

Philosophical Summaries

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
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
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("Tamil passage omitted here")

Sri Satchidananda Nrsimha Bharati of Sringeri Monastery

("Tamil passage omitted here")



Atmavidya Vilasa

(THE JOY OF SELF - KNOWLEDGE)

by
SADASIVA

(Early 18th century Sage of Karur, in Mysore State)²

.....

translated from the Sanskrit

@@@@

This poem contains pure Advaitic truths mystically expressed and was a favourite with His Holiness the late Sri Satchidananda Nrsimha Bharati Swami, Head of Sringeri Mutt, and Guru of Shankara order³. Every day the Swami recited its verses and expounded its meaning to his devotees.

¹ The original editor inserted page number "1" by hand

² The original editor changed "(18th century Sage of Nerur, in Mysore State)" to "(Early 18th century Sage of Karur, in Mysore State)" by hand

³ The original editor inserted "Shankara order" by hand

ATMAVIDYAVILASA.

1. I salute that unknown first preceptor who is the sprout of the bliss of Kaivalya,¹ who has his abode in the proximity of the banyan tree, and whose lotus hand bears on its fingers the symbol of intense wisdom.
2. I bow to the sandals⁵ of the venerable Paramasivendra² which is the ever-active⁶ ferry-boat for men who have fallen into the boundless⁷ ocean of mundane life and which is the sledge-hammer in breaking false⁸ religions.
3. I who have the divine glory awakened in me by the force of the teaching of my spiritual preceptor Paramasivendra, after my soul has rested in peace,—I now with great zest utter a few words of praise.
4. The Supreme Soul shines pure and intelligent—the Soul who has no equal, who is eternal and has no desire, is spotless, mayaless and has neither attributes nor form and who is devoid of all change.
5. The sage who was formerly⁹ tied down by his own ignorance, who¹⁰, being bewildered, performed¹¹ religious rites and who, by good fortune is¹² now released from bondage, knows his own self,—that sage reigns supreme.
6. He who having slept overpowered by Maya (ignorance) has seen a thousand kinds of dreams during his sleep—¹³that¹⁴ unknown person, now being roused by the words of his spiritual preceptor, plays in the ocean of bliss.

⁴ The original editor inserted page number “3” by hand

¹ Kaivalya=mergence in the SupremeSelf

⁵ The original editor changed “sandal” to “sandals” by hand

² Paramasivendra=the author’s own Guru

⁶ The original editor inserted “ever-active” by hand

⁷ The original editor inserted “boundless” by hand

⁸ The original editor inserted “false” by hand

⁹ The original editor inserted “was formerly” by hand

¹⁰ The original editor inserted “, who” by hand

¹¹ The original editor changed “perform” to “performed” by hand

¹² The original editor inserted “is now” by hand

¹³ The original editor changed “{??ingddle (of his sleep)” to “during his sleep—” by hand

¹⁴ 4

7. The wise man, after having abandoned his lower nature, assuming his true nature, existence-intelligence-bliss, and by the graceful glance of the holy guru himself attaining the dignity of a guru, revels in joy.

8. The contemplative sage whose mind, by the grace of his blessed guru, is merged in his own true nature of Existence, Intelligence and Bliss – that unknown person wise, calm, self-possessed and extremely delighted within himself, silent¹⁵ in joy.

9. The best of sannyasins, getting his internal darkness (ignorance) dispelled by the sun's rays of the blessed holy preceptor's grace, continues to revel in the ocean of limitless joy.

10. The best of Sannyasins, with his internal passions¹⁶ cooled by the force of his contact with the flood of grace from his holy guru, delights in¹⁷ himself alone, unrestrained on the utmost limits of incomparable happiness.

11. After extricating by discriminative knowledge the five elements (which compose his body) from the succession of births and deaths, the calm recluse keeps meditating on the true principle of Atman which (alone) remains in the end.

12. Thinking in his mind that the whole of¹⁸ this world is unsubstantial and is the product of maya, he, an indefinite being, wanders about¹⁹ having all his desires rooted out and his pride, self-esteem²⁰ and passion lost.

13. In reality neither the slightest tinge of maya nor its action exists in the spotless Atman. Thus determining within himself, the yogin, with his heart full of bliss, feels delighted.

14. Devoid of the consciousness of 'thou' and 'I' and approving with delight the various practices of the people, he wanders alone like a child immersed in the pure ocean of bliss.

15. Having shaken off the toils of ritualism, and resembling the fool, the deaf and the blind, he, the indescribable self-delighted prince of ascetics, remains roaming in the recesses of forests.

¹⁵ The original editor over write the "silent" by hand

¹⁶ The original editor over write "passions" by hand

¹⁷ The original editor inserted "in" by hand

¹⁸ 5

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

¹⁹ The original editor inserted "about" by hand

²⁰ The original editor over write "self-esteem" by hand

16. He who is himself alone, who has known the secret of true enjoyment, who is in the firm²¹ embrace of²² peace and who is magnanimous in having allayed all the sufferings of others – that person sports on his pleasant couch of bliss.

17. The prince of yatis,³ who has rooted out all his enemies²³ – the objects of senses, –²⁴ and has taken possession of all that belongs to renunciation, shines effulgent in his atmic empire which is glorious in the blissful enjoyment of the Self.

18. Even if the sun were to become cool-rayed, the moon hot and the fire burn downwards²⁵, the man, who is fretted²⁶ even whilst living from future births, knowing that all this is the production of maya, never gets astonished.

19. The prince of ascetics, who has conquered the enemy – ignorance,²⁷ and has ascended the head of the elephant of supreme knowledge, dwells in the abode of undiminished enjoyment of bliss which is delightful in every way.

20. The evil of egoity having been extirpated and his mind steadily concentrated, he, the indescribable one, whose nature is cool like the full-moon and who knows the essence of bliss, existence, shines brilliantly.

21. He lives, as it were, in another world engrossed in his inner bliss, but outwardly engages in meditation or singing or dancing, just as it strikes his fancy.²⁸

22. Wherever he may be, untouched by sin, and having calmed down all wandering thoughts, and given up orthodox religious in actions, the wise man remains always on the shore of perfection.²⁹

²¹ The original editor changed “is firmly” to “is in the firm” by hand

²² The original editor inserted “of” by hand

³ Yati means a wandering ascetic.

²³ The original editor corrected spell: “enemies” by hand

²⁴ The original editor inserted comma and mdash by hand

²⁵ 6

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

²⁶ The original editor overwrite the word “fretted” by hand

²⁷ The original editor inserted comma by hand

²⁸ The original editor overwrite this para “He lives, as it were, in another world engrossed in his inner bliss, but outwardly engages in meditation or singing or dancing, just as it strikes his fancy.” By hand

²⁹ The original editor overwrite this para “Wherever he may be, untouched by sins and having calmed down all wandering thoughts, and given up orthodox religious in actions, the wise man remains always on the shore of perfection.” By hand

23. Having expertly³⁰ caught the fickle deer of his mind in the snare of investigation and being fatigued of³¹ roaming in the wilderness of the Vedas, he, sleeps alone in his abode (of bliss) – the Self.³²

24. Having destroyed the cruel tiger of his restless thoughts³³ by the sharp edge of the sword of³⁴ his calm and steady mind, he, following his own inclinations, wanders victoriously in the forest of fearlessness.

25. Spreading the rays of his vivifying thoughts³⁵ which cause the lotuses of the hearts of good people to blossom, he the spotless sun of the holy ascetic, travels in the sky of intelligence.

26. The pure moon of the prince of recluses, who is fit to be worshipped by gods and whose moonlight of intelligence³⁶ dispels the darkness of ignorance causes the lilies³⁷ of the earth to blossom, shines forth in the heaven of Vishnu (sky).

27. Allaying the incessant afflictions of the soul by raining his (nectarine) water of bliss, the cloud of the yogin, devoid of its capricious movements, shines in the sky of intelligence. How wonderful!

28. Driving away all fatigue by wandering amidst the sweet scents of flowers, the pleasant wind of the yogin sports in the rich pleasure garden of bliss.

29. That unknown one, the peacock of the yati shines in the grove where fear has disappeared, which is full of the juicy fruits of supreme bliss and which is charming with the tender leaves of pure knowledge.

30. Leaving the sapless sandy desert of Samsara that supreme swan plays alone unrestrained in the magnificent lake of intelligence which is filled with the water of³⁸ bliss.

³⁰ The original editor overwrite the word “expertly” by hand

³¹ The original editor transposed and inserted “being fatigued of” by hand

³² The original editor inserted “ – the Self.” By hand

³³ The original editor inserted and overwrite “restless thoughts” by hand

³⁴ 7

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

³⁵ The original editor overwrite the words “vivifying thoughts” by hand

³⁶ The original editor deleted “that” by hand

³⁷ The original editor changed “lil” to “lilies” by hand

³⁸ 8

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

31. The cuckoo of the sage whose voice is sweet like nectar sits cooing in the cool garden of Vedantic lore whose tender plants are the manifold scriptures.³⁹

32. The noble lion of the great sage, having torn to pieces the ruttish elephant of illusion and having driven away the tiger of sins, roams in the vast wilderness of bliss.

33. Roaming freely in the hilly tracts on the highest peak of knowledge which lies beyond reach of⁴⁰ the great lion of ignorance, the strong⁴¹ elephant of the yati shines having cooled its limbs with the water of wisdom.

34. Some unknown recluse sits on the banks of a river meditating on the truth of existence—that recluse who has fixed his eyes on the tip of his nose and who has withdrawn his mind from (the distinctions of) names & forms.⁴²

35. The ascetic who has taken the vow of silence and has put an end to all his desires, who has adorned himself with renunciation and is calm, and whose begging bowl is the palm of his hand and abode is⁴³ the foot of a tree—that ascetic reigns supreme.

36. That prince of yatis, who is tranquil equanimous, of blissful intelligence and indifferent to external objects, lies down in his bower-house on the solitary bank⁴⁴ of a river, on the simple lovely couch made of the beautiful sand-bank.

37. He who is the crest-jewel of Sannyasin princes shines having the ground for his soft bed, refreshed solely by the fan of cool breeze and having for his light the full-moon.

38. On the broad slab of the rocky ground, sublimely surrounded by the crystal waters of a brook and with the soft Southern breeze gently wafting, the indescribable prince of yatis sleeps serene.

39. Supremely reticent, always fixing his mind on that one thing within himself (his internal self), and eating what he begs with the bowl of his hand, the recluse silently⁴⁵wanders, indeed, in the streets putting on an idiotic appearance.

³⁹ The original editor inserted “scriptures.” By hand

⁴⁰ The original editor overwrite the “lies beyond reach of” by hand

⁴¹ The original editor overwrite “strong” by hand

⁴² The original editor inserted “forms.” By hand

⁴³ The original editor inserted “is” by hand

⁴⁴ 9

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

⁴⁵ The original editor overwrite “the recluse silently” by hand

40. Having denied the whole world and depending on that one indivisible thing which alone remains in the end, he puts into his mouth whatever food is obtainable by his karma which is now operating.⁴⁶

41. With a heart refreshing like sandal and his mind filled with the sprouts of bliss, the yogin does not despise anything internally nor is he pleased with any other thing.

42. Abandoning the network of scriptures and giving up entirely all the settled practices of the world, and having attained the perfect state of existence, the yogin remains like the unflickering lamp.

43. With⁴⁷ his body covered with straw and mud and looking on the whole world as lightly as straw, the yogin solitarily wanders on the skirts of the forest, firmly rested in that state where there is no old age and no death.

44. The yogin does not see any distinction of form; he does not speak and does not hear any words whatever. Attaining perfection, he remains in that uncomparable condition resembling a log of wood.⁴⁸

45. Devoid of the pride of race and seeing perfection in all creatures, the prince of yatis roves unnoticed like a fool,⁴⁹ but he is⁵⁰ deeply learned in the truths of all things.

46. Making his upper shoulder his pillow the sky his covering and the earth his bed, and embracing peace as⁵¹ his wife, the yogin sleeps overpowered by bliss.

47. The Sannyasin prince, ascending the mansion of truth which is led to by the road of renunciation and which is lit by the big light of knowledge, enjoys himself like a king in the company of courtesans⁵² in the company of liberation. (mukti)

48. He, the indefinable knower of Self, bears the blue lotus garland of solitude, the wish-yielding creeper of non-attachment to woman, and the sweet (immortalising) pill of indifference to honour.

⁴⁶ The original editor overwrite and deleted "is now operating." By hand

⁴⁷ 10

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

⁴⁸ The original editor overwrite "log of wood." By hand

⁴⁹ The original editor inserted comma by hand

⁵⁰ The original editor inserted "he is" by hand

⁵¹ The original editor inserted "as" by hand

⁵² The original editor inserted "like a king in the company of courtesans" by hand

49. A yati does not reject anything from his perception of its faultiness, nor does he accept anything from his perception of its⁵³ goodness. But knowing that all this is the outcome of ignorance (avidya) he observes indifference and non-attachment.⁵⁴

50. He does not think of anything that is past, nor does he carl⁵⁵ within himself of the future⁵⁶ that is to come. He does not see things that are present. He has equal delight in all objects.

51. With all his senses controlled and with his desire for all the objects of the senses swept away, the holiest of yatis roams having reached the utmost limit of contentment.

52. The king of devotees does not relinquish what has come to him, nor does he desire at any time for what has not come to him. He lays himself down enjoying alone the internal bliss of the self.

53. Having attained a pure state of existence which is of the nature of bliss, intelligence and super-conscious wakefulness, the homeless mendicant continues to wander all alone as he pleases⁵⁷, released from every kind of bondage.

54. His mind being absorbed into that one thing which causes to disappear the manifestation of the whole of this phenomenal universe, the king of the dispassionate shines indifferent to everything else.

55. By the graceful glance of his preceptor having obtained the nature of infinite intelligence, a paramahansa who has subdued all distinctions (by abstract meditation) shines⁵⁸ glorious.

56. Having risen above the conventional distinctions of castes and religious orders of life and thrown off scriptures and other such sources of knowledge, the yatindra is left over merely with infinite bliss and intelligence.

57. Having made all karma⁵⁹ to disappear, except⁶⁰ the karma which is now working⁶¹ out its fruits, and with the distinctions of body completely vanished, the sage becomes the Brahman who alone exists.

⁵³ 11

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "and non-attachment." By hand

⁵⁵ The original editor overwrite "carl" by hand

⁵⁶ The original editor inserted "the future" by hand

⁵⁷ The original editor overwrite "as he pleases" by hand

⁵⁸ 12

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

⁵⁹ The original editor overwrite "karma" by hand

58. Some indescribable Supreme Principle which is motionless infinite and nameless which is eternal and full of bliss and intelligence and which is unchangeable, primeval and one – that thing alone exists.

59. Some Supreme Principle exists – that thing which is imperishable, undecaying, unborn, which is the extremely subtle, ancient and pure wisdom and which is free from all afflictions or distress.⁶²

60. Some indescribable Principle which is pure existence shines forth – that Principle which is extremely blissful undecaying and innate, which is the strongest of helps in crossing the ocean of samsara, which is equally pervading essence of everything and which is fearless and boundless.

61. That ultimate Principle which is without taste, without smell, without form, which⁶³ is devoid of passion, goodness, and darkness, which is without an equal and without fear – that something shines eternally.

62. By the graceful glance of a blessed guru I have uttered in two and sixty faultless Arya verses that teaching which is the essence of philosophy of the Upanishads.

63. The wise man contemplating every day on this “Atmavidyavilasa” – The exposition of the science of Atman – which has been uttered by me, shall have ripe knowledge of the Supreme Reality and immediately attain the Highest Truth.

COMMENTARY BY V.S.IYER on above book:

“Atma Vidya Vilasa” does not suit modern conditions. It is almost impossible to follow it now-a-days. He recited it publicly for a certain purpose. He told me “that what I am doing is not true Sanyas, but this poem Atma Vidya Vilasa describes true Sanyas. “I am here sitting in a palanquin attending to official business, surrounded by devotees, but it is not what I want. I want to be free like Sadasiva”. Sometimes we walked alone to the top of a hill and sit down on a rock. He would then say “Now we can talk freely. Don’t look on me⁶⁴ as a real Sanyasin. It is only appearance, show. I am the Head of a Mutt. But a true sanyasin must not stay in one place. The true sanyasin is

⁶⁰ The original editor overwrite “except” and deleted “enjoyed” by hand

⁶¹ The original editor overwrite “is now working” by hand

⁶² The original editor inserted “or distress.” By hand

⁶³ 13

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

⁶⁴ 14

ATMAVIDYAVILASA

described in "Atma Vidya Vilasa". I long to escape from this Mutt, and be free to wander incognito." The poem is intended for Sanyasins only, not for those like Janaka who live in the world, but follow the path of knowledge. For instance, which Sanyasin to-day is prepared to wander homeless from place to place? But this wandering was prescribed so that he might not get attached to any place, property, person, women or object. Yet such a possessionless man alone is a true Sanyasin.

The Author's ideal is one who takes Sanyas and becomes a Gnani, i.e. who has not merely renounced but also follows path of knowledge to the end. However such complete external renunciation, wandering in the forest without even a hut, avoiding the society of all men, not even to owning a begging bowl, as described here is impracticable in modern times.

Sri⁶⁵ Sankara went to Sringeri and built a temple there to Sarada and established a Mutt there and appointed Sureswara as its head. One day one of his disciples named Anandagiri was absent. Sri Sankaracharya stopped the lessons till his return. Then the disciple Padmapada asked him: "He is merely serving you. He is not a learned man. Why should our lessons stop for his account?" Anandagiri then returned. By his master's blessings he composed on the spot a poem in the Totaka metre giving the quintessence of the Adwaita philosophy. The other disciples wondered at this event. He was thenceforth known also as Totakacharya. Sureswara, Padmapada, Hastamalaka and Totaka are the greatest disciples of Sri Sankaracharya.

Critical⁶⁶ Idealism

AND THE

ADVAITA VEDANTA::

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By S.S. SURYANARAYANAN

in MYSORE UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE)

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“CRITICAL⁶⁷ IDEALISM AND THE ADVAITA VEDANTA”.

(V.S.=⁶⁸ Vedanta Sutras. Appearance stands for Appearance and Reality, Essays for Essays in Truth and Reality and Dvivedi for that author’s translation of the Mandukya Upanishad with Shankara’s commentaries).

By S.S. Suryanarayannan in Mysore University Magazine

It was a fashion in philosophy till lately to look upon Indian speculation as dogmatic in character. This supposed dogmatism has been claimed by admirers and adverse critics alike, the former extolling Indian philosophy for the very reason for which others decry it. I am now referring primarily to the critics, favourable or adverse, of the method itself. There are, besides these, others who object to a system of philosophy because the conclusions are repugnant to them. The conclusions, according to these are hopelessly faulty and the methods by which they are arrived at must at least be equally faulty. With these there is hardly any arguing. We can but thank them for teaching us the organic unity of method and results and pass on.

The Advaita Vedanta, the dominant school of philosophic thought in India, has suffered all the varying fortunes of criticism. While some of its most frenzied adherents expound it for the benefit of the world, as the doctrine of the abstract universal, there are other merciless critics who cry down this along with other forms of absolutism for this very same vice that it is based in the end on a doctrine of abstract identity. A few others claim that the conclusions would be satisfactory enough, but for the dogmatic method employed, while the opponents of these would have it that the method is alright, is perhaps the only valuable part of this system of philosophy, while the conclusions themselves are unacceptable. To arrive at any one opinion as satisfactory, out of such a mass of opinions, is not an easy task. The⁶⁹ western scholar or the student who applies western methods is accustomed to a certain method of thinking. Any suggestion he may receive which will help him to look at Indian philosophy in the light of western metaphysics is to him invaluable. But the ever-present defect of an analogical argument is that it may mislead, being based on non-essential resemblances. Our own students will be discharging an important though comparatively insignificant, duty by constantly keeping on the lookout for such unsound analogies, correcting them wherever they exist, and suggesting aperçus wherefrom the westerner can obtain a more profitable and more satisfactory view of our philosophic systems.

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⁶⁸ The original editor inserted “=” by hand

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The Advaita Vedanta has suffered through unsound analogical views. It has been compared by some with atheistic or abstractly monistic systems of the west; and since these are condemned, it follows in their minds that it should be condemned also. Of course, a good many of those who effect such comparisons are either unsound scholars or unsound philosophers or both. From the failure of Spinozism, they jump to the inevitable failure of absolutism, or if they do believe in absolutism of a sort, they fail to see the essential resemblance between this and the Advaita. Nor is this unsoundness confined to hostile critics like Gough. Well-intentioned scholars like Deussen do us a great disservice when they compare this system to Kant's. Kant, no doubt, was a great philosopher in his day; and if the truth were known, few of his critics yet understand his real greatness. But nothing can be more effective condemnation of the Vedantic Brahman than a comparison of it to the Kantian Thing-in-Itself; for in whatever Kant's greatness may lie, the doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself certainly does⁷⁰ not contribute to it. The present writer believes that the Advaita philosophy is substantially the same both in method and results as what now has so much vogue in the west as critical idealism; he believes that to look at the Indian system through those idealist spectacles will certainly help to a more correct appreciation of that system than has hitherto been reached. The full exposition of critical idealism is a task beyond the limits of any single paper. It is proposed to take up only one of the leading expositors of that system—F.H.Bradley—and compare in this paper the methods of Bradleian and Vedantic idealism. The identity of results is perhaps more remarkable than the identity of method, but for this very reason we do not consider it here. The correctness of a man's beliefs is not by itself a guarantee of the validity of his thinking, for the beliefs may be grounded on irrational acceptance of tradition; what has come to be accepted without strenuous thinking may be abandoned as easily. It is in method that the two systems are strongly contrasted, and it is to the elucidation of the substantial resemblance in method that this paper is devoted.

Advaitism and critical idealism are both monistic. The real is the One, the Absolute; anything like duality in any realm stops short of the ultimate. Ultimate duality is intolerable to both systems. This being the case reason, which is our guide in metaphysics, may not be looked down upon, condemned or subordinated to some other faculty. For from this would follow either the self-condemnation and suicide of reason or an ultimate duality of faculties, a duality fatal to any monistic conclusion. Critical idealism, therefore, should not and generally does not condemn reason⁷¹. Advaitism, however, does not seem to recognise this. We find throughout Vedanta Sutras a fairly explicit condemnation of reason and an exaltation of some other kind of knowledge which is intuitive. This provides the most marked contrast between the two types of

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Idealism. Allied this is another point of contrast: This supreme knowledge has been intuited by the Rishis and handed down to the rest of humanity; so that it is our task now only to do our best to understand what the Rishis have left us. This is dogmatism. So then, whatever may be the identity in results, irrationalism and dogmatism would seem to constitute a substantial difference in method between Bradleian and Vedantic idealism.

We may profitably consider the charge of irrationalism first. Is reason adequate to complete knowledge of reality or not? If not, what is its function and how is it superseded? The most important passages in the Vedanta Sutras treating the topic are II. 1 (6) and II 1 (11). In both places, it is distinctly stated that reason should be taken as a subordinate auxiliary to intuitional knowledge contained in the Scriptures. Reasoning proceeds from characteristic marks. But of Brahman you cannot say it is characterised by this or that to the exclusion of other attributes; or else, you will be limiting Brahman. In the absence of such marks, it is clear that inference and inferential knowledge are impossible.

Further, inference is a purely formal process. You can start from anything and argue to anything else you like without any necessity for the conclusions being true. If the rigidity of the reasoning process were to guarantee truth, we should have arrived at truth, long ago, whereas we find only different schisms and sects each pretending to be logical and each in conflict⁷² with the rest. This can only be, because in spite of the rigidity of their reasoning they start from wrong premises and do not know how to check either their starting point or their results. We Vedantins labour under no such difficulty. We admit the validity of reasoning within limits. We say, for instance, that because the waking and the dreaming states are mutually exclusive, the self cannot be present as such in either state; or that, since the world emanates from Brahman, Brahman cannot be different from the world on account of the non-difference of cause from effect. Reasoning is useful in disproving rival theories; it is also useful as, to a certain extent, indicating the final truth; but for the full comprehension of reality it is inadequate.

We might leave it at that, if Advaitic literature did not supply us with passages which seem to contradict the above conclusion. Thus for instance, in commenting on Gaudapada's Karikas III. 1 Sankara says "It is asked whether the Advaita is to be taken as proved only on the evidence of the Sruthi, and whether no reason can possibly demonstrate it. This chapter, therefore, shows how the Advaita can be demonstrated by reason. The whole of this chapter of the Karikas is devoted to demonstrating the Advaita by reason.

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On the original doctrine, it would follow that since reason is inadequate, the only way of knowing Brahman is by doing all that is enjoined in the Scriptures. Since at least parts of the Scriptures enjoin sacrifices, etc. the performance of such karma would have to be taken as the only means of realising Brahman. This is a conclusion diametrically opposed to Advaitism. The performance of Karma is not merely not the only way of realisation; it is not a way of realisation at all. The⁷³ man who wants to become identical with Brahman, must follow the path of knowledge, not of action. This the Advaitic doctrine as laid down in the Bhagavad Gita.

What are we to conclude from this? That Sankara contradicts himself, or that he believes in two faculties of knowledge—one intuitional and another ratiocinative? Neither conclusion follows. True, Sankara believes in knowledge which is not merely inferential, but this is not due to a different faculty. It is knowledge arising from the exercise of the same faculty when properly trained by a spiritual preceptor and instructed in the Vedanta. The purpose of such instruction is to give reason some genuine material to work upon and not go round in a circle of formal consistency. But the proper exercise of Reason the Rishis attained perfect Self-knowledge, and they have communicated to us their knowledge through Vedanta. This knowledge being knowledge of the perfect Brahman is eternal, and if our reason works on such material it cannot go wrong. The conclusions of the Rishis are of the nature of axioms or self-evident truths and they are immanent in reason itself.

If they were not thus immanent, Brahman being devoid of characteristic marks, it would follow that knowledge of the real is completely impossible. No such fears need trouble us, however. The knowledge of the real is present in the knowledge of every object of experience; only it is present there along with so much impurity created by avidya (ignorance), and what the study of the Vedanta helps us to do is to remove this impurity. The real is present in everything. But if each thing is taken to be real in itself, we fall into error, being deluded by ignorance. The things themselves if⁷⁴ properly known, reveal themselves as appearances of the One. When avidya is removed and proper apprehension comes in Brahman is seen to be self-evident. It requires no demonstration, no inference through characteristic marks. The study of the Vedanta has for its objects the creation of right knowledge; but to this end it does not do away with reason, for such knowledge is immanent in reason.

To the man who knows Brahman, there can be no re-birth, for birth and death to him are but illusory. Final liberation, therefore, can be attained only by the knowledge of Brahman. If the Scriptures say liberation can be attained by works, then so far they

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are wrong and we shall have to interpret them in such a way that they do not appear wrong. We shall have to say that part of the Scriptural teaching is intended only for the unenlightened. For, if and so far as the Scriptures merely contradict experience, they cannot be ultimately true. That 'fire is hot' is a matter of experience; and if Scriptures say that 'fire is cold' so much the worse for them, unless we can reinterpret the saying successfully so as to save them. In the same way, it is a matter of experience that if the causal chain of act and result be taken as ultimate, the chain cannot be abruptly snapped at any stage. You can get out of it only if you have sufficient ground to think that the causal chain is not ultimate. But it is absurd for you to say, "if I go on acting, I am sure the chain will come to an end sometime and I shall be liberated." This kind of belief is suited only to people of dull intellect whose only conception of liberation is, perhaps, enjoyment in another life. For those to whom life itself is misery the only way of salvation is knowledge which will help us to regard the⁷⁵ causal chain as illusory. A thousand texts cannot prove that fire is cold; nor can they prove that an ultimate causal chain can ever come to an end.

You may ask at this stage, if we refuse to admit the authority of Scripture in some matters, on what grounds do we accept that authority in the case of Brahman? Because, we reply, in the case of knowledge within experience, there is possibility of scriptural statements being contradicted, as avidya is not yet removed. But in the case of Brahman, when there is no avidya, the possibility of contradiction cannot arise. In other words, knowledge of finite things is always conditional on a region of avidya or ignorance. But Brahman by its perfection *ex hypothesi* excludes the possibility of avidya in the knowledge of itself. Knowledge of Brahman is not dependent on an Other. Hence the Scriptures may be taken as authoritative in the case of Brahman.

Perhaps we can now see why reason as such is not adequate to the knowledge of Brahman. This knowledge is that which leads to final liberation. He who knows Brahman is Brahman. But Brahman is not reason alone, it is other aspects of experience as well. Complete knowledge of Brahman would therefore mean a self-transparency of all elements of experience, reason being included as one element. If knowledge means this, then reason is certainly inadequate for such knowledge; it has to be "corrected" as Bradley says by other aspects of experience. The Rishis who realised Brahman attained complete knowledge, not ratiocinative knowledge alone; and this complete knowledge they have transmitted to us, poorer mortals, as the Vedanta, with which we have to supplement mere reason.

It⁷⁶ will be seen from the foregoing account that it is fairly difficult to substantiate a charge of irrationalism against Sankar. It may, however, be urged that

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the doctrine we have just expounded is the one which is criticised as irrationalistic and that the charge is based on a full knowledge of Sankara's doctrine and not merely on isolated passages from the Sutras. It is at this stage that a comparison with Bradleianism is likely to prove fruitful.

Let us see what he has to say about the function and value of thought. Thought is ideal, he says, not real as such, since it is in the relational form. It is an attempt to hold apart separated aspects of experience, the content from the form, the that from the what, and yet somehow to understand them in relation. Thought involves another distinction over and above this, viz. the distinction of the knower from the known. In so far as genuine knowledge increased, this contrast is bound to decrease. But with the vanishing of separation and the birth of sympathetic insight, we become increasingly one with absolute experience and rise beyond the level of merely discursive thought. Thought as such can not attain to the absolute, but the latter is the fulfilment of the former; for the absolute is not one thing standing over against another, but the only real which includes all things harmoniously within itself.

The object of thought is the attainment of truth, and this it succeeds in attaining according as it is more or less faithful to reality, i.e. according as it is more or less harmonious. There are then degrees of truth. The recognition of such degrees would be purposeless, if in the end thoughts should be incapable of giving us knowledge of the real. This⁷⁷ is not Bradley's view. Thought no doubt falls short of reality, but this is not to confess thought's absolute bankruptcy. It is usually believed that there are only two alternatives—either thought is adequate to the comprehension of reality or it is hopelessly inadequate. The possibility of a *via media* is not recognised. This is a mistake. Reality is supra relational; it is not, however, irrational.

Bradley distinguishes between conditional and unconditional truth. The former relates to individual things, the latter to the absolute. Since, however, even the latter is not co-eval with the absolute, it also would be liable to supplementation and correction. Yes, says Bradley, but there is still a valid distinction between conditional and unconditional truth; for the former is intellectually corrigible whereas the latter is not. If we say 'cows are white', it would be a conditional truth since further knowledge based on judgments 'cows are black, brown, etc.' will increase our present knowledge. In the case of the absolute there is nothing outside to be known, nor is there any superior faculty of knowledge where with it may be known. This unconditional truth is not liable to intellectual supplementation.

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May not the theory of the absolute be itself a conditional truth, and as such liable to be upset by increasing knowledge? No doubt, but our knowledge of the general nature of reality that it is absolute experience will not be upset. For our knowledge of particulars may always be modified by knowledge of other particulars related to them; but for reality there can be no Other beyond itself. The finite is always passing beyond itself, but there is nothing which the infinite can pass into; if it did so pass it would not be infinite. With increasing knowledge, we may be able to comprehend more⁷⁸ and more fully the internal structure of the absolute. But no increase of knowledge could upset our conclusion as to the systematic or consistent nature of the real, as such knowledge would defeat itself. Self-contradiction would become the ideal of knowledge, which is absurd.

In comparing the two philosophers, we would draw special attention to this treatment of unconditional truth. Bradley's treatment is closely parallel to Sankara's argument noticed earlier about the non-existence of avidya in Brahman. Knowledge about Brahman cannot but be true fully and finally; for, *ex hypothesi*, it is all that is, and our knowledge of that is not likely to be upset by further knowledge. Knowledge of the absolute is unconditional, says Bradley, for the absolute is its own Other. The parallelism thus clearly exhibited points to a substantial identity of thought between critical idealism at least of Bradleian variety and Sankara's Advaitism. If the one is irrationalistic, so must the other also be; and irrationalism need no longer be levelled as a special charge against eastern or Indian speculation.

The two philosophers agree on the inadequacy of reason or thought. Both make a distinction between knowledge which can be within our experience and knowledge beyond that experience. Both believe that the absolute truth as merely truth has to be supplemented before it can be full knowledge of the absolute. We would only point out that the similarity is in the defects as well as in the merits. Sankara conceives reason as just that faculty which syllogises. That this faculty is itself condemned by reason and that reason must therefore be more than this⁷⁹ is an objection to his theory which he himself recognises but does not answer. The parallel assumption of Bradley's is that thought is merely discursive, that as thought it is inadequate to the full comprehension of Reality. The difficulty with him is the same. If thought is really inadequate, how can we think of its inadequacy? Bradley is conscious of this; that is why he sometimes identifies truth and reality. But he very soon wakes up to the requirements of consistency and treats truth as an appearance. If we should be asked whether these inconsistencies should not discredit the two systems, we reply in the negative. In speaking of the absolute and knowledge of the absolute, it is difficult to avoid slight

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inconsistencies; for whatever thought is, speaking or writing is certainly in the relational form. We have to make hard and fast distinctions and stick to them, so far as we can, though such distinctions have no claim to be, in the end, real. The preservation of such distinctions may give an appearance of inconsistency, but their abolition may lead to intolerable confusion. It is well to keep the distinctions, so long as we can get behind them to the genuine thought implied.

We have so far tried to show that reason is never discarded by the Vedantin, that it is used as a means to complete knowledge, though complete knowledge can never as such be merely rational. Reason is not sublated, but attains its fruition in complete knowledge though it, as such, is not present therein. We have also tried to show the similarity between the Bradleian conception of thought and the Vedantic conception of reason, a similarity which extended both to the merits and defects of their doctrines. Such a similarity should make us pause⁸⁰ before we can accept as final a fundamental divergence of method as there seems to be between the two systems. We shall, therefore, inquire a little more in detail what Bradley's method is.

Why Bradley should call his method ideal experiment we do not know. In its essence, it is not different from the experiments of the scientist. Certain facts are observed and their tendencies noted, and in the end a law or formula is made to explain the facts. Even when the scientist is experimenting with concrete things, his experiment is not confined to those things; his mind is working on all their known attributes, trying to make out some intelligible relation among them. It can not be said, therefore, that Bradleys experiment is ideal as he experiments with ideas, whereas the scientist experiments with things, for the latter too experiments with ideas. Perhaps Bradley used 'ideal' only to explicate what he means by experiment; he may not mean to distinguish ideal experiment from other kinds of experiments.

Let us now look at what we know of the Bradleian absolute. The absolute is individual, it includes appearances and is present in appearance in various degrees. It can be shown with little or no difficulty that all these results flow from or are different ways of expressing the one fundamental truth—reality cannot be self-contradictory. To say that it cannot contradict itself is to say that there can be nothing to make it self-discrepant from without or within; to say, in other words that it is inclusive and harmonious or that it is individual. It follows from this that appearances cannot be outside of reality, and since appearances as such are more or less self-discrepant, it also follows that they⁸¹ cannot all as such be real. They must be transformed and in varying degrees. Our conclusions about the absolute, therefore, are in the main exhibitions of

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the same principle one may almost say 'deductions' from the principle. We shall not, however, use the term deduce, as this has purely formal syllogistic significance, and our knowledge of the absolute, whatever else it is, is not syllogistic for, to say the least, from one premise you cannot have a syllogism. Granted, then, that reality cannot be self-contradictory, we can without further trouble know all that we can know about reality.

We contend that this principle which has to be taken for granted is of the nature of an axiom. We cannot have this principle given to us through the examination of experience. We cannot say, for instance, that on examining any piece of thinking it is found to be not self-contradictory and that therefore, reality cannot be conceived to be self-contradictory. No doubt, we find it exemplified in experience that what contradicts itself destroys itself and can be neither permanent nor real. But we do not get our principle from observation of cases and generalisation from these. The principle is presupposed in our very observation. We could not observe or think to any purpose if we had not this principle ingrained in our being. It is, no doubt known in experience, but it is not known from experience as, for instance, the truth that water is H₂O is known. Indeed, it may be said, if we had to generalise from experience, it is possible to conceive reality as being self-contradictory, for we do find contradiction within our own experience. The one reason why we look beyond these contradictions is that we know already that contradictions cannot⁸² be ultimate, that reality cannot be self-contradictory. This principle is self-evident; it is not known by experiment, ideal or otherwise, but is the indispensable presupposition of any experiment; in short, it is an axiom. And it is this axiom which is at the root of Bradley's doctrine of reality.

We do not see any reason why Bradley should fight shy of this conclusion. When his critics object that the absolute is deduced from an axiom, the best reply would be to take the bull by the horns and ask, "What if?" An axiom is a self-evident principle and it could not be self-evident if it belied experience. This being so, what objection could there be to conclusions deduced from such a principle? Such critics somehow conceive the realm of logic as lying outside the realm of experience; conclusions logically coherent may nevertheless prove inadequate to experience. Life is more than logic; our experience as James used to say, overflows and surrounds our miserable categories. This conclusion may to a certain extent, be true; it is possible to have formal consistency without truth. But that, in the end logic can be true to itself without being true to experience is inconceivable. Formal consistency, is after all, not the end and aim of logic, any more than such consistency is the ideal of thinking. The end of one as of the other is truth, which is more than absence of contradiction. If Bradley had for his criterion of the real, the principle of formal consistency, and evolved a system of metaphysics therefrom, the critics would be justified in their attacks. But this is not his criterion. The principle of coherence or the impossibility of contradiction

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is different from that of formal consistency. Any conclusion which⁸³ is only formally consistent is intellectually corrigible; one which is coherent is perfect so far as intellect can be perfect, i.e. perfect enough for metaphysics. The better course, then for Bradley or the Bradleian is to show how the axiom which Bradley does start from is a quite satisfactory principle, if fact, the only principle from which any one could start. Such a course would disarm objectors more effectually than Bradley's defence of his method as ideal experiment.

This conclusion of ours about Bradley's method, that it does start from an axiom, helps us in two ways. First, the difference in method between Bradleianism and Vedantism looks much less than what it seemed. Bradley's axiom, it may be said, was conceived by the Indian Rishis in a slightly modified form, that Reality must be one. This axiom they elaborated in the Upanishads with a wealth of detail and illustration. One of the Rishis, Vyasa (or Badarayana), to lighten the task of memorising, wrote a compendium of Upanishadic teaching, and styled it the Vedanta Sutras. The task of Sankara was to expound the Sutras in consistency with the original teaching as elaborating the principle of identity. Reality is one. If the principle were construed as enouncing abstract identity, it would be absurd and in the end self-contradictory. Reality does not exclude, but includes appearances as illusory manifestations of itself. This doctrine is part of the Upanishadic teaching, but is fully expounded by Sankara as his doctrine of Maya (illusion). Bradley starts with the axiom of identity; the conclusion, in both cases is the same, the conception of reality as a concrete universal. Is it not evident from this that even in method there is a great similarity, not a divergence?

The⁸⁴ second way in which our conclusion about Bradley's method helps us is that it enables us the better to answer such criticisms of Bradley as those urged by Prof. Pringle-Pattison. It is said, for instance, that Bradley has no difficulty in swallowing at a gulp, in the case of the absolute, what he had found unintelligible in appearance. Identity, and difference, unity and diversity permanence and change, concepts the realisation of which Bradley could not understand, are by him said to be somehow reconciled in the absolute. If you can never know how, why not believe that the reconciliation happens somehow in the case of appearance?

The answer to this is plain. Reconciliation cannot be somehow in the finite, for the finite can show no principle of reconciliation. In the end, it can only leave conflicting elements side by side, not resolve them into a unity. And even if it did, its unity, being finite, is liable to disruption from without. We do not say the finite does not to our knowledge harmonise conflicting elements, but that, being finite, it cannot

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harmonise. The necessary condition is infinitude and unity and this we call the absolute. If the finite could be intelligible and it is only our intelligence that fails, our critics would be justified; but our contention is that the finite cannot be intelligible, and this has yet to be disproved.

What lends colour to such a criticism is the impression a casual reader may entertain that Bradley has discovered reality in a far-off land, a being that is free from the blemishes of our finite experience. If Bradley did really advance any such theory, it would be right to ask him why he should assume such a reality, which cannot fully explain⁸⁵ anything, a defect which it shares with appearance. But such is not Bradley's conclusion. The impression that it is his conclusion is very natural, because of his talk of ideal experiment. If a scientist condemned an existing hypothesis and advanced a new one on which things are still unintelligible, the new hypothesis would unhesitatingly have to be condemned also. But Bradley's conclusions do not belong to the realm of conditional truths like scientific hypothesis. They are absolutely true; they are not the result of experiment, but the presuppositions of experiment. They may not make things fully intelligible, but they may not be condemned because of that; because, condemning them, you condemn knowledge itself. There is nothing we have said here, which Bradley does not himself say somewhere or other. And even in using the term "experiment" we are sure he meant right, that he meant a process which would exhibit its own presuppositions clearly. But in view of the current misconceptions about deduction, induction, experiment etc., we wish he had not talked of his method as experimental at all.

It may still be said that after all Sankara is not content with intellectual demonstrations and to that extent he is irrationalistic. If Sankara does really believe in reason why should he bother to appeal to Scriptures at all? A question like this ignores the historic setting of Sankara's teaching. Anti-idealistic theories were rampant in his days, and these theories based themselves sometimes on scriptural authority and at other times on appeals to reason. In the latter respect they are comparable to the "rationalistic" theories of to-day. A system like the Sankhya for instance, based itself both on reason and the Scriptures. In refuting the system one should not content oneself with merely cutting⁸⁶ away one foot but should seek to disable the adversary permanently. Hence the appeal to the scriptures. But would not a mere appeal to reason be good enough for wise men? Perhaps so; but the Vedanta, though understood only of the few, is not intended for the benefit only of the elect. The masses may not see the right path clearly yet, but they should at least be guarded from going wrong.

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This historical justification is not fully convincing to some. In so far as there is any appeal to Scriptures at all, Sankara's work seems in their eyes to lack philosophic value. Our answer to this is that the objection would be fully valid if Sankara juggled with the two appeals making up deficiencies in logic by scriptural authority. This, however, he cannot be charged with. The conclusions of reason are reinforced by reference to scriptural authority; the one does not seek to take the place of another. I have Mr Bradley's authority for saying that, in his opinion at least, such an appeal, whose aim is not substitution but supplementation, will not be out of place in the mouth of a philosopher. So that even on this last point there seems to be little difference between western critical idealism of the Bradleian variety and the Advaita Vedanta. This agreement in method can be brought out far more clearly in the light of some far more interesting analogies in the conclusions of the two systems. The Bradleian theory of judgment and the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality find very close parallels; but these do not come within the scope of this paper.

"Einstein's⁸⁷ Theories of Relativity etc" by R.N. Mirza. In Mysore University Magazine

1. Space and time have always been considered as two separate absolute entities, but the speculative genius of Einstein came to a different conclusion. He saw that the cause of the phenomenon of the constancy of light for all observers is due to the fact that space and time are not two separate absolute entities, and that all statements or understanding of time as used in describing any physical process have relative significance, that is, the conception of the flow or passage of time described by observers who are in motion with regard to each other will be different. In what way different? Will there be any link any correcting fact to find out this relative difference? The reply is to be sought in the "event" that the velocity of light is constant for all observers. By obtaining the equation showing the constancy of light for all observers we can deduce definite mathematical relations linking the intervals of time and spaces of different observers.

If once this fundamental revelation is grasped, the subsequent deductions are easily understood. Consider, for example, a pole 100 ft. long fixed in an open plain. As we go further and further away from the pole, it appears to get shorter and shorter, but the event, that is the 100 ft. length of the pole does not alter. Suppose that we did not know anything about the length of the pole and were seeing it from a distance, of say, half a mile. We should instinctively apply a correction factor and approximately arrive at the true height of the pole.

Similarly, two human observers standing side⁸⁸ by side and then moving away from each other will see the other diminishing in height. We do not, however, call in question this property of space which makes things appear smaller at a distance.

2. All this sounds bewildering, because of our conception of time and space. Space and time are not immediate sense perceptions. Because we perceive matter, we think of space and because we see one event following another we realise the sensation of time. Space and time are the products of our brain (like right and left, up and down, backwards and forwards), and while they are very useful in our every day life, these practical conceptions interfere with our viewing the Universe as a whole. We can say, might not the conception of space and time depend on our spatial-temporal state of mind? Why should not this state be disturbed by our change of position in space with respect to time although we may not be aware of the same? Other kind of evidence is also forthcoming to show that the time scale does not remain constant.

3. We had obtained from the fact that the velocity of light has the same measured value relative to every observer approaching towards, or receding from, a source of light, the consequence that space and time are inter-linked in a definite manner and that the relationship can be stated in a definite algebraic functional form. That functional form shows that the intervals of space and time cannot be considered "absolute" since they are dependent on each other. Thus for example, the two directions which we call right and left or backwards and forwards have each no separate existence independent of the other, and are interchangeable when we turn round the other side, or to be precise, when we move through two right angles. Even⁸⁹ so a little consideration makes us realise that there can be no "where" without "when" nor "when" without "where". No one has observed a time except at a certain place and a place except at a certain time. The "when" represents time and the "where" fixes the position in space. Because we perceive matter, we think of space; and because we see one event following another, we realise the sensation of time. Space and time have been actually invented by our brain to locate specific parts of happenings occurring every day and all round us. Would anything like time exist if all matter in the Universe lay dead and exhibited no motion whatsoever? Could space exist if it contained nothing? And in what sense, as it is not possible to reproduce the past, it is not also possible to reproduce space once gone over in the Universe. Thus the reader is asked to consider space and time as forming one indissoluble union and to exist as one continuum. In fact, some considerable period before Einstein and Minkowski, other philosophers had also pointed out that Newton's assertions of "absolute time" and "absolute space" are respectively that which "of its own inherent properties flows equably without regard to anything external", and that which "without regard to anything external is immovable and remains for ever the

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same", did not agree with certain facts arising in nature. We have now to free ourselves from this conception of time gliding along uniformly and eternally like a stream, and of space existing eternally as always the same and immovable. We have now to accept space and time as two convenient divisions of one indissoluble union.

The Fourth Dimension and the Four Space: In the above paragraph we realised the need for linking space into time. That is to say, to our customary method of measuring the ordinary space by means of⁹⁰ the three dimensions:—

"Right and Left" i.e. Length denoted by the symbol x , "Backwards and Forwards" i.e. Breadth denoted by the symbol y , "Up and Down" i.e. Height, denoted by the symbol z , we must now add, to complete the information, the reply to the query, "Prior or Later" i.e. Time denoted by the symbol t .

All these four combine to form one indissoluble union, namely, the world of four space. Through this world of fourspace our consciousness travels recognising at ever changing three-dimensional cross section of it as it goes in which the position at a particular moment is a three-dimensional cross section of the entire "space".

The Problem of Change in the Light of Bergson by K.H. Raja Rao (in Mysore University Magazine)

1. The Problem of change is not new in the history of thought. Ever since the days of Upanishadic seers and Buddhistic scholars in the East, of Parmenides and Heraclitus in the West, the open conflict between the static and the dynamic nature of Reality has continued to exist with all its vigour and freshness.

2. Such is the case with Bergson, who, with a masterly richness of imagery and a psychological delicateness of analysis, seeks to explain the nature of reality in terms of Change. But his critics point out clearly, if not equally poetically, that change cannot be ultimate; as Alexander Mair puts it, "change cannot be the last word in our characterization of Reality" Accepting the fact of change the critics ask, What is it that changes? And Bradley remarks without hesitation "Change, it is evident, must be change of something..." "There is a permanent in the perception in⁹¹ the perception of change, which goes right through the succession and holds it together."

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3. "We know that everything changes, but it is mere words... The greatest difficulties of philosophy are due to not taking account of the fact that Change and Movement are universal. It is not enough to say that everything changes and moves – we must believe it." Change is real immobility is only apparent. In fact, the alleged immobility is merely relative, being a relation between movements. Thus the passengers of two trains which run in the same direction on parallel lines at the same speed, will regard the trains as motionless, while observing the train opposite to them. Again, language may equally mislead us; thus we speak of "state of things" and what is a state but an appearance which change assumes to a being, who, himself, changes in equal proportion? The man, stretched on the grass a summer-day, looks around him and feels no change; everything is at rest. But the grass is growing, the leaves of the trees are developing or decaying; the man is himself growing older all the time. As Bergson has it, "Change, then, is simple, while the 'state of things' as we call it, is composite. Every stable state is the result of the coexistence between that change and the change of the person who perceives it".

In order to think change and to perceive change, man must do away with conventions, artificial and natural, the products of his speculative thought and the products of his common-sense. The Buddhistic thinkers of the past, it is strange to note, brought a similar restriction for a clear perception of change. The Truth of Santana (procession of change) consists in Kalpanapodhatva, in being divested of fancied elements. True perception of change is⁹² blind to the individual's convenient fictions; the individual may think that he bathes twice in the same river Ganga but it is a fiction, for where is the same river, while water is continually flowing, while the course itself is continually shifting?

4. Pure perception and pure memory point out clearly the indivisibility of change. The movement of my hand from A to B is not divisible; true, it may stop anywhere in AB but if it stops, there is no movement from A to B. The foot-ball, when kicked near the post, rises in one bound and touches the centre of the field but is there such a movement if it stops in the air? Bergson shows the point where one is apt to be misled. He says, "As the path is in space, the space is infinitely divisible, we picture to ourselves the movement itself as infinitely divisible. We like to imagine it thus, because, in a movement it is not the change of position which interests us, it is the positions themselves which the moving object has left, which it will take up, which it might assume if it were to stop in its course. We have need of immobility, and the more we succeed in presenting to ourselves the movement as coinciding with the space which it traverses, the better we think we understand it. Really, there is no true immobility, if we imply by that an absence of movement." This divisibility is certainly necessary for practical purposes but it must not be constructed as the absolute Reality. We create

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fictitious states and seek to compose movement out of them, endeavouring thus to make a process coincide with a thing, a mobility with an immobility. The famous puzzles of Zeno illustrate the error we commit, for “they all consist in applying the movement to the line traversed, and supposing that what is true⁹³ of the line is true of the movement.” Hence he concludes, “Every attempt to reconstitute change out of states implies the absurd proposition, that movement is made of immobilities.”

5. Even our modern conception of time is false. Coming from the physical sciences as it does, the conception is spatial in character. What is more, time to us is homogeneous and unlimited, an inevitable corollary of the conception. Bergson says, “Time, conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space, haunting the reflective consciousness.”

The true, living, concrete Time, and not the mathematical, spatial falsity masquerading as time, is called by Bergson as la duree. La duree is heterogeneous in character; it implies a flow or ‘stream’ of consciousness, a qualitative multiplicity of conscious states that interpenetrate one another. “Pure Duration” he says, “is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. (It)... forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another... We perceive them (the different notes) in one another, and....their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected.”

The error of conceiving change as divisible is extended by us even to the conception of time. But it is only such a hybrid conception of false time that is susceptible to measurement. As he puts it, “Real Duration is just what has always been called Time, but it is Time perceived as indivisible. Such a time cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only by⁹⁴ conscious beings, for “it is the very stuff of which life and consciousness are made.” La duree, then is “wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another.” This qualitative nature of time is clearly brought out by Bergson in a number of picturesque similes. “When we hear a series of blows of a hammer” he writes, “the sounds form an indivisible melody in so far as they are pure sensations, and here again give rise to a dynamic progress; but, knowing that the same objective cause is at work, we cut up this progress into phases which then regard as identical; and this multiplicity of elements no longer being conceivable except by being set out in space—since they have now become identical—we are, necessarily, led to the idea of a homogeneous Time, the symbolical

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image of La Duree." A similar case is found when the inattentive ear hears the strokes of the neighbouring clock.

A consideration of la duree implies the distinction of two selves, the fundamental and the social, the real and the external. A deep introspection leads us to grasp the truth of constant becoming, of the indivisible la duree. But such movements are rare; we live outside ourselves, perceiving the ghost of us, the colourless shadow which is but the social representation of the real and largely concealed Ego; we are thus 'acted' and we do not 'act' ourselves.

Such an 'acting' Ego changes for ever and ever; and in changing alone does it endure.

6. Bergson proceeds to portray the nature of the 'acting' ego, which perceives everything in terms of change. He says, that the Self is free, undetermined by anything felt or known. The bonds of grim necessity, the meshes of merciless fate, and indeed, the play of the so-called⁹⁵ conscious states, feelings, and sensations—all these physiological and psychological snares would only give us a phantom self, the shadow of the Ego. Thus Bergson discards the physical and psychical determinism. Self alone can determine itself.

7. The reason for our failure to grasp the reality of this perpetual change is the limitation of our intellect. As Bergson himself asserts emphatically, "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life" It seeks to rest in convenient abodes, the abodes that are static, stable, solid. And, "the function of intellect is to preside over actions.", and hence our mind always perceives things in the same order in which we are accustomed to picture them when we propose to act on them...Our action proceeds thus from 'nothing' to 'something' and its very essence is to embroider 'something' on the canvas of 'nothing' ".

This activity consists in taking snapshots, as it were, of the ever-passing Reality, in producing successive but static photographs of the Eternal Change. Hence "the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind" and further, "the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them," for our activity goes from an arrangement of things to a re-arrangement, like the pictures of the glass pieces in a kaleidoscope after every shake.

8. Bergson's poetry fails to strike home, because of inherent weakness of positing change without that which changes, of positing activity without that which acts. To him, "to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly;" and he asks, "Should the same be said of existence in general?" In change,

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“We live and move and⁹⁶ have our being.” It is no wonder if he has realised his own error,—or rather, his own insistence on change which the critics have taken to be an error. Hence it is that he justifies his position. He writes, “There are changes, but there are not things that change; change does not need a support. There are movements, but there are not, necessarily, constant objects which are moved; movement does not imply something that is movable.”

This is to ignore logic and self-consistency. Bradley rightly says, “How anything can possibly be anything else was a question which defied our efforts. Change is little beyond an instance of this dilemma in principle. It either adds an irrelevant complication or confuses itself in a blind attempt at compromise.”

9. Bergson's argument would amount to this: that we posit a thing that changes, first by the mistaken notion of divisibility of time and next by the wrong way of looking at change, by looking at change in terms of space. Regarding the so-called indivisibility of time, suffice it to say that it is a contradiction in terms, for time to exist must be divisible and ‘pure’ time which is one is a speculative phantom.

10. Alexander Mair is right when he writes that ‘pure’ change “is something which cannot be experienced. There must be points of reference—a starting point and an ending point at least. Pure Change, as is the way with ‘pure’ anything turns into its contradictory. Paradoxical though it may seem, it ends as static. It becomes the One and Indivisible.”

Bergson would have at least been logical, if he had denied the reality of time. Buddhists for instance, in their *Kshana bhanga vada* or the Doctrine of Momentariness, said that change occurred every moment; nothing lasts more than a moment.⁹⁷ Thus the burning of a lamp flame is continually changing. The seed sprouts, puts on tender leaves, grows to a big tree; it flowers and fruits. Thus there is a procession of momentary states. But Bergson wants change in a *la duree*, the indivisible and non-spatial time.

The Buddhist cleverly argues that an enduring element is not wanted for succession. He says that the changing object XA_i becomes under certain conditions XA_{ii} , XA_{iii} , XA_{iv} ad infinitum; if A_i change into A_{ii} , A_{iii} and A_{iv} , X the so-called common element is superfluous; it is only a conventional adjunct of A_i , A_{ii} , A_{iii} and A_{iv} . Or, if XA_i becomes under the same conditions XiA_{ii} , $XiiA_{iii}$, ad infinitum, there is no common or enduring element at all; X and A both change. In either way, there cannot be a permanent thing which changes. This symbolical dilemma is rebutted by

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the other schools of Indian thought, which say that if there is no enduring object, we have no right to posit XAi itself, which is said to 'become' XAii or XiAii. As Swami Vivekananda says, in his 'Raja Yoga' "Motion can only be perceived when there is something else which is not moving. Logic compels you to stop somewhere. You must complete the series (of things relatively moving as fastest, faster, fast, slow, slower, slowest etc) by knowing something which never changes. Behind this never-ending chain of motion, is the Purusa, the Changeless."

To pass on from this jugglery to Bergson's conception of change, little need be said again. Bradley drags the problem of change to the field of appearance. In his words, "The problem of change defies solution, so long as change is not degraded to the rank of mere appearance." "This creation is a monster. It is not a working fiction, entertained for the sake of its work. For, like most other monsters, it really is⁹⁸ impotent. It is both idle and injurious, since it has diverted attention for the answer to its problem", Bradley well concludes: "There is a permanent in the perception of change which goes right through the succession and holds it together. The permanent can do this, on the one hand, because it occupies duration and is, in its essence, divisible indefinitely. On the other hand, it is one and unchanging, so far as it is regarded or felt, and is used, from that aspect.

The Place of the Indian Attitude in the World Civilization by H.G. Ramaiya in Mysore University Magazine

1. India to-day is assimilating vigorously science and scientific method. People imagine that the Indian temperament is something philosophic, full of abstraction and dreaminess. It is that; but also watching India to-day one must not that in spite of that subjective temperament there is sufficient objective capacity to bring out of the Indian people not only scientists, mathematicians and politicians, but also commercial magnates. The Indian will soon compete in everything with the rest of the world, but he will always have the specific characteristics of his nation.

2. It is absolutely different in India. The Indian works with the idea; he must see the idea clearly. And if in his mind there is any vagueness in the idea, the application of it is not easy for him. And that is just his trouble to-day with regard to the present reforms. All the difficulties and discussions are due to the fact that the Indian sees in the Reforms Bill all kinds of functions which he does not clearly conceive. It is one of the most striking characteristics of the Indian temperament that it tries to see clearly into everything before it plunges into action.

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3. The⁹⁹ Indian, in other words, is “subjective” He certainly can see things from the standpoint of the outer world of action, with the vision of one utterly immersed in it but he prefers to act from inner and fundamental principles.

4. All the time, then, that is left over from the struggle for bread and butter, is for relaxation. There is no idea that, if you have any leisure, you might as well try to understand life. That is the Indian attitude. The Indian too wants leisure; he engages in business, he tried to make a fortune, but all the time, life is not for an aesthetic gratification through travel or games, but for a discovery which will bring him to the centre of things. Subconsciously, all the time, the Indian temperament is trying to come to the centre, for unless the problem of life is seen fully and clearly, a satisfactory life is not possible for him. Hence the Indian attitude, which expresses itself in its typical forms of drama, literature, philosophy and now, to-day, in politics.

5. The Indian must first have certain great ideas; he must make the inner world of himself clear to himself, before he can go forth and act. Of the civilisations in the West to-day which emphasise the value of thought first, before action, the French is foremost. With the French, lucidity of thought gives a new insight into life. The French care for clear thought, and they try to come to an intellectual centre with regard to the problems of life. Now it is not a mere intellectual centre but a spiritual which the Indian wants to realise, for life here below has to him some kind of relation to the greater life of the Cosmos. Nothing is for him right unless he can fit his life into that great purpose. Hence the Indian spirit consciously or unconsciously seeks the centre.

Paralogisms¹⁰⁰ of Pure Reason - Kant & Sankara by S. Thirumalai in Mysore University Magazine

1. The critique of Rational Psychology receives with Kant the title, “On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” because it is to be shown that the main principles of that science rests upon as many paralogisms. The aim of Rational Psychology is to penetrate to the source of consciousness. It endeavours to ascertain the inner constitution of the subject of the psychical states and to discover the relations subsisting between the subject and the object.

2. All the categories presuppose the unity of self-consciousness and this unity is presupposed in all experience. This unity is not a specific conception like substance and causality but is only a formal and general idea of the unity of consciousness. Rational

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Psychology endeavours to build up the doctrine of the soul upon the single proposition "I think". If it is to be rational it should exclude all empirical elements. Since the continuous unity of consciousness is essentially presupposed in all experience, the Rational Psychologists supposed that the thinking subject is independent of experience and that its nature can be determined purely by a consideration of it as self-consciousness.

3. Kant says that Rational Psychology rests upon an illusion and falls into four parallogisms corresponding to the above four propositions. A parallogism arises out of reason confusing its own idea of an absolutely complete subject with a real object corresponding to that idea. All the inferences of Rational Psychologists assume that the thinking subject can be determined as an object by the application of categories to it. From the unity of self¹⁰¹-consciousness which is the general form of the activity of consciousness, the existence of a non-composite substance is inferred. A substance is inferred from the synthesis. The transcendental self-consciousnesses, or pure ego, which accompanies and connects my representations and the subject of all my judgements, is the presupposition of all my experience. But as such it can never become an object of knowledge. It is a simple empty idea. As a subject of all experience it can never become an object to which the categories can be applied. What it is by itself cannot possibly be known because it is never given apart from experience. To know myself as an object, I must perceive it and this perception presupposes self-consciousness. So the consciousness of myself as a determining subject does not yield the consciousness of myself as an object. Our eyes cannot see themselves. Therefore Rational Psychology must be a failure. The unity of self-consciousness only shows that so long as there is consciousness of objects there is consciousness of self. Any Rational Psychology inferring from this that there is a permanent indestructible thinking substance must be wrong.

In truth, Rational Psychology is in fundamental contradiction with the principles of knowledge. It assumes that we can show a priori that all thinking beings are simple substances. The claim of Rational Psychology rests upon the ambiguity of the middle term and therefore upon a quaternio terminorum.

Major Premise—That which can be thought of only as subject must exist as subject and the therefore substance.

Minor Premise.—A thinking being from its very nature can be thought of only as subject. Conclusion—Therefore, a thinking being can exist¹⁰² only as subject, that is, as substance.

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Here while the subject in the major premise means both the thinking subject and an independent subject or substance, it means only a pure thinking subject in the minor premise. Moreover it is assumed that, while the self can only be thought of as subject, never as object, it can exist independently of every object.

To sum up, the claim of Rational Psychology to rank as a science must be denied to it since that claim is based upon a misunderstanding. "The unity of consciousness" says Kant, "which is the supreme unity of the categories, is simply confused with the perception of the subject as object, and hence it is supposed that the category of substance can be legitimately applied to the thinking subject." The thinking subject cannot be determined by the categories. It knows the categories but it does not know itself thro' the categories. Thus the illusion under which Rational Psychology is labouring is obvious. It falsely assumes that we can be conscious of our own existence apart from experience. It confuses the mere possibility of self-consciousness with the imaginary existence of a transcendental subject while we have in thought only the formal unity of self-consciousness presupposed in all experience.

The foregoing is Kant's criticism of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Even Sankara protests against the same likewise in his commentary of the Brahma Sutras.

4. By the primary or fundamental character of self-consciousness is meant that it is the basis of all other kinds of knowledge and therefore not dependent on any of them. As it is the self that perceived and reasons, its existence is logically prior to perception and¹⁰³ reasonings. The necessary and self-evident character of self-consciousness is also clear, and it cannot be expressed more clearly than in Sankara's own words, "it is not possible to deny such a reality, for it the very essence of him who would deny it." Descartes, the father of Modern European Philosophy, found himself capable, at the beginning of the course of philosophical reconstruction started by him, of doubting every thing, God and the whole world, but incapable of doubting his own self; for even the act of doubting it implies its existence. Doubt implies the doubter, and so Descartes expressed the fundamental and self-evident character of self-consciousness in the well-known proposition: "Cogito ergo sum." All objects of knowledge and thought appear related to us as known and thought of. It seems that in much of my knowing and thinking, I forget myself and that it is only in reflective moods that I am aware of myself as a knower and thinker. But this is really based on a misconception. It is indeed true that in unreflective moods, the proposition "I know, or "I think" is not distinctly before my mind but the fact of my being a subject is, in a more or less indistinct form, present to my mind in every act of knowing and thinking; for unless it were so, unless I know myself related as subject to every object known by me, I could not, after the act of knowing, bring myself into relation to it in my reflective mood. I can remember only that which I knew; I can recognise only that which I cognised. And so, if for instance, I

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had really forgotten myself when I heard yesterday's lecture, I could not now remember, as I actually do, that I did hear it. The very fact that I now remember myself as the hearer of the lecture shows that I knew myself then as its hearer. All knowledge, therefore, contains, either¹⁰⁴ explicitly or implicitly, self-knowledge, the knowledge of the self as the subject or the knower. This self-knowledge may be associated with various wrong notions about the nature of the self; but that does not make the fundamental knowledge of the self as the knowing principle any the less real. In ignorant minds the real nature of the self may be concealed, as it were, under various objects wrongly identified with it, as the real nature of the sword is hidden by the sheath that encloses it. But that does not invalidate the original atmapratyaya or self-consciousness that accompanies all these mistaken identifications. Vedantic philosophers have taken the trouble of enumerating the various gross and subtle objects with which, at successive stages of our spiritual progress, we identify the self, and have also taught us the way to discover the error of such ignorant identifications. At the lowest stage of spiritual progress, they say, we naturally identify the self with the gross body, the organism which is built up with our food. This they call annamaya Kosha, the nutrimental or material sheath. At the next higher stage, we identify the self with the vital principle, the principle that lies at the root of our respiration, digestion, etc. They call this Pranamaya Kosha or the vital sheath. At the 3rd stage, we consider our passing ideas and sensations or a conceived substratum of these as ourself. This they call Vignanamaya Kosha, the intellectual sheath. At the fifth and last stage we identify the self with the pleasurable emotions. This is called Anandamaya Kosha, the beatific sheath. At each higher stage, we identify the self with a subtler and subtler object and ascribe to it a higher and higher function. And¹⁰⁵ each higher sheath, because subtler, is therefore a truer representation of the self than the lower. But as each of them is an object characterised by being known and is not self-knowing, none represents the true self, which is a self-knowing subject and not the object of knowledge. Though we identify self with others, yet we refer every piece of knowledge to a knowing principle constituting our very self.

The foregoing exposition clearly shows us that Sankara protests against the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the same sense as Kant. Is not Shankara himself while vehemently protesting against the paralogisms, committing the paralogism, when he talks of knowing Brahman? This question again leads us to rethink both Kant and Sankara in the aspect of their respective theories of perception. For Kant knowledge is not possible without a manifold, without categories of the understanding and forms of intuition, and it has been shown already how the self on his theory of knowledge

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cannot be known, for to know is to have percepts. The self is not perceived but is seen through the glasses of perception through the time form as a succession of states. But though the self cannot be known it can be thought. Indeed Kant's whole theory of knowledge is based on the thought of such an ego. Now let us turn to Sankara.

Sankara, in agreement with Kant, protests against the paralogsms of pure reason. But having said like Kant that the self cannot be proved to be a substance, he talks of knowing Atman or Brahman. How could we know that which cannot be perceived? This seems to be a contradiction. To understand whether this is really so, let us turn to his theory of perception. Vedanta Desikar in his Sree Bashya says, "Sankhya, Sangatha, Charvaka, Sankarath, Sandarodayaha". That is¹⁰⁶ to say, Sankara's philosophy is a product of the Sankhya philosophy, Sangatha or Madhyamika's philosophy of the Buddhist school, Charvaka philosophy and Sankara's own intelligence. Afterwards he says that he got his theory of perception from the Sankhyas, his theory of Maya from the doctrine of Sunya of the Buddhists, and the inadequacy of the Sruti and the ritual doctrines claiming as Pramanas to higher realities from the Charvakas; and the rest of his philosophy is the product of his own intelligence.

5. Sankara says, ignorant men transfer the qualities of the Vishaya to the empirical subject and the empirical subject thinks that he is the author of it. "As one is accustomed, when it goes ill or well with his son or wife, and the like, to say, "it goes ill or well with me" and thus transfers the qualities of the outer things to the Atman, in just the same way he transfers the qualities of the body when he says, "I am fat", "I am thin" etc. and similarly the qualities of the sense organs when he says, "I am blind, dumb", and similarly the qualities of the inner organ or manas, desire, wish and the like. Thus also he transfers the subject, presenting the 'I' to the inner soul, present solely as witness of the personal tendencies and conversely, the witness of all, the inner soul, to the inner organ and the rest." Thus the sould becomes an object of perception of the 'I', not a witness but the doer, that is, the individual sould endowed with objective qualities. These things are all done, according to Sankara, by unrealed sould, by the sould who have not reached the knowledge of Atman. "All empiric action is true, so long as the knowledge of the soul is not reached, just as the actions in dream, before awakening occurs. As long in fact¹⁰⁷ as the knowledge of unity with the true self is not reached, one has not a consciousness of the unreality of the procedure connected with standards and objects of knowledge and fruits of works, but every creature, under the designation of 'I' and 'mine' takes more transformations of the self and for the characteristics of the self, and on the other hand, leaves out of consideration their

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original Brahman—self-hood; therefore, before the consciousness of the identity of Brahman awakes, all worldly and Vedic actions are justified” and for Sankara these are not justified in the eyes of the released Soul.

Having said all this, Sankara, says that Atman is the only reality and it must be known. It has already been noted that Sankara, like Kant, said that we cannot know Brahman, for to know is to have percepts. What, then, does Sankara mean by saying that we should know Atman? How is it possible to know that which cannot be perceived? Does it not seem to be a contradiction? We shall examine this closely.

As we have said, for Sankara Atman is the only reality. The world is Maya. So we shall see what will be the nature of the released soul. For a released soul the only reality is Atman. For him the means of knowledge, perception and the ritual books of doctrine are limited to the province of ignorance. “Because without delusion that the ‘I’ and the ‘mine’ consist in the body, sense organs and the like no knower can exist and consequently a use of the means of knowledge is not possible. For without calling in the aid of sense organs is not possible without transferring the being of the self to the body, and without all this taking place, no knowledge is possible for the soul, which is independent of embodied existence. But without the action of knowing, no knowing¹⁰⁸ is possible. Consequently, the means of knowledge, perception and the best belong to the province of ignorance.” So in as much as there is no scope for a released soul to perceive or act, there is no empirical ego and Buddhi is unreal. The Naisargika Adhyasa (the inborn transference of Vishaya and Vishayin) is not possible in his case. Since Atman is the only reality for him, it can never become an object. It is knowledge and not knowing. The whole tenet of Sankara is to negate this world of Maya and thus negate this empirical ego. The aim of Vedanta, according to Sankara, is to clear men of ignorance.

In what sense, then, does Sankara say that Atman can be known? For Kant the only channel of knowledge is perception. For him the soul cannot be perceived, and so he says that it cannot be known. He postulates it as thinkable on ethical grounds. But for Sankara, there is another channel of knowledge, namely Intuition. He says Atman can be known by Intuition. It is according to him, the nearest and the most exactly apprehended reality. If Sankara had said that it can be known intellectually, how would he have committed the paralogism; but he, with Kant, says it is impossible to know Atman intellectually. It is even absurd to say that it can be known intellectually or by perception, for, according to Sankara, there is no other reality to which Atman can be the object.

To sum up, Sankara says that in the Vyavaharika world of ignorant men are justified in transferring the qualities of the object to the subject. He also says that for them the soul is an object of perception in as much as they transfer the qualities of

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another to it. In this sense the unreleased souls are committing the¹⁰⁹ paralogsms of pure reason. We can even grant that Sankara, before he knew the real nature of Atman, must have committed paralogsms of pure reason. But the whole of Sankara's philosophy is an emphatic protest against this avidya, and, in fact, his whole philosophy is a means to be free from this avidya. The Sankara of the commentary on Braharasutra of Sree Bashya, and the Sankara of Advaita philosophy cannot in the nature of things, commit the paralogsms of pure reason, for he is clear from the avidya haunting the unreleased souls. To attribute the charge of committing the paralogsms of pure reason to Sankara is due to ignorance of avidya, whose removal is the sole object of Sankara's philosophy.

Who Is Qualified To Study The Vedanta by N. Sivarama Sastry, in Mysore University Magazine

1. Indian philosophers have always been very particular about the question of qualifications for a Vedantic student. Everyone is not fitted to study the Vedanta. A certain preliminary training is required.
2. The intellectual qualification consists in the study of the Vedas and the Vedangas (books on science, as logic, astronomy, grammar etc) under a teacher. This gives the student a general knowledge of the contents of the Vedas, thus facilitating the further study of the Upanishads and the Vedanta works. The study of the Vedangas especially gives him a strong and firm intellectual foundation to understand the abstruse philosophical truths found in the Upanishads and other works.
3. After the intellectual training comes the most important training—the moral training.
4. He should have experienced thing of this world and must have felt dissatisfied with the ordinary and commonsense explanation—rather explaining¹¹⁰ away—of things and seek earnestly for a truer, a better, a more real and tangible reality than this world of the senses. This dissatisfaction is most important for the student or there is no meaning in studying philosophy, if he is satisfied with what is given to him in ordinary experience. This is vairagya. The teaching should be imparted only to such a person, says the Mundaka Upanishad, who is “Whose thoughts are not troubled by any desires and who has obtained peace”. In the Katha Upanishad we hear Yama testing Naciketas

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before imparting to him the Brahmavidya. Only when Naciketas has flatly refused all worldly pleasures such as beautiful women, chariots, sovereignty over the whole earth and so on, does Yama being to approach the subject. The search after a reality which is all-embracing and in which there is no strife such as if found in this phenomenal world must engage his attention. He constantly thinks of this ideal and guise his actions according to it. This is Saguna-Brahmopasana. He becomes like the lamp-flame in the niche. It is steady, and most important of all, it is active. This constant meditation upon the great truths gives him great powers of concentration, very helpful to the study of Vedanta.

5. As a natural consequence of this idea his desires in this world grow less and less. He cultivates an attitude of unselfishness towards the fruits of his labour on this search as well as the next, because they do not help him in the realisation. They hinder rather than help him in the path of moksa. Therefore he tries to his duty and leave the rest to God. This is Karma-yoga.

6. The Vedantic disciple, as a member of society in which he lives, has to perform certain duties towards its uplift. He does them. But the difference¹¹¹ between his actions and the ordinary man's is in this, that the Karma of the former is niskama or disinterested whereas that of the latter is Kama or interested.

7. We might mention here the two theories regarding vairagya. Some hold the kamapradhvamswada. They say that it is impossible to give up desire by remaining away from the objects of the senses. On the other hand, only a complete and hearty enjoyment kills the desire. It is no use talking of vairagya unless a man has tasted pleasure to the full and then Vairagya will come of itself. In other words a person should become a thorough Indriyarama. But there are others like Sankara who hold that vairagya is possible only after Dhoshadarsana. It is not by enjoyment that desire is killed. On the other hand, it is kindled a hundred-fold. Only when a person begins to realise the gross error underlying all sensual pleasures, does he get true vairagya. Enjoyment will only bring discontent. As early as Manu this view seems to have been taken, for he says: Fire only blazes the higher the more you pour offerings into it. The Bhagavad-Gita also favours this view. It compares desire to an unquenchable fire.

8. Then comes Samadhi—intense application to the study of the Vedanta with the utmost earnestness. In fact, Sama and the rest pave the way for Samadhi.

In addition to this sraddha is very necessary. The disciple must be really interested in the study and have faith in his guru. He must start with the confidence that his guru can lead him. This means no "intellectual stultification". On the other

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hand, we can describe it as “loyalty to one’s own ideal”. In fact, he follows the teaching of the guru whom he himself has deliberately chosen.

Last of all he must feel the keener desire for ¹¹²moksa. He should exhibit the utmost seriousness. He must feel the necessity to overcome this finitude, this strife, the cause of so much pain. He must feel like a person whose head has caught fire and who rushes out in search of water. He must feel that the ideal can be attained, here and now.

Conception of Pranava or “Om” by N.D. Mehta

1. The syllable “OM” divested of all its subsequent mystic significance was originally used as a word signifying assent. This assent was either subjective to one’s own internal thoughts or objective to an enquirer’s question. In its latter aspect the word “Om” implied “Existence” of “Being” per se; while in its former aspect it implied “Consciousness”. In pre-vedic times the word was used in the sense “Yes. It is so” or “Amen I am.” In the transition period of phonetic evolution the word appears in the Latin “Ominis” we formulate other words to express our concept of the Deity. Thus we say:—“He is Omni-potent, Omnipresent etc.” It reappears in the English Language after long periods of time as “Am” the verb of existence associated with the first personal pronoun “I”. Conceiving thus intuitively of Deity, we are in a position to correlate ourselves to the universal principle of all “Om.”

2. The cult of “Om” was materially developed in the later period of the Aranyakas, and we find in the concluding portion of these books for anchorites that the secret doctrine of the Upanishads viz: Atman—Brahman was taught through the initiation of this mystic word “Om”.

3. If we proceed to another old prose Upanishad of the Aranyaka of the Black Yajurveda we gather that ‘Om’ is the pivot on which¹¹³ the study of the vedic lore turns. The Upanishad, in its first chapter, which deals with the rules of study of the Vedic literature, especially the occult portion of it, informs the disciple that “Om” is the omnipresent bull impregnating the cows of the Vedic texts; it was the essence born of the Vedas to reveal immortality; as self-shining god it is capable of imparting intelligence to the students. It is further described as “a sheath covering the true nature of Brahman and itself enveloped by intelligence.”

4. In the metrical Kathaka Upanishad, young Niachietas is taught the secret doctrine of immortality of the soul by God of death as a third boon. Yama says:- “I tell

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you the most concise means of knowing the Supreme Being as “Om”. This is the secret Logos which all the Vedas teach.

5. But the value of “OM” lies more in its powers of revealing the fundamental truth of the identity of the Individual soul with the Supreme Being than in its efficacy of generating a trance of Samadhi. The ancients regarded speech as a means of suggesting the truth, and its expressive power was valued in so far as it was capable of revealing the suggested¹¹⁴ sense. As the Supreme Being was beyond the ken of our senses and mind, and as the Vedas described it as Neti, Neti, i.e. in a negative manner, the most powerful word which could carry us to the border-land of the phenomenal world was to be sought after. Such a word was found in “Om” – which was capable of conveying the maximum of truth in the minimum of verbal activity. We have seen that “Om” was the abbreviation of the great sentence “I am He”. It was pregnant and significant syllable easy to be muttered and pondered over without extraneous help. The sages of the Upanishads tried their best to employ¹¹⁵ the maximum of thought in this monosyllable, and in this section we shall endeavour to shew how they succeeded in their efforts.

6. The Cosmic Self which is the only real self of all egos reveals itself in three phenomenal and one noumenal aspects. The finite ego is a reflection or individualized emanation of the Cosmic Self, and may be taken as the basis of revealing the Infinite self. We shall therefore, analysis the nature of the finite ego in order to understand the corresponding nature of the Infinite self. The finite ego as revealed in a human form passes in 3 stages of consciousness called waking, dreaming and sleepy, and these three stages of consciousness are prominently brought to our notice in the three centres in physical organs viz. eye (optic nerve), throat (cervical nerves) and heart (the nerves governing the working of that organ). The waking consciousness limits the ego to the physical organism and its objective surroundings; the dreaming consciousness, in which the control of the will disappears, limits the ego to psychic sheaths and their innate impressions; and the sleeping consciousness merges the ego into the infinite self—not absolutely but in union with his individualized life-giving element. The consciousness like an ocean has rhythmic periodic ebbs and tides which are mere surface disturbances, but the deeper level remains unruffled. This disturbed region of consciousness constitutes the whole life, as it were, of the ego who forgets that his real life or being is embedded in the infinite undisturbed consciousness.

Although each ripple or wave has an independent life or being, the series of waves are not only interdependent but are governed by¹¹⁶ the periodic law of rise and

¹¹⁴ The original editor marked corrections its not clear by hand

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fall. Such is the case with each individualized ego, who in some respects is an independent entity in his own limited sphere of action, and who has an inter-relation with similar egos and the cosmic Self governing the Colony of individual egos.

7. This Law of unity of consciousness is grasped with the help of "Om" which has three mortal and one immortal elements. The A of the "Om" (Aum) symbolizes the individual waking ego and his sphere of action and thought, which correspond respectively to the Cosmic waking self and his sphere of action and thought. The individual commences his life with his body and knows the world, or achieves his objects through his body. The A of the "Om" is also the beginning of the alphabet and the beginning of the Vedic literature. It also pervades the alphabet and the whole region of speech in as much as no consonant, no word and no sentence can be pronounced without the help of A.

The second part of "Om" viz. U is the symbol of the individual dreaming ego and his sphere of action and thought encompassed in the subtle elements, as also of the Cosmic Self in his psychic activity through various divinities. The psychic life is the higher aspect of the physical organism and connects the latter with the external objective world and the internal subjective world. Owing to its double attributes of superiority and connecting link, the U of "Om" becomes the expressive part of the whole of the psychic realm and the teaching of the middle Veda.

The physical organism remains quiet, the psychic life disappears, and the common organic life indicated by the rhythmic action of the heart continues. The ego is then said to be asleep and appears to be unconscious. As a matter¹¹⁷ of fact the consciousness is deprived of its limitations, and the non-appearance of objects in the sleep is not the result of absence of consciousness but absence of intellectual objects. The very negation of the objective world is proved by the light of consciousness, for nothing can be denied in the absence of a witnessing soul. This stage in which consciousness is cut off from all limitations is the maximum measure, and the ultimate sphere of absorption of the universe. The individual ego in this stage called Pragna, and the cosmic self called Easwara, come in contact with each other on the border-land of witnessing soul. The M of the "OM" symbolizes this expansive finest matter the inherent intelligence, and the teaching of the third Veda.

The individualized and cosmic limitations disappear, and we reach the border land between Qualified and Absolute Brahman. This border-land is called the OM.

8. The teaching of the Upanishads was that "OM" was the root-word or Logos which conveyed the import of the whole of the cosmos and the spirit underlying it.

"H.G. Wells' Idea of God" by Otto Rothfeld in Indian Philosophical Review

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1. Philosophy is not after all a thing for personal study only: it is, or should be, living thought on the problems of man and reality, of human goodness in relation to creative will, of the intelligence of men in each age at their highest activity. There is, perhaps in our day too great a tendency to become specialists; and philosophers, like lawyers and brick-layers, are only too apt to adopt trades unionism and to exclude outsiders with¹¹⁸ all superiority of the professional. But I hope that in this Review at least, with its essentially catholic purpose, it will not be thought unsuitable, to analyse the thoughts of a great modern thinker on the Being of God, even if the thinker is not a philosopher by profession and occupies no tutorial chair.

2. The attacks are shrewd and witty and by their wide publication must assuredly serve a useful purpose. They at least expose publicly what an educated man should know and what in effect every thinking artisan in England or in Scotland (especially in Scotland) does know and declare. It is only the better class product of the great public schools, which on political grounds under the alias of moral needs, still profess to ignore the facts.

3. Convinced as he is that nothing can ever be known or predicated of the Absolute, Mr Wells goes further and says we may and should entirely ignore its Being. We have to live in space and time and we can think and gain knowledge only through these categories. Hence, he argues, we need not waste a breath or a regret on the impersonal reality that may exist beyond our life and knowledge. This, to me at least, appears to be the first serious error in the book. The fact that we cannot represent the nature of ultimate being seems to be an inadequate cause for ignoring its existence, if once we are convinced that it does exist. To omit from all reasoning the substance in which we think and live, if once we admit that there is this substance, seems to me inevitably to lead to error in all reasoning about the relations of appearances. At the very best, it must lead to the relations and¹¹⁹ the conclusions of the understanding being thrown out of balance and receiving a weight and value which cannot properly belong to them.

4. The God only of mankind and not of other living beings even on this earth. His functions seem to be those of a companion to each and every man and woman on this small planet out of all the stars and stellar systems of the universe.

5. If I did not know how many thousands of persons in the recorded ages of man have felt thus sudden illumination and this transforming intuition of the presence of God, who were after all proved by the passing of a few years to have been misled by

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false and vapoury gases dancing over the morasses of their ignorance. There is no one now who does not know that by under-feeding, by solitude, and by fixing the mind upon vacuity, it is as easy to see and know any God one likes to imagine as it is for a conjuror to produce rabbits from a top-hat. I regret, therefore, that I must refuse to be convinced of the existence of this God of Mr Well's, simply on his assertion of his own subjective experience or on the iteration of the experiences of others of his friends and fellow-thinkers. The question is whether the existence of such a deity fits into our reasoned universe of thought, and is consistent with the principles of our understanding.

6. These things can stand a test of experience but we refuse to believe them, not because evidence is deficient and not because we discredit the narrator of the experience but simply because we know them to be unreasonable. We want, therefore, a proof of the existence of Mr Well's deity which should satisfy the understanding and which shall not be¹²⁰ inconsistent with the balance of our thought.

7. It is obvious that Mr Wells is here thinking of the physiological theory of thought being conveyed like an electrical current along the nerves from or to the human brain. Looked at in this abstract way, and as a matter of physiological research alone, it is no doubt desirable or at least inevitable that thought should be imagined to take time in traversing space, but it should be imagined to take time in traversing space but it should be equally obvious that it is only because it is imagined as crossing a space that it is supposed to take time. Remove the spatial extension and no necessity remains for supposing any time at all to be consumed in the process of thought, Duration, in relation to thought, has meaning only if thought is placed also in the category of space. But, when Mr Wells expressly states that God does not exist in space, no possible basis remains for ascribing him or duration to the movements of His thought.

8. What is or can be meant by a person that has no body and therefore no sensations and having no sensations can therefore have no perceptions, is a problem that meets at every turn those who would pry into the religious conceptions of God as it does those who analyse the conceptions of an immortal soul. For myself I fear I have long given the problem up. I must confess it to be beyond my powers of conception. A persona, an appearance, that is, in which a thought masks itself or appears and is known, but which has no corporate being, has no lineaments and no possibilities of sensation is something that lies beyond my conjecture.

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8. It is astonishing to me that Mr Wells or any modern thinker imbued in the teaching of biology and the lessons of evolution can venture to¹²¹ suggest a reality an anthropomorphic deity worthy of some man-centred Jewish mythology.

9. Man made no sudden entry on the stage of life. Hundreds of thousands of years passed while men and women were developing from their simian ancestors.

10. If man creates his God in his own image, it is clear at least that his shape will have no stability and must vary even at the same time and place with the fancy and caprices of his creator. The moral ideal is not the same for every man and woman. It would not be even right to say that it should be. There are many men now in modern educated England who might differ considerably from Mr Wells in his estimate of the place and degree and value of his model virtues. The maintenance of racial life, for instance, is a goal which many of the best among us would probably repudiate, which others with apparent justice might leave this to the natural working of the Life Force of Will to Be.

11. It amounts to this, then, that the existence of such a God can be justified only by the supposed need of mankind to believe in a regulating and ideal personality. The appeal is after all to the needs of man. We are asked to believe not because we know the thing to be true, but because we need the belief for our happy activities. We are told not to ask for proof but to rely upon our emotions. The ultima ratio, the last word is only this despairing question: "How could I act, poor I, did I not thus believe?" This is a form of appeal which is no-a-days common and fashionable. It is an appeal to which it is difficult to reply because, for anyone who aspires to truth and still has some reliance upon reason, it is impossible to find a common ground. But this at least can surely be said that¹²² by opening the door to this cry of emotion we are allowing into the sanctuary of our mind every lie, every evil, and every insincerity that has tormented or can torture mankind. The savage needs, for instance, to believe in evil spirits lurking in every jungle thicket, which require the efficacy of human sacrifice. For him to act at all, the existence of such spirits is a need and for him his belief in their existence with their cruel worship has its definite value. The veneration of a Virgin Mother and the scornful destruction of her images are both needs at one and the same time of troubled humanity. The danger of yielding to this belief in a deity shaped according to man's conception of a moral standard or a moral ideal however much it may be justified by its value and a people's need, has never been more distinctly shown than in the last war with Germany.

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12. The world has seen the effort and the result. It is not likely again to adopt a creed which bases itself upon the supposed needs of the religious spirit and upon the illusions of factitious moral ideals. It amounts to this, that Mr Well's God and the Gods of similar systems are nothing more than a yielding to a religious craving added to a more or less reasoned ethical ideal.

13. It is when it is removed from the sphere of ordinary argument by the taint of religious emotion that it becomes so dangerous and even damnable. It becomes then something which is faced round like a sacred table, something that may not be touched, something that in the end will always seek to impose itself upon others by iron and blood and untold barbarities, as the Prussian savages sought to impose their narrow categorical imperatives upon the free and wind-blown spirit of France. To me at least, it seems a sheer cowardice thus to desert the camp of reason¹²³ and seek refuge in the trackless wilds of the emotions. To believe not because a thing is true, not even because one has reasoned oneself into the belief, but merely because one should like to believe, because one feels weak without such support, because one trembles in the darkness of unbelief when the lamp of reason is blown out, that to me at least is the worst of insincerities. To find refuge in words, in empty protestations, call them needs or human values or what you will, mere words which have no truth in them, which are indeed not true, better I think to stand steadfast and dumb in the face of eternal silence. This much I know at least; that there is a truth, that this world is not all a lie a poor piece of wood painted by my fancy to resemble what I wish it to be like. This I know and let the rest be silence, if so it must be. This at least is a man's part, to live and endure and not to talk when he cannot know.

Man stands in face of the undefined and illimitable universe, merely one animal among so many other living things on one tiny little planet that revolves its little cycle round one fixed star out of the infinite number of other constellations. All the living things of the earth together are but an atom of the total life in this infinitude and the millions of years in which man has developed to his present shape from the first protoplasm and the two or three hundred thousands of years in which he has developed from the ape to his present disharmonious and body are only as a breath or moment of the infinite spirit's rhythm and life. Such is the species, such mankind. And the individual, what is he? Not even a bubble on the flow of infinite existence. For such to devise a God for himself is¹²⁴ an arrogance that is tolerable only by its absurdity. Better by far for him to play his momentary part in the dream of infinite illusion without fear and without repining, to struggle and desire, to suffer and enjoy, to live and love.

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Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism by A. Coomarswamy, reviewed by R.D. Ranade in I.P.R.

The distinctions between them are “merely temperamental: fundamentally there is absolute agreement between them, that bondage consists in the thought of I and mine, and that this bondage may be broken only after those in whom all craving is extinct”. The author points out that the Anatta-vada of the Buddhists must not be undershot as a reaction against the Upanishadic Atmanism. The Buddhistic and the Upanishadic Philosophers understood quite different things by the words Atta and Atman. The Buddha could hardly be regarded as having understood the precise significance of the Upanishadic Brahman as he always uses the word Brahma. The Buddhists and the Upanishadic Philosophers must further be at one in their ethical doctrine of the mean, their doctrine of Becoming and destruction, and in their recognition of their inability to determine the actual state of the soul after death.

In the section on Mahayanism again, Dr Coomarswamy makes a very careful and interesting comparison between the doctrines of the Hinayan and the Mahayan. He refuses to call Mahayanism a mere degradation of the earlier doctrine. It was “and overflowing of Buddhism from the limits of the Order into the life of the world”. If Hinayanism was a doctrine of knowledge, Mahayanism was a doctrine of live. If the earlier doctrine insisted on the ideal of the Arhat, the later doctrine insisted on the ideal¹²⁵ of the Bodhi Sattva.

(in I.P.R.)

The Identity of Atman with Brahman by Langley

1. Many centuries later than the Upanishads a great modern thinker, Immanuel Kant, following a similar method, revealed universal characteristics of the self which transform it at the two points where the conception of the Upanishads appears most defective. Kant showed first that the self is a synthesising principle, and secondly that one of its essential features is moral consciousness. With regard to the first point it is clear that if the universal self present within the individual is a synthesising power, it must function only in relation to the representations of the world which are given. Apart from such intuitions its activity will be impossible, for there can be no synthesis apart from a content or material to be synthesised. Thus the self does not negate the world and experience; on the other hand it constitutes that world. Apart from the self there could be no world; and not only so, but the converse is equally true, from apart from the given intuitions there could be no consciousness of self. Kant himself, however, failed to understand completely the consequences of his great discovery. He

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believed that the self in synthesising the given intuitions distorts the representations of the real object which give rise to them. Although he demonstrated that the self in so far as it constitutes the objects of experience is a synthesising activity, there always remained with him the belief that the transcendent ego in itself is an analytic principle and that the ideal for knowledge is a purely analytic consciousness which creates its own object and to which therefore intuitions are not given. He points out¹²⁶ that in explaining the functioning of the synthetic principle, he is describing the specifically human consciousness, and that the knowledge of such a consciousness was necessarily limited to appearances. This belief led Kant to the distinction between phenomena, and noumena, and to all the perplexing difficulties which arise from the relation between these two types of being.

2. There can be no analytic activity of the self, save that which presupposes synthetic activity. The ideal consciousness is a consciousness which functions not analytically, but synthetically; so that the unity of the self is a unity which through its intuitions embraces and does not negate the universe.

Once the significance of this principle is grasped, it will be seen that there is here a conception of the self which leads right back to the concrete world of individual things and persons, in place of a conception which leads away from and negates them. Although the terms analytic and synthetic were not used by the writers of the Upanishads, it is clear that the self is conceived by them as an analytic principle. The process of apprehending the self is a process of learning the way in which it is independent of that which is given in immediate experience. The reason why dream consciousness is supposed to represent the self more truly than waking consciousness, is that in dreams the individual without receiving intuitions, creates his own object. When the self is comprehended as a synthesising principle, however, it is seen that the plurality of intuitions, which link it to the world, are as essential as the universal unity which relates them. Moreover such an interpretation of the Universal as concrete was impossible until the discovery¹²⁷ that the activity of the self is a synthesising activity, and for this reason the suggestions in the Upanishads which point to a synthesis could not be developed.

(I.P.R)

The Jain Theory of Karma by Chapat Rai Jain

1. Analysis reveals the important fact that joy is nothing other than an inalienable attribute of the soul itself, so that it only arises from within our own being. Reflection also discloses the fact that happiness arises only with the cessation of some irksome

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obligation, task, duty or burden, and then only for so long, as another task or burden is not imposed on the soul. The lawyer who feels joy on his being called to the bar begins to experience a different kind of feeling as soon as he desires to reap the practical benefits of his success.

The principle to be deduced from these facts is that happiness is the natural state of the soul which is marred or manifested according as the individual consciousness is agitated and swayed by desires or freed from their influence. The soul, then, a pure embodiment of joy, which is realizable and realized fully only when all its desires are destroyed.

The same is the case with knowledge, which, like happiness, consists in the states of our own consciousness. For nothing like knowledge has a concrete existence in the outside world, so that our awareness of things is primarily the awareness of our own states. Reflection, no doubt, reveals the fact that these states of consciousness are caused by the external stimulus operating on the soul, the living principle or consciousness, but it is clear that the sense of awareness itself is actually a state of our own being, and is only invoked from¹²⁸ within. Neither the senses of a knowing being nor the stimulus from without constitute knowledge in any sense of the term. The eye contains no more awareness within it than the lens of a photographic camera, nor is the current of vibrations that impinge upon it charged or loaded with knowledge any more than the rays of light which being reflected reproduce and inverted image of their source on the ground glass. The truth is that the soul is a substance which nature has endowed with awareness, and it knows and feels its conditions and states. The photographic apparatus is not so endowed with the capacity to know and feel its modifications and is consequently devoid of knowledge and conscious states.

Now since nothing that is not proved to exist can be admitted to be existing, and since all that is provable is knowable, it follows that knowability is an attribute of existence. Hence, all things are knowable, that is to say, that which will never be known to anybody at all must be non-existent.

2. The soul is a reincarnating ego which passes from "life" to "life" in an unbroken succession, till nirvana be attained. This is evident from the fact that the soul is immortal by nature, so that it must have had a past, however much it might be ignorant of it in its present incarnation.

3. But when even the events of a few moments back are forgotten and cannot be recalled by us, what is there surprising in our inability to recollect anything of a past which has been since followed up by wholesale constitutional changes in our existence? Immortal by nature the soul must have been in existence throughout the beginningless eternity of time in the past, just as surely as it will continue to exist in the future.

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4. As¹²⁹ Mr J.L. Jaini observes (“Outlines of Jainism”) “It is not fate, nor even predestination: but it is the ever continuous balancing of the different accounts that we keep with the forces of life. There can no mistake no suppression, and no evasion. The credit and debit sides go on automatically; and whatever is due to us is paid us ungrudgingly and without demand. The continuity cannot be broken by change of house: the debts of London are not extinguished by going to Berlin: nor is the liquidation suspended till the Day of Judgment. The karmas are not extinguished simply because we give up the body called A. When we are dead as A, the karmas must still bear full fruits. The karmas constitute the karmic body; and it drags us into another state of being”.

5. But the question is, how to develop the spirit of renunciation in such a way as to ensure its persistence? Erratic action will not do: the top cannot be reached by haphazard jumps and flights in the air. A ladder must be found which will take one, step by step, to the top, and save all the falls and bruises consequent on them”.

6. Jainism, it will be seen, does not recognise any god or goddess to be appeased or propitiated for one’s good, but approaches the subject in the spirit of pure science, investigating and dealing with it on lines of cause and effect throughout. Of all the creeds now prevailing in the world Jainism is the only religion that places the doctrines of karma, transmigration and salvation on a scientific and therefore thoroughly rational basis. Some of the other creeds, indeed, have no idea, whatsoever of what the bondage of the soul might signify, and there are others that openly preach to the contrary. Those¹³⁰ amongst the remaining systems that profess to preach the doctrine know little or nothing about it on lines of scientific thought, and exhaust themselves in elaborating fanciful theories of their own which are beside the point, and which only tend to make the confusion worse confounded. The ‘elaborate’ doctrines of others, no doubt, at times seem to approach the Jaina conclusions but they only proceed upon vague generalities and wordy abstractions. Unscientific at core, they too betray their intellectual poverty if carefully probed and examined.

The Dev Samaj

1. The history of humanity may be divided into four stages according to the attitudes taken up towards religion. The first is the primitive stage of Indifference, in which man has not yet arrived at interests going beyond physical satisfaction. It does not enquire into the causes. The second is that of Mythology, the work of the imagination, by which through the personification of natural objects men try to explain

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all sorts of happenings in Nature on an analogy with their own life. Here anthropomorphism begins, and with it the various practices of religion, such as praying and making offerings. The third stage is that of theology and metaphysics, in which though reason is used, it is applied to "objects" similar to those of the second period:— "imaginary," "fictitious" and "not based upon objective reality." The fourth and the last stage is that of pure Science when observation, experiment, and reason are alone accepted as means to truth.

2. The founder of the Dev Samaj was himself a believer in God for many years after he founded the Dev. Samaj. At that time he used to advance a number of arguments in support of the¹³¹ belief in God. Three of these arguments he once published in the then existing Urdu organ of the Samaj, called the Dharam-Jivan. These he repeats in one of his recent publications, saying that all of them are viciated by an underlying fallacy.

3. God is said to be the creator of the world. Now creation implies beginning, but there was no time when the world and its laws did not exist, and the world cannot therefore be said to have been created at all. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by the law of Conservation of Energy according to which nothing could be ever created or destroyed. The world therefore was never created and God therefore could not be its creator. The idea that the world requires a creator originates from another false idea that nothing could exist without being caused by some other cause, and be self-existent. But if that be so, then God Himself should have been caused by some other cause and as such could not be self-existent. But in this sense He could not be the God of the theists at all.

Give up one attribute and you give up the entire idea of God, for however slight may be the elimination you make from the attributes of God, the resulting idea is not the idea which theists maintain.

4. The Dev Samaj is based in large measure on the acceptance of the claim of the Shri Dev Guru Bhagwan that he himself is possessed of "the complete higher life" necessary to form environment for the regeneration of every soul possessing the germs of higher life. He gives men the necessary knowledge of the higher life and also aids them to realise it. "Until and unless these higher forces which man lacks are supplied to him here can be no way of¹³² his salvation from the downward course..." These forces are supplied by the Guru. His personality is the environment necessary for men, otherwise too weak in themselves, to triumph over sin. "By heart union with me" he himself says, "in so far as a soul received and imbibes the higher influences or vibrations emanating from my soul, it is to that extent moulded in the Higher life.

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5. Suffering of all kinds is due, in general, to the violation of a law of nature. This may be by a man himself or by someone else, for man's sufferings are not caused merely by himself, and his actions or abstinence from actions may be a cause of sufferings to others besides himself. The fact that men suffer for the sins of others must be emphasised. This arises from the fact that the universe is an organic whole, and anything that happens to any parts affects all the others. None stands alone. The battle cry of the Guru is, therefore, the higher harmony between the parts of the universe, and if that is achieved a great part of the suffering is accidental, as when one man accidentally shoots another.

Not all suffering can be overcome, nor should be overcome. Some suffering has a disciplinary and moral value: if the eradication of this suffering is impossible without losing the moral effects, it must not be eradicated. The suffering due to ignorance of the laws of Nature may be removed by an effort after knowledge, and that which is due to sinful activities can be avoided only by the cultivation of the forces of higher life. Man's control of the forces of Nature is only very limited and thus he is incapable of preventing the great catastrophes such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, and such things.

The¹³³ Significance of Plato's State Absolutism by Prof. A.R. Wadia (Mysore University Journal)

1. The whole of Platonism has been enveloped in a nebula of mysticism. Far from being the central pivot of his system the knowledge of Ideas is a mere means to the end of social regeneration. With the passion of an intellectualist Plato believed in the necessity of knowledge to do anything whatever; he recognised no knowledge but the knowledge of the essence of things, and he sought to study these essences under the nomenclature of Ideas. He was often lost in the contemplation of them; he was often tempted to rest in their balmy atmosphere as befitted a poet. But he never failed to respond to the call of humanity, and he was a true disciple of his great master in feeling that there is no end so worthy as serving humanity. There is a compulsion laid by him on all true philosophers never to shrink from the duty of being leaders of men, and if they fail in their duty they are condemned to the penalty of being ruled by men, immeasurably their inferiors. Political philosophy in the widest sense of the term, as including ethics, is the real fulcrum, the real palpitating heart of Platonism. Herein he displays a profound insight, for he recognizes that morality is not the concern of an individual qua individual, but that it essentially involves for its birth and growth a social organism. Through the individualistic concentration on individual souls to which Europe got attached through the influence of Christianity, the profound interrelation of ethics and politics was lost sight of, till Hegel once again established it in

the last century. But¹³⁴ man as essentially a social or political animal marked the starting point of the highest ethical thought of ancient Greece, and he who overlooks this renders himself incapable of comprehending any part of Platonism.

2. "The mere preservation and continuance of life", he says in the Laws, "is not the most honourable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life while we live".

3. A corrupt state is a moral tragedy, and it would be the duty of a virtuous man to prefer to be an outlaw rather than "bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors", Better the yoke of exile than the citizenship of a state "which is likely to make men worse". Plato had the courage of his convictions to practise what he preached. His beloved Athens had proved guilty of persecuting Socrates and thus sinning against philosophy. She had not proved herself a great moral state. He never forgave her for this sin, and after the death of his guru he left Athens in disgust and courted the trials of a willing exile for a number of years.

4. There is, however, a saving grace in the state Absolutism of the Republic: it lies in the uncompromising emphasis which he lays on the absolute necessity of having at the head of affairs only those whose intellectual and moral worth had been tested and proved beyond the possibility of doubt. In the choice of the Guardians worth alone counts. Even from the ranks of the barbarians they may be chosen, and thus in the interests of morality he transcends the usual Hellenic antipathy to barbarians. It was a strong faith in him unshaken by popular doubts and prejudices that finds expression in an immortal passage in the Republic: "Until philosophers are kings¹³⁵, or the kings and the princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures, who pursue either to the exclusion of the other, are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils – no, nor the human races.

Time and Eternity by M.A. Venkata Rao*

1. Thanks to Bergson and Einstein, Time has become the central problem of philosophy. Innurable discussions are taking place all the world over, and day by day

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* In "Studies in Philosophy" (Bangalore put)The original editor inserted footnote "In "Studies in Philosophy" (Bangalore put)" by hand

fresh aspects of the problem are being worked out—biological, psychological, and physico-mathematical. The old antinomies of Zeno and Kant are given a fresh lease. The philosophical consequences of the principle of relativity are being drawn from all possible points of view. The richness and variety of contemporary thought is bound some day to lead to a new synthesis, more comprehensive than any earlier world-view.

2. The central problem is presented by the antithesis of Time as felt and Time as thought. Perceptual time is agreed to be a continuous whole, whereas conceptual time is more or less agreed to be mathematical, discrete and infinitely divisible in character. Time as perceived has a felt duration, a continuous becoming, not a mere succession of discrete moments.

3. We cannot give up either view. Mathematical logic cannot convince us that our perception of change is discrete, that our felt duration is an illusion engendered by quick succession of momentary states. For, experience of succession cannot be derived from pure succession. Nor can we think of external reality as infinitely divisible, as a series of events succeeding each other, with no continuous ground underlying¹³⁶ it. The 'ground' need not be the mysterious 'substance' of matter, which has done so much of mischief in science and philosophy from Descartes to the present day. Confronted by this problem, philosophy has so far taken the usual methods of suppressing one or other of these two aspects of the problem. In Idealism, the importance of time was not sufficiently stressed, as it was regarded as appearance, a form of manifestation. And no serious attempt was made to work out the view in all its detail, and render it intelligible. So it convinced only the converted. In the eyes of its critics, this doctrine of appearance was identified with illusion, pure and simple. Hence the exhortation to take Time seriously. The first to take time seriously was Bergson. He dismissed conceptual time as empty, spurious and 'spatial': and upheld perceptual time as the only concrete reality. Time becomes the very stuff of reality. It is identified with change, and duration. Reality is change. There is nothing static. Everything is a flow. The Universe is a creative evolution. Infinite divisibility and discreteness is dismissed as an illusion manufactured by the intellect, moulded in close contact with the least dynamic aspect of nature, namely materiality. The puzzles of Zeno are solved. But the logical atomist, the protagonist, of conceptual time, is not satisfied. B. Russell has a great suspicion of this easy solution. For him, analysis is the road to reality, and the world can be analysed into a number of series of discrete moments. The mind is a succession of sensations and images, and the world a succession of appearances.

Thus present-day discussions of Time display opposite abstractions. One school of thought stresses duration to the exclusion of all distinctness¹³⁷, of all complexity.

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Change is regarded as one and indivisible, with no distinguishable parts or aspects. This view is represented by Bergson, who is the modern Heraclitus. Another school of thought stresses the succession of states, and regards time as consisting of an infinite number of static and momentary existences. This view sees nothing contradictory in regarding change as consisting of changeless units, particularly reinforced by George Cantor's mathematical theory of infinity. It is represented by Bertrand Russell, who is the modern Democritus. Both these opposing views are the result of abstract and one-sided interpretation of the facts of experience. Bergson takes this stand on the perceptual and immediate experience of time, emphasizes the indivisibility and ultimate primacy of 'duration'. Russell takes his stand on the succession of states revealed by analysis in our experience of change. The report of immediacy is final for Bergson, whereas analysis is the path-way to reality for Russell. As usual, extremes meet, and both views commit the same fallacy – that of denying unity. Bergson seems disinclined to admit a unitary ground or essence, revealing itself in duration and speaks of 'pure duration'. And Russell is equally emphatic in denying continuity of essence between the succeeding states. He reduces perceptual continuity to mere appearance due to physiological and psychological conditions. As usual, the truth consists in the synthesis of opposites. Reality is both duration and succession. If we interpret time as the aspect of succession we have to supplement it with the aspect of enduring ground or essence, to render it adequate to reality in its fullness. This aspect is that¹³⁸ of eternity. Reality displays both the aspects of time and eternity.

4. Bertrand Russell develops his view of time in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. He outlines a special method of 'construction' by means of which he bridges the gulf between the world of commonsense and the world of physics, between the world of things in continuous space and time and the world of electrons in mathematical space and time.

5. Time is known to me as an abstraction from the passage of events. The fundamental fact which renders this abstraction possible is the passing of nature, its development.

6. All appearance of continuity, of identity, is only illusory, due to insufficient analysis, or the grossness of our senses.

7. Accepting the lesson of relativity, we must think of the life of each organism as a whole. Momentary snapshots will not give us its true nature. Its full nature is revealed throughout the changing phases of its life. If we cannot describe a bit of matter adequately without reference to the time axis, the greater is the need of taking account of time in the case of living organisms. But time is not the whole story. The changing

phases from birth to death reveal a unity of essence, a continuity of interpenetration, which is the eternal background.

8. If, before, now and after constitute the three dimensions of time, eternity may be said to be its Fourth Dimension, compresent with all the other three dimensions, just as Time is the fourth dimension, of space, and 'compresent' in a looser way with its three dimensions.

9. Eternity is usually taken in its widest stretch of meaning as referring to the universe as a whole, and the topic is plunged at once into the ultimate metaphysical riddles of the relation between Eternity and the time-process, between¹³⁹ the Absolute and the world-process. Eternity is a concept which must be built up by analysis of experience, like any other. Any premature flight to the peaks of speculation is likely to render the discussion thick and misty.

10. The eternal and temporal aspects form a living unity. Both are indispensable. As Dr Whitehead puts it, temporalization is realization. Potentiality passing into actuality takes the form of time or successiveness. But successiveness involves also unity of essence. Bergson's analysis brings out the close relationship between spirit or consciousness and time. But he jumps to the conclusion that time therefore constitutes the stuff of reality, is of the essence of it. These are hasty metaphors.

11. The Eternal Now cannot certainly be taken to include the future. Even if there is no absolute simultaneity, things can be said to occur earlier or later than a third according to the observer's point of view. But there can be no point of view which can bring the future, the non-existent into view. To interpret the Eternal Now as including the future is a great fallacy. To speak of the Absolute or God as seeing the future is to speak words without meaning, for the absolute is infinite spirit taking form; the process of manifestation is vital. If the absolute is the underlying aspect of forms or things, it is an abstraction apart from the time process. The eternal does not stand apart from the flux, and view the past, present and future at one glance. The future is the future, unborn and non-existent. No doubt its potentiality is in the eternal; the¹⁴⁰ past and the present determine it in its main lines, but the concrete form of its realization is unforeseeable. Bergson's insistence on the unforeseeability of the future has great value. "The finished portrait is explained by the features of the model by the nature of the artist, by the colours spread out on the palette; but even with the knowledge of what explains it, no one, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced – an

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absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation.” This holds good even with regard to the relation between the universal spirit and its manifestations.

12. Everything in this world is seen to be a form of the eternal, when understood as it is in the texture of reality, and not as clouded by what Spinoza calls the Imagination. When we put our obtrusive self aside, and grasp things as they are, in their own relationship, when the mind reflects reality faithfully, we have true wisdom, and see eternity here and now. We see the eternal meaning in the system of forms and existences which constitute the universe. Of course, such a view requires strenuous self-discipline whether in the moral or the scientific sphere—the discipline of the larger self, or the discipline of fact, ‘of irreducible and stubborn facts,’ in the fine phrase of W. James. This discipline involves holding the changing phases of the world at arm’s length even while scanning them carefully. But it is not to regard change and time as unreal. It is to endeavour to pierce through them to their meaning. As Prof. Radhakrishnan puts it “we must¹⁴¹ step aside from the procession, if we would see the whole of it.” This stepping aside is not to discard the procession as of no value, it is a means to a fuller vision of it, a closer apprehension of it. All thought involves the rhythmic processes of analysis and synthesis. We must rise above the data, survey it as a whole, analyse it into its elements and relationship before our knowledge is rendered clear, definite and rich in meaning. But the analytic phase operates on the ground of synthetic apprehension, and the threads of analysed elements are gathered into the synthetic construction at the end. It is only for this purpose that we must free ourselves from the changing aspects of the world, its scintillating and alluring appearances, while retaining our scrutiny of it. This is all that is meant in idealistic thought, when the precept “Rise above the illusion of time” is given. We rise above time to see its own true character as the bearer of eternity. The precept “Take time seriously” need not be supposed to clash, therefore, with the precept “Take eternity seriously”. To take Reality seriously is to take both time and eternity seriously. We must listen both to Spinoza and Alexander.

This view of the concrete nature of duration as implying eternity derives support from the principle of Relativity.

13. We have exorcised the three ghosts of an empty space, an absolute uniform time, and an inert substance.

14. This resolves the old Kantian antinomy of a world without a beginning in time. The antinomy disappears if there is no time apart from the events, no empty plenum, or container¹⁴² existing before the creation of the world. Time comes into existence with

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the world, and as an aspect within it. It has no meaning before it or after it. The antinomy becomes self-contradictory if Time is regarded in itself, torn out of its context as a character of the Real. This is the real lesson of the Antinomy. All categories or partial features of the world become self-contradictory, when regarded as ultimate, or as adequate to express the full nature of the real. This is the meaning of the devastating dialectic of Bradley in the earlier part of his *Appearance and Reality*. Thing, Quality and Relation, Space and Time become self-contradictory when regarded as Real, i.e. ultimately real, or sufficient to characterize Reality as a whole. They all express real aspects integral to things; only they must not be applied to the whole, and if Reality is defined as the Whole, obviously they can only be unreal. Much of the antagonism to Bradley is due to misunderstanding of his definition of Reality as ultimate Reality.

This view of the relation between Eternity and Time also answers the old question of what God was doing before creation, and why he suddenly bethought himself of launching this 'sorry scheme of things' on its fateful career. Why should the Absolute consent to be tainted with the descent into this world? This question disappears if there is no one Time pre-existing before the universe. What we have is a universe realizing itself in an infinity of space-times. The underlying source expressing itself we call Eternity, the process of expression we call Time. They are integral to each other. God does¹⁴³ not exist prior to and unrelated to the world. There was no Time, when the Absolute was unmanifested. The transcendence of God means, not the pre-existence of God, separate from the world, but the infinite richness or inexhaustible depth which is more than any one or all of the 'histories' taking place, of the space-time systems, or 'epochal wholes' in the language of Whitehead. Infinite essence taking infinite forms is the picture of reality we get if we draw out the implication of the principle of Relativity. The unity of all these 'nama rupas', 'names and forms' is neither spatial nor temporal, pace S. Alexander but Eternal. It is a unity underlying Spaces and Times and irradiating them. Eternity is the Fourth Dimension of Time.

15. The principle of relativity necessitates the taking into account 'all nature', all 'systems of reference' to describe adequately a particular system of events.

16. The lesson is clear that no event can be completely explained in terms of itself. Every event has an aspect which registers or 'mirrors' the rest of the entire universe. Each event is what it is, not only because of its own individuality, but of some character in which the rest of the universe is contained 'ideally' as it were. That is to say, nothing is merely individual, but also has a universal aspect. In the heart of the physical event itself is thus discerned a bipolar 'nature' individual and universal. The universality of each event does not interfere or diminish its individuality. On the contrary, it maintains it. In such a way, the thing is the meeting point of relations. The essence or principle of

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each event¹⁴⁴ is two-fold, individual and universal. Thus the Fourth Dimension of each event or series of events, their eternal aspect, has a double nature,—an individuality ‘informed’ or charged by universal significance. There is a meaning therefore in saying that Time is in Eternity, or is the process of its revelation, not merely in the sense of the individual principle of Duration in each event or system of events, but also in the sense of a universal meaning which it shares.

17. The “Quantum Theory” supports the conclusions drawn from the relativity of space and time. Just as the theory of relativity renders impossible the fallacy of simple location, and lays bare the organic view of nature, the quantum theories seem to point to the breakdown of Atomism as principle of explanation. If space and time do not belong to particular systems of reference absolutely neither is it possible, it would seem, to isolate the ultimate unit of matter of energy, and treat it as a self-contained entity.

18. The electron doesn't persist in its own nature and form and essence. It passes, like the wave, and others take its place. It is a temporary individuality. The element of stability in it is the interspace of which it is a concentration, just as the element of stability in us is the universal nature of which we are the embodiments. Thus recent physics illuminates classical metaphysics and lays bare the essentially abstract character of the mathematical view of time as infinite discreteness. If each unitary event bears the impress of infinity upon it, it becomes rather meaningless to speak of point-instants as if they existed by themselves, without any enduring ground. Of course, they are¹⁴⁵ entirely valid within the scientific sphere, and their applicability to the real world shows only that it represents a genuine aspect of Reality, the aspect of structure. As Vaihinger puts it, the mathematical view is an instrument dealing with the world, not a picture of it. The ultimate nature of reality is not prejudged by it. The universe, therefore, is a unitary fountain of energy, giving rise to infinitely diversified events, each process exhibiting time and space. Each event is at once individual and universal, a particular ‘nama rupa’ or name and form. The universe is a unity of space-times. The Real is the Eternal revealing itself in infinite times. Time and Eternity are aspects of reality.

To take time seriously is therefore to take eternity seriously. A unified concept of both resolves the antinomies of abstract time, and gives the clue to the nature of reality.

Caitanya (Knowledge) in Advaita by H.N. Raghavendrachar in Mysore University Journal

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1. Vijñānavāda maintains that in fact its theory of knowledge is contradicted by no experience. It interprets the experience "I know this or that" in its own way. Accordingly "I know this or that" is not a single experience but it consists of several experiences. First, there is the experience of 'I', then of 'this' and lastly of 'knowing' i.e. there are respectively self-consciousness, awareness of the object and awareness of knowing, each by itself. All these cases are nothing but the cases of awareness. Owing to previous impression now the awareness appears of being of self, now of the so called object and now of knowledge which is wrongly¹⁴⁶ regarded as object. Apart from awareness there is no self and no object and knowledge is not objective. Besides to talk of object is absurd. For granting that there is an object we must hold that it exists independently of knowledge. In holding such a conception as this we create fresh difficulties under the cover of solving the problem of knowledge. Granting that the object is different from knowledge we must account for the relation between them. Now to think of any relation between knowledge that is mental and the object that is non-mental is absurd. If there is no relation, there is no reason why we should say that knowledge is that of an object. Besides, the object is never given separately from knowledge.

2. So the awareness of self, the so-called object of a knowledge is momentary and it has no outside content. At the time each form of awareness disappears, it leaves its impression there. At the next stage through these impressions all the three forms of awareness are recalled and consequently there seems to be the experience "I know this or that" which seems to bind the knower and the known.

3. Advaita admits the validity of both the origin and the meaning of recognition, and consistently with this it holds that knowledge is both generated and permanent. But the same knowledge cannot be both generated and permanent. The knowledge that is generated is antahkaranavritti and the knowledge that is permanent is caitanya. The former is also in essence caitanya but it is qualified by antahkarana and that is why it seems to be generated. So the ground of both these forms of knowledge is the same; and this¹⁴⁷ explains how the same recognition explains how knowledge is both generated and permanent. Thus recognition points to two forms of knowledge. Since this is not apparent, thinkers often go wrong in denying its truth. They should not deny things that are given, but they should explain all things consistently with what is given. When it is said that knowledge is permanent, what is meant is the pure-consciousness

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(caitanya). As this is the essence of knowledge, in all these discussions we must note that the term knowledge, unless it is specified by vritti, means caitanya.

4. One is conscious of knowledge when one says 'I'. Merely from this we must not conclude that 'I' is the same as knowledge. Obviously 'I' is objective and therefore it is different from knowledge. It is discursive, because in one case it seems to be the subject, as for example, 'I know thin'; and in the other it is the object as in the case of self-consciousness. In order to be subject it must consist of knowledge and in order to be object it must consist of something else which is other than knowledge. Therefore 'I' is a complex entity which is a product of both knowledge and non-knowledge—cit and acit. So far as it is knowledge it is unknowable and so far as it is something else it is knowable. Merely because 'I' is a product of both knowledge and non-knowledge, we must not understand that knowledge really admits of something else with it. To regard knowledge so is wrong. In order to remove such difficulties as this, Advaita explicitly says in elucidating the meaning of 'I' that 'I' is the produce of cit and acit, that what is meant here is only that cit is reflected in 'I' and under this circumstances it¹⁴⁸ only resembles the space that is reflected in a mirror. Here the example of space is very suggestive. We know that space among the empirical things is infinite in a sense and admits of no part which is non-space. We also know that reflection of space in a mirror does not in any way affect the condition of space at all. Space is there unaffected outside the mirror; and yet it helps the observation of things in it through its reflection in the mirror; In the same way cit though it seems to be in company with acit, is not at all affected. It ever remains as one and unconditioned.

Next we may feel a difficulty how 'I' can be regarded as a product of cit and acit, while cit cannot at all be conditioned by anything outside. Unless this difficulty is removed, we cannot understand the problem, since 'I' as the product of both implies that either of its component parts is limited by the other. Advaita considers this is not the true implication at all. The analogy we clearly distinguish between the fire that burns and the naturally cold iron ball. This means that the cold iron ball does not in anyway condition the formless fire and being in connection with the iron ball the fire is wrongly regarded as having that form. In the same way the pure cit has nothing to do with acit, yet we wrongly think that it is in relation with acit. 'I' is the result of this wrong thought.

The acit part in the 'I' may be called Antahkarana. This only means that it serves cit as an instrument. So, through the instrumentality of acit, cit does its knowing function in the empirical sense of the term. Without the instrumentality of the acit, cit of course remains as subject, but it knows nothing¹⁴⁹ outside it; and it is regarded as subject then, because of its conscious character.

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The fact that 'I' is a product of two factors opposed to each other may be further substantiated by a reference to different kinds of experiences that the same empirical subject 'I' has. Sometimes 'I' appears as miserable, changing, inert, finite; and some other times it appears as eternal, all-witnessing, something that is most liked. Here these two contradictory aspects cannot belong to the same entity. Unless we attribute them to different elements we cannot explain away the contradiction. Quite obviously the latter aspect belongs to the cit part because cit is eternal, all-witnessing, etc. Therefore we have to conclude that the former aspect belongs to the acit part, i.e. antahkarana.

5. Advaita holds that 'I' is not the real subject and it proves this by the analogy of a heated iron.

6. The position of Advaita regarding the problem:- The whole conception of Prabhakara rests on the assumption that 'I' denotes atman which is the real subject of experience. Reserving his view of knowledge and object for a later discussion let us examine if 'I' is identical with Atman. A close study of experience shows that Prabhakara's assumption is false. As it will be clear further 'I' denotes something other than Atman. Before analyzing 'I' let us understand what Atman means and what its relation to knowledge is. The following considerations show that atman and knowledge are not two things but one.

7. We¹⁵⁰ know how knowledge is self-given and therefore we cannot deny it. If atman is different from it, we do not know how we can arrive at the conception of atman. Like knowledge Atman is not given.

8. So the so-called Atman is nothing but knowledge.

9. Advaita solves the difficulty as follows:- Flame is known by something outside it. i.e. by knowledge. So when the flame is known all its properties may not be known. But the case of knowledge is quite different. Knowledge is self-known and when it is known, it is known with all its details. If a piece of knowledge were different from other pieces of knowledge it ought to be known as different. But it is not so known. Therefore we cannot assume that it is different. So we may conclude that knowledge is one, i.e. undifferentiated unity.

It is already made known that it is eternal, i.e. that it is both beginningless and endless. If it had a beginning we must necessarily be conscious of its absence previous

to its beginning. So we are conscious of the absence of every effect before it is produced. But in the case of knowledge we are not at all conscious of its absence. Even assuming that there is such an absence, we must be conscious of it only in terms of knowledge. So the so-called absence of knowledge must be known by knowledge itself. But, according to the previous conclusion that knowledge is one, i.e. partless, these two cases of knowledge are not different. This means that knowledge has no beginning.

So we may conclude that knowledge is no other than Atman; it is partless, self-evident, and eternal. From the standpoint of object atman is regarded as knowledge and by itself as atman.

10¹⁵¹. IS "I" ATMAN?: Coming to the problem 'Is 'I' Atman?' as it is already stated, Vedanta says 'no'. The reason for this is as follows:- Atman is eternal and therefore it endures during sleep also. If 'I' were Atman it must be known as enduring the. But this is not the case. We cannot say that we are not conscious of 'I' in sleep merely because we are not conscious of any object then. For if 'I' is to be conscious of Atman and in being conscious of Atman we need not be conscious of any outside object, because Atman is self-evident.

We may still argue in favour of 'I' as follows:- 'I' is Atman. It is always known as the subject of experience—experience is of something. So it is only when we are conscious of any object we are conscious of 'I' as the subject. Taking up the case of sleep, we may say that then 'I' is not experienced as 'I' since it is not the subject of any experience. (The preceding argument is from the side of the object and this is from the side of the subject).

But this is not a sound conception. In making 'I' the subject of experience, the view renders it only relative -relative to object. But atman is not relative. It stands by itself. So it cannot be 'I' or the subject as referring to some object. If we mean by the term 'subject' pure knowledge (cit) that is not relative, then atman may be regarded as subject. But this interpretation of subject does not prove that 'atman' is 'I' because atman is absolute and 'I' is only relative.

The conception of 'I' does not endure in sleep is based on the fact that it is not remembered as existing then after awaking from sleep. But against this position one may try to retain the conception that 'I' endures¹⁵² in sleep, by explaining our failure to remember as follows:- Once more we shall make the process of remembrance clear. We have an experience now. When this ceases, it leaves in its place the corresponding impression. When there is an occasion, this impression causes the corresponding remembrance. We cannot apply this process to the present case. 'I', though it endures in sleep, cannot be remembered since 'I' i.e. atman, is eternal and so it admits of no

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impression in its place and consequently there can be no remembrance. These considerations show that we cannot argue its absence from our failure to remember it.

Of course this explanation is based on a true conception that Atman which is eternal does not admit of impression; but it is not consistent with experience. As this explanation asserts, if 'I' is not remembered after sleep because it is eternal, it should never be remembered. But this is not true. Sometimes we do remember 'I'. For instance the remembrance that 'I' experienced some object last day. So consistently with this experience we ought to remember 'I' if it endures during sleep. The fact that it is not remembered so does prove that it does not endure. The fact that we remember 'I' of yesterday clearly proves that 'I' is not the same as Atman.

In spite of all these considerations something might yet be stated against the position of Advaita. After sleep we seem to have some such remembrance as "I slept happily" which clearly indicates that "I" endures in sleep. Otherwise we could not have thought "I" as the agent that slept.

Advaita Explanation of the Remembrance "I slept happily":- During sleep there is no outward source of happiness; so the happiness that is experienced must be attributed to the that¹⁵³ endures then. So, like consciousness, happiness must also be a phase of Atman. Like the former this phase also must be eternal. This means that during waking also this state continues. But we are not aware of it since the self then is distracted by wind. But in the state of sleep there can be no distraction, as all the sense organs with antahkarana that bring soul into relation with outward objects and hence cause distraction, are quiescent.

So far, we know that during sleep, Atman endures as pure cit and ananda. Then the question may arise how the pure atman comes to have the waking state which is nothing but distraction. In meeting this difficulty we must note that atman is only comparatively pure during sleep but not fully pure. Even at this stage there continues to be the seed of waking state. We call this seed nescience. But it does not completely cover atman at this state. When this conceals atman fully the latter comes to have waking state. Reserving a detailed discussion of these problems we may conclude so far that during sleep there remain three things, Atman, bliss and nescience (avidya). The waking man's remembrance that he slept happily refers to atman and ananda (bliss) and his remembrance that he did not know anything refers to nescience.

Of course antahkarana which is the means of experience disappears during sleep. So the experience of Ananda is affected by nescience itself. Nescience in this capacity is called avidyavritti. It continues to do its function till the sleep continues. When the sleep is over it leaves the corresponding impression which in its turn gives rise to the memory. We¹⁵⁴ note that even this memory happens to the person qualified only by nescience and not by antahkarana. When the waking man is further determined by

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antahkarana, he is only enabled to express what he remembered. So during sleep atman is determined only by nescience in its causal form; and in the waking state he is further determined by antahkarana. A state intermediate between sleep and full waking is recognized, when the person is determined by nescience in the form of effect. At this stage also nescience may be regarded as comparatively elemental.

The above considerations show that there is an actual experience of ananda etc. during sleep. This view is of much importance; because it gives a clue to the real nature of Atman. The Nyaya philosophy sets aside the importance of the problem by interpreting the memory as only pointing to the absence of pain and not to positive Ananda. This is wrong. There can be no experience of the absence of something unless the experience is already aware of the object whose absence he experiences. In the present case if the sleeping man is to experience the absence of pain, he must at least remember what the pain is, just when he experiences its absence. Obviously there is no such feeling during sleep; otherwise he would have remembered it. Of course after waking we do think that there was no pain etc. during sleep; but we only infer this from the fact that we experienced ananda etc. then.

Conclusions from the above considerations: What are experienced during sleep are atman, bliss and nescience. This implies that "I" or "ego" is not experienced then. So in the memory "I slept happily" "I" denotes only the¹⁵⁵ empirical "ego". Consistently with experience we ought to have said that the pure self (atman) slept happily, etc. We do not do this because the pure self (atman) transcends all expressions. As it will be further explained it is indefinable and inexpressible; because it is very subtle and transcends all that is empirical. Whenever we want to say anything about it, we can only indicate it by 'I'. There is no other word that can better point to it than 'I'. So in place of "atman slept happily" we have "I slept happily".

Now we may conclude that Atman is not 'I'. 'I' is an effect of nescience. So the latter is the stuff of 'I'. The power to know in the ordinary sense of the term and to do is the essence of 'I'. No action can be attributed to pure consciousness, because it is changeless.

So far it is clear that 'I' is a product of both cit and acit and this acit part is antahkarana which is nescience itself. Now the difficulty is how to explain the relation between cit and nescience. Strictly speaking, Advaita denies any real relation between them. This is in accordance with the conception that Atman cannot be determined by any relation. So the apparent relation between them is merely so called or superimposition.

11. Though we are always in it and of it we seem to have not realized it, because we are so immersed in finite thinking owing to the beginningless Samskara. So ordinarily, our common thought is an obstruction in the way of realising caitanya. When through philosophy and meditation we remove the obstruction, caitanya shows itself. The so-

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called realization of it only resembles the refinding the neck-lace which we have forgotten though¹⁵⁶ it is there on the neck all the while. It is in order to indicate all these considerations Advaita is named as Advaita. This term simply means the denial of dualism. As it is implied by this term, the business of philosophy is just to remove the wrong thought, i.e. the thought of Dvaita (dualism) regarding the nature of caitanya. So all our following discussions show how dualism is not a fact and how everything that appears points to caitanya as its ground.

So, then, we may conclude that caitanya is the only form of knowledge. If so, there arise the questions how there comes to be the knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term, and what its value is. In answering these questions Advaita admits the empirical reality of the ordinary knowledge; and shows that it points to caitanya as its ground. So cit and ordinary knowledge are not opposed to each other. However this point needs to be explained. Till then the thought of dualism seems to be ultimate and all our logical enquiry into the nature of cit seems to be opposed to experience; and this makes any clear conception of caitanya impossible. To show that the ordinary knowledge is not ultimate requires a thorough study of it.

12. Vritti-jnana is the same as that we hitherto were calling ordinary knowledge. This is the knowledge which involves subject-object relation. It appears and disappears as there is an occasion for it or not. So it is finite in nature, and consistently with its nature, its origin also must be finite. For it is only a finite thing that gives rise to a finite entity. Such an origin is called antahkarana in Advaita. Here in this term antah means internal and karana an organ. This¹⁵⁷ organ is not an instrument of knowledge because knowledge takes place in it. This is why knowledge (ordinary) is called vritti-jnana where vritti only means a state. Knowledge being a state is identical with antahkarana itself. We may note that antahkarana in Advaita is essentially different from manas in the Nyaya Vaisesika sense. Manas is only a sense organ, because it is only an instrument of knowledge and it is only infinitesimal in size. But the size of antahkarana is not infinitesimal since it is the abode of thought.

All our experience is due to the activity of antahkarana. From this we may conclude that Antahkarana is not active when there is no experience in such state as deep sleep. Antahkarana is quite active during both waking and dream states. During waking state antahkarana functions both by itself and by co-operating with the outward sense organs; and during dream state it functions by itself. Antahkarana is not only the abode of knowledge, but we may also regard it as the abode of feeling and volition. So all the psychical activities – knowing, feeling and willing – take place in antahkarana. It has both the power to know and the power to do.

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We have to note that the knowledge that takes place in antahkarana is no knowledge at all in the real sense of the term. As it is made clear in the previous pages, knowledge is permanent, self-evident and partless. Obviously the knowledge that appears in antahkarana is just of the opposite character. So we may conclude that vritti-jnana is not the same as cit. If so, it follows that it is something inert. Yet it is called knowledge since it reveals an object and to reveal¹⁵⁸ an object is to remove the nescience that covers the object. This is a fact that is supported by experience. So consistently with the logical enquiry regarding the true nature of knowledge, vritti is metaphorically called knowledge.

Now we may feel a difficulty how something inert can be called knowledge even metaphorically. In removing this difficulty, we may recall the conception that cit is infinite and therefore it is the ground of all and so the ground of antahkarana also. We may also consider that the knowing power observed in antahkarana is due to the presence of cit in it. From this we may conclude that antahkarana is so delicate in nature that it is very easily affected by the immanence of cit in it. Owing to this fact, it appears as leaving its own nature and exhibiting the knowing power. Thus the knowing here is nothing but the reflection of cit in antahkarana.

The Problem of Superimposition (Adhyasa) in Advaita Vedanta by H.N. Raghavendrachar (M.U.J.)

1. The terms atman and anatman are understood in various senses. Unless we are definite regarding the meaning of these terms, we cannot pronounce the judgment.
2. We may take three senses of the terms Atman and Anatman into consideration. In popular parlance we accept certain things as denoted by these terms; from the point of view of non-Advaitic Indian thinkers we accept certain other things as denoted by them and from the Advaita point of view we get quite other things as understood by the terms.
3. According to Vedanta, atman is partless caitanya and the other things antahkarana, body¹⁵⁹, etc. are anatman. Of these anatman is denoted by "you". It is not from the point of usage that anatman is described like this. As it is already stated, the body, etc. come under anatman. Ordinarily they are not described as being denoted by "you". A person does not address his own body etc. in the second person. But they are described as "you" in Advaita technicality. Accordingly "you" is that which is made known by cit. Since every thing that is other than atman is given by cit, all such things,

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even including body, etc., can be termed “you”. But atman is self-evident and therefore it cannot be denoted by ‘I’. These considerations clearly show that the first argument against superposition—that atman and anatman cannot be superposed on each other because they are respectively denoted by *asmat* and *yusmat* which are opposed to each other—is wrong since there are no such things as are denoted by *asmat* and *yusmat*.

4. Atman is *cit* and therefore it is only the subject; and anatman is of the opposite character and therefore it is only an object. If there is any thing that has the character of both atman and anatman, then that thing must be both subject and object at the same time. This is contradiction in terms. The same thing cannot at the same time be both subject and object. The subject is always the subject and never the object and the object is always the object and never the subject. We might say that the thing that is the subject by nature become the object owing to external conditions. But this does not hold good in case of Atman. Atman is partless and it cannot be externally conditioned. Nor can it evolve into the object for the same reason. In¹⁶⁰ fact, nothing that is partless can evolve into or take the form of a thing that is of opposite character. Space is partless; so it does not evolve or take the form of a thing that has parts. Similar consideration applies to the case of anatman. By nature it is of the character of object. It is *acit* (non-*cit*). So it cannot be *cit*. Nor can it be *cit* owing to external conditions; for to think of *acit* becoming *cit* is contradiction in thought. *Acit* evolves into *acit*. Clay evolves into pot. Pot is *acit* because clay is *acit*. Nor can *acit* be regarded as *cit*, because it gives room for *cit*; for by nature *cit* is omnipresent and to think of it as being given room afresh is contradiction in terms. So, in no case does *acit* become *cit*. They are of opposite characters and therefore one cannot be superposed on the other.

5. The body, etc. are not real. But it does not follow that they cannot be superposed. For superposition presupposes only the idea of the thing that is superposed and not its reality. This may be illustrated by the shell-silver superposition. Here, in this example, silver has no reality and the shell is real from the empirical point of view. Thus the unreal silver is superposed on the real shell. In the same way the unreal anatman may be superposed on real atman. In both the cases the idea of the things that are superposed cause the superposition. All super positions are of this nature. When the two distant trees are mistaken for one, it is not one tree that is superposed on the other but it is the superposition of oneness on the trees. Here oneness is unreal and it is superposed on the real trees.

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6.¹⁶¹ It is quite correct to hold that the appearance and disappearance of superposition presuppose those of its cause. This implies that superposition has a cause. We term this cause “nescience.”

7. The thing that appears in superposition is not real; and in perceiving such a thing antahkarana requires no help from sense-organ, just as in the case of dreams. It is clear that in the dream the whole experience is due to the activities of antahkarana. So also in the superposition “This is silver” “silver” is given through antahkarana. So the absence of the activity of the sense-organ does not negate the perceptual character of superposition, as it is the case in dream.

This explanation also does not hold good. Admitting that antahkarana itself does the whole function, what all we have stated is that antahkarana assumes the form of knowledge, i.e. superposition. Now we have to answer the question “Who is to have the experience, i.e. knowledge?” Obviously it is not antahkarana; because it has already assumed the form of knowledge and it cannot further evolve as the knower. Assuming that it also evolves as the knower, we have to hold that all experience is to antahkarana. But this is not true. Antahkarana is inert and it cannot be the knower. The knower must be of the character of caitanya and this is atman. So all experience is to atman. So the cause of superimposition, i.e. nescience also must be in atman, otherwise superposition as residing in atman cannot be explained. So far the whole position is that Atman is caitanya, in him there is nescience, and this nescience is the material cause of superposition.

8.¹⁶² According to Advaita the positive and the negative are not contradictory. For, to assert that the world is either exclusively positive or negative involves contradiction. The positive is the real and the negative unreal. The fact that something has a beginning and is destroyed proves that it is not real i.e. that it is not positive; and the fact that something has a material cause proves that it is not negative, The real has neither a beginning nor an end, for instance, we may take caitanya; and the unreal has no material case, as, for instance, the horns of a hare. Likewise the real cannot be contradicted, and the unreal cannot be the cause of anything. We know that nescience is contradicted and therefore we may conclude that it is not real i.e. that it is not positive. We also know that it is the cause of super-imposition and therefore we may conclude that it is not negative. So nescience is neither positive or negative. It must be an entity of a third order.

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This conclusion is inevitable. It is forced by logic. Though it is not a familiar order of existence we have to accept it as the irrefutable logic gives it to be the true nature of existence.

9. We may hold that Nescience and Atman are similar to each other in so far as they are not-negative and beginningless. But from this we must not conclude that like Atman, nescience is not destroyed. Atman by its own nature cannot be destroyed. But nescience is not so. It is destroyed because it is other than Atman.

First¹⁶³ Principles of Theosophy By C. Jinarajadasa

1. REINCARNATION—that life, through successive embodiments, ascends to fuller and nobler capacities of thought and feeling—and Evolution—that form ascends, becoming ever more and more complex in structure—are as the right hand and left.

2. By common usage, however, the word reincarnation is restricted to the process as it affects the souls of men, and it is used in one of three senses, as follows: (i) That at the birth of a child, God does not then create for it a soul, because that soul existed long before as an individual, in some spiritual condition. For the first and for the last time, the soul takes birth in a human form. This is the doctrine of Pre-existence. (ii) That the soul of man has already appeared in earlier embodiments, sometimes in human forms, but at other times as an animal or plant; and that, similarly after death, the soul may be re-born as an animal or plant, before returning once more to a human habitation. This idea is best known as Transmigration or Metempsychosis. (iii) That the soul of man, before birth as a child, has already lived on earth as man and as woman, but not as an animal or a plant, except before “individualisation”, i.e. before the soul became a permanent, self-conscious, individual entity; and that at death, after an interval of life in a spiritual condition, the soul returns to earth again, as man or as woman, but nevermore taking birth as a plant or as an animal. This is the doctrine of Reincarnation.

3. The aim of reincarnation is to enable a soul to be wiser and better after the experience of¹⁶⁴ each incarnation; but it is found that while one soul has the ability of learning quickly from an experience, another will be extremely slow to learn, and needs each experience to be repeated over and over again. This difference in capacity for assimilating experience is due to the difference in age of the two souls.

4. The youngest souls are those who are unable to control their violent and crude desire-natures and are lacking in mental ability; in the world to-day, these souls appear

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in the savage and semi-civilised races, as also in the backward or criminal-minded individuals in civilised communities.

5. Somewhat further evolved, and so older, are those souls who have passed beyond the savage stage, but are still simple-minded, unimaginative, and lacking in initiative. These two classes include more than nine-tenths of humanity. Then come the more advanced and cultured souls in all races.

6. The Adept is past any need of reincarnation he has already gained all experiences which civilisations can give him.

7. He has then finished his reincarnation, and is himself, in his causal body only, with all his experiences transmuted into ideals and capacities. But as he has still much to do towards perfecting himself, he reincarnates again.

8. For souls of the two classes—the simple-minded and the undeveloped—the law of reincarnation is modified to the extent that they will be born repeatedly in a sub-race before passing on to the next. This will be due to their inability to gain the required experience during two or three lives in a sub-race. The period between their incarnations is¹⁶⁵ sometimes only a few years, though it may be long as two or three centuries. They are in reality millions of years behind the cultured class, so far as their general evolution is concerned. Yet the backwardness is not due to any evil in them; it is merely a matter of the age of the soul; they are young souls. The larger outlook on life and the wider sympathies, which are natural to-day to a cultured soul, will some day be possessed by the undeveloped and the simple-minded souls also. Growth comes to all, sooner or later, in the endless life of the soul.

9. We are already familiar in science with the conception of the whole universe as an expression of energy. The electron is a storehouse of energy: so too, though on a larger scale is a star. This energy is continually changing, motion transforming itself into light or heat or electricity, and a heavy element into a lighter, and so on from one transformation to another. Man himself is a storehouse of energy; he takes in energy with his food, and transforms it into the movements of his body.

10. All the time that man lives, he is a transformer; the universal energy enters into him, to be transformed by him into service or into injury.

The law of Karma is the statement of cause and effect as man transforms energy. It takes into account not only, as science does, the visible universe and its forces, but also that larger unseen universe of force which is man's true sphere of activity. Just as, with the flicker of an eyelid, man throws into the universe a force which affects the

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equilibrium of all other forces in our physical cosmos, so too, with each thought and feeling, he changes the¹⁶⁶ adjustment of himself to the universe, and the adjustment of the universe to himself.

The first principle to grasp, in the attempt to understand Karma, is that we are dealing with forces and its effects. This force is of the physical world of movement, or of the astral world of feeling, or of the forces of thinking.

11. Since man is not an individual by himself, but is one unit in a Humanity of millions of individuals, each thought or feeling or act of man affects each of his fellow men, in proportion to the nearness of each to him as the recipient of force. Each such use of force by a man, which helps or hinders the whole, of which he is a part, brings with it a result to him; this result is briefly stated, in terms of his action and its resultant reaction.

12. Each injury is so much force thrown out into the universe, which works itself out in the injury inflicted on another; but the equilibrium of the universe to that other has then been disturbed by the injurer, and that equilibrium must be restored at the expense of the wrong-doer. His "karma" for the injury is a "pain"; the force which produces the pain discharges itself through the injured as the fulcrum, and thus restores the original equilibrium. Similarly is it with a kind act; its karma or reaction is a force which adjusts circumstances so as to produce a "comfort".

Furthermore, in this universe of law, each type of force, works on its own plane. One man may give alms to a beggar with pity and sympathy, but another merely to get rid of him as a nuisance; both perform a kind act, and to both the karma of the act on the physical plane¹⁶⁷ is a "comfort"; but there is to the former an additional karma on the astral plane for his pity and sympathy, and it returns to him as a happy emotion, while to the latter there is no karma of this kind. Similarly, I may have nothing but pity to give to a sufferer; I reap thereby an emotional "happiness" but I do not reap a physical "comfort" as well.

13. Each one of us, as he enters this life, comes from a long past of many lives; as we take up our task once more on earth, we bring with us our karma, good and evil.

14. To some extent, there is for each man a "fate", for "fate" is that quantity of good and evil karma selected for him by the Lords of Karma for a given life. His parents, his heredity, those who help him and those who hinder him, his opportunities, his obligations, his death—these are as his "fate"; but while these forces spend themselves, they do not impose upon him the manner in which he shall react to them. Small though

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his will is, as yet, that will is still free; he can react to his old karma and produce good rather than bad of new karma. It is true that he is greatly handicapped, both by his past tendencies and by the pressure of his environment; yet the divine spirit lives within him and, if he will but rouse himself, he may co-operate with the Divine Will in evolution, and not work against it.

15. When any man fails – and much of his failure now is due to his environment – each of us who has helped to make that environment shares in the karma of his failure.

16.¹⁶⁸

"KARMA"	===	ACTIVITY.
OF PAST LIFE		OF PRESENT LIFE
Serviceable actions	make	Good environment
Hurtful actions	make	Evil environment
Aspirations & Desires	make	Capacities.
Sustained thoughts	make	Character.
Successes	make	Enthusiasm.
Experiences.	make	Wisdom.
Painful experiences	make	Conscience.
Wills to serve.	make	Spirituality.

Sankaracharya's Interpretation of the Brahmasutras by Lingesha Mahabhagavat in I.P.R.

1. Whether Sankara's interpretation is an innovation, an attempt to read his own doctrines into the Sutras, or has a weighty tradition behind it.
2. Mr Gough holds the view "that Sankara is the generally recognised expositor of true Vedanta doctrine, that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sutrakar and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedanta doctrine known to us from Sankara's writings."
3. Whether there are any indications in Sankara's writings to assure us that the Advaita was taught long before Sankara.
4. As to the internal evidences in Sankara with regard to previous teachers of Advaita, I may refer to various places in his works where Sankara gives homage to ancient teachers.

5.¹⁶⁹ The epithet applied to Gaudapada is quite significant. These evidences in the Bhashya and other references to ancient Gurus in the Updesha sahasri and other works of the philosopher are sufficiently strong for the assumption of a good tradition behind Sankara. This assumption is very much supported by the consideration that Sankara throughout his writings strongly condemns independent effort to understand the Vedas without the help of a Guru.

6. We have seen that there are a good many indications in Sankara as well as in other Vedantic writers warranting the supposition that this philosopher was only a representative of a very ancient school.

7. Colonel Jacob, however, calls this description of Maya as incorrect. He says “the word Maya is nowhere used by Sankara, as a synonym for Avidya, but is expressly said to be produced by it, and that in no sense whatever does he regard it as the cause of the world.

8. “The word Maya has also another meaning, that of an illusory appearance, as in the state of dream...” It will be clear that the question of Maya has not been as fully investigated by modern scholars as it deserves. In any investigation concerning the philosophy of Sankara, the determination of the exact significance of Maya must necessarily occupy the foremost attention, since without it, the system of Sankara now universally known as Maya-vada, cannot be correctly understood. Neither Indian nor Western scholars are quite unanimous on this question of all-absorbing interest.

9. The necessity of putting away individual prepossessions¹⁷⁰ for the time being, while engaged in the examination of Indian Philosophical works.

10. He must be that type of yankeefied ascetic, in gold spectacles and yellow garo, at whose perfumed sandals a certain type of hysterical American womanhood pays fulsome court.

“Indian & Western Philosophy” by B. Heimann

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SANKARACHARYA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMASUTRAS. by LINGESHA MAHABHAGAVAT. in I. P. R

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SANKARACHARYA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMASUTRAS. by LINGESHA MAHABHAGAVAT. in I. P. R

1. Thus both climatically and geographically India was predestined for the full development of cosmic speculation. Her Nature still remains the force majeure in spite of steadily encroaching Western technics.
2. When we consider the deep elemental differences dividing East from West, all these apparent similarities will be found to be merely accidental. Even if they digress occasionally from the fundamental tendency, the underlying inherited trend of thought still remains extremely effective in spite of the seeming reciprocal approximation of the two different worlds of thought.
3. The Greek term Philo-sophia means "love of sophia" of human reason, measure, of judgment and discrimination.
4. Of the Greek philosophers about 500 B.C when Xenophanes and his contemporaries mocked at gods conceived in animal form.
5. For Indian speculation, God is not almighty.
6. Above him are the two eternal cosmic laws: the eternal law of reincarnation and that of Karma which, through all the manifold forms of reincarnation, manifests its efficacy in action and consequent reaction. In Homer, however, as with the pre-Sophistic thinkers, we discover a similar acknowledgment of¹⁷¹ supreme cosmic laws: for neither Moira, self-incurred fate, nor Ananke, natural necessity, is subject to the will or grace of Zeus.
7. According to Indian Philosophy there is indeed, even in our present lifetime and in our stage of definite form, one state in which we may experience this super-definite Being. For in deep dreamless sleep, free from all memory of empirical happenings, we attain the super-conscious, super-rational stage of "no-form", or form that cannot be grasped in any way. Thus we plunge into the reservoir into which all definition and all consciousness are absorbed, but out of which empirical functions may reappear.
8. The Samsara (derived from sar) is a continuous stream of actual lives, and should never be rendered as the "cycle of rebirths", since the individual in its rebirth never returns to the same, but always to a more developed stage of incarnation, in accord with the growth of its own inherent tendency. All Indian thinkers hold that the Karmabija (Karma seed) biologically develops into the Karmaphalam (Karma fruit) thus choosing for its next embodiment a more adequate and less limited form of existence.

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9. The word Karma simply means activity; in the philosophical Vaisesika system it denotes the category of motion, thus comprising both activity and its aim; grammatically it is the accusative, the direct object of action. The so-called ethical Karma theory therefore, is not Ethics in the Western criminological sense of protecting the social community by punishing and segregating the offender; it involves no act of justice by a revengeful God nor—semi-indianized—retribution of the impersonal Karma-force.¹⁷² It¹⁷³ is purely biological ethics, revealed in the inviolable law of cause and effect, and imposing on the individual a super-personal responsibility towards both the future and the cosmos. This means, still further, that the main tendency of character becomes manifested in the later stages of rebirth in forms better suited to Man's intrinsic needs.

10. "Neither "good" nor "bad" therefore is an ultimate canon in India's natural, in the sense of ethically indifferent, Philosophy. But while both are merely relative, still the power of development in any given direction is irresistible.

11. It is indeed possible to summarize the whole of Indian Ethics by considering Sat from the philological-philosophical point of view. For in accordance with Indo-European linguistics Sat is merely the present participle of the root as (Greek asti, Latin Est); Sat therefore means "Being", but in India Sat also means "good": whatever exists, in other words, is justified by its very existence. If now the compound of Sat, Satya, the Sat-like, is taken into consideration, the fundamental Indian ethical principle becomes clear; for not only is all Being Sat, good, but as such it is also Satya, "real" and "true"; and hence every dynamic expression of life, simply because it is life, is true & good.

12. Logic itself has a religious or cosmic aim, which it shares with all other disciplines of similarly general character—that is to extend the limits of reasoning and thus to transcend the narrow bounds of the individual mind. Thus understood, Logic provides a way to liberation from that isolation which is, to the Indian spirit, only an illusion, upadhi, or attribute that is projected into the objective world by Man's subjective rationality.

13. Western Sphists, on the other hand, adopted a¹⁷⁴ sceptical attitude towards perception, in accordance with the anthropological principle: "Man is the measure of all things." By thus elevating Man above other cosmic beings they isolated him and conferred on him a personality which he proved too weak to bear; for the same reason the Sophists proclaimed perception to be unreliable, rather than established facts.

¹⁷² The original editor deleted "Nor" by hand

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14. Descartes, for example, doubted the reality of the external world and asserted, as the primary certainty, the existence of a thinking subject, cogito ergo sum, just as long before him Socrates taught his "Know thyself", both principles alike mean: Make your own ego the starting point for all investigation.

15. Vidya, true knowledge, is the synoptic vision of the whole; it is genuine "Conception" "gathering-together", "consciousness" in its literal sense of "knowing-together" all things however apparently different and divergent. Avidya then, like Maya, is the fiction of separation.

16. None of them ever isolates Logic from the actual world and removes it to any remote sphere of abstraction; all alike originate from contact with the empirical world. By the contemplation of Nature's diversity therefore, and not by means of isolating definition and rational reasoning, they attain the goal of unity and of final liberation from the fiction of isolated existence.

17. Much of the mysterious charm of Indian jungle life, closely connecting Man, animals and plants with one another.

18. The knowledge of the influence of carriage and posture on physical and thus on psychical, well-being has been since the earliest times the common property of all Indians with or¹⁷⁵ without special training. (For further details cf. Journ.Roy.Asiat.Soc. 1937, pp.355ff.)

19. Some individuals, remote from the main line of thought, attempted to follow paths off the beaten track that seemed to lead to the consistent cosmic views of India: men who spent their lives in monasteries or lonely rectories in the North, meditating on the stillness of Nature as contrasted with an outside world bent on temporal pleasure and resounding with the clamour of earthly struggles.

20. The relativity of all Man's hitherto fixed categories has also perturbed the Western standard of his status in the Cosmos. On the one hand, the principle of master and measure of all things) has now gained the sanction provided by all his marvellous achievements, even while it is this very predominance that has been shaken by Man's own discoveries. Irony of Fate! The heliocentric theory has for several centuries held undisputed sway; Man and his world are no longer singled out from other cosmic systems; their centre of gravity has been displaced; Man himself is but one of the many possible cosmic beings of countless other galaxies. How then can the West, faced with

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these universally accepted conclusions, adhere to its postulate that the path of Western culture is the only possible one?

21. Leisure is no longer left for solitude devoted to fruitful meditation and humble expectation of divine intuition; but it was only the quiet of a culture, knowing no time restrictions, that could give birth to India's intuitive vision. As against all this, the psychological consequences of the recent Western discoveries establishing the relativity of hitherto established categories have lead implicitly to a new non-rationality, to a search for refuge in mysticism and emotionalism of all shades.

22¹⁷⁶. The Bhagavadgita has recently been interpreted in different political quarters as the "Song in praise of fighting"; but it is quite inadmissible to draw any parallel between this ancient Indian extolling of the warrior's duty in combat, and any political dogma of the West, since the Bhagavadgita explicitly recognizes contest only as a neutral obligation free from emotional personal concern.

23. Anu-iksiki, lit. look along (anu). Hence: philosophy as investigation and reflection.

Avidya, lit. non-knowledge= Maya i.e. discrimination of isolated objects.

Bhatki, lit. participation. In theology: union of devotee and object of devotion.

Darsana (drsti), lit. a seeing. In religious psychology: vision; in epistemology: knowledge; general term: system.

Dharma, lit. fixed position. Legal term: a statute; in ethics: duty, right; in ontology: law of Nature; in Buddhism; precepts of Buddha; in later Buddhist epistemology: the phenomena as data.

Karma, lit. action. In theory of perception: category of motion; in grammatical science: direct object (accusative case); in ethics: action and reaction.

Maya, lit. a measuring. In philosophy: all measurable (i.e. all empirical) objects. In Buddhism and Vedanta exp. illusion, as contrasted with transcendental reality.

Nirvana, lit. blown off. In ontology: dispersion of all definite shape; in logic: (dis)solution of all definition: in psychology: (dis)solution of all individual desire.

Rta, lit. a going. In ontology: functional immanent order of the cosmic phenomena; in theology: divine law; in epistemology: truth.

Sat, lit. being (pres. part. of to be). In ontology¹⁷⁷: existent; in ethics: good; in epistemology: true (cf. Satya)

Upadhi, lit. to place near, to put upon. In logic and theology: wrong attribution, wrong discrimination.

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Yantra. Lit. causing to go or to restrain. (polarity of meaning!) General: any instrument, implement, or machine; hence in ethics: interference with the course of Nature.

Yoga, lit. Union. In astronomy: a conjunction of stars; in arithmetics; addition; in grammatical science: etymological association: in Yoga System: Concentration of body and mind.

Mary W. Calkin's Introduction to Scribner's Edition of the Works of Berkeley

1. the most striking feature of this doctrine is Berkeley's teaching, that material things do not exist. To get at his meaning, it is necessary, first, to understand his use of terms. By a spirit, he means a primarily conscious and, in that sense, an active and permanent being; ideas he describes as mental but as "passive", that is, as dependent on spirit, and as "fleeting", or impermanent; matter he defines as that which is radically unlike and independent of mental reality, that which (in the words which Hume later used) "would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated."

By four main considerations Berkeley seeks to undermine the belief that material objects thus defined, exist. (1) Against the unsophisticated dualists of his day (and of ours), who insist naively that they directly see and touch and hear, and therefore know, the existence of material things, Berkeley argues that this assertion leads to the contradiction of¹⁷⁸ supposing that a material object has no stable or constant nature of its own. Cool one hand and warm the other, he directs, and then plunge them both into a basin of lukewarm water and, behold, you shall directly perceive what you call the material water as both hot and cold. And similarly, you may at different times or from different positions perceive the same fruit as sweet or as sour, the same buildings as large or small. All this, Berkeley insists, is sheer absurdity from the standpoint of the naive dualist, who conceives the material world as fixed and permanent, but is readily explained by the idealist, who claims that things are ideas and who points to the notorious changeableness of the same ideas.

(2) Berkeley's second argument is urged against the academic dualist of his day who had accepted Locke's distinction, and Descartes's, of the secondary from the primary qualities. But the primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley points out, are "inseparably united" in the physical object. What we see is not the coloured and the extended but the coloured, extended object. What we touch is not the hard and the extended but the hard, extended object. Those, therefore, who agree with Locke and Descartes that the secondary qualities are mental, and this includes virtually all the scientists of Berkeley's day as of our own, must by parity of reasoning conclude that the primary qualities, extension and motion, are mental also.

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(3) Up to this point, Berkeley has contended merely that we have no right to claim direct perception of material things—in other words that¹⁷⁹ the objects of our direct sense-consciousness are themselves percepts. His third argument he directs against a strongly entrenched position of Descartes and of Locke. This is the doctrine, held by many of our own day also, that though we directly perceive only what is mental, namely our own percepts, we must none the less infer as causes of these percepts existent material object. In opposition to this doctrine, Berkeley points out that causes must be held to resemble their effects; and accordingly that a material, that is a non-mental, thing can not in the nature of the case be conceived as cause of a percept which is mental. More than this, every cause, he insists, is active whereas matter is, by common consent, “passive and inert”. For both reasons, because no material thing can be conceived to cause that which is mental (since the material is by definition radically unlike and independent of the mental) and because no inactive thing can be a cause at all, Berkeley rejects the conclusion that matter can be inferred to exist as cause of our percepts.

(4) These three arguments, so briefly summarized in the preceding paragraphs, are greatly elaborated by Berkeley and drawn out over many pages. And yet he explicitly proposes to supplant them by a consideration of quite a different sort. Toward the end of the first of the THREE DIALOGUES, Philonous, representing Berkeley says to Hylas, the dualist, “I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any...sensible object whatever to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.” Hylas rises greedily to this bait. “What is more easy” he exclaims “than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself independent of, and unperceived by¹⁸⁰, any mind whatsoever?”. But Philonous is quick to point out that the tree or house in question must be conceived by Hylas if he is to describe it in any way at all, even as existing independent of mind. And in the end Hylas reached the following idealistic position: “As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place...me thought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought-of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind...Abd this is far from proving that I can conceive them as existing out of the minds of all Spiritis.” In a word Berkeley bases his idealism on the appeal to our consciousness which shows us that whatever we experience is part of our own experiencing, and accordingly mental.

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Berkeley's conception of the Universe as Spiritual: The preceding pages have summarized only Berkeley's doctrine that the physical world is mental, not material. For aught that he has so far told us, physical objects are merely his own sense percepts. But his universe is at once enlarged through the discovery of an important difference between the percepts which constitute his physical world and other ideas which he calls the ideas of imagination. These last he can excite in his mind at his pleasure; but his percepts are actually imprinted on his senses without dependence on his will. To explain the occurrence of these ideas of sense it is necessary, Berkeley argues, to infer the existence of some cause other-than-himself. The immediate problem concerns the nature of this cause. It is no longer open to him to infer the existence of a material cause of these sense-ideas. Nor¹⁸¹ is it possible, in the second place, to argue that his sense-percepts are caused by still other ideas. For ideas, Berkeley invariably teaches, are passive, not active; and accordingly "the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see" he continues, by way of illustration "is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it." Only one path remains open. The cause of Berkeley's sense-ideas must be another self, or spirit, and to explain the order, regularity and nature of these sense-ideas it is necessary to infer that this creative spirit is infinite.

2. They have virtually ignored two striking features of his teaching, his sensationalism and his opposition to what he calls abstract ideas. By the term "sensationalism" is meant, on the one hand, Berkeley's emphasis on perception, imagination, and upon the ideas imprinted by sense, and on the other hand his neglect of thought and of other-than-sense ideas.

3. Berkeley never goes beyond this bare assertion of an intellectual factor in knowledge, the notion, which on the one hand resembles the idea in being treated as dependent on mind and described as copy of a known object, but which, on the other hand, is contrasted with the idea as active where as the notion is always described as passive. He never distinguishes the notional experience of awareness of self from the radically different notional experience of awareness of relation; nor does he ever distinguish one relational experience from another or anticipate Kant and Hegel by showing¹⁸² that our consciousness of physical objects is relational as well as sensational. With the years, however, he comes to estimate far more highly the intellectual as compared with the sense-factor in knowledge.

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4. Berkeley's concern through long periods of his life was practical social and economic issues; and Berkeley has an ethical doctrine which underlies his solutions of the concrete problems which he faces.

5. The more naive of the critics of Berkeley's idealism have always urged that on his principles "all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world". Against this objection, Berkeley maintains that "Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist," he continues, "I make not the least question." The reality of perceived things consists, he repeats, not in their independence of mind but in their independence of any definite mind.

6. The discriminating idealist is not greatly concerned for the fate of either argument. He bases idealism on no one of these subsidiary considerations but squarely, as Berkeley placed it, on the one unchallengeable assertion: what I directly know, and all that I directly know, is a self (myself) experiencing. To state this central Berkeleyan position in slightly different fashion: what I am at any time unchallengeably incontrovertibly certain of, when I assert the existence of a physical object—flower, desk or book—what I can maintain against anyone's denial is merely this, that I have such and such an idea, that I am experiencing in such and such a¹⁸³ fashion, sensationally, relationally, or affectively. Any other statement which I make may be disputed but no one on earth can challenge the assertions: "I see, hear, taste thus or thus," "I have such or such an idea", "I compare", "I relate causally." And each of these unchallengeable assertions has, as object, mental reality.

Against each of the arguments by which Berkeley seeks to prove that matter can not validly be inferred to exist as cause of our percepts modern realists propose an objection. (a) In opposition to the argument, "the mental can not be caused by the non-mental", they rightly urge that it assumes what is a point at issue, the necessary likeness of cause and effect. (Modern idealists, accepting this criticism point out that Berkeley might, in Kantian fashion, have shown that cause is itself a form of experience) (b) against Berkeley's contention that matter is inactive, and accordingly non-causal, contemporary realists appeal to the modern dynamic conceptions of matter, in terms of electrons moving with incomparable swiftness, with ceaseless energy. The idealist, on his side, hospitably welcomes the modern conceptions of matter. But he insists that the physical universe, thus described, is still reducible to the elemental factors which Berkeley discussed: that ions & electrons and atoms, as well as particles and planets, are spatial entities and are endowed with motion; that energy itself is motion, or capacity of motion; that force is ratio of motions or cause of motion—in a word, that there are no

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ultimately novel terms in which modern scientists describe their world. It follows that contemporary conceptions of matter are no less¹⁸⁴ stateable than 18th century conceptions in Berkleian terms.

For more significant than any one of the preceding criticisms is the contention of contemporary neo-realists that the idealistic position consists essentially in the fallacy of deducing from the truism “no unknown objects are known” the conclusion “no unknown objects exist.” The first comment to be made on this criticism is that, like most of those already considered, it has been anticipated by Berkeley.

7. The discriminating idealist of our day will react in a similar fashion to the criticism in its modern form. He will admit that he himself and his fellow idealists have no right to deny forthwith the possible existence of unknown objects. But this, he will point out, is merely because no statement whatever should be made about anything conceived as literally unknown; and he will urge that the criticism cuts both ways and that consequently the realist has no more right than the idealist to make statements about unknown objects. This conclusion, however, obviously undermines the fundamental realistic teaching that objects exist both as unknown and as known. The idealist insists, accordingly, that his realistic critic must face the dilemma of Hylas: either he after all knows something of the objects which he calls unknown—that they exist, that they need not enter into the knowledge relation, and so on—or else he illicitly claims for himself the privilege, which he rightly denies to the idealist, of making assertions about that which is unknown.

8. The criticisms so far considered have all been directed against Berkeley’s doctrine of the objects¹⁸⁵ of knowledge, in particular against his conception of the physical world as a system of ideas. Those which follow concern themselves not at all with his doctrine of physical objects but with his philosophy of spirits. The first of the criticisms to be discussed is that of Hume. With Berkeley’s doctrine of the world of ideas Hume was completely in accord. “No man”, says Hume, “who reflects, ever doubted that...this house and that tree are nothing but perceptions.” But Hume believes, in opposition to Berkeley, that only ideas exist, that the universe is merely a great and ordered collection of more or less vivid percepts and images. Accordingly he challenges Berkeley’s doctrine of spirit or self, contending that mind, or spiritual substance, should have been outlawed along with matter. “All our perceptions”, he says (and by “perceptions” he means precisely what Locke and Berkeley mean by “ideas”) “may exist separately and have no need of anything else to support their

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existence." And he flatly denies the direct and intimate awareness of self which Descartes and Locke had strongly emphasized and Berkeley unequivocally asserted.

8. Against this move, however, Berkeley had already countered. He was meditating on the concept of the mind as "congeries of perceptions" more than 30 years before Hume published his Treatise. And in the 3ed of the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous he makes clear why he rejects this doctrine that the mind is a "heap or collection" of ideas. "It seems" says Hylas, anticipating Hume's criticism, "that according to your own way of thinking....it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And as there¹⁸⁶ is no more meaning in spiritual Substance than in material substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other." To which Philonous rejoins: "How often must I repeat that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself an not my ideas but somewhat....that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas...I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance...supports...ideas." To this the 20th century idealist has nothing essential to add. He may indeed point out that every Humian assumes a self in the very denial of self, but he rests his case on the appeal to every man's direct and immediate experience of himself as being conscious, as having ideas.

9. By far the most serious of the criticisms on Berkleian idealism concerns itself with the grounds of his doctrine of our knowledge of spirits. The difficulty in the form in which Berkeley tried to meet it is pointed out by Hylas towards the beginning of the last of the three Dialogues: "Answer me, Philonous, Are all our ideas perfectly inert?" (And Philonous of course replies that "they are altogether passive and inert"). Hylas continues: "And is not God an agent, a being purely active?"; to which Philonous once more assents. On these admissions Hylas bases his argument. Since no passive idea "can be like unto or represent" an active spirit, we have therefore no idea of any spirit; and accordingly Philonous can not even claim to know his" own soul."

A candid reader must admit that Hylas carried off¹⁸⁷ the honours in this philosophic tourney. Philonous, impersonating Berkeley, has throughout implied that knowledge consists in the possession of an idea like its object; and has stressed the contrast between passive ideas and active spirits. And it certainly follows from this distinction that no idea can resemble a spirit and that spirit, consequently must remain

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unknown. Berkeley's effort, already considered, to evade the difficulty by proclaiming that he has an active "notion", not a passive "idea", of spirit is, as every one recognizes, a futile quibble; for he nowhere distinguishes notion from idea except by its function of resembling spirit (or relation). To the 20th century idealist it is evident that there is only one way – but a clear way – out of the difficulty: to abandon, once and for all, the whole copy-theory of knowledge, by recognizing that ideas are ways in which minds are conscious, not copies distinct from mind of objects external to both. As a matter of fact, while at the same time inconsistently clinging to the mythical notion-doctrine of knowledge, Berkeley really takes this other way out. He reasserts his direct and immediate knowledge of his own existence and thus suggests the possibility of a knowledge of other selves which is from one point of view "mediate" because derived from his knowledge of himself, and yet from another point of view "direct", since it requires no intermediary idea. In other words, Berkeley virtually abandons the discredited view that a mind knows objects by possessing ideas which are like the objects known. Knowledge accordingly becomes for him an attitude of mind not an idea distinct from mind. And the illuminating, indisputable instance of direct knowledge is, as Berkeley reiterates, his knowledge of himself.

Present¹⁸⁸-day realists, unhampered by the copy-theory of knowledge, find a second difficulty in Berkeley's doctrine of knowledge of minds or selves. Granting Berkeley's right to a certainty of his own existence, they contend that, on the basal principle of his idealism, he may know only his single, individual self – that other finite selves and God, as well as physical objects, reduce simply to ideas in his mind. In the writer's view, this criticism constitutes the one important contribution of contemporary realists to the great controversy between realists and idealists. The argument, as has just been stated, consists essentially in developing the implications of the fundamental idealistic position: I unchallengeably know only myself and my experience. From this it follows, the critic insists, not merely (as Berkeley had argued) that alleged material things are really my ideas but also that God and my fellow-men are my ideas. In a word, the metaphysical universe, narrows to myself and my own experiences – I have no more right to infer the existence of other selves than to infer that on non-mental objects. Yet, on the other hand, the passivity of my perception, indeed all my involuntary experience, forces me to admit the existence of some what other-than-myself. The idealist is thus, his critic asserts, involved in a hopeless contradiction. On the one hand he insists that he is certain only of himself and his own experience. Yet, on the other hand, because of his directly experienced passivity, he is forced to admit the existence of something besides himself.

It can not be claimed that Berkeley met this criticism or even that he explicitly foresaw it. 20th century idealists adopt one of two attitudes toward it. The pluralists

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among¹⁸⁹ them, those who conceive the universe as a great society of independent spirits, or persons, stressing the direct experience of passivity insist that the reality beyond me is more likely to resemble than to differ radically from the self directly known. In a word, they reason from analogy, or else they assume without reasoning, that the world is throughout mental. Monistic, or absolutistic, idealists on the other hand, believe that the paradox (involved in asserting both that I am certain only of myself and also that there exists reality outside myself) may be resolved by the conception of myself as identically part of an Including Self. So conceived, the other-than-self of which in my passivity I am directly conscious may be regarded as, in another sense, my own Greater Self. This doctrine can not properly be attributed to Berkeley but it may be argued that only by such a conception can Berkeley explain how the percepts which constitute his physical universe are at once his own and God's.

VERSES ON THE PROSPECT OF PLANTING ARTS AND LEARNING IN AMERICA.

The Muse, disgusted at an age and clime
Barren of every glorious theme,
In distant lands now waits a better time
Producing subjects worthy fame:
In happy climes, where from the genial sun
And virgin earth such scenes ensue,
The force of art by nature seems outdone,
And fancied beauties by the true:
In happy climes, the seat of innocence,
Where nature guides and virtue rules,
Where men shall not impose for truth and sense,
The pedantry of coursts and schools:
There shall be sung another golden age,
The rise of empire and of arts,
The¹⁹⁰ Good and great inspiring epic rage,
The wisest heads and noblest hearts.
Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,
By future poets shall be sung.
Westward the course of empire takes its way;

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The four first Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the day;
Time's noblest offspring is the last.

(GEORGE BERKELEY)

10. Never perhaps, since the days when Plato sought to set up in the Sicilian court a philosopher-king, has a metaphysician entertained a more adventurous plan for the up-building of the Great Society.

For nearly five years before he sailed into Newport harbour, Berkeley had lavished all his energy, his time, and his fortune on this project of founding in the Summer Islands a College which should serve for the instruction, both of the "English youth" of the colonies and of "a number of young American savages, in Christian religion, practical mathematics, and other liberal arts and sciences". The repeated attempts of Berkeley's contemporaries, to depict his personal charm and persuasiveness, pale beside the statement of the bare fact that his fiery pleading in behalf of this Utopian scheme had won for him private subscriptions of more than five thousand pounds from prelates and noblemen and distinguished ladies "who desire to be unknown", a vote of approval from the House of Commons (after Berkeley had privately talked with each member of it), a charter for the college of St. Paul in the Bermudas, and a promise from Sir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister, of a grant of 20,000 pounds. Most amazing of all, a gently bred Irish lady, chosen¹⁹¹ by Berkeley for her "qualities of mind and her unaffected inclination to books," agreed "with great cheerfulness" to sail westward with him on this adventurous voyage.

Nothing in the record of Berkeley's early years prepares us for this astounding effort of his middle life.

11. The fascinating record of Berkeley's animated thinking during his college years—a story which we construct for ourselves from the pages first published only half a century ago, of a little manuscript volume, in Berkeley's own hand, called by its first editor, *Commonplace Book*. The abbreviated memoranda, questions, notes, and comments succeed each other with no attempt at logical order and no thought of consistency. There are brief references to the doctrines of Locke and Hobbes, of Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza; vigorous reactions to the mathematicians and scientists of the day, and, in particular, to Newton; anticipations of all the significant teachings of Berkeley's own system; indications of doctrines which more or less completely he later abandons. His first book, the Essay toward a New Theory of Vision, published in 1709, is a primarily psychological study of our consciousness of distance and magnitude but subtly suggests the metaphysical conclusion of the books which follow close upon it, the *PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE* and the

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DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS. In these volumes Berkeley, before he is thirty, makes his great contribution to modern philosophy drawing, in ineradicable outline the conception of the universe as, through and through mental.

12. A second letter clearly indicates Berkeley's consuming concern for human welfare. Looking back upon his weeks in France, he writes "I cannot help observing that the Jacobites have little to hope and others little to fear from that reduced nation¹⁹². The king indeed looks as he neither wanted meat nor drink and his palaces are in good repair; but throughout the land there..are instances enough of poverty and distress to spoil the mirth of any one who feels for the sufferings of his fellow-creatures." (1713).

13. New England has furthermore the honour of being the birthplace of the important book, called *Alciphron*, in which Berkeley expounds his philosophy with special reference to its theistic basis and its moral applications.

14. He published the *Analyst*, an essay setting forth the unreasonableness of the free-thinking mathematician who presumes to say that "mysteries may not be objects of faith at the same time that he himself admits such obscure mysteries" as "infinitesimals each infinitely less than the foregoing and infinitely greater than the following...to be the objects of science."

15. Berkeley lived for nearly 20 years dividing his time between his philosophical studies, the education of his children, and his eager efforts in behalf of the dwellers in Cloyne. The enthusiasm with which he had undertaken to enrich the lives of colonial youth and "savage Americans" burned now for his Irish countrymen, especially for the native Irish. "Ireland", he wrote in a letter to an American friend, "contains ten times more objects of charity, whether we consider the souls or bodies of men, than are to be met with in New England." And, in frank opposition to the prevailing theory and practice, which far outlasted his generation, he insisted that any "scheme for the welfare of the Irish nation" should "take in the whole inhabitants" instead of concerning itself with "the flourishing of our Protestant gentry, exclusive of the bulk of the natives." He proposed accordingly the admission of Romanists to the College of Dublin; and in 1749 appealed by his WORD¹⁹³ TO THE WISE to the Roman Catholic clergy of Ireland "to preach the gospel of work and self-reliance to their flocks" It is a satisfaction to read of the "sincere and hearty" response to this appeal.

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In the three Parts of THE QUERIST, successively published in 1735, 1736 & 1739, each Part consisting simply of a series of brief and pointed questions, Berkeley suggested his social philosophy. It centred about the doctrine that "individual industry is the soul of social and economical prosperity." Berkeley's theories found expression not only in his books but in his conduct. He was perhaps as ardent an advocate as Gandhi of home industry, and "chose to wear ill clothes and worse wigs rather than leave the poor of the town to be unemployed."

"Studies in Vedantism" by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya

1. The individual wills, asserts himself against the world, nature and society; and as his will spends itself, the world recoils on him. As his willing necessarily means a limitation of vision the recoil seems foreign to him; hence all the misery and apparent injustice of the world. He sets it down to blind nature (or unjust selfish society). This rough tussle with nature and society, however, develops in some spirits a generalised and moralised reason, whereas in others it deepens unreason, leading them through impotent strife gradually, through a diminution of life, to the level of stocks and stones. Those in whom reason is developed come to perceive that the recoil is their own work, that a punishment as well as a reward is something that is their due, something to which they have a claim. But the Universe is not quite so simple, and it puzzle the reason to lead it per-adventure to serener heights or to hurl it down¹⁹⁴ again. For are not the rewards and punishments, notoriously the latter, very often disproportionate to one's Karma in this life? What is stranger still, why should evil Karma be acquired at all? Why should reason every now and then lapse into irrationality which is the essence of sin? Why again should there be the sudden conversions, the lightning flashes of good inclinations, now and again bursting forth from the leaden cloud of habits? It is only the 'noumenal character' that can explain all this, the character which may not get completely manifested in any one stage of the phenomenal life, not even in one's whole life. The self as identified with it moves freely in the (knowing and), willing process; at every stage, the self recognises the character then manifested to have been pre-existent, unconsciously constituting his individuality. This noumenal seed is not explained by heredity and accidental variations which explain only the outward, naturalistic side of it. The individual self sees no beginning of itself and looks out beyond its life-processes to an uninterrupted existence before birth. The existence of a life before this is intelligible in the light of the relation between the (naturalistic) evolutionary view and the a priori view on the one hand and the Vedantic view on the other. The concrete self or the noumenal character is known a priori, at any rate recognised in empirical consciousness to have been beginninglessly operative.

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2. Such a will-self then, ranging as it does over many lives of the same individual, furnishes us with a solution that considerably lightens the heavy unintelligibility of the Karma system.

From the stage, therefore, in which the individual feels¹⁹⁵ himself freely claiming his rewards and punishments, he passes again to the stage in which the recoil is felt to be foreign to him till that mist, too, clears up in the recognition in a far wider sense than before of himself being the eternal architect of his own fortunes. Here, however, the difficulty comes back in an accentuated form. In the light of the moralised reason that has been developed in him, he will cry out in Augustinian despair, 'Am I then never to escape from this self-imposed self, this radical evil in me? Is final liberation or Moksha impossible for me?' In this stage of deep vairagya (denial of the will, repentance), he learns, emotionally and intellectually, of a higher soul (a guru).

3. The jivanmukta, having killed off his ignorance no longer feels the solicitations of desire, and hence acquires no new Karma. The sanchita Karma is burnt off in the fire of knowledge, destroyed in its embryonic stage. The arabdha, being a unity, must run out its course and cannot be stopped half-way. As in the case of an arrow shot through the air or of the revolving wheel of the potter, the momentum must spend itself out. But then it may be asked while the momentum is there in life, how can there be absolute knowledge or moksha? If, too, sanchita be destroyed by this knowledge which shows forth all Karma to be illusory, how can the momentum of arabdha be there still? It is replied that to the jivan-mukta himself, the momentum of his bodily life is nothing in reality: it is positively existent only to others with dim vision. The world, including the bodies of individuals, is but the community of the self-energising Karma-unities (energising in the grace of God, which is the deepest sense of self-energising). Natural law is but the obverse face of the moral law. If the body of the 'Jivan¹⁹⁶-mukta were annihilated for others also, there would be violation of this law, which is absurd. To the jivan-mukta himself, however, the emergence of this knowledge of the illusoriness of his body must appear to be abrupt.

Towards a Systematic Study of the Vedanta by Saroj Kumar Das

1. Very few people possess an adequate idea of the initial strain on everyday experience and sustained hard thinking that the Vedanta entails as a rule.

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2. It is a striking fact that immersed, as we are, in the commonsense valuations of our work-a-day life, we can in a moment rise to the sublime heights of the Vedanta.

3. Akin to those instance of Vedanta simplified is its representation as an art of life or as a practical science, – a science, so to speak, of mysticism, or even of magic, – making out its sole concern to be a meditatio mortis culminating in the prescript of a happy euthanasia for its devotee.

4. Complains have often been made, and not without justice, that Indian philosophy, far from evincing a studied unconcern for the values of life, has given undue prominence to the non-logical or moral values as the shaping force and directive agency of the theoretical impulse, which alone, in the opinion of these critics, should have been the informing principle of a philosophical system. By so doing Indian philosophy, it is contended, has so often betrayed the intellectual trust reposed in it, and made a premature compromise with the commonsense valuations of life, and thus ended by making a religion of philosophy.

5. Sankara has voiced in unmistakable accents what was left unvoiced, but none the less clearly suggested. Avoiding alike the¹⁹⁷ aberrations, on the one hand, of devotionism which imports a self-abasement up to the liminal intensity of a 'creature-consciousness' or a 'feeling of absolute dependence,' and, on the other, of egoism which, by a misplaced emphasis, easily slips into the egotism, that is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship, Sankara brings to light the edifying implications of the cult of spiritual worship when he sums up his comments in the forceful words: 'Moreover, I do neither beg of thee in the manner of a slave or a mendicant.'

6. The greatness of Sankara, at least, does not lie there. He overrides others by the sheer force of his greatness—by the compelling greatness, in particular, of his logic of absolutism, or what is the same thing, his logic of comprehension. The whole host of other commentators exhibit in their interpretation what may be called thoughts of arrested development; and whether of the form of qualified monism (*visishtadvaita*) or of dualism (*dvaita*), they all point, by force of their unconscious logic to Advaita-Vedanta of the Sankarite type as their natural culmination. They are the people who make a premature compromise with findings that are not, in any sense far-reaching or of foundational importance, and thus come under the category of these that have not felt, the drive or 'the arduousness of reality'.

7. Sankara had yet the sufficiency to assign to reason its rightful rank even in the matter of attaining unto the highest bliss of mankind. His verdict—namely, that 'a man who somehow espouses a creed without prior discussion or critical reflexion is

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dispossessed of beatitude and incurs evil'—may be regarded as being typically illustrative of the Vedantic position concerning¹⁹⁸ the issue of Revelation vs.reason.

8. The world of waking consciousness which is regarded as my real world depends on the presumed oneness of my self as knower with the body and sense-organs, and, likewise, activity is not possible except on the supposed continuity between the self and the body. The waking state is that in which knowledge is occasioned by the activity of the sense-organs. The dreaming state is one in which there is produced an immediate perception of objects in independence of sensation. In the language of modern psychology, it is to be called non-sensuous perception, sensations not being the condition sine qua non of perception according to the logic of the Vedanta. The attempt to account for this perceptual factor of dream-experience as being purely memory-begotten directly runs counter, so the Vedantist argues to such perceived facts as 'I see a chariot' or 'I saw the chariot in the dream.' The explanation is further confirmed by quotation from the sruti which also testifies to the creation of 'chariots' and 'teams' (or horses etc) during dreams. No longer weighed down by the ballast of sensations and freed from the yoke of the body, together with all its earthly freights, the soul regains that creative spontaneity which was circumscribed within certain well-defined limits on the waking plane. The objective control which is the very differential of our waking life (barring out the cases of 'play-consciousness' imagination and reverie wherein such control is partially held in abeyance) is here reduced to the minimum and the soul of the dreamer enjoys an 'unchartered freedom' in the matter of creating its own object. But that¹⁹⁹ is no reason why the dream-world should be discounted as altogether unreal and worthless. My real world—the world of normal waking consciousness—is also, as Samkara and modern philosophy insist alike, a construction, limited in range but none the less indispensable. Thus my waking world does not score a point in advance of my dreaming world on that count alone.

9. It means the empirical reality—the reality of normal waking life—from whose standpoint the verdict of unreality is pronounced on the dream-world. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Samkara recognises profound discrepancy that exists between the spatial, temporal or causal relations of waking consciousness and those of dream-experience—a discrepancy which necessitates the postulation of a different order of space, time or causal relation. For example, a man sleeping at a particular space perceived (or dreams) to have gone to a place hundreds of miles away from the former and returned forthwith; a man in India retiring to sleep at night-fall experiences dawn in that very land; and also does a man frequently experience to have lapsed hundreds of years within the short span of a dream lasting for a moment.

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10. What these dream-experiences unquestionably prove is that in dreams we are granted a far wider range than is possible for us to acquire in the waking life; in other words, the dream-world is wider and more comprehensive.

11. Some of Sankara's observations in this context are eminently suggestive from the psychological point of view. The dream-phenomena are called unreal, because they remain unto the last amorphous or indeterminate owing to the absence of a spatio-temporal order which is, for anything we know, the only medium of empirical reality²⁰⁰. As compared with concrete objects of waking experience, the dream-objects must, therefore, be somewhat abstract, sketchy or shadowy, and thus come to be regarded as unreal. The distinction may be further elucidated by saying that unlike waking experience, where the objects are given to us from without and 'strike upon' the mind in the Humean sense, in dream-consciousness the dream-objects are created *pari passu* with the very act of dreaming; or to vary the language, creating the mind dreams, and dreaming it creates.

12. The constant conjunction of the self with empirical objects on the waking plane may engender the supposition that self-consciousness is conditions by, or dependent on, the consciousness of objects. The dream consciousness has its efficacy so far as it dispels the misconception (by abstracting the self from the empirical objects) in accordance with a methodological principle which seems to be very similar to Mill's "Method of Difference."

13. It is in the treatment of dreamless sleep the third stage of the soul, that there is the total extinction of the empirical life along with the distinction of subject and object. This does not, however, amount to an extinction of consciousness as well; for, such a supposition is directly negated by the remembrance of peaceful repose of such sleep on waking. This fact of remembrance unmistakably proves the direct experience or perception of such a repose by the self during dreamless sleep; for memory can be only of a past presentation.

14. What is of psychological as well as metaphysical²⁰¹ importance is the recognition of dreamless sleep as the plane of Atman. The outstanding characteristic of the self in that state is the sublation of all determinate knowledge; and thus the soul seems to regain that original purity and self-sufficiency from which there was a temporary lapse owing to its association with limiting adjuncts of the waking and dreaming life.

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15. Although there is in dreamless sleep the absence of all determinate knowledge, the self persists as subject to witness or illumine this absence itself, this blank or nothing; in the ecstatic consciousness, however, it breaks through the last vestige of subject-object consciousness and becomes the absolute—a state of which it can truly be said “When, however, all melt into one Atman, who knows what?”.

16. The points raised in connection with the status of the self in dream and dreamless sleep afford instructive comparison with the corresponding doctrines of certain typical thinkers in the West. Kant, for example, starts in his epistemological analysis with a sense-manifold as Sankara does with sense-contact. It is only when such manifold has been furnished by sensibility that the activity and spontaneity of the soul can be ascertained in the synthesis of the manifold, which alone can convert such manifold into the texture of knowledge. The ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ which, according to Kant, accompanies all our representations in the form of ‘I think’ appears only as the epistemological correlate of the object—a penumbra or shadowy image of the object. With all his emphasis on the subjective side, Kant could not, it must be admitted, secure an independent status for the self. It might be contended, however, that the self or subject in the Kantian analysis²⁰² of the epistemological situation is only a thought or logical concept merely, and to present it in an entity or soul-substance is a ‘Paralogism of Pure Reason.’

17. The standing difficulty in the way of our apprehending this pure self-manifest chaitanyam is the halting superstition that knowledge is produced by sensations. In dreamless sleep it, of course, reveals itself in its essential nature as self-manifest. The place of dreamless sleep in a metaphysical rendering of experience probably appeared too slippery a ground for Kant, and so he preferred to stick to his transcendental Unity of Apperception—the ‘dark lantern’ that illumines the whole world except itself.

18. “The self (in dreamless sleep)”’, says Sankara “appears as unconscious, not on account of the absence of consciousness, but of the objects of consciousness; just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not owing to the lapse of its nature.” But he does not attempt to get over the difficulty by cutting the Gordian knot instead of untying it.

The characteristic absence of contradiction is however, less psychological and more distinctly epistemological. No prima facie case can be made out against dreams that they are wholly illusory or are figments of imagination merely. Each is true within itself and each of the dreaming and the waking worlds is unreal only in relation to a beyond. None in real absolutely but while ‘the cosmic phenomena, such as akasa etc. are seen to have a stable character until the oneness of the Self with Brahman is

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attained, the dream-phenomena²⁰³ are daily sublated'!. Thus the unreality of dreams is not to be construed in any absolute sense. Dreams are true so long as they last, and they are called unreal relatively to the objects of waking life, not absolutely. This shows the more or less arbitrary or conventional nature of the distinction that we draw between the waking and dream worlds. Thus the hard and fast line of demarcation that is usually drawn between the two worlds will have to give way to a difference in degree, and ultimately in value. What we may profitably note here is the continuity between the four grades of consciousness, despite the emergence of real difference in each.

19. The privileged life of thinking and critical reflection—through which alone, as the pathway to blessedness, humanity has travelled for ages—does, however, entail its peculiar disciplines on the person who would qualify himself for it. The right to think, to know and be free, has to be achieved—not without sacrifice and purification of the heart; and it is the 'pure in heart' that alone 'see God'. Thinking is thus to be preceded by moral effort.

20. We have in the Vedanta a frequent insistence on the reformed or purified mind as the organ of immediate experience or revelation of Brahman. Sankara is frankly of opinion that the study of metaphysics should in all cases be preceded by a propaedeutic discipline in the social ethos.

21. According to Sankara, the disciplines in question are four in number. In the first instance there must be a knowledge of the distinction between things eternal and non-eternal. It is prima facie impossible for the student, called to the study of Vedanta, with²⁰⁴ a full-fledged 'knowledge' of this type: all that is demanded of him is 'the metaphysical craving of the soul' which does not allow the philosophic enquirer to stop short of the goal, but as 'the discontent Divine' ever goads him on the probe deeper beyond the surface show of things. The second pre-requisite or sadhanam is a 'complete apathy' or 'indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions, whether here (in this life) or here after (in the life to come). What is meant here is that the philosophic inquirer must renounce all self-centred considerations, and approach his task with perfect disinterestedness. For interest congenital or otherwise, that predisposes the intellect with any definite bias, and thus blurs the vision of truth, is a serious disqualification in a seeker after truth. The cultivation of this spirit of detachment or indifference stands him in very good stead, when the student is confronted with such specific problems of life as the relation of happiness to the summum bonum of human life. If the philosophic inquirer does not profess mere lip-

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loyalty to this injunction, he will avert the mishap that befell Kant in his philosophic career. There we find the rigoristic preacher of 'duty of duty's sake', who had scrupulously expunged all considerations of happiness from the moral life, staggering us by the baldly hedonistic lines in which he rounds off his theory—namely 'the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world. Such tragedy of moral purism inculcates the supreme necessity of a spirit²⁰⁵ of disinterestedness as a philosophical pre-requisite. Although negative in formulation, it is not barely so but acquires, in practice, "the expulsive power of a higher affection". It is, in short, a preparation for that disinterested intellectual curiosity which characterises the genuine scientific temper—a well-grounded plea for that cosmo-centric point of view in philosophy which, by thrusting aside all anthropocentric considerations, enables us to view things in their cosmic perspective. It is remarkable, indeed, that Mr Bertrand Russell following an altogether different approach to philosophy, substantially agrees with Sankara on this point, and places 'desire' under a ban as being 'the last prison-house of the intellect.'

22. These disciplines are expected to bring about a complete change of heart—a Platonic 'turning round of the eye to the soul'. The fourth and the last is the desire or longing for liberation from bondage, which is the tacit presupposition of the three other disciplines and the immediate pre-condition of the philosophic impulse.

23. Thinking always proceeds by questioning experience, and unless there be in evidence this questioning spirit or *jijnasa* the pursuit of truth becomes an impossibility. *Jijnana*, has therefore, not only an abiding value for pedagogics, but a plain epistemological meaning. Accordingly, the very first Sutra of Badarayana—'then, therefore, an enquiry into Brahman'—may in all fairness be taken as being symptomatic of a philosophic frame of mind. The term *jijnasa* can hardly be rendered by its supposed English equivalent 'enquiry': it is far more radical in its significance than what is implied in the bare act of enquiry, comprehending, as it²⁰⁶ does, within its scope 'the whole process from its mental inception of the act in desire to the accomplishment of the intended result in knowledge. It is thus only that the integrity and philosophical importance of *jijnasa* can be sustained.

What does this *jijnasa*, then, signify? By *jijnasa*, the author of the Sutra suggests, as the *Bhamati* declares, a 'doubt' and a 'value' that is an object of our quest. ..And it is this very doubt that gives the impulse to philosophic enquiry. "The doubt here" as Bradley truly observes "is not smothered or expelled but itself is assimilated and used up. It becomes an element in the living process of that which is above doubt, and hence

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its own development is the end of itself in its original character." Wonder, said Plato, is the parent of all philosophy while doubt, according to Descartes, is the beginning of philosophical thinking. Both refer, although by means of different designations to the same inquisitive attitude of the mind in which we have the psychological genesis of philosophy.

24. The inward self which, according to Sankara, is the eternal witness of all the modifications of the producer of the notion of self-hood (viz. the internal organ) may be defined as the Self of self, consciousness of consciousness itself, or in other words, Self-consciousness. Such a self is essentially self-manifest, self-revealing and self-revealed. As eternal, timeless chaitanya, it is self-evidencing and self-evident; and its existence can be demonstrated only negatively by a reduction ad absurdum. Of such a self it can truly be²⁰⁷ said that it exists only as it thinks and that it thinks always, as Sankara says explicitly. But Descartes equates such a self to the individual soul or mind that thinks always (*mens semper cogitat*), thereby exposing himself to the justified criticism of Locke that the child (as the potential man) should think even in the mother's womb. A similar charge of lapse in the continuity of self or consciousness on the basis of such evident lapses in consciousness as swoon and dreamless sleep in which there is an apparent breach in the psychic continuum, could not be urged against Sankara.

25. A glorious consummation and consequent quietus of all restless thinking and striving It does not, however, overtake the soul abruptly as an alien something, but we have a foretaste of that consummate bliss in deep sleep. It is the fourth, the Turiya condition of the self, 'not an exclusive self, but the common ground of all' comprehending and transcending all the three grades of reality—those of waking, dream and dreamless sleep.

26. What Descartes, in his enunciation of *de omnibus dubitandum*, forgot to reckon is that it is not doubt that creates the self-certitude of the thinking ego, and therewith the criterion of truth, but it is the prior certainty of the principle of consciousness, which is the very base-rock of certitude, that creates the doubt. That is clearly the implication of the dictum. If that be really the case, is there any room for doubt and the consequent need of philosophical enquiry? To this Sankara readily replies that although no one doubts that there is an Absolute as the²⁰⁸ Self of all, yet there are conflicting opinions as to what that Absolute is; and, accordingly, these discrepancies and conflicts of opinion are sure to give rise to doubt. Doubt is not, as is ordinarily believed, the mere absence or negative of belief. Just as there cannot be anything as bare negation, so there cannot be any such thing as mere doubt, meaning thereby a purely negative attitude. Doubt is

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the belief that some assertion is not certainly true; this belief, for ought we know, may itself turn out to be false. Hence the determination of the validity or legitimacy of any doubt presupposes a criterion of certainty and a power of discrimination in the believing agent. In the face of current conflicting beliefs, Sankara exhorts the philosophic enquirer to assume a critical attitude, in order to sift the grounds of a belief before espousing it, and not merely to rest in an animal faith originating from non-discrimination and revealing itself in perceptual activities etc. Thus it is doubt or scepticism, as against animal faith, which is the distinctive prerogative of man as a rational animal.

27. Now, if truth has a value, and value is to be measured, as some contend, by satisfaction it affords, we are sure to be deflected from the path of truth-seeking. 'What we mean by value in the world' says Lotze, 'lies wholly in the feeling of satisfaction or of pleasure which we experience from it.'

28. Knowledge is knowing with certitude, and Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge is, therefore, primarily a theory of certitude. Almost all systems of Indian philosophy – to which the Sankara-Vedanta forms no exception begin with an elaborate enquiry into the nature²⁰⁹ of pramanas or self-evidencing sources of knowledge, prama or valid knowledge i.e. truth (as the result of the employment of pramanas) and prameya or object of valid knowledge, that is, Reality. This fact, at least, is sufficient to absolve Indian philosophy, Sankara's philosophy in particular, from the charges of 'dogmatism' and the like.

29. The problem of criteriology is to ascertain the validity of mental assents. To that end we have got to make a distinction between evidence and certitude, which very nearly corresponds to that between pramana and prama. 'Evidence' as the etymology of the word shows, is simply 'bringing to light' or manifestation of objective truth; certitude is the result of reflection. Evidence, in other words is a quality of objects known, certitude a state of the subject knowing.

30. Sankara impresses this truth on our minds by way of a significant query: 'Is the Brahman (thus described) known or not known (prior to the philosophic inquiry proposed to be undertaken)? If it is known, it need not be enquired into; if not known, it cannot be enquired into.

31. The dilemmatic dialectic employed by Sankara is unmistakably reminiscent of its precursor in the Madhyamika school, specially of Nagarjuna, the celebrated Buddhist dialectician of the first century A.D.

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32. We have an analogue of this dialectical form of argument in the Meno. The Socratic profession of ignorance of the nature of virtue is readily met by Meno with the objection How will you enquire into that which you do not already know? What will you put forth as the subject of the enquiry? And if you find²¹⁰ what you want, how will you recognise that this is the thing which you did not know?. "I see what you mean" answers Socrates "but consider what a troublesome discussion you are raising. You argue that a man cannot enquire either into that which he knows or into that which he does not know; for if he knows he has no need to enquire, and if not, he cannot enquire, for he does not know the very subject about which he has to enquire."

33. We must cultivate that mental alertness which does not accept things at their face-value.

34. While explaining the origin of the idea of personal identity, Hume's argument is that owing to the extreme rapidity with which the discrete mental states succeed one another, they fail to be apprehended as discrete or different from one another, and this non-apprehension of their difference produces the impression that they are continuous implying a permanent spiritual entity called the Self.

35. The advancement of knowledge must be viewed as progressive initiation into truth, which is ultimately in perfect harmony with reality. All revelation, in point of fact, is ad modum recipientis, that is to say, proportionate to the receptive power of the person to whom something is revealed. This epistemological truth is implicit in the celebrated doctrine of adhikaribhedah or the law of accommodation.

36 The doctrine of Adhikaribheda, construed epistemologically, has no such pernicious association in itself. It is only when it loses mobility and stiffens into artificial social stratification that it becomes the prolific source of mischief. Further, the distinction between²¹¹ an esoteric and an exoteric philosophy, which is fathered upon this doctrine seems to have its remote ancestor in Plato who has in the Republic prescribed Mythology "for the Many" and Philosophy for 'the few'. The ingrained intellectual aristocratism of this doctrine will not perhaps be palatable to the democratic temper of our age. But then one has to reckon that the Demos is never spiritually creative, and if all philosophies are creations, we must look in the end to the select few, the intellectual aristocrats, the 'heroes' in the Carlylean sense, for an intellectual construction of Reality, – in a word, for our enlightenment and edification. But that is another matter. What is worth nothing in this doctrine of adhikaribheda is the

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epistemological basis it provides for an ethical and a metaphysical construction of the Advaita-Vedanta.

37. In the prolegomena to his metaphysics, Sankara has, with unerring philosophical insight, made common experience the settled point of departure in the philosophic 'voyage of discovery' – the veritable Pilgrim's Progress of philosophy. "Although" to quote the very opening words of the prolegomena, "a mutual transference of the qualities of the Ego and the Non-ego (the meum and the tuum) which are prima facie opposed to one another as light and darkness is obviously wrong, yet in mankind the use of judgments such as 'I am this' 'this is mine' conditioned by false knowledge in the form of coupling the true (the Ego, the Subject) and the untrue (the Non-Ego, the Object) is inborn, thus transferring the very being and qualities of the one to the other on account of a failure of the²¹² power to discriminate things that are discrete in their nature." Now, the real problem of philosophy, indeed the great problem of Sankara-Vedanta, is the search after the truly obvious – not the immediate which is insistent with its claims on our recognition.

38. We all speak glibly of 'Self' and pretend to be fully conversant therewith, but few are in possession of the truth about it, says Sankara. Indeed, we can very well hazard the paradox that in life the greatest truths are assented to, but not believed. Hence what is necessary is a 'transvaluation' but not a transcendence of the whole realm of experience not to seek the real behind or beyond it, but as the informing life and spirit thereof. We certainly feel error everywhere and yet, again, we have a hold on truth. Herein lies the 'secret' of the dialectic of the Vedanta. The question of crucial importance in metaphysics is undoubtedly the nature of the Given.

39. The seemingly harmless, but effectively insidious, phrases 'implicit consciousness' 'unconscious reason' and the like are delightfully vague terms – terms, as Prof. Perry rightly complains, 'with indefinite potentiality' and, so charged, they have the pernicious effect of leading men astray from the pursuit of truth. They serve only to mystify the issued in the domain of philosophical thought. These no doubt have the badge of modernism, and under Protean masks, are made to work wonders in modern psychology as well as Philosophy.

40. The lesson that such wordly warfares drive home to our minds is that it is not yet too late in the day for us to profit by Bacon's classic warning against the Idola Fori, or Berkeley's²¹³ injunction of drawing aside 'the veil of words' that we may hope to see things in their true light. Sankara does not fall a victim to these seductive phrases; to

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play fast and loose or to dally with notions is a thing which strict intellectual honesty or a sense of the arduousness of Reality, as Sankara, had, would never permit.

41. The true logical significance of the concept of Abhedah, Ananytvam or Tadatmayam is hardly conveyed by the word 'identity' which has consequently been the prolific source of misconstructions heaped on Sankara or Bradley. Let Bradley speak for himself. "Where there is no diversity there is no identity at all, the identity in abstraction from diversity having lost its character." Again, "there is no sameness of mere existence, for mere existence is a vicious abstraction. And everywhere identity is ideal and consists in the transcendence of its own being by that which is identical." Passages may be quoted from Sankara's commentary to show that the concept of abhedah or ananytvam as expressing the relation of cause and effect is not one of abstract, colourless identity – "Identity in abstraction from diversity." It means simply what it directly stands for viz. 'non-different' i.e. the 'effect' is not different from the 'cause' (in respect of its essence). A paraphrasing of 'non-different' as 'identical' – an apparently innocuous procedure – is the 'original sin' in the matter of interpreting Sankara's texts. In the first place, Sankara clearly states in his commentary on Brahmasutras II 1.6 "On the hypothesis of absolute sameness moreover, the cause-effect relation itself is²¹⁴ destroyed." Next he proceeds to allay all misunderstandings bearing on this topic by his express repudiation of the suggested 'identity': (the term has been used), not with a view to their identity, but with a view to the denial of a reality (on the part of the effect) other than that of the cause. That is why Sankara's system goes by the name of Advaitavada, i.e. non-dualism and not Aikyabadah i.e. a system of abstract or absolute monism. The Vedantaparibhasha in the context of the logic of Perception substantiates this point further by the usages of the term in the true sense: "the non-difference from the knower verily is not (tantamount to) their virtual identity, but the denial (on the part of the object) of a reality other than that of the knower." In the face of such outspoken utterances, the perverse interpretation of 'abhedah' as 'identity' betrays a lamentable ignorance of the contextual criticisms that are to be found in the literature of the Sankara-Vedanta school. Vacaspati Misra, who is regarded by common consent as a notable exponent of Sankar-Vedanta pursues the tenour of the master's logic to the following effect: "Neither are the earthen vessels different, nor non-different, nor even, both different and non-different from earth, but are in reality, indescribable or indefinable." This trend of thought was taken up in right earnest and developed in a negative direction by Sriharsha, another renowned protagonist of this school, so that he ended by metamorphosing the Advaitavada of Sankara into a Philosophy of the Indefinable or Anirvacyavadah. This he achieved by assigning central importance in his system to the notion of individuality of a thing which always²¹⁵ eluded the grasp of universals. No universal or even system of universals can

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possibly exhaust the infinite variety of the individual, and to recognise this inaccessibility of the individual is, in Sriharsha's opinion, the deeper philosophical significance of that recondite principle of Maya.

42. What Sriharsha's dialectic has taught us—no matter whether we agree with all his findings or not—is that we are not to be dismayed at the revelation of the nature of things as the home of countless contradictions. Our logic must be attuned to the nature of things and not the things stretched on the Procrustean bed of our abstract formal logic or metaphysical predilections, Sankara rightly observes that "the union of contradictories is not denied of phenomenal objects, it is denied only of the noumenon, the simple, eternal object." It is in the light of such a methodological principle that one can best hope to appraise the full significance of the relation of abhedah or ananyatvam as distinguished from aikyam. "In identity of contradictories, the identity is known through recognition; the relation of identity is nothing but the identical thing."

The concept of ananyatvam comes into clearer relief in the context of the Vedantic doctrine of Causation (to which it strictly applies as its peculiar category) nevertheless it is, as Deussen truly remarks, not only the law that determines the relation between events and changes of phenomena, but is also the bond between substance and attributes. Although it may appear as an advance labelling, such a doctrine is the inevitable outcome of an immanent view of causation.

43. That all the so-called effects are the modes of one primal substance is also established from²¹⁶ the fact of reciprocal action among the phenomena of the empirical world "Whatever stands" says Sankara "in the relation of agent and patient or mutual interdependence is found to be conditioned by a common cause and pervaded by a community of nature...This entire universe as well as (its constituent elements like) earth etc., illustrate this relation of mutual interdependence." The generalisation contained in the latter part of the extract seems to be a maturer view of the causal relation as exhibited in the phenomena of the world. The same immanent dialectic which spurs us on from the category of causality (or causal dependence) to that of reciprocity (or reciprocal dependence), which is nothing but causality more adequately conceived, seems to have led Sankara to this position. The argument embodied in the whole passage is substantially the same as that employed by Lotze in arguing from the fact of interaction according to law among the so-called independent facts of the world to the presence of one unitary principle (called M) as their immanent, underlying ground. To seek to know in detail the essential nature of this principle is an impossible demand set up by the finite mind. There must be left a residuum of mystery, a dark impenetrable background, to explore which is not within the reach of beings like ourselves.

Now, the concept of causality, as so far construed by the Vedantist, is brought to bear on the relation of the world-appearance to its causal substance. The net result of the dialectic of causation is that Reality is of the nature of cause and the appearance is²¹⁷ the effect in a phenomenal sense, while metaphysically viewed, it is non-different from the cause. But at the same time the Vedantist admits that the effect, empirically viewed, is a baffling mystery. It can neither be said to be existing nor non-existing. It is something indefinable. Equally mysterious is the nature of the cause as gauged by means of its revelation in a system of appearances; for the causal substance has an individuality of its own apart from its revelations, and this inner core of mystery is something at once inviting and resisting all scrutiny. Thus the dialectic of Causation leads up to the dialectic of Nescience or Ajnanam.

44. While maintaining with a Spinozistic emphasis the ultimate identity of natura naturans and natura naturata, Sankara has gone to the very root of the matter and made his position secure for all time by showing the logical untenability of the category of Relation itself. Thus the standing problem of philosophy—the relation of the finite to the infinite—does not arise for Sankara at all. The situation is further reinforced by a resolute carrying out of the Dialectic of Causation which unequivocally denies the metaphysical reality and independence of the effect as distinct from the cause. This does not, however, amount to a denial of the empirical reality of the finite world of things as an appearance of Reality. It is, in other words, Maya. Here it is, as critics of Sankara will probably urge, that the dialectic is strained to its breaking-point, and the situation is saved only by an appeal to the doctrine of Maya which is but a surrender to a cheap, agnostic scepticism of the ignoramus et ignorabimus type. A criticism of this sort²¹⁸ has, we admit, some amount of plausibility but we should do well to remember as William James remarked in another reference, that the “native absolutism of our intellect deserves to be snubbed and kept in check” in its effort to encompass the mystery of existence. A confession of ‘ultimate doubts’ is not always the unmistakable symptom of intellectual indolence on the part of a philosophical inquirer or index of a premature compromise with the forces of ignorance he was commissioned to conquer. On the contrary it bespeaks intellectual honesty—a candid confession that philosophy cannot justify its own apotheosis. Agnosticism may be bad, or a pitfall in philosophy, but a cheap and overweening gnosticism that presumes to chase away all mystery from the universe is worse still, and foredoomed to failure in the task to which it stands pledged. If Sankara has erred at all here, he has done so in good company; for, Bradley (whose name is assuredly one to reckon with in Contemporary British Philosophy) with due regard ‘for the exercise of doubt and wonder’ offers his apologia thus: “We admit the healthy scepticism for which all knowledge in a sense is vanity, which feels in its

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heart that science is a poor thing if measured by the wealth of the real universe. We justify the natural wonder which delights to stray beyond our daylight world, and to follow paths that lead into half-known half-knowable regions. Our conclusion, in brief, has explained and has confirmed the irresistible impression that all is beyond us.”

45. The cryptic utterances ‘I am’ and ‘I am that I am’ express, with as much accuracy as force, just this standing riddle, the inexplicable enigma and baffling mystery of the world-appearance which²¹⁹ Sankara has in view. Now, admitting this to be a fact, what Sankara, in strict fidelity to his monistic persuasions, is concerned to maintain is the falsity of such appearance—to maintain the integrity and identity of Being by the negation of such appearance. The alleged fact is thus found to fall short of the truth. Nevertheless this fact of appearance is neither ignored nor left unaccounted for. Of the two possible modes of explanation, Sankara stoutly refused with a Kantian emphasis to make an extravagant, and therefore, illegitimate use of the concept of evolution or development, as has so often been employed to set forth the relation between the world as a whole and its transcendent ground, and what he accepted instead as the only possible hypothesis was that of illusory appearance.

46. He incurs a tremendous responsibility of facing all the issues fair and square, and of grasping aright the course of dialectic or thought-development on the part of the great thinker in question. An initial bias or preconceived opinion is thus a serious handicap.

47. Sankara in this conception of Maya or Avidya avoids as much the pitfalls of mentalism as of materialism. Further, what he seeks herein to establish is the non-duality between Brahman and the world as based on a transcendental analysis of causation. It is fundamentally wrong to label Sankara’s position in this regard as ‘abstract monism’ or to compare it, in conformity with the spirit thereof, to a ‘lion’s den’ that swallows up all the traces of particular facts of experience. As we have already seen (in connection with our elaboration of the notion of and treatment of the Dialectic of Causation), Sankara is far from implying hereby²²⁰ the identity of Brahman and the world as such, but is only seeking to deny the existence of the world apart from Brahman. Advaitism is not monism or singularism—it is only the statement of what it is vix. the denial of duality or affirmation of non-twoness, as Edmond Holmes has truly grasped the distinction and oriented it to Western thought.

47. Fichte, again, having made the transcendental unity of apperception the settled point of departure in his metaphysical construction, goes beyond Kant in investing the

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principle of self-consciousness—the logical ‘I think’ which had only a regulative validity for Kant—with constitutive or metaphysical reality as well. Having a firm grip on the central truth of the Kantian analysis of experience, Fichte thinks that he has discovered the secret of Kant’s philosophy—which he had only suggested but left undeveloped—in the conception of Pure Self or Ego, the ‘I am’ at the back of ‘I think’ or Self-consciousness and represents it as absolute creative agency—an act and product in one, or the original ‘deed-act’, the that hand lung. This Ego or Self thus affirms or posits itself but this it can do only by opposing or distinguishing from itself a non-ego. By thus limiting and negating itself, the absolute Ego (Ichheit) brings into being the element of otherness which is the conditio sine qua non of the concrete relation of subject and object or of self-consciousness.

48. So far as the finite or empirical self is concerned, Sankara is emphatic on the point that it is the ‘psychological Me’, the object of self-consciousness, the active and enjoying self, and not the logical or ideal construct the²²¹ pure Ego of Immanuel Kant, or the witnessing consciousness which is the presupposition of all finite experience. Thus all agency belongs to the Self or Atman so far as it is limited or individuated by a world of objects and not intrinsically. This investiture with the upadhi of buddhi accounts for personal identity and continuity which are comparatively in a state of abeyance and potentiality in deep sleep and bodily death but resumes its actuality or activity on waking and rebirth.

49. Consciousness thus limited is Jiva, while consciousness as witnessing this limiting condition itself is Sakshi or the Witness.

50. Some think that the witness or sakshi is the Isvara or Brahman so far as it is the inmost being and is immanent in Jivas. It is the principle that has nescience itself, pure blank or non-existence for its objects in deep sleep. As the scriptures put it, the individual in deep sleep as being in the embrace of the universal self, verily like the husband in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing without or within.

51. Others however, like Prakasananda, the author of Siddhantamuktabali, throw overboard this theory of periodical or cyclical evolution and involution and subscribe, with a Berkeleyan emphasis, to the doctrine that Drshti, seeing or perceiving, is Srshti or creation. Esse is percipi. This directly falls in with the Ekajivavda or solipsism according to which nothing is real save Brahman, the only self to whose perception the world owes its origin and existence. “The world is my idea” said Schopenhauer; “the world the wise maintain to be ideal while the unenlightened or stupid erroneously view it as objective” says Prakasananda.

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52²²². According to Siddantamuktabali, the world is of the very stuff of intelligence or ideal in essence, there being lack of evidence for the difference of the objective world from the perception thereof; while, according to a different version of the theory of Drshti-Srshti the world is surely synchronous with the perception of it, on account of the impossibility of a non-distinction between the conscious and the unconscious and of the impossibility of the pre-existence of the world prior to, and different from percipi, whose nature is to reveal or witness. This interesting development of Sankara-Vedanta in the direction of an undisguised subjective idealism gives the lie direct to the realistic trend of thought – of course, an empirical realism – that lies embedded in the thought of the great master.

53. Critics conveniently ignore the fact that the doctrine of oneness to which the Advaita Vedanta stands pledged, the Vedantic God-in-man, is a task as well as a fact, is as much a problem as a possession.

54. It is sheer perversity to stick to this line of criticism in the face of clear enunciation by Sankara, of his own view regarding the place and function of ethics in a philosophical rendering of the world. What Sankara, however, has been all along contending against is the finality of the ethical categories construed in an absolute metaphysical, (to use Sankara's own words) reference, while consistently conceding, and in fact insisting on, the empirical or practical reality of these. Believing, as he does, in self-hood as a process, rather than a state, Sankara has no difficulty in establishing the episodic character of ethical distinctions, and vindicating their emergent and relative²²³ reality in the pathway to liberation – which is the crowning achievement of all intellectual and ethical disciplines.

This is a point of first-rate importance in any intelligent understanding and faithful presentation of Sankara-Vedanta position. While fully upholding the inviolability and majesty of the Law of Karma and therewith the validity of the distinction of good and evil or merit and demerit which form the very basis and fulcrum of a Divine government of the world and of ethical theism in general, he never yet loses sight of that finale of perfected selfhood, that bliss of the unitive life, beyond good and evil, of which, as the seers of the Upanishad testify, it is the exclusive privilege of the wise to be the legatee. Thus, it is in the attainment of an absolute oneness of being, which is at once the completion and raison d'être of the life of ethical endeavour, that the requirements of the ideal of holiness are satisfied. Without such a monistic crown, any progressive scale of moral perfection must ever remain truncated and devoid of a grounding in reality. An ideal as ideal fails to furnish dynamic of moral life, unless it is known to have been realised in toto in some integral experience.

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Not doing but being in an ultimate reference—that should in all conceivability be the ideal of ethical conduct and it is only Sankara Vedanta that has the sufficiency to envisage fully the ideal of perfection and pursue with vertical consistency to its logical conclusion, the implications of the injunction; “Be ye perfect.”

55. But such transcendence, which have proved to be the source of endless misdirection to the critics of Advaita-Vedanta—is not to be construed, as is so often done but without any warrant whatsoever, in the sense of annulment or abrogation of recognised laws of morals or ethical distinctions²²⁴. In any such conceivable consummation of the moral life, the life according to rule—the code of injunctions and prohibitions—undergoes only a transfiguration and acquires a new dimension of value, the centre of gravity having been shifted from the externally imposed law to the eternally realised Atman within the inner self, as the author and inspirer of the entire code of ethics. The life of law thus culminates in the life of love, for love, as they say, is the fulfilling of the law, and this is exactly what the Sankara-Vedanta seeks to convey by the ideal of a cosmic expansion of self, which is another name for Vedantic redemption. When this supreme knowledge of the oneness of soul dawns upon the philosophic pilgrim in his uphill work with aching hands and bleeding feet, a new light bursts upon him.

56. It is an ethical commonplace that our valuations are not at all constant, but are subject to change and development. While the Advaita-Vedanta stands pledged to the consolidation and conservation of the ethical values, it gives by no means a pledge of continuance to the distracting varieties of ethical valuations, destitute of a survival-value. To that extent Sankara-Vedanta is on the true life of advance—in hearty agreement with Spinoza and Russell. An ‘ethically inspired metaphysics’—with its faith pinned to the division of the world into two hostile camps, as it were, of good and evil and by which ethics always swears,—is to Russell something of the nature of a hybrid construction, a monstrous aberration on the part of the strictly theoretical impulse in man; for, ethics²²⁵, however refined, remains more or less subjective and the philosophy which it inspires is always more or less parochial, more or less infected with the prejudices of a time and a place. To Russell good and evil have a meaning wholly practical in character—a meaning traceable to the gregarious or group instinct of man as their originative source. Accordingly so long as we remain merely impartial (in our contemplative life) we may be content to say that both the good and the evil of actions are illusions.

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57. To all these findings of Russells Sankara would readily subscribe but with a difference of emphasis. No one, for example, is more perfectly at home in the parochial character of ethical code than Sankara himself. Says he, 'What is followed as the virtuous or right course of conduct in some particular clime at some particular time and under some particular circumstances, turn out to be the very reverse, that is to say, the vicious course in some other clime, at some other time and under a different set of circumstances. He would not surely go in for an unconditional elimination of ethical considerations—even though it were construed as an ethical advance—except it be on condition of their fulfilment in a supremoral state of existence. He would advocate, in other words, sublimation in place of elimination of ethical considerations, and this is strictly in accordance with his philosophic persuasion that is only in attainment of the knowledge of the Supreme Being that the entire code of duties and ethical maxims finds its natural completion and culmination. It is his reasoned conviction that the active and contemplative life,—Karma and Jnana—though poles as under in²²⁶ their essential nature, do yet co-operate towards the fulfilment of the supreme end of human life, Moksha or liberation. Such a philosophic consecration of Karma on the part of a radical anti-pragmatist or anti-Mimansist like Sankara, who has left no stone unturned to drive in a wedge between the theoretical and the practical aspects of human nature, between Karma leading unto bondage and Jnana showing the way to liberation, may seem at first sight to be strangely at variance with the fundamental creed of the philosopher—to be condoned perhaps only as an involuntary concession to popular demand. But on a closer and critical sifting of his utterances, it will be found that he has re-iterated this claim on behalf of Karma and the life of voluntary discharge of ethical duties as being ancillary or instrumental to the attainment of the supreme end of life. Although he appears herein to have mitigated the opposition between the two, such a minimising of the interval between Karma and Jnana does in no way lend countenance to the hybrid doctrine of action-cum-contemplation against which his own anti-pragmatic dianoetic system of ethics was a sustained polemic. All that this moderation amounts to is a denial of antagonism between the two, while antithesis there surely is, and must ever remain. In consonance with his fundamental tenet that the liberated state is eternally accomplished and not contingent upon any human activity, Sankara only allows a subsidiary function to Karma—as a direct means of that supreme knowledge which has the saving grace. Hence Karma acquires a metaphorical extension of its efficacy as an instrument of redemption and thus is established the authority²²⁷ or (empirical) reality of the ethical code from the standpoint of Sankara-Vedanta. Far from being subversive, therefore, of my station as a moral being and the duties incidental thereto, the Knowledge of the Self in its integrity—which is the metaphysical implication of all ethical dualism—is the fitting epilogue to the drama of moral is at once continuous

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with, and an advance beyond the original. significance and acquires a new extension of meaning which is at once continuous with and an advance beyond the original.

58. With a truly Kantian emphasis Sankara opens the ethical enquiry with a rigid antithesis between the theoretical and practical reason, between the heteronomy of nature and the autonomy of the Spirit as being the essential pre-requisite of morals. In the first place, it is authoritatively laid down that all actions determined by empirical motives and uninspired by a vision of the supreme end must lead unto bondage, for all such actions are motivated by ignorance. Hence what is initially needed is a complete breach with the life of unreflecting acquiescence is nature-necessity—the realm of darkness or ignorance which is the prolific source of all evil, moral and metaphysical—and a thorough grounding in the knowledge of the supreme End which is the only pathway to liberation. The function of ethics as a science is to call for, at the very start, a ‘turning round of the eye of the soul, a ‘conversion’ in the Platonic sense of the term, and to re-orient the whole hierarchy of means and ends in the light of the supreme end, the End par excellence of human life. Its business, however, is not, as Sankara conceives it, to furnish ‘copy-book headings’ for the guidance of moral life or a codified list of duties; and thus its²²⁸ function is neither legislative more executive, but only informative or enlightening. Man as a moral subject or agent cannot be commanded, he has to be drawn. Nor coercion but persuasion that is the only instrument of moral causation. Here emerges the most important postulate of ethics—freedom of will on the part of man as a moral being.

59. Moral discipline or culture argues a violent wrenching of the mind, together with the entire sensory apparatus, from its natural outgoing activity, a resolute setting one’s face against the current of impulses and solicitations of sense, and thus a supreme almost superhuman effort in changing the current of natural inclination in the direction of the inward Self. It is along this path of self-discipline that man can hope to regain his Self—as he is in his essential nature—from which there has been a lapse. This process of erecting oneself above one’s self in order to attain one’s Self may appear to be not a little confusing to the student of Advaita-Vedanta. But all doubts and discrepancies on this score may be set at rest by means of a faithful reproduction of Sankara’s own utterances on the matter. Every man is equipped ab initio with a stock of innate cravings and capacities surviving in him as the latent traces or dispositions of actions in a previous cycle of existence and constituting a part of his psychical make-up. This is what Sankara calls the prakrti, the instinctive basis of the psychic continuum, expressing itself invariably in certain organic cravings or peculiar likes and dislikes.

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60. Moksha is not a matter of catastrophic attainment²²⁹, descending from the above upon a man in accordance with an inscrutable Providence, but is a matter of progressive realisation through the steady cancellation of that nescience which has deprived him ab initio of this priceless legacy.

61. If moksha is an eternally accomplished fact, there is conceivably no useful purpose served by the perpetual injunction of *sravana*, *manana*, and *nididhyasana*, of *Sruti* texts and the impulse to all these is paralysed at the very start. Does it then lead to a life of inaction, a *laissez faire*, or encourage a happy-go-lucky sort of life? The *Vedanta-paribhasa* sets at rest any such implication of the *Samkara-Vedanta* doctrine of redemption. Moral effort or exertion is not rendered nugatory, seeing that there is room for activity in cancelling the illusion of an unaccomplished moksha, which as identical with *Brahman* is eternally accomplished.

62. Indeed to possess a thing and not to be conscious of the possession amount to not possessing the thing at all. Just as a person, oblivious of the necklace round the neck, goes about looking for it and leaves no stone unturned to discover it, and eventually comes into a virgin possession of the thing, on being reminded of it, so also here.

62. Prof. Pringle-Pattison himself has at times strained his logic to the breaking-point or compromised his monistic persuasion in philosophy in his stainless allegiance to the 'profound personalism of Christianity' which is the acknowledged source of his inspiration and the special teaching of his revered teacher A.C. Fraser. Moreover, on a general survey of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's part in this acute controversy, it may not unreasonably appear that it becomes in the end a²³⁰ verbal one, turning as it does on the interpretation put upon that highly ambiguous word 'self'.

63. The emancipation of the intellect from 'desire' its 'last prison-house' is, admittedly a salutary advice so far as it goes, but one has to see that it does not go too far, and end by throwing away the babe along with the bath. A relentless rejection of all petty, private interests, and the cultivation of a temper of judicial neutrality must undoubtedly be put in the forefront as being an essential pre-requisite of the pursuit of truth; for these alone have the efficacy of purifying the intellect, and predisposing it in such a way as to make it a fit recipient of truth. But in carrying out this purificatory rite, one stands in danger of making a holocaust of the abiding or permanent interests, in a word, the values along with the changing or ephemeral interests of life, and thus carrying the process beyond the saturation-point of a total indifferentism. There is

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surely no heroism in renouncing things which a man has no right to renounce; nor is there any moral grandeur—and, if there be one got up, it is a fictitious one—about a martyrdom that is as gratuitous as it is fool-hardy. “It is vain” as Kant reminds us, “to profess indifference to those questions to which the mind of man can never really be indifferent.” Indeed, there is such a thing as ‘ostentatious poverty’—the classic prototype of which we have in the meeting of Diogenes the Cynic with Plato the intellectual aristocrat. When, the nil admirari Cynic visited Plato in the latter’s house, he is said to have called out to the latter to the following effect: “Look here, Plato; thus do I tread on your²³¹ carpet.” “But not without a pride” was the smart reply of the other who is reported to have followed it up with the remark: “I see into your pride through the holes in your jacket.”

64. The ingrained intellectualism of Mr Russell’s standpoint has been, as we know, steadily on the increase, and, in his latest writings, it shows itself to be on the verge of bankruptcy, and stultifying itself by a veritable reductio ad absurdum. It appeared in excelsis in the course of lectures he delivered, under the auspices of the British Philosophical Institute during the Lent term of 1928. The course was entitled ‘Philosophy of Physics,’ and although some portion of it has been incorporated in his Analysis of Matter, the course was of a more sketchy character, and therefore too intellectual to be intelligible to the ordinary student uninitiated into the intricacies of mathematical logic. At the conclusion of one of these evening discourses (which I had been regularly attending)—and this was on the nature of Substance—one elderly gentleman, an artist by profession took the lead during the question-time and made a telling remark: “I have followed with rapt attention the frame-work of the Physical universe which the lecturer this evening has unscrolled before our admiring eyes. But when I am told in the name of a Philosophy of Physics to believe that my wife sitting next to me is a mere ‘formula’ representing a group of events in the series $-x + f_1(x)dt + f_2(x)dt^2 + \dots f_1(x)$ ²³² being a continuous function of time, it sends a thrill of horror through my blood.” The whole house burst into a peal of laughter, but the redoubtable Mr Russell rose equal to the²³³ occasion and replied with a characteristic smile: “I cannot help it: such is in the abstract the character of the universe, and I was not consulted at the time of its creation.”

65. In India at least philosophical thought has never been an intellectual pastime merely, cut off from the moorings of all other values of life. Free thinking in the sense of an unchartered freedom to indulge in polemics for their own sake has seldom found favour with the Indian mind.

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²³² The original editor inserted “ $-x + f_1(x)dt + f_2(x)dt^2 + \dots f_1(x)$ ” by hand

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66. His frequent insistence on *jijnasa* (a sifting enquiry) *vicara* (ratiocination) and *mimansa* (critical investigation) surely admits him into the rank of philosophical inquirers of all ages and of all climes. What, however, decides once for all his claim to be reckoned a critical thinker, in the modern sense of the term, as an epoch-making pronouncement of his with regard to the status of function of *vicara* or rational criticism in the matter of attaining unto the highest bliss of mankind. Entrenched, as he was, in a rigid orthodoxy, Sankara had yet the hardihood to assert with all the emphasis he could command that a man who somehow espouses a creed without a prior discussion or critical reflexion is debarred from beatitude and incurs evil.

67. It is the realisation of this oneness of spirit that alone can afford a sense of security and peace that man is ever hankering after.

68. Such an esotericism or aristocratism to say the least of it, is fundamentally at variance with the native absolutism of the human intellect which squares, paradoxically enough, with the democratic temper of our age. Indeed, the effort to take shelter behind a²³⁴ supra-rational Authority is a discredited relic of Mediaevalism and pseudomysticism, and in unquestionably a glaring instance of historical anachronism, in this age of rationalism and free-thinking.

69. It is too late in the day to learn that truth is one organic whole, just as reason, as the only availing guide in our search after truth, is also unitary in character, and that, therefore in the republic of the Vedanta we can acknowledge no other authority except that of reason. It is undoubtedly, a question of principle, and not merely one of modernism or spirit of the times (*Zeitgeist*). For, it is preposterous to suggest that truth is to be obtained by a counting of heads. Truth does not, and most certainly did not, as the history of human civilization clearly shows, depend on a majority of votes to enforce its acceptance. It rules everywhere by its own inherent right.

70. If reason in its analytic function is pressed, as it needs must be, into the service of this mystical knowledge, it must be all in all or never be at all. For, the spectre of reflective thought once summoned to our aid can not conveniently be laid in its grave. Indeed, those who seek to gain a Pyrrhic victory for the cause of esoteric or mystical knowledge by thus antagonising it to the clear deliverances of reason seem to be hardly conscious of the dangerous precedent they are thereby creating. For, such a procedure has its inevitable Nemesis in that common ruin which awaits all the hard-won findings of an occult or mysterious organ of the soul. In point of fact, mysticism does not enjoy such a precarious eminence²³⁵. Antiintellectualism or antirationalism is the plea of the

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pseudo-mystic only. It is in reference to these pseudo-mystics that Plato made the remark in the Phaedo: “Many are the thyrsus – bearers, but few are the mystics”. The mystic, forsooth, is one “who believes in spiritual apprehension of truths beyond the understanding.” The name μύσγης²³⁶ would originally be given to ‘one initiated’ or to a priest of secret rites of divine worship. This affords an instructive comparison with the radical meaning of the term ‘Upanishad’, which, as derived from the root (sad- to sit) with the prefixes Upa and Ni, means, –Sankara’s interpretation, notwithstanding – “that which is imparted to the (initiated) disciple when he sits close to his preceptor: – hence, a ‘secret doctrine or mystery’. The word μυστήριον²³⁷ is, again, cognate with μνεῖν²³⁸ which literally means ‘closing of lips or eyes’ – perhaps as being symbolic, and suggestive of withdrawal of the senses from the scene of their operation and concentration within the soul. It is strikingly similar to the literal as well as symbolic meaning of avrittacakshuh or ‘closed eyes’ that occur in the opening verse of the 2nd chapter of Kathopanishad, which, again, in its turn is strongly reminiscent of the ‘averted eye’ of the Pythagoreans.

71. That knowledge from which reason is debarred on pain of profanation has not even that redeeming grace of letting down the ladder for the vulgar and the uninitiate, which entitles it the name of ‘knowledge’.

72. Deussen thinks that the new Testament and the Upanishads, these two noblest products of the religious consciousness of mankind, are found²³⁹ when we would their deeper meaning to be nowhere in irreconcilable contradiction, but in a manner, the most attractive serve to elucidate and complete one another.’ The supplementation in question, according to Deussen, appears in relation to the central teaching of each. “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ is the requirement of the Bible” and this injunction remains inexplicable and unauthoritative, until the Vedanta adds by way of explanation the reason therefor: “Because thy neighbour is in truth thy very self, and what separates you from him is mere illusion.”

72. The barren formalism of a principle of universal legislation which fails to give us a concrete code of maxims, or a guidance in the practical concerns of life, must naturally and necessarily provoke its own Nemesis in the entire set of casuistical literature that has followed in the wake of both. The criticism may not be relished by the Vedantists, but none the less true. It is undeniable that Kant sought to obviate the empty formalism of his teachings in the proposal to make Humanity always the end of action, and never

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²³⁶ The original editor inserted “μύσγης” by hand

²³⁷ The original editor inserted “μυστήριον” by hand

²³⁸ The original editor inserted “μνεῖν” by hand

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a means only—that is to say, the happiness of humanity, represented in your neighbour, always the end of our action. Whether the cult of the love of one's neighbour has failed or not is writ large across the face of history, which, if Croce is right, is but contemporary history.

73. It does not land us, as is sometimes apprehended, in sheer emptiness or negation. If the negative prescript were to terminate in pure negation or blank, would it (in all propriety) be called the true of the true, as asks Sankara most significantly?

Thus²⁴⁰ is revealed ultimately the source of abiding inspiration for the Vedantist. It is the spirit of the Whole, which does not allow us to halt at any half-way house, but bids us march past till the goal is reached. This, the underlying and informing spirit of the Whole, may best be indicated, in the words of Bradley, as 'Justice in the name of the whole to each aspect of the world according to its special place and proper rank—Reality everywhere through self-restriction in claim and in denial.'

74. Accordingly, 'one main work of philosophy' for the Vedantist as much for Bradley 'is to show that, where there is isolation and abstraction, there is everywhere, so far as this abstraction forgets itself, unreality and error.'

75. A Parliament or Federation of Mankind, must forever remain an idle dream, and a League of Nations is too apt to degenerate into a clique of nations, until and unless the making of the international mind is an accomplished fact; and this has the greatest chance of materialising under the perpetual inspiration of the Vedantic cult of 'no-cult', or what is the same thing, the inspiration of a Church Invisible. The method of working from bottom upwards has been tried and found wanting. Why not try the other—namely, of working from above downwards. That is why the Upanishadic sage, with unerring prophetic vision, declares that this ancient holy fig tree (symbolising the Infinite and the Eternal) has its roots in heaven and its branches spreading downwards.

76. It is easy to deride the notion and take to the blunt Johnsonian method of refuting an ideal by kicking against it.

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1. No duality, no Other exists in the final reality; all not-Brahman is unreal. The last distinction which seems to be ultimate in consciousness, between the subject and the object vanishes. The knows cannot be known. Atman is the one goal of philosophy.

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2. The inner principle is called Kshetragna or the soul in man. He is the subject, the central source of all activity and knowledge, the one permanent, changeless factor in the midst of all change and destruction. Now, all experience, all knowledge, all existence presupposes the operation of these two factors the subject and the object. Take away either the subject or the object and the world vanishes. The object has no existence at all apart from the subject; the subject has no empirical existence apart from the object.

3. Gaudapada, maintains that there is no more reality in the waking life than the experiences of dreams. The first is external; the second is internal; but both agree in one point, their capability of being seen or being presented as objects. Both are believed to be real on this ground; but as the dream-experiences prove illusory after they are over; so also must be the case with the experiences of waking life. The true criterion of reality therefore is not the capability of becoming objects for a subject; but the capacity of persistence for all time. The test of reality is its persistence. But the experiences of waking life have both beginning and end, like such other illusions as dreams or mirage; hence they are no more real than the latter. Now it is said that the pragmatic test is satisfied in the case of waking life inasmuch as our experiences are verified by facts; here tangible things are used as means for tangible ends²⁴²; we get actual satisfaction from food and drink. This test is not operative in the case of dreams. Gaudapada replies that the experiences of a man who has quenched his thirst or hunger are stultified when he enters dream-life; a hungry man often appears as a man of satiated appetite and vice versa. Hence there is no advantage as regards saprayojanatha on either side. In both cases the reality has no existence beyond that particular state, be it of waking or dreaming. The difference lies merely in the instruments of cognition. What is then the substrate behind these illusions? It is Atman in both cases. Atman posits the illusion both of the subject and the object through the power of Maya. The whole cosmos is a result of this illusion.

4. Reality is defined as that which is unchangeable. The true nature of a thing is the constant, permanent, immutable element in it. Evolution is a category which is inapplicable to the absolute truth or reality. If we once grant the reality of distinction, anything becomes anything, and there will be chaos. Hence that which is immortal can never pass into birth and death. All becoming, all change, all causality is an illusion, valid only in the empirical world and not in the transcendental sphere. The reality of the empirical world is mind-dependent; the concept is responsible for our experience of the world. The philosophy of the Absolute which thus asks us to surrender all individual existence, experience, activity, demands of us very heavy sacrifices; the complete freedom from all relations, all conditions, all limitations which it promises, staggers the imagination of all but the most robust of us.

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5.²⁴³ “Apart from man no being wonders at its own existence. When man first becomes conscious he takes himself for granted as something needing no explanation. But not for long, for, with the rise of the first reflexion, that wonder begins which is the mother of metaphysics..” Schopenhauer: “The Worlds as Will and Idea.”

6. Modern western philosophy began with doubt—doubt about everything in man and nature. Hence its predominantly epistemological character.

7. But the searching spirit of the modern world questioned everything and above all, its questioned the capacity of human reason to grasp adequately the final truth about the fundamental constitution of reality. We therefore find philosophy turning itself into an inquiry into the limits and validity of human knowledge in the great idealistic philosophies since the time of Berkeley.

8. Whole process of oscillation must therefore be checked and suspended. Only in the eternal and immutable state after which we long, can this cease. But since all ideas arise in the world of experience, so unrestful and so much at the mercy of difference, no expression of ours can characterise positively the eternal and immutable state after which we long. And since all change and movement, when once we have attained this state is seen to be an illusion, we shall see that the longing for it is also an illusion.

9. But above all, for the Hindus, philosophy was not a luxury of speculation, an outgrowth of wild intellectual activity, an efflorescence of the searching spirit of man in its highest form, but an affair of life. Like Rudolf Eucken, the Hindu thinkers thought of the fundamental²⁴⁴ importance of the problem of life, and philosophy as its handmaid. Hindu philosophy is, therefore, essentially a philosophy of life, on the right understanding of which depend the eternal interests of man.

10. Modern philosophy insistently persists in maintaining the permanent importance of preserving the separate identity of our conscious existence. The idea of absorption in the Absolute is a veritable abomination to the Western brain. Personality is conceived to be the highest category known to us; it is therefore the essence of ourselves; and hence our distinct personality must survive in any scheme of ultimate redemption. The Eastern sages consider this stage as a very imperfect one. Personality implies limitation, its limitation by other personalities, and by external environment. Personality implies difference; any union short of identity is more or less external, more or less imperfect. Hence it is incompatible with the idea of an all-round perfection, a complete freedom from limitations.

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11. The soul is above all ordinary processes of consciousness, because these as we ordinarily experience them imply many imperfections such as capacity of growth and decay, capacity of more and less, duality of subject and object, and so on. The soul as perfection as Reality, must be above all these categories of thinking. But to the Western philosopher the soul apart from life in thought, feeling and willing is an abstraction- a mere X, of which we can have no idea whatever.

12. The pendulum of thought in the ancient world swung from senses to thought; it has again swung back from thought to senses. Pluralistic²⁴⁵ theories and pragmatic philosophies typify these tendencies.

13. The universe is a freak of Maya, time and space are creatures of our brain, causality is a product of our narrow vision, the whole world of facts and thoughts is a mere cosmic illusion, and art and literature, science and philosophy, morality and religion are simple playthings of a baby who is pleased with a rattle.

14. Hindu philosophy laboured under one great limitation. The comparative absence of the development of sciences made many portions of our philosophy mere matters of guess-work. The whole modern philosophy stands in this way in broad contrast with all ancient philosophies. Each step in modern philosophy is dedicated by a fresh step in science; and thus philosophy goes on being modelled on the existing scientific knowledge. With the progress of science, there appears a corresponding progress in philosophy.

15. Philosophy according to the Hindus was not a sum total of knowledge or wisdom; nor was it co-ordination of sciences. It was a synoptic view of the whole, a theory of the ultimate reality.

16. Philosophy does not ignore experience. It is our ordinary commonsense view of things which comes first; and when we find on deeper reflection that it is partial and inadequate, we are led to more fundamental views about the universe. Experience, is therefore, the startingpoint of Sankara's system as well as that of other systems. In fact, it is the only possible starting point for all people, philosophers as well as non-philosophers. Edward Caird says: "Metaphysics does not proceed to create the world out of its own categories still²⁴⁶ less to supersede the special work of science. On the contrary, it is through the discovery of the partial and inadequate explanation of things which the categories of science furnish that it is led to seek after a deeper satisfaction for

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thought, and interpretation of the world by higher principles till it attains that final interpretation which is given by a principle which rests on none higher, but is seen by its own light.

17. Shankara himself gives a justification of this polemic in his work: "An opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger. There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Samkhya and similar system as requisite for perfect knowledge, because these systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons and profess to lead to perfect knowledge."

18. The doctrine of momentariness renders causality an impossibility. We may say A is; B is, But to say B follows A, would mean connection between the two; but A perishes in the first moment and has nothing to do with B.

19. The fact of remembrance also refutes the doctrine of universal momentariness for remembrance implies the continuity of the person. Nor will it do to say that the recognition takes place owing to the similarity of the different self-cognitions; for the cognition of similarity is based on two things²⁴⁷. The judgment of similarity cannot be quite a new act; the expression, 'this is similar to that', contradicts it. We always feel that we are conscious of it being that. Doubts may arise as regards the identity of similarity of outward things; but no doubts are possible regarding the continuity of the person, of the conscious subject.

20. The subjective Idealists: These philosophers maintain that external things do not exist, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms. But such minute things as atoms cannot be apprehended.; and aggregates of atoms cannot be thought of as different from atoms, nor as identical with them (not different because they are composed of atoms nor identical for they would not be then observed in all their parts.) What exists is therefore the mental process of knowledge connected with the mind. Further, ideas have the same form as the object; that is the form of the object is determined by the ideas. Hence these are identical. Again, we are simultaneously conscious of the fact of knowledge and the object of knowledge; this also proves the identity of the idea and the object. Perception is similar to a dream. The variety of ideas is due to the impressions left by the previous ideas. In the beginningless Samsara ideas and impressions succeed each other as causes and effects.

The Vedantin replies that this reasoning is not correct. External things exist, because we are conscious of them. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall, is

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conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts, walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. All the instruments of knowledge testify to the truth of this consciousness.

21²⁴⁸. To say that ideas are self-luminous while external things are not so, is not reasonable. The idea is apprehended only as belonging to a self, and existence of Self is self-proved. This Self is quite distinct from the ideas (of the Bauddhas) the latter originate, pass away, are manifold; while the Self is one and permanent.

It is idle to say that our ideas are like dreams. The latter are negated by the consciousness of our waking state; the former are not; the latter are the results of remembrance while the ideas of the active state are acts of immediate consciousness. The results of the ingenious sophistries of the so-called philosophers cannot wipe out our belief in the data of our immediate consciousness.

22. All impressions require a substratum which the Bauddhas do not admit, because it cannot be cognised. The self-cognition cannot be the abode of the mental impressions; because it is momentary.

The Shunya Vada (or nihilism) does not need special refutation. The apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of right knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth on the basis of which he may impugn its existence.

Refutation of the Jainas: The Jainas apply the following reasoning to all things:- somehow it is, somehow it is not; somehow it is and it is not; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and it is not and is indescribable. Well, such a doctrine of relativity is nothing but a bundle of contradictions. Such contradictory attributes as being and non-being cannot belong at one and the same time to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches²⁴⁹ us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time. The whole reasoning is very unsettling; the result is vagueness and confusion. No definite assertion is possible; and we are landed in agnosticism or scepticism. Further it is impossible to act upon such theories; because of their contradictory and chaotic nature.

22. The existence of the self is not dependent upon the existence of the body. The very argument of the materialists can be turned against them. The materialists argue that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the body, because they persist as long as the body. We may rejoin that the qualities of the Self are not the qualities of the body, because they do not persist while the body persists. Shape, etc. persist, but motion,

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remembrance etc. do not persist in the state of death. Further, while the former are perceived by others, the latter are not perceived. The qualities of the Self may persist by entering into another body.

Form and colour and other qualities (of the elements) do not make their own form or colour or the form and colour of something else their objects. But consciousness can render elements and their products its objects; hence it cannot be a quality of any body. Because consciousness makes the material world known (and not vice versa) consciousness must be separate from the latter. This consciousness constitutes the nature of the Self. And we may infer from the fact of the identity of the conscious agent in such mental acts as recollection that consciousness is one. From the unity of consciousness therefore we may argue the unity of the Self and its independence of the body and its consequent eternity.

Moreover, perceptive consciousness takes place where²⁵⁰ there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps and the like, and does not arise from their absence. Still it is not an attribute of lamp or the like. In the same way, the body is used by the Self as an auxiliary. Further, in the state of dream, we have perceptions, while the body is motionless. Hence the Self is separate from the body.

23. Brahman or the Absolute has a twofold appearance in the Vedanta system. It is now described in terms of phenomena, now it is mentioned as a pure noumenon.

24. The reason for this distinction is to be sought in the different levels of culture of the persons addressing themselves to God.

25. Metaphysics is concerned mainly with the undifferentiated Brahman, the pure Absolute. It is mainly described in a negative way, by a reference to what is not than what it is. It is frequently said that it is above speech and thought. "It stands to reason that Brahman cannot be expressed in words such as Sat and Asat. (existing and non-existing); for every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing—when heard by another—as associated with a certain genus or a certain act, or a certain quality, or a certain mode of relation—But Brahman belongs to no genus...It possesses no qualities...It is actionless...It is not related to anything else...Hence it is but right to say that it can be denoted by no word at all." It is therefore described as neither being nor non-being. Shankara explains this by saying that it is neither the object of consciousness of existence, nor of non-existence, because it is beyond the reach of the senses. It must not be understood by this negative way of expressing the nature of Brahman that it is a mere abstraction or negation. Nothing can be more remote from truth.

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26.²⁵¹ Opponent says everything must be comprised under one of the two categories of existence or non-existence. Shankara replies that this is correct as regards objects of sense-perception. But Brahman being supersensible need not be an object of consciousness of existence or non-existence.

27. The essential nature of the soul is eternal intelligence, because it is one with the highest soul, and the highest soul is eternal intelligence. In sleep etc. also the intelligence is alive, but the absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of objects, not to the absence of intelligence, just as the light pervading the space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.

28. Shankara says: "The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same persons who previously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man." "We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or is merely similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject has never any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is the one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and today remembers that sensation." "Unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolute unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything²⁵², we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause."

The supreme criterion, which distinguishes the spiritual intelligence—the soul—from all material objects, is that the former can illuminate itself, while the latter cannot shine by their own light but require the aid of an intelligent principle.

29. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by any thing else.

30. The Self is distinct from and superior to ideas, because the ideas require an ultimate principle which unites and connects them, while the soul is itself the ultimate principle which renders the cognition of the ideas possible. "The witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing Self

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is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied. Moreover if you maintain that the idea, lamplike manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the other means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves...As the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle."

31. Whatever exists for something else, whatever can be an object for a subject is non-intelligent²⁵³. Even the principle of self-consciousness is non-intelligent, it does not exist in its own right. It is the object of apperception to the soul. "Non-agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent belongs to the apperceiving principle; for self-consciousness itself is an object of apperception. What then is the difference between self-consciousness and the soul? It is not a mere verbal difference. The self-consciousness is expressly an object of the consciousness viz. I. It is the narrow circumscribed ego, within us. This ego is not the final key, the master clue to the interpretation of Reality; hence it cannot be the ultimate principle. We can supplant it by a higher ego, the ego of the universe. A broadening and deepening of the Self within us takes place, till we arrive at the identity of the individual and cosmic consciousness. This cosmic self-consciousness, this common 'I' in all things, this bed-rock of 'I' in each thing or person, is the soul; it is *Asmathprathyayavishaya*. This is the final form which our self-consciousness can attain; beyond it we cannot go. Hence it can supplant all things, even our narrow egoisms; but it itself can be supplanted by none. In this sense Shankara insists with persistent emphasis upon the fact that the soul is always a subject and never an object. While it remains identical with the all, it is impossible for it to be an object; if it becomes an object, it ceases to be a subject. But an object without a subject is an impossibility; hence a pure self-consciousness, feeling itself in complete identity with the soul of the universe is the last and the most ultimate form of being we can conceive.

32. *Buddhi* in fact, is the nearest approximation to the core of our self-consciousness.

33²⁵⁴. Nothing disconcerted them more than the all-pervasive influence of change. The universe was a sort of Heraclitean flux, a perpetual whirl, an eternal shifting of cosmic dust, where nothing is, but everything becomes. This essentially transitory and perishable nature of all things, even those the most valuable creates a sort of disgust in

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all minds; and in proportion to the depth and subtlety of nature, this reaction from the world works more or less powerfully in the bosom of every individual or nation. An irresistible feeling rises up that the finite can never satisfy the Infinite within us that the changing and the perishable cannot satisfy the changeless and deathless nature of ours. This is the psychological genesis of the doctrine of Maya; and in one shape or another it has obtained a very great hold over humanity. It is the verdict passed by the Advaita philosophy upon all appearance, upon all change.

34. The confusion of this distinction is the root of all our experience. "Object and subject having as their province, the presentation of the 'Thou' (the not-I) and the 'I' are of a nature as opposed darkness and light. It is certain that the being of the one is incompatible with the being of the other it follows so much the more that the qualities of the one also do not exist in the other. Hence it follows that the transfer of the object, and its qualities to the subject and conversely, that the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the object, is logically false—yet in mankind this procedure resting on false knowledge, of pairing together the true and the untrue (that is subjective and objective) is inborn so that they transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other, not²⁵⁵ separating object and subject, although they are absolutely different and so saying for example "This am I", "That am I". This passage with which Shankara begins his great Bhashya is of very great importance inasmuch as it lays down the root of all worldly distinctions and thus points indirectly to the proper goal of metaphysics.

35. And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, than the entire phenomenal world—which is based on the individual soul—having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside."

36. The entire body of the doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine? Shankara refutes these objections and at the same time vindicates the comparative reality of the empirical view. "These objections do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes...Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed." The Vedanta texts although untrue can convey true information; as dreams, although unreal often prognosticate real events.

37. A third factor which goes to constitute the world is Karman. The law of causation embraces ²⁵⁶the whole empirical realm and is thus an essential feature of its constitution.

38. Illusion even as an illusion must be accounted for. Hence from the Vyahavarika point of view we may try to explain its origin and nature. The seat of Avidya is in the mind of man. The explanation of the empirical concept must be sought in the nature of our cognitive faculty. Shankara, to a certain extent, explains Avidya in this way. It is called Nisargika; it is innate in our mental faculty. It is based on wrong knowledge; and knowledge is a function of the mind. It consists in the form of a wrong conception. "All jivas—human entities—which are really non-existent, are (with all concomitant appearance of birth, death etc.) mere results of the objectivising tendency, of the mind and nothing else. The whole experience i.e. duality made up of perceiver and perceived, is pure imagination. There is no Avidya apart from the mind...on its destruction all is destroyed; its activity is the cause of all appearance.

39. It requires a very robust metaphysical capacity in man to face all these ordeals. Hard thinking, persistent thinking, clear thinking, thinking to the roots of all problems, to the very fundamentals of all situations, to the very presuppositions of all thought and being, is the very essence of metaphysics. He who has no courage to face the results of his thinking to swallow the conclusions of his thought, whatever they may mean to him personally, should never take the trouble to philosophise.

An absolutist philosophy indeed demands very heavy sacrifices. But its conclusion is proportionately splendid. The end justifies the means. It is limitless existence, limitless happiness we get.

40²⁵⁷. Externality has to go, difference between subject and object has to go, spatial and temporal view of things must go, causal determination of one thing by another must go, maniness as well as oneness must go. This is inevitable. But the universe with all its reality will not go, even for the liberated soul. It will merely change its form, meaning, and significance. Nothing will disappear except a false view, a limited horizon, an erroneous idea, a circumscribed vision. Fact, Reality, Existence, however will remain as fundamental as ever. But the view-point will change. This is the radical change which the Vedanta claims to work in our intelligence.

41. The greatest of all revolutions then will be the revolution in the standpoint of human intelligence; and that revolution will bring about the downfall of phenomena and the installation of noumena in their stead.

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42. It is knowledge alone which is effective in putting an end to Samsara, not ordinary knowledge, nor scientific knowledge, but true philosophic knowledge of the unity of the soul and its identity with Brahman. Knowledge alone is sufficient without works; because liberation is nothing but perfect knowledge. "Liberation is nothing but the removal of ignorance."

43. We are apt to understand the term Gnana or knowledge too abstractly in the light of modern psychology. Knowledge is not a purely intellectual cognition; it has its basis in will, as well. It is an attitude of the soul towards reality. It is very remote from a verbal superficial insight into the language of the Vedanta. A man may delight in the conundrums of Vedanta, may revel in these speculations as intellectual luxuries but he may be a complete ignoramus all the same.

In²⁵⁸ the commentary on the Gita, Shankara distinguishes between a Gnani and one who has realised the truth. What is necessary for liberation is not a mere change in the view of things. It is the turning of the eye of the soul that is necessary the very fundamental attitude of one's knowing, feeling, willing Self that is to be revolutionised. Gnana or knowledge includes willing as an important element in it; it includes Bakti or devotion as a substantial part of it; it is in Bergson's pregnant language "integral experience". It is an all-round realization involving in it, a complete conversion of the whole consciousness. To secure this right and firm attitude of the soul, it is necessary to go through not only intellectual training, but moral discipline as well. The ethical as well as religious duties have thus an auxiliary value.

44. In the beginning of the Bhashya, certain qualifications are laid down for the student of this highest philosophy. These are the essential prerequisites in all cases, without which it is not possible to get the highest knowledge.

45. This is the dawn of the metaphysical consciousness in man. A renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here and hereafter. A man must feel the profoundly unsatisfactory character of all finite enjoyments, before he can profit by the teachings of the Vedanta. A sacrifice of all personal longings is demanded in order to attain a pure, lofty, unprejudiced view of the ultimate essence. These comprehend together complete peace of mind; freedom from external and internal agitation.

46. "He whom nobody knows either as noble or ignoble,²⁵⁹ as ignorant or learned, as well-conducted, or ill-conducted, he is a Brahmin. Quietly devoted to his duty, let the

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wise man pass through life unknown; let him sleep on earth as if he were blind, unconscious, deaf." – Shankara.

47. The question still remains; How is the passage from the finite to the Infinite possible? The works are important as regards this; The Shastras can only remove hindrances and attune the soul to the knowledge of Reality. But ultimately even the knowledge derived from Shastras with its necessary polarization into subject and object, is itself a delusion and a snare. How then are we to break these hedges and peep into the Absolute? From the point of view of the esoteric metaphysics such a question cannot arise; we leave behind us the category of causality.

48. In the commentary on the Gita also Shankara lays bare the egoistic basis of all morality and immorality. "Even if they (men under worldly delusions) are devoted to the performance of duty, their conduct in speech, thought and deed is egoistic and is prompted by a longing for reward." "He who knows the truth does not think 'I act'; not does he long for the results.

49. "The soul being engrossed by nescience identifies itself as it were with the body and so on and imagines itself to be affected by the experience of pain which is due to nescience. 'I am affected by the pain due to the body'...The pain of the individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts, which are due to name and form, the effects of nescience. A person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter." – SHANKARA.

50.²⁶⁰ "Let us consider the case of many men, each of whom possesses sons, friends, etc.. while others do not. If then somebody calls out 'the son has died,' the 'friend has died', grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the imagination of being connected with sons and friends but not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed themselves from the imagination." – Shankara.

51. All individuality which we attribute to ourselves is due to Avidya. The sense of individuality in us is called Ahamkara, and this is the root of all actions. This consciousness of autonomy is however an illusion even in empirical sphere.

52. The Advaita of Shankara may be supposed to be fatal to the ethical life of humanity. Morality and immorality appear as mere illusions from the standpoint of the Absolute. Thus to a certain extent, it must be confessed that the ethical problems lose that fundamental importance which they possess for the ethical theisms of the West.

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The centre of gravity is shifted for the eastern sages from the kingdom of actions to the kingdom of thought and from the sphere of consciousness to the sphere of pure gnosis or superconsciousness. The few exalted spirits, who have kindled the immortal fire within themselves, raise themselves at a stroke from the empirical world with all its thought distinctions and moral appreciations to the transcendental world of pure spirit, where human judgments and provincial valuations of our planet disappear.

53. In practical life, (Plato's world of shadows) the influence of the teaching of Advaitism is of the purest and loftiest type. Moral life of humanity is deprived of one great support and supplied with another but powerful²⁶¹ one. The very foundation of our ordinary righteousness is taken away; its egoistic basis disappears. This egoistic morality is necessarily narrow, provincial and sectarian; it sets individuals, against individuals communities against communities, nations against nations. It worships individual as the highest product of civilisation. It over emphasises the importance of personal considerations. But Plato rightly divined that the ills of the world will not disappear till kings were philosophers or philosophers kings. (i.e. possessed of the vision of the Whole, seeing things fundamentally, and not taking the narrow, individual standpoint). The Advaitism extends the idea one step further and lays it down that men must be philosophers and philosophers men and then will come the promised land, not flowing indeed with milk and honey but flowing with spiritual peace and harmony and happiness. The Self of an individual is the Self of the universe; and the conduct of every being must be regulated by what constitutes the good of the universe. This language is only a paraphrase of Kant's dictum: "Act in such a way that your conduct may be a law to all beings;" of Jesus Christ "Do towards others as you would wish them to do towards you;" of Plato "The society must be ruled by the Idea of the good, the happiness and greatness of the whole." There is no good of a part which is not a good of the whole. The Vedanta proposes to remove not only men's miseries, but the very roots of their miseries, not only their immorality but the seeds of their narrow virtues and narrow vices. Jesus Christ supplied the moral basis to this great ideal when he placed the essence of the Self in willing not in knowing; Guatama Buddha founded this ideal in the very heart²⁶² of man, in his love, broad and disinterested for all life; Shankara representing the Hindu thought placed this ideal on its proper intellectual basis and thus secured a true philosophic foundation for the ideal of fundamental unity of mankind by boldly proclaiming that the individual self is intrinsically the same as the soul of the universe.

53. Philosophy is largely a question of proportion. Any dogmatic, one-sided emphasis on one of these moments of Reality is suicidal. Comprehensiveness is the

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very essence of a great philosophical system; it must be capable of explaining all things from the great Absolute to a blade of grass. Such a system of philosophy must be both idealistic and realistic; for in it ideas and outer facts get due recognition, and receive their proper place in a broader synthesis. It must be both monistic and pluralistic, for it does not sacrifice the one at the altar of the many, nor the many at the altar of the one; but in it both the one and the many become perfectly reconciled with each other. It must not be a brutal materialism, which worships facts and ignores values, idolizes science, and neglects religion and morality; nor must it be predominantly a philosophy of values, which goes on evading and ignoring all connection with facts and builds up for itself a magnificent 'Palace of Art', out of all possible reach for humanity. But it appreciates fully the significance of both facts and values and tries to explain intelligibly the relation of the one to the other. At the same time a great system of philosophy is something very remote from eclecticism, a mechanical union²⁶³ of these diverse elements, a superficial harmony of these fundamental discords, but a bold original characteristic structure of thought in which all elements find their appointed places, and get their meaning and significance in the light of the Whole.

Such is a brief outline of the ideal of unification towards which the philosophic world is steering. But it is an ideal only, and there is hardly any system of thought which satisfies all these conditions. This is the only extreme limit, the measuring rod, the standard by which all the existing philosophies may be judged.

54. The founder of modern idealism is Descartes. He deserves the credit of laying down the fundamental basis of all modern philosophy, in his celebrated proposition cognito ergo sum. 'I think, therefore I am.' With the enunciation of this proposition a great step was taken in philosophy. Self-consciousness was conceived for the first time to be the basis of all reality.

55. Shankara therefore, in common with all modern idealists makes the Self the one supreme, ineradicable assumption, which makes all knowledge, all reality possible.

Another great step forward was taken by Berkeley. Berkeley's great merit consisted in the fact that he proved in convincingly for all time the absurdity of the conception of matter as an absolutely independent substance. He asks the very relevant question: "What is meant by the term Exist when applied to sensible things?" And he answers: "The absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their essi is percipi, nor is it conceivable that they should have any existence out of the minds of²⁶⁴ thinking things which perceive them." And his proof is this: "It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or motion, or colour to

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exist without the mind or unperceived—. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.” Berkeley’s position therefore comes to this: no object without a subject. This is the element of permanent truth in Berkeleanism. For Shankara also the refutation of materialism consists essentially in the impossibility of conceiving an absolute, independent existence of all material things. Shankara’s position is this: Whatever can be the object for a subject is matter (or we may put it: Matter is that which can only exist as an object for a subject); whatever cannot be an object for a subject (that is whatever is eternally subject) is spirit. The former has, therefore, a secondary existence, dependent on the perceiving mind, the latter alone has an independent existence, an absolute reality, an existence not derivative, nor secondary but existence in itself..

55. It is equally clear to both Berkeley and Shankara that ideas also have no independent reality; they have reality so far as they belong to some person (or spirit as Berkeley puts it). Ideas according to Berkeley are unthinking things, and the very existence of an unthinking thing consists in being perceived.

56. Shankara’s view of the relation of ideas to soul, is the same as Berkeley’s. “As the idea only is apprehended by the self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea) there results no regressus ad infinitum.²⁶⁵ And the witnessing self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known.”

57. Shankara says: “It may be urged if Atman is ever incomprehensible, it may be something unreal. This cannot be, for we see its effects as plain as anything. as we infer the existence of the illusionist from effects such as the production of different forms etc. brought about by existent worker of the illusion, so visible effects such as the birth of worlds etc. must lead us to infer the existence of the absolutely real Atman, the substratum of the whole of illusion as spread out in the variety of forms etc.

58. Berkeley’s main contribution to philosophy lies in his refutation of the dogma of an object without a subject, of an independent and absolute existence of matter. And this kernel of his teaching became a part of all idealism; and as have seen on this point, he is in fundamental agreement with Shankara also.

Hume showed the untenability of certain assumptions in Berkeley’s system and showed a necessity for a deeper analysis. The transition from Berkeley and Hume to Kant is a very apt parallel to the philosophic movement from the sceptical position of Baudddhas to the idealist position of Shankara. Berkeley dissolved the world of matter into ideads of the human or divine brain. Hume finished the work of destruction by applying the same criticism to the idea of soul or spirit or substance. Matter is

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unrelated to subject does not exist; because we cannot form an intelligible idea of an independent material world. Well, says Hume, neither have we got an idea of spirit. All that we feel, is a series of impressions and ideas; the idea of the soul or substance behind them is absolutely illusory as the idea of a material substratum, an unknown somewhat²⁶⁶ which produces the sensation, in us. In this way, all our experience is resolved into a flux of sensations, a dance of ideas. The Bauddhas also denied the existence of outer world and also the existence of the soul. The Vignanavadins were subjective idealists, for whom the sole reality consisted in series of ideas which were self-conscious. Another point common with both these sceptical movements was that they took away the ordinary basis of causality and could not secure any other basis.

Shankara's position with regard to the Bauddhas very much resembles Kant's position with regard to Berkeley and Hume. In both these great philosophies the spirit of man becomes conscious of the necessity of a deeper analysis of experience owing to the difficulties revealed by scepticism. Both Shankara and Kant were convinced that scepticism (Shankara used to style it Sunyavadaprasanga). was an impossible attitude of mind. Kant absorbed Berkeley's teaching so far as to deny the existence of the world of matter unrelated to all intelligence. Shankara similarly with the Bauddhas could not conceive of the outer or inner world of reality not dependent upon mind. But here they part company with the sceptical theory. Kant tries to preserve the empirical reality of the outer world against Berkeley. For Berkeley the outer world was dissolved absolutely into ideas; the object completely melts away into the subject. But Kant maintains that the inner life has no more meaning except with reference to an outer life. Berkeley points out that "for a sensitive subject such a world can exist only through its²⁶⁷ own affections, and therefore cannot be known to exist apart from them. The Kantian answer is that while for such a subject there would be no external world as such, neither would there be any consciousness of sensations as states of the self. The life of a purely sensitive being is not for it an inner life, i.e. not a consciousness of a series of states of its own being, any more than it a consciousness of an outer world of objects. On the other hand, the self-conscious being which has an inner life cannot separate it from the outer life which it presupposes. Its inner life is not the consciousness of a series of sensations as such, but of perceptions or ideas which refer to external objects." ..Caird-Philosophy of Kant.

59. Both Kant and Shankara base their refutation of sensationalism a proper analysis of consciousness, which reveals that both our inner and outer states, both our subjective and objective feelings are conditioned by one another.

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60. Further, while Hume had resolved the world of inner experience into a mere string of unrelated ideas, Kant tries to reinstate the self to its original position by making it the fundamental condition of all experience. Empiricism states that knowledge is imprinted upon our minds from without. Mind is tabula rasa, experience is merely the object making itself felt on this white sheet. Berkeleian idealism invokes God to account for the possibility of experience as an orderly system. But the role of self as a selective, active principle working spontaneously to make the subjective world of experience was dark to him. Hume worked on the premises of empiricism;²⁶⁸ and hence his failure to account for order and unity in our experience. Kant took a wider and deeper view of human nature; he found that the cardinal feature of all experience is the idea of self. Ideas do not hang in the air; they are essentially personal. An idea unrelated to self, unappropriated by a personality can never be imagined to exist. "All the manifold determinations of perception must necessarily be related to the 'I thing' in the subject that is conscious of it. The consciousness 'I think' cannot be given to the subject, but must proceed from the spontaneous activity of the subject. It is called pure apperception or pure self-consciousness, because it is the universal form which is necessarily presupposed in all modes of consciousness whatever. It is, therefore distinguished from empirical consciousness, inasmuch as the latter involves a particular relation to sense or feeling. It is also called original apperception, because it is the primary condition without which there can be no self-consciousness whatever, and therefore, no unity in our experience. And this 'I think' is the only idea which occupies the position of being presupposed, explicitly or implicitly, in every form of consciousness." Watson. Philosophy of Kant Explained.

61. Another point in which Kant and Shankara make a considerable advance upon their predecessors must be noticed. The latter fail to arrive at a right solution because in them the consciousness which was the object of analysis was some one individual consciousness. But Kant and Shankara widen the sphere of analysis when they make not this or that consciousness, but consciousness in general the object of their investigations. It is this which²⁶⁹ Shankara means by the distinction between Ahamprathyavishaya and Asmathprathyavishaya. In the same way, Kant as well as Shankara vindicate the empirical validity of the law of causation. Kant accounts for it by making it a category of our understanding, But causality has no validity in the sphere of noumena. Shankara says: "It is Jiwa (individual soul conditioned by upadhis) whose very nature is bound up with the idea of cause and effect, as evidenced by such daily experience as 'I do this' "this happiness or that misery is mine", and the like Atman is absolutely free from any such idea, but in it is seen, like the snakes in place of the rope, the idea of Jiwa.

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62. Shankara has clearly grasped the fact, long before Hume, of the essentially subjective character of the category of causality.

63. It is the distinction between phenomena and noumena in Kant's philosophy which brings it into real contact with Shankara's metaphysics. This distinction of the standpoints is fundamental in both these systems. Shankara distinguishes between Vyavaharika (realistic) and parmarthic (metaphysical) standpoints. Kant distinguishes between transcendental and empirical knowledge.

Both are thus able to unite the empirical reality of the world with its transcendental ideality. All knowledge, says Kant, is only of phenomena; because all knowledge is essentially relative to our understanding. It is not the knowledge of the pure object as it is in itself, but the knowledge of the object as it is refracted through our sense and understanding. An element of relativity enters, therefore, into all our knowledge, and hence we do not know pure Reality, but Reality as it appears to us through the spectacles of our human senses and understanding. Hence our knowledge has not absolute validity, it²⁷⁰ has a comparative validity only. But then in the empirical realm, in the sphere of our existence as conditioned by our human limitations, all the categories of understanding are fully valid. But beyond these spheres, in the transcendental realm, these categories have no application. But how can we pass from phenomena to noumena, if we are enveloped everywhere by relativity? Here Kant brings his doctrine of practical reason; what is taken away as knowledge is restored as faith. Shankara virtually takes up an identical position. "The whole of experience i.e. duality made up of perceiver and perceived is pure imagination—a fiction of the mind which, in absolute truth is Atman, and is, as such not in relation with objects, eternal and absolute.

64. "Kant's conception of thought is, that by its very nature whatever is positive—in other words what is real—must be real or complete in itself. From this point of view it is obvious that everything conceived to be real must be independent of all relations to anything else. If thought can only admit that which is self-complete to be real and exclude from this reality all contradiction, clearly reason will demand an individual which contains within itself all positive predicates to the exclusion of all relations and negations. This is what is meant by the Idea of Pure Reason." Gaudapada defines Reality as distinguished from appearance (Shankara expands this definition), "By the nature of a thing is understood that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is inborn, that which is not artificial or that which does not cease to²⁷¹ be itself."

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65. All the universe of names and forms is therefore due to Maya; in Kant's language it is a 'phenomenon.'

66. Spinoza thinks with Shankara that all unhappiness is due ultimately to ignorance, error, a false view of things. If ignorance is the root of all evil in the world, knowledge is salvation. The attainment of the right point of view as regards all existence is the one end of philosophy.

67. "What Spinoza aimed at was a system of knowledge in which everything should follow by strict necessity of thought from the first principle with which it starts.

68. Substance is from one point of view Thought, and from another point of view Extension. Shankara would say that the very nature of Brahman is intelligence; and intelligence is not conceivable without existence.

69. Shankara therefore, resolves the fact of experience into two parts—the change and the changeless. The former he calls Maya and the latter Reality. Spinoza comes to the same conclusion. We come to the idea of the Infinite by removing all the limitations which make finite thing infinite. His view is illustrated by the idea of space in us. This presents a close resemblance to Shankara's system, in which also the notions about Brahman are modelled upon those of Akasha—pure space. Space is one and continuous.

70. In moral theory of Spinoza there are two points which resemble the corresponding ethical positions of Shankara. The first is the identification to a certain extent of intellect and will. The ultimate root of all evil is not wrong willing, but wrong knowledge. Error or²⁷² false view of the world is responsible for all sufferings. The second position is the absence of real freedom of will. The first stage of man is that of bondage. All finite things are conditioned and determined from without, and man among the rest.

71. The concept of causality receives almost identical treatment in either case. Here also there are two aspects of the problem. There is a sort of reality which we ascribe to this fact....But this elementary causal concept is soon replaced by the ideal causal concept. Ordinary causation is evidently a category of the finite. It implies the succession or co-existence of its members. In the former case, the cause loses itself partially or wholly in the effect. In the latter case we have to take things as external to and also affected by each other. Thought, therefore, works down from the elementary idea of causation to an ideal concept in which there is complete identity of cause and

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effect. Like Shankara, therefore, Spinoza says “God is omne esse.”. The relation between cause and effect is conceived ultimately as one of identity.

72. What is the specific contribution of Bergson to philosophic thought? It lay in this. Philosophic speculation had come almost to a deadlock. Since the time of Descartes, many attempts were made to overcome the dualism of subject and object, mind and matter. Descartes posited the dualism and then tried to overcome it by bringing in God. Spinoza sees these two as mere parallel expressions of Substance. Berkeley also brings in the tertium quid of God. It was the same with Leibniz²⁷³. Kant went much further. He said that understanding creates nature, that mind instead of being merely the passive recipient of impressions from the outside world, is itself ordering of the world by means of its forms. Experience is two-fold; matter and form. Mind imposes its form on matter. But what then, this matter ultimately is? We know it so far it is refracted through our understanding. Hence matter as it is in itself or as it is for a perfect understanding is something quite unknown and unknowable to us. It is the thing-in-itself—the noumenon. Thus the world was sundered into two parts—phenomena; and noumena; the former are within the sphere of our knowledge, the latter are beyond it. This means that our knowledge is always relative and we are debarred for ever from knowing reality. It was a sorry pass to which philosophy was thus brought. Hence the system thus became an unconscious mainspring of all the latest agnostic systems. It reality is unknowable, we must take to either agnosticism or scepticism.

Bergson claims to deliver philosophy from this impasse. We know that both Kant and Shankara think reality to be unknowable. Bergson agrees with this position. Intellect as it is, is incapable of comprehending reality.

73. This is the very point of Shankara’s criticism of the uselessness of the study of Shastras, from the point of view of the Absolute. Shastras represent labour of thought, of intellect; they may merely mean multiplication of the points of view; hence there will be greater and greater conflict; and still we shall be outside the Absolute.

74. The very word Darshana applied to Hindu systems²⁷⁴ of philosophy points to the fact that it is ultimately sight or insight, they aim at.

75. Shankara thinks that although the study of Shastras cannot bring us into touch with the Absolute, they can point the way to it; they can turn us away from irrelevant pursuits. Bergson also thinks that a preliminary preparation of this type is necessary.

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76. Both Shankara and Bergson think that intuition is not radically different from perception. Shankara compares the two by saying that in both the object speaks and not the subject; and in both, therefore, error, hesitation, and diversity of views have not scope. Bergson distinguishes between these two, calling perception, infra-intellectual, and intuition supra-intellectual. Kant recognised only the former; hence his failure to reach the possibility of experiencing the Absolute. Lastly, we may point out one more common feature. A single effort of intuition, says Bergson, is not sufficient. It must be systematically practised it must be a habit, nay a very part of us. Shankara's emphasis on manan and midhidhyasa point in the same direction. Both thinkers emphasise the extreme difficulty of the effort and lay down extensive study and much practice as the pre-requisites of attaining it.

77. In some of the great idealistic systems, intellect accounts for the world, but intellect itself remains unaccounted for. But Bergson, like Shankara traces the genesis of the intellect to the same source; Shankara traces it to Maya or prakriti; Bergson says that intellect is the deposit of spirit on its march, In both theories intellect is a negation of reality.

78. The following implications appear to be common in all philosophies (1) "Totality: philosophy²⁷⁵ is conceived as a comprehensive view, as dealing (objectively) with the whole or universe, and accordingly as (subjectively) requiring to be pursued in a catholic or impartial spirit. It is thus marked off from the special sciences which limit their view to some specific set of facts... (2) Generality Just because the view is a whole, it manifests itself in universals, in principles, (3) Application..The general truths do not remain inert or sterile, but are carried over to illuminate and make reasonable the relevant details." ..(Prof. Dewey: Philosophy (Baldwin's Dictionary of philosophy). Philosophy expresses a certain attitude, purpose, and temper of conjoined intellect and will, rather than a discipline.

79. Philosophy is bound to be critical; it is reason to which it ultimately appeals. None of the ingenious structures of men like Thomas Aquinas can stand this test; they are not, therefore philosophies in the present day use of the term. The Jewish philosophy was also nothing but an attempt to reconcile the teachings of Judaism with the results of secular sciences. It is therefore better to characterise the systems of these thinkers as theologies rather than philosophies.

80. Philosophy cannot then afford to be merely a science of sciences or an appendix to sciences. It is not the results, but the presuppositions of sciences, the assumptions of our everyday life and the assumptions of our various sciences, which philosophy takes upon itself to consider. Sciences take portions of reality for study, but a study of all the

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parts is not the same thing as the study of the whole. The whole has a character of its own; it is not a sum of the characters of the parts. The universe is one fact²⁷⁶, not a series of facts, and it is this fact which the philosopher has to consider.

81. The criteria of truth are known in the Hindu thought as pramanas or canons of knowledge. Shankara as well as other Hindu philosophers recognise in perception the one great source of knowledge. This was known as pratyaksha or the sensuously perceptible; that knowledge in which we come in direct contact with reality. A contact of the sense with the object produces the necessary conviction. It is realised that it is the main source of knowledge for the human beings and the sole source for animals. Perception takes place inevitably and is not in the least dependent upon our will. It has a measure of reality which can never be taken away. We cannot accept the words of him who while perceiving a thing through his sense still says that he does not perceive the outward thing and that no such thing exists.

82. Shankara recognises other tests of truth also such as, consistency or freedom from contradictions. He frequently rejects many theories on the ground of the presence of discrepancies therein. He says: "Other views are refuted on the ground that they are full of contradictions.

83. Sankara accepts the pragmatic test of truth. A statement of theory is true in proportion as it works successfully in practice. Truth is thus to be judged by its consequences, by the difference it makes to us when we accept or reject it. Many positions are attacked on the ground that they would lead to the unsettling of the minds of the people. This is the argument advanced against the vague and confused reasoning of the Jainas and against the Bauddhas. Sankara argues that if the doctrine of momentariness be accepted the consequence will be the weakening of the people's faith in the doctrine of causality²⁷⁷ and consequent chaos. Similarly, all reasonings or theories which render the attainment of salvation improbable or impossible are to be rejected. The fundamental motive of philosophy of the Hindus is practical; it is the deliverance from all finite states.

84. Shankara points out the importance of reasoning as an organ of truth. (1) Reasoning is not only a principle of difference, but a principle of agreement also. (2) We must have a healthy confidence in our reason, otherwise there shall be chaos. All human activity is based upon certain conclusions; and if all faith is shaken in the powers of our mind, society will collapse. (3) Even if it is meant to say that there is any higher source of truth, the fact that it is a higher source must be justified at the bar of

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reason. Hence reason in this case too becomes an ultimate arbiter. (4) Revelation requires the assistance of our reasoning power in elucidating its meaning, harmonising its teaching and so on. (5) Because some theories established by reasoning are false, it does not follow that all are and will be false.

There are a few passages in which Shankara says that reasoning alone is adequate to establish the foundation of his system.

85. Very important indeed is the contribution made by reason towards obtaining a satisfactory, ultimate view of the Reality. But Shankara very clearly perceives that an independent exercise of our dialectical faculties cannot take us into the heart of the Absolute. In a brilliant passage, he exposes the limitations of intelligence (or conceptual view of things) as the organ of the knowledge of Brahman.

“The true nature of the cause of the world on²⁷⁸ which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts; for it cannot be object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like.

86. It is said that while Brahman is one, the knowledge of it should be one also.

87. Shankara’s metaphysics has two aspects—the esoteric and exoteric. In the esoteric metaphysics or the pure philosophy of the Absolute, the quest of a criterion becomes impossible. In this respect Shankara’s position resembles the position of Aristotle. Truth is one, absolute; hence there are no degrees of truth, there are degrees of error only. But the position is different from the point of view of ordinary experience. Shankara recognised that the nature and the validity of the tests of truth depend upon the appropriateness of the spheres in which they are employed. Thus we cannot assert offhand that one criterion is superior to another absolutely; in fact, there is no criterion to truth; there are criteria of truth. Shankara has grasped a very important truth inasmuch as he perceives the failure of the quest after one ultimate, absolute and all-comprehensive test, by the application of which it may be quite easy to draw off the exact line of demarkation between truth and error. From the point of view of action, those Shrutis which prescribe moral injunctions or prohibitions, acquire special validity, but if we adopt the standpoint of philosophy, the parts of Shruti which describe the ultimate unity acquire special weight. Therefore, the Vedanta which teaches the unity of Brahman does not stultify²⁷⁹ the ordinary Shastra; nor will the science of conduct be rendered useless.

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88. The Shrutis do not introduce us into the positive nature of Brahman, they can only remove our illusions regarding it. They have the purport of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to exchew the objects of his aversion and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the one quoted divert him from the object of his natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (highest) Self.

The function of the Shrutis, is, therefore a negative one; they destroy the obstacles on the road and the point the way to it.

89. When the knowledge of the true nature of the Self has been attained, neither organs of knowledge nor objects of knowledge present themselves to consciousness any longer. The final authority (Veda) teaches that the Self is in reality no percipient of objects and while so denying (i.e. as a result of that teaching), the Veda itself ceases to be authority, just as a dream perception (cease to be an authority) in a waking state." SHANKARA.

90. An analysis of the contents of our ordinary consciousness shows us that the deepest the most ineradicable, the most constant element in it is the idea of Self. Everyone feels that the most intimate part of his nature, the very centre of his being lies in this idea of Self. The consciousness of Self is, in fact, the one thing, of which we²⁸⁰ are absolutely sure. It is the very rock of our certitude. No reasoning however subtle or penetrating can explain away this fundamental fact of our nature, in the innermost recesses of our being, the one solid fact which stands firm and unshakable in the midst of all storms, which gives us the very sure guarantee that is required. We may go on doubting the existence and validity of every part of mind and nature, but we cannot doubt the doubter away. Such propositions as 'I doubt, the existence of my being' or 'I do not exist' carry within themselves their own refutation. The fact of I-ness, of self-consciousness is presupposed in either proposition. In fact, any attempt to charm away the I-ness is foredoomed to failure. A single thought, a single word, a single movement of head or heart is sufficient to destroy absolute scepticism. Even a dumb, speechless scepticism is an impossible attitude of mind. Bergson has very ably proved that the idea of pure nothingness is a pseudo-idea, that in its very nature it is an absurdity. We cannot either picture or conceive such a thing as absolute annihilation, absolute void or absolute nothingness. An irreducible minimum of consciousness persistently remains, permanently thwarting our endeavours to leap beyond the shadow of our thought. This residue of consciousness and reality can never be conjured away by any legerdemain, any trick of logic. Shankara's philosophy takes its stand upon this fact of facts, this eternal bedrock of reality, and his position thus is an impregnable one and no attacks from any quarter can dislodge it from this.

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91. A reciprocal influence was exercised by these²⁸¹ two vital departments of human thought and conduct, and the result was a double one. Philosophy did not remain an academic activity of the few; it became a living force, a mighty tradition, a universal leaven among the people of all ranks and conditions.

92. A passion for originality or for the exercise of unfettered independence of the human intellect which ignores all the old wisdom altogether and tries to create a philosophy *de novo* is a very shortsighted passion or rather a suicidal one. We do not know of any great philosopher who entirely cut himself adrift from the old moorings and started an entirely original system. Originality or freedom of reason does not exist in an independence of the past.

93. Judged from the externals, Shankara's system appears to be more like the mediaeval schools or the Jewish systems. But a detailed study of the fundamental positions of Shankara's system dissolves such an illusion. It was a necessity of his position which compelled him to support his system with theologic buttresses. But his system does not stand in need of any support.

94. Like Hume, he exposes the fiction of a mere habitual belief in cause and effect. Like Kant, he is convinced that phenomena are mere appearances, that Reality is unknowable for intelligence. Like Bergson, he tries to show the intuitive basis of our highest knowledge. Like Hegel, he sees that the subject and object are one, that the real is the rational is real. It is our firm conviction, therefore, that Shankara has as much title to the name of philosopher as any of these brilliant thinkers. (finis)

“The²⁸² Power and Secret of the Jesuits” by Rene Fulop-Miller

1. Of all these works, few indeed attempt to treat the subject objectively, while the remainder are all concerned either with reviling and accusing or with praising and defending.

2. The Jesuits, however, in direct opposition to such opinions, made themselves the exponents of another doctrine, according to which perfection could not only be experienced in supernatural ecstasy, but also could be attained by the exercise of the natural human capacities.

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3. "I can find God at all times, whenever I will", Ignatius Loyola said once to Manares, one of the brothers of his order.

4. The Spanish Jesuit, Godinez, went yet further when he said that in general the man who lived in a state of intense contemplation was not to be regarded as the more perfect, but he whose will strove the more eagerly after perfection.

5. In his Book of the Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius Loyola has endeavoured to show how man may develop his natural powers to the highest degree by systematic exercises. He starts from the fundamental assumption that perfection, in the last resort, consists solely in this; that man, who from his ordinary standpoint views life in a false, earthly and transitory perspective, and consequently often goes astray, should struggle forward to a free way of life and thought leading straight to the highest goal.

6. This 'indifference' does not, however, signify with Ignatius an end in itself, like the Ataraxia of the ancient Stoics or the "detachment" of the mediaeval mystics; it is merely a necessary pre-condition, so that the will may free itself from all disturbing, confusing attachments²⁸³ and inclinations.

7. According to Jesuit teaching, God is not to be found only in inactive transports of ecstasy, but above all in a clear recognition of the divine will, and in an activity directed by this recognition; man attains to perfection when all his actions are directed "to the greater glory of God." This point of view destroyed the hitherto prevalent belief in the special vocation of the few, elect persons. Hosts of pious people, who had never received a "revelation", now saw before them a way by which they might reach perfection, with no less certainty than those whom God elevated to Himself in the fire of mystical ecstasy.

8. It is true that, in the course of centuries, the spiritual exercises have undergone great changes, and the form in which they are usually given today differs considerably from the original version. A way which is to be accessible to everyone must be adapted from time to time to constantly changing conditions and to the individual requirements of the exercitants. Ignatius himself enjoined that the provisions of the Exercises should always be adapted to the grasp of each individuality of the person concerned. It was often found desirable, even in the early days, to shorten the exercises, and thereby the original scheme of exercises was sacrificed for the sake of popularizing their activity.

Most significant, perhaps, is a precept from the Directory issued by Ignatius, a collection of instructions from the "Exercise master," which states that the spiritual director must always adapt the exercises "to the age, capacity and powers of those who

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desire to undertake them"; and that he should "never lay too heavy²⁸⁴ a burden on a too little enlightened spirit or a too weak heart."

9. Whereas in the 16th century attention was mainly directed to those who wielded temporal and spiritual power, to the princes and high ecclesiastics on whom at that time the people's weal and woe depended, at the present time the exercises are directed mainly to the organised masses of the Catholic proletariat, whose conquest promises considerable political influence.

10. From the beginning, the Society of Jesus has known how to make use of the personal qualities of its members, and it is in this very combination of discipline and individualism that the novelty of the community founded by Ignatius lies.

11. His superior assigned to him a definite mission and imparted to him the necessary instructions; but within the limit of his instructions he could display his personal initiative. For, within a short time after the foundation of the order, the Jesuits were acting as spiritual directors at the courts of Europe, as preachers in the most remote primeval forests, as political conspirators, disguised and in constant danger of death; thus they had a thousand opportunities to employ their talents their cleverness, their knowledge of the world and even their cunning, "to the greater glory of God."

12. An organization scattered over the whole world whose members act independently in their own spheres of activity, and at the same time when circumstances demand it, are prepared humbly to obey commands. Only such an organisation, combining the most rigid discipline with individual freedom of movement, could have made²⁸⁵ possible the inner unity of the order of the widest geographical dispersal; and herein lies the secret of the power once exercised by the Jesuits, and which, to a considerable extent, they exercise to-day.

13. When Ignatius was about to introduce into the Constitutions of the order a new provision, he would generally withdraw to his cell and ponder over all the considerations for and against the proposed precept, and observe most strictly the effect on the state of his soul. Like a careful experimenter, he kept a detailed record of all his thoughts and perceptions. It was often a month before he was able to arrive at a decision in this way. Afterwards, he referred to numerous books, and he further tested the new rule thoroughly in practice for a time; then finally he inserted it in the Constitutions.

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He used to rewrite his letters as many as twenty times before he committed them to the post; he did this not only with important official letters, but also with harmless private epistles to his friends and relations.

14. He did not, as most other founders have done, give his name to the order which, down to the smallest detail, was his work; unlike others, he withdrew behind the order he had created and merged himself in it completely, so that, in the end, the Society of Jesus, was known, but he himself hardly at all.

15. The history of the practice of the exercises which was finally to become the noble and universally admired Jesuit school of the will, begins with a frivolous though distinguished circle of simple and hypocritical ladies. He himself felt no satisfaction in this society of "converted souls", who, indeed, were bound to him only by an entirely superficial enthusiasm.

16²⁸⁶. His activity in Alcala thus had no other result than to produce in his women followers accesses of ecstasy and the symptoms of a very doubtful enthusiasm.

17. Just as the relationship of these youths to their master rested on nothing more than an immature enthusiasm, so too was it of scant duration. When Ignatius left Spain in order to continue his studies in Paris, his disciples did not accompany him, and he waited in vain for them to follow him. Hardly had his personal influence been withdrawn when the whole association was dissolved.

18. When that small but completely reliable band of fighters for God had gathered about him in Paris, Ignatius believed that he had almost completed his work. Actually, however, his real and most serious difficulties lay ahead of him. It was now necessary for Ignatius to assign their tasks to this small band, but it became at once apparent that he still had no practical or definite end in view, on the formation of the Society on the day of the Feast of Assumption in the year 1534.

19. The fact that these zealots had begun to take an interest in the evils of their time and to think of suitable methods for combating them meant a decided turning-point in their ideas. Slowly the Jesuit organization developed from a group of immature visionaries to one that was to strive painstakingly after sober tasks. Once the efforts of these first Jesuits had been turned from fantastic and remote ideals to practical needs, problems sprang up on all sides, for the solution of which the militarily disciplined "Compania de Jesus" seemed to have been specially formed.

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20. Soon, however, Ignatius began to realize how feable such assistance, devoted and self-sacrificing²⁸⁷ though it was, must be in relation to those social needs which, deeply rooted in the structure of society, had existed as permanent institutions from time immemorial. He could, therefore, no longer be content to hasten here and there with his small band in order to succour a few of the sick and the starving; what moved him now was a strong desire to combat the evil in its entirety, and the whole of society became the test of his powers and of those of his followers. The need of society was not, however, to be met by the benevolent succour of individuals, but by planned and organized assistance on a large scale.

Mediaeval Christian charity, based on spontaneous compassion, now for the first time broadened into well-thout-out social-welfare work, and the Jesuits striking into this path were the first who went far beyond the charitable activities as thither to exercised by the spiritual brotherhoods. The Great, enthusiastic impulse, the unreserved surrender to a spiritual aim, of which only the mediaeval man was capable to such an extent, had, in more sober surroundings, been able to express itself only in absurd, romantic and theatrical poses; this energy was now gradually transformed and was to continue its life in the form of a severely rationalistic organization of compelling power.

21. The distinguished orders such as the Benedictines, which had remained undefiled by the corruption of morals, lacked all contact with the people. The proud and learned monks led a life of refined culture and mediation, and exerted no kind of influence on the multitude.

In this way, the population was left almost entirely to its own resources.

22. Though power over the souls of the masses was important, it was still more important to win²⁸⁸ the mastery of those few men in influential places on whom the fate of nations depended. The real political role of the Jesuits started only from the moment when they began to dominate the consciences of kings and princes. The way to world domination, which had first of all led them from direct charity to organized social-welfare work, now brought them up against new aims, in that the activity of the order was applied more and more to the spiritual guidance of princes, for the order of the Jesuits from now on recognized in the rulers the personification of the whole nation. Ignatius soon perceived with great distinctness the historical mission of the Society he had created.

23. Where they had already gained a footing, street and popular preaching was later practised almost wholly for the purpose of training the young novices of the order.

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When the Jesuits of Cologne spent too much time on popular missions in the country, Ignatius censured them expressly for it, and wrote that such activity was only to be recommended as a beginning. Nothing was worse than to pursue trivial successes, and thereby to lose sight of the great tasks; the Jesuits had far higher aims to strive after than the mere conversion of peasants.

These higher aims consisted for the most part in the conquest and enduring guidance of secular and spiritual authorities on whom, in a time of ever stronger absolutism, finally depended every important decision even in matters of faith.

24. Loyola's views on asceticism are most clearly expressed in his letter of Sept. 20, 1548, to Duke Francisco Borgia. "As for fasts and abstinence," he says, "I would wish you to maintain²⁸⁹ your bodily powers in health for the service of our Lord, and to strengthen them instead of weakening them... We must look after the body and keep it healthy inasmuch as it serves the soul and fits it for the service and glorification of the Creator.

25. Ignatius, with deepening understanding, had grasped that a really homogeneous fighting force, aiming at success under the most difficult internal and external conditions, needed discipline before all. Only in a union of men so trained could those forces be freed which until then had been weakened by mortifications, and which now, rightly directed, were united into a superior, all-compelling power.

26. They all acknowledged that, if the other orders found obedience necessary, the new community, whose members would be scattered over the whole world, needed it still more; and it was finally decided to formulate the duty to obey in the strictest terms.

27. Specially difficult letters had to be sent to the kings of Spain and Portugal; in these the effect of each word has to be carefully considered in order that Philip II might command his Flemish bishops to admit the order into the Netherlands, and that John III might assist the mission which had only recently been sent to Abyssinia. For some days, Ignatius had been in bad health, but he would not on that account lay down his work. In the afternoon, he was still engaged on a long letter, carefully correcting any word that was not altogether well chosen.

28. As a Jesuit, Bellarmine had long since learned to handle external matters, with caution and diplomatic skill. He therefore held his peace for a long time, and silently collected his damning evidence.

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29²⁹⁰. Descartes' acquired a thorough knowledge of the whole of the philosophical theories of his time. "Since philosophy is the key to the other sciences," he himself writes in his Memoirs, "I regard it as most helpful to have so thorough a study of the subject as it was taught in the Jesuit schools." "I will thus assume", he once wrote, "that the source of truth is not an all-benevolent Deity, but some kind of malicious and yet very powerful demon, who uses all his art to lead me astray. I mean that every thing I perceive outside myself—heaven, air, earth, colours, forms, sounds—are but visions seen in dreams, created by that evil spirit to ensnare my credulity." From that time onward up to our own age, doubt as the fundamental attitude of the investigator into all phenomena and hypotheses was destined to dominate the whole development of European thought. The scientific, philosophic and technological achievements of the last century have all sprung from the spirit of doubt, from the principle that experience and experiment are the starting-point of all speculation.

30. It was chiefly the theological faculties at the great universities who, out of their own learned darkness, attacked most violently the innovations of Descartes.

31. Ignatius avails himself, in especial, of the power of imagination; he tries to awaken in his pupils quite definite pictorial representations, all with the object of intensifying the power of distinguishing between right and wrong conduct.

32. He who goes through Loyola's Spiritual Exercises has to experience hell and heaven with all his senses, to know burning pain and blessed rapture, so that the distinction between²⁹¹ good and evil is for ever indelibly imprinted in his soul.

33. It is through images that Ignatius strives to assist mankind towards perfection; for every day and for every hour of the day the Exercises prescribe exactly what representations the exercitant has to evoke, and of what aids to this end he has to make use.

34. The Jesuits proceeded, at the outset, with the utmost caution and, for a long time, kept their true purpose a close secret. With the Chinese, so wrote one of their missionaries to Rome at this time, it is necessary to walk with guile, and carefully guard against any indiscreet over-zealousness; it might otherwise easily happen "that the gates, which the Lord God has opened into China, will be closed again." If they asked what was the real reason that had brought them to China, they replied that the fame of Chinese institutions had reached them in their own country and that they had been irresistibly attracted by the wisdom and high moral development of the Chinese.

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35. The Jesuits laid detailed statements before the inquisition tribunal. In these, they said they had never denied the crucifixion, but, in the interests of the Faith, it had been necessary to impart the Gospel to the heathens with care and with tact. Crucifixion in China was a great disgrace, and the Chinese could only with great difficulty be made to believe in a God who had been executed in so shameful a manner. For this reason, the Jesuits had refrained from relating the crucifixion of Christ until such time as the converts had been sufficiently prepared. So far as concerned the rites, the toleration of which they were²⁹² reproached with, it was not a case of religious ceremonies, but of a certain form of piety, against which there could not be the least objection from the Christian point of view. The funeral celebrations of the Chinese meant nothing more than the expression of a childish reverence for their forbears. Further, these customs were absolutely binding on all Chinese, and to forbid them would render {Illegible}²⁹³ abortive any attempt at conversion to Christianity.

36. The slow and unsystematic methods of the Russian diplomats were intolerable to the Jesuits, mentally disciplined, clear-minded and swift-thinking, and accustomed to independent action as they were.

37. "Your defence of the Apostolic See, and your efforts to maintain the people in submission to this See," so ran Loyola's instructions, "should never go so far that you lose control of yourselves, and get decried as Papists; thereby you will merely, bring about general suspicion...Try to make friends with the leaders of the opposition and with those who have most influence among the heretics and wavering Catholics, and loose them from their error through wisdom and love.."

The letters of the first Jesuit missionaries also bear witness to the realization that German Protestantism must be combated first with friendliness: "He who wishes to be of use to the heretics of the present day must be conspicuous first of all for his great love for them and must banish from his mind all thoughts which could in any way lessen his opinion of these men. Then we must try so to gain their hearts and wills, that they love us too and have a good opinion of us. We shall easily attain this if we have friendly²⁹⁴ intercourse with them, and without any strife touch only on that on which we are at one."

38. The most important factor in the recatholicizing of Germany was, however, the educational activity of the Jesuits. In all the more important towns of the land Colleges

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²⁹³ Indecipherable in the original look like "{Illegible}"

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were opened in rapid succession, the remarkable success of whose teaching even the Protestants had to recognize.

Religious instruction in the Spiritual Exercises, exhortations to the worldly clergy, mildness and friendliness to the Protestants, instruction in the catechism and the erection of numerous schools – these were the means by which the Jesuits set about the Counter-Reformation in Germany.

39. Jesuit controversial literature was also carefully designed to maintain the friendly tone". When the general of the order, Acquaviva learnt that one of the fathers was disseminating a spiteful tract against Luther, he forbade him, with the assertion that a too bitter and biting pamphlet would only do harm to the society itself. Neither is this fitting for us, as we should fight with discretion and solid learning and not with calumnies and insults."

40. True to their constant principle of adaptation to the given circumstances, the hitherto peace-loving fathers immediately turned over a new leaf.

41. In the choice of means employed by the Jesuits to this end can be seen the same adaptation to the requirements of the moment and the same prudent wisdom which is evident in almost all their actions in Germany.

42. The whole character of their appointed task demanded, rather, a persevering, continuous²⁹⁵ exertion of influence over rulers.

43. The history of this sudden rise from ignominious exile to the royal confession shows better than any other phase of the order's existence those peculiar Jesuit tactics, which consisted primarily in always adapting their behaviour to the requirements of the time, and not shrinking even from a complete change of standpoint when this seemed to them necessary for the attainment of their end.

This readiness at one time to support the sovereignty of the people and at another to stand, with Byzantine zeal, for the rights of the ruler, may appear as nothing but "lack of principle," unless the behaviour of the Jesuits is considered in relation to the universal policy of Rome, when it nearly always appears direct and purposeful.

44. In China, the remarkable manner in which the order has endeavoured to adapt itself to the changed conditions of modern times is particularly noticeable. While formerly every effort was made to acquire influence at court, and thus to carry on missionary work "from above" these tactics had to be abandoned as the enfeebled empire slowly dwindled in importance. Ever since Emperor Kiak'ing was killed by lightning in 1820, the reigning dynasty had completely lost its authority in the eyes of

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the superstitious masses, and the real balance of power had slowly but surely passed into the hands of the people and of the educated classes.

Accordingly, on their return, the Jesuits entirely ignored the now insignificant imperial court, and pursued a popular policy, founding schools in order to gain influence over the masses and the educated classes. They endeavoured, by training able students, to win to themselves the future leaders of the country.

45.²⁹⁶ The mediaeval philosophers regarded the Aristotelean theory of knowledge merely as a new method by means of which the content of the Catholic dogmas could be explained rationally. It never occurred to them that reason and revelation could ever disagree; neither did anyone suspect how little reconcilable in the long run was the rational logical investigation of the cosmos demanded by Aristotle with the irrationality of a religion that was in opposition to the discoveries of the human mind.

Nearly all the early scholastics had contented themselves with applying the results of rational perception reached by the philosopher of Stagira, as a means of strengthening and explaining the Christian beliefs.

46. Their efforts were powerless against the spirit of modern times, a spirit daily increasing in power and opposed to their purpose.

The good fathers had in vain made concessions to the thirst of modern humanity for knowledge allowing it to turn its telescopes to this or that harmless star, and to doubt many things which were unimportant in relation to the Faith; they could not halt the progress of the human mind towards that stage in history which is usually described as the "age of enlightenment."

47. For, once Francis Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and Newton had directed philosophical and scientific thought towards new knowledge and discoveries, the moment had to come when doubts of the dogmas of the Church surged up, together with notions of man and his relation to creation as well as to the Creator which were unconnected with the teachings of Christianity.

48²⁹⁷. Now intelligence, so eagerly protected by the Jesuits, was turned against the Church, instead of serving it like a "hand-maid" in the sense of mediaeval theology; no longer content to support and substantiate revelation with a thousand rational arguments and "divine proofs" the intellect had emancipated itself from all religious guardianship, and claimed, in its "presumption," to displace faith.

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49. The Encyclopaedia was justly regarded everywhere as the codification of a philosophy of life which had decisively cut loose from all ecclesiastical traditions, and for that very reason the work was greeted with enthusiasm.

50. It was asserted at the time that the Jesuits had prevented the success of the order of the Illuminati by smuggling some of their own people into the fraternity; these managed successfully to confuse the disciples of Weishaupt, and to seduce them from their original fixed principles, thereby bringing about the downfall of the whole association.

Similar assertions have since then continually been made regarding the relations between the Jesuits and the Freemasons. Whenever gross abuses have been found within the lodges, Masonic historians have immediately given vent to the suspicion that the wily Jesuits have once again smuggled their emissaries into the association, and corrupted it in this cunning manner.

51. Even in 1902, the Masonic historian, J.G. Findel, wrote that the Jesuits had succeeded in all parts of the globe in creating strife and confusion among Freemasons by tampering²⁹⁸ with the rituals and by the introduction of higher degrees.

52. After the Jesuits had recognized that empiricism could no longer be resisted, they changed their tactics, and sought to apply the exact sciences to the service of the faith.

53. The only thing for the Jesuits to do was to wrest the weapon from the enemy's hand, and, by empiricism itself, to establish proofs of the existence of God and the truth of revelation.

54. Kant had taught, in his Critique of Pure Reason, that all human knowledge is limited to external phenomena in so far as they are accessible to us by experience; any attempt to make any positive or negative assertion that goes beyond these limits, to comprehend the transcendental or to apply rational argument to it, must necessarily lead to "empty and futile speculation." "Objects of the senses" Kant once wrote, "are perceptible by us only as they appear and not as they really are; in the same way, objects which are beyond our apperception are not objects of our theoretical knowledge." The conclusions reached by our reason concerning the immortality of the soul, the origin of the world and the existence of God merely involve thought in "paralogisms, insoluble antinomies and false arguments."

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason thus emphatically contradicted the prevailing view of the age of the Enlightenment concerning the omnipotence of reason, and at the same time, Catholic theology; it allowed neither the contention that the non-existence of God can be demonstrated by reason, nor the effort to confirm the existence of a creator

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by means of intellectual arguments, as Catholic theology had unswervingly endeavoured to do since the time of Thomas Aquinas.

55²⁹⁹. Guided by obedience and prudence, the Jesuits were exhorted “to let no single opportunity pass of fostering hatred against the Freemasons, both in their utterances and writings and in their teachings, their preaching and in their spiritual exercises.”

56. The Jesuit undertaking to adapt the Christian doctrine to secular affairs has led to a revolting degradation of religion. Through their attempt to bring the mysteries of the faith nearer to the limited imagination of the masses by coarse and blatant images, the true inwardness of life of faith has perished, and an external, formal and superstitious cult of saints had gained the ascendancy.

57. Did not Ignatius expressly exhort his subordinates never “either in spiritual talk or in other more indifferent or confidential conversations” to let themselves go entirely, but always to take account of the fact that every word uttered might reach the public? He instructed his disciples in their intercourse with great and distinguished men, always to win their confidence by adapting themselves to the character of each person.

58. What are we to think of those maxims of life which Father Baltasar Gracian, the rector of the Jesuit college at Tarazona, collected together in his Handbook Oracle? Are not the most cynical principles of a corrupt worldly wisdom set down in this curious little book? “What is likely to win favour, do yourself”, Baltasar Gracian advises his disciples; “what is likely to bring disfavour, get others to do; know how to dispense contempt; intervene in the affairs of others, in order quietly to accomplish your own ends; trust in to-day’s friends³⁰⁰ as if they might be tomorrow’s enemies; use human means as if there were no divine ones, and divine means as if there were no human ones; leave others in doubt about your attitude; sweeten your ‘no’ by a good manner; contrive to discover everybody’s thumbscrew; trust in the crutch of time rather than in the iron club of Hercules; keep in mind the happy outcome, as the victor need render no account; refuse nothing flatly, so that the dependence of your petitioner may last longer; always act as if you were seen; never give anyone an opportunity to get to the bottom of us; without telling lies, do not yet tell all the truth; do not live by fixed principles, live by opportunity, and circumstances...”

This is the spirit in which, according to their numerous accusers, the Jesuits have acted since the foundation of the order, and in which they have pursued their course both at courts and among the people, both in Europe and in foreign lands.

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59. But, as the Society of Jesus made it its mission to spread the kingdom of God in this world, in every age and to every civilization, it was bound to come to terms with the existing conditions and to take account of them. And, if the Jesuits adapted themselves to all men, in order to win all men, might they not appeal to the words of the Apostle Paul, who taught that the man of spiritual gifts must take account of the weakness of his fellow-men and serve them in their earthly needs with compassionate love? "For though I be free from all men," he writes in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, "yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law. To them that are without the³⁰¹ law, as without law. that I might gain them that are without the law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. And this I do for the gospel's sake, that I might be partaker thereof with you."

60. The Jesuits, however, have not limited their service in the "army of Christ" to the stillness of the cloister or to the debates of ecclesiastical convocations, but have extended it to the whole world, to the cabinets of rulers and ministers, to parliaments and universities, to the audience halls of Asiatic despots, to the campfires of the Red Indians, to observatories, physiological and psychological institutes, the stages of theatres, the congresses of learned men and the tribunes of political orators; they have sought to subordinate all man's thoughts and feelings to the Faith, and they have claimed the whole, noisy world, with its wealth of interests and objects, as the sphere of their religious activities.

61. It is more from a wise complaisance than from an evil intension that we suffer a greater freedom in other persons. We are compelled to do so, as the world is now so corrupt that men no longer come to us; but we must go to them, otherwise they would forsake us entirely and give themselves up defiantly to sin.....For it is the main object of our Society never to repel anybody, whoever he may be, so that the world may not be given over to despair."

62. The study of these works, wrote Roger Bacon, meant "nothing but a waste of time, the³⁰² source of errors, and the diffusion of ignorance."

63. It would recognize only its own world of ideas and its own terminology as uniquely true, and for a long time refused equal privileges to scientific modes of observation, and expression; no less, however, will the present-day view of the universe

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incur the reproach of being a reprehensible dogmatism, if, forgetful of criticism and relativity, it refuses to admit the way of religion too as an entirely valid form.

Vedanta Kesari (Nov. 39)

Reminiscences of the Holy Mother: by a disciple.

1. Those who are the Master's 'own' accompany him in different ages when he is born on earth...Whenever he comes to the earth, all are born with him. He brought down Narendra from the plane of the "Seven Sages."

The Advaita and the moral paradoxes. by P.T.

Raju: The story is told of Sankara that, while he was going through the streets of Benares, he was attacked by a tusker and began to run for his life; and that some put him the question, why he was afraid of the elephant if it was unreal. It is also said that the same test was proposed by Ramanuja to decide the issue between his philosophy and the Advaita. The Advaitin, like Sankara before him, is reported to have answered that the elephant and his running for life were both unreal. The same question is put by a large number of critics of the Advaita, and usually the same answer is given.

2. Is the Advaitin refuted when questioned why he runs away from a charging elephant, though he knows that it is unreal? The answer can be only³⁰³ in the negative. To refute a philosophical theory by practical devices is unphilosophical. If a scientist tells that food is nothing but carbon, oxygen, etc. and we ask him why he does not eat charcoal, we do not refute his theory. Johnson kicked at a stone, and asked, in order to refute Berkeley's idealism, how that can be an idea. But we all feel that Johnson's refutation is unphilosophical. Similarly, when the Advaitin, who is living his mundane life, is asked why he treats this world as real, why he cares for his body, his food and so forth, it is really no refutation. A philosophical theory, because it is a theory, can be refuted only philosophically. If we do not bear this in mind we shall be very unfair to the philosopher and his theory, and shall miss the truth by caricaturing it.

Buddhism and the Philosophy of Nagarjuna by Swami Vimuktananda (in Prabuddha Bharata)

1. In the hierarchy of Buddhism Nagarjuna occupies a most prominent place. According to the tradition of the Mahayana Buddhism he is said to be the fourteenth patriarch and the founder of the Madhyamika school. Indeed he has systematized the

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whole of Mahayana Buddhism and the Prajna-paramita-Shastra, his magnum opus, has been rightly regarded as the Encyclopaedia of this school. He is also famous for his unique conception of reality which is sometimes called sunya or unrestrictedness. This has earned for him the appellation of a nihilist (sunya-vadin), for which perhaps he is not responsible. His philosophical conception reaches such a dizzy height that at that stage it is impossible for any one either to assert or to deny anything; and to call it sunya or non-existence is certainly misleading. His is the middle (madhyama) course which³⁰⁴ keeps clear of the two extremes, viz. existence and non-existence. That is why it is called Madhyamika or the Middle path.

In his philosophical pursuits Nagarjuna is mainly guided by the ontological facts of Buddha's realization, which he endeavours to expound in his monumental work, the Madhyami-kakarika. There he has made an attempt to bring into clear relief the inner significance of Buddha's teachings, imparted to a selected few. Himself a Buddhist, he has the temerity even to deny the personality of Buddha and thus keep his philosophy aloof from all religious anthropomorphism and crass superstition.

2. Nagarjuna came of a Brahmin family in Southern India. His native place is said to have been Vidarbha or Berar. He flourished about 700 years after the birth of Buddha i.e. some time between the latter half of the second century A.D. and the first half of the third century A.D. His chief disciple Aryadeva was also a native of Southern India.

3. Nagarjuna was a versatile genius and a prolific commentator and writer. His works consists of a number of treatises on various subjects ranging from philosophy and religion to social laws and medicine. His Prajnaparamita-Shastra is a commentary on the Prajnaparamita-sutra.

4. Nagarjuna was born at a time when Buddhism was passing through a transitional period. Although there never grew any protestantism in Buddhism, yet at that time the old type of Buddhism (Hinayana) was being superseded by a new and more advanced form that evolved out of the old, and thence-forward came to be known as the Mahayana. Nagarjuna, the doyen of the new school, made use in his philosophy of all the materials supplied by the Hinayana, but effected a thorough re-orientation in³⁰⁵ them.

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5. These three categories form the very basis of Buddhistic thought and are the avenues of proper understanding of the full implication of its philosophy and ethics. This triad, however, concerns itself only with phenomena; the Noumenon is Nirvana, which is supermundane and free from all dichotomy and difference.

6. This school holds that the constituted things (samskrita Dharmas) that come into existence following a series of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) are in a state of flux. It is only the basic constituents or skandaa that are really existent. Vulgar minds think that there is a soul or individuality (pudgala), to which they desperately cling and thus create innumerable miseries. One attained the final release by eschewing the very idea of a permanent atman or soul and merging all mental modifications in the original source from which they have sprung.

7. It has been stated that everything is in perpetual motion, in a state of constant flux. But what is it that causes these movements? It is Karma that sets revolving the “wheel of becoming”. It is the aboding results of our action that drag us on from birth to death—lift us to heaven or hurl us into hell, and there is hardly an escape from its inexorable laws. No predestination, no blind chance or divine will guides the destiny of man; it is after all his own Karma that fashions his fate. Everybody is responsible for his future, and no one should lay the blame at the door of others for one’s miseries and misfortunes as the power to give a right direction to his destiny lies in himself.

8. Karma, therefore, means a succession of causes and effects, which involves time with³⁰⁶ its three divisions as its corollary. Without the past there cannot be any cause, and without the present or future there can be no effect. So Karma and its concomitant time play an outstanding role in the evolution of the universe and have considerable philosophical importance.

9. Just one hundred years after Buddha’s Parinirvana, a second Council was convoked at Vaisali to bring to terms the Vrijjian monks, who were accused of malpractices. The conveners at once found themselves in the vortex of bitter disputes; the meeting came to an abrupt close, and the long feared schism that threatened the solidarity of the Order immediately followed. The schematics held another Council, wherein, it is said, nearly ten thousand people participated. They came to their own decisions about Vinaya (monastic rules) and seceded from the mother Church. Since then they were called Mahasanghikas after this Mahasangha or Great Council.

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10. These Mahasanghikas are the pioneers of the Mahayana movement and are the creators of its philosophy, which was afterwards formulated and given a practical shape by Nagarjuna.

11. Regarding Buddhology the Mahayanists did not believe in the personality of Buddha. Though they have mentioned the trikaya (Nirmanakaya, Sambhogakaya and Dharmakaya) of Buddha, yet in point of fact these kayas (forms) are no better than phantoms, belonging to the realm of phenomena.

12. The most outstanding feature of Mahayana is its ideal of Bodhisattva, which brought about a thorough change in the religious outlook of Buddhism. The Theras were pre-occupied with working out their personal salvation³⁰⁷ and could hardly think of an altruistic ideal in life. Although Buddha has admonished his followers to go as preachers to preach, out of compassion, the religion "for the benefit of many, for the happiness of many, for the good and happiness of both men and gods," yet his immediate followers laid stress on working out their salvation (individual) and aspired only after arhathood.

13. The laity were so long merely the supporters of the Sangha and not its actual members. The arhatship was not for them, unless they could give up their hearth and home and embrace the life of a monk. But the Mahayanists gave out that everybody irrespective of his station in life was destined to develop not only arhathood but also Buddhahood. A householder is as much a Bodhisattva as any Bhikshu, if he only takes up the ideal of great compassion and undergoes the requisite charyas (practices) prescribed for a Bodhisattva.

14. The task before the Madhyamikas was to state the nature of the ultimate reality, whereas the Yoga-charas, tacitly accepting the conclusion of their predecessors, busied themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness or how events and things appeared in and through vijana or mind, which was the repository of all knowledge (alaya-vijana).

15. Throughout his whole work, he has made an attempt to subject all categories of thought to a critical examination and thus expose, through his irrefragable logic, their inanity as ultimate philosophical principles. He has, therefore, rightly styled each of the twenty-seven chapters of his book as "Examination"³⁰⁸ (of different categories). The

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chapters are: (1) Examination of Causality, (2) of Motion, (3) of the Senses, (4) of the Constituents, (5) of the Elements (6) of the Attributes and substance (7) of the Composite (8) of Action and the Actor, (9) of Priority (10) of Fire and Fuel, (11) of the Limit of what is Before and What is Behind, (12) of Sufferings, (13) of Disposition (14) of Relations (15) of Particularity (16) of Bondage and Freedom (17) of Results of Action, (18) of Soul, (19) of Time, (20) of Totality (of causes and conditions) (21) of Origination and Cessation (22) of Tathagata (Buddha), (23) of Perverted Knowledge, (24) of Noble Truths, (25) of Nirvana, (26) of the Twelve Links (of the causal nexus) (27) of Conceptions.

Nagarjuna in his long dissertation on the different categories, has proved that the things and events that we are cognizant of in our daily life, and which we falsely believe to be the components of reality, have but a relative existence, inasmuch as they appear and disappear following some causal laws. To believe that the categories have real existence because they have a practical bearing on life and are endowed with some pragmatic value, is a sort of enlightened superstition. All the popular doctrines which have hitherto been held to be unassailable are found incapable of sustaining themselves before a searching examination of reduction ad absurdum. Even the intellect in its quest after the ultimate reality, which must be non-contradictory, stands self-condemned, as it finds perplexing antinomies in the world of experience with which it is to deal³⁰⁹. The reality always eludes the detection of the mind and refuses to be caught in the meshes of thought. To revel, therefore, in one's private opinions, and uncriticised judgment, thinking them to be the ultimate philosophical principles corresponding to reality, may be a pastime for the intellectualists, but it is no sign of sound philosophical thinking. Nagarjuna finds all the conclusions of philosophy reached by the power of human intellect as so many paradoxes hidden by mere thoughtless phraseology. He, therefore, explodes them all and proves them to be only a figment of imagination, mere thought fabricated out of emptiness.³¹⁰

16. He applied this method *mutatis mutandis* in examining all the existing categories and proved their untenability as philosophical finalities. In his examination of motion he has shown that "neither one passes a path he has already traversed, nor does he pass a path that is yet to be passed; and one cannot comprehend the existence of a path that is different from what is passed and what is yet to be passed." Commenting upon this Chandrakirti has said that what is already passed cannot be passed now, for such an act will make the past and the present happen at a given moment, which is an impossibility; so also what is yet to be passed cannot be passed at this moment, as the present and the future can by no means be brought together, and the absurdity of a third alternative is obvious. He further shows that if at a particular point of time one is

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³¹⁰ The original editor inserted "out of emptiness." By hand

to make a movement, there is no space for him to move in, except what is either before or behind him. Of course, one may say that there is the space covered by his feet, which is neither behind nor before; but if³¹¹ one closely analyses it one will find that the space under his toes lies before his heels and that under his heels lies behind the toes; and if one follows this method to its logical conclusion, one will be driven to a situation where it will be altogether impossible for him to escape the tangle of this "before and behind" or "what is passed and what is yet to be passed." This will naturally lead to the impossibility of motion. One is here reminded of Zeno's argument against motion or change. If one is to pass through a certain space, he argues, one must first cover half of that space, and again, if he is to cover this half, he is to move through half of this half, and so on ad infinitum; and therefore motion is impossible. But Nagarjuna penetrated more deeply into the matter and proved that while it was absurd even to take the first step, the question of moving through half of a given space is inadmissible. Nagarjuna applied this method almost ad nauseam throughout his work, while examining the existing categories and conclusions of philosophy, in order to disprove their absolute character. He has thus shown that the cause and effect, the substance and attributes, doer and deed, relation and the relata, freedom and bondage, permanence and change, origination and cessation, Noble Truths, sufferings, Nirvana and even Buddha are but in the world of relations.

17. The empirical method of Nagarjuna has naturally led him to scepticism, which prompts him to get rid of all superstitious belief, however deep-rooted it may be. By his powerful dialectics he has reduced all popular notions to mere fantasies and warned everybody not to believe anything that the uncritical judgment presented to our mind. But his scepticism is not wholly destructive. He has shattered the outer³¹² crust of the phenomena so that the inner reality may reveal itself.

18. No category of thought ever has the power to impart the knowledge of reality. But our incapacity to comprehend it does not mean its denial. So Nagarjuna follows a negative method to describe the reality, and he calls it sunya because there is hardly any other term that can better express it when we approach it through absolute negation. The Upanishadic method of 'neti' 'neti' (not this, not this) is vividly reflected in Nagarjuna's way of describing the reality through eight "noes". By dint of his daring logic he has proved to the hilt the insubstantiality of all postulates, and sunyata has been forced upon him as a natural conclusion of his thoroughgoing research.

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19. We have already seen that the phenomenal world is but a complex of innumerable relations, and as such it is devoid of reality, as it has no intrinsic nature of its own.

20. When the reality or sunyata of Nagarjuna is bereft of all relations and stripped of all attributes, will not lapse into an empty residue, a mere abstraction of thought, without having any value or reference to life and experience? Nagarjuna of course does not answer it either positively or negatively, but he says: "It cannot be called Sunya (void) or non-sunya or both or neither but in order to comprehend the same we call it all these," and to show its universal character and utility in life he further adds: "Everything becomes possible to a man who comprehends the compatibility of sunyata." When one truly realizes this sunyata, which is in its absolute character not a pure blank or a flat monotony emptiness, but all-comprehensive, all-embracing reality³¹³, then samsara loses all its distinctive characters and merges itself in the all-absorbing truth. It is ignorance that has covered the truth, and made it appear as samsara. When this outer wrap page is peeled off, there remains "not the slightest distinction between samsara and nirvana."

21. It is by following the conventional truth that Buddha has spoken of the four Noble Truths, the eightfold path, pratyasamutpada and a host of other religious and philosophical theories, doctrines and dogmas. But he has had recourse to transcendental truth while declaring sunyata, which is beyond all intellection and conception, to be the last generalization of all that exists. The Hinayanists, without knowing the difference between these two form of teachings, have mistaken the apparent for the real and thus made confusion worse confounded. It is, therefore, a foremost necessity for one to know the distinction between these two forms of truth before one can strive for a proper understanding of the Master's teachings. Samvriti satya, which holds good in our everyday life, is also absolutely necessary for realizing the paramartha, as we are to begin from this stage and climb higher and higher till we ascend to the last rung.

22. It is an indubitable fact that no philosopher can possibly escape the influence of those who come before him. Rather he receives ample help from them, and without jeopardizing thereby his own conclusion, can build up an entirely new system of philosophy. Nagarjuna himself while expounding the nature of the final reality, might have had Upanishadic conclusions in his mind.

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23. The³¹⁴ conventional teachings are for the generality of people and therefore form the exoteric aspect of Buddhism, whereas the transcendental teachings, which are for a selected few, come under its esoteric aspect. The division of reality into samvriti and paramartha has its parallel in Vedantic division of it into the pratibhashika (the apparent), vyavaharika (the practical) and paramarthika (the transcendental.) The first two come under samvriti, with its two divisions of alokasamvriti or apparent (which refers to a particular deluded individual) and lokasamvriti or practical (which, though in the world of delusion, has a universal appeal). But by this division of truth into samvriti and paramartha one should not think that there is such difference actually existing in the reality. This is an expedient method of bringing within the easy reach of the common folk (prithagjana) the highest truth, which otherwise would always remain beyond their comprehension. Both these truths are valid in so far as the relative world is concerned and have no reference to ultimate reality.

Sri Krishna ³¹⁵Prem: “The Forgotten Land”

Mortal: Perhaps. But still your immortality seems cold to me. What of my memory, the record of my joys and griefs, my loves and hates, my struggles and my failures? What is that immortality in which all that has happened to me, all that I have done, is lost? All I have striven for of good, all I have seen of beauty, will be lost as if it never had been Soul. Not so, for memory remains in me. Goodness and Beauty can exist in me alone for both are aspects of the one harmonious Whole, not of the warring parts, and, while you are a self, you catch but fitful glimpses of the wondrous Pattern that is in me. I am the Tree of which you are the leaves. I sent you forth and fed you with my sap to breathe the sunlight and the air of summer. You fall and wither but the air and light you gathered is not lost. It³¹⁶ enters into and lives on in me, becoming that life-blood with which, after the night of winter, you go forth again.

M. Not so indeed! It is another leaf that is put forth next year and so it seems it will not be I who am born again but someone new, an heir to me perhaps, but not myself.

S. Your self, your self! Can you not lose that self? Have you not heard the ancient saying, “he who will save his soul shall lose it?” Those words came from one who knew me to the full and therefore was he able also to say, “heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away.” All who have known me have known this

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and in various words have striven to teach their fellows. All this is true, good and beautiful in you shall live eternally in me as all that is useful in the food you eat lives on in you. Why should you seek to keep the worthless dross?

2. S. There you have spoken—you do not accept the he truth. As for my words, what would you have of me? I spoke the truth first in silence but you heard it not. You would have words and what are words but pictures? Even those abstract words of which you nowadays make so much use are in the end but pictures taken from your sense experience, and sense experience, as even you must know, is mortal. How can the mortal reveal the immortal? Yet if you will but use your words as windows and look through them, not build them as a wall to hide behind, even through those words you may behold the wordless truth.

3. S. It gazed, warming with its own glory the world of things and living in that warmth. But there it could not stay, for all things change and that which rises up must fall again. Slowly that ebb set in. The life that warmed the things again withdrew; your body hardened and grew cold in its recesses; your mind, though with regret, retired within itself, turning its back upon the world without, to live in its own memories, and, were it wise, to seek infinity within its own cool depths.

Esoteric³¹⁷ Religion in³¹⁸ Review Of Philosophy And Religion: (Allahabad) Sri Krishna Prem

Men of deep spiritual insight are always rare and, the deeper the insight, the rarer will it be. The great majority of the disciples will be men of ordinary insight and in the last resort it will be their voices which will prevail at the councils called to determine the Faith. Speaking more accurately, the men who come to the front and whose opinions prevail at such councils—we can actually see the process at work in the history of both Buddhism and Christianity—will be those men who, while possessed of more than average strength of character and intellect, yet have the same degree and type of spiritual insight as has the average disciple and so can satisfy the latter by giving to his feelings a coherency and an incisiveness that he himself would not have been able to attain.

2. The opinions of the relatively few men of deep spiritual insight, the pneumatikoi,³¹⁹ will therefore, receive scant attention at the councils, the forces of jealousy adding their sinister quota to the innocent depreciation caused by failure to understand. The inevitable result will be that those few who have the deepest understanding of the Master's teachings will either be forced into silence or else

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³¹⁸ The original editor inserted "ESOTERIC RELIGION in" by hand

³¹⁹ The original editor corrected spell "pneumatikoi," by hand

expelled from the church as heretical. This is what happened to the Gnostics who were expelled, persecuted and finally stamped out by the Catholic orthodoxy, simply because their understanding was too deep for the average church father and it appears also to have happened at the second council of the Buddhists, at which it would seem that those who understood most of the spirit of the Buddha were forced to secede and hand on the traditions which afterwards became the Mahayana. Not only is there reason to suppose³²⁰ that this is what did happen; there is reason to know that it is what must have happened and must always happen, since it is a process based on the universal characteristics of human nature.

There is no question here of an actual esoteric doctrine imparted only to a few chosen disciples.

3. While human is what it is at present and that the result, the inevitable interpretation which satisfies the man of mediocre spiritual insight just because it was created by such and for such.

It is no less obvious that it is useless to expect to find the deepest spiritual truths in these established churches. They are quite tolerably suited to the needs of the ordinary religious man.

4. Their claim to possess the Truth is false and their quarrels with each other are childish, resembling nothing so much as the disputes of small boys about the importance of their respective fathers' places in the world, a matter of which they know nothing whatever. Even the lubricating oil that they furnish for the average man has to be paid for heavily because of the obscurantism and selfish cunning always found in priesthoods who are ever ready to raise the cry 'our holy religion is in danger' when all that is in truth endangered is their own comfortable position in human society.

The Meaning of Pain: Christmas Humphreys

It is well known that the Buddha laid a great emphasis upon the sorrow of the world, indeed he made the perception of sorrow the first step upon the inner path. The author of this article makes it clear that this emphasis, so often misunderstood, is no mere ascetic repugnance for life, no mere weariness of pleasure shrinking from pain. Rather it is based on a profound insight into the nature of conditioned existence and constitutes a courageous grasping³²¹ of the nettle of sorrow that, so far from being a weak withdrawal and winging of the hands over life, is infinitely strengthening to the soul.

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THE MEANING OF PAIN: CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

2. It follows that only the fool is happy. He whose circumstances let him say, "I am a happy man," forgets that an hour before, he was unhappy, and that anicca change, being another of the Signs of Being, his happiness, as all else in existence, will shortly cease to be. Even while this illusion lasts it does so at the cost of shutting out the cry of those unable to escape from dukkha's grim reality.

3. What, then, is this happiness which all men think they seek? When the conception is analysed, it is found to contain at least four ingredients, of which the first is likelihood of the undisturbed continuance of the status quo.

3. It is, however, first imperative to face the omnipresence of suffering, for in this realisation lies the seed of that compassion whose flowering is the crown of Buddhahood. He who faces the fact of his own unhappiness may learn to see the same unceasing agony in the eyes of other men, and so be driven, as the Buddha was impelled, to find and finally destroy the cause of suffering, both for himself and his fellowmen. There is no other way to free oneself from suffering. There's no escape, in pleasure of the senses, crude or delicate, in books and busy products of the mind, in man-begotten beauty, in the silent fastness of the desert air, in dreams of may-be or the might-have-been nor yet, when death has partially disrobed the soul in Heaven. Soon or late each human being must face the cold, inexorable fact of suffering, alone.

4. Cosmic suffering which exists by virtue of the nature of manifestation, with the consequent separation of all manifested things. For³²² the Universe is ultimately ONE, and separation from this Oneness is an illusion from which all things struggle to be free. This sense of separateness is in essence Maya, for the Secondless can never cease to be, and those who think they wander in the wilderness have never left their Father's home. But every self, bemused with the maya of separate existence, fights to maintain its "interests" at the expense, if need be, of all other selves, and dreams that it will grow thereby. It knows not that in fighting for its own aggrandisement it fights against the SELF. Thus dukkha is the lot of all who fail to realise the truth of anatta, that "There is no abiding principle in man." Yet even this illusionary self, this fragment of a whole it cannot comprehend, is itself for ever changing, and change, anicca, is a cause of suffering to those unable or unwilling to flow with the river of change. Life is a process of becoming, and progress is becoming more. But growth of life means a constant change of forms, as each in turn is unable to express the evolving life within. Hence the truth of the Buddha's dictum, "Birth is suffering, growth is suffering, decay and disease are suffering, death is suffering." Unknowing of the law of change, man strives to resist its flow; believing in a personal, Immortal Soul, so comforting to human vanity, he fails to realise, in H.G.Well's immortal words, that "we are episodes in an experience greater than ourselves," and boasts of the rare occasions when he rises to self-sacrifice.

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5. It is the illusion of separateness which causes man to fight for his own desires, not knowing, for avidya fills his eyes, that the littlest act of the smallest part of the Universe affects the whole, and so long as his own will³²³ fails to accord with the will of the Universe, so long will his efforts breed but suffering, for himself and all mankind.

6. This ego-centric point of view impels its victims to grab at the part and ignore the needs of the whole. Yet all that tends to separateness is fundamentally untrue, and violates the will of SELF, whose purpose is reunion. All that accords with Universal Law will mover to its appointed end with the vast momentum of that Law, while every desire that includes the thought of self must gain fulfilment as a breach of Law, and take the consequence. It is desire, moreover, which gives power to circumstance, for it grasps and clings to possessions with a miser's claw, and when the river of change inevitably bears them away the sense of loss is a torn-out agony.

7. Sin punishes itself by weakening the will, by weakening the will, by further deluding the mind and by fostering the growth of low desire. We are punished therefore, by our sins, not for them, and, what is more, we have the right to be punished for our sins. Were it not so, in the darkness of illusion, man would plunge still deeper in the mire, unknowing that his chosen path was the left-hand path of self-destruction. The wise man is therefore willing to suffer, for, whatever its cause, the right "digestion" of that suffering will lead to a clearer vision of his true relation to the Universe, to his fellowmen.

8. Our sins and errors, which we only learn to be sins and errors by the suffering they entail, are not only useful incentives to progress but necessary to growth. As Prof. Jung³²⁴ explained, at a lecture given in London, no doctor can heal a patient against his will, the healer, representing the voice of Nature's laws, explains those laws as best he can, but "when a man goes away, and does not pay attention, I do not call him back. You may accuse me of being un-Christian, but I do not care. I am on the side of Nature. The old Chinese Book of Wisdom says: "The Master says it once." He does not run after people, for it is no good. Those who are meant to hear will understand, and those who are not meant to understand will not hear."

Karma Yoga. A Historical Study BY P.M. Modi

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THE MEANING OF PAIN: CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

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THE MEANING OF PAIN: CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

The Bhagavad Gita originally aimed at teaching Arjuna, and, through him the world, how to do one's duties so as not to be 'bound' by the good or bad results of those karmas.

On Death and Rebirth:³²⁵ The Forgotten Land by Krishna Prem

It is all very clear and definite, or at least can be, if the medium be a good one, and, if we have lost the sombre dignity of the temple, we seem to have gained something of the vivid matter of factness of the laboratory, or at least, of the popular science magazine.

But, and this is the unfortunate aspect of the business, do these teachings really come from the discarnate spirits on whom they are fathered? What evidence have we in support of the claim? The question is one which has been learnedly argued in many books, both for and against but, in the end, all we can say is that we do not know and that it seems no one else really knows either. What is certain is that accounts given through different mediums are at least as discrepant with each other as are the teachings of the different religions, that, only too often, they bear the stamp of the medium's own unconscious mind and that none of the ingenious tests devised by psychic³²⁶ researchers ever seem able entirely to close the loopholes through which doubt may creep. Moreover, there is a curious psychic unhealthiness that pervades the seance room, an atmosphere which one can no doubt get used to and cease to notice, much as one can get used to the smell of bad drains – at one's own risk.

The physical sciences deal solely with physical bodies and can therefore only tell us in technical language what we already know, namely, that our bodies are eaten by worms or burnt in fire and vanish utterly. As for academic philosophy if anyone can find anything definite in its thick volumes of learned ifs and ans, he will be more fortunate than the present writer has been. There only remains psychology, but, this science is in its infancy and is still tethered by the heel to physiological concepts, nerves, brain structures and the like.

2. The mortal: What happens after death?
The Soul remains silent.

M. I ask again what happens to me after death?

S. Who are you who speak?

³²⁵ The original editor inserted "ON DEATH and REBIRTH:" by hand

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M. I? I am just a man. My name imports nothing for I speak on behalf of all my brothers. We who, like gladiators are about to die, salute thee, Caesar, who art reputed deathless and a God.

S. Yet when you sleep and dream your body is unconscious though still you see and hear, feel, joy and pain. Who is that 'you' that sees and hears without the body's help?

M. I know what you would say that in dream we have experience in a subtle body which also survives death. That is a superstition of the past which arose when men knew nothing of the true³²⁷ nature of dreams but now we know that they are caused by repressed desires, desires which in our waking life are denied expression.

S. You are entangled in a web of words. Do things become different just because you give them different names? In those past ages also which you so despise it was taught that the dream body was the body of desire, yes, of desires of which the waking ego was not conscious. Have you not heard of vasantas, the unforgotten longings of the past? Your eyes are blinded by the shadows that you call material things so that you see no reality save what is physical. I ask again, what is the 'you' who dreams?

M. Whatever it is, it is not I myself, for those desires that find expression in my dreams are those that have been rejected by my personality. They seem to belong to a being that is wider and deeper than my being, one whose memory is greater than my memory and whose standards and judgments are not my own. Whose are the dreams? Shall I not say those of a great unconscious life, in which myself is but a parch of foam, a wave, a passing form that moves upon the sea which gave it birth.

S. Even against your will you see the truth save that you wrongly term that Life unconscious because, forsooth, you are not conscious of it. I tell you that nowhere in the universe is there life without consciousness and nowhere consciousness which is not life. Your personality is indeed a pattern on the surface of the sea, a pattern which by Law has come to be, which changes hourly and in time will cease. It was the winds of Desire that brought that wave, that pattern, into being: they speed it on its course, changing it every moment, and only when those winds grow calm and cease, not at what you call death, will it subside once more into³²⁸ the sea. If you believe yourself to be that wave then you will surely die and be no more, for patterns ever change giving birth to new. But then, in truth, you die at every moment and not at 'death' alone since for two moments you are not the same but change and change for ever. Are you so

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pleased with the pattern that you call yourself that you would have it endure for all eternity?

M. By no means! But I would perfect the pattern and in perfected form enjoy eternal life.

S. And, so you may, but then you must identify yourself with that unchanging being out of which all patterns rise. Moreover, no patterns are perfect in and for themselves but only the great Pattern of the Whole. I am that Whole. And therefore if you seek eternal Life it is in me and not in any finite part that you must live.

M. But I, I, I,—it seems that life which you promise me will be no longer myself, that I must go out as the flame of a candle and my precious uniqueness be lost in something which I cannot feel to be myself.

S. If it is self you seek, your precious uniqueness as you call it, then you are right. Do what you will, that self must change and pass: It cannot stand for ever. But I tell you that self to which you cling is a source of fear to you, the hard and knotted root of all your sorrow. Why should you cling to what brings naught to you but tears and why with foolish owl-like eyes do you see only the passing wave and not the water of which that wave is made? Know that you are the water not the wave and all your grief is gone—you are immortal.

S. That life of which I speak, that life which is³²⁹ your Self, sinks down into your heart until at length your body grows all cold and moves but feebly, answering no more the rudder of your will. Now comes the end; it ceases; it is dead.....The mind has turned within itself; it holds no further traffic with the world of outer things but lives alone, feeding on its rich store of images and thoughts as even you would know if you had studied in that Hall of Learning that you men call dreams. Enter that Hall and study now if you would learn the deathlessness of life.

M. You mean that after death the mind is wrapped in dreams? What are those dreams?

S. What are all dreams? The tissue of desire, a web which your desires weave from the fibre of your outer life. Your acts in life were motived by desire; as your desires have been, so shall be now your dreams. Here are those hells, with flames of lust and hatred of which your sacred books told tales to frighten children—true tales if rightly understood—here, too, are heavens, heavens of peace and pleasure, but transient all, passing like shadows as the stored up energy which called them forth discharges and grows calm.

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M. And then?

S. "Ease after toil, port after stormy seas." Deeper and deeper sinks the life within. The zone of dreams is passed and the boat of the soul enters on a great calm. It was yourself in life who made those dreams; yes, you who made your heavens and your hells. How long they lasted and of what sort they were was all decided by the course you steered in life. Once you have entered the Night that is below the world's horizon, your course is set, the dreams can but unroll. Yet, long or short, happy or sorrowful³³⁰, they too, like all things finite have their end and all is peace.

M. The peace of utter oblivion?

S. Oblivion of the forces of desire. Before that peace is entered the body of desires will die as dies the outer form that is your body now and even the desire itself will sleep as sleeps the life hidden in winter seeds, to wake again in season....But to all who enter my being is given one flash of Light which, like pictures of the past unrolling before the mental eye of him who drowns, there comes a vision of the endless thread of life, weaving its pattern on the loom of Day and Night. All those past Days, that flowing stream of lives endlessly stretching to the very rim of Time, shine for a moment as this latest day is added to their number, and, in their light, the mind sees something of the purpose of the whole and thus of me who am the life in all. Then the veil falls once more; Midnight is passed; after the ebb, the flow begins anew. The Stream of life, reenergised by contact with its source, flows forth once more to seek the Light of Day.

M. Then we are born again?

S. Rebirth there is, but whether he who is reborn is you is for yourself to judge. The stream of life is one, ebbing and flowing, weaving through many lives, with other streams the pattern of the Whole. That stream which was yourself, which if, you like, is still yourself, flows forth, entering the zone of dreams, and, in that zone, desire awakes once more and fashions for itself a body of desires that is the heir of those it left behind before it entered peace. This is what you call Karma, others, fate. Guided by those desires it seeks and finds a human pair who can provide it³³¹ with a mortal body fitted for its needs, needs judged by me acting, as you would say, instinctively within the stream. Thus the life mingles with the two parental streams, enters their hearts and the new-forming body of a child and so is born to see another Day with an inheritance of countless lives but a new body, memory and brain.

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**Review by Sri Krishna Prem:³³³ Review on books: (1)
The Secret Sciences in the Light of our Time by Hans
Liebstoeckl³³⁴**

“The author either accepts³³⁵ whatever he may have gathered from Dr Steiner’s writings with unquestioning faith, or in regard to his own contributions with a complete indifference to any attempt at accurate or adequate verification of his own statements and beliefs.

For a really serious student of the Secret Sciences, therefore, this book will be of little use except to give him some idea of what Dr Steiner thought and believed about the matters treated of, and possibly to afford the serious student with some quiet amusement and a smile now and then.

But for the general reader, to whom such loose and inaccurate books appeal, who seeks amusement and scrappy information with no deep or earnest purpose, it may, indeed it should prove, attractive. It will give him some well filled and pleasant hours of reading from which he will rise with the happy feeling that now, at least, he knows and understands all about occultism and the secret sciences and can talk about them as fluently as any one, and more so than most, with an air of profound wisdom and complete understanding.

We are then hurried along to Steiner’s deepest obsession: the mysterium of Gologotha, and³³⁶ Christianity. Steiner naturally holds—as do many in the West—that Jesus of Nazareth was, in a unique sense the son of God as none other was or shall be: and with that one step he imprisons himself in a cell of ‘orthodoxy’—not an accepted or recognised orthodoxy of course—but equally a prison house, because it seeks to exalt some particular, some one person or doctrine, above and beyond the universal: which alone is or can be full, adequate Truth itself.

I knew and appreciated Dr Steiner fully and affectionately: although he knew too well that I disagreed with his outlook and views on many matters. But he at least was no dogmatist nor did he allow differences of opinion or intellectual struggles to affect his friendship. It seems a pity that his disciples—at any rate some of them—in their enthusiastic devotion fail to imitate the great virtues and wide-heartedness of their teacher”....Sri KRISHNA PREM.

³³² The original editor inserted “Continued on page 257” by hand

³³³ The original editor inserted “Review by Sri Krishna Prem:” by hand

³³⁴ The original editor deleted “Translated by H.E. Kennedy:” by hand

³³⁵ The original editor corrected spell “accepts” by hand

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Review by AC Mukerji:³³⁷ (2) “Indian Realism” by Jadunath Sinha

This is a valuable book. The problem of realism versus idealism has very long and chequered history in the Western as well as Indian Philosophy. But the Indian controversy has so far been very insufficiently known; and here lies the value of the work before us which provides a fairly exhaustive display of the weapons of offence preserved in the Indian armoury. The author has brought together here a large number of alternative expositions as well as criticisms of the doctrine of subjective idealism by some profound thinkers of India belonging to different schools of thought, such as Santaraksita, Kamalasila, Mallisena, Kumarila, Jayanta Bhatta, Vacaspati Misra, Sridhara, Sankara and others. This³³⁸ method has inevitably led to a certain measure of repetition; but, nonetheless, it has the merit of showing how the renewed reconstructions of the foundation of subjective idealism have added to its strength and richness, and the reader can easily appreciate the value of each individual contribution toward an increasingly perfect analysis of our knowledge of the external world.

A valuable feature of the author’s presentation is the quotation of appropriate parallel arguments from the works of Berkeley, Hume, and the contemporary realists. It must be very interesting to know that Kumarila refuted the famous dream argument of the subjective idealist in the same strain as Alexander did at a later age, that Vacaspati Misra anticipated Prof. Perry in detecting the fallacy of the ego-centric predicament in the argument of idealism, that Ramanuja foreshadowed the arguments of Prof. A.C. Ewing against epistemological idealism, or that Sridhara’s criticism of Idealism has been repeated by Fraser and Johnston. Similarly, the Indian discussions on some of the characteristically modern problems of philosophy—viz. the subject-object relation, consciousness versus self-consciousness, the problem of value, representative perception etc.—will be found to be not only interesting, but stimulating, and some of the new turns given to the arguments in favour of, as well as against, the idealistic position should be of immense help for a re-adjustment of the relative claims of the partisans in this age-long controversy.”A.C. MUKERJI.

Sir³³⁹ Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. I.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA AND THE RESULTS OF MODERN SCIENCE: BY H.M. BHATTACHARYYA: The doctrine of Maya, which, in its germinal stage can be traced to the hymns of the Rgveda (RV., I. 164. 46), and which was further outlined in the

³³⁷ The original editor inserted “Review by AC Mukerji:” by hand

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Review by AC Mukerji: (2) “INDIAN REALISM” by JADUNATH SINHA

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dialectic of Yajnavalkya and Naitreyi in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, systematised and perfected by the genius of Badarayana and Sankara, and, though modified, yet kept in its integrity as regards its essentials in the later Upanishads, has admittedly, and not unjustifiably, occupied the supreme place in the systems of Hindu thought. And taking into consideration the still later literature which has grown round about this nucleus of thought one can fully appraise the intellectual vein of the mind of the Mayavadin at its proper worth. One who has taken pains to enter into its logical and epistemological problems, specially into the problems of arthapatti, which consists in the supposition of the premises, reason or cause, from the conclusion, consequence or effect, and which therefore answers to the hypothetical method of modern European Logic, and of anupalabdhī which has the exclusive privilege of cognising the abhava or non-existence of a thing, but the absence itself and which therefore affords a new dimension of perception, would, without the least hesitation, acknowledge the stupendous height of logical and epistemological speculation it has attained. And on its ethical side, suffice it to say that the world at large stands in awe and admiration before its sublime conception of morality which manifests itself in the quiescent, self-abnegating life of the Jivankukta.

A misconception³⁴⁰ however prevails, based no doubt on plausible grounds, about its metaphysics, that it reduces the entire world of ours to Maya or illusion – that the infinite variety of its contents living and non-living, that “the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth” are swept into non-entity before the sole reality of Brahman which it upholds. In this way, it is further held, it offends against common sense and ordinary experience, which are loath to disbelieve in the stern reality of the world round about us, as it brushes away, instead of explaining it, and finally it contradicts the results of modern scientific researches which are based on the irresistible theory of Natural Realism. It is therefore the Vedantic metaphysics, in particular, that has furnished object of criticism, not only for some of the other schools of classical Hindu Philosophy, nor again for one of the ramifications of the Vedantic School itself, viz. the system of Ramanuja; but also, curiously enough, for many of those modern dabblers in philosophy who have little or no pretension to independent lucubrations, but only allow themselves to be sophisticated by the cheap rationalism of the Hegelian type, and show a readiness to shrug their shoulders in contempt whenever they find any very great height or depth in Eastern speculation and to pronounce it immediately as hypersubtile or mystical.

Now the primary end of the present article is to counteract and dispel this baseless misconception of Vedantic Realism on the part of these last-mentioned modern philosophy-mongers by showing that contradiction to European common sense, and scientific thought, if there be any, is rather apparent than real; and that the Vedantic

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metaphysical standpoint, if rightly understood³⁴¹, will not be found to suffer from bad logic any more than the “scientific” thought of the present day. All this has been attempted in this essay not with the polemic of a dogmatic apologist but with the perfect open-minded impartiality of a truth-seeking free-thinker. The aim of this article thus being circumscribed to an examination of the allegation against Vedantic Metaphysics in the light of modern scientific thought, be it said at the outset, that it does not of course claim completeness as an elaborate treatment of the Vedantic theory as a whole which is more than what our space permits.

Now what is to be understood by this principle of Maya? We cognise something and ipso facto cannot take it as unreal, we give ourselves to the belief in its reality. Then we bring our powers of reflection to bear upon this naive belief and find that after all we cannot reconcile ourselves to it. Thus what was regarded as real from one standpoint melts into unreality from another. And all this is due to what the Vedantist understands by his principle of Maya.

The juggler produces in the twinkling of an eye a full-grown mango-tree out of a mango-seed before an astounded audience. They cannot deny the apparent reality of the full-grown mango-tree which they see with their own eyes, nor again can they affirm it when they reflect on the inconceivably short time within which it is made to grow into foliage flowers and fruit. They would assign it to Maya or illusion.

The principle of Maya is then what makes a thing to appear as real from one stand-point but³⁴² reduced it to be unreal from another, what, in other words, gives an air of reality to what is really unreal, makes one and the same object to be both sat, real, as well as asat, unreal. Maya is thus otherwise described as *sadasadbhyam anirvachya*—an inexplicable enigma of Being and Non-Being, of the Real and the Unreal.

This enigma of the apparent reality of a thing is created by the double function of the principle of Maya. In the first instance it operates in the form of *avarana sakti*, or the function of what may be some-how expressed by the term “subjection” which “throws under” or covers or conceals the actual nature of the thing; and then it works in the shape of *viksepa sakti* or the function of what may be called “projection” which projects, or creates, or imposes on the already concealed thing the new sensory elements of what is unreal, the cumulative effect of this double function of Maya being the illusory perception of a thing, the nacre for example being mistaken for silver. The *modus operandi* of the principle of Maya, therefore, is that first of all it covers the real and then discovers the unreal, the result of all this being that it shuts one out from the knowledge of a thing. Hence Maya is *Avidya* or *Nescience*.

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The nature of Maya becomes further illumined from a consideration of the Vedantic theory of causality. Vedanta affirms that the cause is not absolutely homogeneous with, nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the effect. For, had the cause been absolutely heterogeneous to the effect, then the effect would have no connection with the cause any effect whatsoever could have been produced out of any cause whatsoever—to quote the classical example, oil could have been produced, not only out of oil-seeds, but also out of grains of sand. And³⁴³ again were it possible to suppose that the effect is absolutely homogeneous or identical with the cause then the usual and practical distinctions between one thing and another would become altogether meaningless; the lump of clay could have been used in place of an earthen pot, an earthen jar would have served the purpose of an earthen bowl, which however can never be the case. The effect is thus neither totally homogeneous with nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the cause. It is thus the as, yet different from the cause. The earthen jar is the clay and yet is not the clay, the jar qua jar is sat or real and yet the jar as clay is asat or unreal. Are we not then tempted to say that the phenomena of cause and effect are products of illusion whose nature it is to make one believe in that which is not really itself? The illusion under which one finds oneself in the understanding of cause and effect differs from that in the case where nacre is mistaken for silver only in degree and not in kind. The illusion in our mistake of nacre for silver is comparatively short-lived, whereas that in our attempt to understand the world of our experience, which is bound by a network of causes and effects, persists until the attainment of the monistic knowledge which is Brahman.

The above consideration of the Vedantic doctrine of causality reveals to us the further fact that Maya is the root of all difference and individuation. The earthen jar is regarded as such and is differentiated from the earthen bowl in so far as we allow ourselves to be illusionised as regards their common cause, viz. clay. Thus the ‘names’³⁴⁴ and ‘forms’ of ‘jar’ and ‘bowl’ which constitute the individuality and difference of these objects are mere empty husks of reality and not the reality itself; they are, in the language of Plato, the “imperfect adumbrations of the Ideas”. The principle of Maya “the matrix of all ‘names’ and ‘forms’ “thus furnishes the principium individuationis as well as the principium divisionis of the entire system of things.

Maya is, to recapitulate, that principle of ignorance which makes us think of things both as sat or real and as asat or unreal; which, in other words, unifies contradictories, and which constitutes individuality and diversity of things which are but ‘names’ and ‘forms’ hypostatized. And the world of our experience which teems

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with individualities and differences, spatial, temporal, or constitutional, and which harbours contradictories of the real and the unreal is thus reduced to Maya or illusion.

Can there be any other conclusion than the above which is more shocking to the imagination of one who is accustomed to the realistic grooves of thinking? Indeed the Realist will startle back when he will be asked to accept the entire fabric of his real world as a will-o-the-wisp! But the advaitavadin clearly and distinctly points out the three different strata of existence: (i) the pratibhasika-stratum in which the existence of an illusory object is but momentary, as that of silver in the case of the ordinary illusory perception of nacre, for the silver disappears as soon as it is pointed out that what one takes for silver is not silver, but nacre; (ii) the vyavaharika-stratum in which the system of things is practically real or empirically certain so as to render possible the ordinary affairs of the work-a-day world; to³⁴⁵ this belongs the system of scientific truths; and (iii) the paramarthika-stratum in which nothing but the absolute homogeneous unity of Brahman is real and existent, and every thing else which harbours unity of Brahman is real an difference in unreal.

The first-mentioned stratum is not very important for our present purpose. If we take the distinction between the vyavaharika and the paramarthika strata in a little wider sense we may very well maintain that the distinction is only a general hint as to the relativity of apprehension. What is real or existent from the vyavaharika stand-point, that is from the stand-point of a particular inquirer with a special interest and a particular type of intellectual capacity, proves unreal or non-existent from a higher point of view, where the interest is wider and the powers of apprehension keener and more penetrative. And the same stand-point which is paramarthika or higher is itself found to be lower or vyavaharika by an inquirer of higher intellectual powers. Thus the distinction between the two strata is entirely relative and also truth is relative to the inquirer, and the relation between the system of empirical truths on the one hand and capacity of apprehension on the other, may be said to be one of inverse variation. The wider one's outlook, — the more analytic one's apprehension — the less and less real do the objects with their individualities and differences begin to appear — they seem to dismantle themselves of their cloaks of false realities one after another as one's capacity of apprehension gains in depth and minuteness of analysis, until finally, the absolutely paramarthika or real stage is reached where there is no further vyavaharika stratum³⁴⁶ possible thinkable, and in which the absolute reality of Brahman in its indeterminate homogeneous eternity is realised. Now this absolute reality of Brahman is identical with Knowledge and Existence, Thought and Being. We can very well understand how this is so, when we sublimate the knowledge of objects of the empirical world, one after

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another as unreal in our vyavaharika stages, and find that it is knowledge again, though of a higher order, which is sublating that of the lower order. Proceeding in this way it is possible to reach the highest or the absolutely paramarthika stage where there is no dvaita or difference but pure monistic knowledge in which all distinction of subject and object and even the activity—or in the language of Plotinus—merges into one homogeneous whole, and that is Brahman.

It is worth while to note that the relativity of apprehension which is the fundamental principle of all attempt to know the world and which as we have seen, follows from the Vedantic conceptions of the paramarthika and vyavaharika strata of knowledge is not the same as the Protagorean Subjectivism or what is otherwise known as Homo Mensura doctrine, that all knowledge is a matter of individual standpoint and that the individual is the standard of everything that is true and good. So long as men are within the charmed circle of Maya things will appear in their differences and individualities and will be taken in the same light and in the same sense, thus making universal standard possible within that circle. The Lilliputian must have his Lilliputian standard. There are indeed planes or zones of certitude corresponding to the degrees of apprehensive powers. What is real or true to the popular mind³⁴⁷ is certainly not so to the scientific mind and what is real or true to the scientific mind may not be so to the philosophic mind which moves in another and higher plane. But as soon as the magical wand is touched and the cup broken, the magical reality of the empirical world with its “names” and “forms”, its infinite conditions of individuality and difference, shrivels into non-entity. The firm grasp of the quiescent unity of Brahman dissipates all differences (dvaita). Here we have an important distinction between the Vedantic and Hegelian conception of the Law of Contradiction. In Vedanta unity or identity is the truth, and difference is illusory, and even the negation of the difference through which the identity is affirmed is illusory. Hegel on the other hand points out that it is not the undifferenced unity, but unity-in-difference that constitutes the truth which is thus the home of contradictories. Advaitism, however, does not altogether deny the importance of difference and individuality which co-exist with unity but only relegates them to a lower or inferior plane. The world of our experience which manifests unity-in-difference is regarded as real from the vyavaharic standpoint or from the stand-point of practical or empirical truth, and not from the point of view of monistic consciousness, and here it is worth while to remember Herbart's criticism of Hegel that the union of contradictories is only an empiricism.

The relativity of apprehension, which, we have seen, is the natural outcome of the Vedantic distinction between the three strata of existence, appears to be the greatest³⁴⁸ logical and epistemological lesson for science and philosophy. It is the basic

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principle of the supposition of rival hypotheses and shows that any attempt to apprehend the world, however sound, is only a working hypothesis standing every moment in danger of being superseded by a better one.

Beginning from our ordinary practical life we find that what appears true, real and important from one stand-point is far from being so from a higher or more comprehensive standpoint. To the man who is thirsty and feels a longing for a glass of cold water, the water is as real as any thing could be, but the chemist whose stand-point and interest are different from those of the thirsty man will take water to be unreal, what is real and true to him is the H₂O. Again from the point of view of the physicist the H₂O is as unreal as the water and what is real and true is the energy or force to which he will reduce everything and in terms of which he will explain every thing. May it not be further asked if the true nature of this physical energy has yet been determined? All this therefore points to the conclusion that every object of this empirical world may be regarded as both real and unreal, existent and not existent. The line of argument adopted by Advaitism, therefore, far from contradicting European common sense and scientific spirit, is in perfect conformity with it and reveals the further fact that this highest specimen of philosophical speculation was discovered by the Indian sages in a remote age when the modern European scientific spirit was scarcely born. Therefore the unreality of the empirical world³⁴⁹ on which the Advaitavadin insists is not of the type of the will-o-the-wisp but indirectly reveals the relative incompetency of human apprehension consequent upon man's finitude and imperfection.

This important lesson of the Vedanta may be very well brought home to our minds when we take into consideration the results of scientific researches of modern times. Ptolemaic astronomy regarded the earth to be an immobile central body round about which the other members of the system moved; Copernicus demonstrated that this was illusory, a Maya;—the earth was not the immobile central body but it is one of the many moving bodies revolving round about the sun which lies at the centre of the system and which is relatively stationary.

The ancient Greek atomist Democritus maintained that the ultimate constituents of our world were atoms which were inert, indivisible minute bodies—each being a plenum or portion of space entirely filled and therefore impenetrable. This statical theory of atoms, however, failing to account for motion was regarded as illusory or unreal, and had to make room for the dynamical hypotheses of Faraday and Lord Kelvin. Faraday demonstrated that the atoms were not inert as Democritus supposed, but that they were elastic and compressible so much so that they render possible the interaction of things. And Lord Kelvin supposed the atoms to be like "vortex rings" or

whirlpools in the perfect fluid known as the ether of space and the properties of such vortices were demonstrated mathematically by Helmholtz to possess self-sufficiency and durability required of the ultimate units of matter.

Later³⁵⁰ researches, however, tend to show that the so-called atom which was regarded as the simplest possible constituent of matter is really far more complex than Faraday's "centres of forces" and than Lord Kelvin's "vortex rings"—a reservoir of forces in moving equilibrium, of unthinkable complexity, capable of being liberated and of passing over into free force of motion again—"a solar system in miniature"—but possibly immensely more complex than the solar system of the sun, planets and moons we are acquainted with. The atom is thus thought to be composed of many minuter units revolving round on another and about a common centre with inconceivable rapidity and holding one another together in moving equilibrium rendered stable by the excessive velocity of the revolving units. But though comparatively stable, its equilibrium is extremely sensitive and constantly being modified by external influences and capable of being partly or wholly disintegrated—the constituent units being thereby liberated and left to move with inconceivable rapidity through space. These minuter units are called ions and electrons. They form the atoms by their equilibrated revolutions and are themselves possibly whirlpools of the luminiferous ether.

From this it also follows that the atoms are not indestructible. They are produced by the integration of finer elements into equilibrated systems and can be destroyed by the disruption of these electrons; and this would appear to be the case from the phenomena of radio-activity which are due to the spontaneous disruption of the atoms.

Now³⁵¹ does not the above examination of the Atomic theory of the universe and its replacement by the Electron-theory, not excluding the possibility that the latter again would make room for quite another and a better one in future, confirm our belief in the position of the Mayavadin that the apparently real world in which we live and move is scarcely more reliable than the magician's jugglery. Interpret and understand the world in any way you like, but the next moment you will be in a difficulty to reconcile yourself to what you believed with regard to it. You were at perfect liberty to suppose that the ultimate constituents of the material world were the atoms or indestructible and indivisible centres of energy, and you are now dis-illusioned to find that they are neither indivisible, being made up of electrons, nor are indestructible, disruptions and reintegrations of the constituent elements giving rise to destruction and reconstruction of fresh atoms.

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Again let us consider the fate of the old Ether-theory. Lord Kelvin writes in his Popular Lectures and Addresses: "You can imagine particles of something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing you call luminiferous ether. This is the only substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of that is the reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Indeed unless a material medium for its propagation is either assumed or found, the phenomenon of light cannot be mechanically described, nor again other forms of variation, as well as electricity and magnetism. And the additional advantages of this hypothesis is that³⁵² it affords the ground for unity among the variety of physical facts.

Now the hypothesis of an imponderable inert luminiferous ether as something having "reality and substantiality" has been resorted to by scientists like Lord Kelvin, because they assume covertly or overtly, the a priori necessity of the mechanical theory of the universe. Here their argument seems to involve the following steps. Grant first, that the world must be intelligible, grant secondly, that to be intelligible it must be mechanical, and grant finally, that to be mechanical there must be an ether or ethers whose motions constitute light, electro-magnetism, etc. grant all this and then we might say that the existence of ether is indirectly proved. The first two steps in this argument, it will be observed, are quite philosophical, but the second, however, is very disputable philosophy. Science, however, has no right to build on philosophical premises and is forward always to disown such a priori methods. Leave aside then any persuppositions of this kind and other remains but a mechanical hypothesis. No doubt its value as a descriptive hypothesis has been greatly enhanced by the labours of Maxwell and Hertz. But as to the worth of their results, one may suppose, Poincare's remark upon it is not too cautious: "There still remains much to be done; the identity of light and electricity is from to-day something more than a seducing hypothesis; it is a probable truth, but it is not yet a proved truth."

The scientific world has been enjoying for some time the benefit of the investigations of Maxwell and Hertz until recently Einstein in his Theory of Relativity, and Hooper, the Fellow³⁵³ of the Royal Astronomical Society, who had in reality anticipated Einstein, have revolutionised the entire scientific world. Hooper is declaring at the present day, in the Royal Astronomical Society, and before the whole scientific world, that the old theory of an imponderable fixed ether is inadequate to solve many a problem of ethereal physics such, for example, as that of the continued rotation of planets on their axes, or of the alteration of the inclination of the earth's axis to the magnetic equator. Experiments performed by Michelson and Morley, of America, have proved beyond doubt that the old theory of inert ether is entirely wrong,

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while Fitzgerald's photographs of the advancing wave of light prove that the wave-front, instead of being homogeneous, is broken up into thousands of points. And Hooper concludes that ether is the primary form of matter and possesses all the properties of matter. It is atomic, possesses elasticity because it is atomic, possesses density and different degrees of density in space, and also possesses inertia. The ether-atoms are subject to the law of gravity just as any other form of matter and this is in conformity with the results of Planck and it satisfies all the rules of Newtonian Philosophy. This new theory of an ether subject to gravity will compel us to alter all our preconceived ideas of space and especially of ether-atoms in relation to solar and planetary bodies.

So far matters are clear. But can all this be more than a mere hypothesis? Can it claim to have reached the final solution of the protean complexity of the entire system of the solar universe? Can we not as well expect that³⁵⁴ just as Maxwell and Hertz have been superseded at the present day by Einstein and Hooper, even so the day shall come when Einstein and Hooper will also be superseded in their turn by successors of greater scientific acumen?

Does not all this confirm once more the Vedantic view-point that what appears to be 'real' and 'substantial' from a particular angle of vision is proved merely illusory, unreal or unreliable from a more comprehensive stand-point? Trace the whole history of human attempts to understand the nature and the system of things from the so-called scientific or philosophic point of view either in its outline or in its details, what do we find, but an alternation of truth and untruth, of reality and unreality; and the conclusion with which one is to remain satisfied is, therefore, that truth or reality is only relative to the knower, or that truth recedes further and further as the inquirer approaches. This puts one in mind of what the poet said,—“I am a part of all that I have met; Yet all experience is an arch wherethro' Gleams that untravell'd world whose margin fades for ever and for ever when I move.”

We are remind here also of Kant's discussion of the cosmological antinomies, that the world of empirical reality is not the true essence of things—it is merely an unreality, an appearance and not the thing in itself. And we are glad to find the same conception of the world confirmed by so eminent a scientific thinker as Herbert Spencer, who describes “science as a gradually increasing sphere,” such that, “every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience.” Our knowledge is not only bounded by an ocean of ignorance, but intersected and cut up as it were by³⁵⁵ straits and seas of ignorance; the orbis scientiarum, in fact, if we

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could but map out our ignorance as we map out our knowledge, would be little better than an archipelago, and would show much more an unexplored sea than land.

And this is what the Mayavadin insists on when he presses forward the point that the whole vyavaharika or empirical world is a huge illusion. And all science and philosophy however much they might boast of their achievements, point to the irresistible conclusion that truth is relative to the apprehensive power of the inquirer – and that it recedes as the latter advances – and that the root principle of the universe is never to be discovered, and that the many theories that have been propounded about this root principle are only relatively true. This is the most valuable lesson that the Mayavada teaches in the celebrated verse of the Brhadaranyaka, – “those who pretend to know, really know nothing, but those who say that they do not know are the real knowers.” And the same truth flashed upon the great ancient Greek Vedantin, Socrates the father of European philosophy in the true sense of the term and he declared that “he knew that he did not know.” Mayavada is thus not the ordinary Illusionism by which name it is often stigmatised, nor will it be properly characterised if one calls it Agnosticism, as it never shuts out all knowledge; but it is rather Relativism, pointing always to the relative or tentative character of the knowledge of the world of things in which we live and move, and insisting on the constant revision of one’s standpoint, on the “transvaluation of all values” – an intellectual attitude quite in keeping with the testimony of Modern Science and Philosophy.

Sankara³⁵⁶ and Prof. James Ward by W.S. Urquhart

1. The comparison will be restricted to the doctrine of the Self, as held by the two philosophers, and as set forth in the recently published “Psychological Principles” of Dr Ward and in Sankara’s Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras. Some striking similarities appear, and the placing of the two conceptions side by side may be illuminating in regard to the difficulties of both.

2. The problem of the Self is just one of those problems which are on the border-line between psychology and metaphysics, and in regard to which no clear and definite line of separation can be drawn. The psychological analysis of the Self must ultimately lead to metaphysics, and Dr Ward’s treatment is no exception to this general statement.

By “self-consciousness” Dr Ward means, “not the consciousness that we attribute to every self, but the consciousness of this consciousness” a consciousness attained only gradually and by a limited number of experiments. He distinguishes between the self-known, which he calls the empirical Ego or the Me, and the self-knowing, which he calls the pure Ego or the I, and he proposes a threefold line of inquiry, with two phases of which we are mainly concerned. In these he sets forth on the one hand “the content and gradual elaboration of the presentation of self as experience develops” and, on the other hand, “the meaning and justification of the existential proposition “I am” that in

the light of it all seems to become explicit.” The close union of psychology and metaphysics in such an inquiry is obvious.

But, first of all, let us dwell for a little on the distinction between the psychological and epistemological points of view from which³⁵⁷ Dr Ward starts in his argument. He joins issue at once with those who hold that because the conception of the pure Ego, is fundamental and therefore underivable, it is psychologically a simple presentation. He sees in this a relic of the old “substance” theory, according to which it might be suggested that the self could exist without acting, and he would have agreed with Hume in his scepticism, provided Hume had restricted that scepticism to the self as a datum of sense, and had not proceeded to apply it to the absolute existence of the self. He regards Berkeley’s use of the term “notion” as also an attempt to emphasise the idea that the self is not given as a datum of sense, though he might object to certain implications of the term “notion” as used by Berkeley.

Now, in this protest of Dr Ward’s against confusion between the empirical Me and the pure Ego, and against the resulting attempt to treat the pure Ego as an object, presentational or conceptual, there seems to be an interesting parallel with Sankara’s warning against transferring the qualities of the subject to the object, and of the object to the subject. According to him the two are opposed as darkness and light; they are the sphere of the real and the unreal respectively. Confusion between them is both the result and the producer of false knowledge. The attempt to treat the pure Ego as an object, as a datum of sense, as a substance, as a concept amongst other concepts, binds us more firmly in the chains of ignorance. We shall never reach the ultimate nature of the Self, if we superimpose upon it the qualities of the³⁵⁸ object. It is indeed a natural error of the human soul. We are constantly transferring the qualities of outer things to the self, we are clothing it in the data of our ordinary experience. Sankara himself gives copious illustrations of the process in the opening paragraphs of his Commentary on the Vedanta Sstras. “Extra-personal attributes are super-imposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children and so on are sound or entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man thinks of himself as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping...In this way there goes on this natural beginning – an endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers, and is observed by every one” (Dr Thibaut’s translation of Sankara’s Commentary). Yet, however natural the confusion may be, detection and correction of it is absolutely necessary, if we are to reach a true understanding of the self. The motive in Dr Ward’s case may be the completion of psychological investigation, and in Sankara’s case may be the penetration of metaphysical reality, but their attitude to this

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great question seems to be wonderfully similar. They are both impressed at the outset by the impossibility of treating the pure ego as an object amongst other objects.

3. As we are spectators of others so we become spectators of ourselves. "It is through the 'us' that we learn of the 'me'. We become conscious of ourselves as persons, forming a more³⁵⁹ or less self-contained unity, capable of thinking and acting, retaining some traces of emotional resonance and bodily affection, sufficient at least to afford a basis for the regarding of ourselves as objects—objects of the pure Ego which still eludes our efforts after presentation.

Now, certain minor similarities may be noticed between this teaching and Vedantic teaching. The second level is compared to the dream world in both systems. When the senses are drawn inwards, when we become independent of impressions from the external world, we live in the world, as it were, of dreams. The very language of Dr Ward strengthens the force of the comparison. "At the ideational level," he says, "where coming events seem to cast shadows before them because past events have left traces behind, a new environment—a pictorial world of things past and things possible—allures the self to withdraw into it from the actual and there to ruminate, day-dream, and desire."

4. We have been tracing the development of the empirical self upon the various levels, but throughout we have been eluded by the pure Ego. The I than thinks these various conceptions, that develops its knowledge of the empirical self, has never itself been an object of knowledge. The process has exemplified the truth of Sankara's dictum that we cannot apply objective qualities to the subject. As soon as it acquired content the I has been transferred to the Me. We have attempted to increase our knowledge of the self, but as soon as we formulate our knowledge another self appears which alone can carry through that formulation. And as we turn our psychological inquiry upon it, it³⁶⁰ again eludes us. The eternal distinction between subject and object has not been transcended and never can be transcended. The question remains—and it is the crux of the whole enquiry—whether this Ego can ever be known. Dr Ward gives the answer that it cannot be known, but can be experienced. Sankara would agree with him to a certain extent, but would take a different view of the particular character of the experience.

Dr Ward is aware of the danger that this pure Ego which he has found at the centre of the different zones of experience—sensory, ideational, and personal—may turn out to be in the phrase of Kant, a mere focus imaginaries, but he would rather run this risk than adopt false methods of investigation. He would rather have no knowledge at all than a knowledge which is not based on experience. He would rather

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be a sceptic with Hume than a dogmatist with more cheerful philosophers. But he thinks that scepticism is unnecessary, if certain cautions are observed. In the first place we must, from the point of view of knowledge, regard the conception of the pure ego as a "limiting conception". When we attempt to fix it, it eludes us – and points the way to further knowledge, while itself remaining unknown. The meaning of this will become clearer if we consider Dr Ward's symbolism. The fundamental formula for him is the Subject perceiving the Object, or, S p. O. The development of our knowledge of the empirical self yields a fairly complete idea of the relation of the empirical self, which may be symbolised as M, to its objects. The formula for the psychologist will then be S p (M p O); S typifying the pure Ego, which is as soon as and as often as it becomes known, passes over into³⁶¹ M, i.e. becomes part of the Object. When, in other words, we have the most comprehensive knowledge of S, it ceases to be anything at all, it becomes a pure abstraction. It acquires content, only to surrender it again. It enters into knowledge only as it ceases to be what we want to know. It can never be known, if by knowledge we indicate an object of knowledge. Are we, then, entirely ignorant of it? Is it a "will o' the wisp" of whose reality we can never be sure?

Dr Ward would answer this question in the negative, and here he brings in a second caution. Experience is not co-extensive with knowledge. We experience far more than we know. Our experience is based upon the fundamental relationship of Subject and Object. Both of these enter into our experience, but only one of them can be known, because knowledge applies only to objects, and that which is externally a subject can never become an Object. It may seem as if this would land us in the impossible position of knowing one term of a relationship without knowing the other, but to an objection of this kind Dr Ward would reply that we are not dealing with two terms in a proposition both of which are objective to us, but with an entirely unique case of relationship – with the subject of our experience in relation to its object or objects. The subject is that through or by means of which we know everything, and cannot be its own object, any more than the eye by which we see physical objects can itself be an object of at the time we are visually perceiving anything.

Nevertheless, we are sure of this pure Ego, just because of its persistent activity. It enters into all our constructions as their fundamental³⁶² conditions. It is reflected in them – in our sensitive, our ideational, our personal self – as well as in all the other objects of our experience. If we are sure of any thing, we are sure of this Ego, not as a sense datum, not as a substance, not as an object of any sort not as a concept, but as a subject, persistently active so long as we have experience. The self cannot be known, but can be experienced directly, and as the basis of all other experiences. We cannot ascribe objective qualities to the subject, and make it an object of knowledge, but nevertheless it is the basis of all our experience, knowledge included.

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Coleridge as a Thinker by H. Stephen

1. Kant drew his attention to the ever afterwards popular distinction between what is contrary to reason, and what is above reason without being contrary to it—between what is provable and what is neither provable nor disprovable but yet possible and believable. What is indemonstrable but nevertheless free from contradiction may be believed, if there are grounds for the belief other than demonstration; reasons and causes, he began to think, are not its only legitimate grounds of belief. Now Kant had shown that demonstration and logical certainty are possible only with regard to the world of things in space and time, which is open to sense experience. But space and time do not apply in reality as it is in itself; they are not things, but forms which reality is compelled to assume in entering into the consciousness of finite minds, and in making itself to be symbolically understood by them. Behind the things that appear to us under the forms of space and time, there is the world of reality³⁶³ which not being subject to space and time, is therefore beyond the range of human conception and of logical proof and disproof.

2. Some have thought of him, as was thought of his first master, Synesius,—that after all only a half-Christian—with an esoteric and an exoteric, a private and a public way of thinking—philosophizing at home and mythologizing abroad like Synesius; and the criticism might be justified if a point of metaphysical theory were to be the only criterion of religious faith.

3. Hume had refused to identify mind with body, but had introduced into mind a system of atomism analogous to that of the material world. He had sought to establish an atomic theory of the mind. External things by force of impact make impressions on the system, and these enter in the system as ideas. Ideas maintain their separate existence in mind as isolated units somewhat as atoms do in the physical world.

4. Certain individuals appearing contingently from time to time may appear to be the causes of public revolutions and calamities, but to clearer thought these are only the agents of a deeper power “working out a good intent” even in revolutions, namely, the power of universal reason, working in their motives, and bending them in subservience to its own purpose.

5. The action of the French republic opened his eyes to the fallacy of the theories on which it was based. The republicans were using the liberty which they had themselves acquired to take away the liberty of others. Nay, they were letting themselves become subject to a severer thralldom than that from which³⁶⁴ they had delivered themselves.

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He had long viewed without changing his mind the excess of the reformers, even when they were "Weaving "A dance more wild than e'er was maniac's dream." But he could not bear up against the invasion of Switzerland and "the groans from bleak Helvetia's caverns sent." His ideas and opinions on political subjects now underwent a complete reversal. These things were enough to destroy all his faith in political reform. To remove political and social evils was only to rush into greater evils: "The sensual and the dark rebel in vain, Slaves by their own compulsion." and "sensuality and darkness" he now takes to be the natural condition of men.

5. How is this radical change in Coleridge's mind towards his fellow-beings—this loss of his once- so-confident faith in human nature—to be accounted for? Was it wholly owing to the high-handed proceedings of the republican government, as he assures us in one of his best poems? Yes, to some extent, but he gives us to understand that the tendency to change was strengthened by new intellectual insight. Following the Platonists too closely, he had misunderstood the true place and function of reason. He now becomes acquainted with Kant's distinction between reason and understanding, and sees that many errors in politics had risen from ignorance of that distinction. Understanding is that function of mind which deals with individual things, and accepting them as they appear to be outwardly to the senses, and assumes them to be separate and independent realities, acting and reacting on one another outwardly in space and time, and the mechanical philosophy, taking understanding as its standard had assumed that this³⁶⁵ external interaction of units is the whole truth of things. But Kant had made a great discovery: he had discovered that reason is a power different from and higher than understanding: and views things from the opposite side. Understanding is the differentiating power, and dissects wholes into parts, and considers the parts as independent things. Reason is the unifying power and views things as wholes, and sees how the parts must co-operate to make a harmonious whole, and sees the laws and reasons which rise out of the whole and underlie the outward appearances of things, and checks and corrects the conclusions arrived at by understanding.

Now the reformers had thought only in terms of understanding.

6. Political institutions are not made, but are a part of the life of the nation, and grow as it grows, keeping time with the vital requirements of the whole, as the bark grows along with the tree, adapting itself to the life of the growing organism. Therefore a constitution cannot be abolished nor altered artificially, without destroying or injuring the life of the nation. Reforms, if they must come at all, must grow gradually and naturally out of the slowly changing circumstances of the people. Making sudden

changes of political institutions is like tearing the living bark from the tree, and substituting some artificial covering in its stead.

“Kant’s Ethical Theory, by Hiralal Haldar

1. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the unity of the world as an unconditioned totality remains for Kant a mere ideal. Reason is guided by this ideal in linking phenomena to each other in accordance with the principles of³⁶⁶ understanding, but, for theoretical reason, it remains a regulative ideal only. It gives a definite aim to and controls the processes of the understanding, but its validity as a constitutive principle cannot be established. But practical reason succeeds where theoretical reason fails. In our consciousness of ourselves as moral and, consequently, as free beings, we have the direct assurance of the reality of a power which determines, but is not determined by, phenomena. I do not know myself as an object, because it is the presupposition of the existence of an object, but in my practical activities, I become conscious of a power which can freely initiate actions and control, modify and systematise them. If, in so far as I am cognitive being, I can only try to find an ultimate unity in the world of experience which permanently eludes my grasp, as a moral being, I feel that I am above³⁶⁷ the series of phenomena and that it is for me to introduce unity and system into life and nature. No knowledge is possible of myself as a noumenal object, but the actions performed by me bear witness to my reality as a free being. In short, man as an active being would not be possible unless he were a free being. And as a free being, it is the nature of man to assert his superiority over the world by bringing its phenomena under the subordination of his will. The nonconformity of the objects of consciousness to the unity of the self implied in their existence gives rise to an ideal which stimulates the understanding in its determination of things, but which it is unable to attain. But practical consciousness directly reveals to us a power which is not subordinate to anything and to which³⁶⁸ therefore there is no limit. The ideal object which for the theoretic consciousness is only an object of thought is for the practical consciousness the principle to which I seek to bring the world into conformity. In other words, it becomes for me an end to realise by means of my own free activity. The ideal in fact is one with my self-consciousness and is the full actuality of what I am in possibility and my effort to mould and fashion the world in conformity with the ideal is, from another point of view, the ceaseless endeavour on my part to actually be what I potentially am. That I can realise the ideal in the world is possible because it is the ultimate truth of the world itself.

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³⁶⁷ The original editor corrected spell “above” by hand

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That the self is a free cause is directly involved in the moral consciousness. As a natural being, the actions of man are as strictly determined by their motives as the phenomena of the outer world determine each other in accordance with the law of causality. But the moral consciousness reveals to him that he is more than the series of inner states and has the power of self-determination. The moral law peremptorily orders me to rise above the chain of phenomena and to be determined in all my actions by the idea of the world as fully conformed to the consciousness of self. To act according to the moral law, then, is to try to make the self the determining principle of the world, to establish its ascendancy over nature and to make nature the instrument of its self-realisation. To conquer nature within and without is the absolute requirement of practical reason, and the moral law formulates this requirement.

In order fully to understand the meaning of all this, it is necessary to recall the distinction³⁶⁹ which Kant makes between the empirical and the intelligible character of a thing. The changing states of an object related to each other as cause and effect are the phenomenal expression of its intelligible essence which is their determining ground. The free causality of the noumenon accounts for its expression in the time series and is not to be confounded with the law of causality which binds together phenomena. This distinction, which in the Critique of Pure Reason remains a merely problematical concept, is proved to be valid by the consciousness which man as a moral being that his vocation is to make the self the ruling principle of the world and not to be determined by the objects which surround him as they are determined by each other. That for which a possibility was left open in the Critique of Pure Reason is, through the moral consciousness, established as an undeniable truth in the Critique of Practical Reason. If we attribute our actions to ourselves, it is because we, as noumenal beings, belong to the intelligible world of which the phenomenal world is the outer expression. The moral law expresses the requirement of reason that the phenomenal self should be subordinated to and determined by the noumenal self. As empirical beings, we are conscious of the moral law as absolutely bending on us, but it is the law which emanates from our own real self and as such is self imposed. It is the law of the autonomy of the Homo noumenon and we become conscious of it as binding on us when we contemplate it from the point of view of the Homo phenomenon. The demand of reason that all our actions as phenomenal beings must conform to the autonomy of the pure self is the categorical imperative.

2. Freedom³⁷⁰, we thus see, involves two things. Negatively it consists in resisting the solicitations of sense and, positively, in the will willing itself. In so far as we succeed in over-riding passion and in being guided by the idea of the pure self as end, we are free. The moral law rests upon freedom or rather is the expression of freedom,

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for, to be moral is to be absolutely self determined. The validity of the idea of freedom, however, is for us proved by the categorical imperative, though, logically, the former is not posterior to the latter. From the categorical imperative I learn that I am free. If I feel that I ought to do a thing, it necessarily follows that I have the power to do it. "Thou oughtest therefore thou canst." Though the idea of freedom is inseparably bound up with moral law, Kant tells us that we are unable to give any positive account of it, or to say in what it consists. To explain a thing is to refer it to the cause which determines it in the context of experience and such an explanation is obviously impossible of the principle which lies beyond the mundus sensibilis and to which the category of causality is inapplicable. "Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how freedom is possible. For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the object of which can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which in no wise can be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any possible experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by any example or analogy. Where determination according to³⁷¹ laws of nature ceases, there all explanation ceases also". But though explanation of freedom is impossible, the defence of it is possible. Those who discover contradiction in the idea of freedom persist in considering man as appearance only and do not perceive that "behind the appearances there must also lie at their root (although hidden) the things-in-themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances",

We are now prepared to understand the meaning of Kant's dictum that the only thing absolutely good is the good will. By "good will" we are to understand the will which wills itself and is not influenced by anything extraneous to itself. Will is with Kant reason in its practical aspect and the good will, therefore, is only another name for the free causality of reason, the activity of reason which is determined only by reason. Opposed to such autonomous action is the heteronomous action which is determined by extraneous motives which, according to Kant, all fall under the principles of self-love.

3. What is the formal principle by which an action, in order to be moral, must be determined? Kant's answer is that it is that "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." If, in so far as an action is good, it cannot be ³⁷²determined by any particular motive, the only test of its morality must be its consistency with itself when universalised. "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." Judging an action by this criterion, we can easily say whether it³⁷³ is morally good or

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not. Place yourself in the position of an impartial observer and ask whether an act which you are inclined to do can be done by everybody in similar circumstances.

4. The formula that we should so act that the maxim of our will may become a universal law does not express the full meaning of Kant, though it furnishes us with a criterion by which we can judge our actions. For, in Kant's view, the essence of moral actions is that by means of them the self is realised as an end in itself. The ultimate unity of all things, which theoretical reason seeks but does not attain, becomes the end at the attainment of which practical reason directly aims. In other words, the world conformed to the unity of self-consciousness, or self-consciousness realised in the differences of the world, is the ideal by which moral actions are determined. The activities which, so to speak, do not radiate from the centre of our being in order to bring all things within the circle of its influence are heteronomous and are the very reverse of moral. The moral law, therefore, is not adequately formulated unless it brings out that a moral action is not merely that which does not contradict itself it is universalised, but that which is consistent with the end of self-realisation. Hence it is that Kant finds it necessary to lay down the second formula for the moral law which is as follows: "So act as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." This formula substitutes consistency with self for self-consistency as the moral standard, and such a standard is the standard of the end³⁷⁴ and not of mere law. The law, that is to say, is subordinated to the end. This end is the self, not the individual self but the universal self of humanity of which all particular individuals are organic elements. In all our acts, in so far as we are moral beings, we are to endeavour to further the interests of humanity as an end in itself and never to treat any man as mere means to an end which is not proximately or ultimately his own end. In the common end of humanity every individual participates and to act in conformity with the second formula is, therefore, to impose principles of action upon oneself which are of universal validity.

5. The distinction which Kant makes between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self is only a special application of this general principle criticised above. The self, he regards as pure reason to which all sensuous element is foreign, and the free activity of reason, therefore, can in no way be influenced by passion. In so far as man possesses a sensuous nature, he is a mere animal and a part of the physical world, and it is in virtue of his rationality that he is a free being and capable of rising above the limitations of his finitude. It is true that man is both finite and infinite, rational and irrational, but it does not follow from this that he is a composite being one half of whom is pure reason and the other half mere animal. He is not like the monsters of Greek mythology, a grotesque combination of incompatible elements. Reason in him includes

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within itself all the sensuous elements of his nature, transmutes them and makes them the means of its own expression. Passions and feelings cannot come into contact with reason without being transformed³⁷⁵ by it. They, as component elements of our self-conscious nature, are not alien to it, but contribute to its life as the means of its self-expression. Just as in the order of nature spirit is revealed, so in our actions determined by particular motives, the self is realised. The noumenal self of Kant divorced from desires and feelings, is only an abstract universal and therefore unreal. The universal, in order to be real, must be expressed in the particular and the self which does not find expression in the particular contents of the consciousness is a meaningless abstraction. To be determined by particular motives in our actions is, therefore, not to lose freedom. In each motive the universality of the self is particularised and it is only as thus particularised that the self is individual. The universal self is expressed in it. It, therefore, goes beyond it to other determinations in which it is equally manifested. It is in the systematic totality of the particular contents of consciousness referred to their objects that the self is revealed. The more integrated and organised the contents of the mind are, the more complete is the self that is realised in them. What the unified system of the external world is to the spirit immanent in it, that the varied contents of the mind organised into a whole are to the self which underlies them and is their principle of unity. In the particular motives by which actions are determined, it is the self that is expressed and in being determined by them it is determined by itself. Freedom, therefore, does not consist, as Kant supposes, in annulling passion and in will willing itself. It does not mean absence of determination, but self-determination. Will³⁷⁶ willing itself is an absurdity. Unless something particular is willed nothing is willed at all. The false separation of the universal will from particular motives gives rise to the dilemma in which the alternatives are the liberty of indifference or empty freedom on the one side and the fatal determination of the will by subjective inclinations on the other. But the antimony is solved when it is perceived that the universality of the self-conscious will has meaning only as it is specified in its determinations, namely, the particular desires and their objects. The self moved to action by particular objects of desire is indeed determined but is self-determined.

Self-realisation, we thus see, does not consist in the attainment of a life of pure reason from which passion is excluded, but in the establishment of the supremacy of the self over nature or in bringing nature into conformity with the self, which is possible only by means actions determined by definite ends. But the self which thus seek to realise is not the individual self, or, to be more accurate, the realisation of the individual self is rendered possible by a universal principle which is manifested in the life of the individual and which brings it into organic connection with other individuals and determines its relations to them. In the individual the universal is particularised.

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6. The progress of society is ordinarily a silent and imperceptible process and does not imply sudden and sweeping changes. As the growth of a living body is furthered by the normal never-ceasing functional activities of its members, so social development is effected through³⁷⁷ the individuals faithfully performing the duties of their stations. But in the evolution of society there occur times when important transformations of its ideal and organisation, characterised more or less by unrest and disturbances, take place exactly as certain periods of physical growth are marked by symptoms of ill-health. These are ages when old traditions and customs lose their binding force and individuals seek to emancipate themselves from the social yoke and strike out new paths for themselves. Men begin to regard themselves as self-subsistent and independent of the ties which hold them together. The social bonds appear to be purely arbitrary restraints on the liberty of the individual and to reduce them to a minimum comes to be regarded as the aim which the best of men ought to set before themselves. Such individualism flourishes when the old ideal fails to satisfy the human mind and society has not yet been fashioned in accordance with the new ideas which are in the air. It is the lever that raises society from a lower to a higher plane. It is this individualistic spirit that finds expression in the ethical view that man is a law and an end to himself. When the laws and institutions of society tend to be stereotyped and cease to adequately embody the ever-growing moral ideal, the choicest spirits of the times, for whom the ideal is not an empty vision, withdraw into themselves and seek to regulate their lives by an inner law to which the outer law does not correspond. The ethical theory of Kant represents an attitude of this kind. It emphasises the opposition of the inner spirit to the outer law. But³⁷⁸ true morality cannot be merely subjective. It must be both subjective and objective. It consists in the regulation of life by a social standard, because in the customs and ordinations of society the inner law is concretely realised. It is possible, however, to forget the inner spring of customary morality and to make the outer laws the chains of the spirit. Against this bondage of the mind, the Kantian ethics rightly enters an emphatic protest. But it errs in ignoring the objective side of morality. If conforming to merely external law is slavery of the spirit, determination by an inner law which has objective content is a perfectly empty freedom. Kant's ethical theory is founded upon the individualistic spirit which arises from time to time in the history of the world when existing social forms become insufficient and helps the transition towards the development of the higher social consciousness.

7. The self-surrender of the individual is not to other individuals, but to the universal of which the social organism is the expression. The essence of the moral life is

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that it consists in the surrender on the part of man of his natural self and in his winning by this means a larger self which is universal. True self-sacrifice is the surrender of all to the universal life of the society which gives back to each his individual life, sanctified, and changed into an organ of itself. As sharers in the social life, men are permeated and possessed by a universal spirit which makes use of the special aptitudes and talents of each for the purpose of realising some particular function necessary to the completeness of the social organism. In the phenomenon of social life, we see a universal principle that realises itself³⁷⁹ by going out of itself to the particular lives of the individuals and by bringing them back to its own unity. Society is not a collection of individuals: it is a substance, the presupposition of them.

It all this is true, it is impossible to draw a line between duties to self and duties to others. All duties are duties to society; but as society is not an abstraction but an organic unity of individuals, duties to it are at once, from different points of view, duties to self and duties to others. In serving society, I serve myself, for the life of society is my own higher life and to carry out the purposes of society is also to render service to others, for apart from society they have no being and whatever contributes to its order and progress contributes to their true well-being.

The Philosophy of Anarchy and The Idea of Time by H. Stephen

(1) Philosophy was in danger of becoming only another name for the preaching of fads, paradoxes and crude analogies. In accordance with this tendency, the strange habit of depreciating intellect and reason began to gain ground, and of magnifying, in opposition to the, the claims of interests and of automatic impulses and supposed instincts, as the really authoritative guides of life. This tendency threatened an irruption of dogmatism and anarchy into scientific thought—not to speak of ethics and politics. Logic being set aside, we might expect that the old effort to ascertain what we should believe would come to be superseded by whimsical pretexts for believing what we wish to believe, making the wish to be parent to the thought. That the old effort to find what is universally true, would be superseded by the desire³⁸⁰ to find what will be useful to ourselves under our particular circumstances. And if the use of the intellect is to go out of fashion, and “intellectualism” is to be set aside as a relic of the dark ages, and belief thus liberated from the control of exact reasoning, what more is to be expected?

2. We may speak reverentially of organic inclination, feeling, impulse, and instinct, as if they were mystical intuition and divine inspiration. But when reason is dethroned

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from its rule over conduct, the inevitable result will be the enthronement of the great god, Wish. Or rather, irrationalism must end in thorough-going automatism which leaves no room for wishes. There is no firm ground to stand on between reason and mechanism. Foremost perhaps of this corybantic school, and certainly the most influential, was the half-crazy fanatic Nietzsche. We want a new world in which all moral values will be transformed and rectified. Mankind must put an end to the usurpation of reason over life, and set the Will free, as the real essence of human nature. And when Will is made absolute, what can it will? It can will only itself, that is, unlimited power.

3. Professor William James was very far removed from the wild iconoclasm of Nietzsche, but had certainly the same desire to prove his originality and astonish people by dethroning reason and reversing received opinions; and showed it, among other ways, in his theory of Belief.

4. The philosopher came in the person of M. Henri Bergson. His philosophy has little or nothing original in it, apart from its metaphor, rhetoric and paradox.

5. The great flood of force which fills the world and sweeps human beings along within it³⁸¹, has itself nothing in common with anything so local and temporary as human reason; and it would have been well if human beings had let themselves be carried along passively by the wave from the beginning, as the lower creatures have done.

6. In those creatures which continued to surrender themselves to the elan vital of nature, organic tendencies and instincts were developed which guide them straight to the attainment of their needs. This excellence is seen especially in insects, which Bergson seems to consider the highest products of the vital impulse. The human race, unfortunately, at some point on the long road of animal development, took the wrong turning. Instead of letting themselves be developed at last, by the life of nature, into sublimated grasshoppers and dragon-flies, they separated themselves from nature; and began to regulate their own actions, and thereby to develop their powers of intellect and reason. They thus entangled themselves in the meshes of logic and intellect which can lead to nothing. If they had continued to surrender themselves to the central flow of life, they would have been able to go straight to everything needed as the bee shoots straight to the flower; instead of having to wander round and round in the mazes of reasoning, and generally missing their mark.

7. Intellect, he tells us, consists in differentiating the unity of life into plurality, and fixing attention on particular aspects or cross sections, as it were, of the current of vital

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activity separating them from the current itself, building them up into “concepts” operating upon them as if these “concepts” of our own making were real things.

8. As consciousness consists just in this discrimination into parts and building of concepts,—i.e. in³⁸² this work of intellect—therefore in shaking off this habit of intellection, we subside more and more into the unconscious or subconscious life of nature and animal instinct, and this, from Bergson’s point of view, will be the highest good.

9. The most elaborate attempt in recent times at an interpretation of experience, viz. that of Bergson, strives to find everywhere confirmation of the same irrationalist or anti-intellectualist view of the world and the same justification for dethroning reason from its old position as the supreme co-ordinating power of human life. It seeks to vindicate the freedom of belief and conduct by depreciating the claim of intellect to be the faculty of revealing truth and imposing laws; and casting doubt on axioms hitherto regarded as intellectually necessary, thereby liberating thought from the trammels of logic. By thus depriving knowledge of its universality it points towards anarchy in thought and life.

10. But if we accept this analysis, we overlook the fact that differentiation is consciousness itself—to be conscious is to become aware of the differences of things; and that reducing the many which result from differentiation, to unity again by classification and conception, is also of the expense of consciousness. Therefore intuition as understood by Bergson, by leaving behind it the processes of intellect, means sinking out of consciousness altogether—casting off individuality and “swooning” back into the infinite as mediaeval mystics thought they could do—a state which was to them a state of ecstasy but not one from which they pretended to bring back knowledge of anything. Or it is a sinking back into that sub-consciousness or semi-consciousness of animal instinct which we have³⁸³ so long left behind, and for their retention of which, he envies so much the lower animals. But is such intuition be really a source of knowledge, Bergson must have learnt a great deal from it himself,—otherwise he could not know it to be such. What new truth then has he brought back from his voyage into the vague and formless infinite? Indeed he has got nothing to show in the way of intuitions, from his discovery, beyond commonplaces which have evidently no deeper source than intellectual common sense.

It may be admitted that at one point in his criticism of science, he comes near to hitting the nail on the head. This is in criticising its statical conception of the world, constructed wholly by differentiation, enumeration and classification. The world is certainly not a vast museum of dead articles arranged on shelves in a museum, as

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science often assumes. It is a process of many processes like a living whole. But Bergson, while admitting this, will not tell us what life really is, nor why all things flow. He assumes that the unity of the world is explained by calling it life. But life is the most complex as well as the most unitary of things, and the principle which makes it to be both unity and plurality is certainly purpose. Yet, in Bergson's *elan vital* eternally flowing out of the formless infinite, i.e. out of nothing, and rushing on into an empty futurity which also is nothing, there is no principle of unity. And this criticism of science has been made by many analytical and inductive, which it must be provisionally.

11. Parmenides had argued that the absolute must be perfect in itself, and that plurality and³⁸⁴ change are inconsistent with perfection; and that therefore the absolute reality must be above all plurality and change.

12. If we did not see events to be connected together by causality underlying reason, in which the future is active as well as the past, there would be to us no time.

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1. Human thought has kept no register of its birth, and thought the beginning of Philosophy has been variously traced to such emotions as curiosity, doubt and wonder,—and one may claim for such guesses at its genesis at least some degree of reasonableness—the beginning of thought itself is an event in the History of the world—if indeed it is an event—which has, it seems, still kept in tact its seal of mystery, and bids fair to remain for long one of the undeciphered hieroglyphics of existence—to retain a place near the centre of the Riddle of the Universe and in a catalogue of those “Enigmas” about which our verdict is likely to be “We do not know”.

2. The problem, as soon as one tries to approach it, resolves into several. Of these we may distinguish some: the anthropological one asking—when and under what circumstances did the primitive man first give unmistakable indications of his being a thinker? Can the beginnings of thought (which must be defined) be traced down to the anthropological roots of man as, for instance, Darwin attempted to do in his *Descent of Man* or Romans in his *Mental Evolution in the Animal and Man*? Then the psychological one asking—when and under what conditions, does the baby give hints

that it³⁸⁵ has developed into a thinker? Then, the metaphysical one asking when and how, if at all, did thought evolve out of the general scheme of being?

3. Thinking appears to be an event like any other event; how and when does this event occur; and is thought competent to know its own occurrence?

4. One need subscribe to Materialism to believe in the possibility of thought having an origin, or in that of thought thinking out its own origin.

5. The fact of thinking may, be just one element in a vast issue of events; so that, the mere fact that thought can judge and reason about other events (e.g. the fall of the apple or the incidence of a magnetic storm) whilst these other facts cannot, as it is commonly believed, judge and reason about themselves (the apple apparently not itself discovering gravity; or the well-known astronomical discrepancy of the motion of the perihelion of Mercury not itself proving Einstein's Relativity; the magnetic storm not itself observing, measuring and deducing from the solar spots or other causal data; and so on) – this fact viz. that thought is, apparently, the sole judge and thinker, while other events simply are without judging and reasoning about themselves, is – that thought is so far a class by itself, sui generis, that it cannot be made to rub shoulders and elbows with the "brute", "blind", "unintelligent" events of the universe – that, in fine, it must not, in its essence at least, be drawn up into a line with the common herd of facts – that thinking as such, that is, as distinguished from³⁸⁶ its empirical forms, is not an event at all as events are understood, excluding therefore, every possibility, in regard to thinking as such, of there being either an origin or an end, and of its philosophizing genuinely about that origin or end.

To materialism Thought commonly is, of course, an "epiphenomenon", a "by-product" a sort of "effervescence", "phosphorescence" and so forth: and not only is it an event, but it is one that possesses the greatest face-value but the least actual credit in the "Stock-Exchange" of world's verities. Thought thinks that the world can be taken on, and in, its own terms, that is, in terms of "impressions and ideas" and the laws of their association, and has sometimes fancied that the world is not there – the infinite realm of facts and laws not there – when Thought is not there; but Materialism and Realistic views of the world have generally seen in such thinking and fancying factitious fallacy and delusion.

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6. I shall not, at this stage, speak of fundamentum ultimum—the so-called “matter” —of the materialist; but it already appears that the basis on which he laid his foundations has been shaking and shifting very much of late. Locke’s distinction between the Primary and Secondary qualities— though disallowed by Berkeley — has for long been tacitly accepted as an hypothetical base of construction by generations of physicists; and, in scientific theory, the real world has for long consisted of atoms and their motions which are believed not to possess the secondary qualities— colour, taste, smell, sound, and so forth.

7. The issue is not whether Thought (beginning with³⁸⁷ a capital letter) or Thinking as such is an event. The Idealistic School, generally, will say—it is not. The Thought that thinks, judges and relates must stand aloof from the whole empirical show, and it was the constant theme of Green, Bradley and some other idealists that relations between A and B, B and C, C and D can be constituted and known by a Principle which does not itself enter the tissue of relations: the Principle that not merely knows and thinks, but constitutes all relations—relations of contradiction being some of them—,that subsumes and embraces all relations, and yet is not one of them or even their sum-total, has commonly been styled the Absolute, the Spiritual Principle in Knowledge and in Nature, and so forth.

8. It is this view of the realist that awakens confidence and evokes sympathy in the breast of the plain man who sees a wondrous world around him of which he knows himself as a part, and his instinct teaches him to regard the world as much real as himself, and events in the world at least as real as thoughts and feelings in himself. He is haunted with no predilection for regarding, for instant, a patch of cloud ablaze in the sublime conflagration of the setting sun as wholly or largely an “idea” or a “complexus of sensations” in him; or for regarding a beautiful thought and an uplifting purpose in him as only a brain-secretion or even as a psychosis turning one facet of a fact of which the other is a neurosis. He bestows no thought also on the question whether the world around him and the consciousness in him may or may not mingle in their roots, and drawn the sap of their substance from one parent Being.

9. The³⁸⁸ plain man suffers himself to be shaken by no such doubts and questionings; and Realism is a view of things which, while raising these doubts and questionings, claims to see sufficient grounds why they should be quieted as our peace-breakers and dispelled as our seducers rather than encouraged as our pathfinders and

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trusted as our enlighteners. The Realist alone, therefore, can hold out assurance to the plain man that his instinct has not erred, that his commonsense is not necessarily common nonsense. The materialist—if he were a savant—could only tell him that his world of experience is real only as regards the abstract qualities of mass-inertia and motion, and that all else—all the wealth of varied colour, taste, smell and sound in the world—do not exist outside his own skull; and the most astounding and dismaying revelation of all—that the only thing real, substantially and causally, inside his skull, is not his consciousness, but the cerebral matter in motion. This is a revelation which cuts violently across the grain of the easy, natural instinct of the plain man.

10. The Vedanta view of perception makes perceptions presentations and not representations of external objects.

11. The infinitely rich world of colour, smell, taste and music translated into neuron-movements inside the bony casement of the cerebral hemispheres. The plain man is shaken out of his naive complacency by these theories of knowledge and experience; and though the plain position is not necessarily the right position—ignorance, doubt, error and illusion besetting it too often and too plainly—in exchanging this for one of those commonly adopted by “high” Philosophy, one only loses what it is better to lose, and gains what it is essential to gain. The incidence of ignorance³⁸⁹, error and so forth in the naive position is patent enough, and consequently, there is need enough for criticism—for science assuring correctness and truth, and philosophy defining ends and appraising values. In fact, it is this weakness of the naive position out of which the necessity of a science of Evidence (Pramana) is born: it is because naive experience is not necessarily, and in all cases, right experience (Prma).

12. The plain man seems to be an ideal to which the savage and the child are more or less close approximations. The man in the street is perhaps a more distant approximation than the ancient hunter—the man in the bush. Man, in whatever state we now find him, is a mixture of the naive and the theorist: the pure, pristine metal can hardly be separated from the “alloy”. On the other hand, the pure, theorist does not exist also—never without a very strong dash of the naive. Commonly, a philosopher is a philosopher in his academy; in every day life is a plain man. The absolutely plain man and the absolutely wise man, are, therefore, both concepts, ideals; and we are practically called upon to deal only with compromises.

13. We may take it that in the universe of the plain man—who as we meet him has, no doubt, tasted the fruit of the forbidden tree, and is no longer plain in the pristine sense—the question we asked ourselves at the outset of the present lecture is not too

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“ethereal” to find a place. He has learnt to distinguish between thought and thing, though he is as yet innocent of idealism, materialism or neutralism, or any other ‘ism’ for the matter of that. He sees an external event, say, an eclipse of the moon, and is curious to know the why of it; and³⁹⁰ he has some explanation of it that satisfies him, fantastic or otherwise. No doubt, the fact or event of thinking or feeling he has learnt to distinguish; but it is late in the day that he turns his steps “homeward” – to the facts of consciousness itself. This has been “pre-arranged” by the author of our being as the Katha Upanishad in one of its mystical passages says. But whether this reflective attitude turned inward comes early or late in the day, it comes.

13. We may ask: What is our universe, apart from all notions we may have formed of it? Theories have their use; but facts are infinitely more important. Now, the universe of the plain man is a fact.

Here we must essay, tentatively at least, to describe our plain man’s universe. The most indubitable fact about every one of us is—Experience. By this I mean the totality of what is sensed, felt, thought, imagined and desired. Since, evidently, this totality is not a chaotic mass, but has the appearance of a system—as reflection at least shows—, I may call it a universe.

14. We must, in the first place, disburse our minds of all theories and lay aside every theorising attitude. This is the first requisite. The second pre-requisite is that we must lay aside, for the moment, all pre-conceived notions (which are veiled theories) which may circumscribe, mutilate or otherwise disturb the concrete, live fact.

15. Notions and reviews about the Fact give us something which is not the Fact. Any interest any bias, any partiality will, in this way, operate as a factor of treatment. To get at the fact—the Continuum and Universe of Experience³⁹¹, we must, therefore, put ourselves, as early as possible, into a perfectly impartial and disinterested attitude.

16. In Indian Epistemology, too, the “Catalytic action” of an “Witness” (“Onlooker”—a spiritual “Origin” or “Point” or reference) has, generally, been recognised as necessary for all forms of experience.

17. The realms of the unconscious and semiconscious will gradually close in upon the realms of attention and vividness; the focus will be reduced further and further; till, in the long run, we may have the field of intuitive experience contracted into a “speck”

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of feeling. It is as if the radiance of the full moon shrank more and more in range till it dwindled down into the timid, uncertain phosphorescence of the glow-worm. In fact, this may be actually the case with the feeling responses of the lowest species of living beings. In our own "Centres", too, the contraction of the field of experience in this sense is not an uncommon and unfamiliar event. Contraction may be voluntary or non-voluntary. In some forms of contraction, revealing or presentation may decrease in extensity and increase in intensity; that is, the area of presentation becomes smaller, but the amount of "light" distributed becomes correspondingly greater; and, in a conceivable case, maximum amount of "light" may be co-existent with a minimum of area—what may, practically, be a point. In our normal experiences, again, the contraction and expansion of the field of effective or tonic consciousness, may, in some cases be strikingly illustrated. We may refer to the two cases of "just falling asleep", "just beginning to be awake". I have studied these cases³⁹² at some length elsewhere (in "The Approaches to Truth"). In "abnormal" experiences also (including the Yoga experiences) we have the phenomena of contraction and expansion of the field variously illustrated, sometimes with striking and vital results.

17. A drop of water seen by the naked eye is clear; the same drop seen under the microscope is teeming with countless inorganic or organic particles.

18. The solipsist, the yogachara Buddha, the Drishti-Srishti Vadin in Vedanta may hold that a world outside and independent of the actual consciousness of the experiencer does not exist, and cannot be proved to exist.

19. Science traces a causal chain, at the near end of which are all the qualitative differences that we actually perceive; but the farther end of which stretches into a mystery which, to quote the words of Hume that have become classical, "our line is too short to fathom". Science is exploring farther and farther into the depths of this abyss of nescience in order to discoer, if possible, the farther end of the causal chain, and it is undeniable that she has made some arduous but real progress; but her progress in this line is bound to be in the nature of an asymptotic approximation; and, to the wildest fancy it does not seem credible that she will ever actually reach the fundamentum ultimum she is in quest of.

20. There is no ground for maintaining a dualistic position like this. In fact, it is our inveterate habit of analytic and abstract thinking that is responsible for such dissecting and hypostatizing of form and content, of quantity and quality, of material cause, and efficient cause. Actually form and content quantity³⁹³ and quality, material cause and

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efficient cause as cause cannot be isolated from each other, and so set up that the one can function independently of the other.

21. Analysis of experience, as we ordinarily have it, does not shew, therefore, that matter and form are isolable – that we have one series in which form is reduced more and more suggesting “pure” matter “in the limit”; and another series in which matter is eliminated more and more suggesting “pure” form in the limit.

22. The Sanskrit term for that aspect is Chit, Chaitanya or Samvit; and it is an untranslatable word. “Consciousness” “Cognition”, “Intelligence”, “Thought”, “Awareness” are among the many English synonyms proposed; but the western meanings and implications and associations of these terms are such that they cannot be made to truly express the meaning of Chit. To make the best of a bad job, however, we choose the first term – “consciousness” – for the purpose.

In western psychological literature this term has not been used invariably and precisely in the same sense. From cosmic consciousness or sub-consciousness to that group of mental re-actions connected with the excitations of the cortex of the brain (excluding, therefore, others which are not so connected) the term has been made to spread the net of its meaning wide and narrow.

23. In all “schools” of Vedantism, Consciousness in the sense of Cosmic Consciousness is recognised as a continuum – a seamless unbounded “expanse”;

24. We maintain that the Vedanta does not teach wither the realistic or the idealistic view of reality as these views are currently understood, but that its teaching grasps a more³⁹⁴ complete and profound set of values. In other words, both ordinary realism and idealism are partial renderings of a more complete and fundamental import of reality which the Axis of the Vedanta bears.

25. We have to remember that such processes start with an apparatus of fundamental premises or postulates which we are forbidden to challenge on the penalty of losing our logical universe itself. It appears, therefore, that the practical valuation of Truth presupposes a conventional frame of reference. And since this frame is a variable one, the need is felt of a standard frame of reference which shall (1) reduce to nil the eccentricities of individual and group frames of reference, and (2) present the real, whole and entire. This, of course, is the Standard or Ideal, and this is the true meaning of Veda (from Vid.= to know).

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26. This account of Truth is given in terms of the common “representative” view of knowledge. But that view, though analytically useful, is a superstition. In the Vedanta, Truth is not a representation of Reality, but is Reality, inasmuch as Experience is Being. The mistake of Idealism is that it first separates Experience or Consciousness from Things, then attempts to reduce these in terms of their representations (ideas) in the mind – to shew that things are only the “cluster” or “complex” of these representations. But this is a surreptitious begging of the whole question. Experience or Consciousness should be so defined or exhibited that it may embrace things as well as representations of things as ideas in the mind.. The perception of a tree, for example, should not be conceived as the mental representation of an actual tree which is really not in perception. The perception is³⁹⁵ the real tree with only this difference that perceiving apparatus has made a partial, and commonly, a more or less eccentric section of the complete reality of the tree. It is one thing to take a quadrant of a circle, and another thing to have an image, reflex or any other kind of representation of the circle.

The Vedanta view of perception makes it clear that perceived things are not mere reflexes existing outside the mind, but they are the real things themselves.

27. This partial but actual section of the real (to which, therefore, the mind becomes identified to that extent) in experience is called in Vedanta Vritti: which is not a “subjective” state as such, nor an “Objective” phenomenon as such, but the neutral identity of the two: Jnana and Vishaya, as the two poles, when differentiated, are called. In a famous passage, the Brihadaraynyaka Upanishad calls this neutral identity intuited in perception Brahman.

28. There are Vedantic Texts which speak in no uncertain accents, of the falsity of our pragmatic experience; but their meaning ought not to be misunderstood. Our pragmatic experience is false only in the sense in which, say, my lay perception of a leaf of a tree is false compared with the expert perception of the same leaf by the botanist under his magnifying glass. Certain things in that leaf have been “held back” from me, and probably also, certain things have been “taken in” by me in more or less altered senses. Science is for enlarging the scope of lay experiences as well as correcting the errors due to the eccentricities operative in them. The Veda is conceived as the Ideal or Standard of Experience³⁹⁶ thus progressively enlarged and corrected. All the same, the lay experience is an actual section of presentation of the real universe: it is not a representation or reflex of, we not what, scheme of beings (“things-in-themselves”).

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It is true that the Maya-vada School in Vedanta has laid stress on the falsity of common, pragmatic experience, and though the ordinary opinion recognises three orders of reality (viz. The absolute, the pragmatic or conventional, and the seeming) there is another which recognises but two, viz. the first and the third, holding that there is no difference in kind between the conventional reality of a rope “truly” perceived and the illusory perception which makes it seem a snake. But all this, if the definitions are rightly grasped, does not make the world an “illusion” or “dream” in the sense such terms are commonly understood.

If by “real” or “true” in the absolute sense we mean pure and perfect Experience-Being (“pure” indicates that there are no excentricities, and “perfect” indicates that there is no veiling of keeping back), then, two things are clear: first that no definite pragmatic experience is real in the absolute sense; and, secondly, that the distinction between the “real” perception of the rope and the illusory perception of the “rope-snake” is merely a difference in degree,—convention fixing up veilings and variations within certain limits as being generally true, and veilings and variations outside those limits as being false.

Maya-vada cuts its epistemological coat according to its ontological cloth. Its ontology is the “Pure Aether” of Being-Consciousness³⁹⁷-Bliss to which we have repeatedly referred. It wants to absolutely seize upon this. Its definition of the Real is, therefore, “what changelessly abides for all time”, and “What is the common element of all forms of existence.” We have elsewhere subjected these definitions to a logical scrutiny; and here we simply observe that its theory of Avidya (“Ignorance”) involved in the act of perception, and especially of illusory perception, is fashioned in accordance with the needs of its fundamental conception of Reality.

29. The Axial Vedantic position—as distinguished from the special rendering by this School or that—is this: That All is Brahman, and All is Real: and it is only in practical appreciation of this Centre or that, that somethings or events seem to be unreal; so that what is seeming and “illusory” is this appreciation of the unreal. The Shakta Tantras (which represent a type of Vedanta), amongst some other types, particularly emphasize this, and what is more important, develop a system of practical discipline based upon the recognition of this, and designed and directed to its realization by the dispelling of the avidya that some things are not real.

It would not be loosely supposed that this Vedantic teaching, like the other extreme view represented by pan-illusoriness, undermines the vital distinction between the real and the unreal; that whilst the latter erased the first word, this one erases the second. It no more obliterates the useful and practical distinction between the two, than, for instance, Science by adopting Clerk Maxwell’s Electro-magnetic Theory of

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Light, or, lately, that³⁹⁸ of the Electronic constitution of the atoms, has obliterated the practical distinction between a candle and a horse-shoe magnet or that between a cylinder of oxygen gas and another of nitrogen.

When “All is real” is realized, the term “real” loses its ordinary, pragmatic meaning, but becomes so enlarged in meaning that it means either an element of the Fact-Whole (Brahman), or a member of a cosmic logico-causal system. Such enlargement of meaning is familiar even in ordinary science. A dream illusion or an hallucination is “unreal” from the lay standpoint, but to a psychologist it is as real a phenomenon as any other, having its conditions and consequences as good and genuine as those of any other. An unreal experience is thus a real event.

30. The fundamental teaching of Vedanta, instead of undermining the foundations of ethics, aesthetics and religion, lays the foundations deeply and unshakably. And it must be remembered that the Vedanta avowedly and actually more a science of practical realization of the Highest Reality than a speculative philosophy. Its practical developmental and mystical character is its essence, and not an incident that can be separated. And this practical character presupposes “competency” and “discipline” in the aspirant.

Not only those Schools of Vedantic Culture that have laid stress on the Method of Devotion-Love-Service, on that of Yoga (in its various—commonly classified into four—forms) and on the Method of Mixed Karma and Knowledge but even the Maya-vada School, which in its more prominent type, has stressed the position that the supreme knowledge of Brahman is attainable ³⁹⁹by “hearing” the “Great Propositions” (including the identity of Self, World, and Brahman), distinctly lays it down as a precondition that the aspirant must be morally “pure”—sinless, passionless and stainless, and that he must receive the “Word” from one who has, like Sanat-Kumara in the Seventh Book of the Chhandogya Upanishad, actually “seen” the Supreme Self. Otherwise, no competency for the fruitful hearing of the Word is established. Some professors of Maya-vada are not content even with this. They hold—as the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in a famous Text lays down—that after ‘hearing’ not only “thinking” but Yogic meditation is necessary for the attainment of the “beatific vision” — which “resolves all doubts, severs all the chains of the heart and the spirit, and reduces to the vanishing point the compulsory determinateness of actions.”

31. The Vedanta requires that this life must have its keynote in virility and heroic endeavour. It is a misconception of the Vedantic attitude—and even of the Maya-vada

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attitude—to say that weakness, inertness, zestlessness or dreaminess have any real place in the economy of Vedantic culture. Even he who would realize—“I am Brahman”; “the world is my dream”; and so forth—must be an absolute “hero”. True renunciation such as has been preached by all great philosophies and religions of the world—for example, by Gautama Buddha, the Bhagavad Gita and Jesus Christ—is not a cult of {co??dly}⁴⁰⁰ escape from the world and the struggles of life. What Lord Shri Krishna most strongly impresses on the mind of His friend-disciple is that he must not lapse into “impotency” or passivity, that he must rise superior⁴⁰¹ to all weakness and miserliness of the heart: that he must be a hero and conquer “desire”, which is hardest to conquer. The Gita is universally adopted in India as an authoritative statement of the Vedanta doctrine and Vedantic culture; and different Schools have their own commentaries on the Gita. Whatever construction may be put on the philosophical text of the Gita, there is absolutely no doubt that we possess the best and noblest presentation of the ethics of Vedanta in the Gita which is looked upon as the “cream of the Upanishads.” It is also notable that western scholars and missionaries have not unoften sought to affiliate the teachings of the Gita to those of the Bible. It is immaterial which is anterior to which, or which has borrowed from which; what is material is this that there has existed from time immorial an ancient quarry of human Vedantic Culture, which not only Hinduism and Christianity, but other ancient cultures and religions—in China, Egypt and Babylonia, for instance—have drawn upon. If the Sermon on the Mount can be affiliated to the teachings of the Gita, it only shows that they both have a common, ancient parentage to which Confucianism, Stoicism, Sufism and so forth, can also be traced.

32. We have seen what philosophical bases are provided by the Vedanta for the Ethics of the Gita. The Self is the natural object of love; and he who sees the Self in all things, loves as he loves the Self. The Cult of Universal Brotherhood finds, in this way, its amplest and surest foundation in the Vedantic teaching of the Self in all things. And it is to be noted that the Self is in all things, and not merely in all men. The Vedantist, accordingly loves all Nature—man, animal, plant, stock and stone.

33. Nor⁴⁰² need we go into the question, often not very intelligently raised, as to whether Vedanta does not sanction a self-centred life, and one that connotes lack of power—the sterner stuff of our moral being on which Nietzsche and others recently laid so much stress—in the ordinary, mundane realm of existence. That some types of Vedantic and Buddhistic philosophy—especially as injudiciously extended and made

⁴⁰⁰ Indecipherable in the original look like “{co??dly}”

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available to the incompetent or those who are not fit to receive and profit by its teachings—have in fact tended to depreciate the humanistic and mundane values, is a statement that need not be denied. Such improper availability of the highest Truths for those who are unfit is strongly condemned by the Vedanta itself, and it is doubtless true that, in a measure, this has been responsible for the low efficiency of Indian life in the later eras of its history. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that humanistic virtues have not suffered to the same extent as the mundane virtues, especially those summed up by politico-economic solvency and efficiency. As regards non-violence in spirit, charity, toleration and love, the unsophisticated Indian masses of other races of the globe. But the “active” side has certainly suffered.

34. A nation’s practical ethics and philosophy should be such that it lives and can hold its own on their basis against any combination of hostile or disintegrating environmental forces: or, to stage generally, to profit by those forces that accelerate or help its real advance, and resist those that obstruct it or turn it back or lead it astray. For this it is not necessary that it should always and in every case “move with the times”, as the phrase⁴⁰³ is; often, particularly when the disposition of world forces takes a mischievous or sinister orientation, it becomes necessary that a nation should summon enough courage and strength to refuse to move (so far as that may be possible) or move in spite of the times. Now, I think it can be claimed for the fundamental teaching of the Vedanta that, if rightly imbibed and thoroughly cultivated, it does confer such strength. The key-note of this gospel is Blessedness, Fearlessness and Deathlessness, and a nation living according and up to this gospel, truly in spirit and in action, can never come to grief, and find that it has lived in vain.

34. The path of liberation is a laboriously long and arduous spiral ascent, so long as a Centre is in the scheme of convention which defines it as a finite Centre; but it is direct, immediate and complete, the moment it realises itself as not defined and restricted by any scheme of convention.

Not only man, but every kind of being, possessed this essential nature and carries the possibility of this supreme destiny, “more or less” according to chosen frames of convention, but absolutely and perfectly in itself.

35. Vedantism is called upon to vindicate itself as a discipline which has some sort of real value. If it fails to do so, it becomes a discipline of no value; and may possibly be regarded as one of the unhealthy tumours growing on the brain of humanity, which the sooner it could operate away the better.

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36. We have this significant fact becoming increasingly significant with the progress of time, viz. that many of the deeper currents in the realms of Science and philosophy are now seeming to converge to a position that is essentially⁴⁰⁴ similar to the position of Brahma-Vada in the Upanishads. Such progressively indicated agreement of ancient thought with the suggestions and implications, if not the actual findings, of modern thought is, of course, no absolute proof that either is true or valuable; but it at least raises the probability of their being so. The probative value of each is enhanced, if both pursuing apparently different avenues of approach, ultimately meet at a common point.

37. The clear indications of unity become clear day by day as enquiry is proceeding apace in Physical Science. The “units” of physical matter are no longer the “hard” separate atoms, but units of electric charge, positive and negative; so that the different “elements” differ not in substance of stuff but in constitution or as regards “atomic number”. The “material” of matter is thus one. The current dynamical view of matter has further tended to reduce “mass” of matter to purely electro-magnetic mass, and thereby narrowed the gulf between matter and energy. This, in one sense, is movement towards the dematerialization of matter.

38. The Relativity Theory has postulated a still more undefinable frame work for the universe—the four dimensional continuum of points (point-events, intervals, tensors, and so on.) Ans so, though some kind of continuum (whether the Aether or the four-dimensional continuum of points) is strongly indicated in physical speculation, we have to start in the last resort, with what Bertrand Russell calls “an apparatus of the undefined.” Hence the victory of fundamental unity⁴⁰⁵ and continuity is achieved in science at the cost of definability and measurability. As Prof. Eddington has remarked, the fundamental postulates of physical speculation are both undefinable and unmeasurable; then come certain entities (electricity etc.) which are undefinable but measurable; lastly come the objects of experience both definable but measurable. Fundamental unity and continuity coupled with fundamental undefinability and unmeasurability are, therefore, the plainest indications of current physical speculations.

39. As regards the “Origin” of life, scientific thought has indeed been strongly leaning towards a monistic explanation (e.g. the Colloidal theory and so forth); but here, too, unity and continuity are purchased at the cost of definability and measurability; for, even if life “spontaneously” originates from matter, life is not thereby “materialized;” since matter itself, in its last analysis, has become undefined and

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unmeasured. The idea of a “cell-soul” or even an “atom-soul” cannot be lightly dismissed as a pure myth. Matter on one side, and life and soul on the other, may ultimately meet and coincide. Science confirms rather than shakes such a hope and belief. But by such fusion, though unity is achieved, the vaunted definability and measurability of matter ultimately vanishes.

40. It is easy to perceive that whilst there is, doubtless, a community of mental life in the animal kingdom (possibly also the vegetable) including man, the consciousness of different men probably form parts of a common, cosmic consciousness (or sub-consciousness; that individual souls are bargaining with one another in a universal “Over-Soul” medium.

41. The⁴⁰⁶ nucleus or kernel round which ancient theosophic and theogonic ideas rested or grew is the idea of a Continuum of Being-Energy, undefined and unmeasurable in itself – which is the idea of “Aditi”, and also the equally ancient idea of “Varuna”.

42. The Upanishads in many places, applying contradictory epithets (as does the Kena Upanishad, for instance) to Brahman, convey to us the deepest import of ancient Brahmanism viz. that Brahman is a logical – a substratum of Being-Energy too immense (Bhuvan) to be cast into any of the “moulds” (categories) of logical thinking. This is also the essential idea underlying the teaching of “Bhuvan” in the seventh chapter of Chhandogya Upanishad, where the polarities of subject-object, seer-seen etc. are negated with regard to the Supreme-Being-Experience.

The Upanishads make another feature clear as regards the Alogical Continuum of Being-Energy, viz. that it is Experience. Brihadaranyaka calls Brahman “Sakshat apareksha” – immediate experience; Kena Upanishad says that Brahman is “pratibodha-vishavam” – intuitively given in every fact of experience as its veiled (that is, unrecognised) background.

43. Brahman-Experience may form part of the structure of the intuitive beliefs (almost sub-conscious) of humanity, or part of the structure of its reflected thought. This later may be either formulated (that is reduced to system), or unformulated. The former, again, may be of two types: (1) practically or experimentally formulated (e.g. Kepler’s Well-known laws of planetary motion had been practically formulated by him: and later, they were theoretically formulated by Newton⁴⁰⁷ with the help of his laws of

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Motion and Gravitation; similarly, in the Upanishads we read stories of aspirant disciples who were “gradually” led to realize the nature of Brahman practically through such tentative and leading conception as Brahman is “food”, Brahman is “life”, Brahman is “mind”, and so on, until the Purna or Whole itself was reached.

44. And since the essence of Brahnavada is the common heritage of man, we may expect to find its unformulated and formulated types that are not merely Indian, but that are extra-Indian also; which are not merely historic, but are “prehistoric” and “proto-historic” also.

45. Coming down to the cro-magnon race in Europe and Aurignacian culture of which we now possess some archaeological data, it can only be a travesty of the truth to maintain that they were “brutes” devoid of the rudiments of culture. Their artefacts and other archaeological signs point unmistakably to magic occupying the centre of their religious beliefs and practices. And what is true of them is true of other “lower cultures” ancient and modern, elsewhere on the globe.

46. The experiences of the amoeba, as also those of a Shankara and a Kant are, in reality, Brahman experiences; though, in the “conventional universe” these represent different points of view and “apparatus” for making “cross-sections” of the Whole.

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Kant’s Central Concept by Ramdas Khan: Every thoughtful reader of the “Critique of Pure Reason” knows that the book primarily deals with the problem of knowledge, and not with the problem of being, the problem which the “Critique” proposes⁴⁰⁸ to solve is that of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. “How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?”.

2. Is it correct to say that Kant asserts that what a “thing-in-itself” is cannot be known by us, but only that it exists can be known by us?

3. Kant most emphatically disclaims the charge brought against him that his system is idealism; he denies that he is an idealist in the ordinary sense of that term. What, then, is the difference between Berkeley’s idealism, which he calls “Dogmatic” and Kant’s own idealism which he calls “Transcendental” or “Critical”?,

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4. Kant argues, however, that we cannot know the nature of that extra-mental reality; this is his Absolute scepticism. Things are known to us merely as phenomena; this is his Phenomenism.

5. The following are some of his statements in regard to the unknowableness of the "thing-in-itself." "Even if we could see to the very bottom of a phenomenon, it would remain for ever altogether different from the knowledge of the thing by itself". "Even if we could impart the highest degree of clearness to our intuition, we should not come one step nearer to the nature of the objects themselves." "What the objects are by themselves would never become known to us, even through the clearest knowledge of that which alone is given to us, the phenomenon." "It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our senses."

6. But phenomena imply a something which is not phenomenal; for there can be no appearance without something that appears. And Kant⁴⁰⁹ seems to regard the "thing-in-itself" as the correlative of phenomenon when he says: "The transcendental conception of all phenomena in space, is a critical warning that nothing which is seen in space is a thing by itself, nor space a form of things supposed to belong to them by themselves, but that objects by themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call external objects are nothing but representations of our senses, the form of which is space, and the true correlative of which, that is the thing by itself is not known, nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to know anything about it in our daily experience.

7. Unless, therefore, we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the word phenomenon indicates a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself, that is, an object independent of our sensibility.
"Hence arises the concept of a noumenon.

8. This negative service of the concept Noumenon, Kant calls the limitative use of the concept. "The concept of a noumenon is....merely limitative, and intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only."

9. What, then, are the Ideas of the Reason? The answer to this question is given by Kant as follows:- "By Idea I understand the necessary concept of reason to which the senses can supply no corresponding object. The concepts⁴¹⁰ of reason, therefore....are

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transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason, so far as it regards all empirical knowledge as determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very nature of reason, and referring by necessity to the whole use of the understanding. They are, lastly, transcendent, as overstepping the limits of all experience which can never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea."

10. This subjective formal unity is clearly stated by Kant as follows:- "...in the original synthetic unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself, but only that I am." This consciousness that I am, or the proposition I think, to which all mental states are referred is only a formal condition of experience. It is simply "the single and in itself perfectly empty, representation of the I of which we cannot even say that it is a concept, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all concepts. By this I, or he, or it, that is the thing which thinks, nothing is represented, beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts=== x, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept....."

11. Kant defines Idealism to be the doctrine that "the existence of all objects of the external senses is doubtful" on the ground that such "existence cannot be perceived immediately but is only inferred". "It must not be supposed, therefore, that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects⁴¹¹ of the senses: all he does is to deny that it is known by immediate perception, and to infer that we can never become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience whatsoever". And yet Kant recognises three kinds of Idealism: 1. Dogmatic, or Berkeleyan Idealism, which denies the existence of matter because it is irrational to admit its existence. 2. Sceptical or Cartesian Idealism, which doubts the existence of matter, because it is impossible to prove it. 3. Transcendental Idealism, which does not hesitate to admit the existence of matter considered as phenomenon only but not as a "thing-in-itself."

12. "The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure Understanding and Reason there is truth.

13. The reason why Kant applies to his system the term idealism is because he holds with the idealists that "space and time together with all that they contain, are not things

nor quantities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearance of the latter: up to this point he is one in confession with the above idealists.”

“My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special character, in that it subverts the ordinary Idealism, and that through it all cognition a priori, even that of geometry, first receives objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This being the state of the case I could have wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of⁴¹² mine otherwise, but to alter it altogether, was impossible. It may be permitted me, however, in future, as has been above-mentioned, to term it the formal or better still, the Critical Idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from the sceptical Idealism of Descartes.”

These statements of Kant, in which he distinguishes his Critical Idealism from the Sceptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes and from the Dogmatical Idealism of Berkeley, are so precise and clear that there is no need of comment to convince any impartial reader of the “critique” of their differences. They speak for themselves. Therefore, the attempt to interpret Kant as an idealist in the same sense as Berkeley was, is an impossible task. The charge of Schopenhauer, that Kant has abandoned in the second edition his consistent idealistic standpoint by reason of his old age and moral cowardice, is not only groundless, but seems monstrous to any unprejudiced reader of the first and second editions.

So then, the “Critique of Pure Reason” is neither Idealism pure and simple nor Realism pure and simple, but a combination of the two. It agrees with Realism in admitting the existence of matter, but only as a phenomenal reality. Hence it is called Empirical Realism. It agrees with Idealism in maintaining that space and time are merely subjective forms of intuition and not qualities of extra-mental realities. Hence it is called Transcendental Idealism. In short, the Kantian philosophy is what K. Fischer calls “Ideal-Realism” – a via media between Idealism and Realism.

14. By Dogmatism Kant understands the “presumption, that it is possible to make any progress with pure (philosophical) knowledge consisting⁴¹³ of concepts, and guided by principles such as reason has long been in the habit of employing, without first inquiring in what way, and by what right, it has come to possess them. Dogmatism is, therefore, the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without a previous criticism of its own powers.”

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15. "From the inability of reason to employ the principle of causation beyond the limits of experience, Hume inferred the nullity of all the pretensions of reason in her attempts to pass beyond what is empirical."

16. "Scepticism is a resting place of reason, where it may reflect for a time on its dogmatical wanderings, and gain survey of the region where it happens to be, in order to choose its way with greater certainty for the future.

17. "In our system" says Kant, "we need not hesitate to admit the existence of matter on the testimony of mere self-consciousness, and to consider it an established in the same manner as the existence of myself, as a thinking being".

18. These never-ceasing disputes of a purely dogmatical reason compel people at last to seek for rest and peace in some criticism of reason itself, and in some sort of legislation founded upon such criticism."

19. Kant does not try to accomplish this task by combining whatever truths he found in all these opposing systems of thought, but rather, by employing a profound principle which was not recognised by any of them. The question then is: What is that principle which guides him in this irenic attempt? Our answer to this question is that the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena is his leading principle throughout.

20. All I find in me are simply my constantly changing mental states. As such states they require⁴¹⁴ "something permanent, different from them, in reference to which their change and, therefore, my existence in the time in which they change, may be determined.

21. Kant says: "...the fact of my having myself given my theory the name of transcendental idealism can justify no one in confounding it with the idealism of Descartes, — — — or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar cobwebs of the brain our Critique rather contains the best specific. For what is by me termed idealism, does not touch the existence of things (the doubt of the same being what properly constitutes idealism in the opposite sense), for to doubt them has never entered my head, but simply concerns the sensuous presentation of things, to which space and time chiefly belong."

22. What is this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena which, as we have seen, serves as the principle of mediation in the Kantian theory of cognition? Is it a distinction merely in thought or in reality? Is it a logical distinction or a real

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distinction? The right answer to this question is not unessential to the correct interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself", for he is often misapprehended and accused of inconsistency on this point. Such a criticism, however, loses its force when this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena is rightly stated. What then is the distinction? It is evident that the distinction is not that of reality but merely that of thought. For, according to Kant, the Noumenon in a negative sense, is nothing but a problematic, limitative concept, and we cannot know, in the Kantian sense of the term, whether it exists⁴¹⁵ extra-mentally or not. It is a necessary correlate of the phenomenon but this necessity of thought does not in the least prove the necessity of existence. "A real division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world, is therefore, quite inadmissible, although concepts may very well be divided into sensuous and intelligible. No objects can be assigned to noumena, nor can they be represented as objectively valid". The distinction then is not that of the extra-mental existence but that of thought only.

22. It is said against Kant that we cannot draw a hard and fast line between Phenomena and Noumena, and maintain that we know the former but not the latter. They are but two aspects of one and the same reality. We know Noumena by knowing Phenomena.

Now this criticism is true and valid, if Kant holds that we know that the "thing-in-itself" exists though we cannot know what the "thing-in-itself" is. This is not, however, the doctrine of Kant. He does not admit that we know that the "thing-in-itself" exists. All he maintains is that we must think the "thing-in-itself" as existent, since it is the correlate of the phenomenon. In short, the concept "thing-in-itself" is a necessary presupposition of our thought but whether behind every phenomenon there is a somewhat which manifests itself as such phenomena, we can not know; for our intuition is sensuous and not intellectual. Thus if Kant's position is rightly understood, the objection to his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena,—that it is childish attempt to separate entity from its attributes—is removed.

23. Kant's mediating attempt between Idealism and Realism is unsuccessful (K. Fischer: *A Critique of Kant*⁴¹⁶.)

Prof. Bowne aptly says: "Kant's philosophy could not stay where it stopped, but either the realistic or the idealistic factor must be given up. Kant himself certainly thought it possible to retain both, but he combined them so unfortunately that while

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one cannot become a Kantian without being a realist, one cannot remain a Kantian and retain realism" (Bowne's Metaphysics).

The course of the post-Kantian speculation proves the truth of this statement. The idealistic aspect of the Kantian philosophy was developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; the realistic aspect of it was developed by Herbart and his school.

Hence, I shall conclude this investigation with the sagacious remark of Jacobi: "without the supposition of the "thing-in-itself" I cannot enter into the Kantian system, but with that supposition I cannot remain there."

Journal of the Department of Letters of Calcutta University, Vol. XXI, 1931

"SANKARA ON KNOWLEDGE" by S.K. MUKHERJEE.

1. The test of truth according to Samkara is non-contradiction (Gita Bhasya) 2. 16)
2. The distinctions of the subject and the object is also another characteristic of empirical knowledge. We can have no example of empirical knowledge where there is an absence of the subject or the object. Knowledge comes in only when the subject and the object are related. What should the agent know unless there is an object to be known? And how can, on the other hand, the object be known unless there be a subject to know?
3. Samkara has made an extremely sharp distinction between the subject and the object. He⁴¹⁷ definitely warns us against our tendency to make the subject an object of our thought. Try however we may, there is always the subject which baffles our attempt to make it an object of our thought. The reason is simple enough if it is stated, all our experience requires a subject and when we turn our thought over into the subject, we require another subject and so on ad infinitum. In all our thinking the subject is always to be posited. "What we want to know," says Samkara "is the object and not the subject." To make the subject an object of thought is a sheer contradiction. "And if it is a fact," continues Sankara, "that we can know only the object, then the subject can never be known." "As fire cannot burn itself, so the subject cannot know itself as an object."

Sankara in his Taittiriya Bhasya gives another reason which is of a negative character. "Even supposing that the subject can be known, the subject becomes an object, and we have no subject." If every piece of knowledge requires a subject, and if we assume that we know the subject, then an absurdity occurs inasmuch as are to know the subject as an object without there being a subject to know! Nobody can deny that

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knowledge requires a subject, but we are to deny this very first principle of epistemology if we are to make the subject an object of thought.

4. European psychology has laid it down as a condition of knowledge that knowledge is possible only if the sensations are assimilated and discriminated from one another. This assimilation and discrimination show that there can be no knowledge unless sensations or ideas are taken as related. This has, however, been given⁴¹⁸ so great and so exclusive a stress in the Neo-Hegelian School that they have gone to the length of asserting that we know nothing but relations. Green in his Prologomena to Ethics says that, if we “exclude from what we have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find that none are left.”

5. Sankara holds the same opinion and is very clear on the point: “A thing can be understood as this or that,” says he in his Taittiriya Bhasya, “after being compared or discriminated from similars and dissimilars.” “So there is an organ called mind, because if anybody touches my back with hands or legs, I cannot see (whether he touches my back with hands or legs.) but still it is with the help of mind that we can know whether it is hand or leg. Had there been no mind to discriminate between different sense impressions, there would have been no other means of differentiating among them” and concludes “that which discriminates is mind.” To know anything is thus to know it as compared with and contrasted, or in other words as related.

6. Empirical knowledge—or *apara vidya*, as Samkara calls it following the Upanishads—when duly examined makes us feel that our much vaunted knowledge, is after all, a kind of knowledge which cannot show us Brahman, the ultimate reality. “With this lower knowledge” says Dr Urquhart, “we are helpless prisoners and cannot by any means save our soul. We may pass from one experience to another but cannot shake ourselves free from the degradation of the ordinary.” If such be the unfortunate lot of men what hope is there to satisfy our longing to know the truth? If such a question be put to Sankara he would unhesitatingly answer, “Yes, there is hope for us.” He does not, like Kant⁴¹⁹ or Spencer, tell us a Thing-in-itself or an Absolute whose mere existence we know, but which are always unknowable in any other sense. Carlyle compared Kant with one who can conjure up ghosts but cannot drive them, or one who leads another in the Serbonian Bog but cannot lead him out. The remarks are equally applicable to Spencer. Both of them show the defects of empirical knowledge in a thousand and one way and steep us into the sea of agony, from which no rescue is ever

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possible. We are sometimes tempted to ask Kant and Spencer: What good is there in making us wise when ignorance is a bliss? Verily, there is no good in tormenting us with puzzles which we can never solve.

Mayavada by A. Rai Chaudhri

1. Sankara seems to occupy an advantageous position. He can talk any way he likes. He is intelligent enough to admit grades of reality. Paramarthika sutta belongs to Nirguna Brahman only; the God (Saguna Brahman), the world and the jiva have vyavaharika existence; and things experienced in dreams, illusions and hallucinations are real in pratibhasika sense only. He does not deny difference, he only states that it is not real in the ultimate sense.

2. The best analogue of Nirguna Brahman in European philosophy is the Eleatic Being. Following Xenophanes more rationally and rigorously, Parmenides declares that pure simple being is the truth. This being, according to him, is "imperishable, whole and sole, immutable and illimitable, indivisibly and timelessly present, perfectly and universally self-identical;" the illusory ideas of multiplicity and change are totally divorced from it. He next passes on to the discussion of the phenomenal world with the remark that⁴²⁰ truth's discourse is ended and it is only mortal opinion that is to be considered.

3. It was Zeno rather attempted to present dialectically the basis of the Parmenidean conception of being. "If Parmenides maintained that only the one is, Zeno, for his part, polemically showed that there is possible neither multiplicity nor movement because these notions lead to contradictory consequences."

4. Just as a man sees at these different things animals or men in a dram, so the jiva sees all these different persons, different things, as if in a dream.

5. Gaudapada and others would maintain that this world is exactly like the dream-world. As in dream, so also in actual experience. In Mandukya-karika, Gaudapada explains that the world which people call real is no more real than a dream-world. "The only difference is that waking-world seems external, dream world seems internal". Of course this position is quite sound. Bertrand Russel admits that this is a very consistent and logically unassailable position. Dr Prabhu Dutt Sastri writes in the Doctrine of Maya, "Mr F.H. Bradley, the well-known author of "Appearance and Reality" once told us that there could be no difficulty whatever on speculative grounds in holding this position."

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6. “Brilliance” or the element common both to silver and nacre and also some kind of defect, cataract or the like—becomes transformed into the ‘apparent silver’. We may note here that the defect may be of different kinds, e.g. disease of the eye, distance between the perceiver and the perceived thing, insufficient light etc.,

7. The defect of Kant is his failure to rise to the height which Vedanta reaches. The conception of⁴²¹ the personality of God (as the Distributor of good and evil) is perhaps the last vestige of anthropomorphism in Idealistic Philosophy. Vedanta retains all these in the vyavaharika sphere. Try to rise higher and then you will find that the personality of God the problem of good and evil, ethics, religion metaphysics—all sunk.

8. It is perhaps the only system of philosophy which supplies the real basis of morality. Christianity says—“Love thy neighbours as thyself.” Kant writes—“Always treat humanity both in your person and in the person of others, as an end. and never as a means” We ask—Why? The solution of this ‘why’ is satisfactorily given only in the Vedanta. Because all beings are Brahman in their essence or ultimate nature. The principle of advaita or abheda is the basis of morality. Bearing this in mind, we can establish the ‘Kingdom of God’ on earth. How noble is the conception of “vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.” It is not a fantastic dream of the theorist but a noble ideal.

9. If we judge the liberated by worldly laws, “we might be tempted to call them monstrous aberrations from the paths of nature.” If fact, they only are the ‘choice specimens of humanity!

10. Sankara repeatedly says that the paramarthika unreality of the world does not deprive it of its vyavaharika reality. A misunderstanding of this caution has often engendered what may be called the ‘Abuse of Vedantism.’

11. Sankara is a master of the Sanskrit language. In discussing philosophical problems he uses so simple and beautiful Sanskrit that one is reminded of Kalidasa. Moreover, his method of argumentation is simple, clear and forceful.

12. Bergson holds that reality is a continuous flow. Change is the essence of reality. But, according⁴²² to Samkara, persistence is the criterion of reality.

13. Adhikaravada plays an important role in Indian Philosophy. In ancient times the Guru never inculcated the Brahma-vidya to the uninitiated. The learner of the secret doctrines of the Upanishads must, first of all, be an Adhikari. By a careful study of the

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Vedas and by performing the necessary disciplines and nitya and naimittika karmas, the learner becomes purged of all impurities of the mind. To such a man the principles of Brahma-vidya are to be given, otherwise the secret doctrines will be abused by the uninitiated. Brahma-vidya is secret and was kept in confidence among the gurus and the disciples.

14. It is also a psychological fact that all minds are not of the same capacity. All kinds of glass do not reflect the sun exactly the manner. With an open eye to this fact the teacher should instruct his learners.

15. It is this practical aspect of Indian Philosophy which saves it from being merely 'logic-chopping' and 'intellectual jugglery.'

16. Man, confronted with the vast panorama of the world, stands stupefied, mystified and bewildered. After the lapse of this state of mind, he naturally begins to ponder over these questions—What is this world in its ultimate nature? Whence is it? Who am I?. Is there a ruler, a regulator of all these beings and things? Everything in this world is changing—but not without a principle. There is harmony in discordance, unity in multiplicity, uniformity in diversity. This regularity in the midst of change gives rise to metaphysical quest. But this questioning is inherent in man. Really speaking, there can be no such thing as "Origin⁴²³ of philosophy". Man, as man, must philosophise. So, as Dr Stephen puts it, the question is not of philosophy or no philosophy but of a good philosophy and a bad one.

"The Doctrine of Maya" by Prabhu Dutt Shastri in Indian Philosophical Review

1. We maintain that the distinction of the empirical and transcendental standpoints, forms one of the most significant thoughts in the history of philosophical speculation. We are asked to confine ourselves to the knowledge gained from Experience. This is true so far as it goes but it does not go far enough. It is only a kind of preliminary survey of our powers before we take up the study of Metaphysics. Refusal to recognise the transcendental leads to an uncalled for arrest of our thought.

2. A distinction of standpoints, which is an absolutely necessary preliminary to any attempt towards a philosophical synthesis, does not amount to any "shifting" of grounds or points of view.

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3. If the question amount to an enquiry into the cause of the world, then we repeat that the very question is illegitimate. No philosopher of whatever school, can satisfactorily dispose of this question. Mr Sarma insists on an answer, saying that "in all the spheres of thought known to science, the law of causality exercises unquestioned sway and has validity". But need we remind our critic that causality in the Advaita and in Transcendentalism is only a category of thought, whose applicability is limited to experience. It is not derived from experience since it enters into the very organisation of experience. But it applies only to experience, which it cannot transcend. Obviously therefore, it is illegitimate to inquire into the cause of the Universe.

4. We⁴²⁴ should also say that even in the highest forms of "Bhakti" there must be the annihilation of the relation referred to. You can easily experience the annihilation of this relation when you are studying a superb work of art. You can only understand it and admire it truly when your whole personality enters into it: surely the subject-object relation vanishes for those moments.

Review by S. Radhakrishnan of the Idealistic Reaction against Science by Prof. Aliotta in Indian Philosophical Review

1. It is not denied that feeling and will have their own values quite as fundamental as those of intellect; but we cannot reduce the one to the other. In philosophy it is the cognitive attitude that is to be adopted, and not aesthetic contemplation or ethical action. We may philosophise or may not as we please, but when we once enter the game we have to stick to the rules of the game and play it out. It is not sportsmanlike to appeal to the plain man's faith or the ethical needs of the ordinary consciousness.

2. "If everything was subject to change should there not be some subject to perceive the change?"

Review by R.P.P. of "Herbert Spencer" by Hugh Eliot

1. "Study of Sociology" is one of the most brilliant works in the International Scientific Series and is cordially to be recommended to all who wish to acquire a sound habit of thinking on serious problems. In India especially when everybody is apt to think that he is entitled to give an opinion on every subject under the sun et quibusdam aliis Spencer's masterly discussion of⁴²⁵ the various pit falls ought to do good to the young men in a hurry.

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“James Ward’s Pluralistic Theism” by S. Radhakrishnan in Indian Philosophical Review

1. But all this is the statement of the theory and not its proof. When driven to a corner, Ward admits that panpsychism is only a matter of faith. He only proves that there is no such thing as a mere potentiality unrelated to any mind.

2. The idealists are charged with confusing things with thoughts. Whether the idealists are open to this charge or not, Ward is. He dissolves the concreteness of the world into a white blankness. The mystic unity of mind swallows up all differences. While it is important to maintain identity it is equally important to maintain difference. It is useless and unphilosophical to exaggerate or minimise, identity or difference. It is strange that the critic who is vehement in attacking the absolutists for minimising the significance of diversity should himself have succumbed to this temptation.

3. To wipe out the distinctions between the several kinds of reality is an unscientific procedure to which Ward as a psychologist very solicitous about the distinctions of experience has no right.

4. What exists is mind. But science describes its outer surface in terms of mechanism. Nature is something relative and unreal. It is a theoretical construction. The real significance of the world can only be understood in terms of mind. Science may give us laws eminently valuable for purposes of calculation. But it is essentially abstract and hypothetical as it does not⁴²⁶ give us an account of real concrete experience. The distinction of persons and things which we know to be real in the world of experience is dissolved by Ward in a dead unity of life.

5. Is Ward faithful to this experience which also tells us that physical nature is a reality? When he dismisses the physical as relative and unreal, his ideal is not fidelity to experience but speculative consistency. And if this ideal requires the absolutist to consider the world of plurality by itself to be not the final truth, why attack him? He is but following the impulse of logic which, Ward well knows, sometimes over rides the testimony of experience.

The Multiple Authorship of The Vedanta Sutras by S.K. Belvalkar in I.P.R.

“THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA” by Prabhu Dutt Shastri in Indian Philosophical Review

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1. I have proposed to myself in this paper the thankless task of delivering a few strokes of the hammer against a literary fact which all have been hither to content to accept as a fact.

Review on Plato and Platonism by Walter Pater, by S.V. Mukerjee

1. In a series of pen-pictures he shows us a procession of figures—each lighted up by some characteristic phrase—all vivid with the glow which Pater alone can give. Heraclitus, with his doctrine of flux—so symbolical of the ‘impetuous spring-tide of Greek history’, Parmenides preaching his ‘arid formula of Pure Being in the midst of the busy, already complicated life of Elea;’ Pythagoras, that dim shadowy figure with the dust of his “Golden Verses”, son of Apollo, ‘the twilight, attempered, Hyperborean Apollo, like⁴²⁷ the sun in Lapland;’ Socrates himself, “rude and rough as some failure of his own sculptor’s workshop”, yet with a compelling fascination that attracted to him all the opulent youth—the jeunesse dores- of Athens, Alcibiades, Aristophanes and shy Charmides, most beautiful of them all,—they pass before us in a bright panorama.

2. Pater however was hankering after final harmony, seeking to trace the mystery of beauty back from the individual to ‘the primal emotion.’. Somebody has said that he was a philosopher who had gone to Italy by mistake instead of to Germany. But he had gone to Italy and returned disappointed; and his intellectual craving was for seeking some refuge from his own “tyrannical impulses” some satisfying synthesis, behind the chaos of change and turmoil. And he thought he found it in Plato.

But the analogy must end here. The chasm between the ancient and modern temper is too deep to be bridged over by mere individual resemblances. Pater himself has in this book expressed this contrast finally for all time: “The scepticism of the modern world, beset now with insane speculative figments, has been an appeal from the preconceptions of the understanding to the authority of the senses. With the Greeks, whose metaphysic business was then still all to do, the sceptical action of the mind lay rather in the direction of an appeal from the affirmations of sense to the authority of newly awakened reason.”

Review of “Structure and Growth of Mind” by W. Mitchell, by A.E. Wadia in I.P.R.

1. He distinguishes complete absorption from aesthetic contemplation although the two are very⁴²⁸ often confounded together. Complete absorption results when we are

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lost in a certain activity in all its aspects while aesthetic contemplation does not involve such a complete absorption.

2. There is a world of difference in the spirit with which things are taken for granted by the educated and the illiterate and this is a point of considerable importance for educational purposes. Thus the problem is to bring pupils over the old course without needless delay, but so that they may arrive at thoughts with the same virile understanding as the pioneers who first made them.

3. Education, especially in India, is too often taken to stand merely for a mass of facts and figures, and too little for that alertness of intellect, which is the truest criterion of a really educated man. Facts and figures become useful in so far as they tend to produce that intellectual zest which has marked the highest human intellect. Hence the difference between "general intelligence" and "general information" is very vital. It is certainly possible for a teacher to make things so clear that his pupils understand him easily but fail to manifest that curiosity, which is the prerogative of an intellectual being. Such a teacher is often styled successful, but there is a weakness in him most detrimental to the interests of real education. On the other hand it would be easy for a teacher to make himself so unintelligible as to make his pupils lose all interest in the subject. Hence the problem is to teach in such a way as to produce understanding together with intelligence. The secret of a successful character is a perfect organisation of all our faculties.

Review⁴²⁹ on "Philosophy of Loyalty" by Josiah Royce. by A.K. Trivedi in I.P.R.

Prof. Royce's whole analysis of loyalty is tersely and impressively summed up when he says: "Whenever a cause, beyond your private self, greater than you are,—a cause social in its nature and capable of limiting into one the wills of various individuals, a cause at once personal and, from the purely human point of view, super personal,— whenever, I say, such a cause so arouses your interest that it appears to you worthy to be served with all your might, with all your soul, with all your strength, then this cause awakens in you the spirit of loyalty. If you act out this spirit, you become, in fact, loyal."

Review on J. Welton's "Groundwork of Logic" by T.M.D.

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Of all the branches of Philosophy, Logic still bears the stamp of Scholastic thought very clearly and has always been loathe to break with its traditional ways and keep in line with other branches of Philosophy.

Presidential Address of first Annual Meeting of Indian Philosophical Association by Father Goodier

1. If there is one characteristic more conspicuous than another in the thought of our present generation it is the desire, growing more and more, for unity of mind and heart, among men.. The politics of the world are proof of it; the very war in which we are engaged illustrates it; religion on every side looks at religion and asks itself what it has in common with its neighbour.

2. Men are growing tired of the constant wrangling of rival schools; on the other they have passed the age when they thought that difference in⁴³⁰ opinion meant difference between right and wrong. They have come to see that two men may differ and yet each may be right in his degree.

3. The world has suddenly come together; the West has discovered the mentality of the East and the East has discovered the mentality of the West; each is conscious that it sees life and truth from a different angle, and each is feeling its way towards the understanding of the other; knowing well that when this perfect understanding is reached, when the one can express itself fully in the terms of the other, then we shall have reached another epoch in the progress of man.

4. By careful definitions, by synthesis and analysis of these definitions, we hope to come to that hinterland of understanding, where, we believe all thought is one. And by that means to arrive at a broad and a deeper understanding of truth as it is in itself.

I do not know what greater aim a student can have than this, nor do I know any study which is likely to produce more lasting results.

A.G. WIDGERY'S ANNUAL REPORT; When it is remembered that neither the Association nor the Review aim at being popular at the expense of scholarship, this is a creditable number for the first year.

"Eastern Religion vs. Western Civilization" By C.E.M. Joad in The Aryan Path Magazine

The decay of religious belief in the Western world is notorious, and I propose to take it for granted. There is now growing to maturity a generation of men and women

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to whom organised religion in the traditional sense is meaningless. They do not subscribe to its dogmas with regard to the supernatural government of the universe, nor do they seriously endeavour⁴³¹ to live the kind of life which it enjoins. Their scepticism is instinctive. It is not merely that the modern Western mind rejects this or that description of the supernatural world, or this or that explanation of the point and purpose of existence; it denies the existence of any world other than that which is known to the senses, and fails to recognise any purpose beyond the immediate purposes of daily life.

That this world is not in itself such as to satisfy our aspirations, or this life such as to invest the business of existence with significance, is unfortunately obvious. It follows that the modern Westerner tends to be cynical and indifferentist, and looking upon life as a pointless adventure in a meaningless universe, finds the rationale of existence in the satisfaction of his tastes and appetites. Where everything is uncertain, the doctrine of "let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die" at once concrete and definite, is eagerly embraced. The future being unknown, it is the part of wisdom to make the most of the present that we know.

"CONSTRUCTIVE SIDE OF BUDDHISM" by MASATOSHI GENSEN MORI. (1) Buddhism has only too often been interpreted negatively and has thereby been exposed to a charge of unfitness for an age of progress. It has been accused of pessimism and fatalism, love of passivity, and everything else unsuitable for an era of international competition.

2. But it is not fair to insinuate that this religion is opposed to progress or science, or that it is essentially negative in its attitude towards life.

"Let us Disarm" in Aryan Path (Editorial)

At the present hour there are many who⁴³² think of soul-life in terms of a strong personal life. Egotism made more subtle and so much more powerful; the senses quickened into more varied action and into self-expression which means heightened sensuousness the brain-mind sharpened to outwit its fellows;—these are thought to be the marks of a spiritual man. On the other hand there is an equally false notion prevalent, that to throw away objects of possession—even things of beauty and utility—and to plunge into simplicity denotes the up springing of the spirit in man. To eat or

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desist from eating certain kinds of food; to wear or desist from wearing a certain style of dress – these and other bodily and outer practices are no signs of soul-pulsation than a life in which license to the senses is fully accorded. Both are snares and delusions into which, according to the temperament of each, men and women fall.

Soul-life is neither an enjoyment of sense-life, more a loathing of the things of the world. The simple life is not a life without possessions, but one in which all possessions become objects of trust, and each is valued at the right figure.

“UNRECOGNISED THEOSOPHISTS” by Lionel Hawthorne: Emerson was not blind to the effect that modern science would have upon the religious thought of his day. He foresaw the conflict between religion and science, and prophesied that the new ideas of science would strike at the very roots of religious dogmas. The narrow sectarian cannot read astronomy with impunity. The creeds of his Church shrivel like dried leaves at the door of his church.

“Religious⁴³³ Tendency in Japan” by E.E. Speight

We should no more take isolated utterances of Japanese recluses or poets as typical of Japanese humanity than we should choose the more beautiful of the lyrical passages of Tulsi Das or Tuka Ram as typical of Indian religious thought, or Henry Vaughan’s mystical poetry as characteristically English. Nowhere is hasty generalization more dangerous than when applied to Japan.

ARYAN PATH Editorial: – Dr Bernard Hollander spoke recently on what may be summed up as the necessity for mind-control, at the British Phrenological Congress. He said: “The insane we can restrain, but not the far greater number of semi-insane and borderlane insane.”

2. Col. Lynch deploras that the British Medical profession should have favoured Freud’s theories without realising their danger to the younger generation and concludes in the significant way: “His work is not a scientific exposition at all. Freud does not begin at an intelligible base and thence conduct a consecutive argument to valid conclusions. He ignores the elements of the true psychology. On the other hand, he luxuriates in suggestive description of sex matters which have nothing to do either with psycho-analysis or anything else in the field of thought. That is his strong point; he has no other.

“He talks nonsense on every separate branch of the subject on which he has written. Scientifically, he works on dreams, on memory, on the Oedipus Complex, on the ‘Unconscious Mind’ are contemptible. He redeems all that, and redresses the balance for his admirers, with his spicy, and often nonsensical talk on sex. His works

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are pernicious for young minds; but in my⁴³⁴ opinion, the worst evil is the effect of sheer stultification he produces on serious students who believe that in reading Freud they are studying science, and who, through faulty education, cannot discriminate between the dross and the pure metal of thought.

“The medical faculty is deplorably ill-educated in these matters. Its lack of adequate education is largely to blame for the fact that a man such as Freud, who has made no appeal on scientific grounds, but has been carried on a wave of popular interest, and puffed into prominence by ‘booming’ publishers, should stand forth as a figure of note even in a scientific domain which should be sacred – psychology. Against so gross an outrage upon science, scientific method, clearness of thought and public welfare I raise my hand in emphatic protest.”

A Glance at H.P.B’s “Secret Doctrine” by HU

You must perform two interior acts of great consequence if your study is spiritually to benefit you, and through you, others. You must first disencumber your mind of much, or most, or all, of its mental furniture and impediments, your pet ideas, your sentiments, aye, even your beliefs learnt at your mother’s knee. All these you must be prepared to cast overboard. A few of them may, it is true, be worth salvaging – time alone will show. The second act is this: you must be prepared to abandon all fear and with unbreakable moral courage to enter a new world, a world of new ideas, new conceptions, strange, startling, mind-shaking.

“The⁴³⁵ Symbol of the Serpent” by G.T. Shastri

1. From the Druids to the Incas, from the Hindus to the Mexicans, the Serpent-symbol seems to have been used primarily to represent Supreme Wisdom and to designate those highly evolved men who embodied that Wisdom.

2. The regenerative power in Nature, which destroys worn-out forms in order to build statelier mansions for the soul, finds an expression in the power of the serpent to renew its strength and vigour by casting off its old skins.

3. The circle formed by a serpent swallowing its own tail is one of the most suggestive forms of this symbol. At the same time it presents a truly philosophical concept⁴³⁶ of eternity without beginning as well as without end. It also forms a picture of the unending law of cycles under which all evolution proceeds, and shows how

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⁴³⁶ The original editor corrected spell “concept” by hand

periods of non-manifestation follow periods of manifestation as night follows day. One of the most ancient books on occult learning—the Siphrah Dzeniouta—compares the evolution of the Universe to a serpent unwinding its coils.

4. Many Egyptian names are derived from the word Aphe—meaning serpent—and it is interesting to note that the very title of the Egyptian kings—Pharaoh—is a compound of Phrah or Ra, the Sun, and Aphe, the Serpent. This clearly points to a time in Egyptian history when temporal and spiritual power was united in the great King Indicates who ruled that land.

The Pharaohs, as will be remembered, wore high bonnets terminating in a ball, the whole being surrounded by figure of asps. The hooded snake adorning the King's head-gear was⁴³⁷ not only a badge of royalty but an indication of his power.

5. The Sanskrit word Naga means literally serpent, and was a name used to designate certain wise men who were venerated for their profound learning and great virtue.

6. Gautama, the Buddha, traced his lineage through the Serpent line of Kings, who dwelt in Magadha, and tradition points to certain Nagas who attended him at birth. In Buddhistic drawings the hooded snake appears above his head, while in some of the Amravarti designs in the British Museum the serpent actually occupies the place usually assigned to the Buddha himself.

In China these wise men were called “Dragons”, the word meaning “the being who excels in intelligence”. Speaking of the “Yellow Dragon”, the Twan-ying-t'u says: “His wisdom and virtue are unfathomable.”

7. The serpent became the symbol of evil only during the dark days of the middle ages.

“Conceptual knowledge is impossible without the subject-object series”...A. Rai Chaudhuri.

“Object of horror or of adoration, men have for the serpent an implacable hatred, or prostrate themselves before its genius.” – De. Chateaubriand.

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Speaking of education and the young—the undergraduates and the new graduates of America have spoken their minds. The New Republic (New York) publishes The Students Speak Out, a symposium from 22 colleges. The general verdict is reported to be against⁴³⁸ grades and degrees, against lectures and text-books and against professors and their ways, and in favour of small groups, of the Socratic method, of thrashing out problems. One boy or girl in every eight goes to college, but the large size college-factories and mass production of labelled graduates is severely objected to in this volume. Will America be the first to think of the old world method where the guru gathered a few under his roof and taught the youngsters what the soul was?

“The Old Doctrine of Maya and Modern Science” by Ivor B. Hart in Aryan Path

1. The problem of Maya at different stages in the philosophical evolution of Ancient India the significance of the term underwent modification. Now it signified “illusion” – then “magic” – and then again “deception.”
2. The implication is that plurality, as for example, conceptions of proximity in space, succession in time, interdependence of cause and effect, contrast of subject and object, therefore has no reality in the ultimate sense. The Atman, or Brahman (soul, self, God) is the sole reality. Know the Atman and all is known. The appearance of reality and change presented by Nature is mere Maya – illusion.
3. Picture, then, the Indian sages of old, pondering in their jungle solitudes upon the evidences of continual change and transience of “the heavens, the earth and all that in them is.” They see in life a perpetual flow. They witness an ever-moving world, into which beings come, out of which beings pass. How can these things be real, since that alone is real that neither passes into being nor passes out of being, but simply is? What is⁴³⁹ there that lasts and which alone therefore has reality? Seek that, know that, and you find the Brahman, the pure ultimate reality out of which, in its union with the illusory Maya, proceeds the ever changing cosmical illusion of a world of semblances – a world of countless modes of life, continually replacing each other, bringing fleeting pleasure tinged with pain, or pain tinged with pleasure, and producing its round of births, deaths, movement, change and so on.

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4. One does not need to be a student of philosophy to know that the great Kant, in his enquiry into the capabilities of the human intellect, in his turn came to the conclusion that the universe is Maya – that it is appearance only, and not reality. Our philosophers are still seeking for the first principles of life and of the universe. Some seek it deliberately, others by implication. Among the latter we may include our modern scientists. Time was when science was philosophy and philosophy was science. There was no distinction between them. The divorcement came at the time of the Renaissance of Learning in Western Europe, and it endured almost to the beginning of the 20th century. Now there are signs of a reuniting of forces and the philosophers, who were frankly ignorant as to the facts of modern science, are now seeking to embrace these facts within their ken; whilst on the other hand the more broad-minded of our great scientists of to-day are frankly enquiring as to the philosophical implications of their own researches. The new physics and chemistry of the 20th century, with its revolutionary flood of new light on the constitution of matter and the structure of⁴⁴⁰ the atom, and its new theories of time and space, are providing more and more evidence as to the illusory nature of our objective world such as gives added pertinence to the doctrine of Maya of Ancient India.

5. The very isolation of each human entity from his fellows is surely significant enough in itself as a claim for the inevitableness of Maya. The perception of “awareness” is essentially individualistic. The measure of A’s awareness of the quality of “yellowness”, for instance, in a coloured object can in no way whatever be related to that of B; and the modern philosopher frankly recognises the truth of this. He agrees, for example, that clear ideas, however specific and definite they may be, are nevertheless not necessarily trustworthy. Doubt seems impossible, yet doubt there must be. For while outer evidences cannot take logical account of inner experiences, yet inner experiences are of the every essence of human life, and cannot be ignored by the true philosopher. Modern science brings us continually up against evidences of the old Doctrine of Maya. Your biological chemist may take a living plant in his laboratory, determined to discover of what it is composed. He may analyse it down to its last grain. He may prove up to the hilt that it contains so many grains of this, so many of that, and so many of the other. But he cannot synthesise these constituents back to the living plant. The veil of Maya obscures the knowledge of that vital force which is lacking to give life to the combination.

6. Mankind is left standing in the dark. For one thing is surely definite to us all, namely, that the universe and the ultimate truth beyond it, is anything but a mere aggregate of natural laws and mathematical equations. Nor, on⁴⁴¹ the other hand, can it

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satisfy us to believe that the reality and purpose of existence can be explained by a gamut of sounds, sights and other sensations. One man may describe an object in front of him as a thin flat circular sheet of copper, $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter, and brownish red in tint; while another will speak of it as a material object occupying two-dimensional space according to the equation $16x^2+16y^2=25$ (expressed in rectangular co-ordinates with the centre of the object as the origin); that it is built up of molecules of a substance of atomic weight 63.57, with an atomic structure of electrons and protons on a stated pattern; that it exhibits a colour scheme to the observer in accordance with an absorption of electro-magnetic waves of such and such a range of wave-lengths; and so on. Each is describing the object according to his notions of accuracy and exactness. Yet the one is probably no nearer the ultimate truth than the other. We may express it, as indeed Kant taught it, thus: that precise, detailed, organised Knowledge does not give the real nature of things as they are. The real world escapes our Knowledge.

But possibly the most striking evidence of the strong link between the old doctrine of Maya and modern science is seen in the recent revolution in the conception of time and space embraced in the relativity theories of Einstein and others. Up to the beginning of the present century, it was generally taken for granted that there is only one time and only one space, and that these, both time and place, are completely alike everywhere in the universe. We know how, thanks to the brilliant researches of⁴⁴³ our leading physicists of to-day, that this is hopelessly incorrect. Our visual outlook on the universe is mere Maya.

We can well illustrate it by the following example. We on the earth P may hold up a square for the inspection of the inhabitant of another world Q in one of our neighbouring stars, and lo and behold, he tells us that it is a rectangle we are showing him, with sides in the ration of a:b. He in his turn now holds up a square for inspection, and we assure him that the delusion is his, and that he is showing us a rectangle whose sides are as a:b. We both appeal to a seemingly impartial umpire who inhabits yet a third globe R, and we each hold up our respective squares for his inspection and decision; and behold our joint chagrin! For he tells us we are both wrong. Not only are we neither of us holding up squares, but the dimensions of P's so-called square areas a:c, whilst those of Q's so-called square are as a:d. We tell R we do not believe him, and we ask him to show us what he considers to be a square. He smilingly obliges, and what happens? With great indignation we each repudiate R's suggestion that he is showing us a square. We of the earth say it is a rectangle of sides in the ration of a:c, and Q says it is a rectangle of sides in the ratio of a:d. And clearly an appeal to the inhabitants of yet a fourth globe would only make confusion more confounded.

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⁴⁴² The original editor corrected equations " $16x^2+16y^2$ " by hand

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We are unable in the space of this article, to attempt an exposition of the modern doctrine of relativity with a view to offering an explanation of the foregoing as one of its consequences. Such readers as are not familiar with the theory of relativity must seek elsewhere for details. We can but point to the facts in so far⁴⁴⁴ as they bear on our subject, and these at least are perfectly clear. They afford nothing more or less than a triumphant vindication of the Old Doctrine of Maya. The trend of modern science demonstrates this more and more clearly as time goes on.

Nevertheless nothing can remove the fact that the quest for ultimate truth must be maintained.

Let us, then, like Indian sages of old, continue, by research and by meditation to ponder on life and its mysteries and its illusions, and strive to separate out the Brahman from the Maya in our quest for eternal truth and reality.

For further elucidation refer to the following passages of H.P. Blavatsky's SECRET DOCTRINE: I.274, I.295-6, I. 39-40 & I. 329-30.

E. Denison Ross (in A.P.)

While Western Scholars are devoting energy and money to the unravelling of the ancient past, the people to whom that past belongs are using every endeavour to learn the secret of Western progress. If we have revealed the past to the Hindus and the Muslims we must remember that the result of such revelations may act differently on different men. While some may take the view that their glorious past is to be accounted for them as a great asset in their place in the world and fills them with legitimate pride, others may resent the work of Orientalists, feeling that they wish to be altogether rid of the past and only to look to the future.

2. Nevertheless, there are many Hindus and Muslims who have shown themselves eager to take their part in the researches initiated by⁴⁴⁵ Western Orientalists, and with such men the awakening of a reverence for the past does not blind them to the possibilities of national progress.

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B. Aschner in (A.P.)

(Dr Bernhard Aschner, of Vienna, is eminent as a pioneer of a new-old system of medicine whereby modern technical experience is combined with old and exotic medical science. In fact, he may be called a modern disciple of Paracelsus. Indeed, he is editing a monumental edition of that great 16th century genius in modern German, two vols of a thousand pages each having been published in 1926 and 1928, and three more being in preparation)

1. Only a few doctors make use of this method as a treatment which they keep secret. In my book, Die Krise der Medizin (The Crisis in Medicine), all these remedies and methods are described exactly and every doctor can easily learn them.
2. We find ourselves to-day in a mental crisis such as there was during his time, when the discovery of America, the Reformation, the rise of natural science in opposition to the official scholastic science of the Middle Ages, took place as great intellectual and historical revolutions.
3. Just as at that time man was no longer regarded as the sole purpose of nature but as part of the combined universe, so we also, stimulated by the electromagnetic theory of light, are again seeking connection with the cosmos.

Mr H.W.R. in (A.P.)

1. Once again, heredity confirms my conviction in reincarnation. Without it, I could not understand or explain either the justice or the purpose of my inheritance, bodily, temperamental or intellectual.

I⁴⁴⁶ have seen enough spendthrifts born of misers fools born of intelligent couples, and vice versa. Atavism perplexes no more when the light of reincarnation falls on it.

A.R. Wadia (in A.P.).

Modern civilisation in this is undoubtedly superior to anything that East or West produced in the preceding ages. We are no champions of Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of the loin-cloth, and we ourselves see in the mechanisms of to-day a wonderful manifestation of human power and genius.

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2. Human life is a great co-operative venture. That is why it is necessary for every civilisation not merely to look ahead – prospicere – but to look back – respicere – for the past is both a warning born of experience, and an incentive, for the Spirit is not and cannot be content with what is or has been.

Ex. Freudian. (in A.P.)

Concepts of gods, devils and what nots are razed to the ground, and the released energy, in many cases, is capable of disintegrating the organism by the denouement it entails..

H.D. Sethna: review on The Problem of Time by J. Alexander Gunn (George Allen & Unwin Ltd)

The two traditional explanations of the meaning of time, as Mr Gunn points out, are the Absolute and the relational theories, the former having come down to us from the work of Newton and the latter from that of Leibniz. The Absolute theory claims that there is something called time which exists apart from events and which is characterised by a succession of separate moments. The Relational theory asserts that it is just a relation born out of succession of events. But both these theories, Mr Gunn tells us, cannot be held to be valid. To conceive of a something radically⁴⁴⁷ separate from the events is to render the relationship between the latter impossible, for if we try to bridge the separation between any two events and that something called time, an infinite number of relations will spring up between these events and time, and the result is that the events will never be connected at all! On the other hand, to conceive of time whose existence wholly consists of being a relation between events, is on the very face of it absurd, for in order that any thing should exist, say the time-relation, it must exist in time, and if that is so, time cannot be the relation only.

Thus the two traditional theories of time cannot be justifiably held. The only method to realise the true nature of time is to understand it as it is actually found in our experience. Kant was the first in Western philosophy to indicate this to us. But, as Mr Gunn points out, in investigating time as it is found in our experience, philosophers have been led away to identify the latter with the subjective process of thought.

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The veteran scientist J. Arthus Thomson, contributes a remarkable article on “The New World of Science”. It is a masterly review of past achievements, fair to the dead materialism which, he says, “was largely a superstition”, and which in the last decades of the 19th century was in fashion. He also records the death of “the old view of science as a kind of bed-rock of knowledge which has the last word to say about everything, the one and only right way to reality. Science has no such exalted metier.” In reading this record we are able to see the theosophizing of the scientist’s attitude; and the humble admission that “science is a particular way of looking⁴⁴⁸ at the world, but It is not the only way,” reveals once again the greatness of mind of a true scientist. Prof. Thomson rightly takes credit for the gifts science has made to mankind, but cautions his readers that what science deals with “are What, Whence, How. But it declines to ask the question Why? For it is not its business—that is, not in the line of its methods of descriptive analysis—to inquire into the purpose or significance of the evolving world as a whole.” He concedes that pertains to the domain of philosophy.

Dr Mulk Raj Anand on Clemenceau Ideas:⁴⁴⁹ (in Aryan Path)

1. What is the truth Clemenceau has told us? The answer to this question is simple. Away with ideas, metaphor and imagery, embrace the hard and stern facts of the universe with science.
2. “Birth is the continuation of an ordained interplay of energies in perpetual flux and change. “Life” is the sensation of an imaginary permanence amid the elusive whirl of things. “Death is” to continue forever eternally changing forms.”
3. Science has no presuppositions. Scientists, therefore, need not be questioned as to whether the universe is coherent or incoherent. The generalisations of religion are the product of dreams and hallucinations. The ideals which speculative metaphysics keeps on building up are the last attempts of drowning men to clutch a straw in order to keep afloat while they are being tossed and buffeted by the waves on the heavy sea of existence. Metaphysics is really the consequential abuse of terminology expressly invented for the purpose. Systems built on the insecure foundations of imagination, Clemenceau thinks with⁴⁵⁰ almost Human scepticism, shun the daylight, while science standing on the firm rock of reason invites criticism and contradiction.

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⁴⁴⁹ The original editor inserted “ON Clemenceau Ideas:” by hand

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4. Mysticism is a good thing for lazy people who have a fantastic contempt of struggling for truth. For himself he would rather choose the process of intellectual analysis. He would seek logical proofs for every particle of the knowledge of reality gained by man. The generality of mankind, however, are inclined to prefer the easy-going method of belief.

Those who seek emotional peace, order, uniformity, truth, in the inspirations of poetry, mysticism, religion, will not turn to Clemenceau. He is for the stubborn realist who can go doggedly and persistently searching for truth even though he knows he will never find it. He is not for the man who cannot face an ideal, who cannot free himself from the shackles of slavery to his environments, who is for ever groping in the dark abysses of existence.

Ivor B. Hart (in Aryan Path)

1. Modern physics develops apace, and with this somewhat irritating characteristic – that rapidity of progress tends to carry the physicist beyond the bounds of simple interpretation. Familiar as everybody is with the name of Einstein and the phrase “relativity”, the doctrine underlying that phrase remains with the comprehension of a lucky few. The reason is not far to seek. Einstein and his fellow-workers have brought us up against four-dimensional space, and we find it hard to realise what this means. We have lived our lives and have inherited from our forbears and are bringing up our children in the three-dimensional manner.

2. The two great features on the development of modern physics are undoubtedly the doctrine of relativity and the theory of quanta.

“Indian Realism”⁴⁵¹ by Jadunath Sinha

1. I have incidentally compared the Yogacara subjectivism with the idealism of Berkeley and the sensationism of Hume, and briefly noted resemblances and differences between them. I venture to say, Berkeleyan idealism cannot claim the thoroughness and metaphysical acumen of the Buddhist idealism, which preceded it by at least one thousand years.

2. The Yogacara, like Berkeley, cuts off the objects. He believes in the theory of immediacy of perception. We immediately perceive cognitions which apprehend themselves (svayamvedana). There are no external objects independent of cognitions. Similarly, Berkeley argues: “What are the fore-mentioned (sensible) objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or

sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?" G.A. Johnston states his doctrine thus: "Berkeley insists that if the thing is itself perceptible, there is no need of intermediate ideas to relate it to the percipient subject, for the thing itself is immediately presented to the percipient, and is accordingly, in Berkeley's terminology, itself an idea. In perception, then, we have only two factors, the percipient subject and the idea-thing perceived." Thus the Yogacara agrees with Berkeley in holding the presentative theory of perception in the same manner.

3. The identity of the object and its cognition is inferred from simultaneous perception of them. Whenever we perceive an object (e.g. blue), we perceive also the cognition of the object (e.g. cognition of blue) at the same time. Hence the object must be identical with its cognition. The⁴⁵² apparent difference between them is an illusion like the appearance of the double moon. The cause of this illusion is a beginningless and uninterrupted series of subconscious impressions of difference (bhedavasana). Though there is no real distinction between subject and object in consciousness, it appears to be differentiated into subject and object owing to illusion; the duality of subject and object is as illusory as the appearance of the double moon.

We find a similar argument in Yogavasistha. The subconscious impressions of difference (bhedavasana) due to nescience are imbedded in the mind. So different objects are presented to the mind like the illusion of the double moon owing to the revival subconscious impressions of different objects perceived in the past, which have their root in nescience. The mind perceives a jar, a cloth, and the like under the influence of subconscious impressions of difference. The variety of cognitions is due to the variety of subconscious impressions which spring from nescience. It is not due to the variety of external objects. The manifold world of objects is a mere construction of the mind; and what is a mere construction of the mind is unreal and unsubstantial. The being of the world is nothing but the being of the mind; the being of the world is only mental.

The Yogacara believes in neither the permanent soul nor the external objects. He believes only in a self-subsistent series of momentary cognitions with no permanent spiritual substance behind them, and with no external objects as their causes. He is an uncompromising sensationist like Hume and J.S. Mill.

4. Berkeley also does not abolish the distinction between the real and the imaginary, though he⁴⁵³ reduces external objects to ideas of the mind. He recognizes a distinction between the two within the contents of consciousness.

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5. The realist believes that sensations are produced in the mind by physical objects. The Yogacara and Berkeley both deny this. Berkeley holds that sensations are produced in the finite minds of God according to fixed laws. The Yogacara does not believe in God. He holds that sensations arise somehow from within the mind; the variety of sensations is due to the variety of subconscious impressions imbedded in the mind. He does not recognize any extra-mental source of sensations. He is a thorough going subjectivist. The Yogacara differs with Berkeley on another point. He does not recognise even the reality of the soul. He regards the so-called soul as a series of momentary impressions, ideas, and feelings. He agrees with Hume in his conception of the soul.

6. Aliota says in explaining Mach's Philosophy: "The difference between the illusory image and the perception of the real is one of practical order only: the most fantastic dream is just as much a fact as any other, and if dream images were more coherent, more normal, and more stable, they would be even greater practical importance to us." (The Idealistic Reaction against Science. P.58).

7. The Yogacara neither believes in the external world nor in God. So he cannot trace sensations to either. He must find their origin in the stream of consciousness itself, for he does not believe in the permanent self. He finds the origin of sensations within the psychic continuum in subconscious impressions (*vasana*). The variety of sensations is due to the variety of subconscious impressions. The Yogacara doctrine may be compared with Hume's sensationism.⁴⁵⁴ Hume also does not account for sensations by the hypothesis of God or external material objects. In fact, he does not seek to account for them. Discrete and unconnected sensations are the given element in our knowledge. Hume tries to connect them with one another by appealing to the subjective laws of association, the law of similarity, the law of contiguity, and the law of cause and effect. Thus Hume accounts for the connection among ideas by the laws of association, whereas the Yogacara accounts for sensations by subconscious impressions. The Yogacara is a more thorough-going subjectivist than Hume. Sensations are the causes of subconscious impressions. But how subconscious impressions can be the cause of sensations passes one's comprehension. The Yogacara believes with Hume that sensations and ideas are discrete and unconnected. When *b* is in the field of consciousness *a* has gone out of it, and *c* has not yet come into it. Thus *a*, *b*, and *c* are discrete and momentary. There is no permanent self to connect them with one another. But the Yogacara believes that *a* leaves behind a trace (*vasana*) *a'* before passing out of the field of consciousness, and this trace *a'* modifies the sensation *b*, and similarly *b* leaves behind its trace *b'* which modifies the next sensation *c*, and so on. Thus the Yogacara makes the hypothesis of subconscious impressions (*vasana*) and their

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transference to succeeding psychoses (vasanasamkrama) to account for the connection among discrete momentary sensations and ideas.

8. The Yogacara holds that a cognition is self-luminous: it manifests itself: it is self-aware. There is no real distinction of subject and object within it. It is not related to itself as subject and object. It is one and undivided. It⁴⁵⁵ is free from distinction of subject and object. The Yogacara differs from Berkeley on this point. The Yogacara holds that a cognition apprehends itself: it is by its very nature self-aware. But Berkeley holds that the self, which is a permanent, active, spiritual principle, perceives an idea. The self is a thing entirely distinct from ideas, "wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived." Berkeley recognizes the reality of spirits and ideas. The Yogacara recognizes the reality of ideas alone. He regards the self as a stream of consciousness.

9. The modern new realist also offers a similar criticism of Descartes and Locke's representative theory of perception. According to this theory, "the mind never perceives anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or states. What we perceive is held to be only a picture of what really exists." This leads to an absurd consequence. "The only external world is one that we can never experience, the only world that we can have any experience of is the internal world of ideas. When we attempt to justify the situation by appealing to inference as the guarantee of this unexperienceable externality, we are met by the difficulty that the world we infer can only be made of the matter of experience, that is, can only be made up of mental pictures in new combinations." Thus representationism leads to phenomenalism.

10. Dr J.E. Turner also criticises critical realism in a similar manner. "The physical thing and the psychical state...are unquestionably to and mutually independent...The knower is confined to the datum, and can never⁴⁵⁶ literally inspect the existent...We have no power of penetrating to the object itself and intuiting it immediately. On the other hand, we can 'immediately intuit' the sensation. 'You can turn your attention to the mere sensation of light or heat...you can consider them in themselves.

11. Santaraksita says: "The cognition of an object is non-distinct from the cognition of cognition. They are not different from each other. The cognition of blue is non-distinct from the cognition of the cognition of blue." Kamalasila makes it more clear. He emphatically says: "There is one and the same cognition of the cognized object (jneya) and of the apprehending cognition (jnana). The cognition of a cognition is the

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very same as the cognition of the object. The cognition of the object also is the same as the cognition of its cognition.”

12. Descartes and Locke are advocates of representationism. Descartes affirms the independent existence of matter as distinguished from mind. But matter is not directly perceived; it is only causally inferred. Adventitious ideas are modes of mind caused by matter. So the existence of matter is inferred from them. Locke holds that ideas are signs of things, and from ideas we infer things. We directly perceive ideas, and infer the existence of physical objects from them. Representationism is based on the causal notion of perception.

13. It may be asked why we should admit the reality of ideas alone, since we do perceive external objects which are quite unlike our ideas. The Yogacara replies that the existence of external objects cannot be proved. He asks: What⁴⁵⁷ do we perceive in the perception of the so-called external object? It is either the form of the internal cognition, or the form of the external object, or both. If we perceive both the forms—the form of the cognition representing the form of the object—realism is established. If we perceive only the form of the cognition which does not represent the form of the object, subjective idealism is established. The Yogacara holds that only one form is manifested to consciousness in the perception of an object, and it is the form of a cognition.

13. If the realist admits that the percipient cognition is not other than the perceptible object, the object cannot be regarded as external to the cognition. It cannot be extra-mental because it is nothing but the cognition itself. Thus there is not real difference between realism and subjective idealism. Hence the Yogacara concludes that there is no external world. There is no dispute as to the existence of cognitions. But the existence of external objects is open to controversy. Besides, external objects require cognitions to manifest or apprehend them. So, for the sake of parsimony of hypotheses, we must admit the existence of cognitions only but not of external objects. The forms of cognitions are not due to the forms of external objects; they are determinations of consciousness itself.

14. The realist must admit that there is apprehension of a cognition before there can be apprehension of an object. So it is said that an object cannot be perceived unless its cognition is apprehended.

15. We distinctly apprehend cognitions without external objects in dreams, illusions, hallucinations, recollections, and the like. These⁴⁵⁸ are subjective forms of cognitions

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without any external objects corresponding to them. Hence it is established that the forms or determinations of consciousness are inherent in the cognitions themselves, and not due to the forms of external objects.

16. It is admitted by all that dreams and similar states are determinate cognitions independent of external objects. Our waking perceptions are on the same footing with dreams and the like. They also are determinate cognitions independent of external objects.

17. It is needless to assume that the form of an external object is indirectly known through the form of its cognition. In fact, the Yogacara does not recognize the reality of external objects. He believes in the presentative theory of perception by cutting off external objects. Perception is direct and immediate. It directly apprehends cognitions. It does not apprehend external objects because they do not exist. Thus the Yogacara's theory of immediate perception is similar to Berkeley's theory. According to both, cognitions are ideas alone are directly perceived.

18. The Yogacara argues: There is no object existing apart from its cognition. But there are cognitions existing apart from their corresponding objects, such as those that are imagined in dream and similar states. The so-called external objects are mere imagination of the mind. They are mental constructs like objects of dreams with no existence in reality.

19. But if the object is not different from its cognition how is it that it looks as if it were different from it? The Yogacara answers that the apparently external object is a construction of imagination: it is a fabrication of the mind. The known object is a creation of the⁴⁵⁹ act of knowing. Knowledge is creation. It is not discovery.

20. Among the Buddhists the Yogacara believes in the reality of cognitions only but not in the existence of external objects; and the Madhyamika denies the reality of cognitions also after proving the non-existence of objects. The denial of the existence of external objects is common to both the schools. The Madhyamika's denial of the reality of cognitions is based on his denial of the reality of external objects.

21. Yogavasistha also practically abolishes the distinction between dream-cognitions and waking cognitions. It does not recognize any fundamental difference between them. The only difference between them lies in the fact that waking cognitions are stable (sthira-pratyaya) while dream-cognitions are unstable (asthira-pratyaya). Dream-cognitions are felt as waking cognitions, if they are distinct and stable, and endure for a long time; waking cognitions are felt as dream-cognitions, if they are indistinct, unstable

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and momentary. Dream-cognitions are of the nature of waking cognitions; waking cognitions are of the nature of dream-cognitions; they are homogeneous in nature; their contents are the same always and everywhere. They do not differ from each other in their intrinsic nature. They differ only in that waking cognitions are distinct, steady, and stable, while dream-cognitions are indistinct, unsteady, and unstable.

Berkeley similarly recognizes only the difference of degree between sensations and images: The former are more intense, steady, and coherent than the latter. David Hume also, like Berkeley, recognized only the difference of degree or intensity between sensations and images.⁴⁶⁰ Images, according to him, are merely faint copies of impressions or sensations. Yogavasistha liken waking cognitions to dream-cognitions, and the waking world to the dream-world. The waking experience is apprehension of an unreal world; the dream experience is apprehension of an unreal town or the like. the objects of both are unreal. Illusions, dreams, wrong cognitions with their objects like imaginary cities (gandharvanagara) are creations of the power of the mind. Likewise the body is a construction of the mind and the whole world is nothing but mind and its construction.

22. The relationship of the object and its cognition is explained by their identity (tadatmya). The blue object is related to the cognition of blue because it is identical with the cognition; and because it is related to the cognition it is apprehended by it. This is the nature of a cognizable object that it must be identical with its cognition. The object which is supposed to be independent of its cognition is not identical with it; it is distinct from the cognition. It cannot, therefore, be related to the cognition, and be apprehended by it. There is no other relation between the object and the cognition, which can bring them into relationship with each other, and enable the cognition to apprehend the object.

23. Berkeley also holds that the object perceived is identical with perception. Gentile is of opinion that Berkeley is right in holding this view. "Reality is conceivable only in so far as the reality conceived is in relation to the activity which conceives it, and in that relation it is not only a possible object of knowledge, it is a present and actual one. To conceive a reality is to conceive at⁴⁶¹ the same time and as one with it, the mind in which the reality is represented; and therefore the concept of a material reality is absurd.

Croce holds that mind is the only reality, and there is no reality which is not mind. Mind is essentially activity and mental activity is all reality. He says, "When being is conceived as external to the human mind, and knowledge as separable from its object, so that the object could be without being known, it is evident that the existence

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of the object becomes a datum, something, as it were, placed before the mind, something given to the mind, extraneous to it...And yet...there is nothing outside mind, and there are therefore no data confronting it. The very conceptions we form of this something, which is external...show themselves to be not conceptions of data which already are external but data furnished to mind by itself." (LOGICA, p.120 quoted in Wildon Carr's THE PHILOSOPHY OF BENEDETTO CROCE)

24. "It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire and the idea of fire". Berkeley refutes this objection by showing that the distinction between reality and unreality is within consciousness.

25. Kumarila points out that such yogic intuitions are not given to mortals on earth; we know nothing about the so-called intuitions of the gifted few who are said to have reached the yogic state. An appeal to yogic intuitions is an appeal to credulity. The Yogacara cannot show any instance to prove the real nature of the yogic intuitions which invalidate waking cognitions.

26. Moral considerations of virtue and vice compel the recognition of the existence of external⁴⁶² objects. If the experiences of heaven were similar to the experiences of a dream nobody would exert himself to perform duties for the mere pleasures of a dream.

27. Broad says, "appearances are not perceptions of nothing but have an object just as much as do those which are supposed to be perceptions of the real." Thus variability of appearances does not disprove the reality of qualities of external objects. It proves relativity, but not unreality.

28. Parthasarathimisra, a follower of Kumarila, gives a critical exposition of the Yogacara idealism in SASTRADIPIKA. He states the following arguments of the Yogacara for the denial of external objects:- (1) We have perceptions in such forms as "this is blue", "this is yellow", etc. The Yogacara asks whether in such perceptions, a mere cognition or an external object is manifested to consciousness. If it is perceived, it must be endowed with a form, since a formless cognition is not perceived; and the form perceived must be held to belong to the cognition inasmuch as only one form is perceived. If two forms were perceived, one of them might be held to be a form of cognition, and the other, to be a form of the object. But we do not perceive two forms. We perceive a single form, and it must be held to belong to the cognition. The external object is not perceived; hence it does not exist. If it were existent, it would be perceived by a cognition at some time or other. But it is never perceived. In fact, the external object can never be related to cognition, and therefore cannot be perceived by it. A cognition cannot function towards an external object. It makes itself its object of

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cognition. (2) The parsimony of hypotheses demands that we should recognise the⁴⁶³ existence of cognitions only. It is a cognition that is manifested in the form of blue, yellow, and the like are perceived. If these are regarded as cognitions which appear to be external objects owing to an illusion, it does not involve many assumptions. But if they are regarded as external objects, it involves many needless assumptions, since objects cannot be established without cognitions apprehending them. It is true that the Yogacara assumes a single cognition to have the power of cognizing and being cognized. But the realist unnecessarily adds to the number of assumptions; he assumes the existence of the percipient cognition and the perceptible object and their different capacities. Thus the parsimony of hypotheses is in favour of the Yogacara idealism.

29. The Yogacara refutes this argument. If a cognition is imperceptible, it cannot be known by any other means of valid knowledge. If a cognition were known by an inferential cognition, it would be known by another, and so on ad infinitum. Further, a cognition is self-luminous; it does not depend upon any other cognition for its manifestation. If a cognition were always imperceptible its invariable concomitance with any other thing would never be perceived, and consequently it could never be inferred. Hence a cognition must be held to be perceptible.

The cognition cannot be said to be inferrible, since there is no mark of inference (linga). The external object (artha) cannot be regarded as a mark of inference which is an invariable concomitant of the object of inference. The external object is not invariable concomitant of the cognition. The Mimansaka himself admits that external objects exist during⁴⁶⁴ deep sleep when there are no cognitions at all.

30. An object is external, while the cognition is internal. Therefore, the object can never be apprehended by the cognition, because what is extra-mental cannot come into relationship with a cognition. The external object can never be apprehended by a cognition, whether it is real or unreal. Hence the Yogacara concludes that a cognition apprehends itself, and not an external object; it is self-luminous: it is apprehended by itself, and not by any other cognition. There is no object other than the cognition itself; there is no other cognition to apprehend it, which is distinct from itself. It has no other object than itself; it has no other subject than itself. It manifests itself. It is its own subject; it is its own object. The distinction of subject and object is within consciousness itself, and not beyond it.

31. The Buddhist idealist argues that the realist assumes the reality of cognitions, and establishes the reality of their objects on the strength of these cognitions: but, in fact, all these cognitions are wrong, and hence they cannot reveal the real character of

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their objects. If they were right cognitions, the analysis of things by them could reveal the real nature of their objects. But, as a matter of fact, when we analysis things by our reason, we fail to apprehend their real character. For instance, when we analyse a cloth by our reason, we find that it is made up of yarns; when we analyse a yarn; when we analyse these parts we find them to be made up⁴⁶⁵ of atoms; and when we analyse atoms further and further, we reach a point where nothing remains. Thus there is no object called a "cloth" over and above its constituent parts, which may be the real object of the notion of cloth. And there being no real object called a cloth, the notion of cloth must be a wrong cognition. "There is no cloth apart from the yarns; and there is no yarn apart from its parts; and so on up to atoms; of atoms also we cannot perceive the real character. Hence from atom upwards, no object exists." Thus all cognitions are wrong; and there are no real objects of cognitions.

32. The Yogacara argues that objects are not different from cognitions because they are cognized, like the feelings of pleasure and pain. Just as the feelings of pleasure and pain which are apprehended are not different from the apprehending cognitions and have no existence apart from the mind, so the objects also which are apprehended are not different from their apprehending cognitions and have no existence apart from the mind. We find a similar argument in Berkeley's DIALOGUE BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS.

33. The Yogacara contends that the cognized object is not different from the apprehending cognition, and that which is regarded by the realist as the manifestation of the object is but the manifestation of its cognition. If the apprehended object were different from its apprehending cognition, it would be material and unconscious. The apprehending cognition, on the other hand, is essentially conscious, since it manifests the object. But there is not a double manifestation of the conscious cognition and the unconscious object. Hence we must hold that a material object is not⁴⁶⁶ manifested by a cognition, but a cognition is manifested by itself. A formless cognition is never manifested. A cognition is apprehended only when it is invested with a particular form. And since determinate forms of cognitions are apprehended the assumption of external objects is absolutely needless.

34. The Yogacara argues that an object and its cognition are invariably perceived at the same time, and therefore they are identical with each other. They are always perceived together. So they are identical with each other. Hence it is said: "Blue is identical with the cognition of blue, since they are invariably perceived together."

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If the object had a separate existence apart from, and independent of, its own cognition, it could be perceived by some other cognition—which is not the case. For instance, blue is never perceived by the cognition of the yellow. This clearly proves that there is no difference between the percipient cognition (grahaka) and the object of perception (grahya). Thus the Yogacara argues that a perceptible object (grahya) must be identical with the percipient cognition (grahaka), because they are invariably perceived together. Here the identity of the object with its apprehending cognition is sought to be established on the ground of the invariably simultaneous perception of the two.

35. The Yogacara argues that one and the same object appears different to different persons. For example, a young woman appears as a beautiful damsel to an amorous person; she appears as no better than a corpse to an ascetic;⁴⁶⁷ and she appears as a delicious food to a carnivorous animal. The same object appears short in comparison with one thing, and long in comparison with another. What, then, is the real nature of the object in itself? The Yogacara replies that there is no real object at all independent of cognitions. The different appearances of the so-called external object are nothing but cognitions which are subjective modes of consciousness. There is no need of assuming the existence of external objects. They do not explain anything. It is sufficient to admit the reality of cognitions, the variety of which is due to the variety of subconscious impressions (vasana) within the stream of consciousness itself. Cognitions themselves take on different forms owing to revival of subconscious impressions. This assumption does not involve any self-contradiction. But the existence of external objects distinct from, and independent of, determinate cognitions, is a useless hypothesis. Hence, cognitions alone are real, which appear as a variety of objects. The distinction of the object of knowledge (prameya), the instrument of knowledge (pramana), and the result of knowledge (pramiti) is within consciousness itself. The modification of consciousness into the form of an object is the object of knowledge (prameya). The apprehending mental mode or cognition is the instrument of knowledge (pramana). And apprehension of cognition by itself or self-conscious awareness is the result of knowledge (pramiti). One and the same cognition appears to be diversified into knower, known, and knowledge owing to nescience, (avidya). On the destruction of avidya all these distinctions will melt away in the formless transparent,⁴⁶⁸ transcendental consciousness. Locke offers a similar argument to prove that secondary qualities such as heat and cold taste, odour, sound, and colour are ideas of the mind.

36. Thus both Locke and Berkeley suppose that if an object appears various to the same person or to different persons, it must be an idea of the perceiving mind. The

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Yogacara also holds the same view. The Yogacara argues that there is no external object, since one and the same object appears different to different individuals. If there were an external object it would appear to be the same to all individuals. But it does not appear to be the same. It appears different to different individuals. Hence these different appearances are ideas of the percipient minds. They are creations of the mind. It is the *vasana* or psychical disposition of the mind that creates its own appropriate object.

37. The Yogacara argues that an object of cognition is identical with the apprehending cognition. A cognized object must be of the nature of cognition; the apprehension of the cognition is the apprehension of its object; there can be no apprehension of an object apart from the apprehension of its cognition.

38. The Yogacara argues that external objects do not really exist; they are, in reality, mere forms of cognitions; they have existence only as cognitions. But mere forms of cognitions appear like external objects.

39. The Yogacara holds that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of subconscious impressions which form a beginningless series and are rooted in nescience (*avidya*).

40. The Yogacara admits the reality of a series of momentary cognitions only, and cannot, therefore, account for recollection. One momentary⁴⁶⁹ cognition cannot remember another past momentary cognition which it never experienced. The series of self-cognitions (*alayavijnana*) cannot be said to remember momentary cognitions, because self-cognitions also are momentary like object-cognitions.

41. The Yogacara likens waking cognitions to dream-cognitions and argues that waking cognitions are without any basis in external objects like dream-cognitions because they are cognitions.

42. The past and the future objects cannot produce cognitions at present, since they are non-existent. But still they are apprehended. Therefore an object cannot be said to be apprehended by a cognitions because it produces the cognitions. The causal theory of knowledge is unsound.

The relation of cognizer (*grahaka*) and cognized (*grahya*) cannot be said to follow from the subject-object-relationship (*visaya-vsayibhava*) between the cognition and the object. The two relations are not distinct; they are one and the same. The character of the cognized (*grahyatva*) does not in any way differ from that of being the object of cognition, and that of the cognizer does not in any way differ from that of

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being the cognition of the object. Hence the relation of cognizer and cognized cannot be said to follow from the subject-object-relation between the cognition and the object.

43. Not only the object is non-different from cognition, but also the subject is so. The distinction of the cognizer (grahaka), the cognized (grahya), and cognition (samvitti) is illusory appearance like the appearance of the double moon.

But the cognition of an object (e.g. blue) always⁴⁷⁰ appears with the form of the object. If there is no external object, what is the cause of the form which appears in the cognition? The blue object cannot be its cause because it is never perceived; it is always beyond the range of sense-perception. Berkeley also similarly argues that matter as conceived by philosophers is never perceived, and consequently it does not exist.

44. We always apprehend an object (visaya) and its cognition (jnana) together. Hence they are identical with each other. Whenever we perceive an object we perceive also the cognition of the object. If any of the two is not perceived, the other also cannot be perceived. We cannot perceive an object without perceiving its cognition, and we cannot perceive the cognition of an object without perceiving the object itself. And because an object and its cognition are always perceived together they must be regarded as identical with each other. If they were distinct from each other, they could be perceived apart from each other. So there are no external objects.

Our waking perceptions can be explained without the hypothesis of external objects like dream-cognitions. Waking cognitions are on the same footing with dream-cognitions, reveries, and hallucinations, since they do not differ from each other so far as they are of the nature of cognitions. And even as dream-cognitions appear as apprehending cognitions (grahaka) and apprehended objects (grahya), although there are no external objects corresponding to them, so our waking perceptions also are independent of external objects. The distinction of subject and object is within consciousness itself in waking perceptions as in dream-cognitions.⁴⁷¹ The distinction of the cognizer (pramatr), the instrument of cognition (pramana), the result of cognition (pramiti), and the object of cognition (prameya) falls within consciousness. None of these factors indispensable for knowledge is outside consciousness. They are nothing but consciousness pure and simple. The distinction among these factors of knowledge is imaginary. It is imagined by the intellect (buddhiparikalpita) for practical purposes.

We cannot account for the variety of perceptions (pratyayavaicitrya) if there are no external objects. The Yogacara holds that it is due to the variety of subconscious impressions (vasanavaicitrya). In the beginningless cycle of existence (samsara) perceptions and subconscious impressions are related to each other as causes and effects, even as seeds and sprouts are related to each other as causes and effects. There

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is mutual causality between the two. Just as seeds produce sprouts, and sprouts, in their turn, produce seeds, so perceptions produce subconscious impressions, and these impressions, again, produce other perceptions. Thus the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of subconscious impressions. Both the realist and the subjective idealist agree in holding that dream-cognitions are due to the variety of sub-conscious impressions, and not of external objects. But they differ in their explanation of the variety of waking perceptions. While the realist explains it by the variety of external objects, the Yogacara explains it by the variety of subconscious impressions. He does not postulate the existence of external objects to account for⁴⁷² waking perceptions. But the question is how internal cognitions assume the forms of external objects. The Yogacara holds that the forms of internal cognitions appear to us as forms of external objects owing to an illusion.

45. The Yogacara may argue that if cognitions are not self-luminous but are apprehended by something distinct from them, that also will require something else to apprehend it and so on ad infinitum. Thus it will commit us to infinite regress. But Sankara replies that cognitions are apprehended by the witness self (saksin) which is self-luminous. So there is no infinite regress in the Vedantic doctrine. The witness self and cognitions are essentially different in nature so that they are related to each other as the knowing subject of the self since it is the very presupposition of all experience. It bears testimony to its own existence. The individual cognitions, according to the Yogacara, are discrete and momentary; they come into being and pass away. Hence they must require one, permanent, intelligent principle or the self to witness the production and destruction of all these cognitions which are not self-luminous.

46. The Yogacara argues that our waking perceptions are not produced by external objects like dream-cognitions. In a dream-cognition nobody perceives an object which is other than the cognition itself; a dream-cognition apprehends itself as its object. So a waking perception also apprehends itself as its object; there is no object distinct from the cognition.

47. Cognition implies an object. Cognition without an object is not possible. We are never conscious of it. We are never conscious of a cognition which does not refer to a knowing subject and a known object. Cognition without an⁴⁷³ object is as inconceivable as cognition without a subject.

48. The Yogacara may urge that he does not deny the consciousness of an external object but he regards it as an illusory appearance. He holds that what we are

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immediately conscious of are nothing but our own ideas, and hence the so-called appearance of external objects is the result of our own ideas. To this Baladeva replies that the very fact of our consciousness proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality. Moreover, there are three factors in the cognition, "I know the jar": the knowing subject or self, the known object, e.g. the jar, and the knowledge. An act of knowledge requires an agent as well as an object. The whole world believes in it and acts upon it. The consensus of opinion proves that the object is as real as the knowing subject. Therefore, to say that there is only knowledge, but no object of knowledge, is to court ridicule. Hence it is established that an object is real and distinct from knowledge.

It may be asked if an object is distinct from its knowledge, how this distinction can be known. If the knowledge of the distinction is said to shine forth in consciousness, then by knowing one object we ought to know all objects, since all objects have the common attribute of being distinct and separate from knowledge. If one thing which is distinct from knowledge must be known, everything distinct from knowledge must be known. Baladeva argues that this argument is absurd. All external objects, have, no doubt, this quality in common that they are different from the knowing self.⁴⁷⁴ They all come under the category of the not-self. Certainly, we know everything as not-self by knowing one not-self. By knowing one not-self we know the general relation of the not-self to the self, but we do not know the special relations of different not-selves, to the self. There are many not-selves, and their special relations to the self are different. One object is yellow, another is red, and so on, and the knowledge of the yellow object cannot be said to be the same as that of the red object. The idea of yellow is quite different from the idea of red. Therefore there must be two different external objects to give rise to two different cognitions.

The object and its cognitions are certainly perceived together always. But this invariable concomitance instead of proving that objects are unreal and cognitions are real, proves just the contrary. The very fact that they are always perceived together shows that they are different and not one.

Waking perceptions are not similar to dream-cognitions. The former are of the nature of perception; the latter are of the nature of memory. The former are invalid; they are sublated by waking cognitions. The latter are valid. They are not contradicted. Therefore, waking perceptions cannot be regarded as objectless like dream-cognitions.

The variety of perceptions cannot be due to the variety of subconscious impressions, since the impressions themselves presuppose previous perceptions of external objects, and the existence of the permanent self as their abode, both of which are denied by the Yogacara.

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“Sri⁴⁷⁵ Kaivalya Navaneetham” (Translated by M.S. Venkataramiah)

1. You say that you cannot find the embodied being as different from the gross body. Then tell me who appeared as the subject in your dream when you were asleep; or who experienced the deep sleep in which even the pain of dream was absent; or again what is this intelligence wherefrom the thoughts spring forth in the waking state.
2. (Just as one examines and finds out that this is not a snake but a coil of rope and this is not a thief but a thick post so also one makes out beyond doubt by the word of the master and the light of the scriptures that the body, the world and the elements cannot be apart from consciousness which remains ever changeless and that they are all Brahman only. “Know this to be the removal of super imposition.”)
3. In the world, the substratum “this is” can never be veiled; but the particular identity “This is a rope” is mostly veiled. Similarly with the particularity called the jiva, ignorance does not veil the substratum “I AM”; but it veils the knowledge “I am Brahman”.
4. “Has any one gained release from the cycle of subsequent births because the world was totally lost from view in one’s deep sleep or in Deluge? But the power of multiplicity can altogether bring about liberation. And the thick veil of ignorance is the sole cause of the present calamity.
5. (The answer is): A poison is commonly counteracted by another poison (as an antidote); (a bit of) iron spike is extracted by another iron (probe); the (assailant’s) arrows are thwarted by the (defender’s) arrows;⁴⁷⁶ dirt is washed away by another dirt (e.g. fuller’s earth). In the same manner, ignorance which is weak in itself can be eradicated by methods which are themselves of the same maya; eventually, the deep-rooted Maya also perishes like the pole used to turn a corpse which is burnt.
6. This maya shows itself in the seven stages of development of the jivas which are in the ascending order of their merit as follow: ignorance, (ajnana) veiling (avarana) multiplicity (vikshepa), indirect knowledge (parokshajnana) direct experience (aparokshajnana), freedom from misery, and supreme Bliss.
7. Of these, ignorance is to lose sight of the fact that the inner self is no other than Brahman; veiling does not show forth Brahman and therefore His existence is denied;

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plenty is the result of the root-thought “I am a man” and its derivatives “I am the doer and the experiencer”; indirect knowledge is to know the nature of the Self by the teachings of the master; direct experience is to realise the unitary Being of the Self after enquiry into the Self and to stay unshaken in the Reality; when the limitations vanish and the sense of doer ship is at an end, there is freedom from misery; release from bondage and the seal of finality are the marks of Supreme Bliss.

8. I shall now relate to you a story to illustrate how the same jiva can be the subject of these seven stages of maya: ten men forded a stream and on reaching the other shore, each of them counted nine others and omitted to count himself. They were all perplexed (because the tenth man was missing).

9. Here want of right understanding causes confusion and this is ignorance. The tenth man is not to be found and so he is missing. This⁴⁷⁷ thought is the veiling. Grief at the loss of the companion is vikshepa. To heed the words of a sympathetic passer-by who says “the tenth man is among you” is indirect knowledge. When the kindly man further makes one of them count the others and points to the teller as the tenth man, the discovery of oneself as the missing tenth forms direct experience. The cessation of grief for the lost man is freedom from misery. The joy of indubitable ascertainment by oneself is the supreme Bliss.

10. The sweets are sweet by the sugar in them. Does it not follow that sweetness is sugar itself. That which makes the insentient objects intelligible as ‘this thing’ and ‘that’ thing is intelligence. But it is not itself ‘this thing’ or ‘that’. Realise IT to be the Self.

11. On hearing this, the disciple remained loyal to the instructions. He was thus able to discard the five sheaths, pass beyond the blank and realise the Self as being the witnessing consciousness. He next became aware: “I am Brahman” and later went beyond that awareness also and into the Realisation of Perfect Being.

12. My Lord! I transcended the dual perception of ‘you’ and ‘I’ and realised the self to be entire and all-pervading. Can such realisation fail me at any time.?

The Master replied: “The Truth that I am Brahman is sometimes realised by a study of the scriptures or by the Grace of the master. Nevertheless one can become fixed in the realisation of the Self, only if he has totally freed himself from all abstractions.

13. As a result of long-standing habits in the⁴⁷⁸ innumerable incarnations in the past, these obstacles frequently rise up as ignorance, uncertainty and erroneous conclusions,

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and cause trouble. Unless these are at an end, the fruits of realisation slip away. Therefore, root them out by means of hearing the truth, meditation and ascertainment by experience. (Sravana, Manana and nididhyasana).

14. "Sravana" i.e. hearing the truth amounts to reverting the mind repeatedly to the teaching. 'That thou art'. "Manana" i.e. meditation is to ponder over the text and unravel the unity between 'That' and 'thou'. Nidhidhyasana i.e. contemplation is to fix the clear mind in Brahman.

If you devote yourself every day to these, you will surely be liberated.

15. The practice must be kept up so long as the sense of the seer and the seen persist in you. No effort is necessary, there-after. For then you will be pure, eternal consciousness which remains untainted like the ether. Those who are thus liberated even here while alive, will live for ever as That after being disembodied also.

16. Were passions casually to rise, they also disappear instantly because they cannot make an inroad into the mind of the Brahmavid. Such sages live just like others in society but yet remain detached like water on lotus leaf. They may look like fools; they may not show forth their knowledge but remain mute owing to the intensity of their Bliss.

17. "Prarabda" i.e. Karma which is now bearing⁴⁷⁹ fruit, differs according to the actions of the person in the past incarnations. Therefore the present pursuits also differ among the jnanis who are all however liberated even here. They may perform holy tapas; or engage in trade and commerce; or rule a kingdom; or wander about as mendicants.

18. Even the immemorial Vedas declare that single-minded devotion to a holy sage is not only pleasing to Brahma, Vishnu and Siva together but also secures the rewards of all the Vedic rites and finally liberation from the cycle of rebirths.

Now listen how liberation here and now leads to liberation after disembodiment also.

19. The karma which is in store waiting to bear fruit in later incarnations is altogether burnt away in the fire of jnana like cotton in a huge conflagration.

As for karma which is accumulating, it will certainly not count for the gnani because it is still-born.

But the karma which has brought about the present incarnation, must be exhausted by experiencing its fruits.

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20. Because his detractors share the demerits of the present actions of the jnani and his devotees the merits, there is nothing left to enforce a reincarnation on himself.

21. Finding that the disciple keeps to him like his shadow, the master asks him: "Are you able to stay unshaken as the non-dual witness of all? Have all your doubts disappeared? Or, does the sense of differentiation creep in at times? Tell me your condition."

22. A⁴⁸⁰ shy maiden says "not he, "not he" of all others until her lover is pointed out, when she remains shy and silent. In the same way, the Vedas clearly deny what is not Brahman as "not this" not this, but indicate Brahman is silence.

23. "The satva is pure and forms the very being of the mind; when the rajas and the Tamas (which give the pattern to it) are destroyed (by proper practice), the identity of the term "mind" is lost. For, in such a state, the sages will partake of what comes unsolicited to them; they will not think of what passed or what will happen in future; they will not exult in joy nor lament in sorrow; they have got over their doership and become non-duers; and they remain witnessing the changes in the inner faculties in their waking, dream and dreamless states. So they stay liberated at the same time they pass through the prrabha. There is thus no contradiction in it. You need have no doubts on this point."

24. The meaning is: A person who realises the self by his own efforts (such as enquiry into the self), never loses hold of the natural Bliss, like the girl who thrills with love and is yet attentive to her duties, On the other hand, were a person to realise the Truth by a stroke of luck (such as a master's or divine grace), the effects are only transitory, like that of the girl, who, distraught with illicit love, neglects her duties.

25. The Master: "A person who wakes up from a dream speaks of his experiences in the dream. In the same way, the self-realised sage uses the language of the ignorant. But⁴⁸¹ he would not (for this reason) identify himself with the ego. A man who commits himself the flames on the eve of his becoming an immortal God is spoken of only as a man until his body is reduced to ashes. So also, the ego-free sage appears to function like others until he is disembodied."

26. My good boy, hear me further. The activities of the sage are solely for the uplift of the world. He does not stand to lose or gain anything. The Almighty who is only the

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Repository of Grace for the world, is not affected by the merit of demerit of the cosmic phenomena of creation etc.”

The disciple: The cumulative effect of all the meritorious actions of the past incarnations would confer jnana on us. What is the necessity for enquiry into the self?
The Master: Hear me. The unselfish actions which are rendered into God help to keep off the impurities and make the mind pure. The mind which has been purified thus, sets forth to find out the Real from the unreal and gains wisdom;

27. In the same manner jnana can be got only by enquiring into the self. For the characteristics of Brahman are revealed in the Vedas. The self cannot be realised by a study of the Vedas, feeding the hungry performing austerities, repeating mantras, righteous conduct, sacrifices and what not.

28. The Master: “A loving mother is concerned with the ailment of her child who had eaten some earth; she therefore coaxes the child with a tempting sweet in which a medicine is wrapped. In the same manner, the Vedas say cheerfully “Do your household duties, perform sacrifices, they are all good!⁴⁸² But their aim is different which is not understood by the seekers of pleasures in heaven.

29. “When the Vedas enjoin: “If you desire fermented drinks and meat, have them by performing sacrifices; if you have sexual impulse, embrace your wife; the person is expected to desist from other ways of satisfying his desires. The Vedas aim at total renunciation only”

The Disciple: In such a case, why should there be those commandments at all?

The Master: They are only preliminary and not final.

30. Contemplation is certainly different from the Gnana obtained by vichara. To formulate one thing as another in this world is a forced yoga-practice because direct knowledge can alone be true. Do not be deceived by fanciful ideas.

31. Jnana is the result of direct experience whereas contemplation is mere mental imagery of something heard. That which is heard from others will be wiped off the memory, but not that which is experienced. Therefore that which is experienced is alone real but not those which are contemplated upon. The moment the ajnana is sighted, it is ruthlessly killed by experience-mode and not by karma.

32. The disciple: My lord, tell me if it is not blasphemy to deny as unreal, the lotus-seated creator and the other Gods, the great men of the world, the holy waters, like the Ganges, the places of pilgrimage, the holy occasions, the four Vedas with their six auxiliaries, the mantras and the austerities?

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33. If it is a sacrilege to deny the dream visions as false, it would be a sacrilege too to deny the world which derives its existence⁴⁸³ from illusion. If, on the other hand, it is right to deny the dream vision, it is only right to deny the world also which is derived from illusion.

34. O son, no one can ascertain how this mysterious illusion came into being. As to why it arose, it is because of the (person's) want of Vichara (discriminating enquiry)*

35. The Master: What becomes of the well-known qualities of air, water or fire when they are paralysed by virtue of live gems, mantras, or suitable drugs? Similarly should you be free from other thoughts while you stay as Sat-chit-ananda, the Maya becomes ineffective. And no other method can be found in the whole range of the Vedas.

36. These enjoyments confer pleasure only; but the realisation of the Self is beatitude itself which is unrivalled. The desire for sensual pleasures undergoes changes whereas the intense desire for the Self ever remains unchanged. The sensual pleasures can be indulged in or rejected; but, who is there to accept or reject the Self? The Self can reject all other pleasures, but can never be rejected itself.

37. My son, hear me describe their distinguishing characteristics. A man who is always exerting himself in the waking state, seeks rest on his bed, out of sheer exhaustion. Then his mind is well interiorised and, in that state, it reflects the image of the Bliss of consciousness which shines by itself. The pleasures which he then experiences represents the sensual pleasure.

38. That the bliss of deep sleep is BrahmAnanda, is⁴⁸⁴ the statement by the scriptures. That some persons take elaborate care to provide themselves with downy beds to sleep on, is the fact which supports it. That there in that state, all sense of right and wrong, of man or woman, of in or out is totally lost as at the time of the embrace of the beloved, is the experience which confirms it. So it is Brahmananda, sure and certain.

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* Re: Ananda has already been said to be the characteristic of satva guna which is the state of repose. Therefore any shade of ananda must be traced to the mind which is free from agitation. Even so the sensual pleasure. The original editor inserted footnote “Re: Ananda has already been said to be the characteristic of satva guna which is the state of repose. Therefore any shade of ananda must be traced to the mind which is free from agitation. Even so the sensual pleasure.” By hand

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39. The disciple: In that case why should any one lose hold of that non-dual Bliss of Brahman and come out of it?

The Master: He is drawn out by the force of his past karma. The man who has just wakened from deep sleep, does not immediately lose the happiness of sleep for he does not begin walking at once nor forget the happiness. This short interval of peace which is neither sleep nor waking is the bliss of remembrance.

40. The very moment the I-am-the-body idea starts, he loses himself in the troubles of the world and clean forgets the bliss. His past karma brings on happiness misery or the colourless interval between the two. Everyone has sometime or other been empty of thoughts and therefore felt happy. This is the happiness of indifference.

41. Can this be the Bliss of Samadhi? (No). For instance, the exterior of a pot is cool owing to the external moisture and not to the water contained within. Similarly, this happiness (of indifference) amounts to being the shadow cast by the bliss of yogic samadhi when it is obstructed by the rise of the ego. When the ego also subsides, samadhi will result. The yogic samadhi is the state of repose in which the mind is not aware of the environments, nor is it asleep, and the body stays stiff like a post.

42. The⁴⁸⁵ Master: Is water tripartite because of its coldness, fluidity and whiteness (i.e. transparency)? Or, is the fire tripartite because of its light, heat and redness?

The Vedas have analysed and dismissed the cosmos beginning with ether as unsubstantial, insentient and misery-laden. In contradiction to this and for easy understanding, they have described Brahman as Sat-chit-Ananda which is after all One only.

43. The Master: Being must itself be consciousness. Were the consciousness of being different from being, it must be non-existent. How then can the being be revealed?

Again, consciousness must itself be the being. Were it different from consciousness, it must be insentient. The insentient being cannot reveal itself and therefore cannot exist.

Thus the Being and Consciousness being identical, it is also homogeneous with Bliss. Should the bliss be different, it will be non-existent and imperceptible so that there can be no experience of bliss – (which is absurd).

This is the best line of argument for establishing the homogeneity of Being-Consciousness-Bliss.

44. Again, the sat is that which exists at all times. How is it revealed? By itself or by another?

Answer. By another.

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Question. Is that other non-existent, or does it exist differently from the original sat?

Answer: Non-existent.

Question. Fool! Can the son of a barren woman be more than a word?

A. Then, let it be something existing, but different⁴⁸⁶ from the original sat.

Q. How is its existence revealed? You must say: "By another" Will there be an end to this chain of existent things and their cognisers? Your answer is therefore untenable. Now get rid of this false reasoning and be clear in your mind.

45. The Master: After analysis, the elders say that there are seven states of ignorance, and seven degrees of wisdom. Of them all, first hear me mention the seven states of ignorance.

The elders have named them thus:

- 1) Bija-jagrat: the germinal state of waking.
- 2) Jagrat: the waking state.
- 3) Maha-jagrat. The waking state grown hardy;
- 4) Jagrat-wvapna: the state in which one builds castles in the air;
- 5) Svapna: the dream-state.
- 6) Svapna-jagrat: cogitation of the dream after waking up from it;
- 7) Sushupti: the dreamless slumber.

46. The germinal waking state is the uncompounded consciousness which rises up fresh from the unitary state of being;

- 2) The waking state contains the sprout of the ego which was previously absent from the germinal state:
- 3) the sprout of the 'I' and 'mine' which rises up with every reincarnation, becomes hardy (because it sows itself as often as it rises); and this is the hardy waking state;
- 4) the fussy ego conjures up visions in the dreamy waking state;
- 5) to have uncontrolled visions while sleeping after a full meal, is the state of dream;
- 6) to be thinking of the dreams after waking up from them, is the waking dream;
- 7) the dense darkness of ignorance is the state of deep slumber.

These⁴⁸⁷ are the seven stages of wisdom which represents liberation.

47. The elders have analysed them into

- 1) Subheccha: desire for that which is good:
- 2) Vicharana: investigation into the Truth
- 3) Tanu-manasi: the mind which has become pure and therefore attenuated.
- 4) Asamsakti: a detached outlook on the universe and its contents.

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- 5) Satvapatti: The Realisation of the Truth.
- 6) Padarthabhavini: awareness of the Self as the One without a second;
- 7) turiyaga: the highest and the indescribable state.

48. To wean from unedifying associations and desire the knowledge of the Supreme is the first plane called subheccha;

2) to associate with the enlightened sages, learn from them and meditate on the truth is called investigation;

3) With faith in the teachings of the masters, to contemplate steadfastly on the Truth until the person is enabled to get free from the desires which were swaying him before, is called the attenuation of the mind;

4) owing to the development of the foregoing conditions, there shines forth the highest Knowledge in the mind which is environed by enlightened associations; this is Realisation;

5) when the mind is stabilised in the Realisation of the Truth, the ignorance is lost in all its entirety; this is the plane of detached outlook on the universe;

6) gradually the bliss of the non-dual Self prevails and the triads are obliterated; this is the awareness of the Self as the One without a second.

7) The state of sublime silence in which he⁴⁸⁸ remains as the very nature of the self is the Turiya.^{*489}

Earlier, this seventh plane was said to be the turiyatita (i.e. beyond the turiya).

49. The first three planes are said to be the jagrat (i.e. waking state) because the world is perceived (in them as ever before).

The fourth plane corresponds to dream (because the world is recognised to be dreamlike). Even the dim perceptions of the world vanishes and therefore the fifth plane is called the sleep state.

Transcendental Bliss prevails in the sixth which is therefore called turiya (i.e. the fourth state relatively to the foregoing waking, dream and sleep states).

The plane beyond all imagination is the seventh one which the Vedas indicate as the sublime Silence (i.e. Turiyatita).

50. Q. I do not seem to know this 'I' who is Brahman that is manifest as 'I'.

A. In that case, who says 'I' now:

Q. The intellect.

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* Re: Turiyatita: Lit. beyond the fourth. The waking, dream, and sleep states are the three which have their basis on the self. So it is called the fourth in relation to the other three. But when the self is realised as the sole reality comprising all, there is no duality and no related thing. It is therefore absolute.

⁴⁸⁹ The original editor inserted footnote "see footnote" by hand

A. The intellect is lost in a swoon (and in deep sleep) and yet there remains something which is not lost but fills in the dreamless sleep as 'I'. That is consciousness' Self and also the 'I' of the present.

Q. It is not clear to me in what manner this fullness can be felt.

A. There is the experience of happiness in deep sleep and it is that. No happiness can be experienced anywhere when a want is felt. Therefore there must be the complete whole (in deep sleep) which is this self. It is also the source of the entire cosmos.

51. The disciple: By what means, can I root out the ignorance of the causal body?

The Master: The srutis can never mislead any one.⁴⁹⁰ Have faith in them; remember their teaching: 'I' am the whole and the worlds are passing phenomena in ME.

How can there be ignorance if you are thus firmly fixed?

52. Were you to remain always aware that 'I' am consciousness which is untouched and remains the whole, how does it matter what you think and act?

All these are as unreal as the dream visions after one wakes up from them. I am all-Bliss.

(diagram⁴⁹¹ from Sri Kaivalya Navaneetham)

The Planes of enlightenment.	I Scheme.	Remarks.	II Scheme	Remarks.
1. Subheccha	(waking)	Because	the	
2. Vicharana	The Jagrat	world	is	
3. Tanu-Manasi.	state among	perceived	in	
	the	them as	ever	
	Jnanabhumi	before.		
	kas.			
4. Satvapatti.	(dream)	Because	the	
	The Swapna	Reality	underlying	the
		world is realised	& the world	itself appears
		like a phantom.		

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5. Asamsakti.	(sleep) The Audupti.	The darkness of ignorance is totally lost and therefore it corresponds to sleep in the planes of enlightenment		
6. Padarthabhavini. ⁴⁹²	Dense Sushupti.	There is no place for the cogniser, the cognised & cognition. The person cannot himself wake up from this state unless external influences draw him out forcibly	Turiya.	Because it is the 4th in relation to the 3 previous states.
7. Turiya.	The Sublime Silence.	Existence as the Self only, whether manifest or unmanifest	Turiyatita.	is that which lies beyond Turiya.
8. Turiyatita.	Videha Mukti.	The state of liberation after disembodiment.		Not taken into account because there is nothing to speak of.

“Metaphysics⁴⁹³ of Energy” BY C.R. Malkani

1. We must so conceive consciousness that it does not become a thing, an expanding or a contracting substance. What we call meaning or know ability is indivisible and unique, just because it is independent of every form or possible object. Forms are varied and indefinite in number, but their know ability remains the same,— we know a horse in the same sense in which we know a cat, a dog, a colour or a smell. Spaces may be large or small, but they do not require large or small consciousness to know them; the meaning of a mile is not greater than the meaning of a foot, nor the perception of a table greater than the perception of a book; if it were otherwise, the

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difference of greatness and smallness will itself become impossible, for this difference requires a unity which is indifferent to both of its members. But the perception of table does not lie side by side with that of the book, as one big inert block by the side of another small one; rather, that unity that makes them small or large, makes them any perceptions at all. This know ability has no size or quality; time has revealed progress in the forms of our knowledge, but none in know ability itself.

2. Can we conceive consciousness as a movement? The coming and going of thoughts does not make a movement of consciousness; if it did there will be no continuity in it. The fact is that consciousness always remains in its own place; the epithets 'past', 'present' and 'future' can only be applied to it, when consciousness is drawn out into a series, and the different members allowed to move in space like so many distinct units; but even⁴⁹⁴ then the continuity and the unity of consciousness is required to give meaning to motion. How can consciousness be conceived as moving when it is the unmoving ground of all motion itself! Bergson himself emphasises the unity and the essentially non-spatial character of consciousness; it is meaningless then to speak of it as a movement. Movement is out and out a spatial conception,—it requires a thing with a definite form having definite bearings towards other things. But that which has no form and is out of space, no relations with aught else, where can it go and out of what place

3. We cannot conceive consciousness interrupted. This has been worked out at length in a separate booklet, *The Problem of Nothing*. Bergson himself acquiesces in this position. An interruption of consciousness is still consciousness. We know the interruption; and this knowledge is only possible because consciousness goes beyond it; a real limit of consciousness can never be cognizable or appreciable as a limit. Let us try to recede from consciousness, and give it a slip. The task will be found impossible. 'In' and 'out' themselves get meaning from consciousness,—how can we go out of it? We can by no means interrupt consciousness, as we can by no means interrupt ourself; the every effort at this will become clearer and more tense consciousness. When, however, we consider that this interruption is another name for matter, Bergson's position becomes ridiculous. What is matter, if not forms of consciousness? Bergson himself, in his matter and memory, is obliged to⁴⁹⁵ define matter as a 'bundle of images'. How can matter be an interruption of consciousness, when it is nothing but consciousness?

4. We now come to a great paradox. Motion cannot be objective and so discontinuous; but if we take away its objectivity to save its continuity, we find that it ceases to be motion. We are most aware of movement when we jostle most and stumble

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most. With closed eyes, a bullock-cart gives us a greater sense of movement than a railway train; all earthly conveyances in their turn give us a greater sense of it than the movement of the earth itself through the heaven; and in fact, any movement, however headlong, through a frictionless medium, will give us no sense of movement at all,—it will be absolutely indistinguishable from perfect rest. Here is our paradox: motion can only be felt as motion, when it is discontinuous,—and then it is motion no longer; but pure and perfect motion, on the other hand, is identical with perfect rest,—it is devoid of any sense of movement or efficiency. Where is motion then? Those who ask this question, do not know what they ask; it is the same thing as to ask where is where. The only way to bring such inquirers to the folly of their question is to ask them to define the word and let us know what they exactly want; and they will be seen shuffling between continuity and discontinuity, between unmoving self-consciousness and static objective images. Our consciousness itself appears to us as moving,—and so it is represented in books of psychology by the image of a stream,—because we have created in it static points, specific thoughts and feelings, and made⁴⁹⁶ it discontinuous; having so made it, there is no sense in its movement; continuity once more presents us, this time in our mental life itself, the image of a series. But the moment we want to rehabilitate this sense, we must get behind these static points to that uninterrupted continuity of our consciousness, whose perfect serenity is the real meaning of all movement; till we get at this, movement is a mere word without any significance. Obsessed by the sense-intellectual view, however, we misinterpret continuity as discontinuous, perfect peace as restless activity; we need only analyse these notions to expose the illusion of words.

Here a natural but a meaningless question will possibly arise. If we never have any experience of motion as such in the world outside our mental life, whence comes the idea itself which we naturally distinguish from other ideas. But this question implies a certain meaning of motion, and the questioner forgets that it is this very meaning that we are seeking to fix; if our inquiry shows that the word is meaningless as a distinctive, we must question no longer about it. Yet, perhaps, it will clear our thoughts, if we say a few words about its distinctive character. Motion is not the opposite of rest but its correlative. Specific thoughts and ideas cannot be what they are in and by themselves; the unconscious continuity of the Self which gives them succession, is the very ground of their being; isolated, they will perish altogether.

5. When we have given up the correlation, it is not in pure 'nothing' that we plunge; but in that continuity of consciousness, the⁴⁹⁷ meaning of which cannot be grasped by the senses and the intellect; in it nothing comes and nothing goes; it reconciles motion and rest in absolute meaning.

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6. I am quite conscious of the inadequacy of the treatment here. Many questions will be proposed and doubts raised. But we cannot enter into them here, for this will carry us to a much wider field. The truths of Advaitism are closely interlocked, and I can only hope to meet the legitimate objections on this point in a future work.

7. We emphasise the readability of the book chiefly because the value of philosophical literature is apt to be underestimated. The complaint is often made that there are too many facts and too little thought about modern education, and that what is chiefly required by all nature pupils at schools and students at universities is a thorough grounding in metaphysics so that accurate and profound thought may be more commonly met with than at present.

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“Evolution” by J.D. Beresford in Aryan Path

1. We are in a position to examine the whole subject, not only with a freer mind but with all the added advantages offered by the record of biological research during the interval.

2. The effects are slowly beginning to show themselves in this leaning towards mysticism this tentative searching after a broader, freer and more acceptable belief.

It will be seen that I have passed beyond the confines of my immediate subject to the consideration of larger issues, but my text of “Evolution” was intended to serve mainly as an illustration. It is, indeed, a reasonably representative one. In this relation that⁴⁹⁸ sixty year old belief in the evolution of man from the lower animal has been a stumbling block to many intelligent minds. It has, without question, been the most important factor in the mechanistic argument which before some more or less acceptable explanation of man’s appearance on earth could be offered, was fatally handicapped by the impossibility of finding any answer to the simple, inevitable question: “How and where did the human race begin” or, since it must have had a beginning, “Who or what responsible for it?”

Wherefore, I feel that the sooner the Darwinian misconception of man’s origin is finally rejected on all hands, the sooner will what is still quite a large number of thinking men and women be released from a restricting and injurious habit of thought.

3. The general average of Western intelligence is ready to accept the teaching of the old Wisdom. And it is the duty of all readers of THE ARYAN PATH to familiarise themselves with that teaching and to pass it on to those who may be ready, to receive it.

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MODERN SCIENCE & THE SECRET DOCTRINE by S. IVOR B. HART. (in A.P.): It is none too easy for one who is trained in the traditions and the basic concepts of European Science to answer this question. Difference of premises, of outlook, of modes of thought, are not easy to bridge.

2. We begin then with Space—a topic that is assuming enormous importance nowadays. Einstein, need we remind the reader, has taught that space does not “go on” for ever, but bends back on itself, so that, by travelling in any one direction long enough, one ultimately returns to⁴⁹⁹ the starting point itself. The straight line, in fact, becomes the circle of infinite radius, except that the universe being on this hypothesis finite, the radius must in fact just fall short of being considered infinite.

3. As between mathematicians and the metaphysicians of the West, on both of whom has devolved the task of answering the query, “What is Space?”, it may on the whole be fairly said that the major contribution has come from the former. Euclid, dare we say, in the brave days of old, and Gauss, Lobatchewsky, Riemann, Clifford and Einstein in more modern times, have undoubtedly dominated the field of enquiry. And they have shown that the geometrical approach as distinct from the physical approach could not fairly be ignored. For after all geometry relates to pure space, while physics is the science of matter. (contd on page 427)⁵⁰⁰

The Colour Question by Ethel Mannin in A.P.

Western civilisation reaches its monstrous apex in the United States of America.

It is futile to attempt to convert people on the colour question; centuries of prejudices and superstition have caused the taboo to become too deeply implanted; the most that can be hoped for or achieved is for the minority who do not recognise any colour bar to reach out to each other without fear or prejudice, meeting each other on the common ground of humanity, taking what each has to give, and with a respect free of sentimentalising or romanticising, never losing sight of the fact that in the end the colour question must and will dissolve of itself.

Philosophy⁵⁰¹ & a Sense of Humour by T.V. Smith in A.P.

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⁵⁰⁰ The original editor inserted “(contd on page 427)” by hand

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1. The philosopher as philosopher works with words. In this he differs from the common man, who works with things; from the scientist, who works with instruments; from the politician, who works with people. From the litterateur, who also works with words, the philosopher differs in seeking directly through words to tell the plain unvarnished truth. Precisely therein lies the heart of philosophy—a heart which appears, as you will, tragic, or comic, or humorous. For words, though things in their own right, are not the things intended by the philosopher; they remain even for him symbols. Now yearn as one may for reality, the symbol is not the thing symbolized; and so the philosopher is doomed always to occupy himself with something other than his true vocation. Plato is not the only philosopher who is in recognition of this fact and fate has resorted to heroic measures to prevent, as he puts it, seeing himself at last altogether nothing but words.

2. “It is the function of the philosopher” says Aristotle, “to be able to investigate all things.”

Ivor B. Hart⁵⁰²

(4) What a puzzle there must have been for science when Romer, with the aid of eclipse phenomena in connection with Jupiter’s satellites, first provided us with the new phrase “velocity of light”, the reality of which Fizeau subsequently brought to the level of the laboratory. Something that was not matter was in incredibly swift motion! 186000 miles per second! And what a relief when the subsequent years showed that light, as⁵⁰³ a form of radiant energy, is sufficiently related to the concept of matter to bring consistency to what has appeared inconsistency.

The Ethical Value of the Doctrine of Reincarnation by Saroj Kumar Das in A.P.

It is undoubtedly a commonplace of critical scholarship that in evaluating the true import of a doctrine of pre-historic antiquity, one has to cultivate that mental alertness which refuses to be persuaded by its traditional sense or popular appeal without examining de novo its credentials. It is all the more urgently needed in those cases where clusters of associations, incidental or accidental, precipitated by long standing prejudices, spring up, overshadowing the main theme, and the result is that one cannot see the wood for trees. But, then, on closer inspection it is sure to appear that the fault originally lay with our defective vision.

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The doctrine of reincarnation calls for just this circumspection and level-headedness that alone can ensure the best interests of a critical study as contemplated here.

Ivor B. Hart⁵⁰⁴

5. The space-time continuum of the modern relativist has really done very little to remove this attitude of materialistic fundamentalism. Yet, ironically enough, it is this very materialistic fundamentalism that must inevitably break down upon the “Maya” of the time factor. Divorce soul as much as he may wish from considerations of space and matter—though goodness knows the folly of such an attitude—the Western scientist cannot evade, if he but faces up to it, the remorseless and relentless fact that in the consideration of the phenomenon of “time” he is dealing with⁵⁰⁵ something that is “different”. Space and matter you may measure up. There may be just so much of it. Distance may be taken this way or that way. But time has only one way—“forwards” or shall we rather say “onwards”. “Backwards” carries us not to the phenomenon of time, but to memory, as to which we will defer discussion to a later article.

Here, then, is a most interesting situation. The “pure scientist” professes to concern himself exclusively with the material in nature, and he pursues his experimental researches to degrees of laboratory refinements that demand more and more the elimination of what he calls “the personal equation” in the recording of results. The frailties of the human consciousness must be frowned upon as “confusing the issue.” Therefore the recording of results must be made more and more mechanical. Yet every record takes time, and every scientific discussion involves the time factor, and the time factor is part and parcel of the human consciousness. So we have an inconsistency that must be faced and recognized.

6. We get to the pitch of the matter—a frank recognition that, in the language of Western Mathematics, time is a function of consciousness. It cannot be divorced from life. That it is indeed “Maya” is a different point that does not affect the argument; but whether it be illusion or reality, it is a function of conscious life.

“Thinking - a Faculty” by Isabel Stradley in A.P.

1. “All the world” wrote Emerson, “is at hazard when God lets loose a thinker.” This leads us to suppose that there are not many thinkers⁵⁰⁶ in the world! The greatest asset to a nation or a race is its finely organised, balanced minds capable of real thought.

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2. People believe that because they are human beings, they know how to think. "Such nonsense," a person declares, "of course I know how to think! Did I not go to school, and have I not a university degree!" The mind to grow must receive continuous education.

3. The ancients considered the most important thing in life was that man be trained to think, and all preliminary education in the Mystery Schools was concerned with this problem of building the thinking faculty.

4. People often do not realise that the mind is an instrument capable of fatigue, and for every period of intense effort, the mind must be given a similar period of rest and relaxation.

5. Concentration is an aid to mind training, and has to do with the training and unfolding of the brain. We have no time to-day for concentration, for we can never do only one thing at a time! In our civilization we must do several things and all at once. We pick up a book and turn on the radio. We believe we know how to concentrate; we believe, too, that we are mentally alert the whole time we are awake, but very often we are not thinking at all! Consider how a crisis causes our mind to rise to organized, executive ability. But when the crisis is over, think of the resultant mental exhaustion! Training, however, will enable the thinking faculty to engage in prolonged, orderly thought.

To learn to think intelligently requires more time and effort than any other professions in⁵⁰⁷ the world. And it is only acquired through the most exacting discipline. People say to-day that life is so short, its problems so numerous and complex that time does not permit complicated studies regarding spiritual and mental things. This is inconsistent. He who does not start to learn about himself and the true purposes of life because he feels he will not have time to finish, will never start no matter how much time he may have.

"Duration and Time" by Mahendranath Sircar (in A.P.)

1. (Prof. Mead of Chicago arrives at "an element of indeterminism" like the German Max Planck.---Editor of A.P.)

2. The present has been defined as the locus of reality. Reality exists in the Present. The present, of course, implies "a past and future and to those both we deny existence."

The conception of the specious present suggests a temporal spread, which could take in the whole of temporal reality but would eliminate the past and the future. Prof. Mead conceives the present as continuous with the past and as emergent out of it. The main question that he considers in relation to the present is the status of its past. The distinctive character of the past in relation to the present is mainly that of irrevocability. The past is that out of which the present has arisen and is an irrevocability. But this identical relation is never the whole story. The doctrine of emergence compels us to believe that the present is in some sense novel, something not completely determined by the past out of which it arises.

The present, so far as it is new, will have in⁵⁰⁸ it “an element of temporal and causal discontinuity.”

3 He puts the question: “Can we in thought reach that, which is independent of the situation, within which thinking takes place?”

4. The present can be the locus of reality only as the meeting point of life which is the continuity of the past and the future, but which in itself, as the constant point of reference, is really transcendent.

In fact the present cannot be understood, it always eludes the grasp. The moment it is understood, it is no longer present. The present as the locus of reality is beyond time. It is “is-ness.” It is absolute.

Sleeping and Waking by Max Plowman in A.P.

1. The perception of truth always comes with a sense of awakening. We wake to recognise. However strange the sudden appearance of truth may be, in itself it is perfectly familiar: we come to it as a sailor to his own port; we know it as certainly as we know a friend’s face in a crowd; this is what we have sought even without knowing what we were seeking. Yet with this sense of complete familiarity there is the great and sudden sense of awakening. A film, like the veil of sleep, falls from our eyes: suddenly we are transported on to higher ground, and with assurance we know the way.

This fitful process of moving from one level of consciousness to a higher is the manner of man’s whole spiritual progression.

On Language: by G.B. Harrison, in A.P.

Words can become exceedingly dangerous, especially when men worship them, and worst of all when books – which are but collections of words – become deified: the pages of the Bible and Koran⁵⁰⁹ are spattered with the bloodshed in the name of God.

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Words are the coin of thought, and like all currencies liable to the fluctuations of the market. Words change their meaning, and often their social value and status, at one time expressing a rare or noble thought; and then by over-use they become smooth and valueless. Sometimes they are highly charged with emotion and then in changed circumstances the glow fades and the word loses its colour. Eighteen years ago such words as "Reprisal" were full of ghastly intensity; reprisals are now but an evil memory to those who lived through the war, and to the younger generation mean nothing.

Again, seeing that words often take their colour from the experience of the speaker, they are inadequate to express anything that lies beyond the hearer's capacity for experience. A man may express his thoughts to his own satisfaction, for the expression reminds him. Yet the purpose and art of language is not merely self-expression but communication so that the great writer needs a reader as nearly as possible on his own level. To use words to their fullest the speaker must therefore be able to understand the experiences of his hearer and to express his own thoughts in words which will evoke his hearer's memories. Great writing or speaking needs a vast experience; and indeed the first quality of a teacher is to enter into the mind of his disciple.

The exact meaning of a word to each individual comes from his own past.

2. But in each man the same word will stir different emotions. Herein lies the great difficulty⁵¹⁰ of words as a currency for the exchange of thought; it is so hard to be sure that any phrase conveys the same exact meaning to hearer and speaker.

The greatest danger in the use of language is to misunderstand its nature and limitations; for words are like chisels, dangerous to handle, easily blunted, but in the hands of an artist, keen and penetrating, his tools in the work of creation.

George Godwin

1. The need for integrity in speech, and the right use of words is a prerequisite for sound judgment and even an approximate (the best we can ever hope for) appreciation of the facts and the problems inherent in them.

2. It is this sort of verbal outlawry of such terms that does infinite damage, the effect being disastrous because it diverts the attention of the hearer from the authentic meaning of the words and loses in his mind a set of images and emotions that are impediments to clear judgment or any judgment at all.

The unthinking man who hears the term “bolshie” employed only in notes of contempt or opprobrium, does not hesitate to consider the adequacy of the grounds for such obloquy. And the chances are he reacts in such a manner that his mind is rendered incapable of considering the underlying realities that would be otherwise the subject of quiet and dispassionate examination.

It is probably true to say that the western world has been completely anaesthetised by this outlawry of a single word and rendered incapable of looking squarely at a social and economic phenomenon without parallel in the world’s history.

3. Time⁵¹¹ and misuse have blunted language and robbed it of much of its former power to evoke strong emotions. Our verbal currency has worn thin, so thin that we respond but feebly to the stimulus or respond not at all. We accept the cant phrase and accept as minted gold the gilded sixpence of verbal currency. Worse, we accept unquestioningly coins that are spurious, and pass them on.

Little wonder then that men who desire to use language as an instrument for the communication of emotions and ideas are being driven to the expedient of coining language anew.

4. The flippant use of extravagant words—the perpetual misuse of the word “marvellous” and the like—one may pass over as foibles of the moment that will pass. Every age has seen such absurdities. But the tendency of our time to invest words connoting ideas of terrific import to the world with ignominy is to throw up before the enquirer after truth a verbal barricade so high that the truth is often beyond his reach.

The Economic Crisis and the Spiritual Life in America by Irwin Edman in Aryan Path.

It is the fashion to say, therefore, that a great chastening has come upon the American people, and that in their adversity they have learned to disprize the material values they can no longer so easily encompass. It would be absurd to pretend that three years of economic disaster have turned America from the ingenuities of the West to the enduring wisdoms of the East. It would be fantastic to assume that a nation marked so⁵¹² deeply by a pragmatism in action and a restlessness of imagination should overnight have turned into a commonwealth of aspiring saints and seers. Having given up hope of a transfigured earth, they have not turned to a remembered Heaven. But slowly the symptoms of a change of heart and mood are becoming apparent. There has been bitterness, there has been cynicism, there has been delusion. But there has also

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been a chastening of the whole temper of life. Simplicity has of necessity been restored to the lives of thousands who would a decade ago have despised it. In the midst of a civilization whose basic conditions of life are in a state of precariousness obvious even to the most comatose, the imagination has turned to consideration of a newer and better order of life.

The Limitations of Speculative Thought by Edmond Holmes in A.P.

1. The explorers who have gone furthest in the advance to their goal are beginning to find that, beyond a certain point the concepts which they brought with them and which has so far never failed them, concepts which are firmly embedded in human thought and human speech, refuse to work, and that it is not easy to find substitutes for them.

Prof. Lindeman, in his work on THE QUANTUM THEORY, makes this clear, and explains how it comes about. "How the indefinable upon which all our thought processes depend were formed" and shows "that they cannot be justified." His words, which deserve our closest attention, are as follows:- For the description⁵¹³ and classification of natural phenomena we use words and symbols. Symbols are defined in words, and the words, if they are to be of any service, must represent ideas which are common property amongst those who are concerned to know what has been written. In natural science certain words have assumed a specific meaning. These may be called the scientific concepts which are the basis of all discussions and calculations. A physical law expressed an accurate numerical relation between such concepts. If the law is known, then some of them can be expressed in terms of others. Ultimately, however, there must obviously be certain indefinables, in terms of which we express the other concepts. The three indefinables commonly used in physics are length, time, and mass. From these, with the help of certain systematized physical observations or laws, we can derive or express other physical concepts.

How does this method work when applied to the study of ultimate particles? Says our author:- It is not easy to make clear the arbitrary nature of the space-time framework which we have chosen in order to describe reality. The co-ordinates are so convenient in the case of the grosser macroscopic phenomena, immediately perceptible to our senses, and have become so deeply ingrained in our habits of thought and so inextricably embalmed in our language that the suggestion that those indefinables may be meaningless, or, at the best, only statically valid, is bound to meet with a certain amount of repugnance.

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2. It⁵¹⁴ can easily be shown that the concepts of temperature, of colour, of smell are inapplicable to ultimate particles. It is the same with the concept of distance. "Observing distance (between electrons, let us say) changes it." "When we endeavour to describe the behaviour of ultimate particles it may therefore well be meaningless to do so in terms of space and its related indefinable time." "Nevertheless," says our author "it is impossible for us, constituted as we are, to escape from spatio-temporal coordinates. We cannot think in other terms, we cannot even speak the new language which would be required."

3. What do we mean by the "universe?" The average man is at no loss for an answer to this question. "We mean by the universe the world which lies around us, the world which we look out upon, the world which sense-experience reveals to us, the world to which we, as corporeal beings, belong." This, though he would not set it forth in so many words, is his answer to that large and vital question; and he has no misgiving as to its correctness. But there are serious objections to it. To begin with, who guarantees the intrinsic reality of the world which we look out upon? Who guarantees that the outward and visible world is "the universe?" Are we to say, with Aristotle, that "sense-perception proper, free from any admixture of association and interpretation," is infallible? No. We know too much to-day about the inner constitution of the material world to be able to endorse the naive realism of a thinker who lived more than two thousand years ago, when science was still⁵¹⁵ in its infancy.

But apart from this difficulty, to which I will presently return, there is the more obvious difficulty, that there are variations in sense-perception, in virtue of which different men receive different impressions of the surrounding world. If a colour-blind man (as we call him) sees green where I see red, who shall arbitrate between us? Who is to say that I am right and that he is wrong? I can but plead that nearly all men see things as I see them. This means that I regard the sense-experience of the normal or "standardized" man as the ultimate criterion of reality, and the world which that experience reveals to us as the real world and the whole world. (I am looking at things for the moment from the standpoint which popular thought, following the lead of Aristotle, instinctively adopts). But in what capacity do I, as a standardized man, guarantee the intrinsic reality of the outward world? Do I mean by 'I' my corporeal or my self-conscious self? The guarantee that I might give in the former capacity would obviously be worthless.

4. This is one objection to the naive "realism" of the average man. The next objection is one which the more recent researches of physical science into the constitution of the atom have presented to our thought. The world which we look out

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upon is woven, so to speak, on the space-time framework. If that world is as real as it seems to be, if it is in very truth the whole world and the only world, then the space-time framework must be absolutely real, and the space-time concept must be absolutely valid. But, as we have⁵¹⁶ already seen, the space-time concept is so far from being absolutely valid that beyond a certain stage in our study of the inner constitution of the material world, beyond a certain point in our approach to the *primordia rerum*, it fails us completely and refuses to work. This failure disposes of its claim to absolute validity, and in doing so disposes of the claim to absolute reality of the world which is woven on the space-time framework.

5. Out of these elusive penultimates, with ultimates behind them which are as yet unknown, the world of our everyday experience is unceasingly built up. How? By the interpretative action of the conscious self of man. There is no colour in the physical world as it is known to-day to the physicist, no sound, no smell, no taste. The investigator has left all these behind him as he makes his way towards the *Infinitem Little*. The world has become for him "a picture in black and white." His business is to see "when a pointer coincides with a graduation in a scale" and to note the exact point. "Practically," says Sir A. Eddington, "every exact physical measurement resolves itself into a reading of this kind." It is the conscious self of man which translates the electromagnetic waves of the physical world into colour, the vibrations of the air into sound, and so forth.

Man and his God by J.D. Beresford in A.P.

1. By way of introduction to any understanding of the nature of God, I want to say something of the aspects of what we regard as matter. Our approach to it is necessarily by⁵¹⁷ way of the physical senses, and the corroboration of these senses by one another leads to the conception of an idea. For most of us the more important of these senses is that of sight. Light is reflected from all material surfaces in varying degrees, and produces certain reactions in the mechanism of the eye which we translate into ideas of form and colour. If all the light were absorbed on which it fell, the whole material world would be wrapped in darkness and we should see nothing. If all the light were reflected we should still have no sense of either form or colour. The only information regarding the nature of matter that reaches us through the eye is dependent upon the relative degrees of light's reflection and absorption, and it is probable that no two people register precisely the same impression.

Our next important approach is through the exercise of touch, taste and smell, the first of these being that most frequently used to check an ocular inference. The

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combined exercises of these four senses enable us by association to build up certain concepts with reference to the nature of material objects, concepts that serve us reasonably well in the conduct of ordinary life. We are, it is true, liable to error as a consequence of the too rigid application of these associations. In any new experience, there may be apparent discrepancies between the evidence of the sense impressions. The perfect imitation of a flower, for instance, may conform previous associations by its appearance or even by its texture when handled, but fail to produce the expected reaction by its smell; and⁵¹⁸ in such cases a new concept has to be formed in the mind to distinguish between natural and artificial flowers. But the majority of the images of material objects conceived by the mind are so steadily confirmed by experience that we commonly think of them as presenting a fixed reality.

The fifth sense, the sense of hearing, is somewhat isolated from the other four. The external means for translating sound,—that is to say a succession of air-waves,—into an idea, is by way of an ingenious but relatively simple mechanism, and the loss of it would not have any far-reaching effect on our inferences with regard to the nature of matter. Thus, apart from its aesthetic value in relation to music, hearing would appear to be, in most connections, the least essential of our approaches to material reality.

2. Practically all our inferences and decisions, however, are ultimately submitted to the test of reason which, guided by memory, is then able to form an interpretation of the impressions conveyed by the senses.

3. This, in the briefest summary, presents an inclusive account of our contact with the objective world.

4. And from the premises afforded by these instances of high probability, man has built up the whole body of his learning and beliefs. There are no other grounds for what is known as “exact knowledge”, which is founded solely upon these records of fallible sense impressions, none of which can be proved to correspond with any absolute reality. To take an instance from modern physics, we now believe as the outcome of a long train of observation and reason that matter, the thing in itself, corresponds⁵¹⁹ in no particular with the concepts of it signalled by the senses. It has no colour although it reflects certain colours to the eye; it is not hard and impenetrable although it conveys that impression to the touch; it is not inert although for all practical purposes we may so regard it.

5. There must be an essential being to do the work of reception and collation. Indeed here for the first time in this essay do we come upon a piece of knowledge,

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common to every human being, that is not received in the first instance through sense impressions and is not dependent upon them for verification,—the knowledge embodied in the statement “I am”.

This, the single premise of conscious life, is never learnt in the ordinary sense and cannot be forgotten. It is not the outcome of experience and therefore precedes all other knowledge. There may be moments when it does not appear to be present in thought, but this “I am” is a perpetual affirmation whatever form such affirmation may take.

6. Matter is the agent and not the principal that there is an individual consciousness which is other than matter and antecedent to it.

Has Asia Anything for the West? by George E. Sokolsky in A.P.

1. I believe in the machine age. I believe that the materialistic civilization of Europe has been a boon to mankind. Too many years have I lived in the squalor of Chinese cities, in the disease infested fields of China to believe that a civilization which disregards the human body, the very skin of man, can be sound.

2. If⁵²⁰ I am to compare that with the hospitals and asylums, the social service, the fine roads and clean cities of the West, then I have no alternative but to hope that Western materialism may come to Asia, yes even the factory and the mill, even the high building and the hydro-electric dam.

But our materialistic civilization in the West, even in its finest aspects, has missed something. The individual human being is lost; he has missed one of his good roads. He spends his life in hard work and fast play; he has hurled himself into a fierce tempo which not only moves but moves him. He stands erect and clean; his teeth are white and strong; he knows about vitamins and prophylaxis. But he has no peace.

3. Yet, they know no poverty such as is evident everywhere in Asia.

4. Religious teachers always look backward. They seek authority and encourage superstitions. They avoid cerebration and hope to acquire addicts rather than believers. Religious thought has hardly moved in the Western world in the past few centuries. Hocus-pocus sects have been founded to stupefy the incurably stupid.

5. Japan has conquered the secrets of the machine age. She has mastered all the methods of the Westerners. She has even defeated, by war, diplomacy and trade, great

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Western states. Yet, the individual Japanese has, in his private life, not succumbed either to the Western suppression of personality or to the chaos of a life without contentment. The Japanese dons his kimono, sits on his haunches on tatami and forgets the roar of the machine—which he can operate as well⁵²¹ as any Westerner, who, however, never forgets his machine and is frightened when it ceased to roar. I have watched Japanese, in their country houses, sit motionlessly, contemplatively utterly at peace. In Western countries, men dare not contemplate.

6. Time is here now, when the Westerner will pause to question his own wisdom, to discover that he is rapidly becoming a robot. He will seek peace. He will again turn to Asia, he will gaze Eastward, as Greece and Rome and the blond tribes of the North, gazed Eastward, to find that peace.

Vivekananda by Clifford Bax in A.P.

The work was obviously a labour of love and reverence but this factor ought not to lower our literary standard. Unfortunately, most books that deal with the spiritual life are badly or poorly written, the reason being, no doubt, that many people at a certain stage of religious development assume that literary art is a mere plaything—just as others persuade themselves that “the body” is unimportant. People of this kind should realise that only skill enables a writer to convey a mood or a meaning, that earnestness alone cannot achieve its purpose, that, as Charles Lamb remarked “easy writing makes damned hard reading”. When as in this book, several inexpert authors have collaborated, we are certain to find ourselves travelling over a very uneven road, and no one will be surprised to find that the writing in these volumes varies from the straightforward to the embarrassingly emotional, from plain prose to unlucky attempts at poetic style. The opening writer, for example, not content with “Hushed in silence was the household, hushed in silence and rest” actually progresses to “came the morning.” Another⁵²² writer observes someone that “he shook the dust of his feet.” Vivekananda’s life and personality offer superb material for a biography and it is disappointing, therefore, that this memorial to him should be twice as long as it ought to be if it was to achieve its maximum effect, that it is put together without any sense of attractive presentation and that the authors had not skill enough to lure the reader effortlessly from paragraph to paragraph. An expert writer, in sympathy with the subject, might have made this “Life” s classic, and this does not mean, as many earnest people will suppose, merely that it might have been “better written”. It means that it might have interested not only the few who are already attracted by Indian philosophy,

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but also the whole literary world. It means, too, that it might have been certain of lasting for generations.

We all know that there are persons in Europe and even more of them in America, who are ready to regard any Hindu with superstitious awe. We know also that several mountebanks have taken advantage of this foolish attitude. Vivekananda, however, was probably the finest representative of any Eastern religion or philosophy who ever visited the West. His sincerity is beyond question. These volumes convincingly destroy the old rumours that in America he succumbed to the physical charm of woman. They show too that his intellect must have been exceptionally powerful.

Arriving At Universal Values by L.E. Parker in A.P.

1. Science itself staggers a little uncertainly in the face of its discovery of its own relativity.
2. The meaning of words also is relative to interpretation.⁵²³ Many of the world's wisest men did not attempt to formulate their knowledge in written works on this account.
3. The doctrine of reincarnation and evolution, if accepted, has in itself a broadening effect upon the mind and understanding, for we are no longer confined to a single page of the book of life but begin to get an idea of what the book is all about. This is to exchange a world for a universe since we are now concerned with universal values.
4. The valley, the plateau, and the mountain present different appearance to the dwellers in the valley, on the plateau, and on the mountain: all three are correct from their own view-point. But our views are points of view only; we cannot see any object whole and everything we do see we see in time. Prof. Einstein's theory of relativity is now accepted by the majority of scientists, but they fail to apply relativity to mind and consciousness.

By a Student in A.P.

All true teachers of Theosophy have insisted on the necessity of study. The spiritual man must act, think and feel with knowledge. "Be ye wise as serpents" commanded Jesus, "and harmless as doves." It is only the true esoteric wisdom that can bring to birth the true ethical standard. Hence the urgency of study.

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Why did Madame Blavatsky spend so many hours in giving out the knowledge to which she had access by writing books? To provide food of the right kind, i.e. spiritual food which perchance some hungry souls might see and eat—in a word, to help them to solve their own problems, which is the most any man or god can do.

“Soul⁵²⁴ – What is It” (A.P. Editorial)

1. Like so many other important terms the name “soul” is pressed into service by physicists, psychologists, philosophers and others, as well as by theologians. Each understands it in his own way. Has not the time come to define the term, so that all may know what each signifies when he uses the word soul? Church theology, especially in Protestant countries, inclines towards what is loosely regarded as the scientific concept of soul. Modern science has not defined with any exactitude the nature of the reflective consciousness or self-consciousness of the human being.

2. Even in India, confusion exists, arising from this babel of thoughts.

3. It is of the utmost importance that definite words should be used for definite things. We are not advocating a brushing away of differing schools of thought, representing definite points of view, but recommending that terms used by each be simply and adequately defined.

A.P. Ends & Sayings. Bitter experience is forcing upon the minds of the day, the interdependence of the world and the necessity of learning the solidarity of man. Mr Harold Cox in The Sunday Times of May 17th, commenting on “World Trade” the journal of the International Chamber of Commerce, writes; ...all the nations of the world are dependent on the prosperity of one another. For example, the misfortunes of Central Europe which followed the war, reduced their purchasing power of English and German cotton goods, and that in turn led to a reduction in the demand for raw cotton from the United States, with the result that a considerable part⁵²⁵ of the cotton area in the Southern States had to be abandoned.

He designates the ill as the unfortunate spirit of “economic nationalism” in a day when no country can live to itself, and asks: “How far is it possible to liberate the world from this nationalistic spirit as applied to trade?”

\$. Rapid communications have linked the world. The volume of trade has enormously increased while the mind of man has not travelled with the same speed to realise the meaning of economic unity.

Renascent India by N.B. Parulekar in A.P.

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1. A walk through the bazaar shows how from hardware to haberdashery, the East and the West are intermingled and indistinguishable. As I write these lines my fountain pen is Canadian, the ink is American the paper is Swedish and the paper fasteners lying around are made in Germany, but all were bought in India. The West does not terminate at the Red Sea but stretches out further entering into our daily life, modifying our habits, and cajoling us.

2. Burma or Bermuda have shrunk to the proximity of a downtown tea room where one may join his friend on the way to a matinee. A man broadcasts his voice from the station of the General Electric Company, Schnectady, and the echo girdling round the earth reaches him in one eighth of a second. Science the creation of the West, has helped to break down physical barriers and put men in proximity wherever they be. It is increasingly perfecting the technique to co-operate and keep in touch with smaller groups of men who though born and living scattered in different environments are nevertheless capable⁵²⁶ of feeling at home with the whole world. Our gratitude is due to the West whose scientific achievements have rid us from the fear of isolated death by putting progressive men in shouting distance of one another.

Ivor B. Hart

Is there yet no significance in the fact that Man is the only living species that is interesting himself in, and is capable of discussing, the problem of his own existence, and of that of his surroundings? Speck he may be, physically speaking, in the cosmical scheme, but an insignificant, speck, never!

Geoffrey West on "Louis Claude" de Saint Martin

1. Not that he was a hermit or anchorite. He accepted his world for what it was, lived in it, formed friendships, played his part in the state to which he was born, yet always without worldliness, without taint of greed or ambition.

2. Although the light is intended for all eyes, it is certain that all eyes are not so constituted as to be able to behold it in its splendour. It is for this reason that the small number of men who are depositaries of the truths which I proclaim are pledged to prudence and discretion by the most formal engagements.

Aristocracy & Democracy by Hugh Ross Williamson in A.P.

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To confound unity with uniformity is to put a premium on decay. Democracy must cultivate the faculty of disbelief, for a habit of scepticism is the surest antidote to the poison of a slogan.

H.P. Blavatsky describes Kant as “the greatest philosopher of European birth”.

The⁵²⁷ Aryan Path (Book Reviews)

1). J.W.N.SULLIVAN on Joad’s Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science: Mr Joad is so anxious to emphasize the complete objectivity of everything we perceive, to whatever order of reality it may belong, that he will not admit that any communion with Deity occurs, even in the highest order of mystical experience. He says: God, it is obvious, if He is to be an object worthy of our adoration, must be kept unspotted from the world that adores Him. To suppose that the mystic can enter into communion with Him is to suppose that the saint can become one with Him is to suppose that He can become one with the saint. But, I repeat, the permanent and perfect cannot be continuous with the imperfect and the changing; nor could it, without ceasing to be itself, enter into communion with the imperfect and the changing..

2). R. NAGARAJA SARMA on Manual of Buddhism: Mrs Rhys Davids would surely consider the “Cronic recluse” and the “coenobitic Monk” as marking a fall from the ideals advocated by the founders of Buddhism who laid emphasis on a life of dynamic activity lived according to the standards of Dharma, and were dedicated to the finding of the More in each and to the enabling of others to find It. Avoidance of the extremes of hilarious hedonism and an irrational mortification of desires, cultivation of the will to help one’s fellowmen, and a progressive realisation of the More constitute the essential elements of Buddhism as taught by its founders.

(3) C.B. PURDOM.⁵²⁸ on Janet Chance’s “⁵²⁹Intellectual Crime:”⁵³⁰ Mrs Chance attacks what she regards as present day indifference to truth. She finds such indifference in politics, business, education, the press, and particularly in religion and

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⁵²⁹ The original editor inserted open double codes by hand

⁵³⁰ The original editor inserted close double codes by hand

in connection with morality. Even scientists are not free from it, though she declares that “there can be no examples of intellectual crime in Science proper.” Her main object is to show that religious belief is the greatest of intellectual crimes and to urge that the only honest attitude towards the problem of existence is that of the agnostic. She goes no further than Huxley⁵³¹ when he declared that he had “a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble.” For those who take up any other attitude she has contempt and says, “They are persons to whom it has not occurred that there are such things as intellectual standards of right and wrong.”

With much that Mrs Chance says most people will agree. Intellectual integrity is rare. Humbug of the most outrageous kind is tolerated in almost every sphere of life. Any amount of respectable truth is merely lies. Steadfastness to truth and courage are the two qualities most needed in the special circumstances of to-day. Any group of people that was truthful and had the courage to act accordingly would revolutionise the world. To the extent that this book will cause its readers to give up false ideas and be honest with themselves it can be warmly welcomed, and that it may have such an effect upon some who read it can be taken for granted; but its effect will be limited because the author confines herself to the approach to truth by means of the rational mind – by the methods of⁵³² experiment and verification adopted by Natural Science and by the use of logic – she will have nothing to do with what the poets and saints have to say about truth What they say, she asserts, has no universal value, so it can be ignored.

(4) CLAUDE HOUGHTON on Clifford Bax’s ‘INLAND FAR.: There is one passage in Mr Bax’s book which best reveals his philosophy:- -Even under sore stress, I should feel that life is a dream, alternately terrible and enchanting; that the tangible world is a phantasmal picture; that something in every man exists beyond it; and that one day, whether here or not here, I shall wholly wake up and perceive, with compassion and mirth, how crazily the real is distorted in our eyes during this familiar process of living...These are not convictions to which I have dragooned my mind they are modes of being that I cannot undo.

(5) ‘I.S’ on KRISHNAMURTI by Carlo Soares: “The fundamental contradictions of all civilisations” are “built upon the illusion of the ‘I’. Man must free himself “from the ‘I’ and its creations, i.e. from the entire set of past values”; man must “free himself from the sense of the self.” All these “past values” – such as “beauty, truth, morals, religion, progress” – “all these are illusions” “All that men have set up as ‘truth’ is opposed to this liberation (of the man from ‘I’), for these truths promise to the self a future.” But “the present is the only eternity: that which the ‘I’ calls its future is ⁵³³merely a projection of its past” and therefore equally illusory.

⁵³¹ The original editor corrected spell “Huxley” by hand

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⁵³³ The original editor inserted space by hand

(6) by⁵³⁴ J.P.W. on Edmon Holmes' The Head-Quarters of Reality: 1. Some time ago the distinguished American Writer Mr Will Durant, wrote:- The result has been a kind of intellectual suicide: thought, by its very development, seems to have destroyed the value and significance of life. The growth and spread of knowledge, for which so many idealists and reformers prayed has resulted in a disillusionment.

2. Students of Madame Blavatsky's works will recognise in the present religious ferment a fulfilment of her prophecy in ISIS UNVEILED, where she points out that one cycle has almost run its course and that "an era of disenchantment and rebuilding will soon being, – nay, has already begun."

(7) G.W. WHITEMAN on B.K. Wadia's Communication as Education: In its deepest and richest sense it (educative communication) must always remain a matter of face to face intercourse between individuals..

F.S.C. Northrop

The departmentalization of the universities, culminating in its fruits, in the widely educated masses for whom the psychology of advertising is as profound as subject as physics or metaphysics, and to whom all concepts are of equivalent importance and none clearly defined.

"The Dilemma of Western Psychology" by C. Daly King in A.P.

Both spiritualists and materialists omit any serious consideration of consciousness. The Spiritualists make the amazing assumption that the nature of consciousness is self-evident, when in plain fact it is almost impossible to think of anything less self-evident than the⁵³⁵ nature of consciousness. Yet here is a problem, not only prior to that of "minds" or "souls" but central to the whole science of psychology. If one is interested in experience, the final common denominator of all experience is consciousness of some type or other. The Materialists, on the other hand, offer only denials either of the existence or of the importance of consciousness, and thus raise the intriguing mystery as to how, in its absence, there can be any psychology at all.

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"THE DILEMMA OF WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY" by C. DALY KING

It is, certainly, a brand new addition to scientific technique, this solution of a basic problem by the simple expedient of denying its existence.

And both the contending schools in Western psychology, when occasionally forced to make some passing reference to consciousness, fail to distinguish in any way between consciousness and conscious content, which they definitely assert to be synonymous terms. That is a stumbling-block which is final, unless demolished. It would be difficult indeed for a physicist to experiment upon the nature of light, if he persisted in confusing it with that of a lighted object.

2. Such a new and distinct envisagement of the psychological field can only be attained by a psychology that places prime importance upon the initial and crucial problem of consciousness. There are many other legitimate problems for psychology, but not one of them can be properly solved or even correctly evaluated in the scale of psychological worth until a rigidly scientific definition of consciousness and strictly objective evidence therefore are obtained.

So far as is known, there is but one small⁵³⁶ school in Western psychology that possesses a scientific, rather than a sentimental interest in the consciousness problem. This is the school of Integrative Psychology, founded by Dr William M. Marston during the last decade—and unfortunately its originator is not, for the time being, carrying forward those essential researches upon which its firm establishment must rest. The integrative viewpoint is not spiritualistic not necessarily materialistic. It asserts that objective behaviour is determined at the synapses of the central nervous system where those integrations of nerve impulse groups take place which in fact originate and shape the subsequent behaviour, both explicit and implicit, of the organism. It further asserts that the energy generated upon the psychons of these synapses, when the impulse groups cross and combine, furnishes the conscious content of subjective experience. Thus in psychonic phenomena behaviour and passive experience meet; and when they are studied together in these phenomena we find a starting point for a complete psychology, that lends itself furthermore, to objective scientific measurement.

It is suggested that here is to be found a remedy for the materialistic fallacy. The strength of the Materialist position lies precisely in its insistence upon the investigation of definite, physiological actualities; its mistake is that it investigates relatively unimportant ones before achieving any basic relation between the phenomena of physiology and those of psychology—bad selection, due to an axe to grind against the spiritualists, in conjunction with a surprising philosophic⁵³⁷ naivete. Let the Materialists select from physiology the psychologically important, integrative

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phenomena of the central nervous system and they will find themselves, perhaps to their own astonishment, able to formulate scientific laws of experience that will remain forever beyond the abilities of their spiritualistic rivals.

Likewise in this approach we may not only see the fallacies of the Spiritualists laid bare but may even discern the first outlines of a possible remedy also. For this outlook possesses its own strength no less than does the materialistic view—its unshakable assertion of the reality of experience and experiencer. To go beyond this assertion only by inventing literary terms and using such non-objective inventions in the construction of experiments and theories that thus possess almost no scientific value at all, is its weakness. Its integrity will only find justification when it is willing to face the harsh truth which resides in the fact that psychonic energy furnishes the conscious content of a thoroughly passive experiencer. Here it will have need of a philosophy, not primitive but subtly searching. For even now it is possible to demonstrate that the “minds” or “souls” of which the Spiritualists so unthinkingly speak, are actually non-existent even if potentially actual. If but one-tenth of the researches now being carried forward by the Spiritualists upon quite unscientific “Gestalts” “incentives” and “complexes” were to be directed toward controlled experiment on the nature of the experiencer, it might well eventuate⁵³⁸ that before very long we should have some rational indications of the experiencer’s potentiality and his eventual nature.

Only when the Materialists turn their attention to psychologically significant problems, only when the Spiritualists adopt an objective, instead of a subjectively speculative technique, shall we have arrived in the West at the threshold of a genuinely scientific psychology.

Sri Krishna Prem

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An essential requirement of any real yoga is complete detachment from any personal prejudices or sectarian notions. Without such impersonality the practice of yoga will lead to no enlightenment but, by inducing subjective visions, will plunge the so-called yogi deeper and deeper into the net of his own personal notions which will seem to be confirmed by the experiences which, in point of fact, owe their form to those very notions.

A.E. Waite

The Victorian scientist, according to Sir James Jeans, believed that he was studying “an objective Nature” independent of the perceiving Mind and existent from

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all eternity, whether perceived or not. But according to the new physics that Nature we study is made up of our perceptions rather than of something we perceive, and there is “no clear-cut division between the subject and object” no room left for “the kind of dualism which has haunted philosophy since the days of Descartes.” The perceiving mind was “a spectator” in the old physics; “it is now an actor”. In other words, “perceiver and perceived are interacting parts of a single system.” (finis of Aryan Path)

“India⁵³⁹ & Modern Thought” by Viscount Haldane in the New Era

The British Empire is entering on a new stage in its development. The principles recognised and adopted two years ago for that development express what is latent in the new stage. Wherever a dominion has reached a sufficient level in the practice of self-government, it is now recognised that it has freedom to govern itself without interference from London. It is open to it to recede from the British Empire if it should elect to do so. The movement has however been accompanied by another movement. The dominions generally have shown that they attach importance for themselves to remaining within the Empire on terms of complete liberty of action. Not only is this important to them from the point of view of wealth and trade and commerce as well as of defence. It is important to them in another respect, which is each year growing more apparent that the Empire is consolidating itself in another fashion. Each year sees more of the best teachers of standpoints held in common going out to continue their work in the dominions overseas and more of the best teachers in these dominions are coming to Great Britain to teach our students and to work co-operatively in the advancement of learning generally. The Empire is in short being unified intellectually.

Of course this step forward requires the attainment of such levels as can enable it to be taken. If the Dominions are to be equal among themselves and with the mother country, they must have developed their standards of excellence to the necessary point. It is this that is making people turn with⁵⁴⁰ increasing attention to the development in India of the deeper outlook which has characterised its thought. A common-misapprehension, even among philosophers, is that the quality of thinking of a nation can be readily estimated by glancing at what are really its superficial aspects. Because much of what is said in the name of that nation to-day does not seem to accord with Western sciences and all the ethical standards of to-day in the West, it is apt to be assumed that we may turn our eyes away from it. But this seems to be a profound error. To see what is the thinking of a nation which has produced a high level of idealism, we must understand the history of that idealism. It has been truly said that there is no one system of philosophy that will commend itself to all men individually.

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“INDIA & MODERN THOUGHT” by VISCOUNT HALDANE in THE NEW ERA

We have to study the history of reflection before we can appreciate what that history has brought to birth. The full truth lies in the development grasped as occurring from stage to stage. It is only so that the highest advances can be ascertained and estimated. Such an enquiry calls for the study of all phases of live history. It is useless to imagine that a reliable result can be reached by looking at what has been said, however apparently authoritatively, in any one generation.

This has for long appeared to me to be profoundly true of the history of Indian reflection. Of course, the language employed has been different, and there has been a lack of exact science and of the and⁵⁴¹ of the spirit of Baconian methods. But that is not the most important thing to search for. If we come by study to the highest quality in Indian thought, this must when found be given the first place, in as much as it is found to have influenced profoundly everything important that has come afterwards.

There has been study of Indian reflection in its various stages of development not only in Britain but in America and Germany and France, but this study has been confined to the few, and its results have not penetrated widely. In India, on the other hand, there has been study of European thought at least as keen. There too the study has been in few hands. But the hands are those of highly competent philosophers who have examined and mastered the idealism of the West more thoroughly than we have that of the East. The names of such Indian thinkers as Radhakrishnan, Das Gupta and Haldar are associated with us with penetrative insight into our idealism in the West and the mastery of its standpoint. It is but rarely that we find much insight of the same metaphysical quality over here.

What we need is this. West and East should grasp the level to which each has attained in its own form and in its own language. For the more there is of mutual understanding the more there seems to be discoverable of identity in outlook on the foundations of reality. Nor has the common outlook really been affected by the development of modern Sciences. The principle of relativity for example fits in easily with philosophical reflection in India as well as here.

What⁵⁴², then, is it that is most called for just now? The new Journal will, I hope, produce an increased amount of reciprocal interpretation. What we need is to get down to the common foundation of metaphysical reflection in India and over here. This is not so difficult as it seems if we go behind words to their meanings. I will not repeat what I have sought to convey in an article written in the Hibbert Journal for July. The comparison of the doctrine to be found in the Vedanta and in the teaching of Gautama

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and elsewhere in the language of the leaders of Indian thought, with what has been laid down in much detail by Bradley in his "Appearance and Reality" and "Essays on Truth and Reality" and even more massively by Hegel in his "Philosophie des Geistes" points to the dominance with both sets of thinkers of conceptions required and employed in common. Bradley may pronounce thought to be essentially relational and therefore inadequate as an instrument for reaching what is ultimate. He may suggest feeling as a purer element of approach. But into these conceptions which belong to thought he lapses back unavoidably in his final analysis. His departure from Hegel, of whose legacy he so often declares himself to be inheritor, is really much less than is popularly supposed.

When we pass over the seas to look at what the great Indian teachers have bequeathed to the world, we find the analogy to this. At their highest, when they go behind metaphor, they tell us, as Gautama for instance did, that the foundation of⁵⁴³ the real is mind. By mind they do not mean a substance, any more than Hegel did. What is said is that the ultimate reality is action, the activity of thought in giving actuality and meaning to experience. They do not indicate the activity of a finite or individual human mind. For such a mind is always conditioned by the natural organism which it requires in order to express itself and cannot stand for the full truth. They mean mind in the sense in which it signifies what is final and absolute, expressing itself in human minds and also in their objective experience, but in fact being always more than this. When one compares Indian teaching on this matter with the doctrine set out as a whole in Hegel's "Philosophie des Geistes", it is impossible not to be struck by the close resemblance in the teaching given in an interval of centuries between. The analogy is even greater than that between the Hegelian principle and the Philosophy of the Greeks. The concluding part of the "Philosophie des Geistes" brings this out.

It seems to me that it is the duty of modern thinkers to examine these resemblances more closely than has so far been done. For they indicate that the ultimate conceptions of metaphysics in all its greatest forms have much that is identical in them. If so, however East and West have come to diverge over details, the essence of their final doctrines are not divergent. If this be so, it opens up a new avenue for hope in the quest after final⁵⁴⁴ truth. Much of the work has yet to be done, but the thinkers of India have in the recent works to which I have referred made a handsome contribution to it. If less has been accomplished over here it is perhaps because our people are less attracted by metaphysics.

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Of course there is in both worlds of philosophy much metaphor and simile. For it is in images that we think even in the most abstract and exact sciences. But we can get behind such metaphors and similes to the general conceptions they embody with the expressions in the Vedanta and in the records of Gautama's teaching this has been so far done. What remains for further research is to compare closely the underlying conceptions so embodied in Eastern thought with the fundamental conceptions of western metaphysicians. Thinkers like Professor Radhakrishnan have shown themselves to be well aware of the analogies. Take for example the wider and deeper view of mind in the last volume "The Philosophy of Mind" which we have in an admirable translation. Hegel explains how this conception has nothing to do with what is called pantheism. It is concerned with the absolute as subject. "Only" he says towards the conclusion of Section 552 "in the principle of mind, which is aware of its own essence, is implicitly in absolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation, does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power, religion and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one, and for accomplishing the⁵⁴⁵ reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. Self realising subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality."

Compare with this what Professor Radhakrishnan says about the form which the history of reflection has assumed in India. Towards the end of his book on "The Hindu View of Life" he makes this observation:-

"There has been no such thing as a uniform, stationary, unalterable Hinduism whether in point of belief or practice. Hinduism is a movement, not a position; a process, not a result; a growing tradition, not a fixed revelation. Its past history encourages us to believe that it will be found equal to any emergency that the future may throw up whether in the field of thought or of history." Again earlier (page 46). "Every God accepted by Hinduism is elevated and ultimately identified with the central reality which is one with the deeper self of man. The addition of new Gods to the Hindu Pantheon does not endanger it."

This presentation of the history of religion and Philosophy in India resembles in material respects the presentation of the history of all such reflection in the West by the Western idealists. What need further is to have attention more closely called to it and to have it worked out in detail.

Of course, there are differences in such presentations.⁵⁴⁶ The spirit in the East is different from that of the West but the task is to discover whether there is not a basis

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fundamental in common to the spirit in both cases. For the reasons I have just given and for those assigned in the article on East and West in the Hibbert Journal for July. I think that a common basis exists. It is to me a source of much satisfaction that the new Journal is likely to stimulate the process of the necessary investigation of it.

The Modern Review: Prof. S. Radhakrishnan

“We must attain power to translate our inspiration into actualities.”

2. “Let us build a better India, a better Asia and a better world. If the science of the West is necessary for the comfort of the world, the wisdom of the East is necessary for the salvation of mankind.”

The⁵⁴⁷ Good Life & Hinduism by Swami Nikhilananda in Modern Review

(1) We do not deny that Christianity, like other religions, has produced moral men of distinction and eminence. But we totally deny that Christianity gives any rational philosophy of the good life. It is the fear of God that is the basis of morality in Christianity as of all religions depending solely upon the conception of a personal God.

2. his philosophy (or dogma?) of morality is based upon two assumptions, viz. that in reality a personal God exists and that He is powerful enough to punish the transgressors of His law. The existence of God as a “Person” has not yet been rationally proved. Neither the cosmological, nor the teleological nor even the ontological arguments point to us the real existence of a ‘personal’ God. Even Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” does not rationally establish a ‘Personal God’ as the source of morality. The conception of ‘personal’ God is only a theological necessity. All men, really speaking, do not believe in the existence of a ‘personal’ God.

3. Even if a personal God exists the history of the world belies His almightiness as well as his goodness. Everywhere the moral law is transgressed with impunity. War, bloodshed, and destruction are still the general rule in the world whereas love, amity, fellow feeling the exception. Nature ‘red in tooth and claw’ still reigns supreme. Almighty God who is all good is impotent before it. If He himself has created Satan then God must be the creator of the worst passions and the most wicked instincts. If God is perpetually confronted and frustrated in His benign plan by⁵⁴⁸ an evil spirit

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called Satan, then He is not almighty. And if He Himself has planted evil instincts in the hearts of men and then chastises them, he cannot be said to be good. The prospect of reward in heaven or punishment in hell is no solace to the virtuous who suffer from iniquity in this world. God is the Lord of this world as He is on heaven and hell. "Let Thy will be done in this world as it is in Heaven" is the daily prayer of the Christian. Still we find God helpless in subduing the force of evil on this earth to which a man looks wistfully to see God's will fulfilled. Man has a right to doubt the assurance of divine reward in heaven if he finds God impotent to overcome evil in this world which is His 'foot-stool'. Where is the answer to the question why so many innocent children are made to undergo untold suffering in this world? The fear of hell or the assurance of heaven and the conception of a God armed with sceptre and rod may satisfy the commonalty of mankind who require the whip and the cudgel for making them pursue the right path. But such ideas seem childish to the rational mind, in the absence of a proof that God, heaven and hell are actualities.

4. We look in vain for a stable moral philosophy in any religion depending solely upon a personal God or His so-called revealed Words. Among men who do not belong to any religion or school of philosophy there have been and are exemplars of the highest morality. But when we inquire into the rationale of such conduct we must say that Vedanta alone gives us a true philosophy of 'the good life'. Vedanta, the foundation of Hinduism, says that the real explanation of immoral propensities of⁵⁴⁹ man lies in his perception of duality which engenders in him selfishness, lust, greed, fear, jealousy, hatred etc. According to Vedanta this duality is the mother of evil. All that exists is only Brahman which is non-dual. And duality is the outcome of ignorance of the real nature of Brahman. When one sees another, one being impelled by the motive of self-preservation, becomes a rival to the other. But one who realizes his own self in All cannot hate or injure another. No one but lunatic ever thinks of injuring or becoming a rival to one's own self, Brahman. The bond of brotherhood of men under the fatherhood of God is an extremely fragile bond which gives way under the slightest stress, as the history of Europe has abundantly shown, especially in her dealings with the Asiatics, the Africans and the Americans. The aim of knowledge, according to Vedanta, is to make every individual feel as one with the entire universe. Vedanta has formulated certain ethical laws which are indispensable for the realization of the ideal of non-duality.

5. The non-dual infinite alone is Bliss, and all limitations spell misery, says Vedanta. The Indian ideal of morality means detachment from the senses and attachment to the self. We should not do our duty with the motive of purchasing shares in the other world and opening a bank account with God. as Prof. Radhakrishnan says.

In Europe philosophy has practically nothing to do with morality. No philosopher except those belonging to the Elastic and the Stoic schools of ancient Greece enjoin moral⁵⁵⁰ discipline as necessary for men in their pursuit of philosophical enquiry. Therefore it is a gross misrepresentation of fact to say that Hinduism has no philosophy of the good life. On the other hand, no one in the world could be more moral than the philosophic Hindus. Their benevolence, charity, love and sympathy go beyond their own race and cover not only the entire humanity but also the animal and the vegetable world because Brahman is one with the entire universe.

6. The author deplors that Hinduism is dominated “by intellectualism of a highly abstract kind” and regrets that the ablest thinkers of India display “a passion for the One, the Absolute, which has not applied itself to the interpretation of the present day experience or the scientific study of nature, but has tended to regard it all as an illusion—as a baneful veil that hides the face of Reality and on which the wise man, in his search for Truth, had to turn his back” This is also a misrepresentation due to lack of understanding. The Brahman of Vedanta is not a mental abstraction or a logical necessity like the Absolute of Hegel. It is a Reality that one actually realizes as the substratum of the entire universe. It explains in the most rational way our empirical experiences which have no reality apart from Brahman. The Vedantists studied the sensuous experiences in their minutes detail and found the world of percepts extended in time and space and bound by laws of causation to be nothing but thoughts and ideas. The conclusion that the conception of time and space is after all a relative one and that material world is nothing but⁵⁵¹ mere form of thought is now admitted by such great scientists as Eddington and Sir James Jeans. Therefore the Vedantic seers had rightly turned their face against the illusion of name and form in order to find out the reality underlying the universe. The realisation that phenomena are, after all, illusion of mind enabled them to get a firm grip over life and instead of turning their back upon the world they accepted it knowing it to be the manifestation of Brahman. Vedanta never asks a man to escape from life but only exhorts him to know its true worth. The Vedantists can make themselves quite happy in this world by devoting themselves to its amelioration because they feel their oneness with all.

We do not deny the fact that unprogressive and conservative priesthood contributed a great deal to the degradation of Hinduism as is the case with all organized religions dependent upon the church. A witty Christian writer once remarked, “Dont touch the Church of England. It is the only thing that stands between us and Christ.”

Dr Gore condemns the asceticism of Hinduism and carps at its monastic ideal which he characterises as “the extinction of individuality by the extinction of desire.”

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Hinduism never enjoins ascetic practices for their own sake. It, no doubt, prescribes certain rigorous disciplines for curbing the inordinate desire of the flesh: for complete detachment from senses is a sine qua non for the realization of Truth. The ideal of Vedanta is to realize the true meaning of individuality which is nothing but⁵⁵² identity with the Universal Self. This ideal can never be reached without changing one's outlook on the individuality of the ego which is nothing but a combination of the sense organs, mind and body whose ephemeral nature is too well known to require any refutation.

7. The Gita gives a wonderful synthesis of different aspects of human thought. It shows that different phases of human nature, for instance, active, emotional, psychic or intellectual, if properly guided by reason and understanding, ultimately lead to the realization of the Highest Truth, The Gita gives the philosophy of work which is of inestimable value to every one in the world. All of us do work but very few know its secret which lie in the disinterested attitude of the worker. The Gita exhorts everyone to look upon himself as the Eternal and Immutable Atman and this can be realised if we perform our duty for the sake of duty, love others for the sake of love, and acquire knowledge for the sake of knowledge.

8. Dr Gore claims superior rationality for his arguments. But we have tried in vain to find in the book any trace of pure reasoning based upon universal tests. He claims that Christianity contains the highest Truth though nowhere does he give the tests of truth. From cover to cover the book shows only what is known as the 'rationalization' of a preconceived desire, namely, the author's conception of the superiority of Christianity over other religions. He depends upon faith and intuition to prove his contention or rather the conclusion he had already formed in his mind.

9. If⁵⁵³ reason is helpless in proving the truth of anything, then, one wonders why Dr Gore should have taken the trouble of writing a voluminous book of 346 pages in order to prove the superior rationality of Christian monotheism over other systems of thought. This shows that he is also painfully conscious that no intelligent man or woman of modern times would listen to him unless he states his case in a rational way. The modern philosophy of Europe owes its development to the discarding of the exploded scholastic methods of the medieval age. But it is by this method, i.e. by mixing up faith and intuition with a so-called process of reasoning that the author has arrived at the conclusion.

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10. "Intuition", "Faith" and "Inspiration", untested by reason, has been a most potent factor in perpetuating human ignorance and increasing human misery. They stifled in the past the spirit of free enquiry after Truth. Most of the scientific and philosophical discoveries of Europe have been arrived at in the teeth of church opposition because the custodians of the church came to know intuitively that such discoveries would imperil human (or rather rationally speaking, 'their own') interest. But still reason, the divine impulse in man, has triumphed. Triumph of blind faith means the reversion to the dark age. If 'arrogant' faith, scorning the very idea of independent reason, needs any chastisement, there is no more effective chastisement than the human refusal to submit to its illegitimate guidance.

11. The non-dualism of Advaita has survived the tremendous opposition levelled against it during the last twenty centuries. Whenever opportunities⁵⁵⁴ arose in the past it profoundly influenced and enriched other philosophical systems of the world. Among the early Greek thinkers, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus, according to some reliable authorities, were greatly impressed by the Hindu ideal. Later on Vedanta exerted its influence upon modern thinkers like Carlyle, Schopenhauer, Deussen, Max Muller, Thoreau, and Emerson. It is because the philosophy of Vedanta is based upon reason and seeks the Truth, The fact that the modern European trend of thought has again turned its attention towards Idealism and that it looks forward to Vedanta for guidance shows that the philosophy of Europe has become eager to rise about forms, creeds and beliefs and pursue the Truth for its own sake. Naturally, the vested interests of the Church have become nervous at the prospect of the Vedantic invasion of Europe.

The Psychological Outlook in Hindu Philosophy by Girindrashekar Bose in Modern Review

1. Our enquirer when he comes upon an open plane and looks upwards, will find that his space is bounded above by the immense blue vault of the heavens called by the name of 'Dyau' by the rishis of old; the lightning which seems to flash out of the dyau is called bidyut in Sanskrit which means the piercer of the dyau. The sun, the moon, and the stars all move within the dyau. The dyau is limited below by the different points of the compass and is the biggest entity. The Dyau is the Brahman.

When our enquirer makes a careful observation of the dyau he finds that the position of the stars and the heavenly bodies change from⁵⁵⁵ day to day till after a year

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the original configuration comes back. It is within the fold of time that the dyau goes on changing. Therefore, time is the larger entity and Time is the Brahman. You might raise the objection that our enquirer who is unfamiliar with Einstein should include space and time within the same category and should call one the bigger of the two. It is true that the psychological perceptions of space and time are quite distinct from each other and have nothing in common between them. If we go deep into introspection we find that the experience of time, unlike that of visual space, does not come through the intermediary of any special sense organ. Time is directly apprehended by the mind as it were. All sensations have duration as one of their attributes. The 'time feeling' is specially marked in all those mental experiences which have the characteristic of change in them; all such experiences take place in time. It may, therefore, be said that the experience of time is a wider experience which includes all other experiences. The time of the physicist is only an outward projection of the psychologists' time experience. Time as an entity, therefore, is the biggest entity of all. The spatial experience of dyau of our enquirer has the characteristic of changing from day to day and that is the reason why introspection shows it to be engulfed in the wider experience of time. Our enquirer is perfectly right when he says "O time, everything happens within thy fold, none can escape thy embrace. Every⁵⁵⁶ being is born in time and dies in time. Thou art eternal. Thou are the Brahman. My salutation to thee."

2. Jaibali then enlightened the two rishis and said that the earth had its support in space or the sky which was the largest entity. He further pointed out that everything had its origin within this space and perished within it; the sky was immeasurable and infinite and he who knew it to be so was bound to become great and victorious in life.

3. It was ultimately asserted that Ananda was the Brahman. Ananda is to be identified with Pure Consciousness, not the consciousness of this or that or the knowledge of anything, but the pure consciousness without reference to any context, which like the light illuminates everything on which it alights and which it brings within its grasp. It is to be noted that most of the present-day psychologists do not admit a pure consciousness without a context; consciousness must be of this or that. But the pure consciousness of the rishis is no imaginary concept. It is to be realized in actual experience by ardent effort. I have only made an attempt here to arrive at it intellectually. It took one hundred and one years of hard meditation on the part of Indra to realize this pure consciousness which is identical with the Brahman. The search for Brahman thus essentially turns out to be a pure psychological problem.

4. When a modern scientist attempts to formulate a theory of creation he begins with matter either as a primordial stuff or electron and proton or whatever it is. Out of such⁵⁵⁷ stuff the nebulae are formed and then the suns and stars which are of the nature of incandescent gases. The stars give rise to planets which gradually cool down and become liquid and finally the crust becomes solid. There is no life, much less consciousness up to this stage. Then the oceans come into existence and out of inorganic matter life of a simple type in the form of unicellular organism comes into existence very likely in the ocean. This uni-cellular organism develops along two directions and in the process of evolution gives rise to immense varieties of plants and animals. Consciousness is the last to develop and first appears in a rudimentary form in the lower animals. In the human being which is the last word in creation consciousness attains its fullest development.

The Hindu theory of creation stands in sharp contrast with the modern scientific doctrine. It begins at the wrong end as it were. Consciousness is the first element in creation and inert matter is the last to develop.

The Future of Civilization by Pramatha Chaudhuri in New Era

(1) I was not a little surprised at coming across a pamphlet called Kalki, which Prof. Radhakrishnan has contributed to the TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW series of England, a series which is considered ultra-modern, both in thought and style. I wondered what a Hindu Philosopher could have to say, to kindle the hopes or fears of the civilized people of the West. Supposing he had a message to deliver, would it be intelligible to them?

It⁵⁵⁸ is a well-known fact, that even the professional philosophers of Europe find our philosophic ratiocinations utterly unintelligible. Why the scientifically constructively intellectual machine of Europe should be paralysed at the touch of Indian thought, has ever been a mystery to me. Is it the unfamiliar nature of our thought, or our method of reasoning, or our strange vocabulary, which throws the European mind off its track?—I have my doubts. That appearance may not be reality, is a thought which has troubled the philosophic conscience of Europe also. Is Indian logic, then, a mere misnomer for what the Greeks called fallacy? As regards vocabulary, there is no such barbarous concatenation of words as: “transcendental unity of apperception”, in the whole range of our philosophical literature. I can only presume that the inability to grasp other people’s thought, is considered to be a mark of the superior mind. Whatever the cause

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may be, the fact is that Hindu philosophy is an unintelligible to Europeans, as European philosophy is intelligible to Indians.

2. His voice, at any rate, does not come from the innermost depths of the Indian jungle. His mind is as unmistakably modern as that of any other contributor to the TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW, series, and he has also appropriated his European colleagues' manner of expression.

3. We gather that in the opinion of the journalistic critics of England, every pamphlet of this series is at once brilliant and witty, sparkling and startling. It is difficult for a foreigner to believe, that a whole race of⁵⁵⁹ Voltaires has suddenly sprung up from the soil of England. However that may be, Kalki certainly does not belie the reputation of the series, in spite of the fact that it was written, not with the object of making timid people start, but of giving level-headed people pause. To my mind the greatest merit of Kalki, is that it is not deliberately clever, that is to say, deliberately insincere.

4. Russell compels us to think furiously, and so does Radhakrishnan; although the spirit in which the Hindu philosopher approaches the problems of modern civilization, is totally different from that of the English mathematician. I think Radhakrishnan is as incapable of subscribing to the doctrines of What I believe, as to those of the ancient Hindu philosopher, Charvak. His mind is absolutely free from all dogmatism, Eastern, or Western, religious or scientific. We Indians, as a rule, are not men of faith, in the European sense of the term,—I mean those amongst us, whose misfortune it is to think clearly, and not act blindly. So it is not to be wondered at, that the religious optimism of Kalki is in striking contrast to the scientific pessimism of Icarus. That everything is not for the best in this the best of all possible worlds,—that is to say in modern Europe—is as apparent to Russell as to Radhakrishnan; only the Hindu believes that things can be bettered. That is the keynote of his thought.

5. A confession of error is the prelude to all improvement. Even those of us, who have not the robust optimism of Radhakrishnan in their⁵⁶⁰ constitution, need not have any hesitation in joining the campaign against old-world errors. All kinds of lazy dogmatisms must be disturbed and the shackles of the past must be broken, if civilization is to grow. But what of the living and kicking dogmatisms of to-day, and the political and economic shackles, which the modern man is busy forging for himself? What guarantee is there, that they will further the growth of civilization?

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6. Anybody who cares to go through Kalki, cannot fail to be impressed with the thoroughness of his analysis, and the keenness of his criticism. What is known as modern thought is largely, if not wholly, made up of negations. When an intellectual giant of the modern world talks of "What I believe", he tells us what he does not believe. This lack of belief is the outstanding characteristic of the modern mind, and in the opinion of Radhakrishnan, is at the root of all the negative results of modern civilization. Human life, whether individual or national, cannot be solidly based on an empty "no" much less can it grow thereon to its full height.

7. The reason why I find Kalki so interesting is, that it brings home to us Indians the fact, that the ideas and ideals of the West, are knocking the bottom out of our Indian psychology. England has not only conquered our country, but our soul too. Whilst we resent our political slavery, we glory in our intellectual and moral subjugation. We have persuaded ourselves that the only way to gain political swaraj, is to lose our spiritual swaraj. We blindly adore the idols of the market⁵⁶¹-place of Europe, and call them divine ideals. Kalki may be helpful in mode-rating our enthusiasm for the dubious deities of the demos.

An irate Frenchman, named Massis, has recently written an alarmist book, called DEFENCE OF THE OCCIDENT. He is afraid that Western civilisation will fall into a deadly swoon, if it is not protected from the invidious attack of the poison gas called Indian thought. His countrymen however, have found the lucubrations of Massis more amusing than alarming. The Westerners know perfectly well, that there is not the least chance of their becoming Buddhists or Vedantists. As one French critic has pointed out, the danger is all the other way, because the prestige of Europe is so great, that its errors are welcomed by the Asiatics as revealed truth.

Some Thoughts on English Prose Style by C.L.R. Sastri in New Era

(1) Certain reputed critics have laid it down as their considered opinion, as their unshakable conviction, that the manner is nothing so long as the matter is precious; that the idea is the chief thing; and that "style", being only a kind of outward dressing, a sort of extraneous ornament, does not, to appeal to the serious student. One of our objects in writing this article is to show up the utter hollowness and absurdity of this theory.

It is, we venture to think, high time people recognised that obscurity of expression does not necessarily connote profundity of thought. Every person that writes is allowed certain peculiarities of style (to match the particular⁵⁶² idiosyncrasies of his mind), but it only stands to reason that he should not push these peculiarities

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THE FUTURE OF CIVILIZATION by Pramatha Chaudhuri. in NEW ERA

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beyond a more or less well-defined limit. All arts enjoin on their practitioners some amount of discipline of self-restraint, and we do not see why, amongst them all, writers alone should regard themselves as being exempt from it. The function of literature is to entertain, not puzzle, the reader. Nor is profound thought, we imagine, any the worse for lucid expressions. If the expression is not lucid, then one of two things follows: either the thought of which it is, *ex hypothesi*, the vehicle, is not so profound, is not so world-convulsing, as it feigns to be, or it is, as yet, not clear enough to the writer himself. Let us not be taken in by such pretences. There never yet was any thought that was incapable, in the right hands, of the most lucid expression. As Mr Herbert Paul, referring to Swift, says in his admirable book, *Men and Letters*

“Until Swift became a lunatic, his mind cut life a diamond through the hardest substance in its way. No sophistry ever deceived him. No difficulty ever puzzled him. There was nothing he thought which he could not express. The pellucid simplicity of his style, both in prose and in verse, came of clear thinking and sound reasoning, assisted by the habit of daily explanation to unlettered women. It is easy to understand him, because he understood so easily himself. A great deal of time is wasted by the general reader in guessing at the meaning of authors who did not mean anything in particular. Uncertainty is the fruitful parent of obscurity, and many people write obscurely in the hope that they will be thought profound. Like⁵⁶³ the subaltern who would not form his letters distinctly lest his correspondents should find out how he spelt, there is a class of writers who will not be plain lest the poverty of their thoughts should be exposed. In philosophy, thought may be more important. Nay, it is more important.

2. The silliest thing uttered well becomes literature: where as the profoundest thing spoiled in the telling remains outside literature’s porch.

Reviews Reviewed in ‘New Era’

The essence of this quotation is in the two sentences: “In the desert he hears a voice and a call. He does not hesitate: he says it is the voice of god, the force, is divine.”

It is incredible that in our day men can still be so ignorant as to believe things of this kind. Do they not know about voices, compulsion-neuroses, etc. as studied by psychologists? Do they really suppose that because a voice appears to a man who imagines it to be divine, it therefore is divine? If they would visit our lunatic asylums and collect statistics as to what divine voices have commanded, I think they might feel a little more hesitation.

The objectification of good and evil, which I confess I believed in at one time, appears to me now to be a mere error due to self-importance. I do not mean personal self-important; I mean self-importance on behalf of the human species. We think

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ourselves very fine fellows, and imagine our doings to be very important: we flatter ourselves that⁵⁶⁴ our hope and fears are a key to the universe. But wherever scientific knowledge is proved possible this attitude has had to be avoided. Experience shows that a certain kind of ethical self-repression is necessary if we are to understand the world. Ethics is after all concerned with what happens in this planet, and to attribute cosmic importance to it is some what parochial. One is reminded of the villagers who, when lightning strikes the village pump, think that this has happened because they do not go to church with sufficient regularity. What is human history in any case? It is only a brief episode on the surface of a minute planet. If we are going to attach cosmic importance to human history, let us at least take it as a whole, and include in our purview the extinction of human life, which is in the end inevitable. When the last man crawls into a cave to die of cold or thirst, will he take the same view of the religious meaning of human history as Mr Wood takes? I doubt it.

Future of Civilisation by Pramatha Chaudhuui

(8). We ⁵⁶⁵Indians to-day hanker after a To-morrow which would be a facsimile copy of Europe's to-day. I am afraid that it is as little feasible for us to go back to the Vedic age, as to go forward to the new age of Europe.

9. Every nation with a history, has a distinct psychological accent of its own, which creates all the difference in the world. We can no more jump out of our historical frame of mind, than we can jump out of our skins.

10. But to be stimulated by foreign ways of thinking, is not the same thing as to be dominated. Modern Europe has profoundly disturbed our⁵⁶⁶ psychology; and has created the present wholesale confusion of Indian thought. To us the gospel according to Bertrand Russell, is the same as that according to Romain Rolland. The incapacity to distinguish mathematical logic from musical ethics, does not argue intellectual sanity.

11. How can we get out of this serio-comic situation? Certainly not by waxing eloquent over the wisdom of our ancient sages. Life has placed new problems before us, which cannot be solved with the help of time-worn formulas. Neither can we seek security within a Chinese wall of ignorance and prejudice. The days of provincialism are over, and intellectual barriers are falling down on all sides.

In the modern world, criticism is the only weapon, both offensive and defensive, in our intellectual armoury. It is a double-edged sword, which cuts both ways, and

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does not spare the errors of either the past or the present. That the author of Kalki can wield this weapon with the ease and skill of a master, no reader of the book will venture to deny.

B.K. Mallik

In this pseudo-astrological haste to frame up our future; and, to lament at leisure, the rest of our life, for having nothing more to do.

Reviews in New Era

The upper classes are wasting money and by their provocative follies are destroying the bough on which they are perched. Revolutions are usually brought about by those who fear them most.

\$ But all those achievements belong to the to⁵⁶⁷ the external order and would never have been realised had Bolshevism been but one of the occasional salient phenomena measured by the ordinary standards of historical criticism. It is more. It is a transcendental agency which took its origin from the unplumbed depths and its charter from Fate. And it is amoral and inexorable because transcendental. It has come, as Christianity came, not for peace, but for the sword, and its victims outnumber those of the most sanguinary wars.

\$\$ Prof. Dewey too reads the same lesson as Mr Russell out of the text of American life, as already being what the world in general is coming to be. Out of that experience a new answer is emerging to an old problem, "the one answer that has not either-to been given." The answer seems also to be called a "position" or an "attitude". Either way it appears to be based on the enforced acceptance of the controlling role of technological industry in contemporary civilisation and voted in the resolution to find a philosophy appropriate to that fact. IT undertakes the task of supplying "an articulate system of ideas which will provide subsequent workers with confidence and courage, and give direction and point to their activities."

\$\$ The defects in the older tradition to which he points out are there, should be acknowledged, and cures for them sought for and welcomed. It is indeed ridiculous to suppose that the text of human experience came to its close 25 or 300 or⁵⁶⁸ 400 years ago, just as ridiculous as to suppose that its text began then. If we are ever to make out its meaning we must take it as widely as we can and treat all we can keep or get of it in

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the same say. Not otherwise can we look to interpret any chapter of it or order our doings appropriately to that state of affairs whatever it may be, in which we have to act. To confine ourselves to the present age, or to the American and "Americanised" tract of it, is simply to put on blinkers.

Religion and Reality by Sir Hari Singh Gour in New Era Magazine

Tradition, early impressions and the influence of elders are far more potent factors in moulding the thoughts of men than education, logic and reason. Indeed, the combined effect of one is the parent of that blind faith which refuses to yield to the stern reality of reason, the very approach of which is at times hailed with the missiles of derision angry protests and calumny. It is thus that fallacies and fancies that become perpetuated and passed into the very fibre of our being, and though the world is old and has made giant strides in the domain of science, in the domain of superstition and dogma, it has remained, and remains today, as backward as it ever was when the witches were burnt and the unbelievers impaled. The civilization of Europe and America has made cataclysmic changes in the political and social outlook of man, but in the field of religion its advance, if any, has been spasmodic and erratic. Its feeble movement towards advance has been ruthlessly checked by a counter movement towards a deeper orthodoxy. In India, where the refreshing breeze⁵⁶⁹ of new ideas passes unnoticed, the masses, accustomed to traditional faith and mechanical routine of life, remain unmoved by the preacher of a new dispensation. The Eastern Society is, indeed, an inert mass of unmoving matter which might be galvanized into a semblance of life but to which there is yet no hope of imparting real vitality. As such, the masses in the East and those in the West might be said to present a contrast—and afford no room for comparison. But if we examine the psychology of the two people we shall find innate identity between the two the differences between them being those of degree rather than of kind.

The Western thinks the Eastern mind devoid of effort—originality and energy—the Eastern thinks the Western devoid of spirituality benevolence and charity. The Eastern regards the Western materialistic, the Western contemns the East as superstitious, which he in his ignorance and folly calls "spiritualistic."

The fact is that both the East and the West are a prey to time-long domination of another power—a power which enslaved their progenitors and which by its gained momentum has imparted to the enslaved a feeling that their bondage is their birthright, their thralldom their excellence. It is by a process of perverse reflex action that a man

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can be led to believe that all his shackles are his golden amulets, that his abject subservience to the crafty priest craft, the best guerdon of his personal purity and mental spirituality. This abject state of human depravity feeds upon its own venom and imparts it to those born free from it. Thus in time the virus⁵⁷⁰ inoculates the whole nation and the prisoner becomes his own goal-keeper more vigilant and ruthless than any mere hireling can hope to be. This is then the aetiology of a people whose little lives are spent in their self-ordained torture chambers—believing, believing, and believing, but seldom thinking of what they believe and never putting their thoughts into the fiery crucible of reason.

If we examine the history of the world we shall find that humanity at large has from the days of its infancy been a victim to its own hopes and fears. These have been exploited by the unscrupulous and the wily who have, in course of time, spread a network of superstition, dogma and ritual, which, while arresting the play of reason, have reduced man to the abject condition of a lunatic or a child or one whose mental faculties have been benumbed by the paralysing passes of the hypnotist. And such is the vicious circle in which man moves, that if all the religions of the world were suppressed, and if all their priests hanged, it will not be long before another set of prophets and Pharisees will arise and engulf humanity into a new set of dogmas and nostrums, and one is not sure whether the new dispensation would not be worse than the old. The fact is that man cannot exist without a religion. To him religion of some sort is a psychological necessity. He must have a religion to satisfy his craving for immortality. He must have a religion to satisfy his yearning for greater happiness. He has invented religion to give his life a hope and remove from death its sting. This is the rationale of all religions. They⁵⁷¹ are all man-made, and made, as it were, to order. Their view-points are diverse, because human cravings are diverse. If one wants quiet and repose in the Elysian fields after the heat and dust of a restless life, another wants the houris and almond trees to gratify one's wants which intensify the pleasurable sensations of an idle life. Contrariwise persons whose life upon earth is akin to hell need a more horrid portraiture of the netherland than those to whom the mere deprivation of their favoured pursuits would launch into a mental anguish compared to which the horrors of hell are but a crude pastime.

We may then safely premise that religion is a logical necessity to man to fill in the lacunae left vacant by science. The one fills by prophecy what the other cannot cover by ratiocination. Those, therefore, who decry religion as a snare and its institutions as a menace to human progress must not forget that no human device will stamp out religion, and if we can conceive of an Utopia in which the rule of life would

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be guided by reason we must not dismiss from our conception the misery of those who have no reason to guide them. Shall they then be left wholly guideless? Shall they, who cannot see, be refused the aid of those who profess to see for them? They may be themselves misguided, or they may be calculated charlatans anxious to profit by the weakness of their fellow-beings, but whatever may be case, the fact remains that they are as much a social necessity as they are a social danger. The philosopher would let the religionist alone if he could be kept within his legitimate bounds. Let him peer into the Unknown of which the thinker knows not, let him offer an imaginary and attractive el dorado to those to whom the fancied beatitude of a future⁵⁷² life gives solace to this. But this limit is seldom observed, nor is it possible to restrict them otherwise than by the rush of reason to dispel the idols of the market place. This is the arena for the conflict of Science with religion. The one addresses itself to the reality – the other to the exuberance of human fancy fanned by human ambition to attain the unattainable, to idealize the real, and weave an imagery round the drab plain truths of life. The conflict between religion and science has been going on for time immemorial, and though religion has pilloried science and burnt its apostles meeting their truths with ruthless mendacity, science will continue to carry on its struggle, but whether it will ever triumph and knock off the shackles which religion has wrought around human endeavour can only be dimly divined. It is clear that the present century, and certainly the last decade, has shattered human belief in divine agency and the omni-potency of religion. It is beginning to be slowly realized that religion was invented to satisfy the human craving, but has lived to curb its manifold energies. But so long as science fails to plumb the depth of human ignorance religion will remain to regale the masses with its traveller's tales. And this will go on till man becomes more rational and less religious, more thoughtful and less superstitious, more determined to give a pause to his romantic fancy and less disposed to truckle to the fallacies of dogma.

In order to wean him from the confusion of ages what is required is a new method of education.⁵⁷³ Religion must be banished from the school curricula. The parental right to impose upon his offspring his own religious idiosyncracies must be curbed by the State. It must stand for the elucidation of truth, for the development of human mind along the well-beaten track of known data and demonstrable knowledge. Education in the schools must be secular and that in the college sternly scientific. After the student has left the college let him delve in his hobbies – but so long as he is under tutelage let his mind not wander into the mysteries of after-life nor absorb its ready-made solutions. It is prophesied by the hierophants of religion that such an education would drive out all moral sense from the pupil and in a single generation degrade a god-fearing nation into a rabble of athiests. They, however, forget that it is much better

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to beget a race of truthful athiests than a rabble of religious hypocrites. What is good for the humanity? Its training so that all that is highest, noblest, and best in man should be given a chance to develop and subserve the cause of truth, or that a docile superstitious animalculae be raised to carry on the tradition of their forbears and obey the behests of authority? The problem is great and not only national but international. The masses already steeped in the abysmal darkness of ages and surrounded by the phantoms of fear and dread of the unknown cannot be expected to take the lead. It is the thinking few all over the world who can combine to remove the religious menace to the growth of knowledge, and it is they who must stand and be ready to suffer the social⁵⁷⁴ martyrdom for their faith in the ultimate good of humanity as bound up with the study of reality and the banishment of religion from their academies.

B.K. Mallik (A Critical Survey of S. Radhakrishnan's "Hindu View of Life")

1. This eminently readable book still remains to be understood.
2. But what, to my infinite shame, I am not aware of, is whether the real point of the Professor ever crossed the seas.
3. Perhaps the European mind would never see the Hindu point however heroically it might try. Whether this is my personal pathology or it is truly grounded in realities I do not know; but what seems to have been almost rooted in me especially after a long sojourn in Europe, is the conviction that even the days of Vivekananda are gone, once and for ever. What this exactly means is certainly not what I obviously say; but it was high time our Swami his had realised the decline of those heroic days and the steady "catholic wrath" in their trail. I would not deny, however, that a Russel or a Jacks, might, still behave, at times, as if the citadel of European absolutism had well-nigh capitulated. On the contrary we might even witness stray wanderings either into the vividness of our Rabindranath or the chastened twilight of Sabarmati.
4. Here was a talk as brilliantly modern as you please, and yet it all flowed from one who was scrupulously a Hindu though curiously enough with neither its aloofness nor orthodoxy. Perhaps, it is too early yet to canonise Professor Radhakrishnan, but, indeed, there was so much of open and fresh air⁵⁷⁵ in his presentation side by side with keen advocacy, so much of humility and love along with a rigidity. And yet the lectures were, one and all, an intellectual treat, as strongly independent in tone as they were fresh and original in form.

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5. If it so happened that the distance between the Hindu and the European still did not shrink, even after the Professor had spoken, perhaps it was a calamity which even the Gods could not mend. Indeed, it need not be even officious to add that there must be considerable happenings in this universe of ours before we could seriously contemplate even an intimate alliance between them. At the very least, to raise only a practical issue, a quite fresh and original mode of social existence has to be devised; and that, for the whole of the human family.

6. The more the western mind went into it the more was it bound to retreat either to its age-long antipathy or even to open hostility. Besides, this uneasy sense could only deepen as Prof. Radhakrishnan did not conclude either as a mere historian or as an advocate of Hinduism but even rose to the prophetic pitch of offering its basic principles for the reconstruction of the human home.

Aldous Huxley in "New Era"

The man who, in his vanity, imagines himself in any way a superman and who tries to behave as though he were more than human, invariably ends by becoming less than human. The further they advance in their respective carriers, the more obviously sub-human do men like Louis XIV, and Napoleon become. And the same alarming descent towards sub-humanity is observable in many of the saints and philosophers. The descent of the would-be superior⁵⁷⁶ ascetics is through relatively harmless imbecility, as exemplified by the early Franciscans, to sheer diabolism as exemplified by the Calvinists and the monks of Thebaid. The lop-sided intellectual, the sage exclusively pre-occupied with his philosophy, generally sinks into infanthood. The babyishness of professors is proverbial. Those who wish to know how far an intellectual superman can sink into infantile sub-humanity should read the story of Kant and the dried fruits quoted by Mr Havelock Ellis in his "Dance of Life." What applies to public men, to saints and philosophers, applies also, to some extent, to every member of a highly specialized society like our own. We are all in some degree living lop-sidedly, incompletely, disproportionately.

Book Review by New Era

There is a tone of assuredness about all that Shaw says or writes that attracts immediate attention. He seems to see clearly where others feel their vision is blurred. He knows his mind and makes others feel that he knows it very well. Half his genius is his self confidence. He has a superb talent for saying things that linger in the memory

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for long. He may look a trifle cynical but no other writer can give the world the shake that it badly needs. One may not agree with Shaw. But there is no ignoring him. He must be heard.

Editorial Notes

War is less the handiwork of scheming politicians and sinister diplomats and more the outcome of national temper and race prejudice. Peace will not be permanent in a world where one nation hates another, is ignorant of its history, and is contemptuous of⁵⁷⁷ its civilization. The truest guarantee of world peace is cultural understanding and harmony amongst the peoples of the earth. It is a matter for great gratification that all over the world an effort is being made by the saner section of every community to promote mutual knowledge and sympathy. The increasing interest which Europe and America are evincing in the life and thought of India and other Eastern countries is an instance in point. Turkey and Afghanistan, where hitherto the surge of life has been proverbially slow have enthused themselves by the stimulus afforded by the contact with the West. Thus culturally the world is being knit together as a unit, a process in which modern science has been a great help.

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It is not for half-penny journalists and blatant politicians to pronounce verdict upon work so great. It is for the soldiers, charged with their nation's very life, in the greatest military struggle of human history to have the final say; and this is what Lord French the Commander of the entire British forces in the early part of the war says in his book "1914": "Backed up by the opinion and advice of a very few soldiers of experience, the Secretary of State for War cast all this prejudice to the winds, and determined upon a regular and complete divisional organisation for the Territorials. It was indeed a great and courageous decision.

Lord Haldane had only some eight or nine years to wait for his reward, Within that time he saw his Territorials doing splendid and invaluable work as complete divisions in⁵⁷⁸ the field, fighting with success against the most powerful and efficient army in the world. When I say "he got his reward" I may well be mis-understood. He got nothing but calumny and grossly unjust abuse: but, the "reward" to such a man does not come in the ordinary way. He had proved the value of his great work, and that is all the reward he ever wanted.

It is marvellous that amidst all this misrepresentation and ungrateful abuse Haldane did not show the slightest sign of bitterness. But "how" one asks "did this all come about." How did Lord Haldane, who never made an enemy in his life, attract so furious an outburst of national temper?

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It is not our intention to rake up wounds which the merciful time is fast healing, but lest we forget how much democracy injures itself by allowing its judgement to be stamped by uninformed journalism we have to recount here the story of his fall, as told by the brilliant author of *The Mirrors of the Downing Street*.

Lord Haldane was not a mere man of action. Great as he was as a statesman, he was greater still as a scholar, and an enthusiast for learning. But not even his warmest admirers would claim for Lord Haldane a place among the original thinkers of philosophy, those who stamp their age, and ages to come with the vigour and individuality of their thought.

Still his great mastery of the general problems of philosophy, and his unrivalled grasp of the German metaphysics of the 19th century have made him, perhaps, the most distinguished of the Hegelians in England. His labours in philosophy were directed towards interpreting⁵⁷⁹ the great and growing problems of modern science in the light of Hegelian philosophy. This was the central plan of his Gifford lectures, which he delivered at St. Andrews in 1902–03. and were afterwards published under the title of “*Pathway to Reality*”. The stimulus for his later philosophical activities came from Einstein’s “*Theory of Relativity*” and his large volume “*The Reign of Relativity*” is an attempt to affiliate this new conception in the domain of Physics with the main notions of Idealism. Latterly Lord Haldane had been evincing great interest in Indian philosophy, and being struck with the amazing resemblance between ancient Hindu metaphysics and some schools of western thought, he was earnestly encouraging thinkers both in England and in India to work out the points of identity in greater detail.

Nest to metaphysics education came nearest to his heart. He believed in knowledge and only in its diffusion he saw the solution for the grave and menacing problems of social economy. When more than 20 years ago he suggested the formation of the Worker’s Educational Association he said “*Educate your people and you have reduced to comparatively insignificant dimensions the problems of housing, temperance and of raising the condition of your masses.*” After the War he felt the need for education more than ever. And he inspired the foundation of the British Institution for Adult Education. Regardless of his age and the inconveniences of public speaking he responded to every invitation to speak about the aims of that Institute. His great ambition was to see that the bracing air of University culture was carried to the door⁵⁸⁰ of those who for one reason or other have been denied the chance of breathing it.

Lord Haldane was no mere politician. Rarely have men brought to the problems of public affairs a mind so well informed and tidy, and a spirit so wistful and serene. Years of reflection on the eternal and abiding themes of life have destroyed in him all traces of personal ambition and the narrow combative spirit so common to the party

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politicians; few men gave less evidence of the last infirmity of the noble minds. He took part in public life, not because he had a flair for it—he was not a very impressive speaker—but because he regarded it as his highest duty to help the progress of his people. He had plans for all the knotty problems of administration. He had plans for a more effective imperial organisation, for a more efficient system of cabinet rule, and for the solution on principles of equity and reason, of the vexed tie between capital and labour. Only for these did he remain in politics. There was a streak of stoicism in his temper that made him sometimes a far away and distant person. His indifference to the noisy forms of social intercourse and his contempt for sentimentalism and the arts of the demagogue explain why he could never be a popular person. Of all the men of his generation he came nearest to the Platonic ideal of a Philosopher King. That he did not make the impression that by virtue of his knowledge and personality he should have, on the life and politics of his age, only shows that democracy is still unprepared to be manned by⁵⁸¹ men of real wisdom and high character.

C.E.M. Joad: “The Invalidity Of Literary Judgments”

(1) When a person knows something, for example a chair or a verse of poetry, I shall call the person knowing the subject, and the thing⁵⁸² known, the chair or the verse, the object. A statement made about the state of mind or feeling of the person knowing, I shall call a subjective statement, a statement about the object knowing objective. In the light of these definitions it will be easily seen that some of the judgments we commonly make are subjective, while others are objective. If, for example, I say, “These gooseberries are sour,” what I am really talking about is the effect produced by the gooseberries on my palate; the sourness is in short not a property of the goose-berries but a sensation of mine. The statement, “These gooseberries are sour” is, therefore, subjective. Another person with a different kind of palate may very well find the gooseberries sweet; but his statement “These gooseberries are sweet” will not really contradict mine, since each statement is about something different., his about one of his sensations, mine about one of mine.

Now let us take a statement such as that which asserts that two and three make five. This is not some private fancy or dogma of mine, an account of the opinions that exist only inside my brain but a statement about the relations between certain objects, namely numbers, which are constituents of the outside world; the statement is, therefore, objective. For this reason anybody who thought that three and two make six would not merely differing⁵⁸³ from me on a point of taste: he would be just wrong. Similarly if from a bridge I look at a pair of railway lines immediately below me and say

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⁵⁸² The original editor corrected spell “thing” by hand

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that they are parallel, I am making a statement about the actual relationship of the lines to each other; that is to say, a statement which is objective. If, looking a mile along the track, I see them converge and say that the railway lines meet a mile away, the object of my judgment will be a subjective appearance which is due to a peculiarity of my vision. This statement will, therefore, be subjective.

How let us consider judgments about books in the light of our distinction. It is not difficult to see that most if not all of them fall in the category of subjective judgments; they are not, that is to say, judgments about books at all, but about the effect produced by the books on the mind or taste of the reader. The language used by people in talking of books on the mind or taste of the reader. The language used by people in talking of books affords ample testimony to the subjectivity of their statements. They say of a book that it is enjoyable, horrible or interesting, when what they really mean is that it has aroused sensations of joy, or horror, or has stimulated interest in themselves. The object of their judgments is not, therefore, the book at all, but is certain states of feeling experienced by them as the result of reading the book.

2. There is no disputing about anything but tastes; from which we may deduce that it is not in literary discussion the books at all but⁵⁸⁴ our feelings towards them that we are making the objects of our statements and judgment. And just as in the case of the gooseberries, it was possible for one man to think them sweet and another sour, because each was judging about a private feeling of his own, so it is possible for two completely contradictory opinions about a book to be both of them true, for the simple reason that the opinions are not opinions about one and the same thing, namely, the book itself but that each opinion is about something different, namely, the feelings produced by the book in the speakers.

S. Radhakrishnan

(1) Philosophy in the larger sense of the term is the unseen foundation on which the structure of a civilisation rests. The Indian tradition gives the first place to the pursuit of philosophy, adhyatma vidya vidyanam. It is the study which gives the impulse and direction to the general life of the community. Throughout the history of Indian thought, the quest for reality has engaged the mind of the country.

(2) But the past glory does not confer present distinction. An explorer of recent philosophical literature in India finds little to report except a few spordic attempts to reinterpret ancient doctrines. Tradition is still strong and authority is profoundly respected and in such an atmosphere philosophy cannot progress. Freedom of thought and fixidity of belief are inconsistent with each other. Today we are content to let things take their own course. We are crouching behind the wall when the storm is

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passing by. We may offer an explanation for this unfortunate condition. A culture⁵⁸⁵ that has flowered and reached a high standard of beauty and excellence tends to grow conservative and decadent and our political misfortunes turned our minds into conservative moulds. But explanations are no excuses.

If the philosophies of India are not to be regarded as mere mummies, enshrined corpses of once living ideas and dead very long since, we should rethink them in the light of the whole theoretical and practical experience through which we have passed. Truths, the most ancient, are endowed for us as the result of new experience, with greater certainty. The philosophic impulse is not independent of other factors of life. Science philosophy and religion are intimately connected. A reorientation of philosophical perspective is the task facing us to-day. We must make our philosophical views agree with the new dimensions of thought into which scientific extensions are our horizon have led us.

At the present day in the western world almost all the work in the field of philosophy centres round the problems in the border-land of science and philosophy as the foundations of science, the structure of the atom, the problem of continuity, vitalism and the laws of inheritance. The names of Russell and Whitehead, Broad and Alexander, Bergson and Driesch, Smuts and Lloyd Morgan leap to our mind. Recent disturbances in the world of thought caused by the evolutionary hypothesis have made it of surpassing interest to the general mind.

3. The scientific account is content with a statement of the facts observed while the philosophical⁵⁸⁶ hypothesis attempts to offer a metaphysical explanation. Within the limits of the phenomena observed, science may speculate and argue and abandon inadequate descriptions for more adequate ones. It may give up Ptolemy for Copernicus, Newton for Einstein, but it has little to do with final causes. While it may trace the operation of the laws of nature and determine the rise, growth and decay of phenomena, it cannot explain why nature is what it is, how it came to be, and whether it will ever cease to be. When the scientist attempts to tackle these problems he becomes a philosopher and generally a bad one at that.

S.N. Das Gupta

Is a philosopher merely a caterer to the taste of the logical propensity of the intellect as a confectioner is to the palate? ... Certainly in this sense metaphysics cannot be verifiable and is not therefore verifiable. Must it not then be an intellectual myth or fancy which is therefore different with different individuals? We read Shelley, Browning and Keats and enjoy, so do we read Kant, Hegel and Lotze. But there is this

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difference that there is no pretention on the part of the former for any exclusive privilege. Each philosopher on the contrary claims that his system is the only valid theory to the exclusion of those of others. What this claim for validity means is however again uncertain and vague; it generally takes two forms, namely, that one system is logically more consistent than the others and that it satisfies the demands of our nature better than the others. The precise meaning however, of the latter claim is not so easily intelligible and many philosophers have often taken advantage of this vagueness (often unconsciously)⁵⁸⁷ and have uncritically given it some sort of a convenient interpretation and have tried to convince others in the same way. The fact that this satisfaction of the demands of our nature is offered as a criterion for the validity of any system or as a claim for its acceptance, again leads us to think that it is the craving of the intellect for a logical consistency.

2. Logic is the language with which we interpret our diverse experiences in volition to one another. It can work upon facts and give us the clue to many new relations of facts, but it does not create new facts, nor does it stand a guarantee for the validity of the result, if the validity of the facts supplied to it cannot be certified beforehand. Whatever Spinoza's opinion may have been, metaphysics, I think, is not geometry. You cannot take a maxim or a principle either as an axiom or as a postulate and then sitting upon it, continue to spin and spin until you have got a web big enough for covering all experiences with an Absolute along with them. I do not deny that even in this procedure there may be found some results with which one could be in agreement, but I think that to depend only on such a process without any reference to experience, is hopelessly wrong in metaphysics. It is done nowhere. Even in geometry, when you start from certain principles and arrive at certain results, these are verified in experience though their validity may be claimed apart from those verifications. Geometry starts with certain axioms and postulates regarding the nature of space relations and from them by a process of logical reasoning, proves other⁵⁸⁸ space properties. This result is valid as a logical deduction, but this is verifiable too by actual experience in accordance with our other experiences of time-relations and space-relations. But if the deductions of geometry could not be verified otherwise, and if it would not have directly taken part in other experiences with which we are interested, they might still have remained valid for thought, but no one would have thought to relate these logical constructions with other parts of our experience. Physics makes abstractions from experience, but at each step these abstractions are verified in experience.

A metaphysician surely misses his vocation if he considers himself to be Moses, the law-giver. He cannot claim to dictate to us what Reality is; but his business is to

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seek and find what people imply when they speak of Reality. He should seek to find out by an analysis of experience, as well as by the synthetic implications of experience, the validity of the range and scope of our craving after finding the Reality.

3. The enquiry after Reality is an enquiry which proceeds from the totality of our being; it is not a mere pastime of intellectual exercise; it is therefore necessary that any result that is attained in this course must be such that it should not only be made somehow logically consistent, but should be felt in the experience as a whole in which we are really interested. The business of a metaphysician should be to interpret experience and not to hold forth a logical principle and then stifle all those experiences that would refuse to obey it.

4. The labours of past workers can be of help to us mainly so far as they have penetrated into⁵⁸⁹ the evidence and implications of experience. No deductions from a hastily formulated abstract principle can hope to be successful, for, the search after Reality being essentially a tendency of the mind, the object of search has to be achieved in the field in which the mind moves, namely, the experiences. A neglect of these considerations has led some philosophers (Bosanquet – Essentials of Logic) to think that philosophy can tell us no new facts and can make no discoveries and that all it can tell us, is the significant relation of what we already know.

Progress or Decadence? By Harry F. Ward

When this symposium was first announced I said to the editors that the title had established a world record by begging three questions in five words—first that there was anything which could properly be called civilization; second that these United States had a title to the term America; third that there were any gains in the life of this country since the war. To this I added my grave doubts about a procedure which looks for something people want to find instead of going to see what is there. For good measure I threw in my very strong objection to any undertaking which seemed either designed or likely to fortify our comfortable, middle-class religionists in the false security which emanates from the idea of automatic progress that left them so unprepared and helpless when the World War hit them. That shelter must be ruthlessly destroyed before such people will set to work to make the future.

2. If⁵⁹⁰ religion must either function as a saviour in the practical affairs of mankind or be sloughed off with other useless encumbrances, where are the signs that an ethical religion is actually developing among us?

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3. It is at the point of our impact upon other peoples that the nature of our way of life is revealed. Civilization is an inter-communicating, interdependent world is henceforth universal and the measure of the culture of any particular people in those elements in their life which the other peoples recognize to have common worth.

4. A manner of living that is entitled today to the name of civilization must be part and parcel of the whole life and struggle of mankind. It must both draw from and pour into the common pool of resources for the development of the common life of man. It must be not only willing but anxious to universalize its gains, to share its experience and resources with all other peoples and in like manner to receive from them. Because we now live and move on the world stage we can no longer measure one sectional life against another under the term civilization. They are but cultures, still predominantly local perhaps, but not exclusively so. Therefore the life of any people must now be measured by what it contributes to the rest of the life of man. No way of life that draws tribute from others, that waxes strong at the cost of making others weak, can henceforth be regarded as civilized, no matter what the state of its machinery, art, literature or⁵⁹¹ religion. Imperialism is as barbarous now that the sun of world brotherhood is rising as was the plundering of the Goths when the sun of Imperial Rome was setting.

The Hindu Standpoint by S. Radhakrishnan

1. Whatever is true of empirical being is denied of the real. It is not in space or time; it is free from causal necessity. But on this account, it is not to be confused with nonbeing. Sankara points out the great temptation towards this confusion.

2. I may here refer to a very familiar criticism that the Hindu conception of God is pantheistic. I do not know whether this charge is to be taken as a criticism or a compliment. I am sure that all intelligent men to whatever religious denominations they may belong have finished with a God who acts spasmodically on the world from without, interfering with it only when it goes wrong, breaking his own laws by miracles and special providence, a God who is used by us to fill up the gaps in our knowledge. We are obliged to look upon the vast creative process as the expression of God's spiritual energy. Behind the terror and the tragedy as well as the wonder and the joy of the world there is a love that is wise and austere, patient and suffering. Any other view reveals a blindness to the scale and proportion of reality. If pantheism means that there is nothing in the world which is not inspired or permitted by God, then the Hindu faith is pantheistic.

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3. The distinction between good and evil is not an absolute one. All conflict is between higher and lower, superior and inferior. Even the worst forms of evil are not utterly undivine. Many of us believe that all white is snow⁵⁹² white and all black is lamp black. But in the actual world it is all grey or brown, more whitish or less whitish but not completely white or completely black. When we are confronted by what the world regards as evil it is not necessary to get upset. The best way to deal with our opponent is to believe in him. If we understand his history and background, his heredity and temperament we can realise why he happens to possess an opinion he holds or do a thing he does.

4. So long as there are unredeemed individuals the work of cosmos is not finished. Those who have attained to a harmony within themselves are said to be saved though no one can be really saved until the whole world is saved. The presence of error and imperfection, is a challenge to those better placed. When the question is asked as to why sages like Apantaratamas, Narada, Bhṛigu etc., are working for the world while liberated, the answer is given that they will have to fulfill their functions in the economy of the world until the cosmic process terminates, which will be only when sarvamukti or redemption of all arises. The Hindu has faith in corporate liberation or salvation in togetherness.

.....

“Credit is due to him for not falling into the somewhat fashionable error of holding Science responsible for all the ills that man now suffers from. On the other hand he sees its nobler side and thinks it can be of immeasurable value in helping man to the next rung.”

“Influence⁵⁹³ of Indian Thought” by Helmutm Von Glasenapp in The Calcutta Review

1. There are amazing coincidences between the doctrines of the German mystics like Meister Eckehard and the grand conceptions of the Upanishads, but Indian influence cannot have worked directly. On our mysticism it must have come thro’ the mediation of a long chain of links, if it actually existed at all. Many scholars are of opinion that mystic ideas of the One, which manifests itself in every life, may have originated independently in the various countries, so that we can talk here rather of parallelism than of dependence.

2. Of many stories it can be proved that they wandered from India to the West, although it is impossible for us to follow the stages of the way which the various stories

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took to get to Germany and which form they assumed before they made a home for themselves in our German literature. The way, for example, which the Panchatantra took is quite clear before our eyes. This celebrated fable-work was translated by command of Eberhard "with the Beard" by Anton von Pforr into German, of course, not from the original Sanskrit but from a Latin translation, which itself was derived from Hebrew, Arabian and Pahlavi versions.

3. The credit of having for the first time translated an Indian text direct from the original into a European language belongs to a Dutchman, the missionary Abraham Roger, who worked in Paliacatta (north of Madras) in 1630. Roger left a voluminous work which appeared in Dutch at Leyden under⁵⁹⁴ the title of "Open Door to the Hidden Paganism" of which a German translation appeared already in Nuremberk in 1663. At the end of his work Roger gave a prose-translation of 200 maxims of the Sanskrit poet Bhartihari—the 100 verses of the 3rd century of the Shringara-Shataka he did not dare to give his readers. These 200 maxims, the translation of which Roger made with the help of the Brahmin Padmanabha, form the first instance of Indian literature which became known in Germany after the Panchatantra. Roger's work for a long time remained the chief source, from which the West drew its knowledge of the religion and the literature of the Hindus. Even acquaintance with the culture of the land of the Ganges became broader.

4. Actual investigation of Indian literature only began at the end of the 18th century. From that time on we can talk of an increasing influence on Western thought by the Indian world of ideas. The first Sanskrit scholars were Englishmen; Sir Charles Wilkins, the translator of the Bhagavadgita, Sir William Jones, the translator of Shakuntala, of the Gita-govinda, of the Ordinances of Manu, and so on, Sir Henry Thomas Colebrooke, the expounder of Indian philosophy, H.H. Wilson, the translator of the Meghaduta; then we have the Frenchman Anquetil Du Perron, who translated the Upanishads from the Persian versions of Sultan Darashekoh.

5. Goethe wrote to the French Sanskrit Scholar Chezy: "The first time when my notice was drawn to this unfathomable work "The Shakuntala" it aroused in me such an enthusiasm it⁵⁹⁵ attracted me in such a way that I could not be quiet until I studied it profoundly."

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6. We cannot assume that Kant was influenced by Indian thought. It is the case rather that thinkers arrive at similar conclusions on totally different paths. For instance, Kant's theory of knowledge with its differentiation between the physical world conceived in space and time and the unknowable thing in itself lying beyond these forms of conception are similar to a certain extent to the Maya doctrine of Shankara, so that, according to Paul Deussen, Kant may be said to have "given the scientific basis for the intuitive doctrine of Shankara." We also find certain parallels between the Kantian and the Buddhist philosophy. It is, for instance, a fact that Kant declared a number of questions to be unsolvable ("antinomies of the rational cosmology"), which is comparable to Buddha's refusal to answer questions like "Has the world a beginning or not" "Is it finite or eternal" and so on. Th. Stcherbatsky has called our attention to similarities between lines of thought of Kant and later Buddhist thinkers like Chandrakirti. To the same Russian scholar we also owe the proof that Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative has its counterpart in Brahmanic philosophy.

7. In Hegel we can also find parallels to Indian philosophy, and especially regarding his dialectics and that of the great Mahayana teacher Nagarjuna. Th. Stcherbatsky says thereon: "Hegel in his 'Phaenomenologie des Geistes' challenges common sense to point out some object which is certainly known for what, in our experience, it is, and⁵⁹⁶ solves the question by stating that all we really know of the object is its 'thisness', all its remaining content is relative. This is the exact meaning of the 'Tathata' or of 'suchness' of the Mahayanist, and Relativity, as we have seen, is the exact meaning of the term 'Shunyata'. We further see the full application of the method which maintains that we can truly define an object only by taking explicit account of other objects, with whom it is contrasted, that debarring this contrast, the object becomes 'devoid' of any content, and that both the opposites coalesce in some higher unity which embraces them both. The facts are knowable only as interrelated and the universal law of Relativity is all that is properly meant by reality. Both philosophers assure us that Negativity (Shunyata) is the Soul of the Universe, 'Negativitat ist die Seele der Welt.' Reducing the world of fact to a realm of universal relativity, this implies that everything cognizable is false, transient and illusory, but that the constitution of the real world depends upon this very fact. Even sensations and sense data (rupa) which first appeared as ultimate realities, we then gradually discover to stand in relations without which they prove to be meaningless. Relativity or negativity, is really the Soul of the Universe."

Hegel has evolved his system independently. The parallels with Nagarjuna, which Stcherbatsky has discovered, are more coincidences of some particular results, which he has arrived at from totally different starting points as Nagarjuna. If Hegel

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lived still, he⁵⁹⁷ would certainly be vastly astonished at Stcherbatsky's comments, for all that he had heard of Indian philosophy – of Nagarjuna he knew nothing – had made no impression on him at all, so that in his writings, he rejected everything Indian more or less roughly

8. Schopenhauer was first introduced, whilst he lived in Weimar, in 1814, to Indian antiquity by the Orientalist Friedrich Majer. Since that time he never lost his interest in Indian thought. The library, which he left at his death, contained numerous Indological works. His enthusiastic words with which he praised the "Oupnekhat" are well known. He said: "It is wonderful how the 'Oupnekhat' breathes the holy spirit of the Vedas throughout! It is wonderful how he, who reads this Persian-Latin version of this incomparable work diligently and assiduously, is affected and stirred by this spirit in his inmost heart! Every line is so full of firm, defined, and thoroughly consequential meaning! And on every page we discover deep, original, sublime thoughts, whilst a high and holy earnest hovers over the whole. We breathe Indian air and original, spontaneous existence. And how the spirit is purified of all Jewish superstition drummed into us in youth and all philosophy slaving to support it! It is the most profitable and elevating reading (except the original texts) possible in the world; it is my comfort in life and will be my comfort when I die."

Beside the Vedanta he occupied himself especially with Buddhism. He signified this⁵⁹⁸ outwardly by placing a Tibetan Buddha statue in his study.

9. The scholars, philosophers and poets, who endeavoured to propagate Indian ideas in Germany were few, and they talked to a few. There are, however, a number of associations with more or less firm organisations, which regard it as their task to spread Indian doctrines directly and indirectly. Of these I mention first of all the spiritualistic, occultistic, and especially theosophic societies, which appeal to large circles and strive to make Indian religions widely known.

10. As is shown by what we have said the German public is especially interested in the religions, the philosophic systems and the classic literature of old India. The extraordinary success Rabindranath Tagore had with his lectures in Germany, the many readers the works of Gandhi have found in German translations prove that the interest of the German people in the spiritual life of modern India is very great. It is little more than a century that Indian wisdom and Indian poetry have extended their "Digvijaya" to the West. At the beginning of the last century India was no more than a word, except

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to a few, but to-day its spiritual treasures are well known to all the educated people and are estimated at their full worth. Much, however, is still to be done to make known the great creations of the Indians more and more to the general public, but everyone who knows anything⁵⁹⁹ about it will be of my opinion that in no country of the Continent a greater interest exists in Indian thoughts and ideas than in Germany. One may see in this a spiritual sympathy and affinity.

Significance of "Self" & "Substance" by M.S. Modak in Review of Philosophy & Reln.

1. Self-consciousness is the ultimate ground of all categories.
2. Upanishadic thinkers start 'Self' as the primary reality.
3. The process of knowing, says Sankar, is not so much a creation as a discovery. It follows that this discovery will be imperfect if there is any taint clinging to the instrument of the mind. The necessity for improvement or correction of the understanding which is essential in Spinoza's philosophy is also emphasized by the Upanishads.
4. We must be content in the last resort with the clear and persistent witness of consciousness.
5. It is certain that Spinoza would admit nothing supernatural whatever in his system of thought. His whole thinking would revolt against it. Intellect, to him, is a sufficient guide to the knowledge of reality. His intuition is not something extra-intellectual, but it is 'thoughtfulness matured.
6. "The Upanishadic philosophers say in an Augustinian mood that he who thinks he knows does not know, while he who thinks he does not know really knows..." Kena, II. 3.
7. But⁶⁰⁰ in its uniqueness and absolute self-identity it is altogether different from the self-consciousness of finite minds.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF "SELF" & "SUBSTANCE" by M.S. MODAK. in REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY & Reln

8. "Words are powerless to comprehend the self" say the Upanishads. (Yato Vachonivartanta). Spinoza also warns us against the inadequacy of words, which 'can be the cause of many great errors.' For they are a part of imagination. 'They are composed in vague order in the memory owing to condition of the body' and hence 'we can feign many conceptions.' They are the signs according as they are in the imagination, but not according as they are in the understanding. This is apparent from the fact that on all those which are only in the intellect and not in the imagination, negative names are often bestowed, such as incorporeal, infinite, etc. and many things which are really affirmative are expressed negatively and contrariwise, as uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal, etc., because their contraries are much more easily imagined and therefore occurred first to men and usurped positive names. Infinite, immortal, etc. are the really positive ideas but since imagination (words) cannot grasp them, they are expressed negatively and contrariwise. Imagination thus cannot adequately know the reality.

"True⁶⁰¹ Perfection" by Maher Baba

The perfection which belongs to the spiritually realised souls is not in the domain of duality, and is as such entirely beyond the scope of the intellect. It has no parallel in the domain of duality. When a person becomes spiritually perfect, he knows that nothing exists except God, and that what seems to exist in the domain of duality and is capable of being grasped by the intellect is only illusion. For the spiritually perfect man God is the only reality. Science, art, music, weakness, strength, good and evil are all to him nothing but dreams. His perfection consists in the knowledge of one indivisible existence.

2. Though perfection transcends the opposites, it also includes them. If you try to grasp the nature of perfection by means of a set standard (implying an opposite) you are bound to limit it, and thus fail to understand its real significance. Perfection includes the opposites and transcends them. Therefore the perfect man is not bound by any rule or limited ideal. He is beyond good and bad: but his law for those who are good, gives good rewards; and for those who are bad, it responds in their own coin. Krishna proved to Arjuna, who was his devotee, that his apparently bringing physical and mental annihilation of Kauravas, who were vicious, was for their spiritual salvation. Perfection might manifest itself through killing or saving according to the spiritual⁶⁰² demands of the situation. The heart of the Perfect One is at once soft like butter and hard as steel. Perfection is not in its expression limited to any one of the opposites, i.e., it cannot exclude the possibility of finding expression through the other opposite also. It can express itself through either of the opposites according to the logic

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which is implied in the situation. That is why it transcends the opposites, and is capable of giving a rational response to all the possible situations in life. It ensures perfect adaptability without surrendering the standpoint of the Truth, and secures an unshakable peace and a sense of harmony in the midst of diverse situations, which must be baffling to those who have not had all-sided development.

Human activities are limited by the opposites, and perfection is beyond them. It should not, however, be imagined that perfection has no human touch about it. Human beings are unhappy, and they laugh to make themselves and others happy; but even a Perfect, Man who is eternally happy, is not without a sense of humour. Perfection, in other words, does not consist in being inhuman but superhuman; it is the full development of that rationality which is implicit in humanity.

3. The mind is accustomed to work upon material things, and its driving power for this intellectual understanding of material object is derived from lusts and cravings.

The⁶⁰³ Problem of Sex (by Meher Baba)

1. In relation to sex mind has a tendency to think of indulgence and repression as alternatives from which there is no escape. It seems as if man must accept the one alternative or the other. And yet he cannot whole-heartedly accept either alternative because when he tries repression he is dissatisfied with his lot and longingly thinks of indulgence and when he tries indulgence he becomes conscious of his bondage to the senses and seeks freedom by going back to mechanical repression. The mind remains dissatisfied in both the alternatives and there thus arises one of the most vital and complicated problems of human life.

In order to solve the problem of sex the mind must first understand how both of these alternatives are equally the creation of imagination working under the deluding influence of craving. Craving is implicitly present in the repression of sex as well as its gratification; both presuppose the vitiation of consciousness by the operation of lust or the desire for sensations. The mind is there fore inevitably restless in either alternative.

2. The mind which is restless with desire creates an illusory idea of happiness in the gratification of desire, and then knowing that the soul remains dissatisfied even after gratification of desire it seeks freedom through repression. Thus in search of happiness and freedom the mind gets caught up in the opposites of indulgence and repression which it finds equally disappointing. And since it does not try to go beyond these⁶⁰⁴ opposites its movement is always from one opposite to the other and consequently from one disappointment to another disappointment.

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Craving thus falsifies the operation of imagination and presents the mind with the option between the two alternatives of indulgence and repression which prove equally deceptive in their promise of happiness. However in spite of alternate and repeated disappointment in indulgence as well as repression, the mind usually does not renounce the root cause of unhappiness which is craving, because, while experiencing disappointment in repression it is easily susceptible to the false promise of gratification and while experiencing disappointment in gratification it is easily susceptible to the false promise of purely mechanical repression. This is like moving within a cage.

3. Mind turns to mechanical repression of craving because of disappointment; but it turns to internal and spontaneous renunciation of craving because of disillusionment or awakening.

The need for indulgence or mechanical repression arises only when the nature of craving is not clearly grasped. When the aspirant becomes fully awake to the inevitable bondage and suffering entailed by craving it voluntarily begins to disburden itself of craving through intelligent understanding. The question of indulgence or repression arises only when there is craving; the need for both vanishes along with the complete⁶⁰⁵ disappearance of craving. When the mind is free from craving the mind can no more be moved by the false promises of indulgence or mechanical repression.

However it should be born in mind that the life of freedom is nearer to the life of restraint than to the life of indulgence (though in quality it is essentially different from both). Hence for the aspirant a life of strict celibacy is preferable to the married life, if restraint comes to him easily without any undue sense of self-repression. But such restraint is for most persons difficult and sometimes impossible and for them married life is decidedly much more helpful than a life of celibacy. For ordinary persons married life is undoubtedly advisable unless they have a special aptitude for celibacy.

4. The value of celibacy lies in the habit of restraint and the sense of detachment & independence which it gives. But as long as the mind is not altogether free from craving there is no true freedom. In the same way, the value of marriage lies in the lessons of mutual adjustment and the sense of unity with the other.

5. For the celibate as well for the married person the path of inner life is the same. When the aspirant is drawn by the Truth he longs for nothing else; and as the Truth increasingly comes within his ken, he gradually disburdens himself of craving. Whether in celibacy or in marriage he is no longer swayed by the deceptive promises of indulgence or mechanical repression and he practices internal and spontaneous renunciation of⁶⁰⁶ craving until he is freed from the deceptive opposites. The path of

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perfection is open to the aspirant whether in celibacy or in marriage; and whether he beings from celibacy or from marriage will depend upon the sanskaras and the karmic ties of the aspirant.

6. Promiscuity in sex-gratification is bound to land the aspirant in the most pitiful and dangerous chaos of ungovernable lust; and as such diffused and undirected lust veils the higher values, it perpetuates entanglement and creates insuperable difficulties in the spiritual path of internal and spontaneous renunciation of craving. Sex in marriage is entirely different from sex outside marriage. In marriage, the sanskaras of lust are much lighter and are capable of being removed more easily. When sex-companionship is accompanied by a sense of responsibility, love and spiritual idealism, conditions for the sublimation of sex are much more favourable than when it is cheap and promiscuous.

In promiscuity the temptation to explore the possibilities of mere sex contact is almost formidable; and it is only by the maximum restriction of the scope of mere sex that the aspirant can arrive at any real understanding of the higher values which are attainable through the gradual transformation of sex into love. But if the mind once tries to understand sex through the increasing of its scope there is no end to the delusions of which it must be a prey, because there is no end to the enlarging of its scope. In promiscuity, the suggestions of lust are necessarily the first to present themselves to the mind and⁶⁰⁷ it is doomed to react to people with the limitation of this initial perversion and thus close the door to deeper experiences.

7. In married life, the range of experience in the company of the partner is so wide that the suggestions of lust are not necessarily the first to present themselves in the mind, and there is a real opportunity for the aspirant to recognise and annul the limiting factors in experience. By the gradual elimination of lust and a progression through a series of increasingly richer experiences of love and sacrifice, he can finally arrive at infinity.

“True Perfection” (continued)

4. The mind, in its objective handling of the material world, is saturated with the experience of multiplicity and separateness, and it, therefore, feeds the ego-centric tendencies which divide man from man and make him selfish and possessive.

5. The intellect of most persons is harnessed by innumerable wants, Such a life is from the spiritual point of view the lowest type of human existence. The highest type of human existence is free from all wants; and it is characterised by sufficiency or contentment. Every one is seeking happiness, but few have it; for, lasting happiness

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dawns only when there is complete freedom from wants. This highest state of non-wanting may outwardly seem to imply in action and easy of⁶⁰⁸ attainment. But, if any one tries just to sit quietly without inwardly wanting anything and with full consciousness (i.e. without going to sleep) he will realize that such a state of non-wanting is very difficult to attain, and that it can be sustained only through tremendous spiritual activity.

Editorials⁶⁰⁹: Maher Baba's Journal

Such dual aspects do not belong to God. If we take God as one separate entity, he becomes one term in rational existence. Just as good is the counterpart of bad, the Infinite comes to be looked upon as the opposite of the finite. When we talk of the Infinite and the finite, we are referring to them as two, and the Infinite has already become the second part of the duality. But the Infinite belongs to the non-dual order of being. If the Infinite is looked upon as the counterpart of the finite, it is strictly speaking no longer infinite but a species of the finite, for it stands outside the finite as its opposite, and is thus limited.

2. Thinking becomes false owing to the interference of samskaras accumulated during the process of the evolution of consciousness. The function of consciousness is perverted by the operation of samskaras which manifest themselves as desires. Through many lives consciousness is continually being burdened by the after-effects of experience. And the perception of the soul is limited by these after-effects. The thinking of the soul cannot break through the hedge created by samskaras, and consciousness becomes a helpless captive of illusions projected by its own false thinking. And this falsification of thought is present not only in cases where consciousness is partly developed, but also in men where it is fully developed.

3. The soul gets enmeshed in the desires, and cannot step out of the circumscribed individuality constituted by these desires. It imagines these barriers and becomes self-hypnotised. It⁶¹⁰ looks upon itself as being limited and separate from other individuals. It gets entangled in individualistic existence and imagines a world of manifold separateness with many individuals with their respective minds and bodies.

4. The separateness of individuals does not exist in reality but only in imagination. The one universal soul imagines separateness in itself. And out of this division there

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arises the thought of 'I' and 'mine' as opposed to 'you' and 'yours'. Although the soul is in reality an undivided and absolute unity, it appears as being manifold and divided owing to the working of its own imagination. Imagination is not a reality. Even in its highest flight it is a departure from truth. It is anything but the truth. The experience which the soul gathers in terms of the individualised ego is all imagination. It is a misapprehension of the soul. Out of the imagination of the universal soul are born many individuals. This is maya or ignorance.

5. Duality implies the existence of opposites limiting and balancing each other through mutual tension. Good and bad, virtue and vice are examples of such opposites. The ignorant soul enmeshed in duality is in the clutches of both good and bad.

6. Wanting thus comes to be inevitably limited by the perpetual tension of the opposites. This gives rise to unending oscillation from one state to another, without arriving at the unlimited state which can only be discovered in the unchanging and eternal aspect of life. The Infinite is to be sought far beyond the domain of duality.

7. As⁶¹¹ long as a person remains under the sway of duality and looks upon the manifoldness of experience as being true and final, he has not traversed the domain of ignorance.

8. This realization must and does take place only in the midst of life, for it is only in the midst of life that limitation can be experienced and transcended, and that subsequent freedom from limitation can be enjoyed.

9. He is interested in everything, but not concerned about anything. The slightest mishap may command his sympathy; the greatest tragedy will not upset him. He is beyond the alternations of pain and pleasure, desire and satisfaction, rest and struggle, life and death. To him, they are equally illusions which has transcended, but by which others are bound, and from which he has come to free them. He uses every circumstance as a means to lead others towards Realization.

He knows that men do not cease to exist when they dies, and, therefore, is not concerned over death. He knows that destruction must precede construction; that out of suffering is born peace and bliss; that out of struggle comes liberation from the bonds of action. He is only concerned about concern.

10. For the moment, they must be patient. The wave of destruction must rise still higher, must spread still further. But when, from the depths of his heart, man desires something more lasting than wealth, something more real than material power, the wave will recede. Then peace will come, joy will come, light will come.

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11. The Samskaras or impressions form an enclosure around⁶¹² the possible field of consciousness. The circle of sanskaras constitutes that limited area in which alone the individual consciousness can be focussed. Some of the desires have mere latency of action, but others can actually translate themselves into action. The capacity of a desire to find expression in conduct depends upon the intensity and the amount of the Sanskaras connected with it.

12. The entire life of the personal ego is continually in the grip of wanting i.e. an attempt to seek fulfilment of desires through things that change and vanish.

13. Man is only partially satisfied in his attempt to have the fulfilment of his desires. And this partial satisfaction fans and increases the flame of craving instead of extinguishing it. So greed always finds an endless field of conquest, and leaves the man endlessly dissatisfied. The chief expressions of greed are related to the emotional part of man.

14. Selfishness inevitably leads to dissatisfaction and disappointment, because desires are endless. The problem of happiness, is, therefore, the problem of dropping out desires. Desires, however, cannot be effectively overcome through mechanical repression. They can be annihilated only through knowledge. If you dive deep in the realm of thoughts and think seriously for a few minutes, you will realize the emptiness of desires. Think of what you have enjoyed all these years and what you have suffered. All that you have enjoyed through life is today nil. All that you have suffered through life also is nothing in the present. All was⁶¹³ illusory. It is your right to be happy and yet you create your own unhappiness by wanting things. Wanting is the source of perpetual restlessness. If you do not get the thing you wanted, you are disappointed. And if you get it, you want more and more of it and become unhappy. Say, "I do not want anything," and be happy.

15. Wants should be carefully distinguished from needs. You might think, "I need all that I want," But this is a mistake. If you are thirsty in a desert, what you need is good water not lemonade. As long as man has body there will be some needs, and it is necessary to meet these needs. But wants are an outcome of infatuated imagination.

16. In the state of liberation there is neither selfishness nor selflessness in the ordinary sense; but both of these are taken up and merged into the feeling of selfness for all. Realization of the unity of all life is accompanied by peace, and unfathomable bliss. It

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does not, in any way, lead either to spiritual stagnation or to the obliteration of relative values. Selfness for all brings about undisturbed harmony without loss of discrimination, and unshakable peace without indifference to the surroundings.

17. This freedom cannot be attained by running away from life for fear of entanglement. This would mean denial of life. Perfection does not consist in shrinking from the dual expressions of nature. The attempt to escape from entanglement implies fear of life. But spirituality consists in meeting life adequately and fully without being overpowered by the opposites. It must assert its dominion over all⁶¹⁴ illusion—however attractive or powerful. Without avoiding contact with the different forms of life a perfect man functions with complete detachment in the midst of intense activity.

18. Since all intellectual categories turn out to be necessarily inadequate in grasping the mystery of creation, the nearest approach to understanding its nature is not through an intellectual concept, but through an analogy. Just as a wave going across the surface of a still ocean calls forth into being a wild stir of innumerable bubbles, the lahar creates myriads of individual souls out of the indivisible infinity of one Oversoul. But the all abounding Absolute remains the substratum of all the individual souls. The individual souls are the creations of a sudden and spontaneous impulse, and have, therefore, hardly any anticipation about their destined continuity of existence throughout the cyclic period until the final subsiding of the initial tremor.

19. There can be no act of involution or evolution within the being of the Absolute; and nothing real can be born from the Absolute as any real change is necessarily a negation of the Absolute. The change implied in the creation of the manifested world is not an ontological change or a change in the being of the Absolute Reality; it is only an apparent change.

20. The manifoldness of creation and separateness of the individual souls exist only in imagination. The very existence of the creation or the world of manifestation is grounded in bhas or illusion, so that, in spite of the manifestation of numberless individual souls, the⁶¹⁵ oversoul remains the same without suffering any real expansion or contraction, increment or decrement. But, though the oversoul undergoes no modification due to the bhas or illusion of individuation, there comes into existence its apparent differentiation into many individual souls.

21. Man is mostly what he becomes by being chopped, chisled, and shaped by the sculptor of environment. Whether or not he can surmount his surrounding depends

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upon his strength of character. If he is strong he remains free in his thought and action, even in the midst of action and reaction with his environment. If he is weak he succumbs to its influence.

22. Desirelessness or the state of non-wanting alone can bring about true freedom. Wanting is necessarily binding whether it is fulfilled or not. When it is fulfilled, it leads to further wanting, and thus perpetuates the bondage of the spirit; and when it is unfulfilled, it leads to disappointment and suffering which, through their sanskaras, fetter the freedom of the spirit in their own way. There is no end to wanting because the external and internal stimuli of the mind are constantly alluring it into a state of wanting or disliking (which is another form of wanting) something. The external stimuli are the sensations of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch; and the internal stimuli are those that arise in the mind-stuff of man from the memories of the present life and the totality of sanskaras gathered by consciousness during the evolutionary period and human lives. When the mind is trained to remain unmoved and balanced in the presence of all external and⁶¹⁶ internal stimuli, it arrives at the state of non-wanting; and by not wanting anything (except the Absolute Reality which is beyond the opposites of stimuli) it is possible to unwind the sanskaras of wanting.

Wanting is a state of disturbed equilibrium of mind; and non-wanting is a state of stable poise. The poise of non-wanting can only be maintained by an unceasing disentanglement from all stimuli, whether pleasant or painful, agreeable or disagreeable. In order to remain unmoved by the joys and sorrows of this world, the mind must be completely detached from the external and internal stimuli.

23. It is not possible to deny only the disagreeable stimuli and remain inwardly attached to the agreeable stimuli. If the mind is to remain unmoved by the onslaughts of the opponents, it cannot continue to be attached to the expression of affection and be influenced by them. The equipoise consists in meeting both the alternatives with complete detachment.

24. It is no use trying to coerce the mind to a life of asceticism. But any attempt to force or hasten the mind towards an ascetic life is likely to invite reaction.

25. Detachment should not be allowed to form any nucleus for the ego to fasten itself on; and at the same time it should not be an expression of one's inability to cope with the storm and stress of worldly life.

26. The assertion of 'no', 'no' has to be sufficiently powerful to effect the eradication of all the physical, subtle and mental sanskaras.; but after it has served its purpose, it

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has to be ultimately abandoned. The finality of spiritual experience does not consist⁶¹⁷ of a bare negation. To bring it under a negative formula is to limit it by means of an intellectual concept. The negative formula has to be used by the mind to decondition itself, but it must be renounced before the ultimate goal of life can be attained. Thought has to be made use of in order to overcome the limitations set up by its own movement; but, when this is done, it has to be itself given up. This amounts to the process of going beyond the mind; and it becomes possible through non-identification with the mind or its desires. To look upon the body as well as all thoughts and lower impulses objectively is to get established in blissful detachment and to negate all the sanskaras. This means freeing the soul from its self-imposed illusions like "I am the body", "I am the mind" or "I am desire.

27. The control of the habitual tendencies of the mind is much more difficult than the control of the physical actions. The fleeting and the evasive thoughts and desires of the mind can be curbed only with great patience and persistent practice.

28. Control is deliberate and involves effort as long as the mind is trying to decondition itself through the removal of sanskaras, but after it is released from the sanskaras it becomes spontaneous, because the mind is then functioning in freedom and understanding. Such control is born of strength of character and health of mind; and it invariably brings with it freedom from fear and immense peace and calmness. The mind which appears feeble when it is wanton and uncontrolled in its functioning becomes a source of great strength when⁶¹⁸ it is controlled.

29. The control which has true spiritual value does not consist in the mechanical repression of thoughts and desires, but is the natural restraint exercised by the perception of positive values discovered during the process of experience.

30. Thus the tendencies for lust, greed and anger are removed though the appreciative recognition of the value of a life of purity, generosity and kindness.

31. Ordinarily the psychic energy of the mind is scattered through its diverse thoughts; and meditation on a point is very salutary for the mind to gather itself and settle down. But it is a mechanical process, and, therefore, lacks creative and blissful experiences. However, in the initial stages this form of meditation might be used as a preparation for other more successful forms of meditation.

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32. Concentration on the universal aspect of God is best achieved through the selfless service of humanity. When the soul is completely absorbed in the service of humanity, it is completely oblivious of its own body or mind or their functions as in meditation, and therefore, now sanskaras are not formed. Further the old sanskaras which bind the mind are shattered and dispersed. Since the soul is now centring its attention and interest not upon its own good but upon the good of others, the nucleus of the ego is deprived of its nourishing energy. Selfless service, is, therefore, one of the best methods of diverting and sublimating the energy locked up in the binding sanskaras.

Selfless⁶¹⁹ service is accomplished when there is not the slightest thought of reward or result, and when there is complete disregard of one's own comfort or convenience or the possibility of being misunderstood. When you are wholly occupied with the welfare of others, you can hardly think of yourself.

33. Thus through living for others your own life finds its amplification and expansion. The person who leads a life of selfless service is, therefore, hardly conscious of serving. He does not make those whom he serves feel that they are in any way under his obligation. On the contrary, he himself feels obliged for being given a chance of making them happy. Neither for show nor for name and fame does he serve them. Selfless service is completely achieved only when in serving others a man derives the happiness of himself being served. The ideal of selfless service frees him from the sanskaras of the craving for power and possession, or self-pity and jealousy, or the evil deeds actuated through selfishness.

34. In true karma yoga or the life of perfect action there is proper adjustment between the material and the spiritual aspects of life. In this type of life, consciousness is not fettered to the mundane and material things, but at the same time it is not allowed to fly away from every day existence. The mind is not allowed to be immersed in the material life of gnawing wants, nor is it allowed to be merged in spiritual bliss. But it is used to face and tackle the problems of life from the point of view of spiritual⁶²⁰ understanding.

35. Whence once true adjustment between spirit and matter is secured, there is no phase of life which cannot be utilized for the expression of Divinity. No longer is there any need to run away from everyday life and its tangles. The freedom of the spirit which is sought by avoiding contact with the world and by going to the caves or mountains is a negative freedom. When such retirement is temporary and is meant to digest worldly experiences and develop detachment, it has its own advantages. It gives

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breathing time in the race of life. But when such retirement is grounded on the fear of the world or lack of confidence in the spirit, it is far from being helpful towards the attainment of real freedom. Real freedom is essentially positive, and it must express itself through the unhampered dominion of the spirit over matter. This is the true life of the spirit.

The life of the spirit is the expression of infinity, and as such knows of no artificial limits. True spirituality is not to be mistaken for an exclusive enthusiasm for some fad. It is not concerned with any 'ism'. When people seek spirituality apart from life as if it had nothing to do with the material world, their search is futile. All creeds and cults have a tendency to emphasize some fragmentary aspect of life; but true spirituality is totalitarian in its outlook. The essence of spirituality does not consist in a specialised or narrow interest in some imagined part of life, but in a certain enlightened attitude to all the various⁶²¹ situations which obtain in life. All the material things of this world can be made subservient for the Divine game; and when they are thus subordinated, they become auxiliary for the self-affirmation of the spirit.

The value of material things depends upon the part they play in the life of the spirit. In themselves, they are neither good nor bad; they become good or bad according to whether they help or hinder the manifestation of Divinity through matter. Take for example the place of the physical body in the life of the spirit. It is a mistake to set up the antithesis between "flesh" and the spirit. Such contrast almost inevitably ends in an unqualified condemnation of the body; but the body stands in the way of spiritual fulfilment only if it is pampered as having claims in its own right.

36. Since the physical body and other material things can be availed of for the life of the spirit, true spirituality does not take any hostile attitude to them. In fact it seeks expression in and through them. Thus the perfect man does not look down upon the things of beauty or works or art, the attainments of science or the achievement of politics. The things of beauty can be degraded by being made the objects of craving or jealous and exclusive possessiveness; the works or art can often be used to augment and exploit egoism and other human frailties; the attainments of science can be used for mutual destruction, as in modern wars; and political enthusiasm, without spiritual insight, can perpetuate social and international chaos; but all these⁶²² can also be rightly handled and spiritualised. The things of beauty can become the source of purity, happiness and inspiration; the works of art can ennoble and raise the consciousness of people; the attainments of science can redeem humanity from unnecessary suffering and handicaps; and political action can be instrumental in establishing a real brotherhood of humanity. So the life of spirit does not consist in turning away from the

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worldly spheres of existence, but it consists in reclaiming them for the Divine purpose, which is to bring love, peace, happiness, beauty and spiritual perfection within the reach of everyone.

However, he who would live the life of the spirit must remain detached in the midst of worldly things without becoming cold or indifferent to them. Detachment should not be misunderstood as lack of appreciation. It is not only compatible with true evaluation of things, but is its very condition. Craving creates delusion and prevents right perception; it nourishes obsessions and sustains the feeling of dependence upon external objects. But detachment promotes right understanding, and facilitates the perception of the true worth of things without making consciousness dependent upon external things. To see things as they are is to grasp their real significance as parts of the manifestation of the One Life, and to see through the veil of their apparent multiplicity is to be free from the insistent obsession for anything in its imagined isolation and exclusiveness. So the life of the spirit is to be found in comprehensiveness which⁶²³ is free from clinging, and appreciation which is free from entanglement. It is a life of positive freedom in which the spirit infuses itself into matter, and shines through it without submitting to any curtailment of its own claims.

37. The expression of spirituality does not require a separate or exclusive field; it does not become degraded by being concerned with the ordinary physical, intellectual and emotional needs of people. The life of the spirit is unified and integral existence which does not admit of exclusive or unrelated compartments. <H

Lionel B. Burrows in Calcutta Review

In that stimulating book ON THE ART OF WRITING Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch protests against the intrusion of scientific methods into art, but he cannot prevail against the spirit of the age nor persuade students of to-day that science should be excluded from literature, that theoretical generalisations should be exchewed in literary criticism, that definition and classification are out of place in literary art. "Beetles, minerals, gases, may be classified," he says, "and to have these classified is not only convenient, but a genuine advance of knowledge. But if you had to make a beetle, as men are making poetry, how would such classification help?" One answer is that, if one were making a beetle, it would be helpful to know what kind of beetle one was trying to make, and that, if one attempted to make a gas without⁶²⁴ such knowledge, the results might be distressingly tragic. The fact is that literature cannot be shut away in an idea-tight compartment, aesthetics itself being simply science applied to art,

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classifying the various arts, defining their functions and limits, determining the conditions of artistic production, and formulating the principles of critical appreciation. So far as style in prose is concerned, Sir Arthur's ideas are unsatisfying to the scientific or philosophical mind which asks what style consists of, whence it comes, and how its many diverse forms can be reconciled. Being professedly an artist, his treatment of the subject is perhaps purposely inclusive. Though he admits incidentally the connection between matter and style, insists that style can never be separated from the man, and dwells on craftsmanship as a finishing factor, he nowhere synthesizes these scattered reflections, while he defines style as "the power to touch with ease, grace, precision, any note in the gamut of human thought and emotion," a definition which is as little instructive in substance as it is logical in form. This is not the way to knowledge.

J.P. Bulkeley

(1) Why are so many American Universities offering general courses which emphasize the interrelation of all human knowledge? Why this growing tendency to synthesis of studies? I think the answer is to be found in what has been called the modern literature of hope based on the possibility of effective social control.⁶²⁵ For that, it seems, we must mobilize nationally and internationally all the world's present knowledge, scientific, educational, economic, political and ethical. For such a mobilization of specialists we require leaders, "ring-masters with just enough to the alloy of mountebakery" to touch the imagination of the masses.

2. A labour politician who could speak fluently on any subject once went for two years to Ruskin College. After that period of study he could no longer speak fluently on any subject because he knew too much and had lost his old certainty and conviction. The men who lead crowds, and get things done are generally men of narrow views and intense convictions. Historical studies train a man to see many sides to all questions and that often causes failure in public life. Conscientious and thorough historical studies will make you more reasonable and enlightened politicians, but I doubt if they will make you more successful politicians.

3. "The essence of the best academic spirit is a willingness to face facts, to discard cherished theories when fuller evidence makes them no longer tenable, to suspend judgment upon matters upon which certainty is unattainable, to welcome criticisms and to hear difference of opinion with tolerance. Few of the undergraduates who have spent three years in a university are scholars, and fewer still, of course, are qualified to make any addition to knowledge themselves. But, in so far as they have taken advantage of their opportunities, they ought to have acquired a standard of

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thoroughness, to have become accustomed⁶²⁶ to reading books in a spirit of enquiring criticism, not of mere acquiescence and to have obtained some idea of the foundations upon which knowledge reposes and the methods by which it is advanced, they ought to be able to weigh evidence, follow and criticise an argument, to put their own value on authorities, and to prefer sober truth to pretentious superficiality." -----English Adult Education Committee's report, 1919.

4. Let us consider further the training of judgment for it is the most valuable thing you will get from your historical studies, and your best safeguard against an excessively academic outlook. Judgment translated into action is the first requisite for men of affairs especially business men. It is less necessary for teachers, hence the traditional type of professor, a child in the affairs of the world. No bore is more intolerable than the learned bore whose mind retains an infinite store of information which he is incapable of using except to retail. A judicial temperament and judicial capacity come from long training best acquired in the university of life. Nevertheless a teaching university provides useful preliminary training. Students are often impatient at having to spend time on remote periods of history and problems that have comparatively little connection with modern life. Nevertheless remote problems which it is easy to consider dispassionately give more valuable training than those more closely connected with our own prejudices. The young historical student is not likely to acquire capacity for dispassionate judgment if he neglects preliminary training⁶²⁷ in ancient and medieval history. Burke observed very acutely that "men are wise with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of all times save their own". It is therefore prudent to begin on what is easiest and train our judgments to work dispassionately before attempting to use them on modern problems.

Alexander Goldenweiser

1. The psychological system of the psychoanalyst, meaning primarily Freud, may be reduced in its principal features in the following propositions: The conscious psyche represents but a surface phenomenon of psychic life. It is but fragmentary and distorted replica of the unconscious psyche which operates with great coherence and consistency, subject to as rigid laws of causal determination as are the events of the material universe. Nothing is accidental in the psychic domain. Its apparent incoherence or freedom are merely due to our ignorance of the deeper-lying connections. Once these are understood, the mystery and casualness of psychic life vanish and it begins to assume the form of a well-ordered and strictly deterministic system.

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The unconscious itself is populated by psychic urges, originally conscious, which come into conflict with certain attitudes, taboos and regulations brought by civilization and imparted to the individual in education. In the ensuing test of strength the original urges lose out, to be forthwith repressed into the unconscious. They do not, however, cease to exist. On the contrary, they remain active and dynamic and continue to influence the life and reactions of the individual. In⁶²⁸ this they are most successful just because their very existence remains unknown to the person who harbours them. These unconscious processes display a marked resistance to being once more pulled into the domain of the conscious psychic, this resistance being the greater the more thorough-going the preceding repression.

2. It is justifiable to transfer the mechanisms which explain neuroses to the psyche of the normal individual? To a degree, no doubt it is. It is quite in line with modern psychiatry generally as well as with latter-day criminology, medicine, and in fact, biology, not to draw too sharp a line between the normal and abnormal, between health and disease.

3. In the domain of the neuroses the mechanisms which engender them must be assumed to be in more emphatic control of psychic life in a neurotic than they are in a normal individual.

Kunjalal Datta

The Atman is the subject of knowledge in us. This Atman is no other than the knower of all knowing in us; for this only is our real self: mental phenomena, which were often mistaken for Atman, are as much an object to it as the external world.

The Atman, the pure Subject, is itself unknowable by reflection or any mental operation. All the inner mental states being foreign to it, as an object to subject, it follows that the real Subject, the knower of all the states can never be made an object of knowledge like other objects. The Atman as pure Subject self (Jivatma) and the objects known by it, the mental phenomena and the world of perception.

Evolution⁶²⁹ in Maya Vada by Kamakhyanath Mitra in Calcutta Review

(1) The Advaita-Vedantists accept neither the atomism of the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas nor the theory of creation of the crude Dualist, nor do they accept the Sankhya doctrine of evolution. To them they are all unsatisfactory, and they have subjected all these

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theories of the universe (Jagat) to a vigorous criticism. They say that no explanation of the universe (Jagat) is satisfactory.

2. To them it is hardly a problem at all, for it is *tuccha* (a matter of indifference). It has got to be renounced. The only thing that matters to them is Atman or Brahman. In the Samadhi or turiya state the world simply vanishes. This is the highest spiritual experience and Sankaracharya has very pithily recorded it in verse 485 of his *Vivekachudamani*, beginning with the words: *Kva gatam kena va natam* (where is it gone, who has absorbed it!). Because it vanishes therefore it is false. It is the *vivarta* of Brahman. It is the rope mistaken for the snake. Why worry about that which is false? This is strictly the position of the Advaitist. According to Huxley, the position is one of “inverted agnosticism;” but the statement is not correct, for the advaitist does not say that the world is unknowable in the sense in which God is unknowable to Herbert Spencer or Huxley. According to Huxley, God may or may not exist and even if He exists, He is unknowable. According to Herbert Spencer, He exists but is unknowable. They do not say that God is false. The advaitist’s attitude to the world is different. He says that it is false but *bhava-padartha*, that is, it is not like the horn of the hare (absolutely non-existent⁶³⁰) but it is like the rope mistaken for the snake, or in other words, it is false, though existent in a certain sense. The latest conclusion of Science also supports the doctrine of *Maya* in its own way, for Science now says that matter is immaterial.

Just as the old Vedantist rejected the evolution of the Sankhyas, so the new Vedantist rejects the modern doctrine of evolution. The new Vedantist also rejects the attempt that is made by some well-meaning people at the reconciliation of creation with evolution when they say that the idea of evolution is not opposed to that of creation, but evolution should be regarded as a method of creation. He rejects the attempt, as no reason has been given why evolution should be so regarded at all.

Evolution is at best a hypothesis. It is not a name for the cause of the order of the external world. It merely describes the process or effect, or, in other words, it does not explain why but tries to explain how

3. From the standpoint of Einstein’s theory of relativity also, evolution is an illusion. Let me quote the summary of the conclusion of Dr Robb in *Evolution in the light of Modern Knowledge—A Collective Work* published by Blackie in 1925. The summary has been given in the *Times Literary Supplement*, August, 27, 1925. It runs as follows: “In one serious matter, however, a recent use of scientific material by philosophy as seemed to disturb the theory of evolution either in its general or in its restricted sense. Evolution implies a real past or present, and infers a real future. But if time is only one of four dimensions describing⁶³¹ or determining an event, and if the

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time determinant for any event has any indefinite range of variation in accordance with the choice of the other determinants, evolution must be an illusion of a particular observer." The italics (under-score) are mine.

4. Vyavaharic knowledge belongs to science which is aparavidya and Sir Jagadis speaks as a Scientist from the standpoint of evolution. He should therefore observe the distinction and by observing the distinction admit like other Scientists that evolution does not explain the emergence of life and thus prepare the ground for Maya-vada. We shall then be able to understand the paramarthic standpoint of Sankaracharya.

5. "I believe that is the essence of the physical universe, to follow a cycle, round and round:- The plant assimilating inorganic materials, elaborating them into food for animals, the animals returning them in the inorganic form, ready for the plant; energy taking the potential form, then the kinetic, then the potential again, and so on alternately for ever; water evaporated, rising as vapour, then galling as rain, getting back into the sea, and being evaporated again. Everywhere we find a cyclical process in the material universe." (Huxley's lecture on Evolution delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge on 3/12/25)

6. We Hindus need not be frightened at the depressing picture of the cosmic process, for we have been consistent believers in the cyclical movement of the world. This is the ABC of our philosophy and religion. We know the world to be a vicious circle which cannot be explained, and because it is vicious, therefore it is false, and its right name is Maya. In⁶³² the words of Sankaracharya: "Day and Night, Morning and Evening, Winter and Spring return again and again. It is thus that Time sports. It is thus that Life runs out. Still men are dupes of false hope). We do not see teleology anywhere, neither immanent finality nor teleology related to a transcendent Deity or a Being at once immanent and transcendent. It is dysteleology all through. 'The whole creation' is not moving to a far-off divine event, in the words of the poet; nor can it be said with Hegel that the ideal is real and the real ideal.

Is there no hope then? The Advaitist says: Yes. There is hope, though it will sound 'too like despair' to many. It need not, however, so sound, for (Even the least of this Dharma saves from great fear). The Advaitist says: The spiritual value is supreme and you can get out of the vicious circle. How to get out? How to realise? Through Nivritt, through the denial of the will to live, through the voice of Ought, another name for the ethical process, the very reverse of the process of the material universe. This belongs to the Sadhan adhyaya of the BrahmaSutra. What is the end, the goal? The end is Mukti, Brahma-nirvana, absolute freedom, absolute renunciation, absolute good, perfection. This belongs to the Phaladhyaya of the BrahmaSutra.

It is the message of strength. Very brave hearts alone can receive it. Very brave hearts alone can say: I am That: I am That. Very brave hearts alone can say: I am the Infinite, the Eternal. I am the Infinite as I have struck off all fetters and destroyed limitations—and as the infinite cannot be two, so I am the Only One that exists, the Ekamevadvitiam. Om tat sat Om. This is mysticism and this is also logic—and this is the roar of the lion of Vedanta, the highest philosophy and the highest religion.

“Understanding⁶³³ Human Nature” by Alfred Adler

1. Scientific knowledge must never remain private property to those who, by virtue of their special training, have been enabled to win new truths from Nature: the value of all knowledge is relative to its usefulness to humanity. The origins of Individual Psychology lie in chapters on organ and constitutional pathology which are among the most abstruse in all medicine. Very few are qualified to read and understand Adler’s first epoch-making “STUDIE UBER DIE MINDERWERTIGHEIT VON ORGANEN.” Yet in the fifteen years which have followed the publication of this work, Alfred Adler and his fellow-students have experimented ceaselessly along the lines suggested in this book, so that to-day Individual Psychology has become a separate science, a psychotherapeutic method, a system of characterology, at one and the same time a “Weltans-chauung” and an approach to the understanding of human conduct. Despite the difficulty of the source material, the technique of understanding human conduct which is the fruit of these fifteen years of constant experiment and study, lies within the scope of any intelligent adult.

2. The precept of Socrates, “Know thyself!” was unfortunately, not followed by directions for acquiring that knowledge.

3. We could gain an understanding of these single manifestations only when we considered them as partial aspects of an indivisible whole, and that these single manifestations could be valued only when we could determine their place in the general stream of activity.

4. In⁶³⁴ our daily life we observe people drawing whatever conclusions they desire from their experiences. There is the man who constantly makes a certain mistake. If you succeed in convincing him of his mistake his reactions will be varied. Whatever excuse he makes, he betrays one thing, and that is that he wishes to be excused of further responsibility. In this manner he has an apparent justification and avoids all criticism of himself. He himself is never to blame. The reason he has never accomplished what he desired to do is always someone else’s fault. What such

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individuals overlook is the fact that they themselves have made very few efforts to obviate their mistakes. They are far more anxious to remain in error, blaming their bad education with a certain fervor, for their fault. This is an effective alibi so long as they wish to have it so. The many possible interpretations of an experience and the possibility of drawing various conclusions from any single one, enables us to understand why a person does not change his behaviour pattern, but turns and twists and distorts his experiences until they fit it. The hardest thing for human beings to do is to know themselves and to change themselves.

Any one who is not a master in the theory and technique of science of human nature would experience great difficulty in attempting to educate human beings to be better men. He would be operating entirely on the surface, and would be drawn into the error of believing that because the external aspect of things had changed, he had accomplished something⁶³⁵ significant. Practical cases show us how little such technique will change an individual, and how all the seeming changes are only apparent changes, valueless so long as the behaviour pattern itself has not been modified.

The business of transforming a human being is not a simple process. It demands a certain optimism and patience, and above all the exclusion of all personal vanity, since the individual to be transformed is not in duty bound to be an object of another's vanity. The process of transformation, moreover, must be conducted in such a way that it seems justified for the one changed.

5. They must be cognizant of all the veiled distorted, disguised tricks and legerdemain, of human behaviour. To this end we must learn the science of human nature and practice it consciously with its social purpose in view. Who is best fitted to collect the material of this science, and to practice it? We have already noted that it is impossible to practice this science only theoretically. It is not enough simply to know all the rules and date. It is necessary to transmute our studies into practice, and correlate them so that our eyes will acquire a sharper and deeper view than has been previously possible.

6. Contemporary education is still unsuited to give us a valid knowledge of the human soul. Every child is left entirely to himself to evaluate his experiences properly, and to develop himself beyond his classroom work. There is no tradition for the acquisition of a true knowledge of the human soul.

7. There must be experience as well. A real appreciation for human nature, in the face of⁶³⁶ our inadequate education to-day, will be gained only by one class of human

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beings. These are the contrite sinners, either those who have been in the whirlpool of psychic life, entangled in all its mistakes and errors, and saved themselves out of it, or those who have been close to it and felt its currents touching them. Others naturally can learn it, especially when they have the gift of identification, the gift of empathy. The best knower of the human soul will be the one who have lived through passions himself. The contrite sinner seems as valuable a type in our day and age as he was in the day when the great religions developed. He stands much higher than a thousand righteous ones. How does this happen? And individual who has lifted himself above the difficulties of life, extricated himself from the swamp of living, found power to profit by bad experiences, and elevate himself as a result of them, understands the good and the bad sides of life. No one can compare with him in this understanding, certainly not the righteous one.

When we find an individual whose behaviour pattern has rendered him incapable of a happy life, there arises out of our knowledge of human nature the implicit duty to aid him in readjusting the false perspectives with which he wanders through his life.

8. A new viewpoint in itself is of great value to the perplexed, since from this he learns where he has gone astray in making his mistakes. According to our view the strict determinists who consider all human activity as the sequence of cause and effect are⁶³⁷ not far from wrong. Causality becomes a different causality, and the results of experience acquire entirely new values, when the power of self-knowledge and self-criticism is still alive, and remains a living motif. The ability to know one's self becomes greater when one can determine the wellsprings of his activity and the dynamics of his soul. Once he has understood this, he has become a different man and can no longer escape the inevitable consequences of his knowledge.

9. This type recoils from difficulties or wriggles out of them in order temporarily to evade the demands of life. We must understand that the reactions of the human soul are not final and absolute: every response is but a partial response, valid temporarily, but in no way to be considered a final solution of a problem.

10. Our way to the absolute truth will lead over countless errors of this kind.

11. Only that which is universally useful is logical. Another instrument of the communal life is to be found in articulate speech, that miracle which distinguishes man from all other animals. The phenomenon of speech, whose forms clearly indicate its social origins, cannot be divorced from this same concept of universal usefulness. Speech would be absolutely unnecessary to an individual organism living alone. Speech is justified only in a community; it is a product of communal life, a bond

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between the individuals of the community. Proof for the correctness of this assumption is to be found in those individuals who have grown up under circumstances which have made contact⁶³⁸ with other human beings difficult or impossible. Some of these individuals have often evaded all connections with society for personal reasons, other are the victims of circumstance. In each case, they suffer from speech defects or difficulties and never acquire the talent for learning foreign languages. It is as though this bond can be fashioned and retained only when the contact with humanity is secure.

Speech has an enormously important value in the development of the human soul. Logical thinking is possible only when the premise of speech, which gives us the possibility of building up concepts and of understanding differences in values; the fashioning of concepts is not a private matter, but concerns all society. Our very thoughts and emotions are conceivable only when we premise their universal utility; our joy in the beautiful is based on the fact that the recognition, understanding, and feeling for the beautiful are universal. It follows that thoughts and concepts, like reason, understanding, logic, ethics, and aesthetics, have their origin in the social life of man; they are at the same time bonds between individuals whose purpose is to prevent the disintegration of civilization.

12. Everyone must help his neighbour. Everyone must feel himself bound to his fellow man. The vital relationships of man to man have originated thus.

13. There are fantasies which far exceed the customary imagination in sharpness of focus. Such visions are so sharply outlined that they have a value not of imaginary products, but influence the behaviour of the individual as though⁶³⁹ the absent stimulating object were actually present. We speak of hallucinations, when fantasies appear as though they were the result of an actually present stimulus. The conditions for the appearance of hallucinations are in no wise different from those which determine fantastic day dreams.

14. Illusion is closely related to hallucination, the only difference being that some point of external contact remains, but is misinterpreted, as in the case in the story of Goethe's ERLKONIG.

15. Fantasy is but another creative faculty of the soul. Traces of this activity may be found in the various phenomena which we have already described. Just as the projection of certain memories into the sharp focus of consciousness, or the erection of the bizarre superstructures of the imagination, fantasy and day-dreaming are to be considered part of the creative activity of the soul.

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16. Empathy occurs in the moment one human being speaks with another. It is impossible to understand another individual if it is impossible at the same time to identify oneself with him. Drama is the artistic expression of empathy.

17. Our entire life is very much dependent upon the faculty of identification. If we seek for the origin of this ability to act and feel as if we were someone else, we can find it in the existence of an inborn social feeling. This is, as a matter of fact, a cosmic feeling and a reflection of the connectedness of the whole cosmos which lives in us; it is an inescapable characteristic of being a human being. It gives us the faculty of identifying ourselves with things which are quite outside our own body.

18⁶⁴⁰. He acquires the ability to evade and circumvent the pressure of these primitive needs. This phenomenon occurs in the time of self discovery, approximately during the time that a child begins to speak of himself as 'I'. It is during this time also that the child is already conscious that he stands in a fixed relationship to his environment. This relationship is by no means neutral, since it forces the child to assume a different attitude and to adjust his relationships according to the demands which his world-view, and his conception of happiness and completeness, give him.

19. As soon as we wish to be attentive to any one thing we desire to exclude all other disturbances. Attention, so far as the soul is concerned, means an attitude of willingness to make a special bridge between ourselves and a definite fact, a preparation for offence, which grows out of our necessity or out of an unusual situation which demands that our whole power be directed toward a particular purpose.

20. The most important factor in the awakening of attention is a really deep rooted interest in the world. Interest lies in a much deeper psychic stratum than attention. If we have interest, then it is self-understood that we should also pay attention; and where interest exists, an educator need not concern himself with attention. It becomes a simple instrument with which one conquers a field of knowledge for a definite purpose. No one has ever developed without making mistakes in the process. It follows that the attention is likewise involved when some such mistaken attitude⁶⁴¹ has become fixed in an individual, and it thus happens that attention is directed toward things which are not important in the preparation for life. When the interest is directed towards one's own body, or towards one's own power, one is attentive wherever these interests become involved, wherever there is something to be won, or wherever one's power is threatened. Attention can never be linked with something extraneous so long as some

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new interest is not substituted in place of the power interest. One can observe how children become immediately attentive when their recognition and significance are in question. Their attention on the other hand is easily extinguished when they have the feeling there is "nothing in it" for them.

A defective attention actually means nothing more than that a person prefers to withdraw from a situation, to which he is supposed to pay attention. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that someone cannot concentrate himself. It can easily be proved that he concentrates very well, but always on something else. Lack of will power and lack of energy are similar to the inability to concentrate.

21. We may seek and find the behaviour pattern of a man in the unconscious. In his conscious life we have but a reflection, a negative, to deal with. A vain woman usually has no knowledge of her vanity in most of the instances in which she exhibits it; quite to the contrary, she will behave so that her modesty will be apparent to everyone. It is not necessary to know that one is vain to be vain.

22.⁶⁴² Human beings may be differentiated into two types; those who know more concerning their unconscious life than the average, and those who know less; that is, according to the extent of their sphere of consciousness.

23. In the first class are those who live a more conscious life, who approach problems of life without blinders on their eyes, in an objective manner. The second class approaches life with a prejudiced attitude, and sees only a small part of it. The behaviour and speech of individuals of this type are always directed in an unconscious manner.

24. We have made the important contention that the understanding of human nature can never be learned by the examination of isolated phenomena which have been withdrawn from their entire psychic context and relationships.

25. If we can succeed, however, in gaining a number of points where we can apply the leverage of our system, and join these into a single pattern, we have a system before us whose lines of force are evident, whose clear unit evaluation of the human being will be worth while. Under these circumstances alone shall we be standing upon solid scientific ground.

26. He loses his understanding for human connections, his relations to life become warped. He forgets the obligations of living, and he loses sight especially of the contributions which nature demands of every man. No other vice is so well designed to

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stunt the free development of a human being as that⁶⁴³ of personal vanity which forces an individual to approach every event and every fellow with the query: "What do I get out of this?"

27. The story is told that Socrates addressed a speaker who had mounted the tribune in old and bedraggled clothes: "Young man of Athens, your vanity peeps out through every hole in your robe!"

28. We can use this discussion very well to apply a standard to ourselves, even though we are not capable of uprooting, in a short time, what thousands of years of tradition has allowed to grow up in us. It will nevertheless be a step in advance if we will not allow ourselves to be hoodwinked and entangled in prejudices which eventually will be proven disadvantageous and dangerous.

29. The ability to identify oneself with a thing or situation we call empathy. It is well demonstrated in our dreams in which we feel as though some specific situation actually was taking place.

30. The satisfaction of one's vanity through the misuse of one's desire for religious satisfaction, is also found on the trail of the striving for God-likeness. We have only to remark how important it may be to an individual who has suffered shipwreck, to remove himself from other human beings, and engage in personal conversation with God! Such an individual considers himself quite in the proximity of God, Who is duty-bound, by virtue of the worshipper's pious prayers and orthodox ritual, to personally concern himself with the worshipper's well⁶⁴⁴-being. Such religious hocus-pocus is usually so far from true religion that it impresses us as being purely psychopathological. We have heard a man say that he could not fall asleep unless he had said some definite prayer, because if he had not sent this prayer to heaven, some human being somewhere would have a misfortune. To understand this whole flimsy soap-bubble-blowing it is but necessary to produce the negative corollary of some such statement, and interpret it. "If I say my prayer no harm can come to him" would be the proposition for instance. These are the ways in which one can easily achieve a magical greatness. Through this paltry trick a human being really succeeds in diverting a misfortune in the life of another human being at a definite time. In the day-dreams of such religious individuals we can find similar movements which reach out beyond the measure of humanity. In these day-dreams are disclosed empty gestures, brave deeds, which are quite incapable of actually changing the nature of things, but succeed very

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well in the imagination of the day-dreamer in preventing him from coming into contact with reality.

31. They complain and commiserate with themselves, and shift their pains upon the shoulders of a complacent God. Their whole activity concerns itself solely with their own person. In this process they believe that God, this extraordinarily honoured and worshipped Being, is concerned⁶⁴⁵ entirely with serving them, and is responsible for their every action. In their opinion He may be brought into even closer connection by artificial means, as by some particularly zealous prayer, or other religious rites. In short, the dear God knows nothing else and has nothing else to do, but to occupy Himself with their troubles, and pay a great deal of attention to them. There is so much heresy in this type of religious worship that if the old days of Inquisition were to return, these very religious fanatics would probably be the first to be burned. They approach their God just as they approach their fellowmen, complainingly, whining, yet never lifting a hand to help themselves or better their circumstances. Cooperation, they feel, is an obligation only for others.

“Sankara on the Nature of the Subject” by Satindrakumar Mukherjee in Calcutta Review

1. The term subject has been used in two entirely different ways in European philosophy, as the subject of knowledge, the knower; and again, as the subject of a logical sentence. But Jnata, or Pramata, which corresponds to the subject in the former sense, has no other meaning in Indian Philosophy; and when we use the term subject throughout our discussion, we mean the knower.

The first question we may ask is: Who is the subject? This question would not have much value in European philosophy, for it would generally be attributed to Mind except by a few philosophers like Plotinus, Wolfe, Kant and Bradley, but in Indian philosophy the claims of Manas and Atman to be called⁶⁴⁶ the subject have been discussed threadbare.

2. The real subject is what the Nyaya and Vedanta call Atman, and the Samkhya calls Purusa. Sankara also agrees with them that the mind is not the real subject, the subject is other than the mind: Well the mind can think upon everything yes, it is so. Yet it cannot think upon things without a thinker. This statement clearly proves two things, firstly, that the mind is only an organ and the mind ‘thinks’ only in the sense in

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which the eye 'sees'; secondly, that there is an entity, distinct from the mind, which is the real subject.

Sankara has another argument, which is characteristically his own, for refusing to call the mind the subject. "The mind is", says Sankara, as much an object of thought as anything else, or in other words we know the mind as we know a stone or a tree. Now when, we know the mind, certainly there is an entity which knows. The very fact that the mind is known, shows that there is a knower, or in other words the mind is an object for a distinct and different entity which is the subject. The mind cannot be called Atman because it is as much an object of thought as colour, etc., and so we cannot attribute the quality of a subject to the mind. This assertion proves firstly, that the mind is an object and not a subject; and secondly, that the quality of the knower belongs to the Atman. The second deduction perhaps, requires some explanation. Is mind then the Atman? No. Because it cannot be called the subject. Why can it not be called the⁶⁴⁷ subject? Because the mind is an object of thought like colour, etc. The mind is not Atman because it is not the subject; and it is not a subject because it is an object like colour, etc. The mind is not the Atman because it is not the subject; and it is not a subject because it is an object like colour, etc. It is clear, therefore, that Sankara refuses to call the mind Atman, because it is not the subject. He thinks that the Atman being the subject, the mind cannot be called Atman because the mind is not the subject.

3. Our ordinary experience is always temporal, ever-changing. 'I hear' is succeeded by 'I see', 'I see' by 'I smell', 'I am happy' by 'I am suffering' and so on. Our ordinary knowledge thus consists of series of cognitions which are short-lived, and supersede one another. Now the question is; Is the jnana of the Atman also, thus, ever-changing? The Atman, the subject of all knowledge, is undoubtedly the possessor of such series of cognitions, and are we to take it that the jnana of the Atman, is fleeting, or that when we have no such stray cognitions, e.g. in deep sleep, the Atman is devoid of knowledge?

4. To prove that the Atman is essentially intelligence, Sankara depends entirely upon experience. The life of a man can be divided into three states: waking, dreaming and deep sleep. In our waking state the Atman is certainly conscious, and so also in our dreaming state. But the state of deep sleep is apparently a state of dark unconsciousness, and this may seem to justify the Nyaya-Vaisesika position⁶⁴⁸ that the Atman is not essentially intelligence, for in that case there would have been knowledge even at that state. But if we look a bit closer into the matter, we will see that even in such states as deep sleep and swoon, the Atman is conscious. To understand that we

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were unconscious in these states proves that we were at least conscious of our unconsciousness. Sankara says in his Sutra Bhasya: "Even for him who maintains that consciousness fails in those states, it is not possible to speak of a failure of consciousness not witnessed by consciousness." The states of deep sleep and swoon are not a negation of consciousness, but only an indefinite consciousness due to want of definite objects of perception, the organs of sense having ceased to function. Sankara in his Sutra Bhasya thus states: Sankara in another place thus states with equal clearness. In that state of deep sleep Thamas predominates; and it is due to predominance of thamas that knowledge does not arise. Sankara states in his Upadeshasasri that in that state the Atman cognises this thamas. To cognise Thamas, means, perhaps, nothing more than the want of cognition of definite object. Vidyananya Swami following Sankara thus puts it: When a man rises from deep sleep he thinks that he did not know anything so long. This awareness of ignorance is certainly due to remembrance. And as remembrance presupposes a fact of knowledge, we must admit that the Atman in deep sleep cognises ignorance." Thus the Atman in all its three stages is never devoid of knowledge.

5.⁶⁴⁹ Let us now proceed to discuss Sankara's theory of the Atman as the illuminator of all experience. The Nyaya theory of an unconscious Atman possessing knowledge at intervals cannot satisfy the demands of reason. The Nyaya is right in holding that our momentary experiences require a permanent Atman to explain them. Desire, aversion, etc., depend on recognition, and recognition depends on an entity which is permanent throughout the experience series, but how can they at the same time hold that Atman is unconscious by nature? There are difficulties both metaphysical and epistemological. How can an unconscious substance become conscious? But this metaphysical difficulty we need not discuss. But so far as epistemology is concerned, the question is: Suppose the Atman finds a thing pleasant now, and after a lapse of intelligence for some time, it again comes across the thing, and it desires to possess it, how is such a desire possible? The Atman's first experience is also "I experience X," similarly its second experience is, "I experience X." But what we require for recognition is in the form: "I that experienced X formerly, experience that X now." But such a recognition is not possible unless we admit that the 'I' – the subject – had always been conscious of itself as 'I' whether there had been any particular and definite object or not – in other words the Atman as subject or recognition must have been all along a conscious, and to retain its consciousness under all vicissitudes.

6. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of the adventitious character of jnana of the Atman, based⁶⁵⁰ upon a confusion. Ordinarily we think that the stray experiences are what

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constitute the totality of the jnana of the Atman as subject and completely forget that the stray experiences can become experiences of the Atman only if we admit the Atman to be always conscious. When we have committed this mistake, it is very easy to say that when these stray experiences are there, the Atman is intelligent, and when they are not there, the Atman is non-intelligent, and does not know anything, or in other words the Atman is unconscious. The fact, however, as we have seen before really is, that the Atman has no knowledge of definite objects, though it is conscious. Sankara puts it thus: The reason of the faulty theory that the Atman is not essentially intelligence but that its intelligence is adventitious, is due to the fact that the fleeting experiences are expressed by the eternal intelligence of the Atman.

7. So far Sankara and Descartes walk together, but Sankara takes a different turn and gives us a new kind of argument in support of his position. This is what is known in European Philosophy as the *Reduction ad Absurdum* of the opposite position. Every activity of man has at its basis the idea of 'I' as I do, I eat, I read and without the idea of 'I' no activity of any kind is possible. This is a fact of universal experience. If however we do not admit the self-evident character of the self of the doer, the whole activity of the world – from the prattling of the child to the multifarious and complex vocation of a genius – all fall⁶⁵¹ to the ground; we are confronted with the absurdity of declaring that there is no kind of activity in this world:. The Atman as knower is, thus, according to Sankara, self-evident. Bradley is also of the same opinion. "The real subject" he says, "is always felt." To say that "I who knows do not know myself" is a worse sort of scepticism and as the Panchadasi says, "It is like saying that I who talk have no tongue."

From another standpoint Sankara may seem to contradict his first principle of the self-evident character of the subject when we are told that it is unknowable. The sage of the Upanishad has said "How can we know him who knows?" The knower, the subject, is unknowable. This may at first sight seem to be a strange contradiction after so much trouble to prove the self-evident character of the subject, are we to believe that the subject is unknowable. But a careful study will reveal the great truth.

The self of a man as the knower is, undoubtedly, a self-evident reality, a "felt reality" as Bradley called it, but nevertheless we cannot know it more than what we know. Thus far and no further. You know the self thoroughly well as the subject of empirical knowledge as Aham but do not try to know it more. The subject, we have seen, is the presupposition of knowledge, and to turn thought into its presupposition is not possible. To use a simile, divorce from the context, it is as absurd as the attempt of a man, however clever, to mount his own shoulder. Sankara has made an extremely

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sharp distinction between the self and⁶⁵² the not-self, the Atman and Anatman; the former means only the subject, and the latter anything but the subject. He definitely warns us against our tendency to make the subject an object of our thought. Try however we may, there is always the subject which baffles our attempt to make it an object of our thought. The reason is simple enough, if it is stated – all our experience requires a subject, and when we turn our thought over into the subject we require another subject, and so on ad infinitum. In all our thinking, the subject is always to be posited. “What we want to know” says Sankara, “is the object and not the subject”. To make the subject an object of thought is a sheer contradiction. And if it is a fact, continues Sankara, that we can know only the object, then the subject can never be known: “As fire cannot burn itself, the subject cannot know itself as an object.”

Sankara in his Taittiriya Bhasya gives another reason which is of a negative character. Even supposing that the subject can be known, the subject becomes an object and we have no subject: If every piece of knowledge requires a subject, and if we assume that we know the subject, then an absurdity occurs inasmuch as we are to know the subject as an object without there being a subject to know! Nobody can deny that knowledge requires a subject, but we have to deny this first principle of epistemology if we are to make the subject an object of thought.

8. It may seem a strange contradiction to call the subject, self-evident and unknowable at the same time. If the subject is self⁶⁵³-evident, how can it be unknowable? The contradiction, however, vanishes, if we look deep into the matter. What is meant by the subject being self-evident is that we are aware of the subject as Aham which is undeniable and which is the presupposition of all knowledge. The subject as Aham is not unknown in this sense; Sankara frankly admits this in his Sutra Bhasya: If a thing is entirely out of human knowledge there can be no discussion about it. The Atman is thus known. But how is it known – it is not known by any act of knowledge but it is known of itself, it is self-evident. The subject is self-evident in the form of ‘I’. Now comes the question, if so, how is it unknowable? The reply is that it is known as Aham and in any other form it is unknowable. But if we wish to know anything more about it – more than Asmatprityaya – we must take it as an object of thought which, however, we have seen Sankara denies to be possible. The subject is, thus, known as Aham, as the subject, but unknown and unknowable in any other form of empirical knowledge. The subject is known to the subject as the subject, but never as an object. In this sense, therefore, there is no contradiction in calling the Atman as self-evident and unknowable at the same time.

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9. Knowledge depends on the two factors subject and object and these two we have found to be uncompromisingly heterogeneous. If the subject is thus opposed by a heterogeneous object, then we can say that it is limited by the object. The subject cannot do without the object, yet it cannot cease to be opposed by⁶⁵⁴ the object. And if we look deeper, this limitation is but bringing about a change in the subject. The subject as it was before it was opposed by the object, is not the same after it was opposed by the object—'S' is not the same as 'S-O'.

The same is the case of the subject in relation to knowledge.

10. If the consciousness of the Atman is eternal, there is then no necessity on the part of the Atman for further empirical experience which is alien to it. But if somehow it has to acquire empirical experience (as Sankara says, under the influence of avidya), then we cannot but admit that the constituents of this empirical experience, viz. object and knowledge, limit it and change it, as already explained.

11. The subject is thus limited and changed by the other two constituents of empirical knowledge. The three constituents of knowledge are not, therefore, in quite friendly terms. Sankara thus states in his Taittiriya Bhasya "The subject is limited by knowledge and object." In the same Bhasya he further adds: "changed by being the subject of knowledge".

This theory of Sankara requires special notice because it has momentous influence upon his philosophy, and has served to be the bone of contention between the two of the mightiest minds of India—Sankara and Ramanuja. It is easy to see that one who holds that in knowledge the subject is limited and changed by the object and knowledge, cannot predicate the quality of the knower in the empirical sense to Brahman; for in that case Brahman would also be limited and changed by the object and knowledge. Ramanuja, however, found it necessary on⁶⁵⁵ different grounds to attribute this quality to Brahman. Sankara clearly states his position in the Taittiriya Bhasya, part of which has been quoted above: "If Brahman is a subject of knowledge, it is limited by object and knowledge, and not unlimited." Further in the same Bhasya: "If Brahman is a subject, then it is changed by being the subject, so how can it be existent, and unlimited?" We have explained above the meaning of the two statements beforehand, and perhaps no explanation is necessary here. What is clear, however, is that Sankara's Brahman is not a subject.

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“The Science of Living” by Alfred Adler

1. The conception of the Unconscious as vital memory—biological memory—is common to modern psychology as a whole.
2. It was left to Alfred Adler, a physician of wide and general experience, to unite the conception of the Unconscious more firmly with biological reality.
3. That method of analysing memories out of their coagulated emotional state into clearness and objectivity.
4. It is not now a question of contemplating our errors, it is necessary that we should learn by them. We have been trying to live as though the soul of man were not a reality, as though we could build up a civilized life in defiance of psychic truths.
5. We may not desire to know ugly facts, but the more truly we are aware of life, the more clearly we perceive the real errors which frustrate it, much as the concentration of a light gives definition to the shadows.
6. What inhibits it is, to speak bluntly, the enormous vanity of the human soul, which is, moreover⁶⁵⁶, so subtle that no professional psychologist before Adler had been able to demonstrate it, though a few artists had divined its omnipresence.
7. An individual who feels painfully unable to dominate the real world will refuse to co-operate with it, at whatever disadvantage to himself, partly in order to tyrannize over a narrower sphere, and partly even from an irrational feeling that the real world, without his divine assistance, will some day crumble and shrink to his own diminished measure. In case this should seem an exaggeration, we may recall the fact that nearly all the narrowest kind of sects, religious or secular, have a belief in world-catastrophe: the world from which they have withdrawn, and which they despair of converting, is to be brought to destruction, and only a remnant will survive, who will be of their own persuasion.
The question is thus raised, how we should act knowing this tendency to inordinate vanity in the human soul, and that we dare not merely add to that vanity by assuming ourselves to be miraculous exceptions? Adlers reply is that we should preserve a certain attitude to all our experience.
8. It occurs to very few that the right way would be to make alliance on human grounds with others in the same predicament and profession, to assert its proper dignity as a social service and improve it; but this is the only way in which the

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individual can really be reconciled with his economic function. Many of those who complain most about the conditions prevailing in their work are doing nothing whatever to re-organize it as a function of⁶⁵⁷ human life, and never think of attacking the anarchic individualism which is its ruin. We derive it from Individual Psychology, as a categorical imperative, that every man's duty is to work to make his profession, whatever it may be, into a brotherhood, a friendship, a social unity with a powerful morale of cooperation, and that if a man does not want to do this his own psychological state is precarious. It is true that now, in many professions, the task that this presents is terribly difficult. It is all the more essential that the effort should be made towards integration.

9. When we face, objectively, this fact of the relation of all souls and their mutual responsibility, what are we think of the inner confusion of the neurotic? Is it not simply a narrowing of the sphere of interest an over-concentration upon certain personal or subjective gains?

10. This tendency of the modern soul, to narrow the sphere of interest, both practically and ideally, is most difficult to subdue, because it is reinforced by the scheme of apperception. For that reason an individual alone cannot do it, excepting only in rare cases. He needs conference with other minds, and an entirely new kind of conference. A resolution to treat one's immediate surroundings and daily activities as if they were the supreme significance of life brings an individual immediately into conflict with internal resistances of his own, and often with external difficulties also.

11. The culture of human behaviour which this work has begun already to propagate might⁶⁵⁸ well be mistaken for an almost platitudinous ethics, but for two things—its practical results, and the background of scientific method out of which it is appearing.

12. It is a remarkable thing that individuals always try to justify their attitudes by feelings.

13. This characteristic of dreams is also found in our waking life. We always have a strong inclination to deceive ourselves emotionally.

14. Consciousness and unconsciousness move together in the same direction and are not contradictions, as is so often believed. What is more, there is no definite line of demarcation between them. It is merely a question of discovering the purpose of their

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joint movement. It is impossible to decide on what is conscious and what is not until the whole connection has been obtained.

15. If a philosopher wants to accomplish his work, he cannot always go to lunch or dinner with others, for he needs to be alone for long periods of time in order to collect his ideas and use the right method.

16. We see the same phenomenon in megalomaniacs who believe themselves to be Jesus Christ or an emperor. Such a person is on the useless side of life and plays his role almost as if it were true. He is isolated in life, and we shall find, if we go back to his past, that he felt inferior and that, in a worthless way, he developed a superiority complex.

17. The great difficulty with persons trained in this way is that they are overstrained and are⁶⁵⁹ always looking for a confirmation of their fixed ideas. It thus becomes impossible to change their ideas unless somehow we penetrate into their personality in a manner that will disarm their preconceptions. To accomplish this it is necessary to use a certain art and a certain tact. And it is best if the adviser is not closely related or interested in the patient. For if one is directly interested in the case, one will find that one is acting for one's own interest and not for the interest of the patient. The patient will not fail to notice this and will become suspicious.

18. Significance of the belief in fatalism affects whole peoples and civilizations as well as individuals, but for our part we desire to point out only its connection with the springs of psychological activity and the style of life. The belief in predestination is in many ways a cowardly escape from the task of striving and building up activity along the useful line. For that reason it will prove a false support.

19. This affective character, and its accompaniment of self-deception is a theme with many variations. Thus it is expressed in the pre-occupation with comparisons and metaphors. The use of comparisons is one of the best means of deceiving oneself and others. For we may be sure that if a person uses comparisons he does not feel sure that he can convince you with reality and logic. He always wants to influence you by means of useless and far-fetched comparisons.

Even poets deceive, but pleasantly, and we enjoy being entertained by their metaphors and⁶⁶⁰ poetic comparisons. We may be sure, however, that they are meant to influence us more than we would be influenced by usual words.

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20. Teachers, by the very nature of their social function, are better equipped, to correct the mistakes of children. Mankind started schools because the family was not able to educate children adequately for the social demands of life. The school is the prolonged hand of the family, and it is there that the character of a child is formed to a great extent, and that he is taught to face the problems of life.

All that is necessary is that the schools and teachers should be equipped with psychological insight which will enable them to perform their task properly. In the future schools will surely be run more on the lines of Individual Psychology, for the true purpose of a school is to build character.

21. For the individual psychologist all this is so clear that he does not hesitate to fall back on happy marriage as the only satisfactory solution for sex troubles. A neurotic does not look with favour on such a solution, because a neurotic is always a coward and not well prepared for social life. Similarly all persons who overstress sexuality, talk of polygamy, and companionate or trial marriage are trying to escape the social solution of the sex problem. They have no patience for solving the problem of social adjustment on the basis of mutual interest between husband and wife and dream of escape through some new formula. The most difficult road, however, is sometimes the most direct.

“Lord⁶⁶¹ Haldane as a Philosopher” by Hiralal Halder in The Calcutta Review

Viscount Haldane of Cloan, whose eminence as a statesman is universally recognised, is also a great figure in the philosophical world. It is the conviction of many who know the value of his work in philosophy that if he had not taken to politics he would have been in the very front rank of the world's great thinkers. As it is, it is hard to say whether he is greater as a statesman than as a philosopher or as a philosopher than as a statesman. He is a notable example of men who can gain distinction in more than one sphere.

“I am not by profession a philosopher”, says Lord Haldane, but, all the same, in spite of his political pre-occupation, he has been a philosopher all his life. He made his debut in philosophy in the early eighties of the last century by editing, jointly with Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison, a volume of essays entitled *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*. It was a sort of manifesto of the younger members of the Neo-Hegelian school then rising into prominence, many of whom have subsequently made their mark in philosophy. Among the contributors are to be found, besides the editors, the names of Bernard Bosanquet, D.G. Ritchie, Prof. Sorley and Sir Henry Jones. The volume was dedicated to T.H. Green and Edward Caird wrote a preface. The second essay in this volume was written jointly by Lord Haldane and his distinguished brother Professor J.S

Haldane. The point of view is thoroughly Hegelian. But soon after the publication of this book, Lord Haldane's faith in Hegelianism as an ontological theory seems to have weakened⁶⁶². In a short paper in *Mind* for October, 1888, he argues that the value of Hegelianism lies in it "merely being a point of view from which to criticise other modes of thought", in pointing out that categories valid in one sphere are not to be indiscriminately extended to other spheres. It is a mistake, he says, to regard it "as ground upon which to place props for speculations in both ontology and philosophy." What is essential in Hegelianism is its "mode of investigating knowledge itself" and not its "erection into a Divine experience" of the synthetic unity of consciousness. In this article, Lord Haldane appreciates only Hegel's criticism of categories and not his conception of the Absolute and praises Prof. Seth for having "cut himself adrift from Hegel if by this is meant the ontological developments of Hegel's results."

In his reply Prof. Seth rightly points out that theory of knowledge or criticism of categories is not the whole of philosophy. It is rather a preparation for the properly philosophical question. This question is, what is reality, and unless philosophy attempts to answer the question, it evades its task. It must give some definite account of the universe. The impression left on Prof. Seth's mind by Lord Haldane's article was that "he wishes to evade the necessity of taking up any metaphysical position at all. He clearly disclaims for himself the metaphysics of Hegel and Green." It must be admitted that there is much in Lord Haldane's paper to justify this impression.

But Lord Haldane's distrust of Hegel's metaphysical⁶⁶³ construction did not last long. In his *Pathway to Reality* he returns to his earlier position and definitely accepts Hegel's conception of the Absolute. He truly speaks of Hegel as "the greatest master of speculative philosophy that the world has seen since the days of Aristotle." Imitating Hegel's own words "I am a Lutheran and wish to remain so," Lord Haldane declares, "I am content to say that I am a Hegelian and wish to be called so" He does not conceal that "all that is best in these lectures I have either taken or adapted from Hegel." The *Pathway to Reality* is undoubtedly one of the best interpretations of the Hegelian philosophy in the English Language.

In his *Reign of Relativity* Lord Haldane gives us a fresh treatment of the subject matter of his earlier work in the light of the recent discoveries of science, particularly that of Einstein. He regards the theory of Einstein as only an application to a particular subject of the general theory of relativity implied in Hegel's criticism of categories. This

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is not an after-thought, for in the Pathway to Reality the significance of relativity in knowledge is distinctly pointed out. All that he does in the later work is to lay greater stress on this doctrine and to explain in detail some of its applications.

The Hegelian theory which Lord Haldane whole-heartedly accepts is that reality is no other than mind at the highest level of its self-comprehension. It is not something different from the world in which we live, but the self-same world adequately comprehended. "Viewed from a different standpoint and with fuller⁶⁶⁴ insight this world may turn out to be but appearance and God the ultimate reality disclosing Himself in that very appearance." Nature, man and God are not different entities but only distinguishable phases of a single reality contemplated from different standpoints. "To me" says Lord Haldane, "it seems that by God we mean and can only mean that which is most real, the ultimate reality into which all else can be resolved, and which cannot itself be resolved into anything beyond; that in terms of which all else can be expressed and which cannot be itself expressed in terms of anything outside itself." (Ibid. p.19). Such a view of reality is very different from that of the men of science of the Victorian age who split up nature into two halves, one the genuine objective reality and the other but appearances in the mind. The real world was supposed to consist of an "assemblage of atoms and energy" in "a self-subsisting and uniform system of space and time, with its points and instants independent of the events that occurred at them." The qualities called secondary, which the plain man attributes to things, were regarded as existing only in relation to the mind of the percipient. "People do not now try to bifurcate nature in the old fashion." It is realised that all the various contents of experience are actually there in the world as its distinguishable aspects. If reality has mechanical features, it no less has the features with which biology deals. And it is mind as much as life. "Separation in standpoint, or in order and level in knowledge is thus tending to supersede the notion of separation⁶⁶⁵ in existence."

This changed outlook, Lord Haldane thinks, is largely due to the Kantian criticism. The essence of Kant's achievement is to show that meaning cannot be separated from experience. "The mind found as there in nature what was of its own character and content, in objective form." Without being intelligible nothing can be real. The error of Kant was to "lay (Knowledge) out on the dissecting table for dismemberment," to break it up into factors wrongly supposed to be independent. When this error is corrected, it is seen that "Reality lies in the foundational character of knowledge and in the distinction between perceiver and perceived, knower and known,

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as being distinctions falling inside the entirety of that foundational character, in as much as they are made by and within knowledge itself" (Reign of Relativity). Do what we may, we cannot go behind knowledge itself.

Although reality is one, it may be viewed for different purposes from different standpoints. The mathematician, for example, fixes his attention upon the most general relations of things in time and space and abstracts from all other qualities which they possess. In this way he is enabled to accomplish the special purpose he has in view. Similarly, the physicist ignores everything except atoms and their movements and works with such conceptions as causality and conservation of energy. This does not mean that things are nothing more than matter and motion to which everything else is to be reduced. From the biologist's point of view⁶⁶⁶, life as a self-conserving whole in which the parts co-operate for the fulfilment of an end is as real as the aspects of nature with which the sciences work in their respective spheres are not to be hypostatized into independent entities, but are to be regarded as the stages through which the mind passes in the process of its self-comprehension. The conception which is valid at one level of thought is not so at another. The varying outlooks do not conflict because they belong to different planes of intelligence. The great mistake to be avoided in interpreting the world is that of letting some of its aspects dominate and even negate the other aspects, of supposing that "what is in truth only a mere aspect of reality is the manifestation of its exclusive and ultimate nature."

With this principle of relativity philosophy has always been more or less familiar. It has recently been brought into prominence by science. "The researches of Einstein" says Lord Haldane, "have given a fresh importance to the principle of relativity." But the theory of Einstein is only a special application of the general principle. In the widest sense relativity means that reality has distinguishable degrees or grades for the interpretation of which conceptions of different kinds are needed. The categories which express the nature of reality from one point of view fail to do so from another. We must, therefore, guard against the tendency "to slip inconsiderably from the terms of one order of thought which is appropriate to the facts which are actual into the terms of a different order which is⁶⁶⁷ not so appropriate." The various levels of thought are relative to the corresponding levels of reality. In distinguishing these levels we do not distinguish independent entities of different kinds but only special phases of one and the same reality. Mechanism, for example, is not one thing, life another and

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mind another still; they are but aspects which reality presents from different standpoints.

“Knowledge” says Lord Haldane, “everywhere enters into reality with transforming power.” Outside knowledge nothing is. “To be known in some form is the only way of being real.” This truth is concealed from us by the view which the immediate appearance of things suggests that the materials of knowledge are provided by the sensations which objects external to our organism produce in the mind by acting upon it through the organs of sense. Concepts come to be regarded as the outcome of mere subjective reflection indifferently applicable *ab extra* to a variety of particulars. But “the reality of a world of space and time can only be stated in terms of concepts.” On reflection, “nature turns out to have been permeated by the activity of reflection.” Knowledge is foundational. Within it fall all the distinctions we make, including the distinction between the organism and its environment. But “Knowledge discloses itself as of degrees and at levels which are determined by the character of the concepts it employs. But these degrees and levels imply each other. They are not distinct entities apart. They are all of them required for the interpretation of the full character of reality. The principle of relativity means that the⁶⁶⁸ distinguishable orders in knowledge “imply, as determining their meanings, conceptions of characters logically diverse like those of mechanism, of life, of instinct and of conscious intelligence.” The validity of each conception is limited to the particular grade of reality to which it is appropriate. Truth, therefore, is more than the fragmentary view of the universe which is all that we can get within the domain of a particular science. It must imply the whole and nothing short of the whole, whether the whole be actually and fully attainable by the human mind or not.” Ideally it lies in the exhibition of the universe as “embodying in a self-completing entirety a plurality of orders in existence as well as in knowledge of that existence.”

Lord Haldane argues that what stands in the way of our realising that knowledge is the ultimate reality is the notion that it is the property of the finite mind which is supposed to be a kind of thing. Over against this thing the physical world appears to stand in its hardness and fastness and knowledge seems to be a process set up in the mind by its influence. But mind is not a thing at all. It is the subject for which alone the objective world alone can exist. For the finite purposes of our everyday life, it is no doubt legitimate to distinguish the particular selves from one another and from the world, “Unless I, by an abstraction, which, for the purposes of social intercourse, is essential, looked upon myself as a thing with a particular mind and history attached to it, as a being standing in social relationships, it would be impossible for me to conduct

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any conversation with⁶⁶⁹ you or to live in a common social world". But from the highest point of view the distinction between finite selves is only relative. The body with which the finite mind is connected is continuous with its environment. Between the two no rigid distinction can be drawn. But mind and body are not two different things arbitrarily conjoined. The former is the latter "taken at the higher degree of reality." Between one mind and another, therefore, there can be no impassable gulf. It is by their feelings, which in their own nature are particular and incommunicable, that minds are distinguished from one another. Feelings have their setting in thought. Apart from thought they do not exist. The universal forms of thought are the framework of experience and constitute the element of identity in individual selves. If men were sentient beings only they would be completely cut off from one another like the monads of Leibnitz. "It is only when the level of thought is reached that we can have identity in difference." The varying experiences of men correspond to one another because of the identical thought-forms which lie at their basis.

Experience, Lord Haldane maintains, has always the character of a whole. But it is a whole "conditioned and limited by a specially important fact, that I am the centre in which this experience has its focus, and from which it also, as it were, radiates. And I notice at once that the range and activity of my mind is this experience radiate far beyond what is in contact with me or even close to my living body. My experience is⁶⁷⁰ always in course of letting itself be enlarged by the thinking activity of the self." (Reign of Relativity) This shows that that the conception of mind as a finite thing is not ultimate. We are forced to pass beyond it to the view that "it is a whole containing within itself the I who knows and the entire field of knowledge, with the conceptual and sentient aspects distinguished within it through its own abstractions." (Ibid)

An object-world not known to mind has no meaning and what has no meaning has no existence. This seems to be an incredible doctrine because the self is uncritically taken to be a mere thing in time and space. "The irrelevant and unmeaning metaphors which we carry with us as a burden on our backs" mislead us. It is not seen that presence to mind is the essential condition on which the existence of things depends. "Subject and object are undivorcable." As finite embodied beings selves are, of course, objects having their places within nature, but at a higher level, they are the subject for which the objective world exists. Within the entirety of knowledge its various grades must be carefully distinguished. A finite self, in one point of view, is a thing distinguished from other things. As such it is capable of being interpreted by means of

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the categories which the physicist and the chemist employ. But it is more than a thing. As a living organism it belongs to a higher order in knowledge and reality and its nature is disclosed only when it is conceived as "a whole that gives their meaning to parts, each of which performs a function in that whole, and each of which has itself no life except as a living member of the whole⁶⁷¹ for which it functions." From the biological point of view, however, self-consciousness is a mystery. We cannot understand it unless we rise to a still higher level of thought and find in it the principle of unity of all things. In its proper nature it is infinite and seems to be finite because of the obstacles to its expression arising from its connection with an animal organism in man. The self thus turns out to be the entirety of knowledge and its adequate comprehension involves the survey of it from "points of view which differ in their logical character, and belong to different orders in knowledge, no one of which is reducible to the other, however much it may require its presence." (Ibid). The various aspects must be co-present in a single comprehensive view. As foundational, knowledge includes all things within itself and there is nothing beyond it in terms of which it can be described. "Its conception is an ultimate one within which both subject and object fall."

We thus see that mind or self-consciousness is not a thing in time and space, nor a subject with an object of a foreign nature. It is the ultimate unity self-distinguished into subject and object. As essentially related to the subject, the object-world is on one side a system of universals. But the universal apart from the particular is an abstraction. "You cannot deduce the universe out of the universals of thought any more than you can divide or divorce thought from object⁶⁷² or from the particulars of sense." In the actual which is always individual, the universal and the particular as inseparably united as its moments. The distinctions between the self and the not-self, the universal and the particular arise within the inclusive whole of knowledge. "The picture of pure self-consciousness," says Lord Haldane, "regarding things from the highest standpoint, finding itself in its objects and no longer troubled by any distinction between the object-world and itself, because it has got rid of all the abstractions of lower standpoints, such a picture we cannot present to ourselves, because we are compelled to view the universe from the standpoint of the particular individual. But by reflection we may get towards the grasp of the concrete truth that this is the final conception of the self, the real foundation and meaning of experience, and that it is really actualised by experience" (Pathway to reality).

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Lord Haldane contends that nature seems to be a self-contained entity independent of mind only from the point of view of a self "subject to the physical limitations of the organism." The relative validity of this conception is not to be denied. At the level of thought occupied by us as finite human beings, nature is independent of us and irreducible to mere ideas of the mind. In so far as it lays stress on this truth the position of realism is sound. But the standpoint from which mind is set in opposition to the world is not final. It arises from the limitation which thought imposes upon itself⁶⁷³. But thought "can spread its wings and fly beyond the limits of what appears immediately," reaching the summit from which it is seen that "the completed entirety within which falls all this is and was and will be, not less than the mind for which it is there, is the whole for thought short of which thinking cannot arrest its conception" (Reign of Relativity). That which lies at the basis of reality cannot be treated as a particular fact comprised within it. To be discursive and relational is not, as Mr Bradley supposes, the whole nature of thought. It takes the relational form in order to accomplish limited purposes, but it has the power to rise above its self-limitation. If it distinguishes and relates, it also transcends the distinctions which it sets up. At its highest level it is the all-embracing experience of which feeling and will are aspects.

Lord Haldane is unwearied in urging that the nature of reality is not understood unless it is viewed from many standpoints. These standpoints "are moulded by the categories the mind in its freedom of purpose selects, and they give rise to degrees of levels in knowledge and reality which constitute a hierarchy within the all-embracing fact of mind" (The Philosophy of Humanism). "Most of the confusion" he says, "which has characterised the history of reflection has been due to the assumption that a particular set of universals would prove sufficient for the description of objects differently characterised in facts disclosed in nature. The inquirer has again and again pursued in consequence a path which⁶⁷⁴ has led him away from these facts" (Ibid).

Reality, as interpreted by the categories of a particular standpoint, is not the whole but only an abstraction from the whole made for a specific purpose. The various interpretations from different standpoints can be arranged in an ascending scale in which "the higher stands to the lower at once as that in comparison with which the lower is less perfect because more abstract, and also as the more concrete individuality within the limits and range of which the lower falls." Ultimately reality discloses itself as the all-inclusive mind within which the distinction of subject and object arises. What the general principle of relativity teaches us is that because a particular view of the

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universe is correct in its own place, we are not justified in concluding that every other view is false. "Each may be adequate in the order in experience with which for the time being we are concerned, and for each view what appears for the moment to constitute truth and reality may be accurately described in terms of the conceptions appropriate to the standpoint which we are occupying." In the constitution of the actual all of these conceptions are co-present.

Lord Haldane does not think that idealism, as he conceives it, has any reason to fear the criticism of new realism. Indeed it has much in common with the latter doctrine. The real quarrel of new realism is with subjective idealism or mentalism, the way to which was opened up by Locke's new way of ideas. Locke treated knowledge as "an instrument separable from knower and known alike and capable of being laid⁶⁷⁵ on a table and pulled to pieces." He held that the mind acquires knowledge of things through the medium of ideas existing apart from them. Some of these ideas were supposed to be like and others unlike the actual qualities of things. Berkeley denied the possibility of separating the primary from the secondary qualities and argued that things cannot be other than their ideas. The ideas, he maintained, are the things. But he continued to believe in the reality of mind as substance and as the support of ideas. Hume carried Berkeley's principles to their logical conclusion and contended that we can have no idea of substance, mental or material. Besides impressions and ideas nothing can be proved to exist. Thus he conducted philosophy "down a slippery slope to a precipice." It was reserved for Reid to expose the fallacy of Locke. He denied the theory of representative perception and stoutly maintained that what is perceived is not an idea but a thing. In perception the mind is face to face with an objective fact. Between the perceived object and the perceiving mind no idea intervenes. In this he clearly anticipated the new realists, who are now busy returning to objects the qualities of which the subjective idealists robbed them so unjustly. And the dues of things are being returned to them with handsome interest. The new realists are all in favour of investing them with universal relations. No only colour, sound and the other so-called secondary qualities, but universals also, including ends and the relation of an organic whole to its parts, we are⁶⁷⁶ told, belong to things. But a distinction is still maintained between mind and non-mental realities and the function of the former is limited to passive awareness. But as Lord Haldane asks very pertinently, "if the categories of life are as much part of a non-mental world as are those of mechanism, why are not the categories of morals and religion and beauty also part of it." He truly observes that "if the object-world is to swallow down the entire subject-world then there is no longer any

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need for distinguishing between non-mental and mental, or between matter and mind." If the new realists went further along the path pursued by them and had the courage to transfer to the side of things not only secondary qualities and universal relations but mind itself, they would see that "mind is no isolated thing, it is no attribute to property of a thing." It is the self-contained whole within which fall all distinctions made by thought, including the distinction between mind itself and the world of which it is conscious. The thought of a particular individual does not, of course, make things but "that is very different from saying that thought is alien to the constitution of the universe and does not in the multitudinous phases in which we feel and know enter into the very essence of the real universe."

Lord Haldane has shown how universal is the sway of the principle of relativity; but he does not seem to have bestowed thought on one possible application of this principle. The relativity of knowledge not only means that the self-comprehension of reality involves its⁶⁷⁷ interpretation from different levels of thought, but also that it as subject knows itself as object in ways as various as the standpoints provided by particular objects. For, each of these objects is, at the highest level, the unity of mind in which the whole world is focussed and represented. If even an organism is a unity belonging equally parts, far more so is mind. It is not apart from the objects presented to it but is in each of them, completely and indivisibly, as its ideality. In its own other it is itself. In no other way can we think of the relation of the experienced world to mind. What is in all things as their ideal principle of unity is realised as a complete whole in every one of them. To deny this is to say either that mind is present generally in all things but not particularly in any of them, or that it is distinct from them and is therefore, like them, only a numerical unity, or that they are merely its transient modes. None of these alternatives, as the idealistic argument shows, is admissible. If, therefore, mind is to be regarded as the unity that goes out to the differences of objects, it must be conceived as immanent in each single object, whole and undivided, although not limited to it. It is present everywhere in its fullness. This means that what at the lowest level is a thing in time and space, is, at the highest, a view-point from which the whole universe is survived and interpreted. The universe is real only as it is interpreted and it is interpreted from standpoints as varied and numerous as its constituent objects. The difference of interpretation is not due to the difference of degrees or levels in reality only⁶⁷⁸, but also to the difference of the points of view even at the highest level. And the mind that interprets is not separable from the standpoint from which the interpretation is made. The universal mind, therefore, is not an abstract unity nor a

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unity differentiated into mere things, but a unity, a confluence of many minds which, at a lower level, are objective entities, and its knowledge of the universe is a synopsis of the interpretations of the universe from an infinite number of view-points.

“Knowledge” Lord Haldane points out, “is more than merely theoretical. It not only issues in action but it is action”. As rational beings men are never satisfied with the world as they find it; they seek to mould and fashion it in conformity with their ideal. The values selected by them are no more dependent on their arbitrary will than are the objects known by them the products of their cognitive activity. Both in his knowledge and in his purposive activities, the individual is raised above his mere particularity. “It is the universal that is active in individual form and is therefore always dynamic as pointing beyond itself.” The good is, no doubt, of the individual, but the nature of the activity determined by the idea of it cannot be understood apart from something of a higher degree of reality than “the isolated and fragmentary volition of the individual, looked at in his aspect of one organism among a numerical multitude.” Beneath the difference of the ends of individuals, there is identity, and it is this identity that keeps them together and finds expression in the laws, institutions and customs by⁶⁷⁹ which their conduct is regulated. Man’s fitness to be a member of society is that he is no isolated particle, but a person living in relation to his fellow human beings, and permeated by ends held in common with them by which, however little consciously, his conduct is influenced at every turn. It is by the fulness of the life of the whole as shown in his activity that he is judged, and his individuality becomes larger and not smaller by his acceptance of the duties he owes to those around him.” (Ibid). There is a general will because men are not exclusive and self-contained beings. It is not “an outside compelling power”, nor a mere sum of particular wills but “just our own wills at their social level.” Apart from our own wills the general will has no being. It is outwardly embodied in the institutions of society and the state.

Lord Haldane regards the general will as the source of the sovereignty of the state, but he does not think that it is an easy task to ascertain it. In the result of a general election public opinion may seem to find expression, but the actual fact may be quite different. It is often very difficult to say exactly what has been decided at an election. “One of the most delicate and difficult tasks confided to a newly elected Ministry is to determine what mandate has really been given. Not only may that mandate be really different from what it appeared to be from the language at the time employed by those who gave it, but it may be undergoing rapid and silent modification”. This is unquestionably true, but then why speak of a mandate being given at all? The mandate⁶⁸⁰ theory is not an orthodox theory in British politics. Until

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quite recently, it was an unheard of thing, and until mob-rule is established it cannot be a reality. Lord Haldane truly observes that "it is not enough to say that in the ballot boxes a numerical majority for a particular plan was found. For it may have become obvious that these votes did not represent a clear or enduring state of mind." The electors, he justly thinks, "may have felt the points at issue to be too obscure and have meant that the Ministers in effect chosen should decide for them what modifications of existing decisions and what fresh and further decisions might be required." The essential function of the true statesman is to interpret the general will. "That will may even be to devolve to him the duty of taking the initiative and of acting for his clients freely, as a man of courage and high intelligence should act and he may have been chosen more on the ground of faith in his possession of these qualities than in order that he might take some specific action which the nation feels that it has not adequately thought out. Democracy, even in its most complete and thorough going form, may imply all this." But is not this a fancy-picture of democracy? Is it the thing that we know in actual working in various countries? Between the statesman as Lord Haldane conceives him and the demagogic politician practised in the art of vote-catching, is there not a world of difference? What Lord Haldane says about the duties of ministers is very true, but it is a condemnation of the existing forms of democratic government and a powerful plea for a genuine aristocracy⁶⁸¹ or government by the wisest and best. So at least it seems to some of his readers. The democratic spirit has done great good to the world by breaking down the artificial barriers between man and man, It is removing "the gaps in mental life that exist to-day." After a lapse of two thousand years, it is at last making the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man a really guiding principle in life. But in so far as it has ushered in the kind of government under which the thoughtful and worthy few are liable to be at the mercy of the thoughtless many, the capable and enterprising at the mercy of the never-do-well and lazy, the kind of government which, in its helpless dependence on the fickle will of a short-sighted multitude, is unable to do its first duty of governing properly, it has effected a change the full consequences of which it is not yet possible to calculate. Democracy, as we know it to-day, is no more a success than the forms of government it has supplanted. A constitution in which those who should be the representatives of the people interpreting their real will are merely their delegates pledge-bound to carry out their mandates is an indefensible as irresponsible autocracy. If civilization is to endure, the human spirit must be equal to the task of evolving a type of government which shall eschew the errors of democracy while satisfying its demand for equal opportunities for all. The eagerness of impatient idealists or rather visionaries to introduce it everywhere in the world needs to be checked. As the support of public opinion is essential to the existence

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and⁶⁸² well-being of a state, representative government is, no doubt, the ideal, but representative government does not necessarily mean democracy.

The spirit of man that creates the fabric of the state also rises above its limitations. In virtue of their common human nature, men and women, however great their national differences may be, are capable of developing a common ideal. The state, therefore, can never be the final embodiment of the mind of a people. "The world is becoming more and more international. States are not isolated units. They continue to subsist only through relations with other states, relations which tend to multiply in volume as well as intensity and which show no prospect of being superseded." As citizens of a state are related to one another, so are the sovereign states of the world, although there is no universal empire to which they are subordinated. The need of an international bond of union finds expression, Lord Haldane thinks, in the desire for a league of nations. He regards its foundation as a hopeful sign of the times, although its growth depends upon the amount of the general goodwill it can secure. His attitude towards it is neither that of the pessimist who thinks that no good can ever come from it, nor that of the fanatic who imagines that it has brought in the millennium. He takes a hopeful view of its future because he thinks that "there are already some indications that higher than merely national purposes are moving mankind and that it is struggling to express them in institutions that⁶⁸³ may in the end prove to have dominating influence."

Passing on to the discussion of the relation of man to God, Lord Haldane begins by pointing out that God cannot be a thing or substance. A thing is limited and distinguished from other things, which God is not. Nor is he a transcendent being beyond the reach of knowledge. He is rightly conceived as subject provided that we do not regard the object as foreign to it. God "must not stand for less than entirety, and such an entirety must be that within which all distinctions and resulting relations can fall." The object of the Divine mind must be within itself. "It must find the necessary distinction from itself in an other that is just itself. The mind of God must have in its other itself, and must recognise in that other just Himself in the form of otherness". Lord Haldane agrees with Hegel in thinking that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity gives expression to this idea in a symbolical form. Mind in itself is the Father, mind "gone into otherness, heterogeneity, finite mind" is the Son and the Holy Spirit is the fulness of self-consciousness in which the opposition of subject and object is reconciled. Such a conception is fundamentally opposed to the deistic view that God is other than the world. "It is just in the world that is here and how when fully comprehended and

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thought out that we shall find God, and in finding God Shall we find reality of that world in Him”.

“Man and God” says Lord Haldane, “are not numerically distinct subjects in knowledge. They are the one foundational mind, disclosing itself⁶⁸⁴ in different degrees or logical stages in the progress of reality but as identical throughout divergences in form. It is the identity that underlies the correspondence of our thoughts that relates man to his fellow man. It is the same identity in difference that relates him to God”. The human mind, hampered by the organic conditions on which it depends is unable to comprehend the nature of the Divine life as lived by God. It cannot envisage things from the Divine point of view. But by reflection it can transcend its limitations and learn that “God is present in us and it is in God that our fully developed reality must centre.”

“There is” Lord Haldane tells us, “only a single actual universe, the universe which is one abstract aspect is thought in another, nature, in its concrete, individual, living actuality, mind. This same actuality presents to us its different aspects according to the plane of intelligence at which we approach it. With the categories we employ its degrees of appearance vary and arrange themselves. These degrees of appearance, degrees not of substance but of comprehension, give us the differing and changing aspects of the world as it seems, and, may be, the justification for our faith in their several titles to places in reality”.

Lord Haldane has done well to emphasise that there is only one reality and that beyond it there is nothing. Beyond reality is a meaningless expression. Nature and spirit are not two entities antithetical to each other. It is not in any transcendent region that the spiritual is to be found. The spiritual world is the natural world at a higher level of interpretation. What seems to be purely physical⁶⁸⁵ at first sight is, viewed from within, the revelation of mind. But because spirit cannot be divorced from matter, it does not follow that it is completely realised in what we call the material world. Of the objective expression of the Absolute mind, our present abode may form only a very insignificant part. The error of medieval thought was to suppose that the distinction between this world and any other possible world beyond it is the distinction of the material and the spiritual. Against this view idealism rightly urges that the same reality is at one plane of thought matter and at another mind. Mind includes the object-world within itself. But the object-world may consist not only of the material universe but also

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of an unseen universe continuous with it. There is no reason to suppose that because mind is revealed in nature, it is revealed in nature only and that there can be no sphere of existence other than the one in which we at present find ourselves. In his recoil against medieval dualism, Hegel went to the opposite extreme of equating the object of God's knowledge with nature and his followers have endorsed this error. But may it not be that medieval thought, wrong in one way, was right in another? It was wrong in supposing that the spiritual world is beyond this world. The spiritual is not somewhere far away; it is here and now as the sustaining principle of everything that is. But, nevertheless, medievalism may have been in the right in divining that the present sensible world is not at and that beyond it there are other worlds. Neither science⁶⁸⁶ nor philosophy has anything to say against this view. Some scientific men at any rate distinctly favour it. Sir Oliver Lodge, for example, speaks of the ether as "something more fundamental than matter, something of which matter is only a sensuous modification" and suggests that it may be the stuff of which worlds unknown to us are made. All that can justly be urged is that all these worlds must be regarded as elements of a single objective system in which the Absolute mind is revealed. Our conception of reality has been deepened by the idealistic interpretation of it. It will be broadened if we think that its objective side is not co-extensive with the sensible world only.

"Vedantism" in the Calcutta Review

1. Kant discovered that the objects of thought are none other than the products of thought itself" Now, these two currents of thought the Aristotelian and the Kantian movements had been unified in the Vedantic speculation in India.
2. In its all-embracing Unity, which is pure 'inwardness' and has nothing external to it, and wherein the terms external and internal lose all their meaning and application. This is the central conception of Vedanta.
3. The idealistic thinkers have, on the contrary, been confronted with insuperable difficulties in their attempts to pass from the ideal to the real. The difficulty of the task compelled Plato greatly to compromise his position, and to take recourse to the hypothesis of a principle of non-being, to explain⁶⁸⁷ the world of change and generation. Hegel solved the difficulty by declaring the identity of thought and being. But "the idea which involves reality, thought which implies force, is" to use Weber's words, "more

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than an idea, more than thought." The reconciliation of these two opposed positions and a true synthesis of Idea and Form must be sought for in a higher principle.

"The Wonder of Words" by Isaac Goldberg, Chapter 15⁶⁸⁸

"What are we talking about. or applied Semantics: It turns out that, in the structure of our languages, methods, "habits of thought" orientations, etc., we preserve delusional, psychopathological factors." Alfred Korzybski, in "Science & Sanity"⁶⁸⁹.

It is an illusion bred by the dictionary that words "mean" other words. They acquire their meaning, however, not from printed definitions but from living use. By applied semantics, then, I mean the study of words not as solitary entities, not as subjects for phonetic, semantic, and etymological elucidation, not even as factors in the stream of speech, but as factors in the stream of meaning.

Can words trick us? Or is the treachery ultra-verbal? Does the treachery have its source in the mind behind and beyond the word—in the mind of which the word is a tool?

The mind supposedly is the seat of reason. It is a human failing, however, to use the mind not so much for reasoning as for rationalization⁶⁹⁰—that is, to employ the mind in discovering justifications for a belief or an attitude already⁶⁹¹ decided upon. This process is called wishful thinking, and is the opposite of that which might be called thoughtful wishing. The first allows the wish to be the father to the thought; the second tries to set the wish in an atmosphere of realistic thinking.

Science, broadly considered, attempts to remove the element of emotionality, of wishfulness, from the investigation of data. Art, broadly considered, transforms the emotionality, the wishfulness, into an instrument of poetic power. We are not deceived when we acknowledge the fiction.

It follows, then, that science and art are different dialects of the human mentality. It is not, except for uncomprehending spirits, a question of a superior or an inferior dialect; it is a question of adaptability. Even a professional mathematician does not make love with mathematical symbols. The language of the laboratory is not the language of the concert hall or of the art gallery.

⁶⁸⁸ The original editor inserted underline by hand

⁶⁸⁹ The original editor changed case sensitivity by hand

⁶⁹⁰ The original editor corrected spell "rationalization" by hand

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Because, in the daily pursuits that make up the irrationality of living, we become mentally and emotionally tangled up with realities that resist our desires and our wills, we are very likely to reveal our confusion in our language. By confusion I do not mean only the evident clash of reality with our wills and desires, but the more subtle evidences of that clash – evidences of which we may be totally, or only half, aware.

We⁶⁹² speak, we write, and we say many things that are illogical, beyond our power to prove; we say and write things that are saturated with emotional prejudice; we forget that words are not actual things, and that they require constant redefining; that they may change their meaning between one usage and another, in the selfsame sentence. We forget that not every word stands for something that has actual, tangible existence. We forget that everything that exists has a word for itself. The most concrete word is an abstraction, a symbol.

Spinning words, we are much like the spider spinning its web out of its own body. We, however, unlike the spider, may be enmeshed in our own web.

Applied semantics is a practical discipline, related to life outside the study, where words are tools and not topics for analysis. It is a discipline that is needed quite as much by scholars as by the man in the street. A few actual examples of words as stumbling-blocks, as false signposts, will make clear the need for such discipline. Thought and language may not be identical, but modern man does much of his thinking with words. Unclear expression and unclear thinking make for confused living.

Political terms, as they are so frequently in the heat of controversy, acquire an emotional connotation so strong that it is almost impossible to⁶⁹³ employ them for the more scientific, the more contemplative or even rational, moments of living. Whatever Democrat may have meant in its origins, or Republican, they both tend at the height of a campaign to mean friend or enemy, the respective significance of depending upon the party to which the bearer belongs. As for the term Socialist, it rouses Democrat and Republican alike to gestures of hostility. The term Bolshevik, or, better still, Communist, becomes so encrusted with non-political significance that it loses any sharpness of outline with which it may have begun, and grows into what has been called 'a smear-word' – a word that takes on whatever emotional color the speaker may at the moment desire it to assume.

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"THE WONDER OF WORDS" by ISAAC GOLDBERG. CHAP. 15

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Terms belonging to the controversies of religion suffer a like degeneration, and for like causes. Such terms, whatever their uses within the zones of their origin, defeat clear thinking precisely because they have become so overladen with emotional attitudes. It is difficult to carry on discussion and much more so to carry on debate, with words that contain within themselves a prejudgment. It is possible for words to acquire so many meanings so many derivative emotional connotations, that they lost their utility as elements of clear speech and clear thought.

In an earlier chapter I examined the words romanticism and classicism, and showed how they had lost their original clarity⁶⁹⁴. Used in literary or musical discussion they must be carefully defined, and even then misconceptions easily arise. In contemporary politics, a number of words have long been wearing away and suffering like defacement. Prominent among them are radical, liberal, conservative.

Each of these is an important, even a noble, word. It is not hard to know what is meant by radical in mathematics, for example; the word is derived from Latin radicalis, a derivative of radix, meaning 'root'. Radix is thus applied to anything that serves as, or suggests, a root. One older meaning was the root, or source, of anything. In philology it means the etymon, or root, of a word. In botany it means to root of a plant. The radish, is an edible root. In mathematics a radix is "a number that is arbitrarily made the fundamental number of a system of numbers; a base". Without a grounding in mathematics this may seem obscure; it is, however, in its own realm, stable.

In politics, however, the word radical, like all political words takes on what might be called a floating significance. A radical himself will tell you that he is so called because he wishes to get down to the root of things; his opponent, the conservative will tell you that the radical wishes to tear things by the root. They agree only on the roots.

The conservative will tell you that he⁶⁹⁵ wishes to preserve the existing order, and by that same token (though not too logically) all order. There is really no radical who wishes to destroy everything; there is no conservative who wishes to preserve everything. One course would mean chaos; the other would mean stagnation.

Between radical and conservative stands the liberal. Naturally, in view of what fallible human beings may be, to the conservative the liberal takes on the hue of a radical; to the radical the liberal takes on the hue of a conservative. Liberal thus becomes a shuttling term. At its root is the Latin liber, 'free.'

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What, then, could be more desirable in a citizen than that, speaking etymologically, he should be liberal, conservative and radical all at once? That is, as a liberal, favouring free, uncircumscribed thinking; as a conservative, favouring the preservation of basic institutions; as a radical, desiring to know conditions from the root up, and therefore to make scientifically the adjustments that liberal thought finds necessary and conservative principles find feasible. At this juncture all three arise and, in chorus protest against an evasive policy of compromise.

Dorothy Thompson, speaking on the 14th of November, 1937 at the Lotos Club in New York, devoted some much-needed attention to these three treacherous terms⁶⁹⁶. "We are living" she said "in the midst of lost words." Radical was a "glorious word originally"; to-day it has become a label to designate those "who accept with blind obedience a dogma which will not stand the test of disinterested thinking." Conservative, too, was "a beautiful word, full of meaning and very feminine." (I do not know whether Miss Thompson was thinking of Havelock Ellis and his dictum that woman is the conservative element of the human race). Once it denoted those who "hold to that which is good," but now it is used as a shibboleth by those who "believe that income tax is too high and that a thing which has been a convention for a long time is inherently good." To the speaker, liberal was "the most American, the most humane of all words (this phraseology is that of the reporter), "one whose spirit was instilled in the vernacular phrase, 'Give men a break!'"

Miss Thompson's ideal was to be "a radical as a thinker, a conservative as to program, and a liberal as to temper." It is, in the arena of active politics, an all but impossible, a superhuman, ideal.

As for living in the midst of lost words, that is not a condition descriptive only of contemporary life. We are always losing, always gaining words; words are always losing elements of their meaning, and acquiring new overtures.⁶⁹⁷ Johnson, in the Preface to his Dictionary, speaks of Swift, who in "his petty treatise on the English language, allows that new words must sometimes be introduced, but proposes that none should be suffered to become obsolete. "But" continues Johnson, "what makes a word obsolete, more than general agreement to forbear it? and how shall it be continued, when it conveys an offensive idea, or recalled again into the mouths of mankind, when it has once by disuse become unfamiliar, and by unfamiliarity unpleasing?"

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A language can no more be guarded against the obsolescence of its parts than can the human body against old age. Language, too, has its liberals, its conservatives, its radicals, Swift in his essay, was conservative in a literal, and likewise in a utopian sense; for he asked the impossible. We cannot long stay the natural evolution, or devolution, of words. What we can do, however, is to be on our guard against the various shifts in sense, against the emotional colouring that makes words less trustworthy as the exponents of thought and as the elements of thinking.

The rhyme of our childhood,
Sticks and stones may break my bones,
But names will never hurt me,
is not true. Names can hurt; names can cause sticks and stones to be thrown.

Machines⁶⁹⁸, trees and propaganda. A woman, watching the operation of an intricate machine, is led to exclaim upon the wonders of machinery. "Why" she cries, "this is truly human." Of course it is truly human, and in a deeply creative sense. For the machine has been made by man. It is an extension of his limbs, his energy – of his mind. If machinery seems human, it is manifestly because, being the product of man's ingenuity, it is as much a pattern of his mind as is the word.

A poet, the lamented Joyce Kilmer, marvels at nature much as the woman of the preceding paragraph marvels at artifice.

Poems are made by fools like me,
But only God can make a tree.

A little thought will reveal the simple truth that the same God who makes the trees makes the fools who make the poems. There is also an unrevealed pun upon the word make, for it does not really mean the same in the first line that it does in the second. Is this a fault of the mentality behind the words?

To return to the machine: When, in 1815, the toilers of England, in their rage against the replacement of manual labor by machinery, turned upon the new mechanisms and wrecked them, they were acting, perhaps, too humanly. In their own way, they exhibited as false a reaction to the machine as did the woman of our anecdote. That is, they personified it. They proceeded against it as if it, like them, shared human attributes⁶⁹⁹; as if it were a personal, rather than an economic, enemy. Destruction of machines merely postpones settlement of the problem machine-versus-man. It even

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confuses the problem, which is not machine-versus-man so much as machine-in-the-best-interests-of-humanity.

In the case of the historic machine-wreckers we have a confusion of thinking that creates a confusion of words. This, I believe, is the normal course of confusion. That confusion of words can create confusion of thinking is, however, only too true. Part of the tremendously important task of clarifying all such confusion is to make as clear as possible, the relationship between the word and the thing or quality. There is, unfortunately, such a process as thinking in words instead of thinking with them. Language can both clarify thought and obscure it. There is sleight-of-words as there is sleight-of-hand.

Human weakness, again unfortunately, lends too ready aid to such deception. For, before we are deceived, we are largely self-deceived. Our finer thinking is for ever at war with our looser wishing. And if, as has already been said, thinking is a process of selection, the word "finer" may suggest not an aesthetic quality so much as the close-woven screening of a very fine sieve.

I come, in one of the leading newspapers of New York, upon an article devoted to "Propaganda". Mr George E. Sokolsky, after making it clear what he understands by⁷⁰⁰ the word propaganda, proceeds to give his personal feelings about the term and the thing. It is interesting, by the way, to observe that he takes, as characteristic meaning of the word, not its original sense of spreading a faith or an idea, but its derivative sense of providing a point of view, "usually somewhat distorted and always biased. It is never objective and it tends to over-emphasis."

Mr Sokolsky frankly confesses to a favouritism for propaganda as thus understood.

"⁷⁰¹I personally am a confirmed propagandist. I should find life an awful bore if there were nothing to be a propagandist for. When my enthusiasms become red not I write and lecture and argue about them because I want to convert all the world to my point of view.

And I like nothing better than to meet another propagandist and to have it out with him. It is fearfully dull to argue with those milk-and-water scientists who see all sides of all questions and never get high blood pressure on any subject. They are usually intellectual sissies.

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⁷⁰¹ The original editor inserted open double codes by hand

What I like most is a fellow who fights with horseshoes in his gloves. Suppose he does not state his case fairly; I'm no cripple and the audience is not a boob. The only real danger is that somebody will repress us both."⁷⁰²

This, I believe, is the pith of Mr Sokolsky's argument. It is a truly human⁷⁰³ commingling of praiseworthy social emotions and unpraiseworthy individualistic emotions. Or, lest we become bogged in such treacherous pseudo-antitheses as social-individual, let us rather say, a truly human commingling of clear and muddled thinking.

For example, does Mr Sokolsky really mean that he "likes most" a fellow who fights with horseshoes in his gloves? Nothing of the sort; the phrase is used metaphorically. Sokolsky, at a prizefight, would boo a pugilist who had somehow managed to elude the vigilance of the authorities and padded his gloves with iron. The metaphor was chosen most unadvisedly. "The audience is not a boob." Again a figure of speech and again chosen most unadvisedly. For, if the history of thought reveals anything, it reveals that the "audience" "is a boob" and that nobody knows this better than the unprincipled propagandist. Indeed, by Mr Sokolsky's very definition, propaganda is unprincipled to begin with.

We have, however, but scraped the surface of the treacherous thinking in this passage. First, the writer flouts unemotional thinking; this is a fallacy of primary danger to the human race. Second, he is led to malign the few scientific minds that humanity has developed against this menace. "Then it is dull to argue with those milk-and-water scientists ..." What a confusion here; What could have been duller—to the outsider⁷⁰⁴—than the vast amount of plodding research that went to discover the sources of such scourges as smallpox, cholera, yellow fever, diabetes, diphtheria, syphilis? "Milk-and-water" indeed; A test-tube may not be so glamorous as a baseball and bat (it is Mr Sokolsky who, inferentially, establishes that opposition, not I); but one does not use bats in laboratories any more than one raps out home runs with a test-tube.

To see all sides of a question, so far from being the attribute of a sissy, is one of the rarest achievements in the long, long history of man's ascent from the condition of the brute. "Intellectual sissies" indeed: By what process of mentation Mr Sokolsky establishes a correlation between high blood-pressure and masculinity, and between low blood-pressure and femininity or sissification, I do not know. I know only that the

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expression “sissies” on his part, contains yet another fallacy – that of regarding male attributes as invariably strong and right, and female attributes as invariably weak and wrong. To make matters worse, he had to write “usually intellectual sissies”. An Einstein, a Darwin, a Newton, an Aristotle, a Galileo – representatives of men and mentalities that have faced death from disease and at the stake, in the service of clear thinking and dedication to man’s⁷⁰⁵ higher potentialities – represent to Sokolsky a type of intellectual sissy; but a man who knows that he is fighting “with horseshoes in his gloves” yielding to every illusion that emotional thinking can provide – the very type of man who, under the temptations of the mob spirit, would burn a Galileo, stone a Newton, disfranchise and Einstein – is not a sissy, is not milk-and-watery, but is a useful and commendable member of society!

Our problem, again, is: How much of this evil mentation is verbal, and how much goes back of the word to a pattern of mind? Certainly the word propaganda is one of the most dangerous of contemporary terms. Yet in the article that caused this discussion, the writer shows from the beginning that he is aware of the dangers; then blithely he yields to them. From the facile discovery that men distort the truth in the interests of their private desires he proceeds to an acceptance of that vice and to a condemnation of those who do not share it and try to rise above it.

The error of this thinking is not verbally induced; indeed, it seeks to impress its fallibility, its harmfulness, upon the vocabulary.

Locke, Ogden, and Misunderstanding. That professional word-men (logicians and semanticists) are not immune to the infections and contagions spread by words is only too evident.

Let⁷⁰⁶ us consider first an example from the logicians of yesterday.

The third book of John Locke’s *An Essay on the Human understanding* contains toward the end a long passage upon deception in which it is possible that, for all his wariness, the author himself was partly self-deceived. Locke, having considered, in his hyperlogical and somewhat dry, repetitious manner, the latent dangers of words, turns his attention to the perils of metaphorical language. Not without great courage, he writes:

“But yet, if we must speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative applications of

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words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else out to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats; and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform and instruct, wholly to be avoided; and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot be thought a great fault either of language or the person that makes use of them. What and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world will instruct those who want to be informed. Only I cannot but observe⁷⁰⁷ how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been in great reputation; and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.”

Locke has just been speaking of the difficulty that men create by entering upon discussion without previously defining their terms. Earlier in the book he has written, “This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of ideas only, and not for things themselves.” This has become an axiom of writing and intercourse, yet the disputes and the misunderstandings continue, not alone through incomprehension but through sophistry. It is at sophistry, indeed, that he aims in the passage upon rhetoric, and although his language may be somewhat stiff and outmoded, his admonitions are as badly needed to-day as they were in his own day.

Yet⁷⁰⁸ Locke, who understood well the concrete basis of all abstract language, must have known, too, that artificial and figurative applications of words are a necessary form of linguistic expansion. Without this figurative aid, language would have remained a starkly limited process. To borrow Locke’s own figure about the fair sex, we might say that his diatribe against figurative language too much resembles the diatribes of misogynists, who, having been betrayed by a woman’s beauty, find all beauty there-after a snare and a delusion.

It is important – and it was never more important than now – to be on our guard against the Lorelei of language. It can win us – to apply Shakespeare – with honest tribles (words) and deceive us in deepest consequences (meanings). Yet to interpret

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Locke by the letter would be to abandon, through gross insensitivity, the conquests and the solaces of poetry, and of all such language as rises above literality. This is something that even science, for all its progress toward a language unhampered and unclouded by emotional references, cannot and does not really wish to achieve. Mankind, outside the laboratory, is interested in other things than demonstrable truths. It is too easy, in fact, to go astray with such words as truth. Communication between persons, is even for those who engage in the most lofty pursuits of the intellect, largely an⁷⁰⁹ emotional exchange. To live solely by “logic” (and I am not sure of what “logic” means in such a context) would suggest something monstrous, unfeeling, and quite inhuman.

Are we therefore to surrender the attempt to rid language of its emotional pitfalls? No. For the sake of the very emotions involved we must insist that words—like all good signs—point clearly to what they designate. Mathematics, for example, is a language; this does not mean, however, that all language must approach the cold, abstract character of mathematics. “Euclid alone” sings Edna St. Vincent Millay, a most un-Euclidean poet, “has looked on Beauty bare.” This is an austere passion. We cannot imagine, outside of caricature, a Tristan and an Isolde making love through algebraic symbols. When lovers intimately speak, their words are rather music than speech, and need have as little verbal meaning as music itself. In an ideal world, perhaps, lovers should sing, not speak. They do so in opera, which is one of the secrets of the fascination that the hybrid form exercises upon so many.

The fact seems to be that we all speak not one language but many. Some of these languages demand far more accuracy than the others.

Words, to risk a paradox, mean more than they mean. They are evidence, not only of the life of fact but of the life of fancy. They bear witness not⁷¹⁰ only of the life of thought, or logic, but even more to a life of the emotions, of the non-logical, non-thinking process. Man does not live by logic alone, nor does language. Grammar and semantics, like the Sabbath, were made for man, not man for the grammarians and the semanticists. To anatomize poetry, or the metaphorical, daily habit of speech as if it were intended to be taken literally is as useless and humorless a pursuit as to turn mathematics into metaphors.

Translation is not only a process that involves a transfer of meaning from one language to another. It involves, almost as much, a transfer of meaning, in the self same language, from speaker to hearer. As truly as man errs the while he strives, so does he

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translate as long as he speaks and listens. To converse is to translate—to recreate meanings, moods and metaphors. “One of the hardest things in the world” wrote the author of Alice in Wonderland to Miss Dora Abdy, “is to convey a meaning accurately from one mind to another.”

My second example of a semanticist trapped in his own words is C.K. Ogden, inventor of Basic English. The invention itself, which in many respects is a great practical advance over other types of universal language, and which even has importance for the learning of one’s native language, whatever that language may be⁷¹¹, is considered in my chapter “Forward from Babel.” I am interested, for the moment, in Mr Ogden’s exaggerated claims for his own invention, and in the way he falls into a snare woven by his own words.

“What the world needs most,” he proclaims, with as much humor as truth, “is about 1000 more dead languages—and one more alive. The so-called national barriers of to-day are, for the most part, ultimately language barriers. The absence of a common medium of communication is the chief obstacle to international understanding, and consequently the chief underlying cause of War.”

Basic English, it appears, is not a sure protection against violation of Basic Logic.

Mr Ogden has gone⁷¹² astray between two different meanings of misunderstanding—and he a semanticist of power and originality, co-author, with Mr Richards, of The Meaning of Meaning! In the first instance (international misunderstanding) the word means failure to achieve perfect translation of meaning. Misunderstanding as a “chief underlying cause of War” on the other hand, means a difference of opinion, of purpose, and may be the result of understanding each other only too well! Does Mr Ogden seriously mean that nations go to war because they translate imperfectly each other’s language—that there would be no war if people spoke the same language?

Did⁷¹³ not our North and our South speak the same language? Did not the Spanish Loyalists and the Spanish Rebels speak the same tongue? Have there not, throughout history, been disastrous civil wars, waged by those disastrous civil wars, waged by those speaking a common idiom?

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⁷¹² The original editor corrected spell “gone” by hand

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Certainly the misunderstanding of an important word or phrase might be a contributory cause of a war – contributory, not the “chief underlying cause.”

When so nimble-witted an expert as Ogden, in a paragraph emphasizing the importance of a common medium of international communication, himself falls into an error of communication, should not we lesser spirits handle our words with greater care than ever?

It should be clear that the basic error here is one of thinking rather than of expression; or, to put it in a slightly different way, one of an imperfect correlation between thought and expression. A loose employment of words betrays us into loose thinking; loose thinking effects a like betrayal of expression.

The nine symphonies of Beethoven have been divided into those of even number and those of odd. It has been observed that those of odd number are the masculine works; those of even number, the so-called feminine. That is, the odd ones are more powerful in theme and structure; the even ones, simpler, more frankly melodious, less intricate in facture. Such classification is imperfectly scientific or aesthetic; it⁷¹⁴ is based, of course, upon a superficial observation of the sexes in civilized life. Nevertheless, the use of masculine and feminine to denote strong and weak (whether in daily life, or in the naming of rhymes) is now an almost ineradicable habit of language.

See, then, how the odd-numbered symphonies of Beethoven are subtly transformed into the superior, because they are masculine; and the even-numbered into the inferior, because they are feminine. Such facile classifying ignores altogether the element of contrast in the creative personality; it ignores, in fact, the “masculine” and “feminine” elements, so-called, that enter into the composition of any single symphony. It ignores, too, the weak moments in the “strong” symphonies and the strong moments in the “weak”.

The illusiveness of this language goes further. In discussing which of the Beethoven symphonies will be carried over into the musical education of the proletariat, a Communist critic rejects the even-numbered symphonies as ill-befitting a proletarian state. Why? Because, presumably, they represent the feminine, the weak, the inactive principle. The fallacies of this attitude would occupy many pages of a treatise on logic. Because the word proletarian is associated with an economic revolution, because revolution is naturally associated with violent⁷¹⁵ activity, therefore the tastes of the future proletarian state will be – so runs the thread of thought – in favor of music that

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portrays tumult. The use of arts as a contrast to the utilitarian requirements of life is readily overlooked; the psychological, the biological demand for contrast in the work of art itself is overlooked as readily. I suspect that he who rejects, through insufficient understanding or mistaken fervor of propaganda, the even-numbered symphonies of Beethoven has ill understood the symphonies of odd number.

The Treachery of Words—or of mind? I should like, finally, to consider certain phases of a recent effort to popularize the study of word-significance. For we have become, of late, more word-conscious than ever; or, perhaps, meaning-conscious would be the more precise term. To paraphrase Cowper's famous lines, in The Tyranny of Words we have a newly converted semanticist who does everything but

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A panting syllable through time & space. Suspicion of words is nothing new under the sun.

And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do definitions nor explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and over-rule the understanding, and⁷¹⁶ throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.

The quotation is from Francis Bacon's Novum Organum, the first book of Aphorisms, Number xliii. Such excerpts as this and the passages that I have quoted from Locke might, with slight changes in vocabulary and punctuation, have been written by the latest disciples of Messrs. Ogden, Richards, and Korzybski; indeed, they have. There are moments when Locke inveighs against such abstractions as "sympathy", "antipathy", and "justice" in just the same manner of Mr Chase doing his valiant job upon the misleading—but not therefore empty or unnecessary—abstractions of our own day and generation. I am reminded of the title of a curious book published by David Urquhart in London, more than eighty years ago, called The Effect of the Misuse of Familiar Words on the Character of Men and the Fate of Nations. One of those words, Mr Chase might be interested to learn, is tyrant. Mr Urquhart had a tough time of it with the verbal tyranny.

That words partake of evil magic, then, and that they are not things, is not a new discovery of Malinowski, Korzybski, et alii. Yet it is good that we should be reminded again and again; for too often we hear only with our ears, just as we speak only with our lips.

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We should be on our guard, however, against substituting new magic for old. Semantics is but a word. It is axiomatic in⁷¹⁷ semantics, as we have seen, that not every word represents a thing—merely because we have a word does not mean that therefore we have an object; that we have no words for certain things, on the other hand, is no proof that they do not exist. The referent is that to which the word points. There are more referents in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your Semantics....

It is important to remember this because some semanticists—and every one of us is a semanticist, good or bad—are misled by their enthusiasm for the language of mathematics into envisioning a language that shall be drained of emotionalism.

Mathematics is a language—one of many that human ingenuity has devised. But not all language is, or ought to be, mathematics. Wishful thinking is bad wishing and bad thinking. This valuable observation does not destroy the validity or the desirability of wishing. I have known some scientists, mathematicians among them, who scoffed at poetry because it dealt in matter that did not lend itself to proof. Mathematics, as a language, had played its role in misleading them. They seemed actually to believe that what one cannot count is not there. They talked as if they believed that because you cannot prove the superiority of one work of art to another, therefore art means less than mathematics. It was as if they had never heard of incommensurables.

The⁷¹⁸ mathematician, and the scientist generally, work with symbols whose emotional connotations have been deadened. Emotions have no place in the laboratory. It is because Mr Chase forgot the importance of such connotations outside the laboratory, however that he should become semantically confused about, for example, obscenity. Let me make it clear that I have little objection to what is called obscenity, and that my attitude toward it is aesthetic, not moralistic. The problem of obscenity calls for radical semantic readjustment; the confusion would be cured appreciably by an investigation of the etymologies of our “bad” words, and an understanding of the significance revealed by those etymologies. It is only half true, nevertheless, that in the matter of the four-letter Anglo-Saxon word for sexual intercourse, and the phrase “sexual intercourse” itself “both symbols have precisely the same non-verbal act as referent.” The various terms for coitus have various connotations, as for that matter, has the non-verbal act itself. If words were invariably confused with things, coitus would be just as objectionable as any other word for the act. Why isn’t it? Because it suggests an approach to sex altogether different from the approach suggested by Mr Hemingway’s favorite quadrilateral vocable. Coitus suggests a scientific interest; it

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connotes, moreover, an interest not directly selfish, not solely physical⁷¹⁹. The word that is too vulgar to be generally printed suggests, on the other hand, indelicacy, a merely epidermal interest. It is a commonplace of semantics that there are really no synonyms in a language.

I wish I could be as sure as Mr Chase is that “people are not ‘dumb’ because they lack mental equipment; they are dumb because they lack an adequate method for the use of that equipment.” I wish I could be equally sure that as he writes, “to improve communication new words are not needed, but a better use of the words we have”. Elsewhere he adds, “There is little fault to be found with the words we use, much with the way we use them.” But isn’t the “way we use them” intimately associated with our mental equipment? Do we think better because we use the “right” words, or do we use the “right” words because we think better?

As for the need of new words, can it be that, at this precise moment in the history of humanity, we have ceased to feel it? That up to now, languages have needed to grow, but that suddenly we have all the words we need? Will there ever be such a time? Dean Swift thought it possible to halt the evolution of speech and fix certain elements of the language for all time; now Mr Chase implies that we can do the same with words. He will meet the disappointment of his illustrious predecessor.

That⁷²⁰ words often obstruct thought and action is only too true. That we cannot be too careful with them follows obviously. But how we are to make more careful use of them without the intervention of our mental equipment, I cannot see.

When Madame Roland bade farewell to the world, on the scaffold, she uttered a phrase that should be a slogan—and a warning—to semanticists. “O, Liberty! Liberty! How many crimes are committed in they name!” Let us not forget, however, that the Madame spoke French; she used the word liberte. Is this an exhibition of academic captiousness? By no means. It strikes, rather, at the root of a fundamental semantic misconception. Many a crime has been committed, too, in the name of svoboda, which happens to be Russian for ‘liberty’. Certainly between liberty and svoboda there is no phonetic resemblance. It is not the mere sound of a word that makes it into a powerful agency for misleading one’s self or one’s followers. Whether the word svoboda, liberte, liberty or liberated, it serves equally well the purposes of Russian, French, American, or Spanish demagoguery respectively.

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To believe that the mere word liberty or any abstraction, carries in itself a power for misleading is to revert to the ancient conception of the word as magic. It is not the word, it is the cluster of associations that possesses the potentialities of misleading. By that same token the⁷²¹ abolition of these words will hardly do away with the power of the demagogue or the folly of Demos. For other words stand ready to rush in. The new words will gradually acquire the selfsame connotative potency, and presently become as dangerous as the terms that they replaced.

The new semanticists – with whom I am for much the greater part in sympathy, by the way – exhibit an almost stigmatic petulance, as if they resented having to be as careful with words as they supposedly are. Messrs. Ogden and Richards, in their volume, The Meaning of Meaning, after stating their canons of a clear prose style, assure us that the canons actually produce such a style, “though not necessarily one intelligible to men of letters.” This is a lower order of writing, as unfunny as the wise-crack of Mr Van Loon, who, during a broadcast on the Curies, early in January of 1938, allowed himself to say that “the learned professors, as usual, were wrong.” Semantics is hardly the cure of such wilful chatter. The fault lies in a permanent or passing quality of mind. Messrs. Ogden and Richards, by the way, brilliant as is their book, might have spent less energy in feeling superior and a little more in making clear the meaning of their meaning. A semanticist who cannot make himself clear is a bad advertisement for his subject. Physician, heal yourself!⁷²² Semanticist, clarify yourself!

It is necessary, if we are to inoculate ourselves against verbomania, to understand that the real trouble lies not in the words but in the psychology behind the words. The word is but a symptom, a symbol, a sign, pointing not only to an object or a concept, but to a subject and a conceiver.

“A whole book” writes Aldous Huxley, “could be written on the way in which thought has been affected by the accidents of grammar.” This is true; any accident of speech, whether in the word or the word-group, may affect thought. Much thought is a sort of silent talking. A larger book, however, could be written on the way in which the accidents of grammar have been affected by, even caused by, the accidents of thought.

It is here, I believe, that we come upon the basic significance of the modern revolt against language as we know it to-day. That revolt, which is much older than Count Korzybski’s germinal – and intensely difficult – book, Science and Sanity, is only in part a revolt against misused words. It is a realization that language is still saturated by, and in its forms determined by, primitive ways of thinking.

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The objections that are voiced by Korzybski and his followers against language as it is constructed to-day were heard at the beginning of the century from Lady Welby, the sharp-spoken proponent⁷²³ of Significs. Lady Welby wrote, in her What is Meaning, that “Language is still in what we have to express by that vague and misused word, the ‘instinctive’ stage. We must raise it as we have ourselves risen from the ‘instinctive’ level to the volitional and fully rational plane, in the fullest sense. What we will it to be (and thus to give us) that it must inevitably become... Significs is a practical means of calling attention to the backwardness of language in comparison with other words of communication, and to the urgent need of stimulating thought by the creation of a general interest in the logical as well as the aesthetical value of all forms of Expression.. Our present vocabulary, and especially our metaphor, only fits the pre-Copernican or at best scholastic order of things, and is pre-scientific in a sense which would have aroused energetic protest and entailed effective reform in the days of those classic forefathers whom we all profess to revere.”

Lady Welby’s significs has been regarded, in some quarters, as a harsh-sounding synonym for semantics. It appears to be more, carrying the question of meaning out of language into all the zones of life and living.

In this country the neo-semantic movement is slowly discovering Korzybski as a rallying-point. It is a relativist movement, intent upon discovering structural relationships rather⁷²⁴ than over-simplified schemes of cause and effect. It is an effort to refashion language in the image of the contemporary mind, not that of the primitive to whom genders and verb-endings and metaphors and other linguistic habits were a clumsy apparatus—as clumsy as the first cart in comparison with the latest model of transatlantic flyer.

I believe that it is an error to regard the problems of the new semantics as being “mainly verbalistic”, except as all problems of the mind must be expressed in words, and therefore must reveal something of the mind that does the expressing.

Korzybski himself, in the introduction to his book, which is of primary importance to all advanced students of language, says: “It seems obvious once stated, that in a human class of life, the linguistic, structural, and semantic issues represent powerful and ever present environmental factors, which constitute most important components of all our problems...”

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To speak only of words, or even mainly of words, when it is a relationship between mind and expression that requires restatement, is to fall back into the primitive's veneration of, and misunderstanding of, the word. Language, says one of the leaders in the new semantics, "is no mere signalling system. It is the instrument of all our distinctively human development, of everything in which we go beyond the other⁷²⁵ animals."

Semantics is no sham battle between "good" and "bad" words. Words do not possess absolute character. They acquire their virtues or their defects, as they acquire their meanings, from their context. Their characters, their values, are relative.

The problem of applied semantics—to continue our martial metaphor—a real battle between straight thinking and crooked thinking, between effective and ineffective expression, in which words are the weapons, not the warriors. We are the warriors.

The Wonder of Words by Isaac Goldberg

1. ⁷²⁶Among the prime sources of error are words, which are now being examined with unprecedented suspicion. Man has for many thousands of years believed in spirits; his language is permeated with animistic expressions which cannot but be a potent factor in influencing his thoughts...He has not been much concerned with scientific truth and error, and so his ways of expressing himself are ill-adapted to careful description and discrimination. Indeed most people most of the time are sadly bored by attempts at accuracy...Our speech is full of anachronisms recalling ancient misapprehensions of all kinds. So one of the tasks that is imposed upon us by the increase of knowledge and the consequent revision of old ways of thinking is further study and investigation not only of these⁷²⁷ faults of language, but of how they have influenced and continue to influence even scientific thinking. We must devise better and better ways of talking about things as they now appear to us; for thinking and language are inextricably interwoven and interdependent, and both must be constantly considered in any attempt to illustrate the story of error. JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON, on "The Procession of Civilization" in *The Story of Human Error*, a symposium edited by Dr Joseph Jastrow.

2. The study of language primarily from the standpoint of sound is called phonetics (Greek Phone 'sound'). The study of language primarily from the standpoint of form is called morphology (Greek morphe, 'form').

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⁷²⁶ The original editor inserted open double codes by hand

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The study of language primarily from the standpoint of meaning is called semantics (Greek *sema*, 'a sign'; *semantikos*, 'significant'). Other names for this branch of linguistics are semasiology (Greek *semasia*, 'signification') and signification.

3. The problem of meaning, in its entirety, is the newest branch of linguistics, and the one that to-day is undergoing the most intensive cultivation. It will throw needed illumination upon the other branches.

4. Sounds, in fact, do not begin to mean anything until they are found to possess a negotiable⁷²⁸ utility.

How does this come about? The word signification in the sense of meaning, provides⁷²⁹ the central theme for development. To signify is to make a sign. A sign, moreover, to our eye-conscious civilization is something printed or painted or written: design, insignia, signature. The spoken word, however, is no less a sign than any of these.

5. "...To have more words and to attend more to words is not simply to increase mental power; words themselves are powerful things and dangerous things. H.G. WELLS, in *The Outline of History*.

6. All names are words, and they are none the less words for being applied to creatures that can move and talk and give names in turn.

One philologist maintains, indeed, that the first words were designations of human beings—that they were not so much what we call names as what we call pronouns. "In our opinion" writes Breal "the first word to stand out from all others was the pronoun. I believe that this category is more primitive even than that of the noun, because it requires less inventiveness, because it is more instinctive, and more easily commented upon by gesture. We should not, therefore allow ourselves to be deceived by the term 'pronoun' (*pro nomine*, 'instead of a noun) which comes to us from the Latins, who in turn, themselves translated it from the Greek (*antonumia*). The error has lasted into our own days. Pronouns are, on the contrary, in my belief the most ancient part of language. How could our⁷³⁰ me ever have lacked for an expression with which to indicate itself?

Pronouns, says Breal, are the most mobile elements in language; they are never definitely attached to a single person, but are forever on the go. "There are as many me's as there are individuals who speak; there are as many you's as persons to whom I may speak. There are as many he's (better still it's) as there are real or imaginary

⁷²⁸ The original editor corrected spell "negotiable" by hand

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objects in the world. The reason for this mobility is the fact that these pronouns contain no descriptive element. Thus a language composed only of pronouns would resemble the babbling of a child⁷³¹ or the gesticulation of a deaf mute. The need of another element, out of which were formed the noun, the adjective, and the verb, was therefore evident. But it is none the less true that the pronoun takes its place as the foundation and the origin of languages: it was without doubt with the pronoun..that the differentiation into grammatical categories began.”

There is a certain logic to this. Man, as the measure of all things, awaking to the world, might naturally be imagined as eventually dividing it into self and not-self. It is a question that must be settled, however, by the psychologists. If linguistic research could prove what Breal maintains, it would add weight to such a psychological view. Were the first words pronouns or adjectives? That is, were⁷³² they designations of self or crude descriptions of the outside world, out of which, gradually, nouns and other parts of speech evolved?

In a negative way, studies in the evolution of grammar may come to our assistance. It seems to be a question however, whether we became (or, as infants, become) conscious first of ourselves or of the rest of our environment – whether the I or the it arrives earlier in the course of our gradual achievement of the feeling that we are distinct from the rest of the creation. As thus stated, it looks like a question for the philosophers as well as for the psychologists. In any case, it stands on the outer frontier of linguistic investigation.

It may be indicative that, as pronouns are supposed to be made out of nouns, they may almost as easily be made into nouns. There is nothing strange about saying “my ego” or “your ego”. Ego is Greek and Latin for ‘I’. To be able to say “my I” is not only a triumph of grammar but of understanding. It could not have been done in the early stages of mankind, for it connotes a certain depth of self-understanding, and a certain ability to consider oneself not only subjectively but objectively.

As for the phrase “your ego” the word ego has undergone a transformation thro which, from meaning ‘I’, it has come to mean⁷³³ anyone’s ‘I’ – that is, anyone’s ‘I’ – that is anyone’s self. Just as anyone’s name may become an ordinary noun, standing for something inanimate, so may the very word for the speaker, as referring only to himself, become a word for the one spoken to.

7. “An eminent Logician who can make it clear to you That black is white – when looked at from the proper point of view; A marvellous Philologist who’ll undertake to show That ‘yes’ is but another and a neater form of ‘no’. GILBERT AND SULLIVAN’S UTOPIA, LIMITED.

⁷³¹ The original editor corrected spell “child” by hand

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8. Words, then, are not definite and unchangeable. They not only state; they suggest. The current meaning of a word is but one of its meanings, and to us, the most important one. Yet words mean more than meets the eye, or the ear. The psycho-analytic school of Freud, in the interpretation of dreams, distinguishes between the manifest and the latent content of the dream-material. The manifest content is what the dream appears to mean on the surface; the latent content is what lies concealed beneath, requiring skilful investigation.

Words, too, have a manifest and a latent content. They denote; they connote. For the ordinary purposes of living, the denotation—the manifest meaning—is enough. Yet why would we feel insulted if someone were to say that we devour our food instead⁷³⁴ of eat it? Is it not because we associate the word devour with animals? Words carry not only statements, but implications. They have, as it were, shape and colour. They speak out-right; they also imply.

Words, like other sounds, are not simple. We have learned, in the chapters on phonetics, that sounds have not only tones but overtones. Words, too, in a metaphorical sense, have overtones.

The meaning of a word, then, is not a clear-cut image; it is more like a selection from a number of possible, very similar, images. It acquires definition from its context; alone it is rarely well defined. A word is, in this sense, a focus. It is a blur of meanings, upon which the mind brings its sharp light to play, centering attention upon one selected meaning. To a mathematician, the word operation means one thing; to a surgeon it means another; to a stock-broker it means something else again. To one person, in the varied course of a day, it may mean, in succession, all three things, but never at the same time. The nature of our interests, of our requirements, focuses attention upon the meaning that we desire.

Words can change in meaning, then, in much the same way that the sounds composing the words can change—by a subtle and often unnoticed shifting from one delicate distinction to another. Or they may change—again like sounds—by the⁷³⁵ perception of an analogy.

9. The phrase Siamese twins entered the language in 1829; within four years the term was being applied to twins of like formation, regardless of their origin. From the resemblance to the tubular band that joined the Siamese twins we then evolved the verb siamese, meaning “to unite (two or more pipes) by a Siamese joint so as to discharge through a single, usually larger pipe.”

The word Siamese thus loses, even in the case of the twins, association with the very country that gave birth to it.

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10. When, in the late 1880's, Herr Abel came to the study of ancient antitheses, he selected the Egyptian language as that containing the only relic of primitive words. "Imagine" he "writes" such apparent nonsense as, for instance, the word 'strong' at the same time denoted 'weak' the word 'light' also meant 'darkness' that in calling for beer another would use the same word to call for water; conceive that, and one has the astonishing practise of the old Egyptian language.

"Egypt⁷³⁶" he continues, some what later, "was everything else but the home of nonsense. On the contrary, it is there that we have the earliest signs of the development of reason. It had a morality which was pure and dignified, and had formulated for itself the majority of the ten commandments at the same time when the races now ranking as civilised were in the habit of sacrificing human⁷³⁷ beings to their bloodthirsty idols. A people which in so dark a period was able to keep the torch of justice and civilization alight alight, could not in its speaking and thinking have been exactly stupid...How then can we understand the Egyptians allowing themselves such a peculiarly contradictory language?"

The contradictoriness reached into the very composition of the word. For, besides words that had opposite meanings within themselves, there were words "compounded of two distinct words, the whole word having the meaning of only one of its component parts. In other words, there are in this extraordinary language not only words such as 'strong' which denotes also 'weak', 'command' which means 'obedience' as well, but impossible words such as old-young, far-near, 'in-out' or out-in which, in spite of the opposite meaning of the two parts, only have the significance of one part."

11. For this, Abel advances a theory that may be more than plausible. We know what light is, he avers, for the same reason that we know what darkness is. Each assumes the existence of, and is defined by contrast to, the other. Words, like so many other things, are relativities. The achieve independent meaning only by being contrasted with, separated from, other things and qualities. To conceive of strength it is necessary to conceive of⁷³⁸ strength it is necessary to conceive too, of weakness. The old Egyptian words, then, do not express positive, absolute meanings so much as they express relationships. Strong-weak, as a word-formation, would mean something like "the relationship of strength and weakness, or which, in this instance, the element of strength is to the fore."

⁷³⁶ The original editor corrected spell "Egypt" by hand

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12. Abel quotes Bain on Logic: “The essential relativity of all knowledge, thought, or consciousness cannot but show itself in language. If everything that we can know is viewed as a transition from something else, every experience must have two sides; and either every name must have a double meaning, or else for every meaning there must be two names.”

Carnoy says, likewise, “It is an essential principle of semantics that the sense of words is established, or at least confirmed, by opposition to others.” He observes, too, that “children also generally begin by using the same term for heat and cold.” Jespersen reports that children confuse words like tomorrow and yesterday, and that they have been heard to say next time when they meant last time. The Gothic *gistradagis*, which gives us yesterday, and the German *gestern*, actually meant ‘tomorrow’.

Latin *luere* meant both to wash (ablution) and to pollute. Chinese *mai* means to buy and to sell; *shem* means to acquire and to give. Our host means both the host and the guest; these are two forms of the same original word, *hostis*, which⁷³⁹ means, in Latin, “enemy”. Greek *xenos* has a similar double meaning of both ‘stranger’ and ‘guest’ – a stranger is a possible enemy; he is also a possible guest.

13. In our own tongue, as in the ancient Egyptian, the contradictory elements may compose a single word, as in without: With is, of course, an inclusive element; out, an exclusive.

14. I find myself casting about for synonyms, nor am I the only one to feel that many once noble words are being spoiled by new applications. At one extreme, words are often injured for some by the mere fact that they are excessively employed by persons, or by groups, that one does not like. Philosophers opposed to Croce, for example, develop an aversion for the word intuition; some psychiatrists dislike the word complex in its psychoanalytic sense. Such word-aversions may act like a taboo, and compel the speaker to seek substitutions for the objectionable word.

15. Women and the less well-educated among men find analysis too arduous.

16. The science of meaning, in its origins and its changes, is called Semantics.

In the evolution of these sounds and meanings, the direction has always been from chaos, confusion, and disorder to order—from agglomeration to analysis—from unwieldy forms to more manageable forms. Language is, among other things, a tool, and man refines upon⁷⁴⁰ all his tools.

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Analysis, however, is not enough. Words are parts; they are not, in any deeper linguistic sense, wholes. Analysis, or taking apart, is necessary to understanding; for utility, however, we must be able to synthesize, to put together. A machine works through the co-operation of its intricately organized parts. Organization, indeed, is cooperative synthesis.

We know words—their sounds, their definitions. In order to achieve true meaning, we must be able to put these sounds and their definitions into organic cooperation.

In analyzing the word we distinguish three different aspects. It makes a sound. It has a meaning. And it has a place in the larger series of sounds we call a sentence.

17. The fundamental rules of English grammar are relatively few, simple, and logical. Yet the country is densely populated with graduates of high schools and even colleges who subscribe to agencies that promise, for a small fee, to teach them how to avoid the common mistakes of daily conversation. Just as certain careless semanticists seem to believe that there are ‘bad’ words and ‘good’ words, and that by using only the good words we shall all make ourselves more clear, so certain careless grammarians seem to believe that there are “bad” constructions and good ones, and that the problem of language is to use only the “good” ones.

These⁷⁴¹ are dangerous half-truths. Words do not exist by themselves; neither do grammatical constructions. They, too, are part of a context. The purpose of speech is not to achieve “correctness” it is to achieve vital transmission of sense, meaning, intention. Such sense, such meaning, such intention, are the very life of speech. Correctness at best—and it has a place—is one of the numerous means by which language seeks to ensure transmission that shall be as nearly complete as possible. The place of correctness, then, is as a means that is constantly changing, even as are all the other means. Correctness in language, whether we refer to the definition of a word, to the conjugation of a verb, to the specific use of a preposition, or to a grammatical “rule” is a more or less passing phase of the language, just as are the words themselves.

The language changes even while the purists argue for the permanence of their favored forms. Justifying one manner of speech or condemning another is, or should be, really a historic, a sociological, a psychological discussion. Behind the notion of “correctness” of obedience to grammatical law, lies a fallacy. It is the fallacy of what passes for academicism—adherence to a set of rules that has been allowed to crystallize, to impede the flow of thought and action, to render stagnant the waters of linguistic adaptation.

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18.⁷⁴² We are far more conscious about linguistic process than were our ancestors. To study language, to formulate laws about it, to compile grammars and dictionaries, is to be linguistically self-conscious. Such study, on the whole, is content to explain and formulate; it accepts what it finds. Those who use language for expression, and not as a subject for research, cannot remain satisfied with such acceptance. They are not content to sit by while language slowly evolves; they wish to play a part in, hasten that evolution. They may admire Greek style and Latin construction and Sanskrit word-composition, but they are too much of their own day and of their own kind to submit unprotestingly to formulas based upon the physiology and the psychology of other peoples, so distant in time and space. They feel, or know, that life is a continuous readaptation of organism to environment, and that language, a form of important behavior, is no exception to this observation.

19. Noon, for example, comes from the expression nona hora, the ninth hour. For the medieval monk the day began at three in the morning: twelve o'clock, or midday, would therefore be the ninth hour, or noon. Shall we, therefore, to please the pedantic Urquharts, reject our word noon in its contemporary significance? The Spaniard takes his siesta (that is, sexta hora, or 'sixth hour) regardless of etymology. What he desires is⁷⁴³ coolness and repose, not a treatise on phonetics and semantics. He is no more interested, as a human being in need of comfort, in the history of the word siesta than in the fact that September is, etymologically, the seventh month of the year and not, as in his calendar, the ninth.

20. The modern dictionaries, says Mr Herbert, in one of his characteristic paragraphs, "are pusillanimous works, preferring feebly to record what has been done than to say what ought to be done."

Pausing for a moment to question the construction of "preferring ... than", may I suggest that Mr Herbert's attitude toward the dictionary is personal rather than scientific, and that it refers more properly to an age that sought to impose usage rather than to provide the materials for choice. In 1721, Nathaniel Bailey (Universal Etymological English Dictionary) announced it as his intention to "fix the language by means of a standard Dictionary which should register the proper sense and use of every word and phrase, from which no polite writer henceforth would be expected to deviate."

This is not science; it is dictatorship. It is a static and even a moralistic, conception of words – words, which cannot stand still any more than life. It is a desire

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to fix that which is vital flux. Without deviation no progress is possible in language. Bailey's attitude⁷⁴⁴ was much like that of Mr White with the word marriage. But words changed before the time of Mr Bailey, and they have persisted in changing since the time of Mr White. The very word dictionary, were Mr Bailey an adherent of his own principles, would not have been employed by him as a title for his book. A dictionary, originally, was a phrase-book a list of words. Diction is still, in English, a word misused to mean pronunciation instead of the choice of words.

If Mr Herbert desires an Academy of Diction, very well, he would receive my vote for the presidency. But the dictionary is in different case. It is a most catholic institution. It is, in baseball parlance, a score-keeper, not an umpire. The presence of a word or expression in the dictionary—and none knows this better than Mr Herbert himself—does not absolve the one who uses the volume from exercising taste or discretion. The dictionary is a register of deeds, not a court of appeal.

It follows; it does not lead. In the eyes of its makers, every word used by the speakers of a language is entitled to citizenship. The conferring of citizenship is a civic, not an aesthetic, act; it does not establish rank. Life alone, the speech of the living, makes words and destroys them.

21. The revolt against artificial languages is⁷⁴⁵ older than Mr Ogden's pertinent observations. In England it is to be found, and quite naturally, in the writings of V. Welby, who is one of Mr Ogden's forerunners in the emerging science of semantics. It is to Welby, in fact, that we owe such terms as "significs" which she invented as an improvement upon semantics. In her What is Meaning? which seems to have suggested the title of Ogden and Richard's The Meaning of Meaning, she rejects various proposals to make, even of natural languages, international media. Italian, she writes, in opposition to a suggestion made by Sir F. Bramwell, is out of the question. But so, she adds, is English. Latin and French are likewise read out of court.

The truth is that Welby, intent upon reforming not only language but the linguistic-mental process, demands a radical re-education of mankind in "significs". The true "common language" of the future, she maintains, "—so far as one can be used at all—will not be artificially foisted on the present system of education; it will be a spontaneous and thus really effective product of that change of educational standpoint and aim which the method of 'significs' involves."

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The point, though neglected, is well-taken. It is to be remembered in connection with what I have said about⁷⁴⁶ semantics in a previous chapter. It is impossible to purify the linguistic process without first, or at least concurrently, purifying the mental process. If we are to write better, we must think more clearly. Clearing language of encumbrances will help; this has been one of the seemingly inevitable laws of language history. However, if thought is not language, neither is language thought. Clear thinking should lead to clear expression, but clear expression is not enough for clear thinking. There are no “right” and “wrong” words apart from their ineffective or incorrect use. The understanding of words implies an understanding of situation and situation, or context, implies the co-operation of the intelligence. Mrs Welby, in her writings upon “significs” insists upon a distinction between meaning and sense. Sense is definition; meaning implies intention.

Welby, then, foresees, beneath common, or universal, languages, a cleansing of signification. She demands, then, not only a common language (sense)—“so far as one can be used at all”—but a common meaning. “For even if the whole civilized—or intelligent—world could be brought by means of some great international movement to unite in the formation and consent to the use of such a language—whether an old language adapted or a new one constructed—it could⁷⁴⁷ at best but touch the surface of the question, and might indeed easily tend, by engendering content with unworthy ideals, still further to hamper and discourage that development that development of linguistic resources for which at present the very variety of tongues and dialects must indirectly make.

22. I would wish, among the improvements of the new semantics, for a terminology that did not make so definite a distinction between body and mind, between the physical and the spiritual. This is a dualism that we have carried over from the days and nights of primitivity. Language is thickly burdened with such vestiges of ill-adjusted thinking and feeling, and one of the problems of the future is to eradicate them from expression.

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⁷⁵⁰ The original editor inserted “On Esoteric Religion” by hand

⁷⁵¹ The original editor inserted “A study of AFTER-DEATH.” by hand

⁷⁵² The original editor changed “or” to “of” by hand

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⁷⁵³ The original editor changed "in the light of modern times." To "about RUDOLF STEINER"
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⁷⁵⁴ The original editor inserted "by A.C.M." by hand

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⁷⁵⁶ The original editor changed "THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA Prabhu Dutt Bandri" to "Book
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