the Buddha in us. Enlightenment is manifested through this very body and this very mind. This thought is presented as the very heart of Shingon teaching.

Mikkyo (Shingon) teaches, quite contrary to Hinayana, that this world and human life have value¹³⁴, and that this world is the world of the Mandala and manifests the virtues of Mahavairochana, and that the purpose of Mahavana is to make us find the eternal in definite and finite things. So, in reality, we are true sons of Buddha, for we are in nature one with him who is the spiritual Reality. This is an entirely different The common and fundamental principle of ordinary conception in Buddhism. Buddhism is Sunya which means that we do not recognise the temporal existence of the phenomenal world and that all beings are produced by the combination of all relations and so have no unchangeable and fixed essence, but Shingon has a different way of looking at this. We come to know the great emptiness of things through wisdom and then we transcend reality; as we know the real meaning of the phenomenal world, we are free from phenomenal things, and as we grasp the principle of reality great compassion comes to us and our thoughts are no longer set upon Nirvana as an ideal, but for the sake of others we wish to remain in this phenomenal world to work for them. Ordinary Buddhism was preached to enlightened beings to show the value of the individual in the universal. In Shingon, the principle of Sunyata (emptiness) is passed through. Affirmation and not negation is the ultimate end of enlightenment. The real nature of the Tathagata is not Sunyata but action in inaction, omnipresent, eternal, and absolute being.

7. Hinayana Buddhism teaches the impermanence of all things including beings themselves, but that Shingon teaches their permanence and absoluteness which is above birth and death. We may look upon it as a difference in the point of view. Briefly, Hinayana seeks Nirvana outside the world of birth and death, but Mahayana finds

¹³⁴ 128

Nirvana in this very life and death. As the Hinayanist seeks to get rid of this world of 135 birth and death and enter Nirvana, Mahayanists seek for the activity of saving others and postpone their Nirvana, or rather they can find their Nirvana in the everlasting Here and Now, i.e. in this very body, in this world, in this present life. All Mahayana sutras have only one teaching and come to the same conclusion, i.e. the one reality of all things.

- 8. There are two sides of the Shingon teaching, namely, the Kyoso, or theoretical, and the Jiso, or practical. They are like the two wheels of a carriage, or the two wings of a bird, one is as necessary as the other. The Kyoso, the theoretical, is stated in books, but the Jiso is transmitted orally from master to pupil.
- 9. The Secret Teaching arose when Vairochana the Buddha preached it in the spiritual realm, but it was not known to men until Nagarjuna obtained it in the Iron Tower from Vajrasattva. Whether this tower was an actual tower or whether it is a symbol of the enlightened state of Nagarjuna's mind, is a question. The key to Shingon lies in Nagarjuna's statement that not only the mind but the body itself becomes Buddha, that men in this very body and in this very world may become a Buddha. At the end of the Bodaishinron by Nagarjuna we find this passage: "The body born of parents forthwith accomplishes the grand or final enlightenment." And, "Body (or form) and mind are not two, enlightenment can be accomplished with this very body."
- 10. The Sutras which Shingon consider authoritative and on which it bases its teachings are the 'Dainichikyo' (Mahavairocana Sutra) translated by Zemmui (Subhakarasinha); and the 'Kongochokyo' (Vajrasekhara Sutra) translated by Fuku (Amoghavajra); the sastra 'Bodaishiron' written by Nagarjuna and translated by Fuku. It can be seen that Nagarjuna is the father of Shingon, the fountainhead of the Secret Word.
- 11. There 136 are two lineages of Patriarchs or Fathers of this sect. The first is called Eight Fathers of Fuho or transmitters Dharma. The first, the transmitters, are as follows: Maha-vairochana, Vajrasattva, Nagarjuna (Ryumyo), Nagabodhi (Ryuchi), Vajrabodhi (Kongochi).
- According to Vajrabodhi, at the time of the Buddha's death an iron stupa 12. containing scriptures had been set up and never opened. Nagarjuna wished to open it in order to find the sacred writings. For a week he walked around it, repeating a sacred mantra and vowing to devote his life to the holy word. At last he was able to enter the

^{135 129}

stupa and there he found the great sutras. He learned them and wrote them down; so Nagarjuna is called the founder of Shingon Mikkyo.

Nagarjuna (Ryumyo or Ryuju in Japanese) was the son of a noble Brahman in South India. He was a talented young man and very accomplished, but he gave himself up to sensual pleasures. Once, with three companions he entered the king's palace pursuing a love affair, he made a narrow escape but his companions were killed. This incident made a great impression upon Nagarjuna and he realised that desires are the cause of pains and the source of evil, so he became a Buddhist monk and studied the Hinayana scriptures, but when he went to the Himalayas he was given a Mahayana Sutra by an old monk and thereafter he began to study, teach and propagate Mahayana.

Nagabodhi's pupil Vajrabodhi (Kongochi) was the third son of Ishanamama, a king of Central India. He was born in 671 A.D. At ten years of age he became a Buddhist monk in Nalanda temple. When he was 31 he went to South India and there met Nagabodhi from whom he learned both the esoteric and exoteric Buddhism, and also studied philosophy, science and 137 art. Avalokitesvara appeared to him and said: "You have already succeeded in your studies, now go to Ceylon to worship, and then proceed to China to make a pilgrimage to the holy place of Manjusri and redeem all beings by teaching them." After a difficult voyage he reached Kuang-fu, modern Canton. This was in 719 A.D. He was welcomed by a company of three thousand persons. The next spring he went to Loyang and had an audience with the Emperor Hsuan-tsung. By command of the Emperor he first lived in Jion temple and then in Sempukuji in Chang-an, engaged in missionary work for 22 years, first in Loyang and then in Chang-an. Many priests and others visited him to learn his teaching, and among them Ichigyo was one of his great pupils. He translated many books into Chinese. He also wrote a number of original works.

- 13. The founder of Mikkyo in Japan was the priest Kukai, posthumously titled Kobo Daishi by which name he is more popularly known.
- 14. After his return from China, Kukai travelled about Japan, spreading his doctrine and founding temples, and in the seventh year of Konin he established the great monastery of Koya-san. The mountain was given to the Daishi by the Emperor Saga. Here many temples were erected and soon Koya became a famous sanctuary and to this day is the holy place of Shingon. Before his departure he called his disciples together and told them: "But you need by no means grieve, for my spirit lives." In the year 931 he was given the title Kobo Daishi (Great Teacher of Law-propagation) by Emperor Daigo. He was not only a great religious leader, but he was also active in all sorts of social work for the benefit of his country.

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¹³⁷ 131

- Poems by Kobo Daishi: Parting: Studying same doctrine, Under one master, You 15. and I are friends¹³⁸. See yonder white mists Floating in the air On the way back to the peaks. This parting may be our last meeting In this life. Not just in a dream, But in our deep thought, Let us meet often Hereafter. (The parting was with Giso, one of Kobo's fellow-monks studying under Keikwa in China. "The master" refers to this Keikwa.
- The Enlightened Mind: From the beginning That which I sought Lay in my 16. hands. How stupid I was To have thought it an echo Floating to me From beyond!

Now, enlightened, back I look, And lo! this new mind of mine-What is it but that very one Which formerly was covered o'er With clouds?

Think not that the light appears With the clearing of the clouds; The moon has been there all the while Shining in the sky, For ages past. So does the mind Eternally abide in me.

- 17. Shoken Akizuki: Anjin in Shingon: Nothing is so wonderful as the mind. If the direction of the mind is changed, it can made a man good or bad. According to the theory of knowledge, our worlds as constructed by the mind are varied according to the different mental standpoints. "The three worlds are one mind, nothing besides Mind." Indeed all conditions are produced by the One Mind. What is entering the religious life or awakening religious faith but the change of direction of the mind? Entering the religious life points out to us the right direction. It is quite natural that when we have religious faith our world becomes quite different from what it was before.
- 18. Shingon makes our mind act firmly because of grasping the truth of our oneness with Buddha. The important points in Shingon are: believing in the truth of oneness, the endeavour to improve in speaking acting, and thinking as near like¹³⁹ the Buddha as possible, and to have the attainment of Buddhahood for our ideal. Shingon, all beings in their nature are one with Buddha and they strive for perfect communication with Buddha.
- Kobo Daishi said in his Hiken, "The truth of Buddha is not far away from us but 19. very near, for it exists in our minds and as Bhutatathata does not exist outside of us. How can we attain it by giving up our bodies? Enlightenment and unenlightenment belong to us, so we can attain to Buddhahood at once when we get the religious mind. Ignorance and enlightenment, darkness and light do not exist outside of us. So we can realize the highest truth at once if we believe in it and practise it."

^{138 132}

20. Anjin in Shingon is the belief that beings in their nature are truly Buddha, filled with perfect wisdom and perfect compassion. When we can attain to this state of belief, the direction of our minds and characters are changed from the very depths.

The attitude of such a mind is: (1) When we think of ourselves as unenlightened, full of sins and destined to eternal transmigration, discouragement arises, and it is difficult to maintain a courageous frame of mind; (2) But if, on the contrary, we realise our true nature to be one with the Buddha, then we are filled with gratitude, and the idea to make the effort to realise comes up in the mind, (3) When we think of ourselves as we seem at present we cannot help but have a strong feeling of repentance and deep shame. Our Anjin which makes us realise Oneness can control our characters by means of the strong effort to attain the highest and the deep self-reflection which compares our apparent self with our true real self.

Our Anjin helps us to think of others as Buddha, and by "the others" is meant not only human¹⁴⁰ beings but all beings in the universe. When we realise the existence of the Absolute One pervading not only us but all the universe, conscious of its perfect wisdom and compassion, it is impossible for us to keep from paying reverence to it with a pious mind, and at the same time we are filled with joy when we know that we are one with this Absolute Being.

Owing to universal communication we are justified in taking refuge in the Buddhas and the founder of Shingon by paying homage and receiving their protection.

There are some who may think it a contradiction to bow down before Buddhas and perform ceremonies before them because Anjin teaches that man and Buddha are one, but this is a superficial opinion and comes from shallowness in understanding the Anjin of Oneness.

The teaching of Oneness, i.e. the identity of us with Buddha is from the point of view of the Absolute, but from the relative point of view we are still unenlightened. In this attitude of mind we resemble Tariki followers, our devotion comes from the Anjin of Oneness which believes in the real and ultimate relation between ourselves and Buddha: for this reason we can have firm confidence in communication between the one who is revered and the true self, and at the same time we can feel at rest and joyful just as in the relation which exists between an affectionate mother and her son.

There may be persons who think of Anjin as only a theory and as not powerful enough to work such a radical change in us, but it is not a theory but a demonstrable fact that Anjin effects a profound change in the minds and characters of Shingon believers.

21. <u>Seiren:</u> Koya-San: High up on the mountain of Koya, 3000 ft. above the sea surrounded by of cryptomeria and fir, in a saucer-like plateau, rests the temple village of Koya the¹⁴¹ holy place of pilgrimage to devotees of the Shingon sect. For a thousand

^{140 134}

years the light has been burning in the Mandoro, and here come pilgrims from all over the world to do homage to Kobo Daishi, the great founder of the Shingon sect.

- 22. Koya-san was discovered by Kobo Daishi. Wishing to find a quiet remote place to establish a home for his mystic teaching, he wandered over many mountains in the vicinity of Kyoto and felt that he found in Koya-san the ideal spot.
- 23. In the ninth year of Konin (818 A.D.), Kobo Daishi began with the help of his disciples to excavate the mountain and the first temple was built the next year and soon after great temple buildings rose up. When it was entirely finished it must indeed have been a grand place with stately buildings, elegant pagoda, golden Buddhas, with wonderful pictures and statues.
- 24. His grave is the Mecca of throngs of devoted followers who come to pray before his grave, offering incense and candles. His tomb stands among the giant trees of his beloved Koya at the very end of the great cemetery. At Koya it is believed that the spiritual light of Kobo Daishi is still shedding its rays not only upon Koya but upon all the temples and followers of Shingon throughout Japan. To Shingon believers Kobo Daishi was not an ordinary man but an incarnation of the Buddha. Popularly, he is revered as a Bodhisattva and Koya-san is dedicated to his spirit.

In its best days the temples are said to have numbered 2000 to 9000, but there are only about 110 left. Most of the temples of Koya receive pilgrim-guests. There is no fixed fee for hospitality: every one gives what he can whether it is a large contribution from a wealthy follower or the modest offering of a poor pilgrim. The fare is strictly vegetarian.

- 25. At the end of the stately avenue is the tomb¹⁴² of Kobo Daishi where lights and incense are always burning and devotion is ever offered. Shingon followers like to be buried at Koya if possible, and if not to have a portion of their ashes interred in a common receptacle near the tomb of Kobo Daishi.
- 26. I must not forget however to mention the gardens of Koya, the charming one at Shojo-shin. In, where the pink lotus bloom, the artistic one at Tentoku In laid out by Kobori Enshu and a fine example of the master's art, the picturesque one at Fumon In serene in formality. Each temple has its garden and each one preserves its characteristic impression. The walks on Koya-san are beautiful, amid the giant trees and with temples and shrines on all sides.

- 27. There are schools and colleges at Koya-san—college and university as well as elementary schools. Some of the most eminent scholars of the sect reside here; there is a fine library and a splendid museum.
- 28. Nature, Art, and religion have been lavish in their gifts. He who comes to this lovely place may feel as if he has come to an earthly paradise where he can spend peaceful hours among the lofty trees, amid the sound of birds and the flutter of dragonflies, listening to the ponderous but musical bell. Koya-san has within it the element of peace which it has been drawing to itself since Kobo Daishi, treading over the mountain, stopped here and said, "Here will I build my temple. Here will I make my religious home."

<u>WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN.</u> "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM." @

1. The first half of the famous Mahayana scripture, the Lotus of the Good Law (Saddharma Pundarika Sutra), is given up to shewing that in reality there is but one road, that the other goals¹⁴³ are but upaya—devices—on the parts of the Buddhas for the purpose of leading the world away from Sensuality and materialism.

Strangely enough, however, though throwing the gates of Buddha hood open to all, Mahayana took great pains to exalt the dignity and powers of the Buddhas. In Hinayana the Buddhas are men pure and simple, while in Mahayana they are looked upon as divine incarnations, or as material expressions of the Universal Buddha, whose existence Mahayana gradually came to teach.

- 2. In a word, then, the Madhyamika doctrine of Cunya is that there is no thing-unto-itself, nothing with a self essence, nothing that cannot be broken up until we reach the great transcendent reality which is so absolute that it is wrong to say that it is or that it is not. This underlying reality—the principle of eternal relativity, non-infinity—permeats all phenomena, allowing expansion, growth and evolution, which would otherwise be impossible.
- 3. To quote Kuroda: "In contradistinction to the fallacious phenomena of existence there is the true Essence of Mind. The Essence of Mind is the entity without ideas and without phenomena and is always the same. It pervades all things, and is pure and unchanging....so it is called Bhutatathata—permanent reality."

143 137

[®] (see also 'Yoga Vasista Notes' page 347ssss

4. The doctrine of the Absolute of most Western philosophies is based upon the idea of pure Being. The Mahayana doctrine of the Absolute (Bhutatathata) evolved from the idea of becoming, yet the two doctrines are strangely similar. In both the Absolute is the sufficient reason of the universe; it is the principle of existence which transcends but includes matter and mind, life and death, sameness and difference, Samsara (the phenomenal world) and Nirvana (the noumenal world). The Bhutatathata of Mahayana is the norm of life, the acme of being, the are and the woof of the universe. It comes near to Hegel's conception of the Absolute, inasmuch as it is not only the force behind evolution, but also the very process of evolution itself.

Retaining, as Chinese Mahayana does, the conception that all existence is derived from the Alaya Vijnana principle in the Bhutathata, it declares that the Absolute is both identical and non-identical with the material universe.

- 5. For the uninitiate the Shingon speaks only in terms of parable and symbol. The Absolute and the various aspects of the Absolute are represented as celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattyas, each one with a mystic name, form, colour, and sign—each represented by a certain sound. The Bhutatathata itself, as a whole, is generally represented as Vairocana or the Sun Buddha. The noumenal aspect of the universe is called the Diamond World; the phenomenal aspect the Womb World, and sacred charts (mandals) are drawn illustrating the nature, attributes, and relations of each. The Shingon sect corresponds very closely to the Lamaism of Tibet and Mongolia. Both are derived from the later phases of the Yogacarya sect in India, about the sixth century A.D.
- 6. All understanding of Buddhist metaphysics must be based upon a comprehension of its theory of knowledge. This theory we had best consider under three aspects: -(1) The nature of truth, (2) the methods of ascertaining truth, and (3) the methods of demonstrating truth.
- 7. Absolute Truth was equivalent to complete and perfect enlightenment. Words being but symbols are incapable of describing adequately or defining it. Thought consists of a number of concepts, and any concept being equally a symbol and therefore inadequate, it follows that a knowledge of Absolute Truth cannot be gained merely¹⁴⁵ by a process of ratiocination. While, however, Absolute Truth is inconceivable it is not

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{144 138}

^{145 139}

unrealizable for through spiritual development we may gain direct illumination, more or less adequate, according to our nature and the stage of our development.

Once we have thus acquired a direct insight into truth we may inadequately attempt to clothe it in words and concepts, and crystallize it into dogmas, as a guide to the later seekers after truth. It is, however, like trying to describe the colours of the rainbow to a man blind from birth.

This crystallization of truth by formulation of doctrine is what the Mahayanists call relative truth. Absolute Truth is ever the same, while relative truth is ever advancing, coming nearer and nearer to an approximation of Absolute Truth, as each generation taking the doctrine of its predecessors is able more succinctly to interpret it and compare it with new realizations of Absolute Truth. While, however, the smaller circle of relative truth is constantly expanding and thereby approaching in size the greater circle of Absolute Truth, the two can never coincide, since the latter is infinite, and the former must ever deal with finite instruments, such as the brain or speech.

Mahayana declares that all theories, hypotheses, doctrines, whether verbal or incorporated in scriptures, whether scientific, philosophical or religious, and including its own doctrines of Nirvana, the Universal Buddha, etc. belong to the body of relative truth, and must, therefore, be modified with the course of time.

- 8. The three-fold division of truth is nothing more than a restatement of this in other terms. The three classes are (1) illusion (parikalpita) (2) relative knowledge (paratantra), (3) absolute knowledge (parinispanna). The first is absolutely¹⁴⁶ false, as when a rope lying in the road is mistaken for a snake. The second is pragmatic comprehension of the nature of things sufficient for ordinary purposes, as when the rope is seen to be a rope. The third deals the real and ultimate nature of things, when the rope is analysed and its true nature understood. The only real difference between the two-fold and the three-fold divisions of truth is that finite knowledge is separated into falsehood and that which is relatively true, and the latter exalted to its proper position, since otherwise, by neglect of this important phase, intellectual progress would be barred.
- 9. All doctrines, theories, and scriptures are but fingers pointing to the moon, and have no inherent validity. This doctrine is called the doctrine of Ton or suddenness, i.e., the means whereby knowledge may be gained at one stroke through transcendental apperception without waiting to piece together, one by one, the data of empirical knowledge.

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^{146 140}

<u>Reason</u> is the means whereby we piece together the separate and unconnected sense data, whether empirical or transcendental, and thereby make a system or a new co-ordination of facts, enabling us to lay down generalizations and broad formulae.

10. All this was changed by the formulation of the doctrine of the Absolute, the Universal Buddha, or the Essence of Mind, the supreme ideal which is behind all life and from which all things draw their sustenance.

Every sentient being is possessed of the <u>Bodhicitta</u> (wisdom heart) or the seed or kernel of enlightenment. This is the spark of Buddhahood which has only to be awakened to spring into the flame of perfection or Buddhahood. Consequently all forms of life spring from the noumenon which is itself good, which is possessed of the four-fold qualities of 'Jo' purity,¹⁴⁷ 'raku' pleasure, 'ga' self essence, and 'jo' permanence. All phenomenal life is bad only because it is relative, incomplete, imperfect, because it inadequately expresses the absolute, because it is bounded and conditioned, for latent within each phenomenon is supreme bliss.

Nirvana consists not in escape from the world but in the unlocking of the hidden nature, the development of the sleeping Buddha, the unfolding of potentialities. It is the fruition of life rather than its denial. Sin and sorrow are not so much exterminated as transmuted into holiness and joy.

11. Shinran, the founder of the Shin school of Buddhism (13th century A.D.) accepted the philosophy of unreformed Mahayana Buddhism, but gave it a practical turn. Though the world be potentially good and all men possessed of the Bodhicitta, yet do grief and doubt assail us. Meditation upon the Absolute may suffice the metaphysician, but the man in the street is left disconsolate. Weak mortality is unable to awaken the Bodhicitta, and for such the older philosophies give no help.

Though acting on these ideas Shinran did not deny the validity of the older doctrines, but he devoted his life to formulating them in such a way that they might serve as a comfort and a stimulus. Looked at from the relative point of view, so long as our hearts are bent upon external pleasure, or are in dependence upon material things, there is no true happiness or peace of mind. Anguish seizes upon us, and we find ourselves forlorn and hopeless.

Salvation, however, may be found in understanding the true meaning behind the words 'Amida,' 'Tariki' and 'Ojo.' 'Amida,' (Sanskrit Amitabha) is a symbol of the Infinite, the sum total of our highest aspirations. 'Tariki (literally other power) is a complete setting aside of ¹⁴⁸ personal motives, or self-aspiration in a complete adoration of the supreme.

^{147 141}

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

12. It is important to understand quite clearly just what relationship exists between the Mahayana and other theories concerning the nature of the Absolute. In attempting to explain their own position, modern Mahayana scholars have classified the various forms of monotheism in the following way:- Transcendental Monotheism, under which Orthodox Christianity and Islam are included. In this the Deity and the world are entirely separate and distinct. Spirit and matter were created by God out of nothing and hence forwards exercise their functions in accordance with His Laws. Emanational Monotheism is a modified form of pantheism which teaches that God and the World are not the same, yet the world is of a similar nature and is an emanation from the Deity. In this school the Divine is the parent as well as the ruler of the Universe. This theory which found much favour with the Hindus and the Sufis and which has had a revival amongst many members of modern Liberal Christianity is usually associated with the idea that the world when first emanated was pure, but that it has become corrupted, though finally the universe and the human soul will once more be purified, whereupon it will be reabsorbed into the Divine Essence. Devolutional Monotheism. With the third form of monotheism we definitely enter the limits of pantheism strictly so-called. In this system God and the world are absolutely synonymous, one word being used for the other. There are two forms of this idea, one is that the Divine is simply the sum total of the atoms which compose the universe, the other which has been termed panentheism, is that God while the sum-total is yet something more, a something in itself.

In¹⁴⁹ either case this school teaches that in the manifestation of the universe the Divine has changed His essence—that the nature of the Absolute was at first pure and undefiled like clear water, but that subsequently it became polluted as if some mud were mingled with it but that at some future time it is to be hoped that this mud will be strained off and the water will once more resume its clarity. The Mahayana Conception stands in contradistinction to all the other teachings. To be sure Mahayana is, philosophically at least, monotheistic, and at the same time it is Pantheistic in teaching that the divine and the universe are indivisible, though with the Panentheists Mahayana asserts that the Universal Buddha is far more than the sum-total of existence. The fundamental difference is that according to Mahayana the essence of the Divine remains unchanged throughout all eternity, and the basic nature of one phenomenon is exactly the same as another, though the mode of expression or manifestation may be widely different.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{149 143}

The Absolute express itself in the Universe without in the least affecting its own essence. The Bhutatathata therefore is the Eternal Being and yet the Eternal Becoming. Furthermore as there can be an ocean without waves but no waves without the ocean, so, Mahayana declares, that no life would be possible without having for its essence the Bhutatathata.

- 13. The Bhutatathata is identical with the Essence of Mind, and so it is called the seed of life, or the Tathagatagarbha (the womb of the Tathagata) when it is thought of in analogy to Mother Earth where all the germs of life are stored. The Alaya Vijnana is but a development of this aspect of the Bhutatathata.
- 14. The Absolute has two phases or aspects:— (i) The Unmanifest or Transcendental phase (literally the soul as pure Form) or the Absolute proper,¹⁵⁰ and (ii) The Manifest or Immanent phase (literally the soul as birth and death) or the Absolute become limited.

<u>The Unmanifested Phase</u>, is the Ideal World the underlying unity, the quintessence of all being. It is the eternal sameness under all apparent difference. Owing to our subjective activity (nen) we build up a vision of a discrete, particularized universe, but in reality the essence of things ever remains one, void of particularity. Being absolute "it is not nameable or explicable. It cannot be rendered in any form of language."

The Manifested Phase is the Womb World where are stored all the potentialities of every form of life. It is identical with the Alaya Vijnana, the repository consciousness, or the Essence of Mind. This Essence of Mind has likewise two aspects, (a) that of Enlightenment in which it is regarded as the focus of purity in the phenomenal world. (b) Non-enlightenment in which the Alaya Vijnana becomes entangled by ignorance, and as the result of consequent confused subjectivity gives rise to the formation of the phenomenal world, which is, of course, at bottom subjective.

<u>Enlightenment</u> consists of supreme wisdom and purity. In one sense it is latent in all sentient beings however low their state. This is known as Potential Enlightenment, or enlightenment a priori. The majority of mankind, however, have still to develop this seed of Buddhahood until this enlightenment be made manifest and conscious. Enlightenment is then known as Active Enlightenment or enlightenment a posteriori.

^{150 144}

Non-enlightenment consists of fecundation of the Essence of Mind by Ignorance which results in blind activity and the subsequent evolution of units of consciousness, which, interacting with¹⁵¹ one another create for themselves the image of the phenomenal world. "Therefore the three worlds are nothing but the manifestation of the Alaya Vijnana—separated from the mind there would be no such things as the six objects of sense." In order to explain the evolution of the phenomenal world the Mahayanists have brought in the Pratitya Samutpada or the twelve Nidanas, which in Hinayana refer almost exclusively to personal origination, to explain the evolution of the external world. First comes ignorance, which, acting upon the Absolute, brings about action, which results in the formation of consciousness—and so on through the list.

The stream of life being set flowing, from the action arising therefrom we find the beginning of the individualization of the particular units of latent consciousness. Thus in the Alaya Vijnana which as Suzuki says, "is a particularized expression in the human mind of the Tathagnta-garbha. It is an individual, ideal reflex of the cosmic garbha. It is this psychic germ, as the Alaya is often designated, that stores all the mental possibilities which are set in motion by the impetus of the external world."

The Alaya Vijnana (Vijnana means consciousness, and Alaya repository) is not waking or normal consciousness. In itself it is more like the unconsciousness which is behind matter and spirit, thought and extension. Although it is individualistic, or the centre of blind activity, it has not yet reached the stage of self-consciousness, or distinguished itself from other such centres. It is but the seed from which the flower of consciousness will blossom, or the material out of which the world of subject and object will be constructed.

Gradually, just as the Unconsciousness of Von Hartmann evolves into the Conscious in mankind, so ¹⁵² does the Alaya Vijnana evolve into the Klictomano-vijnana. Klicto-mano-vijnana is literally "Soiled Mind Consciousness" and means the state in which the unit of life begins to be aware of itself, to distinguish itself from other such units, to become a co-ordinated organism.

As this organism comes more and more into contact with the stream of life around it, begins to react to its external environment, to distinguish sensations, to group them together, to abstract them into ideas and to associate ideas into memory and

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{151 145}

^{152 146}

reason. Instinctively, following the line of self-preservation, it likes certain sensations and dislikes others, to crave for the pleasant and to avoid the unpleasant. In this way the Mano-vijnana (Mind consciousness) comes into being.

The external world has, in its essence, a real existence. It is a part of the stream of life based in the Essence of Mind. The world as it appears, to us, however, is the result of action of the Alaya, Klicto-mano and Mano-vijnana, stimulated by contact with the real external world, which in turn is but a phase of the universal Alaya.

- 15. 'Ku', or Cunya, has no direct European equivalent. It is usually expressed by Nihilistic Idealism, but in reality it is neither nihilistic nor idealistic. The Cunya doctrine simply asserts that there is nothing-unto-itself, that there is nothing changeless and eternal, but that everything is in a state of flux, that there is never a Being but only a Becoming. Modern European science is nihilistic in asserting that there is no changeless and self-existing table, as every table is a changing concatenation of elements. The Cunya doctrine, as we have already observed, goes on to say that these elements are in turn composite, and 153 continues its process of disintegration until we reach the ceaselessly flowing stream of life.
- 16. The Nirmanakaya is of course, Cakyamuni, and the other human Buddhas, having all the qualities of mortals, subject to disease, old age, and death. (Hence the name Transformation). Being, however, the voice of the Universal Buddha they are one with it. The Nirmanakaya might be more freely rendered as the Body of Incarnation.
- 17. The Buddha of the Mahayana Sutras, then, is an idealized Buddha, and has the same relation to the historical Buddha as the Christ, or the Logos to the historical Jesus, or perhaps to the glorified Christ of the resurrection. It is this aspect of the Buddha which is known as the Sambhogakaya.

Strangely enough, the Occidental idea which comes nearest to the Buddhist doctrine of the Sambhogakaya, is Mr Well's theory of God the Invisible King. Wells contrasts the God behind the Veil, the God of Abstract Justice, with the conception of God as the Ideal, as the object of devotion, as the symbol of the Christ spirit. The God behind the Veil is the Bhutatathata, or the Dharmakaya, and the Invisible King is the Sambhogakaya, the Body of Glory, the Buddha Spirit behind all human Buddhas.

The Buddha of most of the Mahayana Sutras is this Sambhogakaya, who merely uses the Nirmanakaya as his mouth-piece, and though he is one with all the Buddhas, and not merely Cakyamuni, he is often called by this name. Thus for example, the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra speaks of the Buddha as being the loving father who rescues his children (all sentient beings) from the burning house of the three worlds.

^{153 147}

- 18. Comparing the Trikaya with Western ideas we may say that Bhutatathata stands for the Essence¹⁵⁴ of Godhood, the ultimate and unmanifested Deity, the Dharmakaya to the norm of the manifest world, the Christian God the Father, the Sambhogakaya to a compound of the Logos, the Resurrected Christ, and Well's Invisible Kind, and the Nirmanakaya to the incarnation of the Divine.
- 19. But it is impossible for men with their finite thoughts and still more finite language to speak of God except under some form with which they are themselves familiar. Hence we get in the Old Testament the anthropomorphic language about God, His holy arm, His feet, etc. Such language the Japanese would call 'hoben' (upaya) an accommodation of the truth to the capacity of the hearer.
- 20. The waking consciousness, the Mano-Vijnana gradually evolves from the Klicto-Mano and the Alaya Vijnana.
- 21. The view held by most philosophic Mahayanists is expressed by Suzuki when he says: "The reader must not think that there is but one Pure land which is elaborately described in the Sukhavati-Vyuha Sutra as the abode of the Amitabha.. It would look to every intelligent mind that those innumerable Buddha countries existing in such a mysterious and incomprehensible manner cannot be anything else than our own subjective creation.
- 22. Since all things are ultimately derived from the Dharmakaya, both the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya are in reality one in essence with it, and hence indirectly united one with another, but from the phenomenal point of view their functions and attributes are different. They are in a word separate entities with a common basis rather than one entity with three phases. The Sange doctrine teaches that in reality the three Kayas are absolutely identical, are but three ways in which the Absolute reveals itself to the world, or even but three ways of regarding the Absolute¹⁵⁵.
- 23. It is but natural therefore, that the Shodomon should lay especial emphasis upon the reason side of the Absolute, which is, as we know, the Dharmakaya, while the Jodomon gives especial deference to the Sambhogakaya which is the wisdom or mercy aspect.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{154 148}

^{155 149}

- 24. Under these circumstances the multiplicity of the representatives of the Universal Buddha should cause no surprise.
- 25. Developed Mahayana, such as the Kegon and the Tendai and later schools declared that in reality there are not three goals but only one goal—the highest, Buddhahood, which sooner or later everyone must attain. The other seeming goals are but upaya (devices) which the Tathagata has used for the purpose of bringing his children (all sentient beings) from the burning house of the three worlds.
- 26. Like the Vedanta school of Hinduism, the Shodomon school of Mahayana teach that Enlightenment is to be gained chiefly through philosophic insight, and realization.

Salvation by Faith: The later Shin sect declares that the chief fault with this idea is that if people are persuaded that they will be "saved" by knowledge they will indulge in logical hair-splitting and useless metaphysics rather than engage in the cultivation of spirituality. Accordingly the Jodomon and more especially the progressive Shin sect teaches that the only means of acquiring the Buddha state is through devotion or faith in the Universal Buddha typified by Amitabha. This "faith" might be better expressed by the words "devotional realization," or self-surrender.

27. The abrupt school of the Shodomon, consisting chiefly of the Avatamsaka, Tendai, the more especially the Shingon (Mantra) and Zen (Dhyana) school teaches that it is not necessary to pass through¹⁵⁶ each one of these stages successively, for proper realization may enable one to jump over or leave out several stages or even to pass at one step from the lowest to the highest degree.

The Jodomon teaches that salvation by one's personal effort is difficult and useless, since we have at our command the omnipotent and all embracing 'Tariki' (other power) of Amitabha, the Universal Buddha who is, however, the true self of each one of us. Accordingly, if we practise the Tariki and have a deep devotion to the one Buddha we shall enter at death into the Pure Land of Amitabha, which is the surest and quickest way to gain Buddhahood.

28. Needless to say, at the time of his enlightenment the Buddha comprehended the profound truths of Mahayana as well as the doctrines of the simpler Hinayana. At first he attempted to expound the whole body of truth in the Avatamsaka Sutra preached in the second week after the attainment of Buddhahood. Finding however, that his auditors were unable to comprehend him he decided, for the time being, to confine himself to the Hinayana system and gradually to lead his followers into the more

¹⁵⁶ 150

complete comprehension of the law. Accordingly after the second week of his enlightenment for twelve years he taught only the pure Hinayana Sutras. After that, for another eight years he taught the Vaipulya or developed Sutras which revealed the first stages of Mahayana. Subsequently for another twenty years he taught a still further stage of wisdom emphasizing the Cunya doctrine in the Prajnaparamita Sutra, and others of the same type. Finally, for the last eight years of his life he returned to the complete position of truth in the Saddharma Pundarika, the Nirvana, and the Sukhavati Sutras.

29. The¹⁵⁷ synthesis expounded by Tendai Daishi (as Chiku was later called) goes on to state that all the teachings of Buddhism may be classified into four groups. The first of these is the 'Zo' or Tripitaka doctrine, meaning in this instance by the Tripitaka only the orthodox Hinayana system. The next in the order of development is the 'Tsu', or intermediate school, so-called because it is the system which is intermediate between the Tripitaka doctrines and the later and more perfect doctrines of true Mahayana. To this class belong the Dharmalaksana or Yogacarya and the Tricastra or the Madhyamika school. With the third class, the 'Betsu' or Differentiated doctrine, we at length reach real Mahayana. In this school, which is perhaps most characteristic of the Avatamsaka sect the Transcending Middle Principle (Madhya) is formulated; but in this case it is the transcendality which is insisted upon. This root of existence though above the Universe or rather though far more than the universe yet ever aids at making all sentient beings attain emancipation and so instead of revealing only the one road (dokyo) it uses many upaya (means) and teaches in many different manners, (Betsu-kyo or Bekkyo) to suit the exigencies of the times. The fourth and highest doctrine is that of 'En' or Completeness. This is the teaching which emphasises the immanence as well as the transcendence of the Absolute and seeks to find the Universal Buddha in the lowest inhabitant of hell as well as in the supremely illuminated sage. The doctrines of Completeness as taught in the Avatamsaka Sutra (the shaku-en or old completeness as it is called) is merely the highest of the four classes of doctrine, while the En of the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra (the kon-en or the new completeness) is the only doctrine in which all the others are included.

30. Zen¹⁵⁸ means suddenness and is the method whereby the learner is told directly and immediately the whole truth.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{157 151}

^{158 152}

31. In Buddhism the theory of anitya or impermanency is applied even to the psychic life, largely on the analogy of the human body. The body exists but it has no self essence, i.e. it is made up of component parts which, in many cases, are constantly replaced. There is no one centre of the body which is its ultimate essence, for neither the heart nor the brain, etc., could function without the other organs. Since the material parts of which it is composed are continually changing, in one sense it may be said that our bodies of to-day are not identical with our bodies of yesterday, yet it is obvious that they are not different since they have a sequential, or causal, or what the Buddhists would call a karmaic connection.

All this, says Buddhism, applies equally to the soul. There is no atman for the personality consists of five skandhas or aggregates, or faculties. One is not the basis around which the others are grouped. They are all co-ordinated parts, constantly changing, so that at no two moments can the personality claim to be identical, yet at the same time there is a constant Karmaic persistence.

- 32. In the Yogacarya school the whole of life was reduced to the stream of life, and all the dharmas are but vortices or centres in this universal substance. All the phenomena of life including the Dharmas are but mental ejects or objectivizations of various aspects of the essence of mind. This point brings up the question of the nature of Vijnana or consciousness and the part which it plays in the appearance of the external universe.
- 33. The Abhidharma Koca is realistic. It believes that there is an external universe closely¹⁵⁹ corresponding to the sense data which we experience, but it realises that in its present form the world as we see it is subjective, the result of the action of the percipient consciousness (vijnana) acted upon by external stimuli. Necessarily, the world as we see it is subjective, even though it is based on an external reality. Being Hinayana, and therefore more in accordance with the primitive Buddhism, no attempt is made to elucidate the real nature of the external universe.

The epistemology, ontology, and phenomenology latent in this system should be carefully thought out before we pass to the Yogacarya system, since the latter, though antithetical, is yet derived from the earlier teaching. In the Yogacarya school there are eight forms of consciousness or Vijnana postulated. The first six are more or less in accord with the six vijnana of the Jinayana doctrine, save that the Mano-vijnana or the Abhidharma Koca is divided into two, Mano-vijnana proper or normal waking consciousness, and Klicto-mano-vijnana which is more subjective, and corresponds to self-awareness. The eighth Vijnana, Alaya Vijnana, or receptacle consciousness, so

^{159 153}

called because it contains the seed of all things, is, as we have said, like the Unconscious of Von-Hartmann, the sea of life from which both subject and object are derived, for it is at once that which sees and that which is seen.

- 34. The Alaya Vijnana gives rise to the Seed Alaya proper—the basis of consciousness—and to the sense organs, and the sense objects or the external world. The actual world has thus already been created, but its replica has not yet been created by the mind. This is the stage at which Hinayana begins. From the interaction of these three there comes into being the essence of the world as perceived, the basis of the empirical world.
- 35. By means of the interaction of these various Vijnana, a man builds up for himself the external world which he experiences. The absence of any of them would destroy the completeness. Without the first Vijnana he could not see, without the sixth he could not understand the relative value of the various phenomena presented to him. Without the seventh he could not formulate a conception of shape or size, while without the eighth neither he nor the external object could exist.

One last word concerning certain details. The eighth Vijnana is the root or essence of all things so that all other seven Vijnanas are derived from it. The Seventh and Eighth Vijnanas are closely associated and so maintain a direct and immediate relationship. The sixth Vijnana serves to co-ordinate the remaining five. Among the ignorant and the unenlightened the sixth Vijnana or normal consciousness is aware of the existence of only the seventh Vijnana. This they suppose to be their real selves and to be an eternal and unchanging reality. Bodhisattvas are able to see the true state of affairs. They are able to penetrate to the core of the seventh Vijnana, and thus come into contact with the eighth or Alaya Vijnana the ever fluid medium which is the true cause of all existence.

36. A mango seed is planted, the sun, rain, and the earth act upon it, and a mango tree springs up. From the epistemological point of view, says the Yogacarya school, in the origin of the experienced world, the sixth Vijnana is the seed, the seventh and eighth Vijnana the condition, and the experienced world the fruit. This, of course, is obvious. That which really formulates the eject of externality is the normal waking consciousness, though this is based upon the discriminating faculty of the seventh Vijnana, and the essence of mind as expressed in the Alaya Vijnana.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

^{160 154}

¹⁶¹ 155

- 37. Just as the later Mahayanist philosophers considered these supernatural worlds to be purely subjective, so did they come to think that re-incarnation was general rather than particular, that there was no specific survival of each personality, but that the stream of life seen in the development of the human race alone survived, that each person added to his quota to the general stream, and that the individual karma was added to the Universal Karma which conditions the life of future generations. This idea has been especially emphasized by the Dhyana sect.
- 38. Contrary to the teaching of certain Hindu schools Buddhism does not consider that vegetables belong to the world of sentient beings, so that it is impossible to be reborn in that state.
- 39. Finally there is the Sukhavati school which eliminates all the preceding stages and seeks to attain Nirvana by entering directly into the Pure Land of the Universal Buddha. With some this pure land is taken literally, as a material heaven to be attained by faith in Amitabha. Among all philosophic Buddhists, however, the Pure Land is a symbol, a state of mind, an awakening of the Buddha seed, the bursting into flame of the spark of spiritual life to be obtained by means of mystic adoration and devotional realization of the true nature of reality. This rebirth into Paradise is to be attained here and now, at the moment when the soul throws off the trammels of the lesser self, and realizes its fundamental and a priori union with the Greater Self.
- 40. Tibet, on the other hand, though starting in the field much later than China carried out the 162 work of translation for some time further, and for the Indian Buddhist works from the seventh century down to the extinction of Buddhism in India we have only the Tibetan Tanjur to guide us, because with the exception of a few works kept in Nepal, almost the whole of the extensive Buddhist Sanskrit literature has perished.
- 41. The influence of the Madhyamika sect was enormous. Many of its doctrines were incorporated in the Yogacarya sect, and its teachings form the basis of most of Tibetan Buddhism, and the Sanron and Tendai sect of China and Japan as well as the later schools founded thereon. Even the later, more complete, more elaborate, and more consistent Yogacarya sect was unable to supplant it. The later Madhyamika philosophers waged war on the innovations of the Yogacaryas, claiming that they were but ephemeral additions to relative truth, and therefore already potentially included in the absolute truth of their own teaching. For this reason most Tibetan and Chinese histories of Buddhism give the Yogacarya system as the stepping stone from Hinayana to the perfect Mahayana represented by the Madhyamikas.

¹⁶² 156

Notwithstanding this fact the Yogacarya school must be considered the full blossom of Mahayana philosophy, the high water mark of metaphysical Buddhism. Not content with accepting the vague Cunya doctrines of the Madhyamika school it formulated a remarkably lucid and consistent doctrine of idealism, explaining how the universe was the product of mind, and yet at the same time guarded itself from the dangers of solipsism. As yet too little is known of the Yogacarya metaphysics, but when translations are made from their philosophical works we shall be able to appreciate, for the first time, to what a high level Indian and Buddhist speculation¹⁶³ had reached.

In its later and more degenerated stages the Yogacarya school took up several forms of mysticism and esotericism. Its several stages on this path may be marked off in the following way:—First came what we may call Mantrayana, or the doctrine of salvation by spells, exorcisms, and incantations. This includes the use of dharanis and mantras. With the theory of the mystic value of sound, there also arose the idea of the value of certain colours, and the symbolic meaning of certain positions of the hands (mudra). With this evolved the whole doctrine of an esoteric as opposed to an exoteric tradition. The next stage, which is usually called Tantrayana, is marked by still further symbolism and esotericism.

42. The Tibetan form of Buddhism, known popularly as Lamaism was destined to triumph in Mongolia, and the Himalayan States.

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SRI AUROBINDO: IN LETTERS TO DISCIPLES

1. The most decisive way for the Peace or Silence to come is by a descent from above. For the highest spiritual self is not even behind our personality but above it. The inner centre which opens directly to the Self is above the head altogether outside the physical body, in the subtle body. This Self has two aspects: one is static, wide peace, freedom, silence, unaffected by any action or experience, standing back unconcerned. The other aspect is dynamic experienced as the Cosmic Self which originates the whole Cosmic action. The first is Nirvana, an infinite peace, wideness above the head as it were, and extending into all space; the other a vast Force, a vast Light, a vast Bliss. The opening through the heart puts us primarily into connection with the individual Divine, the Divine in his inner relation with us.

¹⁶³ 157

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN. "AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM."

- 2. The¹⁶⁴ fundamental difference of Integral Yoga and the other Yogas is in the teaching that there is a dynamic divine Truth (the Supermind) and that into the present world of ignorance that Truth can descend, create a new Truth-consciousness and divine life. The old yogas go straight from mind to the absolute Divine, regard all dynamic existence as Ignorance, Illusion and they say you pass out of cosmic existence when you enter the static and immutable Divine Truth.
- 3. There is no complete truth below the Supermind.
- 4. The Indian systems did not distinguish between the Overmind and the Supermind, which is the reason why they got confused about Maya (Overmind—Force), took it for the supreme creative power and lost the secret of transformation—although the Vaishnava and Tantra Yogas groped to find it again and were sometimes on the verge of success. I know of none that has not imagined, as soon as it felt the Overmind lustres descending, that this was the true illumination, the gnosis, with the result that they stopped there. You have to pass through and beyond Overmind if you would reach Supermind.
- 5. There are two systems at once in the organization of the being and its parts—one is concentric, another is vertical, an ascension and descent. First there must be a conversion inwards, a going within, next there must be an ascension, a series of conversions upwards and a turning down to convert the lower Parts. Going upwards, one passes the human mind and at each stage there is an infusion of the new consciousness into the whole of the nature.
- 6. In our path the attitude is not forceful suppression but detachment and equality with regard¹⁶⁵ to the objects of desire. Desire lies latent and exasperated by suppression. It is only when one stands back, separates oneself from the lower vital, refusing to regard its desires and clamours as one's own, that it becomes gradually purified. Each wave of desire as it comes must be observed as quietly and as much unmoved as observing something going on outside you, and allowed to pass, rejected from the consciousness, and the true movement steadily put in its place.
- 7. The ascent to the divine which is common to all paths of yoga is not enough; there must be too a descent of the Divine to transform all the energies of the mind, life and body.

8. All truths below the supra-mental (even that of the highest spiritual on the mental plane, which is the highest that has yet manifested, earthly life; they can at most modify and influence it). The ancient seers had glimpses of the Supermind, or sometimes its indirect influence or pressure, but it has not been brought down into the consciousness of the earth and fixed there. The Vedic Rishis never attained the supermind: they did not bring it down and make it a permanent part of the earth-consciousness. It was because of this failure that the spiritual effort of India culminated in Maya-vada.

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<u>SUDDHONANDA BHARATA</u>: <u>NOTES ON AUROBINDO'S TEACHING</u>: (1) Purna Yoga is the integral yoga which holds the ideal of a victorious harmony between a life in the world and spiritual perfection, gaining God without losing life, reuniting God and Nature in a liberated and perfected human life. Purna means full, integral, perfect, complete. It does not deny, refuse or reject any part of life, physical, vital or mental. It lights the lamp of life with the eternal light of the spirit.

- 2. Life¹⁶⁶ extinction, in the spirit is the aim of the Vedantic yogas. Life in the spirit is the virtue of Purna Yoga. The old systems of yoga recoiled from the phenomenal world as a dream, maya and mirage. They were other-worldly. They attached great importance to trance (samadhi) by killing mind to arrive at cessation of physical consciousness. The Integral yoga demands complete annihilation of the separative ego. It is not the individual or selfish Mukti it seeks but the manifestation of the Divine in humanity. It is integral in that it manifests God in man; the bliss of heaven upon material earth, and raises the Spirit's image upon the pedestal of physical-vital-mental. It spiritualises all the details of life so that all living becomes a grand universal yoga.
- 3. No other system of yoga has actually spiritualised humanity. Such fulfilment is possible only on the Supra-mental plane to which no other yoga has yet reached. The Rishis knocked at the door which covers this plane but after so many centuries it has only just been opened by the gigantic sadhana of the Poorna Yogi. Man cannot grasp with his limited twilight mentality the splendour of the supra-mental plane.
- 4. Pranayama strikes awake the inner dynamism of Kundalini.
- 5. Not only the conquest of the Subjective empire but also the objective by the subjective consciousness is our aim.

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¹⁶⁶ 160

- 6. Liberation is the one aim of the old yogas—Karma, Bhakti and Jnana. Work (Karma Yoga) by Dedication of works purifies the mind and becomes conscious of the Divine Force that leads the world. The Karma yogi becomes aware of the Master that lords over the world and directs so wonderfully all the details of cosmic existence. The Inani through contemplation and self-examination arrives at the self-centre. These yogas are directed to other-worldly abstraction¹⁶⁷. But the Integral Yoga is a synthesis of Knowledge, Love and Work. Its knowledge is integral in that it enlarges selfrealization to the realization of the phenomenal existence as the play of the Divine, and that all in the world of names and forms is Brahman.
- Integral yoga raises human consciousness to the Divine and comes down with all 7. the splendour of divinity to transform the lower planes of mind, life and body so that it makes all life a yoga of Nature.
- 8. The world is an emanation from the self-delight of the Divine. The creation of the divine Reality cannot be a drsyam. The world is not an illusion: it is a changing constant, an eternal recurrence. To the supramental consciousness, manifoldness is an eternal self-unfolding of the One Reality, time (is) an eternal present, space an indivisible extension. The universe is the diffusion of the Divine All in infinite space and time. The futile 'maya doctrine' is a trick of speech, a false attitude towards God and Nature.
- 9. The first man and woman ate the fruit of divided mentality and fell. Who is responsible? The father gives books, clothes, food and fees, and sends the boy to school. The boy wastes time, does not attend to lessons and fails, weeps "How miserable is my lot" Who is to be blamed? Father, or Master? No. It is the crooked mind of the boy that has to be straightened.
- 10. Supermind (Vijnana) is the direct and divine as opposed to the indirect and human knowledge. It is Truth-Consciousness. In it the Soul possesses its infinite oneness with the Supreme Purusha. Mind is charged with ignorance unaware of the absolute which is the source of all things: it works through reason, logic memory, imagination and critical judgment, where as Supermind has direct, luminous intuitive perception.
- To 168 transcend the mind, all egoistic mental constructions must be put away; the 11. being must be made a smooth passive channel of Divine. Be ego-free: keep yourself receptive.

¹⁶⁷ 161

- 12. This life-divining Integral Yoga culminates not in the siddhi of an individual, but in the collective life divine of the whole humanity. Such a spiritual perfection of a community of integral yogis shall effect a tremendous transformation in the collective life of man.
- 13. The Integral yogi does not point his finger to a far-off heaven. He seeks to bring Heaven here, to express in humanity the splendour of
- 14. Sri Aurobindo has harmonised the two ends of existence, Spirit and Matter. Most ways of Yoga lead, in the end away from life: Aurobindo's rises to the Spirit to redescend with its gains, bringing the power of the spirit into life to transform it. The created world is not a mistake or vanity and illusion to be cast aside by the soul returning to Nirvana, but the scene of a spiritual evolution by which is to be manifested progressively the Divine Consciousness in things. Supermind is the self-aware light, self-existent knowledge: it is only by its descent that the perfection dreamed of by all can come. It is possible to remain in constant union with the Divine and bring down the Supramental Force force for mind and life, and in the end, even for body. Such is the dynamic aim of Sri Aurobindo.

THOMAS CARLYLE: "We sit as in a boundless Phantasmagoria and Dream-grotto; boundless, for the faintest star, the remotest century, lies not even nearer the verge thereof; sounds and many coloured visions flit round our sense; but Him, the Unslumbering, whose work both Dream¹⁶⁹ and Dreamer are, we see not; except in rare half-waking moments, suspect not. Creation, says one, lies before us, like a glorious Rainbow; but the Sun that made it lies behind us, hidden from us. Then, in that strange Dream, how we clutch at shadows as if they were substances; and sleep deepest while fancying ourselves most awake!.... Where now is Alexander of Macedon?...Napoleon too, and his Moscow Retreats and Austerlitz campaigns! Was it all other than the veriest Spectre-hunt?... That warrior on his strong war-horse, fire flashes through his eyes; force dwells in his arm and hearts: but warrior and war-horse are a vision; a revealed Force, nothing more. Stately they tread the Earth, as if it were a firm substance: fool! the Earth is but a film; it cracks in twain, and warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet's sounding. Plummet's? Fantasy herself will not follow them. A little while ago, they were not; a little while, and they are not, their very ashes are not...Thus, like a God-created, fire-breathing Spirit-host, we emerge from the Inane; haste stormfully across the astonished Earth; then plunge again into the Inane....But whence? –O Heaven, whither? Sense knows not; Faith knows not; only that it is through Mystery to Mystery, from God and to God."

LO-TSU, founder of the WU MEI, (mystical school in China): Lo-Tsu was again asked why he did not worship images. He answered "A brazen Buddha melts, and a wooden Buddha burns, when exposed to the fire. An earthen Buddha cannot save itself from water. It cannot save itself; then how can it save me? In every particle of dust there is a (Buddha Kshetra) world, ruled by a Buddha. In every temple the King of the Law resides. The mountains, the rivers, and the great earth form Buddha's image. Why, then, carve¹⁷⁰ or mould an image for him?

Again when asked why he does not burn incense he replied: "Ignorant men do not know that every one has incense in himself. What is the true incense? It is self-government, wisdom, patience, mercy, freedom from doubts, and knowledge. The pure doctrine of Sunyata is true incense, pervading all heaven and earth. Incense is everywhere ascending. That incense which is made by man being the smoke of fragrant woods, does not reach heaven." ¹⁷¹

BUDDHIST TRANCES:[®] We come to the trances which are brought on by these meditations. These are known as the Nine Attainments, comprising the first four trances, the four formless states and the trance of cessation. When the aspirant, having freed himself from sensual pleasures and from all demeritorious traits, continually exercises reasoning and reflection, he enters upon the first trance, which is characterized by happiness and joy. When through greater concentration he stops reasoning and reflecting, but retains only joy and happiness, he enters upon the second trance, which is an interior tranquilization and intentness of thought. When that stage is passed, he has no joy, but may be said to be "indifferent contemplative and living happily," he enters upon the 3rd trance. After that stage, he abandons all happiness and misery, gladness and grief, and enters upon the 4th trance. When the aspirant enters upon these stages of trance the perception of form ceases. These are therefore known as the formless states. Now comes the highest of the trances, which brings the aspirant into the dominion of Wisdom. It is called the cessation of perception and sensation. When this trance is attained all Karma bodily vocal & mental stop. It may last for a period of time which the ascetic has set for it before entering upon it. Now we come to the highest discipline, known as Wisdom.

¹⁷⁰ 164

LO-TSU, founder of the WU MEI, (mystical school in China)

¹⁷¹ The original editor inserted close double codes by hand

[®] In Journal of the Mahabodhi Society, 1898.

SIR¹⁷² CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM.

- 1. In the Buddha's own words: (a) If there is anyone who thinks 'it is I who will lead the brotherhood' or 'the order is dependent on me,' it is he who should give instructions. But the Tathagata does not think that he should lead the order or that the order is dependent on him. Why then should he leave instructions?
- (b) I am an old man now, and full of years, my pilgrimage is finished, I have reached my sum of days, I am turning eighty years; and just as a worn-out cart can only be made to move along with much additional care, so can the body of the Tathagata be kept going only with much additional care. It is only when the Tathagata, ceasing to attend to any outward thing becomes plunged in meditation, it is only then that the body of the Tathagata is at ease.
- The philosophy of early Pali Buddhism deals with psychology rather than with metaphysics. It holds it profitable to analyze and discuss man's mental constitution, because such knowledge leads to the destruction of false ideals and the pursuit of peace and insight. Enquiry into the origin and nature of the external world is not equally profitable; in fact it is a vain intellectual pastime. Still in treating of such matters as sensation, perception and consciousness, it is impossible to ignore the question of external objects or to avoid propounding, at least by implication, some theory about them. In this connection we often come upon the important word Dhamma (Sanskrit Dharma). It means a law, and more especially the law of the Buddha, or, in a wider sense, justice, righteousness or religion. But outside the moral and religious sphere it is commonly used in the plural as equivalent to phenomena, considered as involving states of consciousness. The Dhamma-sangani divides phenomena into those which exist for the subject and those which exist for other individuals¹⁷³ and ignores the possibility of things existing apart from a knowing subject. This hints at idealism and other statements seem more precise. Thus the Samyutta-Nikaya declares: "Verily, within this mortal body, some six feet high, but conscious and endowed with mind, is the world, and its origin, and its passing away." And similarly the problem is its posed, "Where do the four elements pass away and leave no trace behind." Neither gods nor men can answer it, and when it is referred to the Buddha, his decision is that the question is wrongly put and therefore admits of no solution. "Instead of asking where the four elements pass away without trace, you should have asked: Where do earth, water, fire and wind, And long and short and fine and course, pure and impure no footing find? Where is it that both name and form Die out and leave no trace behind?"

To that the answer is: In the mind of the Saint.

Yet it is certain that such passages should not be interpreted as equivalent to the later Yogacara doctrine that only thought really exists or to any form of the doctrine

¹⁷³ 166

¹⁷² 165

that the world is Maya or illusion. The Pitakas leave no doubt on this point, for they elaborate with clearness and consistency the theory that sensation and consciousness depend on contact, that is contact between sense organs and sense objects. "Man is conceived as a compound of instruments, receptive and reacting" and the Samyutta-Nikaya puts into the Buddha's mouth the following dogmatic statement. "Consciousness arises because of duality. What is that duality? Visual consciousness arises because of sight and because of visible objects. Sight is transitory and mutable: it is its very nature to change. Visible objects are the same. So this duality is both in movement and transitory."

The 174 question of the reality of the external world did not present itself to the early Buddhists. Had it been posed we may surmise that the Buddha would have replied, as in similar cases, that the question was not properly put. How would not, we may imagine, have admitted that the human mind has the creative power which idealism postulates, for such power seems to imply the existence of something life a self or atman. But still though the Pitakas emphasize the empirical duality of sense-organs and sense-objects, they also supply a basis for the doctrines of Nagarjuna and Asanga, which like much late Buddhist metaphysics insist on using logic in regions where the master would not use it. When it is said that the genesis of the world and its passing away are within this mortal frame, the meaning probably is that the world as we experience it with its pains and pleasures depends on the senses and that with the modification or cessation of the senses it is changed or comes to an end. In other words (for this doctrine like most of the Buddha's doctrines is at bottom ethical rather than metaphysical) the saint can make or unmake his own world and triumph over pain. But the theory of sensation may be treated not ethically but metaphysically. Sensation implies a duality and on the one side the Buddha's teaching argues that there is no permanent sentient self but merely different kinds of consciousness arising in response to different stimuli. It is admitted too that visible objects are changing and transitory like sight itself and thus there is no reason to regard the external world, which is one half of the duality, as more permanent, self-existent and continuous than the other half. When we apply to it the destructive analysis which the Buddha applied only to mental states, we easily arrive at the nihimism or idealism of the 175 later Buddhists. Of this I will, treat later. For the present we have only to note that early Buddhism holds that sensation depends on contact, that is on a duality. It does not investigate the external part of this duality and it is clear that such investigation leads to the very speculations which the Buddha declared to be unprofitable, such as arguments about the eternity and infinity of the universe.

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SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

175 168

^{174 167}

- Atman, of course, means self and is so rendered by Max Muller in this passage, 3. but it seems to me that this rendering jars on the English ear for it inevitably suggests the individual self and selfishness, whereas Atman means the universal spirit which is Self, because it is the highest (or only) Reality and Being, not definable in terms of anything else.
- 4. Others, commonly called materialists, while agreeing that the soul comes into existence with the birth of the body, hold that it ceases to exist with the death of the body. To the first theory the Buddha would probably have replied that there is one law without exception, namely that whatever has a beginning has also an end. The whole universe offers no analogy or parallel to the soul which has a beginning but no end, and not the smallest logical need is shown for believing a doctrine so contrary to the nature of things. And as for materialism he would probably say that it is a statement of the processes of the world as perceived but no explanation of the mental or even of the physical world. The materialists forget that objects as known cannot be isolated from the knowing subject. Sensation implies contact and duality but it is no real explanation to say that mental phenomena are caused by physical phenomena. The Buddha reckoned among vain speculations not only such problems as the eternity and infinity of 176 the world but also the question, Is the principle of life (Jiva) identical with the body or not identical. That question, he said, is not properly put, which is tantamount to condemning as inadequate all theories which derive life and thought from purely material antecedents.
- 5. For his hearers the difficulty must have been not to explain why they believed in rebirth but to harmonize the belief with the rest of the master's system, for what is reborn and how? We detect a tendency to say that it is Vinnana, or consciousness, and the expression patisandhivinnanam or rebirth-consciousness occurs. The question is treated in an important dialogue in the Majjhima-Nikaya, where a monk called Sati maintains that, according to the Buddha's teaching, consciousness transmigrates unchanged. The Buddha summoned Sati and rebuked his error in language of unusual severity, for it was evidently capital and fatal if persisted in. The Buddha does not state what transmigrates, as the European reader would wish him to do, and would no doubt have replied to that question that it is improperly framed and does not admit of an answer.

His argument is directed not so much against the idea that consciousness in one existence can have some connection with consciousness in the next, as against the idea that this consciousness is a unity and permanent. He maintains that it is a complex process due to many causes, each producing its own effect. Yet the Pitakas seem to admit that the processes which constitute consciousness in one life, can also produce their effect in another life, for the character of future lives may be determined by the

^{176 169}

wishes which we form in this life. Existence is really a succession of states of consciousness following one another irrespective of bodies. If ABC and abc are two successive lives, ABC is not more¹⁷⁷ of a reality or unity than BCa. No personality passes over at death from ABC to abc but then ABC is itself not a unity: it is merely a continuous process of change.

- The doctrine of Gotama as expressed in his earliest utterance on the subject to the 6. five monks at Benares is that neither the body, nor any mental faculty to which a name can be given is what was called in Brahmanic theology atman, that is to say an entity which is absolutely free, imperishable, changeless and not subject to pain. This of course does not exclude the possibility that there may be something which does not come under any of the above categories and which may be such an entity as described. Indeed Brahmanic works which teach the existence of the atman often use language curiously like that of Buddhism. Thus the Bhagavad-gita says that actions are performed by the Gunas and only he who is deluded by egoism thinks "I am the doer." And the Vishnu Purana objects to the use of personal pronouns. "When one soul is dispersed in all bodies, it is idle to ask who are you, who am I?" The accounts of the Buddhist higher life would be easier to understand if we could suppose that there is such a self: that the pilgrim who is walking in the paths gradually emancipates, develops and builds it up: that it becomes partly free in nirvana before death and wholly free after death. Schrader has pointed out texts in the Pitakas which seem to imply that there is something which is absolute and therefore not touched by the doctrine of anatta. In a remarkable passage the Buddha says: Therefore my disciples get rid of what is not yours. To get rid of it will mean your health and happiness for a long time. Form, sensation, perception, etc. are not yours; get rid of them. If a man were to take away¹⁷⁸, or burn, or use for his needs, all the grass, and boughs, and branches and leaves in this Jeta wood, would it ever occur to you to say, the man is taking us away, or using us for his needs? Certainly not, Lord. Why not? Because Lord, it is not our self or anything belonging to our self. Just in the some way, replies the Buddha, get rid of the skandhas. The natural sense of this seems to be that the skandhas have no more to do with the real being of man than have the trees of the forest where he happens to be. This suggests that there is in man something real and permanent, to be contrasted with the transitory skandhas and when the Buddha asks whether anything which is perishable and changeable can be called the self, he seems to imply that there is somewhere such a self.
- 7. Mental concentration is essential to samadhi which is the opposite of those wandering desires often blamed as seeking for pleasure here and there. But samadhi is

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

 $178\ 171$

^{177 170}

more than mere concentration or even meditation and may be rendered by rapture or ecstasy, though like so many technical Buddhist terms it does not correspond exactly to any European word. It takes in Buddhism the place occupied in other religions by prayer—prayer, that is, in the sense of ecstatic communion with the divine being. He concentrates his thoughts and is able to apply them to such great matters as he may select.

- 8. In all cases the process is marked by mental activity. The meditations of Indian recluses are often described as self-hypnotism, and I shall say something on this point elsewhere, but it is clear that in giving the above account the Buddha did not contemplate any mental condition in which the mind ceases to be active or master of itself. When, at the beginning, the monk sits down to meditate it is "with intelligence alert and intent"; in the last stage he has the sense of freedom, of duty done, and of knowledge immediate and unbounded,¹⁷⁹ which sees the whole world spread below like a clear pool in which every fish and people is visible.
- 9. The state of a Saint after death cannot be legitimately described in language that suggests that it is a fuller and deeper mode of life. Yet it is clear that nearly all who dispute about it wish to make out that it is a state they could somehow regard with active satisfaction. In technical language they are infected with aruparago, or desire for life in a formless world, and this is the seventh of the ten fetters, all of which must be broken before arhatship is attained. I imagine that those modern sects, such as the Zen in Japan which hold that the deepest mysteries of the faith cannot be communicated in worlds but somehow grow clear in meditation are not far from the master's teaching.
- 10. Almost all who treat of nirvana after death try to make the Buddha say, is or is not. That is what he refused to do. We still want a plain answer to a plain question and insist that he really means either that the saint is annihilated or enters on an infinite existence. But the true analogues to this question are the other insoluble questions, for instance, is the world infinite or finite in space? This is in form a simple physical problem, yet it is impossible for the mind to conceive either an infinite world or a world stopping abruptly with not even space beyond. A common answer to this antinomy is that the mind is attempting to deal with a subject with which it is incompetent to deal, that the question is wrongly formulated and that every answer to it thus formulated must be wrong. The way of truth lies in first finding the true question.
- 11. Perhaps he will be nearest to the Buddha's train of thought who attempts to consider, by reflection rather than by discussion in words what is meant by

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

¹⁸⁰ 173

^{179 172}

annihilation. By thinking of the mystery of existence and realizing how difficult it is to explain how and why anything exists, we are apt to slip into thinking that it would be quite natural and intelligible if nothing existed or if existing things became nothing. Yet as a matter of fact our minds have no experience of this nothing of which we talk and it is inconceivable. When we try to think of nothingness we really think of space from which try to remove all content, yet could we create an absolute vacuum within a vessel, the interior of the vessel would not be annihilated. The man who has attained nirvana cannot be adequately defined or grasped even in this life: what binds him to being is cut but it is inappropriate and inadequate to say that he has become nothing.

- 12. Gotama did not hold Jhana or regulated meditation to be essential to nirvana or arhatship, for that state was attainable by laymen and apparently through sudden illumination. But such cases were the exception. His own mental evolution which culminated in enlightenment comprised the four Jhanas.
- 13. The doctrine that nirvana is attainable merely by practising the Jhanas is expressly reprobated as a heresy. The teaching of the Pitakas seems to be that nirvana is attainable by living the higher life in which meditation and insight both have a place. In normal saints both sides are developed. The distinction is not without importance for it means that knowledge and insight are indispensable for nirvana: it cannot be obtained by hypnotic trances or magical powers.

The Buddha is represented as saying that in his boyhood when sitting under a tree he once fell into a state of contemplation which he calls the first Jhana. It is akin to a sensation which comes to Europeans most frequently in childhood out sometimes persists in mature life, when the mind181, usually under the influence of summer scenery, seems to identify itself with nature, and on returning to its normal state asks with surprise, can it be that what seems a small distant personality is really. I? The usual form of Jhana comprises four stages. The first is a state of joy and ease born of detachment, which means physical calm as well as the absence of worldly desires and irrelevant thoughts. It is distinguished from the subsequent stages by the existence of reasoning and investigation, and while it lasts the mind is compared to water agitated by waves. In the second Jhana reasoning and investigation cease: the water becomes still and the mind set free rises slowly above the thoughts which had encumbered it and grows calm and sure, dwelling on high. In this Jhana the sense of joy and ease remains, but in the third stage joy disappears, though ease remains. This ease (sukham) is the opposite of dukkham, the discomfort which characterises all ordinary states of existence. It is in part a physical feeling, for the text says that he who meditates has this sense of ease in his body. But this feeling passes away in the fourth Jhana, in which there is only a sense of equanimity. This word, though perhaps the best rendering which can be found for the Pali upekkha, is inadequate for it suggests merely the

¹⁸¹ 174

absence of inclination whereas upekkha represents a state of mind which, though rising above hedonistic views, is yet positive and not merely the negation of interest and desire.

In the passage quoted the Buddha speaks as if only an effort of will were needed to enter into the first Jhana, but tradition, supported by the Pitakas, sanctions the use of expedients to facilitate the process. Some are topics on which attention should be concentrated, others are external objects known as Kasina. This word (equivalent¹⁸² to the Sanskrit kritsna) means entire or total, and hence something which engrosses the attention. Thus in the procedure known as the earth Kasina the Bhikkhu who wishes to enter into the Jhana makes a small circle of reddish clay, and then gazes at it fixedly. After a time he can see it as plainly when his eyes are closed as when they are open. This is followed by entry into Jhana and he should not continue looking at the circle. There are ten kinds of Kasina differing from that described merely in substituting for the earthen circle some other object, such as water, light, gold or silver. The whole procedure is clearly a means of inducing a hypnotic trance.

The practice of tranquillizing the mind by regulating the breathing is recommended repeatedly in Suttas which seem ancient and authentic; for instance, in the instruction given by the Buddha to his son Rahula. On the other hand, his account of his fruitless self-mortification shows that the exercise even in its extreme forms is not sufficient to secure enlightenment. It appears to be a method of collecting and concentrating the mind, not necessarily hypnotic.

- 14. The contemplation of a burnished pewter dish and of running water induced ecstasy in Jacob Boehme and Ignatius Loyola respectively.
- 15. In the first formless state the monk who is meditating rises above all idea of form and multiplicity and reaches the sphere in which the infinity of space is the only idea present to his mind. He then passes to the sphere where the infinity of thought only is present and thence to the sphere in which he thinks "nothing at all exists," though it would seem that the consciousness of his own mental processes is undiminished. The teaching of Alara Kalama, the Buddha's first teacher, made the attainment of this state its goal. It is succeeded by the state in which neither 183 any idea nor the absence of any idea is specially present to the mind. This was the goal of Uddaka Ramaputta, his second teacher, and is illustrated by the simile of a bowl which has been smeared with oil inside. That is to say, consciousness is reduced to a minimum. Beyond these four stages is yet another, in which a complete cessation of perception and feeling is attained. This state differs from death only in the fact that heat and physical life are not extinct and while it lasts there is no consciousness. It is stated that it could continue

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

¹⁸³ 176

¹⁸² 175

during seven days but not longer. Such hypnotic trances have always inspired respect in India but the Buddha rejected as unsatisfying the teaching of his masters which made them the final goal.

But let us return to his account of Jhana and its results. The first of these is a correct knowledge of the body and of the connection of consciousness with the body. Next conies the power to call up out of the body a mental image which is apparently the earliest form of what has become known in later times as the astral body.

16. Iddhi, like the power of evoking a mental image, seems to be connected with hypnotic phenomena. It means literally power, but is used in the special sense of magical or supernatural gifts such as ability to walk on water, fly in the air, or pass through a wall. Some of these sensations are familiar in dreams and are probably easily attainable as subjective results in trances.

He who has his mind perfectly controlled can treat himself to any mental pleasure he chooses. Although the Buddha and others are represented as performing such feats as floating in the air whenever it suits them, yet the instructions given as to how the powers may be acquired starts by 184 bidding the neophyte pass through the four stages of Jhana or meditation in which ordinary external perception ceases. Then he will be able to have the experiences described. And it is probable that the description gives a correct account of the sensations which arise in the course of a trance, particularly if the trance has been entered upon with the object of experiencing them. In other words they are hypnotic states and often the result of suggestion, since he who meditates knows what the result of his meditation should be.

It is hardly possible to imagine better hypnotic subjects than the pupils of an 17. Indian religious teacher. They are taught to regard him with deep respect and complete confidence: they are continually in a state of expectant receptivity, assimilating not only the texts and doctrines which he imparts, but his way of life: their training leads them to believe in the reality of mental and physical powers exceeding those of ordinary mankind and indeed to think that if they do not have such experiences it is through some fault of their own. The teachers, though ignorant of hypnotism as such, would not hesitate to use any procedure which seemed to favour progress in meditation and the acquisition of supernatural powers. Now a large number of Indian marvels fall under two heads. In the first case Buddha, Krishna, or any personage raised above the ordinary human level points out to his disciples that wonders are occurring and will occur: he causes people to appear or disappear: he appears himself in an amazing form which he explains. In the other case the possessor of marvellous powers has experience which he subsequently relates: he goes up to heaven or flies to the uttermost parts of the earth and returns. Both of these cases are covered by the phenomena of hypnotism¹⁸⁵. I

^{184 177}

do not mean to say that any given Indian legend can be explained by analyzing it as if it were a report of a hypnotic operation, but merely that the general character of these legends is largely due to the prevalence of hypnotic experiences among their composers and hearers. Two obscure branches of hypnotism are probably of great importance in the religious history of the human race, namely self-hypnotization without external suggestion and the hypnotization of crowds. India affords plentiful materials for the study of both.

There is no reason to doubt that the Buddha believed in the existence of these powers and countenanced the practices supposed to lead to them. Thus Moggallana, second only to Sariputta among his disciples, was called the master of iddhi, (In spite of his magic power he could not prevent himself being murdered. The Milinda-panha explains this as the result of Karma, which is stronger than magic and everything else) and it is mentioned as a creditable and enjoyable accomplishment. But it is made equally plain that such magical or hypnotic practices are not essential to the attainment of the Buddha's ideal. When lists of attainments are given, iddhi does not receive the first place and it may be possessed by bad men; Devadatta for instance was proficient in it. It is even denounced in the story of Pindola Bharadvaja and in the Kevaddha Sutta. In this curious dialogue the Buddha is asked to authorize the performance of miracles as an advertisement of the true faith. He refuses categorically, saying there are three sorts of wonders namely iddhi, that is flying through the air etc.: the wonder of manifestation which is thought-reading: and the wonder of education. Of the first two he says "I see danger in their practice and therefore I loathe, abhor¹⁸⁶ and am ashamed of them." Then by one of those characteristic turns of language by which he uses old words in new senses he adds that the true miracle is the education of the heart.

Neither are the other transcendental powers necessary for emancipation. Sariputta had not the heavenly eye, yet he was the chief disciple and an eminent arhat. This heavenly eye (Dibba-cakkhu) is not the same as the eye of truth (dhamma-cakkhu). It means perfect knowledge of the operation of Karma and hence a panoramic view of the universe, whereas the eye of truth is a technical phrase for the opening of the eyes, the mental revolution which accompanies conversion. But though transcendental knowledge is not indispensable for attaining nirvana, it is an attribute of the Buddha and in most of its forms amounts to an exceptional insight into human nature and the laws of the universe, which, though after the Indian manner exaggerated and pedantically defined, does not differ essentially from what we call genius.

18. Yet despite the intense reality of this happy state, despite the illumination which floods the soul and the wide visions of a universal plan, there is no agreement as to the cause of the experience nor, strange to say, as to its meaning as opposed to its form. For many both in the east and west the one essential and indubitable fact throughout the

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

¹⁸⁶ 179

experience is God, yet Buddhists are equally decided in holding that the experience has nothing to do with any deity. This is not a mere question of interpretation. It means that views as to theism and pantheism are indifferent for the attainment of this happy state.

The mystics of India are sometimes contrasted with their fellows in Europe as being more passive and more self-centred: they are supposed to desire self-annihilation and to have no¹⁸⁷ thought for others. But I doubt if the contrast is just. If Indian mysticism sometimes appears at a disadvantage, I think it is because it is popular and in danger of being stereo-typed and sometimes vulgarized. Nowadays in Europe we have students of mysticism rather than mystics, and the mystics of the Christian Church were independent and distinguished spirits who, instead of following the signposts of the beaten track, found out a path for themselves. But in India mysticism was and is as common as prayer and as popular as science. It was taught in manuals and parodied by charlatans. When mysticism is the staple crop of a religion and not a rare wild flower, the percentage of imperfect specimens is bound to be high. The Buddha, Sankara and a host of less well-known teachers were as strenuous and influencial as Francis of Assisi or Ignatius Loyola. Neither in Europe nor in Asia has mysticism contributed much directly to politician and social reform. That is not its sphere, but within the religious sphere, in preaching teaching and organization, the mystic is intensely practical and the number of successes (as of failures) is greater in Asia than in Europe. Even in theory Indian mysticism does not repudiate energy. No one enjoyed more than the Buddha himself what Ruysbroeck calls "the mysterious peace dwelling in activity," for before he began his mission he had attained nirvana called apratishthita: those who attain it see that there is no real difference between mundane existence and nirvana and therefore devote themselves to a life of beneficent activity.

19. The gods, though freely invoked as accessories, are not taken seriously, and there are some extremely curious passages in which Gotama seems to laugh at them, much as the sceptics of the eighteenth century laughed at Jehovah. Thus¹⁸⁸ in the Kevaddha sutta he relates how a monk who was puzzled by a metaphysical problem applied to the various gods and finally accosted Brahma himself in the presence of all his retinue. After hearing the question, which was Where do the elements cease and leave no trace behind? Brahma replies, "I am the Great Brahma, the Supreme, the Mighty, the Allseeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Controller, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointed to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be." "But," said the monk, "I did not ask you, friend, whether you were indeed all you now say, but I ask you where the four elements cease and leave no trace." Then the Great Brahma took him by the arm and led him aside and said, "These gods think I know and

187 180

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

188 181

understand everything. Therefore I gave no answer in their presence. But I do not know the answer to your question and you had better go and ask the Buddha." Even more curiously ironical is the account given of the origin of Brahma. There comes a time when this world system passes away and then certain beings are reborn in the World of Radiance and remain there a long time. Sooner or later, the world system begins to evolve again and the palace of Brahma appears, but it is empty. Then some being whose time is up falls from the World of Radiance and comes to life in the palace and remains there alone. At last he wishes for company, and it so happens that other beings whose time is up fall from the World of Radiance and join him. And the first being thinks that he is Great Brahma, the Creator, because when he felt lonely and wished for companions other beings appeared. And the other beings accept this view. And at last one of Brahma's retinue falls from that state and is born in the human world and, if he can remember his previous birth, he reflects that he is transitory but that Brahma still remains and from this 189 he draws the erroneous conclusion that Brahma is eternal.

He who dared to represent Brahma (for which name we might substitute Allah or Jehovah) as a pompous deluded individual worried by the difficulty of keeping up his position had more than the usual share of scepticism and irony.

- 20. The Buddhas enumerated are supreme Buddhas (Sammasam-Buddha) but there is another order called Pacceka (Sanskrit Pratyeka) or private Buddhas. Both classes attain by their own exertions to a knowledge of the four truths but the Pacceka Buddhas are not, like the supreme Buddhas, teachers of mankind and omniscient. knowledge is confined to what is necessary for their own salvation and perfection. They are mentioned in the Nikayas as worthy of all respect but are not prominent in either the earlier or later works, which is only natural, seeing that by their very definition they are self-centred and of little importance for mankind. The idea of the private Buddha however is interesting, inasmuch as it implies that even when the four truths are not preached they still exist and can be discovered by anyone who makes the necessary mental and moral effort. It is also noticeable that the superiority of a supreme Buddha lies in his power to teach and help others. A passionless and self-centred sage falls short of the ideal.
- 21. Mahayana metaphysics, like all other departments of this, are beset by the difficulty that the authorities who treat them are not always in accord and do not pretend to be in accord. The idea that variety is permissible in belief and conduct is deeply rooted in later Buddhism: there are many vehicles, some better than others no doubt and some very ramshackle, but all are capable of conveying their passengers to salvation. Nominally the Mahayana was divided into only two schools of philosophy:

189 182

practically¹⁹⁰ every important treatise propounds a system with features of its own. The two schools are the Yogacaras and Madhyamikas. Both are idealists and deny the reality of the external world, but whereas the Yogacaras (also called Vijnanavadins) admit that Vijnana or consciousness and the series of states of which it consists are real, the Madhyamikas refuse the title of reality to both the subjective and the objective world and hence gained a reputation of being complete nihilists. Probably the Madhyamikas are the older school.

Both schools attach importance to the distinction between relative and absolute knowledge. Relative knowledge is true for human beings living in the world: that is to say it is not more false than the world of appearance in which they live. The Hinayanist doctrines are true in this sense. Absolute knowledge rises above the world of appearance and is altogether true but difficult to express in words. The Yogacara makes three divisions, dividing the inferior knowledge into two. It distinguishes first illusory knowledge (parikalpita) such as mistaking a piece of rope for a snake or belief in the existence of individual souls. Secondly knowledge which depends on the relations of things (paratanta) and which though not absolutely wrong is necessarily limited, such as belief in the real existence of ropes and snakes. And thirdly absolute knowledge (parinishpanna), which understands all things as the manifestation of an underlying principle. The Madhyamikas more simply divide knowledge samvriti-satya and paramartha-satya, that is the truth of everyday life and transcendental truth. The world and ordinary religion with its doctrines and injunctions about good works are real and true as samvriti but in absolute truth (paramartham) we attain Nirvana and then the¹⁹¹ world with its human Buddhas and its gods exists no more. The word sunyam or sunyata, that is void, is often used as the equivalent of paramartham. Void must be understood as meaning not an abyss of nothingness but that which is found to be devoid of all the attributes which we try to ascribe to it. The world of ordinary experience is not void, for a great number of statements can be made about it, but absolute truth is void, because nothing whatever can be predicated of it. Yet even this colourless designation is not perfectly accurate, because neither being nor not-being can be predicated of absolute truth. It is for this reason, namely that they admit neither being nor not-being but something between the two, that the followers of Nagarjuna are known as the Madhyamikas or school of the middle doctrine, though the European reader is tempted to say that their theories are extreme to the point of being a reductio ad absurdum of the whole system. Yet though much of their logic seems late and useless sophistry, its affinity to early Buddhism cannot be denied. The four-fold proposition that the answer to certain questions cannot be any of the statements "is" "is not," "both is and is not," "neither is nor is not," is part of the earliest known stratum of Buddhism. The Buddha himself is represented as saying that most people hold either a

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SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

191 184

^{190 183}

belief in being or to a belief in not being. But neither belief is possible for one who considers the question with full knowledge. "That things have being is one extreme: that things have no being is the other extreme. These extremes have been avoided by the Tathagata and it is a middle doctrine that he teaches," namely, dependent origination as explained in the chain of twelve links. The Madhyamika theory that objects have no absolute and independent existence but appear to exist¹⁹² in virtue of their relations is a restatement of this ancient dictum.

The Mahayanist doctors find an ethical meaning in their negations. If things possessed svabhava, real, absolute, self-determined existence, then the four truths and especially the cessation of suffering and attainment of sanctity would be impossible. For if things were due not to causation but to their own self-determining nature (and the Hindus always seem to understand real existence in this sense) cessation of evil and attainment of the good would be alike impossible: the four Noble Truths imply a world which is in a state of constant becoming, that is a world which is not really existent.

But for all that the doctrine of sunyata as stated in the Madhyamika aphorisms ascribed to Nagarjuna leaves an impression of audacious and ingenious sophistry. After laying down that every object in the world exists only in relation to every other object and has no self-existence, the treatise proceeds to prove that rest and motion are alike impossible. We speak about the path along which we are passing but there is really no such thing, for if we divide the path accurately, it always proves separable into the part which has been passed over and the part which will be passed over. There is no part which is being passed over. This of course amounts to a denial of the existence of present time. Time consists of past and future separated by an indivisible and immeasurable instant. The minimum of time which has any meaning for us implies a change, and two elements, a former and a subsequent. The present minute or the present hour are fallacious expressions. Therefore no one ever is passing along a path. Again you cannot logically say that the passer is passing, for the sentence is redundant: the verb adds nothing to the noun and vice versa: but on the other hand you clearly cannot 193 say that the non-passer is passing. Again if you say that the passer and the passing are identical, you overlook the distinction between the agent and the act and both become unreal. But you cannot maintain that the passer is different from the passing, for a passer as distinct from passing and passing as distinct from a passer have no meaning. "But how can two entities exist at all, if they exist neither as identical with one another nor as different from one another.?"

The above, though much abridged, gives an idea of the logic of these sutras. They proceed to show that all manner of things, such as the five skandhas, the elements, contact, attachment, fire and fuel, origination, continuation and extinction have no real existence. Similar reasoning is then applied to religious topics: the world of

192 185

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

193 186

transmigration as well as bondage and liberation are declared non-existent. In reality no soul is in bondage and none is released. Similarly Karma, the Buddha himself, the four truths, Nirvana and the twelve links in the chain of causation are unreal. This is not a declaration of scepticism. It means that the Buddha as a human or celestial being and Nirvana as a state attainable in this world are conceivable only in connection with this world and therefore, like the world, unreal. No religious idea can enter into the unreal (that is the practical) life of the world unless it is itself unreal. This sounds a topsy-turvey argument but it is really the same as the Advaita doctrine. The Vedanta is on the one hand a scheme of salvation for liberating souls which transmigrate unceasingly in a world ruled by a personal God. But when true knowledge is attained, the soul sees that it is identical with the Highest Brahman and that souls which are in bondage and 194 God who rules the world are illusions like the world itself. But the Advaita has at least a verbal superiority over the Madhyamika philosophy, for in its terminology Brahman is the real and the existent contrasted with the world of illusion. The result of giving to what the Advaita calls the real and existent the name of Sunyata or void is disconcerting. To say that everything without distinction is non-existent is much the same as saying that everything is existent. It only means that a wrong sense is habitually given to the word exist, as if it meant to be self-contained and without relation to other objects. Unless we can make a verbal contrast and assert that there is something which does exist, it seems futile to insist on the unreality of the world. Yet this mode of thought is not confined to text-books on logic. It invades the scriptures, and appears (for instance) in the Diamond Cutter which is still one of the most venerated books of devotion in China and Japan. In this work the Buddha explains that a Bodhisattva must resolve to deliver all living beings and yet must understand that after he has thus delivered innumerable beings, no one has been delivered. And why? Because no one is to be called a Bodhisattva for whom there exists the idea of a being, or person. Similarly a saint does not think that he is a saint, for if he did so think, he would believe in a self, and a person. There occur continually in this work phrases cast in the following form: "What was preached as a store of merit, that was preached as no store of merit by the Tathagata and therefore it is called a store of merit. If there existed a store of merit, the Tathagata would not have preached a store of merit." That is to say, if I understand this dark language rightly, accumulated merit is part of the world of illusion which we live in and by speaking of it as he did the Buddha implied that it, like everything else¹⁹⁵ in the world, is really non-existent. Did it belong to the sphere of absolute truth, he would not have spoken of it as if it were one of the things commonly but erroneously supposed to exist. Finally we are told of the highest knowledge "Even the smallest thing is not known or perceived there; therefore it is called the highest perfect knowledge." That is to say perfect knowledge transcends all distinctions; it

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SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

195 188

^{194 187}

recognises the illusory nature of all individuality and the truth of saneness, the neverchanging one behind the ever-changing many. In this sense it is said to perceive nothing and know nothing.

22. The work called "Awakening of Faith" and ascribed to Asvaghosha is not extant in Sanskrit but was translated into Chinese in 533 A.D. Its doctrine is practically that of the Yogacara school and this makes the ascription doubtful, but it is a most important treatise. It is regarded as authoritative in China and Japan at the present day and it illustrates the triple tendency of the Mahayana towards metaphysics, mythology, and devotional piety.

The exposition is tinged with fine unselfish emotion and tells the believer that though he should strive not for his own emancipation but for the salvation of others yet he himself receives unselfish and supernatural assistance. He is remembered and guarded by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in all quarters of the Universe who are eternally trying to liberate mankind by various expedients (upaya). By expedient is meant a modified presentment of the truth which is easier of comprehension and, if not the goal, at least on the road to it, such as the Paradise of Amitabha.

But the remaining aspect of faith, which is the one that the author puts first in his enumeration, and treats at great length, is "to believe in the fundamental truth, that is to¹⁹⁶ think joyfully of suchness." By suchness (in Sanskrit bhuta-tathata, in Chinese Chen ju) is meant absolute truth as contrasted with the relative truth of ordinary experience. The word is not illuminating nor likely to excite religious emotion and the most that can be said for it is that it is less dreary than the void of Nagarjuna. Another and more positive synonym is dharma-dhatu, the all-embracing totality of things. It is only through our ignorance and subjectivity that things appear distinct and individuate. Could we transcend this subjectivity, isolated objects would cease to exist. Things in their fundamental nature cannot be named or explained: they are beyond the range of language and perception: they have no signs of distinction but possess absolute sameness (samata). From this totality of things nothing can be excluded and to it nothing can be added. Yet it is also sunyata, negation or the void, because it cannot be said to possess any of the attributes of the world we live in: neither existence nor nonexistence, nor unity nor plurality can be predicted of it. According to the celebrated formula of Nagarjuna known as the eight Nos there is in it "neither production (utpada) nor destruction (uccheda) nor annihilation (nirodha) nor persistence (sasvata) nor unity (ekartha) nor plurality (nanartha) nor coming in (agamana) nor going out (nirgama)." But when we perceive that both subject and object are unreal we also see that suchness is the one reality and from that point of view it may be regarded as the Dharma-kaya of all Buddhas. It is also called Tathagata-garbha, the womb or store-house of the Buddha, from which all individual existences are evolved under the law of causation, but this aspect of it is already affected by ignorance, for in Bhuta-tathata as known in the light of

¹⁹⁶ 189

the highest truth there is neither causation nor production. The Yogacara employs the word sunyata (void), ¹⁹⁷though not so much as its sister school, but it makes special use of the term alaya-vijnana, the receptacle or store of consciousness. This in so far as it is super individual is an aspect of suchness, but when it affirms and particularises itself it becomes citta, that is the human mind, or to be more accurate the substratum of the human mind from which is developed manas, or the principle of will, selfconsciousness and self-affirmation. Similarly the Vedanta philosophy, though it has no term corresponding to alaya-vijnana, is familiar with the idea that Brahman is in one aspect immeasurable and all-embracing but in another is infinitesimal and dwells in the human heart: or that Brahman after creating the world entered into it. Again another aspect of suchness is enlightenment (bodhi), that is absolute knowledge free from the limitations of subject and object. This "is the universal Dharma-kaya of the Tathagatas" and on account of this all Tathagatas are spoken of as abiding in enlightenment a priori. This enlightenment may be negative (as sunyata) in the sense that it transcends all relations but it may also be affirmative and then "it transforms and unfolds itself, whenever conditions are favourable, in the form of a Tathagata or some other form in order that all beings may be induced to bring their store of merit to maturity."

It will be seen from the above that the absolute truth of the Mahayanists varies from a severely metaphysical conception, the indescribable thing in itself, to something very like an all-pervading benevolent essence which from time to time takes shape in a Buddha. And here we see how easy is the transition from the old Buddhism to a form of pantheism. For if we admit that the Buddha is a superhuman intelligence appearing from time to time according to a certain 198 law, we add little to this statement by saying that the essence or spirit of the cosmos manifests itself from time to time as a Buddha. Only, such words as essence or spirit are not really correct. The world of individuals is the same as the highest truth, the same as the Dharma-kaya, the same as Nirvana. It is only through ignorance, that it appears to be different and particularised. Ignorance, the essence of which consists in believing in the distinction between subject and object, is also called defilement and the highest truth passes through various stages of defilement ending with that where under the influence of egoism and passion the external world of particulars is believed to be everything. But the various stages may influence one another so that under a higher influence the mind which is involved in subjectivity begins to long for Nirvana. Yet Nirvana is not something different from or beyond the world of experience; it does not really involve annihilation of the skandhas. Just as in the Advaita he who has the true knowledge sees that he himself and everything else is Brahman, so for the Mahayanist all things are seen to be Nirvana, to be the Dharma-kaya. It is sometimes said that there are four kinds of Nirvana (a) absolute Nirvana, which is a synonym of the Dharma-kaya and in that sense universally

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197 190

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM

198 191

present in all beings, (b) upadhisesha-nirvana, the state of enlightenment which can be attained during life, while the body with its limitations still remains (c) anupadhiseshanirvana, a higher degree of the same state attained after death when the hindreances of the body are removed, (d) Nirvana without abode or apratishthita-nirvana. Those who attain to this understand that there is no real antithesis between Samsara and Nirvana: they do not seek for rest or emancipation but devote themselves to beneficent activity and to leading their fellows to salvation.¹⁹⁹ Although these statements that Nirvana and Samsara are the same are not at all in the manner of the older Buddhism, yet this ideal of disinterested activity combined with Nirvana is not inconsistent with the portrait of Gotama preserved in the Pali Canon.

23. The Tien-tai sect has for its scriptures the Lotus, the Nirvana-sutra and the Prajna-paramita, while the Shin-shu sect admits only the three Amidist sutras. The following are the names of some of the principal Mahayanist scriptures: (1)200 Prajnaparamita or transcendental knowledge is a generic name given to a whole literature consisting of treatises on the doctrine of sunyata, which vary greatly in length. They are classed as sutras, being described as discourses delivered by the Buddha on the Vulture peak. At least ten are known, besides excerpts which are sometimes described as The earliest translation of one of these treatises into Chinese substantive works. (Nanjio, 5) was made about 170 A.D. and everything indicates that portions of the Prajna-paramita are among the earliest Mahayanist works and date from about the first century of our era. Prajna not only means knowledge of the absolute truth, that is to say of sunvata or the void, but is regarded as an ontological principle synonymous with Bodhi and Dharma-kaya. Thus Buddhas not only possess this knowledge in the ordinary sense but they are the knowledge manifest in human form, and prajna is often personified as a goddess. All these works lay great stress on the doctrine of sunyata, and the non-existence of the world of experience. The longest recension is said to contain a polemic against the Hinayana.

The Diamond Cutter is one of the best known of these transcendental treatises and the two short works called Heart of the Prajnaparamita, which are widely read in Japan, appear to be brief²⁰¹ abstracts of the essence of this teaching. (2) The Saddharmapundarika, or Lotus of the Good Law, is one of the best known Mahayanist sutras and is highly esteemed in China and Japan. It purports to be discourse delivered by Sakyamuni on the Vulture Peak to an assemblage of Bodhisattvas. The Lotus clearly affirms the multiplicity of vehicles, or various ways of teaching the law, and also the eternity of the Buddha, but it does not emphasize, although it mentions, the doctrine of sunvata. The work consists of two parts of which the second (ch. XXI-XXVI) is a later

^{199 192}

²⁰⁰ The original editor inserted open-close brackets by hand

^{201 193}

addition. This second part contains spells and many mythological narratives including one of an ancient Bodhisattva who burnt himself alive in honour of a former Buddha. (3) The Lalita-Vistara is a like of Sakyamuni up to the commencement of his mission. (4) The Lankavatara gives an account of the revelation of the good Law by Sakyamuni when visiting Lanka. The Bodhisattva Mahamati (apparently Manjusri) proceeded to propound a series of more abstruse questions which are answered at considerable The Lankavatara represents a mature phase of speculation and not only criticizes the Sakhya, Pasupata and other Hindu schools, but is conscious of the growing resemblance of Mahayanism to Brahmanic philosophy and tries to explain it. A translation into Chinese which is said to correspond with the Sanskrit text was made in 513. If so the barbarians referred to cannot be the Huns. An earlier translation made in 443 does not agree with our Sanskrit text and perhaps the work existed in several recensions.

- 24 One of the sutras most read in China and admired because its style has a literary quality unusual in Buddhist works is commonly known as the Leng-yen-ching. The full title is Shou-leng-yen-san-mei-ching which is the Chinese transliteration²⁰² of Surangama Samadhi. (Translated in part by Beal, Catena of Buddhist Scriptures, pp. 286-369. See also Teitaro Suzuki, "Outlines of Mahayana, p.157).
- The Suvarna-prabhasa or Glitter of Gold is a Vaipulya sutra in many ways 25. resembling the Lotus. It insists on the supernatural character of the Buddha. He was never really born nor entered into Nirvana but is the Dharma-kaya. The scene is laid at Rajagriha and many Brahmanic deities are among the interlocutors. It was translated into Chinese about 420 A.D. and fragments of a translation into Uigur have been discovered in Turkestan. The contents comprise philosophy, legends and spells. The Suvarnaprabhasa is said to be specially popular among the Mongols.
- 26. The Lankavatara Sutra which was translated into Chinese in 513 and therefore can hardly have been composed later than 450, is conscious that its doctrines resemble Brahminic philosophy, for an interlocutor objects that the language used in it by the Buddha about the Tathagatha-garbha is very like the Brahminic doctrine of the Atman. To which the Buddha replies that his language is a concession to those who cannot stomach the doctrine of the negation of reality in all its austerity. Some of the best known verses of Gaudapada compare the world of appearance to the apparent circle of fire produced by whirling a lighted torch. This striking image occurs first in the Maitrayana Upanishad (VI.24), which shows other indications of an acquaintance with Buddhism, and also in the Lankavatara Sutra.

^{202 194}

- A real affinity unites the doctrine of Sankara to the teaching of Gotama himself. 27. That teaching as presented in the Pali Pitakas is marked by its negative and deliberately circumscribed²⁰³ character. Its rule is silence when strict accuracy of expression is impossible, whereas later philosophy does not shrink from phrases which are suggestive, if not exact. Gotama refuses to admit that the human soul is a fixed entity or Atman, but he does not condemn (though he also does not discuss) the idea that the whole world of change and becoming, including human souls, is the expression or disguise of some one ineffable principle. He teaches too that the human mind can grow until it develops new faculties and powers and becomes the Buddha mind, which sees the whole chain of births, the order of the world, and the reality of emancipation. As the object of the whole system is practical, Nirvana is always regarded as a terminus ad quem or an escape (nissaranam) from this transitory world, and this view is more accurate as well as more edifying than the view which treats Brahman or Sunyata as the origin of the universe. When the Vedanta teaches that this changing troubled world is merely the disguise of that unchanging and untroubled state into which saints can pass, it is, I believe, following Gotama's thought, but giving it an expression which he would have considered imperfect.
- 28. Asanga founded the school known as Yogacara and many authorities ascribe to him the introduction of magical practices and Tantrism. But though he is a considerable figure in the history of Buddhism, I doubt if his importance or culpability is so great as this. For if tradition can be trusted, earlier teachers especially Nagarjuna dealt in spells and invocations and the works of Asanga known to us are characterized by a somewhat scholastic piety and are chiefly occupied in defining and describing the various stages in the spiritual development of a Bodhisattva.
- 29. I-Ching, who ends his work by asserting that²⁰⁴ all his statements are according to the Arya-mula-sarvastivada-nikaya and no other, gives an interesting summary of doctrine.

"Again I say: the most important are only one or two out of 80,000 doctrines of the Buddha: one should conform to the worldly path but inwardly strive to secure true wisdom. Now what is the worldly path? It is obeying prohibitive laws and avoiding any crime. What is the true wisdom? It is to obliterate the distinction between subject and object, to follow the excellent truth and to free oneself from worldly attachments: to do away with the trammels of the chain of causality: further to obtain merit by accumulating good works and finally to realize the excellent meaning of perfect reality."

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

204 196

^{203 195}

- 30. The worship of Adi-Buddha, or an original divine Buddha practically equivalent to God, has been often described as characteristic of Nepalese religion and such a worship undoubtedly exists. But recent accounts indicate that it is not prominent and also that it can hardly be considered a distinct type of monotheistic Buddhism. The idea that the five Dhyani-Buddhas are emanations are manifestations of a single primordial Buddha-spirit is a natural development of Mahayanist ideas, but no definite statement of it earlier than the Kalacakra literature is forthcoming, though many earlier works point towards it. In modern Nepal the chief temple of the Adi-Buddha is on the hill of Svayambhu (the self-existent) near Katmandu.
- 31. The Kashmir school is one and that there is no real opposition between the Spanda and Pratyabhijna sections. The word Spanda, equivalent to the godhead and ultimate reality, is interesting for it means vibration accompanied by consciousness or, so to speak, self-conscious ether. The term Pratyabhijna or recognition is²⁰⁵ more frequent in the later writings. Its meaning is as follows. Siva is the only reality and the soul is Siva, but Maya forces on the soul a continuous stream of sensations. By the practice of meditation it is possible to interrupt the stream and in those moments light illuminates the darkness of the soul and it recognizes that it is Siva, which it had forgotten. Also the world is wholly unreal apart from Siva. It exists by his will and in his mind. What seems to the soul to be cognition is really recognition, for the soul (which is identical with the divine mind but blinded and obstructed) recognizes that which exists only in the divine mind.
- 32. The task of the soul is to free itself from illusion, and thus from bondage. For strictly speaking the bondage does not exist: it is caused by want of discrimination. Like the Vedanta, the Sankhya regards all this troubled life as being, so far as the soul is concerned, mere illusion. But while the Vedanta bids the soul know its identity with Brahman, the Sankhya bids it isolate itself and know that the acts and feelings which seem to be its own have really nothing to do with it. They are for the soul nothing but a spectacle or play.
- 33. The Sankhya manuals do not dwell further on the character of this liberation: we only know that the eternal soul is then completely isolated and aloof from all suffering and material things. Liberation is compared to profound sleep, the difference being that in dreamless sleep there is a see, that is, the possibility of return to ordinary life, whereas when liberation is once attained there is no such return.
- 34. We must distinguish between the knowledge of the lower Brahman or personal Deity (Isvara) and of the higher indescribable Brahman. The same distinction occurs in

^{205 197}

the works of Meister Eckhart²⁰⁶ (1327 A.D.) who in many ways approximates to Indian thought, both Buddhist and Vedantist. He makes a distinction between the Godhead and God. The Godhead is the revealer but unrevealed: it is described as "wordless" (Yajnavalkya's neti, neti), "the nameless nothing," "the immoveable rest." But God is the manifestation of the Godhead, the uttered word. "All that is in the Godhead is one. Therefore we can say nothing. "He is above all names, above all nature. God works, so doeth not the Godhead. Therein are they distinguished, in working and in not working. The end of all things is the hidden darkness of the eternal Godhead, unknown and never to be known."

35. Sankara and the Brahma-sutras will not tolerate such doubts. According to them, Brahman in making the world is not actuated by a motive in the ordinary sense, for that would imply human action and passion, but by a sportive impulse: "We see in every-day life," says Sankara, "that certain doings of princes, who have no desires left unfulfilled, have no reference to any extraneous purpose but proceed from mere sportfulness. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose. But it is not really an explanation. It means that the Advaita is so engrossed in ecstatic contemplation of the omnipresent Brahman that it pays no attention to a mere by-product like the physical universe. How or why that universe with all its imperfections comes to exist, it does not explain. European thought attains to these altitudes but cannot live in them for long: it demands and fancies for itself just what Sankara will not grant, the motive of Brahman,²⁰⁷ the idea that he is working for some consummation, not that he was, is and will be eternally complete, unaffected by the drama of the universe and yet identical with souls that know him.

36. Ramanuja admits no distinction between Brahman and Isvara, but the distinction is abolished at the expense of abolishing the idea of the Higher Brahman, for his Brahman is practically the Isvara of Sankara. Brahman is not without attributes but possessed of all imaginable good attributes, and though nothing exists apart from him, like the antithesis of purusha and prakriti in the Sankhya, yet the world is not as in Sankara's system merely Maya. Matter and souls (cit and acit) form the body of Brahman who both comprises and pervades all things, which are merely modes of his existence. He is the inner ruler (antaryamin) who is in all elements and all human souls. This tenet is justified by Brihad Aran. Up. III, 3 which is a great text for Ramanuja's school. "He who dwells in the earth (water, etc) and within the earth (or, is different

206 198

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

207 199

from the earth) whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thyself, the ruler within, the immortal."

- 37. Tibetan Buddhism is a form of late Indian Mahayanism with a considerable admixture of Hinduism, exported from Bengal to Tibet and there modified not so much in doctrine as by the creation of a powerful hierarchy, curiously analogous to the Roman Church. It is unknown in southern China and not much favoured by the educated classes in the north, but the Lamaist priesthood enjoys great authority in Tibet and Mongolia, and both the Ming and Ching dynasties did their best to conciliate it for political reasons. Lamaism has borrowed little from China and must be regarded as an invasion into northern Asia and even Europe of late Indian religion and²⁰⁸ art, somewhat modified by the strong idiosyncrasy of the Tibetan people.
- 38. There are settlements of Kalmuks near Astrakhan who have Lama temples and maintain a connection with Tibet.
- 39. Mahayanist Buddhism existed in Camboja during the whole of the period covered by the inscriptions, but it remained in such close alliance with Brahmanism that it is hard to say whether it should be regarded as a separate religion. The idea that the two systems were incompatible obviously never occurred to the writers of the inscriptions and Buddhism was not regarded as more distinct from Sivaism and Vishnuism than these from one another.
- 40. There is a tradition that the east of Asia was evangelized by the disciples of Asanga or Vasubandhu.
- 41. The Kamahayanikan is a treatise or perhaps extracts from treatises) on Mahayanism as understood in Java and presumably on the normal form of Mahayanism. Its object is to teach a neophyte, who has to receive initiation, how to become a Buddha. In the second part the pupil is addressed as Jinaputra, that is son of the Buddha or one of the household of faith. He is to be moderate but not ascetic in food and clothing: he is not to cleave to the Puranas and Tantras but to practise the Paramitas. These are defined first as six and then four others are added. Under Prajnaparamita is given a somewhat obscure account of the doctrine of Sunyata. Then follows the exposition of Paramaguhya (the highest secret) and Mahaguhya (the great secret). The latter is defined as being Yoga, the bhavanas, the four noble truths and the ten paramitas. The former explains the embodiment of Bhatara Visesha, that is to say the way in which Buddhas, gods and the world of Phenomena are evolved from a

^{208 200}

primordial principle called²⁰⁹ Advaya and apparently equivalent to the Nepalese Adibuddha.

- 42. He quotes with approval the saying "you are I: I am you" and affirms the identity of Buddhism and Sivaism. "Well, my son" is the conclusion, "These are all one: we are Siva, we are Buddha."
- 43. Mahayanist Buddhism in Camboja and at a later period in Java itself was inextricably combined with Hinduism, Buddha being either directly identified with Siva or regarded as the primordial spirit from which Siva and all gods spring. The unity of the two religions is proclaimed: Buddha and Siva are one. I have already briefly analysed the Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan which seems to be the most authoritative exposition of this creed. The learned editor has collected many parallels from Tibetan and Nepalese works and similar parallels between Javanese and Tibetan iconography have been indicated. The explanation must be that the late forms of Buddhist art and doctrine which flourished in Magadha spread to Tibet and Nepal but were also introduced into Java. The Kamahayanikan appears to be a paraphrase of a Sanskrit original, perhaps distorted and mutilated. This original has not been identified with any work known to exist in India but might well be a Mahayanist catechism composed there about the 11th century. The terminology of the treatise is peculiar, particularly in calling the ultimate principle of Advaya and the more personal manifestation of it Divarupa. The former term may be paralleled in Memacandra and the Amarakosha, which give respectively as synonyms for Buddha, advaya (in whom is no duality) and advayavadin (who preaches no duality), but Divarupa has not been found in any other work. This use of advaya and advayavadin strengthens the suspicion that the origins of the Advaita philosophy are²¹⁰ to be sought in Buddhism. It is also remarkable that the Kamahayanikan does not teach the doctrine of the three bodies of Buddha. It clearly states that the Divarupa is identical with the highest being worshipped by various sects: with Paramasunya, Paramasiva, the Purusha of the followers of Kapila, the Nirguna of the Vishnuites, etc. Many names of sects and doctrines are mentioned which remain obscure, but the desire to represent them all as essentially identical is obvious. The Kamahayanikan recognizes the theoretical identity of the highest principles in Buddhism and Vishnuism.
- 44. This is the Tien-tai school which takes its name from a celebrated monastery in the province of Che-kiang. The founder of this establishment and of the sect was called Chih-Kai, or Chih-I and followed originally Bodhidharma's teaching, but ultimately rejected the view that contemplation is all-sufficient, while still claiming to derive his

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

210 202

^{209 201}

doctrine from Nagarjuna. He had a special veneration for the Lotus Sutra and paid attention to ceremonial. He held that although the Buddha-mind is present in all living beings, yet they do not of themselves come to the knowledge and use of it, so that instruction is necessary to remove error and establish true ideas. The phrase Chih-kuan is almost the motto of the school: it is a translation of the two words Samatha and Vipassana, taken to mean calm and insight.

The Tien-Tai is distinguished by its many-sided and almost encyclopaedic character. Chih-I did not like the exclusiveness of the Contemplative School. He approved impartially of ecstasy, literature, ceremonial and discipline: he wished to find a place for everything and a point of view from which every doctrine might be admitted to have some value. Thus he divided the teaching of the Buddha into five periods²¹¹, regarded as progressive, not contradictory.

- 45. Completeness or plenitude, is the doctrine of the Lotus which embraces all aspects of religion. In a similar spirit of synthesis and conciliation Chih-I uses Nagarjuna's view that truth is not of one kind. From the standpoint of absolute truth all phenomena are void or unreal; on the other hand they are indubitably real for practical purposes. More just is the middle view which builds up the religious character. It sees that all phenomena both exist and do not exist and that thought cannot content itself with the hypothesis either of their real existence or of the void.
- 46. The school called Chen-yen (in Japanese Shin-gon), true word, or Mi-chiao, secret teaching, equivalent to the Sanskrit Mantrayana or Tantrayana is akin to the Buddhism of Tibet and may be described in its higher aspects as an elaborate and symbolic pantheism, which represents the one spirit manifesting himself in a series of emanations In its popular and unfortunately commoner aspect it is simply and reflexes. polytheism, fetichism and magic. The principal scripture of this sect is the Ta-jih-ching or sutra of the Sun-Buddha. What appealed only too powerfully to Chinese superstition was the use of spells, charms and magical formulae and the doctrine that since the universe is merely idea, thoughts and facts are equipollent. This doctrine (which need not be the outcome of metaphysics, but underlies the magical practices of many savage tribes) produced surprising results when applied to funeral ceremonies, which in China have always formed the major part of religion, for it was held that ceremonial can represent and control the fortunes of the soul, that is to say that if a ceremony represents figuratively the rescue of a soul from a pool of blood, then the soul which is undergoing that punishment will be delivered.
- 47. Tantric²¹² schools seem not to be regarded with favour. They are probably mistrusted as leading to negligence and superstition.

^{211 203}

- 48. There were numerous Buddhist schools in Bengal, Kashmir and Nepal and numerous learned monks ready to take their residence in Tibet. This readiness has been explained as due to fear of the rising tide of Islam, but more probably the result of the revival of Buddhism in Bengal during the 11th century. The most illustrious of these pandits was Atisa, (980-1053), a native of Bengal, who was ordained at Odontapuri and studied in Burma. Subsequently he was appointed head of the monastery of Vikramasila and was induced to visit Tibet in 1038. He remained there until his death 15 years later; introduced a new calendar and inaugurated the second period of Tibetan Buddhism which is marked by the rise of successive sects described as reforms. It may seem a jest to call the teaching of Atisa a reform, for he professed the Kalacakra, the latest and most corrupt form of Indian Buddhism, but it was doubtless superior in discipline and coherency to the native superstitions mixed with debased Tantrism, which is replaced.
- 48. At a critical period in the history of eastern Asia and indeed of the world, namely, the conquests of Chinggiz (or Jenghiz Khan) and the rise of the Mongol Empire. There is no evidence that Chinggiz was specially favourable to Buddhism. His principle was one King and one God and like other princes of his race he thought of religions not as in compatible systems but as different methods of worship of no more importance than the different languages used in prayer. The destruction wrought by the Mongol conquerors has often been noticed, but they had also an ample, unifying temper which deserves recognition. China, Russia and Persia all achieved²¹³ a unity after the Mongol conquest which they did not possess before, and though this unification may be described as a protest and reaction, yet but for the Mongols and their treatment of large areas as units it would not have been possible. The Mings could not have united China before the Yuan dynasty as they did after it.
- 49. The Mongol Court had already been favourably impressed by Tibetan Lamas and the Emperor probably had a just feeling that the intellectual calibre of the Mongols and Tibetans was similar and also that it was politic to conciliate the uncanny spiritual potentates who ruled in a land which it was difficult to invade. At any rate he summoned the abbot of Sakya to China in 1261 and was initiated by him into the mysteries of Lamaism. The Mongol historian Sanang Setsen relates that Pagspa took a higher seat than the Emperor when instructing him and on other occasions sat on the same level.
- 50. The reigns of Grand Lamas in the 19th century have mostly been short. Two others were selected in 1858 and 1877 respectively. The latter who is the present

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

²¹³ 205

occupant of the post was the son of a Tibetan peasant: he was duly chosen by the oracle of the urn and invested by the Emperor. The British Government were anxious to negotiate with him about Sikhim and other matters, but finding it impossible to obtain answers to their communications sent an expedition to Lhasa in 1904. The Grand Lama then fled to Urga, in which region he remained until 1907. In the autumn of 1908 he was induced to visit Peking. On the birthday of the Empress he performed a service for her long life, at which Her Majesty was present. It was not wholly successful, for a week or two later he officiated at her funeral. At the end of 1908 he left for Lhassa.

51. When after a lengthy eclipse Buddhism was reinstated²¹⁴ in the 11th century under the auspices of Atisa and other foreign teachers we hear of something new, called the Kalachakra system also known as the Vajrayana. Pending the publication of the Kalachakra Tantra, it is not easy to make definite statements about this school which presumably marks the extreme point of development or degeneration in Buddhism, but a persistent tradition connects it with a country called Sambhala or Zhambhala, translated in Tibetan as bDe-hbyun or source of happiness. This country is seen only thro' a haze of myth: it may have been in India or it may have been somewhere in Central Asia, where Buddhism mingled with Turkish ideas. Its kings were called Kulika and the Tibetan calendar introduced by Atisa is said to have come from it. This fact and the meaning of the word Kalacakra (wheel of time) suggest that the system has some connection with the Turkish cycle of twelve animals used for expressing dates. A legend states that Sakyamuni promulgated the Kalacakra system in Orissa (Dhanyakataka) and that Sucandra, king of Sambhala, having miraculously received this teaching wrote the Kalacakra Tantra in a prophetic spirit, although it was not published until 965 A.D. This is really the approximate date of its compilation and I can only add the following disjointed data.

Tibetan authorities state that it was introduced into Nalanda by a Pandit called Tsilu to Chilu and accepted by Narotapa who was then head of the University. From Nalanda it spread to Tibet. Manjusrikirti, king of Sambhala, is said to have been an exponent of it and to have begun his reign 674 years after the death of the Buddha. But since he is also the second Incarnation of the Panchen Lama and since the fourth (Abhayakara) lived about 1075, he²¹⁵ may really have been a historical character in the latter part of the 10th century. Its promulgation is also ascribed to a personage called Siddha Pito. It must be late for it is said to mention Islam and Mohammed. It is perhaps connected with anti-mohammedan movements which looked to Kalki, the future incarnation of Vishnu, as their Messiah, for Hindu tradition says that Kalki will be born in Sambhalagrama. We hear also of a Siddha called Telopa or Tailopa, who was a vigorous opponent of Islam. The mythology of the school is Vishuite, not Sivaitic, and

214 206

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

215 207

it is noticeable that the Pancaratra system which had some connection with Kashmir lays stress on the wheel or discus (cakra or Sudarsana) of Vishnu which is said to be the support of the Universe and the manifestation of Creative will. The Kalacakra is mentioned as a special form of this cosmic wheel having six spokes.

The peculiar doctrine of the Buddhist Kalacakra is that there is an Adi-Buddha, or primordial Budda God, from whom all other Buddhas are derived. It is possible that it represents a last effort of Central Asian Buddhism to contend with Moslims, which instead of denying the bases of Mohammed's teaching tried to show that monotheism (like everything else) could be found in Buddhism—a method of argument frequent in India. The doctrine of the Adi-Buddha was not however new or really important. For the Indian mind it is implied in the dogma of the three bodies of Buddha, for the Sambhogakaya is practically an Indian Deva and the Dharmakaya is the pantheos or Brahma. Under the influence of the Kalacakra the Lamas did not become theists in the sense of worshipping one supreme God but they identified with the Adi-Buddha some particular deity, varying according to the sects. Thus Samantabhadra, who usually ranks as a Bodhisattva²¹⁶ – that is as inferior to a Buddha – was selected by some for the honour. The logic of this is hard to explain but it is clearly analogous to the procedure, common to the oldest and newest phases of Hindu religion, by which a special deity is declared to be not only all the other gods but also the universal spirit. It does not appear that the Kalacakra Tantra met with general acceptance. It is unknown in China and Japan and not well known in Nepal.

The Kalacakra adopted all the extravagances of the Tantras and provided the principal Buddhas and Bodhisattvas with spouses, even giving one to the Adi-Buddha himself. Extraordinary as this is from a Buddhist point of view, it is little more than the Hindu idea that the Supreme Being became male and female for the purpose of producing the universe. But the general effect of the system on monastic and religious life was bad. Celibacy was not observed; morals, discipline and doctrine alike deteriorated.

52. Of the sects originating in Atisa's reformation the principal was the Kadampa, but it has lost much of its importance because it was remodelled by Tsong-kha-pa and hence hardly exists to-day as an independent body. The Sakya sect is connected with the great monastery of the same name situated about 50 miles to the north of Mount Everest and founded in 1071 by Sakya, a royal prince. It acquired great political importance, for from 1270 to 1340 its abbots were the rulers of Tibet. The historian Taranatha belonged to one of its sub-sects, and about 1600 settled in Mongolia where he founded the monastery of Urga and established the line of reincarnate Lamas which still rules there. But shortly after his death this monastery was forcibly taken²¹⁷ over by

216 208

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

217 209

the Yellow Church and is still the centre of its influence in Mongolia. In theology the Sakya offers nothing specially distinctive but it mixes the Tantras of the old and new sects and according to Waddell is practically indistinguishable from the Nying-mapa.

- 53. There seems to be no difference between Tibetan and Mongolian Lamaism in deities, doctrines or observances. Mongolian Lamas imitate the usages of Tibet, study there when they can and recite their services in Tibetan, although they have translations of the scriptures in their own language. Well read priests in Peking have told me that it is better to study the canon in Tibetan than in Mongol, because complete copies in Mongol, if extant, are practically unobtainable.
- 54. Zen ecclesiastics managed politics like the French cardinals of the seventeenth century and profoundly influenced art and literature, since they produced a long line of painters and writers. But the most interesting feature in the history of this sect in Japan is that, though it preserves the teaching of Bodhidharma without much change, yet it underwent a curious social metamorphosis, for it became the chosen creed of the military class and contributed not a little to the Bushido or code of chivalry. It is strange that this mystical doctrine should have spread among warriors, but its insistence on simplicity of life, discipline of mind and body, and concentration of thought harmonized with their ideals
- 55. Looking westwards from India and considering what were the circumstances favouring the diffusion of Indian ideas, by water we know that at least after about 700 B.C. there was communication with the Persian Gulf, Arabia and probably the Red Sea. Semitic alphabets were²¹⁸ borrowed: in the Jatakas we hear of merchants going to Baveru or Babylon: Solomon's commercial ventures brought him Indian products. But the strongest testimony to the dissemination of religious ideas is found in Asoka's celebrated edict (probably 256 B.C.) in which he claims to have spread the Dhamma as far as the dominions of Antiochus "and beyond that Antiochus to where dwell the four kings named Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and Alexander." The kings mentioned are identified as the rulers of Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Gyrene and Epirus. Indian figures found at Memphis perhaps indicate the existence there of an Indian colony. Some fragments of the Kanarese language have been found on a papyrus, but it appears not to be earlier than the 2nd century A.D. In 21 A.D. Augustus while at Athens received an embassy from India which came via Antioch. We also hear of an Indian colony at Alexandria in the time of Trajan.
- 56. Gnosticism consisted in the combination of Christianity with the already mixed religion which prevailed in Alexandria, Antioch and other centres, and which was an uncertain and varying compound of Judaism, Hellenistic thought and the ideas of

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^{218 210}

oriental countries such as Egypt, Persia and Babylonia. Its fundamental idea, the knowledge of God or Gnosis, is clearly similar to the Jnanakanda of the Hindus, but the emphasis laid on dualism and redemption is not Indian and the resemblances suggest little more than that hints may have been taken and worked up independently. Thus the idea of the Demiurgus is related to the idea of Isvara in so far as both imply a distinction not generally recognized in Europe between the creator of the world and of the Highest Deity, but the Gnostic developments of the Demiurgus idea are independent.

- 57. Carpocrates and Basilides both taught at Alexandria²¹⁹ about 120-130 A.D.
- 58. Carpocrates is said to have claimed the power of coercing by magic the spirits who rule the world and to have taught metempsychosis in the form that the soul is imprisoned in the body again and again until it has performed all possible actions, good and evil. Therefore the only way to escape re-incarnation (which is the object of religion) and to rise to a superior sphere of peace is to perform as much action as possible, good and evil, for the distinction between the two depends on intention, not on the nature of deeds. It is only through faith and love that a man can obtain blessedness.
- 59. A more important sect of decidedly oriental affinities was Manichaeism, or rather it was a truly oriental religion which succeeded in penetrating to Europe and there took on considerably more Christianity than it has possessed in its original form. Mani himself (215-276) is said to have been a native of Ecbatana but visited Afghanistan, Bactria and India, and his followers carried his faith across Asia to China, while in the west it was the parent of inspiration of the Bogomils and Albigenses. The nature and sources of his creed have been the subject of considerable discussion but new light is now pouring in from the Manichaean manuscripts discovered in Central Asia, some of which have already been published. These show that about the 7th century and probably considerably earlier the Manichaeism of those regions had much in common with Buddhism. A Manichaean treatise discovered at Tun-huang has the form of a Buddhist Sutra: it speaks of Mani as the Tathagata, it mentions Buddhas of Transformation (Hua-fo) and the Bodhisattva, Ti-Tsang. Even more important is the confessional formula called Khuastuanift found in the same locality. It²²⁰ is clearly similar to the Patimokkha and besides using much Buddhist terminology it reckons killing or injuring animals as a serious sin. It was eclectic and held up an ascetic ideal of celibacy, poverty and fasting unknown to Persia and Babylon. To take life was counted a sin and the adepts formed an order apart who lived on the food given to them by the

SIR CHARLES ELIOT: HINDUISM & BUDDHISM

220 212

^{219 211}

- laity. Mani wrote a book called Shaburkan in which he said that God sent different messengers to mankind in different ages, Buddha to India, Zaradusht to Persia and Iesus to the west.
- Do the Neoplatonists, Neophthagoreans and other pagan philosophers of the 60. early centuries after Christ owe any debt to India? Many of them were consciously endeavouring to arrest the progress of Christianity by transforming philosophy into a non-Christian religion. They gladly welcomed every proof that the higher life was not to be found exclusively or most perfectly in Christianity. Hence bias, if not accurate knowledge, led them to respect all forms of eastern mysticism.
- 61. We may surmise that for Plotinus the Indian origin of an idea would have been a point in its favour, although his writings show no special hostility to Christianity. So far as I can judge, his system presents those features which might be expected to come from sympathy with the Indian temperament, aided perhaps not by reading but by conversation with thoughtful orientals at Alexandria and elsewhere. Plotinus seems to me nearer to India than were the Gnostics and Manichaeans, because his teaching is not dualistic to the same extent. He finds the world unsatisfying not because it is the creation of the Evil One, but because it is transitory, imperfect and unreal. His system has been called dynamic pantheism and this description applies also to much Indian theology which regards God in²²¹ himself as devoid of all qualities and yet the source of the forces which move the universe.
- 62. The ultimate Godhead is called En soph or the infinite and is declared to be unknowable, not to be described by positive epithets, and therefore in a sense nonexistent, since nothing which is predicated of existent things can be truly predicated of it.

- W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY." 1. For the Mahayanists of India we have the great representatives of the two principal Mahayana schools, the Madhyamika and the Yogacarin systems, including Nagarjuna, Arya Deva, and Candragomin for the former, and Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmapala, and Dharmakirtti for the latter.
- 2. Most of the philosophic texts of the Yogacarins have been lost, and what remain are like the Sutra Alamkara, devotional handbooks for the aspirant after Buddhahood, rather than text-books of metaphysics.

Fortunately a certain number of texts were translated into Tibetan, and as years go by, these will probably be revealed to us. But, alas, the Tibetan texts are by no means

^{221 213}

complete. The Tibetan people, prior to the introduction of Buddhism, were possessed of practically no culture of their own. They were ignorant even of the art of writing, so it is little wonder that when they adopted Buddhism there was a greater demand for Sutras, Avadanas, Jatakas, and Dharanis than for abstruse works dealing with the minutiae of ontology and phenomenology. Rather must we be thankful for what has been preserved.

On many points where the Sanskrit remnants are silent, however, and where even the Tibetan Canon can give no help, we find a full explanation in the Chinese translations of the Buddhist works, which are generally though somewhat incorrectly known²²² as the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka. Here are to be found all the important works of the Sarvastivadins, Madhyamikas, and Yogacarins, in addition to the original works of the philosophers of the T'ien T'ai and Hauyen schools, to whom reference has already been made.

- 3. According to some thinkers, this combination of the elements to form concrete phenomena might be due to chance, the spontaneous will of the elements themselves, fate or destiny, or the decree of God. To the Buddhists however, none of these explanations were acceptable, and they strove to show that the formation and dissolution of compounds was due to an endless cycle of fixed causes.
- 4. The Yogacarins were also frequently known as the Vidyamatrins, or Vijnanavadins. Its philosophical and other works were likewise composed in Sanskrit.
- 5. The Tibetan and Mongolian monks when not executing devil dances, or composing incantations and charms, study the philosophical systems of India, adding thereto very little of their own. Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, however, have developed schools of thought which are quite original and important.
- 6. Important difference between the Hinayanists the Madhyamikas and Yogacarins is that the first believed in the existence of the external world and its constituent parts, the dharmas; the second completely denied the existence of the world, and the dharmas; while the third believed that the world, though an eject of the mind, has yet a relative existence, and that, in fact, the dharma are but stages of the mind's unfolding.

There is some doubt as to the exact date of the foundation of the Yogacarin philosophy, but its first patriarchs, Asanga and Vasubandhu, cannot have lived before A.D. 359 nor after A.D. 450.

^{222 214}

- 7. Vasubandhu's²²³ cautious, sane, and philosophical mind probably prejudiced him against the existing forms of Mahayana, which were either wildly superstitious and exaggerated, or else concerned with points of more sophistic nihilism (Madhyamika).
- 8. Many names figure in the galaxy of thinkers produced by the Yogacarins, between the death of Vasubandhu and the downfall of Buddhism in India, but of these Dignaga, Dharmapala, and Dharmakirti are the most important. Dignaga revolutionized Buddhist logic, and in some ways may be said to be the real founder of Buddhist philosophy as opposed to Buddhist theology, since it was he who first laid down the principle that every doctrine must be proved either by sense-experience or reason without reference to tradition. Dharmapala carried on the work of Dignaga with more especial reference to metaphysics, and his commentary on Vasubandhu's Vidyamatra Siddhi became, for the Chinese at least, the standard manual of the Yogacarin sect. Dharmakirtti, slightly later, made many notable additions and modifications to the Yogacarin philosophy. Unfortunately, the period of his activity was too late for the Chinese to take much note of him, but the Tibetan Tanjur contains many of his works.
- 9. The Yogacarin school founded by Asanga was a new and in many ways original contribution to Buddhist thought. Consequently, it was in exact accord with none of the preceding sutras even of the Mahayana school. Nevertheless, it was found necessary to give the new school added prestige and authority by the citation of certain sutras which were already known and accepted. Consequently, recourse could only be had to those sutras which taught the doctrine of transcendental idealism, a doctrine which seems to have developed subsequent to Nagarjuna, and in contrast to the latter's absolute nihilism. As finally constituted²²⁴ the new Sutra canon consisted of Avatamsaka Sutra, of which we have two complete Chinese translations, in addition to renderings of separate parts.

Like all the other Sutras of the Yogacarin Canon, this cannot be earlier than Nagarjuna, but it must be one of the oldest of the six as the Tirthakas (heretics) and Hinayanists claim that it was compiled by Nagarjuna himself, and even the orthodox Mahayana tradition has it that he found this sutra in the dragon's cave. As a whole, however, it is probably later than Nagarjuna, as, in addition to the doctrine of Sunya or Nihilism, which we know was the special doctrine of Nagarjuna, it teaches in a rather vague way the doctrine that the universe is the product of the mind—a later development. Apart from Buddhological ideas, however, it is principally concerned with expounding the stages (52 in all) of a Bodhisattva on his path to perfection or

^{223 215}

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

^{224 216}

Buddhahood. This sutra is the basis of a special school of Chinese Buddhism. (The Huayen School).

Lankavatara Sutra: This is a highly important sutra from the philosophical standpoint, teaching in an almost systematic way a definitely idealistic system, differing, however, on various important points from the later orthodox Yogacarin system, chiefly because the sutra emphasizes the noumenal aspect of things with a tendency towards monism and transcendentalism, as opposed to the more pluralistic and phenomemalistic idealism of the doctrine of Asanga. Its doctrines are in general accord with the Mahayana Sraddhotpada of which we have an excellent English Translation by Suzuki. ("Awakening of Faith in Mahayana Buddhism.")

10. The twelve Sastras are: "Yogacara-bhumi"—This is the gigantic work in 100 fasc., which²²⁵ is supposed to have been dictated by the Bodhisattva Maitreya, and transcribed by Asanga. Translated into Chinese by Husuan Tsang. The original lost.

"Sutra-alamkara"-This is a literary epitome of much of the practical side of the Yogacara-bhumi, i.e. the stages on the path of the aspirant, and the actions, thoughts, and studies which should accompany each stage, together with the different resultant meritorious qualities associated with the various degress of sanctity. It has no connexion with the book of the same title by Asvaghosa. We are fortunate in possessing French translations of both Asanga's and Asvaghosa's Sutra Alamkaras, the former by the veteran scholar, Sylvain Levi, and the letter by E. Huber, whose death was a great loss to Buddhist scholarship.

"Alambana Pratyaya Sastra" — This is a work dealing with the process and cause of sense impressions. For the meaning of the word Alambana Pratyaya (which may be roughly rendered Occasional Cause in the Cartesian sense), see the discussion in that part of the present work termed Cosmic Dynamics. The original work is ascribed to Dignaga, the great Yogacarin Logician. Of this there are two Chinese translations. There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary by Dharmapala which is even more famous than the original work itself.

11. Last and most important is the 'Vidyamatra Siddhi' in 30 verses, also by Vasubandhu. This is a more systematic exposition of the whole Yogacarin philosophy in 30 mnemonic verses. Its vast influence in the Buddhist world is due to the fact that it was more the text for numerous commentaries composed by that galaxy of intellects that followed Vasubandhu. Perhaps the most notable commentary was that written by Dharmapala.

The importance of this compendium was early recognised,²²⁶ and it became the standard manual for all students of the Yogacarin system. It is still, moreover,

^{225 217}

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

²²⁶ 218

considered necessary for the priests of all other schools to have read through it. However one may disagree with its doctrines, it is difficult to over praise its clear, concise, and logical form of exposition, differing so much from the slovenliness characteristic of a great deal of Buddhist thought.

- 12. When only four Dhyanas are spoken of, they are as follows: (1) supernatural ecstasy associated with vicara and vitarka; (2) ecstatic contemplation no longer associated with either vicara or vitarka, or, in other words, where reasoning gives way to intuition; (3) contemplation where ecstasy gives way to serenity; (4) deep meditation where the mind becomes indifferent to pleasure and pain.
- 13. Unfortunately, for us the names of the five skandhas are not so illuminating as they seem to have been to the ancient Indians, and we find in the Occident a wide variety of terms used to translate them. The names and arrangement of the skandhas is almost invariably as follows: i. Rupa, literally form or shape (sometimes colour), corresponds roughly to our matter, and in the personality implies the physical body. The other definition, more in accord with our own ideas on the subject, is "that which resists" or "impenetrable."

The Yogacarins, being idealists, thought that all matter is but the creation of the mind. Nevertheless, from the relative point of view, they followed the Sarvastivadins very closely and accepted the four elements and the eleven derivatives (though the Yogacarin eleventh factor differs from that of the Sarvastivadin). The early Yogacarin philosophers, such as Asanga and Vasubandhu, likewise accepted the atomic theory, but this was denied by later thinkers²²⁷ such as Dignaga and Dharmapala as being inconsistent with idealism.

- ii. 'Vedana,' the first of the four immaterial skandhas, is sometimes translated sensation, but careful study of the texts shows that it corresponds more closely to our own term feeling, for, in the first place, sensation in the sense of awareness is not Vedana but Vijnana, and, secondly, the fundamental division of Vedanta into pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral, or sometimes into pleasant, unpleasant, joyful, sorrowful and neutral (the first two physical, the next two mental, the last both), shows that the hedonistic side of Vedanta is emphasized.
- iii. Samjna is sometimes rendered "perception" and sometimes "conception." Vasubandhu (A.K. I-IIb) defines it as "the grasping of the differences of characteristics," and, again, "Samjna skandha has for its essence the grasping of images, i.e. it seizes hold of the attributes, blue or yellow, long or short, male or female, pleasant or unpleasant, antipathetic and sympathetic, etc." Personally, I favour the term "ideation" as a translation of Samjna, and Mrs Rhys Davids tells me that this will also cover the Pali use of the term.

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²²⁷ 219

iv. 'Samskara.—Unquestionably, the most difficult term to explain is Samskara. Samskara early became associated with Karma, or action, as may be seen by its position in the Pratitya Samutpada. It has thus been rendered into Chinese, to do, to perform.

The definition of Samskara as volition would have rounded off the Buddhist list of the five skandhas very well, but as psychological analysis continued, and further factors in the mental process were formulated, a place had to be made for them in the classification of the factors of the personality. Here there was a difficulty. The later Buddhists dared not add to the five-fold classification²²⁸ which they believed to have been laid down by the founder, so that the newly postulated factors had to be arranged somewhere inside the five already existing skandhas. The most convenient dumping ground was found to be Samskara, which thus became a weird medley of otherwise unclassified mental factors.

- 14. Samskara thus came to be used as a term denoting all the mental concomitants which are at any time associated with the arising of Vijnana or consciousness. Consequently, since Vedana and Samjna come under this category, they also were enumerated a part of Samskara, so that from the absolute point of view the five categories were reduced to three viz. i. The body, ii. Mental properties or concomitants of consciousness., iii. Consciousness.
- 15. Vijnana, the last of the skandhas, is usually translated 'consciousness' or 'cognition'. This definition is quite in accord with all the commentaries, and many references to the term shows that it denoted for the Buddhists merely "awareness" in the broadest sense of the term. Hence it is associated with much which we should call sensation, save that it lacks the hedonistic element which is given to Vedana. Again, it is associated with the perceptual aspect of Samjna, save that it is ampler in its scope, implying not merely the "seeing" of a thing but the full awareness of it, or the absorption of the image into the conscious mind.

The distinction between Vijnana and Samskara, particularly in the later use of the latter term, is that Vijnana is "consciousness" or the "various aspects of consciousness", and Samskara is the contents or functional phases of consciousness. Thus the awareness of a visual object implies attention (manaskara), sensation or contact (sparsa), etc. And further, as Vedana and Samjna are considered as Samskaras, we find that even these are phases or functions of²²⁹ consciousness rather than independent realities.

16. Buddhist books are constantly repeating the Buddhist adage that there is not ego entity, no self-existing mentator, and that not only is the mentating personality evoked by a combination of causes and conditions, but also that mind ceases to exist when

^{228 220}

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

²²⁹ 221

sense object and sense organ cease to interact. Strangely enough, even the Yogacarins, who were idealists, refused to believe in a permanent individual mind-substance, but stated that though mind is the only ultimate reality, every individual mind is constantly changing and being remodelled under the influence of causal law.

17. We have seen the personality to be a constantly changing compound formed and fashioned under the influence of Karma. The question now arises, what is the exact way in which the personality is evolved and disintegrated? The Buddhist answer to this question is to be found in the Pratitya-samutpada or twelve-fold chain of causation. In all variations of Buddhism it is seldom that sermons lack mention of the timehonoured rune. In spite of its popularity, it seems difficult to ascribe to it logical exactitude, though the uses which have been made of it are innumerable. It is at one and the same time an abstract table of the sequence of cause and effect, and a list of the concrete stages in the supposed history of the origin, maintenance, disintegration, and persistence or transmigration of the individual ego, while in Mahayana it is used to explain the whole process of development of the objective world, including the factors of existence or dharmas from the universal essence of mind.

To enumerate them in their proper order, the twelve Nidanas are: -i. Ignorance, Avidya, ii. Action, Samskara or Karma, iii. Consciousness, Vijnana, iv. Name and Form of Mind and Body, Namarupa, v. The²³⁰ Six Sense Organs, Sadayatana. vi. Sensation, Sparsa. vii. Feeling, Fedana, viii. Desire, Trsna. ix. Attachment, Upadana x. Deedprocess or activity existence, Bhava. xi. Birth, Jati. xii. Old Age, Disease, and Death, Jara-marana.


Mahayana Interpretation:- The Yogacarin school introduced radical innovations. The most important points were as follows:

i. A two-fold instead of a three-fold relationship. In Hinayana the chain takes account of three lives, - past, present, and future. In Mahayana it shows the causal relationship of two lives only, the first ten belonging to one life, and the last two to the other life. It may be applied, however, either to the relationship between past and present, or between present and future. Thus, the present life may be considered as links xi and xii, results of i-x in the past life; or as links i-x, resulting in xi and xii in the future life. Thus, xi and xii cover the same time, place, person and stage as the whole of i to x, being merely two different ways of regarding the same group of dharmas, the one as cause, the other as effect. The Yogacarins assert that the causal aspect has received greater emphasis and subdivision that the resultant aspect merely in order that, by knowing the exact nature of the causal process, we may control the nature of our next re-birth, or, better still, so curb the causal factors that no further re-birth takes place.

ii. The four-fold classification of the nidanas. The Hinayana classification of the nidanas into (i) past cause, (ii) present effect (iii) present cause, (iv) future effect is, therefore completely superseded, and in its place we find an entirely different four-fold

^{230 222}

grouping of the twelve links, largely based on the idea that the phenomenal world around us is but the expression, manifestation, unfolding ('hsien hsing') of the seeds²³¹ (mental, of course) which are stored up in the alaya-vijnana. For the phenomenal world to come into being, then (substantive matter having been denied), it is necessary (i) that some causal force bring about the formation of the seeds of each dharma; (ii) but these seeds even after they have been created will remain quiescent in the Alaya-vijnana without manifesting the phenomenal universe unless some new force comes as a stimulus or a fertilizing force. Thus, for one plant to produce another plant it must produce seed, and this seed must be subject to the fertilizing influence of ground, rain, and sun. With this in our minds, we can now understand the four-fold category of the Yogacarins, which is:



Into these four groups the twelve nidanas are placed in the following way:-

- i. <u>Seed-producing Force</u>. This consists of ignorance and action. These are the ultimate causes of re-birth, since they alone are powerful enough to produce seeds.
- ii. <u>The seed:</u>- This consists of the links Consciousness, Name and Form, the Sense Organs, Sensation and Feeling.

Consciousness is the seed of the eighth vijnana, which serves as the basis of existence in the future life in any of the divisions of the three worlds. This is the most important of the resultant seeds, since the eighth or Alaya-vijnana is the substratum of all the other dharmas.

iii. <u>Seed-fertilizing Forces.</u>—The seeds for the next life having been produced, have an innate tendency to sprout or germinate (future corporeal existence). As yet, however, the force which they can exert is too weak to act. The next two²³² nidanas (Desire and Attachment), however, serve as a stimulant under whose influence the seeds awaken into full activity. Desire is more technically defined as the inferior, and Attachment as the superior klesas associated with the Manovijnana.

Bhava or Existence, the tenth nidana, is defined by the Yogacarin school as being the above-mentioned seeds of the future life in their germinated stage, or when the process of sprouting has begun as the result of the influence of the klesas.

iv. <u>Manifested Effect:</u> —Just as the seed from an old seed lives on after the parent plant has decayed, bringing forth a new plant, so does the germinated seed from an old personality, after the death of the latter, result in the manifestation of a new personality.

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

^{231 223}

^{232 224}

In this personality two stages are noticeable. The first is the waxing stage, from the movement the germinated seed enters the mother's womb to the time when, in the middle life, the period of growth in over. This is called Jati, birth, or the eleventh nidana. From the time when growth ceases and decay sets in until the end of the new life the personality is said to be dominated by Jara-marana, or old age, disease, and death.

- 18. The whole process of causality as applied to the personality, are summed up in the word Karma. We have the following sub-divisions:
- i. <u>Immediately effective Karma:</u> karma the fruit of which is to be experienced in this life. If its influence is counteracted, and it is unable to operate, it becomes non-effective. "A hunter shoots one arrow: if it misses the deer remains unaffected."
- ii. <u>Remotely effective Karma</u>, or karma the fruit of which is to be experienced in the next life. Here, also, if through other causes this cause is unable to operate at that period, it becomes non-effective, i.e. is not carried over to another existence.
- iii. <u>Indefinitely ²³³ effective Karma</u>, or karma which is to be experienced in some after life. The scope of this karma is not so limited, and is liable to become effective at any time unless, in the meantime, Nirvana be attained, whereupon of course, it, too, becomes non-effective.
- iv. <u>Non-effective Karma</u> (lit. karma which has been).—This comprises all forms of karma of the first two classes which were too weak to operate, or were counteracted by some more powerful karma.

<u>Counteractive Karma:</u> – This tends to render null and void the karma of the two preceding classes. It may thus counteract both good and bad karma.

19. <u>Weighty Karma.</u>—This is so called because karma of this nature operates all others. It may either be meritorious or demeritorious. In either case it may be productive, supportive, counteractive, or destructive. Demeritorious weighty karma precludes the operation of meritorious weighty karma till its results have been fully effected.

<u>Death-proximate Karma.</u> – This is the Karma which determines the nature of the next birth. Should there be any weighty karma, meritorious or demeritorious, this, of course, would apply here. In its absence, however, whatever karma presents itself at the moment of death takes precedence over all else.

<u>Habitual Karma</u>.—"This is the karma generated by constant repetition of thought, word, or act. It comes next in power to Death-proximate Karma, and, in fact, becomes Death-proximate Karma if it be forceful enough to overcome other karma."

<u>Cumulative Kama</u>. It comprises "all the accumulated karma, good, bad and indifferent of the ages. It is, in fact, the whole of each being's illimitable past—the 'chasing dogs' of Indefinitely effective karma." If no new karma be powerful enough to

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^{233 225}

act, then it is a karma of this class that will operate as Death-proximate karma. But cumulative karma is so great a store that there²³⁴ is absolutely no certainty (except to perfectly enlightened one) as to how it will act. It is compared to a fool's stone-throw. It may strike when least expected.

<u>"THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"</u> Translated into Chinese by Paramartha: Translated into English by Timothy Richard. (Published in Shanghai in 1918).

- 1. The great value of the book is also apparent when we remember that the Eastern world had been driven to general despair by the atheistic doctrines of primitive Buddhism, called the Hinayana School, and that it was by the doctrines of this book which gave rise to the Mahayana School of New Buddhism, that a gospel of great hope was preached to the greater part of the Eastern Asiatic continent. Its new doctrines were that of the One Soul immanent for good in all the universe, that of a Divine Helper of men, of individual immortality and growth in the likeness of God, of the importance of faith in God to produce good works and that of the willingness of the best spirits to make sacrifices to save others.
- 2. Suzuki's translation into English was published by the Open Court, Chicago. His translation bears the mark of one who has spent much study on the subject but he did not possess the knowledge of the true key to the fundamental and central idea of the whole book, namely,... He translates it by "Suchness," which obscures his whole translation; whereas I gave the literal translation True Model, meaning God, which I later found confirmed in an old standard Buddhist work called Wan Fa Kwei Sin Luh. In Suzuki's introduction he quotes a large number of different authorities about Ashvagosha. But as he approaches the subject from the non Christian point of view, the light which comes from²³⁵ a comparison between it and Christianity is denied him. He dwells more on his philosophical "suchness" or on his psychological theory of "triple personality" and only on one religious characteristic "faith," apparently unconscious of its incalculable importance as a religious eirenicon between the East and the West.
- 3. The old Buddhism believed in retirement from the evil world; the New believed in living in the world and in saving others as the highest virtue.

W.M. McGOVERN: "A MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY."

^{234 226}

^{235 227}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

- 4. Ashvagosha was founder of the New Buddhism, often called the Mahayana school, or the Northern Buddhism.
- 5. How to bring down high dogma to practical life for the permanent good of all classes remains still the great problem of life, philosophy, and religion.
- 6. It is a common error of translators to translate the same word always by the same word. As the same word in different connections often has different meanings and the translated word, however literal, does not always cover exactly the same amount of meaning as the original, I have endeavoured to give the true meaning of the original, although the English rendering may be by different words in different places. This is why I have rendered the term by True Form, True Model, True Reality, Archetype, and other terms, rather than by any unfamiliar term, as likely to give a more correct idea of the original to the beginner in the study of Buddhism.
- 7. We find that others dislike voluminous writings and prefer a terse style which embraces many principles and which they are able to understand.

Thus this book is written for the last class of men which desire to know the general principles of the great and profound Law of Ju Lai with its infinite applications.

Expositions²³⁶ of the Mahayana Faith are of three kinds. (a) Those about the 8. meaning, (b) About the correction of erroneous conceptions (c) about the different steps of progress.

As to the meaning of the One Soul there are two aspects: (i) One is the eternal transcendent Soul (ii) The other is the temporary immanent Soul.

Those two aspects embrace everything for they are really one.

i. The eternal state of the Soul:

The Soul or mind of the True Form is the great essence of the invisible and the visible worlds. As to the nature of this One soul it is the same in all forms. To think it is different in different forms is only a false notion of the world. Once we penetrate beyond forms it is discovered that all the different forms of the universe are not real differences of soul at all, but different manifestations of one real power, hence it has always been impossible to speak adequately, to name correctly or to think correctly of this One Soul, the real essence of things, which is unchangeable and indestructible. We therefore name it the TRUE ESSENCE OR THE TRUE LIKENESS OR THE TRUE FORM OR MODEL. But all nomenclature of these matters is imperfect and if one follows superficial thought, the true meaning cannot be found out. Even though we call it the True Model, it has no form. It is because language in its extremity fails us that we coin a

^{236 228}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

new term to avoid ordinary ideas. But the nature of the Archetype is a reality that cannot be destroyed, for all things are true though they cannot be truly pointed out to the senses, and all forms are really only different manifestations of the one True Model.

When we leave ordinary thought of these things we are entering into the gate of knowledge. Next when using words to discuss the True Model it may be spoken of in two ways, viz.²³⁷ first as the unreal as compared with ordinary realities, in order eventually to show its reality; secondly as the only real as compared with ordinary realities, because it has a nature of its own full of infinite possibilities. We mean that which has never been defiled, which is separate from all existing forms. We speak of the Real we have already explained that the True Form is apparently. Unreal but true; in other words that it is the true mind, eternal, and unchanged, full of purity, therefore we call the Real One. But it has no form. When the imperfect notions of things are given up, then alone can we verify this truth.

9. The Eternal Soul immanent in the temporary. The temporary arises from the forces of the Eternal Ju Lai. It is neither the same nor different but we call it the Natural. This natural state has two meanings, viz. that which embraces all things and that which produces all things: the first is called the Infinite enlightenment, the second the Finite enlightenment.

Infinite Enlightenment. By infinite enlightenment is meant that which has no false notions and is infinite like space, one which the True Form as in instinct and intuition. This is the natural state of the Incarnate True Model (Ju Lai) and is called the original state of enlightenment. This is to distinguish it from acquired enlightenment which cultivates that infinite enlightenment, for the two have the same thing in common though it is only in part. Where there is the original infinite enlightenment there exists finite enlightenment, there is more enlightenment to be acquired.

Again, when one attains to the original enlightenment it is called the perfect enlightenment. When one has not attained to the original enlightenment it is not perfect enlightenment.

For example, when an ordinary man discovers that ²³⁸ his former ideas were wrong and is able to prevent such ideas arising any more, such knowledge on his part though it might be called a kind of enlightenment is only finite.

Or when those learned in the wisdom of the two lower Schools (the Primary and Secondary, Hinayana and Madhyamika, or smaller and middle) or such Bodhisattva Saints as are beginners in the Mahayana school are enlightened so as to know that there

^{237 229}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

^{238 230}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

is in one sense a difference and in another no difference between these two classes of ideas, we call their knowledge partial enlightenment.

10. When the false notions began, these had no real beginning, yet in order to excape far from microscopic anxious thought of things, they are able to see the true nature of the One Mind. This state is the eternal one which we call the perfect enlightenment. Therefore the Sutra says that when one can apprehend that which is behind thought, one is on the way to Buddhist wisdom!

Again, as to the beginning of imperfect notions in the mind of men, these have no beginning. But when we speak of their beginning, we mean that they arise without thought, therefore are not called enlightened, as they have not exercised thought. As each thought has been transmitted without interruption from the beginning and men's minds have not been able to free themselves from this, the imperfect notions have been said to be without beginning and to be finite enlightenment. If we meet a man without these thoughts, we shall then know the different stages in the development of the mind, such as beginning, resting satisfied, considering ending because without thought he knows that there is really no difference in kind between the enlightened neophyte's enlightenment and the original enlightenment. For the four states are co-existent and not independent, but are originally all alike—different stages of one²³⁹ and the same enlightenment.

Next, original enlightenment in men appears according to the different degrees of confusion in two different states, but not separate from the original enlightenment. These different states are the state of pure wisdom and the state of unspeakable blessing where things are incomprehensible.

The state of pure wisdom is that which exists when under the transforming influence of the True Form till all departments of deliverance are completed, when one reaches the state where the temporary gives way to the eternal and is grafted on to the eternal Mind.

11. Just as the water in the ocean, on account of wind, forms itself into waves, wind and waves being inseparable, and yet motion is not an attribute of water, (for if the wind ceases the waves also cease) but the fluid nature of water remains indestructible; so the true nature of men is clear pure mind. Though on account of the rise of the wind of finite enlightenment the pure mind is moved, the pure mind and the finite knowledge in man's heart are unseen and inseparable but this mind's nature is not finite enlightenment. If the finite enlightenment ceases then the imperfect notions will cease, and the wise nature remains indestructible.

The state of unspeakable blessing is the practical, when it follows pure wisdom and is able to do all sorts of wonderful things, being called the state of infinite blessings,

^{239 231}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

unceasing and natural. In proportion to the natural goodness it abounds in all kinds of blessings according to the need of all.

Next consider the attributes of this Enlightenment. They are four great ones, infinite as space and clear as a mirror.

Infinite of the Eternal (Real Emptiness). It is very different from all thought and form. It cannot ²⁴⁰ be made apparent and enlightenment cannot reveal it to the unenlightened.

Infinite light of energy which influences things and which is called the unseen forces (not Real Emptiness). All appearances in the world are brought about by this. They are without appearing and disappearing, without loss or destruction, eternal in One Mind. All existence is but the true nature of this Mind. Moreover all kinds of defilement cannot defile this. Its nature of wisdom is unchanged, full of perfect energy, influencing all men.

Infinite light of the law of deliverance called the invariable law of Salvation (not unreal Law), which sets aside the hindrances of pessimism and the hindrances to ordinary wisdom and leads one out of the state where the mortal and the immortal are combined so as to get into the perfect free light of life.

The infinite light of practice, called deliverance according to the law shining on the minds of all living beings, leading them to practise goodness by methods suitable to their needs.

Finite Enlightenment or acquired knowledge. This is not like the knowledge of the Eternal that there is only one way: hence finite enlightenment shows itself in many forms of existence. These forms have no independent existence separated from the original enlightenment. Just as with a man who has lost his way, his losing of the way depends on his original knowledge of his course (for if he had no idea of the way at first, he could not be said to have lost it) so with men, it is because they have the idea of enlightenment that they know they are unenlightened. If they had no idea of enlightenment in the abstract they could not to be said to be altogether unenlightened.

12. Finite enlightenment may be viewed in 3 ways²⁴¹ always inseparable from it. (a) Sensation. When the unenlightened mind is excited we call it sensation. When there is enlightenment there is no excitement; if there is excitement there is pain, as effect follows cause. (b) Consciousness. This occurs when following any excitement one becomes conscious of something. Without sensation there is no consciousness. (c) Perception. This is formed when following consciousness the external becomes real. Without consciousness there are no perceptions of outside objects.

"THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

^{240 232}

^{241 233}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

13. Mental powers have five names. One is the faculty exercised when in the midst of ignorance finite consciousness begins. The second is the faculty used when the mind takes note of something. The third is the faculty used when all phenomena are put in the objective. Just as outward things are reflected in a mirror, so does this faculty reflect what the five senses show instantaneously at all times. The fourth is the faculty used when distinguishing between the pure and impure. The fifth is the faculty used when it reflects impressions from one object to the other incessantly. It retains the past infinite manifestations of one's own existence with all their good and evil; it ripens into the knowledge of the causes of present and future joy and sorrow which are the unfailing results of our deeds; it is able to call up the past, lay it instantly before our mind and to call up our finite knowledge of the future. Therefore the phenomena of the three worlds (of desire, of form and of no-form) are mind-made. Without mind then, there is practically no objective existence. Thus all existence arises from imperfect notions of our mind. All differences are differences of the mind. But the mind cannot see itself, for it has no form. We should know that all phenomena are created by the imperfect notions of the finite mind, therefore all existence is like a reflection²⁴² in a mirror, without substance, only a phantom of the mind. When the finite mind acts, then all kinds of things arise; when the finite mind ceases to act, then all kinds of things cease.

Next, the faculty of thought. This comes out of the fifth as above. In common men this is very strong. The consciousness of self and of environment and all the imperfect arising from these, trying to distinguish between all the objects of the senses, is called thought, and is also called the independent faculty, as well as the faculty of distinguishing things. This increases with the senses, with desires, and with their sorrows.

- 14. When we speak of the original nature of the mind, eternally without thought, we call it eternally unchanged. As the human mind originally does not know the Archetype (the Absolute Reality) the mind does not correspond with the outward universe. Then thought suddenly begins and is called the finite thought.
- 15. If the finite mind ceases, how can there be continuation? If there be continuation, how then do you speak of finally ceasing altogether?

What is destroyed is only the finite state of the mind, not the mind's being, just as wind in relation to water is a moving power. If there be no water the effect of the wind is not apparent; there is nothing to show it. If the water remains, the state of the wind is made apparent; only when the wind ceases does the moving of the water cease. It is not the water that ceases to exist. So ignorance in relation to the True real nature is made apparent.

"THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

^{242 234}

If there were no True Real nature of the mind, then all existence would not exist; there would be nothing to show it. If the True Real Nature of the mind remains, then finite mind continues.

- 15. How²⁴³ is it that pure influences are acting incessantly? It is because there is a True Model able to influence the ignorant, a power at work causing man's misguided mind to dislike the sorrows of transmigration and to seek the joys of divine rest (nirvana). As this ignorant mind is moved to dislike transmigration and love nirvana, this fact influences the finite mind to believe that its nature is finite and to know that its finite mind is full of false ideas, and further, that there is no true objective world before men and that therefore they are to cultivate some way of deliverance. As from the True Model man knows that there is no objective world, then the various means of following and obeying this True Model arise spontaneously (without thought and without action) and when influenced by this power for a long time, ignorance disappears. As ignorance disappears, then false ideas cease to arise. As these false ideas do not arise the former objective world also ends. As the forces cease to exist, then the false powers of the finite mind cease to exist, and this is called NIRVANA, when the natural forces of the True Model alone work.
- 16. The influence of the True Model is of two kinds, viz. that which arises from subjective influences of the True Model element itself, and that which arises from outward conditions.

Although there is the power of the influence of the True Model in them, if it does not meet with the noble forces of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as a means to call forth, there would be no means of preventing wild thoughts and of entering Nirvana. And although there would be the force of outward conditions, yet without the force of the pure Reality, there would not be the power of this Real influence. If the forces and the means of utilizing them are complete, such as the force of the influences of the True Model and also²⁴⁴ of the loving vows of the Buddhas and of the Bodhisattvas to save the world, there arises a dislike to sorrow and a belief in nirvana and the cultivation of a good character.

17. It is in relation to consciousness and the finite that this difference appears. And how does it appear? As regards the origin of all things there is but One Mind, not an unenlightened Mind conjecturing at things, for in the finite there are imperfect ideas.

^{243 235}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

^{244 236}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

- 18. This Divine Soul is the essence of all form, therefore it can manifest itself in form. This is why we say mind and matter are eternally the same. As the essence of matter is WISDOM, the essence of matter is without form and is called the embodiment of wisdom. As the manifested essence of wisdom is matter, it is called the all-pervading embodiment of wisdom. The unmanifested matter is without magnitude; according to the will it can show itself throughout all the universe.
- 19. Now we show how to proceed from the finite to the infinite. This is called analysing all experience matter to mind. In all the six objects of sense there does not exist false conjectures as men's thoughts are. As the mind has no form we seek for it at all points of space in vain. Just as a man having lost his way calles the east, west, although the east and west have not really changed, so is mankind lost in ignorance calling the mind of the universe his thoughts! But the Mind is what it ever was, all unchanged by men's thought. When men consider and realize that the Absolute Mind has no need of thoughts like men, they are then following the right way to reach the Infinite.
- 20. Hearing the Sutras saying that the eternal nature of Ju Lai is in the end only vacuity like space, some men, not knowing that this expression was used in order to destroy belief in phenomena²⁴⁵ as real, say that Space or Emptiness itself is Ju Lai. How is this to be rectified? Men are to understand that space is nothing. It has no existence and is not a reality. It is a term in opposition to reality. We only say this or that is visible in order that we might distinguish between things. All phenomena are originally in the Mind and have really now outward form, therefore as there is no form it is a mistake to think there is anything there. All phenomena only arise from false notions of the Mind. If the Mind is independent of these false ideas, then all phenomena disappear. This is called the true glorious nature Wisdom of Ju Lai the Model Come (Manifested) and not merely empty space.

Hearing the Sutras saying that the nature of all things in the world is unreal, even the final nature of Nirvana and of the True Model (the Absolute Reality) therefore they are also intangible and eternally independent of all forms, some men, not knowing that it was for the purpose of destroying belief in phenomena that these expressions were used, say the nature of the True Model and nirvana is nothing but unreality. How is this to be rectified? They are to understand that the divine nature of the True Model is not unreal. It is full of infinite possibilities.

Hearing the Sutras saying that the treasures of Ju Lai, the Manifested Model, are eternally fixed without addition or subtraction and are potentially full of all possibilities, some men, not understanding it, say the treasures of Ju Lai contain both the distinctions of mind and matter. How is this to be rectified? According to the True

^{245 237}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

Model there is no distinction between mind and matter, it is on account of the defilement of the finite in the round of life and death that these distinctions appear.

- 21. As the treasures of Ju Lai are without a beginning, so is the state of ignorance without a beginning.
- 22. To²⁴⁶ meet the intelligent of the two lower schools, Ju Lai only spoke of them of the True Model as not like men (not anthropomorphic). As he had not spoken fully to them of the temporary nature of experience, they feared the rounds of life and death and sought a false nirvana. How is this to be rectified? As the nature behind all experience has no beginning, so it has no end—this is the true Nirvana.

Finally, to leave false conceptions, one should know that purity and defilement are both relative terms and have no independent existence. Although all things from eternity are neither matter nor mind, neither infinite wisdom nor finite knowledge, neither existing nor non-existing, but are after all inexpressible, we nevertheless use words, yet should know that Ju Lai's skilful use of words to lead men aright lay in this—to get men to cease conjecturing and to return to the Absolute Reality, for the best human thought of all things is only temporary and is not Absolute Truth.

- 23. Cultivate the root of things, by looking on the true nature of all things as eternal, without beginning, independent of man's conception of things and not permanent in temporary life, by looking on all things linked together by a never failing law of deeds and their consequences, by nourishing a great pity and cultivating virtue joyfully, bey seeking to save all men, not resting in the nirvana of the two lower schools, as that which does nothing for the Eternal Archetype never rests. Cease from evil. It is by contrition and repentance that one is enabled to cease from all evil and prevent its increase. As one follows the eternal nature he departs from all evil.
- 24. Even if he hear nirvana cannot be obtained²⁴⁷ till after patient toil through troubles lasting for immeasurable and endless kalpas of longest durations, still he faints not, as by faith he knows that behind all existence there is naturally the Supreme Nirvana (Rest).
- 25. There is no such things as omitting any term, as all the Bodhisattvas go through the three terms; though they follow different ways with different men. As men's

"THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA" $\,$

^{246 238}

²⁴⁷ 239

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

nature, desires, and dispositions are different, the Bodhisattvas show different methods for their salvation.

- 26. All the universe originally was only one Soul needing not to conjecture at things.
- 27. Practise the state of checking idle thought and of cultivating sound reflection. TWO STATES ARE TO BE GRADUALLY CULTIVATED, INDEPENDENTLY, BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.
- 28. As to the practice of checking vain thoughts, it should be done in a quiet place, properly seated and in a proper spirit. It is not the practice of breathing air in a special manner into the body, as is the custom of some religions thinking thereby to get the vital spirit of nature into the body, nor the use of anything that has form or colour, whether of empty space or of the four elements earth, water, fire and wind, or even of the knowledge gained by any experience of the senses, for all kinds of ideas as soon as thought of must be put away, even the idea of banishing them must also be put away. As all existence originally came to be without any idea of its own, it ceases to be also without any idea of its own, any thoughts arising therefore must be from being absolutely passive. Nor must one follow the mind in its excursions to everything outside itself and then chase that thought away. If the mind wanders far away it must be brought back to its proper state. One should know that the proper state is that of the soul alone without anything outside it. Again, even²⁴⁸ this soul has no form and no thought by which we can conceive of it properly.

In time one gets perfect in the practice and the mind is at rest. As the mind is at rest it gradually gets courage to proceed; in this way it reaches the peace of the Eternal far beyond all trouble with faith increasing so that it will soon be so perfect as never to fail any more. Those who are conceited, who will not persevere, and such-like people cannot obtain this peace.

29. If there should be some men without the strength which comes from good deeds who are troubled with evil spirits and the gods and demons of outside religions, appearing sometimes in ugly forms causing fear to them whilst sitting in contemplation; at other times appearing in lovely forms to tempt them, they should think of the One Eternal Soul, then these appearances will vanish and give no more trouble. These evil spirits also teach men how to know the past and to know the future and how to know what is in the mind of others and how to have unfailing gifts of speech, causing men to covet the fame and wealth of this world.

Or again these evil spirits cause men to be frequently violently angry or very happy, without anything to steady them, sometimes to have great compassion, or to be

^{248 240}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

sleepy or ill or to be without perseverance, or they cause men to persevere for a time and then to fall back worse than ever, to lose faith, to have many doubts and fears, or give up their practice of checking vain thoughts and make them follow miscellaneous matters and be chained by the many affairs of the world, so as to give men a certain kind of peace, somewhat similar to the true peace, but which is the product of outside religions and not the true peace of the Eternal.

Or again, these evil spirits cause men for one,249 two, three, or even seven days to remain in contemplation as if enjoying delicious food; they are most happy in mind and body without any hunger or thirst, or they may be led to eat without any control, sometimes much and sometimes little, so that the countenance changes and exhibits gladness or sorrow accordingly.

As there are such things, religious people should always wisely examine themselves lest their minds should fall into the nets of heresy. They should carefully rectify their thoughts and neither ad opt nor be attached to them, but keep themselves far from all delusions.

One should know that the peace of outside religions is of the senses, or of the affections to gratify self, desiring the honours of fame and the wealth of the world.

But the true peace is not in the realms of the senses or in possessions and even after contemplation there is neither the feeling of having attained perfection with no further effort nor conceit for what has been accomplished. All trials gradually diminish.

If men do not cultivate this peace there is no other way to get the seed of Ju Lai (the Divine Incarnate Lord).

As the peace of this world mostly arises from the pleasure which is given to the senses, it is bound to the three worlds of form, of desire, and of no-form, like that of the outside religions. Once men leave the guidance of sound wisdom, there arise at once false doctrines.

Next note that those who diligently set their minds on securing this peace should in the present generation obtain ten advantages:

All the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (saints) throughout all space always protect them.

None of the evil spirits can cause them any fear.

They²⁵⁰ cannot be deceived by any of the ninety-five kinds of outside religions.

They are far beyond questioning the deep things of the Buddhist religion, and great sins gradually diminish.

There is an end to all doubts and all kinds of heresies.

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

Although they have not obtained full peace at all times and in every place, they are able to lessen their trials and do not covet the world's pleasures.

NOW IF MEN PRACTISE ONLY CONTEMPLATION, THE MIND IS DAMPED, UR GETS WEARY, ADD DOES NOT REJOICE IN ALL GOODNESS BUT IS FAR FROM PITY, THEREFORE IT IS NECESSARY TO CULTIVATE REASONING OR REFLECTION.

One should reflect that nothing made throughout the universe can last long; in a moment it may be destroyed.

One should reflect that all thought rises and vanishes again like a wave and is therefore a sorrow.

One should reflect that all the past is misty like a dream, that all the present is like lightning, that all the future rises suddenly like a cloud in the sky.

One should reflect that the bodies of all living beings are unclean, full of all kinds of uncleanness, and therefore not to be rejoiced in.

Thus one should reflect that all living beings from eternity down the ages, being influenced by ignorance, live and die and endure all the great sorrows of mind and body; and reflect on the endless trials of the present and on the immeasurable sorrows of the future which cannot be got rid of and which men are scarcely aware of. When all men's lives are so full of sorrow they are greatly to be pitied.

Having²⁵¹ thought of these things one should stir oneself up to make a great vow to lead one's own soul to leave the finite and gain the infinite, cultivate every means of grace to deliver all men for ever from their sorrows and obtain the highest joys of Nirvana.

31. Whilst sitting in meditation one's mind should be bent on checking vain thoughts. At other times one should reflect carefully in regard to everything whether it should or should not be done. Whether walking or resting, lying down or rising up, both reflecting and checking vain thoughts should go together. This is what is meant by the saying that although we practise all these things, our perfection is not really produced by ourselves, but by the nature of the Eternal working through us.

The practice of checking vain thoughts is to sever the attachments of ordinary men to the world and to put away the fears and weaknesses of the two lower schools of Buddhism.

The practice of reflection is to deliver from the narrow sin of the two lower schools who do not have the vow of great pity for others and who do not keep far from ordinary men who do not practise goodness.

IN THIS WAY THE TWO METHODS OF REFLECTION AND CHECKING VAIN THOUGHTS ARE MUTUALLY HELPFUL TO ONE ANOTHER AND

^{251 243}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

INSEPARABLE. IF BOTH ARE NOT PRACTISED ONE CANNOT THEN ENTER ON THE WAY OF WISDOM.

32. Next consider those who begin to learn the five methods of this Chapter and desire to get right faith but are timid and weak. As they live in this world of extreme suffering, they fear they cannot constantly approach God (Buddha) and personally contribute to His service. Thus they fear they cannot attain to this perfect faith and have a mind to renounce their search after it. These should know that Ju Lai has excellent²⁵² means to strengthen their faith. It is by having the mind set only on the Buddha.

As the Sutra says, if a man sets his mind to think only on Amitabha Buddha, he is always in the presence of Buddha he will never fall back.

If we reflect on the eternal nature of Amitabha Buddha and constantly practise this method, one will in the end reach the place of true wisdom.

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)@@

Dipankara was born A.D. 1980 in the royal family of Gaur at Vikramanipur in Bengala, a country lying to the east of Vajrasana. His father called Dge-vahi dpal in Tibetan, i.e. "Kalyana Sri" and his mother Prabhavati gave him the name of Chandragarbha, and sent him while very young to the sage Jetari, an 'Avadhut' adept for his education. Under Jetari he studied the five kinds of minor sciences, and thereby paved his way for the study of philosophy and religion.

As he grew in age he acquired proficiency in the three 'pitakas' of the four classes of the Hinayana Sravakas, in the Vaiseshika philosophy, in the three 'pitakas' of the Mahayana doctrine, the high metaphysics of the Madhyamika and Yogacharya schools and the four classes of Tantras. Having acquired the reputation of being a great pandit in the Sastras of the Tirthikas, he defeated a learned Brahman in disputation. Then, preferring the practice of religion to the east and pleasures of this world, he commenced the study of the meditative science of the Buddhists which consists of the Trisiksha or the three studies—morality, meditation and divine²⁵³ learning,—and for this purpose he went to the 'vihara' of Krishnagiri to receive his lessons from Rahula Gupta. Here he

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

^{252 244}

[&]quot;THE AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHAYANA DOCTRINE—THE NEW BUDDHISM BY THE PATRIARCH ASHVAGOSHA"

^{@@} Translated by Sarat Chandra Das from Tibetan. (These memoirs were written by Kalyana Mitra phyagsorpa—the personal friend and devoted companion of Atisa and were printed in a Tibetan monastery in 1250 A.D.)

²⁵³ 245

was given the secret name of Guhyajnana Vajra, and initiated into the mysteries of esoteric Buddhism. At the age of 19 he took the sacred vows from Sila Rakshita the Mahasanghika Acharya of Odantapuri who gave him the name of Dipankara Srijnana. At the age of 31 he was ordained in the highest order of Bhikshu and also given the vows of a Bodhisattva by Dharma Rakshita. He received lessons in metaphysics from several eminent Buddhist philosophers of Magadha. Lastly, reflecting on the theory of "the evolution of all matters from voidity" he acquired what is called the "far-seeing wisdom."

On account of these divers attainments which moved his mind variously in different directions, he resolved to go to Acharya Chandrakirti the High Priest of Suvarnadvipa. Accordingly in the company of some merchants he embarked for Suvarnadvipa in a large vessel. The voyage was long and tedious, extending over several months during which travellers were overtaken by terrible storms. At this time Suvarnadvipa was the head quarter of Buddhism in the East, and its High Priest was considered as the greatest scholar of his age. Dipankara resided there for a period of 12 years in order to completely master the pure teachings of Buddha of which the key was possessed by the high priest alone. He returned to India accompanied by some merchants in a sailing vessel visiting Tamradvipa (Ceylon) and the island of forests on his way. Returning to Magadha he sought the company of many eminent sages, such as Santi, Naropanta, Kusala, Avadhuti, Tombhi and others.

The Buddhists of Magadha now acknowledged him as their chief and unanimously declared him to be the hierarch of Magadha. During his residence at the shrine of Maha Bodhi at Vajrasana he thrice²⁵⁴ defeated the Tirthika heretics in religious controversy, and thereby maintained the superiority of Buddhism over all other religions in Magadha. At the request of king Naya Pala he accepted the post of High Priest of Vikrama sila. At this time Magadha was invaded by the king of Karnya (probably Kanauj). Naya Pala's armies first suffered a defeat at the hands of the enemy who had advanced up to the capital. The Magadha king was victorious at last when his enemy sued for peace, and a treaty was signed by which friendship was established between the two kingdoms. In this treaty Dipankara took an active part. It was he who brought about a reconciliation between the king of Karnya and Naya Pala.

The King of Tibet. His anxiety to reform Buddhism: Lha Lama Yes'e hod, king of Tibet, who held his court at Tholin in Hah-ri was a devout Buddhist. He ruled peacefully over his country for many years. About the year 1025 A.D. he founded the monastery of Thoding at Tholin (the lofty place) in Purang. With a view to introduce pure Buddhist monachism in Tibet, he selected seven intelligent lads, each ten years old, and carefully trained them up in Tibetan. Then, with the consent of their parents,

he admitted them into the sacerdotal order. When these lads advanced in their study of the sacred books and became initiated in the practice of monastic discipline, he appointed two novice-monks (S'ramanera) to attend to each of them, and thereby increased the strength of his institution to twenty-one. Not satisfied with the Buddhist teachers of Tibet, whose cult had become greatly debased by the admixture of Tantrik and Bon mysticism, he sent these young monks to Kashmir, Magadha and other places of India where pure Buddhism still prevailed, with a view to their studying the philosophy of Ananda Garbha²⁵⁵ of Kasmir and the Vinaya-code of monastic discipline. He commanded them to invite to Tibet, if possible the renowned Kasmirian pandit Ratna Vajra and the Buddhist heirarch of Magadha and other holy men whose acquaintance they might make during their sojourn in India. He also instructed them to ascertain if there were any other Pandits who, when invited, would be useful to the cause of Buddhist reformation in Tibet. Accordingly they proceeded to India in search of knowledge and holy men, bidding a long farewell to their native country. Though the king succeeded in getting the services of 13 Indian Pandits, it is said, that out of the twenty-one monks whom he had sent out to India, nineteen died there from heat, fever, snake-bite and other causes. Rinchhen Zan-po, the great Lochava, and Legs pahi Serab were the only survivers who had the good luck of returning to Tibet crowned with success. They studied Sanskrit under some of the eminent scholars of India and acquired great proficiency in the Buddhist literature. Bearing in mind the instructions of their royal master, they visited Vikrama Sila to inquire of the Sramanas if there was a saintly scholar in their midst who, when invited to Tibet, would be useful in the reformation of Buddhism. There they heard of Dipankara Srijnana, whose spiritual attainments and learning were of a superior order, and who then occupied the highest position among the Buddhist scholars of Magadha. They were also told that he was in fact, the second Sarvajna of the school of 500 Arhats which is commonly called the Mahasnghika. The Lochavas, however, did not venture to ask him to visit Tibet, being told that any such proposal would be premature at this time, if not absurd. On their return to Tibet they submitted an account of their experiences in India, and also of the condition of the Buddhist church of Magadha.

Greatly²⁵⁶ desirous of seeing the renowned sage of Magadha, the kind commanded Rgya-tson-gru Senge, a native of Tag-tshal in Tsang to proceed to Vikrama Sila, taking with him one hundred attendants and a large quantity of gold. After encountering immense hardships and privations in the journey, the traveller reached Magadha. Arrived at Vikrama Sila, he presented to Dipankara the king's letter with a large piece of bar gold as a present from his sovereign and begged him to honour his country with a visit. Hearing this, Dipankara replied:— "Then it seems to me that my

going to Tibet would be due to two causes: -first, the desire of amassing gold, and second, the wish of gaining sainthood by the loving of others, but I must say that I have no necessity for gold nor any anxiety for the second at present. So saying he declined to accept the present. At this unexpected reply Gya-tson wept bitterly in his presence, wiping his tears with a corner of his sacerdotal robe. He explained to the sage that he was come from the country of Himavat thus far to Vikrama Sila, undergoing immense privations, spending much treasure and suffering the loss of many of his companions who died of heat, fever, snake-bite and other causes, and at last he had to go back to his Sovereign depressed at heart and disappointed in his hopes. Dipankara sympathized with him and tried to console him.

On his return to Tibet the Lochava explained to his royal master the circumstances of the failure of his mission and returned the presents. Thinking that it was hopeless to bring Dipankara to Tibet, the king again commanded the Lochava to proceed to Vikrama Sila to invite the scholar who was second to Dipankara in learning and moral purity. At this time Nag-tcho, a young monk of Gung-than, met Gya-tson and begged to be his pupil, but the Lochava desired him to wait till his return from Magadha. He proceeded to India with five attendants and a small quantity of gold, barely enough to meet the expenses of his journey to Vikrama Sila.

The king of Tibet with a small escort proceeded to the frontier of Nepal for the purpose of collecting more gold. When he arrived at the gold mine which was discovered by his minister at a place to the south of Purang, he was encountered by the troops of the Raja of Garlog who professed a religion which was inimical to Buddhism. They out-numbered his followers and easily made him a captive and led him in triumph to their capital.

2. Chan Chub having obtained leave for an interview with the king (his uncle), went to see him in the prison. There addressing his uncle he said:—Oh dear, kind uncle, this is the consequence of your former acts (karma). It is possible for me to fight with the Raja for your sake; but I am afraid such a step would make him more cruel towards you. He has offered to release you provided, it is agreed, that you be his vassal. Hearing this, the unhappy king replied:—"Death is more welcome to me than the vassalage of a wicked and infidel Raja." Chan Chub asid that as the Raja's cupidity was not satisfied, he would go to fetch more gold to effect his release. At this, the king, in his grief, with a smile replied, My son, you should preserve the traditions and the religion of our ancestors, that is of the utmost importance to us all. In my opinion in our country the laws based on Buddhism should be maintained. My Karma will not permit me to see the wished for reformation. I am now grown old, and verge on death's door. Even if you succeed in releasing me, my life may not extend to more than ten years. In none of my former births I believe, did I die for the sake of Buddhism.

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²⁵⁷ **249**

This time let me, therefore, be a martyr to the cause²⁵⁸ of my religion. Do not give a grain of gold to this cruel Raja. Take back the entire quantity of it that you may conduct religious service in the great monasteries and spend in bringing an Indian Pandit to Tibet. If ever you send any messenger to the great Indian Pandit Dipankara Sri Jnana, let this message of mine be conveyed to him:—"Lha-Lama, the king of Tibet, has fallen into the hands of the Raja of Garlog while endeavouring to collect gold for diffusing the religion of Buddha and for the Pandit himself. The Pandit should therefore vouchsafe his blessings and mercy unto him in all his transformed existences. The chief aim of the king's life has been to take him to Tibet to reform Buddhism, but, alas that did not come to pass!

- 3. After the death of Lha Lama, Prince Chan Chub who had embraced a monkish life expressed his earnestness to give effect to the wishes of the late king. To the assembled ministers he said: "Now my uncle's desires should be fulfilled. Religious service on a grand scale should be performed at Lhasa and Samye, and a great Pandit, holy and learned, should be brought here from India. The service of a worthy envoy to proceed to India is wanted." He was told that there was a certain Buddhist scholar, a native of Gungthan, belonging to the family of Nag-tcho who was versed in Sanskrit.
- Nag-tcho meets Atisa: "In the following morning I went to the door of a Vihara 4. (monastery). While I was reciting the prajna-sara, a venerable Acharya with bright looks and smiles in his face entered the Vihara. Observing the simple, unostentatious demeanour which marked him I resolved within myself: - If we fail to take Atisa to our country, this Pandit might as well serve our purpose. Next morning I happened to be at the place where that venerable Acharya²⁵⁹ was distributing alms and food to the poor and making offerings to spirits. A beggar boy who failed to get his share of alms ran after him and exclaimed: - "Bhala ho O, Nath Atisa, Bhat-ona Bhat-ona." Blest be thou O patron Atisa! give me rice." Hearing this I became delighted. Tears of joy flowed from my eyes. I followed him as he walked towards his place, and was about to fall from a bridge while walking over it, my attention being wholly engrossed upon Atisa. He recognised me as a Tibetan and said: -'Ah Tibetan Ayusmat! you are earnest men, do not shed tears. I have much regard for the Tibetan people, -your king and ministers. You have again come for me without losing heart, offer your prayers to the three Holies."
- 5. The king of Tibet is a Bodhisattva. His three illustrious ancestors were indeed incarnate saints. Gon-pa-sal, the son of Lamu, whose religious name was Ge-wa-sal La Chenpo, was a still greater saint than they, otherwise he could not have revived fire in

^{258 250}

the dead embers of Buddhism. Lha Lama and his nephew Chan Chub being saintly persons it behoves me not to act contrary to their wish. I do keenly feel compassion for them. What personal sacrifices have they not made for my sake! A good deal of their wealth and men have been wasted. I feel for you, oh Tibetans! What troubles have you not undergone on my account. I have now grown advanced in age and have the keys of many monasteries in my charge and good many works still remain unfinished. So I cannot shortly set out for Tibet. But, however, in the meantime I shall consult my tutelary deities about it to know, whether I would be of service to your country and the religion of Buddha if I go there. Presently do you take back the gold?" So saying he returned the treasure.

Atisa Consults the Oracles about his going to Tibet: That night Atisa made preparations for conducting a religious service before the image of ²⁶⁰ the goddess Tara. Placing the 'mandala' (cycle of offerings) before it, he made the prayers: "If I go to Tibet, would I be of great service to the religion of Buddha, whether thereby the wishes of the saintly king of Tibet would be fulfilled, and last of all if there would be any risks to my person and life?" His tutelary gods directed him in a dream to go to the great Tirthika city called Mukhena in the neighbourhood of Vikrama Sila, at the centre of which there stood on a hillock a small Buddhist temple. He was told that there he would meet with a female ascetic who could tell him all that he wished to know. Then in the following morning Atisa carrying a handful of cowries went there. While he was seated in a prayerful mood with the offerings placed on a 'mandala' before the image of Tara, there suddenly appeared from what quarter none could tell, a yogine (female ascetic) with locks flowing to her feet and reaching the ground. To her Atisa presenting the cowries asked: - "If I go to Tibet in compliance with the invitation of the king, would I be of service to the living beings of Tibet?" To this she replied: —"Yes if you go to Tibet you will be of great service to them and particularly to an Upasaka (lay devotee) (according to our author this was the first conception of the foundation of the grand hierarchy of Tibet which is presided over by the Dalai Lama), and through him to the whole country, but your life would be shortened thereby."

How much shortened? By 20 years she replied. If you do not go to Tibet, you will live 92 years. In Tibet you would live only up to the 72nd year.

Atisa thought within himself:—"If I be of service to Tibet, even if my life be shortened by going there I should not mind it." It occurred to him that the consideration of longevity should²⁶¹ be subordinate to that of the good of the world and that his love for other beings should prevail over his self-love. Again he thought it would be still necessary to perform religious service at Vajrasana for the purpose of gaining further prayers. When he was about to start for Vajrasana, Acharya Jnana Sri said to him:—"Your inquiry is auspicious and of the highest significance. Among the

260 252

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA) ²⁶¹ 253

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

priests of Vajrasana there is an old Yoginee, a female ascetic of the goddess Vajra Tara, who has brown clotted hair. Offering her these cowries, ask her for a reply to these queries." Accordingly Atisa took the handful of cowries. With six attendants accompanied by Nag-tcho's party of five he proceeded to Vajrasana. On the way he met with a woman of extra-ordinary sanctity approaching that of the gods. To her Atisa inwardly (at heart) made a salutation and asked her if his going to Tibet would benefit all living beings. "Do you by all means go to Tibet unmindful of the consequences that may happen to your body or life? It will be of immense good to numberless living beings." she said in reply. That holy nun, according to Atisa, was no other than Arya Tara herself in human shape. Arriving at Vajrasana they visited the temple of Vajra Tara when an old nun wearing locks of brown clotted hair said to him: - Give me the cowries sent by Jnanasri. To her also Atisa out of veneration made salutation though not to external appearance. Being asked the same question she added that, he would be of great service to all living beings in Tibet, particularly through the instrumentality of a lay devotee (Upasaka) who by shaking off or extirpating all spiritual gloom would in a future birth attain perfection by practice in the mystical branch of Buddhism called Maha mudra. She too, according to Atisa, was a yoginee (female adept) in her very nature. Having²⁶² made offerings and prayers at Vajrasana Atisa returned to Vikrama Sila and calling the two Lochavas(Tibetan scholars) to his presence said: — The spiritual teachers and the tutelary deities declare that my visit to your country will conduce to the welfare of all Tibet. As you have been pressing me, I have, with a view to go to Tibet, decided not to take up any new work, but will finish all that is in hand. I shall have to finish them before making over the charge of the monasteries. All these will require at least 18 months to complete. Till then, Oh Ayusmats, would you wait? The Lochavas replied: - "Not to speak of 18 months, if required we could wait three years should your holiness consent to go Tibet." If so, continued Atisa, keep this matter secret, do not talk of my intended visit to Tibet. Looking to Nag-tcho he said, you had better continue to study Buddhist authors under Sthavira Ratnakara. Now having got a scholar like Atisa as his teacher and interpreter like Gya-tson, Nag-tcho decided to remain in India for a longer period so that he might acquire greater proficiency in the sacred books.

At this time the venerable Naropanta came on a visit to the Vihara of Vikrama Sila. All the ordained monks of the monastery gave him warm reception. In getting down from the 'dooly' he leaned on the right arm of Atisa while Jnana Srimitra helped him with his left arm. In course of conversation Naro said:—Prabhu Dipankara, now you should be the minister of the religion of Buddha. So saying he made over to him the ministry of the Dharma. Atisa meekly replied:- In the presence of your venerable self who may be likened to the sun and moon I am but a firefly. How can I illumine the world? The venerable Naro replied:- "as I shall not live long you must necessarily be the

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minister of the relition of Buddha." During the 20 days he stayed at²⁶³ Vikrama Sila, Naro did not enter into any religious discussion with Atisa. Thereafter Naro proceeded towards the South and after a few days breathed his last. Some relics of his remains were brought to Tibet by Atisa. They are said still to exist, being preserved in the sacred stupa of Hor at Nethau.

Nag-tcho on one occasion while on a visit to the town of Antaja (in Tib. mthar sKyes) saw a very old man with a large round head without hair, who, having acquired wonderful powers by the Tirthika process of regulating the breath, was in a state of suspended animation. He was told that the man was 300 years old, while some estimated his age at 400 years. Others declared that his age could not be less than 500 years. Nag-tcho inquired of Atisa how it was that the man lived so long? "Marmots and beavers, he said, also were known to live to a great age, in that manner. The process of prolonging life by suspended animation was meaningless."

- 6. One of Atisa's tutors named Krishna Duhara who has been miraculously visited by the Tantrick deity (Bhagavan Ananda Vajra) wrote a book called "Bhumi-vichara Darpana." This he presented to Atisa saying: "You will go to Tibet where you will be in possession of a place for residence with its north protected and south open, filled with groves and orchards. You will not come back to India. There you will have many pupils who will found monasteries and other religious institutions. At that time you will require this book, your pupils, grand pupils and also great grand pupils for three generations will become excellent Lamas. After that their successors would sink into significance and become degenerated." In this wise he prophesied Atisa's future.
- 7. One day Nag-tcho accompanied by the Lochava (Gya-tson) with the object of sounding Sthavira Ratnakara's views about Atisa's going to Tibet, went²⁶⁴ to his place, and having made salutation and placing half an ounce of gold before him offered is prayers as directed by Lochava. The Sthavira replied: "Ayusmat, in the absence of Atisa, no other Pandit would be able to preserve the moral discipline of the monks here. India is the fountain head of the religion of Buddha. If she were deprived of the services of Atisa the happiness and prosperity of all living beings of the country would be greatly affected. He holds the keys of many a monastery of Magadha. For these reasons we can ill afford to lose his venerable presence. I too feel for the people of Tibet, specially the old king, who after losing good deal of treasure and a number of his people was at the end thrown into a prison, and died a lamentable death. If you study with assiduity and zeal you will become a master of the sacred literature fit to do immense good to your country."

^{263 255}

One day Nag-tcho and the Lochava went together to Atisa's place with a view to make an earnest prayer to him for a definite expression of his wishes about going to Tibet. Atisa said: "You Lochavas are a very earnest people. Gya-tson has related to me personally everything about his country. From his graphic but pathetic account my heart shivers to think of the sufferings of the King of Tibet, and I deplore his lamentable death. I also pity the sinful Raja of Garlog. There is no other place for him to go except hell. Though the saintly King of Tibet has this time (in this life) suffered very much, his self must now be resting in Tushita Heaven. Lha-tsun Chan Chub Hod is also a pious prince. I always think of him." While these were being enumerated tears gushed out of Nag-tcho's eyes. Atisa continued:—Bearing in mind that the King of Tibet and his people have been so devoted to me, I shall not allow their efforts on my account to go in vain."

- 8. Atisa²⁶⁵ having completed his unfinished works now prepared himself to proceed to Tibet. With a view that others may not know of his intention of leaving India, he made up his mind to make pilgrimage to the eight sacred places of Buddhist sanctity. One morning he went to the residence of Sthavira Ratnakara and addressed him: "Most venerable sir, it is necessary to show all the great places of pilgrimage to these Ayusmats of Tibet. Religious service and offerings should also be made at such places on their account. I trust from this time till my return you would enjoy good health and permit religious works and services to be conducted as usual. The Sthavira said: — "That is very good, if you go I shall accompany you to those places, and after visiting every one of them we shall come back together." A young monk of Vikrama Sila having perceived the plans of Nag-tcho about Atisa's mission, said: —"This master (Atisa) is like an eye, unto us—the Indians. In his absence we should indeed be blind. If I communicated your plans to the king, there would be danger to your life, but I must not tell him anything about it. Proceed with our master to your country and take care that he does not meet with accidents and suffer privations on the way. When the object for which you have come is fulfilled bring him back to our midst.
- 9. The Sthavira now clearly perceived that by going there Atisa meant to proceed to Tibet. Then pointing to Nag-tcho he said: "That Ayusmat has not really come here for the sake of study. The king of Tibet has sent him to steal away my man. On a former occasion he sent an invitation to him but I did not let Atisa go. This time I can resort to means to prevent his going there, but Atisa out of his own good-will and purity of heart, like to secretly visit Tibet. Besides if I do not let him go, it would be putting obstruction²⁶⁶ in his way of doing good to others." Then addressing Nag-tcho he continued:—"Ayusmat, as you have been a pupil of mine, to displease you would be to

^{265 257}

shake your confidence in my kindness. Out of compassion for you and your countrymen, many of whom have died for taking Atisa to Tibet, I lend his services to your country for three years, and after that you must bring him back here.

- 10. In the morning before starting for Tibet Nag-tcho went to take leave of his tutor, the abbot. Making obeisance at the feet of Sthavira Ratnakara, he said: "Oh venerable sage, permit me to act as the Pandit may command me, for it would not be proper on my part to act against his will." The Sthavira replied:—"Ayusmat, that is very fair. Ask the help of Buddha and the Bodhisatvas. How should you ask the Pandit to return? If he expresses his pleasure to return here, do you accompany him. If he wishes to remain in Tibet serve him there. If he does not express himself at all on the subject of returning, you must accompany him back to the frontier of Nepal. Oh Ayusmat, without Atisa India will be in darkness. He holds the keys of many institutions. In his absence many monasteries will be empty. The looming signs prognosticate evil for India. Numerous Turuskas (Mussalmans) are invading India, and I am much concerned at heart. May you proceed to your country with your companions and with Atisa to work for the good of all living beings there."
- 11. Gya-tson with two servants, Nag-tcho with six and Atisa with 20 attendants set out from here for Tibet. Near the frontier, within the Indian territory, there was a small Vihara. When Atisa and his party reached the place the priestly community (Sangha) of the monastery gave him a very warm reception. They talked among themselves:—"If Atisa went to Tibet, the sun²⁶⁷ of Buddhism would set in India—an attempt should therefore be made to stop his journey to Tibet." Some of the priests remarked:—"As the Sangha of Vikrama Sila has failed to prevent his leaving India, it would be idle to think of taking such a step." They and the people at large looked upon his departure as a sign of the downfall of Buddhism in India.

Then Atisa and his companions crossed the Indian frontier and arrived at a place sacred to the Tirthikas. There were 15 Acharyas (teachers) of their creed. They too received him very kindly and interrogated him respecting their own religion for a whole day. Atisa being very well acquainted with the religion of the Tirthikas, explained their doctrines so lucidly that the 15 teachers presented him each with an umbrella as a mark of their appreciation of his kindness and learning. They behaved themselves obediently as if they were his attendants. Atisa while talking to his companions, said:—"I must please the Tirthikas." Then leaving that place they proceeded on their journey. Of the Tirthikas, among whom were the Saivas, Vaishnavas and Kapilas, the sons of Siva were very jealous of the Buddhists. They did not like the idea of a Buddhist propaganda in Tibet. It is said that attempts were made by them to assassinate Atisa, by sending his eighteen robbers. As soon as they saw his venerable face, the robbers were struck dumb, and stood motionless as so many statues.

²⁶⁷ 259

Having advanced a short distance, Atisa said: —"I pity the robbers." So saying he uttered some charms drawing figures on sand which had the efficacy of restoring the stupified to their senses.

Again on the confines of India and Nepal when proceeding on their journey to Tibet, Atisa arrived at a deserted camping ground of herdsman. There he saw three puppies left uncared for,²⁶⁸ and he took them in the folds of his robes saying "Ah poor little ones, I pity you," and went on his journey. The breed of these puppies, says the historian, is still to be seen at Radeng. Then proceeding northward he entered the country of Nepal, and he halted there for the night. The Raja (landholder) of this place behaved very rudely using harsh language and shewing bad manners towards the travellers. Atisa had a pretty little table made of sandal-wood with him which the Raja impudently demanded. Atisa said he would carry it to Tibet to make a present of it and so he would not part with it. The raja, it is said, out of malice caused some robbers to wait on the road side with a view to way-lay him in the following morning. Just after the Raja had left the place Atisa remarked: "The hill men will come to rob us in the morning." In the morning when they met with the robbers on the way, Atisa uttered some charms, drawing some mystic figures on the ground and walked ahead of all. The rest of the party who followed him saw the robbers sitting on their right and left with bamboo bows. So when they passed, walking in silent paces, the robbers were thrown into a glamour, though their eyes were still open like those of a statue. On reaching the top of the pass Atisa uttered some mantras and taking some sand in his hand sprinkled towards them, on which they got up and went their way. The goddess Tara is believed to possess the secret of detecting and catching robbers by certain charms. Then the party reached the sacred place of Arya Svayambhu. The beasts of burden were now unloaded and all the packages were deposited at the place of their encampment, and a temporary wall was raised round the baggage. The sight of the sacred temple of Arya Svayambhu is said to²⁶⁹ have given delight to Atisa, who constantly gazed at it. The sight of these new sacred sites of Nepal pleased him very much.

12. Then the party proceeded to a place called Holkha of Palpa to avail themselves of the hospitality of a friend of Atisa a Buddhist sage, who owing to his deafness was called the deaf Sthavira. Here Atisa spent one month. The deaf Sthavira heard from Atisa a complete discourse on the Paramitas, which are different from the Mantra portion of the sacred books, for full six days. The Sthavira having had no faith in the Mantras, Atisa explained to him that the way to the attainment of Bodhihood lay both in the Mantras and the Paramitas. Accordingly he wrote the work called Charya Sangraha Pradipa.

268 260

- 13. Atisa's party and the Tibetans for the first time met on the Tibetan soil, and the king's representative named Nari-tcho Sumpa with his five companions presented Atisa with about five ounces of gold, one tray full of treacle and tea prepared in Tibetan manner poured in a cup decorated with the figures of the Chinese dragon. In offering the tea he said:—"Venerable sage, permit me to make an offering of this celestial drink which contains the essence of the wishing tree." Atisa who was seated on a thick stuffed cushion at the top of the row in an exalted position, said:—"The concatenation of circumstances is very auspicious. This curious cup of precious substance contains an elixir of the wishing tree. What is the name of this drink which you prize so much?" The Lochava said,- "Venerable sir, it is called 'cha' (tea). The monks of Tibet also drink it. We do not know that the 'cha' (tea) plant is eaten, but the leaves are churned (being mixed with soda, salt and butter) in warm water and the soup is drunk It has many properties." Atisa observed: "So excellent²⁷⁰ a beverage as tea must have originated from the moral merits of the monks of Tibet:"
- 14. The horse on which the great sage rode, ambled gently like the walking of the golden swan. His demeanour, personal beauty though sixty years old, and his pleasant appearance made him worthy of divine honour. A smile was ever present on his face, and Sanskrit 'mantras' were always on his lips. His voice was distinct, loud and impressive. His expressions were happy, oh, how sweetly he talked, and how noble he looked!
- 15. The Indian Pandit became the subject of conversation everywhere, for all classes of men wished to know from travellers, lately returned from lake Mapham (Mansarovara) what kind of man Dipankara was for whom so much wealth and so many people were sacrificed.

Thus the king of Tibet gave Atisa a most cordial reception. He commanded his people to receive his teachings with profound veneration. Finding the Dipankara was the best and wisest of the Indian Pandits whom he and his father had ever asked to visit Tibet, the king out of reverence for his deep learning and purity of morals gave him the name of Jovo Je (The Supreme Lord, in Sanskrit Prabhu Svami). Arrived at Tholin Dipankara preached the profound doctrine of Mahayana doctrine and wrote several works on the principles and cult of the general and esoteric branches of Buddhism, among which Bodhipatha Pradipa is pre-eminent. In short he revived the practice of the pure Mahayana doctrine by showing the right way to the ignorant and misguided Lamas of Tibet who had all become Tantriks. He cleared the Buddhism of Tibet of its foreign and heretic elements which had completely tarnished it and restored to it its former purity and splendour. Under his guidance the Lamas of Tibet discovered what is called²⁷¹ the "real and sure path of the exalted excellence." After a residence of 13

^{270 262}

years which was distributed over the different provinces of Tibet during which he assiduously devoted himself to the propagation of pure Buddhism, enjoying uninterruptedly the good-will and veneration of the people, Atisa died at Nathan near Lhassa at the age of 73 in the year 1053 A.D. He is remembered with deep veneration all over higher Asia or wherever the Buddhism of Tibet prevails. He was the spiritual guide and teacher of Bromton, the founder of the 272 first grand hierarchy of Tibet.

Dipankara wrote several works and delivered upwards of one hundred discourses on the Mahayana Buddhism. The following names of his works occur in do of Bstan hgyur:— (1) Bodhipatha pradipa; (2) Charya sangraha pradipa; (3) Satya dvayavatara (4) Madhyamopadesa, (5) Sangraha garbha, (6) Hridaya nischita, (7) Bodhisattva manyavali, (8) Bodhisattva karmadimargavatara, (9) Sarangatadesa; (10) Mahayanapatha sadhana varna sangraha; (11) Mahayanapatha sadhana sangraha; (12) Sutrartha samuchhayopadesa; (13) Dasakusala karmopadesa, (14) Karma Vibhanga. (15) Samadhi sambhara Parivarta, (16) Lokottara-saptaka vidhi. (17) Guru Kriyakrama (18) Chittotpada samvara vidhi krama, 19) Siksha samuchhaya abhi samaya.

This was delivered by Sri Dharmapala, king of Suvarnadvipa to Dipankara and Kamala; (20) Vimala ratna lekhana.

This last is an epistle addressed by Dipankara to Naya Pala, king of Magadha.

The Lamaic Hierarchy of Tibet: Atisa who had attained to a high degree of 16. saintly perfection and possessed 'Purva janmanu-smriti,' (the power of remembering the incidents of former births) of himself and others, followed the example of Buddha in the illustration of his sermons by anecdotes and parables. During his 12 years' residence in Tibet he visited almost all the important cities and holy sites of the country and preached²⁷³ the sacred Dharma with extraordinary success. Not since the days of Upagupta, the spiritual Instructor of Asoka, were the labours of any solitary Buddhist teacher and traveller crowned with such brilliant results in converting a foreign nation as those of this illustrious son of Bengal. At the end of every discourse he used to make observations sometimes alluding to the events of his own life in a previous existence, and at others, to those of his disciples and hearers as to their behaviour on particular occasions when moral courage and fortitude came into question. The Tibetans always listened to him with wonder and reverential attention. The purity of his life, the charm of his manners, the love that he cherished for all living beings, and his unmixed sympathy for the suffering world, earned for him the sincere veneration of the entire The doctrine of transmigration on which rests the foundation of Tibetan people. Buddhism was fully expounded by him to his disciples, who in their turn preached it to the people.

Owing to this circumstance the Jatakas, the birth-stories of Buddha and the Bodhisattvas became a favourite study of the educated classes in Tibet. Old and young thronged round the Buddhist teachers to listen with eager curiosity to the narration of marvellous anecdotes from the lives of saints. They regarded the Law and Buddha as the savour of gods and men, and admired the acts that Siddhartha had performed for the sake of humanity and the world at large in successive ages. Atisa and his disciples exhorted the people to refrain from the ten impious practices, particularly from taking life and making animal sacrifices to spirits and hobgoblins after the manner of Pon fetichism. He preached that of all states of existence that of the developed man was by far the most exalted, noble and enviable. Even the Gods and Asuras²⁷⁴, though is some respects happier than man, were precluded by their own Karma from availing themselves of the conditions under which infinite progress may be attained. He fully impressed in their minds the important doctrine that though it was within the power of a human being to be a God by dint of moral merit, it was not given to the Gods to enter the path of purity without reverting to the ordinary condition of human life. The celestial life or residence in the heavens of Indra Vishnu or Brahma, being in fact only a state of enjoyment at the cost of one's moral merit, was not to be desired or envied. In this manner he gave a thoroughly spiritual turn to the minds of the Tibetan people. While the aim of a pious Hindu – nay an Indian, is to be translated to the mansion of the Gods in his next existence, a Tibetan intuitively longs to be born as a better and holier man. While the Hindus Mussulmans, and Christians cherish a fondness and pray in this life for the bliss of paradise under the covenant of celestial service, while the materialist exists himself to build a paradise of earth, laying its foundations on the misery of all living beings, man not excluded, the Tibetan Buddhist meditates seriously on the prospect of being born again as a man, nay a superior man for the acquirement of saintly perfections. Herein lies the secret of the success of the doctrine of incarnation, which got a firm and practical hold on the minds of the Tibetan people through the wise efforts of Dipankara Sri Jnana-Sri Jnana, the enlightener. Among his numerous disciples mostly men of learning, position and rank, Jinakara, well-known by his family name of Bromton, was pre-eminent. He was Atisa's constant companion in Tibet and was so devoted to him, that he has been compared with Ananda the companion of Buddha.

Atisa narrated 20 Jatakas connected with Bromton's²⁷⁵ former births end identified his spirit with that of Avalokitesvara. During his stay in the delightful valley of Yarlung, Atisa resided for a period of about three varshas (rainy season) in the monastery of Yerpa, the most romantic spot perhaps in all Tibet, situated in the midst of the group of snowy peaks of great height.

When Atisa and Bromton were residing in the 'vihara' (monastery) of Yerpa, situated on the neck of the snowy peak of Lha-ri, Lama Nog, one of his disciples, thus addressed the latter:—"The work called Ratnamala²⁷⁶ which is not like other works and which you two, spiritual father and son have prepared, in 23 chapters, in the course of your three years' questioning and answering contains expositions of numerous abstruse religious questions. In it you have said that, one should cultivate an earnest love for the attainment of Siddhi (spiritual perfection) after he has become free from all doubts. Pray, out of your kindness express to me how you first left off doubts, and how you gained earnest liking for spiritual progress?"

To this Bromton meekly replied, "I am an ordinary person, ignorant as a boy, who is tied with numerous fetters of worldliness. How could I have quitted all religious irresolutions? Being devoid of Abhijnana (fore-knowledge, at the outset have I found it very hard to cultivate earnest love for spiritual perfection, for the acquirement of Siddhi, nor have I succeeded in silencing all religious doubts. But generally speaking I am of opinion that he who longs for emancipation, should possess cheerful confidence in the superior resources of his guide, which is essential for the attainment of Siddhi, as soon as he has become entirely liberated from doubts."

At this Sanphupa rose up and making three profound²⁷⁷ salutations to Atisa, said:—"This Jinakara (pointing to Bromton) has kept hidden from us all his talents. He will not shew them to us. Oh, Lama, relate unto us some of his virtues! For he really possesses many latent powers and verily we believe that when you narrate them there will be no exaggeration. By hearing his virtues the future generations of living beings will derive immense good, imbibing faith and veneration in the Dharma. Lama, under these circumstances vouchsafe unto us a few anecdotes of his former births.

Atisa replied: —"His virtues may be compared with a mine of precious gems. Being of a superior order they could hardly be comprehended by others. It behoves him not himself to describe them to others. I shall narrate some of them that you may store them in your mind." At this Bromton (Jinakara) said:—"Oh most venerable Lama! as you teach the Dharma which is holy at its beginning, at its middle and at its end, may I ask what necessity there is for narrating how I wandered many times in the world. It is much better to expound the Dharma for our instruction than to recount the incidents of my past lives. Do not therefore draw out my heart at any length." Nog now interrupted him saying:—"Oh saintly sage! do not you know that I am one who is sparing in speech and thinks much.' Have I not come here leaving behind me five hundred pupils in order to know how to solve my doubts and to be free from them? If you will not yourself say anything about yourself, pray do not stand in Atisa's way. Having regard to my grey hair and wrinkled face grant me forbearance." Hearing this entreaty Bromton could say nothing. Atisa now in a clear voice said: "Not you are

277 267

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

 $^{^{\}rm 276}$ The original editor corrected spell "Ratnamala" by hand

right. I shall certainly narrate to you those secrets of his former births which are known to him and me.

The First Jataka: In ancient times there lived in²⁷⁸ the city of Kapilavastu a Brahman of the name of Sujata, who was versed in all the Vedas. He had a wife of the name of Manorama, who possessed all the accomplishments of her sex. She gave birth to a son who, from his infancy, shewd indications of extraordinary intelligence, and the development of mature age. Observing these remarkable characteristics, she gave him the name of Tvishya, and also education in the sciences of the Brahmans. At the age of seven Tvishya acquired great proficiency in all branches of science, arithmetic and literature. Thereafter he commenced the higher studies and learned the Vedas. Once on a time hearing of his learning, the Brahmans of Kapilavastu entered into a discussion with him on the learned sciences in which they were well versed. And finding that his attainments in those sciences were great inquired: "How is it that being so young in age, you have mastered the Vedic learning?" The boy replied: — "I have a teacher in the all-perfect Buddha, a protector in the sacred Dharma and a guide in the venerable Sangha. Under the influence of these three (ratnas) precious Holies, I have imbibed faith in the doctrine of Karma and Phala. I do not entertain any doubt about the inevitable operation of karma which springs from a former cause, therefore I am most assiduous in ascetic works. It is for this reason that though still young in age, I have been able to learn the higher sciences. As soon as he said this, they took him for an incarnate being, and abandoning the discussion went to their respective homes. Having finished his studies under his professors, he returned home, to the delight of his parents who told him that the fame of his learning had already reached them. How was it, they inquired, that he acquired so much proficiency at so young an age? He replied that it was simply due to the kindness of his parents and²⁷⁹ the mercy of the three Holies. What, they again wondering inquired, could be the reason of the three Ratnas, taking so great an interest in his welfare? The young man replied:—"Beloved parents, the three holies have always the welfare of all living beings before them. Now that auspicious circumstances have presented themselves to me, I should have firm faith in the doctrine of Karma and Phala." Parents: - "Who taught you that profound doctrine?" Son:-"Formerly when Sarvartha Siddha was born as the son of king Suddhodana, in the city of Kapilavastu, I was also born there in the house of a Brahman under the name of Jyotishka. Once when I was standing at the gate of the city there arrived the Prince accompanied by the state ministers and retinue. Seeing me the Prince said: —"Brahman boy, do not you know that results (phala) are akin to their efficient cause? Nothing can stop the operation of this principle. Do not you stand immodestly at the city gate! In your former life, you did not prove yourself a strictly moral person. Now that you have

²⁷⁸ 268 LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA) ²⁷⁹ 269 LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

again appeared here as a human being, you should acquire efficiency in moral discipline. If you do so you will be born as a learned Brahman under the name of Tvishya. You will then gain the highest proficiency in the doctrines of Karma and Phala, and also be free from all doubts respecting the immutability of their action. In that life you will apply yourself to the attainment of saintly perfection and thereby contribute immensely to the spiritual welfare of all living beings."

From this his parents could know for certain that he was really an incarnate being. They then wished to know if he would, for the purposes of working in the cause of humanity, remain at home or enter the life of Pravrajya (renunciation).

Tvishya²⁸⁰: – "Dearest parents! A worldly life being beset with troubles and miseries is like a furnace, – unless one can get out of it there is no chance of a free and happy life for him. The life of 'Parvrajya' indeed resembles residence in a cool house from which one can rescue other sufferers out of the fiery pit of worldly miseries. If I am to lead a house-holder's life, it were better if no son had been born to you, for then I would be precluded from reaching a higher life, from liberating either my parents or other living beings who in their former births had been my parents. In that case my being born as a man, that blessed life which is but very slowly attained, would be to no purpose."

To this the parents replied: "In working for the cause of all beings there are two ways: first the life of a house-holder, second that of a Bodhisattva, who has entered the Pravrajya. Tvishya, in this great city of Kapilavastu, the people are divided into four great castes, and eighteen different handicrafts. The people are rich and prosperous by the good government of their king. They are loyal and religious, being possessed of opportunities for the accumulation of merit. For this reason the learned and qualified are respected by all. Particularly we Brahmans on account of the Vidya and sanctity of the Vedas are highly honoured. Do you, Oh, Tvishya, remaining at home, work for the good of all beings, adore the Tri-Ratna, their protector and object of refuge. Being versed in the words of the Vedas, you will find the way to prosperity without being duped by any means. Practise the Paramitas, such as charity, etc. and acquire Dharma, virtues or the stages of perfection, the path to purity, to your heart's content." Tvishya:-"Parents there is good deal in what you have said: - generally the word Dharma²⁸¹ includes both the orthodox (Buddhist) and heterodox doctrines. The latter may be characterised as constituting selfishness and obstruction to eternal progress. orthodox religion both in its general and particular aspects is most comprehensive, being devoted to the good of all living beings. It is therefore beyond the comprehension

of the heterodox class. That which is disliked by bad people may be known as good. Therefore I should adopt the orthodox creed. It is divided into two schools, the Mahayana and Hinayana; the latter being the doctrine of the Sravakas. This too is superior and deeper when compared with the heterodox doctrine. Oh Parents! ask me not to live as a householder, to follow you in worldliness and in the creed of the Brahmans. It is full of misery and keeps one busy about nothingness and emptiness. Henceforth do not call me Tvishya—for I have no enlightenment in me. For if I fail to see want of reality in the nature of all things which are niratmaka, I am indeed full of darkness. Among house-holders the citizens of Kapilavastu are great. They are opulent and versatile. Notwithstanding my attainments youth and personal beauty, I consider myself insignificant among them. Do not you, oh dear Parents, out of your affection for me, put me into misery. Far better it would be to permit me to exert myself for the welfare of the world by embracing the perfect religion, that noble creed for attaining to the state of Buddha, the Lord of the world.

To this his parents replied: — "Son, if you embrace the religion of Buddha, where will you enter the Pravrajya, who will be your teacher, into what monastery will you go to learn how to become a Buddha? If you go to any place or mountain retreat beyond the limits of the city of Kapilavastu we shall keenly feel your separation, you are indeed, like our eye. Your absence will make us blind - you are like our heart, if you leave²⁸² us, we shall be lifeless. You are like our limbs, if you forsakeus we shall become cripples. Oh, Tvishya; if you are indeed desirous or regarding all beings as your parents and to work for their welfare, why should you be regardless of us, your immediate parents to whom you owe your existence? Why should you plunge us into misery instead of making us happy?" Tvishya replied "My dear Parents, what you say is true, but I regard my native land as the residence of the arch enemy, the demon Mara and my home, as a prison-house where there is no freedom, and where no life can be happy. The concerns of a worldly man are like so many chains which entangle him and from which there is no escape to the Land of freedom. Desires and attachment are like poison, though transiently sweet and charming, they are ultimately destructive so, my dear Parents, in this great city of Kapilavastu there is no place where I can apply myself to spiritual study and liberate myself from the snare of doubts.

I am in need of a place of solitude where I may sit absorbed in higher thoughts for continuing my spiritual progress. You say very kindly that I am dear to you like your eye. If indeed I may be so compared let me then discharge the work of the eye, i.e. see myself. That eye which fails to perceive its own existence is really blind. For if I remain at home I shall not be able to see on what depend the miseries of myself, yourselves and the world. If I cannot see the advantages of the state in which liberation from worldly sufferings is possible, I shall indeed consider myself blind.

202 2

You, out of your extreme affection for me, compare me with your heart. If so, must I not then do the functions of the heart? You also liken me to your limbs. What are then the services rendered by the limbs? When the heart ceases to beat and the limbs refuse to do their respective²⁸³ works, that one is said to be dead. Permit me, my dear parents, to so work that I may prove to you the heart on which rests the life of the emancipated. The limbs will then take you to the rest of Nirvana. For these reasons take me to where I may find my teacher (Guru) and solitude." Arguing in this manner Tvishya at last prevailed upon his parents to let him betake himself to the life of a Bodhisattva hermit by entering the order of Pravrajya or renunciation. They gave him leave to find for himself a hermitage within the city of Kapilavastu where lived many holy men. He was told by every one whom he interrogated about his spiritual instructor that his best guide was to be found in his parents, and if he could please them he would gain his ends. He was also told that his father and mother and the three Ratna were the most powerful factors of his destiny. He could achieve nothing successfully by acting contrary to their wishes. Therefore it was essential for his success to be guided by their advice in adopting the life of a religious recluse.

He was told that if any holy man happened to point out to him a sacred spot fitted for his residence he should go there and never fail to always seek his spiritual instructor. For it was in such a personage alone that one's real parents were to be found.

One morning Tvishya proceeded to the lake called "Swan's swim," situated to the south of the city where the people of Kapilavastu used to resort for pleasure and sport. There to his great delight he found a number of boys of pleasant manners. As soon as he came to their midst they felt intuitively happy and said:— "Welcome to you oh charming Brahman boy. We are pleased to see your lovely face. Tell us how we can help you? We shall be glad to give you anything that you may want from us. Come here as often as you wish to this delightful grove which is²⁸⁴ variegated with different flowers and contains beautiful and grassy banks and bushes ever enlivened with the sweet songs of birds and sylvan music. Holy men also come here to bathe and to enjoy solitude. We never met you before but having once seen you we like to gaze at your lovely face." To this Tvishya replied:—"Friends, surely you who had been angels in your former life have come here for merriment and sport. You have showered sweet praises on me. You seem to possess understanding and sense. How is it then that you are so fond of foolish amusements and play? Why not delight in the real pleasures or study and take lessons from some good Guru? Do you all then not like to go to play in

...

283 273

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

284 274

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

the lotus grove of serene joy where there is no death? Let us be companions in the way to that grove of eternal spring where gods and men vie with each other in the noble work of doing good to others. Friends, behave well while it is still your privilege to be in this blessed existence." He then made certain inquiries about the city and the park. The boys after enquiring of his parentage and name, said that they were but boys, not wise men who possessed wisdom and fore-knowledge. They could not give him any information beyond what they had heard from their parents. They heard that about one-twentieth of the population of the city of Kapilavastu were educated men. Now that they heard his advice they would give up play and join him if permitted in the pursuit of learning. Tvishya replied if indeed you are willing to do so, you should go home to inform your parents that you would henceforth become students. The boys now looking at him stood motionless not knowing what to do. It was hardly in their power now to be separated from him. At this time nine divine beings assuming the shape of nine swans, appeared before Tvishya and blessed him.²⁸⁵ All the boys drew near them and with attention heard them speak. Tvishya addressed them and said: -Oh miraculous beings, in this city of Kapilavastu the people are fond of worldliness and pleasures. The king is after wealth and pomp. I am averse to remain at home buried in false and empty pleasures. I love solitude and holy company. Tell me where to find my Guru to guide me in matters spiritual and sacred learning."

Pleased with this request the chief of the miraculous swans thus addressed him—"Hear then Oh, Tvishya, I shall reveal to you that secret. From here in the direction of south at a distance of 500 miles there is a mountain retreat where resides a Brahman sage named Abhayamati. He was your spiritual teacher in your former births. Go therefore to him oh Kula putra (noble born) to take the vow of Pravrajya (renunciation) to dispel your doubts and for concentrating on the acquisition of Siddhi. The way to Dharma is beset with dangers. Temptations and attractions to worldliness are many. The smiles of beauties and charms of the daughters of Mara, their angelic dress and ravishing voice and bewitching manners may rob thee in the way or lead astray. Fly then from their midst and go to that hermitage in the midst of mountains that the Brahman's son may meet the Brahman sage." So saying they flew towards the direction of south.

Tvishya sedately reflected for a moment what could be the meaning of these revelations! Then quietly retracing his steps towards his home, full of hopes and happy at heart he related the cheering news to his parents. His mother first of all said:— "Happy I am, my son, that I have given birth to you who are a saint incarnate, untaught, yet self-taught you have learnt the Dharma. Now I see that like a hero of faith you will proceed to the south to meet that Brahman sage²⁸⁶ who is the instructor of

²⁸⁵ 275

LIFE OF ATISA (or DIPANKARA)

a thousand saints. The Brahmans of this city dare not stand before you to argue on the Dharma or the Sastras. Go therefore, if you will, to the sage Abhayamati and be glorious, wise and learned in Dharma." His father next said: "If it is true that the sage Abhayamati who resides in the rocky retreat of the south had been your tutor in former lives, surely you should go to him. Tvishya now begged them to take him to his guru without delay.

His parents accordingly made arrangements for the journey and on a fine morning while the sun was rising above the horizon they proceeded toward the south. Arriving at the mountain retreat of the sage, Tvishya recited a gatha (hymn) from the Vedas and thrice walking round him reverentially made three profound salutations to the venerable sage and thus addressed him:-

"Oh the Light of the world, my sole refuge!
Thou art my protector I am told,
In all ages past, present and future,
Lama grant thy mercy unto me,
Dispel my doubts and lead me to light,
The rays of the sun destroys the world's gloom,
May your glory refulgent enlighten my heart!"
Abhyamati replied:

"Oh, Tvishya! it is good that you have come to me. Mistake not the efficient cause for its fruit. All causes being void in their nature, produce results which owing to a variety of errors the ignorant mistake for realities. These erring beings then are the progenitors, called parents—in this world. Tvishya, you seem to possess powers for observing things properly (in their true state). They indeed constitute wisdom and resource.

Do you then sitting on the cushion of meditation and wearing the dress of good morale, eat the inexhaustible food of contemplation. Also summon²⁸⁷ fortitude and perseverance to your service, and wearing the armour of patience and forbearance vanquish your enemies with the weapons of prajna (divine wisdom).

I reside in this mountain retreat and pass my time in meditation, being lost in abstraction. I am free from dull sleep, heaviness of heart and worldly anxieties. Possessed of a pure heart I work for the good of the world."

Then looking to Tvishya's parents he continued:—"Oh noble-hearted souls! Sujata and Manorama, happy are you, for unto you hath been born a good and worthy

son who will be blessed in all his births. Though you reside in the city of Kapilavastu you do not forget to do good to others, for you have brought unto me your only beloved son to enter the state of Pravrajya and to be separated from you for ever."

To this the parents replied:- "Oh venerable sage, who art most holy and glorious in the assembly of Brahmans! We consider ourselves very lucky, and indeed it is no ordinary satisfaction to us to be permitted to place our beloved Tvishya in your venerable charge. Now grant us leave that we may return to our home." Abhayamati after giving the vows of religious renunciation to Tvishya, conducted him to a grotto called the 'cell of meditation.' Here the young Brahman commenced his new life, devoting his time and attention to study and meditation, abstracting his mind altogether from worldly thoughts.

One day while he was absorbed in study the devil Mara, looking grave and heavy at heart and assuming the guise of a saint, came to his cell and said:—"Tvishya you have entered the Pravrajya, renounced the concerns of the world, have spent nearly nine years here in abstraction for the attainment of perfection. Now having left what was to be left off you have gained that²⁸⁸ spirituality, which is good and profitable. You have indeed become a holy person now, but do not you know that to sit alone confined in a cell is contrary to the doctrine of doing good to others? Come out therefore from confinement and proceed to the city to do good to others and to live there in comfort and ease according to your own pleasure. Believe me I give you this advice in earnest."

To him Tvishya replied:—"Yes, Yes, what you say may be true, but I must not give up my vows or quit the three holies, for they are the objects of my worship and happiness. Let me live in them and let my love for them ever increase."

One month after this the sage Abhayamati came to see his pupil. Being informed of what had passed between his false friend—Mara and Tvishya he was extremely delighted. He praised the firmness and persevering faith in the three holies which marked his pupil's character, and declared that he had indeed become the son of Buddha. He exorted him to continue in his endeavours with still greater devotion to the acquisition of spiritual progress. If he fulfilled what was required of him, in time to come, undoubtedly both the teacher and the pupil would be called to preach the profound doctrine in Himavat—the border country of Aryavarta."

At the conclusion of this Jataka Atisa continued:—Oh Nog Legpai Sherab! that Lama Abhayamati was no other than myself. You are that good lady Manorama incarnate. Sujata of that time is our friend Khu. That Brahman boy Tvishya who received his spiritual lessons from the sage Abhayamati is Jinakara himself.

288 278

This Jinakara (Brom-ston²⁸⁹ Rgyal-vahi hbyungnas) was the founder of the Grand Hierarchy of Tibet. i.e. Bromton (pronounced)²⁹⁰

Prof.²⁹¹ M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY" [®] 1. The aim of philosophy, as a whole, is to determine the ideal practical life rather than merely to formulate a set of theoretical views of the universe.

- 2. The first and foremost of these features is unselfishness. Suresvara, whose place in the history of Vedantic monism is next only to that of Sankara, states that it characterises the ideal of practical life according to not only the Vedic but also the non-Vedic systems. And he adds that one of the latter, viz. Buddhism denies the very existence of the self in order to impress on the minds of its adherents the importance of this feature. If the belief in a persisting self were false, it is obvious that all selfish activity would become utterly meaningless. Thus the Buddhistic doctrine of 'no self' (nairatmya-vada), according to Suresvara is, what is termed 'a fiction of ethical value'. Other schools may not have pushed their metaphysical views so far as Buddhism; but they do not, in the least, lag behind it in the emphasis that lay upon this feature of the ideal. But we must remember that by unselfishness here is to be understood the entire abnegation of self-interest.
- 3. A witty bishop, in speaking to children, is stated to have asked 'What is the Cross?' and answered it himself by saying 'It is the 'I' crossed out.'
- 4. This emphasis on the total exclusion of self-interest may suggest that it is a purely ascetic ideal which is here held up before the aspirant—an ideal which is negative and means a voluntary forsaking of the world. That, indeed, is now the prevalent belief regarding the Indian view of life. There is no doubt that the²⁹² ideal is ascetic; but, according to most of the schools, it is so in a positive and not in a negative sense. By 'positive asceticism' I mean such asceticism as goes hand in hand with altruistic activity and is never divorced from it. That is, the aim of life is not mere detachment, but detachment and service. We have here a second feature of the common Indian ideal, viz. service, which shows that the pursuit of it does not mean running away from society and seeking passive isolation. Man's temptation, according to it, is not the world: rather his temptation, to put it compendiously, is the flesh. In

²⁸⁹ The original editor changed "HBrom-ston" to "Brom-ston" by hand

²⁹⁰ The original editor inserted "i.e. Bromton (pronounced)" by hand

²⁹¹ 279

[®] In Indian philosophical Congress, 1939.

^{292 280}

other words, what is commended here is self-renunciation and not world-renunciation; and the common belief that the Indian ideal is mostly negative is not in accord with the prevailing spirit of Indian teaching. The greatest warrant for this conclusion is found in the Gita which all orthodox systems, without any exception, reckon as a scripture of the highest authority. It insists upon the necessity of leading a life of incessant activity, although one may have no object to attain thereby for oneself. Life without action, it reckons, as almost a sin. The divine teacher here, who is necessarily also the exemplar of the teaching he imparts, says 'There is nothing in the three worlds which I have to toil for; and yet I act.' The influence of this teaching is, in all probability, to be traced even outside orthodox thought as, for example, in the Bodhisattva conception of later Buddhism, according to which, Buddhahood, the very pinnacle of human aspiration, is sought because of the fitness it secures for rendering true service to others.

It may appear from what I have stated that renunciation and service are separate aims, which are to be pursued independently. But it²⁹³ is really not so, for they are conceived as standing in an intimate and vital relation to each other. Service is not regarded here as a mere concomitant of renunciation, but the very means of cultivating it. Consequently the aim is not renunciation and service, but renunciation through service. It means that true detachment cannot be achieved, except by living an active life in the midst of others and devoting oneself to their welfare; only the activities, which such a life signifies, should be carried on without the least thought of advantage to oneself, if they should lead to complete detachment. As active service then, the discipline involves self-affirmation; and as tending to complete detachment, it also involves self-denial. The excellence of the teaching is in bringing these opposites into harmony; and it is able to do so by purifying the one of egoism and the other of passivity or inaction.

- 5. When we consider duties as means to renunciation, it is not their content that matters, but the selfless spirit in which they are done. All can therefore be samnyasins in this sense, because all have their places in society and the duties pertaining to them. Accordingly, we find the Mahabharata representing as a pattern of true asceticism a pedlar who fulfils his functions in society conscientiously and with absolute disinterestedness.
- 6. But all such activity, by its very character, involves the possibility of an internal constraint or strife within the self. Disinterested activity, even when it is the result of strife, may be quite commendable; but it cannot be regarded as the ultimate ideal. The need for striving which may, at any moment, be felt in such activity is rather an index that the goal has not been reached. To reach it which, according to all Indian thinkers, is a state²⁹⁴ characterised by peace of spirit, 'a repose that ever is the same,' this need for

²⁹³ 281

effort must wholly disappear. Hence it is not enough for attaining the ideal to dismiss self-interest; the notion of agency also must be given up. In other words, the agent should transcend the sense of duty itself by rising above himself completely. As the Mahabharata puts it, we should first forswear all selfishness, and then 'forswear that by which we do so.' The thought here is that unselfishness which is conscious of itself is not the perfect form of it. We have a sample of such a totally impersonal attitude, though but a transient one, in art experience, where the object is contemplated, neither as related to oneself nor as related to others, but solely for its own sake.

- 7. The same purpose is present in both the mother and the nurse, viz. the welfare of the child; but, in the case of the mother, the service gains a new significance as the spontaneous expression of a unique attitude towards the object of devotion. The attainment of a similar level of action, in respect not of this person or that but of all, represents the Indian ideal of life. The agent passes in it from a state of striving morality to that of spontaneous service where he acts as he does, because he cannot but do so.
- 8. This service also undoubtedly involves love; and an old Sanskrit verse describes the attitude of a person, who has reached the goal, as that of a parent to whom the whole world is like his own household. But it is a love which is meditated by comprehensive knowledge. If one form of love is notoriously blind, all forms of it operate more or less instinctively and not with complete understanding. The only key to such understanding is²⁹⁵ philosophy with its synoptic comprehension of the universe. That is, the gulf between common morality and the ideal, referred to above, can be bridged only by philosophic knowledge; and for the acquisition of such knowledge, a further course of discipline, which is predominantly intellectual, becomes necessary.
- 9. There are, we know, such differences as, for instance, in regard to the ultimate nature of the self; but for us they only mean that the doctrines assign different metaphysical reasons to show the need for renunciation and service, which all of them alike admit as essential to the ideal. But whichever be the doctrine chosen, it is absolutely necessary that its teaching should as a whole, be properly assimilated, if it is to have effective influence on everyday conduct. It is not enough to think and know; one must also feel and experience. That is, the knowledge conveyed by the teaching should be transformed into an immediate conviction, if it is to issue in unbidden action, like a mother's love. In her case also, there is a similar realisation. It is only such a living awareness, and not a merely conceptual knowledge, of reality that can inspire love which will transmute conduct. But it is necessary to remember that the two types

Prof. M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY" ²⁹⁵ 283

Prof. M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY"

of love are quite different. The one, viz. instinctive love is really a form of attachment (mamata) as shown by the exclusions it implies, whereas the other signifies, as we know, complete detachment and therefore equal love for all. The latter resembles what theistic creeds like Christianity term 'divine love'; but even from that, it differs in some vital points. To mention only one of them: we are there in the realm of faith and not, as here, of knowledge or insight into the ultimate nature of the universe. It is this insight or abiding enlightenment that forms the third and last feature of the common Indian ideal of²⁹⁶ life to which I desire to draw attention now.

When the ethical training of the first stage comes to be aided by such enlightenment, renunciation, instead of being merely an aim externally regulating conduct, becomes the natural expression of an inner conviction; and, in like manner, service, instead of being a means to an end, becomes the necessary consequence of that conviction. Or, to state the same otherwise, the constraint of obligation is replaced by the spontaneity of love. Owing to this total metamorphosis, moral action passes into a higher form. To a person that has reached this stage, the duties of his station, as such, to whose importance in the earlier stage of the discipline, I drew attention, lose their special significance; and he reacts to presented situations without relating them as before, to himself. It is this transcending of all subjective or personal valuation which is the significance of the Upanishadic saying that a knower is not troubled by thoughts like 'Have I not done the right?' or 'Have I done the wrong'? It means that he rises above the moods of self-approbation and self-condemnation. Consequently, though still an actor on the stage of the world like others, his point of view becomes than of an impartial spectator. He will necessarily continue to work and help others, but the service which he renders will extend to all without any distinction whatsoever. Thanks to his enlightenment and the new perspective he has thereby gained, it will also be the best of its kind.

10.²⁹⁷ This feature of enlightened and self-forgetting service characterises the final state attained in the present life. Many a sage whose memory is preserved in Indian tradition, we learn, led a life of such disinterested and ²⁹⁸ loving service.

11. The message of Indian philosophy is that man should seek for the fulfilment of his highest being in such service. The distinctive features of this service, as I have tried to point out, are that it should be rendered in a spirit of absolute disinterestedness and that it should be rooted in an all-comprehensive love which is the outcome of complete enlightenment.

Prof. M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY"

²⁹⁷ The original editor inserted "10." By hand

²⁹⁸ 285

Prof. M. HIRIYANNA: "THE MESSAGE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY"

²⁹⁶ 284

G.R. MALKANI: "THE PRINCIPLE OF INEXPLICABILITY IN PHILOSOPHY." This inexplicability is an ultimate fact. It is the only true answer to the original demand for explanation. This demand is accordingly not frustrated. It is fully met, and in a way which makes any further repetition of the original question meaningless. demands to be explained is sublated by the truth and wanders homeless like an illusory The most complete explanation is not that which can accommodate appearance. literally everything within a self-explanatory system (there is no such system), but an explanation which leaves no further problem of explanation by recognising the inexplicable. Paradoxical therefore as it may appear, a thing is fully explained when it is seen to be inherently and ultimately of the nature of the inexplicable. If it is not thus seen, the problem of explanation will only change its form, but it will never get finally resolved. It will keep recurring in one form or another. To resolve the question, we must show it to be ultimately illegitimate. It should not arise. An irrationality is not a matter for explanation; for it is opposed to reason itself. We in fact get here to the end of reason. We see the real which reveals itself, and reject the unreal about which no further question can be asked.

- 2. The²⁹⁹ process of explanation is inapplicable to reality. The content of anything real cannot be prescribed in thought. It is in a sense infinite. A fact, however insignificant, has no definite limits.
- 3. When we declare something to be, by its very nature, inexplicable, we do not mean that it has an explanation which we do not know or even cannot know. What we mean is that the question of explanation simply does not arise. The illusory is incapable of explanation. But this does not mean any defect in our understanding of it. To know the illusory as illusory is to realise it as what is self-contradictory, a something which is at the same time not that something, and which therefore offers no mystery and no legitimate question of explanation. It is completely uncovered, completely open to our view, and completely resolved as a mystery of being. It is known for what it is, and Our understanding may be forced, because of its offers no further problem. ineradicable habit of questioning, to entertain certain questions about the illusory. But in the end, and on analysis, they would be found to be quite unanswerable, just because they are illegitimate. To say then that the illusory is inexplicable is not to confess ignorance on our part. It is rather a claim to penetrate the veil of mystery that hides reality from us and to know reality as self-revealing and self-luminous.
- 4. The only explanations that the intellect, in its normal activity, can devise, are the scientific explanations. These do not really go to the root of the matter. They do not explain. They merely postpone an ultimate explanation. They move within the sphere

200

[®] In Indian Philosophical Congress 1939.

²⁹⁹ 286

of what is called "matter of fact." The "matter of fact" may be the <u>end</u> of science. But it is only the <u>beginning</u> of philosophy. We cannot for ever stay in the matter³⁰⁰ of fact. It demands an explanation. This explanation cannot take the form of certain "reasons" which the intellect can conceive. All reasons lead merely to further reasons. There is no end that way. What may be called "the sufficient reason" for anything is intellectually an impossibility. The best reason is necessarily beyond reason. It is to resolve facts that require to be explained into that reality which does not require to be explained. Questions arise from defective seeing. We have only to see well and truly. This is the ideal explanation which philosophy must help us to realise.

<u>SADDHARMA-PUNDARIKA</u>. (or <u>THE LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW</u>.)^{@@} 1. The Saddharma-pundarika is one of the nine Dharmas which are known by the titles of –1. Ashtasahasrika Pragnaparamita; 2. Ganda-vyuha; 3. Dasabhumisvara; 4. Samadhi-raga; 5. Lankavatara; 6. Saddharma-pundarika; 7. Tathagata-guhyaka; 8. Lalita-vistara; 9. Suvarna-prabhasa.

These nine works, to which divine worship is offered, embrace (to use the words of the first investigator of Nepalese Buddhism) 'in the first, an abstract of the philosophy of Buddhism; in the seventh, a treatise on the esoteric doctrines; and in the seven remaining ones, a full illustration of every point of the ordinary doctrine and discipline, taught in the easy and effective way of example and anecdote, interspersed with occasional instances of dogmatic instruction.

- 2. As the book, along with the Parisishtas, already existed some time before 250 A.D., we may safely conclude that the more ancient text in 21 chapters, the epilogue included, dates some centuries earlier. Greater precision is for the present impossible. We know that a commentary on³⁰¹ the Saddharma-pundarika was composed by Vasubandhu.
- 3. The title of Adibuddha does not occur in the lotus, but it is intimated that Sakya is identical with Adibuddha in the words: 'From the very beginning (adita eva) have I roused, brought to maturity, fully developed them (the innumerable Bodhisattvas) to be fit for their Bodhisattva position.' It is only by accommodation that he is called Adibuddha, he properly being anadi, i.e. existing from eternity, having no beginning. The Buddha most solemnly declares (ch.xv) that he reached Bodhi an immense time ago, not as people fancy, first at Gaya. From the whole manner in which Sakya speaks of his existence in former times, it is perfectly clear that the author wished to convey the

^{300 287}

G.R. MALKANI: "THE PRINCIPLE OF INEXPLICABILITY IN PHILOSOPHY."

^{®®} Translated by H. Kern. (A Mahayana Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese text)

^{301 288}

meaning that the Lord had existed from eternity, or, what comes to the same, from the very beginning, from time immemorial, etc.

Sakya has not only lived an infinite number of Aeons in the past, he is to live for ever. Common people fancy that he enters Nirvana, but in reality he only makes a show of Nirvana out of regard for the weakness of men. He, the Father of the world, the Self-born One, the Chief and Saviour of creatures, produces a semblance of Nirvana whenever he sees them given to error and folly. In reality his being is not subject to complete Nirvana; it is only by a skilful device that he makes a snow of it; and repeatedly he appears in the world of the living, though his real abode is on the summit of the Gridhrakuta. And this is, in other words, the teaching of Narayana in Bhagavadgita IV, 6.

- 4. The Lotus, as a whole, breathes a less monastic and ascetic spirit; it does not go the length to speak of ascetism and mortification in such scornful terms as the Bhagavad-gita does, but at the same time it never extols it. There are³⁰² in the book many indications that the art of preaching was made much of and highly developed, and it may be supposed that a greater proficiency in hermeneutics combined with superior mental activity has enabled the Mahayana to supplant its rival, the Hinayana, and to extend its spiritual conquests once from the snows of Siberia to the luxuriant islands of the Indian Archipelago.
- 5. The venerable Sariputra, who apprehended the doubt and uncertainty of the four classes of the audience and guessed their thoughts from what was passing in his own mind, himself being in doubt about the law, then said to the Lord: What, O Lord, is the cause, what the reason of the Lord so repeatedly and extremely extolling the skilfulness, knowledge, and preaching of the Tathagata? Why does he repeatedly extol it by saying, 'Profound is the Law by me discovered; it is difficult to understand the mystery of the Tathagatas.' Never before have I heard from the Lord such a discourse on the Law.
- 6. Now it happened that five thousand proud monks, nuns, and lay devotees of both sexes in the congregation rose from their seats and, after saluting with their heads the Lord's feet, went to leave the assembly. Owing to the principle of good which there is in pride they imagined having attained what they had not, and having understood what they had not. Therefore thinking themselves aggrieved, they went to leave the assembly, to which the Lord by his silence showed assent.

There upon the Lord addressed the venerable Sariputra: My congregation, Sariputra, has been cleared from the chaff, freed from the trash; it is firmly established in the strength of faith. It is good, Sariputra, that those proud ones are gone away. Now I am going to expound³⁰³ the matter.

^{302 289}

- 7. It is not by reasoning, Sariputra, that the law is to be found: it is beyond the pale of reasoning, and must be learnt from the Tathagata.
- 8. When the Tathagatas, etc. happen to appear at the decay of the epoch, the decay of creatures, the decay of besetting sins, the decay of views, or the decay of lifetime; when they appear amid such signs of decay at the disturbance of the epoch; when creatures are much tainted, full of greed and poor in roots of goodness; then, Sariputra, the Tathagatas, etc. use, skilfully, to designate that one and sole Buddha-vehicle by the appellation of the threefold-vehicle.
- 9. No less than five thousand monks, nuns, and lay devotees of both sexes, full of unbelief and conceit, remarking this slight, went, defective in training and foolish as they were, away in order to beware of damage. The Lord, who knew them to be the dregs of the congregation, exclaimed: They have no sufficient merit to hear this law.
- 10. Why should not the mighty one, after having waited for the right time, speak, now that he perceives the right moment is come? This is the fit opportunity, met somehow, of commencing the exposition of what really is.
- 11. On the terrace of enlightenment I have remained three weeks in full, searching and pondering on such a matter, steadily looking up to the tree there (standing).

Keeping in view that king of trees with an unwavering gaze I walked round at its foot (thinking): This law is wonderful and lofty, whereas creatures are blind with dulness and ignorance.

Then it was that Brahma entreated me, and so did Indra, the four rulers of the cardinal points³⁰⁴, Mahesvara, Isvara, and the hosts of Maruts by thousands of kotis.

All stood with joined hands and respectful, while myself was revolving the matter in my mind (and thought): What shall I do? At the very time that I am uttering syllables, beings are oppressed with evils.

In their ignorance they will not heed the Law I announce, and in consequence of it they will incur some penalty. It would be better were I never to speak. May my quiet extinction take place this very day!

But on remembering the former Buddhas and their skilfulness, (I thought): Nay, I also will manifest this tripartite Buddha-enlightenment.

12. When I had come to that conviction, O son of Sari, I instantly went to Benares, where I skilfully preached the law to the five Solitaries, that law which is the base of final beatitude. From that moment the wheel of my law has been moving, and the

name of Nirvana made its appearance in the world, as well as the name of Arhat, of Dharma, and Sangha.

Many years have I preached and pointed to the stage of Nirvana, the end of wretchedness and mundane existence. Thus I used to speak of all times.

- 13. This (event) to-day will be hard to be understood by the ignorant as they are proud and dull. But the Bodhisattvas, they will listen to me. And I felt free from hesitation and highly cheered; putting aside all timidity, I began speaking.
- 14. The Tathagata reflects thus Verily, I am the father of these beings; I must save them from this mass of evil, and bestow on them the immense, inconceivable bliss of Buddha-knowledge, wherewith they shall sport, play, and divert themselves, wherein they shall find their rest. Unless they are forced to leave the triple world which is like a house the shelter and roof whereof is³⁰⁵ in a blaze, how are they to get acquainted with Buddha-knowledge?

And to attract them I say: These vehicles are grand, praised by the Aryas, and provided with most pleasant things; with such you are to sport, play, and divert yourselves in a noble manner. Ye will feel the great delight of the faculties, powers, constituents of Bodhi, meditations, the (eight) degrees of emancipation, self-concentration, and the results of self-concentration, and ye will become greatly happy and cheerful.

And those beings, Sariputra, who are delivered from the triple world, to them the Tathagata gives as toys to amuse themselves with the lofty pleasures of the Aryas, the pleasures of meditation, emancipation, self-concentration, and its results; (toys) all of the same kind.

The Tathagata, the Arhat, etc. tells no falsehood when by an able device he first holds forth three vehicles and afterwards leads all to complete Nirvana by the one great vehicle.

- 15. The powers, meditations, degrees of emancipation and self-concentration by many hundreds of kotis, that is the exalted vehicle in which the sons of Buddha take a never-ending delight. In playing with it they pass days and nights, fortnights, months, seasons, years, intermediate kalpas, nay, thousands of kotis of kalpas.
- 16. I am teaching blessed rest (Nirvana), in so far as, though you have not yet reached (final) rest, you are delivered from the trouble of the mundane whirl.
- 17. When the creatures in this world of delight in low and contemptible pleasures, then the Chief of the world, who always speaks the truth, indicates pain as the (first)

³⁰⁵ 292

great truth.³⁰⁶ And to those who are ignorant and too simple-minded to discover the root of that pain I lay open the way: 'Awaking of full consciousness, strong desire is the origin of pain.'

Always try, unattached, to suppress desire. This is my third truth, that of suppression. It is an infallible means of deliverance; for by practising this method one shall become emancipated.

And from what are they emancipated, Sariputra? They are emancipated from chimeras. Yet they are not wholly freed; the Chief declares that they have not yet reached (final and complete) rest in this world.

Why is it that I do not pronounce one to be delivered before one's having reached the highest, supreme enlightenment? (Because) such is my will; I am the ruler of the law, who is born in this world to lead to beatitude.

This, Sariputra, is the closing word of my law which now at the last time I pronounce for the weal of the world including the gods. Preach it in all quarters.

- 18. But thou, Sariputra, hast good will, not to speak of my other disciples here. They will walk in my faith, though each cannot have his individual knowledge. But do not speak of this matter to haughty persons, nor to conceited ones, nor to Yogins who are not self-restrained; for the fools, always revelling in sensual pleasures, might in their blindness scorn the law manifested.
- 19. In this bodily existence, closing with Nirvana, we have continually accustomed our thoughts to the void; we have been released from the evils of the triple world we were suffering from, and have accomplished the command of the Gina. To whom (soever) among the sons of Gina who in this world are on the road to superior enlightenment we revealed (the law), and whatever law³⁰⁷ we taught, we never had any predilection for it. And the Master of the world, the Self-born one, takes no notice of us, waiting his time; he does not explain the real connection of the things, as he is testing our disposition.
- 20. Even as the great cloud, Kasyapa, after expanding over the whole universe, pours out the same water and recreates by it all grasses, shrubs, herbs, and trees; even as all these grasses, shrubs, herbs, and trees, according to their faculty, power and strength, suck in the water and thereby attain the full development assigned to their kind; in like manner, Kasyapa, is the law preached by the Tathagata, the Arhat, etc. of one and the same essence, that is to say, the essence of it is deliverance, the final aim being absense of passion, annihilation, knowledge of the all-knowing. As to that, Kasyapa, (it must be understood) that the beings who hear the law when it is preached

^{306 293}

by the Tathagata, who keep it in their memory and apply themselves to it, do not know, nor perceive, nor understand their own self. For, Kasyapa, the Tathagata only really knows who, how, and of what kind those beings are; what, how, and whereby they are meditating; what, how and whereby they are contemplating; what, why, and whereby they are attaining. No one but the Tathagata, Kasyapa, is there present, seeing all intuitively, and seeing the state of those beings in different stages, as of the lowest, highest, and mean grasses, shrubs, herbs, and trees. I am he, Kasyapa, who, knowing the law which is of but one essence, viz. the essence of deliverance, (the law) ever peaceful, ending in Nirvana, (the law) of eternal rest, having but one stage and placed in voidness, (who knowing this) do not on a sudden reveal to all the knowledge of the all-knowing, since I pay regard to the dispositions of 308 all beings.

21. Whether walking, standing, or sitting, I am exclusively occupied with this task of proclaiming the law. I never get tired of sitting on the chair I have ascended.

I recreate the whole world like a cloud shedding its water without distinction; I have the same feelings for respectable people as for the low; for moral persons as for the immoral.

- 22. The Lord having thus spoken, the venerable Maha-Kasyapa said: Lord, if the beings are of different disposition, will there be for those who have left the triple world one Nirvana, or two, or three? The Lord replied: Nirvana, Kasyapa, is a consequence of understanding that all laws (things) are equal. Hence there is but one Nirvana, not two, not three.
- 23. To the man who recovers his eyesight is likened the votary of the vehicle of the disciples and of Pratyekabuddhas. He rends the ties of evil passion in the whirl of the world; freed from those ties he is released from the triple world with its six states of existence. Therefore the votary of the vehicle of the disciples may think and speak thus: There are no more laws to be penetrated; I have reached Nirvana. Then the Tathagata preaches to him: How can he who has not penetrated all laws have reached Nirvana? The Lord rouses him to enlightenment, and the disciple, when conscious of enlightenment has been awakened in him, no longer stays in the mundane whirl, but at the same time has not yet reached Nirvana. As he has arrived at true insight, he looks upon this triple world in every direction as void, resembling the produce of magic, similar to a dream, a mirage, an echo.
- 24. He who ignores the rotation of mundane existence, has no perception of blessed rest; But he who understands that all laws are void and without reality (and without

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³⁰⁸ 295

individual character)³⁰⁹ penetrates the enlightenment of the perfectly enlightened Lords in its very essence.

One who occupies a middle position of wisdom is called a Pratyekagina (i.e. Pratyekabuddha); one lacking the insight of voidness is termed a disciple. But after understanding all laws one is called a perfectly-enlightened one; such a one is assiduous in preaching the law to living beings by means of hundreds of devices.

25. As an able teacher he shows the true law; he reveals supreme Buddha-enlightenment to him who is most advanced.

To those of middling wisdom the Leader preaches a middling enlightenment; again another enlightenment he recommends to him who is afraid of the mundane whirl.

The disciple who by his discrimination has escaped from the triple world thinks he has reached pure, blest Nirvana, but it is only by knowing all laws (and the universal laws) that the immortal Nirvana is reached

In that case it is as if the great Seers, moved by compassion, said to him: Thou art mistaken; do not be proud of thy knowledge.

When thou art in the interior of thy room, thou canst not perceive what is going on without, fool as thou art.

26. Similarly all disciples fancy having reached Nirvana, but the Gina instructs them (by saying): This is a (temporary) repose, no final rest.

It is an artifice of the Buddhas to enunciate this dogma. There is no (real) Nirvana without all-knowingness; try to reach this.

27. He who considers all things to be alike, void, devoid of particularity and individuality, not derived from an intelligent cause; nay, who discerns that nothingness is law; Such a one has great wisdom and sees the whole of the law entirely.

28³¹⁰. Indeed, monks, the Tathagata, etc. reflect thus: Great is this forest of evils which must be crossed, left, shunned. It ought not to be that these beings, after hearing the Buddha-knowledge, should suddenly turn back and not proceed to the end because they think: This Buddha-knowledge is attended with too many difficulties to be gone through to the end. Under those circumstances the Tathagata, knowing the creatures to be feeble of character, to give repose to the creatures, very skilfully teaches and proclaims two stages of Nirvana, viz. the stage of the disciples and that of the Pratyekabuddhas. And, monks, when the creatures are there halting, then the Tathagata, etc. himself, pronounces these words: "You have not accomplished your

^{309 296}

task, monks; you have not finished what you had to do. But behold monks! the Buddha-knowledge is near; behold and be convinced: what to you (seems) Nirvana, that is not Nirvana. Nay, monks, it is an able device of the Tathagatas etc. that they expound three vehicles."

29. This being the case, monks, you need not be afraid. It is as if there were a forest dreadful, terrific, barren, without a place of refuge or shelter, replete with wild beasts, deprived of water, frightful for persons of no experience.

(Suppose further that) many thousand men have come to the forest, that waste track of wilderness which is fully five hundred yoganas in extent. And he who is to act as their guide through that rough and horrible forest is a rich man, thoughtful, intelligent, wise, well instructed, and undaunted.

And those beings, numbering many kotis, feel tired, and say to the guide: 'We are tired, Master; we are not able to go on; we should like now to return.' But³¹¹ he, the dexterous and clever guide, is searching in his mind for some apt device. Alas! he thinks, by going back these foolish men will be deprived of the possession of the jewels.

Therefore let me by dint of magic power now produce a great city adorned with thousands of kotis of buildings and embellished by monasteries and parks.

Let me produce ponds and canals; (a city) adorned with gardens and flowers, provided with walls and gates, and inhabited by an infinite number of men and women.

After creating that city he speaks to them in this manner: 'Do not fear, and be cheerful; you have reached a most excellent city; enter it and do your business, speedily.

'Be joyful and at ease; you have reached the limit of the whole forest.' It is to give them a time for repose that he speaks these words, and, in fact, they recover from their weariness.

As he perceives that they have sufficiently reposed, he collects them and addresses them again: 'Come, hear what I have to tell you: this city have I produced by magic.

'On seeing you fatigued, I have, lest you should go back, made use of this device; now strain your energy to reach the Isle.'

In the same manner, monks, I am the guide, the conductor of thousands of kotis of living beings; in the same manner I see creatures toiling and unable to break the shell of the egg of evils.

Then I reflect on this matter: These beings have enjoyed repose, have been tranquillised; now I will remind them of the misery of all things (and I say): 'At the stage of Arhat you shall reach your aim.'

³¹¹ 298

At that time, when you shall have attained that 312 state, and when I see all of you have become Arhats, then will I call you at together and explain to you how the law really is.

It is an artifice of the Leaders, when they, the great Seers, show three vehicles, for there is but one vehicle, no second; it is only to help (creatures) that two vehicles are spoken of.

Therefore I now tell you, monks: Rouse to the utmost your lofty energy for the same of the knowledge of the all-knowing; as yet, you have not come so far as to possess complete Nirvana.

But when you shall have attained the knowledge of the all-knowing and the ten powers proper to Ginas, you shall become Buddhas marked by the thirty-two characteristic signs and have rest for ever.

Such is the teaching of the Leaders: in order to give quiet they speak of repose, (but) when they see that (the creatures) have had a repose, they, knowing this to be no final resting-place initiate them in the knowledge of the all-knowing.

30. The Tathagata excepted, monks, there is none able to equal Purna. Now, monks, do you suppose that he keeps my true law only? No, monks, you must not think so. Even as he is now with me, so he has, in all periods, been the foremost of the preachers of the law; has in all periods been a consummate knower of Voidness; has in all periods acquired the (four) distinctive qualifications of an Arhat; has in all periods reached mastership in the transcendent wisdom of the Bodhisattvas. He has been a strongly convinced preacher of the law, exempt from doubt, and guite pure. Under the mastership of those Buddhas he has during his whole existence observed a spiritual life, and everywhere they termed him 'the Disciple'. By this means he has promoted the 313 interest of innumerable, incalculable hundred thousands of myriads of kotis of beings, and brought innumerable and incalculable beings to full ripeness for supreme and perfect enlightenment.

Viewing these beings to be lowly-disposed and to be startled at the lofty vehicle, the Bodhisattvas become disciples and exercise Pratyekabuddhaship.

By many hundreds of able devices they bring numerous Bodhisattvas to full ripeness and declare: We are but disciples, indeed, and we are far away from the higher and supreme enlightenment.

It is by learning from them this course (of duty) that kotis of beings arrive at full ripeness, who (at first), lowly-disposed and somewhat lazy, in course of time all become Buddhas.

They follow a course in ignorance (thinking) We, disciples, are of little use, indeed! In despondency they descend into all places of existence (successively), and (so) clear their own field.

They show in their own persons that they are not free from affection, hatred, and infatuation; and on perceiving (other) beings clinging to (heretical) views, they go so far as to accommodate themselves to those views.

By following such a course my numerous disciples skilfully save creatures; simple people would go mad, if they were taught the whole course of life.

31. In the same manner, O Lord, has the Tathagata formerly, when he still followed the course of duty of a Bodhisattva, raised in us also ideas of omniscience, but we, O Lord, did not perceive, nor know it. We fancied, O Lord, that on the stage of Arhat we had reached Nirvana. We live in difficulty, O Lord, because we content ourselves with such a trifling degree of however ceased, the Tathagata teaches us the right: 'Have no such idea of Nirvana, monks.' We were contented with a little of Nirvana; we required nothing higher, nor even cared for it.

But the Friend of the world has taught us better: 'This is no blesses Rest at all; the full knowledge of the highest men, that is blessed Rest, that is supreme beatitude.'

- 32. He performs the task of the Tathagatas and has been sent by me to the world of men, he who in the last days shall copy, keep, or hear this Sutra.
- 33. It is this which is apt to meet with no acceptance with everybody, to find no belief with everybody. This, indeed, Bhaishagyaraga, is the transcendent spiritual esoteric lore of the law, preserved by the power of the Tathagatas, but never divulged; it is an article (of creed) not yet made known.
- 34. When the wise man does not remark, 'This is a woman,' nor marks, 'This is a man'; when in searching he finds no laws (or things), because they have never existed;

This is called the observance of the Bodhisattvas in general. Now listen to me when I set forth what should be their proper sphere.

All laws (i.e. the laws, the things) have been declared to be non-existing, not appearing, not produced, void, immovable, everlasting, this is called the proper sphere of the wise.

They have been divided into existing and non-existing, real and unreal, by those who had wrong notions; other laws also, of permanency, of being produced, of birth from something already produced, are wrongly assumed.

^{314 301}

Let (the Bodhisattva) be concentrated in mind, attentive, ever firm as the peak of Mount Sumeru, and in such a state (of mind) look upon all³¹⁵ laws (and things) as having the nature of space.

35. Let the sage first, for some time, coerce his thoughts, exercise meditation with complete absorption, and correctly perform all that is required for attaining spiritual insight, and then, after rising (from his pious meditation), preach with unquailing mind.

The kings of this earth and the princes who listen to the law protect him. Others also, both laymen (or burghers) and Brahmans, will be found together in his congregation.

Further, Mangusri, the Bodhisattva Mahasattva who, after the complete extinction of the Tathagata at the end of time, the last period, the last five hundred years, when the true law is in a state of decay, is going to propound this Dharmaparyaya, must be in a peaceful state (of mind) and then preach the law, whether he know it by heart or has it in a book. In his sermon he will not be too prone to carping at others, not blame other preaching friars, not speak scandal nor propagate scandal. He does not mention by name other monks, adherents of the vehicle of disciples, to propagate scandal. He cherishes even no hostile feelings against them, because he is in a peaceful state.

36. The wise man is indefatigable; not even the thought of fatigue will rise in him; he knows no listlessness, and so displays to the assembly the strength of charity.

Day and night the wise man preaches this sublime law with myriads of kotis of illustrations; he edifies and satisfies his audience without ever requiring anything.

Solid food, soft food, nourishment and drink, cloth, couches, robes, medicaments for the sick, all this does not occupy his thoughts, nor does he want anything from the congregation.

On³¹⁶ the contrary, the wise man is always thinking: How can I and these beings become Buddhas? I will preach this true law, upon which the happiness of all beings depends, for the benefit of the world.

The monk who, after my extinction, shall preach in this way, without envy, shall not meet with trouble, impediment, grief or despondency.

37. After having revealed perfect enlightenment and led many kotis of beings to perfect rest, he himself will be extinguished like a lamp when the oil is exhausted.

^{315 302}

38. I show the place of extinction, I reveal to (all) beings a device to educate them, albeit I do not become extinct at the time, and in this very place continue preaching the law. But men of perverted minds, in their delusion, do not see me standing there.

In the opinion that my body is completely extinct, they pay worship, in many ways, to the relics, but me they see not. They feel (however) a certain aspiration by which their mind becomes right.

When such upright (or pious), mild, and gentle creatures leave off their bodies, then I assemble the crowd of disciples and show myself here on the Gridhrakuta.

And then I speak thus to them, in this very place: I was not completely extinct at that time; it was but a device of mine, monks; repeatedly am I born in the world of the living.

- 39. I see how the creatures are afflicted, but I do not show them my proper being. Let them first have an aspiration to see me; then I will reveal to them the true law.
- 40. I never speak to them of the infinitude of my action. Therefore, I am, properly, existing since long, and yet declare: The Ginas are rare (or precious).

Such³¹⁷ is the glorious power of my wisdom that knows no limit, and the duration of my life is as long as an endless period; I have acquired if after previously following a due course.

Feel no doubt concerning it, O sages, and leave off all uncertainty: the word I here pronounce is really true; my word is never false.

For even as that physician skilled in devices, for the sake of his sons whose notions were perverted, said that he had died although he was still alive, and even as no sensible man would charge that physician with falsehood;

So am I the father of the world, the Self-born, the Healer, the Protector of all creatures. Knowing them to be perverted, infatuated, and ignorant I teach final rest, myself not being at rest.

What reason should I have to continually manifest myself? When men become unbelieving, unwise, ignorant, careless, fond of sensual pleasures, and from thoughtlessness run into misfortune,

Then I, who know the course of the world, declare: I am so and so, (and consider): How can I incline them to enlightenment? How can they become partakers of the Buddha-laws?

41. Let him energetically pursue enlightenment with the thought of his reaching all-knowingness, and so arrive at the highest degree of meditation.

^{317 304}

42. Then seeing that old age has approached for them, that their brow is wrinkled and their head grey (he thinks): Alas, how all beings come to decay! Let me therefore admonish them by (speaking of) the law.

He teaches them the law here on earth and points³¹⁸ to the state of Nirvana hereafter. 'All existences' (he says) 'are like a mirage; hasten to become disgusted with all existence.

43. The quickness of his apprehension will be unlimited; like the wind he will nowhere meet impediments; he knows the purport and interpretation of the law, he who keeps this exalted Sutra.

He will, after some reflection, always find out the connection of the Sutras spoken by the leaders; even after the complete extinction of the leader he will grasp the real meaning of the Sutras.

He resembles the moon and the sun; he illuminates all around him, and while roaming the earth in different directions he rouses many Bodhisattvas.

- 44. He will show to those who must be converted by a relic of the Tathagata himself such a relic, and to those who must be converted by complete extinction, he will show himself completely extinct.
- 45. In quarrel, dispute, war, battle, in any great danger one has to think of Avalokitesvara who shall quell the wicked troop of foes.

O think with tranquil mood of Avalokitesvara, that pure being; he is a protector, a refuge, a recourse in death, disaster, and calamity.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

- 1. The Theistic system of Madhva (Anandatirtha) is practically unknown in the West, though brief references have been made to it, and short essays written on it. In India, knowledge of the system is a monopoly of the Pandits, as the works of Madhva are written in terse terminology, and as commentaries on them are technical and voluminous. I have, therefore, attempted an exposition of the ten important works of Madhva which reveal systematic evolution of his system.
- 2.³¹⁹ The exaggerated Absolutism which was emphasised by Sankara and his school of the Vedanta broke under its own weight. A Pluralistic and Realistic reaction was the natural outcome. The reaction can never be repudiated or condemned as an intellectual or speculative luxury. It represents and marks a genuinely felt need. Ward writes:

SADDHARMA-PUNDARIKA. (or THE LOTUS OF THE TRUE LAW.)

³¹⁹ 306

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{318 305}

"But the recoil from Absolutism still persists; and accordingly, the 20th century opens with the attempt to work out the idealistic interpretation not in the old way, as essentially a devolution of the One, but rather—as far as possible—to represent it as an evolution of the Many. In England, in America, in France, and even in Germany, once the stronghold of Absolutism, systems of Pluralism more or less pronounced are rife."

- 3. It is true that Ramanuja, Madhva's predecessor, led a reaction against the Absolutism of Sankara, but it does not render Madhva's subsequent protest any way superfluous and needless, as the latter reveals different lines of approach to a criticism of Absolutism.
- No elaborate justification need be attempted for Madhva's developing system in 4. opposition to Sankara's, as obviously it is possible to maintain that a discontent was felt with the extreme Absolutism of the latter. The discontent might have been engendered not merely by the methods pursued by Absolute Idealists but also by the conclusions reached. Faint echoes of the method in question are heard in Bergson's advocacy of violence being done to Intellect. The inexhaustible richness and wealth of Reality and its interminable Creative Vitality can never be adequately expressed in terms of dead intellectual categories, and the very refusal of Reality to permit itself to be stuffed into and squeezed into Intellectual and Conceptual moulds, must point in the direction of 320 a new method to which prominence should be given in all future metaphysical attempts. Granting this method of Intellect to be defective what is the substitute? Sankara speaks of a method of steady and patient practice in psychic advancement which is vouchsafed to lead to the most intimately spiritual contact and even identity with Reality. It will not be an exaggeration to assert that the average philosophically inclined commonalty could not have had any patience with a method-abstract, abstruse, and defyingly difficult to practise - and the promise of an ultimate Identity with Reality as the goal of metaphysical endeavour should have proved to be tantalizing and elusive, until a reaction set in against the view that any such Identity was practical politics at all. While a very adroit and robust mentality is necessary to reconcile oneself to the position, that the gap between the Human and the Divine, the Finite and the Infinite can easily be bridged and the Finite can realise its own Identity, with the Infinite, it is so easy and natural that weak Humanity always considers it to be an unpardonable sacrilege even to dream of an Identity with the Absolute and the Infinite, which must for ever remain out of its grasp and reach. The nervousness of Humanity is great and perfectly justified especially when the God or Deity of Religion comes to be identified with the Absolute of Metaphysics. The God of Religion is the fountain-head of love, mercy and compassion. To forgive is divine. Erring man lifts his hands to Him in ecstatic prayer and submission and implores His pardon and forgiveness. A life dedicated to His worship and prayer is the best morally lived. How

^{320 307}

can such a religious soul ever dream of an Identity of itself with the Deity? The central doctrine of the Advaita Vedanta should have appeared to be a fantastic one and too³²¹ chimerical for practical realization and guidance in life.

The doctrine of the illusory nature of the universe propounded by the Advaita should have failed to make a ready appeal to the minds of the people. It would be nothing short of downright metaphysical pedantry to tell a person working and toiling for his scanty daily bread in the sweat of the brow that the universe is illusory, and that at the dawn of genuine spiritual illumination or insight, the nothingness and emptiness of the world will be realized. The employment of a special psychical method and the goal to which it is believed to lead owe their importance to and derive their significance from the illusory and unreal character of the universe. The two doctrines are closely dependent on one another. Granted the unreality and the illusoriness of the world, it follows that freedom from the world is the only goal. A special method leads to its realization.

- 5. The unpracticality of them and their empty abstraction led to a protest and reaction in course of time.
- 6. The individual effectively realizes his helplessness and impotence even in the comparatively minor concerns of life and existence. More acute and poignant is the sense of his helplessness in spiritual matters. He feels he must lean on some firm support, one which is itself not in need of further or other support. Only the Infinite can be such a perennial and unfailing guide and source of succour. It cannot, however, be anything identical with the Absolute of Metaphysics-towards which all paths lead and from which nought proceeds! To a devout heart oppressed with a heaviness of the Evil and Misery in the world, the Absolute of Metaphysics invariably appears to be a comprehensive Non-entity³²² or Omnipenetrative Nullity. It could not afford any solace to the afflicted heart nor any enlightenment to the baffled and confused reason. A successful grappling with the Absolute were as hopeless as the childish attempt to crush the rising circles of smoke between the palms! A Deity that would sympathise with the afflicted individual, chasten, chastise, and yet release him from the bondage and the "phantasmagoria of metempsychosis" should be enthroned and the Absolute deposed. A devoted and complete surrender of the personality in penitent penance is the only heart-felt and sincere tribute to the Deity. The relationship between the Infinite and the Finite with love, grace, and sympathy on the part of the former, and realization of helplessness and complete surrender of personality and obedience to divine will on that of the latter is termed Bhakti.

^{321 308}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{322 309}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

- The failure of European historians of Indian Philosophy to pay any attention to Madhva's system of thought can by itself be no proof of the inherent unworthiness of the system or of its lacking in metaphysical merit, though such a perverted estimate is so common that non-recognition by European writers is deemed an indictment of Madhva's philosophy, and the scant attention paid to it by European and Indian writers, ancient and modern, has made it a forgotten chapter of the Vedanta.
- 8. When once we begin to suspect whether or not our understanding yields us knowledge of objects as they are, there is no end to such suspicion.
- The Absolutists are driven to the confession of a definite cleavage, not mere relativity which involves only a difference in degree, between intellect and intuition or between ordinary knowledge and the final incandescent act of apprehension of the Absolute. But Madhva maintains a³²³ relatively graded system of knowledge in which the lesser type possessing a lesser degree of clearness exactness and a comprehensiveness, is as much real as the most perfect type. An error is committed the moment unreality is sought to be foisted on the lesser type, or degree. Madhva is uncompromising on this point.
- Madhva then proceeds to describe several types of knowledge which differs in 10. Extent, Range, Intensity, Clearness, and distinctness and penetrativeness. The several types of knowledge have been arranged by him in something like a descending order commencing from the Most perfect Divine Knowledge, and ending with or culminating in the imperfect Human Knowledge. The Higher levels are super-human. The First and Foremost is Iswara Jnyana, Knowledge possessed by the Almighty, or the Most Perfect Divine Being. Such knowledge has a clearness the distinctness and the immediacy of the everlasting Present together with a comprehensiveness such as can never be even imagined by imperfect, finite human intelligence. Such knowledge again is not a progressive mental construction, by no means a growth. It is to the finite intellect incomprehensible, and by it immeasurable and unfathomable. It is never clouded, never obscured. It knows no hesitancy, no deliberation whatever. There is nothing which is not its object and which is not comprehended by it fully.
- The absolutist all the world over is an ingenious person. He is ready. He is 11. resourceful. It becomes incumbent upon him to explain how the Absolute ever became degraded into finite existence. It is all a matter of words.
- 12. The Indian absolutist, to whom oneness of the individual and the Universal is the chief plank, is hard put to it to explain such oneness or identity. The misery, failure,

pain and³²⁴ evil and all the concomitants of finiteness are perfectly incompatible with the oneness of the individual and Brahman to whose essential nature the concomitant marks of finitude are so foreign and alien. How then is any identity to be thought of and methodologically established between the two?

The position of the Indian Absolutist is thus summed up by Madhva's commentator in the work under elucidation—the Upadhi-Khandana. There is nothing wrong or illogical or inconceivable about the identity or the oneness between the individual and Brahman. There is only one reality – only one Substance. The finite soul is Brahman. On account, however, of the ignorance of the real nature of this oneness or identity the individual becomes subject to pain, misery, suffering and all the concomitants of finitude and imperfection. The moment ignorance is removed by an incandescent intuition of Brahman or the Absolute, the individual would have realised his identity with the Absolute. The realisation is the goal of life. It would lay the axe direct to the root of sickening recurrent cycle of births and deaths. With a view to securing such a realisation, an earnest quest after the nature of Brahman should be undertaken by spiritual aspirants. The quest after the Absolute is technically termed Brahma-jignyasa. A study of the Vedanta is undertaken in order to achieve the realisation. Evil (henceforth that is the term used for all concomitants of finitude) is the result of ignorance. We are fallen angels. We are identical with the Absolute. Why, Where? We even now are. The individuals suffer from a sense of isolation, separation and disparateness which is due to ignorance. Life is a preparation. It is a magnificent harnessing of the spiritual resources of the individual with a view to realising the identity between Brahman and itself. A³²⁵ study of the Vedanta would reveal the root cause of the disparity and difference. It is ignorance. Ignorance should be got rid of. The incandescent intuition would reveal the identity between Brahman and the Jiva. A study of the Vedanta leads to positive as well as negative results. The riddance of ignorance would fall under the latter. The dawn of the incandescent intuition and the realisation of the identity between Brahman and the Jiva would come under the former. A study of the Vedanta is thus obligatorily enjoined on all aspirants.

13. The identity is not experienced. It has not been realised. Something stands in the way of the realisation. It blocks the path of an aspirant. What is the interrupting or the obstructing agency? It is ignorance. An ignorant person might be considered to be the 'adhikari'. The unknown is the 'vishaya' or the object of investigation. The removal or the riddance of ignorance is the fruit of enquiry, i.e. the 'prayojana'. Ignorance is thus the pivotal point around which the discussion would naturally revolve. How is omniscience compatible with ignorance? It is useless to endeavour to wriggle out of the situation by contending that omniscience has been clouded. That is a fatal admission.

^{324 311}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{325 312}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

It would seriously militate against the absoluteness of the Absolute! If at any time omniscience became clouded like that, it would cease to be omniscience. Either the identity doctrine should be surrendered or it should be admitted that ignorance can never be compatible with omniscience.

14. It is at this juncture the absolutist introduces the concept of 'Upadhi'. It is a metaphysical <u>open sesame</u>. It is the magic wand. A single waving of the wand is sufficient to silence and hypnotise all critics. No doubt the indefatigable efforts of the absolutist have³²⁶ provided him with a ready subterfuge. It is possible consistently to explain ignorance without in any manner compromising omniscience. True identity between the finite and the Infinite is the truth, the central doctrine of the absolutist. But the identity can tolerate difference as well. It is not abstract bare identity. It is concrete identity. It is identity in and through difference. How is the difference to be accounted for? The difference is due to Upadhi. The moment difference is shown to exist, ignorance also would follow. The difference means Fall from Paradise. Fall from omniscience is ignorance. There is the well-known analogy. Look at the original and the image. There is the mirror. The original is reflected therein. The original is called 'Bimba.' The image is 'Pratibimba.' The mirror or the reflecting agency is 'Upadhi.'

The identity between the finite and the Infinite is maintained alongside of difference. Brahman or the infinite is 'Sarvajnya' – i.e. omniscient. Yet the omniscience does not attach itself in any contagious manner to the finite self, Jiva. The latter has been alienated from the Absolute by the separatistic mischief of the 'Upadhi.' Extend the analogy a bit further. The original or the face might be quite beautiful and even entrancingly charming. Suppose some dust particles have accumulated on the surface of the looking-glass. The dustiness would be then transferred to the image. Even so, Brahman is omniscient 'sarvajnya'. But Jiva or the finite self having come under the influence of the 'Upadhi' has only ignorance and none of omniscience. Ignorance would thus stand or fall with the 'Upadhi'. It somehow separates the finite from the Infinite and having brought about this divorce envelopes the finite in ignorance. Grant the existence and the operation of the 'Upadhi'. Difference of the finite from the³²⁷ Absolute would follow. The difference would be in all relevant and significant respects. Otherwise the Upadhi would have been summoned to account for trivialities which The difference would lead to the conclusion that while Brahman is omniscient 'Jiva' or the finite is ignorant. Try he must for the riddance of the ignorance. He should try and understand the real nature of Brahman and Atman if he is to get rid of his ignorance. He should undertake metaphysical quest. Metaphysics would thus find its proper and adequate justification. This in brief is the doctrine of the 'Upadhi'.

^{326 313}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{327 314}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

What is Madhva's criticism of it? If it could uncritically be conceded that there exists some mysterious agency or force, or entity, or limiting principle, or fissiparous concept or notion, called Upadhi it might follow that the finite selves become alienated from the Absolute and suffer in ignorance. Analogies do not run on all fours. But the function of analogies is to suggest some reliable hypotheses. The mirror-analogy is perfectly and positively misleading. What hypothesis would it suggest? The mirror is there. 2. There is the object, the original or 'Bimba' which is reflected. Light rays proceed from the object, are reflected by the mirror, act as visual stimuli, and 3 an image of the object is perceived. The analogy must break down when it is extended to explain the relationship between the Absolute and the finite selves. The mirror or the reflecting agency is as perfectly real as the original. The process of stimulating the visual organs and the visual area in the brain is real. The image too is real. But the entire trouble is the Upadhi can never be admitted to be as real as the original. If it is, absolutism is clean thrown overboard. When it is passionately asserted³²⁸ that the Upadhi is so potent as to alienate the finite from the absolute, it should be admitted to be as real as anything else. A non-existent or illusory mirror would not produce any image! The mirror must be a reality. But then is the Upadhi a reality? What is its nature? Is the Upadhi a reality or is it held (to maintain absolutism intact) to belong to the realm of the illusory? The alternatives are examined in turn by Madhva.

It the Upadhi is a reality with as much reality as that of the Absolute itself—for no quibbling can be permitted about pet degrees of reality—then absolutism is gone, and Dualism would be the only rational philosophy of life. There would be the Absolute. There would be the limiting or the alienating principle—the Upadhi. Absolutism and Monism would then be the merest empty terms. The same criticism applies with equal force to the European system of absolutism, developed and championed by thinkers like Bradley and Bosanguet. A system-builder is under a methodological obligation to explain how he is able to derive the entire cosmos from his central principle. The absolutist is no exception to the rule-How is the world of organized and unorganized matter and spirit to be derived from the Absolute which alone is the only reality? One is not entitled to introduce the concept of the other surreptitiously. It cannot be so quietly smuggled into the bargain. The Upadhi the other, or the limiting agency should like Ceasar's wife be above all suspicion. Its nature requires the fullest elucidation. It is powerful enough to interfere with the Absolute and somehow bring about the projection of the cosmic show! The question should be raised "Is the Upadhi real or not, real in the same sense in which the absolute is?" It cannot be. If it is, advaitism or absolutism would be gone. There would be³²⁹ dualism instead. Two principles would have then been admitted. The absolutist would have none of dualism. The Upadhi cannot thus be admitted to be as real as the Absolute.

^{328 315}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{329 316}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

How is it that an entity of such dubiousness and indeterminateness is held to be responsible for the degradation of the Absolute into the multifarious men and things of the cosmos? (which are described with a charming metaphysical naivete as manifestations of the Absolute!)

- ii. The second alternative is equally risky and illogical. The Upadhi itself might be viewed not as a reality, but as owing its origin to ignorance or Ajnyana. The term used in the text is 'hetu'. The Upadhi which is credited with the power to produce ignorance is now itself regarded as the product or outcome of ignorance! This casual ignorance would itself be the effect of a preceding Upadhi. The Upadhi again would be in need (for its own existence) of a previous ignorance which would be its cause! There would ensue a regress ad infinitum!
- 15. It is the difference between the finite and the Absolute, i.e. difference between Brahman and Jiva. The difference is brought home to an individual in various ways. Early enough in the progress of his mundane career he realises the difference. Ajnyata i.e. ignorance is the most striking characteristic of finite individuals. Ignorance at every step hinders his progress and advancement. His best calculated and most carefully planned actions are thwarted. He has countless troubles due to his inefficiency and ignorance. The knowledge which he possesses and which enables him to execute effective adjustments to the environment is after all limited in range and incomplete Miscalculation, inability to apprehend the meaning and and finite qualitatively. significance of several situations, and inability³³⁰ likewise to respond to them, are the essential characteristics of finite individuals. Even the most perfect knowledge possessed by the most efficient and best of men and women is after all incomplete and limited. It cannot stand a moment's comparison with omniscience.
- Success in the matter of effective adjustment is a mark and unfailing index of the 16. power and potency of the organism. The Jiva-an individual-realises that he is inefficient and impotent in the matter of adjusting himself to several situations in life to which he would fain have an adjustment at any cost! Such failures are the unmistakable reminders of the finiteness of an individual and of his utter insignificance in contrast with the Supreme Being. Considering that sometimes even the most beneficent and moral activity is thwarted for no fault of the agent, he would not be foolish enough to arrogate to himself the possession of superhuman powers and abilities. He might do so if he were a metaphysical megalomaniac. Hedged in all through and all sides by countless drawbacks and handicaps, hemmed in by the pressure and force of adverse and counteracting circumstances, leading a life cribbed, cabined and confined, a finite individual would be the first to realise his own impotency and inability.

^{330 317}

- 17. Sorrow is the outcome of ignorance and impotency. The finite individual does not possess either the knowledge or the power and ability necessary to anticipate the course of events intelligently and ward off the evil and the unpleasant. He suffers therefore. Suffering and sorrow would seem to be his birthright. If individuals would calmly compare notes, they would see that the sorrow and suffering shared by them might and do differ in degree, but the finite³³¹ qua finite can never boast of life free from <u>all</u> sorrow and suffering. One might indeed be self-possessed in the face of suffering. He might have excellent fortitude to bear in a resigned mood all his sorrow and suffering. Yet suffering and sorrow are there. The problem of evil, of pain, sorrow and suffering has been as old as the cosmos! It is insistent. It is imperious. Its solution is imperative for the integrity of every system of philosophy. Yet only vague and nebulous answers and hazy solutions have been offered by the absolutists all the world To them to be sure, the problem can have no meaning whatever. absolutistic and Monistic Universe there can be no place for evil and suffering. Nothing is gained by the dogmatisation that sorrow and suffering are illusory. They are real to the sufferer. Only the wearer knows where the show pinches. To the pluralist and the realist, the problem of evil has supreme and tremendous significance. Suffering and sorrow mark off the finite from the infinite.
- 18. There is the egotistic conviction that the individual is free to pursue whatever line of activity he pleases. But no. The conviction cannot in several instances be translated into practical politics. Various are the counteracting factors and circumstances. The volitional individuality of the finite is limited. Taking stock of the best achievements of men and women, the Kartritva or the free agency of the finite is terribly limited and circumscribed.
- 19. The Supreme Being sees and knows everything. It knows all in an everlasting <u>present</u>. The Supreme Being is not subject to any error or illusion. He is never deceived and never victimised by environmental circumstances.
- 20.³³² The Supreme Being is all powerful. Its power knows no arrest or abstraction, no thwarting and no counteraction.
- 21. The so-called freedom of will and independence possessed by the finite creation, are only restrictions and dependence seen through coloured spectacles or through a wrong angle of vision altogether.

^{331 318}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{332 319}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

- 22. Such is the contrast between the finite individual and the Supreme Being—a contrast that is radical, fundamental and all-round. A realisation of the contrast which is being forced on the attention of the individual every moment of his existence would compel him to realise how different he is from the Supreme Being. If there were identity why should there be such an acute and striking difference between the two? If the identity were a fact, either the Absolute would be a blundering metaphysical bureaucrat, or the finite individual would be an omniscient power lifted out of all his misery, sorrow and suffering amidst which he struggles hopelessly. The only legitimate conclusion that can be under the circumstances necessitated by the marked contrast between the finite individual and the Supreme Being, (drawn without violence being done to life and logic) is that the <u>liva</u> and Brahman, the finite and the Supreme Being are fundamentally and radically different from one another.
- 23. The cant of the absolutist notwithstanding, we are empirical individuals – philosophers and laymen and all—We never have so far realised any identity between the finite and the Absolute. To say that we have so done is philosophic pedantry. It would be a self-complacent observation or admission too suspiciously subjective to be of any objective validity. One man's intuition and introspection are as good as those of another. There is no reason why those of a particular individual should be given any credence to while³³³ those of another are rejected as misleading and untrustworthy. Several things are done under cover of mysticism and personal intuition. All that has no objective binding validity. If intuition and mysticism are frequently appealed to in order to establish something like identity between the finite and the Absolute which has so far remained out of range of practical politics, and which is so to say mocking the aspirant by defiant aloffism and receding horizon-like with every attempt at a near approach made by the aspirant, there is no reason why the intuition and introspection of another person cannot likewise be appealed to in support of difference between the finite and the Absolute. The introspective experience and testimony would rather converge in the direction of the non-identity and disparity between the finite and the Supreme Being.
- 24. The finite individual does not realise his own incapacity and helplessness, his ignorance and impotency. His is the lot to struggle and suffer. Ignorance, pain and misery fall to his lot. It must pass one's comprehension how in the face of such a marked contrast between the Supreme Being and the finite individual, identity is asserted to exist between the two. The identity is not clung to merely as a logical possibility. The identity is made the central pivotal point not merely in metaphysical theorising, but in practical philosophy as well. The identity should be experienced and realised. No sufficient justification has been urged for the non-realisation of it by the finite individual constituted as he is at present.

^{333 320}

Madhva would therefore urge that if the identity between the Absolute and the finite were clung to so tenaciously, there could not be anyone who is ignorant. There could be none steeped in metaphysical darkness and slumber. There³³⁴ could be none in need of light, enlightenment and illumination. There would be no Adhikari – no fit person ready and willing to undergo metaphysical discipline. The Sastra-or the metaphysical science would then have no locus standi. A science or discipline presupposes persons interested in its pursuit and intelligent study and presupposes those who are likely to profit by its study or adherence to it. If identity were a fact, there would be none ignorant and likely to profit by undertaking metaphysical study There would similarly be nothing un-known. Omniscience is the characteristic of the Absolute. It is the only reality. The finite and the Absolute are identical with one another. The omniscience of the Absolute would be shared by the finite as well. The finite even as the Absolute would perceive every thing in a sudden flash of illumination or more accurately in an eternal flash of illumination and there would remain nothing unknown-nothing obscure. An eternally clear and distinct perception would be the result of the identity between the finite and the Absolute. In the absence of the Adhikari-the deserving aspirant ready to embark on the metaphysical quest—the Vishaya—or the object of the quest would vanish too as there is nothing which is unknown and abscure.

- 25. The absolutist holds tenaciously to the doctrine of identity between the finite and the Absolute. That means, the omniscience of the Absolute is the omniscience of the finite as well. There would no ignorance at all. Either the omniscience of the Absolute or the possibility of ignorance has to be surrendered. The impossibility of ignorance instantaneously deprives metaphysics of its legitimate object.
- 26. The concept of oneness or identity between the finite and the Absolute is riddled with contradictions³³⁵ and inconsistencies. It is either different from the nature of the Absolute or not. In either case absolutism is illogical.
- 27. The utter dependence of the finite creation on the Supreme Being and the absolute helplessness of the former can be explicable only on the view of difference and not of identity.
- 28. On the view of identity between the Absolute and the finite, there is nothing to strive for, nothing to be achieved. Identity with the Absolute is freedom from bondage. The identity is there. It is not something to be realised by something in the course of time. It acts like a blind <u>vis a tergo!</u> The identity is ever a <u>fait accompli</u> or it is nothing.

^{334 321}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{335 322}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

On the view of difference, there is every scope and justification for spiritual progress and advancement. A free soul becomes what it is as a result of its own spiritual endeavour. The Supreme Being <u>qua</u> eternally free should be different from what <u>becomes</u> free having once been bond! No riotous imagination, no mystical reverie can annihilate the difference which is an inherent characteristic.

- 29. After all, notwithstanding the <u>ipse dixits</u> of those who say that life is more than logic, that life is experience, and that the experience of the mystic would guarantee the reality of the pure being and the illusoriness of the finite existence, logic cannot be so summarily repudiated, What is <u>not non-existent</u> should be existent. Why then should violence be done to such an inexorable law of thought from the standpoint of mystical experience which (if records of such experience be true) contains as its life-breath the negation of all logic.
- 30. But what of the passages in which Brahman is described to be the only 'Rita' – the only reality and all else as 'Anrita', i.e. unreality Are not such statements in support of the illusoriness and unreality of the universe? Rita is336 from the root Ri which means going. 'Gati' also means 'avagati'. Going from the state of unknown to that of known is avagati. Brahman is described to be 'rita' as it maintains all is characteristic and is known as not subject to the Bergsonian flux. But finite creation reveals change, contingency and uncertainty. It is therefore best described as Anrita. The terms thus do not mean real and unreal. Both Brahman and the finite creation are equally real. The former as the author of all finite creation and as the ground of all existence, is known to have certain characteristics - set, definite and unchanging, while the latter is rooted in change and contingency. 'Rita' might mean eternal. 'Anrita' is changing and perishing. The world of change and transformation is 'anrita'. The world of contingency is 'anrita'. Brahman is 'rita' as it is not subject to change and any contingent whimsical flux. No contrast is contemplated in the texts between illusion and reality, between a thing as it appears and as it really is. Brahman is sat as eternal bliss. Samsara—finite existence in the world of births and deaths—is asat as full of evil and misery.

The aforesaid interpretation of the texts is necessitated on account of the pronounced and unequivocal statement found elsewhere that the world of finite existence—the world of organised and unorganised matter and spirit—is perfectly real. Vyasa smriti is the first authority quoted. It maintains that the world is 'satyam'. (real). It is under the power and control of Vishnu who is the Supreme Overlord. The divinity and supremacy of Brahman would be seriously compromised if He is to be the Overlord of something which is unreal and illusory! He is the real overlord of a real universe. But then does He like a churlish boy break the bowl he made? He does not. The universe is 'nitya' (eternal). Not however static for all time. It is eternal on the

^{336 323}

analogy of a 'pravaha^{337'} or flood. There will be cessations of and commencements of the flood. The universe never changes its characteristic of being real—stubbornly real. In particular times and under the influence of particular concatenations of circumstances, the universe under the control of the Supreme Being—Brahman—behaves exactly as it should for adequate adjustmental purposes. The 'Vyasasmriti' contains a condemnation of those who propagate the mischievous and misleading doctrine that the universe is unreal, illusory, ignorance-begotten etc. The 'Bhagavadgita' has a similar condemnation denunciation of those who maintain the doctrine of the unreality and illusoriness of the universe.

- 31. The possibility of objectless knowledge cannot be seriously considered at all. There is no such knowledge. Science and philosophy, common sense and technicality, know not such knowledge. The position amounts to this. No definition of 'Jadatva' would suit. It cannot be defined as "Aprakasa"—non-luminosity. If it is Atman would be so. If the figure be removed, knowledge would be the essence of Atman. But knowledge requires an object. Objectless knowledge is a chimera. What is the object? It cannot be the self. If it were, it would have the attribute of being object. In fact, it is attributeless. Self-consciousness in the view of the Absolutist becomes impossible. The other (other than the self) cannot be the object either. The other is unreal and illusory. Therefore 'prakasa' or illumination according to the absolutist becomes inexplicable in fact, as the illumination would be objectless—would have nothing in respect of which illumination or knowledge is sought and gained.
- 32. Accurate and well-informed sense-knowledge modifies and corrects inaccurate and ill-informed sense-knowledge³³⁸. Here and there occur perceptual illusions which are dispelled by correct acts of cognition progressively arrived at. There is nothing to invalidate the sense-knowledge that the universe is a reality. The reality of existence is stubborn and persistent. It is never challenged. It is neither stultified nor repudiated. When a rope is mistaken for a snake, and when subsequently it is realised that one's fear was groundless when he was confronted with a rope, it is only correct sense-knowledge that dispels the illusion. There is no indirect inference. Similarly, when trepidation ceases on his being told it is only a rope, other's observation should be brought home to the percipient of the illusion only in the shape of the latter's sense-perception and not otherwise. The <u>onus probandi</u> rests on the opponent—(the absolutist) who asserts the universe is unreal and illusory. Its reality is striking and strikingly brought home to every rational agent. It is never doubted.

But the absolutist contends that pratyaksha or sense-knowledge is misleading. The moon appears as small as a disc. Is it really so? Madhva replies that the Moon's

^{337 324}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{338 325}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

appearance is due to the circumstances over which the percipient has no control whatever. It is due to distance. The sense-knowledge has been distorted by distance. Normally sense-knowledge is quite accurate and gives no room for ill-executed responses. It functions within well-known and obvious limitations. Its range and scope are definite. Limited scope does not mean illusory knowledge within the said scope. Limited as its scope is, sense-knowledge is perfectly reliable and gives us information about objects as they really are. The apparent exceptions only prove the general rule.

33. There exists a mass of overwhelming evidence which³³⁹ proves that the universe is the outcome of knowledge and purposive ness and not of ignorance. The Supreme Being creates, protects and destroys the universe which is the training ground of the finite souls in matters spiritual. The world is the theatre for spiritual apprenticeship of the individual strictly under the control of the Supreme Being. The creator ever has a vigilant and watchful eye on his creation. It is idle to contend that the Supreme Being indulges his whims and fancies in blowing bubbles and creating illusions and unrealities. The universe pursues and works out its destiny ever under the eye of the Supreme Being.

In the juggler-analogy, the juggler himself is not a victim, but the spectators are. The juggler himself sees no illusions and sees not the objects of his creation: Here on the contrary, the Supreme Being is described as <u>ever seeing</u> the objects of His creation. To the Supreme Being it is all the case of an ever-lasting present, or an eternal present. His perception should be admitted to be accurate and never liable to any illusions find errors. He always sees directly and immediately the universe created by Him. The latter cannot therefore be an illusion at all.

- 34. Madhva at once proceeds to draw out explicitly the doctrinal identity between Buddhism and Advaitism. The Advaitin styled in the present context, Mayavadi, and the Buddhist Sunya-vadi.
- 35. There is very little or no difference between the Absolute—Brahman of the Mayavadi and the Sunyam—fontal nullity of the Sunya-vadi. The identity is striking. The Absolute is devoid of and free from all determinations, attributes, and qualities. So is the Sunya. The Absolute is unknowable. So is the Sunya. The³⁴⁰ finite universe is the result and outcome of ignorance. It has only a pseudo-reality—a reality so called for the sake of metaphysical courtesy! To the absolutist, the universe is unreal. So is it to the Buddhist. The final state of liberation is to the absolutist identity with the Nirgunabrahma—the attributeless Brahman. To the Buddhist it is merging into the fontal nullity—the Sunya!! It will thus be seen that the approaches to the problems of

^{339 326}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{340 327}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

God, man, the universe and of their inter-relation, psychological, logical, and metaphysical (approaches from the standpoints of psychology theory of knowledge and metaphysics) point in the direction of unmistakable identity between Buddhism and Advaitism.

36. The conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason were all in some material particulars recanted in the Critique of Practical Reason. There is nothing strange about it. Mere reason, performing acrobatic feats in the air, can never sustain a serious conclusion against the onslaughts of perception valid and reliable standing and functioning on its own merits and in its own inherent right. It is the birthright of senseperception to give a Subject knowledge of external reality as it is. The time-honoured almost worn-out, and platitudinous distinction between 'as it is' and 'as it appears or seems to be' has only interest for a philosophic pedant and not for an eager student or an earnest aspirant.

Madhva, therefore, maintains that mere reason unaided by sense-perception cannot be powerful enough to invalidate perception and the reality of the world implied in all valid perception, and indirectly indicated by perceptual illusions. When difference is there and when its validity has been sanctioned and guaranteed by perception which is the only final court of appeal, it is indeed impossible to deny difference which is foundational³⁴¹ fact of reality, simply through the instrumentality of the so-called reason, ratiocination or inference. That is a fool-hardy feat worthy of those who would not shrink from the commission of metaphysical dacoities in broad daylight! How indeed can the foundational fact be denied or negated? Knowledge is foundational of Reality. Difference is equally foundational. All knowledge involves and must involve some real difference, somewhere in reference to some real objects and things—an objective system. With the exception of what is familiarly known as mystic knowledge and mystic experience, in which it is alleged that the distinction between subject and object, of knower and known, etc. disappears, in all other types, degrees and manifestations of knowledge, difference is always involved.

37. Objects to Madhva appear as they are and what they are and are what they appear to be. All that glitters is not gold. True. But closer perception and a more careful analysis would reveal the truth of the matter.

Analyse the well-known instance of a stick immersed in water, appearing bent. In the arresting terminology employed by Stout in the latest Edition of his Manual of Psychology (reviewed by me in the Literary and Educational Supplement of "The Hindu") a sensation never occurs alone, is never perceived alone. A pure sensation is a magnificent myth. A sensation then always appears and exists in relation to some condition somewhere. Of course the bend is not actually in the stick, but somewhere in the progress of the light rays proceeding from the surface of the stick immersed in

341 328

water, factors and conditions that are responsible for the bend being perceived should be located and identified.

The I-awareness or the 'sakshi' as it is technically 342 termed, in terms of which 38. alone all experience comes home to the individual, does not support the identity-thesis. Every one feels that he is ignorant or knows little, possesses little power, etc. while the Supreme Being is described in the sacred texts as Omniscient Omnipotent etc. and realising as every one must, his own limitations, how is it possible for him to claim identity with the supreme Being? If the identity between the two is to be practical politics, the finite individual enjoying to the fullest extent, the benefits, rights, privileges, power and enlightenment et hoc should feel in his being, essence and the daily transactions of the affairs secular and spiritual, the identity and its concomitant features, but as a matter of fact, even the most powerful of finite individuals is after all a hopeless creature tossed about like the ball which right or left as strikes the player goes and it would be no better than idle philosophy if one were to be contented with the belief as some of the absolutist actually are, that a mere apprehension of the meaning of the words and terms spoken or written "Tatvamasi" That Thou Art-is tantamount to realisation of the fullest benefits of the identity between the finite and the Supreme. One may write on the black-board or a piece of paper the proposition "That Thou Art" or the proposition that the "Finite is identical with the Supreme" or utter it countless number of times without being any the wiser for the scribbling on the black-board or the utterance. Sense-perception cannot be any evidence in support of the identity. But the absolutist contends that Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. are the attributes of a Supreme Being which is itself relegated to a lower degree of reality namely, the Saguna Brahman. So, absence of experience of Omniscience etc. belonging to a lower³⁴³ degree of reality is really no evidence against the identity between the finite and the Infinite. The identity is however with the "Nirguna Brahman" - the attributeless Absolute. Madhva retorts that sense-awareness never conveys to any one or brings home to any one the experience that he or she is identical with the attributeless Absolute. Madhva asserts "Na-kasyachidanubhavah." The Realisation of the identity objects the absolutist can be secured only through the employment of trained and practised perception, not the perception of the man in the street. An expert in the evaluation of diamonds has a trained and practised perception. The flaws and flawlessness of precious stones not discernible to the lay eyes are detected and perceived by the trained ones. Even so identity between the finite and the Infinite can be perceived only by those whose perception has been trained, and perfected by a study of the "Sastra." Madhva readily replies that even those who have mastered the "Sastras" do not feel they are Omniscient and Omnipotent Beings. Those eminent authorities in 'Sastras' yet strive to secure the

^{342 329}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{343 330}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

necessities of life like 'Bhiksha,' food etc. If ignorance or 'avidya' is destroyed by realisation of the identity, such striving has no meaning. You cannot speak of remnants of 'avidya'. If search after food etc. even after realisation of the identity, be due to persistence or remnants of 'Avidya' the remnants which persist even after realisation of the identity will never perish, and the implication being that freedom from 'avidya' under that doctrine is impossible, the expert and the tyro would be in the same boat. Mundane activity cannot be explained by appeal 'to Karma.^{344'} The entire stock of Karma should be admitted to have been destroyed root and branch by the realisation of identity. So, neither the Sastraic expert nor the uninitiated tyro has any experience of the identity between the finite and the Infinite.

On the other hand, difference between the finite and the Infinite, inferiority and helplessness of the individual are poignantly experienced by the initiated and uninitiated alike. Study of the Sruti texts is sure to give one correct and accurate definition of the nature of Brahman—the Infinite. The attributes of Brahman are also enumerated. An individual with reflection—even with a very little amount of it—would soon realise that he or she does not possess those attributes. Far from it. Other attributes and helpnesses are the marks of the finite. One who feels that he has attributes different from those possessed by the Absolute or described in the sacred texts as possessed by the Infinite or Brahman, cannot fail to realise the radical and fundamental difference between the two—the finite and the Infinite.

39. The absolutist again contends that even as the ruddy colour is perceived as shared by a piece of white crystal placed in close juxtaposition with a red flower, though as a matter of fact there is no real transference of colour from flower to crystal, even so, on account of the close proximity of the subject with the 'antahkarana,' the inner sense associated with the I;—pain, misery etc. that are due to the latter appear to be transferred to the former. Hence the perception of difference—so called. Madhva replies that in the light of the cardinal Upanishadic text, "Etatsarvam-mana-Eva" the cognitive, the emotive, and conative experiences and responses of the individual would have to be traced to the mind itself, and the analogy³⁴⁵ of the crystal appearing red and flower is unsound as in the former the red colour is inherent in the flower but in the latter the emotions etc. are the experiences of the subject. There is really no crystal at all as closer analysis is bound to reveal.

The joys and sorrows concomitant with existence here are not however final. The subject is pure joy and unalloyed bliss. That state would be reached after pursuit of rigorous spiritual discipline.

Pratyaksha, sense-perception, and Sakshi—the witness—I—in terms of which alone all experience is brought home to the individual do not reveal and support the

^{344 331}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{345 332}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

identity between the individual do not reveal and support the identity runs counter to the I-witness-awareness. Difference on the other hand is revealed and supported by it.

40. Madhva's magnificent metaphysical masterstroke is evident in the interpretation of the famous Upanishadic text "Tatwamasi" usually translated into "That Thou Art." The text is a very important and significant one and is believed to lend support to identity between the finite and the Infinite. All the European students of Indian philosophy and authors, and Indian students and authors of Indian Philosophy who have mostly blindly followed in the footsteps of the European workers, have accepted and repeated the said interpretation. Madhva stands alone in taking the text differently and interpreting it in support of his metaphysical doctrine of difference between the finite and the Infinite. It is the duty of impartial and disinterested students of Indian Philosophy to consider how far Madhva was right in abandoning the beaten track and chalking out a path of his own. The Acharya let it be noted has just split up the³⁴⁶ pada or terms by prefixing the negative familiar in grammar as "Atat-twamasi" instead of the Tat—taken by other commentators, Madhva has taken Atat—the simple meaning then is —Thou art not-that or non-that if that is permitted.

By this splitting up Madhva maintains that the text usually and traditionally claimed to support the thesis of identity between the finite and the Infinite, as a matter of fact, emphasizes the doctrine of difference between the two. There is absolutely no manner of grammatical difficulty or incongruity or untenability in splitting up the compound "svetaketotatwamasi" into "svetaketo-atat-twamasi." That the illustrious predecessors of Madhva did not think of such a splitting up is hardly excuse enough for a summary dismissal of Madhva's attempt as undeserving of serious attention. Madhva maintains that A-Tatwamasi is the proper splitting. This is necessitated by the illustrative instances and analogies indicated in the Upanishadic texts. The explanation and careful description of the nature of the Supreme Brahman are attempted with a view to emphasizing that the finite self is not identical with the Supreme Self. Uddalaka (father) tells (his son) Svetaketu that the finite self ('you' being taken as a typical representative of all finite selves) is not identical with the Supreme Self. To impress upon the mind of an aspirant, the grandeur and greatness, the magnificence and majesty of the Supreme Lord of the Cosmos, the text proclaims that the Supreme Being unaided by any other agency or power creates the vast universe of Fire, Water, Earth etc. (such creative activity is totally absent from the finite beings), the vast universe, spatio-temporal-stellar etc. the vastness of which staggers the imagination even of the expert scientists, and the ³⁴⁷ majesty and the magnificence of the Supreme Being can be learnt only from the sacred text. How is the greatness of the Almighty Lord of the Universe to be made realisable in some measure at least by finite

^{346 333}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{347 334}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

individuals? In the waking state when finite individuals transact the affairs of life, they act as if they were independent and themselves masters of the situation, developing not un often megalomania of the most mysterious make and in that frame of mind, finite individuals will never realise the Majesty of the Almighty. In the state of sleep however the Egoism and sense of independence and freedom of the individuals are relaxed and relegated to the level of the subconscious, and in that state, the dependence, (indispensable and inevitable) of the finite on the Infinite can be brought home to the mind of the former. The father begins by observing "Let me now explain to you the state of sleep."

In the waking state as well as the state of dreams, the subject is obliged to direct here and there his senses, which direction brings on fatigue as an outcome, a necessary effect. Fatigue which is the law of life indicates that recuperation and reconstructive rehabilitation of the fatigued tissues and senses, are also inevitable. Bio-chemists, Physiological-Psychologists and others may claim that the reconstructive rehabilitation of the tired and fatigued nervous mechanism is brought about exclusively by chemical and physiological processes, but if the upanishadic passage be interpreted in metaphysical terms, the conclusion will be that the fatigued finite individuals rest in the Supreme Being Itself, and equip themselves with the necessary energy for the adjustment of a day as it were and the performance of the day's work from the Infinite which is³⁴⁸ the central source of all cosmic life and energy. It is a fine and attractive conception that finite individuals once in 24-hours, return to the Infinite, quite fatigued in order to re-absorb energy from the Infinite, and nothing would bring home to the human mind the greatness of the Infinite better than facts of fatigue felt at the end of the day's work and the refreshing reconstructive rehabilitation and onrush of energy which are felt at dawn the next day. How can the individual who draws energy from the Infinite be identical with the latter? The dependence of the finite on the Infinite for the supply periodically of the necessary quantum or amount of energy to keep the former going, till the moment of death in any given life, and till practically the exhaustion of the past stock of Karma-is a stubborn fact which cannot be explained away. This dependence is a philosophic fact. There should be some eternal and in exhaustive source of ever-ready and never-failing energy to satisfy the needs of all sentient and non-sentient creation, and that source of energy is Brahman, the Infinite or the Supreme Being, in whatever manner one may choose to describe it. The Supreme source of energy can never be identical with the finite objects and individuals that share the said energy. The rehabilitation that is daily experienced by finite individuals is irrefutable evidence in support of the difference that there should subsist between the two.

In support of the difference between the finite and the Infinite an illustrative instance is cited. A bird tied down flies here and there in all directions and returns to the cage not finding comfortable rest and habitation elsewhere. Each finite soul is such a bird. Its numerous activities in the waking and dream states are compared to the

^{348 335}

flights of a bird. A³⁴⁹ bird returns to rest and so does a finite individual. The Upanishadic texts mean that all sentient beings have as their source and origin the Sat – Brahman, the Supreme Being, which is their prop and support and reservoir of energy and life-force which are periodically absorbed by the finite beings when they resort to the Supreme Being in moments of deep sleep.

The Supreme Being though unseen is not for ever beyond the reach of and 41. On account of certain well-known limitations and realisation of finite beings. disabilities, the finite has its spiritual vision beclouded and when the hindrances are removed and got rid of, the finite will be in a position to stand face to face with the Supreme Being. The son asks—how is it possible for the finite Beings whose vision is thus blurred and beclouded, to realise the Infinite? The substance of the father's answer is this. Find a proper preceptor—the Guru—who has the spiritual welfare of the pupil at heart. You will be taught the means of realising the Infinite. Suppose a rich man is attacked by a band of robbers. His eyes are bandaged over, and the robbers leave him in a lonely forest. The poor victim cries aloud. Some sympathetic passer-by hears the cry, removes the bandages from his eyes, and directs him to proceed carefully in a particular direction so that he may reach in safety the place from which he had been A resourceful person, with self-confidence and selfkidnapped by the robbers! possession, who is quite capable of adjusting himself to his environment, will note the route taught to him by the sympathetic passer-by, proceed along it making enquiries on the way to satisfy himself if he has come along the correct route, and in the course of time³⁵⁰, reach the place from which he had been thrown into the wilderness.

The Karmic forces and factors are the robbers. Primal ignorance is the bandage put round genuine spiritual vision. The finite being with the eyes thus bandaged over is thrown into the wilderness of Samsara—the recurring cycles of birth and deaths—the cries aloud for help. The impulse to find the proper preceptor should come from Divine Grace. When once the impulse is implanted, he is sure to seek and find the Guru. He would practise the spiritual discipline taught to him, and go back to his original home, and source of all existence—the Supreme Being. Paradise lost is thus regained. The illustrative instance rightly emphasizes the supreme importance of the choice of the right person as Guru or spiritual preceptor as without his help the finite being would be obliged to grope eternally in the dark without ever enjoying brilliant sunshine.

42. There is another term in the context which would appear to lend support to the interpretation of the absolutist, namely, the intriguing 'Aitadatmyam'. It is usually interpreted to mean that there is only one real Atman in the Universe, or even the Atman which is the sole and only reality has manifested itself as the universe.

^{349 336}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{350 337}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

According to Madhva the term 'Aitadatmyam' means the Universe is the Supreme Being's own and ownership is but the natural concomitant of overlordship. On this view, difference between the finite creation which is owned, and the Supreme Being which owns, stands out in clear outlines and bold relief.

The term 'Atma' is equally intriguing. While the absolutist contends that it refers to the finite self which is of course identical with the Infinite, Madhva maintains that in the light of the explicit statement of the Sutrakara, it should be taken to mean only the Supreme Being³⁵¹. The reference is quite natural. In relationship with the categories of time, space and attribute, He is Infinite. This Infinitude is appropriately and adequately conveyed by the term 'Atma' in virtue of the root from which it has been grammatically formed. Omniscience and Creatorship are also implied. By uncritical usage it has come to be applied to the finite self as well, and we get the pair 'jivatma and paramatma' to denote respectively the finite and the Infinite.

- 43. Suggestions of identity emanate from ignorance of the real import of the sruti texts. Texts like—I am Brahman—have reference to the immanent Supreme Being, and not to identity between the finite and the Infinite.
- 44. In the light of the foregoing analysis, it becomes obligatory to interpret the Upanishadic text 'By knowledge of one, knowledge of all else can be cured' without reference to the material causality of Brahman and to the concomitant (according to the absolutist) illusoriness of the Universe. Madhva interprets the text to mean that when a representative type is known others that are allied to the type are as good as known. When you know a representative American, usage allows you to state that you know America as a whole.

The same can be applied to knowledge of Brahman on the one hand and knowledge elaborate and laboriously gained about the various details of ritual, religion etc. Whatever may be the spiritual efficacy of correct knowledge and accurate practice of the rituals in question, it is secured easily and perhaps doubtless more efficiently by securing knowledge about the nature of Brahman. The correct import of the text is that Brahman known makes known the significance of all religious and spiritual practices, codes, duties, obligations et hoc, and instead of an aspirant wasting ³⁵² time and energy over the latter, he should run the spiritual race by a short cut as it were and reach the goal easily and without wasting effort. When Brahman is known, the real nature of the cosmos under His jurisdiction is also as good as known, on account of the fact that Brahman is Creator of the Cosmos and in other ways inseparably connected and associated with the cosmos. It is interesting to speculate on what would be the fate of God without a cosmos, and what would be the fate of the latter without the former.

^{351 338}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{352 339}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

Man made in the image of God, and God made in the image of man are just now swaying the minds of the scientifically advanced countries of the West. According to the Vedanta, however, God and Cosmos are inseparably together. Both are known by Pramanas—sources, means and guarantors of valid knowledge. Both are real. The cosmos is under the eternal vigilance, direction and control of God. When the latter is known, the former is known too. If we begin at the wrong end, and allow the world to be too much with us, knowledge of Brahman is sure to be delayed and even denied to us. We should begin at the right end and strive for attainment of knowledge of God. Then knowledge of the world, with all its ritual and religion, cults and ceremonies, injunctions and interdicts, will follow as a matter of course. Resemblance (qua knowable by Pramanas) between Creator and the Cosmos is the thing sought to be emphasized by the text.

44. Madhva explains that the analogy of the dream-world and dream-phenomena about which much ado is made by the absolutist, will not support the theory of the unreality of the universe. All phenomena endowed with reality which is their birthright are perceived eternally in their own nature and as they are, by the Supreme Being, and perceptual illusions, on analysis reveal either central or peripheral defects. They are exceptions which prove the general rule of reality of 353 the Universe. Exceptio probat regulam. Exceptions do not invalidate a general law. If the universe is compared to dream-phenomena, the comparison is intended to emphasize that the former is under control of the Supreme Being. In the light of the central doctrine of the supreme Overlordship of Vishnu, terms like, 'Asatya' taken on new meanings in the contexts cited by Madhva. The term Asatya does not mean unreal. "A" means Vishnu or the Supreme Overlord. "Satya" means reality. The meaning of the compound is that the reality of the cosmos of real constituent elements, is under the eternal guidance and overlordship, direction and control of the supreme Being.

Similarly the term Avidya does not mean ignorance. It means the mysterious and wonderful power possessed by the Supreme Being by means of which He rules, and guides the destinies of the cosmos. Avidya, Maya, Prakriti, Niyati, Mohini, etc. are terms that denote the mysterious power of the Supreme Being. The possession of the said power by the Infinite and the absence of its possession by the finite are rocks on which every variety of monistic metaphysic should be sooner or later wrecked. The difference between that which has the power to control the affairs of the cosmos and those who under the inverted bowl coopt, crawling, die, should certainly be fundamental and radical difference. Identity between the two is unthinkable.

If so what is the meaning of texts, passages like "Aham-Brahmasmi-Sohamasmi-Sa-Evahamamsi" etc? Madhva is emphatic that they have reference to the Immanent Supreme Power which the inner controller and inspirer of all finite beings i.e. the 'Anataryami'—inner inspirer, the immanent censor.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{353 340}

45.354 The 'antaryami' doctrine which pushes into prominence Divine Immanence that is eternal, is indeed as intriguing as interesting. It cannot help Monism or Absolutism, Mystic or Monistic Absolutism. The very concept of Immanence implies difference between the Supreme that is immanent, and the finite agents and objects in which the Supreme is Immanent. To secure the maintenance intact of a social system of mutual communication, we have throughout the world a complicated network of linguistic symbols. Language and grammar have brought into existence an elaborate scheme of symbols, terminations, roots, etc., the sole object of which is to render intelligible the various ways and means in which the subject adjusts itself to the environment. X beats Y. Grammar insists on certain fixed arrangements of the parts of speech to render this thrashing intelligible to society. Similarly, as may easily be seen, all the cases parts of speech, inflections, conjugations, etc. reflect age-long convention, conventional-but none the less scientific-symbols which adequately tell the tale of man's adjustment to his surroundings. But wait. The activity of man is under the eternal direction and control of the Supreme Being, who is immanent in all objects and persons of the cosmos. Who then is the real and the genuine author of man's activity? Not surely man. He has but derivative independence. Though apparently, to mortal eyes, man seems to be the author of activity resulting in adjustments to environmental demands the real agent, the author of man's thought, feeling and volition is the Supreme Being Who directs the various relationships in which man stands to his environment. So, the first second and third person forms, the numbers, genders, cases et hoc, all primarily refer only to the Supreme Being Who directs the affairs of the cosmos. Vain man, success-intoxicated, goes to the extent of arrogating³⁵⁵ to himself power and independence which are not his. A religious soul on the other hand sees that it is the Immanent Supreme Power Which moves him and makes him act. When all cases, conjugations, etc. refer to the Supreme, there is no wonder or impropriety in the "Aham" – 'I' – being considered to be "Brahman." In the lower man the assertion "I am Brahman" is mere braggadocio. In the mouth of the genuine spiritual aspirant the statement means that he is under the eternal vigilance and censorship of the Supreme Being. He has attuned himself to the Supreme so intimately that he can venture on the assertion that he is Brahman or the Supreme Being. The universe is energising, and living only on account of the life-force eternally supplied by the Immanent, Supreme Being, – the supply of course will be cut off the moment the Karmic bell rings the knell of parting entities - and they can never mean any identity between the finite and the Infinite.

⁻

^{354 341}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{355 342}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

- 46. All texts and passages which affirm "I am Brahman" converge towards the central truth that all the activities of the 'I' (not merely activities, but the innermost thoughts and feelings as well, nay, the very life of the 'I') are directed and energised by the Supreme Being who is Immanent in 'I' and the entire cosmos.
- 47. Among the many arguments indicated one is unanswerable. The Vedanta-sutra "Jagad-vyapara-varjam" clinches the matter. While describing the greatness achieved by Released souls, the author of the Vedanta Sutras is quite emphatic and positive that what-ever the extra-ordinary powers gained by Released souls as the result of their having attained perfection after riddance of karmic effects, good and evil, they do not succeed in gaining such a power as to be creators of the cosmos. The "Jagad-vyapara" the activity of creating the world or the cosmos must and does for ever remain beyond the achievement of 356 Released souls. Souls do perfect themselves and attain freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. That is the maximum of spiritual advancement they are entitled to. They cannot succeed and they do no in gaining the power to create the cosmos. That power is possessed only by the Supreme Being. The sruti texts clearly mention that it is the Supreme Being that guides the destinies of the cosmos.

The possession and non-possession of the power to create cosmos are very significant criteria, and in the light of them the Supreme Being which has that power and Released souls which do not have it must be different from one another. It can be easily argued out. It is unphilosophical to admit or postulate a plurality of creators of the cosmos even in a pluralistic system of metaphysics. Plurality of creators would mean a plurality of conflicting wills and schemes, and cosmos will not be evolved out of the conflict in question. Only one Supreme Being is the creator, and the creatorship is not shared even by Released Spirits. Difference then based on the solid bed-rock of non-possession by Released Souls of the creatorship, between the Supreme Being and Released Souls even in the state of final liberation, is proof positive that the said difference between the two is not one to be relegated to a lower order or a lesser degree of reality. As the influences of ignorance which alone are responsible for manifestations of lesser orders and degrees of reality have been eradicated or should have been, in the final state of realisation, destroyed root and branch, the difference touching Released Souls, which characterises that state, will have to be regarded as final and unriddable, unriddable because, the final state does not mean merging of finite personalities in the Absolute, but only realisation of the inherent bliss to which they are entitled.

48.³⁵⁷ The released soul is described to be "Anucchitti-Dharma" i.e. one who retains intact attributes, qualities etc. "Ucchitti" means eradication. The attributes, qualities

^{356 343}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{357 344}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

and features know no eradication in the state of final liberation. If these were not retained intact resplendent with added spiritual hue, the final state will not be worth striving for. To meet the perfectly natural and legitimate objection of Maitreyi, Yajnyavalkya assures her that far from being a blank, the state of final liberation indicates a fullness and richness of attributes and values inconceivable in the state of bondage.

- 49. The texts are quite emphatic that difference persists between any two of the countless released souls, on the one hand and the free souls and Brahman on the other. Let alone other considerations. Even in the release-state a finite individual knows and realises that after all his spiritual labours have not been in vain and that they have been crowned with success. There is the awareness or realisation that X who was an erring struggling individual has attained to perfection and release. There is knowledge of the state of release itself which has been reached after very rigorous spiritual discipline. Otherwise how is one to distinguish between the state of bondage and that of release, should there be no knowledge of the latter? Knowledge of that state there must be.
- 50. Even a 'mukta' released soul is different from the Supreme Being, in two striking particulars. In the first place, the Supreme Being is 'svatantra' independent with complete, unalloyed and unqualified independence. Whereas the released souls are still, even in the stage of release, under the direction and control of the Supreme Being. Secondly the Supreme Being is 'purna' Full, the Immanent Whole, while the released souls are not.
- 51. The finite approximates to the Infinite and comes face to face with It. But the former never obtains any identity with the latter nor does it realise an identity with it already existent but obscured by ignorance.
- 52. Suppose, by some mysterious agency or ability the identification of that one real self is possible. Is that the self of the teacher or of the taught? If the former, his occupation would be gone, as he would realise too the futility of teaching a pupil whose reality he cannot but deny. Such a reductio ad absurdum is perfectly logical. All the relations, values, concepts and transactions of life would turn topsy-turvey on the absolutistic hypothesis. If that one real self is identified to be that of the disciple, he would find himself in a strange predicament, when he rises above "Statu pupillari" and himself becomes a professor! He would then have a disciple. According to this variety of absolutism, the cosmic show is due to the ignorance of the one real self which is that of the disciple. The moment he commences having a disciple, he would be the outcome of ignorance in his own pupil and so on and so forth. It will be easily seen that Madhva

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^{358 345}

just exhibits the absurdities to which one will be led on the hypothesis of this variety of Monistic metaphysics.

53. The Absolutist turns his attention to dream phenomena to see if they will not afford any support to his pet doctrine. He contends that dream-phenomena are all unreal and illusory. There is nothing that could be pointed out as the substratum or "Adhistana." Yet illusions are plentiful. They are engendered by error and misapprehension. So can the universe be.

Madhva maintains in reply that this objection will not stand a moment's scrutiny as dream phenomena are as real as the facts and phenomena of³⁵⁹ walking of life, but the difference lies in the former being very evanescent and transitory. It is a real enough world with which one is confronted in dreams. Dream-phenomena are just flashed across the mind like lightning. The past experiences stored up in the shape of all but obliterated images, somewhere in the vast sum total of the unconscious enveloping the present and the past lives, and throwing occasional glimpses of the future as well, constitute the raw material out of which dream-phenomena are woven out as it were. The images are the material causes. Nature's compensatory scheme of rewards and revenges etc., would be efficient cause and so on. Whatever the ultimate explanation of dream-phenomena and whatever the nature of a reconstruction of dream-psychology, it is plain that experiences of other objects in perfectly real situations and concatenations of circumstances are responsible for the projection of dream phenomena which are real but which are extremely evanescent.

54. Sankara maintains that the spiritual entity of Atman—the self—is mistaken for or is erroneously identified with something that is <u>not</u> Atman—self, namely, the body or the material encasement of the embodiment of Atman. Madhva retorts that this sort of mistaking is simply out of the question. Certain experiences and errors come naturally within the range of perceptual illusions or illusions and hallucinations centrally initiated. They are easily explained by the well-known facts and principles of psychology that are now current coin. But there are other items and experiences which never come within the clutches of illusions. Take our own self—the self of each individual. In all norman awareness, the self is perceived as <u>different and distinct</u> from something that is not self. Even in abnormal awareness, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the abnormal³⁶⁰ person thinks or imagines himself to be a piece of stone or a broken article of furniture. If any two objects, ideas, relations etc. are ascertained to be opposed to one another—radically and fundamentally opposed, as the self and the not-self are—one can never be mistaken for the other.

^{359 346}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{360 347}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

55. What is the nature of this "something" that is responsible for the appearance of difference and diversity? What is the nature of the relationship into which it is supposed to enter with the Absolute? Does it come into contact with the Absolute? Or not? Is it related to the fundamental nature of the Absolute? Is it again due to some 'Upadhi', or 'Upadhi' par excellence? Even supposing that other queries are brushed aside, the two named last will have to be answered, It is not fair play at all in a philosophical game to contend that such questions should not be raised? In that case one system of thought is as good as another. A slavish acquiescence in Monism is pathetic in the indolence it indicates of thinkers.

The questions are classic and standing. They were asked in connection with the Absolutistic account of difference. If that mysterious "something" responsible for the appearance of diversity and difference, be the essential and fundamental nature of the Absolute, then it will be as eternal as the Absolute itself. That which is maintained to be powerful enough to have caused the illusion of cosmic appearance, can do so only if it is puissant enough vitally to affect the Absolute at some vital point or points. If the "something" touches the fundamental nature of the Absolute, it will share in the eternity of the Absolute and that would mean that the difference caused by it will persist till the termination of eternity!

Instead of being mere appearance difference will be a reality even in the state of release. The³⁶¹ identity-doctrine will thus be compromised.

- 56. If metaphysical investigation is to be started with a doubt whether the senseorgans are able to grasp the nature of reality <u>as it is</u> one would find himself confronted at the termination of the inquiry with a greater mass of doubt against which he will be obliged to knock his head.
- 57. The stock argument advanced by writers on European philosophy that a subject is never directly aware of objects of external reality and that the latter are inferentially understood to exist in the light of his subjective experiences which a one are directly apprehended by the subject.
- 58. Madhva contends that yogic and meditative practices are all intended for the purification of the subject as a preliminary to self-realisation and coming face to face with the Infinite. Unless there is the awareness that without the Grace of the Lord our efforts will not be crowned with success, Yogic meditations are valueless and they may not be any better than the Occultism and the Black Art practised by select sects all the world over. They contribute to a purification of the spirit, after which the genuine aspirant realises his own inherent bliss and sees something of the grandeur and majesty of the Supreme Lord Narayana in Whose Presence, he is ushered in, in the fullness of time.

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^{361 348}

- 59. The Absolutist is not in a position to explain satisfactorily the pluralisation of the Absolute and its vicissitudes.
- 60. Karma is "anadi" beginningless in time. So is the spirit. At any point of time, the present existence is to be considered the outcome of the past actions of an individual. The present in like manner paves the way for the future. Each rational and responsible individual has perfect liberty to make or mar his or her fortune. God delegates the necessary freedom without³⁶² his own Freedom being compromised in any manner or to any degree. That freedom has to be postulated. It renders intelligible moral responsibility, a doctrine of morality and its translation into practice. All careers are thus determined by the law of Karma the sway of which is supreme and inexorable.

In the fullness of time, when the individual realises his own inner-spiritual bliss and qualifies himself to stand face to face with the Divine Creator of the Cosmos, he attains freedom from all karmic bondage and enslavement. The stock of his Karma good and bad is burnt up and potentiality for future lives is destroyed altogether.

- 61. The Sakshi—the witness in each and every knowing feeling, and willing mechanism, —grasps only the fact of utter helpnessness when confronted with the mystery of cosmic existence. Even the most egoistic, egocentric self-complacent, and conceited members of humanity will not arrogate to themselves the authorship of the "Starry heavens above, and the moral law within" which would appear to have inspired an illustrious European thinker with awe, wonder and reverence. The evidence luminous, clear and convincing afforded by the Sakshi supports an unexpurgated case for an unbridgeable gulf that there yawns between the finite and the Infinite. Madhva maintains that by giving the particular definition of Brahman which he has, in terms of authorship of eight determinations of the vicissitudes of the cosmos, over which the finite beings cannot have even the slightest control the author of the Vedanta Sutras has pronounced a final verdict in favour of difference and dualism between the finite (jiva) and the Infinite (Isvara).
- 62. Freedom from the cycle of births and deaths, from the phantasmagoria of metempsychosis can be obtained only through the Grace of the Supreme Lord Narayana. In his "Tatvanirnaya" Madhva has explained³⁶³ clearly that "Moksha" release from the bondage of existence is the goal or should be the goal of spiritual effort and endeavour of an aspirant. The Sruti is quite unequivocal in stating or proclaiming that freedom from evil-ridden existence can come only through the Grace of the Supreme Being. "Yame-vaisha-vrinute" etc. says the Katha Upanishad. This is not a

^{362 349}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{363 350}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

matter that can be argued out to the satisfaction of the fastidious critical conscience of the modern man or his scientific mentality. One has to approach a kind of sympathetic spiritual preceptor who will teach his pupils the way to freedom from the ills that flesh and spirit are heirs to.

- 63. Inquiry will bring home to the minds of individuals, the genuine aspirants, the Adhikaris, those that are eligible for embarking on the quest after the Infinite, the nature of Brahman, the Supreme Being. Knowledge of the nature of Brahman will help devotional concentration of attention on Brahman and contemplation of the excellent attributes of the Supreme Being. Such a pure, and practised devotional concentration of attention on the nature of Brahman in the fullness of time, will enable one to secure Divine Grace. Divine Grace will guarantee final emancipation from the ills of existence, from the ills of recurring cycles of birth and deaths.
- 64. Bondage is real. Its riddance is impossible without Divine Grace. Divine Grace cannot be secured without devotional, prayerful and worshipful concentration of the attention of aspirants on the Supreme Being. Such a concentration will not be practical politics unless one knew exactly the nature and characteristics of the Supreme Lord, and an investigation of the nature of Brahman as embodied in the sacred texts will give only knowledge of the characteristics and nature of Brahman. The Sruti and Sutras³⁶⁴ proclaim with one voice that Brahman or the Supreme Being is to be understood as the Author of an eight-fold determination of the vicissitudes of the cosmos. Equipped with that knowledge, one has to concentrate devotional attention on Him. He will be pleased in due time with the devotion of aspirants, and shower His Grace on them. There is nought else for the attainment of which one would strive after he obtains Grace of the Supreme Being.
- 65. Performance of Yogic practices, submission to spiritual discipline, and readiness to sacrifice pleasures of the flesh, would have significance, according to Madhva only on the world-view of Pluralistic Theism. If spiritual endeavour and effort are to be viewed as gripped by a cosmic illusion, it is not clear why such effort and endeavour should be put forth at all. They have significance only on the doctrine of Pluralistic Theism, and the Radical Realism of Madhva. There has been a fall somewhere sometime. At this time of existence and evolutionary progress it is idle to query why there should have been any fall at all from Paradise. Fall or no fall, experience has to be taken as it is, interpreted and dovetailed into a philosophical system. To put an end to all needless discussions, finite selves are postulated to have no origin-in time. ('Anadi') "Karma" the inexorable Law of Cause and Effect transferred from the physical to the moral and spiritual realm, holds sway. If the Pluralistic Universe be just an illusion or mere appearance it becomes obligatory to explain the appearance satisfactorily. There

^{364 351}

can be no appearance unless two reals are admitted which shatter the illusionistic doctrine to pieces. If bondage were unreal, there is absolutely no meaning in effort and endeavour being put forth.

- 66. Decorated idols and images of Gods are taken in processions, and people flock to witness them³⁶⁵. That may be quite all right provided one realises that the image is <u>just a reminder</u> of the Infinite. It is just a symbol that would put one in memory of the Infinite. The image or the idol is <u>not</u> the Infinite. Madhva explains that the Infinite is to be thought of and meditated upon and worshipped as the Supreme Power Immanent in the Cosmos, and Immanent in the image as well. That is true worship, real and genuine worship.
- 67. When the spiritual equipment of an aspirant becomes sufficiently powerful and serviceable he should worship Brahman as the Immanent Power is the Cosmos concentrating attention on Divine Immanence in respect of the innermost recess of one's heart as indicated in "Dahara-Vidya," i.e, the yogic meditation by an aspirant on the Supreme Being grasped and perceived in Its Immanence in the innermost recess of his heart.
- 68. Released souls or free spirits regulate their activities in the perfectest accord with Divine Will and Pleasure. Free Spirits will find newer and fresher avenues of service to the Lord. The details cannot be imagined by finite intellect. Service is spirituality. Work is worship. The freed spirits devote their time and energies to the service of the Lord in countless ways into which we may not have any inkling from our condition of bondage, and cosmic imprisonment. In their capacity for service free spirits differ from one another as they do in the matter of enjoyment of their inherent bliss. Annihilation of individuality in the state of release is merest moonshine. The individuality of each self and every spirit is maintained intact. The Radical Realism and Pluralism that are noticed here and now, are to be found elsewhere as well in the state of release. The philosophic position of Madhva is this. If final release is to mean some kind of mystical³⁶⁶ swooning and losing one's individuality in the Absolute, metaphysical, moral and spiritual games are not worth the candle. The finite and the Infinite can never be identical with one another. In actual life and experience in this life, and in this world one finds a Pluralistic Universe. There is no reason why the land of the released and free spirits may not be Pluralistic Universe, purified, and perfected.
- 69. The Vedantic conception of final emancipation, on the other hand is not based on mere reason and ratiocination. Reason would establish anything in fact and a counter

^{365 352}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{366 353}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

line of reasoning will demolish what was once enthusiastically established. A concept of such a high spiritual and philosophical significance as Mukti cannot be left to the tender mercies of vagrant logic and free-lance ratiocination. A solid foundation should be laid on which the concept of final emancipation should be grounded. The Jaina conception of Mukti has nothing about it that would kindle the spiritual and divine in man and convince him that striving for the attainment of it is indeed worth while. (2) The Buddhistic conception of release is no better. Entry into the Great Nothing is final emancipation according to Buddhists. (Maha-sunya). The Buddhists do not admit the existence of any Atma, spirit or subject, or spiritual entity in the present existence. They admit none either in the state of final release or emancipation. The Fontal Nullity, or the 'Non Pareil Nullity' is uncharacterisable and indescribable. It is neither existent nor non-existent, (neither Sat nor Asat). It is Sunya (nullity with a capital N). No moral and spiritual endeavour need be wasted on the attainment of this Nullity.

70. On a metaphysical plane, Madhva's dualism does not satisfy some. unbridgeable gulf has been created by the Acharya between mind and matter³⁶⁷. Is matter something like a rival set over and against the Deity? In that case does it not compromise Divine Greatness? Matter will have to be admitted either as not traceable to any origin or it should be said to have been created by God. Is that a de novo creation? Or is it mere manifestation, rendering explicit what is already implicit? Is Creation merely rendering kinetic what is potential? If so, the question of evil and imperfection is not solved. Can there be any evil and imperfection in this the best of all possible words created by an Omniscient, and Omnipotent Being? It cannot be. Evil is not dismissed by Madhva as mere appearance. It is admitted to be a reality. What is Evil from one angle of vision is just bondage from another. The latter is to be explained to be due to Karma of each individual. The Deity cannot be accused of partiality, favouritism, etc. "Karma" is beginningless in time. Judging the system on the criterion of inner harmony or consistency, one is bound to feel that the existence of real Evil, suffering, and imperfections in a Cosmos created and controlled by God, An unequalled, All-perfect Being, has not been accounted for satisfactorily. There is also a real and serious difficulty if it is assumed that the cosmos has been already there, and God merely assisted its manifestation. Even then evil is there, in embryonic form. God anyhow aids or abets its manifestation. Madhva has not given any harmonised explanation of the relation between mind and matter on the one hand, and between real evil and imperfection in the world and Omniscience and Omnipotence, etc. Of the Creator on the other. If Deity can afford to be so unconcerned and indifferent or unable as to allow Satan to steal a march over Himself, one may not368 be any the wiser spiritually by approaching the Deity with arms lifted in prayer.

367 354

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{368 355}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

71. That something totally non-existent enters into illusional situations is quite apposite to Nihilism of the Buddhistic metaphysics, and momentariness of cognitions of its Theory of Knowledge. Modern psychology has placed the question of illusions on a definite basis. Normally speaking sense-organs function correctly and give knowledge of the world and its objects as they are. It is not admitted that the sense-organs are only intended to deceive the subject. They are useful weapons of understanding the nature and characteristics of external reality. In all normal situations sense-knowledge is correct, accurate, and reliable. However, abnormalities are bound to arise. It may be the rapprochement between sensory structures and objects is disturbed. It may be the sensory apparatus has been incapacitated congenitally as in the case of those born deaf and dumb and so on. In such unfortunate instances sense-knowledge is bound to be distorted. It may be some injury caused to the sense-organs by violent stimuli like thunder and lightning prevents the subject from grasping the nature of external reality as it is. Too great distance, too intimate proximity, shock to sense-organs, mental distraction or preoccupation, obscurity and microscopicness of objects, may distort sense-knowledge or even render it totally impossible of achievement. Peripheral and central factors contribute to the distortion of normal sense-awareness. Madhva is not justified in trotting out a new bogey of a totally non-existent something appearing in illusionistic phenomena. A little careful analysis will convince anyone that previous experience and the stock of imagery play a prominent part in the shaping and the determination of illusions. Madhva is not justified in denying it. The³⁶⁹ contention that the silver which is elsewhere, and the snake that is elsewhere do not form part of the present situation is pointless, because, the images of silver and snake in the shape of previous experience of them are stored up somewhere in the limbo of the unconscious, and they form part and parcel of the percipient or the subject. The doctrine of illusions urged by Madhva appears to be due to a too deep and ineradicable realistic bias. The Acharya appears to argue that in accordance with his scheme of realism, he cannot tolerate the officiation of the very real silver present elsewhere at the ceremony of its illusionistic perception in a piece of shell by a subject, who after a minute examination of the piece exclaims, - "This is not silver - This never was silver, and will never be silver." In reference to the "This", the fraction of reality with which he comes into intellectual contact, it was never silver, never is, and never will be. That is settled. If so, wherefrom does the silver come? Madhva contends it is totally non-existent – asat. If the acharya is to maintain in tact his radical Realism, he comes in his endeavour perilously and terribly near Buddhism. That is Nemesis.

72. The position of Madhva is that Religion and Metaphysics emphasize two aspects of the same problem. Religion and metaphysics reinforce one another. Metaphysics, according to Indian traditions, is just an inquiry into the nature of Brahman with a view

^{369 356}

to realisation of Divine Immanence. Religion is only the attitude of Devotional Prayer or Prayerful Devotion to Brahman.

- 73. Identity between the finite and the Infinite is nowhere expressed or implied in the "Sutras." In the definition of Brahman contained in the second aphorism, there is absolutely no trace of any Monism. The Universe is definitely said to³⁷⁰ have been created by Brahman. Brahman is its preserver. Brahman would end it in due time. Monism must feel helpless to twist the second sutra and make it support and Absolutistic interpretation. It is not playing the game of philosophy if one should contend that the Brahman mentioned is only the Saguna-Brahman of a lower degree of reality.
- 74. God's Grace has to be won and secured. How can that be won without effort and endeavour?
- 75. Whether one chooses to describe the distinction or more correctly difference between the finite and the Infinite, between man and God, as one of degree or of kind, the fact remains that the author of the Vedanta Sutras maintained long long ago that the finite and the Infinite must differ from one another, as Brahman is the author of the eight cosmic determinations, and as the authorship can never be the property of the finite. As Madhva puts the matter admirably, the author of the Vedanta Sutras rejected once for all identity between the finite and the Infinite, by deliberately defining the latter in the second aphorism as the author of the eight cosmic determinations. Philosophical sentimentalists and unity mongers may console themselves with the belief that there is only difference of degree between God and man. Be that as it may, the difference is foundational and fundamental. Up till now, authors and book makers who swear by Absolutism have not "proved" that the fundamental and foundational difference is ever to be removed, stultified or annihilated.
- 76. Swooning of the finite into the Infinite or the Absolute is repudiated by Madhva. What, then, are freed spirits doing in the Kingdom of God? Freedom from the bondage of Karma and the birth-and-death-cycle creates countless opportunities, the nature of which it would be impossible to envisage from the level of existence familiar to finite³⁷¹ life, for uninterrupted enjoyment of the inherent spiritual bliss of each freed spirit.
- 77. A genuine aspirant will say to himself—"I have done my best. I have acted in accordance with the dictates of my conscience and with the commandments in the sacred texts. I have acted in the belief that this course chosen by me may commend

^{370 357}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

^{371 358}

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA: "REIGN OF REALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY."

itself to the Supreme Lord who has given me, knowledge, feeling and will. The rest is in God's hands." Such a conviction is confirmed by the experiences of many aspirants. On the contrary no one acts in the belief that he is the Absolute Itself working under certain well-known limitations, and that all will be well at the dawn of true knowledge. The Absolutistic doctrine is not made the dominant and dynamic motive of life by any of the metaphysically-minded.

78. No doubt God's ways to mankind are mysterious. Divine Justice may sometimes seem to be a mere name, a philosophic pedantry. Eternal and Immutable are the Laws of God. One may seem to have violated them with impunity and to be getting on splendidly well in life; he may scoff and mock at those that have a firm faith in Divine Control. Nemesis is bound to overtake those raised to bad eminence who tyrannising over and exploiting their fellowmen seem to be monuments of failure of Divine Justice. The Supreme Lord gives the sinners and evil doers a long, long rope. When the cup of their iniquities is full, they get what they deserve. It is a very crude form of inquiry to ask why the Almighty Lord or the Supreme Power should not put a stop to all sin, evil, and misery in His best of all possible worlds.

IRENE RATHBONE: THE SOCIAL CREDIT STATE®

- 1. What we perceived as the arch cause of modern ills was the Money Power: the power of banks to create³⁷², issue and destroy money. And what we proclaimed as the cure was the socialising of money (credit), the transference of its control from private bankers to the Sovereign People, the subduing of it to people's needs. Social credit is merely the rather arid-sounding title for a human money system. Under which the human being is free. Under no bondage either to employer or State. Free to choose a job, to walk out of it. Free from the toil and misery of our Work-or-Starve system.
- 2. Such freedom, reaching into every orbit of the citizen's material and spiritual life, will be conferred on him through, and because of, an income. Not a dole—a dividend, a flat rate share of the nation's Real Wealth, starting, say, at Pounds 100 a year, mounting as the country's production mounts, and irrespective of existing income (wage or salary) The nation's Real Wealth consists in its physical assets, its industrial or agricultural production, in fact, its Things. Money will be made to balance Things. Whatever physically exists will therefore be financially obtainable. At present there is a glut of Things—not only in Britain but the world; there is nothing like enough money. The State will create it. The State will distribute it as and where required: to every citizen in the form of a dividend, to the various services (Education, Transport, Defence, etc) in the form of grants. Inflation will be prevented by means of a price adjustment.

372 359

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[®] In "The Aryan Path, Oct.1941.

Taxes will be unnecessary. All <u>debt</u> unnecessary. That monster inanity, the National Debt, will cease to exist.

- 3. Exports too will be unnecessary, as we understand them now. We will export merely what is over when our citizens have had all they want here. No scramble for foreign markets: we shall be our own market. The immensely increased purchasing power will cause that.
- 4. Agriculture: Soil fertility will gradually be restored. Small scale self-contained mixed farming be³⁷³ taught and encouraged. Tithe payments and debt duties on land abolished, and all bank debts and mortgages. Large scale re-afforestation will be carried out. Land badly farmed will be sequestered.
- 5. Health: Medical services will be preventive, not palliative. Adequate grants will be made for research. Adequate grants to all hospitals, health centres and clinics, thus rendering charity needless.

Industry. Bankers' control of it will go. Obsolete methods of production be scrapped. All inventions now held in check by vested interests be released for the benefit of the community. Mining be fully mechanised.

Building. Slum areas will be speedily cleared. Unhealthy or hideous town demolished, new ones founded according to a general plan. The country will be country; the town town. No suburbs. No ribbon-development horrors. No advertisement hoardings. All buildings, from universities to cottages, will have solidity, dignity and comeliness. All worthy of preservation because of historical interest will be kept in tact. Power stations and certain factories be sunk below the surface of the earth.

Transport. Great new main roads will be planted with trees, and be, throughout their length <u>one-way</u>. Old roads, attractive and winding and characteristically English, be left untouched. The use of inland waterways re-developed. Of the entire merchant fleet a survey will be made. Unseaworthy craft be scrapped, and grants made towards the building of fast medium and small-sized merchant ships of the latest type with good accommodation for crews. Seamen will be highly paid, as is consistent with their dangerous and vital work.

Defence. In this sphere, above all, can no red-tape or vested interests or any type of sabotage be allowed. War being, alas, more than³⁷⁴ possible we must see to it that the people of Britain are well guarded while the Social Credit State is being established and until its beneficent influence has spread abroad. Today, technical quality counts for more than drilled quantity, so the Army, Navy and Air Force must be mechanised to

IRENE RATHBONE: THE SOCIAL CREDIT STATE

374 361

IRENE RATHBONE: THE SOCIAL CREDIT STATE

^{373 360}

the full. Officers and men must be selected for a high standard of intelligence and initiative.

- 6. People will learn in time to live on their National Dividends, to use their leisure and work at things they have an inclination for.
- 7. Education. This will be reorganised throughout, so that it forms a ladder from nursery school to university. Schooling will be free of charge and open to every child in the land. Probably compulsory from five to seventeen, after that voluntary. All text books will be examined and revised so that the manner of presenting facts is as nearly as possible free from distortion, confusion and sentimentalisation.
- 8. A civilisation worthy to be so called is distinguished by two things: happiness, variety. Both will distinguish and make fragment that civilisation that springs from a Social Credit groundwork.

We exalt variety. It will be encouraged in every sphere as against uniformity. There will be <u>separate</u> little firms and shops; immensely <u>diverse</u> newspapers, journals, outlooks, ideas, occupations, crafts, clubs, customs, costumes—food. Destandardisation. Decentralisation.

9. We apply the principles of Social Credit to our internal economy: consumption balancing production. We abolish taxes, we wash our debts, we distribute Things.

M. HIRIYANNA: "THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION."@

- 1. The difference lies, as is commonly recognised, in the fact that he can become self-conscious or³⁷⁵ explicitly aware of his own identity. While other animals also lead a conscious life, they never know that they do so. In the words of one of our scriptures, they live only from moment to moment, whereas man is aware of the past as well as the future. It is a great gift, because it enables him to review his thoughts, feelings, and actions as if they were apart from himself and pass judgment upon them.
- 2. It is well known that the contemplation of a work of art leads to an attitude of mind which is quite impersonal. Man not only grows unselfish here, but also forgets himself completely; and in the supreme aesthetic moment, he is conscious of nothing but the object or the situation portrayed in the work of art in question. His attitude then resembles what the yogins term savikalpa-samadhi, in which one loses oneself, as it

M. HIRIYANNA: "THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION."

[®] Madras University Miller Lectures: 1940.

³⁷⁵ 362

were, in contemplative union with the object. As a consequence of this self-forgetfulness, man rises above all the cares and anxieties of everyday life and experiences a rare kind of satisfaction.

- 2. All this is true; yet art experience cannot serve as that ideal, for it has, at least, one great deficiency which renders it unfit to do so. The contemplative satisfaction which it signifies is transient, because it lasts only as long as the art stimulus lasts; and the stimulus is bound to end, sooner or later, since it arises from an external and fictitious situation created by the artist. It is not suggested by this, that art experience will not leave its wholesome influence behind. All that is meant is that, whatever may be the nature and extent of that influence, the experience itself, with its distinctive features, disappears after a time. And no state that is transitory can obviously be regarded as the final goal of life, whatever its other excellences may be.
- 3.³⁷⁶ So long as the appreciation of nature is piecemeal, the deficiency of transience pointed out above in the case of art experience is also here, because the fragmentary spectacle cannot be held before the mind for very long. Sooner or later it is succeeded by another, and the experience to which it gives rise may be altogether unaesthetic. Thus the realisation of beauty in nature can no more be the final ideal than the realisation of beauty in art can.
- 4. While it may ordinarily be adequate to guide us aright in situations that more or less conform to that standard, it cannot be trusted to do so always. For there are sure to arise new situations in life, or there may suddenly present itself a conflict of duties, when it may fail us. Such situations will give rise to a tension of mind which cannot, unless moral success is a matter of pure chance, be got over till we are able to perceive for ourselves the kind of action which they demand of us. This perception presupposes a knowledge, or more strictly an intuitive understanding, of the ultimate truth.
- 5. The deficiency of art experience, viz. that it is transient, because of its dependence upon a situation created by the artist, is not found in the case of philosophic truth, for it has direct reference to reality. Nor does it suffer from the other drawback of fragmentariness characterising our sense of beauty in nature, for such truth is all-comprehensive, its object being the whole of existence. Any satisfaction, which its discovery may have for man, should therefore be quite stable. Further, the pursuit, as in the case of art and morality, is also marked by unselfishness, for truth, in its pure and undefiled form, is not likely to be attained if it is not sought for its own sake. Its purpose is to satisfy disinterested curiosity, and the intrusion of any personal interest like gain or glory is sure to vitiate the result that may be reached 377. But all the

^{376 363}

same, this value also has its limitation for, as now commonly conceived, it is speculative and signifies a purely theoretical understanding of reality.

- A person that has attained 'jivanmukti' does not abandon activity, if indeed, it is possible for anybody to do so; but the activity becomes wholly impersonal, and he responds to presented situations without relating them to himself. It is this transcending of all subjective or personal valuation which is the significance of all the Upanishadic saying that a knower is not troubled by thoughts like "Have I not done the right?" or "Have I done the wrong?" It means that he rises above the moods of selfapprobation and self-condemnation, and not that he ceases from acting. The freed or perfected man does not lead a passive life. Nor is his attitude towards the world one of pessimistic fatalism, as it is too commonly assumed. That is clear from our characterisation of 'moksa' as a state of supreme bliss; and there are many passages, like the song of the soul's unity in the Taittiriya Upanishad (III, x.), which revel in describing the peaceful state of the knower. There are again 'samnyasins', still among us, who are the embodiment not only of loving kindness for all, but also of detached joy of which the serene smile that ever plays on their lips is a sure sign.
- 7. Long prior to the time of Samkara, there flourished a Vedantic thinker, named Bhartrprapanca. He also was a monist, like Sankara; but he advocated what is known as the 'bhedabheda' view. That is, though he believed in the sole reality of Brahman, he, unlike Sankara, found a place for all variety in it. According to him there is only one soul, but it functions in many centres. The common notion of a plurality of souls is due to this functional divergence and the mistaking of a temporary focusing of experience for the permanent³⁷⁸ individuality of the experiment. But really this individuality only represents one of the numerous points where the single soul operates. There is nothing novel in this notion of one and the same soul being in relation with many bodies for, according to the 'karma' doctrine, a single soul is regarded as assuming different bodily frames in different births, though the bodies there are conceived as succeeding one another only in time and not, as here, as co-existing in space also. If thus there is only one soul to be liberated, the so-called individual jivas, which are but partial and provisional manifestations of it, can only contribute towards its liberation, which will not obviously result until the effort in that direction of the last jiva is successful. All of them should strive, but it is for a common end that they should do so. This unity of purpose, however, is only from the standpoint of moksa. In regard to other purposes relating to moral or material welfare, the jivas manifestly differ; and their difference, so far, is admitted to be real. That is, while every person feels, and feels rightly, that he has his own specific aims to achieve, that feeling is wrong, if entertained towards the final aim of life, because he cannot secure it apart from the rest. In this twofold aim, he

M. HIRIYANNA: "THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION."

378 365

M. HIRIYANNA: "THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION."

resembles, we may say, a planet which, while moving on its own axis, also moves, in accordance with the constitution of the solar system, about the sun as all the other planets do.

- 8. It is the conviction that the souls are many and are only externally related to one another that is the source of much, if not of all, moral evil. When that conviction is replaced by the contrary one that they are but the same, the moral evil practically disappears. A person, who has experienced his identity with the cosmic soul, will necessarily be actuated by universal love, and that, there being nothing to disquiet him except³⁷⁹ the consciousness that there are others who have yet to realise the same identity, his main concern then will be to assist them in doing so. What we have to note particularly in connection with this view is that man must disabuse his mind once for all of the notion that he can reach his spiritual goal apart from others.
- 9. Thus we see that, although the view that moksa is the highest ideal has been accepted by all Indian thinkers, and the Vedantins among them are also agreed as regards certain important features of it like its positive and blissful character, there are details relating to it which remain still unsettled. What is surprising is that, with all the attention which the best minds have devoted to it for so long, even the nature of the ideal should be yet not completely known. The ordinary view that it is known and is embodied in the triad of values—the good, the beautiful and the true—is, as we have seen, not correct. Until the ideal becomes quite clear in all its important aspects, we cannot expect true or steady progress towards it to be made. But its further determination, it should be plain from what has been stated so far, does not depend upon mere speculation; it depends also upon an earnest pursuit of it on the practical side.
- 10. It is only when both theory and practice are pressed into service that, on the Indian view, any genuine progress in our knowledge of it can be made. As the nature of the final goal becomes clearer and better understood in consequence of this two-fold endeavour, we may be sure that man's march towards it will be less slow and less chequred than it has hitherto been.

<u>SANTIDEVA</u>: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": AN ANTHOLOGY COMPILED IN THE 7TH CENTURY FROM THE FOLLOWING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST TEXTS:

³⁷⁹ 366

"Sagaramati Sutra": Again, Blessed One, the Bodhisatva³⁸⁰ honours, respects, and defers to evil friends who have the semblance of the Good Friend, such as dissuade him from the Four Elements of Conciliation, from the accumulation of merit, from laying hold on the Good Law, and make him apply himself to complete seclusion, apply himself also to be a man without interests and without activity, and constantly preach to him discourses really suited for the Disciples and the Pratyeka Buddhas; and at the same time when he would make progress in the Mahayana by means of the secluded life, then they overwhelm him with occupations, on the ground that a Bodhisatva ought to be occupied, then they bid him meditate. And thus they say to him: 'Enlightenment belongs to the active Bodhisatva, not to the idle; if you cannot gain perfect enlightenment in eight or nine aeons, you can never gain it.' (But even) in this case, reverend sir, the Bodhisatva by a supreme effort might after all gain the state which is known to have Nirvana as its fruit. This, reverend sir, is the Tenth Hook of Mara working under the guise of the Good Friend.

- 2. "Ratnakuta": Ill-judged instruction: That the Bodhisatva should confide in those who are immature, is a mistake; and that he should explain the exalted doctrine of the Buddha to unworthy vessels, is a mistake: or again, it is a mistake in him to impart the Lesser Way to those whose mind is set upon high things.
- 3. "Ratnamegha": All principles of things have their origin in mind: when mind is exactly known, all principles are known. Moreover, 'By mind the world is led; mind beholds not mind; mind is the mine of action, whether merit or demerit.'
- 4. "<u>Dharmasangiti Sutra</u>": The Bodhisatva Mativikrama said: 'Whatever thing is called a thing has no local existence general or particular, but only in dependence upon one's own mind. Hence I must strive to make my own mind well-ordered, well³⁸¹-established, well under control, well-trained, well-subdued.
- 5. "<u>Dharma-sangiti Sutra</u>": What are these practices of the Bodhisatva? In this world the Bodhisatva does not abide in a wrong spot, nor at a wrong time; speaks not out of season, is not ignorant of time or place.
- 6. "Sagaramati Sutra": This is the care of oneself, that one should not be injured by others, and that one should not injure others. This essence of a world of texts must be always kept in the heart of the Bodhisatva.

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^{380 367}

SANTIDEVA: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": AN ANTHOLOGY COMPILED IN THE 7TH CENTURY FROM THE FOLLOWING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST TEXTS

SANTIDEVA: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": AN ANTHOLOGY COMPILED IN THE 7TH CENTURY FROM THE FOLLOWING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST TEXTS

- 7. "Ratnarasi Sutra": The Blessed One enjoins the acceptance and use of the offerings of the faithful. If, Brethren, a Brother who is meditative, devoted to meditation, familiar with my teaching, aware that all sentient conditions are transitory; if he knows the pain of all the conditions of sense, has confidence in the theory that all states are unreal, if he longs for peace and final deliverance, he may enjoy the gifts of the faithful in proportions as large as Mount Sumeru. Very pure is the gift he gets. And whenever the offering is enjoyed by the gift of any munificent givers, most rich and splendid for them is the ripening of merit there from. This is the reason: Chief of those fundamental good works is the mystic state of benevolence. Then, Kasyapa, when a brother after receiving garments and alms from a generous benefactor attains infinite peace of mind, infinite ripening of merit is to be expected for that generous benefactor.
- 8. "Bhagavati": This is the thought he cherishes. 'I whose duty it is to appease the quarrels of all beings, I myself quarrel. My gains are hard gained, if I answer as I am spoken to. I whose duty it is to be the means of progress for all beings, I myself say to another³⁸², The same to you, or return a harsh answer. This I ought not to say; I should be as without speech, I should be as dump sheep in quarrels and bickerings. When I hear others' ways of speech ugly, unkind, abusive, I ought not to make my thoughts angry. In the presence of others this is not meet or proper, that I recognize the faults in another's heart. This is not proper, that I think even the fault of another's heart worth listening to. Why is that? My purpose must not be weakened by me, whose duty it is to make all beings happy by providing all happiness, and completely to emancipate them, by awaking in them the incomparable supreme wisdom; in that case I perish; nor must I be angry for the great offences of others; in that case I go into delusion and agitation. This is my duty to do; with firm energy I must exert myself; I must not be agitated, even if my life is being taken: I must not show a frown on my face.'
- 9. "Bhagavati": The Bodhisatva, when first he has begun to think, walking in the Perfection of Contemplation, falls into the ecstasy by thoughts connected with omniscience. Seeing forms with the eye, he is not affected by them. Going or standing, sitting or lying or speaking, he does not leave his condition of tranquillity. He does not fidget with hands or feet or twitch his face, he is not incoherent of speech, his senses are not confused, he is not exalted or uplifted, not fickle or idle, not agitated in body or mind; tranquil in his body, tranquil his voice, his mind is tranquil; in secret and in public his demeanour is contented. And why is this? He regards all things as having the Void for their special characteristic, as not existing, as not created, as not produced; that is the matter in sum. All that is composite is unreal, like illusion, like a dream, soon there must be parting from all that is dear; no

^{382 369}

one is here permanently; strive and make effort always for the Perfections, the spiritual Stages³⁸³, the Powers; never let slip your strength until you awaken the most excellent wisdom.

"Ratnacuda" The intent contemplation of thought is as set forth: Thus he 10. inquires into his thought. But what thought? Thought is glad or sorry or deluded. What about past, present or future? Now what is past is exhausted; what is future is not yet come; the present cannot stand still. Thought, Kasyapa, is to be found inside, not outside, not between the two. Thought, Kasyapa is formless, unseen, not solid, unknowable, unstable, homeless. Thought, Kasyapa, was never seen by any of the Buddhas. They do not see it, they will not see it; and what has never been seen by the Buddhas, what they do not see and will never see, what kind of a process can that have, unless things exist by a false conception? Thought, Kasyapa, is like illusion, and by forming what is not comprehends all sorts of events... Thought, Kasyapa, is like the stream of a river, unsettled, breaking and dissolving as soon as it is produced. Thought, Kasyapa, is like the light of a lamp, and is due to causes and secondary causes. Thought, Kasyapa, is like lightning, cut off in a moment and not abiding. Examining thought he does not see it as internal, he sees it not outside him, nor in the conformations, nor in the elements, nor in the organs of sense. Not seeing thought, he follows the course of thought, asking, 'Whence does thought arise?' He thinks, 'When there is an object thought arises. Then what else can be its object? Thus the object is the thought. Only if the object is different the thought is different; then there will be a double thought. So the object is the thought. Then how does thought see thought? Thought does not see thought. As the same sword-blade cannot cut the same swordblade, as the same fingertip cannot touch the same fingertip, so that the same thought cannot see the same thought.

11.384 "Pitrputrasamagama" It is described how all phenomena are without substance, but it is not denied that they are connected with the fruit of action; that they have no properties of their own, but it is not denied that they are connected with the world of appearance. The sense are like illusion, material objects are such stuff as dreams are made of. Take an example, sir. A man asleep might in his sleep have to do with some young woman. What think you, sir: does that woman exist in the dream?' He said: 'No, Blessed One.' The Blessed One said: 'What think you, sir? Would that man be wise who would remember the young woman in his sleep or believe in the dalliance?' He said: 'No, Blessed One. And why so? Because the young woman in the dream does

^{383 370}

SANTIDEVA: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": AN ANTHOLOGY COMPILED IN THE 7TH CENTURY FROM THE FOLLOWING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST TEXTS 384 371

SANTIDEVA: "SIKSHA-SAMUCCAYA": AN ANTHOLOGY COMPILED IN THE 7TH CENTURY FROM THE FOLLOWING MAHAYANA BUDDHIST TEXTS

not exist at all nor is to be found; then how could there be any dealings with her, except in so far that he who believes in her existence really feels failure or fatigue?' The Blessed One said: 'Even so, sir, a foolish, untaught worldling when he sees agreeable forms believes in them, and believing in them is pleased, and being pleased feels passion, and feeling passion develops the action that springs from passion. So, sir, the senses are all illusion, unsatisfied and unsatisfying, things are such stuff as dreams are made of, unsatisfying, causing dissatisfaction.

- 12. "Dharmasangiti" The true nature of things is a way of describing the void. And that void condition neither arises nor ceases. The belief of the whole world, young sir, is convinced of arising and ceasing. Then the Tathagata in his great compassion to keep men free from fear, taking his stand upon experience, said that things arise and cease; but in this he did not mean the existence or destruction of anything.
- 13. "Dharmasangiti Sutra" One who believes in the void is not attracted by worldly things, because they are unsupported. He is not delighted by gain³⁸⁵, he is not cast down by not gaining. Glory does not dazzle him, lack of glory does not make him ashamed. Scorn does not make him hide, praise does not win him; pleasure delights him not, pain does not trouble him. He that so is not attracted by the things of the world, he is said to know the Void. So one who believes in the void has no likes or dislikes; he knows that to be only void which he might like, and regards it as only void. That in brief is the Cleansing of Thought.
- 14. "Tathagata-guhya Sutra" I accept respectfully the voice of those clever at instructing others, who assist with unsolicited instruction; I am the pupil of all. I have to fight alone against many passions, my enemies; then while I am engaged in battle with one, others strike me easily. Then he who tells me a danger, in the rear or in some other quarter, whether he hate me or love me, he is a friend that gives me life.

OLIVER L. REISER: Review of Irving J. Lee's "Language Habits in Human Affairs."

Language Habits in Human Affairs has to do with words. It presents the new science of semantics in terms of today's problems, in language that everyone can understand.

It is no accident that the role of language in human affairs should be scrutinized today. In an age when the deliberate misuse of language has become a conscious art, the publication of Dr Lee's book is an event of importance. Here are provided the necessary correctives for the abuses of language. The desperate need of our world for clear thinking and straight talking calls for just such a study, showing us how to detect the workings of lying propagandists while yet rising above negativism and defeatism.

^{385 372}

Dr Lee is a student of Alfred Korzybski. Trained as a mathematician and engineer in Warsaw, Korzybski's work in the General Staff Intelligence Department of the Russian Army of World War³⁸⁶ I whetted his interest in the problems of human adjustment, and brought into sharp focus the achievements of the physical scientists in their fields as compared with the failures of those who guide us in our everyday living. When engineers plan, they end with structures which are reliable; bridges and buildings stand up, guns and airplanes work, steam shovels and dynamos function as they should.

But how about the men who govern our economic, political, and legal affairs? Too often for them "Prosperity is just around the corner," or "Germany just couldn't finance a war," or "If this bill is passed, it will have such and such effects." And so on. The security we have with the engineers we do not have with the social "scientists" — if we measure their achievements.

Surveying this situation, Korzybski asked the question: If both the physical structures and the social institutions are products of human nervous systems, what does the engineer do that the social scientist does not do when each goes to work? The answer given by Korzybskian semantics is that the engineer utilizes a symbolism (language) similar in structure to the fact with which he has to deal. His major effort is to make his talk, formulas and equations adequately represent the facts. But in the social field we find no such reliability and predictability because utterances here do not fit the facts. Following Korzybski, Dr Lee not only points out our bad "language habits", but shows us how to develop a symbolism which will represent the life facts, and thus enable us to construct a sane society.

In presenting the main techniques and conclusions of general semantics, Dr Lee introduces the reader to the main Korzybskian formulations: map-territory relations, the ladder of abstractions, the³⁸⁷ world of processes, and how to deal with these processes through "indexing," "descriptions," and "inferences," "proper evaluations," and the rest. One of the most interesting chapters has to do with <u>Silence</u>—when to "keep still." After the victory is won, this chapter should be made compulsory reading for all the former Dictators!

Thus simply and succinctly, Dr Lee succeeds in presenting language as the unique ingredient in man. Man lives in time: he can draw from the <u>past</u>, in and through the <u>present</u> and make ready for the <u>future</u>, because man can preserve his knowledge through his language-using abilities. Symbolization is the means whereby the uniqueness of man is established. As Dr Lee puts it:

^{386 373}

OLIVER L. REISER: Review of Irving J. Lee's "Language Habits in Human Affairs." 387 374

OLIVER L. REISER: Review of Irving J. Lee's "Language Habits in Human Affairs."

"To see the uniqueness of man's time-binding capacity is to begin to realize the significance of language. If we discover the creative uses of words, we may begin to know what it is to function humanly."

Let us hope that in the world which is to come we shall all master the techniques for the "creative uses of words," and thereby build for ourselves and our descendants a saner and a better civilization than men have thus far been able to construct.

WILLIAM H. GEORGE: THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION.

- 1. As a scientist I cannot use the philosophical ideas of 'truth' and 'validity', I therefore challenge devotees of the Absolute to produce not their evidence, but a description of the tests, based upon agreement between human observers, by which the Absolute can be recognized when it is met.
- 2. Einstein's General Relativity Theory is not a theory which has grown out of, or developed from, or evolved from Newton's work, it is a different way of looking at things.
- 3,388 The difficulty of excluding mention of the human element can be seen in considering such a simple mechanical problem as the motion of a spot of mud on the rim of a wheel, which is rolling with constant speed along a level road. Seen from the axle of the wheel the mud-spot is moving with uniform speed in circles. Seen from the road the mud-spot is moving with varying speed along an unclosed curve, the cycloid. Lovers of Absolute Truth may want to know how the mud-spot is really moving. Surely the mud-spot cannot be moving in circles and also along a cycloid at the same time. What answer can be given? The General Theory of Relativity has reminded us that even in the most abstruse physician problems we do not get away from the observer. Not only must information about the observer be specifically stated, but the results are expressed in terms of what this observer can detect.
- 4. When psychology was freeing itself from the stultifying influence of philosophy one group of workers devoted attention to the actions of men who definitely do not behave like pure reason machines. These workers found with "great frequency" in the insane, grandiose delusions in which the patient claims "to be some exalted personage, or to possess some other attribute which raises him far above the level of his follows." Ideas derived from a study of the abnormal actions of the insane or of the mentally ill were later used in studies of more normal action. No brief is here held for the

psychoanalytical theories of normal human action, but it is difficult to deny the relevance of these studies.

- 5. When they use such a phrase as 'the nature of the physical world' they refer to what some kind of world or universe is really like or would look like if all mankind were dead. The users of the Patterning theory can make no scientific statement whatever about a physical world³⁸⁹ or a mysterious universe which includes no human beings. For the patternist, science starts from facts. Facts are coincidence observations made by human observers. As a world containing no human beings contains no human observers the patternist can get no facts. He cannot therefore get any scientific classifications, laws, or theories about such a physical world. For him the phrase 'the nature of the physical world' means a collection of physical facts, classifications, laws, and theories, all of which are biological products of that particular kind of animal called man. For the patternist the idea of an external world is then no more than an hypothesis.
- 6. An appropriate stimulus of suitable intensity has acted upon a healthy, normal sense organ, but has not yielded an observation. Words are available to describe this phenomenon. It may be said that <u>attention</u> was absent. Although the phenomenon is common, well known, and named, it is not understood. The essential differences between the condition of a stimulated sense-organ yielding or not yielding an observation are not known. Attention is, then, one essential requirement of observation. But whether attention precedes, determines, or merely accompanies observation, is not known.
- 7. The examination of even a simple object under favourable conditions is not a simple process. Perhaps we unconsciously add something derived from previous experience.
- 8. What results have so far been obtained in the critical examination of observation. Observation gives the facts upon which all scientific knowledge is based. In the first chapter facts were described as impersonal observations and impersonal was used in the sense of being essentially independent of any one individual, not as independent of human beings altogether. Methods of observing are therefore³⁹⁰ wanted which shall give the same results with all or at least the majority of observers. Our examination has shown that the eye-witness of everyday life is from this point point of view wholly unreliable. What is observed depends upon who is looking. To get some agreement between observers they must be paying attention; their lives must not be consciously in

WILLIAM H. GEORGE: THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION

390 377

WILLIAM H. GEORGE: THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION

^{389 376}

danger, their prime necessities of life must preferably be satisfied and they must not be taken by surprise. If they are observing a transient phenomenon the phenomenon must be repeated many times and preferably they must not only look <u>at</u>, but must look <u>for</u> each detail. In inferential observation of even a simple stationary object its appearance may seem to change if it is viewed for a time. Inferential observation of other simple objects may give erroneous results and the erroneous results are not permanently absent from unaided observation. The deceptive appearance of some optical illusions remains even with knowledge of the more detailed evidence. No method of observation has therefore been found which can be guaranteed to give trustworthy results unable as basic in scientific research.

- 9. It must remembered that research work is done by human beings, not by machines, and consciousness is a property of man. Stimulus of sense organs may not give an observation if the observer is not paying attention; that is, if he is not aware or conscious of the stimulus.
- 10. Scientists invented the conception of atoms and electrons; they are not things directly experienced individually by the senses so of course they are conceptual inventions made by man. But they are real none the less. It is just the same with the ordinary objects of everyday life. The complete idea of a solid object such as a chair or a table is not given directly³⁹¹ to the senses. One only perceives certain aspects at a time. One can't see all round it at once, and one can't know it is there when one is looking the other way. In fact, the continued existence of a three-dimensional chair is a scientific hypothesis of exactly the same nature as the hypothesis of the existence and properties of electrons. Electrons have different properties from chairs and tables, but they are no more fictitious; only they are rather more abstract in the sense that they are several steps further removed from the direct perception of the senses than are the ordinary objects of everyday.
- 11. It would appear that all sense data come first in wholes and are later analysed into smaller and smaller wholes ending (in scientific observation) with the simple whole consisting of two parts, between which coincidence or the lack there of is judged. Observation of single isolated things is impossible, for a single object without a contrasting background is invisible. Some kind of whole, even though it be as simple as object and background, is invariably essential in either ordinary or scientific observation.
- 12. The same objects seen more than once by the same individual do not look in every way the same. The internal observations and the details of sense data upon which attention is concentrated are not the same when I return to a sunlit, primrose-

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³⁹¹ 378

decked wood in springtime after having visited, seen, heard, and smelt a sordid city slum. Each new symphony I hear slightly alters what I notice on rehearing the old ones. A very crude mental picture of observation by an individual may be formed by supposing that each observation is registered upon something like a cinema film, and that in making the next observation, the whole of this succession of negatives is flashed through the mind³⁹² of the observer. What he then selects from the initial whole and registers upon the film depends upon what is already upon the film. The film registers not only sights but sounds, smells, and all other sense data.

- 13. Two ideas are in perpetual use in research. They are the idea of concrete objects of the laboratory, i.e. objects of the hypothetical external world, and abstract ideas or mental concepts formed by studying these objects. The distinction made between the two is that the observer becomes aware of the concrete objects by seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, or tasting. The concrete objects can be observed by the coincidence method. The observer can also be aware of the abstract ideas or mental concepts but he cannot manipulate them with his hands. Mental concepts are not observable by the coincidence method.
- 14. Boltzmann put it thus: "It has never been doubted that our ideas are merely images of the objects (or rather symbols for them) which have a certain relationship with the objects, and never completely correspond to them, but are related to them as letters to sounds or notes to musical tones. Also on account of the limitation of our intellect they are able only to depict a small part of the objects."

When the abstraction has been made it can be manipulated only with the mind. In the laboratory an object can never be found having the properties of our abstract, without having also a vast number of other properties which are completely ignored in making the abstract. Furthermore, in the mind, all sorts of things can be done with these abstracted ideas which cannot be done in the laboratory with the objects from which the abstracted qualities were first got. A mathematician can work with triangles, but a physicist has to use triangular pieces of wood or metal or the three feet of a spherometer and the like. I see no rational grounds for being surprised when it³⁹³ is found that a laboratory steel-rule does not behave in exactly the same way as do the mental concepts derived from it and used in the mind. In the very expectation that a few mental concepts abstracted from examining some object or phenomenon will be able to tell us 'all that matters' about the thing, we seem to be giving ourselves credit for remarkably penetrating vision. If it be assumed that other concepts are trivial, then, in effect, either Nature or other men's interests are being criticized.

WILLIAM H. GEORGE: THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION

393 380

WILLIAM H. GEORGE: THE SCIENTIST IN ACTION

^{392 379}

15. It is useless to search laboratories in the hope of finding particles. From the description of the particle of dynamics it might be thought that a tiny steel ball such as can be found in a ball bearing was something like the particle of dynamics. The steel ball could be picked up with a magnet, but not so the particle of dynamics. Only the steel ball would reflect light, and only the steel ball would rust if left out in the rain. A novice in dynamics could get an idea of a particle by imagining the steel ball shrunk more and more, without losing its mass but he would still have to put out of mind a host of other properties of the steel ball before he had grasped the idea of the particle of dynamics. Neither a tiny drop of oil such as was used in Millikan's experiment, nor a drop of water such as is seen or photographed in a Wilson Cloud Chamber, nor the much smaller objects such as are studied in bacteriology, are particles. No human observer has ever seen a dynamical particle. It can be found only in the mind of the scientist. This distinction between what can be observed by human observers and what can be conceived in the mind, is here laboured in reference to the dynamical particle, because this latter can be very readily visualized in spite of the fact that it cannot be seen. Once this idea is grasped, that the particle of elementary dynamics cannot be seen, one is less worried³⁹⁴ by the fact that another kind of particle called an electron, which cannot so readily be visualized, cannot also be seen.

In some scientific work mental concepts are used which cannot be visualized. This double complication, firstly that they are mental concepts and cannot therefore be observed, and secondly that they cannot be visualized, has led to some remarkable paradoxes in popular science literature where some of these difficult mental concepts have been treated as if they have the properties of concrete objects.

- 16. Much confusion of thought can be, and often is, produced outside the laboratory in such fields as politics, ethics, religion and social studies, by failure to distinguish between abstract concepts and concrete objects and events.
- 17. All abstractions are mental concepts, but all mental concepts are not abstractions. Eddington writes: "We are accustomed to think of a man apart from his duration...But to think of a man without his duration is just as abstract as to think of a man without his inside. Abstractions are useful, and a man without his inside (that is to say, a surface) is a well-known geometrical conception. But we ought to realize what is an abstraction and what is not. Redness would be called an abstraction because concrete red objects, red buses or flowers or books or ink or sunsets and the like, can be seen almost anywhere. An <u>n</u>-fold continuum would be called a mental concept, but not an abstraction, because the source of the idea is not readily apparent.
- 18. Lodge writing of Einstein's relativity theory says: "In such a system there is no need for 'Reality:' only phenomena can be observed or verified: absolute fact is

^{394 381}

inaccessible. We have no criterion for truth; all appearances are equally valid; physical explanations are neither forthcoming nor required....Matter is, indeed, a³⁹⁵ mentally constructed illusion generated by local peculiarities of space." These are views with which he does not agree.

19. Another view is that real means what can be observed by the use of the sense organs, in making coincidence observations. It is on this view, according to which pain, for example, is not real, that the poet, referring to a gentleman from Deal, wrote: "Although I'm told pain isn't real If I sit on a pin And it punctures my skin I dislike what I fancy I feel."

In contrast with these views where 'mere' impressions of the mind are presumably regarded as unreal, the opposite view may be noted that mental concepts express ultimate reality.

- 20. These are only a few of the views on what is real. They suffice to show that in the present state of the literature no general agreement has been reached as to the scientist's use of the term. Equally eminent writers not only give different definitions but some precisely invert the meaning of others. If only different definitions were found then it would be reasonable to try to see if each of the definitions was emphasizing some different property or aspect of reality. When, however, one authority says that 'real' means impressions of the mind and another authority says that 'real' means not impressions of the mind, we are face to face with a logical inconsistency. 'Real' cannot both be and not be impressions of the mind. Under these conditions I fail to see how any answer can be given to such a specific question as "Are electrons real?" One can only ask "What do you mean by real?" or "What tests must be applied in order to decide whether a thing is real or not?" Research workers are concerned with what they can observe³⁹⁶ about things, not with what things are.
- 21. Writing on the use of words whose sense is not defined Heisenberg says: "In this connection one should particularly remember that the human language permits the construction of sentences which do not involve any consequences and which therefore have no content at all-in spite of the fact that these sentences produce some kind of picture in our imagination; e.g. the statement that besides our world there exists another world with which any connection is impossible in principle, does not lead to any experimental consequences, but does produce a kind of picture in the mind. Obviously such a statement can neither be proved nor disproved. One should be especially careful in using the words 'reality' 'actuality' etc. since these words often lead to statements of the type just mentioned."

^{395 382}

22. 'Are atoms and such familiar objects as chairs essentially the same, differing only in, say, size and shape?' In view of what has just been said about the restriction of the scientist's interests to what can be technically verified, it is evident that the only part of the question which can be dealt with scientifically relates to what can be subject to tests of observation and experiment.

It is claimed by some writers that even when the coincidence method is directly applicable, as in observing a chair, some kind of synthesizing process analogous to theorizing has to be used in order to get any idea of the whole which is called the chair. On this view common observation is regarded as a process of rapid synthesis, a rapid building up into a whole, of a number of separate details which are first seen in isolation or unrelated; one first sees the four legs, seat, and back, and then rapidly synthesizes them into the whole visual impression of the chair.

We³⁹⁷ may answer that the scientist as such is interested only in 'truth as technically verified.' He is concerned not with what things are, but with what tests he can apply, using his sense organs, and with mental concepts into which the sense data can be fitted. As to tests, the thing called a chair can directly give sense data; it can form one of the two parts essential for judgement of coincidence. The sense data got from observation of a chair can be got by using the type of human judgement in which agreement between observers is reached. Sense data can also be got from the chair, in the form of a whole, by using common observation. In contrast with this, the thing called an atom has so far yielded neither types of sense data.

BEPIN VEHARI RAY. "DEMOCRACY AS PLURAL GOVERNMENT.®

- It will be seen that for Rousseau there exist only two ways of deciding political (1)matters. Hence two political parties: a Government party and an Opposition party. And the two parties are considered to be the antipodes to one another, having nothing in common. A careful examination of party politics and the evolution that has been taking place since Rousseau's time do not give justification for Rousseau's assumption. It is not true that there are only two ways of looking at political problems; nor is it true to say that political parties remain unalterably fixed in plan and programme.
- 2. Plural Government has ceased to be a matter of emergency; it is rapidly becoming the oder of the day. Concomitantly with the emergence of many political parties, the dividing line between one party and another is getting thinner. Parties do not appear so violently opposed as they used to be. Vertical differences are³⁹⁸ being

^{397 384}

[®] In Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol.17.1941.

^{398 385}

replaced by horizontal ones. All parties have become progressive; the question is one of more or less.

Thus it is that in place of a left and right party, we find each side to consist of more than one group. The splitting up into section of classical parties, not only reduces the divergence as between groups but also has the effect of bringing the two sides closer together. The extreme left and the extreme right may be wide apart. But others are not so. The left group nearest to the right side contains differences that may be worked into harmony. Parties again are moving with the times. The old groupings are undergoing changes. An impartial observer of the present party politics in Britain will have no hesitation in saying that the present Conservative party is not what it was before. It is less tenacious of the Principles it once held sacred and is more open to conviction. It is the ruling party in Britain, and its rules not by rigorously following, but by gradually discarding hidebound conservatism. The Liberal party also is in course of disintegration, some favouring the right and others the left tendency. And the Labour party is broken up into a moderate and an extreme section. This is how political parties are undergoing transformations, how time, experience and deeper political thinking are slowly bringing about a new alignment of political forces. Such being the movement and direction of political groups in democratic countries, is it not time to think seriously of plural Government?

- 3. If the issues to be faced are of a national character, it is difficult to understand why they be confided to a single party. Such matters are likely to be handled better by a Government on which several parties are represented than a party Government; for that Government will have given due weight to different point of view before it arrives at a decision. And that decision will³⁹⁹ carry behind it an authority which can not be challenged by any group worth considering.
- 4. Self-interest is a dividing quality. It separates one man, one party, from another. My interest differs from yours; your interest differs from mine. Left to pursue our sectional interests, we run at each other's throat. The clash becomes inevitable. Yet they hope to build the orderly life of a nation out of these essentially anarchical materials. There are other objections too. Party Government breaks up the nation into two or more incompatible political groups and is inconsistent with the true view of national life as one indivisible whole.
- 5. Is competition more valuable than co-operation in the sphere of social life? So far as lower stages in life are concerned, competition probably provides a useful stimulus to legitimate growth. A student needs it when he is at the threshold of his life. But as he grows up, he discards it. He pursues knowledge because it attracts him, because it is a good. What is true of individuals applies in a larger measure to group-life. In politics,

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³⁹⁹ 386

we follow common interests, a good which is to be shared. We are seeking a value that is a value for all of us. Where interests are common, the realization of the same is hampered by political antagonism. It is furthered by political co-operation.

- 6. The pronounced antagonism among the different economic units and rival social forces has added to the difficulties of party Government. No political party, whatever be its strength, considers itself competent to tackle such issues. Any attempt at solving socio-economic questions would require assistance of the opposed groups as much as of those who take an independent view of the matter. A broad governmental basis, cooperation between one group and another, and continued⁴⁰⁰ efforts are essential to a successful handling of socio-political needs. Again a composite Government which represents different shades of political opinion is more likely to enjoy these days stability and continuity of life, if only members know how to work. Therefore what we need is not a unitary Government which keeps away all differences, but a pluralistic state in which "the commonwealth resulting from the successful co-ordination of all social forces will ultimately be a comprehensive all-satisfying unity.
- 7. Moreover whatever extreme views they may have had, it is well known that party men, when actually engaged in the work of administration learn to modify their principles. Participation in Government has the effect of softening the rigour of party tenets. Power begets a sense of responsibility and enables men to take a wider view of the situation.

A pluralistic State is opposed to a unitary structure. In it the legislature and the cabinet are both composite, consisting of men who represent different politicoeconomical forces, of men who want to move quickly and others who desire a slow progress. But a plural State must not be understood to mean a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements. Here opposed members are present, and the opposed members have one mission. They are there as fellow workers in a common cause. A plural cabinet signifies national front. This does not mean sacrifice of principles or domination of one group over another. There is no absorption, no merging of one party in another, no question of one constituent group coercing another. What is meant is that different parties place their varied experiences at the service of the nation. Government is essentially a matter of exchange of ideas, and eventually one of give and take. Each party contributes elements to the total result which it alone is competent to give and 401 in return each is rewarded by gifts which it is incapable of producing out of its own store. A plural Government is not the negation, but the completion of party Government. There will be in it majority and minority interests. The minority will be there to influence the majority to such extent as it reasonably can. The majority will be

^{400 387}

there to tolerate the existence of the minority. The plural parties in a plural cabinet constitute unique members in a unique whole.

Some people think that plural Governments to be lacking in necessary strength. We differ from this view. A plural Government is not so weak as it is supposed to be. It was Baldwin's first plural Government of 1931, which saved England from an acute financial crisis. Others would say that the presence of minority group or groups in the cabinet will prove worse than useless. For such groups either succeed in changing the policy of Government or they do not. In the former case, the administration becomes a minority administration; and as such it will be against the will of people as reflected in the majority group. In the latter case, they will be so many superfluous bodies. But the dilemma is false, because it assumes majority and minority groups to be wholly incompatible elements; and that the majority never listens to what is said from the other side, and the minorities are there simply to obstruct others. A Government by one party either is or is not prepared to entertain suggestions from other parties. If it is, it ought to admit for that very reason, members of other party into the cabinet. If it is not, that betrays a morbid mentality which scents danger in everything that comes from the other side. Even if a minority group stands for radical changes, it is preferable to have someone who represents that point of view⁴⁰² by our side. For then we can meet and discuss about peace and progress and decide as to what is desirable and practicable. We cannot prevent revolution by keeping revolutionaries at a distance. They will drive revolution deep into national life.

It is true that the presence of more than one party in the sphere of Government involves a certain amount of restriction on the powers and liberties of majority group. This group whatever be its complexion, is not wholly free to act in the way in which it wishes to act. For example, the admixture of non-socialistic elements proves a hindrance to the socialistic party, which, because of the obstruction it receives from the other side, cannot carry to the extreme its plan of social equality. But this obstruction is not purely an evil. On the contrary it forms a necessary ingredient to the expansion of political life. In our individual life, we all experience the antagonism between the sentient self and the rational self; and we know that the growth of the rational self is not hampered by the opposition it has to face and overcome from the lower nature. The same thing is true of Governments. The narrow party life rises to fullness by the impact of other parties. We learn to accommodate, to appreciate other points of view. The contact with other parties which to superficial observation appears to be an evil, is the very factor which renders possible the growth of our civic sense.

And we arrive at the same conclusion, judging by the sense of freedom. There can be no real freedom where the component limbs in socio-political life of the nation, are not represented in the same proportion to their intrinsic service to the nation.

402 389

G.R. MALKANI: "SOLIPSISM."®

- (1) If I cannot take note of another, is another real for me? The truth is that reality, for all theoretical as well⁴⁰³ as practical purposes, is inseparable from the knowledge of it. If A, for example, does not know B, C, D etc. these are as good as non-existent to it. What is its universe? Its universe contains one term only,—and that is A. A has every right to declare itself the Absolute, if it could not take note of its own situation. Its universe is not limited by anything from outside, whereby it may recognise itself to be one among many.
- 2. Let us now suppose that the many are known. Are they not real in that case at least? Our knowledge itself proves them to be real. If they are not real, although known, we are reduced to solipsism. One self alone is real, and other selfs are parts of his experience. If that is so, what is this privileged self? Is it you who are asserting or the person with whom you are disputing, or a third neutral party? The very possibility of this question shows that you can not regard yourself to be the sole reality; and there is no other person who has a better right to it. The very fact of a dispute or a conflict of views arising contradicts the solipsistic position.

We take it for granted that knowledge must reference to another or a reality which is outside of us. But this is just incomprehensible. Why should an outside reality be at all known? I can directly know myself and my states. They are part of me. An outside reality is no part of me. How is the gulf to be bridged? The view that knowledge, by its very nature, bridges the gulf, is dogmatic. If knowledge were capable of performing this miracle, it should do so unaided by any instruments of knowledge, such as sense-organs, etc. But the very fact that we depend upon our own sensations in order to know an outside reality, reduces that reality to our own state. Can we ever transcend our own states? We do not think that to be possible unless we can intuit reality directly and without subjective meditation⁴⁰⁴ of any sort.

It appears to us that there is not a single argument against solipsism. It is absolutely self-consistent. If I hold that the many are part of my experience and have no transcendent reality, what argument can you have against me? You cannot point to something which really transcends my experience. What really transcends cannot fall within my experience and cannot be pointed out. On the other hand, I can argue against you. It is all as in dreams. The other individuals are my creations, and yet I react to them as though they were real and transcendent to me. The solipsistic position is irrefutable. The only argument against it is a certain bias derived from the needs of life and activity, reason or no reason, we do not want to believe solipsistically.

G.R. MALKANI: "SOLIPSISM."

G.R. MALKANI: "SOLIPSISM."

[®] In "Indian Philosophical Quarterly" (1941).

^{403 390}

^{404 391}

You want to know, what self constitutes the unity in question or is the sole reality. Whose self is that? We reply, it is you or the self of the person asking. Let this person take himself seriously, and try to know his own true self. This self is the only ground of the appearances of reality which is the world. To know the self as such a ground is to know it as the ultimate reality or the unity of all things. The self in itself is not unknown. It is not unrelated to intuition. In fact it is the soul of every intuition; it is pure intuition. What we do not know is the true significance of this knowledge of the self which we already possess. This significance has to be elicited the process of eliciting it is what we call philosophy.

G.R. MALKANI.[®] "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?"

Progress is the watch-word of modern times. We naturally suppose that this progress is all-round. That there has been considerable progress in our knowledge of nature in recent times may be undoubted. But we are prone to think that the spiritual stature⁴⁰⁵ of man too has grown proportionately. Unfortunately, in holding this belief, we are governed by a certain prejudice. We think that knowledge is the highest faculty of man, and that knowledge is essentially of an outside reality which can be empirically studied. All positivism is unconsciously governed by this idea. It is thought that real progress is scientific progress. It is progress in the theoretical understanding of reality. This reality is extremely complex. But science at least introduces system into our knowledge of it, and thereby it helps our understanding of the same.

What then is the function of philosophical knowledge? Philosophical knowledge appears to be a species of knowledge. But evidently it is not scientific knowledge. Can there be any other kind of knowledge? The old-type philosophers believed that philosophic knowledge was also knowledge of reality. It answered certain ultimate questions about it. The philosophers, so it is thought by modern positivists, vainly sought those answers. The result was that they were like blind men led by the blind. They raised false issues, and wasted their labour in pursuing them. We should recognise that philosophical knowledge is not knowledge. It is more or less a grammar of the universal language of experience. A grammar is not a study of reality. It does not presume to give new knowledge. It merely systematises and sets out the rules that are already in operation. These rules, as used by us, are unconscious. Grammar, for the first time, fixes them explicitly in our consciousness. Philosophy is similar to a grammar in this sense. But the language which it studies is not the phonetic language of any social group. It studies the rules of the universal language in which the common experience of humanity is expressed. It makes clear the theoretical sense of common statements, however they may be expressed.

405 392

[®] In "Indian Philosophical Quarterly (1941).

If⁴⁰⁶ this view is right, the problem of philosophy is essentially a problem of meaning. We must not expect our knowledge of reality to be advanced through philosophical thinking. We must raise the right issues. And we can only do so, when we realise the meaning-function of language. Statements which have no meaning for the common man or the social man ought never to be made or discussed; and yet it is exclusively with such statements that traditional philosophy occupied itself. It talked about super-sensible reality or ultimate-reality, etc. We must correct this attitude. We must take our stand upon common experience, and interpret all significant statements in terms of it. We may no doubt be mystically inclined. In that case, nobody can prevent us from indulging in our favourite pastime. But the experiences of the mystic are his personal affair. Other people do not share them, and do not understand the language in which they may be communicated. Mysticism is not philosophy. It is beyond ordinary logic. The business of philosophy is to achieve clarity of meaning; and it can only do this through reduction of more complex statements of experience to their simplest logical constituents. All philosophical problems are in this sense languagepuzzles.

This conception of philosophy is the natural result of a scientific bias. If science alone gives any useful knowledge of reality, what has philosophy got to do? It must either merge in science, or it must change its course. It cannot stand ambiguously between science and religion. It must disconnect itself from both. It must be conceived as a new science, more or less formal in character, in which the meaning-function of language is analysed and studied.

We do not agree with this view. We hold the traditional conception of philosophy. Philosophy has something to do with reality and the understanding of 407 reality. Indeed, it is not one of the empirical sciences, or even a universal or an all-embracing science. It is not a science at all. By a science we understand any empirical study of reality. Philosophy is not an empirical study. Its approach to reality is entirely different from that of a science. It does not formulate hypotheses and then test them by facts. If it did this, it would indeed be a science; and like every science, it would compel acceptance of its conclusions by every right-thinking person. It would be speculative only in the sense in which all science is speculative. We do not believe that this universal science is possible. All science is restricted to well-defined groups of facts, and governed by certain postulates. Such restriction is inadmissible in philosophy. Again, there are no questions relating to all facts alike which can be empirically or scientifically tackled. We cannot have a science which has this universal scope. Even if it were possible, we should leave it among the sciences with a appropriate name, and reserve the name "philosophy" for some other kind of approach to reality which we believe to be possible.

^{406 393}

G.R. MALKANI. "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?" 407 394

G.R. MALKANI. "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?"

In order to understand this properly we must realise the inadequacy of the scientific approach. Scientific knowledge may be knowledge of reality. But when every precaution has been taken to render it true to reality, we may yet be obliged to recognise the subjectivity of this knowledge. Sense-data are subjective. Categories of thought are subjective. All empirical concepts through which we interpret and determine the nature of reality are subjective. Knowledge should be of the thing in itself. Or alternatively, the thing should declare itself to us for what it is. This is never so at any stage of scientific knowledge. The result is that our knowledge does not realise the ideal of knowledge. The⁴⁰⁸ distinction of reality and appearance is forced upon us. The most certain knowledge of the object that we can possibly have is still subjective. It is open to modification, to doubt and even to sublation. Certitude is impossible. Can we still claim that this is knowledge, and that we have no further problem regarding reality?

Some might argue that we can and do have this certain knowledge in which subjective intervention, subjective interpretation and subjective mediation is wholly absent or at least negligible. In that case, evidently, he has no problem left. However he has got to this knowledge, there is no need and no scope for him to philosophise. He has reached truth without philosophy. There might be others who think that although we cannot eliminate subjective mediation, there is an empirical way, through trial and error, to truth. An error may last long. But it can be exposed. Thus, although there is always <u>room</u> for correction, we can be reasonably sure that a particular piece of knowledge is true after we have applied all the empirical tests that are relevant and that are at our disposal. Truth for us is empirical. We cannot transcend normal means of knowing, normal means of detecting error, and agreement with other normally constituted individuals. We may all be living in a sort of cave of which Plato spoke, and we may all be seeing only the shadows and not the reality. But there is no means of getting out of this cave. Our only contact with reality is sensible contact, and we cannot substitute anything else for it equally certain.

If such is the state of our knowledge, a problem certainly arises. We are evidently not satisfied with our knowledge as it is. The empirical approach may be continued and it may be carried far. But it is like a blind alley. We must change the mode of our approach. This mode we may conveniently call the non-empirical or the transcendental mode. 409 Philosophy stands for this.

408 395

G.R. MALKANI. "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?" 409 396

G.R. MALKANI. "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?"

Kant talked of non-empirical or <u>apriori</u> categories of thought. He talked of the transcendental unity of apperception. But in so far as these had a necessary reference to the matter of experience, they were not truly transcendental. Kant started with an initial bias, the scientific bias. The result was that he did not work out all the implications of his own critical standpoint. One cannot criticise, except from a standpoint which is absolute and which is not itself open to criticism. There must be this transcendental certitude if all empirical knowledge is to be criticised and condemned. Kant did not explore this possibility. He reduced the mind to a number of empty forms of thought, and the self to an empty or logical unity. He could see no "reality" in that transcendental direction. He had already come to the conclusion that no reality could be found in the direction of the empirical object. Kant recognised a philosophical problem, but he went the wrong way about it. He was obsessed with empiricism and logical formalism. It is not the problem of philosophy, as he supposed, to justify our ordinary knowledge or scientific knowledge against the attacks of scepticism. This knowledge cannot be justified, and scepticism with regard to it is inevitable. It will be found on examination to be not real knowledge, but only an appearance of knowledge.

The distinction of appearance and reality is the very starting point for a new effort at a comprehension of reality. Whatever appears to us is infected with subjectivism. Reality cannot appear. The initiative of knowledge must not lie us with us, who can only contemplate reality from the outside. It must be with reality itself. Reality must reveal itself, or know itself. Self-knowledge is the only form of knowledge which can survive the attacks of scepticism.

The⁴¹⁰ self cannot be known as something outside or as something sensibly given. It is the only directly intuited reality. It alone is capable of realising the ideal of knowledge. To know all reality in the form of the self or as the self is to know it as it is in itself. Philosophy ought to seek this type of knowledge. The self, if we think of it as a category of thought, is the only one that is adequate to reality.

We conclude that philosophy seeks knowledge of reality. This knowledge is knowledge in a higher and a truer sense. It is knowledge in the sense in which reality evidences itself and is not a subjective construction. This reality is ultimate reality. It is also super-sensible reality. We cannot carp at the notion of ultimate reality. Ultimate reality is the same thing as reality; and this is opposed to mere appearances. The distinction of appearance and reality cannot be denied. It is our starting point. If we do not make this distinction, we have no philosophical problem. But if we make it, we cannot avoid the subsequent issue. If we condemn one piece of knowledge, we must replace it by another which is true. If we condemn all empirical knowledge in principle,

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^{410 397}

we must replace it in principle by knowledge which is transcendent and absolute. Philosophy, in the pursuit of this ideal, has nothing in common with the scientific method of knowing which is the method of abstractive reasoning. Philosophy does not rely on imagination and make suppositions or hypotheses which would presumably explain facts of sensible experience. It does not explain facts hypothetically or theoretically. It seeks to see them as they are in themselves and the only means of this seeing is to criticise experience itself and as a whole from the standards of certitude already contained in it. There is no room here for imaginative thinking. There is room only for seeing the issues properly, and seeing their answers as contained in⁴¹¹ experience. Any other view of philosophical knowledge will not mean progress to a higher ideal, – there is no higher ideal. It will mean renunciation of the ideal and of the only justification of philosophical thinking, and so a regress from the goal.

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA." @

It is sometimes supposed that Kant has worked out in a system the same sort of truth which Vedanta asserts in an archaic way. In any case, Kant's thought is supplementary to the thought of Vedanta, if it is not an actual improvement upon it. Unlike Vedanta, it is based upon reason alone and not upon any scriptural authority, and it is worked out in greater detail and more methodically. This view is, in our opinion, very far from the truth. Reason in Kant's philosophy is not entirely free as might be supposed. It is yoked to a metaphysical standpoint for which there is no reason except the thinker's own way of looking at things as a whole. There is a metaphysical stand behind the innocent methodological procedure, and for this stand no reason is given. The super-sensible or ultimate reality which is the object of metaphysics is admitted, but according to Kant it cannot be rationally known. It can at best be realised ethically or in the sphere of practical reason. As to the contention that Kant's philosophy conforms to Vedantic thought or has similar trends in it, the statement is not wholly unjustified. Nevertheless, there are fundamental differences right at the beginning, not to speak of final conclusions. Kant's whole outlook was scientific. His epistemology was inspired by the desire to justify science. As to metaphysical entities, his attitude was unreservedly agnostic. According to him, metaphysics had not developed a universally accepted method. If it was to succeed, it must be preceded by⁴¹² an enquiry into the limits of our reason and the possibilities of our knowledge. Thus he developed the critical method which confirmed his distrust of metaphysics and his faith in science.

411 398

G.R. MALKANI. "ARE WE PHILOSOPHICALLY PROGRESSING?"

[®] In Indian Philosophical Quarterly: 1942.

^{412 399}

It is just the other way with Vedanta. The whole vedantic thought is inspired by a higher vision of reality and by the conviction that the super-sensible metaphysical reality can <u>not only be known</u>, but that <u>it alone</u> realises the ideal of knowledge. Indeed, reason had no positive function in this knowledge. But reason had some other function, let us say negative or analytical, and some other starting-point different from sense-intuitions. Reason could in this way know ultimate metaphysical truth. Thus Vedanta goes definitely beyond Kant. Empirical knowledge is not only the lower kind of knowledge, but it is really no knowledge at all. What we know in it is not reality, but illusory appearances. There is a world of difference between the standpoint of Kant and that of Vedanta. But there is humour in their very opposition,—for they come very near to each other in certain important aspects of their thought.

Kant as we all know was roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume. He had accepted in faith the truth of scientific knowledge. He had now to justify that knowledge and defend it against the attacks of sceptism. But he gave an account of it which confirmed, if only indirectly, Hume's scepticism about it. The knowledge which we get is subjective in character and the reality which it reveals is phenomenal. The subject seems to be everything in knowledge from the manifold of sense to the last synthesis of knowledge, while the real object or the things in themselves are there in his system only in name, – they hardly perform any effective function in knowledge. There is much of Vedanta in this evidently. Do we know reality? The answer is an emphatic Kant loses everything to Hume, but he salvages two⁴¹³ characteristics of knowledge, – universality and necessity. Human understanding is so made that it goes to work in a particular fashion and knows nature after its own manner. It is endowed with certain a priori forms which function in knowledge and give rise to the kind of knowledge which we all share and which has accordingly both universality and necessity. This is why scientific knowledge is true for us all and we must not question it,—it is the product of the essential nature of our common intelligence. universality and the necessity is not objective, -it is all subjective, being inherent in pure reason. Hume is not refuted; he is in a way glorified. There is no positive contribution of Kant to a theory of knowledge we understand knowledge of reality as it is in itself.

Yet there is no gainsaying the fact that Kant has gone beyond Hume; and herein comes the humour of his opposition to an essentially metaphysical system such as that of Vedanta. Without knowing it, Kant has turned a metaphysician. He has postulated metaphysical entities, and embroiled himself with them. What he went out to justify, he in effect ended by condemning; and what he want out to condemn, he set out as an unsolved problem which could not be shirked and which needed solution if reason was to be true to itself. Our common knowledge or scientific knowledge was not

⁴¹³ **400**

knowledge of reality; and yet he could not give any account of knowledge without bringing in reality or the things in themselves. If knowledge was not of reality, why bring in reality at all: But once it is brought in, how can we escape the problem of its knowledge,—a problem which leads us directly into the centre of metaphysical quest? The truth is that knowledge seeks to reach out to reality. If it fails in this, it fails to be knowledge. Kant indicated the real problem of knowledge without solving⁴¹⁴ it and unluckily without recognising it as a legitimate problem. But he undoubtedly showed by implication that if knowledge was to be true to reality, the subjectivity of it must somehow be transcended. There must be an intuition of things which is not sensible, and which is not conditioned by thought. Categorised knowledge in this sense was no knowledge at all.

Kant went beyond Hume in the direction of a positive theory of knowledge in so far as he postulated things in themselves or reality as the ultimate sanction for any process of knowledge arising. Knowledge did not arise in the mind without any basis of reality as Hume's scepticism tended to show. The postulate of things-in-themselves is a weak point in Kant's philosophy, and yet it is here that he has gone beyond Hume. Having once postulated these things, the question is inevitable, how we might know them; how we might correct the subjectivity of our knowledge; how a transcendental intelligence which is not limited like us by a body and dependent upon sense-intuitions for its knowledge of reality, would know things. These questions naturally arise, and keep the metaphysical quest open. Vedanta starts with something more than senseintuitions. It admits intuition of the self as what is entirely opposed to objects. It thereby achieves that metaphysical knowledge of reality which was certainly suggested by Kant's critical method, but which was not considered possible by him because of the limitation of his standpoint.

There is another profound suggestion in his philosophy. Side by side with the postulate of things-in-themselves, Kant has, unlike Hume, asserted the unity of the subject and its capacity to make or construct nature. He has not conceived the subject as something inane, incapable of doing anything, and divided into endless states. The⁴¹⁵ transcendental unity of the subject, although conceived by him as formal only needs only a touch of Vedanta to transform it into a living and ultimate reality, particularly after his condemnation of all objectivity as phenomenal and his suggestion of an ultimate unity of the true subject and the true object. Kant discredited metaphysics, but he has indirectly served metaphysics. He has served Vedanta as a servant might do who goes after his own business (which in this case was to justify scientific knowledge) but who thereby succeeds only in achieving the unsought-for

^{414 401}

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."

^{415 402}

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."

purposes of the master. His criticism of knowledge has only brought to the fore the problem of real knowledge which metaphysics seeks. For when this problem is solved, the metaphysical quest has achieved its purpose. It has ended in the knowledge of ultimate truth.

But is not metaphysics different from epistemology? Can metaphysics begin with epistemology? I take the view that epistemology is an essential part of metaphysics. It is wrong to suppose that any epistemology must have a metaphysical background or a system of unquestioned postulates. The problem of knowledge is entirely soluble from within, and its solution has profound metaphysical significance. Kant was in effect philosophising or thinking metaphysically without knowing it, when he was propounding a theory of knowledge. His professions to the contrary carry little weight. He is claimed as the originator of different systems of metaphysical thought, just because his thinking cannot be dissociated from metaphysics proper.

It is sometimes said that epistemology is not possible or that an epistemological enquiry leads us nowhere. Some writers have therefore reverted from epistemology to metaphysics as a reaction against Kant's procedure. The philosophy of Bergson and that of S Alexander are instances in 416 point. It is argued that we cannot go beyond knowledge as we find it or as fully formed. We are somehow confined within it. We can neither say how knowledge arises, i.e. what are its presuppositions, -nor, when it has arisen, what makes it true to reality. All that we can do is to remain within knowledge, analyse it into its factors, and distinguish true knowledge from false knowledge within the limits of knowledge itself. What we cannot do is to take up a transcendental position outside knowledge, and criticise knowledge as a whole from that standpoint.

Now I believe that there was good justification for Kant's procedure in-as-much as he felt obliged to criticise knowledge as a whole; for knowledge as a whole appeared to him to be governed by subjective principles, and not by the things as they are in themselves. This necessarily involves a position outside empirical knowledge, and so transcendental in respect of it. But we need not take Kant at his word and suppose that there is no knowledge which is not empirical in character, or that the transcendental standpoint is only a presupposition of knowledge and contains no indication of a higher form of knowledge. We can only criticise a particular form of knowledge from the standpoint of a higher kind of knowledge which gives us, although only unconsciously our standard of knowledge or our ideal meaning of knowledge. We cannot criticise knowledge entirely from the outside. Kant's transcendental standpoint requires to be understood in the way, as a criticism from within knowledge where we have both higher and lower forms, or forms which are true to reality and forms which are not.

The transcendental standpoint represents an unconscious intuition of reality as it is in itself. Kant may disclaim this intuition. But we certainly claim it for him. Many times our actions belie our professions. The philosopher who philosophises about things⁴¹⁷ in toto, assumes a role which he cannot himself define philosophically. Epistemology understood in the above way is not only a legitimate inquiry, but it forms part of the very core of the metaphysical problem. It is not useless or an unnecessary branch of philosophy but philosophy itself understood as the investigation of ultimate truth.

Our view is that Kant's criticism is really informed by a form of knowledge which is not subjective. It is this higher form of knowledge which alone can lead to the consummation demanded by the unsolved problem of Kant's epistemology. postulate of the things in themselves could not be left at that, as the postulation of something that is by its very nature outside knowledge and yet necessary to knowledge; and the functioning and knowing subject could not be merely the logical non-entity of a certain formal requirement. Further reflection discloses that this formal unity is no other than the empirical ego which is discovered when we reflect on knowledge, and that it does not constitute our only intuition of the subject. We can go beyond it. The true subject is not capable of being discovered in the objective attitude; and yet it cannot be denied as real and as the presupposition of our knowledge of the ego. This subject or self is the only intelligent subject, not the one which we discover as formally functioning in knowledge. It is here that Vedanta goes beyond Kant, and completes Kant. It paves the way for a true knowledge of metaphysical reality, the kind of knowledge which Kant refused to recognize as possible.

A word might here be said about Kant's contention that metaphysical entities such as God soul, freedom, and immortality can only be realised in the sphere of practical reason or ethically. Here Christian tradition is strong with him; and also the Indian mode of thought, particularly Vedanta, is wholly opposed to⁴¹⁸ his way of thinking. What may be realised ethically cannot cease to be a problem for knowledge. Can we rest content with a situation in which faith takes the place of knowledge, and in which we have to accept ignorance as our lot? Our ethical and religious nature might find some satisfaction in this limitation of our knowledge, but the satisfaction will lack completeness. For knowledge alone is appropriate to reality, whether that reality is empirical or non-empirical; and knowledge is also in the end the foundation of right feeling and right conduct. If we have eyes to see the Truth, our will shall automatically get trained to right courses of conduct and our whole life will get the right orientation. Vedanta accordingly agrees with the Socratic principle that knowledge is of the highest virtue. In fact, according to Vedanta, freedom from bondage which is the highest goal

^{417 404}

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."

^{418 405}

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."

of our spiritual effort is only possible through knowledge of Brahman or Ultimate Reality. Prescribed courses of conduct or ethical virtue is only a means to it. When the highest is realised, there is nothing left to be further achieved, and the smaller ends of action or virtuous conduct cease to have any real scope. Emancipation through knowledge is the motto. Vedantic thought is thus opposed to Kantian thought in a fundamental way. Ultimate truth can be known and seen. And since this knowledge has the highest spiritual value, philosophy here merges into religion. In fact, philosophy is the highest form of religion. It uses the testimony of the scripture not in the interests of a dogmatic form of religion, as theology does, but in the interests of a dogmatic form of religion, as theology does, but in the interests of a real metaphysical knowledge which tolerates no dogma. Vedanta, based on Vedantic texts, may appear dogmatic in form, but it is not so in real intention. The only truth which it recognises cannot be stated in the form of a dogma, and it makes the⁴¹⁹ most of reason in the attainment of that truth.

ANGELO MOSES. "BERKELEY AND HUME." @

Locke's philosophy, therefore, rightly regarded, provides not a theory of knowledge, but the beginnings or groundwork of a theory of knowledge. He was right in pointing out that all knowledge and all beliefs take their rise in experience somewhere; but in the case of much of our knowledge, subsequent philosophy has shown it to be a far more difficult task than Locke realized, to determine just on what experience particular truths are based. Locke shows that the really vital step on the road to knowledge is the discovery of a necessary connexion between our ideas, since it is this step which distinguishes true knowledge from mere belief. He does not notice, however, that this step has not been shown by him to be derivable from experience at all. The ideas themselves are no doubt dependent upon sense-perception, but the discovery of necessary connexions between them is not itself an act of sense-perception, nor has it even been shown by Locke to be necessarily accompanied or conditioned by any such act. Unless it can be shown that this vital operation is itself dependent upon an act of sense-perception, we shall have to say that experience provides the merest occasion for the discovery of mathematical truths, and that the empiricist has advanced his claims no farther. Thus, as a constructive thinker, Locke leaves his task essentially uncompleted.

From Berkeley, who is considered as effecting the transition between Locke and Hume, the theory of knowledge of the "Essay" received undoubtedly important improvements in detail, but no modification of essence. The lasting value of Berkeley's philosophy is dependent upon his life-long criticism of materialism rather than upon

^{419 406}

G.R. MALKANI. "KANT AND VEDANTA."

[®] In Indian Philosophical Quarterly: 1941

any critical defence of spiritualism in which he always believed. In considering the physicist's 420 account of the world we must remember, Berkeley urges, that unlikely as it appears on the face of it, this account depends wholly on the evidence of the senses. Like the plain man, the physicist starts by seeing and touching, and his account of reality is an elaborate superstructure built upon evidence of this kind. The sensible world is illusion, he says; the intelligible world of science, insensible through and through is real. This position, Berkeley maintains, is unsound. Analysis shows, he argues, that all the conclusions of science rest upon the observations of the senses. Observation of the physical world can never be criticized by pure thought, that is, in particular, by pure mathematics. Thought can never transcend the sensible; it serves only as the servant of observation, every fresh act of knowledge being the work of perception. This is Berkeley's 'New Principle' to which he adhered in essence through all his writings. By it he seeks to refute, once and for all, the claim of science to discover the truth about the ultimate nature of reality. The scientific view, Berkeley maintains, of the nature and the structure of any particular physical object, or of the physical world in general, depends essentially on the observation of its sensible qualities; granted these qualities, its structure is such and such; if its qualities are not as perceived, its structure will be different; if we cannot be sure of our observations, we cannot be sure of its structure. Observation and scientific theory stand or fall together; science can never reject or transcend the evidence of the senses, and however elaborate be the calculations and ratiocinations involved, fresh knowledge of the physical world is the work of perception. This is the essence of Berkeley's argument, and he thus stands as the true follower of Locke.

Though Berkeley gave most of his life and all his best thought to his attack on the rationalistic position, there is no doubt that in his own mind this work of criticism was a means to an end. He sought⁴²¹ to maintain that the true nature of the world around us is revealed to us in spiritual experience; and he believes that his own attack on scientific thinking leaves the validity of this spiritual experience unimpaired. He teaches that the world is in every detail always in the hand of God, and that our ultimate understanding of it depends on our knowledge of God. This knowledge depending as it does on our apprehension of spirit is totally different in kind from our understanding of the physical world; it owes nothing to the senses, but is direct and immediate in character. In this way we know that the world is in essentials as the Christian religion represents it; we know that God orders that physical events shall conform, for our convenience and happiness, to certain laws of nature, and that this conformity, though usual and general, is not quite necessary and universal, God's will being ultimately arbitrary; we know too the duties which are incumbent upon us as God's creatures; though in all

^{420 407}

ANGELO MOSES. "BERKELEY AND HUME."

^{421 408}

respects, God being an infinite Spirit. His ways in the end are inscrutable to us, yet in His goodness He has made it possible for us to have such knowledge as is necessary to our state. Of all this we are assured by our knowledge of the activities of spirit, which is in the end, for Berkeley, the only true knowledge.

Thus Berkeley has two special theories to maintain; a special theory of the nature of our apprehension of spirit and the activities of spirit. In actual fact, he became so much pre-occupied with the difficulties of the first that he gave but scant attention to the second. Yet it is on the latter that the essential doctrines of the Idealism with which his name is associated really rest. The truth is that it is rather as an empiricist, following in the steps of Locke, than as an idealist, that Berkeley is of importance in the⁴²² history of philosophy.

Berkeley is always, first and last conceived that the essence of reality is spiritual, and that its true nature is apprehended by us in and through our insight into the activities of spirit. He seeks to discredit rationalism and materialism by showing that science deals only with the sensible; this being mind-dependent, its full apprehension of mind or spirit, which was the business of philosophy and theology; at any rate the possibility of such knowledge is essentially closed to physical science by the fact that its fundamental concepts are derived from the senses. At first, in the "Principles," he expresses this view so forcibly and crudely that he becomes involved in the view that the esse of the scientific mind is percipere, that knowing is perceiving. Gradually under the influence of his close and valuable investigations of the method of science, and also perhaps of his reading of Plato and Aristotle, he recognizes that this cannot be maintained, since it is clear that "that principles of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination." He therefore ultimately admits that even scientific knowledge depends on notions, that is, on our apprehension of mind, which is not derived from the senses. With this admission he really abandons empiricism, and is left without any epistemological justification for his view that science cannot apprehend the true nature of reality; since it is now recognized to work, like philosophy and theology, with conceptions which have their origin in our immediate knowledge of spirit, and about objects which cannot be understood by sense, their esse being, not to be perceived by man, but to be manifestations of God's inscrutable purposes. Berkeley's followers were right in recognizing that the early Berkeley of the "Principles" and the "Dialogues" was the consistent Berkeley but they did not see that he had⁴²³ himself shown, by a rigorous analysis, that his own view could not be maintained.

^{422 409}

Hume's main interest in the philosophical inquiry was rationalistic. His aim was to apply the methods of physical science to human nature and thus to build a Science of Man. Hume wrote as a builder of the Science of Human Nature, and it was as such that he exercised his main influence on his successors. He encouraged in men the hope of the successful extension of scientific progress to human nature itself: thus might come a reasoned, definitive and accurate answer of all problems-religious, moral, social and It is true that in approaching the problem of knowledge from the psychological side Hume was but following Locke and Berkeley. Both these thinkers were confident of the possibility of a scientific psychology; they both believed that a full rational account of the necessary behaviour of mind could be arrived at by observation of the conscious activities of minds. But the final act of faith in the new science was not acquired by either of these as it was acquired by Hume. Both Locke and Berkeley were satisfied that their psychology justified a belief in human knowledge and even in They did not therefore have to choose between their faith in physical science. psychology and their common system of beliefs; indeed they were rather strengthened in their faith in the new science because of its supposed capacity to explain and justify both common knowledge and physics. Hume alone was forced to the final choice; and he chose, almost without noticing it, to put complete faith in his own psychology, even at the cost of rejecting his ordinary beliefs or the discoveries of physical science.

Hume's method then was psychological. Hume, like Locke, believed that the most fundamental of all inquiries was the inquiry into the powers of the mind. In this inquiry the object of investigation⁴²⁴ was the mind itself, and so the mind must be treated as a physical object is treated in physical science. It must be closely observed and its behaviour under varying conditions noted until the laws if its nature are discovered. Thus it was Hume's problem to describe exactly all the contents of the individual mind, and in particular to determine the necessary conditions of the origination and the development of conscious experience in the individual mind.

The development and the structure of Hume's work follow and necessarily form the fundamental principle of his method. First, he gives a careful account of the contents of mind, attempting to describe exactly all the elements that can be discovered in conscious experience. Secondly, he examines those judgments which are grounded in the 'formal elements of experience,' space and time. In the third part he analyses the relation of cause and effect, the principle that underlies real connexions between the elements of experience. And finally he considers his results, attempting to determine the ultimate significance of experience. In short, what Hume attempts to show is that knowledge depends ultimately on two things, namely, the receiving of simple impressions by the senses and the connecting of the ideas corresponding to these impressions in accordance with the causal principle.

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Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Hume's teaching is in essence sceptical, and such that any philosophical defender of science must challenge it. In spite of Hume's plea, and in spite of the arguments of many modern thinkers in England and America, it must surely be maintained that nothing but truth itself can really be "satisfactory to the human mind;" only that which is true can ultimately "stand the test the most critical examination." It was a true instinct which led Hume to see that his theory of knowledge⁴²⁵ would not consort with any positive teaching whatsoever. Moreover, with unerring judgment, Hume himself touches the spot, and displays the central point of his whole system. "There are two principles," he says, "with I cannot render consistent nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; namely, that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences." Real connexion cannot be apprehended by perception; are we then to say it cannot be apprehended at all? Or is it apprehended in some other way? Here Hume confesses himself beaten; he has indeed represented our experience as wholly explicable without supposing that we can apprehend real connexion at all; yet in the last resort he is not quite satisfied that we do not perhaps apprehend it. "For my part," he says, "I must plead the privilege of a sceptic and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding; I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. It is rather in this light, as challenging others to "wake up from their dogmatic slumber," and to solve a problem—too difficult indeed for Hume himself, but such that until a solution of it is found philosophic enquiry must remain bankrupt and resourceless – that Hume is most properly regarded.

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS." @

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I. <u>Introduction</u>: The Founding Members of this Conference are, for the most part, professors in⁴²⁶ American colleges and universities. They are eminent representatives of the various academic disciplines, among which are the three mentioned as most relevant to this Conference—science, philosophy, and religion. The presence of historians and humanistic scholars is justified by the modern extension of science to include the so-called social sciences, with which all research about human affairs and culture can be affiliated. Most of these professors belong to one or more of the several

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

^{425 412}

ANGELO MOSES. "BERKELEY AND HUME."

 $^{^{@}}$ In The Daily Maroon (1940) Journal of the Students of the University of Chicago. 426 413

learned societies which meet annually for the reading and discussion of papers that purport to make contributions to truth, or at least do what is academically recognized as learning. Hence, the reason for this Conference, for this additional meeting at which more papers are being read and discussed, must be some need for the professors to get together in a different way and for a different purpose. If the public wonders why we are gathering here this September, we must justify this Conference as trying to do something which is not, and perhaps cannot be, accomplished in the ordinary processes of our academic life—in classrooms, faculty meetings or the sessions of learned societies.

Some explanations have already been given. We have come together because we all share, for different reasons and in varying degrees, an uneasiness about something we call the present situation. Whether or not we are ready to say that God's in his heaven, we cry with one voice that all's not right with the world. I wish I could credit my colleagues with one further agreement, namely, that the present crisis is only superficially a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism in the political arena, or between individualism and collectivism in the economic sphere. If that were the full nature of the crisis, why should we waste time talking about science, philosophy and religion? The fact that we have chosen to consider three major components of human culture⁴²⁷ should indicate that we all have a vague sense of cultural disorder as the root of our troubles, as the source of a threatening doom. Far from being prime movers, Hitler and Mussolini, or, if you wish, the Stalins and Chamberlains, are but paranoiac puppets, dancing for a moment on the crest of a wave—the wave that is the historic motion of modern culture to its own destruction.

A culture is not killed by political conflicts, even when they attain the shattering violence of modern warfare; nor by economic revolutions, even when they involve the dislocations of modern mass uprisings. A culture dies of diseases which are themselves cultural. It may be born sick, as modern culture was, or it may decay through insufficient vitality to overcome disruptive forces present in every culture; but, in any case, cultural disorder is a cause and not an effect of the political and economic disturbances which beset the world today.

The health of a culture, like the health of the body, consists in the harmonious functioning of its parts. Science, philosophy and religion are certainly major parts of European culture; their distinction from another is quite separate parts is certainly the most characteristic cultural achievement of modern times. But if they have not been properly distinguished, they cannot be properly related; and unless they are properly related, properly ordered to one another, cultural disorder, such as that of modern times, inevitably results. This Conference, one might suppose, has been called to consider the illness of our culture; more than that, to seek and effect remedies. One of the troubles is that scientists, philosophers, and theologians, or teachers of religion, have long failed to communicate with one another. The structure of a modern

427 414

university, with its departmental separations, and its total lack of order among specialized disciplines, 428 represents perfectly the disunity and chaos of modern culture. Since nothing can be expected of the professors locked up in their departmental cells, since reforming our institutions of higher learning (to make them truly universities) seems to be impossible, since the ordinary processes of academic life manifest the very defects which must be remedied, the professors have been assembled under the special auspices of this Conference with the hope that the lines of communication can be established. That done, one might even hope for communication to lead to mutual understanding, and thence to agreement about the truths which could unify our culture.

II. The Purpose of the Conference: If what I have said is not the purpose of this Conference, I can see no justification for it whatsoever. The fact that all the professors gathered mention that Present Crisis, without trying to agree about its nature and causes; the fact that they manifest some concern about Democracy, without trying to define it and understand its roots; the fact that, in a baffling variety of senses, they refer to Science Philosophy and Religion, without trying to solve the intricate problem of the relationship of these disciplines,—all this amounts to nothing. An undertaking of this sort is not needed to make professors think or talk this way. Nor is it needed to give them an opportunity to write and read papers which do credit to their specialized scholarly achievements. Unless this be a Conference in more than name only, unless it be concerted effort to reach a common understanding of our cultural failure and a common program for its reform, this gathering will be as vacuous and futile as many another solemn conclave of professors, advertised by high-sounding and promising titles.

But if I have stated the only purpose which might justify this Conference, then I must also say⁴²⁹ that it cannot possibly succeed. I do not bother to say that a conference, however good, cannot succeed in reforming modern culture, or even in correcting one of the main causes of it's disorder, namely, modern education. That goes without saying. To expect such results would be ask too much from even the best of all possible conferences. I mean, much more directly, that one cannot expect the professors to understand what is wrong with modern culture and modern education, for the simple reason that would require them to understand what is wrong which their own mentality. If such a miracle could be hoped for, I would not be without hope for a peaceful deliverance from our manifold confusions. Since professors come to a conference of this sort with the intention of speaking their minds but not of changing them, with a willingness to listen but not to learn, with the kind of tolerance which delights in a variety of opinions and abominates the unanimity of agreement, it is

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preposterous to suppose that this Conference can even begin to realize the only ends which justify the enterprise.

Instead of a conference about science, philosophy and religion in relation to a democracy, what is needed is a conference about the professors of science, philosophy and religion, especially American professors whose intellectual attitudes express a false conception of democracy. The defects of modern culture are the defects of its intellectual leaders, its teachers and savants. The disorder of modern culture is a disorder in their minds, a disorder which manifests itself in the universities they have built, in the educational system they have devised, in the teaching they do, and which, through that teaching, perpetuates itself and spreads out in ever widening circles from generation to generation. It is a little naive, therefore, to suppose that the professors can be called upon to solve the problem of 430 the relationship of science, philosophy and religion in our education and in our culture-as naive as it would be to invite the professors to participate in a conference about what is wrong with the professors.

III. The Failure of Mr Hutchins. We do not even have to wait until this Conference is over to discover its futility and the reasons therefore. The glorious, Quixotic failure of President Hutchins to accomplish any of the essential reforms which American education so badly needs, demonstrates the point to us. In fact, if he could have succeeded, this Conference would not be necessary now. The fact that he did not succeed may make this Conference necessary, in the sense that fundamental rectifications of modern culture are imperative; but if we understand why in the nature of the situation, Hutchins could not succeed, we also see why a conference of professors about the defects of the modern mentality must be self-defeating.

What did Mr Hutchins propose? He proposed in the first place, that man is a rational animal, essentially distinct from the brutes, and hence that education should cultivate the moral and intellectual virtues. He proposed; in the second place, that science, philosophy and theology are distinct bodies of knowledge, radically different as to methods of knowing as well as with respect to objects known. But he went further. He said that theoretic philosophy delves more deeply into the nature of things than all the empirical sciences; that, as theoretic knowledge, philosophy of superior to the sciences by reason of the questions it can answer. He said that practical philosophy, dealing with ethical and political problems, is superior to applied science, because the latter at best gives us control over the physical means to be used, whereas practical philosophy determines the ends to be sought, and the ordering of all means thereto. Hence the structure of⁴³¹ a university should not be a miscellaneous collection of departments from astronomy to zoology, with all treated as equally important theoretically and practically, but a hierarchy of studies, ordered educationally according

^{430 417}

to their intrinsic merits. Because of the fact that our secular universities harbor a diversity of religious faiths, Mr Hutchins placed metaphysics at the summit instead of theology. For man the highest knowledge, and the most indispensable to his well-being, is the knowledge of God; and since the ultimate conclusions of metaphysics comprise a natural theology, metaphysics is the supreme subject-matter in the domain of natural knowledge. But Mr Hutchins would have to admit (and he indicated his willingness to do so) that if there is a better knowledge of God, and man's relation to God, than metaphysics offers, then such knowledge is superior to philosophy, both theoretically and practically just as philosophy is superior to science. Traditional Judaism and Christianity do, of course, claim that there is such knowledge, the sacred theology that rests on faith in God's revelation of Himself. It is properly distinguished from both science and philosophy as a supernatural knowledge which man cannot have without God's direct aid.

Why did Mr Hutchins fail? Anyone who has ever attended a faculty meeting knows the answer. It can be discovered by anyone who will read the reviews of "The Higher Learning in America," written by the professors, or what is worse, the professional educators. He failed not because his analysis was patiently demonstrated to be in error; not because someone <u>proved</u> that philosophy does not exist or is inferior to science; or that religion is superstition, and sacred theology a rationalization of some make-believe. He failed because he was asking⁴³² the professors to change their minds and to agree about something. He failed as much with the professors of philosophy as with the professors of science; he failed even more with those teachers of religion who regard themselves as liberal. What Hutchins proposed ran counter to every prejudice that constitutes the modern frame of mind, and its temper. The professors being in the vast majority, and ultimately controlling, as they should, educational policy, it was naive of Mr Hutchins to suppose that he could reform education by appealing to truths the professors ignored or denied. Worse than naive, he had the effrontery to assume that if the professors were ignorant of certain truths or had neglected the implications of others, they would submit themselves to teaching on these points. Since the professors cannot conceive themselves as being taught, certainly not by anyone without a Ph. D. in their field, the man who tries to argue with the plain intention of winning agreement must really be trying to impose his doctrine. The simplest way to deal with a fellow like Hutchins is to call him a fascist.

IV. <u>The Academic Mind</u>. Now I want to make one thing absolutely clear. I am not begging the question in this issue between Mr Hutchins and his opponents, by proceeding as if I have proved the former right and the latter wrong. I know I have not proved the truth of any of the theses mentioned, nor have I proved the falsity of their contraries. With the time at my disposal that would be impossible to do under any circumstances; and even with much more time I would not try with this audience. With

a few notable exceptions, the members of this Conference represent the American academic mind. It is that fact itself which makes it unnecessary, as well as unwise, for me to make any effort in the way of reasoning. I know too well, from much experience, the opinions of this audience, and of all the professors they represent—about the nature and relationship of science, philosophy and religion. I also know, because I have tried so many times to present an analysis with the fullest of supporting arguments, precisely what reactions such procedure calls forth. Fortunately, there is no need to very this once again, because on this occasion I am concerned only to show the futility of a conference of professors about science, philosophy and religion.

That can be shown by simply. Either the prevailing opinions of the professors are right or they are wrong. Let us suppose, for the moment, that they are right, that what is now generally taught in American schools about the relation of science, philosophy and religion, is the true account. If it is true, there is nothing wrong with modern culture, for modern culture, in all its practices and institutions, embodies these opinions. On this alternative, therefore, it is difficult to see why there should be any conference about science, philosophy and religion. If, however, on the other alternative, the prevailing professorial opinions on these matters are wrong, and if, in addition, modern culture suffers grave disorders precisely because it embodies these opinions, then there is some point to a conference which would seek to correct the prevalent errors. But then it is pointless to ask the professors to consider the problem. They have already considered it and told us their answers in all their teaching and all their educational decisions. The same majority point of view will dominate this Conference, as in the Hitchins controversy. Of course, the minority view will get a hearing, with all that indifference about the truth which hides behind the mask of tolerance, but it is a foregone conclusion that nobody's mind will be changed;434 in fact, everyone knows that it is not the aim of a conference, anyway. Hence, when all is said and done, the relative weights of majority and minority opinion will be registered once more. The Conference will have exhibited the characteristic mentality of our culture, and those who are deeply concerned about changing that mentality will be confirmed in their pessimism that nothing, simply nothing, can be done to form our education or to reorient our culture.

Now I am well aware that my colleagues do not think there is any such clear-cut division between a majority and a minority view of science, philosophy and religion. For one thing, they do not like to acknowledge the existence of clear-cut issues, with truth on one side, and error on the other; if there were such issues, then anyone who undertook to think about them might be obliged to risk his academic reputation by coming to a definite conclusion. For another thing, the professors do not like to feel that they share even a common majority opinion with each other. The sacred individuality

433 420

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

434 421

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

of each professor can be preserved only by differing. When one is in substantial sympathy with what a colleague has to say, he still safeguards his freedom of opinion by saying the same thing some other way. Most professors seem to feel that agreement, even if freely reached, violates their personal integrity.

V. The Prevalence of Positivism. Nevertheless, I charge the professors—and here I am speaking of the vast majority—with being in substantial agreement on one side of the crucial issues this Conference faces. I say that most of them are positivists. I know that there are enough varieties of positivism to permit the professors to retain their individuality but I insist that behind the multiplicity of technical jargons there is a single doctrine. The essential point of that doctrine is simply the affirmation of science, and the denial of philosophy and religion. Again I am aware that 435 the professors will smile at my simplicity. Whoever heard anyone, except a few violent extremists, flatly denying philosophy and religion; as a matter of fact, such dogmatic denials are made only by a small circle of "philosophers" who blatantly advertise themselves as positivists. The very presence at this Conference of scientists, philosophers and theologians shows that the representatives of the several disciplines respect each other; the fact that they are willing to listen to each other's papers show the spirit of cooperation which prevails among them. One even begins to wonder about the sanity of those who talk about the disorder and disunity of modern culture. The real problem of this Conference must be the perils of Democracy; its certainly cannot be the issue of positivism.

Despite such blandishments, I repeat my charge. The professors, by and large are positivists. And, furthermore, I say that the most serious threat to Democracy is the positivism of the professors, which dominates every aspect of modern education and is the central corruption of modern culture. Democracy has much more to fear from the mentality of its teachers than from the nihilism of Hitler. It is the same nihilism in both cases, but Hitler's is more honest and consistent, less blurred by subtleties and queasy qualifications, and hence less dangerous. I shall return to this point after I have supported my charge.

Within brief scope, the easiest way to force the professors into the open is by making the issue sharp and clear. Let me do this first with respect to philosophy, and then with respect to religion.

VI. <u>The Issue About Philosophy</u>. With respect to philosophy, the following propositions must be affirmed. He who denies any one of them denies philosophy. (1) Philosophy is public knowledge, not⁴³⁶ provide opinion, in the same sense that science is knowledge, not opinion. (2) Philosophical knowledge answers questions which

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

436 423

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

^{435 422}

science cannot answer, nor or ever, because its method is not adapted to answering such questions. (3) Because their methods are thus distinct, each being adapted to a different object of inquiry, philosophical and scientific knowledge are logically independent of one another which means that the truth and falsity of philosophical principles or conclusions does not depend upon the changing content of scientific knowledge. (4) Philosophy is superior to science, both theoretically and practically: theoretically, because it is knowledge of the being of things whereas science studies only their phenomenal manifestations; practically because philosophy establishes moral conclusions, whereas scientific knowledge yields only technical applications; this last point means that science can give us only a control over operable means, but it cannot make a single judgment about good and bad, right and wrong, in terms of the ends of human life. (5) There can be no conflict between scientific and philosophic truths, although philosophers may correct the errors of scientists who try to answer questions beyond their professional competence, just as scientists can correct the errors of philosophers guilty of a similar transgression. (6) There are no systems of philosophy, each of which may be considered true in its own way by criteria of internal consistency, each differing from the others, as so many systems of geometry, in terms of different origins in diverse, but equally arbitrary, postulates or definitions. principles of all philosophical knowledge are metaphysical, and metaphysics is valid knowledge of both sensible and supra-sensible being. (8) Metaphysics is able to demonstrate the existence of supra-sensible being, for it can demonstrate the existence of God, by⁴³⁷ appealing to the evidence of the senses and the principles of reason, and without any reliance upon articles of religious faith.

These eight propositions are not offered as an exhaustive account of the nature of philosophy, its distinction from, and relation to, science. I have chosen them simply because they will serve like intellectual litmus paper to bring out the acid of positivism. Let the professors who claim to respect philosophy—and this goes as much for the professors of philosophy as for the others-decide whether they affirm every one of these propositions. Those who say that philosophy is just another kind of knowledge but not superior to science might just as well call philosophy opinion and deny its Those who suppose that philosophical principles or conclusions are dependent on the findings of science; those who suppose that real technical competence is necessary in order to solve scientific problems, whereas none is need for philosophical problems; those who think that philosophy comprises a variety of logically constructed systems, among which you can take your choice according to your preference among postulates; among postulates; those who say philosophy is alright, but metaphysics is nonsense, and there is no rational knowledge of God – all these deny philosophy. They are positivists. If the professors were clear of mind and forthright of speech, they would come right out and say that they regard philosophy as opinion, not knowledge. But the professors are unaccustomed to simple affirmations and denials.

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They give true-false tests, but never take them. They will, therefore avoid the test I have presented by saying that it is all a matter of how you use the words, or that it all depends on your point of view, or something equally evasive. Yet, by their evasions shall you know them, for those who affirm philosophy to be knowledge neither hesitate nor quibble on any these points.

VII. The⁴³⁸ Issue About Religion. With respect to religion, the following propositions must be affirmed. He who denies any one of them denies religion, in any sense which makes it distinct in character from science and philosophy. (1) Religion involves knowledge of God and of man's destiny, knowledge which is not naturally acquired in the sense in which both science and philosophy are natural knowledge. (2) Religious faith, on which sacred theology rests, is itself a supernatural act of the human intellect, and is thus a Divine gift. (3) Because God is its cause, faith is more certain than knowledge resulting from the purely natural action of the human faculties. (4) What is known by faith about God's nature and man's destiny is knowledge which exceeds the power of the human intellect to attain without God's revelation of Himself and His Providence. (5) Sacred theology is independent of philosophy, in that its principles are truths of faith, whereas philosophical principles are truths of reason, but this does not mean that theology can be speculatively developed without reason serving faith. (6) There can be no conflict between philosophical and theological truths, although theologians may correct the errors of philosophers who try to answer questions beyond the competence of natural reason, just as philosophers can correct the errors of theologians who violate the autonomy of reason. (7) Sacred theology is superior to philosophy, both theoretically and practically: theoretically, because it is more perfect knowledge of God and His creatures; practically, because moral philosophy is insufficient to direct man to God as his last end. (8) Just as there are no systems of philosophy, but only philosophical knowledge less or more adequately possessed by different men, so there is only one true religion, less or more adequately embodied in the existing diversity of creeds.

These⁴³⁹ eight propositions, like those concerning philosophy, are far from exhaustive. That are intended simply as a device to bring professional positivism—or shall I call it "negativism"?—out into the open. Those who claim to respect the distinct place of religion in modern culture, but refuse to grant that religion rests upon supernatural knowledge, or that it is superior to both philosophy and science, either know not what they say or are guilty of profound hypocrisy. For unless religion involves whatsoever; and if it rests upon supernatural knowledge, it must be accorded the supreme place in the cultural hierarchy. Religion cannot be regarded as just another aspect of culture, one among many human occupations, of in different importance

438 425

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

439 426

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

along with science and art, history and philosophy. Religion is either the supreme human discipline, because it is God's discipline of man, and as such dominates our culture, or it has no place at all. The mere toleration of religion, which implies indifference to or denial of its claims, produces a secularized culture as much as militant atheism or Nazinihilism. Philosophers who think that all the significant questions men ask are either answerable by reason or not at all, are naturalists in a sense analogous to the positivism of scientists who think that science alone is valid knowledge, and that science is enough for the conduct of life. If the professors are positivists, they are certainly naturalists. They dishonour themselves as well as religion by tolerating it when, all equivocations overcome, they really think that faith is superstition, just as they really think philosophy is opinion. The kind of positivism and naturalism which is revealed in all their works and all their teaching, is at the root of modern secularized culture.

VIII. The Professional Position. Now let me guard against misunderstanding once more. The various propositions I have enumerated I do not regard as matters of opinion. I think their truth can be proved. But I have not done so. I have done absolutely nothing to show that positivism and naturalism are false doctrines. My only aim was to show that the professors are, whether right or wrong, positivists and naturalists. My only hope was that the professors might examine their conscience in the light of clearly defined issues, and acknowledge plainly what they really think. I know, of course, that that is too much to hope for. But since actions speak louder than words, no one who understands the issues will be deceived by what the professors have to say, however much they fool themselves. The professorial reaction to the proposals of Mr Hutchins, the professorial conduct of this very Conference, give the lie to professional speech, the polite discourse, the insulting tolerance, which conceals the dismissal of philosophy as opinion and religion as superstition behind expressions of specious respect.

IX. Medieval and Modern Culture. The central problem of medieval culture was the relation of faith and reason, religion and philosophy, supernatural and natural knowledge. The so-called mediaeval synthesis, the cultural harmony and unity of the mediaeval world, depended on the solution of that problem. It was not solved by Conferences although in the middle ages something much better than conferences of this sort took place: patient, honest, forthright, hard-thinking discussion. Centuries of earnest disputation, despised by modern professors as logic-chopping and wordy dialectic, prepared the way, because in every case the disputants were seeking to agree about the truth, not to maintain their individuality by holding to a difference of opinion. When, after such preparation, the time⁴⁴¹ was ripe, two men solved the problem by

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sheer intellectual mastery of every relevant truth: Moses Maimonides solved it for the Jewish community, and St. Thomas Aquinas for the Christian world. That later Jews and Christians world. That later Jews and Christians did not sustain the solution, or even repudiated it, was part of the cultural tragedy which the modern era went through at its birth.

The central problem of modern culture is more complicated, and much more difficult, than the mediaeval, because in our times science has become a distinct and important enterprise, both theoretically and practically. The modern culture, will be achieved only when all the goodness of science can be praised without sacrificing any of the goodness in philosophy and religion, only when the truths of philosophy can be integrally retained without losing any of the genuine advances in knowledge or production that science has contributed. The modern synthesis must necessarily include the mediaeval solution, but it can do so only by carrying the mediaeval principles to a higher level of comprehension. In order that every cultural good shall be preserved to the fullness of its own unique value, each must be recognized precisely for what it is, and according to its distinctive character it must be ordered to the others. Since in the world of values, there is no order without hierarchy, science, philosophy and religion can never be harmonized so long as they are all asked to lie down together, but only when each is called upon to perform its proper function, whether that be to serve or to rule.

The time is obviously not yet ripe for a modern solution. There are not enough scientists who understand the truths of philosophy and religion, not enough philosophers and men of faith who are at home in the domain of science. Much work by representatives of all three disciplines is 442 required to prepare the way for the modern analogue of Maimonides or Aquinas, perhaps even centuries of patient discussion and incisive disputation. This Conference might have been an occasion for such work. That it was called at all indicates a vague realization of the task to be undertaken. But if I am right about the professorial mind—and I look to the actual proceedings of this Conference for confirmation—there will be no discussion of fundamental issues, nor even a formulation of them. The members of this Conference are not cooperatively seeking to agree about the truth, through the painful ordeal of intellectual debate. Each is content to express his own opinions, and to indulge everyone else in the opportunity for similar self-expression.

X. <u>The Present Crisis</u>. The various propositions I have enumerated are either true or false. Each, therefore, can be regarded as constituting a problem, a two-sided issue at least. Should it not be the business of this Conference to take up such problems in a definite order, and to direct all its intellectual energies to their solution? If a group of men do not come together because they have common problems, and ultimately seek to

reach common answers, there is no more community among them than there is in a modern university, or in modern culture itself. As I have already said, the failure of this Conference to do the only work which justifies its existence, perfectly symbolizes the absence of cultural community in the modern world; worse than that, it justifies the most extreme pessimism about an impending catastrophe, for until the professors and their culture are liquidated, the resolution of modern problems—a resolution which history demands shall be made—will not even begin. The tower of Babel we are building invites another flood.

The failure of this Conference is due not only to the fact that the professors are, for the most⁴⁴³ part, positivists; but even more so to their avoidance of what is demanded for fruitful intellectual procedure. Unlike the medieval man of learning, the modern professor will not subject himself to the rigors of public disputation. He emasculates discussion by treating it as an exchange of opinions, in which no one gains or loses because everyone keeps his own. He is indocile in the sense that beyond the field of science, he cannot be instructed, because he acknowledges no ignorance. Hence anyone who would try to instruct him about philosophical or religious truths would be regarded as authoritarian, as trying to impose a doctrine. He is scandalized by the very notion of a commonly shared truth for all men. Even though such truth can be attained only by the free activity of each mind, the fact that no mind is free to reject the truth seems like an infringement upon his sacred liberties. What he means by truth in science and by agreement among scientists permits him to talk as if he were a truth-seeker and willing to agree; but that is because the contingent and tentative character of scientific knowledge so perfectly fits the egoism, the individualism, the libertinism, of the modern mind. The greater necessity and finality of truth in philosophy and religion oblige a mind in ways it will not suffer. On fundamental questions, which means all the questions beyond the scope of science, he wishes to keep a thoroughly open mind forever; he wishes neither to be convinced of anything nor to convince anyone. Hence he would not participate in a conference which required everyone to agree upon the fundamental questions to be answered, and measures its success by the degree to which such answers were commonly achieved as a result of the most patient discussion.

XI. The Roots of Democracy. I have so far pointed out the significance of this Conference for the state⁴⁴⁴ of our culture, and the doom its forebodes. In conclusion, I wish to indicate briefly the bearing of my analysis upon the crisis of Democracy. Let me say at once that I hold Democracy to be the greatest political good, the most perfect form of political community; and I hold this not as a matter of fine feeling or local opinion, but because I think it is a conclusion which can be demonstrated in terms of the truths of moral and political philosophy. Now, what can positivists say about such

443 430

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

444 431

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

a demonstration? Obviously, they must repudiate it. Outside the sphere of science nothing can be demonstrated, and the proposition that Democracy is the best political order certainly lies outside the sphere of science. What is neither self-evident nor demonstrable must be an opinion, which attracts or repels us emotionally. Anyone who denies that philosophy is knowledge denies, of course, the self-evidence of moral principles and the validity of moral demonstrations. Hence the professors can be for Democracy only because they like it, not because they know it is right. They talk of great deal about natural rights and the dignity of man but this is loose and irresponsible talk, in which they lightly indulge because they do not mind contradicting themselves. There are no natural rights if there is no natural moral law, which is binding upon all men everywhere in the same way. Man has no dignity if he is not a rational animal, essentially distinct from the brutes by reason of the spiritual dimension of his being. This should be enough to make clear that positivists are forced to deny the rights and dignity of man, or hold such views only as prejudice, rationally no better than Hitler's prejudices to the contrary. But to reinforce the point that the professors have no grounds for any of their fine feelings, let me add that the same facts which warrant man's dignity as an end to be served by the state also imply445 that man has an immortal soul, and a destiny beyond the temporal order. In short, one cannot have reasons for affirming Democracy and at the same time deny the truths of philosophy and religion.

Of course, the sort of democracy to which the professors are sentimentally attached can not be demonstrably approved, for theirs is an essentially false conception. The social order they would like to preserve is the anarchic individualism, the corrupt liberalism, which is the most vicious caricature of Democracy. Objecting to any inequalities in value, objecting to any infringement of absolute individual liberty by loyalties and obligations to superior goods, they want a democracy without hierarchy and without authority. In short, they want chaos, not order, a society in which everyone will be as free as if he lived alone, a community in which common bonds will not bind the individual at all. Even when they speak enthusiastically about this false ideal, the professors seldom claim that they have rational grounds for defense. The very fact that they so frequently refer to democracy, not as government or a political order, but as a way of life, reveals them as exponents of a false religion. This religion of democracy is no better than the religion of fascism. One is the idolatry of individual liberty as the other is the worship of collective might.

XII. <u>Democracy and Modern Culture</u>. One of the greatest achievements of the modern world is the discovery of the moral and political reasons for the democratic ideal, as well as actual experimentation in the field of democratic processes. But though it be in this sense a child of modern times, Democracy will not be fully achieved until modern culture is radically reformed. <u>Science contributes nothing whatsoever to the</u>

445 46

understanding of Democracy. Without 446 the truths of philosophy and religion, Democracy has no rational foundation. In America at present it is at best a cult, a local prejudice, a traditional persuation. Today it is challenged by other cults which seem to have more might, and no less right, so far as American ability to defend democracy rationally is concerned.

For all these reasons I say we have more to fear from our professors than from Hitler. It is they who have made American education what it is, both in content and method: in content, and indoctrination of positivism and naturalism; in method, an exhibition of anarchic individualism masquerading as the democratic manner. Whether Hitler wins or not, the culture which is formed by such education cannot support what democracy we have against interior decay.

If I dared to raise my voice as did the prophets in ancient Israel, I would ask whether the tyrants of today are not like the Babylonian and Assyrian kingsinstruments of Divine justice, chastening a people who had departed from the way of truth. In the inscrutable Providence of God, and according to the nature of man, a civilization may sometimes reach a rottenness which only fire can expunge and cleanse. If the Babylonians and Assyrians were destroyers, they were also deliverers. Through them, the prophets realized, God purified His people. Seeing the hopelessness of working peaceful reforms among a people who had shut their eyes and hardened their hearts, the prophets almost prayed for such deliverance, through the darkness of destruction, to the light of a better day. So, perhaps, the Hitlers in the world today are preparing the agony through which our culture shall be reborn. Certainly if it is part of the Divine plan to bless man's temporal civilization with the goodness of Democracy, that civilization must be rectified. It is probably not from Hitler, but from the professors, 447 that we shall ultimately be saved. A Reply to Adler the Illogical Logician: By the editor: Mortimer J. Adler, in an effort to achieve rhetorical excellence has overstepped the bounds of logic.

This statement is made in criticism of his address to the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion recently reprinted in the Monitor, an official Catholic newspaper.

The editors of the Daily Maroon are not well enough qualified as theologians or metaphysicians to attempt an analysis of the eight propositions which Mr Adler says must either be affirmed or denied for both religion and philosophy.

But we read with incomprehension at first, and then with resentment his burning accusations that "democracy has much more to fear from the mentality of its teachers than from the nihilism of Hitler" and his vehement statement that it is futile to expect the professors to change their minds on what values there must be in an ordered culture.

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

447 434

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

^{446 433}

<u>Historically False</u>: The first, and the most immediately important of his statements is, we believe, historically false.

It is not the "mentality" of our teachers that has made necessary war in so many countries, and immense armaments in our own. Hitler's "nihilism" is an aggressive, brutal effort to dominate the world by force. The mentality of our teachers, even of Dewey's ilk, Mr Adler, would not cause them to act in so dangerous a fashion.

Secondly, and of this we are certain, Mr Adler seems to us to be illogical when he says that it is futile to try to change the minds of the professors. It is well known that he thinks man is a rational animal. It does not take very deep or penetrating analysis to see that if man is rational, he should be able to be convinced by arguments of reason. Professors, (and we think despite his obvious prejudices against them, Mr Adler would be forced to agree with us here) are the most rational of men. So if Mr Adler were patient enough to iterate and reiterate reasonably the arguments for his beliefs and if they were reasonable arguments culminating in a series of demonstrable truths it would seem that ultimately they would gain adherents.

One of two conclusions: We are forced to draw one of two conclusions, then. The first is man is not a rational animal. If such is the case, then all of Mr Adler's argument is meaningless, because it proceeds from the basic and fundamental assumption, that men, (particularly himself and Mr Hutchins) can analyse reasonably, and by the use of their reason, arrive at the truth.

The only other conclusion to draw is that the professors can be convinced of the rectitude of Mr Adler's ideas, if the ideas are right. That they have not been convinced so far must be attributed to the fact that either his views have not been broadcast enough among the teachers, that he has not been able to present them convincingly, or that he has not allowed them to be absorbed, or perhaps even that they are not true.

<u>Too Impatient:</u> Actually we think that there is a great deal of truth in what Mr Adler says. But we must adopt the somewhat incongruous position of admonishing an older man to be more temperate, not to be so impatient.

We think that many of his rash statements were made for rhetorical effect. But they were dangerous statements, and we must take issue with them.

SIDNEY HOOK: Reply to Adler: "The New Medievalism."

1. After all, it is precisely the cultures which Mr Adler himself damns as positivistic, England and America, which are leading the fight against Hitler and Mussolini instead of making concordats with⁴⁴⁹ them as some anti-positivistic

MORTIMER ADLER. "GOD AND THE PROFESSORS."

449 436

SIDNEY HOOK: Reply to Adler: "The New Medievalism."

^{448 435}

organizations have done. He will note that the Roman Catholic Church, leader of the anti-positivists, has probably the best claim to the invention of "fascism". True, fascism has, to a still undetermined extent, tended to Frankenstein, particularly in Germany. But the Church gave Mussolini all his ideas, and made and protected Franco. Among other things the Church paralyzed efforts in America to modify the Anglo-American embargo against a social democratic regime in Spain, whose defeat was, more than Munich, the decisive turning point in recent European history.

- 2. President Hutchins' views were historically false, badly reasoned in a succession of arguments containing undistributed middle terms, and pernicious in their conclusions.
- 3. If by disputation we mean the public, critical analysis of ideas in order to achieve clarification and to determine what evidence would be relevant to the truth of meaningful assertions, then I submit that Mr Adler's charge is plainly false. Although practice may fall short of the ideal in many respects, this is precisely the aim of those professional associations and periodicals which carry on the intellectual enterprise in American life. But if by public disputation we mean denunciation of all who do not hold our alleged "self-evident" truths instead of analysis of them, and calculated insults under the guise of plain speaking, coupled with a call for liquidation of heretics in metaphysics and theology—of which Mr Adler has just given us an illustration—then I am happy that, in the main, our non-parochial intellectual life is free of it.
- 4. Mr Adler in advance has ruled out as evasive any reply to his propositions which would make their truth or falsity depend upon the meaning assigned to his words, i.e. upon the distinctions in the sense and uses of his key terms. He demands⁴⁵⁰ yes or no answers. Now true-false answers to isolated propositions may be demanded in religious catechisms. They cannot be intelligently given to philosophical questions without <u>analysis</u>. And the wisdom of philosophical analysis, from the time of Aristotle down, consists just in this ability to make distinctions in the meaning and use of terms before essaying an answer to them.
- 5. Despite the fact that all of Mr Adler's certainties, immediate or derived, rest upon highly dubitable assumptions, he asserts that those who deny any <u>one</u> of his propositions are denying philosophy. Since there is no leading figure in modern philosophy, whether it be Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Kant, who has not denied at least one of Mr Adler's propositions, the preposterous implication is that there is no such thing as modern philosophy and that most of those who are called philosophers are but blind and wicked nominalists.

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⁴⁵⁰ **437**

- 6. As for Mr Adler's self-evident or derived metaphysical truths, in so far as meaning can be assigned them, I am convinced it can be shown that where they are not false they are either tautologies, rules of discourse or disguised defitions, or, at best, vague empirical generalizations on a commonsense level which can be better established by the more precise methods of science. And despite Mr Adler's excommunication of all who disagree with him, I believe it is still possible to be a philosopher without subscribing to <u>his</u> philosophy.
- 7. I am not forcing an interpretation upon Mr Adler's paper, although he will probably make that claim. These are the logical implications of his remarks. They are confirmed by what he has to say of the cultural beauties of medieval culture, of which the liquidation of religious heresy and the Inquisition were integral parts, and⁴⁵¹ his belief that positivism, the root of all modern evil, began with the Renaissance and Reformation.
- 8. We can only request that in the interests of truth and fruitful intellectual procedure, of which he asserts this conference has no conception, he argue his position instead of begging it and refrain from distorting the views of those with whom he disagrees. It is intellectually cheap, for example, to assert, as Mr Adler does, that because democrats reject a society with his conception of hierarchy and authority, they want "chaos, not order"; "anarchic individualism" not healthy social relations.

<u>QUINCY WRIGHT:</u> Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy": (1) The novelty of Mr Adler's doctrine lies in its association of democracy with absolutism. This is familiar doctrine. It was the doctrine used to justify the divine right of kings.

- 2. Government by consent has not, in experience, been government by the logical application of any truths either revealed or self-evident, but by the prevailing opinion of the moment. It has allowed every man to have his own private domain of absolute truth provided he kept it private.
- 3. Democracy thus interpreted has been far from perfect, but as compared with other forms of government many consider that it has been justified by experience. Some think it has not. Mr Adler, however, as I understand him, denies that the test of experience is a suitable one to apply. He criticizes "the professors" not because they interpret experience wrongly, but because they regard experience as a valid test. That is what he seems to mean when he calls them "positivists".

It may be that a civilization could be created on the basis of absolute truth. The Catholic Church tried to apply dogma to secular affairs in⁴⁵² the Middle Ages and

SIDNEY HOOK: Reply to Adler: "The New Medievalism."

^{451 438}

found the Inquisition and the stake necessary. Stalin has tried to govern according to the dogmas of Karl Marx and has found the G.P.U. and the firing squad necessary. Hitler is trying to govern the world by the dogma of the divine right of the "Aryans". He has found the concentration camp, the Gestapo and a world war necessary. The Puritans of New England tried to govern according to the dogmas of Calvin and found it necessary to exile Roger Williams and to hang the Quakers.

4. It is my opinion, which is, I think, supported by considerable evidence, though perhaps it cannot be deduced from any self-evident truth, that men fight for neither postulates nor axioms, but for beliefs, and that beliefs have arisen from experience as well as from preconceptions. There are men who can see a giraffe and admit its existence, even though they are unable to deduce it from the previous idea of an animal. There are also men who can compare two societies and decide that one is better than the other, even though they cannot justify their decision by deduction from any self-evident truth. Such observations and evaluations provide the data from which men formulate the hypotheses which they believe, from which they argue, and upon which they act. These hypotheses can never be more relative truths.

There is little to warrant the expectation that everyone in any society will ever believe precisely the same. Perhaps that is fortunate. If the whole of a society knew the absolute truth, the world might prove a dull place. Disagreements about relative truths are what give life to a society and the possibility of progress. Experience has taught that such disagreements need not lead to war. It is the effort to suppress them that is dangerous.

FRANK H. KNIGHT: Reply to Adler: "God And Professor Adler and Logic. (1) The central tenet of Positivism, 453 stated in homely language, is "we stand for facts." This credo is a clear and quite effective 'petitio principii', almost enough to stop all opposition in its tracks. For one can hardly argue against the facts; and if an opponent raises the actual issue, as to what is a fact, and whether every question reduces to a matter of fact, he can be readily and plausibly accused of verbal evasion—just as Mr Adler accuses the positivists themselves. The mode of formulating the issue has placed potential opposition at such a disadvantage that its case is rendered nearly hopeless; and this is ninety-nine per cent of "logic", the art of debate.

The case of Pragmatism is very similar. Its credo is, "We stand for results," and for such an interpretation of any situation, and such treatment of it, as will best accomplish the end in view. It is about as hopeless to argue for destructiveness or futility as to argue for falsehood, and about as useless to raise the question, what is the "real" end, or whether the sole function of intelligence is that of finding correct procedures for realizing concrete ends. Such an answer is rather easily disposed of,

QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy"

453 440

QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy"

again, as evasion or quibbling; and the "logic" of Pragmatism is also an excellent one—from the "pragmatic" point of view which is readily shared by all three schools.

Finally, there is Mr Adler's own type of philosophy, for which "Scholasticism" is an admissible short designation. Its credo is "We believe in God," and, anyone who disagrees with us denies God. Mr Adler makes this position especially clear and emphatic by his challenging assertion that he can prove the existence of God. Undoubtedly he can-given his own definitions of (a) God, (b) existence (c) proof. And—with the same proviso—he can easily prove the other half of his position, that any disagreement with⁴⁵⁴ him on any question is a denial of the existence of God. (He could probably to better still; a moderately skilful dialectician could probably grant an opponent one, or even two, of these definitions and still confound him utterly). Now this third 'logic' or technique of argumentation is beyond question and by far the best of all; for it is not only a superb 'petitio principi' but in addition to the ultimate 'argumentum and hominem', one which virtually admits of no response at all. For any opponent who dares to suggest that a question might be raised as to the meaning of "God", or of the term "existence" used in connection with God, or of the term "proof" used in connection with the existence of God, practically stands self-convicted, not merely of intellectual evasion and quibbling, of the grossest variety, but also of the abominable sin of heresy. And the way in which heretics are to be treated is, again, not open to question; to question it is to be guilty of heresy itself. Heretics are to be answered with deeds, not words. (Scholasticism is in fact the true Pragmatism, the logic of effective action, and might be called the "Higher Pragmatism"). The Holy Thomas of Aguino (a very a favorite authority with Mr Adler) said: "For it is a much heavier offense to corrupt the faith whereby the life of the soul is sustained, than to tamper with the coinage, which is an aid to the temporal life. Hence if coiners or other malefactors are at once handed over by secular princes to a just death, much more may heretics, immediately they are convicted of heresy, be not only excommunicated, but also justly done to die." (Translation of J. Rickaby, S.J. 2a, 2ae, quall art 3; here quoted from D.G. Ritchie, "Natural Rights", p.161). As everyone knows, correct from under "Christian" auspices, requires that the execution be performed "without the shedding of blood," which means by burning 455 alive. Surely no more cogent "argument" has been invented, or is likely to be.

What is really important, especially for education, is that all three of these schools of thought make their appeal in the same way, by the same type of fallacy. Looking beyond logical textbook classifications, the real fallacy, (which lies at the bottom of system-building in philosophy in general) is that of over-simplification, or 'simplisme.' It is the pretense, beginning with self-deception, of having found some word or formula which will "automatically" solve the serious problems of life, of

454 441

455 442

QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy"

QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy"

knowing, understanding, appreciating, and acting. If there is one thing in particular, which education-even not very "high" education-should strive to the uttermost to do, it is to teach students, as early in life as possible, that there is no such word or formula, and that this romantic craving, and all catering to it, must be resisted and banished from thought, as the first condition prerequisite to any sound intellectual and moral life. The three philosophies mentioned are essentially the three possible, or at least the most important, antitheses to a truly rational basis of life; and their proponents are its three main sets of enemies, the real "anti-intellectuals."

- 2. Especially should youth be warned against the notion that solutions for real problems can be deduced by "formal logic" from any plausible generalization as a major premise, such as Mr Adler's favorite, that "man is a rational being." Such premises are "true" but not in a sense which excludes the truth of divergent and even formally contradictory statement supporting very different conclusions. In this case, for example, there would be no point, no real sense, in the statement that man is rational if he were not also non-rational and irrational in much of this thinking and action. (Perfect rationality would⁴⁵⁶ indeed reduce to mechanism and contradict itself).
- 3. Such generalities have little significance for the guidance of the sincere man himself, and virtually none in telling him that he should expect anyone else. It is of the essence of the position of the Church of S. Thomas that the revealed truths call for continuous interpretation by an inspired authority; and we all know that no law can be made which will not prove ambiguous in application to cases, and call for authoritative interpretation if it is to function.

What, then, is the true philosophy? it will be natural to ask, especially for the earnest young student. The only general answer is that true philosophy is good sense. But what is the mark or test by which one may know good sense? There is none. There are numerous tests for error, which have much value when used intelligently, i.e. with good sense, and not mechanically; but there is no self-testing or self-applying test for the truth. Truth is a matter of judgment, ultimately and accurately speaking, a matter of taste. That is, it is a matter of good taste; and no one, not even a philosopher, of any school, should be so stupid as to think this means that one opinion is as good as another. As to how to recognize, or find, truth, or good sense, there are two positive answers. The first is that every one, every human being capable of considering the question, is, and must be, his own judge, just so far as he is a free mind. He must decide on his own responsibility, at his own peril, using such tests and following such council as his own judgment dictates. The other answer is that truth is determined by law and the arbitrary authority of men in power. All social life, indeed any possible human life, embodies some combination and compromise between these two methods of

⁴⁵⁶ **443**

determining what is truth. The great issue in the world, and⁴⁵⁷ especially our own country, today, centres a tendency, a movement and a struggle to shift the point of compromise away from individual freedom and responsibility far in the direction of authority and force. In this connection, the import of Scholasticism is obvious; that is why it is a serious issue.

MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA and MADHYAMA BHIKSU YUVATCHARYA BALTARI. "GURU ATISHA OF TIBET".®

- 1. Of all Buddhist countries the most religious to-day is Tibet, the Land of Buddhas in the heart of Asia. Shut off from the rest of the world, Tibet preserves the greatest number of sacred texts of the Buddhist faith and shows the most wonderful devotion to the noble Doctrine of All-Knowing Buddhas. It was in the lifetime of Atisha, the celebrated author of the Sanskrit work called 'Bodhipathapradipa, of "The Lamp of the Right Way," that the Tibetans began to value the priceless truths of Buddhist philosophy especially highly.
- 2. Atisha went forth as a homeless wanderer, studying Vajrayana Buddhism and different Mahayanist doctrines. He visited many lands, including Afghanistan, on the west, and Burma, on the east, and gained thus a very varied experience before his thirtieth year, when he was ordained in the highest order of Buddhist priests.

There are three periods into which the history of Buddhism in India is being divided, known as the three "Swingings of the Wheel of the Law" (called in Sanskrit 'Trichakra), each period having a duration of about 500 years. Central conceptions of these three main phases of Buddhism in India were: <u>pluralism</u>, during the first period of Buddhist Philosophy, <u>monism</u> during the second period and <u>idealism</u>, during the third and concluding quinquennium of the history of Buddhism in India.

Pandit⁴⁵⁸ Atisha, the first of the great reformers of Lama Sangha, lived at the end of the third period of Buddism, contemporaneous with the golden age of Indian civilization, when arts and sciences flourished, the final orientation was given to Buddhist Philosophy, namely, the orientation of epistemological logic. Quite soon after his full ordination into the Buddhist Brotherhood, Atisha was invited to become professor of Buddhist Philosophy in the famous Vikramashila Buddhist University (the place where it was situated is known to-day as Sultangang in Bhagalpur) in Magadha.

QUINCY WRIGHT: Reply to Adler: "Absolutism and Democracy"

MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA and MADHYAMA BHIKSU YUVATCHARYA BALTARI. "GURU ATISHA OF TIBET"

^{457 444}

[@] In "BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND" (Journal) 1940.

^{458 445}

3. Pandit Atisha mastered the schools of Nagarjuna and Deva, establishing the idea of a real, ultimate experience, or unrelated reality, maintaining that the universe is one motionless whole where nothing originates and nothing disappears. Further, he mastered the so-called moderate Svatantrika-Madhyamika school of Bhavya, whose standpoint consisted in a dialectical destruction of all the fundamental principles on which cognition (svartha-anumana) of an object through its mark is based.

Atisha took also keen interest in logical problems, which was one of the outstanding features of the third period of Buddhist Philosophy started by the brothers Saint Asanga and Master Vasubandhu, natives of Peshaver.

In the first half of the third Buddhist period in India an infinity of possible ideas was assumed to lay dormant in a "store-house" of consciousness (alaya-vijnana) and constitute the Universe, the maximum of compossible reality. The series of facts constituting reality or cogitability were supposed to be pushed into efficient existence by a Biotic Force called in Sanskrit 'Anadi-Vasana'. This theory was predominant for a time in India and has still many admirers in China and Japan. Atisha is supposed to have studied this theory of "storehouse Consciousness" assiduously, 459 but is believed to have dropped it later.

Pandit Atisha had studied hard and gained a very broad Buddhist outlook, but all his life long he remained faithful to Buddhist Tantrism, namely, to the peculiar 'Kala-Chakra' system (meaning the Circle of Time) supposed to have been derived from Shambala, a certain mysterious country in the north. In the Tibetan Buddhist collection of 225 volumes, known as Tangyur, the five first volumes contain fifty-two original treatises or tracts on the Kala-chakra system, all translated from the Sanskrit. But then there are commentaries on this system by Tibetan authors, which are very numerous. The Kala-chakra system holds that Adi-buddha, the most excellent first Buddha, one eternally existing, from which all things are mere emanations, must be taught by every true Guru or religious guide, and that every true disciple who aspires to liberation must worship Adibuddha as Supreme Buddha.

4. Buddhism in India at the time of Atisha was in the process of decay. The philosophical and critical religion of Gautama the Buddha found a new home in the Malay Archipelago, Indochina and other countries.

Dissatisfied with his own attainments when High Priest at Vikramashila and with a view to acquire a still deeper knowledge of Buddhism in his days, Pandit Atisha went to the distant island of Sumatra, then called Suvarnadvipa, to consult the Sumatran princely High Priest Atcharya Dharmakirti.

^{459 446}

- 5. In acknowledgment of his great religious work he is often called "Sun of Tibetan Buddhism" and the Tibetan epithet Jovorje Paldan, meaning the Reverend Lord, always precedes his Indian name of Atisha.
- 6. Atisha was teacher of Dromton, Tibetan historian and founder of Radeng Monastery. Dromton was a young man when he had left home and become disciple of Atisha when he served with great devotion.⁴⁶⁰
- 7. Atisha's great work remains "The Lamp of the Right Way," known in Tibetan as "Lamsgron" and engendering even to-day a mental fire in the hearts of Tibetan Buddhist priests.

The Tibetan climate had no doubt badly affected the health of Pandit Atisha and the great Guru became finally very feeble and died in 1067 C.E. at the age of 73, in a Nyetang monastery, not far away from Lhassa, where he had spent nine years of his life.

Mahatcharya Vahindra and Ananda Maitreya Baltari: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY." @

- 1. He was born at Vidarbha (Berar) in a Brahmin family circa 150 C.E and studied already as a child the four Vedas, each of 40,000 Gathas (each Gatha containing 42 letters or syllables.) As the typical representative and learned expounder of the whole of Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna became the subject of many legends.
- 2. Nagarjuna's teacher Ashvaghosha was the saintly author of the marvellous work entitled "The Awakening of Faith" or 'Mahayana Shraddhotpada Shastra' ("On raising Faith in the Mahayana") and describing the nature of Suchness (in Sanskrit Tathata.)
- 3. The Tibetans however translate Nagarjuna as Klu-glub (pron. Lu-grub), viz. "one who was fully instructed by the Nagas." When quite a young man Nagarjuna went to a mountain on which there was a wonderful 'stupa' and, having become a Buddhist priest, began to study the Three Pitakas of the Hinayana Buddhism, and this feat he accomplished in the short period of 90 days and fully understood their deepest meaning and their philosophic secrets. Then he met a Manayanist Bhiksu and received from him a Sutra of the Mahayana, but could find no commentary to it. Then a very old Buddhist tradition goes to tell figuratively how the King of Nagas, (Nagaraja or the

MAHATCHARYA VAHINDRA and MADHYAMA BHIKSU YUVATCHARYA BALTARI. "GURU ATISHA OF TIBET"

^{460 447}

[®] In "BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND" (Journal) 1941.

^{461 448}

Chief of the Wise ones) felt great compassion for the young Nagarjuna and initiated him into the Secret Lore of the Buddha-Lords in the "Dragon's Palace" under the sea. Great Adepts at Yoga or the wisest of the Wise Men have long been symbolized by the Nagas, or Serpent Demigods. And the sea symbolizes the superhuman realm whence the teachings of Nagarjunan Relativity are believed to have originated. The tradition says that Nagarjuna read in "The Dragon's Place" (which also provided a shelter for his meditations) again in 90 days the most valuable of Mahayana Scriptures with indispensable commentaries, fully grasped the deepest essence of the Great Way, and then joyously returned back to everyday life clearly perceiving the purely phenomenal and illusory nature of the world, and realizing that existence and non-existence have only relative truth.

- 4. He is also regarded by the Mahayana Buddhists as the founder of Mantrayana or "The Spell Vehicle," having received it from the Celestial Buddha Vairochana through the divine Bodhisattva Vajrasattva at "The Iron Tower" in Southern India, where Nagarjuna lived in secret retreat and whence he spiritually directed, as a Mahatcharya, his beloved friend and patron the Indian Buddhist King Vikramaditya (Udyana), known in Tibetan as Dechod-Zangpo. The great Nagarjuna died in Southern India in Shamkara's kingdom.
- 5. Nagarjuna produced a vast literature of the Prajnaparamita, i.e. "Transcendental Wisdom" or "the means of arriving at the other side of wisdom," called by the Tibetans the S'er-p'yin (Pron. Sher-chin) and commonly divided into 21 books, which in block-print form fill one hundred volumes of about 1000 pages each.

It⁴⁶² is said that Nagarjuna claimed that our Lord Buddha Gautama Himself composed this apocalyptic treatise, and hid it away in the depths of a vast lake or sea in the custody of the Naga Demigods, until such time as men should be sufficiently enlightened to comprehend so abstruse a system. This assertion of the great Guru seems to be a symbolic way of stating that the Buddha Gautama taught the Prajnaparamita esoterically.

6. The generic name Prajnaparamita includes five different works. These Scriptures or "Holy Wisdom of Buddhism" are pre-eminently Mahayanistic, and their main topic is the doctrine of Relativity or Voidness. It is developed in the form of discourses in which our Lord Buddha Shakyamuni Himself is the chief expounder; but some of His celebrated disciples also often appear as teachers. True Buddhism is declared in these Scriptures to be founded on the theory of Relativity or Nagativity, and the attainment of the highest perfection is made to depend on the performance of meditations of which the object should be Relativity or Shunyata.

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^{462 449}

- 7. Guru Nagarjuna was a prolific writer, but his three different works explaining the Buddhist Theory of Negativity or Relativity made him the greatest figure in Buddhism. These are: the celebrated fundamental work called Mula-Madhyamika Shastra or "A Treatise on Relativity," known also as Prajnamula, and two short summaries—Yuktisastika, a very condensed statement of the theory, and Shunyata-saptati, a short poem on Relativity with the author's own comment. He composed also two tracts dealing with the method of negative dialectics employed by him, the first being "The Refutation of Contests" or "Vaidalya-sutra and prakarana," a self-defence against the charge of perverting logic. One may find in Tibetan language still one more important work ascribed to Nagarjuna⁴⁶³ and entitled "A vindication of empirical Reality" (Tha-snad-grub-pa).
- 8. The famous Middle Path of Eight Noes of Nagarjuna, the putative father of the Great Vehicle and the revealer of the Sutras of the Prajna-paramita, is as follows:

"There is no annihilation (nirodha), no production (upada), no destruction (uccheda), no persistence (shashvata) no unity (ekartha), no plurality (nanartha), no coming in (agamana), and no going forth (nirgama)."

According to Nagarjuna, the state of Being admits of no definition or formula, and the real is what is not dependent upon anything else. Only the Whole of the wholes is real. All component elements of existence, because interdependent, are unreal (shunya).

Nagarjuna defined Reality or tattva in the following way: "unrecognisable from without, quiescent, undifferentiated in words, unrealisable in concepts, non-plural—this is the essence of Reality."

Hence all our cognitions are illusions, because they are relative. All cognitions are just as wrong as the erroneous perception of a piece of glittering nacre which at a distance is mistaken for silver. The only non-relative reality, according to Nagarjuna, is the Cosmical Body of Buddha, or Dharmakaya.

He did not admit the existence of caused matter, nor the existence of a real space. The reliability of the direct experience remains to be proved. By his negative method he established that the separate entities of the phenomenal world have never originated and do not exist. Taking his stand upon Universal Relativity, the cause and effect, being correlative, have neither of them any absolute existence. He held that consciousness cannot apprehend its own self. Accordingly it is said in the 'Questions⁴⁶⁴ of Ratnacuda:'

Mahatcharya Vahindra and Ananda Maitreya Baltari: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY."

^{463 450}

^{464 451}

"The trenchent of a sword cannot cut its own trenchant. The tip of a finger cannot touch the very tip. Similarly, this consciousness cannot be conscious of its own self."

Therefore conceptions about what is only a conception should not be produced, an idea about what is only an idea should not be conceived. A Buddhist monk must enter that mystic condition where all concepts and all feelings are extinct.

Nagarjuna extols the principle of Relativity (shunyata) or the theory which maintains that the Relativity of all objects of the empirical World is the surface of its monistic Essence. This doctrine of Nagarjuna is called madhyama pratipad or the doctrine of the Middle Path. He held that our Lord Buddha Gautama proclaimed the Principle of Universal Relativity and that the blissful Nirvana, according to Lord Gautama is to be described in the following manner:—

"There nothing disappears,

Nor anything appears,

Nothing has an end,

Nor is there anything eternal,

Nothing is identical (with itself),

Nothing moves,

Neither hither nor thither."

In other words, nothing in the Universe can disappear, nor can anything new emerge as an individual existence; there is no cutting off the stream of consecutive point-instants, nor is there anything existing through all times; nothing is non-discrete or non-separate, nor is there anything different or discrete; there is no motion, neither towards us, nor from us.

The great Guru preached that it is wrong to maintain that entities can be produced out of conditions which are different from them. Production out of something extraneous means relation to⁴⁶⁵ it or some kind of pre-existence in it. But this is impossible. He dissolved every problem into thesis and antithesis and denied both. In the Nagarjunan treatise on Relativity there is the following passage about Nirvana:—

"What neither is released, nor it is ever reached,

What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternality,

This is Nirvana. It escapes precision...

What is the Buddha after his Nirvana?

Does he exist or does he not exist.

Or both, or neither?

We never will conceive it...."

Nagarjuna maintained that logic is incapable to solve the question about what existence or non-existence really are. He did not believe in logic. He abandoned logic and betook himself to direct mystic intuition (yogipratyaksa) of the One-without-a-

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^{465 452}

Mahatcharya Vahindra and Ananda Maitreya Baltari: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY."

Second, a kind of direct vivid consciousness. He asserted always the incapacity of human reason to cognise things as they really are. For the benefit of Westerners it may be stated that there is remarkable similarity between the negativism of A.C. Bradley and the Middle Path of Nagarjuna. Still greater family likeness may be found between Nagarjuna's dialectics and the dialectical method of Hegel, who in his precious work entitled 'Phanomenologie des Geistes' expresses himself like a genuine Mahayana Buddhist of the Madhyamika School. Hegel stated that all we really know of the object is its "thisness" all its remaining content being relation. The 'thisness' of Hegel is the "suchness" of Mahayana Buddhism or Relativity (Shunyata). Both Nagarjuna and Hegel teach that the facts are knowable only as interrelated and that Relativity or Negativity (Shunyata) is the Soul of the Universe. As to comparison between Zeno of Elea and Nagarjuna, this has been suggested by Prof. H. Jacobi.

To⁴⁶⁶ regard however, the philosophy of Nagarjuna as pure negativism or nihilism would be to commit a great mistake, for he held that the intellect "condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antinomies in the world of experience. To him, absolute truth is midway between affirmation and negation. Nagarjuna denied not only the existence of the being who suffers, but also of pain. He pointed to a primitive non-differentiated reality, identified with Buddha's Cosmical Body (dharmakaya) as the central conception of Mahayana. Nagarjuna declared the Essence of Being to be undefinable, uncharacterisable. This unique reality may be called the "element of the elements" the "suchness of existence," "thisness," "suchness," the "relation to thisness," the matrix of Tathagatas or tathagata-garbha, the "Cosmical Body of the Lord" or dharmakaya, or simply Relativity, i.e. shunayata.

Buddha and Nirvana are, in Nagarjuna's eyes, different names for the same things. Nagarjuna taught the equipollency of Samsara and Nirvana and declared all plurality to be an illusion, and nothing short of the whole to be Reality directly cognised in mystic intuition. The unreal phenomenal veil (samvrti) conceals absolute Reality (paramartha-bhutartha).

Hinayana Buddhism denies motion since it represents in reality a series of separate momentary productions as in a cinema. In Mahayana Buddhism motion is denied because all these moments are relative.

Nagarjuna's view on Causality was identical with the following words of a Mahayana Sutra called 'Shalistamba-sutra' —

"This sprout which springs up from a seed is not produced out of itself, neither is it produced out of non-self, nor out of both, nor without a cause. It is neither created by God (Ishvara)⁴⁶⁷ nor by Time, nor from the Atoms, nor from Primitive Matter (prakrti), nor by Nature (svabhava)"

^{466 453}

Nagarjuna emphatically asserted the essential identity of Nirvana and Samsara, of the Absolute and the Phenomenal. All things exist—in a world as will and representation which is that of all Buddhism—as if they were not. And the mind itself must be freed not only from the world, but from itself.

Nagarjuna wished to inculcate that mystic intuition can only be felt internally and cannot be expressed in words. Thus the real attitude of the Buddhist Saint (arya), i.e. the man who has through accumulated virtue and accumulated knowledge entered the Path of Enlightenment consisting in a direct intuition of the real condition of the Universe, in the discussions about the Absolute should be silence. And the realization of Relativity can be compared to a bottomless, unfathomable gulf which opens in the heart of the saint, an abyss full of ineffable beauties and interminable transparencies. On the surface of this bottomless gulf the fascinating mirage of different things plays in changing colours, but under the surface of this optical illusion there is a limitless vacuity, the unfathomableness itself. According to Nagarjuna, the name Buddha means the one who has realized the omniscience of the truth and has identified himself with vacuity.

Nagarjuna's arguments run to the conclusion that all the earthly incidents in the life of our Lord Buddha Gautama Shakyamuni belonged to the phenomena of the Buddha's physical body (jatakaya, i.e. "born in flesh"), in contrast with his real substance (dharmakaya). The former view is admitted from the standpoint of the earthly principle (loka-artha), and the latter is the only true view according to the first principle (paramartha) of Prajna or Sapience.

The⁴⁶⁸ final extinction (parinirvana) of Lord Gautama's physical body was, of course, not the end of a mortal, but was meant to be a visible example of ultimate absorption into the depth of vacuity. This applies to all Buddhas, past as well as future, who are infinite in number and nothing but individualized manifestations of the mother Prajna or Buddhist Holy Wisdom, which is often prayed to and invoked by the Mahayana devotees, and which communicates itself to the mind in an inexpressible communion.

It is generally believed that Guru Nagarjuna also composed the 'Sama-dhiraja', Buddhavatangsaka' and 'Ratnakuta' Sutras, famous apocalyptic treatises. On these, 'Samadhiraja', a Mahayana narrative in which various forms of Buddhist meditations are explained, needs special stress. It describes the process by which a votary of Lord Buddha may rise to the highest elevation, each of the 42 Chapters showing a step in the gradual progress of the human mind in its moral condition, and reciting one or more stories on virtuous superiority in illustration of the different stages of that progress. The principal interlocutors are our Lord Buddha Shakyamuni and Chandraprabha, and

Mahatcharya Vahindra and Ananda Maitreya Baltari: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY."

^{468 455}

the scene is laid on the famous Gridhrakuta Hill or "Vulture's Peak", near Rajagriha (Rajgir), the metropolis of Magadha in the time of our Lord, who so often collected alms there, in the reign of the noble king Bimbisara. The 'Buddhavatasangsaka Sutra' is a famous sutra vividly describing and teaching the state of complete dissolution called 'abhishyanditakayacitta,' in which we are no more conscious of the distinction between mind and body, subject and object. The 'Buddhavatangsaka Sutra' says: "The One true Essence is like a bright mirror, which is the basis of all phenomena. The Basis itself is permanent and real, the phenomena are evanescent469 and unreal. As the mirror, however, is capable of reflecting all images, so the True Essence embraceth all phenomena, and all things exist in it and by it." The 'Buddhavatangsaka 'Sutra' or "Association of Buddhas" is divided into six volumes. It deals with the description of several Buddhas, their provinces, etc., and enumerates also several Bodhisattvas, and degrees of their perfections. This great Sutra is alleged to have been preached by our Lord Gautama in the second week of his Buddhahood and before he turned the Wheel of the Law or the Dharma-chakra at Sarnath, Benares. Moreover, it is asserted to have been delivered in nine assemblies at seven different places, and is thus given preeminence over the first historic discourse at the Park of the Antelopes. The 'Ratnakuta Sutra' (of which a part is known as 'Kashyapaparivarta') or "The Jewel-peak" contains the enumeration of several qualities and perfections of the Buddha and the Dharma and also describes the Middle Path as the true way of viewing things.

Mahayana Buddhism develops potential mysticism and teaches the most wonderful and thorough-going individual heroism grafting upon the theory of Relativity. And the great Guru Nagarjuna describes the supreme reality as Relativity or the Void, in the sense that it is free from the limitations of relative knowledge, but from our part it will be proper to add that the Perfect Enlightenment alone can fully reveal to us what Relativity in all its implications really is. He preaches daringly that when a man has thoroughly realized the pluralistic illusion of all separate entities, there is for him no Moral Law.

Nagarjuna plunges himself into the activity of things in the bosom of Relativity and sees there a series of waves perpetually succeeding one⁴⁷⁰ another on the fathomless ocean. To his mind, the phenomena of life are the bottomless ocean viewed as waves, and the Essential Nature or 'bhutatathata' is the waves viewed as the ocean.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that it was through Nagarjuna that the Buddhist mysticism of the so-called Mantra School had attained to undreamed-of psychic states.

Hence the Nagarjunan philosophy of Relativity has an eternal value for all humanity, for it discloses in Relativity the profound reasons both of radical positivism

Mahatcharya Vahindra and Ananda Maitreya Baltari: "NAGARJUNA: EXPONENT OF RELATIVITY."

^{469 456}

⁴⁷⁰ 457

and of all-identifying idealism. And it will remain for ages to come a source of satisfaction and of real consolation for many great leaders and visionaries, working in the future for the betterment of our human society.

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT." @

In a little book recently published: "What was the original gospel in Buddhism?" I have made positive statements as to what are, for me, the things that Gotama called the Buddha may, by critically weighed evidence, be held to have taught as his essential Message. I have there, incidentally or otherwise, rejected certain teachings, now held as orthodox, as neither essentially nor in any way his Message. Here, not incidentally, but in a definite catalogue, I would touch briefly on the chief of the teachings I reject as not his.

There is nothing exceptional in world-religions like Buddhism in such critical eclectical decisions. With the advance of higher criticism, that is, of historical criticism, such decisions will be more definitely come to, more freely stated than is now the case. To compare such criticism as has so far been made in Christianity with its like in Buddhism were to compare an⁴⁷¹ adolescent with a babe. But we can, fore-stalling the future, see that advance in deciding about things that will, and 'things that will not have been taught' by the respective Founders are complicated by the difference in the time-interval before the compilation of authentic written scripture, supplanting that which had been orally taught only. Believers in the superior reliability of a carefully conducted oral transmission may, with a recent writer, point to "the 10,000 variant readings in the New Testament." I would set over against this the book of the 10,000 Vedic Variants, as, pace the respective length of documents, no mean case of pot versus kettle.

I maintain, that an oral thesaurus (with possibly only lists or heads or at most an 'argument' written on metal leaves), which is recorded as having been set down in writing (no mention made of the language) some 400 years, at the shortest reckoning, after the death of the Founder of the religious institution adhering to that teaching, is bound to have come thus to a second birth in a very different world of religious values from that of the Founder. And therein and thereby to have undergone important editorial changes, necessarily exceeding those in scriptures where compilation of a Canon has taken place, in less than half that interval.

Here is one important result of this difference in interval. In Christianity the relatively shorter interval prevented the Hebraic environment from affecting the

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT."

[®] In "BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND" (JOURNAL) 1941.

⁴⁷¹ 458

teaching in the New Testament to the extent to which that "affecting" came to change the institutional teaching of later Christianity:-the doctrine namely of sacrificial expiation. We are able to catch the reminiscences of the life and ministry of the Founder before they had, under the hand of time and changing values, become⁴⁷² relatively much altered. That which in Christianity is reminiscence handed down unwritten during a few generations, has in Buddhism become almost purely legendary cult. Time and changing values have been much longer at work. The Man, loyal friend and helper of man, has become a superman, object of awe and worship. The monastic cult grown great has superimposed its own outlooks on life as 'ill', on the original message which sought to expand and safeguard the teaching of Immanence current in its day. The analytic cult of the new psychology has seen, in the Man who "is That," just body and mind. The protest against Brahmin ritual has come to include protest against all, even the central Brahmin teaching. It was in this environment that the Pali Canon was built up, was finally closed, was finally written down. It is hardly strange that in it we find much, very much more of which we can plead: this and that he will not have taught, than we can find in the Christian Gospels.

For all that, I am not complacently expecting agreement with my "Nots", any more than with my positive statements as to what Gotama Sakyamuni did teach. I would only, while yet for brief space the light (such as it is) of earth is with me, have both, have both Ayes and Noes clearly set down, so that I be judged by what I have said and not (as has happened before) by what I have not said.

I sum my 'Nots' up under ten things he will not have taught to man about man, and one thing he will not have taught about himself. (I could add others).

He will not have taught that:

- 1. the man, the very man: self, spirit, soul, 'purusa' is not real.
- $2. \ the \ very \ man \ is \ but \ a \ compound \ of \ bodily \ and \ mental \ parts \ or \ states.$
- 3. man^{473} was to trust in, depend upon his present, actual self as lamp and refuge.
 - 4. 'dhamma' had value and reality as code or body of teaching only.
 - 5. His teaching was mainly about 'ill,' namely, old age, illness, death.
 - 6. craving as such was to be stopped.
 - 7. 'leaving the world' was a higher life than living 'in' the world.
 - 8. causation had religious value as stopping, not as bringing about.
 - 9. man's religious concern was mainly with life here and now.

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^{472 459}

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT." $^{473}\ 460$

- 10. man's ultimate goal was waning out as man. Finally –
- 11. he will not have taught about himself that he was omniscient or outstandingly 'Buddha' (awakened, wise).

These ten, with the eleventh, are ranked by Hinayanists (or, if they prefer it, Theravadins) as either central tenets, or as important. And it is expressly claimed, by record, or tradition, or both, that "the Buddha taught them."

It will briefly dismiss the last first. We have, in the Second Collection, a categorical repudiation of being omniscient ascribed to Gotama. A man asks: "I have heard it said that you are all-knowing, all-seeing" and enlarges on this. The answer is: "This witness is not true; it imputes to me what is false, untrue." His reply could be supported by such admissions in the Canon, that he <u>hesitates</u> whether he can profitably teach men or not; that he, seeking former teachers, is <u>informed</u> from the unseen that they are deceased; that, being asked whence he had knowledge of this or that matter, he is made to say: "A deva told me." It is added (significant addendum): "And I knew it of myself." Again, where he is once recorded as saying: "Think of me as 'buddha,' brahmin" and in the following verse: "hence am I buddha," the context demands,⁴⁷⁴ as I have pointed out, that the needed word is, not <u>buddha</u>, but <u>suddha</u>: purified. I have also elsewhere shown that, in the records of the first two councils after his death, at the interval of a century between the two, he is not referred to as Buddha.

I come to the ten 'Nots' concerning his teaching. Let us take Nots i, 2 and 3:— denial of an entity in human personality; acceptance of him as a body-mind complex only; and that this complex was to be its own savour. These three may be seen and heard as the orthodox Hinayamism of to-day times without number. But the third is more taught now than by the exegesists, it being largely due to European mistranslation which has affected Buddhists of the present day. That which is lacking in all three assertions is the <u>atmosphere of the religious culture</u> which was present about the birth of Gotama's message.

When Jesus taught the sonship of every man to a Divine Father, he was bringing to the front of his teaching a background concept of the Old Testament, of some Apocalyptic literature, of Stoic philosophy. The "Have we not all one father? Hath not one God created us?" of the prophet Malachi has many echoes in these teachings, as Paul reminded the Athenians. In the same way, when Gotama began his mission by advising men to seek thoroughly for the Atma (spirit, self), and ended it by bidding men live as having the Atma for their lamp and refuge, he spoke within the atmosphere of current religious Immanence, using its phraseology. "We worship Brahman as the Atma" was the accepted teaching, which Gotama sought; "not to destroy but to fulfil."

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^{474 461}

To the extent that man was to choose the better, the "middle way" in his life, not once, but at every turn, is the one item in the teaching that may, at first sight, support the notion of self-saving. But to see in this, not, as it is, the exercise of man's will in his quest, but the⁴⁷⁵ winning of the quest itself, is as bad as to confound 'conversion' with final attainment.

Nor is Buddhism in this misconstrued slogan of self-saving logical. It had clearly no such tenet in mind when it set up for the believer the trinity of 'Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha' as every man's 'REFUGE', forgetting that the Founder had limited such refuges to two: Atma, and Dhamma—"and no other," among the last words ascribed to him. It has not only changed the first of his two refuges, putting 'Buddha' in the place of his 'Atma' it has added a third to the two, namely, Sangha.

Further, Buddhism has committed another logical absurdity about the man or self. Because the Second Utterance enjoins that he be not identified with either body or mind, it has concluded that therefore 'he' does not exist. As if, as I have said, we were to pass over boatswain and purser, in seeking the captain, and say: Then there's no captain. The Founder himself is shown recognizing the absurdity. In an overlooked saying, he is shown reminding a debater that you cannot recognize as king-judge one who disposes of his subject's life and fortunes, and at the same time see in him a mere subject. He is more than they.

Buddhists cannot have it both ways. Either they are wrong, or their scriptures make the Master contradict himself. Nor must we forget, that in their numerical lists of titles of doctrines, the apparently oldest of these lists does not mention the title, under its Fives, of the five groups (khandhas) into which body and mind came to be divided. Nay, it is fairly clear, from another canonical saying, that at one time the 'five' included the very man, thus: body, three mental functions and the experiencer through these (vinnama), invisible but very real.

I have tried to show elsewhere, how we see here⁴⁷⁶ the way in which—much as with Europe in our own age—the new psychology or proto-Sankhya was causing the growing Buddhism to lose touch with the Brahmanic teaching of Immanence, and to concentrate, not on the Man, but on his instruments.

In the fourth Not:—the original place in the teaching of 'dhamma,'—the new foreground detaches itself somewhat from the older background of Immanence. But only to this extent. Gotama, in speaking of man as longing for the Great "Atma,"

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT." 476 463

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT."

^{475 462}

declares himself as worshipper of 'dhamma'. This word was no new term in his day, but it corresponded rather to the concept of propriety in conduct: the 'what is done, is not done.' He saw in it the higher force, the more dynamic ethic, of what ought to be, or not to be done. He virtually equated it with the antaryamin of the Upanishads, the 'conscience' - "ay, that Deitie within my bosome" - of our own time and place. It was this that he is shown naming as his sole successor, not the externalized code of teaching which it became. Nor do I find anything in Hinayana justifying a modern tendency to look on 'dhamma' as cosmic law, a tendency possibly due (?) to the newer attention that is being given to Mahayana. 'Dhamma' is only rightly rendered as 'law' in the sense of conscience as a 'law unto one's self.' Early Buddhist poetry calls it a man's best of wayfarers.' The seeing in the word as Leibnitzian monad is a metaphysical emergence a thousand years later than the day of Gotama. Midway between those two days we find it, in the Pali books, as applied to religion in general: thus "what is this 'dhamma' by which your disciples being comforted, see in man's inclination the basis of the godly life?" As if the word had come to stand for religion with the growth of men's seeing in religion a mockery were it not 'lived'.

In⁴⁷⁷ numbers five to ten we see certain emphasis due to the steady growth of monasticism, beginning in Gotama's day and gaining strength so much that it transformed that earlier background into his own back-and-foreground. If we, to get truth through sympathy, assume the monastic ideal that life as layman is 'the low thing' so-called in Buddhist scripture of life as leading, even at its best, to material welfare here and an other wise material welfare hereafter, with no term set to recurrence of death-if we then create a teacher of the ideal that a distaste for, and renunciation of life, as we know it, is best, we shall then be able to accept these six Nots as very much what we should expect such a teacher to say. We should not, with the former, be seeking, more than most laymen. Not if we were a Christian monastic! Why? Because in the Indian teacher's case, two conditions would bend him in another direction. He would not, with the former, be seeking more than most laymen, "a better country, that is an heavenly." He would be bent aside by the rupture with Brahmanic Immanence and by the new psychology. All living, the 'heavenly' too, would be to him 'ill' (dukkha). He was not out to "seek another country." He was out so to live as hereafter no more to experience being born, living, dying 'in' or of any world, but to win to an indescribable state, indescribable save that it was one of "supreme happiness." To do that he would have in a way to be a happy 'man'; but in so far as he identified 'man' with mere body and mind, there must be an outgrowing of such manhood. For this, nirvana, the new, the later summum bonum, was truly a waning out, attainable only when the age-long wayfaring in many lives, many worlds was consummated. But the Christian monk would cheerfully look forward to further wayfaring in that "better country."

But⁴⁷⁸ <u>he</u> would have this notion of 'ill' better conceived than was the case of the Buddhist monk. He would make little of bodily and psychological 'ill': old age, illness, mental worry, dying, birth. For him 'ill' would spell mainly or solely the spiritual Less which he sought to improve in a spiritual More. For the Buddhist monk, it was the former class of ills which are avowedly called dukkha. Spiritual dis-ease does find mention, but rarely. He sang:-

Like forest fires behold them drawing nigh: Death and disease, decay, dread trinity.

And when he did conceive in verse his notion of happier conditions rewarding moral effort here, it is mainly a physical betterment that he describes. There is, it is true, the negative "no fear, no grief" of the Islamic paradise, but added well-being is not worthily made out as spiritual. In the only passage I know, where a happier hereafter is made a replica of a sincerely religious life here, the Master is made to describe it as just a happy "suchness" of the latter.

But that, here and now, the monk-life implied, as such, a higher stage in preparation is emphatically rejected in the Master's saying, that for him a man had worth not in being a monk rather than a layman, but solely in better conduct.

Monasticism, again, went far in obliterating the emphasis in the (much-edited) First Utterance on man as willer, as chooser. Not only in the substitution of a superman for the 'Wayfarer' therein, but also in the condemnation of will or desire as 'thirst,' usually translated as 'craving.' Now for the 'man', 'everyman', there is nothing in will, under any name for it, that he can afford to wipe out. Where would man as constructive creature be had he excised all will having a strong coefficient of feeling, namely, yearning, longing, craving? But the monk, walking 'in the world yet not of it, has found it often needful to⁴⁷⁹ cool off desire or efferent will; at least the Buddhist monk with his curtailed outlook certainly did so. Note, on the other hand the persistence in the refrain urging to ever further effort: "thus and thus must yet train yourselves":—fine calls upon will as desire to attain. And so illogical is it to see, in the teacher of these, the man who would call any term for "desire to attain, to accomplish" the necessary precedent of 'ill', that I cannot see both calls and condemnation as truly his.

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT." $^{479}\,466$

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT."

^{478 465}

Nor can I accept as his the formula known as Arising by Causation. His long mission may have permitted formulas to be drafted in his lifetime. But this one, wherein the natural course of man's life is shown as so many conditions of 'ill' and that alone, is but a one-sided application of the current interest in man's inner casual uniformities. It is unworthy to stand alone as illustrating the more general statement of casual law. Given this, that follows; stop this and that is stopped. How did not monasticism weaken Buddhism by this decapitation!

Finally, we have in number 9 perhaps the most tragic result of the darkened monastic outlook:—its dread namely of a protraction of life; its conversion of the great symbol of man's progress, the Wheel of his becoming, into a mere Ixon-rotation of sameness. Forgotten are the canonical sayings called the Master's goal or aim in religion one that is of the Beyond (samparayika). Forgotten the description of the Way, not as an inadequate 'eightfold' string of qualities, but as solely "leading to the Beyond". "He taught us about life here, and left the next world to take care of itself." What a monstrous description of his teaching, who is said to have found "sheer happiness" in converse with good men of other worlds, who was sought after to give news of lost ones gone before, who bade his disciples look forward to a happiness hereafter within their power to win!

This is but a hasty exposition of certain things which both scripture and our own unprejudiced judgment tells us the founder of a great world-religion did not teach, nay, could not have taught. Historical criticism has not yet duly exerted itself to show, that things put into his mouth are largely, even mainly, the work of compilation from older materials affected by the editors holding, under the long pressure of certain influences, different values from those of his day. If we set that historic figure in its due place and time, we can see that, to be what he was, not one of those things will he have taught. They are all of the Less in man's nature, life, destiny. There is no evidence that he judged his age had been rating these as too much in a More. If anywhere he checked the uplift in a More of the current Immanence, it was in his reticence concerning the Most. Man was being taught to call himself the 'Most'. Gotama saw him as, at best, in a More, and taught the More there lay before him to become.

<u>Mahatcharya Vahindra</u> & <u>Ananda Maitreya Baltari THE BUDDHA:</u>[@] (1) His mind is a union of the Highest Knowledge and All-swaying Compassion. He proclaims a scheme of salvation open to all mankind.

2) All past, present and future Buddhas teach the same Dharma in the manner best suited to the time and place of their appearance.

^{480 467}

Mrs C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS: "THINGS BUDDHA WILL NOT HAVE TAUGHT."

[®] In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND (Journal) 1939.

3) It teaches that no result can be attained without striving, and that to be born a human being is a unique opportunity.

There⁴⁸¹ are three kinds of training in Buddhism: (a) Training in the higher morality (in Pali, 'Adhisilasikkha') (b) Training in the higher thought (in Pali, 'Adhicittasikkha') (c) Training in the higher learning (in Pali, 'Adhipannasikkha').

3) Enlightened disciples cannot remain idle, but have to feel all the sorrow of this world, and expend their virtue with unstinted generosity.

Those among the Buddhists who sacrifice their lives for the sake of others are called Bodhisattvas or Mahasattvas. Those choose not the path of Immediate Salvation, but that of Ultimate Salvation or Liberation. They consider all sentient beings as their own self and do not cling to their individual forms.

4) Buddhism insists on the interdependence and even the identity of all life. Hence it is understandable why Buddhist activities must be for the benefit, weal and happiness of the world at large, for the sake of the complete Nirvana of all beings.

The term Nirvana is used with many different meanings by different people, who are either ignorant of the teachings of the Buddhas or do not understand them. The real Nirvana does not consist in simple annihilation of the senses and the senseminds. The real Nirvana is not to be separated from this life-and-death world. Nirvana is where compassion for others transcends all thoughts of self; it is where the Buddha stage is finally realised, the undifferentiated stage of the One who has fully attained the goal of spiritual unification. The Buddhahood expresses itself in Perfect Love for all and in Noble Wisdom for the enlightenment of all.

<u>BEATRICE</u>⁴⁸² <u>LANE SUZUKI</u>. "<u>INSIGHT INTO REALITY</u>" <u>According to the Japanese Shingon Teaching</u>.[®]

There is a religious teaching in Japan which claims to be able to open the mind to see Reality. This is the Shingon or "True Word" school of Mahayana Buddhism. It is akin historically and spiritually to certain teachings in India, but like much which the Japanese have taken from others it has been adapted to the Japanese mind and transformed by the Japanese spirit.

Shingon is said to have originated with the great teacher Nagarjuna, who discovered in a temple in South India the two precious sutras, the 'Dainichikyo' (Sanskrit: Mahavairocana) and the 'Kongochokyo' (Sanskrit: Vajrasekhara). But

Mahatcharya Vahindra & Ananda Maitreya Baltari THE BUDDHA

^{481 468}

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according to Shingon, Nagarjuna thought out and systematised Sakya's teaching, Sakya was indeed his inspiration. Not all of Sakya's teaching is contained in the Pali scriptures. Shingon like Zen claims a secret transmission from the Buddha handed down orally and to a certain extent preserved in Sanskrit manuscripts. Nagarjuna handed down the sutras which he found through a series of illustrious teachers in India and China, till they came to Keikwa, the teacher of Kobo Daishi, the great scholar-priest-saint of Japan.

Kobo Daishi was a most remarkable man whether we view him as religionist, social worker, scholar, painter, sculptor, or general man of affairs. So tremendous was his prestige, spiritual, artistic, and human, that the remembrance of it has survived to this day, and he is easily considered by almost all Japanese as one of the greatest geniuses which Japan has ever produced.

Kobo Daishi, to call him by his official and posthumous title, previously known as Kukai, was born in 744 A.D. and entered the priesthood while very young. He practised austerities and read⁴⁸³ the scriptures, but when he found in an old temple the sutra of Dainichi, all his doubts were cleared up and he resolved to go to China to learn the doctrine. He obtained Imperial permission and left for China when he was 32 years old. There he studied at the temple of Seiryuji in Choan under Keikwa and received Kwanjo. Upon his return, he spread the teaching not only at the Imperial Court among the aristocracy but among all classes of people. He opened up the mountain of Koya and established a group of temples there. This collection of temples, still existing today, is the chief headquarters for Shingon teaching. Here is the college where Shingon doctrine is systematically taught and the temples where daily practice is performed.

The main idea of Shingon is what may be called cosmotheism. The universe is a manifestation of the Supreme Buddha, Mahavairochana, and is composed of six elements: earth, water, fire, air (wind), ether and consciousness which make up the body of Mahavairochana. His thoughts, words and actions of the universe and are called The Three Secrets. We, as apparently imperfect reflections of him, are to try to make our thoughts, words and actions as much like his as possible. How to do this is the teaching of the system of Shingon Buddhism.

The Shingon mandara is of great help, for to understand the mandara is to understand oneself. The two chief mandara are pictorial representations of the universe in symbolic presentation the Kongo (Sanskrit: 'Vajradhatu') representing the wisdom side of the Eternal Buddha, and the Taizo (Sanskrit: 'Garbhakosa'), the side of Compassion; the Kongo also shows the fulfilled enlightened aspect of the Buddha but the Taizo shows the growing universe. In these pictures, many Buddhas and

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⁴⁸³ **470**

Bodhisattvas and ⁴⁸⁴ others are depicted, but it must always be remembered that these many Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are not separate personalities but are simply the varied aspects of the one Eternal Buddha: in the phenomenal world they may be seen as personal, but in the absolute world as the Dharmakaya.

All these holy figures and the symbology of their attitudes and the objects they hold must be considered a device (upaya) for opening the mind to see Reality. The method is different from that of Zen, but it is a striving for the same end. The mandala is to be regarded as the representation of the quality of the Eternal Buddha, Mahavairochana, and it reveals the divine nature of all beings. All appearances are contained in the mandala, whether dog, tree, stone, man or Bodhisattva, for the whole universe is Mahavairochana. His substance is the Six Elements and his activity the Three Secrets.

The Shingon calls enlightenment 'Sokushinjobutsu' which means to become Buddha in this very body, and the aim of all its practices is to attain this even if only in a slight degree. It has a variety of methods adapted to different classes of persons. For the more ignorant, there are ceremonies and rituals of all kinds to put them on the preparatory path; for the more enlightened these very rituals assume deep meanings. Some of these rituals are performances to symbolise the body, speech, and mind of the Eternal Buddha by means of gestures (mudra) words (mantra) and meditation (dhyana). These mystical teachings and practices are taught to priests and earnest laymen. Among them are the ceremonies of 'Kwanjo,' commonly translated as baptism but differing very much from the usual meaning of that word; rituals connected with the mandala and the fire ceremony. Ceremonies are considered helpful rather than necessary; they make a path and are not goals in themselves. There 485 is a special meditation connected with every Buddha and Bodhisattva aspect in the mandala; besides these there is the moon meditation and perhaps the most important and significant of all is meditation upon the letter A (Aji) of the Sanskrit alphabet. Through these practices spiritual perception is gradually cultivated and to some may come the summum bonum as in Zen, i.e. an insight into one's own nature and that of the Buddha, the One Reality.

The aim of the practice of the Three Secrets is to become one with the Dharmakaya (the Absolute Buddha). As the gestures represent his activity, we try to imitate them; as the sacred words represent his speech, we try to speak them; and with our minds, we meditate on our oneness with him. If true enlightenment is not obtained

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI. "INSIGHT INTO REALITY"

⁴⁸⁵ 472

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI. "INSIGHT INTO REALITY"

^{484 471}

fully in this life, then perhaps a glimpse will be given, and if not even this is vouchsafed, then it serves as a preparation for the future life.

We are Buddhas now in essence because we have the Buddha nature although phenomenally we seem far from it. The fundamental essence of Shingon teaching is that Buddha and all beings are one and this means not human beings only, for animals and plants have the Buddha-nature also and are aspects of Mahavairochana. Illusion surrounds us and obscures our vision of this truth. 'Bodaishin' (Bodhichitta) exists in all things animate and inanimate and in both enlightened and unenlightened beings.

What is this Buddha-nature (Japanese: Bussho, that is, Bodaishin)? In our hearts we have innate Buddhahood which can be developed. 'So-kushinijobutsu is to be obtained in this very world, in this very body, not after death as is taught by Christianity and certain Buddhist sects such as those which believe in Amida and his Pure Land. In this respect, Shingon resembles Zen. Both strive to realise that there is no⁴⁸⁶ birth and no death and that Buddhahood is Here and Now. 'Sokushinjobutsu' may be described as the opening of the Buddha's wisdom in us and the exercise of his compassion whereby we acquire his virtues and powers.

Shingon lays much stress upon this acquiring the virtues and powers of the Buddha and asserts that it is possible to do so. It says that by the practice of the Three Secrets we can acquire the powers and appropriate the virtues of the Buddha-wellbeing; happiness, compassion, wisdom. Wisdom and Compassion are the two foundation posts of Mahayana Buddhism. The Shingon devotee makes four great vows at the beginning of his practice:—

However innumerable sentient beings are,
I vow to save them;
However inexhaustible the passions are,
I vow to extinguish them;
However innumerable the Dharmas are
I vow to study them;
However incomparable the Buddha-truth is,
I vow to attain it.

Shingon systematic practice is generally begun with the 'Kwanjo', which means that the aspirant has deliberately of his own free will started upon the career of the Bodhisattva. He then proceeds to learn the rituals with the view of endeavouring to realise his oneness with Mahavairochana. Practice must be united with Faith and by faith is meant faith in the teachings of Non-duality and 'Sokushinjobutsu'. The two

⁴⁸⁶ 473

great sutras—'Dainichikyo' and 'Kongochokyo' explain the doctrine of 'Funi isshin' (One Mind, not two), the former from the standpoint of Compassion and the latter from that of Wisdom.

Shingon explains the true nature of the Dharmakaya Buddha. According to Shingon, it is not empty and formless as in the teaching of some schools of Buddhism, but of real substance, true⁴⁸⁷ and permanent, with which we can unite.

When we are enlightened, the Dharmakaya is found to be not formless and empty but active, and we understand the meaning of the Great Self and the true teaching of non-ego which is emptiness of the small self but not of the Great Self which unites itself with Mahavairochana.

According to Mahayana Buddhism, and especially Shingon, the conception of Nirvana is different from that as generally explained in Buddhism. Many writers on Buddhism consider Nirvana to be extinction but Shingon conceives of it as the Absolute Reality and equivalent to Enlightenment. In Nirvana, the self is enlarged and becomes one with all other selves in Mahavairochana. In Nirvana, true individuality is not lost. Each individual is the centre of the universe, but he must realise that all other beings are himself. This is 'anatta,' which is very different from the Hinayana conception. Shingon says that we must not cling to the small self but enlarge it to contain all others. This constitutes the Real Self and the knowledge of it is Nirvana which is full of Bliss.

The field of supreme enlightenment is 'Bodaishin.' The great enlightenment of Mahavairochana is tranquil and bright and filled with compassion for all beings. The sutra says that the Buddha sees all over the universe and knows that all can realise Buddhahood. The whole trouble with us unenlightened beings is that we regard ourselves as separate when in reality we are united in the Dharmakaya. This is the true meaning of non-ego.

What is Shingon?

It is the teaching of non-duality, of Buddha-nature, of enlightenment, of union with the One which brings the Vision of Truth and the Insight into Reality.

BEATRICE⁴⁸⁸ LANE SUZUKI. "BODHICITTA." @

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI. "INSIGHT INTO REALITY"

^{487 474}

^{488 475}

[®] In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND (Journal) 1939.

Mahayanists hold that every creature is possessed of Bodhicitta (Japanese: 'Bodaishin'), which comprises our very essence, consists in wisdom (Bodhi), and signifies the desire for enlightenment.

It is the goal of practical Buddhist life to arouse and develop the Bodhicitta in oneself and others. As Sthiramati says in his discourse on the Mahayana Dharmadhatu:

"Nirvana, Dharmakaya, Tathagata, Tathagata-garbha, Paramartha, Buddha, Bodhicitta, or Bhutatathata—all these terms signify merely so many different aspects of one and the same reality; and Bodhicitta is the name given to a form of the Dharmakaya or Bhutatathata as it manifests itself in the human heart, and its perfection or negatively its liberation from all egoistic impurities, constitutes the state of Nirvana."

The Bodhicitta is latent in all beings and is a matter of growth, taking many lives to mature. The Bodhisattva's field of action is not confined to one life nor even to one world; his Bodhicitta is ever working and is eternal.

This Bodhicitta is the germ which sustains a being, for as it is latent in any being, it cannot be destroyed or hidden. As Suzuki says in his 'Essays in Zen Buddhism' (Series III, p.180): "When the Bodhicitta is aroused, the fact becomes a personal event. The Bodhisattva and the Bodhicitta are inseparable... The Citta is the key that opens all the secret doors of Buddhism."

According to the 'Dasabhumika', the Bodhicitta is produced in the Bodhisattva in order to liberate the entire world, and this awakening of the Bodhicitta is the first stage in the life of the Bodhisattva; in fact it is the maturing of the Bodhicitta which makes the Bodhisattva⁴⁸⁹ possible.

How is the Bodhicitta to be awakened? The great Buddhist Vasubandhu in his 'Discourse on the Awakening of the Bodhicitta gives some directions upon this point:

- 1. By thinking of the Buddhas, whether in the form of the Dharmakaya as Mahavairocana, the Sambhogakaya as Amida, of the Nirmanakaya as Sakyamuni, and taking them as the ideals of our lives, giving them reverence, regard and homage.
- 2. By reflecting on the faults of material existence, its transiency, its impurity, its ignorance.

⁴⁸⁹ 476

- 3. By observing the deplorable state in which sentient beings are living, regarding the suffering which comes to all through disease, old age and death and the ills arising from worldly life.
- 4. By meditation upon the virtues of a Tathagata and endeavouring to imitate them.

In short, as Suzuki says in his 'Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism' (page 306) "The Bodhicitta is awakened in us either when love for suffering creatures is called forth, or when our intellect aspires after the highest enlightenment."

Again, he quotes Sthiramati as saying:

"It is free from compulsive activities; it has no beginning, it has no end; it cannot be defiled by impurities; it cannot be obscured by egoistic individualistic prejudices; it is incorporeal; it is the spiritual essence of Buddhas; it is the source of all virtues, earthly as well as transcendental; it is constantly becoming, yet its original purity is never lost.

"It may be likened unto the ever-shining sunlight which may temporarily be hidden behind the clouds. All the modes of passion and sin arising from egoism may sometimes darken the light of the⁴⁹⁰ Bodhicitta, but the Citta itself forever remains free from these external impurities. It may again be likened unto all-comprehending space which remains eternally identical, whatever happenings and changes may occur in things enveloped therein. When the Bodhicitta manifests itself in a relative world, it looks as if it were subject to constant becoming, but in reality it transcends all determinations; it is above the reach of birth and death (samsara)"

"However defiled and obscured the Bodhicitta may find itself in profane hearts, it is essentially the same as that in all Buddhas."

The awakening of the desire for Enlightenment is preliminary to the life of a Bodhisattva. Without it there is no incentive to live the Bodhisattva life, for it constitutes the essence of a Boddhisattva and its awakening marks the beginning of his career. "The life of devotion and vows which stamps a Buddhist as Mahayanist and not as Hinayanist is impossible without first arousing the Bodhicitta."

"The Bodhicitta means the awakening of the desire for supreme enlightenment, which was attained by the Buddha, enabling him to become the leader of the religious movement known as Buddhism. Supreme enlightenment is no other than all-knowledge, 'sarvajnana', to which reference is constantly made in all the Mahayana texts. All-knowledge is what constitutes the essence of Buddhahood. It does not mean that the Buddha knows every individual thing, but that he has grasped the fundamental principle of existence and that he has penetrated deep down into the centre of his own being. When the Bodhicitta is aroused the Bodhisattva's hold on all-knowledge is definite and firm.

"The rise of the Bodhicitta marks the beginning of the career of a Bodhisattva. Before this the idea of a Bodhisattva was no more than an abstraction. We are perhaps all Bodhisattvas, but the⁴⁹¹ notion has not been brought home to our consciousness, the image has not been vivid enough to make us feel and live the fact. The Citta is aroused, and the fact becomes a personal event. The Bodhisattva is now quivering with life. The Bodhisattva and the Bodhicitta are inseparable; where the one is there the other is. The Citta indeed is the key that opens all the secret doors of Buddhism."

In Hinayana Buddhism we find no reference to the Bodhicitta, which is a pure Mahayana conception and one of the chief points of difference between the Mahayana and the Hinayana.

Enlightenment or Prajna is what constitutes Buddhahood, and it is the aspiration of every earnest Buddhist to attain to it. This enlightenment is mainly for the sake of others, but in order to help others it is necessary first to enlighten oneself and then to turn that knowledge to the benefit of others. It is for that reason that Mahayanists emphasize 'Mahakaruna' (the great compassionate heart); infact, it is the central pivot of Mahayana doctrine and without it Mahayana falls. Without compassion there could be no Bodhicitta, for Bodhicitta arises from it, no Bodhisattva, no Mahayana, for Mahakaruna is the foundation upon which the edifice of Mahayana is built.

Before we can attain Enlightenment there must be the <u>desire</u> for Enlightenment (Bodhicitta), in order to <u>practise</u> compassion and help others to the same Enlightenment.

To become aware of the rising of Bodhicitta in the mind is therefore a notable spiritual event in the life of a Mahayanist, and in some sects in Japan, when the desire for enlightenment has arisen, a ceremony is held called the Bosatsukai.

The conditions necessary for awakening the Bodhicitta and entering upon the path of the Bodhisattva and entering upon the path of the Bodhisattva⁴⁹² are moral conduct, compassion for others (and by others is meant not only human beings but animal and other beings which also represent the Dharmakaya in this relative world) and friendliness for all.

"The Bodhicitta is present in the hearts of all sentient beings. Only in Buddhas it is fully awakened and active with its immaculate virility, while in ordinary mortals it is dormant and miserably crippled by its unenlightened intercourse with the world of sensuality."

"The Bodhicitta or Intelligence-heart is awakened in us (1) by thinking of the Buddhas, (2) by reflecting on the faults of material existence, (3) by observing the deplorable state in which sentient beings are living, and finally, (4) by aspiring after those virtues which are acquired by a Tathagata in the highest enlightenment."

Here we must call to mind that the awakening of the Bodhicitta is not a mere thought, but such an intense and earnest desire that it results in acts, moral, compassionate and friendly.

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^{491 478}

<u>Dr D.T. SUZUKI. "THE REALM OF NO-KARMA."</u>

There are many approaches to the study of religion, briefly – psychological and logical, historical and sociological, emotional and intellectual, devotional and mystical, etiological and existential, and so on. According to what position we assume towards religion we obtain more or less differentiated definitions of it. And again, generally speaking, we approach with prejudice that seems to be inevitable, because we are born with a religion before we begin a conscious study of it; our minds are never like a <u>tabula rasa</u> in regard to religion. As thus we are already in possession of some form of religion, our approach is necessarily coloured. However impartial a Christian scholar may try to be in the study of religions, the⁴⁹³ very fact that he is a Christian betrays his claim at the outset. So many books have been written on the science or philosophy or psychology of religion, but, as they mostly come from the pen of the Christian, they are not able to convince the students unconditionally of the truths or statements they make concerning religion generally.

With this short preamble, I proceed to expound my view of religion. Being a Buddhist, my position is naturally not that of a Christian, but I will try to be as objective as I can. My approach, further, will be a personal one; that is to say, the following will, to a certain extent, reflect my own experience.

In all religion there is something ultimate which we may call God, the Buddhanature, Elan vital, Substance, Thought, The Unconscious, the Absolute Spirit, the Atman, or anything you like. It does not really matter in what name it is known, or no name at all. It is an undeniable fact that there is something in every religion whose experience can never be done away with, with all the logic we can bring upon it; because logic itself foreshadows the fundamental experience—that is, because of the latter, logic is possible. Not only in logic, but at the basis of all our experience there is a truth or fact which we have to accept as irrefutable, and beyond which we cannot go. This truth is that "I act" and not that "I am," which is to say, there is "Karma" to use Buddhist terminology. Religions and philosophies are attempts to interpret that significance of Karma.

Thus we say that there is, in the beginning, Act or Karma. But to declare the existence or non-existence of anything, that is, to say "Yes" or "No" is to commit ourselves to intellection; we submit ourselves to its dictates. Hence, the conception of Karma is inevitably linked⁴⁹⁴ with discrimination, and discrimination is ignorance.

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^{493 480}

Dr D.T. SUZUKI. "THE REALM OF NO-KARMA."

One might suppose that ignorance means the absence of discrimination and not discrimination itself. But from the Buddhist point of view, because of discrimination there is ignorance as to that which is beyond discrimination, and this—that which is beyond discrimination—is of supreme importance when we begin the study of religion in its bearing on life. For religion consists in the dispelling of ignorance. In other words, the world of Karma is to be transcended, whereby discrimination, and with it ignorance, is also done away with.

"To act and yet not to act, this is where the Tao abides"—so says Lao Tzu. We also find a statement to a similar effect in the Bhagavad Gita. They all point to a transcendental realm of non-discrimination. The world of Karma stands in direction opposition to this so far as our logic is concerned. Now, as we are such sticklers for logic, let me state that our deliverance from Karma consists in plunging headlong into the abysmal depths of non-discrimination. We can now talk somewhat intelligently concerning the nature of religion.

The function of religion is so to penetrate into the significance of Karma and Ignorance; Karma is the source of annoyance, and ignorance always leads us to an endless maze of contradictions. When they are upon us we have no freedom, we are not masters of ourselves; we always hesitate, falter, and are afraid of ourselves and of the world.

When a stone is thrown upwards it always wants to get back to the earth where it can find its eternal peace. The human soul in its ordinary state, as we find it in most of us, is like the stone up in the air; it never knows rest and therefore no bliss. The airy wilderness where discrimination prevails is unable to give rest and peace to 495 the soul. The soul, gone astray, always wishes to be back in its native home.

Life is Karma, so is the world where life has its stage to act. Thus, although it is impossible for us to do without the world, we somehow have a longing for things not of this world. Although it is Karma that we are here at all, we somehow aspire for deliverance from Karma.

Why is it necessary to be delivered from Karma? If Karma is the fundamental fact of life, to be delivered therefrom is to deny life itself, and this is committing suicide, as many think. But the strangest thing is that we all wish to be delivered from Karma because it fetters us. We want to live and at the same time not to live; we affirm life and yet deny it, for there can never be a simple act of affirmation without a counter act of

negation. To live means to die. Immortality is sheer self-contradiction. If we want to live we must die for once and for all. We are here because of Karma, but it is Karma that makes us long for deliverance. Suffering comes from this dilemma; we must, somehow solve it; we must somehow rise above living, above the contradictions of being and not being. We must fathom the mystery of Karma. This is going behind ignorance.

In a mysterious way our constant yearings are for what we are not; we are evidently always contradicting ourselves. This is why life is a tragedy. Karma is fated. Sin is another name for this karmic tragedy; however much we try to get rid of sin we are always entangling ourselves in it. So God's help is invoked; that is, another power is needed to save us. But God, or another power, is also Karma, unless ignorance is dispelled and Karma gives up its dark, secret workings.

To use Buddhist phraseology, Karma is a divider; wherever it goes it cleaves and creates a⁴⁹⁶ dualistic world. What we want now is, not that dualism should disappear, but that we should be able to penetrate into its secret structure, so that we do not wander out into a world of nothingness, the void; but that, with all our dualistic ways of thinking, we somehow get in touch with the unknown, which is nevertheless not in the realm of ignorance. When we come down, or come up, to this realm where Karma has no effect, our religious life begins in earnest.

This coming into the realm of no-Karma must not be merely intellectual but practical. We may put it thus: the realm of no-karma must be realised in our everyday life: it must be present and living in the raising of our hands, in our walking in the street, in our exchanging salutations, in our weeping for the unfortunate, in our congratulating the happy. For if God is transcendentally immanent and immanently transcendental (though this does not really mean much for our spiritual difficulties) God must move with my pen as I write this, on this sheet of paper: indeed God must be in this hand, this body, this mind. This is the reason why all the sages of the West and East express their desire not to say a word, not to give one any specific instructions as regards truth, which lives and not babbles. No doubt this is one of the most difficult things the human mind is asked to grasp, but unless this is done there will be no peace of mind.

Some would be inclined to insist that my way of understanding religion is too matter-of-fact and not enough "religious" and that religion ought to be discovered in one's prayerful mode of mind with which one approaches a being or an unknown quantity, or I might call it, that which is regarded as in existence beyond this "natural world." This is what some scholars would call prophetic religion, as distinguished from

^{496 483}

mystical religion, which is rather the name given to religion somewhat approximating to my own.

There⁴⁹⁷ are, in fact, two types of mind, prayerful and mystical, affectional and intuitional, visionary and practical. Although I do not know whether it is proper to distinguish these two types of religion too strongly, the presence of them in our minds is undeniable. Religions reflect them, but as a matter of fact all religion deserving the name is mystical in its final analysis. What is designated prophetic is at bottom mystical, while that which is designated as mystical may frequently slide off to the prayerful type.

Inasmuch as every form of religion that has been developed in history becomes truly "religious" only when it is mystical, we can say that mysticism is the life of all religions—and by mysticism I mean the actual experiencing of what each religion holds as the highest and most fundamental reality in whatever way this may be conceived.

In my experience, when Karma is transcended, when ignorance is penetrated and when that which is acting through Karma and ignorance is grasped, we have religion. I may express it in another way though quite paradoxically: to die is to live; not to act is to act; to negate is to affirm; not to discriminate is to live the life of enlightenment: and this is religion.

<u>DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI</u>. "THE MESSAGE OF BODHIDHARMA" (Founder of Zen Buddhism).®

The history of Zen Buddhism starts with Bodhidharma, popularly known as Daruma in Japan and Tamo in China, who came to China late in the fifth century. But the significance of Daruma was not fully recognized until the time of Yeno (Hui-neng in Chinese) when a dispute arose between him and his opponent, Jinshu (Shen-hsiu). They were both disciples of Gunin (Hungjen, died 675), and each claimed to⁴⁹⁸ transmit the orthodox line of the Zen teaching traceable to the First Patriarch, Bodhidharma. This being the case, we can say that the value and signification of Zen Buddhism as distinct from all the other schools of Buddhism so far developed in China was not manifestly appreciated by its followers until late in the seventh century.

What is then the teaching of Daruma? Three characteristic features of it may be pointed out as distinguishable from other Buddhist schools. As Daruma's teaching,

404

^{497 484}

Dr D.T. SUZUKI. "THE REALM OF NO-KARMA."

[®] In THE ARYAN PATH (Magazine) 1936

⁴⁹⁸ 485

which later came to be known as Zen Buddhism, belongs to the practical wing of Mahayana, it does not attempt to offer any novel method of philosophising on the truth of Buddhism. Daruma was no logician. He simply wanted to live the truth. Whatever he taught, therefore, consisted in presenting a method considered by him to be most effective in the attainment of the final goal of the Buddhist life. The characteristic features of his teaching are thus inevitably all related to the Buddhist discipline.

1. The first thing needed for the discipline then was to know definitely what the objective of the Buddhist life was. Without full knowledge of this, the Yogin would be like a blind man running wild. Daruma pointed out that the objective was to see into the nature of one's own being, and this he designated 'shin' or 'kokoro' (or 'hsin' in Chinese). Shin or hsin corresponds to the Sanskrit 'citta' but frequently to 'hridaya'. When it is translated as "mind", it is too intellectual; "heart" is too emotional; while "soul" suggests something concrete, it is so strongly associated with an ego-substance. Provisionally I shall make Mind with a capital M perform the office of shin or hsin. Now Daruma wants us to see into this Mind. For it is only when this is perceived or grasped that we attain the end which is the "peaceful⁴⁹⁹ settling of the mind," called 'anjin', (an-hsin)

Daruma's interview with Eka (Hui-k'e) is significant in this respect. He did not talk about realising Nirvana, or attaining emancipation; nor did he discourse on the doctrine of non-ego, that is, 'anatta'. When Eka told his master how troubled he was in his mind, the latter at once demanded that he produce this troubled mind before him so that he could calm it for its owner. For this was Daruma's patented method, which had not yet been resorted to by any of his predecessors.

When Eka complained about his mind being in trouble, he used the term "mind" in its conventional meaning, which, however, indicated also that his thought followed the conventional line of reasoning. That is to say, he cherished an unconscious belief in the reality of an entity known as mind or 'shin', and this belief further involved a dualistic interpretation of existence leading to the conceptual reconstruction of experience. As long as such a belief was entertained, one could never realise the end of the Buddhist discipline. Daruma, therefore wished to liberate Eka from the bondage of the idea of a mind. Liberation was a "pacific settlement" of it, which was at the same time the seeing into the inner nature of one's own being, the Mind.

Eka must have spent many years in this search for a mind, with which he was supposed to be endowed, philosophically or logically as well as conventionally. Finally, it must have dawned upon him that there was after all no such entity as to be known as mind. But this recognition failed to ease his mind, because it still lacked a final "stamping"; it did not break out in his consciousness as a final experience. He appeared again before Daruma and gave an answer to the master's former demand⁵⁰⁰

^{499 486}

for a mind: "I seek for the mind but it is not attainable." Daruma now exclaimed, "I have your mind peacefully settled!"

Eka now had a real experience, this authoritative "stamping" on the part of the master broke the intellectual barrier and made Eka go beyond the mere formulation of his insight as the unattainability of a mind. Without Daruma's absolute confirmation, Eka did not know yet where to have his "mind" fixed. A fixing was no-fixing, and therefore the fixing, to use the Prajna dialectic. In other words, Eka found his "mind" where it was not to be found, and thus his "mind" came to be finally peacefully settled. This is Daruma's doctrine of Mind.

2. Did Daruma teach us any definite form of meditation? Zen means dhyana, i.e. meditation. Being the First Patriarch of Zen in China, Daruma naturally advocates meditation. But his is the one specifically known as Hekkwan (pikuan), literally "wall-gazing." He has never defined the term and it is difficult to know exactly what kind of meditation it was. This much we can say, that as long as it was differentiated from the traditional method and claimed to be Mahayanistic, it was not mere tranquillisation, nor was it a form of contemplation. It was to follow the idea referred to in the Vimalakirti: "When a mind is controlled so as to be steadily fixed on one subject, such an one will accomplish anything." This means "to keep mind as self-concentrated as a rigidly standing cliff, with nothing harassing its imperturbability." For thereby one can enter the Path (tao).

Daruma's Hekkwan, therefore, means "concentration," fixing attention steadily on one subject. But there must have been something more in it. The Hekkwan was the method of finding out the "abode of all thoughts," in other words, of having an insight into the nature of Mind. The method⁵⁰¹ is always defined and controlled by the object. When the object is to experience what is immovable in the movable without stopping its movement, the self-concentration means a state of utmost activity, and not at all mere quietude or passivity. The Hekkwan then in connection with its object begins to have a definite signification of its own.

In fact "wall-gazing" is not at all appropriate to explain the Hekkwan. "To stand rigidly like a cliff" does not mean the bodily posture assumed by the Zen practiser when he sits cross-legged with his backbone straight. "Being like a cliff or wall" refers to an inner state of mind in which all disturbing and entangling chains of ideas are cut asunder. The mind has no hankerings now; there is in it no looking around, no reaching out, no turning aside, no picturing of anything, it is like a solid rock or a block of wood; there is neither life nor death in it, neither memory nor intellection. Although a mind is spoken of according to the conventional parlance, here there is really no "mind", the mind is no-mind, shin is mushin, hsin is wu-hsin, citta is acitta. This is the Hekkwan meditation.

But if we imagine this to be the final state of the exercise, we are greatly in the wrong, for we have not yet entered into the Path (tao). The necessary orientation has been achieved, but the thing itself is far beyond. When we stop here, Zen loses its life. There must be a turning here, a waking-up, a new state of awareness reached, the breaking of the deadlock, so to speak. All the intellectual attempts hitherto made to seek out the abode of all thoughts and desires could not come to this; all forms of contemplation, all the exercises of tranquillisation hitherto advocated by the Indian and the Chinese predecessors of Daruma could not achieve this. Why? Because the objects they erected⁵⁰² severally for their discipline were altogether amiss and had no inherent power of creation in them.

3. What may be called the ethical teaching of Daruma's Zen Buddhism is the doctrine of Mukudoku ('wukung-te in Chinese) which means "no merit." This is the answer given by Daruma to his Imperial inquirer as to the amount of merit to be accumulated by building temples, making offerings to the Buddha, providing shelters for monks and nuns, etc. According to the First Patriarch, deeds performed with any idea of merit accruing from them have no moral value whatever. Unless you act in accord with the "Dharma," which is by nature pure, beyond good and bad, you cannot be said to be a Zen follower.

According to Daruma, there is no antithesis in the Darma of good and evil, of detachment and attachment, of "self" and "other". In Daruma's discourse on "the Twofold Entrance" he describes the life of a wise man in the following terms:

As there is in the essence of the Dharma no desire to possess, a wise man is ever ready to practise charity with his body, life and property, and he never begrudges, he never knows what an ill grace means. As he has a perfect understanding of the threefold nature of Emptiness (sunyata), he is above partiality and attachment. Only because of his will to cleanse all beings of their stains, he comes among them as one of them, but he is not attached to form. This is the self-benefiting phase of his life. He, however, knows also how to benefit others, and again how to glorify the truth of enlightenment. As with the virtue of Charity, so with the other five virtues: Morality, Humility, Indefatigability, Meditation, and Intuition. That a wise man practises the six virtues of perfection is to get rid of confused thoughts, and yet there is no consciousness on his part that he is engaged in any meritorious deeds—which means to 503 be in accord with the Dharma.

This concept of meritless deeds is one of the most difficult to understand—much more to practise. When this is thoroughly mastered the Zen discipline is said to have been matured. The first intellectual approach to it is to realise that things of this world are characterised by polarity as they are always to be interpreted in reference to a

^{502 489}

subject which perceives and values them. We can never escape this polar opposition between subject and object. There is no absolute objective world from which a subject is excluded, nor is there any self-existing subject that has no objective world in any sense standing against it. But unless we escape this fundamental dualism we can never be at ease with ourselves. For dualism means finitude and limitation. This state of things is described by Mahayanists as "attainable". An attainable mind is a finite one, and all the worries, fears and tribulations we go through are the machination of a finite mind. When this is transcended, we plunge into the Unattainable, and thereby peace of mind is gained. The Unattainable is Mind.

This approach being intellectual it is no more than a conceptual reconstruction of reality. To make it a living fact with blood and nerves, the Unattainable must become attainable, that is, must be experienced, for anjin (that is, peaceful settling of the mind) will then for the first time become possible.

In a recently recovered Tung-huang MS., which for various reasons I take to be discourses given by Daruma, the author is strongly against mere understanding according to words. The Dharma, according to him, is not a topic for discourse; the Dharma whose other name is Mind is not a subject of memory, nor of knowledge. When pressed for a positive statement, Daruma gave no reply, remaining silent. Is⁵⁰⁴ this not also a kind of meritless deed?

According to a Buddhist historian of the T'ang dynasty (618–907 A.D) the coming of Daruma in China caused a great stir among the Buddhist scholars as well as among ordinary Buddhists, because of his most emphatically antagonistic attitude towards the latter. The scholars prior to him encouraged the study of the Buddhist literature in the form of sutras and sastras; and as the result there was a great deal of philosophical systematisation of the dogmas and creeds. On the practical disciplinary side, the Buddhists were seriously engaged in meditation exercises, the main object of which was a kind of training in tranquillisation. Daruma opposed this, too; for his 'dhyana' practice had the very high object of attaining to the nature of the Mind itself, and this not by means of learning and scholarship, nor by means of moral deeds but by means of Prajna, transcendental wisdom. To open up a new field in the Buddhist life was the mission of Daruma.

When Zen came to be firmly established after Yeno (Hui-neng), there grew among his followers a question regarding the coming of Daruma to China. The question was asked not for information, but for self-illumination. By this I mean that the question concerns one's own inner life, not necessarily anybody else's coming and going. While apparently Daruma is the subject, in reality he has nothing to do with it, and therefore in all the answers gathered below we notice no personal references whatever to Daruma himself.

^{504 491}

H.P. BLAVATSKY: "ON MEMORY." @

Not the smallest sensation, the most trifling action, impulse, thought, impression, or deed, can fade or go out from, or in the Universe. We may think it unregistered by our memory, unperceived by our consciousness, yet it will still be⁵⁰⁵ recorded on the tablets of the astral light. Personal memory is a fiction of the physiologist. There are cells in our brain that receive and convey sensations and impressions, but this once done, their mission is accomplished. These cells of the supposed "organ of memory" are the receivers and conveyers of all the pictures and impressions of the past, not their retainers. Under various conditions and stimuli, they can receive instantaneously the reflection of these astral images back again, and this is called memory, recollection, remembrance; but they do not preserve them. When it is said that one has lost his memory, or that it is weakened, it is only a facon de parler; it is our memory-cells alone that are enfeebled or destroyed. The window glass allows us to see the sun, moon, stars, and all the objects outside clearly; crack the pane and all these outside images will be seen in a distorted way; break the window-pane altogether and replace it with a board, or draw the blind down, and the images will be shut out altogether from your sight. But can you say because of this, that all these images—sun, moon, and stars have disappeared, or that by repairing the window with a new pane, the same will not be reflected again into your room? There are cases on record of long months and years of insanity, of long days of fever when almost everything done or said, was done and said unconsciously. Yet when the patients recovered they remembered occasionally their words and deeds and very fully. Unconscious cerebration is a phenomenon on this plane and may hold good so far as the personal mind is concerned. But the Universal Memory preserves every motion, the slightest wave and feeling that ripples the waves of differentiated nature, of man or of the Universe.

P. NAGA RAJA RAO. 506 "KANT AND SANKARA." @

This book is a compendious abridgement of Professor Norman Smith's translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" which was in itself an achievement of the first magnitude. Here I propose to examine in some detail a few of its ideas in the light of Indian philosophic method and thought. Kant's Critique represents a reaction as much against the empirical school of thought as against the ultra rationalist school in Western philosophy, laying thus the foundations of the Western Idealistic School in Epistemology. The salient ideas of the critique briefly stated, are as follows:-

H.P. BLAVATSKY: "ON MEMORY."

[@] In "Lucifer Journal".

^{505 492}

^{506 493}

[®] In ARYAN PATH Magazine 1935.

- 1. Kant believes that the <u>whole</u> of knowledge does not arise out of experience, though a part of it arises out of it. The part that arises out of experience is merely the raw material which can be transformed into knowledge. He posits two a <u>priori</u> forms, Space and Time, as the necessary pre-conditions of perception. He further tells us that these two forms are indispensable and envelope every act of perception. Perceptions are impossible for Kant without these a priori forms.
- 2. Kant divides reality into two parts, first the Noumenon, about which we cannot predicate anything, for human reason has no applicability in that realm. Secondly, the phenomenonal realm. Human knowledge is confined only to this part. The categories of understanding and the forms of perception work only in this realm. So, according to Kant, we can only know the thing as it appears, and not the thing in itself.
- 3. The perceptions of the senses within the Space-Time framework are worked upon by the understanding with the aid of a dozen indispensable a priori categories. These categories are Unity, Totality, Plurality, etc. They are the patterns of all thought and they are synthesised into⁵⁰⁷ a unity whence knowledge results.
- 4. Finally Kant states that though Pure Reason cannot prove the existence of God, the Soul and Immortality, we have to take them as the moral imperatives dictated by our Practical Reason. The Ontological, the causal and the design arguments cannot prove the existence of God. God is a moral postulate and an ideal to be used.

Let us examine these ideas in the light of Indian philosophy, with a view to finding out in what respects Kant's epistemology has been anticipated and in what respects improved upon definitely by Sankara. Primarily to Sankara, the object of knowledge is Brahman. He posited Brahman and asserted that it was the only reality. Kant on the other hand abruptly stops with the Noumenon and fails to tell us what its purpose is. He posits the Noumenal realm to make the phenomenal to the Noumenal world in terms of cause and effect. It is a piece of self-contradiction to introduce the category of causation for explaining the Noumenal where he himself says that it is inapplicable. Sankara's Brahman is not a mere ideal to be used like the God of Kant, but the ultimate reality to be experienced, the ground and the goal of existence. Brahman is not a mere regulative concept arising as a result of the demand of morality, but an object of spiritual experience whose existence is taken for granted on the authority of the Srutis. Sankara explains the world of phenomena as a continuous stream of illusions. Sankara with his inimitable, scientific and logical frame of mind suspended his judgment about the phenomenal world and its relation to the Noumenal. He said it is indescribable (Anirvachaniya). He was a sceptic in the sense that the human intellect cannot grasp the nature of the ultimate reality. Sankara as well as Kant

P. NAGA RAJA RAO. "KANT AND SANKARA."

^{507 494}

are both realists in their theories of 508 knowledge in the phenomenal realm. Sankara also posits the raw material of knowledge and tells us that the categories bring knowledge to the empirical self.

Sankara destroys the eternal riddle of epistemology, namely: If the known object is different from the knower, how does the knower come to know it? If mind is mind and matter is matter, how does mind come to know matter?—by reducing the content of all the three factors of knowledge, the knower, the known, and the instrument of knowledge to one primordial mindstuff. Sankara's solution of this riddle is definitely superior both in its framework and in its results. He does not fail to grapple with the problem, nor does his solution involve the fallacy of petitio principii as some ill-instructed Western critics are apt to think. Sankara's epistemology when compared with Kant's is more coherent and indisputably better articulated.

The chief defect of Kant's epistemological structure is the high place given to reason. His Reason, however, is another name for intuition. He is an intuitionist. It must be said to his credit that he exploded the sensationalist psychology of his day and established an elaborate theory of knowledge. He examined the telescope before he turned it upon the stars. In the words of Prof. Ward, Kant tried to make human reason either Caesar or nothing at all and thus spoiled a case for a constitutional monarchy. The moral law within and the starry heavens above about which Kant so often spoke are akin to the perceptions of our own Upanishadic seers. The imperfections of his epistemology do not however detract from his transcendent eminence in philosophy. Assuredly his place is among the great thinkers of the world.

<u>PHILIP</u>⁵⁰⁹ <u>C. JONES</u>: Reply to <u>P. NAGA RAJA RAO ON KANT</u>. One fundamental misunderstanding seems to be that Kant makes certain assumptions, and on these as a base builds up a possible epistemology. It is started in the article, for example, that Kant "posits two a priori forms, Space and Time, as the necessary preconditions of perception," but Kant does not do this. That space and time exist in all our normal perception (and it is only with the normal that Kant is dealing) is a matter of universal experience. Kant's achievement was not the positing of anything, but that proving that space and time are a priori and merely formal; a priori in the sense that they precede or are not derived from experience, and formal in that they comprise relations only, and are not perceived as substances.

To quote again: Kant divides reality into two parts, first the Noumenon, about which we cannot predicate anything, for human reason has no applicability in that

^{508 495}

P. NAGA RAJA RAO. "KANT AND SANKARA."

^{509 496}

realm. Secondly the phenomenal realm. Human knowledge is confined only to this part.

In reality the latter part of the above quotation contradicts the first part. If human knowledge is exclusively confined to the phenomenal, it cannot rightly describe the noumenon as reality, and Kant does not fall into this error. There is no element of Kant's work more often misconstrued than the noumenon.

Further quotation will show how much trouble the noumenon can cause. Sankara "posited Brahman and asserted that it was the only reality. Kant on the other hand abruptly stops with the Noumenon and fails to tell us what its purpose is." Of course he does, for to do so would be to trespass into a field in which, as Kant has carefully shown, we can have no human knowledge. Further, "he (Kant)⁵¹⁰ posits the Noumenal realm to make the phenomenal world intelligible." Obviously not, for if we can have no knowledge of the noumenon, how can it make the phenomenal world intelligible? Mr Rao also says, in speaking of Kant, "his Reason however, is another name for intuition." This is a fundamental misconception of the first important. I cannot understand how any student of Kant can come away with this belief.

G.R. MALKANI: "THE PROBLEM OF NOTHING":

- 1. Let us analyse the image and the conception of what we recognize as real. We get an 'image' of a thing and we say that the thing 'is'. Sensation, as Lotze says, is the only evidence of the reality of 'things' and it informs us of nothing beyond itself. We shall here see that not only it does not inform us about itself without going beyond itself. For, wherein consists the reality of the image, if not in that which goes beyond that image, and surrounds it as with a fringe which is unimaginable and unconscious so far as that image goes? Bergson has shown conclusively in his book "Matter and Memory" that there is no pure perception, and that what goes by that name is already mixed with something of our past experience which is continually embodying itself in the present perception and thereby giving to it all the reality that we latter recognize in it.
- 2. We have, however, one significant fact to guide us in our inquiry. In order to 'see' any ignorance, any gap in the knowledge of the Self, the Self must stand outside of it. But no. You must track the Self; you must create a gap in the very place of its standing. But in this attempt you are always worsted; wherever you see ignorance, gap, or darkness,—the Self always stands outside as an onlooker; you cannot catch hold⁵¹¹ of it, much less tamper with it. Where the senses and the intellect are applicable, you can

PHILIP C. JONES: Reply to P. NAGA RAJA RAO ON KANT

511 498

G.R. MALKANI: "THE PROBLEM OF NOTHING"

^{510 497}

have presences and absences, ignorance and knowledge, darkness and light. But where the senses and the intellect are out of court all questions as to darkness and light, ignorance and knowledge etc., disappear. That which gives meaning and reality to these pairs themselves, cannot be spoken in their terms.

- 3. It is a wise Socrates or a Newton alone who knows the true meaning of ignorance; he has so any questions. The ignorant man has no questions, no wants. No doubt the mystery of an object, say a stone, is as great to the one's to the other. But there is a vast difference in the ignorance of the two mentalities. It is no paradox to say that the wise man has greater ignorance of the stone than the ignorant man. If we study their mental attitudes we find that the former is almost saturated with ignorance, while the latter does not seriously regard the stone a mystery. It is knowledge that creates questions and deficiency. It is because you are obsessed with the reality presented by the senses and the intellect, that you think that you are deficient without it, that you are an ignorant man. And when that reality is altogether absent, as in sleep, you think you did not exist then, – it is a gap in your being. You have created this ignorance and this gap, because you have taken the sense-world alone for reality, and staked your own Self upon it. The biblical story of the fall of Adam often excites laughter and derision in cultured circles. How could man have falled from paradise because of having eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge? We ridicule the idea because we do not enter into the real significance of the story. Paradise can be no other than Self-knowledge.⁵¹² The accursed fruit is the reality presented by senses. Having eaten of the fruit, we think the world is real and not the Self; the latter has at best a secondary reality dependent upon the former. No Christ is required to lift us out of this sin. Advaitism says, the sin is real only so long as you believe in it, so long as you see it. Know the Self, and where is sin, sorrow or ignorance?
- 4. Turn your gaze to the reality that persists through them, and is unaffected by these changing states, and you never find yourself in a state of nothing; the waking life itself gets a different illusion,—for you have now touched the fountain of Wakefulness Itself. The 'manner' of our persistence now becomes easy to understand. It is not by keeping the individual as individual that Advaitism proves his persistence, but rather by elevating him to his immortal Self; for the individual has lapses in his individuality, while the true Self is ever awake and self-luminous; there is no change or interruption in It; It is literally beyond life and death.
- 5. We cannot, however, according to Advaitism, rise above the world of sense, until and unless we have cultivated the eye of the Spirit. If we want to rise above it, to renounce it, without this special eye, we shall be in the position of conceptual thought trying to reach zero by a process of diminution, the absurdity of which we have already

^{512 499}

seen. A pure nihilism of sense is impossible for it cannot disengage itself from sense. However you may try to think away every image, the very absence of image will become an image. So long as you see darkness, you see an image; nay, the consciousness of the whole world of light enters into that image; you cannot think away⁵¹³ the world of sense by thought. But what is a true nihilism and a true zero, is also the most positive reality in itself, the reality of the spirit, —of our inmost Self. It is true Being and true illumination in one – there is no 'other' here, no sorrow and anxiety.

Dr D.T. SUZUKI: "WHAT IS ZEN?"@

- Seeing that we are endowed with the power of speech and understand one another by means of this power, we have to appeal to words. Words are such an untractable medium. If we become masters of words, we are all right. But sometimes we are too willing slaves to words, and when words enslave us we become perfect fools. We do not know what we are saying. Zen Buddhism tries to master words, but the means they use to help us in mastering them are strange, though not so strange to those who are used to them. But to others, they seem extraordinary.
- 2. The Indian mind was so rich in imagination and so wonderful in its capacity for speculation. Indian metaphysics are the deepest in the world, and their dialectics are incomparable. All nations of the world have to bow to the Indians in this respect. To them, religion was philosophy and philosophy religion, for whatever religion there is in India it is backed by philosophy. Intellect should always be backed by certain deeper understandings which we may call faith. Intuition is fundamentally the affirmation of a certain fundamental belief on which and with which and by which we stand and live our life. This must be associated with the intellect, and when it is associated it becomes a certain philosophy. That is the reason why, in India, religion is always associated with philosophy.

In Christianity there seems to be some difference. Theology is separate from Faith. But when⁵¹⁴ Faith is left to itself it is apt to go astray. It becomes superficial and superstitious, leading in the end to bigotry. Faith represents the emotional side of human life, while philosophy is its intellectual side. Faith and philosophy must always go hand in hand, for when they are separated the result is always lame. In India this philosophy was well in its way, but it lacked something which was supplied by the Chinese mind, something which we may call a consciousness of practical life, of life itself. The Chinese people are more like the ancient Romans. The Romans established the philosophy of law. In China morality became the foundation of society, and the

Dr D.T. SUZUKI: "WHAT IS ZEN?"

^{513 500}

G.R. MALKANI: "THE PROBLEM OF NOTHING"

[®] In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND: 1936.

^{514 501}

Chinese people are prone to things practical. They are not given up to the intellectualism and philosophism of the Indians. That is where the true greatness of the Chinese lies.

When Indian philosophy came to China as Buddhism, the Chinese people took to it partly, but at the same time there was something that did not quite appeal to them, something against which they revolted. "Zen", said a Chinese scholar, "is the revolt of the Chinese mind against Buddhism." It is a revolt. Zen must be something quite different from Buddhism. Yet while it is not quite Buddhism, it still is Buddhism. It developed from Buddhism, and in fact it could not have developed from anything else. Zen has its origin in India, but when it came to China this revolt of the Chinese mind gave it a somewhat different form.

The Zen form of Buddhism is most deeply imbued with a practical spirit. For while there was logic and metaphysics in ancient China, it was never highly developed. They had a very subtle way of reasoning 2,400 years ago, but we find little of it in the greatest era of Chinese culture—the T'ang Dynasty, which was some six or seven centuries ago. Certainly China has had its great philosophers. Chinese philosophy was the result of Buddhist philosophy stimulating the Chinese mind. If the Chinese had to stand against Buddhism, it had to take Buddhist philosophy and assimilate it into its own body and make it its own blood. The result of this assimilation was Zen—and the work of assimilation was completed by the Sung Dynasty, which followed the T'ang.

The T'ang Dynasty represents the highest point of Chinese culture. With T'ang the Chinese mind developed to its fullest extent, and everything associated with this dynasty we can consider as representing the flower of Chinese mind—art, literature, poetry and religion. Zen is one aspect of that golden age.

In the early days of Buddhism in China the monks used to live in the monastery and devote themselves entirely in the practice of Dhyana. They did not eat after midday, but because of its colder climate, this practice had to be changed in China. They considered it contrary to the spirit of the Buddha's teaching to refuse to adapt themselves to climatic conditions because of a blind reverence for mere formalities and rules devised for people living in the tropics.

3. Thus while some monasteries adhered to the Indian rules and customs, these monks who desired a Buddhism more after the heart of the Chinese people formed monasteries of their own. These became the Zen monasteries.

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⁵¹⁵ 502

- 4. Zen teaching is to be carried on in close connection with our daily life. As we walk in the fields, Zen teachings are to be demonstrated and understood—not outside the work, but with the work and in the work.
- 5. There is no special teaching—the most ordinary things in our daily life hide some deep meaning that is yet most plain and explicit, only our eyes need to see where there is a meaning. Unless this eye is opened there will be nothing to learn from Zen. Another teacher said,⁵¹⁶ "In Zen there is nothing special except our everyday thought ('sin'—mind consciousness)"
- 6. Our two eyes see dualistically, and dualism is at the bottom of all the trouble we have gone through. That does not mean that dualism is to be abolished. Only there ought to be a third eye. The important thing is that the two eyes must remain, but at the same time there ought to be another. When I speak according to the ordinary way of talking, I have to say that a third eye is needed, but in fact this third eye is <u>outside</u> the two eyes we already have. But again, the third eye is not between or above the two eyes—the two eyes are the third eye. I am beginning to philosophize, and when we philosophize we are no more followers of Zen. Therefore Zen people always close their mouths when they are pressed. But that does not mean they cannot say anything.

That which is not mind nor matter is not Buddha nor anything else. The Absolute seems to be something beyond human understanding. But in discussing the Absolute it is no longer Absolute. We say God is everywhere, but we like to put God in Heaven. How can we conceive God as giving rules to us? If God is immanent, God is ourselves. But Zen does not say that God is transcendent or immanent. When you try to comprehend a fact by means of words, the fact disappears. When we use our minds we have to understand things dualistically—either transcendentally or immanently. When I have explained that, there is nothing more to say. All that is needed is the opening of the third eye. When we have a third eye, it does annihilate the two eyes. So the world of dualities is not annihilated at all.

7. By 'dualism' it is apparent that Dr Suzuki means what he described in his paper for the World Congress as the discrimination "between that which knows and that which is known, between <u>noesis</u> and <u>noema</u>... Most people think dualism is final, that the subject for its own reason ever stands⁵¹⁷ contrasted to the object, and vice-versa, that there is no mediating bridge which crosses over the chasm between the two opposing concepts, and that this world of opposites remains forever as such, that is, in a state of eternal fighting."

Dr D.T. SUZUKI: "WHAT IS ZEN?"

517 504

Dr D.T. SUZUKI: "WHAT IS ZEN?"

^{516 503}

8. You are you and I am I, but at the same time you are not me and I am not you. This particularization cannot be analyzed. So when things are brought to you, you just accept them and say thank-you, but do not talk about it. This is the Zen attitude. Zen tries to make you accept things, and when you have accepted them you give a hearty laught.

How does one study Zen if to study is not to study? You have got to stop understanding in order to understand. Zen is the art of living. To study is to stop, and life moves on.

Satori may last five minutes or ten hours. It is not something which is specially experienced—it is life itself. It is not experience, but daily life—it runs through all experience. When we have one or two, we have the foundation of all numbers—therefore one satori is the ground conception of all satori—one's moral life will be affected accordingly. There is a gradual deepening of enlightenment. Just like using tools you must learn to use satori—whether it is satori or not you must go on using it because it has become your tool and slave.

<u>Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."</u> (Reprint from lecture to the Kokusai Bunka, Shinkokai, Tokyo)^{@@}

Buddhism, being a great world religion, has eighty-four thousand ways of teaching at its command, any one of which is available on any occasion. One single word causally dropped from the lips of a master, or his gesture such as the raising of the eye-brows, or the pointing of a finger at a flower, is sufficient to open⁵¹⁸ the mind of his intelligent disciple. Buddhism performs this miracle when necessary, that is, when conditions are thoroughly matured. But the topic I have to deal with here is the philosophy of Buddhism, and the business of philosophy is to deal with concepts, which is really the most roundabout way of reaching the truth. Practical religionists all avoid this.

Then what are the most important concepts in Buddhist philosophy? There are two: Sunyata and Tathata in Sanskrit. Sunyata means "emptiness" or "void" and Tathata "suchness" or "thusness". I am afraid both terms are unfamiliar to the Western mind. The former is quite likely to be misinterpreted even among Buddhists themselves. When we speak of "emptiness" or "void" we generally think of a state of negation where nothing is allowed to exist, a kind of mere expanse devoid of content, if such a state of things is at all conceivable. This is, however, from one point of view altogether natural, for our logic has never taught us to rise above dualism, and we have always interpreted all our experiences on the basis of a bifurcation of dichotomy. First of all, the subject stands against the object, the seer against the seen, the knower against the known. Once this antithesis is established, many other oppositions and

^{@@} In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND: 1936.

^{518 505}

contradictions become possible, and we are hopelessly involved in dilemmas and most vexatious uncertainties. But Sunyata is a concept even prior to the rise of this world of pluralities, underlying it, and at the same time conditioning it so that all individual existences have their being in it.

Although we say that Sunyata is "that which underlies" the one and the many, birth and death, you and me, that which is and that which is not, it is not quite right to say "underlies" for it suggests the opposition between that which lies under and that which lies over—which is a new⁵¹⁹ dualism; and when we go on like this, we commit the fault of infinite regression. According to Buddhism, this third term is designated Sunyata, Emptiness. All opposites rise from it, sink into it, exist in it.

Sunyata is apt to be misunderstood by all of us whose so-called logical mind fails to conceive anything going beyond relativity. Sunyata is set against reality and understood as non-reality or nothingless or void. I generally translate it Emptiness.

Sunyata is not the Absolute as it is usually understood, when the Absolute is regarded as a something standing by itself. Such an Absolute is really non-existent, for there is nothing in this world which is absolutely separable from the rest of it. If there is such a one existent we have nothing to do with it.

Sunyata is not God, for Sunyata is not personal, nor is it impersonal. If it is at all personal, its personality must be infinitely different from what we generally conceive of personality. As long as human beings rise from Sunyata, the latter must be regarded as to that extent personal and self-conscious. But it would be a grave error to try to find any parallelism between human personality and that of Sunyata.

Nor is Sunyata to be conceived atheistically, nor pantheistically, nor acosmistically. Therefore, Buddhism which upholds the idea of Sunyata is not a godless religion, nor is it pantheistic as it is sometimes most incorrectly conceived. Nor is it acosmism.

Sunyata is sometimes identified with the Universal which is really non-existent. Devoid of all contents, the Universal is a mere logical concept and cannot be operative in this world of particulars.

Tathata generally translated as "suchness" points to an affirmative attitude of mind if Sunyata is to be regarded as more or less negative, although in fact sunyata is just as affirmative as⁵²⁰ Tathata. Tathata may be explained as our most primary, absolutely unadulterated, and fundamentally irreducible experience, from which rise all the rest of our experiences. It has something akin to a sense-experience as far as its finality and irreducibility are concerned; but in fact it is more fundamental because sense-experience gains significance only in reference to this. The recognition of Tathata is the basis of Buddhist philosophy. For in a sense Tathata and Sunyata are

^{519 506}

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN." 520 507

complementary. When you know what Tathata is, you also at once know what Sunyata is. They cannot be separated.

The relationship between the emptiness and the suchness of all things (sarvasattva) may be illustrated by the following dialogues which are recorded in a history of the Zen masters of China.

A monk asked Dosan, "How do we excape the heat when summer comes and the cold when winter is here?"

The master said, "Why not go where there is no summer, no winder?"

"Where is such a place?"

"When the cold season comes, one is thoroughly chilled; when the hot summer is here, one swelters".

The actual outcome of Dosan's answer is that where you suffer cold or heat is where there is neither cold nor heat. This is a paradoxical saying, but the ultimate truth of all religion is paradoxical, and there is no way to avoid it as long as we are sticklers to formal logic. To translate the idea in terms of regular Buddhist terminology, Sunyata is to be found at the very seat of birth and death, or, more directly, Sunyata is birth and death, and birth and death is Sunyata. Yet they are not identical. Sunyata is Sunyata, birth-and-death is birth-and-death. They are distinct, and are to be kept distinct when we desire to have a clear grasp of the fact itself.

A monk⁵²¹ came to Suibi and asked, "What is the meaning of Bodhidharma's coming to this country from the Western land?"

"Wait until there is nobody around us and I will tell you," said the master.

They walked about in the monastery grounds. The monk said, "Nobody is around here now; pray tell me, 0 master, about the idea of Bodhidharma."

Suibi pointing at a bomboo said, "How tall this bamboo is!" Then pointing at another bamboo, he said, "How short this one is!"

A monk accosted Sozan and said, "It is terribly hot, and where shall we escape the heat?"

Sozan answered, "Let us go down to the bottom of the furnace."

The Zen master's advice is like pouring oil into a fire; instead of being an escape in the ordinary sense of the word, it is aggravating pain, bringing it to its acutest point; and when there is thus no soothing of pain, where is the escape we are so earnestly in search of?

The monk has not stopped here, and, wanting to pursue the matter to its ultimate end, asks:

"But in the furnace how shall we escape the scorching fire?" The point may be somewhat difficult to comprehend, but it means this. When life is accepted, with all its pains and evils, where is our salvation? Heaven has been created for this purpose, and if we go to Hell as advised by Sozan, what is the use of our at all trying to escape, to

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^{521 508}

save ourselves? Hence the monk's second question. The master's answer was, "No further pains will harass you."

When thought is divided dualistically, it seeks to favour the one at the cost of the other, but as dualism is the very condition of thought, it is impossible for thought to rise above its own condition. The only way to do this is to accept dualism squarely, and not think of it any further. When you are to suffer a pain for one⁵²² reason or another, you just suffer it, and have no other thoughts about it. When you are to enjoy a pleasure you just enjoy it, and have no further thought about it. By thus experiencing what comes to you, you experience Sunyata in which there is neither dualism nor monism nor transcendentalism. This is what is meant by the statement which makes up the basic teaching of the Prajnaparamita, that "When I thus talk to you there is no talk, nor any hearing; nor is there any talker, and no audience either"—which is Sunyata.

This conception of Sunyata in relation to a dualistic or pluralistic world is expressed in Buddhist philosophy by the formula: 'Byodo in Shabetsu' and 'Shabetsu in Byodo.' 'Byodo' literally means "evenness and equality" and 'shabetsu' "difference and division." 'Byodo' is sometimes taken to mean identity, or sameness, or the universal, and 'shabetsu' individuality, or particularity, or multiplicity. But it is more correct to consider Byodo=Sunyata= "that which lies underneath pluralistic existences," or "that from which individuals rise and into which individuals sink." Individuals always remain individuals in a dualistically-conditioned world, they are not the same in the sense that you are I and I am you, for you and I are antithetical and their merging into each other is the end of the world. But this does not mean that there is no bridging between the two terms, for if there were no bridging, there would be no maturity, and conseqently no communal life. This discrete and yet continuous state of existence is described by Buddhist philosophers as "Byodo in Shabetsu and Shabetsu in Byodo." or, for brevity's sake, "Byodo Soku Shabetsu and Shabetsu soku Byodo." Soku is a copulative particle expressing equation or identity.

This being so, Buddhists frankly accept this world of pluralities with all its moral and intellectual complexities.⁵²³ They advise us not to try to escape it, because after all no escape is possible, wherever you go your shadow follows you. A monk asked a master, "How is it possible to escape the triple world?" Answered the master "What is the use of escaping it?" The triple world of desire, of form, and of no-form is the place where we have our being and live our lives; our trying to escape it in order to find a land of bliss somewhere else is like a lunatic seeking his own head which he never lost. When the founder of the Myoshinji monastery was requested by a monk to help him get out of the cycle of birth and death, the founder roared, "Here in my place there is no birth-and-death." This answer in its final purport is not at all negativistic, it ultimately points to the same idea as given vent to by the other masters.

^{522 509}

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN." 523 510

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."

With consciousness once awakened, discrimination inevitably follows its steps, and on the reverse side of discrimination Ignorance is found. Ignorance shades our life as long as it is the ruling principle of the world, as long as we are unable to see behind a world of dualities and hence of pluralities. In short, if we hold up this dualistically-conditioned existence as finality, and altogether leave out the mediating notion of Sunyata from which individual things rise and to which they return, and by which they are interrelated one to another while in existence; then we become incurably either crass materialists or dreamy idealists. Ignorance is dispelled only when we have an insight into Sunyata.

Enlightenment may sound more or less intellectual, but in point of fact it illuminates life itself and all that makes up life is cleansed of its taints. Love now shines in its true life. Although differences are recognised and accepted, they cease to be the condition of antagonistic feelings—which latter is usually the case with us unenlightened. Fellowship becomes an actuality. Here⁵²⁴ is the ideal of Bodhisattva hood.

Arhatship, which has been upheld by Buddhists as the supreme type of mankind, is not unconditionally countenanced by followers of Mahayana Buddhism. The latter recognise the dominating power played by the material world over the welfare of human beings. They have an inexhaustible love for all beings, they endeavour to save them from all forms of misery, material and spiritual, and they are even willing to sacrifice their own welfare for others. In order to carry out, their altruistic impulses, they are ever resourceful, they devise every possible means to attain the end they have in view—the work of universal salvation.

Unfortunately, we have no space to pursue this course of study beyond the barest possible outline sketched here. Let us hurry to an exposition of a Mahayana canon known as 'Yuimakyo' or 'Vimalakirti Sutra' for in it we read all the fundamental teachings of Buddhism explained in a way most of us can grasp more intelligently than through the dialogues just cited. This sutra was one of the first three Mahayana texts studied and commented upon by Shotoku Taishi early in the seventh century. That Buddhism came to Japan to stay and moulded the character of her people in more ways than one was due to this prince who is justly regarded by the Buddhists as the father of Japanese Buddhism. He was great not only as a pious Buddhist student but also as statesman, educator, architect, social worker, and creator of various branches of art. Horyuji at Nara is the monument immortalizing his memory. The best way to approach Mahayana philosophy will then be to get acquainted with the contents of the 'Yuima-kyo'.

The 'Yuima-kyo' was translated first by Kumarejiva in A.D. 406. Owing to its deep philosophical and religious insight and also probably to its dramatic setting and

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^{524 511}

fine literary quality, the sutra has wielded great spiritual and intellectual⁵²⁵ influence not only in Japan but in China. The knowledge of its teaching will surely help our understanding of Buddhism. It is not exactly known when this sutra was compiled in India. This much we can say that the compilation took place prior to Nagarjuna, that is, some time in the beginning of the Christian era. The principal figure of the sutra is Yuima who was a wealthy householder of Vaisali in the time of the Buddha. He was thoroughly versed in Mahayana philosophy, he was a great philonthropist and an austere follower of Buddhism. Although living in the world as a layman, his immaculate conduct elicited universal admiration. At one time he was seen indisposed. This was one of his 'hoben,' "skilful means" or "mysterious ways" (upaya-kausalya), whereby he wanted to teach his people regarding the transitoriness of life. The whole town of vaisali including great lords Brahmans, officials, and other classes of people hastened to visit him, anxiously inquiring after his health.

The Buddha, learning of this, wanted to send one of his disciples to Yuima. But they all refused to comply with the Buddha's wish, excusing themselves on the ground that none of them was equal to the task of interviewing the great Mahayana philosopher-saint. They had all at least one experience with him, in which they were miserably worsted and had failed to carry out their line of argument against his. It may be interesting to our audience to cite one or two examples of such religio-philosophical interviews between Yuima and the disciples of Buddha, for herein we can see what kind of discourse Yuima advances to defeat the Hinayana followers of the Buddha.

The great Kasyapa was once going around begging for his food among the poor. Yuima appeared to him and said, "You need not purposely avoid the rich. When you go out begging, your mind must be entirely detached from discriminations, your heart⁵²⁶ must be filled with impartial love. Food should be received as if it were not received at all. To harbour the thought of reception is a discrimination. Rising above the ideas of self and not-self, of good and evil, of gain and loss, you are able then for the first time to make offerings to all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas with one bowlful of food received from your donor. Unless you attain this state of spirituality, you are a wasteful consumer of food when you try to gather from the poor, thinking that they might thus be given the chance to be charitable."

When Subhuti was asked to visit Yuima, he made this confession and excused himself as not worthy of the mission: "When I once called at the old philosopher's residence for my food, he filled my bowl with food and said: 'Only such a one is worthy of this food as has no attachment to it, for to him all things are equal. While in

^{525 512}

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."

⁵²⁶ 513

the midst of all forms of worldly entanglements, he is emancipated; he affirms all existences as they are, and yet he is not attached to them. Do not listen to Buddha, nor do you see him, but follow your heretical teachers and go wherever they go; if they are destined for hell, you just go with them; and when, by doing this, you feel no hesitancy, no reluctance, then you are permitted to take this food. Donors do not accumulate merit, charity is not the cause of bliss. Unless you are able to go in company with devils and work with them, you are not entitled to this food.' When I heard this, I was thunderstruck and at the point of running away from him without the vowl. But he said: "All things are after all like phantom existences, they are but names. It is only the wise who without attachment go beyond logic and know what Reality is. They are emancipated and therefore never alarmed." This being the case I realize that I am not the person to go and inquire after his health."

To quote one more example from many. When the turn⁵²⁷ came to Maitreya, he had this to say. "When I was formerly at the Tushita Heaven, discoursing before the lord of Heaven and his followers on a life of non-retrogression, Yuima appeared and talked to me in this wise. 'O Maitreya, I understand that Sakyamuni the Buddha prophesied your attaining to the Supreme Enlightenment in the course of one life. Now I wish to know what this one life really means. Is it your past, your future, or your present one? If it is the past one, the past is past, and no more; if future the future is not yet here; if present, the present is "abodeless." (That is to say, the present has no fixed point in time. When you say this is the present, it is no more here). This being the case, the so-called present life as. it is lived this very moment by every one of us, is taught by the Buddha, as something not to be subsumed in the category of birth, old age, and death.

"'According to the Buddha, all beings are of Suchness (tathata), and are in Suchness; not only all wise and holy persons but every one of us—of course including yourself, O Maitreya. It you are assured by the Buddha of attaining to Supreme Enlightenment and realizing Nirvana, all beings sentient and non-sentient ought also to be sure of their Enlightenment. For as long as we are all of Suchness and in Suchness, this Suchness is one and the same; and when one of us attains to Enlightenment all the rest too share it. And in this Enlightenment, there is no thought of discrimination. Where do you, O Maitreya, put your life of non-retrogression when there is really neither attainment nor non-attainment, neither body nor mind?'

"O Blessed One, when Yuima gave this discourse at the Tushita Heaven, the two hundred Deva-lords at once realized the Kshanti in the Unborn Dharma. For this reason I am not qualified to do anything with this old philosopher of Vaisali."

⁵²⁷ 514

Finally, Manjusri accepted the mission. Accompanied by 528 eight thousand Bodhisattvas, five hundred Sravakas, and hundreds of thousands of Deva-Lords, he entered the city of Vaisali.

The interview of this wily philosopher-saint and the Bodhisattva whose wisdom had no peer among Buddha's disciples began in this manner:

Yuima: "O Manjusri, you are welcome indeed. But your coming is no-coming, and my seeing is no-seeing."

Manjusri: "You are right. I come as if not coming, I depart as if not departing. For my coming is from nowhere, and my departing is no-whither. We talk of seeing each other, and yet there is no seeing between the two. But let us put this matter aside for a while, for I am here commissioned by the Buddha to inquire after your condition. Is it improving? How did you become ill? And are you cured?"

Yuima: "From folly there is desire, and this is the cause of my illness. Because all sentient beings are sick I am sick, and when they are cured of illness, I also shall be cured. A Bodhisattva assumes a life of birth and death for the sake of all beings; as long as there is birth and death, there is illness."

- 2. Yuima tells him how to seek the Dharma. Seeking the Dharma consists in not seeking anything, not getting attached to anything; for when there is any seeking or attachment, from it grows every form of hindrance moral and intellectual, and one will be inextricably involved in meshes of contradictions and altercations. Hence no end of illness in this life.
- The goddess: "Do not say so; these flowers are free from discrimination. But, 3. owing to your own discrimination, they adhere to your person. Bodhisattvas. As they are entirely free from this fault, no flowers stay on them. When all thoughts born of discrimination are removed, even evil spirits are unable to take advantage of such beings."
- 4. Manjusri 529says: "As I understand it, when there is not a word to utter, not a sign to see, not a cognizance to be taken of, – and when there is complete detachment from every form of questioning, then one enters the gate of Advaita."

^{528 515}

Manjusri asks: "O Yuima, what is your view now that we have all expressed ourselves on the subject?" Yuima remains silent and does not utter a word. Thereupon Manjusri makes this remark: "Well done, well done, indeed, O Yuima! This is really the way to enter the gate of Advaita, which no words, no letters can explain!"

5. When there was yet no religion, no philosophy, no sustained thinking, no literary work of creative imagination, the study of those Mahayana works must have caused an unprecedented mental upheaval among the intellectual classes of the time. But the most wonderful event in the annals of Japanese thought is that these Mahayana documents filled with the deepest religio-philosophical intuitions were readily grasped by a genius most favourably endowed, and made the foundation of Japanese thought and feeling which had yet to develop. Had it not been for Prince Shotoku, Buddhism would not have found such a favoured land in which to grow and bear fruit.

If we want to know what effect Buddhist thought had on Japanese cultural life, the best way is to wipe out all the Buddhist temples together with their treasures, libraries, gardens, anecdotes, tales, and romances of various sorts, and see what we have left in the history of Japan. First of all, there would be no painting, sculpture, architecture, or even music and drama. Following this, all the minor branches of art would also disappear—landscape gardening, tea ceremony, flower-arrangement, and fencing (which may be classed as art since it is the art of spiritually training and defending⁵³⁰ oneself against the enemy, morally as well as physically). The industrial arts would also vanish, the first impetus to which was given by Buddhism. Shotoku Taishi is still worshipped by carpenters and architects as the patron-saint of their profession; for it is a well-known fact that anything approaching architecture in Japan dates from the erection of Horyuji.

6. The Japanese people are regarded as not being profound in philosophy, nor deep in religious feeling. This statement may be interpreted in various ways. Whether it is correct or not will largely depend upon the definitions we give to the terms philosophy and religion. This, however, takes us into the field of thought where much discussion is always going on, and as I am afraid of digressing too much, let me briefly state that the fundamental conception of philosophy differs in the East from what is so understood in the West, and that in the East and especially in Japan, philosophy above all things is the art of looking directly into the working of the mind, and that in this respect there is not much distinction between philosophy and religion, except that in religion there is more feeling. This being so, the first business of philosophy is to train the inner consciousness so as to enable us to have an immediate perception of the self. Philosophy with us Japanese so far has been an intuition and not the manipulation of concepts. Since the introduction of Western, especially German thought, the Japanese

^{530 517}

have begun to philosophize after the Western method and before long we may have "philosophers" (so called) even among ourselves. In fact we have already at least one original thinker comparable to any of the living philosophers of the West; in depth of thought and dialectic subtleties his philosophy stands quite distinguished among the contemporary thinkers of Japan. But this philosopher's work is no more than an adaptation of Western methodology in the logical clarification of ⁵³¹ the fundamental Japanese intuitions in regard to life and the world. It is the growth of Japanese consciousness as nourished by Buddhist thought. Whatever profundity and penetration there is in modern Japanese philosophy has its roots deeply laid in the intuitions of the Japanese mind. And these intuitions have all been attained by the philosophical training that has been going on since the days of Shotoku Taishi, Dengyo Daishi, Kobo Daishi, and others. Students of Japanese thought are strongly advised to acquaint themselves with Buddhist literature.

Now the peculiarity of intuition is that it has no words to express itself, no methods to reason itself out, no extended demonstrations of its own truth in logically convincing manner. If it expresses itself at all, it does so in symbols and images, and these are most puzzling to those who have not been initiated into them. Outwardly they are senseless, even when they become somehow intelligible, their inward meaning is too apt to be left out. In this respect Zen has developed its own philosophy of intuition to such a degree that its uniqueness is a wonder of the world. In the history of the human mind there is nothing comparable to it. It stands by itself. If ordinary philosophy based on logic and built up with concepts is said to move in a world of three dimensions, Zen philosophy is in the fourth dimension. No measure used in the former can be applied here, and there is no question here about profundity of thought or systematic reasoning.

- 7. According to this, not to explain is to explain, and to explain is not to explain, which is the stock teaching of the Prajnaparamita Sutras. It is also the doctrine of Sunyata, and Sunyata is something beyond demonstration of any kind, as we have already seen in the dialogue of Yuima and Monju. Ratiocination is of no avail here.
- 8. One may ask where is the philosophy of Buddhism here? No marshalling of concepts, no measured development of ideas; but this almost nonsensical⁵³² exchange of remarks which have apparently not the remotest reference to Buddhism or anything approaching the doctrine of Sunyata or Tathata—what does it mean?

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN." 532 519

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."

^{531 518}

But from the intuitionist point of view, this meaningless exchange of remarks and Kyozan's hearty laught have the greatest possible significance in Buddhist philosophy. I will not try here to probe into the inner meaning of the whole affair, but this much I can say that unless these dialogues are understood, in their proper light, we have no right to judge the real value of Buddhism as philosophy or religious teaching.

When we speak of the Buddhist influence on the literature and art and life of the Japanese people, we have to keep this mystic trend of Buddhist philosophy in mind; for there is no doubt that it has had a great deal to do in the moulding of the spirit of our forefathers. Intuitionalism requires pointers more than ideas to express itself, and these pointers are enigmatic and non-rational. They are shy of intellectual interpretation. They have a decided aversion towards circumlocution. They do not repeat, and brevity is their essence. They are like flashes of lightning. While your eyes blink, they are gone. That Haiku is a poetic form peculiar to Japanese literature, and that Sumiye is a favourite art of painting here, are to be considered in reference to the intuitionalistic philosophy of Buddhism.

A frog jumps into the old pond,—this is a pointer to the Japanese mind, enabling it to have a fair view of the beyond. The mind, by the aid of the pointer, comes in contact with Reality which is thus directly grasped and the experience is altogether satisfactory. This, however, to some minds is far from being satisfactory, because there is no fine disposition of concepts known as dialectic. And these will judge the Japanese way as superficial or belonging to the realm of sensibility where⁵³³ there is no penetrating cognition, no far-reaching imagination. In the domain of intuition, however, there is no need for such, for things are directly handled, no intermediating concepts or ideas are called for and are most unnecessary encumbrances here. They are useful in the order where they belong—this goes without saying. The confusion of orders inevitably leads to misunderstanding.

9. Behind Japanese intuitions we can say that there is philosophy of time in opposition to philosophy of space. The latter characterizes generally the systems of Western philosophy. The specific feature of the philosophy of time is that it turns inwardly and intuitionally apprehends the facts of consciousness, whereas the philosophy of space is always conscious of an external world and endeavours to interpret inner experiences in terms of space. This means that space-philosophy postulates something permanently existing outside the thinker himself who hungers for Even time in this system is translated into a form of space; it is immortality. comprehended as a kind of blank sheet spread from eternity to eternity, on which each instant moves, somewhat in the way individual objects fill space. Time here is conceived as a continuum composed of individual moments succeeding one after

^{533 520}

another apparently without interruption. When time expands like space, all its characteristics are destroyed. It is no wonder that the old conception of time has now begun to be done away with by the physicists. The philosopher has to follow them and reconstruct his notion of time on a more movable and flexible basis.

The philosophy of intuition on the other hand takes time at its full value. It permits no ossification as it were of each movement. It takes hold of each moment as it is born from Sunyata, that is, Emptiness, according to Buddhist philosophy. Momentariness is therefore characteristic of 534 this philosophy. Each moment is absolute, alive, and significant. The frog leaps, the cricket sings, a dew-drop glitters on the lotus leaf, a breeze passes through the pine branches, and the moonlight falls on the murmuring mountain stream. The Japanese mind trained in the time-philosophy of Buddhism is quick to catch each movement of nature and expresses its impressions in a seventeen-syllable poem or in a few strokes of the brush.

Space-philosophy is like building a stone house and time-philosophy a frame house. Stones are piled one after another according to a definite plan and a grand cathedral is erected. For a straw-thatched tea-room timber as it comes straight from the woods is used, often unplaned, just cut to make it fit different parts of the hut. Timber cannot be piled up like stone or brick, its length and size are determined from the beginning. Every instant of time is like a piece of timber—complete in itself and alive throughout its duration, however instantaneous that may be. A stone-building is grand and imposing as a whole, standing by itself apart from its surroundings. It is altogether individualistic. It does not merge into other objects. The straw-thatched hut is insignificant in comparison but it harmonizes well with the woods in which it reposes. It is a living thing like the surrounding objects of nature. But when you begin to philosophize about it no logicians can exhaust its meaning, because it lives with nature itself. This part of the work, that is, philosophizing on Buddhist intuitions, will be left to modern Japanese thinkers who are taking in more and more of Western ideas in order to complement the work already accomplished by their predecessors.

Finally, I wish to say a word about the Buddhist influence on the Japanese character. As we all know, Buddhism is singularly noted for its broad-mindedness, gentle-heartedness, and adaptability.⁵³⁵ The spirit pervading its entire constitution is not at all militant, or aggressive, or exclusive. It has a strong missionary spirit. In this respect it is self-assertive, but being adaptable to any new conditions its self-assertion is carried out without giving any offence to the cults and traditions of the people among whom it finds its new habitat. It does not attempt to attack or displace the state of

^{534 521}

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."

^{535 522}

affairs already in existence among such people. It quietly comes among them and is at home with them before long. Its march beyond the borders of its birthplace has never been marked with violence or bloodshed. This has been true not only in its missionary movements but in its intellectual activities. This can best be illustrated in the teaching and cult of the Shingon sect of Buddhism in Japan.

Look at those Vedic gods, native gods, Nagas, Kinnaras, Garudas, Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and many others who are all in a most comprehensive manner taken into the Mandalaa and made to perform their various functions according to the grand cosmic scheme of Shingon philosophy. When Shingon came to Japan it also succeeded in incorporating all the native gods as avatars of the Buddha Vairocana. Shinto has no philosophy, and therefore it has not been able to assimilate Buddhist thought into its own folds.

10. If Buddhism were, against its own nature, militant and aggressive, its missionary spirit would have caused many a sanguinary religious war and, with its superior religio-philosophical equipments, crushed many a system of primitive beliefs, mythologies, superstitions, and national traditions which are interesting and worth studying as records of human culture. This spirit of tolerance demonstrated on all sides and in every possible way by Buddhism and its followers was not a sign of weakness. It was what may be called⁵³⁶ 'of uroshikiism' in which all kinds of things can find a place each according to its specific quality and function.

This all-comprehensiveness of Buddhism which is not the same as being merely tolerant, must have made a great impression on the Japanese mind. Buddhism has been so sure of the truth of its religio-metaphysical intuitions that wherever transplanted it has allowed itself to establish a harnomious relationship with its new surroundings—moral, intellectual, and spiritual. It has never been aggressive, nor arrogant, it has always been in readiness to propose new theories if necessary to accommodate the old native beliefs already firmly established. Those who have come under the influence of Buddhism, therefore, always try to practise this spirit of generosity and of universal kindness even towards enemies.

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHO-THERAPY.@

One of the greatest questions in all religious history is this: If there is any good in religion at all, or if perhaps it would be better to drop all religion. This question is also asked by the most profane people of rationalistic epoches, but I am not thinking here of atheistic and intellectual asking. I am thinking of the doubt in religion which has arisen again and again in the history of religion itself and from the very standpoint

Dr D.T.SUZUKI. "BUDDHISM IN THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF JAPAN."

^{536 523}

[®] In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND: 1937.

of religious feeling. Perhaps religion is not an aim, not a purpose, in itself, but only a medium, an educational system, which has to overcome itself and to fall out in the final result of the process. In the same way, the assistant lines we make in a geometrical design are good and necessary as long as we have to seek for a result, but in no case must be found in the result itself. And indeed, this⁵³⁷ is the doctrine of many scholars and of many religious people, and of prophets also.

Thus Freud would say that religion is only a very useful illusion which once was the only way of helping mankind in its struggle with father-and hero-complexes and which had to instil the first moral principles into social life. But now, he would say, there is no further need of it, because the human mind has the possibility of freeing itself from those complexes by a conscious technique. In quite another way Karl Barth would say that we need no further religion from the very moment we have found God and the right belief in Him. His question and the question of all the dialectical theologians of his school is this: what need have we of religion, of mysticism, institutions and experiences if we are in any case in the hand of Almighty God, who is a fact, a real certainty, in spite of all human attempts to deny or acknowledge Him. Indeed, it is by no means better to say "Yes" to Him and His reality than to say "No." What, then, is the use of any ceremonial, of religious forms, efforts and formulae? Therefore, belief in God and submission to Him, but no religion—that is the doctrine of Karl Barth.

In the same way the Zen school of Buddhism in modern Japan does not see any good in all the religious ceremonies and prayers of the other schools of Buddhism. Zen simply tells us that we should not strive and yearn for any salvation at all, because we are already free. The eternal life we are so earnestly longing for has already come, and we need not pray to the Bodhisattva-gods because we are all Bodhisattva ourselves in all the glory of wisdom and perfection. We only need to realize this fact and to put away all error concerning it.

That is a point of view which we can find in various epoches of human history, for in the course of religious development there always comes⁵³⁸ a time when mankind is tired of all the old rituals and ceremonies and is sceptical of their efficacy. Those who are not interested in religion then put away religion altogether. But what will all those others do who have a real religious feeling in regard to the fundamentals of life? Of course, they keep their religious enthusiasm and at the same time create what we may call: 'The religion of non-religion.' That means: like all the others, they throw aside the old forms of religious life, ceremonies and dogmas and names—indeed, they bring to

537 524

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

538 525

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

an end this old practice of word-magic and witchcraft with names. For they believe far more in facts than in words, and they feel and know that it is impossible to give special earthly names to that very Reality which I have called the fundamentals of life or the other side of reality, the Beyond, the Transcendental Being. Therefore they pass on to a mere negation of just those names which former ages have given to this Reality, which conventionally we may call God. That is the way of all so-called "negative theology" which always grew up on the foundations of abstract mystical feeling. We can see it in the writing of Plotinus, the Neoplatonist, as well as in the sermons of Meister Eckhart in the early middle ages. We find it also in India, for there is hardly a single idea known to the human mind which has not arisen in some period of Indian history. But in general India is far more the land of names and forms and ceremonies than of abstraction and negation. India is the country where holy and demonic realities have more shape and colour than anywhere else in the world. We Westerners of today are keenly interested in all those wonderful and abstruse forms of holy symbols which are found in Indian life. But even more we are touched by the overcoming of forms and names in the still deeper vision of those rare mystics and 539 saints such as we find in Tibet.

That is one of the reasons why today the general interest of the public in Indian religions and art is rapidly being transferred to Tibet, which only a short time ago was almost unknown. For example, in 1910 there were ten or twenty times as many books on India than on Tibet. I would not go so far as to say that today the situation has quite changed to the reverse; but certainly it is evident that Tibet has come more and more to the centre of the history of relitions. Another reason for this increasing interest is the fact that in Tibet everything appears to be of greater dimensions than in more moderate India, more striking, more rough and radical, too. For this has the effect of giving a clearer idea of the psychical background of every doctrine.

Therefore the "religion of non-religion" which I have mentioned above, can nowhere be seen more clearly and expressively than in Tibet. In the legendary beginning of the history of Tibetan Buddhism we see the most important personality the yogi-saint Ti Lo Pa. The various legends concerning him do not show us the clear personality of a human being, nor even the idealized the contrary, they show us, as it were, a sort of ghost, not quite living on earth, but also not quite in the heavens of gods and holy ideas. He is rather in the middle world of magic and sorcery. Yet all the records concerning him tell us of one sentence of his teaching which is a remarkable expression of the "religion of non religion." It was the motto of his life, and was just this: – "Don't reflect; don't meditate. Keep your mind in its natural state."

That was his teaching—nothing more than that: But what more is needed? Of course it must be understood that this doctrine is not taught to the public nor to children. But it is the 540 last word of wisdom that a teacher, a guru, gave to his best pupil, his shishya. Yoga-practice is reflection and meditation; it is a strong procedure by which the mind is led far away from being only natural; in most cases it leads to a degeneration of nature in body and mind. Most teachers think this degeneration of nature to be important and inevitable for everyone who would develop himself into a superman; they conceive it as in some way holy and nearer to the almighty power of gods and demons. I am told that often enough teachers in our Western world think in the same way. Yoga and all religious education of Asia starts with reflection, which means seeing oneself as in a looking-glass, trying to separate in oneself two different personalities; subject and object, the Observer, as Indian logicians tell us in a somewhat abstract manner that there is still a third factor—the process of observation itself, which must be different from both the observing and the observed parts of the soul. You may call this an artificial schizophrenia which is set forward in all these Asiatic methods of psychical development. In this respect, Tilopa's advice not to reflect and not to meditate is the advice of a physician who wants to repair what has been destroyed. So we can see that his advice is only intended for a late period of mental instruction, and not for its beginning. It is a widespread illness to be compelled to reflection. The reformer Martin Luther called self-reflection the root of all evil and sin because it involves the forgetting of God. Indeed, if you look around, you may see a whole number of people, especially of the educated classes, who live always in view of an imaginary looking-glass. They seem to have nothing else in mind than their own behaviour. This kind of self-reflection is al illness and an awful suffering, and the Tibetan teachers of Yoga have invented excelled means for its cure.

A pupil who is too self-willed and self-centred in his way of life is placed in front of a looking-glass. He⁵⁴¹ is told to watch his own face very carefully and then to given all honours to his reflection. He must bow before it, make gestures of devotion and veneration, fall on his knees and even garland it with flowers, thus giving it all the praise and honour vouchsafed as a rule only to Gods. This kind of self-worship will result in a deep disgust of one's own person. Yet this is not the final intention of the guru who directs the exercise. It would be useless to replace the former over-estimation of the self by an under-estimation, for the one is just as false as the other. Therefore there follows at once another exercise. The pupil being anxious to regain a right self-consciousness is now placed in front of another looking-glass, set at an angle so that when he looks into it he will see, not his own reflection, but the image of a God. This image is placed a little behind him and to one side. He is now told to meditate on the

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

541 528

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

^{540 527}

mirrored image before him in all its details and to regard it as his own reflection. He must also feel the eyes, the mouth the limbs and even the expression of creative power in the face of the image to be his own. By this identification with a God he will learn to drop all distinctions between God and man, between the inner and the outer world, between here and there, and thus to experience the all-one-ness of the Absolute in a mystical way. After he has done this for a long time, enjoying always his own perfect identity with the universe, he must try to obtain the same feeling with closed eyes. He must then think about himself as the almighty mother-goddess Vajara-dakini in both her aspects as a bringing of mercy as well as a cruel destroyer of life. These two opposites are her two faces, for in Buddhism creation is not thought in any way better then the destruction which follows it. The pupil must now imagine that his own being, merged into the goddess, will grow more and more until he feels himself to be a giant bigger⁵⁴² than the house, bigger than all the earth. At last he must feel himself embracing the whole universe which he must imagine, not, as is usual, in the shape of a ball, but in the shape of a female body. (You will surely have seen Indian and Tibetan pictures in which the universe is shown as a woman). When he has completed this work of imagination, he is told by his teacher gradually to diminish the contours of this universe which has now become his own self. It must become smaller and smaller until it is only the size of a little seed, so that he may paint the red image of the "goddess world" on his finger nails and there meditate upon it again and again in all its details. But the very end of this process will be attained only when all these idols-God, the universe and the ego-have completely melted away into mere nothingness, thus becoming the sole, one pointed Reality of the holy Nirvana-state in which there is no space for any shape at all.

We have now considered in brief some of the important Tibetan Yoga practices. Beginning with meditation in front of a looking-glass, (i.e. reflection), they aim at a state of consciousness where meditation and reflection overcome themselves and are no longer possible. For the observer and the observed the subjective and the objective, have come to an identity, and thus have given up their former dynamic activity in creating the waves and whirls in the ocean of life. Thus meditation ends in non-meditation, reflection in no reflection, and religion in non-religion.

This is the real meaning of Tilopa's doctrine, which is really a revolt against the former states of educational practice, when he tells us: "Don't reflect; don't meditate; keep your mind in its natural state." Of course he knew quite well that this was advice only to be given to the most advanced students, already well progressed in meditation. For we know that he treated his own pupils in quite another way. We now have a translation of⁵⁴³ the records of the life of Tilopa's most famous pupil Na-Ro-Pa, who

542 529

became his successor as head of that branch of the Tibetan Buddhist church in which the secret tradition of especially holy doctrines and practices has been guarded from early times to the present day. I believe that this biography of Naropa could be extraordinarily useful to all those who are interested in the history of myths and their psychological investigation. For we find here a rich source of historical, religious and visionary mythical material that only seems to await a full revelation in intensive, searching interpretation. Therefore there follows a synopsis of these records:-

Naropa, who played an important part in the history of Buddhist Lamaism in Tibet, is supposed to have lived from A.D. 924 to 1039. According to various biographies, he was conceived and born in a wondrous way, under auspicious omens in a royal hourse. After Naropa (his name means "his mother's best one") has been educated in the arts of chivalry and has married, the moment comes when he, like the Buddha himself, gives up a profane life and all worldliness, and leaves his home to become a monk.

He roams about for a long time and then becomes the abbot of a monastery. Here he has a vision. While he is reading, an old woman with the 37 signs of repulsiveness appears as a shadow above his book, and in grotesquely distorted form asks doctrines he is studying, of, if he understands the sense of them also. To the first question he answers "Yes." He understands the words quite well. Thereupon the old woman lifts up her stick, dancing and laughing. But when he afterwards affirms the fact that he understands also the sense of the words, she becomes very sad and weeps loudly. At once his shortcomings and defects become clear to him. He leaves the monastic⁵⁴⁴ community and proceeds to search for his life's master, his guru, the mysterious Tilopa. The latter only manifests himself to Naropa in symbolic appearances intended for his edification, but he always recognizes them too late.

He suffers tremendous trials. In the disguise of a leprous, loathsome old woman sitting at the roadside, his teacher is supposed to show him that in the face of the great Absolute Beings all differences disappear. A poor bitch, half devoured by maggots, is intended to awaken pity for all beings. A man, dashing people's skulls to pieces, is supposed to show him that the chief thing is to destroy egotism. As a hunter, wanting Naropa to be his companion, his teacher instructs him how to chase the deer of his personal inclinations. Disguised as a woman who serves him with forbidden food, preparing a soup of frogs for him, he wishes to free him from paltry scruples. Finally he hears someone say: "Thou must proceed to kill the principles of father and mother in thee." The release from the burdens of father and mother is the decisive stipulation

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

544 531

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

for the proper recognition of his teacher, who presents himself to him in his own human form for the first time on the next day.

But this brings Naropa's despair to a climax. A dream-vision shows him blind people who can see notwithstanding their blindness, deaf people without ears who can hear, lame who can walk and resurgent dead. As he cannot grasp all these symbols he makes up his mind to commit suicide, in the hope that he may perchance find his teacher in his next incarnation. Exclaiming, "I have sought and have not found, O disgraceful non-entity:" he seizes a knife to cut his throat. At this instant he is saved, and a voice from Heaven proclaims that he has found his master. Here we are reminded of Goethe's Faust, who is also saved from suicide by the heavenly voices of a church choir at the very moment he puts the goblet with the poisonous liquid to his lips.

Notwithstanding⁵⁴⁵ that Tipola now instructs him, he has yet to suffer many excruciating pains and agony. His teacher demands pious and unconditional sacrifice of his ego up to the point of death, again and again. A fall from the roof of a temple, a leap into the fire bathing in a swamp full of leaches, the martyrdom of oil-lamps stuck in the flesh—one does not know if there is a question here of symbolical gestures, or are these the real deaths that Na-Ro-Pa dies, so that in numerous reincarnations he may strive to reach the same aim of the right doctrine?

He obtains this teaching in the typical late-Buddhist method of intimations of the truth, the sense and the definition of which the disciple is compelled to find out himself. For instance when Ti-Lo-Pa makes a knot in a living snake, which loosens by itself. This means the necessary liberation of oneself from the course of reincarnations. Then his master demands that he should take a Mudra, which means here that through his clearly-conscious sexual intercourse with a woman, who is to be a complex of symbols for him, he may reach supreme knowledge. Subsequently the master demands self-chastisement for the pleasure he enjoyed. The cruelty of the master knows no bounds. Na-Ro-Pa is forced to set up a mandala, a soul-diagram by means of the several limbs of his own body. He must eat putrefied products of brain-pans. But it is just through all these cruel purifications that his teacher apprises him of the sublimest knowledge of Buddhist religion.

A king, impressed by Na-Ro-Pa's killing an elephant by a magic glance, gives him his daughter as Mudra. Now Na-Ro-Pa is the hero, she is his Shakti, his inner passion's life and soul and his guide. He goes hunting with her to conduct the creatures to the result of their inner destiny. That is to say he kills them⁵⁴⁶ and in this way makes

^{545 532}

celestial wanderers of them, at the same time leading them to redeemed perfection with his magic glance. Finally Na-Ro-Pa makes the following proposal to the princess: that they should now both become wanderers. She agrees and a great garden festival is arranged to celebrate their solemn sacrifice. They are both broken on the wheel and cremated. The very next day they are seen dancing in the flames as ghostly forms. We only see Na-Ro-Pa again in his next incarnation playing among children. In this incarnation too he is instructed by his teacher Ti-Lo-Pa through song.

The legend closes with a mighty song of praise of the redeeming power of the great Na-Ro-Pa, it also describes how his bodily form has passed over into part of a rainbow and slowly fades away in the sky.

When we consider this biography from the psycho-analytical point of view, we see that the tragedy of Naropa's life is caused chiefly by two facts: (1) his complicated feeling against the female principle, and (2) his complete dependence upon the male hero-figure of his teacher. As to the first point, there are many details which prove strongly that there has always been an unsolved problem in Naropa's relations to the woman. At first Naropa has difficulty in being born because there has already been a girl born, a sister, and the astrological signs are not favourable to the birth of a male child in the same family. Afterwards it is his mother who tries to hinder him in his desire for a religious life and who forces him to get married first. It is also mentioned in the text that his mother quarrelled with his father.

Naropa is forced to agree with the plans of his mother. But he puts several conditions as to his future wife, hoping that such a wife can never be found. She must be without any scruples and without shame, for she has of course to be his⁵⁴⁷ mudra, with whom he can experience all the secrets of sexual life. After long search, a minister of the king finds a girl who corresponds exactly with Naropa's description. He meets her in a little village at the side of a well where she gives him water. When he tells of Naropa's intention, she suddenly changes her colour to blue-black, and there is a demonic look in her eyes. Later on, after he had been married for a considerable time, the text tells us that she was too devoted in doing all the services he claimed, and that therefore he tired of her and wished to send her away. He complained that she was full of lies and fraud, that she was dirty, and he sang a song dealing with her endless sins. Curiously enough, his wife agrees absolutely with his opinion and goes away.

The next time we meet with a woman in Naropa's life is when the old hag with the 37 signs of repulsiveness comes to teach him as the negative aspect of his mother-imago. She is described as being red-eyed, hollow-eyed, her hair tangled and fox-red,

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

547 534

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

her forehead domed and overlarge, skin shrunk with innumerable wrinkles, ears very long, neck rough and swollen, nose an abscess of decay, a beard yellow-white like corn stubbles, with open, slanting mouth, the teeth broken and ruined, the tongue hissing on the lips, snorting when licked, spitting when she yawned, tears dropping down when she wept, gasping when she spoke blue-black coloured, with rough skin, bowed and crippled body with crooked neck supported by a stick. This view of woman becomes still worse when he meets later on the half-decayed leprous woman by the wayside. After all, we are scarcely astonished when we hear at last of his being castrated by his own hand or even by his teacher, Tilopa. (The text is not clear on this point).

We may certainly think that it would have been informative and helpful if Naropa could have⁵⁴⁸ been analysed in this respect. But I think we should not believe the same about his attitude to his teacher. Surely his earnest yearning for Tilopa and his utmost devotion to him when he has found him can be called a transference? But this very transference does not seem to be as dangerous for Asiatic peoples as for Westerners. Wherever the individuality of a single man has not developed so calamitously far as in modern Europe, there is no need always to keep oneself absolutely free and On the contrary, Indian teachers are surely quite right when they autonomous. recommend their pupils to give up all their own ambitions and to submit to the guidance of the guru. An Indian swami once said to me: "Of course, you Westerners are quite right when you always try to keep your critical faculty awake and to preserve your independence. For you can never be sure that your teacher is always doing only what is best for you. Where can you ever find a real leader in the Western world who has so far overcome all his personal ambitions and prejudices that he really would be able to take responsibility for other people, for the sake of their souls? But you may be sure of a real yogin-teacher in the East, for he feels his own self in no way separated from the selves of his pupils."

Therefore transference does not involve any danger under these circumstances. And if one really wanted to analyse such a feeling in an Indian, one would first have to develop in him the feeling of a free and independent individuality. This could hardly be done, and perhaps it would prove by no means useful and good. For the manner in which "psycho-analysis" is done in Tibet cannot be without the foundation of a strong transference. This means that the pupil does not feel isolated, but always supported by the attentive and merciful spirit of a guru, who is not an isolated personality. Rather he is conceived as but one link in the chain of teachers, one standing always on⁵⁴⁹ the shoulders of another, the utmost predecessor being the heavenly Buddha himself, who thus is also the teacher of every pupil even to the present day.

548 535

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

549 536

Dr FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG: TIBETAN PSYCHOTHERAPY

It is the experience of Western psycho-therapy that the most a patient is alled to go his own way and follow his complex phantasies, the more he must be sure of a leader who cares for him and shows him a clear path as soon as he is in danger of losing his direction. We have seen that in the procedure of a Tibetan teacher the pupil is always told to do everything he wants to do. He must always "realize" his eager demands. That is the way in which every "repression" is avoided. For example, when Tilopa stands with his pupil by the wayside and sees him looking at a beautiful princess, sitting on an elephant and just on her way to her marriage, he orders him to go at once and seduce the girl. Naropa assaults her, and of course is severely beaten by the king's servants so that he is almost slain. That means: if you follow all your desires, you must surely also bear the consequences of your conduct. But that is better than to abstain from your desires simply from fear of what may come afterwards. Life has to be lived and not to be avoided. We are shown that this is the right way by the fact that immediately afterwards Tilopa cures his pupil of all his wounds by a magic gesture. But of course a teacher or a physician must be a magician to be able to do this.

Only a little while after in the history of Tibetan Buddhism we see again the same fact. A pupil is made to suffer tremendously by his teacher and yet in the end can only be redeemed because this very teacher leads him to his aim, which he could never have attained without his help. We find this in the story of Milarepa (i.e "Mila, the cotton-clad") who was a pupil of Naropa's most important pupil—Marpa, called always⁵⁵⁰ Marpa the Translator. Records of Milarepa's life can be found in one of the three volumes which Evans-Wentz has edited in co-operation with the famous Tibetan interpreter and translator, the late Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup. Together they also published the Tibetan Book of the Dead and a most surprising volume on Tibetan Yoga and secret doctrines—all published by the Oxford University Press. I would strongly recommend these three books to all those who are interested in myths and dreams, and who want to combine their own work of psychological practice and research with the astonishing facts we get from these ancient Asiatic sources.

It think we can be sure that physicians and practical psychologists can add much more to the explanation of those myths. For they have come in touch with so many patients who may often dream and create similar phantasies and experiences. I hope the orientalists can help the psycho-therapists in some way to have a better understanding of these little-known aspects of the human mind. Because the progress of historical understanding is certainly due to the new discoveries in psychoanalytical work, for which we orientalists fell truly thankful.

550 537

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." @@ (1) Paradoxically, English idealism, which is regarded as being by nature opposed to science, seems to have had its occasion in a scientific theory. Ideas were not described as impressions "in the mind" until modern physical science had built up a successful system on the hypothesis that the external world consists of movements of extended physical substances which, impinging on the retina of the eye, produce various colour sensations, and on the drum of the ear various sound sensations, and so on. This was definitely the theory which John Locke took for granted, and it did not so much result in his distinction⁵⁵¹ between primary and secondary qualities as actually bring the distinction ready made. Locke's work was not so much to discover this distinction as to incorporate it in a theory of knowledge and of reality. And this is also the reason why the majority of people, including scientists, are very ready to endorse a modified form of idealism, because they too have accepted without question the hypothesis of physical science. It seems to them a fact scarcely admitting of dispute that our awareness of the external world consists of impressions produced in our mind by the impact of material bodies of some kind. It is, they believe, a simple case of cause and effect, exactly on a par with the pin and the pain resulting from a prick, the only difference being that with colours, for instance we see only the colours and not the material agency causing them, while with the pin, we both see the pin and feel the prick.

For the same reason people are very ready to argue that our impressions of the external world may be illusions. They do not mean thereby that there is no external world, but only that the ideas produced "in our minds" may deceive us as to the true character of what really is "out there." The very conception of an "impression" implies some causative agency and of "being in the mind" something outside it. Thus, for popular versions of subjective idealism, at any rate, the external world is a necessary basis or implication.

Once, however, the theory as to impressions or ideas "in the mind" has been agreed to it is only a short stage to suggesting that concepts of movement and extension and solidity are also ideas "in the mind" and consequently to doubting also their independence of the mind. This step was taken by Berkeley. It has the somewhat unfortunate result of twisting the physical hypothesis back on itself and of turning it into a vicious circle. The basis of this hypothesis was, as⁵⁵² we have seen, the assumption of a physical particle or movement causing an idea in the subjective mind, but now this conception of a mental idea has been extended so as to embrace also the physical cause: Thus, if the theory is carried to its logical conclusion we have the

^{@@} In ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 1928-29

^{551 538}

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." 552 539

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM."

absurdity of an idea caused by the physical impact of an idea. In fact, the physical theory which originated the thought of an impression "in the mind" must be discarded; for there can be neither a material impression (all being ideas) nor a "within" the mind there being no "outside", as the very conception of "outside" is itself an idea within. Thus Berkeley began with Locke's premises-"It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually (1) imprinted on the senses..." but as his argument proceeds he gradually shifts his ground. It is one thing to maintain that sensations are dependent on the mind and in the mind because we happen to know that they are caused by movements outside which have not got the character of sensations—that is a scientific physical argument involving the category of causation-and another to maintain that no idea can be conceived as existing independently of consciousness, that 'esse est percipi.' This is a conclusion which results from a consideration of the character of an idea, and it is not due to the theory that an idea is something produced in the mind by an external agency. Reflecting on the character of solidity, extension and so on, we realise, according to Berkeley, that it is meaningless to talk of these qualities as existing independently of consciousness. That, at any rate, is the main substance of Berkeley's argument. And it is only on this basis that the criticism of Locke's primary qualities has any cogency. If the doctrine "esse est percipi" holds good of colours, why should it not hold good also of the qualities of bulk⁵⁵³, movement, extension and so on. Locke, however, was not founding his views, even as regards secondary qualities so much on the doctrine 'esse est percipi' as on the scientific doctrine that colours are caused by the impact of moving substances on our sense organs. Berkeley's argument has the effect of rendering Locke's underlying assumptions untenable, but it does not actually prove any contradiction in Locke's account. For Berkeley was not really arguing on the same plane as Locke. To put the matter shortly the basis of Locke's theory, was one of physical location: the basis of Berkeley's theory, when purged of the Lockian associations surrounding it, is an intuition as to the character of sensations or perceptions, and the physical location theory, so far from assisting Berkeley gets in his way, for space being itself an idea, ideas cannot be physically located in space, and the sensation is neither in the brain nor, as realism would hold, partly "out there," it is within the mind which is, so to speak, superior to space.

2. To question the truth of the hypothesis of physical causation is to skirmish with science. It is of course, possible with some show of reason to maintain that one is not questioning the scientific method or conclusion, but is only pointing out that science deals merely with one aspect of a situation namely, that which can be measured and counted, and that it deliberately omits the aspect of quality, which is none the real. This, however, seems to me to state what scientific theory ought to be rather than what it is: for though I speak with considerable diffidence, I do think that science has hitherto

been impregnated with a Lockian philosophy. Because it has been successful—this success is not denied—in accounting for certain phenomena of vision on a quantitative basis, it has tended to conclude that the units with which it works are the whole objective reality and that anything else is subjective, and it has imported this assumption⁵⁵⁴ into its general attitude. The assumption, however, is really without any sound philosophical basis. For the reality which science explains quantitatively may also have a qualitative aspect. Because you decide to take out statistics regarding the inhabitants of London, analysing their births and deaths, their daily movements, their entrances and exits, and the results enable you to make certain predictions, it does not follow that the numbers making up the statistics are the sole reality. The waves which are said to cause the sensations of sound and light may themselves be but aspects of colour and sound. At any rate, it does not follow from the fact that the phenomena of sound and light are dealt with quantitatively in terms of wave movements, that the wave movements are the only independent objective reality. To that extent I am in agreement with realism. Science proves nothing outside its terms of reference and science itself can never get away from sensation or "explain" the occurrence of sensation. The scientist must start, for instance, with awareness of a particular shade of colour, and no amount of quantitative formulae will be a substitute for that awareness or a sufficient explanation as to how the sensation arose. The quantitative formulae do not explain, they merely paraphrase.

According to this view then, the physical causation theory is not by itself sufficient to esyablish Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is possible, of course, that the distinction might be maintained on other grounds: for instance, it might be maintained that reflection on the nature of pleasure and pain, hot and cold, of smells and colours, and so on, shows that they are so to speak expressions of consciousness, and that their existence is bound up with consciousness, whereas this is not the case with extension, motion, solidity, and so on. And this is, I believe, what, without much reflection,⁵⁵⁵ people do feel to the case. They feel that at any rate, some classes of sensation are mind dependent; for instance, pleasure and pain. But this is not the result of the physical causation theory, although it often, so to speak, works together with that theory: it is the result of an inchoate reflection upon the very nature of pleasure and pain. Berkeley himself appealed to it in support of his idealism.

At one point Berkeley appears to make this feeling, that pleasure and pain are so essentially products of consciousness one of the proofs of his argument. He urges that as it is impossible to separated the sensation of heat from the pleasure or pain of heat, and as pleasure and pain are mind dependent. And he seems to regard the view that

^{554 541}

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." 555 542

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM."

pleasure and pain cannot exist without consciousness as an intuition, something demonstrable. There are, in fact, two different methods of proof of idealism. One is an appeal to intuition, to what is self-evident and immediately seen: for instance, by pointing to the fact that the same water may appear warm to one person and tepid to The appeal to intuition does not necessitate the rejection of discursive argument. Berkeley uses both—but it would be possible to build up an idealist theory by process of cumulative argument without relying on immediate intuition at all (except in so far intuitive judgment).

A great deal of attention has been paid to the logical implications of Berkeley's proposition, 'esse est percipi' as well as to the some-what annoying truism so often quoted in support of Berkeley, that it is impossible to quit consciousness to see what exists outside it. Obviously, it is impossible to prove by concrete demonstration⁵⁵⁶ that anything exists independently of consciousness. But that is merely negative and satisfies no one. If the doctrine 'esse est percipi' is to be accepted as true, it must be on much more substantial grounds than this or any merely logical handling of the question of subject and object, existence and perception, being and knowing. Nor, surely, can it be merely a matter of the analysis of a single proposition. The nature of reality cannot be demonstrated in a proposition and if we do endeavour briefly to sum up our conclusions in a few words, the measure of the value of those conclusions is not to be found in a meticulous analysis of the exact meaning or meanings of the words employed, but in a reference back to the totality of the experience thus interpreted.

Let us take first the more limited question, whether our sensations or any of them seem to be inextricably bound up with consciousness so that they may properly be described as expressions or manifestations of consciousness itself. I must confess that I do find this is the case with pleasure and pain. To speak of a pleasure or pain as existing in unconsciousness seems to me to have no meaning at all. I am not referring to the logical meaning of the proposition, but to the things themselves, actual pleasure and actual pain. They do seem to me to be identical with a particular kind of consciousness. And the knowledge is in a sense intuitive. It is not a question of selfevident or necessary proposition, but of an intuitive perception of a fact. Subsidiary evidence might, of course, be adduced in its favour. For instance, while we talk of a table as hard and broad, we do not ascribe pleasure or pain to it, and it is often questioned whether the lower animals feel pleasure or pain, because it is doubtful to what extent they are conscious. This simply indicates general agreement with Berkeley's view on this particular point.

Further,⁵⁵⁷ with Berkeley, I am unable to separate the pain of intense heat from the sensation of heat or the pleasure of warmth from the sensation of warmth. The matter seems to me more open to doubt than the question of pleasure and pain, but what I do feel is that if other sense data are in fact dependent on consciousness, the evidence for this should be more direct than that of connection with pleasure and pain. It should be possible to show either by an immediate judgment or by a chain of reasoning that consciousness does belong to them as an intrinsic property, and by that I do not mean that consciousness is one part of a greater whole so that you can say that this colour has consciousness plus other qualities, but that consciousness pervades and develops the whole thing, so that the colour is an expression or manifestation of consciousness or of the mind.

Passing from the primary to the secondary qualities of extension, hardness, etc. here the difficulty of conceiving them as independent of any awareness of them is not so much due to some immediately sensed quality in them as to the perception that the extension and the hardness is a matter of relation to oneself, and that to a person differently constituted the material might appear of a different size and soft or permeable. Our perceptions of size and shape seem to be bound up with our constitutions and movements, and to depend upon them. And modern realism virtually admits that this is the case, but qualifies the admission with the suggestion that consciousness is epiphenomenal. Considering how large a part memory plays in perceptions of this kind, and memory not only of other perceptions but of our own activities of moving and touching, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that each person's perceptions are his own picturing and that consciousness is the central organising principle.

The⁵⁵⁸ point, however, which I wish to emphazise here is that while with pleasure and pain it is almost a matter of yes or no at first sight, with the other primary and secondary qualities and with the system of perception and thought generally, it is a question of constructive reasoning—of the discovery of a hypothesis which will fit in with the facts of experience as a whole. It is of little use, for instance, coming quickly to the conclusion that each person's sensations and perceptions are subjective, if you cannot fit this conclusion at any rate into a plausible theory of reality. Berkeley was up against this problem and it is often said that he resorted to a 'deux ex machina.' I believe that he was even more interested in proving the existence of God than the subjectivity of our ideas, but he was more convincing regarding the latter than the former. The argument can, of course, be applied with equal force to realism. One often finds on examination that a thinker who was stoutly maintaining in a theory of

557 544

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." 558 545

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM."

knowledge a whole hearted realism is an idealist when he come to metaphysics. But if it is thought that reality as a whole cannot be explained except in terms of God, and that everything depends on Him and has its being in Him, then the objects of our perception are not really independent of mind. In fact, the final position is almost exactly that of Berkeley. In that case why this enormous trouble to prove in the theory of knowledge that sense data are independent of mind? It is with this particular aspect of a theory of knowledge, the question of its effect upon a theory of reality, that I wish to deal here. It is usually assumed that unless you keep within the world of appearance or perception and maintain an agnostic attitude as regards a theory of reality, you must adopt some form of absolute idealism or a form of realism. I want to suggest that there is a third alternative which, at any rate, merits consideration, and 559 to show the bearing of this alternative solution on the question of primary and secondary qualities.

The logical conclusion of Berkeley's doctrine "esse est percipi" is a complete subjectivism or solipsism, and this is in contradiction with all the working assumptions of our everyday action and thought. For if the content of our sensations and perceptions is dependent upon us, and there is no external object independent of this subjective content (most subjectivists really assume that there is), then the world disappears when we are not aware of it. (Of course, the plural is inconsistent because it implies a plurality of worlds).

It was the impossibility of this conclusion and the fact of the orderliness and regularity of our ideas not willed by us which led Berkeley to postulate God as the source of our ideas, and the single independent, objective reality. On the face of it this was scarcely consistent, but it saved Berkeley from a very difficult position. inconsistency lay in proving the existence of God from the principle "esse est percipi." All that follows from this premise is that the world of which we are aware depends on our awareness. However, having asserted this explicitly, Berkeley proceeded to state the contradictory premise that something must exist apart from our perceptions. He introduced thereby surreptitiously all the implications of Dr Johnson's kick at the stone. He then committed a further inconsistency, arguing that as something exists independently of our awareness, and as esse est percipi, this something must be a conscious purposive Deity. The reasoning is scarcely convincing, nor is any purely epistemological proof of the Deity likely to be convincing. Nevertheless, I feel that Berkeley's general position is not so repugnant to common sense as it is sometimes supposed to be. Hume may have been more logical, but Berkeley took the larger view. This general position may be summed up as follows. Each person's 560 ideas and notions are his own personal property. On the other hand, there does exist a reality of persons

^{559 546}

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." 560 547

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM."

and objects independent of each person's ideas (not a reality "corresponding" to these "ideas," but with its own independent activities), and there is reason for believing that this reality is not mere matter, but is in some sense spiritual through and through. It is, I think, possible to be in substantial agreement with these conclusions without holding that they follow necessarily from a proposition such as "esse est percipi," or that this proposition is self-evident.

Clearly as regards other persons of whom we are aware, it is not true that their being is dependent on our perception of them. On the other hand, it may be equally untrue that what we do perceive of them is independent of such perception. However true our ideas about other persons may be, they are our ideas, and are not in any way in identical with the conscious being of those people nor are they mirroring that being. So far, therefore, as this instance is concerned a form of idealism can be held without exactly assenting to the proposition "esse est percipi". It may be that the being of a sensation lies in its being perceived, but the being of a person is a more complex matter, and certainly does not depend on the perception or sensation of other people. The being of a person lies in perceiving rather than in being perceived, and, in fact, it only has the quality of being perceived in so far as perception involves self-consciousness. But the being of a person is action as well as perception. Thus it may be said that as far as human beings are concerned "esse est agree et percipere", and that while they may also be perceived by others this perception is not essential to their being, which remains unaffected by it. Further, the perception of one person A by another person B is the personal construction of B, a construction which⁵⁶¹ apart from B has no independent existence and in that sense is B's creative act.

It may be thought supremely rash to attempt to apply this conclusion to what is known as the inorganic world. It may be maintained that while animals and even plants may have a world of their own, matter, assuming that it exists at all, is definitely something without the remotest trace of inner purpose or consciousness or anything analogous to these qualities or organic things. Thus, for what might be described as the normal idealist view matter must be "resolved" into a higher consciousness, presumably that of the Deity or the Absolute. And this is doubtless the view which will appeal to the larger number of people. It avoids a great many difficulties, and if it does not provide concrete solutions to many problems it suggests that these problems should be left in the safe-keeping of the Deity. Idealism and agnosticism have several points in common.

4. It is not, of course, suggested that external reality is deprived of all primary and secondary qualities when not observed by the human mind. The nightingale's song is not intended for man and presumably is heard by the nightingale and its mates. The colours and scents of flowers are surely also appreciated by the creatures whom they

^{561 548}

are primarily intended to attract. The sensations of animals may not be quite like ours; but there is no reason for supposing that they are not similar in kind. And they have a common cause; but this is neither the actual content of the sensation—the colour, scent and so on—nor is it a complex of primary qualities (the physical cause theory of Locke), but it is an activity of an independent organism which may be described as a cause in the same way as Berkeley's theory of ideas has been the common cause of various thought sequences in other minds. The real primary quality, the mysterious x, which is behind our representations⁵⁶² of the external world is thus itself activity and perceiving. This x (which may itself be a representation of someone else) is never identical with our own representations, although it is referred to by them. But the retention of this distinction between primary and secondary qualities with a different application will probably only lead to confusion.

Equally, it is not intended to resolve what is regarded as physical reality into a group of monads fantastically endowed with human perceptions. It is true that it is suggested that the concepts of activity and perception should be applied to physical reality, and although this does in a sense mean humanising physical reality, it also means carrying activity and perception underground far below what is ordinarily regarded as the level of human consciousness. Life is asleep in matter: so much so that it is not usually believed to be there at all.

It may well be asked how do we know this, and the answer, so far as I am concerned, must be that the term know is too strong and definite. There is no question here of a priori certainty, of a self-evident truth immediately perceived. Certainly the basis of the suggestion is partly a conviction that the only intelligible account which can be given of reality is in terms of activity, of purpose, of life itself; but this conviction does not arise from or depend upon any theory of knowledge or epistemological doctrine such as esse est percipi: it can be expressed in the statement esse est agree et percipere et percipi; but such a statement is by itself totally inadequate, where as a selfevident proposition such as that a judgment either is or is not self-evident does not require further demonstration. The only way of developing such a conviction is to show how it can provide a satisfactory working explanation of our experience as long as what are called the "facts" of experience (mainly other accepted theories)563 do not support it, and it is not possible, therefore, to afford a coherent explanation, the conviction remains ineffectual. It is as part of a possible philosophical explanation that it is suggested that matter is, in fact, organic, and possesses in however low a degree the qualities of living activity. There is, I believe, a certain amount of scientific support for

^{562 549}

A.H. HANNAY. "PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES IN IDEALISM." 563 550

the view, and it does fit in with modern evolutionary theory, although it may not be necessary to that theory which concerns primarily animal and vegetable organisms.

If this view of matter is not held then (apart from agnosticism), the alternatives seem to be the resolution of matter in a concept of Deity (Berkeley and English Hegelianism) or a thorough-going materialism or a realistic dualism. And the theory of knowledge and of primary and secondary qualities will vary accordingly. But even if the view as to the organic character of matter were held, an idealistic theory of knowledge such as I have suggested is not necessary: for it is possible, as has already been pointed out, to regard reality as composed of active organisms plus primary and secondary qualities. The evidence for the organic character of matter does not depend on an idealistic theory of knowledge, and such a theory is possible without belief in the organic character of matter. I have merely suggested that the two views can be fused together in a possible theory of knowledge and reality.

W.H. WALSH KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS.**

- 1. What is the 'Critique of Pure Reason' about? The terminology of the work is so complexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the subjectivity of space and time, the existence and 564 objective validity of a number of a priori concepts or categories, the falsity of the arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century; but though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the wood for trees.
- 2. If we go through the work with some such formula in our minds as "What can we know by simply thinking?" or better, "What can we know by other means than sense-experience?" we should be able to see what it is about. But we shall find that Kant himself is more apt to use the other formula, "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" and this should be explained.
- 3. It should be clear that the subject of the 'Critique' is the same as that of so many other philosophical treatises: an investigation of the sources of knowledge open to human beings. Only Kant is particularly interested in the suggestion that reason or intelligence is a source of propositions which are both true and "positive"; and his main aim is to estimate the value of this suggestion. That is why his work is a "critique of pure reason"—a critical estimation of the powers of pure reason, i.e. of the intellect by itself. The object is to say what pure reason both can and cannot do. The existence of

W. H. WALSH KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS

^{**} PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY, London 1939

^{564 551}

certain propositions whose apriority, synthetic character, and objective validity are all regarded as certain by Kant shows that reason (in a wide, non-technical sense) has some powers; the existence of metaphysics shows that some philosophers claimed other, apparently more significant, powers for it. As a result of the 'Critique' Kant will be in a position to pronounce on the claim. And indeed it is to make this pronouncement that the whole inquiry is undertaken: the object of the work is to determine the possibility of metaphysics, a science the very concept of which, we are told in the 'Prolegomena', implies that 565 its sources cannot be empirical. Metaphysical knowledge, if such a thing is possible, is the supreme example of non-empirical knowledge: is there any metaphysical knowledge?

- 4. His pronouncements in the 'Critique' and the 'Prolegomena' show that he thought that metaphysics occupied a quite peculiar position among the sciences. It was a science which "could never cease to be in demand," a science which responded to a natural want in human beings. To eliminate metaphysics altogether would be impossible; the most that could be done would be to abolish certain illegitimate types of metaphysics, making room for a new "scientific" doctrine.
- 5. But quite apart from this professional interest, Kant felt as an ordinary man an interest in the fate of metaphysics. He was convinced that there were certain truths or dogmas which it was important to maintain: the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will. Now these dogmas were traditionally thought to be the province of metaphysics; and in it reason, in its capacity as speculative, brought forward arguments for or against them. In neither case did it do much good to the Quite apart from the positive opposition of materialist dogmas in question. philosophies, the support lent them by rationalist systems of the Leibnizian type was of dubious benefit. For the rationalists were never able to confute their opponents completely; and by claiming as they did that our acceptance of the propositions argued for depended on the maintenance of their positions they tended to cast doubt on our confidence in the truth of those propositions. If, as the traditional metaphysics claimed, these matters were within the competence of the theoretical intellect, then it was difficult to maintain without fear of contradiction the existence of God and the remaining dogmas. It remained, then, for anyone convinced of the truth of the dogmas to argue that their acceptance did not stand or fall with the 566 success of the intellect in defending them. And to maintain this point is the aim of Kant's philosophy as a whole. For Kant's philosophy, in its exaltation of the moral over the intellectual nature of man, is a philosophy which claims spiritual worth for all human beings. But in order that this position may be established, metaphysics in its traditional form, as a science

^{565 552}

W. H. WALSH KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS 566 553

W. H. WALSH KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS

claiming to give us knowledge of an intelligible world, must be shown to be bogus; and not until that has been effected can we rest secure in the possession of our dogmas. Hence the interest to the plain man of the result, if not the details, of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'

- 6. Our knowledge of space and time in general (as opposed to our knowledge of particular spatial and temporal situations) is not drawn from experience; space and time are 'a priori' representations with which we are endowed. But that does not mean that we possess in them a source of knowledge other than sense-experience. For space and time, though 'a priori', are only 'a priori' forms of human sensibility, i.e. subjective ways of our perceiving. We group all phenomena in time and all the date of the outer senses in space, and in this operation time and space are presupposed. But they are only presupposed as subjective forms; apart from data which must always come from the senses they are empty.
- 7. It follows not only that space and time have no metaphysical value, but that anything connected with space and time cannot have metaphysical importance. For metaphysics, if there is such a thing, must be non-empirical, i.e. must have some other source than sense-experience.

<u>SOHAKU OGATA.</u> ZEN FOR THE WEST.^{@@} (1) Why are Western people so enthusiastic about Zen; what does it mean to them? By solving this question we will be able to understand what Zen means in the present day for the main current of modern

ALAN⁵⁶⁷ W. WATTS: "WHAT IS REALITY." @@

People often say that they are looking for Reality and that they are trying to live; I wonder what that means? The answer to this question depends solely on why it is asked. Let's see what the Chinese themselves say about it. A pupil asked his teacher, "What is the Tao?" He answered "Everyday life is the Tao." "How", went on the pupil, "does one get into accord with it?" If you try to accord with it," said the teacher, "you will get away from it." The result of such attempts is invariably loss of personality, for there is an ancient paradox of the spiritual life whereby those who try to make themselves great become small. The paradox is even a bit more complicated than this; it also means that if you try, indirectly, to make yourself great by making yourself small, you succeed only in remaining small. It is all a question of motive, of what you want. Motives may be subtly concealed, and we may not call the desire to be a real person the desire to be great; but that is just a matter of words. So many modern religions and psychologies make this fundamental mistake of trying to make the tail wag the dog, which is what the quest for personality amounts to.

^{@@} In Buddhism in England: 1941.

^{@@} In "BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND" 1937

⁵⁶⁷ 554

For Life and Reality are not things you can have for yourself unless you accord them to all others; they do not belong to particular persons any more than the sun, moon and stars.

What then is Life, what is Reality? If we regard it as a particular way of living or as a particular kind of existence and accord our devotion to that, what are we doing? We are reverencing its expression in great personality. But here is the snag. When we revere real personality in others, we are liable to become mere imitators; when we revere it as an ideal for ourselves, here is the old trouble of wanting to make yourself great. But a Tao, a Reality, that can be at once a Christ, an ignorant fool and a worm, this is something mysterious and wonderful and really worth devotion.

thought,⁵⁶⁸ both in East and West. It will also explain to us the relationship between Zen and the modern science of intellectual knowledge, because of the systematic and logical trend of the Western mind. Moreover, it will give us an important hint as to the future of the world, for the modern material civilization built up by Western thought has now come to a deadlock of contradiction that is involved in it; and some new way of life is badly needed. It is often said by Westerners that the sun of glory has set in the West and the light will come again from the East. And Zen is the essence of all Eastern philosophies.

- 2. We have learned that the publication on the Buddhist religion in Europe has overwhelmingly increased since the Great War. The main interest of Western people in Buddhism seems to lie in the fact that the teaching is rational, and that it emphasizes salvation, or rather emancipation, in this life by one's own effort and not be revelation. If that is so, then it is quite natural that Westerners who attempt to acquaint themselves with the practical side of Buddhism in the Far East come to Zen. For Zen is the only sect of Buddhism in Japan and China that still keeps burning the lamp of Dhamma and continues the practice of spiritual training as in olden times. Among the Westerners devoted to the study of the East, Americans are more interested in things artistic while Europeans prefer philosophical inquiry. But they all come to the same conclusion, that one must study Zen in order to realize the East because Zen is the genuine key-note of the Eastern Mind.
- 3. Nothing can be better than the proper thing at the proper time. Let me quote a Zen story which tells us something of the attitude of a Zen person towards intellectuality.

568 555

SOHAKU OGATA. ZEN FOR THE WEST

Ganyo, a learned Buddhist theologist, came to Jyoshu, a famous Zen master in the T'ang dynasty, and asked: "Zen teaching emphasizes the need for the expulsion of every idea of definition. Am I right when I have no idea?" Jyoshu: "Throw⁵⁶⁹ away that idea of yours." Ganyo: "I have told you that I have no idea. What can I throw away?" Jyoshu: "You are free, of course, to carry about that useless idea of no idea." Where upon Ganyo attained satori.

Eastern thought, on the contrary, is predominantly associated with action. The fundamental essence of Eastern thought is something more than mere intellect, it is called "kokoro," or in Chinese "hsin." Kokoro literally means mind, heart and spirit. "Michi," or, in Chinese "Tao" is the synonym of "hsin," the literal meaning of which is "way" or "path". It signifies universal being and, at the same time, personal individual existence. To realize the unity between this universal being and our individual mind is the aim of all Eastern teaching. Confucius says: "That which Heaven has conferred is called 'Nature'; to walk in accordance with this nature is called the 'Path of Duty'; the regulations of this path are called 'instruction.' The path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would not be the path. Therefore, the superior man does not wait until he sees things in order to be catious; nor does he wait until he hears things to be apprehensive." Therefore, Confucius' teaching is called Dogaku, way learning; or Shingaku, mind learning. Eisai, the pioneer Zen master of Japan, says: "Oh, how great the Kokoro is! How impossible to exhaust the height of the heavens, yet the kokoro reaches beyond the heavens. How impossible to fathom the depth of the earth, yet the kokoro reaches below the earth. How impossible to pass beyond the light of sun and moon, yet the kokoro reaches further. How impossible to exhaust the great universes which are as many as the sands of the Ganges River, yet the kokoro embraces them all. Oh, how great the Kokoro is! There is no name for it. And I shall necessarily call it by names such as the 'first principle, the true form of wisdom and the wonderful mind of Nirvana.' Lord Buddha handed it down to Mahakasyapa calling it' A Special⁵⁷⁰ Transmission outside the Scriptures.' And this very same teaching Bodhidharma brought to China, from whence it reached Japan. It contains all vehicles of Enlightenment. This is what is called Zen." To realize this kokoro, that is, to experience the unity of man and God is really the Alpha and the Omega of Zen study.

Let us look upon the present stage of the world's history. The scientific thought of the West in recent years has created so-called material civilization and has challenged the whole world. The spiritual civilization which has developed in the East for thousands of years seem to have been subdued by it. However, in what condition are we now? What will happen to us to-morrow? What irony, that an aeroplane, the

569 556

550

ALAN W. WATTS: "WHAT IS REALITY

570 557

ALAN W. WATTS: "WHAT IS REALITY

wonderful child of the twentieth century, should attack modern cities, the brothers of its very producers!

What we are earnestly desiring and longing for is some sort of new civilization, a civilization in which both "intellectual" and "intuitional" forces will, in their combined manifestation, attain "kokoro" to the ultimate well-being of everyone. Consequently we look to Buddhism and especially to Zen.

Zen is not a religion in the sense in which the term is popularly understood; for Zen has no God to worship, no ceremonial rites to observe, no future abode to which the dead are destined, and, last of all, Zen has no soul whose welfar is to be looked after by another and whose immortality is a matter of intense concern. Zen is free from all these dogmatic and 'religious' encumbrances. And this irreligion of Zen is what appeals to most Western people. When they find the images of various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in Zen temples they are quite surprised. They cannot see why they are expected to attend the services in the morning and in the evening while staying in Zen monasteries. Even when they understand intellectually the⁵⁷¹ inner significance of those images and ceremonial rites, their hearts do not agree with the observance of such outward forms as sutra-chanting and image-worship. They cannot reconcile the teachings found in old Zen literature which aim at the abolishment of all these rites with the practice found in modern Zen temples, and consequently are assailed by sincere doubts. What then is the means of attainment to satori, the goal of Zen?

In fact, there is no way to Zen. Mumon says in the introduction to his book "Mumonkan" one of the most important Zen texts: "Zen takes the Buddha-mind as its essential principle. It takes no gate as its gate. If there is really no gate, how does one pass through the gateless gate? Some say that whatever enters through a gate is not family treasure." Here is an interesting story:

Daiye was one of the most famous Zen masters in the Sung dynasty. Under him there was a monk called Doken, who had been practising Zen for many years and had not gained enlightenment. One day he was told to go on an errand to a distant place, the journey to which would have taken more than half a year. He became deeply anxious as to whether or not this journey would prevent him from practising Zen. Taking pity on him, Sogen, a brother monk of his, offered to go with him and to do for him whatever he could in order that Doken might be able to continue his meditation on the journey. So the two of them started together on the trip.

One evening Doken, with a heavy heart, asked the kind brother, "Wont you be so kind as to give me some indication as to how I may attain satori?" "I certainly desire

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⁵⁷¹ 558

to do everything in my power for you," answered Sogen, "yet there are a few things that I cannot do in your stead. What are they? My eating and drinking will mean nothing to you when you are hungry and thirsty. Neither can I rest for you when you are tired." This⁵⁷² conversation gave some light to Doken's mind and he said, "I can never be too thankful to you, Brother, for your kindness in enlightening me. I am very glad to have finished my job." Sogen said, "Hereafter you can proceed on your journey by yourself." And they departed from one another, each on his own way.

If there is any help or stimulation to be got from the study of Zen, it would be instruction through personal example. Consequently, personal contact with a master is very essential in Zen study. And the master should be chosen according to one's own temperament.

ALAN W. WATTS: THE 'WHAT' AND THE 'HOW'. @@

- (1) It is often said that letter-writing is a lost art and that nowadays no one bothers to write more than a sort of enlarged telegram. Don't you believe it. The people who used to write long and beautiful letters in the leisurely days that are past has their modern counter-parts; their style is, of course, different, but I have no doubt they take as much trouble. The difference between now and then is that now more people write letters and those who are responsible for these enlarged telegrams would not have been able to write at all if they had lived two hundred years ago. If you are a writer, and especially if you are an editor, and especially if your writing and editing is concerned with philosophical and religious subjects, you are bound to receive a large number of letters. Some of these raise such important and interesting problems that I have thought it worth while to devote some space in each number of this magazine to a discussion of questions of general interest, suggested by letters which I receive in the past two months.
- 2. It is a simple matter to show how to add ten to eight, because both the explanation and the addition are performed by the intellect, but it is ⁵⁷³ a very different matter to explain how to love, how to appreciate music or how to acquire wisdom. The trouble is that almost any explanation must be made in terms of intellect, that is, the reasoning faculty of the mind, which measures, calculates, makes deductions, discriminates, analyses and in short "puts two and two together." But such things as love, beauty and wisdom cannot be measured for they are qualities and not quantities. Thus we cannot devise a formula for a beautiful piece of music, such as: five hundred quavers, forty semiquavers, a thousand crotchets, two hundred minims and either semibreves arrange in bars, each bar being of the value of four crotchets, equals one

ALAN W. WATTS: "WHAT IS REALITY

@@ In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND: 1936.

ALAN W. WATTS: THE 'WHAT' AND THE 'HOW'

^{572 559}

⁵⁷³ 560

Overture. Unfortunately, not all intellectual explanations of abstract qualities are as absurd as this - at least, not apparently so, or we might be more often on our guard against them. But leaving aside questions of how to write beautiful fusic or build bridges, let us consider the problem for which so many of us are seeking to answer and which, after all, is the greatest of all problems. How can I find happiness? How can I find Enlightenment? How can I find help from this Buddhism?

Well, we are always trying to give answers in this magazine. We say, "Give up selfish craving—the desire to make yourself God." Or "Study the Four Noble Truths. Keep the Precepts. Follow the Eightfold Path," and if more detailed instructions are wanted we write a long text-book on Concentration and Meditation giving numerous exercises in mind-control. We publish articles intended to be of help in the ordinary affairs of life, explanations of the workings of the mind and the emotions, and while some of these are advanced and difficult, others are so simple that one would think a child could understand them. But were we to enlist the services of sages to write for us, if we could have a Buddha to write a leading article⁵⁷⁴ in every number, we should not necessarily be of any more help to our readers than we are already. After all, do not most of us make a fairly regular practice of reading the words of the Buddha or the other great teachers of men? And yet, with all these great teachings at our finger tips, most of us still go on seeking, trying to find some interpretation of these teachings or some new teaching which will give us just that something that we lack. But what can we say that is new, and what can we write that has not been written already in another form? Even the Buddha said nothing new, for there were Buddhas before him, and their teachings were forgotten just as his may some day be forgotten.

So we might write and teach and preach for ever, but still people would fail to practise Buddhism; they would still go on reading and reading with an ever-growing hunger for words; they would still be unable to understand what we said or else come to us with the eternal complaint, "Yes, I understand what you say perfectly and agree with it entirely. You have explained what I should do in every detail, but how am I to do it?" I ask the same question myself, and I confess it worries me a lot, but I think I have found some sort of answer. Let me return to the analogy of music. No one on earth could write a book giving a complete explanation of how to write beautiful music, although thousands of people have written books on the mere technique of music. Though there are works on Harmony, Orchestration, Counterpoint, Tempo and the rest, there is no work on how to become a Mozart. In just the same way all that appears in this magazine and even all that has been said by B uddhas and sages is no more than a collection of instructions on the technique of Buddhism. These instructions are very useful in their way, but by themselves are so much waste paper. They can be of use to

you if you can use them, just as the technique of music is useful to 575 one who has a beauty in his soul which he wishes to express. But it cannot give him that beauty. Similarly, if you already have a conscious spark of Enlightenment within you, you will be able to use the teachings of Buddhism to increase it and express it. But if you have not, no amount of words will create it and though you study till your hear turns grey you will find nothing because, in themselves, words are mere lifeless forms. Yet you are by no means a "lost soul."

The spark of Enlightenment is in everyone simply because everyone has life. But not everyone is conscious of the spark; in fact, this consciousness is an unusual achievement and there is no need to feel that you are an outcast or that you are subnormal because you haven't got it. (In strict confidence, I don't think I've got it myself). But I believe that we can find this spark if we look, in the first place, not to words and teachings and technical principles but to livings things. If this spark exists anywhere, where would one expect to find it? Surely the answer is – In the people who have it. Not in what they write, or say or do, but in what they are. To find someone like this, it is not necessary to go to Tibet or start hunting for a guru, for you have it yourself, only you don't know it. You are one of those people, so is your next-door neighbour. And once again you ask, "How am I to know that?" The answer to that is a question: Does the great music of the world seem lovely to you? If so, you have within you a little Mozart. Have you any regard at all for your fellow men? Do their interests or troubles seem of any importance, even if they have nothing to do with you? If so, you have a little Bodhisattva. Do you reverence wisdom when you meet with it, not in wise sayings or learned books, but in life, in people? If so, you have a little Buddha, a little spark of Enlightenment.

Wisdom can no more be found in books on Buddhism or 576 any other philosophy than you can find out how to love your wife or husband in a text-book on Matrimony. If you cannot find it in living beings, in your self and in others, all the scriptures in the world are worthless, for they are about wisdom; wisdom itself is alive and can no more be set down than sunlight can be caught in a box.

ALAN W. WATTS. THE TRUTH THAT IS MORE THAN TEACHING: @@ This seems to be a fitting occasion to consider the subject of unity in religion and to examine some of the reasons why, even among Buddhists, there are innumerable sectarian squabbles which prevent us from working together like reasonable human beings.

575 562

ALAN W. WATTS: THE 'WHAT' AND THE 'HOW'

ALAN W. WATTS: THE 'WHAT' AND THE 'HOW'

@@ In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND. 1936

All schools of Buddhism are agreed that Life is a Unity, and that the apparent separatedness of one being from another is illusion. However different we may appear to be on the surface, ultimately we all have our roots in a common source which you may call Life or Reality or whatever other name you may prefer. This is such an important Buddhist principle that I have often wondered at the things which divide us into conflicting parties and which cause believers in this great truth to quarrel among themselves. All conflict must take place on the plane of separateness, in the superficial and illusory aspect of Life where the fundamental Unity is not perceived. In the real aspect there can be no conflict, for there it is realized that the many are One. I believe that such conflict might be overcome if we could accept the fact that in Samsara—the world of form and separateness—it is in the very nature of things to disagree. In all the universe there is no one form that is in every respect same as another, for all things, while they are essentially One, are unique in their outward appearance.

Therefore quarrels are caused by looking for agreement where it cannot exist, and the man who quarrels with his fellows is he who seeks to impose⁵⁷⁷ his own form upon others. But in Samsara unity can only be achieved by agreeing to differ. For difference is the very nature of Samsara, and unity cannot be achieved by trying to make separate forms the same as one another, but only by realizing that all forms have a common essence. For instance, if a bird is to be a bird it would be ridiculous to expect the wings to be like the beak, or the claws like the tail. And yet many of us seriously expect such impossibilities to be achieved when we try to make others conform with our own patterns and plans. For the human race, in the same way as a bird, is an organism of which every part has a separate and distinct function or dharma, and the whole cannot be expressed in its parts unless each part is unique in its form and method of work.

Just as the human race is a total organism, so are the followers of the Buddha of whatever sect or school. It is unfortunate, therefore, that within this great religious body there should be numerous conflicts and quarrels which prevent it from working as a harmonious whole. There is the conflict between Mahayana and Theravada, between the various schools of thought about the Anatta doctrine, between theists and atheists, and between the Self-power and the Other-power sects of China and Japan, to mention only a few. These conflicts prevent Buddhists from sincerely acknowledging one another as brothers, and destroy the effectiveness of a common purpose within the greatest religious community in the world. Of course, it would be too much to expect people not to quarrel, for the seeds of strife are planted deep in human nature. But it is not too much to expect the more conscious and intelligent members of this community to refrain from doctrinal squabbles and to realize that there is a deeper and infinitely more important bond between man and man than mere similarity of belief.

577 564

We⁵⁷⁸ must accept the fact that, even among Buddhists, beliefs are bound to differ. For all belief in doctrines is a matter of intellect, and intellect is that faculty of the mind which discriminates, which forms ideas and concepts. All forms, whether mental or physical, are of Samsara; thus they will differ in greater or lesser degree with each individual, for, as we have seen, in Samsara there can be no two things of the same pattern. Therefore I am convinced that it is a mistake to try to achieve unity among Buddhists or between the members of any other religion by attempting to construct a common creed or even a minimum basis of generally accepted beliefs. We can be united and yet have different opinions. This may sound strange, even impossible, and so it would be if there were not in Buddhism a Truth that is more than teaching, more than a set of ideas about the universe.

The error which is at the root of all conflict is too great a reliance on forms. No one, unless he spent too much reverence on mere concepts, would quarrel with another because of his form of belief, or be offended because someone disagreed with his own. If someone attacks my property and so offends me, my feeling of offence can only arise through attachment to property-which is not a Buddhist virtue. What applies to property must also apply to beliefs, concepts and doctrines, for these are the property of the mind. Tanha—selfish clinging—can apply just as much to ideas as to money, for both are 'anicca', impermanent, and 'anatta' without essential reality. For a concept (even the concept of Karma or Anatta) is a form and as such is subject to the same conditions as all other forms. Thus even the Dhamma is a part of Samsara, and for this reason the Buddha likened it to a raft for crossing a stream, a raft which must be left behind when the stream is crossed. Therefore if the Dhamma cannot enter Nirvana, it is certainly a part of Samsara.

One⁵⁷⁹ should always be careful to avoid that simplest yet most dangerous of mistakes-the confusion of belief with Truth, the identification of the raft with the opposite bank of the stream. Beliefs are ideas about Truth and not Truth itself, for the formless Nirvana cannot be described by the forms of Samsara, and as all forms are illusory and impermanent, he who clings to beliefs is lost. He who would attain Nirvana must give up all clinging, for only in this way can he achieve the Enlightenment which is freedom from forms. That is not to say that he destroys all forms, but that he is no longer attached to them, that he no longer depends upon them for his peace of mind. Therefore let us make less ado about beliefs; no one ever travelled far on a road by clinging to its surface, and he who travels fastest, he who runs, touches it least with his feet. But how, then, shall we know that we are on the

^{578 565}

right road? Must we not depend upon the road if we would reach the Goal? Paradoxically the answer is: That road is the best upon which we feel the need depend least, for that road leads to non-attachment, to freedom from dependence. Further than this, non-attachment is that road, for Buddhism is essentially the art of setting the mind free from the forms which it uses. For the doctrines of Karma, Anatta, Dukha, Rebirth and the rest are all teachings about the nature of Samsara; they are warnings to us to be careful of the snares of Samsara. But the Truth which is more than all these teachings can only be known when we depend neither upon Samsara nor on ideas about it or about anything else. Therefore why should intelligent Buddhists quarrel over the various merits of certain sets of ideas and doctrines? For the real question for them is not in which set of doctrines to believe, but how to pass beyond all doctrines. Let them ask not, "How shall we reconcile our beliefs?" but "How shall we cease to depend on beliefs?"

For⁵⁸⁰ the essence of Buddhism is the attainment of Enlightenment through freedom from all objects, forms and concepts—yes, even the concept that we must depend for our salvation on becoming free from objects, forms and concepts! Ultimately Buddhism goes as far as that, for even he who is attached only to Nirvana knows not Nirvana.

ALAN W. WATTS: "IS THERE A SELF." (1) For some reason the doctrine of 'anatta' is the occasion of endless controversy. The remarks of Mrs Rhys Davids produce storms of protest, and in the past few weeks I have seen several Buddhist periodicals containing somewhat polemical articles on the subject. It has been said that three-quarters of controversy is due to inadequate definition or understanding of terms, and doubtless this is no exception to the rule. Naturally it is very difficult to discuss things intelligently unless we all know what we are talking about, but the real trouble with this particular discussion is that it has little or no relation to practical life. I do not say that it is not a very interesting discussion, in the same way as a crossword puzzle or a game of chess is interesting. Certainly it is a peculiarly delightful and in every way legitimate form of intellectual gymnastics, and so long as we recognize that the result of it does not matter one way or the other, it must be regarded as a very excellent and entertaining amusement.

2. Of course the matter-of-fact person will at once ask, "Surely it matters very much whether I do or do not exist?" But unfortunately it is not quite so simple as that because we first have to define what we mean by 'I'. In the philosophy of the East we find mention of at least two different kinds of self. One is the little creature "the size of a thumb" who is said to exist somewhere inside the body—a creature who is both personal and immortal. The other is the Self of the Upanishads, the Self which is the

⁵⁸⁰ 567

same for everyone, existing in all things alike, and this is⁵⁸¹ impersonal and immortal. The first of these corresponds approximately to the Western notion of the soul. There is really no need to define it philosophically, because everyone knows exactly what it means. It is the feeling, the intuition, that I am I, separate from you and from everything else. And therefore the problem is, does this thing which says I am I exist or does it not? If it does exist, is it immortal? And further, is one's intuition of it incomplete in the sense that it is really much greater than one thinks, that it includes the whole universe instead of just that area of space which is bounded by one's own skin?

It is certainly a very entertaining problem, but it does not matter in the least because we have no means of knowing whether, objectively, the "I" exists or not. We cannot examine ourselves to find out if we are really here, because we cannot examine the thing that examines, and that is the great limitation of all scientific investigation. The scientist may probe into the psyche of other human beings and declare that on analysis he cannot find anything in the shape of a self. Unfortunately he cannot probe into the thing that probes. However, the doctrine of "anatta" is included in the Buddha's teaching and if we believe that the Buddha was the wisest of men, he must have had some reason for including it. Is the answer that he intended us to believe in our non-existence, because, apart from all questions of objective truth, that belief is a working hypothesis conducive to the good life? Was the Buddha a pragmatist, holding that the effect of a belief upon one's manner of life is more important than the truth of the belief?

But here again it is important to note that this is not fundamentally a question of belief or disbelief in anything; the living of the Dhamma does not require assent to any proposition which is foreign to our experience. The Dhamma is concerned with life here and now at this very moment⁵⁸²; it has no immediate relation to metaphysics, and however rational the doctrines of rebirth and the non-existence of the personal soul may be, they are undeniably metaphysical. In our present stage of evolution discussion of them must always be mere intellectual gymnastics, because we have no means of testing their objective validity.

What, then, does 'anatta' mean in reference to the ordinary experience? To understand this, it must be taken in conjunction with the two other "signs of being" — 'anicca' (impermanence) and 'dukha' (suffering). It is important to remember that the Buddha spoke of these three signs of being not as doctrines, not as "revealed truths," but as facts of ordinary experience. "Dukha" does not mean only "suffering" in the Western sense of the word; if its meaning were as narrow as that, it would be absurd to say that all life is 'dukha'. We experience happiness and misery in turn, and though the two are frequently mixed, we cannot deny that life is composed of <u>both</u> pleasure and pain. "Dukha" is rather "limitation"; it signifies confinement, discontent, the transiency

581 568

ALAN W. WATTS: "IS THERE A SELF

582 569

ALAN W. WATTS: "IS THERE A SELF

of happiness, the imperfection of our lives, as well as actual suffering and pain. And this is not a doctrine requiring belief or disbelief; it is a fact of experience, and we are as familiar with it as with the hotness of the sun. The same is true of 'anicca'. We know that all things are subject to change, and no proof is wanted. If, therefore, these two signs of being are facts of ordinary experience, should not the same thing be said of 'anatta'? And the answer is, Yes. For are we not perfectly familiar with the fact that the identity of forms disappears? To every form, whether man, beast, flower or stone, we attribute an identity. When we meet Mr Jones on Monday, we recognize him again on Thursday because we identify him as the same Mr Jones. He has not become Mr Postlewaite or Mr Featherstone. The Buddha did not deny the fact of identity, but he said⁵⁸³ something about it which is perfectly obvious to everyone. That was that identities not only come to an end but are in a constant state of flux. When we meet Mr Jones again on Thursday, we know quite well that he is not really the identical Mr Jones we met on Monday. In the first place, he may have changed his mind about lending us a five pound note; he has certainly changed in body, for his tissues have absorbed nourishment and some have wasted away; he may have had experiences which have made him a "different man." All these are changes in the identity called Mr Jones. Therefore, when the Buddha said that all things are 'anatta', he meant that identity is not an abiding principle in any form of life. If everything did retain its identity life would stop dead, for change is really a constant movement towards losing one's identity. As soon as we are born, we begin to die, and our identity is always running away from us.

The trouble is, however, that people are always trying to run after their lost identities. The baby who does not want to be weaned from his mother is running after his identity as a suckling; he resists the loss of his suckling 'atta' and does not want to give up his old self. But if we are to go forward, we must give up our old selves every minute. In fact we are compelled to give up these selves, whether we like it or not. What makes the difference between the enlightened and unenlightened man is that one accepts this giving up gladly, while the other does it against his will and usually tries to deceive himself into the belief that he has not done it. Try to imagine yourself back in the identical state of consciousness and experience which you were in two minutes ago. You cannot do it. You are different. And if you think about it long enough, you will find it hard to believe that the "you" which got out of the train two minutes ago is the same "you" which is now walking down the street. It is not the same you. 'Sabbe sankharam anatta.'584

583 570

ALAN W. WATTS: "IS THERE A SELF 584 571

ALAN W. WATTS: "IS THERE A SELF

But what is this 'you'? What is the something that two minutes ago experienced getting out of the train, and now experiences walking down the street? Certainly it may have changed in that two minutes, but what is it? Is it the self? Is it the immortal soul? Is it the unchanging essence of the universe? Those questions cannot be answered, for the simple reason that it cannot look at itself to find out. Some lunatics imagine that if they turn round quickly enough they can see the backs of their heads. But man has eyes only in one side of his head, and a characteristic of all things is that while one side is in the light the other is in the dark. It is that dark side which we are perpetually seeking, consciously or unconsciously.

ALAN W. WATTS: "THE FALLACY OF DETERMINISM."

This brings us to the fallacy of the determinist interpretation of Karma. We have already seen that this interpretation is entirely logical. In terms of pure reason it is quite impossible to make out any case for Freewill. Accordingly, from a strictly rational point of view, life is a machine; beauty, intelligence, love and virtue are all the outcome of complex mechanical processes—the inevitable effects of a chain of causes going back into infinite time. If all human thoughts and actions are the inevitable results of certain causes, it is therefore interesting to enquire into the cause which results in the belief in determinism. It seems as if it were closely allied to the desire for suffering, for bondage, for limitation. If masochism is the conscious love of pain, determinism is the conscious love of bondage. We say "love" because almost all determinists argue for their doctrine as if their lives depended on it. It appears, therefore, that determinism is a form of neurosis (Freudians, please note); it is a supremely reasonable creed, but the trouble is that of all reasonable people lunatics are by far the most reasonable.

We⁵⁸⁵ do not allow ourselves to be free; we tie ourselves up in Karmic effects until, consciously or unconsciously, our minds are hopelessly limited. But in terms of logic, freedom can never exist. This is because the logical faculty is essentially a mechanical faculty. If man uses this faculty alone for understanding the universe, then it is only to be expected that he will view it as a machine. The logician claims that his particular faculty is the highest of all faculties, but that is simply because he does not know any higher. His thoughts are limited by the instrument of perception, but, unfortunately, it seems that one can only shake one's head and say, "Poor fellow!" It is as hard to convince a logician that there is a higher faculty than logic, as to convince an idiot that he is not in fact Jesus Christ or a poached egg. Both are splendidly isolated by the barriers of rationality, those tough, iron walls through which nothing human can penetrate. Their Karma is Fate, because they make it so; but if you choose, Karma need not be Fate, for in itself it is just your own doing.

⁵⁸⁵ 572

<u>ALAN W. WATTS.</u> "EDUCATION FOR PROGRESS." We are confronted with two opposite views of Progress. The first, common to a vast number of modern men and women, is that progress consists in having and fulfilling desires for more and better things. The second, found only among a few, has this important asset: that it conceives Progress as growth of character, but it considers that this can only come precisely from a lack of "things," from poverty, from "going through the mill."

Obviously the solution to this conflict of views may be found in the Middle Way, and this provides an unusually clear illustration of the fact that the Middle Way does not mean a mere compromise between extremes. If this were so, we should say that the Middle Way consists in having neither too few possessions nor too many, that in quality they must neither be too good nor⁵⁸⁶ too inferior. That, however, would be a lukewarm and lifeless solution to the problem; indeed, it would not be a solution at all, because, as we have seen, the number or quality of one's possessions makes no difference to the way in which one uses them. Thus the Middle way is not only between extremes but also above them for it shows that progress in wisdom has nothing to do with either wealth or poverty except in so far as it shows itself in the use one may make of them. A poor man may appear to be wise, but if wealth kills his wisdom it is not real wisdom. Often enough a man will neglect his friends and develop vicious habits after "coming into money," but that is less a reflection on the evils of money than the evils of man. The converse is also true. Often we see one who is happy and content while rich become a grumbler in poverty. In both instances we see that their "wisdom" depends on their circumstances. Thus if character is to be educated by poverty, who shall say that it will stand the test of wealth?

But poverty does not necessarily call forth the best in man. It does not follow that because most of the saints and sages have chosen to be poor, all poor men are therefore saints and sages. On the contrary, wherever there is a community abjectly poor, there is cruelty and immorality of every kind, and that has not only arisen in these time of the cinema, hire-purchase and other methods of increasing men's desires. Long before advertisers ever attempted to persuade the millions that luxury was within their reach, the poor quarters of every great city harboured vice; one has only to look at Hogarth's pictures to understand that poverty and nobility of character are not inseparable, and never have been. Nor must it be imagined that poverty and vice are only found together in the slums of great cities. Much sentimental romance has been written about the poor but honest countryman by those who have always lived in towns. But in those 587 quaint and curious little houses with tiny windows which look so picturesque from the outside one often finds the equivalent or worse of the city slum.

^{586 573}

ALAN W. WATTS. "EDUCATION FOR PROGRESS."

^{587 574}

There, too, vice flourishes in the same way, save that it is less apparent. Yet it would not be either fair or true to make any sweeping generalisations about the relationship between material and moral conditions. For to say that poverty necessarily breeds virtue is just as untrue as to say that it necessarily breeds vice. We simply note the fact that where there is great poverty and where there is great wealth, there one is likely to find great evil. It does not necessarily follow from this that either is a bar to wisdom; what does follow is that neither is more a bar than the other.

Thus if one imagines that education, if it is to be of any value at all, is concerned mainly with "things," whether in scarcity or abundance, the whole point is missed. One school of thought would teach children how to do with little, another how to do with a lot; the trouble with the first is that some men have riches thrust upon them, and they are a karmic responsibility not to be denied. Precisely the converse is true of the second. Both make the mistake of trying to produce wisdom by circumstances instead of circumstances by wisdom. Closely allied with this error is another which in the West (and in much of the East) is making education a pure farce. And this is the error of teaching children to cope with material things rather than spiritual and moral things. The aim of much modern education seems to be to produce successful men of business instead of successful human beings. It is said that they must be taught something of "use", something which will help them to "get on in the world." Thus delightful but quite "useless" subjects, such as Religion, Hebrew, Latin, Greek or maybe Sanskrit, Pali or Hebrew are replaced by Economics, Shorthand Typing, Accountancy, Science, and other literate inhumaniores⁵⁸⁸. The result is that our youth tends to become merely clever. It is like educating technique and neglecting art. The child becomes an efficient manipulator of the machinery of modern civilization, but his understanding goes little further; he has not been shown how to direct that machinery with wisdom.

Thus Progress, if it is to be more than an acquisition of "things" and of cleverness, can only mean progress in wisdom. Material goods and knowledge about the world, in whatever quantity and of whatever quality, may be used for base and immoral ends if wisdom is lacking. And of all men, the educationist must be the first to realize this, for in the modern world he wields a far greater influence than the old source of spirituality—the Church. Nowadays, nobody need go to a church or join any religious community. Almost everyone, however, goes to school, and that is now the only place where teaching has (or can have) a universal hearing. Hence, with the decline of the Church the educationist inherits a tremendous responsibility, and it is fortunate that there are still a large number of important schools free from the control of the State. For while State schools may be compelled by law to give the type of education required by a deluded public, the independent schools are still able to give the world what it ought to have as distinct from what it thinks it wants. Their influence

⁵⁸⁸ 575

is still strong enough to arrest this false utilitarianism if they work together. This, however, will be difficult, although its necessity seems almost painfully obvious.

<u>ALAN W. WATTS: "NOT ONLY BUT ALSO</u>." One of the first and most difficult bars to the understanding of Buddhism in the West (and even in the East) is language. Even among those who speak English argument may be occasioned simply because different people use the same words with a variety of meanings.

There are those three crucial words 'dukkha', 'anicca' 589 and 'anatta,' the Three 2. Signs of Being, usually taken to mean that life is characterized by Suffering, Impermanence and Absence of Soul, that is to say, of any individual principle in man that is real, much less eternal. From this we are given to understand that the object of Buddhism is to escape from suffering and impermanence by understanding that there is no "I" which suffers or changes. There being no actor, it follows that there is no action, and that the whole phenomenal universe is a mere figment, a shadow without substance on the face of Nothingness. On the other hand, there are those who say that the Buddha could never have preached so hopeless, not to say illogical, a teaching, maintaining instead that though the 'I' which suffers is illusory, there is behind the false a true 'I' which is the Self not only of the individual but of the whole cosmos. It would be so easy to pin the Buddha's words to one or other of these interpretations, but it was not so easy to pin the Buddha himself. A certain Vacchagotta once tried to obtain a definite Yes or No on this point and received only a Noble Silence (Samyutta Nikaya, iv 400). For unless the Buddha had compromised and said No or Yes, it would have been almost impossible to explain to that obtuse person that before one can say whether Self does or does not exist, one must not only know very clearly what is to be understood by "Self" but also by "existence." Furthermore, the Buddha's teaching is no mere matter of words and definitions, for even his own most dogmatic assertions can only be regarded as hints, as glyphs into which each disciple will read just as much as his understanding permits.

"Dukkha," it is said, means Suffering, and the Buddha expressly stated that his doctrine was concerned with one thing, 'dukkha' and deliverance from 'dukkha'. The obvious interpretation of this would be that Buddhism is first and ⁵⁹⁰ foremost a method of what is vulgarly termed "saving one's bacon," or rather of avoiding the responsibility of having any bacon to save. Life is a misery, an intolerable burden, therefore get rid of it as quickly as possible by committing spiritual suicide. However intolerable the burden of life may be it is ridiculous to imagine that any but the most depraved

^{589 576}

mentalities would prefer an eternity of oblivion to an eternity of mixed pleasure and pain—if those were indeed the <u>only</u> two alternatives.

Let us then leave the dreary prospect of eternal oblivion. Perhaps the Buddha really meant that we should evolve some kind of super-consciousness in which we become identical with the universe, in which we become nothing in particular but everything in general. This was certainly a doctrine prominent in India at his time, that is, if Western interpretations of the Upanishads are not wholly false, which is likely enough although outside the scope of this article. In this event suffering would be an illusion because it is only something which pertains to individuals. Individuals are unreal from the viewpoint of the One Universal Self, and therefore if one's consciousness is identified with that Self, suffering is unreal. The implications of this teaching are only slightly removed from mere nihilism—if we accept it at its face value. For it implies that the whole universe of form might as well not be there; that it is without meaning, without interest, and that the only thing of worth is a Nothing, a colourless, formless, infinite consciousness, which has nothing to be conscious of. But it will be said that it is conscious of the Infinite, a sublime mystery which requires a special sense of appreciation. The trouble with the Infinite seems to be that it is only half the truth, and one of those half-truths which may easily be worse than falsehood. Someone has wisely said that there is nothing infinite apart from⁵⁹¹ finite things, and perhaps we have in that saying a key which will unlock the first door of that inconceivably vast palace of the Buddha's wisdom.

There seems to be something about the interpretations of Buddhism considered above altogether inconsistent with that tremendous title "Buddha"-supremely Enlightened. They are so shallow, so reminiscent of the vague generalisations made by those who have never penetrated deeply into their subject. It is so easy to proclaim the doctrine of "Nothing But," to say that life is nothing but this, or nothing but that, for this is the practice of almost every tyro in every field of study. When, however, he has progressed far enough to realize his ignorance, he comes instead to the doctrine of "Not Only But Also," which is another name for the Middle Way. Thus to every reliable observer, life is characterized not only by suffering but also by happiness, for the whole existence of the world of form depends entirely on the existence of opposites. We should not know pain unless we also knew pleasure, and the same may be said of living and dying, hot and cold, day and night. Hence, as Buddhism is the Middle Way par excellence, let us assume for the moment that 'dukkha' means neither pain nor pleasure, nor an indifferent condition between the two. Let us call 'dukkha' the quality of the relationship between pain and pleasure. If it is not taking an unpardonable liberty with the Pali, let us translate 'dukkha' as 'discord' or 'lack of harmony', and then ask if it does not refer to a state of discord in relationship between pleasure and pain, implying

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a conflict between the two opposites. This conflict exists only in man's mind, for it is he who sets the opposites at war by striving for the perpetuation of one and the abolition of the other. It is precisely this conflict which is at the root of man's misery, of his spiritual disease⁵⁹², for he is seeking something which simply does not exist, which is 'maya' in the real sense of that term. For there is no such thing as pleasure apart from pain, and 'dukkha' would seem to be the illusion (maya) of seeking pleasure as a thing-in-itself (atta).

This principle may also be applied to the 'anatta' doctrine. Because man does not understand 'anatta' he tries to hold himself apart from life as a separate entity; he tries to appropriate to himself various other entities, and in this he is like one who attempts to separate the beautiful parts of the human body from the ugly with the result that he kills both. For surely 'anatta' means that any individual thing considered in and by itself has absolutely no meaning, no use, no life, no autonomous soul. Did anyone ever see a finger working without a hand? Or a spoke running round without a wheel? Or a hair growing without a head? For if we consider those two opposites, the part and the whole, we see that they can no more exist without each other than pleasure without pain. That they are opposites we know well enough, for each one of us distinguishes sharply between the self and the not-self, subject and object, "I" and the universe. But separate self from the universe and it has no existence—it is 'maya'. The converse is also true, and this is where we have to distinguish between Buddhism and the "All-is-Nothing-But-One" doctrine. The whole has no existence without its parts. No one ever saw a hammer without handle or head, or a cube without any sides, and even the Platonic Idea of a cube, the abstract prototype cube, requires prototypical sides. That is to say, if you take a chariot to pieces and then say, "Where is the chariot-soul?" the answer is "In the mind of the man who made it." But that mental chariot is inconceivable without its mental parts. Thus 'maya' is a term applicable to any one opposite considered apart from the other, and 593 when the Mahayana Sutras say that the opposites are 'maya' they imply that they are meaningless, illusory and non-existent apart from the Reconciling Principle which relates them to one another. And this principle is called "Dharma" or "Tao," or "Logos"; it is the Meaning the raison d'etre of the opposites just as the child is the meaning and raison d'etre of man and woman. Hence so far as oneself and the universe are concerned, the object of Buddhism is surely to follow the Middle Way, to become absorbed neither in oneself (which is 'trishna') nor in the universe (which is nothing), but to give full attention to the Meaning which reconciles the two. This reconciliation is love (karuna), the higher reflection of the love of man for woman, which, fulfilling itself, is directed beyond and between the two opposites to the child. To express it in as concrete a way as is possible: forget yourself,

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593 580

ALAN W. WATTS: "NOT ONLY BUT ALSO."

^{592 579}

ALAN W. WATTS: "NOT ONLY BUT ALSO."

forget the world outside you, and go straight ahead, but don't remember either by trying to forget.... After all, if you have concentrated on this article that is what you have been doing all the time. You forgot yourself, forgot the printed letters, and remembered only the Meaning which was born of your thoughts and mine.

<u>ALAN W. WATTS: "SIMPLE LANGUAGE</u>." (1.) The difficulty with these terms is that almost everyone uses them in a different way. Although we speak English, each of us yet speaks a different language, and that difference is most acute in the realms of philosophy, religion and psychology.

2. The sublime paradox of Indian philosophy was that man must become what he IS; the becoming referred not to his essential nature but to his realization of that nature; the evolution was less of fact than of understanding. But even here this difference of opinion is perhaps more on account of language, of words, than of reality. What two people may understand intuitively in the same way, they may express differently in words⁵⁹⁴, for words are merely the mind's interpretation of something which it is inherently unable to grasp. Thus its grasping is inevitably full of blunders. Hence we are a little doubtful of the value of paying too much attention to words, and it seems that Mrs Rhys Davids is rather too anxious to find the right words for things which no words can fit. She strives valiantly to achieve her end, and in the course of the struggle produces many things that are valuable and well worth reading. But her style is somewhat inclined to suffer as a result; she gets words that are as nearly right as may be, but too many begin with the letter "W"! The result is that she achieves clarity at the expense of harmony.

There is another element in her book—a preoccupation with the life beyond death. To all who have suffered great loss, and to all who are approaching the end of this particular life, death and that which lies beyond is inevitably of great concern. But is it not possible for us to attain, in time, a view which transcends both life and death, which sees them as two forms of the same process, which concentrates on the process and forgets the forms? Death will come; so will to-morrow; death will go just as yesterday has gone, but whether it is yesterday, to-day or to-morrow is a matter or insignificance beside the all-important work of enlightenment. That work must go on in whatever realm of becoming we may find ourselves. Thus the important thing is not the past or the future but the Now. "We cannot mount the camel that has gone, nor the camel that has not yet come."

The real value of all Mrs Rhys Davids' work, however, lies in its positive, dynamic drive. In this she is always young and even if she tends (at any rate in her writings) to forget to-day in the vision of to-morrow, this is counterbalanced by a

^{594 581}

tremendous will for betterment. This is especially important in her work with Buddhism where⁵⁹⁵ both among scholars and among some of its adherents there has been something static, pedantic and negative. Mrs Rhys Davids is for coming to bud while others are going to seed, but perhaps there is a Middle Way between the two, for both are opposite aspects of the same cycle which in Buddhism is called the Wheel of Life.

2. But what is simple language? Does it consist in economy of words? The 'Tao Te Ching' is a model of such economy, but who will say that he understands it? Does it mean ordinary words of not more than three syllables? But what are ordinary words? It may be said that they are the words used by the great masses of the people, but here we can only ask, "Which masses and which people?" What is common speech in East London may perhaps be more or less unintelligible in Lancashire, not to mention New York. Perhaps then it means the language of what we call ordinary educated and intelligent people (implying people like ourselves). Yet I have often seen such people argue for hours without understanding each other in any sense whatever. Indeed, it has frequently been my experience that the more intelligent the company, the more it fails to arrive at any understanding. Take, for instance, the very "simple" phrase, "Without faith in spiritual realities there can be no religious life." All the five important words used here are common enough in everyday speech, but if any three people can be found who can fully agree to the meaning of any one of them, I shall be not only amazed but incredulous. And if the simplicity of words consists in their familiarity and brevity, here is a list of fifteen ordinary four-lettered and one syllable words over which we might argue for millions of years: —

Love Life Good Hope Fact Real True Hate Mind Soul Time Fate Sane Form Self.

For⁵⁹⁶ the difficulty is that even when we (perhaps) know what we mean ourselves by these words, those to whom we speak give them widely different meanings. If we were so very simple, in more senses than one, as to tell people that the first principle of Buddhism is that Life is Pain, and the second that Pain is born of Lust, we should be neither explicit nor intelligible. This may be simple language, but it does not convey a simple truth. For there are two kinds of simple language: one is used by such people as the Buddha, Lao Tzu and Jesus Christ, and this is more difficult to understand than the most formidable tomes on metaphysics. The other conveys a meaning which one not only sees but sees through, as when pleasantly vague people produce the devastating remark that Love solves all problems. We have known it to create some exceedingly difficult ones. But the paradox is that profound Truth is complicated because it is simple. We stumble over it because we are seeking it far

595 582

ALAN W. WATTS: "SIMPLE LANGUAGE."

^{596 583}

away, and perhaps the most difficult thing in the world is to perceive the obvious. The remarks of the Zen masters are said to be baffling, yet they refer to such commonplace things as shoes, dishes, spades, the weather, sticks, trees and cups of tea. What is found so strange is that they talk about these things in answer to religious questions. The disciple asks about something which he imagines to be distant and difficult and the master points to something under his nose. Whereat we feel that the master must be an obscurantist or a lunatic. But almost everyone has at some time engaged in a furious search for the glasses, pen or knife which he was carrying all the time in his hand or in his pocket. And when someone points out this odd lapse of memory we do not scratch our heads (or tap them) but laugh at ourselves for not having thought of the obvious.

Here we may say, in parenthesis, that this is the main reason why religion is not the serious and solemn affair which so often masquerades under its⁵⁹⁷ name. For essentially it is the same as the joke about the man looking all over the house for the shoes he is wearing or the dog spinning round in a wild chase after its own tail. Certainly it is a solemn business both for the man and the dog, but religious experience itself, the actual awakening to the truth, is such that a Zen master has said of it, "Nothing is left to you at this moment but to burst into a loud laugh." But the mind of man, and especially of educated man, is so easily led away by the pride of knowledge that the obvious becomes merely contemptible. The things which lie at our feet are called "ordinary" and "commonplace" as if these words were synonyms for "dull". It is said that the deepest shadow is nearest to the lamp, and in this shadow are all manner of wonders and mysteries. We can only call ordinary things dull when we never really look at them, and simple things platitudinous when we never study them. Thus for "intelligent" people the difficulty is to be simple, and by this I do not mean what is often called "leading the simple life," for this is just another way of being complicated. To don a loin-cloth and feed on beans in the wilderness, and to imagine that such practices are necessarily conducive to religion is, in any event in the West, just another form of spiritual pride, of the love of being peculiar, of the contempt for what is usual. In the words of St. Jerome, "Beware of the pride of humility; and having renounced the desire to attract by thy fine raiment, seek not to call forth attention by thy rags." And beyond this there is an even more subtle trap; the pride of the religious man in being ordinary, in making himself conspicuous by being normal.

Thus, when we are asked for simple language, we are not really being asked for simple language at all. The readers of Buddhism In England would⁵⁹⁸ no doubt be a little surprised if, instead of articles on Buddhist philosophy, they were suddenly treated to something so simple as a few hints on cooking or carpentry. If the Editor

597 584

ALAN W. WATTS: "SIMPLE LANGUAGE."

598 585

ALAN W. WATTS: "SIMPLE LANGUAGE."

were a Zen master these surprises might be expected. Nor are we being asked for articles full of those dangerous little words of four letters. In fact, we are not being asked for any particular kind of article at all. For when someone wants Buddhism explained in a simple language, he means his OWN language, and if the Editor and his contributors are to satisfy in this way they must have the Gift of Tongues. By this I do not mean that they must be able to write in every language from Esquimaux to Arabic. That would be comparatively easy; the British and Foreign Bible Society has done as much already. The Gift of Tongues is the art of putting oneself so much en rapport with another person that one uses words in the same sense as he understands them. To return to cooking and carpentry; it is well for those who wish to explain Buddhism to find analogies for it in every form of human activity, so that it can be presented to one's cook or one's carpenter in the terms of their respective arts. Hence in talking with another, let him first do the talking so that his language may be learnt. It is almost useless just to talk at people; one might as well waste one's Swedish on a Hottentot or one's knowledge of differential calculus on the professor of Early Greek History. One must always begin with what is called the Socratic method of asking questions-a method almost invariably used by the Buddha himself.

Unfortunately it is a little difficult to do this in a periodical which appears only once in two months. It would be hard enough if it were a "daily", but at the same time our aim is to try to present a central Truth under as many forms as possible in the hope that sometimes they may come⁵⁹⁹ near to someone's language. In this we may have the advantage that Buddhism is a religion of tremendous variety and that among its may sects is a way of life suited to almost every general type of human being. In the words of Dr Suzuki: "Buddhism, being a great world religion, has eighty-four thousand ways of teaching at its command, any one of which is available on any occasion. One single word casually dropped from the lips of a master, or his gesture such as the raising of the eye-brows, or the pointing of a finger at a flower, is sufficient to open the mind of the intelligent disciple. Buddhism performs this miracle when necessary, that is, when conditions are thoroughly matured... The business of (Buddhist) philosophy is to deal with concepts, which is really the most roundabout way of reaching the truth. Practical religionists all avoid this."

ALAN W. WATTS. "THE BUDDHIST WAY OF LIFE." @@

For a Western man Buddhism is a wonderful eye-opener—in many senses. Firstly, it reveals the meaning of his own religion, Christianity, because it enables him to find the true psychology of spiritual experience which Christianity has concealed in historical and theological doctrines. Buddhism is the only psychological religion in the world, because it sets out the conditions of this experience free from symbolism.

599 586

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Secondly, in the form of Zen, it reveals the meaning of ordinary life and ordinary experience. For who would think that walking down the street, watching the kettle boil, or feeling angry was anything but a series of limitations imposed by physical existence? And yet Zen Buddhism points to such common experiences as these in answer to the most profound questions about the universe. This is because most religions have split the universe in two—God and the world, spiritual and material, higher and lower. Reality and Illusion.⁶⁰⁰ Even when they try to unite these opposites in consciousness they still presuppose their separateness. But to unite things which are already joined is like trying to kiss your own lips.

Buddhism breaks up this vicious circle of lip kissing, or looking for sight with wide-open eyes, and shows us the unity of Nirvana and Samsara, eternity and time, simply by demonstrating the living fact. Comments are unnecessary and often misleading, for they are like painting the reflection on a mirror or putting legs on a snake. As the great religion of non-duality, Buddhism kicks us out of the vicious circle of trying to lift ourselves up by our own belts, and shows us that our present experience is already united with Buddha-experience, that all things demonstrate their one-ness by being multiple and diverse.

Thus a flower or an old tin can demonstrates eternal truth neither by symbolism, nor by illusory aspect of the Infinite—but by being a flower or an old tin can. Buddha taught the great doctrine of 'anatta,' which means that things are as they are, unique, individual and impermanent, having no mysterious essential and in-dwelling immortal self. This is what is so excellent about them. You clap your hands, and where does the sound go? If it stayed, it would not be a slap; if things did not end, they would not have a beginning, and this would never exist. When we try to perpetuate them, we kill them; when we try to unite the temporal with the eternal, we destroy it. What is the need? Eternity is the moment, not in everlastingness. He knows eternity who lets the moment go, who lets it be momentary, who lets himself be mortal and limited in time and space. Try as you may, we cannot prevent ourselves from doing this, and therefore Buddhism teaches that we are already in Nirvana in spite of ourselves. Surely this is excellent news.

ALAN⁶⁰¹ W. WATTS. "THIS WORLD AS REALITY." @@

1. When we say that all things in the universe are the creative activity of God, this is really like putting legs on a snake or painting the reflection on a mirror. It is not to be compared to seeing that activity as it is, although we say that it is God's activity to draw attention to it in a particular way. But the trouble is that people spend so much energy looking for the God that they fail to see the activity, which is surely a sad state of affairs. What is this activity? The rivers flow; the flowers bloom; you walk down the street.

ALAN W. WATTS. "THE BUDDHIST WAY OF LIFE."

^{600 587}

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^{@@} In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND. 1941

Really we should need to say no more than this, but it is sometimes called the activity of God to point out a certain understanding to the sort of person who might retort, "The rivers flow; the flowers bloom; you walk down the street—so what?"

- 2. It is a way of emphasizing actual life to draw attention to it in much the same way as we underline words or put them in italics. Thus we call the universe the activity of God to induce the so-whatter to pay some attention and reverence to it, because he always bolts his life instead of rolling it appreciatively round his tongue.
- 3. The snow is falling on the window-sill. Is this the activity of God? May be, but if anyone watches it <u>in order to</u> see God he will surely be disappointed. "No man hath seen God." No, and in looking for God he may fail to see the snow. "Thou art Brahman!" But if you look in yourself <u>in order</u> to find Brahman, you will be very disappointed indeed. Yet all this trouble has started because people have taken a simple device much too far.
- 4. Whence all this hurry to arrive at a state? Are you not already watching the snow? Are you not already face-to-face with the eternal mystery? Take it easy for a while; just watch the snow⁶⁰² falling or the kettle boiling, and not so much hurry. What's wrong with the watching the snow or the kettle that anyone should want to arrive at a state? Is it possibly that any ordinary moron can do this just as well, and why not go him one better? How splendid is his ignorance! Like the stones, the grass and the wind, he has Enlightenment without knowing it, and cannot appreciate his good fortune. Yet he, too, is a so-whatter, for he asks "So what?" when others go questing for God. He is not free to watch the snow because he can do nothing else, and especially because he does not appreciate his freedom.

But you are free to abandon yourself to actual life and to know that living in God is another name for this abandonment, for watching the snow and walking down the street. And you are free not only because you have been living in this abandonment all the time, though without knowing it. If you had actually to get into it, to arrive at a state of abandonment, where you had not previously been, you would not be free, for this would involve going somewhere, arriving to-morrow at a place where you were not yesterday. And to-morrow never comes.

You say you do not feel this abandonment right now. What do you expect to feel? It is not <u>a</u> feeling; it is feeling. It is not <u>a</u> thought; it is thinking. If it were a particular thought or feeling there could be coming into it and going out of it; but God is One and all-inclusive, and here there can be neither coming nor going, inside or outside.

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^{602 589}

ALAN W. WATTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MYSTERY.[®]

1. Perhaps the greatest advice ever given to those who tread the path to Enlightenment was the Zen master's answer to the question, "What is the Tao?" "Walk on!" Unfortunately so many of us are much more inclined to walk off, even to the extent of making jumps into the air. In other words⁶⁰³, life moves and to attain harmony we must keep pace with it; to stop for a moment to regret the past, to put off the future or to retain the present is to be thrown out of time. For life passes on, and those who lag create about themselves a turmoil like a log caught up in the weeds by the side of a stream. But those who move forward in time attain that stillness which is perfect motion; the stream carries them and the turmoil ceases—hence the Christian paradox that in the service of God is perfect freedom. But there are so many leaping salmon in the human stream, jumping up from the water at the elusive objects of the upper air. Perhaps they are attracted by the glories of the sky, preferring them to the familiar water. But if only they would not create so many ripples they would see that the water holds the sky's reflection. For this world is the counterpart of the worlds beyond; man is the universe write small; and every littlest thing of this world is a symbol of eternal principles.

Therefore it is rather disturbing to find so many who discredit this ordinary world that we know with our five senses. Someone wrote to me saying that she was very anxious to attain "Cosmic Consciousness," and could I please help. So much is written and said in occult and "spiritual" circles about the development of senses which can see beyond ordinary life; our senses, they say, deceive us and with occult perception we could discover the truth behind this mirage of form and substance. It does not often occur to them to ask why, if our physical senses deceive us, our occult senses should not deceive us also. Furthermore the question arises, "If there are deeper worlds within this world, do we become any the wiser just for changing our realm of perception?" But for the vast majority of religious people, extraordinary states of consciousness, conditions of occult perception and the rest are simply means of leading one astray⁶⁰⁴. For the Buddha said: "In this very body, six feet in length, with its senseimpressions and its thoughts and ideas, I do declare to you are the world, and the origin of the world, and the ceasing of the world, and likewise the Way that leadeth to the ceasing thereof." (Anguttara Nikaya, ii 46). And here are two Zen stories which demonstrate the same truth. The disciple asked, "What is the Tao?" And the master replied: "Usual life is the very Tao." On another occasion a disciple asked, "What is 'satori' (Enlightenment)?" The master answered, "Your everyday thoughts."

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[®] In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND: 1937.

^{603 590}

ALAN W. WATTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MYSTERY $^{604}\,591$

I have just been reading Miss Evelyn Underhill's famous work 'Mysticism' and was astonished to find that her opening chapter was based on the peculiar theme that mystical understanding involves the knowledge that this "worldly existence" is only a shadow-play, that sense knowledge is a distortion of Truth and that its familiar forms are only the symbols of what lies beyond. Certainly they are symbols, but they are not only symbols. In the word 'only' there is the suspicions of a sneer. Now in snearing there is pride: there is also a tinge of what is known as the "inferiority complex," which simply means pretending to be superior to something to which you inwardly know yourself to be inferior. As a rule, those who in any way deprecate the ordinary world of the senses are those who have not come to terms with it; and those who have come to terms with it do not deprecate it. In the sayings quoted above from the Buddha and the Zen masters there is no trace of pride; they are the words of those whose eyes have been opened to the miracle of a world from which so many would-be mystics seem anxious to run away. But there is no mysticism in exploring other worlds, in attaining mere knowledge. If we are to understand mysticism as the art of bringing oneself into harmony with life, as perceiving and living its deepest meaning, then this world⁶⁰⁵ is sufficient for us. Attempts to see beyond the senses come under a totally different department of human activity, namely Science, whether physical or psychic. This is a perfectly legitimate undertaking so long as we do not imagine that it increases our spirituality. It is simply the accumulation of facts about the universe, and it has been said that the important thing is not facts but their significance. Lao Tzu once said that without going out of his door he knew the whole universe. That is to say, in the world in which you live you have the secret of all possible worlds; when you know one you know all, for all are based on the same principles. Therefore spiritual wisdom is less in accumulating experiences than in perceiving the significance of any one experience, and for that purpose our ordinary everyday experience is enough. For the secret is that the Enlightenment which we seek by such curious and roundabout ways is precisely what we experience at this very moment, whether it is sitting in a chair or having breakfast. As Hui Heng might say, the difference between a Buddha and ordinary person is that one realizes this and the other does not. For this reason a Chinese poet said:

How wondrous and how miraculous this – I draw water and I carry fuel.

Or in the words of Hakuin:

This very earth is the Lotus Land of Purity,

And this body is the Body of Buddha.

For mystical understanding involves a great sense of wonder and reverence for the most common experience. As a rule vast knowledge of the mysteries of the

605 592

universe increases pride; to lay bare all mysteries is to be in danger of becoming bored, and Van der Leeuw has wisely said that "the mystery of life is not a problem to be solved, but a reality to be experienced." If you try to discover the secret of beauty by taking a flower to pieces, you will arrive at the 606 somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion of having abolished the flower. For beauty is beauty just because it is a mystery, and when ordinary life is known as profound mystery then we are somewhat near to wisdom. Here is a new connection between mystery and mysticism, a connection which is sometimes indignantly denied. So, you will say, is the important thing just to cast aside all curiosity and embrace the maxim that where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise? Of course, the catch is that every degree of wisdom has its counterpart in folly, and the two are so alike that the wise man is wise simply because he can distinguish them. The highest and lowest notes of the musical scale are both inaudible, and the ignoramus and the sage are both faced with mystery. The difference between the two is that even if you explained the mystery to the sage it would still remain mysterious, whereas the fool would simply be disappointed and disillusioned. For the fool would imagine that the explanation, the taking to pieces, the analysis, had spoint the mystery; the sage would see that it has not even begun to explain it. The fool would think that he had thereby become wise; the sage would know that he was still a fool, and, in the words of Chuang Tzu, "He who knows he is a fool is not a great fool."

Therefore if the sage is told that this world is no more than a maya, a phantom, conjured up from the Primordial Essence by deceptive senses, he is not very much impressed. If a doctor explains the transformations undergone by food in his stomach, he does not cease to enjoy his dinner. If a scientist informs him that thunder is not the music of the gods but mere electrical disturbances the thunder is for him no less wonderful. For what is especially interesting about explanations is that they do not explain; and what is especially dangerous about them is that if they are taken seriously enough and far enough they simply explain things away. And even if one does resort to the ultimate⁶⁰⁷ madness if explaining all things away, there remains still the impenetrable mystery of who is it that explains and why?

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MAN AND THE MEANS. 1. Even if he chooses the right path he cannot help choosing it for some selfish end; because of his inherent wrongness, he aims at spiritual unselfishness for the sake of his own pride, or in the belief that it will in some way deliver him from the limitations of circumstance. The fundamental problem is, therefore, of motive, and for this reason the Buddha put Right Motive at the very beginning of his Eightfold Path. And yet, it must be asked, how can we have right motive until we have trodden that path?

606 593

ALAN W. WATTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MYSTERY

607 594

ALAN W. WATTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MYSTERY

2. We must ask ourselves again just why we are making this act of acceptance. Nine times out of ten we shall find that we are only trying to achieve the same end in the opposite way, that we are accepting our limitations in order, paradoxically, to escape from them. Acceptance may be the right means, but again it works in the wrong way because acceptance is not our real motive.

Much is said in modern psychology of the evils of trying to escape from life, by which is meant suffering and limitation, for naturally we do not try to avoid the things which give us pleasure. But psychology does not give us much help beyond this destructive criticism; it does not tell us how <u>not</u> to try to escape, although it pretends to do so. It teaches the doctrine of acceptance, which is all very well so long as it is recognized that acceptance may simply become the tool of the desire to escape which is always an essentially selfish desire. The same truth has been expressed in the saying that "Nirvana is not for those who desire it, since Nirvana is the absence of desire." The question is naturally asked, "How, then, do we <u>not</u> desire Nirvana?" And again we must ask ourselves why we want not to desire it. The answer must⁶⁰⁸ be, 'In order that we may have it,' which brings us back to the point where we began.

- 3. Those who are persistently honest with themselves are always led to this strange impasse, this point where they seem to be revolving in circles, vainly trying to achieve the impossible. In this state they begin to despair of salvation, for in all religious effort they see only the hopeless attempt to run away from the one thing from which we cannot escape, seeing that it is the very thing that runs away—oneself. And when we learn that trying not to run away from it is only running in the opposite direction, they understand that nothing can be achieved by trying. The self cannot change itself any more than the blind can lead the blind; all attempts to be different are vain attempts to avoid what <u>is</u>, and to try not to avoid what <u>is</u> only an indirect means of avoiding it.
- 4. At this point our minds may be troubled by serious doubts. We shall be wondering if religion is not, after all, an absurdity. For the moment we begin thinking about our own thoughts, feeling about our own feelings, and desiring about our own desires, we become involved in the morass of infinite regress, the endless circling of the dog in chase of its own tail, or the perpetual efforts of a lunatic to kiss his own lips. This, we may say, is wholly unnecessary. What is the use of working ourselves into this hopeless condition which may so easily lead to madness? Animals have no religion, and before we began to think about these things we just behaved like animals and went ahead with the ordinary business of life, eaching, sleeping, and playing without having another thought about it. Perhaps it would have been much better to stay in this condition after all. But we are men and not animals, and man has this peculiar faculty of self- consciousness which is the source of all the trouble. His personality seems to be

^{608 595}

divided; there is the self and the self⁶⁰⁹ which is aware of the self, and these two divisions are by no means at peace with each other. Like Siamese twins, they are inseparable and yet wish to go in opposite directions. We have no evidence at all that there are two selves; it is more likely that there is just one self which is hopeless confused by the one thing which it cannot understand—itself. For it is self-conscious; it knows that it exists but cannot see what sort of a thing it is that exists.

But it is not wholly self- conscious, for this is revealed in the very fact that it tries to change its own desires and control its own impulses. It looks upon those desires as something almost external, something which it can clutch and move. It is as if a man were trying to walk by moving his legs with his hands, not realizing that he can make his legs move by themselves. What is true of the legs is true also of the mind; it is not something apart from ourselves which we can control and restrain, as it were, from without. There is a Zen story which illustrates this point peculiarly well. A disciple came to Bodhidharma and said, 'Master I have no peace of mind, Pray pacify it.' Bodhidharma answered, 'Bring out your mind here before me and I will pacify it.' The disciple was sorely puzzled and said, 'But I cannot find my mind to bring it out.' 'Then,' replied Bodhidharma, 'I have pacified your mind.' There is yet another story which shows the same truth in a different way. A disciple asked, 'How can I be delivered from the wheel of birth and death?' The master replied, 'Who is putting you restraint?' Indeed, who is? When you walk into trouble do not blame your feet.

5. The mistake is to localize either the Path or the Goal. There is a saying in the Voice of the Silence that you cannot treath the Path until you have become it. The same is true of the Goal. It does not exist independently of yourself;⁶¹⁰ it is only another name for yourself in a certain state.

6. As Milton has it:-

The mind is its own place, and of itself Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.

And if the mind is a hell anyway, how can it make a heaven? Figs do not grow on thistles, and that is the problem. The only answer one can give is the advice of a French painter to his own pupils —"Continuez, mes enfants, continuez." When the problem seems more baffling than ever, then is the greatest opportunity. "Continuez" ever more, for effort in the darkest hour is worth ten times as much effort during the light.

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MONKEY-MIND IN RELIGION.

609 596

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MAN AND THE MEANS 610 597

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MAN AND THE MEANS

One of the most disturbing features of all religious thought to-day, whether among Buddhists, Christians, Hindus or Theosophists, is the enormous amount of pure materialism dressed up in spiritual guise. By this I do not mean moral materialism, such as the sensuous pursuits of decadent priests or the use of religious forms for selfish ends. Nor should the term materialism be understood in this sense as the denial of a life after death, of the existence of God or of eternal valves transcending time and space. For the particular form of materialism in question is something much more subtle than this, something which is found in almost every department of philosophy and religion, something which is found in almost every department of philosophy and religion something which is, in our time, the most potent enemy of true spirituality, the more so because its presence is unnoticed. Part of the difficulty is that we are wholly vague as to what we mean by such elusive terms as "matter" and "spirit" and their even more elusive adjectives "material" and "spiritual." It has been said that spirit is simply a finer form of matter, and, especially in occult circles, this saying is the cause of a most lamentable⁶¹¹ confusion of thought. For the so-called occultist is often under the impression that he is being spiritual in the highest sense of the word when he is concerning himself with the study and manipulation of these finer forms of matter, when he is developing his senses of raising his consciousness so that he can perceive and control them. But in fact he is still being purely material, for matter does not cease to be material when it takes on finer forms, when it becomes invisible to our ordinary senses. Strictly speaking, the occultist of this kind is dealing with psychic things, and under the heading "psychic" we must place all such phenomena as telepathy, clairvoyance, projection of the astral body and the development of those powers which are known in Buddhism as the 'siddhis.' Even the word "psychic" is unhappy in this place, for it comes originally from the Greek word 'psyche' meaning the soul. But it has been used so constantly in connection with these phenomena that it is now impossible to separate it from them, and we can only be clear on the subject if we agree to define as psychic just those material things which are unperceived by our five senses in their present state of development. Thus there is no difference of kind between material and psychic substances; there is only difference of degree. Besides occultists of this kind, there are others who are victims of the same confusion, but in a less obvious form, and I think they may be placed under two general headings.

The first are those who consider that there is something spiritual and religious in beliefs or even knowledge about the visible or invisible structure and destiny of the universe. They hope to arrive at spirituality by studying the laws of the universe, maintaining that for every material law there is a spiritual counterpart. This is true enough if we agree to call this counterpart not spiritual but psychic. It is true also⁶¹²

that the outward forms of spiritual development are analogous to many material processes such as the conception and birth of a child, the motion and nature of the wind, the growth of a flower or the inner workings of the body. This we understand from observing the behaviour of spiritual people and from their own words which liken spiritual attainments to material processes. But these are only the outward forms; they are the what and how of spiritual development, but never the why, and it is only this last that belongs to the realm of true spirituality. No one can obtain the spiritual gifts of a sage by copying his outward behaviour; for this is only copying what the sage does, and is not necessarily doing it for the same reason as the sage. If the motive for the sage's behaviour is love, it may well be that the copyist's motive is nothing more than self-aggrandisement.

This brings us to our second category—those who believe that spirituality can be attained simply by shaping their lives in accordance with a pattern, simply by imposing upon themselves a technique. The mere observance of a rule of life can no more produce spirituality than figs can grow on thistles, or a beautiful symphony can emerge from a purely mathematical arrangement of notes. There are no rules for producing spirituality any more than there is a specific method of creating in oneself love for another person, any more than one can read in a book how to make oneself a Beethoven or a Shakespeare. Certainly we can say what a Beethoven symphony is, but we cannot say why it is beautiful. The musician may try to explain its beauty by its accordance with certain rules and standards of musical expression. But question him further, and he will be quite unable to say just why those rules and standards are beautiful. It simply happens that we like them; the innermost core of our being shouts a joyous "Yes!" when it hears them. But words can tell⁶¹³ us no more than what it shouts at; why it shouts remains an impenetrable mystery. One might indeed write music which accorded in every respect with those rules and standards and yet fall a long way short of Beethoven's genius. For this is simply copying; it is following slavishly in the paths which others have trodden, and this is the very antithesis of spirituality. It is just that materialism which we have described as the besetting danger of religion in this age and for that matter in any age.

For in just the same way the slavish copying of someone else's religion—whether the Buddha's the Christ's, Patanjali's, Krishna's or Lao-Tzu's—can only lead to a dead end. This is why the teachers of Zen have discouraged reliance on scriptures, on moral rules and on ritual as means of producing Enlightenment. These things, may be necessary for ordering the lives of those who neither desire nor care about spiritual attainment, but he who strives for Enlightenment must be ready to accept the dangers of giving up these props and crutches, for he must be prepared to die for his Goal. For they are no more than the mechanism, the technique, the means of expression of true

spirituality, and without spirituality they are like a brush without an artist. For ethics, exercises in meditation, prayer or self-sacrifice can no more effect spirituality by themselves than a brush can jump up off a palate and paint a masterpiece. They can make a well-ordered life, but this is not necessarily a spiritual life. This may seem a farfetched analogy unless we remember that spirituality is something essentially creative. In just the same way as a mastery of musical technique will not of itself make a Beethoven, a mastery of moral technique will not of itself make a Buddha. In this respect religion offers an exact parallel with art, music and literature. For⁶¹⁴ there is all the difference in the world between the reason why a Buddha will be moral and why a copyist will be moral. The one is a free and creative genius using a limited technique in order to express, as far as possible, his genius in the world of form and limitation. The other is a slave who is no greater than his technique; he relies on it, depends utterly upon it, and is used by it instead of using it. He is like a carpenter who is no greater than his hammer who expects it to show him the right way to knock in nails.

The essence of spirituality is creative freedom. It is compelled to pay regard to the regulations of technique if it is to be expressed at all in this limited words; but it always feels technique to be a poor instrument and inwardly rebels against its insufficiency. But in this it is a thousand million miles from the copyist who seeks Enlightenment within technique, who expects these limited rules to reveal the supreme secret by themselves. This, perhaps, is the reason behind the strange, dynamic antics of Zen teachers and of the true mystics of all time. In every Zen book will be found warnings against the danger of copying these antics which seem to laugh at all the rules of logic. But when the Zen master hands his disciple a cup of tea in answer to a question about Buddhism, he is not trying to be obscure. He is performing a creative, free and spontaneous act; he is expressing the creative power of the universe which pulses in his own soul. He is not acting in accordance with a percept, handing his disciple a cup because an old book says this is the right thing to do. For in the spiritual man all thoughts and deeds proceed spontaneously from this centre of power. It is impossible to tell anyone how to attain this state, except to say, "Just go straight ahead with life. Don't stop to imitate. Just life, and one day the secret will reveal itself quite unexpectedly, for if you live fully, life⁶¹⁵ itself will show it to you. For of a sudden you will find to your surprise that you have performed an unpremeditated, spontaneous and above all genuine act—not a forgery. But if you go about expecting this revelation you will not find it, because the irritating joke is that you have it all the time without knowing it. At every moment you are expressing this great creative power, but you hinder its expression by trying to copy someone else's style in the belief that it will give you his genius." That is why all mystics tell us to seek Enlightenment not in books but

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in our own hearts—and mark the word "own." It is lying there all the time, and just because it is the thing nearest to us (which indeed <u>is</u> us) it is the thing least known. It only comes to light when we <u>use</u> it, when we learn to see with our own eyes instead of asking another to tell us what he sees. No one can tell you how to see with our own eyes except to say "Look!" No one can tell you how to use your legs except to say "Walk!" Spirituality is a faculty given to every man just as much as speech and sight and movement; it is undeveloped just because we do not make ourselves, through use, aware of its "muscular centre." You cannot walk without first becoming aware of the power in your legs; you will get nowhere by trying to move them with your hands! But this is just as the monkey copies man and imitates his efficiency without developing, through use, the power of thought.

Spirituality, therefore, develops through use, and not through the use of its means of expression, monkey-wise. The only thing we can say to the man who wants to become a great musician is "Just use your technique creatively. Create musical sounds! Sing music from our of yourself!" In the same way to the aspirant to spirituality we must say, "use the forms of life creatively. Live life out of yourself. Let each act⁶¹⁶ be something new, but do not make a fetish of novelty. And above all remember that as you live you are creating the universe a new out of nothing in every thought and deed. If you stop creating for the moment, your universe will return to nothingness. And if you copy instead of creating, you will not have a universe at all!"

But does this mean that, for the beginner, all technique must be abandoned? Furthermore, can we make any final distinction between technique and life itself? For is it possible to live at all without technique? Breathing, eating, walking—all these things require a certain degree of technique, and perhaps we should never have dreamt of any kind of spiritual attainment at all unless we had first learnt the technique of speech. Again, to revert to our musical analogy, it must be asked whether Beethoven would ever have discovered his own latent genius if he had not first been drilled in the technique of music. Perhaps it is true that although religious technique will not of itself produce spirituality, it will clear the way for its approach. This is true enough, but the danger is that we should become slaves to technique, and this is especially liable to happen in religion. For unlike music or painting, true religion is not a particular activity. There can be no painting without canvas, brush and colours but vital religion can exist and manifest itself apart from meditation, prayer, ethics and dogma. For spirituality is precisely creative and spontaneous living, and this can come through a whole multitude of techniques most of which may not seem to have anything to do with religion as generally understood. For this purpose chopping wood can be as effective as any ritual, seeing that the hallmark of spirituality is that it is universal. Freedom and limitation are ultimately inseparable, but spiritual freedom is not bound

to a particular set of limitations. Spirituality us limited in⁶¹⁷ so far as life itself is limited by its countless forms of techniques—but no further. Therefore when we say that slavish devotion to technique is the antithesis of spirituality, we refer to the idea that Enlightenment can <u>only</u> be found through one or other of the techniques generally understood as religious, to the idea that we are being spiritual only when our lives are limited by specifically religious or ethical forms.

On the contrary, these forms are worse than useless unless we can see beyond them, unless we can bring forth our spirituality through any other kind of activity of which we may be capable. For true religion dies if we try to fit it into "water-tight compartments," and the spiritual man rejoices in and acts creatively thro' and with any means of expression at his disposal. So also, he who would achieve spirituality must remember that the spirit is life and that he has the means of penetrating its secrets in every task and action that comes to hand. He must avoid aping the religion of others, realizing that the technique of the spirit is the whole vast technique of life and not just that particular assembly of medication, ethics, doctrine and ritual called religion. For religion in this sense was never intended to be anything more than an aid to life. To become absorbed in it, and to neglect life altogether is wholly to miss the point; it is always preparing to live and never actually living. Therefore the mistake is to confine spirituality to any particular physical, mental or moral form; it is embodied in every form, for every form partakes of life and is produced by the creative energy of the universe.

But the trouble is that the religions of the world are thronged with such a vast number of "seekers," combing through a host of doctrines and practices to find the One Royal Road to Truth, 618 trying to confine Truth's immense life within a set of definitions. Herein is materialism and an idolatry of ideas, an attempt to rise to the stature of the great masters by wearing their cast-off clothes. But the secret is not to devote one's life to religion, for this is to become shut in a particular box. Rather it is to devote one's religion to life, expanding from the particular to the universal, to the knowledge that the spirit rises a new and unceasingly in everything that lives and moves. Therefore to "seekers" and copyists and all who put their heads into obscure holes and corners to see what lies right before them in to open we would address the tremendous words of Zen master Rinzai:

"Do not get yourselves entangled with any object, but stand above, pass on and be free! As I see those so-called followers of Truth all over the country, there are none who come to me free and independent of objects...They are all ghostly existences,

617 604

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MONKEY-MIND IN RELIGION $^{618}\ 605$

ALAN W. WATTS. THE MONKEY-MIND IN RELIGION

ignominious gnomes haunting the woods or bamboo-groves; they are selfish spirits of the wilderness. They are madly biting into all heaps of filth. O you mole-eyed!...What do you seek in a neighbour's house? You are putting another head over your own! What do you lack in yourselves? O you followers of Truth, what you are making use of at this very moment is none other than what makes a Buddha. But you do not believe me and seek it outwardly. Do not commit yourselves to an error. There are no realities outside, nor is there anything inside you may lay your hands on. You stick to the literal meaning of what I speak to you, but how far better it is to have all your hankerings stopped and be doing nothing whatever!"

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET. (1) This round, this 'samsara', is considered by Tibetan philosophers as a pure illusion, a dream that the mind (1) itself creates. And they believe that it can be escaped from by passing "beyond" — "upon the other shore" as the 'Theravadins' say.

But this "beyond" is not a place, this "other shore" is nowhere but in our minds. It behoves us to pass beyond those narrow, prejudicial, erroneous conceptions which we have of charity, morality, patience, effort, meditation, and the whole mass of our limited learning which we consider knowledge with a capital K.

All those who are acquainted with Buddhist doctrines know that at their base is found the negation of an existing <u>ego</u>, an uncompounded and permanent entity, either in the person or in anything whatsoever that we can imagine. In site of the difference in philosophical theories, all Buddhist sects agree perfectly upon this point. "Sabbe dhamma anatta," all things are devoid of an ego say the Pali texts and Tibetans desiring undoubtedly to fortify this statement repeat it twice to avoid any quibbling: "There is no <u>ego</u> in the individual. There is no <u>ego</u> in anything.

2. The members of the Council are instincts, tendencies, desires, ideas, concepts, beliefs. They come out of a distant past, descendants and heirs of causes whose line is hidden in the eternity of time. Physical and mental affinities have grouped them momentarily, but the group is not indissoluble. On the contrary, every moment alters its composition.

Thus are explained the contradictory impulses which we feel, our changes of opinion or of conduct. All this is nothing but the manifestation of different members of the Council.

Learned Tibetans adhere to the peculiar 'mahayanist' doctrine which is expounded in the 'Prajna Paramita', the great philosophical work ascribed to Nagarjuna. Now, in 'Prajna Paramita' it is written: "Like images seen in a dream, so should we consider all things."

^{@@} In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND, 1938.

^{619 606}

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET

The world which appears to us, the Tibetan masters say, is within us, not without us. It is⁶²⁰ made up of subjective images that we ourselves create. All that we see, all that we feel, resemble that which we see or feel in a dream state. In our dreams we suffer, we rejoice, we live in opulence or we are clothed in rags, we meet all sorts of people, we perform all kinds of actions and when we awake, all this phantasmagoria disappears: we are men or women who have spent the night in bed. Well, say the Tibetan philosophers, when we awake in our bed, another phase of the dream begins, but it is always a dream.

If you try to embarrass the philosopher who asserts this by saying that the proof of the reality of what you see lies in the fact that other people see the same thing, he will be able to answer you: "How," he will ask, "can you prove that these other people exist? You, yourself are the only witness, these 'people' are perhaps nothing else than subjective images projected by your own thoughts. They affirm that they see what you see, because you seek through their lips, they resemble the 'people' whom you converse with in your dreams.

3. One will be tempted to invoke memory as a testimony and say: "I am certain that I am not a butterfly, for I remember perfectly that, yesterday, I was a man and performed actions that are proper to man alone, and I remember that last year and during many other years the same thing happened.

To this reasoning some learned Tibetans will answer: "Tell me, please <u>when</u> you <u>know</u> that you have performed these actions in the past? The question seems strange indeed, but after having reflected, one must admit that it is at the present moment that one "knows" this. Then, after certain explanations, the Tibetan will conclude that since it is <u>at the present moment</u> that one knows this, he will affirm that he had performed these actions, is conscious of having done them, it is possible that it is a question of ideas that have only now been born in his mind. He has the idea⁶²¹ that he did this or that, but only the <u>idea</u> exists.

Perhaps this may make the interlocutor angry and he will reply to this tiresome reasoning: "As a proof that I was a tailor here is a cost that I sewed; to prove that I was an architect, here is a plan, and a house that was built upon this plan. To prove that I was married, here is my son who is twenty years old." But the imperturbable Tibetan will smilingly reply: "But my friend, in your dreams you have already been a tailor, an architect, a father of a family and all kinds of other characters and you have seen the fruits of their activity; all that you say applies to subjective images projected by your mind which is full of ideas. You, yourself are only an idea present in my mind. I have

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET

^{620 607}

^{621 608}

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET

no infallible proof that you exist. I can only know that I have an idea of this, the impression that it is so. This idea, this impression comes from a cause, but it is not absolutely certain that this cause is really the existence of this man, who argues with me, as I imagine to be."

Buddhist teaching includes theories relating to rebirth and rejects the belief in reincarnation. How could it, after having denied the existence of an uncompounded and permanent ego admit reincarnation? One would ask: reincarnation of what? But the force of habit, and attachment to the powerful illusion of personality, conceived as an uncompounded entity, has made the majority of Buddhists hold to the ancient Hindu belief in the reincarnation of the 'jiva' or spirit.

4. We have already seen that learned Tibetans consider a person to be an aggregate of various elements and not made up only of two parts: soul or spirit and body. They hold that all these elements persist. Not one of them dies nor is otherwise destroyed; each transforms itself and continues to live in the guise of its successive transformations.⁶²² Tibetan masters adhere to the original doctrine of five 'skandhas' but each of these five they see as subdivided in many ways. According to their theory, we never meet with an indivisible unit, a simple atom of homogeneous substance. Everything is compounded, is an aggregation, and no sooner has one seized and separated the elements of those aggregations than each of them appears as a complex capable of being in its turn divided into several elements.

Thus, consciousness is viewed as including five dimensions, each one representing the particular consciousness corresponding to one of the five senses. A sixth consciousness corresponds to intellect, to ideas and, as a subdivision of this latter, is reckoned as a consciousness of the illusory "self" that which "I", voyage in the 'bordo' during the time that elapses between the death (in the ordinary sense of the word) of a person and his rebirth. During this period the consciousness of the eye, the consciousness of the ear, etc. are reborn separately.

5. To be conscious of one's self, the Tibetans say, is to remember impressions that were produced by sensations or perceptions. Conception, according to Tsong Khapa, is brought about by the desire of this consciousness (in Tibetan 'mam par Shepa') to gain taste sensations produced by the senses, this being impossible since this consciousness is no longer united to a physical body. Driven by his passion for life, lived in union with a body, the 'rnam shes' seeks a "place of birth" (a womb). When causes proceeding from past lives, are to bring about birth as a man, the 'rnam shes' feels attraction for a woman, its desire influences her and leads her to seek sexual union. The 'rnam shes' takes advantage of this to reincarnate at the moment of conception. If a

^{622 609}

feminine birth is to take place, the 'rnam shes' feels attraction for a man and the latter is incited to seek union with a woman.

We should note that, according to this theory, the⁶²³ movements of the 'rnam shes' are not arbitrary. It acts according to the impulses produced by the elements of which it is made. As I have already pointed out, in this philosophical system, no "simple bodies" exist made of "indivisible atoms," If I may use these expressions by way of analogy. The 'rnam shes' is a complex, subjected to the law of affinity, it is swayed by attractions and repulsions that are determined by the nature of the elements composing it.

From this point of view, the undeniable fact of heredity, explained with difficulty, sometimes even denied by some followers of the 'Theravada', is no longer in opposition to the popular doctrine of 'karma'. I say popular, for Tibetan philosophers expound other doctrines regarding karma or as is said in Tibetan: 'las rgyu hbras, "the fruit caused by the action." The new being will resemble his parents for it is precisely under the influence of physical and mental tendencies corresponding to those of his parents that he has been driven to seek rebirth as their child. There is already a prenatal resemblance, but resemblance does not mean complete identification. If certain elements existing in the "group" called the "I consciousness" correspond to those that exist in the "groups" forming the "persons" of the father and mother chosen by it, or at last are in sympathy with them, the 'rnam shes' nevertheless contains other elements also. These may differ considerably from the elements that constitute the "persons" of its chosen parents; they may be absolutely antagonistic to them. At the moment of "choosing" perhaps these elements, of an opposite nature, were not so active—in the 'rnam shes' —as those that determined the "choice" or, according to certain opinions it may have happened that they sought complementary elements, or even, have yielded to the attraction of contrast. They⁶²⁴ can later manifest themselves as extraordinary divergences of temperament, such differences as are sometimes observed between parents and children. This term "later" may apply to a distant epoch.

According to the same doctrine, we carry, latent within us, the germs of many possibilities that remain unmanifested, but although for a time inactive, their influence is nevertheless felt by the 'rnam shes' in quest of parents to provide it with a body. A 'rnam shes' attracted by tendencies of courage, daring, existing in the person who will become his father, may in his in new incarnation be governed by contradictory influences that put to sleep the similar tendencies that existed in itself; but these dispositions, though dormant, may remain alive and attract a 'rnam shes' animated by analogous inclinations. If nothing impedes the manifestation of these inclinations, we

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET

^{623 610}

^{624 611}

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN TIBET

shall, then, have a grandson resembling his grandfather and perhaps, not at all his father.

It is interesting to examine these theories, but we must beware of thinking that they constitute the last word on the matter, among philosophers in Tibet. The final teaching sweeps away any idea of the duration of life from birth to death. This we find, however, expressed also in the 'Visuddhi Magga' a book much esteemed by the 'Theravadins,' in the words: "The existence of a being does not exceed the duration of a single thought. As soon as this thought comes to an end, the being also finishes."

- 6. Suppose, said the Lama, that from countless blazing fires, sparks and red hot cinders leap up, some of them fall into neighbouring fires while others, more violently projected, cross the space and land in far distant blazes. The exchange of sparks is perpetual, no single fire exists that can pretend to burn with its own fire. No "self" exists that is not made up of "others." The 625 dissolution followed by rebirth of the elements forming the "group" called "person" takes place, not only after that which the ignorant call "death" but is occurring every instant. "Birth" in its sense of a first beginning, and "death" in its sense of final ending, do not exist. That is what Nagarjuna expressed when he declared: "No birth, no death; no coming, no going."
- The Buddha placed ignorance at the beginning of the chain of the twelve 7. interdependent causes that produce the beings of our world. Nagarjuna resumed these twelve in three causes, namely: ignorance, desire and act. Desire leads us to act to satisfy ourselves, to get hold of the desired object or to repulse that which we deem undesirable. The act produces a pleasant or a painful sensation and the sensation awakens the desire to act in order to re-experience this pleasant sensation or avoid the return of the painful sensation. And so the round of desire and action goes on dominated by ignorance which creates false conceptions regarding objects of desire and motives of action. If the "round" with its "fires" are "images seen in dream" as the 'Prajna Paramita', asserts, what reason could we have to hunt for the origin and nature of a fuel that only exists in our imagination? – In truth the 'samsara' is within us and not outside of us.

The most imperative advice that the 'Prajna Paramita' gives us is: "Do not imagine anything." What counts is the awakening, the liberation from the dream, then all vain questions and discussions cease. With statement we return to the fundamental theme of Tibetan Mahayanist philosophy.

VEN TAI HSU. "BUDDHISM IN MODERN LIFE." @@

625 612

ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL & THE LAMA YONGDEN: MAHAYANIST THEORIES IN **TIBET**

^{@@} In BUDDHISM IN ENGLAND. 1937.

Under a single principle of universal love, Buddhism, in the course of more than two thousand years, has united nearly five hundred millions of believers in Southern and Central Asia. That it is one of the greatest social accomplishments is 626 shown by the antiquity of its birth, the extension of its development, the numbers of its adherents and the great role which it has played in history and in the development of art in Asia.

The extreme tolerance of its principles and the absolute kindness of its teachings bring moral assistance to those, who, in face of present disorders, are engaged in furthering the programme of civilization. The principles of Buddhism can be applied as a remedy to cure the excesses from which people suffer, such as war poverty, and their attendant evils.

Man's only superiority over nature is his judgement (ability to reason) which is constantly threatened by his emotional senses.

From the moment that man, following an evolutional thesis, distinguished the difference between himself and the animal, to the present time, has there been progress or a moral retrogression? Man may not attain perfection or happiness without peace. The history of the world since its origin is an endless succession of struggles wherein force is always triumphant. If force is an acceptable law from an evolutional point of view, it is no longer acceptable from a moral point of view.

If one considers that the era of all plant life was succeeded by the reign of the animal, and that the reign of man succeeded that of the animal, one wonders what will be the fate of man. Will his present authority continue, or is he merely a characteristic figure, a symbol, as it were, in the evolution of things? Is his advantage or privilege reward for an effort on his part, or the result of an opportunity for development? Will man retain a stable equilibrium content with his profits from the wealth of the world, content to apply his intelligence to the realization of a scientific and material progress?

We are proud of our increasing knowledge of science. But in cultivating its extreme and exact demands,627 are we not risking a great deal? surrendering, giving ourselves over to the rules and laws of machinery where personal values must, inevitably, be lost. Man can be saved only by his inner life, his spiritual life. He believes himself so completely intelligent. He is so sure of himself. "One is sure of oneself when, in conceit and ignorance, one thinks one has found life and receives death."

^{626 613}

In spite of the fact that in all scientific spheres, the human mind has been able to grasp at least a part of an explanation of the world, and may hope each day to reach out further, solving such secrets as have hitherto remained inviolate, nevertheless, man does not yet know—or rather he chooses to ignore the entire problem of his own existence. Therefore he is helpless when he touches the very sources of life, and the immutable laws which govern the universe.

If truly reason or judgment is ours, there should be ways of developing it which we have not yet learned. A few and rare men know such ways.

Two thousand five hundred years ago Sakyamuni was born in India. By the unique development of his judgment, he understood the universe in its reality, and attained happiness by a complete renunciation of himself. Through the Light that was his, and in his great pity for poor human creatures, he showed to them the truth.

The man who succeeded, through his experience, in obtaining and giving out his wisdom, was called the Buddha in India, and the 'Perfect Illuminated One' in China, — the clear visioned observer of the universe and life.

Buddhism demonstrates to us that Enlightenment is a natural phenomenon which can be obtained by a wise development of one's judgment. But our knowledge of such matters is insufficient, and our power of comprehension too limited to arrive at any result without guidance. Buddhism⁶²⁸ gives us that guidance.

With an exact vision of the universe would come at the same time the possibility of moral perfection in mankind, and the probability of universal peace.

For twenty-five centuries, the Buddhist doctrine has been practised by a limited group: the Buddhist monks. To-day, there exists a greater contact between intellectual peoples, a freer and more eager give and take among thinking human beings, and an interest in scientific research which seems to point toward a general desire for enlightenment. This, then, seems the time to spread and teach the theories of Buddhism—theories that are better able than any others to efface ancient prejudice, and to work for and with the unity of the world.

My ambition in life is to increase human felicity, virtue, and intelligence, and to achieve universal peace and happiness. In order to realize this wish it is necessary to effect an integration of civilizations, both ancient and modern, Oriental and Occidental, and to create a universal civilization for the progressive development of mankind. Buddhism teaches harmonious relationship between man and the universe. It removes

the barriers between the different civilizations and will hasten the proper development of their peculiar virtues. It will promote mutual understanding of the different peoples and secure a universal peace.

Furthermore, mankind living amidst scientific discoveries and material development needs an ideal and faith to improve its felicity, virtue and intelligence. The mediaeval conceptions of faith have now come into conflict with scientific thought and are no longer adequate. Buddhism, on the other hand, is entirely in accord with science and satisfies the need of the present generation.

Buddhism welcomes Science, but nevertheless considers it as a body without spirit, and incomplete until⁶²⁹ the higher science or Buddhism has been infused into it. One of the effects of Science, and by no means the least important, is that the whole of civilization can now be destroyed in a few weeks, and we have only to realize that the modern world of the West is governed by money and explosives to see where we are drifting.

Buddhism, on the other hand, tends to rescue the world from violence, so that its union with Science is desirable from every point of view, since its intellectual scope and development enables it to meet Science on all points, and complete it as the other half of a sphere.

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM.#

- 1. But this exaggeration has not the approval of the Blessed One. The life of animals in indeed sacred, but it cannot be as sacred as human life. Animals are tended and cared for, because they in some way subserve general happiness. The exaggerated regard for animal life shown by the pious Buddhists would prove disastrous to the very animals on whose behalf the appeal is made. Our only obligation to animals is to give them a happy life and a painless death. Even the practice of vivisection, if guarded from abuse, is justifiable in so far as it subserves general happiness. As I-tsing says, "if one attempts to protect every being, there will be no means of maintaining oneself and one has to give up life without reason."
- 2. When there is just cause for war, war must be waged openly and resolutely but without cherishing feelings of hatred and revenge. Nowhere does the Buddha approve of that ovine indolence which would not resist evil even by right methods. When Prince Abhaya was stirred up by Jnatiputra to tax the Blessed One with having used unkind language to the schismatic Devadatta, the Blessed One explained that a word

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^{629 616}

VEN TAI HSU. "BUDDHISM IN MODERN LIFE."

^{# (}published in Madras, 1912)

which is true and is intended to do good, though it give pain, is right. So also war in a righteous⁶³⁰ cause, which is intended to teach a lesson to the evil-doer, is right.

The spirit of Buddhism is essentially socialistic, that is to say, it teaches concerted action (samanartha) for social ends, a completely fraternal social life. It is therefore totally opposed to that industrialism which with its unremitting, sordid, unscrupulous and merciless struggle for wealth as the one supreme object of human effort is eating the very vitals of the so-called advanced nations of the world. This fascination for the pursuit of wealth has produced within trade circles perfect callousness to the feeling of human brotherhood. Observe the attitude of labourer to capitalist, tenant to landowner, of middleman to producer, or of consumer to middleman. Do not these exhibit suspicious and enemical feelings towards one another? A commercial civilization fosters and applauds only self-regarding virtues. It attaches nominal respect to integrity and does not set much store by justice. Defence of personal rights is regarded as the first canon of Duty. Indifference to personal gain is treated with contempt. Can the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few find ethical justification? Capital is not, as some economists contend, always the result of individual saving or exceptional skill in labour but is the surplus seized from producers, many of whom are reduced to a condition of slavery for the comfort and enjoyment of a few. Men in the lower ranks are pillaged to support the higher in luxury and idleness. Some have become millionaires without labour and skill, without superior ability, sagacity or enterprise. How does this differ from theft?

There are still other kinds of theft. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property (landed property) are legitimate... Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning—these are the sources to⁶³¹ which these titles may be traced." So said Herbert Spencer in the first edition of his 'Social Statics'.

- 4. "There is nothing like lust. Lust may be said to be the most powerful passion. Fortunately, we have but one thing which is more powerful. If the thirst for truth were weaker than lust, how many of us in the world would be able to follow the way of righteousness."—Sutra of Forty-two Sections.
- 5. The Buddhists were the first to enjoin total abstinence from strong drink in India. The reason why the Dharma prohibits strong drink is that intoxication incapacitates a man for rational deliberation without hindering him from acting irrationally. Drunkenness leads the drunkard to treat others irrationally and possibly to abuse them.

^{630 617}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM $^{631}\,618$

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

That drunkenness is the cause of many crimes is a well-known fact. Hence to put oneself in such a condition is a source of insecurity to others.

- 6. "Speech must be bold as a lion, gentle and soft as a hare, impressive as a serpent, painted as an arrow and evenly balanced as a dorje held by its middle"... A Buddhist Proverb from Tibet.
- 7. If you are asked to love your enemy and return good for evil, it is because, as the Bodhicharyavatara says, "an enemy is one who is capable of helping you to acquire Bodhi, if you can only love him."
- 8. Buddhism rejects both of these flimsy supports for the moral life. It makes the basis of morality purely subjective. It appeals to the natural needs of man. Man desires to get rid of the sorrows and sufferings of this life; he desires to enjoy endless bliss. How can he attain this? First of all, as the Bodhicharyavatara argues, punyam makes the body happy. If a man is compassionate and serviceable to others, they will not prove a source of trouble to him. No man can realise all these desires without the help of others. Hence if he desires the help⁶³² of others, he must have sympathy and compassion for them. As they also desire happiness, he must endeavour to get rid of their sufferings and sorrows. How can the sufferings of one affect another? In the same way as the suffering of one's foot affects one's hand. Though the body consists of different parts, we treat it as one and protect it. Similarly there may be different beings in this world, still they should all be treated as one, for all are endeavouring to avoid suffering and attain happiness. One's body is the product of the combination of the sperm and the germ of others, but by custom one speaks of one's body as one's own. If what is the product of others can be regarded as one's self, where is the difficulty of regarding the bodies of others as one's own? That one is always the same person is not true; yet one imagines himself to be the same person. Is it more difficult to imagine one's oneness with others? If there is no atman, all beings are equally void. Is not then the fundamental oneness of all beings obvious (paratma samata)? Such is the manner in which the Buddhist argues. For the ordinary Buddhist the doctrine of Karma may serve as the all-important motive force for the moral life. But for the wise man the main-stay of morality is the internal perception of nairatmya, the realization of the selflessness (sunyata) of all beings and the consequent fundamental equality of beings with one another. It is this realization which forms the well-spring of cheerfulness.
- 9. Only in and with the grand life of mankind as a whole can the individual live as a human being. Not only has he been produced by the vital energies of mankind, but they also maintain him till death. With the elevation of humanity the individual rises in the scale of being, and with its downfall he degenerates. Being but an insignificant

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

^{632 619}

episode in the life of mankind, he can lay no claim to everlasting life. But as the generations before him have contributed to his being, so can he⁶³³ also contribute to the well-being of future generations. If the individual desires perpetual life, he can secure it only by living in the whole and for the whole. Hence what is good for all mankind, what creates better conditions for its existence and its perfection, is also good for the individual. What jeopardises the life of humanity or degrades it is also bad for him.

- 10. All are admitted without distinction and difficulty into the Sangha. Only minors, soldiers, slaves, invalids and cripples are not permitted to join the order. There are inevitable exceptions. Invalids and cripplies are disallowed, because they are incapable of the effort needed to attain bodhi. For bikshuta does not consist in leaving an indolent and idle life, but in a strenuous active life for the good of others. "O bhikshus" says the blessed One, "be not afraid of good works; such is the name for happiness, for what is wished, desired, dear and delightful,—namely goodworks."
- 11. Theoretically man and woman are placed by the Buddha on the same footing of equality. But in practice the latter stands much lower. Her peculiar organization places more hindrances in way of her attaining the goal. Before one can attain the Great Peace one must have purified oneself from all lust of the flesh by a severe struggle. Only a few men enter on this struggle, but most men seem capable of entering on the path. But most women are found in experience to be scant in wisdom, too deeply immersed in the passions which are demanded of those who aspire to reach the supreme heights of Nirvana. This is why the Buddhists often say that most women must be born as men, before they can enter on the Noble Path that leads to the Great Deliverance. But the Dharma itself holds both men and women as equally fitted for the task. If women can only see the light and follow the path, they will reach the goal as well as men.
- 12. Among⁶³⁴ the Buddhists the ceremony of marriage is very simple. There are no complicated superstitious observances connected with it. In Ceylon, Tibet, Mongolia, Japan and in all other Buddhist countries marriage is properly a civil contract witnessed only by parents and guardians relations and friends. Marriage in Burma is a compact on the part of husband and wife which is made before the elders of the village. When a Burmese woman marries, she does not change her name, nor does she wear any outward sign of marriage, such as a 'tali', or a ring, or a covering for the head. No stranger can find out either from a woman's name or by seeing her whether she is married or not, or whose wife she is. A husband has no power over her wife's property. Whatever she may bring with her, or earn for herself, or inherit subsequently, is all her own. She is absolutely the mistress not only of her own property but also of her own

^{633 620}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM 634 621

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

self. Among the Hindus a woman is always dependent. When young she is dependent on her parents, when married on her husband, and when old on her children. Among Europeans, a woman loses her own name when she marries, and becomes known only as the mistress of her husband. In Burma a woman, though married, always remains mistress of herself, a companion of her husband. No wonder that Sir. T.T. Scott says that "Burmese woman enjoys many rights which her European sister is even now clamouring for!"

The very heart and centre of Buddhist teaching is the inviolable sanctity of the individual. It is opposed to holding any person in the trammels of obedience, for maitri is the supreme law. The rule of the Buddhist 'Vihara' is a rule of freedom. Any discipline to which the bhukshu submits is self-imposed. The fruit of liberty is obedience to rule. The authority of the superior (nayaka) of each 'Vihara' over his brethren depends only on their voluntary deference to his superior learning⁶³⁵ or piety. Among the several vows that a bhikshu takes on joining the order, there is no vow of obedience to any superior. How can such a religion make an unbreakable bond of marriage, as other religions have done? Hence in all Buddhist countries the ideal of marriage is that it is a partnership of love and affection, which, when these no longer exist, should be dissolved. The indissolubility of marriage tie is not a proof of high civilization but a superstition characteristic of the lowest and most primitive savages that the earth still harbours.

- 13. On one occasion, we are told, the Blessed One, while preaching, sneezed and the bhikshus interrupted the discourse by shouting: Long life to the Blessed One, as is the custom even now among the Hindus. The Lord admonished the audience saying: "Now if a man has sneezed and some one says, Long life to you! can he live or die on that account?" On another occasion a Brahmin told the Blessed One that bathing in the Bahuka river washed a sinner of his sins and procured religious merit. There upon the Master said: "The Bahuka, the Adhika, the Gaya, the Sundari, even the Sarasvati at Prayaga as also the Bahumati, can not purify the fool of his sin, bathe he himself ever so often. What can the Sundarika do? What Prayaga? What the river Bahuka? No river can cleanse the doer of evil, the man of malice, the perpetrator of crime. To the pure it is always a perpetual fast. To the man of good deeds it is a vow everlasting. Have thy bath here, even here, O Brahman? Be kind to all beings. If thou speaketh not false; if thou killeth not life; if thou taketh not what is given thee; secure in self-denial—what wouldst thou gain by going to Gaya?
- 14. The method of pure asceticism is explicitly and deliberately rejected by the Blessed One. In the Indriyabhavanasutta the Buddha asks a pupil of Parasariya, a Brahmin ascetic, how his master⁶³⁶ teaches the cultivation of the faculties of sense. The

^{635 622}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

answer is that with the eye he sees no object and with the ear he hears no sound. On that system, rejoins the Blessed One, those who have their senses best cultivated would be the blind and the deaf. Finding the youth unable to reply, the Master explains to Ananda the exact nature of the supreme sense-culture of the Noble Path. In this noble discipline the novice is taught to discriminate every sense-consciousness, whether it be pleasant or painful, and appraise it psychologically as a mode of feeling, as something that is changeable, and then view it ethically as inferior to disinterestedness (upeksha) which is the attitude of mind he is seeking to acquire or maintain. In this way the attitude of the mind towards sense impressions becomes cognitive and analytic of them as such. And the intellect then dictates by its regulative power of how and how much shall really be enjoyed.

15. Though knowledge and insight are of the highest value, yet they must be prevented from leading to a fluctuating mood of mind. Hence, side by side with pragna, the aspirant for bodhi must also practice dhyana to attain tranquillity, a state of mind full of restfulness and moral insight. Right peace (Samadhi, camata) alone will bring to a stand-still all mental states which produce frivolous sophistries. Dhyana, as understood in Buddhism, is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view, and as such plays an important part. The Dharma discards prayer as a means of attaining salvation. How can the law of cause and effect be influenced by the supplications of defaulters? The consequences of a fault can only be removed by due repentance and reparation inspired, not by the selfish fear of punishment, but by the love of truth and righteousness. But contemplation, under the necessary moral conditions, coupled with sufficient knowledge for directing it to profit, will⁶³⁷ enable one to know himself better, to examine his conscience more minutely, and to illuminate his mind. Dhyana comprises four stages: a stage of gladness and joy born of seclusion accompanied by investigation and reflection; a state of elation and internal calm without reasoning, consequent on investigation and reflection; the total absence of all passion and prejudice; and, lastly, a state of self-possession and complete tranquillity. The 'Chadradipa-Samadhi Sutra (Quoted by Rev. Soyen Shaku in his Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot) enumerates the benefits of practising dhyana as follows: (1) "When a man practises dhyana according to the regulation, all his senses become calm and serene, and without knowing it on his part, he begins to enjoy the habit. (2) Loving kindness will take possession of his heart, which, then freeing itself from sinfulness, looks upon all sentient beings as his brothers and sisters. (3) Such poisonous and harassing passions as anger, infatuation, avarice, etc. gradually retire from the field of consciousness. (4) Having a close watch over all the senses, dhyana guards them against the intrusion of evils. (5) Being pure in heart and serene in disposition, the practiser of dhyana feels no inordinate appetite in lower passions. (6) The mind being

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM 637 624

concentrated on higher thoughts all sorts of temptation and attachment and egotism are kept away. (7) Though he well knows the emptiness of vanity, he does not fall into the snare of nihilism. (8) However entangling the nets of birth and death, he is well aware of the way to deliverance therefrom. (9) Having fathomed the deepest depths of the Dharma, he abidest in the wisdom of the Buddha. (10) As he is not disturbed by any temptation, he fells like an eagle that, having escaped from imprisonment, freely wings his flight through the air."

16. "No member of our community," says the Blessed One, "may ever arrogate to himself extraordinary gifts⁶³⁸ or supernatural perfection, through vainglory give himself out to be a holy man; such, for instance, as to withdraw into solitary places on pretence of enjoying ecstasies and afterwards presume to teach others the way to uncommon spiritual attainments. Sooner may the lofty palm-tree that has been cut down become green again, that an elect guilty of such pride be restored to his holy station. Take care for yourself that you do not give way to such an excess." Dreams and ecstasies, visions and trances, which are the very proof of holiness in other religions, are vain and foolish imaginings to the Buddhist.

The Buddhist dhyana, sometimes called anuttarayoga, should not be confounded with the Brahminical yoga. The latter is predominantly physical and hypnotic, being a pathological disturbance arising from a subjective self-illusion.

17. The yogin par excellence in Buddhism is the generous bodhisattva who practices the six paramitas. While the Brahmin yogi endeavours to become absorbed in the universal Brahman, the bodhisattva attempts to realise by contemplation the self-devoid character of all things (sarvadharma anupalambha cunyata). Cunyata karunayor abhinnam bodhichittam. The mentality corresponding to bodhi is inseparable from universal compassion and the negation of a self. In his Mahayana sraddhotpada sutra Asvaghosha specially warns the aspirant for bodhi against confounding the samadhi of the Buddhists with that of the tirthakas, the heretics. All samadhis practiced by the heretics are described as being invariably the production of the egoistic conception and hallucination and self-suggestion. And we may add the most intense and so-called divine raptures are the results of and the unconscious activity of at least some of the organs of the sexual life.

The practice of dhyana, uncoupled with pragna, cannot be productive of any good, but when the two⁶³⁹ go hand in hand, the mind is freed not only from disquietude by the removal of all inconsistencies, but also from atmamoha, the lust of self, which is the mother of all egoism. The destruction of egoism enables the bodhisattva to get rid of all sorrows and all obstacles to progress, to acquire self-control

^{638 625}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM 639 626

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

and fortitude, to feel compassion for all beings and to rejoice in doing good acts. It is no wonder that the Buddhist dhyana has been able to produce such remarkable results as we observe in the modern Japanese. Says Mr Okakura Yoshisaburo in his Japanese Spirit: "The self-control that enables us not to betray our inner feeling through a change in our expression, the measured steps with which we are taught to walk into the hideous jaws of death—in short, all those qualities which make a present Japanese of truly Japanese type look strange, if not queer, to your (i.e. European) eyes, are in a most marked degree a product of that direct or indirect influence on our past mentality which was exercised by the Buddhist doctrine of Dhyana as taught by the Zen priests."

- 18. If bathing in the Ganges could confer merit, then the fishermen should indeed be the most meritorious, not to speak of the fishes and other animals, which are day and night swimming in its waters.
- 19. When the bodhisattva has freed himself from eager desire for all particulars (nimittagrahana) and does not direct his thoughts on special objects (abhoga), he becomes immovable (achala).
- In ultimate analysis the bodhichitta, the cast of mind of the man who has 20. attained bodhi, resolves itself into two essential virtues, which are identical in aim, and whose acquisition forms the double duty of the bodhisattva. These virtues are pragnaparamita, knowledge and insight, and cilaparamita, morality. All the other paramitas proceed from these two as their sources. At the commencement the one is complementary to⁶⁴⁰ the other, but in the last stage the two become identical. Till their unification morality is a means to attain enlightenment, but morality alone does not constitute enlightenment. To lead the higher life intellectual illumination is absolutely necessary, but it cannot be obtained except by a previous discipline in charity, morality The abstract theoretical view of the nothingness of the ego and forbearance. (pudgalanairatmya) and the substratelessness of things (analambana) cannot destroy the illusion which makes one believe in the reality of the ego and of the non-ego, unless the growing exercise of charity teaches him to sacrifice his goods, his body, and even his life. But true altruism, genuine benevolence, sincere charity imply also liberality of intelligence and enlightened understanding. The acquisition of wisdom (gnana sambhara) necessarily presupposes the presence of compassion, devotion and morality.
- 21. No change occurs by itself. Every change stands in the relation of cause to some other change, and in relation of an effect to a third change. All changes in the world depend more or less upon one another. This causal nexus, which is found everywhere in experience, is called in the dharma by the technical name of pratitya samutpada. A correct understanding of this dependent origination, of the conditioned nature of all

^{640 627}

existence which has neither beginning nor end, is of the greatest importance in Buddhism. "Pratitya samutpadam pacyanti te dharman pacyanti; yo dharman pacyati sa buddham pacyati." He who has understood the chain of causation has understood the inner meaning of the Dharma, and he that has grasped the Dharma has perceived the essence of Buddhahood.

If every change has a cause, and that cause again a cause, is there then no ultimate unchangeable or first cause? Replies the Blessed One in Samyuttaka Nikaya: "If a man should gather all the grasses and herbs, twigs and leaves of this vast continent⁶⁴¹ of India, and arrange them in heaps, saying: This is my mother, this is the mother of my mother, and so on, there would be no end seen to the mother of mother of this man, even though he might reach the end of all the grasses and herbs, twigs and leaves of this continent of India. What is the reason of this? Without beginning and end is this world-process (samsara)" Again in another place in the same Nikaya the Buddha says: "A gruit does not originate of itself nor is it made by another; it originates in virtue of a cause; it ceases on the cessation of the cause." There can be no first cause. In experience we find no absolute beginning. We come across no change instituting a series of changes, which has not itself been preceded by some other change. The question of cause never even arises except where there is change, and the cause demanded is always another change. Hence, it is meaningless to speak of a first cause. Science knows nothing of first cause. There is no branch of rational investigation from which they can be inferred. Wherever we find the existence of a first cause asserted, we find we have reached a temporary limit to knowledge, or that we are inferring something outside the limits of sense experience, where knowledge and inference are meaningless. As Prof. A. Riehl says in his Philosophische Kriticismus, "a first cause with which as a creative act the series of changes should have begun originally, would be an uncaused change. The necessity of conceiving every change as effect which has its cause in a preceding change makes such an uncaused change absolutely unthinkable." Pratitya samutpada has, therefore, neither commencement nor end; it flows uninterrupted like the waters of a river. It has no lord presiding over it (asvamikam) and it is free from all forms of animism (anatmakam).

22. Is there then no Icvara? In a conversation with Anathapindika the Blessed One argued the matter as follows. "If the world had been made by⁶⁴² Icvara, there should be no change nor destruction, there should be no such thing as sorrow or calamity, as right or wrong, as all things, pure and impure, must come from him. If sorrow and joy, love and hate, which spring up in all conscious beings, be the work of Icvara, he himself must be capable of sorrow and joy, love and hatred, and if he has these, how can he be said to be perfect? If Icvara be the maker, and if all beings have to submit silently to

^{641 628}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

^{642 629}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

their maker's power, what would be the utility of practising virtue? The doing of right or wrong would be the same, as all deeds are his making and must be the same with their maker. But if sorrow and suffering are attributed to another cause, then there would be something of which Icvara is not the cause. Why, then, should not all that exists be uncaused too? Again, if Icvara be the maker, he acts with or without a purpose. If he acts with a purpose, he cannot be said to be all perfect, for a purpose necessarily implies the satisfaction of a want. If he acts without a purpose, he must be like the lunatic or suckling babe. Besides, If Icvara be the maker, why should not people reverently submit to him, why should they offer supplications to him when sorely pressed by necessity? And why should people adore more gods than one? Thus the idea of Icvara is proved false by rational argument, and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed." (Asvaghosha's Buddhacharita). "If, as theists say, God is too great for man to be able to comprehend him, then it follows that his qualities also surpass our range of thought, and that we can neither know him nor attribute to him the quality of a creator" (Bodhicaryavatara). When a thing is defined as unique in character, every basis upon which it is argued is removed.

Is not the world in which we live, it is asked, an orderly world where everything is governed by law? Do not laws imply a law-giver? "Who sharpened the thorn? Who gave their varied forms, colours, and habits to the deer kinds, and to the birds? 'Svabhava'!⁶⁴³ It is not according to the will (ichcha) of any; and if there be no desire or intention, there can be no intender or designer" (Buddhacharita). All the order which exists in the world arises from the simple fact that, when there are no disturbing causes, things remain the same. The observed grouping of things and sequence of events we speak of as the order of the world, and this is the same as saying that the world is as it is and no more.

No natural law is the cause of the observed sequence in nature. Every natural law merely describes the conditions on which a particular change is dependent. A body falls to the ground not in consequence of the law of gravitation, but the law of gravitation is the precise statement of what happens when a body is left unsupported. A law of nature does not command that something shall take place, but it merely states how something happens. While a civil law is a prescription involving a command and a duty, a natural law is simply a description, in which is formulated the repeated sequence of prescriptions. As Prof. Karl Pearson says, "Law in the scientific sense is essentially a product of the human mind and has no meaning apart from man. There is more meaning in the statement that man gives laws to nature than in its converse that nature gives laws to man." When a law has been found to be true in all cases, we naturally expect that it would apply to cases that might hereafter come to our knowledge. The greater the number of cases in which a law has been observed to hold good, the greater is the probability that it is universally true. If the sun has risen daily without fail during the last 5,000 years (= 1,826,213 days), the odds in favour of its rising

643 630

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

tomorrow are 1,826,214 to 1, and this amounts to saying that the rising of the sun tomorrow is practically certain. Thus every natural law represents a limitation of our thoughts,⁶⁴⁴ of our expectations. The more closely our thoughts are adapted to the sense-given facts, the greater are the restrains to the possibilities of our thinking, and stronger is the instinctive tendency to expect an event to happen in exactly the same manner as before. It is only in this sense that we speak of the uniformity of nature. We can only say that the laws of nature are practically universal, but not theoretically so. This practical certainty is all that man is capable of obtaining, and this is enough to serve him as a guide in life. Theoretical certainty would imply perfect and infinite knowledge, but this evidently is beyond man's capacities. All attempts to go far beyond the region of experience, whether it be in time or in space, must be affected with the greatest insecurity, because the probability of the results is nil.

- 22. As far as we are able to penetrate into pre-historic times, man has been found to be a gragarious being, who could not have maintained himself except by the instincts of sympathy, the feeling so solidarity, and a certain degree of unselfishness, which are presupposed in life in a community. Man is man only by living by living in and sharing the life of a society of his fellows. A human being in isolation would be no human being at all. As Aristotle has said, the man who could live without society must either be a beast or a god.
- 23. The psychology of religious experience proves beyond doubt how the experience varies with the character of the intellectual theory connected with it. The theoretical belief may be the cause or the effect of the religious experience, but it is inseparably connected with it. A person's intellectual presuppositions or view of the universe determine the character of his or her religious experiences.
- 24. If the world has not been created by Icvara, may not all existence be a manifestation of the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Unknowable behind all⁶⁴⁵ appearances? Said the Blessed One to Anathapindika: "If by the Absolute is meant something out of relation to all Known things, its existence cannot be established by any reasoning (hetuvidyasastra). How can we know that any thing unrelated to other things exists at all? The whole Universe, as we know it, is a system of relations; we know nothing that is, or can be, unrelated. How can that which depends on nothing and is related to nothing, produce things which are related to one another and depend for their existence upon one another? Again, the Absolute is one or many. If it be only one, how can it be the cause of the different things which originate, as we know, from different causes? If there be as many different Absolutes as there are things, how can

^{644 631}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM 645 632

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

the latter be related to one to another? If the Absolute pervades all things and fills all space, then it cannot also make them, for there is nothing to make. Further, if the Absolute is devoid of all qualities (nirguna) all things arising from it ought likewise to be devoid of qualities. But in reality all things in the world are circumscribed throughout by qualities. Hence the Absolute cannot be their cause. If the Absolute be considered to be different from the qualities, how does it continually create the things possessing such qualities and manifest itself in them? Again, if the Absolute be unchangeable, all things should be unchangeable too, for the effect cannot differ in nature from the cause. But all things in the world undergo change and decay. How then can the Absolute be unchangeable? Moreover, if the Absolute which pervades all is the cause of everything, why should we seek liberation? For we ourselves possess this Absolute and must patiently endure every suffering and sorrow incessantly created by the Absolute." (Asvaghosha's Buddhacharita).

25. The Buddhist denies the existence of all Absolutes, 646 but he does not deny the existence of the internal or external world. For him the world is an aggregate of conditions or relations, which are themselves not self-existent, but inter-dependent. Only when conceived in its totality has the world any meaning.

The absolute owes its origin to the erroneous assumption that every concept has a distinct counterpart in reality, and that the higher or more comprehensive concepts exist prior to the lower or less comprehensive ones, and contain the latter by implication. A simple reference the process of formation of concepts reveals the absurdity of this assumption. In our experience there is nothing more original than sensation. What we speak of as reality is connected with sensation. We know that sensations arise, but we can form no idea of how they arise, as every idea has sensations for its content and its presupposition. A primary datum of sensation is the consciousness of difference.

26. However, before entering on an examination of the nature of ecstatic intuition, we shall just repeat the general warning of John Stuart Mill, concerning the possibility of discerning truths by abnormal methods. "The notion that truths external to the mind," says J.S. Mill, "may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience is, I am persuaded, in these times the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason and is erected into its own all- efficient voucher and justification. There never was a better instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices."

In ecstatic intuition there is an abstraction of the mind from the body in order to enter into direct communication with Icvara, or to overcome the limitations of

^{646 633}

individuality to become one with⁶⁴⁷ Brahman or the Absolute. The method ordinarily employed is as follows: By means of prolonged and intense concentration often assisted by fixing the gaze on a particular object, thought is made to flow along one definite channel (ekagrata) and the mind is thus thrown into a condition in which there is a breaking up and disintegration of the normal consciousness, sense and reason are suspended, and that complex of somatic feelings, which the needs of the daily life keep submerged, rise to fill the focus of consciousness, making it acutely pleasurable or painful. About these somatic sensations there seems to gyrate in the first stage of ecstasy a fringe of auditory or visual elements combined in various ways. These may subside in the second stage and their place may be taken by a vivid sense of some 'presence'; or they may become so dominated by one or more exceedingly intense auditory or visual hallucinations coupled with alternations of fear and elation that the whole complex may be defined by them. In all these the psychologist recognizes nothing more than the temporary shattering of the whole laborious machinery of perception, in which life is reduced to its almost rudimentary protoplasmic state. This interruption of the organized routine of the daily life is regarded as religious experience, and the loss of individual consciousness is felt as an absorption into the infinite, and truths, unattainable by discursive reason, are perceived by immediate intuition. The condition of the organism in this case does not essentially differ from what it is in morbid states, such as may be caused by drugs, disease, physical fear or great emotional strain. In all these cases the subject is beside himself, and the outward and visible characters are the same. If a naturalistic explanation is sufficient for morbid states, it must be equally suitable for ecstatic intuition.

27. No one will deny the absolute authority over the subject of what is merely given, namely, visions,648 voices, entrancing feelings, and volitional attitudes. Nor need we contradict the mystic when we speaks of elation, of freedom, of illumination, of union, or of the increased moral courage and vigour resulting from the so-called higher mystical states. On the mere subjective side these experiences of the mystic are invulnerable and absolute, and as such they are not amenable to any criticism. But considered from the point of view of causal relations the matter becomes different. When the ecstatic ascribes his experiences to the descent of a deity into him, or to the existence of a world of spiritual beings, he is going beyond what is merely felt in to the field of rationalistic elaboration. He is no longer in the region of the mystic consciousness, but has trespassed into the domain of rational consciousness, and therefore becomes amenable to the criticism of the latter. Moreover, the subjective character of the experiences of all mystics inevitably vitiates them. No one can feel sure, not even the participant himself, that the transcendental or supernatural element in it is

647 634

648 635

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

objective reality and not subjective illusion. Nor can mystic demand for others an absolute and unwavering faith in the intuition of his ecstatic feeling. At best he can speak for himself only. A suspicion must naturally attach itself to a form of experience which can equally establish every view of the supernatural. As Prof. James points out, the mystical feeling is "capable of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophers and theologies, provided only they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional need." This inconsistent character of the knowledge claimed refutes of itself the claims of the ecstatic to immediate insight.

27. If the world in neither the creation of Icvara nor the manifestation of the Absolute (brahmam), may it not be a product of the individual self? Without⁶⁴⁹ entering on the question of the reality of the self the Blessed One has shown the absurdity of regarding the self as the maker of the world as follows: "If you say that the self is the maker, then the self should make all things pleasant. But there are many things in this world not pleasing to one's self: how then could it be asserted that the self is the maker? If it be said that the self does not wish to make things pleasant, then he who wishes for things pleasant is opposed to his self, the maker. Sorrow and joy are not self-existing. How could it be said that they are made by the self? If we admit that the self is the maker, there should, at least, be no evil karma, but, as is well known, our deeds produce good and evil results. Hence the self can not be the maker. Perhaps it might be said that the self is the maker according to the occasion, but then the occasion ought to be for good alone. Still, as good and evil both result from cause, it cannot be that the self has made it so." (Asvaghosha's Buddhacharita).

The view here refuted has its origin in the fact that the appearance of things is influenced by the condition of the sensory organs of the percipient. To the jaundiced eye everything looks yellow. This fact is well-known to the naïve man, but it never occurs to him to regard the whole world as a creation of his senses. Even the metaphysician, who believes himself a solipsist, is never such in practical life. He does not attempt to cloy the hungry edge of his appetite by the bare imagination of a feast. Why should the mind be unable to unmake what it made? If things were really made by the mind, there could not be this divergence between theory and practice. Indeed there ought to be no misery at all in this world. Rightly has the Blessed One laid stress on this point in discarding the absurd view of the idealist.

28. On the other hand, the Yogacharas, the followers⁶⁵⁰ of Asanga, form a class of subjective idealists (vigjnanastimatravadin), denying altogether the reality of the external world and regarding it as the creation of a self-subsisting consciousness (alayavignana). The Blessed One might indeed have given some room for the

^{649 636}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM $^{650}\,637$

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

development of these schools of thought, but he himself never propounded these views. He was neither a materialist who tried to evolve consciousness out of the motions of self-existing physical atoms, nor was he a solipsist who regarded the world as the product of the activity of self-subsisting spirits. He was a madhyamika in thought as well as in life. He steered a middle course. He denied the reality neither of the mind nor of the external world. But he denied the existence of all transcendental substrata, all things in themselves, both jivatma and paramatma. He was therefore generally called a cunyavadin. But he never denied the phenomenal world (prapancha) nor the empirical ego (namarupa). He taught a consistent incontrovertible phenomenalism (advayavada). So much so that the little of advayavadi has been specially given to him.

One of the few points on which all philosophers of the present day are agreed is that all that one experiences is given to him only as a content of one's knowledge. Though the content of one's consciousness varies from moment to moment, the certainty of the momentary content is so direct that it can not with any reason be called in question. Though the content of one's consciousness may be valid only for one and only at the moment when is present, still it may be rendered serviceable for all time and also to others by making known the conditions in which its validity holds. But it must never be forgotten that all one can know is psychic. Psychic, being conscious, existing—all mean one and the same thing. Esse is percipi. There can be no such thing as extra psychic or metaphysic. All phenomena exist in consciousness. As⁶⁵¹ all substances and forces are phenomena, we cannot speak of consciousness as a substance or a force. It is the reality in terms of which everything else has to be interpreted. It is tathata, the suchness of all things (bhuta). The neglect of this fundamental fact has given rise to all sorts of suppositions problems about self-subsisting unknowable things, foreign to one's consciousness but working on it.

Every content of consciousness of whatever kind it may be has the character of uniqueness. No two contents of consciousness are exactly alike. But memory, which forms a fundamental phenomenon of consciousness, enables us to place these diverse contents in relation to one another and note their similarities and differences. We are then able to analyse the contents of consciousness into certain elements out of which all experience may be regarded as built up. But what is primarily given in consciousness at any moment is the whole content and not these elements. We obtain these elements by a process of abstraction. These elements are the sense impressions and their memory images. As empirical psychology teaches, all other psychical contents may be built up out of them.

The ordinary man believes that sense impressions are produced by a real thing outside consciousness, and that an internal 'I' has these sense impressions. The 'things' and the 'I' are both inferences and are not originally given. In so far as they are evolved out of the memory images of many different sense impressions, they may be spoken of as complex ideas, and as such they are certainly real. But as substrates, the former

^{651 638}

external to consciousness and the latter as the vehicle or bearer of consciousness, they have no existence. The distinction between body and qualities is a matter of convenience for practical life, but it does not correspond to any perception, to any observation. A body is only⁶⁵² an ensemble, a group of qualities. If the qualities seem incapable of existing by themselves and need a substrate for their support, it is difficulty arising from the ordinary usage of language. In the course of his development man has formed to himself a crude mechanical representation of the relationship between the different sensations which together constitute a body. Certain sensations, which appear to be more firmly connected with a body, have become the support of other sensations less firmly connected with it. The conception which we possess of the stability of a body and of the persistence of its identity not withstanding certain superficial changes accounts for our belief in a substance, that is to say, in an unchangeable substrate. But we arrive at the same result without this useless hypothesis. The identity of a body consists in the sameness of its qualities, comprised in the name which it bears. If the majority of its qualities, and especially of those properties which are the most important for us, subsist without any alteration, or if the alteration, though very great, is made insensibly in small gradations, the residuum is regarded as still the same. We have no need to posit an indestructible substrate.

If all that we experience consists exclusively of processes that occur in our consciousness, is there then no essential difference between outer and inner? Yes; as contents of consciousness there is no intrinsic difference between them. As W.K. Clifford puts it, "my feelings arrange and order themselves in two distinct ways. There is the internal or subjective order, in which sorrow succeeds the hearing of bad news, or the abstraction "dog" symbolizes the perception of many different dogs. And there is the external or objective order, in which the sensation of letting go is followed by the sight of a falling object and the sound of its fall. The objective order, qua order, is treated by physical science, which investigates the uniform relations⁶⁵³ of objects in time and space. Here the word object (or phenomenon) is taken merely to mean a group of my feelings, which persists as a group in a certain manner; for I am at present considering only the objective order of my feelings. The object, then, is a set of changes in my consciousness and not of anything out of it....The inferences of physical science are all inferences of my real or possible feelings, inferences of something actually or potentially in my consciousness, not anything outside it." As the Sutta Nipata says, "natthi ajjhatan cha bahiddha cha kinchiti passato. For him who has understood the truth there is neither external nor internal."

The distinction between inside and outside, between the 'I' and 'the external world', has a practical origin. To understand clearly the practical difference between inner experience and outer experience, let us consider an example. For instance, we

652 639

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM $^{653}\ 640$

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

take a needle. Certain sense impressions relating to colour and form associated with images of past sense impressions constitute for us the reality of the needle. Ordinarily we suppose these to reside in a thing outside. But when our finger is pricked by the needle and an unpleasant sense impression is produced, the pain is supposed to be inside. Yet the colour and form of the needle are as much contents of consciousness as the pain produced by the prick. To what then is this difference due? The experience of pleasure and pain (vadana) gives birth to a cleaving (upadana) and this leads to the formation (bhava) of the idea of a centre of consciousness, an ego, to whose enjoyment all experience is directed. Thus arises the difference between one part of the content of consciousness as the enjoyer and the rest as being outside him and ministering to his pleasure. But when one pursues the Noble Eightfold Path and his prejudiced attachment to pleasure is destroyed, he understands the true nature of all things, 654 and enters the blissful temple of Nirvana.

- 29. The false belief in a permanent self, which is so wide-spread, has its origin in a wrong conception of the unity of compound things. A thing (guni) can be separated from its qualities (guna) only in thought, but not in reality. Can the properties of a thing be actually removed and the thing still left intact? If heat be removed from fire, would there be any such thing as fire? No doubt we can separate heat from fire in thought and argue about it, but can we actually do so?
- 30. As Buddhism resolves the whole phenomenal universe (prapancha), outside which nothing exists into pure psychic processes (dharma) it is but natural that it should categorically reject the existence of an atman, a transcendental subject outside consciousness. But it does not deny the existence of a personality, an empirical ego, an 'I' built up out of the elements of experience and reacting on the elements themselves.
- 31. All creatures are such as they are through past samskaras and when they die their lives shape new beings. In the slow process of evolution activities shape new personalities. What is called the person is but the living embodiment of past activities, physical and psychical. Past activities impress upon creatures the nature of their present existence. This is the law of karma as understood in Buddhism. No other interpretation of the doctrine of karma can be consistent with the teaching of the Blessed One as to the momentaneity (kshanikatva) and the unsubstantiality (nairatmya) of all existing things. That in the personal development of each individual every thought, or feeling, or volition counts for something is not difficult to perceive, but that there is a retribution upon wrong and selfishness after death, when there is no transmigrating atman can have no meaning and validity apart from the individual's relation to mankind as a whole. Physiologically considered, an individual reincarnates

^{654 641}

in his⁶⁵⁵ progeny, and his physical karma is transmitted to them. Ethically considered, the psychic life of an individual cannot be separated from the psychic life of the community of which he is a member. Duty and responsibility have no meaning apart from society. How, then, can a man have karma apart from other human beings? The enjoyments and sufferings of an individual are not always the result of his special karma. The Milindapanha tells us hat it is an erroneous extention of the truth when the ignorant declare that "every pain is the fruit of (individual) karma." Yet no Buddhist will deny that everything is under the sway of causality. Unless we regard all mankind as linked together as parts of one universal whole, we cannot perceive the full significance of the doctrine of karma. Not only are the murderer and the thief responsible to society, but society is equally responsible for breeding such characters. The life of the individual has no other possible measure than that of its significance, its influence, and its value to other individuals. If one demands and hopes more than this, a continuance after death of one's own particular life, one merely denies the meaning of one's particular individuality. Rightly did Galileo say that those who desire perpetual life deserve to be transformed into mountains. True continuance of life consists in its perfect newness and freshness. But this is possible only through alternations of life and death.

- 32. Only non-existence cunyata can claim to be immutable. Permanent unchanging substances exist in our thought, but not in reality. Whatsoever exists is made up of colours, sounds, temperatures, spaces, times, pressures, ideas, emotions, volitions and so forth, connected with one another in manifold ways. And these are continually changing. Everything is therefore momentary (kshanika). Some things may be relatively more permanent⁶⁵⁶ than others, but nothing is absolutely permanent. Modern science can discover nothing fixed in the universe. It is the mistaking of what is impermanent something permanent that makes anitya the source of sorrow (duhkha).
- 33. All that we know consists of sensations, ideas, emotions, volitions, and so forth associated with one another in various way. Out of the fleeting complex texture rises into prominence that which is relatively more fixed and permanent, and impresses itself on the memory, and finds expression in language. Certainly these complexes of relatively greater permanency are called bodies, and special names are given to them. Here colours, sounds, tastes, and other sensations are not produced by bodies, but complexes of these sensations make up bodies. Sensations are not signs by which we recognize things, but a thing is a mental construct or symbol of relatively fixed complex of sensations. Such complexes are never absolutely permanent. Nor is there behind and beyond these sensations, these elements of experience, a prakriti, pradhana, or ding

^{655 642}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM 656 643

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

an sich. Still this does not imply that things are illusory or unreal. They are at least as real as the minds that perceive them.

Among the many comparatively permanent complexes we find a complex of memories, volitions, ideas and relations, linked to a particular body, which is called the ego or the 'I'. But even the ego, as we have already seen, is only relatively permanent. If the ego appears to be permanent it is because the changes that occur in the elements, or the skandhas, which constitute the 'I', are comparatively slow. The mere fact that there is a consciousness of identity does not prove the existence of an atman which is the witness or the possessor of sensations, ideas etc. When a man says that he has the sensation hot, it only means that the elementary experience called hot occurs in a given group of certain elements, such as sensations, memories, ideas, etc. When he ceases to have any sensation, that is to say, 657 when he dies, then the groups, the skandhas, are dissolved, the elements no longer occur in their ordinary accustomed grouping or association. That is all. What has really ceased to exist is a unity constructed, as already pointed out, for economical and practical purposes (samvriti or vyavaharika), not a transcendental (paramarthika) unity. The ego is not a mysterious unchangeable unity. Each individual knows that changes in his ego is undergoing. Knowing the mutability of the ego, each one of us is striving to alter its attributes and improve it.

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA.@@

1. Why, while we look upon a bodily excretion as the not-self, do we not also regard the body and the senses as not self? Both alike are products of the material articles of food and drink. No one regards these as his own self, either earlier than their assimilation or at the end. And what is there in their intermediate condition in which they appear as the body, that they should be regarded as oneself? As food, the material is not mistaken for the self. Only later, as flesh and bone is it by ignorance regarded as having turned into one's own self. The man who can see clear distinctions should look upon his body as he does a garland or a smearing of sandal paste.

If you don't relish our account of the body, you will yourself learn to turn away from it. Until the parting, some glorify it as their very self. But not afterwards, when it is no more than refuse, and jackals tread on it. How indeed can you glorify it as your highest self? The sacred teaching too is that the sphere of the not-self extends from the body of the intellect.

2. The evil qualities, say of the bodily excretions are⁶⁵⁸ repelled by the man because he knows they are external, not his self. Likewise, those of his body and his changing

658 645

^{657 644}

P. LAKSHMI NARASU. THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

 $^{^{@@}}$ Translated by Prof. NARASIMHAYA of Travancore. (Unpublished) (See also my printed translation by Ras Vihari Das under same title

mental processes would not be confused with himself if he could understand his true self and distinguish these as his not-self.

Now, the obstacle in the way of understanding the self in its true nature is the facile acceptance of the empirical series from the intellect down to the body as one's own true self. But a man who can clearly distinguish this series has nothing more to obscure from him his true reality. He will rise to the wise perception that the true reality of all - whether of his enemy, his relation or his own body - is the unqualified and pure soul-principle. Why will such an one ever fly into a blind fury against them any more than against the limbs of his own body?

Other reasons why the body, like the rest of the series, is not the self, we may consider. The body is an object of sense-perception like a pot or other thing. And in sleep and dream, the co-ordination of it with consciousness seems to be absent. The wise will know from these that it is not the self.

- 3. If it were the self, it would not be absent, for instance in deep sleep and in the highest state of fulfilment. Because it is absent, it must be an 'other' than the self.
- 4. If the 'I' consciousness were the essence of the self, it would always be found with it, like consciousness itself, with the result that the whole science of ultimate fulfilment would be reduced to a hopeless futility.
- 5. Men fix their desires on such unrealities as these personal predictions and delude themselves like the fabled father of Soma Sarma (the Indian Alnascher). The true reality is the universal self. There is none other, no dual principle.
- 6. All have to start with experience and go back to it. But superficial disputants run away from it in a fever of logic and weave their own webs of arguments,⁶⁵⁹ satisfied if only they begin their dogmas with the worse 'therefore', 'because' and others (simulating logical reasoning). They merely delude one another. Experience is our supreme arbiter. Our opponents may pursue us even here and ask, if the soul is experience itself, the processes of experience can neither be ascribed to it nor denied of it. Both alike are impossible.
- 7. Further, though in our view it is untouched by the infinite pluralities of mental states, it is always in, (ie. pervades and sustains) these momentary states. We ascribe the changes or modifications to the intellectual consciousness (buddhi). But without the self, there cannot be a unitary consciousness of past, present and future.

Our view of the self in relation to the pluralities of experience is therefore as follows: Though the self does not see (i.e. does not merge in the modification called the

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

659 646

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

process of visual cognition), it is in touch with the mind which sees; though not hearing, it is in touch with the mind which hears; though not an agent and not desiring, it is associated with the mind which has desires. It is the never-relapsing witness of all—the fundamental knower. Though without aversions, it is in touch with the mind which has them; though without anger, it is conjunct with what has anger; though without pleasure and pain, it is conjunct with what has the feelings of pain and pleasure.

8. What apprehends in the humblest mortal is also what apprehends in the man of absolute wisdom. The cognizing self is the same in all cognitions. There is no division except in the objects—none in the knower, the knowing light. So, there is this unitary light of the self, transcending and yet knowing the myriad objects, times, places and conditions reflected by its fleeting states of consciousness.

Now we may be asked: (raising the inquiry into the⁶⁶⁰ absolute) "Since there is the one self in all individuals, should not a person who realises this become ipso facto subject to the pains and experiences of all?"

We answer No. For, even in his ordinary life, in his empirical individuality, his pains and experiences are his own,—not those of other individualities. When he transcends even his own, how can he be subject to those of others?

Let it not be supposed that this view is merely our speculation. It is ratified by scripture, the authority on religious experience. Scripture declares that it is the light and consciousness of the self that makes possible the mental states which reveal external objects like sound, light, etc. Its declarations are: "By those modes of objective cognition, do not try to see the self —the very seer of all the seen." "By what indeed will you try and comprehend and comprehender of all—the sovereign self?"

Pitiable like the blind are those who reject this conclusion, this rational doctrine of the self, and turn to false creeds.

9. The self has always been in experience. This is its very nature. The function of this ultimate wisdom is not to provide a <u>new object</u> of experience—as in the ordinary cases where the illusory serpent is displaced by a new object, viz. the rope. Its function is only to remove the veiling darkness, the blinding ignorance. It is an ignorance which cannot distinguish even the given principles of experience, like the self and the not-self. The I consciousness and other mental processes are the not-self, which are ignorantly identified with the self. These mental factors, the 'I' the cognitive processes, and objects do not know themselves. Nor do they know each other. The knowledge of these is accomplished by another and deeper principle. Let us repeat the distinctions once again. The content or form is the object. Determinate knowing and others are the cognitive processes. The common factor of the I-consciousness in 661 them all is the

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

661 648

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

^{660 647}

knowing subject (the psychological subject). What is unchanging in the midst of all these, is the inmost self, the 'witness' of all, the soul-principle. The self is necessarily that which transcends all the changing and particular phenomena, with their multiple forms of means, actions and results. The self is the knower in the deepest sense.

10. Through the vast panorama of the world, as its ground of origination, subsistence and change, there runs this eternal spiritual principle, with which—and not with the perishing particularities of sense—your own true self is identical.

Nevertheless, the phenomenal world is not entirely alien, an independent opposite. What reality it has it owes to the self-reality, the spiritual principle. It is an external appearance, an image of the self (prabibimba), whose light and basis are all from the self. It is but a magical and romantic show, issuing from Ignorance of the true shape of reality. Its position is indescribable; it cannot be described definitely as real or unreal. It cannot be an independent real.

11. We answer: It is not so. Why? Because in sleep, we have nothing more than the darkness of ignorance, the root of all ills. If it were not a condition of ignorance but of the knowledge of self, the whole world would attain to wisdom in its moments of deep sleep and rise to the highest emancipation and fulfilment. Mankind would have no use for mental and moral discipline, for study, learning or meditation.

Nor,—to pursue the reduction—would it be proper of them to return back to consciousness from such supernal self-fulfilment. If we are told that they should necessarily return, we ask whether self-fulfilment is necessarily unstable and always tentative.

Nor of course can it be said that he who has awakened is different from the man who enjoyed the sleep. We cannot in that case explain the fact⁶⁶² of self-identity, the recognition of oneself as having slept soundly without knowing anything.

Thus, we are driven to the conclusion that it is ignorance that reigns in deep sleep, and not knowledge.

An opponent may turn round and as us: If ignorance reigns in deep sleep, why is there no direct perception of it? We perceive inner feelings like affection and aversion, and even the absence of objects like the absence of a jar, etc. Ignorance ought to be experienced like any of these.

We reply: No. Because the conditions which make it known are not there. How are they not there? Because just as there is no consciousness of a subject without an awareness of object, so too without a mental processes, there is no manifestation of ignorance.

12. And, even if for argument's sake we agree with you that they are of the essence of the self and that the teaching "That thou art" is only an exhortation to meditate on

^{662 649}

the universal aspects of the individual self, the result would be that even by a thousand meditations you will never succeed in raising the self above the evils (of phenomenalism and narrow egoism)

- 13. The result of such meditation is only concentration, one-pointedness. A mere repetitive practice of a cognition does not add to knowledge or bring wisdom. If you think that a mental state or idea merely by being strengthened by repetition may turn away opposite ideas we reply that this result is possible but not permanent. After all, it is only due to another mental state (which is bound to change and pass).
- 14. So the result gained from meditation and from ritualism or external duty is like an alliance with the low,—not to be reckoned steady. (So, we do not accept that meditation has the result claimed for it or that it should be regarded as the support of the saying "That thou art" on the ground that this is against sense-perception.)
- 15. There⁶⁶³ is not a single expression in the world to describe the self directly. We will state why there is not any. Language can only describe five kinds of categories or principles relations, qualities, actions or processes, genus, conventional associations or implications. The self is the very basis of all these, and cannot be pigeon-holed into any of them.

Not a single expression can comprehend the fundamental character of our soul.

We may be told here that we are going too far in denying the very power of words to signify. Cannot a word signify the self? How then do the words "The self is the absolute" etc. of the scripture make any sense and give any instruction?

We will state how. By empirical and unreal means one must struggle up to the self. Strictly speaking, there is no phenomenal path to it. All words, even those like the soul are but pointers, to indicate and imply this inmost reality, the self.

This raises the question whether language can even imply the self. Words have their own fixed meanings, their specific objects, and cannot point to other objects.

We answer: Words do carry implications and suggestions. We recognise them even in ordinary parlance. Let us explain this further. It is a common experience that a sleeping person is awakened by the sound of his name. The scripture language plays an analogous part and rouses the sleeping self. When a person awakens at hearing his name, it is not because the words convey their meanings to him in sleep and produce consciousness. And yet, they are effective enough to break the sleep. On this analogy, we must understand the value of the scripture language regarding the soul.

To take an illustration: The sky remains what it is in its own true nature, whether we think of it wrongly as blue or rightly as colourless. It does⁶⁶⁴ not change

663 650

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

664 651

SURESVARA: ESSENTIALS OF ADVAITA

with the passing states of wisdom and ignorance. It is the same with the self. When self-knowledge arises, nothing new is produced (by scripture-language or other means, but there is only a negative result, the ignorance passes.)

We described earlier language and other means as empirical and unreal paths by which one must struggle up to the true and real. On this view we are asked in surprise and dismay.

- 16. Let us return to out proposition that though language does not directly comprehend the self, it can negatively dispel ignorance and awaken true awareness. We can look at it from another point of view also.
- 17. We answer: Is not meditation the mere reiteration of proofs and propositions, the mere repetition of one's knowledge? We cannot agree that such a process can produce any new knowledge.
- 18. No person ascribes to himself a limb which has been separated from him, like say a severed hand. Likewise the self should not be ascribed or identified with that series of factors which are other than it and separate from it. All these factors—which are into qualifying predicates—are like beautiful ornaments placed on it. They are identified with it only in ignorance. When the true wisdom of the self arises, they will all be seen as other than its intrinsic reality. All these are on a par with a severed hand, in that they are not the essence and heart of the self. The wise man sees beyond them and fixes himself above them. One must seek out the deepest spiritual principle, the true knower and self. Even the empirical I, the self-conscious intellect, will be seen to be but an object among objects, and on a par in this regard with a severed hand. It is not the essence and principle of selfhood. It is no more the essence of the self than a pot or other objective thing. So too are the other psychological factors, those qualifying predicates (pratyaya)⁶⁶⁵ of the subjective experience, pleasures, pains, desires, aversions and others. The self is the deeper principle, the unqualified reality.
- 19. The man who realises this essence and sweep of true selfhood will transcend his sense of narrow selfhood, his egoistic feeling of 'I' and its concomitants of exclusiveness, as a lighted lamp in his hand will break the darkness before him. Let us apply this principle.
- 20. He accepts all and yet rejects all. Acceptance means experience of the full range of the world. Rejection means the denial of ultimate and true reality to it.

We have stated the main principles and will now conclude: Of the wisdom of the Upanishads, the wisdom of the soul which is the highest of realities, the one reality,

^{665 651}A

the wisdom which cuts away ignorance and inertia, we have spoken. This little of its we have explained:

- 21. It is a common experience that even after the false notion of a rope as serpent is corrected, the effects of fear (or other excitement) continue for some time longer. Likewise, though a man knows the truth and sets himself definitely against his infatuations, their effects continue. But of course the seeds of their growth are burnt by the knowledge of the truth. A tree whose roots have been destroyed must dry up. And the sensuous life or a man will certainly decrease when he understands the soul.
- 22. Infatuation for the objective things of the senses is the very mark and essence of ignorance. How can a tree with a fire burning its core be green?
- 23. Only to the man who is not shut in by narrow egoism or other evil and is ennobled by absence of hate and other virtues does this true wisdom become possible. Not to him whose mind is turned away from the soul, towards the outer things.
- 24. However good and easy a work may be, it means nothing⁶⁶⁶ to the lowly and the narrow-minded, as the sun means nothing to that creature of darkness, the owl. But to those of a pure heart and mind, it will shine resplendent with its many gems of truth.

"INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED® YOGAVASISHTHA." (Umrao Sher Gil's introduction)

Some of them have been used somewhat more loosely than in the aphoristic schools of the Vedanta and Sankhya Yoga, but one must not forget that this spiritual romance is not a darshana, a school of philosophy, but an aspect of Vedanta popularised.

A few terms in this work need defining and explanation as their literal rendering into English is liable to create a misunderstanding.

The Self means sometimes the subjective self, but generally the Universal Self or the Spirit.

Vasana means the tendencies that abide in the individual soul as the germs of past experience and based on Avidya or ignorance, and which sprout in the present life as egoity, desires, aversions, volitions, etc.

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^{666 651}B

Sankalpa means volitions resolves desires, and in a word, The Will which creates the world for the person, and the universe as the Universal Will, of which The Individual Will is a part.

Vikalpa means fancy imagination as well as thought which does not exactly correspond to the existing object, but has an imaginary element in it. This also means in this work an erroneous idea, differentiation or difference also.

Cit and Caitanya and Samvid anubhuti and jnana all very often mean one and the same thing namely sentience or consciousness not as a changeful state but as changeless knowledge and sentience which is self-luminous (in fact the only self-luminous) Reality which illuminates everything as its object. Most schools of Vedanta and sankhya Yoga consider it not as a property of some substance, but as the very substance of knowledge⁶⁶⁷ itself. And thus for them Knowledge or sentience or consciousness means the Changeless Self and Spirit, and not a process of knowledge. The process of knowing is the result of reflection of this light of knowledge in the Buddhi or mind or understanding which is thus made conscious by that consciousness and becomes the knowing acting individual soul or jiva as a compound, as if it were, of that pure Sentience and the phenomenal mind which latter in itself is insentient, and merely a mechanism made conscious by the light of the Spirit.

This work holds the phenomenal universe to be a mere insignificant ripple on the infinite and unfathomable ocean of Sentience which is Brahman.

(<u>Translation</u>): 1. That person is qualified to study this teaching, who is neither too ignorant, nor is a knower of That (Brahman), but who has decided, "I am bound, and I shall become free."

- 2. For the prolonged disease of Migrations, the great remedy is proper deliberation; Who am I and who migrates, by this discrimination the (migrations) are dissolved.
- 3. One should not dwell even for a single day in a place where there is not that Tree with fruit and cool shade, in the shape of a good man who knows the Truth.
- 4. One should always approach the Saints though they may not teach; for even their habitual conversations become the teaching.
- 5. O Rama, the course of teaching is merely the observance of a settled traditional method, but the clarified understanding of the pupil is alone the real means of knowledge.

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^{667 652}

[&]quot;INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED YOGAVASISHTHA."

- 6. The Great Lord is not seen through the teaching of books, nor through the Guru (Spiritual Guide). He the Self is seen by one's own Self, by means of one's own understanding which is established in Satva (pure mind stuff) purity.
- 7. He⁶⁶⁸ who after finding that these objects are utterly insipid, again longs after them, that fool is not a human being but an ass.
- 8. From some desire or another a persons sinks into misery; but if he not wish anything, he attains to inexhaustible peace.
- 9. The life of that person is beautiful and blessed, who abandoning that which men wish to acquire or avoid, has properly and fully known the Mind (Consciousness) existing within the mind.

The destruction of the body results only in the vanishing of the Ether limited within the heart. But people sorrow in vain fearing that the Self has perished.

As, when jars, etc. are brother the ether (which they confined) remains unbroken and perennial, so when the bodies vanish, the embodied Self remains ever unsoiled.

Nowhere anything at any time is born; only Brahman manifests in the form of an apparent transformation into the world.

10. O Rama how can this self be born or die, which is more expansive than the Ether sky (space), which is pure and subtle imperishable undecaying and blessed.

Be thou happy thinking that all this (universe) is a unity, tranquil and devoid of beginning, middle and end, and free from becoming existence and non-existence and destruction.

- 11. As after proper knowledge of it is gained the idea that the snake painted in a picture is not a real snake, so the migratory world also disappears through right knowledge, though it is there, apparently.
- 12. My dear, this Maya is indeed wonderful, which deludes everyone and owing to which the Self, though it pervades all the limbs, does not know itself.
- 13. Vasishtha said: The real knowledge of the Self is the only fire for burning the straw of all hopes (desires). This is meant by the word Samadhi; not⁶⁶⁹ sitting in silence.

000 653

^{668 653}

[&]quot;INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED YOGAVASISHTHA."

[&]quot;INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED YOGAVASISHTHA."

- 14. As birds and beasts do not stay in a burning forest, so faults such as desire and anger do not abide in a knower of Brahman.
- 15. As a crystal does not (really) become tinged by the reflection (of a flower placed under it), so, he who knows That Brahman, he is not in himself affected by the fruit of actions.
- 16. He who playfully renouncing the vasanas (tendency) which consists of Egoism, abides without thinking about anything, he is called a Jivanmukta.
- 17. When there remains nothing but the Infinite Bliss of compact (impartite) Consciousness, whose very nature is absence of the difference ideas, and when duality is absent, then liberation of bondage have no significance.
- 18. The mind becomes no-mind by utterly abandoning Vasana. And (the same result is obtained) by checking the movement of the Vital breath. Choose whatever you like⁶⁷⁰.
- 19. Contemplating Brahman only, well, abiding, peaceful, free from troubles, if you remain, then the feeling of being the I (egoism) will vanish of itself.
- 20. Vasishtha said: O Raghava, act playfully in the world, outwardly making artificial effort, and devoid of effect within the heart, doer outwardly and doing nothing within.
- 21. Be always engrossed in that eternal form of thing which is conscious where thou art (in the fourth state) without waking dream and deep sleep.
- 22. O Raghava, That by which thou knowest sound, taste, colour, and smell know that Self to be the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Self
- 23. When the Solid certitude has been established that all is consciousness—ether which is Brahman then the soul becomes quiescent like a lamp without oil.
- 24. The supreme Self is mere consciousness without thought (mind), and illuminating, pervading inside⁶⁷¹ and outside, without parts and whose support is unshakeable.

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⁶⁷⁰ The original editor corrected spell "like" by hand

^{671 655}

[&]quot;INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF THE ABRIDGED YOGAVASISHTHA."

25. To think that 'I am That pure consciousness' is called contemplation, (dhyanam), and to forget the process of dhyanam is called Samadhi (meditation).

GARUDA SARODHARA: THE MEANS OF LIBERATION.@@ (being Chapter 16 of Garuda Purana).

- 1. Among eighty-four hundred thousands sorts of bodies the embodied soul, does not attain to knowledge of the Truth, in other than the human body.
- 2. No one can achieve the goal of life without the body. Therefore he should protect the body, as well as wealth, and should perform virtuous deeds.
- 3. According to some even the gods cannot achieve liberation, for they are absorbed in the enjoyment of divine pleasures. Nor can the sub-humans, as they lack understanding, and follow instincts and are not responsible for their actions.
- 4. He should keep his body healthy by Yoga practices. One may find again and again, a village, a field, wealth, a house, again and again, good and evil activities, but body will not be found again and again.
- Old age stands like a tigress, and life trickles out like water from a cracked jar; 5. and diseases assail one like foes; therefore one should practise that which leads to salvation.
- As long as pain does not reach one, as long as calamities do not arrive, as long as one's powers does not decay, one should practise that which leads to salvation.
- 7. One does not notice Death (Time) owing to manifold occupations of the world. Alas! in pleasure or pain, man does not realise what is for his good.
- who can feel fortitude seeing that prosperities are⁶⁷² like a dream, youth is 8. evanescent like a flower, and life is unstable like the lightning.
- 9. Seeing he stumbles, hearing he does not understand, reading he does not grasp, deluded by the Power (Maya) of God.

^{@@} Translated by Umrao Sher Gil. (Unpublished)

- 10. It might be possible to roll up the wind, to divide the sky, and to tie and bind together the waves, but it is impossible to make life everlasting.
- 11. Oh how pitiable is the delusion of ignorance, that all creatures are born and die, (heedless) engrossed with their own bodies, their wealth, wives and other things.
- 12. What liberation can be gained mere torturing of the body, by the indiscriminating ones? Can a mighty serpent be killed by beating the ant-hill (occupied by the snake)?
- 13. In this world, donkeys and other animals, go about the same in houses (habitations) and forests, naked without shame. Do they for that reason become spiritually attached.
- 14. Therefore O Lord of birds, such activities are merely for pleasing the common people, but the evident cause of Liberation is Knowledge of the Reality.
- 15. O Bird, these animals (on two feet) have fallen into the great well of six systems of Philosophy, do not know the Supreme Object, caught like animals in the halter (of difficult problems). Com. explains that people who study the systems of philosophy and teach the same to others without realising the Truth.
- 16. Knowledge is said to be of two kinds, that which is uttered in the Vedas and that which arises from Discrimination. The Vedic knowledge consists of the Word-Brahman (the creative word) and the Discrimination knowledge is of the Supreme Brahman.

The knowledge of words is incapable of destroying the delusion of migratory existence (Sansara), as darkness can never be destroyed by talking about a lamp.

- 17. The⁶⁷³ study of a person devoid of deep understanding is like a blind person looking at a mirror. But those who have a right understanding their study of the Sastras leads to the knowledge of Reality.
- 18. He wants to hear everything about what is knowledge and what is to be known, but even if he were to live for a thousand years of the gods, he can not reach the end of the Sastras.
- 19. Many are the Sastras, life is short, and there are millions of obstacles, therefore one should properly understand essence, as the swan separates milk from water

^{673 657}

- 20. Advaita (Non-duality) is declared to be benign, which is free from the fatiguing activities (Ritualistic and others.) It is obtained from the mouth of the Teacher, not by reading millions of Sacred texts.
- 21. Some desire Non-duality, and others desire duality, but they do not know the supreme Reality which is neither duality nor non-duality. (Desiring here is equal to trying to establish by arguments duality and non-duality).
- 22. Thus have I described to thee the essence gathered from all the Sastras, in these sixteen chapters. What else doest thou wish to hear?

SANKARACHARYA: YOGA TARAVALI. (STAR-CLUSTER OF YOGA).@@ 1. When all the Nadis are thoroughly purified by the Kumbha of the breath accompanied by expirations and inspirations, the sound called Anahata of various kinds becomes active within, perpetually. (Note: Kumbha- holding of breath Nadis- the nerve channels. Various methods for the cleansing of nerve channels are described, not with precision in works like Hatha-yoga-pradipika and Yogi-Yajnavalkya. Anahata - not struck or produced by any musical instrument.)

- O Nadanusandhana, I salute thee. I know thee to be the means of attaining the 2. above of Reality. By thy favour, my mind gets utterly absorbed along with⁶⁷⁴ the vital air (breath), into the abode of Vishnu. (Note: Vishnu - All pervading Spirit)
- 3. They mention the ties of throat, belly and of the rectal base as Jalandahara, Uddiyana and Mula Bandhas. When this triad of Bandhas has been acquired, there can be no fear of the terrible noose of Kala. (Note Kala - Time or Death. These three Bandhas are described in works like Hatha-yoga-pradipika, which also warn the practitioner against the dangers of some of these Bandhas which produce disease if not properly done, for which reason they should be practised under the direction and supervision of a proficient yogi. Jalandhar is pressing the chin against the breast, Uddiyana is drawing the belly at or below and above the naval backwards the spine, and Mula Bandha is contracting the rectal mussle and drawing the rectum upwards.)
- 4. When the female snake is awakened by means of the Jalandhara, Uddiyana and Mula Bandhas, the vital air, turning backwards, and entering the Sushumna gives up coming and going (inhalation and exhalation) (Note: Female snake; the mystic force called Kundalini the curled or spiral vital force which is said to lie asleep at the rectal base. Sushumna- the mystic third nerve channel the position of which is said to be in the centre of the spinal cord by some)

^{@@} Translated by Umrao Sher Gil (Unpublished)

^{674 658}

- 5. That glory of Kevala-Kumbhaka blossoms, and is experienced in the undisturbed mind of the brave and careful practitioners, in which the movements of the mind and breath are checked. (Note: The word for undisturbed is anahata which means unstruck, and which seem to relate it to the anahata nada, but here not evidently meant for anything more than the undisturbed mind.)
- 6. It is wonderful that those who have totally abandoned the object of vision (knowledge) itself, and are established⁶⁷⁵ here in the Royal Yoga, they are neither in the waking state nor in deep sleep (and dream), there is neither life nor death for them. (Note. The three states of waking dream and deep sleep are lost in pure consciousness. They do not live like the ordinary un-enlightened persons, nor do they know death as they are no longer identified with the body which dies.)
- 7. Those whose minds have become steady in the glorious Royal Yoga, after they have abandoned all ideas of 'I' and 'mine', there is neither the state of the seer nor the seen, and for them the glory of pure sentience (Consciousness) blossoms. (Note. The relation of the subject and object ceases in Non-Duality.
- 8. May that Manonmani (state) prevail in me, which causes the absence of opening and closing of the eyes, and in which the breath is devoid of exhaling and inhaling, and the mind has no sankalpa and vikalpa.

(Note: Manonmani means literally the state in which the mind transcends (or vanishes) above all thoughts etc. in utter passivity. Its nature is shown in these verses, though the word does not seem to have been analysed in any work I have come across. This term and its synonyms amanska (mindless or thoughtless state) which occur later in this treatise are common in works of Lava Yoga and are found in Hatha-Yoga Pradipika etc. We do not find these terms or their corresponding mental states in earlier and more philosophic works, such as Patanjali or the Upanishads. Unless the Dharmamegha samadhi of the Jivanmukta after he has realised the nature of the spirit and the phenomenal world, can by a stretch of imagination be identified with Manonmani. The words Sankalpa and vikalpa can not be rendered by one word in English like some other terms of Sanskrit. Sankalpa means thoughts, wishes volitions resolves etc. Vikalpa means counter thoughts feelings resolves volitions⁶⁷⁶ etc. or fancies which are neither false knowledge nor right knowledge but half realities depending on mere words, such as the horns of a hare, or the son of a barren woman etc. Older works like Vyasa's scholium on Yoga gives more philosophic examples, such as "Consciousness is the very nature of the spirit." Here the words really mean that

SANKARACHARYA: YOGA TARAVALI. (STAR-CLUSTER OF YOGA)

676 660

SANKARACHARYA: YOGA TARAVALI. (STAR-CLUSTER OF YOGA)

^{675 659}

consciousness itself is Purusha, but the sentence carries the illusion, as if consciousness were a property of some substance called Purusha, and this fancy or illusion is based on the words in this sentence which mean Consciousness in the own-form of the Purusha (Spirit) implying the relation of attributing some thing to something else.)

- 9. O man of learning, I shall point out to thee a method of attaining to Unmani state. Assiduously uproot Sankalpa, looking at the phenomenal world with detachment.
- 10. The mind assiduous in shattering the procession of Sankalpas continuously, with strong effort, becoming attenuated owing to the destruction of its support, slowly attains to peace.
- 11. When shall I attain to that natural easy Amanaska (mindless) state, in which all other states have vanished, and which turns away all the organs, which activates the Union (Yoga) with the Supreme Self, and which consists of Consciousness (alone)?
- 12. When the ancient fragrances (vasanas-tendencies) of people have fled, through the highest self-knowledge, there appears that sleep which is not stupor, which excludes the thoughts about phenomenal world, entirely. (Note: Here sleep is intended to signify samadhi which identifies the mind with pure consciousness. It is really the samprajnata Samadhi of the older schools, though many have tried—in vain, I think, to identify it with asmparjnata samadi, as the use of the terms (carelessly perhaps) shown in this treatise. The word for tendencies used in this verse⁶⁷⁷ is gandha dandha which means smell the odour. In later works the word vasana which in order works signified the residue of experience in the mind which create new activities of the mind later in the same or a new incarnation, has been somewhat arbitrarily used in the sense of odour even in the psychological matters. That is why the author has used the word gandha without any hesitation in the sense of mental tendencies which is hardly justified save as a poetical licence. This points to the treatise having been composed in later times when the older and more realistic terms were losing favour in the interest of rhetoric. This little treatise is composed in very facile and excellent verse in which the author has tried to express in fine verse a few ideas in a number of verses without much variety of thought.
- 13. Having found rest on the couch of the Fourth (state), which stands above the three states of Visva and the rest, O my friend always enter that marvellous Nirvikapla Sleep, which consists of Consciousness. (Note: The fourth state is the state of undual pure consciousness the Spirit, which is above the three states of Waking Upanisad. Visva and Vaisvanara is the samashti or aggregate, and vyashti or individual of the

waking state, Taijasa and Sutratma belong to the dream state, and Prajna, interpreted by later writers both as One who knows well, and one who is very ignorant (praajna) belonging to the deep state. It is evident that later Vedanta writers and thinkers who seem to be more theoretical than practical have lost the significance of the dream state which they almost think to be the mere effect of the waking state. While in the Upanishad and older writings, and even later ones like Vedantasara, the dream state is the merging place of the waking state which has come forth from it, just as the dream state has come⁶⁷⁸ forth from the deep sleep state and merges back into it. These three states are phenomenal while the Fourth is Noumenal in which the relation of the subject and object ceases. The word Nirvikalpa seems evidently used in the sense of Patanjali's Asamprajnata Samadhi, though as this work also seems to favour the idea that it is the state in which the mind has been absorbed and identified with the self.

14. Let this mind of mine wander in Nirvikalpa Samadhi, or roam among the breasts of beauties whose eyes resemble those of the black antelopes; let it associate with the thoughts of feels, or the ideas of good people; but (I know that) the good or bad qualities produced by the mind, can not touch me the all pervading (spirit).

Only by reading the various treatise on Hatha-Yoga and the Tantras can one realise what almost hopeless confusion and want of precision reigns in these works. Some say that this is intentional to trap the unwary and unworthy aspirant who does not find a teacher of the right sort. But one can not help thinking that these works are often composed by people from a study of Tantras and a mere theoretical knowledge of the subject, or the result of their own muddled states of mind.

<u>UMRAO SHER GIL</u>. "<u>ON TIME</u>." (Unpublished)

If all things throughout their constant change, are also present somewhere in the Universal Mind and in Eternity, then their change is merely a relative thing in our temporal consciousness. Sankhya-Yoga does not seem to accept the idea of Eternal Time as an immobile existence, but only in the form of constant change in following time or the present Moment, which is succeeded by the future moments without interruption. And yet the idea that to the Infinite Consciousness of God all things are present at one and the same moment including the past present and the future, seems somehow to imply the idea of Eternity of Time⁶⁷⁹ also, though not posited in so many words. We can not form any idea of this Eternity with our limited mental constitution whose very nature in the waking state as well as in dream state (at least also) has the

678 662

SANKARACHARYA: YOGA TARAVALI. (STAR-CLUSTER OF YOGA)

679 663

UMRAO SHER GIL. "ON TIME."

flowing time as a reality though it has different speeds in these two states of waking and dream. Perhaps in Deep Sleep this is somewhat interfered with by the absence of the consciousness of flux in the sense of the two former states. When we try to imagine the past and present and future of anything or person, it takes on the grotesque form of a sort of eternally elongated object, but this is due to the impossibility of translating the eternal timeless state into terms of flowing existence of anything or person. Let us take a person for example, some one in whom love and interest connects us, and try to imagine his or her existence in time as we know it. Let us say that person has come into contact with our life, as a child born at a certain time. We were not aware of its existence before that moment of birth or conception. Now the series of changes which growth implies we see it grow from month to month and year to year, in a most imperceptible manner. After each year we notice some distinct change in its form, through the accumulation of the series of changes that have occurred, though the change must have been constant through growth because it could be seen only when it accumulates through the elapsing of sufficient time. You do not notice this change till your children have become some years older, and then only by recollecting what they were then or seeing a photograph of them at that age. The photograph itself is a momentary representation of a very brief section so to speak of the picture elongated in the time process, if that process is a reality. Or if the whole picture is a composite one produced by superimposing all the momentary pictures which are⁶⁸⁰ somewhere in Time without change, then too the result is something with the human mind can hardly grasp or make out what that picture can be. It seems merely a confusion to the human understanding. And yet the picture is there in a medium which seems able to keep all moments intact in Eternity, and perhaps there each moment is preserved with its distinctive image. Now look into yourself. As I do so I can review some of the pictures in my memory, but cannot collect them together as individual images. One picture must recede and disappear before another one comes before my mind. And each one seems rather external to myself. I remain as the witness of each one with consciousness of identity of my personality, which is all these and yet not any one of them alone. This identity, this sameness in my self seems to be the opposite picture such as sums up all of them, and yet all of them have sunk back into the background of my consciousness leaving behind a simple notion of egoity of Iamness. Out if this seems to spring out all thoughts all memories belonging to the past volitions and thoughts which become present even when I think of the past, and the possibilities of all future state of my existence which are becoming actualised in every moment, as it slips into the present and slips out of it into the past. It seems to come from somewhere in the future, involved in all the circumstances all causes so to speak which are forming the present out of the future, and then vanishing in the process of time and change, on the form of growth and decay of the body for example, and the panorama of mental processes within me. And I notice that as my body changes slowly, my mind is changing with

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much greater rapidity, but changing all the same. Only one thing does not seem to change, and that is the fact of my being aware of all these states of existence, my own in the form of my body⁶⁸¹ and of the bodies and objects around me, as well as of my mind within me. The next thing presented to my consciousness is the fact of my egoity, my Iam-ness, without the multiplicity of thoughts and feelings that spring from it in the form of shapes and colours and sounds and other sensations which seemed to be latent in the world and my conscious mind as its witness, through the senses which make them concrete. The same happens in my memories which are less defined than actual experiences through the senses, unless they arise in dream when they are visualised. But in dream also they do not seem to be very definite, but rather vague and shifting with more less rapidity. And as I refer to my sensations and the images of which they are compounded, I am some how aware that they belong to some class some category and into which I seem to put them away, and from which I recall them when I remember them, or when I recognise some object I had seen before when it is seen again. A sort of sub-creation seems to be going on within me which seems to be dependent on a cosmic creation on which it seems to depend. I seem to wake to world of creation from my dreams and from my deep sleep and merge back into them in the same way every night when I go to sleep, but I feel at the same time that although I seem to have a very minor share in this creative process in being able to change the form of some things, or being compelled to see them somewhat differently from my fellow beings, yet there is greater stability in the things that do not seem to be dependent on my own mind. The creation of the Great Life, Its dream if you call it so, is the foundation of my own personal dream and waking life, from its birth through all its growth and decay and lastly death of the physical frame.

UMRAO SHER GIL. BIRTH AND DEATH. (Unpublished)

When the body begins to form, all the possibilities of the body are in the germ and sperm of 682 the father and mother, inherent in a manner which is impossible for the mind to understand. The ancients have given the instance of the tiny seed of the huge Banyan Tree which has been used to symbolise the Universe, the birth and growth of an infinite seeing universe from an invisible origin like the huge tree being hidden with all its possibilities in the minute seed where one cannot see it at all. So the father and the mother combine through their germinal life to form the new physical body with different approach to themselves in physical and mental characteristics which is at the same time different from either owing to this physical combination and still more probably owing to the nature of the being who takes its birth in a physical body suited for its expression. But whether we take it as merely the result of the parental germ or

681 665

81 665

UMRAO SHER GIL. "ON TIME."

682 666

UMRAO SHER GIL. BIRTH AND DEATH

something also apart from either, it must be admitted that the life does not begin with the new being, but comes from the past of itself or of the parents. Thus there is no such thing as an utterly new beginning, but a continuity of Life. And if we accept the claim of religions that the soul is something apart from the body, then its continuity in the past must involve its continuity in the future also either as an independent existence or merely as a combination. It is however more reasonable to believe as great thinkers apart from religious teachers have held, that the soul does not begin with the body which it dons as a suitable vehicle for self-expression on the plane of concrete physical limitation without which crystalisation and separateness the experience of personality is not possible. On the super physical planes the consciousness is less and limited, less and less concrete till it meets and unites in universal Life. But the aim of Life seems to be the formation of individuality for some end of its own on which seems to be individual self-realisation. This 683 every one feels in himself without a doubt, although through a sort of blindness he tries to explain it as the result of mere physical structure, thus trying to explain the simple by the complex which is against all real scientific and philosophic way of thinking. It is mere perversity to try to refuse an obvious fact by means of complex and unnatural explanations simply for the purpose of denying the immortality of the soul or Life. (See the verdict of even thoughtful agnostics like Huxley, and the conclusions of philosophers like James in recent times, as given in his booklet on Immortality). So this personal existence which seemed to find expression in the birth, growth and decay and death of a physical body, will assume other bodies of gross or subtle matter for its self-expression in the future after death of the physical body, and continue its individualised physical existence along with its inner personality which is directly known to every one, and will continue to think and feel in the life to come. And as physical suitability of the parents drew the soul of the child to them for happiness or unhappiness according to the need of each soul, similarly it is not impossible for the soul of the parents and children and brothers and sisters, nay of those with whom some inherent sympathy and affinity drew together in the past may be drawn together again for the experience which is needed by them till the goal of all this evolution is reached which is said to be the realisation of the One Life in all, call it Higher Self or God or Brahman or whatever, whatever you prefer to name it. This is in the process of flowing Time and extended Space and the endless seeming chain of Causation. But it may be in the universal Life of Non-duality where Time and space and causation do not seem to operate, and where the The One Life and True Being which are said to be pure sentience and Bliss abide, how the personality if it has any significance there will exist is beyond the grasp of the human⁶⁸⁴ intellect. composite universal Picture, may not have characteristics as all existences there may seem only as One without a difference as religion and philosophy seems to claim, and

these may arise only the empirical world on the different planes of Existence as moving through Time into the more and more concrete personalities which lay hidden and unseen in the Great Universal Life, with all the possibilities of change and growth and decay and death. But what of the intermediate stages between one physical life and another? The Indian thinkers and Seers seem to hold that the subtle body of each possesses all the senses and organs of action and perception, and these are the offshoots of the Mind and mind itself is an offshoot and differentiation of the universal mind or Existence, and so the personality must be conscious in a somewhat different way on the plane of the subtle body also, which is a body all the same, or at least those senses and organs of action may after death find suitable vehicles of subtler matter somewhat different from our physical bodies and not altogether different from it, the difference being the subtlety of the matter which forms the bodies, and which is capable of yielding somewhat different experiences, more subtle and less separated, and thus happier, or may be more miserable according to the inner state of each individual. It would be difficult for us, confined as we are in physical frames to know and feel exactly as the disembodied may be feeling, but we ourselves will sooner or later abandon the physical bodies donning the subtler, experience what they feel who have gone before us.

Thus all exist as invisible germs in the Universal and gradually become more and more concrete on the lower planes of separation, each higher state being the background of the lower and thus persisting longer and longer than it with the Eternal at last and thus without change at the same time while seeming to change, and thus holding⁶⁸⁵ the final Paradox which seems impossible only to the limited human intellect. One can find those one has loved and lost either in the ever shifting tower of Time, or in the Eternal Oneness of life.

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARAACHARYA OF KOLHAPUR (1912) in "The Vedantin" Mag.Kolhapur.

- (1) Since an omnipresent spirit cannot appear in a state of a limited being with all its pure knowledge without any limitation, a person should never expect omniscience in anybody. (This in ref to claims of theosophical society leaders!)
- (2) The tendencies and inclinations of every person to do certain actions arise out of the character of his actions in former births.
- (3) Although the Supreme is actually indivisible, still it can be individuated in the sense of wave which is inseparable from the ocean. This wave is the higher self, often called atman in sanskrit literature to distinguish it from the Supreme itself. That there is

^{685 669}

in existence both a higher and lower self is clearly shown by the two verses in Mundak Upanishad, 3–1–1: "Two inseparable companions of fine plumage perch on the same tree. One feeds on the delicious fruit. The not other, not tasting of it, looks on."

- (4) The social moral and political changes which occurred in India during the past few centuries, the selfishness of the Mathas (religious-philosophic institutions) and of the Brahmins, the heavy fetters of caste, greatly account for the lack of appreciation of Vedanta philosophy.
- (5) Formerly it was believed that the Brahmins only had the monopoly to derive all benefits from the Mathas and the Avaita truths. But the same Atman is present in both a sage and a pariah, so all persons in the world have the inherent power and liberty to approach and realize the truth.
- (6) Having noticed that the Vedanta philosophy which was carried to the West by the noble founders of the Theosophical society was lately misinterpreted and mixed up with fallacious occultism, His Holiness⁶⁸⁶ Sri Shankaracharya of Kolhapur has instructed his disciples thru the "Vedantin" to clear up misunderstandings. The Western people should not believe in Leadbeater's stories of clairvoyance into Atlantean books etc. This is an evil which leads many astray.
- 7. When people in England experienced the downfall of Swami Aganya (Tiger Mahatma?) they should have realized that their guru was not a man of perfection as described in Vedantic books. True he could do miracle of stopping his heart but he also exhibited malice and anger. (8). The West will have to leave its physical preoccupation one day and approach yoga practice. (9) In Samadhi there is neither the evidence of the presence of any Gods nor does God split himself into several Gods. There is only one eternal Brahman which is yourself the other things are mere imaginations of yourself. (10) Some persons criticise our policy as we praise faiths with one hand and knock them down with the other. We wish to see thriving in them their advaitic truth but not their theories and dogmas. We regard them as children to be petted, to grow and thrive. (11) Theosophical society has done a lot of awakening but with its now annually-changing theories, the truth seekers will leave it and it will disintegrate. (12) Vedanta is not in sympathy with occultism, spook seeing, aura seeing etc. It does not care for such things. They do not help progress. (13) H.H. proclaimed: "Indifference towards faith and scriptures on all sides threatens religious downfall. Special attempts have therefore to be made by the Jagadgurus with a view to bring about religious regeneration. It is a matter for deliberate consideration what abrupt changes in deeply rooted religious practices will lead to good or evil and how far a revision of rites, ceremonials,

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARAACHARYA OF KOLHAPUR (1912) in "The Vedantin" Mag.Kolhapur

^{686 670}

observances⁶⁸⁷ etc can be effected." (14) Adyar theosophy in its new speculations is trying to delude people. There is neither proof for Leadbeaters assertions nor a confirmatory statement by any old sage; it is imaginary twaddle. He even contradicts H.P.B. He and Besant boldly foretell what happens after death but could not foretell that their arguments in the Madras High Court case would bring a rebuke on them from the Justice.

SANKARACHARYA: 688@ "THE MOON OF SPIRITUAL AWAKENING."

- 1. In spite of various expedients such as Practice, knowledge and devotion, a man does not become fitted for Liberation, without vairagya (detachment).
- 2. That (absence of desire) is obscured in all bodies by egoism and mineness (I amness) and sense of possession). Of these, I-am-ness, is related to the body and mine-ness to the objects such as wife etc.
- 3. Of what is made the body? And what is its relation to the objects? When one deliberates like this, then I-am-ness and Mine-ness turn away.
- 4. The soul wandering through the eight million and four-hundred thousand species of womb of human animal bird and horizontal walking creatures, bound by its deeds, experiences sufferings.
- 5. Among all these species the human body is the last and best, and here too noble birth, and deliberation on the good customs of the family (distinguishes a man). But in spite of all these even intelligent persons, if they have not attained to a knowledge of the body being perishable and a discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self then they have lived in vain.
- 6. One can not purchase even a moment of one's life with ten millions of gold pieces. But if such a valuable life passes in vain, what greater loss can one suffer?
- 7. When the human body is over, and one finds birth in the bodies of beasts etc. in which one has not proper knowledge of one's body even, how can one think of the highest goal of life (Liberation)?
- 8. Like travellers resting on their way, we meet a father, a mother, relations, sisters, uncles, sons-in-law and the rest, while wandering in many births.

⁶⁸⁷ The original editor marked correction its not clear by hand ⁶⁸⁸ 671

[®] Translated by Umrao Singh Sher-Gil. (unpublished)

- 9. The tongue, every moment, utters calumny falsely of 689 others. What does one gain thereby, or the other lose; for nothing man incurs much sin.
- 10. The Creator has designed only one proper halter for restraining the animal known as the Mind, which runs into evil paths; and that is detachment.
- 11. Is the happiness one finds in deep sleep, the result of the senses? Surely not. Because deep sleep is nothing more than the mind's not staying in the sphere of the senses.
- 12. Only one artist holding the threads of various wooden puppets dance on the board in front of the pillar, while himself hidden all the time. (So the Self also does the same)
- 13. As people do their work when the Sun has dawned, but it is not the Sun who does it, nor causes it to be done, so the Self also (does not do anything) but merely illuminates everything.
- 14. As the mind gradually becomes steady on account of ceasing to be interested in the sense objects, so one begins to hear the prolonged note which resembles the note of a flute.
- 15. When overwhelmed by the bliss of non-duality, when the mind becomes still and does not think, who am I? What is this, and whose am I? then it becomes unconsciousness (inert). (The word murchita means to become swooned and is also used in the sense of becoming a solidified, as in the case of quicksilver becoming a solid inert mass after losing its restlessness through the process of amalgamation. Thus it indicates the state of immobility through wonder and absorption.)
- 16. That mere consciousness which pervades the sight, the seer and the things seen, when the mind becomes absorbed in it, then it becomes unconscious or inert (murchit)
- 17. When one comes face to face with the Self, or in other words one becomes mere Consciousness, then the distinction of the subject and the object ceases, but when one is not face to face with the Self, then that does not happen.
- 18. The⁶⁹⁰ state which is experienced within at the end of wakefulness and the beginning of sleep (i.e. between waking and sleeping), if that were to become fixed, then one would find the bliss of non-duality.

^{689 6}**72**

- 19. The mind held in that (state of exalted satva) experiences the bliss of the Supreme Self, and when stability in it is gained, one attains to the state of an elephant intoxicated in (the season of) rutting. (Nots. Simile seems inappropriate on the surface, but it means that one does not care for anything without making any attempt in that direction.)
- 20. Gradually he begins to see the existence of The Glorious Lord in all creatures, and all creatures in the Lord. When his condition becomes like this, then he becomes the chosen servant of The Lord.
- 21. In the same way, if the mind thinking on its cause, (the Self) becomes stable within, and does not go outwards, would it not become itself the Self?
- 22. Because on the occasion of showing The Universal Form to Arjuna (Partha) The Glorious Lord bestowed divine sight, so it is but natural and proper that the Ord (Nara-Hari, Man-Lion) is invinciple.
- 23. Although the Lord is the same towards every one, still He is the Nara Hari The Lord as Man (or as Man-Lion), and still these devotees remain every absorbed in supreme Bliss through his compassionate gaze.
- V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." @@. Philosophical truth on India is usually sought through the medium of the terms "I" and "Thou", i.e. through the Ego and the Non-ego. Some philosophers first attempt to determine the nature of the Ego and then through this knowledge of the Ego they try to explain the outer phenomenal world which is apparently so different form it. Others study the real nature of the external objects in this universe and from this they derive knowledge of the consciousness of the 'I'. On the whole, although all philosophers attempt to know the ultimate reality of the one or the other, still the ways in which they do so are essentially different. The former proceed from the inner to the outer, the latter from the outer to the inner. We shall see now which of the two ways is preferable and what advantage the one has over the other.

"Ego" means "I". It is considered to be a subject by the majority of people. It is also said that it is not altogether independent of the physical world, and that it cannot be cognized without its help. The Non-Ego or the physical world, which includes all the external objects in the universe, is considered as an object. It is also said to be imperceptible except by the consciousness of the Ego. The Ego and the Non-ego, thus, are relative to each other. A knowledge of the Ego or of the Non-ego cannot be gained in the absence of the one or the other. In other words physical nature owes its existence to the Ego which again cannot be thought of without the aid of the former. Thus, one cannot exist without the other. Under the circumstances the question arises whether there is any possibility of making an inquiry into the nature of real truth through the Ego alone. Here the reader will be thrown into an apparent difficulty for a while; but it may be cleared away by a little reasoning. Let us enquire which is the first of the two.

If we assume that the consciousness of the Ego can be gained first, and then that through it comes the perception of the outer world we shall have to admit the independent existence of the outer physical world apart from its cognition by the Ego. It is true that this being proved the existence of the Ego will solely depend on that of the external objects. But for the following reason⁶⁹² one cannot prove such independent existence of the outer world. The perception of all objects takes place at the very moment the 'I' is illuminated. Before its illumination none had, has, or will have, the perception of the physical world.

So, it is impossible to prove the existence of the world before the illumination of the Ego. It is the experience of the yogis, who go into deep sleep and trance, that the very moment the consciousness of the 'I' is lost, the world is also lost with it and that the world begins to be perceived at the same time that the consciousness of the 'I' arises. This being the common experience, it is absurd to maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' is through the perception of the outer world. Thus we inevitably come to the conclusion that the manifestation of the world is always with the consciousness of the 'I'

If they are thus interdependent the question arises whether the natures of the Ego and the Non-ego are alike or different. The Non-ego cannot be said to be different in nature because it would then have independent existence which has been already said to be impossible. When Atman, being self-existent, positively makes the declaration "I am" which existence the Non-ego cannot assert in such an independent way and when the Non-ego is not different in nature from the Ego, it should be admitted that they are of one and the same nature.

Here the doubt will naturally arise, Why are they called by different names when their natures do not differ? According to the revelations given by Shri Jnaneshwar all the objects that we see in the world as stone, water, light etc. are different forms of one and the same Sfurti or vibration of knowledge of Atman. Through ignorance men give them different names to avoid the confusion in everyday life. The Non-ego does not exist independently of the Ego but is another aspect of it. On realisation one feels that

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^{692 675}

the Non-ego, as⁶⁹³ it were, is merged with the Ego into the ocean of Atman, the Eternal source of knowledge and reality. The Ego apparently appears to project the Non-ego in various names and forms, and becomes what it perceives and when there arises the slightest differentiation in the shape of an Ego, it is further merged into the waves of delusion until it is, as it were, entangled in the creation of an infinitely variegated universe. Thus, through delusion, the Ego of a human being thinks itself to be other than the objects in the world. Again, it is the experience of yogis that in certain states of consciousness, such as Sushupti (Deep Sleep) and Samadhi (deep trance) there is neither perception of the physical world nor the consciousness of "I" but there is knowledge of eternal existence.

So, it will be seen that the words subject and object are merely modes of expression of the sfurti or vibration (knowledge) of Atman. But it is already shown that objects cannot be perceived independently of the consciousness of "I" and that Atman through "I" has an individual knowledge of its existence which the Non-ego has not. Hence, the "I" has been taken as the subject and the Non-ego as the object for the sake of convenience of language. Both have importance in their own way. It is not possible for a soul to express itself subjectively without a physical body and vice versa. In fact, there is neither a subject nor an object to a yogi illuminated with the true Knowledge of Atman. As compared with the Non-ego, Ego has direct knowledge of its own existence. So, for the investigation of the Truth it is better to go from within outwards, as is practiced by most of the Indian philosophers, than from the world to the self.

If then the Object has no independent existence and is the Subject itself, the non-perception of the one would imply that of the other. It⁶⁹⁴ is true that, thus viewed, the Subject would not be cognised; but that would not be sufficient to enable us to say that knowledge of the Atman to vanishes owing to the non-cognition of the Subject. We have already made the hypothesis that every idea is made up of the two component elects (Subject) and (Object), the first representing the Ever-existing fountain of knowledge and the other the outside world or object which is nothing else than the Eternal Self unfolded through the medium of the senses, thought etc. The Eternal Existence and the Eternal Knowledge of Atman remain unaffected by the non-perception of the Subject and the Object. When a man passes into a swoon or into sound sleep, the ideas of subject and object are never present to him and yet we find that his Eternal knowledge is not lost. In short, it is our ignorance only which leads us to imagine both subject and object and once we dispel that ignorance and realize the reality which underlies our thought, Subject and Object both fall into the back ground and the light of the all-pervading Eternal substratum dawns upon us and discloses the

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." 694 677

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO."

comparative unreality of these components of our thought. The knowledge of the ulterior self comes to us as personal consciousness. Our knowledge of I which is in its turn linked to the knowledge of this' is only a projection of Atman. Even if this reflection vanishes the source remains as true as it ever was. When that ultimate reality shines forth through the medium of thought, the Subject and Object simultaneously rise and perception of the objects follows. Synthetically, therefore the Ego and Non-ego are merely the ultimate reality in itself and afford no room for imagining them as relatively true, when looked at from this point of view. Dhyaneshwar, the greatest Maharashtra philosopher says in Amritanubhav: "When the Atman shines forth, Ego sees the creation; and when He does not, he does not see anything." The non-cognition of the creation therefore does not imply the⁶⁹⁵ absence of the Atman. Dnyaneshwar clearly propounds that the knowledge of Atman survives the temporary consciousness of Aham (I), which he designates as the perceiver, and this which he designates as the perceived. "When a perceptible object is not present there is no perceiver still the Atman retains His eternal energy. Proceeding on these lines we come to realize that all creation is nothing but a reflection of our own Self and that our own Self is an allpervading entity. On the realization of the infiniteness of our self inevitably follows that consolation, par excellency, which is looked upon as the True Bliss.

Gopalboa, a follower of Dhyaneshwar, says: "When the consciousness of the lower Ego merges into the ternal substratum, the screen (of ignorance) vanishes in the eternal energy and the Atman continues independently of the Subject. That is Self-realization." What he means to inculcate is that when the thoughts or ideas merge themselves into the ever-witnessing Atma, the reality shines forth in its unspecialized consciousness. The thoughts and its components are not there left to screen the ulterior Self and the ultimate reality reveals itself in its diffused and general way, and this is the absolute Reality of the self. Ramachandra Pandit, a Vedantin of the same school says:—
"When the triad is absorbed, the Self alone shines forth and subjective thought is lost. The triad herein referred to consists of perceiver, Subject, perceived, Object and perception and when that is absent there is yet something that is found to continue and that general, diffused and unspecialized knowledge is nothing but the ulterior self or Atman.

Let us, now, proceed from the object to the subject. It has already been proved that the phenomenon has no existence independent of the Ego. If however an independent existence be assumed, we are further led to enquire into its nature and the cause once traced will be found to be ever-existent, but then it is a question whether we shall be in a position to call it a conscious cause. In this creation that we find spread

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." 696 679

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO."

before and around us, we only see and realize the ever-existent phase of the ultimate reality. By the phrase consciousness is meant consciousness manifested. The animate portion of the world constitutes a part of our perceived, i.e. the object and as such its vitality even though it exists yet being only an effect, is not eternal. The subjective cognitional vitality is only present in our own selves and looked at from this stand point the animate world being only the object to us lacks that vitality. It will, thus, be seen that in the animate as well as in the inanimate world it is only a particular phase of reality that is represented. Cognition presupposes this subjective cognitional vitality and but for this, we should never be able to cognize the world. The investigation of the nature and cause of outward phenomena leads only to this that the cause prima alone is found to be ever-existent. Beyond merely asserting that the first cause alone is ever-existent we cannot go.

Beyond merely asserting that the first cause alone is ever-existent we cannot go. There are no data for predicating any thing else of that reality and under these circumstances the causa prima will continue to be unknowable. It will, thus, be seen that this latter method of investigation of phenomenon itself is quite faulty and in no way leads to any very satisfactory conclusion. This objective method is not, therefore, of much use. The subjective method, on the other hand, has this distinct advantage that we not only realize in it the reality of the ultimate self but at the same time the conscious phase of that eternal reality is also brought home to us. The conclusion that the original cause which gives rise to all phenomena including ourselves is not only eternal⁶⁹⁷ but also conscious at the same time, automatically springs up and we are further led to understand that life (Jeevatma) is only an emanation of that underlying eternal and ultimate reality which is the Brahma of the Vedantin. If the original cause be divested of its consciousness, it is a question whether the phenomena can be perceived at all. Being conscious by nature, the original cause cannot be said to be unknowable. It is in itself the spring of knowledge. We, there fore, call it by the name of Ego or Aham and the world being only an effect we call it by the name of Non-ego or Itham. That the Aham and Itham are perfectly identical with each other has already been shown. Aham or subject conditions the original cause and Itham or object conditions the outer phenomenon, the effect. The elimination of these conditioning entities leaves the Absolute reality intact and that is the ultimate self. Though the subjective method of investigation, thus, seems to possess positive advantages over the objective one, still, both are supplementary to each other so much so that the one cannot be said to be complete without the other. Resort, therefore, to both these methods is quite necessary.

Now, we come to the Maya Vad, Hypothesis of Ignorance or Nescience or Avidya, as it is ordinarily called by the Vedantis. It is true that this distinction of

subject and object is felt owing to ignorance but then this ignorance also is involved in the two-fold division, namely subjective and objective factors of thought or sensation. So that in the absence of any sensation of thought, Ignorance cannot possibly arise before the mental vision. Even in deep sleep general or cosmic subject and general or cosmic object (samashti) as distinguished from Individual are assumed and this assumption leads to the further assumption of cosmic Ignorance. Ignorance being thus reduced to an object it cannot be conceived of in any other way and like an object, therefore, has⁶⁹⁸ no existence independently. It has been already said that the disappearance of the object means the disappearance of the subject and analogically we can see that when the ignorance which is referred to the 'this' of the sensation vanishes, its correlate cognition which is referred to the Aham of the sensation also vanishes. Though these sensations or thoughts every now and then vanish to give place to new ones, still the substratum which projects all these sensations and with them all the world, for the former involves the latter, continued to thrive so that it can never be said to vanish along with these sensations. Again this so-called Ignorance which is no other than the This or object, cannot be said to exist potentially in a causal state. If in this way, the causal state cannot possibly be conceived of, much less therefore, can it be said that this Itham is the kayam (effect) of this Ignorance. It may here perhaps be suggested that though Ignorance is object, still as it gives rise to the conception of subject, it is the cause of this effect Aham. But then this suggestion does not go to the root of the question. For it has already been said that object co-exists with Aham (Subject), and there is no warrant for supposing that this Itham which is here suggested as the cause of Aham, existed independently prior to this Aham, so as to constitute in itself a potential cause. This so-called Ignorance cannot be said to co-exist with Atma which is the substratum that projects these sensations, thoughts, etc. The learned Dhnaneshwar in this Amirtanubhav says "If the Shastras be construed to mean that the Ignorance resides in Atma itself and that the substratum is screened by that Ignorance, then in the absence of any second (for Atma is defined as absolute one and without any second), who is there to know that this Ignorance resides there in its potential causal condition." By this Dnaheshwar means that in the absence subjective element of our thoughts or 699 sensations i.e. Aham, we will never be in a position to conceive the so-called potential and causal Ignorance. Again it can be further argued that what existed prior to the coming into being of the subject, cannot be the object.

It has already been proved that even when the object is perceived it cannot be said to have an independent existence of its own. The perception occurs only when the sensation exists. When therefore it does not arise there is no perception. If during perception the object lacks independent existence and if Ignorance is perceived only as

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." 699 682

the object, Ignorance cannot be said to have any existence, independent or otherwise, prior to the birth of the sensation. The hypothesis, therefore, that this Ignorance potentially exists as a cause before its effect—this sensation or thought stands self-refuted. Nor can this Ignorance be called non-eternal, for the attribute "non-eternal" is also relative. The phenomenon, i.e. Itham is called Asath i.e. non-eternal in correlation with Atma which is called Sath or ever-existent. All these relative ideas or conceptions come within the pale of sensation Vritti and thus the non-eternal Ignorance cannot be said to exist at a time when the Vritti or sensation or thought is absent or is not projected from the substratum. If again this Ignorance be conceived as non-eternal in relation to Aham which is eternal then this relational conception does away with the causal nature of Ignorance. For in this case Ignorance falls in the category of Itham or object and as such it cannot be said to be the cause of Aham or the subject.

Dnaneshwar, therefore, says:—The looking-glass and the face both verily make the face perceived. But the face exists in the face and not in the looking-glass. "The perceived (object) is perceived by the perceiver (subject) but the perceiver (subject is the reality. So that which does not exist cannot be said to have been perceived." "Let the face be seen in a looking-glass but⁷⁰⁰ its existence is only in the face. So that the phenomenon of perception is only an appearance (as opposed to reality)" "Again, ornaments (of gold) are gold itself and nothing else; for, here, besides gold there is nothing in existence." "Therefore both these states viz. perceived and perceiver i.e. object and subject are only unreal in appearances and looking to the common stock which projects these states, we find it to be one whose nature is to project." "And if this be called Ignorance, then logic must be said to have gone astray." "At the root of this phenomenon we find cognition so that phenomenon is cognition and (in the face of such a fact) can Ignorance justify itself as the producer or cause of such a phenomenon and as such a cause can it arrogate to itself an existence?"

Dnaneshwar thus clearly propounds that "this" or object has no real existence as such and when there is nothing else but the Ego, reflecting itself everywhere, the perception of the distinction between the original and the reflected is only an appearance and not reality. Comparatively speaking, the substratum is the only reality which projects both the subject and the object. So that our so-called Ignorance or Maya cannot be said to co-exist with that substratum i.e. Atma. It is the substratum Atma or Brahma both of which are identical with each other that is manifesting itself as a phenomenon and then there remains no ground for the assumption of Maya or Ignorance. If then this Ignorance cannot be said to have any existence at all, much less can it be said to screen it. (i.e. the conscious reality)

The conscious reality is screened by the causal Ignorance. For if we consult our experience we find that the object is always perceived by us. Perception or cognition is always with us and this goes to show that this so-called Ignorance does not even touch this unfailing source of consciousness i.e. Atma Ego. To say therefore⁷⁰¹ that Ignorance consists with Atma Ego in the face of the established fact that the process of cognition or perception is going on unceasingly is simply absurd.

If, therefore, the nescience, cannot in any way be proved to have any independent existence, much less can it be said to enfold the Atman so as to screen it from manifestation. If it be assumed that this nescience forms a screen to the Atman, it can never be perceived as an object. But if as a matter of experience, this nescience or Ignorance presents itself as an object, it cannot possibly be said to have any thing to do with the Atman. Cognition cannot be conceived of as co-existing with the Atman and in this state of things the assertion that the nescience abides in the Atman stands self-refuted. If the clouds, for instance, were to completely enshroud the sun so as to do away with it for a time, whence is the light, that makes them visible, to come? In spite of the sun being screened, the clouds continue to be seen so that the sun cannot be denied existence. Dnyaneshwar, therefore, says "To say that, that which is annihilated by Atman, exists with it, is an absurd and self-contradictory talk."

The hypothesis that Aham and Itham are the effects of the latent nescience inevitably drives us to the proposition that these Aham and Itham are integrally one with Ignorance and as such Aham is nothing but Ignorance. If this be granted, then the nescience and the phenomenon of the world will never be cognised by him. Absolute non-cognition will be the end. The hypothesis in question, therefore, is not at all acceptable. The idea of ignorance that is ordinarily associated with the expression which means "I am ignorant" or "I am conscious of ignorance" and which furnishes the basis for the supposition that ignorance co-exists within us along and in union with Ego (individual) cannot by⁷⁰² any stretch of imagination be granted. Ratiocination again would not help us in any way. For when we see directly that all this phenomenon is in reality nothing but the result of the eternal impulse of Atman or the Absolute, a resort to any process of inference for the purpose of allocating this causal ignorance—the expression causal Ignorance again involves an assumption that causation underlies the phenomenon and that ignorance is the cause – becomes quite out of question. In short, it is the absolute Atman that expresses itself into this subject and object - Aham and Itham—and so an independent existence cannot be predicated of this subject and object. Further as they arise from the one Impulse (Sfurti) and being identical in their natures, they cannot be said to stand in any relation towards each other, nor can any relational

^{701 684}

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." $^{702}\,685$

existence be predicated of this manifested creation or phenomenon which is only diversity in appearance and the Absolute Atman which exists even independently of the above referred to Aham and Itham. We cannot again go over and say that the Absolute, all pervading Atma, is such that it transcends all relation. For, when we say so, we come across a predication of which the Absolute is not susceptible.

Herein Dnyaneshwar tries to convey some idea about the Reality. He says that, immediately after the sleep is over, a state supervenes which borders on the waking consciousness, but at the same time it is not clear consciousness. Subject and object are not there in the way they are in the consciousness. Similarly, the idea that "I am the Brahma", (an idea that is ordinarily granted to arise with the advent of real knowledge) savours of the objective and as such is destined to disappear with the subject that perceives that idea. In short, howsoever highly wrought an idea may be, it is bound to disappear i.e. merge into the substratum. The substratum, which is nothing but⁷⁰³ the conscious reality itself, shines forth independently of these ideas or subject and object which go to constitute the idea.

The absolute reality is like the Sun. There is no other resplendent body which can make the Sun visible, nor is there any darkness which can screen it from vision. In the same way, the Absolute Ego is the source of all knowledge in itself; there is no knowledge that can bring it into perception, nor is there any ignorance that can successfully hide it. Again, such Absolute Atman cannot be the object of knowledge; for, as we have seen above, it exists even independently of the subject and object. Direct cognition of such a reality is an impossibility. And yet, we cannot help observing that such a reality is present in it though we are unable to say so either directly or otherwise. The pupil of the eye cannot see itself directly and yet it is perpetually functioning. On the same analogy the Ever-conscious Atman without being able to cognise itself, face to face, is always itself active. Not only can we call it direct or indirect, or knowable or unknowable, but, to call it an existing or non existing being is also beyond our legitimate sphere.

The long and short of what we have is that that which exists is eternal or indestructible. But again a doubt suggests itself and that is about the existing phase that we actually perceive in the world around us. A little amount of reflection will show that unless the subject is perceived the object i.e. the world is not perceived at all; so that before that time both are imperceptible and not non-existent. When the thought rises above the mental horizon, everything is reduced perceptible and the existence is thus unfolded to the vision. Shri Shankaracharya attributes this perception which he calls the effect to Ajnana i.e. Nescience which he calls the cause. Whereas Dnyaneshwar calls

^{703 686}

to aid⁷⁰⁴ for the explanation of this phenomenon. Without the help of these, both these philosophers cannot demonstrate the reality of the Absolute. In spite of the difference of the hypotheses both these philosophers agree on this one point viz. that the reality we come to perceive after the mind begins to exercise itself in the object around us is nothing else than the reality which till then remains unperceived i.e. that which was beyond the pale of our cognition only comes within it immediately the mind begins to manifest its activity. Perhaps it may be said that the invisible transforms itself into the visible by the process of Evolution i.e. the invisible evolves the visible. But then the theory of Evolution supposes that the one which transforms itself into the other is owing to this transformation or Evolution not eternal. Analogically the invisible will thus come to be non eternal and the visible also being subject to the law of Evolution will also fall into the same category. The doctrine of Evolution as propounded by the oriental philosophers presupposes the annihilation of the one and the coming into that place of another. The Ever-existent or the real is not subject to any such law. It continues to subsist as it is in spite of all the various predications devised in respect of it. If, therefore, the Real that is perceived does not evolve, the unreal which is also nothing else than the real perceived as the monism propounds, does not evolve. It cannot, therefore, be said with any claims to credence that the unperceived reality evolves into the perceived reality for there is no real distinction between the two as a matter of fact being by nature one and the same they are no two. They are, so to say, the absolute one ever undifferentiable.

We have, therefore, to see how the unperceived comes to be perceived. It has already been said, above that unless the subject is perceived the world around cannot be perceived. The perception of the subject is really the cause of the perception of 705 the world that follows. During sleep, neither the subject nor the object is perceived. That which is thus invisible in sleep, constitutes the visible in the waking state. Extending this mode of thought, we find that prior to the coming into being of an individual everything is invisible to him and prior to the coming into being of the human being everything was invisible to the humanity. The conclusion, that forces itself upon us, therefore, is that all states, prior to the state when the subject is perceived, fall into the category of the invisible and that, as a matter of course, this world, the object, experiences the same fate. In short, that which was invisible till a certain point of time becomes visible immediately after. The perception or the nonperception being exclusively subjective in their inception, have nothing whatsoever to do with the world at large. The object continues to be what it was, unaffected altogether by this subjective change.

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^{704 687}

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." 705 688

Here a further doubt haunts us and that is if not this object, at least the subject comes to be evolved. For the conscious phase of the subject that is manifest during the wakeful state is undeniably absent in deep sleep and this circumstance in itself furnishes the ground to suppose that the substratum that exists in sleep, evolves the subject that perceives during the stage of wakefulness. Our experience, however as it goes, gives a lie to this position. For the oneness of the individual experiencing sleep and wakefulness is never broken. We always realize that from our birth or at least from the time that consciousness distinctly develops in us till our death or the time we part without consciousness, in spite of the various stages of life, sleep as well as wakefulness we go through, the idea that we have been one and the same always presents us. The Ego which represents the individual knowledge continuously perceives all the vicissitudes in life and yet retains⁷⁰⁶ his oneness vividly. Evolution supposes change out and out and in the face of the above experience to which there is no denying we cannot possibly say that the subject is evolved from the state that exists in sleep. If again Evolution denotes a course onward and if the subject be assumed to have evolved from sleep and arrived at wakefulness, a further sleep cannot again be conceived of. That would mean conceiving backward or devolution. In short, the position that the subject evolves out of sleep in untenable. Nor can the so called evolution or devolution be predicated of knowledge itself on the analogy of the previous arguments. So that the truth that comes out is that the invisible which is the same as the visible comes to be the visible without any Evolution. This doctrine of Evolution is thus untenable and the universal Atman is real and absolute without it. We have already said that there exists no real distinction between the subject and the object. It is the subject that shines forth as the object. The subject alone sees the object. In the absence of the subject, there is nothing like the object or when there is no object, there is nothing like the subject. In fact, both arise simultaneously from the substratum and before they arise everything is invisible or unperceived. The attributes perceived or unperceived have reference more to the subject and object rather than to the all pervading Reality.

The proposition that we find ourselves in a position to lay down is that the ideas of the perceptible and the imperceptible are only relative ideas. Prior to the time when the mind begins to manifest itself in the form of subject and object, everything is unperceived and the perceived comes on with manifestation of the subject and its correlate object. If we eliminate this manifestation which as such is bound to merge in the substratum, there is something left with which individuality also stands integrally assimilated. In fact that is something "from which speech reverts with mind". As⁷⁰⁷ the Prashna Upanishad says "There the speech does not go, the mind does not go." It transcends both that which is known and that which is not known." There is not, thus,

^{706 689}

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO." 707 690

V.S. BALA SHASTRI HUPERIKAR. "THE EGO AND THE NON-EGO."

left the least ground for applying causation to explain the nature of the phenomenon. This is the summum bonum to be attained. This is the farthest limit to be reached. This furnishes the real clue to understand thoroughly the radical unity that underlies the variety of religions, sciences and peoples in this world. It brings home to us the truth that the apparent diversity that characterises this universe is unreal and that unity underlies the diversified appearances. The differences of caste, colour and creed which have, owing to want of right mode of thinking, come to be inherent in human nature individual and communal are so many fictions brought into existence by short sight of ignorance and thus abhorrent to the real nature and constitution of this universe.

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." 1. I cannot definitely tell whether you are within me and I see your image as I reproduce it in my dream or whether you are an idea in the cosmic mind and I see it in name and form under certain conditions.

When I forget you, the idea of self must then be left either in the cosmic mind or kept latent in ray mind.

When I am reminded of you, I, then, take up your idea from the cosmic mind and reflect it in the shape of a picture or should discover myself in your memory, if you are at all within me.

I am glad that you realize that the Vedant is much of a riddle. Moreover I am glad that you give me an existence somewhere either in your own or in the cosmic mind; and do not say that I disappear for ever when you don't think of me.

Indeed, you don't create a world every morning and 708 destroy it at night during sleep. It is there for millions of years.

2. Brahma is non-dual. So, from His standpoint there is nothing external. When he thought of this and created many within Himself (as we mentally create many objects in a dream), each Ego or Jiva conceived of the others as being external. Each Ego is like a wave upon the ocean of Brahma. So what an Ego sees through illusion to be external is merely the reflection of its inner vijnan, the real and full knowledge of the world. The external Vijnan is called cosmic mind. The knowledge of an Ego is classified as (i) Vijnan, (ii) Buddhi or subtle reason (iii) Manas or gross mind, (iv) senses (mental). Thus the senses form the link between the external Vijnan and the qualities of an Ego.

^{@@} In the "Vedantin." (magazine) 1910.

^{708 691}

When mind is the actor in the waking state, it has the reflected Vijnan outside and memory of objects within (Buddhi) and real knowledge of the world innermost (internal Vijnan).

3. Your Self has existence in Vijnana and your ideal image in my Buddhi. You are not outside of me when I am in Samadhi (trance), i.e. when the wave merges into the ocean it becomes the ocean. Similarly Atman on losing limitation becomes Paramatman, the Source of everything.

But when I have greater limitations and call myself B, I see you outside of me. That appearance is only a reflection in my mind. The temple similarly exists in Vijnan.

- 4. It is much better that in prayer statements of needs should be omitted (as God already knows what the devotee wants) and there should be only a request for His help in strengthening the mind to overcome the enormous difficulties of the world. Praises too, of a certain kind should be avoided in a prayer. I think praise is flattery. God should not be flattered for His Qualities. If praises are necessary I do not see why He should not be cursed for the misery in the world. Good and bad are cognized in Vijnan only. Atman is⁷⁰⁹ beyond those qualities.
- 5. There is no knowledge of the world to an ordinary person unless the cosmic mind (samashti) is united to his Vijnan or Vyashti (the knowledge of the cosmos in seed within the self) by Atman through his mental senses.
- 6. Oh, I don't mean it so literally. A Vedantist does not go to the temple to practise Samadhi nor does he hear the music after forgetting himself. Before prayer he repeats a mantra and concentrates his mind to it which in return as it were hypnotises him or inspires suggestions to lead him beyond the veil of delusion until it helps him to know himself truly. The music in trance is the chanting of the Man tram only. A monist attends a temple or church to enjoy the advantage of the purity of the place but he always takes the back seat for deep meditation. He does not like the front rows for he wishes to avoid seeing the movements of the priest while singing hymns and offering prayers as it upsets his stillness of mind and deep meditation. Of course, the ordinary Bhaktas or devotees do not believe in the importance of such retirement in the thought of God. The more they follow the ritual movements and the more they beat the drums, Chpalyas, etc. the more do they believe that the influence of Deity is upon them.
- 7. What do you know of prayer Mr B?

It is the application from the lower to the Higher.

Why should he apply himself to anybody? If the world is an illusion he is alone and has nothing to apply to.

^{709 692}

When you are in deep sleep, you are alone and never think of anybody, but, when you are in the waking state you see so many people and differentiate yourself from others. In this state people of the lower class of life feel the necessity of the help of those of the higher class of life. So, the grosser the limitation, the more are the applications.

If⁷¹⁰ it is an universal law I don't know whether a heavy stone requires more applications to be steady.

It depends on the shape of a stone. The more it is irregular the more supports it will require.

Even if the argument be granted I don't see where is the necessity of a prayer. Can I not for ever remain contented in a limited sphere of life? A Sanyasi is satisfied with a few things.

The general experience is this that nobody is ever steady in this Sansar (worldly affairs). He is tossed about by time into the waves of pain and pleasure. So, in order to get himself more or less steady a person appeals to Higher person.

If a person commits all sorts of blunders of his own accord and thrown himself into serious difficulties, will it be just that, instead of finding out the way himself he should trouble others to extricate him?

As grown up persons help children and when the latter are grown up they in their turn help old people or children, so it is the duty of all to help one another.

I am not aware of such a rigid law. If that be true I should know whether the devotees get the chance of helping a God in His helpless state.

- 8. Don't you remain content with the belief that this world is an illusion. It is so; but, you are caught into its delusion. If you try to ravel into mysticism you will be drawn to more of degeneration and sufferings.
- 9. Dont's you be tempted away by the belief that any Deity can absolve you from the past Karmas. Please remember that an incarnation like Krishna could only reveal the mystery of the world to his beloved friend Arjuna but could not wipe away his ignorance and karmas by one stroke. Arjuna had to spend years in meditation to approach the final goal. Please remember that Atman is Advaita; if you care to be absorbed in Him you must give up dualism. So long as you keep the ideas of two, you can not be one. So, please resort to the meditation⁷¹¹ of Atman which is within you and do not offer prayers to the external space which is but a phantasm.

Krishna, I do like your serenity and practice of Yoga. But, know that your control over mind should not only be successful in a room but should be the same while dealing with the public. For such attainment you must have Jnan. Without knowledge

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^{710 693}

you cannot have bliss. The final goal does not consist in sitting immersed in Yoga but to be the Eternal Brahma with all the knowledge and truth.

- 10. Looking at your own heart you have had experiences that somebody within has given you advices and warnings at the time of various difficulties. If you were to concentrate your mind upon it you will get plenty of miraculous powers and if you were to advance further you will be convinced that this world is merely a mental conception of your own in the Brahma State.
- 11. Mantras do give powers when a person is advanced in the practice of meditation. But such a person can never believe in superstition. So, you should give up the vagaries and take up meditation seriously.
- 12. He praises God by singing hymns in the company of his several friends. As he has no firm faith in God, when he is tossed about by misfortunes, he feels them acutely and blames Him for being so Cruel to him.

As the majority of the people in this world are wholly engaged in the pursuits of daily life, have no time to investigate the Truth of any religion and have dread of the future, so such people and disappointed dualists should temporarily come to take refuge in this Faith until Time should make them think seriously over the Truth and Reality of God and the world.

13. Mr B you said last time that the God of a dualist is a mental conception. Now, if a Monist believes that his God is eternal, please tell me, Is that a mental conception also?

Even⁷¹² a monist argues to the fact that the world is not eternal. It shall have its dissolution one day. If I am a seer of a certain phenomenon—say, of the Oxford Street,—when that street disappears from my sight I lose my seer ship at that moment. So, the God should lose his Godhood at the dissolution of the world.

But, when you forget a street you are yourself lost. You see something else.

My Atman is eternal and will ever be the witness of several phenomena. That is the truth of Vedant. But, on losing sight of a certain phenomenon 'I' the person under that illusion loses his seer ship and becomes Atman.

Do I become Atman on forgetting the Oxford Street?

No. When you lose the sight of all phenomena constituting a world you become Atman and not by forgetting one street.

When another world is created does it not show that God was quiet (inactive) for a moment? When he creates worlds in a series can He not be said to be eternal?

When I think of "I" it must have its correlative "Mine" at the same time. These two Aham (self) and Idam (world) co-exist. When one is absent the other is absent also.

⁷¹² 695

They are the result of a fruits (Impulse) of Atman. Even when you think of an abstraction, your "self" is a knower of that abstract space. On losing that you cannot say that you can exist without a space. Space is a limitation of yourself. On losing the limitation, self is liberated and becomes Atman. So without a world God can never be said to exist as God. Atman again becomes Brahma (God or Ishwar) on creating another world. Thus, the state of God is temporary and not permanent. He cannot be called eternal. Atman is Eternal. It is merely a mental conception of a monist that his God is everlasting. He will remain so (God) until the world exists. Even if he were to go into deep Samadhi he would realize⁷¹³ that there is no such thing as God and World. Thus, a monist revolves under a false belief that the external Nature is a part of God and he offers prayers to such blank space. The true God (Atman) is within and what is external is merely a reflection (phantam) of the knowledge of Atman. So, the prayers should be addressed to what is within and not without.

Are there not Monists who believe in the truth of Adhyatma Vidya (psychology) and have gained some powers? If their God is false, how did they get them?

Bhagawad Gita has well explained in the 7th Chapter that whether a person practises his devotion by way of monism or dualism, he indirectly worships Atman. His Karmas should bear fruits and receive Siddhis as desired from Atman through the Medium of a Deity. Anyhow, the fact is true that the God of every monist is temporary. Those monists who practise Jnan yoga realize their mistake soon and turn out Vedantins while others who revolve in mysticism are lost in delusion and take several births to find out their mistake.

I admit that both the monist and Dualist are labouring under false belief about the nature of God. However, I should ask you which of the two is better.

Before answering it I, must tell you my ideas about a religion. It should consist of the two main principles.—(i) philosophy or the true knowledge of the Purusha who holds this world, And, (ii) Ethics or the path which would keep a person in happiness and lead him towards unity with Purusha.

Most of the religions have at their basis Mono-Thiesm but have Deities, Messengers or Apostles to guide their devotees. So they are almost Dualistic. The principles of their Ethics are sound. By having absolute faith in them the true devotees of those faiths become good and moral people. They spend some hours in devotion regularly in their⁷¹⁴ respective form of worship. They meditate on the mental image or nature of their Deity or Medium and thus practice concentration (control of mind and senses) a good deal. Therefore, such people having absolute faith in what they do, are contented. Perchance, if they were to turn out Vedantin they would practise more of concentration and show themselves to be good Jnan-yogis. But, seeing that Dualism leads to jealousy, hatred and intolerance towards one another, some learned people

^{713 696}

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." ⁷¹⁴ 697

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES."

have lately introduced absolute Monism. (It is called by various names as Unitarianism, Brahma Samaj and Prarthana Samaj). It cannot be called a proper religion as it does not satisfy its two conditions. They cannot definitely tell who the author of the world is. Some of them have a permanent God. If the question "how a transitory world came out from a permanent (Nitya) God" or "how a like comes out of an unlike" be put to them they cannot answer it. While others believe that both Ishvara and Parameshwara stand for the origin of the world.

If the following questions be put to them: (1) How did the two causes come to exist? What necessity is there for their combination for the origin of the world? (2) Is the world a result of their fusion or chemical reaction? Are there any evidences for such statements? (3) Is the world in the state of evolution or involution? Why is it so?

They feel themselves to be almost blown up. Thus, this philosophy is deficient and their God remains ever unknowable. Consequently, their followers grope in darkness, have no firm faith in their God and have no definite goal to reach to. Therefore, their ethics does not stand on firm foundation and is always found to be weak. Most of their members do not strictly follow their principles and find out some excuse or another to avoid the blame. Their practice of devotion consists in a formal shutting up of the eyes and offering prayers⁷¹⁵ to a blank space (unknowable God). Thus, they have no concentration. If they were to follow it they would have to fall upon Vedantin. Thus, Mr C, Dualists are comparatively much better than a monist.

I admit all that you say. But, when a monist tries to remove jealousy, hatred and quarrels resulting from different faiths and when he is convinced of the faults which are in his own creed he turns himself into either theosophist or Vedantin. I know you care more for concentration. It is a self-preparation. But a monist prepares all people for unity and to adopt Vedantism in future. So he need not be looked down upon.

14. I now see the fallacy of the Monists who think that the Brahman (unconditioned) and the Brahma (conditioned) are one. If we say that Brahman is omnipresent He would be eternally bound to the world which also would be eternal in existence which is radically wrong. At the same time a monist can not say that there are eternally two Gods—in that case you subtle Vedantins would ask their origins and whereabouts when you cannot find them in deep sleep and Samadhi (Trance); again, it will be a false and dangerous dogma to assert that all human beings have first to merge into a lower God. Also when a person can for a moment become still and free, why should he not then be absolutely free by the control of mind? Surely, it would be a dangerous dogma to preach that humanity can only become one with the lower God who is eternally bound to the world (without any absolute freedom). Even where there are two Gods human beings cannot also pass from one to the other. However, please explain how can you say that God is temporary in existence?

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⁷¹⁵ 698

You do not use two different terms in English to denote two particular aspects of the same, hence is this confusion. Brahman the unconditioned is⁷¹⁶ the Truth, knowledge and Eternal Existence unconditioned and unlimited in essence. But when an idea of truth acts on knowledge He has mental conception of a world (dream of objects) then He is called Brahma. But when the dream is over He is again Brahman and not God the creator of the dream. Thus Brahma, or God is one aspect of Brahman. He is not a separate Being from it. So, please don't confuse or misunderstand that God has a birth and death. Also, please don't have a notion that a cosmic Being exists in some form or other. Everything is Brahman. He is one without a second or better say, He is Adwaita (Not two-the phenomenal God and the world). When a person is limited by a body in the two states of consciousness (subtle and physical) and is further attached to and degenerated by six evils (passion, avarice, anger, jealousy, egoism and love) he fancies that there is a supreme Being all powerful, intelligent and tremendous in size around him. He forgets that he is Brahman himself and all around him is Brahman also. Thus the human God is an imaginary one which lasts so long a person is ignorant. When he realises the truth of the Vedant he knows that there is nothing outside of him but what is outside is only the reflection of the knowledge of Brahman within.

Well, then the real God is one, we monists offer prayers to Him only. The only difference is then that the monists, through error give permanent attributes such as omnipresent etc. to Him.

That is not only the grave error, I believe that the practice of devotion of a monist is dangerous. His ultimate goal is to reach the cosmic Deity through faith, prayers and charity. If there is no cosmic being to go to, they wander in search of it for several years until they are dissatisfied and turned into agnostics. Thus, instead of attaining salvation soon, they put it off to distant centuries. While a Vedantist is sure that he is Brahman himself, but being attached to the dream of the world, he has forgotten his nature. So in order⁷¹⁷ to regain it he strives hard to clear away his ignorance through the practice of yoga. He does not say prayers occasionally and satisfy himself by saying "Amen" in a belief that his words reached God. Such practical difference is indeed a serious one. Besides, Vedantins can not even say that there is one God. Their Brahman is <u>not two</u>. The number one brings positive limitation which can never be accepted by the Vedanta.

I am sorry, you take away our one God also and give us the Not Two. It sounds rather queer. Still, we cannot object to it when there is an evidence that when we think of anything the two ideas of the Me (subject) and mine (object) are simultaneous in appearance in one reality—the Existence of a person.

^{716 699}

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." 717 700

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES."

- 15. When everything is Brahman and as you say a part of it is engaged in the dream of the world. The dreamer then appeals to the absolute Truth and knowledge to clear away the gloom of sleep (ignorance). Thus the physical 'I' appeals to the Reality through the medium of spiritual consciousness for revelation.
- 16. You are right in saying that the object of a prayer consists in asking the help of Brahman in the attainment of salvation. But I like to know your definite idea of salvation.
- 17. Unity with God. The word unity conveys the idea of two things being welded or riveted together. If God has the patches or layers of devotees put on, no body has ever seen such an evidence so far. Besides, when God can not be a limited Being where can the purified devotees be pasted over to God? If the theory, that the purified souls become Atmas and are dissolved into the fluid or substance of God, be granted, even then a question props up whether the God has been swelling in size and has not yet attained His fullest size or dimension. In other words, one can say thereby that God is yet undeveloped—such assertion would be still more ridiculous.
- 18.⁷¹⁸ Now, listen to the idea of Vedantic Moksha. A Vedantist believes that He is a part (not actual) of Brahman himself. He first engaged himself into the reverie (mental) of this world just for pleasure but forgetting himself as a witness of the phenomenon he associated himself with the actors and began to cry as one does at a theatre. So, in order to get rid of this ignorance or delusion he tries to wake up his previous knowledge of himself as one does when waking from a dream during sleep. When he is thoroughly awakened he knows who He is and how he went into the dream of the world. Thus, He is neither changed in essence, while going into the dream of the world nor increased on returning to his previous knowledge. The worldly play is a purely mental conception. This is quite simple and does not need any theory to be manufactured to prove it. Yoga practice is purely a renunciation of the ideas of the objects in the world which is in truth a phantasm.
- 19. Since I am Brahman in reality, but through the imaginary divisions into Atman and being entangled into the snares of delusion, I have forgotten my <u>Real Nature</u>: so to regain it I must appeal to my knowledge to clear away the mist of ignorance.
- 20. Your spiritual consciousness knows everything before you express it in words. So where is the necessity of even muttering a prayer?
- 21. Have you got three Selves—Higher, Middle and Lower?

⁷¹⁸ **701**

No, I have one self (ego) only; but having various ideas (good, bad etc.) when the Ego takes hold of spiritual thoughts He is called Higher Self and when he has material ideas he is called a Lower Self. Of course, when he takes up one idea other ideas of the same consciousness remain latent in him.

I believe an Ego can work with the ideas of the three states of consciousness at one time. For example, when two persons are talking, their attention⁷¹⁹ is towards the arguments. Both of them digest food in their alimentary tract, carry out all other physiological functions in the body and at the same time try to investigate within themselves the character and the truth of each other. Now, what is your opinion about it?

I hold the same opinion. As mentioned before everything has its three aspects — physical, subtle and pure and the human "I" with its three natures — gross, subtle and spiritual—is bound to think over its three attributes at the same time. But the Ego cannot think of all other things in the world at the same time. When he talks of Oxford Street he drops the idea of his own house and other streets of the city and so on. Thus, when I pray, my ignorance (Lower Self) becomes the devotee and the Reality through the medium of my pure consciousness becomes the Highest Self or God and the intermediate subtle practises devotion in some way or other according to its culture.

22. As each person is sure of his own existence in the three states of consciousness—waking, dream and deep sleep, so collectively, there should be a common existence of one, of which we are all (imaginary) parts.

To see or to know the origin of that one, the knower (man) must exist apart from those two—the creator and the created God; this is impossible. Therefore, the very question "Who created him" is logically wrong.

Even if we were to attribute Its origin to something, again the same question would arise "Who created It?" And ultimately we shall have to accept for a hypothesis the ultimate and Eternal Existence of something (God or Brahman or Purusha). Even if it be ascertained that the ultimate is "Nothing", it will be wrong again. For the conception of the existence of the blankness, beyond the limits of God, is perfectly impossible for a human mind, which has absolute⁷²⁰ confidence in its own existence and which is not the outcome of a void. The Ultimate Existence must have its own knowledge; without It, this world and its sciences could not have been so manifest.

Moreover, when a person says "there is no lake in this field" he assumes that he has seen a lake before somewhere, and there is nothing like it here. So "negation" comes within the categories of "knowledge". Hence, in the statement "Ultimate is Nothing" there is a conception that It was known before and It is not there now. Nobody can ever bear testimony to this.

^{719 702}

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." 720 703

If that Existence (Brahman) is present in all—a soul should have a unit of the Ultimate knowledge. A Vedantin, therefore, dives into this knowledge in Samadhi and determines the Absolute Truth. If the Ultimate is One without a Second, this World must be a mental production of It. So, the Ultimate is the Reality and the world should be a phenomenon.

23. When Brahman is Eternal It must transcend the idea of the "Whole." An ocean is at the bottom of a wave but it is not as big as a wave. It transcends the wave.

God is Omnipresent when He includes all the definite objects; but beyond such a limit of encloser there should be something of His Nature endless and Eternal which is called Brahman. Thus, a Vedantin goes a step higher than all modern theologians in the idea of the Ultimate.

It is a revelation to me also. However, I like to know why Brahman should create the World.

It is Its Nature. If we were to ask a rose tree "why should you have roses?" It must answer it is its nature.

When the Ultimate is One without a second, and nobody outside Brahman is to give the account, why It manifests a Universe, we must accept the hypothesis of the sages who revealed the truth in Upanishads that it is Its nature.

Besides⁷²¹, for the following logical reason we have to believe it to be true:— When a human being is a part of It, it must have the virtues of the Whole. When a person cannot give up thinking even for a moment in the waking, dream or deep sleep state (he has still the idea of 'I' there; otherwise he cannot return to the waking state), so the Whole must have a similar nature of thinking of a World quite unavoidable to It.

Now, please tell me definitely and finally what is the idea of a Vedantin for God? Though Brahman has a Nature of thinking, still It cannot be bound to One thought always; It must have a world with different arrangements at each time.

When One world ends and another arises Brahman should realize Its Own Reality and non-attachment to the thought of a world as a person does when he wakes up from one dream and passes into another dream. Thus, when Brahman is bound to a thought (World) It is limited for a time. It is then called God Who has all knowledge, power and extent in that particular World till the end of the Manvantara (cycle of time). After the dissolution of the World into the knowledge of Brahman, it cannot be called God (the holder of a world). So, God is considered a temporary aspect of Brahman by a Vedantin.

You have put us into a great puzzle: If God the Final Being within the conception of human mind be temporary, whom do people pray to?

A prayer means an asking of a help of a higher being by a lower being. A phenomenal (mind) can only appeal to the Reality (Atman or part of Brahman), through the medium of a superior phenomenal element the Vijnan. Thus, in a prayer a gross

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⁷²¹ 704

knowledge (mind) appeals to the spiritual knowledge (Vijnan) for help to reveal the truth which is next to it (Vijnan).

A phenomenal being cannot appeal directly to the Reality because It is beyond the scope of its⁷²² sense-perceptions. Darkness cannot invite the light to show the secret of its luminosity to it; For, at the rise of light, darkness must vanish with all its prayers, doubts and questions.

If a person can only offer prayers to a superior but phenomenal part of his own why should he at all pray?

Every person has the ambition of getting perfect peace and happiness in the present life. He cannot get them from objects. The more he is attached to objects the more distant he finds his happiness driven from him. So, he resorts himself to God for the fulfilment of his desires. The thought of getting happiness only occurs to a person who is bound to a phenomenal life. Atman of each person does not need any happiness from the world. When a person wakes up to the self realisation of Atman, he does not then seek for happiness. Therefore, so long a person revolves into the miseries of the world, he has to pray for the help of Atman (Ultimate Knowledge and Power) through Vijnan.

24. The transcendental Atman in you is beyond all desires and does not need anybody's help. (b) Your phenomenal nature (Tamoguna) alone seeks for peace and happiness (c) It can request the ultimate through a phenomenal medium which cannot be out of the ancient five elements. (d) The devotee must also use one of his five sense-perceptions to offer a prayer and to receive the help. (e) A person cannot keep himself restful by remaining attached to objects. (f) Satisfaction and Bliss rise forth to a person when he succeeds in the renunciation of phenomenal objects. (g) At the moment of great disappointment, disgust and grief the true knowledge, which is inherent in Mind, inspires it to take refuge into Vijnan-at-man for perfect peace and bliss.

It is clear to me that the ultimate being one, happiness and peace can be present in unity only and never in diversity. The mind by natural inspiration⁷²³ draws its senses from objects and retires within the Sat (spiritual) nature of its own self at the time of crisis for relief.

25. Brahman is indeed behind both the Mind (devotee) and the Vijnan (God). In the first it inspires for seeking help from Vijnan; through the latter it gives revelations of truth to the Mind and makes it happy. Oh, what a wonderful play is going on within one's own self. Indeed, those who know the self know the mystery of the World.

^{722 705}

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." 723 706

26. What is real must exist in the three states of consciousness. Nothing but the "Existence" of a soul fulfils this condition. Again, in an existence of a being two ideas "Me and Mine" always arise simultaneously which are always transient, phenomenal, and dependent on That which is behind them. A being, also, cannot conceive (had never the knowledge) of nothing around him with all his sense-perceptions i.e. mere shutting of the eyes is not a proof of blankness, he mentally sees and feels a space around him. Even in Samadhi he has no knowledge of blankness around him.

Therefore, that which is eternally and endlessly existent, pervading, imperishable, the fountain of all knowledge and beyond the two conceptions "Me and Mine" is real Advait (non-dual) Brahman. In the phenomenal condition of the World, an Ego feels itself small and weak especially in its own waking state and supposes the existence around it of somebody supreme in knowledge, power and extent, called God. But, this supposition vanishes from a person in Deep sleep and Samadhi.

Therefore, the conception of God is temporary to Human Nature and will exist so long a person does not practise Yoga and has the feeling of self-weakness.

26. The part of Brahma in each being is called Atman (Akshara). This Atman though has a limitation through⁷²⁴ the Nirvishesha Sfurti (unspecialized energy) still It has the Truth in It. It is the Witness, Friend, Judge etc. of an Ego. It is a part of Brahman, but it is not so unconditioned. It helps an Ego by intuitions and is anxious that its part the Ego should always be in Bliss and not run to temptations and pains. Thus, Atman, Immanent God is ever present within a person awaiting with all the love to put an Ego in right direction.

This definite and emphatic teaching of the Vedant is, indeed, superior to the teachings of other religions. The Dualists try to seek God, in vain, in the external space the phantasm. The Monists believing God to be unknowable and omnipresent, miss the direct intuitions given by Atman to an Ego when it practises Yoga.

27. Since He enjoys Bliss by remaining witness in each soul He is called Sacchidananda. But, an Ego being a part of Atman (Brahma and Brahman), while going to work in the world, forgets its own limitations and conceives of being omniscient: it gets bewildered at the sight of the diversity in the world (which was worked out by Him in the Brahman state), and is further deluded. For example, At night a person knows the details of a room by means of light. He walks into it, then, fearlessly, but when the light is put out, if he attempts to walk as before he fails, and is dashed against some articles or walls, from want of memory of the position of all the articles in the room. Thus, his previous knowledge from the limitation of darkness becomes doubtful and he is deluded. Therefore, delusion is the result of limitation, egoism and conception of knowing everything. It occurs to an Ego only. It can not be present in God who is Omniscient and Omnipotent.

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^{724 707}

28. But I would like to know when everything is God, how could its unit forget its original nature?

In reply, I should say that in the beginning, God being one without a second, there is no reality of ⁷²⁵ the world in front of him. When he creates a mental world with all the powerful influences of delusion called Maya and when he divides Himself into Maya, a unit of Him does not see in fact the phenomenal state of the world, its strength of omniscience being broken, whereas the omnipotence of Maya remains undivided so through weakness, it feels that the world is real. When a light of four candle-power can reveal the presence of a needle, it will be unwise to ask why one candle-power light should not do it. Thus you will see that as the limitation of a unit limits omniscience, so an ego (Jeeva) cannot help but forgetting its real nature.

29. Regarding diversity I am of firm opinion that it is for the investigation of the truth. Without the comparison of the black colour to the white, a person cannot have an idea that both these colours are created by some who is beyond these two. Therefore diversity leads to the investigation of the existence of God. When God has set the world in motion with all the established laws for its existence in the three states of consciousness, he has to follow them to the utmost test. He cannot stop the world before the end of the period for the sake of anybodys (any of his best ideas). The laws are applicable only to those of His units which are working in the world. Each ego is made up of three chief principles. Atman is the witness and guide; Vijnan has the true knowledge of the world; Mind is the agent to seek for real happiness. When mind works in harmony with Vijnan, it is not affected by the delusion of the world. But being extremely attached to the objects in the world it disobeys Vijnan and consequently becomes liable to suffering. When a person gets his bone broken in a dream he is not in the least affected in the waking condition. Similarly God, while suffering punishment in the dream of the world, is not affected in any way. All sufferings and rejoicings⁷²⁶ are merely the working out of the laws established by God for Himself. Thus, in sufferings God does not do any injustice to any second person external to Him. He follows His own rules to work out the play of the world. Some people say that it may be the play to God but it is a great suffering for humanity. But what is humanity? It is God Himself. If each ego (God in manifestation) were to remember His laws and remain unattached to the world he will never suffer for any thing.

R.V. KHEDKAR: "COMMENTARY ON THE BHAGAVAD GITA" @

^{725 708}

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES." 726 709

A DISCIPLE OF SRI SHANKARA OF KOLHAPUR PEETHA "VEDANTIC DIALOGUES."

[®] In the Vedantin (magazine) 1910.

1. The destroyer of a demoniacal delusion or the giver of the final Nectar is Krishna or Atman alone. Thus, Para Vidya as Vijnan or Buddhi always takes opportunity to reveal the truth or Vedant Philosophy to a person when his mind is either under despair or has the tendency towards (temporary or permanent) renunciation of objects or Vairagya.

It is the usual experience that philosophy is invariably revealed to a person at a cemetery or burial ground.

But, when the mind is not perfectly cleansed by Jnan or Vairagya, the intuitions of Para Vidya are not availed of, and are soon forgotten.

- 2. When the truth dawns upon him that his existence is never lost and he is the same as he was before but that he will only lose the phantasm of the world and the idea of being a limited person in it, he is greatly pleased and encouraged to work hard for such moksha.
- 3. The two thoughts—I and World—of Brahman are co-existent, and "World" is almost the projection and extension of 'I' which is the result of the Thinking Principle or Impulse of Brahman. So, the objects in the world cannot exist without the souls for perception. If the thought of the world be dissolved, the thought of the perceiver of the phantasm should also disappear. Therefore, so⁷²⁷ long as there is human life, there should be the world with its diverse objects.

Having grasped this and the fact that the thinking Principle of Brahman is Eternal the question of the previous verse how (to get rid of—Love and desire for objects, or, Relations and social rules, or Deity and Heaven, or, Mind and Reason, or, Power and Glory or I and World) will appear quite natural. However, it is our experience that we can change one thought into the other, can amuse ourselves simply in the reverie of a deed, and can completely forget the world objects in the deep sleep. So, instead of revolving into the details of the phantasm of the world as an enjoyer or a sufferer let us stand as a Brahma in the way of witness and enjoyer of the phenomenon of the world and have the same pleasure as a person gets when he is a spectator of a play in a theatre or an umpire at games. Thus, the riddle of how is solved by the Vedant.

4. Regarding death—Looking from the standpoint of Atman it is merely a passing of a soul from one state of consciousness to the other according to its various karmas. While passing into the dream and deep sleep state as a person does not feel more than a wandering under certain ideas so at the time of actual death a soul feels the same. It never has pain in it.

The tumult and fright of the mind which is generally seen on the death-bed of a person is simply the result of the remembrance to him long before the advent of death,

of his uncharitable Karmas and of his having wasted his valuable life after vain pursuits instead of practising devotion and communion with Atman. After death some of the theosophists say that Atman leaves behind its seven sheaths (of senses, manas etc) in their respective seven planes. Now, if this theory be granted to be true it will be noticed that Atman will be free from all its limitations and will be ever liberated, It will never return to the earth (gross⁷²⁸ state of consciousness). Also, the manas which is the criminal to account for all the deeds done on this earth will have no witness (Atman) and no record (Vijnan and Buddhi) with it for its trial, so it will also be scot free of its crimes. Besides, nobody has ever seen the cloak rooms where the sheaths of all the souls are stored. So, their theory sounds to be quite imaginary.

What is said in the Gita, as below, is the truth. It has been verified by many in samadhi;

A portion of mine eternal self, transformed into a Jiva in the regions inhabited by souls, draws round itself the senses, abiding in Prakriti, of which the mind is the sixth. When the Lord (Atman) acquires a body (physical) and when He abandons it, He takes hold of these and goes as the wind takes fragrances from their retreats.

Thus, it will be evident that an Atman (Over-self) can never go alone. It has to follow Jiva (ego) in each state of consciousness.

- 5. Mind is one of the qualities of Jeeva, so it is in direct relation with Atman. Mind is from Atman. So naturally it is free in its own way. But in Hamsopnishad it is said to have the functions of imagination, fancy and suspicion. With the former it is drawn to the objects but with the latter it tries to get away from them.
- 6. It is the natural law that action is followed by reaction. So, the karmas formed into a sin will have to be reaped in reaction. They cannot be forgiven by any means. We hear dualists talking of a person being absolved from sin through the mercy of a certain Deity. If it were granted to be true, how is it that the vasanas (tendencies) of that person are not cooled down so that he may not commit the same crime again? So, it is a proof that sins cannot always be forgiven.
- 7. Sir, I should first clear away the misunderstanding that the Vedant leads a person to a state of nothingness. It cannot do so. There is no⁷²⁹ such state as nothingness Nothing, Neti, Neti, means "not that" i.e. not that imaginary world but that Brahman, the Eternal Existence with the Absolute Knowledge and Truth. This is the foundation, the source of everything in the world. Through the study of the Vedanta a person merges into that Reality from which he came forth. In doing so he does not lose his Self but on the contrary his Self, as it were, begins to swell and include into it all the

objects in the world. In his homeward path, he grows more and more intelligent, realizes more and more Unity with all, has more love and sympathy to all and is more anxious to work for the good of the humanity. In short through the Vedant a person understands his duty of being one (non-dual) with all.

8. If such version be granted to be true the Brahma or God will be ever bound to the manifestation of the world without any freedom for Himself; and the revelations in all the religious books and the experiences of the sages that several universes were created and dissolved by Brahman will be untrue. In short, the adwaitism of the Vedant—the true spirit of the Bhagavad Gita will have to be dismissed thereby.

Thus, the 'I' of Brahma cannot be eternal. It has to cease with every manifestation of universe before it rises again with another universe. In the interval, Brahman reveals its eternal knowledge, truth and existence as the substratum of each "I" and Universe.

9. It is indirectly shown in this verse that Brahman is eternal and the substratum of the world and Brahma (the Brahman in manifestation) being omnipresent is perpetual (so long the world lasts) in existence either unchanged or unmoved in all the periods of the lives of beings. Wise men should understand this and not be affected by the changes which are not true in reality. Pain and pleasure are mere ideas in the state of Universal Consciousness (Brahma⁷³⁰) but they become real when a person gets limited to a body and firmly attached to the pursuits following childhood, youth and old age.

From the standpoint of the Vedanta there is neither subject nor object. Everything is Brahman. The world is a mental conception or a dream of Brahma.

A person has only to clear away the layers of gloom in which he is wrapped up. He has to realise that the objects are the reflections of his universal consciousness and not as real entities apart from him.

10. Unity with Diversity or Diversity in Unity can only be real so long they are phenomenal i.e. existing in the conditions of three states of consciousness but they cannot be real in the standpoint of Brahman which transcends the two. Subjective Personality (I, the doer; I, the seer etc.) has its reality or confidence of being existing as it stands on the substratum, Brahman, the Eternal. But it cannot exist alone without the presence of the world to live in. The objective world, as body, creatures, heat, cold, material articles etc. has no independent existence of their own but they exist in the mind of a perceiver. But they appear real to him independent of his own real existence as he is under a limitation and delusion of a small and weak body. When he enters into a universal consciousness of deep sleep or trance he loses their presence of separate and real entities. The worldly diversity is then as it were lost to him. He alone exists there in universal time and space. Thus when he wakes up he says, "I do not remember

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⁷³⁰ **713**

anything of the deep sleep." Had he or the world been completely then lost he would not have come back to it. Since he wakes up and the world was existing in the mind of other people while he was asleep, both he and the world (not the diversity of it) were present in his deep sleep.

11. The Nature of Brahman as (a) Eternally existing and⁷³¹ beyond the reach of anybody for destruction (b) Manifesting itself in the form of the world. In fact, it is not a product of any sort existing outside it. (c) It is immutable though It is ever engaged in the work of the world.

If such is the Nature of Brahman, its principles which underlie the world must be steady and unchangeable also i.e. nobody either a Deity or a sage can upset the laws of the Nature. The World must go through its ordained programme or destiny. A Jiva must also have its actions followed by re-actions. It cannot be forgiven of anything. Every person has to get his or her salvation by the efforts of one's own self only.

- 12. Individuals are special ideas of the general "I" (Ego) as the individuals in a dream are the dream-ideas of the Dreamer. Though the Ideas or Individuals can become latent in Brahman (gain complete liberation or stillness) still the general "I" will remain till the end of the world. Hence it is perpetual and indestructible during the course of the whole time.
- 13. These high authorities do not say that a Jiva (Ego) leaves behind senses, mind etc. in the cloakrooms of their respective regions. Mind and senses are the gross experiences of an Ego. It cannot be separated from them as the vapour of ammonia cannot be separated from its salt. If it be possible for an ego to shake off its attachments so easily then it can easily be Atman and will have no reason to be reborn.

Some Theosophists do believe that an Ego casts away the shells of senses and Manas in their respective planes for storage until its return to rebirth; and some do openly preach that the shells of Kamarupa (desire-body) do speak as Spookes. Well, it is a question whether these shells are stored in cloakrooms with tickets and numbers; and where are their offices? Nobody has yet seen either in Samadhi or deep clairvoyance the store-houses for those shells. Again, if shells can speak without the presence of 732 an Ego it will be very easy for the scientists to make the shells of the vegetables on a table relate their experiences of the past vegetable life.

14. A person should not waste his time in the expectation of either visualising God or being evolved into the perfection of a standard God. In the latter case, if the evolutionary theory be granted to be true, the following objections arise:

R.V. KHEDKAR: "COMMENTARY ON THE BHAGAVAD GITA"

732 715

R.V. KHEDKAR: "COMMENTARY ON THE BHAGAVAD GITA"

^{731 714}

- (i) A Standard God will have to be kept until the last person in the world has reached his perfection. Where is such a God?
- (ii) If every person is to reach that standard, there will be innumerable Gods alike in nature. Where is the evidence of this? If all those high saints and priests who flourished up to the 19th century have reached that standard and marked as Gods, are they visible in any way like Gods?
- 15. Inconceivable is that which is beyond the Prakritis. As It is beyond the phenomenon (Prakriti) it cannot be within the focus of the five senses and mind. Such abstract thing is believed by some persons to be nothing. But, the above word Avikarya suggests also that I cannot even be bound by the limitation of Nothing. Nothing (not this) is even an experience arising from knowledge. It is impossible for a person to conceive of another, for comparison, when the ultimate is one without a second. For example a person is asleep and wandering into a dream-land; if he wants to see his original body which is in bed, he cannot see it, it is inconceivable to him; but it is not lost and gone to Nothing. When he wakes up he will know that his body is in bed and that which was anxious to see it was but a dream body. Thus, the Self is the same in both the states but according to delusion a person says that there is nothing beyond this or that. Thus the Atman is Eternal in Existence. Delusion disappears at the dawn of knowledge so it is really nothing. Absolute knowledge (Atman) is behind the phenomenal (worldly)⁷³³ knowledge: so an ordinary person, who is not in touch with it and can not solve difficult problems, naturally says, "there cannot be anything beyond this."

A person at times is smothered in dream and decides that he is about to die but on being awakened he does not realise anything which can cut short his life. Therefore, the absolute truth is beyond the ordinary mind: it has to be approached through Yoga.

- 16. The two aspects of the physical and the subtle are manifest to show their respective knowledge of diversity and to direct the attention of an ego towards the Truth by comparison and inference. Had there been only one quality, as white or good, without the opposites, there would have been no knowledge of either good or bad, or black or white; nay, there would have been no investigation of the existence of Truth (God). The pairs of opposites are the two aspects of divine knowledge; they are not felt as good or bad by God. Black and white, light and darkness are mere ideas from the standpoint of God; but, a person thinks them as different influences through his limited consciousness.
- 17. Sin does not exist as a separate spirit leading people to temptations and wrong doings as the ultimate is one without a second. Through tiny limitation, a person forgets his original divine nature and is affected by the temptations of the huge cosmos.

⁷³³ 716

Thereby he does faulty actions and gets himself bound to the wheel of births and deaths to repay the Karmas; but, when a person is properly enlightened and deals with the world with self-control, he does not incur sin.

- 18. <u>Sankhya Yoga</u> It is the Janna yoga the highest of all yogas. Its chief aim is to realize the same Brahman in everything and to renounce the limitation caused by name and form to every object. <u>Buddhi⁷³⁴ yoga</u> It is the yoga by which the faculty of reasoning is developed to such an extent that an ego has the right perception of the world and of his own self. Thereby a person controls his mind through meditation, surrenders his actions to his Atman within, and gains illumination of knowledge through its favour.
- 19. Samadhi It is a state of trance; it is of three kinds: –
- (i) In the superficial state a person by the practice of self-control passes into a kind of coma. He is unconscious of the external affairs; he does not respond to stimuli; his heart and respirations are active, but he is conscious within. On his being awake he call tell the events which happened during the period of the trance.
- (ii) The middle state is called the 'samprajnat samadhi.' In this a yogi can stop his heart and respirations and be perfectly still for a period of time, a few hours or a few days. He can tell all the events passing in the distant countries. In this state Yogis help disciples by giving intuitions or showing miracles to them at any distant place wherever they may be.
- (iii) The deep state is called 'Asamprajnat Samadhi'. This is the deep state of trance in which a yogi totally forgets the world. His body is like a log of wood; he can remain in that state for years and years.

R.V. KEDKAR. "THE VEDANT PHILOSOPHY." @@

1. The Vedas in the earliest times were transmitted orally from one person to another. All the secret meanings of the Mantras and self-experiences were revealed by personal explanations and spiritual influences. Later on they were written out by sages and these writings are now called "Shruti". It is sometimes asked, if all these writings are the work of ordinary men how can they be called the revelation of God? It may be replied that the Vedant does not accept the doctrine that there is a God, for to posit existence⁷³⁵ of God is to bring Him under limitations and so within the reach of the human reason. There is no evidence to show that God is visible to the physical eyes. The visions seen by certain persons were either through imagination or illusion. The

^{734 717}

R.V. KHEDKAR: "COMMENTARY ON THE BHAGAVAD GITA"

^{@@} In the Vedantin (magazine) 1910.

^{735 718}

Vedant boldly says that all the objects of creation are a part of the whole. The Ego (Atman) of a person is like a mere wave on the great ocean of knowledge, power and space. So long as the Atman is, through illusion, thus limited, the infinitude of knowledge, power and space will appear vast to it and it (the Atman) will give the name of God to this Infinite knowledge, power and space. So the conception of God remains to a Vedantist only so long as his limitation is not given up.

- 2. The philosophy of the Vedant is considered Non-dual, because it denies the existence of the two separate entities God and Nature. When all this is turned into Atman, who is to be seen by whom?
- 3. A human Ego lives in the three states of consciousness. In the waking state (Jagritavastha) he deals with all physical objects with their corresponding limitations. In the dream state (svapnawastha) he perceives the dream objects with a wider field and less limitation etc. In the deep sleep (Shushupti) he loses all objects and has the consciousness of being himself everywhere in the world. Here he loses duality. The human Ego finds the reality of the phenomenon in the respective states of consciousness and he also doubts the existence of the objects when he compares his waking thoughts with those of his dream; but he never doubts about his own existence in any state of consciousness. The consciousness of the 'I' (Atman) is not an object to oneself in the Vedanta. Objects are real to him through illusion (Maya) because his own existence is real. All that which is in relation to Atman is real. He became the same by thinking over an illusive picture.

A⁷³⁶ person usually thinks over phenomena in succession i.e. When he sees Oxford Street in London he does not think of the other parts of London. They are not lost to him but they remain latent in his memory. When he thinks of Bombay, Oxford street disappears from his immediate consciousness and will remain latent in his mind. If the same rule be applied to the whole it seems that it also should have one thought at a time. Being with such thought is called Brahman. The Bhagavad Gita also declares that the existence of this world has occupied a part of the knowledge of the whole: With a little portion of mine I have pervaded this whole world. A part of mine which is Eternal has become the Soul of this world.

This is made clearer by the following illustration:—When a person is thinking, in a waking state, of Oxford Street or, in a dream of Princes street in Edinburgh the phenomena of those streets occupy only a part of his mind. The persons seen in those mental pictures although they have occupied a certain part of the mind of the thinker and in reality are themselves, the thinker; still they are not cognizant of their own origin and of the whole knowledge which the original thinker has. The knowledge of the body, within which the mind of the thinker is situated, lies beyond their scope also. If this illustration be applied to us it will be seen that although we are in reality one with

⁷³⁶ **7**19

that which is behind the veil of the world still as vision or dream objects we cannot guess our origin etc. But we are sure of our existence in any state of consciousness. Starting from this reality if a person goes further back, opening the gates of illusion with the keys of the Vedant, he will surely find that he is the thinker or the dreamer of the world, the Brahman.

- 4. If He discards the thought of a world for a while He will surely realize His previous state as a person does when he comes out of a dream and realizes that he is so and so lying in bed.
- 5.⁷³⁷ A religion keeps one always in duality with the idea of separation of one's Self from God. As a rule, it keeps the devotee in a weak submissive and begging condition. This will be illustrated by two stories in the coming pages. It makes a person always look outward for something higher although the Atman within and without is the same.
- 6. Heaven and Hell to a Vedantist are simply states of his mind. When a wealthy person is miserable in his house, he thinks that he is in hell there.

The first word of Brahman is 'I'. (I am Brahma the Creator).

The word Creator is rather misleading. It indicates that the Creator is a separate individual from the Creation. According to the Shruti: O, Somya, Sat alone the Nondual was in the beginning of this world. Atma is beyond Maya. So creation means extension or projection of the Sat into the thought or the world. When a person thinks of Bombay he is neither changed himself into Bombay nor does Bombay actually come near to him but his mind through memory reflects the phenomena of Bombay.

- 7. The capacity of thinking is our inherited nature which cannot be stopped in any state of consciousness. As we are a part of the whole so it proves that Brahma also must be thinking of the world. He reflected that He might cause Himself to be turned into many.
- 8. Paramatman is not actually divided into atoms of Atman but it is just like waves on an ocean. Atman means 'Satyam jnanan anantham Brahma. It is the witness. Through it one is perfectly conscious of one's existence.
- 9. Atman cannot be called a subject in the same sense in which the term is commonly understood. He is Eternal conscious of himself, non-dual, omnipresent and cannot be known.

It is beyond the states of subject and object. If the term subject be at all applied to it, it should⁷³⁸ then be understood that it means an Eternal subject which cannot have an object.

It cannot be expressed in words and its existence cannot be denied. The knowledge of our existence is a perfect reality of which we never raise doubts.

10. Thus it will be clear that though the reality of the phenomenal appearance of the world is denied by the Vedant, still a Vedantist says that the idea of the world in Brahman and the illusive nature of Maya do exist. This opinion is of the utmost importance. It shows that the illusive phenomena of the world continue over and over again, i.e. on finishing a cycle the world will be taken back into Brahman and emitted again from Him. It is simply like a phenomenon we see in a dream which is real so long it lasts. When we awake or enlightenment occurs our eyes are opened by knowledge and we know that a dream is an illusion, and the living objects are merely a memory.

As knowledge and desire of the phenomenal world exist in Brahma so in ultimate reality the world is Brahma.

A question naturally rises "When the world is almost as continued (as it springs forth over and over again) illusive phenomenon and the vibrating power for it is Eternal in Brahman how should an Ego behave under the circumstances?" Answers to this have been already given from several authorities—Live in the world but be not of it.

11. In a breath, it is required that there be inspiration, pause and expiration.

A person generally speaks and thinks with and after inspiration or taking in of air. So inspiration of Brahma means thinking and creation of objects. During the pause mind is either united with God (Atman) or the memory of the world, but it is not in touch with air (matter). Here the desire for yoga (concentration) arises in some and in others the questions of "Why" and "What" puzzle the mind.

 ${\rm In^{739}}$ expiration waste matter and air are thrown out. So the Brahma dissolves the creation also.

As the residual air in the lungs remain the same even after each inspiration and expiration so the knowledge of Brahma remains the same even after each creation and dissolution of the same.

This Chaitanya Shakti (activity) is brought forth through the Sfurty (Vibrating force) or desire which is Eternally with Brahman.

12. The revelations of Shri Jnaneshwar, that Ego and World arise simultaneously, through Sfurti, from Atman, which is the Real, the Eternal and the Source of true Knowledge, have been verified by several Yogis. The Ego having direct knowledge,

^{738 721}

through Atman, of its own existence thinks itself to be the Subject, Omniscient and Omnipotent. The Sfurti of the Non-ego (world), which is born with it, grows into Para Prakriti and makes the Ego think more of the details of the world. In this Sfurti all His ideas are of order, bliss and happiness.

13. He has thoroughly to understand that, as a wave is part of the ocean, so, his existence is in the omnipresent Brahma; the thought and programme of the world for the purpose of Bliss exists in the Vijnan (Para or Satvik Maya) and Diversity of objects and temptations exist in Avidya (Apara Maya). Both the aspects of Maya are unavoidable.

When a person puts his finger into a flame in the waking state he cannot say that it does not burn him. In short, it would be misleading to say that a Vedantist does not believe in a world. The laws and conditions of the three states of consciousness of Maya are real, as a dream is real so long a person is engaged in dreaming. Thus he should gain at first a general idea of the principles of Vedant and Yoga philosophy.

14. Vedant has been called a philosophy of the Advaita or the non-dual. This term being ambiguous, I should explain it in a few words by way⁷⁴⁰ of introduction. It treats neither of Monism nor of Pantheism but it deals with that which is beyond the ego or self and the non-ego or the world. This may, at first, strike a reader as nothing but Atheism. But, it is not so. If a person has a firm belief in the existence of himself and the world, he cannot be an atheist in the strict sense of the term. The more he dives into the mystery of the diverse phenomena of the world and psychology, or the nature of human soul, the more he realises the existence of something which is behind these two. If it be admitted that there is a Deity behind each of them which is peculiar to its own nature, our arguments discussed already will at once refute this view. Also questions may arise as to which of the two is superior and why. If both be granted to be of equal force and producing the phenomena of nature as a chemical production, it must also be granted that this substance is permanent in its nature and irreducible to its constituent elements. But the experience of deep sleep and samadhi always reminds us that there is neither a memory of any substance there nor a feeling of our splitting ourselves into two elements or beings. Now, if the pantheistic view of the manifestations of a common being in both of them be granted it will be found erroneous as it is already pointed out that the diverse nature of the objects and their manifestation completely disappear to a person in deep sleep. Also, since the world has no self-consciousness of its own and is to be known through the consciousness of a soul it cannot be proved that the so-called common Being ever remains manifested. Thus, the allegation that the Hindu is pantheistic will be found to be baseless. In the Bhakti yoga (Devotion by worship) he does take an idol or an image but thereby he never worships a stone-God. The very act

^{740 723}

of devotion is dualistic. In the practice of devotion a devotee conceives of God as⁷⁴¹ nothing opposed to himself or vice versa. He has to believe in the personality both of God and himself. When an existent Being is conceived of and when a thing is known by some name and form it is rational that a devotee should conceive of God by some ultimate name and form which he can think of as the best. If a dualist thinks that his God is unknowable and a prayer should not be offered to any Being with a name and a form such a person is not a true dualist in the strict sense but he is half way between Dualism and Idealism and has no firm standing of his own. Therefore the method of prayer of a dualistic Hindu is reasonable and satisfactory to his own mind at least in the belief that his prayer has reached a particular Being who is behind such name and form. Of course even a dualistic Hindu does not believe that the manifestation of the world is permanent and that his Deity is ever materialised into nature. Thus, an ordinary Hindu is not a pantheist in any sense of the world.

Now, if it be granted that there is a Being common to all and He creates this world from his own nature, two questions will naturally arise:

- 1. By what process does He create the Universe? Since a like cannot come from an unlike, it cannot be said that the God is as material as the world. So, he must have a peculiar process to bring forth this solid world.
- 2. Is He ever engaged in such creation or can He remain quiet? If He be ever busy it will be impossible for a person to get liberation or freedom from the affairs of the world of which he gets so tired even if he were to attain the state of God by devotion or meditation.

If the Deity can remain quiet, it will be a question whether such a Being should be called a limited being during the absence of the creation or world. No, it cannot be said so. Now, if it be granted that it is possible for something to remain unlimited or unconditioned and at⁷⁴² the same time to create the world at will, it will have to be proved to be so. Most of the Western philosophers in their works on ontology or the investigation of the ultimate Being or Reality, have given it up as unknowable. But, the Vedant Philosophy is not so despondent. It has expounded the ultimate Reality both through its practical realization and its metaphysics. So, it does not treat of monism.

I have briefly explained in the June number of the Vedantin how the word 'I' reveals the philosophy of the self. Every person is conscious of the reality of himself. This reality is a part of that Absolute Reality (Brahman) which is the basis of both the Ego and the Non-ego.

Descartes has propounded a similar view and says: "The "I" which thinks has nothing to do with matter, or the external world or even the body, none of which belongs to our idea of it. Its essence consists in thinking and in thinking alone." However his following opinion—"The very fact of our existence—nay, of our existence

^{741 724}

R.V. KEDKAR. "THE VEDANT PHILOSOPHY."

⁷⁴² **725**

at any moment—presupposes a perfect Being who has created us"—is quite contrary to the principles of the Vedant. Being advaitic it does not believe in a creator but says that the consciousness of 'I' is merely a reflection of the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality and it is the Reality in its essence. Similarly, the consciousness of the world is also the reflected knowledge of that Absolute Reality and it is said to be co-existent with the consciousness of 'I'. The consciousness of the Ego and Non-ego is said to be the result of the imaginative power which is natural in Brahman.

15. This power has been called "Kalpana" by Gouda Padacharya, "Sfurti" by Sri Jnaneshwar, and "Maya" by Shankaracharya. The Absolute Reality is said to be Brahman constituting Truth, Knowledge and Eternal existence) as opposed to the finite consciousness of Brahma and the creation. "The Atman, the Deva, imagines himself by himself through⁷⁴³ the power of his Maya; he alone cognizes the objects so sent forth; this is the last word of the Vedant on the subject." ...Mandukya.

It should be particularly noted that the General self or Brahman is considered here as a phantom also. The following illustration will clearly show the principles of the Vedant – While a person is sitting quietly and recalling the memory of the evening scene on the Backbay of Bombay through the agency of his imaginative power, a part of his mind is manifested into a seer an another part into the details of the scene there. In this reflection though the seer has a temporary consciousness of his existence at the Backbay but he has knowledge of the absolute reality of his existence as he is a part of the Ultimate Reality. One has the same feeling even in the states of dream, trance or total blindness. The seer in any state of consciousness never has the experience of being alone. The surrounding space or details of creation are co-existent with him and are, more or less, an extension or projection of his knowledge. Here the seer is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient so far as the limitation or extent of the scene or creation is concerned and has the Absolute Reality or Brahman behind him. Thus the real knowledge and force transcend the omniscient and omnipotent actor. Some of the Western philosophers like Schelling and Hegel have come to a similar conclusion; but they have never realized than an eternal existence also transcends the omnipresence of an actor in a manifested world.

Without having a ground of such Eternal existence the "thought" of Hegel or the "Ideas" of Plato, or the faculty of intelligence of Schelling cannot exist alone. Now, it is clear that the three original principles Truth, knowledge and existence transcend every consciousness.

16.⁷⁴⁴ But on closer study again it will be noticed that each principle produces its effects in a particular way. The existence has the feeling of its reality all the same either in the conditional or the unconditioned state.

^{743 726}

The word "Truth" suggests a force inherent in it which plays differently according to its relation with the universal or the relative knowledge of Brahman. When the absolute knowledge has its ascendency the relative truth of the consciousness of Brahma (creator) and the manifestation of the world come to an end and the Absolute Truth supervenes. But when the force of relative truth has its ascendency an individual Atman forgets its Absolute knowledge and gradually gets itself wrapped up in the coils of maya until it believes that a God with Absolute Truth and knowledge is quite apart from him. In our daily life we have the same experience.

We have several times read and heard about Shakespeare's "Hamlet." But when we have a strong desire to see it on the stage, we go there to pass away the time in a lively manner. While the play is being acted we associate ourselves with the actions of an actor and forgetting that it is only an imaginary play and the actors are not the real persons, we are at times frightened or grieved. Of course, at the end of the play we know our mistake and laugh at our own folly. In short, according as we are influenced by desire or knowledge, we behave like the deluded or the wise in the world. But we are never steadily confined to a particular thought. The western philosophers in their conclusions have somehow or other bound the world to a universal thought or idea. Hence, there is not any independence in their Ultimate Reality as a Brahman has in Vedant.

"Prajna (or wise) knows not self or non-self nor truth or falsehood but the fourth is ever all-seeing."...Mandukya.

17. If a person were to see a landscape in his dream⁷⁴⁵ and were to investigate as to who created it, he would perhaps ascribe it to an unknowable person. But after having gone to deep sleep, he will be surprised to know that the landscape and every other manifestation has disappeared. He will, thus, begin to enquire where that phenomenon disappeared into and whether that dream world was transient. On being a little awake, he would realize that he was the dreamer and that the phenomenon was false. But, on going into deep sleep again he would realize also that the phenomenon of the waking state was also unreal.

"The first two are accompanied by dream and sleep, the third by dreamless sleep but those who are firm in the fourth experience neither dream nor sleep."...Mandukya.

On passing into Samadhi, he would be convinced again that the reality of his personality was only true in all the states of consciousness, he was the author of all the creations and that the phenomena of waking and dream states merged into his own Apara Maya and remained there latent in his consciousness.

"Non cognition of duality is common to Prajna and Turya (The Fourth) but the difference consists in the former being with sleep in the form of cause, and the latter being entirely free from it."...Mandukya.

Further, he would realize that he is Brahman itself which through the inherent desire for the imagination a world at first thinks himself extended into a manifestation and further gets attached to it as a girl gets engrossed into the supposed home affairs of her dolls.

- 18. When the human 'I' is a part and parcel of Brahman and when a unit of its three constituent elements (Existence, Knowledge and Truth) is at the root of the manifested world it is plausible that the Vedant should appeal to human mind to get out of the heavy delusion of Maya with the help of its threshold and to realize its original nature which is unconditioned or unattached to the idea⁷⁴⁶ of universe.
- 19. The nature of the all pervading Atman being non-dual, final liberation cannot be given by any one else; it has to be gained and realised by one's own Self.

Belief in a Deity is necessary to some at a certain stage but beyond it he has to leave him and to realize his own Atman. Hence, as far as possible, time should never be wasted in binding oneself to others. He should, of course, have help from yogis in achieving his spiritual progress. A Deity or yogi cannot prematurely stop the wheel of the world and change the destiny of a person. Shri Krishna temporarily gave Arjuna a miraculous vision but did not change his mind. He had to work for his salvation by practice of Yoga.

20. Concentration is practiced in Kumbhak. The harmony in breathing results in harmony in ideas and causes the mind to be better adopted to acts of meditation.

Pratyahar—Restraining the mind from following sense-perceptions. Mind in ordinary men is the Slave of the Senses; but, in this case it is their master and they are completely subjugated. They respond to every call of the mind i.e. when a person thinks of a sound, ears responding to the thought make him hear it well. When he cherishes the imagination of a smell, his olfactory nerves actually feel the sensation. In short, in this the imagination of a person is exalted to such a pitch that all its pictures stand forth vividly on the mirror of objectivity.

21. Samadhi—It is the continued concentration of the thought of the whole world (Brahma). In its higher state, a yogi loses the consciousness of every individuality including his own and reaches the highest knowledge.

It has two stages—a, Samprajnata Samadhi—Meditation with distinct recognition. In this state a yogi can see what is going on in the three Lokas. It is called Trace. It arises from—argumentation, deliberation, 747 bliss and identification of himself with the objects. It is the merging of Mind and Buddhi into Vijnan.

R.V. KEDKAR. "THE VEDANT PHILOSOPHY."

747 730

R.V. KEDKAR. "THE VEDANT PHILOSOPHY."

^{746 729}

b) Asamprajnata Samadhi—Meditation without distinct recognition. The Yogin in this state realises the original nature of Brahman and is never disturbed by anything, not even the temptation of supreme occult powers. It is the merging of Vijnan into Brahm or Paramatman.

The stages of this Yoga cannot be completely realized by all. It will greatly depend on the calibre of the mind and direction of a person—whether he is a Vedantin, Monist or Dualist.

So long as the dualist has the idea of separatedness (between God and devotee) he cannot enter into Samadhi; and when he tries to practice it his dualism disappears and he gets convinced that he was wandering under false colours before. Even without the knowledge of Samadhi we have seen several dualists, who were tossed about into troubles by destiny and never received any help from the God or Goddess in whom they had absolute confidence, changed into either Monists or Vedantins.

Regarding a Monist—when he tries for a Samprajnat Samadhi and realises his own divinity, he also forgets his Monism.

- 22. Shri Jnaneshwar advocated that Brahman has Sfurti (Vibration or Impulse) in His own nature which further develops into (Kalpana and Ichha) fancy or desire for creation. When Brahman is bound up with a strong desire (Sfurana). He is called Brahm i.e. the seeds of the phenomenal and the noumenal creations are then in Him. When the universe is formed then Brahm and called Brahma. When Brahma imagines to be divided Himself into many this force of conception is called Prakriti or Shakti. When an individual Atman is formed it has the conception of some name and form for itself. Through this Avidya (conception of ignorance) every person transforms all the thoughts of Brahma which surround him into a perception of some⁷⁴⁸ names and forms.
- 23. It must be noted that the knowledge, Truth and Existence of Brahman are Eternal as compared to the knowledge, reality and existence of the phenomenal Brahma or Ishwara (God) who is not permanent. In other words, though Maya exists in Brahman as swabhav and Sfuriti and is Anadi (without a beginning) still it is Sant (with an end). For, Brahman can dissolve the world as a person can check his fancy.

Again, it should be observed that only a part of Brahman has a desire of thinking of an universe as only a part of an ocean has waves—the whole ocean never has one wave over it. Also looking to our mind, we think of one object at a time though we have the knowledge of several objects. They remain latent in mind when a part of it is engaged in some thought. If the whole mind were to be engaged in one thought it could not think or remember of other ideas. But it is not so.

Therefore, if a part of Brahman is turned into Brahma and deluded by Maya it cannot be said that the whole of Brahman is affected by Maya. In other words, as a part of a wave (at the side) can become an ocean so an individual Atman can leave Brahma

⁷⁴⁸ **731**

on the strength of the True knowledge which is behind his phenomenal knowledge and can go back into Brahman. This is the true Moksha (liberation) and not that of being liberated from the turmoils of births and deaths and in being an Ishwara (God).

In this point only Vedant differs from all the Dualistic religions.

Now, when a peculiar question is asked: "How Brahman is deluded by his own Maya?" it will be clear that the whole of Brahman is never influenced by desire, fancy Prakriti or Maya. The whole of Brahman has a Swabhava (nature) of thinking—when a part of it is in the act of thinking the force of the whole of swabhava acts on it in the form of Shakti (force). When Brahma is divided Himself⁷⁴⁹ into Atmas the whole force of his Prakriti acts on an Atman in the form of a Maya (delusion)."

24. It is very important to remember the following two important points while discussing or solving the questions of Mayavada.

The Brahman is Advaita (non-dual) and the phenomenal universe is only His mental conception. If he imagines that He is a Cat or a Tiger, His original principles (Satyam, Jnanam, Anantam) are not lost in any way as a person thinking of London cannot himself be turned into London.

Also, as he does not transform another (as there is nobody else besides Him) into a tiger with His magic want so He cannot be brought into any legal crime. At some occasions a persons says to himself "What a fool am I?" but thereby he is not changed so. For, he again says "How clever am I?" So the 'I' which imagines of such opposite qualities is beyond those qualities.

25. It is well known that the gases in the proportion of H₂O stand for water in the chemical world. When water is formed from them their gaseous state is turned into a fluid one. When water is cooled down, it is turned into solid ice. When water is boiled it is turned into steam. Thus, the same substance has different names and forms in each state of consciousness. Now, while discussing about water we should not mix up the qualities of snow with it; nor, should we raise such a question "Why is water generally so hot?" It will show that we do not understand what we speak. Similar ignorance is seen when a person asks questions as "How can God be so ignorant as to forget Himself?" If God has created sin why should he punish people who commit sins?"

In answering the first question we must enquire first whether the whole of Brahma or His part Atman is ignorant. Of course, Brahma being beyond the three states of consciousness and omniscient can never be ignorant. While Atman has the unit of omniscience in it so it cannot be ignorant⁷⁵⁰ also. As ignorance is the characteristic of tamo-guna so Ego, when affected by it, forgets its heritage from Atman but realizes it when it goes into the Sat State (Samadhi or Deep Sleep). So, the forgetfulness is only

^{749 732}

temporary and especially possible when a part thinks itself weak and separate from others of the same nature.

26. Therefore, the cause of ignorance and troubles is the limitation of the self to Rajas or Tamas qualities. Such limitation is attained by an Ego through the false hope of securing happiness in the phenomenal world, and by the firm attachment of himself to the delusive objects in the world. It is a common experience that a person keeps a key in his own pocket and being engaged with other thoughts forgets of it and tries to search it out in all the nooks and corners of the room; on putting his hand into the pocket at last, he comes to know of his mistake. In short, the whole of Brahma cannot be affected by the gross delusive aspect of the Maya.

Regarding the second question of SIN—We must know first what it is. On close observation it will be found that it means limitation of a person to gross ideas, consequent forgetfulness of his own virtues and tendency to be drawn to vices.

- 27. A person instead of remaining in a weak state of offering prayers to a Deity under dualism and ever wait for His blessings should waken up from such ignorance, understand that he has all divine virtues latent in himself and should try to reach the state of Brahma through the practice of Yoga which, though hard illumines the path for Moksha.
- 28. It strictly warns persons to be careful of their karmas as all actions are necessarily followed by reactions. No sin can be truly forgiven by anybody. It has to be reaped in some way or other.

It advises a person not to remain ever begging a Deity for daily food; but it falls that should wake up, make himself bold to tread the difficult path⁷⁵¹ of Yoga and he realise what miraculous (divine) powers he has latent in himself, and what happiness he would have at the rise of Atmajnan in himself.

A person should not have hatred, jealousy, or cruelty towards any living creature as all are truly the parts of One Brahma and Brahman in their true existence. All religions have been so arranged by Brahma as to suit the varying inquisitiveness of a person; and as he is born sooner or later into different religions and nationalities according to his Karmas so no hatred or intolerance for different religions should be shown by him.

29. If a person, under the circumstances, is to say that it is better to keep quiet and not to mind either the world or its happiness he will soon find that it is impossible for him to do so. He can't stop thinking either in the waking or dream state; in the deep sleep state even, he has the idea of "Me" and "Mine". Without these he can't return to the waking state.

^{751 734}

Gita says: "It is impossible for a person to be inactive for a moment."

30. Ignorant think of the Sankhya and the yoga as different, but not the Pandits (Wise).

When a person thinks hard over the truth of any thing, he then controls his senses and mind and indirectly practises yoga. Thus yoga and the attempt for knowledge are inseparable.

31. The priests and ministers of all dualistic religions have from time to time given so many promises for the coming of the saints and failed in those prophesies that congregational people have not only lost their faith in the priests but also in the principles of their sermons.

Unfortunately, even a religious body like the Theosophical society is lately drawn into that groove! In starting such a prophesy a leader thinks he is creating a religious sensation and fresh ferver in devotion, and, thus, does⁷⁵² a lot of good to the world; but, I believe, the failure of the prophesy brings on a disastrous reaction of atheism on the minds of the blind believers.

Therefore such a prophesy does not do a scrap of good to any body. On the contrary, the leaders should impress the fact on the minds of the followers that God is within one's own self, ever waiting for the communion of the soul and it is the duty of every soul to take all the possible advantage of the company of such a sincere Guide.

32. Happiness is the goal of every one. It cannot be obtained in the diversity i.e. following the diverse pursuits and ambitions as they are often attended by failures and disappointments. When a person is tired of any thing the first thing he wishes is retirement. He says "Let me be alone, let me stop those ideas." So, you will see that retirement and tranquility of the mind give happiness. But an untrained person cannot remain still for a long time as his mind is likely to wander in other thoughts and temptations and become unpeaceful again. But, a religion gives an eternal Prop (God) to the mind for rest, hope and guidance. It has a philosophy to show by reasoning the true original Nature of the Self and a practice to realise the same. This practice includes yoga the path of self-control and ethics sets of rules for the moral conduct of the one with the other.

Thus, a true religion gives satisfaction, knowledge and power through self-control and Moksha through the illumination of the ultimate knowledge. Now, a question will arise "Can all religions lead one to the Ideal Moksha?" No. Vedant alone can do it. Other religions are stepping stones to lead a person in course of time to the steps of the Vedant. Vedic principles are the common principles of all religions. If a dualistic religion be studied through the tenets of the Vedant, I am sure, it throws

⁷⁵² **735**

sufficient light to understand better⁷⁵³ several of its mysterious passages. Thus, the Vedant Shastra does not oppose any religion. It is like a Great circle including all the varying circles of religions.

33. The Upanishads definitely say that the ultimate being an Eternal Subject can not be an object to be expressed in words. However, for the sake of the philosophical ontology they have defined it as the Reality, Knowledge and Eternal Existence and called it Brahman. This definition is most complete and satisfactory. The Western philosophers believe that the ultimate should be either words (Plato), Knowledge (Schelling), or Unknowable (Spencer). But the words or knowledge must exist into some being. They can not exist alone.

Also, the statement that the "Ultimate is unknowable" is to be concluded through one's own knowledge. Therefore, in that case the ultimate is known and it comes within the category of knowledge.

Thus, the definition of our Upanishads that the ultimate Brahman is not merely an eternal being but has the absolute Truth and Knowledge is most complete.

- 34. The Ultimate is Adwaita, Non-dual i.e. neither ego nor the world. Both the two vrittis (ideas) appear from and disappear into Brahman simultaneously. Therefore, it will never be possible for an Ego to see the finiteness of the world; hence it is infinite to it.
- 35. When Brahman has a sankalpa (inclination) for manifestation. He mentally pictures the world. He is still one without a second. When God is omnipresent the world must be included in him, it cannot have a separate reality.

But these are mere imaginations. Thereby God does neither become white nor black; good nor bad. When a person dreams that he is flying in air he does not become thereby a bird. Shrutis say that manifestation is through (Natural) inclination for thoughts. It is mentioned in Mandukya Upanishad⁷⁵⁴ that it is the Swabhav (nature) of Brahman to think of the diverse objects of a world. When we are parts of that Brahman we have the same tendency of thinking about "Me and Mine" (in diverse forms) in all the three states of consciousness.

36. The imminent Atman has the Vijnan (particular knowledge of the lower self) and the absolute knowledge of the world.

In this mantra it is declared that Atman is the record of all the actions of the lower (material self) and it has also the knowledge of the past, present and future of the

^{753 736}

world. Thus, it is shown that Atman is not an evolved product. It is the original Brahma.

37. A person who realizes the Universality of spirit obtains the highest goal.

In this mantra the experience is declared that when a person understands the true Reality and the phantasm of the world he will be beyond all personal temptations hatred and disappointments. He will then act as a witness to the phenomena of the world and enjoy the worldly pleasure as a spectator does in a theatre.

38. Shri Jnaneshwar has explained this well. He says that Brahman must be called "Not two" as It is beyond the limitations of "Me and Mine".

These two limitations are co-existent and simultaneous. A person can not say 'I' without having a physical body and a physical body can not have natural existence without an Ego. Take an example of a mirror—a person sees his body and its reflection in a mirror but he does not see his spirit (Atman) in it. It is beyond the body and its reflection.

As Adwait Brahman is neither "me" nor "mine"; so Adwaitism can neither represent limitations of "me" (monism) nor of Mine or (Dualism) Pantheism. Gita says: "All beings are present in me but I am (wholly) not in them." This appears a riddle. But, with an illustration it can be solved. Suppose⁷⁵⁵ a person is dreaming of Bombay in sleep he will have then the various sites and objects of Bombay in him but his whole body will not be evaporated or metamorphosed into Bombay. It remains in bed as it was before. A part of the mind of a person works in a dream the rest is partly latent and partly looking after the other physiological functions of the body. Similarly, Brahman is partly active with the phenomenon of the world but greatly transcendent to the imminent Ishwar.

- 39. If a person has to see an omnipresent God, he shall have to come out of the limit of omnipresence which is an impossibility. Therefore, a person shall never see God. Some persons have seen some God-visions but those would have been the reflections of their spiritual thoughts.
- 40. Many persons do lucidly believe that God is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. If he is omnipresent he must be present within each person. If that is the fact why should they run to an external Deity for help? Similarly, out of omniscience and omnipotence a person should have a unit of knowledge and a unit of power of God within himself. All scriptures do say "Kingdom of God is within." But, it is strange that people do not understand what they read and believe in. Therefore, each person should worship God within one's own self and develop the potencies (knowledge and power) of God which are latent in one's own self.

⁷⁵⁵ **738**

41. Monists believe that there is one God. He is Omnipresent, Omnipotent, Omnicient and Eternal.

Objection: God cannot be limited by any number as one, two or more—for, it brings Him within the reach of sense perceptions for determination of his figure, number etc. He is transcendental. It has been declared in the scriptures of all religions that the world has been created over and over again. Thus, the world is temporary by⁷⁵⁶ nature. In Vedanta, God is considered a temporary aspect (immanence) of Brahman which is in relation with the manifestation of the world. Monists do not accept this idea and are consequently landed into a serious dilemma.

- 42. The Dualism has destroyed the purpose and the goal of the realisation of one's own true state of Brahman. The forms of its worship have become so complicated that a layman has to be entirely into the hands of the priest to carry out all the rituals. Nevertheless, the prescribed form of worship takes away a lot of time and does not conduce to the proper concentration of mind and communion with Atman (Deity). Thus, the devotees thereby remain ignorant as ever, and get into a bad habit of being entirely dependent on a personal Deity without making the least attempt to cleanse the impurities of their minds and to practice non-attachment to the objects in the world.
- 43. "Sanyas" means gradual control of the desires for worldly objects; it does not mean immediate running to the forest life.
- 44. In the practice of yoga and devotion the lower self is applied to the Higher Self (Atman), its mind and Buddhi including the senses are merged first into vijnan, next into omniscience of Atman and finally into Absolute knowledge by Brahman. Lower self merges into Atman; and Atman realises its nature of Brahman. Therefore, in "liberation", an Ego is not added on to Brahman which again does not increase in size. For example, when a person dreams of an elephant, his own mind reflects upon the nature of that animal, and when he wakes up that idea of an elephant merges into his mind but thereby, he does not get himself bigger in size.
- 45. By the study of the philosophy and the practice of yoga of the Adwaitism, a person realizes the perpetual presence of God (Atman) within himself as the Witness, Judge, Friend and Helper⁷⁵⁷ for the spiritual prosperity of himself. Hence he is straight in his character, peaceful in mind, and kind at heart to help his fellow persons.

Brahman (Ultimate Reality, Knowledge and Eternity) cannot be limited and expressed by any term as One; because, it has been already shown that the two

^{756 739}

primordial ideas of "I" (Creator) and "My" (the World) are simultaneous in emanence, co-existing in time and simultaneous in merging into knowledge of Brahman. Therefore, Brahman is "Not Two" (Adwaita).

- 46. God (Atman) is within their self, witnessing the actions of each individual.
- 47. The wonderful Vedas have been the saviours of the Indians. Their downfall was destined, I believe, for the spread of the Vedanta in the West. Otherwise the besotted Indians of the last century who locked up the Vedas and tried to keep the mass under ignorance of it, would never have allowed its spread outside the precincts of India.
- 48. The Vedas are the property of the whole world. Your grand-parents during the last century have buried the Vedic books and remained ignorant themselves. So, to bring you to proper senses and to get the Vedic philosophy spread wide over the world, God has brought your kind cousins, the English to India.

SIR ABDUL QADIR. "THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM" @@

It is a mistake to imagine that the different religions in India will disappear or merge into one synthetic combination of all. In my opinion the best ideal will be to seek unity in the midst of diversity, and to recognize that diversity of religious thought is bound to remain. There is a passage in the Holy Koran which says that God could have so moulded humanity as to have only one religion, but He preferred to test mankind, to see how they use their gifts of understanding and discernment. It appears that this diversity of thought is a part of the scheme of things and is quite in keeping with the scheme of Nature in other directions. The trees, the flowers and the fruits are a significant illustration of Nature's love of variety, with their different colours and flavours and perfumes. Let us recognize that all religions have a right to exist.

^{@@} In Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs. 1942

⁷⁵⁸ **74**1